Asians - A Monolithic Voting Bloc?

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Abstract

Past studies of Asian voting behavior have more often than not treated Asians as a single homogeneous group. Based on this assumption, the studies proceed to predict Asian voting behavior. However, the underlying assumption of homogeneity can produce fallacious results when the group Asians is not homogeneous. In fact, it is often the case that the separate ethnicities act as separate groups with their own unique political perspectives and identities. Hence, studies of Asian voting behavior should either refrain from aggregating all of the Asian groups or else be careful to examine the effects and consequences of such aggregation.

November 29, 1993
1 Introduction

Demographically, the U.S. is in a constant state of flux. In a democracy, population changes have political consequences as politicians examine the new face of the population and adjust their strategies accordingly. Most recently, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of Asian Americans (hereafter referred to as "Asians"). According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1983 and 1990), Asian are the nation's fastest growing group, having increased 128% from 1.5 million in 1970 to 3.5 million in 1980. Asians grew at a rate of 120.36% compared to 26.18% for Blacks and 72.09% for Latinos. In California, when the Asian population increased from 1.5 million in 1980 to 2.8 million in 1990, it became the second most populous minority group, more numerous than the Blacks.

What does this shift in demographics mean to the world of politics? Will this phenomenal growth rate hurl the Asian group into a position of political prominence? Perhaps because this growth is a recent phenomenon, the literature on Asian politics is not as abundant as the literature on other minority groups. Even among the studies that have been done, there is discrepancy about the proper bases from which to study the impact of Asians on the political scene. The first theory encompasses a Pan-Asian hypothesis where descriptions of "Asians" are believed to span across all the subgroups (Chinese, Japanese, etc.), and differences among the subgroups are assumed to be minor. A second theory treats nationality as the key element. It begins by assuming that the Chinese are different than the Japanese, the Japanese are different than the Koreans, etc. Each subgroup is considered to have a separate political identity. Finally, the last theory would throw both of these basic assumptions aside and would regard socio-economic status as the key variable.

Examples of the Pan-Asian hypothesis are numerous. For instance, Uhlaner (1991) claims that Asian Americans have the highest income and lowest poverty and unemployment rates among minority groups. Moreover, unlike other minority groups, she says that substantial proportions of Asians are immigrants.
1 INTRODUCTION

Clearly, Uhlaner is concentrating on Asians as a single homogeneous group. This is not an uncommon perspective. Henry and Muñoz (1991) speak of an Asian voter turnout rate that lags significantly behind that of Blacks and Anglos. They also claim that issues such as immigration, bilingual education, hate crimes and university admission quotas are “Asian concerns.” These studies place their emphasis on the context in which an Asian political coalition might exist. In Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner’s study (1991) of the acquisition of partisanship among Asians and Latinos, they clarify that they are not working under the pretense that Asians are a homogeneous group but rather that they are a “politically meaningful category” in the same way as are Blacks, Whites, and Latinos. At any rate, these studies make little or no effort to discuss the heterogeneity within the monolithic Asian group.

In other studies, this heterogeneity is treated as so prominent that it could not be ignored without impinging upon the usefulness of the results. Nakanishi (1991) describes significant differences among the Asians in educational levels, affluence, party affiliation and party registration. Certainly these aspects have been key indicators of political participation and activity in virtually any study on voting behavior. Cain and Kiewiet (1985) have also claimed that within group differences on “Asian issues” such as bilingual education are pronounced. Their survey showed that sixty-two percent of the Koreans favored bilingual education versus only forty-four percent of the Japanese. Differences as large as these point to the importance of at least entertaining the possibility that we are dealing with separate political entities. We would not put the Blacks, Latinos and Asians together into one group to describe minority voting behavior. The distinct entities would confuse our results. In the same vein, if the Asian subgroups are significantly distinct, they should be separated also.

The last theory encompassing the time-honored socio-economic variables can be seen as a special case of the previous two theories. One can either look at the socio-economic conditions of each of the Asian subgroups separately or at the entire Asian group as a whole. In either case, the value of considering these
variables adds to the quality of the other perspectives rather than competing with them.

My goal is to provide some evidence of when and why one of these approaches might be better than the others. Is it important to look at the Asian subgroups? How might our results differ based upon which perspective we use to approach the question? Is the truth we are seeking confounded by our underlying theory? The recent emergence of Asians into American politics is akin to other topics in that it is important to grasp why a theory might be correct and how the assumptions of that theory might affect our results.

2 Methodology

Unfortunately, the need for this agenda is much simpler to articulate than it is to implement. Especially in the area of voting behavior, determining how a group voted cannot be ascertained with certainty since our voting system employs secret ballots. In addition, the lack of an adequate number of surveys often forces us to derive individual voting probabilities from sets of aggregate data even though no single method for deriving these probabilities is universally accepted as the superior method. As we shall see, some methods are better than others.

2.1 Ecological Regression

One of the most widely used methods is ecological regression. The seminal work of Goodman (1953) stated that, in general, ecological regression cannot be used to make inferences about individual behavior. However, ecological regression may be properly used in some very special circumstances. Unfortunately, these very special circumstances are not met very often in our area of interest.

Some of the research that has followed has examined the utility of ecological regression with direct relation to our purposes here. One of the major findings
is that this method works well when estimating probabilities for a homogeneous
group since the homogeneity of groups is an implicit assumption of ecological
regression. When the groups are not homogeneous, however, the severity of the
improper specification can produce very misleading results.

Freedman, et. al. (1991) demonstrated that violating this basic homogeneity
assumption leads to unreliable results. He cites a 1982 California Assembly
race as an example. Using ecological regression in this case would predict that
the Hispanics voted 231% one of the candidates! In another example, another
candidate received 201% of the Hispanic vote when exit polls suggest that this
number is closer to 25%. Something is obviously amiss.

Clearly, the assumption that the vote can be predicted simply from knowing
Hispanic registration is fallacious. A precinct that has a high concentration of
Blacks would confound the results. In addition, the model does not consider
the differing socio-economic variables of the various precincts. It assumes that
poor Hispanics vote similarly to rich Hispanics. It fails to consider that heavily
Democratic precincts are highly likely to vote quite differently than heavily
Republican precincts. No attempt is made at any sort of differentiation between
these obviously distinct situations. All of these omitted factors affect the quality
of the results.

Moreover, conjuring up a whole host of other potential confounding factors
is not difficult. Any factor that might have a significant impact on the vote
affects the ability of a simple ecological regression to produce reasonable results.
Because of these inherent faulty assumptions, the conclusions drawn from this
method are often unreliable.

### 2.2 Correlation Coefficient

Another method that has been used to identify racially polarized voting utilizes
the correlation coefficient for the ethnic group and the race or candidate of in-
terest. Many have suggested that the correlation coefficient is an inadequate
2 METHODOLOGY

measure. Robinson's (1950) foundational study in this area cited numerous examples to prove the point that there needs to be no relation whatsoever between the individual correlation and the ecological correlation. Hanushek, Jackson and Kain (1987) claim that Robinson would have obtained much better results had he started from a more complete, properly specified model. However, at this point, we reach the impasse of the properly specified model. The argument becomes tautological.

In addition to these works, Engstrom and McDonald (1987) showed that the correlation coefficient can give systematically biased estimates when more than two homogeneous groups are present. Furthermore, Lupia and McCue (1990) have shown that the correlation coefficient is inadequate for measuring racially polarized even when only two homogeneous groups exist. They cite examples where the correlation coefficient takes on different values for electorates voting in exactly the same way. How a person votes should make a difference, but what precinct that vote came from should be inconsequential. The correlation coefficient has trouble differentiating between these distinct situations.

2.3 The Model

The process of finding an adequate measure of racially polarized voting is still in its infancy. Recent literature on the topic has strongly suggested the abandonment of ecological regression as well as the abandonment of the correlation coefficient for measuring racially polarized voting because the underlying assumptions of both are simply not true.

The model used in this paper, although not perfect in and of itself, does address and resolve the problems found in ecological regression and the correlation coefficient. The first step is a cluster analysis that does not begin with a general assumption of internal homogeneity within the groups. The fallacy of this assumption is the basic problem that arises when ecological regression is employed. It accounts for much of the extreme overestimation produced by
that method. The cluster analysis\(^1\) does not make an implicit assumption that a racial or ethnic group is homogeneous nor does it work from the premise that everyone who is not a member of the racial group is homogeneous. It begins with no assumptions of homogeneity and then proceeds to locate the homogeneous groups that might exist. Homogeneous groups are determined by the model, not assumed. In addition, geographical regionalization does not affect the outcome of a cluster analysis as it affects an analysis of correlation coefficients.

The only data required for this cluster analysis are the specific vote for a candidate/proposition and the number of people in each group being analyzed. The analysis is done with precinct-level data. McCue (1990) provides a detailed description of the algorithm. A brief description follows.

### 2.3.1 The Algorithm

- Begin by obtaining a consistent estimate for the response probabilities of the G groups we are examining. For every possible pair of precincts \(i\) and \(j\), solve for the vector of probabilities \(p\). For example, here,

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
A_i & NA_i \\
A_j & NA_j \\
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
p_1 \\
p_2 \\
\end{bmatrix}
=
\begin{bmatrix}
Y_i \\
Y_j \\
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Clearly, the solution is \(X^{-1}Y = \hat{p}\). For \(n\) precincts, there will be \(\binom{n}{G}\) equations to solve.

- The consistent estimate for our first cluster is the modal \(\hat{p}\). Calculate the \(\chi^2\) value for each precinct. If the \(\chi^2\) value is less than \(\chi^2_G\) at \(\alpha = .95\), add

\(^1\)This technique is adapted from Ken McCue’s article “The Inference of Individual Probabilities from Aggregate Data – A Homogeneous Approach"
that case to the first cluster.

- Once we have added all the cases that belong in a certain cluster, remove that cluster and all its \( \hat{p}'s \) from further consideration. Begin again by finding the next modal \( \hat{p} \). Add \( \hat{p}'s \) to this new cluster just as before. Continue in this manner until all the \( \hat{p}'s \) have been allocated to some cluster.

- After the clustering procedure is finished, use the individual probabilities for each group to obtain an overall probability for the entire group. If there are \( C \) clusters, then \( p_c \) is the calculated probability in cluster \( c \). Let \( u \in c \) mean that case \( u \) is in cluster \( c \). Use the following equation to estimate \( p_g \), the probability that a member of group \( G \) will vote for the candidate/issue we are considering.

\[
p_g = \frac{\sum_{c=1}^{C} \sum_{u \in c} X_u p_{gc}}{\sum_{c=1}^{C} \sum_{u \in c} X_u}
\]

The next step utilizes the estimates obtained from the cluster analysis, \( p_g \), as the initial guesses for a maximum likelihood estimation of the logistic regression equation \( Y = X\beta(t, z) + \epsilon \)

where

\[
\beta = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(t_0 + z_1 t_1 + \ldots + z_n t_n)}
\]

Here, the values of the \( z \) variables can be any number of demographic characteristics such as income, education or ethnicity. The number of \( z \) variables as well as the type of \( z \) variables are specified at the discretion of the researcher. These can be re-specified with each race to accommodate variability between races. In other words, the covariates are subject to change depending upon their impact on the response probabilities. Each model can be and ideally should be fitted separately. Once the model is specified, the maximization is performed over the parameters \( t \). A straightforward Newton-Raphson procedure, utilizing
full specifications of both the first and second derivatives, is used to do the nonlinear optimization.

3 The Data

Obtaining the data for such a project is not a trivial task since finding a significantly large number of each of the Asian subgroups is difficult. Hence, limitations in data dictate that only three groups will be examined, the Japanese, the Koreans, and Other Asians. The Chinese compose most of the group, “Other Asians.” The “Other Asians” group, while slightly more liberal than the Chinese, will be referred to as “Chinese” hereafter. A surname dictionary was used to separate the different ethnicities. The data was received from the county registrar and was compiled by the California Assembly’s Election and Reapportionment staff.

Three Bay Area counties, Alameda, San Francisco and Santa Clara, are studied. The data set for Alameda county includes a data set of actual voters in the 1986 general election as well as the registered voters in the county. The actual voter data set includes everyone who went to the polls to vote in the 1986 general election. The registered voter data set includes everyone who is registered to vote. This is the larger set since not everyone who registers actually votes on election day. Unfortunately, the studies of San Francisco and Santa Clara only analyze a registered voter data set and thus are not as complete. This is important in considering the results since inferences from all registered voters to those who actually vote are difficult to predict and less accurate than a projection onto an actual voter data set.

An additional difficulty of the data set might be seen in the internal heterogeneity that exists even within these smaller Asian subgroups. However, separating these subgroups into even smaller groups of immigrants and non-immigrants, or between different generations is extremely difficult and beyond the scope of this study. The ability or rather, the inability to find an adequate number of
3 THE DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alameda</th>
<th>San Francisco</th>
<th>Santa Clara</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>1,105,379</td>
<td>678,974</td>
<td>1,295,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 18</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 65</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives of U.S.</td>
<td>88.15%</td>
<td>71.69%</td>
<td>86.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Asia</td>
<td>8,918</td>
<td>64,540</td>
<td>10,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak English very well</td>
<td>56.60%</td>
<td>46.81%</td>
<td>56.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak English well</td>
<td>26.41%</td>
<td>28.18%</td>
<td>26.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak English poorly</td>
<td>17.09%</td>
<td>25.01%</td>
<td>17.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income less than $5,000</td>
<td>12.91%</td>
<td>15.30%</td>
<td>6.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>$18,700</td>
<td>$15,866</td>
<td>$19,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school grad</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
<td>76.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1980)

Table 1: Demographic characteristics

...the major Asian subgroups in any given precinct, hinders the accuracy of statistical inference already. It would be unwise to diminish these groups further since data collected from such a small sample would not provide useful results. However, this difficulty is eased by the fact that these three counties provide an interesting cross-section of Asians that seems to provide a good perspective for observing generational effects. While this view of a generational effect is by no means definitive or robust, its usefulness in shedding some light on the topic should not be discounted.

