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Author
Campo, Juan E.

Publication Date
1995-05-01

Peer reviewed
THE ENDS OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM:

HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE AND THE ISLAMIC QUESTION IN EGYPT

JUAN EDUARDO CAMPO


Michel Foucault has demonstrated how the formation of madness as a concept and as an apparatus of disciplinary practices was related to the rise of Enlightenment rationalism in Europe. Religion either became a dangerous symptom of madness, and had to be confined, or served as a
device for constraining madness. Likewise, Edward Said has argued how Orientalism constituted a field of European scholarly discourse about the Other, particularly the Muslim Other, and that it played a significant role in the construction of a superior self-image for the West. Moreover, he maintains, it both prepared for and validated the imperialist projects of newly constituted nation states, which were encoded in slogans such as "the white man's burden" and "la mission civilisatrice." In many ways, our understandings of "Islamic fundamentalism" are commensurate with our understandings of madness and the Orient.

This essay is an inquiry into the concept "fundamentalism" as employed in the description and explanation of developments in contemporary Muslim societies, particularly Egypt. It contends that rather than referring to an objective set of phenomena, this concept has been created to serve as a key element in European and American hegemonic discourses about these societies in order to subordinate and control them. This means that it is of little explanatory value; does not facilitate rendering modern amalgamations of religion and politics more intelligible — unless it is seen first in reference to the scholars and institutions who have actually invented and used it. The ensuing discussion, therefore, begins with the emergence and use of "Islamic fundamentalism" in American and European scholarship about Islam, then shifts focus to Egyptian statements about it. The essay will identify the conditions under which "fundamentalism" was introduced into the Egyptian milieu and map the extent to which it has become indigenized in Islamic discourse. A discussion about the relation of the concept of "fundamentalism" to other comparative categories used in the study of religious phenomena will conclude the essay.

A. THE RISE OF "ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM"

The appearance of the neologism "fundamentalism" in Western taxonomies of Islam can be traced to the 1960s, but it did not become a significant descriptive category used by academics and the media until the late 1970s. In a 1966 discussion of contemporary developments in Islam, Fazlur Rahman regarded fundamentalism as a resurgent reform movement aimed at purifying Islamic societies to bring them into conformity with the Quran and the Sunna (the body of authoritative tradition about the exemplary conduct of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers). This activist
movement, which Rahman identified more specifically as “Wahhabism,” set the frame for subsequent Muslim modernist discourse and developed into a forceful challenge to the conservativism of established religious authorities, and the liberalism of westernized intellectuals and officials.3 Shortly after Rahman, Clifford Geertz tacitly included the concept in his discussion of “scripturalism,” which he saw as a recent doctrinal and legalistic style of Islam that interacted with Western colonialism and nationalism to replace the mystically oriented “classical” styles of Morocco and Indonesia.4 As late as 1976, however, “fundamentalism” was not a widely used designation for Islam. A state-of-the-art survey of Middle East studies published that year made no mention of it.5 The rise of “Islamic fundamentalism” as a dominant discursive subject did not occur until a series of key events transpired in the Middle East region: the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the assassination of Egypt’s President Sadat in 1981, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. These events, especially the Iranian Revolution, had profound regional and global political ramifications, and the troubling involvement of religious forces in each gave scholars and governmental agencies suitable cause for sustained investigation.

Take, for example, Middle East historian John O. Voll, who was researching Islamic “revival” and “resurgence” — the conventional terms — in 1978. The next year he published an article on the Sudanese Mahdi as a nineteenth-century “fundamentalist.” By 1982, his book on contemporary Islamic history described what he called a “fundamentalist style” (an adaptation from Rahman and Geertz), one of four “orientations for action, that can be used as an analytical framework for understanding the dynamics of Islamic history.” According to Voll, this style can be traced back to the days of the first Muslim community under the leadership of Muhammad.6 James Piscatori, a political scientist, followed a path from “Islamic Politics” (1983) to “Islamic Awakening” (1986) to “Fundamentalism” in parentheses (1991), and then to full-fledged “Fundamentalism” in his introductory essay for the Fundamentalism Project’s first published volume on Muslim reactions to the Gulf Crisis (1991).7 As was the case for Rahman, other scholars from Muslim countries working in Western universities have used the term in their post-1979 research, such as Fouad Ajami, Hamid Enayat, Bassam Tibi, and Said Amir Arjomand.8 Among other leading scholars in the U.S. who have employed “fundamentalism” as a significant descrip-
tive and analytical concept are Bruce Lawrence, Henry Munson, Leonard Binder, and Bernard Lewis.\textsuperscript{9}

These scholars are not in complete agreement about the definition and application of the term. Some maintain that it describes an intrinsic feature that Islam has had since its beginnings. A majority hold that it defines a form of Muslim reaction to modernity, or to the power of the nation-state. Nevertheless, they all agree that “fundamentalism” is a valid descriptive and analytical term, and that it has wide application. The importance that scholars, politicians, and journalists have ascribed to this concept in recent years is clearly borne out by the fact that between 1988 and 1994 “Islam” and “fundamental” together have been the subjects of more than three hundred journal and magazine articles.\textsuperscript{10}

Amidst the mass of literature on “Islamic fundamentalism,” the most significant comparative treatments to date, in my view, are to be found in the publications of the Fundamentalism Project and in Ernest Gellner’s \textit{Postmodernism, Reason and Religion}.\textsuperscript{11} The first is a set of encyclopedic volumes consisting of articles by experts on fundamentalist movements in various regions of the world, held together by the theoretical framework formulated by its editors, Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Gellner’s book, on the other hand, is more of an essay — one that seeks to interpret fundamentalism in relation to other expressions of contemporary thought. The two enterprises — one collective, the other individual — embody the key features of Western discourse about “Islamic fundamentalism.”

