Let’s Talk: Dialogue Across Disciplines on Immigration and Integration Issues

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Abstract: Immigration has become one of the most prominent issues in world politics and one of the most studied phenomena in the social sciences. However, divergences exist between immigration as a political phenomenon and the response of the academic community to the issue. First, immigration issues are complex because they encompass questions related to almost every aspect of the host society. However, because of practical necessity and the recent focus in the social sciences on micro level analysis, migration research often addresses highly specific questions, rather than exploring the broader relationships among different arenas of immigrant integration. Second, native-born residents are usually interested in the impact of immigration on their immediate surroundings. However, academic research on migration focuses mainly on its national and international aspects and ignores comparative sub-national analysis. Koff's presentation attempts to address these disconnects by comparing integration politics and policies in two French cities (Lille and Toulouse) and two Italian cities (Florence and Bari), with special attention to immigrant integration in the arenas of politics, markets, housing, and crime. He will also suggest avenues for interdisciplinary dialogue in immigration research.

Introduction

Immigration has become one of the most prominent issues in the politics of advanced industrial states, and one of the most studied questions in the social sciences. Obviously, there are many interesting facets of this subject. However, possibly more than any other political issue, immigration represents a social question where divergences exist between the nature of the political phenomenon and the response of the academic community. One can identify two specific differences. First, immigration is extremely complex as it encompasses questions related to most every aspect of host society: labor markets, welfare states, education systems, housing markets, political mobilization, etc. It also has a profound impact on host cultures because it challenges contemporary notions of citizenship, community, identity, rights, etc. Conversely, due to practical necessity and the recent focus on micro level theories in the social sciences, academic analysis of this phenomenon increasingly concentrates on specific questions, rather than exploring the
interaction between spheres of issues. Second, host citizens are generally interested in the impact of immigration on their immediate surroundings, indicating a primary interest in local migration networks and a secondary concern for national and supranational immigration regimes. The academic research on migration focuses strongly on the national and international aspects, and 

*comparative* sub-national analysis has often been overlooked. This research project attempts to respond to these two anomalies by comparatively analyzing the integration of migrants in four European cities.

Comparative social science research is generally characterized by a tension between the explanation of social phenomena within case specific contexts and the analytical need to construct typologies or classifications in order to create “order within social complexity” (Ragin). Because of the importance of culture and identity in immigration politics, this divergence is especially pronounced in our study of migration issues. On one hand, case-oriented research, usually conducted by historians, anthropologists, and sociologists, examines immigration and integration questions within specific contexts in order to maximize the power of their analysis, provide as complete a description as possible of complex social realities, and discuss the impact of cultural factors on migration-related questions. Conversely, variable driven research usually conducted by economists, demographers, and political scientists, is less rich in case explanation, but it expands its focus on theory building.

This project focuses on the tension between these two approaches to social research. By combining elements of both, it attempts to provide as complete an approach as possible to the study of integration issues. Rather than constructing a single interdisciplinary explanation of integration, this study borrows analytical tools and theoretical approaches from various disciplines and implements them within the framework of
classical political science analysis. In doing so, I attempt to indicate avenues for dialogue between fields in the social sciences.

The paper is divided into three parts. Part one presents the analytical and methodological framework of research and sets out the objectives of this study. In part two, the empirical data is presented, which demonstrates sub-national variance in levels and modes of integration between the case cities. Part three, the conclusion, attempts to explain the integration process and discusses the impact of specific variables on integration politics.

I. Analytical and Methodological Framework

In March 2000, a special panel, composed of some of the leading American scholars of comparative immigration politics, was held at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association on the current state of research in this field. During this roundtable discussion, the participants voiced three main concerns with contemporary scholarship on migration issues: 1) the lack of traditional political science analysis in migration studies, creating a theoretical island, 2) the presence of a clear divergence between quantitative demographic and economic studies of immigration and institutional, legal, and social research which is almost entirely qualitative in nature, 3) the domination of micro-analysis, as most recent studies focus on explaining case specificity rather than emphasizing generalization and theory-building. These remarks, in fact, reflect the main points of interest of this study.

Defining The Research Question

European Union member states have often reacted strongly in attempting to prevent immigrants from non-European Union countries from settling within their borders, impeding

\[^2\] The panel participants were Gary Freeman, Gallia Lahav, Jeanette Money, Miriam Feldblum, and Terri Givens.
the social, political and economic integration of these newcomers into contemporary European society. Even though it could be said that European Union activities have created an overarching negative climate concerning immigration, levels and modes of integration vary throughout Europe, all the way to the sub-national arena, contradicting the presently popular notion of a uniform “Fortress Europe.” In fact, the everyday lives of immigrants once they enter a country are determined at the local level, in the communities in which they decide to reside. This study will examine the integration process in four European cities attempting to respond to the following question: What are the key variables which explain social and political responses to immigration in Western Europe and, therefore, determine both how and to what extent immigrants are integrated into European society?

Defining Integration Politics

One of the most interesting questions investigated in contemporary research on migration asks: What is the relationship between immigration and integration? Specifically, scholars question whether these are two aspects of the same process or whether they are two separate phenomena. This project focuses simply on integration for practical reasons. While the relationship between immigration and integration presents numerous questions of interest, the size of this issue would dilute the analytical focus of research and make it unmanageable. Even though I do not directly address this question, I raise it because I borrow a very important tool from those who link immigration and integration (i.e. Hollifield, Di Comite, King): the definition of integration as a process.

In fact, most integration research, especially those that study local responses, define the phenomenon either as a socio-economic good to be obtained or a policy objective (see the « best practice » literature). Whether they focus on political integration (i.e. CNEL, Sagger, Vertovec, Rex, della Porta, Ireland), economic integration (i.e. Portes, Pugliesi, Reyneri,
Ambrosini) or social integration (i.e. Body-Gendrot, Wieviorka, Africa Insieme, Zincone, Rey, Waldinger), these studies often present integration as an end to a process. It is this framework which has led to the above-mentioned self-exclusion of most integration studies from traditional political analysis. Instead of studying how immigrants integrate themselves, most research focuses on how migrants are integrated, indicating the absence of political agency. Those works that do focus on immigrant mobilization (i.e. Boussetta, Withol de Wenden, Bouamama), largely ignore the institutional constraints which restricts the activities of these actors, concentrating specifically on social movement organizations and entrepreneurs. Because dialogue does not exist between these approaches, focus on political systems is limited.

This study, in fact, argues that integration should not be defined as the end of a process, but that it should be defined within the framework of the process itself. Like any other policy issue, immigration is debated within political systems and integration needs to be viewed within this context. Any type of social integration is usually defined in terms of citizenship (Arendt, Marshall, Rawls, Walzer, etc.). The differentiation between a citizen and a subject usually focuses, in some way, on the ability to influence one’s own life course (Rawls). Whether defined in formal, legal terms, or substantive ones, « citizenship » in liberal democratic societies, guarantees the individual’s right to participation. Thus, the foundation of the study is the premise that a political system entails both the laws and institutions which govern social interaction and the actors who participate in it. According to Hinich and Munger:

preferences x institutions = outcomes

where « preferences » are the wants and desires of political actors, « institutions » are the
formal and informal rules that determine how collective decisions are made and « outcomes, » notably public policies, result from the interaction of these variables.

