Title
Economic Voting in Post-Communist Eastern Europe

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Between 1992 and 1994 a puzzling phenomenon manifested itself in four newly democratized states of Eastern Europe: political parties directly descendant of Soviet-era communist parties achieved parliamentary victories in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In less than five years of democratic government, the citizens of these countries had become largely disillusioned with the myriad parties which had arisen in opposition to communism.\(^2\) The relatively peaceful transitions in Eastern Europe permitted the formerly monolithic communist parties to continue playing significant roles in many of these new political regimes. Following internal restructuring, these ex-communist parties, with their established material, networking, and organizational resources, presented themselves as credible democratic alternatives to the major opposition parties associated with the transition to democracy and free-market capitalism. In Lithuania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, ex-communist parties acquired sufficient votes to obtain manufactured parliamentary majorities,\(^3\) while in Poland, the ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) formed a coalition with two other parties to capture nearly three-quarters of the seats in the Polish Sejm.

The behavior of voters in these four countries might be interpreted as a manifestation of nostalgia for the securities associated with the communist past: a time when street crime, unemployment, and unaffordable housing were practically non-existent. Yet, it would be misguided to suppose that electoral support for ex-communist parties equated to a desire for the return of the communist political regime. As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan explain:

\[\ldots\] the reform Communist coalitions accepted the democratic rules of the game in how they contested the election and later in how they ruled. Also, very importantly, they were accepted as legitimate actors and rulers by the parties they defeated. In this sense there was not a regime change away from democracy as political scientists normally use the term. Strictly speaking, in comparative terms, the Lithuanian, Polish, and Hungarian elections represented a peaceful democratic alternation of power. (1996, 454)\(^4\)

The ex-communist parties of Eastern Europe have not typically promoted ideologically communist party platforms. Most, in fact, tend to be pro-democracy. Furthermore, among the ex-communist party elite, many have the distinction of being associated with the soft-line nomenklatura of the communist regime who supported liberalization policies in the late 1980s. Following electoral failures in the first post-communist free elections,\(^5\) many ex-communist parties have been largely successful at transforming their images. Richard Rose explains that these parties have learned "they
need to lean over backwards to pay tribute to freedom in order to reassure voters that they truly have changed their practices. Concurrently, they can emphasize continuing priority for social welfare rather than market values" (1995, 12).

Following the initial democratic elections in Eastern Europe, the victorious fledgling pro-market/pro-democracy parties soon discovered that the negative consequences of engaging in simultaneous economic and political restructuring could potentially prove detrimental to their bases of electoral support. Reduced standards of living and the growth of organized crime, coupled with unfulfilled expectations, resulted in the swift retreat of once-optimistic citizens from political engagement to address social and economic concerns closer to home. This withdrawal is evidenced by the precipitous decline in turnout rates for national elections across much of Eastern Europe following the founding democratic elections. Of those who remained politically involved, many opted to seek out parties which promised social and financial securities, or at least some way of reducing the considerable anomie which ensued following the breakdown of the communist regimes. The ex-communist parties, sporting a kinder, gentler new look, welcomed these voters with open arms.

An informed explanation for the return to power of ex-communist parties in Eastern Europe may find its source in a behavior frequently observed in Western democratic elections: economic voting. Simply stated, theories of economic voting contend that the success or failure of an incumbent party is directly related to changes (real or perceived) in economic conditions prior to elections. Incumbent parties are rewarded with more votes when economic conditions have improved (or are expected to improve), while they are punished with fewer votes when economic conditions have deteriorated (or are expected to deteriorate). Using theories of economic voting developed in advanced democracies, the present study tests the hypothesis that the replacement of incumbent pro-market/pro-democracy governments with ex-communist parties in post-communist Eastern European elections was a function of the economic calculus of frustrated citizens at the ballot box.

**Voting Behavior in Post-Communist Eastern Europe**

The economic crises of the 1980s which helped bring about the downfall of the state socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, coupled with the necessity after 1989 to engage simultaneously in both radical political and economic reform, generated concern among Western scholars about the sources and depth of legitimacy upon which these new democratic regimes could rely. The rapid achievement of efficacy in the economic arena was recommended as a goal of primary importance, as the negative consequences of market reform (unemployment, inflation, reduced standards of living), if neglected for too long, were perceived as real threats to the stability of these fledgling regimes. Concerns about the potential for a popular backlash against democracy, resulting from unfulfilled material expectations and deteriorating living conditions, were widespread. Some went so far as to contend that "perestroika (economic and social reform) must precede glasnost (political freedom)," arguing "that perestroika is more possible without the latter, in impoverished lands" (Lipset 1994, 17; emphasis in original; see also Przeworski 1991).
Nevertheless, despite a broad array of reform strategies—whether through ‘shock therapy’ or gradual (and often impeded) reform—and varying degrees and periods of economic hardship across the region, and despite the fact that perestroika did not precede glasnost, and, finally, despite the fact that communist successor parties and personnel were (democratically) returned to power (or never left) in several of these countries, every former Soviet satellite in Eastern Europe continues to be a democracy ten years after the collapse of the communist regimes. How, then, can we interpret and explain the return to power of the ex-communist parties through democratic elections in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria? While some scholars have attributed the revival of the communist successor parties to factors such as legal thresholds (Moraski and Loewenberg 1999) or previous regime types (Ishiyama 1997), such explanations fail to explain electoral support for these parties among the mass publics of Eastern Europe.

In 1990, Ralf Dahrendorf foresaw the potential for the return of the reformed communist parties: "I suspect that…in East Central Europe…the pendulum of normal politics will have to swing once in the liberal and once in the social direction before you feel that you have made it. The liberal direction…involves the jump start of economies…Opposition to this process is bound to arise, and it will be about the social cost of economic growth" (71-2). While Dahrendorf’s prediction did not manifest itself across the board in Eastern Europe, it certainly seems to fit well with the pattern observed in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Implicitly or explicitly, numerous scholars of post-communist East European politics and political economy have interpreted the resurgence of the communist successor parties as the result—at least in part—of the economic frustrations of the electorate. Among them, Krzysztof Jasiewicz notes, "The hardships of the transition (which often reached the point of absolute pauperisation), whether caused by the ultimately successful ‘shock therapy’ (as in Poland), or by a ‘shock without therapy’ (as in Lithuania or Bulgaria), caused widespread popular dissatisfaction and gave a competitive advantage to political actors promising quick and easy solutions. The former communists were as eager as anyone else to make such promises" (1998, 186). Yet, despite considerable speculation about the influence of economic conditions on the return to power of ex-communists in Eastern Europe, little empirical evidence has been assembled to support such assumptions.

The academic literature regarding post-communist Eastern Europe is virtually devoid of systematic, comparative studies of voting behavior in general. The reasons, however, are numerous and clear. For example, considerable electoral volatility and the continuous emergence, demise, merging, and splitting of political parties and electoral unions have contributed to a situation in which the study of voting behavior in the new democracies of Eastern Europe, particularly from a comparative perspective, is particularly difficult and complex. Furthermore, reliable and comparable cross-national data from the region (whether survey, economic, or electoral) are limited and often difficult to acquire. The result has been the publication of several country-specific studies of post-communist East European elections. An exception, however, is Alexander Pacek’s (1994) empirical cross-national study of electoral behavior in post-communist Eastern Europe. Pacek examines the effects of economic adversity on electoral turnout and election outcomes in elections held from 1990 to 1992 in Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic, and Poland. Using aggregate district-level data, Pacek’s multivariate analyses for each election reveal
that unemployment rates were negatively related to incumbent party vote shares and positively associated with vote shares for the normal and extremist (left or right wing) opposition parties (1994, 734-738). Pacek’s examination of economic voting in East Central Europe is laudable, yet it also demonstrates the need for further research on the topic. His sole indicator for economic decline is change in unemployment rates. Although Pacek’s analyses demonstrate strong relationships between party vote shares and this variable, the various forms of economic voting (prospective/retrospective; pocketbook/sociotropic) cannot be analyzed with Pacek’s aggregate district-level data. Furthermore, while Pacek is able to account for election outcomes, his research does not address individual vote choice. The next logical step in evaluating economic voting in post-communist Eastern Europe is to analyze how individual-level factors affect vote choice from a cross-national perspective.

Examinations of Polish elections have found some evidence for economic voting patterns, but such findings have tended to become qualified by the inclusion of relevant contextual factors. Examining Polish voting patterns in the 1991 Sejm election, Wade, Groth, and Lavelle (1994) revealed that district-level unemployment and the varied presence of the Catholic Church by district were the most important influences on party vote shares, with higher district unemployment rates tending to increase left-party vote shares. Yet, in a follow-up study analyzing the 1993 Polish election (through which the ex-communist SLD was returned to parliamentary power), the same authors find that district unemployment is no longer a statistically significant predictor of party vote shares. Furthermore, only one economic variable (district-level prices) had a significant impact on vote shares. The most compelling explanation for party vote share variation by district in the 1993 election was region: "modern, northern and western Poland [was] more receptive to the blandishments of the left, and traditionalist, southern and eastern Poland [was] relatively more resistant to them" (Wade, Lavelle, and Groth 1995, 424).

Even more compelling, however, are the findings in Powers and Cox’s study of voting behavior in the 1993 Polish election. Employing an individual-level analysis of a national random-sample survey of the Polish population immediately following the 1993 Sejm election, the authors find that while changes in living situations are significant predictors of vote choice, these effects are greatly attenuated (to the point of insignificance) when filtered through individual attributions of blame for the decline in living standards. Thus, the SLD is shown to have received greater electoral support from those who blamed their low standards of living on the first-wave of reformers, while, to a lesser extent, the incumbent Democratic Union drew support from those who attributed blame for Poland’s poverty to 45 years of communist rule. This unique finding leads Powers and Cox to conclude that:

Satisfaction with economic reforms has some influence on voting, but its effect is not as large as one might expect, given the prominence of market reforms and privatization. The greatly attenuated economic effects and the fact that, for many Poles, noneconomic issues are of paramount importance, suggest that the ascendancy of post-communist parties is not so easily explained by economic dissatisfaction and punishment of incumbents. (1997, 627-28; emphasis added)

Existing studies of individual vote choice and election outcomes in post-communist democracies have thus tended to reveal that evaluations of the economy had
some influence on the return to power of the communist successor parties. Yet, simple economic considerations have proven to be poor predictors of vote choice and election outcomes when other relevant factors are considered—especially regional variations (Wade, Lavelle, and Groth 1995) and blame attribution (Powers and Cox 1997). However, it should be apparent to the reader by this point that Poland has received a disproportionate share of attention in these studies. The present study is an attempt to begin rectifying the paucity of comparative individual-level analyses of voting behavior in the post-communist democracies of Eastern Europe.

**Economic Voting**

Researchers studying advanced industrial democracies have attempted to demonstrate that changes in economic conditions under a given government impact an individual’s decision whether or not to vote for the ruling party again at election time. Considerable evidence has been assembled confirming the presence of economic voting among Western electorates, yet the manner in which economics affect voters remains unresolved (see, for example, Kiewiet 1983; Lewis-Beck 1988; Norpoth, Lewis-Beck, and Lafay 1991). There are two general approaches to the study of economic voting: the researcher must distinguish whether the goal is to account for election outcomes (by using aggregate-level economic and election data) or to explain individual party choice (by using individual-level survey data). The present study focuses on the latter. In general, contending approaches to the study of economic voting at the individual party choice level attempt to demonstrate 1) whether individuals are ‘pocketbook’ or ‘sociotropic’ voters, and/or 2) whether individuals vote ‘prospectively’ or ‘retrospectively’.

Pocketbook voting is the notion that voting is influenced by individuals’ assessments of their personal (household) financial situations. If an individual feels that his personal financial situation worsened under a given government, he will be less likely to vote for the ruling party in the next election. On the other hand, if an individual perceives that her personal financial situation improved, then she is more likely to reward the incumbent government by voting for that party in the next election. Support for the pocketbook voting thesis is demonstrated, among others, by Kiewiet (1983, Chapter 4) and Markus (1988).

Sociotropic voting implies that citizens take into account larger national economic conditions when determining for which party to vote. Kinder and Kiewiet (1981, 132) argue that voters develop not-wholly sophisticated impressions of the state of the economy, "and then credit or blame the incumbent accordingly." Sociotropic voting, then, is not necessarily some sort of altruistic calculus of the individual voter looking out for the economic needs of the entire country, but instead may be based on the notion that a better national economy benefits the individual. Lewis-Beck (1988), Kiewiet (1983, Chapter 6), and Kinder, Adams, and Gronke (1989) are among those who have illustrated sociotropic voting effects in their research.

In addition to the pocketbook/sociotropic influences on voting, there is also the issue of whether individuals vote based on evaluations of the past or expectations for the future. Retrospective voting implies that "votes are cast on the basis of economic performance, rather than economic policy proposals" (Lewis-Beck 1988, 40). Using retrospective evaluations as the basis for studying economic voting has, until recently,
been the norm. However, building on Kramer’s (1971) challenge to the retrospective model, numerous scholars have examined how economic expectations for the future impact voting behavior. Although these models of prospective voting might give the average citizen more credit than he is due, evidence has been assembled to show that individuals’ assessments of future economic prospects influence to some degree their decision to vote for or against an incumbent party (see, for example, Kuklinski and West 1981, Lewis-Beck 1988).

Analyses of economic voting are further complicated when there is no clear-cut incumbent. Unlike presidential elections or legislative elections in two-party systems, elections in the post-communist democracies of Eastern Europe most often involve ruling coalitions, where no single party is incumbent at election time. Fortunately, this poses no new dilemma to the scholar of Western European parliamentary elections. Helmut Norpoth explains that in situations complicated by coalition governments and divided oppositions, voters still engage in economic voting "by keying on the major party in office" (1996, 317).

The present analysis of individual vote choice in Eastern European democracies examines the effects of retrospective and prospective pocketbook and sociotropic assessments on the electoral victories of communist successor parties. The application of economic voting models to fledgling democracies, such as those considered here, expands the empirical base and understanding of a behavior presumed to be universal throughout the democracies of the world. For example, concluding a review of the economic voting literature, Norpoth explains that, "[t]here are signs that the inclination to engage in economic voting] is hard-wired into the brain of citizens in democracies" (1996, 317). The economic voting model seems particularly appropriate for Eastern Europe where economic considerations have substantial potential to affect individual vote choice. In Eastern Europe, strong party identification has been slow to develop and party vote-shares have shifted dramatically from one election to the next (see Rose 1995; Cotta 1996); thus, one might expect economic voting to be even more accentuated than in the West where there is greater partisan stability. Furthermore, the simultaneity of both political and economic transitions in these cases, and the consequent economic hardships experienced universally throughout the region, have produced conditions quite distinct from those experienced by the typical Western voter. Taken together, these differences make a comparative study of East European voting behavior an especially rich contribution to the economic voting literature in general.

This study proceeds by addressing two questions of concern: first, is economic voting evidenced through the punishment of pro-reform incumbents at election time in those East European countries where ex-communist parties were returned to parliamentary power; and, second, to what extent did economic adversity contribute to the victories of the ex-communist parties in opposition. In an attempt to answer these questions, I employ survey data from the Central and Eastern EuroBarometer (CEEB) studies. Of the four countries where ex-communists garnered electoral victories, the Central and Eastern EuroBarometer (CEEB) surveys provide us with the relevant voting intention items for all but the 1993 Polish Sejm election. Thus, the present study examines pro-reform incumbent and ex-communist party opposition voting intentions for the following elections: Lithuania 1992, Hungary 1994, and Bulgaria 1994. Table 1
presents the results of these three elections in terms of vote and seat percentages acquired by the ex-communist parties and the incumbent pro-reform parties.

Table 1. Election Results: Incumbent Defeats and Ex-Communist Victories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Votes</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lithuania—October/November 1992</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sajudis</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian Democratic Labor (LDDP)</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary—May 1994</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP)</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bulgaria—December 1994</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Democratic Forces (UDF)</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that in each of these three elections, the pro-reform incumbent party was defeated by the ex-communist party in opposition. Between 1996 and 1998, these same communist successor parties have been replaced again by pro-reform parties. Given the economic hardships endured in each of these countries during this period and expectations derived from the economic voting literature, the recurrent alternation in government between incumbent and opposition parties may be of little surprise. The goal of the present analysis is to empirically verify whether the punishing of the pro-reform incumbents based on negative economic evaluations was a primary cause for the return to power of ex-communist parties. Derived from theories of economic voting and findings indicating that district unemployment rates have influenced post-communist elections (Pacek 1994; Wade, Groth, and Lavelle 1994), the following core hypotheses will be tested for the three elections in this study:

- **Hypothesis 1a (Retrospective Pocketbook Voting):** Intention to vote for the incumbent party is positively related to individuals’ positive retrospective pocketbook assessments.
- **Hypothesis 2a (Prospective Pocketbook Voting):** Intention to vote for the incumbent party is positively related to individuals’ positive prospective pocketbook assessments.
- **Hypothesis 3a (Unemployment):** Individuals who are unemployed at election time tend not to be inclined to vote for the incumbent party.
- **Hypothesis 4a (Retrospective Sociotropic Voting):** Intention to vote for the incumbent party is positively related to individuals’ positive retrospective sociotropic assessments. (TESTED IN LITHUANIA ONLY)
- **Hypothesis 5a (Prospective Sociotropic Voting):** Intention to vote for the incumbent party is positively related to individuals’ positive prospective sociotropic assessments. (TESTED IN LITHUANIA ONLY)
Since ex-communist parties were victorious as opposition parties in these elections, this study further seeks to examine the extent to which these parties reaped the ‘rewards’ of economic adversity in these societies. Thus, the above core hypotheses are inverted for the ex-communist parties in opposition:

- **Hypothesis 1b (Retrospective Pocketbook Voting):** Intention to vote for the ex-communist party in opposition is negatively related to individuals’ positive retrospective pocketbook assessments.
- **Hypothesis 2b (Prospective Pocketbook Voting):** Intention to vote for the ex-communist party in opposition is negatively related to individuals’ positive prospective pocketbook assessments.
- **Hypothesis 3b (Unemployment):** Individuals who are unemployed at election time tend to be more inclined to vote for the ex-communist party in opposition.
- **Hypothesis 4b (Retrospective Sociotropic Voting):** Intention to vote for the ex-communist party in opposition is negatively related to individuals’ positive retrospective sociotropic assessments. (TESTED IN LITHUANIA ONLY)
- **Hypothesis 5b (Prospective Sociotropic Voting):** Intention to vote for the ex-communist party in opposition is negatively related to individuals’ positive prospective sociotropic assessments. (TESTED IN LITHUANIA ONLY)

**Data and Method**

As mentioned in the previous section, this study employs survey data from the Central and Eastern EuroBarometer (CEEB) survey series. In each of the CEEB surveys used in this study, respondents were asked whether they would vote, and, if so, for which party they would vote if a general election were to be held the next day. Since the present research is interested only in individual vote choice, those cases in which the respondent indicated he/she would not vote have been coded as missing. Table 2 below displays the resultant number of cases considered for each election, as well as the survey and election dates.

**Table 2. Election Dates, Survey Dates and Number of Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election Dates</th>
<th>Survey Dates</th>
<th>Total N: Survey</th>
<th>Total N (and %) with vote intentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>October 25/November 15, 1992</td>
<td>November 1-11, 1992</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>878 (87.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>May 15/29, 1994</td>
<td>November 6-14, 1993</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>627 (64.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>December 18, 1994</td>
<td>November 4-11, 1994</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>800 (76.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Central and East EuroBarometer Studies, 1992-94.*
The CEEB survey dates for Lithuania and Bulgaria correspond fairly closely with the actual election dates. The expectation, then, is that reported voting intentions in the CEEB surveys reflect as well as possible the actual votes in the elections, especially considering that these were not intended as election surveys. The Hungarian survey, unfortunately, precedes the actual election by just over six months. Nevertheless, the unavailability of other comparable surveys forces this study to rely on this less-than-perfect survey as an instrument for analyzing Hungarian party preferences prior to the election of 1994.

The CEEB surveys variably include relevant items useful for an analysis of economic voting. In each of the three surveys employed here, the following items have been selected to examine the retrospective and prospective pocketbook voting hypotheses:

- **Retrospective Pocketbook**: "Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the financial situation of your household has: gotten a lot better, gotten a little better, stayed the same, gotten a little worse, gotten a lot worse"
- **Prospective Pocketbook**: "Over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation of your household will: get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a lot worse"

In terms of retrospective pocketbook assessments, an overwhelming majority of individuals in each country responded that their household financial situation had worsened over the past year (see distributions in Appendix). However, given the economic hardships endured throughout Eastern Europe during this period, these negative assessments should be of no great surprise. Looking at prospective pocketbook assessments, it is clear these individuals tended to be less pessimistic about their future household financial prospects. There is slightly more variation from country to country here, but in no country does a majority of respondents expect its household finances to worsen over the next year.

The next item used to test the core hypotheses is reported unemployment. Respondents were asked about their present occupation and given the option to respond ‘unemployed’ or ‘temporarily not working’. A concern which may arise – especially in light of Pacek’s finding that districts with higher levels of unemployment tended to yield lower turnout rates – is the extent to which those who expressed no voting intention (that is, the abstainers not included in this study) were disproportionately more likely to be unemployed than those who intended to vote. Table 3 presents reported unemployment percentages for both the sample that expressed an intention to vote and the sample (excluded from this study) of those who expressed no voting intention.

**Table 3. Unemployment: ‘Voters’ and ‘Non-Voters’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Reporting Unemployed</th>
<th>Lithuania 1992</th>
<th>Hungary 1993</th>
<th>Bulgaria 1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Among those with voting intention</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among those with no voting intention (excluded cases)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Central and East EuroBarometer Studies, 1992-94.*
In the Lithuanian data, there is virtually no discrepancy in reported unemployment between the voting sample and the excluded non-voting sample. In the Hungarian and Bulgarian samples, overall reported unemployment percentages are somewhat higher, with non-voters being more likely to be unemployed than voters. However, the differences in reported unemployment between the voting sample and the excluded non-voting sample are not so large as to substantially reduce the representativeness of the unemployed among voters. Yet, especially in the case of Bulgaria, the reader should bear in mind that a small portion of the unemployed are not represented in this study since these expressed no voting intention.

The last items employed for testing the core hypotheses relate to sociotropic issues. The questions from the CEEB survey are:

- **Retrospective Sociotropic**: "Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the economic situation of the country has: gotten a lot better, gotten a little better, stayed the same, gotten a little worse, gotten a lot worse"
- **Prospective Sociotropic**: "Over the next 12 months, do you expect that the economic situation of the country will: get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a lot worse"

Of the three CEEB survey years employed in this study, the sociotropic items were only asked in 1992. Therefore, we are only able to test for sociotropic effects among Lithuanian voters. Here, again, we find that a majority of respondents felt that the economy of the country had worsened over the past year, but when looking to the future, far less pessimism is expressed. Within the Lithuanian sample, 87 percent of respondents felt that the economic situation of the country had worsened over the past year, while fewer than half felt the economic situation of the country would worsen over the next year.

The four CEEB survey items which ask respondents to evaluate household (pocketbook) or national (sociotropic) economic conditions have been coded as to allow a five-category range of responses from "a lot better" ('2') to "a lot worse" ('-2'), with "stay(ed) the same" in the middle ('0'). Using the 'occupation' item in each of the CEEB surveys, a dichotomous 'unemployed' variable was created, where '1' indicates the respondent reported being unemployed, and '0' indicates the respondent reported any other occupation response. In a similar manner, the dependent variables are measured by dichotomous party voting intention. A '1' was assigned to the party under consideration (whether ‘Incumbent’ or ‘Ex-Communist in Opposition’) and a ‘0’ was assigned to intention to vote for any of the other parties. The units of analysis, then, are individuals surveyed in separate CEEB studies in Lithuania (1992), Hungary (1993), and Bulgaria (1994).

Naturally, other factors, besides the economic variables described above, should be expected to influence individual vote choices. These might include strength of party identification, campaigns, issues, candidate effects, regional variations, blame attribution, and contextually relevant factors as idiosyncratic as attitudes toward the involvement of the exiled tsar in post-communist Bulgarian politics (see Kitschelt, et al. 1995). The CEEB studies do not generally employ survey items which measure such factors, and this study cannot, therefore, account for their effects. Furthermore, the present analysis
attempts to arrive at generalizable conclusions: country-specific peculiarities have thus been avoided as much as possible. Important sociodemographic items, however, were readily available in the CEEB studies and have been integrated into the models examined in this study. These include education levels, sex, age, and a ‘Catholic’ dummy variable (for the Lithuanian and Hungarian elections only).

In addition to these control variables, I have also included two items which gauge fundamental attitudes toward the regime transitions in general. One asks respondents about levels of satisfaction with the development of democracy in their country, while the other asks how respondents feel about the creation of a free market economy. These two variables, although not generalizable in a broader context, nonetheless have the potential to substantially affect party choice across post-communist Eastern Europe. Those who are dissatisfied with the development of democracy in their country may be inclined to vote against pro-reform incumbent parties in favor of extremist and/or ex-communist parties. Similarly, those who feel that the creation of a free market economy in their country is ‘wrong’ might be inclined to vote for parties, such as the ex-communists, which advocate social welfare over market values. This latter variable, in effect, would reflect a type of economic voting specific to the countries under consideration since each of these societies has experienced simultaneous political and economic transitions. The coding and distributions for these two variables, and all of the variables discussed above, are presented in the Appendix.

Since the dependent variable – vote choice – is coded as dichotomous (‘0’ for other party; ‘1’ for incumbent party), logistic regression is employed to examine the relationships of the independent variables to vote choice. Two models are estimated for each of the three elections under consideration: the first (Model A) contains only the three items used to gauge pocketbook voting, while the second (Model B) adds the sociodemographic variables and the two ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables to the first model. In addition, since sociotropic questions are available in the Lithuanian survey, a third model (Model C), which adds the retrospective and prospective sociotropic voting questions to Model B, is estimated for Lithuanian vote choice. To examine the overall goodness-of-fit of the models, I employ a measure analogous to the $R^2$ measure frequently used in linear regression analyses. The logistic regression equivalent used here, referred to as $R_L^2$, is "a proportional reduction in the absolute value of the log-likelihood measure" which "indicates how much the inclusion of the independent variables reduces the badness-of-fit" of the model using only the constant with none of the independent variables in the equation (Menard 1995, 22; emphasis in original). $R_L^2$ can range from 0 to 1, and can be interpreted in much the same was as $R^2$.

The Electoral Context

Before proceeding with the statistical analyses of voting behavior in Lithuania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, it will be useful first to provide a context for each of the elections considered.

**Lithuania 1992:** After nearly fifty years of forced integration into the Soviet Union, Lithuania was eager to take advantage of the Gorbachev era by quickly pressing for independence. Encouraged by the *Solidarity* movement in Poland, Vytautas Landsbergis led the establishment of the Lithuanian Reform Movement *Sąjūdis* in June
1988, with the objective of restoring national independence (Senn 1990, 2). Along with the independence-minded members of the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP), Sajudis was able to work toward the abolishment of single-party rule in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in December 1989. Three months later, in February 1990, semi-free elections were held to elect a new Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Under the leadership of Algirdas Brazauskas, the Lithuanian Communist Party had renamed itself the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDDP), and competed against more hard-line communists and Sajudis for seats in the Supreme Soviet (Michta 1994, 131).

As the only pro-market/pro-democracy party running in the election, Sajudis won an astonishing victory with 49 percent of the popular vote and 74 percent of the seats in the Supreme Soviet. The LDDP came in second with 14 percent of the seats, followed by the hard-line Communist Party with 12 percent (Nohlen and Kasapovic 1996, 53).

Lithuania’s declaration of independence soon followed, but the Soviet Union was as yet unwilling to accept Baltic secession. After denouncements by Gorbachev and a failed military crackdown, Lithuanian independence was finalized with the failed coup attempt in the USSR in August 1991 (Michta 1994, 131). With Landsbergis as president and Sajudis dominating parliament, independent Lithuania quickly moved toward economic and political reform. In spite of expedient changes in the once centrally directed economy, Lithuania’s former complete dependence on the Soviet Union contributed to a difficult economic transition. With GDP per capita plummeting and inflation soaring to phenomenal levels (as high as 1,700 percent) by the end of 1992, nearly 80 percent of Lithuanians were declared to be below the poverty line (Michta 1994, 136). Severe economic decline paralleled a decline in the popularity of the Sajudis government and the Landsbergis presidency, while support for the ex-communist LDDP and its leader Algirdas Brazauskas began to rise. Divisions within the Sajudis government resulted in the calling for new parliamentary elections to be held in October 1992.

The 1992 Seimas election was contested by a center-right coalition headed by Sajudis, a centrist coalition of five parties, and the leftist ex-communist LDDP. Leadership in the LDDP consisted largely of former communist officials: Brazauskas, for example, had been Lithuania’s last communist party boss. Despite the history behind the leadership of the LDDP, its 1992 campaign was based on a social-democratic platform in opposition to the IMF’s recommendations for privatization and market pricing programs. Furthermore, the party clearly emphasized a break with its communist past (Michta 1994, 136-38). The election resulted in a manufactured parliamentary majority for the LDDP, with 43 percent of the popular vote and 52 percent of the seats in the Seimas. Lithuania thus became the first post-communist country of Eastern Europe to return ex-communists to power following a pro-market/pro-democracy government. Sajudis faired poorly in relation to its 1990 victory, winning 20.5 percent of the popular vote and only 21 percent of the seats in parliament.

**Hungary 1994:** As in Lithuania, the Hungarian communists took advantage of the opportunity to benefit from the widespread democratic upheaval in 1989. Having already built a reputation for liberal social and economic reforms during the communist era, members of the Hungarian communist party distanced themselves from the bulk of the old party by founding the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) in October 1989 (Swain, 1993, 72). What was left of the communist party continued to promote reform
communism in the form of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party. With the communists largely discredited by 1989, the MSzP emerged as the strongest component of the old regime to take part in the transition process.

Opposition crystallized early in the transition period, with the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), under the leadership of József Antall, paving the way for pro-market/pro-democracy reform movements starting in 1987. By the time Hungary held its first free democratic elections in 1990, several parties had gained sufficient momentum to effectively compete for the popular vote. In addition to the MDF and the splinter parties of the old regime, two parties emerged representing pre-World War II Hungarian political configurations: the Independent Smallholder’s Party (FKgP) and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP). Other strong competitors included the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), a "champion of rapid bourgeois modernization, liberal political values, human rights and political freedoms", and the phenomenal Young Democrats (FIDESZ), which, with most members being under the age of thirty, was "probably the world’s youngest parliamentary party" (Kéri and Levendel 1995, 135).

Elections held between March and April 1990 to elect Hungary’s first post-communist National Assembly resulted in a victory for the MDF. The extremely complicated electoral formula employed had the effect of producing heavy overrepresentation for the largest party. Thus, although MDF garnered only 25 percent of the popular vote, it was rewarded with 42.5 percent of the seats in the National Assembly (Nohlen and Kasapovic 1996, 128). The ex-communist MSzP took 11 percent of the votes, while FKgP took nearly 12 percent, KDNP 6.5 percent, SZDSZ 22 percent, and FIDESZ 9 percent (Nohlen and Kasapovic 1996, 128). With Antall at the helm, MDF formed the government in a conservative coalition with FKgP and KDNP, and proceeded with market liberalization.

Although the economic reform program of the MDF coalition government resulted in increased foreign investment, Hungary nonetheless experienced the economic hardships associated with the transition to a market economy. Still, the hardships experienced in Hungary were mild compared to those experienced in numerous other former communist countries. Unemployment jumped from a low 1.9 percent in 1990 to 12.6 percent in 1993, while annual inflation rates varied between 20 and 35 percent (United Nations 1995, 18). Nigel Swain explains that, "[d]espite its deserved reputation for economic and political stability, by the early 1990s there was in Hungary a potentially dangerous cocktail of increasing unemployment, decreasing social welfare and growing political acceptance of the vocabulary of extreme nationalism" (Swain 1993, 82).

By the time of the 1994 National Assembly election, the incumbent MDF was suffering from internal divisions, with two groups splintering to form new parties. After its poor showing in 1990, the MSzP needed to make considerable headway in order to compete successfully in the 1994 election. Three ex-communist social democratic parties united under the MSzP in late 1993 to form a powerful left opposition to the Antall government (Michta 1994, 60). Emphasizing continued democratization and market liberalization, the expanded MSzP appealed to the Hungarian electorate through its organizational strength and its appeal to the socially dislocated.

The 1994 election resulted in a clear victory for the MSzP, which took 33 percent of the popular vote. As with the 1990 election, the complex electoral formula resulted in the largest party being overrepresented in terms of seats: MSzP’s success resulted in it
capturing 54 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. MDF suffered serious setbacks, garnering only 12 percent of the popular vote, while its coalition partners FKgP and KDNP took 8.8 percent and 7 percent respectively. In terms of seats, MDF was awarded fewer than 10 percent (Nohlen and Kasapovic 1996, 128).

With the electoral victory of the MSzP in 1994, Hungary became the third post-communist democracy to elect ex-communists to parliamentary power (after Lithuania and Poland). The MSzP formed a coalition with the classic liberal SZDSZ (which had garnered 20 percent of the popular vote) to demonstrate its commitment to reform. Gyula Horn, Hungary’s last communist foreign minister, was appointed prime minister.

**Bulgaria 1994:** Bulgaria had a reputation for being the most conformist and reliable East European satellite of the Soviet Union. Under the leadership of communist premier Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria twice offered to sacrifice independence in favor of becoming the sixteenth republic of the USSR (Pundeff 1992, 105). Opposition to the communist regime was slow to develop in Bulgaria, and, as a result, soft-line communist leaders were able to maintain a hold on the reins of power during the transition to democracy.

In 1989, when Todor Zhivkov was removed from power, it was not by the direct intervention of democratic forces, but rather by the same communist forces which had been working under him. The minister of foreign affairs, Petar Mladenov, replaced Zhivkov as the president of the republic, and proceeded with a number of liberalization policies. In a move to attract popular support, the Bulgarian Communist Party was renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in April 1990.

Opposition arose in the form of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), established, under the leadership of Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, in December 1989 as an umbrella organization to unite and coordinate the actions of the various reform parties and organizations which had sprung up since Zhivkov’s ouster. The UDF and the BSP met in a series of round-table discussions to work out negotiations for the process of the transition to a democratic regime with a free market economy. Elections were subsequently scheduled to form a Grand National Assembly, which would have the primary responsibility of drafting a new democratic constitution. While the opposition parties had little time or resources to organize a decent campaign, the BSP was able to utilize its political experience to win a slight majority in Bulgaria’s first post-communist election. However, the Grand National Assembly was a special legislative body with a limited task, and upon ratification of a democratic constitution new elections were scheduled to form Bulgaria’s first post-communist regular National Assembly (Sobranie).

Held in October 1991, this election proved favorable to the UDF, the primary opposition bloc. With only 46 percent of the seats in the Sobranie, the UDF was forced to form a coalition with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the party which emerged to represent Turkish minority interests in Bulgaria. Yet the BSP, the ex-communist incumbent party, was still able to muster considerable support, taking just over one percent fewer votes than the UDF. Although the UDF victory seemed to represent a firm break with the communist past, many Bulgarians still saw the BSP as the one political force capable of directing the country in this time of change.

In an uneasy coalition with the MRF after the 1991 Sobranie election, the UDF proceeded with market reforms and attempts to construct a democratic Bulgarian society.
However, the coalition government collapsed in October 1992. By December of that year, a government of experts was formed, which was expected to function until the constitutionally scheduled election of 1995. Yet, after barely surviving a vote of no-confidence in May 1994, it became obvious that the government of experts would not survive much longer. The parties began preparing for an early election.

Based on recommendations by the IMF and the World Bank, the UDF coalition government had pursued an economic austerity program to move the country from state socialism to a market economy (Michta 1994, 97). Bulgaria’s prior dependence on the Soviet Union left the country struggling to seek out foreign investment and trade. Adherence to UN sanctions against Serbia proved to be a detriment to the Bulgarian economy. Unemployment reached 16 percent in 1993, while consumer prices inflated by nearly 340 percent in 1991 (United Nations 1995, 18). Among the hardest hit by the economic crisis was Bulgaria’s disproportionately large population of pensioners, who, according to the 1992 census, made up approximately 24.5 percent of the total population (Gotovska-Popova 1993, 46). Pension payments failed to keep up with spiraling inflation, forcing many pensioners to seek alternate sources of income. Apparent apathy among young voters (Meininger and Radoeva 1996) and the emigration of highly educated professionals (Nikolaev 1993) contributed to a situation in which the disproportionately large elderly segment of the Bulgarian electorate could have a significant impact on election outcomes.

Elections to form Bulgaria’s second post-communist Sobranie were held on 18 December 1994, a year prior to the scheduled expiration of the 1991 Assembly’s term. The ex-communist BSP ran its campaign on "a nostalgia for rosier times when people could rely on affordable milk, bread, and even water [referring to the emergency rationing of water in Sofia two weeks prior to the 1994 election]" (Perlez 1994, 16). The BSP had made efforts to change its image to resemble more a social democratic party and focused public attention on its fundamental role in the establishment of a democratic society in Bulgaria (Engelbrekt 1993, 37).

With more parties competing (over fifty) and fewer voters casting their ballots than in the previous two elections, the BSP won its second post-communist majority (43.5 percent of votes; 52.1 percent of seats). The UDF fared poorly, taking only 24 percent of the popular vote, while its former coalition partner, the MRF, dropped from 7.5 percent in 1991 to 5.4 percent in 1994 (Nohlen and Kasapovic 1996, 139). Again, there is some complication in treating the UDF as the incumbent party in 1994: the UDF/MRF coalition of 1991 survived less than a year before being replaced by a government of experts. However, since the UDF led the introduction of the economic austerity program in 1992, it is plausible that the Bulgarian voters would nonetheless associate the UDF as the last elected government whose policies resulted in the economic crisis.

**Predicting Voting Behavior**

**Logistic Regression Results for Incumbents**

At this point we can now proceed to examine the extent to which the five core hypotheses derived from theories of economic voting help explain incumbent party vote intentions in
the three elections described above. Let us begin by first examining the effects of the two pocketbook voting items and unemployment alone, then continue by looking at the performance of these items when taking into account the sociodemographic variables and the ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables. Last, the Lithuanian data are examined in a third model which incorporates the two sociotropic voting items. Again, I remind the reader that the sociotropic items were not asked of the Hungarian (1993) and Bulgarian (1994) respondents, so that Hypotheses 4 and 5 can only be tested for Lithuania (1992). The results of the logistic regression estimations for incumbent party vote intentions are presented in Table 4 below.

The columns labeled ‘Model A’ present the unstandardized logistic regression coefficients for the two pocketbook items and unemployment alone. The pocketbook indicators perform differently in each election. With the exception of the retrospective pocketbook item in Bulgaria, each pocketbook coefficient is in the predicted positive direction; but in terms of statistical significance, there is considerable variance among the three countries. Lithuanians appear to have engaged in both retrospective and prospective pocketbook voting to some extent: those whose personal household financial situations improved over the past year and those who expected their personal household financial situations to improve over the next year tended to be more inclined to favor the incumbent Sajudis over other parties. However, in Hungary, we find that, although they are in the predicted positive direction, neither of the pocketbook items is a statistically significant predictor of intentions to vote for the incumbent MDF. Finally, in the case of the Bulgarian UDF, only the prospective pocketbook item is statistically significant. The mixed bag of results for the pocketbook items indicates that even though substantial economic hardship had been endured in each of these countries prior to the elections under consideration, it would be misguided to generalize that the three incumbent parties were all punished based on the personal economic considerations of voters. Other factors likely played a role in shaping individual voting preferences from one country to the next.

The third economic voting item in ‘Model A’ is unemployment. Although the direction of the coefficients is in the predicted negative direction for all three elections – that the unemployed would be disinclined to vote for the incumbent party – the unemployment item performs poorly overall in statistical terms. Thus, Hypothesis 3a is not well-supported by these findings.

Turning now to the columns labeled ‘Model B’ in Table 4, the sociodemographic and ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables are added to the initial three economic voting items. The addition of these variables has little overall effect on the statistical significance of the pocketbook and unemployment coefficients. Sajudis continues to be favored by those who felt their personal household financial situations had improved over the past year or would improve over the next year (supporting Hypotheses 1a and 2a). For the MDF, the pocketbook voting items still fail tests of statistical significance. Finally, in the case of the UDF, we find an odd mixture where negative retrospective pocketbook assessments are statistically significant predictors of UDF voting intentions (contrary to Hypothesis 1a), yet positive prospective pocketbook assessments continue to be associated with UDF voting intentions (supporting Hypothesis 2a). This incongruity for the case of the UDF may find its explanation in the fact that there was no real incumbent party at the time of the Bulgarian election of 1994 – those who felt their pocketbooks had
Table 4. Logit Results for Incumbent Party Voting Intentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Sajudis (Lithuania 1992)</th>
<th>MDF (Hungary 1993)</th>
<th>UDF (Bulgaria 1994)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model A</td>
<td>Model B</td>
<td>Model A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective Pocketbook</td>
<td>.262*** (.10)</td>
<td>.257** (.10)</td>
<td>.142 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective Pocketbook</td>
<td>.200** (.10)</td>
<td>.174* (.10)</td>
<td>.073 (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-.597 (.42)</td>
<td>-.490 (.44)</td>
<td>-.412 (.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective Sociotropic</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.264*** (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective Sociotropic</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.150 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.055 (.13)</td>
<td>.065 (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.445** (.19)</td>
<td>.439** (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.014** (.01)</td>
<td>.015** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.969*** (.25)</td>
<td>.860*** (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Market</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.291** (.14)</td>
<td>.289** (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Satisfaction</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.274*** (.09)</td>
<td>.236** (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.03*** (.11)</td>
<td>-3.05*** (.60)</td>
<td>-2.74*** (.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N:</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are unstandardized logit coefficients with estimated standard errors in parentheses. ‘--’ indicates item not employed for model. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10 Definition of Variables: Dependent: Dichotomous for Incumbent Party Voting Intention (1) and other Voting Intention (0). Independent: See Appendix A.
fared well over the previous year would not be expected to attribute their good fortune to a UDF government, while those who expected their household financial situations to improve over the next year may certainly have believed that the greatest assurance of that prosperity would result from the program of the UDF. The unemployed dummy variable is not statistically significant in any of the ‘Model B’ estimations.

The control variables introduced in Model B produce predictably mixed results. Education is not a statistically significant predictor of incumbent party voting intention in any of the three countries, while age is statistically significant in each case except for the Bulgarian UDF. Gender and religion are shown to be significant determinants of party preference only in Lithuania, with females and Catholics tending to favor the incumbent Sajudis.

Most interesting, however, is the performance of the two ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables. With the exception of the MDF model, favorable attitudes toward the free market have a statistically significant impact on incumbent party vote intentions. The coefficients are positive for the three incumbent parties (although, again, not statistically significant in the case of the MDF), all of which are pro-market parties which had arisen to challenge the pre-1989 state socialist order. In a sense, the fact that those who feel the creation of a market economy is ‘right’ would be inclined to vote for these parties reflects a type of sociotropic economic voting. Although the national economy is not assessed in terms of its performance, the conviction among these voters that a market economy is—or will be—good for their country, and that, therefore, pro-market forces should remain in power certainly reflects a sociotropic orientation toward party preferences. The situation is similar in terms of satisfaction with the development of democracy. Sajudis, the MDF, and the UDF could all draw on the support of those who are satisfied with the development of democracy in their country, while the dissatisfied were disinclined to vote for these parties. In each country, the democracy satisfaction variable is statistically significant. While attitudes toward the creation of a market economy reflect an economic sociotropic orientation, attitudes reflecting levels of satisfaction with the development of democracy provide us with a measure of political sociotropic orientations. That is, one’s interpretation of the unfolding of political developments since the transition provides a yardstick by which to measure the performance of the political parties in power.

In Model C for Lithuania, the inclusion of the two sociotropic variables has little impact on the effects of the sociodemographic and ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables. However, of the five economic voting items, only the retrospective sociotropic variable is statistically significant and in the predicted direction. That is, those who felt the economy of the country had gotten better over the previous year were inclined to support the incumbent Sajudis (supporting Hypothesis 4a). As is typical of studies of economic voting, the sociotropic items, when included, tend to outperform the pocketbook items. In this case, both pocketbook coefficients are reduced to statistical insignificance in Model C, while unemployment and the prospective sociotropic measure, although in the predicted direction, are also not statistically significant.

Overall, how well do these models predicting incumbent party voting intentions perform? To what extent can we argue that these three incumbent parties, all of which lost the elections under consideration, were punished as a result of the economic calculus of the electorate? If we look at the goodness-of-fit of the models, as measured by $R^2$, it is
apparent that in no election do these models have a high degree of explanatory power. The $R_L^2$ for Model A in each of the three estimations is so small (ranging from .02 to .03) that one could confidently contend that the pocketbook assessment and unemployment variables considered here had virtually no effect on incumbent party voting intentions. And though the inclusion of the sociodemographic variables and the compelling ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables in Model B invariably results in an increased goodness-of-fit, the models still do not explain a great deal of the variance in incumbent party voting intentions. Model B is strongest for predicting incumbent party voting intentions in Hungary ($R_L^2 = .17$), but, with none of the three economic voting items producing statistical significance, it is abundantly clear that these variables are not driving the model. In Model C for Lithuania, the inclusion of retrospective and prospective sociotropic economic assessments results in very little overall increase in the goodness-of-fit: while Model B for Lithuania produced an $R_L^2$ of .09, the $R_L^2$ for Model C is only .10. The conclusion to be drawn from this section is that while economic assessments may be statistically significant predictors of incumbent party vote choice, they do not function in the same manner across cases nor do they appear to have a great deal of substantive significance in any case.

**Logistic Regression Results for Ex-Communists in Opposition**

Our focus now shifts to vote determinants for ex-communist parties in opposition. It should be noted again that each of these parties was awarded a manufactured majority in their respective parliaments following the elections considered here. After the poor showing of the logistic models estimated for incumbent party voting intentions, we now examine the extent to which ex-communist parties in opposition reaped the ‘rewards’ of economic adversity in these countries. As stated earlier, the initial core hypotheses employed for the incumbent parties are inverted for the ex-communist parties in opposition.

Again, I first examine the effects of the pocketbook voting and unemployment items alone, then continue by evaluating the performance of these items when taking into account the sociodemographic variables and the ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables. Finally, a third model is tested for Lithuania where the two sociotropic assessments of the economy are included. The results of the logistic regression estimations for ex-communist party in opposition vote intentions are presented in Table 5 below.

Starting with Model A (the two pocketbook voting items and unemployment alone), we find that with the exception of ‘unemployed’ coefficients in the Lithuanian and Bulgarian models, all of the economic voting coefficients are in the hypothesized directions. In terms of statistical significance, however, there is again a mixture of results from one election to the next. Both of the pocketbook coefficients, retrospective and prospective, are negative and statistically significant for the Lithuanian and Hungarian ex-communists, thus supporting the Hypotheses 1b and 2b. That is, those who felt their personal finances had gotten worse over the past year (under the pro-reform Sajudis and MDF governments) and those who expected their personal finances to worsen over the next year tended to favor the ex-communist LDDP (Lithuania) and MSzP (Hungary) over other parties. In the case of the BSP (Bulgaria), only the prospective pocketbook hypothesis (2b) is supported: the statistically significant negative coefficient indicates that those who expected their personal finances to worsen over the next year tended to be
inclined to vote for the Bulgarian Socialist Party. In none of these three cases, however, is ‘unemployed’ statistically related to ex-communist party in opposition voting intentions.

### Table 5. Logit Results for Ex-Communist Party Voting Intentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>LDDP (Lithuania 1992)</th>
<th>MSZP (Hungary 1993)</th>
<th>BSP (Bulgaria 1994)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model A</td>
<td>Model B</td>
<td>Model C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective Pocketbook</td>
<td>-0.261** (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.187* (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.219* (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective Pocketbook</td>
<td>-0.249*** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.160 (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.093 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-0.121 (0.36)</td>
<td>0.013 (0.37)</td>
<td>0.151 (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective Sociotropic</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.165 (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective Sociotropic</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.075 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.145 (.13)</td>
<td>0.072 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.133 (.18)</td>
<td>0.215 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.010 (.01)</td>
<td>0.009 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.563*** (.20)</td>
<td>-0.507** (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Market</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.167 (.11)</td>
<td>-0.144 (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Satisfaction</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.307*** (.09)</td>
<td>-0.293** (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.51*** (.13)</td>
<td>-1.89*** (.57)</td>
<td>-1.99*** (.61)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2: \] 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.09

N: 770 770 730 582 582 719 719

Entries are unstandardized logit coefficients with estimated standard errors in parentheses. ‘--’ indicates item not employed for model. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10

**Definition of Variables:**
Dependent: Dichotomous for Ex-Communist Party Voting Intention (1) and Other Voting Intention (0). Independent: See Appendix A.
Adding the control variables to the initial model, Model B provides mixed evidence for the impact of economic assessments on intentions to vote for the ex-communist parties in opposition. Negative retrospective pocketbook assessments continue to be a statistically significant predictor of LDDP voting intention, while the prospective pocketbook item is no longer significant. The introduction of controls into the equation for the ex-communist MSzP reduces all of the economic items to statistical insignificance – not unlike the findings for the incumbent MDF. Furthermore, similar to the findings for the UDF (Bulgaria), both of the pocketbook items are statistically significant for the model predicting vote intentions for the BSP. In contrast to the UDF, however, the retrospective pocketbook assessments are positively related to BSP vote intention (contrary to Hypothesis 1b), while prospective pocketbook assessments are in the hypothesized negative direction. As with Model A, and with Model B for the incumbent parties, the unemployment item in Model B for the ex-communist parties in opposition is not statistically significant in any case. Clearly, Hypotheses 3a and 3b are not supported by these findings.

The control variables introduced in Model B provide some interesting insights. The ‘Catholic’ variable reveals a negative, statistically significant relationship to ex-communist party vote intentions for both the LDDP and the MSzP. Obviously, Catholics were disinclined to vote for either of these ex-communist parties in opposition. Age is positively related to MSzP vote intentions, as it was for incumbent MDF vote intentions, indicating that younger Hungarian voters were not particularly inclined to favor either the incumbent or the ex-communist opposition party. Age is also positively related to intentions to vote for the BSP, confirming evidence that the Bulgarian Socialist Party victory was due in part to its appeal to the disgruntled elderly population. Higher levels of education are positively associated with intentions to vote for the MSzP, but education is statistically insignificant in the other two countries.

Even more compelling, however, are the coefficients for the two ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables. The ‘free market’ coefficients are negative in all three countries, and statistically significant for the MSzP and the BSP. In both Hungary and Bulgaria, those who felt that the establishment of a free market economy in their country was ‘wrong’ tended to favor the ex-communist parties in opposition. Furthermore, for all three ex-communist parties, the ‘democracy satisfaction’ coefficients are negative and statistically significant. Thus, voters who felt dissatisfied with the development of democracy in their countries were inclined to vote for the ex-communist parties in opposition. If we pair these findings with those in the previous section, the following general picture emerges: incumbent pro-reform parties tended to draw support from those who believe the establishment of a free market economy is ‘right’ and those who are satisfied with the development of democracy; ex-communist parties in opposition tended to draw support from those who feel the establishment of a free market economy is ‘wrong’ and those who are dissatisfied with the development of democracy. A longitudinal, broader cross-sectional analysis of the association between these two ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables and support for major pro-reform versus ex-communist parties, both as incumbents and in opposition, appears to present a promising avenue for further research on the topic of party identification in post-communist Eastern Europe. Again, we find that it is not necessarily assessments of the economy or personal
finances that are driving the models, but more fundamental sociotropic issues about the
development of the new regimes.

In the Lithuanian Model C, the inclusion of the two sociotropic voting items has
practically no impact on intentions to vote for the ex-communist LDDP. Neither
coefficient is statistically significant, although both are in the predicted negative
direction. Hypotheses 4b and 5b are thus not supported by these findings. Furthermore,
the statistical significance and direction of all of the variables from Model B remain
unchanged when the two sociotropic voting items are included.

Despite the various statistically significant findings for ex-communist parties in
opposition voting intentions, the models as a whole are weak in terms of goodness-of-fit.
Did the ex-communist parties in opposition reap the electoral ‘rewards’ of economic
hardships in these countries? By many accounts of the issues surrounding these elections,
including my own in the present study, we would expect a resounding affirmative
answer. Yet, if we look at the $R_L^2$ for each of the models in which only the economic
voting items are included (Model A), there is clear cause for skepticism. Paralleling the
weak goodness-of-fit measures for the incumbent pro-reform party models, the $R_L^2$ in
Model A for the ex-communist parties in opposition is a mere .03 for the LDDP, and .02
for both the MSzP and the BSP. Certainly, at least in terms of the core economic
indicators tested here, economic voting did not play a very large part in the return to
power of ex-communist parties in Lithuania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Even when adding
the sociodemographic variables and the ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables, the
models still perform poorly overall: $R_L^2$ in Model B for each party is .06 for LDDP and
MSzP, and .09 for BSP. As with the model for the incumbent MDF, Model B for the
MSzP indicates that pocketbook assessments and unemployment played virtually no part
in the intention to vote for this ex-communist party. Model C for LDDP, where the two
sociotropic voting items are included, shows little increase in overall explanatory power
from Model B, with $R_L^2$ increasing to only .07. Again, it appears that overall, while
economic perceptions played *some* part in ex-communist party vote choice in *some*
cases, their effects vary from election to election and they do not appear to have had a major
substantive impact on ex-communist party in opposition voting intentions.

**Discussion**

Earlier, I stated that this study sought to answer two questions: 1) to what extent is
economic voting evidenced through the punishment of incumbents at election time in
post-communist East European societies; and 2) in terms of electoral support, to what
extent have ex-communist parties in opposition reaped the ‘rewards’ of economic
adversity in these societies. Given the extent of economic distress and the high levels of
electoral volatility from one election to the next, the economic voting thesis was expected
to provide a strong explanation for the defeat of pro-reform incumbent parties and the
return to parliamentary power of the ex-communistists in these post-communist
democracies.

Yet, reflecting upon the findings from the empirical tests of five theoretically-
based economic voting hypotheses, the dominant impression is that, despite strong
expectations to the contrary, economic factors had at best a modest effect on party
preference in these societies. In most of the models estimated here, economic voting was
apparent to some degree, albeit appearing in various forms from party to party. When controlling for the effects of sociodemographic variables and the two ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables, however, the effects of the economic voting items tended to be reduced in terms of statistical significance. Indeed, in the controlled models for the Hungarian election, neither of the pocketbook assessment coefficients is a statistically significant predictor of vote choice for either the incumbent MDF or the ex-communist MSzP in opposition.

Furthermore, in none of the models estimated in this study did unemployment reveal a statistically significant relationship to voting intention for either the incumbent or ex-communist opposition parties. This contradiction to Pacek’s 1994 study showing that district-level unemployment rates were related to party vote shares deserves more attention. While Pacek examined economic voting in Eastern Europe in terms of party vote shares, the present analysis focused on economic voting at the individual level in terms of party preference. A plausible explanation for the differences between my findings and Pacek’s is that the unemployed themselves do not tend to be inclined to vote for or against the incumbent or ex-communist opposition parties, but rather high unemployment rates in a district are associated by that district population in general with poor performance on the part of the incumbent party. Thus, the relationship between higher district unemployment rates and lower incumbent party vote shares may have little or nothing to do with the unemployed themselves, but instead might be explained as the district population engaging in a form of retrospective sociotropic voting.

Two of the three CEEB surveys employed in this study, Hungary 1993 and Bulgaria 1994, did not include the relevant survey items to gauge individuals’ sociotropic economic assessments. It was therefore impossible to test Hypotheses 4 and 5 (retrospective and prospective sociotropic voting) in terms of intention to vote for the incumbents or ex-communists in these countries. Yet, for the models predicting voting intention for the Lithuanian incumbent and ex-communist parties, the relevant sociotropic survey items were available, and I was able to test the sociotropic voting thesis. However, in neither model did the inclusion of the sociotropic voting items increase the overall goodness-of-fit by any substantial amount. It has been said that "[w]hen both measures are included in a vote equation, the sociotropic side usually beats the pocketbook" (Norpoth 1996, 313). At least partially, this appears to be the case in the Sajudis model, where the inclusion of the retrospective and prospective sociotropic items reduces the pocketbook coefficients to statistical insignificance, while the retrospective sociotropic coefficient is the only one of the five core economic variables which is statistically significant. Yet, in the model predicting voting intention for the ex-communist LDDP, neither of the sociotropic economic assessments are statistically significant, and, of the five core economic variables, only the retrospective pocketbook coefficient is statistically significant (as in Model B).

It may be argued that the unavailability of the sociotropic items resulted in an underspecification of the models estimated for Hungary and Bulgaria. This is certainly a plausibility I am willing to accept, but I have considerable doubt that the inclusion of the same sociotropic items in these models would have improved the overall goodness-of-fit of the models, nor would it likely have changed the overall findings in this research. If we can make any imputation from the Lithuanian models, as we move from Model B (excluding the sociotropic items) to Model C (including the sociotropic items), the
goodness-of-fit for these estimations does not improve so much as to reverse the finding that the effects of economic voting, whether pocketbook or sociotropic, were at best weak. 14

The assertion by Powers and Cox that the return of the communist successor parties is not so easily explained by "economic dissatisfaction and punishment of incumbents" (1997, 628) is clearly supported by the findings in the present cross-national study of economic voting and the return to parliamentary power of the ex-communist parties in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the evidence from the models estimated here indicate that economic assessments were at best only part of the equation predicting voting intentions. In addition to erratic effects by the economic voting items and the sociodemographic variables, the two ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables – attitudes toward the establishment of a free market economy and satisfaction with the development of democracy – were consistently statistically significant predictors of voting intentions. Those who felt the establishment of a free market economy was ‘wrong’ and those who were dissatisfied with the development of democracy tended to favor the ex-communist parties in opposition. These perceptions of the transition process itself are shown here to have consistent impacts on vote choice. Indeed, it is possible to interpret each as a form of sociotropic assessment: politically sociotropic for the ‘democracy satisfaction’ indicator, and economically sociotropic for the ‘free market’ indicator. However, despite their consistent statistically significant performance in the models estimated here, these ‘regime transition’ attitudinal variables are nonetheless not so consequential as to produce models with any satisfactory degree of explanatory power.

In post-communist societies, most people have experienced severe economic hardship as the path to an uncertain future continues to be ill-defined and debated. Certainly, simple economic considerations, such as those included here to gauge pocketbook and sociotropic assessments, will play a role in people’s party preferences, but the role is rendered weak and unclear by a strongly felt sense of anomie and insecurity. Marcin Król, discussing the return of the ex-communists in the 1993 Polish Sejm election, shares this perspective: "It is not nostalgia or an ideological dream but a brute fact that for considerable numbers of people life has become more difficult. The ex-communists have not been shy about exploiting this situation. People may accept the free market and democracy in principle, but they cannot help missing the sweet sense of security that was once theirs" (1994, 91).

So, to use Norpoth's (1996, 317) phrasing, is the inclination to engage in economic voting "hard-wired into the brain of citizens" in Eastern Europe? The findings here indicate that simple economic perceptions explain only a very small part of citizen party preferences in these post-communist societies. In the early 1990s, East Europeans may have had doubts about both incumbents and the ex-communist opposition parties. There appeared no certain course of improvement and no single outlet for the dissatisfied and the economically displaced. Some may have felt that they were suffering from the legacy of state socialism, while others might have thought they were suffering from ill-conceived marketization.

The alternation of parliamentary power between pro-reform and ex-communist parties continues in these countries: ex-communist incumbent parties fared quite poorly and were replaced in elections subsequent to those examined in this study. Certainly, there remains considerable need and opportunity for further investigations of voting
behavior in post-communist societies, especially in a comparative context. Such studies might eventually show that once democracy is consolidated in these societies, and the memory of the communist era and the transition period fades, electorates in East European democracies will more closely follow the patterns of economic voting observed in established Western democracies.

Endnotes

1. An earlier version of this research was presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association in Los Angeles, California. I wish to express my gratitude to those who generously offered constructive criticism and positive feedback on earlier drafts of this research. While too numerous to list individually, I am particularly indebted to the professors and graduate students of the Center for the Study of Democracy at the University of California, Irvine. I would also like to thank Tatiana Kostadinova and Scott Smith for their comments, suggestions, and support. Of course, I alone assume responsibility for any shortcomings or errors contained in this study.


3. Arend Lijphart defines a manufactured parliamentary majority as “the tendency of the electoral system to manufacture a parliamentary majority for parties that have not received majority support from the voters” (1994, 57).

4. Linz and Stepan (1996, 454-456), fail to recognize or discuss the 1994 electoral victory of the ex-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party. Nonetheless, the Bulgarian election of 1994 can be accurately integrated into Linz and Stepan’s assessment of the Lithuanian, Polish, and Hungarian elections.

5. The success of Bulgaria’s ex-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in the 1990 Grand National Assembly election represents an exceptional case explained later in this paper. The BSP lost political control the following year with the first regular National Assembly election.


10. Unfortunately, due to a lack of relevant survey items in the data used for this study, the effects of sociotropic voting could only be tested in the 1992 Lithuanian election.

11. Throughout this paper, ‘incumbent party’ will be used to indicate either the incumbent party (or bloc) in government OR the major party in an incumbent government coalition. The one exception is my treatment of the Bulgarian UDF as the incumbent party in 1994 – as will be explained later, the Union of Democratic Forces was not actually the incumbent party at the time of the Bulgarian parliamentary election of 1994.

12. Considering Pacek’s finding that district unemployment rates tended to depress voter turnout for the elections in his study (1994, 732), it is reasonable to expect that ‘economic voting’ may take the form of abstention by those in the worst economic situations. Although the present study deals only with individuals who expressed an intention to vote, a logical next step would be to examine the financial situations/assessments of those who chose to abstain from voting. Later, in
Table 3, I provide a comparison of percentages reporting 'unemployed' among those who expressed a voting intention against those who did not express a voting intention (that is, those excluded from this study).

13. This could be indicative of younger Hungarians’ continued support for the Young Democrats (FIDESZ). It should be noted, however, that the popularity of FIDESZ had declined since the previous election. In 1994, many younger voters also supported the SZDSZ (Szoboszlai, et al. 1995, 25-26).

14. We are thus still left with a puzzle: district-level unemployment is related to party vote shares (Pacek 1994), yet, at an individual level, neither unemployment, nor pocketbook or sociotropic economic assessments explain much by way of party preferences. The CEEB surveys include a region variable, but these regions do not correspond with actual electoral districts. It is therefore impossible using these surveys to reliably examine the data by region and compare them to electoral district-level party vote shares and unemployment rates. A useful avenue of research would be to extend Pacek’s aggregate party vote share analysis to the elections considered in the present research by examining the relationship between electoral district party vote shares and district-level unemployment rates. However, even if such an analysis were undertaken, it would not be at the level of individual party preferences, and we would still not know whether it was the unemployed or other individuals who tended to support one party over another. What is most needed are reliable and cross-nationally comparable survey data consisting of useful questions for studying electoral behavior and which can be isolated at the level of the electoral district.

References


