Transnational and Cosmopolitan Forms of Islam in the West

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Transnational forms of religions—in this case, Islam—are not new. As Richard Eaton and many others have written, Islam and Muslims have long constituted a “world system.” Muslims were, in interactions and aspirations, moving across linguistic and political borders long before there were modern nation-states. Even though current definitions of transnationalism rest on the existence of nation-states, modern nations actually work against transnationalism by producing tensions that challenge and weaken efforts to establish and maintain transnational connections.

In this article, I argue that transnational forms of Islam are inevitably engaged in losing struggles, particularly in North America and Europe. Although only a few years ago, such writings were rare, some scholars of Islam in Europe are beginning to write about European Islam or Euro-Islam, about Swedish or Norwegian Islam, and about Euro-Muslims, Swedish Muslims, and so on. In North America, Muslims and scholars who previously resisted the phrase American Islam are now accepting it and imbuing it with meanings beyond a simple political claim on the United States or Canada. American forms of Islam can be discerned as the forms of Islam in the West become strongly cosmopolitan rather than transnational.

In examining transnational and cosmopolitan Islamic movements in the West, much depends on the definitions employed. I am using specific definitions of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism rather than the broad definitions that were presented in works published in the 1990s on primarily economic migrants (people moving from their homelands to other societies and linking two or more societies). Steven Vertovec employs a similarly broad definition in an essay on diaspora, transnationalism, and Islam in which he defines transnationalism as “the existence of communication and interactions of many kinds linking
people and institutions across the borders of nation-states and, indeed, around the world.6 These broad definitions focus attention on communities of migrants and can easily slip into what John Bowen has categorized as “demographic movements,” one of three categories covered in his discussion of transnational Islam.7 For over a decade in Europe, scholars have linked issues of religion and migration in one location after another. In the United States, religion and migration is a newly invigorated field of study, as sociologists and others have realized that the secularization paradigm they once thought triumphant is dead.

I am using a narrow definition of transnationalism that emphasizes an ethnic or parochial form of religious belief and practice that is extended from and sustained with reference to the homeland. Transnationalism thus contrasts with cosmopolitanism, which features religious engagements and interactions that are more open to reconfigurations in new contexts.8 Using these definitions, one can look comparatively at forms of Islam in the West that have moved across national boundaries. For me, the relevant theorizing about transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, identity, and citizenship comes from Stuart Hall, Pnina Werbner, and Ulf Hannerz. Hannerz defines transnationals as those who carry with them meanings that are embedded in social networks and cosmopolitans as those “willing to engage with the Other.” Werbner, drawing on Hannerz and Jonathan Friedman, defines transnationals as people who, while moving, build encapsulated cultural worlds around themselves, most typically worlds that are circumscribed by religious or family ties. She defines cosmopolitans as people who familiarize themselves with other cultures and know how to move easily between cultures.9 These definitions seem to correspond to the distinctions made by Stefano Allievi and others between transnational ethnic and transnational nonethnic or multiethnic Muslim communities.10 Muslim migrants everywhere in the West retain some degree of communication and interaction with their homelands, so the questions come down to the kind and quality of interactions that they have with other cobelievers in the homelands and in the West.

Ideas about transnationalism and cosmopolitanism interact with ideas about identity and citizenship. In their discussions of immigrant identities, Stuart Hall and Pnina Werbner both make the point that identities may start with the past—with the way that people give an account of who they are—but that identities are equally about where people are going.11 This brings us to the West, where Muslims are going or where people are going to Islam. In Western nations, forms of Islam are rela-
tively new, and questions are being raised about the place of Islam and its followers.

In this article, I look at two Islamic movements that are commonly regarded as transnational and that are well represented in the West. These are the Ahmadiyya and the Nizari Ismaili movements, which have centralized hierarchical institutions that are intended to transmit and maintain the movements’ core beliefs and practices. Then, and more tentatively, I look at emerging forms of Islam in the West that are designed to be cosmopolitan—movements that rely on discourses that are increasingly grounded in English rather than in Arabic or other national origin languages. Although these movements have not yet developed much in the way of structures or institutions, they are beginning to produce both, and I consider them in their U.S. incarnations (they are most obvious there). These three movements are the fairly conservative efforts by first-generation Western-educated immigrant professionals to build Muslim national coalitions in the United States, the progressive or liberal efforts by generally younger and often academic professionals to emphasize Islam’s potential for social and gender justice, and the assertive and international efforts by young American Muslims to formulate strongly Islamic modern identities. Finally, I look briefly and comparatively at Muslims in the European and North American state contexts to emphasize the continuing importance of the nation-state in shaping transnational and cosmopolitan forms of Islam in the West, an importance that has been both implicit and explicit in the preceding discussion as well.

Two Transnational Islamic Movements in the West

Turning to two Islamic movements that are commonly regarded as transnational, the Ahmadiyya and the Nizari Ismaili movements, let us see how well they fit the definition of transnationalism provided above and how well they transmit and maintain the movements’ core beliefs and practices across national boundaries. The Ahmadiyya, a late nineteenth-century Islamic movement in British India, is among the usual suspects for transnationalism because of its conspicuous international hierarchical structure and proselytizing mission. The Ahmadiyya, or the Ahmadis, almost immediately directed attention outward, to the West. The Ahmadi missionary activities overseas were conducted primarily in English and were formative for Islam in Nigeria, Trinidad, and the
United States. The Ahmadis were pioneers in Europe as well. Always a controversial movement because of allegations that the founder was considered a prophet (and in orthodox Islam, there can be none after Muhammad), the Ahmadis are denied Islamic status today by newer Muslim immigrants in many Western countries, such as the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland.

