Non citizens, Voice, and Identity: the Politics of Citizenship in Japan’s Korean Community

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between citizenship policies and noncitizen political behavior, focusing on extra-electoral forms of political participation by Korean residents in Japan. I analyze the institutional factors that have mediated the construction of Korean collective identity in Japan and, in turn, the ways that Korean community activists have re-conceptualized possibilities for their exercise of citizenship as foreign residents in Japan. My empirical analysis is based on a theoretical framework that defines citizenship as an interactive process of political incorporation, performance, and participation. I posit that the various dimensions of citizenship—its legal significance, symbolic meaning, claims and responsibilities, and practice—are performed, negotiated, and restructured in a triangular interactive relationship between the state, citizens, and noncitizens.

I address a puzzle that is both specific to Koreans in Japan and generalizable to foreign permanent residents in other advanced industrial democracies: Given their high levels of cultural assimilation, why does citizenship remain the last vestige of identity within the Korean community in Japan? Unlike previous studies that have focused on stringent citizenship policies at the level of the state alone, this paper explores the interactive process between institutions and communities. Based on their legal status, we would expect social movements in Japan’s Korean community to center around the quest for citizenship acquisition. Yet, the findings of this paper demonstrate that Korean organizations have concentrated their efforts on securing the community’s foreign citizenship status. I argue that postwar Japan’s ethnocultural citizenship policies both shaped Korean political identity in Japan and structured political opportunities for Korean activists to negotiate the terms of their community’s incorporation. Especially in recent years, new generations of Korean activists have reinterpreted the meaning of Korean citizenship as identity and practice in movements to democratize Japanese society. Rather than naturalize and become a small section of the voting population, Korean activists have increasingly used their noncitizen status as their “voice” to express their opposition to state policies. Based on ethnographic research conducted in Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Osaka over a twelve-month period, this paper explores how citizenship policies affect the political identities, claims, and strategies of noncitizen communities.
**Introduction: The Permanent Foreign Resident**

In a speech to a unit of the Self Defense Forces on April 9, 2000, Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintaro warned that, in the outbreak of a major earthquake, the soldiers should be prepared for riots by sangokujin, a derogatory term used to refer to people from the former colonies of Korea and Taiwan during the Occupation (1945-52). Following the uproar in the media and segments of the public, Ishihara maintained that there was no need to apologize because he was referring to illegal immigrants, not long-term Korean residents. Such a statement does not come as a surprise from a prominent politician who has in the past claimed the 1937 Nanjing Massacre was a fabrication. However, Ishihara’s willingness to qualify his statement only as it pertains to Korean residents highlights the Korean community’s ambiguous position between “troublesome” new immigrants and Japanese nationals.

Korean residents make up about 35 percent of all alien residents in Japan.¹ Although naturalization procedures have become less restrictive for permanent residents over the past few decades, there were fewer than 250,000 naturalized Koreans in Japan by the end of 1999 (see Table 1).² By comparison,

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¹ Japanese citizenship policies are based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* (citizenship by descent) and, therefore, native-born Koreans do not automatically qualify for Japanese citizenship. The current Korean resident population in Japan numbers a little over 630,000, constituting the largest and oldest foreign resident community in Japan. Unlike the principal immigrant communities in Western Europe that were established in the postwar period, mass Korean settlement in Japan began well before World War Two as a result of Japan’s colonialization of Korea in 1910 and peaked during Japan’s wartime mobilization.

² According to Kim Yong Dal (1990: 110), there were 145,572 naturalized Koreans in 1988. The annual naturalization rate in the 1980s fluctuated between an average of 4,500 to 6,800. While the rate for 1991 remained consistent with the previous decade (at 5,665), the annual average increased to 7,244 in 1992 and 7,697 in 1993 (Tanaka 1996: 52-53). Since 1995, the annual average has remained consistent at about 10,000.
close to 840,000 persons in the United States naturalized in the year 1999 alone, including almost 18,000 persons who were born in Korea.\textsuperscript{3} Yet, unlike the Korean community in the United States or the long-term Korean resident population in China, Koreans in Japan show few signs of maintaining a strong Korean sociocultural identity according to the conventional indicators of language, education, and marriage. An estimated 90 percent of this population—which now spans four generations—was born in Japan. The overwhelming majority of school-age Korean residents attends Japanese elementary and secondary schools using Japanese aliases. Furthermore, intermarriages between Korean residents and Japanese nationals have increased to over 80 percent of all marriages among Korean residents.

\textsuperscript{3} These figures are based on the 2000 INS Statistical Yearbook, Table 49. The total Korean population in the United States in the year 2000 numbered about 1.2 million, including a little over 700,000 (57\%) who were born in Korea (see Table 6.1). Thus, the number of Korean citizens in the United States was similar to that of North and South Korean citizens in Japan despite the fact that the majority in the former category was foreign-born while the majority in the latter was native-born. The total number of naturalizations by Korean immigrants in the United States has been almost twice that of Korean residents in Japan since 1991 (before that time, the number was much higher in the U.S.).
Table 1. Annual Naturalizations in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>(N&amp;S) Nationals</th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>282</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>2,434</td>
<td>2,661</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3,763</td>
<td>4,156</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3,438</td>
<td>4,188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4,646</td>
<td>5,379</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>6,323</td>
<td>8,568</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5,987</td>
<td>8,004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>5,040</td>
<td>6,824</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5,216</td>
<td>6,794</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5,665</td>
<td>7,788</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7,244</td>
<td>9,363</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>7,697</td>
<td>10,452</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>8,244</td>
<td>11,146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>10,327</td>
<td>14,104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>9,898</td>
<td>14,495</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>9,678</td>
<td>15,061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>9,561</td>
<td>14,779</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10,059</td>
<td>16,120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Given the high rates of cultural assimilation among long-term Korean residents, why does Korean citizenship remain the last vestige of Korean identity in Japan? The typical answer to this question, by Koreans and non-Koreans alike, is that naturalization is equivalent to assimilation into Japanese society, which is an extension of the colonial policy of forced cultural assimilation. This policy involved the eradication of Korean language, names, and cultural expression. Thus, according to this view, the especially stringent nature of Japanese naturalization procedures coupled with the unique history of Koreans in Japan have resulted in low naturalization rates among Korean residents.

Based on their legal status, we would expect social movements in Japan’s Korean community to center around the quest for citizenship acquisition. Yet, as
this paper demonstrates, postwar Korean organizations have focused their efforts on securing the community’s foreign citizenship status. Unlike previous studies that have portrayed Koreans as “victims” of restrictive Japanese state policies, I argue that the dominant postwar Korean community organizations reinforced these policies by actively discourageing their members from naturalizing in order to ensure their own organizational survival. However, in recent years, new generations of activists have used their foreign citizenship status to challenge the meaning of Japanese citizenship itself, which is presently based on the discourse of cultural homogeneity. Focusing on the mutually constitutive relationship between postwar Japanese citizenship policies and Korean community organizations, this paper addresses a central question posed by contemporary citizenship and immigration politics in advanced industrial democracies: How do citizenship policies affect the political identities, claims, and strategies of noncitizen communities? Through the lens of Korean community organizations in Japan, I will explore the various dimensions and multiple levels of citizenship in comparative, historical, and theoretical perspective to offer insights into the triangular interaction between the state, citizens, and noncitizens in constructing, exercising, and contesting citizenship.

The Noncitizen as Political Actor

Much of the contemporary literature on political participation in advanced industrial democracies has focused on the vexing problem of
declining citizen participation.\textsuperscript{4} In particular, the question that has motivated this literature stems from the disjuncture between citizenship policies and citizen political behavior: Why don’t citizens vote? Scholarship on immigration and racial politics in Western Europe and the United States has demonstrated increasing interest in the disjuncture between citizenship policies and noncitizen political behavior: Why don’t noncitizens naturalize?\textsuperscript{5}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1990 Total*</th>
<th>% of Total of Foreign Population*</th>
<th>1999 Total</th>
<th>% of Total of Foreign Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>88,500</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>145,400</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>101,400</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>248,200</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12,800</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>62,100</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>16,800</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>57,300</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>54,900</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\*Total figures were rounded off to the nearest hundred.

\**The naturalization rate ("% of foreign population") indicates the number of persons acquiring nationality of the host country as a percentage of the total foreign population at the beginning of the year.

Indeed, the anomalous situation outlined in the previous section is not unique to Koreans in Japan. While foreign nationals make up a substantial

\textsuperscript{4} For recent reviews of the voluminous scholarship on political participation in the United States, see Fiorina 2002 and Schlozman 2002.

\textsuperscript{5} For example, there is a growing interest in this question as it pertains to Mexican Americans in U.S. politics (e.g., see Cho 1999; DeSipio 1996; Johnston 2001; Lien 1994, 1998; Pachon 1991; Skerry 1993; Wong 2000).
proportion of the labor force in a number of advanced industrial societies, their rate of naturalization in many cases is low even among long-term and native-born residents (see Table 2). Various states have attempted to incorporate these populations into the polity by gradually extending civil, social, and limited political citizenship rights and privileges that stop short of full citizenship. For example, all of the OECD countries listed in Table 3 grant various social benefits to foreign residents, which may include access to social security, unemployment insurance, and housing assistance. The Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland are among a number of European countries that also grant local, and, in some cases, regional voting rights to its foreign residents. While none of the countries listed in Table 3 automatically grants birthright citizenship to second-generation foreign residents, most grant citizenship to the second-generation under specific conditions relating either to the individual's or parents' residency in the host

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6 Tomas Hammar (1990: 22-23) estimated that, by 1987, approximately 7.5 million foreign residents in Europe (or more than half of the total foreign resident population) fit this category, which he referred to as “denizens.” Even in the United States, where naturalization rates are higher than in other OECD countries, the proportion of naturalized citizens in the foreign-born population has declined from 63.6% in 1970 to 50.1% in 1980 to 40.5% in 1990 and, finally, 37.4% in 2000. This decline is attributable primarily to the relatively low rates of naturalization among the foreign-born population from Latin America, who made up half of the total foreign-born population in 2000. In the year 2000, 28.3% of the total foreign-born population from Latin America consisted of naturalized U.S. citizens (including 21.1% from Central America), compared to 52% of the foreign-born population from Europe and 47.1% from Asia. See U.S. Census Bureau 2001.

7 Citizenship rights are divided into civil, social, and political rights based on T. H. Marshall’s (1950) classic formulation of citizenship rights in Britain. For the purposes of Table 3, civil rights refer to “rights necessary for individual freedom” such as “liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice” (Marshall 1950: 78). Social rights include “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society” (p. 78). In many cases, these rights make foreign residents eligible to most state-administered benefits such as social security, health insurance, worker pensions, child care allowances, admission to public housing, and so forth. Finally, political rights refer to “the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body” (p. 78). For foreign residents, these rights are normally limited to voting in local and/or regional elections.
country (Austria and Japan still require native-born applicants to naturalize).

Despite the numerous revisions to citizenship policies in the past two decades, however, the rates of naturalization in most of the OECD countries listed in Table 2 have not risen past 5 percent (the exceptions in the table are the Netherlands and Sweden).

