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by

Matthew Downey Atkinson

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This dissertation is about how issues get organized into partisan conflict in Congress. I argue that representatives of policy demanding minorities form coalitions with other such representatives in order to gain majority support for their demands. I then show that we can account for change in the composition of these party coalitions based on the compatibility of the preferences of each societal interest that comprise them. These compatibilities undergo change when the evolution of a new presidential cleavage transforms the partisan tendencies of important groups in the electorate (e.g., farmers, African Americans).

The dissertation has three parts. The first part elaborates the theoretical dynamic of political alignments that I summarized in the previous paragraph. The next part tests the proposition that the party coalitions in Congress serve as habitual channels of mutual accommodation in which legislators accommodate the interests of their co-partisan colleagues. The mutual accommodation premise of parties provides societal interests the incentive to align with one of the party coalitions in order to advance their legislative goals.
Which party a societal interest aligns with will naturally be informed by how compatible the group is with the set of interests that comprise each of the major party coalitions. The third part of the dissertation tests the proposition that the dominant cause of change in the alignments of all societal interests is the evolution of new presidential cleavages. New presidential cleavages move the party system to new equilibria of coalitional groupings. These new equilibria obviously involve partisan change by groups that care intensely about each new cleavage issue but also involve change for other societal interests who have their compatibilities with the coalitions transformed by the reshuffling that follows from the evolution of new presidential cleavages.

I test my hypothesis about the dynamics of political alignment by analyzing how all the major issue domains in American politics were affected by the civil rights issue evolution that began in the 1960s, and by evaluating how the organization of defense policy into partisan conflict was affected in five different episodes of partisan transition. Although most of my analysis is focused on the cases of the civil rights issue evolution and the organization of defense policy into partisan conflict, the argument I make is cast in general terms and can account for continuity and change in how all the major issue domains – and the policy demanding interest groups associated with them – are organized into American political conflict.
The dissertation of Matthew Downey Atkinson is approved.

Jeffrey Lewis

Keith Poole

Lynn Vavreck

John Zaller, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

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The beer company Dos Equis employs the actor Jonathan Goldsmith for their “the most interesting man in the world” advertising campaign. I have a visceral reaction to those commercials. I always feel like I should be looking at John Zaller when the most interesting man appears. John is the most interesting man in the world! What a privilege it has been to study under John and have him advise my dissertation.
Education

Stanford University
  Major Field: Economic Development
  Graduate Certificate in Asia Area Studies, 2001

University of California, Santa Cruz
  B.A., Politics and Economics, 2000
  Highest Honors in Politics, Highest Honors in Economics

Meiji Gakuin University, Yokohama, Japan
  Global Security & Economic Development Program (UC study abroad), 1999

Publications


Conference and Workshop Presentations

**Midwest Political Science Association**, Annual Meeting, Chicago 2011

**Midwest Political Science Association**, Annual Meeting, Chicago 2008
  “Race and Realignment: A Southern Story Goes North”

**UCLA Workshop on Political Methodology**, UCLA 2008
  “Candidate Faces and Election Outcomes,” with Ryan D. Enos and Seth J. Hill

**Midwest Political Science Association**, Annual Meeting, Chicago 2007
  “Why Does Macropartisanship Vary Substantially from Cohort to Cohort?”

**UCLA Workshop on Political Methodology**, UCLA 2007
  “Partisan Generational Effects”

**Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology Research Conference**, Washington DC 2003
  “A Computational Routine for Disaggregating Industry Margin Data to Estimate Product Margin Rates”

Non-Academic Work Experience

Economist, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Washington DC; 2001–2004
INTRODUCTION

A “brown state-green state clash is likely to encumber any effort to set a mandatory ceiling on the carbon dioxide emissions blamed as the biggest contributor to global warming,” reports The New York Times. But the report is puzzling. Congress regularly legislates in the face of much deeper divisions between Red and Blue state delegations on such matters as taxes, health reform, and regulation of the economy. Why do Brown-Green divisions hold up legislation on the environment and the Red-Blue divisions not hold up legislation on taxes and spending? The answer, most political scientists would agree, is that Congress is organized around issues of economic conflict. Its choices of leaders, procedures, and party reputations are all based on putting together legislation on economic issues. Environmental legislation cross-cuts the usual battle lines. Some Democratic stalwarts, like organized labor, are liberal on most issues but oppose green legislation, whereas some Republican constituencies, like suburban voters, are generally conservative but favor certain green measures. The result is that Congress lacks the means to forge and enforce deals on green issues.

This problem appears to apply to all issues that cross-cut the main dimension of congressional conflict. As Poole and Rosenthal (2007: 143) have written, “If an issue is to result in sustained public policies, we hypothesize that the policies must eventually be supported by a coalition that can be represented as a split on the first, or major dimension. Policy developed by coalitions that are non-spatial or built along the second dimension is likely to be transient and unstable.” The major dimension of disagreement in Congress is almost without exception whether

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the federal government should shift wealth between social groups, as Poole and Rosenthal have shown empirically.

Poole and Rosenthal’s path-breaking empirical analysis of congressional behavior demonstrates that Congress is perennially organized by conflict over economic redistribution and that historically almost all policy coalitions in Congress are built along the one-dimensional axis of partisan conflict. Thus to realize their policy goals, demanders generally need to get their demands included in the legislative product of the majority party and to do that they need to organize themselves into the economic redistribution cleavage that forms the basis of the dominant coalitions in Congress. This dissertation is an effort to address two important puzzles that follow from Poole and Rosenthal’s empirical findings.

First, Poole and Rosenthal’s finding that the legislative coalitions in Congress are almost always built along the axis that organizes partisan conflict is contrary to the decades-old presumption that different issue domains give rise to different legislative coalitions. Poole and Rosenthal (2007: 42) show, in contrast, “The political parties, either through the discipline of powerful leaders … or through successful trades function as effective logrollers. Parties thus help map complex issues … into a low-dimensional space.” In other words, a high number of issue dimensions are organized into a single left-right axis of political conflict. How and why does this happen?

Second, Poole and Rosenthal (2007, 1993) show that economic redistribution has not been displaced as the central cleavage organizing partisan conflict in Congress since the end of Reconstruction in 1877. Yet to be sure, American politics has undergone monumental changes in

\(^2\) The exceptions are two brief periods in which slavery was the dominant cleavage.
the decades since 1877. How and why could these changes have unfolded in spite of redistribution’s endurance as the dominant cleavage in Congress? Poole and Rosenthal’s finding is certainly at odds with popular partisan realignment and issue evolution explanations of political change in America, which argue that political change is brought about by one dominant cleavage being displaced by another. Instead, their results indicate that the incorporation of new issues – agriculture, civil rights, defense policy, moral traditionalism, etc. – into partisan conflict has involved the organization of these issues into the familiar left-right economic coalitions in Congress.

The theoretical account I develop to address these two puzzles begins with the idea that legislators want to enact policy on behalf of their most important electoral constituencies and that natural legislative majorities capable of enacting this policy rarely exist. Legislators thus need to participate in coalitions in which their policy demands are accommodated by colleagues who in turn expect reciprocal support for their own demands. The same two coalitions organize voting across policy domains because, as Aldrich (1995) has explained, it is not easy to form successful logrolling coalitions: coalition formation involves high transaction costs (negotiation, trust, verification, cycling, etc.) that generally preclude the formation of ephemeral coalitions or coalition formation on an issue-by-issue basis. The theory of political alignments is thus premised on the idea that the parties resolve the transaction cost constraint on coalition formation by serving as “habitual channels of mutual accommodation.”³ Policy demanders are generally most successful at building coalitions through habitual channels – namely, the parties – due to the instability and expense of issue-specific coalitions. Thus minority societal interests with off-center policy demands are incented to align with one of the major coalitions. But how does an interest choose which coalition to align with? Why do some interests get more policy support from their coalitions? And why does

³ The phrase “habitual channels of mutual accommodation” is due to Mayhew (1966).
the partisan alignment of societal interests sometimes change even as the redistribution cleavage continues to organize the dominant coalitions?

My account of change in American political alignments begins with the idea that American politics is characterized by multiple contending interests which need to organize themselves into the party system and that are, to varying degrees, complementary, neutral, or antagonistic. These interest compatibilities are determined outside of politics and cannot be much affected by political manipulation. The contending interests in American society organize themselves into opposing coalitions by aligning with the set of societal interests with which they are most compatible. This process of alignment is anchored by the salience of conflict over economic redistribution. In contrast to the dominant approach to the study of coalition formation which holds that coalition formation takes place under highly unstable circumstances (Riker 1982, 1986; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Schofield 2006), Poole and Rosenthal’s research shows that alignment choices are not made in a chaotic environment but rather involve the organization of interests into the redistribution cleavage that endurally anchors the coalitions in Congress. The process is thus not one of interests organizing themselves amidst chaos but one of interests organizing themselves into the existing structure of the redistribution cleavage. How does this happen?

The interest composition of the coalitions is importantly determined by the redistribution interests of groups in the political system. But even though redistribution organizes the coalitions in Congress, the congressional cleavage is not the only cleavage that shapes which interests align with which party. The great moving part in American politics is the presidential cleavage. The presidential cleavage issue is often redistribution, but unlike the congressional cleavage, the presidential cleavage can change, as it did in 1964 when civil rights was the dominant presidential
cleavage and as it did in 1896 when support for radical agrarian interests was the dominant presidential cleavage.

The presidential campaigns shape the images associated with the party labels under which MCs stand for election. As a result, the composition of the party coalitions in Congress is shaped by the presidential cleavage. When the presidential coalitions change, congressional coalitions change to reflect that change. For example, the evolution of civil rights as the dominant presidential cleavage in the 1960s induced partisan change among racial liberals and conservatives (Carmines and Stimson 1989) which ultimately affected the electoral constituencies of members of Congress aligned with each of the redistribution coalitions.

But the evolution of a new presidential cleavage does not just affect the alignment of societal interests who care intensely about the new cleavage issue. The change in the composition of the coalitions produced by a new presidential cleavage affects how compatible all societal interests are with the party coalitions. That is, societal interests who care about issues secondary to the presidential cleavage issue have their compatibility with the coalitions affected by the evolution of a new presidential cleavage. In this dissertation, I demonstrate how the organization of secondary issues into partisan conflict is shaped by the evolution of new presidential cleavages. Policy demands on secondary issues that are sufficiently compatible with the interests in the dominant coalition tend to get included in the legislative product of the dominant coalition while those that are less compatible do not. Thus if the evolution of a new presidential cleavage changes the interest composition of the coalitions such that policy demanders who care about a particular

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4 I use the term secondary issue to refer to all issues secondary to the presidential and congressional cleavage issues.
secondary issue become more compatible with the interests of one of the coalitions, then that secondary issue will undergo increasing organization into political conflict.

The central theoretical idea developed in this dissertation is that party coalitions are organized by conflicts among societal interests that exist exogenous of the political system – issue preferences that are rooted in society and can’t be much affected by the manipulations of politicians. Coalitions get organized based on what issues and interests go together (and which don’t). Issues get represented in the American political system to the extent the interests behind them can work together in a major party coalition. My claim is that partisan change is thus driven by how the presidential cleavage issue transforms the composition of the coalitions and that all other issues getting organized on a secondary basis.

The argument I make in this dissertation is in stark discord with the dominant view among scholars of American political coalitions who stresses how politicians build coalitions (e.g., Aldrich 1995; Riker 1982; Holt 1978; Schattschneider 1960; see also Sartori 1969). I am going to present a lot of evidence that society-rooted preferences are organizing the party coalitions and that there is not much evidence that electorally-minded politicians are doing anything. To be clear, my intention is not to suggest that politics does not play a role in organizing political conflict. It does. Rather, my point is that politicians and activists operate within a highly constrained political environment; and the goal of the present study is to describe the constraints within which politicians and activists operate and to show that, given these constraints, the range of possible coalitional arrangements is limited and the relationships that evolve tend to be very predictable. Of course, political actors have to grasp the reigns when the political environment presents opportunities to advance their interests. But my claim is that by understanding the opportunities that will evolve we can
effectively predict the evolution of coalitional arrangements. At bottom, I am proposing a dynamic in which groups shuffle into and out of the coalitions based on what they ask of the coalition, what they offer it and what is asked of them in return. The efforts of groups themselves are epiphenomenal – these efforts are merely a reaction to this structure of the coalitions. This reactive dynamic is evinced by the fact that in each major instance where the substance of coalitional conflict has changed, the lines of conflict have been defined before new or transformed parties emerged. It is worth briefly commenting on each of these major transitions – the emergence of the second, third, fourth and post-New Deal party systems – in order to demonstrate that historically it is the structure of social conflict that has organized the coalitions.

In the case of the second party system, that the coalitions were organized by the salient conflict is made evident by the fact that the Whig party did not formally come into existence until the 1830s but the cleavage that organized the second party system was already organizing congressional voting in the early 1820s (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2002) and presidential politics in 1824 (McCormick 1966). The Whig party and the second party system merely institutionalized the economic cleavage that societal interests had already sorted on. In the case of the third party system, the slavery conflict persistently threatened to destroy the second party system throughout that party system’s lifetime and when it did in 1848 it did so in spite of the efforts of the major party leaders and well before a viable anti-slavery party came into existence. Eventually the slavery issue came to enduringly organize the coalitions because the Midwest made a new majority coalition possible – namely, a coalition that excluded the South. The important development thus was not political entrepreneurialism but rather change in the electoral structure. In the case of the fourth party system which emerged when radical agrarians obtained control of the Democratic party’s presidential nomination, party leaders were essentially feckless in
controlling the changing interest coalitions in the party. Both parties experienced uncontained factional rifts that proved politically costly during this period. The most notable of these rifts include the Democratic party’s 1896 nomination of William Jennings Bryan and the party’s inability to unite behind competitive candidates in subsequent years – with each faction in fact preferring Republican victory to control of the presidency by the rival Democratic faction. The Republican party also experienced uncontained infighting manifesting in the Cannon revolt (1910) and the 1912 Progressive party presidential campaign of Theodore Roosevelt. In the most recent instance of coalitional transition, the impetus of change involved pressures to represent the interests of racial minorities that were imposed on the Democratic party in spite of the efforts of party leaders to suppress racial matters (Polsby 2004). The Democratic coalition was rebuilt as a result of the effect on electoral politics of the Great Migration of blacks out of the South.

Before concluding this introduction, it is important to address why political alignments matter. There is compelling evidence that the interest composition of the policy coalition is the most important determinant of policy outcomes. The only factor of comparable importance is public opinion and the short-term influence of public opinion on policy outputs pales in comparison to the influence of the structure of political alignments. This fact is made evident in the analysis developed in the most rigorous effort to evaluate the impact of public opinion on policy making, The Macro Polity (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002); as Bartels (2010) observes of the analysis presented in that book, “Although the authors of The Macro Polity stressed the direct responsiveness of governmental policy to shifts in public sentiment, their findings imply that the policy changes that would be produced by shifting from the most liberal public mood on record to the most conservative public mood on record are dwarfed by the changes produced when a typical Democrat replaces a typical Republican in the White House.”
This dissertation is an effort to put forth a theory that explains the political alignments of societal groups and to test the most important predications of that theory.
Lyndon Johnson was a Zionist who admitted that “he did not fully understand Zionism” and who, according to the Johnson White House’s Jewish liaison, held an “amused, Texas view of Jews ... it was a little of the southern, country attitude toward urban, very different Jews.” Yet Johnson “was a national Democrat, and national Democrats are pro-Jewish; they are pro-Israel,” explained the aide, Henry McPherson. For that reason, Johnson considered himself a Zionist and indeed Johnson was more ardently pro-Israel than his two predecessors. And yet behind the scenes Johnson was not above pushing Jewish interests for concessions in ways that revealed that his advocacy of Jewish interests was based more on coalitional considerations than on principle.

McPherson, for example, recalls Johnson once admonishing him during Johnson’s tenure as senate majority leader: “The only people who want this bill that you keep putting on here are Jews, and I’m not going to take it up until I get something for it.” The bill in question was an immigration bill advocated by the American Jewish Congress. McPherson recalled that the “bill would achieve some immigration reform and let a lot of people in the country. I kept pushing him on it; he wanted to hold it for trading purposes.” Strange, a man who claimed to be committed to the Jewish cause holding Jewish interests hostile to politics.  

Behind the public front, Johnson and the Jewish leaders represented distinct interests and each needed accommodation by the other for advancing those interests. For Johnson, the Jews were a group he could regularly rely on to accommodate his legislative demands and of course

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5 The quotes and foregoing details are drawn from the oral history conducted with Henry McPherson by the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library and from Tyler, Patrick. A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East--from the Cold War to the War on Terror. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009, pp. 66-68, 98.
Jewish leaders expected their accommodation to be reciprocated by Johnson. Johnson and the Jews developed a productive partnership because – though their priorities often differed – their interests rarely directly conflicted and frequently coincided. Each could accommodate the legislative demands of the other with very little detriment to the accommodator’s own interests.

Johnson and the Jews – a southern populist and northern ethnics – were an unlikely combination. But unlikely coalitional combinations sometimes build extraordinary partnerships wherein dissimilar interests accommodate the policy demands of one another: social and economic conservatives, abolitionists and yeoman farmers, labor and African-Americans. In each case, the emergence of synergistic coalitional relationships was a product not only of compatibility – the absence of conflicts of interest – but also of electoral context. Compatibility is only a necessary condition. For a coalitional partnership to take root, that partnership has to be consistent with a viable strategy for winning congressional and Electoral College majorities. This contextual necessary condition cannot be manipulated through political efforts. Consider, for example, the emergence of the modern coalition of African-Americans and labor – why it took hold when it did and why it was successful.

In the 1920s labor was stuck in a difficult coalition with the South. By the 1940s labor was freeing itself of that partnership through its partnership with the newly emergent northern African-American voting bloc. Blacks and labor were able to forge a much more harmonious and mutually beneficial coalition than was possible for labor and the South. This partnership was enabled in the 1940s as a result of the changed electoral context created by the northern migration of African Americans, not changes in interest compatibility. In fact, black interests were probably somewhat more in conflict with the interests of white labor unions in the 1940s than they were in the 1920s.
due to the downward pressure migration put on northern wages. But far more importantly, black migration significantly altered the viable coalitional possibilities available to northern Democrats (Carmines and Stimson 1989). In particular, by the 1940s northern states that had previously been Republican strongholds were made competitive by the growing black vote in those states (James 2000).

The goal of this chapter is to present a theory of how new political alignments evolve. The theory of political alignments begins with the premise that any societal interest with policy demands is incented to align with one of the major coalitions. This is because any issue-specific coalition lacking a preference-based majority can be easily divided and defeated and the institutional means that might prevent such instability are expensive—too expensive to build on an issue-by-issue basis (Aldrich 1995). The parties solve this problem by combining trust with institutional resources and thus serve as habitual channels of mutual accommodation through which various and diverse societal interests cooperate to advance policy demands that lack natural legislative majorities. Because policy coalitions are generally formed within the major party coalitions, societal interests with off-center demands are compelled to attach themselves to one of the coalitions or forego any prospect of realizing their legislative goals. Needless to say, interests align with the group of coalitional partners they are most compatible with.

I argue that by understanding these compatibilities it is possible to account for political alignments and that changes in partisan alignments can be explained by how new issue cleavages affect the composition of the coalitions. The alignment implications of a new cleavage are widespread. New cleavage issues affect not just the alignment of groups with intense demands

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6 The term habitual channels of mutual accommodation is due to Mayhew (1966).
regarding the new cleavage issue but also affect the relative compatibility of all groups in the political system with the major party coalitions. Thus when social changes exogenous of the political system – like the Great Migration – create new electoral possibilities and a new cleavage defines partisan conflict – like the civil rights issue in the 1960s, large-scale coalition change ensues.

