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"A Most Grievous and Insupportable Vexation": Billeting in Early Seventeenth Century England

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“A Most Grievous and Insupportable Vexation”:
Billeting in Early Seventeenth Century England

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

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December 2009

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Acknowledgment

I would like to thank Dr. Thomas Cogswell for all the help he has given me over the last few years and particularly for his help with this Dissertation. Thanks also are due to my wife Judith for putting up with an all too narrowly focused husband.
One of the great controversies in England during the 1620s was the practice of billeting soldiers by order of the royal government in private homes without the consent of the householder. This practice caused considerable distress for the billeters and was one of the initial causes of the English dislike of Charles I and a major contributor to the political turmoil of the 1620s. Billeting was also one of the roots of the Petition of Right, passed by Parliament and given the King’s assent in 1628. This Petition became an important part of the English constitutional system over the centuries and had echoes in the American Constitution. The Dissertation explores the origins of the practice of billeting troops in private quarters and the resulting controversies in the changes in military practice in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and in Charles I’s attempts to participate in the Thirty Years’ War. The Dissertation’s principle subject is the billeting operations in England during the 1620s. It describes the problems these operations created, together with the complaints of the local governments and people of England, caused by the royal government when it forced billeting burdens on to the localities. The argument of the Dissertation is that the root cause of the billeting problems was the
inability of the royal government to raise the money to support its war effort. There is evidence that, as long as the royal government paid for billeting the soldiers, the localities were willing to billet the troops, but when the money ceased to come from London problems soon arose. This failure created, in a domino like effect, other problems with and for the soldiers, which in turn became the problems most mentioned in the documents of the era. The crimes, mutinies and riots by the soldiers are discussed, as well as the problems the soldiers encountered in securing food and lodging. The Dissertation also discusses the closely associated controversy over the use of military law in place of the common law in the context of billeting operations, which engendered the use of military law as a practical way of protecting the people in the areas where the government billeted troops.
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Abbreviations and Date Conventions

Abbreviations

Commonly used abbreviations for terms and for Books, Journals and other published material are presented in the following list. Full bibliographical information may be found in the Bibliography at the end of the Dissertation.

*APC*  Acts of the Privy Council, Privy Council Registers

B.L.  British Library

*C.S.P.D.*  Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series

Co. or Co.s  county or counties

D.L.  Deputy Lieutenant

*E.H.R.*  English Historical Review

*J.B.S.*  Journal of British Studies

J. P.  Justice of the Peace

L.L.  Lord Lieutenant


P.C.  The Privy Council of the King

P.R.O.  H. M. Public Records Office, Great Britain

RHS  The Royal Historical Society

s.  shillings (20 shillings in the pound)

d.  pence (12d. in the shilling or 240d. in the pound)
Date Conventions

In general, the dates of documents and manuscripts consulted for the Dissertation are from the manuscript itself and therefore are “Old Style”, that is, in the Julian Calendar. Where there might be confusion over the year in dates for the months of January, February and March, the date has been indicated with both years thus: January 1625/26, which indicates January 1626 by the modern reckoning and January 1625 in the reckoning current in the 1620s. The ”old style” year ended on 24 March and the next year began on 25 March in almost all the manuscripts consulted.

However, in some places in the dissertation a whole year is referred to as, for example, “1628”. In this case, the year referred to is the year from 1 January 1628 to 31 December 1628.

In a few cases, the documents have “New Style”, or Gregorian, dates and, in these cases, the date is given with the notation (N.S.) as, for example, 17 Dec 1628(N.S.).
Introduction

During the first five years of the reign of Charles I, something extraordinary happened in England. At the start of the reign in March 1625, his subjects cheered the young King. By 1630, many English people groaned about a man whom they now saw as an autocratic, untrustworthy ruler. There were a number of arguments between the members of the political nation and the royal government during this short five-year period that caused this rather startling turnabout. There were disagreements over taxation, the conduct of a war, as well as legal, constitutional and religious issues. These disagreements were evident in the turbulent parliamentary sessions of 1626, 1628 and 1629 and particularly in the important constitutional document of 1628, the Petition of Right, a fundamental statement of the subject’s rights.\(^1\) Because of these conflicts, Charles decided to rule without Parliament until the Scottish war forced him to summon the institution back into session in 1640, which set the stage for the outbreak of the Civil Wars of the 1640s.

In retrospect, the period from 1625 to 1629 seems like a fog bank into which we can see a nation relatively happy with its young King entering on one side and a nation angry with him exiting on the other. Historians have proposed and debated many causes for the upset, but the era still appears shrouded in haze, though today we can perhaps see more clearly. For many years, discussion of the events of the first few years of Charles I’s reign was caught up in debates about the deep underlying causes of the Puritan Revolution in England, the rise of the liberties of the subject against the prerogative of

\(^1\) The full text of the Petition of Right appears in Appendix D.
the crown, the rise of parliamentary democracy, and Marxian discussions of the rise of
the bourgeoisie. In the 1970s, historians started to look more closely the ‘Whig
interpretation’ of the virtually inevitable rise of parliamentary control of government and
the development of civil rights during the seventeenth century. In the last thirty-five
years, historians have looked at the events of the early years of Charles’ reign from new
viewpoints and have shed more light on the grander themes, arguing that events in the
reigns of Elizabeth Tudor and the first two Stuarts were not obvious and inevitable steps
on a “high road to Civil War”.

Yet, in all of this scholarly investigation, which is discussed in Section 3 below,
few have mentioned – except in passing – the importance of billeting soldiers in civilian
homes. This dissertation seeks to correct this lamentable omission. I will argue that the
central government’s practice of billeting, or quartering, soldiers on active duty in private
homes was one of the direct causes of the unrest during the period and that the people of
England not only disliked billeting in itself but that this dislike also contributed to a
number of the other disputes of the 1620s. It continued to be a contentious matter in
England until around 1700 when Parliament gained control of the armed forces and in
North America down to the Bill of Rights of 1791 in the Constitution of the United
States. Furthermore, a better understanding of the problems created by billeting soldiers
with the civilian population will cast new light on the interconnected problems of

2 G. R. Elton, “A High Road to Civil War?” in C. H. Carter, ed., From the Renaissance to the Counter

3 The House of Commons also passed a “Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers” in 1628. This Petition
appears in Appendix D. The quote used in the title of this study comes from this Petition.
finances, the anger of all social strata with the royal government during the period from 1624 to 1628, and the motivation and intent of the authors of the Petition of Right.

1. Outrages and Insolencies

In seventeenth century England, there were no army barracks or camps to house soldiers on active duty nor was there a quartermaster service to provide food and clothing. To provide food and housing for soldiers in areas where troops were assembling for a foreign expedition, or were returning from an expedition, the King’s Privy Council from time to time ordered the local governments to lodge one or several soldiers in many of the homes of the towns and villages surrounding the army rendezvous point. The Privy Council ordered the local government members and the householders to provide quarters. If they refused, the Council often summoned them to London to appear before the Privy Council to explain their refusal, and in the process they often spent time in prison. In addition, the royal government authorized the local governments to punish those of the community who refused to accept soldiers into their homes. The Privy Council also ordered local authorities to levy and collect tax-like payments, nominally a loan to the crown, from throughout the county to pay the costs of providing food for the soldiers.

The amount authorized by the Privy Council for billeting a soldier varied over the period from 30d. per week per man in 1625, eventually rising to 42d. per week in 1627. The total amounts required for eight or ten thousand soldiers for six months or a year could be considerable. At one point, the royal government owed the county of Devon
around £30,000 for the billeting and clothing of soldiers. The government conscripted approximately 45,000 men, nearly 10,000 per year, into the army between late 1624 and 1628 to fight the war. It is this army, or series of armies, that required billeting 5000 to 12,000 soldiers in private homes in England for long periods between 1625 and 1628.

Friction between householders and soldiers was common, perhaps inevitable, and occurred many thousands of times as the men conscripted into his Majesty’s army gathered for expeditions to the continent.

The causes of the anger and fear among the people of England started with “outrages and insolencies” that soldiers billeted on the civilian population committed. These outrages ranged from acts that were irritating, to criminal acts such as theft and burglary, and to truly frightening violence including rape and murder and included riots and mutinies in which injuries and deaths occurred. People in areas where the government billeted soldiers became genuinely afraid for their lives, their families and their property. Two examples illustrate the scale of the problem, one relatively minor and the other in which the Privy Council itself took action. In early 1628, Joane Chapman of Maldon, Essex and her son, Gabriel, testified that on Wednesday the 26 January, four soldiers billeted in her house that night drank eleven quarts of strong beer, which they

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4 See Appendix B, Sec. 3 for details. £30,000 amounted to 10% of the royal government’s peace time revenues.

5 Information on the numbers of men pressed into the army in each year and the expeditions mounted may be found in Table A3 in App. A.

6 SP14/177/18, Sir John Hippisley to the P.C.; 26 Dec 1624. The words “outrages” and “insolencies” appear in this document.
made her buy “out of doors” because they did not like her beer. When they went to their beds, they found fault with them and called for more beer and chamber pots. When she objected, one of the soldiers half drew his sword and swore he would kill her if she did not comply. She then sent her son to an officer to complain, but after Gabriel took up a stick as he was going out, one of the soldiers hit Gabriel’s hand with a candlestick and “cut his hand through”. Subsequent evenings were not much calmer. If the soldiers were not happy with their bed sheets, they tore them up. Each night they demanded two candles and a great fire, staying up until 2 o’clock. She further complained that the constables were no help since they were afraid to come and “appease” these disorders. If they had come, they might have encountered billeting problems similar to those of a householder and a Justice of the Peace in Buckinghamshire.

The Buckinghamshire incident was potentially a more serious situation, one in which the Privy Council quickly took action. The Council’s response, however, was the sort of central government action that incensed the political class of England by the time the Parliament of 1628 met. In early 1628, Sir William Fleetwood, a Justice of the Peace in Buckinghamshire, wrote to the Privy Council that Richard Biscoe of Chesham came to him “full of fear”, complaining under oath that a Lieutenant Sandelands had come to his house with a constable after Biscoe had refused to billet one of his soldiers as the constable had ordered. Biscoe confirmed that he had refused and then, according to Biscoe, Lt. Sandelands threatened to “break his head” and go into his house and take all

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7 SP16/92/85, Petition of the Inhabitants of Maldon to the P.C.; early Feb 1627/28, probably 10 Feb.
8 SP16/92/69, Sir William Fleetwood to the P.C.; 8 Feb 1627/28.
his goods to pay for billeting the soldier, or perhaps better, he would cut off Biscoe’s head if he did not billet the soldier. Quite understandably, Biscoe, in fear for his life, went to Justice Fleetwood and asked him to issue a warrant for Sandelands’ arrest and for a bond that Sandelands vow to keep the peace toward him. This Fleetwood did, “knowing that I was bound by my oath to satisfy his desire”. The next day, two constables brought Sandelands before the Justice. Sandelands did not deny the accusation; indeed two women also testified that they had heard Sandelands threaten to burn Biscoe’s house. Justice Fleetwood then ordered the constables to jail Sandelands, as he could not post the required sureties. Sandelands agreed to submit, but requested Fleetwood punish Biscoe for refusing to billet the King’s soldier. Fleetwood refused, saying he knew of no law that required a man to billet a soldier and to provide the soldier with free food. Shortly afterwards Sandelands’ commander, Captain John Read, came to Fleetwood and asked what had been done with the Lieutenant. When informed that Sandelands was on his way to jail with the constables, Read angrily said that his majesty’s soldiers were not subject to the authority of Justices of Peace but only to their superior officers. Read then went to find Sandelands at the inn in Missenden where he and the constables had gone to get their horses. Soon after, soldiers of Captain Fox’s company of the same regiment, who were billeted in Missenden, surrounded the gate of the inn and swore that they would die before they let the Constable take Lieutenant Sandelands to jail. The constables did not dare to take on dozens of soldiers and released Sandelands. These developments appalled Justice Fleetwood who asked in his letter to the Privy Council if the Justices of the Peace could dispense justice to soldiers in
accordance with their oath of office and the laws of England. If not, Fleetwood said, he
desired to be relieved of his office, as these sorts of complaints and “threats of breaking
open men’s houses who shall refuse to billet and other abuses come daily to my cares”.
Following this outburst, the Privy Council quickly summoned Fleetwood and Biscoe to
London to appear before the Council and they tendered their appearances on 12
February.\(^9\) The Council held them over for a few days and then discharged them from
further attendance on the Council on 16 February, apparently with no further
punishment.\(^{10}\)

These sorts of affairs occurred thousands of times during the four years the
government billeted 5,000 to 10,000 soldiers in England. People, even whole
communities, refused to billet soldiers, and threw soldiers out of their houses. People
were not only injured, as was Gabriel Chapman, or, as in Fleetwood’s and Biscoe’s case,
put in prison without trial for violating laws that did not exist, but they were also
subjected to robberies and other crimes and to mutinies and riots in which people were
killed. Given these incidents, it should be no surprise that many in England were upset
with the King and his government and desired the government to cease billeting soldiers
in private homes.

2. High Politics and Foreign Affairs

The proximate cause of England’s problems in the late 1620s was its entry into
the general European conflict known as the Thirty Years’ War in 1624. This war started

\(^9\) APC Vol. 43, pg. 276, An open warrant to Bring Fleetwood and Biscoe before the P.C.; 8 Feb 1627/28
and \(^{10}\) APC Vol. 43, pg. 283, Fleetwood and Biscoe appear before the P.C.; 12 Feb 1627/28.

\(^9\) APC Vol. 43, pg. 296; Fleetwood and Biscoe discharged by the PC; 16 Feb 1627/28.
when Protestant rebels opposed to the rule of the Austrian Habsburgs invited the Elector Palatine, Frederick V, who was James I’s son in law and a strong Calvinist, to become King of Bohemia in 1618. When Frederick accepted and diplomatic efforts collapsed, a general war in Germany between Protestant and Catholic factions quickly ensued. Eventually France and Spain entered the war, Spain in support of the Austrian Habsburgs and France against the Habsburg interests. When the Elector Fredrick was defeated and expelled from both Bohemia and the Palatinate, James and Charles determined to help him regain his ancestral Palatinate. This decision led England into war with Spain and later with France and this in turn led to other problems, large and small, which afflicted England from 1624 to 1630. Of course there were other causes, direct and indirect and of long and short duration, leading up to the troubles in the 1620s and beyond to the Civil War of the 1640s, but the anger over billeting troops with civilians to support the war effort contributed to them and intensified the conflicts.

England’s war effort over the next four years required the creation and maintenance of an army and navy in being from late 1624 until late 1628. In its search for funds with which to prosecute the wars, the royal government resorted to the use of subsidies granted by Parliament, which were never enough, and ‘unparliamentary’ methods of generating revenue that the crown had used occasionally in the past. In 1625 and 1626, it requested that the subsidy payers and nobility of England freely give a gift or ‘Benevolence’ to the King to defend the kingdom in this time of emergency. When this

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request proved unsuccessful in raising a substantial sum, the government resorted to demanding a ‘Forced Loan’ from the same people equal to the four subsidies that the King averred Parliament would have approved in 1626, had Charles not prorogued the Parliament to prevent the Duke of Buckingham’s impeachment.\textsuperscript{12} The Parliament did vote Charles five subsidies in 1628, which brought in between £250,000 and £300,000 and, in return, it received the King’s assent to the Petition of Right. In addition, the King borrowed money and sold crown lands, plate and other possessions, thus providing considerable funds for the war though at the cost of a great reduction in the royal income in the future.

More importantly for the subject of this study, the royal government added to the funds available to pay for the wars by ordering individuals, towns and counties to pay for goods and services for the army and navy that the crown had customarily paid for, not the least of which was billeting the army.\textsuperscript{13} The crown promised to repay the people and local governments at some point in the future, but usually did not repay them in cash from London. From time to time, the royal government authorized deductions from the subsidy and loan money collected in the community as part payment for the money the crown owed to the localities. However, these deductions seldom equaled the expenses incurred in the towns and counties. Finally, there was a breakdown of trust between a number of the leaders of the southern counties and the King and Privy Council because


\textsuperscript{13} The expenses and other responsibilities associated with billeting which the crown delegated to the counties are discussed in Chap. 3 and 4.
the King and Council did not keep their oft repeated promises to pay for the maintenance of the army.

The central government also delegated the responsibility for finding billets for the troops and for disciplining errant soldiers to the county gentry by creating Commissions for Soldiers and Commissions for Martial Law in areas where it had ordered soldiers billeted. The activities of these commissions in the counties created concern for the economy of the county and the traditional rights and freedoms of the people. Taken together, the crown’s demands placed much of the expense and most of the work of maintaining the army in England squarely on the gentlemen in the counties of southern England.

3. The Secondary Literature

Later chapters will highlight a host of cases similar to those of Joane Chapman and Mr. Biscoe as well as ones that were more frightening to the participants. In so doing the dissertation will cast a novel light on the causes of the political and social upheaval experienced in England during the 1620s. A review of the historiography shows that historians, while mentioning it occasionally, have treated the billeting problem only briefly as one of the underlying causes of the upheaval. Given the frequency of complaints about the practice in the documents of the era and in the debates in Parliament in 1628, and in the two Petitions of that year concerning billeting, it is not clear why this
is so.¹⁴ A brief review of some of the better-known literature on the period indicates the neglect this subject has suffered.

S. R. Gardiner dominated the early investigations of the political and social history of England in the seventeenth century in his pursuit of the causes of what he called the Puritan Revolution.¹⁵ In the process, Gardiner developed the view that the reigns of James I and Charles I represented a ‘highway to civil war’. Gardiner saw the Civil Wars of the 1640s as a battle between Puritans and Anglican churchmen over religion and as a battle between the principles of absolute monarchy and the concept of a limited monarchy that led to the liberal democracies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, in Gardiner’s ten volume History of England and all of the work of the ‘Whiggish School’ of historians on the events in the 1620s, there were only a few words here and there on the English hatred of billeting soldiers in private homes. Gardiner occasionally mentions billeting in his work as a government practice and that it caused distress. Gardiner deals with the years from 1623 through 1629 in Volumes Five, Six and Seven, and in this mass of detail there are four places where billeting and the condition of soldiers are mentioned. He mentioned the problems in Kent during the assembly of the Mansfeld Expedition briefly in Volume 5.¹⁶ The substance of Gardiner’s comment was:


“Whilst Mansfeld was disputing with the Government over the accounts, the men were left to shift for themselves. When they reached Dover they found that but few vessels had been collected to carry them over, …. Neither food nor money awaited them. As a natural consequence they roamed about the country, stealing cattle and breaking into houses.”

Another passage related the lack of training of the troops for the Cadiz Expedition in a few lines.\(^\text{17}\) A third referred to the billeting of the troops after the Île de Ré Expedition:

“The soldiers billeted about the country spread the mischief in all directions. It was bad enough for a quiet countryman to be forced to entertain, for due payment, a number of tough young men whose character before they were pressed into the service was probably none of the best; but when payment did not come the burden threatened to become utterly unendurable. …. [W]hat was done was enough to rouse public indignation in classes which the loan had hardly reached.”\(^\text{18}\)

Finally, Gardiner’s relation of the 1628 Parliamentary debates on billeting contains several tales of misconduct.\(^\text{19}\)

Another nineteenth century example comes from Charles Dalton, who wrote a biography of Sir Edward Cecil, a noted commander of the early 1600s, which included a history of the Cadiz Expedition of 1625, which Cecil commanded. Dalton devoted several lines to a few of the problems encountered in billeting soldiers in and around Plymouth in preparation for the Cadiz Expedition:

“Colonel Sir John Ogle had been sent to command the troops…. at Plymouth, and he had to make preparations for the arrival and billeting of the 8,000 pressed men, who were driven like sheep to the slaughter, … from all the neighbouring shires. …. [S]uch a number of recruits and sailors was a grievous burden to the townspeople, who had to lodge and feed them, for the allowance of half-a-crown a week to each man was…


utterly inadequate to feed able-bodied men, who had brought nothing with them from their homes except keen appetites. “\textsuperscript{20}”

This is all Dalton had to say on the subject.

Starting in the 1920s and continuing through the 1950s, Marxist history and the \textit{Annales} School of history came to dominate the study of the Civil War in England, and debates on the subject concentrated on the rise of the gentry as a middle class, or bourgeoisie, intent on overthrowing the feudal economic order. There was little discussion of the details and causes of Parliamentary activity and actions in the early Stuart years, except to note that the House of Commons was the bourgeoisie’s institution of choice for the overthrow of the old order. The political activities at court and in Parliament were merely parts of the froth in the superstructure of a society controlled by deeper underlying trends. These historians treated the problems of householders and soldiers and sailors similarly, neglecting them all in the same fashion.

Billeting continued to receive little attention in the 1950s and 1960s, as scholars concentrated upon constitutional and religious issues, high politics and foreign affairs. For instance, David Willson in his \textit{King James VI and I} mentioned the army formed in late 1624 and early 1625 only once, remarking that “James had no army and the only hope of obtaining one lay in summoning Parliament, a most unattractive prospect”. \textsuperscript{21} He did not mention the raising of volunteers to help the Dutch in mid 1624 and the billeting in Kent in late 1624 of the army formed under Mansfeld. Willson devoted a few pages to


discussions of James’ arguments with the Parliament of 1624, particularly the matter of subsidies. Another respected historian, Christopher Hill, mentioned billeting several times in his book *A Century of Revolution* as a seemingly minor item in the Petition of Right. He also stated that, for refusal to contribute to the Forced Loan of 1626, “humbler men were impressed for military service or had soldiers billeted upon them.” Hill, however, devoted only two pages to the problems encountered in England in the years 1627 through 1629.  

Even books on military matters mention billeting only occasionally. One of leading scholars on the subject in the middle years of the twentieth century, Charles Cruickshank, mentioned billeting once in his book, *Elizabeth’s Army*, describing in a few sentences the tasks of the authorities in the coastal towns in moving troops from England to the continent. He mentions that the local authorities had to billet the soldiers, provide provisions for the voyage and crews for the ships as well as ferry the soldiers out to the ships. Lawrence Stone’s *The Causes of the English Revolution* does not mention billeting even once among the causes he discusses, such as religious arguments, economic change, the decline in external threats to England, and the rise of a political opposition to the crown. He mentioned even The Petition of Right only once or twice.

Considerable work has been done on the late Tudor and early Stuart period in the past thirty-five years and there have been several great debates, but major works on the

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war years of Elizabeth’s reign and the problems in the reigns of the first two Stuarts, as in earlier works, barely mention billeting, and pass on to other concerns. John McGurk presented a comprehensive description of the recruiting and transportation practices used in England during the Irish wars in the 1590s in his book *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, the 1590s Crisis*. Much of the information in the book can serve as a description of the same practices in the 1620s. The book also provides considerable information on the numbers of men recruited from all over England and the costs associated with the recruiting, clothing, arming and transport of soldiers as well as the types of men pressed into the service, whom the author generally described as “unserviceable”. McGurk does discuss the problems of desertion and the replacement of deserters at length. “Captains and conductors found a profitable sideline … by pocketing bribes to discharge men, [by] encouraging desertion to gain on the coat and conduct money and drafting stand-ins … at the muster in the ports.” However, McGurk says hardly a word about billeting the men, either on the road to an embarkation port or in the port while waiting to sail, except that “the levies were mustered, armed, clothed and billeted at the expense of the local shires with some financial help from the crown in the time-honoured institution of coat and conduct money.” McGurk also mentions that while at the port of embarkation (usually Chester), the local officials made billeting arrangements. McGurk also briefly mentions petty crime, “vagabondage” and passport forgery committed by the hundreds of soldiers who were usually present in Chester.  

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Conrad Russell and his fellow revisionists, known for their work on the alleged lack of power of Parliament in the early Stuart period, were the first to recognize the significance of the war that England was waging in the 1620s and that this war had serious effects in England and in Parliament. However, they were more interested in matters other than the war. Russell mentioned billeting a dozen times in his much studied book *Parliaments and English Politics*, but his comments were all brief, pointed to billeting as a grievance in many counties, and said little else. Perhaps Russell’s longest and strongest remark on billeting was this comment: “The one issue [in the Parliament of 1628] which concerned most members more than any other was that of arbitrary imprisonment, but the issue that was most widely said to be complained of in the country was that of billeting.” Russell also remarked in the same passage that billeting was a grievance mainly in the south and southwest which were also the areas most heavily over-represented in Parliament. Overall, however, Russell did not say much on the anger in Parliament over billeting.

In *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, Kevin Sharpe continued the neglect, alluding to the problems of billeting troops in his early chapters on the 1620s in five places, all but one in the context of finding the money to billet the troops from Forced Loan money. He also remarked that Charles pointed out that Parliamentary approved subsidies “could have removed the grievance had they been voted sooner.” Sharpe also devoted a page or so to very brief descriptions of billeting problems and general problems with the soldiery, specifically mentioning the mutiny at Harwich and the riot at Witham, discussed in

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Chapters 7 and 8 of this study. Sharpe provided a brief quote from Sir William Fleetwood, mentioned earlier, on the lack of a law on billeting soldiers, to which he added a few remarks on the perception in the counties that the central government’s practices were “novel, untraditional and even unconstitutional”.27

Richard Cust mentioned billeting a few times in passing in his recent book, *Charles I, A Political Life*, remarking that it was one of the items in the Petition of Right.28 In his earlier book on the Forced Loan, Cust mentioned billeting ten times in the context of proceeds from the Forced Loan being set off against previously incurred billeting or coat and conduct expenses in several of the counties, which totaled some £82,000. Cust remarked that, early in the collection of the Forced Loan, the Privy Council debated “whether loan refusers should have soldiers billeted on them”. The Council decided against it and instead bargained with the communities and soon issued “the first of many orders …allowing counties to recoup their billeting and coat and conduct charges out of the loan”. This, said Cust, provided a clear indication of the Council’s intentions over the following months and showed a willingness to bargain and negotiate rather than coerce. “This situation was not unusual late in 1626. All over the southern shires, soldiers were being billeted and the central funds to pay for them were exhausted. The loan, however, presented a way out of this difficulty, as the Council seems to have recognized at an early stage”. Cust also described how political factions

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in several counties used their control over billeting affairs and assignments to punish their opponents and to make money for themselves by accepting bribes.\textsuperscript{29}

In still another example, L.J. Reeve in his book on Charles I discussed most of the causes of Charles I’s decision to rule without Parliament for ten years. However, he mentioned billeting only twice and only in the first chapter: “The processes of pressing and billeting and the pursuit of the French war were the most unpopular [in domestic politics]”. Moreover, Reeve did not even mention the elimination of billeting as a point in the Petition of Right; instead, he limited his discussion to “the use of the crown of arbitrary imprisonment, unparliamentary taxation and martial law”.\textsuperscript{30}

Lengthening the record of neglect, Anthony Fletcher mentioned billeting three times in his book, \textit{Reform in the Provinces}. All were in connection with discontent with the King’s ‘exact militia’ program of the late 1620s. Fletcher remarked that trouble occurred over billeting and billeting money in Essex and Norfolk in 1628, without offering any further details.\textsuperscript{31} Fletcher said more on the subject in \textit{A County Community in Peace and War: Sussex 1600-1660}.\textsuperscript{32} A little over six pages are devoted to billeting in Sussex during the 1620s. Fletcher mentioned nothing about the interaction of the local people and the troops billeted with them. He did have quite a bit to say about the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{30} L. J. Reeve, \textit{Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule}, [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989], pp. 16, 20. Billeting is also mentioned in passing on pg. 19.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Anthony Fletcher, \textit{A County Community in Peace and War: Sussex 1600-1660}, [London: Longman Group Ltd., 1975], pp. 193-200.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
financial problems that the counties and towns encountered. He remarked that the county used the money collected in the county for the Forced Loan to pay for billeting 800 men from September 1626 to June 1627, when they left for the Ré Expedition. The amount spent “cannot have been less than £3,500”. In addition, the county spent money on soldier’s clothing and the army demanded £3000 more for officer’s arrears before they would leave Sussex. After the Ré fleet returned in November 1627, the crown billeted 600 men in Sussex until September 1628, but this time there was “no loan money to pay those who quartered the troops”. During this period, matters became unpleasant.

Fletcher related that:

“The deputies did their utmost to shift part of the burden elsewhere, by suggesting to Dorset that 100 men might be billeted in Hastings. … . All inhabitants ‘of any ability’, they declared implausibly, would move away rather than accept soldiers in their homes. … . Plague spread rapidly in Chichester during December and naturally the presence of large numbers of soldiers was held to blame. Some citizens refused the heavy rates imposed to defray the billeting charges there.”

Fletcher also noted that the aftermath of billeting in the southern counties in 1627 and 1628 was a long period of wrangling over payments to householders. Though some money was received, it was “paltry” compared to the costs incurred.

Lengthier discussions of billeting are found in the literature only rarely. Mark Fissel devoted nine pages to the subject of billeting and its associated problems in the 1620s in his survey of English military practice from the early 1500s to the beginning of the Civil War. Fissel presented a snapshot of billeting problems in the 1620s through

33 Fletcher, A County Community in Peace and War, pg. 197.

short presentations of a number of the events described in this study, such as those in Kent in early 1625, Captain Leigh’s survey of the condition of the troops around Plymouth in mid-1625, and the riot at Witham in Essex. He pointed out the tendency of the local officials to impress visitors to the area into the army to reduce the number of natives subjected to the press. He also noted that:

“... the unpopularity of impressment was reflected in an unspoken leniency towards deserters …. Deserters were captured, indicted, and imprisoned. ….

The deserters remain on the calendars of prisoners for a number of terms, and then disappear from the records, suggesting that local officialdom admitted the malefactors back into productive labour as soon as it could be done discreetly”.

Fissel concluded his section on billeting in the 1620s with the observation that “Prompt payment on the local level was essential,” to keep troubles to a minimum.

Mary Wolffe has also provided a description of billeting in Devon and Cornwall before and after the Cadiz Expedition of 1625 as well as in connection with the Expedition to the Île de Ré in 1627. Her description was incidental to a chapter length biography of Sir George Chudleigh, one of the leading members of the gentry in Devon. The description is similar in most respects to the descriptions in Chapter 6 of this study. Sir George was active on the Commission for Soldiers and the Commission for Martial Law in the area in the 1620s. Wolffe’s version is worth reading for those interested in the subject of billeting in the 1620s. On one point Wolffe differed from the conclusions of this study. She ascribed the confusion over the possible removal of the Army from the

35 Fissel, English Warfare, 1511-1642, pg. 108.

Plymouth area in early 1626 to simple miscommunication between the Commission for Soldiers in Devon and Cornwall and the central government in London, whereas I believe that the gentlemen of Devon and Cornwall were also interested in obtaining more money for their counties from London.\(^\text{37}\)

The existing literature does contain a few important and groundbreaking articles on billeting during the 1620s. Taken together, they provide as much, or more, information on the subject, as the rest of the secondary literature. Two of them are Lindsay Boynton’s articles “Martial Law and the Petition of Right” and “Billeting: The Example of the Isle of Wight”.\(^\text{38}\) Boynton’s article on billeting in the Isle of Wight provided many details of the interactions between one local community and the soldiers and between the community and the royal government. Of interest later is the revelation that in 1635 the people of Wight still claimed as unpaid £4340 from the crown for billeting in 1627 and 1628.\(^\text{39}\) The article on Martial Law pointed out the connections between the Commissions for Martial Law and Commissions for Billeting Soldiers and the Deputy Lieutenants that led many in England to think that the Commissions were punishing civilians according to military rather than common law. The deputies and commissioners assumed that the power of the Commissions for Soldiers to adjudicate “billeting disputes arising from the civilian housing and feeding of soldiers” were one of

\(^{37}\) Wolffe, *Gentry Leaders in Peace and War*, pg. 108. See Chap. 6 of this study.


\(^{39}\) Boynton, “Billeting: The Example of the Isle of Wight”, pg. 43.
the “misdemeanors” mentioned in their Commission and this too was a hotly debated subject in the communities and in the House of Commons. The article also provided insight into the billeting problems in Kent in preparation for the Mansfeld Expedition of 1625 and in Hampshire in 1627 and 1628.

Thomas Barnes’ article, “Deputies not Principles, Lieutenants not Captains: the Institutional Failure of Lieutenancy in the 1620s” and Victor Stater’s article “War and the Structure of Politics: Lieutenancy and the Campaign of 1628” also address some of the issues explored here, particularly the use of martial law. These two essays gave opposing opinions on the success or failure of the Lord Lieutenancy as an office of government in the 1620s, but provided some information on billeting and on the use of martial law in counties that billeted soldiers. Another directly applicable article is G. E. Aylmer’s interesting and entertaining essay describing a notorious riot at Witham, Essex between townsmen and Irish soldiers. I have used Aylmer’s essay along with the source documents for the description of the riot in Chapter 7 of this dissertation, though there appear to be a few differences between Aylmer and the source documents. The incident at Witham may say more about the prejudice of the people of Essex against Catholic, Irish soldiers than about billeting problems in other places. However, the riot received considerable attention from the central government and in the House of Commons.

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Commons in 1628. Another informative article nicely summarizes the arguments in the 1628 Commons debates on martial law and billeting: Paul Christianson’s “Arguments on Billeting and Martial law in the Parliament of 1628”.\(^{43}\) Christianson’s essay made it clear that while the members were seeking redress for the problems of billeting, martial law, taxation and arbitrary imprisonment, for the most part they couched their arguments in lawyerly language rather than in direct attacks on the policies of the royal government. Christianson concluded that

“The arguments of the common lawyers attempted to establish a reading of the ancient constitution which envisaged England as a constitutional monarchy governed by custom and statute from the earliest beginnings, a version of 'mixed monarchy' with a substantial infusion from the advocates of 'constitutional monarch' governed by the common law'. However, this remained contested by the king and his leading legal servants.”

It may be arguable that the Members of Parliament had these revolutionary goals in mind as early as 1628, but the argument did indeed continue for many more years and billeting remained contentious for the rest of the Stuart period.

Examples of studies by eminent scholars in the field of early modern English history that give little or no attention to the billeting of soldiers and the significance of the problem in the late Tudor and early Stuart period could be considerably multiplied but that is not necessary. Many more can be found in the Bibliography and in the Library. We can say indeed that the subject has been well neglected.

4. The Argument

The argument of this study is that the root cause of billeting problems in England in the 1620s was the central government’s inability to provide the funds to prosecute its activities in the Thirty Years’ War. The result of this inability was the imposition of a tax, though the government did not call it a tax, upon a limited number of the counties of England. In effect, this tax provided food, lodging, clothes, weapons and other items for the soldiers and sailors of the armed forces that the government raised. The royal government also used other extra-parliamentary subterfuges to raise money from England and Wales, such as the Benevolence or gift of 1626, the Forced Loan, and increased local taxes to support the militia. The government also made unceasing demands over several years on the coastal towns and counties to provide ships and crews for the navy at the expense of the towns and counties. The royal government demanded other outlays from the localities that are mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4. All of these tax-like exactions fell disproportionately on the southern and coastal counties from the Severn around to Yorkshire and particularly upon the counties from Cornwall to Essex. These counties billeted more soldiers more often than the counties in the mid-lands and the north. The crown also called on them more often to meet the expenses of moving troops and of manning watchtowers on the coast. The anger over these exactions eventually became so great that people in many southern counties refused to pay them. The anger, through a domino effect, created other problems that in turn led to conflicts between soldiers and civilians, mutinies, and other violence. The documents of the era and the Parliament of 1628 complained most about the crime, violence, and the arrogant behavior of soldiers,
and the mutinies of soldiers and sailors. The inability of Charles to raise the money he wanted to spend on the wars made the problems intractable in that the taxpayers and billetters did not want to provide the King with as much money as he desired. It is probably not coincidental, even making allowance for population distribution, that the strongest opponents of the King in the Civil War came from the counties most effected by the military exactions of the 1620s, particularly billeting.

When the central government provided billeting money, there is evidence that complaints were minimal, usually limited to the rowdy behavior of soldiers, often aggravated by beer, and a few petty crimes. The experience of the Dutch in organizing the finances for their eighty-year war for independence from the Spanish crown indicates that regular payment of the troops could keep problems at a tolerable level.44 In fact, there is evidence that Devon and Cornwall initially welcomed the army for the money it brought into the counties, but when the money ceased to come from London, the local authorities and people of Devon and Cornwall quickly changed their minds about the presence of the soldiers.45 The Isle of Wight also at first welcomed soldiers and the money they brought, according to the direct statement of one of the Deputy Lieutenants of the Island.46 When the money ceased to come from London, or never came at all in some counties, the billetters and the rate payers who were forced to provide money from their own purses soon began to experience difficulties in providing food for the soldiers

44 See Chap. 1 of this study.
45 See Chapters 3 and 6 of this study.
and then refused to pay and then to throw the soldiers out of their houses. The soldiers and sailors were doubly put upon – the crown pressed them into the army and navy against their wills and then did not feed or lodge them adequately, while their families went on the dole or starved. The reactions to the situation on both sides were predictable, and the county leaders did predict them. It is perhaps surprising that worse riots, mutinies and rebellion did not occur.

The reaction of the people in the communities where the crown billeted soldiers never led to anything resembling rebellion against the royal government or against the local officials in the counties and towns. There was violence, including a few deaths, in fights between farmers and marauding soldiers in late 1624 and early 1625 in Kent. Billetters threw soldiers out of their homes in Devon and Cornwall in 1625 and 1626, forcing the soldiers to “steal or starve”. The soldiers preferred to steal, needless to say, generating some violence between farmers and soldiers. There were reports of alehouse brawls between civilians and soldiers throughout the period. Outright refusals to billet soldiers became common in 1626 and 1627, and by early 1628, the individuals, and even whole communities, refusing to billet soldiers became more numerous.47 Incidents of small-scale violence between soldiers and civilians appear more frequently in the records after the army returned from the Ré Expedition in late 1627. There were a few significant outbreaks of violence, including one at Harwich, Suffolk in 1627 and a major riot or battle between the inhabitants of Witham, Essex and soldiers in March 1628. There also were mutinies by ship’s crews and soldiers from time to time whose suppression required

47 See Chap. 8, Sec. 2 of this study.
calling out the local militia, but local officials put down these mutinies without much trouble. On the other hand, the records contain a few reports of good relations between soldiers and the communities where they lodged.

We should also remember that the vast majority of ordinary soldiers and sailors were members of the lower levels of society and held the opinions and attitudes of those orders in their home counties. When they were in the army and in billets in England, they were in counties, or “countries”, that were strange to them, but their fear and anger, to some extent, mirrored the fear and anger of their billetters. Therefore, attention will be given in this study to the problems the private soldiers encountered, and their responses to those problems, because the soldiers’ actions were an important part of the response of the English people to the problem of billeting during the 1620s in England.

The “outrages and insolencies” these soldiers perpetrated created anger and fear among people of all ranks and the monetary demands of lodging, feeding and clothing the soldiers led to considerable hardship for the poorer people and anger among the better off. The king’s apparently arbitrary behavior in violation of the customs of the realm in not paying his army’s expenses and in his arbitrary monetary exactions without parliamentary agreement eventually caused many to fear not only for their lives but also for their property and led to defiance of the royal government’s orders in the communities of southern England. The lack of laws defining the citizen’s duties with respect to billeting and the use of what appeared to be military law and of arbitrary arrest as punishment for not billeting soldiers also cast doubt on the King’s intentions and raised questions about his use of the royal prerogative to override the laws and customs of
England. All of these threats to the perceived customs and laws of the land had many of their roots in the billeting of soldiers in private homes and they were one of the causes of the rancorous parliamentary sessions of 1628 and 1629, the Petition of Right and contributed to the outbreak of the Civil War a decade later. While it is true that men and women cannot foresee the future, they certainly do remember the past. The political gentlemen of England were not anticipating the Civil War and the overthrow of King Charles in 1628, but they remembered his past actions well in 1642.
Chapter 1

The Military Arts and Billeting in Early Modern Europe

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the royalty and nobility of Europe viewed war in much the same way as they had in medieval times. The aristocrats and rulers of medieval and early modern Europe believed that rulers should wage war on one another and that wars were a necessary part of political and social life. Prolonged peace represented stagnation, moral decline and the loss of opportunity to display skill and courage. Although English Kings after Henry VII seldom led their troops into battle, the nobility participated in wars, either directly on the field or in planning and directing wars from the center, as an expected and natural part of their lives.¹ As military technology and tactics evolved in these centuries, a wider segment of the population became involved in war when it occurred, either as soldiers or as voluntary and involuntary suppliers to the armies and navies of the period.

The concept of billeting soldiers in private homes did not suddenly spring to life in the 1620s in England. Rather, the practice evolved on the continent in the previous century along with many other new military practices, and so some discussion of the evolution of military practices in early modern Europe will aid in understanding the problems encountered with billeting soldiers in private homes in England during the first years of Charles I’s reign. First, the development of new methods of warfare between 1450 and 1600 led to changes in army organization, control, recruiting and maintenance,

¹ This thought comes from Paul Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars: War, Government, And Society in Tudor England, 1544-1604 [Houndmills: Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003], pg. 10. The last English King to lead troops in battle was George II in 1743 at the Battle of Dettingen.
which in turn led to the common European practice of billeting troops in privately owned quarters. English officers and soldiers who had served on the continent and in continental armies carried these practices over to England during Elizabeth’s reign and a brief discussion of their evolution will help both to describe the practice in England and to explain its origins. These changes in military practice were themselves the result of technological advances in gunpowder weapons and changes in military tactics to take advantage of gunpowder weapons, both in sieges and in battles in the open field.

This Chapter will start with a discussion of the evolution of warfare that led indirectly to the billeting problems of Charles I’s reign. Then it will describe the methods and changes in methods used to house and feed armies on the continent. The adaptation and evolution of army maintenance practices in the English environment from around 1570 to the early seventeenth century will be discussed in the next Chapter.

1. The Effects of Gunpowder: More Men and More Money

Put very briefly, the effect of the changes in military practice that took place after 1500 led to the creation of fortresses that were more expensive to build and of larger armies that governments maintained on active duty for longer times. Among other things, gunpowder weapons and the invention of more effective infantry tactics permitted the use of large numbers of relatively quickly trained men from many levels of society as the dominant force on the battlefield. Larger armies in turn required more complex and more expensive logistics to supply them with food, shelter, clothing and weapons. In particular, until governments and army commanders developed proper commissary and
quartermaster services, they had no way to provide shelter and food for years on end except by quartering soldiers with householders.

In contrast, during the middle ages, the king or the lord traditionally called out the feudal levy for forty days at a time, though it often was in the field for longer at the lord’s expense. Its members came equipped with weapons and clothing that were usually enough for the summer campaigning season and the levy usually returned home for the winter. By the late twelfth century, the defense had gained an advantage over the offense as castles with high, vertical masonry walls proliferated in many parts of Europe.\(^2\) By the thirteenth century, an invader was able to control an area while he occupied it with an army, but if he took no strong points, then his control ended when he withdrew his army.

The primary objective of those who wished to annex territory was to take its fortified points.\(^3\) In an area of castles and fortified towns, war long remained primarily a guerilla war of maneuvers and skirmishes combined with sieges of castles and towns.\(^4\)

The arrival of gunpowder technology, which spread into Europe from China through the Middle East, temporarily ended this situation.\(^5\) Large bombards capable of battering down stone walls appeared in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. As

\(^2\) On the origins and importance of stone castles, see B. S. Bachrach,"Early Medieval Fortifications in the West of France", *Technology and Culture*, XVI (1975), pp. 531-69.

\(^3\) R. C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare 1097-1193* [Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1956], pg. 24. See also pp. 21-25, 39, 204-5.


cannon became progressively lighter and more manageable for the same hitting power, the medieval walls proved easy to breach and sieges took days rather than months or years. For a period in the late 1400s and early 1500s, battles in the open field became more common and decisive, as the numerous wars in Italy demonstrated. The overwhelming power of the French artillery during the French Italian Wars of the 1490s was a major influence in Italy and then in the rest of Europe.⁶

However, in the usual seesaw of offense and defense, the designers of fortifications developed defensive counter measures. The first of the new style fortifications appeared in Italy at Civitavecchia in 1513 and improvements continued for the next 200 years.⁷ These new fortifications had lower and thicker walls, often with an earth core, that could absorb the blow of a solid cannon ball. Equally important, they included ‘bastions’ and ‘crown works’ which projected beyond the main line of the wall and from which cannon, hand held guns and arrows could be used to sweep the walls of attackers.⁸ The result was a fortress or town that, if properly manned and supplied with food and water, could resist almost any direct assault. The besieger then had only the options of blockade and starvation, or attempts to undermine the walls with explosive filled tunnels followed by an assault, or bribing the garrison to surrender the fort. The capture of a stronghold defended by the new designs usually took months, if not a year or


⁸ Parker, *The Military Revolution*, see Figure 1, pg. 11 for a sketch. These fortresses were commonly called *tracé italien* as the first examples were in Italy.
more. A chain of siege works, facing both the fortification and the outside perimeter to protect the besiegers from the defender’s friends, had to be constructed and manned until the defenders were starved out or the siege works could be advanced close enough to the walls for mining to be attempted. Formal battles became rare and usually occurred when a field army attempted to lift a siege. As fortresses of the new design became numerous in the Low Countries and northeastern France and later in Germany and England, these strategies became the common ‘European method of warfare’ in the early modern era.

The costs of building the new fortifications were considerably more than costs of maintaining the existing medieval fortifications but most continental rulers considered it necessary to expend the money to defend themselves from enemies and to deter potential enemies. Manning the number of fortresses needed to defend a territory required the government to station a large number of men more or less permanently in them - anywhere from several hundred to several thousand soldiers per fortification. As the garrisons were essentially permanent, the government eventually housed the men in barracks inside the fortress or fortified town, although in many towns soldiers lodged in the homes of townspeople because of lack of space to build barracks.

A second major change in war fighting that came to characterize European warfare in this period was the discovery that infantry could defeat cavalry and subsequently the infantry returned as the ‘queen of battles’ for the first time since the fall of the Roman Empire. The English success with the longbow in the Hundred Years War demonstrated the value of missile weapons and others soon copied the English with longbows or crossbows. Moreover, in the context of increased reliance on missiles, the
attractions of the gun became obvious. Small-caliber firearms, hand-held and on carriages, first appeared on the battlefields of Europe in the fourteenth century but, in terms of accuracy and range, they long remained inferior to the bow. However as firearms improved in range, were reduced in weight and became easier to fire, they gradually took over the battlefield. The damage a lead musket ball could do to armor of any reasonable weight also reduced the usefulness of armor that was generally impervious to blows from edged weapons and arrows. Moreover, the officers and sergeants could train a farmer or tradesmen to use a harquebus or a musket in a week or two since great accuracy was virtually impossible, while it took years of practice to train a good archer.9

In addition to the development of handheld firearms, well-drilled infantry also proved to be superior to heavy cavalry because of the development of new formations and tactics. In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the armed forces of the Swiss cantons demonstrated that tightly formed squares of pike-men could defeat both the cavalry charges of knights and attacks by other infantry units. Indeed, for a time, after the crushing defeat of the Burgundians in the 1470s, military men reckoned the Swiss pike squares to be invincible and many German and Italian states ordered their armies to imitate them. Nevertheless, firearms succeeded where the knights had failed: a

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pike square might fend off knightly cavalry, but it offered an easy target for field artillery and handguns.\textsuperscript{10}

By 1600, most units comprised shot and pike in a ratio of three or four to one. It was now the pike-men who protected the musketeers, thanks to the musket’s slow rate of fire. An experienced musketeer could get off one round every two minutes. Against a cavalry charge that meant the musketeers could fire only one round in the time between the enemy cavalry coming into effective range and the onset of hand-to-hand combat.\textsuperscript{11}

In the 1590s, the commanders of the Dutch army, Maurice of Nassau, who became Statholder in 1585, and his cousin William Louis, realized that there was a way of increasing the musketeers’ rate of fire. If the men formed a series of lines or ranks, and the first rank fired together and then retired to reload while the following ranks came forward in turn and did the same, the formation could maintain a more nearly continuous rate of fire.

This, in turn, had important consequences. Changing a pike square perhaps fifty deep into a musket line ten deep exposed far more men to the challenge of face-to-face combat, calling for superior weapons proficiency and discipline in each individual soldier as well as better unit cohesion. Volley fire also placed great emphasis on the ability of entire tactical units to perform the firing and reloading motions in unison and as swiftly as possible. The answer to both problems was practice. Maurice and William Louis


\textsuperscript{11} See Michael Roberts, \textit{Gustavus Adolphus; a History of Sweden, 1611-1632} [London: Longmans, 1953 and 1958], pg. 177 on musket rate of fire.
divided their army into smaller formations and drilled the units constantly. They reduced companies of 250 with eleven officers to 120 men with twelve officers and reorganized regiments of 2000 into regiments of 850 to 1000 men. On the other hand, the investment of time and money in training, coupled with the need to man fortresses and to respond quickly to Spanish attacks, induced the Dutch to retain a core of experienced soldiers year round, in what people came to call a standing army. In this, they were emulating, in part, the Spanish who maintained a permanent army in Flanders during the eighty years war for Dutch independence. Maurice and William Louis reorganized the Dutch army into a smaller, more flexible but better paid force, realizing that the commanders could better control such an army. They thought that a smaller, better-controlled army was far more effective than was a large army of underpaid mercenaries who devoted time to looting the countryside for food and clothing, a common occurrence in the Spanish Army of Flanders.

European governments had little trouble raising as large an army as they could afford. They could enlist volunteers from the government’s territory or they could hire mercenaries raised elsewhere. They recruited units in areas remote from the war zone (Spain and Italy for example) and sent them to fight far away from their homes (in the


13 Lois Schwoerer’s definition of a standing army is a good, brief one: “The term ‘standing army’ refers to a military force that is permanently embodied and kept ‘standing’, even in time of peace. Standing armies are distinguished from mercenaries, who are paid, professional soldiers hired for an occasion and then dismissed, and from the armies of the Tudors and early Stuarts, which were composed of men who were conscripted to defend the state, to man an expedition, or to fight a war and who were then disbanded. A standing army is also different from the local, casually trained militia, which most Englishmen approved.” Lois G. Schwoerer, “No standing armies!” The Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974], pg. 2.
Low Countries for example). Another popular method was to enlist soldiers from a defeated army, who might be looking for work, into the victor’s own army, which had the advantage of gaining experienced veterans. When all else failed, they conscripted local men against their will. Volunteers were preferred, particularly if they were veterans with military experience, but there were seldom enough if the war was more than a year or two long because of the high attrition from disease and desertion.

Whatever one’s views on the causes and effects of the military revolution, or evolution, on European society, the introduction of gunpowder weapons and new infantry tactics altered the terms of warfare in Europe. The new weapons made possible the use of larger armies because the army could train men from all social classes as effective soldiers in a relatively short period. The new weapons required the use of larger armies and encouraged the creation of standing armies to defend the new fortresses and to form field armies of an effective size. The perennial cockpit of Europe in the Low Countries acquired numerous fortifications and fortified towns as the Spanish and the Dutch fought each other to a standstill. Therefore, larger armies came into being, to the extent that the governments could find financial resources to arm, feed, clothe and house them in times of war.

2. The Army of Flanders

The Spanish armed forces, and particularly the Army of Flanders, developed many of the techniques of army recruiting, maintenance and organization that other

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European armies later adopted. The Spanish actually began the development of their new military tactics and administrative techniques during the later stages of the *Reconquista* in the late 1400s.\(^{15}\) The Dutch copied and then improved upon the Spanish methods and the Spanish and the Dutch in turn passed these methods on to Europe and the English.

England was current with continental practice by the end of Elizabeth’s reign because of the large number of Englishmen serving with the Dutch and even in the Spanish armies in the Low Countries after 1570. The gradual creation of an experienced cadre of officers would prove one of the great but unheralded achievements of Elizabeth’s reign and was important in Charles I’s reign, both in the 1620s and in the Civil War.\(^{16}\)

The Eighty Years War between Spain and the Dutch combined guerilla war, sieges and an occasional pitched battle, and so the Army of Flanders required a flexible tactical organization for active service. The ‘company’, which could contain between 100 and 300 men, was the basic unit of continental European armies from the 1500s until at least 1700. Until approximately 1600, anything larger than a company tended to be an administrative convenience, not a tactical unit. However, the largest army usually won in formal battles.\(^{17}\) When the Army of Flanders required something larger than a single company, the most experienced companies from one of the various ‘nations’ of the Army (Spanish, Walloon, German, Italian, Burgundian and British) were informally combined


into a single force. These necessities placed a premium on training and experience and so encouraged the development of standing armies, which in turn required even more money to maintain the army over a period of years. Throughout the early modern era, wars seldom yielded any result but stalemate and usually ended in truces and temporary peace treaties when one government’s money ran out and bankruptcy threatened or occurred. “He won who had the last pound, guilder, franc or escudo.”

a. Recruiting

The Spanish government, and eventually all the governments of the larger nation states of Europe, employed three different methods to recruit armies: commission, compulsion and contract. When recruiting by commission, the central authority decided who should receive a commission, issued a patent, scheduled the areas in which recruiting was to take place, the number of men to be raised, the time which was allowed and the destination to which the recruits were to march. Under the commission system, the principal recruiting officer was always the captain and the unit was the company. Each captain, armed with a royal patent, named his junior officers and ordered colors made for the company. Then the captain visited the various towns and villages specified in his patent. From those who came to volunteer their services, the captain chose men who were able-bodied, over 16 and under 50, single and, hopefully, sane.


19 Parker, The Military Revolution, pg. 61.

20 The following descriptions come from Parker, The Army of Flanders, pp. 35-40.
If time was short, it was easy for a state to engage the services of a military contractor and these men were commonly purely mercenaries. The contractor not only raised his regiment or company, he also acted as its commander and he named its officers. The basic contract required the government to pay a sum of money to the contractor at once and regular fixed wages thereafter. In return, the contractor agreed to present a given number of men within a certain time and at an appointed place. The contractor’s chief advantage was speed: because he usually kept a skeleton force of his best men permanently on call, ready to raise the rest when need occurred, he could often have a whole regiment ready within three or four weeks.

After 1600, and certainly after the start of the Thirty Years’ War, the use of compulsion, that is forcing men into the army against their wills, became common as the costs of recruiting by contract became much greater and volunteers scarce. Recruiters took men from prisons into the army as a commuted sentence, vagabonds and bandits became fair game for the recruiter and teenagers were accepted. Perhaps it is a credit to the military traditions of the Habsburg domains that they did not need to use compulsion until the 1620s.

b. Food, Clothing and Weapons

The traditional method of provisioning the first early modern armies was primitive – the army requisitioned everything on the spot, with or without compensation. When on the move, troops marched into a village or group of villages

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21 Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pg. 46.

22 The descriptions in the following paragraphs are taken from Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pp. 87-100 and from Chapter 7, pg. 158 ff.
and quartered themselves wherever they chose. When people inhabited the houses, they forced the hosts to provide free food and rooms. Soldiers who found billets in empty houses collected contributions from the neighboring residents to pay for their food, but, in either case, the soldiers were a heavy burden on people in a subsistence economy.

The increase in the size of armies and in the scale of military operations during the sixteenth century complicated this casual arrangement. It became difficult to find communities large enough to quarter the larger armies if more shelter than improvised huts built by the soldiers was required. Around 1550, a new institution, the military staple (étape) or magazine, made its appearance in Spanish controlled territory, especially along the route called the Spanish Road that Spanish army units used to march from Italy to Flanders. The Spanish authorities designated one village as the center, the staple, at which they collected and distributed food for the troops. If the troops needed shelter and beds, the army command and the managers of the staple used the houses of the étape and its surrounding villages. Those in charge of the étape, together with the quartermaster responsible for the troops’ lodgings, issued special chits, or billets de logement, which stipulated the number of persons and horses to be accommodated in each house. After the troops left, the householders presented the billets for the troops to the local tax collectors and claimed their expenses against future or past tax liability. In addition to food and lodging, army quartermasters often required the staples to provide baggage transport for the army on the segment of the march near the staple.

Eventually there were strong protests against this procedure because those who supplied the staple were often paid years later and or not at all. Therefore, the Spanish
government in Flanders delegated the task of feeding armies on the march and in garrison to private contractors to increase the efficiency of the operation and to minimize the soldiers’ discontent. Either the soldiers or their captain paid the supplier on the spot or, if funds were short, they gave the supplier a warrant on the treasury in the Netherlands.  

The contract system, when it worked, was in the best interests of everyone. The troops received their rations without delay and usually on credit. The contractors paid the peasants immediately for the food they provided. Of course, in this era no system of comparable complexity could function indefinitely without the occasional disaster. There were problems with quality, late delivery and spectacular corruption from time to time. The common soldier usually suffered more than the contractor did when these problems arose and lack of food was one of the contributors to the mutinies discussed below. After 1601, the Spanish government centralized the provision of victuals to the entire army. They entrusted the operation to a single official, who was the contractor who offered to supply bread to the troops for a year at the cheapest price. Despite highly competitive bids, the cost of feeding the troops rose steadily, following the upward trend of market prices, but the soldiers were insulated against the fluctuations and scarcity of the local markets, and the government had less to fear from soldiers who were not starving.

Clothing the soldiers, which the government also undertook after the 1580s, was less regular but less prone to disaster. A man on active service needed a new suit of clothes and a pair of shoes at least every year. Since the government could rarely supply either enough money or the new clothes, the appearance of the troops rapidly degenerated.

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23 Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pg. 92. It was not a free market, since the contractors were forced to observe a price that the government fixed in advance when selling to the soldiers. However, contractors could still make large profits (and losses).
into that of a pitiful band of scarecrows. As with food, the government contracted the work out. The officials in charge showed the contractor a suit of clothes and required him to produce a thousand or more suits of the same design and measurements. The suit included a topcoat, breeches, jacket, shirt, underwear and stockings; there were only two sizes, large and small. There was no standard color, for military men frowned on the idea of a standardized uniform until the 1630s, because they believed that a soldier who was allowed freedom of sartorial expression would fight more ferociously.  

**c. Lodging the Army**

Even with the soldiers armed, fed and clothed, they still required housing. This was usually no problem during the summer campaign season. The normal improvised campaign shelter of the early modern soldier was the ‘barrack’ or hut, generally constructed of materials taken from deserted houses or barns. With experience, the army could throw up a whole camp built as a grid pattern town virtually overnight and military handbooks of the time showed standard plans for such camps. When the soldiers moved on, they usually burned their barracks to deny their use to the enemy.

More serious billeting problems arose in winter quarters and in garrison towns. The traditional method, lodging the troops free of charge in private houses, was certainly an advantageous arrangement for the soldiers, but it imposed a crippling burden on the

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25 See also Charles Greig Cruickshank, *Army Royal: Henry VIII’s Invasion of France, 1513* [Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969], pp. 41-42 for a description of simpler huts used for only a night or two and made from brush.

26 Henry Hexham, *Principles of the art militaire Part 2* [Delft: Jan Pieters Valpote, 1638], images 73,74,75. This is one handbook used by the English. This book is available online at the subscription service “Early English Books Online”, http://eebo.chadwyck.com [accessed 15 May 2009]. The original is at the Huntington Library.
householders. Until 1598, the Spanish government ignored civilian protests, but Philip II’s decision to make the archdukes of the Spanish Netherlands into independent rulers of the Netherlands led to changes. The Archduke Albert became a sovereign prince as well as captain-general of the Army of Flanders and had to balance the interests of his subjects against those of his soldiers. The archduke favored the civilians and his government often commuted the obligation to lodge troops into a tax-like money payment. In the key strongholds of the Spanish Netherlands, the government constructed a number of more permanent shelters, also known as barracks. The standard barrack contained accommodation for four persons sleeping in two beds: four single or two married soldiers. The government constructed substantial stone-and-timber housing in many centers in the Low Countries after 1600. In the citadels of the Spanish Netherlands (Ghent, Antwerp, Cambrai), the barracks were somewhat larger and stood within the castle walls. However, the Archduke still forced the local magistrates to furnish beds, furniture and so on. However, it was seldom possible to lodge a large garrison entirely in barracks. The government always had to quarter some troops on the townspeople, or at least on those not protected by a special exemption from billeting.27

d. Paying the Army

   Every captain in an early modern army held great power over the members of his company. As he was in absolute charge of discipline, he could flog, fine or otherwise humiliate his men whenever he chose. Because he alone decided who should perform sentry and other onerous duties, the captain was free to victimize the men he disliked and

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27 Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pg. 166.
excuse his friends. The captain chose the two sergeants and eight corporals of his company and he distributed pay among his men at his pleasure. Moreover, the insolvency of the military treasury made the company captains into moneylenders and welfare officers as well. Every company captain kept a ‘chest’ and used the money to advance subsistence wages, called ‘lendings’ by the English, to his men when no money arrived from the treasury. The captains were also responsible for ransoming, re-arming or re-horsing any of their men who had the misfortune to lose their liberty, their weapons or their mounts. Naturally, when the treasury did contrive to pay an installment of wages, the captains expected to receive it first in order to deduct the sums already advanced on account. The scheme was workable in principle, but it assumed that all captains were honest and scrupulous men, and of course, they were not.

Although the government attempted, often during mutinies, to pay the troops directly, these attempts always broke down because it proved impossible to pay wages in cash for long, since the Spanish government was chronically short of funds. The men were soon begging their captain to lend them money again in order to save them from starvation. The military commanders also believed that they had to prevent the soldiers from squandering their wages the moment they were paid. Repeatedly, the payment of large arrears of wages generated massive conspicuous spending among the troops - gambling, fine clothes, and women - resulting in new destitution. The general opinion of experienced officers was that discipline, order and military effectiveness would be preserved if they gave the soldiers only their subsistence.
Investigations repeatedly found officers guilty of cheating their men and defrauding the treasury. At every muster they presented new recruits and claimed they were veterans who were entitled to higher pay and they put their servants and even local peasants temporarily into the ranks and swore that they were soldiers. The captains pocketed the wages due to all who passed the false muster. There was no direct remedy to this corrupt system: central government control of the army’s clerical staff proved to be no more effective than its control of the captains; the staff usually participated in the fraud for part of the gain.

**e. Mutinies**

The Army of Flanders had numerous mutinies during the eight decades it conducted active warfare with the Dutch. Arrears of pay, poor or no food, insults or injury from unpopular officers or rumors of a new campaign were the usual causes of mutinies in the Army of Flanders. A mutiny in the Army of Flanders became almost a ritual once it started and assumed some of the aspects of a modern labor strike, but it also had some of the characteristics of the protest riot of the town workers or rural peasants that were common in the era. If a majority of the troops in a regiment or garrison rallied to the standard of sedition, then the mutineers expelled all officers and men who would not join them on an equal footing. They allowed chaplains, drummers and lieutenants who wished to participate in a mutiny to do so on the same level as the poorest pike-man. The whole community of mutineers then assembled and democratically elected a leader,

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a council to advise him and a secretary to handle his correspondence. The leader ruled his troops with absolute authority. There was no appeal from his orders and he maintained discipline with an iron hand - all disobedience was punished with death. After electing their leaders, the mutineers prepared to defend themselves. Garrisons that mutinied were already reasonably safe behind the walls they were supposed to defend, but when detachments of the field army mutinied, they had to capture a fortified town themselves, often by persuading its garrison to mutiny and let them in. If this went well, the mutineers set about securing an income and formulating their grievances. Armed, mounted veterans with a strong walled town to defend themselves found it easy enough to raise a living from the villages of the neighborhood.

The mutineers then initiated talks with the captain-general. The requests were fairly predictable. First, inevitably, was the demand for full payment of all wage arrears due to the mutineers. Next, the mutineers demanded a full pardon for their actions and safe passports for their leaders. A third invariable request was for a ‘general muster’ at which every soldier could choose the unit in which he wished to serve, whether infantry or cavalry, thus enabling a man to escape from the tyranny of a malevolent officer or sergeant. Finally there might be specific grievances such as a demand for a military hospital to care for the wounded, a magazine to supply them with food at a price they could afford, or a surgeon and a chaplain for each company. The mutineers then sent their demands as a petition to the captain-general for his consideration. If he was able to offer satisfaction on all the major points, the settlement of the mutiny became merely a practical matter of how and when to pay the troops.
As one might imagine, the pay created another reason for an increasing incidence of mutiny in the Army of Flanders - success. The high command was in a trap, for, if they did not pay the mutineers, they ravaged the countryside and paralyzed the government’s military efforts. If the commanders met the claims, other troops, seeing their comrades emerge with a full purse, were encouraged to emulate them. It was said that the difference between the mutineer and the loyal soldier in the Army of Flanders was that the mutineer “was … comfortably quartered in a large town, far away from the fighting, in receipt of liberal contributions either from the countryside or from the government, and confident of payment in full. In contrast the loyal troops were unpaid, unfed and unprotected against enemy attack.”

The mutineers were certainly not revolutionaries. A direct frontal attack by the government provoked them to take desperate measures, but if left alone, they made little trouble, except for the poor souls in their vicinity. Although they were remarkably articulate and could produce manifestos of surprising sophistication, they had no political or social program. They just wanted to be paid. They asked for better conditions of service if they remained in the Army or for the freedom to go home with their just reward. In short, the mutiny was simply a collective protest, a sort of labor strike intended to persuade the state to treat its employees more honestly, more humanely and more respectfully.

29 Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pg. 197.
3. The Dutch Army

As discussed above, the Dutch developed many of the elements of the ‘European method of warfare’ in the late 1500s during their war for independence from the Spanish crown. Volley fire has been mentioned, but Europeans in his own time knew Maurice of Nassau more for his developments in siege warfare, which became the principle action in the war for independence as fortified towns became common in the Low Countries. Maurice can be credited for his improvement of siege tactics, the improvement of the mobility and flexibility of the siege train, employing engineers and pioneers during sieges (though the origin of this practice may be attributable to the Spanish), the organization of better logistic support of the army, and standardization of the artillery.30

Louis’ and Maurice’s innovations placed great emphasis on the ability of entire tactical units to perform the motions necessary for volley firing as swiftly as possible and in unison. The answer to both problems was practice. They and their officers trained the troops to fire, countermarch, load and maneuver together. The two counts divided their army into smaller formations and drilled the units constantly. They reduced the size of companies and regiments, keeping the number of officers the same. However, the Dutch governments to some extent dictated these reductions in unit size because of their desire to limit expenses, as Maurice and William Louis seem to have preferred companies of 150 to 200 men.31 To ensure that the infantrymen underwent daily training, they needed

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more officers and non-commissioned officers than ever before. The officers had to discipline, train, and lead the troops and this, in its turn, demanded their daily presence and their daily exertions. Obviously, the army also required officers well trained for their profession.

a. Finances and Recruitment

The United Provinces also developed new financial measures in the 1590s to pay for the war.\textsuperscript{32} Because each of the individual Provinces had sovereign authority, the apportioning of the financial burden between the Provinces required a system in which none paid too much or too little. Every year the Council of State completed a so-called “State of War”, or budget, for the coming twelve months, in which each of the Provinces, according to its means, contributed a certain fraction of the army’s expenses, thus establishing a regular source of funds for the army. Of course, some of the provinces were unable to meet all of their obligations in some years and States General usually made up the difference by borrowing money in Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{33} This arrangement largely solved the problem of financial supply, which was one of the major weaknesses of early modern military system. It was essential to the system that the Provinces did not pay their shares into anything like a national treasury. Instead, the Council of State assigned to each Province certain Regiments and military officials who were to be paid directly

\textsuperscript{32} David Trim, “Fighting Jacob’s warres”: The Employment of English and Welsh Mercenaries in the European Wars of Religion: France and the Netherlands, 1562-1610 (unpub. PhD Thesis, Univ. of London, 2002), pp. 205-206. In the years prior to 1595 or so, the Dutch were as slow in paying their soldiers as other governments.

\textsuperscript{33} H.L. Zwitzer; “The Eighty Years War” in Marco van der Hoeven, ed.; Exercise of Arms; Warfare in the Netherlands, 1568-1648; pg. 35. See Nickle, “The Military Reforms of Prince Maurice of Orange”, Chap. IV, pp. 76-89 for a more complete discussion.
from the provincial treasury. The main point of this so-called “Repartition System” was that each Province was individually responsible for a part of the army’s expenses. This made it possible for a Province to pay regiments not garrisoned on its own territory, but somewhere else in the Republic or even abroad. Because of the complicated calculations that were required to apportion each Province its exact share, two Provinces often split the costs of a regiment. It was also possible for a regiment’s colonel to receive his pay from one Province while his troops received their pay from another.

Another important feature of the Dutch financial reforms was the tailoring of the size of the army and navy to the money available to support them. This permitted the Dutch to pay the army regularly but it often limited the strategic and tactical options to defensive measures.34 However, since the Dutch were striving for survival, rather than conquest, a defensive war was not objectionable to the provincial governments.

The Dutch army was larger than the country’s population would warrant during the 1500s and 1600s, but, with its financial resources, it was able to recruit foreigners as well as natives for its service. At most times, fifty to eighty percent of the Dutch army were foreigners, some hired from contractors as mercenaries and some recruited into nominally Dutch units and some provided by allies such as England. Although soldiers for the most part came from the lower orders of society, this did not mean that they were all rabble and riffraff. In times of economic depression, men quickly lost their means of subsistence. Of course, not everyone from such poor groups elected to join the army, but once they were destitute, the army could offer relief. In the army of the United Provinces

the pay was half that of a day laborer, but while laborers and journeymen always balanced on the verge of unemployment, joining a regiment in the army of the Republic held the prospect of continuous income. Under the “Repartition System” mentioned above, soldiers of the Dutch Army received their pay quite regularly by contemporary standards. The Venetian ambassador to the Republic, Girolamo Trevisano, reported to his government, perhaps with some exaggeration, that “I do not believe that there is any other place or country where the army observes discipline and rules as well as here. All soldiers are paid every ten days, so that nobody’s pay is delayed even for an hour”.

However, some modern historians report that the Dutch government’s promptness in paying its soldiers was not as clockwork-like as these reports indicate, although payment of recruiting expenses did become less problematic.

b. The Army and Society

Military life was not unknown to the common people in the United Provinces. A person could become involved in the turmoil of war in various ways. He may have been a victim of war who had to flee from violence or who had lost everything during looting and spoiling. As a contractor, or employee of a contractor, he was in a position to make a great deal of money out of supplying the army and a farmer might earn money by working as a carrier for the army. Nor was the Dutch army unfamiliar to the commoners. The relations between officers and the soldiers on one side and the non-military elements of society on the other were too numerous to be ignored. Especially in the garrison

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towns, the army was always present. The number of soldiers in a garrison often was
between 10 percent and 25 percent of the population of the town. Although soldiers and
officers had meager incomes, these figures indicate that the military could provide a
substantial increase in trade for small businesses, shopkeepers, other retailers and
craftsmen in garrison towns.

The army officers kept good discipline in their units and the army was under the
control of the state, though there were problems at times with hired foreign units over
matters of pay. A number of factors played their part in fostering the excellent discipline
the Dutch Army under Maurice. Foremost was the continuous drill, mentioned above.
The men were constantly active and under supervision. The second factor was the
regular payment of the soldiers. Regular pay was unheard of in every other army of the
day. One might even speculate that, because of this, the soldiers of the States Army
allowed themselves to be drilled like animals and were willing to dig trenches and other
earthworks, tasks for which armies of the day typically dragooned farmers and
townsmen. Dutch soldiers did not have difficulty in getting billets in civilian households
because their pay was regular. Indeed, as a startled Italian visitor observed, private
people even invited soldiers to lodge at their homes.  

Another factor fostering discipline was punishment. This was nothing new in
other armies or for the experienced foreign soldiers that Maurice employed among his
troops. It was new to non-professionals like the farmers and townsmen who were
numerous in the States Army. His soldiers suffered severe punishment when they

37 J. P. Puype, “Victory At Nieuwpoort, 2 July 1600” in van der Hoeven, ed., Exercise of Arms; Warfare in
the Netherlands, 1568-1648, pg. 87.
infringed on the rules of conduct and misbehaved themselves morally as well as militarily. Not only did they not kill anyone in a captured town, but they also did not plunder, except when the commanding officers allowed them to do so, and for good reason - Maurice executed marauders. At the capture of Huist in 1592, he shot the first man found looting - robbing a woman - in front of the man’s company. Later, at Delfzyl, he hung another whose small booty was a burgher’s hat.38

In Dutch practice, we can see many of the foundations of the English armies of the 1600s, for from 1572 on, the English had a contingent of troops in the United Provinces and many, if not most, of the senior English officers of the Elizabethan wars and of the 1620s received training in the Netherlands and gained combat experience there. In fact, England did have a standing army in Elizabeth’s reign – it was in the United Provinces.

4. Conclusion

The art of war in early modern Europe changed from the late medieval pattern as infantry armed with gunpowder weapons came to dominate the battlefield and defensive fortifications improved to resist cannon fire. These changes led European governments in turn to the creation of larger armies needed to both man the fortifications and form sizable field armies. Armies came to consist mainly of infantry armed with firearms and pikes as the ease of using handheld firearms increased and their cost decreased. Early modern European governments recruited or conscripted armies that were predominately

from the lower classes, as the armies could train men of all classes relatively quickly to handle muskets and master the maneuvers needed to use them. All the governments of Europe encountered financial problems in creating and maintaining these larger armies, which led to changes in the methods used to feed, clothe and lodge the soldiers. As wars became longer and more frequently continued over the winter months and lasted for longer periods, governments billeted soldiers in private quarters in towns and in the countryside because private dwellings were all that was available. Feeding and clothing an army eventually became the responsibility of the central government and contracts were negotiated with merchant suppliers to provide food and clothing, particularly when the army was on the move. However, when an army took billets in private quarters, it forced the billeters to provide food as well as lodging. Governments often promised repayment of the costs of billeting, either through pay to the company captains and through them to the soldiers to the billeters, or the government or the captains might pay the billeters directly, but nearly as often, the government did not keep these promises, thereby creating great hardship for the billeters and the soldiers.
Chapter 2

English Armies in Elizabeth I’s Reign

During the sixteenth century, English military practices evolved toward those used on the continent, but several decades behind. Henry VIII used methods for recruiting and maintaining his armies that were mixtures of late Medieval and early modern practice.¹ Henry’s forays onto the continent against the French proved largely futile and experienced military men recognized by the middle of the century that changes were required. The English quickly copied the Spanish and the Dutch during the war years of Elizabeth I’s reign when the government realized that armies which were organized and fought as they did in Henry VIII’s time were no match for the Spanish or French and likely would not be able to repulse an invasion by the Army of Flanders. In part, this backwardness was because England was physically separated from the continent of Europe and somewhat insulated from military developments there. Her continental neighbors had a much stronger incentive to study developments across their land frontiers and to ensure by imitation and improvement that they did not lag behind in the arms race. Many Englishmen, officers and private soldiers, served in the armies of the United Provinces, and some in the Army of Flanders.² These men brought back the new


methods of warfare and of maintaining armies to England from the continental ‘military academies’ and, over the second half of the 1500s, the English used and adapted them in their wars with the Spanish, in putting down Irish revolts and in assisting Protestants on the continent.

In the 1620s, English military leaders and the royal government referred to the lessons learned about warfare in Elizabeth’s reign as precedents for action. Some of the leaders of the English government in the 1620s, such as Secretary of State Sir Edward Conway, had been army or navy officers in Elizabeth’s wars. Their memories of the successes and failures of the 1580s and 1590s affected their actions in the 1620s and they and others constantly made comparisons. Therefore, this Chapter presents material for comparison between the organization and size of the armies, government income and expenditures as well as billeting practices in the two eras.

1. Elizabeth’s Wars

During Elizabeth’s reign, England participated in a number of wars and military expeditions and spent sizable sums in assisting the Dutch in their wars against the Army of Flanders and the Huguenots in the French religious wars between 1560 and 1590. Periods of war were interspersed with relatively peaceful years during the long reign of 45 years from 1558 to 1603, but during the last eighteen years of the reign, from 1585 or so, England was almost continuously engaged in war with the Spanish and in the 1590s faced a great rebellion in Ireland.

At the very beginning of the reign, in the late 1550s and early in 1560s Scotland experienced a time of troubles as the Scots argued over religion and over the succession.
Mary of Scotland, the young widow of the King of France, returned to Scotland in 1561 as Queen and continued the French influence in Scotland. Catholics and Protestants fought out the religious conflicts of the Early Modern era in Scotland during her reign and these battles led to the establishment of the Scottish Kirk that John Knox founded upon Presbyterian and Calvinist lines a few years earlier. The English felt compelled to support the Protestant faction in Scotland, which was also anti-French, as a matter of self-defense. In addition, both Mary of Scotland and her son James VI of Scotland (and later James I of England) were heirs to the English throne through descent from Henry VIII’s older sister Margaret, who had married James V, King of Scotland, in 1503. Elizabeth sent four thousand English troops under the Duke of Norfolk and Lord Grey of Wilton into Scotland 1560 to prevent the French from using it as a base to attack England.³

Religious conflict in France flared again after the death of Mary of Scotland’s husband, Francis II, in December 1560. The Huguenots sought aid from England. Elizabeth and her government feared that if the Catholics were victorious that they would start meddling in Scotland again and renew their attempts to have Mary of Scotland supplant Elizabeth as queen of England. In addition to a loan of £40,000 to the Huguenots, England mounted an expedition 1562/63 to capture Le Havre in an attempt to aid the French Huguenots, who were under siege in Rouen. The English also hoped to use Le Havre as a hostage for the return of Calais, which England had given up in 1558 after three centuries of English occupation. However, French forces besieged the English

expeditionary force in Le Havre and the English eventually surrendered. The ensuing peace treaty compounded the defeat, as England gave up its claims to Calais in return for a small payment from France, which did not even repay the loan given to the Huguenots.\(^4\)

In 1568, after losing the contest in Scotland, Mary of Scotland fled to England and her presence soon led a number of old Catholic English families to support her succession as queen of England. A brief rebellion on the north in 1570-1571, led as usual by the Percy and the Neville families, required a military effort by the crown of England to put down.

Elizabeth’s major wars, though not England’s involvement, started with the rebellion in the Spanish Netherlands in 1566-1572.\(^5\) The break between the Protestant northern provinces of the Spanish Netherlands and Spain became final in 1579 when the southern, Catholic, provinces broke from the seven northern provinces and returned to the Spanish fold and the northern provinces, now the United Provinces, asserted their independence from Spain. In 1576, the provinces of Holland and Zeeland had offered Elizabeth election as countess of Holland and sovereign of the provinces, seeking the protection and participation of England in their growing war for independence from Phillip II of Spain.\(^6\) Elizabeth declined the offer, not wanting to enter a war with Spain. She did agree to help the Dutch by hiring 10,000 troops in the Rhenish Palatinate in 1578.


\(^5\) Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars*, pg. 81

and thereby hoped to counter French influence in the United Provinces. During the early 1580s, Elizabeth contemplated aid to the United Provinces, but England did nothing substantial until 1584/85, while Henri III of France also negotiated with the Dutch about aid and sovereignty.

An informal sea war had been sputtering since 1568, conducted by English freebooters seeking booty in Spanish waters in Europe and in the Americas. Following the discovery of a Catholic plot to invade England via Scotland with Spanish aid and the assassination of Statholder William of Orange (William the Silent), England’s participation in the Dutch rebellion became official in 1584. In 1585, England concluded the Nonsuch Treaties with the United Provinces in which Elizabeth agreed to become the “protector” of the United Provinces, though not their sovereign as originally suggested. England agreed to send around 4500 men under Sir John Norris and later agreed to increase the total to 7500 after the Dutch lost Antwerp to the Army of Flanders. In return, England received control of the “cautionary” towns of Brill and Flushing to insure that the Dutch would repay the funds which Elizabeth was committing. England also agreed to supply a Lieutenant General who would have some civil powers.

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9 Norris had been serving in the Dutch forces since 1578 as commander of 2000 to 3000 volunteers recruited in England. He had returned to England and served for much of 1584 in Ireland but in late 1584 volunteered to return to the Netherlands. (Simon Adams, *Leicester and the Court, Essays on Elizabethan Politics* [Manchester: The Manchester Univ. Press, 2002], pg. 179.

Elizabeth placed the expeditionary force of 7500 men under the command of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, as Lieutenant General, who arrived in the Netherlands in December 1585. Combat, disease and desertion had depleted Norris’ initial contingent of 4000 and his small army needed more recruits. By mid-1585, the English army was starting to arrive in force and over the three years from 1585 to 1587, England sent an estimated 18,000 Englishmen and 1000 Irishmen to the Netherlands. Dudley wanted an offensive war and Elizabeth a defensive war, and he further angered the Queen by accepting the post of governor General from the Dutch, contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of his written instructions. The English army was plagued by the usual shortage of funds and by quarrels among the officers, particularly men Leicester had brought over and the officers recruited earlier by Norris. After several military defeats in 1587 and the inability or unwillingness of Leicester to account for a large part of over £300,000 spent on the army in the Netherlands, Leicester returned to England in late 1587. Command of the English troops passed again to Norris. In view of the lack of success in the United Provinces, Elizabeth asked the Dutch to join her in a peace conference with Spain. The Dutch, however, refused. The year 1587 also brought reports of a Spanish naval buildup, which many of Elizabeth’s councilors thought was in preparation for an invasion of England. Convinced of Spanish intentions to attack England, Elizabeth ordered Sir Francis Drake to do what he could to disrupt the Spanish naval activities. Elizabeth gave Drake four royal ships and he and other private investors provided seventeen more, hoping that loot seized from the Spanish would turn a tidy profit. An attack on ships in


Cadiz’s harbor in April 1587 and less substantial attacks elsewhere did destroy some Spanish shipping, but the largest part of the Spanish preparations were at Lisbon, which was too strongly fortified for Drake to attack. Nonetheless, a profit was turned on the voyage, which returned to England in the fall of 1587 after a short voyage to the Azores where they seized a homeward bound Portuguese east Indiaman.\textsuperscript{13} Memories of Drake’s expedition of 1587 lingered into the 1620s, along with several other expeditions to the Spanish coast, and it was one of the reasons that many in England favored a sea war against Spain.

The destruction of Spanish ships at Cadiz may have delayed the sailing of the Armada for a year and it did cost the Spanish a large amount of money to replace the ships and repair the damage. In any event, the English efforts in the Netherlands and on the Spanish and Portuguese coasts did convince the Spanish that they would not be able to re-conquer their Dutch provinces without eliminating England from the war. Thus, the Spanish launched the famous Armada against England in 1588, with well-known results, including an increase in fear and dislike of the Spanish King and his doings.

By 1590, the Dutch were faring better under the reforms of Maurice and his circle but the King of Spain’s diversion of Parma’s Army of Flanders into France to assist the French Catholic League in a renewed outbreak of the French religious civil wars provided even more help. Opponents had assassinated Henri III and several prominent Catholics and Huguenots in 1588 and 1589, and the claimant to the throne was Henri of Navarre, a Protestant, as Henri IV. However, Henri IV immediately faced a rebellion by

\textsuperscript{13} Hammer, \textit{Elizabeth’s Wars}, pp. 135-137.
the forces of the Catholic League.\textsuperscript{14} For Phillip and Spain, this renewed war raised the prospect of a Protestant France helping the Dutch. For Elizabeth and England, this raised the fear of a Catholic France allied with Spain’s Phillip II. As a consequence, England launched several expeditions to France to assist Henry IV, the first ventures into France since the retreat from Le Havre in 1563. These expeditions had a further goal of preventing the Spanish from establishing bases in northern France and Brittany, which were, of course, convenient points from which to launch attacks on England. In September 1589, Elizabeth and her councilors sent an expedition of approximately 4000 men under Peregrine Bertie, Lord Willoughby to France to assist Henri IV in an unsuccessful attempt to capture Paris and it ended in a winter campaign with Henri’s army in Normandy and Brittany to clear the area of Catholic forces.\textsuperscript{15} Though the campaign was largely successful, circumstances forced Willoughby to withdraw in December 1589, having lost perhaps three quarters of his force and lacking supplies or money, which had not arrived from England. By the summer of 1590, Henri IV was again threatening to take Paris, which prompted Spain to send part of the Army of Flanders into France. Of more concern to the English in 1590 was the Spanish landing of 3000 troops in southern Brittany, posing a threat to England since the Spanish could use the ports of Brittany to launch attacks on England. The immediate English response was


to land Sir John Norris and approximately 2000 men in Brittany, but after the promised support from the French failed to materialize, Norris had little choice but to fight a defensive war for much of the next two years.\textsuperscript{16} Henri IV and Elizabeth, who hoped to recover her loans to the Huguenots from the Rouen custom revenues, launched a combined campaign to capture Rouen in 1591.\textsuperscript{17} England contributed 4000 men under the command of the Earl of Essex, including 600 veterans from the English forces in the Netherlands. The siege of Rouen not only was a failure, but it also led Elizabeth to distrust both Henri and Essex, who boastfully overcommitted themselves about the chances for success. The English government sent three thousand more men to Norris in Brittany in 1594 to counter a Spanish attempt to seize Brest and, with them, Norris successfully drove off the weak Spanish force.\textsuperscript{18} By 1595 England had effectively withdrawn from France after Henri IV converted to Catholicism in 1593 to pacify the Catholic League and secure the crown, defeated intrusions by the Spanish from Flanders in 1595 and in 1597 and gradually brought France under his rule. Henri also declared peace with the Spanish in 1597, to the dismay of Elizabeth and Burghley.\textsuperscript{19} Eventually France signed a peace treaty with the Spanish at Vervins in 1598, ending hopes for a continued alliance between France and England against Spain.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{16} MacCaffrey, \textit{Elizabeth I: War and Politics, 1588-1603}, pg. 154. See MacCaffrey pp. 152-219, for a more complete description of the English activities in France in the 1590s.


\textsuperscript{18} MacCaffrey, \textit{Elizabeth I: War and Politics, 1588-1603}, pp. 163-182.

\textsuperscript{19} MacCaffrey, \textit{Elizabeth I: War and Politics, 1588-1603}, pp. 208-214.

One other English expedition to Spain is of some interest here because of its echoes in the 1620s – the attack and capture of Cadiz in 1596. Another report of Spanish preparations to attack England prompted this attack, as had similar reports that prompted Drake’s venture in 1587, and other naval expeditions in 1589, 1590, 1591. The Earl of Essex, Elizabeth’s sometime favorite, and the Lord Admiral, Lord Howard of Effingham, commanded the expedition of 1596. Elizabeth had ordered the destruction of Spanish warships, but Essex sought to do more and to land army units and capture Cadiz as a more or less permanent foothold on the coast of Spain. This expedition was also similar to the one in 1587 in that the commanders, Essex and Howard, provided most of the financing. The Expedition was a large one with 100 ships, seventeen from the royal fleet, and eighteen were substantial Dutch ships, though most were armed merchantmen and privateers contributed in hopes of a share of the spoils. On board the fleet was an army of 6300 men organized into eight regiments, including around 2000 veterans from the Netherlands brought over by Sir Horace Vere.

On 21 June, the fleet entered Cadiz Bay and in a naval battle, the English damaged, sank or captured a large number of Spanish ships, including four of the large galleons called the Twelve Apostles that Spain had built after the Armada was defeated in 1588. Essex quickly got his army ashore and, with some luck in finding an unguarded

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21 For Essex’s secret plans and machinations, see Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars, pg. 194; and MacCaffrey, Elizabeth I: War and Politics, 1588-1603, pp. 115-120.

22 Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, pg. 252.

23 Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars, pg. 195. Hammer notes that the ratio of veterans and gentlemen adventurers duplicated the ratios in the tercios of the Army of Flanders, probably at the suggestion of Sir Roger Williams, chief military advisor to the Earl of Essex.
gate and a gap in the wall and perhaps with information from two spies who swam out to
the fleet, captured the town of Cadiz.\textsuperscript{24} Unfortunately, during the assault and capture of
the town, the Spanish had time to burn and sink a number of valuable merchant ships in
the bay, thus depriving the English of much of their expected financial gains.\textsuperscript{25} In
another incident that had echoes in 1625, a contingent of English soldiers got drunk on
“strong white wine” while attempting to capture a fort at Puntal, and the Spanish killed
200 when they caught the units on their way back to Cadiz.\textsuperscript{26} The English army
remained in Cadiz for two weeks, thoroughly looting the town and gathering ransoms for
a number of their captives. Essex and Vere were in favor of remaining in the town, at
least until the Queen’s wishes were known, but they were in a minority; the Council of
War for the expedition voted to return to England.\textsuperscript{27}

After the fleet returned to England, there were acrimonious debates on the failures
and successes of the commanders. The failure of the fleet to capture the merchant ships
and bring them home, the distribution of the loot that the English did seize (the Queen
was upset that little found its way into her Exchequer), and the failure to find and capture
the treasure fleet afterwards were the major points of discussion. The debate was so
public that the crown suppressed for a time much of the information the participants


\textsuperscript{25} Hammer, \textit{Elizabeth’s Wars}, pg. 197. Hammer says that the merchant fleet was worth an estimated £3.5 million.

\textsuperscript{26} Hammer, “New Light on the Cadiz Expedition of 1596”, pg. 197.

\textsuperscript{27} This brief account is based on Cruickshank, \textit{Elizabeth’s Army}, pp. 251-279 and particularly pp. 265-276.
After the Cadiz Expedition of 1596, the direct war between England and Spain dwindled and slow moving peace negotiations started between the two as England faced growing problems in Ireland.29

The greatest English military effort during Elizabeth’s reign was the suppression of the revolt in Ireland, known as Tyrone’s Rebellion or the Nine years War (1594-1603).30 Foreign intervention in Ireland was an ever-present fear since before the defeat of the Armada, for an invader could use Ireland as a stepping-stone to England.31 Thus, suppressing the Irish rebellion, aided to a limited extent by the Spanish, and preventing further Spanish intervention became a major issue for the English government. This war of attrition consumed over 30,000 English soldiers and vast amounts of money in its nine years and had political effects in England.32 Among other things, It caused the downfall of the Earl of Essex, who had been one of Elizabeth’s favorites, leading to his abortive rebellion against Elizabeth and thus to his death.


29 MacCaffrey, Elizabeth I: War and Politics, 1588-1603, pp. 220-230. The peace was not concluded until James I came to the throne.


31 John McGurk, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, the 1590s Crisis, pg. 11.

There had been an earlier rebellion in 1582, which England successfully put down, but Tyrone’s rebellion almost freed large parts of Ireland from England. The war was largely a guerilla war with a few pitched battles. The English army was surprised and defeated at the Battle of Yellow Ford in August 1598, which was really an ambush, and there were several additional more or less pitched battles over the years. However, the English strategy was to scorch the earth for most of the war, denying the native Irish of food and shelter. Essex had tried negotiations and gained a truce with the Irish leader, The Earl of Tyrone, but after he left Ireland in 1599 and Lord Mountjoy came to Ireland in 1600 as Lord Deputy in his place, the emphasis quickly turned to the destruction of cattle, crops and cottages. In 1601, English fears were realized when the Spanish landed 1700 men and captured the Port of Kinsale in southwestern Ireland. The Irish were defeated in a pitched battle at Kinsale in December 1601 in an attempt to lift the English siege of the Spanish who held the town. When Tyrone was unable to raise the English siege, he and other Irish leaders fled to Spain, the Spanish surrendered and though the rebellion went on for fifteen more months, it was essentially over. At Elizabeth’s death in 1603, the war with Spain effectively ended as well. England and Spain again took up peace negotiations in 1603, which James I concluded in 1604, thus ending twenty years of war.

2. Organizing for War – the Government

By Elizabeth’s reign, the feudal army made up of the retinues and tenants of landed noblemen, which in its prime had often been a menace to the Crown and to noble rivals at home, had virtually ceased to exist.\(^{36}\) A few acts of parliament paid lip service to it, but this was a matter of form. The national militia, the descendent of the Anglo-Saxon fyrd, was less mobile than the feudal levy because there were limitations in the medieval laws on the locations where it could serve. The Monarch could not require the militia to serve outside their county except in the event of an invasion; the royal government, not the counties, had to pay the militia when in service, though the counties paid for training and maintenance; and the militia could not serve overseas.

The direction of military affairs, both the militia and foreign wars, as well as domestic affairs was firmly in the hands of the Queen and Privy Council, with Parliament very much in the background. Policies were created either through a royal proclamation, which in practice had virtually the same force as a statute, or by directions and orders from the Queen and the Privy Council. The Tudor monarchy, and the Stuart’s who followed Elizabeth, depended on the leading men of the counties and towns to provide the day-to-day administration of justice, the poor laws, the regulation of local trade and markets and other domestic affairs, and most military matters, other than the maintenance of the navy. Local and county governments performed most government activities based on directions from the Privy Council but with little interference from the royal

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\(^{36}\) Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, pg. 12.
government. These arrangements worked effectively, but by their efficiency, they obscured the government’s successes in the field of military administration. There were many developments in the reign, but the crown and Parliament never consolidated them in a single military statute that would have left no doubt about the accomplishment.

In practice, the Crown ignored the statutory restrictions on the movement of militia troops. Whatever the constitutional details, the militia was the only reserve of trained men with some rudimentary idea of the art of war. The crown used the militia to put down rebellion and occasionally sent it into wars overseas because it had to if England was to win a war or even fight one. Over the years, Parliaments discussed revisions to the law, but the talk never came to anything. The government was likely aware of the true position, but did not attempt to change it, as this might have brought dissent into the open as it did on occasion in Elizabeth’s reign and in the 1620s. It is unlikely, however, that many of the nobility or gentry during Elizabeth’s time troubled themselves about the constitutional position. They joined the army or navy of their own free will to win fortune, honor and glory. It was the voiceless majority, for whom the wars held little but hardship and misery that were impressed against their wills and suffered.


38 Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, pg. 18 ff.

39 Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, pg. 12.

40 Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, pg 10. Cruickshank also mentions the case of Sir John Smythe of Essex who did dissent in 1596 and after a famous trial in Star Chamber was imprisoned for his treason.
In the Tudor scheme, the county was the administrative unit for military affairs, as it was for general purposes. The Lord Lieutenant, the Deputy Lords Lieutenant, the Justices of the Peace and the Sheriff all had a hand in running county military affairs, but during Elizabeth’s time, the Lord Lieutenant became the most important. The office of lord lieutenant was allowed to lapse in many counties late in Elizabeth’s reign and early in James I’s reign, but became firmly established during the second half of James’ reign and during the reign of Charles I.  