### Table 3. Foreign Populations and Alien Rights in Selected OECD Countries (1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Foreign Population (thousands)</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
<th>Citizenship Rights</th>
<th>Host Citizenship Attribution for Second-Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>748.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>Civil, Social</td>
<td>Naturalization required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>897.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>Civil, Social</td>
<td>Conditional entitlement^1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,263.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Civil, Social</td>
<td>Conditional entitlement^2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7,343.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>Civil, Social</td>
<td>Conditional entitlement^3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,556.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Civil, Social</td>
<td>Naturalization required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>651.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Civil, Social, Political</td>
<td>Conditional entitlement^2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>487.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Civil, Social, Political</td>
<td>Conditional entitlement^2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1,368.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>Civil, Social, Political</td>
<td>Naturalization required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2,208.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Civil, Social, Political, Political</td>
<td>Conditional entitlement^3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


^1These rights are limited to nationals holding Commonwealth citizenship. Commonwealth citizens, however, do not automatically have immigration rights.

^2Dependent on parents’ years of residence in host society.

^3Dependent on individual’s years of residence in host society.

These low naturalization rates among permanently settled populations of foreign residents who have been granted partial citizenship rights—and are thus, neither full citizens of the host country nor recent immigrants who lack a secure residence status—pose particular dilemmas for liberal democracies. On the one hand, the long-term exclusion of a significant fraction of the population from the
rights and duties of full citizenship is untenable for putatively democratic states. Especially as debates about immigration and national identity become increasingly racialized, the line separating de facto and de jure second-class citizens is often blurred. Moreover, the contradictions inherent in having a population of permanent residents who pay taxes, benefit from social services, and otherwise participate in the host civil society but remain disenfranchised threaten the political stability of liberal democracies (Hammar 1990: 27). On the other hand, low naturalization rates among permanently settled foreign populations reflect an unwillingness to assimilate into the host society and polity. Not only does this position pose a potential threat to what is commonly referred to as the “cultural integrity” of the host society, but it may also challenge the civic ideals upon which the society’s citizenship policies are based. Additionally, the reluctance on the part of foreign residents to sever ties with their country of origin may be interpreted as a threat to the national security of the host society.

In a number of cases, the disincentives for foreigners to naturalize, such as language barriers, lack of money and/or time, or reluctance to sever ties with the homeland (Lien 1998: 5), may outweigh the incentives, such as the right to vote or run for public office. In addition, recent moves to equalize citizenship rights between citizens and noncitizens in advanced industrial democracies may have lessened the incentives for foreign residents to naturalize. Moreover, the anomaly of a significant proportion of a country’s eligible residents
remaining outside the community of citizens is certainly not a recent phenomenon.\(^8\)

However, given that foreign community organizations purport to seek the political empowerment of their communities, why are campaigns to encourage naturalization and voter registration absent in such countries as Japan, Germany, and Austria, where naturalization rates remain low even among native-born foreign residents?\(^9\) Why do native-born foreign resident activists focus their energies on gaining partial citizenship rights rather than full citizenship for their communities? Why do many foreign community organizations resist, rather than encourage, state efforts at political incorporation?

Based on the case of Korean voluntary associations in Japan, I argue that new generations of foreign community activists have used citizenship, in its various dimensions, as a political tool to negotiate the terms of their community’s incorporation. Even if foreign residents ultimately want to become formal members of their host societies, they may not necessarily want to

\(^8\) For example, following the adoption of *jus sanguinis* in France’s 1804 civil code, the majority of second-generation immigrants who were eligible for citizenship remained foreigners. As Patrick Weil (2001: 28) explains, they “were in no hurry to claim their French citizenship” because, as noncitizens, they could avoid the military draft. The French state subsequently introduced “double *jus soli*” whereby third-generation immigrants born in France were automatically conferred French citizenship (Weil 2001: 28-29).

\(^9\) Remarkably little has been written about the patterns of noncitizen political mobilization and participation. Most of the literature on this subject concentrates on transnational or homeland-based political activities of immigrants and foreign residents (e.g., see Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1995; Chan 1990; Faist 2000; Georges 1990; Gurr 2000). Important exceptions include Ireland 1994 and Koopmans and Statham 2000; 2001. This lack of interest may partially derive from assumptions that “noncitizen political participation” is an oxymoron, or that disenfranchisement implies political passivity. However, these assumptions contradict historical evidence and scholarship documenting the political activities of noncitizens and second-class (disenfranchised) citizens, such as women and racial minorities. For example, Theda Skocpol’s (1992) study of social policy formation in the United States at the turn of the century demonstrates that movements by women’s voluntary groups were more influential in agitating for social legislation than those of industrial workers despite the fact that women did not have the right to vote at this time.
naturalize under the terms and conditions of extant citizenship policies, especially when they are based on ethnocultural understandings of nationhood. Hence, their social movements may be focused on contesting and negotiating the terms of their political incorporation, not simply political incorporation itself.

Precisely because their status is ambiguous—they are foreigners with extensive civil and social citizenship rights—permanently settled foreign residents are in a unique position to engage in this form of political exchange. In fact, the problems that they pose to liberal democratic states—as permanently settled residents without full citizenship rights—in an era of heightened international concern for human rights may give them a louder “voice” than their naturalized counterparts especially when their numbers are relatively small.10 In putatively homogenous societies with restrictive citizenship policies, foreign residents may experience greater bargaining power at the local level as a result of piecemeal extensions of institutionalized rights. Because foreign residents are recognized as de facto citizens, liberal democratic states may encounter considerable internal and external pressure to politically incorporate this group and, consequently, may tolerate certain conditions that were once unthinkable (such as the de facto toleration of dual citizenship). Accordingly, the very stringency of such citizenship policies based on claims of ethnic and cultural homogeneity may

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10 I contend that this phenomenon is in part due to the highly contingent character of the citizenship acquisition process in advanced industrial democracies. While the legal barriers to naturalization in most democracies have diminished significantly in the past few decades, the exclusionary and particularistic character of citizenship discourse has reinforced high symbolic barriers. Indeed, in another work, I argue that the contingencies of particular citizenship policies can have a chilling effect on the political activities of naturalized citizens (see Chung 2002).
provide foreign resident activists with distinct opportunities for negotiating and contesting what is otherwise a passive determination of membership in a political community. In this way, noncitizen social movements seek not only institutionalized rights guaranteed by the state; rather, they may likely seek to contribute to the quality of citizenship exercised in their host society.

Postnationalism, National Traditions, and State-Centered Approaches to Citizenship

In recent decades, we have witnessed a resurgence in comparative studies of citizenship, race, and ethnicity in the social sciences. The collapse of the Soviet Union, structural shifts in the world economy that have brought about corresponding processes of globalization and fragmentation, and the revival of racist and nationalist movements in Europe are among a few of the factors that have contributed to this resurgence. Contemporary research on citizenship in Europe and North America has provided us with new ways of thinking about citizenship that extend significantly beyond a strict national definition. Although the starting point for much of the work in this field is T. H. Marshall’s (1950) post-war conception of citizenship-as-rights, scholarship on the “frontiers of citizenship” problematizes the location of citizenship within the geographical and cultural boundaries of the nation-state (Vogel and Moran 1991). The concept of postnational citizenship in the European Community (Hammar 1990; Habermas 1994; Soysal 1994) and the communitarian model of democratic citizenship based on “critical associationalism” (Walzer 1991) have attempted to
weaken the equation of citizenship with nationality in advanced industrial societies. Meanwhile, liberal models of multicultural citizenship in Canada (Kymlicka 1995) and cultural pluralist conceptions of “differentiated citizenship” (Young 1989) have called into question the notion of a homogenous community of citizens.

Whereas political, economic, and technological changes have transformed the outer limits of citizenship as well as the “geographies” of national identity (Lavie and Swedenburg 1996), international migration has intensified the significance of race as a global phenomenon. Debates on immigration and “true” membership in national polities have become increasingly racialized and exclusionary. In France, the “challenge” posed by new (or non-European) immigrants to French national identity has been the source of a broad socio-political debate since 1985 (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991). In the United States, Congress passed a welfare reform bill in 1996 to bar legal immigrants and permanent residents from a wide range of federal benefits and services.

While the study of citizenship has long centered around the problems of inclusion and exclusion, as well as rights and obligations, recent analyses of citizenship in advanced industrial societies have focused particularly on the position of foreigners and immigrants from post-colonial societies. In particular, the long-term exclusion of a significant fraction of the population from citizenship has reappeared as a problem in democratic theory (Brubaker 1989b;
Spinner 1994; Murchland 1997; Benhabib 1999). Furthermore, current popular and academic discussions on citizenship reflect the growing concern with reconceptualizing the concept in the context of multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and/or multi-cultural societies (see Bulmer and Solomos 1996: 782).

Much of the recent scholarship has applied a top-down analysis of citizenship policies at the level of the state alone. The two dominant paradigms, which are centered around postnational and “national traditions” approaches to citizenship, look primarily at the issue of state sovereignty in arguments that assert either the historical continuity or discontinuity of national citizenship in the contemporary world. Scholarship on postnational citizenship, for example, argues that economic globalization, international migration, and the development of supranational organizations have changed the territorial boundaries of citizenship and, according to some, have made national citizenship obsolete. This field of research varies widely, ranging from theories of denizenship (Hammar 1990) to models of postnational citizenship (Soysal 1994), transnational citizenship (Bauböck 1994), and European citizenship (Meehan 1993; Habermas 1994) to calls for global citizenship (Falk 1994). However, they converge in their definition of citizenship as membership in a community of legal rights and obligations rather than as membership in a nation-state.

Although this “new wave” of citizenship scholarship has developed in response to actual events and movements, much of it tends to be more prescriptive than diagnostic, with abstract conceptualizations of citizenship
ideals rather than realities. Moreover, this scholarship is based on the highly precarious assumption that global convergence, or a structural transformation, has already occurred. To be sure, international conventions based on universal human rights are increasingly constraining the ability of individual nation-states to enforce social hierarchies based on race, ethnicity, and caste especially through violent means. At the same time, national states continue to enjoy wide discretionary power in defining their citizens. Moreover, citizenship reforms in the past few decades have not necessarily been expansive. While various states, such as Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark, have granted foreign residents extensive civil and social citizenship rights (and limited political rights), others, such as Britain, France, and the United States, have successfully and unsuccessfully attempted to restrict foreign residents’ access to birthright citizenship and social welfare benefits. In France and Germany, recent reforms to nationality laws followed the failure of efforts to extend voting rights to foreign residents in the 1990s (Thomas 2002). These patterns demonstrate the continued saliency of national citizenship in debates about the political rights of foreign residents. If, as postnationalists claim, a deterritorialized system based on universal human rights is replacing the national model, why is national citizenship (in a European member state)—rather than residence—a precondition for European citizenship, which is the first institutionalized model of postnational citizenship in the current era?
In fact, Rogers Brubaker (1992) argues that national citizenship policies have demonstrated remarkable continuity despite convergent migration processes and immigration policies. Citizenship remains a powerful instrument of social closure and, thus, a politically charged institution for citizens and noncitizens alike. Until recently, modern citizenship acquisition policies in advanced industrial democracies remained fundamentally unchanged in most countries despite various revisions. Brubaker attributes this persistence to the distinct national traditions rooted in each nation-state’s political and cultural development.

Yet, Germany’s incorporation of *jus soli* (birthright citizenship) into its citizenship laws in 2000 represents a radical departure from its century-long adherence to a pure system of *jus sanguinis* (citizenship by descent). How do we explain this fundamental change after almost a century of continuity? Brubaker’s emphasis on static national traditions does not leave much room for change. However, “national traditions,” as numerous studies have demonstrated, are themselves reproduced, restructured, and reinterpreted according to historically specific processes (e.g., Anderson 1983; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Goldberg 1993; Hobsbawm 1990; Small 1994; Sollors 1989; Steinberg 1981).

Despite their different lines of argument, both postnational and “national traditions” approaches to citizenship focus on a single unit of analysis: the state. Indeed, the issue of state sovereignty lies at the heart of most state-centered
approaches to citizenship. Thus, arguments for historical continuity or discontinuity are dependent upon evidence of the persistence or decline of the nation-state. In many ways, postnational approaches suffer from the same problems that have plagued the torrent of globalization theories since the mid-1970s, such as the convergence hypothesis in international political economy (e.g., Reich 1991; Stopford and Strange 1991) or the “end of history” arguments in the popular press (Fukuyama 1992). That is, they assume that the irresistible forces of globalization are making the nation-state form obsolete. According to this view, the decline of national citizenship is inevitable. In the face of evidence to the contrary, postnational theories become little more than normative undertakings that operate on an “axis of aspiration,” reaching out to a future-to-be-created (Falk 1994).

On the other hand, the national traditions argument put forth by Brubaker makes fundamental changes to citizenship policies virtually impossible under the nation-state system. This view implies that changes in citizenship policies can occur only following revolutionary changes to the system of nation-states or, at the minimum, radical transformations in understandings of nationhood within a nation-state. Thus, the national traditions approach cannot explain why fundamental changes to German citizenship policies were implemented without a sweeping rejection of ethnocultural nationhood traditions, much less a social revolution. By framing the concept of national traditions in static, foundationalist terms, this approach masks the malleability of those traditions at the hands of
state and non-state actors, as Miriam Feldblum (Feldblum 1999: 6-7) argues. In many cases, the organization of interest groups and coalitions as well as their appropriation and manipulation of national traditions may be more pivotal to citizenship politics than the traditions themselves.

By focusing primarily on structural changes, these approaches tend to overlook the politics behind citizenship policies. In other words, they often ignore the interaction between state and non-state actors (citizens and noncitizens) in the process of shaping citizenship debates and building the groundwork for citizenship reforms. In particular, the role of the noncitizen is reduced to spectator, victim, or beneficiary of citizenship policies and reforms.

I argue that the structural transformations of the past few decades have brought about significant changes to the meaning and practice of citizenship, less so to formal citizenship policies. Hence, change and continuity in citizenship policies and politics are not mutually exclusive. We are witnessing neither the end of national citizenship nor the perpetuation of static national traditions. Accordingly, the preoccupation with examining citizenship as formal membership at the level of the state alone is not adequate for explaining the current dynamics of citizenship politics. In order to better comprehend these dynamics, we need to examine citizenship at the level of both formal membership and practice.
Citizenship as an Interactive Process

Building on the work of Charles Tilly (1996), I define citizenship as an interactive process of political incorporation, performance, and participation based on universalist claims that are subject to constant interpretation and negotiation by state and non-state actors within structural boundaries. Rather than a top-down analysis of citizenship policies at the level of the state alone, this paper considers the various dimensions and multiple levels of citizenship. This definition of citizenship encompasses four broad categories: 1) legal status, which represents formal membership in a political community; 2) symbolic significance, or the collective identities that are defined by citizenship policies; 3) rights and responsibilities, which may overlap between citizens and noncitizens; and 4) the practice, or exercise, of citizenship in civil society, according to the republican definition. As indicated in Figure 1, the individual categories become more expansive as they move away from the domain of the state toward that of citizens and noncitizens. Indeed, the placement of the last category—the practice of citizenship—at the bottom of the pyramid signifies both the predominant role played by citizens and noncitizens in shaping the practice of citizenship as well as the relatively wide arena that this category encompasses. Nevertheless, all of these dimensions—which are not mutually exclusive—involve the triangular interaction of the state, citizens, and
noncitizens and thus, contribute to the dynamic process of citizenship.11 While extant approaches to citizenship tend to focus on individual dimensions,12 I argue that a comprehensive understanding of citizenship requires a relational analysis that situates the interaction of these dimensions in the proper historical context.

Citizenship policies, which are themselves the products of debates on national identity, race, ethnicity, and so forth, define the categories of political membership within a nation-state and their attendant rights and duties. By distinguishing between who is and is not worthy of

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11 I acknowledge that the term, “noncitizen,” encompasses a broad category of distinct groups such as recent immigrants (including legal and illegal immigrants, migrant workers, etc.), permanent foreign residents, refugees, stateless persons, and varieties of “second-class” citizens (nationals who do not have full citizenship and immigration rights). Although this dissertation focuses on permanent foreign residents, I have chosen to refer to them periodically as “noncitizens” in order to delineate both their structural position vis-à-vis citizens and the state and their fluid self-representations as sojourners, immigrants, or foreign residents, for example.

12 For example, the two predominant approaches to citizenship focus on the last two dimensions: 1) citizenship as rights in the tradition of T.H. Marshall (1950) and 2) citizenship as civic behavior in the republican tradition (Almond and Verba 1963). While the former focuses primarily on institutionalized rights guaranteed by the state and the latter on civic culture, both schools of thought have traditionally framed their analyses within the context of the nation-state. The current liberal-communitarian debate on citizenship centers around the significance of citizenship as rights and duties (which is framed as citizenship as rights or duties), and inserts elements of the republican tradition to support or negate the respective positions. Additionally, postnational approaches have applied Marshall’s formulation in their discussions of rights granted to those outside of his model—migrants and foreign residents. However, these approaches are more interested in the structure of citizenship at the level of the state than its impact on the political behavior of migrants and foreign residents.
Figure 1
An Interactive Approach to Citizenship
membership as well as the terms of membership and non-membership, these policies structure the relations between state and non-state actors and between citizens and noncitizens. As a result, citizenship policies and the discourses upon which they are based shape the collective identities of those living within the territorial and legal boundaries of a nation-state as well as the political opportunities for their exclusion and participation in political development. In turn, citizenship practices, debates, and revisions are shaped by the ways in which politically constructed groups interpret and respond to their legal and political positions within discursive and material constraints (although not necessarily as a result of the actors’ intentions). Finally, the institution of citizenship itself may be reshaped and reformed according to developments in citizenship practices, debates, and revisions. In this way, the various dimensions of citizenship—its legal significance, symbolic meaning, claims and responsibilities, and practice—are performed, negotiated, and restructured in a triangular interactive relationship between the state, citizens, and noncitizens.

Two important caveats to this understanding of citizenship must be noted. First, international and historical context is central to the empirical application of this framework. International developments may trigger new (and old) 

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13 For instance, among these rights and duties conferred to citizens includes that of political participation, which encompasses the right to political contestation. As a result, citizens have the right to contest the terms of their citizenship and challenge the boundaries of their rights and duties. These terms and boundaries may shift according to legislative reforms or specific circumstances, such as war. They may also shift according to the constitution of the citizenry—from predominantly ethnic Germans to a multiethnic community, for example. In this case, some citizens may call for measures to restrict the community of citizens (e.g., restriction of citizenship acquisition policies) and others may demand reforms to meet the needs of the changing community.

14 This world-historical context is what Theda Skocpol (1979; 1992) refers to as “world time.”
debates, shape opportunities for diverse citizenship practices, and necessitate specific citizenship reforms. For example, the “new” immigration from post-colonial societies in Western Europe has been the source of broad socio-political debates about “national identity” and numerous proposals for restrictive immigration and citizenship revisions since the 1980s. Following the end of the Cold War, the massive influx of ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe into Germany eventually motivated legislation limiting immigration rights for ethnic Germans in 1993. At the same time, the development of international human rights organizations and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has created opportunities for political mobilization and participation based on transnational identities and issues. Correspondingly, the International Covenants of Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Covenant of Refugees required domestic policy revisions among member states to reflect the provision that resident aliens be given the same rights as citizens in the areas of social security and welfare. In addition, the “snowballing” or demonstration effects of democratization (Huntington 1991) may pressure states to make adjustments to their immigration and citizenship policies to uphold their legitimacy as liberal democracies in relation to other states (Thomas 2002: 48-49).

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15 This development is certainly not new. Transnational movements, such as Pan-Africanism, were a feature of the modern world well before the current era of internationalization.

16 The “demonstration effects” of democratization are not limited to the state level; on the contrary, they provide transnational templates for various forms of political participation, claims-making, and understandings of citizenship. In Japan, for example, proponents of local voting rights for foreign residents frequently refer to their...
Second, the categories of actors in this framework—the state, citizens, and noncitizens—are neither static nor internally coherent. This paper treats the state as a relatively autonomous actor that “tends to be an expression of pacts of domination, to act coherently as a corporate unit, to become an arena of social conflict, and to present itself as the guardian of universal interests” (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985: 48; Skocpol 1985). In addition to these contradictory tendencies, state efficacy may be affected by competing configurations of ideologies, interests, and coalitions that change over time. Therefore, citizenship policies do not necessarily reflect a unitary conception of national traditions but are often shaped by particularistic interests and constituents within specific historical circumstances. In other words, the exigencies of “hot” or “cold” wars, the interests of particular industries, and the outcome of specific elections, among many other factors, may be more crucial to the configuration of citizenship policies at a given time than “deeply rooted” understandings of nationhood.

The categories of citizens and noncitizens are also dynamic and heterogeneous. New immigration, generational changes, and naturalization procedures constantly affect the composition, character, and significance of these categories. These factors, combined with international developments, may create or abolish subcategories of citizens and noncitizens such as second-class citizens, “denizens,” or dual citizens. Moreover, citizenship status is the source of successful implementation in a number of Western European countries (see K.D. Kim 1995; Y.D. Suh 1995; Tanaka 1995; 1996; Park 1999).
one of many social identities that an individual may have. As Seyla Benhabib (1999: 718) puts it, “We are more authentically members of a family, of a neighborhood, of a religious community or of a social movement than we are members of a state.” Consequently, interests based on race, ethnicity, class, gender, religion, and sexuality may conflict with (and override) those based on membership in a nation-state.

Furthermore, we cannot ignore the fact that the majority of noncitizens in advanced industrial democracies originate from post-colonial societies. Thus, they are not only foreigners, but also racial and/or ethnic minorities. To be sure, immigrants and “domestic” or “native” minorities are qualitatively different categories with distinct histories, problems, and opportunities. For example, new immigrants may consider language and cultural barriers to be greater impediments to their social mobility than racial obstacles. Also, recent immigrants and their descendants may not identify themselves as belonging to the same racial categories as their “native” counterparts. Nevertheless, both foreign-born and native-born minorities may experience similar, or identical, forms of racial, ethnic, and cultural discrimination based on their common racialized identities. In putatively homogenous societies where native-born minorities may themselves be foreigners in legal status, “immigrants” and “racial/ethnic minorities” may be synonymous. Indeed, studies of the “new racism” in Europe and the United States highlight the ways in which “culture”

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17 See, for example, Reuel Rogers’ (2000) comparative study of Afro-Caribbean immigrants and African Americans.
and “immigration” have come to replace biology and race as a means for distinguishing and rationalizing differential societal outcomes for different groups (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Small 1994; Solomos 1989; Steinberg 1981; Winant 1994). By analyzing the politics of “immigration” and “race” as mutually exclusive categories, we run the risk of overlooking the racial dimensions of immigration and citizenship debates, especially when state and social actors themselves avoid references to “race.”

Next, “citizen movements” may involve coalitions of citizens and noncitizens around issues of transnational or local significance. This usage borrows from the republican conception of citizenship as active civic participation based on communal mores. While noncitizens may not be formal members of the host society, they may nevertheless engage in civic activities that aim to reinforce, revise, or transform the shared values and/or public policies of their communities. Permanent foreign residents are especially well-equipped to engage in such activities—through extra-electoral forms of political participation—because of their secure residence status, extensive rights and duties, and, in most cases, their symbolic and material significance in their local and national communities. Moreover, because they are permanently settled in their host society, foreign residents have compelling material and ideological incentives to participate in the politics of their host societies and, thus, strive to improve their living and working conditions. This multidimensional, interactive approach to citizenship is especially useful for understanding the discrepancy
between national citizenship policies that have remained fundamentally unchanged in the postwar period and citizenship meanings and practices that have undergone significant changes, particularly at the local level, as is the case in contemporary Japan.

The Politics of Korean Citizenship in Japan

What’s in a Name?

Discussion of Koreans in Japan—in English as well as in Japanese—often begins with the thorny issue of names. In English, this community is most often referred to as “Korean residents in Japan” (in reference to their legal status) or “ethnic Koreans in Japan” (which would include Japanese nationals of Korean ancestry), or the “Korean minority in Japan” (to signify their discursive position in Japanese society), or simply, “Koreans in Japan.” Although some use the term, “Korean-Japanese” (or “Japanese-Korean”), to refer to this group, the concept of hyphenated identities and its allusion to a multicultural society have yet to be widely accepted in Japanese society. The official Japanese term for Korean residents is Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin (South and North Korean Residents in Japan); however, the actual term used by individuals and groups is

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18 Incidentally, reference to Koreans in Japan in Korean is least controversial. Koreans are simply referred to as “Overseas Koreans in Japan” (Chaeil Kyopo, literally “brethren” or “compatriots” in Japan). This term has also been adopted by some members of the Korean community in Japan (although the term, dōhō, rather than kyōhō, is more often used in the Japanese version). While all external Korean populations are named in Korean in this way, the politics of this term is controversial among some Korean Americans who identify themselves primarily as Americans of Korean ancestry (literally Hankuk kye mikukin, but more often referred to as Hanin dongpo, or “ethnic Korean brethren,” and Komerikan, the Korean slang for “Korean American”) rather than as “overseas Koreans” who reside in the United States (Chaemi Kyopo).

inextricably linked to the identity politics of this community. Indeed, the official term in itself divides the community according to nationality (with the implication that Chōsen refers only to North Korea) and privileges South Korean nationals by placing Kankoku before Chōsen. While some prefer the term, Zainichi Korian, because of its neutrality and its apparent reference to Koreans as an ethnic group, others identify themselves according to their specific nationalities (e.g., Zainichi Kankokujin if they are South Korean nationals). Still, some prefer their historically contextualized names (Chōsenjin was the term used to refer to Koreans prior to the war), while others simply use the abbreviation, Zainichi, as a reference to their permanent residence in Japan. On the other hand, some would like to be rid of the term, Zainichi, altogether because they see themselves as part of an autonomous nation separate from the Japanese state and not as a Japanese minority group. As one third-generation Korean activist stated, “I don’t like to be referred to as a Zainichi. I am Korean and therefore should be recognized as being a whole Korean person, not as someone whose identity is compromised by the country in which I reside” (Interview, 27 March 1999, Tokyo).

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20 The term, Chōsenjin, is no longer used regularly by the general public to refer to present-day Koreans in Japan because of the negative connotations associated with its usage from colonial times. Indeed, the term is often used by children as a slur to taunt other children who are suspected of or are identified as being Korean. However, members of the Korean community continue to use the term to refer to their history in Japan as colonized subjects and their present situation of statelessness (since Chōsen as a unified state no longer exists). Moreover, the term has been reappropriated by some members of the community as a symbol of ethnic Korean pride in a manner similar to the Black power movement and the gay rights movement.

21 Harajiri Hideki (1997) has devised the term, Nihon teijū Korian (“permanent Korean residents in Japan”) to emphasize the Korean community’s permanent resident status.

22 Throughout this paper, I only use the personal names of those who have given me their prior consent.
The problem of “naming” the Korean community extends to the actual names of individual Koreans themselves. Most Korean residents have two names: a Korean name (honmyō; “real name,” “official name”) and a Japanese name (tsūmei; “assumed name,” “alias”). Not only is the Japanese name often used in daily life, but it is routinely printed on the individual’s alien registration form in brackets next to the Korean legal name (Fukuoka 2000: 28). In comparison, while it is not uncommon for Korean Americans to have both Korean and English given names, rarely do they adopt a non-Korean family name, except in the cases of marriage or adoption. Moreover, the symbolic difference between the names, “Hyun-Ju Kim” and “Helen Kim,” pale in comparison to that between “Kim Hyun-Ju” and “Kanemoto Kashiko.” The practice of adopting Japanese names among Koreans derives from the policy of sōshi kaimei (the forced adoption of Japanese names) under the cultural assimilation program of the Japanese colonial period. Although this policy was abolished with Japan’s defeat in World War Two, the practice continued with second-generation Koreans who, like Jews in nineteenth century North America who “Anglo-sized” their names, used their Japanese names to pass as Japanese (see I.M. Kim 1978). In the past two decades, public figures, such as entertainers

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23 During my fieldwork in Japan, I personally experienced the politics of “names” and “naming” in the Korean community. When I first arrived in Japan, my business cards displayed the romanized version of my English-language name in katakana (“Erin Chung”). While few Japanese questioned this usage, many Korean residents that I met were disappointed that I had chosen not to use my “real [Korean] name.” As a result, I promptly changed the name on my business cards to my Korean name (“Chung Ae-Ran”) using the original Chinese characters (with the katakana reading on top). Incidentally, some Korean residents instructed me to include my English name as well to indicate that I am Korean American and not a South Korean national or resident (see Chung 1999).
and writers, have increasingly begun to use their Korean names. Also, younger generations have begun to fuse their Korean and Japanese names to form a hybrid, single name (e.g., the use of the Korean family name with a Japanese given name such as “Son Masayoshi,” the name of Yahoo Japan’s president, or the use of a Japanese or Korean family name with a Japanese reading of the Korean forename such as “Takayasu Keisai” or “Kim Chika”). Others adamantly use the Japanese pronunciation of their Korean names in their everyday lives (e.g., Ri Tai-Ei instead of Yi Tae-Yŏn). Nevertheless, these cases remain exceptions. Local surveys conducted in Kanagawa prefecture in 1984 and 1993 showed that approximately 80 percent of ethnic Koreans use their Japanese names regularly (Kimpara et al. 1986; Fukuoka and Kim 1997). In contrast, the 1984 survey revealed that over 80 percent of the Chinese residents in the same prefecture did not even have a Japanese alias. A second-generation businessman described the dilemma of having two names accordingly:

I have to carry two sets of business cards: one with my Korean name and one with my Japanese name. When I think that my Korean identity will pose a problem for me, I always use my Japanese name. Sure, the elite can use their Korean names freely. But when you work for someone else, you don’t have that freedom. . . . What has troubled me most during my entire life in Japan has been the name problem. I have a real name and a Japanese alias. . . . Where else in the world can you find a whole community of people who all have two completely different names?” (Interview, 10 April 1999, Kawasaki).

The methods that Korean residents have adopted to grapple with the predicaments of being Korean in Japan highlight the community’s complexity and diversity. They are divided by national identities (Japanese/North
Korean/South Korean), regional ties (e.g., the Kansai and Kantō regions in Japan or the Kyōngsang, Chōlla, and Cheju regions in Korea), class, and generations (e.g., in Japanese, Zainichi issei, nisei, sansei, yonsei or, in Korean, Chaeil kyopo ilse, ise, samse, sase). In addition, there are different political agendas for achieving social parity, which are mixed and often antagonistic. While some Korean groups lobby for voting rights and political inclusion, others vehemently oppose these efforts because they are said to promote assimilation and collaboration with the Japanese government. During the 1980s, at the height of the campaign to abolish the fingerprinting requirement for Korean residents, a number of Korean groups, particularly those affiliated with Chongryun (the pro-North Korean organization in Japan), maintained that the fingerprinting requirement was a necessary consciousness-raising experience for Korean youth who, upon turning 16, were confronted with their Korean identities often for the first time. It was said that without this sort of “rite of passage,” Koreans in Japan would assimilate themselves completely into Japanese society without ever having to acknowledge their true identities. According to this argument, Korean residents would then continue to hide their identities, which, in turn, would place less pressure on the Japanese government to end its discriminatory social policies (Interview with Tanaka Hiroshi, 31 May 1995, Tokyo).

The identity politics of this highly assimilated, legally foreign community is directly related to their ambiguous status as native-born foreigners. Postwar Japanese citizenship policies effectively “reinvented” Japan as a homogenous
nation by making citizenship status, rather than race or ethnicity, the primary means by which the Japanese state could differentiate former colonial subjects from the remainder of its population. Although Japan’s population remained heterogeneous, its members were recategorized from imperial subjects to citizens and noncitizens. Under the heavy-handed discretion of the Justice Ministry, naturalization entailed not only the renouncement of national allegiance to the homeland but also complete cultural assimilation or “Japanization.” Indeed, until the late 1980s, Justice Ministry officials frequently commented that the existence of ethnic minorities within Japanese society was highly “undesirable” and that efforts should be made to encourage Korean residents to assimilate to the point of “indistinguishability” (Takenaka 1997: 303; Y.D. Kim 1990). In turn, the major (state-based) postwar Korean organizations appropriated this discourse to equate Korean nationality with Korean ethnic identity and use citizenship as a political strategy for various purposes. Even after the passage of restrictive citizenship and immigration laws that made foreign nationality a primary source of social closure from the dominant Japanese society, Korean citizenship continued to be the basis for political organization within the community. In the early postwar period, Korean citizenship signified the temporary nature of the community, but in the 1970s and 1980s, as a result of movements for civil and social rights in South Korea and Japan, Korean citizenship came to pinpoint a permanently resident minority group in Japan. From the 1990s, activists in the Korean community have
attempted further to expand the boundaries of citizenship not only as a dynamic identity in the Korean community but also as an active practice in Japanese civil society.

Conflating Nationality and Ethnocultural Identity

The first postwar Korean organization in Japan, Choryŏn, aggressively asserted the rights of Koreans as foreign nationals of the Allied powers who not only enjoyed special rights and privileges under the American Occupation government, but were often beyond Japanese criminal jurisdiction. Although the repatriation of the Korean community was one of Choryŏn’s stated goals, its members nevertheless actively involved themselves in Japan’s reconstruction and democratization through joint projects with the Japanese Communist Party. On the other hand, Choryŏn’s successor organizations, Mindan and Chongryun, consciously divorced themselves from Japan’s “internal affairs,” and concentrated their activities around repatriation and homeland politics.24 Throughout the Cold War, the two state-based organizations focused their energies on competing with each other rather than on protecting the rights of the Korean community in Japan. They discouraged their members from not only becoming Japanese citizens, but also from switching their nationalities from North to South Korean, or vice versa, to maintain their memberships and, thus, ensure their own organizational survival. Furthermore, they frequently denounced efforts to secure rights for Korean residents as movements toward

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24 At the same time, their organizational platforms made clear that they would submit to Japanese laws.
Japanese cultural assimilation. At the same time, given the high levels of discrimination in Japanese society against Koreans for the large duration of the Cold War (but especially until the late 1970s), coupled with the colonial legacies associated with Japanese nationality, most Korean residents did not naturalize but, at the same time, made efforts to assimilate into Japanese society in order to “pass” as Japanese. These patterns have resulted in the anomaly of over 600,000 highly assimilated Korean permanent residents living within Japan’s territorial boundaries without full citizenship rights.

Strangely, Mindan and Chongryun’s non-threatening policies and practices have made Koreans in Japan a “model minority” of sorts. In contrast to new immigrants who, according to mass media accounts, are portrayed as being either unaware of or unwilling to adopt Japanese customs, have limited Japanese language skills, overstay their visas, and otherwise contribute to the rapidly increasing crime rate in Japan, Korean residents are a highly assimilated, law-abiding community with a number of affluent members. Similar to the construction of the Asian American model minority myth, state policies regarding Korean movement and activity in Japan were ultimately constructions of the Cold War. Having changed their legal positions to foreigners, Japanese and Occupation authorities were able to monitor and restrain potentially subversive elements within the Korean community using the threat of deportation or imprisonment. The establishment of Mindan and Chongryun and their declarations of non-involvement in Japanese domestic
politics facilitated the creation of a politically docile community vis-à-vis the Japanese state. Unlike prewar Korean groups and the short-lived Choryŏn, Mindan and Chongryun focused their political activities on opposing each other, not on contesting Japanese state policies and social discrimination. Indeed, the pro-North Korean Chongryun has posed few problems for the Japanese state because even their pro-communist ideology is solipsistic—the chuch’e philosophy of self-reliance discourages coalitions with Japanese communist and socialist groups. Thus, under the leadership of two insular organizations that encouraged them to maintain their precarious status as foreigners with limited rights, Koreans in Japan remained a severely deprived minority for at least the first half of the Cold War era.

Three major events in the late 1960s and early 1970s fueled the transition from state-based identity politics to the birth of independent movements in the Korean community. First, in February 1969, Kim Hi-lo, a second-generation Korean resident in his 40s, made national news when he killed two Japanese gang members (yakuza) in Shimizu city and held 13 people hostage for 88 hours at a nearby hot spring inn in Shizuoka prefecture. During the standoff with the police, Kim made two demands. First, he wanted a public apology from a local detective, known for harassing Koreans, for an anti-Korean slur that Kim witnessed him saying. Second, he demanded to make a public announcement through the mass media that he killed the two gang members as part of a plan to end their continued harassment of him. The Shizuoka district court eventually
sentenced him to life imprisonment after eight years of a series of dramatic trials. During his trials and subsequent interviews in prison, Kim described the constant discrimination he encountered living as a Korean in Japanese society. While in prison, Kim conducted hunger strikes to protest discrimination against Koreans in Japan. The Kim Hi-lo incident suddenly threw the Korean community into the public spotlight after years of remaining an "invisible" minority in Japan (since the end of the Occupation). In particular, Kim’s story resonated intimately with second-generation Korean residents and spurred much soul searching among them.

Second, in April 1971, came the arrest of the Suh brothers while they were students at Seoul National University in South Korea. Suh Sung and Suh Jun-sik were second-generation Korean residents in Japan but had been active in student demonstrations during the bitterly fought 1971 presidential election between Park Chung Hee and Kim Dae Jung (see Suh 1994). Following an unauthorized visit to North Korea, the brothers were arrested for violating South Korea’s National Security Law, which bans unauthorized contact with North Koreans, any activity that “praises” or “benefits” North Korea, and any involvement in organizations alleged to be pro-North Korean. South Korean authorities also charged Suh Sung with masterminding an espionage ring of students, which included his younger brother, under orders from North Korea. They sentenced Suh Sung to death and Suh Jun-sik to 15 years in prison. At their

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25 For a detailed autobiographical account of his life, see (Lee and DeVos 1981).
second trial in 1972, their sentences were commuted to life imprisonment (reduced to 20 years in 1988) and seven years, respectively. Following his release in 1978, Suh Jun-sik was detained for another ten years for refusing to submit a statement of ideological conversion. Partially through the efforts of their younger brother, Suh Kyung Sik, their cases attracted international attention to the treatment of political prisoners in South Korea and the brothers were regarded by Amnesty International as Prisoners of Conscience.\textsuperscript{26} However, they were merely the best known case: between April 1971 to February 1976, some 36 second-generation Koreans from Japan were arrested in South Korea for their alleged links with the “pro-North Korean” community in Japan and for violating South Korean political laws (Chen 1988: 391).

Third, in 1970, the Hitachi company dismissed Pak Chong-sŏk, a second-generation Korean resident, after learning of his Korean nationality. The resulting Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial spurred a citizen movement in Japan that generated a coalition between young Koreans and Japanese who organized the Committee to Support Pak (\textit{Paku-kun o kakomu kai}).\textsuperscript{27} This coalition successfully organized a boycott campaign against Hitachi products

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{26} Suh Jun-sik, who remained in South Korea as a human rights activist following his release, was arrested again in 1997 during a human rights film festival that he helped organize. Suh was charged with violating the National Security Law for screening the film, “Red Hunt,” a South Korean documentary about the 1948 Cheju Island uprising and subsequent massacre of suspected communist sympathizers. For more information, see the Amnesty International Report, “Republic of Korea (South Korea): On Trial for Defending His Rights: The Case of Human Rights Activist Suh Jun-Sik” (AI Index: ASA 25/18/98), May 1998.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{27} It should be noted that this coalition was originally formed entirely by Japanese students from Keio University who were involved in the anti-(Vietnam) war organization, \textit{Beiheiren}. Indeed, Pak solicited help from members of this group as they were distributing leaflets to protest changes to the Immigration Law (Wender 1999: 90). Shortly after the conclusion of the trial, this coalition published the proceedings of a panel discussion on the trial and the accompanying social movements. See Paku-kun o kakomu kai 1974.}
that spread from Japan to South Korea and threatened to extend elsewhere (Northup 1974). Neither Mindan nor Chongryun extended their support to Pak because, they argued, employment in a major Japanese corporation was merely a step toward assimilation into Japanese society. Pak won the case in 1974 and used his Korean name for the entire duration of his employment at Hitachi.28 His case brought to light the widespread discrimination against Koreans in employment, housing, and social welfare, among other areas. Moreover, the movement that grew out of this trial eventually led to the creation of Mintören (the “National Council for Combating Discrimination against Ethnic Peoples in Japan”) in 1975.29

These events coincided with the coming of age of second-generation Koreans and the subsequent development of the concept, zainichi (“residence in Japan”), which emerged in opposition to the prevalent kikokushugi (“repatriation”) ideology of first-generation Korean residents. Whereas the first-generation leadership of Mindan and Chongryun absorbed themselves in homeland politics, second-generation members began to question their connection to the homeland. Many of those who visited South Korea to “rediscover” their roots returned disillusioned. This experience resembled those

28 At the outset of the trial, Pak used his Japanese name, Arai Shōji, in employment applications and daily life. During the course of the trial, however, Pak eventually gained a sense of “ethnic pride” and began to use his Korean name in daily life (Wender 1999: 91-92).

29 Mintören is made up of both Korean and Japanese members, under Korean leadership, and supports neither North nor South Korea. Rather, the group defines Zainichi Korean identity according to their colonial and post-colonial history in Japan. Coexistence (kyōsei) with the Japanese is the central platform of the group. Because Mintören identifies Koreans as a minority group in Japan, it concentrates its efforts on securing rights for Koreans and other marginalized groups in Japan.
of African Americans in the 1960s and 1970s who “returned” to the homeland to discover, as John A. Williams described in 1963, “There is nothing like a trip to Africa to make an American Negro realize just how American he is” (quoted in Walters 1993: 56). Rather than welcoming them as one of their own, South Koreans in the “homeland” treated many Koreans from Japan as foreigners or criticized their lack of proficiency in Korean language and culture. In addition, many Koreans from Japan found that South Korean customs and daily life were foreign to them and became subsequently homesick for Japan. Consequently, many of those who expected to become more “Korean” during their visit to South Korea returned to Japan with the realization that they were neither Korean nor Japanese, but Zainichi.30

Zainichi signifies the permanent nature of Korean residence in Japan and became the basis for seeking civil and social rights in Japan. At the same time, this concept did not imply assimilation into Japanese society. Furthermore, second-generation activists did not challenge the equation of nationality with identity. On the contrary, Zainichi proponents endeavored to define and maintain a distinct Korean identity in Japan that neither embraced repatriation to the homeland nor assimilation into Japanese society. Ironically, the struggle to define a specific Korean identity in Japan reinforced the equation of nationality with identity. Because second-generation Koreans were born and raised in Japan, few distinguishing characteristics tied them together as Koreans

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30 For a fictional account of a resident Korean’s experience in South Korea, see Yangji’s Lee’s (1989) *Yuhi*. 
aside from perhaps food, some cultural rituals and family traditions, and socioeconomic status. Not many were fluent in Korean since the majority of second-generation Koreans were educated in Japanese schools. Furthermore, most Koreans in Japan are physically indistinguishable from the dominant Japanese population. Consequently, the overwhelming commonality that the community shared was Korean nationality. In this sense, (North or South) Korean nationality came to signify not only one’s legal status but also one’s politics and, ultimately, one’s ethnic identity. As Kang Chae-ŏn (1996: 178), a first-generation Korean resident writer, puts it, Korean nationality became the final “fortress” (toride) for Japan-born Korean residents to demonstrate their Korean ethnic identity.

Expanding the Boundaries of Citizenship: Post-Cold War Developments

Over the past couple of decades, the incongruity between the daily lives of Korean residents as integral members of their local communities and their legal positions as foreigners has brought about alternative social movements among the younger generations. Independent Korean voluntary associations have challenged the ideologies of their state-based predecessors and have centered their movements around the idea that Koreans are permanent and

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31 In addition, many first-generation Koreans were unable or unwilling to teach the Korean language to their children. Those who came to Japan as uneducated laborers were likely to be illiterate and/or unable to maintain their fluency in Korean under harsh conditions in Japan. Others chose not to teach Korean to their children to protect them from discrimination.
vital members of Japanese civil society (as opposed to repatriation and homeland politics).

In fact, a number of developments have altered the content of the Korean community itself. First, the rate of Korean naturalization jumped dramatically in the 1990s. While the naturalization rate had been increasing steadily since the postwar period, the number of Koreans who naturalized in the late 1990s was almost double the figures of the 1980s. 32 Second, the rate of intermarriage between Koreans and Japanese began to surpass marriages between Korean nationals (North and South) at the end of the 1970s. By 1997, only 1,269 marriages (or 14.9% of total marriages) reportedly took place between Korean nationals, compared to 7,178 (or 84.1%) between Korean and Japanese nationals. With the revision of the Japanese nationality law in 1984 (discussed below), this trend in marriage patterns suggests that the vast majority of third-, fourth-, and fifth-generation Koreans in Japan are or will be Japanese nationals.

These changes within the Korean community, along with structural shifts in the international political economy and their impact on Japanese politics, economy, and society, have forced Korean activists to rethink their political strategies. Yet, while many of the Korean organizations formed in the post-Cold War era welcome Koreans of all nationalities and encourage the participation

32 According to Kim Yŏng Dal (1990: 110), there were 145,572 naturalized Koreans in 1988. The annual naturalization rate in the 1980s fluctuated between an average of 4,500 to 6,800. While the rate for 1991 remained consistent with the previous decade (at 5,665), the annual average increased to 7,244 in 1992 and 7,697 in 1993 (Tanaka 1996: 52-53). Since 1995, the annual average has remained consistent at about 10,000.
of Japanese and other foreign and minority groups, the majority continue to
discourage Korean residents from naturalizing. Given that these organizations
are primarily interested in the political rights and power of the Korean
community in Japan, why would they want Koreans to remain foreign residents
without full citizenship rights?

At the individual level, naturalization offers obvious benefits. Aside from
the two most prominent advantages of full citizenship—voting rights and the
right to run for public office—acquiring Japanese citizenship yields immediate
material gains, such as freedom from employment restrictions (for example, in
the public sector) as well as the advantages of carrying a Japanese passport in
international travel. Conversely, the material costs of naturalization for individual
native-born Korean residents are relatively low. As discussed further below, state
reforms from the 1970s relaxed naturalization procedures for “special permanent
residents” (the majority of whom consist of prewar Korean immigrants and their
descendants). Also, because Article 9 of Japan’s postwar constitution prohibits
Japan from having a standing army,33 naturalized citizens are not subject to
military duty. Moreover, given their high levels of cultural assimilation, most
native-born Korean residents would not have to make significant changes to
their lifestyles to become Japanese citizens. Likewise, the symbolic costs of
naturalization are not terribly high for native-born Korean residents who are

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33 However, Article 9 does not explicitly prohibit the use of force in matters of self-defense. As Kenneth
Pyle (1992: 124, 10) points out, the American and Japanese drafters of the postwar constitution intended that Article
9 would not prohibit Japan from maintaining self-defense forces or contributing to collective security arrangements
as a member of the United Nations.
generations removed from the experience of Japan’s colonial era. To be sure, these factors have likely contributed to the growth of naturalizations within the Korean resident community.

However, this cost-benefit analysis does not hold true at the community level. The total foreign resident population, of which Korean residents constituted about 35 percent in 2001, makes up approximately 1.4 percent of the total Japanese population. Consequently, their “voice” as naturalized Japanese citizens would remain relatively insignificant in Japanese electoral politics. Hence, the added political value of naturalization is relatively low for the community as a whole. In fact, Koreans in Japan have become a fairly influential political force as foreign citizens in the post-Cold War era, especially in relation to their small numbers. While they cannot participate directly in Japanese electoral politics as foreign residents, their political presence rarely goes unnoticed by policymakers.

At the same time, the costs of naturalization remain prohibitively high from the standpoint of Korean community activists. Because the dominant discourse within both the Korean community and Japanese civil society equates nationality with ethnocultural identity, the naturalization of the Korean population in Japan would be equivalent to the Korean community’s extinction.34 Without a cohesive, much less popularly accepted, alternative

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34 I am referring specifically to the community of prewar Korean immigrants and their descendants, or “oldcomer” Koreans, who explicitly distinguish themselves from the postwar, or “newcomer,” South Korean immigrant community. For further discussion on this distinction, see Chapter 5.
understanding of Korean identity, the Korean community would lose the only tool through which they have effectively distinguished themselves from the Japanese majority since the postwar era. Nevertheless, the significant changes within the Korean community in the post-Cold War era—including rapidly growing rates of naturalizations, intermarriages, and other forms of assimilation—have forced Korean activists to reevaluate their political strategies, which have been based on the decades-long equation of Korean citizenship with Korean ethnic identity. Yet, as one of my interviewees stated, fostering Korean ethnic pride among Koreans is insufficient to bring about the community's political empowerment; in order to realize a just and equitable incorporation of the Korean community, Japanese public opinions and policies need to be changed (Interview with Suh Jung Woo, 8 September 1999, Osaka). Facing a rapidly diminishing membership base, these activists have increasingly focused their energies on the dominant Japanese society.

New generations of Korean activists have reinterpreted the meaning of Korean citizenship as identity and practice in movements to democratize Japanese society. Korean citizenship, for these activists, has come to signify a method of resistance to Japanese state policies (they are actively not naturalizing) and, at the same time, a political tool of visibility. In other words, new generations of Korean activists have appropriated the dominant discourse that equates nationality with ethnocultural identity in order to challenge the notion that Japan is culturally homogenous and, thus, generate public debate
on Japanese citizenship policies themselves. Especially as they engage in coalitions with other segments of Japanese civil society, including other foreign resident and minority groups, their visibility as integral members of Japanese society is increasingly blurring the dichotomy between those who are legally defined as “citizens” and “noncitizens” by the state.

Accordingly, efforts to discourage individual Korean residents from naturalizing are viewed as part of a political strategy to disassociate nationality and citizenship (e.g., efforts to gain local voting rights for foreign residents), increase awareness of Japanese cultural diversity, and otherwise democratize Japanese society. By mobilizing around their noncitizen status, Korean activists are attempting to negotiate the terms of the Korean community’s political incorporation. In other words, they seek to transform an assimilationist process of naturalization, in which the subject gives up his/her ethnocultural identity (nihon minzoku ni naru koto, “becoming part of the Japanese nation/race/ethnicity”), into a dynamic practice of acquiring citizenship along with its accompanying rights and responsibilities—from passive kokumin (“nationals”) to active shimin (“citizens”). Rather than the submissive implication of kika (“naturalization”), this form of citizenship acquisition (shiminen o shutoku suru) implies that the non-Japanese subject will diversify the meaning of Japanese citizenship itself, from a discourse based on cultural homogeneity to one based on a multicultural, multiethnic society.
Since the late 1970s, a number of developments have altered conditions in Japan and created opportunities for this type of political strategy. Japan’s ascendance as a major economic power from the mid-1970s brought about heightened international scrutiny and pressure to implement “internationalization” (kokusaika) within. Not only did this project require the implementation of reforms to meet international norms regarding trade and security, but it also entailed significant changes to policies regarding migrants, refugees, and minorities within Japan. In effect, Japan’s new international spotlight led to the creation of an immigrant incorporation policy that corresponded to the emerging set of international norms concerning refugees and alien residents in the post-Vietnam War era, which called for the equalization of rights between citizens and alien residents in social welfare policies as well as the institutionalization of a secure residential status for refugees and other foreign residents, among other things (Kashiwazaki 2000: 449-450). As the largest foreign resident community in Japan, Korean residents were the primary beneficiaries of these reforms, most of which were implemented from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s.35

35 Following the ratification in 1981 of the international convention on the status of refugees, the Japanese government created a new permanent resident status to cover former colonial subjects and their descendants. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, the Japanese central and local governments enacted a series of reforms that made the legal status of Korean residents more secure and conferred social welfare benefits on them such as social security and health insurance. This new legal system is based on their rights and obligations as tax-paying permanent residents rather than on their nationalities (Miyajima 1997). In regions with relatively high concentrations of foreign residents, the cultural rights of foreign residents have been addressed through the implementation, for example, of Korean “ethnic education” classes in several wards in Osaka, bilingual education in Kanagawa Prefecture, and the Foreign Citizens’ Council in Kawasaki city. Finally, in 1991, the government created the category of “special permanent residents” to cover all former colonial subjects and their descendants, which granted Korean and Taiwanese permanent residents greater residential security and a wide range of citizenship.
At the same time, the demand for unskilled labor, especially in what is commonly referred to as the “3D” (dirty, dangerous, and difficult) industries, resulted in the rapid influx of “foreign workers” from developing countries to Japan in the 1980s and prompted public debates on “closing” (sakoku) and “opening up” (kaikoku) the country to international migration.\textsuperscript{36} Like their Western European counterparts, Japanese government officials responded to the problems and responsibilities that accompanied Japan’s “internationalization” campaign by implementing policies to tighten immigration controls while more fully incorporating foreign residents settled permanently within Japan’s borders. Indeed, while the Japanese central government has made efforts to improve conditions for Korean and other foreign permanent residents over the past two decades, it has simultaneously made policies regarding new, and especially illegal, immigrants more restrictive. For example, a law that went into effect in February 2000, the same year that the voting rights bill (discussed below) was proposed, made illegal immigration punishable by 300 thousand yen (about $2,800), three years of imprisonment, or both. These penalties had previously been applied only to foreigners who overstayed their visas and were waived for immigrants who had resided in Japan for three or

\textsuperscript{36} The total foreign population has doubled since 1985. The vast majority of new immigrants to Japan are laborers from other Asian countries, including China, the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
more years. In addition, the law bars illegal immigrants from re-entry into Japan for five years, up from the previous one-year ban (Washington Post, 18 February 2000). By making Japanese citizens of an already highly assimilated, phenotypically indistinguishable Korean resident population, the state can reappropriate the dominant discourse on Japanese cultural homogeneity and reinvent Japan as a “closed” country that cannot deal with the “psychological and biological chaos” of opening its doors to foreigners (quoted in Pyle 1989: 53). Based on the decades-long equation of Korean identity with Korean citizenship, the naturalization of the Korean population would, in effect, eradicate the “Korean problem.”

With the equalization of social citizenship rights between citizens and noncitizens over the past few decades, the material and symbolic barriers of restrictive citizenship policies have inadvertently shifted the burden of political assimilation from the noncitizen to the state, forcing the Japanese state to ease naturalization requirements and offer political concessions to the Korean permanent resident population. In the past few decades, the Japanese government has almost entirely removed restrictions to naturalization for Korean residents. In fact, as indicated in Table 1.2, the number of naturalizations among Korean residents has risen steadily over the years, especially from the mid-1990s.

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37 This shift contrasts with recent attempts to roll back the citizenship rights of foreign residents in countries with liberal citizenship acquisition policies. For example, the 1986 reform to French nationality laws (know as the first Pasqua Law) proposed to make the acquisition of French citizenship a privilege, rather than a right, by requiring second-generation immigrants to formally request French citizenship and take a loyalty oath (see Hollifield 1998: 14).
Also, a 1984 revision to the Japanese nationality law removed the unequal treatment of men and women in citizenship attribution policies. As a result, children of intermarriages between Korean residents and Japanese nationals can acquire Japanese citizenship either through their father or mother’s nationality.

Since the mid-1990s, a number of high-profile Japanese officials have encouraged Korean residents to naturalize, using their Korean names if necessary (Sakanaka 1999). Moreover, members of the Diet have been debating the merits of a bill to ease naturalization procedures specifically for foreigners with special permanent residence status, the majority of whom consist of prewar Korean immigrants and their descendants. The Liberal Democratic Party proposed this bill in 2001 as a counter-measure to one that had been proposed in the previous year to grant foreign residents local voting rights. In sum, these reforms have made it considerably easier for Koreans in Japan to become Japanese nationals; additionally, as “special permanent residents,” Korean residents now possess more rights than most other foreigners in Japan.

While Japanese citizenship policies have remained largely unchanged in the postwar period, the meaning and practice of citizenship have expanded significantly in Japanese civil society. Japan’s “internationalization” campaign not only led to the growth of immigrant communities in Japan, but it also

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38 Until very recently, naturalization applicants were required to adopt Japanese family and given names.

39 This bill has wide support among the opposition parties (specifically, the Democrats and the Communists) as well as the New Komeito and some members of the LDP.
stimulated the creation of citizen groups working to “internationalize” Japanese civil society through coalitional work with Korean and other minority communities. In particular, the development of “citizen” (shimin) movements over the past two decades that emphasize “coexistence” (kyōsei), multiculturalism, and civic engagement has provided a distinct political opportunity for Korean activists to re-conceptualize possibilities for foreign residents to “exercise” their citizenship as long-term, tax-paying, non-national members of Japanese civil society.

The language of citizenship in Japanese signifies the growing dichotomy between citizenship at the state and local levels as well as that between citizenship as policy and practice. Although the term, “citizenship,” translates directly into Japanese as shiminken, this term is not used in Japanese government documents or legal texts to refer to citizenship as a policy. Rather, the Japanese government employs kokuseki (“nationality”) to refer to legal-juridical membership in the state and kokumin (literally “people of the country”) to refer to citizens. Shiminken is usually reserved to discuss citizenship in North America and Europe. In the past two decades of Japan’s self-proclaimed era of “internationalization,” however, Japanese voluntary associations have increasingly used the term, shimin (literally “people of the city,” “townspeople”). In particular, locally based movements and community groups often refer to themselves as participating in shimin undō ("citizen movements") or shimin dantai ("citizen groups"). Shimin transcends the implied passivity and formality
of kokumin to connote an active member of civil society. Furthermore, the usage of the term, shimin, in this case is based on community rather than state membership, which opens up the possibility of recognizing foreign residents as citizens in the sense of their being members of a civil society.40

Accordingly, citizenship in its various dimensions has become a tool for this group of activists to negotiate the terms of the Korean community’s political incorporation. As legal status, foreign citizenship status gives Korean activists a “voice” disproportionate to their small numbers, especially in comparison to their naturalized counterparts who constitute a miniscule section of the voting population. Second, the symbolic significance of Korean citizenship as ethnocultural identity differentiates an otherwise highly assimilated, phenotypically indistinguishable minority from the dominant Japanese society and, consequently, provides compelling evidence of cultural and ethnic diversity in Japan. Third, the rights and responsibilities that Korean permanent residents have acquired over the past few decades surpass those of other foreigners and have made them, in effect, de facto citizens of Japan. Finally, as

40 Indeed, during the course of my field research in Japan, both Korean and Japanese scholars and activists often questioned my usage of the term, shiminken, claiming that such a concept does not exist in Japan. In particular, a number of Korean activists maintained that the only condition under which they would be willing to naturalize would be within a system of birthright citizenship (jus soli) similar to that in the United States. At the same time, discussions of their rights, obligations, and civic identities indicated that their particular nationalities guaranteed neither their full rights as citizens nor their loyalties to a particular state. For example, most of the independent activists that I interviewed with South or North Korean nationality interpreted their rights within the boundaries of their legal status as “special permanent residents” in Japan and their obligations as tax-paying residents of their local communities (jūmin) and as members of their organizations. Discussions of their civic identities varied according to those as residents of their local communities, as members of their organizations, and as Korean residents in Japan. The vast majority of the activists I interviewed interpreted their Korean nationalities narrowly as legal status. While they often identified themselves as “Korean” (e.g., Hanguk saram or Chosun saram in Korean and Kankokujin or Chōsenjin in Japanese; literally a “Korean person”) or “Zainichi Korean,” they rarely referred to themselves as North or South Korean “citizens.” Moreover, all of my interviewees reserved the term, shimin, to refer to their participation in their local communities or in their Korean organizations.
a practice in Japanese civil society, citizenship has increasingly become associated with local politics, NGO and NPO activities, and grassroots movements, including those led by Korean activists. Moreover, because this concept of citizenship is based on community and residence, rather than on state membership, it opens up the possibility of recognizing foreign residents as “citizens” of Japanese civil society. Accordingly, by mobilizing around their foreign citizenship status while engaging in joint projects with Japanese activists as well as other foreign and minority groups, Korean activists aim to challenge the very basis of Japanese ethnocultural citizenship policies: If Japanese society is not culturally homogenous, why are its citizenship policies based on consanguinity?

**Comparative Implications**

This paper has focused on a particular category of noncitizens who are permanently settled in their host societies with extensive citizenship rights and duties but remain disenfranchised, at least at the national level. Precisely because their status is ambiguous—they are foreigners with extensive civil and social citizenship rights—permanently settled foreign residents are in a unique position to negotiate with the host state. In fact, the problems that they pose to liberal democratic states in an era of heightened international concern for human rights may give them a louder “voice” than their naturalized
counterparts especially when their numbers are relatively small. In putatively homogenous societies with restrictive citizenship policies, foreign residents may experience greater bargaining power at the local level as a result of piecemeal extensions of institutionalized rights. Because foreign residents are recognized as de facto citizens, liberal democratic states may encounter considerable internal and external pressure to politically incorporate this group and, consequently, may tolerate certain conditions that were once unthinkable (such as the de facto toleration of dual citizenship). Accordingly, the very stringency of such citizenship policies based on claims of ethnic and cultural homogeneity may provide foreign resident activists with distinct opportunities for negotiating and contesting what is otherwise a passive determination of membership in a political community. In this way, noncitizen social movements seek not only institutionalized rights guaranteed by the state; rather, they may likely seek to contribute to the quality of citizenship exercised in their host society.

My findings support the general hypotheses of the “institutional channeling” literature: postwar Japan’s ethnocultural citizenship policies mediated the construction of a Korean collective identity in Japan, which is equated with Korean citizenship, and, in turn, Korean social movements have mobilized around the community’s position as foreigners. At the same time, the

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41 I contend that this phenomenon is in part due to the highly contingent character of the citizenship acquisition process in advanced industrial democracies. While the legal barriers to naturalization in most democracies have diminished significantly in the past few decades, the exclusionary and particularistic character of citizenship discourse has reinforced high symbolic barriers. Indeed, in another work (Chung 2002), I argue that the contingencies of particular citizenship policies can have a chilling effect on the political activities of naturalized citizens.
present study goes a step further in arguing that movements based on noncitizen status may seek to challenge or even transform the public values, institutions, and policies of the host society and are, therefore, not limited to homeland politics. Specifically, this paper contends that recent generations of Korean community activists have used their noncitizen status as part of a political strategy to negotiate the terms of their community's incorporation and thereby diversify the meaning of Japanese citizenship itself.

Contemporary patterns of noncitizen political participation indicate that the findings of the present study are generalizable to immigrant and foreign resident communities in other advanced industrial democracies. Movements for local voting rights for foreign residents as well as calls for multicultural citizenship and the separation of citizenship and nationality are evident in virtually all advanced industrial democracies today. For example, in France, “antiracism” campaigns led by second-generation immigrants of North African descent (known as beurs in French) in the early 1980s and the “new citizenship” (nouvelle citoyenneté) campaigns of the mid- and late-1980s included demands for a more participatory citizenship within a multicultural society that would be based on residence and participation, rather than on nationality or descent (Wihtol de Wenden 1991: 329; Feldblum 1999: 49-50; Castles and Davidson 2000: 97). In addition, initiatives for local and regional voting rights for foreign residents were

42 Although this group of Franco-Maghrebis consists of noncitizens and citizens, by birth or acquisition, they maintained that they were all “citizens by participation” regardless of nationality (Wihtol de Wenden 1991: 331; Castles and Davidson 2000: 97).
successfully implemented in Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland from the mid-1970s.

The case of Turks in Germany is a particularly illustrative comparison to that of Koreans in Japan. In comparative studies of citizenship in Western Europe, Germany is frequently cited as the case study par excellence of the “ethnic” citizenship model, in which common descent, language, and culture is the basis for membership in a community of citizens (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994: 11). As in Japan, German nationality is closely related with ethnic, racial, and national identity. Recent immigrants as well as long-term foreign residents are often treated as sojourners in terms of both legal status and social recognition. Indeed, for almost an entire century, German citizenship policies were based on a pure system of *jus sanguinis* that not only limited citizenship attribution to those of German descent but also made the naturalization procedure an exceptional measure rather than “a regular procedure terminating a process of immigration” (Hailbronner 2001: 102). Despite numerous reforms over the years, the central tenets of the Citizenship Law of 1913 (*Reichs-und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*), which applied *jus sanguinis* strictly, remained in effect until the introduction of *jus soli* in 2000 (Brubaker 1992).

In fact, the German terminology for citizenship and nationality displays striking similarities to the equivalent in Japanese. While the term, *burger*, refers both to “bourgeois” and “citizen,” the term, *Staatsburgerschaft*, literally translates into “citizen of the state” and is closely associated with the term for
“nationality,” *Staatsangehörigkeit* (Smith and Blanc 1996: 75). Moreover, the concept of citizenship used in reference to the “citizenship initiatives” of the 1970s that led to the Green Movement in Germany implies “active involvement in the affairs of the city at the local level” (Smith and Blanc 1996: 75). Like the Japanese case, the German concept of nationality is intertwined with an ethnocultural definition of nation. To be sure, the Japanese concept of *Yamato minzoku* (the “Japanese race”) did not emerge from attempts to preserve a distinct national identity in the context of prolonged political fragmentation and an ethnocultural frontier, as was the case for the German concept of nation. Another important distinction between the Japanese and German construction of citizenship concerns their timing. In Japan, the reconstruction of postwar citizenship policies coincided with the transformation of Japan into a national state. In Germany, the concept of nation preceded that of the state and postwar citizenship policies reflected the idea of Germany and Germans as a nation without a state (Brubaker 1992: 168-169). However, both the Japanese and German states have used ethnocultural conceptions of nationhood to justify political, social, and economic exclusion, and, at times, persecution, and made these the basis for each country’s nationality laws.

The similarities between the Japanese and German cases are not coincidental. During the citizenship debates of the nineteenth century, Meiji oligarchs consciously adopted the Prussian-German model for the strict application of *jus sanguinis* in the 1899 Nationality Law. In addition, the
naturalization policies of both countries (until the recent change in Germany’s policies) are based on the principle that neither is a country of immigration. As Rogers Brubaker (1992: 78) puts it, naturalization in Germany “is perceived as involving not only a change in legal status, but a change in nature, a change in political and cultural identity, a social transubstantiation that immigrants have difficulty imagining, let alone desiring.” Likewise, Han Jŏng Sŏk, a pioneer of the Korean resident anti-fingerprinting movement in the 1980s, argues that the meaning of naturalization (kika) in present-day Japan is not equivalent to that of acquiring citizenship (kokuseki o shutoku suru). Whereas the latter concept implies the rights and responsibilities of citizenship (shiminken), the former presupposes cultural assimilation (nihon minzoku ni naru koto, “becoming part of the Japanese nation”) (Interview with Han Jŏng Sŏk, 17 October 1998, Tokyo).

Despite the long-held claim that Germany is not a country of immigration, foreigners made up almost 9 percent of the total population in 1999 and, based on the projections of demographic surveys, are expected to make up almost 17 percent of the population in 2030 (Hailbronner 2001: 101). While large-scale immigration of laborers from neighboring Polish regions to Germany began in the late 1800s, most of the current immigrant and foreign resident population originate from the “guest worker” immigration of the 1960s from Southern Europe and Turkey. Currently, the Turkish community constitutes the largest foreign population in Germany. Yet, by the end of 1998, only about 160,000 of over 2 million Turkish residents in Germany had acquired German citizenship (Thomas
These low naturalization rates are representative of the entire foreign population in Germany, where 55 percent of over 7.3 million foreigners had been in residence for more than eight years in 1999. As Philip Martin (1994: 190, 193) argues, this anomalous situation is largely due to the “disjuncture between immigration policy goals and actual outcomes,” in which “an officially nonimmigrant country is in fact one of the world’s major destinations for immigrants.” Because Germany’s immigration policies focused on “guest workers,” rather than permanent foreign residents, they were aimed at labor rotation rather than immigrant incorporation.

The failure of these policies to limit immigration along with the long-term settlement of “guest workers” into permanent residents forced the German state to develop more durable policies for immigrant integration (Martin 1994: 193-196). In the early 1980s, a member of Germany’s Christian-Liberal government admitted that, “no state can in the long run accept that a significant part of its population remain outside the political community” (quoted in Brubaker 1992: 173). The reforms implemented in 1990 and 1992 facilitated the citizenship acquisition process for permanent foreign residents, giving long-term foreign residents a legal claim to German citizenship. At the same time, concurrent

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43 Akira Takenaka (1997: 261) notes that the transformation of “guest workers” to permanent residents was primarily the product of demands by employers to abandon the “rotation” labor importation model in order to reduce the costs the training new foreign employees. The interests of the migrant workers themselves, whose goal was to earn as much money as possible in a short period of time and return to their home countries, were consistent with the “guest worker” policies.

44 In 1993, the Social Democratic Party proposed legislation to grant birthright citizenship to third-generation foreign residents, ease the naturalization process for the second-generation, and recognize multiple
reforms placed considerable limitations on extending work and residence permits beyond two or three years to new immigrants, reflecting a general strategy to avoid the failures of the early guest worker policies (Martin 1994: 194; Takenaka 1997: 264-265).

While both Germany and Japan have enacted policies to simultaneously incorporate foreign residents who are permanently settled within their borders and restrict new immigration, citizenship policy reforms in Germany have been more liberal and implemented at a much swifter pace than those in Japan, despite the fact that Korean settlement in Japan began well before the arrival of “guest workers” to Germany. This difference may be attributable to the timing and intensity of public debate on immigrants and citizenship in both countries. In Japan, public debate on immigrant incorporation and Japanese multiculturalism did not develop until the large-scale influx of new immigrants from the 1980s, most of whom originated from other Asian countries or are of Japanese descent. The high rates of cultural assimilation within the prewar Korean community—due to social discrimination, generational changes, and the legacies of the Japanese colonial policies of forced cultural assimilation—coupled with the phenotypical similarity between Koreans and the dominant Japanese population resulted in public ignorance and apathy about the Korean minority in Japan until the 1980s.

citizenship. However, the governing liberal-conservative coalition rejected this initiative in April 1994 (Takenaka 1997: 287-288).
In contrast, the mere presence of the non-European foreign population, most of whom are phenotypically different from the majority German population, has generated public debate over immigrant integration, German citizenship, and German multiculturalism. Indeed, with a few exceptions, the foreign population in Japan is the only group for which phenotypical difference is not the basis for the formation of new ethnic minorities among advanced industrial democracies. In their comparative analysis of the United States, Canada, UK, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, Stephen Castles and Mark Miller (1998: 232) contend that phenotypical difference is the central marker for minority status in that it may “coincide with recent arrival, with cultural distance, with socioeconomic position, or, finally, it may serve as a target of racism.” Thus, not only is immigration a central area of public concern in these countries, immigrants and their descendants are also targets of public discontent. In Germany, there were reportedly an average of 50 to 100 anti-foreigner incidents daily between 1992 and 1993 alone (Martin 1994: 189). Consequently, incorporating the noncitizen in Germany is not simply a problem that is localized to the noncitizen community; on the contrary, the intense public debates and extremist violence have made immigrant incorporation impossible for policymakers to ignore.

In this way, visibility is not likely to be the basis for social movements within the Turkish community as it is for Koreans in Japan. Because most Turks cannot “pass” as ethnic Germans, the large-scale naturalization of the Turkish
community would not lead to their de facto eradication, as I have argued is the case for the Korean community in Japan. Whereas the political assimilation of the Korean community can facilitate the state’s attempt to “recreate” Japan as a homogenous society and, thus, maintain exclusionary policies toward foreigners, the incorporation of the long-term Turkish community in Germany poses a formidable challenge to ethnocultural definitions of German nationhood. In the German case, the question at hand is not about the existence of ethnic minorities, but what the state should do about them. Specifically, the major political parties have engaged in a heated debate over the terms and conditions of citizenship acquisition for foreign residents in recent years.

At the same time, Turkish community activists seek social recognition as an ethnic minority in Germany, which requires the German state and society to acknowledge both their membership in German civil society and their differences from the ethnic German population. Similar to the case of Koreans in Japan, this particular form of multiculturalism is rooted in the equation of nationality with ethnocultural identity, reflecting the influence of particularistic citizenship policies on the political identities of noncitizens. Accordingly, noncitizen political movements in Germany have centered on demands for local voting rights and dual citizenship, in addition to homeland politics (Castles and Davidson 2000: 95-97; Thomas 2002: 21). Although the local voting rights movement was ultimately defeated by the courts in the early 1990s, movements
to liberalize Germany’s citizenship policies have realized two remarkable feats: the *de facto* recognition of dual citizenship and the incorporation of *jus soli* (birthright citizenship) into Germany’s citizenship policies in 2000. As Merih Anil (2001) argues, the symbolic change of this reform—from one associated with ethnocultural identity to civic identity—is more politically charged than the policy change itself and is likely the reason that this reform came last after a decade of piecemeal liberalization. Indeed, the naturalization rate among Turks almost tripled between 1993 and 1995, following the liberalization of German naturalization policies in 1992 and the Turkish government’s decision to allow expatriate Turks to reclaim their Turkish citizenship after they have made a formal renouncement (Joppke 1999a: 638-639). As Christian Joppke (1999a: 639) points out, the latter move was a direct result of lobbying efforts made by Turkish residents in Germany. Moreover, because the “as-of-right” (*Rechtanspruch*) naturalization policy adopted in 1992 is based entirely on residence, the “deeply embedded” understanding of German ethnocultural nationhood has been completely removed from naturalization criteria (Joppke 1999a: 638; Thomas 2002: 24).

At the same time, Joppke (1999b: 12) notes that minority populations are but “marginally involved” in German multiculturalism, which “consists of the moderate request to respect the very fact of ethnic diversity brought about by immigration.” However, Brett Klopp’s (2000; 2002) study of contemporary Turkish resident political participation in Germany demonstrates that foreign residents
have actively engaged in movements to change the meaning of German citizenship from one based on an ethnocultural definition of nationhood to one based on multiculturalism. Much like Korean social movements in Japan, the refusal to naturalize is a form of resistance against the existing terms and conditions of German citizenship policies, not an indication of political apathy. As one activist in Klopp’s study stated, “We want to have German citizenship, but not Germanness” (Klopp 2002: 20).

Noncitizens, Voice, and Extra-Electoral Forms of Political Participation

The current world-historical context has shaped a common political opportunity for foreign residents in many advanced industrial democracies to negotiate the terms of their incorporation. Structural shifts in the world economy have not only stimulated liberal political and economic reforms among individual nation-states, but they have also resulted in the movement of vast numbers of people across national-state boundaries. Whether or not the interconnectedness of the world economy has brought about economic and political convergence, it has made national borders particularly porous and has posed considerable challenges for extant immigrant incorporation policies. In this context, national citizenship remains a powerful instrument used by states to determine the criteria of belonging and affiliation within a national community even as heightened concern for universal human rights and hybrid, transnational identities increasingly complicate the relationship between those
defined as citizens and noncitizens. In this respect, the “new wave” of international migration has “reprioritized” citizenship (Feldblum 2000: 477), expanding the boundaries of citizenship (with new forms of regional and postnational citizenship) on the one hand and, on the other hand, triggering a range of new and old debates pertaining to immigrants and their impact on national identity, national security, economic wellbeing, social stability, and democratic governance.

A number of observers have noted recent trends toward the convergence of citizenship rights between citizens and noncitizens among democratic states with descent-based citizenship policies and, at the same time, restrictive changes, or a backlash, to liberal citizenship policies among “countries of immigration” (Joppke 1999a; Feldblum 2000; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Weil 2001). In fact, recent efforts to better integrate permanent foreign residents in such countries as Japan, Switzerland, and Germany have simultaneously accompanied legislation to tighten borders and heighten the punishment and surveillance of illegal immigrants. Between these two currents, permanent foreign residents occupy an ambiguous legal and symbolic position. Because they enjoy extensive citizenship rights and secure residence, they are a far more powerful group than are recent immigrants. At the same time, because this category of noncitizens has permanently settled in the host society, repatriation will generally be an undesirable option, especially among native-born generations. Yet, because they are disenfranchised (with the exception of
local voting rights in some countries) and cannot run for political office, they are nevertheless “second-class” citizens at best. Thus, it is highly unlikely that noncitizen activists seek the indefinite deferment of citizen status for their communities.

If repatriation and homeland politics are not of central concern, what is the rationale behind noncitizen movements that seek to secure their community’s foreign citizenship status? This paper contends that foreign community activists use their noncitizen status to give “voice” to their preferences, especially when their numbers are small. Resistance to political assimilation via naturalization, in this case, is a form of protest against existing citizenship policies. Moreover, because it is based on “voice” rather than “exit” (e.g., repatriation), this strategy can be interpreted as an attempt to “change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs,” according to Albert Hirschman’s now classic work on Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970: 30).

Movements calling for local voting rights for foreign residents, the recognition of dual citizenship, and the separation of nationality and citizenship are ultimately based on noncitizen status itself. While participants and supporters may include both citizens and noncitizens, the presence of a substantial number of foreign permanent residents who are unwilling to naturalize under the given conditions adds political force and urgency to these movements. While their success may depend largely on the “fit” between the organization of the interest groups and configurations of power in the host state
and civil society, including local-level actors, as well as the opportunities presented by the world-historical context, these noncitizen movements pose a fundamental challenge to existing understandings of citizenship and nationhood. Especially in countries where citizenship policies are based on descent and, thus, ethnocultural understandings of nationhood, political strategies based on noncitizen status are likely associated with movements for multiculturalism, racial and/or ethnic equality, and other efforts to diversify democracy.

While further research on noncitizen political movements needs to be conducted in order to test the cross-national implications of my hypothesis, the findings of the present study underline the limits of one-dimensional, state-centered approaches to citizenship. An interactive approach to citizenship provides a powerful tool for cross-national and intra-national comparisons of citizenship politics and how they impact and are impacted by state and non-state actors—citizens and noncitizens, transnational organizations and local interest groups, national leaders and local officials, and so forth. Rather than focusing on the continuity or discontinuity of national citizenship policies, which is implicitly contingent on the resilience of the nation-state form, this approach encourages multidimensional and multilevel comparisons of citizenship politics in their entirety by analyzing how citizenship policies, meanings, rights and

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45 I am borrowing elements of Theda Skocpol's (1992) “polity-centered approach” in this sentence.
responsibilities, and practices affect the relationship between the state, citizens, and noncitizens.

In particular, the findings of the present study point to the need for further research on noncitizen political participation, especially extra-electoral forms, in advanced industrial democracies. These patterns of political participation problematize the notion that immigrants and noncitizens are merely objects of citizenship and immigration policies or that they seek only social recognition and institutionalized rights. The case of Korean residents in Japan demonstrates that citizenship practices and movements are neither restricted to legal citizens nor confined to the boundaries of the nation-state. While it is premature to declare the end of national citizenship, the notion that noncitizens are politically passive neglects the rich comparative history of noncitizens engaged in what can only be characterized as movements toward citizenship that affected not only their individual communities but the entire political order (e.g., women’s suffrage movements, civil rights movements, gay rights movements, immigrants’ rights movements, and so forth). While noncitizens may not be formal members of the host society, they may nevertheless engage in various extra-electoral forms of political participation to influence public opinion, public policies and institutions, political parties or individual politicians, foreign relations, and racial politics. By associating meaningful political participation with formal citizenship status, we overlook the multiple channels of political mobilization and participation not only of foreign citizens but also of other groups who have
historically been denied the right to vote, such as women, racial minorities, and children.

To be sure, movements for social recognition by noncitizens are in themselves appeals to citizenship. Citizenship status alone does not guarantee protection from discrimination or even equal social status with the dominant group (despite the principle of equality among citizens). In many ways, it is the terms of a group’s political incorporation (or exclusion) that shapes both their treatment by the host state and citizens as well as the political opportunities for distinct forms of collective action. As the population of permanent foreign residents expands throughout advanced industrial democracies—including long-term foreign residents who cannot or will not naturalize and native-born generations who choose to maintain their foreign nationalities—their political incorporation and political participation patterns will undoubtedly have a critical impact on the development of immigration, citizenship, and racial politics in their host societies.
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