Title
150 Years of Transborder Politics: Mexico and Mexicans Abroad

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3vp3d5jt

Author
FitzGerald, David Scott

Publication Date
2016

Peer reviewed
A CENTURY OF TRANSNATIONALISM

Immigrants and Their Homeland Connections

EDITED BY NANCY L. GREEN AND ROGER WALDINGER

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS
Urbana, Chicago, and Springfield
Migration from Mexico to the United States is the largest sustained flow between any two countries in the world. The 11.7 million people of Mexican birth living north of the border in 2011 represented more than the total number of immigrants in any other country. An additional 21.9 million people of Mexican origin were born in the United States. Studies of this massive migration have played a leading role in conceptualizations of “transnational migration circuits,” “transnational communities,” and “transnationalism from below.”

In the 1990s making only the most cursory historical references insisted that a new phenomenon of cross-border ties had been uncovered. Later work sought to ascertain what was novel by comparing different migration systems at different historical periods, such as Robert Smith’s comparison of Mexican hometown associations in New York (1940s-1990s) with Swedes in the American Midwest (1860s–1920s). Few studies have attempted to assess systematically just what is new in the Mexican case by taking the historical long view of transborder political engagement.

Many of the most important forms of transborder politics and their implication in transformational events in Mexican history have been forgotten in contemporary accounts of transnationalism because of four different kinds of blinders. Removing the blinders of when, who, how, and why reveals what is new about transborder politics, what has caused historical change, and the consequences of those changes.

The “when” blinder obscures the historical record with presentist assumptions that practices today are somehow different in the context of Mexico-U.S. migration, without actually investigating the form and content of earlier practices. Most accounts of Mexican transborder politics begin their discussion in the 1990s and ignore the previous 140 years of migration history. The “who” blinder obscures the broad range of political actors that have been involved in transborder politics. The ongoing romanticization of “transnationalism from below” focuses on labor migrants, thus obscuring the activities of Mexican political elites living in the United States, from nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century political reformers and revolutionary leaders such as Benito Juárez and Francisco I. Madero, to the five presidents beginning with Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) who studied in U.S. universities and then returned to steer the ship of state on a new course of neoliberalism. The transborder actors that have most transformed Mexican politics have been drawn from the ranks of political exiles and elite technocrats. The “how” blinder is the failure to see the full range of transborder political acts, such as violent insurrection, because of an unstated normative preference to focus on peaceful forms of politics such as voting from abroad. The “why” blinder also hides the involvement of labor migrants in older projects of cross-border violence led by exiles. The “why” blinder is a technological determinism that becomes so focused on the effects of various forms of electronic communication and high-speed travel on jet aircraft that it obscures the more consequential causes of changing patterns of cross-border politics—the contours of the U.S.-Mexico relationship and institutions in Mexico that shape the boundaries of political contestation. Together, these blinders of when, who, how, and why obscure the most serious consequences that transborder actions have had on Mexican politics.

The alternative approach here considers the broad range of Mexican transborder politics to uncover lapsed practices, continuities, and novelties with an eye to explaining those patterns. Transborder political activities of Mexicans in the United States have included projects that ignore U.S. politics, such as agitation for the right to vote in Mexican elections by absentee ballot, as well as activities that engage U.S. politics as a means to accomplish an end in Mexico, such as lobbying in Washington. I argue that emigrants and exiles have been involved in every major violent conflict and political transformation in Mexico since the 1860s. The changes since the 1920s are the new institutions and pacific goals of transborder politics. At the elite level, technocrats returning from the United States have played an underappreciated role in transforming Mexico since the 1980s. At the level of mass politics, the major shift in the 1990s and 2000s was to institutionalize the promotion of dual loyalty and long-distance engagement through a dual nationality law, extending suffrage abroad, and establishing multiple government agencies to forge ties with migrants sharing a town of origin. Technology has not played a consequential role in these changes, which are mostly caused by the unintended consequences of U.S. immigration policies.
that have created hometown satellite communities in the United States, the pacific integration of North America in a way that upholds the sovereignty of Mexico, and the revival of competitive yet peaceful partisan politics in Mexico.

A Rebel Sanctuary

Mexicans have been engaged in cross-border politics as long as there has been a border. An estimated 75,000 to 100,000 Mexicans lived in the territory seized by the United States in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Most residents stayed on the U.S. side of the border and became U.S. citizens. Their numbers swelled in the late nineteenth century as labor migrants arrived to work on U.S. railroads and agriculture. The Mexican-origin population became a critical source of political support for exiled Mexican reformist and revolutionary leaders crossing back and forth across the border through the 1930s.\(^6\) While border studies specialists and students of Mexican political history are familiar with these early aspects of transborder politics, they have fallen out of almost all accounts of “migrant transnationalism” despite their critical importance in shaping modern Mexico.