The Ahmadis pioneered in sending missionaries to the West and had various effects in different places. Transnational intentions led to cosmopolitan results in the United States and Trinidad in the early twentieth century. Ahmadi missionaries were crucially important to America’s Black Muslim movements in the early twentieth century. They gave English translations of the Qur’an to key leaders in 1920, informing them of core teachings like the five pillars of Islam and publishing the first English-language Muslim newspaper in the United States in 1921. Ahmadi missionaries started the long process of drawing African American Muslim movements closer to mainstream Sunni or old world Islamic traditions, which helped produce the single largest category of Muslims in America today (African Americans are an estimated 30 to 42 percent of American Muslims).

In the United States, the Ahmadi story was complicated when Pakistan’s Supreme Court declared the Ahmadis to be non-Muslims in 1974. The movement’s headquarters and leader were in Pakistan, so Ahmadis responded by moving abroad, many to the United States. Although the partnership between African American and South Asian Ahmadis experienced strains from the start, African American converts were largely unaffected by overseas opinions of the Ahmadis until the late twentieth century. Well-educated in English, large numbers of professional Pakistani Ahmadi immigrants arrived in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, where their interactions with the long-standing African American Ahmadis were complicated by class, cultural, and racial differences. African American Ahmadi mosques were in inner-city locations, but the immigrant Ahmadis usually lived in the suburbs and wanted their mosques there. Ahmadi women played major roles within the missions. However, compared to the often unmarried African American women in the established American Ahmadi mosques, the immigrant women seemed culturally conservative and constrained by traditional family roles. African American men and immigrant men did not work together easily, and African American men lost prominence in the movement.

In Trinidad and Tobago, Ahmadi efforts led to a very different
configuration. A dynamic Ahmadi missionary, Maulana Durrani, arrived there in 1921 and immediately provoked lasting conflicts with Sunnis from South Asia who were already established there. Durrani left in 1923 but recruited a young Trinidadian, Ameer Ali, who trained at an Ahmadi institute in Lahore and returned to be the first formally qualified local *maulvi* in Trinidad. This vital movement renamed itself the Trinidad Muslim League (TML) in 1947 at the birth of Pakistan and also marked its link to Pakistan by naming its main mosque the Jinnah Memorial Mosque. However, in 1976, two years after Pakistan’s declaration that the Ahmadi movement was un-Islamic, the TML abandoned its earlier affiliation. It now calls itself *ghair mukallid* (nonconformist). In Trinidad, (unlike in the United States), the group’s strong link with Pakistan was its primary identity but has been downplayed in recent decades. A Trinidadian Muslim scholar categorized it as one of the modernist Muslim movements there, where its practitioners consist of middle-class Muslims whose men typically do not have beards and whose women do not wear the *hijab* (in the United States, Ahmadi women typically do wear a long coat and *hijab*).¹⁷

The Ahmadi movement has been displaced from its homeland, and its Islamic status continues to be challenged, most dramatically again by Pakistan in its “follow-up” 1993 decision against the Ahmadis. This decision actually assigned intellectual property rights or trademarks to “authentic” Islam, explicitly likening it to Coca-Cola and forbidding non-Muslims to use the profession of faith or the word *mosque*. Pakistani Muslims now have to sign a declaration on their passports of adherence to the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad.¹⁸ Following Pakistan’s example, Bangladeshi Sunni leaders are now leading a campaign in that country against the Ahmadis.

The Ahmadis represent a relatively young proselytizing international movement with a leadership that is trying to hold together a membership that is clearly shaped and constrained by national contexts. The membership has also been increasingly shaped by antagonism from other Muslims. The Ahmadis’ headquarters is now in London, where the Khalifa (Hazrat Mirza Masroor Ahmad) lives. Each country has an *amir* or president, and there are local presidents under each national *amir*. Activities are organized and supervised by committees, with cohorts structured by age and gender. This transnational umbrella structure lends apparent unity to the community, yet national and local variations characterize the on-the-ground communities. These communities engage people from new and different nations of origin and ethnic
groups and develop new kinds of communities of meaning, paying attention to race and gender issues in local contexts. Yet today, after being attacked by other Muslims and losing control of some of the original converts abroad, the Ahmadis might be retreating to a narrowly transnational base, albeit from the new homeland in the United Kingdom, using modern technology to maintain the core South Asian community.

The Nizari Ismaili Shi’i movement, which is led by the Aga Khan, also has a strong international hierarchical structure, but it reflects an intentional and explicit cosmopolitanism. Among the Shi’i, imams (spiritual authorities) have always had great veneration from and power over their followers, and the Nizari Ismailis, alone among the Shi’i, recognize a living imam. This Shi’i community originated centuries ago in Iran but was decisively shaped by British India, where its leader moved in the 1840s for political reasons. He already had followers there, as the Hindu Khojah caste of traders and merchants in western India had converted to this form of Islam in medieval times. The then-Aga Khan derived greater authority over his growing community and greater Islamic legitimacy from decisions made by the British colonial judicial system in both India and East Africa. Community beliefs and practices were heavily influenced by the forms of Hinduism and Sufism that were prevalent in western India. Thus, these followers of Ali, fourth Caliph, son-in-law of the Prophet, and first Shi’i imam, declared Ali to be the tenth avatar or incarnation of Vishnu, a major Hindu divinity. The followers of the Aga Khan also engaged with the Nimatullah Sufis, with whom they shared many beliefs and, at times, leaders, in the nineteenth century. In the twenty-first century, the Nizari Ismailis still tend to marry endogamously and observe certain Hindu customs and laws.

