The Calloway Affair of 1880: Chemehuevi Adaptation and Chemehuevi-Mohave Relations

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On March 28, 1880, Chemehuevis in the Palo Verde Valley of the Colorado River killed a white engineer, Oliver P. Calloway, looted his camp, and threatened to kill every white man on the river. The stories of this event as told by both the Chemehuevi and Mohave tribes today, and the character of the event itself, contribute a great deal to understanding the long tradition of Chemehuevi-Mohave relations. The story has become something of a modern myth among the Chemehuevis and Mohaves. Though seemingly a Chemehuevi-white conflict, the story is told as one of a body of stories of conflicts between Chemehuevis and Mohaves which contributes to each tribe's definition of its ethnic identity and relationship to the other. The event and its outcomes indicate the contrasting adaptations of the two tribes twenty years after American assertion of control over the Colorado River area and how these differences in adaptation had changed the relationship between the two tribes.

BACKGROUND TO THE CALLOWAY AFFAIR

The Chemehuevis occupied the northernmost end of the Palo Verde Valley on the California side of the river at and above the site of the present town of Blythe (Fig. 1). This was the southernmost penetration of Chemehuevis, who, in the centuries before American settlement, had been gradually pushing south and west from out of the desert. The Palo Verde Valley was the largest river area they occupied and probably the earliest. Laird (1941:29, 1976:142) and myths of the Chemehuevis describe them as having once been allies of the Halchidhomas, sharing with that tribe the Palo Verde Valley and the Parker Valley immediately to the north.1 A Chemehuevi “captain,” Mon-cas-a-wus, interviewed just after the Calloway Affair, told Indian Agent Jonathan Biggs (1881a) that he had lived there as a small boy at the time of the expulsion of the Halchidhomas from the valley. The latter conflict, between the Halchidhomas and the Mohaves and their Quechan (Yuman) allies, is dated by Kroeber (1925:593-5) as occurring between 1827 and 1829. Because considerable shifting of Indian groups occurred within the two valleys in the years before the Halchidoma expulsion, it is difficult to determine when the Chemehuevis first settled in the area where the Blythe development was begun. In 1862, when the mining town of La Paz, Arizona, was built, the Chemehuevis were...
Fig. 1. Chemehuevi and Mohave territory between 1850 and 1910.
reported to be farming just across the river, where Calloway later found them, with the Quechans to the south and the Mohaves to the north (San Francisco Bulletin 1862).

Chemehuevi reactions during the Mohave-Chemehuevi “war,” a period of hostilities between the two tribes from 1865 to 1870, demonstrated the importance of the area to Chemehuevi subsistence. Forced to retreat from the river into the desert, as was their traditional tactic during such conflicts, the Chemehuevi groups became scattered and short of food. One Chemehuevi chief, Pancoyer, was interviewed in the Cabezon Valley (Coachella Valley) by Indian Agent J.L. Stanley, who reported his people were “collecting Mescal, ... having nothing to eat and fearing to return to the river on account of the Mohaves” (Stanley 1867). Soon after, George Dent, Arizona Superintendent of Indian Affairs, arranged a peace treaty between the two tribes guaranteeing the Chemehuevis the right to plant on the west bank of the Colorado River opposite La Paz, their “accustomed place” (Dent 1867a), while the Mohaves were to remain on the east bank, north of La Paz (Dent 1867c). Dent (1867b) stated: “It appears that the primal cause of complaint was that the Arizona Indians [the Mohaves and their Yavapai allies] crossed the Colorado and made farms on Chemehuevi lands.” The Mohaves, it should be noted, claimed then, and still claim, that the entire valley was theirs or the territory of their Quechan allies.

The Chemehuevi proper have been distinguished by anthropologists as the southernmost group of the Southern Paiute. The term often has been used to include the Las Vegas Paiute band distinguished by Kelly (1934). This was the group immediately to the north. The two groups were very similar culturally, interacted extensively, and had some sense of unity. The term “Chemehuevi” will be used here to refer to these groups in general, with the terms “southern Chemehuevi” and “northern Chemehuevi,” respectively, used to distinguish the Chemehuevi proper and the Las Vegas band where necessary.

In the period discussed here, the Mohave tribe had split into two groups. One remained in their homeland, near Fort Mohave, and will be referred to as the Fort Mohave Mohaves. The other moved south onto the Colorado River Reservation in the Parker Valley, just north of the site of the Calloway Affair. Where necessary, these will be referred to as reservation Mohaves or “Colorado River Mohaves.”