Benito Juárez is one of Mexico’s most revered presidents. He was also the first of many major Mexican leaders to plot his revolt from the safety of U.S. territory. In 1853, Liberal leaders opposed to the dictatorship of General Antonio López de Santa Anna fled to New Orleans to conspire against the general. Benito Juárez spent two years in exile working at a cigar factory and building a coalition with Melchor Ocampo and other revolutionaries. They published a series of political pamphlets and drafted their 1854 Plan de Ayutla that set the overthrow of Santa Anna in motion. Juárez then returned to Mexico, where he became president in 1858 during the War of Reform (1857–1861) between Liberals and Conservatives. Throughout the mid-1860s, Liberals sought political support, weapons, and soldiers from the United States to fight the Conservatives and their French allies who had landed an expeditionary force in 1861. Liberal generals in the United States organized solidarity groups known as “Juárez Clubs,” “Mexican Clubs,” and “Monroe Doctrine Societies” to raise money, recruit soldiers, and generate propaganda against the Conservatives and their French allies. General Plácido Vega spent two and one-half years and US$600,000 organizing the Liberal cause in California. In what must have been one of the earliest attempts to form a “Mexican lobby,” General Vega sent a letter to the presidents of all of the clubs during the 1864 U.S. presidential election urging them “for the salvation of the American Continent . . . to use all the influence possible . . . with the Hispanic Americans so that in the coming election of November 8 they will give their vote in support of the candidates of the Republican party, for President Abraham Lincoln and Vice-President Andrew Johnson.”\(^7\) At least fifteen Juárez clubs operated in California alone. Liberal agents paid Spanish-language newspapers in cities such as San Francisco to support the movement. Californians of Spanish or Mexican descent played a prominent role in the Liberal project. An armed expedition of 400 volunteers, many of whom claimed Spanish or Mexican descent, attempted to sail for Mexico from San Francisco in 1865, but U.S. authorities tipped off by the French consul turned them back. Still, the successful influx of weapons and munitions for the Liberal cause was critical to their victory. Historian Robert Miller concludes that “the militant resurgence of the [Liberal] Mexican republicans would have been impossible without the aid secured by secret agents in the United States.”\(^8\)

After Juárez died in 1872 and was succeeded by Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, Liberal general Porfirio Díaz fled to New Orleans to organize an attack on the new regime. In 1876, Díaz attacked Mexico from several towns in South Texas with an estimated force of 500 to 1,000 men, including some who had been living on the U.S. side of the border. When Díaz overran the garrison in the Mexican border town of Reynosa, the losing soldiers then fled to Texas themselves.\(^9\) Díaz went on to become president of Mexico and its longest-serving ruler.

Intensive cross-border political activity continued in the early twentieth century when President Díaz forced Ricardo Flores Magón into exile in 1903. Flores Magón founded the anarchist Mexican Liberal Party (PLM) sworn to the overthrow of the Mexican government. He released the Programa del Partido Liberal in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1906 and organized an extensive propaganda campaign and local chapters in Arizona, Texas, Illinois, and California. The Mexican consulates responded with physical assaults and campaigns of intimidation against the anarchists. Street fighting broke out in Los Angeles and San Diego between pro- and anti-PLM forces. After U.S. authorities arrested Flores Magón for his revolutionary activities, his deputy organized Mexicans living in Texas to attack border towns on the southern side of the river in 1908. Flores Magón was released in 1910 and moved the party’s headquarters to Los Angeles, where its weekly newspaper, Regeneración, enjoyed a circulation of over 10,000. The party allied with the International Workers of the World to organize labor on both sides of the border.\(^10\)

When the Mexican Revolution erupted in 1910, cross-border raids from anti-Díaz forces in Texas already had a twenty-year history. General Torres
of the Mexican army observed that “[t]he problem would be resolved very quickly if it were not for the help the rebels receive in Texas.” Throughout the revolution, thousands of exiles from various factions fled north and used U.S. territory as a rebel sanctuary. They organized sympathizers, raised money, manufactured counterfeit Mexican pesos, smuggled arms, recruited soldiers, and unleashed raids across the border. The Mexican Secret Service monitored insurgent organizations and attempted to disrupt their operations.12

Francisco Madero, the losing contender against Porfirio Díaz in the fraudulent 1910 election, fled to Texas after his defeat. While in San Antonio, Madero issued his manifesto, the Plan de San Luis Potosí, and prepared for the fight against Díaz. Sympathizers from California to Texas raised money, recruited men, and bought guns. Madero invaded the state of Chihuahua in February 1911 and fought a successful campaign with weaponry smuggled across the border from the United States. By June, he had deposed Díaz and became president.13

Madero’s presidency lasted less than two years. The commander of his armed forces, Victoriano Huerta, conspired with U.S. ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to launch a coup and have Madero shot. Huerta assumed the presidency until 1914, when Venustiano Carranza and other revolutionary generals forced him into exile. Huerta arrived in New York the following year, where he met with an estimated 400 exiled Mexican army officers. American officials bugged Huerta’s conversation with a German naval officer about the possibility of using German financing and arms to launch another coup in Mexico and then detained Huerta near El Paso on June 27, 1915, as he apparently headed for the border to attempt a crossing. Huerta died of natural causes in U.S. custody seven months later.14

The Carranza regime that had seized power in 1914 also looked north for support among Mexicans in the United States. His government recruited men in Laredo, El Paso, Los Angeles, San Antonio, San Diego, and Calexico and formed “Constitutionalist Clubs” of his supporters.15 Following the lobbying model initiated by the Benito Juárez clubs in the 1860s, a newspaper financed by the Mexican consul in San Diego urged Constitutionalist Clubs to petition President Woodrow Wilson to acknowledge Carranza as Mexico’s legitimate president. The U.S. government finally offered Carranza de facto recognition in October 1915. The following year, the Mexican government asked Mexicans in the United States to register at the consulates. A San Antonio newspaper explained that “the principal reason for the register is to see on which side lie the sympathies of Mexicans living in the United States, in case there is an uprising.”16