Having a living imam whose word was authoritative enabled these Isma‘ilis to undertake flexible adaptations to changing conditions. Reforms undertaken by the present Aga Khan’s grandfather and continued under the present Aga Khan have produced a strikingly modern, highly educated community. Aga Khan III (1885–1957) urged followers to adapt to their host countries and to secure modern educations in English or French. He encouraged women to wear Western dress and become highly educated and active in community institutions, issuing a firman (order) in 1899 that “In our Isma‘ili faith women and men are exactly equal.”

The present Aga Khan, Prince Karim Shah, Aga Khan IV, succeeded his grandfather in 1957. He presides over a community whose link language is now English, but his followers speak Arabic in the
Middle East, Persian or Tajik in northeast and Central Asia, and Gujarati, Sindhi, and Punjabi in India and East Africa. Prince Karim Shah received a degree in Islamic history at Harvard, and from his home in France he directs a worldwide community represented in at least twenty-five countries. The homeland has always been where the Aga Khan lives, and the current leader is guiding his followers closer to mainstream Islam. Changes made by Aga Khan III in the 1950s and strengthened by Aga Khan IV mean that prayers are now in Arabic and that selections from the Qur’an are included in worship. In the jamatkhanas (meeting places, their term for mosques), the symbolic throne of the imam has been removed, and only two pictures of the imam are allowed, changes made by Aga Khan IV in the 1980s. The Institute for Ismaili Studies in London promotes a standardized and increasingly Islamic course of study for Ismaili students. The community overall is highly educated, highly endogamous, and highly efficient in its international outreach efforts. Such efforts are directed primarily to community members—for example, in Pakistan’s northern territories and more recently in Afghanistan and Central Asia, where followers came forward as the Soviet Union fell. Thus, the community is strikingly cosmopolitan in origins and languages, but it no longer proselytizes.

The Nizari Ismailis have been responsive to the nation-states in which members live, and although those legal systems have determined major aspects of Nizari Ismaili life, the community has remained intact. In India and East Africa, the judicial systems granted legal sanction to the imams as legislators within the Ismaili community, and the sweeping reforms of the Aga Khans proceeded rapidly. In Pakistan, the Islamic law of the land applies to all Muslim citizens, and Nizari Ismaili reforms there are not as far-reaching as elsewhere. Also in Pakistan, the Nizari Ismailis have compromised with Sunni Islam, following Hanafi Sunni laws and marriage and burial practices in the Punjab and North-west Frontier areas where their numbers are small. The Ismailis in Pakistan, while nontraditional in their beliefs in ways that are similar to the Ahmadis, have not been declared non-Muslims, probably because of their wealth and the Aga Khan IV’s outstanding contributions to the nation—a private medical school and numerous health centers and schools. Like the Ahmadis in some ways but unlike them in others, the Nizari Ismailis have seemed unthreatening to states and to other Muslims.

Aly Kassam-Remtulla has analyzed the Nizari Ismailis as a kind of
deterritorialized political-religious entity with a constitution, a titled leader (or *imam*) with his own flag and throne, and a common secular language (English). The Aga Khan encouraged Ismailis to become citizens of the nations in which they reside. In 1986, the Aga Khan introduced one constitution to govern all of his followers (there had previously been different constitutions for different national followings), replacing regionalism with a vision of a pan-Ismaili global community. Well-educated professionals staff the Supreme Council in Nairobi and an international secretariat at Aiglemont in France, with subordinate national and regional councils. Women have their own organizations but are well represented in the broader structures. Many women participate in Nizari Ismaili governing institutions, and there is a rumor that the Aga Khan’s daughter will be appointed as head of the Nizari Ismailis after him.

However, the Nizari Ismailis’ cosmopolitanism reflects the historical development of the community, not recent proselytization. Their *jamatkhanas* (mosques) are closed to nonmembers, and converts are rare. The same uniqueness that allowed the Nizari Ismailis to adapt many aspects of Western culture—the reliance on their leader’s spiritual authority—kept them apart from other Muslims. According to conventional wisdom, even in diaspora settings they identify most closely with each other rather than with other Muslims, but this may be changing as the Nizari Ismailis move closer to mainstream beliefs and practices. Increasingly exposed to the critical gaze of other Muslims, they are being attacked in Pakistan today by conservative Sunni leaders.

**Emerging Cosmopolitan Islamic Movements in the West**

Having established that movements that usually are understood as transnational have often been, in effect, cosmopolitan or have moved in that direction in some places and at some times, I turn to emerging forms of Islam in the West that are designed to be cosmopolitan. These movements are beginning to develop structures or institutions that tend to be decentralized, developing from the ground up. John Bowen has distinguished between debates or dialogues (ongoing discussions across borders that are relatively ungrounded in institutions) and institutions and structures that reach across national borders. Like him, I am interested in debates or dialogues. Unlike him, I see these evolving discourses as being increasingly grounded in the English, not Arabic, language on the
global stage, and I see them as producing structures and institutions, however tentatively.