Between American assertion of control over the river area in 1859 and the Calloway Affair in 1880, there was no real supervision of the Chemehuevis by the federal government, except for efforts to control raiding and warfare with the Mohaves. Attempts to induce the Chemehuevis to settle on the Colorado River Reservation were unsuccessful. Chemehuevi involvement with whites in this period was characterized by extensive and aggressive economic interchanges combined with successful efforts on their part to remain independent of government supervision.

THE CALLOWAY AFFAIR

The man whose killing touched off Chemehuevi-white hostilities was Oliver P. Calloway, an engineer who was constructing an irrigation canal as part of a large-scale farming enterprise being created in the Palo Verde Valley. There had been extensive activity by whites in the valley since the building of the mining town of La Paz in 1862 and just south of it a few years later, the town of Ehrenberg, which served as a steamer port for inland settlements. The Chemehuevis and other Indians in the valley had had considerable contact with whites in these settlements, working for them and selling things to them. Most white activity up to this point was in mining, however, rather than farming or ranching.
Calloway first visited the valley in 1874 as a government surveyor, and, seeing the potential for a large-scale farming enterprise, he interested Thomas Blythe in forming a company to construct a canal in the valley. The company, the Colorado River Irrigating Company, filed in 1875 for 40,000 acres under the Swamp Act of 1850. The land was in the exact area of the valley that the Chemehuevis had long claimed.

In 1877, construction was begun on an irrigation canal, with Chemehuevis and some Mohaves from the nearby Colorado Reservation working as laborers on the project. During the work, Calloway evidently began to expect trouble from the Indians because he at some point requested military protection, though apparently none was provided (Mal- lory 1880). The day before he was killed, Calloway wrote that in three days he would finish all the work needed to prepare the main irrigation ditches (Daily Times 1880a).

The events of the actual shooting of Calloway, which probably occurred on March 28, 1880, vary sharply from version to version. White accounts at the time and later accounts by a Mohave, a Chemehuevi, and a white contemporary with the incident present the following general description. The killing was done by some Chemehuevis who reportedly went to Calloway's house and threatened him with a pistol. According to some accounts (Kroeber and Kroeber 1973:47; Woodward 1939:39) the Indians had gone across the river to Ehrenberg, possibly on payday, and gotten drunk. They may have demanded to be hired (Woodward 1939:40) and/or sought to gain entrance to Calloway's house (Kroeber and Kroeber 1973:47). In any event, Calloway shot and killed a Chemehuevi who is said to have threatened him, and who is identified as "Aapanapi" (White Clay Lightning Flash), the son of the chief of the Chemehuevis (Laird 1976:71). Calloway was then stabbed to death by a Chemehuevi named Big Bill Williams and a second unidentified Indian. Present at the scene also were John H. West, an investor in the irrigating company, an Indian agency employee named Porter, and some Mohaves. The Chemehuevis opened fire on these witnesses, wounding Porter and scattering the others.

Present-day Chemehuevi and Mohave versions of the story give somewhat different accounts of the incident. These accounts portray the source of the violence as a half-Indian boy who was pestering another Indian, perhaps by knocking a cigarette out of his mouth. The man being pestered, who was said to be drunk, struck the boy. Calloway intervened to defend the boy, perhaps because he was his son, shot the Indian, and was in turn killed by the other Chemehuevis.

After the killing, the Chemehuevis cleaned out Calloway's house, taking a large quantity of firearms and ammunition (Worthington 1880a). Then, burning their houses, the entire group of Chemehuevis in the valley fled from the river into the mountains, their traditional refuge in time of conflict. They gathered at Mopah Springs, in the Turtle Mountains, a short distance from the river.

From their mountain retreat, the Chemehuevis were defiant, threatening to kill every white on the river and putting a thorough scare into everybody. Indian Agent Henry R. Mallory reported that it was not safe for Indian or white to cross to the California side of the river (Kroeber and Kroeber 1973:91). The Chemehuevis refused to give up the men responsible for the killing. They were quoted as saying "Chemehuevis sabe shoot, soldiers no sabe shoot," and "Chemehuevis want to see what kind of leather the soldiers are made of" (Worthington 1880a).

Army troops were sent for, arriving after various delays from Yuma, San Diego, Fort Mohave, and Fort Whipple at Prescott. A special military district was set up under the command of Colonel Redwood Price, a man with long experience on the river.
Before any troops arrived, the commander of Fort Mohave sent four Mohaves from the Fort Mohave portion of the tribe, including Asuket, who then or soon after was chief of that group of Mohaves, to parley with the Chemehuevis. Agent Mallory believed that this mission caused the Chemehuevis to think that the Indian agency was "acting in concert with the army" (Mallory 1880), and hence led the Chemehuevis to directly threaten the agency. "Word was brought by the most intelligent and influential of the Mohaves that the agency would be attacked that night by the Chim-e-hue-vas if soldiers were sent up after them" (Mallory 1880). Lacking arms, the agent attempted to get twenty Mohaves to guard the agency, but "through their fear they would not come . . ." (Mallory 1880). Consequently, he abandoned the agency, going down river to Ehrenberg where he was met the next day (April 14) by the first detachment of troops, arriving from Fort Yuma (Hyde 1880). Returning to the agency, Mallory was successful in establishing a Mohave guard because of their fear that the agency would be destroyed. There were "20 Indian soldiers armed with bows and arrows, a few pistols, and four old Spencer carbines—a Falstaffian Crew . . ." (Kroeber and Kroeber 1973:90).

The military took very seriously the difficulties of defeating the Chemehuevis. The Chemehuevis were credited with having between 80 and 150 fighting men, depending on the account, with one worried army officer noting also that the Chemehuevi women were "nearly as good fighters" as the men (Worthington 1880a). The Chemehuevis apparently were heavily armed, saying of themselves that they had "plenty Winchester rifles, plenty Spencer rifles, plenty needle guns, plenty ammunition" (Worthington 1880a). The military and the Indian agent contrasted this with the Mohaves, saying, "They are poor fighters, very few know how to use guns . . ." (Worthington 1880a). The army was afraid that the soldiers would never be able to dislodge the Indians from the difficult terrain of the desert mountains which were "totally inaccessible to white troops and destitute of water except in . . . water holes known only to the Indians" (Motte 1880). The difficulties encountered in the Modoc War of 1872-73, where the Modocs defied the army from lava beds, were obviously fresh in military minds (Worthington 1880b). For this reason, Colonel Price, who eventually succeeded in negotiating a favorable settlement, "wanted to avoid war if possible" (Worthington 1880b).

Despite military opinion that he "would probably be killed for his pains" (Worthington 1880a), Agent Mallory undertook to settle the conflict in a peaceful manner. He sent one of the reservation Mohave leaders, Settuma, to confer with the Chemehuevis. Settuma succeeded in arranging a conference with sixteen Chemehuevis at the agency headquarters. The Chemehuevis still refused to give up the men wanted for the killing of Calloway, and, surprisingly, went down to the irrigation project to ask for their jobs back (Kroeber and Kroeber 1973:91). Employment was refused unless the killers were surrendered. Thus, a stalemate was reached at that point.

The situation was resolved by the arrival of more troops and probably by hardships being experienced by the Chemehuevis in the mountains. Colonel Price arrived with troops on April 30 and on May 4 one of his officers wrote " . . . some Chemehuevis were at our camp yesterday and Colonel Price sent them off to the tribe with such favorable terms that it seems pretty sure the whole tribe will come in by this PM and settle the difference peaceably" (Worthington 1880b). Chemehuevi accounts also seem to view the terms as favorable. The Indians involved in Calloway's death were to be surrendered, and the Chemehuevis were then to move onto the Colorado River Reservation, where they were to be given military rations. According to the Chemehuevis, the
two men who stabbed Calloway agreed to the surrender, saying "why should I endanger you?"

The two prisoners were convicted in an Army trial and sent to military barracks on Alcatraz Island (Patterson 1962:10). According to the Chemehuevi version of the trial, however, the Quechan chief Pascual served as interpreter and the army decided that Calloway was at fault. One of the killers, whose name is not known, died in prison (Kroeber and Kroeber 1973:48). The other, Big Bill Williams, was pardoned in 1889 and returned to the river. The pardon petition was circulated by John West, then a judge at Needles, California (Our Bazoo 1889). Judge West was a particularly appropriate person to circulate such a petition. Besides having been present at the killing, he later had a ranch in Chemehuevi Valley and was married to a Chemehuevi woman. His wife, in turn, may have been related to Big Bill, since members of her family sometimes went by the name of Williams.

Despite their defiant attitude toward the whites, some of the Indian accounts indicate the Chemehuevis were afraid the government would retaliate for Calloway's death by killing all of their people. Although present-day accounts do not suggest this, contemporary accounts suggest they were suffering hardships which motivated them to surrender. Colonel Price described the Indians as "destitute" at the time of their surrender (Daily Times 1880b) and another military letter at the time quoted the Chemehuevis as saying they wanted to fight, but "their women and children could not stand the journeys in the desert without water and with little to eat" (Worthington 1880c). Despite this, the Chemehuevi threat was sufficiently credible for the whites to offer them favorable terms for surrender.

Aspects of Chemehuevi social organization during the Calloway Affair remain obscure. There was little mention of Chemehuevi leadership in either Indian or white accounts. Though a "chief" was mentioned in a few instances (e.g., Kroeber and Kroeber 1973:47; Biggs 1880), there was no single chief involved in negotiations with whites such as there had been earlier in the Mohave-Chemehuevi "war." Hyde (1880) asserted that "they have no chief." Similarly, there were hints of a division of opinion within the tribe over the land question, though all members were forced to flee after the killing (Biggs 1881a). During the confrontation, one military letter asserted that "the fighting talk comes from the young men" (Hyde 1880).

Besides the Palo Verde Valley community, the Chemehuevi Valley people also were involved to the extent that they too fled the river and were subsequently placed on the Colorado River Reservation. During the affair soldiers went to Chemehuevi Valley and burned some houses but found no one remaining there (Kroeber and Kroeber 1973:91). The northern Chemehuevis apparently steered clear of the conflict, with the Chemehuevis working in the mines at Ivanpah reported as friendly (Weekly Times 1880a). Troops sent to guard the Mohave trail across the desert reported finding no one to fight against (Daily Times 1880b). It is doubtful that any northern Chemehuevi were rounded up and placed on the reservation. The southern Chemehuevis themselves apparently stayed for the most part in the nearby mountains throughout the affair rather than scattering.

In 1885, when half the Chemehuevis on the reservation had already drifted off, the Indian agent granted their request that they be allowed to go to Chemehuevi Valley where they expected better farming (Stewart 1968:25). By 1886 and 1887, the Chemehuevi had already returned to their old economic and settlement pattern, with half of them occupying Chemehuevi Valley and half "scattered over the territory [Arizona] and California, working in mines and mills" (Ashley 1886). It was also reported that "quite a number" were working
for the new railroad, presumably in Needles, California (Busey 1887). After this, the Chemehuevis had little contact with the Indian agency until about 1910.

Though Chemehuevis frequently worked in the Palo Verde Valley in succeeding years, including on the Blythe Ranch, the area was never again the center of a definite community of Chemehuevis. Many Chemehuevis today regard Palo Verde Valley only as a place where Chemehuevis found work among whites and not as part of traditional Chemehuevi territory. I have not found it possible to trace what happened to the Chemehuevis who originally occupied the valley as their home base. Since Chemehuevi residence patterns were flexible, they presumably joined other groups. Some may have become part of the Beaver Lake community, formed about this time on lands opposite Fort Mohave. This area, which traditionally had been in the heart of Mohave territory, afforded new economic opportunities with the coming of the railroad to nearby Needles.

After the Calloway Affair, there were three more "war scares," in 1885, 1889 and 1897, which, like the Calloway Affair, seemed to follow the long tradition of Chemehuevi-

Fig. 2. Chemehuevis, probably around 1890, wearing "citizen dress." According to an Indian agent at the time of the Calloway Affair, "The Chemehuevis are intelligent and industrious, wearing civilized costume from hat to shoes, used to supporting themselves and well worthy of aid and encouragement" (Biggs 1880). The scene is a temporary camp along the Colorado River, location unknown, "in the winter time because the water is so calm," according to informants. Courtesy of the Colorado River Indian Tribal Library (Pierce Collection, Southwest Museum negative 3506).
Mohave conflicts and also to be consistent with a shift in power in favor of the Chemehuevis (Ashley 1885; Walker 1967; David 1897). In each of these, the Chemehuevis reportedly had plenty of guns, while the reservation Mohaves were said to have few guns or significant knowledge of their use, and to be fearful of a Chemehuevi attack. No hostile incidents actually occurred. In two cases, the Chemehuevis denied any hostile intent, while in 1889 the Chemehuevis backed away from hostilities with the Mohaves under the threat of intervention by Fort Mohave (Walker 1967: 274).

ANALYSIS OF THE CALLOWAY AFFAIR

The Calloway Affair grew both out of resentment over white encroachment on a vital area of Chemehuevi territory and a personal animosity toward Calloway himself. The importance of the area to Chemehuevi subsistence was indicated by evidence that Mohave encroachment was an important issue in the Mohave-Chemehuevi “war” only a few years before the Calloway Affair. Whether armed conflict was an inevitable result of white encroachment in the Palo Verde Valley cannot be stated with certainty. This was the only such direct conflict between Chemehuevis and whites that took place, although the Indians had carried out considerable raiding for economic purposes as late as 1870. The Chemehuevis’ predominant pattern, however, was one of aggressive and extensive economic involvement and cooperation in wage work and other economic opportunities created by white settlement.

There is a clear implication in white accounts that animosity toward Calloway went beyond a clash between Indians and whites over land in which Calloway stood as a symbol because of his central role in the irrigation company. Some more complex, personal relationship between Calloway and the tribe or parts of it is implied. Agent Mallory, who claimed to have known Calloway for several years, wrote in January, 1880, that “I learn there is a personal animosity toward the Superintendent Calloway and I believe he will ultimately be killed by them” (Kroeber and Kroeber 1973:89). Mallory’s successor the next year, however, was given the impression that animosity toward Calloway existed only among a minority of the tribe (Biggs 1881a). As chief of a crew of Indian laborers, Calloway would have had considerable personal interaction with them. Whether friction with some of the Indians developed due to “injudicious management” by Calloway, as Mallory (1880) put it, or whether a more personal relationship with some of the tribe was involved, cannot be determined. The present-day Chemehuevi versions of the story indicating that a little boy was involved, let alone that he was Calloway’s son, could not be documented historically. They (see below) appear to be the result of a later reworking of the story. However, the inclusion of this element in the story might reflect the historical existence of some kind of personal relationship. Personal animosity toward Calloway is absent in Chemehuevi versions; Calloway is in fact portrayed as having been killed in the course of defending his half-Indian child (or some half-Indian child at least) against another Indian.

White accounts of the time (with the notable exception of those in the Yuma newspaper) generally ignored the possibility that a conflict over land was a motivation for the incident. Most newspaper accounts did not provide any real explanation for the affair beyond reporting the drunkenness of an Indian against a background of aggressive Indians whose reputation for raiding in the past had not been forgotten. Indian Agent Biggs (1881a) stated: “I am clearly of the opinion that the occupation of said Plantation by its present claimants was not the immediate or direct cause of the unfortunate occurrence, but that it
was brought about by, and through the intoxica­
tion of, one of the Indians.” Biggs (1881a), it
should be noted, was well aware that the
Chemehuevis strongly claimed the land had
been theirs.

The Calloway Affair itself, and its after­
math for the Chemehuevis, provides important
evidence of the kind of adaptation to white
society that the Chemehuevis had made in the
twenty years after the Americans had asserted
control over the Colorado River. It is evident
also that the Mohaves’ adaptation differed
markedly, accounting in part for the erosion of
their dominance over the Chemehuevis. The
Chemehuevis at this point differed from local
Mohaves in the extent of their integration into
wage work and in other characteristics as well.

The Indian agent in 1880 reported them as
“used to supporting themselves,” in contrast
to the Mohaves, and, hence, “well worthy of
aid and encouragement” (Biggs 1880). The
same agent said in 1881 that, in comparison
with the Mohaves, the Chemehuevis were “first
in adopting the dress, ways, manners and
customs of the white man: also in energy,
industry and enterprise” (Biggs 1881b) (see
Figs. 2 and 3). Among the 1881 reservation
population, all but four of the Chemehuevis
wore “citizen dress” which meant “like whites
from hat to shoes” according to the agents. At
the same time there were only eight Mohaves
wearing even partial “citizen dress.” Chemehuevi
farms on the reservation also produced
two and one-half times the crops per acre as
those of the Mohaves and they had twice as many children proportionately attending the school (Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1881). Another kind of contrast with the Mohaves, also involving adoption of the “ways of the white man” is the extensive knowledge and use of firearms by the Chemehuevis.

The importance to the Chemehuevis of their involvement in the economy of white settlements at the time of the Calloway Affair was well illustrated by the results of their confinement on the Colorado River Reservation. Formerly independent, they immediately became a problem for the agent because, in his words, they had become “destitute” and had to be put on rations. They had to leave their “crops, and woodpiles, and shanties” when they moved. Most important in his mind, they were cut off from their source of wages (Biggs 1880). Twenty Chemehuevis had worked for Calloway and others had worked in Aubrey City or on ranches nearby. As noted above, their concern for their jobs was such that they asked for the ones at Blythe back before they had even made peace.

Other kinds of qualities in which the Chemehuevis contrasted with the Mohaves were commented upon. The aggressive qualities of the Chemehuevis were admired during the Calloway Affair and the Indian agent Mallory had referred to the Chemehuevis as “a hard tribe to manage,” because they were “very intelligent and brave” (Mallory 1880). Mallory’s successor the next year indicated that although the Chemehuevis were “first” in qualities such as enterprise (cf. above), what they were not first in was “civilized behavior and obedience to the agency” (Biggs 1881b).

From the perspective of the long tradition of relationships between the Chemehuevis and the Mohaves, the Calloway Affair was in important ways quite typical but in other ways indicated that the relationship was changing. The two tribes traditionally had a close relationship, encompassing a mixture of hostility and friendliness. These two elements tended to fluctuate. The Mohaves traditionally had been dominant over the Chemehuevis and during the hostile periods the Chemehuevis retreated into the desert where they had the advantage over the river-dwelling Mohaves. During the Mohave-Chemehuevi “war,” between 1865 and 1870, only five years after American assertion of control in the area, there were already indications that the Mohaves’ traditional dominance had greatly weakened. The Mohaves had become divided into two groups and were weakened by their restriction by whites. The Chemehuevis meanwhile had grown stronger, aggressively taking advantage of new economic opportunities and moving into new areas. The actions of the Mohaves during the Calloway Affair—their fear of Chemehuevi attack and inability to defend themselves—suggest that the erosion of their dominance over the Chemehuevis, already evident by 1870, was by 1880 complete.

If the dominance of the Mohaves was ended, the fluctuating character of the relationship remained. Friendship returned soon after, with the Chemehuevis living side by side with the Mohaves in the Mohave Valley and working in Needles.

Versions of the Calloway Affair vary considerably, sometimes with bewildering combinations and reworkings of details. However some important, systematic differences are apparent, and not surprisingly, between Chemehuevi and Mohave versions, and also between the story as told today and the story told by individuals living at the time.

As told today by the Chemehuevis and the Mohaves, the story has become a modern “myth” that is more than simply an historical account. It is “myth-like” in the sense that the story states a basic ethnic view of each group about itself. The story is probably more prominent among the Chemehuevis, who place a strong focus on the Mohaves as a reference point (cf. Roth 1976). The Chemehuevi-
Mohave relationship receives the greater emphasis in the Chemehuevi telling of the story, even though the actual conflict of course was with the whites. The story is one of the most frequently told (to an outsider at least) of a variety of “war stories” demonstrating the superiority of the Chemehuevis over the Mohaves in the old days. (Other such stories concern the Mohave-Chemehuevi “war” and conflicts predating American settlement in the area). The story is recounted with elements of scorn toward Mohave cowardice at the time of the affair and pride in Chemehuevi defiance of the whites.

Chemehuevi accounts do, naturally, give some significance to relationships with whites in the themes of land taken by whites and pride in Chemehuevi defiance and abilities. The emphasis on these themes is partly a function of the context and the speaker. Among older Chemehuevis telling the story, concern for the land seems to depend on whether the speaker was from a group which lived in the more southerly parts of Chemehuevi territory.

As might be expected, the few Mohave versions the author has examined have a different flavor, though they also were elicited as part of a body of “war stories.” The Mohaves tend to stress the wrongness of Chemehuevi behavior, and Mohave willingness to help against them. Kroeber’s Mohave informant struck a particularly “virtuous” note. Any fear of the Chemehuevis on the part of the reservation Mohaves is not indicated. Mohave versions include the characteristic Mohave assertion that the Chemehuevis had no real claim to the Palo Verde Valley.

What both the Mohave and Chemehuevi versions have in common is that they are primarily about Mohave-Chemehuevi rather than Indian-white relationships. For both groups the story is one in a series of myths and tales which describe the ambivalent relationship between the tribes.