Initiated in 1986 at the University of Chicago, the Fundamentalism Project is a coordinated, long-term undertaking supported by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Marty and Appleby, scholars in American religious history at the University of Chicago Divinity School, are its directors. Although the project focuses on religion, it is highly interdisciplinary, attracting scholars specializing in history, political science, Islamic studies, Asian studies, cultural anthropologists, and economists from the U.S., United Kingdom, France, Germany, Israel, and Egypt. Besides Piscatori’s edited volume on Gulf War “Islamic fundamentalisms,” the project has resulted in the publication so far of four volumes dealing with “fundamentalisms observed,” “fundamentalisms and society,” “fundamentalisms and the state,” and “accounting for fundamentalisms.”\textsuperscript{12} It has also produced a five-part National Public Radio series, “Remaking the World: The Impact of Fundamentalism,” and a Public Broadcasting Service series, “The
Glory and the Power: The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Modern World,” together with a companion volume. Although the project is concerned with comparing fundamentalisms in as many cultural settings as possible, including American ones, it was clearly the rise of “Islamic fundamentalism” that provided the main impetus for initiating the project, and winning substantial funding for it.

Marty and Appleby introduce the first volume of the project with a “user’s guide” that sets forth their rationale for the application of “fundamentalism” to cross-cultural comparative research. They also state what they believe distinguishes it from concepts such as “traditionalism” and “conservatism”: its militancy. Fundamentalists are “fighting back” against modernity and secularism in defense of their society and way of life, using religiously sanctioned doctrines and practices selected from their tradition as weapons. The project’s goal is to make this phenomenon more intelligible to academics, journalists, students, and public officials. For this reason, its publications have been designed for use as an encyclopedia or as text books. Four of the fourteen cases of fundamentalism discussed in the volume pertain to Islamic varieties. The rest are concerned with fundamentalisms in the Americas (3), Israel (1), India (2), Theravada Buddhist societies (1), China (1), and Japan (1).

The editors conclude the first volume with a wide-ranging discussion of “pure fundamentalism” — a Weberian ideal type consisting of more than fifteen “family traits” that they have constructed on the basis of the fourteen case studies. These traits include religious idealism, scandalous rejection of outsiders, extremism, dramatic eschatology, missionary zeal, totalitarian impulse, close affinity to modernism, and mass appeal. Marty and Appleby then reach the project’s complicated creedal definition for the phenomenon:

Fundamentalism [is] a tendency, a habit of mind, found within religious communities and paradigmatically embodied in certain representative individuals and movements, which manifests itself as a strategy . . . by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group. Feeling this identity to be at risk in the contemporary era, they fortify it by a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from the sacred past. . . . These fundamentals . . . are accompanied . . . by unprecedented claims and doctrinal innovations.
Gellner, like Marty and Appleby, sees fundamentalism as a modern phenomenon. For him, however, religious fundamentalism is but one of three, not two, contending intellectual positions in the world today, the other two being Enlightenment rationalism (rationalist fundamentalism) and postmodernism (relativism). Religious fundamentalism is a doctrinally based rejection of secularism and is manifested in its most vigorous form in Islam. Its roots lie in the “high culture” of medieval Islam, which has been revitalized by modern reform movements. In its new “puritanical, egalitarian, scripturalist” form, Gellner maintains, this Islam “does not seem necessarily doomed to erosion by modern conditions. It may on the contrary be favored by them.” He dismisses postmodernism as an inchoate fashion among American intellectuals but identifies rationalist fundamentalism as religious fundamentalism’s most viable competitor. According to Gellner, this rationalism is a secularized continuation of exclusivist monotheism — a universally translatable set of scientific propositions and procedures “that has proved so overwhelmingly powerful, economically, militarily, administratively, that all societies have had to make their peace with it and adopt it.”

B. THE PROBLEM WITH “ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM”

Clearly, “fundamentalism” has come to dominate our thinking about Islam. Nonetheless, the establishment of such an influential discourse has not transpired without engendering a respectable amount of criticism. Since the early 1980s, a growing number of scholars has objected to the use of the concept in relation to modern Islamic movements and their ideologies. These include Ibrahim Abu Lughod, Yvonne Y. Haddad, William Shepherd, and, more recently, Gilles Kepel, John L. Esposito, and Mark Juergensmeyer. Critics have drawn attention to four serious defects that accompany the use of the term:

1. taxonomic error
2. taxonomic imprecision
3. polemical distortion
4. ideological mobilization

Extracting a term from its early-twentieth-century American Protestant context and employing it in the description and interpretation of
twentieth-century developments in the Muslim world has been determined to be no less than a taxonomic error, like calling a Muslim jurist a minister or clergyman. Both may be males, both may be religious authorities, but differences in their training, functions, and sociocultural environments negate any effort at classifying one in terms of the other. Likewise, how can “fundamentalism” encompass such variegated phenomena as Saudi Arabia’s post-1973 ideology; activities of the Muslim Brotherhood; the Iranian Revolution; antigovernment violence in such disparate countries as Egypt, Israel, and Algeria; the rediscovery of religion among Muslims in Europe and America; and the upsurge of veiling practices among Muslim women from Malaysia to Michigan? Doctrines of scriptural inerrancy, coupled with opposition to scientific modes of thinking and evolutionary theory, which are trademarks of American fundamentalism, do not begin to describe recent developments in Muslim societies with precision, nor do they make them any more intelligible. Indeed, some have argued that if adherence to a doctrine of scriptural inerrancy is invoked as the basis for classification, then all believing Muslims, who today number in the hundreds of millions, must be regarded as fundamentalists. Any designation with such general application is of little use in scholarly inquiry because it encompasses peoples holding diverse outlooks — passivist, activist, secular, conservative, radical, democratic, reactionary — coming from many different walks of life. Relativist critics contend, moreover, that since there is not an equivalent term to “fundamentalism” in the core languages of Islam, it is not a legitimate analytical concept.

