Title
The Changing Non-Voter: What Differentiates Non-Voters and Voters in Asian American and Latino Communities?

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Over the past two decades, the empirical scholarship on the impact of race and ethnicity on electoral politics in the United States has offered significant insights into how racial and ethnic populations differ from and share behaviors similar to those of non-Hispanic whites. Where generalizations about group disinterest or studies of discrimination once sufficed to explain minority political behavior, more rigorous empirical scholarship now shapes scholarly understandings of the dynamics of Black, Latino, and Asian American electoral behavior. This more nuanced understanding of the behavior of groups and of the differences within each of the racial/ethnic populations, however, provided only limited understanding of whether there is a “racial/ethnic” story in U.S. elections or instead a series of distinct processes that shape the electoral engagement of Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans (Cho 1995; Dawson 1994; DeSipio 1996a; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Tate 1993).¹

In this paper, we take an initial step to assess this question by examining electoral participation and non-participation among Latinos and Asian Americans in an explicitly comparative framework. We use similar models to assess whether the patterns of non-participation differ between these two populations and whether the predictors of participation vary for different forms of non-participation. Specifically, we assess three forms of non-participation in each of these communities: we compare non-naturalized immigrants to naturalized citizens, non-voter registered U.S. citizens to registered voters, and registered non-voters to voters in an effort to assess if the barriers to participation differ between Latino and Asian American communities.

We select these two communities for analysis for several reasons. Perhaps the most obvious of these is that they are less likely to vote than non-Hispanic whites (hereafter Anglos) or African Americans (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2005) (see Figure 1). Asian American and Latino adults made up 8.4 percent of voters in 2004, but they made up 29.2 percent of non-voting adults (or 17.1 percent of non-voting U.S. citizen adults). The reasons for Latino and Asian American non-participation and participation share some structural similarities with each other that enrich the value of comparative analysis. Both the Latino and Asian American communities include higher shares of non-U.S. citizens, recently naturalized citizens, and the children of immigrants than do the Anglo or African Americans populations. Each of these populations has, on average, lower levels of political socialization in U.S. politics and, consequently, are in greater need of institutional resources to ensure that they can make the transition to regular voting.

¹ The dramatic growth in scholarship on the electoral behaviors of racial/ethnic populations in the United States has not included a rigorous empirical scholarship on Native Americans (Stubben 2005) and has only begun to analyze the experiences of Muslims as a distinct ethnic group (Read 2006; Stockton 2006).
voters. Thus, by studying the Asian American and Latino experience, we can develop a much richer understanding of the broader phenomenon of electoral non-participation. Finally, non-participation in these communities is not driven solely by immigration. Instead, a lower share of U.S. citizen Asian Americans and Latinos vote (and a lower share of registered voter Asian Americans and Latinos turn out on election day). As a result, their experiences, and the reasons identified for their non-participation can offer insights into the broader phenomenon of non-participation in contemporary politics and into whether there is a racial/ethnic dimension to non-participation that differentiates the causes of their non-participation. Although we will not be able to examine this question fully here – we limit out analysis to Asian Americans and Latinos, we will be able to assess commonalities and differences in the causes of non-participation in these two populations.

Figure 1. Characteristics and estimated size of Asian American and Latino New Electorates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asian American New Electorates</th>
<th>Estimated size (CPS 2000 and 2004):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Electorate 1</td>
<td>Current Asian American voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated size (CPS 2000 and 2004):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Electorate 2</td>
<td>Registered U.S. citizens, but did not vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated size (CPS 2000 and 2004):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Electorate 3</td>
<td>Non-registered U.S. citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated size (CPS 2000 and 2004):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Electorate 4</td>
<td>Non-U.S. citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated size (CPS 2000 and 2004):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latino New Electorates</th>
<th>Estimated size (CPS 2000 and 2004):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Electorate 1</td>
<td>Current Latino voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate size (CPS 2000 and 2004):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Electorate 2</td>
<td>Registered U.S. citizens, but did not vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated size (CPS 2000 and 2004):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Electorate 3</td>
<td>Non-registered U.S. citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated size (CPS 2000 and 2004):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Electorate 4</td>
<td>Non-U.S. citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated size (CPS 2000 and 2004):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
So, we believe that comparative analysis in non-electoral participation in Asian American and Latino communities will both provide the foundation for developing a more rigorous theory of racial/ethnic electoral participation (and, by extension, racial/ethnic political behavior more generally). Equally importantly, it will stimulate a renewed assessment of the dynamics of electoral non-participation in American electoral politics.

We also believe that our work here offers a second contribution to the electoral behavior scholarship, of a more methodological nature. One of the major reasons that scholars have not conducted extensive inter-group analysis is the absence of reliable data that assess political behaviors across ethnic groups. The major national data set on electoral behavior, the American National Election Study (ANES), has not traditionally included enough Asian Americans and Latino for analysis without pooling samples across multiple elections. Although this pattern of ANES neglect may be changing in the near future, the small Latino and Asian American samples in the ANES discouraged scholars from undertaking comparative assessments of racial/ethnic electoral behaviors.

Other national data sets are certainly available for analysis of racial/ethnic electoral behaviors, but they tend to focus on the political behaviors of just one racial/ethnic population (e.g. the Latino National Political Survey, various Pew Hispanic Center or Tomás Rivera Policy Institute election studies, the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey, or the forthcoming Latino National Survey). The one data set that does allow for cross-group, cross election analysis, and the one that we tap here, does, however, have weaknesses that discourage its use (Bass and Casper 2001; Ramakrishnan 2005 as important exceptions). We acknowledge these weaknesses in our discussion of the CPS but think that the potential for building more rigorous theory outweighs these weaknesses.