3.1 Demographics

With this disclaimer in mind, we can consider the census data in Tables 1 and 2 that show San Francisco to be a haven for most first generation immigrants while the suburbs in Santa Clara reflect a group of Asians who are more assimilated into western culture. The inhabitants of Santa Clara county are generally younger, wealthier, and better educated than the inhabitants of San Francisco county. This distinction in the data is also confirmed by surveys that have been done in the Bay Area. In particular, Binder and Lew's survey...
### THE DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Median Age</th>
<th>Renters</th>
<th>Median Home Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alameda county</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>11531</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>43.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>32177</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>37.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>3641</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>58.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>San Francisco county</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>12046</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>67.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>82480</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>53.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>3763</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>73.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Santa Clara county</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>21907</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>30.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>22891</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>30.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>6109</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>43.61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *U.S. Census Bureau (1980)*

Table 2: Demographic characteristics

(1992) provides further evidence that San Francisco’s Asian population bears distinctions from Asian populations in other counties.

If we shift our focus to the Asian subgroups, we find distinctions there as well. Data from the Census Bureau show that the Japanese are older than the other groups. The Koreans are the most likely to be renters rather than owners. They seem to span a wider range of incomes, however, since the median value of a Korean home in Alameda and San Francisco county is higher than the Japanese or Chinese median home. The data show clearly, but perhaps not profoundly, that certain groups are poorer and younger while other groups are more wealthy. In addition, we know that each group tends to congregate in a different area (Chinatowns, Japan town, etc). No “Asiatowns” exist. Hence, we can see that not only do the statistics demonstrate heterogeneity, but that the subgroups themselves tend to have strong associations within their own group. There are few prominent outward signs of collaboration or collegiality between the groups.
Rates of increase are indicated above each bar.

Figure 1: Growth Rates

Perhaps the most striking differences between the Asian subgroups are exemplified in their disparate growth rates. Growth rates in Alameda and Santa Clara county fall nothing short of phenomenal. In those counties, it is more the rule than the exception for a group to double, even triple in size over the period of just one decade! At least, this is true for every group other than the Japanese who seem to be relying on birth rates instead of immigration to increase their population. The Chinese grew by 113.15% and 184.07% while the Koreans grew by 161.93% and 154.79%. The Japanese, on the other hand, have stagnant growth across all three counties. Their growth rates hovered at the low rates of 17.87% and 21.04%.

Another striking feature that is seen in Figure 1 comes from the comparison across counties. While San Francisco also displays the above-mentioned pat-
tern, its rates of increase are half the size of the rates of increase in the other two counties. The county where most non-English speaking immigrants settle to find comfort in others of their own race is growing slowly while the suburbs are more rapidly being inhabited by their descendants and other better assimilated immigrants. The differences in the rates of increase are extremely large. The recent census adds credibility to the claim that the ethnic mix in the suburbs is growing rapidly while the mix in major cities is not growing quite as rapidly.

The San Francisco Chronicle ran a series of articles on the huge influx of Asians where staff writer Frank Viviano (1991) summarized that the Bay Area region will emerge as the Western Hemisphere’s first genuine Pacific metropolis, with an Asian community as large as some of Asia’s major cities. However, unlike the past where almost the entire Asian community was concentrated in 19 square blocks of San Francisco Chinatown, Viviano further notes that the recent tide of immigration has diversified its area of settlement by positing that “the Bay Area is no longer an urban region where immigrants are concentrated exclusively in the inner cities, nor is it a region that has grown more desperate as it has grown less white. Hence, the case is not simply that immigrants are settling elsewhere, but that the types of immigrants have recently changed also.

Three key points from the data should be highlighted. First, the Asians in each of the counties show differing levels of acculturation and socio-economic statuses. These dissimilarities are likely to be important factors in explaining the vote differentials between the counties. Secondly, the counties are not growing at the same pace. Many of the new immigrants are settling into the suburbs instead of the aging inner cities. The city is growing slowly while the suburbs are experiencing a booming influx of immigrants. Lastly, because of the pattern of tremendous growth rates, we should expect to find a corresponding shift in political preferences among “Asians” in the coming decades. This will not necessarily be the result of a large-scale change in attitudes, rather, on the contrary, it is likely to be the result of the nature of the changing demographics – the subordination of the Japanese voters and the increased influence of the immigrant
population in the suburbs. Currently, Asian political preferences are largely skewed by the more politically active Japanese group. However, as the other groups increase in size, their influence will unavoidably rise. Hence, no matter where the growth is occurring, the Japanese are quickly being subordinated to one of the more minor subgroups. The Chinese and the Koreans are expected to become more dominant as their growth continues at almost unbelievable and unprecedented rates. We are definitely in the midst of great change.

4 Voter Registration

What will change in the political scene as these changes occur among Asians? The first step to political participation is often just registering to vote. Although being registered with a party does not restrict one to always voting with that party, it is at least indicative of a person's general impression on a variety of issues. The party that one first registers with can have a large impact on one's view of politics (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960). Thus, registration figures should at least give us an impression of the general political tendencies of a group.3

If we begin with the pan-Asian perspective, we see very clearly from Table 3 that Asians have definite democratic leanings. Almost half of all the registered Asians registered with the Democrats while only 27.51% registered with the Republicans. In addition, the number of Asians that are registered Decline to State (hereafter “DCL”) almost equals the number of Asians that are registered Republican. This number is not insignificant as it includes one in every four registered Asian. The numbers here are very lucid. Certainly, we could proceed from here with a very believable explanation of why most Asian officeholders are elected from the democratic party: most registered Asians are Democrats,

3The data presented here includes only registered voters and thus, only citizens. These people provide the most useful sample of Asians for the purpose of studying distinctive voting patterns among the Asian subgroups. An analysis of citizenship rates would not add to our analysis of actual voting patterns. Thus, this task is not undertaken.
4 VOTER REGISTRATION

Dem Rep DCL
All Asians 48.45% 27.51% 24.04%

The pan-Asian perspective

Dem Rep DCL
Chinese 43.16% 28.46% 28.38%
Japanese 57.28% 25.75% 16.97%
Korean 45.87% 28.14% 25.99%

The ethnicities separated

Table 3: Asian registration rates

so most Asian officeholders are Democrats. The result seems clear and simple. However, can we really describe all Asians with a blanket statement pointing toward democratic sympathies? Are we convinced and ready to treat the entire Asian group as a democratic ally in the same way that other minorities are thought of as forgone democratic votes? Before proceeding to such a bold conclusion, we must ask if anything is being hidden by the aggregation of the Asians groups. Table 3 shows us that, in fact, a disaggregation of the registration levels leads to distinct registration patterns for the different Asian groups. While each group still has more registered Democrats than Republicans, the democratic tendencies we saw before are largely fueled by the overwhelming fervor of the Japanese. The other groups are not as democratically inclined. In addition, the large numbers of DCLs are supported by the less politically active groups, the Chinese and the Koreans. The Japanese are more likely to register with a specific party. The differences between the Japanese and the other Asians seems to be notable in all aspects. The Chinese and the Koreans are generally similar. The only conspicuous differences are found in the fact that the Chinese are slightly more likely to register DCL than the Koreans while
the Koreans are slightly more likely to register with the Democrats than the Chinese. However, these differences are minor in comparison to the distinctions born by the Japanese.

At least this is the case when the counties are considered in the aggregate. If we proceed further to view the counties separately, however, Figure 2 shows us that the tendency to register DCL is fueled by the voters in San Francisco county, the larger immigrant population. The other more assimilated Asians tend to register with a specific party. The voters in Alameda county are more likely to register with the Democrats than are their counterparts in the other two counties. Likewise, Santa Clara county's voters are more likely to register with the Republican party. Suddenly, not only does ethnicity seem to be significant, but generational effects and questions of assimilation arise as possibly important variables to consider.

Strangely enough, the observed registration patterns do not necessarily coincide with conventional wisdom about the effects of socio-economic status. For
Japanese       Chinese       Korean
Income          $24,987       $24,637       $22,774
Below poverty  3.8%          9.5%          12.9%
Median age     33.7          30.0          27.8
HS graduates   85.7%         71.9%         81.5%
Years of school 13.1        13.5          14.0
Foreign born   28.77%        62.31%        67.66%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1980)

Table 4: Overall Asian demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Chinese %</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Japanese %</th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th>Korean %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>2947</td>
<td>45.53%</td>
<td>3682</td>
<td>59.69%</td>
<td>3251</td>
<td>50.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>29.59%</td>
<td>1451</td>
<td>23.52%</td>
<td>1684</td>
<td>26.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCL</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>22.70%</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>15.38%</td>
<td>1402</td>
<td>21.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>2.18%</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1.41%</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6472</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>6169</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>6459</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1986 General Election Data

Table 5: Alameda county registered voters

instance, even though the differences are not dominating, Table 4 shows that the Japanese are generally the more wealthy, better educated, native-born group. Hence, if we see any effect generated from these distinctions at all, it should be that these characteristics translate into more conservative political tendencies (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). However, as we can see, almost the opposite case is true – the Japanese are the most likely to be left of the center in the political spectrum. This gives us an indication that even though the socio-economic status of Asians might still purport to be of substantive importance, it is more than likely that other factors are significant if not overwhelming. These factors might be due to ethnicity or other contextual, historical or cultural variables. This point will be discussed further when we examine voting patterns.

However, we have not yet exhausted the utility of the registration data. If
Chinese | Chinese % | Japanese | Japanese % | Korean | Korean %
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Democrat | 1743 | 48.51% | 2370 | 63.41% | 1773 | 52.02%
Republican | 1126 | 31.34% | 906 | 24.24% | 953 | 27.96%
DCL | 669 | 18.62% | 418 | 11.19% | 637 | 18.69%
Other | 55 | 1.53% | 43 | 1.15% | 45 | 1.32%
Total | 3593 | 100% | 3737 | 100% | 3408 | 100%

Table 6: Alameda county actual voters

We probe a little deeper into our data to look at the differences among the actual voters instead of just registered voters, we can gain even more insight into the nature of the Asian electorate. Our two data sets from Alameda county should help us in this endeavor. Certainly we know that everyone who registers to vote does not actually go to the polls on election day to cast their ballot. Getting Asians to register is certainly a task in itself. However, getting them to vote is a hurdle that must be overcome not just once in a lifetime, but once every election. Tables 5 and 6 display the actual counts and corresponding percentages of registered Asians and actual Asian voters in Alameda county respectively. It is interesting to note that while the Japanese have the fewest registered voters, they still command the largest group of Asian voters. For instance, there are 290 more registered voters of Korean descent than of Japanese descent. However, in the actual election, the Japanese outnumbered the Koreans by 329 voters. The numbers are significantly and completely turned around! There is a world of difference between registered voters and actual voters.

The trends of Japanese participation in Alameda county are probably evident elsewhere as well. In San Francisco county, the Japanese have the fewest number of registered voters, but this really implies nothing about the profile of Asians who actually vote since the registered Japanese voters tend to vote at far higher rates than the other Asian ethnicities. In addition, San Francisco has an unusually high percentage of people who register DCL so we must consider
the fact that people who register as DCL or with a minor party turn out to vote in significantly fewer numbers than those registered with one of the two major parties. Hence, while the Japanese are outnumbered even more significantly than they were in Alameda county, their impact on the political scene as far as Asians are concerned has probably not been significantly reduced. Their high rates of political participation are still serving them well. Their returns are not diminishing; they are unbelievably flourishing. Only their relative percentages of the Asian population are diminishing.

In San Francisco, we can see that while the Chinese outnumber the Japanese by better than 6 to 1, this number goes down to about 2 to 1 when we consider only registered voters. Combine this with the fact that the Japanese are more liberal and vote at higher rates. It can hardly be disputed that the Japanese viewpoint heavily skews any analysis that combines the Japanese and Chinese people together into one group.

The story is repeated once again in Santa Clara county where the Japanese also leave a large impression of their political zeal. While the Japanese make up a scant 19.60% of all registered Asians in San Francisco county, the Japanese comprise a commanding 43.99% of the registered Asians in Santa Clara county. Without data on the actual voters in the county, we can only speculate about the extent of the Japanese influence on the total “Asian vote.” However, past patterns would indicate that any description of Santa Clara’s Asian voting pop-
ulation would, in some cases, almost be entirely the result of the Japanese voters.

Even though the three counties have differential makeups, the main story line is not diluted: the Japanese exercise overwhelming influence upon the "Asian vote." Even though the Chinese are by far the dominant group in San Francisco, the Japanese probably still make a significant contribution to "Asian voting behavior" in that county. In Alameda, there are more registered Chinese voters than Japanese voters; there are also more registered Korean voters than Japanese voters. However, if we look at those who actually vote, the ones who make the real difference in politics, we see that the Japanese are better represented than either the Chinese or the Koreans. This turn-around in numbers runs counter to our initial intuition. When we move progressively from examining population to registration to those who actually voted on a certain issue, the Japanese share of influence becomes increasingly larger. Their share of influence is simply phenomenal compared to their share of the population.

4.1 Japanese dominance of Asian American politics

The trend of higher registration among the Japanese that we saw in Alameda county is probably a pattern that stems from their racial heritage as well as their socio-economic status. Understandably, the Asians who have come from communist countries seem much more adverse to participating in politics. They have never had any inclination to participate in politics, nor have their previous political experiences been positive. The Japanese, on the other hand, had have an entirely different set of past political experiences. In addition, the Japanese experience is also different in one other historical perspective; they were interned during World War II. As a result, they have always had more incentive to assimilate into western culture.