These two types of objections, taxonomic error and imprecision, are usually linked to a third: that the concept “fundamentalism” has acquired extremely negative connotations in academic circles, and in the eyes of the Western public at large, thanks in part to media sensationalism. It has become embedded in antireligious polemics. Esposito observes, “For many liberal or mainline Christians, ‘fundamentalism’ is pejorative or derogatory, being applied rather indiscriminately to all those who advocate a literalist biblical position and thus are regarded as static, retrogressive, and extremist.”¹⁸

When such a term is employed in relation to the description and study of Islam and Muslim movements, therefore, it is burdened with the history of polemical connotations it has acquired in Western cultures — meanings that become embedded in serious scholarly discourse and public
opinion alike. This embedding has been noted by a Muslim reviewer of Marty and Appleby’s *Fundamentalisms Observed*:

The news media’s encapsulation of complex issues play [sic] a significant role in creating an atmosphere, perhaps which does not help to understand the deep-rooted reality of many complex situations. “Fundamentalism — Violence — Intolerance” becomes the dominant imagery which is often seen through the lens of “national interest” and presented to local audiences with a notion of “relevance” and “importance.” 

The polemic imagery described by this statement is exemplified by Martin Kramer in the introduction to his contribution to the Fundamentalism Project:

Of the many fundamentalisms that have emerged within Islam during recent years, perhaps none has had so profound an impact on the human imagination as Hizbullah — “the Party of God.” This movement of Lebanese Shi‘ite Muslims gained both fame and infamy within months of its first public appearance in 1982, by its resort to ingenious forms of violence. Hizbullah’s progression from suicide bombings to airliner hijackings to hostage holding made it an obsession of the media and the nemesis of governments. . . . More than any other fundamentalist movement in recent history, Hizbullah evoked the memory of the medieval Assassins, who had been feared in the West and Islam for their marriage of fierce militancy with destructive deeds.

This is not a particularly unusual statement. It demonstrates how Western scholarly discourse constructs a platform from which to make sweeping assessments that link fundamentalism, violence, and fear with Islam. Kramer’s association of Hizbullah with the twelfth-century Assassins exemplifies the strategy employed too frequently by scholars and journalists of directly identifying troubling developments in Muslim societies today with medieval ones, as if the more complex forces of historical change, cultural transformation, and demographic shifts were not worth taking into account. One can only imagine the objections that would be raised if a respected American Studies scholar were to interpret Chicano
or African American gang activity in American cities in terms of ancient Aztec or African warrior religions, while neglecting to discuss the immediate social, cultural, and economic causes. Although Kramer’s analysis contains valuable information about Hizbullah, and stresses its distinctive Shi’i character, as well as its links with Iran, it unfortunately neglects to discuss in any meaningful way the most immediate cause for the rise of the organization: the 1982 Israeli invasion and American complicity with it.

The fourth defect in “fundamentalism” is that it can foster ideological mobilization, a consequence of its capacity for polemical distortion. Much as monolithic “communism” (the “red menace”) functioned before the Iron Curtain rusted and the Soviet Union collapsed, “fundamentalism” invites deployment by governments and other hegemonic agencies to attain regional and global strategic objectives. Thus, in recent years, we have seen how scholars, political strategists, and powerful governmental bodies in the U.S. and abroad have found it in their interest to rally opinion against what they see as a pan-Islamic “threat” or “Muslim rage” against the West, its values, and its economic priorities. Prominent academics have joined with media personalities on CNN and other leading networks and newspapers to sell “fundamentalism” to the Western public, often focusing discussion on caricatured portrayals of individuals like Khomeini, Qaddafi, Saddam Husayn, and cUmar cAbd al-Rahman. As of mid-1993, the U.S. State Department has taken the position that there is no substance to fears of a global Islamic threat and has officially eschewed the use of the term “fundamentalist” when referring to Islamic organizations. “Political Islam” and “Islamism” are now de rigueur. Nonetheless, “fundamentalism” and the idea of a global Islamic threat are widely conjoined in public opinion and could easily resurface together on the policy level under the right set of circumstances.

Since the late 1970s, “fundamentalism” has become embedded within hegemonic discourse. Both it and “terrorism” are what Edward Said has recently called “overscale images” derived entirely from the concerns and intellectual factories in metropolitan centers like Washington and London. They are fearful images that lack discriminate contents or definition, but they signify moral power and approval for whoever uses them, moral defensiveness and criminalization for
whomever they designate. These two gigantic reductions mobilized armies as well as dispersed communities. . . .
Thus to oppose the abnormality and extremism embedded in terrorism and fundamentalism . . . is also to uphold the moderation, rationality, executive centrality of a vaguely designated “Western” (or otherwise local and patriotically assumed) ethos. 23

These remarks draw attention to a recurring feature of Western fundamentalist discourse — the habit of defining the subject in terms of opposition and negativities. Lawrence has maintained that although fundamentalists might be moderns, they nonetheless “oppose modernism and its proponents.” 24 Marty and Appleby posit that “fighting,” confrontation and opposition, and a “totalitarian impulse” are among its key distinguishing characteristics. The concept of “pure fundamentalism” that they devise is a “synthesis of extremes,” which includes the desire to be “intentionally scandalous.” By this they mean, in agreement with Lawrence, that fundamentalism commonly entails beliefs and practices “that violate the canons of the post-Enlightenment secular rationality that has characterized Western thought over the course of the past three centuries.” 25 Likewise, Gellner instructs us that, “Fundamentalism is best understood in terms of what it repudiates.” 26 None of these statements posits an insurmountable chasm between us and the fundamentalists — each leaves room for building bridges, however narrow. On the other hand, such judgments are conducive to the view that whoever fundamentalists are, and no matter how diverse their ideas and practices may be, they are essentially “not us.” In the language of religious phenomenology, they are “wholly Other” to the extent that they can inspire both fear and fascination. Aside from the fact that circumscribing the word “fundamentalism” with negatives violates one of the basic rules for scientific definition, thus impeding intelligibility, it also favors a climate within which Manichean notions such as Samuel P. Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” can gain wide circulation and credibility. Inspired in part by Western fundamentalist discourse, Huntington warns us of a Confucian-Islamic connection “that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power.” 27

The benefits to be gained from continued use of “fundamentalism” in scholarly research should therefore be carefully weighed against its theoretical and ethical shortcomings. Taken individually, these shortcom-
ings are not capable of dislodging the dominant paradigm. In aggregate, however, they make a compelling argument against it. At the very least, they require us to admit that "fundamentalism," especially "Islamic fundamentalism," is far from being a value-free concept, despite the disclaimers of its proponents.