These newer forms of Islam in the West are different in Europe and North America because of varying patterns of immigration and settlement and of interaction with national populations and state policies. John Bowen analyzes a transnational Islamic space of reference and debate across Europe and beyond in which figures of learning and authority from the Arabic-speaking world (both immigrants and travelers) dominate and conduct discourses primarily in Arabic. But in North America, the emerging discourses and forms of Islam are led by figures of authority who conduct discourses primarily in English, and these men and women see themselves as reaching out to both Europe and the Islamic world. These figures or leaders of emerging forms of Islam in the West are most often (but not always, especially in North America) immigrants who are marked by their new national contexts and also by their age, education, and gender. These emerging forms of Islamic thought exhibit cosmopolitan characteristics and are developing organizational and institutional structures that cross national boundaries. The situation is fluid, and lines are sometimes hard to draw, but competition among these movements and competition with figures of authority based in the old-world Islamic heartland (particularly Saudi Arabia) is often vigorous. This outline of emerging movements is tentative, is based on developments in North America rather than Europe, and puts forward generalizations in an attempt to stimulate further comparative research.

The first of these emerging forms of Islam in North America is distinguished by its social base (first-generation immigrant Muslim men who are trained in the sciences and professions) and by its generally conservative or puritanical content. Heavily influenced by South Asian Deobandi, Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Saudi Arabian Salafi or Wahhabi beliefs and practices, these conservative beliefs and practices were institutionalized in many mosques and Islamic schools in the United States and Canada. These mosques and Islamic schools were usually led by boards of directors but sometimes by influential imams, the latter usually not men of science or professional training but traditionally trained scholars from abroad who were employed by boards of directors or their equivalents. Many scholars refer in passing to the transnational impact of conservative Islamic movements, but few have traced the networks or movements in any detail. At regional and national levels, spokesmen from these Muslim mosques and schools be-
came prominent in North American Muslim coalition building through organizations like the Islamic Society of North America, the American Muslim Alliance, the American Muslim Council, and the Muslim Public Affairs Council. The latter three aim at participation in mainstream U.S. politics, but the former’s aim is to transmit to and consolidate in North America an Islam that is conservative in orientation. There is considerable overlap among the memberships and even leaders of these major organizations. Perhaps Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel, who think that transnational Islamist or political Islam is on the wane,37 are right, but other writers see these movements as powerful in the West and tending toward what Khaled Abou El Fadl (a professor of Islamic law and jurisprudence at the University of California at Los Angeles) has termed Salafabism.”  

In many Western countries, these new religious spokesmen often compete with each other in national and international contexts as they mobilize on the basis of religion for participation in mainstream politics. The medium of debate and discussion in North America is English, partly because immigrants from South Africa are significant participants and leaders in American Muslim politics and their Western educations proceeded in English and partly because the children of these immigrants are losing competency in South Asia’s vernacular languages. As an immigrant engineer from Hyderabad, India, told me, Islam could certainly be transmitted in English in the United States. Arabic and Urdu both had to go because religious education was the first priority, and the language that their children knew was English.39 Rather than consult or invoke traditional sources of religious authority in the homelands or the West, these professional Western-educated men feel competent to read and interpret the Qur’an and hadith themselves. Such spokesmen have emerged among both Sunni and Shi‘i Muslims in North America,40 where selective immigration policies have produced a middle- and upper-middle-class profile for post-1965 immigrants. Those who are building American Muslim political organizations and coalitions tend to be Sunni and draw the boundaries of Islam narrowly. They do not always or even usually include Shi‘i, and they rule out Ahmadis and Louis Farrakhan’s Nation of Islam, although they are trying to work with other powerful African American Muslim organizations.  

Such new spokespeople in America are fueled by prosperity, mobility, and access to political power, but they can be found in Europe, too. Rachel Bloul found them in France, as she differentiated between old
and new Muslim immigrants there. The newer immigrant men belong to Islamic associations, and their participation in French public space did not occur at the expense of their Islamic identities. They made their religious distinctiveness a central component of their identity, mobilizing Islam and following the logic of a minority politics of cultural difference. She identified these men as chiefly students or semiprofessionals who had Westernized formal educations and who saw themselves as members of an educated transnational Muslim elite. They also marked their collective difference through their control and use of women and through their women’s distinctive appearance in public. Her analysis is similar to Abou El Fadl’s of this class in North America and its stance on gender issues.

A second form of cosmopolitan Islam in the West is best represented by fiqh specialists and scholars of Islam in North America (like Abou El Fadl) who are speaking and writing in English. This contrasts with similar figures of authority in Europe who speak and write in Arabic. The languages that are used and the demographic configurations of co-believers (whether indigenous or other immigrants) matter. Muhammad Qasim Zaman, writing about the discursive language of ulama and the limits of Islamic cosmopolitanism, points to the dilemma of modern ulama who are trying to write for both specialized scholarly audiences and ordinary believers and are now forced to compete with new spokespeople (like those in North America described above). Although these scholars who are based in North America with training in Islamic law and civilization espouse a range of interpretations of their religion, a cluster of them could be called progressive or liberal, sometimes even feminist in their orientation. The range of spokespeople here is much broader than among the Western-educated professionals, including, in America, Nizari Ismailis and other Shi’i and Euro-American and African American Muslims (including some Sufis) like Siraj Wahaj, Warith Deen Muhammad, Amina Wadud, and Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons. Progressive Muslims, a major work that was edited by Omid Safi in 2003, exemplifies this strand and its American but cosmopolitan base. The book’s fifteen contributors were almost all teaching in the United States, but many were immigrants from many countries and with academic degrees from all over the world. Four were American converts, and two were African American women. These scholars of Islam in the United States were closely linked to colleagues in Malaysia, Canada, Lebanon, South Africa, and Germany. A Progressive Muslim Union, founded in 2004, and a website, Muslimwakeup.com, are mov-
ing to institutionalize these views, albeit with struggles and divisions among participants.