Influences on Immigrant and Racial/Ethnic Political Incorporation

The existing scholarship has identified five categories of determinants that influence political incorporation: socioeconomic status, immigrant socialization, political institutions, social context, and national origin. While each category plays its own unique role on immigrant and racial/ethnic political incorporation, the scholarship has not successfully teased out the interactions between these sets of influences.

Socioeconomic status is widely understood as a key predictor of political participation (DeSipio 1996a; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Tate 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Generally, the more resources an individual has at her disposal, whether through education, income, or experience as indicated by age, the more likely that person will participate in politics. While classic studies on political participation have not accounted adequately for immigration or race/ethnicity, more recent studies of immigrant/ethnic communities have shown that just as with native born Anglos, Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans with high socioeconomic status are more likely to participate in politics (DeSipio 1996a, Lien Conway and Wong 2004, Ramakrishnan 2005).

However, while socioeconomic status is understood as the baseline model for political participation, scholars of immigration and ethnic politics have identified other factors that shape the likelihood of political behavior and that can reduce the potentially positive impacts of higher than average socioeconomic status. In particular, political socialization is a key variable which scholars find impacts the level of immigrant political incorporation. As Cho (1999) posits, immigrants are socialized in different political contexts and bring with them distinctive
perspectives on politics. So while native born children of U.S.-born parents (the generational status of the vast majority of Anglo and Black adults) are socialized into American politics through schooling and their American-born parents, immigrants must learn about American political culture upon their arrival to the United States, and they are less able to reinforce the political socialization their children receive in the schools. Thus, according to Cho, socialization factors such as time in the United States are important factors which predict immigrant political incorporation. Studies by DeSipio (1996b); Mollenkopf, Ross, and Olson (1999); Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001); and Ramakrishnan (2005) offer empirical substantiation to Cho’s idea of the costs of political adaptation and also test the effects of immigrant generational cohorts on political participation rates. Each finds that naturalized citizens are less likely to participate politically than comparably situated U.S.-born co-ethnics. The impact of generational change between the second and third generation among contemporary immigrants is less understood.

The role of political institutions has also been of significant focus in the political incorporation and racial/ethnic politics literatures (Lubell 1952; Erie 1988; Sterne 2001). When scholars consider immigrant/ethnic political incorporation, the focus is on two types of institutions: the laws which, for immigrants, shape naturalization propensity, and for the native born, shape the ease or difficulty of voting, and the role of institutional actors in mobilizing or demobilizing immigrant/ethnic communities. Laws and policies create what Jones-Correa (1998; 2001a) calls the “rules of the game” which dictate political inclusion. Institutional barriers such as electoral laws, naturalization requirements, and conflicts over dual nationality all place heavy costs on political incorporation for new immigrants and may determine many of the differences in participation found among immigrants. Scholars have demonstrated conclusively that naturalization and electoral rules shape political behavior in immigrant/ethnic communities (Alvarez and Ansolabehere 2002; Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Grofman and Davidson 1992; DeSipio 1996a; Keyssar 2000; Lubin 1997), but generally less is known of the impact of these institutions exert specifically on immigrant populations (de la Garza and DeSipio 1993, forthcoming; DeSipio, Bean, and Rumbaut 2005; Hayduk 2006; Jones-Correa 2001b; Ramakrishnan 2005).

The role of institutional actors, in particular political parties, has been a key area of study for most research on early twentieth century immigrant groups. Dahl’s (1961) seminal study on ethnic politics in New Haven found that the political party machine was a key institution which ensured the political incorporation of new immigrant groups (see also Wolfinger 1965). During the early twentieth century, political parties identified new immigrants as crucial new voters whose voting numbers could help win elected office; they were more selective in reaching out to the native born, but in close elections could tap latent ethnicity to mobilize needed votes (Erie 1988, Sterne 2001). Recently, however, scholars have been more critical about the role of political parties for immigrant political mobilization. Studies conducted on contemporary Latino and Asian immigrant groups have found that parties frequently identify naturalized citizens as low propensity voters. As a result, ethnic populations have been mobilized selectively and, for the most part, only in the closest of elections (de la Garza and DeSipio 2005, and earlier volumes in the Latinos and Presidential elections series). In their stead, civic institutions such as labor unions, hometown associations and non-profit community organizations have taken on the primary role as mobilizing institutions for new immigrants (DeSipio 2006; Wong 2006). They, alas, don’t have the resources that parties once marshaled. As a result, their mobilization efforts are more sporadic and more targeting to likely naturalizees and likely voters.
The social context of immigrant/ethnic communities is an area which is largely understudied in the field of ethnic political incorporation. Some scholars such as Marrow (2005) and Jones-Correa (2001a) have argued for the need to explore communities outside the metropolitan areas which have large proportions of immigrant/ethnic populations. Others such as Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) posit that the political culture of a state as measured by average vote turnout may also impact the rates of immigrant political incorporation. Few studies, however, have examined the role of racial and ethnic diversity on immigrant/ethnic political incorporation. Past research has already shown that the racial and ethnic makeup of a geographic area plays a crucial role in shaping the area’s political culture. Building from the work of Tocqueville and Key, Hero (1998) posits that racial and ethnic minorities help incorporate varying perspectives and viewpoints into a state which impacts its overall political culture. He finds, however, that racial diversity also has a dampening effect on minority empowerment given that with the increase in diversity also comes an increase in competition among groups. Although these studies on racial and ethnic context have not been applied to immigrant populations, the same competitive environment may also discourage immigrant political incorporation.