A lord lieutenant had far-reaching powers. His commission gave him the right to call up the men of his county, and arm each according to his financial capability and to lead them against the enemies of the Crown. The monarch authorized him to appoint muster masters to inspect the forces and a provost marshal to administer military law in time of rebellion or invasion. Finally, he could command at need the services of all the justices of the peace, sheriffs, constables, and other local officials. The instructions that accompanied the commission of lieutenancy show how the lieutenant was to operate. He had to summon the justices to inform them of his commission and to insure that they would obey his orders, he had to verify that they did execute orders. He was empowered to appoint deputies to assist him, and these deputies did a great deal of the work, particularly when the Lord Lieutenant was not a resident of the county, as was usually the case. He was to arrange for musters to be held at intervals, and to make sure that musters

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were properly organized, both to insure that the militiamen were present and properly fitted out and that some training and practice with their arms took place. The lord lieutenant needed these powers to make the office a reasonably effective arm of the Crown in the shires, but they were so potentially dangerous that the crown provided a number of safeguards. The Crown took the precaution of limiting the lieutenant’s sphere of activity to the county and reminded the lieutenant of the geographical limits of his authority. The royal practice of moving the lord lieutenant’s responsibility from one county to another from time to time reduced the danger that he might become a petty despot or a threat to the Crown in the manner of the medieval nobility. There were other safeguards, for at any given moment several members of the Privy Council were also lords lieutenant. This meant on the one hand that they had first-hand knowledge of the Council’s thinking and policy and on the other that the Council as a whole had a particularly close control of a number of the lieutenants.\(^{42}\)

From the middle of Elizabeth’s reign the lords lieutenant were responsible for recruiting the militia according to the rules laid down by statute, royal proclamation and orders of the Privy Council.\(^{43}\) All those between the ages of 16 and 60 were eligible, and their income determined the arms they were to possess. There were exemptions for the nobility who sat in Parliament and their servants (the nobles supposedly trained with their retinues), members of the Privy Council, justices of the peace, clergymen and recusants. Those exempted were still liable for a money payment in lieu of their physical service.

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\(^{42}\) Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, pp. 19-20.

\(^{43}\) On the militia, see Lindsay Boynton, *The Elizabethan Militia* [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967].
The royal government came to recognize that it required a less costly and more adequately trained force to repel possible invasions by the Spanish. Therefore, it formed the Trained Bands, which were to be smaller in number, and better trained and more nearly soldiers. The government expected the Trained Bands to be the first line of home defense and planned not to send them out of England, if possible.\(^{44}\) This prohibition had two unfortunate consequences: the Trained Bands sometimes became refuges for a number worthless semi-soldiers and some of the best men were not available for foreign service.

This in turn necessitated the conscription, or impressment, of all sorts of unwilling men for foreign expeditions if there were not enough volunteers, which was usually the case. The conscripts were the largest part of units sent on foreign expeditions during Elizabeth’s reign.\(^{45}\) The Privy Council determined the number of men needed and then sent appropriate orders to press a certain number of men in several counties to the respective lords lieutenant. The lord lieutenant sent orders to his deputy lieutenants who in turn passed them on to the Justices of the Peace, from whom they went to the constables and churchwardens who selected the men to press.\(^{46}\) Those pressed usually included men who were the dregs of society – felons, vagabonds, beggars, the unemployed, and so forth, who quite frequently deserted at the first opportunity. As the

\(^{44}\) Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, pg 25.

\(^{45}\) Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, pp. 209-291. There were close to 106,000 men levied for foreign service between 1585 and 1602, an average of 5900 per year.

reign wore on, impressments, particularly for Ireland, became increasingly common and increasingly disliked.\footnote{Mark C. Fissel; \textit{English Warfare, 1511-1642} [London: Routledge, 2001], pg. 94.} Pressed soldiers destined for Ireland mutinied in the Chester area in 1574, 1578, 1580, 1581, 1594, and 1596, as well as in Limerick, Towcester, and elsewhere. The combination of social-economic disorder with relentless pressing made conscription universally detested. The Stuarts reduced forced impressments after 1603 by capitalizing on the Elizabethan victory in Ireland, reducing the standing forces there (from 9,000 troops in 1603 to barely over a thousand in 1606) and then erecting a resident loyalist establishment through plantation and patronage.

Another of the developments of Elizabeth’s reign that had important consequences in the 1620s was the shift of some of the financial burden of raising and supporting the armed services from the central government to the localities. This happened in part because of changes in the recruiting and training of the militia and the introduction of the ‘trained band’ concept, but mainly because the royal government was strapped for funds. As the inflation of the 1500s caught up with the relatively fixed (in monetary terms) revenues of the crown, the real (in purchasing power) revenues of Elizabeth were only a third or a fourth of those of her father and grandfather.\footnote{Hammer, \textit{Elizabeth’s Wars}, pp. 187,188. See also the Tables in Hammer’s last Chapter on pp. 239,241,246. The average price of wheat, barley and oats in England doubled from 1550 to 1600 and increased another 15% by 1625, according to David Hackett Fischer, \textit{The Great Wave; Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History} [Oxford Univ. Press, 1996], pg. 92. Other price deflators indicate that in 1600 the purchasing power of the pound was perhaps 40% of what it was in 1540.} In addition, the costs of war were rising as more, and more expensive, arms and soldiers were required for a chance of military success. By the 1590s, taxpayers of England were growing weary of the increasing and more frequent financial demands to support the
military – the militia, the trained, bands, muster masters, the provision of ships and supplies for the royal navy – in addition to the damage to trade and manufacturing by the loss of ships, seamen and laborers to the war effort.\textsuperscript{49} In addition, the shires provided arms, clothes food and lodging for men levied in the county until the men were on board ship. The landed gentry increasingly avoided these burdens, as evidenced by the declines in the yields of subsidies due to regressive assessments of land values and by conniving with the tax commissioners. The result was that more and more of the burden fell on the less well off. There were serious signs of unrest by 1595 and the better off feared violence by the lower classes.\textsuperscript{50} The mounting fear of disorder by ‘masterless men’ encouraged the widespread appointment of provost marshals to arrest suspicious vagrants and, if necessary, enforce military law.\textsuperscript{51}

3. \textit{The Armies - England Follows the Continent}

As the royal government eliminated the remaining feudal trappings in English military practice during the 1500s, a military chain of command developed that borrowed many of its features from continental armies. In Henry’s reign, army units were of varying size, depending on how many retainers a nobleman could bring to the army. During Elizabeth’s reign, an English army was an expeditionary force sent to France, the Low Countries, or to Ireland or on a raid to the coast of Spain and it was not a permanent,

\textsuperscript{49} McGurk, \textit{The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland}, pp. 30-31.

\textsuperscript{50} Hammer, \textit{Elizabeth’s Wars}, pp. 187-188.

\textsuperscript{51} Originally, officers charged with enforcing military discipline on campaign, provost marshals were first appointed to control civilians in Ireland in the 1550s, and were occasionally employed in England.
standing army in the modern sense, although there were more or less permanent English companies and soldiers in the Dutch service and in Ireland. When the army came home, the royal government usually disbanded it and, when England needed another, the government created a new one. There was, however, some continuity in the officer corps as many men, generally military professionals, served as lieutenants, captains and colonels in several expeditions and recruiters eagerly sought veteran soldiers for their experience when the crown was forming a new army. The organization of these English armies evolved between 1570 and 1600 to resemble that of the continental armies.\textsuperscript{52}

The basic unit of an English army quickly became the company, first with 200 or 300 men as on the continent. By 1585 or so, the English settled on 100 to 150 men in a company at full strength, and with companies of uniform size, albeit with larger numbers in companies commanded by senior officers such as the general or colonel.\textsuperscript{53} The company commander was the captain and subordinate officers, a lieutenant and an ensign and several sergeants, assisted the captain. All senior officers were, first of all, company captains and, in the case of the Lord General, the Sergeant Major and Generals of Foot and Horse, regimental colonels as well.\textsuperscript{54} Continental armies had found, in an army of ten thousand with 100 companies, direct communication and transmission of orders from the army commander to 100 captains was inefficient and clumsy. As a result, continental military men created the unit called a regiment, commanded by an officer called a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{52}The organization of a typical English army of the late Tudor and early Stuart period may be found in Table A1 in Appendix A.
\item \textsuperscript{53}Cruickshank, \textit{Elizabeth’s Army}, pg. 52.
\item \textsuperscript{54}See Appendix A, Table A1 for more information on the duties of these senior officers.
\end{itemize}
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colonel, and typically containing eight to twelve companies, to ease the burden on the commanding general officer.\textsuperscript{55} With little note or complaint, the regiment started to appear in English armies around 1570 and became an accepted part of the organization by 1590. At first, the regiment was more of an administrative convenience and not a tactical unit in battle, but this changed over the next decades and by 1600, the army commanders had begun to use the regiment as a tactical unit in battle.\textsuperscript{56} However, regimental organizations were still rather flexible as late as the 1620s, with companies moving from regiment to regiment as convenient and regiments disbanding and forming as the army shrank or grew.

The expeditionary armies formed during Elizabeth’s reign varied in size as the need required, as diplomatic negotiations indicated and as financial resources permitted. In general, English government intended the expeditions sent to the United Provinces and France to assist and fight in or alongside the armies of the United Provinces and Henri IV in France. In Ireland, the English companies formed their own regiments, armies and garrisons and were an independent force, as were the troops assembled on the Scottish border in 1560 and those assembled in the north to suppress the rebellion of 1569/70. Table A3 in Appendix A, presents the number of men levied for these armies. The size of these forces, while not large by modern standards, were sizable for the times and were particularly so compared to the size of the English population of between three and four million, which was much smaller than that of France or Spain or the Austrian Habsburg

\textsuperscript{55} Cruickshank, \textit{Elizabeth’s Army}, pg. 51.

\textsuperscript{56} Cruickshank, \textit{Elizabeth’s Army}, pg. 53.
lands. The total levied during the years of the war with Spain and the Irish Rebellion, from 1585 to 1602, was almost 106,000 or an average of approximately 5900 per year. However, if only the six years of the heaviest levies for Ireland, 1596 to 1601, are considered, the average was approximately 8300 per year. The numbers of recruits shown in Table A3 do not include presses for the navy and if these numbers were available and added in, the totals and averages would be higher still. David Trim and Paul Hammer have given slightly higher estimates and these numbers are also presented in Appendix A, Table A3. These more recent numbers from Trim and Hammer increase the average during the last eighteen years of Elizabeth’s reign to between 6500 and 6600 and the average for the years from 1596 to 1601 to 8400.

The great majority of men recruited for the armies fighting on the continent were not impressed men, contrary to the picture painted by Cruickshank.57 The company captains and their junior officers and patrons of the captain persuaded a good number to join the colors voluntarily. In fact, this was the major method of recruiting men for service in the companies paid by the Dutch or directly in the Dutch or Huguenot service. The patrons might be members of the nobility and were patrons in a political sense, or they were godly men, even ministers, anxious to help the Dutch fight the papist Spanish, or they might be members of a network of relatives and friends of the captain. In

57 Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, pg. 26.
contrast, the men recruited for English companies in the pay of the Queen and in the Queen’s service were mostly impressed men.  

4. Paying for the War - The Financial Situation in Elizabeth’s Reign

War was the most severe test of the sixteenth century state and financing war was the most difficult part of the test. European governments could not have brought about the new techniques of warfare that transformed continental warfare in the sixteenth century without changes in the financial operations of the governments. This required higher taxes and the development of an international money market and long-term government borrowing. England lagged behind the continental powers in these respects also, but there were changes in England that increased the revenue available to the crown. Perhaps most important among these changes was the invention of the subsidy in the 1520s. This tax, based on a new and, at the time, realistic assessment of property values, was open ended, to the extent that the crown could secure parliamentary approval for emergency taxation. Surprisingly, Elizabeth and her advisors managed to pay for most of the wartime expenses out of current resources in that, when the final payments of the last subsidy money came in following Elizabeth’s death, the government had largely


met its war expenses, though there was no money in the treasury to meet the immediate needs of the new king.\footnote{MacCaffrey, \textit{Elizabeth I: War and Politics}, pp. 59-60, 64.}

The military expenditures during Elizabeth’s reign were considerable when compared to the normal peacetime expenditures of running the government and the royal household. My estimates of government income and expenses, including the military expenditures of both the Army and the Navy, during the reign are given in Appendix B, Table B1-1.\footnote{The financial data given here come from Frederick C. Dietz, “The Exchequer in Elizabeth’s Reign”, \textit{Smith College Studies in History}, Vol. VIII, No. 2, Jan 1923, pp. 65-118. I have selected those expenditures that I judge were for military purposes from the line titles in Dietz’s tables plus other information in Dietz’s footnotes to his tabulations. Missing years and other blank spaces are due to data missing from Dietz’s sources.} This table summarizes massive amounts of numerical data presented by Frederick Dietz, together with several of my own estimates and interpolations as indicated in the notes to the table. Dietz’s data start with the year 1559, though data for many of the years prior to 1570 is limited due to the loss of documents, and thus Table B1-1 covers the years of the Spanish War and Irish Rebellion only. The lines labeled “non-Military” expenses are for the most part, the expenses of running the royal government and household, although the noticeable increases in this amount after the wars started in 1585 may indicate that Dietz’s calculations left some war expenses in the non-military category. These “peace time” expenses seem to have averaged around £70,000 in the 1570s and around £90,000 per year in the 1580s, at least for years in which relatively complete data are available.
For the thirty-eight years for which data are available in Dietz, the English government spent a total of £7,132,526, or an average of £187,700 per year, on wars and military preparation. The years in which there were especially high military expenditures, correspond with significant campaigns and expeditions, as would be expected. In 1560, England spent large amounts along the northern border and in Scotland because of the troubles in Scotland and the French and Catholic influence there. In 1570, the crown spent a larger amount than in the preceding several ‘peaceful’ years suppressing the rebellion in the north. The years of heaviest military expenditure started with the beginning of the long war with Spain around 1585, with all but two of the years to 1602 being well above the average. The total military expenditures from 1585 to 1602 were £5,848,937, or 82% of those for the entire reign.63 The item “Aid to the Netherlands and the army there” first appeared in the accounts in 1585 and continued until the end of the reign. The total amount listed by Dietz for aid to the Dutch over the years from 1585 to 1602 came to a little over £1,531,000, which is about 21 per cent of the total military expenditures. The English government spent another £1,538,000 in Ireland from 1592 to 1602, an average of around £140,000 per year. By contrast, in prior years the Exchequer typically sent £20,000 to £50,000 to Ireland. The expenditures for the Navy (Treasurer of the Fleet, Surveyor of Victuals of the Fleet and Surveyor of Ordnance of Ships) came to £1,126,000 for the thirty-eight years for which data are

63 The £5,850,000 includes money spent on the Irish War in the 1590s and early 1600s. MacCaffrey provides a figure of £4,555,000 for the years from 1585 to 1603 from Outhwaite, but it is not clear whether this includes the expenditures on the Irish rebellion, but a footnote implies that it does not. MacCaffrey, Elizabeth I, Politics and War, pg. 64. (R. B. Outhwaite, “Studies in Elizabethan Government and Finance: Royal borrowing and the Sale of Crown Lands, 1572-1603” (unpublished PhD dissertation, Univ. of Nottingham, 1964), pg. 19.)
available, with £783,000 of that total spent in the years from 1592 to 1602. The royal
government spent £153,000 on the Navy in 1588 and £65,000 in 1589 at the height of the
Armada campaigns. It is perhaps worth noting that the yearly military expenditures at the
height of the Irish Rebellion from 1599 to 1602 were the greatest for the reign, and far
exceeded those for the Armada Year of 1588. Following the peace with Spain in 1604
and the suppression of Tyrone’s Rebellion, military expenditures fell to much lower
levels during the early years of James I. However, Elizabeth left James with reduced
income due to the sale of income producing land as well as an empty treasury. The
Stuarts started their dynasty with the disadvantage of reduced income and sizable debts,
financial problems that they never fully overcame.64

The income, or revenue, side of the ledger reveals a good deal about how the
royal government financed the wars. Loans and the sale of assets, mainly land, did not
become prominent in the accounts until 1597, but from then until the end of the reign
loans and asset sales became an important part of the cash available. Of particular
interest is the amount generated from direct taxation of the laity and the clergy, that is,
subsidies, tenths and fifteens voted by the parliaments of the reign as aids to the crown in
the emergency. From 1586 to 1603, subsidies etc. brought in £100,000 per year and in
some years over £150,000. By my reckoning, the total direct taxes from 1586 to 1603
amounted to £2,289,600, or an average of £127,200 per year. If we compare Elizabeth’s
ability to obtain revenue from her Parliaments to Charles I’s ability to obtain revenue

64 Frederick C. Dietz, English Public Finance, 1558-1641, 2nd ed. [New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc.,
1964], pp. 113-126. One estimate of the government debt at Elizabeth’s death was £600,000; see Richard
W. Stewart, The English Ordnance Office, 1585-1625 [Woodbridge, Sussex: The Royal Historical Society
and Boydell Press, 1996], pg. 31. Dietz says the debt was around £425,000; Dietz, pg. 113.
from his parliaments (discussed in Chapter 3), we find that Charles was not nearly as successful as Elizabeth was in this regard. The royal accounts are in deficit for only four of the years between 1584 and 1602: 1587, 1588, 1589 and 1596. Thus, it seems that Elizabeth and her Privy Council were able to adjust their war aims to the funds available better than was Charles I, albeit with sizable loans and asset sales in the 1590s at the height of the Irish troubles.

Elizabeth summoned thirteen parliamentary sessions during her reign: in 1559, 1563, 1566, 1571, 1572, 1576, 1581, 1584-1585, 1586-1587, 1589, 1593, 1597-1598, and 1601. All of these sessions passed subsidy bills except the session of 1572, while the session in 1587 voted a benevolence to the Queen, a gift from her well-affected subjects, equal to half a subsidy from both the laity and the clergy. Elizabeth gained parliamentary cooperation on taxes and other matters by means of diplomacy (and an occasional fib), flattery and a willingness to negotiate on grievances that the members presented to her. An example, one among many, occurred in the session of 1601. The Commons sought relief from the exactions of holders of monopoly patents granted by the crown and the House of Commons was delaying a vote on the requested subsidies in order to influence the Queen. The Queen and her councilors quickly seized the opportunity, and, in a matter of three days had prepared and printed a royal proclamation that voided the principal patents complained of in Parliament, authorized anyone harmed

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or wronged by other patents to seek ordinary remedy at law, and rescinded letters of assistance from the Privy Council to patentees as well as forbidding such letters in the future. At an audience with 140 members of Commons, the Queen thanked the Commons for bringing the problem to her attention and indirectly apologized for the harm that may have come to her subjects. The House of Commons, needless to say, was overjoyed and the subsidy bill passed. The members, who were soon to have a new sovereign, went home with fond memories of their Queen and were to look back on her reign as a golden era.⁶⁷

At this point a brief word on inflation, the declining value or purchasing power of money, is in order. The sixteenth century, and particularly the second half, was a period of substantial inflation in Europe. Therefore, comparing income and expenses over a twenty-year period can be deceptive if only the “current year” value of money is considered, which is what has been done here so far. Several indices are available that can be used to estimate the relative value of a pound sterling between pairs of years. One is the O’Brien and Hunt Index, which gives a ratio of 1.15 between the years 1584 and 1603. Another is the ESFDB Consumables Price Index, which gives a ratio of 1.34 for the same years. A third is the Measuring Worth Purchasing Power Index, which gives a ratio of 1.25 for these years.⁶⁸ The indices vary both up and down considerably over

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⁶⁸ The O’Brien and Hunt Index was available on the European State Finance Data Base (ESFDB) website until at least 2003, but is not now available there. The index numbers I have used come from Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars*, pg. 239. The ESFDB Index of Consumables may be found on the ESFDB website, www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ENDIC/eind003.txt, [accessed 8 Sep 2008]. The Measuring Worth Index may be found on the Measuring Worth website, www.measuringworth.com/ppoweruk/ [accessed 8 Sep 2008]. The Measuring Worth database also contains a long article describing the derivation of the index numbers.
these years, so the ratios given here should not be used for other pairs of years. The middle value from Measuring Worth seems the best compromise and the Measuring Worth Index is probably the index using the most sources. This index reveals that a pound spent in 1603 would purchase only 80 percent (that is, $1/1.25 = 0.80$) of what a pound spent in 1584 would purchase, be it gunpowder or grain or clothing. Put another way, the £393,000 spent on the military in 1602 is approximately equivalent to spending £314,000 in 1585. The military and other expenses in 1602 were still greater than the amounts spent in the mid-1580s, but they were not as great an increase as the unadjusted numbers in Table B1-1 show: military expenditures were only 3 times higher in 1602 than in 1585, rather than almost four times higher.

5. Paying, Feeding and Lodging the Troops

During the wars of Elizabeth’s reign, the initial expenses of recruiting, clothing, arming and transportation to the theater of war were borne by the company captain. The captain also bore the expense of paying his men in advance for pay the captain expected to receive from the government. Although the captain might receive a down payment from his employer, this was not common. As a result, the captain had to have independent financial resources and if the government that agreed to employ him and his men did not pay him, he could meet financial ruin in short order. The Dutch, the Huguenots and the English government, usually used this arrangement though most of the surviving information comes from Dutch records. Once the company arrived at the

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(Lawrence H. Officer, “The Purchasing Power of British Pounds from 1264 to 2007”. [Measuring Worth, 2008].)
appointed place, the employing government was supposed to reimburse the captain for these expenses. On the other hand, if the employer appointed the captain to take over an existing company, the government avoided some of these expenses.

In theory, the companies received a weekly sum paid to the captain who, with the assistance of the company clerk, passed the money to each soldier. The government intended this weekly sum to provide for food, lodging, and ammunition. The employing government nominally paid the balance of what was due to the soldier every month to the captain, but often the government paid the balance only every six months or more. The captain in turn doled it out to the men. The English called the weekly payment ‘imprests’ or ‘lendings’, revealing the origin of the practice when the captain literally had to lend his men money from the company chest for food until he received money from the central authority. The additional pay given at six-month intervals they called a ‘full pay’ and originally was to purchase clothing twice a year as well as for ammunition and arms. The weekly payment provided bare subsistence for the soldier and was usually low enough that, if the soldier was shorted even a penny, his income fell below the subsistence level. The system developed in continental armies to keep the soldiers on a short leash, to prevent waste and to prevent drunken brawls. The captains often took advantage of the system, as we have seen, and considered a captaincy as way to make one’s fortune. The captain, in collusion with his clerk and with pay officers higher up in the army administration, regularly reported men on the company muster list who were not present.

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being dead, deserters or simply fictitious. Captains often doled out less than the weekly amount to the soldiers, blaming the higher administration for underpaying them, or engaged in subterfuges such as unfairly docking a soldier’s pay for infractions of the rules. On the other hand, the practice of keeping dead soldiers in the muster list was so common that the governments institutionalized it and often allowed captains on overseas service a certain number of “dead pays” to increase their salaries or to pay for other incidentals.\footnote{See Cruickshank, \textit{Elizabeth’s Army}, pp. 153-158 for a more complete description of “dead pays” and the pay system in general.} Clothing was another way for the chain of command to make money. For example, the army administration might receive money for 1000 suits of clothes but only deliver 800 suits to the soldiers. The soldiers pay was not sufficient to provide anything for a family left behind and was less than a man could earn as a farm hand or cloth worker. During Elizabeth’s reign, the weekly lending amounted to 2s. 6d. a week (a little over 4d. per day), whereas a laborer could earn as much as 8d. or even 1s. a day in good times, although the farm laborer and the town worker generally were not employed every working day of the year.\footnote{SP16/25/76, Andrew Mudd to Sec. Conway; 27 April 1626 mentions 8d.}

Once the impressed men had been assembled in their home county, the county was expected to provide ‘coat and conduct’ money for each soldier. The county used the coat money, to which the royal government contributed 4s. out of a typical cost of 10 to 15s., to buy clothes for the pressed men. The conduct money, an allowance of 8d. per day for food and lodging while the men marched to an embarkation port, was provided by the royal government or reimbursed to the local government. The royal government
expected the men to cover twelve to fifteen miles per day. The impressed men were usually ‘conducted’ to the embarkation point by the company captain or lieutenant or by a hired officer who had more military experience than a deputy lieutenant or justice of the peace. The conductor was responsible for seeing that all the men got to the embarkation point, did not sell their arms and coats on the way, and marched the stipulated number of miles each day. The conductor controlled the conduct money, which he doled out to the men as he saw fit. Desertion on the march was common and the recruits sometimes accused conductors not giving them all of the conduct money due them.

There were short periods when the government had to billet an expeditionary army or replacement troops in England. This occurred when the government recruited troops and then sent them to an embarkation point to eventually board ship for their destination. At the port, local officials billeted the soldiers for a time in and around the port town. This situation might last for a month or more if there was a problem in finding shipping or the winds were unfavorable. Usually the time spent at the port was a few days to a few weeks. The Privy Council charged the town officials of the port with the responsibility of finding billets and ships and the town councils came to complain about the trouble and expense of the process.

Merchants under contract with the royal government generally provided food for the army while it was abroad, and the merchants were usually English. One of the greatest difficulties the English government encountered was the logistics of supplying an army while it was across the sea. The procurement of foodstuffs, as well as clothes and

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72 Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, pg. 92 on coat money and pp. 61-63 on conduct money and marching distance.
ammunition, was rife with corruption, particularly in supplying troops in Ireland. As a result, the poor soldiers often received inferior or spoiled food, while the Crown paid for quality victuals. Many a merchant, baker, brewer and government supply officer made a fortune. Transport for the army and its supplies were also usually provided by contract with merchant ship owners. While overseas, the army commanders arranged for necessary lodging, either paying for it or commandeering it as circumstances dictated.

There were a few occasions during Elizabeth’s reign when an army on active duty was billeted in England for a longer period. The first instance of billeting such a body of troops in private homes seems to have been in Kent and other southeastern counties in December 1588 after the naval battles with the Armada. England was then preparing for attacks on Spain in 1589 and still feared a Spanish attack on England, so the government brought over English veterans from the United Provinces to England and billeted them for six weeks in private homes in Kent for lack of any other quarters. This apparently created no great upset in Kent, probably because the Crown arranged for reasonably prompt payment of the soldier’s daily pay to billeters, either through the captains and soldiers or through the Deputy Lieutenants of Kent directly to the billeters. However, the royal government did not completely repay some towns until 1591.

6. Conclusion

During the war years of Elizabeth I’s reign, there were few changes made in the methods or organization of government that she, her sister Mary and her brother Edward

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inherited from their father. One change that effected military affairs was the creation of the Lord Lieutenancy to control military affairs in each county and the creation of the trained bands as a smaller, less expensive and, hopefully, more effective defense force. The crown delegated some of the recruiting responsibilities to the lords lieutenant and through them to county officials, a precedent that the crown further extended during the reign of Charles I.

The costs of war were a burden for England as they were for all European countries at the time. Although Parliament granted Elizabeth more money than it did to any previous monarch, to support the financial burden she was forced to borrow money and, following in the footsteps of her father, to the sale of royal lands and other assets. Elizabeth spent approximately £6 million on the armed services from 1585 to 1603, of which she raised about £2 million in subsidies and other direct taxation on the laity and clergy. She raised another £1 million through asset sales and the crown borrowed at least another £200,000. Most of the rest came from economies in government and the royal household, money fines on recusants, increased customs duties and “impositions” (akin to excise taxes).75

England changed its methods of recruiting and maintaining an army during the second half of the sixteenth century, emulating developments on the continent, particularly those of the Spanish Army of Flanders and its Dutch opponents. The many Englishmen who served in the continental wars brought knowledge of these new developments to England, for a small army of English officers and soldiers served in the

Dutch forces continuously from the 1570s to the mid seventeenth century. As on the continent, the basic unit of an English army became the one hundred-man company commanded by a captain and by 1600, as armies grew larger, they also included multi-company regiments in their organization. The English did not develop a standing army during the wars of the 1500s as commonly happened in Europe, notably in the United Provinces, France, Spain and in the Austrian Habsburg domains. England organized new armies for each expedition conducted against Scotland, a continental foe or to suppress an Irish rebellion, though she did maintain something resembling a standing army in the Netherlands and in Ireland for some years during the times of trouble in the 1590s and first few years of the 1600s.

Most of the practices and problems of the last twenty years of the Tudors continued into the first thirty years of the Stuarts, and it is to those years we shall now turn.
Chapter 3

English Wars, Diplomacy and Government in the 1620s

1. Introduction

From 1618 to 1628, England participated in the early years of the Thirty Years’ War that convulsed Western Europe from 1618 to 1648. In pursuing the war, James I and then his son Charles I encountered the same fundamental problem in waging war that Elizabeth did, money, or lack of it. The irregular and unpredictable revenues from subsidies granted by Parliament compounded Charles’ difficulties, for Charles was not nearly as adroit in cajoling money from parliament as Elizabeth had been. This difference led to a second difference. In the 1620s the local governments and the people and a disproportionately few counties and towns in southern England bore directly a greater proportion of the cost and effort.

The chapter starts with a brief description of major events in England’s participation in the early years of the Thirty Years’ War and then touches upon government organization and operation and the additional responsibilities placed upon the local governments. Finally, the financial problems of the royal government that were one of the principle causes of billeting problems are presented in summary form, as in the last Chapter.

2. England’s Participation in the Thirty Years’ War – 1618 to 1628

Active English participation in the Thirty Years’ War that convulsed western Europe from 1618 to 1648 occurred in the years from 1618 to 1628. However, England and James I were very much involved in the start of the war and this involvement
contributed to political activities within England, royal conflicts with parliament and ultimately to the creation of an English army which was maintained for four years and thus to the billeting of troops within England from late 1624 to late 1628. An extensive knowledge of the history of the Thirty Years’ War and the religious and political situation in the Holy Roman Empire, Spain and France is not necessary to understand the background of England’s problems with army recruiting, maintenance and billeting during the 1620s.¹ However, some knowledge of England’s political, diplomatic and military maneuvering is necessary to understand the war-related activities in England and to place them in context.

Family ties connected James I and Charles I to two early participants in the Thirty Years’ War: Frederick V, Elector Palatine and Christian IV, King of Denmark, and these relationships drew England into the war. Frederick V was a leader of the Calvinist group in Germany and, in addition, he was one of the leaders of the Protestant Union, an alliance created for the defense of all Protestants and Protestant states within the Empire. As one of the leaders of the German Protestants, Elector Frederick was involved directly and intimately in the events leading to the Thirty Years’ War. However, Frederick was also the son-in-law of James I and the brother-in-law of Charles I and this familial connection quickly involved England in the early phases of the war. Christian IV of Denmark was the brother of James’ wife, Anne and thus Charles’ uncle and joined the Protestant side in the Thirty Years’ War in 1625 as the forces of the Catholic League

gained ascendancy in northern Germany. Support for Christian led to promises of financial aid and the dispatch of English troops to Denmark.

The start of the series of events that led to the Thirty Years’ War arguably occurred in 1617 when the childless Emperor Matthias designated Ferdinand of Styria, a staunch Catholic, the heir to the Austrian Habsburg dominions and, as such, the King of Bohemia by the Bohemian Estates. Ferdinand and the regents he designated to rule Bohemia quickly sided with the Catholic cause in Bohemia, much to the concern of the Protestant nobility. The Bohemian Protestant leaders called a meeting of the Estates in Prague and, in May 1618, they rejected the new King and formed a commission of thirty Directors to govern the kingdom and, in effect, started a rebellion against the new King of Bohemia. In early 1619, the Emperor Matthias died and Ferdinand became Emperor, thereby elevating the Bohemian rebellion into a rebellion against the Emperor. The rebellion spread to other Austrian provinces and soon led to the involvement of the Spanish Habsburgs in support of their Austrian relatives and their Catholic co-religionists. This in turn led England and the Dutch into intermittent efforts to prevent the growth of Habsburg power in Europe and to support the continental Protestants. France also began to worry about Habsburg domination of Europe and to consider support for Protestant states. The flames of war were truly lit when, in August 1619, the

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Bohemian Estates invited the Elector Frederick to become King of Bohemia, hoping he would bring with him the material support of the Protestant rulers of Europe.  

Throughout his reign, James I sought to maintain religious peace in Europe and had tried to mediate various disputes. In seeking this balance, he married his daughter to the Protestant stalwart, Frederick, and was negotiating the marriage of Prince Charles to a Spanish princess. James offered to mediate the Bohemian, now Imperial, dispute and the Spanish King accepted the offer in early 1619.  

James sent ambassadors to the Emperor with this objective, but the embassy failed.

Frederick’s decision to accept the offer of the throne of Bohemia in the summer of 1619 precipitated the widening of the Thirty Years’ War. Frederick had written to James asking advice, but before James could respond advising against it, Frederick announced his acceptance of the Bohemian crown. His acceptance elevated the Bohemian crisis to an Imperial constitutional issue since, traditionally, the King of Bohemia had been the heir apparent to the Imperial throne.  

Frederick entered Prague on 31 October 1619, but a year later Imperial forces expelled him from Bohemia after the rebels lost the Battle of the White Mountain to an army under Tilly and the Duke of


8 Zaller, “Interests of State: James I and the Palatinate”, pg. 147.
Bavaria in October 1620, earning Frederick the derisive sobriquet ‘The Winter King’.

An even greater disaster struck Frederick in 1620 when Spanish Habsburg forces under Spinola invaded the Palatinate to help the Habsburg and Catholic causes in Germany and to forestall enemy occupation of the Rhenish Palatinate, whose possession would threaten the ‘Spanish Road’ from Italy to the Low Countries and the Spanish reinforcement of the Army of Flanders from Italy. The Spanish also considered this a thrust at the Dutch, since the Twelve Years Truce between the Dutch and the Spanish was due to end in 1621.

England’s first military involvement in the war occurred when James allowed Colonel John Grey, who was in the service of the Elector Frederick, to recruit 2500 men for service in Bohemia. James also permitted the recruitment of 4,000 English volunteers for service in the Palatinate under Sir Horace Vere, a renowned English soldier of the day. However, only 2,250 men went to the Palatinate in October 1620. Neither Vere nor the Protestant Union forces sent to help would engage Spinola in battle, and Vere soon retired to garrison in Mannheim, Heidelberg and Frankenthal, while the Union forces simply retired from the stronghold of Oppenheim to Worms. This limited intervention was to no avail, for, after considerable diplomacy and negotiation, the

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10 Gardiner, (Vol. 3, pg. 333) says that James gave no positive response to Grey’s request. Pursell (The Winter King, pg. 109) says that James permitted Grey to recruit 2,500 volunteers.

11 Brennan Pursell, The Winter King: Frederick V of the Palatinate and the Coming of the Thirty Years’ War, pg. 109. Zaller, in “Interests of State: James I and the Palatinate”, calls the troops mercenaries (pg. 147).

Imperial Armies under Tilly, aided by Spanish contingents from the Army of Flanders under Spinola, finally conquered and occupied the entire Palatinate in 1622. Frederick and Elizabeth had fled to the Dutch Republic in 1620 after they left Bohemia and their exile now became virtually permanent.

Perhaps the most important effect in England of the earliest years of the war and for the story of billeting was the renewal of the Protestant and anti-Spanish fervor of the reign of Elizabeth. James had called a Parliament in 1621 and the first session opened in early in the year, quickly approving two subsidies for the support of the Protestant cause and the Elector Palatine. However, the approximately £140,000 from the two subsidies would not have supported the forces that were needed to recover the Palatinate. During the rest of the first session and in the interval between the first and second sessions, it became apparent that James was not in favor of a decisive military intervention in the Palatinate but rather preferred to rely on diplomacy and his proposed Spanish alliance to return the Palatinate to Frederick. The Parliament disagreed and refused to vote more money in the second session as members of Commons spoke fervently for substantial action in the Palatinate, for a sea war against Spain, for stern action against recusants at home, and against a Spanish marriage for Prince Charles. James was particularly angry

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13 Conrad Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-9*, pg. 91. King James’ Council of War estimated that that £250,000 was needed immediately and £900,000 per year was required to support an army of 30,000 for defense of the Palatinate. (Gardiner, Vol. 3, pg. 31.) Somewhat different amounts are given in Thomas Cogswell, “Phaeton’s Chariot” in J. F. Merritt ed. *The Political World of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, 1621-1641* [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996], pg 28.

at a request that Prince Charles be married to a Protestant, which led to the dissolution of the Parliament.

Notwithstanding Parliament’s complaints and popular opinion, King James continued to pursue a Spanish match for the Prince and a negotiated settlement in the Palatinate during 1622 and 1623. In an attempt to settle the matter of the Spanish marriage and to reveal the true intentions of the Spanish, Prince Charles and royal favorite Buckingham traveled incognito to Madrid, leaving in March 1623 and returning in October 1623. The two then worked to convince King James that the Spanish would not agree to give back the Palatinate and, additionally, to organize support for a revolution in English foreign policy that would pursue English intervention to recover the Palatinate for Fredrick and Elizabeth as well as provide aid to the Protestants on the continent. They helped organize and lead the Parliamentary support for the new policies, including a grant of subsidies for war, in the Parliament called to meet in February 1624. The debates and maneuvers during the Parliamentary session have been described in many places. The result was a subsidy bill that included unprecedented conditions. First, it declared that the King must abandon the treaties for the Spanish marriage and the recovery of the Palatinate. Then it provided three subsidies and three fifteenths “for the maintenance of that war which may hereupon ensue, and more particularly for the

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16 A description of this session and an informative analysis may be found in Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution, Chaps. 5 and 6, pp. 166-226. A short description is available in Lockyer, The Early Stuarts, pp. 205-214. Another with different interpretations may be found in Conrad Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-9, pp. 145-203.
defense of this your realm of England, the securing of your kingdom of Ireland, the assistance of your neighbors the States of the United Provinces and other [of] Your Majesty’s friends and allies, and for the setting forth of your navy royal”. The bill further required that the tax collectors in the counties were to pay the money raised to parliamentary treasurers whose names were listed. They in turn were to disburse funds only on the instructions of the Council of War, whose members were also listed by name. The subsidy bill further provided that the Parliamentary Treasurers and the Councilors of War were to be accountable to the House of Commons.\(^{17}\) Of some interest is the fact that Commons left vague the nature of the war which might ensue because James insisted that this was a matter of the royal prerogative. Additionally, as Professor Cogswell and others have pointed out, the vagueness was probably necessary to convince Parliament to support the proposed war and, indeed, as the war unfolded over the next few years, costly army expeditions to the continent dismayed Parliament, which hoped for a sea war against Spain.\(^{18}\) In later years, the future King Charles was dismayed that Parliament did not provide the funds he thought they had committed to provide in 1624.

The Protestant and anti-Habsburg cause in Germany was in dire straits in 1624. The Palatinate was in Imperial hands and the Imperial forces under Tilly had gradually cleared the Empire of organized Protestant forces, ended the Bohemian revolt and driven the remnants of the Protestant forces into the Netherlands.\(^{19}\) The new English policy

\(^{17}\) Lockyer, *The Early Stuarts*, pg. 213. Taken from J. R. Tanner, ed., *Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I* [Cambridge, 1930], pp. 375-377. For more on the Council of War, see Sec. 2 below.


\(^{19}\) Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years’ War*, pp. 64-71.
prompted the creation of an alliance between the French, the Dutch, and the English intended to prevent Habsburg and Catholic domination of Germany. England agreed to raise, and to pay for two years, four regiments of 1500 men each to aid the Dutch in their war of independence and in June and July 1624, the royal government recruited some 6000 volunteers in England and sent them to increase the English forces in the Netherlands.  

To help consummate the alliance and to bring France into the anti-Habsburg fold, James and Buckingham initiated inquiries about a marriage treaty with France in December 1623 as an alternate to the Spanish match. Negotiations became active in May of 1624 and eventually resulted in Charles’ marriage to the French princess Henriette Marie, the sister of King Louis XIII, in June 1625. Disputes over the execution of the treaty eventually contributed to discord and, as we shall see, to a war between England and France. The principle irritants were the agreement to relax the restrictions on English Catholics, which was anathema to Parliament and many Englishmen and, second, an agreement to loan English ships to the French government which, as it turned out, were used around Rochelle to help suppress a new Huguenot rebellion.

In conjunction with the marriage treaty, France agreed to provide 3000 cavalry and England agreed to provide 12,000 infantry for an expedition to recover the Palatinate


for Frederick V. Count Ernst von Mansfeld, a German mercenary, who had been fighting at one time or another for the Elector Frederick in Bohemia, for the Protestant Union in Germany and for the Dutch, was engaged to command the expedition in negotiations involving The English government, Mansfeld, the French and the Dutch. After many months of negotiation during 1624, the agreement foundered over French/English disagreement on a written agreement, the French preferring to have nothing in writing, and the French withdrew permission for Mansfeld’s Expedition to land in France at the last moment. England proceeded with the expedition and in early 1625, England launched the first of its expeditions to assist the Protestant and anti-Habsburg causes on the continent. Count Mansfeld led 12,000 English volunteers and conscripts to recover the Palatinate with Dutch assistance.\textsuperscript{23} To mount the expedition, the crown used part of the 1624 subsidy money, leading to some disagreements in the Parliament of 1625.\textsuperscript{24}

The expedition gathered at Dover in late December 1624 and left in early February 1625 but the French refused to permit Mansfeld to land at Calais, contrary to previous agreement. The fleet sailed on to Flushing in the United Provinces where some of the men were sent ashore. The rest spent the winter onboard ship and over half the men died of sickness and malnutrition during the winter. The 3000 or 4000 remaining alive and fit went off with Mansfeld to assist the Dutch at the siege of Breda that spring.\textsuperscript{25}


\textsuperscript{25} Gardiner, Vol. 5, pp. 280-290.
At the urging of the Dutch, a few eventually proceeded up the Rhine toward Heidelberg and the Palatinate, and very few ever returned to England.

The situation in England changed dramatically when, in March 1625, King James died and Charles came to the throne. In early 1625, King Christian IV of Denmark, James brother-in-law and Charles’ uncle, entered the war in Germany on the Protestant side as Imperial forces were gaining control of northern Germany. Charles soon agreed to provide £30,000 per month to Christian, though the King seldom paid because the English treasury did not have the money. Shortly after James I died in March of 1625, Charles also issued writs for the first Parliament of the new reign, which met in June 1625, two days after the arrival of the new Queen from France and during an outbreak of the “plague” in London. The first session of this Parliament offered Charles two subsidies, perhaps £140,000, considered the traditional tonnage and poundage grant, but only for a year rather than the length of the reign, and adjourned to reconvene in Oxford on 1 August to avoid the plague. Arguments within the court and within Parliament marred the first session. The disagreements included opposition to the relaxation of the anti-recusancy laws to conform to the French marriage treaty, the use of the funds voted by the Parliament of 1624 and the lack of a report from the Treasurers, as well as religious matters. The August Parliamentary session in Oxford lasted less than two weeks, continuing the deep divisions of the first session and yielded no additional grant.

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26 Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years’ War*, pp. 71-81.

27 Cust and Hughes, ed. *Conflict in Early Stuart England*, pp. 172-179, and Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics*, pp. 218-237. Russell listed (from a speech by Sir John Coke) financial commitments totaling over £500,000 that had been made, or were in the process of being spent, to prosecute the war. The subsidies of 1624 and two from 1625 probably yielded about half that sum.
of supply to the crown. The King dissolved the Parliament on 12 August and turned to consider other methods of raising money. Parliament certainly did not provide what James and then Charles proposed to spend the first year of the war - over £1,000,000.\textsuperscript{28}

During the first half of 1625, England also prepared another expedition, this one to attack the coast of Spain under the command of Sir Edward Cecil, created Viscount Wimbledon in December 1625, who had acquired considerable military experience in the Dutch service but who had little naval experience.\textsuperscript{29} Approximately 5000 sailors and 10,000 infantry were impressed for the Expedition, which was much delayed in leaving Plymouth due to various problems in acquiring supplies and ships.\textsuperscript{30} It sailed very late in the season, on 8 October, and arrived off Cadiz on 22 October. The goal of the raid was to interfere with Spanish shipping and preparations for a suspected invasion of England, and possibly to capture the year’s treasure fleet sailing to Spain from the Americas. There was no plan of attack made before sailing; a Council of War made up of the senior officers of the Expedition planned the attack and made all tactical decisions after the fleet reached Spanish waters.\textsuperscript{31} The Expedition War Council decided to raid Cadiz seeking booty and the capture or destruction of Spanish ships. The infantry landed successfully,

\textsuperscript{28} See the Introduction to Table A6 in Appendix A for the estimated expenses. Dalton, Vol. 2, pg. 105. The data are taken from Samuel Rawson Gardiner, ed., \textit{Debates in the House of Commons in 1625} [Camden Society, ns, 6, 1873], pg. 2. Cust also mentions the £1 million figure in Richard Cust, \textit{Charles I, A Political Life} [Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd., 2005], pg. 45.


\textsuperscript{30} John Glanville, \textit{The Voyage to Cadiz}, Alexander B. Grosart ed. [London: Camden Soc., ns, 32], 1883], pg. xli, 27 Feb 1626, Cecil to Sir John Coke on the numbers of sailors and soldiers.

\textsuperscript{31} Gardiner, Vol. 6, pg. 14.
but, on the march to attack the town, the English soldiery, short of beer and water, became gloriously drunk when they found a wine cellar and, because of this and other problems, the expedition’s war council aborted the raid. The fleet then spent a short time looking for the Spanish treasure fleet, but the Spanish managed to alert the treasure fleet and it landed in Seville before the English could intercept it. The Cadiz Expedition accomplished little militarily and a storm badly damaged the fleet on the voyage home in November. It arrived in Plymouth in early December. Because of their condition, many damaged ships put into ports on the southern coast of Ireland. The expedition spent a month in Spanish waters and lasted two months altogether. Upon their return, the Privy Council ordered the soldiers to return to the billets around Plymouth that they had occupied before sailing and it ordered the army officers and local officials to do everything possible to keep the companies together. Approximately 4000 soldiers remained in billets in Devon and Cornwall until September 1626. According to the Privy Council orders, the King had plans for the future use of the army.\textsuperscript{32}

The English fleet attempted to raid the coast of Spain again in the fall of 1626. Lord Willoughby commanded the expedition, which was largely a naval effort with few soldiers involved. Storms in the Bay of Biscay drove the ill-equipped fleet back and it never reached Spanish waters.\textsuperscript{33} In 1626, England also sent several regiments (which disease and other losses had reduced to approximately 4000 men) under the command of

\textsuperscript{32} These billeting matters are discussed in Chap. 6 Sec. 5 below. For the directions given to the local officials, see \textit{APC}, Vol. 40, pg. 263, P.C to the Mayor of Plymouth, 6 Dec 1625. Also, pp. 266-268, P.C. to Viscount Wimbledon; 12 Dec 1625. Also, pg. 271, P.C. to the Attorney General, 10 Dec 1625. Also pp. 275-277, P.C. to the Commissioners at Plymouth, 19 Dec 1625.

\textsuperscript{33} Gardiner, Vol. 6, pg. 142.
Sir Charles Morgan from the Netherlands to aid the King of Denmark. The Imperial Armies had defeated Christian in several major battles and driven him back into Denmark, part of which Wallenstein, the Imperial generalissimo, occupied in 1627.34

When the King summoned another Parliament in 1626, the Parliament stepped forward and tried to impeach Buckingham for several alleged peculations, though, in the main, the House of Commons blamed him for his advice to the King and the kind of war they did not want and for military defeats. The impeachment attempt, made before Parliament voted any money for the crown, eventually prompted Charles to prorogue Parliament without accomplishing anything to support the war financially. To raise desperately needed money, the royal government first asked for a “benevolence” or gift to the crown, as had done after the 1625 Oxford session, but the benevolence raised only a relatively small amount and disturbed many who viewed it as taxation without proper parliamentary approval. Then in the fall of the year, the Privy Council decided to order the levy of a privy seal, or forced, loan, a concept used in Elizabeth’s reign with success, and which lawyers and taxpayers generally regarded as a legitimate means of extra-parliamentary supply. However, there were important differences. The crown had solicited past privy seal loans through personal letters sent out to selected individuals, whereas it wished to raise this loan from all persons required to pay subsidies at the equivalent of five subsidies. Moreover, while earlier privy seal loan letters had contained

34 Most notably at the battle of Lutter in August 1626, Tilly commanding the Imperial forces. Parker, The Thirty Years’ War, pp. 75-79. For Morgan’s expedition to Germany to help the Danes, see E. A. Beller, “The Military Expedition of Sir Charles Morgan to Germany, 1627-9”, EHR, Vol. 43, No. 172 (1928), pp. 528-39. According to Beller, only 2500 actually embarked for the expedition. The rest had deserted. (Beller, pg. 530). The strength of Morgan’s infantry was increased in May 1627 to near 5000 by a press of men in England, which led to the Harwich Mutiny discussed in Chapter 6.
specific promises of repayment, in the new loan these promises were extremely vague.\textsuperscript{35} Such differences suggested to many subsidy payers that proposed loan more nearly resembled a tax than a loan. Even more objectionable was the context in which it was being levied and the severity of the measures taken to enforce it. The Forced Loan, which this loan came to be called, was successful in raising nearly £300,000 during 1626 and 1627, but its collection created considerable anger and consternation in the counties and towns of England and loans to the crown became one of the major grievances addressed in the Petition of Right of 1628. On the other hand, the government left some £80,000 in the counties to pay for billeting and other war related expenses, which reduced the amount, sent to London, but no doubt mitigated some of the anger in the counties.\textsuperscript{36}

During 1626, relations with the French Crown also broke down in arguments over the execution of the marriage treaty, England claiming France was interfering in the King’s household arrangements with demands for greater freedom for the new Queen to practice her religion in public and the French claiming that the English were not giving the promised relief to English Catholics. There were other disputes over the use of English ships and crews that England loaned or chartered to the French government in 1625 and which the French used in their efforts to suppress the Huguenot insurrection at Rochelle, against the wishes of the ship owners, the crews and King Charles.\textsuperscript{37} Charles


\textsuperscript{36} Cust, \textit{The Forced Loan and English Politics}, pg. 92.

had undertaken to help the Huguenots obtain freedom to practice their religion and felt obligated to send aid to Rochelle, which the French, with some cause, regarded as interference in their internal affairs. England’s seizure in 1625 of French ships accused of carrying military contraband to Spain also strained relations between France and England. During 1626, the French embargoed English goods in Rouen in reprisal and Sir John Pennington’s fleet conducted a raid on Le Havre and seized French shipping in the Channel while the French seized ships and cargoes belonging to English wine merchants at Bordeaux. The Rouen and Bordeaux seizures outraged and frightened many English merchants and threatened the livelihood of a large number of Londoners. As a result, Charles decided to go to war with France, putting the Spanish war on hold for a while.

In 1627, England launched a major expedition to capture the Île de Ré, an island that controlled the sea approaches to Rochelle, in order to permit supplies and reinforcements to reach the besieged town. The Expedition sailed in late June under the command of the Duke of Buckingham in person and at first had some success, but ran out of supplies and replacement soldiers, which, despite several attempts, never arrived from England in sufficient quantity. By 1 August, the campaign settled into a siege of the fortress of St. Martins and a naval blockade of its harbor. When the French landed supplies at St. Martins in late September, the possibility of starving the defenders out

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receded farther into the future. The English suffered from lack of food, men and the equipment necessary to conduct a siege or assault on the fortress. The failure of the French Huguenots to foment a much hoped for general uprising in France was another disappointment. After an attempt at storming the fort failed on 27 October, a Council of War and Buckingham decided to abandon the effort. The English forces retreated from St. Martins to their ships and returned to England on 29 October. Nearly half of Buckingham’s army was lost to disease, in combat and in the disastrous fighting retreat from the siege of St. Martins to the ships.\textsuperscript{40} The survivors arrived in Plymouth and Portsmouth in early December 1627, resuming their billets in southern England.

Another fleet, under the command of Lord Denbigh, sailed to relieve Rochelle in April 1628. It was primarily a naval force, but the navy drafted large numbers of soldiers into the fleet as seamen because the navy could not press enough experienced sailors. Denbigh intended to clear a shipping passage to the city and deliver grain and a few hundred men to help the besieged Rochellese, but the effort was unsuccessful and the fleet returned in mid-May.\textsuperscript{41} During the first few months of 1628, after the return from Ré, the Privy Council ordered the army moved into billets scattered through most of the counties of southern England. The Council intended to distribute the costs and aggravations of billeting troops more widely than in the past three years. The perhaps unintended result of the Council’s action was the irritation of an even wider segment of the country. The king called for a Parliament to meet in March 1628. This session

\textsuperscript{40} Gardiner, Vol. 6, pp. 168-185 and 191-199.

\textsuperscript{41} Gardiner, Vol. 6, pp. 291-293.
produced the Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers and the Petition of Right and, in return for Charles’ approval of the Petition of Right, granted five subsidies to the King.\footnote{See Chapters 8 and 9 for a discussion of the events of 1628 concerning billeting, conflicts between soldiers and civilians, and the parliamentary session in 1628.} When the Parliament took up debate on a Remonstrance against Buckingham and the perceived failures of the royal government, Charles again prorogued the session.\footnote{Russell, \textit{Parliaments and English Politics}, pp. 378-382.} In August of 1628, a disgruntled army officer assassinated the Duke of Buckingham while the Duke was preparing another effort to relieve Rochelle. After the failures at Rochelle and the death of his friend and advisor, Charles decided to abandon the war effort, using the money voted by the Parliament of 1628 to pay arrears and disband the army and to reduce the size of the fleet. After a short and acrimonious session of parliament in early 1629, Charles embarked on his ten years of personal rule without parliaments. Of course, the Thirty Years’ War went on for another twenty years on the continent, ending with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and England went on to engage in a Civil War and ultimately deposed and decapitated King Charles.

3. \textit{Government and Administration}

In the conduct of this war, as in Elizabeth’s reign, the King and Privy Council controlled military affairs, with Parliament in the background, although Parliament did not remain as far in the background as Charles wished. The administrative burden of raising and maintaining the army was split between departments of the royal government in London and various Commissions in the counties. Indeed, during the war years the royal government in London pushed down into the local communities much of the work...
required to maintain the army. Some information on these various bodies and their work is provided here to establish an understanding of the rudiments of the lines of authority and the basic functions involved in the billeting activities in England during the war years of the 1620s.

a. The Central Administration

In the royal government, the primary governing body below the king was the Privy Council. The Privy Council was responsible for the day-to-day conduct of domestic and foreign affairs for the king. The Privy Council combined an advisory role with an executive role, including the supervision of local government for the King, and was crucial to the effectiveness of Charles’ personal monarchy. According to Kevin Sharpe and others, the Privy Council was not very effective during the first years of Charles’ reign because of the dominance of patronage by the Duke of Buckingham. The Duke’s dominance narrowed the experience of the Council members in various counties and reduced the flow and quality of information from many counties back to the Privy Council. Be that as it may, the Council’s broad responsibility was beyond the capacity of the twenty-five or so members and a small staff to perform without other assistance. In the preparation and conduct of war, the Privy Council and the royal government as a whole also had several other organizations that were responsible for parts and pieces of the creation and maintenance of land and naval forces.

44 For the duties, functions and members of the Privy Council, see G. E. Aylmer, *The King’s Servants; the Civil Service of Charles I* [New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1961], pg. 16-23. The modern British Cabinet is officially still a subcommittee of a much larger Privy Council. Aylmer gives the overall organization of the central administration in an Appendix, pg. 470ff.

First, once an expedition left England, the general and detailed direction of the naval and army elements of the expedition was the responsibility of the commander of the expedition and his senior officers, who formed the War Council for the expedition. These men were, in effect, surrogates for the King and Privy Council, particularly for short engagements such as Cadiz and Ré. However, before an expedition left England and after it returned, the commanders received instructions frequently from the King and Privy Council.

There were also permanent organizations in London that were in charge of some of the work necessary to defend the realm. One was the Office of the Ordnance, which had responsibility for durable stores such as cannon, gunpowder, muskets and other weapons – everything but clothes, food and medical supplies - for both the navy and the army, when an army existed. The Ordnance Office had been in existence since the 1400s, but underwent a major expansion of its role during Elizabeth’s reign as gunpowder weapons became dominant on the battlefield.\footnote{Richard W. Stewart, \textit{The English Ordnance Office, 1585-1625} [Woodbridge, Sussex: The Royal Historical Society and Boydell Press, 1996], pg. 6. Stewart provides a detailed description of the Ordnance Office and its functions.} It had a staff of around fifty persons in the 1620s and, while it could make and repair small numbers of weapons, it primarily bought them under contract.\footnote{Stephen J. Stearns, “The Caroline Military System, 1625-1627: The Expeditions to Cadiz and Ré” (PhD diss. Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1968), pp. 116-118. Also Richard W. Stewart, “Arms and Expeditions: the Ordnance Office and the Assaults on Cadiz (1625) and Rhé (1627)”, in Mark Fissel, ed., \textit{War and Government in Britain, 1598-1650} [Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1991], pp. 112-132.} Ordnance engineers also served as advisors to other royal officials in the maintenance of fortifications and, on foreign expeditions, served as advisors to the “Master of Ordnance in the Field”, that is the Master of
Ordnance of an army. The Ordnance Office was an important component of the war effort of the 1620s, particularly in preparation for and support of the large expeditions to Cadiz and Ré. Historian’s opinions of the effectiveness of the Ordnance Office during the 1620s range from Alymer’s finding of “serious faults” to Stearn’s analysis that the Ordnance Office’s performance “left much to be desired” but that there were “no direct adverse military consequences”, while Stewart contends that it functioned well enough to provide “a bare minimum of arms” to the soldiers.48

The second body was the Royal Navy, which the Lord Admiral and his subordinates, the Treasurer of the Navy, the Surveyor of Marine Victuals, the Clerk of the Navy and the Comptroller, formally administered. As the result of a reform of the corrupt naval offices in 1618, the King and Privy Council placed the principal officers under the control of a commission, which was collectively responsible to the Lord Admiral for the management of the Navy. The Clerk received all supplies for the navy of whatever kind and was the chief secretarial record keeper for the Navy while the Comptroller was an independent check on the Clerk. The Surveyor of Marine Victuals was responsible for the purchase of all food and drink for the men of the fleet and, during the 1620s, this included the expeditionary armies carried by the fleet. The Treasurer of the navy received and disbursed all naval funds for the payment of wages and materials, from biscuit to ships. The naval administration was notorious for corruption during the early years of James’ reign, but, after several failed attempts, a Commission under Lionel

Cranfield and Lord Admiral Buckingham effected reforms in the years from 1618 to 1620, but peculation seems to have returned during the war years of 1625 to 1628.\textsuperscript{49} During these years, the preparation for major expeditions was sometimes more than the naval administrators were capable of, for the Treasurer of the Navy seldom had the money to pay all of the bills and the vast amounts of food required seems to have overwhelmed the Surveyor of Victuals. As a result, the Vice-Admirals of the western coastal counties, utilizing many expedients, took on some of the work and assumed much of the responsibility for victualling the Cadiz and Ré fleets and for the pressing of merchant vessels to carry the supplies.\textsuperscript{50} These additional responsibilities, coupled with housing, feeding and disciplining large numbers of soldiers, no doubt added to the difficulties that other local officials encountered.

A third body in London that carried some of the responsibility for matters connected to the war effort was the Council of War. Elizabeth had created a Council of War, but it seems to have been advisory only and lapsed during the first fifteen peaceful years of James’ reign. In January 1621, James created a Council of War as a purely advisory body to assist him in making a decision about an expedition to the Palatinate. The King desired the Council to provide him with an estimate of the numbers of men, the time required to raise a force and the costs required to restore the Palatinate to Elector Frederick. None of the members was a Privy Councilor, but all were experienced


military men who had served in Ireland or the Dutch War or both.\textsuperscript{51} After submitting a report, the King disbanded the council.

On 5 March 1624, King James, in a speech to a Parliamentary delegation, offered to allow Parliament to oversee the expenditure of the subsidy money voted by Parliament for the four purposes of defending the realm, securing Ireland, assisting the United Provinces and other allies, and preparing the royal navy to enter a war, should one ensue. Buckingham had recommended this offer as an inducement to Parliament to support war and approve subsidies, and probably as the result of a suggestion from some members of Parliament to the Duke.\textsuperscript{52} James went further, suggesting that Parliament could appoint its own treasurers to collect and disburse the money. James made another suggestion for constitutional change when he also said that, just as he had advised Parliament on events and treaties which might lead to war, he would inform Parliament about any treaty that was being considered to end such a war. On March 11, Sir Benjamin Rudyerd suggested in a speech to Commons that Commons also appoint, in addition to the treasurers, a Council of War including experienced military men and members of Parliament to advise Parliament on the execution of any matters dealing with the four points set out as the basis for a war.\textsuperscript{53} Parliament eventually agreed to the creation of two bodies and they

\textsuperscript{51} Stephen Stearns, “The Caroline Military System, 1625-1627: The Expeditions to Cadiz and Ré”, pg. 129. The estimate was 25,000 men with a cost of £1 million the first year and £900,000 a year thereafter. These numbers are at variance with those given in Note 13 above.


\textsuperscript{53} Young, “Revisionism and the Council of War, 1624-1626”, pg. 4.
were incorporated into the Subsidy Bill of 1624, which passed Commons on May 21 and which granted the King three subsidies and three fifteenths amounting to perhaps £300,000.\textsuperscript{54} The members of the two boards were identified by name in the Subsidy Bill. The King formally appointed the Council of War and created it as a semi-permanent institution of government. The Bill further required that the treasurers were not to disburse funds unless the Council of War issued warrants requiring the expenditure. However, James insisted that the Council of War not divulge to Parliament either state secrets or its advice to the King, and so Rudyerd’s concept was not realized, and the Council of War had divided responsibilities: advice to the King and approval of the Parliamentary treasurer’s disbursements.\textsuperscript{55} In addition, the Bill declared that the Council of War and the treasurers were to be answerable to the House of Commons for their financial accounts and for the use of the money in accordance with the four points.

The provisions of the 1624 Subsidy Bill had repercussions in the Parliaments of 1625 and 1626, for in both sessions the House of Commons called members of the Council of War before it to answer for what the House judged to be inappropriate expenditures on the Mansfeld and Cadiz Expeditions. In 1625, the Commons began an investigation of the expenditures, but did not proceed to any significant action before the King dissolved the Oxford session. In 1626, the Commons called five members of the Council of War before it on 3 and 7 March to answer questions on the Mansfeld and

\textsuperscript{54} Cogswell, \textit{The Blessed Revolution}, pg. 259. Also, see pp. 183,189,216,221-2, and 259 for other information on the two boards and their genesis. On the value of the grant, Lockyer, \textit{Buckingham}, pg. 186

\textsuperscript{55} Young, “Revisionism and the Council of War, 1624-1626”, pg. 6-7. The War Council members are listed on pg. 6. See also Stearns, “The Caroline Military System, 1625-1627, pg. 133.
Cadiz Expeditions.\textsuperscript{56} In their first appearance, the War Council members stated as a group that they had spent the subsidy money in accordance with the four points as nearly as they could. On 7 March, they answered that they would discuss the financial accounts but not any advice they had given the King. With strong support from the King for the Council of War’s answers, this is essentially where the investigation ended, though the Council members were called before the House two more times.\textsuperscript{57}

The Privy Council called upon the Council of War a number of times in the next four years. The War Council helped mediate disputes between Mansfeld’s officers and the Privy Council over pay rates in late 1624, provided advice to the Privy Council and Lord Admiral Buckingham on the Cadiz Expedition in 1625. It also advised the Privy Council on the reform of abuses in the naval administration, the appointment of army and navy officers, the disposition of officers without commands (the reformadoes) due to the disbanding of their companies, the revision of pay scales in the armed services, and on the preparedness of the trained bands of the militia. Over the next few years, the King added the Lord Admiral, Secretary of State Sir John Coke, and several former ambassadors to the Council. Starting in 1629, after England’s withdrawal from the war, the Council of War principally concerned itself with seeing the government paid off officers and their heirs in an orderly fashion.\textsuperscript{58}

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\textsuperscript{56} Stephan Stearns, “The Caroline Military System, 1625-1627”, pg. 140. Also SP16/22/1, SP16/22/15 and SP16/22/16.

\textsuperscript{57} Young, “Revisionism and the Council of War, 1624-1626”, pp. 11-12, 14-15.

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Leading the war effort and these organizations were four dominant personalities: King Charles, the Duke of Buckingham and the two Secretaries of State, Sir Edward Conway and Sir John Coke.\textsuperscript{59} The first two were military novices, while Conway was an experienced army officer with considerable service with the Dutch army as well as the command of the cautionary town of Brill in the 1590s, while Coke had naval experience, though it was entirely in the administration of naval affairs. Buckingham was the royal favorite, first of King James, and then of Charles, who relied on Buckingham more than any other advisor and all three served at the pleasure of the monarch. Coke, writing late in life about the times the monarchs he had served had ignored good advice to follow other counsels, concluded that the lesson of his life's work amounted to this: “kings cannot be served against their wills”.\textsuperscript{60} Perhaps Coke’s conclusion, while possibly evincing some self-pity, would serve for Conway and even Buckingham as well, for we must assign the principal role in leading England during these years to King Charles I. His decisions, personality and character as head of state and chief executive officer, in the end, dominated the years of his reign.

b. County Administration and Commissions

The Tudor and Stuart monarchs had depended for a century on the county gentry to provide local government, both for truly local government and as the executors of the

\textsuperscript{59} Biographies of Charles I by Richard Cust, Michael Young and Kevin Sharpe are listed in the Bibliography. Also listed are Roger Lockyer’s biography of Buckingham and Michael Young’s biography of Coke.

\textsuperscript{60} Young, \textit{Servility and Service}, pg. 274. Coke MSS, packet 65, late 1640.
domestic policies of the royal government. The government in London established policies and issued proclamations, which had the force of statute law, and sent them on to the local governors for execution. In addition, many statute laws passed in parliament and approved by the monarch were bills which members of parliament had introduced and concerned local affairs or, if national in scope, required local administration. The leading local officials included the Justices of the Peace, acting together as a sort of county council in addition to their duties as judges, and the Deputy Lord Lieutenants for the county, who nominally handled military matters under the direction of the Lord Lieutenant whom the royal government appointed. The Lord Lieutenant was usually not a resident of the county and often was an official of the royal government and, usually, several, like Sir Edward Conway, were Privy Councilors. The deputy lieutenants were responsible for the proper mustering and training of the militia and for the impressment of men into the royal army and navy for foreign service in wars. The deputy lieutenants were local gentry and were intermediaries between the royal government and the county officers and inhabitants in many military matters, particularly during the wars of the 1620s. As deputy lieutenants, they often had to deal with the tensions that the Privy Council created with orders to their counties concerning billeting matters and military discipline. This they did with some success. County sheriffs and constables were also

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involved in local administration, primarily the justice system in peacetime, in several capacities and as subordinates of the county bench and the deputy lieutenants. The county gentry also served as subsidy assessors and tax collectors for the central government when there were taxes or ‘loans’ to be collected.

The county gentry became even busier during the late 1620s when the army moved into their counties. For during the war years, the royal government in London pushed down into the local communities much of the day-to-day planning and work required to maintain the army. The royal government added these war related responsibilities by the time honored method of placing them ‘in Commission’. The first such Commission created was the novel Commission for Martial Law (today called military law) in areas where soldiers were billeted and which were a legal innovation created to discipline soldiers accused of crimes. The Privy Council through the Attorney General’s office created the initial Commission for Kent on 2 January 1624/25 because of the disorders there in connection with the assembly of the Mansfeld Expedition.64 Martial Law Commissions used military law and thus operated more quickly than Common Law courts. They were similar to Courts Martial, but included civilian officials, usually deputy lieutenants, as well as army officers. The government expected the Martial Law Commissions to protect the local inhabitants from the depredations of

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64 SP14/181/11, Hippisley to Buckingham; 2 Jan 1624/25 and SP14/181 /26, Hippisley to Sec. Conway; 7 Jan 1624/25. Local officials requested the use of martial law.

Barnes, in the previously noted article, has a somewhat different opinion of the deputies’ success, pointing to several cases of bribery to release men from the press.
the soldiers by quickly hearing cases and meting out immediate punishment. A copy of one Commission for Martial Law and the associated “instructions”, or martial laws, are presented in Appendix D, Items 9A and 9B. The Commission is quite short and gives the appointed Commissioners the authority to “proceed according to martial law against mariners, soldiers, and all other disorderly persons that shall adhere and join with them and that do commit felony, murders, etc., or any outrage and misdemeanors.” The list of rules, or laws, contains 47 Items, some fairly specific and some general. For example, No. 3 states that “All willful murders, rapes, firing of houses, robberies, outrages, unnatural abuses, and such like shall be punished with death.” No. 5 states that “Whosoever shall conspire to do anything against the fleet or army shall be put to death without mercy.” The Commission does not define words such as “unnatural abuses”, “such like” and “anything against the fleet or army” and therefore definition is left to the judgment of army and navy officers and the Commissioners.

The second sort of Commission was the Commission for Soldiers, to which the royal government assigned the responsibility for planning and controlling the billeting of soldiers in the area, including designating those who were to billet soldiers, assessing countywide rates to pay for billeting and collecting the money. The Privy Council created the first of these Commissions in May 1625 in Devon and Cornwall in the area around Plymouth in preparation for the Cadiz Expedition. The Privy Council sent the commission to Plymouth in late May 1625, just before the recruits arrived, no doubt having learned something from the difficulties in Kent before the Mansfeld Expedition

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65 For a discussion of this subject, see Boynton, “Martial Law and the Petition of Right”, E.H.R., Vol. 79, No. 311, Apr. 1964, pp. 255-284 and also Chapter 4, Sec. 3 of this study.
sailed. The Commissions for Soldiers included deputy lieutenants of the county, senior army officers, Justices of the Peace and, in the towns, the mayor and some members of the town council, though the composition of the Commissions varied from place to place and time to time.

The instructions from the Privy Council to the Commissions for Soldiers were brief and general. One letter of instructions for the Plymouth area before the Cadiz Expedition is presented in Appendix D. The Commissioners in Devon and Cornwall to whom the instructions were sent were Deputy Lieutenants and the Mayor and several aldermen of Plymouth. The Privy Council told the Commissioners to aid and assist Sir John Ogle, commander of the army units in the area, and to follow his directions. Their responsibilities were to provide food and lodging for the soldiers and to secure the towns and countryside from “damage and outrage” by the soldiers. The Council also ordered the deputy lieutenants on the Commission to have the trained bands in readiness to provide security as necessary, including suppression of refractory and mutinous behavior of soldiers toward their captains and officers. The government in London required the Commissioners to provide lodging and victuals for the soldiers in Plymouth and nearby places that are “fit to receive them” and to see that the markets where the soldiers and billeters could buy food were “well served at reasonable prices” and that the provisions being brought to the markets were to be kept safe from pillage by the soldiers. The Commissioners, upon the advice of Ogle, were to make arrangements for paying billeters


67 See App. D, Item 7 for the instructions to the Commission for Soldiers in Plymouth in mid-1625.
by the week, either by the captains or by the soldiers themselves, though if the billetters agreed to accept payment from the soldiers, it was at their own risk and only if they trusted the soldiers.

When the Privy Council issued similar commissions for Hampshire in 1626 and 1627, it created a single Commission for Soldiers and for Martial Law that contained the same members and dealt with both areas of administration.\(^{68}\) Thereafter the Hampshire Commission dealt with soldiers, sailors and civilians who were somehow associated with the military, if only in billeting soldiers. The Commission in Hampshire was required to have a quorum of three or more of the members who were deputy lieutenants present at meetings in order to conduct business, since it was also the Commission for Martial Law. However, this led to deputies absenting themselves from meetings to avoid moving soldiers to their area of the county and to other abuses.\(^{69}\) The two commissions did not always consist of identically the same men, but the Commissions for Soldiers and for Martial Law in a given area did have considerable overlap in membership.

Since there were usually hundreds, if not thousands, of men to billet, the Commissions delegated the direct responsibility for selecting households to billet soldiers to the high and petty constables throughout the area. On occasion, the Commission was also involved in procuring shoes, clothing, the repair of arms and arranging for the care of sick soldiers and sailors.

\(^{68}\) Boynton, “Martial Law and the Petition of Right”, pg. 259.

\(^{69}\) Boynton, “Martial Law and the Petition of Right”, pp. 267-269.
Since some of the Deputy Lieutenants of affected counties were members of both Commissions, The Commissioners sometimes mixed the powers of the office of Lord Lieutenant in with the powers of the Commissions, which further complicated the understanding of the Commission’s authority in the eyes of the local population. The members of the Commissions for Soldiers and for Martial Law, along with the deputy lieutenants also bore the burden of mediating and negotiating about soldiers and the grievances of the inhabitants of the area with the royal government. In 1626, the officials in the town of Southampton imprisoned three soldiers, one for killing a fellow soldier in a fight and two others for desertion. The Deputy Lieutenants of Hampshire refused to try the offenders before the Commission for Martial Law and so the Mayor of Southampton had to write the Privy Council asking if he could try the imprisoned men under Common Law and for directions to the Deputy Lieutenants and himself as to how to proceed in the matter.  

The Council seems to have taken the simplest way, writing back to the Mayor that he could try the three soldiers under the Common Law at the town court’s next session. In another example, from 1627, the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon wrote to the Privy Council asking for help and for money to pay billetters. They remarked, “We are continually so molested with the cry of the poor billetters for present pay as our business is disturbed, our credit lost with our countrymen and ourselves utterly wearied in the performance of this impossible service.”

70 SP16/34/20, Mayor of Southampton to Sec. Conway; 23 Aug 1626.

71 APC Vol. 41, pg. 239, P.C. to the Mayor of Southampton; 31 Aug 1626.

72 SP16/82/82, D.L.s of Devon to the P.C.; 25 Oct 1627. Other typical documents on this subject may be found in APC Vol. 41, pg. 299, P.C. to Mayor of Southampton; 30 Sep 1626. SP16/35/93, D.L.s of
4. Paying for the War – The Royal Government’s Financial Problems

Finding the money to finance a war was usually the limiting item in conducting early modern European warfare, and in this respect, the English of the 1620s were no different from their Elizabethan predecessors or the Spanish or the French. Charles I, however, had more difficulty in convincing his Parliaments of 1625, 1626, 1628 and 1629 to provide subsidies for the extraordinary expenses of war than did Elizabeth, whose Parliaments voted subsidies requested by the Queen, albeit with a good deal of grumbling. The Parliaments that met in 1624, 1625, and 1628 did vote subsidies, the session of 1628 being generous by past standards in approving five subsidies. The Parliaments of 1624 and 1625 voted two subsidies but the total was much less than was needed to fund the war that Charles and Buckingham contemplated. However, Charles’ goals, ambitions, and plans outran the money available and thus helped to create the billeting problems of the period.

The generally poor economic conditions in the 1620s complicated the financial arrangements of the royal government. As early as 1621 the important cloth trade was in recession due to the wars in Germany. Cloth workers rioted in several counties, demanding food and money from the better off, causing the Privy Council to order the London merchants to buy cloth and for watches to be set on the roads and in towns to

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Hampshire to Conway as L.L.; Sept. 15, 1626. And also APC vol. 41, pg. 272, P.C. to D.L.s of Hampshire; 17 Sep 1626. APC vol. 42, pp. 166, 167, P.C. to the D.L.s of Hampshire; 28 March 1627.

Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, pp. 186-190, 226. In 1624, James originally asked for 5 subsidies and 10 fifteenths for the war.
prevent further riots.\textsuperscript{74} Government imposed embargoes on trade with Spain and then France, tit-for-tat retaliation by the French, as well as the depredations of Muslim and Dunkirk pirates further hobbled the economy during the years 1625 through 1628.

The crown’s financial situation is summarized in Table B1-2 in Appendix B. This Table, based on data compiled by Frederick Dietz, incorporates some of my own interpolations and adjustments and I am responsible for any sins of omission or commission.\textsuperscript{75} There are typical problems in Dietz’s numbers, as with all similar data, because of the loss of source documents, poor addition on the part of Exchequer clerks and, probably, deliberate “errors” by supervisors to make the books balance or to hide expenditures.

The data in Table B1-2 indicate that there was a net fiscal surplus for the period from 1621 to 1629 of £39,000. Subsidy money collected during the period totaled £612,000 and Asset Sales (such as land, jewels and plate) totaled £193,000, mostly in 1628 and 1629, while loans, including the Forced Loan, generated £475,000, mostly in 1627, 1628 and 1629. (A subsidy was a personal tax charged upon persons who possessed movable goods, such as merchants, at the rate of 2s. 8d., or 13.3\%, in the pound of value, and upon persons who possessed land at the rate of 4s., or 20\%, in the

\textsuperscript{74} Underdown, David, ed., \textit{William Whiteway of Dorchester His Diary 1618 To 1635}, Dorset Record Society Volume 12 [Dorchester, Dorset: The Dorset Record Society, 1991], pg. 43, 3 Feb 1621-22 and pg. 46, 27 Jun 1622.

pound of its annual income; no one could be double-charged for both land and goods.\footnote{O.E.D., 2nd ed., s.v. “subsidy”}

Obviously, without loans and asset sales, the crown could not have met the costs of the wars. The “Other” category of income includes income from sales of “Reprisal goods taken at sea” of £207,146 for the years from 1626 to 1629, with £52,700 in 1626 and £146,500 in 1627. Captain Pennington’s naval efforts in 1626 and 1627 seem to have helped to pay for the Ré Expedition. Military Expenses for the period totaled £2,607,000.

In addition, in November 1621 the Lord Treasurer told the Parliament that the King had already spent £211,000 on the “Bohemian War”, though Dietz doubts that the government actually spent this much.\footnote{Frederick C. Dietz, English Public Finance, 1558-1641, pg. 189. See pp. 216-219 for a list of the largest items of military and naval expenditure for the years 1624 to 1629.}

As in Table B1-1 for Elizabeth’s reign, discussed in the previous Chapter, the numbers in Table B1-2 have not been adjusted for monetary inflation. The discussion in Chapter 2 on this subject applies here as well, with the advantage that, in Table B1-2 for the 1620s, the time span is shorter and so the distortion is less. The Measuring Worth Index of prices indicates that there was a small but noticeable price decline in the late 1620s, but prices were perhaps 15 percent higher than in 1585 and 13 percent higher than in 1600, again with noticeable year-to-year variation. The price index from 1621 to 1628 or to 1629 shows less than 5% change, with a spike to between 10 percent and 15 percent possible in 1627.

It must be emphasized that the financial officers did not always discharge the crown’s financial burdens as indicated in Table B1-2. “Assignments by Talley”, the last
item in the Table, which Dietz listed as a separate item that is neither revenue nor expense, were nominal assignments of revenue to pensioners, or providers of goods and services to the crown, or as repayment to those who had loaned the crown money, or for other items considered urgent.\textsuperscript{78} The tally authorized someone who collected taxes, such as a custom duty, to pay the creditor directly without sending the money to the Treasury.\textsuperscript{79} The total of “Assignments by Talley” for the nine years from 1621 to 1629 was £685,000, which we could add to both Revenue and Expense. Where they should be assigned in the expenses is not clear. First, some of the Assignments by Talley between 1625 and 1629 were probably for war related expenses, though this is not apparent in Dietz’s data. Second, the fact that a person held such a tally did not mean that the holder received payment on demand, particularly if there was no cash available and so the Talley was, in effect, a loan document. Third, if part of the ‘Assignments by Talley’ are added back into revenue, i.e. not paid, the ‘Balance’ amount at the bottom of the Table would look considerably more favorable. If, on the other hand, some of the tallies were paid but the government did not realize all of the revenue, the net fiscal effect would be decidedly negative. For the same reasons, the Treasury frequently did not repay loans to the crown on time. Dietz’s data indicate that various sources loaned £475,000 to the crown in these nine years, while the crown repaid £154,000 on loans, though some of the loans, no doubt, were not payable for a number of years. Beyond this debt, the crown

\textsuperscript{78} See Dietz, "The Receipts and Issues of the Exchequer During the Reigns of James I and Charles I", pp. 120-124 for his discussion of Assignments by Talley.

\textsuperscript{79} Dietz, "The Receipts and Issues of the Exchequer During the Reigns of James I and Charles I", pg. 120.
reportedly had approximately £900,000 in unpaid debts in 1621, at the very start of the wars.  

There is also no mention in Dietz’s data of any repayments to the counties and towns for such items as coat and conduct money, billeting and other expenses that the crown nominally reimbursed. Dietz’s data show a single line item called “Military Operations and Defense of the Palatinate” which probably included these expenses, to the extent they were paid. This item amounted to only £100,000 to £175,000 a year in the five years from 1625 to 1629 with an average of approximately £117,000 per year. The highest amount occurred in the year 1627 and undoubtedly reflects the Ré Expedition.

However, note the “Loans” line in Table B1-2. It indicates that £151,000 was taken in during Fiscal Year 1627, when the government received most of the Forced Loan money. Cust has shown that the crown realized approximately £270,000 from the Forced Loan and that some of that the government assigned to the counties for repayment of their military expenditures before they sent their Loan money to London. Cust also remarked that Exchequer received £184,820 from the Loan. Dietz’s study seems to confirm this point. It appears that the central government left between £85,000 and £100,000 of the Forced Loan money in the counties to pay billeting arrears, coat and conduct money and other items traditionally reimbursed to the counties. On the other hand, Dietz lists £114,000 in loan money as received in 1628. According to Dietz’s numbers, the sum of the loans received in 1627 and 1628 is then £265,000, which is very

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80 Dietz, English Public Finance, 1558-1641, pg. 190. From Cranfield’s notes in Sackville MSS 7906.

81 Richard Cust, The Forced Loan and English Politics, pg. 92. Cust also remarked that Exchequer accounts show that the crown received £184,820 from the Loan.
close to Cust’s £270,000 estimate of the amount realized from the Forced Loan. However, the crown took out other loans in these two years, so the picture is clouded.

Given the potential of Parliamentary subsidies to reduce the deficit, it is easy to see that a cooperative Parliament and House of Commons was essential to Charles’ military plans. Over the nine years from 1621 to 1629, Dietz’s data shows that the crown collected a little over £600,000 from subsidies, tenths and fifteenths from the laity and clergy combined, an average of £68,000 per year. If only the four years in which largest amounts of subsidy money were received in the Exchequer (1626 through 1629), the average is £115,000 per year. In comparison, Elizabeth’s revenues from subsidies averaged £127,000 per year for eighteen years. Roughly corrected for inflation, Elizabeth’s £127,000 was worth perhaps £142,000 in 1628, which is 23 percent more than Charles received using the four years with the highest subsidy income, or 108 percent more if the average for all nine years is used. As mentioned in the previous Chapter, Elizabeth’s Parliaments helped her in this respect. That Charles did not secure equal cooperation proved a major setback and was a cause as well as an effect of billeting soldiers on the people of England.

In addition to the war expenditures of the government in London, local authorities collected and spent considerable sums of money. The defense expenses the counties traditionally bore were also generally higher than they had been during James’ reign. The coastal towns and counties regularly complained about (and tried to evade the

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82 The Measuring Worth Index for prices and the years 1600 and 1628 was used for the inflation estimate. If the years 1584 and 1628 are used the deflator value is 1.21 rather than the deflator of 1.12 used in the calculation in the text.
responsibility for) the royal government’s repeated demands that they provide ships for
the navy to use and then outfit, victual and man these ships. An extreme example was
in a letter the King sent on 11 February 1627/28 to officials in most of the counties of
England asking for money to outfit fleets to help the King of Denmark and to relieve
Rochelle. The letter to the Justices and Deputy Lieutenants in Essex asked them to
collect £6057 as Essex’s proportional share. The total demanded of the counties in
England was £173,000, with another £20,000 demanded from the clergy as a gift.
However, in response to numerous complaints, the King rescinded this request before the
Parliament of 1628 met.

The royal government also demanded that the counties pay recruiting expenses
for men pressed in the county, such as coat and conduct money, and these amounts were
considerable, although some of the cost was supposedly recoverable from the crown.
Again using Essex as an example, the county spent about £580 in recruiting, clothing and
conducting a levy of 400 men from Brentwood, Essex to Plymouth for the Cadiz
Expedition in May 1625, which comes to about £1.5 per man. This included £46 to pay
for two conductors, two lieutenants, six sergeants and two drummers for the 16 days
march and their return. The county billed the royal government in London £567 for this

83 See for example SP16/50/57; 21 Jan 1626/27(?), Petition from the Mayor and Inhabitants of Poole (Dorset) to the Council. SP 16/55/9; Mayor and Council of Kingston upon Hull to the Council; 25 Feb 1627/28. SP16/59/52; Deputy Lieutenants and Justices of Essex to the Council. 5 April 1627. SP16/59/52, Deputy Lieutenants and Justices of Essex to the Council; 5 April 1627.


85 Gardiner, Vol. 6, pg. 227. SP16/92/88 and SP16/92/93.

outlay. Allowing for the fact that Essex is farther from Plymouth than most other counties, recruiting and marching 8000 recruits to Plymouth must have cost all of England something like £8000 to £10,000. The counties and their citizens were additionally required to expend considerable sums on militia training and equipment, and maintaining and manning watchtowers and beacons (in coastal counties) when invasion was expected.

Un-reimbursed billeting expenses could be quite large as the example of Cornwall and Devon discussed in Chapter 6 demonstrates. After billeting soldiers from May through September 1625 before the Cadiz Expedition, and from December 1625 through September 1626 after the Cadiz Expedition, the crown owed the two counties approximately £30,000 in addition to what the royal government sent from London while the soldiers were billeted there. The crown did not discharge the debt until 1629 or 1630. The amount owed in Hampshire was larger still. During 1626, 1627 and 1628, the Privy Council billeted approximately 1500 soldiers in mainland parts of the county, although there was a peak of around 7000 just before the Ré Expedition sailed. By my estimate, Hampshire, not including Wight, spent around £26,400 to billet soldiers in the county between October 1626 and late September 1628. Including Wight, the county spent £36,500 in the years 1626, 1627 and 1628. In 1629, the Justices on the Isle of Wight lodged a claim of £7,340 for un-reimbursed billeting expenses for the Scots Regiment in 1627 and 1628. The crown probably repaid some of the expenses from Loan and

87 See Appendix B, Item 3. Also included in Item 3 is an estimate for the total expense for billeting troops on Wight.

Subsidy money collected in the county, but as was common, that source almost certainly did not cover the full amount, as the Isle of Wight claim shows. The Island was paid £3000 in the 1630s and wrote off the rest. Dorset also lodged a claim in 1629 for £4,380 for billeting troops during prior years. This claim too was unpaid in 1632. However, according to Dietz, few counties pressed their claims persistently enough to receive what the crown owed them.  

5. Conclusion

Protestant inclinations and the entanglement of the royal family of England with its relations by marriage on the continent, especially the Elector Palatine, quickly led to England’s entry into the Thirty Years’ War during its first years. After Charles I’s brother-in-law contributed heavily to the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War in 1619 by accepting the throne of Bohemia, England gradually became involved in the war, to assist both the Elector Palatine and the Protestant cause in Germany and France. England’s involvement included major military expeditions in 1625 to the Netherlands and Germany (Mansfeld) and to Cadiz, in 1626 to the Spanish coast, and in 1627 to the Île de Ré to aid the Huguenots and in 1628 to aid the Huguenots at Rochelle again. England also agreed to provide financial assistance to the Huguenots in France and King Christian IV of Denmark, Charles uncle, as well as to Elector Frederick. None of these actions was successful, but they did require the crown to raise considerable amounts of money beyond the normal royal income, much of it from loans and the sale of crown assets.

The involvement in these wars in turn led to differences of opinion within England regarding the prosecution of England’s part in the war. Parliament was not willing to provide the funds for the war which Charles I wished to conduct and as a result, the King was usually short of funds necessary to pursue that war. Therefore, the crown pushed much of the cost and work of maintaining the Army onto the county and town governments. The crown had traditionally paid for billeting, coat and conduct expenses, clothing and some other defense related expenses and Charles promised to repay these expenditures to the counties that incurred them, but seldom did, except to allow them to deduct money from subsidy and loan funds that the counties would otherwise have sent to London. However, these allowances were usually less than the expenditures for billeting alone. Counties continued to seek reimbursement well into the next decade, but the royal government never repaid some of the claims. The result was anger in many counties of England over the costs of billeting soldiers and sailors in private homes and fear in those same counties of the crimes and outrages committed by the soldierly living with them.

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90 Boynton, "Billeting: The Example of the Isle of Wight", pg. 40.
Chapter 4

English Armies in the 1620s

1. Introduction

English military practices throughout the 1620s were much the same as they were at the end of Elizabeth’s reign, but there was an important difference: the crown’s creation of an army-in-being that it billeted almost continuously upon the people of England in the four years from mid-December 1624 until late in 1628. The numbers of soldiers billeted in England varied as the winter gave way to the summer campaigning season, but there were some soldiers in billets most of the time. This chapter presents information on the English army-in-being during these years, including recruiting practices, the connection between martial law and billeting, billeting practices and the ‘pay’ system. Finally, the organization, reorganization, movement and billet locations of the army-in-being when it was in England are discussed. The following chapters will use this information or refer to it in describing and explaining the many events, decisions and actions in the counties and towns of southern England as the local communities struggled with the problems of billeting from 1624 to 1628.

2. The Army-In-Being

As James and then Charles and their advisors on the Privy Council and the War Council contemplated war on the continent, the expeditions they planned required England to maintain an army for four years. When an expedition returned to England, the royal government did not order the men paid off and sent home, but instead ordered the troops to remain with their companies in billets in England, for the government
wished to retain this nucleus of “veterans” for use in future military actions. This army was not a standing army in the modern sense, as discussed in Chapter 2, for prior to the Civil War there never had been an English “standing army”. Moreover, it is probably incorrect to speak of ‘the English Army’ during this period. There were in fact several armies, one replacing another as time went on. The large losses of men necessitated the replacement of both the common soldiers and, to a lesser extent, the officers. In a typical ‘campaign season’, from approximately 1 April to the following October or early November, 50% to 60% of the men in the army were lost to disease, malnutrition or outright starvation, desertion and, occasionally, in combat. (These high losses were common all over early modern Europe and included some losses to disease and desertion during the winter spent in billets.) In addition, there were sizable bodies of English troops engaged on the continent in the service of other nations, notably under the King of Denmark and in the armies of the United Provinces. These troops required replacements several times over for the same reasons. Each of these armies was virtually new in that most of the soldiers were raw recruits pressed into the service at the command of the King and Privy Council.¹ There does seem to have been some limited continuity in the officer corps. Colonels commanded regiments in several expeditions and company captains appear in the sources repeatedly. However, the officers suffered losses as well: for example, four out of the ten colonels who went to Rê died there. The regiments the colonels commanded were reorganized several times as depleted companies were disbanded and their captains paid off (if money was available), and the remaining

¹ See Table A4 in App. A for the numbers of men recruited in one way or another during the 1620s.
sergeants, corporals and soldiers from the company sent to other companies and
regiments to bring them up to near full strength. To describe this situation, the term
“army-in-being” is used.

English army organization followed the standard continental model: the basic unit
was the company commanded by a captain and containing from eighty to two hundred
men when at full strength, and the companies grouped into regiments commanded by a
colonel.² The army for the Mansfeld Expedition, with around 12,000 men, contained six
regiments of 2,000 men each and each regiment incorporated 11 companies of 200 men
each.³ For other expeditions, such as the ones to Cadiz and to Ré, the usual authorized
number in an English company was one hundred men, and each regiment usually
contained ten companies, nominally mustering 1,000 men, but sometimes containing
eight, nine or eleven companies.⁴ The colonel commanding the regiment typically also
commanded a company, as did the lieutenant colonel and the sergeant major of the
regiment. The army, commanded by an officer titled the Lord General, could contain any
number of regiments. The English armies assembled during this period contained from
six to ten regiments.

3. Recruiting the Army

During the 1620s, the vast majority of the soldiers were ‘impressed’ or ‘pressed’
into the army; that is, they were conscripts forced into the army against their will. There

² See Table A1 in Appendix A for more information on army organization.
³ See Table A5 in Appendix A. The colonel, lieut. colonel and sergeant major commanded companies.
⁴ See Appendix A, Tables A6 and A9 for the organization of the Cadiz and Ré Expedition Armies.
were some volunteers, mostly seen in the sources as men who wanted to join existing depleted companies after the return from an expedition. However, in June and July 1624, England did send an expeditionary force of 6,000 volunteers to the United Provinces. The royal government (the King, the Privy Council and the Council of War were involved) commissioned senior officers and captains and there were many men seeking these positions, for a captaincy was traditionally a position in which a man could make money.

The procedure for levying soldiers during the 1620s was essentially the same as it had been during Elizabeth’s reign.\(^5\) First, the central government in London made a decision on the total number of men it wished to raise and how many of them from which counties. Then the Privy Council sent out an order under the monarch’s signet to the lord lieutenant of each county affected to press from the county, or counties, in his jurisdiction the requisite number of men. The Council often provided detailed instructions in a second letter.\(^6\) The lord lieutenant sent copies of the order and letter to his deputy lieutenants who in turn sent copies on to local Justices of the Peace who sent them on to high and petty constables, bailiffs, churchwardens, and tithing men as appropriate for the county subdivisions, and to the mayor and aldermen of towns. The deputy lieutenants directed them to present some number of men at a specified date and at a specified place, usually some central point in the county. The constables and other local officials then

\(^5\) For a fuller description of the impressment process, see Stephen Stearns, “Conscription and English Society”, \textit{J.B.S.} Vol. 11, No. 2, (1972), pp. 1-23. Also see Stearns, “The Caroline Military System, 1625-1627: The Expeditions to Cadiz and Ré”, pp. 154-199, which includes a discussion of the sorts of men that were pressed.