The end of the Mexican Revolution did not end political intrigue across the border. President Plutarco Elías Calles launched a secularizing crusade against the Catholic Church in 1926 and fought armed Catholic rebels known as cristeros with particular intensity in the central-west plateau that was the origin of most Mexican emigrants. Calles exiled half of Mexico’s bishops by May 1927. San Antonio, Texas, became the headquarters of the Church-in-exile, where Mexican bishops worked with the U.S. Church leadership to lobby Washington to apply pressure on Calles to ease the anticlerical restrictions. In Los Angeles’s Mexican neighborhoods, street processions to celebrate the Day of the Virgin of Guadalupe turned into public rallies in support of the cristeros. The U.S. ambassador finally brokered an agreement between the Mexican clergy and the new president, Emiliano Portes Gil, which ended the first Cristero War in 1929. However, the United States once again became a center of exile when a brief, second Cristero War erupted in 1932 over President Lázaro Cárdenas’s socialist and secular education campaign. Archbishop Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores, the apostolic delegate in Mexico, fled to the United States with other Church leaders.17

As the victorious generals pacified Mexico in the 1920s, Mexican politicians and leaders in the Mexican community in the United States dubbed the population México de afuera, the Mexico outside of the country’s territory. According to Douglas Monroy’s study of Los Angeles during the 1920s and 1930s, “Mexican politics fired the passions of mexicanos de afuera much more than, say, the election of 1924, which pitted Calvin Coolidge against another American.”18 In 1928, Mexican presidential candidate José Vasconcelos campaigned in the Southwest and in Chicago against the “official” candidate, Pascual Ortiz Rubio. During the first Cristero War, Vasconcelos had exiled himself to Los Angeles, from which he supported cristero rebels in Mexico. On his return to Los Angeles as a presidential candidate, his supporters formed Clubes Vasconcelistas. The major Spanish-language daily, La Opinión, supported Vasconcelos and organized a presidential straw poll, which he won. The Revolutionary National Party (PNR), precursor to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that ruled Mexico until 2000, countered by organizing Clubes Reforma Pro-Ortiz-Rubio in California. When Ortiz Rubio won the election, vasconcelistas in the United States publicly charged the Mexican government with fraud and protested to the U.S. State Department.19

Mexican consulates organized unions and social assistance among the Mexican population during the 1920s and 1930s,20 but historian Gilbert González argues that “no other activity occupied as much time and effort
as that of fomenting and orchestrating loyalty to the Mexican government and adherence to its politics. Prominent people of Mexican origin were given honorific commissions (comisiones honorificas) to organize patriotic activities. Mexican organizations in Los Angeles were organized into the Confederación de Sociedades Mexicanas. Until the 1940s, the consulates made little distinction between Mexican citizens (including children born abroad to Mexican parents) and U.S. citizens of Mexican origin. Because most of the Mexican-origin population consisted of first- or second-generation immigrants, the consulates assumed they were all Mexican nationals.

Unlike the Mexican organizations that emerged decades later to focus on hometowns of origin in Mexico, early organizations sponsored by the government focused on maintaining migrants' broader national ties to Mexico, avoiding seditious transborder activities, and promoting better labor conditions in the United States. The lack of hometown-based organizing reflected settlement patterns of Mexicans in the United States. Ties between the descendants of the pre-1848 population and their places of origin in the Mexican interior were attenuated by time and the imposition of the international border. Recent immigrants were recruited by railroad companies and other U.S. employers targeting Mexican men. The strong social networks creating satellite communities in the United States formed by migrants from the same locality in Mexico did not emerge fully until permanent family settlement migration took hold in the 1970s—a process that the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act accelerated.

One of the consulates' main projects during the Great Depression of the 1930s was to support U.S. authorities in the repatriation of an estimated 400,000 Mexicans between 1929 and 1939. Officials hoped that migrants would return with valuable skills that were lacking in Mexico and settle the sparsely populated northern states. The government did not anticipate the political consequences of mass repatriation. Returnees led miners' strikes in Sonora and were accused throughout the country of being agents of Bolshevism. In conducting oral histories among ejidatarios in the Los Altos de Jalisco region, Ann Craig found that "the single most distinctive characteristic shared by the majority of the first agraristas is that they had worked in the United States before becoming ejidatarios, usually even before joining the agrarian reform." Similar concentrations of former migrants among the first agraristas formed in various sending communities in the state of Michoacán.

From the 1850s to the 1920s, people of Mexican origin living on the U.S. side of the border and exiles fleeing Mexico used the United States as a base for fomenting revolution and political change in Mexico. Every one of the major developments in Mexican political history during that period—including the War of Reform, the expulsion of the French expeditionary force, the establishment of the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, the early voice of dissent among anarchists, the revolutions of Madero and Huerta, U.S. recognition of the victorious Carranza regime, the Cristero War, and the agrarian reform of Cárdenas—involved transborder political action. The weight of emigrants and exiles in defining the outcomes of these sagas varied, from a minimal role in the agrarian reform to critical importance in the wars of the Reform and the Revolution.

Ignoring Mexico de Afuera

The 1940s through 1960s were the nadir of cross-border politics. George Sánchez argues that the 1930s repatriations fundamentally shifted the orientation of the remaining Mexican-origin population in Los Angeles away from Mexico and toward life in the United States. Those who stayed were much more likely to have been born in the United States and see their futures there. While the break in orientation may not have been quite so dramatic in Texas, given its greater proximity to population centers in Mexico, cross-border political action declined throughout the Southwest. In the short run, the Bracero program from 1942 to 1964 created large numbers of circular labor migrants, not settlers who could create networks of clubs. In Mexico, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) consolidated power in the 1930s and ruled virtually unopposed until the late 1980s. The party pacified Mexico and eliminated the possibility of armed insurgency based in the United States. The last president to be deported to the United States, Plutarco Elías Calles, lived quietly in Los Angeles when he was exiled with his aides in 1936. President Ávila Camacho allowed Calles to return to a peaceful Mexico in 1941.