Finally, we anticipate that there will be varying levels of political incorporation across national origin groups. One of the political challenges that face both the Asian American and Latino communities is the very nature of the community makeup. The role of panethnicity on immigrant political incorporation is two-fold. First, both panethnic umbrella categories encompass a number of national-origin groups who have different cultures, immigration experiences, political socialization in the United States, and, in the case of Asian Americans, language differences and ancestral animosities. These different immigrant and U.S. political socialization histories and current experiences influence the political incorporation of each national origin group in their own unique way. Second, collapsing the various national origin groups into panethnic categories may itself have an adverse effect on immigrant political mobilization (Jones-Correa 2005). Mobilization efforts which treat all national origin groups within a panethnic umbrella as virtually the same may discourage individuals from national-origin groups that identify themselves as distinctive communities from participating electorally. Thus, scholars continue to debate the viability of a panethnic identity within both Asian American and Latino communities (DeSipio 1996; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; Lien 2001, Lien Conway and Wong 2004). Empirical studies of voting behavior in Latino and Asian American communities find variation by national origin group (DeSipio 1996a; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Mollenkopf et. al. 2006).

Data and Methods

Our analysis relies on a merged file of the 2000 and 2004 November Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS provides large samples of both Asian American and Latino respondents which allows us to analyze vote behavior not only by panethnic group but also by national origin (through the use of the merged file). Although we highlight the most glaring weaknesses of the CPS for analysis of electoral behavior below, we are confident that by using

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2 The authors would like to thank Matt Barreto and Charlie Morgan for their helpful comments and methodological assistance.
the CPS, we can provide a comparative picture of Asian American and Latino naturalization and voting behavior that cannot be conducted with other public opinion, survey, or electoral data.

The strengths of the CPS are several. Most importantly, it has a sufficiently large sample (n=261,560) that its Latino and Asian American sub-samples offer enough cases for analysis (n=30,933 and n=11,851 respectively). In order to allow for analysis at the national origin-level, we do pool two CPS November supplements (2000 and 2004), but for analysis at the pan-ethnic level either one would have been sufficient. Second, the CPS is a nationally representative sample that includes racial/ethnic respondents not just from the areas of their greatest concentration. Thus, it is possible to incorporate state-level contextual characteristics as independent predictors of naturalization or electoral behavior and ensure that the racial/ethnic story being told is broadly representative of these populations. Third, the sampling frame is of all (non-institutionalized) adults. As a result, the CPS includes citizen adults who are not registered to vote and non-U.S. citizen adults in the sample. This is a significant advantage over exit polls (which only allow analysis of voters) or samples drawn from voter registration lists (which can only assess non-voting among the registered). Fourth, the CPS allows analysis by immigrant generation within ethnic populations. It allows for the identification of national origin or ancestry for the first and second generations and pan-ethnicity for the third and beyond generations. Finally, although the sampling methodology changes each decade based on the results of the Census, the CPS allows comparative electoral data on electoral behavior and some reasons for non-participation stretching back to the 1964 presidential election.

By pooling data, we are able to obtain sufficient samples for analysis of six Asian national origin groups: Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, South Asian (Indian and Pakistani), and Vietnamese, as well as a collapsed category of other Southeast Asian national origin (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma and Bangladesh). Due to the small number of respondents from these groups, we were unable to disaggregate them individually. Among Latinos, we were able to disaggregate six national origin groups: Mexican, Puerto Rican (resident on the mainland), Cuban, Dominican, Colombian, and Salvadoran, as well as a residual other Central/South American category with included immigrants from or children of immigrants from Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The increased sample sizes available through the merged file also enable us to disaggregate each national origin group by the four voting and non-voting categories that we use for our analysis: voters, registered non-voters, non-registered U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens (see Figure 2 and Table 1 and 2).

Data sources such as the American National Election Studies (ANES) sample Asian American and Latino respondents, but do not allow for analysis at the level of national origin. Other public opinion surveys which oversample Asian American and Latino respondents can only provide information about those living in either high Asian or Latino density areas. Moreover, in addition to questions on voting and registration, the CPS also asks a wide array of questions on demographics, occupation and residence which provide a more extensive portrait of Asian American and Latino voters and non-voters.

The two most significant weaknesses of the CPS, and the likely reason that it is not used regularly in analysis of electoral participation, are (a) the self-reported nature of voting, registration, and citizenship and (b) the absence of attitudinal questions on the survey. The first

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3 Third and beyond generation Asian American adults numbered 1,053,803 and Latinos 5,586,134; for these respondents, which made up 10.1 percent of Asian Americans and 21.0 percent of Latinos, we do not have data on national origin or ancestry.
of these is a significant weakness for the analysis presented here. Respondents over-report voting, often by as much as 10 percent. There is tentative evidence that the levels of over-reporting vary by racial/ethnic group (Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee 2000). As important, there is a second form of over-reporting that has not been measured rigorously. That is over-reporting of citizenship status, which would have a disproportionate impact on communities with high shares of non-U.S. citizens. The CPS is conducted in the weeks after the November election and involves data collection by individuals who identify themselves as working for the U.S. government, specifically the U.S. Census Bureau. When contacted by Census data collectors, it is quite possible that some immigrants, particularly unauthorized immigrants, may think it safer to identify themselves as U.S. citizens. Once they have misrepresented their citizenship status, they may then be more likely to also misreport registration and voting status. Arguably, the likelihood of immigrant misrepresentation of citizenship status or voting eligibility would be different depending on the degree to which immigrant status/immigrant rights are publicly debated (so, it would be high in the 1994 election when California was debating Proposition 187 or in 1996 just after President Clinton signed the Welfare Reform Bill which eliminated many federal social welfare benefits for legal permanent residents and lower in 1998 when immigration-related issues were not in the national debate). We would hypothesize that the respondents who misreport citizenship status are more likely to be unauthorized immigrant than permanent residents. The CPS has no means to identify unauthorized immigrant respondents.