\(^6\) A summary of one such letter sent out for the Cadiz Expedition in 1625 may be found in App. D, Item 1.
picked the unlucky souls to be pressed. Often the constables sent more men to the collection point than the number required so that, if the deputy lieutenants found any of the men unfit or excused some, there would still be enough to fulfill the Privy Council order. When the recruits arrived at the collection point, the deputy lieutenants reviewed them for suitability, that is, age, physical disabilities and sanity. If the pressed men were lucky, the deputies also considered other reasons why they should not be pressed. However, as we shall see, a considered review of qualifications did not always take place in many jurisdictions.

Once the deputy lieutenants made the final selections, they gave the pressed men “the king’s shilling”, though it seems in some cases the deputies actually gave only 4d. or 6d. to the recruit, and by accepting it the men acknowledged that they were now soldiers of the king.\(^7\) Obviously, the deputy lieutenants and justices must have been able to administer punishment of some sort if the recruit did not accept the king’s shilling, but the sources usually do not mention this part of the process. In one case, Northumberland officials threw a man into jail for refusing the money and jailed others for refusing to march.\(^8\) After induction, the authorities entered the pressed men’s names on an “indenture”, a triplicate written list on one large piece of paper, which was cut into three pieces with jagged edges (the edges being the ‘indenture’). Sometimes they added the men’s occupation, parish or town of residence and some distinguishing physical features to the indenture so that the officers who received the group could evaluate them to

\(^7\) It is given as a shilling in SP14/182/33 and SP16/3/92 and as 6d. in SP16/1/56 (13 April 1625, Dep. Lieutenants of Hants to the Council) and 4d. in SP16/4/160 (Captain Leigh’s Report, July 1625). See also Stearns, “The Caroline Military System, 1625-1627: The Expeditions to Cadiz and Ré”, pg. 158.

\(^8\) SP16/73/41, Capt. Herbert Prise to the P.C.; 5 Aug 1627.
determine if the men present were indeed those pressed and to help identify runaways. The deputy lieutenants and the ‘conductor’, who was to lead the men to the army rendezvous, signed the indenture on all three copies. The deputy lieutenants kept one copy, gave a copy to the conductor and sent the third copy to the Privy Council. Finally, the deputy lieutenants gave the recruits a coat and perhaps other clothing and shoes and handed over the ‘conduct’ money to the conductor, usually 8d. per day for room and board on the march to the army rendezvous. The men might receive weapons from the county, though the counties did this less often as the war years went on.

The deputy lieutenants then turned the men over to the conductor who would lead them to the army. The conductor might be a gentleman of the county, but was often a man with some military experience hired by the county or sent by the Privy Council. In any event, the county was responsible for paying the conductor, typically 4s. to 10s. per day, and for any assistants the conductor might require to keep the men in order. The conductors were responsible for seeing that the men marched the required number of miles per day, that none ran away and that they did not sell the clothes and arms, if any, that the county had provided. There were many corrupt conductors and the Privy Council repeatedly warned the deputy lieutenants to select honest conductors. The Privy Council also issued written instructions for conductors to follow. When the men arrived at the army rendezvous, the conductor turned the men over to an army officer designated to

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9 In 1625 for the march to Plymouth, Essex paid the two conductors 10s. per day each, their two lieutenants 5s. per day and six sergeants 3s. per day each. A total of £46 17s. was paid to these men, plus two drummers and four corporals selected from the pressed men. Quintrell, ed., *The Maynard Lieutenancy Book 1608-1639*, Vol. 1, pg. 77.

10 One typical set for the Cadiz Expedition preparations in mid-1625 may be found in Appendix D, Item 2.
receive them, or, if there was no such army officer, as was frequently the case, to the Commission for Soldiers in the area. The receiving officer and the conductor carried out an “exact muster” of the recruits and compared it to the indenture. The officer and the conductor noted the deficiencies in number or suitability for the service of the men on the indenture, and both signed the indenture. This step often generated differences of opinion over both number and suitability, since the receiving officer frequently judged a number of the recruits lame or otherwise disabled.

The system just described was rife with corruption.\textsuperscript{11} Constables and county officials took bribes to release men from the press and they pressed men with the intent of extracting bribes to release them. Some men alleged they were pressed for spite because of some past disagreement or that deputy lieutenants had refused to consider legitimate excuses from service. Recruits accused conductors of keeping some of the conduct money for themselves or of letting men go free for a payment of money, and even of kidnapping and pressing men encountered on the road to replace runaways. These dismal beginnings were just the start of the many complaints about army service in the era.\textsuperscript{12}

The number of men pressed each year between mid-1624 and 1628 was large when compared to the experience of the previous twenty five years and even exceeded the large numbers impressed in the all but one year of Elizabeth’s reign. The yearly levies of both pressed and volunteer men during the period are presented in Appendix A, Table A4. Table A4 may be compared to Table A3, which provides similar information

\textsuperscript{11} Stearns, “Conscription and English Society”, pp. 9-11 and later Chapters of this study describe the corruption.

\textsuperscript{12} See Chaps. 6 and 7.
for conscription in Elizabeth’s time. During the reign of Elizabeth, over 105,000 men were pressed or volunteered for various expeditions, but that total accumulated over eighteen years, an average of nearly 5900 per year as discussed in Chapter 2. In 1596, 1597 and 1598, the crown pressed approximately 9000 men a year and it pressed 12,600 for service in Ireland in 1601. The early part of the reign of James I saw no wars. The royal government raised the first levies since 1603 late in James’ reign: in 1620 volunteers for the Palatinate and in 1624 conscripts for the Mansfeld Expedition. The three and a half years from mid-1624 to late 1627 saw around 50,000 men pressed for the army and navy in England, an average of nearly 12,500 per year for four straight years. Over the three and a half years in which government conducted the presses, the average was 14,300 per twelve months. As one might imagine, the loss of so many men from the workforce in these years led to growing dismay in England and had economic consequences. By the end of the period, local officials started complaining to the royal government about the loss of productive men and claimed that they had reached the bottom of the barrel.13 The heavy levies of men in some counties became another of the sources of anger in England over the Charles’ prosecution of the wars. For one thing, the Privy Council levied replacements for deserters and sick conscripts in areas near embarkation points, such as Devon, Cornwall, Dorset and Somerset near Plymouth and in Hampshire and nearby counties close to Southampton and Portsmouth, because the men could march to the port in a short time and with minimum conduct costs. Thus, these counties pressed men twice for the same service to make up for deserters who were from

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13 See Chap. 7 Sec. 2 for a discussion of these complaints and the source documents from which they come.
other counties. The marching distance and conduct cost also entered into decisions on the original drafts of men. For example, the royal government pressed the men sent to Harwich in 1627 for transport to Denmark in Essex, Norfolk, Cambridgeshire and Leicestershire. Essex conscripted seventy new men, in addition to its original press of 200 men, to replace men from other counties who had deserted on the way to Harwich.14

The losses were equally disturbing. These pressed men did not return to their homes after the war. Of the 12,000 men who boarded ship in 1624 for the Mansfeld Expedition, few ever returned to England. Of the almost 10,000 pressed for the Cadiz Expedition, around 4000 returned to Plymouth, though some were landed in Ireland and some of these probably later returned to England, an attrition rate of 60 percent. Of the approximately 10,000 soldiers sent to the Île de Ré in 1627, 7,200 at most returned to England, 3,000 landing at Portsmouth and 4000 at Plymouth.15 These included 1200 sick and wounded men, most of whom soon died. When Crosby’s regiment returned from Ré and went into billets in Essex, it reportedly mustered either 400 or 600 men.16 Assuming that it left Ireland in August 1627 with 800 to 1,000 men, the losses in this regiment were also somewhere between 40 percent and 60 percent. Thus, the evidence indicates that approximately 50 percent, and perhaps more, of the pressed men died as the result of the Ré Expedition. Very few of the men sent to Denmark to support King Christian ever

14 SP16/59/31, Dep. Lieutenants of Essex to P.C.; 4 Apr 1627.

15 SP16/85/95, Statement of the numbers of men returned to Portsmouth from the Isle of Ré; Nov 1627. For Plymouth, SP16/85/61, Sir James Bagg to Buckingham; 29 Nov 1627. A later muster showed 4400 landed at Plymouth.

returned to England. The information that exists indicates that, of 8000 to 10,000 men
sent to Denmark over the years, only 2000 remained with the colors and Colonel Morgan
in 1627.\textsuperscript{17} (The figure of 10,000 includes the original 4000 plus 4400 sent in 1627 and
other smaller contingents sent from time to time.) England seldom sent the money
promised to support them, and the King of Demark was virtually penniless by 1627.
Some reportedly deserted Morgan’s forces just to get something to eat.\textsuperscript{18} Losses due to
sickness and desertion before an expedition left were also considerable and necessitated
additional presses before an expedition sailed. It would appear that, over a period of
several years, only around a third to a half of those pressed into the army survived. This
survival rate is somewhat biased by the fact that few, if any, of the Mansfeld Expedition
returned. Omitting the Mansfeld Expedition, perhaps 40 percent to 50 percent returned.
Even so, serving in the army was close to a sentence of death.

4. Maintaining Order among the Soldiers – Martial Law and Common Law

Another of the conflicts between the inhabitants of the counties that were billeting
troops and the soldiers and their officers was the matter of discipline, that is, the arrest,
trial and punishment of soldiers who committed crimes, outrages or misdemeanors. The
problem first occurred in Dover and Kent during the preparations for the Mansfeld
Expedition. Sir John Hippisley and others on the scene requested a Commission for

\textsuperscript{17} E. A. Beller, “The Military Expedition of Sir Charles Morgan to Germany, 1627-9”, pg. 534, mentions
1400 English and 230 Scots returned to the United Provinces and 800 English troops were left in Germany
without pay or provisions in mid-1628.

\textsuperscript{18} Beller, “The Military Expedition of Sir Charles Morgan to Germany, 1627-9”, pg. 533.
Martial Law in December 1624, and in January 1624/25, the Privy Council responded.\textsuperscript{19} The Privy Council’s response was to order the Attorney General to issue a Commission for Martial Law in the area in order to quickly try and punish soldiers who had committed crimes.\textsuperscript{20} The Commission for Martial Law included army officers and local civil officials and provided the commissioners with general and broad authority to employ summary justice, and the Commission used it immediately to discipline soldiers.

However, there was, and continued to be, confusion as to the legality, or perhaps better, the constitutionality, of this process in the situation prevailing in England between 1624 and 1628. Military leaders had used Martial Law for centuries to discipline soldiers when the army was overseas and out of the reach of the English Common Law system. Existing law authorized the lords lieutenant to invoke martial law when an English army was in the field in England putting down rebellion or repelling an invader. Now, however, English soldiers were in billets in England, but not in the field fighting the enemy. Was the situation one of peace or of war when the English army was in England but not in the field before the enemy? Common Law advocates argued that in England itself there was peace, and therefore that the Common Law applied.\textsuperscript{21} The response of

\textsuperscript{19} SP14/177/78, Hippisley to Sec. Conway, 31 Dec 1624. According to the letter, this was the third request. SP14/181/26, Hippisley to Sec. Conway; 7 Jan 1624/25.

\textsuperscript{20} For a discussion of this subject, see Boynton, “Martial Law and the Petition of Right”, \textit{E.H.R.}, Vol. 79, No. 311, Apr. 1964, pp. 255-284. The term ‘martial law’ in early modern England meant a code and process analogous to today’s ‘military law’. It was not the rule of the civilian population by the military authorities.

the royal government was one of expediency and practicality. It regularly issued Commissions of Martial Law for areas where troops were in billets to maintain discipline and protect the inhabitants from crimes committed by soldiers. The Council of War also drew up and issued a set of “Martial Laws” for the use of army officers and these commissions.\(^{22}\) The Commissions empowered the commissioners to conduct trials quickly using Martial Law, thereby omitting many formalities of the Common Law, and to execute the defendant quickly and publicly if they found him guilty. Under these powers, the commissioners were to try robberies, murders and other felonies, ‘other misdemeanors’ and also mutinies. The royal government also instructed the commissioners to erect gallows and to conduct executions in view of the soldiers, to keep them in fear and awe of the law.\(^{23}\) The term ‘other misdemeanors’ was construed to give the commissions jurisdiction over billeting disputes between soldiers and civilian billetters arising from the housing and feeding of members of the military. In the Commission for Martial Law issued for Devon and Cornwall in May 1625, and in later Commissions, the Privy Council and the Attorney General added words to the effect that the Commission’s writ extended to “other dissolute persons joining with them [soldiers]”, thus explicitly bringing civilians into the net of the military law.\(^{24}\)

\(^{22}\) See SP16/13/41, 1625(?). A similar code from Elizabeth’s reign, prepared by the Earl of Leicester, may be found in Cruickshank’s *Elizabeth’s Army*, pp. 296-303. Some discussion of the 1625 Code may be found in Stearns, “The Caroline Military System, 1625-1627: The Expeditions to Cadiz and Ré”, pp. 293-297.

\(^{23}\) Boynton, “Martial law and the Petition of Right”, *EHR*, Vol. 79, No. 311 (April 1964); pg. 258.

\(^{24}\) Boynton “Martial Law and the Petition of Right”, pg. 260. Also see SP16/2/54.
The Privy Council’s appointment of many of the same men to both the Commission for Soldiers, which was in charge of billeting, and the Commission for Martial Law further confused many people in the counties where the Commissions operated. For, in one session the Commission members dealt with billeting offenses by civilians as well as crimes committed by soldiers and their civilian accomplices. It appeared to some that civilians were being judged according to Martial Law rather than the Common Law, as when, in one meeting in January 1626/27, the Commissioners in Hampshire dealt with billeting assignments, leave for soldiers, discharge of unfit soldiers, and with crimes committed by soldiers and civilian confederates in Winchester.25 Beyond this, army officers generally maintained that soldiers were servants of the King and therefore not subject to the common law and that only the army could punish them. On the other hand, irate local officials, including Commissioners, complained that the army often punished offending soldiers too leniently or not at all. Therefore, between the close connections between the two commissions and the need for the two commissions because the government was billeting soldiers in the counties, questions about the use of Martial Law entered into the Petition of Right connected to the question of billeting.26

5. Paying, Feeding and Lodging the Soldiers

In principle, the procedure for feeding and housing (billeting) the troops was quite simple – the Privy Council ordered them placed in private homes and inns in the area of


26 On the arguments and debates about billeting, and particularly martial law in the Parliament of 1628, see Paul Christianson, “Arguments on Billeting and Martial Law in the Parliament of 1628”, *Historical Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1994); pp. 539-567 and Chap. 9 of this study.
the army rendezvous, and in many other areas when an army returned from an expedition. The billetters then provided food and a bed for each of the soldiers billeted with them while the crown promised repayment later at a daily rate that the royal government established. However, the royal government seldom reimbursed the county and the billetters. In practice, this process was not simple and was subject to local arguments over where in the county the county authorities should billet soldiers, the refusal or attempted refusal of the householders in an area to lodge the soldiers and the resistance of local taxpayers to pay their assessments for the cost of billeting. These objections from the local community frequently angered the soldiers, squeezed between their forced service in the army and the inability of the government to provide food, clothing and lodging to them.

Early in the period, during preparations for the Mansfield Expedition in 1624/25, the Privy Council gave the responsibility for billeting troops at the embarkation port, Dover, to the mayor of the town and the Lieutenant of Dover Castle (Sir John Hippisley), a royal government office. As the number of troops around Dover grew due to unexpected delays in getting transport ships ready, they sought help from the Justices of the Peace of Kent and eventually the Justices sent troops to billets in Kent as far away as Canterbury, where the Town Council assigned soldiers to homes as billets.\textsuperscript{27}

After the problems around Dover, the Privy Council determined to place men on the spot and familiar with the locality in charge of billeting. The Council took care to create a Commission for Soldiers in each of the rendezvous areas such as Plymouth

\textsuperscript{27} SP14/177/17, Sir John Hippisley et al. to the P.C.; 25 Dec 1624. Also APC, Vol. 39, pg. 409, P. C. to Hippisley; 26 Dec 1624.
together with Devon and Cornwall and Portsmouth together with Hampshire, Sussex and Dorset. The Council generally did not set up Commissions for Soldiers in counties that billeted only a few hundred soldiers, as happened in 1628 when the Council moved soldiers around to spread the billeting costs to more counties. They left the responsibility for billeting to the Justices of the Peace and the deputy lieutenants in these counties.

The Privy Council gave the Commissioners the authority and the responsibility to assign billets and to assess the county, or town, as a whole for the billeting costs, at per diem rates set by the Privy Council.28 The Privy Council always promised to repay this amount for each billeted soldier upon the presentation of a proper set of accounts on the expenditure, as was customary in “former times”, i.e. in Elizabeth’s reign. Commissions usually paid the billeting assessment money direct to the billeters, to the disgust of some army officers, though occasionally the Commissions paid the soldiers through their captains in the usual military fashion. The army officers preferred giving the money through the captains to the soldiers, claiming that it encouraged soldiers to live within the King’s means and kept them out of trouble in the alehouses.

The soldiers ‘pay’ was not pay in the modern sense. It was in fact barely enough for subsistence, and the crown did not expect that there would be any left over to support a family back home. At the beginning of the war years, the ‘lending’ amount was 2s. 6d. per week per man, which was the rate set in Elizabeth’s reign.29 By 1627, the Council of

28 See SP16/7/35 J.P.s of Essex to the P.C.; 7 Oct 1625 and SP16/35/40, D.L.s of Hampshire to the P.C., 7 Sep 1626 complaining of assessing general rates without authorization by Parliament.

War and army officers persuaded the government to take into account the reduction in the purchasing power of money over the years and increase the amount to 3s. and then to 3s. 6d. per week, or 6d. per day.  At the same time the royal government set the soldier’s total pay, or ‘full pay’, at 8d. per day, or 4s. 4d. per week. In comparison, a weaver or an agricultural laborer in Essex could earn between 10d. and 12d. a day, at least on days that he could find work. In theory, the government paid the soldier periodically and it was then his responsibility to buy food and pay for lodging out of the money he was given. The captain gave the lending to the soldier each week from the captain’s funds, under the conceit that the government paid the soldier once a month, and then deducted the lending from the monthly pay when he received it from the paymaster. Thus the soldier received the ‘overplus’ between the lending and the full pay once a month, or more likely once every three months or, at this time in England, every six months or never. The ‘overplus’ was intended to provide one or two suits of clothes a year for the soldier and to pay for arms and repair of weapons. If the commissioners did not give the money directly to the billetters, there were many possibilities for the captain to make money, and this was one reason men sought captaincies.

The sources describe only sketchily the methods the commissioners, or deputy lieutenants, used to select places in which to billet soldiers. It appears that they called on lower county officials such as the constables and parish officials to pick households to billet one to five soldiers, or more in inns, the number depending on the ability of the

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30 *APC*, Vol. 42, pg. 22; 19 Jan 1626/27, an instruction from the P.C. to the Lord Treasurer and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

householder to pay for food for the soldiers. There are several letters in the sources, which indicate this. One from the Deputy Lieutenants Suffolk to the chief constables of the hundreds, directs the constables to billet the companies of Sir Charles Rich’s regiment in the maritime towns and adjoining areas of the county. The letter directs the high constables to notify the officials of the listed towns to provide billets for the number of soldiers sent to them.  

The brief general instructions from the Privy Council usually specified that deputy lieutenants should place soldiers only with those with the ability to pay for the soldier’s food. However, the Commissioners billeted soldiers in poor homes of necessity when there were thousands of soldiers to billet. The Commissioners were often reluctant to billet soldiers with the better off inhabitants or near their own homes, perhaps because they did not wish to offend fellow members of the gentry in their county. On the other hand, the Privy Council and the army command insisted that officers should have billets in better off households, since the officer’s daily allowance was approximately 3s. a day. The result was that county authorities billeted large numbers of soldiers with those least able to afford the expense and a great expense it turned out to be.

The problems with this system are easy to imagine. First, an assessment of a few shillings or a pound a month on a wealthy landowner or well-to-do merchant was one thing. Actually collecting it was another. As the years wore on, increasing numbers

32 B.L. Add. 39245, fo. 100, verso, 14 Feb 1625/26; D.L.s of Suffolk to the High Constables of Suffolk. The source does not include a list of towns or numbers of soldiers for each town. This MSS is a Suffolk Lieutenancy Book, with entries dating from approximately 1612 to 1640.

33 See APC Vol. 40, pp. 55-57; 16 May 1625, To the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon and Cornwall for one such set of instructions. This document is also included here in App. D, Item 7.
refused to pay. In some parishes and towns there was universal refusal. However, the
government forced many poor families to spend 6d. a day to feed a soldier when they
only earned an average of 8d. a day.\textsuperscript{34} If the government promptly repaid the billet
money to the householder, all was reasonably well, but this rarely happened; thus,
householders frequently threw the soldier out of his billet so that the householder and his
family could survive. Then the soldier had to steal to eat.\textsuperscript{35} The royal government
repeatedly promised to repay billeting money to the Commissions for Soldiers and the
county, but this was seldom done, and increasingly so in 1627 and 1628. The time lag
between the first expenditure and the receipt of repayment money from London was
subject to the usual bureaucratic delays and, in truth, during these years the Lord
Treasurer seldom had more than a few pounds in the treasury. He had many other
obligations to meet, such as financial support for the Elector Frederick, outfitting ships,
purchasing food for an expedition and acquiring gunpowder, ordnance and infantry arms,
that were considered more important than paying for billeting which had already been
provided.\textsuperscript{36} The soldiers were still alive, and the army still existed. As an alternative,
the Privy Council authorized the county to repay billeting expenses from funds held in
the county from tax collections or subsidies approved in Parliament or from loans made
to the King, before it sent any cash to London. This approach mollified the counties
concerned to some extent and reduced the complaints. However, most areas considered

\textsuperscript{34} SP16/25/76; 27 April 1626; Andrew Mudd to Sec. Conway.

\textsuperscript{35} SP16/95/8, D.L.s of Dorset to the Earl of Suffolk; 1 Mar 1627/28 and SP16/95/9, Capt. John Watts et al.
to Col. Thomas Fryer; 1 Mar 1627/28.

this little better than no payment at all. In most counties that billeted troops, the amounts collected for subsidies or loans were less than the money spent on billeting. The southern counties constantly complained that the counties billeting troops were paying twice - for the subsidies and the billeting - while counties with no troops to billet were paying only once and sometimes not at all. This of course led to demands that money be raised in a ‘parliamentary way’, that is, money be raised from all the counties by means of formal subsidies voted by Parliament. If the crown raised more money from all the counties, the southern counties might hope for reimbursement.

Finally, the complaints about billeting expenses were not always without ulterior motives. There is direct evidence from Devon and from the Isle of Wight (discussed in later chapters) that, when the troops first arrived, the local officials and gentry believed that considerable extra income was to be had from the King for billeting the troops, for supplying them with clothing and for the chartering of locally owned ships to carry the troops and supplies. I suspect that even the poorer householders thought they might be able to clear an extra penny or two a week for billeting a soldier. In other words, when the King paid for his army, the localities were reasonably content.

6. Army Formation, Reorganization, Movements, Billeting Locations and Dates

During the period from 1624 to 1628 when England launched one expedition after another, there was much war related activity in England, Wales, Scotland and even Ireland. This section presents information on the makeup of the army and its changes.

37 SP16/57/85, D.L.s of Dorset to the P.C.; 22 March 1626/27 documents such a case.
over time as well as information on the locations where the royal government billeted English army units at various points in time. The information comes mainly from the *Acts of the Privy Council*. Some small pieces of information on the location of companies and parts of companies were found in the *Commons Debates 1628*, in the State Papers, Domestic and other sources. The information from the sources is scattered, and in places confusing and even contradictory, and this has required piecing the available information together like a jigsaw puzzle and has required some assumptions and educated guesses. There are, no doubt, many additional small details on the location of companies and parts of companies available in local archives throughout England.

It is often difficult to follow the companies and regiments through their travels and vicissitudes because sources identify the units only by the name of their commanding officer: for example, Captain Hone’s Company of Sir Charles Rich’s Regiment. As the officers died, retired or were replaced for other reasons and because regiments and companies were “reduced” (disbanded), consolidated and reorganized to make full strength units from the remnants of decimated units, tracking units over a period of more than a year or so requires considerable detective work and some guesses based on sometimes thin evidence. There were so many personnel changes that a virtually new army started each campaigning season. Therefore, in describing the unit movements and locations, I have considered each year separately, tracing continuing units from the previous year and into the next year to the extent the sources permit.

To reduce the amount of narrative, most of the data on regimental and company movements have been summarized in tables, which appear in Appendix A. Many of the
tables in Appendix A are liberally annotated, reflecting the sometimes confusing or contradictory information presented in the sources.

The first information on the raising of large numbers of recruits, forming armies and the billeting of troops comes from 1624. The government recruited 6,000 volunteers and sent them to the Netherlands in June and July to augment the English forces serving with the Dutch. The King and Privy Council authorized the Earls of Oxford, Southampton and Essex and Lord Willoughby and their captains to recruit these volunteers at the drumhead, and to organize them into four regiments. Later in 1624, the royal government men pressed 12,900 men in many counties, mostly in the south, for Count Mansfeld’s expedition, which the crown intended to recover the Palatinate, and another 2300, mostly from the north and Wales, for service in Ireland. The Privy Council consulted with the War Council starting in mid-October 1624 and issued the official letters ordering the impressing of recruits to the lords lieutenant on 31 October. The Privy Council ordered the soldiers for Ireland to proceed to ports on the Irish Sea (Barnstable, Bristol, Milford Haven, Liverpool and Chester) to take ship for Ireland. The soldiers for the Mansfeld Expedition rendezvoused in and around Dover in Kent,

\[38\] SP14/168/23, P.C. to Lord Zouch; 23 June 1624.

\[39\] SP14/168/26, /27, /28, P.C. orders to the 4 Cols.; 23 Jun 1624. These documents provide lists of captains and other officers.


\[41\] APC, Vol. 39, pp. 467,468 a letter from the P.C. to the L.L.s of 20 counties in the north and in Wales. After a false start, they were to arrive in these ports on 14 through 16 March 1624/25 and were supposed to sail on 20 March. The actual sailing date does not appear in the APC but it might have been delayed.
where they were in billets from 25 December until they sailed in early February. The royal government organized the Mansfeld Army into six regiments of ten companies each. Table A5 in Appendix A provides a reconstructed Table of Organization for this army. The whole 12,000 sailed for Calais and then to the United Provinces in early February 1624/25. Though very few of these soldiers ever returned to England, some of the officers listed in Table A5 appear in later APC entries.

The next expedition after Mansfeld’s was the attack on Cadiz in the fall of 1625. The Privy Council issued an order for the press of 9,150 men on 5 May 1625. The order directed the men to rendezvous around Plymouth by 25 May 1625. Later orders adjusted the numbers of men pressed from a few counties, keeping the total at 9,150 and redirected some of the men to Hull. Then, the Council levied more men from the north of England, ordering them to Plymouth and bringing the total sent to Plymouth to 9,350 men. The Council also ordered the impressment of additional men from the north to go to Hull. The royal government initially intended to transport the 2,000 men at Hull to the Netherlands, where the conductors were to exchange them for 2,000 English veterans. The ships that transported the recruits were to board 2,000 English veterans from the Netherlands and to carry them to Plymouth to join the Cadiz Expedition. However, the 2,000 veterans did not come to Plymouth because the Dutch refused to release them.

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42 This organization is given in SP14/182/17 from the mayor of Dover to the P.C.; 19 Jan 1624/25. It is confirmed by a list of army officers who were to conduct the men to Dover.

43 APC, Vol. 40, pp. 42-45; P.C. to L.L.s of 44 counties; 5 May 1625. A summary of the letter, which contains typical instructions from the Privy Council to the Lords Lieutenant for the impressing of soldiers, is provided in Appendix D, Item 1.

44 APC, Vol. 40, pp. 48, 55-57, and many entries on pp. 56-105 on minutia of the billeting of the men. The letter on pp. 55-57 is from the P.C. to the L.L. and D.L.s of Devon and Cornwall; 16 May 1625.
Therefore, the 2000 raw recruits that boarded at Hull stayed on their ships and went to Plymouth to join the Cadiz Expedition. The Dutch did release a number of officers for a three-month period, with the stipulation that they take none of their men with them to England.\textsuperscript{45} In August a further 1200 men were levied and in early September another 500, all to replace men lost to desertion and disease in the army around Plymouth.\textsuperscript{46}

The \textit{APC} does not provide the organization of the Cadiz army specifically, but Dalton provides an organization, which may be found in Appendix A, Table A6. It is very similar to the list of Regiments given in the \textit{APC} for December 1625 shortly after the return from Cadiz. The Commissioners for Soldiers billeted the 9,000 to 10,000 men in the Cadiz army in the Counties of Devon and Cornwall in areas surrounding Plymouth prior to sailing. Billets were generally in smaller towns, and in Plymouth and Exeter. The soldiers remained in billets in these locations from late May 1625 until the fleet sailed on 6 October. The expedition left Cadiz on 16 November 1625 and straggled into Plymouth starting around 6 December 1625, with a number of storm damaged ships landing their men in southern Ireland. The Privy Council ordered the regiments to resume the billets they had occupied before their departure.\textsuperscript{47} Comparing Tables A5 and A6, it appears that Sir John Burroughs (also spelled Burg, Burghe, Burge, Bourough) and Sir Charles Rich were recalled from the Mansfeld Army in the Netherlands (or did


\textsuperscript{46}\textit{APC}, Vol. 40, pg. 135, P.C. to L.L.s of 17 counties; 23 Aug 1625 and pp. 171-172, P.C. to L.L.s of Devon, Dorset, Somerset and Cornwall; 9 Sept 1625. The second group totaling 500 were levied in Dorset, Devon Somerset and Cornwall, the areas nearest Plymouth.

\textsuperscript{47}\textit{APC}, Vol. 40, pg. 261; P.C. to Sir Francis Drake et al.; 6 Dec 1625 and pp. 266, 267, P. C. to Viscount Wimbleton et al.; 12 Dec 1625.
not actually sail with the Army) to serve as Colonels in the Cadiz Expedition. None of
the captains in any of the Mansfeld and Cadiz regiments was the same, leading to the
probable conclusion that all were entirely different regiments. However, there are several
Douglasses listed in the two Tables, but these are all probably different captains.

From this point in time, information becomes more plentiful in the sources and it
becomes possible to trace the movements of regiments by means of references to their
commanding officers. Some information on billet locations of smaller units and small
numbers of men start to appear, usually through complaints made about the behavior of
the soldiers. The royal government apparently had decided to maintain an ‘army-in-
being’ for future operations, for, in a letter to Lord Conway, the Privy Council mentions
that the King desires to maintain the land forces sent to Cadiz for “imploymet” he will
shortly have for them.\(^{48}\) This decision is also evident from the fact that the Privy Council
admonished the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon to prevent the men from “depart[ing] and
slip[ping] away from their colours”.\(^{49}\) Table A7 in Appendix A presents the movements
and locations of the Cadiz regiments during 1626. This Table must be used with caution
because the names of regimental commanders change – a new colonel taking over from
the previous colonel. Some colonels of regiment are listed by title (the Lord Marshal or
High Marshal for example, who was Cecil for the Cadiz Expedition, the nominal Lord
General being the Duke of Buckingham) and sometimes by the office holder’s name. It
also appears that at least one regiment was disbanded, since the total number of regiments

\(^{48}\) APC, Vol. 40, pp. 283-284; 24 Dec 1625.

falls from ten to nine. The army command may have disbanded the missing regiment, with its remaining troops used to bring other companies and regiments nearer to full strength.

The Privy Council ordered the Commission to quarter the regiments in Devon and Cornwall for a time immediately after their return from Cadiz, supposedly in places where they had been billeted before the Expedition left England. In December 1625, the army command and the Lords Lieutenant in the West Country suggested to the Privy Council that it move the regiments. The Privy Council agreed and requested suggestions for new billet locations.\(^{50}\) On 24 January 1625/26, the *APC* records a list of new billet locations.\(^{51}\) However, these movements never took place for the local leaders reconsidered and suggested that the regiments remain in the west.\(^{52}\) The regiments listed in Table A7 stayed in Devon and Cornwall until September 1626, at which time the Privy Council ordered them to move to the counties listed in column 3 of Table A7. The reasons for this move probably were to better position the regiments either to repel an expected invasion from the Spanish Netherlands or for departure on the second Cadiz Expedition, which took place in the fall of 1626, or both. In addition, by July 1626, the Commission for Soldiers and the Deputy Lieutenants of Cornwall and Devon were desperate to be rid of the army because of the un-reimbursed expense and the discipline problems. Their pleas to the Privy Council may have had a large effect on the Council’s decision, as an *APC* entry mentions the pleadings of Sir George Chudleigh, one of the

\(^{50}\) *APC*, Vol. 40, pg. 275, P.C. to Viscount Wimbledon et al.; 19 Dec. 1625.


\(^{52}\) A discussion of these events may be found in Chap. 6, Sec. 4.
Deputy Lieutenants of Devon, for the payment of monies due the county and the removal of the troops.\textsuperscript{53}

There is little information on the number of men in the regiments for the period from May 1625 until late 1626 after the return from Cadiz. However, the number of pressed men and those pressed to replace deserters and the sick kept the army near the nominal strength of 10,000 until the Cadiz Expedition sailed. This implies that there were 900 to 1000 in each regiment. There is an \textit{APC} entry for 24 January 1625/26 indicating that every regiment has ten companies, each company with 100 men and that William St. Leger’s regiment has 10 companies, with St. Leger’s own company mustering around 200 men, giving a total of 1100 men for his regiment.\textsuperscript{54} These numbers imply a total for the army of around 10,000 men in early 1626, which is hard to believe considering the losses due to sickness and desertion. The entry goes on to mention that the army will report the actual numbers of men in the muster rolls that it will create before the march to new locations. It is very likely that nowhere near the 10,000 that went to Cadiz were with the colors by January 1625/26 and there are no entries in the \textit{APC} concerning more levies of men during 1626.\textsuperscript{55} Other \textit{APC} entries may give the true number. They state that the royal government would move 3800 men east from

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{APC}, Vol. 41, pp. 216-219, P.C. to D.L.s of Devon and Cornwall; 24 Aug 1626.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{APC}, Vol. 40, pp. 326-327, P.C. to ten L.L.s; 24 Jan 1625/26. The numbers of soldiers may have been for estimating purposes only.

\textsuperscript{55} One exception is that there were 1550 foot and 200 horse ordered to be raised in the north, seemingly for defense against a Spanish invasion. These troops seem never to have left the north, and they may not even have been raised. (\textit{APC}, Vol. 41, pg. 71, P.C. to Lord Clifford; 10 July 1626).
Plymouth, 800 to Kent, 800 to Sussex, 1100 to Hampshire and 1100 to Dorset.\textsuperscript{56} In late 1626, there is one mention of moving 6000 troops in the service of the United Provinces and of “companies of soldiers which are now to be levied”, but the Council ordered no more impressments in 1626.\textsuperscript{57} I have estimated attrition rates from other data, and it is possible that no more than 50 percent of the Cadiz army, or 5000 men, were left in mid-1626 before the departure of a second expedition to the coast of Spain, and perhaps as few as 3,000 to 4,000 men left after the return from second voyage to Spain in late 1626.\textsuperscript{58} To recapitulate, at the end of 1626, there were nine regiments with ten companies each, located mainly in Kent, Sussex, Hampshire and Dorset with smaller units in the Isle of Wight, Berkshire and possibly a few companies in other counties (Surrey, Essex, Hertfordshire). The total number of men in these regiments was between 3000 and 5000.

On 31 March 1627, the King and Privy Council ordered a complete reorganization of the army-in-being: they consolidated nine regiments into five regiments and disbanded 27 or 36 companies, their men distributed into the surviving companies.\textsuperscript{59} The five are regiments are shown in Appendix A, Table A8-A. According to the \textit{APC},

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{APC} Vol. 41, pg. 291; 26 Sep 1626. In \textit{APC}, Vol. 42, pp. 22, 23, P.C. to the Lord Treasurer and the Chancellor of the Exchequer; 19 Jan 1626/27; it is also stated that there were 3800 men in the army after the return from Cadiz.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{APC}, Vol. 41, pg. 318, P.C. to Lord Treasurer and Chancellor of the Exchequer; 19 Oct 1626 and Vol. 41, pg. 322, 323, the King to the P.C.; 20 Oct 1626.

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{APC}, Vol. 41, pg. 291, P.C. to the Commissioners for the Army; 26 Sep 1626 provides numbers which indicate that between 200 and 400 soldiers sailed with the second fleet to Spain and 3800 were left in England, giving a total of 4000 to 4300 men in the army before the Spanish Expedition of 1626.

\textsuperscript{59} For details, see Table A8-A in Appendix A and a list of the disbanded companies in Table A8-B.
there were 40 companies in the five reorganized regiments, or eight companies per regiment. If there were approximately 4,000 men left in the army as previously estimated, then there were approximately 100 men per company. However, the Table of Organization of the army after the reorganization shows ten companies per regiment, if the colonel, lieutenant colonel and sergeant major all commanded companies. Ten officer’s names appear in both the Mansfeld Army and the reorganized army of 31 March 1627. There are another four captains whose names appear in the both the Mansfeld Army (Table A5) and the list of disbanded companies of the same date (in Table A8-B). There seems to be little or no continuity in the regimental assignments of these officers. Some of the names which appear in both Tables could also be different men with the same names. Note that the Cadiz Expedition and a year and a half intervene between Tables A5 and A8-B. If twelve or fourteen of the sixty-six officers with the rank of captain or higher in the Mansfeld Army somehow continued with the army-in-being through the Cadiz expedition, then there apparently was a core of officers, around 20%, that came back from the Low Countries to help form the Cadiz Army.

There was a further reorganization May 1627, or rather an increase in the size of the army. This addition seems to have brought the five regiments formed from the remains of the Cadiz army up to the standard size of ten or eleven companies. The central government formed two new regiments under Colonels Sir Thomas Thornton and Sir Henry Sprey from new levies and added a company to each of the now seven regiments, increasing their size to eleven companies. The government conducted two

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60 APC, Vol. 42, pp. 189-190.
presses of men during April and May 1627 – one of 1500 men and one of 2000 men.\textsuperscript{61} The first press of 1500 men came from in the southern counties – Hampshire, Devon, Sussex, Dorset, Kent and Wiltshire. The second levy came from fifteen counties as far north as Hertford, Bedford, Buckingham, and Oxfordshire. All went to Portsmouth. The two new regiments went on the Ré Expedition and so were in billets around Portsmouth for only a month or two. The new organization is presented in Table A9. It includes the two new regiments, the added companies and some changes in captains of companies in the five reorganized regiments. If the strength of the army was around 4000 men before these changes, it increased to between 6500 and 7500, if all the pressed men made it to Portsmouth, which is unlikely. Perhaps a total of 7000 is close to the actual number, as this number agrees fairly well with other indications in the \textit{APC} and the \textit{Commons Debates, 1628}, discussed below.

There are other pieces of information in the \textit{APC} and the State Papers, Domestic on the locations of the troops before and after the reorganization.\textsuperscript{62} From these documents, it is plain that the army was being concentrated around Southampton and Portsmouth to facilitate the reorganization and to prepare for the Ré Expedition later in the year. The royal government billeted the army around Portsmouth and Southampton Town until the departure for Ré on 27 June 1627. In addition, there were also 3000 men pressed and sent to the King of Denmark in the spring of 1627, sailing from London, Hull and Harwich. The troops pressed for Denmark mutinied several times, and many


\textsuperscript{62} This information may be found in Appendix A, Table A10.
deserted, so the number that actually sailed for Bremen is uncertain.  

On 31 July and 10 August 1627, the Privy Council levied 2400 more men and directed them to rendezvous in Plymouth by 10 September 1627. The Council formed 2000 of these men into two more new regiments under Colonels Sir John Ratcliffe and Sir James Ramsey but they did not go to Ré and remained around Plymouth until the end of 1627. The Privy Council ordered 2000 more men pressed as replacements for losses at Ré in late September 1627 and this levy assembled at Plymouth, but the men never boarded ship. 

There were four additional regiments formed and sent toward the battle in 1627 and three of these will be of interest later in this study. On orders from London, the Irish government formed two regiments of Irishmen under Colonels Sir Pierce Crosby and Sir Ralph Bingley at Waterford, Ireland and they sailed directly to Ré around 30 August 1627. Crosby’s regiment was formed from new Irish ‘volunteers’ and Bingley’s mostly from Englishmen stranded in Ireland after the return from Cadiz and English from the

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63 Information on these contingents may also be found in Table A10.


65 They may have boarded ship and may have sailed in late Oct or early Nov, but turned back before reaching Ré. APC, Vol. 43, pg. 49, P.C. to Capt. Thomas Button of the ship Antelope; 25 Sep 1627. Information on these regiments may be found in Table A11.

66 APC, Vol. 43, pp. 61-62, P.C. to L.L.s of 16 counties; 30 Sep 1627. These men were to arrive in Plymouth by 1 Nov 1627 and appear to be replacements for sick men and deserters. The P.C. sent orders for their billeting on 4 Nov 1627 (APC, Vol. 43, pg. 127, from the P.C. to the Commissioners at Plymouth; 4 Nov. 1627).

67 APC, Vol. 43, pg. 43, P.C. to Lord Deputy of Ireland; 22 Sept. 1627. This entry mentions the two Irish regiments sailed on 29 and 30 August for Ré. See Table A9 Note 5 for more information on all three of these regiments: Bingley’s, Crosby’s and Barty’s.
The entry in the *APC* concerning the formation and organization of the Irish regiments also refers to the formation of another new regiment under Colonel Sir Peregrine Bertie (Barty) from several English companies and four Irish companies recruited in Ireland and brought to Portsmouth. The fourth regiment was from Scotland and was under the command of the Earl of Moreton. The Scots Regiment was a large one, variously described as having 1500 or 2000 men. It arrived in Portsmouth by ship from Scotland in early October and soon went into billets on the Isle of Wight. The Scots never got to Ré.

After the return from Ré, the Privy Council initially ordered the returning regiments into billets in those locations where they were billeted before sailing – the *APC* mentions Kent, Sussex, Hampshire, Dorset, Devon and Cornwall. However, it quickly became apparent that the Privy Council needed to billet the army in more counties to equalize the costs to the localities and to keep the healthy separated from the sick and wounded. During the months of November and December a hint of panic, or at least confusion, developed as the Privy Council sent out numerous orders concerning the disposition of troops, orders for moving companies from one place to another, cancelled

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68 The Irish recruits were not all volunteers. Many were pressed from the jails. See the Lord Deputy of Ireland’s letter, Appendix D, Item 4.


70 The Earl’s title is spelled “Morton” or “Moreton”. I have used the spelling Moreton to distinguish the Earl and the Scots from the regiment of Col. Morton (English). Some information on Moreton’s regiment may be found in Table A11.

71 From Boynton, “The Isle of Wight”, pp. 24, 31. Boynton also mentions that the Scots were sent to Wight so that they could not desert as easily as on the mainland. See also Table A11.

72 *APC*, Vol. 43, pg. 139, P.C. to Attorney General; 14 Nov 1627. This order actually requests the Attorney General to issue Commissions for Martial Law for the named counties.
previous orders for moving troops, issued directions on caring for the sick and wounded and addressed complaints from areas where troops were billeted. Quite probably only a few of these directives were actually executed, for by January 1627/28, the government in London had developed a plan and the various regiments were ordered to a number of counties for longer term billeting. The Privy Council’s general assignments, sorted by regiment, may be found in Appendix A, Tables A12-A, A12-B and A13. Some of the colonels who commanded regiments before sailing to Ré died in the fighting and do not appear in the regimental designations after the return. Table A12-B also provides a cross listing of the colonels between early 1627 and January 1627/28 and speculations on which regiments the new colonels commanded.

The entries in the APC, the Commons Debates and the State Papers, Domestic contain a number of scraps of information on the whereabouts and movements of troops during 1628, until the discharge of the army-in-being in the fall of the year. All the available information is presented in an extensive Table in Appendix A, which identifies counties, towns and rural areas where troops were in billets in 1628.73 Given the nature of the information in the sources, and the government’s frequent changes of intent, this information is provisional at best. Table A13-A in Appendix A presents the available information on troop billet locations and movement, sorted by county and then by town or rural area within the county. Each entry then identifies the regiment and an estimated number of men at the location. Some of the entries for the number of troops in a location are estimates and some come from the sources. Finally, the Table provides a list of all

73 See Appendix A, Table 13A and Table 13B
the towns and areas mentioned in the sources that billeted soldiers. The government billeted troops in nineteen counties and the Isle of Wight, while it billeted sailors in the greater London area and in Portsmouth. In the end, regiments, companies and parts of companies were in billets in Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Essex, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Herefordshire, Kent, Norfolk, Northampton, Oxfordshire, Somerset, Suffolk, Sussex, Wiltshire, Worcestershire and the Isle of Wight.

The losses at Ré were substantial. Approximately 10,000 to 11,000 men, not counting seamen, sailed to Ré during the campaign. This total includes 5000 men in the five reformed regiments of late March 1627, and 2000 in the two new regiments formed in May under Colonels Thornton and Sprey, plus 2000 Irish in the two regiments under Crosby and Bingley that sailed from Waterford in late August and, probably, 900 or 1000 in Barty’s mixed regiment. In addition, there were 400 known replacements, and, by my estimate, 300 sappers, miners etc. and possibly several hundred artillerists. Naval personnel manning the 100 ships must have totaled another several thousand. One APC entry mentions that the Commissioner for the Navy was to plan for food for 12,000 men at Ré, but this number may have been for estimating purposes. Various sources suggest that 4000 to 7000 died either there, or soon after the return, of wounds, disease and so forth. The French virtually wiped out two regiments and their killed their colonels in the retreat from St. Martins. The most likely estimate is that approximately 7000 remained after reducing the total for the sick and wounded who died within a short time after the

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74 APC, Vol. 43, pg. 134, P.C. to the Commissioners for the Navy; 9 Nov 1627.
75 Gardiner, Vol. 6, pp. 198-199.
The sources mention other, larger losses. In a Commons debate in May 1628, Sir William Beecher said that the English lost 7000 men at Ré and that the numbers of troops sent were 7000 in the English army, 2400 from Ireland and 400 more from England (a total of 9800) and that 2500 and then 3000 (5500 total) were shipped home sick and most died. In the same debate, Sir Edward Giles remarked that 7000 were lost. The Privy Council mentioned that large, but unspecified, numbers deserted after the return.

An order from the Privy Council in June 1628 mentioned that the army numbered around 6000 men, but this number must include the 2000 replacements levied in September 1627, so the total of survivors from Ré still around the colors would have been around 4000. Thus, if around 10,000 soldiers went to Red and there were approximately 4000 left, the attrition including desertion was approximately 60 percent. Other combinations of all the numbers can be used, but it seems likely that the attrition was 50 to 60 percent.

The information from previous pages on the size of the army can be used to estimate the numbers of soldiers billeted in England by year and month over the period from December 1624 to the Autumn of 1628. The following chart gives the results.

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76 SP16/85/95, Statement of the numbers of men returned to Portsmouth from the Isle of Ré; Nov 1627 notes 3000 at Portsmouth. For Plymouth, SP16/85/61, Sir James Bagg to Buckingham; 29 Nov 1627, notes 4000 at Plymouth. A later muster showed 4400 landed at Plymouth.

77 Commons Debates, 1628, Vol. 4, pg. 310. These must be round numbers.

78 APC Vol. 43, pg. 156; 28 Nov 1627; P.C. to JPs of several counties; pg. 243; 20 Jan 1627/28, a proclamation is to be prepared ordering all soldiers in London to return to their regiments; pg 249; 24 Jan 1627/28, P.C. order to return all deserters to their companies.

79 APC, Vol. 43, pg. 513, P.C. to Thomas Eyres et al.; 28 June 1628.
There were only five months in the four years in which no, or very few, soldiers were in billets in England. Between 4000 and 6000 soldiers were in English billets after the return of Cadiz Expedition in December 1625 until the formation of the Ré Expedition, in April and May of 1627. The gradual decline estimated during this period is due to desertions and deaths from sickness. Except for January 1624/25 (the Mansfeld Expedition army and troops for Ireland), the largest numbers (10,000 to 12,000) were billeted in England after the return of the Ré Expedition in December 1627. This large number is the sum of the 6000 to 7000 survivors of the Ré Expedition (which included substantial numbers from two Irish regiments), the 4000 additional men pressed in August and September 1627, and the arrival of the 1500 strong Scots regiment in October 1627.
7. Conclusion

From late 1624 until late 1628, England maintained an army almost continuously. The army was not a standing army in the modern sense or one like the standing armies that existed on the continent before and during the Thirty Years’ War. The crown formed the army from survivors from previous campaigns and periodic levies of newly pressed men for new expeditions. The government often disbanded and created regiments and companies to eliminate depleted units and strengthen other units as the need arose. The procedures for recruiting the army-in-being, feeding and housing it, and paying it, as well as disciplining it while it was in England were, to a great extent, a continuation of the practices established in Elizabeth I’s reign. They were also extensions of the peacetime government of England. The central government depended upon the governing gentry of the counties, the county subdivisions and the towns to execute and administer the decisions made in London and, in an extension of this dependence, placed considerable financial and administrative burdens upon the local governments. The Privy Council created two Commissions of local leaders in counties that were billeting large numbers of soldiers to organize and supervise the billeting and disciplining of soldiers. The Commission for Soldiers was responsible for finding and paying for billets for the troops and the Commission for Martial Law was responsible for the speedy trial and punishment of soldiers who committed crimes. The two Commissions usually had a number of members in common and in Hampshire were one body. The overlap sometimes created confusion and the people of Hampshire accused the Martial Law commission in particular of applying military law to civilians on occasion, thus creating additional upset
in the counties. While the Commissions did find billets for the troops most of the time and did effect some improvements in the trial and punishment of delinquent soldiers, they also created additional frictions between the local governors and the royal government.

When recruiting new soldiers, the Privy Council sent orders to the deputy lieutenants in selected counties to impress a quota of men to serve against their wills, or very occasionally to solicit any volunteers that might be willing to serve. The recruits then marched to the area where the army was assembling under the control of a conductor and his assistants. The conductor was theoretically responsible for seeing that all the recruits arrived at the army rendezvous with the clothing provided by the county. The system was rife with corruption, for both the press officers and the conductor were willing to accept bribes to release men, to press unsuitable men or, in the case of conductors, to withhold some of the conduct money due to the recruits. Over the four years from late 1624 to 1628, approximately 50,000 men were pressed for military service, a considerably greater number per year than the average of 5,000 or 6,000 pressed during Elizabeth’s reign. Around half of these men died from disease, malnutrition and combat.

While the regiments were in England, the royal government ordered civilians to billet the men in private homes for the most part. The billeters bore the expense of feeding the soldiers and royal government generally ordered the county officials to compensate the billeters from the proceeds of a countywide tax. The royal government promised to repay the billeters and the county, but seldom did, except to allow the counties to deduct some of the money from subsidy money and loans collected in the
county. This was seldom adequate and the counties were still trying to collect arrears in the 1630s. The soldiers were also difficult to keep in order and committed many crimes, “insolencies and outrages”, adding to the distress of the inhabitants of areas where they were billeted. The government ordered regiments, companies and parts of companies billeted in at least twenty counties in southern England as it formed armies for the Mansfeld Expedition in early 1625, for the Cadiz Expedition in May and June of 1625, and the Ré Expedition in 1627, as well as several smaller, largely naval efforts in 1626 and 1628. When the expeditions returned to England, the soldiers returned to billets in the southern counties to await the future plans of the central government. There were few months in the four years that did not see some soldiers billeted in private homes. The numbers of billeted soldiers were as high as 12,000 in January 1625, and 10,000 from June through September of 1625. During most of 1626 and 1627, 4,000 to 7,000 were in billets in England and during the first half of 1628, 9,000 to 10,000 were in billets in England.

Because of the costs of the royal government’s military expeditions and the constant maintenance of an army for four years and because of the royal government’s lack of financial resources, the King and the Privy Council forced more of the immediate cost and work of maintaining the army onto the local communities. When the policies and decisions of the central government created distress and then anger and conflict in the localities, the local governors attempted to mediate between the royal government and the people. However, when the county governors became upset with the decisions of the London government because of their costs and their social effects in the counties, towns,
and parishes, compliance with the desires of the King and the royal government became intermittent and sometimes ceased altogether. The cost and effort required to maintain the army, together with the large numbers of men pressed into the military services, were the proximate causes of the anger and conflict in the counties and towns of England and thus led to the partial breakdown of inter-government relations and to the anger and upset seen in the Parliamentary sessions of the war years. Early 1628 saw the largest numbers of soldiers billeted in England and the anger over billeting shown in the Parliament of that year was probably related to that fact. The next Chapters will provide insight into the many events that led to a crisis in the English system of government in the 1620s.
Chapter 5

Billeting Soldiers for the Mansfeld Expedition –
November 1624 to February 1624/25

1. Introduction

England’s first major experience with billeting soldiers in private quarters in the 1620s came with the first large military campaign of the war, an expedition intended to recover the Palatinate for the Elector Frederick, Charles’ brother in law. The English and Dutch hired the German mercenary commander Count Ernst von Mansfeld to lead the expedition. During the preparations for the Mansfeld Expedition, the local officials billeted approximately 10,000 pressed recruits in Kent from mid-December 1624 until late January 1624/25. The English government originally planned a joint effort, which was to include the Dutch and the French, but the French withdrew at the last moment. The English were to supply 12,000 foot and the French 2000 or 3000 horse and the English were to land at Calais and march through French territory to reach the Rhine. At the last minute, the French forbade the English to land at Calais, and so the English sailed on to Flushing in the United Provinces, where half the troops went ashore and half remained on board ship until spring. Most of the soldiers died of disease, hunger and exposure, but a remainder went with Mansfeld to participate in the siege of Breda with the Dutch, and after Breda, a few went on toward the Palatinate.

The local authorities in Kent tried to execute the orders of the Privy Council concerning the preparations for the expedition, but they encountered difficulties from the very beginning. The problems in Kent were severe and came as something of a surprise to the men assigned the responsibility to billet the troops, who had little or no experience
in these matters, and the events in Kent probably surprised the Privy Council as well. The Council and the Kentish officials learned as they encountered emergencies and they changed procedures on an *ad hoc* basis as situations developed. The discontents of the local governors and the people started at the very beginning as well, though perhaps at a lower level of anger and unhappiness than was the case in subsequent years and other places. The government in London learned from the chaos in Kent and changed the administration of billeting operations accordingly. The Attorney General issued the first Commission for Martial Law for Kent in early January to deal with felonies and misdemeanors committed by the soldiers and the royal government issued a Commission for Martial Law and a Commission for Soldiers for Devon and Cornwall in May 1625 for the next Expedition, the voyage to Cadiz.

2. *Assembling the Army*

In November 1624, the Privy Council sent out orders to the counties of England and Wales to impress 12,900 men for the expedition intended to recover the Palatinate.\(^1\) The Privy Council originally ordered the recruits to rendezvous at Dover around 1 December, but difficulties immediately arose. The royal government demanded that the recently appointed company captains receive their soldiers in the various counties and undertake the expense of conducting the recruits to Dover.\(^2\) Virtually to a man, the captains refused to bear the expenses. The dispute took a month to resolve and the

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resolution involved the royal government, the counties, the captains and Count Mansfeld. In the end, Mansfeld agreed to provide the conduct money, though this did not happen again and the counties provided conduct money for their recruits in the future. 3 Because of this dispute, the rendezvous did not take place until late December and even then there were numerous problems.

From the very beginning of the war, the authorities expected men to hide from the press. The instructions from the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex to the Justices of the Peace for the press for the Mansfeld Expedition included a specific directive to search all the “inns, alehouses and other places” where men might hide from the press officers the night before the “taking of the muster”. 4 Of course, the alehouses and inns yielded up just the sorts of men the county most wanted to get rid of, and so the Deputy Lieutenants may have intended this directive to insure that all the ner-do-wells possible were sent off to the Palatinate.

Many of the captains, or their subordinates, did not come to the counties to receive their men until the second half of December. 5 In one well-known case, the Deputy Lieutenants of Suffolk followed the Council order and pressed 150 men on 18 November from one of the divisions of the county in time to have them in Dover on 30 November. 6 An army officer was supposed to conduct the pressed men to Dover, but, as

3 SP14/175/54, Sir William Beecher to Sec. Conway; 26 Nov 1624. (In 1624, Beecher was Sec. to the Council of War. He was one of Buckingham’s clients in the 1620s.)

4 Maynard Lieutenancy Book, pg. 72, No. 213, 4 Nov 1624.

5 SP14/176/4, Earl of Northampton to the P.C.; 1 Dec 1624. SP14/181/1, D.L.s of Suffolk to the P.C.; 1 Jan 1624/25.

no officer appeared, the billeting of the men from 22 November was at the expense of the constables and other local officials. A Lieutenant Woodhouse at last came into Suffolk on 25 December and the constables assembled their men. Woodhouse reviewed the recruits and accepted 150. The next day, when Woodhouse called the muster, one man was absent, reportedly in town buying food for the march. Woodhouse peremptorily refused to accept the group with one man short and refused to wait for him to appear. He left at once, ordering the deputy lieutenants to send the men forty miles to Ipswich where he was collecting more men pressed from the county. The deputies wrote heatedly to the Privy Council of Woodhouse’s behavior and the extra trouble and expense it caused them. In addition, they accused Woodhouse of inciting the men to mutiny, telling them that they were fools to march a step before the county provided the five weeks conduct money they were due since the November press. Sussex experienced similar problems. The county pressed four hundred men in November 1624 and then paid them for a month, until 22 December, when a conductor at last came to take charge of the recruits for the march to Dover, leaving the constables of Sussex with £375 of conduct money gone from their purses.

The first reports of outrages committed by soldiers came from the counties through which the men pressed for the Mansfield Expedition marched to Dover. The

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7 SP14/181/1, D.L.s of Suffolk to the P.C.; 1 Jan 1624/25 and SP14/181/13, D.L.s of Suffolk to the P.C.; 3 Jan 1624/25.

8 See also Stearns, “Conscription and English Society in the 1620s”, pp. 16-18 on Lt. Woodhouse and the Privy Council’s failure to correct abuses in the press.

weather was cold and the men were often ill provided for because of the dispute over conduct money between the newly appointed company captains and the government in London. In response to reports from Essex, a county through which many of the recruits from the east and north of England passed, the Privy Council thought it necessary to order the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex to call out the trained bands to prevent the soldiers from committing further “insolencies” as they passed through.\textsuperscript{10} The Council also ordered officials in Essex to press an additional 200 men to make up for deserters and deaths in the army assembled around Dover.\textsuperscript{11} The people of Essex no doubt saw this as an imposition on them due to the failures of other counties, as they did in 1627 at Harwich when they had to replace deserters from other counties destined for Denmark.

Dudley Carleton described the proceedings as seen in London in a letter to Sir Francis Nethersole thusly: “It is lamentable to see the heavy countenances of our pressed men and hear the sad farewells [as they] have nothing but deadly unwillingness for the service, [because of] the incommodity of the season, the uncertainty of the employment and the ill terms upon which they serve. The people [of London] dislike the whole business and say it will bring neither honor to our nation nor anything but wretchedness and misery to the poor soldiers …” How true Carleton’s words proved, as the expedition was a military failure and most of the soldiers died during the campaign.\textsuperscript{12} In a letter to

\textsuperscript{10} APC Vol. 39, pg. 407, Privy Council to D.L.s of Essex; 21 Dec 1624.


\textsuperscript{12} SP14/176/66, Dudley Carleton to Sir Francis Nethersole; 18 Dec. 1624.
Sir Dudley Carleton, John Chamberlain described the pressed men as a “… rabble of raw and poore rascals … and so unwilling that they must be driven rather than led. …. One that was prest hung himself and another ran into the Thames and drowned himself, another cut off the fingers on one hand and another put out his owne eyes with salt.”\footnote{Norman Egbert McClure, ed., \textit{The Letters of John Chamberlain} [Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1939] Vol. 2, No. 463, pp. 591-593, John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Carleton, 18 Dec 1624. This letter is also SP14/176/65.}

### 3. Billeting the Army in Dover and Kent

The original plan called for the soldiers to board their ships immediately upon their arrival in Dover, so that there would be virtually no need to billet soldiers in Dover.\footnote{SP14/176/14, Locke to Carleton; 4 Dec 1624.} However, the ships that were at Dover were not ready and not enough ships had arrived at Dover.\footnote{SP14/177/19, Hippisley to Nicholas, 26 Dec 1624; SP14/177/20, Sir Richard Bingley to Buckingham; 26 Dec 1624. SP14/177/34, William Jones to Nicholas; 27 Dec 1624. SP14/177/42, Hippisley to Nicholas; 30 Dec 1624.} Many of the ships required the installation of bulkheads to hold supplies while at sea.\footnote{SP14/181/26, Hippisley to Sec. Conway; 7 Jan 1624/1625.} By 25 December, “8000 foot and some horse” had arrived in Dover, but the men could not board the ships as originally planned. The Governor of Dover Castle, Sir John Hippisley, and the Mayor of the Town and two deputy lieutenants requested the Privy Council to allow them to billet the men in adjacent towns, since Dover did not have food to feed them all.\footnote{SP14/177/17, Sir John Hippisley et al. to the P.C.; 25 Dec 1624. Also \textit{APC}, Vol. 39, pg. 409, P. C. to Hippisley; 26 Dec 1624.} The Council agreed, and they soon placed
thousands of recruits in billets in the surrounding county and in towns as far a way as Canterbury, while a thousand or two remained in Dover.

The surviving documents give little information on how the officials in Kent administered the billeting, except to say that the Privy Council largely left the billeting arrangements to the Mayor of Dover, Sir John Hippisley and the Deputy Lieutenants of Kent since they had requested permission to do so. Presumably, they assigned soldiers to billets in Dover and nearby villages with the help of constables, while the Mayor and Aldermen in larger towns like Canterbury did the same in their towns. There was no planning for large amounts of food or lodging before the troops arrived in Dover, since the royal government did not expect the soldiers to stay in Dover longer than a night or two before being ferried out to their ships.

Within a few days, the Mayor of Dover and Deputy Lieutenants of Kent from the surrounding countryside reported all sorts of “outrages” committed by the soldiers: pulling down fences and even houses, stealing livestock, stealing provisions from carts before the carts reached Dover and robbing homes, shops and people on the street. The next day the Mayor again reported that the soldiers were committing “great outrages”. Perhaps the soldiers deserve pity as well, for they were probably using the house timbers for firewood to keep warm and the cattle for food and selling the other goods for food or clothing. The mayor reported that no food or other provisions could be brought into town because the soldiers took it all off the carts before the food got into town and asked that provisions be sent from London. When the town officers arrested offending soldiers

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18 SP14/177/18, Sir John Hippisley to the P.C.; 26 Dec 1624. The signature at the bottom of this letter is that of the mayor of Dover, not Hippisley as the C. S.P.D. has it.
and placed them in prison, their fellows soon broke them out. The town officials sent the letter containing this information in the hands of a sailor who had gotten into an argument with some soldiers. The soldiers carried the sailor off, intending to hang him, but the Mayor and Sir John Hippisley rescued the sailor with “much ado”.19

Francis Wilsford described the soldiers as “jailbirds and rascals” sent to plague the county, killing an abundance of sheep and anything else they could catch, threatening to break into houses and burn down the town, and generally stealing or eating anything in sight.20 Wilsford commented that the people of Dover and Kent were in great misery and in fear of the marauding soldiers. A letter from William Jones reported that soldiers killed 140 of one man’s sheep in a night as well as a bull and 70 sheep of another man.21 The shopkeepers were so afraid of the recruits that they would not open their doors. According to Jones, the people of the town and its immediate surroundings were already in great misery and fear although the soldiers had been in Dover less than a week. He reported no violence between soldiers and the town’s people, but rather that the inhabitants were hiding in their houses and trying to avoid the recruits. Sir John Hippisley reported to Secretary Nicholas on 30 December that there were not enough ships to carry the soldiers and supplies and that they needed the Lord Admiral’s help desperately.22 The soldiers continued to burn houses, small boats, and ship masts and the

19 Ibid., SP14/177/18.
20 SP14/177/33, Francis Wilsford to Nicholas; 27 Dec 1624. Wilsford describes the recruits as “gaol birds”.
21 SP14/177/34, William Jones to Nicholas; 27 Dec 1624.
22 SP14/177/42, Sir John Hippisley to Nicholas; 30 Dec 1624. SP14/177/47, Hippisley to Sec. Conway; 31 Dec 1624. SP14/177/48, Hippisley and the Mayor of Dover to the P.C.; 31 Dec 1624.
recruits continued to release any soldiers that the constables imprisoned. Hippisley further wrote that the soldiers were so insolent that no man dared walk the town and that the soldiers threatened to hang the mayor and burn the town. Hippisley and the Mayor of Dover reported that the soldiers had utterly wasted the countryside for 10 or 12 miles around. As might be expected, the people in the countryside reacted to protect their livelihoods and their families. There were arguments and fights between the inhabitants and the soldiers and a number (“divers”) of soldiers and civilians had died in the disorders in the countryside. The soldiers were mutinous for want of authority to punish them according to the local authorities, and, although the local authorities had requested such authority, in the form of a Commission for Martial Law, from the Privy Council, they had not yet received in late December. Hippisley and the Mayor endangered themselves to protect the town from utter ruin by preventing soldiers from pulling down houses. The soldiers clamored for money to buy food and Mansfeld claimed he had none, but the town came up with £200 for those billeted in the town, which kept things relatively quiet for only a few days. According to Hippisley, six companies, which he wanted to send to other places, would not move without conduct money.

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23 SP14/177/48, Hippisley, the Mayor of Dover and the Justices of Kent to Sec. Conway; 31 Dec 1624. SP14/177/47, Hippisley to Conway; 31 Dec mentions only that “some soldiers” were killed.

24 The general opinion among lawyers was that the common law did not convey the power to discipline the King’s soldiers. (Boynton, Martial Law and the Petition of Right, pp. 257-58.)

25 SP14/177/47, Hippisley to Sec. Conway; 31 Dec 1624.
Hippisley and the Mayor of Dover feared that soldiers who had occupied houses in the towns would seize weapons in the houses.\textsuperscript{26} Another letter described the devastation in the countryside.\textsuperscript{27} The soldiers were still going out into the country and stealing numbers of sheep, swine and poultry, and doing it all in the open. They had killed the cows of poor “milk women” as well as pregnant cows and ewes and burned up plows, wagons and wagon wheels. If this continued, the author wrote, the country, the town and the soldiers were all likely to starve. The soldiers continued to pull down fence rails and posts and to pull down poor men’s houses, to break up small boats and large planks and ship’s masts, all of which they burned in the houses they occupied. They forced entry into houses and shops and pilfered them for things to sell. Soldiers at the pier stole the rings right off of a Mrs. Barrett’s fingers. The author of the letter ascribed the troubles to the absence of army officers to keep the men disciplined as well as to the lack of martial law.\textsuperscript{28} Another letter reported that unruly soldiers had badly injured Sir Thomas Dutton, a Lieutenant Colonel.\textsuperscript{29}

In the midst of this chaos, Secretary Conway, being the experienced army officer he was, wrote to Hippisley and the Mayor of Dover suggesting that they call in the Earl of Lincoln, the commanding officer, and his colonels and take their advice for

\textsuperscript{26} SP14/177/48, Hippisley, the Mayor of Dover and the Justices of Kent to Sec. Conway; 31 Dec 1624.

\textsuperscript{27} SP14/177/44; 30 Dec 1624. This letter is calendared from Richard Marsh to Sec. Nicholas, but the signature appears to be someone else’s, perhaps Hippisley’s. However, it doesn’t look like Hippisley’s signature on other documents.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., SP14/177/44.

\textsuperscript{29} SP14/181/9, Sir John Ogle to Carleton; 2 Jan 1624/25.
disciplining the soldiers.\textsuperscript{30} He also said that they should take care to pay the soldiers in timely fashion, since it would be “too hard a course” to give them no allowance for food and then punish them for offences. However, Conway continued, the local officials must keep the soldiers content with the daily amount allowed by the government in London. Conway further suggested that the best method to keep the soldiers out of trouble was to have them practice with their arms. However, given the tenor of the reports from Kent, it seems possible that Conway did not understand the situation. In a positive action, the Privy Council ordered the Lord Lieutenant of Kent to call out the trained bands to restore order and ordered those in charge in Dover to punish offendors, but not to err in the “severe way of shedding blood without great cause”\textsuperscript{31}.

The soldiers continued to march around in large groups, plundering as they went and some then left for their home counties, reducing the size of the army by nearly a third according to one report, although I suspect that the number of desertions was exaggerated, as near 12,000 were reported to have shipped out in February\textsuperscript{32}. On a brighter note, in mid-January two officers wrote to Secretary Conway that soldiers billeted in Canterbury had behaved well.\textsuperscript{33} The problems in Kent were common knowledge in London by early January, as the Venetian ambassador wrote to the Doge and Senate “The Count of Mansfeld already has all his troops from this kingdom

\textsuperscript{30} SP14/177/46, Sec. Conway to Sir John Hippsley; 31 Dec 1624.

\textsuperscript{31} APC Vol. 39, pg. 409, P.C. to Lieut. of Dover Castle (Hippsley) and the Mayor of Dover et al.; 26 Dec 1624 and pp. 410-411, P.C. to the Earl of Montgomery, L.L. of Kent; 31 Dec 1624.

\textsuperscript{32} SP14/177/34, Wm. Jones to Nicholas from Dover; 27 Dec. 1624.

\textsuperscript{33} SP14/181/51, Sir John Ogle and Sir William St. Leger to Conway; 13 Jan 1624/25.
together, but they have committed grave excesses, to the disgust of the people and exciting the king’s bitterness. Want of discipline caused the trouble”.\textsuperscript{34} The complaints about the soldiers’ behavior declined in the second half of January as the Commission for Martial law had its effects, as the soldiers boarded ship and, probably, and as some of the money advanced by Burlamachi arrived in Kent and was used to buy food and clothing for the soldiers.\textsuperscript{35} At last, the soldiers were embarked over a period of a week or so, and, after being on board for a week while their landing place was negotiated with the Dutch and the French, they sailed on 31 January 1624/25, no doubt to the relief of the people of Kent. John Chamberlain reported to Carleton that the fleet was off Flushing with the soldiers half starved by 26 February.\textsuperscript{36}

**4. Conclusion**

A review of the available information reveals at least a few reasons for the problems. One was the lack of money. The Court and the Exchequer persuaded the Council of War in October 1624 to authorize the Parliamentary Treasurers to pay Mansfeld £15,000 for the expenses of levying the troops and another £40,000 to pay the men for two months (nominally for the months of October and November). However, by the end of the year, Mansfeld said that he had spent the money, though some were

\textsuperscript{34} Allen B. Hinds. ed., *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating To English Affairs. Existing In the Archives and Collections of Venice, And In Other Libraries of Northern Italy*, Vol. XVIII. 1623 – 1625 [London: 1912, Kraus Reprint, 1970], No. 769, pg. 552; 17 Jan 1625(N.S.).

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. Prince Charles offered to pawn his jewels to secure the money. The *Calendar* also incorrectly states that the billeting allowance was 8p. per day per man, which was the full pay or a days conduct money in 1624 or , rather than the lending.

\textsuperscript{36} SP14/184/47, Chamberlain to Carleton; 26 Feb 1624/25.
doubtful that he had. When Mansfeld asked for the £20,000 due for December, no cash was available, for by this time, the resources of the Parliamentary Treasurers were exhausted. After a delay, the crown found the money with the help of Burlamachi, the London financier, who loaned the crown the money on Prince Charles personal security.

Second, local authorities claimed initially that they had no power to punish soldiers, as the soldiers were the King’s servants. Although problems continued through January, the crimes do seem to have been fewer in number after the royal government issued a Commission for Martial Law for Kent in early January. The authorities in Kent requested a Commission for Martial Law in early or mid-December, but the authorizing document did not arrive from London until 2 January 1624/25. After the Commission got into operation, it soon sentenced several solders to death for various crimes and actually hung one soldier for house breaking. After that, Hippisley reported, the soldiers’ behavior was much improved. He remarked that, had the Commission been received a few weeks earlier, Kent would have saved £40,000 in costs and damages. A court martial sentenced another mutinous soldier to death, but the officers, “being tender

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37 Gardiner, Vol. 5, pp. 271-272. SP14/174/87, Sir William Beecher to Sec. Conway; 18 Nov 1624. What Mansfeld did with the money he had been given is not clear, but he did have two or three regiments of Germans under arms on the continent and he may have used the money to keep these regiments together. SP14/174/43i, Council of War to Conway; 11 Nov 1624 mentions Mansfeld’s soldiers of “other countries” and SP14/176/16, Careton to Carleton; 4 Dec 1624 mentions his “Hamburg soldiers”.


39 SP14/181/26, Hippisley to Sec. Conway; 7 Jan 1624/25.

40 SP14/181/11, Hippisley to Buckingham; 2 Jan 1624/25 and SP14/181/26, Hippisley to Sec. Conway; 7 Jan 1624/25.
in shedding blood”, asked the French Ambassador, who was traveling to London, to seek his pardon, which the ambassador did. The plea saved the man but did much good in frightening the soldiers. 41 This was the first instance of a sentiment, prominent among army and navy officers, in later troubles with soldiers and sailors: if the authorities hanged a transgressor, the hanging might create more problems by further aggravating the soldiers or sailors. This attitude and such actions on the part of the officers contributed over the years to the opinion in the communities which billeted soldiers that the officers and Commissions for Martial Law did not punish the soldiers for their felonies and crimes against the billetters and the members of the community.

Third, the officials in Kent responsible for billeting the troops and getting them onboard the ships also ascribed the problems, in part, to the lack of army officers to supervise the men. Apparently, the army commanders, the Earl of Lincoln and his colonels, were not exercising their responsibilities in this respect, since Secretary Conway suggested that Hippisley meet with them to get their advice. 42 In fact, Conway’s instructions to Hippisley perhaps reveal more about Conway than about the situation in Kent. Conway was an experienced senior military officer who had spent many years serving in the United Provinces and his instructions closely follow the practices of the Dutch army described in Chapter 1. Whether these practices were applicable to the disorganized rabble of an army in Kent is debatable. Exercising the troops every day was not possible if the army’s officers were not present and paying them regularly was not possible if there was no money with which to pay them.

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41 SP14/181/11, Hippisley to Buckingham; 3 Jan 1624/25
42 SP14/177/46, Sec. Conway to Sir John Hippisley; 31 Dec 1624.
The local authority’s and the people’s response to soldier’s violence is curious. There are many documents that mention the people of Kent’s fear of the soldiers, but only two mention fights between civilians and soldiers in which some soldiers and civilians died. The two letters do not mention the number of confrontations nor is one singled out, so they must have involved only a few participants on each side. The Privy Council ordered the Deputy Lieutenants of Kent to call out the trained bands of the militia in early January, more than a week after the first reports of violence in Kent arrived in London. Since the Privy Council reprimanded the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex for not calling out the trained bands, it is obvious that deputy lieutenants had this power but did not use it in Kent or Essex until the Council ordered them to do so. However, local constables were arresting soldiers for crimes, since there are several reports of soldiers breaking their fellows out of jail. The Kentish officials believed the army officers should control the problems since the soldiers were the king’s servants, but after several weeks of disorder and violence, the officials did not, or could not, mount an adequate guard at the jails. The people of Dover and Kent were overwhelmed by the large number of soldiers and the lack of preparation for their stay, but surely they could have done more to protect themselves.

The soldiers were in the Dover area and Kent for only a short time compared to other expeditions - from around 25 December until late January, only five or six weeks - but the amount of damage and the number of crimes were alarming. However, the royal government learned something about matters of organization and billeting and they applied the knowledge to the next expedition, though not completely successfully. The
crown issued a Commission for Martial Law and a Commission for Soldiers for Devon and Cornwall in May 1625 for the next Expedition, the voyage to Cadiz. The royal government intended these Commissions to better control billeting activities and to better protect the populace from the depredations of the soldiers, but the Commissions led to other problems and complaints. In addition, the government made some money available at first, though the local officials complained that the money was not sufficient, and that it was not available in a timely fashion.
1. Introduction

The next expedition that England mounted was an attack on the Spanish Coast under the command of Sir Edward Cecil. Originally, it was to leave for Spain in June 1625, but because of various problems, it did not sail until early October 1625, very late in the sailing season. Therefore, the expeditionary army was in billets around Plymouth in Devon and Cornwall for four months, from early June until the beginning of October. After attacking Cadiz unsuccessfully, the fleet left the Spanish coast and sailed for home in November, arriving in British waters in early December. Storms badly damaged many of the ships during the fleet’s return, and a number of ships landed at ports on the southern coast of Ireland. The central government ordered the Commission at Plymouth to billet the returning troops in Devon and Cornwall, where they stayed until the summer of 1626.¹

As part of the preparation for billeting operations in Devon and Cornwall, the Privy Council created the first Commission for Soldiers and established a Commission for Martial Law before the army assembled. The Commissions were useful, as Devon and Cornwall encountered difficulties with the soldiers similar to those that occurred in

Kent earlier in 1625, particularly after the Cadiz Expedition returned. During the period from the army’s return from Cadiz until the army moved to other counties in 1626, the sources reveal a change of opinion among the local authorities concerning the presence of the army in their area. The authorities in Devon and Cornwall apparently welcomed the troops initially as a source of additional income for the counties and then became desperate to rid the counties of the army when the money ceased to come from London and problems with the soldiers increased. This change of opinion, together with other pieces of evidence presented in following Chapters gives a strong indication of the importance that billeting costs had in creating discontent over billeting in England. Soldiers’ crimes and bad behavior certainly created some of the discontent, as it did in Kent, but in Cornwall and Devon, the crimes did not rise to as high a level as they did in Kent until after the royal government ceased providing money to pay for billeting expenses.

2. Preparing to Sail – May through September 1625

a. The Army Comes to Cornwall and Devon

Assembly of the army for the Cadiz Expedition started officially on 5 May 1625 with the Privy Council’s issue of orders to press 9150 men out of virtually all of the counties of England and Wales. The Council ordered the pressed men to march to the rendezvous at Plymouth by 25 May 1625, with the counties, as usual, providing coats and 8d. per day per man conduct money until the recruits reached Plymouth.\(^2\) To help

\(^2\) _APC_, Vol. 40, pp. 42-45, P.C. to L.L.s; 5 May 1625.
matters along, in April and May, the London government arranged to borrow £60,000 from the City, with crown land as collateral and in August and September, £98,000 came into the treasury from the new Queen’s marriage portion. The King also issued a proclamation on 15 May calling on all the counties through which the soldiers would pass to take steps to “restrain” their disorders.

On 16 May, the Privy Council issued a letter to the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon and Cornwall, telling them to prepare to receive and billet 8000 soldiers in and around Plymouth by 25 May and appointing Sir John Ogle to command the new army temporarily. The Council specifically warned the deputy lieutenants “to protect the provisions [being brought to market] and the area from depredations by the soldiers”, another indication that a lesson had been learned from problems in Kent. This letter probably arrived in Devon about a week before the Privy Council had ordered the recruits to arrive, though the press order of 5 May gave the people of Devon and Cornwall some advance warning that the recruits would be there at the end of the month. The letter also mentioned the Council’s worries about two epidemics (called “spotted fever” and “the plague”) which were affecting Plymouth and the nearby town of Osen. The Council therefore ordered that the Commission prevent soldiers billeted in these areas from contacting infected persons. These epidemics may

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4 Coll. Procs. Car. I, No. 12, 15 May 1625 (from C.S.P.D. 16/2, pg. 23.)

5 APC, Vol. 40, pg. 55, P.C. to Sir Francis Drake et al.; 16 May 1625. Additional instructions were sent on 23 May (APC Vol. 40, pp. 67,68, P.C. to Sir Francis Drake et al.) and another to the L.L.s of Devon and Cornwall; 23 May 1625).
have been the sources of the sicknesses that affected the soldiers on the Expedition, and that they later brought back to Plymouth. However, there was a notable epidemic in most of southern England in the summer of 1625, the one that prompted the Parliament of 1625 to adjourn to Oxford that summer.

On 23 May, the Privy Council issued an order creating a Commission for Soldiers, the first of these Commissions created during the war years. The Commission “empowered and required” Sir John Ogle, the senior army officer in the area, the Mayor of Plymouth, the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon and Cornwall and others to provide billeting, and also watches and security to prevent problems with the soldiers during their stay in Devon and Cornwall before the Expedition left. At the same time, the Council also issued a Commission for Martial Law, demonstrating that they had learned something from the assembly of recruits in Kent for the Mansfeld Expedition in December and January 1624/25. The short time between the press order on 5 May, the notification to the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon and Cornwall on 16 May, the issuance of the two Commissions on 23 May and the scheduled arrival of the recruits on 25 May is surprising. The press order must certainly have given the Deputy Lieutenants in Devon and Cornwall warning that soldiers would arrive in three weeks. On the other hand, the Privy Council may have intended the short notice to minimize the number of complaints from the Plymouth area, as was the case in Essex concerning a rendezvous of recruits at

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7 SP16/2/84, King to Mayor of Plymouth; 23 May 1625.
Harwich in 1627.\textsuperscript{8} However, the delays and problems in procuring and outfitting ships over the next four months, leading to delays in the expedition’s departure, also indicate a hastily conceived plan.

In addition to the press of recruits to go to Plymouth, the Privy Council ordered a press of 2000 men to assemble at Hull by 25 May and from there to be transported to the United Provinces. In the United Provinces, they were to be exchanged for 2000 English veterans, who in turn were to be transported to Plymouth.\textsuperscript{9} As it turned out, the Dutch refused to release the veterans and the raw levies from Hull went to Plymouth by ship after going to the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{10} Sir Edward Cecil, who was still in the Netherlands, complained to Secretary Conway that the Dutch refused to let him select the experienced officers and men he wanted, but rather insisted that he take whole companies so that the companies would not remain in Dutch pay. Cecil pointed out that the English companies in the Netherlands were mostly new men who had replaced those lost to sickness over the previous winter and would be of no more use than new recruits would.\textsuperscript{11} Since England could reach no agreement with the Dutch, the levies from Hull continued on to Plymouth. Captain William Courtney, who was the conductor for the men from Hull to the Netherlands and the veterans from there to Plymouth, wrote to the Privy Council on 24 May requesting instructions on how to distribute pay to the soldiers and to whom he was

\textsuperscript{8} See Chap. 7, Sec. 3 for information on this incident.

\textsuperscript{9} APC, Vol. 40, pp. 54, P.C. to L.L.s of Lincoln, Nottingham and Derby; 16 May 1625.

\textsuperscript{10} SP16/2/102, Courtney to Sec. Conway; 30 June 1625.

\textsuperscript{11} Sir Edward Cecil to Mr. Sec. Conway from The Hague, 2 June 1625. Anon., 
to hand them over in the Low Countries. 12 Courtney wrote again on 4 June to tell the
Privy Council that only 1600 men had arrived at Hull. 13 A set of notes from Secretary
Conway to himself, dated 16 May, show that English government had not yet notified the
States General of the United Provinces, at least officially, that it was going to make this
exchange. These notes also mentioned that the Council had not yet notified Sir John
Ogle to go to Plymouth and take command, and that they needed to send letters to
Plymouth telling the local officials that troops were coming and to find them billets. In
addition, the Council needed to notify Courtney to go to Hull. 14 Courtney’s letter and
Conway’s note provide more evidence that the planning, experience and perhaps the
competence of the royal government were questionable and that it therefore needed to
make decisions very quickly.

By 30 May the recruits were arriving in some numbers and the Mayor of
Plymouth wrote a letter to the Privy Council telling them that their order to billet
10,000(sic) soldiers had been received and that they were doing their best to find billets,
but that the billeting allowance of 2s. 6d. per week (a little over 4d. per day) brought
complaints both from the soldiers and the billetters, particularly since the soldiers had
been allowed 8d. per day conduct money on their march to Plymouth. 15 The Mayor

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12 SP16/2/88, Courtney to P.C.; 24 May 1625 and SP16/2/121, same to same; May (?) 1625. The second contains notes on the P.C.’s answers.

13 SP16/3/22, Courtney to P.C.; 4 Jun 1625.

14 SP16/2/65, Conway to himself; 16 May 1625. However, there was some understanding about such an exchange in a treaty between England and the United Provinces a year earlier (Gardiner, Vol. 6, pg. 6).

15 SP16/3/33i, Conway to the P.C.; 5 Jun 1625. Capt. Courtney also reported that the people of Hull were unhappy with the rate of 4d. per day. (SP16/3/22, Courtney to the P.C.; 4 June 1625).
asked for an “amendinge of theire paie”. He also mentioned that they were having a great deal of trouble keeping the soldiers in order because there were few army officers present to take charge of them. Secretary Conway took these matters to the King and responded to the Council who in turn responded to the gentlemen of the West Country that Sir John Ogle and a number of other officers, who would probably arrive before the letter, were on their way. As for the soldiers pay, the King had decided that 2s. 6d. per week for the lending was satisfactory and had created no grievance when the crown billeted troops around Plymouth in the past and that would be the rate now. The Council letter also remarked that if the Devonians could find precedents for a higher rate in the past, the King would take it into his gracious consideration. On 11 June, Lord Treasurer Ley notified Secretary Conway that money for the soldiers had been sent to Plymouth and to Hull, but, that this, together with several other payments to the Navy and the King of Denmark, had completely exhausted the cash in the Exchequer.

At first, problems with soldiers were not as serious or as numerous as they were in Kent in December and January. On June 12, Ogle reported a mutiny of an Essex contingent against their conductor, which might have been about withheld pay or conduct money. (A contingent of Londoners may have been involved in this mutiny, as the Commissioners for Martial Law reported in a letter from Plymouth to the Privy Council)

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16 SP16/3/33, /33i, 33ii and SP16/3/36 and /36i; 5 June 1625. The penciled numbers on the manuscripts SP16/3/33i and /33ii are reversed from the manuscript numbers in the Calendar of State Papers, Domestic. I have used the penciled numbers on the manuscripts.

17 APC Vol. 40, pg. 94, P.C. to Sir Francis Drake et al. at Plymouth; 6 June 1625.

18 SP16/3/52, Lord Treasurer Ley to Sec. Conway; 11 June 1625.

19 SP16/3/55, Sir John Ogle to the Earl of Pembroke; 12 Jun 1625.
that some Londoners had mutinied on the march.\textsuperscript{20} As a result of the investigation, the local authorities hanged one of the ringleaders of the mutiny. In his letter of 12 June, Sir John Ogle also reported to Secretary Conway that the condition of the recruits in Plymouth was poor. There were not enough officers to control the men, the men were poorly clothed, and many men were “insufficient”.\textsuperscript{21} He described the “insufficient” men as “lame, impotent, and unable men unfitt for actuall service”.\textsuperscript{22} The Commissioners for Soldiers at Plymouth reported much the same on 18 June. They also transmitted a copy of a petition from the soldiers to the Commission to the effect that the recruits had been impressed and sent away so quickly that they could not make use of their own resources or those of friends to help them on the march. They had worn out their shoes and stockings and their feet were bare, and they had no change of clothes so that “wee shalbe eaten upp with vermine”.\textsuperscript{23} Still, the soldiers seem respectful and the Commissioners confirmed the truth of their complaints. It is perhaps noteworthy that some of the pressed men were willing to use their own resources to equip themselves for the service; they may have had some idea of what to expect.

Sir John Ogle sent Captain Hone to survey the levies in Devon and Captain Leigh to survey the contingents in Cornwall during early July, and they confirmed the problems

\textsuperscript{20} SP16/5/47, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 15 Aug 1625. The letter does not mention the cause of the mutiny, nor its date. The mutiny is not mentioned in Captain Leigh’s report on the condition of troops, discussed later in this Chapter.

\textsuperscript{21} SP16/3/55, Sir John Ogle to the Earl of Pembroke; 12 Jun 1625 and SP16/3/59, Ogle to Sec. Conway; 12 June 1625 and SP16/3/67, Ogle to Conway; 14 June 1625. SP16/3/67 mentions Capt. Edward Leigh’s survey, reported in SP16/2/160 and discussed later.

\textsuperscript{22} SP16/3/83, Ogle to Conway; 18 June 1625.

\textsuperscript{23} SP16/3/81, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 18 June 1625.
in detail, while Captain Courtney reported similar problems at Hull.\textsuperscript{24} Indeed, Courtney described the pressed men at Hull as the most ‘unruly’ he had ever met, particularly those from Northumberland.\textsuperscript{25} Although Ogle had already initiated the survey, the Privy Council sent a letter demanding complete information on the outrages the soldiers had committed on the march to Plymouth, their physical inadequacies and their lack of clothes, which the impressing county should have supplied. The Council also demanded to know the soldier’s misdemeanors while at Plymouth and also wanted a list of officers who had not yet come to Plymouth as well as a report on the competence of the officers who were at Plymouth.\textsuperscript{26} The Council’s demand was probably in response to the letters from Ogle and the Commission at Plymouth describing the conditions, and perhaps due to complaints from counties on the line of march to Plymouth. This letter mentioned that the Privy Council had heard of misbehavior from other sources, but those sources are not identified in the Council’s letter. From the content and the rather stern tone of the letter, it appears that the Privy Council intended to prevent the development of conditions like those that had prevailed in Kent.

In a letter dated 30 June, Ogle informed the Privy Council that the survey was underway and noted that they were unlikely to find much information on soldiers’ misdemeanors, as neither they nor their conductors were likely to inform on themselves.

\textsuperscript{24} SP 16/3/101, Ogle to the P.C.; 30 June 1625. SP16/3/107, Capt. William Courtney to Sec. Conway; June 1625. Leigh’s report survives and is discussed below.

\textsuperscript{25} SP16/3/107, Capt. William Courtney to Sec. Conway; June 1625. Perhaps this was because they were from the ‘wild’ north?

\textsuperscript{26} APC, Vol. 40 pp. 99-100, P.C. to Mayor of Plymouth, Ogle and Commissioners at Plymouth; 23 June 1625.
He further noted that there had not been the least complaint from the people of Devon about the soldiers. Indeed, there was a “good friendliness” between the soldiers and the local people. In fact, said Ogle, the Commissioners had told him that “they have not at any tyme (havinge divers tymes had armiess upon this theyr bosom) knowne ye soldje[r]s in better order and where there hath been so little occasion given for justice to use the sword”.\footnote{SP16/3/101, Ogle to the P.C.; 30 June 1625.} It may be questioned whether the behavior of the soldiers in Devon and Cornwall was that good, but they had been there no more than a month and money for billeting was not yet an issue.\footnote{See SP16/3/52, Lord Treasurer Ley to Sec. Conway; 11 Jun 1625.} However, it does appear from the Privy Council letter to Ogle that behavior was worse than Ogle described it, though the Council’s information was most likely about behavior on the march to Plymouth.\footnote{APC, Vol. 40 pp. 99-100, P.C. to Mayor of Plymouth et al.; 23 June 1625.}

On 28 June, the Privy Council sent a letter to the Commission for Soldiers at Plymouth instructing them to provide clothes for the soldiers at the King’s expense, promising to send money to pay for the clothing as soon as the Council received an account of the amount expended from the Commissioners.\footnote{APC, Vol. 40, pg. 105, P.C. to the Mayor of Plymouth and the Commissioners; 28 Jun 1625.} The clothiers and shoemakers of Devon and Cornwall no doubt welcomed this order and it may have led to their disappointment and their financial problems with a similar supply order after the soldiers returned from Cadiz.\footnote{See Sec. 3 below on clothing supply.} By mid-July, the Commissioners at Plymouth reported to the Privy Council that they had arranged to supply the soldiers with the necessary
clothing. They also reported that they had received £9312 from the Lord Treasurer and paid out £7400 for soldier’s billeting and that they would use £1000 for the clothing, leaving enough money for less than a week’s pay. The Commissioners also warned of dangerous consequences if more money were not forthcoming due to the poverty of the local country people and the needs of the soldiers. The amounts quoted in the letter indicate that the cost of billeting the recruits was running about £1000 a week and that Devon and Cornwall had received nearly £10,000, which must have been quite an addition to the local economy. On the other hand, the Lord Treasurer reported to the Privy Council many times from the summer of 1625 until the end of the year that there was no money in the Exchequer.

At the end of July, the Commissioners at Plymouth again respectfully asked the Privy Council for more money since they were out of cash, the billeters were becoming angry and the soldiers were complaining of hunger, and they again expressed their fear that the unpaid troops would commit outrages and misdemeanors. Sir John Ogle also wrote to the Privy Council with the same request and the same warning. Interestingly, Ogle said in his letter that the Commission did not dare put arms in the hands of these soldiers until the full complement of officers arrived for fear the soldiers will be “emboldened to insolencies which nowe they are not soe well hartened to undertake.”

32 SP16/4/109, commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 23 Jul 1625.
33 See for example SP16/3/52, Lord Treasurer Ley to Sec. Conway; 11 Jun 1625 and SP16/4/92, Ley to Conway; 20 Jul 1625.
34 SP16/4/149, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 30 July 1625.
35 SP16/4/139i, Sir John Ogle to the P.C.; 28 July 1625.
Soldiers with weapons did indeed commit many nasty ‘insolencies’ in 1627 and 1628, such as the indignities inflicted on Joane Chapman and others in Maldon, Essex, and so it appears that Sir John knew his men. In the meantime, those officers who were there were “borrowing [the services of] so manie of their hosts and acquaintances” and they were training the men in both pike and musket drill.

The Commissioners also reported that some of the ships assembling in Plymouth harbor were putting a few sick men ashore under “sail cloth” (tents?) and at least five sailors had already died. They asked the Privy Council how they were to care for these sick men if the fleet sailed without them. In early August James Bagg, one of the deputy lieutenants, personally wrote to the Duke of Buckingham, telling him that the sailors lacked clothes and this was causing sickness, but there were few surgeons to tend the sick men. Bagg thought the same would soon be true of the soldiers. Throughout July the refrain continued, as the Commissioners for Soldiers asked the Privy Council for money to fill the empty stomachs of the soldiers and the empty purses of the billeters and they continued to write in this vein until the fleet sailed.