A major component of this second emerging form of Islam in the West is the so-called *gender jihad*, which is mobilizing indigenous and immigrant Muslim women scholars in North America. Amina Wadud, an African American Muslim and an Islamic studies professor, was an early leader here. In her 1999 book, *Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective*, she called for a radical and continual rethinking of the Qur’an and hadith and a rethinking by women as well as men. Another African American Muslim, Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons, has written about separating religion from culture and advocates reintegrating some interpretations of earlier sects or groups in Islam that once were dismissed as heterodox. Another American convert, Kecia Ali, a Euro-American scholar of Islamic law, calls for radical rethinking of Islamic law in today’s world.

These new forms of cosmopolitan Islam in the West reach across countries in terms of discourse and sometimes institutions (the strongest networks and institutional linkages seem to be through the gender *ji-*had), but they vary depending on national context. What is thought to be religion in one place can be understood as culture in another, and national policies regarding secularism can vary considerably. In North America, Muslim communities have confronted internal disputes (like the one that developed in 2004 when women led mixed-sex prayers in mosques), while in France the state’s new policy against girls and women wearing the *hijab* in schools adds the state as a major participant in the debate. One difference between the forms of Islam emerging in Europe and North America concerns the relative lack of participation of Muslim women in European debates and discussions. The possible reasons for this include differences of language, audience, class, or education in the European and North American Muslim spheres of activity.

Conservatives and progressives are engaged in struggles over the sources of authority for Islam in the West. *Shari’a* (Islamic law) and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) have historically played central roles in defining Muslims and Islamic communities, and the conservatives and progressives both assert the right to issue legal pronouncements. Abou El Fadl and others contend that the Wahhabi puritanical strand of Islam (which is strongly associated with Saudi Arabia today and promoted abroad) erases reliance on the classical schools of Islamic law, especially in the West, where legal scholars like themselves are poorly represented. The new Western-educated spokesmen (who far outnumber
scholars of Islamic law abroad) have been speaking out, authoritatively and publicly, on issues ranging from citizenship and voting to marriage and family law. Although these new spokesmen and new kinds of media (print, radio, TV, video cassettes, and the Internet) have reinvigorated Islamic discourse and developed a wider role and mainstream audience for Islam in the West, they have also standardized and simplified the discourse and weakened the commitment to legal pluralism. The goal of the conservative spokesmen is political mobilization and Muslim engagement with mainstream American politics at local, national, and international levels. The goal of progressive or liberal scholars and activists is to engage Muslims in struggles for social and gender justice in the contemporary world.

The very different emphases in these two evolving cosmopolitan movements within American Islam are clear. Zaman’s comments on the efforts of the ulama (trained Islamic scholars) to express contemporary issues and concerns in a discursive language that can compete with new spokespeople using popular language, new media, and mass educational outlets are relevant here. Making a similar point, Carl Ernst tells of an unsettling encounter with an Iranian American student in California. The student told him that the prominent Shi’i theologian Ayatollah Khu’i in Iraq was “only a religious mullah because he does not really talk about Islam.” Ernst writes, “What was astonishing about this remark was the way it dismissed a major religious scholar on the grounds that he was not an ideological activist; the fact that his work concentrated on traditional ethics, ritual, and interpretation of authoritative texts made him irrelevant to the transnational political concerns of the student. . . . the term Islam had shifted into an almost entirely political register.”

My third example of a cosmopolitan form of Islam that is developing in the West has a younger social base. Young Muslims who are growing up in the West are developing cosmopolitan forms of Islam and Muslim identities that are different from those of their immigrant parents and that aim at global viability. Young Ahmadi and Nizari Ismaili Muslims join with more mainstream immigrant Sunnis and Shi’i and indigenous Muslims in varying and again largely localized permutations of Muslim identities. Because of the growing use of sophisticated modern technology and English as the international language for writing and teaching about Islam, many scholars see the strongest potential here for new forms of Islam moving across national boundaries. An unknown number of young Muslims from Western countries are studying or trav-
eling abroad and establishing networks. One notes the growing popularity of study-abroad Islamic tours and camps in North America, for example, and young African American Muslims are among the participants. Two American Muslims who are popular with young people in North America studied abroad in their youth: Siraj Wahaj is an African American Sunni imam in New York, and Shaykh Hamza Yusuf is a Euro-American specialist in Islamic law with Sufi leanings who runs an institute in San Francisco. These two men have large and youthful followings today, even outside the United States. They were already immensely popular speakers, in person and on cassettes and videos, when they both took stances after 9/11 that may have enhanced their popularity and gained them new audiences.55 Other cosmopolitan Muslim youth-based movements stem from expressive culture—for example the transglobal developments of Sufi devotional music and Islamic hip-hop.56

The extent to which these developing new and cosmopolitan forms of Muslim identity engage North American and European Muslim youth with each other is as yet unknown. Garbi Schmidt, Peter Mandaville, and others have commented on the major role that is played by young American Muslims in knowledge production and on the dominance of English-language materials on the Internet.57 Stefan Allievi writes about the neocommunities of Europe, discussing the media and a discourse that is no longer rooted in specific localities; however, he does not thoroughly examine the content of this Islamic neocommunity discourse.58