C. THE INDIGENIZATION OF "FUNDAMENTALISM" IN EGYPT

It is one thing to describe the deployment of fundamentalist discourse in Washington, Cambridge, England, and Chicago, but it is something quite different to comprehend its transference to other parts of the world. If my thesis is correct and "fundamentalism" is truly a mode of hegemonic discourse, then we should not be surprised to find it embedded in the ideologies of Middle Eastern states, among ruling elites as well as among their subjects. Above all, this should be the case in countries that the U.S. government regards as "moderate" or "pro-Western" but that others might consider to be "client" states of the U.S. because of their overwhelming dependence on American military and economic assistance, and their consequent reluctance to criticize or act against U.S. foreign policy. The embedding of hegemonic discourse in such milieu is the result of indigenization processes, which I understand to consist of two aspects. On the one hand, indigenization entails the direct and indirect measures taken by superordinate agencies — in this case, Western academia, the U.S. government, and the media — to introduce their outlook and practices into local configurations of power to enhance stability and control for their own ends abroad. On the other hand, indigenization entails the conscious appropriation by the host society of a foreign concept or practice, or an aggregation of such concepts and practices, into its own political and cultural milieu to pursue its own localized interests. This is what has happened with "fundamentalism" in the Middle East, the best example of which is Egypt, one of America’s chief allies, or client states, since the 1970s.

The Islamic Question in Egypt today has become primarily a matter of what form of Islam will govern the country and its institutions, not one of church versus state or even religion versus secularism. For centuries, the Muslim population in Egypt construed its understanding of Islam in
terms of the household and the shrine, where they could turn for solace
and saintly intercession. The most pervasive social organization besides
the family was the Sufi order, whose branches linked Egypt’s urban
quarters and villages with each other and with the wider Muslim world.
The government was based largely on a network of patron-client relations
that tied soldiers, merchants, tax collectors, religious authorities, and Sufi
orders with the rulers. Governmental Islam was usually a large-scale
version of popular Islam. The traditional religious authorities based
their status upon knowledge of the Islamic sciences, which included
study of scripture and commentary, prophetic tradition, and above all,
Sacred Law. In times of stress, they served as intermediaries between
commoner and ruler.

This formation of Islam was profoundly shaken in the nineteenth
century, when, in the wake of Napoleon’s invasion, the local Turkish
aristocracy calculated that it was in its interest to create a “new order”
(nizam jadid) based on Western models of rationalized military organiza-
tion and production. For one-hundred fifty years, the dynasty of Muham-
mad ʿAlī was the chief conduit through which European ideas and
institutions, including securalism, were introduced into Egypt with varying
degrees of success. By the end of the last century, this process had given
Britain a colonial base in the country that lasted until the 1950s. It also led
to the displacement of the traditional Muslim religious authorities by new
educational and legal institutions that were not concerned with Islamic
sciences and jurisprudence, and by new technocratic elites. Nevertheless,
a group of active religious reformers emerged from amidst the traditional
bases of authority to harmonize Islam with Western science by restoring
what they identified as its essentially rational principles. These modernists
succeeded in gaining access to the colonial system. Together with the
secular intelligentsia, they promoted the cause of Egyptian nationalism and
attacked popular Sufism for being un-Islamic, irrational, backward, and
contrary to the forces of national independence.

Lastly, with the creation of a colonial economy based on new forms
of agricultural and industrial production, populations began to migrate to
towns and cities from the countryside. In these new environs, people
formed voluntary associations, a number of which were organized along
religious lines. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928, was the most
successful of these. Its core membership came from the urban petite
bourgeoisie, but in contrast to the modernists, it gained widespread appeal
among workers and peasants. The Brotherhood actively promoted a pro-
gram to create an Islamic order (*nizam islami*) through the moral revital-
ization of religion and Egyptian society through implementation of reli-
gious law, elimination of imperialist control, and repudiation of blind
imitation of the West. This organization, therefore, came into conflict with
the British-controlled monarchy, liberal nationalists, Muslim modernists,
and traditional religious authorities.

The Islamic Question in Egypt today is articulated in a formation
doing discourses about Islam that have developed from this historical back-
ground, particularly since the establishment of an independent nation-state
in 1952. This formation includes the Islams of the pro-Western Sadat-
Mubarak regime, the liberal intelligentsia, the Azhar-based religious
authorities, the Islamists, and the populace at large. The government knows
that it cannot define itself without reference to religion. It constructs its
Islam from elements of the others in order to either perpetuate itself or
legitimate its policies. For example, faced with the need to consolidate
power against the left, the Sadat regime appealed to the Muslim Brother-
hood and newer, more radical Islamist organizations. When these organi-
izations pose too much of a threat to the regime, the government appeals
to the liberal intellectuals and Azhar-based men of religion. Both of these
groups cooperate because they have become dependent on government
patronage and they know that they are not likely to fare well in a situation
where the Islamists gain the upper hand. Following the practice of other
regimes in Egyptian history, the government strives to appeal to popular
religious sentiments through its funding of mosque construction and
maintenance, involvement with Sufi organizations, organizing the Hajj,
and similar activities.