During the war, Japanese Americans found a need to prove their loyalty to the United States. One telling story recounts the words of a young Japanese
American who was released from an internment camp so that he could continue his education. The University of Nebraska student reported "all of us have tried to avoid being seen in conspicuous groups and have tried to spread out as much as possible" (Daniel, 1988). In another enlightening comment of this period, Kitano (1969) writes, "One of the most influential events hastening acculturation was the evacuation of the Japanese during World War II. It broke up the power of the Issei and the ethnic ghettos; altered family life; scattered Japanese throughout America through resettlement; sent many males into the armed forces and overseas; and made many renounce everything Japanese."

Hence, we see that in many ways, World War II gave the Japanese an aversion to reverting back to their culture and encouraged them to a more acculturated life, to act and look as Americans would. It is an understatement to say that this experience has had a profound impact on the lives of the Japanese. Hence, it is important to view our results in the light of this very unique experience that is completely absent from the other Asian groups.

One way to see how this mentality might transfer over to the political realm is to understand that part of the western experience is engaging in a democratic form of government. Certainly the internment would encourage people to be more politically active than would a life in a Communist country. However, while the Japanese are more politically active, they are also quickly being out-numbered by the other Asian subgroups. So, while they may register at higher rates and vote at higher rates, soon, this political zeal will become inconsequential. Asians currently seem to be more sympathetic to the Democrats. Their composite vote would indicate liberal tendencies. Moreover, almost all Asian elected officials are Democrats. However, much of this democratic bent can be attributed to the Japanese whose representation among the group "Asians" is currently dominating but quickly and definitively diminishing.

Soon, the views and perspectives of the other subgroups will dominate the Japanese view. Even if the subgroups continue to vote as they always have, the face of voting behavior for the all-encompassing Asian group will inevitably
change because the dynamics of growth within the monolithic Asian group are forcing the changes. It cannot be emphasized enough that the numbers we are currently observing are only pieces of a larger picture that explain how the future of Asian American politics will unfold. The current state of affairs is certainly not indicative of the years ahead. This seems to be a unique feature of the Asian Americans as a minority force in American politics. Black and Latino political participation has been more stable across time.

5 Results and Implications

However, an analysis of registration patterns is not enough to make inferences onto how Asians vote because the correspondence between registration and voting preferences is not necessarily isomorphic. Hence, the next logical question is how do they vote? Are there ethnic cues that are unique to Asians or is their perspective on issues similar to the perspectives of other voters?

The analysis here uses data from the 1986 general election. The Secretary of State race, where Chinese candidate and incumbent March Fong Eu ran against Republican Bruce Nestande, should give us an indication of the impact of having an Asian candidate on the ballot. The controller's race between incumbent Democrat Gray Davis and Republican Bill Campbell is also examined. This race bears no distinct or obvious appeal to Asians. However, its results should help us see how Asians tend to vote when there is no "Asian concern" at stake. The last race examined is the 1986 gubernatorial race between Democrat Tom Bradley and Republican incumbent George Deukmejian. This race possibly adds a feature of whether or not racism between Asians and Blacks plays a part in Asian voting behavior. We will have to approach this interpretation gingerly, however, since this aspect is difficult to separate from other possibly confounding variables. Finally, Proposition 63, commonly known as "English Only," was also analyzed. It would have made English the official language in California. Ethnic groups with high proportions of people who do not speak
English or speak English poorly were obviously against its passage. Translating this analysis to the Asian groups would lead to a prediction that the Japanese generally supported the measure since they have largely assimilated into Western culture whereas the Chinese and the Koreans probably would not support the measure since their populations have higher proportions of immigrants.

Our first view of the data will be from the pan-Asian perspective presented in Table 8. Several interesting patterns are evident. However, the most compelling argument arising from the data seems to be that Asians are more sympathetic to the Democratic party than they are to the Republican party. A small exception can be seen in the Governor's race where the preference cannot be ascertained because the vote is statistically indistinguishable. However, the Asians voted for the Democrat in the Controller's race as well as the Secretary of State's race. In addition, akin to a majority of the Democrats (57.44%), they voted against the passage of Proposition 63. "Asian interests" would probably have led us to predict the preference for March Fong Eu in the Secretary of State's race.

### Table 8: The Pan-Asian perspective: Asian ethnicities and counties combined

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### RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

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Table 9: Asian ethnicities estimated separately

as well as the vote against Proposition 63. The result in the Controller's race only serves to provide further evidence of the democratic leanings of the Asian group. From the perspective of one who begins with a pan-Asian hypothesis, all indicators point to the same conclusion — Asians are sympathetic to the Democrats. While it is not clear that they are wholly inclined to democratic tendencies, we see that at least in several instances, their views are more aligned with democratic views.

This results speaks of the Asian group as a whole. We have yet to consider whether this democratic leaning translates to each of the Asian ethnicities sep-
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

arately. Does it matter than the Asian group is actually composed of several different ethnicities? Table 9 displays the results of the races after we separate the Asians groups and posits a strong argument that all Asian ethnicities do not necessarily have democratic leanings. When we view each group as their own political entity, distinctions that were once hidden become apparent. While viewing all Asians together gave us the impression that the Chinese fit into a democratic mold, the separate analyses show that this association may have been made a bit hastily. In the Controller’s race, we see that the Japanese and the Korean vote are still democratic but the Chinese vote becomes statistically indistinguishable between the two parties. In addition, the Chinese vote on the Governor’s race deviates from the other groups. They voted Republican while the other two groups remained with the Democrats. Moreover, the Chinese are not the only group to bear different political tendencies. The Japanese exhibit their own unique mark on the issue of an having English as the official language. They voted for Proposition 63 while the Chinese and the Koreans voted against its passage.

Hence, we see that the decision to view Asians as a single group or as a conglomeration of groups is critical and can have a large impact on our results. If we believe that “Asians” are a politically meaning category, then we should be satisfied with the analysis starting from the pan-Asian hypothesis. However, if the different ethnicities do not act in unison or do not consider themselves to be politically akin to the other ethnicities, our analysis would greatly benefit from the separation of the Asian groups. This allows us to uncover the previously hidden and differing political tendencies unique to each nationality.

At this point, we reach somewhat of an impasse. We have seen that the underlying hypothesis about whether Asians are one group or many is crucial to the subsequent interpretation of the results. However, we have not established or looked at the question concerning politically meaningful categories. Are Asians as a whole a politically meaningful category or is it much more useful to look at each ethnicity as a separate political unit? In order to answer this question,
5 RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

we will examine our results a little more carefully and discuss them in the light of some historical and cultural variables.

5.1 Ethnic cues?

One would expect that March Fong Eu would have a large following in the Asian community since she is the highest Chinese elected officeholder. Even among the electorate at large, her vote margins have consistently been much higher than a strict party vote would imply. Tables 8 and 9 show that Asians as a whole as well as each separate ethnicity have also supported her in very high proportions. An interesting note is further seen in Table 10 when not only each Asian ethnicity but each of the counties is also estimated separately.\(^4\) We see hints that some factor influences the Asian subgroups themselves. For instance, while Chinese support for March Fong Eu is very high in both Alameda and San Francisco county, her support drops considerably when we look at Santa Clara county. For the Japanese, her support is generally high but it plummets dramatically in San Francisco county.

At this point, in search for explanations, studies of voting behavior usually turn to the partisanship variables that are generally rife with explanatory power. However, it seems that something other than partisanship is at work here. The results appear to be more in the realm of contextual or socio-economic effects. For instance, it is odd that the voters in San Francisco, who are the least likely to express their partisanship by registering with a specific party, displayed overwhelming levels partisanship in the Secretary of State race. Is this a display of partisanship or of some other variable? Perhaps this vote represents the ability of a Chinese candidate to bring out the Chinese voters of San Francisco. It is difficult to conjecture. However, the evidence pointing away from partisanship and toward an ethnic voting cue is strengthened from the fact that the San

\(^4\)The “NA” table entries indicate that an estimate could not be obtained from the maximum likelihood procedure. This does not imply that no maximum exists. It merely indicates the inability to find a good starting estimate.
5 RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

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Table 10: Asian ethnicities and counties estimated separately
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

Francisco Chinese, the group that is most likely be apathetic according to our traditional partisanship analyses, turned out to produce the most overwhelming vote margin for March Fong Eu.

We find a similar but opposing story when we examine the Japanese vote. While we would expect the Japanese to vote for March Fong Eu by virtue of her democratic label, we would also expect them to react differently toward her because of the ill will that exists between the Japanese and the Chinese. In fact, this animosity reveals itself only in San Francisco. In the other counties, the Japanese generally support March Fong Eu in high proportions. Explanations for this discrepancy can be traced to several factors. The Japanese may not see a Chinese candidate as one of their own even though the two groups are joined together under the “Asian” group heading. But why would the Japanese see the Chinese as their kin when historically, the Chinese and Japanese have not even been friendly races? Many still remember the horrors of the Sino-Japanese War. Especially among the older generations, the past vividly revives itself in their political perspectives. The older Chinese remember the loss of dignity and self-worth that came with the occupation. Indeed, the horrors of the war are embedded memories not easily forgotten. It is not simply an historical account. Some of these prejudices may subside as future generations tend to forget their ancestors’ past since it is certainly not the same experience to just hear about the war through stories or textbooks. Although the outrage may still be evoked, the emotions are not usually quite as manifest. Hence, it is not surprising that the older Japanese population in San Francisco county displays disparate voting behavior from the younger generations living in the suburbs.

Strangely, or perhaps not so strangely, we find the same sort of pattern in the Korean vote. The Korean vote for March Fong Eu is high with the exception of the San Francisco voters. Certainly, these patterns strike of significant ethnic divisions among the Asians. The Chinese bear the only consistent vote for March Fong Eu across all of the counties. Their vote for her spans from the young to the old, from one socio-economic level to another. This patterns speaks
strongly against those who would hold to the pan-Asian theory. At least for the older Asians, the thought that all Asians are alike seems almost ludicrous.

The Secretary of State race exhibits many intra-ethnic problems. When we move to the Governor's race, however, the interesting question switches from intra-ethnic effects to possible inter-racial effects. Although Asians and Blacks do not necessarily have past dismal relationships in the form of wars, their attitudes toward one another have been known to be unfavorable. This may account for Tom Bradley's lack of support in the Governor's race. Both the Chinese and the Koreans displayed Republican leanings while the Japanese wavered on the race. However, the Japanese are definitely more inclined than the other two groups to democratic tendencies. Again, there seems to be some sort of ethnic cue at work here. We should not consider this ethnic cue lightly since it seems to have the ability to thwart the strength of the partisan cue.

Finally, we switch from candidates to the issue of an official language. For the Chinese, especially those who live in Chinatown, English is often a second language if they speak it at all. For the Japanese, however, since their English proficiency numbers are proportionately higher, Proposition 63 would not be as detrimental to their interests. The data analysis supports this reasoning with an addendum. All of the groups in San Francisco county opposed Proposition 63. The Chinese and the Korean levels of opposition were higher than the Japanese level of opposition. All of the older generations seemed to have an interest in the defeat of the proposition. However, the younger generations in Santa Clara county, the wealthiest and youngest of the counties, shift the vote in the other direction to favoring the proposition. This seems to be a generational effect spurred on by the differing demographic characteristics among the three counties. Those who speak English better were more likely to vote for English Only. Again, some factor other than partisanship seems to have been the key explanatory variable.

It is clear from examining the voting patterns that of each of the Asian sub-groups bear distinctions that uniquely describe and distinguish themselves from
5 RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

the others. Party identification does not generate as much explanatory power as it did with other groups in the electorate. We saw how the Chinese and Japanese reacted oppositely in San Francisco county. Forces other than party identification fueled their decisions. The Chinese heritage of March Fong Eu seemed to have more of an impact on Asian voting behavior than party allegiance. In a similar way, English Only supporters were not uniformly members of one certain party, rather, factors such as an ability to read and write English as well as immigrant status played larger roles. The numbers do not reflect a strong pattern of partisanship.

The effect of parties is not entirely dissipated though. Party identification begins to have the expected effect in Santa Clara county. It is interesting to note that the voting patterns of the different groups begin to resemble each other more and more as we move out into the suburbs. Party labels begin to evoke an overarching effect that dilutes the ethnic distinctions that were so clear among the first generations. Party labels become increasingly important with future or more assimilated generations. If this hypothesis is true, the ensuing decades should sense less animosity between the Chinese and Japanese. Younger generations and thus future generations seem to act differently than the older generations. Thus, while an Asian coalition does not appear to be credible now, a unified front in the future should not be ruled out.

The curious behaviors that we are observing are likely to be a generational effects unique to Asians. These forces may stem from historical events. They may stem from simple racism within the monolithic group "Asians." Without party identification as a cue, the Chinese in San Francisco are more likely to vote for someone if they can relate to that person. Certainly Chinese immigrants can relate to a Chinese candidate. Older Japanese relate to the Chinese differently than future generations will relate to the Chinese. Asian racism subsides with later generations. The subgroups begin to search for different cues. For many, party identification provide these cues. At least for the younger Asians in Santa Clara county, party loyalty plays a much larger role in their decisions than the
previously discussed aspects that provided the cues for their earlier generations.

Party identification certainly has its place in political science literature, but when we are discussing Asians, many factors seem to relegate party identification to lower, more insignificant ranks. Party identification makes a difference to those who understand what it means and what its ramifications are, but it makes less of an impact when the voters are largely foreign born and not proficient with the English language.

6 Conclusion

Asians should not be neglected from political science literature. Their numbers tell the story. As a group, they have experienced unprecedented growth in recent decades. While the number of registered Asian voters is not quite commanding today, their growth rates foreshadow a day that is rapidly approaching. However, Asians present some unique problems to traditional research on minority politics. Because the Asian ethnicities are heterogeneous in several respects, it often becomes important to separate the monolithic Asian group into its component parts. If, however, the relevant interest is the potential impact of an Asian coalition, then the ethnicities should be considered jointly; and care should be exercised in interpreting the results lest some bias clouds the perceptions. In addition, the research is complicated by the often disparate tendencies of different generations as well as the immigrant population.

