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Locating Semantic Reference

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Locating Semantic Reference

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

by

Jessica Pepp

2012
The dissertation studies a question of longstanding interest in the philosophy of language, which I call the “Reference Determination Question.” The question is: what determines that a linguistic expression (such as a name, indexical, demonstrative, or description) refers to a particular thing? In one way or another, the question seeks a reduction of reference in terms of other features of speakers, words, and the things to which they refer. Until the work of Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan in the 1960s and 1970s, such a reduction seemed available. According to what I call the “Condition View,” the reference of a linguistic expression is whatever, if anything, uniquely satisfies the conditions that the user of the expression associates with it. I show how this view fits within a broader picture of language, which I call the “Capture Picture.” The Capture Picture envisions linguistic reference as a speaker’s reaching out from her interior experience to capture a particular thing in the world outside that experience. Kripke’s and Donnellan’s criticisms of the Condition View led to its widespread rejection, but not, I argue, to radical revision of the Capture Picture. I press the same form of argument that they
employed against the Condition View against replacements for it that remain within the Capture Picture. I suggest that this expansion of the Kripke-Donnellan critique has not been pursued because of Kripke’s influential distinction between “speaker’s reference” and “semantic reference,” and I explain why this distinction does not in fact track a substantive difference, and does not block my arguments. My criticism of alternative views within the Capture Picture reveals a parallel between linguistic reference and sensory perception: both are ways of experiencing things that are present in one’s sensory or cognitive environment. I defend this parallel, and show how it makes available a replacement for the Capture Picture that I call “Referential Direct Realism.” Referential Direct Realism is the counterpart, for referential experience, of the position usually called “Direct Realism” or “Naïve Realism” about perceptual experience. It holds that linguistic referring experience is direct cognitive contact with the objects to which one refers. On this view of linguistic referring experience, the Reference Determination Question does not arise. For there is no gulf to be bridged between what is inside the speaker’s experience (the linguistic expression) and what is outside (the object). I argue for Referential Direct Realism and show how it points the philosophical study of linguistic reference, and language in general, in a different direction from those that traditionally have been followed.
The dissertation of Jessica Pepp is approved.

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2012
Dedicated to the memories of my grandmothers, Bertha Pepp and Rose Alden.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a study of a question of longstanding interest in the philosophy of language, which I shall call the “Reference Determination Question,” or “RDQ” for short. Before introducing the question, I would like to draw attention to my use, in the previous sentence, of the word “study.” I chose it advisedly, in that the work to be presented does not, and does not aim to, answer the RDQ. Indeed, my aim is to suggest that the RDQ does not need answering, or, at any rate, whether it needs answering is itself a substantive question. This further question, of whether the RDQ needs answering, goes to the heart of the way we think about linguistic reference and language more generally. It is for this reason that the RDQ is a crucial question to study, if not to answer.

So, what is the Reference Determination Question? Exactly what the question is—what it is really asking—is a matter of some difficulty, which I take up in detail in Chapters 2 and 3. For a starting point, though, it can be put as follows:

What determines that a linguistic expression (such as a name, indexical, demonstrative, or description) refers to a particular thing?

The same question is often expressed by asking what links, attaches, or hooks a linguistic expression to some particular thing.¹ Or, what “mechanism” holds expression and referent together?² It may seem so obvious as to not be worth mentioning (to borrow Russell’s famous phrase) that certain names (or other expressions), as used on certain occasions, refer to certain things. Yet upon reflection, the nature of this relationship between name and referent is somewhat obscure. On the one hand there is an expression, a name or other word or collection of words, and on the other hand there is a thing, and somehow they are connected.

¹ Putnam 1990 seems to have popularized the locution “words hook onto the world,” with the metaphor of hooking originating with Wittgenstein. All of the words “link,” “attach,” and “hook” are used in this way in Reimer 2009, a survey introduction to the topic of reference.

² This way of putting the question is due to McGinn 1981. For just a few examples of the uptake of the term “mechanism” in discussing reference determination, see Abbott 2010, Wettstein 2004, Azzouni 2000, and Marti 1995.
Undoubtedly, much of the felt mystery here is due to the apparent arbitrariness of the connection. There seems to be nothing intrinsic to things or to names of things that suggests any particular pairing. What, then, underlies such pairings? I choose to use the word “determine” in setting out the question because it emphasizes as a source of the question this mystery about why a name or other expression refers to one particular thing rather than another (or, given the possibility of reference failure, rather than to nothing at all). What determines which thing an expression refers to—what determines that it refers to one thing rather than another?

To answer this question in a satisfying way would be to characterize the relation of reference in other terms: to explain what reference is. Let it be accepted that the name “Aristotle,” in certain uses, refers to the ancient philosopher Aristotle. What does that relation amount to? What is it, other than simply reference? In one way or another, the question seeks a reduction of reference in terms of other features.

Until the work of Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan in the 1960s and 1970s, such a reduction seemed available. According to a broad view that I call the “Condition View,” the reference of a name is determined by the conditions that someone using the name associates with it. As a simple example, someone might associate with the name “Aristotle” a condition such as being the ancient Greek philosopher who studied with Plato and taught Alexander. Or, we might consider a large cluster of conditions associated with the name, by a single speaker or a community of speakers. These conditions, either taken altogether or in some sort of weighted way, could single out a particular object (e.g., Aristotle) as the only one satisfying them, in which case this would be the object the associated name referred to. Or, they could fail to single out any particular object, in which case the name would not refer to anything at all. In this way, the relation of reference between name and object could be reduced to the relation of the satisfaction by the object of conditions associated with the name.

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4 See Chapter 1 for discussion.
Kripke and Donnellan gave separate influential critiques of this broad view. The critiques were based on intuitive counterexamples, in which names, as used, referred to particular things despite the absence of associated conditions that singled out those particular things. As an empirical matter, they contended, names often do refer in the absence of such singling out; thus the reference of names could not be reduced to such singling out. Classic examples of Kripke’s, which I discuss in Chapter 1, include the case of speakers who associate with the name “Feynman” only the condition of being a famous physicist, which singles out no one, and yet they refer using “Feynman” to Feynman, and the case of speakers who associate with the name “Peano” only the condition of having discovered certain axioms, which in fact were discovered by Dedekind, and yet they refer using “Peano” to Peano.

Kripke’s and Donnellan’s critiques were aimed not only at particular versions of the Condition View, but, as Kripke put it, at “the whole picture given by this theory of how reference is determined.” This distinction between picture and theory is one that informs my entire discussion. I take a picture to be a way of picturing or envisioning a phenomenon of interest. A picture is not a theory: it does not reduce a phenomenon or say what it fundamentally is. Rather, a picture portrays a phenomenon in a way that may be metaphorical, analogical, or picturesque. A picture can provide a foothold to begin investigating a phenomenon, and it can provide a tool for making a theory of that phenomenon come to life.

The picture of linguistic reference that the Condition View reflects is what I call the “Capture Picture.” The Capture Picture depicts linguistic reference as involving a speaker, who is isolated inside her language, trying to reach out with it and grab things in the world. “From the inside,” the speaker has access to names, which must somehow be attached to things “on the outside.” Language (inside) must be “linked up” to the world (outside). The Condition View reflects this picture in that it reduces reference to the successful working of a trap that speakers set, using their inside resources, to capture objects. By associating conditions with a name, speakers

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5 Kripke 1980.
enhance what they have access to from the inside to the point that it may single out and thereby capture something on the outside. The line between what is inside and what is outside is not blurred, yet speakers are in a certain way able to reach out from the inside and attach their words to things on the outside.

Seen in one way, Kripke’s and Donnellan’s critiques indeed suggest an overthrow of this whole way of picturing language. They show that we do not need to snare referents for our words in conceptual traps. They suggest that speakers are not isolated from the world and from one another, and can refer to things using names without the ability to single out those referents using their own inside resources. The critiques suggest that the referents of the names we use may be given to us, rather than captured by us.

Despite these suggestions, it is not clear that influential alternative pictures have really been replacements of the “whole” Capture Picture, as opposed to fairly conservative revisions that change the emphasis while keeping the same basic picture in place. Kripke initially proposed one alternative picture, envisioning linguistic reference as involving a chain initiated by a dubbing, and then stretching from speaker to speaker, vocabulary to vocabulary. Gareth Evans developed a different alternative picture, envisioning reference as involving the keeping and proliferation of files of information about a particular thing. These pictures have been the bases for many further refinements of answers to the RDQ, in response to counterexamples to the answers initially given by Kripke and Evans, which I call the “Baptism View,” and the “File View,” respectively.

It is important to see, and I develop this in Chapter 4, that these answers to the RDQ are developments of pictures, not theories. The pictures of which they are developments are more vivid with respect to saving reference than capturing it. Kripke’s metaphor of the chain gives a vivid image of reference as something passed from person to person, extended across time and space, not accomplished in a private, isolated room by a speaker and her conceptual resources.

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Evans’s metaphor of minds as file cabinets, storing files of information labeled with names, gives a vivid image of reference as both preservable and changeable over time, both within a person’s vocabulary and among the vocabularies of people across time and space.

But despite the shift in emphasis in these pictures to the preservation rather than the capture of reference, it is not at all clear that the metaphor of capture is removed from these pictures. Kripke’s discussion, while not unequivocal, sometimes suggests that each link in the chain of reference involves a new speaker’s capture of a referent for the name, at least with the temporary invocation, through the speaker’s intention, of the condition of being the thing referred to by the person from whom she hears the name. For speakers who introduce a name for something in an initial baptism, Kripke explicitly allows that their means of doing so may be by fixing the name’s referent using such a condition. He also allows that reference fixing may be by “ostension,” but again is equivocal on whether ostension involves the use of a condition to fix reference. Kripke is unequivocal that a speaker, whether baptizer or later acquirer, need not perform this capture upon each subsequent use of the name: it is fix-a-referent and forget it, so to speak. Nonetheless, for the initial acquisition of the name and the saving of the referent along with it, it seems to be important that some sort of capture occur. Evans similarly requires a speaker to capture a referent by means of her intention, in order to form a file based on someone else’s use of a name. Thus, these pictures give the impression that saving a referent is a follow-on to capturing it.

For his part, Donnellan did not suggest that names serve any kind of saving or preserving role in linguistic reference. His only positive claim about linguistic reference using a name was that the thing referred to, on a given occasion, by a name, should enter into the “historical explanation” of the speaker’s utterance of the name.7 His focus was on the utterance and what led to it, and not much on the name at all. In this, and in other parts of Donnellan’s work, lay the seeds of a genuine alternative to the Capture Picture. Given this, it is not surprising that

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7 Donnellan 1974.
Donnellan shows reluctance to answer the Reference Determination Question, which, as I will explain, only arises within the Capture Picture.

To move toward the development of a genuine alternative to the Capture Picture, I begin by considering the answers to the Reference Determination Question emerging from the more conservative alternative pictures suggested by Kripke and Evans, the Baptism View and the File View. I argue that the very same form of picture-altering argument deployed by Kripke against the Condition View can be deployed against either of these views. These views cannot give the correct account of what determines the reference of a name, as used, because there are cases in which it is intuitive that names, as used, refer to particular things without those things having been baptized at the start of a chain leading to the speaker’s acquisition of the name, and without those things being the dominant causal sources of any mental file for which the name might be a label. These are what might be called “wrong-name” cases, in which a speaker uses a name to refer to a particular thing, although that thing has not been given that name in any event from which her use derives, nor does she use that name mentally to store information about that thing.

I contend that these cases show the inadequacy of the Baptism and File Views as starkly as Kripke’s and Donnellan’s cases showed the inadequacy of the Condition View. They suggest that the “whole picture” behind these views, in which linguistic reference is depicted as the retrieval of something saved by a name, is wrong. However, such cases have not been raised as problems for these views because of Kripke’s influential distinction between “speaker’s reference” and “semantic reference.”\(^8\) The distinction would seem to immediately rule out the counterexamples as instances merely of “speaker’s reference” being to a particular thing in contravention of the relevant views, rather than of “semantic reference” being to that thing. That is, they are cases in which the speaker may use a name to refer to a particular thing, but it is not the case that the

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\(^8\) Kripke 1977.
name, as used, refers to that thing. And the views in question concern the determination of “semantic reference,” not “speaker’s reference,” so the counterexamples are irrelevant to them.

In Chapter 2, I explain how this distinction does not track a real difference as it appears to, but is an all too powerful tool that can be used to defend any answer to the Reference Determination Question. In essence, the distinction allows a theorist to restrict her theory of reference determination to relations among name, speaker, and object that are the kind of relation she claims reference is. In light of this, the “wrong name” cases stand as counterexamples to the Baptism View and the Condition View.

One upshot of this critique, which is the focus of Chapter 3, is the emergence of a parallel between linguistic reference and sensory perception. For the critique shows that what one linguistically refers to depends on what one has in mind (in Donnellan’s suggestive phrase) to refer to, much as what one sees (for instance) depends on what one has in one’s visual environment. One cannot see what is not in one’s current visual environment, and one cannot refer to what is not in one’s current cognitive environment. The presence of a thing in one’s cognitive environment cannot be saved by a name, any more than the presence of a thing in one’s visual environment could be saved by a memory. Things are present in these environments or they are not. This presence can be continued, but it cannot be saved. No mental device can allow me to see (really see, not remember, imagine, or hallucinate) Saul Kripke when he is not visible to me. Likewise, no mental device, like the name “Saul Kripke,” can allow me to linguistically refer to Saul Kripke when I do not have him in mind. The name “Saul Kripke,” without Saul Kripke himself in my mind, is useless to me in referring to him.

Taking a cue from the parallel with sensory perception, I suggest that presence of a particular thing in one’s cognitive environment is a matter of being able to cognitively experience that thing. This is in much the same way that the presence of a particular thing in one’s perceptual environment is a matter of being able to perceptually experience it. Linguistic referring is one mode of cognitive experience. When linguistic reference is seen in this way, the
Capture Picture can be seen as a rejection of a direct, perhaps naïve, picture of linguistic referring experience. A direct or naïve picture of experience (perceptual or linguistic) views experience as being given, or presented with, the objects experienced. The naïve picture makes no split between the “inside” and the “outside.” It treats experience, as it is for the experiencer, as direct contact with the things experienced. In philosophical discussions of perception, the division between inside and outside is made in response to what has been called the “puzzle of experience.” Roughly, the puzzle is that it seems that two perceptual experiences could be just the same for the experiencer—“from the inside”—and yet one might be veridical while the other is an illusion or hallucination. In light of this, it is often concluded that the way these experiences are from the inside cannot be direct contact with the objects experienced, as the naïve view would have it. Rather, the experience of a perceiver must be contact with some other entity, a sense datum, or it must be a representational state.

The Capture Picture is a similar picture of referring experience: the linguistic expressions used are “inside,” and a speaker could have exactly the same experience using them whatever it is on the “outside” that she refers to, or whether she refers to anything at all. Implicitly rejected by the Capture Picture is a truly direct picture of referring experience, parallel to naïve realism about perceptual experience. On this picture, which I call “Referential Direct Realism,” successful referring experience is direct contact with the object referred to. On such a view, there is no Reference Determination Question, because the relation of reference among speaker, name, and object is not reducible to an inside component (such as the speaker’s being in a certain representational state) and an outside component (such as the object’s bearing some relation to that representational state of the speaker). Thus, we cannot hold up the inside bit (for instance, the name) and ask, what makes this name refer to this particular object on this occasion?; what connects it to this particular object?

Pursuing the Reference Determination Question is upholding the Capture Picture. It is viewing reference as a bridge between “inside” and “outside,” and trying to figure out what such a bridge could be, given that “inside” and “outside” must always be separate. If the Capture Picture is really rejected, as I think it was by Donnellan, then the RDQ does not arise. Instead of wrestling on and on with the RDQ, it is possible to defend and develop Referential Direct Realism. In Chapters 4 and 5, I set out a framework for this project. I discuss motivation, other than the mere availability of Referential Direct Realism and the difficulty of finding satisfying answers to the RDQ, for preferring Referential Direct Realism to its representationalist alternative. I develop a Referential Direct Realist picture of linguistic reference, which I call the “Focus Picture,” using the analogy of sensory perception as a way of envisioning, and getting an initial grip on, linguistic reference. (This is in much the same way that Kripke used the analogy of a chain of links, and Evans the analogy of a file cabinet.) I explain how our linguistic capacity can be seen as like our sensory capacities, and individual linguistic expressions as like tools for enhancing sensory capacities, such as eyeglasses and microscopes. These expressions have a surface component, a phonetic or orthographic structure whose activation alerts one to the presence in her mind of particular things. Beneath these surfaces are networks of associations of which one is likely unaware, which operate not to single out objects, but to perpetuate and register their ongoing cognitive effects.

An important part of the Referential Direct Realist framework I present is a way of treating the communicative aspect of linguistic reference, which might seem to distance linguistic reference from sensory experience. I make the case for the coherence of the notion of communicative experience, suggesting that the communicative function of language does not endanger the analogy with perception. Finally, I lay out the problems facing the Referential Direct Realist view that parallel the problems of perceptual experience involving hallucination and illusion. I explain what I take to be the basic structure of these problems, and how Referential Direct Realism is constrained in addressing them. I make a suggestion about how
they might be addressed. Finally, I connect these problems of referential experience to the classic reference puzzles of informative identity statements and empty names.

One lesson of the dissertation is that the critiques of the Condition View by Kripke and Donnellan called into question a whole way of picturing linguistic reference. By chasing up this kind of empirical counterexample to answers to the Reference Determination Question, and resisting the false comfort of the speaker's reference-semantic reference distinction, I find that linguistic reference, like sense perception, is a way of experiencing the world. It is a communicative way of experiencing the world, but a way of experiencing it all the same. Given this, it is a substantive decision to treat linguistic reference as divided into “inside” and “outside” in the way that the Capture Picture and the Reference Determination Question presuppose. There are reasons to resist this treatment, and to develop instead a truly direct picture of linguistic reference. The work in the following pages makes a start on this.
CHAPTER ONE: PICTURING THE REFERENCE OF PROPER NAMES

1.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the central question of the dissertation. I call it the “Reference Determination Question.” Put simply and roughly, the question is: what makes a proper name refer to a particular object? In the 1970s, Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan raised compelling doubts about answers to this question based on what I will call below the “Capture Picture” of proper name reference. On the Capture Picture, a speaker’s linguistic resources, of which proper names are one, are seen as “inside” the speaker’s experience and in need of capturing things on the “outside” if they are to refer to those things. The Capture Picture has extensions to other mental and linguistic phenomena besides the reference of proper names, but the case of names is a rich testing ground for the picture, as Kripke saw. The aim of this chapter is to set out the Capture Picture and, in particular, Kripke’s challenge to it, and to explain what a “picture” is and what role it plays in philosophical inquiry. A second aim is to lay the framework for the development of an alternative picture of reference, which will be filled out and expanded in later chapters.

The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, I shall clarify the Reference Determination Question. Section 1.3 distinguishes the notion of a picture from that of a theory. With these clarifications and distinctions on board, Section 1.4 elucidates the Capture Picture, and Section 1.5 characterizes a view of reference determination, which I call the “Condition View,” that flows naturally from the Capture Picture. Section 1.6 briefly discusses some famous empirical counterexamples raised by Kripke against the Condition View, and Sections 1.7 and 1.8 discuss the force of these counterexamples with respect to both the Condition View and the Capture Picture. Finally, Section 1.9 begins to consider the nature of an alternative picture of the reference of proper names.
The purpose of this chapter is not to break new ground but to put a certain order on ground broken long ago. Kripke in *Naming and Necessity* and Donnellan in contemporaneous work posed a fundamental challenge to a way of seeing language. I think it really was a challenge to a way of seeing language—to a picture of language. What follows is an attempt to explicate that challenge so as to prepare the way for a new picture—a new way of seeing language.

1.2 The Reference Determination Question

Kripke’s * Naming and Necessity* put a point on, and made pressing, a question that has been variously characterized as:

- What determines the reference of a proper name?
- What is the mechanism by which a name refers?
- In virtue of what does a name refer to what it does?

These are all ways of phrasing what I will call the "Reference Determination Question," or “the RDQ,” for short. The RDQ is one of the first questions posed in the *Naming and Necessity* lectures. Kripke poses it as follows:

The basic problem for any view such as Mill’s is how we can determine what the referent of a name, as used by a given speaker, is. According to the description view, the answer is clear. If 'Joe Doakes' is just short for 'the man who corrupted Hadleyburg,' then whoever corrupted Hadleyburg uniquely is the referent of the name 'Joe Doakes.' However, if there is not such a descriptive content to the name, then how do people ever use names to refer to things at all?

Let me begin with some preliminary remarks about the question. First, the RDQ is not the question of whether what Kripke here calls the “description view” or “Mill’s” view is correct. The

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10 Kripke 1980, p. 28.
“description view” is that a proper name is synonymous with, or is simply an abbreviation of, a definite description. The view attributed to Mill is that a proper name is not synonymous with a definite description, and indeed has no descriptive meaning at all, but only names an object. The question of the synonymy relations, or lack thereof, between names and descriptions is distinct from the question Kripke asks here: how do people ever use names to refer to things at all? Perhaps, as Kripke suggests, there is an easy answer to this question if names are synonymous with descriptions. But the RDQ is not itself the question of whether names have descriptive meaning.

The RDQ should be distinguished, also, from the following question: How can we, a linguistic audience, figure out what some speaker is referring to when she uses a name? It often happens that one hears a speaker use a name that one does not recognize, or that one does recognize but is unsure whether the speaker uses it to refer to the same thing to which one has heard it used to refer in the past. The first two sentences quoted might seem to ask about this and to provide at least the beginning of an answer on behalf of the description view. The description view tells us that we can find out to whom 'Joe Doakes' as used by a given speaker refers by figuring out who corrupted Hadleyburg, perhaps by undertaking some research.

Although this question and the RDQ are related, they are not the same. The RDQ does not concern how we determine, in the sense of “figure out,” what a name, as used by a speaker, refers to. It concerns what makes a name, as used by a speaker, refer to what it does. As it might be put, it concerns what it is for a name, as used, to refer to a particular thing, or in virtue of what a name refers, as used, to a particular thing. The RDQ is a metaphysical, rather than an epistemological, question.¹¹

Just what sort of answer this metaphysical question is after can be difficult to pin down. Kripke seemed to see it as in pursuit of a “theory” of the relation of reference that can hold between a name and an object, where a theory amounted to necessary and sufficient conditions

¹¹ Elugardo and Stainton 2004 make a distinction between metaphysical and epistemological determination.
for the relation’s obtaining. Later in the lectures, he explicitly discusses the way in which versions of the "description view" offer a "theory" of name reference, or "necessary and sufficient conditions" for a name to refer to a particular object, and he bemoans, though it is not clear how ingenuously, the difficulty of putting an alternative theory or set of necessary and sufficient conditions in place. What Kripke seems (albeit with much qualification) to view as an ultimate goal in answering the RDQ is the provision of "more exact conditions for reference to take place."\textsuperscript{12}

Something to clarify about the Reference Determination Question is what the relata are of the relation whose nature is being queried. One is the referent, the thing referred to. The others are the name and the speaker. (Kripke asks about the "name, as used by a given speaker.") Why is the relation of interest not simply a relation between a name and an object, but between a name, a speaker, and an object? Clearly, it is because different speakers may use a name to refer to different things. Some people use the name "Jessica Pepp" to refer to me, but other people use it to refer to another woman by the same name, and others to still another woman. Thus, one might think that the name "Jessica Pepp" does not refer to any one particular individual, since, as used by different speakers, it refers to various individuals. Or, one might think that the name refers to many individuals, and the relation between the name and any one of those individuals obtains in virtue of there being some speaker who uses the name to refer to that particular individual. But then an account of this latter relation is needed. Either way, the question that needs answering is what it is for "Jessica Pepp," as used by a particular speaker, to refer to a particular object.

This qualification of the name relatum immediately raises another question. Given that there are (at least) three people named "Jessica Pepp,"\textsuperscript{13} it is certainly possible that some single speaker could come to use the name "Jessica Pepp" to refer to all three of these people on

\textsuperscript{12} 1980, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{13} So a Google search reveals.
different occasions. Imagine that by coincidence we three all came to work in the same office and had the same boss, call her Smith. By the same considerations just given, then, one might think that the name “Jessica Pepp”, as used by Smith does not refer to any one particular individual, since, as used by Smith on different occasions it refers to various individuals. Or, one might think that the name, as used by Smith, refers to three individuals, and the relation between the name, Smith, and any one of those individuals obtains in virtue of there being some set of occasions on which Smith uses the name to refer to that individual. But then an account of this latter relation is needed, and it seems that the question should be further qualified so that it asks what determines that "Jessica Pepp," as used by a particular speaker on a particular occasion, refers to a particular object.

So we can put the Reference Determination Question more precisely as follows:

For any speaker, S, name, N, object, O, and occasion, C, what determines that N, as used by S on C, refers to O?

Kripke was not the first to raise this question, but his dismantling of a certain kind of answer to it was part of a deep challenge to an entire way of seeing not only proper name reference but language and cognition generally. To appreciate this challenge, we need to distinguish theories of reference from pictures of reference.

1.3 Levels of inquiry: theory versus picture

The Reference Determination Question seeks a theory of the relation of reference between name and object. Nonetheless, throughout his critique of extant answers to the question and discussion of alternatives, Kripke speaks less of theories than of what he calls “pictures.” It is not only the received theories, but the whole picture of proper name reference that they espouse, which is wrong. On the positive side, Kripke is wary of presenting any alternative theory to those he finds lacking, but believes he can articulate a better picture. The distinction between theory
and picture is appealing, but can be difficult to get a grip on. Since the distinction is central to my understanding of the state of inquiry with respect to the RDQ, it is worth elucidating in some detail.

Kripke’s discussion suggests a number of different lines that might be drawn between a picture and a theory. Here are some:

1) A picture is a rough first pass at a theory. A picture lays out necessary and sufficient conditions for a name to refer to an object, but with the clear recognition, and perhaps even enumeration, of counterexamples to these conditions. In this way, a picture is a useful straw man of a theory, designed to be taken apart but seen as pointing in the right direction. This notion of a picture is suggested by the section of *Naming and Necessity* in which Kripke lays out “a rough statement of a theory,” to which he presents a possible counterexample, and then notes that “I may not have presented a theory, but I do think that I have presented a better picture than that given by description theorists.”