The problem is that this strategy has been only partially effective
as a palliative for widespread discontent resulting from a serious deterio-
rating in domestic socioeconomic conditions, pervasive political corrup-
tion, and overreliance on brute force when dealing with political opponents
and criminals alike. High rates of unemployment, a widening gap in
incomes between the elites and the working classes, inadequate health and
educational facilities, unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions, environ-
mental pollution, and declining agricultural production are among the
leading troubles people face. They consequently lose confidence in gov-
ernment, and some channel their alienation and discontent by joining and
supporting alternative Islamic organizations, ranging from the conserva-
tive Muslim Brotherhood to radical activist groups such as the Society of
Muslims (*jama'at al-muslimin*), al-Jihad, and the Islamic Society (*al-
jama'a al-islamiyya). Like the Muslim Brotherhood and Sufi orders, the radical groups form branches throughout the country but are highly secretive to avoid government intervention. Their strategies vary from gradualist to revolutionary, but all seek to replace the status quo with a purely Islamic government and social order. Proclaiming their message through sermons, cassettes, leaflets, demonstrations, and social service activities, they draw their membership from the working class, low-level bureaucrats, teachers, students, and, to a limited extent, military personnel. Women participate actively as members or provide support networks for the men. Their strongest bases of operation are located in Upper Egypt, especially between the Fayum and Qena, and in the densely populated shantytowns in Cairo and Alexandria. Their influence can be found even in small towns and villages.

Since the late 1970s, the radical Islamic organizations have been engaged in an ongoing cycle of violent confrontations with the government. They have successfully carried out assassinations of President Sadat, a former minister of religious affairs, the speaker of the assembly, and dozens of police and security officers. In recent months they have made attempts on the lives of top governmental officials and national figures, including President Mubarak and Nobel Prize author Naguib Mahfouz. Some groups have detonated bombs in public squares and near police stations, and launched deadly attacks on Coptic Christians, banks, businesses, and foreign tourists.

The government for its part acts and reacts with full force under the umbrella of the state of emergency it declared in 1981. Its security forces conduct sweeping arrests of suspects, including women and children. When the speaker of the parliament was assassinated in October 1990, thousands of people were arrested. According to Amnesty International, detainees are held indefinitely and are subject to torture — or worse. Defendants are tried by military tribunals, with little recourse to adequate legal counsel. When the influence of the Islamic Society organization in Imbaba — a crowded Cairo neighborhood of rural immigrants, reported to have a 50 percent rate of unemployment — attracted the attention of the international media in December 1992, the government declared a curfew and ordered more than 14,000 troops with armored vehicles into the area to seal it off. Within five days they arrested more than 600 suspects, including the alleged leader of the group, and closed its mosque. A spokesman for the government declared to the New York Times, “This operation should finish
them off. We estimate that 90 percent of them have been captured now, and the rest are on the run, homeless. The terrorist movement has felt the full force and magnitude of the government."

Responses from residents to this emergency action were mixed; some spoke in favor of the government’s intervention, others criticized it or avoided saying anything for fear of reprisal. The comments of a woman whose brother had escaped capture by security police, however, reveal how Islamist organizations have been able to gain popular support:

They helped the people. They were the first people to help when the earthquake happened [12 October 1992]; even before the Red Crescent came, they put up tents for the victims. If anyone committed a crime the Islamists would make sure they were punished for it."

Islamist organizations thus appear at times to perform more efficiently and effectively than governmental ones, especially in places like Imbaba, where a substantial number of Egyptians live.

It is during this fourteen-year state emergency, when hundreds have lost their lives and thousands more have been imprisoned and tortured, that “Islamic fundamentalism” has become indigenized in Egypt. Unlike the term “democracy,” which continues as a loan word in Modern Standard Arabic (dimugratiiyya), “fundamentalism” has been translated into Arabic with the word usuliyya. Let us now turn to consider precisely how it has become indigenized.

Uktubar magazine is an Egyptian weekly news and editorial publication, directed to an upper-middle class readership. The views it expresses conform with those of the government. One of its April 1993 issues contained an article by Professor cAbd al-cAzim Ramadan, a professor of contemporary Egyptian history and a writer and editor for the magazine. The article, entitled “The Fundamentalists: An Egyptian or a Global Phenomenon?” describes the author’s involvement in the Chicago Fundamentalism Project and the publication of its first volumes, and assesses its implications for dealing with the domestic situation in Egypt. Ramadan first points out that in 1979 he was part of a closed-door commission convened by the National Center for Criminal and Social Research and was charged with discussing the issue of “religious extremism.” He then links this commission’s task with that of the Chicago Project in the late eighties:
I thought that the fundamentalist phenomenon was confined to Egypt and the Islamic world, but I quickly realized that the phenomenon was much greater than that, that it encompassed the entire surface of the globe, including all revealed and natural religions.

I realized this from the number of professors participating in the project, whose scholarly specializations include the world’s different religions and regions. It is an extraordinary number, belonging to many universities and numerous nationalities. Besides myself, the project’s administrative committee consists of sixteen members from the universities of Harvard, Chicago, Stanford, Emory, Columbia, Vanderbilt, and the Economic Development Institute of Delhi.

Most striking is how the author recruits the project to settle the question of how to deal with the violence Egypt experienced in 1992-93. He identifies two schools of thought, one that sees the problem as a result of Egypt’s deteriorating social and economic conditions, the other (favored by himself) that sees the problem as primarily a global political one:

It is clear from this overview of the two volumes [published by the Project] that fundamentalist movements are not limited to Egypt — they extend across the civilized world, across all religions. It is a new global phenomenon drawing everyone’s attention, trying to reconstruct the world on new foundations. It differs from religion to religion, and from society to society, but it is in agreement in its rejection of the existing political order, and desires to reshape it by various means, from peaceful appeal to armed terrorism.

As is the case for any new disease, scientists start to study it for the purpose of dealing with it and eliminating it. All the political systems in the world today regard the fundamentalist movements as a new disease; they must study it, and understand it thoroughly, so that they can eliminate it with ease.
He discounts the socioeconomic explanation on the grounds that Egypt’s long history of problems in this area has not as a rule created terrorist groups:

The phenomenon therefore is a matter of politics and state security. It may exploit social and economic conditions, but it does not result from them! Its treatment, therefore, must be purely a matter of state security.