Literature on Muslim youth in each country suggests that these movements or neocommunities may be at least parallel, if not transnationally linked to youth movements in the West. In her discussion of young Muslims’ activities and organizations in France, Joselyne Cesari looks at new forms of Islam and also activities that are sometimes linked to transnational movements like the Muslim Brotherhood or Tunisian or Algerian Islamist movements. She sees the young as assertive consumers who choose which rules and tenets to believe or discard and who aim for voluntary local-level social activism.59 In the United States, Nadine Naber writes similarly of Arab Muslim youth in San Francisco who choose religion over culture by putting “Islam First” in an identity politics that is strongly shaped by second-generation assertiveness and also by the American political context. Other scholars—including Syed Ali, Lubna Chaudhry, Denise Al-Johar, and Jamillah Karim—discuss identity politics among young South Asian and African American Mus-
Most astonishing, perhaps, is a punk Muslim novel that offers a wide array of young American Muslim identities that are inflected by both local and global forces.

The kind of identity that some young Muslims are postulating in America and elsewhere has been described by Garbi Schmidt as "ummatic." Similarly, Valerie Amiraux, examining the reactions of Muslim immigrants in Germany to the idea of the European Union and possible European citizenship, suggested that European citizenship could make the Islamic aspect of community identity more important than ethnic or national identity. She found that immigrants were more interested in gaining European citizenship than German nationality and that Muslims wanted a place in public space in Europe regardless of their nationality. Olivier Roy discusses the deterritorialization of Islam and links it to Muslim student organizations in similar terms.

Finally, I want to emphasize the continuing effect of nation-states on individual and community identities. These forces work against idealistic youthful concepts of an evolving and global Islamic identity. Looking at Muslims or forms of Islam whose "public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state," I would argue that the Western nation-states to which Muslim immigrants are going immediately impose constraints and offer opportunities that act on the new arrivals and the converts to change the forms in which Islam arrived. Carl Ernst states succinctly, "In practice, religion is defined by the state, throughout the world." For the United States, he mentions the Internal Revenue Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the courts. The United States has a tax code that exempts religious groups that qualify for exemption from taxation, it offers visas for immigrant religious teachers, and it interprets religious rights in relation to the U.S. Constitution. In other Western countries, the situation is similar, but the details are different. If and when Muslim immigrants apply for citizenship in Western countries, they confront these different details and are influenced by them.

Given the importance of the parameters set by nation-states, I would not connect transnationalism to postnationality. For Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, transnationalism is a development in the long-term process of global capitalist penetration, and they discuss deterritorialized nation-states and global cultural constructions as aspects of transnationalism, and Arjun Appadurai postulates that transmigrants would be loyal to a nonterritorial transnation first. Others have envisioned the umma, the hoped-for international or univer-
sal Islamic community, as a deterritorialized or nonterritorial transnation. Rachel Bloul analyzes this possibility, talking about new Muslim migrants in France who are educated men who viewed themselves as members of a transnational elite group. They simultaneously proselytize for Islam as an alternative universalism while ethnicizing it as “a Maghrebi attribute in France.” This localized strategy is an “ironic by-product of the deterritorialization resulting from global cultural flows”—in this case, the transnational migration of North African Muslims and their interactions with their French hosts. Bloul sees a similar paradox between the globalization of the Islamic ecumene and the ethnicization of Islamic communities in other contexts and notes that this also led to the ethnicization of the host population identity and perceptions of threat from newcomers to the nation.

Predominantly national understandings and practices that regulate citizenship and political participation, religious institutions and associations, and religious rituals in private and public spaces for Muslims in Western nations play major roles in shaping both transnational and cosmopolitan Islamic movements. For example, among the characteristics that are attributed to religion in the United States is “congregationalism,” which often is assumed to mean worshipping as a congregation in some religious setting. American social scientists write about religious institutions and practices becoming “congregational” and religious specialists taking on a “pastoral role” that spans a wide, not narrowly religious, range of functions. In the United States, congregationalism actually requires a formal decision-making structure, a defined membership, a hired clergyman, and regularly scheduled activities. It generally involves legal incorporation to qualify as a tax-exempt religious organization and build up a dues-paying membership. All this means new concepts of membership and of dues paying for many immigrants, particularly those from countries where one can worship at any mosque and mosques are state-supported.

The national policies in Europe and North America on recognizing and funding religious groups and institutions differ and have changed over time. Can groups register as religious associations, or do they have to register as working-men’s clubs or other kinds of associations? When registering as religious groups, what has to be done, and what resources come as a result? For example, in Norway, state funds are dispensed to religious communities, and a certain amount per member is paid directly to a mosque or congregation. In Sweden, similar funding goes to umbrella organizations that redistribute the money. In the United States,
religious communities do not receive government money. As a result of these policies, in Norway, some 70 percent of Muslims are members of mosques; in Sweden, the percentage is lower; and in the United States, an early, perhaps outdated, estimate put only 10 to 20 percent of Muslims as “mosqued.”