There was little political contact between U.S.-resident Mexicans and the Mexican government in the 1950s and early 1960s. Major Latino organizations such as the League of United Latin American Citizens (founded in 1929), the United Farm Workers of America (1962), and the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF, 1968) focused on U.S.-based issues rather than Mexican politics. Interactions increased in the early 1970s when some Chicano activists began seeking the support of the Mexican government to promote Chicano socioeconomic and political advancement within the United States. President Luis Echeverría (1970–1976) saw Chicanos as a potential ethnic lobby in the United States and met with Chicano leaders while excluding critics of the PRI. The
administration of José López Portillo (1976–1982) also met with leaders of organizations such as MALDEF and formed a Hispanic Commission comprised of Mexican-American and Mexico-based elites and officials.\textsuperscript{34}

Notwithstanding these contacts, transborder politics from the 1940s through the early 1980s was restricted to a handful of activists in the United States whose primary orientation was plainly toward U.S. politics. Their activities did not affect Mexican politics in any appreciable way. The principal reason for this lack of impact was the near-absence of competitive politics in Mexico, given the PRI’s hegemonic grip on power that used everyday cooptation and episodic coercion to control the political process. Military campaigns against scattered leftist guerrillas in the 1970s were based in the south of the country. Geography and the potential U.S. military reaction kept guerrillas from attempting to use the United States as a base. The days of cross-border raids definitively ended with the Mexican government’s pacification of the country in the 1920s and ’30s.

Institutionalizing Pacific Ties

The return of competitive party politics in the late 1980s was the primary reason for the reengagement between emigrants and the Mexican state, but it was accompanied by background demographic, economic, and political factors that complement this explanation. The percentage of the Mexican population living abroad skyrocketed from 2 percent in 1970 to 10 percent in 2000.\textsuperscript{35} The Mexican population in the United States became more important to the Mexican government and opposition political parties by virtue of its size. A tendency for whole families to settle permanently rather than for men to migrate seasonally meant that extraordinary efforts were needed to maintain ties that would otherwise attenuate over time.\textsuperscript{36} As a consequence of demographic growth and settlement, the volume of remittances rose dramatically as well, from US$1 billion in 1980 to US$3 billion in 1990 and US$22 billion in 2010.\textsuperscript{37} The Mexican government sought not only to increase the volume of remittances by supporting migrants’ ties with Mexico, but also to channel the money into job-creating investments.\textsuperscript{38} Finally, the growing links between the U.S. and Mexican governments, expressed most dramatically through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that went into effect in 1994, made it possible for a Mexican political establishment that historically had been very suspicious of the United States to allow and promote dual ties. Such a policy of acercamiento (rapprochement) would have been unthinkable during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when U.S. settlers seized Texas (1836), U.S. forces conquered half of northern Mexico (1846–1848), the U.S. Navy seized Mexico’s principal port of Veracruz (1914), and General Pershing’s expeditionary force invaded Chihuahua in search of Pancho Villa (1916–1917).

Technology was largely irrelevant in the transition toward renewed cross-border ties. To be sure, improved communications, transportation, and infrastructure make transborder engagement faster and easier for hometown clubs in particular. Migrants communicate using cell phones, Skype, email, Facebook, and web pages, and fly back and forth between the United States and Mexico, to maintain club projects in ways that would be more difficult in the absence of such technologies.\textsuperscript{39} Yet, technology has improved consistently over the past 150 years, while the pattern of engagement is a U-shape over the course of the twentieth century. The scholarly fascination with technology threatens to miss the far more important institutional context that shapes transborder politics.

Relations between Mexican political actors and the Mexican-origin population in the United States changed significantly in the aftermath of the 1988 Mexican presidential election. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the center-left opposition candidate for president in 1988, drew large crowds of Mexican migrants while campaigning in California and Chicago. Cárdenas appealed to Mexicans in the United States to influence the vote of their family members in Mexico and promised immigrants dual nationality and the right to vote from abroad if he won.\textsuperscript{40} Although Cárdenas lost the election, which was marred by widespread irregularities, he remained active in politics and helped found the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). His supporters formed U.S.-based organizations such as the Mexican Unity Group and the Organization of Mexicans for Democracy (OMD). At the PRD’s first national congress in Mexico City in 1990, the leader of the OMD and two Southern California cardenistas were appointed as California delegates to the PRD’s national assembly.\textsuperscript{41} PRD supporters in California helped raise money for campaign events in California, sent pro-PRD pamphlets to Mexico, and—according to the PRI—raised money for PRD candidates in Mexico in violation of Mexican law.\textsuperscript{42} Local PRD committees in California also raised funds, which they claimed to send to their home communities for nonelection expenses.\textsuperscript{43} Whatever the legal controversies were in Mexico over raising funds abroad, it is uncommon in practice. In the 2006 National Latino Survey, fewer than 1 percent of Mexicans in the United States reported contributing to a Mexican political campaign after they migrated to the United States.\textsuperscript{44}