In his conclusion, Ramadan accuses those who would propose a socioeconomic explanation of misleading Egyptians into thinking the solution lies in improving employment and living conditions, which he claims is nearly impossible for the government to do at the present time. The phenomenon is really a global one and deserves continuous study by government agencies so that the fight against terrorism can be based on scientific knowledge, and not left completely in the hands of the state security apparatus.

Official government discourse in Egypt refers to Islamic opposition groups as gangs of “extremists” and “terrorists,” inspired and bankrolled by dark forces abroad (especially Iran and Sudan). They are not really Egyptians, nor even Muslims. Therefore, they can be dealt with mercilessly with the full force of the state. What Ramadan’s article demonstrates is how the category “fundamentalism,” as construed by Western scholars of religion and politics (i.e., “us”), can be appropriated to validate the line of the Egyptian regime, and to justify state action. The physical effects of such actions on human bodies is now well documented by international human rights agencies.

But this is not the only way “fundamentalism” has been indigenized in Egypt. Muhammad Sa’id al-‘Ashmawi, High Court judge and bold critic of “political Islam,” has published widely in the Egyptian print media during the 1980s and 1990s. In a 1986 essay on “Islamic fundamentalism” he acknowledges that “fundamentalism” is a foreign word originating among a group of Christians in America. Despite this, he adopts it to designate two contending currents in Islam today: rational and activist. Rational fundamentalism is concerned with returning to the original Islam, as it was understood by the first Muslims on the basis of the Quran and the paradigmatic example of the Prophet Muhammad, and using this understanding “to renew Muslim spiritual life, restore respect for the values of work and individual effort, and to take a turn in guiding world civilization such that the human being becomes its axis and God becomes
Activist fundamentalism, on the other hand, is a purely human enterprise concerned more with political action than real religious renewal. Taken up only with the superficialities of Islam’s past, “it seeks to make politics out of religion, a political party out of religious law, and war out of Islam.”33 cAshmawi, therefore, contends that one kind of Islamic fundamentalism promises to contribute to human progress, while the other impedes it.

Most of cAshmawi’s writings in recent years have advocated secularism and democratization in Egypt, which conform with “enlightened” Islam, while he has simultaneously undertaken a sustained critique of the ideology of activist fundamentalism, which he now prefers to call “political Islam.” The three basic characteristics of this kind of Islam are that it requires all Muslims to engage in political action against unbelief and corruption in order to establish a theocratic regime based on God’s law, that those who participate in this effort are the only true Muslims, and that it uses violence (jihad) in order to impose its doctrines. These claims, cAshmawi argues, are not only erroneous, but they threaten to place Islam in opposition to “world civilization” in general and the West in particular, thus actually confirming the suspicions of the Orientalists:

The project of Islamic civilization cannot stand in isolation from global reality. It also cannot possibly undo this reality without having first understood it and contributed its sublime religious values and lofty moral principles to it. Therefore this project will bring values, morality, knowledge, consciousness, capability and strength into being. It cannot possibly be based on mere political contentions and empty slogans.34

In cAshmawi’s view, Islam (or rational fundamentalism) promises to contribute to the moral progress of human civilization. Activist fundamentalism, or political Islam, is a modern revival of ancient Islamic sectarianism and offers nothing of lasting value. His persistent criticism of Islamist ideology has earned him the enmity of its proponents, to the extent that they have placed his name on their death list. It has also placed him in disfavor with the government’s foremost Islamic agency, Al-Azhar. In January 1992, a committee in Al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Academy ordered the confiscation of five of cAshmawi’s books at the annual Cairo International Book Fair, including his book on political Islam. He suspects
that it was acting in collusion with Islamist organizations, perhaps because the Algerian government had just issued an edition of *Political Islam* to counteract the growing influence of the Islamic Salvation Front. Ashmawi immediately took his case to the Egyptian media, arguing that Al-Azhar had violated Egyptian censorship laws. Within a week, President Mubarak nullified the confiscation.

A very different indigenization of "fundamentalism" is evident in the writings of Hasan Hanafi, a well-known philosophy professor at Cairo University and American University in Cairo. Hanafi, after having been imprisoned by the Sadat regime together with other prominent dissidents of the left and right in September 1981, was asked by a leading Egyptian journalist to analyze the legal proceedings of the Sadat assassination trial. The early result of this was a study cast in the form of a legal brief for the defense of Sadat’s assassins, who by their actions, he says, brought an end "to one of the worst eras in Egyptian history." An expanded version of this study was published in 1982 by the Egyptian newspaper *al-Watan* in fifteen installments, under the title "The Contemporary Islamic Movement and Its Future." In 1989, these articles were published in expanded form as a book under the title *Islamic Fundamentalism (al-Usuliyya al-islamiyya).*

The introduction to this volume sets forth his interpretation of the term "Islamic fundamentalism." He argues that *al-Usuliyya al-Islamiyya* and *al-Salafiyya* are the most fitting terms for what the West calls "Islamic fundamentalism," but he indicates that they connote a very different "signified." *Usuliyya* can refer to the scholarly task of identifying the fundamental principles of Islamic religious doctrine and law. Every event, organization, or state is based on a concept that is foundational. Thus, capitalist states are founded on the concept of capitalism, socialist ones on that of social justice, and Islamic states on Islamic legality. *Usuliyya*, in one of its meanings, therefore, is concerned with formulating and implementing this legality.

*Salafiyya* in Quranic and colloquial discourse, according to Hanafi, denotes sentiment or nostalgia for the virtuous ancestors of the past, in marked contrast to ensuing generations. This concept was developed by the *salafiyya* movement founded by Ibn Hanbal in the ninth century and followed by jurists like Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). It was revived in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the Wahhabi, Mahdist, and Sanusi movements, as well as by the leaders of the Islamic reform movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
At this point in the discussion, Hanafi begins to define what *usuliyya* is not. It does not necessarily mean conservatism, backwardness, or hostility to modern civilization, nor fanaticism, narrow-mindedness, or rejection of dialogue. It does not necessarily mean sectarian groups or groups of oppressed social outcasts, nor committing acts of violence, using force, overthrowing the government, or plotting assassinations. Lastly, it does not mean attachment to superficialities, like growing a beard, wearing a head covering (*hijab*), calling for the application of Islamic law, establishing an Islamic state, and building mosques. Finally, it is not even a product of the modern age.