We saw the value of adhering to these precautions in the research presented here. For instance, we saw that although the Asian groups are quite distinctive in San Francisco, the younger, more wealthy generations who live in the suburbs begin to close this intra-ethnic gap. While the younger generations' political tendencies tend to depart from the older generations, they also begin to become more similar, more akin to the younger generations of other Asian ethnicities. Hence, what now seems like disparate groups lacking the ability to form a coalition may well be a unified front when the younger generations come
into positions of political leadership. The patterns of growth seem to imply that this day of unification is close. The migration of subsequent generations out of the city more than doubled this past decade while migration into San Francisco hovered meagerly around 50%. The younger generations also bring with them a stronger desire to participate in the political process.

The Asian American politics of tomorrow will not be like the Asian American politics of today. Today, the Japanese dominate the Asian groups in the political realm, but their rate of growth is minuscule compared to the other groups. They register in greater numbers. They vote in higher percentages. But none of these things will matter if the other groups outnumber the Japanese by better than 10 to 1. The liberal bent of the Japanese will soon translate into a more conservative outlook for Asians as a whole.

Asian American politics is at an exciting and critical time. The ensuing decades will see their full emergence into the political process. The numbers are there. Apathy is now their last and greatest barrier.
References


REFERENCES


REFERENCES


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Table 11: Growth rates
British Scepticism and the European Community: A Guide for Foreigners and Americans

L.J. Sharpe

Working Paper 93-29
British Scepticism and the European Community: A Guide for Foreigners and Americans

L.J. Sharpe

Working Paper 93-29
BRITISH SCEPTICISM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A GUIDE FOR FOREIGNERS (and Ambassadors)

by

L.J. Sharpe.
As I hope my title implies, I am not necessarily myself advocating scepticism about the EC, but merely explaining and describing the British version of it. Explication, then, and not advocacy is the order of the day. Secondly, it must be emphasized that the motivation for undertaking the exercise derives from contacts with continental colleagues who tend to be deeply puzzled by Britain's continued aberrative attitude to the Community. What they ask, more in sorrow than in anger, is Britain worried about? Almost every other member country is happy to tread the path of increasing integration without agonizing about its status as a nation state. How sad it is, they usually add, to see a once great power so eaten up with xenophobia and national pride that it sinks to spoiling manoeuvres and mindless obstruction to a noble endeavour. Could it be, they seem to hint, yet another example of British anti-cooperative and aggressive 'maverickism' which is so out of tune with the prevailing zeitgeist and seems to be on a par, say, with the ludicrous triumphalism of Mr. Major's verdict on Britain's performance at the Maastricht Summit: 'Game, Set, & Match'. Alternatively, British anti-Community attitudes are seen as being the equivalent of British lager louts laying waste to yet another Costa Brava resort, or with the monstrous riot of the Liverpool fans at the Heysel stadium, or, even, the murderous efficiency with which Britain prosecuted the Falklands War.

This article is an attempt to answer these questions by demonstrating that, whatever their defects, British negative attitudes towards the Community are not expressions of mindless xenophobia, but, rather, form a set of logical and comprehensible arguments. I would not expect my continental colleagues to agree with all of them - after all other people's nationalism, like other people's squalor, always looks worse than your own. My hope is that having read the following they will at least understand the phenomenon they now find so puzzling.

Two preliminary remarks are in order. The first is that what I'm going to describe is a set of opinions which are broadly hostile to the EC which I claim are held by a relatively high proportion of the British people. Precisely what proportion is unclear since there seems to be some volatility of attitudes. A June 1991 survey\(^1\) shows that a bare
majority of the British people favoured Britain remaining a member of the Community: fifty two percent favoured staying in against thirty five percent who favoured leaving. In 1987, however, only thirty one percent of the British favoured 'a European government, responsible to a European Parliament'. In general we can say that, despite some oscillation, the UK has been consistently more hostile towards the EC than all other member states. The EC conducts regular surveys of popular attitudes to the Community in each member state and in the 63 of such surveys conducted between 1972 and 1989 in the U.K., only in 27 of them was the percentage against the EC less than the percentage for; in other words there was over the period an approval rating of only 42 per cent. This compares with a 100 percent approval rating in all other member countries over the period except Denmark where the rating was 87 percent. This difference actually masks the distinctiveness of UK attitudes since in the countries with a 100 percent approval rating the percentage against in each survey very rarely exceeded 10 percent. It is such British scepticism that drove over ninety MPs of all parties into the 'No' lobby in the British House of Commons against the Maastricht Treaty in May 1992 despite a governmental three line whip and Opposition abstention. The purpose of this article, then, is not to claim that most British people are hostile to the EC, but, rather, that (with the exception of Denmark) there tends to be a higher proportion of the population who are sceptical about the Community and resist any further integration than in any other member state.

It might be countered that on the only occasion when the British public was asked to express its opinion on the EC when it would count - the 1975 Referendum - rather than being a response a hypothetical survey question, it had voted clearly in favour of the Community - 67.2 per cent for remaining in. However, that result was almost certainly strongly influenced by two transient factors - a severe balance of payments crisis precipitated by the world oil price increase and a rise in world food prices so that they were for a brief period higher than EC prices. Both events made membership of the EC look more attractive and so bred a certain caution in the voters. Also, there had been a massive publicity campaign in favour of the Community organized by Brussels via the European Commission Information Services (ECIS) from 1960 into the 1970s. From 1960 to 1970 it
spent about £10m in a long campaign designed to soften up opinion leaders in favour of the EC. In the mid 1960s the campaign reached such a pitch that ECIS expenditure was running at £3.5m per annum. During the actual pre-Referendum campaign the two British Commissioners, Sir Christopher Soames and George Thomson were so active that one commentator remarked,

'in the deployment of two international civil servants, the comprehensive coverage of their every speech in the press, the pro-marketeers displayed an extraordinary lack of sensitivity to the constitutional ethnics of non-interference ... in the domestic policies of a nation state'.

The whole of the ECIS operation from 1960 onwards is probably unique in the extent to which a foreign power has sought to intervene and influence British domestic politics and whatever its persuasive success with the general public it caused considerable dismay among eurosceptics, who commanded no comparable publicity campaign.

There are indications that the proportion of the British population which favours the E.C. has been slowly increasing over the years from about 31 percent in 1973 to 50 percent in 1989. It is this change no doubt that accounts for the British Labour Party's change of posture from an anti to a pro stance in the late 1980s.

It is the relative novelty to the outside world of what will follow that prompts another preliminary point, namely, that the vast bulk of the British media is pro-E.C. and has been since the early 1960s. Much of the most telling arguments of the anti-EC forces in the UK rarely gets a hearing in the British media and it is therefore hardly surprising that outsiders tend to know little of what will follow. In saying that, I draw a sharp distinction between the majority of the media and the much more recent anti-Brussels trivia of the British gutter press, arguably the worst in Europe, which conducts a campaign against the Community of barely imaginable crudity. Eurosceptics in Britain, in other words, have had to live for over 30 years with the fact which faces many groups who espouse issues that lay outside 'respectable' politics - namely, that a free press rarely means an open press. Thus until Mrs Thatcher began to express her misgivings about the Single European Act - despite having herself bulldozed it through Parliament in the mid-1980s - a
great deal of British scepticism about the Community rarely got a public airing. The closed character of the media on European issues was partly derived from the fact that from the start opposition to the EC came in some quarters to be identified with the extreme Left. Because Moscow and the British Communist Party opposed the Community, to be against it was defined as being on all fours with being against NATO; to be, that is, against freedom and democracy and for the totalitarian forces of Soviet Communism. Later the pro-Market argument also became identified with modernism and the future so that euroscepticism became even less palatable to the media and received even less attention. Above all, the identification of euroscepticism with the extreme Left drove a wedge between the eurosceptical Right and the eurosceptical Left. Conservatives who doubted the wisdom of Britain joining could easily be written off as hopelessly isolated, as out of date and eccentric fuddy-duddys trying to relive past national glories. Conservative euroscepticism thus went subterranean and constantly surprised observers by its virulence when it did surface, for example, in the extraordinary isolation of Macmillan within his own party in the early 1960s when he sacked the majority of the Cabinet so as to have a set of colleagues more amenable to his Community entry bid. Underlying Conservative doubts about the EC were even more apparent in the peculiar vehemence with which in the mid 1970s Conservative M.P.s dismissed Mr. Heath (the author of Britain's entry) in favour of the rank outsider Mrs Thatcher. Perhaps underground Conservative euroscepticism found its most startling expression in the strength and virulence of the new right wing eurosceptic movement - the Bruges Group - whose inspiration is Mrs Thatcher's doubts about the Single European Act which she expressed in a speech in Bruges in the 1980s.

The Political Case Against the EC

So much for preliminaries, what is the British eurosceptics case against the EC?. Any answer to such a question must begin by amending slightly the earlier assertion and admitting that there is a touch of xenophobia in the case, but it is by no means mindless for it has its roots in the obvious geographical fact that the United Kingdom is, after all, on the European periphery. Living on an island severely moderates any sense of kinship with
the mainland. Similar feelings of remoteness from the continent are said to exist in Norway and Sweden. This strong sense of difference is underlined when the traveller returns from the East across the Channel. The eye is assailed by countless physical features each of which pronounce that the traveller has not only entered a different country but a different culture; a culture that is as different from the continent as a whole as the continental countries seem to be alike. The mainland, to British eyes, is thus always profoundly foreign. This sense of the profound foreigness of the continent was precisely reflected by Sir Anthony Eden when he told an American audience in 1952 that 'joining a European federation was 'something which we know in our bones we cannot do'.' It is also expressed in the crude, almost racialist, assertion that 'the wogs begin at Calais' which expresses not only the profound foreigness of the continent but also its inferiority. Such inferiority is not derived from the general culture - after all many millions of the British eagerly flock across the Channel every summer because they prefer the continent for their holidays. No, the origin of the inferiority is largely political. The British are immensely proud of their political tradition and value, above all, its stability. The four major states of Western Europe; Germany, France, Italy & Spain, all succumbed, the British note, to facism. Over the years, the continent seems to have been in constant turmoil while the UK has remained a serene constitutional monarchy. France, for example, has enjoyed five republics, two monarchies, two empires and a form of fascist dictatorship while Britain has remained a constitutional monarchy. This reverence for political stability cannot be over-emphasized and merits a minor diversion from the main thread of the discussion which begins by noting that reverence for stability leads to reverence for the system and its institutions. They must be appropriate otherwise how do we explain their longevity? No institution is more revered in Britain than Parliament and the key concept of parliamentary sovereignty. It is a concept that is profoundly hostile to any notion of power sharing whether it be decentralized or supra-national power. Undivided power concentration is thus the keystone of representative democracy for the British. To transfer any sovereignty out of the system to the EC, or anywhere else, is therefore peculiarly painful for the British and moreover smacks of non-democracy. This is the reason why Mrs Thatcher, without
batting an eyelid, was able to rail against the remoteness and bureaucracy of Brussels while at the same time strangling British local government.

The alien and unstable character of the continent in British eyes, has been re-enforced by the fact that it has always been the source of the greatest threats to the British polity and most of Britains wars in the modern era have originated on the continent, culminating in the slaughter of the two world wars. This is why, traditionally, Britain has always supped with a long spoon with the continent exploiting her peripherality by intervening when she felt threatened, but never getting permanently embroiled until the second world war. The key British policy aim was always a divided Europe for Britain has always thrived on such division and once the continent became united, Britain's influence and power have correspondingly waned. Here is one reason for British hostility to joining the EC, or supporting its further integration.

Resistance to European integration is thus fuelled by the feeling that joining is a major departure from this traditional, but highly successful posture of detachment. Much as the British have appreciated the need to cooperate militarily as a founder member of NATO so as to avoid the dangers of not cooperating so glaringly revealed in 1939-40, especially during the height of the Cold War, such long term entanglements have always been uncomfortable in the UK and were lent a touch of farce in British eyes when one of the major states in the alliance - France - on whose behalf such cooperation was said to be so essential, left NATO so peremptorily in the 1960s. That NATO had indeed moved into the realm of farce was confirmed when General Ailleret, De Gaulle's Chief of Defence Staff, announced triumphantly on French withdrawal that in future French nuclear weapons would be targeted in all directions - 'tous azimuts' - against the Americans as well as the Russians.

All in all, it may be said that a large part of British reluctance to become further integrated with the Community can be simply put down to a sense of political superiority. All British people over fifty grew up looking at a map of the world showing the vast expanse of the Empire - 'a fifth of the globe' - and whatever their own personal attitude towards that Empire, could not help musing as to why such a small island had acquired so
much salience in the world. There surely must be something distinctive - and superior - about Britain to explain such a phenomenon.

In this sense the British lack of interest in the E.C. is the reverse of that of the newly liberated East and Central European states, such as Hungary and Poland, which are so anxious to join it. In both countries the primary factor is broadly cultural. Joining the EC for Hungary, and especially Poland, is to underline both country's conception of themselves as being culturally part of Western Europe rather than the benighted East. The desire to join, in other words, forms part of an East-West continuum of cultural one-upmanship which begins with the Great Russians looking down on all beyond the Urals; the Byelo Russians looking down on the Great Russians; the Poles looking down on the Byelo Russians; the Germans looking down on the Poles, and the French looking down on the Germans. As the most westerly people on this continuum it is hardly surprising that the British merely look down on everyone else to the East. Hence, again, 'the wogs begin at Calais' vulgarism. But it does have another less crude dimension, and again the measure is essentially political. This is the claim that in the recurrent crises that have engulfed Europe during the evolution of the free, secular, democratic society, Britain has been the last redoubt that has ensured that such a society has survived against the depredations of some anti-libertarian orthodoxy from across the Channel whether it be post-Reformation Catholic authoritarianism, Buonarpartism, Wilhelmine megalomania, or Fascism. With this essentially political conception of its' own superiority, joining Europe for Britain had none of the urgent attraction of joining the cultural core that it has for the ex-Soviet satellites. For the British nationalist Britain is the core. Hence the famous British newspaper headline: 'Fog in Channel: Continent Cut-off.'