2) A picture is a non-reductive theory. This is suggested in the same passage just noted, where Kripke also says that his rough theory is non-reductive in that it characterizes what it is for a name to refer to an object partly in terms of speakers having intentions to use names with the same references as the speakers from whom they learned those names. There is some suggestion that this is, at least in part, why the account is a picture rather than a theory.

3) A picture enumerates some necessary conditions for a name to refer to an object, but does not claim to provide sufficient conditions. When Kripke is laying out his own picture of proper

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14 The counterexample he presents is a case in which a teacher tells his students that a man, whom he calls “George Smith,” first squared the circle. In telling this tale, the teacher pulls up the name “George Smith” because that is his neighbor’s name. This looks like a counterexample’s to Kripke’s rough theory because the name “George Smith,” as used by the teacher, refers to the neighbor, and the students in learning the name intend to use it with the same reference as the teacher, yet it does not seem that if the students subsequently used the name they would refer by it to the neighbor. Thus what the rough theory presents as sufficient for reference does not seem to be sufficient. Gareth Evans raised a somewhat similar counterexample, which is more famous, concerning the name “Madagascar,” which at some point came to refer, as used by certain speakers, to an island, even though they had intended to use it with the reference of those from whom they acquired it and those from whom they acquired it used it to refer to a portion of the mainland.

name reference, he suggests that a causal connection between a speaker and an object may (at least for certain sorts of cases) be necessary for a name, as used by that speaker, to refer to the object, although such a connection would not be sufficient: “But of course not every sort of causal chain reaching from me to a certain man will do for me to make a reference. ... So other conditions must be satisfied in order to make this into a really rigorous theory of reference.”

4) A picture characterizes typical or paradigm features of a name’s relation to its referent, without claiming that these features are necessary or sufficient for reference. In this way, a picture might provide an account of what reference is in some cases that is not an account of what reference is in general. Kripke suggests this way of understanding what he means by a “picture” in his assertion that the description view might be correct about some cases of reference, but that “in general this picture fails.” In other words, the description view might fail as a picture because it does not accurately describe paradigmatic or typical cases of reference.

5) A picture is just what it sounds like: an image or visualization. To give a picture of a phenomenon like proper name reference is to characterize it in a picturesque or vivid fashion. It is to show how you envision the phenomenon; to share the helpful metaphors you employ in thinking about it.

All of these notions seem to be in the vicinity of Kripke’s use of the term “picture.” Nor are these various notions mutually inconsistent. From the perspective of interpreting Kripke, it may not be possible to put any sharper point on what he means by “picture” than to say that it is an account falling short of a full theory in any of these ways. However, the last notion stands out from the others in that it is not a subtraction from a full theory, but a different sort of thing altogether. A picture in the sense of an image or visualization is not a rough or partial theory, but a foundation for theorizing about phenomena like the reference of proper names. Pictures give us an initial grip on what we wish to study. They are the background against which we

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16 p. 93.

17 p. 95.
formulate hypotheses in the first place. They give us something to revise and draw from in generating new hypotheses when the initial ones come up short. They help us to communicate our views to one another and to clarify them for ourselves. This notion of a picture is the one on which I will focus.

Theories of proper name reference, including rough and partial ones, flow from the pictures of proper name reference that inform them. Thus, one can make guesses about a theorist’s picture of proper name reference on the basis of her theories or proto-theories. One can also get a feel for a picture from the examples she favors. Indeed, in describing “the picture presented by the received views” and his own “better picture” of reference, Kripke relies heavily on giving examples that evoke these pictures. Consider, for instance:

Neptune was hypothesized as the planet which caused such and such discrepancies in the orbits of certain other planets. If Leverrier indeed gave the name ‘Neptune’ to the planet before it was ever seen, then he fixed the reference of ‘Neptune’ by means of the description just mentioned. At that time he was unable to see the planet even through a telescope.\textsuperscript{18}

Another case, if you want to call this a name, might be when the police in London use the name ‘Jack’ or ‘Jack the Ripper’ to refer to the man, whoever he is, who committed all these murders, or most of them.\textsuperscript{19}

The picture which leads to the cluster-of-descriptions theory is something like this: One is isolated in a room; the entire community of other speakers, everything else, could disappear; and one determines the reference for himself by saying— ‘By “Gödel” I shall mean the man, whoever he is, who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic.’\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} p. 79, n. 33.

\textsuperscript{19} p. 79.

\textsuperscript{20} p. 91.
Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about
him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is
spread from link to link as if by a chain. A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who
has heard about, say Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring
to Richard Feynman even though he can’t remember from whom he first heard of Feynman
or from whom he ever heard of Feynman.\(^{21}\)

Each of these cases casts reference in a certain light. In the cases of Neptune, Jack the
Ripper, and Gödel, a speaker gives a name to something, or uses a name that he has given to
something. Further, the name-giving occurs in isolation from the object to which the name is
given, and in isolation from other speakers who might speak of that object. This is clearest in the
fantasy case of a speaker isolated in a room, with no access to other people or the objects of the
world about which he might want to speak. Kripke’s attempts to find real-world cases with a
similar feel are not entirely successful. Leverrier was not isolated—at least not causally isolated–
from Neptune, nor the police detectives from Jack the Ripper (assuming Jack the Ripper
existed).\(^{22}\) But the thought seems to be that Leverrier’s or the police detectives’ naming Neptune
and Jack the Ripper in the absence of a certain kind of contact—presumably visual—with those
objects creates at least an analogous kind of isolation of the speakers from the things of which
they speak. By contrast, in the Feynman case, the people who name Feynman are in immediate
perceptual contact with him, and those who later learn his name do so by contact with other
speakers. This case suggests a picture of reference as an activity involving contact with other
speakers and objects, rather than isolation from them.

\(^{21}\) p. 91.

\(^{22}\) This has been emphasized to me by Joseph Almog. For discussion of the Leverrier case see Almog 2012.
1.4 The Capture Picture

The idea that one gets from these cases, of a speaker trapped in a room, isolated from the world around her, fits a certain image of mind and language, on which one has to use whatever is “inside” one’s mind, such as sensations, bits of language, and concepts, to form some representation of what is (or might be) “outside” of it. On this picture, objects are not “given” to the mind in any sense; rather the mind has to pull its various resources together in order to “capture” or “pick out” objects. In the case of reference using proper names, one has, on the “inside,” just a blank sign—a symbol or sound, perhaps—together with one’s various other sensations and concepts. For that blank sign to connect to something on the “outside,” the speaker must somehow capture or pick out a referent by making a kind of trap using the materials she has on hand “on the inside.” I will call this the “Capture Picture” of proper name reference.

In presenting the Capture Picture, I have used scare quotes around “inside,” “outside,” “given,” “capture,” and “pick out,” because these are metaphorical ways of talking. Although speaking metaphorically is often viewed negatively in philosophical contexts, it is appropriate when what we are doing is articulating a picture. For a picture of a phenomenon is just that: it is a way of picturing the phenomenon, a way of envisioning it. Since proper name reference, as a whole phenomenon, is not something we can see with our eyes, a picture of it must be metaphorical. As we do in many philosophical endeavors, in investigating the nature of proper name reference we need a way of thinking of the phenomenon of interest. Forming a picture or image is at least one way of getting a rough grip on what we are trying to understand.

Kripke claims that his arguments against what he calls the “description view” of reference—I will call it the “Condition View”—show not only that this theory, but the picture behind it, is wrong. That picture, it seems to me, is the Capture Picture. In the rest of this chapter, I will

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23 “What I think the examples I’ve given show is not simply that there’s some technical error here or some mistake there, but that the whole picture given by this theory of how reference is determined seems to be wrong from the fundamentals.” (Kripke 1980, p. 93.)
explain how Kripke’s arguments against the Condition View call the Capture Picture into question. I will not argue that these arguments definitively defeat the Condition View or the Capture Picture. Rather, my aim is to show how they motivate the development and consideration of a different picture, and to present a choice about how radically that picture should diverge from the Capture Picture.

The discussion will proceed as follows. First, I present the Condition View, which provides a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a proper name to refer to a particular object. Second, I discuss empirical counterexamples to these conditions, adduced by Kripke. These show that the Condition View cannot be a complete theory of the reference of names. It can at best be correct about cases of proper name reference other than those noted as counterexamples to the account. However, I next explain why, if the factors identified by the theory do not account for reference in these counterexamples, then there is no reason to think they account for it in a range of other cases which are not counterexamples. There are some cases in which it remains plausible that these factors account for reference. This suggests that there are at least two metaphysically quite different phenomena in the arena of proper name reference. These phenomena may be unified in some way; the question of whether they are can be left open. However, it is clear that the cases about which the Condition View seems correct are not the standard or paradigm cases of proper name reference. This suggests that the picture on which the Condition View is based might not be the best way of envisioning proper name reference, at least not in its paradigmatic form. In the final sections of the chapter, I consider two ways in which the picture might be revised, one a conservative and one a radical revision.

1.5 The Condition View

The core of the theory of the reference of proper names that Kripke lays out on behalf of thinkers including Frege, Russell, Strawson, and Searle is the following:
N, as used by S on C, refers to O in virtue of S, on C, associating with N a set of conditions that single out O.

Two important variables in this formulation of the Condition View bear noting. The first is the question of what it is for a speaker to associate a set of conditions with a name. Kripke expresses it as the speaker’s believing a sentence of the form ‘φN’, where N is the name and φ is the linguistic expression of the set of conditions.²⁴ His discussion in the lectures suggests that the view of condition-association behind this formulation is that associating a set of conditions with a name is being able to produce the linguistic expression of those conditions if prompted with a question like, “Who is N?” or “To whom do you refer by N?” But probably Kripke did not mean to imply that one must be able to express in words every belief one has about a thing. Taking this on board, it seems within the spirit of Kripke’s discussion to say that his view of condition association is that for a speaker to associate a condition with a name is for her to be able to call that condition, in some form or other, to mind when prompted with the name. It is for the condition to be phenomenally available to her in connection with the name. As will be discussed below, alternative views of what it is to associate a condition with a name yield different versions of the Condition View, some of which may resist Kripke’s counterexamples.

The second variable that bears noting is the question of what it is for the set of conditions a speaker associates with a name to single out a particular object. On the version of the Condition View that Kripke calls the “Frege-Russell” view, what it is for the set of conditions to single out a particular object is for there to be one and only one object such that it satisfies every condition in the set. Strawson and Searle proposed more relaxed notions of singling out by associated conditions.²⁵ They held that not every condition a name might call to mind for a speaker need be involved in singling out its referent as used by that speaker. A speaker might have some false beliefs about a thing, and thus associate with the name of that thing some conditions it fails to

²⁴ 1980, p. 64.

²⁵ In Strawson 1959 and Searle 1958.
satisfy, without this constituting a failure of that name, as used by her, to refer to that thing. Thus, the various conditions associated with a name by a speaker, or by her linguistic community, need to, in Kripke’s words, “take some sort of a vote.” 26 Just how this is done, including whether some associated conditions get more weight in the vote than others, needs to be spelled out.

At a high level, it seems fairly clear why the Capture Picture, as a way of thinking of or envisioning proper name reference, would suggest that what makes a name refer to a particular object is the object’s being singled out by the conditions the speaker associates with the name. On the Capture Picture, a speaker must use what she has access to “from the inside”—her sensations, her concepts, and what she can build from these—to grab hold of things she does not have inside access to; things that are “on the outside.” A speaker may have access to a sign—she may be able to hear a sound or picture a symbol—from the inside. But by itself this would not allow her to grab anything on the outside. Signs in themselves, it is often stressed, are meaningless, impotent, mere sounds and shapes. Thus, for a sign to be made to refer to something, it seems that it must be coupled in some way with another entity, also available from the inside, that has the ability to “grasp” things on the outside. The suggestion made by Kripke on behalf of Frege, Russell, Strawson, and Searle, is that the relevant entities are conditions, built up from the speaker’s sensations and concepts. These conditions “capture” objects by being met, or satisfied, by those objects.

But do conditions “capture” objects that are “outside” of the speaker in the right kind of way for the capture to count as reference? Certainly, a condition may be met by certain objects that are “outside,” and it may even be met by exactly one such object. The speaker who has access to the condition may even believe correctly that the condition is met by exactly one object on the outside. But it is not clear that this gives her a grasp of any particular outside object. It is only a true belief about the outside world (i.e., that it contains exactly one thing meeting a certain

26 1980, p. 65.
condition), not a true belief about any particular object in the outside world. If she could take her condition to the outside world, she could use it to locate and pick out the particular object that uniquely meets the condition. But this is incoherent on the Capture Picture. There is no “going” to the outside world and locating something in it. The line between inside and outside is inviolable on the Capture Picture. So even armed with her uniquely satisfied condition, the speaker seems unable to capture the particular object that satisfies it.

How, then, is a particular object to be captured? It must be acknowledged that in one sense capture is impossible on the Capture Picture. What is outside can never be inside, and a speaker can only grasp what is inside. But perhaps there is something close enough. On the inside, the closest thing to the outside world is a map or representation of the outside world. Perhaps a very good map is isomorphic with the outside world, having an element corresponding to each element of the outside world, and relating these elements in ways that correspond to the relations among the corresponding elements in the outside world. If this is the closest thing on the inside to the outside world, then the closest thing on the inside to picking out a particular item in the outside world is picking out a particular item on this map. A speaker's access to a condition would enable her to do this. For a map of the world that she could have access to from the inside would be built up out of the same inside resources as the condition. Thus, she could look at the map, see which thing on the map, if any, is uniquely represented as meeting the condition, and grasp, from the inside, that particular thing. What she would grasp, strictly speaking, would be an element of the map, not an outside object. But if the map is a good map, this element will correspond to an object in the outside world. This is as close as one can get, on the Capture Picture, to grasping an outside object. Thus the Condition View fits naturally with the Capture Picture. If the closest one can get to grasping a particular outside object is being able to identify an element corresponding to it on an inside map, then the kinds of conceptual and other internal resources from which such a map would be built are the perfect tools for the job.
The way in which the Condition View fits the Capture Picture might be made clearer by considering updated versions of the Condition View that are thought to withstand the kinds of counterexamples Kripke raised. On these versions of the Condition View, to associate a condition with a name is not to be able to bring the condition to mind when prompted with the name, but to connect the condition to the name implicitly. The nature of the implicit connection is roughly that one is disposed, when presented with a description of the world that is complete except that it does not say to what the name refers and neither uses nor mentions the name, to identify as the referent of the name the object that uniquely satisfies the condition.27 Here the “inside” nature of the field from which one picks out the referent of the name is clear. On these versions of the Condition View, to associate a condition with a name is to have an ability to locate something within a complete description, which is a linguistic entity and hence can be accessed from the inside, in accord with that condition. Returning to Kripke’s version of the Condition View, the case is the same even if the condition is something you have explicitly before your mind. Either way, the sense in which the association of a condition with a name gives you, using the name, a grasp on an outside object is that the association of the condition constitutes your ability to point, on an inside map, to an element that corresponds to that outside object.

1.6 Empirical counterexamples to the Condition View

Having set out a theory of proper name reference inspired by the Capture Picture, Kripke went on to offer a variety of counterexamples to the necessary and sufficient conditions given by this theory. The most compelling of these counterexamples are the empirical ones: actual cases of reference using proper names where speakers appear not to associate with those names conditions that in any way single out an object, and actual cases of reference using proper names where speakers do associate conditions with the names that single out an object, but nonetheless

that is not the object to which they refer. These empirical counterexamples are especially compelling because they show not only that we can conceive of cases where reference using proper names comes apart from singling out by associated conditions, but that we are confronted with such cases in everyday life. Just by considering ordinary instances of reference using proper names, Kripke argues, we can see that a speaker’s associating with a name conditions that single out a particular object is neither necessary nor sufficient for the name, as used by the speaker, to refer to that object.

One example that Kripke points to as illustrating the non-necessity of singling out by associated conditions is the case of relatively uninformed speakers who use the name “Feynman” to refer to the physicist Richard Feynman. Many speakers, Kripke observes, associate with the name “Feynman” only the condition of being a famous physicist. This condition singles out no unique individual, nor do these speakers take it to single out a unique individual. Nonetheless, intuitively, “Feynman,” as used by these speakers on certain occasions, refers to Feynman.

Another example, to which Kripke points as illustrating the non-sufficiency of singling out by associated conditions, is the case of the name “Peano.” Many people associate with that name, as they use it on certain occasions, the condition of having been the discoverer of “certain axioms which characterize the sequence of natural numbers, the so-called ‘Peano axioms’”. In fact, the Peano axioms were discovered by Dedekind; Peano formulated them more precisely. Nonetheless, intuitively speakers who associate only this condition with the name “Peano” on certain occasions of use refer to Peano, not to Dedekind.

These empirical counterexamples show that the Condition View, as Kripke understands it, is not a complete theory of proper name reference. It is worth noting two things that the counterexamples do not show. First, they do not show that the Condition View in any form fails as a theory of proper name reference. If associating a condition with a name is an implicit

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28 p. 84.
matter, in the sense of the views discussed above, then it is possible that the uninformed speakers in the Feynman case do associate with “Feynman” a condition that picks Feynman out. It is also possible that the condition of having discovered the Peano axioms, which is what the name “Peano” calls to mind for the speakers in the Peano case, is not in fact the condition they associate with the name. Nothing in the present discussion should be taken as claiming that Kripke definitively disproved the Condition View in every possible form. Rather, my interest is in getting clear on the nature of the doubt that Kripke raised about the Capture Picture, and on the kind of alternative picture that this doubt suggests.

Second, Kripke’s empirical counterexamples do not show that the Condition View does not provide a correct account of some particular cases of proper name reference. The fact that in some cases what makes a proper name refer to a particular object is not the speaker’s associating the name with conditions that single out the object does not imply that there are no cases where this is what makes a proper name refer. It only implies that in general this cannot be what it is for a proper name to refer to a particular object. It implies that the Condition View, as Kripke understands it, cannot be a complete theory of proper name reference. It still might be that the Condition View is the correct account of some cases of reference, and some other account is needed for cases such as the Feynman and Peano cases. Perhaps the various cases are unified in some way; this is a further question.

1.7 Hard cases, bad law?

If the counterexamples leave it open that the Condition View might give the right account of at least some cases of proper name reference, the question arises as to whether it might give the right account of most cases, or of paradigm cases. Might Kripke’s examples involving low information speakers be hard cases that make bad law? Implicit in Kripke’s critique is a negative answer to this question. Once it is clear that in these counterexamples proper names refer in
virtue of something other than the satisfaction of associated conditions, the satisfaction of such conditions in cases that are *not* counterexamples seems redundant as far as determining reference.

For one thing, it is clear that the way in which speakers usually come to associate with a name conditions that successfully pick out its referent is by starting out as low information speakers. When one first learns of Feynman, the name may call to mind only the condition of being a famous physicist, if this is all that one is told about him. By learning more, one may come to associate with the name conditions that do pick out Feynman uniquely. But Feynman’s satisfying such conditions uniquely seems redundant as far as making reference happen. Somehow, one was able to refer to him by the name from the start. One did not need these singling out conditions in order to do so, and one has referred easily and seamlessly to Feynman since one first heard of him. There is no reason to think that whatever made the reference happen in the first place has gone away with one’s increased learning. So there is no explanatory need for the Condition View in such cases.

This redundancy is evident even in cases in which a speaker associates information with the name that uniquely picks out its referent from the beginning of her use of the name. To see this, consider first a simple case of learning more about Feynman over time. Rose makes a visit to the Chamber of Commerce in Far Rockaway, New York. The docent tells her all about the town, and lists Feynman, a famous physicist, as one of the town’s native sons. The speaker now associates with the name “Feynman” the condition of being a famous physicist and being born in Far Rockaway. As it happens, these conditions do not single anyone out, since Feynman’s sister Joan was also born in Far Rockaway and is also a physicist of some renown. Nonetheless, assuming the docent is talking about the more famous sibling, the name “Feynman,” as Rose would now use it, refers to Richard Feynman. Later, Rose asks the docent what else he can tell her about Feynman, who sounds like an interesting character. The docent, more interested in local trivia than physics, replies, “Here’s a fun fact about Feynman: his sister, who was also born
here, is a well known physicist too!” Now Rose associates with the name “Feynman” the conditions of being a famous physicist born in Far Rockaway and of having a sister born in Far Rockaway who is a famous physicist. These conditions do single out Richard Feynman. But the addition of the extra condition is redundant with respect to any future uses Rose makes of “Feynman” to refer to Feynman. Whatever made Rose’s use of “Feynman” refer to Richard Feynman originally is still operative, or, at least, there is no reason to think it is not. But now suppose that instead of telling Rose first about Feynman being from Far Rockaway and then, later, about his sister, the docent had told her all at once that Feynman was a famous physicist from Far Rockaway whose sister was also a famous physicist from Far Rockaway. As in the first case, suppose Rose later asked what else the docent can tell her about Feynman. It is hard to see why whatever brings it about that Rose’s use of “Feynman” refers to Feynman in the first case would not also bring it about in the slightly altered second case. Again, the unique satisfaction of the conditions she associates with “Feynman” seems redundant.

Are there cases in which the speaker’s associating a name with a condition that uniquely picks out an object is not redundant in light of the fact that names somehow refer in low information cases? Cases in which a speaker self-consciously stipulates that a name, as used by her, will refer to whatever meets a certain set of conditions, if anything does, are the best candidates. Perhaps I can sit in my study and make a declaration that the name “Wavy,” as used by me, refers to whatever dog was the first one to spend more than 24 hours on a human-built ship on the open seas. If two or more dogs shared this honor, I may acknowledge, then “Wavy,” as used by me, does not refer to anything. But if only one dog fits the bill, maybe I succeed in making that dog be the referent of “Wavy,” as used by me on this occasion. In this case, the condition I associated with the name “Wavy” does not seem to be redundant with respect to making the name refer to Wavy. I have not learned this fact about Wavy, nor is there a closely similar situation in which I might have picked up the name for Wavy without associating this condition with it. Rather, it is my stipulation alone that has made “Wavy”, as I use it, a name of
Wavy, and if I had not assembled enough of a condition to pick something out uniquely, then, as I explicitly acknowledged, the name would not have referred.

It is worth noting that for this kind of stipulation to work, one has to be quite precise. Standard examples of conditions used to fix the reference of names like *being the oldest man alive in 2012, being the tallest living woman, or being the first child born in the 22nd century* are, as they stand, far too vague. For instance, is age measured from the time of birth or the time of conception? Does being alive at any point during 2012 count, or would the man need to be alive throughout the whole year? Or is the oldest man alive at a particular date in 2012 the one to be singled out? How is height to be measured? Is it the tallest at a given time of day, since people’s heights vary slightly from morning to night? What about people who live in different time zones—should they be measured simultaneously, or at the same clock hour in their respective time zones? Is the first child born in the 22nd century the first born anywhere in the world when it is past midnight on January 1, 2101 in any time zone, or the first born when it is past midnight on January 1, 2101 in the time zone of the birth? What qualifies a baby as being fully born as opposed to in the process of being born? Should we go by the time recorded by the hospital officially? What about babies not born in hospitals? (There may be close calls that need deciding.) And so on. Reading up a little on the production of the Guinness Book of World Records shows the difficulty of establishing these superlatives. This is not to say that sufficiently detailed stipulations cannot be arrived at or that one could not stipulate the reference of a name in this way. It is rather to press the point that successful stipulations of this kind are rare.30

So we have two kinds of cases of proper name reference. In one variety, singling out by associated conditions is either absent or redundant. In the other variety, it is present and essential. In the latter kind of case, what constitutes a name’s referring to an object—which it is

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29 This last is an updated example of the “Newman 1” example from Kaplan 1968.

30 The proper names “Mitochondrial Eve,” which is used in the field of human genetics to refer to the most recent matrilineal ancestor common to all humans alive today, and “Y-chromosomal Adam,” which is used to refer to the most recent patrilineal common ancestor, seem like plausible cases. (I believe these cases were brought to my attention initially by Mark Greenberg.)
for a name to refer to an object–is that object’s being singled out by an associated condition. In the former kind of case, the reference of the name is something quite different. We can call these kinds of case “stipulative” and “non-stipulative,” respectively. When we see that a phenomenon separates in this way into two metaphysically very different phenomena, we can choose between two approaches to further inquiry. We can hold out hope for a theory of the phenomenon as we originally identified it. In this case, we can hold out hope for an account of proper name reference that explains what unifies the Condition View about stipulative cases and whatever view (which we have not yet discussed) gives the correct account of the non-stipulative cases. Alternatively, we can conclude that we have discovered that there are really two different phenomena that we were calling by the same name of “proper name reference,” which have only a superficial commonality. Proper name reference might be like jade in this way. At this point, I make no pronouncements about which way one ought to go. What I want to emphasize is that the cases about which the Condition View, as understood by Kripke, seems to be correct are very unusual. They are not paradigmatic or standard. They are the hard cases that would make bad law. Kripke’s counterexamples, as well as other non-stipulative cases which are not counterexamples to the Condition View but about which it is redundant, are paradigmatic.

### 1.8 Challenging the Capture Picture

I have suggested that the picture motivating the Condition View, in any form, is the Capture Picture. Kripke did not consider every available form of the Condition View. But in the form in which he did consider it, it faces compelling counterexamples. The place of these counterexamples among the paradigms, rather than the strange outliers, of proper name reference indicates that this form of the view is wrong not in its details but in its essentials. Such a deep upheaval of a view sends us back to the picture on which the view is based. It may

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31 Donnellan, for instance, emphasized the importance of distinguishing *reference* from *denotation*. For more recent discussion, see Capuano 2012.
occasion a revision of this picture: perhaps we are thinking of the phenomenon in entirely the wrong way. As Kripke put it, “the whole picture given by this theory of how reference is determined seems to be wrong from the fundamentals. It seems to be wrong to think that we give ourselves some properties which somehow qualitatively uniquely pick out an object and determine our reference in that manner.”