Given this litany of negatives, Hanafi proceeds to lay the outlines of what he thinks *usuliyya* really is. *Usuliyya*, or *salafiyya*, has existed throughout the history of Islam. It is the call to Muslims by reformers, progressives, and enlightened people to embrace science, industry, and free, democratic systems. *Usuliyya* includes open-minded thinkers and intellectuals who are conversant with cultural history and modern civilizations, and who face contemporary challenges. They write in the spirit of toleration and cooperation, calling for brotherhood and love. They call for the creation of the total individual in order to achieve a comprehensive unity for the (Muslim) community as a whole, the mobilization of its peoples, the establishment of its own state, and the preservation of its identity. It is a movement based on spreading religious consciousness, awakening nationalist consciousness, and founding political consciousness by using the instruments of religious reform: religious education, preserving the Arabic language, calling for purity, and activating the tenets of religion in the hearts of the faithful. Indeed, *usuliyya* gave birth to people’s liberation movements against colonialism in the Sudan, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Palestine.

Ramadan, cAshmawi, and Hanafi articulate three different fundamentalisms within the liberal intellectual formation of Islam. Ramadan, a participant in The Fundamentalism Project, takes the “Islamic fundamentalism” of the West and uses it to legitimate the use of force by the state. Hanafi takes this same fundamentalism and inverts it to subvert Western formations of truth and to critique the Egyptian state as well as the condition of popular Muslim consciousness. cAshmawi takes a position half-way between the two, distinguishing between the threat of activist fundamentalism and the promise of rational fundamentalism.
It would be incorrect to conclude, of course, that these constructions of “fundamentalism” are the only ones in Egypt. Members of Islamist organizations occasionally identify themselves to outsiders as fundamentalists, but in doing so they are clearly adopting a term that has odious connotations for Westerners as a badge of honor. It is not, however, a designation that they utilize in their internal discourses. On the other hand, since 1992, numerous articles have appeared in the Egyptian press that have either rejected outright the concept of usuliyya or protested the way the West has used it.

One of those who has stood against the indigenization of “fundamentalism” in Egypt is Muhammad ćImara, the prolific professor of history at ćAin Shams University in Cairo and, since the 1980s, a leading intellectual for the more moderate wing of the Islamist movement. In a talk on the subject, “The Interaction of Civilizations,” he discussed the question of the plurality and integrity of civilizations.36 It is possible, he maintained, for different civilizations to coexist and maintain their identities as long as they acknowledge their commonalities, minimize their conflicts to peaceful competition, and affirm their differences to the degree that these differences pertain to protecting the welfare of their respective peoples. Scientific knowledge, for example, is something to be shared across civilizational boundaries; it is something they have in common. “Fundamentalism” is not, because in the West it connotes backwardness, while usuliyya in Islam is a designation for progress and reason. In his opinion, Western “fundamentalism” is a completely invalid concept.

Ahmad Bahgat, the lead editorialist for Egypt’s semi-official newspaper al-Ahram, known for his strong interest in religious issues, took ćImara’s argument even further. In a July 1993 editorial, “The Fundamentalist Model,” he contrasted how the world reacted to the creation of Israel with how it reacted to the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. While it did not object to the first, it aligned itself against the second. He then stated that,

The only thing any one knew about the word usuli before the fifties and sixties of this century was in relation to doctors of Islamic jurisprudence and their students. As for the common man on the street, the term usuliyya means proper social conduct (usul al-ma‘rifa). The expression ibn al-usul was used with the connotation of
having a good upbringing, taste, morals, and a noble family background.

Then America invented the term *usuliyya* a little after inventing the hamburger, and its new meaning became terrorism, criminality, and lawbreaking.\(^{37}\)

If this is the case, Bahgat argues, the term is more aptly applied to Israel, which he claims, without supporting evidence, is the first *usuli* state in the Middle East. He wonders why Jewish *usuliyya* is respected and Islamic *usuliyya* treated as a plague which must be eradicated? Furthermore, why isn’t the term applied to Christianity in regard to the actions of David Koresh, which led to the deaths of many of his followers? Bahgat concludes abruptly with the assertion that Israel is, in fact, the supreme exemplar for fundamentalist terrorism.

In this, and similar lines of discourse, the neologism *usuliyya* is construed as fundamentally alien to Islam, a rhetorical weapon used against it by its enemies in the West and their proxies as well as a weapon to be directed back against them. The prolific female columnist and scholar of religious literature ‘Aisha ‘Abd al-Rahman (Bint al-Shati’) has gone so far as to aver that Islamic fundamentalism has been invented by Israel in order to justify its suppression of Palestinians and pursue other objectives in the region with American backing.\(^{38}\)

The indigenization of “fundamentalism” in Egypt as presented in the foregoing pages has occurred primarily among the country’s intelligentsia. Some have appropriated it in a way that supports the government’s campaign against Islamist organizations; others have used it to distinguish between progressive and reactionary religious ideologies. Yet others have used it as evidence of a foreign conspiracy against Islam. Although some Islamists occasionally use the term, in their own discourses they prefer to use terms such as “Islam,” “Islamic awakening,” “Islamic path,” “Islamic renaissance,” even “political Islam,” instead of “fundamentalism” when referring to their ideologies, organizations, and practices. But to elicit the history and nuances of these self-designations as well as the categories the Islamists construe for others is a task that must be kept for another time.

Although “Islamic fundamentalism” is not likely to survive for long as an active concept in the Egyptian milieu, the comparative approach used here can be applied to other contexts in a way that would be conducive to attaining greater intelligibility. Thus we would expect the indigenization
of "Islamic fundamentalism" in Algeria, Tunisia, Palestine, or Iran to be substantially different from its indigenization in Egypt because the formations of Islamic discourse in each of those lands are substantially different and because their relations with Western powers differ. A study of the indigenization of "Islamic fundamentalism" in Israeli discourse would be no less revealing.