Consequently, integration, the dependent variable in this study, is not defined as a social good or policy objective, but it is conceptualized within the context of competition for political, economic, social, and cultural resources in line with Harold Laswell’s classic definition of politics as « who gets what, when, and how. » Given this basic premise of “politics as distribution,” integration is examined within this framework as a question of justice. Rational actors compete for what they consider to be a just distribution of resources. Thus, integration is not defined in terms of equality or utility (the two most common definitions found in various forms in the literature). Instead, it is broadly defined by levels of participation in the host society, which indicate levels or degrees of political and socio-economic agency.

Given the broad analytical focus of this project, however, it must be noted that this study does not defend “rationality” defined simply in terms of political or socio-economic gains. Instead, it recognizes the role of norms in the formation of actors’ preferences. It discusses the role of ideology and political culture within political systems and examines the interaction between socio-economic and cultural integration through the presentation of concepts espoused by sociologists, such as Durkheim, Marx, Weber, and Coleman, and psychologists, such as Fanon. (see below).

For this reason, the conceptual framework of the study argues that micro-analysis is insufficient for the study of integration. Whereas contemporary scholarship focuses on specific questions, such as immigrant participation in politics, social movements, achievement in education, labor markets, housing, crime, multiculturalism, human rights, etc, I argue that

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these arenas of integration are intrinsically linked. Adapting the model presented by Michael Walzer in his book, *Spheres of Justice*, I contend that integration should be viewed in terms of separate spheres of social participation. Unlike Walzer, who states that exchanges between these spheres are blocked, I recognize the impact of participation in one sphere on levels of integration in the others. This is illustrated in figure one.

Because integration is defined broadly, this study argues that meso-analysis is best suited to the comparative study of migration. Such an approach, which includes elements of both case-oriented and variable driven research, attempts to address the interaction between rationality, institutions, and cultural variables in a coherent explanation of integration (see below). Even though this project examines each dimension of integration more superficially than micro-analysis, this approach is better suited to analyzing the nexus of these axes (see figure two).

**Figure One: Overlapping Spheres of Integration**
Measuring Integration: Is it possible?

Obviously, the tension between case oriented research and variable driven studies is not limited to theoretical discussions. Measurement is a function of adopted definitions of integration. These approaches differ significantly over how they operationalize integration as a dependent variable. Large \( n \) demographic and econometric studies, which define integration in economic terms, focus on aggregate socio-economic data. The weakness of these studies is that they often ignore the human factor, which is essential to any form of identity politics. Moreover, data is not always easily comparable cross-nationally. Cultural studies, instead, utilize qualitative analysis, which focuses on the human factor, but they are often criticized as unsystematic, and consequently, unscientific.

This project includes elements of both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Comparative data is utilized to empirically measure the integration of immigrants in economic, housing, and criminal markets. However, as stated above, this analysis is only partial as cultural issues related to identity, and, more specifically, to xenophobia, often are related to immigrant positions in these markets. Moreover, no reliable statistics exist that adequately measure the political integration of immigrants. For this reason, the study utilizes
nominal and ordinal scaling techniques and modelling that structure *content analysis* (the
systemic counting, assessing and interpreting of the form and substance of communication⁵),
*direct observation* (collecting data on events as they happen⁶), and *data collected from
interviews* with 192 officials from local and national government, non-governmental
organizations, immigrant communities, business organizations, unions, and newspapers, who
are active in immigration politics in the case cities. These scales and models ensure a
systematic form of comparison of qualitative research on otherwise unquantifiable
phenomena. Through the use of these techniques, qualitative research both complements and
controls quantitative data collection. In this regard, the study focuses on the statistical analysis
of integration, while at the same time considering the human aspects of immigration politics.
Moreover, scaling is a necessary tool for the overall evaluation of the integration process,
given the operational definition presented above of integration as the just distribution of
resources and participation in the host community (see part three).

*Research Design*

This project focuses on two cities in Italy, Florence and Bari, and two in France,
Toulouse and Lille. These cities were chosen because of their structural similarities, which
respond to many critiques of local studies of integration. First, in order to control for
population size, I have chosen mid-sized metropolitan areas as each has between six hundred
thousand and nine hundred thousand inhabitants (Florence: 650,000, Bari: 630,000, Toulouse:
650,000 and Lille Metropole: 900,000).⁷


⁶ Ibid., p.200.

⁷ 1990 Census information
The cases were also chosen because of the similar immigration histories of each city. Obviously, well established immigrant communities would be better integrated than newer ones. In France, both Lille and Toulouse were considered "secondary" immigration areas. Hence, immigrants began arriving only after traditional immigration centers, such as Paris and Marseilles were already saturated (mid 1970s). Because of Italy's history as an emigrant country, immigrants began arriving on a larger scale in Florence and Bari only in the early 1980s. It is also important to note that each of the case cities has a socially and ethnically heterogeneous immigrant community, which represents between five and eight percent of the total population. By controlling these factors I can minimize their effects on the final results. Moreover, were ethnic affiliation the most significant explanatory variable of integration, then clear patterns would emerge across the case cities. This has not occurred.

Because this study focuses on two separate countries, I can systematically vary country differences across national city pairs, while controlling items within each pair. If, as many suggest, reactions to immigration are formed at the national level, then Florence and Bari should show similar responses to immigration flows as should Lille and Toulouse. Thus, Bari and Florence should be a matched pair as should Lille and Toulouse.

The cities chosen for this study were also selected in order to control for the structure of local economies in response to the argument that immigration is a strictly economic phenomenon and integration occurs where labor markets are more open and therefore, can better handle the increased pressure. Conversely, closed labor markets offer immigrants few possibilities for work and immigrants find themselves competing with host citizens for jobs.

Florence and Toulouse both have mixed economies based on commerce, tourism and industry. On the other hand, Bari and Lille are industrial cities attempting to rejuvenate themselves after having suffered through recent periods of recession. Florence, Toulouse and Lille each have an unemployment rate ranging between 9.8% and 11.9 %, while Bari's official
unemployment rate is much higher at 25%. This is offset by the presence of a large “black market” economy.⁸ According to the hypotheses discussed above based on market structures, Lille and Bari are a matched pair as are Florence and Toulouse. This is illustrated in Appendix A.

Methods

This project is based on both archival research and personal interviews. Research was conducted from the summer of 1995 to summer 2001. Approximately two hundred interviews were conducted in the four cities. Interviews were held with members of local, provincial and regional governments interested in issues concerning immigrants. Specifically, I spoke to mayors, regional presidents, regional and city commissioners and legislators in regional, provincial, city, and neighborhood councils. In addition, I interviewed city, provincial and regional bureaucrats with responsibilities in: social services, housing, health care, education, job training, law enforcement and the judicial system. I also conducted in-depth interviews with a sample of non-governmental actors, including the local and regional leaders of: political parties, trade unions, voluntary associations concerned with the immigration issue, economic cooperatives and immigrant communities.