Kripke’s use of the word “give” here is telling. It connects to the way I characterized the Capture Picture, as being defined by its insistence that objects referred to are not given but taken: captured. Kripke here suggests that what is given—what we have, in the picturesque terms of the Picture, “from the inside”—are the properties, the conditions, which “somehow qualitatively uniquely pick out an object.” But examples like the Feynman case and the Peano case suggest that, search around as we may among our concepts, sensations, and conditions constructed from them, we often do not find enough to do the capturing that the Picture portrays us as doing. And when we do find enough to do the capturing, we may also find that what ought to be thus captured, intuitively is not.

As already noted, Kripke may not have looked hard enough among our internal resources for the conditions that do the capturing. It may be, as argued by Jackson and others, that we do have such conditions available to determine the reference of the proper names we use, but only implicitly. If this line of thinking is correct, it may offer a way to preserve the Condition View and maintain the Capture Picture. My focus here is not on developing or critiquing ways of defending the Condition View against Kripke’s criticisms. I think these criticisms are strong enough to motivate putting a different picture of proper name reference on the table. It is worth doing this for the same reason that it is worth seeing if the Condition View can be shored up against the criticisms: because the Condition View in its most obvious form is empirically inadequate in paradigm cases. This raises the possibility that the Condition View needs revising, but it also raises the possibility, pointed to by Kripke, that the whole picture behind the

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32 p. 94, emphasis added.
Condition View needs replacing, so that new views guided by it can emerge. Even if Kripke’s arguments do not force a new picture upon us, they are enough to make us want to have a look at such a picture, so that its explanatory fruits can be compared to those of the Capture Picture.

1.9 An alternative picture?

In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke gestures at a clash of pictures. I have been trying to cash out this idea by understanding a picture as an imagistic, metaphorical way of thinking of a phenomenon. The Capture Picture, I have claimed, is one of the clashing pictures of proper name reference. What is, or should be, the other picture? One question, an interpretive one, is what Kripke’s own “better picture of what is actually going on” really was. Another question is what a better picture might be, independently of what Kripke thought it was. Although these are different questions, and it is the second that most interests me, the first is not a bad place to start. What Kripke’s picture was is not entirely clear, and by considering a more and a less radical way of understanding it, we can get a sense of what a true alternative to the Capture Picture would look like.

The most evocative element in Kripke’s alternative picture is the metaphor of the chain. Kripke’s picture of proper name reference depicts a chain that begins someplace and adds links as it grows. The beginning of the chain is the naming of an object by some speaker. Links are added to the chain when other speakers learn the name from the initiating speaker. Further links are added to these links when still more speakers learn the name from those speakers. And so on. Given this picture, there are two kinds of cases about which we might ask: in virtue of what does N, as used by S on C, refer to O? In one kind of case, S is the speaker who gave the name N to O. In the other kind of case, S has learned N from another speaker. The examples that Kripke uses against the Condition View are all of the second kind. Kripke’s picture of these cases

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33 p. 96.
would seem to be one on which something considered by the Capture Picture to be “inside”–a name that a speaker has in her vocabulary–is not stuck “inside.” Rather, it comes to the speaker from what the Capture Picture would see as “outside.” It comes from another speaker. But an entity cannot be both “inside” and “outside.” Thus, the division made by the Capture Picture between inside and outside might seem not to figure in Kripke’s picture.

Whether Kripke meant to jettison the inside/outside division depends on how radical a departure one takes his picture to be from the Capture Picture. And in spite of its seeming that even this fundamental element in the Capture Picture is being rejected, there are ways of reading Kripke’s discussion as keeping much of that picture alive.

1.9.1 The Capture-and-Save Picture: a conservative revision

The seeds for a conservative revision of the Capture Picture can be found in Kripke’s treatment of cases of reference using proper names in which the speaker is the one to give the name to the object. For he allows that a speaker may initially fix the reference of a name by associating it with a condition that singles out an object. He does not claim that this is the only way to give a name to a thing, allowing that it also may be done by ostension, where ostension is not to be regarded as a variety of singling a thing out using conditions. But in maintaining singling out by conditions as a way of fixing reference initially, Kripke preserves at least a bit of the Capture Picture.

An important question here is what picture Kripke has of ostension. He glosses it only as “primitive reference,” noting that Russell recognized that such a notion would be required to make sense of his view of ordinary proper name reference. This suggests that Russell’s notion of acquaintance provides one way of understanding it. At different stages of his philosophical development, Russell’s notion of acquaintance fits more and less well with the Capture Picture. At early stages, Russell’s notion was quite close to the ordinary notion of acquaintance. Roughly
speaking, one was acquainted with things one perceived. This “knowledge by acquaintance” of things was contrasted with only being able to single a thing out using conditions—only having “knowledge by description.” At this stage, Russell’s acceptance of our acquaintance with ordinary objects combined with his understanding acquaintance in opposition to singling out by conditions suggests that he did not have a Capture Picture of cognition in general. For Russell at this stage in his thinking, cognition of objects is not limited to entities “inside” the mind and conditions formulated from these. Thinkers are given the ordinary worldly objects that they see and hear, rather than having to capture them. Throughout his career, Russell maintains that some things must be given rather than captured. There must be things with which a person is acquainted in order for there to be things she singles out by description. But at later stages of his thinking, his notion of acquaintance becomes much more restrictive. The objects of acquaintance move “inside,” in the terms of the Capture Picture. Russell eventually arrives at the view that the only particular objects with which I am acquainted are my sensations (sense data) and perhaps myself. At this period in his thinking, Russell’s view of thinking and speaking fits the Capture Picture. The only things one is “given” are one’s own sensations and one’s concepts (universals). Anything else must be “captured” by building up conditions from these interior resources.

It is not completely clear whether Russell’s early or late notion of acquaintance is a better model for Kripke’s notion of ostension. In a footnote, Kripke says: “Usually a baptizer is acquainted in some sense with the object he names and is able to name it ostensively.” Since we do not usually name our sensations or concepts, but ordinary worldly objects, this passage casts ostension on the early model of Russellian acquaintance rather than the late one. But Kripke also says in the same footnote: “The case of a baptism by ostension can perhaps be subsumed under the description concept also.” (That is, baptism by ostension is perhaps a

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34 Russell 1910.
35 p. 96, n. 42.
variety of baptism by description.) So perhaps this ordinary kind of naming by ostension, where
one names something which one perceives or has perceived, does not involve the kind of
ostension, or primitive reference, that contrasts with singling out by conditions. Perhaps Kripke,
like the later Russell, would only allow ostensive naming of “inside” entities such as sensations.
If so, then there would be little break from the Capture Picture with respect to speakers’ initially
giving names to things.

So Kripke’s alternative picture of name-giving is not clear, and might be interpreted as
fitting with the Capture Picture. There is also room to interpret Kripke’s picture of the passing of
a name from link to link as a Capture Picture. For in giving his rough statement of a theory,
Kripke tentatively sets down the requirement that for a name to be passed from one speaker to
another, the speaker who acquires the name “must intend when he learns it to use it with the
same reference as the man from whom he heard it.”36 One way to understand this is as follows.
In hearing a name spoken aloud, the learner gets a new “inside” entity—a sign, in this case a
sound. Now, just as in the isolated room fantasy, she needs to find a way to capture something
“outside” with that sign. She might, as Kripke notes, simply like the sound of the name and
decide to give it to her pet aardvark, perhaps by associating with the name the condition of being
an aardvark, owned by her, etc. Or, she might associate with the name the condition of being the
thing this name refers to, as used by the speaker from whom she hears it. This, it might seem, is
what is required for the name, with its reference, to be passed to her from the other speaker.

Now, Kripke emphasizes that on his picture the person who acquires a name from another
speaker need not associate such a condition with the name whenever she uses it in order that it
refer, when she uses it, to the object to which it referred, as used by the speaker from whom she
learned it. The view that associating such a condition with a name is either necessary or
sufficient for that name to refer to a particular thing would be subject to the same kinds of
problems demonstrated by the cases of Feynman and Peano. A speaker might forget from whom

36 p. 96.
she acquired a name, and thus not be able to associate such a condition, or she might be
mistaken about from whom she acquired it, thus associating a condition that might single out
something other than the thing to which the name, as she uses it, refers. 37 For determining that
a name, as used on a given occasion, refers to a particular object “it is not how the speaker
thinks he got the reference, but the actual chain of communication, which is relevant.” 38
Nonetheless, on this way of understanding Kripke’s picture, the speaker does need to use a
condition like this to “capture” a referent for a name in order to acquire it.

Thus, one way to paint Kripke’s picture of proper name reference is as follows. The Capture
Picture is not so much a false picture, as it is incomplete. To picture proper name reference more
completely, the metaphor of the chain should be used. However, each linking point in the chain
fits the Capture Picture. Whether introducing a name afresh or acquiring a name from another
speaker, adding a name to one’s vocabulary requires bridging the chasm between what one has
on the “inside” – the sign – and the thing on the “outside” to which that name shall refer. But, on
this version of Kripke’s picture, the capture is something that is only required for this initial
entry of a name into one’s vocabulary. Once a referent has been affixed to the name, the capture
need not be repeated each time the speaker uses the name. The referent is “stored” (again, to
speak picturesquely) in the name, so that the speaker need not retain the means by which she
initially captured it. The name becomes a repository for the referent, allowing the speaker to link
to that object anytime she uses the name. In this way, worries such as Kripke raises for
Strawson’s view are averted. Let us call this the Capture-and-Save Picture of proper name
reference. The main way in which it differs from the Capture Picture is in portraying names

37 Kripke makes these points in response to a suggestion by Strawson that proper name reference might work like this.
38 p. 93.
themselves not merely as interior experiences for which reference must be captured on each occasion of use, but as repositories of reference.\textsuperscript{39}

1.9.2 A more radical revision?

One might think that if the views of Frege, Russell, Strawson, and Searle are wrong fundamentally, at the level of the picture of proper name reference that they present, then a suitable alternative would not merely expand on this picture, but replace it with an entirely new one. One might think, as suggested above, that an alternative might get rid of the inside/outside metaphor that is so central to the Capture Picture. This line of thinking suggests a different way of developing an alternative to the “whole picture” that Kripke thought was wrong. On this more radically different picture, referents would not be “captured” at all, neither on each occasion of reference (as on the original Capture Picture) nor initially so that they might be “saved” by names (as on the Capture and Save Picture). Instead, referents would be “given.”

I initially brought out the Capture Picture by focusing on the kinds of examples Kripke used to describe it. The cases Kripke relies on in articulating his alternative picture in some ways suggest the contrasting “givenness” that a radical alternative would embrace. For they are not cases in which speakers are cut off from other speakers, where they are trapped in rooms with blank names, or even trapped in name-giving scenarios without visual contact to the thing they wish to name. They are not cases in which speakers seem forced to rely on their conceptual and sensational resources in order to “capture” or “pick out” something in order to give a name to it and refer to it. Instead, they are cases in which the thing to be named and referred to is, at least in some sense, simply given, simply there. In the Feynman case, for example, Feynman’s parents

\textsuperscript{39} The Strawsonian view might be revised so that the kind of condition associated with the name on an occasion of use is more general, something like \textit{being the referent of this name as it was used by the person from whom I acquired it (whoever that may have been)}. Such a view would not seem to be vulnerable to the worries Kripke raises. Nor does it seem especially more plausible that speakers engage in this kind of capturing only when they first acquire a name as opposed to on each occasion of use. Thus, it is not clear the the Capture-and-Save Picture offers significant advantages over the Capture Picture.
do not seem to need a way of capturing him or picking him out from all the things in the vast unknowable realm beyond their minds. At least, this is not emphasized in the example. The baby Feynman is just *there* for them: they see him, they hold him in their arms, and they give him a name.\(^{40}\) If someone else picks up this name from the parents, this further speaker also does not need to “capture” or “pick out” Feynman. She may imagine him in certain ways and have certain ideas about him based on the parents’ description or her own guesses, but none of this is involved in ensuring that she refers to Feynman when she uses the name “Feynman”. She is not isolated and can rely on Feynman’s having been “given” to those from whom she learned the name for his being also “given” to her.

Even more suggestive of a radical alternative to the Capture Picture is Keith Donnellan’s way of setting out an alternative to the Condition View. He writes:

The main idea is that when a speaker uses a name intending to refer to an individual and predicate something of it, successful reference will occur when there is an individual that enters into the historically correct explanation of who it is that the speaker intended to predicate something of. That individual will then be the referent and the statement made will be true or false depending upon whether it has the property designated by the predicate. .......

The central idea is that this calls for a historical explanation; we search not for an individual who might best fit the speaker’s descriptions of the individual to whom he takes himself to be referring (though his descriptions are usually important data), but rather for an individual historically related to his use of the name "Socrates" on this occasion.\(^{41}\)

Importantly, Donnellan makes no suggestion that the speaker must fix or capture a referent for the name, “Socrates,” which she uses, nor that anyone figuring in the “historically correct

\(^{40}\) Of course, it might be *argued* that this case is not so different from the case of the isolated man in the room trying to use “Gödel” as a name of something (anything!), but the case of holding the baby and giving him a name certainly does not *seem* like this prima facie.

\(^{41}\) 1974, p. 16.
explanation” of the use of her name must have at any point performed such a capture of a referent for that name. (Indeed, he explicitly denies that anything like a dubbing need occur.) Rather, Socrates is simply there in the history leading up to this particular utterance, such that an “omniscient observer of history” might spot him as what the name, as used on this occasion, referred to.

Donnellan’s discussion, and the contrast between a referent being given as opposed to captured, only suggests an outline of a more radical alternative picture. I will close this chapter, and begin my further exploration of the radical alternative, by raising a question about how this outline is to be filled in. The question is, what is the role for names on such a picture? If a name’s referring to an object on an occasion is a matter of that object being in some way given to the speaker on that occasion, it seems as though it does not matter what name she uses. If she is given the object, what is left for the name to do?

To see the force of the question, consider first that names are not essential to chains of communication such as Kripke describes. When Rose hears of Feynman at the Chamber of Commerce, she may remember the name and use it later to tell someone else about Feynman. But she also may not remember the name much beyond the conversation in which she first heard of (on this picture, was “given”) the object. She might quickly forget the name, and then later be asked, in a trivia quiz, perhaps, to list some important scientists. She might remember Feynman, though not by name, and say, “Oh, that physicist...what was his name?” Intuitively, by “that physicist,” she refers to Feynman, even though she cannot remember his name and perhaps she cannot even remember when or from whom she heard about him. It is enough that Feynman has been given to her and has remained with her. I think we can even make sense of a case where she forgets that Feynman was a physicist, and says, “Oh, that chemist...what was his name?” and yet it is Feynman she is remembering and referring to. My intuition is that even if the trivia quiz demanded a list of pop stars, it could be Feynman whose name she tries to recall. Indeed, I can easily imagine having such an experience, perhaps finally coming up with the
name, and then realizing, oh, no, he was a physicist, not a pop star. Additionally, the docent who
told Rose about Feynman need not have used his name to do so. She might just as well have
used a description (“A Nobel Prize winning physicist was born here,”) or a demonstrative (“He is
one of our most famous native sons,” [pointing to a picture of Feynman]) to “transmit”
Feynman.

One way to see the difference between the Capture and Save Picture and the Capture Picture
is that the Capture and Save Picture gives names something to do. On the Capture Picture,
names are rather like phenomenal window dressing, putting a neat front on the associated
conditions that really secured the reference. The Capture and Save Picture, by contrast, depicts
names as workhorses. They save the reference captured by a condition that is initially associated
with a name so that the name can be used to refer when that condition is long unavailable, or
would pick out something other than the name’s referent if it were now associated with the
name. How do names “store” reference on the Capture and Save picture? They do not store the
condition used to fix the reference, for if that were what they stored, a referent would be
determined anew on each use. But nor do they store a worldly object, singled out by the
condition when reference was fixed. For on the Capture Picture, which characterizes the links in
the chain, there is no movement of “outside” objects to the “inside”. There can be no storage of
outside objects in inside objects like names. Recall that on the Capture Picture, singling out an
object amounts to picking out, or being able to pick out, a correlate of that object on an inside
map one has of the outside world. Thus, on the Capture and Save Picture, what is stored in a
name is the element on that inside map that is initially singled out.

On a more radically altered picture such as I have sketched, it cannot be the job of names to
store such elements, for on such a picture speakers do not need to single out objects, but are
simply given the objects. The Capture and Save Picture depicts a representational correlate of an
object being put into a name and stored by it, but the kind of picture I am suggesting depicts the
object itself as given, on a particular occasion, to the person doing the referring. This is an
altogether different way of envisioning linguistic reference using names. I believe that arguments like those put forth by Kripke and Donnellan against the Condition View ultimately point toward such a picture. Seeing why this is so involves scrutinizing the role that names in fact play in referring using names. This is what I will take up in Chapter 2.
CHAPTER TWO: TOWARD A MORE RADICAL REVISION OF THE PICTURE OF PROPER NAME REFERENCE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a critique of one influential alternative to the Capture Picture. This alternative, which I call the “Save Picture,” seems to have been Kripke’s own alternative picture. It also underlies an important revision by Gareth Evans of Kripke’s sketch of an account of proper name reference. Where the central metaphor of the Capture Picture is the metaphor of capturing an outside object using inside resources, the central metaphor of the Save Picture is the metaphor of saving or preserving a connection to an object. The Save Picture envisions proper name reference as a phenomenon in which an object is in some way saved by a name, so that any use of that name provides access to the object. In answering the Reference Determination Question, the Save Picture emphasizes the mechanism by which a name saves its referent rather than the mechanism by which the referent is captured. My critique of the Save Picture has the same structure as Kripke’s critique of the Capture Picture. I draw upon this structural similarity to disarm a likely dismissive response to my critique based on Kripke’s distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. The upshot is that the Save Picture cannot be an adequate picture of proper name reference.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the Save Picture, as well as two answers to the Reference Determination Question based on this picture. One, sketched by Kripke, is what I call the Baptism View. The other, introduced by Gareth Evans, is what I call the File View. Section 2.3 sets out explicitly the structure of Kripke’s argument against the Condition View. In Section 2.4, I give an argument in the same pattern against the Baptism and File Views. Section 2.5 presents what is likely to be an automatic response to the argument of 2.4: a

42 Kripke 1977.
dismissal of the argument based on Kripke's distinction between speaker's reference and semantic reference. Section 2.6 contextualizes the distinction between speaker's reference and semantic reference as a response to Donnellan's critique of Russell's theory of definite descriptions. Section 2.7 fits Donnellan's critique into the same pattern of argument exhibited by Kripke's criticism of the Condition View and my criticism of the Baptism and File Views. Section 2.8 uses this pattern to undermine Kripke's response to Donnellan, and Section 2.9 shows how the dismissal of my criticism on the basis of the distinction between speaker's reference and semantic reference is also undermined.

The aim of the chapter is to show that an influential way of revising the Capture Picture conservatively cannot be the right way of picturing proper name reference. Yet another alternative picture is required.

2.2 Pictures and views

Kripke's critique of the Condition View motivates the development of new views of proper name reference. Also, because the critique challenges the whole picture behind the Condition View, it motivates the development not just of a new answer to the Reference Determination Question, but of a new picture of proper name reference. At the end of Chapter 1, I described a fairly conservative alternative, the Capture and Save Picture. I contrasted this with an as-yet underspecified more radical alternative, embracing neither capturing nor saving as a central metaphor.

As I also discussed in Chapter 1, there is some suggestion that Kripke had a Capture and Save Picture in mind as a replacement for the Capture Picture embraced by Frege, Russell, Strawson, and Searle. His treatment of initial baptisms and subsequent acquisitions of names can be taken as requiring each user of a name to capture its referent for herself, using conditions

43 Donnellan 1966.
of one sort or another. But there is also some suggestion that he wished to move away from the metaphor of capture, preserving it only as a way of picturing certain rare cases that might or might not, in the final analysis, be classified as cases of proper name reference. Kripke’s intentions may not have been univocal on this matter. One thing that seems clear is that if Kripke does have a Capture and Save Picture, his focus is on the “Save” aspect of the picture. The innovation in Kripke’s alternative picture is the casting of names in the role of savers of reference, across time, space, and the many members of an ever-changing linguistic community. The way in which we should picture these names getting into the position of saving particular referents in the first place is somewhat obscure. I am going to call this alternative picture simply the “Save Picture.”

Kripke considers an answer to the Reference Determination Question within the Save Picture that I will call the “Baptism View.” The Baptism View says (for any name N, speaker S, occasion C, and object O):

N, as used by S on C, refers to O in virtue of O having been given (assigned to, dubbed with, baptized as) N in a baptismal event B which stands in the relation R to S’s use of N on C. A use of N on C stands in R to B in virtue of the use deriving from B where S herself performed B, or deriving from S’s acquisition of N from another speaker where S intended, at the time of acquisition, to use N with the same reference as the speaker from whom S acquired N, where that speaker’s use of N on that occasion stands in R to B.  

The Baptism View is not the only answer to the RDQ that someone with a Save Picture of proper name reference might arrive at. A different kind of view within that picture is what I will call the “File View.” This kind of view was sketched initially by Gareth Evans, who was motivated by apparent counterexamples to the Baptism View. Evans pointed out that modern

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44 Again, Kripke never commits himself to such a theory, or to any theory, but this is a plausible way of spelling out the rough statement of a theory that he tries out.

English speakers use the name “Madagascar” to refer to an African island. However, the baptismal event to which their uses of the name bear R is an event in which not the island, but a portion of the mainland, was named “Madagascar.” The Madagascar example shows that the condition articulated by the Baptism View is not necessary or sufficient for a name to refer to a particular object.

Evans took such cases of reference change to suggest that a name being given to an object and then passed with the appropriate intention from speaker to speaker does not preserve its original reference. Instead, Evans proposed, a name in a speaker’s vocabulary saves a body of information—a set of conditions, we might say—that the speaker associates with the name. These sets of conditions, or “files” as Evans and many subsequent theorists have called them, may vary from speaker to speaker along a chain of communication. Furthermore, on Evans’s view, these conditions do not function as they would on the Condition View. A file, and thus the name saving it, refers not to the object that satisfies all of its conditions, but to the object that is the “dominant causal source” of these conditions. If an object in some way causes certain conditions to be grouped in a file by a speaker, then the object is the referent of the file, and of any name saving or labeling the file, regardless of whether it satisfies the conditions.

Evans’s view might be called a “double save” view. First, various conditions that a speaker takes up from an object (whether the object in fact satisfies them or not) each save the object that is their source. Second, these conditions are gathered together into a “file” by the speaker and labeled with a name, so that the name saves the whole file of conditions, each of which saves an object (many, most, or all may save the same object). The name sticks to the file and the conditions stick to their source object. However, as different conditions enter the file, the dominant source may change, and thus the referent of the name may change. This can happen especially when the name is passed from speaker to speaker and each subsequent speaker forms her own file to which she attaches the name.

46 Both savings could occur simultaneously; “first” and “second” are not meant temporally.
This is what accounts for reference change as in the case of “Madagascar”. To tell a heavily simplified story that gets across the general idea: the sailor from whom Marco Polo originally learned the name might have had in his “Madagascar” file\textsuperscript{47} conditions such as being the largest city in the Land of the Berbers, being the region producing the finest fabrics, being located by the turn in the Shebelle River, and so on. When Marco Polo learned the name, his initial file may only have had a condition like being the place this sailor is referring to by a name that sounds to me like “Madagascar,” being somewhere off the coast of southeastern Africa, and so on. The source of these conditions was the area in the mainland. Over time, however, Marco Polo added new conditions to his “Madagascar” file, whose source was the island, and eventually, although the name “Madagascar” stuck fast to the same file throughout, the dominant causal source of the conditions in the file, and hence the referent of the name, changed.

The File View and the Baptism View are not compatible with each other, but both are based on the same general picture of proper name reference. Both are based on the Save Picture, in which the role of a proper name is to be a repository for an object, whether directly as on the Baptism View, or by being a repository for a set of conditions which are themselves repositories for an object or objects. A name may save a connection to an object, or it may save a connection to a file whose contents save connections to an object or objects.\textsuperscript{48}

In Chapter 1, we saw how capture was the metaphor or image at the center of the Capture Picture of proper name reference. For the Save Picture, the central metaphor or image is that of saving, preservation. The shift in imagery from the one picture to the other matches up with a shift in how language, in general, is conceived. The metaphor of capture fits with a private or (in Evans’s term) egocentric conception of language, as a means of expressing an individual’s

\textsuperscript{47} Really it would have been a “Mogadishu” file (or a file with a related Arabic name), since Marco Polo’s version, which in fact was not “Madagascar” but “Magadaxo” and variants on this, was likely a corruption of that name for the Somali Port. Actually, the etymology of both names is complicated and a matter of some dispute; see Chittick 1982 for discussion.

\textsuperscript{48} Note the close connection between the metaphor of a file and the metaphor of saving: saving is what a real file is for.
thinking that is primarily a phenomenon of that individual.\textsuperscript{49} When language is conceived in this way, as it seems to have been by Frege and Russell, the central question about proper name reference is how an individual speaker and thinker is able to make a name reach outside of her mind into the world around her and attach it to an object.

The metaphor of saving, by contrast, fits with a public conception of language, as a system of communication exploited by many speakers and having a life of its own independent of any particular speaker. When language is conceived of in this way, as it seems to be by Kripke, the central question about how proper names refer is not so much how a speaker is able to make a name reach outside her head, but how a name can be used and understood by multiple speakers, or the same speaker at different times, to refer to the same thing. The central question is how a name’s reference manages to be invariant across a linguistic community. In general, the idea that words have some sort of invariant significance across different uses by a single speaker or a community of speakers is a starting point for the modern linguistic project of understanding our ability to produce and understand indefinitely many sentences of a language we know. This makes it unsurprising that Kripke and Evans, with their more modern, public conception of language, would have shifted the critical metaphor to be explored in their pictures from capture to preservation, or saving. Nonetheless, it is not clear how far from capture and the private conception they really get. I will return to this below.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{2.3 A pattern of argument}

In a moment, I will give some counterexamples to the Baptism View and the File View. Before I do that, I want to review the structure of the argument against the Condition View and the Capture Picture laid out, on Kripke’s behalf, in Chapter One. The argument I am going to make forms a pattern with this one, which is significant in ways I will explain.

\textsuperscript{49} Evans 1982.