A former Mexican consul in Los Angeles acknowledged that the 1988 Cárdenas campaign in the United States and subsequent protests against
electoral fraud in the presidential race demonstrated migrants’ transborder influence and encouraged the Mexican government to reformulate its policy toward Mexicans abroad. Prior to 1988, the network of Mexican consulates controlled most government programs directed at emigrants. In the early 1990s, the PRI created a separate system of Compatriot Aid Committees in U.S. cities to support the party in open ways that consular agents could not. The new policies aimed to circumvent the opposition’s organizations among emigrants.44 Echoing the old discourse of “México de afuera” in his 1995–2000 National Development Plan, President Ernesto Zedillo declared that “the Mexican nation extends beyond the territory contained within its borders.”45

The government and migrants demanding reform negotiated a series of institutional reforms over the next decade that strengthened cross-border ties. The novelty in these programs lay in their promotion of dual ties to both the United States and Mexico, rather than simply calling for Mexicans to return home or at least maintain their affiliations from afar. Whereas the programs of the 1920s were based almost exclusively on the long-distance nationalism of identification with a nation despite physical absence from the homeland, the programs of the 1990s and beyond were based on a much greater degree on the dual nationalism of political identification with two distinct nations.46 The promotion of dual ties was promoted through a dual nationality law and efforts to encourage a Mexico lobby in Washington, D.C. Long-distance nationalism was promoted through the extension of the voting franchise to Mexicans abroad and government programs promoting ties to the Mexican federal government, particular states, and particular migrant communities of origin. Migrant activists were critical actors in shaping these institutions.

Dual Nationality

One of the principal novelties in the relationship between the Mexican government and its emigrants is the government’s promotion of dual nationality. Naturalizing abroad has been grounds for losing Mexican citizenship or nationality since 1857. Since the adoption in 1886 of a mixed system of attributing nationality based both on descent (jus sanguinis) and birth in the territory (jus soli), many children born to Mexican nationals in jus soli countries like the United States or born in Mexico to foreigners from jus sanguinis countries were de facto dual nationals. “Voluntary” foreign naturalization was grounds for denaturalization beginning in 1934, but the interpretation of “voluntary” narrowed between 1939 and 1993, so that emigrants who adopted a foreign nationality as a requirement of employment were considered to have involuntarily naturalized and thus were able to maintain their Mexican nationality. They became de facto dual nationals as well. Although the 1993 nationality law adopted the principle that nationality should be singular and required de facto dual nationals to choose a single nationality at the age of majority, just five years later, the “nonforfeiture” (no pérdida) of nationality law that took effect in 1998 protected native Mexicans from mandatory denaturalization, though they may still voluntarily expatriate. In effect, the nonforfeiture legislation was a dual nationality law. The term “dual nationality” was likely not adopted in official documents to avoid raising the hackles of those who discursively associate dual nationality with “dual loyalty” and to maintain a semblance of continuity in Mexican law.48

In Mexico, dual nationality has been considered a potential way that foreign-born or “gringoized” Mexicans could intervene in Mexican affairs, buy land and economic concessions in strategic border and coastal areas, and call on the backing of foreign governments in disputes with Mexican authorities. Yet the vote in favor of dual nationality carried 405 to 1 in the Chamber of Deputies because such arguments were simply no longer as salient given that nationalism directed against the United States had faded. Unlike the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Mexican state was now secure from invasions by a foreign power.

The substantive prerogatives of dual nationals remain contested and ambiguous, however. The Mexican constitution appears to prohibit dual nationals from holding the offices of federal deputy, federal senator, president, or state governor. The 1917 Constitution still in effect specifies that these positions are reserved for “Mexicans by birth,” and Article 32 specifies that positions for which one is required to be Mexican by birth “are reserved for those who have this quality and do not acquire another nationality.” The question of whether dual nationals can serve as federal deputies has not been resolved conclusively, however. Manuel de la Cruz, a dual U.S. and Mexican national and longtime California resident was believed to have won election to the Mexican Congress’s Chamber of Deputies based on his position on the PRD’s party list in 2003. Despite the controversy over whether a dual national was legally eligible for the office, none of the Mexican political parties formally challenged de la Cruz’s election with election authorities, likely because they wanted to avoid antagonizing emigrants. At the last moment, after de la Cruz had already been issued a key to his new congressional office, the Federal Electoral Tribunal ruled that to rectify a technical miscalculation, it would reapportion to another party the PRD’s seat that de la Cruz thought he had won. De la Cruz never took federal office, but
the question of the political rights of dual nationals will likely resurface as more Mexicans residing in the United States run for office in Mexico.

The Elusive Lobby

The Mexican government has hoped that Mexicans in the United States will become a lobby for its interests, but that hope has largely remained unfulfilled. The creation of a Mexican lobby in the United States became one of Mexico’s serious foreign policy goals in the 1990s, beginning with the campaign to negotiate and pass NAFTA in the U.S. Congress. The Mexican government advertised heavily in U.S. Spanish-language media urging Mexican Americans to contact their U.S. congressional representatives to approve fast-track negotiating authority. It spent at least US$30 million promoting NAFTA in Washington, D.C.—an effort that catapulted Mexico from a conspicuous absence among foreign powers lobbying on Capitol Hill to one of the most prominent. The Mexican NAFTA lobby worked with Latino organizations like the National Council of La Raza and the National Hispanic Chamber of Commerce to hire former administration officials and pay for U.S. policymakers’ trips to Mexico. In 1993, all but one of the Mexican American members of Congress voted to approve NAFTA. Yet most studies of Mexico’s NAFTA lobbying agree that the ethnic factor was not a decisive factor in NAFTA’s passage. Only five of thirty major lobbyists contracted by the Mexican government were Latino, and only two of the major lobbyists focused on promoting NAFTA among Latino voters. Many Mexican American congressional representatives agreed to vote for NAFTA only at the last minute after funding for a North American Development Bank to cultivate community projects was added to the agreement. As the political scientist Rodolfo de la Garza summarized, “There is no evidence...that Mexican American members of Congress voted for NAFTA because of Mexican lobbying or because they supported Mexican interests.”