D. THE ENDS

Bassam Tibi wrote recently that, "Islam is not identical to Islamic fundamentalism."39 This statement is correct, but not in the sense Tibi intended, because he insists that the latter is primarily a modern Islamic political ideology. As I have contended in the foregoing pages, "fundamentalism" is first of all a product of Western academic discourse about religion in the modern world—particularly the religion of the Other. To reword Marty and Appleby's definition, I would say that "Islamic fundamentalism" is 'a tendency, a habit of mind, found within scholarly communities and paradigmatically embodied in certain representative individuals and organizations, which manifests itself as a strategy, or a set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers in the West attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group.'

In 1965, E.E. Evans-Pritchard acknowledged that anthropologists were becoming uncomfortable about the use of the word "primitive" with reference to small-scale, kin-based societies. He contended that despite its origins in "the good time of Victorian prosperity and progress," its use in comparative description and analysis was still valid in a value-free sense. The study of primitive religion in particular has helped us comprehend the essential features of religion in general, as well as discover the roots of "higher religions...including our own." Moreover, he concluded, the word "is too firmly established to be eliminated."40

Alas, Evans-Pritchard's defense of: "the primitive" has proven to be incapable of withstanding the forces of decolonization and nationalism. It has succumbed both to the triumph of newly constituted nation-states over tribal peoples and to the direct involvement of the so-called primitives in anthropological and cultural discourse. Individuals who might have been informants for white Anglo ethnographers half a century ago now hold positions in American universities, actively participate in academic
conferences, and lecture and publish widely. "The primitive" has disappeared as a valid concept for comparative cultural analysis and description. More than ever, it is now seen as a milestone in the history of a Western colonial discourse about the colonized that reached its apogee in the early decades of this century. Evans-Pritchard's statements signaled the end of this discourse.

Like the study of "the primitive," the organized study of religion emerged from the reorientation of power and knowledge within the nineteenth-century European nation-states and colonial empires. It thereupon claimed a stake for itself in secular hegemonic discourse, outside the limits of traditional theology. From this position it produced an array of comparative theorectico-descriptive concepts, from "fetishism," "animism," and "the sacred" to Urmonotheismus. Phrased in evolutionary or phenomenological terms, each concept was drawn into the quest for the beginnings of religion and human culture. Each one was used to establish relative and absolute differences between ancient and modern, primitive and highly evolved, savage and civilized, irrational and rational, Oriental and Occidental, and, of course, "them" and "us." Today these concepts survive mainly in vestigial form, representing stages in the evolution of scholarly discourse, not in human cultures per se. This does not mean that relativism and new-age theology have triumphed, however. There is a timely need for sustained comparative inquiry and critical theorizing about human beliefs, practices, and institutions — particularly where they are at junctures of change and interaction.

Now, at the end of the twentieth century, we have "fundamentalism" — another localized concept that has attained universal application. Like its predecessors, it is obsessed with origins (fundamentals), and like them, it has been produced and wielded within an asymmetrical, hegemonic frame of discourse. Marty and Appleby have frankly acknowledged that the participants in The Fundamentalism Project "are resolutely 'of the Western Academy.'" Echoing Evans-Pritchard's defensive remarks about "the primitive," they have even declared that "'fundamentalism' is here to stay." Where "fundamentalism" departs from its predecessors, however, is in the emphasis it places on the conjunction of religion and politics in the modern world.

In the Western Academy the study of religion has tended to neglect topics dealing conspicuously with the interrelationships between religion and politics. Perusal of any issue of the Journal of the American Academy of Religion, History of Religions, and Journal of Religion, or even the
programs for the American Academy of Religion’s annual meetings, bears this out. In response to contemporary events, and growing consciousness about their inattention to aggregations of religion and politics, scholars of religion set forth in the 1980s on an interdisciplinary inquiry into “fundamentalism.” This concept, too, I believe, is destined for the same reliquary as “the primitive,” “animism,” and “totemism.” But at what cost? For as long as this designation for Islam and other religions remains operative, it has the very real potential to legitimize the mobilization of tremendously destructive forces against colonized peoples, ethnic minorities, social classes, religious movements, and political activists to bring about their subjugation in a new world order. In short, it has the capacity to fulfill the prophecies of a Western confrontation with Islam, with what Huntington has called “the Confucian-Islamic military connection.” Isn’t this, after all, one of the ends of “Islamic fundamentalism,” too?

NOTES

7 James Piscatori, ed., *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); *Islam in a World of Nation States*


10 This figure is based on a search of the MAGS database through the University of California’s on-line Melvyl catalogue, conducted 1 November 1994.


12 All four volumes have been edited by Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, and were published by the University of Chicago Press between 1991 and 1994.


14 Ibid., 835.

15 Gellner, Postmodernism, 22.
16. Ibid., 61.


21. Esposito wrote The Islamic Threat largely as a corrective to such exaggerated claims; see especially the discussion in chap. 6.

22. See, for example, George A. Pickart to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Battle Looms: Islam and Politics in the Middle East, 103d Congress, 1st sess., February 1993, S. Prt. 103-17. "Fundamentalism" occurs in this report, but references to political Islam and Islamism prevail. It deals with the subject on a country-by-country basis and avoids inferring that there is any kind of pan-Islamic conspiracy at work.


25. See Marty and Appleby, Fundamentalisms Observed, vii-x; 818, 824.


31 Ramadan’s *Uktubar* magazine article, intended for an educated Egyptian readership is markedly different in tone from his contribution to the Fundamentalism Project, “Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups,” in *Fundamentalisms and the State*, ed. Marty and Appleby, 152-83. The latter was adapted by Appleby from a book-length study that is yet to be published, which may partly explain the difference in tone between the Arabic and English articles, in addition the fact that the intended audiences differ.


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., 246.


41 Marty and Appleby, *Fundamentalisms and the State*, 5.