\textsuperscript{50} See Section 2.8.
The structure of Kripke’s argument is as follows. A way of envisioning proper name reference, the Capture Picture, yields, in the work of philosophers including Frege, Russell, Strawson, and Searle, the Condition View. There are empirical counterexamples to the Condition View, of which the Feynman and Peano cases are examples. These counterexamples are especially damning for two reasons. First, they challenge not only the Condition View, but the whole picture on which it is based, the Capture Picture. They challenge the Capture Picture because they suggest that instead of having to capture objects to refer to, speakers may simply be given such objects. Second, there is no reason to think that whatever the mechanism of reference is in these counterexamples is not also the mechanism in other paradigm cases of proper name reference that are not counterexamples to the Condition View. That is, there is no reason to think that paradigm cases of proper name reference in which speakers do associate conditions with the name that pick out the thing to which they refer do not have the same mechanism of reference as cases in which they do not. (This intuition is clear in the very way of phrasing the claim: a thing being the one “to which they refer” is a feature independent of being the one their conditions single out.)

So Kripke’s counterexamples are not “hard cases,” they are standard, paradigm cases. The truly hard cases, which Kripke notes, are those in which a mechanism something like what the Condition View posits seems indispensable. Such cases might include Kripke’s own example of someone isolated in a room who makes the mental declaration, “By ‘Gödel’ I shall mean the man, whoever he is, who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic.” 51 If this is reference using “Gödel,” its mechanism seems to involve the satisfaction of the description. Another case would be the use of the name “Mitochondrial Eve” by geneticists, who use the name to refer to the

51 1980, p. 91.
matrilineal most recent human ancestor of all currently living humans, whoever that was.\textsuperscript{52} If such uses are instances of proper name reference, the mechanism, again, seems to involve the satisfaction of the associated condition.

These truly hard cases might be instances of a kind of proper name reference, or they might be a different kind of phenomenon altogether. At any rate, these two kinds of phenomena are distinct and have different mechanisms which require separate accounts. Since the kind of reference that happens in Kripke’s counterexamples and closely related non-counterexamples is the paradigm kind of proper name reference, the Condition View, and perhaps the Capture Picture as well, need revising.

As noted, the challenge might be answerable on behalf of the Condition View and the Capture Picture, by articulating a different understanding of what it is to pick something out by means of conditions. Without ruling out the possible success of such responses, Kripke’s challenge motivates the exploration of alternative views and an alternative picture, one that does not give a central role to the metaphor of capture. The Save Picture is, potentially, one such picture, and the Baptism and File Views are two such views.

2.4 Counterexamples to the Baptism View and the File View

In this section, I will present two cases that I claim are counterexamples to both the Baptism View and the File View. My argument from these cases will parallel Kripke’s argument against the Condition View.

\textsuperscript{52} The referent of “Mitochondrial Eve,” used in this way, could vary from use to use, though this is unlikely in practice. For consider that if some sort of armageddon scenario killed everyone but Jane and her siblings, Jane’s mother will be the individual picked out by a subsequent use of “Mitochondrial Eve” in this way. Nonetheless, the name “Mitochondrial Eve,” as used in this way on any given occasion, is still rigid in Kripke’s sense. If a speaker says, “Mitochondrial Eve might never have had a child,” she says of the woman who in fact is the matrilineal most recent common ancestor, that she might never have had a child. There might be some deferential uses of “Mitochondrial Eve,” as when a student uses the name in a genetics discussion without associating with it the standardly associated condition. If so, her deference picks up the condition associated with the name by expert geneticists, rather than the particular individual these conditions actually picked out on any given occasion of use.
In the first case, I idly overhear some people on the bus talking about their friend Edgar. Let
us suppose that this is the first time I have heard the name “Edgar.” In overhearing this
conversation, I have no plans to strike up a conversation with these strangers or to encounter
them or their friend Edgar in the future. Thus, I do not form any intention to use the name
Edgar to refer to the person to whom they refer, or to anyone at all. Later in the day, I become
engaged in a conversation about someone I know, Edward. No doubt because of the recently
overheard conversation on the bus, I get Edward’s name wrong and refer to him as “Edgar.” I
find it intuitive that “Edgar,” as I use it, here refers to Edward, or, alternatively, that I refer using
“Edgar” to Edward.53

This intuition runs contrary to the Baptism View, which implies that the name “Edgar,” as
used, does not refer to anything at all. Since I do not form any intention to use “Edgar” in any
particular way, my subsequent use does not bear R to any particular object. Nonetheless, I
become aware of the name “Edgar.” Similar scenarios unfolding on separate occasions may
reinforce the name “Edgar” in my vocabulary of names without my ever intending to use it with
the reference of someone from whom I hear it. It seems likely to me that I have acquired a
number of names in this way, as there are certainly names that I am aware of as names but
cannot think of a single individual I know or have heard of who bears that name.54 Even though
such names, as I use them, have no referent according to the Baptism View, it is intuitive that
they refer as I use them in cases like the one just described. Thus, what is supposed to constitute
a name’s referring to an object according to the Baptism View is not in fact necessary for proper
name reference.

Similarly, it is not plausible that names acquired and used in this way are, when used, labels
of files in the sense of Evans’s picture. Perhaps one can say that as I listen idly to the
conversation on the bus I form a temporary “file” labeled with the name “Edgar.” Perhaps this

53 I will say more about these alternative phrasings in the next section.
54 To adapt a term of Kaplan 1990, one might say that these are names I have acquired in a “generic” way.
happens each time I hear the name “Edgar” in some context. Nonetheless, the name “Edgar” as I use it in the example is not saving any file. I may have “lost” whatever temporary files I formed, and even if I have not altogether forgotten the bus conversation, it seems clear that the name I acquired from the conversation has been broken off, in my mind, from any conditions I might temporarily have associated with it. Thus, what is supposed to constitute a name’s referring to an object according to the File View also is not necessary for proper name reference.

If a proponent of the File View wanted to maintain that in this case I do have a file, generated during the conversation on the bus, for which “Edgar,” as I use it, is the label, all this would show is that what is supposed to constitute a name’s referring to an object according to the File View is not sufficient for proper name reference. For I maintain that it is still intuitive that “Edgar,” as used, refers to Edward, not to the friend of the people on the bus or to anyone else called “Edgar.”

The sufficiency of the conditions articulated by the Baptism View are also open to challenge. For one case, suppose that on hearing the conversation on the bus and acquiring the name “Edgar,” I did form the intention to use the name with the reference of the speaker from whom I acquired it. But suppose that by the time I mistakenly call Edward “Edgar,” I have forgotten this intention and everything to do with the acquisition, so that all that remains is my awareness of “Edgar” as a name. When I use “Edgar” to refer to Edward, it is unintuitive that the name, as I use it, in fact refers to the friend of the people on the bus. For another case, suppose I know two people, one named Edgar and one named Edward, and I am not confused about which is which but I forget which has which name. When I talk about Edward using “Edgar,” I use “Edgar” to refer to Edward, even though my use bears R to Edgar.

55 This intuition could be weakened by building in to the description of the case various ways in which I am thinking of the bus conversation in referring to Edward. At the extreme end, I might be confused and think that the people on the bus were talking about Edward, whom I know. (Perhaps the things they were saying sounded like things Edward would do, and since I am not close with Edward I forget that his name is “Edward,” rather than “Edgar.”) I will say more about such confusion cases below.
So my first claim is that these Edgar/Edward cases are counterexamples to the Baptism View and the File View, just as Kripke’s Feynman and Peano cases are counterexamples to the Condition View. My next claim is that these counterexamples challenge not only these particular views (in the way that, say, the Madagascar case challenges the Baptism View), but the whole Save Picture, and the central role of the metaphor of saving in understanding proper name reference. They suggest that at least in some cases, names need not save any referent or set of conditions in order to refer. And even where a name might be part of how a speaker remembers some object or organizes some information, the name, as used on a particular occasion, can refer to something other than that object or the source of that information. Such cases undermine the idea that what determines the referent of a name, as used, is a mechanism of saving or preservation that the name performs.

A third claim about these counterexamples, also fitting the pattern of argument described in the previous section, is that they are not hard cases that make bad law. Some mechanism of reference different from that posited by the Baptism or File Views is required to account for how “Edgar” manages to refer to Edward in these cases. Whatever that mechanism is, there is no reason to think that it would not also be active in cases that are similar except that there is a baptismal event to which the use bears R, or the object referred to is the dominant causal source of a set of conditions grouped together under the name used. If I have a name in my vocabulary, however generically, I can use it to refer to something. It is not clear why whatever mechanism enables me to do that would cease to be operative if I had, upon acquiring the name, formed a certain intention about how I would use it and if I were in fact fulfilling that intention by my use. Indeed, it is that mechanism whose functioning will allow me to fulfill any such intention I might form upon acquiring the name. Similarly, it is not clear why that mechanism would not be

Readers may feel at this point that the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference obviously makes these cases not be counterexamples to the Baptism View or the File View. Bear with me; that response will be taken up in the next section.
operative in a case where I also associate with the name a set of conditions whose dominant causal source is in the object.

As in Chapter 1, it is instructive here to consider cases in which a name’s saving of a referent or file of conditions does not seem to be redundant for its referring. Good cases might be ones where a name “just comes to you.” The name, “Naomi Jones,” for instance, just pops into your head. You think to yourself, “ ‘Naomi Jones,’ that’s someone’s name, I guess, but whose?” Perhaps after a while you remember that you had a classmate from elementary school by that name. It seems plausible that in such a case the only way in which the name “Naomi Jones,” as used by you when it first comes to you, refers to your classmate Naomi Jones would be by its having been stored that way by you long ago. (On the Evansian file approach, the way to describe the case might be as one in which you gradually pull up the contents of the Naomi Jones file by having a grip on its label. In this case, the saving of these conditions in the file with this label is not redundant to the name’s referring to Naomi Jones. Seemingly, the only way for the name, when it initially occurs to you, to refer to Naomi Jones is by being the label to a file, the contents of which you still need to bring into view, but which have a dominant source in Naomi Jones.

These are cases in which it is plausible that if the name refers at all it refers in virtue of what the name itself brings with it—what it saves or preserves. Just as some uses of names like “Mitochondrial Eve” seem to refer, if at all, in virtue of the satisfaction of associated conditions, so some uses of names, like the use of “Naomi Jones” in the example just given, seem to refer, if at all, in virtue of their preservation of a link to the object. Likewise, it is clear that these are not the standard or typical kinds of cases. Standard cases of using names to refer are cases in which a speaker has something in mind to refer to, and uses a name to do it, not cases where all that comes to mind is the name itself. It could even be argued that in wondering who Naomi Jones is, the name “Naomi Jones,” as used by the speaker, does not refer to Naomi Jones at all, but only
stands in some other relation to her, such as the relation of being born by her. In effect, the speaker may not be referring to Naomi Jones in her wondering, but only wondering about the name “Naomi Jones,” whom do I know by that name? This is parallel to the possibility of arguing that a name like “Mitochondrial Eve” stands in some other relation than the reference relation to the individual satisfying its associated conditions. In both cases, it is evident that two quite different kinds of relations are under consideration, and that only one of them is the paradigm reference relation.

2.5 Speaker’s reference and semantic reference

As noted earlier, philosophically informed readers are likely to respond automatically to the Edgar/Edward counterexamples in the following way. These are not counterexamples to the Baptism View or the File View, it will be claimed, because they are not cases in which, intuitively, the name “Edgar,” as used by the speaker on the relevant occasion, refers to Edward. They are cases in which the speaker refers to Edward, to be sure, but the name as she uses it refers to someone else or to no one at all, but at any rate not to Edward. The objection assumes that there is an intuitive difference between the following two versions of the Reference Determination Question:

(1) What determines that N as used by S on C refers to O?
(2) What determines that S refers to O using N on C?

At the present moment in philosophical history, most philosophers reflexively understand (1) and (2) as posing two different substantive questions. (1) asks what determines what a word

57 One could also call this “denotation.” See Chapter 1, note 31 concerning the difference between reference and denotation.

54 The difference between thinking only of the name “Naomi Jones” and thinking of Naomi Jones might be quite subtle. If the name pops into your head together with a vague sense of knowing someone by that name, this may really be a case of remembering a particular person (who may or may not in fact be called “Naomi Jones”), whereas if this sense is missing, it may be a case of just the name being recalled.

59 See note 36.
or expression refers to (on an occasion of use by a speaker); it concerns the determination of
expression reference or linguistic reference or semantic reference. (2), on the other hand, asks
what determines what a speaker refers to using a word or expression (on an occasion of use); it
concerns speaker’s reference. The distinction between the two kinds of reference was made
initially by Kripke, and is rooted in H.P. Grice’s earlier distinction between word meaning and
utterer’s meaning. It is by this point deeply ingrained in philosophical thinking about reference.
I will come back to it.

But let us temporarily suspend the reflex of making the distinction. If we do so, it is plausible
to hear (1) and (2) as two ways of phrasing the same question. The difference is simply that (1)
emphasizes the name used while (2) emphasizes the speaker. But it is not obvious that each
would require a different answer, any more than would

(3) What determines that a gun, g, as used by a shooter, S, on an occasion, c, shoots a victim,
v?

And

(4) What determines that S shoots v using g on c?\textsuperscript{60}

Of course, the fact that we can suspend the reflex to separate two questions about reference
does not imply that we should not ultimately make the distinction. But it is not clear that the
distinction is an intuitive one. There \textit{is} an intuitive distinction in the vicinity. This is the
distinction between bearing a name and being called by a name on some occasion. For instance,
I bear the name “Jessica,” and I do not bear the name “Jennifer,” even though I have been called
by the name “Jennifer” on many occasions similar to the Edgar/Edward scenario described
above. But the difference between (1) and (2) is not that (1) asks what it is for O to bear N while
(2) asks what it is for O to be called by N on some occasion. (1) asks what it is for N, as used on
some occasion, to refer to O. At the very least, it is not sufficient for N, as used on some

\textsuperscript{60} I owe the analogy between referring and shooting to Barber 2011.
occasion, to refer to O, that O bear N. Many objects may bear any given name. “Edgar,” as I use it on the occasion described in the example above, does not refer to a certain dog currently living in Ohio, just because that dog happens to bear the name “Edgar.”

Indeed, in Kripke’s original straightforward and intuitive discussion of the determination of proper name reference in Naming and Necessity, he does not, in the main text, clearly distinguish a question about the determination of the reference that a name (as used by a speaker on an occasion) has from a question about the determination of the reference that a speaker (using a name on an occasion) makes. In setting up for his famous argument that the account of reference determination offered by Frege and Russell is contradicted by the empirical facts about reference in language, Kripke puts the challenge for any opposing view both as,

“The basic problem for any view such as Mill’s is how we can determine what the referent of a name, as used by a given speaker, is,” 61

and, a few lines later, as,

“...if there is not such a descriptive content to the name [i.e., if names are not short for definite descriptions, as on the view Kripke attributes to Frege and Russell], then how do people ever use names to refer to things at all?” 62

There is an easy switch here between the kind of emphasis in (1) and the kind of emphasis in (2), which reflects the fact that at an intuitive level there is no glaring difference. Despite this easy switch, Kripke does declare in a footnote that he distinguishes between the reference of a name (as used by a speaker on an occasion) and the reference made by a speaker (using a name on an occasion), and that his interest is in the former rather than the latter. 63 Kripke presents this declaration as being prompted by some arguments of Keith Donnellan, which I will discuss

61 Emphasis added.
62 Emphasis added.
63 Naming and Necessity, footnote 3.
in the next section. In closing this section, I want to emphasize that there is no obvious pre-theoretical distinction between these two relations among names, speakers, objects, and occasions that supports a difference in their underlying mechanisms. The idea that they are distinct needs motivating. Thus, the Edgar/Edward counterexamples are at least a *prima facie* threat to the Baptism View, the File View, and the entire Save Picture.

### 2.6 Donnellan’s referential-attributive distinction

I have argued that the distinction between the “linguistic” or “semantic” reference of a proper name and what a *speaker* refers to using that name is not an obvious intuitive distinction. This does not imply that it is not a valuable one. In fact, I do not think it is a valuable distinction, either in general or for the purposes of neutralizing the Edgar/Edward counterexamples. To explain why, I return now to the dialectical context in which Kripke made the distinction, with the aim of getting clear on the role it plays in that context.

The distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference (hereafter, the “SRSR distinction”) was made initially by Kripke, in response to a separate distinction made by Keith Donnellan. Donnellan’s distinction was between the “referential” and “attributive” uses of a definite description. So I will begin by setting out what that distinction is supposed to be. According to Donnellan, definite descriptions have a “duality of function.” One way in which a definite description may be used is *referentially*: to refer to something that a speaker already wishes to talk about, or has in mind to talk about. In terms I have used above, a referential use of a definite description is a use of it to refer to something that is given to one. Alternatively, it may be used *attributively*, to say something about whatever it is that fits the description used. Donnellan further claims that which function a description has depends on the particular circumstances in which it is used, and not merely its positioning as the subject of a sentence.
Here is an adaptation of one of Donnellan’s examples to illustrate the point. First, suppose two guests are at a party and observe a jovial looking man drinking a clear liquid from a martini glass. One guest says to the other, “The man drinking a martini is happy.” Next, consider a different scenario in which the host of the party orchestrates a game to liven things up. Every guest will be served a clear drink in a martini glass. One of these drinks will be a real martini; the others will be water. The guest who gets the real martini will win a prize. The drinks are served, glasses upended, and one friend says to another, “The man drinking a martini is happy.”

In the first case, the speaker refers to the man she sees. She refers to him even if he is drinking water and even if another man is the unique man at the party drinking a martini. She is using the definite description referentially, to refer to that man. In the second case, the speaker uses the very same description, but only to describe or delineate someone. She does not have anyone in mind, and if there is not a unique man drinking a martini (at the party) on the occasion of using the description, she does not refer to anyone at all. The same definite description, in the same sentence, can be used in these two different ways.

Donnellan claimed that the distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions posed a problem for Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, as well as for Strawson’s. Donnellan takes Russell and Strawson to fail to recognize this duality of function because they both give only one treatment of definite descriptions. Russell claims that any definite description of the form the $\phi$, when it appears in subject position in a sentence, results in a sentence that entails that there exists exactly one $\phi$. (Indeed, on Russell’s view, this is all that the definite description contributes to the proposition expressed by the sentence: it does not

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64 Donnellan 1966.
65 Russell 1905.
Strawson claims that any definite description of the form *the* $\phi$, when used in subject position in a sentence, results in an implication, or presupposition—but not an assertion—that there exists exactly one $\phi$ *that is being referred to*. Strawson adds “that is being referred to” in light of examples like “the table,” which are descriptions whose use he takes to imply uniqueness, because of the use of “the,” but whose descriptive content is obviously not enough to secure that uniqueness.

Donnellan argues that whether one were more inclined toward Russell’s view or toward Strawson’s view, one would run into a similar problem. This is that definite descriptions of the form *the* $\phi$, in subject position in sentences, are not always used in the ways suggested. Sometimes the implication (or perhaps entailment, if one goes with Russell) is not only that there is a unique $\phi$ (or a unique $\phi$ that is being referred to), but that a *particular* thing is the unique $\phi$ (being referred to). Sometimes, a particular thing is referred to and the implied or entailed claim is not a *general* one about the existence of some entity that is $\phi$ (and is being referred to), but a *specific* one about that particular entity—*that* it is the unique $\phi$ (that is being referred to). In other words, definite descriptions can be used referentially, to refer to a particular thing, which the speaker *has*, or is given, in some independent way. While Russell’s or Strawson’s views might be right about the attributive use of definite descriptions, neither of them accounts for this referential use at all. Any view that denies that definite descriptions refer (like Russell’s) or holds that they refer in virtue of picking out a unique object (like Strawson’s) comes up short. These views fail to account for the reference of definite descriptions, used referentially. In this way, Donnellan’s cases seem to be counterexamples to both Russell’s and Strawson’s views.

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66 Russell acknowledges that a definite description may “denote” something: there may be an individual that uniquely satisfies it and thus makes true the unique existential quantification it is involved in expressing. But this does not make for any cognitive connection between the speaker and that object. Here we see some sympathy on Russell’s part for the view that the kind of “reference” about which the Condition View seems to give the correct account should not be treated as unified with the kind of reference about which the Condition View is incorrect.
In responding to Donnellan, Kripke focused on Donnellan’s argument against Russell, so I will too. In fact, Kripke’s discussion could be just as easily directed at Donnellan’s critique of Strawson’s view that definite descriptions refer to the unique thing (being referred to) that satisfies them. The aim of Kripke’s response is to show that Donnellan has not shown any problem with Russell’s theory. Similar considerations, *mutatis mutandis*, could have been marshaled to try to show that Donnellan has not shown any problem for Strawson’s theory.

The structure of the central part of Kripke’s response is as follows:

1) Donnellan’s “referential uses” of definite descriptions are instances of a broader phenomenon, which is the divergence of what Kripke calls “speaker’s reference” from what he calls “semantic reference.”

2) Russell’s theory (or Strawson’s theory) of definite descriptions aims to account for only semantic reference. (And Russell’s view is that definite descriptions have no semantic reference.)

3) Therefore, the fact that referential uses of definite descriptions are not accounted for by Russell’s (or Strawson’s) theory does not show that this theory is incorrect or incomplete.67

In evaluating Kripke’s response, I need to focus first on part 1), the claim that the referential use can be accounted for within a broader framework. For 2) cannot be evaluated until that framework is understood. Having absorbed Donnellan’s examples, the distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions is very intuitive. There is a clear difference between using a definite description to refer to something one has in mind and using a definite description to pick out whatever it is that fits that description, if anything does. The intuitiveness of the distinction might incline one to think that any account of the mechanism of

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67 Kripke characterized Donnellan’s claim against Russell as the claim that definite descriptions are ambiguous between a referential and attributive use. He presented his own argument as an argument against positing such an ambiguity. I am going to omit the term “ambiguity” from my discussion to avoid muddying the waters. My focus is on the question of whether referential uses of definite descriptions ought to be accounted for by a theory of definite descriptions like Russell’s. This may or may not be the same question as whether the distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions is an ambiguity. Whether it is seems to depend to some degree on one’s notion of ambiguity.
the reference of definite descriptions (or, as in Russell’s case, any account of definite
descriptions that denies that they refer) should accommodate it.

The main weight of Kripke’s case against this conclusion is rested on the claim that however
much we might feel that an account of the reference of definite descriptions should
accommodate the referential/attributive distinction, we would be unreasonable to have such an
expectation about an account of proper name reference, even though the very same
phenomenon as grounds the referential/attributive distinction occurs with proper names. Once
we see how to account for the phenomenon in the case of names, we will see that it can be
accounted for in the same way in the case of definite descriptions, without impugning the
theories of Russell or Strawson.

Kripke illustrates his claim that the very same phenomenon occurs in the case of names with
the following example. Two speakers both are acquainted (in the ordinary, non-Russellian
sense) with two men, Smith and Jones. On one occasion, they see Smith in the distance and
mistake him for Jones. They then proceed to talk about what the man in the distance is doing
(raking leaves), using the name “Jones.” Kripke claims that “…in some sense, on this occasion,
clearly both participants in the dialogue have referred to Smith…”.

This case is supposed to be similar to Donnellan’s martini case in that the speakers are both looking at, and have in mind,
the man they see (Smith), just as the partygoers in the martini case are looking at, and have in
mind, the man drinking water from the martini glass. However, the expression they use,
“Jones,” picks out not the man they see but a different man, Jones, just as the partygoers’
expression, “the man drinking a martini” picks out not the man they see but a different man,
who is off in the kitchen or wherever.

A case like this shows us, according to Kripke, that we would not want to require a theory of
proper name reference to account for both an “attributive” and a “referential” use of names. We
would not require a theory of how proper names refer to account for the fact that any name, like


68 1977, p. 263.
“Jones,” could be used to refer to any thing, if the circumstances cooperated. In giving a theory of how proper names refer, we want a theory of how “Jones”, for example, refers to Jones as used by these speakers, not of how “Jones” might, in some weird situation like this, be used to refer to Smith.

To account for such cases Kripke proposes that we need an apparatus extending Grice’s distinction between what a speaker means and what her words mean. Not only is there a distinction between what a speaker means and what her words mean, there is also a distinction between what a speaker refers to by a given expression and what the expression refers to. The latter is “semantic reference”: it is what the conventions governing the use of the expression in the speaker’s language determine, given the way the world is in the context in which she uses the expression. The former is “speaker’s reference,” which Kripke “tentatively define[s]” as “that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.” In the Smith-Jones case, Jones is the semantic referent of “Jones,” as used by the speakers on this occasion, while Smith is their speaker’s referent: Smith is what they are, “in some sense,” referring to on this occasion. The distinction allows Kripke to acknowledge that the speakers are referring to Smith on this occasion without affirming that the name “Jones” that they are using to refer to Smith itself refers to Smith on this occasion.

Since cases like the Smith-Jones case are commonplace, Kripke reasons, the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference is something we need anyway in theorizing about language. But once we have it, it can be applied not only to names but to all referring expressions (what Kripke calls “designators”), including definite descriptions. Thus, the referential use of the definite description that Donnellan identifies can be treated as a phenomenon of speaker’s reference, which might come apart from the semantic reference of the definite description.

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69 p. 264.
The distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference is in effect a declaration that the two formulations of the Reference Determination Question distinguished above are really different. It is a declaration that there are two different relations among a name, speaker, occasion, and object that can be queried. One is the relation of semantic reference: we can ask what it is for a name, as used by a speaker on an occasion to refer to a particular object. Another is the relation of speaker’s reference: we can ask what it is for a speaker, using a name on an occasion, to refer to a particular object. The query of interest to Russell’s theory is only the first. If Russell’s theory is right, there could be speaker’s reference using definite descriptions, but definite descriptions have no semantic reference. Thus, the fact that there are referential uses of definite descriptions, now classified as speaker’s references, is no problem for Russell and indeed is irrelevant to his project. 70

2.7 Fitting Donnellan’s argument into the pattern

Donnellan’s argument against Russell and Strawson follows the same pattern as Kripke’s against the Condition View, and as my argument against the Baptism and File Views. Kripke’s argument that names standardly are not used in the way that the Condition View claims, combined with his allowance that on some occasions they are, and that the Condition View might be right about what happens in such cases, looks very much like Donnellan’s argument that definite descriptions are not always used in the way that Russell’s or Strawson’s theories claim, though sometimes they are, and that either Russell or Strawson might be right about those cases.