Such indifference to being part of the EC as an emblem of 'Western' politico-cultural superiority on the East European model is further enhanced by Britain's traditional role as a periphery, and a periphery, moreover, that has always exploited its peripherality rather than attempting to become part of that which it can never be more than on the margin of. Britain has always looked West rather than East; to the world at large rather than the continent, so that the British people have always taken more interest in and, via the
Empire and later the Commonwealth, been more involved with, the non-European world. This is what Churchill meant when in an oft-quoted declaration he asserted that if Britain had to choose between the continent and the open sea it would always choose the open sea. De Gaulle neatly captured this aspect of Britain's international posture:

'England is in fact insular, maritime, bound by her trade, her markets, her supplies, to countries that are very diverse and often very far away ..... then can England, as she lives, as she produces, as she trades, be incorporated in the Common Market?'

There is also the added attraction to the British of the rest of the world because it contains cultures directly derived from the U.K., so that most British people feel that they have more in common with an Australian, a New Zealander, or a Canadian - even, perhaps, an American - than they have with a Frenchman or an Italian. In 1974, some 59 per cent of respondents in a British national survey thought that they shared stronger links with the Commonwealth than the E.C. Part of these links are derived not simply from language and culture but also from blood ties. The vast majority of British people have relatives in one or other of the Commonwealth countries. Harold Wilson in a parliamentary debate on joining the E.C. once claimed that he had 45 blood relatives in New Zealand alone.

At the risk of exaggerating this aspect of the British psyche, it is the tendency to a world-wide perspective that often renders issues which seem to consume EC members as being rather parochial in British eyes. The British, for example, have less fear of a resurgent Germany than the French or the Low Countries. Moreover the Channel insulates them from the notion that national boundaries are merely human constructs that are increasingly redundant given the globalization of trading patterns. Nor did they respond very readily to the notion of Europe as a 'Third Force' between the two Super Powers. Set against current world issues, such as the increasing prosperity gap between First and Third World states, Moslem fundamentalism, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the apparently obsessional anxiety of EC members to dig themselves even deeper into a rich man's redoubt against the rest of the world seems to border on irresponsibility, or worse. In British eyes the EC also seems to be hopelessly rooted in the world of the 1940s. The
fact that integrationist moves such as the Maastricht Treaty are always undertaken in the
name of the ideal of greater internationalism and the submergence of nation state
chauvinism carries less weight on the Western side of the Channel, for these claims seem to
involve simply the substitution of national chauvinism for a new (West) European
chauvinism.

We shall return to this aspect of British attitudes later, at this stage in the discussion
we need to tackle another aspect of British scepticism which is directly related to the
ambiguity that clouds the question as to whether British E.C. membership is a blow for
internationalism or something else, and that is the role of pro. E.C. forces within Britain.
It has to be said in all frankness that the case for the EC has not been well served over the
years in the U.K. As the late Richard Crossman, a leading Labour Party luminary, once
remarked after a few visits to the Koenigswinter conference, an annual meeting in the
Bundesrepublik between the SPD and pro E.C. Labour party leaders. Crossman noted that
there seemed to be an inverse relationship among the British delegates between a passion
for the EC and knowledge of its working, or, indeed, much about continental Europe in
general. He concluded that the most devout British EC protagonists had extreme difficulty
even ordering a coffee in German. There can be no doubt that Crossman touched on an
important weakness of the pro-EC party in the UK, for all too frequently their cause
became a seductive way of acquiring an instant, ready-made internationalist, as opposed to
chauvinist, posture without the tedious necessity for any further discussion or argument.
Thus the case for the E.C. and its consequences too often degenerated into a claim that the
adherent was a 'committed European' which signalled that it was akin to a religious belief
so that further debate was ruled out in much the same way that discussion about the
existence of the deity is ruled out with a committed Christian.

One of the consequences of this degeneration of political discourse is that to be
doubtful about the EC is to be automatically dubbed by the pro EC party as a nationalist as
if the EC was the sole emblem of internationalism. Such distortion has caused intense
irritation among sceptics and has probably seriously harmed the EC. cause since Britain has
consistently, often with great trumpetings of self-congratulation, adopted as a national
policy a strongly internationalist posture for at least the last half century, as generations of
British tax payers are only too aware. In defence alliances with Europe, first with France
in the 1930s, and then with NATO, the UK has probably spent more of its public sector
expenditure on cooperative defence for a longer period than any other Western state and it
has consistently made a disproportionate contribution to NATO itself. It was a founder
member of the UN, as it was of the League of Nations. Via Bretton Woods, it was the co-
architect with the U.S. of the post-war resurgence of world trade that has so benefitted the
Community. It was a founder member of the IMF and the World Bank. Even on the
much narrower stage of Western Europe, it was a founder member of the European Courts
of Justice, the European Defence Community, OECD as well as NATO. Contrary to the
pro-EC party's jibe that Britain 'turned its back on Europe', it was a founder member of
EFTA so that when it became a member of the EC in 1973 it did not 'join Europe at last'
as the pro-EC party usually claim, but merely exchanged one European trade cartel for
another. And, moreover, it did so after fourteen years of frustrated attempts to join the
EC. Britain made its first formal application to join in 1958 just over a year after the
signing of the Rome Treaty, but it was rebuffed because it sought in joining to change the
EC to a free trade area in industrial goods. But it suffered a similar fate after two further
applications in the 1960s when it accepted the EC and its obligations tout court and was not
admitted until 1973. It need hardly be added that the EC's treatment of Britain over entry
did very little to endear it to the British. It was also a great embarrassment to pro EC
forces in the UK and they usually claimed that the summary rejections of Britain were
merely a quirk of General De Gaulle and not the policy of other member states. But this
explanation hardly satisfied British sceptics for how could it be, they asked, that Gauillist
hatred of the 'Anglo Saxons', who had, it seemed, committed the unpardonable sin for
such a proud and paranoiac man of not backing him and his tiny band of followers strongly
enough during the War be a case for exclusion? How, they asked, could the personal spite
of the leader of a member state become the policy of an organization which proclaimed
itself as being the acme of cooperation and internationalism and the antithesis of national
chauvinism? De Gaulle's rejection was publicly based on the assertion that Britain had a
too-close relationship with the US - more precisely the Kennedy-Macmillan agreement over Polaris. Yet to British eyes the U.S. was one of the principle architects of the Community and had used considerable diplomatic and financial pressure - particularly on the U.K. - to encourage its formation. It may, indeed, have been instrumental in Britain's volte-face in favour of entry in 1961. Moreover, viewed in a wider context, it was, the British remembered, America's massive participation in the Second World War which ensured the victory for democracy in 1945 without which there could never have been a Community, or, indeed, a free France. All in all, the rejection of the British applications looked discriminatory in British eyes and belied all the claims made on behalf of the Community as an internationalist organization. For some it even began to take on the colouration of an anti-British conspiracy.

This sense of the EC as being fundamentally anti-British was linked to another suspicion that the French were at the bottom of anti-British attitudes in Brussels. Not only had De Gaulle been the ostensible cause of all the British entry rejections, there was also the feeling that France plays a special and dominant role within the EC such that it appears at times as being almost a French organization - a kind of extension of the French state. This British perception was powerfully re-enforced during L'Affaire Greenpeace when in 1985 French secret agents blew up the Greenpeace boat Rainbow Warrior - which had been involved in attempts to thwart French nuclear bomb tests in the Pacific - in Auckland harbour, murdering one of the crew, Fernando Pereira, in the process. After many denials, the French government eventually admitted culpability, but not before it had made public threats against New Zealand, which had arrested two of the French agents responsible. These threats warned that France would seek to have re-examined the special concessions made by the EC allowing New Zealand agricultural products into the Community levy-free. That the French government should make any threats to the injured party in relation to such a scandalous act was somewhat surprising in British eyes. But that it should do so in relation to an economic agreement of another sovereign power merely underlined the suspicion that the EC was a French satellite; a suspicion re-enforced by the total silence of other member states on the French threat.
Despite all the evidence to the contrary, the debate within Britain about its 'late' entry to the EC has, somewhat surprisingly, always been structured in terms of Britain's wilful rejection of the Community and this ploy has tempted the pro-EC forces into a claim that has also probably done more harm than good to the EC cause. This is the assertion that if the EC has faults - the CAP is the usual butt of British criticism - that is because the British failed to join early enough. Had they been in at the start, so this argument runs, they could have shaped the Community to British interests and the millions of ecus that flow from Brussels into the coffers of continental agri-business would have flowed across the Channel instead. In a nutshell, latecomers can't be choosers. Thus the manifest faults of the EC became ruled out for discussion since they were nothing more than Britain's own fault! Such undergraduate society debating gambits, it need hardly be added, did little to help the EC cause in Britain especially since the rejection of Britain's three applications may be much more accurately interpreted in the reverse way. It was precisely because Britain as a member would never have agreed to the Common Agricultural Policy and its financing that it was kept out of the Community until the CAP was enshrined in EC legislation. That it would not have agreed to the CAP was made abundantly clear in its 1958 membership bid which sought to exclude agricultural protection from Community policy altogether as a condition of Britain joining. Confirmation that keeping Britain out until the CAP had been enshrined in EC legislation was the intention is underlined by two events. The first is that Britain's application was accepted only after the Treaty of Luxembourg had been agreed among the six in February 1970, which did so enshrine the CAP. Even more telling, the very conditions for entry which Britain had sought in its 1958 application were granted by Brussels to every one of its partners in EFTA - ie. a free trade area in industrial goods - after Britain had become a full member of the EC. Again there seems, in British eyes, to be a systematic animus towards Britain by the EC.

A British EC enthusiast might counter that the true starting date of Britain's failure to join early enough is not 1957, but the foundation of the Iron and Steel Community in 1951. However, that claim from a sceptics view leaves out of account a number of critical
aspects of the Iron and Steel Community for Britain. The first is that Britain's participation in the European trading system in iron and steel at the time was marginal. Joining or not joining, therefore was equally marginal. Secondly, the opening negotiations for the Community required that the negotiating national teams, as a condition of participation, accept the principle of supranationalism which entailed granting the British delegation a degree of discretion that no British Parliament would ever countenance. There was also the added difficulty that the British Labour Government had very recently fought a very arduous and contentious political campaign to nationalize the British steel industry so it could hardly then argue that having secured the industry 'for the nation' it now proposed to hand it over to a remote bureaucracy in Europe. Also, the Iron & Steel Community in 1951 did not look to British eyes like a proto supranational-government that would last, but more in the nature of a compensatory gesture to France enabling it to hitch its wagon to what it saw as the fearsome resurgence of German industrial might as a consolation prize for not being permitted to annex the Saarland against its citizens wishes.

Maladroit as much of the propaganda of the pro-EC school has been in Britain - to which must be included various governments of the day over the years - it would be unfair to saddle them with the whole blame for the persistence of British scepticism about the Community. They have had, after all, an immensely difficult row to hoe and that is not only because of the circumstances peculiar to the UK surrounding entry we have so far discussed, but simply because, unlike its fellow member states there never has been an obvious and undisputable gain for Britain in joining. This absence obviously presents a massive hurdle for the pro-EC school to surmount and their main and very dangerous strategy has been to invent advantages. The first of these was entirely speculative and claimed that because the economic growth rates of the six EC members had been faster than the UKs it followed that if Britain joined it, too, would attain comparable economic prosperity. British industry, it was argued, was out of date and protected and, by exposing it to the 'cold shower' of EC competition it would be stimulated into efficiency. It would also have an enlarged tariff-free market in which to sell its goods. These were the famous 'dynamic effects'. There are two problems with this theory which blunted
The persuasiveness of the original Six member states was equally in excess of Britains long before the EC was established. Moreover EC member states' economic growth rates actually declined after the formation of the Community. Another defect of the 'dynamic effects' claim is that growth rates of Britains partners in EFTA were even higher than the EC. If Britain was to be stimulated into efficiency by example by joining a trade cartel, then EFTA was a much better bet. Such was the welter of propaganda about the economic benefits of the UK leaving EFTA and joining the Community that the economic success of EFTA countries is rarely mentioned let alone discussed in the UK. Yet in 1990 the average index of GDP per capita when the EC average was 100 was some fifty per cent higher in EFTA at 151. The most evident weakness of the dynamic effects argument is simply that since membership the UK has manifestly not improved its' growth rate, indeed by the same measures that are part of the 'dynamic effects' claim it has declined economically since membership as we shall see. Given its manifest falsity the dynamic effects argument is now rarely heard but in the early days of the debate it was extremely prominent and no doubt played its part subsequently in tarnishing the pro EC case in Britain.

The second invented argument put forward by the pro-EC forces in the UK in favour of joining the EC was essentially political and it has been one of the most important. Briefly this argued that the EC constituted a major force in world politics that was constantly growing in prestige and influence. By joining, Britain would share in that power and influence. If it remained outside, however, it would be correspondingly side-lined into marginality on the world stage. As the 1971 White paper which preceded the successful British entry bid put the matter,

'The choice of Britain is clear. Either we choose to enter the Community and join in building a strong Europe on the foundations which the Six have laid; or we choose to stand aside from the great enterprise and seek to maintain our interests from the narrow - and narrowing - base we have known in recent years. As a full member of the Community we would have more opportunity and strength to influence events than we could possibly have on our own'
Mr Heath rammed home this thesis in the debate in the House of Commons prior to the 1973 entry. To reject the Community would, he claimed, be to,

'accept the situation in which vital decisions affecting all of us were taken in circumstances over which we had no control and little influence. This is a gamble which I as Prime Minister am not prepared to advise this House to take'.