On 12 August, the Commissioners again asked the Privy Council to send a second supply of money as they had not paid the soldiers for three weeks and expenses were rising due to the arrival of additional officers. The Commissioners mentioned in the letter that the soldiers are “dejected” because of the lack of pay and their “diminished

36 SP16/4/129, Mayor of Plymouth and Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C; 26 Jul 1625.
37 SP16/5/6, James Bagg to Buckingham; 2 Aug 1625.
38 SP16/4/149, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 30 Jul 1625.
dyett” and the billetters are complaining of the expense and trouble of the soldiers.

Making matters even worse was the fact that, while the royal government had not paid the money for billeting, collection of the next installment of the subsidy was due shortly in the two counties. The Commissioners were telling the soldiers and the billetters that the honorable and bounteous nature of the King would see these problems solved. However, the Commissioners remarked, the billetters and soldiers were unlikely to accept these promises much longer and they were unlikely to remain in good order unless they received a real cash payment. Finally, the Commissioners questioned whether the Commission for Martial Law in the area should or could punish soldiers who committed “misdemeanors” because of “necessity and want”.  

b. The State of the Army; Press Abuses

The tribulations of the impressed soldiers contributed to their poor opinion of the royal government and the local officials, and no doubt predisposed some of them to commit crimes and outrages. These outrages became an important factor in the anger among the people of England, including the recruits, over billeting troops in private quarters. The trials of the pressed soldier began with abuses in the impressment process as well as abuses by the conductors and continued with difficulties in finding food and lodging. A report by Captain Edward Leigh, created in the summer of 1625, provides a view of the soldier’s problems not often seen in the surviving documents. On 15 August, the Commissioners at Plymouth sent the report from the surveys of the troops in Devon and Cornwall made by Captain Leigh and other officers to the Privy Council. In their

39 SP16/5/35, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 12 Aug 1625.
cover letter, the Commissioners reported that three Conductors behaved particularly badly and blamed a merchant from Exeter for problems with the coats of the men pressed in Devon. They also reported that the soldiers had not committed many outrages worthy of note on the march to Plymouth (this is no surprise), except for the mutiny by some of the men from London (Essex?) “out of whome choyse being made of the Ringleaders, the lott fell to one to suffer death by the proceeding of the Commission of Martiall lawe”.  

Prominent among the soldier’s complaints are the lack of pay and withholding of conduct money, and of the many abuses in the press of men to serve in the army. Though there are a number of descriptions of press abuses in the surviving documents, Captain Leigh’s report is the perhaps the most informative. Sir John Ogle had sent Captain Leigh and other officers to survey the troops late in June and early July, and they confirmed the problems in detail. The report we have appears to be a summary of a more detailed report, which was contained in a “Book of Particulars”, referred to in every section of the surviving report as containing more information. The document we have covers only some 2700 of the 9150 soldiers that the Privy Council ordered pressed, namely those from London, and 10 other counties, whereas the Council order called for the press of men from forty two counties of England and Wales as well as London and

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40 SP16/5/47, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 15 Aug 1625.

41 SP16/4/160; Report of Capt. Edward Leigh; July (?) 1625 and SP16/88/52; undated 1627. The second document is misidentified in the Calendar of State Papers, Domestic. Based on its unique format, the handwriting and some of the references, SP16/88/52 is undoubtedly part of the document calendared as SP16/4/160.

42 The “Book of Particulars” may have been Leigh’s field notes, as Stearns suggests. Stearns, “Conscription and English Society in the 1620s”, pg. 8.
Exeter. The contingents in the report are probably those billeted at the time in Cornwall, as the cover page of the report describes Captain Leigh as “Sarjent major of his majesty’s forces in Cornwall”. This is a long document (43 manuscript pages) giving the numbers of troops from each county then in Cornwall, the number of runaways, the number of sick, and the number who had died and more. The numerical information, the counties from which the men were pressed, and the names of the conductors may be found in Appendix C of this study.\textsuperscript{43} The total number of men pressed in these contingents came to 2743 and Captain Leigh found 2265 to be “able and sufficient”. The size of the contingents that arrived at Plymouth ranged from 63 from Cambridgeshire to 223 from Shropshire, the average size being 125 men. The report listed 192 “defective”, 183 runaways, 31 sick, 9 dead, 24 over aged, 2 “franticke”, 4 “purblind”, 3 foreigners, 24 released for other causes, and 6 no-shows from London. In this case, “defective” means the difference between the number of men listed in the indentures and the number ordered pressed by the Privy Council. The number of runaways and defectives amounted to 14 percent of the total ordered pressed, which is considerably less that the approximately 40 percent missing at Harwich two years later. Whether this increase in desertion was due to war weariness or the unpopularity of the Danish service, for which the government pressed the men at Harwich, is unknown.

Leigh’s Report also devotes many pages to the complaints of pressed men concerning the way they were pressed (many said it was illegal), bribes given to

\textsuperscript{43} The numbers of men in total and in some of the categories in the tabulation in Appendix C, which is taken from Leigh’s Report, varies from those in the Calendar of State Papers Domestic and in the Stearns article for mostly unknown reasons (Stearns, “Conscription and English Society in the 1620s”, pg. 8). The inclusion here of the data from SP16/88/52 is one variation. (See Note 41.)
conductors, bribes paid to justices of the peace, deputy lieutenants and constables for releasing men from the press. The men also complained that the deputy lieutenants and constables pressed men maliciously as revenge for past acts and pressed men who were exempt or who were obviously unfit. It is upon these complaints I wish to focus here.

First, soldiers’ ‘misdemeanors’ can be quickly dealt with. There is only one “misdemeanor” mentioned in the whole document. One of the companies from Kent admitted to stealing some geese while on the march to Plymouth. 44 Leigh reported that all the other companies said they had committed “noe misdemeanors”, though this is hard to believe. One other mention of a possible misdemeanor was this: “There is an Irish man which will not go to the church ... .” 45 In one place, Leigh admitted that Leicestershire men had been involved in “disorders” since their arrival in the Plymouth area. 46 Captain Leigh also said that “Most of the disorders which the souldiers have committed since there coming into the country hath groane by reason of there drinkinge in the alehouses wherein the inhabitants have bee noe lesse faultye then they”. In view of the prominence of Leicestershire men in the mutinies at Harwich in 1627, it seems the men of Leicestershire may have been much disaffected or just generally rowdy. The Earl of Huntington must have been ashamed.

The surviving parts of Captain Leigh’s report mention the condition of the soldiers’ clothing for every contingent, although he wrote nothing about their arms.

44 SP16/4/160, document pg. 38.
45 SP16/4/160, pg. 3 of the document.
46 SP16/4/160, document pg. 41.
Leigh reported one company to be “ill apparelled and in great necessitie”, and most are described as needing either shoes, stockings, shirts, breeches or doublets or several of these pieces of clothing. However, every company seems to have possessed coats provided by their county, and Captain Leigh appraised the coats to be worth anywhere from 5s. to 15s. apiece, depending on the county. Leigh also noted how many days in a week each company was “exercysed” by the conductor while on the march - some never, some three or four days a week and many every day. Presumably, the exercise was some sort of training in the handling of muskets or pikes, perhaps with wooden substitutes, but the report does not describe the nature of the exercise. Finally, the men of every company told Leigh that the conductors had withheld one to four days conduct money to which the soldiers were entitled. This was such a universal complaint that it seems the conductors regarded the practice much as the army captains regarded dead pays – a way to make money. One day’s conduct money at 8d. per day per man for the average size contingent of 125 men amounted to a sizable sum of £4 - 3s. for the conductor.

Another common complaint of the soldiers’ was of deputy lieutenants, constables, commissioners and conductors accepting bribes to release pressed men. The complaint usually came from a man pressed to take the place of one who had bribed a deputy lieutenant, a constable or the conductor. In one case, a man claimed that he offered to purchase an able substitute but that a constable refused his offer.47 Bribery was so

47 SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 38, item 4. The purchase of substitutes was not uncommon and is mentioned several times in SP16/4/160.
common that in 1628 the Star Chamber asserted that every deputy lieutenant in England was extorting money or accepting bribes to release men from the press.48

One well-documented case involved Sir Walter Vaughan, a Deputy Lieutenant of Wiltshire, and Sir Thomas Sadler. Pressed men and their relatives accused these men and their servants of asking for or taking bribes from at least 40 people to release soldiers who had been pressed for the Mansfeld Expedition in late 1624. Sadler and Vaughn no doubt took money from many more. In a letter of 28 January 1624/25, the Earl of Pembroke, Lord Lieutenant of Wiltshire, asked four other deputy lieutenants (or justices of the peace) to investigate reports of abuses in the recent press. The deputy lieutenants responded with the results of their investigation in a letter with the testimony of 40 persons on Sadler’s and Vaughn’s extortion and bribe taking.49 The total paid to the press officers, as recorded in the examinations, appears to be £36 6s. 4d. The maximum was £5 (one case) and the minimum was 5s. (four cases). The average was approximately 20s. or £1 per man. Sadler and his men and the others seem to have charged what the traffic would bear. There are 36 recorded payments for discharge from the service. Sadler and Vaughn also ordered the constables to impress more men than the number that the Privy Council had ordered, so that there were more men to attempt to extort money from and so that there would be enough men to meet the county quota after they released some of the pressed men or the deputy lieutenants excused them. The

48 Thomas Barnes, **Somerset, 1625-1640** . . [Harvard Univ. Press; 1961], pg. 255; based on Harvard Law School MS 1128 no. 48. (This reference was found in Stearns, *Conscription and English Society*, pg. 12.)

49 SP14/185/21 and /21i, D.L.s of Wiltshire to the Earl of Pembroke; 6 March 1624/25. This document numbers 39 examinations, but the writer mis-numbered, entering two as no. 34.
constables preferred to take a bribe and not press the man, since they had to bear the cost of his room and board until the constable turned him over to the conductor and the county did not reimburse the constables for more men than their official quota. No doubt the prospective recruit also preferred to pay 5s. to the constable rather than £2 to the deputy lieutenant. In this Wiltshire case, Sadler reportedly forced the constables to lay out money for billeting and for clothing for recruits and for which he later refused to reimburse them, threatening to jail the constables if they did not cooperate.

Constables’ and deputy lieutenants’ solicitation of bribes was often direct and quite forceful. One of the examinations in the document is that of Edward Sanders, who was pressed by Constable John Rowden. Sanders related that Rowden told Sir Thomas Sadler that he, Sanders, would give 20s. toward the appareling of another man if he were given his release. Sadler told Rowden to take the money and release Sanders. However, Rowden, knowing that Sanders had 40s. in his purse, demanded the whole 40s. Sanders gave Rowden 39s. 6d. which was all he had but Rowden at first refused, demanding 40s. Finally Rowden took the 39s. 6d., realizing that was all that Rowden had. Sanders went on to say that Rowden spent only 18s. for clothing. In another examination, the widow Elizabeth Rawlins and Elizabeth Mestbury stated that Constable John Franklin came to the widow Rawlins and told her that he would release her son Robert, who Franklin had pressed, if she would pay him 20s. Widow Rawlins refused at first, but Franklin explained that if she paid the money to buy clothes for a drummer, he would

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50 The observation comes from Stearns, Conscription and English Society, pg. 12.

51 SP16/4/125, Sir Francis Seymour et al. to the P.C.; 25 July 1625. This case was in connection with the press for the Mansfeld Expedition also.
release her son. Widow Rawlins paid Franklin 16s., whereupon Franklin demanded 16s. more. Widow Rawlins refused, as her son was already sick in bed. Franklin then told her that though her son Robert was off Sir Francis Seymour’s book, he was not off Franklin’s and that he would fetch Robert out of his bed and send him packing. Therefore, widow Rawlins paid the additional 16s. Robert Rawlins testified that Franklin told him that he could release one man and if Rawlins would give him the money to clothe a drummer, he would release Rawlins. In most of the other examinations, the witnesses simply stated that they gave money to a constable or one of Sadler’s servants and the constable or Sadler released them from service. Many of these incidents seem to have been common knowledge in Wiltshire. Complaints reached the Lord Lieutenant and eventually the Privy Council, for the Privy Council called Sadler before it, sent him to jail for a time, and then removed him from the Commission of the Peace.52 The Privy Council also summoned Sadler’s brother George and Constable Franklin to appear before it.53 The Council ordered Franklin to give the money back to Rawlins and others and to make a public admission of guilt at the next quarter sessions.

There are other reports of bribes given to release pressed men and of the investigations the Privy Council ordered in 1625. The reports involved conductors and Justices of the Peace and came from Welsh Counties, Leicestershire, the Isle of Ely and

52 *APC* Vol. 40, pg. 54, A Warrant to bring Sadler et al. before the P.C.; 16 May 1625. Pg. 66, Sadler appears before the P.C.; 23 May 1625. Pp. 78-79, the P.C.’s judgment against Sadler; 27 May 1625.

other areas. The Justices of the Peace and other local officials investigating the allegations invariably found that the conductors had been wrongly accused. Of course, the local officials may have wanted to cover up the offenses to protect themselves. After early 1626, allegations of this sort of bribery are scarce in the official records, but they must have continued if the Star Chamber statement in 1628 was valid.

Returning to Captain Leigh’s report, we find similar tales of press abuses. Town officials often pressed strangers and men visiting the town on personal business, such as a lawsuit. This was particularly common in London. There are two general notes to this effect in the sections on contingents from London. Men complained of conductors pressing them on the highway as they met a company on the march to Plymouth. However, in at least one case, soldiers in the company said the pressed man came willingly. Robert Sandall of Thetford said that a conductor pressed him on the highway and then the conductor released three cutpurses who gave the conductor £30 for their release.

A number of men complained that local officials pressed them even though they had disabilities. One had a crippled hand from a burn when he was a child and so could

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55 See pp. 205-206 above. The Chamber accused “every deputy lieutenant” in England of extorting money or accepting bribes to release men from the press.

56 SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 3. and also doc. pg. 15.

57 SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 6.

not handle a pike or musket.\textsuperscript{59} John Betts said that he had come to Norfolk to see a brother and a constable pressed him. When he complained to Commissioner Sir Charles Cornwallis that he was unfit because of a “broken leg” (perhaps a limp), Cornwallis answered that Betts was “stronger for it” and so would not release him.\textsuperscript{60} However, Betts did march from Norfolk to Plymouth on his broken leg, so perhaps he was not too badly off. The report described several as “purblind”, or partially blind. In all of these cases, excepting John Betts, the men also complained that the local officials would not allow them to tell of their disabilities.

Officials pressed several foreigners in London, two Dutchmen and a Frenchman, none of whom apparently spoke English. One of the Dutchmen complained that a friend, who was to take him to a theater, instead took him to Bridewell, a poor house, where, not understanding the language, the men in charge pressed him and held him captive. The London Aldermen would not listen to his translated story.\textsuperscript{61}

Press officers sometimes pressed men who were exempt from the press in spite of their exemption. One man was pressed in London while there on business, although he was a member of the trained militia in his county. A beneficed minister was pressed, Alderman Allen of London telling him that ministers “were best able to goe”.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{59} SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 4, item 4
\textsuperscript{60} SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 28, item 3.
\textsuperscript{61} SP16/4/160, doc. pg 7.
\textsuperscript{62} SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 9, item 6.
A number complained of being pressed for malice or “spleen”. For example, “Digorie Priske he alleagth: That he hath bin a sea-faring man this 20 yeares, he was prest by the malice of 8 Tynne (tin) Marchants who had sued him for £8200 in the Starre-Chamber, and emprisoned him who after wards being released, and walking in the Exchange by the device of the said Merchants (they sending a man to drincke a cup(?) of beere with him) caused him at that tyme to be prested”. Mr. Priske did not say if the Tin Merchants bribed someone to press him or just told the Constable he was available. In another case, “Nicholas Palmer of Abbington saieth he hath a wieffe and children and saith that he was pressed for malice, for that one Boucher dwelling weare his hous made means to have him pressed thereby thincking to obtaine his house”. In still another case, “Nicholas Cleark of Caster is an insufficient man who saieth that the Constable prest him when Sir Charles Cornewallis would not take him, but instead of him prest the Constable; shortly after the said Constable Nicholas Carter [Catter?] made his peace with Sir Thomas Holland, and so the said constable fetcht the said Cleark and prested him againe not with standing the said Cleark was 60 yeares ould and so was sent away”. 

Officials pressed men who were over age or under age. Michael Ireland was barely sixteen and a conductor pressed him off the highway. More commonly pressed

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63 SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 12, item 5.
64 SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 17, item 9.
65 SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 28, item 4.
were elderly men. Twenty-four men over sixty were released by Capt. Leigh. My favorite example is a man pressed for malice who was also over aged: “Ralph Hatt of Stamford saith that he hath left behind his 60th and that Sir Robert Knowles caused him to be prest because he went a fishing in a common poole.”67 Apparently, Sir Robert considered the fishing spot to be his private preserve.

A number of others complained of having a family or elderly parents to support, and who would be undone if they did not return home soon. I am not sure that these were grounds for exemption, but it must have put the pressed men in an ugly frame of mind and their dependents in desperate straits.

There were complaints that constables from other jurisdictions came into men’s houses and pressed them out of their beds and took them away from their families. “William Middleton saieth that a Constable came out of another parish and came into his house and prest him from his wiefe and children and that he hath left them behinde him, alleaging that if he be absent from them long they are likely to go a begging.”68

Several men mention being held for days under the press without the “king’s allowance” and so were forced to sell or pawn their clothes to buy food.69 Situations like this may be more common than reported and were possibly one of the reasons that Captain Leigh found that nearly all the men lacked adequate clothing. Many probably

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67 SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 17, item 5.
68 SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 14, item 2.
69 SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 19, item 4; doc. pg. 38, item 5.
did sell clothing for food or beer on the march, given the well nigh universal complaint
that conductors withheld several days conduct money.

One man may have gone out of a sense of patriotic duty. “Francis Everton prest
in Wollerhampton riding out of the towne was required by the high Constable Richard
Barnefeild to come before Sir Simon who prest him. The constable owing him some ill
will, he being a Gentleman refused the prese money and returned it to Sir Simon Weston
againe and said he would goe for his Kyng and Countrey voluntary; ....” Sir Simon also
pressed several visitors to Wolverhampton and the county.

In another case, involving neither the army nor Devon, but describing the
situation of many men pressed into the army and navy, Anne, the wife of Thomas Reade,
a disabled seaman pressed in Southampton, petitioned the Duke of Buckingham for the
release of her husband. Her first husband had been lost in the service of King James and
she later married Thomas Reade, who had signed on to a merchant vessel to Spain the
previous year. The ship and goods were lost, but the crew saved and Thomas retuned to
England as a seaman on a Weymouth ship and was awaiting his wages, which he had not
yet received. He was a “broken man” and he and his family were “utterly undone” for
lack of money. Then a naval press gang seized him to serve in the fleet preparing for
Cadiz. Anne asked for the release of her husband because of his “wants and brokenness”
and for the relief of his family, which included a small girl who was “decreped in her
limbs” and because “he cannot perform adequate service for the King”.  

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70 SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 19, item 5.

71 SP16/6/9, 3 Sep 1625. The petition is dated 2 Sep and calendared on 3 Sep. It is not clear how Thomas
got from Weymouth in Dorset to Southampton to be pressed, particularly when the petition states that he
It is clear from all the complaints that a sizable portion of the Cadiz Army was not happy. Bribery, withholding of conduct money, poor clothing, and the situation of families at home all conspired to create a situation in which the men might be prone to commit insolencies.

c. The Last Month, Final Preparations and Hungry Soldiers

To make up for the defective numbers, deserters, the lame, the sick and others released among the recruits billeted around Plymouth, the Privy Council issued orders on 23 August 1625 for a further press of 1950 men, nearly 20% of the 10,000 originally pressed (including those who went first to Hull and then to Plymouth). The pressed men were to be at Plymouth by 12 September. On the same day, Sir John Ogle wrote to Secretary Conway that the £6000 negotiated with Burlemachi would all go for billeting the troops and, in any event, authorities in Plymouth had received only £1200. Ogle also reported that the men at Plymouth still were 700 less that the required 8000 and that more should be discharged as unfit and that more officers were needed. On 31 August, Captain Courtney delivered 1500 men left from the press of 2000 men that sailed from Hull to Plymouth by way of the United Provinces. Ogle also requested orders on what to do with these additional men and mentioned that the poorer sort who were billeting the

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72 SP16/5/62, /63, /64, /65, /66, /71, all from the King to a number of L.L.s; 23 Aug 1625 and APC Vol. 40, pp. 135, 136, P.C. to the L.L.s of 18 counties; 23 Aug 1625.

73 SP16/5/70, Ogle to Sec. Conway; 23 Aug 1626.

74 SP16/5/107 and /107i, Ogle to Sec. Conway and Courtney to Sec. Conway; 31 Aug 1625. See SP16/6/23; Sir Ed. Cecil to Buckingham; 6 Sept 1625 and Note 78 on the number of men.
soldiers were beginning to groan under the burden. Another letter from the Commission the next day confirmed that Burlemachi had indeed promised another £6000 but pointed out that this amount would not even cover the arrears. In the same letter, the Commissioners reported to the Privy Council that their fears of troubles were coming true.

The Commissioners reported that hungry soldiers were committing crimes. The soldiers were robbing on the highway, openly stealing sheep and oxen to obtain food and the inhabitants of the county were angry over the loss of their livestock and thus their livelihoods. The Commissioners predicted a bloody confrontation between the soldiers and the farmers, if the Privy Council did not send more money:

The case stands thus, the poore country man is noe longer able to entereteyne the soldier having already half starved his family to helpe the greedy appetite of the hunger-bitten soldier, soe nowe the miserable Billetter hath already in some places (and wee fear that the necessitie of the rest must make them to doe the like) thrust the soldier out of the doores: Your Lordships well knowe that hunger hath no cures and good words hath soe farre cloyd their stomacks that noe more of our fayre promises can in the least degree be believed by them: nowe here is the issue: the soldier hath already broken out hereby to the taking away of the country mans goods, robbing upon the highway and carrying away his sheepe before his face, dressing them in the open view of the world, saying farther they must alsoe have his oxen and other commodities rather than famish, the rest we feare must followe, that the country man will rather die then loose the remaynder of his livelyhood and the soldiour must not perrish for want, soe that without some exceeding speedy course be taken both Army and country will undobtedly be consumed: .... Wherefore we humbly and importunately beseech your Honnors for the love of God; the good of our country, the saving of the blood likely to be shedd and the care of our credits that you would be pleased fourthwith to send not onely the somme forenamed [the £6000], but a farre greater proportion, the rather for that Capteyne Courtney is already come with the Low-country soldiours.  

75 SP16/6/3, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 1 Sep 1625.
In early September Sir John Ogle, who was an old man and a veteran of Elizabeth’s wars, and who had asked several times to be relieved, was discharged from his responsibilities in Plymouth and replaced by Sir Edward Cecil, who was named Lord Marshall of the Army and Vice Admiral of the Fleet. Cecil was a famous and an experienced officer in Dutch service that the London government had apparently picked for this position earlier in the year, but he required time to get his temporary release from the Dutch. Soon after his arrival, Cecil reported to Buckingham on the condition of the troops, noting that they lacked clothes, victuals, training and the money with which to obtain them, reiterating what others had told the Privy Council for the past two months. Cecil said that he could use 3000 more men as the army was wasting away due to “runawaies, by sickness and by those that will hide themselves from us when wee shall come to ship the Armie”. Of those that went into the Low Countries then are come back to us but 1500 and of that 1500, 500 are sick.” Cecil asked for an immediate press of 500 men from the area around Plymouth and said that the Lord Admiral must delay the departure for a month due to lack of provisions and lack of training of the soldiers, who “were all without arms”. The Privy Council ordered the press on 9 September from Dorset, Devon, Somerset and Cornwall.

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76 See SP16/6/24, Sir John Ogle to the P.C.; 7 Sep 1625 for Ogle’s last plea to be relieved of duty.

77 Gardiner, Vol. 6, pg. 10.

78 SP16/6/23; Sir Ed. Cecil to Buckingham from Plymouth; 6 Sep 1625. Also SP16/6/36 and SP16/6/37, from Cecil and St. Leger.

79 APC, Vol. 40, pp. 171-172, P.C. to the L.L.s of the listed counties; 9 Sep 1625.
Very few documents mention any more problems with the soldiers or with money from early September until the fleet left port on 6 October 1626 and sailed for Spain on 8 October when the wind came fair.\textsuperscript{80} Presumably, the £6000 provided by Burlemachi at least mollified the billeters around Plymouth and perhaps the younger Cecil was better able to control the soldiers and to organize the preparations than old Sir John Ogle could. Secretary Coke, who was in Plymouth in early October, did mention in a letter to Buckingham that the country still complained of the soldiers that lay upon them, just as the local officials did in July and August.\textsuperscript{81} England heard little more of the Expedition until its return to England and Ireland in late November and early December, having left the Spanish coast on 16 November.

3. After the Return – December 1625

Plymouth received information in early December on the return of the fleet from Cadiz and a flurry of communications started. On 2 December 1625, the Mayor of Plymouth wrote to the Privy Council that he expected fifteen ships from Cadiz shortly and that there were reports of many sick men on board.\textsuperscript{82} The Mayor requested that the Council order the deputy lieutenants to “dispose” of the sick men without bringing them into Plymouth to avoid danger to the town, since his Majesty might have “further employment” for the town. On 6 December, the Privy Council responded with an order

\textsuperscript{80} SP16/6/3, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 1 Sep 1625, which mentions sheep and cattle theft, is the exception.

\textsuperscript{81} SP16/7/41, Sec. Coke to Buckingham; 8 Oct 1626. See the letter quoted above.

\textsuperscript{82} SP16/11/5, Mayor of Plymouth to the P.C.; 2 Dec 1625.
to the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon to arrange for the returning soldiers and to take care
to preserve them for future service. The Council further directed the deputy lieutenants
to lodge the sick men in places outside Plymouth and the sound men in Plymouth and in
Devon and Cornwall near Plymouth in those places where they had billets before
departure. The Council strictly admonished the deputy lieutenants to keep the men from
running away from the colors, to take an accurate muster of all personnel, to provide for
markets at reasonable rates, and to maintain watches as instructed in previous orders on
the subject. The Council also promised to have the Lord Treasurer and Chancellor of the
Exchequer provide money for the maintenance of the soldiers at the rate used before they
sailed to Cadiz – a half crown (30d.) a week per man. More letters came from the Privy
Council on 10, 12 and 19 December giving instructions to the Army commanders and the
Commissioners for Soldiers at Plymouth to, among other things, keep the army together,
forbidding officers from leaving their units, keeping the soldiers in training, providing
clothing for the soldiers, issuing a Commission for Martial Law and giving orders for the
conservation of powder and shot and for billeting some of the soldiers in Dorset. The
letters also authorized Loan Collectors to issue £5000 from Privy Seal Loan money
collected in Devon and Cornwall to cover the costs.

The Mayor of Plymouth, Nicholas Blake, informed the Privy Council that 100 sick
soldiers had come ashore on 9 December and that he and the Commissioners were doing


\[84\] APC, Vol. 40, pg. 263, P.C to the Mayor of Plymouth; 6 Dec 1625. And pp. 266-268, P.C. to Viscount
Wimbledon; 12 Dec 1625. And pg. 271, P.C. to the Attorney General; 10 Dec 1625. And pp. 275-277, P.C.
to the Commissioners at Plymouth; 19 Dec 1625.
all they could to find lodgings for the men and to provide coals, clothes and other necessities without which the men would perish. However, the only money he had received was a £20 contribution from Sir James Bagg. On 14 December, Secretary Coke wrote to Secretary Conway from Plymouth that Sir James Bagg had informed him that the gentry of Devon and Cornwall would make no further contributions to the support of the Army and Navy under any circumstances and that, if money was not forthcoming, the clamor would be dangerous and grievous. Coke appealed to Conway to help him procure money from London. The Commissioners for Soldiers at Plymouth wrote to the Privy Council on 15 December begging for money and further direction, as they expected more of the fleet to arrive soon, and reminding the Council that they had obeyed the previous orders from the Council. In addition, the Council had sent no directions regarding maintenance of the officers and that, if the crown did not send monetary relief for “the satisfaction of the county”, they expected mutiny and they would not be responsible for what might happen. The Commissioners further complained that a half crown a week was not sufficient to maintain the men in the inclement winter weather. They also asked the Council to send some of the regiments to other counties and pointed out that the lack of clothing was causing more sickness. The Privy Council responded that they would move some of the troops, provide clothes and that £5000 and a Commission for Martial Law were on the way. The Council also asked the

85 SP16/11/44, Mayor of Plymouth to the P.C.; 9 Dec 1625. Bagg was a Dep. Lt. and Commissioner and a client of the Duke of Buckingham.

86 SP16/11/64, Sec. Coke to Sec. Conway; 14 Dec 1625.

87 SP16/11/71, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 15 Dec 1625.
Commissioners at Plymouth to advise them which regiments they could move most easily. Four days later the Council sent a letter to the Deputy Lieutenants of Dorset, which ordered them to prepare to receive some soldiers to billet.  

On December 22, the Commissioners at Plymouth again wrote to the Privy Council about the problems with the soldiers and officers in and around Plymouth, this time in more detail. There were now thirty ships and four thousand soldiers in and around Plymouth, thirty more ships had landed in Ireland and the Commissioners expected many of them to sail to Plymouth at the first favorable wind, bringing the total number of soldiers needing billets to six or seven thousand. There were no reports of sailors’ or soldiers’ misbehavior in the month of December, except for one incident in which some men were jailed for stealing gunpowder; the Commissioners asked that the Commission for Martial law be retroactive to cover crimes already committed.  

Privy Council letters and orders over the years mentioned the protection of powder from theft, indicating that there was a lucrative and ready market for stolen powder. In December 1625, most sailors and soldiers were probably concentrating on trying to stay warm, to secure food and clothes and to recover from sickness and the powder thus provided a helpful source of cash.


89 *SP16/12/35*, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 22 Dec. 1625.

90 There is an undated muster list that may be for twelve Regiments after the return from Cadiz. It is in *SP16/43/34* and gives a total of 3656 men listed by regiment. The *C.S.P.D* dates the muster list to “1626?”.

91 *SP16/12/80*, commissioners at Plymouth to P.C.; 29 Dec 1625.
One of the first reports on the condition of the returning soldiers said that they were in a miserable state, wanting much and many of them sick.\textsuperscript{92} They were weak from hunger due to the scarcity and corruption of the provisions sent in the ships and many died daily both on shipboard and in Plymouth.\textsuperscript{93} A shortage of money to feed and clothe the army is a constant complaint both from the local officials, army officers and men sent down from London.\textsuperscript{94} Billeters were already threatening to throw the soldiers out of their houses, according to the Commissioners for Soldiers at Plymouth. The conditions among the mariners on board the ships were as bad or worse.

According to the Commissioners, there were materials to make sturdy clothes in the area, but there was no money to purchase it or to have clothes made. They also said that they had billeted all sick soldiers outside of Plymouth and the principle towns to prevent the spread of disease. In addition, £5000 was nowhere near enough to feed and house the soldiers, to have suitable clothes made, much less to make necessary repairs to arms so that the soldiers could exercise when they were able to go out in the cold and that 30d. a week per man and the overplus for equipment and clothes was insufficient. There are many other documents in the State Papers reporting the same problems.\textsuperscript{95} One of the more informative ones is a chiding letter from Sir William St. Leger, who was in

\textsuperscript{92} SP16/12/35, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 22 Dec 1625.

\textsuperscript{93} SP16/12/38, Sir John Eliot to Sec. Conway; 22 Dec 1625. There are 20 to 30 documents in the State Papers and in the \textit{APC} dated in Dec and Jan 1625/26 that mention the misery and poor condition of the soldiers. Sickness and lack of clothing are the principle problems mentioned.

\textsuperscript{94} SP16/18/1, Sir William St Leger to Nicholas; 1 Jan 1625/26. SP16/18/8, Sir Edward Harwood to Sir Dudley Carleton; 3 Jan 1625/26. SP16/18/9, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 4 Jan 1625/26.

\textsuperscript{95} See SP16/12/35, /38, /52, /79, /80, /81 and SP16/18/1, /8, /9, /23, /99, among others. All of these documents are from Dec 1625 and Jan 1625/26.
command of the troops around Plymouth, Cecil being absent, to Secretary Conway.\textsuperscript{96} He pointed out in this letter that £5000 was a pittance, as the cost of clothes and some repair of weapons would require more than £15,000. He describes the soldiers thus: “they stink as they goe, the poore rags they have are rotten and redy to fall off if they be touched”. He also said that the £5000 promised from the Lord Treasurer would not arrive until it was all due to the billetters. St Leger further complained that there was no money in the place nor credit available upon any security the town of Plymouth or the Commissioners would give.

4. Changes in the Opinions of the Local Officials - January 1625/26

There was something of a change in opinion among the Commissioners for Soldiers at Plymouth in late December 1625 and again in July 1626. Initially the Commissioners suggested to the Privy Council that the Council billet the army in other counties. However, a month later, the Commission suggested to the Privy Council that the army remain in Devon and Cornwall, rather than move to other counties. The Privy Council accepted the suggestion and the army remained in the west. By July of 1626, however, the local officials and the people of Devon and Cornwall were very unhappy with the behavior of the soldiers, the sicknesses they seemed to bring, and the un-reimbursed expense of billeting them. The Commission requested the Privy Council to move the army out of Devon and Cornwall and in September the army moved east.

\textsuperscript{96} SP16/12/81, Sir William St. Leger to Sec. Conway; 29 Dec 1625.
The sequence began when the Commissioners replied to the request from the Privy Council for advice on regiments that best could be moved. The Commissioners responded to the Council that, in their opinion, the soldiers should remain in their present billets for two or three weeks to rest and recuperate and then the soldiers be distributed among towns along the coast in Devon, Cornwall, Somerset and Dorset. The Commission suggested that the ships that brought the men could transport them by sea to these places, although the Commissioners expected these ships would be gone before they received the Council’s answer. Moreover, the people of Devon and Cornwall were willing to billet five of the ten regiments, if the money was forthcoming to pay the billeters every week. If not, the Commissioners said that the soldiers would be “exceedinge distastfull unto the places where they shalbe settled and occasion of a great deale of distemper to the Inhabitants”.

Before these letters arrived in London, the Privy Council sent a letter dated 31 December 1625 to the Commissioners that told them that, in addition to the £5000 previously authorized, the Council was authorizing another £6000 for maintenance of the troops around Plymouth from the residue of the privy seal loan money from Dorset and Somerset. The Council directed the Commissioners to spend the money as they thought best for billeting and clothing, but to be frugal with the King’s resources. The letter authorized the Commissioners to let contracts for clothing for the soldiers in the

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97 SP16/12/80, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 29 Dec 1625. The Privy Council request may be found in APC Vol. 40, pp. 275-276, P.C. to Commissioners at Plymouth; 19 Dec 1625.

98 The order to send the ships away is in APC, Vol. 40, pg. 286, P.C. to the Commissioners at Plymouth; 25 Dec 1625. 5 or 6 ships were stayed at Plymouth.
Plymouth area. The Council also asked whether the soldiers who landed in Ireland had arrived in Plymouth and how many soldiers the Commissioners wanted to billet in Devon and Cornwall. 99

The Commissioners told the Council on 4 January 1625/26 that the billetters in the area threatened to “thrust them out of their houses for want of their weekly pay”. 100 The soldiers had spent all of their summer’s pay before they sailed, and they had no money to buy. Furthermore, they had received nothing so far from the order for £5,000. They also had difficulties in billeting the soldiers: the rich would not have them, and the poor could not afford to support them. The Commissioners asked the Council what course they should take with those who refused to billet soldiers, as the Commission had no precedents to guide them. The Privy Council replied on 16 January, assuring the Commissioners that the £5000 should be in Plymouth by now and that the Lord Treasurer was taking steps to make sure that more money would be available as needed from the loan money of Devon and Cornwall. 101 The Council also “marveled” that money was so scarce in Devon, considering how much money was spent there before the fleet set sail. The Council ordered the Commissioners to bind over to the Council any who refused to billet soldiers, particularly the richer sort who refused to billet officers. In addition, the Privy Council approved the Commissioner’s proposal of 29 December to billet the troops in small garrisons along the coasts and authorized the Commissioners to use any

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100 SP16/18/9 and -/9i, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 4 January 1625/26.

available shipping to transport them to their new billets.\textsuperscript{102} Cornish and Devonshire men would no doubt own most of the ships.

The Commissioners responded on 20 January 1625/26 saying that the Mayor of Plymouth had received £4280 of the first £5000, but that they had heard nothing of the next £6000 mentioned in the Privy Council’s letter of 31 December.\textsuperscript{103} No soldiers had arrived from Ireland and they “had resolved to take order for those that are landed here, to continue them all within these two Counties of Devon and Cornwall without farther trouble ether to your lordshipps or any other of the Counties soe as your Lordshipps shall not need to take care for proportioning any monie in any other place for those already arrived save to supply their present occasions, that are here”.\textsuperscript{104} They further reported they were unable to fulfill the contracts placed for clothing due to lack of money, and that many soldiers were staying in their beds all day to stay warm. They had advanced a little money to the clothiers, but all was now at a stop. Despite the clamor of the billetters, they accepted the Privy Council’s order that the pay rate for the soldiers remain at the “ancient” level.\textsuperscript{105} On 29 January, the Privy Council approved the Commissioners’

\textsuperscript{102} APC, Vol. 40, pp. 305-306, P.C. to the Mayor of Plymouth and the Commissioners at Plymouth; 6 Jan 1625/26.

\textsuperscript{103} SP16/18/99, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 20 Jan 1625/26.

\textsuperscript{104} According to a letter from St. Leger, there were around 4610 soldiers in the area. SP16/12/81, Sir William St. Leger to Sec. Conway; 29 Dec 1625.

\textsuperscript{105} Letters must have crossed in the post for on 24 Jan the Privy Council issued orders to the Commissioners and the Lord Lieutenants of 10 other counties to move the Army, each of the 10 regiments to a different county, from Dorset to Norfolk. In the event, this order was not executed. APC Vol. 40, pp. 325-327, three letters, one to the Commissioners at Plymouth, one a list of counties to which troops were to be sent and ten letters to the L.L.s of those counties; 24 Jan 1625/26.
suggestion to keep the troops in Devon and Cornwall, approved an initial contract for 200 suits of clothes and promised more money as needed.  

On 31 January, the Commissioners wrote to the Privy Council acknowledging the receipt of the order to move the troops east, but suggested that the Council must not have received the Commissioner’s letter offering to keep the 4000 soldiers in the West Country. In addition, the Commissioners said that the Council’s letter ordering the troop movement had not contained the list of places to which to send the regiments and so they could not act on it anyway. They also suggested that there was no need to retain ships of the fleet in Plymouth to transport soldiers, as the task could be performed “by any other that should bee found in these parts at ffarr easier rates”. Finally, the Commissioners pointed out that the troops could not be brought together for training or transport due to lack of clothing and that the weekly cost of feeding and lodging the soldiers was £600 and that £12,000 was needed for clothes and, thus, £15,600 was required as soon as possible. However, some money came, for on 31 January, in another letter asking for money, the Commissioners noted that they had received another £1,100 and on 7 February, the Mayor of Plymouth sent an accounting of £6006 received from the Collectors of Loans. Thus, it seems likely that, with money coming in again, the Deputies and Justices still wanted the troops and the money they brought and that they

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106 APC, Vol. 40, pg. 332, P.C. to the Mayor of Plymouth and the Commissioners at Plymouth; 29 Jan 1625/26.

107 SP16/19/88, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 31 Jan 1625/26.

108 SP16/19/92, 31 Jan 1625/26. And SP16/20/47, Account by Nicholas Blake, Mayor of Plymouth; 7 Feb 1625/26. The amount is probably that spent to the date of the list in this letter.
also wanted to have locally owned ships transport the troops. One wonders whether the Council’s clerks forgot to send the list of new billet locations from London or it was ‘lost’ in Plymouth.

Perhaps the most intriguing letter from January 1625/26 is one from Colonel Sir William St. Leger to Secretary Conway.\textsuperscript{109} St. Leger said he addressed Conway as one who would best understand what he had to say about the men in the Army.\textsuperscript{110} He said that the men were inexperienced and not much good as soldiers without considerably more training. In fact, said St. Leger, “the chardge of keeping these men together were better spared than spente for if they continue these(sic) course that they are in they will never be better then when preste in regard they live at much more ease and are more plentifully fedd with their 3 meales a day then if they were at home”. The soldiers must be paid before hand and learn to live within their means and the captains enabled to redeem the soldier’s arms, which are now in pawn for the repairs made to them. St. Leger also said that, though the Commission advertised contracts for 2000 suits of clothes throughout Devon and Cornwall, there were not many clothiers who would take the contracts because the clothiers wanted ready money along with the contracts for clothes. Further, it was his opinion that the materials were not available in the counties and the government would have to supply the clothes from London. However, he continued, his fellow Commissioners would not rectify the situation and were unwilling to report the facts to the Privy Council and thus deprive the counties of the “advantage”. As a result, the Army was a “dead stock” upon the hands of the King. St. Leger approved of the

\textsuperscript{109} SP16/19/66, Sir Wm. St. Leger to [Sec. Conway]; 28 Jan 1625/26.

\textsuperscript{110} Conway was a former senior army officer. Or perhaps St Leger did not want to address the whole P.C.
Council’s grant of an increase in the “lendings” to 3s. per week at the request of the Commission in Plymouth, but he thought this would do no good unless the money was actually paid to the soldiers, “but as it is nowe the Country is the better for it but the soldiers nothinge, for he was but too well fedd before” and sees not a penny of cash.

If St. Leger’s observations were true, then it is apparent that the non-military members of the Commission, who were a majority of the Commission and were local deputy lieutenants and Justices of the Peace, were more interested in the money coming from London as an “advantage” to the county economy, rather than in the King’s “serious occasions”. The change in opinion among the Commissioners concerning the location of the regiments and the offer to use local ships to transport them at a lower cost, which appeared in earlier letters, lends further weight to this argument. In addition, in a letter dated 9 February, the Commissioners thanked the Privy Council for sending additional money, finding much joy and comfort in the Council’s “approbation” and its promise to supply more money from time to time as needs required.111 However, as we shall see, when the money stopped coming in the spring of 1626, the Commission’s attitude changed again, eventually becoming one of despair and desperation leading to requests that the regiments be moved from Devon and Cornwall.

5. After the Return – February 1625/26 to September 1626

The only documents extant in the Privy Council Registers and the State Papers Domestic between 9 February and 23 March 1625/26 involving the soldiers at Plymouth

111 SP16/20/57, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 9 Feb 1625/26.
and the royal government are two letters from the Privy Council to the Commissioners at Plymouth.\textsuperscript{112} The first ordered them to remove sick sailors from the ships of the fleet and the second ordered the commissioners to employ the idle soldiers in the building and repair of fortifications in the area. There is a letter from John Clifton at Plymouth to Edward Nicholas, Secretary to the Duke of Buckingham as Lord High Admiral, saying that Clifton had written many letters to Sir Allen Apsley concerning money for the fleet preparing there for a voyage to Spain. Clifton mentioned that he and Captain Pennington, who was in command of the fleet, were constantly appeasing mutinies because of lack of pay.\textsuperscript{113}

On 23 March, the Commissioners at Plymouth wrote again to the Privy Council.\textsuperscript{114} In this letter, the Commissioners complained that the government had sent no money, contrary to the promises of the Privy Council in their letter of 29 January and others. The Commissioners again said that the billetters were in distress and were pushing their families or the soldiers out of their homes. They reported that the sickness was increasing in the towns. They further reported that the clothiers who undertook the contracts had completed their work, but the clothes lay unused in their hands. Moreover, creditors were dunning the clothiers and were threatening them with jail for not repaying the money they borrowed to make the clothes. The officers were not drilling the soldiers

\textsuperscript{112} APC, Vol. 40, pg. 348, P.C. to the Commissioners at Plymouth; 23 Feb 1625/26 and APC Vol. 40, pg. 354, P.C. to the Commissioners at Plymouth; 28 Feb 1625/26.

\textsuperscript{113} SP16/22/109, John Clifton to Nicholas; 15 March 1625/26.

\textsuperscript{114} SP16/23/51, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 23 Mar 1625/26. The letter was sent from Plympton, just east of Plymouth. Perhaps the Commissioners were trying to avoid the sickness.
because their arms were still not repaired. At the end of the letter, they pointed out that lack of money caused neglect to the public service and that therefore they had asked Sir William Strode, one of the Commissioners and an M.P., to lay their case personally before the Council.

By this time, the gentlemen of Devon and Cornwall were beginning to regret volunteering to billet the Army and to keep the clothing contracts in their counties, as Mr. Stode’s trip to London indicates. The Commission had received no money from London since early February, though in February 1626, Charles and his Privy Council believed that the upcoming Parliament of 1626 would quickly grant them more money, rather than present them with a bill for the impeachment of Buckingham. It is not clear whether the soldiers received their clothes or the clothiers were holding the apparel pending payment, although a letter dated 4 April, said the clothiers had not distributed the clothes. Since the sources do not mention the number of suits of clothes that the clothiers were holding, it is not clear whether they made the full 2000. If they had 2000 suits of clothes, St. Leger’s earlier opinion on the capabilities of the west country clothiers may have been wrong.

On 4 April 1626, the Commissioners again wrote the Privy Council pointing out the need for money and suggested that the Council could obtain it from the remaining subsidy money in Devon and Cornwall. This time they also reported that some of the soldiers in Devon were plotting a mutiny for their clothes and pay. They enclosed a report from Captain William Molesworth on the plot. The report said that Molesworth’s

115 SP16/24/26, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 4 Apr 1626. The enclosure is SP16/24/26i. This letter also mentioned that the clothes had not been distributed to the soldiers.
men and parts of two other companies, all billeted in Landulph and Cargreen, were planning to mutiny and march to London to see the King to demand clothing and to show their nakedness to the King. Molesworth also said that the poorer billetters were encouraging the soldiers and that it would be difficult to stop the soldiers because the local watches were lax and infrequent. The Commissioners’ letter to the Privy Council added words to the effect that they had told the Council this would happen if the Council did not provide money. The Commissioners thought the soldiers were planning to march on Easter Monday, if they had not received clothing before then. In addition, they feared that this march might encourage other soldiers to join the march or to plot additional mischief. The Privy Council responded with letters to the Commissioners and the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon and Cornwall ordering them to set watches and to call out the trained bands to suppress the mutiny and to keep the soldiers off the roads and out of communication with one another.

The Government in London also scrambled to find money to pay the soldiers in Devon and Cornwall. On 7 April, the Privy Council sent an order to the Lord Treasurer and two letters to the Commissioners at Plymouth and to the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon and Cornwall. They told the Commissioners that the

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116 SP16/24/26, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 4 April 1626 and enclosure from Molesworth dated 3 April. Cargreen is 4 or 5 miles up the Tamar River from Plymouth.

117 APC Vol. 40, pp. 415-416, P.C. to the Commissioners at Plymouth; 7 April 1626.

118 APC Vol. 40, pg. 414, P.C. to the Lord Treasurer; 7 April 1626. APC Vol. 40, pp. 415-416 to the Commissioners for Soldiers at Plymouth. APC Vol. 40, pp. 415-416 to the D.L.s of Devon and Cornwall. The entry in the APC, Vol. 40, pg. 414 says the subsidy money in Devon and Cornwall had been assigned to a Sir Peter Vanlore (Van Loor) as partial (?) payment for a government debt and that the Lord Treasurer was to cancel part of the assignment to allow it to be used to solve the money problem in Plymouth. The entry is rather mysterious and can be loosely associated with several other entries in the APC for the year 1625 that mention Van Loor.
Treasury would issue money from the subsidy or loan money in Devon and Cornwall as soon as possible, but it is doubtful that they released any money.

A few days later, the Mayor of Plymouth reported to the Council that the Commission would not move the soldiers billeted in Plymouth to new locations, as the Privy Council had directed, in order to keep the sickness from spreading and because of the threatened mutiny. As it was, the mayor said, many people were dying in Plymouth and soldiers were wandering about the countryside spreading the plague. In the letter, the Mayor also told of a fight between three soldiers and the town watch. The soldiers were drunk and wanted to enter a quarantined house to spend the night. The watchmen attempted to stop the soldiers, whereupon the soldiers drew their swords and, in the ensuing fight, the watchmen wounded one soldier, knocked down another and the third fled.119

On 17 April, the Commissioners reported to the Council on the measures they had taken to contain the mutiny and said that they had calmed the soldiers, but that they did not know how long this would last. The Commissioners were able to report that the threat of calling out the trained bands and the prospect of a battle as well as promises of clothes had restrained the mutinous soldiers.120 However, the Commissioners continued, things could not go on like this; they needed money to pay the soldiers and the billetters and to purchase clothes for the soldiers and sailors. The Commissioners remarked a few

119 SP16/24/52, Mayor of Plymouth to the P.C.; 8 April 1626.

120 SP16/25/13, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 17 April 1626. The soldiers were calmed primarily by the threat of calling out the trained bands, but the letter implies that the Privy Council’s promise of money may have been used. The letter is not clear on the subject.
days later in another letter to the Council that they had received no money and, again, that promises were wearing thin with both the soldiers and the billetters.\textsuperscript{121}

In the same month of April, Captain John Pennington, who commanded the fleet being prepared at Plymouth for another voyage to Spanish waters, reported that the whole company of the ship Swiftsure had mutinied and come ashore. With the help of the mayor of Plymouth, naval officers brought the majority back on board and Pennington hoped to get the rest. He commented that he proposed to punish some but that, with the sickness, lack of clothes and lack of victuals, “their cases are so lamentable that they are not much to be blamed”.\textsuperscript{122} Other letters informed the Privy Council that the sailor’s chief complaints were lack of clothing, which only pay would cure, and sickness (probably scurvy) due to a diet of little more than salted meat.\textsuperscript{123} The letters reported the rapid spread of sickness among the soldiers, sailors and the townspeople of Plymouth and that death occurred quickly after symptoms appeared.

The reports of sickness among the sailors, soldiers and the people of Plymouth are also numerous during April, and forty deaths a week in Plymouth are mentioned.\textsuperscript{124} The people of Plymouth were fleeing the town. By June 1626, according to the Commissioners, the town of Plymouth had lost so many to sickness and flight that there

\textsuperscript{121} SP16/25/71, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 25 April 1626.
\textsuperscript{122} SP16/24/33, Capt. John Pennington to Buckingham; 5 April 1626.
\textsuperscript{123} SP16/24/61, John Clifton to Nicholas; 11 April 1625. SP16/24/65, Captain John Pennington to Buckingham, 11 April 1626. SP16/25/13, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 17 April 1626.
\textsuperscript{124} SP16/24/61, Clifton to Nicholas; 11 April 1625.
was scarcely anyone left to billet soldiers and soldiers could not be billeted in any plague
free place because there were very few such places.\textsuperscript{125}

A letter dating to this period from a true member of the middling or lower sort, 
Andrew Mudd of Armington in Devon, to Secretary Conway illustrates some of the 
problems of the billetters.\textsuperscript{126} Mr. Mudd described a number of frauds committed in 
billeting soldiers that transferred the burden from the rich to the poor. Mudd described 
himself as a soldier (“solder”) for 36 years, 8 abroad by sea and land and 28 years in his 
country, presumably as a member of the trained bands of Devon. When he first(“frets”) 
came to Devon (which was likely around 1598, late in Elizabeth’s reign) there were 
houses that billeted 12 or 14 soldiers but now lodged 3 or 4 although their income 
(“manes of the hawses”) was greater now than then. Mud also knew of households rated 
for the subsidy at £32 or £33 in the Queen’s time that were now rated at £10 of land and 
to ease (“eyes”) them [the richer sort], poorer men are rated which makes the poor man 
gorge (“gorges”) and the king is no better for it. These days, Mudd said, two must go 
together to lodge a soldier to ease the rich man while those who billet a soldier have to 
work every day for a groat (“grat”) to support their wives and children.\textsuperscript{127} Householders 
were also required to watch bridges (“breges”) and roads (“trose ways”) to keep the 
soldiers in their quarters when the soldiers could do it as well. Mudd thought that if the

\textsuperscript{125} SP16/29/46, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 8 June 1626. SP16/31/22, Mayor of Plymouth to 
the P.C.; 6 July 1626.

\textsuperscript{126} SP16/25/76, 27 April 1626, Andrew Mudd to Sec. Conway. The spelling in this letter is unusual and the 
interpretations of many of Mudd’s words are my own.

\textsuperscript{127} Mudd’s words here are not clear. He uses “tow” and could mean ‘to’ or ‘two’. The \textit{O.E.D.}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., s.v. 
“tow” gives “tow” as an obs. form of “two”, and I have used “two”. A groat was equal to 4d.
soldiers did this job, it would keep them from some of the disorders that they committed in alehouses. This letter illustrates the real problems of the poorer billeters, for if two households earning 8d. a day between them were required to billet a soldier at 4d. or 6d. a day, there was not much left for the families. Mudd’s ‘groat a day’ may be a slight exaggeration, but it illustrates the main problem in billeting soldiers for a large number of the billeters. I strongly suspect that Mr. Mudd was a billetter.

During April 1626, the Privy Council interrogated Sir Edward Cecil, viscount Wimbledon, the Cadiz Expedition commander, on the expedition’s failure, apparently with Cecil’s subordinates making accusations of incompetence. Cecil wrote bitterly to his patron the Duke of Buckingham that these accusers were insubordinate, and, if these sorts of examinations of the king’s soldiers were continued, the king could only expect poor service and mutinies in the future.  

There were also serious problems in the Town of Barnstaple in the spring of 1626. In a letter from the Privy Council to Lord Russell, Lord Lieutenant of County Devon, the Privy Council chided Russell and his deputy lieutenants for not bringing to book soldiers billeted in Barnstaple who were committing “insolencies”. It was, said the Council, as if there were no magistrates to repress the disorders. The Council ordered Russell to take steps to see that the laws were enforced and the misbehavior of soldiers ended so that the

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129 *APC* Vol. 40, pg. 465, P.C. to Lord Russell; 5 May 1626.
Council would not be bothered with similar complaints in the future. They go on to say that “in all likelyhoode the soldiors are emboldened in their insolences by being permitted to goe up and downe having alwaies their armes with them, we doe in no sorte thinke fit that they be suffered to use or beare their said armes but onely at such tymes when they are trained”. It appears from this order that there were instances of such outrageous military misbehavior in Devon, that people, perhaps the mayor and aldermen of Barnstaple, were prompted to complain directly to the Privy Council over the heads of the Commissioners, Justices of the Peace and Deputy Lieutenants of Devon. Barnstaple’s problems also appear similar to those in Maldon and Witham in Essex in 1628. This situation also contrasts with John Ogle’s and the Commissioners’ reports of good relations between the inhabitants of Devon and Cornwall and the soldiery in May and June of 1625. Relations had deteriorated considerably over the intervening year.

The actions of local officials such as John Rowe, a Chief Constable, aggravated the troubles due to lack of money for both the pressed soldiers and the billetters. A set of Articles presented to the Privy Council in August 1626, or, probably, earlier (see footnote), on behalf of many poor inhabitants of Tavistock and Walkhampton described Rowe’s peculations. The document identified Rowe as the chief constable of Tavistock Hundred and one of the eight “Governors” of the Town of Tavistock. The document

130 There is no record of the original complaint in either the Calendar of State Papers, Domestic or the APC.

131 SP16/3/101, Ogle to the P.C.; 30 June 1625.

132 SP16/34/114, Articles Against John Rowe by the inhabitants of Tavistock; [August?] 1626. Tavistock is about 12 miles north of Plymouth. There is a warrant in the APC, dated 15 Feb 1625/26, for a messenger to bring John Rowe of Tavistock before the Privy Council. Based on this warrant, I date SP16/34/114 to January or February of 1625/26. This date may also indicate that Rowe’s peculations occurred in the
claimed, among other things, that Rowe received money from the paymaster at Plymouth at a certain rate for each soldier and retained considerable sums for himself, paying less than the allowed rates to poor billetters. The same was true for the pay of officers and noncommissioned officers. He also hired out 150 men of two companies to work at haymaking, which the soldiers were willing to do for the extra money with which to buy clothes. Rowe retained this money for himself and the soldiers left without a single shirt, according the manuscript. When called before the Commission for Soldiers at Plymouth on these matters, Rowe denied all and spoke to the Commissioners and others in a “disgraceful manner”. The document does demonstrate that some local officials were using the pay system to fill their own purses. Rowe’s offenses were probably egregious, but it seems likely that there were similar instances in Devon and Cornwall that no one discovered or that somebody covered up, much to the financial distress of the poorer billetters, to say nothing of the distress of the soldiers. These sorts of activities may account for the willingness some of the Commissioners for Soldiers at Plymouth to billet troops in early 1626.

From June 1626, the letters from the Commissioners grew fewer, seemingly as their desperation increased. They wrote to the Council on 8 June that the plague had decimated Plymouth and trade had ceased in the town. The plague had spread to a number of towns and parishes in Devon, most of which were billeting soldiers. The towns and parishes reported that they could control their domestic servants from visiting infected places, but not the soldiers. More remote towns asked the Commissioners not to summer of 1625 before the Cadiz Expedition sailed. The “Articles” mention the haymaking occurred “last summer”.

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command them to billet soldiers for fear that they would bring the plague with them.

Both the towns billeting soldiers and those not billeting them said that their lives depended upon the Commission and asked the Commissioners to remove the soldiers.\footnote{SP16/29/46, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 8 June 1626. The towns and parishes are not given, though the manuscript says they are “hereunder named”. The folio listing the towns appears to have been lost.}

The Commissioners again said the town of Plymouth had lost so many to sickness and flight that there was scarcely anyone left to billet soldiers and soldiers could not be billeted in any place there was no plague because there were very few such places. They sent a similar letter on 29 June, which stated that the Commissioners were at the end of their power to cope.\footnote{SP16/30/67, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 29 June 1626.}

The Commissioners said that they had hoped for the sake of the soldiers, billeters, clothiers, officers that they should by now have received redress. The letter of 29 June further stated that “we have thus far done our best to satisfy all by our speeches, travails, purses and hazard of our Lives, further than this we cannot go, and this we are no longer able to continue, the plague being already so far spread as we know not where to meet with safety. And we call heaven and earth to witness that we neither do nor have at any time written to your Lordships any fevered fears but the very truth …”

They had hoped to receive money by now but had not. Two more letters in July reflect increasing desperation and the Commissioners said that they expected their next letter to report, “all was in an uproar”. The Mayor reported that two hundred families, perhaps eight hundred people, had fled from Plymouth, disabling the town council and the port.\footnote{SP16/31/22, Mayor of Plymouth to the P.C.; 6 July 1626. SP16/31/33, Commissioners to the P.C.; 8 July 1626. Two hundred families probably contained 800 people out of an estimated population of 2000. (The population estimate is from a personal communication with Prof. Thomas Cogswell.)}
This loss, together with a death toll of forty a week reported a few months earlier, represented a loss of over half the town’s population. The Privy Council’s response was to order the Mayor to command the magistrates to come back to town in the King’s name and to assess all inhabitants of the town a weekly rate to help pay for care of the sick, or suffer penalties from the Privy Council.\(^{136}\)

On 15 July, the Commissioners sent another letter to the Council urging the removal of the army from Devon and Cornwall, since the army was useless in its present condition and was likely to be more of a danger to the inhabitants than to any enemy that might land there.\(^{137}\) They suggested that the army move to some place more likely to be invaded, that was free of the plague, and had not been charged with heavy lending to the King for the billeting of troops. Sir George Chudleigh, one of the Deputy Lieutenants, went up to London to lay the case before the Privy Council and his “rude and intractable behavior at the Council board” convinced the Council that the situation in Devon and Cornwall was as bad as the Commissioners had reported.\(^{138}\) In August the Privy Council at last issued orders to move the remains of the Army eastward to Kent, Sussex, Hampshire and Dorset and the troops finally left Devon and Cornwall in September 1626.\(^{139}\) There were approximately 3800 men left with the colors when it came time to

\(^{136}\) APC Vol. 41, pp. 83-84; Jul 1626.

\(^{137}\) SP16/31/180, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 15 July 1626.

\(^{138}\) Wolfe, *Gentry Leaders…*, pg. 121; quote from BL Add. MSS. 64889. f. 151.

\(^{139}\) APC, Vol. 41, pp. 216-219, P.C. to the D.L.s of Devon and Cornwall and the Commissioners at Plymouth; 24 Aug 1626.
move east.\textsuperscript{140} The royal government never did release the money promised in early April. However, it did assign £30,000 in future revenues from the Tin Farm in Cornwall to repay the billetters and clothiers of Devon and Cornwall.\textsuperscript{141} The crown was to repay the money over the next several years, £1000 at Christmas 1626, £9000 in 1627, £10,000 in 1628 and £10,000 in 1629. In February 1626/27, the Privy Council authorized repayment out of the loans of the county and the city of Exeter to the King to the “contractors for the apparalling of the soldiers, to their billetors and the creditors of the captains and officers, with other charges“ that had previously been authorized to be paid out of the Tin Farm.\textsuperscript{142} There was a proviso that if the loan money did not come to the total required, the Privy Council would authorize payment from other sources at the request of the counties, implying that it had revoked the lien on the Tin Farm.

6. Billeting Expenses in Devon and Cornwall in 1625 and 1626

Estimates of the amounts spent on the soldiers and amounts received in Devon and Cornwall are presented Appendix B, Section 3. From the data, it appears that the crown provided roughly £15,000 before the expedition sailed and £11,000 after it returned and assigned £30,000 from the Tin Farm or the Forced Loan over the four years from 1626 to 1629 to repay the people of Devon and Cornwall (assuming the £30,000 was actually paid). The total is £56,000 for the period of approximately a year that the crown billeted

\textsuperscript{140} APC, Vol. 41, pg. 291; 26 Sep 1626. This letter to the Commissioners for Soldiers at Plymouth lists 800 men going to Kent, 800 to Sussex, 1100 to Hampshire and 1100 to Dorset, a total of 3800 men.

\textsuperscript{141} APC, Vol. 41, pp. 206-207, P.C. to the Lord Treasurer; 24 Aug 1626.

\textsuperscript{142} APC, Vol. 42, pg. 107, P.C. to D.L.s of Devon and Loan Commissioners of Devon; 28 Feb 1626/27 on Devon and APC, Vol. 42, pg. 84; 23 Feb 1626/27 for Cornwall. The original orders by the P.C are given in APC, Vol. 42, pp. 75-76; 21 Feb 1625/26.
soldiers in Devon and Cornwall.\textsuperscript{143} As mentioned above, the Privy Council eventually authorized payment of the debt for soldier’s expenses out of the Loan money in February 1626/27 and presumably revoked the lien on the Tin Farm revenues.\textsuperscript{144} How much of the debt the royal government paid out of Loan money is not clear.

Total out-of-pocket expense to Devon and Cornwall was greater when one considers coat and conduct money for men pressed in the counties, providing carts for baggage when troops moved, property damage, costs for watching the roads and bridges for runaways, costs of apprehending criminous soldiers and trying them, etc. The costs discussed in Appendix B also do not include provisions for the fleet and other naval expenses that the citizens of the coastal areas bore, at least temporarily, or the costs of the lost labor of the many mariners from Plymouth and other coastal communities who served involuntarily in the ships of the Cadiz Expedition.\textsuperscript{145}

The expense continued in later years. In 1627, more troops rendezvoused at Plymouth for transport to the Île of Ré and the complaints were the same then as they were in 1625 and 1626. In October 1627 the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon told the Privy Council that they were doing their utmost to find billets for 2000 soldiers and reminded the Council of £2500 still due from recent charges was needed to keep peace in the county.\textsuperscript{146} The woes of Devon and Cornwall grew again, for, as ships returned from Ré

\textsuperscript{143} That is, June through Sep. of 1625 and Dec. 1625 through Sep. 1626.

\textsuperscript{144} APC, Vol. 42, pg. 107, P.C. to D.L.s of Devon and Loan Commissioners of Devon; 28 Feb 1626/27.

\textsuperscript{145} Several documents mention that local mariners were running away to the country to avoid the naval press.

\textsuperscript{146} SP16/82/82, D.L.s of Devon to the P.C.; 25 Oct 1627. SP16/84/12, Earl of Holland to Sec. Conway; 2 Nov 1627. SP16/84/31, Sec. Conway to the Mayor of Plymouth et al.; 6 Nov 1627.
in November and December 1627, a number disembarked soldiers in Plymouth, as well as at Portsmouth and in Ireland. In the 1630s, the people of Devon were still petitioning the royal government for repayment of billeting expenses. Ten hundreds of North Devon presented a petition to the Privy Council in 1631 for money spent on billeting in 1627 and 1628 and, in 1634, the town of Tiverton petitioned for repayment of £160 spent on billeting.\textsuperscript{147}

7. A Naval Mutiny in 1626

There was a naval mutiny in the summer of 1626, which was more like a labor strike, and which sheds some light on the situation of the sailors in the navy. In mid-July, the Sheriff of Hampshire, Sir Daniel Norton, told the Privy Council that over 300 mariners “in a rout” had marched through Hampshire from Southampton to Petersfield on their way to London seeking their overdue pay.\textsuperscript{148} The Venetian ambassador also provided a brief report of this incident to his superiors in which he contended that Buckingham prompted this mutiny when he appeased an earlier smaller mutiny with money from his own pocket.\textsuperscript{149} Norton persuaded the mutineers to halt at Petersfield and asked them to consider the possible punishment if they continued in their present course.

Norton suggested they turn back and not increase the offence. He asked them to give him

\begin{footnotes}
\item[147] Stoyle, Mark, \textit{Loyalty and locality: popular allegiance in Devon during the English Civil War} [Exeter: Univ. of Exeter Press, 1983], pg. 171. The petitions may be found in SP16/179/77; April (?) 1631 and SP16/281/14; 1634(?).
\item[148] SP16/31/112, Sir Daniel Norton, Sheriff of Hampshire to the P.C.; 19 July 1626.
\end{footnotes}
a list of grievances that he could present to the Privy Council. The sailors took Norton’s advice and Norton appointed twenty of the sailors to present the grievances to him. The sailors stated that the King’s officers had pressed them into the service and they had been in the service without pay for sixteen months, some of them more. They were released and then his Majesty’s officers recently pressed them again. They had received no pay for this second time either, but what moved them to march on London was an offer of only one-month’s pay rather than the whole amount owed to them. They said they were without clothes and many of them had wives and children who were near starvation. The sailors were quite insistent that the King should know of their case. Norton convinced them to return to their ships by promising to present their grievances to the Council, which, he said, would provide just redress. He also promised that they would not be punished if they returned to their ships, at least until more was heard from the Privy Council. He also mentioned to the Council that the sailor’s services were important to the King and he hesitated to use force against them, but this he would leave up to the Council. As usual, he made mention of the great expense this affair had caused the county and the Town of Petersfield, which was required to billet the sailors during these negotiations. However, it seems that in 1626, the commoners of England were still loyal to the King and that the royal officials could still could still buy them off with fair words. We see again the desire of those in authority on the scene to go lightly with punishment so as not to foment further disaffection and to preserve England’s defenses.

150 Perhaps he was also worried about pressing more men in Hampshire to replace the mutineers.
The final insult for the navy was, perhaps, the poor quality of victuals in the fleet. The Earl of Denbigh, who was to sail for Spain shortly with a fleet on an expedition similar to the one to Cadiz, reported on 16 September 1626, that he had on board “20 tunn of stinking beare not fitting for any cristians to drink”, no doubt to the disappointment of the crews.\(^\text{151}\)

8. Conclusion

There were changes in local opinion concerning the desirability of quartering troops in Devon and Cornwall after the return of the Cadiz Expedition in early December 1625, until most of the soldiers were moved east to Kent, Sussex, Dorsett and Hampshire in September and October of 1626. In January 1625/26, the reaction of the leaders of Plymouth and surrounding areas who served on the Commission for Soldiers was initially favorable and the troops were even welcomed as long as money came with them or the royal government sent money from London before, or shortly after, the soldiers arrived. Soon after the return of the Cadiz Expedition, the Commission for Soldiers at Plymouth told the Privy Council that they would keep the soldiers who had landed at Plymouth in the Counties of Devon and Cornwall. The reason for the favorable initial reaction appears to be that the army brought income, for the Commission had just received £4000 and expected £6000 more. Money came in return for billeting the troops, while providing clothes for the soldiers brought business for local clothiers, and the transport of men and supplies for the army and navy brought business to the local ship owners and work for the

\(^{151}\) SP16/35/102, Earl of Denbigh to the P.C.; 16 Sep 1626. The expedition ran into a storm and never got to Spain. The bad beer amounted to over 5000 gal.
seamen. During the preparations for the Cadiz Expedition of 1625, there were many complaints about money from the Justices of the Peace of Devon and Cornwall and from The Commission for Soldiers at Plymouth, but the government in London seems to have paid up during the fall. When the troops returned in December 1625, all went reasonably well until the subsidy money voted by Parliament in 1624 and the privy seal loan money ran out in the spring of 1626 and the royal government ceased paying the bills. The royal government continued its war effort by essentially pushing the costs of maintaining the army onto the local governments and the people of Devon and Cornwall, albeit with a promise of repayment at some future date. By the summer of 1626, no more money had come from London and billetters, such as Andrew Mudd and the people of Barnstaple, were complaining about the soldiers and the failure of the government to repay them. In July, Commissioners requested that the Privy Council move the army out of Devon and Cornwall.

There are alternate explanations for the evidence in the series of documents discussed here. Mary Wolff’s book *Gentry Leaders in Peace and War* provides another description of the billeting situation in the Plymouth area in this period and in 1627 in a chapter on Sir George Chudleigh. Wolff gave a different interpretation of the events in Devon and Cornwall in late 1625 and early 1626. She concluded that the reversals of opinion among the Commissioners for Soldiers were simply due to confusion between the Privy Council in London and the Commissioners in Plymouth due to the slow post

and a rapidly changing situation around Plymouth. I think that a careful reading of the documents, particularly St. Leger’s letter, indicates an ulterior motive on the part of the gentlemen of Cornwall and Devon, but the point is debatable.

A third explanation is also possible. Start with the fact that there was one mutiny during the recruits’ march to Plymouth in 1625 and the local authorities apparently put down this mutiny easily. There was only one reported soldier’s mutiny during the year the army was in Devon and Cornwall, the one by Captain Molesworth’s men, and local authorities easily controlled this mutiny also. During the mutiny by Captain Molesworth’s men, the poorer billetters encouraged the mutineers, probably just to be rid of them, but there were no reports of civilians engaging in public riots or demonstrations of a serious nature as there were in other counties in 1628. The Mayor of Plymouth, the Commissioners for Soldiers at Plymouth, Justices of the Peace, army officers and a few others warned the Privy Council repeatedly of the potential for trouble if money were not forthcoming for billeting expenses and clothes for the soldiers and sailors. Yet nothing too serious happened, though no doubt there were many minor incidents, the reports of which are now lost with the local records of the area.

Hungry soldiers stole cattle and sheep, but letters from Cornwall and Devon to the Privy Council mention no violence between farmers and soldiers. Complaints from Devon and Cornwall include Mr. Mudd’s letter, and the complaints of the Town of Barnstaple about more serious crimes by armed soldiers. The investigation of the peculations of John Rowe of Tavistock indicates that billetters and other local inhabitants

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153 Wolffe, Gentry Leaders in Peace and War, pg. 104.
were angry over lack of payment for billeting expenses. Reports from the Commissioners for Soldiers about cattle and sheep stealing by hungry soldiers and several reports of billetters throwing soldiers out of their homes, together with warnings of potential violence between countrymen and soldiers appear in the records and show considerable discontent in Devon. I believe there must have been some violence between the soldiers and the rural population and the occasional reports of alehouse brawls between soldiers and local people, while not surprising, contributed to the dislike of the army in Devon.

There were also some reports of outrages and misdemeanors in the more easterly counties during the first months the army was in its new billets. These men probably behaved themselves no better in Devon and Cornwall. In addition, many of the letters from the Commissioners and the Mayor, and even the army commanders, Sir John Ogle before the Expedition left and Sir William St. Leger after the return, used almost formulaic warnings of dire consequences if the government did not send money from London. Therefore, it is possible that the most distressed people in Devon were the rate payers who were assessed some of the billeting money and the clothiers who were stuck with unsold goods. This is not to say that many of the lower income people of Devon were not in financial distress because of billeting costs, but reactions seem to have been limited to cases of people throwing soldiers out of their houses. It is not clear what happened to the soldiers and where they found housing. There are several mentions over the years of soldiers thrown out of billets to “steal or starve.” The situations of Richard Biscoe and Edward Dally in 1628 give some indication. These men threw soldiers out of
their houses, or tried to, and were penalized for it.\textsuperscript{154} Biscoe appeared before the Privy Council and Dally ended up billeting a soldier. Soldiers stole and ate sheep, cattle and geese, but the troops did not march on a large town, such as Plymouth or London, in organized units with their arms, as was the case in some mutinies over pay in the Spanish Army of Flanders.

The ravages of epidemic sicknesses also brought fear and grief to the people of the two counties during this period. Thousands died and many towns became virtually depopulated, as people, particularly by the better off citizens, tried to flee the sickness for more salubrious climes. Plymouth and other towns reported that almost all the better off fled, leaving only one or two town officials to maintain order and assist the poor and sick. Most attributed the epidemics to the presence of the soldiers. The soldiers and sailors may have brought the sickness in December 1625, as there were many sick men onboard the returning vessels. There were also many reports of epidemics in England in 1625 and 1626 and the return of the soldiers may have only aggravated the situation in the area. However, by the summer of 1626, Devon and Cornwall were in desperate straits from sickness, which killed many people, particularly in the towns, and this contributed something to their resentment of the troops among them.\textsuperscript{155}

Army and navy officers exhibited some sympathy for the soldiers and sailors. The officers were reluctant to execute mutinous men and several times mentioned that it was not fair to punish the men, considering their lack of food and clothes, sickness and, for

\textsuperscript{154} Biscoe’s and Dally’s encounters with soldiers billeted in their homes are discussed in Chap. 8, Sec. 2 below.

\textsuperscript{155} For more information on the fears that sickness caused, see Chap. 8, Sec. 4.
soldiers, a secure billet. Harder to assess is the fear of the army and navy commanders that punishment of some might incite their fellow soldiers or sailors to further mutinies. This was definitely an element in the thinking of some officers, in part because of their desire to see their expeditions succeed.

From the billeting’s standpoint, Andrew Mudd’s letter to Secretary Conway is in one way one of the more informative documents presented in this Chapter. If Mudd’s statement that two households earning 8d. a day between them billeted a single soldier at a cost of 6d. a day is near the truth, the plight of the poorer households required to billet soldiers is easily understood.

I suggest that the primary conclusion to be drawn from these events is that, when money for billeting and clothing was provided by the royal government, the Commission for Soldiers at Plymouth and people of Devon and Cornwall were reasonably content and wanted the soldiers billeted with them for the extra income it provided, although the behavior of the soldiers was a sore spot. However, when the royal government provided no money, everyone was very unhappy. The local officials in Devon and Cornwall, according to several of the documents, refused to supply cash, but in the end, by keeping the soldiers around Plymouth, the Privy Council seems to have forced them to spend considerable amounts of local money, including their own, on billeting.
Chapter 7

Billeting Soldiers Before and After the Ré Expedition;
October 1626 through January 1628

1. Introduction

The remnants of the Cadiz army moved east out of Devon and Cornwall in the fall of 1626, and, though the Privy Council issued orders for the move on 24 August 1626, the troops started to arrive in their new billet locations only in October 1626. Billeting problems continued after the move, though not with the intensity seen earlier in 1626 in Cornwall and Devon. In first three months of 1627, the English government began preparations for the Expedition to the Île de Ré to relieve the Huguenots at La Rochelle, though the regiments did not move toward Portsmouth until March and sailed in late June 1627. After the Expedition returned from Ré in November 1627 there was considerable shuffling of army units from location to location, but by February 1627/28, the troops were in billets all over southern England, which the government expected them to occupy for a considerable time. A description of billeting in England before and immediately after this expedition is the subject of this Chapter, which presents events connected with billeting from October 1626 until January 1627/28. There are, by my estimate, approximately 500 documents concerning the billeting of troops from this period in the Acts of the Privy Council and State Papers Domestic alone. A number of them concern the movement of troops to new billets, but a majority concern billeting problems – lack of

1 *APC* Vol. 41, pp. 216-219, P.C. to D.L.s of Devon and Cornwall; 24 Aug 1626. The first document giving definite information that soldiers had arrived in Kent is in *APC* Vol. 41, pg. 344; P.C. to the Earl of Montgomery; 31 Oct 1626. SP16/36/54, Lt. Henry Keys to Sir Edward Conway; Sept. 26, 1626 gives some indication that soldiers (Bruce’s Regiment) had arrived in Hampshire by late Sep.
money, the problems related to the troops billeted in the counties, the reactions of the inhabitants to the troops, as well as the problems the soldiers had in finding food, shelter and clothing.

Relations between England and France were deteriorating at this time due to arguments over the Queen Henriette Marie’s household establishment and French support for Catholics and recusants in England. Additional disputes arose over the use of English ships loaned to the French government in attempts to reduce the Huguenots at La Rochelle to obedience to the French crown, and the general situation of the Huguenots in France. Charles of England believed himself committed to aid the Calvinist Huguenots in their quest for religious freedom, while Louis XIII and Richelieu saw this as meddling in French internal affairs. Charles saw French support of the Queen’s French establishment and support of the English Catholics as meddling in his household and in his domain. As a result, Buckingham and Charles altered their foreign policy of fostering and leading an anti-Habsburg alliance against Spain and the Emperor and supporting the Protestants in the Thirty Years’ War in Germany. They decided that England would enter a new war against France, a former ally in the anti-Habsburg alliance, to protect the Huguenots and to avenge French actions in trade disputes between the two countries. The royal government commenced preparations for an expedition to the Île de Ré to aid the Huguenots, whom King Charles had promised to support. The French government was conducting a land siege and naval blockade of the Protestant

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2 Refer to Chapter 3. S. R. Gardiner in his History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603-1642 provides a good summary of this background, particularly in Vol.’s 5 and 6. Richard Cust’s recent book, Charles I, A Political Life, provides much of the same information.
stronghold at Rochelle at the time, in an attempt to bring the town and the Huguenots under the civil control of the government, albeit with promises of religious freedom.

2. *The Army Moves East: Billeting Operations before the Ré Expedition Sailed: October 1626 through May 1627*

In the fall of 1626, the Privy Council granted the people of Devon and Cornwall their request and the troops moved east. In the new billets, the problems the soldiers, sailors and the billetters experienced remained much the same. In September, just before the arrival of the troops, the government issued Commissions for Martial Law to the affected counties as they had in Devon and Cornwall the year before.³ The Privy Council authorized the Commissioners to use the procedures of martial law and demanded the death penalty for murder, robbery, felony, mutiny or other outrages or misdemeanors and for desertion from the army or navy. It appears that the Commissioners could hand down the death penalty for any act committed by a soldier that the Commissioners decided was at least a “misdemeanor” or an “outrage”.

When the Army first moved into Dorset, Kent, Hampshire and Sussex in September and October 1626, officials in a number of the counties, towns and cities through which the troops were to travel objected to the costs of providing for the movement of the troops and for the billeting of the soldiers in transit.⁴ The most disliked expenses were providing conduct money for the soldiers, providing “horses and

³ *APC* Vol. 41, pg. 221, P.C. to the Attorney General; 24 August 1626. SP16/35/14, The King to Lord Conway and the D.L.s of Hampshire; 4 Sep 1626. See App. D, Items 9A and 9B for the Commission and the “laws”.

⁴ *APC* Vol. 41, pp. 308-309, P.C. to the D.L.s of Hampshire; 6 Oct 1626 gives a list of the duties of the localities in facilitating the transit of soldiers from one billet to the next. See App. D, Item 8 for the text.
carriages”, or carts, for baggage transport, and, for the county from which the soldiers left, providing clothes to the soldiers in need of them. The officials of the receiving counties and towns complained about billeting troops in their area, claiming poverty, previous expenses un-reimbursed by the crown and the presence of sickness. Dorset tried to avoid billeting and suggested Somerset instead, claiming that the seacoast towns that the Privy Council had ordered to billet soldiers were rife with sickness. The Council responded that the Dorset officials should billet the troops somewhere else in Dorset.\(^5\) The Privy Council was firm in its orders and the counties provided billets, with some adjustments to billet equal numbers of soldiers in each of the counties.\(^6\) The counties and towns soon pled for money from London and the Privy Council answered, as in previous episodes, that the counties should impose an equitable rate on the ratepayers as a whole to pay for the billeting. Hampshire requested new laws to permit them to impose such a rate, for, as Justice Fleetwood would point out, there were no laws concerning the billeting of soldiers on the statute books.\(^7\) There was a flurry of communications between the Commission for Martial Law in Hampshire and the Privy Council as to whether a soldier jailed for wounding a fellow soldier should be tried by common law or martial law. The Hampshire Commissioners claimed not to be familiar with martial law. In the interests of speed and expediency, the Privy Council agreed that the county should try the

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\(^5\) SP16/35/7; D.L.s and Justices of Dorset to the P.C.; 2 Sep 1626 and APC Vol. 41 pg. 261, P.C. to D.L.s and Justices of Dorset; 11 Sep 1626.

\(^6\) SP16/35/83, Sir George Chudleigh to Sec. Conway; 14 Sep 1626.

\(^7\) SP16/35/40, D.L.s of Hampshire to the P.C.; 7 Sep 1626. This letter may be suggesting that taxation for support of the army should be provided by means of subsidies granted by Parliament.
offender at jail delivery according to common law procedures. The Deputy Lieutenants of Hampshire also requested the removal of soldiers already billeted there if they were to billet 1000 more. The Privy council responded that they saw no reason Hampshire should have a problem raising billeting money for 1000 more soldiers and that the deputy lieutenants were to proceed as ordered.

As the companies of the army arrived, there was confusion over billet locations. Captain Goring’s company of Sir Edward Conway’s regiment arrived in Southampton town only to find Colonel Bruce’s regiment billeted there and had to ask Colonel Conway to ask his father, the Lord Lieutenant, if they could go to Wight. The Deputy Lieutenants of Middlesex were surprised by the arrival of 400 soldiers, said they expected many more and requested instructions on what to do with them.

There were a few reports of soldiers committing crimes. Mr. Sharpe of Kent reported to Sir Robert Darrell that six armed soldiers had broken down a wall of his house around midnight one Saturday night and surprised he, his wife and children, put a sword to his chest and demanded money. Sharpe gave the intruders what he had and the soldiers left without harming him. Darrell reported the crime to Sir Norton Knatchbull, one of the Deputy Lieutenants, who remarked that other similar crimes had been committed.

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8 SP16/34/20, Mayor of Southampton to Sec. Conway; 23 Aug 1626. APC Vol. 41, pg. 239, P.C. to the Mayor of Southampton; 31 Aug 1626 and APC Vol. 41, pg. 299, P.C. to Mayor of Southampton; 30 Sep 1626.

9 SP16/35/93, D.L.s of Hampshire to Conway as L.L.; Sept. 15, 1626 and APC Vol. 41, pg. 272, P.C. to D.L.s of Hampshire; 17 Sep 1626.

10 SP16/36/54, Lt. Henry Keyes to Sir Edward Conway; 26 Sep 1626.

11 SP16/36/67, Sir John Suckling to Sec. Conway; 27 Sep 1627.
attempted and committed and that soldiers had threatened to cut the throat of all the
watchmen in Thornecliff. He also said that matters were so bad that honest men in the
country were moving to the towns for safety. The document also mentions that the
Sharpe robbers intended to strike Lord Tustoun’s house, but the soldiers broke into the
wrong house. 12 It was common knowledge that Tustoun was away at the time, so
perhaps this was no more than a common robbery rather than an act of desperate soldiers.
The Commission for Martial Law in Dorset condemned “7 soldiurers and one tapster” to
death for burglary, but six of the soldiers somehow received pardons, apparently much to
the dismay of the citizens of Dorchester. The source does not state whether the tapster or
one of the soldiers was the leader of the gang. 13

The Commissioners for Martial Law in Hampshire wrote to Secretary Conway
that there would be much use for the Commission for Martial Law, since many outrages
and disorders had already occurred among the soldiers, but that they needed instructions
on the execution of martial law, with which they were unfamiliar. 14 There are few
mentions of the condition of the soldiers for several months, perhaps indicating that the
provision of food and clothing had improved. Naval officers, however, continued to
complain about the poor condition of their men, lack of pay for their men, the large
number of deserters and a few minor mutinies. 15 The seamen of the navy marched to

12 SP16/41/78, Sir Robert Darrell to Sir Norton Knatchbull; 11 Dec 1626.
13 William Whiteway, David Underdown, ed., William Whiteway of Dorchester His Diary 1618 To 1635
[Dorchester, Dorset: The Dorset Record Society, 1991], pg. 87, 17 Jan 1626/27.
14 SP16/37/88, Commissioners for Martial Law in Hampshire to Sec. Conway; 13 Oct 1626.
15 See SP 16/41/35, Sir John Watts to Buckingham; 6 Dec 1626, for a brief description of a refusal to work
a ship by the crew. SP16/51/7, Capt. Thomas Philpot to Nicholas; 22 Jan 1626/27. SP16/51/15, Philpot to
London demanding back pay several times, and on one occasion attacked the carriage and servants of the Duke of Buckingham. The crown issued proclamations forbidding soldiers and sailors to come near the court “in troops”. On the other hand, some money was available, for during this period, the royal government was collecting the Forced Loan money and it usually left some of the proceeds in the counties to pay for billeting and other military expenses. Pennington’s fleet was also bringing in prizes, whose sale raised more cash for the royal treasury.

In early 1627, preparations were underway in England for the Ré Expedition. The complaints of billeting communities were relatively muted during the preparations, at least until early April, partly because the number of troops billeted in England was smaller than in most of 1625 and in 1626. Money was also more available as mentioned above and earlier in this study. In April, however, soldiers pressed for service with the King of Denmark and assembled in the Town of Harwich, Essex were involved in a

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16 Antellminelli, Alessandro (aka Amerigo Salvetti), Manuscripts of Henry Duncan Skrine esq.: Salvetti Correspondence [London: Historical Manuscripts Commission, 11th Report Appendix Part I; printed for Her Majesty’s Stationary Office by Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1887], pg. 88, 23 Oct 1626 and also pg. 97, 11 Dec 1626.

17 SP16/56/80, Lord Treasurer Marlborough and Chancellor of the Exchequer Weston to Sec. Conway; 10 Mar 1626/27.

18 S. R. Gardiner, Vol. 6, pg. 160. Also P. R. Seddon, ed., Letters Of John Holles 1587-1637, 3 Vol. [Nottingham: Produced For The Thoroton Society by Derry And Sons Limited, 1975], Vol. 2, pg. 352, No. 476, Holles to Bishop Williams, 1 June 1627. Holles also mentions (arguably) that the English merchants were loosing more money due to French confiscations than England was gaining in prize money. See also Chap. 3, Sec. 3
major mutiny, which will be discussed later, as the events provide information on the attitudes of both the pressed recruits and the people of Essex.

During the preparations for the Ré Expedition, the army was concentrated in Hampshire and reorganized from the ten regiments of the Cadiz Expedition into five regiments of ten companies each. The army disbanded thirty-six ‘broken’ companies and folded their remaining men into companies in the five new regiments.19 In May of 1627, the Privy Council pressed 2000 more men and formed them into two new regiments, raising the army strength to seven regiments totaling around 7,000 men.20 Before sailing, the Council billeted these regiments in Dorset, Kent, Hampshire and Sussex, with the highest concentrations in Hampshire, particularly around Portsmouth and Southampton, which were the main embarkation points for the Ré Expedition. In May, the government formed another new, mixed regiment of five companies from Ireland and four or five from around Portsmouth under Sir Peregrine Barty and it also went to Ré.

When the Privy Council ordered a concentration of troops at Winchester and Southampton in March 1626/27, with funds provided from the loan money, financial shortages started to appear. The Deputy Lieutenants of Dorset informed the Council that the costs for past billeting, for new clothes and for conduct money amounted to £10,503, whereas the loan money amounted to only £5,120, with little of that collected.21 The deputy lieutenants further maintained that they could not raise such large sums without

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19 As described in Chap. 4

20 See Chap. 4 and App. A.

21 SP16/57/85, D.L.s of Dorset to the P.C.; 22 March 1626/27.
help from other counties. Dorsetshire refused to provide the money to pay officer’s arrears for the past five months or the costs of moving the troops. The Privy Council helped Dorset and allocated £3000 from the sales of French goods and from the loans from Bedfordshire.\textsuperscript{22} The Council responded differently to the Deputy Lieutenants of Hampshire, refusing help and ordering the deputy lieutenants to pay the costs of moving troops out of the county loan money.\textsuperscript{23} How Hampshire resolved the issue is not apparent, but it is likely that Hampshire got the money together from loan money and more taxes on the county ratepayers. These incidents and others illustrate the arguments about ways and means and the various similar attempts to find money.\textsuperscript{24} The Council also ordered that any troops that could not move due to lack of money should remain in Kent, Sussex, Berkshire, Hampshire and Dorset and billeted upon loan defaulters.\textsuperscript{25} The money was raised somehow, for all of the regiments showed up in Portsmouth and Southampton to sail for the Île de Ré.

As the regiments and companies marched to Portsmouth to board ship, either the desertion rate increased or the government in London became more worried about desertions depleting the numbers available for the Ré Expedition. The Privy Council issued orders to the Lord Lieutenants of Kent, Essex, Middlesex and Surrey ordering

\textsuperscript{22} APC Vol. 42, pp. 169,170, P.C. to L.L. of Dorset; 28 March 1627; revised and sent on 8 Apr.
\textsuperscript{23} APC Vol. 42, pp. 166,167, P.C. to the D.L.s of Hampshire; 28 March 1627.
\textsuperscript{25} APC Vol. 42, pg. 206, Order from the P.C. to Chancellor of the Exchequer, John Mason, Paymaster et al.; 7 April 1627
them to appoint Provost Marshals in their counties to “to prevent the running away of
mariners and land soldiers in great numbers as they are now doing. This loss of men will
severely hamper his majesty’s plans to safeguard his realm and to aid his allies.” The
Council also noted that many of the runaway mariners had just received some of their
back pay, which I think probably provided them with the wherewithal for the journey
home. The Deputy Lieutenants of Hertford had to ask for men to help the conductor to
escort impressed men to Portsmouth and asked for the power to re-impress runaways,
both of which requests the Lord Lieutenant, the Earl of Salisbury, granted.

There were a number of the now usual requests not to billet soldiers in a town or
county and complaints about the expense and lack of money. There was one revealing
complaint concerning Sir George Blundell. One of the Deputy Lieutenants of Hampshire
accused him of billeting soldiers in poor villages rather in the larger market towns where
provisions were easier to purchase, a cause of much misery to the people. Moreover,
Blundell did not consult with the deputy lieutenants about this matter and responded to
their suggestion rather curtly. Blundell was the Sergeant Major for the force
assembling for the Ré Expedition and appears to have been a rather crusty old soldier

26 APC Vol. 42, pg. 158, letters to the L.L.s of Kent, Middlesex, Surrey and Essex; 24 March 1626/27.
27 SP16/63/76 D.L.s of Hertford to Earl of Salisbury; 15? May 1627.
28 SP16/61/66, The King to Buckingham; 30 Apr 1627. SP16/62/6, Sir George Blundell to Buckingham; 1
May 1627. SP16/62/20, /21, /23, several certificates and returns of coat and conduct money; 2 May 1627.
SP16/64/47, Sir Edward Denys and Sir John Oglander to the P.C.; 25 May 1627. SP16/64/73, Sir George
Blundell to the P.C.; 27 May 1627. SP16/62/6, Sir George Blundell to Buckingham; 1 May 1627. There
are many others.
29 SP16/62/57, Sir Daniel Norton to Sir William Uvedale; 5 May 1627.
who did not gladly brook interference from civilians, which pleased neither the deputy lieutenants nor the people of the villages.

The fleet sailed for the Île de Ré on 27 June 1627 and returned in mid-November. During the period that the army was on the Île de Ré, recruiting and the attendant billeting problems continued in England as the London government gathered replacements to go to Ré. The typical complaints about clothing for the soldiers and sailors, sickness among the troops and billeters and payment for the expenses of maintaining the soldiers and sailors all continued, but at a lower number per month than in the past. In addition to the initial force that sailed from Portsmouth, the Irish government formed two regiments in Ireland, with Sir Pierce Crosby and Sir Ralph Bingley as Colonels. These regiments sailed directly to Ré from Waterford in August 1627. In September, the Privy Council formed two more new regiments from newly pressed men and placed them under the command of Colonels Sir James Ramsey and Sir John Ratcliff. These regiments assembled in the Plymouth area and stayed in the area until early in 1628. Still another regiment, commanded by the Earl of Moreton, was recruited in Scotland. The regiment came from Scotland by ship to Portsmouth in early October and soon went into billets on the Isle of Wight. The Scots never got to Ré though they did sail on a second, aborted, attempt to relieve La Rochelle but soon returned to the Isle of Wight. Finally, the Privy Council levied another 2000 men as replacements on 30 September and ordered them to rendezvous at Plymouth by 1

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30 The Earl’s title is spelled Morton or Moreton. I have used the spelling Moreton to distinguish the Earl and the Scots from the regiment of a Col. Morton (English).

November 1627.\footnote{APC Vol. 43, pp. 60-62, P.C. to 16 L.L.s; 30 Sept 1627.} The fleet returned from the Ré disaster before these men ever boarded ship. These 2000 men remained in the vicinity of Plymouth until mid-1628.