Kripke’s empirical counterexamples, such as the Feynman and Peano cases, are cases in which speakers have heard of some individual. They have learned a name for this individual and

70 This seems to fit with Russell’s insistence, in responding to Strawson, that “[his] theory of descriptions was never intended as an analysis of the state of mind of those who utter sentences containing descriptions.” Instead, Russell says, “I was concerned to find a more accurate and analysed thought to replace the somewhat confused thoughts which most people at most times have in their heads.” (Russell 1957.)
associate some conditions with the name. Nonetheless, whether these conditions pick out anything or not, and regardless of what they pick out, the speakers refer using the name to the individual they have heard of, and have in mind on the occasion partly as a result of having heard of that individual. Kripke also allows that there might be a kind of reference, as in the “Gödel” and “Mitochondrial Eve” cases described in Section 2.3, that does work the way the Condition View says. But, in Kripke’s words, “that’s not what most of us do.” Most of us use “Gödel” to refer to a man we have heard of, and as a result have in mind on some occasion. Even “Mitochondrial Eve” could be and probably is used that way. Lydia, a geneticist with a flair for pet-name humor, might name her dog “Mitochondrial Eve,” and go on to refer to the dog by that name in the ordinary way. This will have the effect that Lydia, as well as many who meet or hear of the dog (some of whom may be unaware of the other use of “Mitochondrial Eve”) use the name to refer to an individual they have in mind, Lydia’s dog.

In light of this, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Kripke, on the basis of cases that are closely parallel to Donnellan’s cases, shows that proper names have both a referential and an attributive use. But the attributive use of proper names, instead of being the paradigm one as the views of Frege, Russell, Strawson, and Searle suggest, is instead an unusual use, which may not even qualify as a kind of reference. The paradigm kind of proper name reference, of which Kripke aims to articulate a picture, and of which the Baptism View is a view, is referential proper name reference.

In drawing this parallel, I am aware that Kripke himself disavowed it, commenting in a footnote to “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference” that “my views on proper name reference in ‘Naming and Necessity’ have no special connection with the referential-attributive distinction.” In making this comment, Kripke seems to have been focused on various suggestions of relations between the themes of Naming and Necessity and Donnellan’s distinction. These include the suggestion that Donnellan’s referentially used definite

71 1977, footnote 20.
descriptions are equivalent to rigid definite descriptions (attributed to Robert Stalnaker and Barbara Partee\textsuperscript{72} and Jerrold Katz’s suggestion \textsuperscript{73} that the referential use of definite descriptions might be used to defend the view that proper names are synonymous with definite descriptions.\textsuperscript{74} I think Kripke is right to reject these suggestions, but what I am suggesting is a different connection between his views on proper name reference and Donnellan’s distinction. It is a much more immediate connection, as I am suggesting that Kripke’s view is, or at least can be seen as, the view that proper names have a referential and an attributive use, contra the Condition View, which accounts, at most, for the attributive use. Further, Kripke’s efforts toward an alternate picture and theory are efforts toward a picture and theory of the referential use of names.

What about the Smith-Jones case? Kripke presents this case as parallel to the martini case in order to show that the fact that a proper name can be used to refer to something had in mind by, or given to, the speaker, is irrelevant to the kind of account he or the proponents of the Condition View want to give of proper name reference. In fact the Smith-Jones case is not parallel to the martini case. In the martini case, the speaker has just one individual, the water-drinking man, in mind. There is no martini-drinking man who is given to her. By contrast, in the Smith-Jones case, there are two individuals the speaker has in mind; two individuals given to her. There is Smith, who is perceptually given, and Jones, who is given in memory, a memory activated by the perception of Smith. The phenomenon illustrated by the martini case is a speaker’s use of an expression to refer to something she has in mind. The phenomenon

\textsuperscript{72} In Stalnaker 1970/1972 and Partee 1972.

\textsuperscript{73} Katz 1975.

\textsuperscript{74} The idea here is that even though Kripke’s arguments show that the Condition View is false, since associated conditions (which could be given in the form of definite descriptions) do not fix the reference of proper names, nonetheless the names might have the same meaning as the associated descriptions, since these could be referential descriptions.
illustrated by the Smith-Jones case is a speaker’s use of an expression to refer to two things at once, or perhaps to fail to refer altogether, as a result of a confusion she is suffering. 75

A martini case that would be a closer parallel to the Smith-Jones case would be one in which the speaker first notices the happy looking man, and then glances away for an instant, during which instant the man wanders off and another man also with clear liquid in a martini glass comes to stand where he was standing. The speaker looks back again, sees a neutral-expressioned man, takes him to be the same man as the happy one she has just seen, and comments, “The man drinking a martini was happy a moment ago.” Let us also suppose that one of the men was in fact drinking a martini, the other only water from a martini glass. Now we have a parallel case to the Smith-Jones case.

The speaker in this case does not use the definite description “the man drinking a martini” in a different way from how the speaker in the original martini case uses it. In both cases, the definite description is used referentially. So the addition of the mistake does not lead us to posit any further difference in uses. The difference between the two cases is that in the first case the speaker has just one thing in mind to refer to, whereas in the second case she has two. This makes it hard to say, about the second case, what the referentially used description refers to. The fact that one of the men is in fact drinking a martini does not push us to say that he is the man referred to. His satisfaction of the description is irrelevant to that question. All of this is consistent with Donnellan’s original case showing that definite descriptions have a referential as well as an attributive use. Similarly, Kripke’s Smith-Jones case does not in any way impugn the conclusion that in typical uses by these speakers, where there is no confusion, “Jones” refers to Jones even if Jones does not satisfy the conditions they associate with the name. For when there is no confusion, Jones is the one they have in mind to refer to in using “Jones.”

75 Other cases might illustrate a speaker’s use of an expression to refer to two things at once, or nothing at all, as a result of attempting to mislead or play along with the audience’s beliefs. For instance, one of the speakers in Kripke’s example might know that the man raking the leaves is Smith rather than Jones, but also recognize that her interlocutor will be hard to convince of this. Thus, for the sake of carrying on the conversation about what the man is doing, she may go along in calling him “Jones.” These are all cases of having two things in mind and referring, due to confusion or contrivance, to both at once.
2.8 Kripke’s response to Donnellan questioned

The parallelism between Donnellan’s arguments against Russell and Kripke’s against the Condition View calls into question Kripke’s defense of Russell using the SRSR distinction. This is because the SRSR distinction could be used by a proponent of the Condition View to respond to Kripke’s counterexamples. The proponent of the Condition View might begin by noting that even if Kripke is right that speakers sometimes, or even in standard cases, use proper names to refer to things that they have in mind as a result of having interacted with them or heard about them, and succeed in this regardless of whether the conditions the speakers associate with those names single out those particular objects, nonetheless at least some of the time speakers use proper names simply to refer to whatever their associated conditions pick out (as in the Mitochondrial Eve case). Such cases need accounting for anyway, and it is (as Kripke himself taught us) the lazy man’s way to posit an ambiguity. So instead of claiming (in effect) that each proper name has a referential and an attributive use, why not treat names as unambiguously having their referents, if any, determined by their associated conditions. The object, if there is one, that is singled out by the conditions associated with a name on an occasion is its semantic referent.

This fits with the Capture Picture, on which the only way for a name to be a kind of “window” to an “outside” object is for it to capture that object by means of associated “inside” conditions. This is the only way for a name itself to be imbued with significance, such that it might stand for something on the outside. Be this as it may, the Condition View need not deny that any use of a proper name has an “historical explanation” (to use Donnellan’s term). The use of the name “Peano” by the under-informed speaker in Kripke’s example is explained (in some way) by the effects that Peano had in the world. In some way which would need to be elaborated, it is Peano, rather than Dedekind, the existence and activities of whom the speaker’s acquisition of the name “Peano” and subsequent use of the name is an effect. In using the name “Peano,” the speaker is
responding to a tradition of talk with its origin in Peano’s life and work. The speaker’s use being a response to Peano may suffice for calling Peano the “speaker’s referent.” Nonetheless, if the Capture Picture is the right way to envision reference, then the name can only have significance through conditions the speaker associates with it, so while the speaker’s response of acquiring and using the name “Peano” may be a response to Peano, that response nonetheless is to acquire and use a name that refers to Dedekind.

So instead of jettisoning the Condition View in response to Kripke’s counterexamples, one could employ the SRSR distinction to argue that the Condition View is fine as it is—as a view of semantic reference. Kripke’s counterexamples are examples of speaker’s reference to objects other than what is singled out by associated conditions, and so they do not impugn the Condition View.

This reveals a tension in Kripke’s characterization of the role of the SRSR distinction. On the one hand, the distinction is supposed to obviate a referential/attributive distinction that would need to be accounted for by a theory of the reference of definite descriptions. But if it does this, then it can also be used to obviate a parallel distinction for proper names. I have argued that the need for a theory of proper name reference to account for just such a distinction, and in particular to account for proper names used referentially, constitutes Kripke’s central case against the Condition View. So it is not clear what importance Kripke can assign to the SRSR distinction without undermining his own arguments against the Condition View. On pain of leaving his own critique of (among others) Frege and Russell on proper names open to dismissal, Kripke cannot dismiss Donnellan’s critique of Russell using the SRSR distinction.

One line of response to this worry is the following. It might be argued that the Condition View cannot be defended using the SRSR distinction because to do so relies on an implausible conception of meaning or significance that is embodied in the Capture Picture, according to which meaning or significance is wholly private, a feature of expressions inside the minds of expressions.

76 Or, instead of looking for new notions of condition association that are not prey to these counterexamples.
individuals rather than of expressions in public languages. Whereas Kripke glosses semantic reference as what is given by the *conventions* of a (presumably public) language, the response I have suggested on behalf of the Condition View treats semantic reference as what is given by a speaker’s private grasp, from the inside, of the outside world. But perhaps this reflects an outdated and uninteresting conception of semantics. If we endorse the shift I mentioned earlier, from viewing language as a private phenomenon to viewing it as a public one, this might seem to make the SRSR defense of the Condition View unavailable.

However, closer examination of the Baptism and File Views, and the Save Picture in general, shows that they do not break off so radically from the private conception of language. On these views, the mere existence of a convention in one’s linguistic community of using a name to refer to a particular thing does not entail that the thing is the referent of a use one makes of the name. Rather, one must have oneself saved that thing with that name, whether by forming an intention upon acquiring the name to use it in the manner of the speaker from whom one acquires it, or by using the name as a label for a mental file of information that in turn saves that thing. One way of putting this is to say that one must oneself have joined in a certain convention or practice, which is public in the sense that many people are part of it. But what matters for the reference of names, as used, is not the public conventions and practices that exist, but the fact that the speaker using the name has joined in such a convention by what is really a private saving of a thing, or a mental file, with a name. Thus, it is not clear that the conception of semantics that would allow a proponent of the Condition View to defend it against Kripke’s arguments using the SRSR distinction is old-fashioned and private whereas the conception of semantics that allows Kripke to defend Russell’s view against Donnellan’s arguments using the SRSR distinction is modern and public. Rather, the difference in conception reflects the difference in emphasis between the Capture Picture and the Save Picture, both of which picture proper name reference as relying crucially on individual speakers’ connections to the objects to which they refer.
2.9 Inadequacy of the Save Picture

In light of this, is the automatic resort to the SRSR distinction in order to avoid the Edgar/Edward counterexamples to views based on the Save Picture tenable? If the foregoing is correct, then it is not tenable, for the distinction is too powerful. If proponents of the Save Picture can appeal to it to defend their picture against the Edgar-Edward counterexamples, proponents of the Capture Picture can equally appeal to it to defend their picture against Kripke’s Feynman and Peano cases. The different ways of making the distinction in each case simply reflect the picture of reference and of language in general that each camp embraces. Absent independent grounds for thinking one picture more accurate than the other, we cannot say that one use of the SRSR distinction is justified while the other is not. Now, Kripke’s arguments do show problems for the Capture Picture. They suggest that it is not an accurate picture of proper name reference. But likewise, the Edgar-Edward counterexamples show a problem for the Save Picture. They show, in a parallel fashion, that it is not an accurate picture of proper name reference.

A proponent of the Save Picture could try to avoid this conclusion by claiming that Kripke’s counterexamples to the Condition View and Donnellan’s referential uses are not parallel. They might accept that Kripke identifies a contrast to a kind of “attributive” use of a name. But the contrast is not with a “referential” use, in the sense of a use of a name to refer to something given or had in mind, but with a “conventional” use. Whereas a name, used attributively, would refer to whatever, if anything, was picked out by the conditions associated with the name, a name used conventionally would refer to the conventional referent of that name within the convention, or practice, that the speaker is following in using the name. In the Feynman case, for instance, although the speakers’ associated conditions may not pick anyone out, because they make a conventional rather than an attributive use of the name, the name as they use it refers to Feynman, who is the individual referred to as “Feynman” within the convention they are following in using the name. The question of what determines that a name, used conventionally
on a certain occasion, refers to a particular object is the question to which the Baptism View and the File View are answers, and the Save Picture is a picture of that kind of reference. This accords with Kripke’s characterization of “semantic reference” as what is given by the conventions of the speaker’s language. The Edgar/Edward cases are not counterexamples to this kind of answer, because the speaker does not follow any convention of using “Edgar” to refer to someone in referring to Edward.

To respond to this line of thinking, I recall again the pattern of argument exhibited by Kripke’s argument against the Condition View, Donnellan’s argument against the views of Russell and Strawson, and my argument against the Baptism and File Views. In this pattern, counterexamples are presented to a view about the determination of reference, calling out for an alternative account of reference determination. A further fact about the counterexamples is that there is no reason to think that whatever reference-determining mechanism is operative in these counterexample cases is not also operative in paradigm cases of reference that are not counterexamples to the view. Finally, it is allowed that there are some cases, which may or may not be instances of a single phenomenon of reference, of which the view being argued against may be the correct account. In Kripke’s argument, these are cases such as the “Mitochondrial Eve” case or the case of someone in a room declaring mentally how she will use “Gödel” to refer. In Donnellan’s argument, these are cases where the definite description is used attributively. In my argument, these are cases, like the “Naomi Jones” case, where the only available mechanism of reference seems to be some kind of saving by the name.

Now, suppose a proponent of the Capture Picture and the Condition View were to respond to Kripke as follows: I acknowledge the distinction between the attributive use of proper names and the non-attributive use that you have pointed out. However, I am only interested in giving an account of proper names used informedly. Informed uses of proper names are uses of proper names in which the conditions the speaker associates with the name single out the thing she is referring to. This happens by definition with the attributive use: if there is reference at all it is to
the thing singled out by the associated conditions. With respect to non-attributive uses, I am interested in accounting for how reference happens in cases where speakers’ use is informed. It is true that I will need to augment my original Condition View with some account of how speakers making non-attributive uses of names have some historical connection to the thing referred to by the name. But the object referred to being singled out by the associated conditions will still be an essential part of the mechanism by which a name used non-attributively but informedly refers to what it does, since if the object were not singled out by the associated conditions, it would not be referred to \textit{informedly} by that name, as used.

Clearly, this would not be a good response. A key element of Kripke’s critique is that paradigm cases of reference, whether speakers are informed or not about what they refer to, are not dependent on the satisfaction of associated conditions by a unique object. As discussed above, cases like the Feynman case and the Peano case are not hard cases, but typical cases. And they would be typical even if, as a contingent matter, people were in general much better informed about the things they talk about than in fact people are. The same underlying factors, whatever they are, that make for reference when uninformed speakers use names will also make for reference when informed speakers use names. Or at least, there is no reason to suppose otherwise. Thus, as acknowledged in the imagined response, a theory of only informed uses would have to account for the mechanism involved in uninformed uses \textit{first}, and then it could go on to conjoin this account with the more specific conditions for informed use. This is hardly a means of dismissing the objection to the Condition View based on uninformed uses. Rather, it is an acceptance that the Condition View is not adequate as an account of proper name reference and at best can be used as a means of characterizing a sub-class of proper name reference once the work of accounting for proper name reference in general has already been carried out.

The response to my argument that I have considered on Kripke’s behalf is parallel to this one, and thus it is not a viable way of dismissing my worry. My argument against the Baptism View and the File View is based on counterexamples in which a name, as used, refers to an
object without or in opposition to the conditions specified by the Baptism View or the File View being met by an object. Further, as argued above, the same underlying factors that make for reference in cases not fitting the Baptism or File Views would make for reference in typical cases where a name, as used, does refer in accord with the predictions of one of these views. I acknowledged the possibility of some exceptions to this, like the “Naomi Jones” case, which we might call a “purely conventional” use of a name. What I mean by “purely conventional” is that the name is used with something like blind faith that one is using it as part of some convention or practice. In the “Naomi Jones” case, the speaker, in wondering, “Who was Naomi Jones?” is simply having faith that this name has popped into her head as a result of some long forgotten practice she had of using “Naomi Jones” to refer to someone. Arguably, she does not have anyone in mind independently, so the convention or practice she is assuming to be there is essential to the name, as used, referring. But most non-attributive uses of names are not purely conventional in this sense. Rather, they are uses of names to refer to something had in mind, something given. If the speaker’s choice of the name used is partly explained by the thing had in mind bearing that name—i.e., if she is following a practice or convention in using the name—then the name is used conventionally. But it would not do to deny the need for a different picture of proper name reference from the Save Picture on the grounds that one is only interested in conventional non-attributive uses. For conventional non-attributive uses are a sub-class of referential uses. There can be no good picture or account of the former that is not developed from a picture or account of the latter.

**Conclusion**

In sum, I have argued—with Kripke, I think, in spite of his disavowal of a connection between his view of names and Donnellan’s distinction—for a distinction between referential and attributive uses of proper names. The relation between names used attributively and the object that is singled out by associated conditions may or may not count as reference, but it is at any
rate a different kind of relation from the relation between names used referentially and the objects they are used to refer to. I have suggested a further category of use of proper names, which is a purely conventional use of names. Once again, the relation between names used purely conventionally and the objects referred to in the relevant convention for referring may or may not count as reference, but it is at any rate a different kind of relation from the relation between names used referentially and the objects they are used to refer to, and also a different kind of relation from the relation between names used attributively and the object singled out by their associated conditions. I have also argued—perhaps contrary to Kripke—that an account of the reference relation between non-purely-conventional, non-attributive, but conventional uses of names and their referents is not a separate thing from an account of what Kripke would call “speaker’s reference,” but an addition to such an account. Thus, neither the Baptism View, nor the File View, nor any account of the mechanism of proper name reference developed from the Save Picture, can be adequate to explain the phenomenon of proper name reference.
3.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 introduced the Reference Determination Question about proper name reference. Picking up where Kripke and Donnellan left off, I argued that a whole range of attempts to answer the RDQ fail. This range of attempts, which includes the Condition View, the Baptism View, and the File View, can be grouped together as holding that the reference of a name, as used on an occasion, is partly determined by some standing entity that is activated by the use. On the Condition View, this is a condition. On the Baptism View, it is an item of vocabulary. On the File View, it is a mental file. By calling these entities “standing,” I indicate that they are not provided by the particular context of the referring utterance, but are available at many times.77

Kripke and Donnellan provided a form of argument against the Condition View, showing that it fails because there are cases where, intuitively, a name, as used, refers to a particular object even though no condition associated with it by the speaker picks out any particular object. Further, there are cases where, intuitively, a name, as used, refers to a particular object even though the speaker associates with the name a condition that picks out a different object. I argued in Chapter 2 that arguments of this form can be deployed also against the Baptism View, the File View, and any other view claiming that the reference of a name is determined by its role as a “saver”—as a standing entity activated by the use. This is because reference with proper names is always a matter of what a speaker has in mind to refer to on a particular occasion, and this is not determined by which referent-saving names or referent-selecting conditions she may use to do so.

77 And perhaps to many different speakers. This would be the case if the conditions are viewed as public, abstract objects, on the idea of Frege’s *sinne*, or if the vocabulary items are viewed as part of a public language. Kripke suggests the latter in his 1977, note 20.
I considered Kripke’s distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference as a defense against this form of argument, and found it lacking. The argument cannot be fended off by claiming that there are two Reference Determination Questions, each with its own subject matter, such that views like the Baptism and File View are only aimed at answering the one about name reference, or semantic reference. For this defense, I argued, can be deployed to defend any view of how the reference of proper names is determined. This is because the lines of the speaker’s reference-semantic reference distinction are stipulated rather than discovered.

The question to be addressed in the present chapter is, what is the positive alternative to these views of reference determination? If there is not a real difference between a relation of speaker’s reference and a relation of semantic reference, what determines reference, full stop? I will claim that, in light of the points made in Chapter 2, the Reference Determination Question may not be a legitimate question. This possibility has been under-explored, and resets the course of the investigation of linguistic reference in a way that will be discussed in Chapter 4. I will also explain what must be presupposed in order for the RDQ to be a legitimate question. Understanding this presupposition will show why the RDQ, if it is legitimate, is not a question to which we should expect fast answers along the lines offered by any of the views considered so far.

Elaborating these points will require first revisiting the RDQ and gripping more precisely what it asks. This is the task of Section 3.2. The Condition View is touted, by Kripke and others, as offering a clear answer to the RDQ, so I begin by asking to what question it offers such a clear answer. In brief, I will claim that this is the question of how we can avoid blurring the line between “inside” and “outside” that was discussed in Chapter 1, while also acknowledging the phenomenon of reference. The RDQ, in effect, asks how the Capture Picture can be upheld with respect to reference. In Section 3.3, I will draw a parallel between the RDQ’s presupposition that a blurring of this line is to be avoided, and the view in the philosophy of perception that a “naïve realist” or “direct realist” view of perceptual experience must be rejected. I will show how this
presupposition of the RDQ is motivated in a similar way to the rejection of the direct view about perceptual experience. The parallel is useful because, as Section 3.4 explains, the argument advanced by Chapter 2 shows that linguistic reference using names is similar to perception in that reference is always to things had in mind to refer to, just as perception is always of things in the perceptible environment. In Section 3.5 I defend the parallel between reference and perception against the objection that certain linguistic expressions seem to force reference to things that speakers do not have in mind to refer to. Section 3.6 further supports the parallel between reference and perception by arguing that referring in language is a way of experiencing the world, just as perception is. Finally, the Chapter’s Conclusion details two upshots of the parallel between reference and perception. One is that a (Perceptual) Determination Question arises with respect to perception only if direct realism is abandoned. Thus, there is at least room to reject the (Perceptual) Determination Question altogether by defending direct realism. A similar point is made about linguistic reference. A second upshot is that even if direct realism about perceptual experience is rejected, it is unclear how to understand a Determination Question about perception. Nothing like the Condition View provides a clear, if incorrect, answer whose shoes alternatives might try to fill. The same is the case for linguistic reference.

3.2 The aim of the Reference Determination Question

What is the import of asking what determines the reference of a name, as used by a speaker on a given occasion? The question is often characterized as requesting an analysis of reference, or, to be clear that the meaning of the word “reference” is not what is at issue, a constitutive account of reference.\(^78\) In seeking a constitutive account of reference, one tries to say \textit{what reference is}: perhaps, what its essence is. It can be difficult to get a grip on such an aim. It is

\(^78\) See, for instance, the discussion of theories of reference in Paul 2012.
tempting to say, as Kripke did quoting Bishop Butler, that everything (reference included) is what it is and not another thing.\textsuperscript{79}

Something one might be after in asking what proper name reference is are some criteria for distinguishing it from other phenomena. But this does not seem to be what the Reference Determination Question is after. The question is not what makes a given activity be referring rather than, say, shooting. Instead, if criteria are being sought, they seem to be criteria for distinguishing reference by a name, as used on a given occasion, to one particular thing, from reference by that name, as used on that occasion, to some other thing, or to nothing at all.

One element of the standard story about the Reference Determination Question is that the Condition View is supposed to provide a good clear answer to it. According to the Condition View, the reference of a name, as used by a speaker on an occasion, is determined by the condition that the speaker associates with the name on that occasion. This answer is wrong, if Kripke and Donnellan are correct, but it is at least an answer, or so the thought seems to be. Indeed, what Kripke bemoans in the early passages of Naming and Necessity quoted above\textsuperscript{80} is the loss of this clear answer, and the uncertainty about what to put in its place. This provides a basis for clarifying the RDQ, since a sample answer, even if wrong, illuminates the question it tries to answer.

The Condition View is focused on the property a name has of referring to a particular object on a particular occasion. What the Condition View does is reduce this property to a different one: the property of being associated on a particular occasion with a condition that singles out a particular object. This is the advance offered by the Condition View. The basic Condition View does not go on to reduce the property of being associated on a particular occasion with a certain condition to some other psychological or neurological property (for instance). The reduction might not even be non-circular, since it might be that the association of certain conditions with a

\textsuperscript{79} Kripke 1980.

\textsuperscript{80} See Sections 1.2 and 2.5.
name involves further linguistic reference. But the Condition View does ensure that reference to particular objects is not a fundamental property of ordinary names, as used. For all the Condition View implies, association with certain conditions may be a fundamental property of names, as used. This raises the question, why is it better to accept association with a certain condition as a fundamental property than to accept reference to a particular object as a fundamental property? What explains the feeling that in making this reduction we are somehow on firmer ground in our understanding of linguistic reference?

I believe the explanation lies in the fact that in accepting reference to a particular object as a fundamental property of a name, as used, one blurs the line between what is “inside,” or part of the speaker’s perspective and experience, and what is “outside.” By contrast, no such blurring is entailed by accepting association with a certain condition as fundamental.

I shall explain this. From the speaker’s perspective, referring using a proper name seems to be a kind of reaching out. The speaker has the name, and with it she somehow introduces or brings up a particular object. The object is “outside,” in the world that is independent of the speaker’s experience, while the name, or at least this use of it, is something she experiences. The mystery of linguistic reference is how the connection between these two things is made; what the nature of this connection is. If we say that a name simply refers, as used, to a particular object, we make the connection brute, primitive. We assign an “outside” entity, the object, to an “inside” entity, the use of the name, and in doing so blur the line between outside and inside without explanation.

