Title
The Resource, Structural, and Cultural Bases of Protest

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Political protest has a long, albeit uncertain, history in the repertoire of political action and the course of political development. From DeToqueville's description of the French Revolution to Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* (1970), some analysts have described protest as a tool used by the disenfranchised and the politically frustrated to pressure the government. In contrast, other scholars claim that contemporary protest has become an extension of conventional politics by other means (Inglehart 1990; Norris 2002), used by those who are generally active in politics.

There is also debate about whether levels of protest are changing. Protest is apparently increasing in advanced industrial democracies, and there are claims that protest has spread on a global scale. In her recent study of political participation, Pippa Norris describes protest as a nearly ubiquitous part of contemporary politics:

Public demonstrations are used today by a multiplicity groups ranging from Norwegian anti-fuel tax car-owners to Florida retirees protesting the ballot design of Miami-Dade county, Philippino ‘people power’ intent on ousting President Estrada, local farmers critical of the McDonaldization of French culture, street theatre like the gay Mardi Gras in Sydney, and consumer boycotts such as those used against British supermarkets stocking genetically-modified foods. Events at Genoa combined a mélange of mainstream charities like Oxfam and Christian Aid, as well as radicals like British 'Drop the Debt' protestors, the German *Freie ArbeiterInnen Union*, and Italian anarchists like *Tute Bianchi* and *Ya Basta*!

Collective action through peaceful channels has become a generally accepted way to express political grievances, voice opposition, and challenge authorities. (Norris 2002: ch. 10).

Because of the centrality of protest to the processes of political change, theorizing on protest is rich and varied—but these theories are often untested. Scholarly interest in protest is long-standing, but the factors that shape levels of protest in a nation are still uncertain. Because it is an unconventional activity, actual counts of protest activity are not as readily available as participation in conventional politics, such as election turnout or political party membership. Evidence of protest activity for developing nations is typically limited to descriptive examples or estimations based on events data from media reports. And without firm estimates of the level of protest across nations, it is difficult to explain what generates protest, and thus what are the political implications of contentious action.

This paper presents a large-scale cross-national study of protest activity based on reports from the publics themselves. We first describe the aggregate level of protest across more than 70 nations based on data from the 1999-2002 and 1995-98 waves of the World Values Survey. This provides the most accurate assessment of protest around the globe that has ever been possible.

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1 A previous version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 1-5, 2004. We appreciate the assistance and advice of Craig Jenkins, M. Kent Jennings, David Meyer, Dorothy Solinger and Chris Welzel.
More important, we review the literature to explain what factors generate high levels of protest in a nation—where is contentious politics most likely to occur. Then, we use the WVS data to systematically test these theories. The results, we believe, provide the richest empirical evidence yet available on the actual use of protest across nations. In addition, by evaluating past theories explaining national levels of protest, we develop a better understanding of the role of protest in contemporary patterns of citizen action.

Measuring Political Protest

The first step in our analysis is to measure the level of protest across nations, which is not a straightforward task. Protest is by definition an unconventional action, which makes it more difficult to measure than institutionalized activities such as voting that are reported in government statistics.

Prior research has generally used one of two methods to assess levels of protest. Cross-national studies of political violence have typically measured protest and violent actions through media reporting on such events. Gurr's (1970) seminal analysis of political violence, for instance, relied on counts of activities culled from media and newspaper reports (also Gurr and Duvall 1973). The World Handbook and Polity projects collected such event statistics. More recently, studies of social movement protests have followed a similar strategy of relying on media report of events (Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 2001).

Media based events data are valuable, especially when other empirical measures of contentious political action are unavailable. These studies provided first empirical analyses of political protest and political violence on a cross-national scale, and rich theorizing about the causal processes. However, such measures have several potential limitations (Olzak 1989). The early events studies were often based on a few media sources, which had a distinctly Western bias in their coverage. The New York Times, for example, might be an authoritative source for protest activity in Western democracies, but its coverage of the developing world is inevitably less complete and accurate. There are also potential biases in media reporting of contentious events. Protest seeking to overthrow a government may generate coverage, but an equal or larger protest on a domestic dispute may not be deemed newsworthy. Finally, the press has limited space for reporting, so some proportion of known protest events will simply not be reported because other news is seen as more interesting or relevant to the readers.

Therefore, we turn to another source: the publics themselves. The empirical base of our research measures protest activity by asking respondents in nationally-representative public opinion surveys to describe their past political activism. The World Values Survey (WVS) collected survey data for nations spanning six continents.¹ We analyze responses from the 1995-98 and 1999-2002 waves because these offer the broadest cross-national coverage and the most recent evidence of cross-national levels of protest. These surveys nearly completely cover the advanced industrial democracies, more than a dozen states from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and an array of developing nations that are normally absent from survey research. In either of these two WVS waves, 73 separate nations asked the battery of protest questions; 33 nations were included in both waves.²

The other challenge is to define what is meant by protest. Protest is considered an unconventional form political action (Barnes and Kaase 1979). Protest earns the label ‘unconventional’ because protesters seek to influence social and political outcomes, not through traditional channels of political participation—such as voting and campaign contributions—but
rather by exerting pressure and demands from outside of traditional channels and institutions. Indeed, social movement research has long argued that for protest to have an effect on public policy it must disrupt normal politics (Piven and Cloward 1968; McAdam 1983). There is clearly variation in the degree to which protest disrupts and challenges cultural and political authority. We therefore conceptualize protest as a continuum of unconventional political action, which seeks to influence the course of social and political change from outside traditional institutions.

Unconventional political action may include some illegal acts, however it is important to note that we are not studying political violence as conceptualized and measured in some of the prior literature on political conflict (such as studies of deaths from political action, physical assaults, or coups against the government). Political violence such as deaths and physical attacks exceed the boundaries of tolerable politics in almost any political system, and may reflect different causal processes. Our research focuses on political protest as an unconventional method of influence that citizens can use as part of their repertoire of action.

The World Values Survey asked about protest participation with five examples of activity:

Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.

- Signing a petition
- Joining in boycotts
- Attending lawful demonstrations
- Joining unofficial strikes
- Occupying buildings or factories.

As a starting point, we combined all the nations from the third and fourth wave of the WVS to describe the broad distribution of protest activity. Overall, 32% of respondents say they have signed a petition, 18% have participated in a legal demonstration, 9% have joined a boycott, 5% went on an unofficial strike, and 2% have occupied a building. Of course, there is wide cross-national variation that we examine below, but the first finding is that protest activities now involve many citizens in at least one form of protest action (also Norris 2002).

Rather than track each item separately, and because of the small number of participants in several activities, we followed three approaches in constructing a protest scale. First, we simply counted the number of activities that respondents had done from among the five on the list; this is the methodology followed by most other studies (e.g., Norris 2002; Inglehart 1997). Second, some researchers question the inclusion of petitions as a measure of protest, since signing petitions is a basic democratic right and even previous studies of unconventional politics treat it as an orthodox activity. Thus, a second measure counts the four protest items, excluding petitions. Third, one might argue that each item should not receive equal weight as a measure of protest. Participation in a lawful demonstration, for instance, is a less intense form of protest than occupying a building. Thus, a third measure weights the four protest items to produce a summary index.

We could debate the theoretical value of each of these three indicators of protest, and it is important to consider alternative measures. In empirical reality, however, all three measures produce highly consistent results. For instance, the national scores on four-item and five-item
protest scales are correlated at .87 across the 106 nation-cases for which we have data. Similarly, the five-item protest scale is correlated at .85 with the weighted four-item index.

Another external measure of validity comes from the new World Handbook database on political conflict. The World Handbook project codes direct actions by non-state actors against the state. It includes all activities that are outside normal institutions channels or regulation (civil direct actions); this includes crime incidents, violence attacks and assaults, as well as collective protest and demonstrations. We combined reports for the 1995-99 period to most closely match the WVS data. There is a .51 correlation between national levels of protest for the five-item WVS index and the Polity data; there is a .37 correlation with the four-item WVS protest measure. In short, these two methodologies differ in their measurement of protest, but the overlap in cross-national patterns is also substantial. Our analyses focus the five-item scale since this includes more items and thus is more likely to yield robust findings, but we also include comparisons with these other measures of protest.

Table 1 presents the average number of protest activities by nation for both waves of the World Values Survey. Describing these levels of protest partially depends on one's prior expectations. On average, a majority have engaged in at least one protest activity (the overall mean is .61 acts). Even if one excludes signing petitions, there is still a large minority who have done at least one challenging act (mean=.31). In a world where voting turnout is decreasing and participation in elections is limited, the frequency of protest activity is relatively common for an "unconventional" action.

Even more striking is the considerable cross-national variation in protest. It is very apparent that protest is more common in advanced industrial democracies. In both WVS surveys, Swedes report the highest level of protest activity—this is hardly evidence of protest as a tool of a poor and disenfranchised public. All 10 of the highest-ranking nations are advanced industrial democracies. Conversely, the lowest ranking nations are a mixed set of Third World nations and some of the poorer nations of Eastern Europe. Thus, the dominant finding is the variation in protest across nations, with a 20-to-1 ratio in protest mean scores between the highest ranking (Sweden) and lowest ranking (Vietnam) nations.

This pattern, at least in part, represents the transformation of political protest in advanced industrial societies. In these nations, protest is no longer the last resort of those ignored or oppressed by the political system. Rather, it is embraced by a wide section of society, and is especially common among the young and better-educated (Inglehart 1990; Norris 2002). In these nations, the level of protest now rivals or exceeds participation in electoral campaigns (beyond the act of voting). In most less developed nations, however, protest remains a relatively rare occurrence.

The increasingly common use of protest in advanced industrialized democracies forces us to consider whether the meaning and content of protest is different in advanced industrialized countries as compared to developing countries. That is, as protest becomes an increasingly utilized mode of political action in developed countries—indeed as it becomes a part of normal politics—should we question the extent to which protest represents a disruptive challenge to social and political authorities? It may be the case that as protest has become more common in advanced industrial democracies, it probably has become more moderate in its tone and scope. One expects that few Swedes are protesting for the overthrow of the regime or using violent tactics for social change—and such patterns may be more common in poor, non-democratic nations where the public is struggling for voice. We cannot offer a definitive answer, but there is some indirect evidence that is relevant. First, even if we remove the most temperate protest act
(signing a petition) or weight acts by their intensity, cross-national rankings are strongly related across different protest scales. Second, data from the World Handbook IV events project displays a similar pattern. There is a .78 correlation between national frequency of all civil direct actions and violent civil actions. While it is true that large popular protests aimed at regime change are less likely in established democracies than in developing nations, the overall use of contentious politics is less common outside the advanced industrial democracies.

Table 1. Mean Number of Protest Activities by Nation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1.63</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>1.35</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>S. Africa</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>.38</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>.38</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>.36</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>.54</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>.29</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>.27</td>
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<td>.77</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>.21</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>.18</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>.72</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table entries are mean number of protest acts in each nation using the five item protest scale.
Three Perspectives on the Sources of Protest

Since the inception of modern social science, scholars have pursued an answer to the elusive question: Why do people protest? Perhaps because of the breadth of the phenomenon itself, there is no single answer or dominant explanation in the literature. Instead, three major theoretical frameworks have emerged: Grievances/Resources, Political Opportunity Structures, and Cultural Explanations. The following sections review each framework, focusing on factors that might explain cross-national levels of protest, and the individual-level processes that might generate these cross-national patterns.

Grievances versus Resources

There are two distinct theories in the literature on protest that use similar variables to construct contrasting explanations of protest. Grievance theory argues that deprivation and dissatisfaction stimulate protest. In contrast, resource theory claims that affluence and a resource rich environment provides a context where contentious groups might flourish, and thus protest is more common. Because these two theories converge on a similar set of explanatory variables, albeit with opposite hypothesized effects, we discuss them together in this section.