Joining the EC, so this claim argues, would help to maintain Britain's status in world affairs and in that sense it was aimed directly at the heart of the anti EC school. Important as this claim has been for the pro-EC faction in the UK, it too has been overtaken by reality in recent years simply because the EC has manifestly not in British eyes been able to act concertedly on the world stage. One of the most notorious examples of this was the disarray within the Community over the UN sponsored war with Iraq. Whatever view is taken of the Iraq war, the EC proved itself incapable of either supporting it or condemning it. Even more telling has been its inability to tackle in a unified manner the bloody civil war in Yugoslavia. However, in the early days the 'EC is a world power' argument still carried weight in the UK and in order for the claim to stick it was absolutely essential to assert that the EC would not evolve into some form of federation since that would destroy the whole rationale of the argument. Clearly Minnesota, for example, does not have a greater influence in world affairs than Sweden because it is part of the world's greatest power, the U.S. federation. No, for the pro-EC school in the UK denying that the EC is moving to anything remotely resembling federalism was absolutely central to sustaining their one big argument for membership that carries weight with the majority of the British public. This is the reason why the negotiations at Maastricht in 1991 over sovereignty and the use of the bogey word 'federal' were so fraught in Britain and so puzzling to other member states. Maintaining the illusion that the EC is and will always remain a Europe des Patries was the only way Mr Heath could marshall enough of his own party into the 'yes' lobby in the early 1970s in support of entry, and his White Paper of 1971 made no bones about the matter. Community membership it insisted involved,
'no question of any erosion of essential national sovereignty; what is proposed is a sharing and enlargement of individual national sovereignties in the general interest.'

This claim is, however, an extremely difficult one to sustain and became increasingly difficult so to do in the late 1980s as the EC moved inexorably towards a federal system. Moving to a federal structure has, in any case, been explicitly built-in to the EC since the Rome Treaty via Article 138. Such a major handicap has never inhibited the pro-EC school in the UK. however, for, as we have noted, it destroys their one big case for British membership. Emphasis has therefore always been placed on what is defined as the crucial safeguard of the unanimous voting requirement. This requirement; known in Europe as the 'Luxembourg Accorde' but in Britain as the 'Luxembourg Compromise', was the product of De Gaulles threatened withdrawal from the EC in 1965. The Accorde granted the right of a member state to a veto and was the ploy adopted for bringing France back into the EC. It has become a veritable life line for the pro EC party in the UK since it provides them with the claim that Britain could always exercise a veto over any decision of which it disapproved. Both the key importance of this so-called safeguard and the gross misinterpretation of the ultimate intentions of the Rome Treaty are nicely caught in Mr Heath's statement to the House of Commons in 1961 which was at the time somewhat perplexed to be told that the application to join without conditions, that had been utterly impossible two years previously, was now absolutely essential,

'In the Treaty of Rome itself there is no commitment either explicit or implicit leading to any particular form of constitutional development over the Rome Treaty. That is quite clear .... If we were to go into it, there would be no obligation on us to accept any particular view. Nationally, we should then be able to use our influence in any developments of that kind which took place. The important thing is that none of this can happen unless there is either an extension of the Treaty of Rome with additional Articles added to it, or there is a new Treaty. Both of, these things have to be done by unanimous consent.'

As the journalist Andrew Alexander asserted at the time in the Daily Telegraph, a staunchly pro-Conservative government newspaper, the claim that joining the EC would mean no loss of sovereignty for Britain was, 'A plain lie. There is no other word for it.'
To paraphrase Mr Alexander, the lying has continued and in the House of Commons debate over the Single European Act of 1985 the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher declared,

'We have fought for the British right to a veto. Where we have unanimity in the treaty, it is inbuilt in the unanimity rules. Otherwise, we still fight for the Luxembourg compromise with one modification: that when it is used, the right of vital national interests should be clearly expressed.'

The illusion that joining the EC would never involve loss of sovereignty has then been a vital claim in the debate over British membership. This is why it was so imperative for Mr Major to conjure up what could be described as a British veto out of the negotiations at Maastricht, despite the fact that the whole intent of the Treaty was to accelerate the integrative process. Mr Major has gone one better than his predecessors and even claimed that the Maastricht agreement reveals a decline in the integration of the Community:

'Many of the issues which are most problematic for us are ones that arise from the application of the original Treaty of Rome not the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty marks the point at which for the first time we have begun to reverse that centralising trend. We have moved decision taking back towards the member states in areas where Community law need not and should not apply.'

Indeed, Mr Major's creative capacities on EC issues far outstrip his predecessors at No 10 for not only does he claim that integration is really disintegration, but he has turned the tables on orthodox Brussels opinion by re-defining one of its favourite concepts - subsidiarity - not as a weapon against the nation state as it was originally formulated in social Catholic doctrine, but against the EC itself. Subsidiarity in Mr Major's hands has now become a slogan for dismantling Brussels, and a new pro-EC case is beginning to emerge in Britain which is likely to lay up untold hostages to fortune in British-Brussels relations in the future - Britain must remain a staunch adherent of the Community in order to ensure that it can be dismantled!

Before we leave what may be called the political case of the British eurosceptics, another source of their unease with the Community must be mentioned and this is the British inability to comprehend continental democratic practices. To British eyes, most of
its partners in the Community seem to have only a faltering grasp of the tenets of authentic representative democracy. This is not simply the sense of outrage the British feel at the activities of M. Delors who as Chairman of the Commission is a civil servant pure and simple in their eyes, but who seems to make major policy on his own initiative as he flits from capital to capital promoting the cause of supranationalism. This is not the way civil servants should behave in an ostensibly democratic organization according to the British. His behaviour confirms their worst suspicions about the bureaucratized shortcomings of democracy continental style. Bureaucratization is the characteristic of Brussels administration most frequently cited in Britain in its disfavour, especially in terms of its alleged love of unnecessary and inexplicable controls and regulations. As usual in such portrayals the marginal and trivia are well to the fore. There are, for example, recurrent furores over attempts by Brussels to regulate in the name of authenticity the more doubtful contents of British ice cream, beer and sausages. The most notorious example of such Brussels intervention, however, had nothing to do with the British passion for adulteration but concerned the abolition of 1,400 vegetable varieties out of 3,000 under the Common Catalogue. To a nation of obsessional gardeners this was utterly intolerable and is still remembered with great bitterness as a prime example of the idiocy of 'the faceless bureaucrats of Brussels'.

Shocking as bureaucratic excess in general and Mr Delors antics in particular seem in the UK, they are not the primary source of British displeasure with the EC governmental style. British unease with the continental version of democracy goes deeper. They peer in puzzlement through the swirling mists across the North Sea to most of their partners and do not see what they regard as the sine qua non of modern democracy - the direct confrontation between government and electorate that forces the former to state and defend its position unambiguously and to take full and unqualified responsibility for it. All the institutions of representative government, they note, seem to be in place among their partners and they are usually backed by immaculately democratic constitutions, but what goes on between the institutions is not the strong and accountable government system they know and love but, rather, a swamp of coalitions, bargaining, factionalism, and
obfuscation, the whole to their eyes also seems to be suffused with clouds of meaningless rhetoric. When the British discovered that, despite all the tub thumping about the glories of a more perfect Community at Maastricht, not one of their eleven partners had even bothered to debate in their home states the primordial issues they were so blithely embracing they were, of course, dismayed but not wholly surprised. No more surprised, that is, than when they discovered that the Bundestag had not even voted on West Germany's accession to the EC in 1957. It has to be emphasized that one of the key reasons for Britain's scepticism about the EC is that many British have a deep distrust of continental political practices.

Britain is Different - the Historical Case

So much for the more direct political reasons for British scepticism about the Community, we now come to the rather more historical and indirect, but no less important, reasons for British different stance as compared with other member states, especially the founding Six. We have to begin with what may be called the 'Allied' version of the Second World War which specified a brutally expansionist Germany that had crushed and enslaved Western Europe thus creating 'a prison house of fascism'. The gallant occupied countries however, despite the iron heel of the dictator on their throats, inspired by the Allied ideal of democracy and their hatred of fascism, fought back against their alien oppressor so that their glorious liberation became almost a partnership between General Eisenhower's armies and the local resistance groups.

It would be idle to deny that this account does have some truth to it, but the central weakness of this account is that it hopelessly understates the extent to which many West Europeans did not regard the German invasion as enslavement and were very far from seeing the glorious allies as a beacon of hope until late 1942 when Germany was clearly on the run. Nor did the German occupation automatically unite the separate occupied states into an anti-fascist alliance. Some West European states - Austria and Italy - were, of course, Hitler's close allies. The terms of the Armistice in 1940 virtually rendered the Petain government - i.e. official France - as an ally rather than an enemy of the Reich as
well. Indeed, except for Norway, the other West European states - Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark - offered merely token resistance and very quickly thereafter came to some form of accommodation with the German occupier. Thus by July 1940, if there was any unity in Western Europe it was most definitely not based on the need to control the threat to democracy and freedom in the shape of the German oppressor, but, rather, on a new supra-national order for the defence of civilized and Christian society against Bolshevism and social insurrection from a communist-inspired Left. After Hitler attacked Russia this anti-Bolshevik unity was, of course, powerfully re-enforced. Only a recalcitrant Britain remained outside this new European order wilfully prolonging the conflict, and deliberately stirring up and aiding Communist subversion and later delivering death and destruction from the air on continental cities.

It can be argued that the occupied countries had no choice when the Wehrmacht invaded, they either did a deal or faced annihilation from the stukas and panzers. But real as the capacity of the Wehrmacht was for death and destruction, it does not explain the heroic resistance of Yugoslavia or Poland or Russia; or, indeed the tenacious resistance of the French and Belgian armies during the First World War. There was, in short, a critical ingredient to the West European collapse and acquiescence in 1940 and in order to understand that we need to push even further back in history to the Spanish Civil War. Viewed through the after-glow of the fascist defeat in 1945, that war is usually seen, especially in the Anglo-saxon world (so misled by Orwells' Homage to Catalonia), as a massive failure of the democracies to come to the rescue of their brother democracy the beleaguered Spanish Republic. In their craven policy of appeasing facism, so this version of events runs, they allowed Franco with the help of Hitler and Mussolini, to crush democracy. The Spanish Civil War was thus a deep democratic tragedy in which morally corrupt Western leaders sacrificed Spanish democracy on the altar of their own countries' self interest. The key, and erroneous, assumption in this version of the Spanish Civil War is that the Second Spanish Republic was just another Western democracy. In reality, however, it was very far from that in the sense that at the outbreak of hostilities in 1936 it was partly in the hands of the anarchists and their allies who had nothing but contempt for
'Western democracy' and as revolutionaries were strongly wedded to violence to solve political problems and they were moreover, more than willing to use it when resisting Franco's coup or ruthlessly eliminating those whom they defined as his allies. The image of the Spanish Civil War for bourgeois, especially Catholic, Europe at the time was not of a tragedy but a triumph for it meant that the forces of order and Christian civilization had succeeded over a murderous rabble of Communists and their dupes. For them the emblem of the war was manifestly not the terror bombing of Guernica by the Nazi Condor Legion which so stirred the Liberal imagination, but the raping of nuns, the murder of priests and the burning of churches by anarchist patrols. Precisely how many priests were actually killed, nuns raped and churches burnt remains to some extent problematic. Clearly Nationalist and Catholic propaganda grossly exaggerated the more spine-chilling activity of the Republican side during the great working class uprising in the summer of 1936 and correspondingly played down insurgent excesses. Yet it would be wrong to assume that the stories which flooded the West European media in the summer of 1936 about Republican excesses were all lies. Churches were burned. Cattell quotes an official communique by Gill Robles in June 1936 to the effect that 160 churches had been destroyed and 257 damaged. Borkenau notes that at Barcelona 'all the churches had been burnt' and this conclusion is confirmed in Jackson. Also priests were most definitely murdered. Carr gives a figure of 6,832. Fraser states that 272 priests and 425 'regular clergy' were assassinated in Barcelona alone and Jackson gives an aggregate figure of 6,800 'religious personnel' being the victims of anarchist terror. There seems to be no reliable figures for nun raping, but indiscriminate slaughter was rife in the summer of 1936. Borkenau states, 'hundreds and thousands were killed in the first days' and Jackson claims that there were 86,000 assassinations of alleged enemies of the Republic in the Republican zone including 1,000 Civil Guards. Francquista repression was almost certainly worse, if only because it had to conquer and suppress its enemy as it slowly expanded its base, but bestiality was a hallmark of the whole war and the key fact to note is that of the Republican part in it was conveyed in the most lurid and exaggerated terms to an appalled West
European audience by the considerable forces of the nationalist and Catholic propaganda machine.

The war was a frightening reminder to the West European middle class that the dreaded Bolshevik revolution did not expire in 1918 in Petrograd, but was an ever-present threat throughout Europe. The Spanish Civil War was merely an extension of such Communist subversion and the Republican government was always defined in Nationalist propaganda as a Moscow puppet. Just as Mussolini and Hitler justified their smashing of their own Parliamentary regimes as a pre-emptive strike to save civilized order from Bolshevism, so did Franco and his allies so justify his own rising. If French civilians murdered officers of their own army in 1940 who persisted in resisting the Wehrmacht, as they assuredly did, such civilians did so not because of any love of Germany, but because Blum's Popular Front and the great sit in strikes of 1936 were for them a frightening reminder that the same forces of Moscow-dominated working class anarchy and murder that convulsed the Spanish Republic were lurking in France. It was pointless resisting Hitler's army in 1940 because it was not the real enemy. While the Soviet Union, the root cause of the working class threat, was at the gates of Europe all good Christians must unite. A Hitlerite occupation was much the lesser of two evils. It is not until after El Alamein and Stalingrad, when the Wehrmacht no longer seemed to be invincible, that we may perceive the end of this Spanish Civil War-inspired collaborationist phase on Western Europe in the name of Christian order and the beginning of that united resistance to German occupation so beloved of Allied propaganda. But even as late as April 1944, that is to say barely three months before D Day, Petain - the arch exponent of collaboration who bitterly hated the British for not following in 1940 the French capitulatory posture visited Paris and was greeted by a massive adulatory crowd.