By contrast, if we say that a name, as used, simply is associated with a certain condition, we only assign another inside entity to the name, as used. For the associated condition, like the use

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81 For instance, to associate with “Aristotle” the condition of being the teacher of Alexander might require an unspoken use of the name “Alexander” to refer to a particular individual. Indeed, if conditions are considered to be generally linguistic, any condition association might require linguistic reference, at least to oneself or one’s experiences. See Russell 1910 for an early argument to this effect.

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of the name, is something available from the speaker’s perspective. If the associated condition happens to single out something on the outside, this will count as reference to that thing, but the line between inside and outside will not be blurred in the process. The line is preserved by reducing reference to denotation.

When the Condition View is rejected, we seem to be back to reference to particular objects as a basic property of names, as used. This is what prompts Kripke to ask how speakers can ever use names to refer at all. What he is really asking, on my interpretation, is how we can avoid leaving reference as a basic property of names, as used, if we reject the Condition View. The presupposition is that there is something problematic about the claim that names, as used, simply refer to things. My suggestion is that what is supposed to be problematic is that the claim posits reference to “outside” objects as a basic feature of “inside” experiences. To leave things this way would be to commit a category error of sorts. At least, it would be to commit such an error within the perspective of the Capture Picture, on which the boundary between inside and outside is inviolable.

The aim of preserving the inside/outside division is apparent, also, in the broad alternatives to the Condition View that I have considered. The Baptism View seeks to reduce the property of referring to a particular object to the property of being used as a certain vocabulary item, where these vocabulary items are (seemingly) individuated by the intentions the speaker formed in acquiring them. These intentions may themselves be partly individuated by conditions such as being referred to on occasion c by speaker S using N, and so ultimately reference-to-o is reduced to a name’s being used in keeping with a stored intention individuated by conditions

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82 This is not obviously the case for the revised views of condition association discussed in Chapter 2. On these views, conditions associated with the name may not be something the speaker has access to in the sense of being able to articulate it or even grasp it in thought. Rather, the association of a condition with a name is a matter of the speaker’s dispositions to respond to various promptings. Given this, the appeal of these views may not come from their reduction of reference to an inside and outside component. They may eliminate an inside aspect of reference altogether, and cease to view reference as an inside-outside connection.

83 See 1.7.

84 See Chapter 1 for introduction of the Capture Picture.
that were at one time accessible to the speaker. The File View seeks to reduce the property of referring to a particular object to the property of being used as a label for a certain mental file, whose contents happen to have their dominant causal source in some particular object. If so, the name, as used, counts as referring to that object. But what is accessible from the inside is the file, not the object.

This suggests that what the Reference Determination Question is after is some account of how a speaker’s experience—her use of a name—can connect to an outside object without that object simply being part of the experience. For, on the Capture Picture, an outside object cannot be part of an inside experience: this is a category error. Those who press the RDQ about linguistic reference aim to avoid such an error, or, to look at it a different way, to preserve the Capture Picture.

### 3.3 A parallel with perception

The Condition View and the proposed alternatives rescue us from having to treat the referential experience as simply being a relation to the object referred to. Each view posits something else as the referential experience (condition association, accessing a name-in-vocabulary, pulling up a file) and shows how the relation of reference breaks down into that inside component together with a way of tying it to the outside object that is the referent. The Reference Determination Question is the question of how this division of the reference relation into an inside and outside element is to be effected. Thus, a presupposition of the Determination Question is that this division must be effected somehow; that accepting reference as both inside and outside at once—we might say, as an inside (experiential) relation with an outside relatum—is not an option. In this section, I will explore the motivation for this presupposition by comparing linguistic reference to another area of philosophical inquiry where the drive to keep inside and outside separate is more familiar: perception.
In discussions of perception, this drive originates in what is known as the “problem of perception.” The problem of perception is a problem with a pre-theoretical or “naïve” picture of perceptual experience. In brief, the naïve picture envisions perceptual experience as the presentation, revelation, or manifestation of the world to us perceivers. To perceive something is to be directly aware of it, to come into cognitive contact with it. Our experience simply is this encounter with the things in our environment and their features. In this way, naïve or direct realism (as this view is called) does not keep the inside and the outside separate. The relation to an outside object that is perception of that object is not reduced to an experiential component and a non-experiential component that connects the experience to the object. Rather, the relation is fundamental and is the only candidate for being the experience.

The classic problem for this picture derives from the fact that we are subject to perceptual illusion and hallucination. A stick in a glass of water can appear bent to me when in fact it is not bent (illusion), and there can appear to me to be a stick in a glass of water when in fact there is no such thing before me at all (hallucination). Perceptual experience can be of objects, or, in the common phrase, as of objects, when there are no such objects being perceived. Perceptual experience can be as of certain properties being instantiated, when in fact no such properties are instantiated by what is perceived. These perceptual experiences are, or at least could be, exactly the same from the perceiver’s perspective as perceptual experiences where such objects or properties are perceived.

The problem this raises is that if a perceptual experience simply is the manifestation of things and features in one’s environment, then it could not be illusory or hallucinatory. For an illusory or hallucinatory experience is precisely not the manifestation of worldly objects and properties. Yet it seems that any perceptual experience could be illusory or hallucinatory, in the sense that one’s experience could be exactly the same while one was suffering an illusion or hallucination. Thus we seem pressed either to give up the idea that perceptual experience is the

85 See Crane 2011 for recent discussion.
manifestation of objects and properties, or to give up the idea that any given perceptual experience could be illusory/hallucinatory. So we have a dilemma, the problem of perception.

It is important to see that this is a problem about perception considered from the inside. It is a problem about the nature of the perceptual experience. The problems of hallucination and illusion suggest that our experience of perceiving cannot be the direct manifestation of objects and properties that it seems to be. We seem to need an alternative characterization of this experience that accommodates the possibilities of hallucination and illusion. The characterization should also allow for some explanation of why the experience seems to be direct contact with our environment, although it is not.

The problem of perception calls out for a separation between this inside perspective on perception and the relation that perception puts us in with worldly objects and properties. Our experience—the inside perspective—must be something other than a direct encounter with the world. Thus, we must reduce the relation of perception between a perceiver and an object by giving some characterization of the perceiver’s experience (which could be in common with hallucinations or illusions), combined with a further account of the connection between the experience thus characterized and the object.

Historically, many classical “theories of perception” have been approaches to dealing with this problem. Sense datum theories, adverbial theories, and intentionalist theories all have treated perceptual experience as other than a relation to worldly objects and properties. They have reduced the perceptual relation in terms of a perceptual experience characterized in some other way, combined with an account of the connection between such experience and the worldly objects perceived.

The details of these views are not especially important for my purposes, but I will briefly describe intentionalism about perceptual experience, which is the non-direct view that arguably

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86 This way of understanding the dispute among the classical theories is convincingly defended by Crane 2006.

87 If they countenance it at all: idealist versions especially of sense datum theory and adverbialism might not.
has the greatest adherence in the contemporary debate. The intentionalist theory holds that perceptual experiences are not relations to or contact with objects, but are representational states. Both a veridical and a hallucinatory visual experience of a red ball represent a red ball, and thus are experiences of the same kind. Both experiences seem to be relations to a red ball, because they represent a red ball. But because they are representations, and representations need not be representations of anything real, neither experience is really a relation to, or contact with, a red ball. The veridical experience is a representation that is appropriately linked to a real red ball, while the hallucination is a representation of the very same kind that is not appropriately linked to a real red ball (or any other real object).

I said that the Reference Determination Question presupposes that the relation of reference among speaker, name, and object must be reduced to an inside component, the speaker’s experience in referring, and an outside component connecting that experience in some way with the referent. The motivation for this presupposition is that if the relation is not broken down into an inside component and an outside component, then the only candidate for the referring experience—referring as it is from the speaker’s inside perspective—is this very relation. And if reference is treated as an inside relation with outside relata, the basic framework of the Capture Picture is violated. There is a clear parallel between what the RDQ presupposes and what non-direct views of perceptual experience accept. Both accept and presuppose that the inside, experiential perspective on their phenomenon (reference or perception) must be kept separate from the outside, “from-above” relations it entails. The goal of doing this while somehow making sense of the inside-outside connection that both reference and perception provide is at

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88 In calling a view “non-direct” I indicate that it is a view that addresses the problem of perception by abandoning the naïve or direct realist position that perceptual experience is the perceptual relation in favor of a view that characterizes perceptual experience in some way other than as a relation to the worldly objects and properties perceived. “Non-direct” does not suggest that all such views hold that perceivers do not in fact perceive objects, but surrogates such as sense data, which may enable them to gain awareness of objects in some indirect way. This is the view of sense datum theories, but it is not the view of intentionalism, for instance, which holds that perceivers perceive worldly objects, but that they do so by representing the world as being this or that way. Their experience is therefore representational, rather than directly relational to the objects perceived.
the heart of both the Reference Determination Question and, to give a title to the parallel question about perception, the Perceptual Determination Question.\textsuperscript{89}

The problem of perception also illuminates further motivation for the presupposition of the Reference Determination Question. One might wonder why it is so important to keep inside and outside separate with respect to linguistic reference; why it would be so problematic to view reference simply as a relation among speaker, name, and object. One motivation becomes clear in considering that parallel problems to hallucination and illusion are present in the case of linguistic reference using names.

The direct, perhaps “naïve,” view of referring experience is that it simply is a relation to the object referred to. My experience in referring is a kind of cognitive contact with the object to which I refer.\textsuperscript{90} But just as there are hallucinations, there are failures of reference. Many uses of the name “Pegasus,” for instance, are not instances of referring to anything. Nor is it clear that a speaker can always distinguish successful from failed reference. If I believe Pegasus was a real winged horse, my experience of referring to Pegasus may seem as much like contact with an object, Pegasus, as your referring to Aristotle seems to you. Given this, it is certainly possible to have two uses of a name be indistinguishable to the speaker and yet have one be a case of successful reference and the other not. My experience of referring using “Aristotle,” for instance, would be the same from the inside whether Aristotle really existed or whether my referring were merely a result of an elaborate millennia-old ruse.

Also, somewhat parallel to perceptual illusion, there is the possibility of referential illusion. Recall Donnellan’s martini case. The speaker refers to a particular man \textit{as drinking a martini}, and yet this man is not drinking a martini. Still, the speaker’s experience of referring to this man

\begin{enumerate}
\item Roughly, what determines that a perceptual experience is \textit{of} a particular thing?
\item The idea that reference, like perception, is a kind or way of experiencing the world, and that the naïve view of referring experience is as a kind of cognitive contact will be defended in Section 3.6 below. For now, I am simply assuming that linguistic referring is a way of experiencing things, insofar as it is a way in which we speakers bring particular objects into our own and others’ experience.
\end{enumerate}
as drinking a martini may seem as much like contact with an instantiation of the property of drinking a martini as would an experience of referring in this way to a man who in fact was drinking a martini. 91

Just as the possibilities of hallucination and illusion call into question the naïve view of perceptual experience, so the possibilities of reference failure and referential illusion call into question the naïve view of referential experience. How could my referring experience be a kind of contact with the object I refer to, if the experience could be just the same without my referring to anything? As in the case of perception, it seems that our experience must be one we could have whether we were referring to anything or not. And how could my referring experience be the presence of the things referred to and their instantiation of properties, if the experience could be just the same whether those properties were instantiated or not?

One alternative candidate for the experience, proposed by the Condition View, is that it is the experience of associating conditions with the name being used. Suppose that in using “Pegasus” to refer, I associate with “Pegasus” the condition of being the white winged horse that Perseus rode. As it happens, this condition singles nothing out, so there is no reference, but if it did single something out there would be a reference (according to the Condition View). Either way, the referring experience would be exactly the same for me, if it consists in the deployment of this single condition. The experiences of calling up a vocabulary item or a mental file are other candidates for the experience of referring, proposed by the Baptism View and the File View, respectively. One could have the same experience of calling up a certain vocabulary item whether that vocabulary item had its source in the baptism of a real thing or not, and one could have the same experience of calling up a certain mental file whether the information in that mental file had a dominant source in a real thing or not.

91 I have not yet made clear in what way referring to a man as drinking a martini is experiencing him, in a certain mode of experience, as having the property of drinking a martini. This will be discussed in Chapter 4.
So the presupposition of the Reference Determination Question is motivated by the same kinds of considerations that motivate alternatives to direct realism about perceptual experience. The Condition View is seen as having great advantages in accounting for reference failure and confusion, and alternative views are often criticized for being less explanatory on these fronts. But what is accepted all around is that in order to account for such phenomena, the referring experience must be set apart from the reference relation. Hence, the reference relation must be reduced to the referring experience plus some means of connecting it to the object referred to.

3.4 A stronger parallel between reference and perception

Having shown that parallel motivations underlie the Reference Determination Question and non-direct views of perceptual experience, I want to push the parallel further. For the argument of Chapter 2 suggests that reference is like perception in another important respect. What speakers refer to using proper names depends, to put it crudely, on what is there. This is in the same way that what people perceive using their visual system, for instance, depends on what is there: perceivers can only see what is positioned so as to reflect light into their eyes. As has often been noted, I do not see a particular thing—say, the Eiffel Tower—just by having a perfect hallucination of it, even one that is based on my memory of the Eiffel Tower, or by seeing some other building that looks exactly like it. Chapter 2 showed that something similar is true of reference using proper names. This is that reference is not saved across uses of a name, any more than sight of the Eiffel Tower is saved across uses of the visual system. Instead, what a name, as used on an occasion, refers to depends on what is there for it to refer to. It depends on what the speaker has in mind to refer to, much as what a person sees on an occasion depends on what she has in her visual field to see. I showed that the attempt to hive off semantic reference

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92 Questions that bedevil the Baptism and File Views are along the lines of: What is it for a vocabulary item or a mental file to have a source in no real thing, or the baptism of no real thing? If many vocabulary items or files have sources in no real thing, what makes them different from one another?
as a distinct phenomenon from that of having something in mind to refer to and referring to it using a proper name does not succeed.

So reference with proper names is like perception at least inasmuch as its objects are provided by the particular circumstances in which it takes place. I cannot refer to something with a proper name unless it is in my mind to refer to, just as I cannot see something unless it is in my visual field to see. My access to a name that happens to have been assigned a certain value (whether through my having baptized that thing with the name, having formed an intention to use the name as the person before me did, or having labeled with the name a file whose informational contents have their source in that thing) is neither necessary nor sufficient for me to refer using that name to a particular object. This is in the same way that Kripke showed that my access to a condition that happens to single out a particular object is neither necessary nor sufficient for me to refer using a name with which I associate that condition to that object. Reference does not depend on picking an object out with a condition or on accessing a previously assigned entity. Reference depends on what one has in mind to refer to with a given name.\footnote{Of course, more needs to be said about having a thing in mind to refer to using a given name. This will be a focus of discussion in Chapter 4.}

3.5 Defending the parallel between reference and perception

This analogy between reference and perception might hold for reference using proper names, while seeming to collapse for certain other types of linguistic reference. In particular, there are some linguistic expressions which, when used to refer, appear to refer, as used, to things determined by invariant features of those expressions, even though the speaker does not have the thing, which is intuitively referred to, in mind. This seems to be the case even if it is agreed that the expression is being used referentially, in Donnellan’s sense, and even if no distinction between semantic reference and speaker’s reference is posited. Certain uses of
definite descriptions and demonstratives provide good illustrations. I will focus on a case involving a use of a definite description. As will be evident, this case is based on a famous case of David Kaplan’s, which instead involved a use of a demonstrative.

Here is the case. David Kaplan is at work at his desk in his office. A student comes in for a conversation. In the course of the conversation, Kaplan, without turning and looking, says to the student, “The photo on the wall behind me is of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.” Unbeknownst to Kaplan, someone has come into his office during the night and swapped his photo of Carnap for one of Spiro Agnew. Kaplan did not notice the swap upon entering the office and remains unaware of it.

Now consider the description Kaplan uses to refer, “the photo on the wall behind me.” The description is here used referentially. Kaplan has a particular photo in mind, and is not simply trying to pick out whatever may happen to be both a photo and on the wall behind him. Further, suppose we accept that whatever the description refers to, as used referentially, is its referent, full stop, and we make no distinction between what the speaker refers to using it and what it, as used, refers to. We might even accept that Kaplan is referring, or that the description refers as used, to his missing photo of Carnap. Still, there seems to be a strong intuition that Kaplan at least also refers using this expression, or that it also refers, as used, to the photo of Agnew: the photo that is in fact behind him.

The case is rather like confusion cases on the idea of Kripke’s Smith-Jones case, in which the speaker seems to refer to two different individuals at once, without realizing that they are

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94 Kaplan 1968.

95 Similar remarks will apply, mutatis mutandis, to the same kind of objection based on the use of demonstratives.

96 See Kaplan 1978, Reimer 1991, Bach 1992, and Perry 2009 for expression of this intuition about the version of the case involving demonstratives. My sense is that the intuitions are the same if the definite description is used instead of “that” accompanied by a pointing demonstration. I have chosen to use a case involving the definite description because it makes for a useful comparison with other cases involving definite descriptions where intuitions go in a different direction. See below.
different or while intentionally conflating them. The difference is that in the Carnap-Agnew case, both photos are not had in mind by the speaker, in the way that both Smith and Jones are had in mind by the speaker in Kripke’s case. Kaplan does not have the photo of Agnew in mind; he only has the photo of Carnap in mind. He is not thinking of the photo of Agnew, and perhaps has never seen or heard of it.

If this is right, then there seems to be a disanalogy between reference and perception, even allowing for referential uses and not taking shelter in the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. (The correct diagnosis of the worry is not that Kaplan refers to the photo of Carnap while the expression he uses refers to the photo of Agnew. Rather, the concern is that intuitively both Kaplan and the expression he uses refer to the photo of Agnew, at least in addition to referring to the photo of Carnap, if not to the exclusion of the latter.)

Linguistic reference, it seems, is not limited for its objects to what is there in the speaker’s mind, in the way that perception is limited to what is there in the perceiver’s perceptible environment. Linguistic expressions, it seems, can force reference to things that the speaker does not have in mind.

I think it is tenuous simply to deny the intuitive pull toward the claim that in this case Kaplan, or his description as used referentially, refers to the photo of Agnew. But it should be noted that this intuitive pull does not cancel out another conflicting intuition. It is also intuitive that Kaplan, or his description as used referentially, does not refer to the photo of Agnew. One could reasonably describe the situation as one in which Kaplan was not referring to the photo of which the description he used is true. Apprised of the situation, Kaplan might say, “Oh, that’s

97 A similar case where there is intentional conflation would be the following. The speaker knows that the man she and her interlocutor are seeing is Smith. However, Smith has faked his own death precisely to avoid various difficulties that this interlocutor has imposed upon him. Not wanting to give up the secret, but nonetheless having a desire to discuss the activities of the people in the vicinity, the speaker asks “What is Jones doing?” In so doing, she refers both to Smith and Jones, and intentionally conflates them.
not the photo I was referring to—who put *that* there?" There is genuine tension here. It is not completely satisfactory either to say that in this case Kaplan, or the description as used referentially, refers to the photo of Carnap, nor to the photo of Agnew. Nor is it completely satisfactory to say that reference is to both, since the intuition is also present that the reference is *not* to the photo of Agnew.

To explain this tension, it helps to consider similar cases where intuitions are likely to tend in a different direction. The version of Donnellan’s martini case described in Chapter 2 is one that has a similar structure. The description used referentially by the speaker singles out a man in the kitchen whom she does not have in mind, just as the description used referentially by Kaplan singles out a photo of Agnew that he does not have in mind. Yet, in the martini case it is not intuitive that the speaker, or her description as used referentially, refers to the man in the kitchen. This intuition seems to hold up even if we move the martini-drinking man out of the kitchen and into full view of the speaker and her audience. Suppose the martini-drinker is not doing anything to draw attention to himself and is not displaying any emotion very prominently. On the other hand, the man drinking a clear liquid (which happens to be water) from a martini glass appears animated and joyful, lighting up the room. When the speaker says, “The man drinking a martini is happy,” it remains intuitive—at least it strikes me this way—that she, and her referentially used description, refers to the man who is drinking water.

How are these martini cases, where there is no, or at least only very weak, intuitive support for the claim that reference is to the true martini-drinker, different from the Carnap-Agnew case? A few possibilities come to mind. One is that a normal, reasonable audience who has been involved in the conversation would be able to tell that the speaker is referring to the water-

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98 Notice that it would be wrong for the speaker in Kripke’s Smith-Jones case, when apprised of her situation, to say either “Oh, Jones is not the one I was referring to,” or “Oh, Smith is not the one I was referring to.” She was referring to both Smith and Jones, without realizing she had confused them. By contrast, Kaplan, at least in one way, was not referring to the photo of Agnew. I believe the difference here is explained by the fact that in the Smith-Jones case the speaker has both Smith and Jones in mind, whereas in the Carnap-Agnew case, Kaplan does not have both photos in mind.

99 See previous footnote.
drinking man in the martini cases, whereas such an audience would not be able to tell that Kaplan is referring to the photo of Carnap.

But this cannot be the difference, because even if we set up the Carnap-Agnew case so that such an audience would be able to tell that Kaplan is referring to the photo of Carnap, the intuition still stands that Kaplan refers, using the description “the photo behind me,” to the photo of Agnew. For instance, suppose the whole conversation was about this great photo Kaplan has of Carnap. The student has been in the office before, and knows the photo well. In the conversation, Kaplan tells the student when the photo was taken, how long he has owned it, and so on. He then goes on to tell the student about all of Carnap’s accomplishments, and finally says, “So, you see, the photo on the wall behind me is of the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century.” Any normal, reasonable audience in this situation would get that Kaplan is referring to the photo of Carnap, and yet the intuition that reference is to the photo of Agnew remains.

A second possibility is that the difference lies in the fact that in the martini case, the man the speaker has in mind is perceptually available to both speaker and audience, whereas in the Carnap-Agnew case, the photo of Carnap is not perceptually available to either of them. Perhaps there is something special about the perceptual availability of objects had in mind to refer to that drives our intuition that they are, in fact, referred to. But this cannot be right, either, since the intuition about the Carnap-Agnew case holds even if we change the case so that the photo of Carnap is still in the room, but has been moved to a different location. Now the photo had in mind is perceptually available, and still the description, as used, seems to refer to the other photo, which fits it.

Instead of these options, the difference between the cases is best characterized as follows. In the Carnap-Agnew case, the photo of Agnew is, from the audience’s perspective, the only thing that is even a candidate for fitting the description. There is only one photo behind Kaplan: it is a
photo of Agnew. Even if, as in the modified case just discussed, the common ground of the conversation makes it very likely that the audience knows that this photo is not what Kaplan refers to, there is still the strong intuition that it is, because the description so clearly and unequivocally picks out this photo, and because the description so clearly and unequivocally does not pick out the photo of Carnap. By contrast, in the martini case, the common ground leaves the water-drinking man as a viable candidate for fitting the description used.\textsuperscript{101}

Of course, there will be cases that fit somewhere in between these cases, on the spectrum from the thing had in mind being clearly ruled out as fitting the description, to the thing had in mind being a completely viable candidate for fitting it. I predict that the strength of the intuition that a description, used referentially, refers to something not had in mind but fitting the description, will vary along this line. The more strongly a thing not had in mind seems to be the unopposed candidate, relative to the conversational common ground, for fitting the description used, the more strongly we are likely to feel that reference—referential reference—is to that thing, all the while feeling the conflicting intuition that reference precisely is not to that thing.

This arrangement of intuitions is explained by the fact that linguistic reference is not only a way for speakers to linguistically experience things they have in mind, but also a way for them to communicate what they have in mind to other language users. This is a way in which linguistic reference is clearly different from perception. Given that linguistic reference is communicational, the particular descriptions speakers use to refer to things they have in mind are important. They are important in that they are the linguistic items that an audience has to go on in focusing on what the speaker refers to. The audience may well have other information to go on, including background beliefs about the speaker, knowledge of conversational common ground, and knowledge of the world in general. But as far as the language itself is concerned, in the examples I have been discussing it is the descriptions that are being used to communicate

\textsuperscript{100} Roughly in the sense of Stalnaker 1970.

\textsuperscript{101} Assuming that the fact that the man is drinking water rather than martini has not been discussed.
the reference. Thus, even if the description used is a perfectly reasonable one given the speaker’s epistemic condition, as it is in the Carnap-Agnew case, and even if the audience has other ways of telling what the speaker has in mind, nevertheless if the linguistic item tasked with communicating reference uniquely and clearly picks out something other than what the speaker has in mind, it is difficult to shake the feeling that it refers, referentially, to that thing.

We can now illuminate the tension between the intuition that Kaplan in the Carnap-Agnew example refers to the photo of Agnew and the intuition that he does not refer to the photo of Agnew. It is a tension between the experiential aspect of linguistic reference and the communicative aspect. Experientially, Kaplan uses the description “the photo behind me” to referentially experience something he has in mind: the photo of Carnap. This grounds the intuition that Kaplan is referring to the photo of Carnap, and is absolutely not referring to the photo of Agnew. He is not in any way referentially experiencing the photo of Agnew. But communicatively, the linguistic device he uses to linguistically experience the photo of Carnap is one that is clearly and uniquely satisfied, and could be seen to be clearly and uniquely satisfied by any sighted interlocutor, by the photo of Agnew. From any interlocutor’s perspective, nothing suggests the photo of Carnap as a candidate for fitting the description. Because we consider linguistic reference as primarily communicative, this directing by the expression has a good deal of intuitive power. As a result, our intuitions about reference are in conflict. How should the conflict be resolved?

One might be inclined to let the communicative aspect of linguistic reference carry the day. It is true that the degree to which linguistic reference is communicative sets it apart from sensory experience. However, it should be noted that linguistic reference is not unique among forms of experience in having a communicative aspect. At least some forms of sensory experience are also communicative to some degree. Vision is an example. Humans have the ability to follow the gazes of others. When we see someone looking at a certain location, our eyes are drawn there as well. In this way, visual experience is also communicational to some degree.
By looking at—fixating my eyes upon—a particular object, I can communicate (intentionally or not) that thing to someone else who sees me looking. Looking is the outwardly accessible aspect of seeing, just as the utterance of a linguistic expression is the outwardly accessible aspect of linguistic referring.