In 1994, Mexican consulates and Mexican American political organizations unsuccessfully worked together to try to defeat Proposition 187, the California ballot measure endorsed by Governor Pete Wilson that would have restricted a wide range of services for unauthorized immigrants had a federal judge not thrown out most of its provisions after it passed. Mexico’s dual nationality law that took effect in 1998 was intended in part to encourage Mexican nationals to become U.S. citizens so they would vote against measures like Proposition 187 and the politicians who supported them. Mexican consular officials and President Felipe Calderón spoke against state-level laws such as SB 1070 in Arizona and similar legislation in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina that targeted unauthorized immigrants in the early 2010s,

but there is no evidence that such efforts drove Mexican American protests against the law. Mexican Americans protested such policies because they sensed that Latinos were being targeted, not because they represented the interests of the Mexican government.

Multilevel Ties

Mexican authorities at the federal, state, and county levels of government are forging ties with migrants abroad. The federal government began institutionalizing ties with emigrants through the Foreign Ministry’s Program for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME). From 1990 to 2003, the PCME sought to promote patriotic events like parades celebrating independence on the 16th of September and the study of Mexican history and the Spanish language. In this sense, the PCME took up the mantle of the comisiones honorificas of the 1920s. More transformationally, the PCME built on existing efforts by migrants and local priests to organize hometown associations (HTAs) based on their places of origin within Mexico. According to Mexican consular registries, the number of Mexican HTAs grew from 263 to 815 between 1995 and 2005. However, Guillaume Lanly and M. Basilia Valenzuela estimate that only about a quarter of Mexican HTAs register with a consulate. HTAs often disintegrate and then form again a few years later, sometimes under a different name. In some communities, ad hoc groups form and disband with each fiesta cycle. A loose definition of associations to include the many ad hoc groups would suggest there are around 3,000 Mexican HTAs in the United States. In a 2004 survey of Mexicans in the United States soliciting a matrícula consular identification document, 14 percent reported belonging to an HTA. Fewer than 4 percent of Mexican immigrants claimed to belong to an HTA in the 2006 National Latino Survey. Even if the lower figure is more accurate, that would imply more than 400,000 adult Mexican immigrants are affiliated with an HTA.

The major emigrant initiatives survived the change in administration from the PRI to the PAN in 2000. When Vicente Fox Quesada won the Mexican presidency in July 2000, he pledged to govern on behalf of “118 million Mexicans,” including the 18 million people of Mexican origin then living in the United States. One of his first acts as president was to tour Mexico’s northern border cities to “monitor” returning migrants, whom he called “heroes.” He quickly inaugurated a Presidential Office for Communities Abroad directed by Juan Hernández, a dual national literature professor born in Texas. The cabinet level position was abolished in 2002.
after conflicts with Secretary of Foreign Relations Jorge Castañeda over how to manage two cabinet agencies simultaneously conducting foreign policy. In 2003, the PCME and the presidential office were folded into the new Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME), which includes an advisory council comprised of 105 Mexican community leaders and 10 Latino organizations in the United States, 10 special advisors, and representatives of each of the 32 state governments in Mexico.60

The state of Zacatecas, which has the highest international emigration rate in Mexico, is in the vanguard of policies incorporating emigrants into its political and economic life. Ties between provincial governments and emigrants have been a vehicle for spreading Mexican partisan politics to the Mexican population in the United States through visits by gubernatorial candidates and incumbents seeking emigrants' political support. That has prompted the party in control of the federal government to respond with its own programs to avoid being left out of the transborder game. Noting Zacatecano success, the Foreign Ministry encouraged all states to create their own emigrant affairs offices and cooperate with the National Coordinator of State Agencies for Migrant Affairs (CONOMAF).61

Hometown associations are the primary vehicle for collective remittances. In 1992, President Salinas created Solidarity International, a small branch of his signature Solidaridad anti-poverty program, which solicited financial contributions from Mexicans abroad for infrastructure development projects in their places of origin. The PCME also drew on models of matching fund development created by migrants from Zacatecas living in California and the Zacatecan state government in the mid-1980s to formalize ties between the clubs and the Mexican government at the state and county levels. The most successful program involving all three levels of government in Mexico is Ties por Uno (3x1), in which migrants and Mexican government agencies jointly develop infrastructure projects in migrants' places of origin. Federal, state, and municipal governments match the funds that migrants contribute. In 2010, the 3x1 program approved 2,488 projects at a total cost of around US$92 million. Sixty percent of the projects involved improving hometown infrastructure, such as paving roads, building potable water systems, and laying electrical line; 14 percent involved education, health, and sports; and 13 percent involved “productive” projects aimed at generating jobs. Approximately 700 HTAs and 574 municipios (county governments) in 28 of Mexico’s 31 states participated in these projects in 2009.62

Matching fund programs can create real improvements in the lives of community members in impoverished rural communities with few government resources, though the extent to which they substitute or complement existing state funding varies by locality.63 However, collective remittances are a pittance compared to individual remittances, valued at US$2.3 billion in 2010.64 The principal economic value of collective remittances is to keep migrants engaged in their towns of origin so the private transfers will keep flowing.