Figure 2. Voting Rates by Race and Ethnicity
Table 1. New Electorate Categories by Asian National Origin Group – Weighted CPS Estimates 2000 and 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting Categories</th>
<th>Adult Population</th>
<th>All Voters</th>
<th>% of Pop</th>
<th>Native Born</th>
<th>% of Voters</th>
<th>Foreign Born</th>
<th>% of Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian¹</td>
<td>10,387,785</td>
<td>3,016,399</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>1,044,455</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>1,971,943</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese²</td>
<td>2,190,324</td>
<td>655,195</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>178,165</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>477,030</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>719,177</td>
<td>269,382</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>153,337</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>116,045</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>945,376</td>
<td>229,638</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>41,199</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>188,439</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>1,838,546</td>
<td>594,883</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>164,670</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>430,213</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian³</td>
<td>1,636,662</td>
<td>354,241</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>68,965</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>285,275</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>906,875</td>
<td>289,554</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>271,246</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other SE Asian</td>
<td>687,649</td>
<td>119,401</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25,210</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>94,191</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third+ Gen</td>
<td>1,053,803</td>
<td>361,215</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Voting Categories</th>
<th>Registered Not Voted</th>
<th>% of Adult Pop</th>
<th>Citizen-not Registered</th>
<th>% of Adult Pop</th>
<th>Non-Citizen</th>
<th>% of Adult Pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>549,659</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3,093,205</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>3,728,521</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>101,904</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>614,283</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>818,940</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>49,794</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>202,114</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>197,886</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>45,075</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>258,279</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>412,383</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>121,505</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>594,479</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>527,677</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>68,282</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>335,775</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>878,363</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>46,122</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>331,669</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>239,529</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other SE Asian</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third+ Gen</td>
<td>50,743</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>283,773</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Includes respondents who either answered “Asian” on the race question or one of the seven listed Asian national origin groups
² National origin group estimates only accounts for first and second generation. Chinese includes those from Taiwan
³ Includes those from India or Pakistan
⁴ Includes those from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma or Bangladesh
⁵ Unweighted sample size is too small to estimate the population
Table 2. New Electorate Categories by Latino National Origin Group – Weighted CPS Estimates 2000 and 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adult Population</th>
<th>Voting Categories</th>
<th>Non-Voting Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Voters</td>
<td>% of Pop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino (^1)</td>
<td>26,532,980</td>
<td>7,421,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican (^2)</td>
<td>11,594,936</td>
<td>2,022,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>1,955,995</td>
<td>918,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>1,277,570</td>
<td>552,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>757,345</td>
<td>196,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvadoran</td>
<td>1,115,081</td>
<td>201,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian</td>
<td>622,869</td>
<td>179,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central/South American (^3)</td>
<td>3,135,698</td>
<td>792,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third+ Gen</td>
<td>5,586,134</td>
<td>2,481,795</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered</th>
<th>% of Pop</th>
<th>Citizen-not Registered</th>
<th>% of Pop</th>
<th>Non-Citizen</th>
<th>% of Pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>1,812,726</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6,775,554</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>10,522,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>556,273</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2,297,736</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6,718,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>219,304</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>818,553</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>66,429</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>234,816</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>423,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>27,016</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>227,989</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>306,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvadoran</td>
<td>14,881</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>136,577</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>761,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian</td>
<td>22,613</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>117,848</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>302,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central/South American</td>
<td>112,340</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>511,984</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1,719,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third+ Gen</td>
<td>767,564</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2,336,774</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 Includes respondents who either answered “Latino” on the ethnicity question or one of the seven listed Latino national origin groups.

2 National origin group estimates only accounts for first and second generation.

3 Includes those from includes those from Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The second limitation of the CPS has to do with the nature of the questions asked. It does not collect attitudinal data. As a result, it is not useful for analysis of questions of candidate...
choice, partisanship, or the role of issues. With these limits in mind, we think that the major strength of the CPS – specifically the ability to measure participation and categories of non-participation across racial/ethnic groups and for national-origin groups – outweighs its major weakness – its reliance on self-reporting – for the question we are asking here. We do recognize, however, that the voter and U.S. citizen populations to which we compare the non-voters and non-citizens include individuals who are neither. We also recognize that a sizeable share of the non-naturalized immigrants in analysis of naturalization propensity are unauthorized immigrants and, hence, ineligible to naturalize.

**Voting and Non-Voting Likelihoods in Asian American and Latino Communities**

We present our analysis in two stages. First, we describe the composition of the Asian American and Latino adult populations in terms of their voting and non-voting behavior. The four categories that we use for the analysis follow the model of DeSipio’s (1996a) analysis of Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cuban Americans, but have not previously been used for analysis of other Latino populations or for Asian Americans. As will be evident, there is both within pan-ethnic group and across pan-ethnic group variation in the likelihood of voting or reasons for non-voting. Second, after describing the electoral/non-electoral status of both pan-ethnic groups, we model each major step towards political incorporation for immigrants: non-citizens to naturalized; non-registered to registered; and registered non-voters to voters. The models tap measures of the five sets of factors which have been found in the previous scholarship to influence immigrant incorporation: socioeconomic status, immigrant political socialization, political institutions, social contexts, and national origin.

**Snapshots of Two Communities: National Origin, Voting and Non-Voting**

Tables 1 and 2 present the CPS estimates of the Asian American and Latino voting and non-voting populations broken down by national origin. Among Asian Americans as a whole, 29 percent of the adult population voted in a presidential election. The share of voters for Asian American national origin groups varied from a low of 17 percent for the other Southeast Asian nationalities to 37 percent for Japanese Americans, a function, in part, of the relatively low share of foreign born Japanese Americans. This pattern reflects the unique characteristics of this community as compared with the other Asian national origin groups. Japanese Americans are primarily a native born population, many of which are in their third and beyond generations. Although the Chinese and Filipinos also have long histories in the United States, these two communities have also experienced large influxes of new immigrants since 1965 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006). Unlike Japanese Americans, Vietnamese American voters are overwhelmingly (94 percent) foreign born.

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4 This number includes those who checked either Asian as a racial identity or one of the Asian ancestries. We present the maximum estimate of Asians in the U.S. which is a larger number than that which is normally reported. The Census only reports those who self-identify racially as Asian. We believe that nationality is a more objective measure of ethnic background and by including those with at least one parent from Asia, we better account for Asians who may be biracial and not identify as Asian American.