Looking and seeing can come apart. One may visually fixate a particular location, and yet fail to see what is happening at that location. Instead, one may see other objects or goings-on at a nearby, also visible location. This could lead to miscommunication. If Noreen appears to be looking at a spider on the table, Jeannette may look at it too and come to think Noreen is curious about the spider, or frightened of it, when in fact Noreen’s eyesight is not good enough for her to make out the spider, and she is only staring at a nearby book on the table, perhaps trying to bring the lettering on its cover into focus by shifting her gaze slightly to the side of it. This leads to her gaze settling on the spider, without her seeing it. In this case, Noreen sees the book, not the spider, and we are not tempted to say that she does see the spider just on the grounds that Jeannette, the observer, has her eyes drawn to, and sees, the spider as a result of the outwardly accessible aspect of Noreen’s seeing.

This case, in the realm of visual experience, is similar to those in the realm of linguistic reference that I have been discussing. Like in the Carnap-Agnew case, there is in this case tension between the experiential and communicative aspects of visual experience. But here, we are able to keep these aspects separate. Noreen experiences the book, not the spider, although she looks at the spider, not the book. Of course, it is through looking at the spider that Noreen sees the book off to the side, just as it is through using the description “the photo behind me” that Kaplan referentially experiences the photo of Carnap. In the visual case we are able to keep the two aspects separate because vision is taken to be primarily, overwhelmingly, an experiential faculty. Vision is centrally a way of experiencing things, and its limited communicative function

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102 See O’Regan et al. 2000 for a relevant study, as well as the literature on inattentional blindness, for an overview of which see Rensink 2008.
does not reverberate back upon our intuitions about what people see in various circumstances.
By contrast, in the case of linguistic reference, the communicative aspect is far more central. It is
this centrality that explains the intuitive plausibility of the claim that objects, if they clearly and
without competition meet the description used, are referred to (not merely denoted) by the
speaker, using the description.

But whether experience or communication is primary for a given kind of experience, the two
are separable. Cases like the Carnap-Agnew case are like perceptual cases where a perceiver is
staring directly and unequivocally at one thing, though she is seeing another. In the case of
vision, we do not say that the perceiver sees what she looks at. Similarly, in the case of linguistic
reference using a definite description, we should not say that the speaker, or even that the
description, refers to the obvious and only candidate for fitting the description. We can
acknowledge that from a communicational perspective, her linguistic reference is likely to cause
her audience to focus, at least initially, on something she does not have in mind to refer to. This
explains the tension we feel with the intuition that she is not referring to that thing.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that this thing is not the object of her linguistic referring
experience.

In sum, then, I do not think that cases like the Carnap-Agnew case support a disanalogy
between linguistic reference and perception. Instead, they point out that both reference and
some forms of perception have a communicative as well as an experiential aspect. This duality of
aspect can create tensions in our intuitions about the objects of these faculties, leading us to feel
about some cases that a speaker, using an expression, both refers and does not refer to a
particular object, or that a perceiver both sees (because she looks at) and does not see (because
she does not become aware of) a particular object. This suggests that just as we are able to
separate seeing from looking at in visual experience, we should be able to separate referring
from obvious and unequivocal singling out. Usually, seeing and looking go together, as do
referring and obvious singling out. But when they do not, it is important to keep in mind that
they are different. Looking does not determine seeing, and singling out does not determine reference.

### 3.6 Referring is experiencing

The preceding discussion may seem to commit a category error in treating reference as a kind of experience. Whereas perception is quite naturally seen as a variety of experience—to perceive is clearly one way to have experience—linguistic reference is perhaps more easily seen as a phenomenon that can be experienced but is not itself a kind of experience. My experience of referring to a particular person using the name “John” might consist of some awareness of my own thoughts about that person, the feeling of the word “John” on my tongue, the picturing of its written form as I say it, or the like. Any deeper understanding of this kind of experience (“cognitive phenomenology,” it might be called\(^{103}\)) would be separate from a theory of reference itself, in a way that a deeper understanding of perceptual experience is not separate from a theory of perception itself.

While there may be some intuitive pull to this distinction between perceiving and referring, it is somewhat difficult to pin down precisely. Furthermore, it is plausible that referring is as much a way of experiencing as perceiving. As I speak, my referring directs me to one thing and then the next. The way I experience these things is not perceptual in the narrow sense,\(^{104}\) but this does not mean I do not experience them through referring. One might think that experiencing things is passive, while referring to them is active; thus referring cannot be a way of experiencing. But this paints referring as much more deliberate than it typically is. In cases where we think deliberately about whether and how to refer to something, we typically have already linguistically referred to it in our thinking, and we are considering whether to do so out loud or not. Initial linguistic reference to something, whether in linguistic thinking or in out-

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\(^{103}\) See Bayne and Montague 2011 for recent work on cognitive phenomenology.

\(^{104}\) Of course, I may also be perceiving the things I refer to.
loud use of language, is typically just a voicing (out loud or in our heads) of our thoughts.\footnote{I owe the notion of simply “voicing our thoughts” to Hornsby 2005.} It is often revelatory to us of what we are thinking of, in a different but equally important way to how it can be revelatory to an audience.

Indeed, a naïve view of referring experience, parallel to the naïve view of perceptual experience, is revealed in the common philosophical idiom that describes reference as “hooking onto” or “attaching to” or “contact with” things in the world.\footnote{See note 1 in the Introduction.} When I use the name “Aristotle” to refer to Aristotle, I seem to achieve some kind of connection to or contact with Aristotle. He becomes, in some way, present in the conversation I am having. He becomes a topic of discussion. This is rather amazing, given that he died more than two thousand years ago. It seems likely that this felt connection with things referred to motivates much philosophical fascination with proper names, especially. We feel a connection with things to which we refer because we do understand linguistic reference as a kind of experience. In particular, we naïvely picture referring as a kind of contact with, or manifestation of, objects.

Clearly, we do not picture referring as involving the same kind of contact as perceiving. In fact, the kind of contact involved in perceiving is often characterized by contrasting it with the kinds of connections we have to objects we merely think or talk about. It may be allowed that referring in language is a way of, or part of a general linguistic way of, experiencing one’s own thinking. It is intuitive that in using language we get a better or at least different view of our mental activity than we would otherwise have. In particular, by putting names to the subjects of the thinking that is going on, we may track, organize, and better understand our own thinking. Presumably, this is why talking through a problem aloud, writing in a journal, or conversing with other people can be helpful in solving a problem or understanding ourselves and others. But experiencing one’s own thinking is different from experiencing the things about which one
thinks. If “mere thinking” is cut off from these worldly things, then linguistic referring might seem to be all the more cut off.

I will offer two responses to this objection. The first is that the Reference Determination Question presupposes that linguistic reference is a variety of experience. So if linguistic reference is not a variety of experience, then the claim that the Reference Determination Question is not a legitimate question will be immediately established. The way in which the Determination Question presupposes that reference is a variety of experience has already been elucidated. Since the Condition View is held up as the clearest answer in the running for the Determination Question, it is evident that what the question is really after is what the Condition View provides. And what the Condition View provides is an account of the relation between the speaker’s inside perspective and the outside object to which she refers. The focus on this inside perspective is tantamount to treating reference to an object as an experience of the object.107

Before moving on to the second response, I would like to clarify that in claiming that, intuitively, linguistic reference is a way of experiencing the things to which we refer, I am not already committing myself to a theoretical position about the nature of that experience. This is in the same way that I could claim that perception is intuitively a way of experiencing the objects one perceives, without committing myself to a naïve realist view of perceptual experience. Sense datum theorists, adverbialists, and intentionalists about perceptual experience can all agree that perception intuitively seems to be a way of experiencing worldly objects. So at this point I only want to defend the claim that linguistic reference, too, intuitively seems to be a way of experiencing worldly objects, not that this is the basis for the correct theory of linguistic referring experience.

107 It may seem sacrilegious to associate the Condition View with a conception of reference as a kind of experience, given that the father of the Condition View, Frege, was so insistent that the senses which determine reference are not subjective entities that are part of the speaker’s experience, but objective, timeless entities that speakers in some way grasp, each of which many different speakers may associate with names in order to make those names refer. It is true that on Frege’s view the determining conditions are part of an objective realm, but it is a realm accessible only from the inside, through a speaker’s “grasp” of sinne. This leaves Frege with the vexing question of what “grasp” is, if the Reference Determination Question is to be fully answered.
I now turn to the idea that linguistic reference is somehow cut off from the objects that are referred to. Another way of putting this is that, unlike the way we think of perception, we do not think of linguistic reference as the presence for us of worldly objects. While we may have the intuition that in linguistically referring our thinking is present, or given, to us, we do not have this intuition of presence or givenness about the things to which we refer. When we perceive, the things we perceive seem to us to be present, there, given, in a way that the things to which we refer do not seem to be when we are referring linguistically.

Underlying this difference in presence might be a difference in the sensitivity of the experience to the way the thing purportedly experienced is at the time of experience. As Tim Crane proposes, it might be that perception intuitively involves the presence of the things perceived, because the way the experience is seems to depend upon the way the things perceived are at the time of experience.108

Linguistic reference might be thought to lack this apparent dependence for a few different reasons. First, it might be thought that linguistic reference cannot be an experience dependent on how the things perceived are, because it does not involve experiencing things as being one way or another. Experiencing a thing as being some way or other might seem to go beyond referring, which is (at best) a brute experiencing of a thing. Such experience might not even be a coherent notion, if one holds the generally accepted view that nothing can be experienced “neat,” but only as being some way or other. On this view, reference is only a component of our broader linguistic experience of our thinking, which is complemented by our ability to attribute features to the things we refer to in language.

However, linguistic reference does involve experiencing things as being one way or another. I might refer to Aristotle as “Aristotle,” or to a particular man as “the man drinking a martini,”

108 Continue to keep in mind that this is a claim about how perception strikes us intuitively and pre-theoretically. That the character of our perceptual experience strikes us as dependent on how the things we experience are at the time we are experiencing them does not imply that the character of our perceptual experience is in fact dependent on how the things perceived are. As hallucinations and illusions illustrate, this may not be the case.
and also, perhaps, as drinking a martini. I will have more to say in Chapter 4 about what features we experience things as having when we experience them, for instance, as “Aristotle.”

For now, let me just say that referring to things does involve experiencing them as having certain features, at least the feature of calling up a certain phonetic or orthographic sign in one’s thinking or speech. Our experiencing things we refer to as being these ways does not imply that they are these ways: I can refer to a man as drinking a martini even though he is drinking water, for instance. Further, our referentially experiencing particular things as being certain ways does not amount to predicating these features of them in language. I can refer to a man as drinking a martini without asserting (asking, demanding) that he is drinking a martini. This is parallel to the way that our experiencing things we perceive as being certain ways does not imply that they are, or ever were, those ways. If they are not and were not, we nonetheless perceive them as being those ways.

A second reason why linguistic reference might seem intuitively to lack the needed sensitivity to its objects is that the experience of referring does not seem to be sensitive to how the things referred to are at the time of referring. This is clearly illustrated by my ability to refer to Aristotle, who no longer exists at the time of referring. But even for things that do exist at the time I refer to them, how I experience them in referring does not seem to depend on how they are at that time, unless I happen also to be perceiving them while speaking.

A critical point about this is that even our intuition of presence in perceptual experience will not pass this test. For a clear example, take our visual perception of stars in the night sky. It is intuitive that when I look up in the night sky, I can see stars. But some of these stars were far enough away from me that by the time light from them reaches my eyes they no longer exist. Thus, how I perceive them to be (for instance, as bright points of light, having certain locations in the night sky, etc.) does not depend on how they are at the time I am perceiving them. For they do not exist at that time. Yet, it seems to me that the intuition of presence that underlies my

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See 4.4.3.
claim that I am experiencing those stars perceptually remains. So the intuition cannot rely on
the sensitivity of how I experience them to how they are at the time of experience. Instead, it
seems to rely on the intuitive sensitivity of my experience to how they were at some earlier time:
the time when they emitted the light now reaching my eyes.

Something similar can be said about referring experience. We do have an intuition of
presence in referring experience. Our referring experience seems to be sensitive to how the thing
to which we refer was at some earlier time, a time at which it set in motion a chain of events
leading up to the referring. This time could be much much earlier than the time of referring, as
in the case of referring to Aristotle, or only slightly earlier, as in a case of meeting someone and
then referring to her in conversation minutes later.

It is one thing to explain, broadly, how light from a distant star can reach my eye and allow
me to see the star. The explanation of this is in itself quite complex. Even more complex would
be the explanation of how energy from Aristotle can reach me through the thinking, speaking,
and writing of others and allow me to refer to Aristotle. But neither of these complex stories is
part of the intuition of presence that we have concerning our experiences of perceiving a star or
referring to Aristotle. In both cases, the experiencer has the sense that how the thing was at the
time to which her experience “reaches back”110 is what has made her experience the thing as she
does. If in referring to Aristotle I experience him as calling up the name “Aristotle” in my
thinking or speech, it seems to me that my experiencing him as having this effect is dependent
upon his having been such as ultimately to produce this effect at the time when the chain of
events leading up to my referring got started. If in referring to a particular man I experience him
as drinking a martini, it seems to me that my experiencing him as drinking a martini is
dependent upon his having been drinking a martini at the time (perhaps only a split second
earlier) when the chain of events leading to my referring got started. Again, this is not to say that
my experiencing him as being that way implies that he in fact was that way. I could, of course, be

110 This turn of phrase is due to Joseph Almog.
wrong. But my experience presents him as having been that way, and seems to present him as he was at the time that is relevant to my experiencing him in this referential way.

A third reason why linguistic reference might seem not to be presence in the way that perception is presence is that in referring I am able to imagine or consider the thing to which I refer being any way I like. Perception, by contrast, does not seem open to such imagining. Perceptual experience strikes us as confined to reflecting the way the things perceived are at the time we perceive them. Or, if we make the amendment I suggested in the previous paragraph, it strikes us as confined to reflecting the way the things perceived were at the time when they emitted the energy that produces the perception. This again suggests that reference is not constrained by the objects referred to in the way it would need to be to count as an experience of those objects.

It is certainly true that I can imagine or consider things I refer to being all manner of ways. I can claim, or suppose, or wish, that they are these ways. I can also do that with things I perceive. I can look at the robin outside my window and imagine him wearing a top hat (which he is not), wonder if he has a hurt wing (which he may or may not), and so on. These are all further things I do, over and above perceiving, and over and above referring. That I can imagine the robin being various ways does not imply that how I perceive him as being does not seem to be dependent entirely on how he in fact is. Similarly, that I can imagine Aristotle wrestling with a dog and wonder aloud whether he might have engaged in such sport does not imply that my experience, in doing so, of referring to Aristotle does not seem to be dependent on how Aristotle in fact was at the relevant time.

In sum, there are strong grounds for allowing that intuitively, linguistically referring to something is a way of experiencing it, not merely a way of experiencing one’s thinking. To be sure, one experiences the thing through one’s thinking (and often also through the thinking, speaking, and writing of many others). Similarly, one perceptually experiences a star through
the passage of light across space and into the earth’s atmosphere. Nonetheless, one sees—perceptually experiences—the star. Likewise, one refers to—referentially experiences—Aristotle.

**Conclusion**

If linguistic reference and perception are similar in the ways I have argued that they are, two upshots bear notice. The first is that in the case of perception, a Determination Question arises only if the naïve or direct view of perceptual experience is abandoned. If the direct view is upheld, then it is accepted that perceptual experience is direct contact with objects perceived, and that the relation between perceivers and objects perceived need not be reduced to an inside state combined with an outside one. In other words, if direct realism is true, then there is no Perceptual Determination Question. Direct realism is at least a defensible view about perceptual experience: a large body of philosophical literature defends it in a debate that is not considered settled. It is also, at least arguably, the naïve view of perceptual experience—the starting point for inquiry into the nature of such experience.

Given the parallel between perception and linguistic reference, we likewise have available a direct realist position about linguistic referring experience, which puts the Reference Determination Question out of bounds. In Chapter 4, I will be developing such a position, and explaining the ways in which it guides the investigation of linguistic reference.

Second, even if direct realism is the wrong view about perceptual experience, it is not clear what a determination question about perception would amount to. For perception, nothing like the Condition View provides an easy answer for which other, more nuanced answers might try to substitute. This is for a few reasons. First, in perception there is no easily isolated entity like a name, or other linguistic expression, that can be targeted as the inside entity whose connection to an outside object must be understood. Second, for familiar reasons it is not plausible that any sort of qualitative matching between our inside perspective and the outside world makes for
perception. Thus, any story about the inside-outside connection cannot stop at describing how it is from the inside and adding the coda that whatever outside things match up will be perceived. Any such story must explicate the difference between inside and outside, and set ground rules for what will be required of an attempt to show their interaction. In effect, a determination question about perception will not be answerable until it is explicated and motivated, which is a thorny task.

I propose that the situation is not different for linguistic reference. Linguistic referring experience is, I have argued, quite comparable to perceptual experience. We do not linguistically refer by calling up a cluster of inside entities—words, descriptions, files, or the like—which induce connections between us and particular objects. Rather, we linguistically refer to things that we have in our minds to refer to, just as we see things that we have in our visual field to see. This phenomenon cannot be boiled down to a connection between a name, or other expression, and an object. Referring in language is a way of experiencing things. It is a way of experiencing things that has a strong communicative element (stronger, for instance, than the communicative element of visual experience). Furthermore, referring in language is a distinctive way of experiencing things, which is different from, though closely connected to, thinking of things non-linguistically. This close connection is similar to that between perceiving things and thinking of them: experiencing things perceptually can lead to experiencing them through thinking. Similarly, experiencing things through thinking can lead to experiencing them linguistically.

Just as a simplistic determination question is out of place in discussions of perception, so it may be out of place in discussions of reference. Even if direct realism about referring experience is rejected, the centrality of the Reference Determination Question to investigations of linguistic reference is questionable. And if direct realism is viable, the aim of understanding what determines reference might be abandoned altogether, opening the way for a new line of exploration of linguistic reference. This is what I will pursue in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR: REFERENTIAL DIRECT REALISM AND THE FOCUS PICTURE OF LINGUISTIC REFERENCE

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and develops a picture of linguistic reference, which I call the “Focus Picture,” that fits within a direct realist view of referring experience, or what I call “Referential Direct Realism.” I emphasize that the Focus Picture is a picture, rather than a theory, of linguistic reference, in terms of the distinction introduced in Chapter 1. Since Referential Direct Realism rejects the Reference Determination Question, the Focus Picture is not an answer to that question. Rather, it is a way of thinking about, or envisioning, linguistic referring, by analogy with sensory perception.

The chapter has four sections in addition to this introduction. Section 4.2 motivates Referential Direct Realism over its likely alternative, once it is accepted that linguistic referring is a form of experience of particular things. I call the likely alternative “Referential Representationalism,” in parallel with perceptual representationalism, and argue that it is not well suited to account for linguistic referring experience. Section 4.3 revisits the distinction between picture and theory (in 4.3.1) and argues (in 4.3.2) that the classical alternatives to the Condition View that have been discussed, the Baptism View and the File View, are not theories but pictures, grounded in analogy. In 4.4, my own alternative picture, the Focus Picture, is introduced. Section 4.4 walks through three levels of the analogy between linguistic reference and perception on which the Focus Picture is based. The outermost level (4.4.1) is an analogy between sensory perception and having a thing in mind. The middle level (4.4.2) is an analogy between a particular sensory modality (vision is taken as an example for concreteness) and language. The inner level (4.4.3) is an analogy between particular referring expressions and particular tools for enhancing the visual modality, such as artificial lenses and other tools.
Section 4.5 addresses what might seem to be a strong disanalogy between sensory perception and linguistic reference: the communicative nature of linguistic reference. I argue that the notion of communicative experience, perhaps even within sensory experience, is not incoherent (4.5.1) and that names play a crucial role in enabling one of the things that seems most amazing about linguistic reference, our ability to transmit reference over great distances in space and time (4.5.2).

4.2 Motivating Referential Direct Realism

Chapters 2 and 3 made the case that linguistic reference is like perception in being a way of experiencing things that are there for one to experience. This implied that just as a direct or “naïve” view of perceptual experience is available, so a direct view of referring experience is available. If such a view is correct, the Reference Determination Question, which has been at the heart of much philosophical investigation into language, is not a valid question. Research on linguistic reference would have to go in a rather different direction from its historical course.

So far, all I have said in favor of what I will call, from here on, Referential Direct Realism is that it is an available position. I have also explained that it is immediately challenged by the phenomena of reference failure and referential “illusion,” 111 in much the same way as direct realism about perceptual experience is challenged by the phenomena of hallucination and illusion. Taken together, this makes a rather weak prima facie case for Referential Direct Realism. In this section, I will offer support for the view by comparing it with its likely alternative, if it is accepted that linguistic reference is, as I have suggested, a way of experiencing things. This likely alternative might be called “Referential Representationalism.” Referential Representationalism, in parallel with perceptual representationalism (or perceptual intentionalism), would hold that referring experience is representational: experiencing

111 Referential “illusion” will be discussed in Section 4.4.3.
something by referring to it is being in a kind of representational state, which one could also be
in if one were not in fact referring to anything—if one’s reference failed. On Referential
Representationalism, a speaker’s, or a word’s (as used), reference to an object o could be
reduced to some representational state of the speaker combined with an appropriate connection
between that state and o.

If particular things are to be experienced, whether perceptually, linguistically, or in some
other way, they must be experienced as being some way or other. This seems to be a basic fact
about the structure of experience. One may experience a thing as being some way it is not, and
yet still experience it, but it is not clear how one could experience a thing not as being any way.
In stating this requirement, I mean for it to be intuitive and not to make metaphysical
commitments about what it is for a thing to be a certain way, or to have or be experienced as
having properties, features, or attributes. I will leave my talk of particular things and their
properties, features, or attributes at the level of ordinary discourse.

This suggests two ways of looking at referential experience. The first is to view it as not
properly a way of experiencing things, but a component of a broader linguistic way of
experiencing things. On this approach, the kind of experience in the vicinity of what I have
called referential experience is experiencing things as being ways that you say they are, or ways
that you ask whether they are, or ways that you demand that they be. So, in saying, “Aristotle
had a beard,” I would experience Aristotle as having a beard. (Not, of course, in the way that I
would by seeing him. But my utterance might bring to awareness this way that Aristotle was that
has been recorded and passed down so as to reach me.)112 There would not be independent
experience of Aristotle through saying “Aristotle,” but only experience of him as part of a full
linguistic experience of him being a certain way.

112 There is much more to say about how this option might be developed. Since I am going to reject it for other
reasons, I do not pursue it here.
It seems to me implausible to deny the independence of referential experience. One can refer to a thing–referentially experience it–without having any broader linguistic experience. This is not only in cases where, arguably, some broader linguistic experience would be supplied by the rest of the conversation, as when one simply says, “Aristotle,” in response to the question, “Who taught Alexander the Great?” For instance, one may be musing on some matter, letting one’s mind wander, and say aloud, “Aristotle...” because Aristotle has come to mind and one focuses on him, perhaps inclined to think more about him. In saying, “Aristotle,” one refers to Aristotle, without saying, asking, or demanding anything. One referentially experiences Aristotle.

In addition, one can refer to something as being some way that one does not say the thing is, ask whether it is, or demand that it be, even if one’s referring is part of making some broader speech act. The speaker in Donnellan’s martini case refers to a particular thing as a man drinking a martini, but does not, more broadly, say that he is drinking a martini or ask whether he is. In saying, “Aristotle had a beard,” I refer to Aristotle as “Aristotle,” but I do not say, ask, or demand that/whether he is “Aristotle.”

This way of making the point that referential experience is independent embraces a view of how things are experienced as being in referential experience. In using “Aristotle” to refer to Aristotle, one referentially experiences the particular man, Aristotle, as “Aristotle.” In using “the man drinking a martini” to refer to a particular man, the partygoer experiences that man, as “the man drinking a martini,” and also as a man drinking a martini. I will say more below about the nature of these attributes, these ways of experiencing things referred to. For now, I will simply claim that if referring experience is independent of other linguistic experience, which I have suggested it is, then the linguistic expressions used to refer must figure attributively in the experience—they must figure in the way the particular is experienced as being. If they did not, and merely provided some sort of link to the particular thing, then a broader linguistic

\[113\] See Section 4.4.3.
experience would be needed to supply the way that the particular is linguistically experienced as being.

Referential Direct Realism can understand this role for linguistic expressions in the way the particular is experienced as being by claiming that a successful referring experience is, from the inside, direct contact with a particular thing instantiating the property of, for instance, being “Aristotle.” Referential Representationalism must say something different. For this view cannot hold that the experiencer has direct contact with Aristotle being “Aristotle.” Rather, the experiencer must represent Aristotle being “Aristotle.” Representing Aristotle cannot be a matter of his being present through her mind, as on Referential Direct Realism. To represent him, the experiencer must represent him by some means that she might also use in a case of hallucination (say, if the whole Aristotle tradition had been an elaborate ruse). This way of representing him in the first place cannot be by the name “Aristotle,” or as “Aristotle,” since this is how she is supposed to be representing him as being. She needs some other way of representing the thing which she represents as “Aristotle.”

In the case of perceptual experience, such ways of representing, or modes of presentation, of things that are also represented as being certain ways are likely to be available. In visual experience, for instance, one sees what one sees as being many different ways, so one can visually represent that sphere as blue, or that thing in the corner of my visual field as spherical. But referring experience is not always like this. In linguistic referring experience I may experience a thing, for instance, as “Aristotle,” and in no other linguistic referring way. I may experience him in other ways that are not linguistic referring ways, for instance I may think of him as Alexander’s teacher, or as wearing a toga. This is analogous to the way I may experience the blue ball as smelling like lavender or giving off a piercing sound. But I cannot visually represent that thing as lavender-smelling, and so I cannot use that mode of presentation to pick out what I additionally visually represent as blue, in order to visually represent that lavender-

114 Remember that I have not yet said what this amounts to. See Section 4.4.3.
smelling thing as blue. Likewise, I cannot represent in a linguistic referring way Aristotle as having features that are not presented via my linguistic referring. This is one upshot of the conclusion that names like “Aristotle” are not abbreviations of descriptions: they do not bring into linguistic referring experience other linguistic expressions of various properties.