It is not just national policies that differ with respect to such things. The most extreme case is undoubtedly that of Switzerland, where twenty-six cantons offer different legal contexts, so that comparative studies must be done of forms of Islam in each of these local settings. In the Geneva canton (where Tariq Ramadan, a major writer on an evolving European Islam, lives), Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabian Wahhabi forms of Islam are interacting. Although the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabi efforts emphasize transnationalism, Ramadan and others are striving for a cosmopolitan European Islam. In another Swiss canton, Neuchatel, groups of Muslim Turks, Bosnians, Maghrebis, Indians, and Pakistanis, coexist, and some of them attempting to unite and qualify for local funding as a single “organization of public interest.” Here (according to Hans Mahnig’s account), transnational elements are lacking, and the focus is on local empowerment, an evolving if very local cosmopolitanism.

Conclusion

In conclusion, even movements that usually are understood as transnational often become cosmopolitan when they move to Western nations, and newer forms of Islam in the West are emerging that are cosmopolitan from the outset. Muslim migrants and forms of Islam that are moving abroad are pulled both ways by homeland societies and politics and by those in the new nations of settlement. Muslim movements and migrants bring with them peculiarities that are associated with the forms of Islam in their nations of origin, but nation-states play a powerful role in shaping the identities of Muslims and Muslim communities in the West. The characteristics of other Muslims already at a site (times of arrival, national origins, languages, and class status) and the characteristics of settled or arriving non-Muslims combine to produce cosmopolitanism and shape community and coalitional politics. Debates and discourses proceed in Arabic, English, and less universal languages at many levels and with different degrees of institutionalization.

When Muslim individuals and communities enter into coalitions,
they become both more and less than themselves. Even coalitions among Muslims (for example, among African Americans, Arabs, and South Asians in the United States) change the participants. Interfaith efforts involve even more mutual accommodation and cosmopolitanism. There are also converts and generational changes. For the second and later generations of Muslim immigrants to the West, the forms of Islam that parents attempt to transmit may easily lose relevance, even for those from the so-called transnational Ahmadi and Nizari Ismaili communities. The sociopolitical experiences that shape religion and its transmission for young Muslims in the West decisively position them in the histories, cultures, and languages of the nation-states in which they are born or socialized. They are engaged in the construction of new identities and coalitions in these Western countries. Between the first and later generations of Muslim immigrants, coalitions inevitably change as they attempt to achieve religious and political goals, and these changes weaken the transnational nature of even the most tightly organized or spiritually compelling forms of Islam as they move across national borders. As younger immigrant and indigenous Muslim leaders emerge in the West, creative new versions of Islam are appearing in the global arena. They are strongly marked by the new homelands but are spreading beyond them through new mediums and languages of communication. Young Muslims in Western countries are reaching across national frontiers with the aid of technology and a shared knowledge of English to work toward new cosmopolitan and more inclusive forms of Islam.

Notes


2. Essays tracing Muslim networks across time and space are featured in Miriam Cooke and Bruce B. Lawrence, eds., Muslim Networks from Hajj to Hip Hop (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). See especially the introduction by the coeditors (p. 2) and David Gilmartin, “A Networked Civilization?” (p. 66). Gilmartin points to the historical contextualization of moral and political forces and to situated interactions among state, society, and religious communities.

3. I interpret Muslim transnational protests against The Satanic Verses (and now
Salman Rushdie’s knighthood), the Danish cartoons, and the remarks of Pope Benedict in 2006 as signs of Muslim powerlessness in their new Western sites.


5. Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton, eds., *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered* (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1992). The authors write easily about the development of social fields that link countries of origin and settlement. These connections are generally viewed positively as “maintained, reinforced, and . . . vital and growing” and as enabling the creation of “fluid and multiple identities grounded both in their society of origin and in the host societies” (p. 11).


8. Bowen, too, rejects postnationality (his third sense of transnationalism) in his analysis of debates and discussions among Muslims about the nature and role of Islam in the West. Although he concludes that this public space is an “alternative cosmopolitanism,” he does not (as I do) relate this to transnational institutions. Bowen, “Beyond Migration,” 891, 881–82.


13. Whether or not the Ahmadis consider their founder to be a prophet is contested. Ahmadis themselves are not necessarily in agreement on the issue. See Yohanan Friedmann, *Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). They were declared non-Muslims in 1974 in Pakistan after the third of three court cases; the two earlier decisions, however, which were based on the same body of textual material as the third, had not found them unorthodox. The third decision was reached under extreme political pressure. Tayyab Mahmud, “Freedom of Religion and Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A Study of Judicial Practice,” *Fordham International Law Journal* 19, no. 1 (1995): 40–100.


19. Many have written about the Ahmadi efforts with African Americans. Huma Ahmed Ghosh writes about Ahmadi responses to American feminist and gender politics.


24. For all of these changes and followers’ reactions to them, see Aly Kassam-Remtulla, “(Dis)placing Khojahs: Forging Identities, Revitalizing Islam, and Crafting Global Isma’ilism,” honors thesis, Stanford University, 1999, available at ismaili.net/Source/1121b/main.html.

25. The Aga Khan University in Karachi, Pakistan, the Aga Khan Foundation in Geneva, Switzerland, the Institute for Isma’ili Studies in London, and other Nizari Isma’ili institutions employ highly competent, multinational staffs.