The argument I develop in this dissertation is an interest-centered account of political change. To have an interest means to have a stake in an outcome. An entity has an interest in public policy when its welfare – either material or ideal – stands to be affected. The political economy literature typically refers to the interests of productive endowments like land, labor, and capital, which frequently have concrete stakes in public policy. But it is just as meaningful to think of groups with ideal dispositions – like moral traditionalists or cosmopolitans – as having a stake in public policy.⁷ Thus in this dissertation “interest” refers to both material and ideal stakes in public policy.⁸

The Literature on Political Alignments

Societal interests make demands on many different important and deeply divisive issues, but, according to Poole and Rosenthal (2007), the dominant line of disagreement organizing the legislative coalitions is usually whether the federal government should shift wealth between social groups. What, then, happens to non-economic issues, many of which – like defense, immigration

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⁷ See Schlozman and Tierny (1986: 16-23) for a discussion of various approaches to the study of interests.
⁸ For the purposes of my study of interests and alignments, it is not necessary go beyond the generalization of interests to include both material and ideal stakes. Further refinement would unnecessarily limit the potential implications of my argument. I do believe, however, that the material structure of society goes a long way toward accounting for the origins of ideal interests, as scholars in the historical materialism tradition have argued. For example, Jackson (1985) presents a nice descriptive study of how material circumstances contribute to ideal dispositions. But this presumption is unnecessary for the present study and I will engage in no further discussion of the origins of ideal interests.
and the environment – are extremely important? Why and how are they organized (or not
organized) into partisan conflict?

The most widely referenced theories of party position change emphasize the electoral
incentives to politicians associated with issue attitudes in the electorate (Riker 1982; Aldrich 1983;
Sundquist 1983; Miller and Schofield 2003; Schofield 2006; Carmines and Stimson 1989;
Schattschneider 1960). Each of these theories anticipates that because the electorate is
ideologically unconstrained, the activation of a new issue displaces the cleavage that previously
organized partisan conflict and is also associated with the suppression of alternative issue conflicts.

This prediction is both anomalous and problematic. It is anomalous in light of Poole and
Rosenthal’s findings (a) that the redistribution cleavage has persisted as the organizing cleavage in
Congress and (b) that in contemporary politics many issues are organized into the axis of partisan
conflict. It is problematic because having now recognized that policy coalitions are usually built
along the axis of partisan conflict (Poole and Rosenthal 2007), a general theory of issue alignments
is needed to make sense of the causes of variation in legislative productivity on the many important
issues that are not central to the organization of presidential and congressional coalitions. How do
these secondary issues get organized into the legislative product of the majority party in Congress?

Consider the issue of defense. Defense policy is today much better organized into partisan
conflict than it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet to argue that the parties polarized on defense
because defense evolved as the central conflict in American politics is – within the issue evolution
framework – to imply that defense displaced economics and civil rights as the central partisan
cleavage. I am not aware of any serious scholar who has tried to make that case. A more plausible
alternative explanation is that events force programmatic parties to develop coherent positions on
important issues. For example, Ehrman (1995), in trying to explain how contemporary ideological positions on defense evolved, studies the debate “regarding America’s virtues and the legitimacy of its global interests” that intensified around 1966. He reviews the foreign policy debates developing in journals like *Foreign Policy* and *Commentary*, which would be the standard venues where experts associated with the parties would develop programmatic policy positions, and argues that unified party positions on defense developed in these elite venues. Yet on many important contemporary issues that policy elites actively debate, these programmatic dynamics appear to play little role in the evolution of partisan issue positions. For example, events in the contemporary period should compel the parties to develop well-articulated programmatic positions on the issues of immigration and climate change. But intra-party debates over immigration and climate change appear to be much more organized by real interests than by principled, programmatic considerations. If this is generally the case, then intra-party interest compatibility is much more relevant to how partisan issue positions evolve than are the debates taking place among partisan issue experts.

Layman and Carsey’s (2002; Layman et al. 2010) conflict extension theory offers a compelling account of how issues get organized into partisan conflict. They argue that the parties have polarized on issues like abortion because activists’ attachments to their parties cause them to support the positions of other activist groups in their party. The parties have indeed evolved intra-party consensus positions when party activists have been willing to go along with the preferences of a group of intense policy demanders in the party. But why does an issue become amenable to the evolution of intra-party consensus? And why on important issues like climate change and immigration have the parties failed to develop unified ideological positions? Certainly many activists are pressing for the incorporation of these issues into the party agendas. And therefore the failure of the parties to organize climate change and immigration into their programs raises the
question of when and why conflict extends. At least for these issues and probably others, partisan
dynamics appear not to have shaped the preferences of activists into unified programs.

**The Theory of Political Alignments**

**The party coalitions and enacting policy demands**

The theory of political alignments begins with the premise that the parties are more than
groupings of like-minded social groups and more than institutions that organize Congress and
control its agenda (c.f., Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). Rather, the party
ccoalitions are groupings of societal interests who regularly accommodate the policy demands of
one another. Participation on a party team involves proactively supporting the interests of co-
partisans even when that support may be in tension with one’s own policy preferences.

Societal interests participate in these coalitions of mutual accommodation because all
minority groups in the political system are made better off by engaging in exchanges of legislative
support. Yet with rare exception ad hoc logrolling coalitions will be unstable and fail as a result.
This is because, as Aldrich (1995) explains, the preference cycles that prevail in multidimensional
policy environments create opportunities for majorities to be divided and in turn defeated: “Social
choice theory tells us that most of the time we should expect there to be no voting equilibrium
based solely on preferences” (Aldrich 1995: 44). Thus policy demanders are incented to
institutionalize coalitions robust to the cycling problem; and the surest way to prevent cycling is for
the same coalitional groupings to organize all policy coalitions, thereby making it difficult to
undermine coalitions by offering inducements to marginal participants (Schwartz 1989). As habitual
channels of mutual accommodation, the party coalitions serve this purpose.
Thus the theory of political alignment's first and second assumptions:

**Assumption 1:** All societal interests need allies.

Even the biggest societal interests – like organized labor and business – comprise only a minority share of the electorate. They need accommodation by political allies to build majority support for enacting their policy demands.

**Assumption 2:** The parties are habitual channels of mutual accommodation.

The party coalitions are the most ready source of allies when preferences alone don’t lend themselves to a legislative majority.

But having asserted that societal interests are incented to participate in a coalition, why do societal interests align as they do and when and why do societal interests sometimes change their partisan alignments?

**How the coalitions form**

Aldrich (1995) explains why MCs are incented to organize themselves along a single dimension of conflict. In a context of multiple issue dimensions and numerous possible voting coalitions, it is nearly impossible to pass policy or even effectively organize the business of the legislature. Aldrich observes that the disorganization of the first three American Congresses was due to precisely this problem. But MCs have careerist incentives to find a way to organize the business of Congress and pass policy. That is, apart from their ideological goals, MCs have careerist motivations to find ways to pick leaders, organize committees, and manage the congressional agenda. How MCs have ultimately organized themselves has been empirically analyzed by Poole and Rosenthal (2007). They show that the dominant coalitions in Congress are economic
redistribution coalitions with only two brief exceptions when slavery was the dominant cleavage. Thus the third assumption:

**Assumption 3:** The cleavage organizing the coalitions in Congress is conflict over economic redistribution.

This empirical regularity is not surprising given that issues vary in the extent to which they can be affected by public policy and that the government's capacity to affect the distribution of resources is in general much more substantial that its ability to produce other social outcomes. It therefore makes sense that as legislators seek an enduring basis of organization they coalesce around pro- and anti-redistribution preferences.

The redistribution cleavage in Congress is an empirical regularity. But the interest composition of the redistribution coalitions sometimes changes. This change is brought about by the emergence of new presidential cleavages. The need of MCs and presidential candidates are different. MCs need an issue that travels well, an issue that members of the party can stand for election on in all regions of the country. Presidential candidates just need an Electoral College majority and have the option of discounting entire regions of the country. Therefore, presidential candidates are sometimes incented to campaign on issues that divide their own parties’ coalitions in Congress. The dominant presidential cleavage will often be economic redistribution but occasionally the presidential coalitions will be organized by a distinct issue. Thus the central moving party in American politics is change and continuity in the presidential cleavage. New presidential cleavage issues do not displace the dominant cleavage in Congress, but they do transform the interest composition of the redistribution coalitions in Congress.
Assumption 4: The presidential cleavage issue can be distinct from the dominant cleavage in Congress.

Voter partisanship is based on response to the presidential candidates and therefore the presidential elections divide the country into stable competing political coalitions. Because voters’ alignments are influenced by what the dominant issue cleavage is in presidential elections, the interest composition of the party coalitions is shaped by the presidential campaigns. Thus partisan change in the electorate is driven by change in the basis on which people in the electorate support presidential candidates; and for MCs elected under the party banners, this partisan change has implications for the types of interests that members of each coalition in Congress tend to represent.

Assumption 5: MCs are elected under party labels whose support in the electorate is primarily based on voter response to the presidential campaigns.

MCs arrive in Congress as the representatives of many diverse interests. The MCs elected under the banners of the two parties do not, in the preferences they seek to represent, reflect a tightly organized set of interests. They arrive in Congress as the representatives of diverse interests – some of whom have policy demands relevant to the issue organizing presidential voting but many have policy demands not directly related to the presidential cleavage. These representatives of diverse interests need to form coalitions to organize the business of Congress and to pass legislation. In practice as Assumption 3 asserts, the cleavage Congress members organize around is conflict over economic redistribution. However, MCs are the representatives of the many interests that reside in their districts.

Assumption 6: Legislators are constrained by the preferences that reside in their districts.
**Corollary to assumption 6:** If district preferences on a new presidential cleavage issue correlate to district preferences on a secondary issue, then that secondary issue will undergo increased organization into partisan conflict in Congress as a result of the new presidential issue’s evolution.

When MCs form coalitions based on economic redistribution – which Poole and Rosenthal observe they do – and when presidential election coalitions organize around a conflict like civil rights or agriculture policy, representatives in Congress are organizing coalitions irrespective of the other issues they care about. All the other issues that societal interests care about get organized on a secondary basis. And the coalitional organization of those issues can happen only to the extent that preferences on these other issues happen to coincide with the composition of interests within the major coalitions. In other words, the organization on these other issues takes place within strong constraints, and these constraints account for how all these secondary issues get organized into partisan conflict.

**Propositions**

By the habitual channels of mutual accommodation assumption, the theory of political alignments proposes that legislators work to accommodate the policy demands of their co-partisan colleagues and therefore the congressional voting behavior of legislators is influenced by the interest composition of the party coalitions they belong to. When districts with the greatest levels of interest in an issue are concentrated within one party’s legislative caucus, members of that party from districts with lower levels of the interest will provide more voting support to the interest than they would if the interest were not concentrated within the party. The mutual accommodation dynamic provides the incentive for societal interests to align with a coalition.
The theory of political alignments explains how changes in the political alignments of societal interests come about. A political alignment is characterized by a stable group of people voting together against another stable group of people, as Petrocik (1981: 10) observes: “Most party histories have emphasized the extent to which our parties have been coalitions of diverse ethnic and religious groups, and changes in the parties have been explained in terms of the capacity of the parties to appeal to new groups or to broaden their appeal to groups associated with the oppositions.” There are two ways partisan alignments change. The first is as a result of “a change in the substance of the political conflict – in Schattschneider’s concept, the relocation of the line of cleavage in the two party system” (Sundquist 1983: 98). Poole and Rosenthal (2007: 54) describe this version of realignment as “a structural change in the basic dimension of voting [in Congress].” The second way alignments change is as a result of an enduring shift in the relative support for the two parties along the existing axis of conflict either as the result of the mobilization of new groups (e.g., Andersen 1979) or as the result of one party gaining a valence advantage. For example, the fifth party system (New Deal period) resulted from a shift in the relative support for the parties in spite of continuity with the basic cleavage that defined the fourth party system (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980). The theory of political alignments addresses the former dynamic. It is about how societal interests align along the dominant axis of political conflict.

When changes in societal conditions create the potential for electorally competitive partnerships between societal interests that are more compatible with one another than existing coalitional partnerships, the coalitions reshuffle in what is commonly called a party realignment wherein the groupings of people within the major parties changes. The mechanism producing realignment is the evolution of a new presidential issue cleavage, and as a result of realignment in the electorate produced by the evolution of a new presidential issue, different types of
representatives come to Congress under the two parties’ banners. In other words, when the electoral base of the parties’ presidential candidates changes, the long-term basis of the electoral coalitions of candidates for Congress also change to reflect the changes in the presidential coalitions. Thus we have the proposition that the organization of the coalitions in the legislature reflects the organization of groups into presidential election coalitions.

The central moving part in American politics in general and the cause of change in the congressional coalitions in particular is the cleavage issue in presidential elections. Issues secondary to the presidential cleavage issue get organized into partisan conflict if and only if the transformed composition of the coalitions caused by a new presidential cleavage issue produces greater compatibility between the issue’s policy demanders and one of the coalitions. What I am going to show in chapters 3 and 4 is that we can explain how the secondary issues are organized into partisan conflict by understanding how activation of new presidential cleavages has affected the interest composition of the coalitions. In particular, I am going to show that the secondary issues that have undergone partisan change are those where the associated policy demanding interests share a similar geographic distribution with the new presidential cleavage issues. Where the coincidence of geographic distribution is substantial, an issue becomes much more organized into partisan conflict as a result of the new cleavage issue’s activation. Where the coincidence is minimal, activation of the new cleavage issue either causes little change in how the issue is organized into partisan conflict or can cause the issue to be displaced from partisan conflict.

For example, consider how the secondary issue of abortion was incorporated through the alignment dynamic that I have described. The development began with the Great Migration of African Americans to the northern industrial states which affected potential coalitional
relationships. In particular, the Great Migration made the liberal coalition more competitive in the northern industrial states and, in turn, made it more difficult for southern whites to remain in alliance with the northern political machines. As blacks entered the Democratic coalition and demanded representation from Democratic legislators in Congress on the issue of race, the white South found itself discomfited. And ultimately when the white South began leaving the Democratic party because of the race issue, that development had the effect of removing a lot of religiosity from the Democratic Party and, in turn, opened the way for later partisan polarization on cultural issues like abortion.

Discussion

“A very extensive literature has shown that if decision making is binary (pitting one option against another) and based on majority rule, or more generally on a non-collegial voting mechanism, then 'chaos' or disorder can ensue as long as the dimension of x [the issue/policy space] is sufficiently large,” writes Norman Schofield (2006: 13-14). I believe the study of American political alignments has been misguided by the tradition of applying the formal literature Schofield describes to the study of coalition formation in America. American coalitions simply do not form in the context of binary choices and one-off votes. Instead, the salient features of the American political system are (a) the regularity with which coalitional arrangements are anchored by the redistribution dimension and (b) the ability of party institutions to facilitate side payments – particularly exchanges of legislative support – that make voting arrangements much more stable than is often presumed in the literature.

How an analyst understands coalitional dynamics depends on how she thinks societal interests and their representatives in Congress cooperate across issue domains. The alignments
literature premised on the idea of unstable coalitional arrangements (Riker 1982; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Aldrich 1983; Sundquist 1983) proposes that inter-domain cooperation does not generally obtain – there’s one dominant cleavage and to the extent that various issue conflicts can be framed in terms of that cleavage, those issues will be organized into politics (Aldrich 1995). Poole and Rosenthal (2007) have shown convincingly that the parties have organized conflict over many different issues including those substantively far removed from the dominant cleavage. I have argued in this chapter that the unidimensional Congress is perhaps not surprising and that by starting with assumptions about the political context different than those of the existing alignments literature it is possible to clarify the logic of how societal interests forge enduring arrangements of mutual accommodation (logrolling).

How and why groups cooperate across issue domains is a largely neglected subject in the American politics literature. Though the discipline’s understanding of the internal workings of interest groups and movements has advanced tremendously since publication of Olson’s (1965) classic critique of collective action, systematic understanding of interactions across interests and issue areas has been slower to develop and the extant work almost all focuses on cooperation among interest groups within a single issue domain. That is, the literature on interest group coalitions focuses on cooperation among groups that want the same thing in regard to a particular issue and who need to resolve collective action problems to accomplish shared policy goals (e.g., Tarrow and McAdams 2001; Hojnacki 1997, 1998; Holyoke 2009). Yet building a successful policy coalition requires obtaining political support from societal interests who are at best indifferent to the specific policy goal and who quite often stand to be (at least marginally) adversely affected by the policy goal (e.g., labor wages and immigration liberalization). This dissertation develops a theoretical argument about the dynamics of group provisions of policy support across issue
domains and tests predictions about when dissimilar interests will cooperate in successful policy coalitions. In the chapters that follow, I show that structural context goes a long way toward accounting for the alliances across issue domains that form and shape public policy. In particular, I argue that the dynamic organizing issue conflict in America centers on (a) the clustering of particular interests within electoral units – for example, interests like agriculture and labor are not randomly distributed across the electoral districts, (b) the president-centered political system – partisan alignments in the electorate are shaped by the presidential campaigns, and (c) the Electoral College system\(^9\) that gives presidential candidates incentive to appeal to specific geographies and the interests clustered within them.

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\(^9\) In fact, the Electoral College system does not explicitly create this circumstance. Rather, the Electoral College incents states to award their electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis which the states have almost universally done since the early 1800s, so the claim is more precisely that presidential candidates are incented to appeal to specific geographies because of the Electoral College and the states’ convention of allocating their electoral votes on a WTA basis.
CHAPTER 2
The Mutual Accommodation Premise of Political Parties

Introduction

In the postwar era, the American farm population shrank to a shadow of its former size. Yet agricultural interests succeeded in sustaining the costly farm support programs enacted when agrarian interests were much more substantially represented in Congress. How could this happen? “If the actions of congressmen were governed by a crude reading of constituency interests,” Mayhew (1966: 55-56) observed in the 1960s, “the farmer would have been abandoned by the federal government some decades ago.” So where did the legislative support for farm programs come from? According to Mayhew, “The answer ... is that party pressures intervened to magnify the power of the congressional farm minority.” He reports that “nonfarm Democrats voted with their farm colleagues year after year on farm matters, regardless of the attractiveness to them of the programs in question” (Mayhew 1966: 46-48).

In the case of farm supports, the Democratic party acted not merely as a coalition of like-minded legislators or as a legislative cartel. Rather, the Democratic party acted as a coalition of legislators who adapted their voting behavior to the needs of their co-partisan colleagues in the legislature. In this chapter, I argue in support of Mayhew’s observation that the parties are “habitual channels of mutual accommodation” whose members provide votes to their co-partisan colleagues on the issues those colleagues care most intensely about. The goal of this chapter is to present systematic evidence that legislators’ voting support for various societal interests is importantly influenced by the interests of their co-partisan colleagues and that when the interests of a legislator’s colleagues change, her voting behavior changes as well.
That the behavior of members of Congress is influenced by the parties is a proposition that was generally subscribed to by political scientists through the 1960s (Sinclair 2002). In a passage characteristic of the thinking during this period, Mayhew (1966: 146) observed:

It is an important fact of American politics that a congressman dispatched to Washington to guard the interests of a district cannot do the guarding by himself. It takes the votes of as many as 218 congressmen to authorize the building of a dam, to pass a housing bill ... or to finance construction of a botanical garden in Hawaii. It is only natural, therefore, that there should develop among congressmen habitual channels of mutual accommodation ... Nor is it surprising that mutual accommodation, or logrolling, should be most common among members of the same political party.