Allowing for considerable variation in detail, there were two different general versions of the immediate cause of the violence, one in which a little boy is the source of irritation and the other in which a drunken adult or adults threaten Calloway. On the basis of limited evidence, the difference appears to be between the story as told by contemporaries of the event and the story as told by individuals living today, rather than being an Indian-non-Indian difference. Contemporary white accounts and two Indian contemporary accounts attribute the conflict to a threat by adult Chemehuevis. The two Indian contemporary accounts are those of Kroeber’s Mohave informant (Kroeber and Kroeber 1973:47) and a Chemehuevi named George Laird, as reported in a recent book, The Chemehuevis (see Laird 1976:xxi). Laird (1976:71), Kroeber’s Mohave informant (Kroeber and Kroeber 1973:47), and one white source, Patterson (1962:10), all identify the Indian who was killed as the son of a Chemehuevi chief.

Present-day Chemehuevi and Mohave versions (the author found no present-day non-Indian versions) appear to have reworked the story, merging the Calloway Affair with an earlier incident or even two incidents. In these versions, the boy replaces (or in one case was in addition to) the drunken Chemehuevi in precipitating the violence. The half-Indian boy is (usually with some uncertainty) identified as either Calloway’s son or as George Laird. As suggested earlier, the transformation of the chief’s son into Calloway’s son may reflect a personal relationship between Calloway and members of the tribe. George Laird, a well-known man among the Chemehuevis, was the half-Indian son of a white man who worked in the Blythe area a few years before the Calloway incident. Laird himself denied that he was the boy in the story, but reported that he was present as a small boy in 1877 when a man was killed at a construction project near Blythe where his father was working as a cook (Laird 1976:xxi). What may be either another version
of this latter incident or yet a third incident was reported by one Mohave informant. Dated by the Mohave as 1864, this incident involved a half-Indian boy and, like some versions of the Calloway affair, took place in a store (in La Paz in this case), and identified the boy as the son of the store owner.

CONCLUSIONS

The Calloway Affair resulted in no lasting damage to Chemehuevi society or to the economic adaptation they had been making to white society, though their loss of territory may have accelerated adaptation somewhat. Placed on a reservation, they did not become dependent on the government, but quickly drifted away, back to their independent life. Nor did the incident do any damage to the relatively high opinions whites held of the tribe. The different roles played by the Chemehuevis and the Mohaves in the incident indicated the contrasting adaptations the two tribes had made to white society in the twenty years after the Americans asserted control over the area.

The Calloway Affair resulted from white encroachment on a major agricultural area of the Chemehuevis, together with some particular personal animosities toward Calloway himself. It was also retaliation for Calloway's killing of a Chemehuevi, and grew out of an unplanned incident. Though it was settled short of an actual military conflict, the event was the closest the Chemehuevis ever came to direct resistance to the advance of white settlement.

Although growing out of Chemehuevi relations with whites, the event was even more significant in terms of Chemehuevi-Mohave relations. From the perspective of the traditional relationship between the two tribes, the Calloway Affair was one of the long series of conflicts between the two tribes that alternated with friendly periods. A change in that traditional relationship occurred, however, with the incident demonstrating the erosion of the Mohaves' traditional dominance over the Chemehuevis. For both tribes the story today is one of a series of myths or oral history stories which contribute to each tribe's sense of ethnic identity and help define their relationship to each other.

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San Bernardino

NOTES

1. Kroeber (1925), whose interpretation is widely cited, supports Mohave claims, giving the Chemehuevis no claim to this region, and has them first living on the river at Chemehuevi Valley. His view was that they probably moved in after the Halchidhomas had been forced to leave the river.

2. The description presented here is a synthesis of many accounts, with comments on differences in description or interpretation within the accounts where these seem relevant. Five Chemehuevi accounts of varying length from informants of different ages and background were used. Added to these present-day versions was some material from George Laird, a Chemehuevi contemporary with the events (see Laird 1976). Two present-day Mohave accounts were used, plus an account by a Mohave contemporary of the events (Kroeber and Kroeber 1973). Finally, contemporary white accounts by military officers, Indian agents, and those in local newspapers were studied. The synthesis
includes information from an article based on an interview some fifty years later with one of the white men working on the irrigation project with Oliver Calloway, the man who was killed (Woodward 1939).

3. This is based on the small population reported on the reservation, about 300 (Biggs 1880), and reports of “Paiutes” camped near mining towns in northern Chemehuevi territory during the years the Chemehuevis were on the Colorado River Reservation (e.g., Woodruff 1881).

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