27. Kassam-Remtulla, “(Dis)placing Khojahs,” 86.
28. Williams, *Religions of Immigrants*, 211–21
31. It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss contemporary, primarily Sunni, movements and networks that are beginning to receive scholarly attention. See Cooke and Lawrence, *Muslim Networks from Hajj to Hip Hop*, for discussions of Salafi networks (by Quintan Wiktorowicz), Sufi networks (by Carl Ernst), and Internet networks (by Gary Bunt and Jon Anderson).
32. Bowen mentions underlying structures (including the European Council for Fatwa and Research, the Union of Islamic Organizations of France, and others), but he emphasizes the Arabic medium of the debates as well as their content. Bowen, “Beyond Migration.”
33. Michael Mann reminds us that both the Chicago Fundamentalisms project and Abdurrahman Wahid (an Islamic intellectual and the former president of Indonesia) agree that fundamentalists in all religions share backgrounds in applied science, technical fields, and management and that there is a connection between training in the sciences and engineering and a literalistic interpretation of Islam. Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire* (New York: Verso, 2003), 172.
34. Religious authority often comes from outside, either by consultation with *fiqh* experts in the homeland or via imported *imams* of various competencies. Many articles mention the need to train *imams* in the country of immigration so that scholars can speak the new language and understand the new context well enough to negotiate with fellow citizens in the new homeland and with members of the second and later generations of immigrant Muslims.
35. The ordinary Shi‘i ulama in the United States, says Liyakat Takim, were largely imported and seldom fluent in English. Liyakat Takim, “Multiple Identities in a Pluralistic World: Shi‘ism in America,” in *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens*, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 223. A seminary that was set up in the United States in 1980 continued to train ulama as though they were in Iran or Iraq. Others make the same complaint about Sunni *imams* from abroad.
40. For example, the well-educated and younger followers of the Ithna Ashari Fadlallah in the United States are engineers and scientists who want rational, scientific explanations and thought in accessible language from their religious leaders and are not reluctant to challenge even a *marja‘ taqlid* with their own readings of the Qur’an. Linda S. Walbridge, “A Look at Differing Ideologies among Shi‘a Muslims in the United


45. Shi‘i scholars in the United States such as Mahmud Ayoub, Abdulaziz Sachedina, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr speak about interpretations of Shi‘i Islam that are relevant to life in the West. These would include new ways of considering women’s rights, relations between the ritually pure and the impure (non-Muslims), and pluralism. Takim, “Multiple Identities in a Pluralistic World,” 223.

46. Safi, *Progressive Muslims*.


48. Amina Wadud, *Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), was first published in Malaysia in 1992, where Wadud was active, and then translated and published in Indonesian (1994) and Turkish (1997) as the global reach of the gender jihad expanded. Wadud taught in Kuala Lumpur’s International Islamic University for three years and participated in Malaysia’s influential Sisters in Islam group. Her recent book is *Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006).


51. The lessened influence of learned clerical bodies has been noted also by Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 34.


54. Ernst, *Following Muhammad*, 204.


56. Karen Leonard, “American Muslims before and after September 11, 2001,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 37, no. 24 (2002): 293–302. A new African-American Muslim coalition, the Muslim Alliance of North America (MANA) (with Siraj Wahaj as leader), turned away from the national immigrant-led organizations in 2001 and 2002 because of the failure of the latter to reflect the concerns of indigenous Muslims. MANA also faulted the organizations for their focus on overseas agendas, and their efforts to be-
come part of the dominant or white mainstream culture. MANA, whose leaders want to maintain a critical stance toward American society, defines *indigenous* as “anyone who is native to America, including second-generation immigrants.” See Karen Leonard, “Finding Places in the Nation: Immigrant and Indigenous Muslims in America,” in *Religion and Social Justice for Immigrants*, ed. Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo (University of Rutgers Press, 2006), 50–58.


59. Allievi, “Islam in the Public Space.”


62. Schmidt, “Muslim Social Activism.”


68. Olivier Roy’s postulated deterritorialization of Islam (like the more generalized deterritorializations remarked upon by Appadurai and others above), without local ethnographies such as Bloul’s (below), remains in the realm of theory. He mentions the difficulty of establishing a real social basis for this postulated Muslim community (Roy, *Globalized Islam*, p. 197), and implies that it takes different, locally contextualized forms. I find the idea most useful when discussing the young Muslims who are establishing international linkages and their efforts to imagine a culture-free Islam (see my note 63).


70. This has clearly been happening in the United States since September 11, 2001. Grants and scholarships are being made available for the study of Islam, Muslims, conservative Christian reactions, and security concerns.

71. Helen Rose Ebaugh and Janet Saltzman Chafetz, *Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations* (Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira, 2000); R. Stephen Warner and Judith G. Wittner, eds., *Gatherings in Dias-
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73. Olivier Roy points out that national cultural and legal traditions strongly influence the ways in which Muslims organize themselves in different Western countries and that Muslims may be influenced more by habits and customs than by laws. Roy, Globalized Islam, 204–07.


75. Earlier Islamic movements also became cosmopolitan and effected cosmopolitanism in their new contexts. See especially the many examples in Richard Eaton, ed., India’s Islamic Traditions, 711–1750 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003); Dominique-Sila Khan, Crossing the Threshold: Understanding Religious Identities in South Asia (London: Tauris, 2004), on the Nizari Ismail movement from Iran to India and community interactions there in several time periods and regional settings. See also Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), on the many local cosmopolitan communities established by Hadramis from Yemen in the Indian Ocean world.

76. Converts to Islam in the West seem important in America, some Scandinavian countries, and perhaps Germany. Women converts in Norway and Sweden seem to be forces for integration and cosmopolitanism. Vogt, “Integration through Islam?,” 95; Anne Sofie Roald, “From ‘People’s Home’ to ‘Multiculturalism’: Muslims in Sweden,” in Muslims in the West, ed. Haddad, 115.