But when the emergence of rational choice theory increased the discipline’s awareness of the constraints on collective action, Mayhew and other leading scholars quickly became skeptical of the relevance of parties. “No theoretical treatment of the United States Congress that posits parties as analytic units will go very far,” Mayhew (1974: 27) declared in his seminal book Congress: The Electoral Connection. For twenty years, nearly all the influential work on Congress treated the parties as analytically irrelevant (e.g., Fenno 1973; Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1984, 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989, 1990), instead focusing on the role of constituency interests and re-election as the basis of decision-making in Congress. Skeptical of the minimal role allotted to parties, some scholars looked and found evidence for party control over the organization of Congress – specifically agenda setting and floor rules (Rohde 1991; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Sinclair 1995, 2005). Aldrich and Rohde’s conditional party government work (Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995;
Aldrich and Rodhe (2001) showed how party leaders could shepherd legislation through Congress, while Cox and McCubbins’ procedural cartel work (1993, 2005) showed how the parties are able to consistently block undesirable legislation.

Yet as political scientists learned of the robust extent to which voting in Congress is organized by the party coalitions across time and across issue areas (Poole and Rosenthal 2007), scholars became interested in whether the parties contributed to this discipline in ways that cannot be accounted for by the agenda control theories of parties. Might the parties compel legislators to vote with the party even when the party position is in conflict with their own preferences? Using measures of legislator preferences, Snyder and Groseclose (2000, 2001) and Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001) found evidence of legislators voting with their parties in spite of their contradictory preferences. Cox and Poole (2001) showed that the cohesiveness exhibited by the party coalitions in Congress is higher than would be predicted by a party-less model of Congressional voting. And McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2001) reported sharp discontinuities in legislator voting behavior following party switching, suggesting that party affiliation plays an important role in influencing voting behavior.

Perhaps the most compelling evidence that legislators’ voting behavior is shaped by parties in the legislature is due to Wright and Schaffner (2002), who exploit legal restrictions against partisanship in Nebraska legislative elections. Wright and Schaffner use a survey of state legislators to show that legislators in the non-partisan Nebraska legislature are more ideologically constrained in their attitudes than their counterparts in the partisan Kansas legislature; however, roll call voting in Kansas is consistently organized by two coalitions across issue areas while in Nebraska many different distinct voting coalitions emerge. That is, the constrained ideological preferences of
Nebraska legislators are insufficient to create disciplined coalitional voting and it appears that it is partisanship in the legislature that organizes the disciplined coalitional voting observed in other American legislatures.

In spite of robust evidence that parties influence the voting behavior of legislators, an empirically supported theoretical explanation for party effects on legislator behavior remains elusive. The agenda control explanations of party influence at the core of the conditional party government and cartel theories cannot account for MCs voting against their own preferences in order to side with their party. Therefore to explain party effects on legislator behavior, Cox and McCubbins (2005) and Aldrich (1995) propose that members’ interest in developing a party brand name that bolsters the party’s electoral competitiveness causes them to sometimes vote in support of the party in spite of their own contrary preferences. This is the brand name explanation of party effects. But there are shortcomings with this explanation. The foremost shortcoming is that many analysts suspect that the parties compel members to take off-center positions – an action that would generally be inconsistent with promoting the party’s electoral competitiveness.

I argue that for a robust account of party influence on legislator behavior we need only go back to Mayhew’s original thesis that the parties are “habitual channels of mutual accommodation.” In this chapter, I demonstrate exactly how this intra-party logrolling plays out. I do this by showing how parties influence members’ votes on specific issues that can be linked to concrete interests represented in the legislature. This allows me to predict in advance which issues will be ripe for intra-party logrolls in a particular congressional session. Specifically, I show that log-roll issues arise when the senators with constituencies demanding policy on that issue are concentrated within a party caucus and that legislators’ voting positions change in response to the
level of interest concentration in their own party caucuses. I do this using data for the 87th (1961-62) to 110th (2007-08) Congresses to evaluate the changes in the concentration of four different interests in the party caucuses and the coinciding changes in senators’ voting behavior on the issues associated with those interests.

**Mutual Accommodation among Legislators**

MCs are willing to cooperate with the party in support of co-partisans’ policy goals knowing that others in the party group will reciprocate. This is the mutual accommodation explanation of party influence on legislator voting behavior. Rather than relying on the party brand name as the mechanism motivating collective action, the idea of mutual accommodation proposes that the party’s core collective good is its capacity to advance the legislative goals of its members. Whereas the brand name explanation takes legislators to be like franchisees who contribute resources toward the promotion of their shared brand name, the mutual accommodation hypothesis proposes that legislators are more like members of a volunteer fire brigade who contribute resources to the brigade to ensure that when they need its services it will come to their aid. Let me explain the logic underlying the mutual accommodation hypothesis.

In order to enact any of their legislative goals, individual legislators need to obtain majority support in Congress. But building coalitions is difficult, costly and subject to cycling (Aldrich 1995). The parties, as habitual channels of mutual accommodation, reduce the transaction costs of coalition formation. Under the mutual accommodation dynamic, members of the party regularly provide support to co-partisan colleagues on issues those colleagues care most deeply about – even if that support is inconsistent with their own preferences – with the expectation that their colleagues will reciprocate. The parties are in essence enduring groupings of legislators who lend
legislative support to one another. The mutual accommodation explanation of partisan behavior elaborates how this works based on three assumptions.

**Assumption 1:** Legislators want to advance the interests of their most important policy constituencies.

A policy constituency is “those interests within [a legislator’s] geographical or legal constituency” that might be affected by congressional policy making (Jones 1961). Legislators’ reelection prospects are directly tied to their relationships with the well-organized policy constituencies in their districts. Therefore, Jones posits that a policy constituency will generally determine legislator behavior on a policy proposal when the legislator “regards these interests as actively and homogenously concerned” and that “when he sees them as weak, indifferent or divided, other factors come into play.” In particular, Jones proposes the following in regard to policy constituencies and legislative behavior:

- “If a policy measure is seen to affect substantial interests in a representative’s legal constituency, then he will rely on his perception of the interests affected (his ‘policy constituency’) when he acts.”

- “If a measure is seen to have little or no direct effect on interests in a representative’s legal constituency, then he will tend more readily to look to his political party for a cue when he acts in regard to this measure.”

A legislator’s most important policy constituencies are those that are strong and well organized. These will always include – but may not be limited to – those interests that compose a major part of the district’s economy or population. Thus if an interest composes a major part of the
district economy or population, that interest will strongly inform the legislative demands made by the district representative.

Because Congress is a majoritarian institution, advancing the interests of a policy constituency with legislative enactments requires a majority voting coalition. Therefore:

**Assumption 2:** Advancing the goals of a policy constituency requires (voting) support from colleagues in the legislature.

Occasionally majority support will emerge simply as a result of shared preferences. But no societal interest comprises a majority of the electorate, so in general enacting legislation addressing the specific goals of a particular societal interest requires that the legislators representing that interest participate in relationships of mutual accommodation with other legislators.

But accommodation involves sacrifice. When a senator from Massachusetts casts a vote in support of agricultural subsidies, she is lending support to a policy that imposes costs without benefits to her own constituents. Yet she might be willing to support agricultural subsidies if her own constituency is relatively indifferent to agricultural subsidies and if senators from agricultural states are willing to lend their support to policies demanded by her major policy constituencies.

**Assumption 3:** Legislators are willing to trade the interests of important policy constituencies against the interests of smaller or more poorly organized constituencies in their districts.

Based on these assumptions, the idea of mutual accommodation implies that a legislator’s voting behavior is influenced by the interests of the colleagues in her party caucus. Because legislators will strongly consider the interests of other members of their party coalition in making
their vote choices when salient constituency interests in their own districts are not at stake, the interests of each legislator’s partisan colleagues influence her own voting behavior. The mutual accommodation hypothesis, therefore, predicts that when the composition of the parties changes in regard to a particular interest, incumbent legislators will change their voting behavior on legislation affecting that interest. For example, if the senate Republican caucus gains more members with defense interests, incumbent senate Republicans will become more supportive of bills desired by the defense policy demanders than they were previously. It is, of course, to be expected that the overall average party position would move in the pro-defense direction as a result of the entry of more pro-defense senators into the caucus, but it is not at all obvious that incumbent members of the caucus would adapt their own positions. My goal in the analysis developed in this chapter is to demonstrate that senators do in fact adapt to accommodate the evolving interests within their own caucus. Specifically, in this chapter I evaluate the following hypotheses:

*The mutual accommodation hypothesis:* Senators adapt their voting behavior to accommodate an interest depending on how concentrated representatives of that interest are within their party caucus. Therefore, when the concentration of an interest increases within one of the parties, senators in that party will adapt their voting dispositions to increasingly accommodate the interest while senators from the other party will decrease in their disposition to support the interest.

*The preference-based legislative voting hypothesis (alternative):* Senators vote based on their own preferences and their voting behavior is not influenced by change in the interest composition of their co-partisan colleagues.
The party brand name hypothesis (alternative): When support for a specific interest (e.g., agriculture) has implications for their parties’ electoral competitiveness, senators adapt their voting behavior to accommodate policy demands made by that interest even when that implies taking a position in conflict with their own preferences.

Research Design and Data

Do legislators adapt their voting behavior in response to changes in the interest composition of their party caucuses? In other words, does a senator offer more support to the policy demands of an interest when that interest’s representatives are concentrated within her own party? The most straightforward way to address this question would be to ask legislators. Kingdon (1989) asked legislators about the determinants of their vote choices, and consistent with the assumptions I have laid out, he found that constituency interests and input from co-partisan colleagues are the major influences on a legislator’s voting behavior. But there are crucial limitations to the survey approach. One is that MCs might not admit to participating in logrolling. For example, in the campaign for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, Rick Santorum was met with ridicule when he explained some of his senate votes as “taking one for the team.” Further, Project Vote Smart has found that legislators today are extremely reluctant to answer even straightforward questions regarding their issue positions, so they will certainly be leery of acknowledging logrolling to a researcher. A second problem with surveys is that legislators might engage in logrolling without recognizing that that is what they are doing. They may for example internally rationalize their voting behavior or they may perceive their colleagues’ influence on their votes merely as cue taking.
My goal is to leverage variation in how four different interests are concentrated within the senate party caucuses to evaluate how senators adapt their voting behavior to changes in concentration over time. I expect to find through analysis of changes in concentration that when the interest demanders are concentrated within a party, dis-interested members of the party are more inclined to vote in support of the interest and dis-interested members of the rival party are more inclined to vote against it. I will refer to the former category of senators as the demanders and the latter category as the potential accommodators.

A senator’s voting position on a measure is shaped by three factors: her own preferences – which are a function both of district interests and of personal ideology (Kindgon 1989), the policy demands of co-partisan colleagues, and how pivotal her own vote will be to passing the measure. The mutual accommodation hypothesis predicts that a senator’s inclination to support a measure is higher if the interests demanding it are concentrated in her own party than if they are dispersed between the parties or concentrated in the rival party. But she is more likely to offer support to her co-partisan colleagues if her support would be instrumental to those colleagues realizing their demands. Thus when the senator’s party caucus controls fewer seats, accommodators will in general need to support measures further away from their ideal points in order for co-partisan policy demanders to obtain legislative majorities; and when the senator’s party controls more seats, demanders in the party will be able to get the pivotal accommodation they need from accommodators whose aversion to the measure is relatively less as measured by the spatial distance between the measure and the senator’s ideal point. In my analysis, I therefore take into account party seat share as a control variable.

Interests and Policy Constituencies
Following Jones (1961), I define a policy constituency as “those interests within [a legislator’s] geographical or legal constituency” that might be affected by congressional policy making. Every MC has numerous different interests within her district. Most are small and not well organized. Some are relatively small but well organized. A few are large and well organized. As I have suggested, when an interest composes a relatively large share of the state economy or population, that interest will be an important policy constituency for the state’s senators. But of course categorizing interests is not a trivial task. To test my hypothesis, I need well-defined categories of interests that can be meaningfully thought of as being actively represented by members of Congress. For example, political analysts commonly refer to senators as having influential labor or agricultural constituencies. I need to identify interests that analysts have found can be usefully delineated and studied as reflective of the process of congressional representation. The congressional representation literature makes regular reference to the same small set of interests. Foremost among these are labor, agriculture, defense, and conservative Christianity. Because a long tradition of scholarship has demonstrated the relevance and robustness of these interest categories, I take them to be the set of interests most appropriate for testing the mutual accommodation hypothesis.

**Measuring senator voting support for an interest**

My focus in this analysis is on the propensity for each senator to support four different interests (labor, defense, agriculture, and conservative Christianity) when bills affecting each of these interests come to the senate floor. In the case of labor, for example, my dependent variable is whether each senator voted with or against labor on roll calls directly affecting labor interests that were voted on in the senate in the 87th to 110th Congresses (1961-2008). These bills were
identified using Keith Poole’s and the Policy Agenda Project’s issue codings of senate roll call votes.\textsuperscript{10}

**Partisan Interest Concentration**

The mutual accommodation hypothesis’s central explanatory factor is partisan interest concentration. That is, how concentrated are the interest demanders within each party? A senator is a high demander in regard to an interest if a high proportion of her state economy or population is composed of that interest. For example, the concentration of labor demanders in the Democratic party is the percentage of senators from labor states who are aligned with the Democratic party. To operationalize partisan concentration, I code as demanders senators from the 15 states where the state economy or population is most composed of a particular interest. Senators from the other 35 states are coded as potential accommodators.

Determining which states fall in the top 15 requires ranking the states according to the percentage of the state economy or population composed of each interest for each Congress (biennial period). I rank states according to defense constituency interests using federal defense expenditures’ contribution to state GDP.\textsuperscript{11} This variable ranges in 2007 from 0.3 percent for Michigan to 8.2 percent for Hawaii. Agricultural constituency interest is measured using

\textsuperscript{10} Poole’s issue codings of roll call votes for the 1\textsuperscript{st} to 110\textsuperscript{th} Congresses were downloaded from voteview.org. The Policy Agenda Project (PAP) issue codings of roll call votes for the 80\textsuperscript{th} to 106\textsuperscript{th} Congresses were downloaded from www.policyagendas.org. The specific roll calls used for labor votes are those Poole assigned the “specific issue code” of 10, 19, 26 or 72, or that PAP assigned the topic codes of 501-505 or 508. The defense roll calls used are those coded by Poole as falling within Peltzman’s “defense policy budget” category. The agricultural votes used are those coded by Poole as falling within Clausen’s agriculture category. The moral traditionalism votes used are those Poole assigned the “specific issue code” of 5, 21, 22, 33, 40, or 69, or that PAP assigned topic code 202. In addition, the roll calls selected by four different interest groups as the key votes in the 110\textsuperscript{th} Congress are included in the analysis; these votes are included for the purpose of making counterfactual predictions and are discussed in further detail in the analysis section.

\textsuperscript{11} State GDP estimates for 1963-2010 and federal military expenditures by state for 1963 to 2010 were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. To measure state defense interests for the 81\textsuperscript{st} Congress (1961-62), I use the 1963 state values.
agriculture’s share of state GDP, which in 2007 ranges from 0.3 percent for Massachusetts to 7.4 percent for South Dakota. The level of state labor interest is measured using the percentage of nonagricultural wage and salary employees covered by collective bargaining (i.e., the unionization rate), which in 2007 ranges from 3.0 percent in North Carolina to 25.3 percent in New York.

Finally, I measure the level of conservative Christianity using the share of the state population composed of Mormons and evangelical Christians, which ranges from 10 percent for Rhode Island and Connecticut to 67 percent for Utah.

The available data make it possible to analyze the 87th (1961-62) to 110th (2007-08) Congresses. To show what these data look like, I present the data used for one year (2007) in Table 1. As this table makes evident, there is wide variation across the states in the extent to which each of these interests is important. However, there is no clear discontinuity dividing the high demand states from the other states, so there is no obvious reason for using the top 15 states to delineate demanders from potential accommodators. Therefore, I have tried measuring concentration using

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12 The tabulations of the agricultural sector’s value added by state for 1950 to 2010 were obtained from the US Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.

13 Unionization rates are calculated by the Department of Labor based on the Current Population Survey. These estimates are available for 1964-2011. For the 81st Congress (1961-62), the 1964 state unionization rates were used.

14 State religious composition estimates were obtained from the 2007 Pew US Religious Landscape Survey. The federal government does not collect data on religion affiliation, so resources for operationalizing state religious composition are limited. Fortunately, the Pew US Religious Landscape Survey is based on a fairly large sample and state demographic characteristics like religious composition are very stable across the decades (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). Although there are survey estimates of state religious composition for earlier decades, I opt to base my analysis on the 2007 Pew survey so that variation in survey sampling error does not contribute to the result I estimate. This choice is consistent with my interest is in studying how change in the geographic makeup of the parties affects legislator behavior.
Table 1: State Economy and Population Composition by Interest, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Unionization Rate</th>
<th>Defense Pet GDP</th>
<th>Agriculture Pet GDP</th>
<th>Conservative Christian Pet Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>25.3 (2)</td>
<td>0.4 (44)</td>
<td>0.1 (47)</td>
<td>11 (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>23.9 (2)</td>
<td>5.4 (2)</td>
<td>0.1 (47)</td>
<td>20 (23)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>23.6 (3)</td>
<td>8.2 (1)</td>
<td>0.4 (26)</td>
<td>31 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>20.4 (4)</td>
<td>2.1 (12)</td>
<td>0.4 (26)</td>
<td>27 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>19.6 (5)</td>
<td>0.3 (49)</td>
<td>0.4 (26)</td>
<td>27 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>19.2 (6)</td>
<td>0.3 (49)</td>
<td>0.1 (47)</td>
<td>12 (45)</td>
</tr>
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cutoffs other than 15 to distinguish the high demand states and the results reported in this chapter are robust to the use of these alternative cutoffs. But the lack of discontinuities raises the question of why concentration is the right causal variable. One alternative is to use the mean level of constituency interest within each party caucus. However, the mutual accommodation hypothesis I have set out posits that it is the concentration of high demanders in the caucus that affects the behavior of potential accommodators, but the party mean is sensitive to the values for states where the constituency interest is very large and where it is very small. One way to address this shortcoming is to use the mean of squared state interest, which would give the high states more influence. I have tried this and the results are consistent with those reported in this chapter. However, the approach presented here is much more intuitive and therefore I opt to present the analysis of partisan concentration in this chapter.

How each of the four interests is concentrated within the Democratic caucus over time is plotted in Figure 1. The variation in this figure could be due to change in state partisanship or to change in how important each of the interests is within each of the states. It is the case, however, that overwhelmingly, the variation is due to change in the state composition of the party caucuses – that is, which states tend to have senators aligned with which parties. The relative importance of each of the interests to each of the states has remained relatively constant over time. The correlation between the interest’s share of state GDP in 1963 and in 2007 is .80 for unionization, .85 for agriculture, and .88 for defense.

The Model

Senators and bills are aligned along a single spatial dimension in regard to each of the interests. That is, there is a continuum of support for labor that senators align along and which bills
Figure 1: Interest Concentration within the Senate Democratic Caucus, 1961-2008
affecting labor are positioned along; there is another unique continuum for defense; another for agriculture; and still another for conservative Christianity.