Grievance Theory. Grievance theory views protest as a response to societal problems and unmet citizen grievances. Ted Gurr’s Why Men Rebel (1970) provided a modern introduction to grievance theory. He argued that when changing social conditions cause people to experience ‘relative deprivation’ the likelihood of protest and rebellion significantly increases. That is, feelings of grievances or dissatisfaction are a prime cause of political action. When people have significantly less than what they think they are entitled to, they experience relative deprivation, which Gurr argues is a “general spur to action” (1970: 13).

Gurr further identified a range of societal factors that might produce feelings of relative deprivation, and thereby predict the occurrence and intensity of political rebellion across nations. These factors included short-term changes the national economy, inflation rates, and GNP growth rates, as well as long-term economic and social deprivation. These indicators were positively related to Gurr's measure of turmoil, which is the combination of demonstrations, strikes, riots and other forms of political protest (Gurr 1968).

Moving beyond Gurr, poor people's movements, demonstrations by racial minorities, and the student protests of the 1960s and 1970s were explained in terms of unsatisfied grievances (Lipsky 1968; Piven and Cloward 1968; Scott 1985). Moreover, prior cross-national studies of domestic political conflict provide some support for this hypothesis. Higher income levels seem to decrease especially intense forms of political conflict (Londregen and Poole 1990; Gurr and Duvall 1973). Auvinen (1997) found that poor economic performance (measured by inflation rates) significantly increased political conflict in developing nations. Schock (1996) demonstrated that income inequality is a significant predictor of cross-national levels of political conflict (also Lichbach 1988; Midlarsky 1988). In addition, studies of protest activity at the individual level routinely include measures of dissatisfaction or deprivation as a predictor of protest (Farah et al. 1979; Opp 1989).

In short, the logic that grievances--especially poor economic conditions--underlie the use of protest and other challenging activities is a prominent explanation in the historical and empirical literature on political protest.
Resources and Skills  Resource mobilization theory provides virtually a mirror image of why people protest. From this perspective, protest movements require more than a collective experience of deprivation. McCarthy and Zald (1977; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996) argued that a resource base facilitates protest activity by social movements. The existence of social movement organizations to mobilize the public is a crucial variable linking dissatisfaction to political action. In short, where a rich civil society exists and citizens freely engage in a variety of voluntary associations, there is a greater propensity towards involvement in SMOs that might organize protest activities as well as other forms of political action.

More broadly, the socio-economic development of a nation creates a resource environment that might stimulate collective action. Extensive non-governmental organizations and other civil society groups are more likely exist in affluent nations that possess the resources to support a large voluntary sector. A nation's socio-economic development produces dense communication structures, mass education, urbanization, and high degrees of social mobility--factors that can increase the resources available to protest groups. Consider, for example, the importance of the mass media and communication technologies. These technologies enable groups to communicate with potential constituencies across large distances. Economic development also produces the individual resources and political skills that are important predictors of protest at the individual level (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Inglehart 1990). Evidence from previous cross-national surveys and events-based analyses indicate a strong positive relationship between national affluence and protest activity (Norris 2002; Inglehart and Catterberg 2003; Boswell and Dixon 1990; Auvinen 1997). Thus, a nation's economic development level can strongly influence group access to resources that facilitate political action.

Some of the more recent literature offers a more complex model of resource effects (Meyer 2004; Goldstone 2003: ch. 1; Schock 1996; Eisinger 1973). With low levels of resources, individuals or social movement organizations may simply lack the ability to mount effective protests, and may be more susceptible to the oppressive powers of the state--so protest levels will be low. At high resource levels, individuals and SMOs may have ready access to conventional channels of influence, and thus protest is less commonly used because it may alienate political authorities or supporters (Milofsky 1988; Oberschall 1993). Consequently, protest may be more common with moderate levels of resources that provide a sufficient basis for political action by groups that are not accepted within the dominant political structure.

Grievance and resource mobilization theory are thus opposite sides of the same coin--one predicting that economic and social needs will stimulate contentious politics, the other predicting that resource rich environments facilitate contentious action. Given these contrasting forces, it is not surprising that previous research yields contrasting conclusions. In part, we believe this arises because of differences in how economic conditions are measured. Some studies measure national affluence, some measure changes in economic conditions, and some measure other aspects of social conditions, such as inequality. Other differences arise because of the choice of a dependent variable. Violent conflict and rebellion, such as those resulting in deaths, may have a different causal process than civil disturbances, such as protests and boycotts.

Political Opportunity Structure

Political Opportunity Structure (POS) is a second framework used to explain why people mobilize outside of conventional channels of participation. The underlying premise of the POS framework is that the configuration of political institutions affects the behavior of the public
However, the literature has different hypotheses about what institutional structures are relevant, and their impact on protest activity. The opportunity structure literature on protest generally stresses three themes.

First, some scholars stress the open/closed nature of the political process. Some research suggests that closed systems are more likely to push actors outside conventional channels and onto the streets, increasing levels and degrees of unconventional political action (Kitschelt 1986; Cuzan 1991). This research thus argues that protest is more likely when groups lack access to institutionalized channels of political influence. According to this theory, we should see more protest in societies where there are fewer channels for citizen access to politics, or in repressive societies because institutional channels are closed off to influence ‘from below’.

In contrast, other studies claim that open political systems encourage higher rates of protest, albeit in less contentious forms (Eckstein and Gurr 1975; Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Political openness exists when individuals can make demands and express their opinions without fear of reprisal; and decision-makers are willing to listen (and perhaps even sympathetic) to the demands made by groups. An open system allows citizens to voice demands and provides institutional channels of interest mediation through which citizens can press their demands on government. Openness, then, can be understood as a continuum of accessibility to state institutions. The system can be generally open or the system can be open to particular groups. Either way the logic is same: openness increases the use of protest because the cost of protest is lower and the opportunities more numerous, as compared to the costs and opportunities in more repressive situations.11

Other studies maintain that political systems with a mixture of open and closed characteristics are most conducive to protest (Eisinger 1973; Meyer 2004). This curvilinear hypothesis holds that contentious protest is low in the most open societies because of the easy availability of influence through conventional channels and low in the most closed societies because these states do not facilitate public action or suppress such activity. This hypothesis expects protest to be highest in countries with mid-level openness.

A second approach to political opportunity structures considers the potential restrictions on protest. Ted Gurr (1970), for instance, argued that the repressive capacities of the state, as measured by the size of the police or military forces, can retard the use of challenging actions by critics of the state. In theory, at least, political input structures that measure system openness may be theoretically distinct from the use of repressive force by other agents of the state.

Third, POS theory suggests that the effectiveness of government may affect the likelihood of protest—although the direction of this effect is unclear. On the one hand, citizens may protest under conditions of institutional incompetence (or low state capacity) because they are frustrated by the incapacity of the state to deliver. On the other hand, citizens may protest more under conditions of institutional competence because they have the opportunity to engage institutions that can better process their demands.

Given these opposing arguments it has been difficult to say definitely how political openness affects protest. Research often arrives at contrasting conclusions, but often the evidence is based on the analysis of particular movements or on small N case studies. These analyses provide insights into state-movement dynamics, but make it difficult to draw broader generalizations about the effect of open and closed political structures. Moreover, because the concept ‘political opportunity’ is open to varying interpretation, researchers employ a wide range of definitions to POS, again making it difficult to compare results across cases and reach broader, more generalized conclusions.12
Political Culture and Protest

Another theme in the literature stresses the impact of values and ideology on political action. In the broadest terms, there are frequent claims that the political culture of a nation shapes the repertoire of citizen action. For instance, protest is seemingly embraced by the French political culture, while in Britain protest is gentrified and less common. In broader terms, several authors have argued that protest is more tolerated, and more common, in Western democracies (Norris 2002; Inglehart and Catterberg 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Other cultural traditions also seem to restrict the use of protest; for example, it appears less compatible with the Confucian traditions of East Asia.

Another cultural explanation builds upon modernization theory. In addition to the socio-economic changes that accompany modernization, modernization also produces a political culture that is more willing to question authority, to emphasize self-expression and participation, and more willing to challenge established political elites (Inglehart 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Flanagan 1987). These changing citizen orientations encourage protest activity. Inglehart (1990), for instance, claims that the presence of post-materialist culture (characterized by a questioning of authority and a new emphasis on quality of life and self-actualization) produces higher levels of protest. Advanced industrial societies also experienced the emergence of new social movements and a more active civil society, which advocates protest and other forms of direct action. These processes thus produce a "social movement society" where protest represents a conventional form of action (Meyer and Tarrow 1998).

A final cultural variable is the distribution of ideological orientations in a nation. Typically, scholars maintain that leftist extremism or rightist extremism stimulate contentious politics. Bingham Powell (1982) showed that support for extremist parties was positively related to the incidence of protests, riots and deaths from political conflict. Extremism of the left or right might provide a mobilizing environment for protest, and indirectly may tap the extent of political grievances in a nation. In addition, a highly polarized nation may find it more difficult to agree on peaceful political outcomes, so protest and violence follow.

Although each of the predictors in this section is theoretically distinct, each represents a different example of political culture might affect protest. And each hypothesis suggests that certain types of political cultures facilitate protest, even if we are measuring broad social traits not explicitly linked to the topic of protest. Furthermore, these analyses reinforce the impression that culture is driven by resources rather than grievances: National levels of protest are higher in advanced industrial democracies, where more citizens hold postmaterial values and endorse democracy.

The Correlates of Protest

We began our analyses by identifying empirical indicators of the theoretical models we have described above, and then seeing if these national characteristics were linked to the levels of protest in bivariate analyses (see appendix for information on each independent variable).

Grievances/Resources. The top panel of Table 2 presents the correlation between various measures of grievances/resources and protest as measured by the WVS data. For the sake of comparison, we include the measure of civil disturbances from the World Handbook dataset in the rightmost column of the table. The first row of the table displays the correlation between
protest and GDP/capita at the time of the survey. As we might expect from the patterns in Table 1, there is a strong positive relationship between affluence and all our protest measures. However, changes in GDP/capita and economic inequality have little relationship with protest. In fact, protest tends to be slightly lower in nations with high income inequality, which we attribute to the spurious effects of GDP.

Table 2. Correlates of National Levels of Protest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>WVS 5-item Protest</th>
<th>WVS 4-item Protest</th>
<th>Weighted 4-item Protest</th>
<th>Polity Civil Direct Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grievances/Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/capita (ppp)</td>
<td>.755*</td>
<td>.511*</td>
<td>.493*</td>
<td>.515*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N of cases)</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>(104)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent change in GDP</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini index</td>
<td>-.299*</td>
<td>-.186</td>
<td>-.153</td>
<td>-.393*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent happy (WVS)</td>
<td>.461*</td>
<td>.303*</td>
<td>.337*</td>
<td>.422*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Opportunity Structures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House democracy</td>
<td>.548*</td>
<td>.325*</td>
<td>.323*</td>
<td>.420*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>.673*</td>
<td>.441*</td>
<td>.434*</td>
<td>.524*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>-.491*</td>
<td>-.306*</td>
<td>-.281*</td>
<td>-.407*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness</td>
<td>.725*</td>
<td>.478*</td>
<td>.472*</td>
<td>.586*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durability</td>
<td>.640*</td>
<td>.392*</td>
<td>.429*</td>
<td>.460*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Influences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterial values</td>
<td>.602*</td>
<td>.416*</td>
<td>.451*</td>
<td>.314*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left and Right extremism</td>
<td>-.365*</td>
<td>-.223*</td>
<td>-.165</td>
<td>-.434*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: See appendix for variable descriptions.*

*Note: Entries are pearson correlation coefficients; coefficients significant at 05 level are marked by an asterisk.*

Economic conditions are only one potential basis of grievance, albeit the one most prominently discussed in the literature. Grievances might also arise because of social conditions, non-economic factors, or conflicts over identity politics. Indeed, protest has apparently spread in advanced industrial democracies because conflicts over the environment, life style issues, and
other non-economic protests have become more common.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, we also used a psychological measure of well-being to tap the personal dissatisfaction represented in Gurr's research. The World Values Survey asked respondents whether they were happy with their lives. We find that protest is more common in nations where a larger percentage of people describe themselves as happy (although happiness levels are also strongly related to affluence). This positive relationship exists for all four measures of protest.

As noted above, some research suggests a curvilinear relationship: less protest among the least and most affluent nations, with the highest protest levels among mid-income nations. Figure 1 displays the relationship between our 5-item protest measure and GDP/capita in the year of the survey. These data show a strong positive relationship that generally follows a linear pattern.\textsuperscript{16} The same linear pattern generally appears for the other relationships in the table.

\textbf{Figure 1. Protest and GDP/capita (ppp)}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Protest and GDP/capita (ppp)}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source:} GDP from World Bank and protest scale from World Values Survey.

In summary, these patterns reinforce the importance of resources—and undermine grievance theory—as an explanation for cross-national levels of protest. Protest politics is more common in affluent nations that possess the resources that non-state actors can mobilize to support their challenging activities. Moreover, these results apply across all four measures of
protest, although the effect of resources tends to moderate for the most conflictual measures of protest.

_**Political Opportunity Structures.**_ The second panel of Table 2 examines various measures of political opportunity structures.\(^{17}\) We assume that the level of democratic development is an important measure of the openness of a political system—especially across the range of nations represented in the World Values Survey. Democratic systems allow for more open expression of opinion and typically have more institutionalized channels through which citizens can press their demands on government. The level of democracy in a nation, as measured by the Freedom House index, is positively related to protest activity across all four protest measures. An even more direct measure of an open political structure is respect for the rule of law, and these relationships are stronger than for the Freedom House measures.\(^{18}\)

We also examined the hypothesis that there is a curvilinear relationship between opportunity structures and protest. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between openness, as measured by the rule of law scores, and protest activity. We selected this variable because of its strong relationship with protest; in addition, the rule of law represents an institutional context that facilitates contentious politics and restricts repression of opposition groups. The figure displays a clear linear pattern, and the same linearity applies to the other predictors of openness. Thus, the availability and accessibility of open political channels and political rights does not mean that people will use protest less—rather, as countries democratize protest becomes an increasingly common mode of political action.

Political structures also might affect protest levels by the repression of dissent, although repression is strongly related to the level of democracy and the rule of law. Table 2 shows that repressive systems have lower levels of protest. This is the obverse of the relationship we already observed between democratic development and protest, since repression is negatively related to democracy scores. In short, our data do not support the hypotheses that protest is more common under repressive or ‘closed’ institutional structures. Rather we find that protest activity is more common in democratic states, which are also less repressive.

The third aspect of political opportunity structures is state capacity. Table 2 demonstrates that government effectiveness is positively correlated with protest. This means that individuals are more likely to protest under conditions where the state is relatively competent.\(^{19}\) In addition, regime stability/durability is positively related to all four protest measures.\(^{20}\) These findings suggest that effective and secure government institutions facilitate public protest, probably because of a higher sense of efficacy among citizens that demands will be heard. Moreover, a government that feels generally stable, secure, and effective is more likely to be willing to tolerate protest activity.

In sum, political structures apparently do influence the likelihood of protest in a nation. Effective, democratic, open systems, and run by the rule of law experience higher levels of protest. Protest is less tolerated in closed systems, and is likely ineffective in influencing government policy because of the nature of the government in these nations. Moreover, these patterns are consistent across multiple indicators of our independent and dependent variables. Protest increases with political development and the institutionalization of a democratic political order.
Cultural Influences. We begin by comparing broad cultural regions to explore whether such factors shape the use of protest. We defined region in terms of six groupings: Western democracies, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, Muslim nations, and African nations. The analyses found that region is strongly related to the level of protest across all four indicators (eta=.79 for the five-item index). On closer inspection, however, it appears that the regional variation is quite limited. The region variable appears to be a surrogate for identifying Western democracies. Western democracies display a high level of protest activity (mean = 1.05). The variation across the other five regions is not substantial, ranging from a mean of .41 in Muslim nations to .48 in Asia. It is possible that controlling for the strong effects of economic and political conditions noted in the previous sections, we might find significant patterns across regions.

The last panel in Table 2 examines the influence of two ‘cultural’ variables derived from the World Values Survey. First, as Inglehart has hypothesized, there is a strong and consistent cross-national relationship between postmaterialism and protest. This may be a spurious relationship between affluence and democratic political structures, since postmaterialism is related to both factors. We test for independent effects in the multivariate analyses below.
Another cultural variable is political extremism. The World Values Survey assesses the percentage of the public in each nation who position themselves at the extreme two positions on the Left/Right scale. The advantage of the Left/Right scale is that it generally acts as a surrogate for the major dimensions of political cleavage in each nation, and thus is a cross-nationally equivalent measure of extremism. Although theory predicts a positive relationship between extremism and protest, all the correlations in the middle panel of the table run in the opposite direction: protest is more common in nations with a small number of extremists, whether measured by extremism on the Left, the Right or both combined. Looking at the scoring of nations, this is easily interpretable. Extremism tends to be less common in affluent nations (\( r = -0.59 \)) and democratic nations (\( r = -0.53 \)). This reinforces our impressions that the extent of grievances, in this case extreme political views, is outweighed by other factors as predictors of protest.

**Multivariate Analyses**

Our next step combines these theoretical perspectives and tests the independent impact of the alternative models. Several of these factors are obviously interrelated--such as national affluence and the level of democratic development--and only by combining measures in a multivariate model can we distinguish the effects of these alternative theories.

We selected a set of variables from each of the three theoretical approaches, based partially on the weight of the empirical evidence above and partially on the theoretical importance of the variable. Because of potential multicollinearity problems, we selected six potential predictors:

- GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity
- Percentage change in GDP/capita over the previous five years
- Income inequality measured by the Gini index
- Rule of law
- Percentage of postmaterialists
- Percentage of ideological extremists

We entered all of these variables into OLS regression models to predict each of the four protest measures (Table 3). In all four models, there is a strong positive relationship between GDP/capita and protest. In addition, the nation’s level of postmaterial values is consistently related to protest. The rule of law variable often falls just below the level of statistical significance, but all four coefficients are in the predicted direction. We even suspect the negative correlation between the GINI index of income inequality and protest is a spurious indicator of this advanced industrial syndrome (inequality is generally lower in advanced industrial democracies), rather than inequality per se lessening protest. Indeed, there is a syndrome of characteristics for advanced industrial democracies—affluence, democratic rights, and expressive values—that combine to facilitate contentious politics. Even in a multivariate analysis it is somewhat difficult to parse these effects.

One additional insight into protest comes from our measure of ideological extremism. In the bivariate relationships (Table 2), the percentage of ideological extremists in a nation was negatively correlated with protest. We attributed this to the spurious correlation with advanced industrial democracy characteristics. In the multivariate model, the direction of this relationship reverses. Holding constant the other economic and political characteristics of a nation, the protest
tends to be more common in nations with a large proportion of ideological extremists. While most of our results tend to emphasize the importance of resources and cultural influences on protest, the significant influence of ideological extremism in several models suggests that political discontent can provide a limited basis for protest politics.

### Table 3  Multivariate Models of Protest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>WVS 5-item Protest</th>
<th>WVS 4-item Protest</th>
<th>Weighted 4-item Protest</th>
<th>Polity Civil Direct Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP capita (ppp)</td>
<td>.544* (4.527)</td>
<td>.415* (2.484)</td>
<td>.317* (2.235)</td>
<td>.177 (804)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent change in GDP</td>
<td>-.055 (.852)</td>
<td>-.082 (.881)</td>
<td>-.048 (.536)</td>
<td>.023 (.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini index</td>
<td>-.163* (2.185)</td>
<td>-.109 (1.052)</td>
<td>-.111 (1.075)</td>
<td>-.111 (811)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>.123 (1.090)</td>
<td>.044 (2.83)</td>
<td>.067 (4.34)</td>
<td>.256 (1.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterial values</td>
<td>.260* (2.070)</td>
<td>.194 (1.650)</td>
<td>.259* (2.210)</td>
<td>.123 (1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist ideology</td>
<td>.154 (1.863)</td>
<td>.187 (1.191)</td>
<td>.204 (1.785)</td>
<td>-.142 (.935)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rsqr.</td>
<td>.638</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>.309</td>
<td>.330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See appendix for variable descriptions.
Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients from OLS regression; the t-statistics for each coefficient are presented in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 0.05 level are marked by an asterisk. We used pairwise deletion of missing data.

In large part, the multivariate analyses are robust in demonstrating similar patterns to our bivariate analyses. The existence of resources and democratic, open political structures facilitates the use of protest. Rather than the extent of one's grievances, it is the nation's capability to support and tolerate contentious politics that is the dominant influence on the cross-national levels of protest politics.

### The Sources and Implications of Protest

Our study addressed the question: what explains the frequency of protest politics in a nation? We have used the most extensive cross-national data on protest available to test longstanding and competing hypotheses in the three dominant theoretical frameworks of the literature. The overall pattern is clear: protest does not occur primarily because people have a basic need and are blocked from other forms of action—people protest because they can.

This pattern holds across the three explanatory frameworks: resources vs. grievances, political opportunity structure, and culture. First, protest activity is significantly higher in countries with higher levels of socio-economic resources and lower levels of income inequality. This finding sheds significant doubt on grievance hypotheses while strengthening the resource mobilization school’s contention that the mere presence of a demand or grievance does not necessarily mean protest will occur: the material and organizational resources for protest are important causal considerations. Moreover, in countries where larger portions of the population
report that they are happy, there is more protest. Protest activity, then, most often occurs not in nations with populations who are terribly discontent, but rather from the opposite context where resources for political action exist.

Second, we have tested competing hypotheses within the political opportunity literature. We find that open political structures encourage higher levels of protest, as does high state capacity. Closed, unstable, and ineffective political structures do not make it more likely for people to engage in unconventional action as many in the literature have argued. Indeed, in these environments challenging actions by the public are typically discouraged or repressed. Rather, unconventional political action seems to be encouraged by political opportunity structures that guarantee the rule of law, give voice to the public, and provide open access to conventional institutions. We have seen that protest is far more pervasive in political contexts that effectively translate citizen demands into policy and decision outcomes. In this sense, a high rate of protest does not necessarily indicate political instability. A high rate of protest may, in fact, be a clear indication of a healthy, vibrant, and accountable democracy.

Third, cultural variables also follow patterns that are congruent with the finding that protest does not typically stem from the urgency of a pressing material need. We show that protest tends to arise from self-expressive values and a belief in democratic processes. Thus, this causal theory again locates protest more commonly among the advanced industrial democracies.

The one caveat to this pattern involves political extremism. Our bivariate analyses found that protest occurs more commonly in societies that are less ideologically polarized. However, once one controls for resources, opportunity structures and culture, then participation in protest is more common in nations with larger proportions of political extremism. Apparently the existence of discontented political minorities can provide a mobilizing base for protest against the state, independent of other causal factors. But even this weak effect is inconsistent across our four measures of protest.

In summary, protest is facilitated by a syndrome of factors found in advanced industrial democracies: affluence, open and effective political institutions, and postmaterialist (self-expressive) values. Each of these variables show a strong linear bivariate relationship to protest, and they continue to display independent influence in our multivariate models.

Our four measures of protest provide a robust basis for our conclusions. The fact that our independent variables have significant and consistent effects across the measures of protest strengthens the validity of our results. The five-item protest measure clearly had the strongest relationship to most of our indicators, revealing that petition signing is a relatively common in affluent and democratic societies. However, even when we exclude petitions, or weigh protest acts by their level of contentiousness, or include violent and disruptive direct action, the same basic trends hold. Protest in its various forms and at different levels of contention is more common in resource-rich democratic contexts.

There are two reasons we believe our results differ from those studies that have found curvilinear or negative relationships between contentious protest and political openness. First, we use public opinion surveys to test these relationships. Previous large-scale cross-national studies relied solely on media reporting, which are inevitably skewed toward over-reporting the exceptional cases of protest that are newsworthy enough to generate media coverage. By asking the public themselves we get a more accurate portrait of patterns of protest behaviors. Thus, we can generally predict more variance on our survey-based measures of protest than for the media indicator from the World Handbook. Second, small N comparisons and case studies cannot capture the broad cross-national patterns that we have shown here. Our large cross-sectional
analysis provides a foundation for understanding how people respond to general or more stable aspects of the political environment.

People protest because they have the resources, open opportunities, and a value of self-expression. Protest, it seems, it is not typically a ‘weapon of the weak’ (Scott 1985), but rather another mode of political action and self-expression for individuals who are also active in conventional political channels (Barnes and Kaase 1979). The positive implication is that as societies acquire more resources and democratic institutions they offer individuals the opportunity to participate in multiple forms of political action. Citizens of democratic countries may be finding that voting and other forms of conventional political participation do not offer enough direct outlets to voice and express their political viewpoints and demands. As such, protest broadens a citizen’s repertoire of a political action, giving him/her more outlets for participation. This can be seen as a positive trend from the perspective of democratic theorists who emphasize participation as a key attribute of a democracy. On the down side, the fact that protest occurs more among those higher on the socio-economic scale means that increased protest may, in fact, infringe on another key attribute of democracy: equality. That is, protest is not an equal access mode of political action. As in other forms of political participation, such as campaign contributions, protest strengthens the voice of those who already have social and economic power, rather than the voice of the marginalized and disenfranchised portion of the citizenry. This tradeoff between increased access to participation and equality of opportunity is not easily resolved. Our empirical analysis, however, suggests that the tension between participation and equality may not only be a reality within democratic societies, but rather is also reflected in cross-national relationships and global patterns of political behavior.
References


Data Appendix: Independent Variables

GDP ppp (Purchasing Power Parity) the year the WVS was conducted in each country; from the World Bank Indicators.

Change in GPP ppp (t-5) over a 5-year period. It is calculated as a ratio of a country’s GDP ppp for the year of the survey and the GDP ppp for that country 5 years prior to the survey.

Gini Index Because Gini coefficients are not calculated annually, we use the gini calculated within 5 years of the year the WVS was conducted; from the World Bank Indicators.

Percent Happy The WVS asks: "do you consider yourself very happy, happy, unhappy, or very unhappy?" For each nation we combine the percentage of people who consider themselves happy or very happy.

Democracy Freedom House scores for the year the WVS was conducted. Political rights and civil liberties are each scored separately on a scale of 1-7. The scores of the two scales are then averaged to create a country’s “freedom house score”. We recoded the original FH scores so that 1 is a country that is not democratic and 7 is a country that is highly democratic. (www.freedomhouse.org).

Free Press assesses the extent of press freedom across the globe. Press freedom considers: the legal environment in which the press operates, the political influences or degree of political control over the press, and the relevant economic pressures involved in securing a free press. The was inverted to runs from 0 being low to 100 as high press freedom. (www.freedomhouse.org).

Rule of Law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. This includes perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts” (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002)

Repression Amnesty International and the State Department score countries on a 1-5 scale called the ‘Political Terror Scale’. Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare; Level 5: Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life for the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. (www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney.html)

Government Effectiveness is a composite index that “combines responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.” (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/index.html)

Durability measures the number of years the current regime type has persisted. The variable is coded from the year of the first regime transition or the first year of independence” (www.cidm.umd.edu/inscr/polity)

Stability combines several indicators that “measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/index.html)

State Failure identifies four types of state failure. 0 means the country has experience none of the four types of state failure in the five years. 1 means the country experienced an adverse regime transition in the last five years. 2 means the country experienced ‘a complex of wars and crises’. 3 means the country experienced revolutionary war in the previous five years. 4 means the country experienced ethnic warfare in the five years preceding the survey. (www.cidm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/)

Institutional Change codes countries that have experienced major institutional change in the five years preceding each country’s survey year. Major institutional change is defined by Polity as a change in 3 points or greater in a countries Polity measure. (www.cidm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.html#data)

Global Regions is defined in terms of six groupings: Western democracies, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, Muslim nations, and African nations.

Postmaterialist Values are measured by the Inglehart (1990) four-item index. We aggregated responses for each country to determine the percent of the population that have postmaterialist values.

Extremism The World Values Survey asks respondents to place themselves along the left-right political spectrum, where 1 is the farthest left and 10 is the farthest right. Leftist extremists are the percentage who place themselves as positions 1 or 2; Rightist extremist position themselves at either 9 or 10. The total amount of extremism we added the percent of leftist and rightists extremists in each country.
Endnotes

1 These data were provided by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ronald Inglehart and the World Values Survey network. We are solely responsible for the analyses and conclusions presented here.

2 There are potential autocorrelation problems represented by the 33 nations that are included in both waves of the World Values survey, and which are treated as separate cases in our analyses. We ran several of the most important models separately to exclude duplicate cases for a nation. In essence, the reduced models are not substantively different, and thus we rely on the larger sample to produce results with a larger empirical base.

3 In our analyses and in previous research, these five items form a single dimension of protest action. We performed a principal components analysis for both the 1995-98 and 1999-2002 waves, combining all respondents in each wave. In each wave only one factor emerged with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 and all five variables loaded strongly on this factor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995-98</th>
<th>1999-02</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signed a petition</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined a boycott</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawful demonstration</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unofficial strike</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied a building</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Variance</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 In a few nations, one of the more demanding forms of protest was not asked in the survey. In these cases, we double-counted a comparable measure of protest so that a roughly comparable cross-national value was estimated. The alternative was to drop these nations from the analyses.

5 We gave legal protests a value of 1, boycotts and strikes a value of 2 each, and occupying a building a value of 3. We then summed the four items. The final score could range from 0=no activities, to 8=all four activities.

6 We thank Craig Jenkins for access to the preliminary version of these data. This new events data collection is more extensive than prior studies. The project used the database of the Reuters Business Briefs, which by the late 1990s had fairly wide coverage. This involves processing a massive amount of textual material, which was done by the KEDS automated content analysis program, with a dictionary designed to measure protest and political violence.

We used the data for the 1995-99 timeperiod, and calculated the frequency of civil domestic acts/per capita. In addition, because these statistics are aggregated over a five year period, we have only 58 cases for the World Handbook data that overlap with nations in the WVS.

7 We expect that in periods of system collapse or mass protest, the patterns of protest may differ from those described in this volume, such as the protests in October 1989 in East Berlin or the people power demonstrations that overthrew Marcos in the Philippines. Thus, we are describing protest patterns within regimes in what might be considered "normal" times.

8 This is based on the aggregate totals for each nation, without adjustment for population size.

9 Other scholars have stressed the importance of resources in individuals’ choices on whether to participate in protest. Rather than protest being the method for the political powerless, as implied by grievance theory, the resource approach stresses the time and cognitive demands of protest activity and maintains that protest is more common among the better educated and the politically sophisticated. Barnes and Kaase (1979) demonstrated the impact of education and political sophistication in stimulating protest across a set of advanced industrial democracies, and it has been replicated in other studies of individual political participation (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995; Opp 1989; Dalton 2005). In fact, resource levels often appear to be more important than grievances in actually predicting individual participation in protest activity.

10 The inclusive scope of the POS concept is evident in Sidney Tarrow’s definition of POS. Tarrow states that the structure of political opportunities are “consistent- but not necessarily formal or permanent-dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure” (1998: 85). This definition leaves considerable discretion to the researcher to decide which aspects of the political environment are relevant for shaping actors expectations of success and failure.

11 Some research claims that although protest is likely under conditions of political openness, protest is also likely to be less contentious or violent in open societies. This argument presumes that in closed societies protests are more likely to be directed at overthrowing the current regime. Revolutionary protest movements bring out more violent and contentious responses by both sides because so much is at stake. In open societies, where protest is
permitted and indeed often facilitated by government, it is argued that neither protesters nor the state need to resort to such disruptive or violent tactics. We do not directly test this hypothesis, but it implicitly presumes that patterns will systematically vary across our four measures of protest that weigh the contentiousness of action.

Some have argued that, precisely because POS seeks to explain such a broad array of questions and outcomes, it has become a concept without clear form or definition. Gamson and Meyer write, “the concept of political opportunity structure is… in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” (1996: 175).

Most of our predictors are based on annual statistics for the year of the WVS. The World Handbook data, however, span the 1995-99 period to provide a more robust measure of protest than might be available from media reports in a single year and to overlap with the WVS data. Thus, the time synchronization of predictors is not as direct with the World Handbook data, and this should be considered in interpreting correlations.

The United Nations’ Human Development Index provides another measure of individual well being, including factors such as educational levels and life expectancy, and it displays the same positive relationships. For instance, the correlation with the five item protest scale is .53.

We should note an inconsistency in this argument, however. It is more likely that economic grievances are salient in less affluent nations. Thus economics should be a reasonable surrogate of grievances in developing nations. But even outside the advanced industrial democracies protest is negatively related to economic condition.

The high end outlier in Figure 1 is Luxembourg. With this outlier removed from the figure, the .76 correlation increases to .79 and the relationship is even more clearly linear.

We focus on cross-sectional rather than longitudinal analysis of protest patterns. Longitudinal studies tend to be more commonly utilized for understanding “cycle of protest” (Tarrow 1998). These studies typically seek to explain the expansion and retraction of movement activity by examining state-movement interaction over time.

We also examined a freedom of the press measure available from Freedom House and a voice and accountability index available from the World Bank; both of these measures of opportunity structures were also positively correlated with protest.

Another element of state capacity is the durability of the current regime. If a regime is stable, then one might hypothesize there is little protest and the government is broadly accepted. Alternatively, an unstable regime may indicate a pattern of political contention that would stimulate protest. Measures of government stability from the World Bank (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/index.html) and state failure from the Polity study (www.cidem.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/)

Two other measures of political change (Institutional change from the Polity data and state failure) were only weakly related to protest, but in a direction consistent with these same processes.

In his more recent work, Inglehart (1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) uses a broader measurer of self-expressive values to tap this conceptual dimension across developed and developing nations. However, this value measure uses protest as one of its components. Consequently, we have relied on the simpler four-item measure of postmaterial values, which equates postmaterialism with an emphasis on participation and self-expression.

Leftist extremists were those who positioned themselves at points 1 and 2 on the scale, Rightist extremists were at points 9 and 10. We excluded Vietnam and Tanzania because in both instances a large majority were positioned in one category, and thus we presumed this represented a nation-specific interpretation of this scale.

Preliminary models included three variables that did not have significant coefficients in any of the four models: political repression, regime change, and the percentage saying democracy is better than other forms of government. We would not attribute this to the complete lack of influence for these variables. Rather, there is considerable multicollinearity among these nine predictors, and significant effects for one variable often restrict the independent influence of other variables. For instance, the rule of law scores and the political repression scores are correlated at r = -.66; if one variable enters the equation, there is little remaining variance for the other to explain because they are complementary ways of measuring similar contextual effects. In addition, many of these predictors are even more strongly related to GDP/capita: rule of law scores (.80), political repression (-.63), postmaterial values (.59), Left/Right extremism (.59), and recent regime change (-.407).

Our results allow us to draw conclusions about the conditions that facilitate protest in situations of “normal politics”. These results may differ under conditions of regime crisis or change, where a ‘big opportunity’ increases mobilization for a period of time (Tarrow 1998). But once the crisis is over, protest returns to follow normal patterns. Indeed, we intend to study such cycles of protest and normality in future research, tracking the effect of regime transition (or attempted transition) on protest.