Voting from Abroad

As early as 1929, the La Opinión daily in Los Angeles called on the Mexican president to give Mexicans in the United States the right to vote, but the demand lay dormant until the 1988 presidential campaign of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas.65 In July 1996, the PRI-dominated Congress amended the Constitution to allow Mexicans to vote for president outside their districts of residence.66 The amendment hypothetically allowed Mexican citizens to vote from abroad, but it did not include the necessary enabling legislation directing the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) to organize elections outside Mexico. The opposition-controlled federal Chamber of Deputies passed the implementing law in July 1999, but the PRI-controlled Senate killed the measure.67 The PRI intended to incorporate emigrants only at a symbolic level to protect itself politically and to create a Mexican ethnic lobby in Washington, D.C., but in doing so, the PRI inadvertently opened the door to a Mexican emigrant lobby in Mexico City. Various emigrant groups expanding from a PRD base to include activists from across the political spectrum formed the Coalition for the Political Rights of Mexicans Abroad, which successfully pushed through a bill in 2005 that enabled Mexicans to vote from abroad by absentee ballot in the 2006 presidential elections. The emigrant lobby achieved a dramatic success that showed the possibilities of binational grassroots mobilization.68

Ironically, the migrant vote was not a factor in the closest election in modern Mexican history, decided by only half a percent of the ballots cast. Three million out of ten million Mexicans in the United States were eligible to vote in the 2006 Mexican elections. Only 56,000 citizens, or half a percent of the U.S-resident Mexican population, tried to register to vote, and only 33,000 actually cast a ballot. Fifty-eight percent voted for the candidate of the incumbent PAN party.69 The reasons for low turnout include the absence of a Mexican voter registration program in the United States, a series of bureaucratic hurdles to obtain absentee ballots, and a new ban on Mexican presidential candidates campaigning in the United States. The ostensible reason for the ban was that the Mexican government could not enforce its electoral regulations in another country's sovereign territory,
so it simply prohibited campaigning altogether. The more likely reason was that the PRI and PAN parties in Congress saw migrant voters as wild cards, and deliberately sought to suppress turnout by limiting their exposure to the campaigns and making the process onerous.

In a 2006 representative survey of Mexican-born adults in the United States, the Pew Hispanic Center found that while 78 percent of the sample was aware that Mexicans could vote from abroad, 55 percent did not know there would be elections that year. Only 13 percent of the sample had a positive opinion of the way that Mexican political institutions function, while a third said they had a negative opinion. During the registration period for the 2012 election, the IFE received only 61,687 absentee ballots, about 4,000 more than in 2006. In short, widespread dissatisfaction with Mexican politics among migrants has not generated widespread political action.

At the subnational level, migrants have forced open procedural opportunities to participate in the political process as well. The vote from abroad has been extended to two subnational jurisdictions, beginning with the state of Michoacán in the 2007 gubernatorial elections and the Federal District in 2012. Roughly a million migrants born in Michoacán lived in the United States at the time. In the 2011 gubernatorial elections, only 341 of them voted from abroad, 9 less than in 2007. As at the national level, voting from abroad has not affected any election outcomes in Mexico.

Returnee Participation

While the vote abroad and government programs at the federal, state, and local levels are aimed at promoting the mostly symbolic engagement of migrants living in the United States, returnees are potentially a greater source of political change. The effect at the mass level is uncertain. Pérez-Armendáriz and Crowe report, based on their 2006 national survey in Mexico, that returnees were more critical of the Mexican government’s rights violations and more likely to claim greater tolerance of different religions, political views, and sexual orientations than peers who had never migrated. Rod Camp’s survey found that for Mexicans who have lived in the United States for even brief periods, views of what constitutes democracy are closer to the norm of other Americans than the norm of other Mexicans living in Mexico. These findings are consistent with Yossi Shain’s notion of “marketing the American Creed abroad,” though the robustness of the evidence and the actual consequences of those attitudes remain to be seen.

Most scholarly attention to returnees and institutional change has focused on migrants from a working or middle-class background. The most spectacular case in the 2000s involved Andrés Bermúdez, the “Tomato King,” who had originally crossed the border into California illegally in 1974. After making his fortune as a tomato farmer, Bermúdez returned to his hometown of Jerez, Zacatecas, to run for mayor against two other candidates in 2001. The candidate of the Convergence for Democracy coalition, Salvador Espinosa, was himself a wealthy returnee, who vied for the support of voters by hiring a small aircraft to fly over the town and throw U.S. currency and campaign flyers out the window. Bermúdez won the most votes, but his enemies prevented him from taking office because he was not a local resident. In response, Bermúdez’s allies in the Zacatecas state assembly passed a law in 2003 that allows binational Zacatecanos residents to run for state and local office. The Tomato King was subsequently elected again and served his term. Since 2003, Zacatecanos living abroad may run in Zacatecas congressional and county elections, though they cannot vote in such elections from abroad.

In the state of Michoacán, the PRD in 2005 assigned one of the six seats it won on its party list to Jesús Martínez Saldana, a California State University, Fresno Chicano Studies professor who had moved to the United States as a child. Martínez served a term as the representative of migrants from the state. Many more returnees serve without claiming to represent migrants in particular. A 2004 survey in Michoacán found that 35 percent of current mayors had U.S. migration experience. Seven of the 113 mayors were U.S. citizens.