Not only was the European bourgeoisie sympathetic to Nazism as a bastion against Communist subversion, they were also impressed by Hitler's economic record. Massive unemployment had, it seemed, been eliminated within a couple of years of his accession and Germany seemed to be embarked on what could only be described as national regeneration. The photos of bands of smiling blonde volunteers of the Labour Corps shouldering their
shovels to build the magnificent new autobahnen contrasted sharply with the appalling disarray of the capitalist archetypes, the US and the UK, with their destitute 5th Avenue apple sellers and the shocking degradation of industrial Britain. If there was a touch of unease about Nazi Jewish policy, the continental middle class was hardly renowned for its pro-semitism. After all, seemed to be the reaction, all good things in politics, as in other spheres, had their price.

The relative popularity of Nazi Germany in Europe in the early phase of the war is perhaps most tellingly exemplified by the attitude of the Irish Republic which was not in any sense vulnerable to German invasion but which refused what was for it the greatest prize of all - a united Ireland - when offered it secretly by Churchill in 1940, rather than fight Germany which was Churchill's price for Irish unity.

On a wider front, the most revealing indicator of the relative popularity of Fascism in continental Europe, what amounts to something like an acid test, is to compare the size of the volunteer army fighting for democracy in Spain in the 1930s and the similar volunteer army fighting for fascism against Soviet Russia on the Eastern Front from 1941-45. Never during the course of the Spanish Civil War did the International Brigades exceed 40,000 men and their maximum strength at any one time was probably 20,000. That total includes it must be remembered, British, Canadian and American contingents. Although rarely given the attention accorded to the International Brigades, the volunteer element fighting alongside the Wehrmacht in Russia during the Second World War was much more numerous. In order to get an accurate measure we must exclude Germany's formal allies. The Spanish Republic, of course, had no formal allies from the camp of democracy in its fight. Altogether some 1.3 million non-German citizens fought at the frontline on behalf of Germany in the Soviet Union. Germany's formal allies included the formidable Finish army of 400,000 men so efficiently bottling up the starving and decimated Leningraders in the North. Also to be excluded is the massive 700,000 strong Hungarian army, the 267,000 strong Roumanian army, plus over a quarter of a million Italians and the various brigades and regiments from the Nazi puppet republics of Slovakia and Croatia. We may add to the excluded group, although many were clearly
voluntary, the half a million Ostruppen, i.e. combat units of Soviet citizens organized by the German army against their own country. For many of them fighting for Germany was the only way of avoiding slow starvation in German prisoner-of-war camps.

The largest voluntary contingent on the Eastern Front was the Spanish Blue Division of 47,000 to which must be added 9,000 Dutch, 5,000 French, 2,000 Walloons, 1,600 Flemish and odd battalions of volunteer Danes and Norwegians, Swiss and Swedes. To these must be added the voluntary Hilfeswillige, or hiwis who were attached to the German armed forces; that is to say, volunteer foreign auxiliaries - sentries, guards and traffic police. At least 160,000 hiwis served on the Eastern Front and in serving released the same number of Germans for frontline duty. A similar substitute role was played by non-German West European civilians who volunteered to work in the Reich. For example, by 1941, 103,000 Danes had so volunteered as had 93,000 Dutch.

The East Front army fighting for Germany against the Soviet Union was, in short, a European army in the full sense of the word and in that respect was the real descendant of NATO rather than General Eisenhower's largely Anglo-Saxon army on the Western Front. Indeed it was more European than NATO since it included a huge Finish contingent plus Swiss and Swedish units, something NATO has never achieved. Curiously enough, the most Hitlerite elements in the Wehrmacht - the Waffen SS - were the most European. This was because the SS was forbidden from recruiting first class German citizens until the army, the airforce and navy had taken their pick. Non-Germans and third class volksdeutsch were therefore recruited in large numbers by the S.S. Thus in the massacre of Oradour sur Glan perpetrated by the SS on French civilians in a particularly dreadful manner, fourteen of the twenty storm-troopers prosecuted were French citizens.35 To sum up so far, by the acid test of voluntary front line duty, anti-Communism, if not outright pro-facism, was vastly more popular in continental Europe in the early 1940s than democracy.

To cut a long and sad story short, once Western Europe was liberated in 1945 a very large proportion of its population - the vast majority of the population in Germany, Austria and Italy - faced a dilemma; everything they had fought for or supported was now
destroyed. Yet the Soviet Union, the principle object of their enmity, not only persisted but was now camped out in the back garden of Western Europe. The need to follow Hitler's precept of uniting against the common threat in the East was even greater than when he ruled, yet the Soviet Union was in alliance with the conquering Allies. Luckily, the onset of the Cold War rescued them from their dilemma for it re-cast them overnight from fascists and collaborators into freedom fighters on behalf of democracy and freedom, the very ideals they had previously fought so assiduously against. The most curious example of this Pauline conversion process is provided in 1945 when the new French, post-Liberation government decided that the Vichy armed forces, more than 200,000 of whom had fought in the Axis cause against the Allies, and various French fascist militias could purge their error by joining the new French army. In consequence at the great victory parade in celebration of the Liberation on July 14th the army that marched past General De Gaulle's saluting box in the Champs Elysee comprised many units that had fought the Allies, plus sundry died-in-the-wool fascists.36

It must be conceded that collaboration with the Nazi's was not solely determined by ideological factors or class interests. Fear also encouraged cooperation rather than resistance and the more repressive the regime the greater the fear. Thus in 1941 the extraordinary spectacle of a quarter of a million Czechs gathered in Wenceslas Square in Prague giving the Heil Hitler salute and swearing allegiance to the Third Reich37 was not in any sense derived from the threat of the social revolution so much as the sheer naked fear engendered by the unbelievably savage reprisals meted out by German occupying forces following the assassination of Heydrich, the German appointed 'Protector' of Czechoslovakia. The swift rehabilitation of the ex-fascists and collaborators' in the name of anti-communism, with Italy re-defined as one of the Allies and Austria as an oppressed victim of Nazism, proved conclusively that they had been right all along in supporting Hitler against the Eastern hordes. They realized, in short, that they had as J Lee Ready has put it, 'not done the wrong thing but had done the right thing at the wrong time'.38 Western Europe was now united, against the real common foe, as Hitler had always
wished, so the ex-fascists and collaborators were no longer outcasts but the far-seeing progenitors of the new united Europe.

Thus European unity in all of its forms - NATO, the EC, WEU - has always been inextricably bound up with winning over the collaborator and ex-fascists to the new democratic order and diminishing his sense of guilt. Reciprocally, a united Europe has always signalled for the genuine anti-fascists political forgiveness, of turning over a new leaf, of rejecting chauvinism and burying for ever the deeply embarrassing events of the early 1940s. In this way the supra national ideal of a united Europe in continental European countries has always carried with it unstated values of profound importance for not just for the growth of the EC, but also the success of the new democratic order in each state, especially, of course, the ex-Axis states. What cannot be emphasized too strongly, and this brings us back to the main thread of the discussion, is that neither of these vital consequences of the Cold War applies in Britain. Luckily, the Channel saved Britain from German occupation although it should never be forgotten that until Churchill became Prime Minister, the British government was still hoping for a compromise deal with Hitler which would end the war. Nor must it be forgotten that the behaviour of that part of the UK that was occupied - the Channel Isles - is now being revealed as having been not all that different from any other part of occupied Europe. But there has been a long official cover up of this unpalatable fact and it has never registered in the British mind which tends to see collaboration among the continental countries during the war as yet another example of their inferiority. For Britain, then, there were simply no collaborationists to be re-integrated and also nothing to forgive or forget. Quite the contrary, for the British the War is a glorious memory of their own country as the last bastion of democracy, standing alone against the Nazi steamroller. To bury the second world war and its consequences is, then, to diminish the British self-styled role as the saviour of Europe. The conscious rejection of national chauvinism which was so vital to the European ideal in continental Europe - Monnets' central appeal as it were - also had barely an echo in Britain. British resistance to Hitler in 1940 would have been impossible without a direct appeal to British nationalism as Churchill fully understood and exploited.
Similarly, another linked but usually unstated objective associated with European unity that has very little relevance in Britain is the ultramontane notion of the Community as the re-creation of medieval Christendom. Moreover, a Christendom that is now on the correct side, after the Church's somewhat doubtful doctrinal wanderings during the 1930s and 1940s. This is the vision of a democratic Catholic Europe that so inspired De Gasperi, Ardenaur and Schumann, the founding fathers of the Community. Their vision, however inspiring to millions of continental European citizens, had a somewhat negative impact in Britain. If anything, it made the Community even less appealing, for if Catholicism was in bed with facism in the 1930s and 1940's it would not be the first time that the Church had aided, inspired and abetted an external threat to Britain as the beacon of the emergent free society, beginning with Phillip II. We may conclude this section of the paper by emphasizing that some of the core motivations that underlay the creation of the EC in much of Western Europe had no relevance and may have had negative effects in Britain.

The British Economic Case Against the Community

We must now turn to a discussion of the economic rather than the political and historical determinants of British scepticism towards the Community. The first economic factor to note is that, unlike the original Six members of the Community, Britain's pattern of trade lay mainly outside continental Europe when it joined whereas for the Six creating a tariff-free cartel had a clear logic since the majority of each members trade fell within the total membership. Not so Britain which at the time of its entry in 1973 had only 14 percent of its trade with the original six member states. The UK, moreover, already formed part of a trading partnership - the British Commonwealth - with which it conducted some 40 percent of its trade. This fact was one of the principle reasons given for not signing the Rome Treaty in 1957. As Macmillan, then Chancellor the Exchequer, told the Commons in 1956,

'I do not believe this House would ever agree to our entering arrangements which, as a matter of principle, would prevent our treating the great range of imports from the Commonwealth at least as favourably as those from European countries.'
Reginald Maudling, then Paymaster General, who had been responsible for the first British entry bid in 1958 put the matter even more succinctly in 1959:

'We could not contemplate any system of working with Europe which was at the expense of our ties with the Commonwealth.'

In short, joining the EC always meant from the creation of the Iron and Steel Community in the early 1950s to actual membership in 1973, joining a trade cartel which was marginal to the British economy and in this sense Britain's position was fundamentally different from the rest of the Community. It also meant a severing of the benefits of Commonwealth preference whereby Britain was able to import foodstuffs and raw materials at preferential prices. It has to be noted that joining also involved a lowering of industrial goods tariffs thus, as it were, 'enticing' competing member states of the EC into the British market. This enticement effect is best exemplified by the dramatic change in the EC trading relationship with the UK since it joined. The negative balance of trade with the rest of the EC rose from $-237m in 1970 to a massive $-3,600m in 1980, i.e., a fourteen fold increase. There is little evidence here of the EC being a stimulus to British industry, the famous 'dynamic effects' we discussed earlier, rather the reverse. But the non-European character of Britains' trading patterns when it joined has diminished as British exporters have adjusted to the benefits of tariff free entry to the EC market. It was this change that, it will be remembered, was supposed to be the stimulus - the 'cold shower' - to British industry rendering it more efficient and achieving faster growth. But no such stimulus seems to have occurred. In the period 1979-91 the UK ranked sixteenth out of the 19 OECD countries in terms of the growth of exports of manufactures. For all exports it was twenty second out of 24 OECD countries. The UKs share of world manufactured exports has also declined steadily since it joined the EC. It also has had almost the lowest growth of manufacturing exports over the period 1979-91 among 21 OECD states. The cold shower of entry far from stimulating seems to have produced a nasty case of pneumonia. In a nutshell, Britain's entry to the EC seems to have had no beneficial effects on the UK.
economy. In a very sober and rather pro-EC summary of the economic effects of entry for Britain, Grant has concluded 'there is no evidence of any benefits being generated'.

But if the UK has not benefitted industrially from entry, it has suffered even worse on the agricultural side: not in production terms but in terms of the monetary costs to the UK. of membership. In order to comprehend just how costly the ECs agricultural policies have been for the UK, it has to be emphasized that at the time of entry Britain had to import fifty percent of the food it consumed; that is to say enough foodstuffs to feed about twenty eight million people every day. This made it the biggest single open food market in the world and in the competition between suppliers Britain benefitted by being able to buy food as cheaply as anywhere in the world. In this way it was thought to enjoy a crucial comparative advantage as a competitor itself in world markets. Cheap food inevitably became almost an axiomatic policy pursued by all British governments. With the enshrinement of the CAP in the EC in February 1972, the Community was wedded to the antithesis of Britain's agricultural policy for it sought not only to keep non-member agricultural goods out of the EC so that Britain's trade with the rest of the world in agricultural products would be penalized, but the CAP also maintained agricultural prices within the EC at higher than world prices. It is impossible to conceive a system more unsuited to Britains traditional trading policies.