We observe whether each senator supports or opposes labor (defense, agriculture, or conservative Christianity) for each labor measure that comes to the floor. I model a senator’s probability of voting in support of labor as a function of the senators’ preferred position on the labor continuum, the proposal’s moderateness, the share of seats controlled by her party, and the concentration of labor in her caucus; and fit the following model using probit regression:

\[ y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \gamma_j + \beta_1 \text{Party Seat Share} + \beta_2 \text{Concentration}, \]

where \( y \) is senator i’s pro- or anti-labor position on bill j (1 if pro, 0 if anti), \( \alpha_i \) is the intercept for senator i, \( \gamma_j \) is the intercept for bill j, party seat share is the share of senate seats held by senator i’s party at the time bill j was voted on, and concentration is the share of the top 15 labor state senate seats held by senator i’s party at the time bill j was voted on.

The bill-specific intercepts (\( \gamma_j \)) estimate how extreme the proposal is: at the left pole, the pro-labor position is extreme and only the most pro-labor senators support labor on the measure; at the right pole the pro-labor position is a consensus position and only the most anti-labor senators oppose labor’s position on the measure. The legislator-specific intercepts (\( \alpha_i \)) estimate legislator preferences (ideal points) on the issue. If senator 1 has a higher labor preference score than senator 2 (\( \alpha_{i=1} > \alpha_{i=2} \)), then senator 1 is more likely to take a pro-labor position on labor measures voted on in the senate.
Table 2 presents the results of the probit analysis with legislator and bill intercepts omitted due to space considerations. This analysis shows that concentration is highly statistically significant for each of the four interests. In casting a vote that affects labor, defense, agriculture or conservative Christianity, senators take into account not only their own preferences but also the policy demands of their colleagues. This is evidence against the party-less model of legislator behavior (Krehbiel 1993). As habitual channels of mutual accommodation, the parties’ interest composition matters to the voting behavior of individual legislators.

The test reported in Table 2 is conservative and may understate the extent to which legislators accommodate their co-partisans. This is because in controlling for legislator preferences on each of the issue areas analyzed in Table 2 (using legislator-specific intercepts), I control for the manifold factors that might affect legislator voting through their influence on legislator preferences. Most of these factors – like district interests and legislator personality dispositions – would not be directly related to who is in the legislator’s coalition. But there are ways that who is in the coalition may impinge upon legislator preferences and therefore cause some of the effect of coalitional...
composition to go through my estimates of legislator fixed effects. In short, by controlling for legislator preferences, I am controlling for a lot of different things and that may downwardly bias the size of the concentration effect I estimate. Thus the direct effect of concentration I report in this chapter may only be one contributor to the influence that the interest composition of the coalitions has on legislator voting behavior.

Substantively how much is legislator voting behavior affected by the interest composition of the coalitions? A common way of measuring a senator’s support for various interests is to use the ratings of interest groups. These interest groups select about 15 key roll call votes in each Congress and rate MCs according to the percentage of votes on which they supported the interest. Thus one meaningful way to assess how much concentration matters is to evaluate how interest group legislator rankings would differ under alternative levels of partisan concentration. In other words, holding senator preferences and party seat shares constant, how would each senator’s interest group scores change if the levels of interest concentration in her party were different? I can answer this question using the parameters from the probit analysis in Table 2 to predict how MC interest group ratings would vary with alternative levels of partisan interest concentration.

The central claim made in this chapter is that a legislator’s votes are affected by whether she is a Democrat or a Republican and that the effect of partisanship is produced by the interest composition of her party caucus. Therefore, the most interesting counterfactual is how a senator’s interest group ratings would be affected if her preferences were held constant but her partisan alignment were switched. This comparison can be implemented by estimating interest group scores for each senator (a) based on the partisan concentration for the party she actually belongs to and comparing this to interest groups scores estimated (b) based on setting the partisan
concentration level for each senator to that of the rival party. For example, I can use the probit analysis parameter estimates to predict what Ted Kennedy’s (D-MA) AFL-CIO score in the 110th Congress would be given his labor ideal point and the level of labor concentration in the Democratic caucus in the 110th Congress (concentration = .80), and I can predict what that score would be if he belonged to a party caucus that had the Republican’s level of labor concentration in the 110th Congress (concentration = .20) with everything else – including his preference on labor – unchanged.

I perform the type of counterfactual comparison just described using the senate roll call votes that four different interest groups selected for rating members of the 110th Congress: the AFL-CIO, the American Farm Bureau, the American Security Council, and the Family Research Council. Each senator’s actual and counterfactual support score is estimated by predicting the probability that she votes with the interest on each bill and then summing these predicted probabilities for the set of bills identified by each interest group; this summing of the predicted probabilities is an estimate of the total number of votes where the senator is predicted to support the interest. To be clear, I don’t use the interest group’s reported MC scores. Rather, I predict those scores using the votes each group used to compile their scores. I do this because I want the counterfactual comparison to isolate the effect of concentration, which the comparison of these predicted values accomplishes.

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15 The specific 110th Congress bills picked by the AFL-CIO are those assigned the following sequence numbers in the voteview database: 23, 24, 64, 132, 150, 172, 174, 175, 227, 260, 334, 339, 353, 380, 391, 392, 394, 403, 414.
16 The specific 110th Congress bills picked by the American Farm Bureau are those assigned the following sequence numbers in the voteview database: 180, 203, 218, 234, 235, 406, 413, 417, 424, 426, 429, 430, 434, 572, 582, 593.
17 The specific 110th Congress bills picked by the American Security Council are those assigned the following sequence numbers in the voteview database: 243, 245, 284, 349, 413, 606, 610, 640, 643, 653.
18 The specific 110th Congress bills picked by the Family Research Council are those assigned the following sequence numbers in the voteview database: 17, 127, 302, 318, 319, 350, 393, 472, 523.
Before presenting the results of my counterfactual comparisons, I need to briefly comment on what drives the model-based predictions I present. I think it is intuitive enough that given the probit model used, each interest group score I predict is a function of (a) legislator-preferences, (b) the moderateness of each roll that the interest group flagged as a key vote, (c) party seat share, and (d) concentration. I think it is also clear enough that each counterfactual comparison is based on changing the level of concentration and holding the other variables fixed. What is somewhat confusing is that because of the implicit interactive relationship among the independent variables in a probit analysis, how much change in concentration affects the predicted probability that the legislator votes with the interest varies depending on the values of the other variables. As a result, the size of the effect of concentration on each interest group score is influenced not only by the coefficient on concentration but also by the coefficient on party seat share and how immoderate the interest groups’ legislative votes are. For any given level of concentration, the effect of concentration on predicted interest group scores will be most impressive in cases where an interest group’s key demands are most immoderate. With this in mind, some of the counterfactual effects I am about to report will be impressive while others will be somewhat underwhelming. In the cases where the results are underwhelming, the reader should bear in mind that if the interest group were to primarily demand immoderate bills (rather than the moderate bills that they did select as key votes), the results would be much more striking. So let me begin by presenting the interest group whose scores were most affected by concentration.

Among the four interest groups analyzed, Family Research Council scores were most sensitive to partisan interest concentration. In Figure 2 I plot the counterfactual comparisons for the FRC scores with senators plotted along the horizontal axis according to their preferences on moral traditionalism as estimated by the legislator-specific intercepts. The solid tokens in this plot
represent the predicted scores based on the parties’ actual levels of conservative Christianity concentration (.23 for the Democrats and .77 for the Republicans) and the hollow tokens represent the predicted scores if each senator belonged to a coalition with the rival coalition’s level of concentration. That is, the hollow tokens represent how each Democrat would be expected to score if she belonged to a coalition with a conservative Christianity concentration of .77 and how each Republican would be expected to rate if she belonged to a coalition with a conservative Christianity concentration of .23.

A senator with moderate preferences on moral traditionalism will have her FRC score affected by about 18 points depending on whether her coalition’s Christian concentration is .77 – the Republican’s level – or .23 – the Democrat’s level. For example, as indicated in Figure 2, Tim Johnson’s (D-SD) predicted FRC score would increase from 17 to 33 if his coalition’s Christian concentration were .77 and Ted Stevens’ (R-AK) predicted FRC score would decrease from 50 to 31 if his coalition’s Christian concentration were .23.

Figure 3 plots the counterfactual comparison for the American Farm Bureau scores. In this case senators with moderate agriculture preferences have their AFB score affected by about 11 points depending on whether they align with the coalition that has the Republican level of agriculture concentration (.63) or the Democratic level (.37). Mark Pryor (D-AR) would increase his predicted AFB score from 30 to 40 if his coalition’s agriculture concentration were .63. Mel Martinez (R-FL) would decrease his predicted AFB score from 55 to 44 if his coalition’s agriculture concentration were .37.

Figure 4 presents the counterfactual comparison for senator AFL-CIO scores. As indicated on the plot, Olympia Snowe’s (R-ME) predicted AFL-CIO score would be predicted to increase from
57 to 67 and Arlen Specter’s (R-PA) would increase from 69 to 77 if they both aligned with a coalition that had a labor concentration of .80. In contrast, Ken Salazar (D-CO) would have his predicted AFL-CIO score decreased from 84 to 77 if he aligned with a coalition that had a labor concentration of .20.

Figure 5 plots the counterfactual comparisons for the American Security Council scores. For senators with moderate defense preferences, belonging to a coalition with the Republican level of defense concentration (.70) rather than the Democratic level (.30) increases the predicted ASC score about 4 points. Ben Nelson’s (D-NE) predicted ASC score would increase from 58 to 62 if his coalition’s defense concentration were .7. Arlen Specter’s (R-PA) predicted ASC score would decrease from 69 to 65 if his coalition’s defense concentration were .3. These changes are small compared to the changes estimated for the other interest groups in part because the ASC roll calls were more moderate than those used by other interest groups as I will show later in this section.
Figure 2: Family Research Council Senator Scores Counterfactual Analysis, 110th Congress
Figure 3: American Farm Bureau Senator Scores Counterfactual Analysis, 110th Congress
Figure 4: AFL-CIO Senator Scores Counterfactual Analysis, 110th Congress
Figure 5: American Security Council Senator Scores Counterfactual Analysis, 110th Congress
Finding support for the mutual accommodation hypotheses raises the question of when and why interests would be better off concentrated within one of the parties and when they would be better off dispersed between the two parties. The mutual accommodation dynamic implies that demanders will have the maximum possible influence on the voting dispositions of co-partisan potential accommodators when the interest is concentrated within one party. If, in contrast, the interest is dispersed between the two parties, demanders will have some influence on the voting dispositions of all senators. Consider the case of agriculture. Today agriculture is less concentrated than most other major interests and as a result legislators from both parties make some effort to accommodate agricultural policy demands, though these efforts don’t approach the level of accommodation Democrats accord labor or Republicans accord conservative Christians. Is agriculture better off getting some accommodation from legislators from both parties or would it be better off getting lots of accommodation from the legislators in one party? The answer depends on the extremeness of the legislative proposals agricultural groups want enacted.

The primary reason interests participate in coalitions is to obtaining the pivotal votes needed to enact policy demands. If a policy demand is very moderate — not far from the ideal point of the median senator — then somewhat increasing the positive disposition of all the legislators will produce more votes than significantly increasing the voting disposition of the legislators in only one party. In contrast, if a policy demand is immoderate — far from the ideal points of the non-d washer legislators, then the interest will get more votes by significantly increasing the positive disposition of the legislators in one party than it would by somewhat increasing the voting disposition of all legislators.
I know how moderate each of the interest group key votes were based on the roll call-specific intercepts estimated in the Table 2 probit model. Again, these intercepts are suppressed from Table 2 for the sake of space but each of the models in that table includes roll call-specific intercepts. I make use of these estimates of the moderateness of the proposal associated with each roll call vote to evaluate how proposal moderateness interacts with concentration in affecting the number of votes the interest groups get on the key roll calls.

In Figure 6 I show empirically how vote counts would be expected to differ on each of the interest group’s key roll call votes if the interests were equally distributed between the parties rather than concentrated at their 110th Congress levels. On the horizontal axis, I plot how moderate each roll call proposal is as estimated by the roll call intercepts from the probit analysis. Figure 6 shows that on proposals that were more moderate, the interest would have obtained more votes if partisan concentration were at parity rather than at its actual 110th Congress level. However, on the more extreme proposals, the interests would have received fewer votes if the concentration levels were at parity.

The final question to tend to in this analysis section is that of the party brand name hypothesis. The leading alternative explanation of party discipline posits that legislators will be responsive to the demands of swing districts because electoral outcomes in these districts determine the share of congressional seats controlled by their party. Therefore, when an interest is prominent in closely contested states, the brand name hypothesis predicts legislators will adapt their voting behavior to be more accommodating of the interest. I measure the prominence of each interest in competitive states using the correlation between state interest levels and state competitiveness. State competitiveness is estimated using the absolute value of the presidential two-
party margin of victory in the state for presidential election years and the average margin of the two adjacent presidential elections for midterm election years. In the Table 2 probit analysis, interest prominence in competitive states is not statistically significant in three of the four cases, and in the case of defense the effect is in the wrong direction. Brand name considerations appear to have little influence on the voting behavior of senators. Instead, efforts to accommodate the demands of co-partisan colleagues are the underlying mechanism producing party effects on the voting behavior of legislators.
Figure 6: How the number of senators voting with the interests on each key vote would be different if the interests were evenly divided between the parties, 110th Congress
Discussion

In this chapter, I argue that legislators adapt their voting behavior to the policy demands of co-partisan colleagues. I show that as an interest gets organized into partisan conflict, party members move to support the positions advocated by co-partisans representing that interest.

This finding not only demonstrates the existence of party effects but also provides a theoretical basis for the unidimensional Congress finding. That the party coalitions organize almost all congressional voting across issue areas has been convincingly demonstrated by Poole and Rosenthal (2007). But why and how the simple structure reported by Poole and Rosenthal exists requires explanation. It is theoretically puzzling that the same coalitions organize voting across so many unrelated issue areas. With agenda control and a dominant cleavage, party leaders could use institutions to make the votes that come to the floor about the dominant cleavage (Aldrich 1995; Sheplse 1979). But Poole and Rosenthal have argued that the basic structure is not due to agenda control, and Wright and Schaffner’s (2002) evidence indicates that extra-legislative ideology is not enough to produce the one-dimensional Congress (also see Jenkins 2006). The mutual accommodation explanation presented in this paper is theoretically attractive because it presents a logic by which the one-dimensional Congress gets organized.

However, the argument that co-partisans in the legislature help one another produce desired policy outcomes raises the question of why the legislature does not evolve into one giant logroll. If legislators seek out opportunities to form alliances across issue areas, then why do they tend to organize into competing coalitions rather than form one universal coalition? Further, when are interests better off as a result of partisan modes of policy making rather than universalism? One compelling explanation for the tendency toward partisanship rather than universalism is that it
is outside societal group that make the demands on legislators which force them into partisan
modes of behavior. Masket (2009) argues that legislators themselves show a tendency to prefer
universalism but that outside policy demanders compel partisanship. However, even if we were to
discount the influence of extra-legislative forces, legislators themselves may be incented to engage
in partisanship. Schwartz (1989) develops the theoretical logic accounting for why a minimum
winning coalition better advances the welfare of its members than a universalist logroll. In general,
it may often be the case that societal interests are in such conflict with one another that the
impetus to try to win elections and work through majority coalitions rather than a universal
coalition is inevitable.

At a minimum, legislative allies cannot effectively act on behalf of strong interests in direct
conflict with one another. The search for compatible coalitional partners is thus the basic force
pushing legislators away from universalism and toward partisan coalitions. Compatibility between
legislators is greatly aided when legislators with a strong interest in their district can find allies with
some level of that interest in their own districts. These prospective allies can potentially build their
own reelection constituencies in the process of providing policy support to a legislative ally. As
Bailey and Brady (1998) suggest, when a legislator has flexibility over the composition of her
reelection constituency, which groups she courts may be partly determined by the potential for
building her reelection constituency while simultaneously providing legislative support to policy
demanders within her party caucus.

These comments on the “why parties” question are merely speculative and much research
remains to be done to better understand the reason why partisan modes of organization dominate
American political conflict. The study presented in this chapter moves the ball forward by showing
what it is that interests get from participation in party coalitions – namely, I show that interests get legislative accommodation – and by showing that whether or not an interest would be more likely to achieve its goals by working through one party depends on how extreme that interest’s demands are relative to the preferences of other societal interests. Political scientists are still grappling with the why parties question because there appears to be no general response but only qualified and conditional answers to the question.
The conservative right transformed the Republican party in the 1960s by transforming the party’s Electoral College coalition. In the era of the solidly Democratic South, the Republican party’s competitiveness in the Electoral College depended on the industrial regions of the country, which generally compelled the Party to nominate moderate presidential candidates. But in 1964 the movement to nominate Barry Goldwater rejected the party’s standard Electoral College blueprint (Rusher 1963). “I just hope to God that for once my party has the guts to say the hell with carrying New York. I hope that for once we have the guts to say to hell with those eastern liberals,” declared Republican National Committeeman Tom Stagg shortly before the 1964 Convention (Rae 1989: 56). Though Goldwater ultimately suffered a landslide defeat in the general election, conservative Republicans did succeed in repudiating the party’s moderate wing in what one activist retrospectively proclaimed a “glorious disaster” for the conservatives. Today, 40 years on, the Republican party has been radically transformed.

The moderate-conservative rift in the Republican party was not new in 1964. In fact, the rift was much more bitter in 1909-1912, producing the Cannon revolt and Theodore Roosevelt’s third party run for the presidency. Yet 40 years after Roosevelt ran on the Progressive party ticket, the 1952 competition for the Republican presidential nomination between Eisenhower and Taft exhibited the same moderate-conservative rift. Rather than transforming the party, 1912’s lasting lesson for the Republican party was that the two factions would have to find ways to get along in
order to avoid another disaster like 1912. So why was the 1964 rift a glorious disaster for the conservatives and 1912 just a disaster? More generally, when does intra-party conflict transform the parties and when does it merely prove politically harmful for all involved? Further, when these transformations develop, how do they affect interests peripheral to the conflict that produced the transformation?

In this chapter, I argue that change in the partisan alignment of societal interests and the organization of partisan issue conflict is caused by change in the parties’ Electoral College coalitions. I develop this argument by studying post-1960 partisan change and showing that all the important changes in post-1960s American politics are attributable to the Republican party’s southern strategy, the demographic developments that enabled it, and the evolution of the civil rights issue it produced. Although this analysis is focused on post-1960 American politics and the changes brought about by the civil rights realignment, the implications are more general. My claim is that all successful major realignments in American history have originated with new Electoral College blueprints. In fact, just as the conservatives’ 1964 southern strategy was precisely the type of blueprint needed to endurably transform the party coalitions, the two other major reorganizations of the coalitions in American history were also produced by the same dynamic of new coalitional blueprints enabled by large-scale demographic change. Specifically in the 1890s, when western settlement made a new Electoral College coalition possible, agrarian radicals wrestled control of the Democratic presidential nomination from conservative groups in the northeast – galvanized in the process by the same “the hell with New York” sentiment that rallied conservatives in 1964. And in the mid-1800s, the most important realignment in American history evolved when the Midwest’s growing population made possible a Northeast-Midwest Electoral College coalition that had not been possible when the distribution of Electoral College votes made a North-South coalition critical.
to winning an Electoral College majority. In each of these cases, the evolution of a single issue conflict reorganized the coalitions for the period that followed.