The most important effect of returned migrants on Mexico has been forgotten in the migration literature even if it is widely recognized in studies of Mexican politics. Just as the Mexican migration literature has largely ignored political exiles in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it has ignored elite student migration during the late twentieth century. A generation of Mexican technocratic elites was shaped by their advanced studies at prestigious U.S. universities, including every Mexican president from 1982 to 2012. Not coincidentally, these presidents introduced and consolidated a neoliberal political economy in Mexico based on the Washington Consensus of limited budget deficits, reduced public spending, free trade, privatization, and deregulation. Their policies utterly transformed Mexico in ways that political scientists have shown to be directly attributable to their experiences studying in the United States.

President Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) earned a master’s degree in public administration from Harvard in 1965. Upon assuming office, he
steered Mexico’s economy away from decades of import substitution industrialization and set a neoliberal course by selling state-owned businesses, encouraging foreign investment, reducing social spending, firing large numbers of government workers, and bringing Mexico into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. His successor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994), also attended Harvard, earning master’s degrees in public administration in 1973 and political economy in 1976, followed by a doctorate in economics in 1978. Salinas continued to privatize state-owned businesses and negotiated the NAFTA agreement. His dissertation formed the basis of his National Solidarity Program. Salinas hoped that a decentralized development program that involved community leaders in the planning process would be less corrupt and more likely to address local needs, while simultaneously generating support for the federal government. Major figures on Salinas’s economic team held advanced degrees from U.S. universities, including his Minister of Programming and Budget, Ernesto Zedillo, who earned his doctorate in economics from Yale in 1981. Zedillo served as president from 1994 to 2000. He and his Stanford-educated finance minister reacted to Mexico’s worst economic crisis since the Great Depression by negotiating a set of “structural adjustment” austerity measures with the International Monetary Fund. Vicente Fox (2000–2006) of the center-right National Action Party broke the PRI’s grip on power dating back to 1929, but economically, he continued the neoliberal vision of his three predecessors. Fox had earned a diploma in Top Management Skills from the Harvard Business School in 1974 while working as an executive for Coca-Cola. His successor, President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), earned a master’s degree in public administration from Harvard’s Kennedy School. Calderón maintained the policy of focusing on exports and foreign investment. While it is uncertain to what extent working-class and middle-class returnees have affected Mexican politics, there is no question that a cadre of technocratic returnees dramatically reshaped the country.

* * *

What, then, is new about Mexican migrant political “transnationalism”? If transnationalism is defined as the quality of acting both in the country of origin and destination, or acting across the international border, there is overwhelming evidence of such activity extending back to the 1850s. The involvement of emigrants and exiles in the wars and struggles that defined modern Mexico has never been a secret to historians, who, perhaps like Molière’s gentleman who discovered he was speaking in prose, were writing about transnationalism all the while without knowing it.

The single greatest shift in transborder politics was the transition from violent to peaceful engagement after the 1920s, though important aspects of peaceful engagement, such as the formation of political clubs, lobbies, and patriotic societies, began in the earlier period. At the level of mass politics, the key differences are a shift to the institutionalized promotion of both dual ties and long-distance engagement by promoting dual nationality; extending the right to vote to Mexicans living abroad; and creating agencies to engage migrants in hometown projects. The major shifts in patterns of engagement have practically nothing to do with improved technology but rather derive from the unintended consequences of U.S. immigration policies that have shaped whole family migration and hometown-based settlement patterns in the United States, the greater integration within North America that legitimizes dual ties, and the establishment of peaceful yet competitive politics in Mexico. While symbolically important, the actual effects on Mexico of new institutions of transborder politics and the activities that they channel pale in comparison to the dramatic consequences that U.S. experiences have had on a handful of technocratic elites at the turn of the twenty-first century. Transborder political engagement among Mexicans in the United States has certainly changed over a century and a half, but it is only by removing blinders of when, who, how, and why that the topography of the changing political landscape comes into view.

NOTES


8. Ibid., 61.


22. During President Cárdenas’s nationalization of the oil industry in 1938, some Mexicans living in California voluntarily sent money to the national treasury to pay for the expropriation. Santamaría Gómez, *La política entre México y Aztlan*.


30. Jorge Bustamante, “Chicano-Mexican Relations from Practice to Theory,” in Mendiola and Martínez, *Chicano-Mexican Relations*.


54. Guillaume Lanly and M. Basilia Valenzuela V., Introducción, in Clubes de migrantes oriundos mexicanos en los Estados Unidos, ed. Guillaume Lanly and M. Basilia Valenzuela V. Guadalajara (Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico Administrativas, Universidad de Guadalajara, 2002), 11–56; “Mexico: HTAs, Fertility, Labor,” Migration News 13 (Oct. 16, 2006). Even ascertaining the number of formal HTAs registered is difficult given errors in the IMÉ’s database of organizations. It listed many organizations as “clubes de oríundos” (HTAs) when they were not (e.g., the Journal of Latino-Latin American Studies) and failed to list many HTAs as “clubes de oríundos” when they clearly were (e.g., Club de Migrantes de “Carmen de Sánchez”), www.imexs.gov.mx/Directory/Organizaciones/ (accessed May 2, 2012).

55. David FitzGerald, Negotiating Extra-Territorial Citizenship: Mexican Migration and the Transnational Politics of Community (La Jolla: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego, 2000).


57. Soehl and Waldinger, “Making the Connection,” 1489–1510.


60. Délano, Mexico y su Diaspora en los Estados Unidos.


62. SEDESOL, “Cuarto Informe Técnico 2010 H. Cámara de Diputados. Programas de Subsidios del Ramo Administrativo 20 Desarrollo Social” (Mexico City:


