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Time and Identity: Socializing Schedules and the Implications for Community

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This article analyzes data collected as part of an ethnography of three families of Israeli emissaries (shlichim) in order to explore the relationship between the individual, the schedules to which s/he adheres, and her/his affiliation with a particular collective. The paper examines the relationship between time, community, and self through a discourse analytic lens that draws on approaches to the study of cultural identity which look to tension as definitive of groups and their members. It is suggested that an examination of the tensions between the individual and the collective provides a fruitful means by which to investigate the meaning of time for society and self.

A temporal order that is commonly shared by a social group and is unique to it to the extent that it distinguishes and separates group members from “outsiders” contributes to the establishment of inter-group boundaries and constitutes a powerful basis for mechanical solidarity within the group.


This article addresses three lacunae in the study of time and society. First, studies of time in sociology and anthropology have not adequately examined how children are socialized to the timekeeping practices these selfsame studies limn. Second, studies of socialization have neglected the role of time—in its tangible manifestations—as socialized knowledge in communities. Finally, both fields of inquiry implicitly understand social time as homogeneous and hegemonic, not accounting, therefore, for the tensions that arise in socializing children to timekeeping practices.

To attend to these gaps, this article examines the socialization of children to daily and weekly schedules and considers the implications such an analysis has for understanding the relationship between individuals and communities. Through analysis of routine negotiations of transitions to and from temporally marked activities (e.g. dinnertime, playtime, bathtime, bedtime) and the reckoning of larger temporal chunks (e.g. weekdays, weekends) the paper examines the socialization of time in the form of schedules and routines in the homes of these families. An examination of tensions between the individual and the collective, especially those articulated in the socialization of young children to local practices of timekeeping, provides a fruitful means by which to investigate the meaning of time for society and self.
To achieve this end, the article focuses on disagreements between children and their parents during initiations of transitions from one temporally marked activity or routine to another (activity-transition-point-proposals) and the ways negotiation of those disagreements reconstitutes the temporal order of communities. Activity-transition-point-proposals (ATPPs) are bids put forth by one party to an interaction (usually a parent) to shift from one activity to another at a specified point in time. When an ATPP is contested by a child, the negotiation of that disagreement becomes a productive moment of socialization.

The data are drawn from two ethnographic, discourse analytic studies of three families of Israeli emissaries (shlichim; IPA: ʃɪˈliːm) temporarily residing in the United States. Data collection for these studies involved participant observation, collection of fieldnotes and artifacts, audio and video recording, ethnographic interviews, and ongoing conversations with participants. The examples discussed were collected during observations in the Gordon family’s home in Chesterfield, California, for nine months in 2005-2006, and in the homes of the Feingluz and Siegel families in Israel and New York for 19 months in 2006-2007.

**TIME, SOCIETY, AND SELF**

Anthropologists and sociologists have long questioned the assumption that time is a natural construct. The idea that time is organized by social rhythms was most clearly articulated by Sorokin and Merton (1937), who defined social time as “the change or movement of social phenomena in terms of other social phenomena taken as points of reference” (p. 618). Following a long tradition in cross-cultural anthropology, this was, fundamentally, a way to claim that Western methods of timekeeping, be they chronometrical or calendrical—in any event, cosmological—are not universal or objective. As a social phenomenon, timekeeping is also a form of knowledge that is taught to novice members of communities as part of the “civilizing process” (Elias, 1992). A logical entailment of Sorokin and Merton’s argument is that time is kept differently across societies and thus is a marker of identity among social groups.

A number of studies have taken up this perspective over the years (cf. Agha, 2007; Gell, 1992; Gingrich, 1994; Laguerre, 2003; Postill, 2002; Schieffelin, 2002; Zerubavel, 1982; Zulauf, 1997), and it is one captured in the epigraph to this article. Sociologists and anthropologists concerned with time and society view collective orientations towards time—usually examined in their tangible manifestations through clocks, calendars, and discourse—not simply as part of the social order, but as carrying with them explicit implications for individuals’ national, cultural, religious, and social identities.

Yet, inasmuch as scholars concerned with time and social order have argued that there is a relationship between (collective) identity and time, their arguments have not paid enough attention to intra-group contestation. That is, these studies, by seeing individuals’ adherence to particular forms of timekeeping as indexical
of collective identity, presuppose that group membership is coterminous with individual identity—although not necessarily vice versa. Internecine diversity is only presumed, if not entirely ignored.⁵

To contest this perspective is not merely to say that what may be considered a collective or a community consists of members who differ from one another and who belong to multiple groups, but that it is the tension, the disagreement between members that defines what is shared.⁶ This dialectical relationship between the individual and his/her communities is one that is achieved and maintained primarily through communication (Philipsen, 1987, p. 249).⁷ While the project here is not to typologize cultures along a continuum of individuality and communality (Philipsen, 1987, pp. 245-6; see also Ochs & Schieffelin, 1984), it is nonetheless important to examine the ways in which, through communication between different members of a community, tensions arise and are negotiated. This negotiation defines normative behavior. A fundamental means by which to uncover these tensions is to examine how they manifest in socializing routines; that is, to look at the ways novice members of communities—in this case, children—contest the norms they are taught to keep.

**LANGUAGE SOCIALIZATION: BECOMING A PERSON IN (TENSION WITH) THE WORLD**

Studies of time and society note that not only are schedules and calendars markers of identity, but individual actors, as social beings, are socialized to different ways of keeping time (Zerubavel, 2003, pp. 5, 96). Most of these studies, however, do no more than posit this sociological given. To claim that individuals acquire sociocultural knowledge is a disciplinary truism of all social science. What remains for researchers is to actually investigate how such socialization takes place (Kulick & Schieffelin, 2004, pp. 351-352). Examining socialization to and through language (Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986) is a productive means for investigating not only how social norms are reproduced, but also how individuals acquire and contest subjectivities (see also Baquedano-López & Kattan, 2007; Garrett & Baquedano-López, 2002; Kulick & Schieffelin, 2004). Socializing practices make explicit the tacit norms and expectations of communities while also serving as a process through which those norms become nuanced or change. In this way, the perspective on socialization taken here departs from functionalist notions of socialization which neglect the role of individual agents in contesting the norms of their social groups.

Within such a model, language is social activity through which cultural and community norms are both transmitted and revised from one generation to the next. Processes of socialization are bidirectional, the novice having both agency and competence (Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986); and the categories “expert” and “novice” are not fixed or clearly assigned in any given situation (Jacoby & Gonzales, 1991). We may add to this that in the negotiation of social norms, not only are
expertness and noviceness contested, but there is also a struggle to define the very mores being taught.

**SOCIALIZING TEMPORALITIES**

Numerous studies of language socialization practices have identified family interactions occurring before, during, and after temporally set activities such as dinnertime, bedtime, and homework time as productive sites of social interaction and instruction (Cf. Blum-Kulka, 1997; Ely, Berko, MacGibbon & Zaletsky, 2001; Heath, 1982; Ochs & Taylor, 1992a, 1992b, 1995; Ochs, Taylor, Rudolph, & Smith, 1992; Wingard, 2006, 2007). Familial gatherings can thus be seen as primary sites of socialization (Ochs & Taylor, 1992b, p. 447). While such work has examined the socializing routines that take place during such activities, they have generally neglected the practices through which community members are socialized to the temporal organization of those very activities.

Activities such as playtime, TV time, dinnertime, bathtime, story time, and bedtime should not be seen as isolable events, but rather as marked practices that, while ordered and bounded, overlap with and bleed, both spatially and temporally, into other activities and events. The fact that a family gathers around a dinner table (or the television set, the bathtub, or the bed), for example, is in itself remarkable, and the negotiations of sitting down and getting up from the table (or the couch, the tub, or the bed), rather than merely the conversations that occur in those spaces, comprise the crux of this paper. Therefore, while I use terms that denote specific temporally marked activities, I consider these activities to be negotiated events in a family’s daily life.

Socialization of time reckoning involves recognition of both the time-boundness and temporal ordering of activities, in other words, of the social organization of time. That is, an activity such as a child playing on the computer can be circumscribed to a particular hour as dictated by the clock, a particular period set off by preceding and ensuing activities, or by another actor’s intervening interests (e.g. a parent wanting to check email). In addition to being bounded, activities are also ordered temporally in that they come to occupy a certain sequential place in relation to other activities (e.g. dinnertime follows play time, bath time precedes bedtime). In this sense, activities such as bedtime and dinnertime are a form of social time (Sorokin & Merton, 1937) in that they are chronological and measurable. Transitions between temporally bounded and ordered activities constitute sites of socialization in which children learn 1) how to tell and keep time, 2) the expectations of their communities in terms of maintaining temporal order and structure, and 3) other social norms and mores.

**Activity-Transition-Point-Proposals**

I want briefly to discuss these transitions and how they come to be keyed (Goffman, 1974), as well as how they invite response, as these are significant
interactions in the socialization of time reckoning. Transitions between activities consist of at least two parts: an activity-transition-point-proposal (ATPP) and an uptake. ATPPs put forward a specified time (e.g., immediately, at the end of a present segment of activity, within a certain amount of time, at an exact time set by a clock) at which participants will transition from the present activity to the next one. They take forms such as directives to transition (e.g. TV-viewing to dinnertime, playtime to bedtime), notices that the time of a particular activity has ended, or proposals to end an activity within a given amount of time. ATPPs are projections (Haviland, 1996; also Solís, Kattan, & Baquedano-López, 2008) that foreshadow future events by announcing their impending onset. Excerpts 1-5, in which parents from two different families instruct their children either to prepare for bed or to sit down to eat dinner, offer examples of ATPPs from parents to children. Below I will discuss the uptake of these ATPPs by children and how the tensions enacted in uptake compose the very processes by which children are socialized to and reconstitute the temporal order of their immediate community.10

Excerpt 1
01 Efrat  \textit{xevre! ha fa’a fmone esrim ve xamef.}  
\textit{guys} \textit{DEF hour eight twenty and five}  
‘Guys. It’s eight twenty-five.’

02  \textit{texef tsrixim lalexet lehitkaleax.}  
\textit{soon need-PL go-INF shower-INF}  
‘Soon we need to go shower.’

Excerpt 2
01 Efrat  \textit{zehu. xaverim feli,}  
\textit{DEM friends 1SG-GEN}  
‘That’s it. My friends.’

02  \textit{bou leexol.}  
\textit{come-PL-DIR eat-INF}  
‘Come eat.’

Excerpt 3
01 Nirit  \textit{a. slixa. bika\textit{\textasciitilde}t \textit{lo.} (0.2) lir\textasciitilde}ot axf\textasciitildev,}  
\textit{ah pardon ask-1SG-PT NEG watch-INF now}  
‘Ah. Excuse me. I asked you not to watch [TV] now.’

Excerpt 4
01 Eyal  \textit{XEVRES? yala\textasciitilde11 holxim le::hitkalex.}  
\textit{guys let’s go go-PL shower-INF}  
‘Guys. Let’s go. We’re gonna go shower.’
A common feature of the socialization of children to time reckoning is the announcement that it is, or will soon be, time to end a present activity or begin another activity. These announcements, or ATPPs, key or initiate the transition from one activity to the next. As can be seen in Excerpts 1-5, ATPPs are themselves keyed by a call, such as xevre (‘guys’), yala (‘come on, let’s go’), bou (‘come’), zehu (‘that’s it’), slixa (‘pardon’), or tov (‘good, okay’), followed by a pronouncement of the need to transition to the next activity or the time at which or within which to move from the current activity. Paradigmatic of ATPPs is the construction of the transition as collaborative through the use of inclusive first-person plural forms of directives (e.g., tsrixim [go-PL], holxim [go-PL]). The casting of the transition activity as collaborative serves both to mitigate directives and to invite positive alignment.

Reference to clock time (Excerpts 1 and 5) is also common, and has multiple functions. First, it marks temporal boundaries and points. Second, it functions as a means by which to inculcate the child with the affective and embodied meanings of particular hours of the day (e.g. eight-thirty is a time to feel tired). Finally, reference to clock time in these routines is a way to teach children about telling or keeping time according to the norms of the broader community. Appeal to a watch or a clock invokes an independent and objectivized authority that measures without bias the order of the day, an authority by which all members of the community must abide.

Words and phrases such as texef (‘soon’), zehu (‘that’s it’), kvar (‘already’), yala (‘come on, let’s go’), az yala (‘so let’s go’), and axfaw (‘now’), which commonly feature in ATPPs, temporally mark the ATPP as an evanescent activity and also invite relevant uptake. When that uptake is positive or compliant (e.g., when a child immediately rises from the desk and moves to the table), the transition from activity to activity does not necessarily offer a robust moment for socializing. However, when uptake is negative or non-compliant, as when a child refuses to transition from one activity to the next, the ATPP initiates a negotiation sequence in which socialization both to time reckoning and other social expectations takes place.
TENSILE TEMPORALITIES:
DISAGREEMENT STANCES IN SOCIALIZING INTERACTIONS

A long tradition in the social sciences views religion, citizenship, socio-economic class, and other categorical affiliations as relevant to understanding the socializing activities employed by families, as well as categorizing the norms to which individuals are socialized. However, the more significant observation, and the one less likely to invoke stereotypes, is that a fundamental precept of socialization becomes possible through and draws our attention to tensions. By attending to language use in situ, and to the tensions that arise in interaction, analysts can avoid categorical claims and focus on those practices that are relevant to participants. In routines that involve daily schedules, weekly calendars, and temporally organized activities, tensions consistently arise between individual family members and the temporal norms and expectations of the family and the local community.

It is necessary to be able to analyze the tensions that arise between self and group in everyday socializing routines in order to interpret what meanings particular cultural facts can have for the individual. It must first be clarified, however, that tension is not necessarily, although it can be oppositional, nor always between participants or their backgrounds, as some of the work on hybridity has attempted to show (Gutiérrez, Baquedano-López, & Tejeda, 1999). Rather, tensions are inherent in interaction and a productive site of knowledge creation (Baquedano-López, Solís & Kattan, 2005; Solís, Kattan, & Baquedano-López, 2008). In other words, the tensions discussed here are similar to Bakhtin’s (1981) discussion of centripetal and centrifugal forces acting upon language: the individual and the community are always simultaneously pulling away from and drawing into one another.

These tensions are most clearly visible when children take disagreement stances toward ATTPs. Disagreement stances are both affective and epistemic stances (Ochs, 1993, 1996; Ochs & Schieffelin, 1989) that display negative alignment toward a proposed activity-transition-point. As a socially situated interactional accomplishment, disagreement stances highlight the tensions between authoritative expectations (e.g., a parent’s announcement that it is time for dinner) and individual desires (e.g., a child’s insistence on continuing to play a computer game). Disagreement stances are not so much a child’s claim to psychological autonomy (Erikson, 1950), as much as they are the display of tension with social norms.

As an instantiation of the dialectic between the individual and the community, disagreement stances are not merely oppositional, but also constitutive of that dialectical relationship. Like oppositional stances, disagreement stances are immediate, unmitigated, and marked by affective intensity (Goodwin, 1998, pp. 33-34). They are also significant sites of socialization in that they draw our attention to local and communal expectations (García Sánchez, 2006). However, whereas an oppositional stance positions one actor against another actor (as in one hopscotch player calling another a cheater [García Sánchez, 2006; Goodwin, 1998]), disagreement stances position an actor against an activity or proposed transition.
In the socialization of temporalizing activity, disagreement stances are most often expressed through negation of ATPPs, as in Excerpts 6-8.

Excerpt 6 (Liron, 3;5; Eyal, father)
01 Eyal yala. bo naale lemala.
let’s go. come-sg-m-s-dir ascend-1st pl up
‘Come on. Let’s go upstairs.’
02 Liron ((running away)) lo! lo! lo! lo! lo!
NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG
‘No! No! No! No! No!’

Excerpt 7 (Jon, 3;11; Ron, father; Noah, mother)
01 Ron ma ha fa’a ima?
what def hour mom
‘What time is it, mom?’
02 Noah ((looks at clock on wall))
03 fa’a lalexet lifon.
hour go-inf sleep-inf
‘Time to go to sleep.’
04 famata (jon)?
hear-2nd-sg-pt (jon)
‘Did you hear, Jon?’
05 Ron famata ma ima amra?
hear-2nd-sg-pt what mom say-3rd-sg-pt
‘Did you hear what mom said?’
06 Jon °ma, °ma° ma?
what what what
‘What? What? What?’
07 Noah fe hegia ha zman lalexet li: (.)
that arrive3rd-sg-pt def time go-inf sl
‘That it’s to go to sl-’
08 Jon lo:....
NEG
‘No.’
09 Noah ke:....n
yes
‘Yes.’
10 Jon lo:
NEG
‘No.’
11 Noah ke:n
yes
‘Yes.’
Excerpt 8 (Dikla, 5;11; Efrat, mother)
01 Efrat (Dikla). holxim leexol xamuda.
go-1^pl. eat-INF cutie
‘(Dikla), we’re gonna eat, sweetie.’
02 Dikla © Wait minute mo-mmy:. ((remains seated at computer))

In Excerpt 6, Eyal has indicated to his son that it is time to prepare for bed, instructing him to go brush his teeth and following up with the directive “yala. bo naale lemala.” (‘Come on. Let’s go upstairs.’). Similarly, in Excerpt 7, Ron and Noah informed their son that it was time to go to sleep. Their give and take demonstrates the often collaborative effort parents make to positively align with each other when proposing a transition. In Excerpt 8, Efrat had commented to her daughter that it was time to sit down to dinner. When Dikla did not verbally respond or indicate by movement or gesture that she was getting up from the desk, Efrat followed up by stating, “holxim leexol” (‘we’re going to eat’).

In all three instances, the children responded to the parent by taking a disagreement stance toward the ATTP. In Excerpts 6 and 7 this was done directly through explicit negation, whereas in Excerpt 8 Dikla counters with her own beseeching directive delivered in plaintive voice. These disagreement stances are affectively highlighted by raised pitch, vowel elongation, repetition, and the embodiment of resistance by the child (Goodwin, 1998, p. 34). Excerpt 7 also exemplifies the ways these negotiations are carried out collaboratively. Excerpt 8 demonstrates that disagreement stances in transition routines of temporally marked activities are often an explicit attempt to remain within the present activity. Excerpt 9 illustrates how this request for continuance is often negotiated by children and parents to prolong the present activity.

Excerpt 9 (Liron, 3;8; Eyal, father)
01 Eyal xevres?! yala holxim le::hitkalex.
guys let’s go go-pl. shower-INF
‘Guys. Let’s go. We’re gonna go shower.’
02 Liron lo. ( ) ani rotzse od ktsat.
NEG ( ) I want more bit
‘No, I want a bit more.’
03 Eyal od ktsat ve az olxim. Atem fomim? ki kvar meuxar.
more bit and then go-pl. you-pl. hear-pl. because already late
‘A bit more and then we’re going. You hear? Because it’s already late.’
04 Liron ken.
yes
‘Yes’
05 Eyal az od ktsat ve az holxim.
so more bit and then go-pl.
‘So a bit more and then we’re going.’
In Excerpt 9, after Eyal’s ATPP (Turn 1), Liron took a strong disagreement stance followed by a request for extension. This opposition launches a negotiation sequence in which Eyal cedes to his son’s request. Eyal’s response simultaneously maintains collaboration and adversariness, the former through use of the plural verb (*olxim* [go]), the latter through the interrogative *atem fomim* (‘Did you hear?’), which casts his children as a separate party not in alignment with his stance. The explanation offered for the need to shower (*ki kvar meuxar* [‘Because it’s already late’]) explicitly signals time of day as a relevant determiner of readiness to prepare for bed. Finally, the repetition of “*od ktsat*” (‘a bit more’) serves to reinforce that the brevity of the proposed extension is preemptively agreed to by Liron.

This negotiation of intersubjectivity through disagreement is reminiscent of Matusov’s (1996) critique of cultural-psychological studies of intersubjectivity that tend to focus too much on instances in which participants are in agreement, thus disregarding aspects of the same phenomena in which actors are in disagreement. Intersubjectivity, following Rogoff (1990), is the recognition in the child that she is a social being through mutual orientation with adults to objects. As Matusov (1996) points out, “disagreement and agreement are both aspects of one process rather than separate phases of microdevelopment of sociocultural activity portrayed as progressing from disagreement (or lack of agreement) to agreement among participants” (p. 25). Agreement and disagreement stances are not only, as in Matusov’s words, “aspects of one process” in which intersubjectivity is attained, but are also necessary tensions for defining group boundaries and the position of the individual within those boundaries.

Transitions from one activity to another are not always immediate, as has been the case with the examples discussed so far. Oftentimes, the negotiation of a transition can occur well in advance of an actual activity-transition-point, projecting the eventual transition as a set event. Instances such as these highlight how socialization to time reckoning is a socially situated activity that also inculcates other social mores and expectations.

The following three excerpts are taken from interactions that occurred at the Gordon home one evening after dinner and involved most centrally Ron and Jon agreeing on a time for bath and getting ready for bed. Jon played with a set of Legos in the living room while his parents, Ron and Noah, finished cleaning up in the kitchen. As Excerpt 10 begins, Ron approached Jon to discuss a possible timetable for the rest of the evening.

**Excerpt 10 (Jon, 3;9; Ron, father)**

01 Jon  ((at coffee table playing with Lego’s. Gaze is on Lego’s throughout.))

02 Ron  *tov*  (*jon*)  (3.2)  ((sits down. Unless otherwise indicated, gaze is on Jon))

‘Okay, Jon.’
what you say

Let’s decide when we’re going to take a shower.

‘Look at my watch.’

‘My watch shows eight and four minutes.’

‘Look at it.’

‘Eight thirty?’

‘Jon? Jon?’

‘When the big hand gets to here?’

‘Now it’s here.’

‘It’ll get all the way to here and we’ll go take a bath?’

‘Agreed’

‘Agreed?’

‘yes’
Socialization to time does not occur as an isolated event in which timekeeping is explicitly taught for its own sake; rather, learning about time and schedules has to do, in this particular instance, with learning about agreements and contracts. Unlike in previous examples, in which the ATPP signaled an immediate or nearly immediate transition, here the ATPP projects (Haviland, 1996) a transition that is to take place in twenty-five minutes. It is the amount of time left before the actual activity-transition-point that allows both for the drawn-out negotiation of the clock time of the transition and the opportunity to instruct Jon in timekeeping and time reckoning practices, as well as to socialize him to the mores of agreement of his community.

Ron, striving to gain an intersubjective field (Rogoff, 1990; Tomasello, 2003) takes several turns in which he repeatedly calls for Jon’s attention (Turns 2-5, 7, 10) both by using the boy’s name and employing directives, as well as placing himself and his watch within Jon’s visual space. These attempts at keying a frame (Goffman, 1974) of intersubjective collaboration are further marked by Ron’s use of first-person plural conjugation of verbs both in their imperative and present aspects, such as naxlit (‘let’s decide’ [Turn 4]; which is further emphasized when followed by beyaxad (‘together’) and holxim (‘go’ [Turns 4, 8, 13]), or in the past tense, as with asinu (‘we made’ [Turn 18]).

The contrasting levels of engagement on the part of father and son indicated through gesture, eye gaze, and vocalization in this interaction belie the collaborativeness of this exchange. While the decision to go to bed at a particular time no doubt has to do with individual desires, it also draws on broader necessities such as the work and school schedules of other family members. By grammatically including Jon in the making of this predetermined decision, Ron mitigates the often
This mitigation is further accomplished through the repetition and questioning intonation of the utterances in which the activity-transition-point is projected (Turns 4, 8, 11, and 13). Jon’s disengagement foreshadows his later disagreement stance.

Ron, as would be expected in a contract genre (François, 2005, p. 52), began by casting Jon as being in agreement with him in the first place. Despite the fact that he was the one who ended up making the decisions, he proposed to Jon that they do it together (Turn 4). The watch, then, became the instrument by which they measured that on which they agreed. This orientation to the supposedly objective timekeeping device for determining schedules, as shown in the discussion of Excerpts 1 and 5, reflects a local ideology of the immutability and authority of clock and calendar time (Postill, 2002). The use of demonstratives when dealing with the watch (po [‘here’] accompanied by pointing) indicate that Jon is not yet deemed fully knowledgeable at how to tell time using watches and is thus a means of teaching him how to use a watch. This lesson also serves to inculcate in Jon the importance of specific hours in organizing his activities, as indicated by the specificity of Ron’s time-telling (fmone? (.) ve arba dakot [‘eight and four minutes’] Turn 6).

In repeatedly intoning questions to Jon, Ron indicates that the transaction is not completed until his son responds. It is only when Jon finally displays agreement (Turn 14) that the conversation turns toward a conclusion. The genre of contract making is, in turn, further carried out by Jon, when he nods and says, maskim (‘agreed’). Ron plays on the intertextuality (Bakhtin, 1986) and polysemy of maskim by taking Jon’s response as having keyed a mock formal professional genre. This is indicated by Ron’s verbally playful yet gesturally serious invitation for Jon to shake his hand and his framing of the transaction as a formal agreement (heskem). The fact that this agreement is witnessed by the unbiased, panoptic (Foucault, 1977) video camera allows the agreement to be finalized as well as giving it a sense of officiality. This lesson in time is finally concluded when Ron sums up for Jon exactly how many minutes he has left to play.

Ultimately, the interaction also has important implications for the parent-child relationship. In this exchange, Ron and Jon are also acting out or performing their preexisting roles as father and son but also creating and producing them anew. As in many socializing routines, socialization to timekeeping involves socialization to recognizing authority positions.

Numerous tensions are played out in this exchange. First, the agreement is itself accomplished through a great deal of opposition to intersubjectivity. Jon’s lack of displayed engagement with his father and Ron’s insistence on getting his son’s verbal agreement to the evening’s proposed schedule is an example par excellence of how tacit disagreement is part and parcel of the accomplishment of intersubjectivity. Additionally, the formality of the agreement casts Jon as a potentially conflictual interlocutor who must be kept to his word. Moreover, the reliance on the watch and the indexing of the camera point to a tension not only between
the boy and his father, but also between the boy and his material and presumably 
objective environment. The regulated and unbiased time of the watch is in tension 
with the subjective measurement of tiredness and readiness for the start of bedtime 
routines as experienced by Jon.

For the next twenty-seven minutes, Jon played with the Legos while Ron 
and I played with him as we conversed about the family’s upcoming Thanksgiv-
ing vacation trip. Noah had joined us, sitting on the couch next to Ron and talking 
about the possibility of going shopping the day after Thanksgiving. Twenty-seven 
minutes after Ron and Jon’s agreement, Noah, who had been in the kitchen and 
presumably within earshot during the previous exchange, asked Ron when Jon was 
supposed to get ready for bed.

Excerpt 11

24 Noah  matai hu holex lifon?
when he go-sg sleep
‘When’s he going to sleep?’

25 Ron  od falof/dakot.
more three minutes
‘Three more minutes.’

26 Noah  a ken,
ah yes
‘Oh yeah?’

27 Ron  (jon)? rot’e ( ) ta fion?
(jon) want-sg ( ) prep-def watch
‘Jon? Want ( ) the watch?’

28 texef ze magi’a le po, ((shows watch to Jon and points at hands))
presently it arrive-3rd to here
‘In a second it’ll get to here’

29 ve kavanu fe kfe ze po, holxim la ambatia.
and decided-1st-pl-pt that when it here go-1st-pl to-def bath
‘and we decided that when it’s here we’re going to take a bath.’

30 az ani holex female ta maim
so I go-1sg fill-inf prep-def water
‘so I’m going to fill up the tub’

31 Jon  tikra li fe temale ta maim
call me that fill-2ndsg-ft prep-def water
‘Call me when you’ve filled the tub.’

32 Ron  beseder ( )
okay ( )
‘Okay’

33 Jon  tov. ve az ani bone
okay and so I build
‘Okay and so I’m building.’
In turn 24 another ATPP is made by Noah that follows up on the original negotiation from nearly half an hour earlier. In turns 27 through 30 Ron reminded Jon of their agreement, again showing his watch and pointing to the minute-hand’s position. In these turns, Ron projects several movements in time, indicated by the transition from present, to future, to past, and again to present tense (Turn 27: \textit{rot}e \textit{[want-PRT]}; 28: \textit{texef} \textit{ze magi’a} ['soon it’ll arrive’]; 29: \textit{kavanu} \textit{[decide-PRT]}; 30: \textit{holex} \textit{[go-PRT]}). Turn 29 serves an especially important role in the projection of past events onto the future by indicating that the original agreement was one that would achieve its fulfillment at a future time.

As in the earlier exchange, Jon is cast as a potentially contrary participant, a stance evinced by Ron’s reenactment of their previous agreement, as well as by Noah’s doubt that Jon will go to sleep at the agreed upon time (Turn 26). That Noah directed her question toward Ron is also significant. Noah’s use of the third-person singular and the fact that she addressed her query to her husband and not her son, cast her as being outside the decision-making process but in positive alignment with Ron. Her utterance bestows upon Ron an authority to have made this decision in the first place, an authority that nonetheless seems undermined by her subsequent ironic remark (Turn 26). This bestowing and retracting of authority enacts communal hierarchies that relationally position father and son to each other and to time. More significantly, it positions Jon as a member of the group inasmuch as the group is affected by his schedule. That is, Jon’s bedtime, more than merely signifying an end to his playtime, organizes the timetable of the three adults in the room.

I want to emphasize as well Ron’s use of \textit{kavanu} (‘we decided’) compared with his earlier use of \textit{heskem} (‘agreement’). \textit{Kavanu} connotes a more definitive and immutable aspect of scheduling as evidenced by its root, which covers the meaning of ‘fix,’ ‘determine,’ and ‘routinize.’ This distinction is especially important when considering the exchange that took place six minutes later. In this interaction Ron announced to Jon that the time had come for him to put away his toys and take a bath. Jon indicated a strong disagreement stance in both words and action which was only resolved when continuation of play beyond this particular day was threatened.

\begin{excerpts}
\begin{align*}
34 & \text{Ron} & \textit{yala bo;}, & \textit{osfim} \quad \text{(joni)}.
& \text{Let’s go come-SG-DIR gather-1#PL (joni)}
& \text{‘Okay, let’s go, we’re gathering them up Joni.’}
35 & \text{Jon} & \textit{lo}.
& \text{NEG}
& \text{‘No.’}
36 & \text{Ron} & \textit{hegi’a ha fà’a},
& \text{arrived DEF hour}
& \text{‘It’s time.’}
\end{align*}
\end{excerpts}
37 Jon  lo >ata lo  roe,<  
NEG you NEG see
‘No, don’t you see?’

38 Ron  stakel al ha faon.  
Look-SG-DIR on DEF watch  
‘Look at the watch.’

39 ha maxog avar et ha lemata.  
def hand passed PREP-DEF down  
‘The hand’s passed the bottom.’

40 Jon  lo naxon  
NEG correct  
‘Not true.’

41 Ron  ken.  
yes  
‘Yes.’

42 Jon  lo  
NEG  
‘No.’

43 Ron  yala. ha mat'lema t'ilma otxa  
come on DEF camera film-1*SG-FM-PT you  
‘Come on, the camera filmed you.’

44 Jon  nu BEEMET!  
so really  
‘Now really!’

45 Ron  ha mat'lema t'ilma otxa mavtiax  
def camera film-1*SG-FM-PT you promise  
‘The camera filmed you promising.’

46 Jon  lo naxon  
NEG correct  
‘Not true.’

47 Ron  ((begins to put away Lego’s in box))

48 Jon  LO! ANI LO MASKIM!  
NEG I NEG agree  
‘No! I don’t agree!’

49  ((takes Lego’s out of box and throws them on table))

---

| (6.8) |

---
In this last exchange, which was eventually concluded in a compromise in which the Legos were collected as part of a playful competition between father and son, Ron again reminded Jon of their agreement and the boy again displayed his opposition to complying with the schedules imposed upon him. As with other ATPPs, Ron begins with a call (yala ['let’s go']) that keys a shift to a transition frame. In turns 36 (hegi’a ha fa’a ['It’s time']), 38 (stakel al ha faon ['look at the watch']), and 39 (ha maxog avar et ha lemata ['the hand passed the bottom']) Ron indicated that the time of the activity was not abstract, but determined specifically by an artifact, the watch, and the minute hand having passed a certain point. The articulation of time through the movement of the watch’s minute hand gave this temporality both an authority that drew on Ron’s position as father and an authority that bestowed upon Ron the power to determine when Jon was to take his bath. By marking the position of the minute hand in space (lemata [down/‘bottom’]) as opposed to by number (mone va xetsi [‘eight-thirty’]) or quantity (esrim ve xamef dakot ['twenty-five minutes’]), Ron continued to function under the assumption, as noted above, that his son had not yet learned to tell time using a watch. Thus, this socializing event also includes a specific practical lesson in telling time. By stating that the minute hand had passed where it needed to be, Ron also indicated that he had already shown leniency in keeping with the original agreement. Jon’s questioning of the veracity of this assessment in turns 40 and 46—a disagreement stance that is simultaneously an affective stance and an epistemic stance—does not dispute the position of the watch’s minute hand—a claim which could not have
been taken seriously considering Jon’s disregard of the watch—but rather marks a generalized disagreement stance.¹⁵

Each one of Jon’s turns in this exchange displays a disagreement stance toward activity transitions. This disagreement progresses from a simple negation to a loud exclamation of disagreement (LO ANI LO MASKIM! ['No! I don’t agree!']). As the disalignment between father and son widened, Ron appealed to different methods of negotiation that increasingly transferred moral responsibility to Jon. It was mentioned above that the agreement between the father and son in Excerpt 10 was framed as a contractual exchange. In Excerpt 11 heskamnu (‘we agreed’) became kavanu (‘we decided/determined’), a shift which increased the determinacy of the contract. In this exchange the original agreement took on a moral imperative. In turn 43, Ron reminded Jon of their agreement by referencing the camera as a witness. When Jon protested, Ron recast the actual event that the camera had filmed as a promise rather than an agreement (Turn 45). As Jon took a stronger disagreement stance, raising his voice, expressing negation, and physically contesting his father (Turns 48-49), Ron changed the witness of the agreement from the impartial camera to the human figure of the researcher who cannot only hold the boy to his word but can also pass judgment on his moral character. The boy is imputed with more and more agency in determining how he presents himself and his moral character. By proxy, timekeeping then also takes on a moral imperative. In this way, socialization to time reckoning furthers socialization to other social mores, most specifically those involved with honesty and responsibility.

The Days of the Week and Communal Belonging

So far we have discussed how disagreement stances during activity transitions function as socializing routines to communal timekeeping and time reckoning norms. These same socializing practices extend to keeping other aspects of the temporal order, such as weeks. The following excerpt exemplifies the ways children are socialized to maintaining weekly schedules, and, more importantly, the ways children contest those schedules. These weekly schedules, with defined workdays and weekends, are part of the social construction of work ethic (Thompson, 1966). The exchange took place at the Gordon family’s home prior to dinner. On this particular day, Jon, 3 years and 7 months old at the time, had stayed home from preschool due to a fever. Noah, his mother, had taken him to the doctor in the afternoon and he was prescribed medicine for an ear infection. A few minutes before the interaction discussed below, Ron, the father, had walked into the house after having gone to the pharmacy to buy Jon’s medicine while Noah was at home preparing dinner. As this particular segment of the interaction began, Jon was playing with toys on the carpet in the living room of the one-bedroom apartment. Immediately prior to this excerpt, Ron tried to convince Jon to take his medicine. Jon refused, saying consistently that he did not want to take the medicine.
Excerpt 13 (John, 3;7; Ron, father)

1. Ron
> ata ro'te< lehavri? (.8) o ata ro'te lehif'ær xole
you-SG-MS want recuperate-INF or you want stay-INF sick
‘Do you want to get better or do you want to stay sick?’

2. Jon
lehif'ær xole ki ani lo ohev lalexet la gan
stay-INF sick because I NEG love go-INF to-DEF kindergarten
‘Stay sick ‘cause I don’t like going to kindergarten.’

3. Ron
@@@@@@

4. Ron
av al xol le ze lo tov la guf
But sick DEM NEG good to-DEF body
‘But being sick isn’t good for the body’

5. Jon
axi xaʃluv ze lihiyot bari,
INT important DEM be-INF healthy
‘The most important thing is being healthy’

6. Jon
@ aval ani ohev lehif'ær ba
but I love stay-INF in-DEF house
‘But I like staying home’

7. Ron
naxon (.2) ve hine od meat yom fiʃ fiʃabat ve niʃær ba
Right and here soon Friday-Saturday and stay-1PL-FT in-DEF
‘Right and soon it’s the weekend and we’ll stay’
bait gam fiʃabat ve gam rifon
house also Saturday and also Sunday
‘home both Saturday and Sunday’

8. Ron
hayom- hayom kvar yom revii niʃar rak xamiʃ ve fiʃ
Today today already Wednesday remains only Thursday and Friday
‘Today is already Wednesday and only Thursday and Friday are left’

9. Ron
yala, kum al ha raglaim
let’s go rise-SG-DIR on DEF feet
‘Let’s go, on your feet’

As noted above, socialization to time does not occur in isolation, but is part of events and activities in which socialization to other expectations and norms also takes place. In this particular excerpt for example, by defining the weekend as the time one stays home, Ron signaled to Jon to what extent his illness could function as an excuse from what are seen as the boy’s responsibilities. It is the role of the schedule within those other expectations, as well as the role of those other expectations within the schedule, that in part creates or displays tensions.

Whereas proposals for transitions between adjacent activities, such as the ones in Excerpts 1-12, feature explicit ATPPs that call for immediate or impending transitions, socialization to broader temporal orders tends to have, as in this excerpt, more diffused calls for transition. Here the ATPP is phrased as an ironic rhetorical question that presumably obviates the second option given (i.e., staying sick). This question is an ATPP because, as becomes evident in following turns,
recuperating from illness both entails eventual capacity to attend school and pre-supposes a desire to comply with regular school attendance, activities which call upon communal temporal norms.

Jon’s response in turn 2 displays a disagreement stance both toward taking his medicine and going to school. This disagreement stance is articulated through the affectively marked lo ohev (‘I don’t like’). On an epistemological level, one could say that Jon’s claim is solipsistic or egocentric in that it proposes that the boy’s dislikes are the potential cause for other decisions, especially decisions that have to do with routines and schedules. In Jon’s suggestion that he remain sick in order to stay home from school, there is either a tacit disregard for or a blatant resistance to the schedules of other members of the family and his broader community. It is, in other words, the display of diversity against homogeneity through the performance of individual self-differentiation from his own group.

Ron’s response, interestingly, is not at first to appeal to Jon’s participation in the collectivity; rather, it is in the form of an aphorism that provides a link between illness and the schedule and which is intended to address at first not Jon’s dislike for school, but his desire to stay sick. In this aphorism, which is in fact two balanced maxims, Ron states universally and unequivocally, “avl’al xo’le ze lo tov ṭla ḥuf / axi xaʃ uv ze lihiyot bari,” (‘But being sick isn’t good for the body’ / ‘The most important thing is being healthy’). Here, the body is isolated from the child syntactically and semantically through the use of generalizing impersonals (ze). On the other hand, the maxim is clearly addressed to Jon, as marked by the exaggerated intonation of the baby-talk register. In this sense, we could say that Jon is being socialized both to his role as a child who must take his medicine because he is told to do so, and to his social identity as a member of a family that is professional middle class and which expects him to attend school on a regular basis. It is important, however, to avoid the implication that the socialization to childhood and social class is objective. This assessment is made here because it appears that the need to have the child attend school draws on the parents’ need to attend to their own daytime occupations. Thus, the terms “child” and “middle class” are used as shorthand to indicate that the predicament faced here, while idiosyncratic, is situated within broader discourses of age and socioeconomic status.

Maxims and aphoristic sentences, through their grammatical structure and indexing of supposedly shared knowledge, produce, recognize, and normalize tensions between the individual and the group. This tension is most evident in the way that both maxims and aphorisms generalize knowledge and experience. Aphoristic sentences consist of a structure that balances two equivalent constructions against each other, such as “easy come, easy go” (Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartik, 1985, p. 843). Maxims, which are often the two parts of an aphoristic sentence or which themselves can be articulated aphoristically, are an especially germane category for evaluating these tensions. As Lewis (1972, p. 42) writes of the generalizing nature of maxims, “far from reflecting a supposedly experiential foundation, the generalization, through its imposing timelessness, enacts a radical
exclusion of the sense—of the pre-sence—of ‘lived experience’.” The durative present of the maxim, according to Lewis, “marks not the immediacy of the particular moment, but the inaccessibility of an undifferentiated eternity” (ibid). In this sense, maxims and aphorisms are used to discredit individual deviance in favor of normative, often moral expectations, bringing to the fore the tensions between societal norms and individual agency. The universality and objectivity of Ron’s claim about health make it unassailable. It is cast as undeniably true, strengthened by the intensifier *axi*, and this truth in turn denies the boy’s power to decide to be sick while disregarding his dislike for school.

In turn 6 (*aval ani ohev lehi†er ba †bait* [‘But I like staying home’]), Jon again displays a disagreement stance, now focusing on his desire to be with his family through a positive (*ani ohev* [‘I like’]) rather than negative (*ani lo ohev* [‘I don’t like’]) affective stance. Thus, the focus shifts from illness to community affiliation but with the proviso that the community, from Jon’s perspective, as noted above, is amenable to the boy’s desires. Through his affective stance Jon invites alignment from his father with the disagreement stance he has taken. This ability to align in disagreement is a feature of disagreement stances that, as noted before (page 11), distinguishes them from oppositional stances.

In his retort, Ron references the whole family by using the first person plural future conjugation of ‘stay’ (*ni†er*), but this time making the family’s needs primary to Jon’s. In this way, Jon’s ability to stay home depends not only on the severity of his illness and the school’s schedule, but also on the schedules of his parents. As with clock time, calendar time is here invoked to lend authority and objectivity to Ron’s statements. Conversely, the appeal to Jon’s affiliation with his family couches the socialization to the weekly chronology of his community. Weekdays and weekends are clearly defined as times that not only follow certain rules and norms, but that also have particular affective meaning. Weekdays are time to work, weekends are times to play; weekdays are times to be apart, weekends are times to be together. In this way, as with socialization to daily schedules and routines, socialization to weekly time reckoning involves socialization to other norms and expectations, such as the epistemic meaning of illness and the affective meaning of family.

CONCLUSIONS

The fundamental purpose of this analysis is to move away from stating the obvious—that children do not always agree with their parents—in order to make a relevant theoretical point about time, identity, and community. Most studies of social time assume intra-group homogeneity while looking for inter-group heterogeneity. In this article I claimed that a close analysis of parent-child interaction can expose the systematic ways in which tensions come to define not only oppositions, but also what is shared. Inasmuch as schedules are always to one extent or another communal, contestation of those schedules is by proxy resistance to communality. Individuals do not merely perform, represent, or display their identities and group
affiliations. Rather, it is through their actions against and with those collectivities that individuals and collectivities are defined by one another. Studies of social time, inasmuch as they assume a relationship between the individual and his/her community, need to pay attention to these tensions in order to further draw out their implications for the study of the construction of social identity.

In this paper I have attempted to show that within socializing interactions involving schedules and calendars, there are inherent tensions that both display and carry meaning for relationships between the individual and her/his community. Activity-transition-point-proposals and their uptake create the interactional space in which those socializing moments can become robust. While the language socialization paradigm provides a productive and refined way to examine how individuals learn to be members of the society they create, studies of language socialization have not paid sufficient attention to how individuals are socialized to particular patterns of language use and timekeeping. If, as Schieffelin and Ochs (1986) have indicated, language socialization takes place in part through activities and routines, then one of the elements that is constitutive of those routines and activities is time or temporality, be it through explicit or implicit schedules and rhythms. Although studies of language socialization have depicted the order in which events are carried out, there has not been much attention paid to how novices are socialized to those orderings (be they of a smaller or larger scale) nor to the implications this has for group membership. This article has attempted to fill that gap.

NOTES

1 Shlichim, and the activity in which they participate, shlichut, are contested terms among Israeli transnationals, owing to the terms’ history and ideological weight. While the three families in this study would not necessarily refer to each other as shlichim, they all referred to themselves by this title, and it is for this reason that I use it here.

2 All names of study participants, except for my own, have been changed to maintain confidentiality.

3 A concern among social scientists with universalist claims about time in science was not uncommon during this era, and reflected a broader preoccupation with cultural relativity. Whorf’s (1940, 1941, 1956) promulgation of the linguistic relativity hypothesis was also focused, not coincidentally, on the ways different peoples, through their languages, perceived concepts of time and space—concepts taken by Western scientists to be objective constants—in unique and equally valid ways. Any analysis of time and society, especially one concerned with the expression of temporal norms through discourse, must necessarily take relativity as a given, and this article is no exception.

4 An extensive review of the sociological and anthropological literature on time is beyond the scope of this paper. For comprehensive reviews of time and social theory, see Bergmann (1992) and Nowotny (1992). For a review of approaches to the study of time in social sciences and the humanities from the 1960’s to the 1990’s, see Glennie and Thrift (1996). For a review of the concept of time within sociocultural anthropology, see Munn (1992), who argues that the field deals primarily with descriptions of timekeeping methods taken as longstanding and static. Munn is additionally concerned with an absence of a theory of time in anthropology. While I share such a concern, this article
is not the place to expound on such a theory. For readers interested in such pursuits, aside from Munn, see Agha (2007); Kattan, Solís, & Baquedano-López (in preparation); Luckmann (1991); Luhmann (1976).

While concepts such as heterochrony (Lemke, 2000) and pluritemporality (Nowotny, 1992) suggest an opening up of concepts of time and temporality to include a multitude of orientations, approaches to the study of such concepts continue to suggest that individuals learn one or another—or a few—ways of keeping time from their communities. Pluritemporality and similar such terms therefore recognize multiplicity within a community, and thus a multiplicity available to individual community members; in other words, diversity. Where pluritemporality recognizes tension is in the abutment of unlike temporalities, not, as suggested below, between the individual and the community that teaches members multiple ways of keeping time.

Such a stance shares, in part, the perspective taken in Bucholtz and Hall’s (2004) concern with essentialism, which itself draws on post-feminist (Butler, 1993, 1999), post-colonial (Bhabha, 1990, 1994), and diaspora (Boyarin & Boyarin, 1993; Gilroy, 1993; Hall, 1990) critiques of cultural identity. Where I diverge from this point of view is in seeing diversity not merely as a feature of social life that needs to be recognized and accounted for by analysts, but as the *sine qua non* of group identification. Diversity, then, is not merely difference; it is the tension that allows the societal structure to stand.

I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this work to my attention.

Wingard (2007) is a notable exception.

It should be noted that Hebrew does not have the nominal compounds “bedtime,” “bath time,” “dinnertime,” etc., but rather expressions such as “zman lišon” (time to sleep), “zman lehitkaleaxh” (time to shower), “zman leexol” (time to eat), and so forth. Discursively, however, they serve a similar function to their compound noun counterparts in English.

For examples originally in Hebrew, the original language is in italics, the word-for-word gloss in roman (plain) type with correct alignment, ‘and the idiomatic translation in single quotation marks.’ In the Hebrew, ‘x’ = voiceless velar fricative, ‘f’ = voiceless alveopalatal fricative, ‘t’ = voiceless alveolar affricate, and an apostrophe = glottal stop. Utterances originally in English are written using standard American English orthography. In the word-for-word gloss, the following abbreviations are used to indicate affixes and particles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st, 2nd, 3rd</th>
<th>person</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>feminine</th>
<th>INF</th>
<th>infinitive</th>
<th>DEM</th>
<th>demonstrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SG = singular</td>
<td>PT = preterit</td>
<td>DIR = directive</td>
<td>GEN = genitive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL = plural</td>
<td>PR = present</td>
<td>DEF = definite</td>
<td>REC = recipient</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS = masculine</td>
<td>FT = future</td>
<td>PREP = preposition</td>
<td>NEG = negation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intonation and other paralinguistic features of speech are marked by the following symbols (transcription conventions adapted from Jefferson, 2002, pp. 1377-1383):

- falling tone
- rising intonation
- sound elongations
- overlapped speech
- relative emphasis
- non-verbal behavior

(0.0) length of pause in seconds and tenths (name) pseudonym
>talk< relatively fast speech <talk> relatively slow speech
CAPS  relatively louder speech  *talk*  relatively quieter speech
@  laughter for an estimated duration  wo@rd  laughter while speaking
*  crying for an estimated duration  wo*rd  crying while speaking
😊 smiling voice  🙅 plaintive voice

11 Yala (also yalla) is a word derived from Arabic that originated as—and in colloquial terms still is—slang, and which can be loosely translated as “come on” or “let’s go” and which discursively functions as an “urging to continue” (Maschler, 2002, p. 26).
12 The works cited in the section “Time, Society, and Self” above are significant examples of this type of analysis. Zerubavel (1982) has argued, for example, that the Pasqualian debates, in which the dates on which Easter is celebrated were contested by different Christian factions, formed Christian identities that were temporally removed both from the Jewish calendrical system and from other Christian sects. Similarly, Schieffelin (2002) showed how the Christian missionizing project changed orientations to time among the Kaluli of Papua New Guinea. Schieffelin illustrated that language, culture, and time are intertwined in ways that mark changing group affiliations and that carry implications for the role and status of the individuals in the group. Reporting on a study of migrant female banking and nursing professionals in Britain, Germany, and Spain, Zulauf (1997) showed that migrant workers are largely affected by differing orientations toward time in the form of scheduling at work, “illustrat[ing] the impact of national difference in time organization” (Zulauf, 1997, p. 152). These three studies, while carried out in distinct yet parallel settings, are exemplary in their analyses of time as a marker of inter-group boundaries and the extent to which they assume those group affiliations to carry meaning for individual identity.
13 One should also distinguish between disagreement stances and breaches, both of which are acts that bring about productive tensions and learning opportunities (Baquedano-López, Solís, & Kattan, 2005; Garfinkel, 1967; Jacobs-Huey, 2007; Solís, Kattan, & Baquedano-López, 2008). Whereas breaches are “disruptions and discontinuities to agreed-upon routines and activities” (Baquedano-López, Solís, & Kattan, 2005, p. 3), disagreement stances are positions taken by actors toward a proposed activity-transition-point. Nonetheless, both concepts can be taken together to build up a theory of tension in socialization.
14 Jefferson (2002) shows that negation is not always a display of negative alignment. It does seem, however, that in all instances of ATPP uptake, negation functions to establish a disagreement stance.
15 In discussing the social phenomenon of indirectness, Blum-Kulka (1982, p. 30) has noted:

Generally speaking, Israeli society seems to allow for even more directness in social interaction than the American one (Levenston, 1970, p. 11). It is not uncommon to hear people around a conference table in Israel disagreeing with each other bluntly (saying things like ‘ata to’e’ = ‘You’re wrong’, or ‘lo nachon!’ = ‘Not true’). Such directness in a similar setting in American society would probably be considered rude...It seems that two languages might possess a similar range of linguistic means for realizing any given act, but in any given context one culture’s social norms can allow for a degree of directness that might be considered offensive if transferred to the other.
Blum-Kulka’s observations set out a cultural framework that is potentially relevant in the present analysis. Yet, while it is likely that Jon is expressing culturally appropriate disagreement stances, it is unnecessary to make essentializing claims about the necessity of these discursive patterns in particular communities, as Blum-Kulka’s analysis may suggest (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004).

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Shlomy Kattan’s research examines language socialization practices and linguistic ideologies among Israeli emissaries temporarily residing in the United States, focusing on how families negotiate their ties to both “homeland” and “host-land” during these transitions. His ongoing collaborative writing with Patricia Baquedano-López and Jorge Sólis examines discourse and learning in science classrooms.