I show in this chapter how the evolution of a new presidential cleavage – civil rights – produced widespread implications for how compatible all groups in the political system were with the major coalitions. Specifically, I show that the important changes in the political alignments of societal groups that have developed since the 1960s are due to the civil rights issue evolution (c.f., Adams 1997). All the various secondary issues that have become organized into partisan conflict since 1960 have not undergone autonomous issue evolutions but, rather, have been reorganized by the changed coalitional circumstances brought on by the evolution of the civil rights issue. Partisan changes on issues like moral traditionalism and international policy have developed as second-order effects of the civil rights realignment. Further, group efforts like the movement to nominate Goldwater in 1964 and the movement behind McGovern’s nomination in 1972 are epiphenomenal in the development of partisan change. While other studies have argued that such efforts are instrumental to coalition change (e.g., Rae 1989, Miroff 2007), my claim is that these types of movements succeed when structural circumstances enable them and fail when structural circumstances are not conducive to their goals.

In the sections that follow, I first discuss the civil rights issue evolution and then show that change in post-1960s American politics can be explained by how this issue evolution has shaped the organization of the issue conflict. To be clear, an important portion of post-1960 partisan change

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19 The American political history literature conventionally delineates five party systems. Readers familiar with this scheme will recognize that I have not commented on the transitions to the 2nd and 5th party systems. This is because the 2nd party system did not displace the 1st party system so there was no re-shaping of the Electoral College coalition blueprints. In regard to the 5th party system, this came about because of a shift in the balance of support for the two parties as Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1980) show but it was not marked by a change in the substantive organization of partisan conflict as Gerring (1998) and Poole and Rosenthal (1993) have shown.
and the overall development of polarization have been due to change on the secondary issues; my goal in this chapter is not to deny these developments but to show that the evolution of the civil rights issue accounts for why these secondary issue changes evolved as they did.

The Civil Rights Realignment

The evolution of the civil rights issue was caused by the large-scale migration of specific populations between the North and the South. Specifically, the Great Migration of African Americans out of the South to the urban industrial centers of the non-South (Carmines and Stimson 1989) and the migration of relatively affluent conservative whites to the growing southern cities (Polsby 2004).20

Carmines and Stimson (1989) have demonstrated how these demographic developments caused conflict over civil rights to evolve as an issue that produced widespread partisan change. Though economic redistribution persisted as the organizing cleavage in Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 2007), the civil rights cleavage in the presidential election coalitions that evolved as a result of the Great Migration transformed which societal groups aligned with the redistribution coalitions in Congress. As a result, the civil rights issue evolution substantially reorganized the interest composition of the redistribution coalitions in Congress.

Though district-level presidential voting is typically organized by district preferences on economic redistribution, occasionally a distinctive issue cleaves the presidential coalitions. In the mid-20th century a multitude of non-economic issues impinged on presidential politics and caused a period where district-level congressional and presidential voting were out of line. I show this in

20 The only other demographic development of comparable scale since World War Two is the historical levels of immigration since the late 1970s. No scholar I am aware of has argued that this development has yet produced realignment.
Figure 1 which plots the correlation between the district-level presidential and congressional vote for the 1952 to 2004 period. This figure indicates that between 1960 and 1988 districts’ votes in presidential and congressional elections were historically out of line with one another and that they were dramatically out of line in 1964 and 1972. What caused this disparity and why was the correspondence between presidential and congressional voting eventually restored in the 1990s? My claim is that the disparity was caused by the evolution of the civil rights issue – which organized presidential voting but did not organize congressional voting; and that correspondence was restored as the persistence of the civil rights cleavage in presidential voting transformed the party images and thereby transformed the interest composition of the redistribution coalitions in Congress. In other words, the persistence of conflict over civil rights in presidential elections changed the electoral constituencies of MCs affiliated with the redistribution coalitions in Congress.

To show how the composition of the redistribution coalitions in Congress were affected by the partisan change caused by the evolution of the civil rights issue, I need a way of estimating district preferences on civil rights and economic redistribution. The most straightforward way to estimate this is to assume that MCs in the 1960s and 1970s reflected their districts’ civil rights and redistribution preferences in the congressional roll call votes they cast. District preferences can then be estimated by scaling MC roll call votes on civil rights and redistribution. In Figure 2, I plot MC scores on civil rights and economics for the Congress elected in 1972 (93rd Congress). Each point in this plot represents a district. This figure makes evident that in 1972 the civil rights issue

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21 Congressional vote data were obtained from Charles Stewart (1972-2004) and from ICPSR 6311 (1952-1970). District-level presidential vote data were obtained from Josh Clinton. The Stewart and Clinton web sites are, respectively: http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html, https://my.vanderbilt.edu/joshclinton/data/.

22 I obtain the MC scores on economics and civil rights by DW-NOMINATE scaling bills identified by the Policy Agendas Project as pertaining to macroeconomics and black civil rights, respectively.
Figure 1: The correspondence between district presidential and congressional vote, 1952-2004
cross-cut the party coalitions and that there was little correspondence between MC positions on economics and civil rights.

In 1972, voting in congressional elections was organized by the economic redistribution dimension but district-level voting in presidential elections was organized by the civil rights cleavage. How district-level presidential vote is associated with district civil rights and economic positions can be estimated by regressing the district-level Democratic presidential vote\(^ {23} \) on the district civil rights and economic scores,\(^ {24} \) and projecting the presidential vote variable into the space plotted in Figure 2 using the coefficients from this regression.\(^ {25} \) We see in Figure 2 that in 1972 presidential voting was strongly organized along the civil rights dimension and almost orthogonal to the economic dimension. This is not the case for voting in congressional elections, which is projected into the plotted space using the coefficients obtained by regression Democratic congressional vote on district economic and civil rights scores. As it generally has been over the past century, voting in congressional elections in 1972 was organized along the economic redistribution axis.

By the mid-1980s, the civil rights realignment had transformed the groups organized into the redistribution coalitions. Whereas in 1972 there was no correspondence between where MCs stood on economics and civil rights, Figure 3 shows that by 1984 if an MC was in the pro-redistribution coalition, there was a very high probability that she was also in the pro-civil rights coalition. As a number of analysts have shown (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Gelman 2008; Bartels 2006) the activation of partisan conflict over race and cultural issues has reshaped the

\(^{23}\) The variable I use is the Democratic presidential candidates’ percentage point margin over the Republican presidential candidate, which takes a negative value when the Republican candidate receives more votes in the district.

\(^{24}\) The percentage of variance explained (\(R^2\)) by this analysis is .50.

\(^{25}\) The slope for this line is \(\frac{\text{Civil Rights Coefficient}}{\text{Economics Coefficient}}\).
Figure 2: MC positions on economics and civil rights, 93rd Congress (elected 1972)

Economic and civil rights scores obtained by DW-NOMINATE scaling House roll call votes identified by the Policy Agendas Project as addressing macroeconomic policy and black civil rights, respectively.
Figure 3: MC positions on economics and civil rights, 99th Congress (elected 1984)

Economic and civil rights scores obtained by DW-NOMINATE scaling House roll call votes identified by the Policy Agendas Project as addressing macroeconomic policy and black civil rights, respectively.
election constituencies of pro- and anti-redistribution MCs. In particular, the civil rights presidential cleavage increased the interactive effect of household income level and racial conservatism on congressional vote choice. I show this in Figure 4 using individual-level data from the National Election Study (NES). From 1962 to 2000, the NES asked respondents whether they supported government efforts to ensure school desegregation. I use respondents’ positive and negative attitudes on this question as a measure of racial conservatism. The left panel of Figure 4 shows the percentage of 1962-66 NES respondents who voted for the Republican congressional candidate by family income level and by racial attitude. In this period, racial conservatism had a small effect of about 3 to 5 percentage points on the congressional vote choice of the higher income respondents and a somewhat larger effect of about 7 to 10 percentage points on the lower income group. Congressional vote choice in the 1992-2000 period is shown in the right panel of Figure 4. Here we see that the interactive relationship between income and racial attitudes increased considerably. Racial conservatism had a 20 point effect on the congressional vote choice of the lower income group and about a 30 point effect on the vote choice of the higher income groups.

Regardless of whether dispositions like racial and moral conservatism now contribute more to vote choice than economic interests, Poole and Rosenthal’s (2007) studies of roll call voting in Congress — the most direct approach to assessing how MCs organize themselves — have found that the party coalitions in Congress are organized by conflict over economic redistribution. Thus it is fair to conclude that (1) the congressional coalitions are organized by conflict over economic redistribution and (2) the strong influence of racial and social issues to MCs’ electoral coalitions has transformed the interests represented by members of the pro- and anti-redistribution coalitions in

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26 The NES variable used is VCF0816, which has two response categories: the government should “see to it that white and black children go (1962-1970: are allowed to go) to the same schools” and the government should “stay out of this area.” I code the former as racial liberals and the latter as racial conservatives.
Figure 4: Republican vote for Congress by income and racial conservatism, 1962-66 and 1992-2000
Congress. It was this transformed partisan constituency base that ultimately organized civil rights into the party coalitions in Congress. But the implications of this transformation went well beyond the organization of partisan conflict over civil rights.

The civil rights realignment and the secondary issues

How the civil rights issue evolution changed the geographic composition of the party caucus. The partisan change I have discussed developing between 1972 and 1984 could have been a result of change in district preferences or a result of party pressure compelling MCs to bring their positions on civil rights into line with their parties’ positions. However, district preferences generally changed little and neither of these factors accounts for the partisan changes that have developed. The partisan change on civil rights was caused by change in which geographic units belonged to which party, and as the evolution of the civil rights issue changed the geographic makeup of the coalitions, partisan change on secondary issues evolved as second-order effects of the civil rights realignment.

There are three geographic contributors to change in a congressional party caucus’s mean position on civil rights. First, the representatives of districts already in the party can systematically become more liberal or conservative on race (district adaptation). This could be due to adaptation by sitting MCs – caused either by party pressure, the evolution of district preferences, or evolution in the MCs’ own preferences – or to the election of a new MC to represent the district. Second, districts whose representatives are more liberal or conservative than the caucus mean could exit the party (district exit) – that is, these districts could elect to Congress a candidate from the other party. Third, districts whose representatives are more liberal or conservative than the caucus mean
could enter the party (district entry). Thus the three geographic contributors to change in a party caucus’ average civil rights position are district adaptation, district exit, and district entry.

Using a method described by Rapoport and Stone (1994), I calculate how state adaptation, exit and entry contributed to polarization on civil rights in the senate for each decade between 1961 and 2001 and for the overall 1961 to 2001 period. Partisan civil rights polarization is measured using the difference in mean party positions on civil rights for each Congress. I calculate the party means using senator positions estimated by DW-NOMINATE scaling senate roll call votes that the Policy Agendas Project has coded as pertaining to black civil rights. I then decompose change in partisan civil rights polarization (i.e., change in the difference in party means) between periods into the adaptation, entry and exit components using Rapoport and Stone’s method.27

Before proceeding, let me clarify the setup of the analysis I present in Table 1. First, this is an analysis of the geographic composition of the party coalitions (not adaptation by specific senators), so state adaptation can be due to position change by an incumbent legislator or to the change associated with replacing an incumbent senator with a new senator of the same party. Second, state exit’s contribution to the change in party mean is due to a state replacing an incumbent senator with a new senator who is not aligned with the incumbent’s party. Third, state entry’s contribution is due to a new senator taking a seat that was previously held by the opposite party. In Table 1 I present the decomposition of how each component contributed to the increase in partisan civil rights polarization in the senate in each decade. Most notably, Table 1 reports that 68 percent of the total change in civil rights polarization since 1961 is due to state exit. That is, the civil rights issue evolution dramatically changed which geographic districts belonged to which party.

27 This decomposition is calculated by using the Rapoport-Stone method to decompose change in each party’s means and then calculating the contribution of each component to the overall change in partisan polarization on civil rights between periods.
and this development had the implication of transforming the interest composition of the coalitions.

This change in the interest composition of the parties affected how compatible interests other than racial minorities were with the party coalitions and therefore, as a result of the organization of civil rights into the redistribution cleavage in Congress, the alignments of other societal interests were also affected. The analysis presented in the rest of this section shows how this transformed composition of the coalitions structured political change in post-1960s American politics. I show evidence of this three different ways. First, I show that senator civil rights preferences in the 1970s were highly correspondent to the other issues that underwent partisan change in the late-20th century (such as moral traditionalism and defense policy), implying that we should expect that if states reorganized themselves in response to race this would carry with it other important issues. Second, I show that this expectation holds up by showing that secondary issues underwent change in their organization into partisan conflict in proportion to how much MC positions on each corresponded to their civil rights positions in 1961-62. Third, I show that the entry of states with conservative (liberal) civil rights preferences induced entry into the Republican (Democratic) party of states with large (small) populations of conservative Christians, large (small) defense economies, and low (high) levels of labor unionization.
Why other issues were carried into the partisan cleavage by the civil rights issue evolution.

The “new politics” issues of the 1960s involved a cluster of issues – civil rights, moral traditionalism and cosmopolitanism/internationalism – that split the party coalitions internally but that had positions that tended to go together and therefore gave rise to their own coalitional basis. If any one of the issues in the cluster evolved to reorganize the coalitions, the other issues could be expected to be carried by that evolutionary issue into the organization of coalitional conflict.

To demonstrate this, I need to assign senators scores on the salient dimension of national political conflict in the 1960s and 1970s, and for that I need to identify the senate roll call votes that best tap into the national political conflicts of the day. Congressional Quarterly (CQ) compiles a list of key votes for each Congress, which are roll call votes CQ perceives as involving the salient political conflicts of the day. By scaling the CQ key roll call votes, I estimate senator positions on the “national political conflict” dimension.\(^{28}\) This dimension could coincide with the dominant axis of organization in Congress – and ordinarily it does – but in the 1960s and 1970s it did not. In Figure 5, I show senator positioning along the national political conflict dimension was, however, highly

\(^{28}\) The scaling is accomplished using DW-NOMINATE.

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Table 1: Geographic contributions to civil rights polarization in the senate between 1961 and 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Change in Civil Rights Polarization</th>
<th>Pct Due to State Adaptation</th>
<th>Pct Due to State Exit</th>
<th>Pct Due to State Entry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961-1971</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1981</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1991</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-2001</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>77.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-2001</td>
<td>0.912</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
correspondent with senator civil rights positions by plotting senators positions on the “new politics” issues against their civil rights positions. This correspondence obtains even though only a small proportion (12 percent) of the CQ key votes in this era involved civil rights. Figure 5 shows not only that civil rights and positions on the salient national political conflicts of the day are closely related but also that the party coalitions in Congress (the plot’s the circular and triangular tokens) were perfectly cross-cut by the salient national political issues of the 1960s and 1970s.

The relationship between civil rights position in 1961, state preferences on secondary issues, and partisan change on secondary issues. The implication of Figure 5 is that if the parties divided on the civil rights issue, they would be divided on the other issues that clustered with civil rights. In particular, how well MC preferences on any particular issue corresponded to MC preferences on civil rights should be associated with how well that issue became organized into partisan conflict as a result of the civil rights issue evolution. I show that this is the case by evaluating how an issue’s correspondence to the civil rights dimension in the 87th Congress (1961-62) is associated with change in how well the issue is organized into partisan conflict. Issues that were highly correspondent to legislator civil rights positions in 1961-62 should have become more strongly organized into partisan conflict as a result of the civil rights issue evolution.
Figure 5: Senator positions on civil rights and the new politics dimension, 1973-74
How strongly congressional positions on an issue are correspondent to congressional positions on civil rights can be measured using the correlation between MC positions on civil rights and MC positions on each of the secondary issues. The Policy Agendas Project (PAP) has coded congressional roll call votes from the 80th to 106th Congresses using a 19 category issue typology. Using the PAP issue codings of roll call votes, I scale MC votes on each issue to estimate MC positions on each of the PAP issue categories. To estimate legislator positions on the civil rights realigning issue, I scale only those roll call votes pertaining to black civil rights. The correspondence between MC civil rights positions and MC positions on each of the secondary issues in 1961-62 is estimated by calculating the correlation coefficient. Finally, how well an issue is organized into partisan conflict in any given Congress can be estimated by calculating the correlation between MC positions on the issue and MC positions on the party unity continuum that runs from -1 for MCs who always vote with the Democrats on party votes to 1 for MCs who always vote with the Republicans on party votes. I refer to this measure as the issue’s organization into partisan conflict.

In Figure 6, I plot change in each issue’s organization into partisanship between 1961 and 2000 against how much the issue corresponded to MC civil rights positions in 1961-62 (87th

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29 The scaling is accomplished using DW-NOMINATE.
30 Though PAP has a general civil rights category, it was conflict over black civil rights specifically that reorganized the coalitions in the post-1960s period (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Therefore instead of using all the PAP civil rights votes – which include votes on issues like the rights of women and the disabled – to estimate MC civil rights positions, the MC civil rights estimates I employ are based on scaling only those roll call votes pertaining to black civil rights.
31 Party votes are those votes where a majority of Democrats opposes a majority of Republicans. Positions on the party unity continuum used for this analysis are obtained by multiplying the party unity scores by -1 for Democratic senators and 1 for Republican senators.
Figure 6: The relationship between an issue’s correspondence to MC civil rights positions in 1961 and change in its organization into partisan conflict.
Congress). As the Figure makes evident, the issues that have undergone the greatest levels of increase in their organization into partisan conflict are the issues where MC positions were highly correspondent to their civil rights positions in 1961-62 – most notably, the issues of defense, labor, and “law, crime & family.” Thus if in 1961 an analyst knew that the civil rights issue would evolve to reorganize the coalitions she would be able to predict back in 1961 which other issues would also become increasingly polarized in the late-20\textsuperscript{th} century.

The puzzle of the timing of ideological polarization. The claim I’ve just made gives rise to a puzzle about the timing of polarization on civil rights and the development of general ideological polarization. Specifically, the parties polarized on civil rights from the 1960s through the 1980s but ideological polarization largely developed after 1990. I show the timing of these two developments in Figure 7, which breaks down how much of the total polarization in civil rights and ideology that developed between 1961 and 2000 had developed (cumulatively) in each year within the 1961-2000 period.\textsuperscript{32} Figure 7 makes evident that by 1983 about 75 percent of the total polarization on civil rights that developed was already manifest yet less than 25 percent of the ideological polarization that developed was manifest in 1983. How could the civil rights realignment have been the root cause of general ideological polarization – and polarization on moral traditionalism in particular – if civil rights polarization predates these developments?

The answer is that different groups in the electorate care most intensely about many different issues, but the terms on which they cooperate with the coalitions are set by how the evolutionary issue – in this case, civil rights – structures the types of interests within each of the

\textsuperscript{32} Ideology in this plot is measured using DW1, and partisan ideological polarization in a Congress is measured as the difference in mean ideology for the two parties.
Figure 7: Cumulative change in partisan civil rights and ideological polarization in Congress, 1961 to 2000
coalitions. Thus polarization on secondary issues like moral traditionalism – which have contributed to partisan change and ideological polarization – has been shaped by how groups with intense demands on these secondary issues have had their organization into partisan conflict structured by the civil rights realignment.

Let me clarify here what distinguishes an issue evolution from more general forms of partisan change on an issue. For Carmines and Stimson (1989) and Riker (1982), issue evolutions occur in the context of coalitional instability and the development of an issue evolution moves the party system toward a new equilibrium. My claim in this chapter is that partisan change in regard to moral traditionalism and other issues did not involve the evolution of a new coalitional equilibrium but rather changes on these issues involved the adaptation of groups to the new coalitional equilibrium established by the civil rights issue evolution.