Part II: Empirical Results

The comparative literature on migration can be divided into two separate approaches. The first focuses on the impact of globalization on international migration regimes. Post-national models of citizenship, proposed by authors, such as Cambell, Weiner, Soysal, Jacobson, etc. argue that the ability of nation-states to control their own borders and maintain ethno-nationalist notions of citizenship has been significantly reduced by both the greater

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⁸ The term “black market” as used here does not imply criminal activity but describes the large unofficial labor market characterized by unreported employment.
importance of the international human rights regime, and improved access to technology, including transportation, which has led to a sharp increase in population movements. Conversely, many authors (i.e. Cornelius, Hollifield and Martin) argue that even though globalization has significantly affected international migration politics, international socio-economic forces are filtered through national political systems, which maintains the divergence in nation-state responses to migration.

Because this study argues that local institutions and cultures significantly influence responses to migration in advanced industrial states, it follows the latter, “politics matter” approach. I contend that local political systems dictate the character of migration regimes, more than international socio-economic or demographic forces. For example, many scholars contend that ethnic conflict or xenophobia is a product of either increased migration pressures in border areas or competition among poorer native and migrant social classes. When analyzing the case cities, one finds that migration pressures are heaviest in the city of Bari, where the local population has been the most open to incoming migrants. Moreover, Bari and Lille (where only sporadic violence has occurred) are the two poorest case cities. Conversely, ethnic violence and social tension are most prominent in Florence and Toulouse, the two wealthiest metropolitan areas. This would suggest that alternative explanations must be sought.

Analysis of the integration process in the four case cities is divided into two parts, following classical political systems analysis (i.e. Easton). According to this approach, political inputs, are filtered through local institutions and cultures. The resulting public policy, then contributes to social outcomes, distinct to the local system. In fact, this section will demonstrate that integration levels vary sub-nationally. Integration, the dependent variable in this study, is measured in terms of parties and party systems, local government responsiveness, social movements and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), economic
markets, housing and crime. The first two topics focus on immigrant participation on the “input” side of local political systems, while the latter three examine social outcomes.

**Political Integration**

The integration of foreigners entails two distinct political spheres: 1) political and civil rights under liberal notions of citizenship, and 2) cultural acceptance under communitarian expectations. Local studies of integration politics (Rex, Ireland, Sagger, MOST, Ethnobarometer) correctly focus on both of these aspects of immigrant participation in local politics. Two problems exist with these studies. First, they rarely identify the mechanisms of integration. Second, they do not attempt to systematically measure levels of integration, limiting discussion to abstract descriptions. This section addresses the latter concern while the former is discussed in part three.

Within the literature on modern democracy, political participation is usually measured in two specific ways: voting percentages and political party membership. These measures create problems for students of integration in Europe because immigrants do not have the right to vote in most EU states, including France and Italy, and the political parties, of both the right and the left, refuse to keep data on the nationality of their members. For this reason, studies of political integration and citizenship must focus on other measures that are more qualitative in nature. This section presents scales constructed from qualitative research and responses to interviews. While these scales cannot be considered statistical measures due to their inexact, qualitative nature, they are useful tools in recognizing differences that exist in integration levels between the case communities. In fact, Table one clearly illustrates three distinct integration regimes within the four cities. Lille must be considered, by far, the « most integrated » city in terms of local politics. Bari is clearly the « least integrated, » while Florence and Toulouse represent mixed models.
Political integration is analyzed in two contexts. First, institutional factors are examined: the representation of immigration on the local political agenda, participation in political parties, access to public services, and access to political representation. Second, this table focuses on non-governmental immigration politics: pro-integration social movements, anti-immigrant social movements, NGO provided services for immigrants, and immigrant participation in NGOs. The cities were ordered for each variable and points were given based on levels of integration. For each measure, “4” indicates the most integrated city and “1” is the least integrated city. In the case of anti-immigrant social movements, “1” was given to the city with the strongest movements (Florence) and “4” was awarded to the city with the weakest ones (Bari) due to their role as obstacles to integration. The values presented in Table one can only be briefly summarized in the following sections due to space limitations. However, even these superficial descriptions show that sub-national variances exist, refuting the matched pairs discussed above.

Table One: Scales Measuring Integration in the Four Case Cities
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lille</th>
<th>Toulouse</th>
<th>Florence</th>
<th>Bari</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Discourse</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity in Political Parties</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Representation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-integration Social Movements</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigrant Social Movements</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO activity in Immigration Politics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in NGOs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration Programs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Immigration, Public Discourse, and the Political Agenda**

The first question posed in this study is: “How is the immigration issue presented on the local political agenda?” Many scholars of immigration, especially anthropologists and sociologists, recognize the impact of political discourse on public attitudes, which reflect notions of trust and community held by both citizens and leaders.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus of Agenda</th>
<th>Lille</th>
<th>Florence</th>
<th>Toulouse</th>
<th>Bari</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus of Agenda</td>
<td>-Political and Social Rights</td>
<td>-Multiculturalism and Economic Integration</td>
<td>-Cultural Assimilation and Economic Integration</td>
<td>-Economic Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts Between Parties and Immigrant Groups</td>
<td>-Political exchange with immigrant communities</td>
<td>-Limited contacts with immigrant communities</td>
<td>-No recognition of, nor direct contact with immigrant communities</td>
<td>-Token contacts with immigrant communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Integration Model</td>
<td>-Progressive definition of social, political, and cultural integration</td>
<td>-Paternalistic model of integration: little political exchange</td>
<td>-Individual is center of assimilation model; no recognition of cultural differences</td>
<td>-Humanitarian model of integration based on social need and moral obligation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Important Issues on Immigration Agenda: Framing the Question</td>
<td>-Social and economic integration of immigrants in periphery, fighting economic racism, crime, Islamic extremism, Rights of Sans Papiers</td>
<td>-Illegal vendors, crime, organized crime, Gypsies, housing, fighting racism (public attitudes), intercultural education</td>
<td>-Social isolation in periphery, crime, relationship between immigrant youths and police, fighting economic racism</td>
<td>-“Frontier of Europe”: mass invasion, humanitarian disaster, border controls, organized crime, economic competition in agriculture sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This section illustrates the presence of four separate and distinct integration regimes with regard to political discourse (See Table two and Figure three). In Lille, there is a “progressive regime” which includes a political agenda that focuses strongly on issues of political and civil rights, group empowerment, economic integration and anti-racism. In Florence, one also finds positive discussions of integration, usually framed in terms of cultural rights and multiculturalism. However, there is a strong focus on anti-racism because anti-immigrant forces have been successful in portraying immigration as a threat to the city’s well being. They have succeeded in framing most public discourse on immigration which is linked to organized crime, the informal economy, and the false production of leather goods. Thus, the city represents a “mixed regime.” Toulouse, a “republican regime” has an agenda that focuses on anti-racism and leads to strong protests against the extreme right, but little is addressed in terms of positive discussions of integration.
In fact, city leaders openly espouse cultural assimilation. Finally, in Bari, integration remains a relative non-issue. The city represents a “Conservative Christian” regime. Humanitarian aid to illegal migrants imported by smugglers from Albania is the central aspect of the integration movement, which is tied to the Catholic church. Immigration is discussed politically in terms of these clandestine waves and imported crime.