5 We believe that the Japanese American native born share underrepresents the true figure. The third plus generation Asian American category includes a large number of Japanese Americans.
The primary reason why Asian Americans do not vote is due to non-citizenship status. Thirty-six percent of Asian American adults are non-U.S. citizens which makes up a larger share of the adult population than do voters. South Asians have the largest proportion of non-citizens (54 percent) while the Vietnamese have the smallest (26 percent). Among citizen non-voters, the non-registered far outnumber the registered non-voters. Thirty percent of Asian American adults fall into the first category and five percent into the latter. For both of these categories, there is somewhat less variation across national origin groups.

Like the Asian American community, less than one third of Latinos voted in a Presidential election. However, unlike the Asian American community, the native born make up a greater share of the Latino population than the foreign born. The pattern is almost exactly the opposite from what we find with the Asian American community. While 65 percent of Asian American voters are foreign born, 63 percent of Latino voters are native born. When we disaggregate Latino voters by national origin, we see that the large proportion of native born voters is driven by second generation Mexican Americans. Were we to make the likely correct assumption that the third plus generation CPS respondents are largely made up of Mexican Americans, the Mexican native born share would be even more striking.

First and second generation Mexican Americans have a relatively small voting population: 17 percent of Mexican adults voted in 2000 or 2004, reflecting the huge Mexican immigration of the last twenty years. Among other Latino national origin groups, Puerto Ricans – who are U.S. citizens by birth – have the highest proportion of voters (47 percent) and Salvadorans have the smallest proportion of voters (18 percent) after Mexican Americans. Among the non-Mexican Latinos, the foreign born make up a majority of Latino voters.

As is the case with the Asian American community, the biggest barrier to non-Puerto Rican Latino political participation is non-U.S. citizenship. Forty percent of Latino adults are not naturalized. Among U.S. citizen Latinos, registered Latinos largely turn – 7 percent of adults had registered, but not voted. Interestingly, the registered population who were more likely to report that they didn’t vote were the third generation and beyond category suggesting, perhaps, the legacies of discrimination that characterized Mexican American engagement with electoral politics prior to 1975. Latino political incorporation is also challenged by a significant non-registered population. Over one-fifth of the eligible adult population was not registered to vote. Puerto Ricans have the largest proportion of non-registered citizens (42 percent) and Salvadorans the smallest proportion (12 percent).

**Modeling Naturalization and Voting Behavior in Latino and Asian American Communities**

In order to develop a richer understanding of the process of political incorporation in these two populations, we model the three steps towards political incorporation for Asian Americans and Latinos: non-U.S. citizenship to naturalization, non-registered U.S. citizen to registered; and registered non-voters to voters. We have specified our models to incorporate measures from the five sets of factors that have been demonstrated to influence immigrant incorporation:

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6 We follow the same coding practice for Latinos as for Asian Americans; “Latino” includes all respondents who either identified as “Latino/Hispanic” on the ethnicity question or who identified with one of the Latino national origin groups on the nativity question.

7 While these share of registered non-voter Asian Americans and Latinos are small relative to the other non-voting categories, Latinos and Asian Americans do have higher overall share of registered non-voters than Anglos or African Americans. The share of registered non-voters diminished in the 1990s relative to earlier periods.
socioeconomic status, immigrant political socialization, political institutions, social contexts, and national origin.

We measure socioeconomic status through traditional measures: age, gender (female), income, education, homeownership, and employment status. We account for variation driven by immigrant socialization with two measures. For immigrants, we account for the number of years they have resided in the United States. U.S.-born respondents are coded as zero, so “years in the United States” captures the variation in immigrant respondents. Second, we measure immigrant socialization with an immigrant generation measure – first, second, and third plus.

To examine the role of political institutions, we include several variables. First, we include a measure of whether a respondent lived in a state which was in a competitive presidential, gubernatorial or senate election in either the 2000 or 2004 election year. This variable aggregates three types of statewide elections (models using the levels of elective office individually resulted in similar findings). We expect that competitive elections will see higher levels of mobilization by political parties. We also include membership in a labor union. We anticipate that union members will have higher levels of social networking than non-union members and will have greater access to information on the political process (a second form of mobilization). Finally, we measure the potential mobilizing impact of Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act by including a control for living in a state in which some or all counties use Spanish or Asian language bilingual ballots.

To account for social context, we include a variable which controls for the proportion of either the Asian or Latino population in the state. We would hypothesize that states with larger proportions of Asian or Latino populations would provide a more supportive political and social environment and/or a richer network of Latino or Asian civic organizations for Asian Americans or Latinos which encourages political incorporation and more ethnic specific electoral outreach. These states are also more likely to have ethnic community organizations which help immigrants navigate through the political process.

We test separate models for Latinos and Asian Americans. We recognize that these panethnic categories mask a great deal of variation, so we include dummy variables for each of the national origin groups, using as the excluded category the national origin group that has the closest to the average rate of electoral participation (Chinese for the Asian American models and Colombians for the Latino models). Each national origin group experiences a different immigration history and different levels of cohesion which may influence the level of their political incorporation in the United States.

Finally, we also control for the fact that we are using a merged data set by including a control for the 2004 election. We do this to ensure that our findings are not driven disproportionately by the data from one election cycle or the other. We do not anticipate that this variable will prove to be significant in differentiating non-naturalized citizens from naturalized citizens, but anticipate that it might prove significant for the distinctions between U.S. citizen

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8 We would prefer to use share of life spent in the United States which has generally proven to be a more reliable predictor of acculturation, but the CPS does not collect year of immigration for immigrant respondents. It does have immigration period in five year cohorts, but this introduces too much fluidity to develop a reliable measure of share of life spent in the United States. As a result, we use the more blunt “years in the United States.”
9 We attempted to use other measures of racial and ethnic diversity such as percent minority population in the state and found that the variable had an insignificant effect.
10 For ease of interpretation and simplicity, we used Chinese Colombians to be the excluded category for all three models.
non-voters and voters because of the extensive voter registration and voter mobilization efforts in some states following the very close 2000 election.

We examine three models which reflect the three major steps to political incorporation: citizenship, registration, and voting. In the citizenship model, we assess what differentiates the non-naturalized from the naturalized. In the registration model, we compare the non-registered to the registered among U.S. citizen adults. Finally, in the voting model, we compare non-voters to voters among registered adults. To do this, we use logistic models for each set of dichotomous variables. In addition to the logit models, we also ran predicted probabilities to understand the impact of each independent variable on each of the three political incorporation steps. For the predicted probabilities, we use the minimum to maximum change which identifies the predicted probability when you move an independent variable from its minimum value to its maximum value. By comparing those variables that obtain statistical significance across the three models, we can explore which factors are only relevant to one step of political incorporation and which are influential throughout the entire process. For ease of interpretation, we first analyze the Asian American and Latino models separately and then conclude with a more comparative analysis.

Steps to Political Incorporation: Asian Americans

Asian American naturalization is shaped by socioeconomic status, years in the United States, national origin, and social context (see Table 3). Perhaps not surprisingly, years in the United States had the greatest substantive effect on naturalization propensity. National origin, however, had the most consistent effects, with each national origin group demonstrating a statistically significant difference from Chinese immigrants. Japanese, Koreans, South Asians, and Southeast Asians are all less likely to naturalize than the Chinese. The Japanese in particular have distinct naturalization rates: they are 33 percent less likely to naturalize than the Chinese. Filipinos and Vietnamese are more likely to naturalize than the Chinese. The Vietnamese, who are almost 20 percent more likely to naturalize than the Chinese, are largely political refugees whose naturalization rates are most likely influenced by the politicized reason for their immigration.

This model also finds that education – which offers immigrants the skills and knowledge they need to meet application requirements – has a strong effect on naturalization rates. Finally, social context is found to play a small role. Asian immigrants who live in states with large Asian populations are more likely to naturalize than those who live in states with small Asian populations.

We test registration and voting models in Table 4. Variables in each of the five categories of determinants shape the likelihood of registration and voting, with both models sharing many of the same determinants. The socioeconomic and immigration related variables were significantly related to both registration and voting in the expected fashion and had the most sizeable substantive effects. Older, better educated, female homeowners who are in the work force and are third plus generation immigrants are more likely to register to vote. These factors, with the exception of homeownership also predict voting. The gendered effect on registration and voting differs from past studies that either find no gender effect on participation or that women are less politically engaged in politics (Lien Conway and Wong 2004; Wong 2003). Our tests for the role of political institutions only finds a mobilizing effect from labor union membership.
### Table 3. Logistic Model Predicting Naturalization – Asian American

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Naturalization</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td>min</td>
<td>max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panethnicity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>-1.511***</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>-.333</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>- .348***</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>-.087</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>.313***</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>-.332***</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>-.083</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>.829***</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asian</td>
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<td>.137</td>
<td>-.201</td>
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<td><strong>Socioeconomics</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>.002</td>
<td>.052</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
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<td>.070</td>
<td>.014</td>
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<td>$15K-24,999</td>
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<td>.163</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$25K-34,999</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.157</td>
<td>.020</td>
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<td>$100K+</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>.010</td>
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<td>-.020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>.010</td>
<td>.305</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Homeowner</td>
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<td>.077</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>In labor force</td>
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<td>.041</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Years in U.S.</td>
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<td>.011</td>
<td>.897</td>
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<td><strong>Political Institutions</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor union member</td>
<td>.273</td>
<td>.280</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State w/ competitive election – 2000</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State w/ competitive election – 2004</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.002</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social Context</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population in state</td>
<td>.755**</td>
<td>.383</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 Election</td>
<td>.852***</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.785***</td>
<td>.233</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 National origin group estimates only accounts for first and second generation, the excluded category is Chinese

2 The excluded income category is $0-$14,999

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
| Table 4. Logistic Models Predicting Voting and Registration – Asian American |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                  | Voting          |                 | Registration    |                 |
|                  | B              | s.e.            | min→max        | b              | s.e.            | min→max        |
| Panethnicity1    |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Japanese        | .071           | .187            | .008            | .258**         | .105            | .063            |
| Korean          | -.014          | .212            | -.002           | -.011          | .115            | -.003           |
| Filipino        | -.089          | .149            | -.011           | .116           | .083            | .029            |
| South Asian     | -.143          | .195            | -.017           | -.022          | .109            | -.005           |
| Vietnamese      | .150           | .225            | .017            | .097           | .117            | .024            |
| Southeast Asian | .277           | .104            | .029            | -.299**         | .140            | -.075           |
| Socioeconomics2 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Age             | .022***         | .004            | .165            | .022***         | .002            | .361            |
| Gender          | .227**          | .104            | .027            | .096*           | .057            | .024            |
| $15K-24,999     | -.182           | .251            | -.022           | -.247           | .152            | -.062           |
| $25K-34,999     | .410            | .259            | .042            | .302**          | .143            | -.075           |
| $35K-49,999     | .097            | .234            | .011            | .003            | .138            | .001            |
| $50K-74,999     | .274            | .228            | .030            | .011            | .132            | .003            |
| $75K-99,999     | .622**          | .242            | .063            | .090            | .136            | .022            |
| $100K+          | .751***         | .275            | .072            | .075            | .151            | .019            |
| Income missing  | .632***         | .239            | .063            | -.754***        | .128            | -.186           |
| Education       | .081***         | .019            | .247            | .131***         | .010            | .564            |
| Homeowner       | .020            | .129            | .002            | .258***         | .068            | .064            |
| In labor force  | .347***         | .121            | .043            | .205***         | .067            | .051            |
| Immigration     |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Generation      | .255*           | .142            | .055            | .274***         | .076            | .133            |
| Years in U.S.   | .019            | .016            | .038            | .004            | .009            | .018            |
| Political Institutions |          |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Labor union member | .963**        | .469            | .080            | .410**          | .195            | .099            |
| State w/ competitive election – 2000 | -.119   | .193            | -.014           | .224*          | .115            | .055            |
| State w/ competitive election – 2004 | .220   | .194            | .024            | .150            | .101            | .037            |
| State w/ bilingual ballot | -.088 | .139            | -.010           | -.086           | .076            | -.021           |
| Social Context  |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Proportion of Asian population in state | -.287 | .524            | -.014           | -.685**        | .279            | -.070           |
| 2004 Election   | .156            | .123            | .018            | .069            | .067            | .017            |
| Constant        | -.1693***       | .496            | -.3278***       | .273           |                 |                 |
| N               | 3,132           |                 | 5,750           |                 |                 |                 |
| Log Likelihood  | 137.38          |                 | 586.80          |                 |                 |                 |
| PPC             | .851            |                 | .642            |                 |                 |                 |
| PRE             | -.002           |                 | .213            |                 |                 |                 |