This point can be clarified by considering the changes developing in the southern congressional delegations following the 1992 and 1994 elections – the two elections associated with the biggest increases in ideological polarization plotted in Figure 7. By the end of the 1980s, southern Democrats in Congress were to the left of almost all Republican MCs on the civil rights issue and the parties had completed most of the polarization on civil rights that would develop between 1961 and 2000. Southern Democrats by the 1980s had come to rely on new electoral constituencies – namely, they had come to depend on the support of blacks in their districts after the civil rights issue evolution caused them to lose the support of racially conservative whites (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Thus even as they took more liberal positions on civil rights, southern Democrats proved themselves to be electorally competitive. The big changes in polarization we see developing with the 1992 and 1994 elections in Figure 7 were due to issues
other than civil rights becoming organized into the parties. These issues are those where policy
demanding groups had their compatibility with the coalitions reshaped by the civil rights issue
evolution. As a result of the dramatic transformation in the geographic makeup of the
congressional coalitions caused by the civil rights issue, the compatibility of interests like moral
traditionalism, defense, and labor with the party coalitions were all affected, and as these groups
adapted — and as party leaders responded to the new interest composition of the coalitions — they
contributed to the increase in ideological polarization.

The civil rights issue evolution carried specific geographic interests into the party caucuses.
The evolution of the civil rights issue carried specific interests into the party caucuses due to the
coincidence between state interests on civil rights and state interests on these other issues. So how
were these state-level interests distributed in 1963 before civil rights evolved as an issue? In Figure
8, I plot 1963 state interests on civil rights, religious conservatism, defense, and labor unionization.

Now suppose for the sake of analysis that the relative ordering of states in regard to each of these interests does not change over the 1961 to 2008 period. For example, the state with the highest level of racial conservatism in 1961 remains the state with the highest level of racial conservatism in 2008. This assumption is in fact very close to reality: the relative ordering of states in regard to these four interests were very stable over the 1961 to 2008 period with correlations of state-level 1961 values to 2008 values of .77, .87, and .80 for civil rights, defense, and labor unionization, respectively.

By assuming that the relative ordering of state interests are fixed, it is possible to analyze the 1961 coincidence of state-level civil rights interests with state-level Christianity, defense and

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33 To measure state preferences on civil rights I use the average civil rights position of each state senate delegation in the 87th Congress (1961-62). An alternative way to measure state civil rights preferences would be to use public opinion surveys to assign states civil rights scores. The NES, for example, asks a number of questions that would be appropriate for estimating state civil rights positions. However, the NES has few (in some cases no) respondents in many states, which poses a severe limitation. The average score for each state's senate delegation in the 87th Congress has the advantage of producing civil rights estimates for all 50 states. Further, this number is highly correspondent to state-level estimates obtained using NES data in states where NES had a sufficient number of respondents (the correlation coefficients run from .56 to .68 depending on the NES questions used). The score has been scaled such that it runs from 0 for the most racially liberal state (Oregon) to 1 for the most racially conservative state (South Carolina).

34 I measure the level of conservative Christianity using the share of the state population composed of Mormons and evangelical Christians. State religious composition estimates were obtained from the 2007 Pew US Religious Landscape Survey. Because of the limited availability of survey data for estimating state religious composition over time, I use the 2007 Pew estimates as my estimates of state religion composition for the 1961 to 2008 period. I do this based on the premise that state demographic characteristics like religious composition are very stable across the decades (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993).

35 I measure state defense interests using the share of the state GDP composed of federal defense expenditures. State GDP estimates for 1963-2010 and federal military expenditures by state for 1963 to 2010 were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

36 The level of state labor interest is measured using the percentage of nonagricultural wage and salary employees covered by collective bargaining (i.e., the unionization rate). Unionization rates are calculated by the Department of Labor based on the Current Population Survey. These estimates are available for 1964-2011. In this analysis I use the 1964 unionization estimate.
labor interests and evaluate what those coincidences imply should eventually develop in regard to
the composition of interests represented by each of the party caucuses as a result of the civil rights
issue evolution. My hypothesis is that the polarization on the civil rights issue we see evolving in
Figure 7 in the 1960s and 1970s should carry into the party caucuses other interests that have a
high coincidence with civil rights. I expect that as states with conservative (liberal) civil rights
preferences move into the Republican (Democratic) party this will bring into the Republican
(Democratic) party caucus states with high (low) evangelical Christian populations, states where a
high (low) share of state GDP is comprised of defense, and states with low (high) unionization rates.
This development involves two components (a) the direct effect of the coincidence of state civil
rights interests with other state interests – for example, when racially conservative South Carolina
switched to the Republican party because of the race issue it brought with it an evangelical

37 Specifically, state interests are fixed at their 1963 levels for civil rights and defense, at the 1964 value for labor,
and conservative Christianity is fixed over the 1961-2007 period at the level estimated by the 2007 Pew US
Religious Landscape Survey.
Figure 8: State interests in 1963 on civil rights, defense, labor, and conservative Christianity
population, a large defense economy, and low labor unionization; and (b) the response of other states with moderate civil rights preferences but intense preferences on the other issues. For example, public opinion in Kansas does not care strongly about racial issues but it does care strongly about issues associated with evangelical Christianity, so when the race issue caused evangelical Christian populations to start concentrating in the Republican party for reasons having nothing directly to do with Christianity, conservative Christians in Kansas experienced improvement in their compatibility with the Republican coalition.

I test my hypothesis regarding the effect of civil rights on partisan change on the secondary issues using a time series analysis of the contemporaneous and long term effects of the shift of racial conservatives from the Democratic party to the Republican party. I measure the mean level of caucus constituency interest in defense by assigning to each senator the defense share of state GDP for her state and then calculating the average of this variable for Democratic senators and Republican senators. The disparity in party defense interests is calculated by the difference in party means. For civil rights, labor and conservative Christianity, I calculate the partisan constituency interest disparity in the same manner. It is important to note here that the state civil rights scores used in the analysis that follows have been scaled to run from 0 to 1. 0 is the score for the most racially liberal state (Oregon) and 1 is the score for the most racially conservative state (South Carolina). This means a partisan disparity of 1 would imply that one senate caucus is comprised of senators from states with civil rights scores are on average equal to South Carolina’s and one caucus is comprised of senators from states with civil rights scores that are on average equal to Oregon’s; obviously this scenario is impossible but that is how the poles of the civil rights partisan disparity continuum are characterized. I will present a more substantively sensible way of interpreting the results later in the chapter.
The most straightforward way of testing my hypothesis is with the general (unrestricted) form of the error corrected model (ECM). The general ECM model is equivalent to the ADL(1,1;1) model commonly used in the political science literature but has the advantage of providing straightforward estimates of contemporary and long run effects (De Boef and Keele 2008). The ECM takes the following form in the case of the conservative Christianity analysis:

\[ \Delta \text{Partisan Disparity in Conservative Christian Constituency Interest}_t = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{Partisan Disparity in Conservative Christian Constituency Interest}_{t-1}) + \beta_2(\Delta \text{Partisan Disparity in Civil Rights Constituency Interest}_t) + \beta_3(\text{Partisan Disparity in Civil Rights Constituency Interest}_{t-1}) \]

\( \beta_2 \) is the contemporaneous effect of how a one point change in the partisan disparity in civil rights constituency interests affects the partisan disparity in the extent to which each of the caucuses represents conservative Christian populations. \( \beta_1 \) is the error correction coefficient. The partisan interest disparity for each of the secondary interests could equilibrate to their levels before the civil rights change or they could equilibrate to a new level. That is, the effect of a “shock” in the partisan civil rights disparity could produce effects on the disparities for other interests that are either temporary or enduring. The enduring effect on the secondary interests is estimated by the long run multiplier. Specifically, the long-run effect of a one point change in the difference in party civil rights disparity on the percentage point difference in each of the interest disparities under analysis is given by \( \beta_3/\beta_1 \), whose standard error can be obtained using the Bewley transformation described in De Boef and Keele (2008).
The contemporaneous effects of a change in the partisan civil rights disparity can be read directly from the regression table presented in Table 2. This is essentially an estimate of the coincidence of state civil rights interests with state interests in each of the other interests under analysis (defense, labor, and conservative Christianity); it is a measure of how much the other interests are carried into the party caucus due to their residing in states with particular civil rights preferences. The results presented in Table 2 show that if one party’s civil rights mean were to flip from one party having a mean equivalent to South Carolina’s civil rights position to having a mean equivalent to Oregon’s civil rights position and the other party did the opposite, the coincidence of conservative Christians in anti-civil rights states implies that this switch would carry with it a net 12.4 percentage point change in the allocation of conservative Christians between the caucuses. The net change for defense interests due to the same development would be 3.9 percentage points, and for unionization it would be 32.6 percentage points.

Beyond these changes that come as a direct result of the coincidence of civil rights with other interests, there can be further polarization on the three secondary interests as states with high levels of these secondary interests react to the evolving composition of the coalitions. For example, as the racially conservative states that tend to be religiously conservative left the Democratic party, states with moderate racial preferences that are religiously conservative can be expected to adapt to this development by adjusting their own partisan alignment. In fact, this is exactly what the long run multiplier estimate reported in Table 2 for conservative Christianity indicates happened. If the partisan disparity in civil rights were to change from 0 to 1, this would produce a 33.0 percentage point change in the partisan disparity in constituency conservative Christian population, a 4.0 percentage point change in the partisan disparity in state defense economy, and a 36.4 percentage point change in the partisan disparity in unionization rates.
Comparing these estimates to the contemporaneous effects indicates that most of the change in defense and labor partisan disparity was directly due to the coincidence of states that are high in racial conservatism having high defense and low labor interests. In regard to conservative Christianity, however, much of the polarization that developed was due to the indirect effect of states high in religious conservatism following into the Republican party the initial groups of states high in religious conservatism who were brought into the Republican party due to their racial conservatism, and also to states low in religious conservatism exiting the Republican party as religious conservatives gained more influence in the coalition.

The actual substantive implications of how civil rights affected the composition of the parties in regard to religious conservatism, defense, and labor can be evaluated by knowing that the polarization of the caucuses in regard to state civil rights preferences increased from .08 in 1961-62 with Republicans representing the more racially liberal states on average to .17 in 2007-08 with

Table 2: ECM analysis of change in the senate party caucus disparity in state civil rights preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \Delta ) Partisan Disparity in Christian Conservative Population</th>
<th>( \Delta ) Partisan Disparity in Defense Share of GDP</th>
<th>( \Delta ) Partisan Disparity in State Unionization Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.932 (0.396)</td>
<td>0.123 (0.046)</td>
<td>-0.281 (0.265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Interest Disparity (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.063 (0.108)</td>
<td>-0.722 (0.240)</td>
<td>-0.242 (0.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Party Civil Rights Disparity (t)</td>
<td>12.422 (6.758)</td>
<td>3.902 (0.697)</td>
<td>-32.601 (4.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Civil Rights Disparity (t-1)</td>
<td>2.081 (7.978)</td>
<td>2.880 (1.164)</td>
<td>-8.797 (5.678)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.752</td>
<td>0.826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box-Ljung Test p-values</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Run Multiplier</td>
<td>32.975 (5.094)</td>
<td>3.988 (0.439)</td>
<td>-36.415 (2.721)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of senate party caucuses in the 87th to 110th Congresses.
Democrats representing the more racially liberal states on average – that is a total change on .25. The .25 total change number can be used to calculate what the civil rights change would imply in the long run for changes in the partisan disparities in regard to state evangelical population, defense share of GDP, and labor unionization. This implied change is an 8.24 percentage point increase in the disparity in the caucuses’ mean state evangelical population, a 1.00 percentage point increase in the disparity between the caucuses’ mean level of defense share of state GDP, and a 9.10 percentage point increase in the disparity between the caucuses’ mean state unionization rates.

**Conclusion**

Many analysts have tried to explain partisan change in the late-20th century with reference to autonomous issue evolutions on matters such as moral traditionalism, women’s rights, and international trade, among others. And many analysts have argued that the implications of the civil rights issue evolution are limited in scope because partisan change on so many different issues developed in the late 20th century.

In this chapter, I argue that an issue evolution involves a specific type of partisan change: the evolution of an issue that moves the party system to a new equilibrium. Other issues may undergo change as part of the development of this new equilibrium. And I show in this chapter that this is the process that organized partisan change in the second half of the 20th century: One issue – civil rights – evolved to drive the party system to a new equilibrium and other issues underwent change in response to the new coalitional arrangements that developed as the result of the civil rights issue evolution.
“How did the Democratic Party get here? How did the party of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy drift so far from the foreign policy and national security principles and policies that were at the core of its identity and its purpose?” asked Senator Joseph Lieberman in 2008. 

“In the late 1960s, a very different view of the world took root in the Democratic Party,” Lieberman accurately observes in lamenting the demise of anti-communist liberalism, a strand of thought cogently summarized by President Kennedy in his inaugural address: “We dare not tempt [our adversaries] with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.” Not all liberals in Kennedy’s day embraced the priority of ensuring “our arms are sufficient beyond doubt.” Progressives and the emergent New Left resolutely rejected that notion, and shortly after the end of World War II, the Democratic coalition was cleaved by disagreement about whether unconstrained expansion of American military power would provoke aggression or whether constraining American military capabilities would make America provocatively weak in the eyes of its adversaries. Today, “provocative weakness” is almost exclusively a conservative concern and contemporary liberals are nearly uniform in their emphasis on the potential provocativeness of American military capabilities.

So how did the political coalitions – virulently divided internally over national defense at midcentury – evolve the coherent and polarized positions on national defense that obtain today?

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39 The division on defense policy within the Democratic Party is well summarized in Schlesinger’s (1965: 299-300) history of the Kennedy administration.
I argue that change in partisan defense polarization is determined by change in the interest composition of the coalitions and that change in the interest composition of the coalitions is caused by the issue evolutions that periodically develop to transform the party system. Some episodes of realignment have amplified defense polarization while others have abated it. By evaluating the major episodes of coaltional transformation in American history, the analysis I develop in this chapter seeks to demonstrate how the evolution of new presidential cleavages substantively unrelated to defense affect the organization of defense conflict into the party coalitions in Congress. Though the analysis in this chapter is focused on defense, I believe the implications are much more general and demonstrate a dynamic that obtains for all secondary issues.

In this chapter, I test the hypothesis that partisan defense polarization is determined by how the emergent presidential cleavages that periodically evolve to reorganize the parties change the interest composition of the coalitions. I do this by evaluating how these issue evolutions have changed the interest composition of the coalitions over time and in turn affected the organization of conflict on defense in Congress. I show in this chapter that the evolution of defense conflict is a second order effect of issues that have evolved to organize the presidential coalitions and not the result of independent episodes of defense policy issue evolution.

My argument in this chapter challenges the perception of some scholars that when tensions on important issues exist within a coalition, coaltional issue positions evolve toward resolution of that tension. In the case of the development of defense polarization in the post-New Deal Party System, for example, I suggest that the heterogeneity of defense preferences within the party coalitions would have persisted were it not for the civil rights realignment and the high correspondence between preferences on civil rights and national defense. This assessment
contrasts with the conventional explanations of political scientists and historians who have analyzed the party positions on national defense and explain evolution in coalitional positions in terms of tensions particular to the defense policy issue. For example, Ehrman (1995) attributes the changing party positions to “dissipation of liberal consensus regarding America’s virtues and the legitimacy of its global interests.” Hamby (1992: 6) attributes it directly to the fallout from the Vietnam War: “The internationalist side of the liberal tradition had somehow degenerated into a ruinous adventure in Southeast Asia, leading to a widespread loss of confidence in the legitimacy of America’s purpose in the global politics.” Vaïsse (2010: 34), in his study of the evolution of neo-conservatism, writes: “The concept [of liberalism in the 1950s] was so vast and so vague that it could accommodate a wide range of very different, indeed almost opposing, sensibilities and tendencies, including precursors of both the New Left and neo-conservatism. How could it fail eventually implode?”

Like these historians, the most popular explanations of coalitional position change in the political science literature also center on how tensions within the political coalitions evolve and how coalitional positions on particular issues are resolved through the efforts of activists and politicians to organize public opinion on that issue. Carmines and Stimson (1989) provide the canonical theoretical statement of issue evolution theory in an argument that centers on the dynamic interactive relationship between political leaders and public opinion in the development of party position change. Issue evolution theory is the most widely used framework for explaining coalitional position change in contemporary political science; it has been employed to explain position change on several different issues, including defense spending (Fordham 1998). In

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40 Issue evolution accounts of partisan change on particular issues include: tax policy (Berkman 1993; Burns 1997; Burns and Taylor 2000), abortion (Adams 1997) defense spending (Fordham 1998), international trade policy
contrast to the literature applying the issue evolution framework to the manifold issues that have undergone partisan change in recent decades, my argument is that how the evolution of a new presidential cleavage issue changes the interest composition of the coalitions shapes the compatibility of all groups in the party system with the major political coalitions. I argue that the American parties do not programmatically organize political conflict across issue domains (c.f., Gerring 1998) and American party leaders are not the strategic, proactive organizers of conflict that the leading theories of political coalitions hold them to be (Riker 1982; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Aldrich 1983, 1995; Miller and Schofield 2003; also see Holt 1978 and Ritter 1997 for examples of work by historians sharing the proactive organization of conflict perspective).

The basic claim I make in this chapter is that change in the interest composition of the coalitions is caused by the periodic evolution of new presidential cleavages and that when defense preferences have corresponded to preferences on the new presidential cleavage, the defense issue has been increasingly organized into coalitional conflict; when this correspondence has not obtained, defense polarization has diminished. In short, I argue that the congressional coalitions’ positions on defense policy have been shaped and reshaped throughout American history by the interests associated with the presidential cleavage that have transformed the party coalitions – namely, federal government investment in economic development (Second Party System), slavery (pre-Reconstruction Third Party System), international political economy (post-Reconstruction Third Party System), agricultural monetary interests (Fourth Party System), and civil rights (post-New Deal party system).

(Shoch 2001), women’s rights (Wolbrecht 2000), gun control (Bruce and Wilcox 1998; Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002), environmental protection (Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002).
The hypothesis I test in this chapter is that change in the extent to which the defense issue has been organized into partisan conflict can be explained as the secondary effect of movements by groups between coalitions that were caused by the evolution of new presidential cleavages. Put the other way, new presidential cleavages cause groups to change coalitions, which has the secondary effect of changing the preferences within those coalitions on defense policy.

The congressional parties have always been organized by conflict over economic redistribution with two brief exceptions when conflict over slavery displaced economic conflict: 1815-1825 and 1853-1876 (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). Further, the presidential voting coalitions have typically been organized by the same issue conflict as Congress. But the substance of presidential and congressional conflict does not have to be identical, and on two important occasions the presidential coalitions organized around a distinctive issue which, in turn, caused that issue to be organized into the redistribution cleavage in Congress. These two instances are conflict over agricultural interests (especially agrarian monetary interests) in the Fourth Party System and the civil rights conflict that began organizing the presidential coalitions in the 1960s. My goal is to show how the five party system transitions attributable to these changes in the issues central to the congressional and presidential coalitions have affected the organization of defense policy into partisan conflict. I investigate the changes brought about by the following five major party system transitions, which are described in greater detail in Table 1.41

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41 The list of transitions I analyze omits the transition between the Fourth and Fifth Party Systems. Poole and Rosenthal (1993, 2007) have shown that transition to the Fifth Party System involved a shift in coalitional support along the axis of conflict that obtained at the end of the Fourth Party System. The terms of conflict, which centered on redistributive economic issues, did not change. Therefore, the transition between the Fourth and Fifth Party Systems is not a case of the type of structural change in the coalitions that is the subject of this study. Because no new presidential cleavage emerged to transform the coalitions in the transition to the Fifth Party System, the Fourth Party System developments discussed in this study account for the structural basis of coalitional arrangements in the Fifth Party System.
1. The transition to the Second Party System when conflict over slavery during the Era of Good Feelings was displaced by economic conflict.

2. The transition to the Third Party System when slavery displaced economic conflict.

3. The transition to the post-Reconstruction Era of the Third Party System when the Compromise of 1877 ended Reconstruction and economic conflict – tariff policy in particular – returned as the dominant partisan conflict.

4. The transition to the Fourth Party System when agricultural interests were organized into the Democratic Party through their efforts to control the Democratic presidential nomination.

5. The transition to the post-New Deal Party System when the civil rights issue was organized into partisan conflict as a result of changed presidential nomination coalitions for the two parties.

Change in the extent to which defense is organized into partisan conflict between party systems depends on how much defense was organized into conflict by the issue at the center of the old party system and by how much defense was organized into conflict by the presidential cleavage. If preferences on defense correspond more to the new presidential cleavage issue than to the issue cleavage of the old party system, then defense will be increasingly organized into partisan conflict in the new party system.

The analysis I develop in the section that follows is based on the idea that MC issue preferences measured before the transition to a new party system can be used to make predictions about how activation of a specific presidential cleavage will change defense polarization in the new
Table 1: Cases of Coalitional Transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Displaced Party System</th>
<th>Central Cleavage(s)</th>
<th>Circumstances enabling transition</th>
<th>New Coalitional Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Era of Good Feelings (1817-1822)</td>
<td>Slavery in the territories</td>
<td>Congressional voting chaotic at this time – not an organized party system</td>
<td>Government finance of economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Party System (1828-1848)</td>
<td>Government finance of economic development</td>
<td>Only North-South coalitions viable in early part of era; westward expansion makes a coalition excluding the South viable by end of the period.</td>
<td>Slavery issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party System, Reconstruction Era (1854-1876)</td>
<td>Slavery and reconstruction</td>
<td>Reconstruction suppressed by Compromise of 1877.</td>
<td>Tariff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party System, Post-Reconstruction Era (1877-1895)</td>
<td>Tariff</td>
<td>Tension between business and agrarian interests in the Republican coalition.</td>
<td>Agricultural issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Party System (1896-1927)</td>
<td>Economic redistribution; Agriculture</td>
<td>The transition to the Fifth Party System was characterized by a shift in the balance of partisan support along the axis of conflict that obtained during the Fourth Party System.</td>
<td>No new issue. (Fifth Party System defined by shift in support along the existing axis.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Party System (1932-1960)</td>
<td>Economic redistribution</td>
<td>Migration of African Americans to northern industrial states</td>
<td>Civil rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-New Deal Party System</td>
<td>Economic redistribution; Civil Rights</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
party system. To implement my test for each transition, I make use of the roll call votes in the last Congress before the demise of each party system and I obtain the MC issue position scores I use in the tests by separately scaling roll call votes (a) on defense, (b) on the issue central to partisan conflict in the old party system, and (c) on the new presidential cleavage issue. For example, the post-New Deal Party System evolved as a result of the civil rights presidential cleavage; so for making predictions about how defense polarization will evolve in the post-New Deal Party System, I make use of roll call votes in the 86th Congress (1959-1960) and scale votes on (a) defense, (b) fiscal policy (which was the central presidential cleavage in the 5th Party System), and (c) civil rights.

**Change in the Defense Issue’s Organization Into Partisan Conflict Over Time**

The best way to measure the organization of defense into partisan conflict in Congress is to estimate how well legislator defense preferences are associated with the one dimensional summary of legislator ideological preferences that first dimension DW-NOMINATE (DW1) measures (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). Poole and Rosenthal’s recommended statistic for measuring DW1’s correspondence to any arbitrary group of roll call votes is the aggregate proportional reduction in error statistic (APRE) (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). Figure 1 shows the extent to which defense policy is organized into coalitional conflict in each Congress throughout American history using the APRE statistic. This is the dependent variable that I study in the analysis that follows.

As Figure 1 indicates, coalitional developments have increased defense polarization on four occasions: (1) the organization of the First Party System, (2) the transition from the Era of Good Feelings to the Second Party System, (3) the coalitional changes developing with the end of Reconstruction in 1877, and (4) the coalitional changes developing with the civil rights realignment. And coalitional developments decreased coalitional defense polarization (1) when the First Party
Figure 1: Defense Issue’s Organization into the Congressional Coalitions, 1789-2005
System broke down and (2) in developments that evolved with the Fourth Party System and persisted through the Fifth Party System. And finally, the coalitional transformations developing with the transition between the Second and Third Party Systems had no net effect on defense polarization. I evaluate each of these transitions in turn.

Transition from the Era of Good Feelings to the Second Party System

The Federalist Party was too principled for its own good. By the early 1800s, all states except South Carolina chose their presidential electors based on the popular vote and suffrage requirements had been liberalized such that nearly all white males were eligible to vote in presidential elections (McCormick 1966: 29). Yet, defying the pleas of some of the party’s younger members, the Federalists refused to establish the correspondence committees necessary to be competitive in mass elections because electioneering was incompatible with the Federalist philosophy of political leadership (Livermore 1962). As the Party’s base winnowed down to New England, the Federalist Party was no longer a viable contender for Electoral College victories and office seekers once attracted to the Federalists’ program went looking for other alliances (Chase 1973: 80).

Though the First Party System was moribund by 1816, the important economic conflicts that organized the First Party System persisted, and, in fact, reestablishing stable partisan conflict would prove contingent on reestablishing coalitions organized around this same conflict. The Era of Good Feelings (1816-1824), which followed the Federalists’ demise, marked the most chaotic period of congressional voting behavior in American history (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). During this period, the question of slavery in the American territories served as the most salient cleavage in Congress (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2002). Yet it was impossible to build a winning Electoral College
coalition on this issue. Unlike the Third Party System when American westward expansion made possible a winning presidential coalition that excluded the South, winning presidential coalitions in the first half of the nineteenth century needed to be North-South coalitions, and as long as America remained a North-South country, the division over slavery expansion that cleaved the sections needed to be suppressed in order to form a new party system.

The Missouri Compromise of 1820 provided precisely the device needed to suppress the slavery obstacle to North-South cooperation in coalition formation. The Whig coalition -- the structure of which was evident almost immediately following the Compromise of 1820 (Poole and Rosenthal 2007) and which had started to become formally institutionalized in the country by 1824 (McCormick 1966) -- centered on the developmental priorities of the Hamiltonian Federalists in the First Party System. The basic premise of the Whig's American System was that insufficient private capital existed in the United States and that economic development would depend on government investment in infrastructure and government efforts to supply investment capital (Holt 1978: 34). Like their counterparts, Democratic leaders explicitly reached back to principles familiar from the First Party System. Articulating the Jeffersonian concept of the negative state, the foremost architect of the modern Democratic Party, Martin Van Buren, declared that government “was not intended to confer special favors on individuals or on any classes of them, to create systems of agriculture, manufacturers, or trade, or engage in them either separately or in connection with individual citizens or organized associations” (Van Buren quoted in Holt 1978: 31-33). The core principle organizing the Democratic coalition, Holt (1978: 31) explains, was that “any active governmental role in the economy, in short, produced inequalities of privilege. The best way to preserve equality of opportunity was for government to do nothing.”
The conflict over federal government investment in economic development central to the Second Party System involved interest coalitions that tended to correspond to specific preferences on national defense. Interests that opposed an active central government tended also to oppose efforts to establish a standing army controlled by the federal government. In addition to principled small government motives for position taking on national defense, that the tariff was the primary source of federal government revenue was an important consideration in the formation of defense preferences because the tariff implied that the burden of national defense costs would be borne by economic sectors other than import substituting industries. Those associated with import-competing industries welcomed the economic rents that higher tariffs would produce, while those not associated with import-competing industries would not directly reap any of those rents and would bear the higher costs of imports and of import-competing products. Interests opposing the Whig’s American System tended both to oppose granting the federal government increased military powers and to also be averse to the distributional implications of the tariff funding mechanism for federal government undertakings. Thus the standing army issue closely corresponded to preferences regarding the American System.

Whig proposals for investing in the American navy were even more fraught than the standing army issue. Naval expenditures of course implied the same tension over the unequal distribution of costs. But in addition a powerful American navy was a component of the mercantilist program advocated by the Whigs and opposed by the Democrats. Mercantilist Whigs demanded an American navy capable of opening and protecting American access to markets in the economic periphery. With import-competing interests exclusively in the Whig coalition, interests in the Democratic coalition were generally opposed to the mercantilist enterprise. In addition to the unequal cost burden consideration already discussed, exporting industries in the Democratic Party
feared American adventures in mercantilism would threaten their access to lucrative European markets. America's commodity exporters had little interest in the commodity economies of the global periphery that the country's import-competing industries aspired to control; and peripheral markets, in their view, were certainly not worth jeopardizing American access to European markets for.

Not every industry that supported government-led development stood to benefit directly from mercantilist efforts. Only those with substantial stakes in access to peripheral markets stood to directly benefit from mercantilism, but almost every interest who stood to benefit from mercantilism also stood to benefit from the internal development efforts of the American System and therefore the most adamant proponents of investments in the American navy were squarely in the Whig coalition.

These considerations suggest that the defense issue should be at least moderately organized into coalitions organized around the American System. So do MC preferences at the end of the Era of Good Feelings predict that displacement of that period's axis of organization with conflict over the American System would increase defense polarization? To test whether MC preferences on the American System corresponded to preferences on defense in a manner consistent with the increase in defense polarization observed in Figure 1, I estimate MC defense, slavery and internal improvement positions by W-NOMINATE scaling roll call votes on each set of issues, respectively, and present a regression analysis of MC defense positions in the 16th Congress (1819-20), which is the Congress that passed the Missouri Compromise of 1820, in Table 2. Table 2 shows that slavery preferences in the 16th Congress had no statistically or substantively significant relationship to defense preferences. MC internal improvement preferences, in contrast, had a
modest correspondence with defense positions, a relationship that Table 2 indicates is highly statistically significant. Thus the Table 2 analysis predicts that displacement of slavery conflict with conflict over the American System would be expected to cause the defense issue to undergo the sizeable increase in its organization into coalitional conflict that Figure 1 shows developed throughout the Second Party System.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( 0.070)</td>
<td>( 0.068)</td>
<td>( 0.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Issue (Anti-Slavery)</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( 0.066)</td>
<td>( 0.065)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realigning Issue (Internal Improvements)</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( 0.071)</td>
<td>( 0.073)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error of Regression</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>0.518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defense, slavery, and internal improvements scores were obtained by ideal scaling House roll call votes addressing each respective issues. See Appendix 2 for a list of the roll call votes used. Defense is scored in the pro-militarism direction. All scores are normalized.
THIRD PARTY SYSTEM, SLAVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD

During the Polk administration (1845-48) cartoonists often portrayed the Democratic coalition as a house of cards. As conflict over slavery in the territories split the coalitions along sectional lines, Polk implausibly reached for the Missouri Compromise’s balance principle which had successfully suppressed conflict over slavery a quarter century prior (Skowronek 1997). This time, of course, the Missouri Compromise principles proved woefully inadequate to prevent the breakup of the economic coalitions. American westward expansion had made new presidential coalitions possible. Most importantly, for the first time in American history it became possible to win an Electoral College majority without the South. This development paved the way for formation of a winning anti-slavery coalition, and conflict over slavery and reconstruction became the dominant conflict organizing the coalitions.

The crisis of the 1850s did two things: (1) it displaced the economic basis of coalitional organization and (2) it eliminated support in the South for an active federal government. During the Second Party System southern Whigs had been supportive of demands for a more active federal government to promote development. Yet with the nation fractured by sectional division at the end of the Second Party System, southerners were uniformly unsympathetic to calls for an active federal government. Few southerners would accept the federal power associated with a standing army and a large navy, and moreover, inequality in the cost burden between North and South implied by tariff-based revenue generation became an even more substantial point of division as the enmity engendered by sectional inequities was exacerbated.

In the non-South, the correspondence between the sectional slavery division and defense preferences increased in the second half of the nineteenth century as Midwest commodity
producers, whose exports to Europe were insignificant, came to believe they could profit from access to Latin American markets. Thus developments in both the North and the South created sectional preference tendencies that brought division on slavery into correspondence with preferences on defense and as a result contributed to maintaining defense polarization at the level that obtained at the end of the Second Party System.

With conflict over the American System displaced by conflict over slavery, the effect on defense polarization in the Reconstruction era should be predicted by how MC preferences on internal improvements and slavery corresponded to defense preferences at the end of the Second Party System. Table 3 presents a regression analysis of this relationship in the 28th Congress (1843-44). Both internal improvements and slavery moderately corresponded to defense preferences in the Second Party System. The implication of the analysis in Table 2 is that when slavery displaced internal improvements as the central cleavage in Congress a moderate amount of defense polarization should obtain in the Third Party System with little net change from the level of the Second Party System. This expectation is consistent with the levels of defense polarization observed in Figure 1.
With industrialization making economic issues increasingly important and the Compromise of 1877 formally ending Reconstruction, conflict over international political economy policy became increasingly central to the conflict organizing the Third Party System, and the Republican coalition transitioned from “ambivalent moderation” to stalwart conservatism on the economic issues (Ritter 1997). “The Republicans were increasingly identified with the new class of American plutocrats who profited from their policies of high tariffs, gold-based currency, and laissez faire economics” (Rae 1989: 11). Though the legacy of the bloody shirt kept the Republican coalition largely intact
throughout the Third Party System, the tariff evolved as the conflict most central to the congressional cleavage in the post-Reconstruction Era (Sundquist 1983).

In this period, Senator Albert Beveridge proclaimed: “American factories are making more than the American people can use. American soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours” (quoted in Ekirch 1974: 175). Through most of the nineteenth century, “the American people associated a large army – especially a large standing army – with European militarism, Caesarism, and despotism” (Ekirch 1974: 203). Though aversion to militarism persisted in the radical agrarian regions of the country, the sentiment expressed by Beveridge was widely shared throughout the nation’s industrial areas, and in spite of vociferous opposition, American aspirations to control world trade led to “the abandonment of the tradition under which the Navy had been confined largely to American waters” beginning in the post-Reconstruction Era of the Third Party System (Ekirch 1974: 197).

Like the mercantilist interests in the Second Party System, mercantilist interests in the Third Party System desired American military capabilities for opening up and defending access to international markets. There was an important difference, however: the intensity of interest in mercantilism among industries had significantly increased because industrial capacity had saturated the domestic market and the breadth of interests attracted to international markets had expanded. In the previous section, I noted that all interests with a stake in mercantilist policies were associated with the Whig coalition but not all interests associated with the Whigs had a vested interest in mercantilism. By the Gilded Age, support for mercantilism was much more ubiquitous among interests in the Republican coalition than had been the case with the Whig coalition.
In the post-Reconstruction period, the international political economy (IPE) issue was organized into the slavery coalitions. How this development could be expected to affect defense polarization is evaluated in the regression analysis presented in Table 4. Table 4 indicates that in the 43\textsuperscript{rd} Congress (1873-74) both Reconstruction and tariff preferences were associated with defense preferences. This analysis thus suggests that the organization of tariff preferences into the pro- and anti-Reconstruction coalitions should moderately increase defense polarization in the post-Reconstruction Era, as Figure 1 shows to have been the case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( 0.045)</td>
<td>( 0.046)</td>
<td>( 0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Issue (Reconstruction)</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( 0.043)</td>
<td>( 0.066)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realigning Issue (Tariffs)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( 0.046)</td>
<td>( 0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>0.471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>0.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error of Regression</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Defense, Reconstruction, and tariff scores were obtained by ideal scaling House roll call votes addressing each respective issues. See Appendix 2 for a list of the roll call votes used. Defense is scored in the pro-militarism direction. All scores are normalized.}
The end of Reconstruction (1877) exposed the Republicans’ volatile alliance between business and western agrarians (Sundquist 1983: 110-12). The Gilded Age was marked by conflict between agrarians and industry within the Republican Party (Rae 1989: 13), but so long as the prominence of Reconstruction secured the Republican Party’s status as the Union party, the Party would control the Midwest and West in spite of its strong ties to commercial interests. On the economic issues, however, agrarian interests were much more compatible with the Democratic coalition; and as the relevance of the bloody shirt, the Homestead Act, and Union veteran pensions declined, agrarians were unsurprisingly drawn away from the Republican coalition.

Deflation and depression incited conversion. The country experienced a monetary contraction between 1879 and 1897 as a result of deflationary monetary policy (Ritter 1997: 189). Deflation devastated debtor farmers by raising the real cost of servicing debt, and the onset of depression in 1893 brought agrarian discontent to a head.42 The System of 1896 that resulted from agrarian discontent was foremost the result of a shift in partisan support along the existing economic axis of partisan conflict (Poole and Rosenthal 2007; see also Bartels 1998 for an analysis of electoral results consistent with this interpretation). Yet even in the absence of conflict displacement, the effect on the composition of the coalitions was significant (Jenkins, Schickler, and Carson 2004). In particular, agrarian interests became organized into the liberal economic coalition, and though monetary policy had served as the presidential cleavage issue that evolved, agrarian interests remained organized into the Democratic coalition long after the salience of monetary

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policy had been marginalized by economic recovery and a large increase in the international supply of gold.

The 1896 election was instrumental in developing the Democratic Party’s pro-agriculture image, but coalitional reorganization around agricultural conflict evolved as a continuous process throughout the Fourth Party System. Figure 2 illustrated this continuous process by plotting the difference in the parties’ mean (normalized) district crop value per capita from 1891 to 1937 in congresses following the midterm elections.\textsuperscript{43}

The theory of political alignments anticipates that coalitional defense polarization should be affected by the organization of agrarian interests into the economically liberal coalition. To evaluate how defense polarization will be affected, I regress MC defense positions in the 51st Congress (1889-90) on MC tariff and agricultural preferences. The analysis presented in Table 5 shows that in the non-South pro-agriculture MC preferences are actually positively associated with pro-Defense preferences. This finding is contrary to the conventional stereotype of isolationist agrarians. To be sure, isolationism was popular in many of the more remote agrarian regions, so Table 5 foremost call attention to the fact that coexisting with the well-known isolationist sentiments among agrarians were also pro-defense sentiments.

The assimilation of agrarian interests into the economically liberal coalition produced greater heterogeneity in the defense preferences of the coalitions for two reasons. The first reason is that the net relationship between pro-agriculture and pro-defense preferences is positive and therefore the net effect of increasing the agrarian interest composition of the anti-tariff coalition

\textsuperscript{43} The plot shows congresses elected in the midterm because congresses elected in presidential election years are subject to noise created by the presidential elections. But the basic trend in Figure 3 obtains for Congresses elected in presidential election years.
Figure 2: Party Difference in Mean District Crop Value Per Capita, 1891-1927.