**Political Participation**

Individual political activity and access to representation are two separate variables that will be analyzed together. Both focus on the willingness and ability, or lack thereof, of immigrants to participate in local politics. As mentioned earlier, political integration cannot be statistically measured due to the lack of available data. However, qualitative analysis of these variables based on interviewing, clearly indicates four separate models of immigrant participation.

On an individual level, Lille represents the most integrated of the four cities because a true class of sophisticated immigrant political elites has formed within that city. All of the
political parties, except for those on the extreme right, present candidates of foreign origin on their lists for local, national, and European elections. Even though many of these candidates are only symbolically included on party lists, others have serious possibilities of winning. In fact, such candidates have won seats in the City Council, Regional Council, French Parliament, and the European Parliament. Moreover, many of the representatives on the neighborhood councils have immigrant origins. Foreign-born candidates have even gained personal followings, and, therefore, independence, from political parties. When some such candidates have come into disagreement with one party, they shift to another, taking many votes with them.

Immigrants are also present on party lists in Florence and Toulouse, but they lack all autonomy. In Toulouse, the immigrant presence is merely symbolic. One Algerian born businessman has been appointed by the mayor to be a city councilor in charge of integration. However, this person is out of touch with the local immigrant community, and even ridiculed by many of its members. His appointment has devalued party politics in the eyes of many immigrants because they perceive him as a member of their own ethnic group who has allowed himself to be utilized by local leaders in order to enhance the city government’s image.

In general, the number of foreign-born candidates on party lists in Florence is greatly reduced compared to France. This is due to the lower rates of acquisition of citizenship. However, in Florence, a number of immigrants have become active in party politics. Even though these politicians have more legitimacy than their counterparts in Toulouse, they enjoy nowhere near the autonomy that immigrant candidates have in Lille. In Florence, immigrants interested in party politics are dependent on the parties of the left, the Democratici di Sinistra (DS) and the Rifondazione Communista (RC). Immigrant candidates from these two parties have won seats in neighborhood councils as well as in the City councils of the small towns.
surrounding Florence, such as Scandicci and Sesto Fiorentino. However, immigrant candidates, like their Italian counterparts, have difficulty expressing themselves as individuals within the rigid party structure. For example, in June 1999, Syrian born Yusuf Hamad, won the largest number of preference votes in the election for one of the city’s five neighborhood councils. Because the DS won the City election thanks to a coalition of parties of the Center-Left, other parties in this coalition asked for the presidency of one of the neighborhood councils in exchange for political support. The other councils had established Florentine politicians as their presidents, so the local party chose to concede Mr. Hamad’s neighborhood council to the Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) for the first two years of a four year term. This decision is not necessarily a question of ethnicity, but because immigrants, such as Mr. Hasad have no real alternatives to the DS in local politics, their bargaining position within the party is very weak.

In Bari, immigrants do not participate in party politics at all and they are not present in any positions of leadership within local political institutions or party structures.

Access to Representation

In addition to their activity in local party politics, immigrants in Lille also influence local leaders through advisory councils. Specifically, the local government has created two such bodies. The first is the Conseil Comunal de Concertation. This body addresses social and economic issues in the city and includes elected members from numerous associations, including immigrants. Second, the Schema Local d’Integration (SLI) is responsible for advising local leaders on integration programs and strategies. The SLI is in constant contact with associations and grassroots movements, as well as City leaders. No such organization exists in Toulouse but immigrant associations have established informal networks with local leaders.
In Florence, Regional and Provincial Councils have been erected that include political leaders, immigrants and representatives of native NGOs. These bodies act as a space to hold public discussion on questions concerning integration. They are useful in coordinating policy objectives but are weak in terms of lobbying for integration policies. Similar bodies have been established in Bari at the city and regional levels but both of these councils are impotent due to a total lack of governmental support. The regional council has not even met in the last five years.

Access to Services

Because this variable reflects welfare systems, it is the only one based on national integration models. The French government is much better organized in terms of social services to immigrants so Lille and Toulouse are ahead of Florence and Bari in this area. National institutions, such as the *Fonds d’Action Sociale* (FAS) and the *Service Sociale d’Aide aux Emigrants* (SSAE) are responsible for the funding and provision of services to immigrants. These bodies are major actors in local immigration politics in both Toulouse and Lille. However, Lille offers more services to immigrants because of the activity of the SLI. Aside from its role as a mediator between the local immigrant community and the city government, it also funds many social and cultural programs for immigrants.

An Immigrant Office exists in both Florence and Bari with varying degrees of success. In Florence, the office has never been popular within the local administration and it has been passed by one city commissioner to another in the last five years. The office has successfully provided immigrants with a point of reference and it does coordinate some services, such as temporary housing centers and health clinics for women and children. In Bari, the Immigrant Office is really just an information service for the local immigrant population.
Immigration and Social Movements

This topic will be discussed in further detail in section three. As a point of introduction, three of the case cities have strong social movement traditions. Bari lacks a history of collective action. Therefore grass roots activity is absent in both the pro-integration and anti-immigrant sectors. Conversely, Florence is well-known for very contentious, sometimes violent politics. A strong pro-integration faction has formed which attempts to counteract even stronger and more frequent anti-immigration protests. In Lille, pro-integration social forces are very strong while the *Front National* has gained a discreet following and anti-immigrant social movements have begun to form. In Toulouse, over ten thousand people march against racism, fascism and the extreme right, while less than one hundred attend pro-integration rallies. Its republican tradition has weakened both the pro-integration and anti-immigrant forces.

NGOs and immigration politics

Again, this subject will be discussed in detail in section three. In terms of social services, the French non-governmental sector is much better organized than the Italian one. Their efforts are better coordinated and their staffs are generally more professional. Lille, though, has more NGOs that provide professional services to immigrants than does Toulouse. In Italy, Florence has a non-governmental sector which is bigger and better organized than that found in Bari.

In terms of immigrant participation in local NGOs, the highest levels are once again found in Lille where immigrants hold full-time and part-time jobs and volunteer in the non-governmental sector. Table three shows that immigrants participate in Lille's non-governmental sector both as individuals and as communities. It is the most complete model of any of the case cities.
Table three: Immigrant Participation in Non-governmental Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Individual Participation</th>
<th>Lille</th>
<th>Florence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak Individual Participation</td>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>Bari</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Florence, immigrant associations are weak but they do sponsor many cultural programs. Many immigrants work as individuals within native associations. The situation in Toulouse is actually paradoxical. Immigrant organizations prosper within the Mirail, which is the immigrant quarter of the city. However, they cannot be considered integrated associations because little contact exists between these organizations and native ones in other parts of the city. This has led to a model based on empowerment and isolation. In Bari, immigrants do not participate in native associations and the few immigrant associations that exist work by themselves.

Socio-economic Integration

Given the sub-national variance which exists in levels and modes of political integration, it is not surprising that levels of socio-economic integration vary locally as well. In fact, as part three shall illustrate, politics alone does not determine socio-economic integration, but it merely limits the influence of different markets on integration levels. Because the case cities are characterized by different market structures, as well as separate integration strategies, levels of integration vary significantly in the socio-economic sphere. This section will demonstrate these trends in terms of economic integration, housing, and crime.

Analysis of these three spheres combines substitution models, borrowed from the fields of demography and economics, with sociological and anthropological considerations regarding public norms and attitudes. Most urban studies of migration issues focus on the
concentration of migrants in various socio-economic classes. This discussion is insufficient, however, because it neglects the intersection of economic standing, power and public attitudes. Often, poorer migrant groups suffer from « minority mentalities » which are characterized by a strong sense of inferiority. Moreover, when such communities are visible, social attitudes often attribute cultural traits to these populations, which are based on their socio-economic exclusion or isolation (Fanon, Comer, Coleman). For this reason, Weberian analysis has more utility than the classical Marxist approaches because it focuses on the intersection of class, power, and status. Unfortunately, due to space limitations, the statistical evidence on which the scales in the following sections have been constructed cannot be presented.

Class

According to Marxist approaches to politics, an actor’s interests are dictated by his/her position in the division of labor. This section focuses on the formation of class structures in economic markets, housing and criminal activities. As long as immigration has existed, immigrants have been accused of stealing jobs, unfairly utilizing welfare resources paid for by taxpaying citizens, such as public housing, and engaging in criminal activities. In the current literature on migration in Europe, most studies have dispelled these myths. Politically, many European Union (EU) and national leaders have recently made public statements in which they claim that the continent needs migrants in order to compensate for aging workforces and increased pressure on pension systems. Despite this rhetoric, however, these same heads of government have been restricting entry to EU states, due to public pressure and the success of the radical right in popularizing nativist opinions.

The reason that nativist positions have dominated European immigration politics, is that immigration does not affect Europe, or even European states uniformly. The radical right has been successful in areas where transformations related to globalization have increased
economic uncertainty. Such sub-national variance is evident in this study. Table four illustrates this fact. Employing economic substitution models, based on government-collected data, I measure economic integration in the four case cities. Because, this scale represents social outcomes, I have chosen to utilize nominal measures. A measure of « 1 » indicates integration and « 0 » indicates a lack of integration. « 0.5 » indicates a mixed model. However, this approach is incomplete because not all of the cities are affected in the same way by immigration.

Demographers rightfully argue that immigration burdens do not merely reflect the number of immigrants coming to a host area. For these reasons, the final measures of integration reflect « real integration » minus « potential for integration » in order to correct for the demographic pressures brought by migration to the case cities. For example, real integration is much higher in Florence than in any other city. However, Bari and Florence both received a final score of « 0.5 » because Bari’s migrant population has replaced the native workforce demographically (indicating high burden) whereas Florence’s foreign population complements the demographic structure of the native community.

Similarly, immigrants affect housing systems in metropolitan areas in different ways. The evidence presented in table five follows a political economy approach. Market analysis includes elements of both substitution rates in local private and public housing markets, the quality of the migrant housing stock, as well as local reactions to emergency housing needs created by immigration. In addition, the spatial distribution of immigrants throughout the case cities is included. Thus, analysis focuses on integration measures utilized in the fields of geography, political science, and economics.
Table Four: Real and Potential Economic Substitution Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A) Demographic Pressure</th>
<th>Lille</th>
<th>Toulouse</th>
<th>Bari</th>
<th>Florence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Burden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Population</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Age of Population</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of Population</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Economic Structure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B) Economic Integration</th>
<th>Lille</th>
<th>Toulouse</th>
<th>Bari</th>
<th>Florence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Integration</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Competition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Economy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total B – A</strong></td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table Five: Summary of Housing Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of Emergency Housing</th>
<th>Florence</th>
<th>Bari</th>
<th>Toulouse</th>
<th>Lille</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Emergency Housing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition from Emergency to Regular Housing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Public Housing</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Private Housing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcrowding</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Utilities</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Market Total</strong></td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial Distribution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, analysis of local criminal markets also illustrates clear sub-national variance between the case cities in terms of the creation of a criminal underclass. Examination of immigrant criminal activity focuses on three specific features: 1) the amount of overall immigrant crime, 2) the types of crimes committed⁹, and 3) the position of immigrant communities in local organized crime markets. Scales are based on two characteristics. First, how «entrepreneurial» are immigrants within criminal markets? Are criminal activities a sign of economic integration in parallel, illegal markets or do they represent destructive behavior based on social isolation and exclusion? Second, are immigrants autonomous actors within each of these markets?

Table Six: Structure of Criminal Markets in Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Entrepreneurial Crime</th>
<th>Not Profit Motivated Crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Immigrant</td>
<td>Florence</td>
<td>Lille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Autonomous Actors</td>
<td>Bari</td>
<td>Toulouse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis presented in table six indicates that immigrants have, in fact, «integrated» most in Florence, where they are entrepreneurial and they act autonomously within local criminal markets, controlling certain activities. In Bari, immigrants act as an entrepreneurial underclass that takes orders from local Mafia bosses. Lille, is a mixed model in which foreigners control the local drug trade, but there is also a significant amount of destructive «protest» crimes, such as the burning and stealing of cars. Finally, in Toulouse, there is little autonomous criminal activity attributed to migrants outside such protest crimes. Once again, the statistical evidence on which these typologies have been created can be furnished upon request.

⁹ Certain crimes, such as the stealing and burning of cars in French cities indicate social exclusion more than integration into criminal markets. Others, such as human trafficking, from the perspective of market analysis, indicates integration because it is linked to the control of a certain economic activity.
Power and Status

As stated in part one, the definition of integration utilized in this study is migrant participation in the various spheres of a host society. This definition actually contradicts much of the literature on immigration. In many works, integration is defined as a lack of ethnic conflict. For example, economists who study immigration often view high substitution rates negatively because they increase the potential for conflict. In the political economy approach, which this study follows, higher substitution rates indicate higher levels of integration because migrants are participating in local markets at the same rates as native citizens.

As stated earlier, I argue that participation denotes citizenship, defined above as the ability to control one’s own life course. In democratic systems, moreover, citizenship is based on equality and thus, classes of citizens cannot, by definition, exist. For this reason, power and status, the focus of much of the sociological and anthropological literature on ethnic integration is highly relevant. Power, according to the classical definition offered by Weber, is “the probability that an actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.”\(^{10}\) If host citizens continuously exert power over immigrants, than a de facto caste system is formed, indicating a permanent state of non-integration, even if inter-ethnic relations remain peaceful.

Obviously, socio-economic markets play a large role in the exertion of power in local societies. However, anthropologists and sociologists correctly note that culture is another means for social control. This is especially true in ethnic politics where symbolism is often more important than reality. Scholars of ethnic conflict, such as Horowitz, De Vos, Fanon, Ture, have long argued that minorities are often stigmatized for their concentrations in the poorest economic classes, geographic neighborhoods, and criminal activities. For example, Emilio Reyneri writes,

When migrants are exploited in bad jobs, employers are happy with them, because migrant workers are a lot cheaper than domestic ones, they work harder and moreover, they are more willing as their job expectations are lower. But the low work positions of migrants, mostly if they are involved in the informal economy, can start a stigmatization process and cause xenophobic attitudes. The relation between discrimination and occupation in the worse jobs could take the character of a vicious cycle: the discrimination against migrants leads them to occupy the worst work positions and they are stigmatized because of the jobs they undertake, then the work discrimination can increase and so on.11

For this reason, this study asks: can integration be defined in terms of the absence of conflict? As stated above, immigrant related violence has arisen in three of the case cities. Does this necessarily mean that integration is failing in these cities and succeeding only in Bari?

In order to respond to this question, it is necessary to understand the type of violence which has arisen in each city. In Florence, conflict has focused on three communities: the Gypsies, the Senagalese peddlars, and the Chinese. In terms of anti-Gypsy attacks, which are frequent in the city, there is a total lack of integration between the two communities. Most of the local Gypsies live in camps outside of the city which are characterized by deplorable sanitary conditions, and high crime rates. They do not trust local institutions or the local population, which, in turn ostracizes them. However, the conflict which has arisen between Florentines and both the Senegalese and the Chinese, is quite different in nature. In each of these cases, violence has erupted from protests over economic competition created by these two populations. Local peddlars organized social movements which created an atmosphere of tension. According to local police officials, this tension, was then translated into violence by local youths who used these migrants « as an excuse for their own unemployment. »

In Lille and Toulouse, the mechanism for violence is quite different. Rather than focusing on competition, conflict has arisen within the so-called quartiers sensibles over the issue of power. Due to the social isolation found in these neighborhoods, which are

characterized by high unemployment, high drop-out rates, poor housing conditions, poor infrastructure, and little commerce, migrant youths have rebelled following violent incidents involving the police. In Toulouse, the situation is more dramatic than that found in Lille because the violence is ongoing rather than sporadic. In both cases, groups of people who feel « powerless » regarding their own life courses, have resorted to violence « in order to be heard. » Scholars of immigration to Toulouse argue that the local situation is especially dramatic because the Grand Mirail, the poor group of neighborhoods in which much of the city’s immigrant population resides, is located just next to two exclusive, gated communities and the city’s technological pole. Thus, it is argued that the quartier’s residents receive daily reminders of their own socio-economic exclusion.

The distinction between these forms of conflict can be explained by the notion of status. Weber defines status as the accepted distribution of social honor within a society. Honor directly reflects neither wealth nor power, thus it is influenced by class, but not dependent on it. Instead, honor is composed of the specific values of a society. Because it is a social construct, it often represents the object of public perceptions more than class does. For this reason, it is a significant tool in understanding the relationship between socio-economic and cultural integration.

In Bari, one of the explanations for the lack of inter-ethnic conflict in the area is that because local socio-economic standards are generally low, little distinction in status exists between local residents and migrants. During interviews with both native residents and immigrants, it was often mentioned that economic integration is the only real problem in the city for both populations. It could be suggested that common economic difficulties have helped to create a certain cultural tie based on class-based social bonds. In fact, the most prominent actors in local integration politics in the city have traditionally been labor unions.

Similarly, in Florence, higher levels of economic integration have earned a certain measure of respectability for the local migrant community. The only difficulty which impedes integration remains high involvement in criminal activities which has led to a cultural backlash against North Africans (drugs), Albanians (prostitution), and Gypsies (petty crime).

Conversely, in both Lille and Toulouse, immigrants have been characterized as a pariah group. In both cases, neighborhoods with high concentrations of immigrants have been characterized as « the Bronx. » Immigrants are often blamed for the poverty and social dislocation found in these areas.

This section has shown that sub-national variance exists in all spheres of integration. For this reason, it is important to pay attention to local reactions to immigration. The sub-national arena is not merely the place where policies decided at higher levels of government are implemented uniformly. Instead, local political systems and socio-economic markets dictate the quality of life of both migrants and native citizens and regulate the daily interaction between these two groups. The question which follows is: what determines these local migration regimes? This is the focus of part three.

III. Conclusion : Explaining Integration and the Need for Dialogue Across Disciplines

Immigration is more than just a simple political issue. It brings together so many different aspects of political, social, cultural and economic life, that one could say that immigration highlights all the strengths and faults of advanced industrial states. If markets are weak, migration exposes structural problems. If communities are closed, then migration forces host leaders and citizens to confront native concepts of identity. If housing is insufficient, migration will expose this shortcoming, as well. In this regard, immigration is a phenomenon which is representative of globalization and its impact on advanced industrial states. International forces often expose the cracks in national political and economic systems.
Most significantly, immigration forces host citizens to reconsider their own cultural and ethnic identities. Thus, migration is a window through which we can view our societies, our cultures, and our personal identities.

The theoretical argument on which this study is based presents a basic premise: immigration is a complex question in need of a complex answer. As stated in the introduction, more than possibly than any other phenomenon, the response of the academic community has varied so greatly from the nature of the problem it is attempting to resolve, given the micro-analysis included in most migration studies. Rather than proposing an absolute position regarding the explanation of integration, this study attempts to recognize various mechanisms which facilitate integration in different political and socio-economic conditions.

*Local Justice*

Basically defined, government is about the distribution of rights and responsibilities within a political community. Similar to Harold, Laswell’s definition cited above, Jon Elster frames local justice in terms of matching goods with recipients. His book *Local Justice* examines the various aspects of distribution in democratic societies. Elster presents basic theories of allocation of social goods and responsibilities in local societies, such as military service, taxes, health benefits, and even immigration.

Elster correctly identifies numerous elements of distribution which are relevant to integration politics. First, he states that a just allocation of goods is a function of two phenomena: scarcity, and heterogeneity. In terms of immigration, one can state that the distribution of membership is significantly affected by these two factors. If the citizenship of country A were distributed freely, there would be no competition, but, at the same time, the rights connected with this good would be rather worthless because they could not realistically be provided to such a large population. Moreover, as the composition of the groups to whom
This good is distributed becomes more complex, the nature of citizenship must adapt to this complexity. The speed of this adaptation is the key to maintaining social peace.

Second, Elster correctly notes that social status often affects decisions regarding resource allocation. Part two has addressed this point in the discussion of public views of immigrants. These perceptions, once formed, often affect the distribution of political rights and socio-economic resources because leaders rationally implement policies that give them the best chances of being re-elected. For this reason, it is important to recognize the impact of justice in one allocative sphere on the others.

Within this framework, Elster provides a simple yet effective manner of « measuring justice. » By utilizing a simple cost-benefit analysis, he creates a classification of the distribution of costs and social benefits on specific groups in bounded societies. Throughout this work, I have followed a similar logic by creating scales which indicate levels of immigrant participation in the case cities. Even though, these scales accurately reflect differences in integration levels, they do not adequately address the question of the real costs and benefits of integration. This was a trade-off which I deliberately accepted because, through the use of ordinal scales, I could rank the case cities in a way which cost-benefit analysis does not allow. This latter tool, however, provides a better tool for studying the complexity of integration within each individual sphere.

In order to include both of these elements in his analysis of justice, Elster assigns a (+) to those groups benefitting in a certain distributive sphere and a (-) when certain segments of the population bear social costs. The preceding section has demonstrated that such a technique is too simple to include the range of integration levels within spheres of justice. For this reason, the following scale has been constructed which elaborates on the logic of Elster’s study, in order to measure overall levels of integration within the case cities:
In order to quantify these measures, the scale has been translated into the following terms:

- ++ = well integrated
- + = integrated
- 0 = neutral variable
- - = excluded
- -- = very excluded

Table seven presents the overall measures for the distribution of the costs and benefits of immigration for the four case cities. Certain variables, such as political participation, can only be positive. Thus, when immigrants are excluded from politics, the value « 0 » is assigned. In other cases, such as anti-immigrant social movements, or anti-immigrant violence, these variables represent negative costs of immigration and, therefore, they are assigned either negative values, or zero.

The table shows that Florence and Lille are the two « most integrated » cities included in this study. This is interesting because, they are the two cities with the strongest anti-immigrant political movements. Of the two cities, Florence seems to be the more equilibrated. Except for low scores in the arena of public security, integration levels seem to be positive for most of the indicators included.

In Lille, one finds an uneven distribution of scores across spheres of integration. This suggests two important findings. First, because Lille, along with Florence is a city of the Left, this classification would suggest that political ideology is significant in the formation of integration regimes. Second, one finds high scores in the political arenas indicating elevated levels of participation in politics and civil society. At the same time, the city scored poorly in terms of the socio-economic indicators, included in the second part of the study. Because of
the city’s high overall scores, this trend would suggest that political participation makes an impact on integration politics in the other spheres. In this case, immigrants find themselves in difficult socio-economic situations, which are tempered through the activities of local government and NGOs.

Third, this table indicates that « tolerance » in fact, does not indicate « integration. » Toulouse and Bari are clearly the two most tolerant, or « most open » cities in this study. In both cases, they register many zeros on the chart, which shows neither a negative nor a positive impact of immigration. This can be translated to signify the presence of tolerance, which refers to an acceptance of ethnic diversity for numerous reasons, some of which are more substantive than others. Regardless of this cultural characteristic, the overall costs of immigration are greater than the benefits to local society in both case cities. This is especially striking in Toulouse due to the city’s healthy economy, anti-racist tradition, and strong social networks.

Finally, the overall value of « 0 » must be considered a threshold measure for integration. I have chosen this value because it represents equilibrium between the distribution of the costs and benefits in local integration politics. The two cities which fall below this line, Toulouse and Bari, are characterized by high costs of integration, and lower benefits. Conversely, Lille and Florence are characterized by a distinct positive contribution by immigrants to the host societies. This signifies that immigrants « participate in the daily life » of the latter two cities, whereas participation rates are lower in the former matched pair.

In fact, this value not only measures the impact of immigration on the host societies, but it also indicates the opportunities available for integration within the case cities. When the costs of migration, outweigh the benefits, this usually signifies that a significant proportion of the migrants residing in that city are living in « at risk » situations. Thus, by connecting this point to the previous one concerning toleration, one could say that tolerant cities provide
Table Seven: Measuring Overall Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Florence</th>
<th>Lille</th>
<th>Toulouse</th>
<th>Bari</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Agenda</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Parties</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Activism</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigrant Social Movement</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Integration Social Movements</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Public Officials</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Participation in NGOs</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services Provided by Government</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services Provided by NGOs</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Integration Programs</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Integration</td>
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<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacement/Competition</td>
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<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Economy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government Programs</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions/NGOs</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Housing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Housing</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Access to Public Market</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Private Market</td>
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<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing Conditions</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>-0.5</td>
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<td>Overcrowding</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Society</td>
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<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Community</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Crime</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-level Crime</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs/Alienation</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clandestine Immigration</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Attitudes</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigrant Violence</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>+5.0</td>
<td>+4.5</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

opportunities for cultural integration, but not necessarily for socio-economic participation.

This, of course, is the primary need of migrants when they arrive in host societies. Cultural
issues, while they remain significant, are usually considered to be secondary concerns among most migrants.

*Explaining Complexity*

The final question which this study addresses is, what variables explain integration? When the project began, six distinct institutional and cultural variables were identified which contribute to the formation of integration regimes: formal access to political systems, local labor markets, overall levels of social capital and citizen participation in civic life, political ideology, religion, and openness of political cultures.

Research has shown that these last two variables, religion and openness of political culture have little bearing on the formation of integration regimes. For this reason, they can be discarded. However, the previous four all contribute in some way to integration levels. The question which needs to be answered is how?

*Explaining Political Integration*

Part two has outlined the basic differences in levels of political integration, between the four case cities. The analysis presented above shows that integration levels are highest in Lille and lowest in Bari. Florence and Toulouse represent mixed models. This last observation is the most significant.

Within the literature on ethnic integration, political ideology is often utilized to explain integration levels, based on the (often incorrect) assumption the the Left is more sympathetic to pro-active integration strategies. Had Lille and Florence demonstrated similar levels of integration, one could argue that ideology does, indeed, most significantly explain levels of integration in local politics. However, because Florence, a city of the Left, and Toulouse, a city of the center-right, are characterized by similar integration levels in this sphere, an anomaly exists which needs to be further investigated.
In fact, it would seem that ideology does indeed affect integration levels, but not directly. Instead, by employing social movement analysis, one can demonstrate that integration levels are determined by both institutional and cultural factors.

First, it must be noted that in order to have successful political integration, the local migrant community needs to demonstrate a clear desire to engage in local politics. For this reason, immigrant entrepreneurs and organizations need to be present. This condition is, in fact, satisfied in all four cities.

The second condition which needs to be filled is the presence of favorable opportunity structures. These structures are the institutional factors, external to the movement, which dictate the strategies of local migrant leaders. In Lille and Florence, one finds the most favorable structures and access to the local decision-making process. Most likely, this form of government is a result of the predominant Left-wing ideologies in these two cities. However, it is this institutional variable which offers immigrants the opportunity to directly participate in the local decision-making process.

This does not mean, however, that culture does not matter. In fact, informal political networks and norms concerning governance are often as important as institutional opportunities. Thus, while Florence is characterized by numerous formal points of access for citizens to participate in local politics, it is culturally more closed than Toulouse because of the strong influence that the merchant associations exert on local leaders, and the strong tradition of individualism found in the city. In Toulouse, conversely, there is a strong tradition of popular politics which dates back to the beginning of the century and the republican tradition has led to a higher collective sense of civic virtue.