During this period, Denzil Holles wrote from Dorchester in August 1627 about the effects of war on the local economy and of the soldier’s behavior in a letter to Sir Thomas Wentworth. The complaints were the same as in previous episodes of billeting in the West Country. Holles mentioned that that all trade was dead, that wool lay unused and workmen out of work, and the local ships remained tied up in port. Among the “petty inconveniences” were soldiers ravishing men’s wives and daughters, stealing and killing cattle and sheep from the fields, not to mention poultry, and robbing and killing men on the roads and in the towns and markets for new shoes or a basket of apples or eggs. “Pranks” like these, Holles reported, came by the dozen to the houses of the Justices of the Peace and the Deputy Lieutenants. Although the royal government intended for sea prizes taken from England’s late allies, the French, to pay for much of the war costs in the west, Holles complained that there was not much money left from the few prizes taken after the Lord Admiral and the vice-Admirals took their share and other expenses were discharged. There were but “slender gleanings” for the shipmaster who took the prize. Prices were also high in the area and the “western lads” believed the “gentlemen” in London should provide more money to supply “his majesty’s wants” for the war.\footnote{B.L. Doc. CW3301551842, Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, The Earl of Strafforde’s letters and dispatches, with an essay towards his life …by William Knowler, … [London, 1739. 2 Vols.], Vol. I., pp. 40-41; 9 Aug 1627.}
Runaway soldiers compounded the problems, and the Privy Council added injury to insult when it demanded that Devon and Cornwall press 200 men and that other counties press more to make up the losses.\textsuperscript{34} The Deputy Lieutenants of Hampshire told the Privy Council that they were having trouble pressing even fifty men to make up for the runaways from Plymouth because they had pressed 1500 men in the last few years and few men were left that could be spared.\textsuperscript{35} The Privy Council also issued a number of orders to local justices, sheriffs and deputy lieutenants to set watches for runaway soldiers and sailors and to return the deserters to their companies and ships or to jail them and punish them according to the laws.\textsuperscript{36} The problem of desertion grew as 1627 wore on, and increased, if anything, after the return from Ré. There are also several reports of men running away when the navy press gang came around and, in one case, of the local constables warning the men in the area that the press gang was coming.\textsuperscript{37}

By October 1627, the Commission for Soldiers at Plymouth and the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon and Cornwall were complaining to the Privy council that they were again bearing the costs of billeting, this time of the two new regiments of Sir James Ramsey and Sir John Ratcliff, now containing only 1700 soldiers because so many had

\textsuperscript{34} 400 to 500 men had deserted from Ramsey’s and Ratcliff’s regiments by mid-October.

\textsuperscript{35} SP16/82/86, D.L.s of Hampshire to the P.C.; 5 Oct 1627.

\textsuperscript{36} APC Vol. 42, pg. 185; 31 March 1627 in particular is addressed to all the counties of England and Wales. APC Vol. 42, pg. 158; 24 March 1626/27 has a letter on the subject directed particularly to the Lord Lieutenants of Kent, Middlesex, Surrey and Essex – the greater London area, which was always a tender point with the King and the Council.

\textsuperscript{37} SP16/78/74, Mayor of Lyme Regis to Sir John Wolstenholme; 20 Sep 1627. There was a similar occurrence reported in Mar 1628 in SP16/96/53, The Earl of Denbigh to Nicholas; 19 Mar 1627/28 and still another in April 1628 in SP16/99/11, Certificate of Phillip Hill; 1 April 1628.
runaway from their conductors. They begged for money to pay for billeting expenses because the people of Devon and Cornwall were again angry and many refused to billet soldiers or pay the billeting rates. In late October, the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon were truly alarmed when the Privy Council sent orders to press 200 more men but did not inform them to expect 2000 more impressed men by early November. They asked for £2500 to pay the billeting expenses of the recently departed regiments of Ramsey and Ratcliff, which had just boarded ship for Ré, and a large sum of ready cash to pay for billeting the new recruits, who were just starting to arrive virtually unannounced. As for impressing men in Devon, they could not do so without endangering the “subsistence” of the county. So many men had been pressed for the navy and the army and, as the tinners were, as always, exempt, there were no men left beyond those needed to farm or fish.

The Deputy Lieutenants closed with this plea:

“There are here att this present honorable witnesses who can bear us recorde of this truth that we have don our uttermost and so farf fayled as we are some of us deeply ingaged both in our owne purses and and creditt for the discharge thereof. And wee are continually so molested with the crye of the pore billeters for present paie as our busines is disturbed, our credite loste with our countrymen and our selves utterlie wearyed in the performance of this ympossible service. Wee doe therefore most humblie beseech you Lordships as you tender his majesties honor, the content of his people, or in any sorte regardre our pore creditts, to send a good some of money with your soldiers, to hasten some sufficient Captayne (as you latelie did in the Lord Wilmott) both to governe and billett them, and also to assigne such porccion of men to Cornwall as your Lordships shall thinke fitt. …. wee knowe no other waie to attayne your Lordships endes for his majesties service or keepe this country in peace or shall our selves bee otherwise ever able to recover the power wee have

38 SP16/81/4, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 10 Oct 1627.
hadd to obey your Lordships commannde in anie service of his majestie wherein it is all our hartie desires to contynewe.”

From the last sentence, it appears that few in the county were obeying the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon.

There is another document, which is undated but from the internal evidence we can assign to approximately the same date. It appears to be another version or draft of the previous document.\(^\text{40}\) It provides more detail and is presented in full in Appendix D, Item 6. Of most interest here is an almost treasonous comment in the document:

“His majesties honor doth likewise suffer much in these penurious wayes of billetting souldiers without money. What say the people will his Majestie make warre without provision of treasure or must our country beare the charge for all England. Is it not enough that wee undergoe the trouble of these insolent souldiers in our houses, their robberies and other misdemeanors but that we must mayntaine them too at our owne cost. This say the people. And the Lordes have bene at sundry tymes advertised of these thinges but it seems they are not believed or not remembred(sic)”

Toward the end of the period when the army was at Ré, soldiers temporarily billeted in Exeter created a major disturbance.\(^\text{41}\) A party of about 200 soldiers impressed in Gloucestershire arrived in the Exeter area on their way to Plymouth. The magistrates of Exeter billeted them for a night in the “suburbs” of Exeter and they were to march on to Silverton, their appointed billet, the next day. There were also soldiers billeted within the city walls of Exeter. The next morning, the soldiers wanted to march through Exeter, which was out of their way to Silverton. The Mayor of Exeter denied them entry to the city, shut the gate in front of them and asked them in a friendly way to take the more

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\(^{40}\) SP16/88/46, complaint to the P.C. by Devon and Cornwall; 1627? Undated. (See the first note in Appendix D, Item 6 on the possible date of this document. The internal evidence dates it to early Nov. 1627.)

\(^{41}\) SP16/84/61, Information against Walter Little and John Hill; 12 Nov 1627.
direct route to their assigned billets in Silverton. The request enraged one of the soldiers, Walter Little, and he gathered together forty of the “the most disorderly sons of the company”, seized an axe, and attempted to pull down some houses near where they had spent the night. The soldiers did succeed in pulling down the cage and the stocks and then approached the town gate. They broke in one of the planks of the gate before the town could raise a force against him, as Little vowed he would hack the gate down and pass through the city or die for it. When “officers” came to “suppress” him, Little and his accomplices vowed to kill them. Little also swore he would “cut the Mayor into pieces and carry his head with him and to make garters of his guts”. Somehow, the riot was ended and “officers” captured Little and another soldier named John Hill. Needless to say, the magistrates of Exeter sought the harshest punishment from the Privy Council for these two and asked for a Commission for Martial Law for the city since it was a common route for soldiers to take to Plymouth. The sources do not state why Little wanted to pass through the city and why the Mayor wished to forbid him, but the Mayor must have believed some trouble was afoot. Perhaps the soldiers wanted to have some fun in town and I suspect that beer may have been involved. In any event, the Privy Council demanded that the Lord Lieutenant prevent such behavior in the future and wanted no more complaints from Exeter.

On several occasions, local officials accused soldiers of poaching deer on private land, including the King’s Forests. One investigation in Hampshire recorded that thirty soldiers allegedly killed a deer and cut it up in sight of an informant’s house. Witnesses testified that they saw another group of ten carrying off a deer and one that one soldier
brought a piece of deer to a man’s house to be baked, but the householder refused.\textsuperscript{42} In another case, the Privy Council received a report that soldiers in Colonel Fryer’s regiment pulled down the “works” being erected to enclose the Forest of Gillingham in Dorset.\textsuperscript{43} The Privy Council ordered the Justices and Deputy Lieutenants of Dorset to conduct a full investigation of the disorders and to punish the perpetrators. The documents do not mention whether the soldiers were protesting the enclosure process or seeking deer, but protest seems likely in this case.

In an incident involving a soldier and a civilian, a Lieutenant Leigh of Sir John Burrough’s regiment, whom Viscount Wimbledon had sent into Devon, petitioned the Council of War for reinstatement to his position.\textsuperscript{44} The Commissioners for Soldiers had dismissed from him from his Lieutenancy for “holding up his stick to Adam Bennett” of Devon while protesting Bennett’s refusal to billet soldiers. I suspect that Lieutenant Leigh also threatened bodily harm with the stick, but the Lieutenant’s petition does not mention this.

Press abuses were as bad or worse in 1627 during preparations for the Isle of Ré Expedition as they had been in 1625 during the assembly of the Mansfeld and Cadiz Expeditions, and the suitability of the men pressed probably worse on average. Among other examples is a report of press abuses in Dorset. A number of witnesses accused

\textsuperscript{42} SP16/88/49, Examinations of Nicholas Tyer et al.; dated sometime in 1627.

\textsuperscript{43} APC Vol. 43, pg. 248; P.C. to Commissioners for Soldiers near Gillingham; 24 Jan 1627/28 and pg. 272, P.C. to D.Ls and J.P.s of Dorset; 6 Feb 1627/28. Fryer’s regiment was the only one billeted in Dorset at this time.

\textsuperscript{44} SP16/88/47, Petition of John Leigh; undated 1627.
Deputy Lieutenants Sir John Browne and Henry Hastings of releasing a “stout” miller and impressing a fifteen year old boy in his place, of pressing a boy who was “as small as he was young”; of impressing a man who had one leg that reached only to the calf of the other leg when he stood; as well as pressing a man with no toes. The witnesses also accused Brown and Hastings of releasing many “sufficient” men who brought money in their purses; that the conductor they selected released many of the most able men on the road; and that their constable impressed an apprentice boy out of a shop, leaving behind four able journeymen.45 Sir George Blundell, Sergeant Major of his Majesty’s forces in Hampshire at this time, wrote a letter to Buckingham and the Privy Council who forwarded it to Secretary Conway, the Lord Lieutenant of the county, pointing out that the Deputy Lieutenants of Hampshire would not listen to him concerning the suitability of recruits.46 They should have sent 200 men but sent only 140, most of whom were “creatures I am ashamed to describe”. Blundell selected 89 out of the 140 as fit and sent the rest back to the deputy lieutenants. He said the deputies were so desirous to be rid of these rouges and beggars that they sent them to me “in spite of my teeth” and though “I told them that I had not a penny”, they sent them without money, clothes or shoes. The situation was no different in 1625 and 1626 before and after the Cadiz Expedition – the soldiers were without money for food, lodging, clothes and shoes because money was not provided from London and many of the local rate payers refused to pay any more.

45 SP16/61/98, Information against Sir John Brown et al. of Dorset; April 1627.
46 SP16/61/68, P.C. to Sec. Conway and SP16/61/68i, Sir George Blundell to Buckingham; 30 April 1627. SP16/62/6, Sir George Blundell to Buckingham; 1 May 1627.
By mid-1627, the Deputy Lieutenants and Justices from other counties were reporting to the Privy Council that they had reached the bottom of the barrel as far as pressing soldiers was concerned. The deputies of Dorset reported that, with 500 men pressed as soldiers since April and with the large numbers of mariners also pressed, they had no more men to press except from among members of the trained bands or substantial householders. The deputies also tried to reach the Privy Councilors’ emotions and gain their sympathy by including this well known sentence: “But with what difficultie in fower dayes labour [to press 150 men] and what lamentable cries of mothers wives and children we have sent away this companie of men, wee cannot by writing expresse to your Lordshipps”.

A conductor of troops pressed for Denmark from Cumberland and Westmoreland reported that most of the men were near naked and very weak. The conductor received only 92 of the 100 ordered pressed in Cumberland and 16 of those ran away. Of the eight that did not appear on the indenture, the deputy lieutenants certified that “some of them killed themselves, some became ffranticke, the rest are committed to the Jaole as refusing either to take presse money or to march”.

The Cumberland deputies later wrote that, because of the poor weather and recent taxes and loans, the county was now so poor that many farm laborers had “runaway” to other counties seeking work. The deputy lieutenants of Devon wrote to the Privy Council that, because of the exemption of the tin miners of the county, as well as members of the

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47 SP16/66/41, D.L.s of Dorsetshire to the P.C.; 8 Jun 1627.
48 SP16/73/41, Capt. Herbert Prise to the P.C.; 5 Aug 1627.
49 SP16/74/29, D.L.s of Cumberland to Lord Clifford; 17 Aug 1627.
trained bands and with the numerous recent presses of seaman and soldiers, vital agricultural laborers would in the future have to be pressed to the detriment of the economy and income of the county.\textsuperscript{50} The Deputy Lieutenants of Pembroke asked for the power to press men from the towns because they had pressed so many men from the rural labor force, it was so reduced that they were obliged to press men they were sorry and ashamed to present.\textsuperscript{51} In October, the deputy lieutenants of Hampshire told the Privy Council that they had experienced great difficulty finding 50 men to press “by reason of the scarsitie of such men with us there having bene ympressed out of this county within theise few yeares ffiftene hundred men and fewe of them returned”.\textsuperscript{52} In September 1627, the Deputy Lieutenants of Leicestershire reported that they were having difficulty finding recruits because men were running away from their homes and hiding when they received notice to appear for the press.\textsuperscript{53}

Sussex pressed 1,150 footmen and 550 mariners between 1624 and 1628. It was never easy to find men who were not members of the trained bands who were also fit for the army and could be spared from the support of families. It was tempting to fill the pressed bands with rogues and vagabonds, the scum of the county and the press officers made sure that the press of replacements for the Ré Expedition in the summer of 1627 at

\textsuperscript{50} SP16/73/52, D.L.s of Devon to the P.C.; 7 August 1627 and SP16/82/82, D.L.s of Devon to the P.C.; 25 Oct 1627. This letter also states that press money and coat and conduct money was levied in Devon for this press and no complaints were made by the deputies. Perhaps Devon had received some of the arrears from 1624 and 1625 that were noted in Chapters 4 and 5. The second mentions £2500 still in arrears.

\textsuperscript{51} SP16/75/37, D.L.s of Pembroke to the P.C.; 28 Aug 1627.

\textsuperscript{52} SP16/82/86, D.L.s of Hampshire to Sec. Conway; 25 Oct 1627.

\textsuperscript{53} SP16/77/31, D.L.s of Leicestershire to the P.C.; 10 Sep 1627.
the height of the harvest was concentrated in the areas of the county “where masterless men abounded”. Once rumors of the press had reached the county, it was best to conduct it quickly, before men had a chance to hide or runaway and once pressed, they had to be paid or they would almost surely run away. The Deputy Lieutenants of Sussex always acted quickly when they received the Council’s letter for a press. They normally allowed only a few days for the constables to press the men required in each hundred before they held a county rendezvous for the whole force. Some men attempted to bribe the deputies for their release, but bribery was not as common or successful in Sussex as in other counties.\textsuperscript{54}

The result of the press must have been an army largely made up of the unhappy, the unwilling, and the angry. It started with many obvious abuses in the levying of soldiers, continued with billeting problems – problems in obtaining food and shelter and clothing - and ended with many counties claiming there were few men left to press. It is not surprising that the soldiers committed ‘misdemeanors’, taking out frustrations and anger on the people of the areas where they were billeted. It is no surprise that morale was low and runaways numerous. Yet those who stayed often fought bravely and well, as at Ré. The reactions of these unhappy and angry commoners became increasingly frequent in 1627 and became more intense in 1628, as violence and desertions increased.

\textsuperscript{54} Anthony Fletcher; \textit{A County Community in Peace and War: Sussex 1600-1660} [London: Longman Group Ltd., 1975], pg. 193. For information on estimated costs of billeting in Sussex, see App. B.
3. A Soldier’s Mutiny at Harwich

There are four incidents, which are described in more detail in the sources than any others, and seem to have concerned the authorities, both in London and in the localities, more than others. Three occurred in 1628 and are discussed in the next Chapter. A mutiny of soldiers at Harwich, which took place in the spring of 1627, illustrates the problems of and with soldiers in more detail than is possible with briefer descriptions. None of the participants directly connected the mutiny to billeting, but it does illustrate some of the interactions between civilians and soldiers that were common during the years from 1624 to 1628. The mutiny may also illustrate the dislike and fear of service outside of England and in non-English armies. Above all, however, the Harwich affair indicates a growing disaffection with the war. There had been other mutiny plots, such as the one in Devon by Captain Molesworth’s soldiers before the Cadiz Expedition, but local officials put down these earlier mutinies with little trouble. However, the conductors, captains and deputy lieutenants did not suppress the mutiny at Harwich without violence.

A previous episode involving Essex and Harwich had left ill feelings in the county. In August 1625, a plausible rumor of a Spanish invasion from Dunkirk prompted the royal government to make a flurry of demands on the people of Essex. The crown appointed the Earl of Warwick as co-lord lieutenant of the county as a substitute for the ineffectual Earl of Sussex. Warwick quickly ordered the muster of 3000 men of the trained bands and the repair of the fortifications at Harwich, all at the expense of the county. The county was in a state of panic and quickly complied, expending over £4000
on the fortifications and on billeting the men of the trained bands. However, the rumors proved to be false and the crown reimbursed only £658 for the repair of the forts. The Essex authorities complained bitterly that in Elizabeth’s time the crown paid for all such expenses and that it should now reimburse the county for all its expenses. They were still petitioning for the money in 1627.55

The Mutiny at Harwich, or rather, several mutinies, took place in April 1627.56 The soldiers involved were recruits pressed to fill up depleted English companies in the King of Denmark’s service. The royal government planned to ship 500 men from Harwich, another 1150 from the London area and another 1350 from Hull, a total of 3000 men.57 The fleet coming from London was to meet the Harwich ships at Harwich, and perhaps those from Kingston-upon-Hull, and the combined fleet was then to sail to Denmark.58 The five hundred men leaving from Harwich were pressed in Cambridgeshire, Essex, Leicestershire and Norfolk and ordered to rendezvous at Harwich on 25 March 1627. There were the usual troubles and problems from the very beginning. The conductor for the voyage to Denmark from Harwich was Captain Richard


57 APC Vol. 42, pg. 101, P.C. to the L.L.s of 20 counties; 28 Feb 1626/27.

58 See SP16/61/5, Mayor of Kingston-upon-Hull to the P.C.; 23 Apr 1627.
Saltonstall, an experienced officer, who was at Harwich to receive the pressed men.\textsuperscript{59} The Deputy Lieutenants of Essex billeted the pressed men who arrived in the town and surrounding areas, in accordance with the usual orders from the Privy Council.\textsuperscript{60}

Captain Saltonstall and a Deputy Lieutenant of Essex, William Smythe, held a muster around 1 April and found the total number of men present to be “defective”.\textsuperscript{61} The 150 men from Norfolk had not arrived nor did all the 350 men from the other counties make it to Harwich, the total being 70 men, or 20 percent, less than the expected 350. According to Saltonstall’s letter to the Privy Council on 3 April, many ran away on the march to Harwich and, after arriving at Harwich, many had escaped with the help of a “waterman whoe by night did convey the soldiers away by bote”.\textsuperscript{62} The waterman had been apprehended after a search and the local authorities were holding him until the Privy Council decided what to do with him. Considerable sympathy in Essex for the pressed soldiers was evident. One of the conductors reported in late March that he had lost nineteen men on the way to Harwich and that, in most parts of Essex, the people were more willing to hide the runaways than to assist the conductor in finding them.\textsuperscript{63} The deputy Lieutenants of Essex reported to the Council, in a letter dated 4 April, much the same information and that they had pressed the 70 men necessary to make up the 350

\textsuperscript{59} APC Vol. 42, pg. 145, three warrants from the P.C. to Coningsbe, Douglas and Saltonstall; 20 Mar 1616/27. Saltonstall is also spelled ‘Saltonstone’ in some documents.

\textsuperscript{60} APC Vol. 42, pg. 172, P.C. to Mayor of Harwich; 28 Mar 1627.

\textsuperscript{61} That is, less than the number ordered pressed by the Privy Council.

\textsuperscript{62} SP16/59/19, Saltonstall to the P.C.; 3 Apr 1627. Whether the “waterman” was helping the recruits out of sympathy for their plight or for money is open to question.

\textsuperscript{63} Quintrell, \textit{The Maynard Lieutenancy Book}, pg. 175, No. 446, 26 Mar 1627.
locally in Essex. This was not a popular action in Essex, as it was the second press for
the same service and the inhabitants of Essex resented having to make up the deficiencies
of other counties. Further, the deputy lieutenants expected the crown to repay the coat
and conduct money that they had paid out of their own pockets for these men and for the
billeting expenses at 8d. a day for all the men while they were in Essex. The deputies
expected to deduct the funds from the Loan money they were presently trying to collect. 64
Finally, Saltonstall reported that the ships, which were to carry the men to Denmark, had
arrived that morning and he intended to get the men on board as quickly as possible to
prevent further desertions. 65 This turned out to be a bad idea.

The next part of the tale comes from a letter written at Harwich by Sir Peter
Saltonstall, Sir Richard’s father, to the Privy Council on 7 April 1627. 66 The soldiers
onboard the ships were in “mutinous disorder”, suspecting that they were to be kept on
the ships for some time until they sailed to Denmark. They threatened to cut the ships
anchor cables and “do some other spoyle” to the ships. Moreover, they held Captain
Saltonstall prisoner and refused to let him come ashore to complete his business with the
conductors, refused to load supplies of food onto the ships and “scorn[ed]” Captain

64 SP16/59/31, D.L.s of Essex to the P.C.; 4 April 1627. The Privy Council had ordered Burlemachi to
provide 8d. a day conduct money for the men at Harwich (APC Vol. 42, pg. 183, 31 Mar 1627). They also
authorized the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex to deduct the costs of the second press from the Loan money,
but not the costs for the first press, which were to be born by the county as was done in all other counties
(APC Vol. 42, pg. 215; 10 Apr 1627).

65 SP16/59/19, Saltonstall to the P.C.; 3 Apr 1627.

66 SP16/59/67, Sir Peter Saltonstall to the P.C.; 7 April 1627. The elder Saltonstall’s information is
confirmed by one of the conductors, Sergeant Andrews, in Quintrell, pg. 176, No, 448, 7 April 1627.
Saltonstall’s commission from the Privy Council to conduct them to Denmark. Sir Peter pleaded for help from the Council.

On 9 April, three of the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex reported to the Privy Council that the mutineers held not only Captain Saltonstall but they also held his lieutenant on another ship. The mutineers threatened to throw them overboard and to cut the ship’s anchor cables and move the ships to the Suffolk side of the River Stour. The previous night the mutineers had obtained boats and a number escaped to the Suffolk side and some to the Essex shore. The Deputy Lieutenants of Essex, with the aid of a Deputy Lieutenant of Suffolk, raised a hue-and-cry to catch the runaways in Essex and Suffolk. Captain Saltonstall added in his own letter of the same day that the mutineers threatened to “pour his blood” as well as throw him overboard, but fortunately, the deputy lieutenants secured order on shipboard by coming along side with two boats full of musketeers. The Essex Deputy Lieutenants parlayed with the mutineers and decided to let them come ashore until the royal government ordered the ships to sail for Denmark, thinking this the best thing to do for his Majesty’s service. This decision freed Saltonstall and his lieutenant. The Deputies thought it was necessary because they had just learned that the Norfolk contingent would not arrive for another week or so. The Deputy Lieutenants mentioned that the soldiers’ only grievance was their confinement onboard

67 SP16/59/84, D.L.s of Essex to the P.C. The deputy Lieutenants involved were William Maynard, Henry Mildmay and William Smythe of Essex and Sir John Barker of Suffolk.

68 Harwich is in Essex. Suffolk is just across the Stour River estuary from Harwich. A bit less than one mile of water separates Harwich from Shotley Gate, Suffolk. The town of Felixstowe and the Landguard Fort are also in Suffolk just across the river.

69 SP16/59/85, Saltonstall to the P.C.; 9 April 1627.
ship in close quarters. For their part, the mutinous soldiers promised to behave while on shore and to re-embark peacefully when the time came to sail. In addition, the deputy lieutenants called out a company of the local Trained Bands to Harwich to ensure the maintenance of order. In his letter of 9 April, Saltonstall requested the Council to set an example by severely punishing some of the mutineers. Of course, the deputy lieutenants ended their letter with a complaint about money and their hope that the crown would reimburse Essex, and they personally, out of the Loan money. To this the Privy Council agreed. Unfortunately, their trust in the trained bandsmen proved to be illusory and punishment had unintended consequences.

The Privy Council did take a positive action: they sent another experienced officer, Captain Robert Gosnold, to Harwich to assist Captain Saltonstall. Gosnold arrived in Harwich on 10 April and reported to the Council on 12 April that the actions of the deputy lieutenants in jailing some of the principal mutineers and taking the soldiers off the ships had quieted the uproar. This, Gosnold thought, left him with little to do. Gosnold also mentioned that onboard ship the pressed men experienced “the inconvenience of ill lodging, and [were] subject to sickness”. However, as it turned out, Gosnold had much yet to do.

On 12 April, the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex on the scene reported to the Privy Council that since the soldiers had been brought ashore they had “behaved themselves

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70 They did not want to be on board ship because it was harder to desert and go home, but fear of sickness and short rations may have been other worries, as we shall see.


72 SP16/60/20, Capt. Robert Gosnold to the P.C.; 12 April 1627.
with as much obedience as we can wish”. The only thing troubling the deputies was lack of money with which to pay the troops. According to the deputy lieutenants, they solved this problem by giving the soldiers 8d. per day out of the Loan money, which they would continue to do until the soldiers re-embarked after both the Norfolk men and the convoy of ships from London arrived at Harwich. The deputy lieutenants also mentioned that many of the pressed men had fallen sick during the short time they were onboard ship. They had called in men of the Trained Bands because the town was “weake” and there were few of his Majesty’s soldiers in the area to provide assistance, if needed. The deputies praised Captain Gosnold for his wise advice and, following it, the deputy lieutenants reported that they had imprisoned one of the runaway soldiers in Colchester jail and would proceed against him at the next quarter sessions, assuming the Council approved. The Deputy Lieutenants also captured and proposed to send up to the Privy Council one of the principal mutineers, John Toner of Colchester, who was of Dutch parentage and who had served in the King of Denmark’s army in the past. The deputy lieutenants overheard Toner swearing to some soldiers that he would rather hang than serve the King of Demark again. Other soldiers told the deputies that Toner said to them while they were onboard the ships that he would rather blow up the ships than go with them to Denmark.

73 SP16/60/19, D.L.s of Essex to the P.C.; 12 April 1627.

74 According to an entry in The Maynard Lieutenancy Book, (pg. 180, No. 454) one man, Emanuel Franklin, was condemned and executed in July 1627 for running away from his conductor. Of course, at this late date, the punishment had no effect on the situation in Harwich in April.

75 The name of this man is given in the C.S.P.D. as “Toner”. I also read the name as “Toner” from the MS. However, S. J. Stearns and Quintrell transcribe the name as “Tomer”.
The Privy Council instructed the Justices of the Peace of Essex and Suffolk to hold a special session of the Commission of the Peace to try and to punish some of the runaways. The Council also instructed them to send up two ringleaders of the recent mutiny to the Admiralty for trial, as the mutiny, being onboard ship, was out of the jurisdiction of the county.\textsuperscript{76} Toner was sent up to the Admiralty Court and a Grand Jury reviewed his case. The jury would have presented him for his speeches on land but these charges were not triable in the Admiralty Court and the jury would not present a bill on the mutiny charge.\textsuperscript{77} As a result, the judge did not know what to do with Toner. The Admiralty Court also heard the cases of four seamen sent up from Harwich on mutiny charges, so some of the ship’s crew must have been part of this mutiny. The Lords of the Admiralty would have hanged them, but someone decided that this could only be done under martial law. It seems probable that Toner avoided going back to Denmark, since these legal actions must have taken more than the three weeks until the fleet sailed. He may have gotten his preferred result, hanging

The next “disorder” at Harwich occurred on 15 or 16 April. Captains Gosnold and Saltonstall described to the Privy Council a jailbreak and its aftermath.\textsuperscript{78} Six of the “principal offenders” from the previous mutiny had been jailed and the Captains thought “all had been appeased” when suddenly all together the soldiers “broke up” the prison and freed the prisoners, vowing that they would all die before they would allow any of their

\textsuperscript{76} APC, Vol. 42, pp. 214-215, letters from the P.C. to the J.P.s of Essex and Suffolk; 10 April 1627. The Commission of the Peace was the standard common law court.

\textsuperscript{77} SP16/60/56, Thomas Wyan to Nicholas; 18 April 1627.

\textsuperscript{78} SP16/60/51, Gosnold and Saltonstall to the P.C.; 17 April 1627.
number to be imprisoned. After calling on the Trained Bands for assistance in apprehending the ringleaders, Gosnold and Saltonstall discovered that none of the Band would “stirr” themselves. “Whereupon wee broke [or took?] their pykes beate in amongst them not without danger to us both and havinge slightly hurt th[r]ee or foure the rest dispersed.” The two captains managed to take some of “them” prisoner and sent the “chief actor” to Colchester Jail. Given the inadequacy of the Trained Band in this incident, the Captains told the Council that their only reliable support in Harwich was twelve of his Majesty’s soldiers who constituted the garrison at Harwich, though they did ask the deputy lieutenants on the scene to send more and better men.

In addition, forty more pressed men, all from Leicestershire, had run away to Suffolk in the past few days. The two Captains beseeched the Council to institute martial law in Harwich, severely punish one or more of the offenders as an example to the rest and, if the runaways were replaced, that they be pressed on the Suffolk side of the river where the runaways were believed to be harbored. The Privy Council finally did order the Attorney General to prepare a Commission for Martial Law for the soldiers at

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79 “Broke up” in this context probably means ‘broke into’. However, the prison might have been a simple stockade that was indeed broken up.

80 It is not clear whether the two Captains ‘beat in amongst’ the Trained Band or the mutinous recruits, but it was probably the recruits, which I think is the opinion of the editor of the *C.S.P.D*. The *C.S.P.D.* and Steven Stearns in “Military Disorder and Martial Law in Early Stuart England” disagree with the transcription “broke”, using the word “took”. However, I think Saltonstall and Gosnold did not “take” the pikes from the mutineers but “broke their pikes”. It seems unlikely that the two captains could take pikes from a dozen or more men without assistance. Arguably, Saltonstall meant that the two Captains wedged in between pikes held by some of the mutineers in a loose and sloppy formation and with drawn swords started to beat the mutineers they could reach, perhaps with the flats of their swords. In other words, they ‘broke into the formation’ or ‘broke the formation’, the formation being a pike line or square.
Harwich on 20 April 1627.\textsuperscript{81} The Commission had not arrived in Harwich by 28 April when the soldiers were finally boarded the ships and it is doubtful that it arrived before they sailed for Denmark.

Poor Captain Saltonstall’s troubles were not over. On 22 April, he wrote to Secretary Conway that he had received the order for embarking the soldiers to be in readiness to join the convoy coming up from London.\textsuperscript{82} However, the Norfolk men had not arrived. They had mutinied one day’s march from Harwich, beaten off their conductors, who arrived in Harwich without the men and with little hope of getting them together again. Saltonstall now had only 290 men of the 500 pressed and ordered to be in Harwich on 25 March and asked the Privy Council if he should sail with these or wait on additional levies. He complained that he had written earlier to the Council about this and had not received any instructions. The next day Saltonstall and Gosnold wrote to the Council that they had beaten the drum commanding every soldier on pain of death to prepare for boarding ship.\textsuperscript{83} Only forty men of the Trained Band and the handful of garrison soldiers supported them and, as the recruits were boarding, one hundred or so broke through the guard and ran away. The Captains sent most of the Bandsmen and some horsemen after them and Saltonstall expected most of the runaways to be returned. Some eighty of the Norfolk men were in Manningtree, just ten miles away. Their mutiny

\textsuperscript{81} APC Vol. 42, pg. 235, P.C. to the Attorney General; 20 Apr 1627. The members of the Commission were the Earl of Sussex, Lord Lieutenant, and the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex, the mayor of Harwich, Captain Gosnold and Captain Saltonstall.

\textsuperscript{82} SP16/60/95, Saltonstall to Sec. Conway; 22 April 1627.

\textsuperscript{83} SP16/61/4, Gosnold and Saltonstall to the P.C.; 23 April 1627.
was about lack of pay, and the Captains sent word that their pay would be provided when they arrived in Harwich. Because of the daily disorders, the two Captains had decided to select by lot one of every ten of the runaway men whom the authorities had caught and to condemn them (to death?) until word came down from the Council. Saltonstall and Gosnold again asked that “wee might have martiall law to punish some of the chiefest offenders heere before the eyes of the rest … which [lack] makes these men presume and growe thus headstrong believing none dare punish them”.

Finally, on 28 April, three of the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex, whom the Privy Council apparently had ordered back to Harwich, reported to the Privy Council that 247 of the men who had mutinied at Harwich were onboard ship.84 The diligence and discretion of Captains Gosnold and Saltonstall had quelled another mutiny onboard. The recruits seized parts of the ships, particularly areas where the food supplies were stored, and ate or spoiled three days provisions in one day, perhaps indicating that the men thought that 8d. day was not enough to both eat on and drink on. The two Captains boarded the ships with forty musketeers from the Trained Bands, suppressed the disorder, and ‘ducked’ the ringleaders.85 These actions reduced the mutineers to reasonably good order. The deputy Lieutenants then took on board the King’s Commission with the great seal and showed it to the soldiers and this finally convinced the men that they were going in the King’s service rather than under false pretenses as had been suggested by some “ill affected persons”. The deputy Lieutenants also released all the soldiers in prison upon

84 SP16/61/56, D.L.s of Essex to the P.C.; 28 Apr 1627.

85 I believe “ducking” means tying the man into a boson’s chair and lowering him from a yardarm into the water for a time until he is near drowning. Waterboarding in the seventeenth century.
their submission to the King’s orders and sent them onboard. Eighty-five of the Norfolk
men finally arrived in Harwich in small groups and the conductors added them to the
contingent boarding at Harwich. So, in the end, it appears that around 330 new soldiers
out of 500 originally pressed went to Denmark from Harwich. The Deputy Lieutenants
praised Captains Gosnold and Saltonstall for their diligence in rounding up runaways,
most of whom were Leicester men, as well as bringing in the eighty-five Norfolk men.
The runaways that were not captured were mostly in Suffolk, according to the Essex
Deputy Lieutenants. As usual, they asked the Council for money to pay for the forty
trained men of the county who had been on duty in Harwich for three weeks. Saltonstall
sailed out to meet the London fleet on 4 May with only 320 soldiers.

The mutinies and disorders at Harwich among the pressed men had risen to a high
level, as the desertion rate of 40 to 50 percent indicates. This particular press for soldiers
to go to Denmark also created notable desertion problems in the contingents that sailed
from London and Hull. There are many entries in the APC concerning desertion, and the
apprehension of deserters, from the Hull and London contingents. Since the sources do
not mention the reasons, they were probably common knowledge at the time. One reason
is mentioned in other sources and in other Chapters: men who were pressed feared their

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86 The C.S.P.D. says 80 men, but the document clearly says “four score and five”. On 27 April, the Privy
Council also sent a letter to the Lord Lieutenant of Norfolk ordering a search in Norfolk for the runaways
and the ringleaders of the mutiny and to hold several for action by the Council. They also ordered the Lord
Lieutenant to press more men to make up the loss of 65 men and get them to Harwich quickly under the
control of a “more skillful conductor”. Given the date of the letter, it is unlikely that this new press went to
Denmark (APC Vol. 42, pg. 250, P.C. to the Earl of Arundell and Surrey; 27 Apr 1627).

87 SP16/62/37, Saltonstall to the P.C.; 4 May 1627.

88 See for example APC Vol. 42, pg. 195, P.C. to L.L.s of Middlesex, Surrey and the Mayor of London; 3
Apr 1627. APC pp. 212,213, P.C. to the J.P.s of Middlesex; 10 Apr 1627.
wives and children and other dependents would starve while they were away. In
addition, it was probably well known in England by word of mouth by the spring of 1627
that service in the army was dangerous and that many died of sickness, poor or no food,
bad water and bad beer. Data on army size and location in the 1620s discussed in
Chapter 4 indicates that from 50 percent to 70 percent of the men died during the course
of a campaign year. The sources also often mention that a number of the pressed men
were vagabonds and strangers in the counties where they were pressed and some were
convicted criminals given a reprieve for service in the army – in general, those men the
county economy and society could most afford to loose. These sorts of characters might
be the most likely to run away, but the proportion of these sorts of men in any particular
press is not known.

The widespread and noteworthy desertions may also indicate people in England
well knew that service with Sir Charles Morgan and the King of Denmark was a
particularly hazardous and unpleasant service, as the statements of John Toner indicate.
The Toner episode is also another indication that news from foreign parts was common
throughout England even among the lesser sorts, spread by word of mouth if nothing else
and perhaps by the pamphleteers.

Why, then, did so many stay? Of the 350 men originally pressed from Essex,
Leicester and Cambridgeshire, 70 did not reach Harwich. Seventy more were pressed
from Essex to replace them. Thus, the total pressed was at least 420. 247 embarked by
28 April and perhaps 320 sailed on 4 May. If this is the case, 60 percent (247/420) of
those who set out from home boarded for Denmark. In addition, 85 of 150, or 56 percent,
of the men from Norfolk eventually showed up. Thus, something like 50 to 60 percent of the pressed men stayed and served. Running away does not appear to have been very difficult, so it seems likely that the men who stayed had some reason to stay with the colors. Patriotism is unlikely since these men were to serve the King of Denmark. Fear of punishment, possibly capital punishment, was certainly one reason. Some young men looked for a chance to see the world and travel to far places and others had religious reasons – to fight the papists and defend the true religion.

From the report of the last mutiny onboard the ships, it appears that the men were hungry. This implies that even though they were in billets around the town of Harwich for approximately a month (25 March to 25 April) they were not getting enough to eat, or thought they were not. On the other hand, they might have used most of their daily allowance of 8d. for drink in the alehouses.

Conspicuously, there are no reports in these documents of crimes by the soldiers against civilians, or by local inhabitants against soldiers – no riots between civilians and soldiers, and no robberies, assaults, rapes or extortion. These sorts of crimes are prominent in other locations such as Hampshire and the west where troops were in billets for long periods and in Kent in December 1624 when troops assembled for the Mansfeld Expedition and in other major incidents discussed in the next Chapter. In fact, there is little mention of any interactions between civilians and soldiers at Harwich. In this case, perhaps the relatively short period, a month, that the soldiers were in billets in and around Harwich was one reason. Another was the relatively small number of soldiers. In addition, the pressed men seem to have been preoccupied with running away and with
mutiny to protect themselves or their comrades. However, there were ‘interactions’
between the local inhabitants and the soldiers. One is the harboring of runaway soldiers
in Suffolk. Another is the refusal of the Essex militia to assist the two Captains.

Sympathy on the part of the people of Essex with the pressed soldiers is mentioned in one
source, where it was reported that the rural population of Essex was more likely to hide
the deserters that to aid the conductors trying to find them.\(^{89}\)

The rumor among the pressed men that the King had not ordered their service, but
rather that some sort of fraud was involved in their impressment points to another
possible reaction of the local people to the war effort. It is mentioned in the last
document that “publisheinge unto them on shippboard his Majesty’s commission they did
instantlye submitt themselves and soone were to be satisfied (in what wee could not
possibelye persuade them to before) that theye were to goe for his Majesty’s service, yt
havinge beene as it seemes otherwise suggested unto them by some ill affected
persons”.\(^{90}\) I suspect the phrase “ill affected persons” refers to someone other than
soldiers, but the rumor could have been some sort of soldierly ‘scuttlebutt’, which is
common in all eras. If the originators were suspicious conscripts, then the incident is
explained. However, if the originators were people around Harwich, which I think the
words “some ill affected persons” suggests, then there were people in the area who were
opposed to the war and the royal government’s methods of conducting it. The
willingness of unhappy soldiers to believe such a rumor is understandable, but I have not
seen this sort of thing elsewhere. There were refusals to accept the King’s shilling, to

\(^{89}\) Quintrell, *The Maynard Lieutenancy Book*, pg. 175, No. 446; 26 Mar 1627.

\(^{90}\) SP16/61/56, D.L.s of Essex to the P.C.; 28 Apr 1627.
recognize the legality of deputy lieutenant’s warrants to billet soldiers or to levy a rate for this purpose, but not refusal to recognize the King’s Proclamations and Commissions.

A major concern, if not the major concern, of the local officials in Essex appears to be the money expended on pressing the soldiers, billeting troops and the costs of calling out a militia company for three or four weeks. This was the case in most counties because of the heavy drain of cash on the county taxpayers and is a common theme in communications sent back to London. The Deputy Lieutenants of Essex discussed money every letter they sent to London. The Deputy Lieutenants were sensitive to the burdens and the problems of assessing and collecting taxes and tax like payments from their neighbors and were having great difficulty in raising money in the county to pay for billeting. In a letter from the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex to the Privy Council, the Deputies said that they had borrowed money on their own credit to pay the billeting expenses for the first week or so the recruits were in Harwich, rather than lay a rate on the county. The reason they gave was that all levies of money were “at this time very unacceptable” to the county taxpayers.\footnote{SP16/59/31, D.L.s of Essex to the P.C.; 4 Apr 1627.}

The Deputy Lieutenants of Devon sent a similar letter to the Privy Council in October 1627, pointing out that they had failed to raise money in the county and had gone in debt themselves to pay the billeters, who were continually “molesting them for present pay”.\footnote{SP16/82/82, D.L.s of Devon to the Council; 25 Oct 1627.} The Privy Council did permit the billeting expenses to be repaid out of Loan money from Essex. By 1627, refusal to pay was becoming more and more common, and the presence of the men pressed for the
Danish service at Harwich was one in a long series of incidents in the first half of 1627, a series that continued in 1628 when Crosby’s Irish regiment arrived in Essex.

Another incident at Harwich a month later adds to an understanding of the exasperation and the extended nature of the problems the people of southern England experienced. In late June of 1627, the Privy Council ordered fifty men of the Trained Bands from the Hundred of Tendring to man the fort at Harwich until the danger of an invasion was over. The Deputy Lieutenants of Essex wrote back asking that the area around Harwich be relieved of this additional burden and enclosed a letter from Captain Gosnold, whom the Privy Council had sent to Harwich to command the fortifications there and at Landguard Point in Suffolk. The Privy Council had ordered the fifty men to be on an hour’s notice to go to the fort in Harwich, while Gosnold demanded that the men come immediately to man the forts at all times. The Deputy Lieutenants of Essex told the Privy Council that an hours notice, based on the firing of ordinance, was impractical and that the area around Harwich was denuded of inhabitants because of the burdens imposed on them recently. Later in the month, Earl Rivers wrote to Secretary Coke explaining that this was a serious hardship for the people of Tendring Hundred and the financial and personal burdens had become so great that people were leaving the Hundred to avoid the impositions of the royal government. Rivers listed first the payments to support the soldiers in the “late camp at Harwich”, which may refer to the


94 SP16/70/56, D.L.s of Essex to the P.C.; 10 July 1627. SP16/70/56i, Capt. Gosnold to the D.L.s of Essex; 7 July 1627.

95 SP16/71/29; Earl Rivers to Sec. Coke; 17 July 1627.
men pressed for Denmark or a call to man the forts earlier in the year. Next, Rivers mentioned the cooperation of the ratepayers in the Hundred in responding to the Forced Loan, and third, that the Trained Bands used to suppress the mutinies at Harwich had come from Tendring Hundred, loosing time from their work and at their own expense. Moreover, as we know from other documents, the royal government had not yet reimbursed them for any of this expenditure. Rivers mentions that this fourth charge for sending the Trained Band to the fort had engendered discontent in Tendring Hundred “as I have not knowne the like in my tyme”.

The events at Harwich in April of 1627 illustrate some of the problems the soldiers in England in the 1620s presented to the communities in which they were billeted. They were hard to keep with the colors and presented many problems of discipline and for the maintenance of peace and tranquility in the communities. This society prized the peace of the county and did not accept its upset well. Thus, the gentry and the people perceived the presence of a group of unruly men as a threat to the social order, in the sense that these unruly men seemed to get away with actions that the community did not normally tolerate. There is no mention of hangings of mutineers even though Captain Saltonstall pleaded with the Privy Council to allow him to hang one in ten of the runaways. However, no one was hanged, at least until long after the fleet sailed for Denmark, though the Admiralty Court proceedings against John Toner may have eventually resulted in his death. In another case involving a mutiny at Plymouth, discussed in the next Chapter, the documents clearly state that many of the military officers on the scene did not want to execute the mutineers for fear of stirring up more
trouble and causing the remaining men to desert. The Privy Council seemed sympathetic to their concern. Desertion also seems to have been of more concern than in the previous year. This was a major concern, as we have seen, during the gathering of the Ré Army at Portsmouth during the spring of 1627. The desertion rate was very high, around 50 percent, among the men pressed and sent to Harwich, whereas during the preparations for the Cadiz Expedition in 1625 the desertion rate appears to have been between 10 percent and 20 percent.96

4. Billeting Operations after the Return of the Ré Expedition: December 1627 and January 1628

When the army returned from Ré in November 1627, there was scarcely a company complete in one ship, much less a whole regiment, due to the hasty and bloody retreat from St Martin’s to the embarkation point.97 The French cut off Rich’s and Bingley’s regiments and only sick and wounded of these regiments returned. The first returning ships came into Portsmouth and Plymouth. Initial reports from deputy lieutenants mentioned that 5000 men landed at Portsmouth, but a later exact muster corrected the number to 3200.98 Sir James Bagg reported that approximately 4800 soldiers landed and received billets around Plymouth, including 1200 sick and wounded soldiers as well as another 600 sick mariners, but the number reported at Plymouth was

96 See Chap. 6, Sec. 2c for Ogle’s and Cecil’s rough estimates of desertion rates.

97 SP16/84/92, Sir William Becher to the P.C.; 17 Nov 1627.

98 SP16/84/92, Sir William Beecher to the P.C.; 17 Nov 1627.
reduced to 4400 soldiers in an exact muster.99 Initial orders from the Privy Council to the Commissions directed them to billet soldiers in the places where they were billeted before the expedition left England.100 By January 1627/28, the central and local governments were sorting matters out and they initially assigned the regiments the billet locations shown in Table A12-A in Appendix A. As billeting problems increased due to the shortage of money and the misbehavior of the soldiers, the government moved regiments and parts of regiments as the need arose, either to quiet complaints or to spread the costs. The reasons for these movements and problems the soldiers and the billetters encountered will be the subject of most of the rest of this chapter.

News of the return spread quickly, for by late November reports of the return of the army from Ré were available in counties as far away from Plymouth and Southampton as Sussex and Norfolk. According to the diarist, John Rous, the people of Suffolk thought that Buckingham was at fault. Rous also mentioned that by January soldiers, mostly Irish, were billeted in Suffolk.101

Matters became worse in southern England after the remains of the Army and fleet returned from the Isle of Ré. Of the some 3200 able soldiers and 1200 sick and wounded as well as 600 mariners landed at Plymouth and billeted in Devon and

99 SP16/85/61, Sir James Bagg to Buckingham; 29 Nov 1627.

100 APC Vol. 43, pg. 139; P.C. to the Attorney General; 14 Nov 1627. This document directed the A. G. to prepare Commissions for Martial Law.

101 John Rous, Diary Of John Rous, Incumbent Of Santon Downham, Suffolk, From 1625 To 1642, ed. by Mary Anne Everett Green, printed for The Camden Society [London: J .B. Nichols and Sons, 1856]; pp. 12-14. Rous also provides a curious report of 30 Scots coming ashore at Yarmouth in late October, and telling the local authorities they were from a fleet of 30 ships carrying 5000 men and supplies for Buckingham at Ré.
Cornwall, 200 had died shortly after the return of the fleet. An exact muster recorded 2989 soldiers to have returned to Portsmouth. Thus, it appears that of the 9000 to 10,000 soldiers and officers that England sent to Ré during the campaign, approximately 7200 returned, including the 1200 sick and wounded. In addition to the 4400 soldiers who returned from Ré in Devon and Cornwall, there were 1700 (out of 2000 pressed) recently impressed men in the Plymouth area for a total of around 6000 men billeted in Devon and Cornwall immediately after the return. The Privy Council soon issued orders to move nine regiments to billets in Hampshire. Some of the troops were ordered sent to other counties a day or so later - Berkshire, Wiltshire, Kent, Dorset, Somerset, and Surrey. This order stated that the Commissioners for Soldiers at Plymouth and Portsmouth would determine the numbers sent to each county and how many each county was billet permanently or to send to other counties. In late November and early December, there was much confusion and upset in the West Country over the soldiers billeted in Devon and Cornwall. Some soldiers were still on board ships and they and the sailors were becoming sick and dying in increasing numbers. The sailors were stealing and selling weapons and powder and all the men were again short of clothing suitable for

102 SP16/85/40, Sir James Bagg to Buckingham; 26 Nov 1627. SP16/85/61, Bagg to Buckingham; Nov. 29 1627. SP16/85/66, Sir William Courtney to Sec. Conway; Nov. 29, 1627.

103 SP16/85/95, Statement of the numbers of men returned to Portsmouth from the Île de Ré; Nov 1627. SP16/85/94 is a similar list giving the numbers that left from Portsmouth for Ré, which totaled 7833 in two contingents.

104 SP16/84/92, Sir William Beecher to the P.C.; 17 Nov 1627.

105 SP16/85/69, P.C. to L.L.s of Berkshire, Wiltshire, Kent et al.; [Nov. 30?]
the winter weather. The Deputy Lieutenants of the Eastern Division of Devon told the Privy Council that they received an order for billeting troops with a promise that the Council would take “speedy order” for payment of the expenses but that many householders in the county refused either to billet soldiers or to pay rates for that service. They said that most of their householders would refuse to billet soldiers if the county did not receive money quickly. Others in the county already complained of what they had already suffered at the hands of soldiers.

Money was in short supply and Paymaster Captain John Mason reported from Plymouth that Sir James Bagg could not yet account for several thousand pounds of money (out of £9400) the Duke of Buckingham had given him to provide for the troops. Mason hoped to prevail upon the county to provide money for clothing for upwards of 4000 soldiers. Without more money, he could neither pay the officers nor “answer the expectations of those in Hampshire who as yet have had nothing” and unless the Duke procured more money for the troops, “all will fall from order”. Poor Mason complained of the “purgatory” of incessant clamor from the mutinous and distressed soldiers.

Matters were no better in Hampshire and adjacent counties. Sir John Watts wrote to Secretary Nicholas from Portsmouth that he had faced a near mutiny of sailors who

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106 SP16/85/22; 22 Nov 1627. SP16/85/24; 22 Nov 1627. SP16/85/40; 26 Nov 1627. SP16/85/56; 28 Nov 1627. SP16/85/61; 29 Nov 1627. SP16/85/64; 29 Nov 1627. SP16/85/65; 29 Nov 1627. SP16/85/66; 29 Nov 1627. SP16/86/5; 2 Dec 1627. SP16/86/27; 7 Dec 1627.

107 SP16/85/56, D.L.s of the Eastern Div. of Devon to the P.C.; Nov 1627.

108 SP16/86/70, Capt. John Mason to Buckingham; 13 Dec 1627.

109 SP16/86/70 and /74, Mason to Buckingham; 13 Dec 1627.
came to him in companies showing their lack of clothing and demanding to know what
they could do as they had not been paid in ten months. The sailors threatened to march
up to London with their complaints. The Commissioners for the Navy reported that
clothiers would not provide clothing for the seamen at Portsmouth unless they received
money in hand, of which the Commissioners had none. Ships were arriving in the
Thames from Portsmouth and Plymouth with no victuals and there was no way to supply
them. The Deputy Lieutenants of Surrey asked the Privy Council to spare them the
expense of billeting soldiers in view of the county’s great expenses in provisioning the
King’s houses and providing carriage for the royal establishment that counties further
away from London did not bear. They further claimed that, because of the great expenses
the county bore, they could not raise much money for billeting soldiers or for paying their
conduct money across the county. The Town of Winchester petitioned Secretary
Conway for removal of two regiments and Conway ordered the Deputy Lieutenants of
Hampshire to move them to other counties not yet heavily charged with billeting.

The Earl of Holland, Lord Lieutenant of Devon, wrote to Secretary Conway that
the officials in the County of Devon had told him that the County absolutely refused to
billet more soldiers because of the County’s inability to pay any more. More soldiers

110 SP16/86/86, Sir John Watts to Nicholas; 16 Dec 1627.
111 SP16/85/65, Commissioners of the Navy to Buckingham; 29 Nov 1627.
112 SP16/86/22, Commissioners of the Navy to Buckingham; 5 Dec 1627.
113 SP/16/86/26, D.L.s of Surrey to the P.C.; 7 Dec 1627.
These were the Irish regiments of Crosby and Bingley. This is an example of the value of having one’s
Lord Lieutenant on the Privy Council and Secretary of State to the King.
from the latest levies were arriving in Plymouth, and Holland ordered the Deputy
Lieutenants around Exeter to halt soldiers headed to Plymouth in their area and billet
them. A letter dated a month later from the Privy Council to the Commissioners for
Soldiers at Plymouth states that the Council had received repeated complaints from the
City of Exeter about the soldiers billeted in the town. The Council ordered the
Commissioners to remove the soldiers forthwith from Exeter into the County of Devon,
as the Council had ordered them to do the previous month but which the Commissioners
had not done. The Council even authorized £1000 for clothes and conduct money to
facilitate the move and expected no further complaints from Exeter. The Commissioners
reasons for not moving the soldiers out of Exeter can only be imagined, but Holland’s
comment that the county refused to billet any more soldiers without payment must have
been one. Local politics may have caused a majority of the Commissioners to fear the
reaction in the county more than the complaints from Exeter.

On 17 December, the Privy Council finally issued orders (ones that actually took
effect) for the soldiers around Plymouth and in Hampshire around Portsmouth to move to
and billet in Hampshire, Sussex, Hertford, Essex and Suffolk with equal numbers of
soldiers in each county and starting with the two regiments billeted at Winchester. The
soldiers were to march along different routes to avoid overburdening any one county and
the Council directed that broken companies were to be filled up with recruits.

115 SP16/84/12, Henry Earl of Holland to Sec. Conway; 2 Nov 1627.

116 APC Vol. 43, pg. 180, P.C. to Commissioners at Plymouth; 17 Dec 1627. These were soldiers billeted
in Exeter, not those passing through who were involved in the riot led by Walter Little mentioned above.

117 APC Vol. 43, pg. 176, P.C. to Conway as L.L. of Hampshire et al.; 16 Dec 1627.
There are many similar documents in the archives showing counties and towns requesting not to billet soldiers; giving orders and counter-orders for the movement of troops; telling of the poor state of the health, clothing and food supplies of the soldiers and sailors on shipboard and on land; issuing commissions for martial law to counties and towns; and documents devoted to trying to find some money somewhere to pay for the maintenance of the army and navy. In addition to what Forced Loan money remained, the crown raised £143,000 in the six months from 25 September 1627 from the sale of land and in mid-December 1627 arranged a loan of £120,000 from the London financiers on the security of income from other crown lands. All of this money did not even cover arrears for 1627 for billeting, pay, victuals, munitions, clothing, ship repair and other war expenses, which amounted to nearly £320,000. The royal government ordered these funds disbursed on 29 Dec 1627 in anticipation of ordinary revenues. In addition, the royal government expected similarly heavy war expenditure in 1628, based on the plans for another attempt to relieve La Rochelle and support for the King of Denmark against Imperial forces in Germany. The stage was set for the Parliament of 1628 and its debates on subsidies and petitions on the rights of Englishmen and on billeting.

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118 SP16/86/97, A minute of the proceedings of the Common Council of the City of London; 17 Dec 1627.

119 SP16/87/63, A list of payments to be made …; 29 Dec 1627.

120 SP16/87/35, Note of the charge of the fleet and army; 22 Dec 1627, indicates that the current expense per week for the army of 7,557 soldiers and the fleet with 4000 seamen was £3862. (£200,824 for a year), arrears due to officers of the fleet and Ordnance were £251,361 and the sum needed for setting forth a fleet of fifty sail in the spring came to £110,000, of which half was needed immediately.
After the first of the year, billeting problems and complaints became more widespread and numerous as the soldiers moved to new billets. A listing of many of the towns and counties that billeted troops from January 1627/28 until late in 1628 may be found in Appendix A, Table A13-A and Table A13-B. The Deputy Lieutenants of Gloucestershire wrote a letter of complaint before troops even arrived looking for billets in their county and provided a typical list of problems.\(^{121}\) They asked the Privy Council not to impose this new burden on them considering the “weake estate” of the county. They had already gone to great and un-reimbursed expense for the support of a trained band of 3000 foot and 200 horse with arms, powder and shot, the pay of sergeants sent by the crown to train the bands, and the pressing and equipping of 1250 soldiers out of a small county. In addition, the cloth trade was decayed and many workers were on the county poor rates, while, in rural areas, the sheep farms had lost many sheep due to the “rotten” weather. The last harvest had been small due to wet weather and tenants were giving up their lands due to lack of money to pay the rent, which in turn reduced the income of the rate paying landowners.

The Deputy Lieutenants of Dorset begged the Privy Council to repay some £2000 the royal government owed county for billeting and conduct money from the past year or they feared the people of the county would no longer be able to sustain the burden and would turn the soldiers out and take their grievances direct to the Privy Council.\(^{122}\) Dorset had not received one penny from London and the Loan money they had used was

\(^{121}\) SP16/90/35, D.L.s of Gloucestershire to the P.C.; 8 Jan 1627/28.

\(^{122}\) SP16/90/46, D.L.s of Dorset to the P.C.; 10 Jan. 1627/28.
far short of the arrears. They also asked the Council to send 200 recruits billeted in Dorset to their regiment in Hampshire, as there were no officers to supervise and control them in Dorset.

Sailors at Portsmouth mutinied and attempted to go to London with their grievances.\textsuperscript{123} To pacify them Sir John Watts placed six of the ringleaders in irons and promised to discharge the rest if they were not paid by the 20th of January and looked for the money every hour. Captain John Weddell gave his sailors at Plymouth some of his small stock of money to buy the worst off some clothes.\textsuperscript{124} Secretary Conway wrote to the Duke of Buckingham that the English contingent in Stade, Denmark was about to mutiny and desert for lack of pay and provisions.\textsuperscript{125} Sir Allen Apsley wrote to the Duke of Buckingham that he was personally in debt for £49,000 for supplies for the navy and needed £9000 immediately to pay for victualling ships but could not get six pence.\textsuperscript{126}

The Deputy Lieutenants of Essex wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that Crosby’s regiment was now in billets in their county, mostly in the town of Chelmsford, and that the soldiers were not content with the “diet” that the billetters could provide on the allotted 6d. per day.\textsuperscript{127} In fact, the soldiers ate food that cost twice that and still were not content. The soldiers were for the most part billeted with poor persons who were

\textsuperscript{123} SP16/90/91, Sir John Watts to Nicholas; 15 Jan 1627/28. SP 16/90/111, Sir John Watts to Buckingham; 17 Jan 1627/28.

\textsuperscript{124} SP16/90/99, Capt. John Weddell to Nicholas; 16 Jan 1627/28.

\textsuperscript{125} SP16/90/108, Sec. Conway to Buckingham; 17 Jan 1627/28.

\textsuperscript{126} SP16/90/121, Sir Allen Apsley to Buckingham; 18 Jan 1627/28.

\textsuperscript{127} SP16/91/6, D.L.s of Essex to Sir Richard Weston; Jan. 19, 1627/28.
now “half undone” because persons of better ability to pay absolutely refused to billet them. A remedy against the refusing persons would have to come from the Council, according to the Essex Deputies. It appears obvious that the Essex Deputies did not want to take any action against their neighbors of “better ability”. The first troubles, other than billeting expenses, with the soldiers of Crosby’s Irish regiment appear in a late January letter from the Privy Council ordering several of the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex to take action to punish inhabitants of the Town of Maldon who had “ill used” some of the men of Captain Carew’s company.\textsuperscript{128}

The mayor and Aldermen of Southampton sent to Secretary Conway, as Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire, a Petition to the Privy Council requesting relief from billeting in that they had been much burdened with the billeting of soldiers since the Ré Expedition returned.\textsuperscript{129} The Deputy Lieutenants of Surrey complained of 130 soldiers sent from Hampshire to the Town of Farnham without order from the Privy Council and asked that the Council remove these soldiers from Farnham in view of the county’s expenses for billeting soldiers and for conduct money for soldiers in transit across Surrey.\textsuperscript{130}

The Deputy Lieutenants of Wiltshire wrote to their Lord Lieutenant, the Earl of Pembroke, that the regiment of Sir Charles Rich had just marched into their county out of

\textsuperscript{128} APC Vol. 43, pg. 253, P.C. to Sir Henry Mildmay et al., D.L.s of Essex; 28 Jan 1627/28. The saga of Crosby’s regiment in Essex and other counties is presented in Chapter 8, Sec. 3.b.

\textsuperscript{129} SP16/91/24, Mayor and Aldermen of Southampton to Conway; 21 Jan 1627/28.

\textsuperscript{130} SP16/91/67, D.L.s of Surrey to the P.C.; 28 Jan 1627/28.
Hampshire without any order from the Privy Council.\textsuperscript{131} The Deputies requested speedy directions on what to do with these soldiers. The letter does not say if the arrival of this regiment was a complete surprise or if the Commissioners for Soldiers in Hampshire had ordered the regiment to go to Wiltshire with advance notice given. The Privy Council had authorized the Commissions in Plymouth and Hampshire to distribute soldiers to the counties the Privy Council had designated as they saw fit, so this appears to be a ploy of the Wiltshire Deputies to avoid billeting troops. The Privy Council had also previously sent a letter to the Deputy Lieutenants of Wiltshire directing them to billet soldiers.\textsuperscript{132}

The Deputy Lieutenants of Wiltshire wrote again to their Lord Lieutenant asking directions for handling a problem with securing money for billeting Colonel Rich’s regiment. For the first month, the constables were able to collect the billeting assessment from the people of the county, but now the people generally refused to pay.\textsuperscript{133}

By early January 1627/28, the first reports of a sickness of a particularly virulent nature began to appear. Sick soldiers and sailors who were brought ashore in Plymouth and Portsmouth died in a few days. The local people who billeted and tended them died soon after.\textsuperscript{134} Henry Holt, the Mayor of Portsmouth, reported to the Privy Council that forty sick sailors were billeted in town and most recovered, but many in the families that took them in became sick and died.\textsuperscript{135} Holt also placed 150 sailors in two old houses he

\textsuperscript{131} SP16/91/84, D.L.s of Wiltshire to the Earl of Pembroke; 30 Jan 1627/28.

\textsuperscript{132} SP16/85/69, P.C. to L.L.s of Berks, Wilts, Kent et al.; [Nov. 30?]

\textsuperscript{133} SP16/94/22, D.L.s of Wiltshire to the Earl of Pembroke, L.L.; 22 Feb 1627/28.

\textsuperscript{134} SP16/24/52, Mayor of Plymouth to the P.C.; 8 April 1626.

\textsuperscript{135} SP16/90/7, Mayor of Portsmouth to Nicholas; 2 Jan 1627.
owned and they burned up twenty tons of casks, ten tons of stacks of wood, pulled down lofts and burned the lot, presumably to keep warm. There were, of course, the usual requests for money and requests to move troops out of the town or county. By March, there were reports of open violence in Dorset – soldiers thrown out of billeter’s houses by force and a general refusal to pay any more for billeting. The gentry were condemning the army officer’s warrants for billeting and thus setting a bad example for the commonality, saying they would answer for it at the Privy Council if it came to that. Billeters forced the soldiers out of doors “to either steal or starve”. The Commissioners answered queries from the army officers with the response that they had “no order for anything.” The Commissioners foresaw danger and violence ahead and the army officers foresaw most of their men deserting the colors.

5. Conclusion

The evidence in the sources shows a rising level of complaint and distress throughout the year 1627 and into early 1628 from all the counties of southern England in which the Council billeted soldiers or even assigned them to be billeted. Most of the complaints were about the lack of money to feed and house the soldiers and sailors, but there were instances of major violence such as the soldier’s mutinies at Harwich and lesser incidents at Exeter and a sailor’s mutiny at Portsmouth and many relatively minor sailors’ mutinies.

136 SP16/90/43, SP6/90/46, D.L.s of Dorset to the P.C.; 10 Jan 1627/28 and others in Vols. 90 91, 92 and 93 from Jan and Feb 1627/28.

During 1627, the deputy lieutenants of several counties (including Devon, Dorset, Hampshire, Leicestershire and even Cumberland) for the first time objected to the press of still more men on the grounds that they had levied so many men for the army and navy that no more could be pressed without damage to the local economy. The deputies had apparently reached ‘bottom of the barrel’. The men that the deputy lieutenants could press were often ones that “they were ashamed to present” and soldiers like Sir George Blundell agreed.

Desertion from the armed services also was a growing concern to the royal government in 1627, as indicated by the appointment of Provost Marshals to apprehend deserters in four counties in early 1627, though there had been many directives to prevent desertion and keep the soldiers around the colors in documents from previous years. Desertion rates at Harwich were high, around 50%, but the number of runaways among the men pressed to go to Plymouth in August and September was a more ‘normal’ 30 percent (1700 out of 2400 pressed were still present in mid-September), though some of these losses were no doubt due to sickness. In addition, the earliest comments I have seen about aid to runaway impressed soldiers from the inhabitants of the counties to which the government sent them appear in 1627. This is particularly noticeable in Essex and Suffolk in connection with the problems at Harwich, but it very likely was happening in other counties too. Aid to runaways in their home counties is not surprising, and there is evidence that people spread warnings of the approach of press officers, and that men were hiding from the press. They may have been hiding in the woods or they may have been hiding with friends. However, the situation in Suffolk at the time of the Harwich
rendezvous when deserting men were “harbored” in Suffolk, while no men were pressed from Suffolk, certainly indicates that strangers were helping the Harwich runaways.

Mutinies or riots, such as those at Exeter and Harwich, which occurred in 1627, were more difficult to put down than the few reported in 1625 and 1626 before and after the Cadiz Expedition. Some violence is evident in these affrays in 1627, whereas, in previous years local officials calmed the mutinies with threats and promises. Of course, the problems in Kent during the assembly of the Mansfeld Expedition were sometimes violent and people died. In this case, I think we must make some allowance for the more severe problems the soldiers were having finding food and keeping warm. The attempt of the recruits from Gloucester to march through the town of Exeter on their way to their assigned billets is different from other incidents mentioned in this study in that there is no known reason for the recruits, and particularly Walter Little, to have been so determined to pass through the town. They were apparently billeted in the “suburbs” of Exeter the night before with few problems and they had billets waiting for them down the road. Perhaps alcohol was involved, but the attack on the town gate was in the morning and so the recruits were not likely to be drunk, unless they had been up all night drinking.

Whatever the cause of Mr. Little’s anger, the incident may be illustrative of similar events involving recruits and soldiers whose descriptions did not survive in the records, but which created problems and fear in the towns through which they passed.

The actions of the men pressed into the army also say something of the attitudes, fear and even anger among the commonality of England. This chapter has described a number of violent acts committed by pressed men. The men pressed as soldiers were, in
a sense, rebelling against their superiors by deserting and the common folk of at least
several counties assisted them in this rebellion. In 1627, one or two deputy lieutenants
reported that soldiers had beaten their officers with training “cudgels”. The Norfolk
recruits for Harwich and Denmark not only ran away from their conductor, but beat him
as well. The people in counties that billeted soldiers were fearful and angry because the
authorities, army and navy officers and even the Commissions for Martial Law, did not
prevent and, according to many reports, did not even adequately punish soldiers who
committed felonies and mistreated billeters. There were many more such incidents
reported in 1628. The ordinary people who billeted most of the soldiers were throwing
the soldiers out of their homes and then refusing to billet soldiers when the Commissions
and deputy lieutenants placed new demands upon them. The cost was certainly one
reason, but the behavior of the soldiers was another. No one likes to be treated “like a
slave” in his own home. The billeters too were rebelling against the burdens placed upon
them. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the Introduction, there are no reports or indications
of any sort of an armed rebellion against the crown or the county gentry during the 1620s,
though gentry dealing with billeting in several counties expressed such concerns and the
Petition Against Billeting Soldiers in 1628 mentions these fears.

During January and February 1627/28, the Privy Council started to move
regiments, companies and parts of companies out of the West Country and Hampshire
into other counties, some of which had billeted few or no soldiers in the past. These
included Gloucestershire, Berkshire, Norfolk, Buckinghamshire, Hertfordshire,
Oxfordshire and even Suffolk, which had been largely spared, not only from billeting
troops, but even from pressing men for the army, at least to the extent other counties had been.  

As 1628 wore on, complaints and problems became more widespread, if only because the counties billeting troops were more numerous. Furthermore, the number of serious incidents involving soldiers’ violence and crime seems to have increased by my rough count to two or three times the number of such events in all of 1627, which in turn had seen more than in previous years. What is more, these complaints reached a peak while the Parliament of 1628 was in session.

138 A list of locations that billeted soldiers in 1628 may be found in App. A, Tables 13-A and 13-B.
Chapter 8

The End of Billeting in England; February 1628 through Late 1628

1. Introduction

As the year 1628 wore on, the soldiers continued in their billets in England, the outcry became greater, and the number of reports of serious and nasty incidents increased. The crown exposed more people to the burdens of billeting as bodies of troops moved into counties that had not billeted soldiers before, such as Norfolk, Gloucestershire and Leicestershire. The royal government was planning another expedition to relieve Rochelle in 1628 and was striving to keep the army and navy together. To raise funds for the expedition, Charles called a parliament, which met from March until June of 1628. This Parliament debated and passed a “Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers”, which a delegation from the House of Commons presented to the King, and the “Petition of Right” which was passed by Commons and Lords and gained the King’s assent, thus becoming a law. The King in return received five subsidies, the highest number ever voted, from the Parliament to fund the war. England made two more attempts to relieve Rochelle in 1628 and a disgruntled army officer assassinated the Duke of Buckingham in August 1628 while he was preparing for one of them. Finally, Charles decided to abandon the war effort, using the subsidy money to pay arrears, disband the army, and reduce the size of the fleet.
2. Billeting Continues

After the return of the Ré Expedition, the Privy Council initially ordered the regiments to return to those locations where they billeted before sailing.\(^1\) In November and December, there appeared to be some confusion in the numerous entries in the *APC* concerning billeting locations and the movement of troops, caring for the sick and wounded and in handling complaints from areas where troops were billeted. Quite probably only a few of the parties concerned actually executed these directives, for by January, a plan was developed and the Council ordered various regiments to move to a number of counties for longer term billeting. (The Privy Council’s billeting location assignments may be found in Appendix A, Table A12.) In one well known case, Crosby’s Irish Regiment was moved from Winchester in Hampshire to Essex, then half of the regiment to Norfolk and then all of the regiment to Kent because of friction between the Irish and Catholic soldiers and the English and Protestant billeters. The dislike of billeting troops was widespread and became wider as the regiments, companies and parts of companies moved into counties and towns that had seldom or never billeted troops.

The problems and vexations associated with billeting the army continued while the number of complaints and refusals to billet troops increased. The Venetian Ambassador perhaps summarized the situation as well as any when he wrote

“...sailors, who, in bands of from three to four hundred commit many excesses all over London, taking food wherever they find it, with the excuse that they are dying of hunger, because the king does not pay them or give them their arrears. Neither will he allow them to take service where they could provide themselves better. ..... They vow they will do even worse,

\(^1\) *APC*, Vol. 43, pg. 139, P.C. to Attorney General; 14 Nov 1627. This order requests the Attorney General to issue Commissions for Martial Law for the named counties.
and in the meantime the general discontent increases, even in the country, as the people are not accustomed to have soldiers billeted on them at discretion and to endure the insolence to which they are necessarily subjected by such a system.”

Whatever the Commissioners for Soldiers in the County of Hampshire were doing in early 1628, they were not doing it to the royal government’s satisfaction. The Council sent a stern letter of reprimand in February 1627/28 to the Commissioners to the effect that some of them were backward in their duties and in the trust the King had placed in them. The Privy Council said it was loath to tell his Majesty that they were neglecting their duties, and improvements were necessary. Members of the Commission frequently missed meetings, and when a quorum, including at least two of the Deputy Lieutenants, was not present, the meetings broke up with nothing accomplished. The Privy Council ordered this behavior to cease, and, to further the service, the Council changed the quorum to any four of the Commissioners. It is likely that the Commissioners, particularly deputy lieutenants, were using the quorum to prevent the Commission from taking actions they did not like, such as sending troops for billeting in their area of the county. The Privy Council also sent an order to the Duke of Buckingham in response to a petition to the Duke from the Provost and Fellows of Eton College to remove the soldiers billeted in and around the town to some other place. The clergy on the Isle of Wight

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3 APC Vol. 43, pg. 294, P.C. to Commissioners for Soldiers in Hampshire; 13 Feb 1627/28.

4 APC Vol. 43, pg. 271, P.C. to Buckingham; 6 Feb 1627/28. The reasons for the petition are not stated nor does the petition appear in the State Papers.
petitioned the Privy Council, through Secretary Conway as Lord Lieutenant, to free them from the burden of billeting soldiers, as were clergymen in all other counties and the Council granted the favor.⁵

The Deputy Lieutenants of Gloucestershire petitioned the Privy Council not to billet soldiers in their shire.⁶ The Deputies claimed that the Commissions for Soldiers in Hampshire and in Devon did no know of Gloucester’s “weak estate” and the heavy charges on a small county by maintaining a Trained Band of 3000 foot and 200 horse, the cost of their equipment, the pay for the Sergeants sent by his Majesty for training the militia and the supplying of the County magazine with powder, match, and bullet. The County had also recently “set forth” 1250 soldiers out of their small county wholly at the charge of the county taxpayers, for which they had received no repayment, unlike formerly. The cloth trade was much decayed by reason of a “slow market” and this trade (with the continent) was the chief support of the county’s economy and its ability to perform services for the crown. Moreover, the spinners, cloth workers and others who depended upon the manufacture of cloth, were cast on the County’s dole and poor rates. In addition, the farmers’ incomes were much reduced because of “our wet harvest” which has reduced the price of their corn. The gentlemen and yeomen who rented their farms and sheep grazing grounds had lost their tenants, which had reduced their income and thus their ability to make loans to the King. The Deputy Lieutenants of Gloucestershire complained a second time about billeting troops, claiming they had no direction to billet

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⁵ SP16/92/98, Petition of 14 Ministers of the Isle of Wight to Conway and SP16/92/99, Conway to the Commissioners for Billeting Soldiers in the Isle of Wight; 11 Feb 1627/28.

⁶ SP16/90/35, Deputy Lieutenants of co. Gloucester to the P.C.; 8 Jan 1627/28.
300 men of the late Colonel Sprey’s regiment recently sent into their county from Sussex and asking the Council to billet these men in some other county that had no soldiers billeted upon it. They also asked for a Commission for Martial Law. The deputies also asked for instructions on what to do with persons who refused to billet or pay the rate for billeting, that is the poor billeters such as the cloth workers in town and tenant farmers in the countryside, and the richer sort who paid royal subsidies and loans. The refusal of people in Gloucestershire to billet soldiers or to pay for billeting is notable because this was the first time that the Privy Council had ordered the county and town to billet soldiers. The Privy Council sent a second and rather preemptory order to the Deputy Lieutenants of Gloucestershire to billet the soldiers sent to their county, to do it in an orderly manner, and pointed out that they had sent instructions to the deputies, contrary to the deputy’s claim. There was one last report from Gloucester: the Mayor of the City of Gloucester wrote to the Privy Council complaining that, though the city was only a sixteenth of the county population, it had provided billets for a tenth of the first companies send to Gloucestershire, perhaps 30 to 60 soldiers. It had agreed to billet a tenth of the recently arrived 300 soldiers of Sprey’s regiment. Now the army officers were demanding that they take more. The Mayor begged not to be required to take more than a tenth, that is, thirty men. Finally, the Privy Council relented, saying they had been

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8 APC Vol. 43, pg. 310, P.C. to D.L.s of Gloucestershire; 22 Feb 1627/28.

9 SP16/94/57, Mayor and D.L.s of the City of Gloucester to the P.C.; 27 Feb 1627/28.
informed of the great poverty of Gloucester, and ordered 300 of the 600 soldiers billeted in Gloucestershire to move to Herefordshire.\footnote{APC Vol. 43, pg. 333, P.C. to D.L.s of Gloucestershire; 1 Mar 1627/28. Also a letter to the D.L.s of Herefordshire.}

Another interesting incident occurred in Taunton, Somerset. During the elections for the Parliament of 1628, two Deputy Lieutenants, Sir John Stowell and Mr. William Walrond, were displeased with the burgesses elected by the town. There had been one hundred soldiers billeted in the town for two months without any problems. Walrond and Stowell, under their own authority, moved twelve of the soldiers to billets in the homes of the mayor and the town recorder, and possibly the homes of several other of the “best” men of the town. The soldiers entered the homes by force and threatened to burn the town if refused. The wife of Mr. Browne, the Recorder, was so terrified that she left town.\footnote{Commons Debates 1628, Vol. 2, pg. 564.} The House of Commons summoned Stowell and Walrond to testify before it and to answer for the misdemeanor.

Another case involving a refusal to billet a soldier came from Buckinghamshire in early 1628, an incident mentioned in the Introduction. Sir William Fleetwood, a Justice of the Peace, wrote to the Privy Council on 8 February 1627/28 that Richard Biscoe of Chesham had come to him “full of fear”. Biscoe complained under oath that a Lieutenant Sandelands had come to his house with a constable and told Biscoe that he understood that the constable had ordered Biscoe to billet one of his soldiers and Biscoe had refused.\footnote{SP16/92/69, Sir William Fleetwood to the P.C.; 8 Feb 1627/28.} Biscoe readily confirmed his refusal. According to Biscoe, Sandelands then
threatened to “break his head” and go into his house and take all his goods to pay for billeting the soldier, or rather, he would cut off Biscoe’s head if he did not billet the soldier. Not surprisingly, this outburst caused Biscoe to fear for his life, so he came to Fleetwood as soon as the Justice had returned from London and asked him to issue a warrant for Sandelands’ arrest and appearance before the Justice to be bound over to keep the peace toward him, Biscoe. This Fleetwood did, “knowing that I was bound by my oath to satisfy his desire”. The next day, two constables brought Sandelands before the Justice. Sandelands did not deny the accusation and two women also testified that they had heard Sandelands threaten to burn Biscoe’s house. Justice Fleetwood then ordered the constables to take Sandelands to the jail at Aylesbury since he could not post the required sureties against violation of the king’s peace. Sandelands agreed to submit, but requested Fleetwood to punish Biscoe in the same manner for refusing to billet the King’s soldier. Fleetwood refused, saying he knew of no law that required a man to billet a soldier and to provide the soldier with free food. The Lieutenant left peacefully with the constables, and requested that they stop at the inn in Missenden to get their horses and to have something to eat. Shortly after Sandelands and the constables left, Sandelands’ Captain, John Read, came to Fleetwood and asked what he had done with the Lieutenant. When informed of the circumstances and that Sandelands was well on his way to the jail, Read said that his Majesty’s soldiers were not subject to the authority of Justices of Peace but only to their superior officers, intimating that, if he had been at Chesham when Fleetwood’s order came for Sandelands, it would not have been obeyed. Read then left Fleetwood and went to the inn. There he joined Sandelands, the constables and the two
helpers the constables had with them. Captain Read ordered the two helpers to go home and promised he would see the job done, “though it cost him £500”. Shortly thereafter, soldiers of Captain Fox’s company, who were billeted in Missenden, surrounded the gate of the inn and swore that they would die before they would let the Constable take Lieutenant Sandelands to the jail. The constables dared not take the Lieutenant to jail through a mob of armed soldiers, and so the Captain and the Lieutenant returned to Chesham where they were billeted. When they arrived in Chesham, another constable informed them that Justice Fleetwood had sent for Captain Read’s Ensign and some other soldiers who allegedly had committed several crimes – namely robbing some men on the road just before their first arrival in Chesham. Captain Read forbade the constable to take the ensign and soldiers, again saying that Justices of the Peace had no jurisdiction over the King’s soldiers. Justice Fleetwood concluded his letter to the Privy Council by asking if the Justices of the Peace had authority to dispense justice to soldiers in accordance with their oath of office and the laws of England. If not, Fleetwood said he desired to be relieved of his office, as these sorts of complaints and “threats of breaking open men’s houses who shall refuse to billet and other abuses come daily to my cares”.

The aftermath of this letter tells something about the position of the Privy Council with regard to refusal to billet soldiers. The Privy Council quickly called Fleetwood and Biscoe to appear before it and they tendered their appearances on 12 February, just four days after the date on Fleetwood’s letter.\footnote{\textit{APC} Vol. 43, pg. 276, An open warrant to bring Fleetwood and Biscoe before the P.C.; 8 Feb 1627/28 and \textit{APC} Vol. 43, pg. 283, Fleetwood and Biscoe appear before the P.C.; 12 Feb 1627/28. I have some doubt about the exact dates on Fleetwood’s letter and the subsequent Council orders. Fleetwood’s letter must have been written before 8 Feb, which is the \textit{C.S.P.D.} date, since the Council order for his and}
before the Privy Council as a punishment for not following Council orders and despite
the fact that there was no law requiring householders to billet soldiers. The Council held
them over for further action. However, the Council discharged Fleetwood and Biscoe
from further attendance on the Council on 16 February, four days after their appearance,
and with no indication of further punishment or promises to mend their ways¹⁴. This
episode makes clear that some men in England took issue with the government’s actions
and viewed those actions as contrary to the laws and customs of England. The debate
and the actions of the Parliament of 1628 make it obvious that these sentiments were
widespread in many of the counties of England.

Another group of documents illustrates in a direct fashion the broad and growing
sentiment against billeting in England.¹⁵ The first is from the Privy Council to the Earl of
Banbury, Lord Lieutenant of Oxfordshire, concerning the numerous soldiers billeted near
the King’s estate at Woodstock, who were creating “inconveniences and disorders”. The
Council ordered the Earl to remove the soldiers so that the king would not be exposed to
the disorders. It appears that even King Charles had problems with billeting. Two weeks
later, the Earl of Banbury sent another group of three documents to Lord Manchester,

president of the Privy Council. The documents concerned the large number of persons in

¹⁴ APC Vol. 43, pg. 296, Fleetwood and Biscoe discharged by the P.C.; 16 Feb 1627/28.

¹⁵ APC Vol. 43, pg. 295, P.C. to the Earl of Banbury; 13 Feb 1627/28 and SP16/94/73, Earl of Banbury to
Lord President (of the P.C.) Manchester; 28 Feb 1627/28 and its two enclosures.
the town of Banbury and adjacent hundreds who refused to billet soldiers or to contribute to the expenses of billeting them in the Banbury area. A letter from the deputy lieutenants to the Lord Lieutenant, who forwarded it to the Council, is the most interesting.\footnote{SP16/94/73 i, (Note 13).} The deputies had sent four or five warrants worded as best they could to the town of Banbury and the hundreds involved, ordering them to billet fifty-two of Colonel Morton’s soldiers in the town and to levy a “proportional” rate for the billeting on the townsmen and on the people of the surrounding hundreds.\footnote{This is an Englishman named Morton, not the Earl of Moreton, colonel of the Scots regiment. Morton replaced one of the colonels who died at Ré.} However, the Town of Banbury and the surrounding villages, except for three or four, absolutely refused to comply with the orders. Beyond the direct refusal, the example of Banbury had caused other towns in their Division of Oxfordshire to refuse to pay for billeting, although they had paid “at first”. The deputy lieutenants went on to request help from the Lord Lieutenant and the Privy Council in the form of some “effectual order” for the payment and billeting the soldiers, that is, please send money. They further claimed that the soldiers had been making “dangerous speeches” because of their lack of pay and that the people of the area despised the warrants of the deputy lieutenants, which the common talk of every idle man made the butt of jokes. In addition, angry soldiers reportedly set fire to buildings in Banbury, causing considerable damage.\footnote{Allen B. Hinds, ed., Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating To English Affairs. Existing In the Archives and Collections of Venice, And In Other Libraries of Northern Italy, Vol. XXI. 1628–1629 [London: 1916]; pg. 45, No. 58, Contarini to the Doge and Senate, 5 April 1628(N.S.)} The deputies felt certain that they could not prevail, though they had used all diligence with “fair and rough”
speaking, using the Privy Council’s letters and those of the Lord Lieutenant. They said that none believed them and that the refusers wanted them questioned for sending the warrants (that is, questioned on the legality of the warrants). In any event, the deputies had been affronted to their great disgrace. The deputies concluded by saying that they had not moved the soldiers from the Woodstock neighborhood, as the Privy Council had required in an earlier letter, because they could find no town that would billet them.\(^{19}\)

The deputies enclosed with their letter a few lines from over twenty towns and hundreds in the Banbury area stating their refusal to pay for the soldiers billeted in Banbury or to billet the soldiers themselves, all attested to by the constables of each of the areas and, in the case of Banbury, the mayor, Epiphany Hill. The constables gave no reasons for their refusal. The Lord Lieutenant’s cover letter to Lord Manchester also stated that he must take some action, by “fair means or foul”, because, if he or the Privy Council did not do something in this situation, refusal to pay for billeting would spread to other areas in Oxfordshire and to other counties. The Privy Council’s answer to Lord Lieutenant Banbury and his deputy lieutenants was to order them, in his Majesty’s name, to billet the soldiers in Banbury and to levy money proportionally for the billeting costs.\(^{20}\) To prevent greater disorder, the Council further ordered any who refused to be bound over to appear before the Council to answer for their contempt. The Earl of Banbury also saw the hand of Lord Saye in this matter and referred Manchester to a Collector of the Forced Loan in the area, who knew the “humor” of most in the area, for more information. In this

\(^{19}\)The P.C.’s letter may be found in \textit{APC} Vol. 43, pg. 295, P.C. to the Earl of Banbury; 13 Feb 1627/28.

\(^{20}\)\textit{APC} Vol. 43, pg. 332, P.C. to the Earl of Banbury; 1 Mar 1627/28.
connection, note that the Banbury area was well known in 1627 for refusing to subscribe to the Forced Loan. Its refusal was the occasion for the letter from Lord Carleton to Secretary Conway in which Carleton said that, should he have trouble convincing people in Banbury to subscribe to the Loan, “But all is well that ends well; and yf it succeede not so where we are going Barkshiere soldiers will be well content to be removed to eate Banburie cakes”.\textsuperscript{21} The “ill example of a neighboring Lord”, which had caused problems with the Loan, is mentioned in this last document, and I think the Lord was probably Saye. The inhabitants of central Oxfordshire seem to have been recalcitrant at times and wanted things done in a Parliamentary way. However, part of the problem in the Banbury area was the refusal of the Privy Council, at first, to let Oxfordshire pay for past press, conduct and billeting expenses from the Loan money collected in the county, which the Council had allowed in other counties. The taxpayers of the county thought this to be a “double charge” on Oxfordshire.\textsuperscript{22} Memories of the Forced Loan intensified the resistance to billeting in the county and, in addition, the “well known Puritan zeal” of the inhabitants of Banbury may have had an effect on their opinions of the royal government.\textsuperscript{23}

During March 1627/28 there was a major mutiny of sailors at Plymouth over lack of pay, provisions, clothes and other matters of survival, with men killed and injured and also a riot and battle between soldiers and townsmen in Witham, Essex. These two

\textsuperscript{21} SP16/50/36, Dudley Carleton to Sec. Conway; 19 Jan. 1626/27.

\textsuperscript{22} SP16/49/34, Earl of Banbury to Dudley Carleton; 15 Jan. 1626/27.

\textsuperscript{23} See O.E.D., 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., s.v. “Banbury”.

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confrontations are discussed later and they were a major concern of the royal government in March.\textsuperscript{24} By early April, a small rebellion of sorts was building in many counties and the complaints and requests for help become even more frequent as more and more people refused to billet troops at their own expense and threw the soldiers out of their homes, forcing them to become highway robbers and burglars. The relations between the royal government in London and the governments of the counties and towns were fraying, and seemed headed for a breakdown. Kent petitioned the royal government to remove the soldiers billeted there, claiming their “insolencies” to be such that the billetters must either leave their houses or beat their “guests” out of the county. The situation in Dorset provides another example.\textsuperscript{25} The citizens of Dorset were so exasperated with their deputy lieutenants concerning the royal government’s non-payment of £4000 for billeting and other expenses over and above the county Loan money that they complained to Parliament about the performance of the deputies.\textsuperscript{26} Large numbers of the inhabitants of Dorset refused to billet soldiers and, according to the deputies, the people were tired of empty promises from the Privy Council.\textsuperscript{27} The deputy lieutenants maintained they could impress only 70 men out of the 100 the Privy Council had ordered levied to replace runaways, unless they sent away “shepherds from their flocks, husbandmen from their ploughs, or poor laboring men from their wives and many children”. Many potential

\textsuperscript{24} See Chap. 8, Sec. 2.a and 2.b below.


\textsuperscript{26} SP16/101/14, D.L.s of Dorset to Theophilius Earl of Suffolk, Lord Lieut.; 15 April 1628.

\textsuperscript{27} SP16/95/8, D.L.s of Dorset to Theophilius Earl of Suffolk, Lord Lieut.; 1 March 1627/28.
soldiers ran away or refused the press money. Of those sent, they feared many would run away from their conductor, or be rejected (as unfit) when they arrived in Plymouth. From the exasperated tone of this last letter, it seems clear that the Deputy Lieutenants of Dorset were tired of angering their friends and neighbors. The soldiers were unhappy too. Captain John Watts wrote to his Colonel, Sir Thomas Fryer, that several officers of the regiment had met with some of the Commissioners for Soldiers in Dorset to complain that billetters violently turned some of their soldiers out of their billets, the billetters saying that they would not provide any billets, and that the soldiers must shift for themselves. The Commissioners claimed they had no order for anything and that the gentry ignored the deputy lieutenants’ warrants for billeting, thereby setting a poor precedent for the lesser folk. If something was not done soon, Captain Watts thought that most of the men would desert.

By April of 1628, the situation in other counties was threatening to become violent. There was violence in Suffolk. A gentleman of the county, a brother of Sir William Wittipole, who was a prominent man in the county, and a Captain Robert Wright, the captain of a company billeted in Woodbridge, became involved in an argument that led to a challenge to a duel. Before the duel, the seconds fell into an argument and Wright’s second, Ensign Madison, was seriously injured. The next day, a group of soldiers and a group of Wittipole partisans engaged in a brawl and gunfight in

28 SP16/101/14, D.L.s of Dorset to Theophilius Earl of Suffolk, Lord Lieut.; 15 April 1628.
29 SP16/95/9, Capt. John Watts and four other officers to Sir Thomas Fryer; 1 March 1627/28.
which a man was shot and killed.\textsuperscript{30} Wittipole and others were tried for murder, acquitted on that charge, but found guilty of manslaughter, and bailed in June 1628. The King granted them pardon in 1629.\textsuperscript{31}

A short letter from Thomas Grove to Colonel Sir Richard Grenville described the problems in Somerset, and similar troubles were no doubt occurring in other counties.\textsuperscript{32} Grove first mentioned that he had sent off Captain Long and 200 soldiers to Plymouth and had “disfurnished” himself to provide the conduct money to get them to Plymouth. Grove complained that Lieutenant Locke had insulted him with “insolent carriage” and foul language. However, more serious problems were coming to a boil in the county. Virtually everyone in the county refused to pay any more toward billeting soldiers. Billetters had already thrown a few soldiers out of their billets onto the streets and the billetters were threatening to turn all the soldiers out of doors. Grove reported that in many places the inhabitants were threatening to “beat” the soldiers out of the county and that unless “some speedie order be taken” (for money to be sent) the soldiers would suffer “in the highest order”. Even within the army, the lack of funds caused problems. Grove also reported to Colonel Grenville that Captain Gates’ lieutenant had struck and


\textsuperscript{32} SP16/101/35, Thomas Grove to Sir Richard Grenville; 18 Apr 1628. Grove was a captain in Bourroughs’ regiment and Grenville was the new Colonel replacing Bourroughs. (See Appendix A, Tables A9 and A12-B.)
hurt a soldier for a minor mutiny - the soldier had refused to march without shoes and stockings, which were not to be had. The Lieutenant (or possibly the soldier) was under arrest (“in durance”) and likely to stay there unless Colonel Grenville took action to free him. Grove had done his best to have the man set free, but the local justices did not understand martial law nor would they allow its use in their county. The brevity and tenor of the letter suggest that the members of the army now commonly experienced these sorts of problems and that if matters continued on their current course, England could expect increasing violence between soldiers and civilians.

In May, Colonel Sir Thomas Fryer wrote to Buckingham that neither his officers nor his soldiers had received billets in Dorset since their return from Plymouth, until the Dorset officials received the King’s letter. The government in London had ordered his regiment to leave Dorset for Plymouth in mid-April to participate in one of the planned expeditions to Rochelle, but the unit did not sail. The regiment was then sent back to Dorset for billeting around 25 April. Since then, most of the men had received billets, but not his company, which was quartered in Dorchester. No one in Dorchester would billet his men or pay for their billeting now. A week earlier, the Deputy Lieutenants of Dorset had informed the Lord Lieutenant, the Earl of Suffolk, that many in Dorset now refused to billet soldiers. Fryer claimed that a man named Bushroad, a magistrate of Dorchester, was a leader of the refusers and suggested that The Privy Council call Bushroad before it to answer for his misdeeds. Fryer also remarked that he had

33 SP16/103/32, Sir Thomas Fryer to Buckingham; 5 May 1628. Fryer signs himself as “Captain” with reference to his captaincy of his own company. He was the Colonel of a Regiment in addition.