The values plotted on the vertical axis are the Democratic means less the Republican means. Data points are for Congresses elected in midterm elections. Per capita district crop value is normalized for each year in order to facilitate comparison across years.
Source: ICPSR files 2896 and 8611.
was to cause the homogeneity of anti-defense Democratic preferences to become much more heterogeneous. The second reason is the diversity of defense preferences among agrarians across the different regions of the country. Agrarians in the Far West tended to share the skepticism of their southern partners in regard to defense expenditures, and for this reason when the election of 1896 concentrated Democratic support within the South and West the economic coalitions briefly increased their polarization of defense policy. But as the Democratic coalition increasingly developed its pro-agrarian image, the party began winning in rural Midwest and Northeast agrarian districts that were more supportive of defense efforts than the radical agrarians of the West. The

Table 5: OLS Analysis of MC Defense Positions in the 51st (1889-90) and 67th (1921-22) Congresses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-South MCs</th>
<th>All MCs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( 0.035)</td>
<td>( 0.052)</td>
<td>( 0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Issue (Tariff)</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>0.787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realigning Issue (Agriculture)</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South X Agriculture</td>
<td>-0.143</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>0.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Defense, tariff, and agriculture scores were obtained by ideal scaling House roll call votes addressing each respective issues. See Appendix 2 for a list of the roll call votes used. Defense is scored in the pro-militarism direction. All scores are normalized.*
heterogeneity developing in the economic coalitions is indicated by the substantial decline in the correspondence between tariff preferences and defense preferences that occurred between the 51st (1889-90) and 67th (1921-22) Congresses. In the 51st Congress, the full model in Table 5 (model 4) shows a standardized coefficient for tariff preferences of .78; in the 67th Congress, that coefficient is .41 (model 5).

**Post-New Deal Party System**

Outside the South, the Democratic Party established itself as the party of minority rights during the Franklin Roosevelt administration. But the party’s pro-civil rights faction was hampered by the Democrats’ substantial southern constituency. Turning the national party into a pro-civil rights party required a coalitional blueprint that excluded the South from the Democrat’s Electoral College coalition. By the 1960s, the substantial growth in the urban black population in northern states – shown in Figure 3 – had made a viable alternative coalitional blueprint possible for the liberal faction of the Democratic Party. Carmines and Stimson (1989) show the substantial implications of this black migration for electoral politics.

If demographic change created an opportunity for liberals in the Democratic coalition, liberals acting on that opportunity created an opportunity for conservatives in the Republican coalition. The midcentury Republican coalitional blueprint vitally depended upon support from large northern industrial states (e.g., New York, California). However, competitiveness in these states necessitated moderation on issues like federal aid to cities and racial integration programs that stalwart conservatives opposed. As Democratic liberals worked to gain control of the urban industrial states by consolidating the racial minority vote, Republican conservatives sought to attract the Democratic conservatives that a more liberal Democratic party would alienate and which
Figure 3: Percentage of Blacks in Central Cities of Twelve Largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 1930-1970

Source: Carmines and Stimson (1989: 33, Table 2.1)
would ultimately enable the Republican Party to be competitive in the Electoral College without appealing to northern urban interests. By realigning Democratic conservatives, Republican conservatives hoped to build a viable conservative Republican coalition (Rusher 1963; c.f., The Ripon Society 1966).

Because African Americans had migrated to the industrial centers in the North where well paying manufacturing jobs were concentrated, these urban areas are where the Democratic coalition made its greatest electoral gains. The Democratic Party evolved into a much more urban party and a party with much less support in the South and in the non-urban parts of the Midwest and Great Plains. This development had important implications for the organization of the defense issue into coalitional conflict because America's urban centers had a vested interest in a stable cooperative international system in which trade and financial relations were unimpeded. The unilateralist preferences of other parts of the country conflicted with those interests.

Table 6 presents a regression analysis of how the organization of civil rights into the economic coalitions would be expected to affect defense polarization. This analysis shows that in the 86th Congress (1959-60) at the end of the New Deal Party System fiscal conservatism and anti-civil rights preferences were both strongly associated with pro-defense preferences. Thus in contrast to the agricultural presidential cleavage in the Fourth Party System which caused the economic coalitions to develop more heterogeneous defense preferences, the civil rights presidential cleavage had the effect of reinforcing the economic coalitions’ existing tendencies on the defense issue. The result was the evolution of defense polarization from a near historical low at the beginning of the post-New Deal party system to the historical high in defense polarization that obtains today.
Table 6: OLS Analysis of MC Defense Positions in the 86th Congress (1959-60)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( 0.046)</td>
<td>( 0.042)</td>
<td>( 0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Issue (Fiscal Conservatism)</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( 0.044)</td>
<td></td>
<td>( 0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realigning Issue (Anti-Civil Rights)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( 0.041)</td>
<td>( 0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.301</td>
<td>0.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error of Regression</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>0.483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defense, fiscal conservatism, and civil rights scores were obtained by ideal scaling House roll call votes addressing each respective issues. See Appendix 2 for a list of the roll call votes used. Defense is scored in the pro-militarism direction. All scores are normalized.
Figure 4: Change in the Defense Agenda’s Organization into the Congressional Coalitions in the Major Episodes of Party System Change.

The correspondence measures used for the horizontal axis are obtained from models 1 and 2 in the regression results table for the party system preceding the plotted party system. The values plotted on the vertical axis are the change in DW1 APRE for defense bills between the Congress at the end of the previous party system and the Congress at the end of the plotted party system.
Summary of Cases of Party System Transition

This section has evaluated how defense polarization has been affected by the five major episodes of party system change in American history. In each case, I show that change in defense polarization is predicted by the correspondence of defense preferences to preferences on the new presidential cleavage issue. Figure 4 presents a summary of the findings developed in this section by plotting change in the defense issue’s organization into coalitional conflict between party systems against the difference in defense’s correspondence to the presidential cleavage issue and the issue cleavage that obtained during the old party system. Figure 4 shows that the theory of political alignments effectively explains change in the defense issue’s organization into coalitional conflict in each of the five episodes of coalition change.

Discussion

America’s participation in all three of its biggest international wars – World War One, World War Two, and the Vietnam War – occurred when the political coalitions were internally divided over the issue of national defense. If anything could be expected to unify the majority coalition on an issue that had previously divided it, war would be the most likely candidate. Yet in the lead up to war, the party coalitions became more rather than less fractured by national defense conflict. This not only highlights a peculiarity of the American political system but also highlights a potentially detrimental flaw with it. Executive leadership is a necessary condition for prudently addressing international crises, and therefore constraints on the president’s ability to lead as the country confronts an international crisis can potentially be disastrous. In fact, we find the leading biographers of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt admonishing each president for failure to lead policy and opinion as America confronted unrest in Europe. Wilson’s and Roosevelt’s
biographers recount that both presidents were internationalists and believed the executive had a
duty to lead public opinion, yet as debate over preparedness began in the United States, internal
divisions within their coalitions caused them to abdicate their opinion leadership roles and initially
to tolerate isolationist policy undertakings counter to their personal principles. Link (1951: 241)
argues that coalitional pressures – both electoral and legislative – caused Wilson’s 1916
“metamorphosis from the firm defender of American rights on the seas to a leading champion of
nonintervention.” Roosevelt’s biographer, James MacGregor Burns (1956), is especially harsh in his
indictment of Roosevelt’s first term foreign policy leadership: “The record is clear. As a foreign
policy maker, Roosevelt during his first term was more pussyfooting politician than political leader.
He seemed to float almost helplessly on the flood tide of isolationism, rather than seek to change
both the popular attitudes and the apathy that buttressed isolationists’ strength” (Burns 1956: 249).
Roosevelt’s “pussyfooting,” Burns (1956: 250) reports, is attributable to the Democratic Party being
“cleft through the middle on international issues” – a circumstance that powerfully affected both
Roosevelt’s dealings with his congressional coalition and the electoral considerations he weighed in
preparation for the 1936 campaign.

In both these cases, Wilson and Roosevelt ultimately charted a prudent foreign policy
course at the most critical moments. In the case of Vietnam, however, the Democratic Party’s
internal division on defense policy very likely contributed to America’s Vietnam quagmire. The
various coalitional pressures and constraints that President Johnson faced led him to equivocate in
setting Vietnam policy, and this equivocation at critical points is viewed by some historians of the
Vietnam War as the cause of the Vietnam quagmire. If Johnson had ignored political considerations
and instead exerted strong leadership on a well-defined Vietnam policy, Betts (1983) argues, the Vietnam conflict would not have been as disastrous.\footnote{Just because a president is given the reins of policy leadership does not mean that the policy he/she develops and its execution will be effective. For example, George W. Bush’s adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan were facilitated by his coalition’s unified preferences on national defense policy, and regardless of whether one thinks the undertakings were justified, policy execution in both cases was imperfect in spite of the propitious leadership circumstances Bush enjoyed. Thus executive leadership is only a necessary condition of prudent national defense policy, and whenever the president’s party is internally divided on defense policy, presidential ability to lead defense policy and opinion is greatly encumbered.}

The larger point of this paper has been to show that the American political system’s ability to deal with the secondary issue like defense is determined by circumstances unrelated to those issue areas themselves. In particular, I show that the presidential cleavage issues that have organized and re-organized the party coalitions have determined which issues are organized into American politics and which are not. With demographic change in contemporary America bringing the coalitions to the crossroads of realignment, the argument developed here has substantial implications for understanding the changes in American political conflict that will evolve in the coming decades. The Republican coalition is especially compelled to make choices about the future composition of its coalition. To persist as a competitive party, the Republicans will either have to do more to incorporate the interests of socially conservative but relatively poor Latinos or to reach out to the affluent but socially liberal college educated population. The theory of political alignments predicts that either development would have important implications for partisan conflict on issues like defense and the environment. If the Republicans choose to incorporate the college educated population that shares the Republican party’s fiscal conservatism, that choice is likely to have the effect of displacing defense policy from partisan conflict and further displacing environmental conflict. The implications of internally dividing the coalitions on these and other issues would be monumental.
In his analysis of congressional candidate issue attitudes in 1958, Converse (1964: 32) finds that “there is some falling off of constraint between the domains of domestic and foreign policy, relative to the high level of constraint within each domain.” Converse reasons, “this result is to be expected: such lowered values signify boundaries between belief systems that are relatively independent.” Today political elites’ foreign policy attitudes correspond much more substantially to their domestic policy attitudes. A popular explanation for this – following from Converse’s reasoning – is that liberal and conservative belief systems have evolved to constrain both domestic and foreign policy issue attitudes. I have argued in this chapter that defense polarization is better explained by change in the interest composition of the coalitions. I show how this explanation not only applies to defense polarization in the post-New Deal party system but also applies to changes in defense polarization throughout American history.

This finding sheds light on when and why conflict within a policy domain is organized by a small number of dimensional considerations. Though interest groups might employ myriad considerations in reasoning about any given policy domain, interest groups active in high conflict policy domains in contemporary American politics tend to make use of a very small number of considerations in justifying their policy positions (Baumgartner et al. 2006). Based on the theory described in this paper, I conjecture that low-dimensionality obtains for an issue area when preferences on that issue area are highly correspondent with preferences on the issues central to coalitional conflict. Where such correspondence obtains for an issue area, coalitional partners can readily make themselves better off by extending their coalitions’ organizing principles to that issue. When this correspondence does not obtain for an issue area, position taking on that issue will be characterized by a high number of considerations, making it difficult to form policy coalitions and therefore precluding legislative productivity on that issue.
Although the goal of this paper has been limited to showing that change in defense polarization is explained by the evolution of new presidential cleavages, the framework applies to change on other issues. Throughout American history, the dynamics of polarization and depolarization on all important issues in American politics have followed the same pattern and the explanation developed here for defense applies just as well to issues like abortion, women’s rights, and the environment.
Appendix: Roll Calls Used for Regression Analyses

The numbers listed correspond to the roll call sequence identifier for the relevant Congress in the Voteview House roll call votes data, which was downloaded from voteview.org.

16th Congress

Defense: 21, 22, 23, 24, 42, 84, 85, 102, 103, 111, 123, 125, 134, 143, 144, 145, 146

Slavery: 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 90, 91, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 129, 131, 132, 133

Internal Improvements: 26, 27, 86

28th Congress


43rd Congress


Tariffs: 179, 402, 403, 405

51st Congress

Defense: 81, 113, 125, 126, 219, 304, 472, 473, 505, 510, 511, 514, 515

Tariff: 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 158, 160, 163, 164, 165, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 193, 387, 388, 389, 413, 414, 465, 552, 558, 570, 582

Agriculture: 29, 66, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 349, 351, 357, 360, 361, 575

86th Congress

Defense: 4, 15, 26, 27, 28, 40, 41, 42, 53, 56, 70, 86, 94, 97, 107, 124, 127, 148, 149, 161, 176, 177, 179, 180

Fiscal Policy: 73, 76, 77, 91, 95, 130, 131

Civil Rights: 87, 98, 100, 101, 102, 106, 109, 136
CONCLUSION

This dissertation presents an argument about the dynamics of American politics that is at odds with the two dominant ways political scientists have explained coalition formation in America, which have centered on either pluralism or political entrepreneurialism. Pluralism (e.g., Dahl 1956), and its more recent incarnation, neopluralism (e.g., McFarland 2004; Gray and Lowery 1996), propose that the structure of political coalitions is very fluid both over time and across issue areas. For pluralists, today’s adversaries could well be tomorrow’s allies and vice versa and there is not a dominant structure of political power. The political entrepreneurialism literature (e.g., Riker 1982, 1986; Schofield 2006) similarly views alliances as less than enduring, with political manipulations perpetually holding out the possibility for reorganization. This instability of coalitions anticipated by each perspective was certainly the intent of the framers of the constitution. Madison expected that the constitution’s design would ensure the instability of coalitions, writing in Federalist 10:

“Because majorities are likely to be unstable and transitory in a large and pluralistic society, they are likely to be politically ineffective; and herein lies the basic protection against their exploitation of minorities.” Dahl (1956) severely critiques the logic Madison offers in support of this claim. And from an empirical perspective, Poole and Rosenthal (2007) have shown not only that enduring majority (and near majority) coalitions exist but also that the same coalitions organize the representatives of societal interests across issue areas. In this dissertation, I have presented an explanation of how the dominant structure of power gets organized and tested it using the cases of the civil rights issue evolution and the organization of defense conflict into the coalitions over the course of American history.
The explanation I present in this dissertation argues for an understanding of coalitional dynamics grounded in the structural principles that political sociology has traditionally privileged. Modern political science perspectives on coalition formation have generally either neglected or dismissed the explanatory power of social structure, instead focusing on how manipulation and strategy shape political coalitions. The modern political science literature on American coalition formation foremost emphasizes how the strategic efforts of politicians shape the coalitions. Riker’s (1982, 1986), Schattchneider’s (1960), and Sartori’s (1969) work has been especially seminal to how political scientists understand coalitional dynamics. For Riker (1982: 192-93), “We can explain ... the perpetual flux of politics in terms of the perpetual mobilization and amalgamation of tastes.” And “the perpetual mobilization and amalgamation of tastes” in Riker’s view is driven by the political manipulations of politicians. Writing along similar lines in emphasizing the role of the politician, the eminent political scientists Giovani Sartori (1969: 209) argues:

The problem is not only that ‘cleavages do not translate themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course’. The problem is also that some cleavages are not translated at all. Furthermore, the importance of the notion of translation lies in the implication that translation calls for translators, thereby focusing attention on translation handling and/or mishandling. As long as we take for granted that cleavages are rejected in, not produced by, the political system itself, we necessarily neglect to ask to what extent conflicts and cleavages may either be channeled, deflected and repressed or, vice versa, activated and reinforced, precisely by the operations and operators of the political system.
I do not, to be sure, deny that the “translation [of cleavages] calls for translators.” But I do claim that the process of translation – the efforts to organize societal conflict into political conflict – is epiphenomenal; my claim is that these efforts take place amidst such rigid constraints that the basic explanatory dynamic is a structural one and not one based on manipulation. Politicians are much more constrained by structural circumstances – they are much more reactive to the coalitional forces that evolve – than is acknowledged by research in the Riker and Sartori tradition.

My claim that politicians are severely constrained has implications not only for how we understand coalition change but also for how the coalitions influence the behavior of politicians. That is, my claim is that politicians not only have less capacity to change the coalitions than is conventionally attributed to them but also that they have less capacity to lead the coalitions than is conventionally believed. The constraints coalitions place on political leaders are severe.

“What if a politician were to see his job as that of an organizer as part teacher and part advocate, one who does not sell voters short but who educates them about the real choices before them.” That’s the role of the politician Barack Obama articulated shortly before campaigning for his first political office. During Obama’s run for the presidency, Michelle Obama contended, “Barack is not a politician first and foremost. He’s a community activist exploring the viability of politics to make change.”\(^45\)

Obama’s aspiration to the role of organizer-in-chief is strikingly consistent with the role of the politician envisioned in the political manipulation genre. Perhaps the political scientists would articulate the idea in slightly more pessimistic terms but they would share Obama’s perception that a politician can lead policy and opinion through his organization and engagement of different

\(^{45}\) The quotes in this paragraph were drawn from the introduction of Kantor (2012).
groups in society. Obama aspired to be to American politics what legendary Apple CEO Steve Jobs was (at least reputedly) to the technology industry: a visionary leader who accomplished goals through sheer force of will. Jobs himself – like many other Obama supporters – shared this expectation of Obama and was inevitably disappointed, complaining to his biographer upon meeting with the president that Obama “kept explaining to us reasons why things can’t get done. It infuriates me.”

My contention is that Jobs himself – or anybody with his leadership style – would prove either a disaster or a disappointment. That’s the reality of working within constrains, the nature of American politics.

Sigmund Neumann wrote that the parties are the people’s great intermediaries (Epstein 1986: 22). I argue instead that the political coalitions are the organized interests’ great intermediaries. I have argued in this dissertation that issue conflict is organized by the interest structure of the coalitions in ways responsive to the organized interests who participate most actively in the coalitions. Because politicians need to align with coalitions and because the coalitions structure the behavior of their members to serve the active interests within them, E. E. Schattschneider was too sanguine in his expectation that politicians and the parties could manage conflict between the unorganized public and the organized interests. Parties may well play a role in effective governance, but in regard to conflicts of interest between the public welfare and organized groups, the parties’ role is to facilitate the legislative majorities that organized interest need in order to realize their political demands (often to the detriment of the public’s welfare).

The problems of the infelicitous straightjacket politicians are confined in were recently highlighted by the contrast between efforts for reelection undertaken by senators Richard Lugar (R-

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IN) and Orrin Hatch (R-UT). In preparing to run for re-election to the senate in 2012, both of these well-respected and long-serving senators faced opposition from well-organized ideological groups. Each responded differently to the challenge. Lugar maintained what he considered the principled positions that roiled the tea party groups opposing him; in particular, he continued to support the new START treaty, the DREAM act, and he expressed no contrition for his votes to confirm President Obama’s Supreme Court nominees (Sotomayor and Kagan). Hatch, in contrast, pandered to the tea party groups, adjusting his issue positions in response to the pressure brought by their challenge. As a leader of the tea party group Freedom Works observed, “The real difference [between Hatch and Lugar] is that Hatch is seeing this as the legitimate threat that this is.”

Lugar lost the 2012 nomination for his seat in a landslide, getting 39 percent of the primary vote. Hatch won the nomination for his seat in a landslide, getting 63 percent of the primary vote. The principled strategy lost big time. The pandering strategy was a success. Unfortunately for the effective functioning of our democracy, the system of American coalitions incents pandering to organized interest and the institutional conditions for successful principled political leadership are severely lacking.

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REFERENCES