1 National origin group estimates only accounts for first and second generation, the excluded category is Chinese

2 The excluded income category is $0-$14,999

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
National origin does not distinguish voters from registered non-voters in the Asian American community. It does, however, appear as a significant predictor of registration propensity with Japanese origin/ancestry respondents showing a higher likelihood of registration than Chinese respondents and Southeast Asians showing lower likelihood. Registration also increased for respondents living in states with competitive elections in 2000 and decreased modestly as the percentage Asian American in a state’s population increased.

Steps to Political Incorporation: Latinos

Latino naturalization propensity is determined by socioeconomic status, national origin, years in the United States, and social context (see Table 5). Of these determinants, years in the United States has the greatest substantive impact followed by individual socioeconomic characteristics. Among the socioeconomic characteristics, education and age had the greatest substantive effects on naturalization propensity. Higher income categories, homeownership, being in the labor force, and being a woman all had more moderate positive effects on the likelihood of Latino naturalization.

National origin also had an impact on naturalization propensity, though the impact was not as consistent as for Asian immigrants. Mexican and Salvadoran immigrants were less likely to naturalize, controlling for the other predictors in the model, than were Colombians, and Dominicans were more likely. Overall, Mexican immigrants were 10 percent less likely than Colombians to naturalize. Since Mexicans make up more than 60 percent of all Latino immigrants, this Mexican naturalization gap goes a long way toward explaining lower levels of naturalization in Latino communities relative to other immigrant populations.

The political institutional variables we analyzed did not prove to be significant predictors of naturalization. CPS respondents in the 2004 supplement were more likely to have naturalized than the 2000 respondents (by approximately 5 percent). This finding (and the similar finding for Asian Americans) suggests that naturalization is on the increase in immigrant communities.

The same factors that distinguish non-naturalized Latinos from the naturalized also shape the transition from non-registered to registered voter and, then, to voter (Table 6). Interestingly, however, Mexican origin/ancestry plays a role no different than that of Colombian in these transitions. Being from Cuba, on the other hand, significantly increased the propensity of registering and voting. Cubans were 14 percent more likely to register and 4 percent more likely to vote, with everything else being held at its mean, than the base group (Colombians). Salvadoreans, Central and South Americans, and Puerto Ricans also saw increased likelihoods of registering to vote. Dominicans were approximately 9 percent more likely to vote and Salvadoreans 11 percent.

As the scholarship would predict, older respondents, higher income respondents, more educated respondents, and Latinas were more likely to register and to vote. Substantively, age and education had the largest impact on registration and voting. When changing the minimum age to the maximum age, Latinos were 47 percent more likely to register and 20 percent more likely to vote. Increasing education had similarly dramatic effects. Being in the labor force positively spurred registration, but not voting.
Table 5. Logistic Model Predicting Naturalization – Latino

<table>
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<th>B</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>min–max</th>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
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<td>-.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
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<td>.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>.478***</td>
<td>.146</td>
<td>.084</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central/South American</td>
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<td>.111</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Socioeconomics</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>.002</td>
<td>.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>.226***</td>
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<td>.035</td>
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<td>$25K-34,999</td>
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<td>$35K-49,999</td>
<td>.308***</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.051</td>
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<td>$50K-74,999</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Homeowner</td>
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<td>In labor force</td>
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<td>.030</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration</strong></td>
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<td>Years in U.S.</td>
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<td><strong>Political Institutions</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>.205</td>
<td>.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State w/ competitive election – 2000</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.007</td>
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<td>State w/ competitive election – 2004</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.091</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social Context</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Latino population in state</td>
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<td>.0003</td>
<td>.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 Election</td>
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<td>.063</td>
<td>.052</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PPC</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRE</td>
<td>.329</td>
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</table>

1 National origin group estimates only accounts for first and second generation, the excluded category is Colombian
2 The excluded income category is $0-$14,999
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
Table 6. Logistic Models Predicting Voting and Registration – Latino

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Registration</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>s.e.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panethnicity(^1)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Puerto Rican</td>
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<td>Cuban</td>
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<td>.199</td>
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<td>Dominican</td>
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<td>Salvadoran</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socioeconomics(^2)</td>
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<td>Gender (female)</td>
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<td>$25K-34,999</td>
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<td>Homeowner</td>
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<td>In labor force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
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<td>Generation</td>
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<td>Proportion of Latino</td>
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<td>.0003</td>
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<tr>
<td>population in state</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004 Election</td>
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<td>.075</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) National origin group estimates only accounts for first and second generation, the excluded category is Colombian

\(^2\) The excluded income category is $0-$14,999

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
The two immigration related variables – time in the United States (which, again, only measures variation among naturalized citizens) and immigrant generation both had at least moderate effects on increasing chances of registering. The larger of the two effects can be attributed to generation. When compared to a first generation Latino, being a third generation Latino increased chances of registering by about 13 percent. Years in the United States also proved to have a modest positive effect on the likelihood of voting. Immigrant generation did not prove to be a significant positive predictor of voting.

While individual socioeconomic and national origin characteristics explain most of what leads non-registered Latinos to become registered and registered Latinos to vote, institutional and context variables also play a role. For Latinos being part of a labor union led to a small increase in the likelihood of registering. Contrary to previous literature, being in a state with a competitive election in 2000 led Latinos to be less likely to register. We do not have an explanation of this finding and think that it must be an artifact of the specification of the model. Increasing Latino share of the state population led to a slight decline in the likelihood of registering to vote. More along the lines of our expectations, Latinos in states with competitive elections had a moderate effect on increasing the likelihood of registered voters to become actual voters. Somewhat surprisingly, however, being from a state with partial or complete bilingual ballot coverage had a modest negative effect on chances of voting. Registered Latinos were 4 percent less likely to vote in states with bilingual ballots. The share of Latinos in the state and being surveyed after the 2004 election also had statistically significant positive effects on the likelihood of voting.

Immigrant Political Incorporation: Comparing Asian Americans and Latinos

Our findings suggest that there is the foundation for a model of political incorporation that speaks to the experiences of more than one racial/ethnic population. Our focus on Latinos and Asian Americans indicates the first element of this model. Electoral participation cannot simply be understood as voting or registering to vote as has been the norm in the scholarship, but it also needs to take a step back to look at the precursor for eligibility to register to vote. For the population as a whole, this eligibility is established with the transition to adulthood; for many Latinos and Asian Americans, naturalization is also a necessary precursor. The impact of immigration on electoral incorporation, however, does not end with naturalization – and this suggests a second way in which a racial/ethnic model of political participation would be distinct from a model for the non-Hispanic whites – as immigrant generation consistently proved to be a statistically significant predictor of voter registration and, for Asian Americans, voting. We conclude our analysis, then, by evaluating similarities and differences in the predictors of naturalization, voter registration, and voting in Asian American and Latino communities.

Despite some similarities, the factors predicting the likelihood of naturalization among Asian American and Latino immigrants would appear to differ. Longer period of residence were clearly very import to predicting naturalization for both populations (and for immigrants in general) and were supplemented by education, labor force status, and homeownership. The Asian American path to naturalization would appear to be shaped much more by national origin than is the case in Latino communities. Each of the six nationality groups in the model differed from the Chinese experience and the variation across groups was quite dramatic (from as much as one-third less likely to nearly 20 percent more likely). These findings lead us to believe that naturalization in Asian American communities should be studied with more attention to the
impact of socioeconomic, immigration, institutional, and social context factors on naturalization for each major nationality group. These nationality variations were substantively more important than any of the other predictors with the exception of length of residence and education.

For Latinos, on the other hand, there is certainly some nationality variation, but the substantive effect of these statistically significant national origin differences are small compared to those that appear in Asian American communities (from 9 percent less likely than Colombians to 8 percent more likely). The socio-economic factors that have traditionally been used in the scholarship to explain naturalization propensity would seem to better explain Latino naturalization.

Finally, for both Latinos and Asian Americans, 2004 CPS respondents were more likely to be naturalized than were 2000 respondents. For Asian Americans, the positive impact of being a 2004 respondent increased naturalization propensity by 21 percent. Since each CPS sample represents a random selection of adults in that year, this finding suggests that naturalization has increased over this period (or that misreporting of citizenship status has increased, an explanation that we do not see a foundation for based on the political debates of these two election years). This finding does, however, offer a caution for our analysis. It suggests that the institutional variables that we measured, and that proved insignificant in both the Asian American and Latino models, may not have effectively captured the political institutional factors relevant to naturalization in these communities. Previous scholarship on naturalization suggests that community institutions are critical to moving many eligible immigrants through the naturalization process (DeSipio 2001). Had we identified measures for these, we might have better been able to identify what changed between 2000 and 2004.

Where the predictors of naturalization varied somewhat between Asian Americans and Latinos, the factors predicting the transition from non-registered citizen to registered voter and registered voter to voter were much similar. At the core of this Asian American/Latino model is a set of sociodemographic predictors that would be used for predicting Anglo participation. It is important to note that income would probably have had a more consistent effect for Anglos, particularly when it is recognized that the income categories that do not prove to be significant account for the vast majority of Latino respondents to the CPS.

The Asian American/Latino model is not, however, limited to sociodemographic predictors. Immigration plays a role for both populations with immigrant generation playing a consistent role and years in the United States (among naturalized citizens) proving to be important for Latinos. Some share of Latino and Asian American exclusion from the electorate is a function of the absence of political socialization. This impact is over and above any exclusion based on class, youth, or low levels of formal education. The likelihood of voting also varies by national origin, in these models more for Latinos than for Asian Americans. Institutional and contextual variables also shape the likelihood of registering and voting, though not always in the predicted directions. Of these, union membership was the most likely to prove to be statistically significant and positive. Population concentration in the respondent’s state proved to be a negative predictor of voter registration for both Latinos and Asian Americans.

We believe that the findings presented here confirm the need to seek a model of racial/ethnic participation that incorporates the experiences of multiple racial/ethnic populations. Such an endeavor will not only make our understanding of participation and, particularly, non-participation in American electoral politics more rigorous, it will also offer tangible targets for political mobilization efforts in minority communities. A natural extension of this work – and one that we plan to undertake – is to add African Americans and Anglos to the models for citizen
adults (for reasons that we have suggested, we are less confident that a common model can be used to model naturalization propensity). To the extent that such a comparative model of racial/ethnic electoral behavior is to be developed, the CPS, despite its weaknesses, is the only data source that would allow for such a model to be tested.
References