34 SP16/102/33, D.L.s of Dorset to Earl of Suffolk; 26 April 1628.
previously paid his company out of his own pocket, but that he was no longer able to do so. He asked Buckingham to have money sent to him to “relieve the poor soldiers”. The Privy Council responded a week later to several Justices of the Peace in Dorset. The Council wrote that they had heard from Colonel Fryer of the refusal to billet soldiers in Dorchester and ordered them to investigate the case of Bushroad and the particulars against him, which Colonel Fryer had presented. If guilty, the Justices should mete out exemplary punishment to Bushroad and any other refractory persons and the Justices should send them to the Privy Council to answer, along with all statements of witnesses in the examination. The Privy Council also sent letters to the Bailiffs of Dorchester ordering them to billet the soldiers on pain of punishment. The Justices sent the results of the investigation to the Privy Council in late May. They found that Bushroad did in fact refuse to billet any of the soldiers. Bushroad claimed that the warrants of the deputy lieutenants were not sufficient authority for the town to receive them, but he had not committed any crime or any personal misdemeanor towards the Colonel that the Justices could identify. The Justices reached this conclusion based primarily upon the testimony of Captain Stephens, who was in command of the soldiers in Dorchester during Colonel Fryer’s absence in London. The Justices told the Council that they could question the Colonel there in London if they wished. The Justices’ finding was based, of course, on the increasingly common argument that no law was violated in refusing to billet soldiers

35 *APC* Vol. 43, pg. 427, P.C. to Sir Thomas Trenchard and several Justices of county Dorset; 16 May 1628.

36 SP16/105/38, Sir Thomas Trenchard et al. to the P.C.; 28 May 1628.
and, since there was no such law, the warrants were not enforceable. The whole incident “came to nothing” according to William Whiteway of Dorchester.\(^{37}\)

In May, Secretary Conway, as Lord Lieutenant, again took the Commissioners for Soldiers in Hampshire to task for not solving a problem in Odiham, where the townsmen were refusing to billet soldiers.\(^ {38}\) The Privy Council gave them strict orders to billet the soldiers in Odiham without “innovation or disturbance”. Serious problems with the Earl of Moreton’s Scots regiment billeted on the Isle of Wight had also developed. Conditions on the Isle of Wight were complicated by the mutual dislike between the Scottish ‘foreigners’ and the natives and there are some similarities in this respect to the situation of Crosby’s Irish troopers in Essex. Billeting problems in both areas are presented in more detail later in this Chapter.\(^ {39}\) The Deputy Lieutenants of the Isle of Wight wrote to Secretary Conway, as Lord Lieutenant, that the soldiers had committed many crimes, including several murders, and that the inhabitants of Wight were in some fear of more “foul disorders”.\(^ {40}\) The Deputies were unable to bring the accused soldiers to justice because of the absence of the Commissioners for Martial Law and the opposition of the regimental officers to executing the Commission of Oyer and Terminer issued to the Deputies. In fact, the Sergeant Major of the regiment, who was in

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\(^{37}\) William Whiteway, *William Whiteway of Dorchester His Diary 1618 To 1635*, David Underdown, ed. [Dorchester, Dorset: The Dorset Record Society, 1991], pg. 96; Apr 1628.

\(^{38}\) SP16/103/64, Sec. Conway to the Commissioners for Soldiers in Hampshire; 11 May 1628. The town had petitioned Conway for removal of 67 soldiers because of the expense of 200 poor people on the dole in the town. SP16/52/49; Jan? 1626/27.

\(^{39}\) See Sec. 2.b and 2.c below.

\(^{40}\) SP16/103/78, D.L.s of the Isle of Wight to Sec. Conway; 12 May 1628.
command of the Scots on the Island, refused to participate at all, which is not surprising since Army officers were usually opposed to civil authorities disciplining their soldiers in common law proceedings. There was also some doubt whether other soldiers could be trusted to maintain order during such a trial and any subsequent execution. The Deputy Lieutenants on Wight particularly complained of 200 highlanders, “a ruder kind of people”, who came after most of the Scots and therefore were scattered all over the Isle far from their commanders and were more disorderly and difficult to control than the rest.

Next, the Deputies complained that the Isle of Wight had spent £4000 on billeting 1500 men and had not received a penny of compensation in fifteen weeks, despite having submitted accounts to the Privy Council. Some of the billeters had already spent half their yearly income on the soldiers and were in dire straits according to the Commissioners. They asked the Council to arrange for prompt payment of the money and to the Commission for Soldiers, rather than to the regimental officers, in order to avoid the “wrongful” deduction the officers had made in the recent past. Finally they questioned the acceptance of men from Wight into the Scottish regiment, which took young men from their gainful employments and endangered (the economy of?) the Island.

The Bailiffs of Basingstoke told Sir Thomas Jervoise, one of the Deputy Lieutenants for Hampshire, that their town had born the burden of billeting soldiers for a

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41 SP16/100/75, Sec. Conway to D.L.s of the Isle of Wight; 10 April 1628.

42 See discussion of “pay”, “lendings” and “overplus” in Chapter 4.
long time without receiving a penny of the £180 disbursed to date. Their neighbors now refused to pay anymore or to billet any soldiers, saying there was no law or authority to force them to do so. The Bailiffs said that, unless there was an immediate payment of the arrears, they would have to leave the soldiers to seek their pay where they could find it, which might prove “perilous”. The thinly concealed threat of losing the soldiers on the land or for a mutiny and march to London was a rare, though not unheard of, occurrence until this time. There were more such threats and fears from Hampshire and other counties in the next months.

The records contain many similar reports of people refusing to billet soldiers, to pay any more for billeting soldiers, of soldiers thrown out of their billets and the unruly behavior of soldiers and local people from all over southern England during the period from April through June 1628. Localities that refused to billet soldiers, in addition to those mentioned above, included Canterbury in Kent, Wells in Somerset, Bath in Somerset, the Cinque Ports in Kent, Essex, Southampton Town in Hampshire;

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43 SP16/103/93, Bailiffs of Basingstoke to Sir Thomas Jervoise; 14 May 1628.
44 SP16/101/28, April 17, 1628 & SP16/101/29; April 17, 1628. SP16/102/51; 29 April 1628. SP16/104/32; 20 May 1628. APC Vol. 43, pg. 439; 23 May 1628. SP16/106/8; June 2, 1628.
45 SP16/101/35, Thomas Grove to Sir Richard Grenville; 18 April 1628.
46 APC Vol. 43, pg. 424, P.C. to Mayor of Bath; 14 May 1628. Also SP16/101/53, Robert Hopton to John Thoroughgood; 21 April 1628.
47 SP16/101/36, the King to Buckingham as Warden of the Cinque Ports; 19 Apr 1628. APC Vol. 43, pg. 383, P.C. to mayor of Hyde; pg. 386, the Mayor of Sandwich’s appearance before the P.C.; 26 April 1628; Sandwich. And APC Vol. 43, pg. 483, P.C. to Mayor of Sandwich; 7 June 1628.
48 There are many reports of trouble with the Irish soldiers in Essex. See Sec. 2.c. below.
Northamptonshire\textsuperscript{50}; Kingston upon Thames, Guildford and Farnham in Surrey\textsuperscript{51}; Wokingham and New Windsor in Berkshire\textsuperscript{52}; and the Town of Thame in Oxfordshire\textsuperscript{53}. The complaints of the towns and counties about the problems with billeted troops and the Privy Council responses to the complaints sound much alike, with cost and the “insolencies” of the soldiers being the most often mentioned. By this time, however, the complaints about soldiers’ behavior are much more frequent than they were in earlier years.

Financial abuses by deputy lieutenants similar to those in Devon in 1625 and 1626 were a continuing point of conflict between billeters and the government.\textsuperscript{54} A report from Norfolk, described local officials’ abuse of the billeting procedures in an attempt to make money from the situation. In the Norfolk Quarter Session of July 1628, a Justice of the Peace who was a sergeant-at-law and “a man grave in years”, publicly attacked the deputy lieutenants over their administration of the billeting money for some Irish soldiers (Crosby’s) who had recently been in the county. The Justice complained

\textsuperscript{49} SP16/102/45, Mayor of Southampton et al. to the P.C.; 28 April 1628. SP16/103/95, Francis Knowles et al. to Sec. Conway and the P.C.; 15 May 1628. SP16/104/9, Mayor of Southampton to the Earl of Denbigh; 17 May 1628.

\textsuperscript{50} SP16/100/87, D.L.s of Northampton to the Earl of Exeter; 11 April 1628. APC Vol. 43, pg. 381, P.C. to Sir Hatton Fermour; 20 April 1628. The APC entry also mentions that the Pachell parish constable not only refused to billet soldiers, but also encouraged others not to. The P. C. ordered an investigation and the constable sent to them if he was guilty.

\textsuperscript{51} APC Vol. 43, pg. 434, P.C. to the Earl of Nottingham and Viscount Wimbledon; 19 May 1628.

\textsuperscript{52} APC Vol. 43, pp. 445-446, P.C. to the Earl of Banbury; 25 May 1628.

\textsuperscript{53} APC Vol. 43, pg. 450, P.C. to Sir Richard Wyanman and Mr. Wary; 30 May 1628. This letter from the Privy Council sounds more conciliatory, still insisting on the billeting of the soldiers, but promising to remove the soldiers shortly.

\textsuperscript{54} On abuses in Devon, see Chap. 6.
that the deputy lieutenants had levied more money than was actually needed for billeting costs, implying that the deputy lieutenants had pocketed the difference. Whether true or not, this complaint probably reflects the opinions of many in other counties.

When a bailiff ordered a Hertfordshire man to billet a soldier, he objected and then had an experience much like that of Mr. Biscoe in Buckinghamshire. Edward Dally of Leominster lodged a grievance “concerning soldiers billeted upon him … together with the bailiffs injustices” which reached the Privy Council in some unknown way. Dally claimed that on 23 April the bailiff, Francis Shooter, directed him to billet a soldier and to feed him that day. Dally provided the food but being a bachelor and having no bedding except for himself and his servants, refused to provide a bed for the soldier. Dally must also have been afraid of theft, for he added that he had custody of other men’s goods. The following day, Dally again fed the soldier, but that evening the soldier brought some of his fellow soldiers to Dally’s house when Dally was absent and threatened the servants, saying that he would lie in Dally’s bed that night. Dally arrived home, heard the commotion, went to Bailiff Shooter together with some of the soldiers and described the lodging problem. Shooter told Dally that he must feed and lodge the soldier or lend 3s. 6p. weekly to the King to billet the soldier elsewhere. Dally refused to lend the money. Upon this refusal, Shooter then commanded Dally to billet five or six of the soldiers and directed the five or six soldiers to Dally’s house for billeting. When Dally again refused, the soldiers went away and returned with their lieutenant and more

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55 Fletcher, *Reform in the Provinces*, pg. 303.

56 SP16/102/80, Complaint of Edward Dally; April 1628. The document appears to be a deposition from an investigation, probably made by a Justice of the Peace.
men of the company. Under the lieutenant’s leadership, they proceeded to break into the house with their swords drawn and threatened to cut the servants throats. In the process, they broke six doors and spoiled some of Dally’s work tools. The soldiers then seized Dally and took him to Bailiff Shooter. The complaint goes on to say that despite all the wrongs done to Dally “contrary to law”, Shooter commanded Dally to take home a soldier and billet him, which Dally did under duress. In addition to the threats and the destruction of property, which was always a leading complaint of billetters, note the reference to “law”. The reports of investigations and examinations in late 1627 and in 1628 more frequently mentioned the common law and its protections and, and, as in this case, legal protection other than the lack of a law on billeting is intended. In this case, I suspect the examining magistrate inserted the reference to the law, but no matter who mentioned the law, the call for protection of the people according to the law reflects, I think, something in public opinion at the time.

In another case, the royal government used the common law to protect a junior officer accused of murder from an unfair prosecution.\(^{57}\) In a directive to the Attorney General, Secretary Conway discussed a petition made to the King for the pardon of Ensign John Graham, whom the local authorities accused of murdering a man in Northamptonshire, where his company’s billets were located. No particulars of the case are given, but from the wording, it seems likely that Graham was to be tried before the Justices of the Peace or a Commission for Martial Law in Northamptonshire and that there was some reason to suspect that the court would be prejudiced against him.

\(^{57}\) SP16/102/19, Sec. Conway to Attorney General Heath; 25 April 1628.
Conway did not mention the Commission for Martial Law in Northampton, though the royal government had issued one in February.\textsuperscript{58} The King did not give Graham a pardon before trial as requested, but did order the trial moved to King’s Bench to insure a “fair and legal” trial. If the victim was a civilian, apparently the civilian authorities could use the peacetime system of justice, though a petition to the King was required in this case to bring it to the King’s Bench.

The royal government imposed other burdens on England, one of the more unpopular being the crown grant to the companies that made gunpowder of access to stables to collect the refuse to extract niter (potassium nitrate) from it. This right of access had been an issue from Elizabethan times, but a royal proclamation of 1627 reinforced and increased this unpopular burden.\textsuperscript{59} Digging in stables was so unpopular that the Chapter of Winchester Cathedral passed a resolution in 1628 to the effect that “by no means the saltpeter man suld(sic) dige within our close”.\textsuperscript{60}

There are a number of complaints about, and descriptions of, the “insolencies” of soldiers in the speeches made during debates on the two petitions during the Parliament of 1628. The speakers may have embellished these tales to make debating points, but there must be a kernel of truth in them. Sir Walter Erle related the following general

\textsuperscript{58} APC Vol. 43, pg. 299, P.C. to the Attorney General; 17 Feb 1627/28.

\textsuperscript{59} John Charles Cox, \textit{Churchwarden’s Accounts from the Fourteenth Century to the Close of the Seventeenth Century} [London: Methuen, 1913], pg. 333.

complaints. Soldiers come “10 or 20 in a company for the billeting of one man” (which may mean a group came to enforce the billeting of one man) and they disturb markets and fairs by seizing goods upon the highway and forcing the owner to pay for their return. Erle went on to say that the soldiers break into houses at night and they extort money from people to get the soldiers to go away. More seriously, they violate women, commit murders, they steal cattle, they extort money for others who are fleeing from punishment for a felony, and they threaten to cut men to pieces who refuse their demands. Finally, the officers exact dead pay for the same man from four or five parishes. Sir Walter also remarked that this sort of thing did not happen during Elizabeth’s reign, and in her reign, the crown forced no one to billet soldiers against their will.

Mr. Strode of Devon related that, upon the return of the Ré Expedition, 1500 sick men came ashore and the Duke of Buckingham gave £3000 to the deputy lieutenants to pay for their keep. The deputy lieutenants sent warrants to the constables to carry the sick soldiers to homes in the county, but the deputies gave the homeowners money for only one week’s lodging. Sir John Strangways of Dorset said that when people of his county complained about soldiers to the Justices of the Peace at sessions, the justices refused to consider the complaints. Strangways continued that twenty-six soldiers came into his hundred and took away horses from the plows, carried off poultry, broke into houses and stayed in them all night if the homeowner did not pay them to leave. When the victims reported this to the Commissioners for Soldiers, they too refused to meddle or give any redress. Sir Henry Wallop spoke of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, remarking

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that when the sheriff arrested a number of soldiers, other soldiers freed them by force and
that the authorities feared to perform executions for fear of the soldiers. He further
commented upon the Scots on Wight, calling them “Red-shanks and a barbarous people”.
The Scots almost ate the people of the island out of their homes and the Scots left
bastards in every parish. Others reported in Commons that people were refusing to farm
the land, and fled towns to be safe from the soldiers. In one case, soldiers held a man
captive in his house, and when he sent a servant to the Commissioners, they refused to
help. Moreover, the householder was “committed to the Mayor and his servant to jail”.

Another incident described in the debates in Commons in 1628 occurred in and
around Kingston-on-Thames in northeastern Surrey. Mr. Bysshe reported that there
were 140 soldiers billeted in Kingston and the county and town imposed rates in the town
and surrounding areas for their maintenance. Without any authority, a constable came
with eighty of the soldiers and demanded lodging for them in several villages near
Kingston. When some of the local officials objected, a fight broke out, and one local
officer “had his brains almost broken out”, and a friend was killed. The soldiers marched
up and down and threatened to beat down Mr. Copley’s house. Copley gave them £12,
which was what they demanded from the parish. The soldiers then came to Bysshe’s
house and made him pay the same. Bysshe further said that the constable and soldiers
did all this without any order from a deputy lieutenant and demanded that the House of
Commons call the constable before it to answer. The House issued such an order
immediately.


Sir Walter Erle reported the incident a bit differently. He agreed that the constable did lead a company of soldiers that committed many outrages. However, upon the arrival of 140 soldiers in the county, the Deputy Lieutenants had levied a rate on the county as a whole to pay for their billeting. When some people refused to pay the money, the soldiers became “discontented” and went to Reigate, together with the constable, to collect the money. The soldiers and the constable collected £20 in Reigate Parish and another £8 in Gatton Parish. Erle said the constable had a warrant from the Lord Lieutenant to billet soldiers in Kingston if the money was not paid, but the Bailiffs of Kingston denied that they gave any directions to the constable. The Constable of Reigate said he had accompanied the soldiers at the order of an army lieutenant who was with the soldiers.

Another version of the tale appears in Cobbett’s *Parliamentary History.* On March 26, the Commons received a “great complaint” about the insolence of soldiers in Surrey and the actions of a constable there respecting the billeting of soldiers. On March 28, a parliamentary committee interrogated John Moulden, a constable in Surrey, which revealed that he had billeted soldiers on householders who had refused to pay billeting money, and, aided by eighty to one hundred soldiers, he had extorted money from men on the threat of pulling down and firing their houses. His defense was a warrant from the Earl of Nottingham, the Lord Lieutenant, although the deputy lieutenants of the county denied that they had issued any warrant for billeting soldiers or paying money.

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In a codicil to the Parliament of 1628, there was a minor event reminiscent of Justice Fleetwood’s experience. Thomas Scott, a member of parliament from the borough of Canterbury, was provoked into a strong outburst against billeting while on his way back home after the King prorogued the Parliament. When the government in London heard of the incident, Scott was hauled back to London where he was forced to “dance attendance” on the Privy Council for two weeks despite his parliamentary privilege. Scott, known as a strong Puritan and an opponent of Buckingham and the royal government, showed a good deal of interest in becoming the latest martyr for the House of Commons. The Council, evidently unwilling to create another martyr after having just gotten rid of the Parliament, decided to take no action and released Scott in late July. However, attendance on the Council no doubt cost Scott a few pounds, so, in effect, he got off with a fine.

By late 1628, the royal government paid off the soldiers and sailors and sent them home, virtually eliminating the army and reducing the size of the navy. The Tuscan ambassador reported in December that “The troops are disbanded and sent to their homes, each receiving two crowns for their expenses, from which I infer that there really is an inclination towards quiet and that all now points to a general peace”, and that the disbandment was proceeding with haste to save further expense to the king. The


66 B.L. Add. MSS No. 27962; Alessandro Antellminelli (aka Amerigo Salvetti), *Manuscripts of Henry Duncan Skrine esq.: Salvetti Correspondence* [London: Historical Manuscripts Commission, 11th Report Appendix Part I; printed for Her Majesty’s Stationary Office by Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1887], pp. 171,172; 2 and 9 Dec 1628.
Venetian ambassador reported much the same, but said that the soldiers and sailors received two months of pay when the crown discharged them. The Privy Council ordered the Council of War to survey the officer’s service records at Ré and the relief expeditions to Rochelle and to pay the officers only for their time on foreign service, or as one young officer put it, they were “cashiered”.

3. A Mutiny, a Riot, and Friction Between Soldiers and Civilians

During the first half of 1628, there were three series of events that disturbed the central government more than any others, to judge from the amount of material about them that has survived. The first was a mutiny of pressed sailors in Plymouth. The mutiny occurred in a twenty-four hour period starting the night of 18 March, but the debates and repercussions lasted into July 1628. The second set of events involved the men of Sir Pierce Crosby’s regiment during the time the regiment was occupying billets in eastern England, from January until August 1628. They finally marched to Bristol and then took ship back to Ireland. These Irishmen caused friction and conflict wherever they went and they may have caused more objections to billeting than any other regiment, or any three regiments, in the army. The third case is the billeting of the Scottish regiment of the Earl of Moreton on the Isle of Wight, mainly during 1628. While this billeting episode did not cause as much consternation in London, it illustrates the conflicts of billeting in a confined area due to a wealth of surviving information in the papers of Sir...

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67 Allen B. Hinds. ed., Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating To English Affairs. Existing In the Archives and Collections of Venice, And In Other Libraries of Northern Italy, Vol. XXI. 1628–1629 [London, 1916], pp. 415-417; No. 595; Contarini to the Doge and Senate; 2 Dec 1628(N.S.).

John Oglander, a Deputy Lieutenant of Hampshire on the Island and Lindsay Boynton’s article. It also provided the members of the 1628 Parliament from Hampshire with a number of debating points. Each of these three cases provides a more detailed picture of billeting in England in 1628.

a. A Sailor’s Mutiny in Plymouth

A conspicuous sailors’ mutiny took place in Plymouth in March 1627/28. This mutiny was only one among many by sailors during the war period and it is given more space here because of its better documentation. Sailor’s mutinies were more common than soldier’s mutinies, probably because seamen were confined on ships most of the time, whereas impressed soldiers, billeted on land most of the time could more easily, ‘vote with their feet’ and desert. The soldiers billeted on land had access to more wholesome food most of the time and usually were not afflicted with disease as frequently as were sailors on board a ship. The events of the mutiny tell much about the hardships of the pressed seamen and violent interactions of the seamen with people of a town. The aftermath of the mutiny also tells something of the concerns and fears of the officer corps and the royal government in the spring of 1628.

On the evening of 18 March, naval officers searched the town of Plymouth for seamen and found 80 to 100 men whom they locked up for the night in the “Guild Hall”

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70 The mutiny is described in SP16/96/54, Sir Henry Palmer to Nicholas; 19 Mar 1627/28 and SP16/98/25, Sir Ferdinando Gorges to the P.C.; 23 Mar 1627/18 and SP16/98/26, Sir James Bagg to Buckingham; 23 Mar 1627/28 and enclosures, particularly the last.
(the Town Hall) for "safe keeping". Unfortunately, someone had left forty pikes in the Hall and probably some swords, which the seamen seized. When the officers next opened the door to the Guildhall, the men inside forced their way out into the street with their arms. The Chief of the Watch set that night at the Guildhall and the Mayor both testified at the subsequent hearing that the mutineers came into the street and "fell to blows" with the watchmen. A number of townsmen (and presumably mutineers) were hurt in the battle, and three died. At least sixty of the mutineers also ran away.

Captains Francis Sydenham and Christopher Osborne of the Navy, who were either present or were called in by the Watch, seeing the situation, went to get Sir Henry Mervyn (or Marvyn), one of the members of the Commission for Soldiers. The three returned to the Guildhall, where they found the mutineers armed with swords and pikes and threatening violence to any officer who approached them. The three men promised to have food and drink sent in and then the mariners allowed them into the building. They attempted to pacify the mutineers and requested the mutineers to give up their weapons, but this the mutineers refused to do. Eventually, some of the mutineers did give up their arms, but one Robert Kerby further aroused the rest, saying "that if we lett our pykes goe that wee shalbe taken and some of us wilbe hanged, And therefore lett us all resolve one and all to dye together." The mutineers again took up their arms. After

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71 This was probably a search by a press gang to find seamen to man ships for Denbigh’s expedition to relieve Rochelle. The search may have also been for runaway seamen.

72 The hearing, or examination, was held on 21 Mar 1627/28; SP16/103/1.

73 SP16/103/1, Commissioners for Martial Law at Plymouth to the King; 1 May 1628.

74 Kerby, or Kirby, was a crewman aboard one of the privately owned cargo ships used to carry supplies during the Ré Expedition. (SP16/98/26, Note 70 above). The manuscripts use the spelling ‘Kerby’.
this outburst, Sydenham testified he struck Kerby on the arm with a cudgel and thus took Kerby’s pike away from him. However, Mervyn testified that he put his sword to Kerby’s chest and ordered the mutineers to lay down their arms, which they did. Somehow, the officers and the town watch restored order and took the ringleaders of the mutiny into custody. Kerby and several other of the mutineers were also deposed under oath and, as might be expected, said little and described the affair as considerably more peaceful than the Captains and the town officials did.

The investigations and debates after the incident provide the pressed men’s grievances. Sir Ferdinando Gorges listed the following: 1. They say they are used like dogs, forced to stay on board and not allowed to refresh themselves on shore. 2. They have no money to buy clothes or to keep themselves in health much less to help their wives and children. 3. When they fall sick they are not allowed fresh victuals. 4. When sick men are put ashore in houses erected for them, they are not looked after and are allowed to perish. 5. Some provisions put on board for them are not fit or wholesome for men to live on. And 6. Therefore they “had as leeve be hanged as to bee dealt withall as they are”. The Privy Council, upon receiving the first letters about the mutiny, ordered the Commissioners for Martial Law to conduct a thorough examination of the affair, to

75 SP16/98/29, Sir Ferdinando Gorges to Buckingham; 23 Mar 1627/28. The item numbers are as in the MS.

capture the leaders of the mutiny and to give exemplary punishment to those found guilty of rebellious behavior.\textsuperscript{77}

The aftermath of the mutiny also provides some insight into the thinking of the naval officers and the royal government. As has been mentioned before, the military officers often appeared reluctant to punish soldiers and sailors who committed crimes and other “outrages.” The reason usually given was that if a soldier or sailor was punished, the rest of the soldiers or ship’s crew would be so outraged that they would mutiny, desert or create even more disturbances, thus reducing the capabilities of the army or the fleet. The events following this mutiny in Plymouth are an example. The outcome of the hearing before the Commission for Martial Law was a death sentence for Robert Kerby and another of the ringleaders. The sources do not mention punishment for other participants in the mutiny. Shortly thereafter, thirteen shipmasters of the fleet then assembling under the Earl of Denbigh submitted a petition to Denbigh requesting a reprieve for Kerby for four or five days and Denbigh sent the petition on to Lord Admiral Buckingham.\textsuperscript{78} The masters first apologized for the behavior of the common sailors. They maintained that Kerby had been an honest and careful man in the three years that he had sailed with them and that he may have fallen in with bad company. Perhaps more important, the masters believed that they would have much more trouble with their crews

\textsuperscript{77} APC Vol. 43, pg. 360, P.C. to the Commissioners for Martial Law in Devon; 24 Mar 1627/28.

\textsuperscript{78} SP16/98/28, Earl of Denbigh to Buckingham; 23 Mar 1627/28. The petition is an enclosure to this document.
“greater inconvenience” if Kerby were executed. Denbigh sent another letter to Buckingham the same day stating that, on further consultation and consideration, he thought that a reprieve or pardon for Kerby might undermine discipline in the fleet. Denbigh wrote that there were two men, both ringleaders of the mutiny, under sentence of death and perhaps the pardon of one should be coupled with the execution of the other. Denbigh further opined that this course might encourage the “better sort”, in that their petition had gotten partial results, and deter the “loose and disorderly” sort because one received severe punishment for disobedience.

There are two other documents in the State Papers that give information on the argument over the execution of the two condemned men. In them Sir George Chudleigh, Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Sir William Strode, three members of the Commission for Martial Law which condemned the men, present arguments for and against the executions. The first document presents reasons for not executing Kerby and the second gives the counter arguments to each item in the first. The arguments against execution revolve around points of law such as the legality of the Commission for Martial Law, since the soldiers in the Plymouth area had been formally discharged (though they were still in the area because there was no money to pay their arrears). There was also no legal definition of mutiny and martial law in the existing proclamations of the King.

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79 The fleet was preparing to sail as quickly as possible. Perhaps the masters expected to leave in four or five days and feared Kerby’s execution might delay the departure. The fleet actually sailed around 1 May.

80 SP16/98/28, Earl of Denbigh to Buckingham; 23 Mar 1627/28.

81 SP16/98/35, Statement signed by Sir George Chudleigh et al.; 23? March 1627/28 and SP16/98/37, Answers to the several Arguments; 23(? ) March 1627/28.
instructions to the Commission, or in the laws themselves. The Commissioners argued further that the fault lay with whoever left arms in the Guildhall and that the seamen in the fleet would be angrier and more uncontrollable if the execution proceeded. The counter arguments are even more lawyerly and complex and are most likely the real opinions of the Commission members, but the arguments in the first document probably summarize the objections of the naval officers and some civilians.

The sailors punctuated the discussion with a riot or demonstration on the proposed day of the executions. They stormed the “Howe”, tore down the gallows, and threw it into the sea. They then advanced toward the prison to release the condemned men, but a company of soldiers billeted in the town stopped them with force, killing two of the seamen and wounding others during the fight. As matters turned out, Kerby was still alive when the fleet finally sailed in early May 1628. Although the Privy Council had authorized the execution, Denbigh had reprieved him until after the fleet sailed. The mutiny had prompted more sailors to desert and, according to the Commissioners, Denbigh thought that the execution of Kerby would not be to the advantage of the King’s service. The Commissioners themselves were divided upon the subject. It appears that in July Kerby was discharged by order of the King.

The seamen’s anger that helped prompt the mutiny persisted for months after the mutiny, fueled by the destruction of the maritime industries of Devon during the wars.

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82 SP16/98/26, Sir James Bagg to Buckingham; 23 Mar 1627/28. A howe or hoe is an artificial hill or mound and it was on this mound that the gallows were erected.

83 SP16/103/1, Commissioners for Martial Law at Plymouth to the King; 1 May 1628.

Muslim piracy was endemic and there was a near total cessation of fishing from Devon ports in the years from 1625 to 1630. This combined with the after effects of plague and billeting devastated the south Devon ports.\textsuperscript{85}

The sensitivity of the officers in the armed forces to the state of mind of the common soldier and sailor is apparent. We saw it in connection with the soldier’s mutiny at Harwich a year earlier and in the instructions from the Privy Council to Sir John Hippisley in 1624 to be “tender in the spilling of blood”. The officers and Commissioners on the scene in Plymouth obviously realized that they would probably not accomplish anything militarily useful with disaffected men. The morale of the common soldier and sailor seems to have been quite low in this period, as evidenced by the mutinies, riots and outrages they perpetrated and the ‘morale’ issue is surely is one reason Charles’ military adventures were unsuccessful. The Privy Council’s first response, mentioned previously, seems to have been ‘hang ‘em high’. However, on other occasions the Privy Council had expressed concern about the attitudes of the soldiers, so this initial response may have been pro forma. Since the King released Kerby a month and a half after Denbigh’s fleet sailed, it appears there was also a change of mind in London. The reasons for this change would be interesting to unravel, but must be left for another time. There was considerable debate in England during the war years about the applicability of martial law to offenses of members of the army and navy while in England and of the relation of the common law to offenses committed by the military, either against other members of the military or civilians. The Privy Council and officers of state themselves

\textsuperscript{85} Mark Stoyle, \textit{Loyalty and locality: popular allegiance in Devon during the English Civil War} [Exeter: Univ. of Exeter Press, 1994], pp. 159-160.
had differing opinions on the subject and the debates on martial law also became entangled in questions about the powers and duties of lords lieutenant and in local politics. We will consider these matters further in the chapter on the Parliament of 1628 and the Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers and the Petition of Right.

b. The Adventures of Sir Pierce Crosby’s Irish Regiment in East Anglia

Sir Pierce Crosby’s Regiment was recruited and impressed in Ireland, went to the Île de Ré in August 1627, where they were engaged in the later portion of the campaign. Upon their return to England, Crosby’s Regiment landed in Hampshire and was one of the units that the Privy Council ordered moved from around Portsmouth and Winchester and billeted in Essex, Gloucester, Suffolk, Sussex and other parts of Hampshire. On 27 December, the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex wrote two letters to London, one to Richard Weston, Chancellor of the Exchequer and the second to the Privy Council. The first advised Weston, who had not signed the Order of 17 December, that the Deputies expected that there would be general refusal in the county to pay for billeting because of recent “unsupportable charges” to the people of the county in billeting troops and providing Trained Bands to defend Harwich and for which there had been no repayment.

86 A fuller treatment of these subjects may be found in Lindsay Boynton’s article Martial Law and the Petition of Right, pp. 266-284. The footnotes in this article are very helpful in identifying source material on the subject.

87 Quintrell describes Crosby (or Crosbie) as a restless adventurer of native Irish stock who was a Protestant with Catholic sympathies and who commended Buckingham’s conduct at Ré while criticizing other senior officers. Quintrell further mentions that Crosby’s regiment missed the fiercest fighting on Ré. (Quintrell, The Maynard Lieutenancy Book, Note 433, pg. 400.)

88 APC Vol. 43, pg. 183; 17 Dec 1627.

This had happened in the recent past and so the Deputies requested Weston to “ease” them of the new burden, pointing out they had made this request to the Privy Council several times. They also asked Weston for his advice on how much of this matter they should discuss with the Justices of the Peace at the next Quarter Sessions in early January.\footnote{The date of the Quarter Sessions is given as Thursday after “Twelvestyde” so the meeting was on Thursday, 10 Jan 1628. Twelfth Night was 6 Jan 1628(O.S.) and was on Sunday in 1628.}

The second letter, to the Privy Council, was a direct response to the Council Order of 17 December and asked for the Council’s instructions on where best to billet the troops, near the sea or inland; when the soldiers would arrive; how many would need billets; how many would be marching through Essex; and how the deputies were to raise the money to pay for all of this. The Privy Council responded twelve days later, leaving the billeting locations to the deputies but suggested the “maritime parts” of the county with the soldiers “near together” for better discipline and training.\footnote{APC Vol. 43, pg. 224, P.C. to D.L.s of Essex; 8 Jan 1627/28. G. E. Aylmer, in his article on the riot at Witham, discussed below, has these documents confused in order of date and in reference to each other. He appears to have misread the date of the first Council Order, mentioned in the manuscript of SP16/87/52, as 27 Dec rather than 17 Dec and missed the P.C. The Order is in APC Vol. 43, pg. 183.}

As for raising the money, the Privy Council ordered the deputy lieutenants to levy a rate on the county as a whole as was commonly done in the past, with the assurance that the King would repay them. The Privy Council also ordered the Attorney General to prepare a commission for Martial Law and for Oyer and Terminer for the County of Essex, which he eventually issued on 24 January.\footnote{Quintrell, pg. 226, No. 552; 24 Jan 1627/28, for the issue date.} The commission included a number of the deputy lieutenants as well as Colonel Crosby, his lieutenant colonel, Captain Butler, and his sergeant major,
Captain Esmond. On the same day, the Privy Council wrote to the Justices of the Peace in Essex requiring them to aid and assist the deputy lieutenants in the billeting of the troops and in maintaining order and in levying the money to pay for billeting.

The deputy lieutenants in turn wrote a letter to the high constables of Essex informing them that soldiers were coming into the county and that the high constables were to see that the petty constables keep a careful watch for “stragglers and felons” among the soldiers and to take all offenders to the nearest Justice of the Peace for punishment. The deputies also ordered the constables to warn all inhabitants of the county not to buy or take into pawn any arms, clothes or goods from the soldiers and if they did, the deputies would consider them “accessories to felons”.

Crosby’s regiment, around 500 strong, arrived in Essex sometime in the first half of January, for on 19 January several of the deputy lieutenants wrote to Chancellor Weston that the regiment was now temporarily in billets around Chelmsford. The deputies informed Weston that the allowance of 6d. per day (3s. 6d. per week) for the soldier’s food was not nearly enough. The billeters were spending twice that amount and the number and intensity of the complaints from both billeters and soldiers was rising hourly. The soldiers’ billets were in the “poorer houses” and the poorer householders were already half undone, while those with better ability to pay were absolutely refusing

93 APC Vol. 43, pg. 237, P.C. to the Attorney General; 14 Jan 1627/28.
96 SP16/91/6, D.L.s of Essex to Sir Richard Weston; 19 Jan 1627/28. “Two days before the beginning of the Quarter Sessions” is mentioned in Quintrell pg. 223, No. 541.
to billet any soldiers. The deputy lieutenants claimed they had no power to correct this situation and required help from the Privy Council to do so. Initially the Justices collected £100 at Quarter Sessions on their own bonds to “prevent the spoyle of the countrie” and shortly later made formal arrangements to levy a rate totaling £1000 on the county as a whole. On the same day, the deputy lieutenants issued an order to the bailiffs of Chelmsford to billet four companies of the regiment “in the houses of people of the better abilitie”.

Based on these early exchanges, the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex obviously were not happy with the prospect of billeting soldiers. In preparing for the arrival of Crosby’s regiment, the deputy lieutenants also prepared two other documents in January 1627/28 bearing on the expected billeting problems. The two documents provide a list of the problems the deputies faced and express some of their fears. First, the deputy lieutenants prepared a set of “Propositions” for the Privy Council, although there is no record in the APC or State Papers that the deputies ever sent the Propositions to the Council. The Propositions were: 1. that the deputies know as soon as possible the number of soldiers to be billeted and that the charge will be as small as possible; 2. that the Deputies have full power to repress all insolencies and punish all offences, even of army officers, if the deputies find them negligent in governing their soldiers; 3. that the soldiers be forced to

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97 This is the frequent complaint of local officials, mentioned earlier in this study. They claimed there was no law requiring the people of England to billet troops in their houses and so the deputies and justices had no way to force the refusers to pay or to billet since it was not an offence under the common law.

98 Quintrell, pg. 223, No. 541, pg. 225, No. 547 and No. 548, 22 Jan 1627/28.

99 Quintrell pg. 225, No. 549, 22 Jan 1627/28.

100 Quintrell, pg. 223 No. 542, 14 Jan 1627/28. The item numbers are as in the MS.
content themselves with the King’s pay and obey the ordinary officers of the law; 4. that the soldiers shall not carry arms to terrorize the inhabitants and that the officers retain the arms, except when the soldiers are engaged in training and exercise; 5. that the soldiers be “tied” to certain hours for their lodging both morning and evening; 6. that full authority be given (by the Privy Council?) to the deputies to billet the soldiers in any man’s house and that directions be given on how to proceed against those who refuse to billet them or to pay for billeting; 7. that letters be written (by the Privy Council?) ordering the Justices of the Peace to aid the deputy lieutenants in billeting matters and to aid the deputies in the apprehension, restraint and punishment of all disorders and offences, with or without a deputy’s presence; and 8. that the Commission for Oyer and Terminer include not only deputy lieutenants and all Justices of the Peace, but also other principal gentlemen of quality. Of particular interest is the desire for the soldiers and officers to be subject to the authority of the ordinary officers of the law (Item 2), referring to the claims of army officers to be the sole governors of their men. This was indeed a sore point in the counties and towns. Item 7 indicates tensions in the county community and that some Justices were unwilling or reluctant to punish their neighbors for refusing to billet soldiers or to pay for billeting. However, as matters turned out, the army officers and soldiers observed few of these propositions in practice, and many of the deputy lieutenants’ fears were realized.

The second document the Commissioners published was a set of orders for Martial Law in Essex governing the conduct of soldiers, which form an informal and
temporary law code.\textsuperscript{101} All of the military and civilian members of the Commission signed this code. It reflects the worries of the inhabitants of Essex and of the army officers. The orders were the following: 1. no soldier shall abuse or disobey any of his officers upon pain of death; 2. no soldier shall draw his sword or dagger or any like weapon within his “garrison” on pain of severe imprisonment and censure by a court;\textsuperscript{102} 3. no soldier shall abuse either his host or hostess where he is lodged or any persons either by base speech or action on pain of severe imprisonment and censure by a court; 4. no soldier shall offer any violence to any woman or maiden on pain of death; 5. no soldier shall be out of his lodging after 8 o’clock or by nine when the bell rings and [soldiers] shall repair to bed without disorder on pain of severe punishment; 6. no soldier shall go out of his garrison farther than he can hear the drum beat without leave of his captain on pain of severe punishment; 7. no soldier shall give any factious or mutinous speeches by “threateninge or otherwise”\textsuperscript{(sic)} on pain of severe imprisonment upon trial by a court; 8. no soldier shall refuse to receive the kings pay on pain of imprisonment upon trial by a court; 9. no soldier shall force the man or woman of the house where he is or shall be billeted to provide his food unless the man of the house is willing to feed him and he shall not be excessive in his firing (that is, in his use of wood or coal in a fire to keep warm) or other necessaries which are allowed him upon pain of severe imprisonment upon trial by a court; and 10. no soldier shall abuse the town watch either

\textsuperscript{101} Quintrell, pg. 227, No. 553; no date given, but it must date from after the receipt of the Commission on 24 Jan 1627/28. Item numbers are as in the MS.

\textsuperscript{102} It is not stated whether this “court” is to be a court martial, the Commission for Martial Law or in the common law system, nor is the word “garrison” defined.
in word or deed and if the watch brings the soldier before his captain for such an action, the captain shall punish the soldier according to the law for the offence.

The army officers probably read these regulations to the soldiers, as was the custom, but it does not seem to have had much effect. For by late January and early February, complaints about soldier’s behavior were coming in from every town that billeted them. By the end of January, the Privy Council had already received reports of violence and reprimanded the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex for not preserving better order.\(^{103}\) The council had heard of an attempted rape followed by the woman’s servants killing of the soldier responsible, of soldiers wandering up and down the highways robbing people, of soldiers refusing to obey the constables, of town watchmen and constables not enforcing the law, and of people refusing to billet even orderly soldiers. The Council accused the local officials of billeting troops in small, poor towns and in places where the Justices of the Peace or their captains and lieutenants could not supervise them easily. The Council issued orders to correct the situation. The deputy lieutenants wrote to the Privy Council that the soldiers and the people of Essex were offending each other in part because of religious differences between the Catholic Irish and the Protestant inhabitants of Essex.\(^{104}\) Beyond this, the soldiers demanded food and drink costing two or three times the crown’s daily allowance. The soldiers were insolent and peremptory in the houses where they lodged and respected neither the goods nor the persons of the hosts in any house where they “thought themselves strong enough to be

\(^{103}\) APC Vol. 43, pg. 260-261, P.C. to D.L.s of Essex; 31 Jan 1627/28.

\(^{104}\) Qintrell, pg. 228, No. 555, 10 Feb 1627/28. This MS does not appear in the State Papers, Domestic.
masters”. The deputies said that the ratepayers had paid in little of the £1000 they had levied on the county and those that had paid said they would pay no more. The money that they had collected was almost gone and, after it was, the deputies were concerned about what the soldiers might do. Therefore, Essex needed money from the royal government quickly. The Privy Council’s response was to send two of its messengers to Essex to bring back to London all who refused to pay to answer to the Council, but the Deputy Lieutenants and Justices of the Peace of Essex responded that whole towns, hundreds, and parishes were unanimously refusing to pay for billeting troops. There were so many people who refused to pay that those who refused could not all be sent, and that the Deputies did not know who to send. The Privy Council also issued several orders to move soldiers from one town to another and then changed the orders. By late February, the complaints were apparently so numerous that the Privy Council ordered five companies of Crosby’s regiment to move to Norfolk. The happenings in Norfolk will be discussed later.

The deputy lieutenants selected the towns of Maldon and Witham, among others, to billet troops. These towns had been refractory in subscribing to the Forced Loan in 1627 and the royal government had earlier suggested them as likely places to billet


troops. The deputy lieutenants first sent a company of Crosby’s regiment to Maldon. The two towns argued about which was least able to billet soldiers and eventually the company was sent to Witham on 8 March. Captain Ross Carew’s (or Carey) was the company in question and both towns had unusually difficult times with Carew’s men. The State Papers, Domestic document events in both towns better than they do most such situations, although the events in Witham are better known. Maldon’s Petition to the Privy Council to have Carew’s company removed contained a number of depositions describing the behavior of soldiers in the houses where they were billeted, and some space will be devoted to the incidents to illustrate the day-to-day events that angered the communities that billeted troops. Of course, it is possible, even probable, that Carew’s men behaved worse than most.

The Petition started with this statement: since the soldiers came …

“They comamnd in our howses as if they were our lords and we theire slaves, inforcing us and ours to attend them at theire pleasure, and to doe the basest offices for them. they will not be contented with dyett proporconable to his majesties pay allowed them but compell us to provide for them what they will eat and drinke att all tymes and to exceede the kings allowance to them three tymes over, And for our trouble(?) they pay us with offering vyolence to our persons and vyle threates Soe as when we should goe to church we stay at home to guard our howses from

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\text{108 William Hunt, The Puritan Moment, the Coming of Revolution in an English County [Cambridge Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 1983], pg. 202.}
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\text{109 SP16/92/59, Petition of one of the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex to Buckingham; 7 Feb 1628. The corporation of Maldon has misinformed the Council as to the size of their town…. and SP16/91/86, Petition of the King’s poor tenants of his manor of Witham in Essex and other inhabitants of the same, to the Council; 31 Jan 1628(?). Aylmer notes that this document is dated 31 January 1628(?) in the Calendar but remarks that it must come after a Privy Council Order of 3 Feb. See his footnotes and particularly Note 18 on pg. 142 of his Past and Present article.}
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ransacking and our wives daughters and maybe servants from them in our absence”.

The Petition goes on to say that the country folk who used to come to the Maldon market are now so afraid of the soldiers that they no longer came to the market and so the town was poorer than ever. The depositions enclosed in the Petition give the particulars.

Dorcas Thurgood testified that the day after the soldiers came to town, those billeted in her husband’s house started drinking beer before supper, which she dared not refuse them. The soldiers demanded more beer and tobacco and when she refused, one soldier came at her and drew his sword half out of the scabbard, calling her a “bastardly whore”. However, her husband seized the sword, apparently avoiding bloodshed.

Thurgood further testified that the solders took all the room in the house, saying the “kinge doth allow them”.

Joane Chapmen and her son, Gabriel, complained that on Wednesday 26 January, four soldiers billeted in her house that night drank eleven quarts of strong beer, which they made her buy “out of doors” because they did not like her beer. When they were to go to their beds, they found fault with them and called for more beer and chamber pots. One of the soldiers half drew his sword and swore he would kill her if she did not comply. She then sent her son to an officer to complain. The son took up a stick as he was going out and one of the soldiers hit Gabriel on the hand with a candlestick and “cut his hand through”. If the soldiers were not happy with their [bed] sheets, they tore them up. Each night they demanded two candles and a great fire, staying up until 2 o’clock.

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110 SP16/92/85, Petition of the Inhabitants of Maldon to the P.C.; (10?) Feb. 1627/28. The date may actually be later in Feb.
To make matters worse, the constables were afraid to come and “appease” these disorders.

Thomas Trowers complained that four soldiers billeted in his house on 23 January consumed a leg of mutton for dinner that cost 20d. and a capon that cost him two shillings. That evening he provided a shoulder of mutton that cost him another two shillings. (This comes to 17d. per man for the day. The king’s allowance was 6d. per day.) At the fireside around 6 o’clock, the soldiers called for supper and then said that the mutton was for dogs and threw it about the house. Their sergeant drew his skeyne and laid hold of Trowers, crossed his throat with the skeyne and threatened to cut his throat. Another soldier half drew his sword and threatened to cut off Trowers’ head. At this point, a young maid fainted while another soldier said they would cut down Trowers’ bacon, burn it, and throw him and his wife on top of the bacon. Finally, the sergeant threw a stool into the fire. Apparently no blood was actually shed since Trowers lived to tell the tale.

Edmund Rayner, one of the town constables, said that, when Carew’s men first came into the town, they attacked one of the townsman and when Rayner tried to stop the soldiers in the name of the King’s peace, they beat the townsman even more. After another affray, Rayner testified, the soldiers threatened to take the town and drive all the inhabitants out. He also said that many of the soldiers would not go to their billets at a reasonable time but got drunk and sat up until three o’clock in the morning.

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111 O.E.D., 2nd ed., s.v. “skeyne”: a knife or dagger that was one of the chief weapons of the Irish foot soldier.
Susan and William Payne reported that five soldiers billeted in their house on 8 February required her to fetch a cloth, which she brought, and then to fetch a penny, which she brought, and then a halfpenny worth of onions and a loaf of white bread, which she also brought. The soldiers ate up the onions and the loaf of bread and then demanded she bring them a wheaten loaf and gave her money. She sent a boy to get the bread, but when he returned with it and set it on the table, one of the soldiers disliked it and threw it on the ground. William Payne picked it up saying that it was good bread and he hoped they might always have such bread. Payne then told Susan to give the soldiers their money back. When she was taking the money from her pocket one of the soldiers thrust his staff in her face, broke off some flesh and skin from her nose, nearly putting out her eye. When William went before a bailiff with a complaint, one of the soldiers assaulted him in the street and wounded him in the head with a halberd. Several other witnesses to the confrontation confirmed all or part of the Paynes’ deposition.

Thomas Aldredge, a constable of the town, and others testified that on the night of the eighth he received a report that a sergeant of the soldiers had killed Payne. Picking up a stick, Aldredge went to investigate on his own. As he went down the street, he met one of the sergeants, who had a halberd in one hand and a sword in the other, with four soldiers of his company behind him, all with their swords drawn. When Aldredge ordered them to keep the King’s peace, seven or eight times, the soldiers “pressed upon him” and pushed him back about thirty feet against a wall. The constable grabbed the sergeant’s sword, cutting his fingers, and then the soldiers started thrusting their swords at him, missing his legs but cutting his hose in a number of places. Aldredge called for
help, which came shortly, and the townsmen soon overcame the soldiers and took the sergeant to prison. One of the townsmen reported that a soldier stabbed him with a sword but the sword cut only his doublet, though it was a near miss.\textsuperscript{112} The sergeant had been in prison about half an hour when his captain came by and had the sergeant released into his custody. One witness, Joshua Hagger, stated that as the sergeant left the prison he swore he would have revenge on Hagger and to “have his blood”.

James Brownword complained that two soldiers billeted in houses near his came to his house at 10 o’clock on 6 February and broke open his street door. Brownword, his wife and two others managed to get the door closed and to hold it against the two soldiers. The soldiers then drew their swords and threatened to have blood. One of them put his skeyne to the chest of a neighbor, threatening to make him eat it, but by then Brownword had gone out a back door of his house, called in the constables and peace was restored.

Based on the complaints of the people of Maldon, it appears that, while the victims shed a little blood from cuts, the soldiers did not kill or even seriously injure anyone. From the details of the incident at the Payne’s, we might ask if the soldiers seriously intended to harm anyone, since the only damage they did was to cut some hose and a doublet. Perhaps the soldiers were having some rough ‘fun’ at the townspeople’s expense, or perhaps they were too drunk to do much damage. It all likelihood, the soldiers were trying to intimidate the townspeople to extort the best food and beer that could be had, rather than intending more serious violence. The soldier’s threat to

\textsuperscript{112} Another witness said it was a halberd and that the victim was cut.
Constable Rayner to drive all of the people out of the town seems like it would have been self-defeating and was not seriously intended. As in other places, alcohol exacerbated at least some of the trouble. On the other hand, we can extend sympathy to the people of this quiet Essex town and understand why these rough Irish soldiers frightened them and why they became a bit hysterical after the soldiers came to town.

After the problems in Maldon, the deputy lieutenants moved Captain Carew’s company to the town of Witham in early March and, while things were quiet at first, on 17 March, St. Patrick’s Day, a serious riot or battle took place between the soldiers and the townspeople. Townsmen may have killed two soldiers and twenty or thirty townsmen, countrymen and soldiers were injured, and someone bounced a musket ball off the head of Captain Carew during the affair, giving the captain a severe cut and a concussion. The affair started on the morning of St. Patrick’s Day when Carew gave his men some money and told them to celebrate the patron saint’s day. This they proceeded to do in the local inn, drinking beer and dancing with their swords in the courtyard of the inn. During the morning hours, two apprentices and a shoemaker’s servant from the town, Calvinists no doubt, tied crosses made of red cloth, the symbol of the Saint and of Ireland, to the town whipping post and to the head and tail of a dog. This insult enraged the soldiers who then went looking for the culprits. The soldiers attempted to break into the house of the shoemaker for whom two of the boys worked as apprentices, and may have injured the shoemaker. Other townsmen started fighting with the soldiers and more soldiers joined the fray. Matters quickly became worse and fights started in the streets of the town. As the affair grew still worse, both sides brought swords and firearms into use,
which in turn led to the casualties mentioned previously. Apparently, people from the
countryside, angered by the wounding of the local men by the soldiers, came into town,
or were in town, and joined in. The local people in the mêlée quickly outnumbered the
soldiers, and a bloody battle could have developed. Someone summoned several nearby
deputy lieutenants and regimental Sergeant Major Esmond, who was in town, and they
managed to calm the townsmen and the soldiers. Eyewitness testimony describing the
events can be found in the State Papers, Domestic.\footnote{SP16/96/39, D.L.s of Essex to the P.C.; 18 Mar 1627/28. This is a report on the riot at Witham.} There was a good deal of
disagreement about the precise course of events and who was to blame. The eyewitness
testimony is in places contradictory and reveals nothing not mentioned above. Much of it
deals with unsuccessful attempts to identify a man who allegedly shot Captain Carew and
another portion deals with successful identification of the boys who tied the red crosses
on the dog and the whipping post. In addition, G. E. Aylmer’s article in \textit{Past and Present}
describes the events of St. Patrick’s Day and days leading up to the riot at more length.\footnote{G. E. Alymer; “St. Patrick’s Day 1628 in Witham, Essex”; \textit{Past and Present}, No. 61, Nov. 1973, pp. 139-148. Another slightly different version of the story may be found in Fissel’s \textit{English Warfare}, pp. 110-111. Fissel describes the red crosses as those of St. George, but I think it more likely that the boys intended the crosses to be those of St. Patrick.} Alymer, however, only mentions in passing the Maldon Petition discussed above.

On 20 March, the Privy Council ordered the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex to move
Captain Carew’s company to some other “fit and commodious” place within the
county.\footnote{APC Vol. 43, pp. 355-356, P.C. to D.L.s of Essex; 20 March 1627/28.} On 31 March, the Council ordered six companies of Crosby’s regiment to
move from Essex to Kent, in Sandwich, Hythe and Canterbury. The Privy Council had
moved the rest of the regiment to Norfolk and the Town of Norwich around 1 March 1627/28. On 31 March, the Council ordered the five companies in Norfolk to march to Kent after a month in Norfolk. And so Crosby’s regiment left Essex, but the people of Essex did not soon forget them. In August, the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex wrote to the Privy Council and the Lord Treasurer requesting repayment of the costs of billeting the regiment. The total for which they submitted accounts was £1061 0s. 4d. The Deputies asked for permission to draw this amount from the money collected in the county for the subsidy that Parliament had granted earlier in 1628. The Privy Council probably approved this request, as it did for most counties. After the riot at Witham, the Privy Council called before it several of the townsmen who had previously given depositions, and it also called Captain Carew to appear. Apparently, there was little or no punishment for any of those called before the Privy Council, except for a few weeks in captivity for Carew, who was released on 27 April.

The County of Norfolk was no happier than Essex was at the arrival of the Irish soldiers and the five companies of Crosby’s regiment created similar problems for Norfolk and the town of Norwich. The Privy Council ordered the five companies to move to Norfolk in late February and the companies arrived in early March. The Mayor of Norwich and some of the Aldermen wrote a letter to the Privy Council in mid-March

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116 APC, Vol. 43, pg. 370-371, P.C. to Buckingham; 31 Mar 1628. Another to the D.L.s of Kent and another to the D.L.s of Essex.

117 Quintrell, pp. 241-242; No.s 587 and 588; 20 Aug 1628.


119 APC Vol. 43, pg. 389, Capt. Carew’s discharge; 27 April 1628
complaining of the behavior of the Deputy Lieutenants of Norfolk as well as of the five companies of soldiers under the command of the regimental lieutenant colonel, Captain John Butler. The Mayor stated that the deputy lieutenants notified neither him nor anyone else in the town of the arrival of the troops until several hours after four of the five companies were already twenty miles inside the county. This occurred despite specific orders from the Lord Lieutenant for the deputies and the town officials to confer on the disposition of the troops and despite the fact that the deputy lieutenants knew of the position of the troops and despite the fact that the deputies had gathered at an inn in the center of Norwich. The reasons for the deputies’ secrecy are not given, but probably they were trying to put off the clamor, which soon arose, as long as possible. This is reminiscent of the question the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex asked the Privy Council in January: how much should they tell the Justices of the Peace and others beforehand about the arrival of the Irish soldiers in Essex?

On 7 or 8 March, the companies marched into Norwich and right into the marketplace with their drums beating, their flags flying and their pikes and muskets in their hands (not on baggage carts). The deputy lieutenants soon withdrew into the countryside, leaving the officials and people of Norwich to arrange billets for the soldiers and feed them at the town’s expense. The next day, Mayor and the town council sent two of the companies off to Lynn and another to Yarmouth. However, they would not leave Norwich until the town fathers liberally rewarded the Lieutenant Colonel, provided carts to carry their armor, horses for their officers and £10 conduct money and 36s. for other

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120 SP16/96/46, Mayor of Norwich et al. to the P.C.; 19 March 1627/28.
charges, all which the town was forced to provide to avoid billeting all five of the companies in the town. The Mayor also complained that, based on past precedents, Norwich should have to bear a twentieth (5 percent) of the cost of the five companies, while they were in fact billeting two fifths (40 percent). Then the Mayor described the behavior of the soldiers, which was outrageous even though, so he said, the town had been very kind and courteous to them. On market days, the soldiers marched around the town with their drums and ensigns, utterly terrifying the country people who soon gave up coming to town, depriving the tradesmen in Norwich of business. The soldiers consorted with idle and disorderly people and accepted them into their companies, paying them out of money the town had provided, which must have irritated the townsmen no end. The soldiers resisted all discipline, saying their officers governed them and no others, and in this opinion the officers encouraged them. The officers, even the senior officers, said that they “cared not” for the King and threatened to assault the mayor and, on one occasion, encouraged the soldiers to kill the sheriff and to affirm themselves papists. Known recusants meet with the soldiers daily and popish priests were “credibly reported” to be among the soldiers. When soldiers assaulted townspeople with drawn weapons, the constables were unable to apprehend the culprits because a whole company of forty or fifty men came to the aid of the miscreants, swearing they would all die protecting their comrades rather than have the constables arrest them, nor would they allow the constables to disarm them. Most of the soldiers carried not only a sword but also a “stabbing knife” (the skeyne, no doubt) in their pockets and they used these knives. The officers refused to stay at the best inn in town but demanded private houses to live in
and then demanded whatever they wanted from the householder and his servants. To enforce all these demands, they threatened a general massacre in the town. In closing, the Mayor said that the bearer of the letter could inform the Council about many more enormities and that Norwich was in fear for its existence. The Town therefore requested speedy relief from their burdens. They were relieved when the Council ordered the soldiers sent to Kent in late March. In a footnote to the sojourn in Norfolk, near the end of March, Captain John Butler, Crosby’s Lieutenant Colonel, wrote to the Privy Council complaining about his treatment in Norwich. In response, the Council ordered the Norfolk Justices of the Peace to conduct an investigation of Butler’s complaint. The results of the investigation are not known, and can only be imagined.

None of the documents mention why the Privy Council selected Kent as the next billeting location for Crosby’s regiment. However, Sir Ralph Bingley’s Irish regiment had been in billets in Kent since early in 1628 and there seem to have been no unusual problems between the people of Kent and Bingley’s regiment. Perhaps the people of Kent were not such hot Protestants as the people of Essex and Norfolk. Perhaps Bingley’s regiment contained mostly recruits from the Pale and other more Protestant areas of Ireland, while Crosby’s regiment contained a greater proportion of men from the western, northern, and more Catholic areas of Ireland or perhaps it contained more felons.


122 APC Vol. 43, pg 367, P.C. to the Bishop of Norwich et al.; 31 Mar 1628.

123 APC Vol. 43, pg. 238, P. C. to J.P.s of Kent; 15 Jan 1627/28.
and jailbirds. However, there is one document, a Petition to the King from the people in “the parts of Kent over against Calais and Dunkirk”, which probably speaks of the men of Bingley’s regiment, and tells of problems with Bingley’s regiment similar to those of Essex with Crosby’s regiment. The Petition requests relief from the presence of the “rude and barbarous” Irish soldiers. In addition to complaints of un-reimbursed expenses, the Petition stated that the people are “oppressed” by the disorderly and insolent carriage and behavior of the Irish soldiers, who are described as differing in “nation, religion and language and affection” from the petitioners. The soldiers threatened, assaulted and abused their billetters and were not satisfied with the food and lodging provided for the daily pay allowed by the King. The petitioners claimed that often they did not go to church for fear the soldiers would rob them while they are gone from home. They made the familiar complaints of the soldiers going about armed and wounding people with their swords and skeynes. Finally, the petitioners mentioned that the soldiers’ billets were far from the homes of the Commissioners (for Martial Law?). They thought that the Commissioners could more easily discipline the soldiers if they were in billets nearer to the Commissioners and if the Commission met more often. The petitioners claimed that they might have to take up arms against the soldiers to defend their families and their possessions, or else to abandon their homes. Although this petition mentioned no riots or major fights, the complaints in it were similar to those

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124 See the letter describing Crosby’s regiment from the Lord Deputy of Ireland in Appendix D.

125 SP16/98/99, Petition of the King’s Subjects inhabiting Kent near to Calais and Dunkirk; provisionally dated Mar 1627/28. This document refers to Irish soldiers billeted with the petitioners since Jan 1627/28.
made against Crosby’s regiment in Essex and Norfolk, or for that matter, English soldiers in other counties, with the exception of religious differences.

In Kent, the local authorities placed Crosby’s regiment in billets in Canterbury, Sandwich, Hythe, Romney and Lydd at various times. The inhabitants of these places were not happy to see more soldiers come, but the complaints were more about the expense, though they did complain about the behavior of Crosby’s men. By 17 April, Crosby’s men had arrived in Kent, for the Lord Mayor of Canterbury wrote to the Privy Council that the appointed number had arrived and were in billets in the town, but seven persons had refused to billet troops. The soldiers were very unruly and discontented, disliking both their lodging and diet, and there was a rumor that some of them had said that the next fasting day would be a black day among the people of Canterbury. The Mayor feared the rumor was true because the Irish refused to go to “our” church, and, being armed, might take occasion to do mischief when the people were at prayer. The Town of Sandwich raised considerable objection to billeting troops in Sandwich. The Privy Council felt the need to directly order the Mayor and Jurats of Sandwich to billet three companies of troops in accordance with previous orders from the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports (the Duke of Buckingham) and that no excuses would be accepted. The Council suspected collusion with Hythe to refuse to billet troops, and the mayor of Sandwich was called before the Council and then sent to Marshallsea prison for his

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126 SP16/101/28, Mayor and Aldermen of Canterbury to the P.C.; 17 April 1628.

127 SP16/101/29, Mayor and Aldermen of Canterbury to the Earl of Montgomery; 17 April 1628.

128 APC, Vol. 43, pg. 382, A warrant directed to the Mayor and Jurats of Sandwich; 21 April 1628.
obduracy. The Council remanded the case to the Attorney General to investigate the Mayor’s denial of receipt of orders from the Council to billet troops in Sandwich. The Mayor had refused to receive the soldiers saying he had not received directions to do so, but, according to the Council, he did have written directions from the Council and the Warden of the Cinque Ports. The Council thought that the Mayor was in contempt of his Majesty, at the least. The Privy Council ordered Attorney General to deliver a report to it concerning a course for proceeding against the Mayor. The argument continued for some time and, apparently, the Council released Mayor from prison, for on 5 July he was again summoned to appear before the Privy Council and made his appearance on 11 July 1628. During the same period, there were similar problems in Canterbury. People refused to billet or to pay rates for billeting. Despite threats from the Privy Council, soldiers were turned out of their billets and in July some eighty soldiers were “on the street” with no place to sleep. The soldiers and their officers threatened to kill billeters and robbed shops for food and for money and goods with which to buy food. Eventually the Privy Council had had enough, and in late July ordered Crosby’s regiment returned to


130 SP16/102/51, Mayor and Aldermen of Canterbury to the P.C.; 29 April 1628. SP16/104/32, Mayor and Aldermen of Canterbury to the P.C.; May 20, 1628. APC, Vol. 43, pg. 439, P.C. to the Mayor and Aldermen of Canterbury; 23 May 1628. SP16/106/8, Mayor and Aldermen of Canterbury to the P.C.; June 2, 1628. SP16/107/60, Mayor and Aldermen of Canterbury to the P.C.; 17 June 1628. SP16/109/48, Mayor of Canterbury et al. to the Earl of Montgomery; 7 July 1628. APC Vol. 44, pg. 16, P.C. to the Mayor of Canterbury; 7 July 1628. SP16/110/18, Mayor and Aldermen of Canterbury to the P.C.; 16 July 1628.
Ireland to fight for the King in that land. The regiment, 900 strong, marched across southern England to Bristol, there to take ship for Ireland. The Council also split the regiment into several groups traveling along different routes and they ordered the officers to go with the regiment to keep them in order. After waiting some time in Bristol for a fair wind, to the consternation of the Mayor of Bristol, they finally returned to Ireland.

The Lord Deputy of Ireland wrote an angry letter to London, dated 29 August, asking that the regiment not return to Ireland. Because of its interest and unintended humor, a good part of this letter may be found in Appendix D, Item 5. The Lord Deputy made the point that the men were not volunteers, as the Privy Council seemed to think. Many of the soldiers were the dregs of society and ‘undesirables’ that county officials wished to get rid of. He had pulled many of them from the jails and impressed others from among the undesirable Irish, as was the King’s policy, the intent being to get them out of the country and onto foreign soil where they could not rebel against the King.

Now the Council was sending them back, with their arms, to fight! I am sure many of the points the Lord Deputy made about the Irishmen sent to the wars apply to the contingents from England as well and the letter may provide reasons why the Irish regiments were so unwelcome in billets in England. It is likely, I think, that the government in Ireland hoped that these men would all die honorably in the King’s service, as many did at Ré.

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132 *APC* Vol. 44, pg. 81; 4 Aug 1628. A strength of 900 men implies that this number included the remnants of both Crosby’s and Bingley’s regiments, since in other sources (Quintrell, pg. 225, No. 546) the number of men in Crosby’s regiment is given as 400 or 600 during this period. Another possibility is that around 300 volunteers had been taken in while Crosby’s regiment was in England for seven months.

133 *APC* Vol. 44, pg. 115, Lord Deputy to the P.C.; 29 August 1628.
c. The Scots on the Isle of Wight

In most respects, the story of billeting soldiers on the Isle of Wight was much the same as in the rest of southern England. Several of the events involving the inhabitants of Wight have been briefly described previously, and there is a good treatment of the subject in the literature in Lindsay Boynton’s article “Billeting: The Example of the Isle of Wight”.\(^{134}\)

The first soldiers billeted on the island were those of Brett’s regiment who were there for two months in 1627 before the Ré Expedition sailed. While the battle was in progress on Ré, the Scots regiment of the Earl of Moreton came by ship to Portsmouth in early October 1627 and was in billets on the Island until 3 September 1628. One of the reasons for billeting the Scots on the Island was to reduce the number of runaways, although the Island was also known as a convenient hiding place for soldiers who had deserted from regiments billeted on the mainland.\(^{135}\) These 1500 Scots were approximately a quarter of the troops billeted in England in October 1627. At first, the people of the Island were not unhappy to have the soldiers. Deputy Lieutenant John Meldrum remarked that “seeing we were well paid for their board, [we] could have been content on the same conditions to have kept them longer…”\(^{136}\) Unfortunately for the people of Wight, the money did not continue coming. As Boynton mentions, “there is


\(^{135}\) Boynton, pg. 26 and pg. 30.

plenty of evidence that … when their bills got in arrears the Islanders soon changed their minds about the soldiers”.

The problems the soldiers created were not limited to complaints about lodgings and food but included the now usual outrages and misdemeanors: several murders, a number of rapes and at least seventy bastards left on the Island, as well as robberies and burglaries. One specific set of accusations against the Scots on Wight appears in the State Papers. They included the murder of a man named Stevens at Brixton by a soldier of Sir George Hayes’ company; a burglary committed at Newport by one of the Earl of Moreton’s Company who got away with £11 or £12; and a rape committed at Northwood by a Highlander of Captain MacNaughton’s Company. The Highlanders committed a number of robberies on the highways and killed of a number of his Majesty’s deer in the park and forest. The Scots also cut down or “spoiled” his Majesty’s trees and committed various other misdemeanors.

The inhabitants soon began to fear that they would be overwhelmed because no one dared arrest and punish the malefactors as they terrorized the Islanders. The royal government had sent a Commission of Martial Law and a Writ of Oyer and Terminer to the Island from London, but the civilian authorities did not receive much help from the officers of the regiment in enforcing the law, even against murderers. When a soldier of Sir William Carr’s company committed a murder, the lieutenant of the company was immediately informed, but he made a search only on the street where he himself was

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137 Boynton, pg. 25 and pg. 32.

138 SP16/88/54, Note of Misdemeanors committed in the Isle of Wight; 1627(?). This is probably misdated in the C.S.P.D. and likely was created in 1628 as part of SP16/100/27, Sec. Conway to the Earl of Moreton; 3 April 1628.
billeted and that on the next day. No one notified a Commissioner for Martial Law until the day after that. The Commissioner sent out the hue-and-cry, but when they found a group of soldiers of the same company in an alehouse, the soldiers refused to provide him any information. The Commissioner set up a Commission hearing a few days later, but the Sergeant Major of the regiment refused to attend and further denied that the Commission had the power to meddle with crimes that soldiers committed. The Commissioner complained that when the army officers did investigate any crimes they “do but slightly punish or restrain the soldiers”. As far as the Commissioner could determine, the Army had punished no soldier for any crime, except with a few days of imprisonment. The deputy lieutenants also complained of the non-cooperation of the higher officers, reporting that the Sergeant Major of the regiment refused to attend meetings of the Commission for Martial Law for trying and punishing soldiers.

For the most part, the deputy lieutenants billeted the soldiers with the poorer inhabitants and the officers with the gentry and, as a result, the soldiers complained about their lodgings and food just as they did in Devon, Cornwall, Essex, Hampshire, Norfolk and Kent. During the period when the Scots regiment was on the Island, the Commission for Soldiers moved the soldiers every five weeks to spread the burden of billeting, but this separated the companies into small groups and made discipline more difficult. On one occasion, the deputy lieutenants wrote to Conway and the Privy Council that there

139 Boynton, pg. 27. These events apparently took place in 1628.
140 Boynton, pg. 32.
141 Boynton, pg. 31.
was not enough food on the Island to feed the soldiers and the inhabitants, but the only solution the deputies suggested was money from London, adding that if the government did not send money, there might be a mutiny.\textsuperscript{142} The soldiers complained that their hosts, the poorest inhabitants, could not afford to feed them. The billetters in turn complained that, even if they could provide the 6d. per day worth of food, the soldiers demanded whatever they wanted and could lay hands on, “to the great damage and general impoverishment of the county”.\textsuperscript{143} The Privy Council’s response was to suggest that the deputy lieutenants should billet soldiers only with those who could afford to pay. If the soldiers were not satisfied with their food and lodging, the billetters could report them to the Commissioners for Soldiers and, if they would not give satisfaction, to the Duke of Buckingham for discipline. This of course was no help at all.\textsuperscript{144}

There was also some ethnic friction between the Islanders and the Scots, whom Oglander described as “base and preemiptory”. The Islanders especially disliked the Highlanders among them and described them as “red shanks”, and “a ruder kind of people” and “barbarous in nature as the clothes they wore”\textsuperscript{145} Oglander found fault with the Scot’s outlandish manners, saying that, though 700 of them were reported to be gentlemen, none knew how to cut bread or meat, not being “used to such good fare in

\textsuperscript{142} Boynton, pg. 31 from Oglander MSS, Deputy Lieutenants to Lord Conway; 12 May 1627.

\textsuperscript{143} Boynton, pg. 31.

\textsuperscript{144} Boynton, pg. 31. Boynton’s footnote referencing APC Vol. 42, pg 237 for this information appears to be in error.

\textsuperscript{145} Boynton, pg. 28.
Scotland. The local gentry were more forthright than most in their complaints to the Privy Council and the royal government in general and to their Lord Lieutenant, Secretary Conway. They accused Conway of billeting the troops upon them because the burgers of Newport refused to elect his nominee to the Parliament of 1628. They also requested that any money that the London government sent down be sent to the deputy lieutenants so that the army officers did not embezzle a large part of it. They argued with the Lord Treasurer and others that the subsidy money collected on Wight did not cover the arrears. More seriously, they accused the King of going back on his word that no more soldiers would be billeted on Wight when the King ordered a company of Moreton’s regiment to be billeted on Wight for awhile longer, after they missed the boats which were to take them on the second attempt to relieve Rochelle. There are some documents indicating that, as late as 1635, the crown still had not repaid the Islanders the billeting money owed to them and that they had to write off over £4000, having been repaid only £3000 of the £7340 owed them.

4. Other Problems and Fears

There were other tribulations during 1627 and 1628 and all of the war years for civilians and soldiers alike that we should remember when considering the anger and fear in England during this period. First, many people in England blamed the soldiers for bringing epidemics, thereby increasing the dread of the army’s arrival. Second, families

146 Boynton, pg. 26.
147 Boynton, pg. 37.
148 Boynton, pg. 40.
that the soldiers left behind experienced hardships that conscription exemptions of various kinds did not mitigate, as they do today.

First, death at a relatively early age due to disease was common in the era and ‘plagues’ and ‘fevers’ were part of every day life. There was no cure and avoidance of infected areas was the only known preventative. In areas with infection, people left the area or confined themselves to their homes as much as possible. The surviving documents contain many mentions of such episodes and people lived in fear of them. The Parliament of 1625 met in June in London and then adjourned to reconvene in Oxford because many of the members wanted to leave town, or had left town, to avoid an outbreak of the plague. There were, however, some definite associations of disease with soldiers as carriers. Epidemics seemed to appear or become worse wherever the government billeted soldiers. A number of the manuscripts mention that towns were afraid to accept soldiers due to the fear of disease. Others mention soldiers, who were wandering around the countryside to visit their fellows, as possible carriers. Thus, at the very least, the people feared the coming of soldiers to their town, perhaps not because the soldiers originally brought the plague to the county, but because they might bring it from wherever they were coming. Conversely, the government generally ordered the commissions not to billet soldiers in towns that were experiencing an epidemic for fear the soldiers would get sick and die, thus depriving the army of men who were difficult


150 Examples are SP16/24/52, Mayor of Plymouth to the P.C.; 8 April 1626 and SP16/90/7, Mayor of Portsmouth to Nicholas; 2 Jan 1627.
and expensive to recruit and train. The spread of disease was certainly one of the problems soldiers faced and one of the great fears of the people of the towns and counties. Perhaps the best description is that it was a shared problem.

There were no reports of epidemics in Kent during the preparations for the Mansfeld Expedition, but it was a serious problem in Devon and Cornwall, especially after the army returned from the Cadiz Expedition in late 1625 and in other areas after the return of the Ré Expedition in late 1627. There can be little doubt that any infectious disease would have quickly spread through the company and the regiment in the close quarters on board ship with little in the way of sanitation. The resistance of the men to disease and its complications was also probably low due to exhaustion and malnutrition. The reports of over a thousand sick soldiers and sailors arriving at Plymouth and other ports in December 1625 were not exaggerations.\textsuperscript{151} The ships were so short of crew that they could not set out to sea again without pressing additional men.\textsuperscript{152} The lack of warm clothes, or any clothes at all, compounded the problems in the winter weather, and we have seen that the need for money to provide clothes was a constant refrain of the Commissioners for Soldiers in Plymouth and the army officers after the Cadiz Expedition returned.

The occurrence of a severe epidemic that spread through most areas where the crown billeted soldiers complicated the problems experienced in 1626. There were

\textsuperscript{151} SP16/12/38, Sir John Eliot to Sec. Conway; 22 Dec 1625. SP16/18/8, Sir Edward Harwood to Sir Dudley Carleton; 3 Jan 1625/26. SP16/18/9, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 4 Jan 1625/26. SP16/22/45, Sir Thomas Love to Buckingham; 8 Mar 1625/26. \textit{APC} Vol. 40 in general contains many mentions of plague and sickness.

\textsuperscript{152} SP16/18/9i, Mayor of Dartmouth to the Commissioners at Plymouth; 3 Jan 1625/26.
epidemics all over England in 1625 and 1626 and the return of the soldiers only
aggravated the situation in any given area.\footnote{See SP16/21/9, Lord Mayor of London to the P.C.; 13 Feb 1625/26, for example reports plague in London in the recent past. The Tuscan Ambassador, Amerigo Salvetti, also reported plague in many places in England during this period. (B.L. Add. MSS No. 27962; Antellminelli, Alessandro (aka Amerigo Salvetti), \textit{Manuscripts of Henry Duncan Skrine esq.: Salvetti Correspondence} [London: Historical Manuscripts Commission, 11\textsuperscript{th} Report Appendix Part I; printed for Her Majesty’s Stationary Office by Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1887], pp. 6,7,15,21,26,28,30,34,43.)} The letter from the Privy Council to the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon and Cornwall in May 1625 notifying them of the impending arrival of the new recruits for the Cadiz Expedition also mentions that the soldiers that they were to billet the men in places that were not infected with the “plague” or the “spotted fever”.\footnote{APC Vol. 40, pp. 55-57, P.C. to D.L.s of Devon and Cornwall; 15 May 1625.} In March 1625/26, Captain Pennington, who commanded the fleet at Plymouth, reported that the sickness had increased so much in Plymouth that it would be dangerous for the fleet to stay there any longer.\footnote{SP16/23/24, Capt. John Pennington to Buckingham; 15 Mar 1625/26.} Such reports continued throughout the spring and, by June, the Commissioners at Plymouth reported that the infection had spread to all the parishes where soldiers were billeted.\footnote{SP16/29/46, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 8 Jun 1626.} Parishes that had no soldiers requested the commissioners not to move soldiers into them for fear of the sickness. Plymouth itself was so badly off that commerce had ceased and all the “best” inhabitants had fled. The Mayor and Aldermen of Exeter reported that a great sickness had fallen on their city and lasted for sixteen months.\footnote{SP16/81/45, Mayor of Exeter to the P.C.; 15 Oct 1627.} As a result, all trading stopped and the inhabitants of “ability” had generally left the town.\footnote{“Ability” in this case refers to the financially well to do.}
“mutinied” and threatened to burn the town for want of help for the sick. From the situation in these two cities, the principle towns of Devon, it is not surprising that the inhabitants were not happy to see soldiers landed in Plymouth upon the return of the Ré Expedition in late 1627.

Sir James Bagg wrote to Buckingham from Plymouth shortly after the fleet returned from Ré in mid-November that the soldiers and sailors in the fleet were infecting one another and were “falling down” (dieing?) daily and therefore the Privy Council ordered that all the soldiers were to be brought ashore and were to be billeted in the county. Bagg estimated that about 1200 sick soldiers were ashore as well as 600 sick mariners. Sailors were still dieing of the sickness on board ship in considerable numbers in February and the soldiers had carried the sickness, which was no better than the plague, to all places where the local officials had sent them.

Similar reports came in to the Privy Council from Portsmouth and Hampshire, and Chatham. A report from Portsmouth well illustrated the reason that billeters were reluctant to house sick soldiers and feared the results. The mayor and aldermen had placed forty sick sailors in houses in the town. Most of the sailors recovered but most of the families that took them in fell sick and many died. Thus the presence of the army in southern England brought death in a very direct way to the inhabitants of those areas.

159 SP16/85/22, Sir James Bagg to Buckingham; 22 Nov 1627. See also SP16/85/24, Sir Francis Willoughby to Sec. Conway; 22 Nov 1627. SP16/85/40, Sir James Bagg to Buckingham; 25 Nov 1627. SP16/85/61, Sir James Bagg to Buckingham; 29 Nov 1627.

160 SP16/86/29, Commissioners of the Navy to Buckingham; 7 Dec 1627. APC Vol. 46, pg. 199, P.C. to Mayor of Portsmouth; 22 Dec 1627.

161 SP16/90/7, Mayor of Plymouth to Nicholas; 2 Jan 1627/28.
that billeted troops and it is easy to understand why the people feared the arrival of soldiers for this reason alone.

Another major concern of impressed soldiers and sailors was the effect their impressment had on the families they left behind, not only wives and children but also elderly parents and other relatives that depended upon them. One example is Hugh Davies, who left a wife and four children when London authorities pressed him even though he was a member of the Trained Band of his county.\textsuperscript{162} John Rowe of Warwick Town alleged that he had left his aged mother alone and she had no one to help her.\textsuperscript{163} Two brothers mentioned that they had left their eighty-year-old father with no one to look after him.\textsuperscript{164} The number of men with families among those pressed for the army and navy must have been a considerable portion of those pressed. The circumstances forced the families left behind on to the county poor relief system paid for with general rates levied on the county taxpayers, in accordance with the poor laws passed in Elizabeth’s reign, or they became beggars. Both possibilities are mentioned here and there in the sources. The City of Winchester, Hampshire, in a “Remonstrance” to the Privy Council in 1627, said that the crown had not repaid the city for coat and conduct money, impress money, ammunition for soldiers, guarding soldiers and billeting soldiers. Their market was decayed and many of the better sort had left town. Beyond all of this, the town had six hundred people on the alms roles and a “great part” of those were the families of men

\textsuperscript{162} SP16/4/160, Capt. Leigh’s Report, doc. pg. 7.

\textsuperscript{163} SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 22, statement of John Rowe of Warwick Town.

\textsuperscript{164} SP16/4/160, doc. pg. 34, statement of Richard Daniel of Ludlow.
pressed in the city.\footnote{SP16/88/56, A remonstrance of those things wherein the inhabitants of Winchester conceive themselves to have been overcharged in the billeting of soldiers; undated 1627.} Thus, the costs of supporting these families became a financial burden to many of the counties. This burden was spread more equitably throughout England than were the costs of billeting, since the royal government pressed men from all the shires at one time or another. However, as the greatest part of the population lived in the southern and eastern counties, the government pressed more men from them than from northern and western counties, creating a larger burden on the southern counties, although roughly in proportion to their populations. Then too, when more men were needed to replace sick men and deserters, they were usually pressed in southern counties nearest the rendezvous area to save time and conduct money.

These family situations no doubt contributed to the desertion rate and, I suspect, may have been a more important factor in desertion than the personal character of the felons and alehouse habitués usually identified as likely deserters. This must have been an important factor, particularly in the last two years of the war after many of the ner-do-wells had already gone off to the army, and the deputy lieutenants were warning that there were few men left to press without damage to the county community.

There is one more problem that soldiers and their families experience in all wars, and which occurred in the 1620s, no doubt more frequently than is mentioned in the sources. In November 1628, Susan Court of Kent petitioned King Charles for pardon from a sentence of death for bigamy.\footnote{SP16/120/49, Petition of Susan Court; 13 Nov 1628.} Her first husband, Robert Court, served in the Isle of Ré Expedition and was reported dead. Susan Court remarried, but then Robert
Court returned after the government paid off the army. The Mayor and Aldermen of Canterbury enclosed a certificate attesting to the truth of the facts. The king pardoned Susan Court according to a note at the foot of the manuscript.

5. Conclusion

Soldiers created similar problems wherever the royal government billeted them. What is perhaps most interesting is that reports in the early years, 1624, 1625 and 1626, more often mention the poor conditions in which the soldiers lived – lack of clothes, sickness, difficulties in finding food and lodging. In the later years, 1627 and 1628, the reports that have survived more often tell of the depredations of soldiers, albeit often in attempts to secure food and shelter or the money with which to pay for food and lodging. The mention of “law” and actions contrary to the law are more common in the later years as well. Many of the incidents mentioned in this Chapter occurred in counties such as Surrey, Northampton, Gloucester, Hertford and Bucks, that saw little or no billeting of soldiers in them before 1627 and 1628. These counties seem to have been more interested in the “legalities” of the incidents and less concerned about the conditions of the soldiers, although, of course, the people of these counties were also very unhappy about the costs of billeting soldiers.

By early 1628, the people of the towns and counties of southern England certainly did not want to pay for billeting the king’s soldiers any longer. They were short of cash and billeting expenses had become too large a portion of their incomes. The costs certainly overburdened some of the poorer sort and many of the better off avoided billeting or fled to other places not subject to billeting. Because of economic problems,
as well as the insolence and misdemeanors of soldiers, increasing numbers of people refused to billet soldiers or to pay for billeting as time went on. Refusal seems to have become more common after the return of the men of the Ré Expedition and continued to increase throughout the first half of 1628. In some areas, such as around Banbury and in parts of Essex, refusal to billet soldiers was well nigh universal. Actions of the local billetters in throwing soldiers out of their homes and the lack of cash pay from the royal government must have caused the plight of the affected soldiers to become desperate, leading them to steal and commit other and worse crimes just to subsist. It also gave the local officials and army officers a stick with which to threaten the royal government – the threat of army mutinies, local rebellion and open, bloody conflict between local people and soldiers. Mutinies over pay were common on the continent and this may have given some force to the arguments. There were officers, and some common soldiers, in the army who had served on the continent and were familiar with such mutinies or at least with tales about them.

While fears of violence were widespread, actual mutinies, riots and large scale conflicts between the local people and soldiers seem to have been fewer than one might expect. There was a mild soldier’s mutiny in Devon in December 1625 that the county authorities easily quieted with promises of pay and another at Harwich in April 1627 that required force to quell. There are many reports of brawls and alehouse incidents, of crimes involving one or a few soldiers, such as a murder or robbery or rape, of sheep stealing and even goose theft, and of property destruction. However, after the return of the Ré Expedition and certainly in 1628, violence seems to have become more common.
An added dimension appeared in the affray at Witham in March of 1628, which led to gunfire and deaths. There were conflicts between Cosby’s Irish soldiers and the local people in other places in Essex, and in Norfolk, Kent and Hampshire, indicating that there was some ethnic and religious prejudice involved in these disputes. Mutinies of the crews of ships in the royal service are another matter, and sailors’ mutinies were more numerous than soldiers’ mutinies. The presence of army officers was usually sufficient to keep problems to a minimum, which is clear from the frequent reports of officers’ absence making it difficult to control the soldiers and the frequent Privy Council orders for all officers to return to their companies and ships to maintain order. The ferocity of punishment, with death as the usual result of mutiny or conspiracy to mutiny, was undoubtedly a deterrent. On the other hand, officers were sensitive to the ‘public relations’ aspect of such punishment as the case of the sailor Kerby illustrates. In the end, there was no major rebellion of soldiers or sailors that led to a major disruption of government or society or to major military defeats.

Such things did happen on the continent and perhaps the rulers of England, both high and low, were overly sensitive to the problem. It is then an open question whether the local officials were playing on the fears of the King and his Privy Council to advance their pleas for money or whether they were genuinely fearful of major disorders. All of these events were no doubt shocking to the people of England after twenty-five years of peace. It is my opinion that the civilians in England were genuinely fearful of the army and of having the army in their midst. They did not fear the King’s use of the army to suppress political opposition, as Russell has suggested, and I think it doubtful that the
royal army of 1627 or 1628 would have been effective in controlling England, though it might have been willing to arrest a few deputy lieutenants and Justices of the Peace. However, the people of England did fear the disease, death, crimes and the other vexations that came with the army.

Writs went out for the summoning of a new Parliament in the first few days of February 1627/28, and the Parliament assembled on 17 March 1627/28. With the debates of the Parliament of 1628 and the passage of the two Petitions, we will end of the story of billeting soldiers on the people of England in the 1620s.

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Chapter 9

The Parliament of 1628; the “Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers” and the “Petition of Right”

1. Introduction

The problems of the war years came to a climax of sorts in the Parliament of 1628, while the anger in England over billeting the army in private homes came to a peak during the Parliamentary session. One result was the preparation and passage in the House of Commons of two Petitions to the King: the Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers and the Petition of Right. Speaker Finch presented the first Petition to the King on 14 April, and Charles promised to examine it, but nothing more happened and historians have largely forgotten it. Commons, after much debate, sent the Petition of Right to the Lords on 9 May 1628. The two Houses debated changes for most of May and the Petition passed in the House of Lords as modified on 27 May. It was delivered to the King on 28 May and the King’s gave his assent to it on 1 June and so the Petition of Right became a statute and, over the years, one of the most important statements of the English subject’s rights. The King sent back a vague and unsatisfactory reply concerning his understanding of the Petition of Right and said he would not respond further, despite requests from both houses. This prompted some members of the Commons to propose a Remonstrance for presentation to the King, but Charles ended the Parliamentary session before it was completed. The Parliament granted the crown five subsidies during the session, Commons sending the final bill to the Lords on 16 June and both Houses sending

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1 The full text of the two Petitions may be found in Appendix D, Items 3 and 4.
it to the King a few days later. The Parliamentary session ended on 26 June and the

crown scheduled it to resume on 20 October, but a later Royal Proclamation rescheduled
it to 20 January 1628/29. The Session of 1629 was short and acrimonious and the king
soon prorogued Parliament. The King called no further Parliaments for ten years.²

   All of the twists and turns of the debate and maneuvering in the Parliament of
1628 on billeting and martial law are not described here, as they are documented
elsewhere.³ Nor will we pay the attention it deserves to the lengthy debates on the rights
and duties of the monarch and the rights and duties of his subjects. Some of the remarks
made in the Parliament of 1628 about the crimes of soldiers and the evils of billeting
were presented in the previous Chapter. The contents of the Petition Against Billeting of
Soldiers and the Petition of Right will be summarized and connections made to the
occurrences described in previous Chapters, connections demonstrating that the crown’s
billeting practices were closely connected to the intentions of the Members in preparing
the two Petitions. The Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers also neatly summarizes the
problems experienced in counties that billeted troops and some of the fears of the
gentlemen of England about further upheaval if the practice continued.

² General discussions of the issues taken up by the Parliament of 1628 may be found in previously noted
articles such as Boynton’s, “Martial Law and the Petition of Right”, English Historical Review, Vol. 79,
No. 311 (April 1964), pp. 255-284 and T. G. Barnes, “Deputies not Principles, Lieutenants not Captains:
the Institutional Failure of Lieutenancy in the 1620s” and Victor Stater, “War and the Structure of Politics:
Lieutenancy and the Campaign of 1628”; pg. 87-109, both in Mark Charles Fissel, ed., War and
Government in Britain, 1598-1650. Also in Paul Christianson, “Arguments on Billeting and Martial Law

³ The most recent source is Robert C. Johnson, Mary Frear Keeler, Maija Jansson Cole, William B.
Bidwell, et al. eds., Commons Debates 1628, 6 Vols. [The Yale Center for Parliamentary History; New
Haven CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1977]. The article by Christianson on “Arguments on Billeting and Martial Law
in the Parliament of 1628” contains a good summary of Parliamentary activities on these subjects.
Conrad Russell summarizes the legal and constitutional principles debated in Parliaments and English
Politics, pp. 347-358.
2. The Parliamentary Session

The parliament convened to hear the King’s Speech on 17 March 1627/28. The Parliament of 1628 spent much of the time it was in session discussing and debating grievances that resulted from the crown’s prosecution of war during the past four years. Members denounced land war on the continent as too expensive and belittled the government strategy in general, while condemning the competence of the King’s ministers, particularly the Duke of Buckingham. Commons argued over the application and misapplication of martial law and the legal foundation for Commissions for Martial Law for many days. The House called into question the powers of the Lords Lieutenant and the legal foundations of the office and it criticized the King’s use of the prerogative. It questioned the legality of his practice of imprisoning persons without trial or hearing. Commons warmly supported the inviolability of private property, which it connected to the crown’s financial demands without approval by Parliament. In connection with the inviolability of property, the House lambasted the practice of billeting soldiers in private homes against the wishes of the householder. Several members pointed out that there was no law requiring householders to billet soldiers and, therefore, refusal to billet soldiers was not an infraction of the law. The commons also debated the legality of pressing men for foreign service who refused to subscribe to the loan or to pay billeting

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4 A typical Commission for Martial Law and the instructions or “laws” associated with such a Commission is presented in App. D, Items 9A and 9B.

The greater part of the members of Commons had no doubt that they should tie supply to redress – the two were twins according to Sir Robert Phelips of Somerset. According to Conrad Russell, there was also a certain amount of alarm, and even fear, among the members of the Parliament in March of 1628. The Five Knights Case, which the courts heard in 1627, had recently been partially decided and, though the legal niceties held that the court had given no judgment on the King’s power to imprison subjects indefinitely based on his prerogative power, the knights continued in custody until January 1627/28. The five knights had refused to pay their assessment for the Forced Loan and had been imprisoned. They attempted to sue a *habeas corpus* plea in King’s Bench and thus test the legality of the Forced Loan in a court of law. The knights remained in custody pending a further hearing, at least until a royal order released all loan refusers on 2 January 1627/28, possibly in anticipation of the summoning of a new Parliament. The notorious Five Knights Case figured prominently in the debates over the first and fourth clauses of the Petition of Right.

Coupled with this was the fact that the King had at his disposal a royal army, which, though unpaid, mutinous, and probably unable to defeat a continental army, was

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sufficient to overawe a Justice of the Peace and perhaps the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{9}

Furthermore, the daily experiences of the members from counties and boroughs where soldiers were billeted surely must have indicated to them that public order and authority was threatened if the soldiers could not be controlled and prevented from committing outrages. Indeed, it must have seemed to many that the civilian Justices of the Peace at Quarter Sessions, such as Justice Fleetwood, did not control local government anymore.

To many contemporaries, the 1628 Parliament appeared to be a critical point in the history of the institution. Charles had ruled without it for the past eighteen months during a war, a time when traditionally he should have been meeting with his subjects more often. Perhaps there was a real danger that English parliaments would follow their continental counterparts into political oblivion. Neither the king nor the more militant members of parliament appeared willing to compromise and, for Charles, parliament was very much on probation.\textsuperscript{10} In his opening speech on 17 March, the King offered assurances of his intent to rule with Parliament, but warned that there was no time for lengthy proceedings. He said, “If you do neglect your duties herein I must then be forced, for the preservation of the public and that which by the folly of particular men may be destroyed, to take some other course”.\textsuperscript{11} As for Parliament, the attitude of many members was similarly unyielding. After three years of the Privy Council’s wartime


\textsuperscript{10} Richard Cust, \textit{Charles I, A Political Life}, pg. 70.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Commons Debates 1628}, Vol. 2, pg. 8.
expedients, they were set on re-establishing the rule of law, which to the members meant putting an end to forced loans, ending imprisonment without showing cause, curbing the prerogative powers of the lieutenancy and banning the compulsory billeting of soldiers. Moreover, they had unfinished business with Buckingham.\textsuperscript{12} As matters transpired, moderate members of the Privy Council tried to build bridges between the two sides. During the early weeks of the parliament, Sir John Coke, Sir Thomas Edmondes, and Sir Humphrey May were successful in building a bridge, though it did not stand for long. In the first major debate in the Commons, they forestalled an attack on Buckingham and persuaded the House to concentrate on other grievances. They encouraged the MPs with promises that the king would remedy their grievances until, on 4 April, they were able to reach agreement on a grant of five subsidies, worth at least £300,000. They also managed Charles rather successfully. The three carefully controlled the flow of information to him about happenings in Commons and dissuaded the King from making any more personal appearances. Instead, Secretary Coke, who was considerably more moderate in his choice of words than the king often was, usually drafted and delivered the King’s views in messages to the Parliament.\textsuperscript{13}

Unfortunately, during the next few weeks, prospects of a general settlement receded as Charles grew increasingly distrustful of the Commons. This happened largely because, as in 1626, the house held back the final passage of the subsidy bill until the King redressed their grievances. On most issues, the crown was apparently prepared to

\textsuperscript{12} Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, pp. 331-340.

concede. Secretary Coke “confessed to be unlawful” forced loans, compulsory billeting and the use of martial law against civilians.\textsuperscript{14} However, Charles insisted on maintaining the prerogative right to imprison without showing cause, which he regarded as an essential part of the royal prerogative. The result was deadlock. The Commons would not confirm its grant and Charles would not back down. The Lords tried to find a way out of the impasse by proposing to allow the king to imprison without showing cause only when reasons of state and the safety of the state required such action, though there seems to have been little discussion of what sorts of situations might endanger the safety of the state. Charles offered a personal assurance that he would not infringe the traditional liberties enshrined in Magna Carta. However, a definition of the nature of these liberties and the relation of the common law to martial law was subject to much debate, even among the common law lawyers.\textsuperscript{15} In the end, the Commons refused to compromise, and when this disagreement blocked the path to legislation in early May, they decided to submit a Petition of Right to the King. Charles’s response to these activities in the Parliament became less and less tolerant. He cast off the restraining influence of his Privy Councilors and demanded that the Commons confirm their grant of subsidies and cease attempts to limit imprisonment by royal prerogative. On 5 May, Lord Keeper Coventry warned on the King’s behalf “if you seek to bind the king by new and indeed impossible bonds you must be accountable to God and the country for the ill

\textsuperscript{14} Cust, \textit{Charles I, A Political Life}, pg. 72.

success of this meeting”. This sounded ominously like a rerun of the final stages of the Parliament of 1626, as the discussion turned to the need for “new counsels”, that is, demands for new ministers and new policies.\textsuperscript{16}

A declaration of Charles’ reasons for a contemplated dissolution of parliament, drafted by the attorney-general, Sir Robert Heath, provides an insight into Charles’s attitude at this stage of the debate. It showed that prerogative taxation was still very much on the agenda. The original version of the document contained a promise not to repeat the forced loan, which was in line with assurances given by Privy Councilors in the Commons. However, there is a note alongside this, suggesting that the passage be omitted and, elsewhere, a warning that the king must now make whatever provision was necessary for the security of the realm. Even more significantly, the draft made it clear that Charles continued to be alarmed about the scope of the Commons’ actions. It described how “some of the members of the house, blinded with a popular applause, have, under the specious show of redeeming the liberty of the subject, endeavoured to destroy our just power of sovereignty”. The ‘popular conspiracy’ theory, which had caused such damage in the Parliaments of 1625 and 1626, clearly remained an influence on the king’s thinking.\textsuperscript{17} However, the government decided that the Parliament must continue. The reason for this was, once again, money. A new fleet, under the command of the Earl of Denbigh, had set out for Rochelle late in April. The attempt failed, and the fleet retreated to England in mid-May; but this did not remove the need for supply.

\textsuperscript{16} Richard Cust, “Charles I, the Privy Council and the Parliament of 1628”, pp. 36-38.

\textsuperscript{17} Richard Cust, “Charles I and a Draft Declaration for the 1628 Parliament”, in \textit{Historical Research}, Vol. 63, No. 151 (1990), pp. 143-161.
Charles interpreted the failure of the fleet as a personal disgrace and decided that the fleet must return to France as soon as possible. This was all but impossible unless the crown could find new sources of revenue. Thus, the royal government and the King had to keep Parliament in session until Parliament confirmed the subsidy bill.\textsuperscript{18}

The crown now wrote to the Lords, appealing to them to safeguard the prerogative, while councilors of all shades of opinion talked in its defense. However, Charles’ and Buckingham’s recent actions had alienated too many peers. So in late May, when the Commons rejected the Lords’ attempt to attach a saving clause to the Petition of Right, a majority of the peers opted to support the document in its original form.\textsuperscript{19}

Charles, however, was still reluctant to concede. He consulted the judges and drafted a series of possible answers to the Petition of Right and then, on 2 June, delivered what the Commons considered to be an unsatisfactory answer, a simple declaration that “right be done according to the laws of the realm”. As was often the case, if Charles had simply given way with good grace that would have ended the matter. Now, however, the Commons was sufficiently outraged that it immediately began to draw up a Remonstrance that condemned Buckingham again. The king once again faced the choice of either dissolving parliament and losing his money, or giving way. After a six-hour discussion in the Privy Council on 5 June, he decided to give way, and on 7 June, he consented to the Petition of Right in terms that gave it the force of law. Parliament

\textsuperscript{18} Cust, “Charles I, the Privy Council and the Parliament of 1628”, pp. 40-43.

finally passed the subsidy bill on 16 June, while the Privy Council had begun to spend the money even before the passage.\footnote{Cust, \textit{Charles I, a Political Life}, pg. 74.}

The cash value of the five subsidies Parliament granted to the King was considerably less than the King’s expressed needs. Each subsidy probably theoretically yielded £70,000 to £80,000 to the King and so five subsidies provided around £350,000.\footnote{Pauline Gregg, \textit{King Charles I} [Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1984], pg. 40.} In granting five subsidies, the landowners of England were committing their entire notional income for a year to the King.\footnote{A subsidy was a personal tax charged upon persons who possessed movable goods, such as merchants, at the rate of 2s. 8d., or 13.3\%, in the pound of value, and upon persons who possessed land at the rate of 4s., or 20\%, in the pound of its annual income; no one could be charged for both land and goods. \textit{O.E.D.}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} \textit{ed.}, s.v. “subsidy”\textsuperscript{.}} However, the yield from a subsidy had declined over the years due to the reduction in the assessed value of land by local officials, as pointed out in Andrew Mudd’s letter, discussed in Chapter 6, and by many historians.\footnote{Dietz, \textit{English Public Finance}, pp. 391-396 and Russell, \textit{Parliaments and English Politics}, pg. 49, among others. The purchasing power of money had also declined over the past fifty years due to the general inflation of the 1500s and early 1600s, and in 1625 was about half what it was in 1575. David Fischer, \textit{The Great Wave} [Oxford Univ. Press, 1996], pg. 70 ff.} The actual yield was approximately £275,000 after all collections were in, and some of that money was left in the counties to pay part of the arrears for billeting costs, coat and conduct money and similar expenses.\footnote{Dietz, \textit{English Public Finance}, pg. 246. Cust, \textit{The Forced Loan and English Politics}, pg. 92. Robert Ashton, \textit{The Crown and the Money Market} [Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1960], pp. 39-41.} Thus, the yield of cash into the treasury was nearer £200,000. King Charles acknowledged that this was the largest...
number of subsidies a Parliament had ever given a monarch, but said that it was less than the need.\textsuperscript{25}

The material resources needed for the war in 1628 had been presented to Parliament a week or so earlier and amounted to approximately £950,000, by my estimate, although the King declined to specify an amount. This amount exceeded not only the subsidies voted, but also the royal revenues from all sources. Secretary Coke presented the King’s “propositions” as a simple list.\textsuperscript{26} Notable by its absence from this list is any mention of money to pay arrears for billeting, coat and conduct money, and other military expenses the crown had promised to repay to the people and the counties and towns of England. From these estimates, it appears that King Charles was planning to borrow more money from his subjects to billet and maintain the army.

3. The Petitions

On the other front, that of redress of grievances, the House of Commons started work almost immediately. On the first day of business after the opening of Parliament and the King’s speech, members rose to speak on the evils of billeting, and summary imprisonment without trial, for, among other reasons, refusal to contribute to loans and beneficences to the king as well as for refusal to billet soldiers or to pay for billeting and other costs associated with the maintenance of the army and navy. Members also complained about royal financial exactions without approval by Parliament. Several spoke on the need for prompt action on voting subsidies for the King. Sir Robert Phelips

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\textsuperscript{25} Commons Debates 1628, Vol. 2, pp. 324, 325, 7 April 1628.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{26} See App. B, Table 2-B for the list of expenditures and my estimate of their magnitude.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{flushright}
denounced the King’s councilors as inept and to blame for the king’s misfortune and for leading the country into foreign military disasters. Many called for the House to present a petition of grievances to the king.\textsuperscript{27} On the second day of business, a committee was appointed to draw up a bill to regulate the powers of lord lieutenants and deputy lieutenants “concerning charging men with arms, raising of money, pressing of soldiers and all other like incidents …“ and debate started on whether supply or grievances should be addressed first by Commons.\textsuperscript{28} There can be no doubt that, from the beginning of the Parliament, the members were angry about the practices of the royal government associated with the maintenance of the army and navy and the prosecution of the wars. In this respect, the Parliament of 1628 was perhaps the most focused of all of Charles’ parliaments. The members were not interested in foreign affairs; they initially did not attack the Duke of Buckingham; they did not ask for the elimination of impositions; they did not even attack the Arminians in the Church of England; they just wanted the soldiers gone from their counties and their ancient liberties restored.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{a. Debates on Billeting}

Debate on billeting began on 22 March following the many complaints expressed in the first few days of the session. There had been a number of speeches against the evils of billeting in the first two weeks of the session and Commons had formed a

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Commons Debates 1628}, Vol. 2, see proceedings for 22 Mar 1628, pp. 53-75.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Commons Debates 1628}, Vol. 2, pp. 78 and 84; 24 Mar 1628. The Petition of Right received the royal assent before the Subsidy Bill was sent to the King.

committee to formulate proposals on the issue. On 8 April, members presented a draft petition on billeting to the Commons. Sir Nathaniel Rich, a godly gentleman of Essex and a cousin of the Earl of Warwick, first brought in the petition. Essex was a hotbed of resistance to the king’s policies throughout the war and, as we have seen, the locale of several nasty arguments with Crosby’s Irish soldiers. The House of Commons commenced full-scale debate on billeting and continued the discussion on the 9th and the 10th. Several of the specific complaints and descriptions of alleged offenses are described in earlier chapters of this study. The speeches of two other members also mention the fear and problems the people of their counties were experiencing. (The connection these two speakers make between billeting and the ability of taxpayers to pay subsidies to the king is notable, but not confined to these two.)

Sir Nathaniel Rich described the general situation in Essex caused by billeting soldiers.

“We shall not need to argue this point [billeting without consent]. I never heard it used in England till now. I know nothing of more danger. As it is new, so nothing hath more violent operations in men’s minds. It weakens the foundation of the fabric of this kingdom and disturbs the common peace, and since it hath fallen out I am not able to tell the ill consequences of it. Men are not able to travel on the way to go to church, or to go to markets, and many a £1,000 worth of land is turned into the hands of the landlords in Essex. They [the tenants]
choose rather to live in town here with bread and water than to expose themselves to soldiers. In Ireland the course of billeting soldiers there makes them so poor that it yields no treasure or strength which otherwise it might. If things go thus, what shall become of us? Let us have the like law here as is in Ireland, where to force a man to take horse or foot into their houses is treason by law.”

Sir John Eliot spoke of the terror the soldiers spread in Devon.

“Give me leave out of that obligation I have to that country for which I serve, which concerns my knowledge, to tell you that with us the soldiers are so many that they kept us in awe, and mastered us. I will from many evils instance in one: the disorders of soldiers are great. I speak not by way of complaint. Some soldiers took that boldness that they came to a gentleman’s house, and began to make spoil. He by fair speech entreated them. The soldiers desisted the goods, and pursued the person of the gentleman, who fled to his house. They still pursued and attempted to break it, and after to enter in at a window. They within were fain to shoot a pistol at them. In going off they [the soldiers] threatened to return with a greater power. The party, not being far from Plymouth, with a guard of his friends went thither and there the soldiers set upon him in the streets, and the gentleman was fain to house himself. Many soldiers came thither and threatened to fire the house. He sent a servant to the commissioners, who gave no succor. Thereupon he went to the Mayor, who went with him to the commissioners, and made his humble complaint, but had no relief. Nay, instead of relief, without disquisition of the fact the gentleman was committed to the Mayor and his servant to the jail. Little difference do I find between these and the old Roman soldiers. Can this people give supply that are not masters of themselves?”

To emphasize its distress over billeting, the House of Commons also called before it John Baber, the recorder of Wells in Somerset, who sat for the borough. Having accused him of signing a warrant to billet soldiers without the express written command of the deputy lieutenants, the House suspended Baber as an example to any other magistrate who might be so inclined. Baber protested that he had acted upon the request

35 Commons Debates 1628, Vol. 2, pg.252.

of his Mayor and several deputy lieutenants, but to no avail. The House assigned the same committee to draft the Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers, and also the responsibility for developing propositions on the Commissions for Martial Law and the use of martial law, indicating the close connection between the two issues in the minds of many of the members.

Many members also connected the Commissions for Soldiers and for Martial Law with the decay of good government in the counties and towns. Sir Robert Phelips remarked that

“The practical power of this [The Deputy Lieutenants and the Commissions] is more dangerous than anything else, and hath dangerously undermined the fabric of the government of England and it contains all our complaints, both propriety of goods and liberty of persons. This appears in sending warrants to raise money, to bind men over to the sessions, to bind them over to the lords. Billeting of soldiers toucheth us also, as we are commanded to have a garrison on us even in our houses. It is grown to that height that those that are in commission do not only execute their commissions, but also mean persons under that pretense send warrants to other constables to lay their rates on us. If this be so, what need is there of parliaments?”

The members were also upset that the Justices of the Peace were unable to try and to punish soldiers who violated the law, while they perceived the Martial Law Commissions to be too lenient in these matters.

Sir Edward Romney of Somerset remarked that the Deputy Lieutenants of Somerset first sent soldiers to alehouses and inns for billets but, due to the lack of money


from the crown, sent them to men’s homes, many of which the soldiers entered by force. Sir Thomas Grantham mentioned again that in Queen Elizabeth’s time, letters came from the queen to the sheriffs and justices ordering them to raise coat and conduct money and that the crown usually repaid the money.\textsuperscript{40} There were no such commissions needed in those days.

The Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers passed its second reading on the 10\textsuperscript{th} and on 14 April, Speaker Finch and a delegation from the Commons presented it to the King. The King promised to study it but pressed the Commons to proceed quickly in the matter of supply.\textsuperscript{41}

On 3 April, just seventeen days after the beginning of the Parliament, another committee on a second petition presented its work to the Commons for debate. The petition was to touch on “The Rights of Englishmen” and the Committee proposed four resolutions to the Commons.\textsuperscript{42} The House passed the first three without dissent and it agreed to the fourth but referred back to the committee. The first resolution was that “no free man ought to be committed, or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained by the command of the King, or the Privy Council, or any other, unless some cause of the commitment, detainer, or restraint be expressed, for which by law he ought to be committed, detained, or restrained”. The second resolution was that “the writ of habeas corpus may not be denied but ought to be granted to every man that is committed, or

\textsuperscript{40} Commons Debates, 1628, Vol. 2, pg. 255.

\textsuperscript{41} Christianson, “Arguments on Billeting and Martial Law in the Parliament of 1628”, pg. 549.

\textsuperscript{42} Commons Debates 1628, Vol. 2, pp. 276-288; 3 April 1628. These pages also describe the debate.
detained in prison, or otherwise restrained, though it be by the command of the King, the Privy Council, or any other”, if the detainee sought the writ. The third was that “if a free man be committed, or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained by the command of the King, the Privy Council, or any other, no cause of such commitment, detainer, or restraint being expressed for which by law he ought to be detained, or restrained, and the same be returned upon an habeas corpus granted for the said party, that then he ought to be delivered or bailed”. The fourth resolution was that the “undoubted right of every free man is that he hath a full and absolute property in his goods and estate, and that no tax, tallage, loan, benevolence, or other like charge ought to be commanded or levied by the King, or any of his ministers, without common assent by act of parliament”. In these resolutions, we can clearly see the beginnings of the Petition of Right. On the same day, the Commons also debated the question of whether the crown could press a man as a soldier for foreign service or only for service within the realm or only for service within his county, a point that the existing statutes left vague.

b. The Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers

The Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers, which Commons passed on 10 April, had eight main points, or complaints, concerning billeting and ended with a plea to the King to eliminate the practice for the welfare of the Kingdom. The first complaint was that Christian worship was hindered because the people in areas where soldiers were billeted did not dare to go to church for fear that the soldiers would “rifle” their houses while they were at the church. Petitions from Maldon, from Kent and from the town of
Canterbury mentioned this fear during early 1628. During the billeting debates in Commons in 1628, Sir Dudley Digges of Kent also mentioned that fear of the soldiers kept householders from attending church services.

Second, the good (or at least the customary) government of the counties and towns was impaired, neglected, and condemned. This complaint arose from the powers that the crown granted to the Commissions for Soldiers and for Martial Law and the deputy lieutenants. Phelips and Rodney made these points in the speeches discussed above. In addition, the time consuming efforts of the Justices of the Peace in keeping the soldiers under control and the considerable amounts of time that members of the county bench spent on the Commissions for Soldiers and on the Commissions for Martial Law and the multifarious tasks connected with the army and navy interfered with the customary administration of local government. There is evidence of this in Denzil Holles’ letter and in Justice Fleetwood’s letters to the Privy Council. The Commissioners in Devon and Cornwall mentioned this extra work in 1625 when asking forgiveness for a tardy response to a Privy Council inquiry. The Commissioners stated that “The length and difficulty of this service together with the variety of business daily occurring to us the Commissioners, we hope will excuse the length of time between the receipt of your Lordship’s [letter] and the return of this our Certificate”.

43 See Chap. 8 Sec. b. The petitions are in SP16/92/59; Feb 1627/28 and SP1698/28; Mar 1627/28 and SP16/101/29; 17 Apr 1628.

44 Commons Debates 1628, Vol. 2, pg. 361, 8 April 1628.

45 For Holles’ letter see Chap. 7, Sec. 2 above. For Fleetwood’s complaints, see Chap. 8, Sec. 2.

46 SP16/5/47, Commissioners at Plymouth to the P.C.; 15 Aug 1625.
As the third grievance, the Petition stated that soldiers resisted and endangered officers of justice, and we have seen much evidence of this in the sailor’s riot at Plymouth and the mutinies at Harwich and the behavior of the Irish troopers in Essex.

In the fourth, and following points, the Petition turned to economic matters. In the fourth point, the Petition claimed that the rents and revenues of the gentry were greatly reduced because farmers and farm workers were forced to move to safer places to protect themselves and their families from the soldier’s “insolencies” and that the wives and children of the yeomen were strongly encouraging them to flee. The Commons intent here was to emphasize that landowners assessed for subsidies could not pay the required amounts if the effects of billeting reduced their incomes. Fears of the soldier’s depredations were, according to Sir Nathaniel Rich, driving rent-paying tenant farmers from the land.\textsuperscript{47} In addition, the theft of livestock, particularly wool-bearing sheep in Kent in late 1624 and in Devon and Cornwall whenever soldiers were billeted in those counties reduced rural income. Thefts of other consumables certainly raised the costs of billeting to the rural community. Repeated demands of the government for money from the inhabitants of the county to billet the troops and for other expenses, such as coat and conduct money, were no doubt, also on their minds when they made this point.

The fifth point concerned the corruption of farm workers, who were essential to the economy of the county, by the soldiers’ bad example. The soldiers’ example encouraged them to seek the idle life, to quit their work and to live idly at other men’s charges rather than by their own labor. I believe that this item referred to men attempting

\textsuperscript{47} See Sir Nathaniel Rich’s speech in the previous section.
to get onto the county poor rates, and probably also referred to the numbers of volunteers who sought enlistment in army companies billeted in the district, thus reducing the labor pool and possibly raising the wages demanded by the rest of the laborers. One example of this is the idle men who joined Crosby’s Irish companies in Norwich.

Sixth, tradesmen and artisans were most discouraged because they had to use their time to preserve their families from violence and cruelty [by the soldiers]. The seventh point stated that markets were unattended and the roads were so dangerous that the people dared not travel them on their usual business. Of course, if the markets had few sellers and buyers, the tradesmen of the towns lost business and income. One example of this phenomenon was the effect that Crosby’s soldiers reportedly had on the markets in Norwich.

The eighth point addressed the crimes and misdemeanors of the soldiers directly. It stated that there were frequent “robberies, assaults, batteries, burglaries, rapes, rapines, murders, barbarous cruelties, and other most abominable vices and outrages are generally complained of from all parts where these companies have been and made their abode”. This last item also reiterated the complaint that the authorities questioned few of the perpetrators of these crimes and insolencies, and they punished fewer still according to the laws.

The Petition concludes with several interesting statements. First, the loss of income due to the problems described in the eight points will prevent the taxpayers from supplying the King’s financial needs. They can pay no tax if they have no money. Next, the Members of Commons were concerned that the “meaner sort of people”, who, being
exceedingly poor, were not easily ruled even in settled times except with the “constant administration of justice”, and in these times were likely to cast off the reins of government, and, joining with “disordered” soldiers”, were very likely to fall into mutiny and rebellion. The members feared that this would happen shortly if the government did not remove the soldiers. The reasons for this statement in the Petition and its meaning are not altogether clear. The members of Commons may have been worried about local riots and mutinies against themselves because of the anger of the “meaner sort” with the billeting of soldiers on them. On the other hand, the members may have intended this sentence to give the King something to consider. Charles had a well-known dislike of the “popular clamor”, by which he meant any hint of what we today call democracy and of rebellion against the royal prerogative.48

Next, the Petition observed that many of the companies of soldiers openly professed themselves “papists” and therefore the Members of the House of Commons suspected that they would join the enemy if there were an invasion by their fellow Catholics, especially as some of their officers are also papists. However, this statement can only have applied to Crosby’s and Bingley’s Irish regiments and only in late 1627 and early 1628. These regiments left for Ré from Waterford, Ireland and came to England for the first time in December 1627. The Commons, and England, were familiar with Crosby’s regiment and its activities because of the events in Essex and Norfolk discussed in Chapter 8. All other regiments formed from 1624 to 1627 were recruited or conscripted in England and were largely Protestant, though a few recusants were

probably pressed at times. The local governments enforced the anti-recusant laws, particularly the local governments in the south and east, which were strongly Calvinist. These local governments usually asked for more such laws as well as stricter enforcement.\footnote{There was a debate on the subject in all Parliaments of the 1620s and one started in 1628, but the matter was put off. \textit{Commons Debates 1628}, 24 Mar, pg. 85. Discussion of the topic is beyond the scope of this study. General studies on the subject include Patrick Collinson; \textit{The Elizabethan Puritan Movement} [Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; 1967] and Arthur Geoffrey (A.G.) Dickens; \textit{The English Reformation} [New York: Schocken Books; 1964].} The royal government kept a close watch on recusants and did not knowingly commission them as officers in the army. Finally, the Members of Commons predicted “imminent calamity and ruin both of church and commonwealth” if these soldiers were not removed from their homes.

The eight major complaints are a summary of the complaints and problems described in previous Chapters. All eight of the grievances refer to crimes and violence committed by the soldiers, with the first, third, sixth, seventh and eighth almost entirely based on soldiers’ crimes and violence. Four of the grievances refer to the harm the soldier’s actions are doing to the local economies: the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh. Surprisingly, The Petition makes no direct mention of the billeting expenses and the other costs that the crown had not reimbursed to the towns and counties. The Petition mentioned the legality of billeting directly only in the preamble as a violation of the ancient laws of England:

“…whereas by the fundamental laws of this your realm, every free man hath and of right ought to have a full and absolute propriety in his goods and estate, and that therefore placing of soldiers in the house of any such free man against his will is directly contrary to those laws under which we and our ancestors have been so long and so happily governed”.

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Arguably, the emphasis on soldier’s misbehavior in the Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers provides an incomplete view of the grievances, since it omits mention of the expense of billeting, though the Petition does mention some effects of that expense. However, the omission may indicate that, by 1628, the soldier’s behavior was a greater and more vexatious problem in the opinions of the Members of Commons.

The Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers did play on a well-known concern of Charles – popular rebellion against the royal prerogative. It is difficult to judge the depth of the Member’s fear of the “meaner sort” joining the soldiers in open rebellion. Was this a real fear or something intended to attract Charles attention? Were the gentry genuinely afraid of loosing their position in their counties and towns, afraid of a true social revolution? There had been no popular uprising in England since the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign, though there were fears at times of violence by “masterless men”, especially when economic conditions were poor as in the 1590s and at times in the 1620s and when many were out of work.

The final statement concerning ‘papist’ soldiers must refer to the Irish regiments in East Anglia and Kent. Given the long history of native Irish rebellions in Ireland, the fear is perhaps understandable. Essex, Kent and the southeast were also likely landing areas for an invasion from the Spanish Low Countries or France, but the specific mention of the “papist” soldiers in this Petition seems a striking indication of the strong religious prejudices of the era. In the end, The Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers became

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50 Richard Cust, *Charles I, a Political Life*, pp. 7-9, 21-25. Cust mentions this concern of Charles several times
entangled in the debates in Lords and Commons on the “Great Petition” and Parliament eventually decided to include an item in the Great Petition on the subject of billeting.

c. The Petition of Right

The debate on the Petition of Right continued throughout April and May within the Commons, in Lords and between the two Houses. A lengthy and detailed discussion of the debate and the significance of the Petition of Right over the centuries are beyond the scope of this study. However, the connection of much of the content of this important constitutional document to the billeting problems experienced in England from 1624 to 1628 is helpful in understanding it.

Much of the debate concerned the status of the common law in England and what the law meant and from what sources it came. Many of the Lords and the King’s Attorneys argued the case for the King’s prerogative, and the Commons members who spoke generally argued for strict limitations on the prerogative. The proposed limitations on the royal prerogative were radical in the sense that Charles and his councilors had probably not used the prerogative to confine subjects in any way that previous monarchs had not used. Charles no doubt viewed the Forced Loan as part of the solution to a state emergency, but imprisonment of men who refused to lend money to the King was a use of the prerogative not often seen in England.

On May 14, the Commons, sitting as a Committee of the Whole, voted in favor of the Petition of Right, deciding not to make changes requested by the King and sent it

51 Commons Debates 1628, Vol. 2, pp. 504 ff.; 17 April 1628.

again to the Lords. The two Houses argued on wording changes here and there, particularly on the royal prerogative, and then sent the Petition to the King, who gave his assent on 1 June. Responding to Parliament on his assent to the Petition of Right, Charles said, to paraphrase, that the King willed that right be done according the laws and customs of the land so that the subject may have no just cause of complaint contrary to their just rights and liberties; to the preservation whereof he holds himself in conscience as well as obliged as part of his just prerogative. Commons thought this reply to be short and not specific enough in describing changes in practice the King might make in the future. They were particularly concerned about the meaning of the last phrases on the prerogative, asking for a more informative response. However, the King answered that this was the only reply that Commons would receive.

The Petition of Right addressed four major points. First, that the crown shall force no subject to pay tax, gift, loan, benevolence or such like without common consent of Parliament, and none shall be called to make answer, or to give attendance [to the Privy Council] or to be confined or molested concerning the same or for refusal to do so. Second, that the soldiers and mariners billeted upon the people be removed and the people not be so burdened in the future. Third, that the King shall revoke and annul the commissions for martial law and that hereafter he shall issue no commissions of like nature. Fourth, that in the future, royal officers shall proceed only in accordance with the laws of the land - that is, no man shall be detained or imprisoned, except by due process of law and according to the laws of the land. Parliament of course intended the last point

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53 Commons Debates 1628, Vol. 4, pp. 52, 53; 1 Jun 1628.
to preclude indefinite detention of a subject by royal order and without charge and without access to the courts to try his case.

We can easily see in the four clauses of the Petition of Right that many of the origins of the Petition arose from billeting problems. To start with, Commons consciously and deliberately folded the main point of the Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers into the Petition of Right. The second clause of the Petition of Right deals directly with the subject. The third, on martial law, also has direct connections to billeting problems. For the royal government only issued Commissions for Martial Law, which were a legal innovation at the time, as an aid in controlling the soldiers when they were in billets in England. The Commissions applied only in areas where army billeting took place and only for periods of time when soldiers were in billets.

The first and fourth clauses had greater consequences in the distant future, but were, I think, prompted in part by the billeting problems. The first clause, which deals with taxation without approval of Parliament, specifically mentions gifts and loans and thus obviously applies to the Benevolence and the Forced Loan of 1626. However, many regarded the rates collected in the counties to pay for billeting and the money paid out by billetters and those assessed to pay for billeting, as a loan to the King. Constable Shooter called the money the billetters paid out just that in his dispute with Edward Dally over billeting a soldier in 1628.\(^\text{54}\) The royal government treated the lien on the revenues of the Tin Farm to reimburse Devon and Cornwall for billeting expenses just as a loan to the crown was. Arguably then, the first clause of the Petition of Right was intended to

\(^{54}\) SP16/102/80; April 1628. This document is discussed in Chapter 8. The term”loan” also appears in other documents on billeting.
include billeting expenses that were not paid back to the billeters or the counties. The paragraph numbered “II” in the Petition also mentions that “divers other charges have been laid and levied upon your people in several counties by lord lieutenants, deputy lieutenants, commissioners for musters, justices of peace and others, by command or direction from your Majesty, or your Privy Council, against the laws and free custom of the realm”. It is reasonable to conclude that billeting expenses were among the “divers other charges”.

The fourth clause concerning the right to due process of the law does not deal directly with billeting problems, but with the punishment of those who offended the King. The first and fourth clauses thus were part on the long running debate in England on the King’s prerogative and limits to that prerogative. Those offenses included the refusal to pay subsidies that Parliament had approved or refusal to subscribe to the Forced Loan. In addition, the Privy Council called many who refused to billet soldiers or to pay the rates levied in a county to pay for billeting to appear before it. These refusers usually spent time in one of the London prisons without a trial for their refusal. Thus, the King’s effort to have the localities pay for billeting his soldiers prompted, in part, both the first and fourth clauses of the Petition.

A high level of activity continued in the House of Commons in the next few weeks. Commons sent the supply bill to Lords on 16 June and Lords sent it to the King on 19 June 1628. The Commons sought to obtain more commitments from the King on changes in government practice now outlawed in the Petition of Right. The Commons started to prepare a Remonstrance condemning Buckingham and others among the King’s
ministers and servants. However, it all came to naught when the King ended the
Parliamentary session on 26 June 1628, albeit with a promise to convene another session
in October, which the members planned to use to seek further redress of grievances.

4. Conclusion

The Parliament of 1628 was an inharmonious meeting, as were all Parliamentary
sessions in Charles’ reign. In 1628, the issues that concerned the Parliament, and
particularly the House of Commons, almost all revolved around the prosecution of the
wars and the maintenance of an army on English soil. The Parliaments of the 1620s
objected to the king’s attempts to raise money by extra-parliamentary means such as
privy seal loans and ‘benevolences’ or gifts. The use of the prerogative to enforce the
King’s will without benefit of the protections of the Common Law outraged the
Parliament of 1628. Finally, the House of Commons, afraid of the precedent and
frustrated with light or no punishment for soldiers who committed crimes, objected to the
use of new methods of criminal prosecution through military law in England. They
objected to billeting troops of any sort in private homes against the wishes of the
householder and without financial compensation. The Commons objected vociferously
to extraordinary ‘taxes’ or loans taken from the towns and counties to maintain the army
and this, in part, prompted the King to seek broader loans from its subjects when
Parliament would not provide the necessary revenues. Even when the Parliament did
approve an unusually large amount, as in 1628, it was not sufficient to cover the King’s
proposed expenditures, as we have seen. No government of the time was able to secure
the level of revenues necessary to support the early modern European methods of
warfare, at least not for more than a year or two at a time. England seems to have had a particularly hard time raising war funds in the 1620s due to the beliefs and personality of King Charles and the survival of that peculiar medieval institution, the English Parliament.

Another striking thing about the Parliament of 1628 was its focus on the rights of the subject. The House of Commons started debate and formed committees to prepare the two Petitions, which are the main subject of this Chapter, immediately after the opening of Parliament. The Commons established the outlines of the Petition of Right by 28 March, and probably a few days earlier.\footnote{Darmaid MacCulloch, ed., \textit{Letters from Redgrave Hall – The Bacon Family 1340-1744}, pg. 121, No. 197, Christopher Vernon to Sir Edmond Bacon; 28 Mar 1628.} This alacrity suggests that some members had organized themselves to present these grievances before the session even opened, though it is not apparent which men may have prepared the way. The primary sources consulted do not give the effective leaders of the committees, but their names may provide some answers. Certainly, many of the men who sought to impeach Buckingham in 1626 returned in 1628 and they certainly knew each other. However, the prompt beginning of work is quite apparent in the Parliamentary records. If nothing else, this apparent preparation indicates the widespread disapproval of the royal government by the men in the counties and towns who selected the members of Parliament.

No attempt was made in the Parliament of 1628 to place billeting on a sound legal footing by proposing a statute on billeting. The Members could have proposed such a statute, but they seem only to have wanted an end to it, only that the “people may not be so burdened in time to come”. Of course, the Petition of Right did not end the practice,
and it appeared again during the Civil War and the Protectorate and in the reign of Charles II. The King and the Privy Council could have proposed such a law as a tactical move, hoping it might lead to a negotiated agreement, but the King’s responses to the Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers and to the Petition of Right were not offers to negotiate. The oft repeated position of the county governors that there was no law concerning billeting and, therefore, those who refused to billet soldiers could not be punished for breaking a law which did not exist, threw the problem back into the lap of the Privy Council. This may have been exactly where the members of the House of Commons and the members of the Commissions for Soldiers wanted it to be located. For by calling on the Council to enforce its own orders, they themselves avoided accusing their neighbors of breaking the law, and could excuse themselves for sending county men to London to answer before the Privy Council.

The Parliament of 1628 was but one step on a long road with many turning points from the Parliaments of the Angevin Kings of the 1200s to Parliament’s assumption of power in the 1700s, but, as the creator of the Petition of Right, it was an important one.
Conclusion

The methods used in warfare and the methods that governments used to provide the resources to wage war changed considerably during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, leading to still other changes that affected broad sections of society. The changes in the methods of waging war included larger, more expensive armies and weapons, and more expensive fortifications that required longer sieges to capture. Some of the changes developed to keep larger armies in the field for longer times brought war closer to more people than had been the case in medieval times. One of these changes was the growth of the practice of billeting soldiers in private quarters, a practice which placed an onerous burden on the populations of many areas in Europe as the practice spread. Medieval armies billeted troops on the people of the towns and countryside, but by the 1600s, such billeting was more common and lasted for longer periods as armies grew larger and campaigns grew longer. The effects of this practice in England during the 1620s have been the subject of this study.

There can be no doubt that the people of England were upset with the effects on them of England’s participation in the early years of the Thirty Years’ War, particularly with the effects of billeting soldiers in private quarters. The two Petitions passed in Commons in 1628 demonstrate this, to say nothing of the acrimony in the Parliaments of 1625 and 1626. This study has presented several of the direct causes of this upset, which included the cost of billeting the army in England, the crimes and violence that the soldiers committed while in England, as well as the general ill behavior of the soldiers. The King’s, the Privy Council’s and the lords lieutenant’s violations of the customary
“rights of an Englishman”, at least as their actions were seen in the counties and towns, and the use of the Commissions for Martial Law and Commissions for Soldiers in novel ways provided further points of disagreement. The arrival of epidemics with the soldiers and the problems the soldiers and their families experienced increased the fear and anger over billeting in England.

1. Money

At the outset of this study, it appeared to me that most of the anger with the royal government’s practice of billeting active duty soldiers in private premises revolved around the inability of the royal government to reimburse billeters for the money that they paid out of pocket for feeding and housing the soldiers. Other problems, such as soldier’s violence, evolved from the crown’s inability to repay the billeters and to provide clothing for the soldiers. This in turn led inhabitants in areas where the government billeted soldiers to fear the nasty behavior and the crime that the members of the army and navy generated, as well as the epidemics that came with them. The majority of the letters, orders and other communications during the period between the local authorities and the government in London on the subject of billeting deal, at least in part, with the lack of money from the London government to repay billeters and those assessed to pay local billeting expenses, and to procure clothing for the soldiers and sailors. However, this concentration is at least partially because a large portion of the surviving documents which were examined are communications back and forth between local officials and the central government in London. Given the relative simplicity of the central administration in all European countries in the early modern era as well as the slow pace
of communications, governments necessarily placed more reliance on the dispersed, local administrators, who were on the scene, to conduct the central government’s business. The decentralization and resulting dependency of the royal government on local officials to conduct its business may have been more pronounced in England than in the territories of the continental powers such as Spain and France, but ‘ways and means’ must have been the topic of a high proportion of government communications in all countries in this era. Moreover, all of this took place in time of war, which has been a voracious consumer of resources in all ages.

Among the billeters there was anger, first because they were being required to loan the King money, which, as time went on, he seemed less and less likely ever to repay. Indeed, as we have seen, local governments were seeking billeting arrears from the crown well into the 1630s. The outlays for billeting brought hardship on the poorer billeters and their families, using up large portions of their income for long periods, making life more difficult than usual for them. The better off generally escaped billeting ordinary soldiers in their homes, but they did billet officers. However, the repeated assessments for billeting expenses in their counties and towns, coupled with assessments of rates for other war expenses such as coat and conduct money, militia maintenance expenses, maintenance and manning of coastal watch towers, policing soldiers, putting down riots and mutinies and other extraordinary expenses of war were an unusual, unexpected and heavy burden for most. The southern coastal counties from Cornwall to Essex bore the greater part of the costs and the vexations and crimes that came with the soldiers billeted with them. The southern counties resented this concentration of burdens.
and the leaders of these counties, with some justification, felt that the royal government was taxing their counties twice over while other counties got off with paying only toward subsidies and loans. The importance of money is also apparent in the comments of the Commissioners for Soldiers and Sir William St. Leger concerning the continued billeting of soldiers in Devon and Cornwall in 1626. The county gentlemen seemed willing to have the soldiers billeted in Devon when they saw the prospect of money coming into the county from London. The people of Devon looked upon billeting money, clothing contracts, and charters for locally owned ships with favor. A Deputy Lieutenant on the Isle of Wight remarked that when the soldiers first came and the King reimbursed their billeting expenses, all was well and that the Island would have been happy to entertain the soldiers longer under those conditions.

Another factor, which was connected to the war’s cost and contributed to the increasing unpopularity of the war, was county gentry’s general dislike of the war strategy that King Charles and his advisors pursued. They thought that if the king pursued another strategy, the war would pay for itself and they would not have to pay subsidies. Many historians have discussed this subject over the centuries and, perhaps overly simplified, it comes to this: the gentry and nobility of England were not adverse to assisting the Protestant states in the Thirty Years’ War, or even to war with the Catholic powers. However, they wanted that war to follow what came to be called in another century the “blue water strategy”. They did not want a costly land war on the continent involving sizable armies, which were very expensive. The political classes wanted a war which involved naval actions, privateering under letters of marque and outright piracy.
aimed at depriving Spain and France of financial resources by interrupting their trade, capturing or sinking their merchant marine and perhaps even capturing a silver feet or two on its way back to Spain from the Americas.¹ Many of the county leaders thought that this sort of war would not only pay for itself, but might even generate a good profit for the crown and the privateers. During the Parliament of 1626, Sir Dudley Digges of Kent, an opponent of the war and the Duke of Buckingham, proposed the establishment of a Parliamentary chartered, privately financed company modeled on the Dutch West India Company to pursue the naval war with Spain. This method of warfare would have obviated the need for subsidies to fight Spain and would have reduced Buckingham’s control of the war.² If the King had followed the “blue water strategy” and if it had been successful, the question of billeting soldiers in private homes in England would not have become a matter of such great discontent. However, the failure of all of the English government’s attempts to pursue the recovery of the Palatinate for Elector Frederick, to wage a war with Spain and then one with France certainly created an anti-war opinion in the Parliaments of 1626 and 1628 and led to Charles’ financial straits. There was no sense, said many in the Parliamentary debates, in throwing good money after bad.

Taxes and money are contentious topics in all times and places, and the resources taken and used by the government to pursue war particularly so. However, the upset in England over the war during the 1620s was greater than any since the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign, so perhaps further consideration is warranted.


2. The Soldiers’ Problems

An additional link in the chain of discontents was the condition of the soldiers, who often were in a difficult situation. The government forced them against their will into the army, and they left behind families who could survive only with county poor relief or by begging. Once in the army, the soldiers often found it difficult to obtain food, lodging and clothing or any aid when they were sick. Moreover, the cause of their privations often appeared to be the refusal of people to obey the King’s and the Privy Council’s commands to provide quarters and food, and they were frequently encouraged by their officers in this opinion. There should be little wonder that the soldiers were sometimes angry with the billetters. On the other hand, there was also considerable sympathy on the part of the common people for the men pressed into the army, as in Essex and Suffolk for the men who mutinied at Harwich in 1627. The local people harbored deserters and helped them to escape.

The bribery, cheating and outright thievery of deputy lieutenants, commissioners for soldiers, justices of the peace, high and petty constables and town officials added to the distress and unhappiness. Bribery to free men from the press was only the most visible of these offences. Thefts like those of John Rowe of Tavistock, who received funds to repay billetters and paid out less than he received, and less than was due to billetters, surely happened in counties other than Devon. These frauds made billeting even harder on the lesser and middling sorts of billetters. Hiring out soldiers billeted in Devon to help with the harvest and keeping the money owed the soldiers was another
theft recorded against Rowe and was directly injurious to the soldiers, who could not buy the clothes for which they had hoped and worked.

Army officers and others accused the local officials of billeting soldiers with the poorer households rather than the better off, possibly as favors to friends and neighbors who might be able to return the favor. Reductions in the assessments on which subsidy payments and other county rates were based and which led to less wealthy men being added to the subsidy rolls, was obviously a sore point with Mr. Mudd of Devon. However, this had been going on for some years and we cannot attribute it entirely to the war, though the war expenses may have abetted the trend. The peculations of conductors in withholding some of the conduct money owed to soldiers surely did not help the soldiers and was common according to the sources. Soldiers, officers and local officials brought accusations against many conductors to the attention of the Privy Council. The Council’s response was almost invariably to order the Justices of the Peace of the county to conduct an investigation, and the Justices almost invariably found that they could not substantiate the accusations. How widespread these misappropriations were is a matter of speculation, but considering the frequent reports of bribery to avoid the press, local officials and conductors in other counties must have been doing the same.

Clothing, or lack of it, was a constant problem for the soldiers. The many references to the poor clothing of the soldiers and sailors mentioned in this study highlight one of the more uncomfortable problems of soldiers: they returned from expeditions just in time for winter weather and wearing their one set of clothes that were

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3 See Chap. 6, Sec. 2.
in tatters, vermin ridden and suitable for milder weather. If the royal government or the
Commission for Soldiers could not provide the soldiers and sailors with new and warmer
clothes, they suffered all winter and their chances of staying warm were slim, with only
kitchen fireplaces using wood or coal to keep the dwelling place warm. Several of the
documents mention soldiers staying in bed under cover all day just to keep warm. The
vermin and the cold must have contributed to the spread of disease and to an increase in
the seriousness of the effects of disease. Most of the residents of the towns which
billeted soldiers were likely better clothed for the winter weather than the vast majority of
the soldiers they billeted.

3. Billetes Grievances

Other grievances followed from the royal government’s lack of financial
resources in a chain reaction, a downward spiral. The behavior of the soldiers quickly
became an important grievance and over time became a larger and larger consideration.
The soldiers’ crimes became as frightening, or more frightening, to the inhabitants of the
counties that billeted troops than the financial strain, and displaced money to some extent
as the focus of grievance. We can see the connection of some of the crime, vandalism
and intimidation to the lack of lodging and food from the very beginning, during the
preparations in Kent for the Mansfeld Expedition in late 1624 and early 1625. The
complaints of house breaking, the burning of fence rails and posts, boards and small boats
were due to the desire of the soldiers to keep warm in the December and January weather.
Hungry soldiers in Kent seized victuals from carts before the provisions got to Dover. At
other times and places poultry, cattle and sheep were stolen and slaughtered and the
King’s deer were poached, all of which sound like attempts to get food, or at least better and more wholesome food. The behavior of soldiers in the homes of billetters could be quite unsettling as events in Maldon demonstrate. The Irish soldiers were perhaps an extreme case, but other, more general complaints that the soldiers treated the billetters and their households like servants came from the Plymouth area, from Wight, from Norwich and from other places, demonstrating that such behavior was not confined to the Irish.

Whether the frequently reported thievery of goods and valuables was simple theft and burglary for money or out of necessity to get money to buy food and beer is uncertain. Both motives are likely, the first in some cases, the second in others. Other incidents, such as the Gloucestershire recruit’s desire to march through Exeter rather than go around the town lacked any explanation, but certainly caused the people of Exeter to fear for their lives and property.

More serious were the riots, mutinies and group violence of soldiers and sailors, which occurred from time to time. While these sorts of incidents were not as frequent in England as in the Army of Flanders or in the many armies in Germany during the Thirty Years’ War, they drew considerable attention from the royal government and were serious for the local governments that had to suppress them. The incidents that occurred in England were also not as difficult to control as many mutinies on the continent were. Town watches, the trained bands or, occasionally, a company or two from the army put them down with force in a few hours or days. In some cases, as with the incipient soldiers’ mutiny in Devon in April 1626 and the sailors’ mutiny and march on London from Portsmouth in July 1626, Commissioners on the scene checked the mutinies with
threats and promises. These two events occurred early in the war period, and later incidents, such as the soldier’s mutinies at Harwich, which occurred in April 1627, and the riot at Witham, and the sailor’s mutiny at Plymouth, which both occurred in the first half of 1628, were not violence free. There is, then, some evidence that the soldiers, sailors and billetters were becoming angrier, or more desperate, as the war grew longer and, among the newly impressed soldiers and sailors, as information on the conditions under which the men served became more widespread.

The increasing opposition among both soldiers and billetters is also indicative of the opinions and attitudes of the vast majority of ordinary people in England. These people were the ones pressed into the army and navy and the ones forced to provide food and lodging for the soldiers. The men pressed as soldiers were, in a sense, rebelling against their superiors by deserting and common folk of at least several counties who hid them from the authorities assisted them in this rebellion. Local officials captured, indicted, and imprisoned deserters. The deserters remained as prisoners for several law terms, and then disappear from the records, suggesting that local officialdom admitted them back into productive labor as soon as they could do so discreetly. The people in counties which billeted soldiers were fearful and angry because the authorities, army and navy officers and even the Commissions for Martial Law, did not prevent and, according to many reports, did not even adequately punish soldiers who committed felonies and mistreated billetters. The ordinary people who billeted most of the soldiers were throwing the soldiers out of their homes and refusing to billet soldiers when the Commission or

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deputy lieutenants placed new demands upon them. The cost was certainly one reason, but the behavior of the soldiers was another. No one likes to be treated “like a slave” in his own home. The billetters too were rebelling against the burdens placed upon them. Nonetheless, there are no reports or indications of any sort of an armed rebellion against the crown or the county gentry during the 1620s, though the gentry expressed such fears when dealing with billeting in their counties and these fears were mentioned in the Petition Against Billeting Soldiers in 1628.

The complaints and reports coming from counties from Cornwall to Norfolk and from Hampshire to Northampton were very similar. Even their wording had similarities beyond the formulaic expressions of deference and loyalty to the King and Privy Council. This may have been because the situations were similar but it also raises the possibility that there was communication between the gentry of the shires, either informal or formal. There was opportunity to compare experiences at parliamentary sessions in 1624, 1625, 1626 and 1628. The increase in printed political material and newsworthy items increased the knowledge in the counties of international and national events as well as events in other counties. The gentry had friends and acquaintances in other parts of their own counties and in other counties and they maintained contacts with patrons, friends, lawyers and other informants in London, so there can be little doubt that some knowledge of events all over England was available in every county. Information on refusals to billet and to pay for billeting, together with the local authorities’ and the Privy Council’s

See, for an example, Ann Hughes, Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire: 1620-1660 [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987], pp. 40-41, 54, 87. Hughes provides a view of the gentry’s connections inside and outside the county.
inconsistent punishment of the offenses, were no doubt among the more popular topics of
discussion and communication. Opposition to billeting and the common hatred of
government billeting practices was certainly sufficiently widespread to quickly organize
an opposition in the Parliament of 1628 and to produce the Petition against Billeting of
Soldiers and the Petition of Right.

4. Local Government Conflict

Charles I’s participation in the Thirty Years’ War also revealed several fault lines
in local political life in some of the counties that billeted soldiers. Differences of opinion
within several of the counties were mentioned briefly in previous chapters. When friction
in a county developed, it often came about because the deputy lieutenants were involved
in local politics as members of the county gentry, as Justices of the Peace, or as members
of the Commission for Soldiers and the Commission for Martial Law. These men were,
at the same time, executors of Privy Council orders and other demands from the royal
government. As respected and influential members of the local community, they usually
provided leadership in one or more of their capacities in arriving at consensual solutions
to local political and practical problems. However, the lieutenancy’s effectiveness stood
upon consensus and mutual obligation and so, when deputy lieutenants took actions that
other members of the politically active group in the county thought objectionable, the
bases of the deputy lieutenant’s leadership broke down. We can see one way in which
the relation between the deputy lieutenants and other members of the county government

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broke down in the reluctance of the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex in December 1627 to
tell the Justices of the Peace about the imminent arrival of soldiers that the Privy Council
had ordered billeted in the county. Another example was the alleged refusal of the
Deputy Lieutenants of Norfolk to tell the mayor and aldermen of Norwich about the
arrival of five companies of Crosby’s regiment until the soldiers were a day’s march from
Norwich. The deputies’ subsequent flight from town apparently left all of the
arrangements for billeting the troops to the mayor and aldermen.

By late 1627, Hampshire Deputy Lieutenants did not regularly attend meetings of
the Commission for Soldiers, and thus prevented the Commission from transacting
business and this dereliction prompted the Privy Council to change the composition of a
quorum to any four commissioners. The Privy Council’s letter on the subject provides
no reasons for the poor attendance at Commission meetings, but perhaps some members
of the Commission, particularly deputy lieutenants, were disputing with one another
about where to billet soldiers. The Privy Council’s warning to the Commission in
Hampshire to billet soldiers, as the Council had ordered, in the Town of Odiham, which
was refusing to billet them, provides some support for this contention. Another
indication of conflict within a county during 1628 came in a petition from Kent, in which
the petitioners complained that the Commissioners refused to billet soldiers near their

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7 SP16/87/52, D.L.s of Essex to the P.C.; 27 Dec 1627. See Chap. 8, above.
8 SP16/96/46, Mayor of Norwich et al. to the P.C.; 19 March 1627/28. See Chap. 8.
9 Chap. 8 and APC Vol. 43, pg. 294, P.C. to Commissioners for Soldiers in Hampshire; 13 Feb 1627/28.
10 Chap. 8 and SP16/103/64, Sec. Conway to the Commissioners for Soldiers in Hampshire; 11 May 1628.
own homes and so could not keep the soldiers in order and did not meet often enough to discipline them effectively.\textsuperscript{11} Local politics certainly affected the situation in Hampshire on occasion, as when several Deputy Lieutenants on the Isle of Wight accused Secretary Conway of billeting troops on Wight because the burgers of Newport refused to elect Conway's nominee to the Parliament of 1628.\textsuperscript{12} Eventually the deputy lieutenants and other commissioners grew tired of offending their friends, neighbors and associates when they found that it jeopardized their influence in the county.

In summary, the problems associated with billeting the army in England contributed to a breakdown of communications and understanding between the royal government and the local governors who were responsible for the execution of the policies and orders of the central government. However, billeting issues also caused, or added to, local divisions within the county, particularly between the lords lieutenant and their deputies and the Justices of the Peace, constables and town governments. The deputy lieutenants in particular often stood alone between local allegiances and the demands of a central government that often ignored their problems.\textsuperscript{13}

5. \textit{Other Questions}

This study has addressed or raised several questions, and we can now give answers, or partial answers. First, why were the problems associated with troop billeting

\textsuperscript{11} See Chap. 8 and SP16/98/99, Petition of the King’s Subjects inhabiting Kent near to Calais and Dunkirk; provisionally dated Mar 1627/28.

\textsuperscript{12} Chap. 8 and Boynton, “Billeting: the Example of the Isle of Wight”, pg. 37.

so intractable for the royal government, the local governments and the people of England? The answer lies, first, with the inability of King Charles and his government to raise the funds from Parliament necessary to provide the weapons, ships, soldiers and sailors and to maintain those physical and human resources that were necessary to achieve even the limited goals and objectives that the King set forth. As a result, much of the cost of the war that Charles pursued was forced directly onto the local people and governments in the counties and towns of southern England. The inhabitants and the county and town governments quickly became unwilling to bear these costs, and the arguments about these exactions led to a stalemate in the Parliamentary sessions of 1626 and 1628, and particularly to the two Petitions of 1628. The ruling elites in the counties and boroughs of England who made up the House of Commons never were able to come to an accommodation with the King, and all of the problems associated with the war became intractable because of these differences. The billeting of troops in people’s homes was an intractable problem because billeting expenses made up a sizable portion of these costs, although we must recognize that billeting expenses were only a part of the financial burden. This raises an additional question. The local money and the King’s money spent on billeting and other items went into someone’s purse. Local people were buying food locally for the soldiers, though some foodstuffs were probably brought in from neighboring counties due to scarcities in the market, and at an increased cost for transportation, but a good deal of the cash must have been retained locally. Recall that, in 1626, the Privy Council was amazed that so little cash was available in Devon and Cornwall since they had sent so much money there in 1625. Some of the crown’s money
went back to London in the form of subsidy payments and the Forced Loan, but some of
the money must have ended up in the purses of the large landowners and food merchants.
What portion people in the county retained in the county and what portion left the county
is unknown.

Second, why did the practice of billeting soldiers in private quarters cause such
anger in the 1620s while England grudgingly accepted the practice during the reigns of
Elizabeth I and Charles II? Part of the answer to this question lies in the hardships
caused by the lack of money to repay billeters. The reduction in income forced on the
poorer billeters worked considerable hardship on them. The expense did not drive
middle-income billeters into near starvation, but they were certainly outraged when they
laid out half their yearly income on billeting soldiers with no compensation, as reported
in the source documents.\(^\text{14}\) Another part of the answer lies in the insults, misbehavior and
violence to which the soldiers subjected the billeters and their communities. The
emotions of the civilians subject to these “outrages” were no different then than they are
today. At the risk of belaboring the point, gang violence and violent attacks on innocent
members of society elicit similar responses today. The light punishment, or no
punishment, which officers or the commissions often gave to the soldiers who committed
the “outrages”, compounded the problem in the communities where the crown billeted
soldiers. Justice was not seen to be done.

The coexistence of the army and the civilian population in Elizabeth’s reign did
not create the same level of anger, although there were problems with the soldiers from

\(^{14}\) SP16/103/78, D.L.s of the Isle of Wight to Sec. Conway; 12 May 1628. See Chap. 8.
time to time and, late in the reign, some fear of disorder by “masterless” men.15 There were several reasons for the lower level of discontent in Elizabeth’s time. By all reports, the crown paid billeting expenses and paid them fairly promptly. In addition, Charles I and his government billeted the army in England continuously for the better part of four years, while Elizabeth and her government billeted soldiers in England for shorter periods spread over more years. Elizabeth’s government billeted soldiers on householders for only relatively short times before boarding their ships and so, while there must have been some “outrages”, anger over them did not build for months and years on end. The ports on the west coast that commonly entertained pressed men bound for Ireland were an exception, but even in those places the level of violence and anger was less than in the 1620s, again, I think, because the recruits seldom stayed more than a few weeks. Finally, there was likely a greater sense of threat to the nation in Elizabeth’s time than in Charles’, thus making the general population of the southern counties more willing to accept the presence of troops.

Although not part of this study, conditions in Charles II’s reign were more like those in Elizabeth’s reign in crucial respects. The army command usually billeted soldiers in inns rather than homes, except for several occasions when the state increased the size of the army due to the immanence of war. In addition, the government often moved the soldiers not in garrisons from place to place throughout all of England to spread the burden. As in Elizabeth’s time, money was usually available to pay the soldiers and thus billetters generally received their compensation regularly. However,

15 Paul Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars*, pg. 187-188.  Also see Chap. 2.
billeting abuses did continue despite the Petition of Right of 1628, but after the passage of the Disbanding Act in 1679, these abuses largely ended.\textsuperscript{16} During the Civil War, both sides regularly used force to compel civilian compliance with demands for food and lodging; both sides often exacted “free quarter”, literally, at gunpoint.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore, comparisons between the 1640s and the 1620s, when England was domestically largely on a peacetime footing, do not have much validity.

Third, if we take the grievances of the Petition of Right as a guide to those royal actions that the people of England most hated during the 1620s, billeting was a grievance that partially underlay the grievances in the Petition not directly concerned with billeting. Therefore, can we find evidence that will demonstrate this connection? The circumstantial evidence, presented in Chapter 9, is relevant and compelling. The Petition’s clause asking for an end to billeting in private homes without the consent of the householder and the clause asking for and end to the Commissions for Martial Law are obviously connected to billeting problems. The clause petitioning for relief from taxation or benevolences or loans without the customary Parliamentary approval refers to billeting money as well as the more prominent Forced Loan and other exactions. The clause asking for the customary due process of the common law in cases of arrest for refusal to obey the King’s prerogative commands, which included orders to billet soldiers, does not specifically refer to billeting offenses. However, men were called before the Privy


Council and spent time in jail as a result of their refusal to billet soldiers or to pay for billeting.

Fourth, did the expenses forced onto the localities cause the near hysteria over billeting, rather than, or more than, any of the other issues raised in the Parliament of 1628 in the two Petitions? As this study has pointed out, the billeting costs and behavior of the soldiers were closely connected and so the two parts of the ‘either-or’ question were probably inseparable in English opinion of the 1620s. Judging from the eight problems and grievances mentioned in the Petition Against Billeting of Soldiers, the crimes and misdemeanors of the soldiers were the primary problems and the costs of billeting were a secondary problem, at least by 1628. The Petition of Right emphasized the right of an Englishman to refuse to loan or pay tax like exactions to the crown without the approval of Parliament and so we can argue that the Petition to which the King assented emphasized the “unlawful” monetary exactions of the crown. In truth, the people of England connected the two points closely in their minds.

Another question concerns the ‘bloody mindedness’ of the soldiers while they were in billets in England among their fellow citizens. Although England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a violent society by modern standards, many soldiers behaved differently in billet than they did at home. England was not a homogenous land in the seventeenth century and men from distant counties found themselves in strange territory with a different dialect when they gathered around Plymouth and Portsmouth. People called their county their ‘country’ (in the modern

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18 O.E.D., 2nd ed., s.v. “Bloody minded”: inclined to bloodshed; perverse, tiresome, cantankerous; stubbornly intransigent or obstructive.
sense) with some reason. We see many of the same behaviors today and it is not surprising that they existed four hundred years ago.\textsuperscript{19} The first is what I call the ”men at a convention” effect. A group of men at a business convention in a strange city will sometimes do things that they would not do at home. Coupled with and encouraging this behavior is the almost certain knowledge that friends and family at home will not learn of their behavior. A new and unfamiliar location can reduce inhibitions and alcohol enhances the inhibitory reduction. Preexisting antisocial personality traits often appear again in new and unfamiliar environments. Thus, criminals often become repeat offenders in a new and different environment. In addition, persons with latent or hidden deviate personalities sometimes first display these traits when placed in an unfamiliar situation. Finally, variable or irregular punishment for bad behavior (or reward for good behavior) engenders the attitude that the bad behavior will not bring punishment (or good behavior a reward) because the transgressor received no punishment the last few times. We certainly have seen many instances of, and complaints about, the irregular punishment of soldiers in this study.

The soldiers’ ill treatment of billetters also has analogues in recent psychological literature. Dr. Phillip Zimbardo’s well known experiment with college students playing the rolls of prisoners and prison guards is one example. Before the experiment was half over, Zimbardo terminated it because the students acting as ‘guards’ were becoming so

\textsuperscript{19} The following points come from a personal communication with Dr. Peter L. Stivers, a Ph.D. in Psychology and a practicing clinical psychologist with 20 years experience.
overbearing toward the ‘prisoners’ that he feared real harm would be done. The attitude of the army officers – ignoring actions that might normally bring punishment – also occurs many times in wars. Army commanders desire to keep the army together and working as a unit for a ‘higher purpose’: defending the country and winning the war. The behavior of General William T. Sherman’s troops, and Sherman’s reactions to their behavior, on the march through Georgia to the sea is an example from American History.

Another, similar, question is why so many men stayed with the colors. Desertion appears to have been relatively easy and there is some evidence from several localities that the inhabitants sympathized with runaway soldiers and hid them from the authorities. Other soldiers and sailors such as John Toner and Robert Kerby said they preferred death to further service in the army and navy. On the other hand, some were patriotic, for King and country, or had religious motives, wanting to fight for the Protestant cause and against the anti-Christ. The severity of punishment was certainly one reason for men to stay, but the army and navy officers often were willing to moderate the punishments or eliminate them altogether in the interests of keeping the troops happy, as Kerby’s case shows.

It is certain that the Parliament of 1628 granted the King five subsidies, the largest number of subsidies in the history of the kingdom, but that was less than the King needed to continue the war. By the fall of 1628, the King had decided to abandon the war, disband the army, and reduce the size of the navy. The assassination of the Duke of Buckingham, the King’s friend and chief advisor, must also have had an effect on this

\[20\] Phillip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect* [London: Rider, 2007]. This recent book reviews the 1971 “Stanford Prison Experiment”, and the author’s personal experiences as an expert witness for one of the Abu Ghraib prison guards.
decision, but the refusal of Parliament to provide enough money was, I think, the major
factor in the decision. The primary factors in Parliament’s decision were the fear of
economic and social upset and conflict in their counties and towns, as well as
unwillingness to contemplate future demands for money, the inequities of Commissions
for Martial Law and the continued billeting of soldiers in their homes.
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Appendix A

General Military Organization;

Organization and Location of the English Army-In-Being in the 1620s
### Table A1

**The Nominal Chain of Command in the Field, Late 1500s and Early 1600s**

(Information in this Table comes mainly from Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, Chap. 3, pp. 47-54.)

Positions in **bold face type** were added during Elizabeth’s reign.

**Lord General**

*High Marshal (sometimes called Lord Marshal)* – second in command to the Lord General; administration of justice, hears capital cases in courts martial, management of the camp; can command a regiment.

*Provost Marshal* – less serious breaches of discipline and executive side of discipline; and management functions in the camp. He imprisoned the convicted (not an easy job when the army was on the march) and hanged the condemned. He was therefore supposed to be well versed in military law. In his other capacity he acted as liaison officer with the victuallers supplying the forces, and was responsible for keeping the camp clean, which was very important at a time when it was almost impossible to stop an epidemic once it had started.

**Sergeant Major** (or Sergeant-General or Sergeant-Major-Major or Sergeant-Major-General) - starting in mid-1500s; his authority extended over the whole force. He had to be an experienced military man; instructed the company captains about the part their individual companies were to play; organized the march; commanded the army if the General and Marshal were absent. Can command a regiment.

*Corporals of the Field (4)* experienced military men; assisted the sergeant major on the march, one assigned by the sergeant major originally to assist each ‘ward’, and one spare.

**Lt. General of Infantry** – with a status just below that of the high marshal. Can command a regiment.

*Colonel of Regiment* – started ca. 1580 in England; 7 to 10 companies per regiment; by 1600 or a little later the regiment was a tactical unit. Also usually the captain of a company.

**Lt. Colonel** – assists the colonel and assumes command when he is absent. Also a captain of a company.

Regimental Sergeant Major - by the 1620s another of the captains was also designated regimental sergeant major.
Captain of Company (100 to 200 men)
Lieutenant or petty captain
Lesser officers – Ensign-bearer, or Ensign, two sergeants, two drummers, a preacher, a cannoneer, a surgeon, and about six corporals commanding 20 men per section. All were selected by the captain.

General of Horse (sometimes Master of Horse) - if there were cavalry units in the army, there was a General of the Horse, with status comparable to that of the Gen. of Infantry

Master of the Ordnance – Also Master of Ordnance in the Field; one of the most difficult and responsible jobs. Directed the artillery in battle. Managed all the ordnance stores, not only for the heavy guns, but also the stocks of calivers, muskets, and other weapons, and a wide range of ancillary equipment. He had to have the technical skill to train and direct the gunners, and this could be acquired only by experience.

Lesser Officers (or staff) – quarter-master (known as the harbinger, at the beginning of the reign), the trench-master (took orders from high marshal), the forage-master, the scout-master, the carriage-master, and the master of victuals.

Notes
The position of Sergeant Major and Colonel and Lt. Colonel were added to provide leadership and direction in battle, transmittal of orders, administration and so on between the General and the Captains as armies became larger, operations in open field battle became more complex, sieges became more complex, and the use of artillery etc. became part of warfare. It proved impossible for the General to directly command 100 Captains in an army of 10,000 or 20,000 men.

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Table A2

This Table number has not been used.
Table A3
Numbers of Soldiers Levied in Elizabeth I’s Reign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number Levied¹</th>
<th>Number Levied²</th>
<th>Additions³</th>
<th>Principal</th>
<th>Destination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1560</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scotland⁴</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1562</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Le Havre, France⁵</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1569-70</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic rebellion in north of England</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1572</td>
<td>3,000?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1585</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1586</td>
<td>4,870</td>
<td>4,870</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1587</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1588</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal (total for yr. is 15,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1589</td>
<td>4,850</td>
<td>4,950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590</td>
<td>4,250</td>
<td>4,250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591</td>
<td>8,425</td>
<td>8,425</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France and Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1592</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>2,520</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>3,025</td>
<td>3,025</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1594</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France and Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1595</td>
<td>1,806</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1596</td>
<td>8,940</td>
<td>11,237</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cadiz and Ireland (4940 for Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1597</td>
<td>8,835</td>
<td>9,285</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland and Azores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1598</td>
<td>9,164</td>
<td>9,564</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland and Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1599</td>
<td>5,250</td>
<td>2,760</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>4,885</td>
<td>7,833</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1601</td>
<td>12,620</td>
<td>9,790</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>4,035</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on next page

¹ For 1585 and after from Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, pg. 290. Large but unknown numbers of these levies were volunteers.


³ Additions from Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars*, pp. 244-249.

⁴ Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, pg. 209.

⁵ Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars*, pg. 64.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totals, 18 yrs.</td>
<td>105,810</td>
<td>Average = 5878 per year between 1585 and 1602, inclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, Trim + Hammer, 18 yrs</td>
<td>117,525</td>
<td>Average = 6529 per yr.; 1585-1602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total All Years</td>
<td>130,525</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 This Total is for Cruickshank’s numbers. No data is available for 1603.
Table A4

Men Levied from 1624 to 1628
(From APC Entries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and Expedition</th>
<th>Numbers Impressed</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1624</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Dutch service</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>Jun; volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansfeld Expedition</td>
<td>12,900</td>
<td>Dec.; greatest no. from the more populous south</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Ireland</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>from the north and Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal, 1624</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,200</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1625</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadiz Expedition</td>
<td>9,150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additions</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>to replace deserters, sick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,350</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Netherlands</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>These troops later came to Plymouth for the Cadiz Expedition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To replace deserters etc.</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>in August and September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal, 1625</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,970</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1627</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhé Expedition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2 new regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2 new regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>replacements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Subtotal)</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,900</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Denmark</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>in March and April; to Harwich, Hull and London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Denmark</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>in July 1627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal 1627, English</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,300</strong></td>
<td>(APC Vol. 42., pp. 381,382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Regiments (1627)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Crosby’s and Bingley’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scots Regiment (1627)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>The Earl of Moreton’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate for Seamen</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000 all years, 1624 to 1628; prob. low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total English</strong></td>
<td><strong>50,470</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total English, Irish, Scots</strong></td>
<td><strong>54,470</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A5
The Mansfeld Army

Table of Organization of The ‘Mansfeld’ Army \(^1\,2,5\)
30 November 1624
(\textit{APC} Vol. 39, pp. 384-386)
(Notes on next page.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Earl of Lincoln</th>
<th>Viscount Doncaster</th>
<th>Lord Cromwell</th>
<th>Sir Charles Rich</th>
<th>Sir Andrew Gray</th>
<th>Sir John Borough (^4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major</td>
<td>S. M. Bonython</td>
<td>Alex. Hamilton</td>
<td>S. M. Gibson</td>
<td>S. M. Killegrew</td>
<td>S. M. Coburne</td>
<td>S. M. Willoughby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 1(^7)</td>
<td>Lincoln’s own</td>
<td>Doncaster’s own</td>
<td>Cromwell’s own</td>
<td>Rich’s own</td>
<td>Gray’s own</td>
<td>Borough’s own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 2</td>
<td>Sir Edward Fleetwood</td>
<td>Archibald Douglas</td>
<td>Capt. Bassett</td>
<td>Sir Warham St. Leiger</td>
<td>David Murrey</td>
<td>William Lake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 3</td>
<td>Francis Wirley</td>
<td>Capt. Zouch</td>
<td>Henry Lane</td>
<td>Sir Walter Waller</td>
<td>Capt. Murray</td>
<td>Capt. Roberts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 4</td>
<td>Capt. Reynolds</td>
<td>John Douglas</td>
<td>Vincent Wright</td>
<td>Capt. Burton</td>
<td>Capt. Forbois</td>
<td>Capt. Webb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 5</td>
<td>Capt. Babington</td>
<td>Capt. Pell</td>
<td>Capt. Jenner</td>
<td>Francis Hamon</td>
<td>Capt. Carewe</td>
<td>Capt. Skipworth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 7</td>
<td>Capt. Barlee</td>
<td>George Kellwood</td>
<td>Richard Owseley</td>
<td>Capt. Goring</td>
<td>Capt. Williams</td>
<td>Capt. Gorge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 8</td>
<td>Capt. Crumwell</td>
<td>Andrew Heatlie</td>
<td>Capt. Crane</td>
<td>Capt. Fowler</td>
<td>Capt. Beaton</td>
<td>Capt. Mostian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location in late Dec 1624</td>
<td>Around Dover</td>
<td>Around Dover</td>
<td>Around Dover</td>
<td>Around Dover</td>
<td>Around Dover</td>
<td>Around Dover</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Check APC Vol. 40, pp. 384-386.
\(^2\) Check APC Vol. 39, pp. 384-386.
\(^3\) Refer to Table A5 for more details.
\(^4\) Name clarification needed.
\(^5\) Refer to notes for more details.
Table A5 Notes

1. It is not indicated in the *APC* that these regimental groupings are in fact regiments, but the list on pg. 384 of *APC* Vol. 39 looks like it is. Later entries authorizing the pressing of drummers confirm this; for example, Capt. Owseley is stated to be a Captain in Lord Cromwell’s regiment (Vol. 39, pg. 403). Vol. 39, pg. 394 indicates that all 12,900 are for Count Mansfeld’s command. This plus 3000 cavalry. An entry on Vol. 39, pg. 396 implies that Mansfeld will have six regiments which implies over 2000 men per regiment—This Table of Organization is confirmed by SP14/175/89. There are 6 regiments of 10 companies each. Each company typically has 200 or 250 men. The total number of men listed is 12,900. SP14/182/17, dated 19 January 1624/25, gives a ‘final’ muster before sailing and shows 11,651 fit and ready for duty.

2. Where two names are listed, I have omitted the military rank of ‘Captain’. Some first names have been gathered from other entries in the *APC*.

3. Based on later Tables of Organization, I have assumed that the Colonel, the Lt. Colonel and the Sergeant Major are also captains of one of the companies in the regiment. Thus there are 10 companies per regiment.

4. Col. Borough’s name is variously spelled in many volumes of the *APC* as Bourg, Burghe, Burroughs, Boroughs and other variants. Burough is the spelling generally used here. Note also that Dalton mentions a Ramsey as one of the colonels of two Scots regiments and either Lincoln or Doncaster as a colonel to be decided. See Dalton vol. 2, pp.74 ff.

5. Entries in the *APC*, Vol. 39, pg. 396; 9 Dec. 1624 and Vol. 39, pg. 398, 13 Dec 1624, state or imply that Mansfeld’s army is to have 6 regiments and 60 companies.

Table A6

The Cadiz Army

Table of Organization of The Cadiz Army
August 1625

Charles Dalton’s *Life And Times Of General Sir Edward Cecil* provides information on the organization and billeting of the Cadiz Army around Plymouth in 1625 that is at variance with the same information contained on the *APC*.\(^1\) The information in Dalton’s book on these subjects is largely taken from Glanville’s *Journal of the Voyage*.\(^2\) The organization of the army that sailed to Cadiz is given in the Table below and can be compared to similar information in the *APC*.\(^3\) I believe that the information from Dalton and Glanville is more accurate than the information from the *APC*. The information provided by Dalton and Glanville carries down to the level of ensign. The Table given here only takes the organization down to the captains of companies and omits the lieutenants and ensigns in the companies. The army is made up of ten regiments which have ten, eleven or twelve companies each. Interestingly, there are no Lt. Colonels designated, while the Lieutenants of companies are listed. Sir Thomas Thornhurst is listed as the Sergeant Major in the Duke of Buckingham’s Regiment and thus he may have been the acting colonel. On the other hand, he is second on the list of captains in this regiment. It is not clear, in Dalton or in the *APC*, whether the Master of Ordinance’s Regiment (Lord Valentia) was a regiment of foot only, artillery only, or a mixture. The lists of Captains contains many names that appear in 1626, 1627 and 1628 as officers in the army-in-being. And it is quite clear in Dalton that the commander of the Expedition is Sir Edward Cecil, who carries the title of Lord Marshall.

For the money needed for the Cadiz Expedition and other war expenses during 1625, see Appendix B, Table B2-A.


\(^2\) Glanville; *Journal of the Voyage*; published by the Camden Society, 1883. Glanville was designated Sir Edward Cecil’s secretary and went on the Cadiz Expedition, against his will according to Dalton.

\(^3\) *APC* Vol. 40, pp. 136,137.
### Table A6 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Duke of Buckingham</th>
<th>Sir Edward Cecil¹</th>
<th>Lord Valentia²</th>
<th>Earl Of Essex³</th>
<th>Sir William St. Leger⁴</th>
<th>Sir Charles Rich ²¹</th>
<th>Sir Edward (?) Conway</th>
<th>Edward Horwood</th>
<th>Sir John Burgh ⁵</th>
<th>Sir Henry Bruce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captains And Co.s</td>
<td>Sir John Preude⁹</td>
<td>Sir Geo. Blundell</td>
<td>Sir Henry Sprye¹²</td>
<td>Essex’ own</td>
<td>His own</td>
<td>Sir John Ratcliff ²²</td>
<td>His own</td>
<td>His own</td>
<td>His own</td>
<td>His own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains And Co.s</td>
<td>Thornix ^6</td>
<td>Fennethorp</td>
<td>Sir Tho. Yorke¹⁵</td>
<td>Gibson</td>
<td>Standishe²³</td>
<td>Willoughby²⁵</td>
<td>Sir Tho. Moreton</td>
<td>Sir Alex. Brett</td>
<td>Sir Henry Killigrew</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains And Co.s</td>
<td>Gifford</td>
<td>Hammond</td>
<td>Hacklett¹⁶</td>
<td>Fryer¹⁹</td>
<td>Stewart</td>
<td>Clapham</td>
<td>Watkins</td>
<td>Sir Ed. Hanley</td>
<td>Scott</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains And Co.s</td>
<td>Knolles Christmas</td>
<td>Bret¹³</td>
<td>Carleton</td>
<td>Courtenay²⁰</td>
<td>Grey</td>
<td>Pelham</td>
<td>Jackson</td>
<td>Bettes</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains And Co.s</td>
<td>Elpheston Crispe</td>
<td>Taylor</td>
<td>Tucke</td>
<td>Richards</td>
<td>Skelton</td>
<td>Rainsford²⁶</td>
<td>Abraham</td>
<td>Terrett</td>
<td>Cornewell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains And Co.s</td>
<td>Paddon Paprill</td>
<td>Fisher</td>
<td>Hone</td>
<td>Mathews</td>
<td>Leighton</td>
<td>Williams</td>
<td>Gibthrop</td>
<td>Hill</td>
<td>Gilpin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains And Co.s</td>
<td>Reynelles⁷ Bridges</td>
<td>Hackett</td>
<td>Shugborough¹⁷</td>
<td>Mostyn</td>
<td>Wailer</td>
<td>Alford</td>
<td>Heatley</td>
<td>Lindsey</td>
<td>Ashely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains And Co.s</td>
<td>Kirton Gore</td>
<td>Bruce</td>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>Reade</td>
<td>Corke</td>
<td>Goring</td>
<td>Dowglas (Douglas?)</td>
<td>Grove</td>
<td>Glynne</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains And Co.s</td>
<td>Coundrey⁸ Ed.</td>
<td>Porter</td>
<td>Crispe¹⁸</td>
<td>Bowles,senior</td>
<td>Staverton</td>
<td>Dixon</td>
<td>Seymour</td>
<td>Lindsey</td>
<td>Mewtus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains And Co.s</td>
<td>Preston Anthony</td>
<td>Tolarne</td>
<td>Bowles, junior</td>
<td>Bucke</td>
<td>St. Leger²⁵</td>
<td>Hammond</td>
<td>Masterson</td>
<td>Greenfeild²⁸</td>
<td>Norton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains And Co.s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leake</td>
<td>Moldisworth</td>
<td>Ogle²⁷</td>
<td>Morgan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Mid-1625</td>
<td>Devon¹⁴</td>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>Devon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table A6 Notes (continues on next page)**

1. Lord Marshall and General of the Army.
2. Master of the Ordinance.
3. Colonel General of Foot.
4. Sergeant Major of the Army.
5. Also spelled also spelled Bourg, or Borrough or Borrhoughs or Buroughs.
7. Probably also spelled Reynolds
8. Also spelled Cuntry.
9. Spelled Prode in the source. Probably the actual commander of Buckingham’s own company.
10. Served at Cadiz, Ré and Rochelle. Later a Colonel.
11. John Felton, who assassinated Buckingham, was the lieutenant in this company. Leigh also wrote the report discussed in Chap. 6.
12. Sprey (also spelled Spry) served in Cecil’s company in the Netherlands and later became a Colonel of Regiment.
   Spry is given as Lt. Col. in Jan 1626/27, Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1627-1628, pg 33, item 47.
13. Probably Sir Thomas Brett, unknown relationship to Sir Alexander Brett, later (1627) a Colonel of Regiment and Lt. Col to Burgh (Burroughs) in this Table.
14. The rendezvous was at Plymouth. Billets were in Devon and eastern Cornwall.
15. Killed at Ré.
17. Died of wounds at Ré.
19. Sir Thomas Fryer; served at Cadiz, Ré and Rochelle, later a Colonel of Regiment.
20. Captain William Courtenay; served in Cecil’s regiment in the Low Countries; Col. of Regiment at Ré.
21. Also spelled Rich; probably the Sir Charles Rich in the Mansfeld Army since Sir Henry Rich, viscount Kensington (1622) and Earl of Holland (Sept. 1624), spent most of late 1625 with Buckingham on diplomatic missions to the Netherlands and France (DNB).
   Dalton only mentions the name as “Riches Regiment”.
22. Also spelled Radclyffe or Radcliff; killed at Ré.
23. Served as Sergeant Major at Ré and was killed in the retreat.
24. Relation to Sir William St. Leger, the Sergeant Major of the Army, is unknown.
25. Sir Francis Willoughby.
26. Later Sir Francis Rainsford; called from the Low Countries for the Cadiz Expedition.
27. Relation to Sir John Ogle who declined the Col. Generalcy for the Cadiz Expedition is unknown.
28. Sir Richard Greenville (also spelled Grenville); probably later made a Colonel after Ré.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regimental Commander</th>
<th>Assigned Location (^1)</th>
<th>Implied Location</th>
<th>Assigned Location (^2)</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1625/26</td>
<td>Aug. 1626</td>
<td>After Aug 1626(^5)</td>
<td>April 1627(^6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Colonel Harwood (or Sir Ed. Horwood or Hurwood)**
- Devon
- Devon or Cornwall
- Kent
- disbanded; probably into Conway’s

**Sir Charles Rich**
- Suffolk (actually in Hampshire and Wight)\(^8\)
- Hampshire & Isle of Wight (actual loc.)\(^8\)
- Kent & Sussex
- Southampton (Ash is mentioned)

**Lord Valentia Artillery Train**
- Dorset
- Devon or Cornwall
- Sussex
- Hampshire

**Earl of Essex**
- Essex
- Devon or Cornwall
- Dorset
- disbanded probably into Rich’s Reg.\(^18\)

**Colonel Bruce**
- Norfolk
- Devon or Cornwall & Dorset
- Hampshire
- Hampshire; became Courtney’s

**Colonel Conway (Sir Edward Conway)**
- Hampshire
- Devon or Cornwall
- Hampshire (Portsmouth and Southampton)
- Southampton

**Lieut. General (Lord General)**
- Kent
- Devon or Cornwall
- Kent
- Southampton, Col. Bret

---

Table continues on next page.
General Information On Billeting Locations:

- Below the dashed line: the two regiments are mentioned in the list of Jan.1625/26 and not in the list of Aug. 1626. Bourg or Borrough is mentioned in entries from the fall of 1626. The Sergeant Major is mentioned in the list of Aug. 1626 but not in the list of Jan 1625/26.
- In Dec and Jan of 1625/26 various companies are mentioned as being in Dorset and in and around Portsmouth. (*APC* Vol. 40, pg. 283; 24 Dec. 1625; pg. 317; 16 Jan 1625/26). Capt.’s Scott’s and Crofts companies and the company of Colonel Bruce are at Portsmouth and troops are to be moved to Dorset (Vol. 40, pg. 276; 19 Dec 1625).
- *APC*, Vol. 40, pg. 396; 31 Mar 1626; a letter to the Mayor of Saltash, Cornwall. Some of the troops from Plymouth are to be billeted in your town.
- *APC*, Vol. 41, pg. 36; 29 June 1626; soldiers are billeted at Faram and Lymington in Hampshire.
- *APC*, Vol.41, pg. 261; 11 Sept. 1626; 1000 soldiers expected to be moved into Dorset in places that do not have the infection and are closest to the sea.
- In Nov 1626, counties identified with troops are Kent, Middlesex, Surrey, Essex, Herts, Dorset, Berkshire, Hampshire, Sussex, and Kent and the Cinque Ports.
- Boyton, pg. 40 "The Isle of Wight" mentions that a “small number of troops” were billeted on the Isle of Wight from Dec. 1625 after the return from Cadiz until October 1626.

Notes to Table A7

1. These locations were ordered by the Privy Council shortly after the return of the fleet and troops from Cadiz. (*APC* Vol. 40, pp. 325-327; 24 Jan 1625/26) Apparently the regiments did not move to the positions listed for them in Jan. 1625/26.
2. Col. Bruce is listed for two regiments in Aug. 1626. Perhaps his regiment is split between Hampshire and Dorset. In that case, there are only nine regiments listed for Aug. 1626 and ten regiments for Jan 1625/26, which is a possibility considering sickness, desertion etc.
3. Apparently the regiment commanded by St. Leger is commanded by the Sergeant Major in Aug. 1626. St. Leger was the Sergeant Major General of the Army in Aug 1625 (see note 19). This may be St. Leger’s Regiment, see note 9. Bourg, or Burroughs, continues to be a Colonel of Regiment into late 1627 and so it is not likely that his was consolidated into other regiments. State Paper Documents show that, from at least July 1626 till early 1627, St. Leger was the Sergeant Major in Plymouth. Therefore his regiment and the Sergeant Major’s are the same Regiment. During some of the time from Jan 1626 till St. Leger reappeared, Sir John Ogle was Sergeant Major of the army around Plymouth.

4. APC Vol. 41, pg. 257; 9 Sept. 1626 – Robert Smythe is mentioned as an ensign and Peter Hone as Capt. of a company in the Earl of Essex’s Regiment. The Earl of Essex at this time was Sir Robert Devereux.

5. The Sergeant Major General is the commander of the Army. (Boynton, “The Isle of Wight”, pg. 262; 12 Sept. 1626) – Sir John Preude, colonel of the Duke of Buckingham’s Regiment, Sir Thomas Morton, lieutenant colonel to Sir Edward Horwood and Sir Thomas Thornehurst, sergeant major (of the regiment of or the army) unto the Duke of Buckingham shall be put into the commission for martial law in Kent. [This implies that the Buckingham may be the Lieut. General as well as Lord Admiral. Could the Sergeant Major listed last in the above table be this sergeant major? Dorset is a long way from Kent, so this last is not likely.] Note also that on page 187 of Vol. 42, Sir George Blundell is addressed as “Sergiant Major General of the Army” and seems to be the commanding officer for the whole army in March 1626/27. Also Viscount Wimbleton [Sir Edward Cecil] is mentioned as Lord Lieutenant General on pg 339 of Vol. 42 and as commander of an expedition to Calais [Cadiz]. In the Calendar of State Papers Vol. 60/35 this regiment is relocated from Devon to Kent to Hampshire (April 26, 1627). See also Note 3.

7. Pg. 302; 30 Sept 1626. Sir John Ogle is mentioned as a colonel.

8. Part of Rich’s regiment was quartered in the Isle of Wight prior to the move ordered in Aug. 1626; see Vol. 41, pg. 309; 6 Oct 1626.

9. APC Vol. 41, pg. 357; 10 Nov 1626 - a letter to the deputy Lieut.s of Southampton. We have received the king’s commands for the moving of the troops of the regiment of Sir John Borrough into Berkshire. I assume this is Sir John Bourg based on the fact that the two names are the English/French cognates for the same word. This means that Borroughs’ Regiment was in Hampshire in late 1626.

10. This is probably the regiment that was eliminated by consolidation during 1626.

11. A Sir Wm. St. Leger is listed as Capt. of a disbanded company consolidated into the five remaining regiments in the lists of 31 March 1627. In APC Vol. 42. A St. Leger is mentioned as the Lord President of Munster. So he must have been sent there and is no longer colonel of a regiment or a captain of company (unless this is a different Sir William).

12. APC Vol. 42 pg. 185; 16 companies are said to be billeted in Sussex in March 1626/27. That is nominally a regiment of 10 and another six companies.

13. APC Vol. 42. pg. 171; 18 Companies of troops are said to be billeted in Kent as of 28 March 1627.

14. Capt. Peter Hone is mention twice as being in the Regiment of the Earl of Essex the latest on Feb. 28 1626/27. Yet in the Organization Table of 31 March 1627 (see below) his company is shown in the regiment of Sir Charles Rich. Thus The Regiment commanded by the Earl of Essex must have been disbanded.

15. See Table A8-A, note 9 below for the numbers of companies billeted in each county as of 14 March 1626/27 and their movements by 27 March 1627.

16. Either the companies went to different locations earlier in March or were redirected to Southampton before or during their march to the locations in Table A8-A by an order after 14 March 1626/27.
Viscount Valentia was the Master of the Ordinance on the Cadiz Expedition. This is mentioned in *APC* Vol. 42, pg. 377 and elsewhere in Vol. 42. It is possible that he did not command a regiment of foot and this entry may reflect the location of the artillery train.

Based on the presence of Capt. Hone in both regiments before and after the reorganization.

In an entry for 23 Aug. 1625 the *APC* (Vol. 40, pp. 136,137) lists the following men and titles for the army around Plymouth before it sailed for Cadiz: Lord Duke of Buckingham, Lord General; Sir Edward Cecil, Lord Marshall; Sir John Ogle, Colonel General; Viscount Valentia, Master of Ordinance; Earl of Essex, Colonel; Sir William St. Leger (Leiger), Sergeant Major General; Sir Edward Conway, Colonel; Sir Edward Hurwood, Colonel; Sir John Burroughs (Brughe), Colonel; Captain Bruce (Bruse), Colonel. This list and the rest of the entry concern the pressing of drummers and surgeons (chirurgions) for 10 regiments.

Portsmouth, Southampton, Lymington and Fareham are mentioned as billet locations in June 1626. (*APC* Vol. 41, pg. 36; 29 June 1626.

The town of Arundel is mentioned as having troops. Sir Henry Spen’s Co. (*APC* Vol. 42, pg. 36, 26 Jan 1626/27)

The New Forest District is mentioned as the billeting place for four companies of Bruce’s Regiment in SP16/42/92, 26 Dec 1626.
Table A8-A
Table of Organization of the Reorganized Army
31 March 1627
(APC Vol. 42 pg. 189)
(The five columns headed by the name of the colonel are the five regiments.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major</td>
<td>Capt. Grinfield</td>
<td>Capt. Standis</td>
<td>Sir James Scott</td>
<td>Capt. Fryer</td>
<td>Capt. Farer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 1</td>
<td>Borrough’s own Co.</td>
<td>Rich’s own Co.</td>
<td>Conway to have Sir Edward Hurwood’s Co. 1</td>
<td>Brett’s own Co.</td>
<td>Courtney is to have Col. Bruce’s Co. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 2</td>
<td>Capt. Grone</td>
<td>Sir Warren St. Leger 2</td>
<td>Capt. Hacluyt</td>
<td>Capt. Richards</td>
<td>Sir George Blundell 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 3</td>
<td>Capt. Turwhitt</td>
<td>Sir Ralph Sheton</td>
<td>Capt. Raysnford</td>
<td>Capt. Kenetorpe</td>
<td>Capt. Paddon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 4</td>
<td>Capt. Robert Hamon</td>
<td>Capt. Hone 5</td>
<td>Capt. Goring</td>
<td>Capt. Molesworth</td>
<td>Capt. Cornwall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 5</td>
<td>Capt. Heetley</td>
<td>Capt. Carlton</td>
<td>Capt. Pellam (to have Sir Sheff. Clapham’s Co.)</td>
<td>Capt. Preston</td>
<td>Capt. Cuntry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 6</td>
<td>Capt. Shugbury</td>
<td>Capt. Paperell</td>
<td>Capt. Tokerne</td>
<td>Capt. Babington</td>
<td>Capt. Watkins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 7</td>
<td>Capt. Bettes</td>
<td>Capt. Morgan</td>
<td>Capt. Ogle</td>
<td>Capt. Brett 4</td>
<td>Capt. Reynolds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 8</td>
<td>Capt. Blundell 3</td>
<td>Phillip Gifford</td>
<td>Capt. Dixon</td>
<td>Capt. Gilpin</td>
<td>Capt. Mewtas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable Location in late 1626</td>
<td>Berkshire</td>
<td>Kent 12 &amp; Sussex</td>
<td>Hampshire &amp; Sussex</td>
<td>?Dorset Wight in May 1627</td>
<td>?Dorset</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes appear on next page.
General Discussion
There seem to be contradictions in the information in the APC listing given in Tables A8-A and A8-B. These contradictions may have been clerical error by the Privy Council administrative staff or possibly the missing companies were ones landed in Ireland or already disbanded. The organization given in Table A8-A seems to include ten companies per regiment if the Colonel, Lt. Colonel and the Sergeant Major each command companies. In the APC entry there are numbers (1 through 10) before each officer’s name and this seems to indicate that there were to be 10 companies per regiment.

The entry from which Table A8-B comes states that the reorganized army has 40 companies, which implies eight companies per regiment which implies that the Lt. Colonel and the Sergeant Major did not also command companies. The APC entry for Table A9, which is the army that went to Ré (the five regiments in Table A8-A and two new regiments) also states that 36 companies are to be disbanded and the men placed in the surviving companies. But there are only twenty seven companies listed in Table A8-B. All of this implies that the reorganized army could have been five regiments of eight companies with 95 men per company, assuming 3800 men in the army, or five regiments with ten companies per regiment, each company containing 76 men. In either case, each regiment has 760 men. Other entries indicate that there were only 3000 to 3200 men in the army immediately after the reorganization in March 1627 and that 4000 were expected to sail for Rhé. (APC, Vol. 42, pp. 248,249, P.C. to Sir Allen Apsley, Surveyor General for the Navy; 27 Apr 1627.) This entry concerns provisions of food for soldiers and may just be numbers for estimating purposes. However, it may reflect actual numbers in the newly reformed regiments and that the regiments were at less than full strength.

Notes to Table A8-A
1. This would appear to be Col. Edward Horwood or Harwood as spelled in earlier entries. Apparently Col. Bruce’s and Col. Harwood’s regiments are two of those to be disbanded and assigned to the remaining 5 regiments.
2. Not to be confused with Col. Sir William St. Leger, whose regiment was probably disbanded and assigned to the remaining 9 regiments in mid-1626. Sir Will. St. Leger also appears in Table 5 below as commander of a company to be disbanded and reassigned.
3. Not to be confused with Sir George Blundell, a Capt. in Courtney’s Regiment.
4. This Capt. Brett is apparently not the Col. of the Regiment, Sir Alexander Brett. He is probably Thomas Brett (Dalton, pg. 392).

Notes continue on next page.
5. A Capt. Peter Hone is mentioned as a captain of company in the Earl of Essex’ Regiment on 9 Sept. 1626. Is this the same Hone? If so, how did his company get into Rich’s Regiment? Was it the Earl of Essex’ Regiment that was disbanded in mid-1626 or in March 1623/27? On 28 Feb. 1626/27 Hone is also mentioned as in the Earl of Essex’ Regiment and located in Dorset. So apparently the Earl of Essex’ regiment was disbanded in March 1626/27.

6. Based on Sir Thomas Thornhurst as Lieut. Col., this is the regiment formerly listed as that of the Duke of Buckingham’s or the Lord General’s. APC Vol. 41 pg. 262 lists Sir Thomas Thornehurst as “serjeant major unto the Duke of Buckingham”. Exactly who was the Lieutenant General is not clear, but on APC Vol. 42 pg. 339, Viscount Wimbledon is mentioned as Lord Lieutenant General and commander of the expedition to Calais (Cadiz).

7. 21 April 1627 – each of the consolidated companies is to have 80 men, for a total of 3200 men plus officers. Note that 1500 more were levied on 13 April and another 2000 on 11 May 1627. This would make the total around Portsmouth near 6700 unless the 1500 and the 2000 are in fact the same levy.

8. Sir George Blundell is the Sergeant Major General of the Army at Portsmouth in 1627; (Boyton, “The Isle of Wight”).

9. General Information on Regimental Locations
   The information in the last row of the Table has been gathered from a number of entries in the APC. Burrough’s regiment is mentioned as having been sent to Berks and Rich’s Regiment and Conway’s Regiment are mentioned as being split equally between the two counties listed in the Table. Later information (see Table A10 below) indicates that, in April 1627, 23 companies were moved from Dorset to Hampshire. This is more than enough to make up 2 regiments, so the other two regiments have been assigned to Dorset in the Table.

10. Ten officers who appear in this table also appeared in Table A 1 on the Mansfeld Army.
    They are Sir Charles Rich, Sir John Burroughs Lt. Col. Bret, and Captains Reynolds, Babington, Crumwell (Cornwall?), Andrew Heetly (Heatlie?), Sir Warren (Warham) St. Leger, Goring, and Pell (Pelham?). Spellings are different enough that Pell and Crumwell are perhaps doubtful.

11. Oglander, A Royalist’s Note Book, pg. 17, says that Sprey was Brett’s Lt. Col. in May of 1627 on the Isle of Wight.

12. The town of Ash in Kent is mentioned in SP16/41/78.
Table A8-B (3)
Table of Disbanded Companies
31 March 1627
(APC Vol. 42, pg. 190)

“A List of 36 companies, whose soldiers are to be reformed into the 40 companies above mentioned.” ¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kent</th>
<th>Sussex</th>
<th>Hampshire and Berks</th>
<th>Dorset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir Henry Lee</td>
<td>Capt. Crofts</td>
<td>Capt. Hamon</td>
<td>Capt. Allen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Donne</td>
<td>Capt. Talbott</td>
<td>Capt. Lindsey</td>
<td>Capt. Grise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Thomas Morton</td>
<td>Capt. Judd</td>
<td>Capt. Perkinson</td>
<td>Capt. Spring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Jackson</td>
<td>Capt. Matthews</td>
<td>Capt. Glen</td>
<td>Capt. Bowles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Seymour</td>
<td>Capt. Stafferton</td>
<td>Capt. Yates</td>
<td>Sir Will. St. Leger ²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Cooke</td>
<td>Capt. Brand</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sir John Gibson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capt. Courtney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Thomas Piggott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Henry Killewre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capt. Astley</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
1. There are only these 27 companies given in the table as presented in the APC, not 36 as stated in the caption in the APC. Later entries (see below) still total 76 companies. Where the ‘missing’ 9 companies were located in the winter of 1626/27 is not known. Another interpretation is that the ‘missing’ 9 companies were disbanded and their men distributed to under strength companies and the 27 companies listed were moved as units into the surviving regiments. However, the captains names do not match so this is unlikely. The nine not listed may have landed in Ireland. Could the other 9 be horse companies? If so, how were the cavalry organized?

2. This is the William St. Leger mentioned in Table A7.

3. There are four names that appear in this listing of disbanded companies that also appear in Table A5 giving the organization of the Mansfeld Army. They are Captains Hamon, Allen, Sir John Gibson and Sir Henry Killewre.
### Table A9
The Reorganized Army of 1627 With May Additions
The Ré Army
*(APC, Vol. 42, pp. 299,300; 28 May 1627)*
(The seven columns headed by the name of the colonel are the seven regiments.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co. No 1</td>
<td>His own</td>
<td>His own</td>
<td>His own</td>
<td>His own</td>
<td>Col. Bruce’s³</td>
<td>His own</td>
<td>His own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. No. 5</td>
<td>Capt. Tirwhite</td>
<td>Sir Ralph Shelton</td>
<td>Capt. Ranesford</td>
<td>Capt. Molesworth</td>
<td>Capt. Dadon</td>
<td>Capt. Masterson</td>
<td>Capt. Courteny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location, Summer 1627</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes appear on next page
Notes for Table A9

1. Most companies, if not all, were around Portsmouth, Southampton or the Isle of Wight before sailing for Ré.

2. “to have Sir Sheff. Chapham’s own”

3. Col Bruce’s own company (not Courtney’s). There is a Capt. Courtney in Sprey’s Regiment. This implies that Bruce replaced Courtney.

4. Comparisons to table 8A show a number of spelling variations and some new names in the first five regiments.

5. APC, Vol.42, pg. 294, 24 May 1627 contains an order concerning the new Irish Regiments and another new regiment to be formed under Col. Sir Peregrine Barty. 20 companies at 100 men per co. are to be transported from Ireland. Troops returned from Cadiz and in Ireland shall make up 10 of these companies. If these companies are not full, Irish or English in Ireland shall be pressed to fill them up. 10 companies shall be all Irish volunteers. There are also 5 Co.s reserved in England by the Lord Admiral. The 20 Co.’s from Ireland and the Lord Admiral’s 5 shall be formed into 3 regiments [approx 2500 men or 800 per regiment?]. The Colonels are to be Sir Ralphe Bingley, Sir Peregrine Bertie and Sir Piers Crosby. Crosby’s regiment shall be all new levies and Crosby is authorized to appoint the captains. Sir Ralphe Bingley shall have authority to appoint captains to his new companies and to the old if the captains are unwilling or unable to go on this voyage. Last, it is ordered that Sir Peregrine Bertie’s regiment shall consist of the companies reformed (reorganized?) there (in Ireland? Or England? Probably in England) by the Lord Admiral and of 4 companies to be brought over (from Ireland?) that is Capt. Sir Francis Willoughbie’s, Capt. Vawhan’s (Vaughn?) and Capt. Pelham’s which is to be for Sir Peregrin himself and a 4th co. of his own choice. (There is a Capt. Pellam in Conway’s Regiment. This is the first mention of Willoughbie and Vawhan. Barty’s Regiment causes an identification problem later on as discussed in the notes to Table 12B. The parenthetical questions are the author’s.

From the State Papers, Domestic, 23 May 1627
SP16/64/23. Order of Council. Of the 20 companies of 100 men each to come from Ireland, 10 shall be made up of the troops returned from Cadiz, and the other 10 shall be Irish volunteers. Those 20 companies, with 5 others to be added here, shall form 3 regiments to be commanded by Sir Ralph Bingley, Sir Peregrine Bartie and Sir Pierce Crosby.
SP16/64/25; 23 May 1627. These 2000 are to be transported to the Isle of Wight.

6. The Sergeant Major in Conway’s Regiment is given as Kemthorpe in Boynton’s paper on Martial Law, pg. 270. Boynton’s source is unclear to me.
7. There was also a Sir Peregrine Bertie, Lord Willoughby who led troops into Northern France in 1589 for Elizabeth. Was this the father of the Bertie of the 1620s? Or the same Bertie? (Ref. Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, pg. 15) (see Note 5 above.)

8. Sir John Burroughs was killed at Ré, at St Martins Fort in Oct 1627.
Table A10

Locations of Companies Before and After The Reorganization of 31 March 1627 and Before the Ré Expedition Sailed

The Re Army

**APC** Vol. 42, pp. 130, 131; 14 March 1626/27
9 companies billeted in Berks are to go to Southampton Town
23 companies billeted in Dorset are to go to Winchester
18 companies billeted in Kent are to go to Havant
16 companies billeted in Sussex are to go to Chichester
10 companies billeted in Hampshire are to go to Southampton Town

76 companies total (This is the total of 40 companies plus 36 companies given in the title of Table 5, from the tables on pg. 187-190, Vol. 42, not the 27 companies actually listed in the **APC** Table.)

**APC** Vol. 42, pg. 144; 19 March 1626/27 – a letter to the mayors of Southampton, Winchester and Havant; saying that you are to provide billets and the money to pay the soldiers being sent to your town for embarkation at 8d. per day per man. The troops have been redirected (my comment: or there are some mistakes and confusion) as follows:

18 companies billeted in Kent go to Havant (no change)
23 companies billeted in Dorset go to Southampton Town (earlier directed to Winchester)^1
9 companies billeted in Berks go to Winchester (earlier directed to Southampton Town)
10 companies billeted in Hampshire go to Southampton Town (no change)
16 companies from Sussex go to Chichester (no change)

76 companies total.

From the State Papers Domestic:
SP16/63/96, 18? May 1627 Sir George Blundell to the Council. Reports his proceeding in reduction of the men levied in Dorsetshire; has also received 990 men of the new levies, and has stationed Colonel Burgh’s regiment at Winchester, Colonel Rich’s at Portsmouth, Colonel Conway’s at Southampton and Romsey, Colonel Brett’s in the Isle of Wight, and Colonel Courteney’s at Chichester.

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^1 It appears that the P.C. wanted to lower the billeting cost to Winchester. Instead of 23 companies, Winchester now is to receive 9 companies. Southampton now receives 33 companies, instead of 19.
Table A10 (continued)

APC, Vol.42, pp. 216, 217; 13 April 1627 – 1500 men are to be pressed in Hampshire, Wiltshire, Devon, Sussex, Dorset and Kent to be at Portsmouth by 25 April 1627. It is not clear whether these are an extra 1500 men or an early order, later amended to 2000 men, to form the 2 regiments formed in May 1627 under Colonels Sir Thomas Thornton and Sir Henry Sprey.

Isle of Wight
From Boynton, “The Isle of Wight”, pg 24,31– 1000 men under Sir Alexander Brett and Sir Henry Sprey from Colonel Brett’s regiment were moved to the Isle of Wight on or about 6 May 1627 and stayed until 21 and 24 June. [Some confusion here. Sir Alexander Brett was the Col. and under him was another Capt. Brett. Whether the first contingent was under The Col. or the Capt. is not clear. Also at this time Sir Henry Sprey was Lt. Col. of Sir Edward Conway’s regiment.

Soldiers Pressed For Service with the King of Denmark
APC, Vol. 42, pg. 100; 28 Feb 1626/27 – letters to several Lord Lieutenants. A number of men are to be pressed from several counties for army service. 1150 to rendezvous at London on 25 March; 1350 to Hull on the 31st of March and 500 to Harwich on the 25th of March. These 3000 men were for the King of Denmark and departed for Bremen (they were to go to directly to Stade) in early May (between 1 May and 19 May). More information on the Harwich contingent may be found in Chapter 7.

On the same topic: Vol. 42. pg. 167; 28 March 1627 – a letter to the Lord Lieut. of Essex. Capt. Richard Saltenstone reports that the levies brought to Harwich (for Denmark) are inferior in number and quality, particularly those from Cambridgeshire. Because of the short time available, press men to make up the deficiencies from around Harwich. Do not take men out of the trained bands.

There are many other reports of mutinies and desertion and shortages of men sent to the embarkation ports for Denmark. New drafts to make up the losses were made on several occasions, mostly from the counties nearest the embarkation points of Hull and Harwich, and St. Catherine’s in the London area.
### Table A11

**The New Regiments Under Sir James Ramsey and Sir John Ratcliffe**  
**Formed in September 1627 at Plymouth**  
*(APC, Vol. 43, pp. 15,16; 8 Sept. 1627)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Sir John Ratcliff</td>
<td>Sir James Ramsey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Col.</td>
<td>Capt. Dauson</td>
<td>(none listed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt.s of 83</td>
<td>Peter Alley</td>
<td>Robert Le Gris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Hone</td>
<td>Reginald Mahune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edward Yates</td>
<td>Cristopher Jackson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allexander Craftes</td>
<td>Humphrey Haukins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Bridges</td>
<td>John Langworth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Thomas Pigot</td>
<td>George Yorke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robert Gray</td>
<td>Sir William Tresham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Linsey</td>
<td>John Pell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Parkinson</td>
<td>Bartholomew Jukes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michael Matthew</td>
<td>Francis Williams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Safferton</td>
<td>John Read</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Quartermaster Anthony With[er]ings**  
**Lt. John Sutton**

#### Notes

1. Counting one company for the Col., there are 12 companies per regiment and, at 83 men per company or 84 counting the captain, this makes 1008 men per regiment. If there are 13 companies counting the Lt. Col. and counting all officers in companies the total per regiment could be as high as 1170 to 1200. Since only 2000 men were levied, a number around 1000 seems reasonable.

2. Ramsey and Ratcliff are also described as “captains of 83”.

3. Note that several of the names above appear on the organization lists in Tables 4 and 5. Among them are Hone, Safferton and Yates and perhaps others with allowances for spelling.

4. The organization lists in the APC also include the names of lieutenants and ensigns, which are omitted here.

5. Ratcliff is often spelled Ratcliff and Ramsey as Ramsay.
Table A11 (continued)

The Earl of Moreton’s Scots Regiment
(From Boynton, “The Isle of Wight”, pp. 24,31)

Colonel    Earl of Moreton  (also spelled Morton)

Lt. Colonel Sir John Balfour; confirmed in Calendar of State Papers, Domestic
(SP16/74/, minute from Conway’s letter book); Vol. 3, pg. 301, Aug 1627.

Sergeant Major Sir John Meldrum

This regiment of 1500 to 2000 men was billeted on the Isle of Wight from Oct 1627.
Calendar of State Papers Domestic Vol. 2 for 1627, pg. 456 (16/84/81), Nov 1627,
mentions Sir Archibald Campbell and an Alexander Mach Nacton or (MacNaughton?) as
commanders of a regiment under the Earl of Moreton. MacNacton may be a captain.
Table A12-A

Regimental Billet Locations as of January 1627/28
(APC, Vol. 43, pg. 235; 14 Jan 1627/28)

Colonel Courtney’s regiment to be billeted in Sussex.
Colonel Grienville’s regiment in Somersetshire. (Greenfield replacing whom?)
Colonel Conway’s in Hampshire.
Colonel Bingley’s in Kent. (This is an Irish regiment.) (Bingley was killed at Ré.)
Colonel Riche’s in Wiltshire. (also spelled Rich)
Colonel Moreton’s in Oxfordshire. (This is Col. Morton the Englishman)
Colonel Bartnes’ in Surrey. (Bartnes [Barty?] replacing whom, or a new regiment?
Colonel Fryar’s in Dorsetshire. (Fyar replacing whom?)
Colonel Sprey’s in Dorset for one month and then to Gloucestershire in Jan 1627/28.
Colonel Ramsey’s in Berks. (later sent to Bucks and then to Northamptonshire)
Colonel Ratcliff’s regiment in Suffolke, 4 companies.
The Earl of Moreton’s regiment of Scotsmen in the Isle of Wight.
Colonel Crosbie’s in Essex. (This is an Irish regiment.)

"The remnants of these regiments whersoever lodged are to goe to the places where the
regiments are appointed to bee billetted."

There are 13 regiments; there are two listings for Moreton. One is the Earl of Moreton
and the other is an English Colonel named Morton (or Moreton).
Table A12-B
Replacement of Regimental Colonels Between May and Dec 1627

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>As of May/June 1627</th>
<th>As of Jan 1627/28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>English Regiments</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Burroughs (or Bourg)</td>
<td>- - Grienville (Grinfield?, Grenville) ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Charles Rich (or Riche)</td>
<td>? Morton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Edward Conway</td>
<td>Sir Edward Conway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Alexander Brett</td>
<td>- - Fryar (Fryer, Frye?) ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir William Courtney</td>
<td>Sir William Courtney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Thomas Thornton</td>
<td>- - Col. Morton (the English Morton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Henry Sprie (or Sprey)</td>
<td>Sir Henry Sprie (or Sprey) (Sprey is “the late Col. Sprey” as of 20 March 1627/28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Ratcliff</td>
<td>Sir John Ratcliff (only 4 Co.’s listed); possibly replaced by Morton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir James Ramsey</td>
<td>Sir James Ramsey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Peregrine Barty</td>
<td>Sir Peregrine Barty This was a composite Irish/English Regiment formed in May 1627. (See Notes on replacement of colonels below and Note 5 of Table A9.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scottish Regiment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl Moreton</td>
<td>Earl of Moreton (in Isle of Wight)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Irish Regiments</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Ralph Bingely</td>
<td>Sir Ralph Bingely (Bingley was killed at Ré and is noted deceased in APC Vol 44, pg. 43, 20 July 1628)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Pierce Crosby (or Crosbie)</td>
<td>Sir Pierce Crosby (also Piers Crosbie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Names</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Grienville (Grinfield? Greenfield?, Grenville) in Somerset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Morton in Oxfordshire.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Fryar (Fryer) in Dorset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals: 13 regiments</td>
<td>13 regiments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There should be 13 regiments: 5 English (reorg. Mar 1627) + 2 English (formed in May 1627) + Barty’s mixed regiment + 2 English (formed in Sep 1627) + 2 Irish + 1 Scots = 13 regiments.
Table A12-B (continued)

Some speculations on the missing colonels and their successors:

- In the reorganization of March 1627 (My Table A8-A; APC Vol. 42, pg. 189), a Captain Fryer is listed as Sgt. Major in Brett’s regiment. Let us assume that he took command when Brett died at Ré.

- Sir Thomas Morton is listed as a Capt. in one of the regiments disbanded in March 1627. He is possibly the second Col. Moreton listed immediately above as a Col. of a presumably English regiment as the Col. of the Scots regiment is usually referred to as the Earl of Moreton (or Morton) or Lord Morton.

- In the Organization of March 1627 (Table A8 above) there is a Capt. Grinfield listed as Sgt. Major in Burrough’s regiment. Let us assume he is ‘Grienville’ or ‘Greenfield’ and took over Burrough’s regiment. Barnes in “Deputies Not Principles …” , pg. 80, uses the name ‘Sir Thomas Grenville’.

- Since Sprey is mentioned as “the late Col Sprey” on 1 March 1627/28, it is possible that Col. Morton replaced Sprey.

- Col. Ratcliffe is mentioned as “the late Col. Ratcliffe” in an entry dated 14 Jan 1627/28 (APC Vol. 43, pg. 233). Morton may have replaced Ratcliffe.

- Pauline Gregg remarks (King Charles I, pg. 168) that four colonels were lost at Ré, although she does not cite a source for this information. If it is true, then the four colonels lost at Ré were replaced by the four new colonels listed in the second column above and one of the old colonels should not be listed. The entries in the APC then indicate that the four colonels who died at Ré were Burroughs, Brett, Thornton and Ratcliffe. On the other hand, information elsewhere in this essay and in the APC indicates the Ratcliffe’s Regiment never went to Ré. Perhaps Ratcliffe died of disease in late 1627 or early in 1627/28.

- According to Dr. Thomas Cogswell, Col. Sir Charles Rich was killed at Ré. He was executed by the French after capture. Rich and his senior officers were offered life but chose to die with their men who were all executed by the French.

- As best I can determine, the following senior officers were killed at Ré or died shortly after the return or were replaced for other reasons: Sir George Blundell, Sir John Burroughs, Sir Henry Sprey, Sir Charles Rich, and probably Brett and maybe Ratcliffe.
Table A13-A

Towns and Areas With Billeted Troops, January 1627/28 to December 1628
(This Table continues on the following two pages.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Town Or Area</th>
<th>Regiment/ Company</th>
<th>Number Of Men</th>
<th>Date of APC Entry</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berkshire</td>
<td>Wokingham</td>
<td>Ramsay 8 Co.'s</td>
<td>400 to 800</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Windsor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25 May 1628</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg 445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Ramsay 4 Co.'s 5</td>
<td>200 to 400</td>
<td>16 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol.43, Pg. 239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eton College</td>
<td>Ramsay ?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>6 Feb 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckingham</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>Plymouth (Moved from Dorset and Somerset) (10)</td>
<td>Fryer, 8 Co.'s Ratcliffe, 4 Co.'s Greenfield, 8 Co.'s</td>
<td>1500 est.</td>
<td>29 March 1628</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shaftsbury</td>
<td>Sprey 4 Co.'s</td>
<td>200 to 400</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16 June 1628</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ca. Dorchester 10, 13</td>
<td>Fryer 8 Co.'s</td>
<td>400 to 800</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maldon, Chelmsford, Braintree</td>
<td>Crosby</td>
<td>600 to 800 est.</td>
<td>3 &amp; 10 Feb</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1627/28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Crosby From Malden</td>
<td>5 Mar 1627/28</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Witham</td>
<td>Crosby</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>20 Mar 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>Barcklay, Kepsigate, &amp; Forrest Divisions; Gloucester town</td>
<td>Sprey, 8 Co.'s</td>
<td>400 to 800; probably 600</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pp. 233,235,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>Southampton Town ?</td>
<td>Conway 6 Co.’s; 2 Co.’s already there</td>
<td>400 to 800</td>
<td>4 Jan 1627/28; Arrived in Feb ?</td>
<td>Vol. 43 pg. 218, 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>Sprey, 4 Co.’s</td>
<td>200 to 400</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basingstoke</td>
<td></td>
<td>200 to 400?</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 235 pg. 434</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton Town From Hampshire</td>
<td>Earl of Moreton 2 Co.’s</td>
<td>24 April 1628</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 384</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton Town Lymington Christchurch Chichester Isle of Wight</td>
<td>Earl of Moreton</td>
<td>26 May 1628 “</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 443 “</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Earl of Moreton</td>
<td>280 1000-1500</td>
<td>28 Sept 1628 Jan-Sep 1628 NS</td>
<td>Vol 44, pg. 167 Boynton; pg. 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereford</td>
<td>Hereford Town et al.</td>
<td>Sprey 300 from Gloucester</td>
<td>1 Mar 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 333</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>Towns near the coast</td>
<td>Bingley, Irish 8 Co.’s</td>
<td>400 to 800</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandwich, Hythe, Canterbury (Moved from Essex and Norfolk) Also Lydd, Romney</td>
<td>Crosby, 3 Co.’s Crosby, 3 Co.’s Crosby, 2 Co.’s</td>
<td>240 est. 240 est. 160 est. (maybe 1000)</td>
<td>31 March 1628</td>
<td>Vol. 43; pg. 370</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>Norwich et al.</td>
<td>Crosby, Irish 5 Co.’s from Essex</td>
<td>250 to 500</td>
<td>25 Feb 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northampton</td>
<td>West Riding</td>
<td>Ramsay 4 Co.’s from Bucks</td>
<td>200 to 400</td>
<td>10 Feb 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>Col. Morton</td>
<td>400 to 800</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28 arrived in Feb?</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pp. 233,235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tame</td>
<td>Col. Morton ?</td>
<td>30 May 1628</td>
<td>Vol 43, pg. 450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>Company/Person</td>
<td>Number of Soldiers</td>
<td>Date of Arrival</td>
<td>Vol. and Pages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>Ratcliffe</td>
<td>200 to 400</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ca. Taunton</td>
<td>Ratcliffe</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Commons Vol. III, pg. 420</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ca. Bath and others</td>
<td>Greenfield</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>400 to 800</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kingston Guildford Farnham</td>
<td>400 to 800</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kingston Upon Thames</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>26 March 1628</td>
<td>Commons Vol. II, pg. 127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk</td>
<td>Ratcliffe</td>
<td>200 to 400</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A riot at Woodbridge</td>
<td>Ratcliffe</td>
<td>27 June 1628</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 513</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex</td>
<td>Courtney</td>
<td>400 to 800</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isle of Wight</td>
<td>Earl of Moreton Scots (9)</td>
<td>1500 (?)</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>Conway</td>
<td>300 to 600</td>
<td>4 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 218</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>Col. Morton</td>
<td>400 to 800</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>400 to 800</td>
<td>14 Jan 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>Sprey</td>
<td>150 from Hereford</td>
<td>17 Mar 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 352</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater London</td>
<td>Wapping, Ratcliffe, Lymehouse, Blackwall and Stepney</td>
<td>500?</td>
<td>13 Feb 1627/28</td>
<td>Vol. 43, pg. 294</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
General Information

In August 1628 Crosby’s Irish was ordered back to Ireland in two groups, one of 200 men to Portsmouth to be used in the Rochelle relief expedition of 1628 and the other group of 700 to Bristol via the Thames Valley and from Bristol to Ireland by ship. I think the first group did not sail to Rochelle and went to Bristol and to Ireland. No mention is made of Bingely’s Irish regiment after early 1628. As noted above, Bingley was killed in the retreat to the ships at Ré. I suspect that his regiment was folded into Crosby’s command and sent back to Ireland.

The ‘army in being’ was paid off and disbanded in the fall of 1628.

The abbreviation “ca., circa” is used to mean “in the town and its immediate surrounding area”.

Notes to Table A13-A

1. From Acts of the Privy Council unless otherwise noted as from Commons Debates, 1628.
2. Ratcliffe died in late 1627; he is listed as ‘the late Col. Ratcliffe’ in this entry.
3. Spelled ‘Grienville’ in this entry. Later he is called Greenfield, which is the more likely spelling.
4. The date of the entry, 14 Jan 1627/28, is for an order to move. Most regiments probably did not arrive at the indicated location until February.
5. Is Ramsey’s regiment only a half regiment or is the other half to be left in Berks?
6. They were at first in Maldon, Billericay and Hornetown. Troops were moved from the last two after ‘incidents’ to Chelmsford and Braintree respectively.
7. The City and the adjacent corners of Middlesex, Essex, Kent and Surrey.
8. These are 150 of the 300 sent to Hereford by an order dated 14 Jan 1627/28.
9. The Scots regiment of the Earl of Moreton probably ended up in Hampshire, not the Isle of Wight. The Table shows them in both places as of January 1627/28.
10. By an order entered on 24 April 1628, these units were returned to Dorset and Somerset.
11. From 6 May to 24 June 1627, 100 men of Bret’s Regiment and part of Sprey’s Regiment were on the Isle of Wight.
12. After the return from Ré in late 1627, the Earl of Moreton’s 1500 (?) man regiment was billeted on the Isle of Wight. Another unidentified company was sent to Cowes in Jan 1627/28.
13. “ca.” is used to mean “in the town and its immediately surrounding area”.
### Table A13-B

**Counties, Towns And Areas Within Counties Known To Have Billeted Troops During 1628**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Towns and Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berkshire (Berks)</td>
<td>Wokingham, New Windsor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckingham (Bucks)</td>
<td>Eton College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>Plymouth and adjacent towns, including some in Cornwall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>Dorchester (Fryer’s Regiment), Shaftsbury, Farnham?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>Maldon, Chelmsford, Billericay, Braintree, Farnham, Thacksted, Witham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>City of Gloucester, rural divisions of Barcklay (sp. Berkeley?), Kepsgate,&amp; Forrest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>Chichester, Fareham?, Basingstoke, City of Southampton, Lymington, Christchurch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereford</td>
<td>Hereford Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>Sandwich, Hythe, Canterbury, Romney, Lydd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincolnshire</td>
<td>Lincoln (Schwoerer, pg. 27 from Cobbett, <em>Parliamentary History</em> 2: pp. 881, 886, 894, 902)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>Norwich, 2 Co.s; Kings Lynn, 2 Co.s; Yarmouth, 1 Co. per SP16/96/46.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northampton</td>
<td>West Riding, Parish of Pachell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>Tame</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table continued on next page.*
Table A13-B(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Towns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>Bath, Taunton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey</td>
<td>Kingston on Thames, Guildford, Basingstoke, Farnham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk</td>
<td>Woodbridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex</td>
<td>troops present but no towns noted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isle of Wight</td>
<td>troops present but no towns noted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>troops present but no towns noted, Dorchester likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
<td>troops present but no towns noted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater London</td>
<td>Wapping, Ratcliffe, Lymehouse, Blackwall, Stepney (sailors)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**
Generally, but not always, when a town is mentioned, the troops were billeted in the town and immediately surrounding areas, not just in the town itself.

There are a number of towns billeting soldiers in Hampshire in early 1626/27 mentioned in Boynton’s ‘Martial Law’, pg. 268.
Appendix B

Crown Revenues and Expenditures,

Estimates of Military Costs During the 1620’s,

And

Costs Incurred by Several Counties and Towns in Providing for the Army-In-Being
1. Crown Revenues and Expenditures – Reigns of Elizabeth, 1584 to 1602 and James I and Charles I, 1621 to 1629

Table B1-1
Royal Government Revenues and Expenses, 1584 to 1602; in £

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1584</th>
<th>1585</th>
<th>1586</th>
<th>1587</th>
<th>1588</th>
<th>1589</th>
<th>1590</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies¹</td>
<td>14,231</td>
<td>11,515</td>
<td>89,655</td>
<td>65,291</td>
<td>88,566</td>
<td>68,509</td>
<td>104,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other²</td>
<td>204,903</td>
<td>192,096</td>
<td>215,931</td>
<td>204,771</td>
<td>208,790</td>
<td>276,382</td>
<td>255,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Sales</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>1490</td>
<td>1751</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rev.</td>
<td>219,150</td>
<td>203,684</td>
<td>305,947</td>
<td>271,552</td>
<td>299,107</td>
<td>344,932</td>
<td>360,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>97,896</td>
<td>108,610</td>
<td>203,482</td>
<td>277,903</td>
<td>329,451</td>
<td>258,909</td>
<td>160,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military³</td>
<td>73,054</td>
<td>74,351</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>89,442</td>
<td>90,850</td>
<td>167,604</td>
<td>189,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exp.</td>
<td>170,950</td>
<td>182,961</td>
<td>282,482</td>
<td>367,345</td>
<td>420,301</td>
<td>426,513</td>
<td>350,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue less Expenses</td>
<td>48,200</td>
<td>20,723</td>
<td>23,465</td>
<td>(-95,793)</td>
<td>(-121,194)</td>
<td>(-81,581)</td>
<td>10,618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B1-1 continues on the next page.

¹ Frederick C. Dietz, “The Exchequer in Elizabeth’s Reign”, Smith College Studies in History, Vol. VIII, No. 2, Jan 1923, pp. 65-118. I have selected those expenditures that I judge were for military purposes from the line titles in Dietz’s tables plus other information in Dietz’s footnotes to his tabulations. Missing years and other blank spaces are due to data missing from Dietz’s sources. I have rounded off Dietz’s numbers to the nearest whole pound in the Table. Dietz presents his data in £ – s. – d..

² Fiscal Year ending Michaelmas (Sep. 29) for the year indicated.

³ This amount includes lay and clerical subsidies, tenths, fifteenths and “benevolences”. It is the total direct taxation.

⁴ The amount listed as “Other” is the difference between Dietz’s “Total” Revenue numbers and the amounts listed in this table. The sum of the many individual items in Dietz’s tabulations is less than his “Total” by £1,000 to £10,000 in a typical year.

⁵ The amount for “non-military” is the difference between Dietz’s total expenditures and the military items. In most years the total of individual items in Dietz’s tabulation varies from the total he lists by up to £20,000, but in some years the difference is as high as £75,000 (1589 and 1590 for example).
Table B1-1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1591</th>
<th>1592</th>
<th>1593</th>
<th>1594</th>
<th>1595</th>
<th>1596</th>
<th>1597</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies</td>
<td>81,648</td>
<td>102,146</td>
<td>73,565</td>
<td>158,590</td>
<td>159,210</td>
<td>103,984</td>
<td>82,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>234,015</td>
<td>266,098</td>
<td>260,454</td>
<td>261,464</td>
<td>298,766</td>
<td>272,273</td>
<td>287,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61,870</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Sales</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>1318</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rev.</td>
<td>316,098</td>
<td>368,314</td>
<td>334,451</td>
<td>420,719</td>
<td>458,840</td>
<td>377,575</td>
<td>432,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>246,915</td>
<td>233,852</td>
<td>204,961</td>
<td>248,509</td>
<td>251,816</td>
<td>299,206</td>
<td>330,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military</td>
<td>106,711</td>
<td>95,862</td>
<td>93,936</td>
<td>92,337</td>
<td>99,189</td>
<td>94,266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exp.</td>
<td>353,626</td>
<td>329,714</td>
<td>298,897</td>
<td>340,846</td>
<td>351,005</td>
<td>393,472</td>
<td>370,000³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue less Expenses</strong></td>
<td>(-37,528)</td>
<td>38,600</td>
<td>35,554</td>
<td>79,873</td>
<td>107,835</td>
<td>(-15,897)</td>
<td>62,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1598</th>
<th>1599</th>
<th>1600</th>
<th>1601</th>
<th>1602</th>
<th>1603</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies</td>
<td>43,314</td>
<td>163,489</td>
<td>149,201</td>
<td>128,239</td>
<td>188,807</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>357,408</td>
<td>306,058</td>
<td>362,142</td>
<td>379,036</td>
<td>334,539</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>45,780</td>
<td>64,916</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Sales</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>87,068</td>
<td>150,241</td>
<td>25,400</td>
<td>104,992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rev.</td>
<td>447,253</td>
<td>621,531</td>
<td>661,584</td>
<td>542,675</td>
<td>638,638</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>315,789</td>
<td>491,716</td>
<td>401,583</td>
<td>378,768</td>
<td>393,009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military</td>
<td>53,165</td>
<td>78,973</td>
<td>138,319</td>
<td>81,882</td>
<td>112,838</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exp.</td>
<td>368,954</td>
<td>570,689</td>
<td>539,902</td>
<td>460,650</td>
<td>505,847</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue less Expenses</strong></td>
<td>78,229</td>
<td>50,842</td>
<td>121,682</td>
<td>82,025</td>
<td>132,791</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ Dietz does not give this amount. I have averaged the amounts from 1595, 1596, and 1598 to get £370,000.

⁷ Only scattered data is available for this year of transition from Elizabeth I to James I.
### Table B1-2

**Royal Government Revenues and Expenses, 1621 to 1629\(^1\)**

*Adjusted for 1621, 1623, 1627, and 1628\(^2\)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1621</th>
<th>1622</th>
<th>1623</th>
<th>1624</th>
<th>1625</th>
<th>1626</th>
<th>1627</th>
<th>1628</th>
<th>1629</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies(^3)</td>
<td>89,312</td>
<td>21,728</td>
<td>18,477</td>
<td>22,503</td>
<td>142,171(^4)</td>
<td>22,770</td>
<td>74,474</td>
<td>220,684</td>
<td>612,119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(^5)</td>
<td>308,036</td>
<td>380,383</td>
<td>348,566</td>
<td>522,724</td>
<td>378,759</td>
<td>684,899</td>
<td>391,680</td>
<td>200,263</td>
<td>3,549,799</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>87,500</td>
<td>40,793</td>
<td>151,240</td>
<td>113,730</td>
<td>475,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Sales</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,704</td>
<td>15,413</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>95,996</td>
<td>73,602</td>
<td>192,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rev.</td>
<td>308,136</td>
<td>507,399</td>
<td>385,707</td>
<td>352,966</td>
<td>339,766</td>
<td>632,727</td>
<td>561,723</td>
<td>858,909</td>
<td>675,850</td>
<td>4,830,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>157,036</td>
<td>204,755</td>
<td>352,966</td>
<td>296,055</td>
<td>363,513</td>
<td>717,510</td>
<td>419,046</td>
<td>302,229</td>
<td>2,606,663</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military(^6)</td>
<td>209,320</td>
<td>270,236</td>
<td>218,288</td>
<td>323,970</td>
<td>313,740</td>
<td>212,031</td>
<td>234,766</td>
<td>208,640</td>
<td>284,383</td>
<td>2,184,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exp.</td>
<td>366,356</td>
<td>474,991</td>
<td>561,704</td>
<td>519,925</td>
<td>576,253</td>
<td>930,577</td>
<td>621,686</td>
<td>590,872</td>
<td>586,612</td>
<td>4,791,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. less Exp.</td>
<td>-58,220</td>
<td>32,408</td>
<td>78,863</td>
<td>62,033</td>
<td>22,932</td>
<td>-13,821</td>
<td>-93,367</td>
<td>48,164</td>
<td>-39,982</td>
<td>39,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assignments by Talley</strong></td>
<td>72,551</td>
<td>63,780</td>
<td>74,308</td>
<td>71,558</td>
<td>154,570</td>
<td>137,859</td>
<td>110,323</td>
<td>684,949</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


2. Dietz’s data reflect only a half year for 1621. All Dietz’s 1621 data is doubled in this Table. Dietz’s data contain only one half year of expense data for 1623, 1627 and 1628 due to loss of documents. His expense data (only) is doubled in this Table for a more likely view of the situation in these years.

3. This amount includes lay and clerical subsidies, tenths, fifteenths and “benevolences”.

4. SP16/84/89, Table of Receipts for the subsidies of 1625, dated early Nov 1627, shows total receipts of £243,573 of which £78,969 was left in the counties for “soldiers”.

5. The amount listed as “Other” is the difference between Dietz’s “Total” Revenue numbers and the amounts listed in this table. The sum of the individual items in Dietz’s tabulations are less than his “Total” by £100,000 to £200,000 in a typical year.
6. The amount for “non-military” is the difference between Dietz’s total expenditures and the military items. In most years the total of individual items in Dietz’s tabulation varies from the total he lists by up to £20,000, but in some years the difference is as high as £75,000. Military items are “Fortifications” (repair), “Admiralty” (the navy), “Ordnance Office”, “Garrisons of Castles”, “Secret Service”, and “Military Operations and the Defense of the Palatinate”.
2. Estimated War Expenses in the 1620s

Table B2-A

Estimated War Expenses for the Year 1625

The data are taken from *Debates in the House of Commons 1625*; Camden Soc, Pub. pg 2.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>King of Denmark</td>
<td>£360,000 (for 1 year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansfeld’s Troops</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops in the Low Countries</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcements for Ireland</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadiz Exp., fleet and army</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£1,025,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The House granted Charles £140,000 (2 subsidies) and recessed because of the plague in London.¹

¹ Dalton remarks on Vol. 2, pg. 107 that The Duke of Buckingham informed Parliament on July 8 through Sir John Coke, Commissioner for the Navy, that the govt. would require £300,000 for the Cadiz Exp. And £240,000 each (in addition to the above?) in the next 12 months for the King of Denmark and for Mansfeld.
Secretary Coke presented the King’s “propositions” as a simple list. The needs were to furnish with men and victuals 30 ships to guard the Narrow Seas and along the coasts; to set out 10 other ships for the relief of the town of Rochelle; to set out 10 more ships for the protection of the Elbe and Sound leading into the Baltic Sea; to levy, arm, clothe, victual, pay, and transport an army of 1,000 horse and 10,000 foot for foreign service; to pay and supply 6,000 men for assistance to Denmark; to supply the stores of the office of Ordnance; to supply the stores of the Navy; to build 20 ships yearly to increase the size of the Navy; to repair the forts within England; to pay the arrears of the office of Ordnance; to pay the arrears of the Victualler’s office; to pay the arrears of the Treasurer of the Navy; to pay the arrears due for the charter of many merchant ships employed in his Majesty’s service; and to provide a magazine of victuals for land and sea service.¹

The two most immediately needed and largest amounts were those for an 11,000 man army for foreign service and 6,000 infantry for Denmark, that is, to pursue the wars with France and Spain and aid the Protestants in Germany. The total expense for these two armies would have exceeded £200,000 per year and probably would have exceeded £300,000 per year, including pay for officers and men, coat and conduct money, arms and ammunition, food and more. These amounts can be roughly estimated from other estimates. The Council of War had estimated in 1624 that the Mansfeld army of 12,000

¹ Commons Debates 1628, Vol. 2, pg. 121, 26 Mar 1628.
men would cost £240,000 per year and the Cadiz fleet and army £300,000.\textsuperscript{2} The fleet of fifty ships mentioned would have cost over £100,000 to outfit and maintain, and to victual and pay the crews for a year.\textsuperscript{3} The arrears mentioned were to pay for arms, ammunition, food, and clothes for the army and navy for past years as well as other expenses incurred for the Ré Expedition and probably amounted to £280,000 to £300,000 or more in the aggregate.\textsuperscript{4} The long promised but seldom paid aid to the King of Denmark, if paid in 1628, would have come to £360,000 per year, though it is not listed in the King’s propositions.

\textsuperscript{2} Refer to App. B, Table 1A, for these estimates.

\textsuperscript{3} Dietz lists £110,000 spent on the fleet in half of 1627 and £90,000 in half of 1628. Dietz, \textit{English Public Finance}, pg. 216. SP16/87/35 gives £110,000 as the estimate for setting forth the 50 ships.

\textsuperscript{4} SP16/87/35, Note of the present charge of the fleet and army; late Dec 1627, states that the arrears of the Ordnance Office, the Navy Victualler’s Office and the Treasurer of the Navy’s Office are £251,000 and the cost of setting forth 50 ships for 1628 will be £110,000. The chartered merchant ships were costing the crown £5,000 per month and so, for 6 months of 1627, arrears would come to £30,000.
### Estimated War Expenses for 1628 from the King’s Propositions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Set Out 50 ships</td>
<td>£110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of 10,000 infantry and 1000 horse</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of 6000 for Service in Denmark</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies for Ordnance Office</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies for Navy Stores</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build 20 Ships</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair Forts in England</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrears for Ordnance Office, Victualler’s Office, and Navy Treasurer’s Office</td>
<td>251,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrears for Charter of Merchant Ships</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide magazine of victuals for land and sea service</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£966,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

5 The list is from *Commons Debates 1628*, Vol. 2, pg. 121, 26 Mar 1628.

6 SP16/87/35, Note of the present charge of the fleet and army; late Dec 1627.

7 From Mansfeld est. in Table B1-A.

8 My estimate for this and the next 3 items.

9 SP16/87/35, Note of the present charge of the fleet and army; late Dec 1627. SP16/87/63, A list of payments to be made …; 29 Dec 1627 lists arrears for 1627 for billeting, pay, victuals, munitions, clothing, ship repair and other war expenses amounted to nearly £320,000, and which were ordered disbursed on 29 Dec 1627 in anticipation of ordinary revenues.

10 SP16/87/35, 6 months at £5000 per month.
3. **Estimates For Billeting Soldiers in Devon and Cornwall; 1625 and 1626**

**Table B3-A**

A Weeks Pay for a Full Strength Company of Foot in 1625-1626

*(APC, Vol. 40, pg. 329, 25 Jan 1625/26)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>£</th>
<th>s.</th>
<th>d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sergeants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Drummers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Corporals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Lanceporadoes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87 Soldiers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>09</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of personnel is 100.

**Table B3-B**

A Weeks Pay for a Full Strength Regiment of Foot in 1625-26

A Standard Regiment of Ten Companies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>£</th>
<th>s.</th>
<th>d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Colonel</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sergeant Major</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Surgeons Asst.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Companies</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>183</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(£183.875 in decimal notation)
The Cadiz Army contained 10 regiments, six with 11 companies and four with 10 companies. This would allow for a maximum of 10,600 men, including officers. The 10 regiments included the two that were embarked at Hull and eventually came to Plymouth. We know that in the course of the summer, 2000 more men were pressed and that only 1500 from Hull made it to Plymouth. Thus it can be estimated that during the period from 1 June to 1 October the army probably averaged around 9000 to 10,000 or about 84% to 94% of the nominal strength. Using 90% and applying that to the nominal pay of the units given above, we have:

Pay for a full strength army per week = £184 X 10 regiments = £1840 per week.

Pay for the actual army = £1840 X 0.90 = £1656 per week.

We also have from SP16/4/109 that in late July the billeting costs were running around £1000 per week. This amount may not have included the pay for the officers, which is about one third of the total pay of a company. If so, the amount agrees fairly well with the value of 2/3rd of the £1656 calculated above, which is £1104. On the other hand, the number of men may have not been as great as 9000 to 10,000. If it had been 7000 to 8000, which some of the documents used in this study indicate, the £1656 would have to be reduced by another 20% or so, giving a total of £1324 per week. In either case, an average pay bill for the army of £1000 to £1100 a week seems about right and it must have been between £1000 and £1500 per week.

The Army was billeted around Plymouth for four months, from early June to early October 1625, or about 17 weeks. Therefore the total bill for billeting the army during its stay around Plymouth before sailing for Cadiz would have been between £17,000 and £18,700 and may have been as high as £28,000.

The Commissioners at Plymouth also reported the purchase of £1000 worth of clothing for soldiers.

What was the effect of the officer’s pay on these amounts? Officer’s pay is included in the above amounts. But some of the documents that refer to pay for the officers indicate that the local officials were paying something for the room and board of the officers. The officers, at least those with the rank of lieutenant and above, were generally lodged with better off members of the community and therefore their billeters were allowed to charge something to the royal government. Whether it was full pay or something less is not clear. For the ten regiments around Plymouth, there should have been approximately 300 captains, lieutenants and ensigns. However, from the constant complaints of lack of officers to control the soldiers, there were very probably fewer than 300 until August or September. Using the amounts from Table B2-A above, the weekly pay for the three officers in each company totaled £2 12s. per week. There were
approximately 106 companies in the ten regiments, so, with a full complement of officers, the pay for them would come to £275 per week and, reduced by the percentages used above, was actually more like £200 per week. If the officers were indeed thin on the ground until August and September, the amount may have been less than £185 per week. This might have reduced the grand totals calculated above by as much as 10%, or approximately £2000, if only half the officers were around Plymouth in June and July.

**Payments by the Royal Government to the Commissioners at Plymouth for Billeting the Soldiers, Summer of 1625**

Reported received in Plymouth before 23 July: £9312

Probably received from Burlemachi in Sep or Oct: £6000

Total reported receipts: £15,312

Billeting Expense £17,000 to £18,700

Approximate Net Deficit of Cornwall and Devon in early Oct: £1688 to £3388

(In SP1611/64; 14 Dec 1625, it is stated that the “the gentlemen of those parts will in no wise be drawn to any contributions” to support the Army, perhaps indicating that there was, indeed, still a deficit outstanding in December 1625.)

**Costs For Billeting Troops in Devon and Cornwall After the Return from Cadiz December 1625 to August 1626**

For the period from the fleet’s return from Cadiz in early December to September 1626, when the Army was moved east, the estimates are even poorer. We know from several of the documents that there were between 3700 and 4000 soldiers around Plymouth early in this period and that during the early part of this period sizable numbers of soldiers died or deserted. There was also a surplus of officers relative to the number of soldiers left, as we know from several documents directing St. Leger to discharge the unneeded officers and send them to London for reassignment or to be paid off. There appears to be no information on how many were with the colors in August 1626. We do know that the ten regiments of the Cadiz Army were reorganized in March 1627 into five

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1 SP16/102/84; April 1628 or 1629; “Notes of payments for billeting, appareling and removing Soldiers in the cos. of Devon and Cornwall, from 1625 to this time”. See below for more information on this document.

2 SP16/43/34, undated 1626 is a muster list giving a total of 3656 men. The unknown date does not permit a firm conclusion but the number of men seems to indicate a muster taken in early January 1626.
nearly full strength regiments (8 companies per regiment; 40 companies total). A number of companies were eliminated and their remaining men were used to fill up the remaining companies. But this reorganization involved Cadiz Expedition troops that were brought back from Ireland as well as those that had landed in Hants and other places. Forty full strength companies would have 3480 common soldiers and a total of perhaps 4000 men including officers. However there is an APC entry indicating that 3800 soldiers were to move east to Dorset, Hants, Sussex and Kent.3

From SP16/18/88 we know that the weekly pay bill in January 1625/26 was (approximately) £600 per week. This gives 36d. per man for 4000 soldiers, but we know that the weekly lending or pay was 30d. per week. Thus, the £600 included some allowance for officers or there were more than 4000 men being billeted: as many as 4800, which seems too high. Using the pay bill of £1472 per week for an army of 10,000 from the calculations for the period before the expedition sailed, we can calculate by proportions that there were 4076 men around Plymouth on 1 January 1625/26, which agrees fairly well with the 3700 to 4000 given in the documents. A ‘guesstimate’, then, is that there were 4000 soldiers in the Plymouth area on 1 January 1625/26 and 3000 to 3800 when the Army moved out of Devon and Cornwall in September 1626. The duration of this second stay in Devon and Cornwall was 9 months.

Taking the ratio of 3000 men divided by 4000 men, we can estimate a pay bill of £450 per week by the end of the period. Assuming a straight line reduction of the size of the Army from 4000 to 3000 over the nine month period, the average weekly pay was £525, which multiplied by 39 weeks yields a total nominal outlay in Devon and Cornwall of approximately £20,500 (£20,475) for the period. Of course the people of Devon and Cornwall might have spent more or less than this amount in lodging and feeding the Army. We also know that clothing contracts totaling some £12,000 for 4000 suits of clothing were contemplated (SP16/19/88). If only half of this amount was spent, the total bill comes to £26,500.

Offsetting this were the payments the crown did make to Devon and Cornwall during this second period. £5000 and another £6000 were promised by the Privy Council. £4280 was received on 20 January 1625/26 and another £1100 on 28 January but there is no confirmation in the documents that the balance of the £11,000 was received in Plymouth. If we draw up an expense statement we have the following:

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<th>to</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<td>Clothing Est.</td>
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<td>Money from Crown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net Deficit</td>
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<td>to</td>
<td>£26,000</td>
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3 APC Vol. 41, pg. 291; 26 Sep 1626.
Deficit from Summer 1625 £1688 to £3388

Total Deficit in Devon and Cornwall £21,783 to £29,388

There is another document bearing on the billeting costs in Devon and Cornwall, that is difficult to interpret and is of uncertain date. It lists expenditures, but does not say how much was paid by the crown and how much by the Counties. My summary by year from this document is as follows:

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<td>277-10s.-0d.</td>
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<td>12073-12s.-3d.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1629</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>£37,713-2s.-3d. (to Mayor of Plymouth)</td>
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Arguably, the £5000 to £10,000 the crown is known to have reimbursed the counties can be deducted from this total, as in the previous tabulation, indicating that around £30,000 was paid out by the two counties and not reimbursed by the royal government. In addition, the document lists £9312 delivered to the mayor of Plymouth on 28 May 1625 for billeting 10,000 soldiers. This last amount must have been for the initial billeting of the Cadiz expedition soldiers.

There is then a total deficit for Devon and Cornwall of between £22,000 and £29,000, or perhaps a bit more, which is suspiciously close to the £30,000 the Privy Council assigned to Devon and Cornwall out of the Tin Farm to repay the Army’s expenses during its two stays in the area. If we had data on other expenses such as coat and conduct money for men pressed in the counties, providing carts and horses to transport baggage when troops moved, property damage, costs for watching the roads and bridges for runaways, costs of apprehending criminous soldiers and trying them, expenditure for the navy, etc., the total un-reimbursed expenses of the people of Devon and Cornwall were greater still.

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4 SP16/102/84; April 1628 or 1629; “Notes of payments for billeting, appareling and removing Soldiers in the cos. of Devon and Cornwall, from 1625 to this time”. The Calendar of State Papers dates this document to April (?) 1628 but the date “Mar 1629” appears in the document so it probably dates from 1629.
4. **Costs of Billeting Soldiers in Hampshire Before and After the Ré Expedition**

**Hampshire (mainland)**

1. The nominal billeting expense per soldier allowed by the royal government was 3s. 6d. per week. (£0.175 per week).

2. The Privy Council ordered approximately 1000 men moved from Devon and Cornwall to Hants in September 1626.¹ The actual number may have been somewhat less, perhaps 800. These men were billeted in Hants till the following March, a period of six months or 26 weeks. The billeting expense is then 1000 men X 26 weeks X £0.175 per man = £4550.

3. After the army reorganization in March 1627, approximately 5000 men were billeted in Hampshire from early March till the first week in June, 1627.² This is about 12 weeks. 5000 men X 12 weeks X £0.175 /man = £10,500.

4. Approximately 1500 men were billeted in Hampshire from 1 Dec 1627 till the fall of 1628, say 10 months or 43 weeks.³ 1500 men X 43 weeks X £0.175 = £11,288.

5. There were likely more men billeted in Hampshire at times in the period from Dec 1627 to the Fall of 1628. There were also two newly formed regiments under Sir Thomas Thornton and Sir Henry Sprie (Sprey) billeted in Hampshire for a month before the Ré Expedition sailed. Therefore the approximate costs calculated above are conservatively low. The two regiments probably contained no more than 800 men apiece, so the expense for them for one month would have been approximately £1,100.

The total then comes to **£27,438**.

¹ *APC* Vol. 41, pg. 291, 26 Sep 1626.

² See Appendix A, Table A8-A.

³ See Appendix A, Table A13-A.
Isle of Wight

1. Before sailing for Re, approximately 1000 men were billeted on Wight for two months. The nominal expense at 3s. 6d. per man per week would have been (42d. per man per week X 8 weeks X 1000 men =) £1,400.

2. Moreton’s Scots regiment was billeted on Wight from December 1627 to late September 1628, or for around nine months or 39 weeks. The nominal billeting expense would have been around (42d. per man per week X 1500 men X 39 weeks =) £10,200.

3. The total cost comes to £11,600. The Island claimed £7,340 as unpaid billeting expenses in 1629 and, making some allowance for payments from subsidy and loan money, the two numbers seem to agree fairly well.

Hampshire and Wight Together

The entire county of Hampshire may have expended some (£27,438 + £11,600 =) £39,000 in 1626, 1627 and 1628, some of which was reimbursed from subsidy and loan money. But a considerable sum was still owed by the royal government in 1629. If the Isle of Wight numbers are near correct, perhaps 75%, or £29,000, may have been unreimbursed in 1629.

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5 Boynton,"Billeting: The Example of the Isle of Wight", pg. 36.
5. Estimates For Billeting Soldiers in Sussex

The Mansfeld Expedition; December 1624

Four Hundred men were pressed in November but did not leave until 22 December. The extra conduct money at 8d. per day for 4 weeks for 400 men came to approximately £375. (This does on include coat money.)

There was no extra conduct money required for pressed men prior to the Cadiz or Ré Expeditions in 1625 and 1627.

The Ré Expedition
September 1626 to June 1627 and December 1627 to July 1628

Before the Ré Expedition

Approximately 800 men were billeted in Sussex from around 1 October 1626 till sometime in early June when they left to join the Ré Expedition, a period of seven or eight months, or around 32 weeks. The cost was probably 3s. a week per man on average (The Privy Council had increased the allowance to 3s. 6d. per man per week during the period)

The billeting cost for the common soldiers for this period was then (3s. X 800 men X 32 wks. =) £3800. The Officers also demanded and were paid £3000 in arrears.²

Therefore the total cost for this period was approximately £6800.

After the Ré Expedition

Approximately 600 men were billeted in Sussex from early December 1627 until September 1628, a period of approximately 9 or 10 months or approximately 42 weeks, at a rate of 3s. 6d. per man per week.

For this period the billeting cost was then approximately £4400.

The total cost to Sussex was thus on the order of £11,575.

According to Fletcher, approximately £4000 raised from the Forced Loan in Sussex was used to pay for some of the billeting expenses for the first period. If true, this left Sussex with approximately £7575 of unreimbursed billeting costs in late 1628.

¹ Data are taken from Anthony Fletcher, A County Community in Peace and War: Sussex 1600-1660, [London: Longman Group Ltd., 1975], pp. 194-199.
² Fletcher, pg. 196; from SP16/62/3 and SP16/62/6.
Appendix C

Tabulations of Press Results from Captain Leigh’s Report
From SP16/4/160 and SP16/88/52
<table>
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<th>Doc. Pg. No.</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Conductor</th>
<th>Ordered Pressed by P.C.</th>
<th>Number Able and Sufficient</th>
<th>Number Defective</th>
<th>Runaways</th>
<th>Other Reductions (Note)</th>
<th>Total Reductions</th>
<th>Erased fr. Indenture</th>
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% of Total ordered to be Pressed

No. who Started: 2450
% who Started: 89.3

Note: See second page of tabulation for numbers of sick, dead etc.
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Appendix D

Selected Manuscripts and Documents in Full
Item 1. **Summary of Instructions for the Impressments of Soldiers for the Cadiz Expedition.**¹

A general order or letter to most Lord Lieutenants ordering the levy of foot soldiers from counties of England and Wales. (33 English counties, 7 Welsh counties and the towns of Bristol, Exeter (‘Exon’) and London are named.²)

The following is a summary of the letter which is several printed pages long in the *APC*.

The instructions to the Lieutenants include the following actions. Take more than ordinary care that the men are fit in health and age for the service, but none are to be taken out of the trained bands. The men are to be pressed out of the areas of the county in rough proportion to the local population so the manpower and the costs are fairly distributed geographically in the counties. Rates shall be as formerly and the men are to rendezvous in Plymouth on 25 May 1625. The choice of conductors to keep the men in order and out of trouble as they pass through the country is left to you, the Lord Lieutenant or your deputies. The men will be listed on documents in triplicate, one copy to go to the Privy Council, one to Plymouth with the conductors and the third to remain with the Lord Lieutenant. The conductors are to remain with the men until they are turned over to the captains sent by the Privy Council to Plymouth to receive them. The actual deliveries of men are to be ‘indented’ (written down) by the captains and the conductors. Rather than the usual coat and conduct money of 0.5d. per mile, the royal government will pay the soldier’s wage of 8d. sterling per day from the time the men set out till they arrive at Plymouth. We expect them to cover not less than 15 miles a day. As in the past and according to precedent (‘presidentes’), the coat and conduct money will be paid by the local counties and reimbursed by the royal government upon submittal of an account to the royal government. Also the Lord Lieutenants are to take more than ordinary care to avoid the abuses of past times of substituting unfit men for fit, and for other abuses by constables, sheriffs and conductors. If corruption is found, or other improprieties, the offender is to be bound over to the Privy Council by the Lord Lieutenant or his deputies.

¹ *APC* Vol. 40, pp. 42-45; 5 May 1625.

² The list of counties and numbers of men levied in each county may be found on *APC* Vol. 40, pp. 44 and 45 and totals 9150 men. The largest contingent, 1000 men, was levied on London. Other counties levies ranged from 50 to 400 men.
Item 2. Instructions To Conductors

At Whytehall the 10th of May 1625.

“Upon debate had at the Board for the repressing of the insolencies and outrages that may be donne by the souldiers (now to be leavied within this kingdome) in their passage to Plymouth, it was thought fitt and ordered that a proclamacion be forthwith drawne by his Majestie’s Attorne General of the tenor following viz. :—Commanding that the captain or conductor and such officers as shall have charge of conducting the severall companies out of the severall counties of this realme to Plymouth shall carefully leade and conduct the souldiers through all partes where they shall passe, see them duefly paid theire conduct money and provided for in theire passage and each party kepte to his company and not suffered to straggle. And to lett all the souldiers knowe that in case any of them shall committ any outrage, bee disordered, take or spoyle any man’s house or goodes in the townes or fields, as they passe, or stragle away from their company, that everie such partie shalbe forthwith comitted to the constable of the place next adjoyneing by him to be sent to the goale, there to remaine without bayle or maineprise, untill he be proceeded against, by the strictest course of lawe that the fact shall deserve. And for better assistance to the captain or conductor of souldiers the captain or captaines of horse in everie county shalbe readie and assistante with convenient number of horse to keepe the souldiers in order and from stragling and to ayde and assist the said captain or conductor in the apprehending, punishing, and comitting any of the disorderly souldiers, who shall committ any such outrages, pilfryes, or doe injuries to others in theire passage. “

3 APC, Vol. 40, pg. 47; 10 May 1625; Orders from the P.C. for the Attorney General to draw up a Proclamation.
**Item 3. The Parliament’s “Petition Against Billeting Of Soldiers”**  
(This version has been transcribed from the original to modern spellings in many places to make it easier to understand.)

“The petition was read as followeth:
To the King’s most excellent Majesty. In all humility complaining, showeth unto your most excellent Majesty your loyal and dutiful Commons now in parliament assembled, that whereas by the fundamental laws of this your realm, every free man hath and of right ought to have a full and absolute propriety in his goods and estate, and that therefore the billeting or placing of soldiers in the house of any such free man against his will is directly contrary to those laws under which we and our ancestors have been so long and so happily governed; yet in apparent violation of the said ancient and undoubted right of your Majesty’s loyal subjects of this your kingdom in general, and to the most grievous and insupportable vexation and detriment of many counties and persons in particular, a new and heretofore almost unheard-of way hath been invented to put in practice to lay soldiers upon them scattered in companies here and there, even in the heart and bowels of this kingdom, and to compel many of your Majesty’s subjects to receive and lodge them in their own houses, and both themselves and others to contribute towards the maintenance of them, to the exceeding great disservice of your Majesty, the general terror of all, and utter undoing of many of your good people; insomuch that we cannot sufficiently recount, nor in any sort (proportionably to the lively sense we have of our misery herein) are we able to represent to your Majesty the innumerable mischiefs and most grievous exactions that by this means alone we do now suffer, whereof we will not presume to trouble your sacred ears with particular instances. Only, gracious Sovereign, we beg leave to offer unto your gracious view and compassionate consideration a few of them in general.

1. First, the service of Almighty God is hereby greatly hindered, the people in many places not daring to repair to their churches, lest in the meantime the soldiers should rifle their houses.

2. The ancient and good government of the country is hereby neglected and almost contemned.

3. Your officers of justice in performance of their duties have been resisted and endangered.

4. The rents and revenues of your gentry are greatly and generally diminished; farmers to secure themselves from the soldiers’ insolences being (by the clamor and solicitation of their fearful and endangered wives and children) enforced to give up their wonted dwellings and to retire themselves into places of more secure habitation.

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4 *Commons Debates, 1628*, Vol. 2, pg. 451; 14 April 1628. see also SP16/101/1
5. Husbandmen, that are as it were the hands of the country, corrupted by ill example of soldiers, are encouraged to idle life, to give over their work and seek rather to live idly at other men’s charges than by their own labors.

6. Tradesmen and artificers almost discouraged, being enforced to leave their trades and employ their times in preserving their families from violence and cruelty.

7. Markets unfrequented, and our ways grown so dangerous that your people dare not pass to and fro upon their usual occasions.

8. Frequent robberies, assaults, batteries, burglaries, rapes, rapines, murders, barbarous cruelties, and other most abominable vices and outrages are generally complained of from all parts where these companies have been and made their abode, few of which insolencies have not so much as been questioned, and fewer according to their demerit punished.

These and many other lamentable effects (most dear and dread Sovereign) have by this billeting of soldiers already fallen upon your loyal subjects, tending no less to the disservice of your Majesty than to their own impoverishment and distraction: so that thereby they are exceedingly disabled to yield your Majesty those supplies for your urgent occasions which they heartily desire; and yet they are further perplexed with the apprehension of more approaching dangers, one in regard of the subjects at home, the other of enemies abroad, in both which respects it seems to threaten no small calamity.

For the first, the meaner sort of your people, being exceedingly poor, whereof in many places are great multitudes, and therefore in times of most settled and most constant administration of justice not easily ruled, are most apt upon this occasion to cast off the reins of government, and by joining themselves with those disordered soldiers are very likely to fall into mutiny and rebellion; which in faithful discharge of our duty we cannot forbear most humbly to present to your high and excellent wisdom, being possessed with probable fears that some such mischief will shortly ensue, if an effectual and speedy course be not taken to remove them out of the land or otherwise to disband those unruly companies. For the second, we do most humbly beseech your Majesty to take into your princely consideration that many of those companies (besides their dissolute dispositions and outrages) are such as do openly profess themselves papists, and therefore to be suspected that, if occasion serve, they will rather adhere to a foreign enemy, if of that religion, than to your Majesty, their liege lord and sovereign, especially some of their captains and commanders being as popishly affected as themselves, and having served in the wars on the part of the King of Spain or Archduchess against your Majesty and your allies; which of what pernicious consequence it may prove, and how prejudicial to the safety of all your kingdom, we humbly leave to your Majesty’s high and princely wisdom. And now upon these and many more which might be alleged most weighty and important reasons grounded upon the maintenance of the worship and service of almighty God, the advancement and continuance of your Majesty’s high honor and profit, the
preservation of the ancient and undoubted liberties of your people, and therein of justice, industry, and valor, which concerns the glory and happiness of your Majesty, all your subjects, and the preventing of imminent calamity and ruin both of church and commonwealth.

We, your Majesty’s most humble and loyal subjects, the knights, citizens, and burgesses of the House of Commons, in the name of all the commonalty of your kingdom, who are upon this occasion most miserable, disconsolate, and afflicted, prostrate at the throne of your grace and justice, do most humbly and ardently beg for the present removal of this unsupportable burden, and that your Majesty would be graciously pleased to secure us from the like burden in time to come.”
Item 4. The Petition of Right, 1628

(This version has been transcribed from the original spellings in places to facilitate reading and understanding. A earlier draft may be found in Commons Debates, 1628, Vol. III, pp. 334 ff., 9 May 1628 and the final version, which is not much different than the preliminary version, can be found in several places as well as in several of the manuscripts listed in the Calendar, State Papers Domestic.)

The Petition exhibited to his Majesty by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, concerning divers Rights and Liberties of the Subjects, with the King's Majesty's royal answer thereunto in full Parliament.

To the King's Most Excellent Majesty,

I. Humbly show unto our Sovereign Lord the King, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in Parliament assembled, that whereas it is declared and enacted by a statute made in the time of the reign of King Edward I, commonly called Statutum de Tellagio non Concedendo, that no tallage or aid shall be laid or levied by the king or his heirs in this realm, without the good will and assent of the archbishops, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and other the freemen of the commonalty of this realm; and by authority of parliament holden in the five-and-twentieth year of the reign of King Edward III, it is declared and enacted, that from thenceforth no person should be compelled to make any loans to the king against his will, because such loans were against reason and the franchise of the land; and by other laws of this realm it is provided, that none should be charged by any charge or imposition called a benevolence, nor by such like charge; by which statutes before mentioned, and other the good laws and statutes of this realm, your subjects have inherited this freedom, that they should not be compelled to contribute to any tax, tallage, aid, or other like charge not set by common consent, in parliament.

II. Yet nevertheless of late divers commissions directed to sundry commissioners in several counties, with instructions, have issued; by means whereof your people have been in divers places assembled, and required to lend certain sums of money unto your Majesty, and many of them, upon their refusal so to do, have had an oath administered unto them not warrantable by the laws or statutes of this realm, and have been constrained to become bound and make appearance and give utterance before your Privy Council and in other places, and others of them have been therefore imprisoned, confined, and sundry other ways molested and disquieted; and divers other charges have been laid and levied upon your people in several counties by lord lieutenants, deputy lieutenants, commissioners for musters, justices of peace and others, by command or direction from your Majesty, or your Privy Council, against the laws and free custom of the realm.
III. And whereas also by the statute called "The Great Charter of the Liberties of England," it is declared and enacted, that no freeman may be taken or imprisoned or be disseised of his freehold or liberties, or his free customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.

IV. And in the eight-and-twentieth year of the reign of King Edward III, it was declared and enacted by authority of parliament, that no man, of what estate or condition that he be, should be put out of his land or tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited nor put to death without being brought to answer by due process of law.

V. Nevertheless, against the tenor of the said statutes, and other the good laws and statutes of your realm to that end provided, divers of your subjects have of late been imprisoned without any cause showed; and when for their deliverance they were brought before your justices by your Majesty's writs of habeas corpus, there to undergo and receive as the court should order, and their keepers commanded to certify the causes of their detainer, no cause was certified, but that they were detained by your Majesty's special command, signified by the lords of your Privy Council, and yet were returned back to several prisons, without being charged with anything to which they might make answer according to the law.

VI. And whereas of late great companies of soldiers and mariners have been dispersed into divers counties of the realm, and the inhabitants against their wills have been compelled to receive them into their houses, and there to suffer them to sojourn against the laws and customs of this realm, and to the great grievance and vexation of the people.

VII. And whereas also by authority of parliament, in the five-and-twentieth year of the reign of King Edward III, it is declared and enacted, that no man shall be forejudged of life or limb against the form of the Great Charter and the law of the land; and by the said Great Charter and other the laws and statutes of this your realm, no man ought to be adjudged to death but by the laws established in this your realm, either by the customs of the same realm, or by acts of parliament: and whereas no offender of what kind soever is exempted from the proceedings to be used, and punishments to be inflicted by the laws and statutes of this your realm; nevertheless of late time divers commissions under your Majesty's great seal have issued forth, by which certain persons have been assigned and appointed commissioners with power and authority to proceed within the land, according to the justice of martial law, against such soldiers or mariners, or other dissolute persons joining with them, as should commit any murder, robbery, felony, mutiny, or other outrage or misdemeanor whatsoever, and by such summary course and order as is agreeable to martial law, and is used in armies in time of war, to proceed to the trial and condemnation of such offenders, and them to cause to be executed and put to death according to the law martial.

VIII. By pretext whereof some of your Majesty's subjects have been by some of the said commissioners put to death, when and where, if by the laws and statutes of the land they
had deserved death, by the same laws and statutes also they might, and by no other ought to have been judged and executed.

IX. And also sundry grievous offenders, by color thereof claiming an exemption, have escaped the punishments due to them by the laws and statutes of this your realm, by reason that divers of your officers and ministers of justice have unjustly refused or forborne to proceed against such offenders according to the same laws and statutes, upon pretense that the said offenders were punishable only by martial law, and by authority of such commissions as aforesaid; which commissions, and all other of like nature, are wholly and directly contrary to the said laws and statutes of this your realm.

X. They do therefore humbly pray your most excellent Majesty, that no man hereafter be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common consent by act of parliament; and that none be called to make answer, or take such oath, or to give attendance, or be confined, or otherwise molested or disquieted concerning the same or for refusal thereof; and that no freeman, in any such manner as is before mentioned, be imprisoned or detained; and that your Majesty would be pleased to remove the said soldiers and mariners, and that your people may not be so burdened in time to come; and that the aforesaid commissions, for proceeding by martial law, may be revoked and annulled; and that hereafter no commissions of like nature may issue forth to any person or persons whatsoever to be executed as aforesaid, lest by color of them any of your Majesty's subjects be destroyed or put to death contrary to the laws and franchise of the land.

XI. All which they most humbly pray of your most excellent Majesty as their rights and liberties, according to the laws and statutes of this realm; and that your Majesty would also vouchsafe to declare, that the awards\(^5\), doings, and proceedings, to the prejudice of your people in any of the premises, shall not be drawn hereafter into consequence or example; and that your Majesty would be also graciously pleased, for the further comfort and safety of your people, to declare your royal will and pleasure, that in the things aforesaid all your officers and ministers shall serve you according to the laws and statutes of this realm, as they tender the honor of your Majesty, and the prosperity of this kingdom.

\(^5\) O.E.D., 2nd ed., s.v. “award v1”: to decide, to determine after deliberation. \textit{Obs.}
Item 5. **A letter From The Lord Deputy of Ireland Describing Army Recruits**\(^6\)

A letter from the Lord Deputy and Councell of Ireland.

The 7th of this moneth I the Deputy have received your Lordshipps letters of the 27th of July, signifying the alteracion of his Majesties purpose for the rayseing of the 7 newe Companies, upon Reducement of the Companies now in list, to consist of English, for which we had former direccion. And that his Majestie doth now intend on the other side to transmitt hither Sir Pierce Crosbies Regiment consisting all of Irish. Your Lordshipps may be pleased to give us leave freely to acquite ourselves, and to observe his Majesties former pleasure, requireing that we should write backe if any direccions came in prejudice of his Majesties pleasure signified by his late letters of generall direccion.

First we must say unto your Lordshipps, that there is a mistakeing in esteeming the Regiment of Sir Peirse Crosbye to be wholy voluntaries, for if he had not beene assisted by the power of me, the Deputy, in takeing many men out of the Goales, and receiveing in of divers of Malefactors and Rebells that stood upon theire keepeing, and pressing of other persons of notorious ill fame in theire Countries, he had passed over with a verie weake Regiment, and now theise people [are] to be retourned hither againe, with enhabellement to doe mischeefe, and with weapons in theire hand in theise tymes. We humbly leave it to your Lordshipps grave Consideracion, whether it be expedient or noe. The wisedome of this State haveing ever beene to purge the Realme of such ill Members and knowne disturbers by venting them into forraine parts for other services of the Crowne, where they may be of steed, which hath proved a greate safetie and presurvacion of the peace of this Kingdome, and is one approved Course without bloude to give way to the real settlement of this people. Besides, wheras the former direccions wer that but a certaine small nomber of Recusants should be admitted in the Armye, nowe all theise of Sir Peirse Crosbies Regiment being Recusants, that rule will hardly be observed in the Residue, which is a further increase of our danger as things stand here.

And wheras the pollicie of this State bath ever thought fitt to keepe the Irish without Armes till they be better growne in subjeccion. Now they are to be furnished with Armes and municion soe if season may serve them they may concurre in the effecting any theire ill purposes. The former direccion was, that the Countrie should for a tyme have ease by makeing the Companies 63; and out of those Reducements to erect the 7 Companies to be all English. Nowe the 40 Companies heere in List must still stand, and this new thousand a surcharge, which wilbe greivous in this penurious tyme, the dearth of all things stil continuing and rather threatening worse then otherwise, or if the former intended reduction shalbe executed, English must be discharged and Irish put in theire steads, which is contrarie to all former sound advices for this goverment. And wheras our last warrante issued for beareing the Souldiers for 3 moneths, from the first of July last, promised that the Countrie should not be in that manner charged any more, which was

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\(^6\) *APC* Vol. 44, pg. 115; 29 August 1628
grounded upon the body of his Majesties late Direccions. Nowe if upon this alteracion and surcharge we shall give warrant to raise pay for this thousand, the Country will finde it soe greivous an alteracion as we cannot but doubt they will hardly receive any more of our warrants for the tyme to come. And we are verie jelous of the Consequences.

And it is alsoe verie considerable, whether it be fitt to discontent and greeve persons of that quallitie and note that the 7 Captains are under whom the new Companies were to be raysed, in a tyme when their assistance mought doe his Majestie much furtherance in the Parliament, and the Civill Inhabitants of the Countrie will repine much at the finding and mayntayneing of theise Irish as theire Guards whom they accounte noe better then Enemies to the generall peace here, and who are Farr lesse governable from oppression. Besides we may not omit to mencion the diffidence which this alteracion will awaken in the minds of prime personages heere, in the performance of his Majesties promises hereafter. Theise are the difficulties, and inconveniences, which offer themselves to our understanding, and doe stand with our duties to Represent unto your Lordshipps, humbly beseeching you to take them into your wise and serious Consideracions as matters of greate Consequence for preservacion of the peace of this Kingdom, and to be a meanes to his Majestic for the disposeing of Sir Peirse Crosbies Regiment into any other parte, where it is lyke they will doe his Majestie better service, but to retourne them into this Kingdome cannot but prove of verie pernitious adventure. His Majesties pleasure we humbly desire may be hastened unto us, until the Receipt wherof things must continue at a Stand; wheras we were readie with the worke of reduceing the Companies and to signe the warrants of entrie for the 7 Captaines, when theise new direccions came, which in our understanding doe Crosse and hazard the generall proposicion of mayntaineing a standing Armye heere, which was intended to be English; otherwise it wilbe held lesse danger to trust to the defence of the Irishe dispersed without Comon Charge and burthen to the Englishe and reformed Inhabitants then to Irish, lying in Troopes armed, from whom onely the dangers heere doe arise, and which (as we finde) was the error wheron Tyrone founded his late dangerous Rebellion, wherein in our uttermost duties we be silent. And soe we most humbly take our leaves.

From his Majesties Castle of Dublin the 11th of August 1628.

Your Lordshipps most humbly at Conmaundment.
Item 6. **SP16/88/46 - 1627**

Complaint addressed to the Council of the burdens laid upon Devonshire and Cornwall by billeting soldiers upon them without payment.

(The most interesting lines are: “What” say the people “ will his majesty make war without provision of treasure, or must our Country bear the charge for all England? Is it not enough that we undergo the trouble of the insolent soldiers in our houses, their robberies, and other misdemeanors, but that we must maintain them, too, at our own cost? “)

Devonshire and Cornwall are both of one nature and condition, reputed fruitfull and yeeldinge store of all kinde of provision for the life of man. And indeede so they are, but not naturally. Therefor as Mr. Samden and Speed(?) in their histories do truly refute: If the groundes of those countries bee not quickned(quietned?) and enforced as it were to fruitfull by the industry of the inhabitants they soone decline to sterility and barrenes. The meane used for this manuring aunce is well knowne to be sanding, liming, marlling and burning of peate(?) all of them very chargeable and not to be performed without greate expense of money and labour of men.

It is the ready way then to ruine these Countries to weaken them either in their people or their purses. Yet in both those they have of late bene much exhaust[ed].

For first these countryes spent upon his Majesties Armys which came from Cales in diett and apparrel neere 10000li. which their owne lendinge of 5 subsidies now applied that way are not able to discharge. And in the presses and levyes of men they have bene seldome spared though it be well knowne that these countryes yeeld more seamen to his Majesties service then any parte of his other dominions. And of the se lat employs have taken up so many as the very fishermen and sand(?) la_gemen have not escaped. The Idlers(?) which all countryes willingly spare are either all ready prest or have thrust themselves as voluntaries into the late expediccions there wants nothing to consumate their undoing but the taking of their husbandmen.

Their humble and obedient sustenance of these infinite pressures (that wee may not terme them oppressions) gettes them no favor before others it seemes rather to draw upon them new charges in the same kinde. The present supply of 2000 souldiers were sent hither without a penny of money to maintaine them. And when 200 men now imposed

7 From the reference to the recent arrival of 2000 soldiers with no money and an order for a press for 200 more men in Devon, we can date this document a bit more accurately in the year 1627. The order to press 200 men was received in Devon on or about 25 Oct 1627 (SP16/82/82). The D.L.s of Devon received notice of the 2000 soldiers headed their way on 3 Sep 1627 and responded to the Council on 6 Sep. 1627 (SP16/77/1) and again for another group around 25 Oct. Thus, this document must date from later than 25 Oct 1627. It probably dates from before the arrival of some of the remnants of the Ré Expedition in Plymouth starting around 12 November, since this event is not mentioned. Thus the document probably dates from between 25 Oct and 12 or 15 Nov 1627. SP16/84/12 of 2 Nov 1627 mentions the start of the arrival of more soldiers in Plymouth, to the surprise of the local officials and so this may be the event mentioned. If so, the date of this document is very probably just after 2 Nov 1627.

8 A reference to the Forced Loan, presumably.
on Devonshire be levyed there bee about 1800 which have of late bene so sent out of that countye whose coates and conduct are yet unpayed for by his Majestie.

If these courses bee continued this people cannot hold out, but suddenly fall into decay. Wherein his majesties losse will be greatest because his interest lies in all their estates, his power consistinge in the strength and riches of his subjects.

His majesties honor doth likewise suffer much in these penurious wayes of billetting souldiers without money. What say the people will his Majestie make warre without provision of treasure or must our country beare the charge for all England. Is it not enough that wee undergoe the trouble of these insolent souldiers in our houses, their robberies and other misdemeanors but that we must maytaine them too at our owne cost. This say the people. And the Lordes have bene at sundry tymes advertised of these things but it seemes they are not believed or not remembred(sic).\/

In the billetinge of these last troopes there was tryall made of a new course viz. by making a proportionable collection of money throughout the countye. It was hoped so much would be raysed weeklie as should have defrayd(sic) the charge. And for this cause the troopes were lodgd(sic) in Townes as fittest for their government, for their exercise and speedy shippinge and diverse other reasons tending to the good of the service and the content of that parte of this country about Plimouth. But this way of levying money however it was at first entertayned with the approbation of the most as agreeable to that charitable(?) compassion which should be between the members of the same bodye in bearing a parte of their fellowes burden, yet the Commissioners finde it nowe to fayle them, and them selves much engaged by it both in their purses and in their credittes, besides the unsufferable(?) cost(?) of the poore billetters to whom the kinge now owes much more then they are worth.

So that it may be concluded for certaine that in the billeting of souldiers there is no way honorable for his Majestie safe(sic) for his service no contentinge to his subiects but by sending ready money with the souldiers into the country, nether is any way so cheape for the billetters will be better pleased with 3s. 6d. ready money then with our(?) hope of 4s. 8d. and then the off reckoninge furnished the souldier with shoes and stockinges and he stay longe for his transportation some other necessaries the way where of sometymes doth prove the overthrowe of a well contrived enterprise:

In the sending of this last 2000 men Cornewall was utterly forgotten that it is situate as neerer the porte of Plimouth as Devonshire: and is as fitt for the shippinge of men. The Lords being putt in minde heereof allotted that countye a proportion, the same it had the Cales voyage: 9 but their governors excused them selves by the smallnes of the countrye and the povertye of their people: ffor theire poverty it is not denyed but Devshire(Devonshire!) must needs partake with both standing upon one course of husbandrie and depending upon the same trades. ffor bye quantity of Cornewall it is yeelded to bee not much above a third of Devshire(sic).

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9 This is a reference to the return of the Cadiz Expedition around 1 Dec 1625. There were also expenses in Devon and Cornwall during the preparations for the Cadiz Expedition in the summer of 1625. See App. B Sec. 2.
But in the billeting of soldiers the quantity of the County is not considerable but the conveniency for his Majesties service. All Devonshire doth not use to billett soldiers but a piece of one division which is third parte. And Cornewall cannot deny it selfe to be equall in worth to the South Division of Devonshire and as fitt to billet soldiers when Plimouth is the rendezvous. But it will be good for his Majesties {service?} and please the governnors wee, if their duties be distinctly assigned each countie by severall directions. In the last expediccion to Cales of 10 regiments Denshire had 6 and Cornewall fowre.

And this proportion they may not unfittly beare upon all his Majesties occasions if money come with the Armies, otherwise they must chase one of the two ways of ruine ether to be quickly devoured or violently spoyled by the soldiier.

[There are no closing or signatures.]
Item 7 – **The Privy Council’s Instructions on Billeting Soldiers**


Wheras eight thousand foote leavied within this kingdome for his Majestie’s service are by direccon of this Board (unto whom his Majestie hath committed the present ordering and disposeing of the said leavies) to make there rendezouz upon the 25th of this present moneth at the porte of Plymouth, there to be shipped and embarqued; we have thought good, as well for the provision and accomodacion of the said troopes during theire stay there with all things necessarie as lykewise for the secureing of the countrie therabouts from such damage and outrage as otherwise they might be in danger of, through the insolencies and disorders of the souldiers, hereby to authorize and require you, or any three or more of you, to be aydeing and assisting from tyme to tyme unto Sir John Ogle, knight (who is sent with a commission from his Majestie to take charge of the said troopes), as well in the care and execution of theis direccions following as of all such other direccions as you shall receive from him for the furtherance of this service, viz

That in case the towne of Plymouth be not able to receive and furnish soe greate a number with sufficient provision of lodging and victualles, that then you cause soe many of the said companies as upon advise with Sir John Ogle shalbe thought requisite to be quartered and billeted in such other townes and places adjacent as are fitte to receive them. And because it is advertized that the plague is in Osen, over against Plymouth, whereof eight are said to be dead, and that in Plymouth there hath dyed of the spotted feaver (as they call it) five a day, you are to take special care, for the avoyding all that may be of any intercourse or commerse to be had betweene those of the said towne of Osen and those of Plymouth and the places adjoyneing. And you are lykewise to take care, that the souldiers be billited as remote as conveniently may be from such places in Plymouth as are infected with the spotted feaver.

That you procure and provide, by all possible meanes, that the markett be well served, and at reasonable prices, and that the provisions to be brought in by the countrie may passe secure and safe from the violence or pillage of the souldiers. For which purpose, as lykewise for the repressing of any insolencies or outrages whatsoever, which may happen to the countrie, or any refractorie and mutinous demeanor of the souldiers toward their captaines or officers such of you as are deputy lieutenantes are to cause to be in readines

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10 [APC Vol. 40, pp. 55-57, 16 May 1625, To the Deputy Lieutenants of Devon and Cornwall]
such nombers of the trayned bandes as shalbe found needfull on that behalfe.

That upon advise had with Sir John Ogle you make agreement with the hostes where the souldiers shalbe billited for theire lodging and dyett by the weeke, and the hostes either to receive theire money imediately from the captaines or, if it shalbe thought fitt to be paide to the souldiers, that then warning be given to theire hostes, that it is at theire owne perilles if they trust them.

Lastly, that in all things conducinge to the orderly and effectual advancement of this service you advise with Sir John Ogle and that you give your best ayde and assistance for the putting in execucion of whatsoever he shall direct or shalbe otherwise agreed upon betweene you. Herein, as the trust reposed in you is of noe small moment, soe we expect at your hande a judicious and diligent discharge of the same. And soe we bid etc.

Postscript. Besides the eight thousand before mencioned there are to arrive out of the Low Counteries twoe thousand more for whom the lyke care is to be taken as for the rest above mencioned.
Item 8 – The Privy Council’s Orders On the Duties of the Localities in Facilitating the Transit of Soldiers from One Billet to the Next

Having by our late letters of the 26th of September given you direction for the removeing of such troopes to their proper regiments as being now lodged upon that countie are not of the regiments designed to be billeted there, although we cannot doubt of your care and wisdome to performe that order, yett for the cleareing of any doubt that may arise we have thought fitt in explanacion of our intencion to give you this further direction which you are to observe in case those troopes be not already removed.

1. First, that you cause exact muster to be presently taken of those souldiers to be removed as they nowe stand, and make the rolle perfect till the day of their remove.

2. That you cause due accompt and reconings to be made aswell betwenee the officers and their creditors as the soldiers and their billiters, according to the rates allowed them, soe that his Majestie may stand charged with the debt and the creditors claime payment, and hereof you are to make a booke and subscribe the same.

3. That you cause a competent provision of victuall or money for so many dayes as may carry the soldiers to the next rendevous, to be taken up after the rate of fower shillings eightpence a week a man, and charge the same upon the forenamed accompt, and if any refuse to contribute hereunto what you shall assesse, you are by vertue hereof to bilett upon them such soldiers as you shall thinck fitt.

4. That for the better accomadacion of the commanders and officers you allow unto them a proportionable ymprest for their remove, haveing respect unto their wants and service in governing and traineing the companies, and to cause entries to be made hereof upon the foresaid booke of accompts.

5. That you give order for convenient carriages and horses to carry the spares armes and ammuniciori belonging to the companies from place to place within your precinctes and put the charge to accompte.

6. That if the soldiers to be removed shall be found very destitute of clothes, that you take the best order you can for the furnishing of them in a convenient manner.

7. And for the due repayment of all those charges thus to be disbursed, you may rest

assured that a speedy order shall be taken and entire satisfaccion given therein. In the
dispatch of the troopes you are to direct them the neerest way and give them certificate
under your hands, where they are to reside, and the tyme and place from whence they did
begin to march. In all which wee nothing doubt of your accustomed care and wee shalbe
ready to ymprove your good service herein to his Majestie.
Item 9A - A Commission for Martial Law

Charles by the grace of God, etc. The Lord Conway, lord lieutenant of Southampton, and the deputy lieutenants thereby named, etc. Whereas there are some dissolute mariners and soldiers who commit felonies, robberies, and depart our service, we have thought fit to punish such offenses, and we give authority to you, or three of you, to proceed according to martial law against mariners, soldiers, and all other disorderly persons that shall adhere and join with them and that do commit felony, murders, etc., or any outrage and misdemeanors, which by martial law is to be punished with death, and proceed to trial according to law martial in time of war and according to certain instructions, and that the offenders be executed openly, and we command all justices and sheriffs to be aiding to you. 4 September, 2 Caroli.

Item 9B – Instructions for the Execution of Martial Law in His Majesty’s Army

1. He that shall take God’s name in vain or blaspheme God, for his first offense in that kind shall be kept three days in prison with bread and water; and for the second time of offending he shall have a hot iron thrust through his tongue and be stripped to his shirt and so banished the army.

2. The like penalty shall be inflicted on those who either say or do aught in despite or derision of God’s word or the ministers of God.

3. All willful murders, rapes, firing of houses, robberies, outrages, unnatural abuses, and such like shall be punished with death.

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1 Commons Debates 1628, Vol. 2, pg. 214. The spellings have been modernized in the Commons Debates 1628.

2 S.P. 16/35/14; 4 Sep 1626. For notice of the drawing of the commission, see APC, 1626, p. 221.

3 Commons Debates 1628, Vol. 2, pp. 424-426; from H.R.O 5M50/1954, folios 114v-116v. The spellings have been modernized in the Commons Debates 1628.
4. No man shall beat, threaten, or dishonestly touch any woman or children on pain of punishment according to the quality of the offense.

5. Whosoever shall conspire to do anything against the fleet or army shall be put to death without mercy.

6. Whosoever shall come to the knowledge of any such fact and conspiracy and not acquaint their chief officer therewith shall be punished with death without mercy.

7. Whosoever shall have a mutiny shall be punished to death without mercy.

8. Whosoever shall make any unlawful assembly shall be punished according to discretion, and if it shall be judged of that quality and of such danger to the service as it shall deserve it, to be punished with death.

9. Whosoever shall be present at such an assembly and call and stir up or entice any to increase it shall be subject to the same punishment, and officers more than any other.

10. He that speaketh any words tending to sedition, mutiny, or disobedience, or that having heard any such words and shall not acquaint his superior officer therewith shall be punished with death.

11. In like manner they shall be punished who rehearse any such words in the presence of private soldiers without order.

12. Whosoever shall entertain conference, or hold correspondence with the enemy, or send any message or letter to the enemy, or receive any from him without the consent of the commander in chief shall be punished without mercy.

13. Whosoever shall converse with any trumpet or drum of the enemy, or any sent in message from them, without leave of the chief officer shall be punished with death.

14. Whosoever shall go out of his quarter from his colors or garrison farther than a common shot without his captain’s leave shall be punished with death.

15. Whosoever shall forsake his colors shall without mercy be punished with death.

16. Whosoever shall neglect his watch or any other service commanded him shall be punished with death.
17. Whosoever shall be found sleeping upon his watch whether of sentinel or perdu shall without mercy be punished with death.\(^4\)

18. Whosoever shall depart from such his watch when he hath been placed by his officer, unless he is called thence or relieved by his officer, shall receive punishment of death without mercy.

19. No man shall make known the watchword to the enemy or any other but by order, or give any other word than is given him by the officers, on pain of death.

20. Whosoever shall absent himself out of the *Corps de Guarde* without his officer’s leave shall be punished with death.

21. No man shall make an alarm or discharge his piece by night, nor make any noise without lawful cause, on pain of death.

22. Whosoever shall draw his sword without order after the watch is set shall be punished with death.

23. Whosoever shall strike his fellow soldier shall be punished according to discretion.

24. No man shall demand money by any unlawful assembly.

25. No captain, lieutenant, or ensign shall depart from his garrison or quarter without sufficient leave, on pain of death.

26. No man shall quarrel or fight in any private quarrel or call any to his help in such a quarrel, on pain of death.

27. Whosoever shall go on freebooting or commit any spoil without order shall suffer death.

28. What soldier soever shall challenge another into the field shall be punished with death.

29. If any corporal or other commanding the watch shall suffer a soldier to go forth privately to fight, he shall without mercy be punished with death.

30. The soldier wronged either by word or deed shall repair to his officer for satisfaction wherein there shall be order taken, or if he take his own course he shall be punished with discretion.

\(^4\) O.E.D., 2nd ed., s.v. “perdu”: advanced and very dangerous sentinel position.
31. Whosoever shall go out of his garrison or quarter, or come in any other way than at the ports and ordinary allowed passages shall be punished with death.

32. Whosoever shall refuse to perform the commands of his officer according unto the discipline of war shall be punished with death.

33. Whosoever shall not repair to his colors unless it be upon evident necessity when any alarm is given or shall go to another place without special order or shall neglect his time in coming to his colors shall be punished with death.

34. Whosoever shall go out of his order or rank where he is placed by his officer without leave shall be punished with death.

35. Whosoever shall run away at a battle, assault, or encounter may be killed by any man that meeteth him, and if he shall escape he shall be declared a villain.

36. No man that shall be appointed to the defense of any place, be he officer or soldier, shall quit that place without order from the chief on pain of death without mercy.

37. Whosoever shall deliver any place to the enemy by betraying it shall be punished with death without mercy.

38. Whosoever shall persuade the leaving of the defense of any place without sufficient order shall suffer death without mercy.

39. Whosoever shall run to the enemy being taken again shall be punished with death.

40. No captain shall entice away the soldier of another captain upon pain of being punished according to discretion.

41. No soldiers shall go away from the service of his captain to the service of another upon pain of being severely punished unless he have lawful order.

42. Whosoever shall by word or deed interrupt an officer in the execution of his office without order shall, without mercy, be put to death.

43. Whosoever shall not come fully armed to his colors, being of the watch, or being to watch or exercise, shall be punished according to discretion.

44. Whosoever takes any prisoner of the enemy shall instantly bring the prisoner to the chief commanding in that quarter, from him to be brought to the chief of the army on pain of death.
45. Whosoever shall take a prisoner and suffer him to depart without the orders of the chief of the army shall be punished with death.

46. Whosoever shall take any prize shall presently acquaint the chief of the army with it on pain of death.

47. All captains and officers shall observe to acquaint the chief commanding in their quarter and the chief of the armies with all offenders under them on pain of being punished according to discretion.

Subscr[ibed by]:
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