These factors, when viewed together, explain the typology identified earlier. Lille, is open formally and informally in terms of citizen participation, and Bari is closed in both regards due to a long tradition of clientelistic politics, and the concentration of power among
the business interests in the city. Because Florence is formally open and informally closed, and Toulouse is formally closed, but informally open, these two cities reflect mixed models. This is illustrated in table eight which suggests that the primary determinate of political integration is access to government while, levels of social capital and citizen participation are significant at a second level.

**Table Eight: Structure of Overall Political Participation in Case Metropolitan Areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informal Participation in Politics- Open</th>
<th>Formal Access to Government Open</th>
<th>Formal Access to Government Restricted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence</td>
<td>Bari</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Explaining Socio-economic Integration**

One finds that a very similar model adequately explains socio-economic integration regimes in the four case cities. In terms of economic integration, Florence and Bari are the « most integrated » cities followed by Lille and Toulouse. This classification can be explained by the flexibility which characterizes the local economies of the Italian cities, compared to the rigidity found in the French cases. In Florence, the economy is highly diversified with both wealthy service and industrial sectors. Agriculture is less significant but, because the native labor force has shunned this work, employment opportunities are available to non-EU migrants. Similarly, the economy in Bari has been characterized for years by a flexible economy based on the mobility of low-income families and a large informal sector. This importance of the black market and seasonal agricultural labor has often meant that native workers have moved from one sector to another rapidly in order to make their living. Today, immigrants benefit from this structure. What separates Bari from Florence, however, is the fact that migrants compete with native labor, especially women, for the same lower-income jobs.
In Toulouse, immigrants are almost completely excluded from the local economy. The only sector where there is an over-representation of foreigners is in construction. The local economy is based on technology and the air-space industry. Because most of the non-EU immigrants lack the educational skills to do such specialized labor, unemployment rates are very high among them. In Lille, immigrants were victims of the restructuring of the local economy which took place in the 1990s. Once a major international center for textiles, city leaders were forced to redirect the focus of the economy to the service and tourism industries, after most of the local mills closed in the late 1980s. The displacement of unqualified labor included many foreigners and the city is only now recovering from the major recession which was caused by this transformation.

Market access also best explains integration in both housing and crime systems in the four case cities. Housing integration levels are highest in Toulouse because migrants have access to both private and public markets, which are characterized by the presence of basic amenities. In Lille, immigrants are heavily concentrated in the public market, while, due to the general lack of public housing in Italy, foreigners in Florence and Bari are dependent on the private market. For this reason, these cities all represent mixed models.

Similarly, immigrants are « most integrated » in local crime in Florence because they have access to prosperous criminal markets in that city. In Lille and Toulouse, the size of criminal markets is limited due to institutional constraints, while the criminal market in Bari is dominated by Italian bosses. For this reason, there is no market flexibility in the latter three cities.

Like the political sphere, levels of socio-economic integration are not simply explained by institutional variables. Once again, the evidence gathered in this study indicates that levels of social capital contribute to integration on a second level. The mechanism which facilitates integration is NGO activity in the fields of job training and education. Only Bari
lacks such initiatives. In Florence, the local and regional government funds and provides contracts to cooperatives which train migrants and provide them with temporary employment and housing, until they find a more permanent position within the private sector. Moreover, the local government and the city chapters of the Chamber of Commerce and Artisan’s Association, have offered programs which teach immigrants how to start and run their own businesses. In many cases, the local unions and other NGOs, have acted as guarantors for business loans with local banks. This activity is one of the most significant reasons that Florence is home to a thriving immigrant entrepreneurial class and over one thousand immigrant owned businesses.

In Lille and Toulouse, governmental and non-governmental initiatives exist, but on a more limited basis. The *entreprises d’insertion*, are run like private businesses but their goal is to train those who work for them and teach them marketable skills. Moreover, job training is offered by numerous NGOs in both cities. The similarities between Lille and Toulouse, would once again suggest that ideology plays a less significant role in determining levels of socio-economic integration.

**Conclusion : The Need for Leadership**

For centuries, America represented a land of opportunity for immigrants coming from every continent. The need for labor created by the ever-expanding economy provided a better life to generations of migrants. However, globalization has now radically changed the nature of integration in advanced industrial states. Whereas markets once acted as reliable agents for integration, the need for increasingly specialized skills has created social dislocation. Moreover, whereas entrepreneurs, such as Henry Ford, could once complain that when he asked for a pair of hands, he got a human being, such views are no longer acceptable due to the increasing importance of human rights in world politics.
Thus, integration is no longer a simple economic issue. Earlier in the century, factories and mills often provided migrants with housing and even social activities, facilitating integration for all those who found employment. Instead, today, migrants find integration to be complicated in various arenas, including politics, economic markets, and housing. Similarly, native citizens are concerned that immigrants will fill increasingly scarce low-skilled employment opportunities and that they will import criminal activity. Post-material concerns surrounding identity, rights, and citizenship also dominate political agendas.

This study has argued that in order to understand the integration process, dialogue is necessary between the various disciplines in the social sciences. This is especially true given the fact that « foreigner » has become an amorphous term. Many of the « immigrants » which natives fear are citizens themselves who belong to the second or even third generation, born in the host country.

However, this focus on the intersection between spheres of integration is not just driven by the academic concerns outlined above. The lives of both immigrants and native citizens are determined at the local level, where interaction occurs daily. On a practical level, it is here where conflict makes an impact, and it is at this level where integration can best be promoted.

In fact, this study has shown that local politics do make an impact on the integration process in all of the different spheres. Because markets can no longer be utilized as permanent agents of integration, it is political leaders who must fill this role. Leadership on integration issues is necessary in both the political and socio-economic arenas due to the exchanges which exist between these spheres. The evidence presented in this study indicates that there is spillover from one aspect of the integration process to the others. Moreover, it suggests that levels of social capital influence integration in politics, economic markets, and society. If integration is to occur than leaders must take a pro-active stance in terms of the programs
offered in the governmental and non-governmental sectors. These programs, can no longer simply isolate specific integration problems, for they have become too complex. For example, during an interview with an official from an NGO in Lille who works with migrant women, this director complained that she provides medical care to battered mothers but she is not allowed to make contact with the social workers who follow the their violent sons’ cases. In Florence, there is little dialogue between the governmental and non-governmental sectors which inhibits any coherent strategies on integration issues. For example, officials from NGOs which implement multicultural education programs sometimes have no contact with any officials in the local education system.

Within the social sciences we too often put our research questions « under a microscope » in order to be as scientifically rigorous as possible. Similarly, in politics, integration strategies follow narrow approaches due to limited resources. This project suggests that in both fields, it is important to step back, and attempt to understand mechanisms within an overall process rather than attempting to individuate simple causality on specific questions. Integration, by definition, cannot be temporary. Thus, it must follow a vision or a common path. Such leadership can only be implemented through an awareness of complexity. How can we promote integration, if we cannot understand relationships?

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