Not only was the CAP singularly inappropriate for the UK, and as such constituted a massive reason for not joining the EC, the British food market was also an enormous potential bargaining counter. With Britain as a member, the agricultural exporting states in the EC now had the huge British market to themselves. Britain, in short, added a 'second stomach' to the Community plus providing a saviour for the ever-burgeoning costs of the CAP. Britain's accession meant a new major CAP paymaster. For not only has Britain been required to pay a fixed percentage of its VAT yield to the EC, it has also had to pay taxes on every ounce of food it imported from outside the Community. In the negotiations for British entry in 1972 the bonanza which British entry offered to other member states seems rarely to have been discussed and the British posture was always one of the supplicant seeking merely to moderate the effects of the CAP. Indeed, far from exploiting Britains
trump cards - the 'second stomach' argument - Mr Heath and his colleagues soon gave up even haggling over the UK's contribution to the CAP and decided that the key desideratum was to get in and leave negotiations over finances for a later date. They did, however, ensure that concessions were wrung from Brussels on New Zealand agricultural imports and for Caribbean sugar. But this was the very least Mr Heath could extract from Brussels if he was to remain in power for New Zealand's wholly agriculture-dependent economy was based on the British market, especially for lamb, cheese and butter and no less than 70% of its exports went to the UK. If British entry had bankrupted New Zealand, Heath would have been politically doomed. After all, in British eyes, New Zealand had made a bigger relative contribution militarily to the creation of a free Europe than any of the Six who seemed to be so intent on cutting its economic throat in the Brussels negotiations. Not even Mr Heath's breezy enthusiasm for the Community, which meant he always downplayed the CAP, could have absolved him from the obligation to save the New Zealand economy. But by acquiescing on the rest of the financial conditions for Britain's entry, Mr Heath left a legacy of massive net payments across the currencies by Britain into the coffers of the CAP. His attitude to this legacy was to mercilessly attack Mrs Thatcher, with what can only be called consummate chutzpah, whenever she strived to reduce the massive British financial contribution he had negotiated.

In order to soften the initial blow of entry, Britain was allowed a transitional period before it paid its full dues. By 1991, however, when these transitional arrangements had come to an end, Britains net contribution was £2,078m which made it second only to Germany as the funder of the CAP. But, unlike Germany, the UK. was one of the poorest members of the Community (the second lowest) as measured by income per capita. There was, in short, a major issue of equity and it was only Mr. Wilsons tenacity under pressure from his own party to 'renegotiate' Britain's entry in the mid-1970s and Mrs Thatchers own inimitable brand of obduracy later which wrought concessions from Brussels in the form of rebates, thus moderating the inequity of Britains payments position. By the early 1990s, therefore, the net loss to the UK is less than it was originally, although the UK still remained second to Germany in the size of its net contribution to the CAP such that in
early 1992 a family of four in the UK paid about £18 a week on average more for food than it would have done if Britain was not a member of the EC. This is a massive and highly regressive tax burden and scarcely adds to the allure of Brussels for the British voter.

Of course, all Western states have to subsidize their agricultural sector, so the CAP is hardly unique. Nor does the CAP entail the highest subsidies in world terms and in 1991 was in fact one percentage point below the OECD average for the percentage of farmers incomes attributable to government subsidy. But the British case against the CAP is not simply its unfairness, but also that it is a very irrational subsidy system since it directly encourages over-production so that there is a built-in tendency to cost expansion. Between 1967 and 1982 the cost of financing the CAP rose ten fold. The CAP system of price rather than income support has also meant that in order to cope with massive overproduction the EC resorts to dumping on world markets. The only alternative is highly expensive and non-revenue producing storage. Such dumping has severe distorting effects on world markets which are of two kinds. The first is that some EC products so dumped could be much more cheaply and efficiently produced by Third World countries. Such products include rice, sugar, tobacco, citrus fruit and animal feedstocks. In this sense the CAP denies Third World countries the possibility of earning foreign currency for the only products which they can trade on world markets. The second effect of EC dumping is simply to depress prices for all the produce it dumps. Again Third World countries tend to suffer most. The EC is not, it must be conceded, the only dumper of agricultural produce on world markets, the U.S.A. is also a major indulger in the same practices. But the US agricultural subsidy programmes are substantially smaller than those of the EC and account for only 27 percent of US farm incomes as compared with 38 percent for EC farms. But, not only is the CAP objectionable to the British because of its sheer scale and irrational character, there is also the fact that all other farm subsidy systems are the natural outcomes of political systems within each individual state. Thus the US government subsidizes its agriculture as a natural consequence of the power of American farmers. And its scale and impact on world markets is the inevitable consequence of the size of the
United States. To British eyes, it is something quite different when twelve of the richest countries in the world came together and deliberately create a subsidy and a dumping mechanism which has such damaging effects on the very poorest countries. The British are not placated by the existence of special programmes initiated by the EC of aid to Third World countries under the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions since these are an unnecessarily bureaucratic way of combatting what is in effect a pricing problem. They are also neo-colonialist and seems to have its origins in an attempt to bind Francophone Africa to metropolitan France as they had to humanitarian objectives. Above all, such formalized aid despite its high profile in public relations terms, is utterly marginal for it accounted for only 3 percent of EC expenditure in 1987.49

A further defect of the CAP in British eyes is its vulnerability to corrupt practices and fraud. In a major enquiry on fraud in the EC a House of Lords Committee has estimated that up to £6 billion of EC expenditure could be fraudulent50 and they comment that 'the level of reported fraud is no more than the tip of the iceberg. Those areas of Community income and expenditure revealed astonishing deficiencies in administration suggesting a high level of fraud'. As the Committee also report, the main source of fraud is the CAP, especially the FEOGA i.e., the guaranteed price system, intervention buying, production aids, export refunds and monetary compensation amounts.

All in all, the economic effects of British membership of the Community have been even more influential in determining British scepticism than the political and the core economic deficiency is the CAP. In 1992, under strong pressure from the GATT, some key changes in the CAP have been agreed which shift subsidies away from price support and although this change will reduce surpluses and thus some of Britain's criticisms of the CAP, in terms of storage costs and world market distortion and discrimination against Third World countries little is changed. Moreover, this change will not reduce the British contribution since surpluses will be avoided by paying farmers compensation for lost production so that expenditure on the CAP will increase.
Other changes will also be occurring in the CAP as a consequence of the EC at last coming to an agreement over the Uruguay Round of GATT in 1992. But the British note that it is very far from being dismantled and will remain overwhelmingly the most important task of the Community absorbing almost seven times the expenditure of any other EC programme. In practice, the CAP, viewed from the Western side of the Channel, also seems to be disturbingly popular in Brussels. As such it was defended, they note, in the prolonged GATT negotiations with the same implacable obduracy that it was defended in the negotiations over British entry despite the fact that the failure of the Uruguay Round spelled disaster for world trade. How, argue the British, can such a ramshackle, corrupt and irrational set of policies that seem to have the sole purpose of making rich farmers and rich countries richer and one so patently hostile to amicable relations with the rest of the world be defended? Understandable as such a question may be, in asking it British eurosceptics merely reveal how remote they still are from the inner soul of the Community. For in reality the CAP is very much more than an agricultural subsidy system and like the aspiration to supranationalism which, as we have seen, the British also get wrong, it is a cherished icon of the Community deriving its hallowed status from the fact that it has always gone hand in hand with the integration process. This link began with the acceptance of common cereal prices, which made monetary union essential, through the allocation of CAP levies and duties being allocated as the Commissions own revenues to the potential collapse of the Community when De Gaulle threatened the withdrawal of France if its demands for retaining and widening the CAP were not met. Too much blood, sweat and tears have been expended by the original Six over the years in late night negotiations, 'clock stopping', and lengthy wrangles, for the CAP to be treated other than as a vital part of the Community. The CAP, in short, is no less than the cement that binds the original Franco-German alliance derived from a bargain struck between the two powers whereby Germany agreed to pay reparations to France, suitably disguised to meet modern tastes, in return for France smoothing the path, via the Community, for Germany's return to the comity of nations.
It would be wrong to exaggerate the link between the CAP and the Franco-German foundation alliance since the CAP's importance has steadily grown over the years. It is now, for example, central to the Irish economy and the Netherlands is a massive beneficiary. Moreover, Italy's commitment to supranationalism, enshrined in its Constitution, also undermines its capacity to question anything so communautaire as the CAP. Finally, Belgium's interests are so tied up with the CAP that it alone among member states, publicly defended the French attack on the EC-GATT agreement and its threat to rescind that agreement. To conclude this section of the paper, we may say that Britain's industrial failure since entry and the CAP and its ramifications comprise yet another massive difference in attitudes to the EC between the UK and the rest of the Community.

The Future

The Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty constitute a new dynamic in EC integration that up to the Danish and French referendums in 1992 had been running strongly throughout Western Europe since the mid-1980s. In Britain, however, this dynamic had the effect of intensifying scepticism about the Community and the main sources of such scepticism was an inability to understand why the integrative dynamic arose; it seemed in British eyes to have no logical basis and strong British disquiet led to Mrs Thatcher's outburst at Bruges. Part of the reason for this incomprehension, as we have already noted, is the long-standing self-deception in British politics about the federalist intentions of the Community which go back to the Rome Treaty and even to the Coal and Steel Community. Nevertheless, there also seemed to British eyes a certain manic quality to the dynamic which involved a great deal of windy rhetoric and unsubstantiated assertions about world forces and the inevitability of integration that tends to grate on British ears.

One British interpretation for what they regard as a kind of integrative angst among their partners is that some member states can see the Community heading for a major crisis of over-expansion. Further integration, in short, becomes a method of regulating and
perhaps avoiding expansion. The over expansion threat comes, first, from the ex-EFTA members who having made a deal with the EC in 1992 creating a new wider market in industrial goods, the European Economic Area, were required to make so many concessions in the negotiations that they have concluded they might as well go the whole hog and become full members. In addition, there are the ex-Communist satellites who are very anxious to join as soon as possible, and then, finally, the new states created out of the break up of the Soviet Union all of whom have expressed interest in joining to varying degrees. In all, some 31 new potential members. The ex EFTA new members will, by definition, be much less committed to the kind of greater integration entailed by the Maastricht Treaty. The Danish referendum result is the most eloquent expression of this problem. In short, the stronger the impetus within the 12 for greater integration, the more difficult it will become for the EFTA states to actually join, especially if they hold popular referenda before joining.

The situation of the eastern and Mediterranean potential members is somewhat different. Greater integration of the EC before they join will certainly make joining more difficult since it will make much greater demands on their own economic and political systems to reach comparable levels before entry could be countenanced in Brussels. Moreover, the very backwardness of their economies raises very serious problems for the existing poorer members among the present 12. With the eastward extension of the EC they would cease to be the poorest and thus cease to receive the very considerable subsidies they now receive from Brussels under various programmes. Some idea of the importance of this relative poverty effect of widened membership can be grasped by the fact that, for example, some 9 percent of the Irish GDP comes from Brussels subsidies at present.

Quite apart from these problems, note the ever-suspicious British sceptics, there is the further long term problem that has always been at the heart of EC extension which is that the logic of an economic cartel is its restrictiveness so that extension must always be a zero sum game for it reduces the number of states discriminated against thus diminishing the advantage of the discriminatory effect. Yet the Community from its very inception has always claimed European scope even when it embraced only six states and therefore a
policy of open entry. It attempted to broach the second principle in relation to the UK, as we have seen, but had eventually to let Britain in. It has also managed so far to keep Turkey at bay, but in the latter case it has, with strong Greek prompting, made entry dependent on a settlement of the Cyprus issue. There is neither a de Gaulle to repeat the U.K. exclusion ploy, nor an excuse as strong as the Cyprus issue to exclude the present queue of entrants. The only way in which a potentially calamitous over-extension can be avoided is to deepen the Community; that is, to centralize and consolidate it so as to make it extremely difficult to attain the necessary conditions of comparability of political order and economic development for the Eastern European states and at the same time make the price of entry too high for the EFTA states whose interests have always been much more related to trade than to political integration. In short, deepening the Community, argue British eurosceptics, becomes the only way of avoiding a potentially disastrous widening.

The British see a further advantage for their partners in deepening the Community involving as it does a single Bank, a single tax system and a common currency, for such a process automatically diminishes the apportionment of costs and benefits on a national basis. With a financially unified Community, Britain's complaints of unfairness over the CAP, for example, would become progressively meaningless. All things considered, deepening is the rational strategy to meet all problems. Hence, say the British, the sudden dash for the Single European Act and Maastricht is explained. The corollary of this theory is that if increasing integration is not achieved, and fairly soon, a widening cannot be avoided. But if widening does take place deepening is impossible. In this case the EC could become an animal that was much more amenable to the British and their long term alienation could come to an end. It is therefore hardly surprising that Britain has expressed itself as being rather keen on the extension option and 'deepening or widening' looks like emerging as a new source of conflict within the EC in the late 1990s in which an ever-watchful Britain will no doubt play a full part.
NOTES


18. Cmd. 4715.


Hansard 2nd July 1985.

As reported in the Guardian May 21st, 1992.


Ronald Fraser Blood of Spain (London: Lane, 1979) p. 152.

Jackson The Spanish Republic p. 531.

Borkenau The Spanish Cockpit p. 75.

Jackson The Spanish Republic p. 530 & 523.


Carr The Spanish Tragedy p. 144.

All the forgoing information on foreign participation on the German side is taken from J. Lee Ready The Forgotten Axis (North Carolina: McFarland, 1987).

Ready The Forgotten Axis p. 506.

Ready The Forgotten Axis p. 523.


Ready The Forgotten Axis p. 506.

Hansard 26 February, 1956.

Hansard 12 February 1959.


Grant ‘The Impact of EEC membership Upon UK Industrial Performance’ p. 108.

George Awkward Partner p. 56. Also see Evans While Britain Slept, for confirmation of both Heath’s uncompromising passion for Britain’s entry but also his willingness to accept virtually any terms.
This potential membership includes as well as the present 12, the EFTA states of Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Switzerland and Austria. Also likely to apply for membership are, Cyprus, Turkey, and Malta on the Mediterranean periphery. To these must be added the six states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia that are likely to emerge from the break up of the Yugoslav federation. Other likely applicants will be Poland, the Czech and Slovak states plus Hungary, followed by Bulgaria and Roumania. Finally there are the nine states that have emerged as a result of the break up of the Soviet Union; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbijan.

For a discussion of this debate see Helen Wallace *Widening and Deepening: the European Community and the New European Agenda* Discussion Paper 23 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1985.)