A case where this point can be seen to some effect might be the musing case mentioned above. It is imaginable that in referring to Aristotle, all I experience is the sound and feel of the name, and the presence in mind of Aristotle. We can even strip away experiences in other modalities, to see the case most clearly. Nothing at all about Aristotle may come to mind. It is just that Aristotle, as “Aristotle,” is present to mind.

It may be suggested that in such a case I engage a demonstrative mode of presentation to represent Aristotle. But in the case of linguistic reference, this demonstrative representation cannot be supplemented by any locational indication or mental pointing as it might be in perception. Aristotle is not represented as “that thing over there” in my mind or “that thing just in front of the rectangular surface.” He is simply there, simply present. The only way he is indicated or presented is as “Aristotle.”

Referential Direct Realism has a way of describing this situation. My referring experience is simply contact with, a relation to, Aristotle. I am directly presented with Aristotle being “Aristotle.” Still, Referential Representationalism has a way to make this bare presence into a representational element. It can claim that Aristotle is represented in a primitive demonstrative way, simply as present. Such a representation could be employed even if nothing were present, allowing for the analog of hallucination, reference failure. But what sort of a representation would this be? Presumably, it is a representation capturing what it is like, from the inside, to have a thing presented to you, having stripped away any of the ways it might be presented to you. But such a stripping away is incoherent on the representational approach. Thus, it would be ad hoc and problematic for Referential Representationalism to posit a primitive bare presentation.

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115 Perhaps along the lines of the proposal about perceptual experience in Burge 1991.
demonstrative mode of representing particular things referred to. Referential Direct Realism, by contrast, accommodates experience of particulars without the need for modes of presentation. This makes it better suited to provide a picture of linguistic referring experience.

Having offered this motivation for Referential Direct Realism, I will now provide a brief positive sketch of a Referential Direct Realist picture of linguistic reference. This sketch will be developed in the remainder of the chapter. Of particular interest is the role that names and other referring expressions play in linguistic reference on this approach. For it can seem that if such expressions do not play the role of representations, then what role they do play is rather unclear.

To begin to sketch the picture, I want to introduce two ideas. One concerns the nature of names, or referring expressions. As recent literature has brought to light, it is not at all clear what words (including names) or, consequently, strings or combinations of words, really are. One thing that is clear enough is that they are not acoustic or geometric types, since the sound of spoken and shape of written words and phrases can vary immensely across the same word. On one conception, a word might be a phonetic or orthographic type. In this sense, the phonetic string ˈærəstətəl or the orthographic string A-r-i-s-t-o-t-l-e might be counted as words. Joseph Almog calls these “surface names” or “Google names.” Clearly, the same surface name can be involved in referring to different things. How and whether an intuitive notion of a name or a word and the individuations of words, which goes beyond surface names or words, can be made out is something I will not take up here.

Instead, I want to make two points. First, the desire that an account of linguistic reference have names and referring expressions playing an important role is not merely the desire that the account have surface names and expressions playing an important role. This is why the accounts we have looked at have treated names as more than just these surface strings: names have been packagers of conditions, trackers of chains of communication, and labelers of files. (Of course,


117 Almog, p.c.
these ways of defining more-than-just-surface names are purpose-built to suit the accounts of reference being given.

Second, surface names *are* involved in referring experience. Sometimes, as noted above, they provide the only way that we referentially experience a particular thing as being. Taken together, these two points suggest that in looking for a role for linguistic expressions in referring experience, we should look both at and below the surface of these expressions.

The second idea that I will introduce is that Referential Direct Realism can allow for the involvement in referential experience of a referential apparatus, just as naïve realism about perceptual experience can allow for the involvement in perceptual experience of a perceptual apparatus. Naïve realism about perceptual experience does not claim that referring experiences simply *are* their objects, or are entirely constituted by their objects. It claims that they are *relations* between perceivers and objects. These relations can be of various kinds: they can be visual, auditory, tactile, or olfactory. They can be of even more specific kinds. Take visual relations. These relations can involve different kinds of visual systems. They can involve more and less well functioning visual systems. They can involve visual systems aided by apparatus, such as eyeglasses, magnifiers, telescopes, mirrors, and so on.\(^{118}\)

The same holds for Referential Direct Realism. Referential Direct Realism does not claim that a referring experience simply is the referent, or is wholly constituted by the referent. It claims that a referring experience is a relation between speaker and referent: a relation that, like a perceptual relation, can involve various specific systems or apparatus. A broad apparatus that is involved, in the case of human beings referring in spoken language, is our linguistic capacity, including our capacity for speech production and perception. If there are non-human languages, referring in them may involve an altogether different apparatus. Beyond our innate language capacity, humans have created many different particular languages. Languages are more specific apparatuses involved in the relation of linguistic referring. And particular words and referring

\(^{118}\) This point is made by Logue 2012.
expressions are even more specific. They are tools, like eyeglasses or telescopes, which may be possessed by some speakers and not others.\footnote{I believe that the idea of words as lenses was initially sparked for me by some comments of Joseph Almog.}

In this way of thinking about referring expressions, they can be intricate devices, constructed and operating in ways that the user does not have any awareness of. They might involve complex webs of associative thinking and memory, which allow us to experience, through our minds, things we might not otherwise be able to experience, in an analogous way to how glasses with particular magnifications or scopes of various kinds may allow us to see things we might not otherwise be able to see. In using these visual tools, we do not see all of their workings; we are not conscious of the ways in which they let us see what they let us see. Nor do we see particular things in using them because they have preloaded images glued to them, so that whenever they are used the same thing is seen. These tools do not carry the things to be seen around with them, but change the range of things that are visible to the perceiver. What she sees on any given occasion is still going to depend on what is “there” for her to see. But the apparatus she uses has an influence on what is “there.”

In the webs of associative thinking and memory that enable us to referentially experience things, we can think of surface expressions as nodes that we often do become aware of. They are like alarms woven into these webs. When Aristotle comes to mind in my musings and I say, “Aristotle...”, many connections, of which I am not aware, have been made in order to activate this surface expression. I am aware of the activation of the surface expression, and it gives me a way of experiencing Aristotle, whose effects have been happening in my mind already. I have said that I experience him “as ‘Aristotle.’” The way to understand this might be that I experience him as setting off a certain alarm: the one with the phonetic profile \(ˈærəstətəl\). This alarm is a bit like the photoreceptors in the eye: when it is activated, you experience a particular thing as activating it—as producing this phonetic string \(ˈærəstətəl\) in your speech or your thinking.
Suppose you view a single star through a telescope, activating just one photoreceptor. You experience the star as activating that receptor—as being a single point of light.

In the next section, I will develop this analogy with perceptual apparatus, in setting out a framework for a Referential Direct Realist picture of referring experience.

4.3 The Picture

4.3.1 Picture vs. theory, again

Recall from Chapter One the difference between a theory and a picture. A philosophical theory of a phenomenon, I suggested, might be a provision of necessary and sufficient conditions for that phenomenon to obtain, or it might be an account of the essence, or what is constitutive of, or what it is to be an instance of that phenomenon. It can be difficult to say just what a philosophical theory is after. A theory can be distinguished, however, from an analogy or simile. Molecules of gas in a container may be similar or analogous to billiard balls in a box, and this may help one to explain and understand the kinetic theory of gases. However, it is not part of the kinetic theory that gas molecules are billiard balls. The helpful analogy is not the theory, nor even part of the theory. The picture of billiard balls in a box is a useful way of thinking about, or envisioning, the behavior of gases.

What I am going to develop in the remainder of the chapter is not a theory of linguistic reference, but a picture of linguistic reference. It is a way of thinking of or envisioning linguistic reference by analogy with other phenomena. It is an alternative to the Capture Picture. Instead of picturing reference as some sort of connection or correlation between “inside” and “outside,” this picture draws no line between inside and outside. The picture I will develop is not, however, an alternative to the views I have canvassed—the Condition View, the Baptism View, the File
View—because these are all ways of answering the Reference Determination Question, and on my direct realist picture, there is no Reference Determination Question to answer.

Nonetheless, I anticipate the following kind of dismissal of what I am going to say: This picture you are laying out is just a picture; just an analogy. It does not give us a theory of linguistic reference, or even the beginnings of one. At least the Condition View and, more importantly, its alternatives, were theories, or rough theories that might eventually be developed into fuller theories.

So I want to begin by questioning the premise that these alternative views, at least, are theories, rough or otherwise. I will question this premise based on the distinction between theory and analogy, and the assumption that a (mere) analogy is not a theory.

**4.3.2 Review of views**

I will begin by allowing that the Condition View itself may be a rough theory rather than an analogy. It reduces a name’s property of referring, as used, to an object \( o \), to the name’s being associated with a condition that singles out \( o \). The Condition View does not give a further theory of association with a condition, but this is no mark against it being a theory of a name’s referring, as far as it goes. So it may remain an advantage of the Condition View that it is a rough theory.\(^{121}\)

The classical alternatives to the Condition View do offer other ways of reducing a name’s referring, as used, to \( o \), as detailed in Chapter 3. But I doubt very much that they offer theories, as opposed to analogies or pictures. Both the Baptism View and the File View are grounded in analogical pictures. The Baptism View is grounded in a certain picture of how people come to

\(^{121}\) The problem with it, as Kripke quipped, is that probably it is false. As noted in Chapter 1, developments of different theories of what it is to associate a condition with a name may make the overall theory defensible.
use names to refer. It is a picture in which, as Kripke puts it, “the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain.” 122

Having set out this picture of proper name use that involves the analogy of a chain between links, Kripke then returns to the Reference Determination Question and generates a “rough theory” from within this picture. On this picture of proper names, the “inside” aspect of proper name use would have to correspond to some sort of employment or activation of one of the “links.” The links correspond to the entrance of names into people’s vocabulary, including the initial baptismal entrance. The “outside” referent would have to correspond to the thing named in the initial link. Thus, what determines that a name, as used, refers to what it does is that the use activates a “link” connected by an unbroken chain to a baptism of a particular object.

Now, in the case of a physical chain with its links, this kind of connection would be familiar. Consider a decorative paper chain made by fastening one rectangular piece of paper into a circle, then feeding another through this circle and fastening it, and so on. It is easy to understand why it is that when a new circle is fastened on, pulling on that circle will bring with it all the other circles, back to the first link in the chain. On Kripke’s picture, names in people’s vocabulary are like this, but it is not clear why they are like this. Why is it that when B hears a name from A and intends to use it as A does, B is suddenly able to connect in some way to the thing that A uses the name to refer to? What made A able, in the first place, to assign a name to this thing and connect to it whenever she accesses this name in her vocabulary? This is not explained. We rely on the analogy with the physical chain of links to give us a feel for it. Thus, Kripke’s “rough theory” is really not a theory at all, but a manipulation of a picture in order to answer the Reference Determination Question.

Similarly, the File View is grounded in an analogical picture of the mind as working like a file cabinet, full of information collected into different files, with proper names serving as the labels

122 1980, p. 91, emphasis added: notice Kripke’s use of the simile-marking “as if.” I thank Joseph Almog for emphasizing to me over the years that these discussions are in the realm of pictures.
on these files. On this picture, the inside element would have to be the file accessed, rather than
the link activated. The information in the accessed file comes (predominantly) from something:
thus reference is determined to be to whatever that dominant source is. Again, this picture
suggests that names are like labels on files, not that they are labels on files. To move to a theory,
we would need to say in what way they are like labels on files, and in what way the mind is set up
like a file cabinet. Thus, in appealing to the information contained in the file labelled by the
name used, we are relying on an analogy, not putting forth a theory. The File View tells us how
the determination of reference would be pictured within the file picture, not how reference is in
fact determined.

4.3.3 The Focus Picture

The Baptism View and the File View are based on different pictures of proper names, and
these differences make the pictures seem more or less accurate with respect to different
examples of proper names. As discussed in Chapter 2, the File View seems more accurate with
respect to the name “Madagascar,” used to refer to the island. But the Baptism View might seem
more accurate about a name in a case like Kripke’s case of “Jonah,” used to refer to the prophet.
Suppose that Jonah really existed, as the scholars agree, according to Kripke, but by the time the
Biblical legends about him were put into circulation, he was long dead and no one remembered
much about him other than that he was a Hebrew prophet. In that case, if the name “Jonah”
were a label on a file possessed by a typical speaker, it would be a file full of information whose
dominant source is not Jonah but the creators of the legends. Nonetheless, the speaker refers
using “Jonah” to the real prophet Jonah. 123

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123 Or so Kripke argues (1980, 67-8). Kripke’s argument is not offered as a reply to Evans, and the way it is out of step
with Evans’s picture is a bit more complex than I have explained. For one might think that the information does have
its source in the real prophet since the legends must at least be legends inspired by him, no matter how loosely, in
order to be about him. However, Evans’s later view is that the information in a file such as a typical speaker’s “Jonah”
file has its dominant causal source in Jonah just if it has its dominant causal source in the file of someone who had a
certain kind of acquaintance with Jonah. And in the case as I have given it, this is not the case for the typical speaker.
I have argued that both of these pictures are shown to be inaccurate by cases like the Edgar/Eduard cases. In both pictures, names are devices for saving referents, whether by being links in chains or labels on files. If either of these pictures were accurate, it should be intuitive that “Edgar,” as used in the cases described, does not refer to Edward. But this is not intuitive.

The alternative picture of linguistic reference that I will propose, which I will call the Focus Picture, is based on an analogy with sensory perception. This picture portrays referring linguistically to a thing as being like perceiving that thing with the senses. The capacity for language is seen as like the capacity to see, hear, touch, smell, taste, etc. For concreteness, I will take the usual example of vision. Names and referring expressions, then, are like tools that we use to enhance our visual apparatus. They are like eyeglasses, magnifying glasses, and scopes of various kinds.

There are many things in the world around me that produce and reflect light. Which of those things I see at any given time depends on many factors, including how good my eyesight is, whether my eyes are open, in which direction I am looking, and whether I am using any of the kinds of devices just mentioned. If I am wearing glasses or looking through a microscope, things are visible to me that would not be visible to me if I were using other or no devices, and things are not visible to me that might be visible to me if I were using other or no devices. My visual apparatus and the ways I employ and enhance it delimit the range of things that I may see at any given time.

Analogously, many things have ongoing effects in my mind. Aristotle has ongoing effects in my mind, as do my family members, my furniture, and countless other individuals that I have encountered, heard about, read about, and seen photos of. At any given time, I am certainly not aware of all these things, any more than I am aware of all the light-producing and light-reflecting things in the world at any given time. Which of the things in my mind I am aware of depends on many factors. It depends on promptings in my current situation, emotions I am

124 See Chapter 2.
experiencing, and, of particular interest to the present discussion, my capacity for language and the linguistic tools I possess. Names and referring expressions, like eyeglasses and microscopes, allow us to “focus” on one or more of the vast array of things that have effects in our minds. They allow us to experience and be aware of things, through our minds, that we might otherwise not be able to experience and be aware of. This is not because names are specially linked to or savers of these things, as a toy telescope might have an image of the planet Mars pasted face-in toward its lens. We have seen the problems with that picture of names. It is because names allow us to focus on things whose effects in our minds might otherwise not be detected. In the Edgar/Edward case, the speaker is able to focus on Edward using the name “Edgar”. Having that name gave her a way to focus on him. She no doubt had other ways she might have focused on him, using demonstratives, descriptions, or other common names that struck her as potentially his. But she used “Edgar.”

This is the basic idea of the Focus Picture. In the next section, I will enrich the picture by walking in more detail through three levels of the perceptual analogy.

4.4 Three levels of the analogy with perception

4.4.1 Perception and having in mind

I begin with the outermost layer of the analogy. The analogy likens linguistic reference to sensory perception of some variety; I have chosen vision as a concrete example. Of course, there are many kinds of sensory perception: many systems for becoming sensorily aware of objects in the environment. Analogously, I think there are ways of referring to things had in mind other than linguistically. A non-linguistic animal may refer to his prey in tracking it: he is aware of the prey through the effects it has had on his mind (perception, memory, desire, etc.) and is focused upon it. A person’s angry outburst may refer to her mother, not linguistically, because she does not realize that it is really her mother at whom her anger is directed and so does not put this into
words, but emotionally. Emotionally, not linguistically, she is in this outburst aware of her mother through the effects her mother has had on her mind.

So, there are different modes of sensory awareness of sensorily perceptible things, and there are different modes of referential awareness of things had in mind. Being in mind, then, is treated by analogy with being sensorily perceptible. This should dispel the feeling that in glossing reference as awareness of things had in mind, I am suggesting that there is some place other than the world (that is, “in mind”) where things can be and be “seen.” This is not the suggestion. Rather, for a thing to be “in mind” is analogous to its being sensorily perceptible. A thing is sensorily perceptible (to a subject, at a time) just if the subject and the thing are situated in such a way that the subject has some sensory apparatus (with or without enhancements) that allows her to perceive it. There is not some fixed place, a subject’s sensory environment, into and from which things can come and go. Being part of a sensory environment is a relation between a subject and a thing, and which things stand in that relation with a subject depends, in part, on her sensory systems and their various enhancements. Similarly, being in mind is a relation between a subject and a thing that depends in part on the various systems and apparatuses, including linguistic capacities and tools like names, that the subject has for becoming aware of things, not perceptually but, to put a term on it, cognitively.

The difference, then, between a thing being in one’s mind and a thing being in one’s sensory environment is in the kind of system or apparatus used to become aware of it. Things in one’s sensory environment are things one can become aware of using certain systems that we categorize as sensory. Things in one’s mind are things one can become aware of using other systems and apparatuses, with language being the example of interest. Both things in one’s sensory environment and things in one’s mind are just things. The very same thing might be both in one’s sensory environment and in one’s mind.

125 My focus on having in mind is grounded in the use of that phrase by Keith Donnellan. A recent festschrift for Donnellan (Almog and Leonardi, eds. 2012) explores his idea in many directions.
On this understanding of the analogy between perception and having in mind, saying (as I sometimes have above) that a speaker refers, using a name, to what she has in mind, is like saying that a perceiver sees, using (say) a pair of eyeglasses, what she has in her sensory environment. This would be very uninformative. And indeed the analog about reference does sound very uninformative. One might respond to it that people have lots of things in mind at any given time, and this is especially true if we think of what they have in mind as being whatever they could become aware of through some cognitive system or other. The above discussion suggests that saying a speaker is referring to what she “has in mind” is a short way of saying that she is referring to what she “has in mind to linguistically refer to using a certain name on a certain occasion.” This is more like saying that a perceiver sees, using a pair of eyeglasses, what is visible to her given the position and orientation of her eyes, functioning of her visual system, and enhancement provided by the eyeglasses.

Of course, a perceiver can see many things at the same time. When I look out my window, I see a tree, a boy, a dog, a car, a road, and a string of power lines. I have claimed that one can also linguistically refer to more than one thing at a time, either accidentally or intentionally. Certainly, though, linguistic reference tends to be to only one thing at a time. That is part of its value as a way of experiencing things: it lets us separate and pin down the many things impacting our thinking. This difference is no mark against the analogy, though. One would expect different experiential systems to be good for different things. (Note that it is more difficult to tactiley feel or to smell multiple things at one time than it is to see multiple things at one time.)

**4.4.2 Vision (as an example) and language**

The second level of the analogy between linguistic reference and perceptual focus is a comparison of linguistic ability and activity with a specific type of perceptual ability and activity.
I have selected vision as an example because I think it allows a particularly vivid development of the analogy. It seems to me quite possible, though, that stronger analogies could be developed with other sensory modes, and no doubt the analogy with still others would be weaker. In building analogies, one has to go with what seems most vivid, and this is likely to vary from person to person.

Vision is one among many modes of sensory experience. I am going to assume (plausibly, I think) that it is also one among many sensory perceptual ways of becoming aware of particular objects. These various sensory perceptual ways of becoming aware of particular objects may make us aware of quite different kinds of objects, or they may make us aware of the same kind of objects. I will leave this question aside. All I want to point out is that vision, audition, and other sensory modes are different mechanisms for providing awareness, perhaps of different kinds of objects, perhaps of the same kinds of objects, but in any case with different results for the nature of the experience.

An important thing to note about sensorily experiencing, or being aware of, particular objects is that it requires not only that the object have some impact on the relevant sensory apparatus, but also that the experiencer be able to distinguish the object from other things in her experience. It is for this reason that visual awareness of a grass field in the distance is not visual awareness of individual blades of grass in that field, even though the individual blades of grass are reflecting light into the eye. Even if blade of grass G is part of this reflection of light into the perceiver’s eye, the perceiver cannot see G. Similarly, if the perceiver held G up close to her face, the cells composing G would be reflecting light into her eye, but she would not be able to see any particular cell of G. If she used a microscope with a certain magnification, she might be able to see some particular cells of G, but not be able to see any particular molecule of those cells, even though the molecules would be reflecting light, and so on.

For instance, it is a matter of some debate whether we both see and hear ordinary material objects, or whether we see such objects but hear only sounds, or objects composed of sounds over time. (See Pasnau 1999 and O’Callaghan 2007.) Nor is it uncontrovertial that we even properly see ordinary material objects, as opposed to seeing only shapes, colors, and so on. (See Spelke 1988.)
Similarly, in the case of hearing, if a thousand people in an auditorium simultaneously make a very soft hissing sound, someone seated alone in an upper balcony can hear the sound the crowd makes (or perhaps the crowd, depending on one’s view of the objects of audition), but not the sound that any individual makes (or any individual). However, if she uses an amplification device of some kind, she may be able to hear individual hisses.

Let me introduce the term “attunement” for an experiential system and/or apparatus’s profile of object distinction. A human being’s visual or auditory system may have a certain built-in attunement. For instance, a human with 20-20 vision can distinguish blades of grass at a certain distance in full light, fields of grass at some other distance, and so on. The attunement can be altered by the addition of apparatus like eyeglasses, microscopes, etc. Attunements can also be altered by training and experience. One can learn to hear a cello distinctly in a string quartet performance, to taste tannins distinctly in a sip of wine, or to see camouflaged animals distinctly in their camouflage environment. This kind of learning may involve what has been called “cognitive penetration” of perception, or it may simply be a matter of developing the perceptual abilities themselves so as to allow for more distinct perception of particular objects.\footnote{Roughly, to say that perception is “cognitively penetrable” is to say that one’s thinking (beliefs, desires, and so on) affects one’s perceiving, so that what you believe (for instance) may have an impact on what you see (for instance). For a survey of cognitive penetrability, see Stokes, forthcoming.} It may be argued that such distinct perceptions are not brought about by the relevant sensory system at all but by other cognitive systems. I will not enter into this fray, but will leave “attunement” as a broad marker for levels of object distinction in one of a perceiver’s sensory environments (e.g., her auditory or visual environment). Attunement should be distinguished from attention: while a person cannot attend to things in a sensory perceptual environment unless she is attuned to them (i.e., her sensory system and apparatus are such that they can be distinguished), one will in general be sensorily attuned to many things to which one is not, at a given time, attending.
Intuitively, language, analogously to vision, audition, and other sensory capacities, lets us experience things we might not otherwise experience. One way—the way that springs most immediately to mind—in which language expands the range of things a subject can experience is by allowing her to become aware of things through other people's speaking. I became aware of Aristotle through language. Perhaps I could not have become aware of him in any other way, given our separation in time and space. This is to do with the communicational aspect of language, which I will discuss in Section 4.5.

But it is also quite intuitive that language allows us to experience things through our own minds, and it is this kind of expansion of our range of experience that I want to focus on now. I will give some examples to bring out the intuition. First, consider how useful it is, in trying to recollect a chain of events, or in trying to work out an inchoate hunch you have about a philosophical problem, or in trying to understand the emotional effect that a traumatic event has had on you, to talk or write. (Even if you are not getting any response from another person.) Your mind may feel blank initially, but by forcing yourself to say or write whatever comes, you make progress. Perhaps, in some cases, you are using language to break new ground, but surely there are also cases where you are bringing to a different kind of awareness—linguistic awareness—things that are already there. Recall the example about the angry outburst that is really directed at the person's mother. This may be an emotional response to one's mother, but the emotional experience may not be an emotional awareness of one's mother distinctly: perhaps it is mixed in with emotion directed at the person's father in an undifferentiated way. When the therapist directs the person to talk about the experience, the person may come up with referring expressions, as specific as “my mother”, or as vague as “someone,” that allow her to become linguistically aware of, and in that way experience distinctly, the target of her anger.

This is analogous to hearing, with one's eyes closed, an indistinct jumble of voices, and then opening one's eyes to see each of ten or so chatting people distinctly. By using a different mode of sensory experience, one becomes aware of the particular people, whereas one's hearing
provided only an awareness of the crowd (or of their combined sound). Similarly, by using a
different mode of cognitive experience, language, one becomes aware of the particular target of
anger, whereas one’s emotional experience did not allow this awareness.

Other intuitive examples suggest that language expands what we can be aware of. Imagine
trying to remember the people who were involved in a conversation you had at a party weeks
earlier. One way you might do this is by letting names come to you, or by trying to think of
names of likely people and then seeing if they jog your memory—“Bob? Oh, right, he was there
and made the very interesting point about Frege...” It is not important that a name that helps
you remember someone is really their name. The name “Edgar” popping into my mind might
well help me remember Edward. Language, then, seems to help us become aware of things
through memory.

For another kind of example, consider learning skills that require certain kinds of awareness
and mastery of subtle movements of the body. The mastery of *ujjayi* breathing is important in
practicing yoga. It is a kind of breathing that involves the partial closing of the glottis, creating a
breath that is something like a gentle snore. It can be difficult to get the hang of. One can follow
basic instructions on how to breath this way (breath as if you were fogging up a glass, but close
your mouth when you exhale; inhale the same way) but be unable to achieve the deep, oceanic
sound that experienced *ujjayi* breathers produce. To supplement the basic instructions, teachers
sometimes tell students to cultivate “the swirl” of breath at the back of their palates. This may be
unhelpful at first, but having a name for the desired movement puts one on the alert for it. One
watches for something that feels “swirl”-like on the back of the palate. At some point, one gets
just the edge of a feeling that is a bit this way, though perhaps only loosely, and focuses on it,
trying out various ways to enhance the effect. Gradually, the effect gets stronger and more
identifiable. This seems to be a case where having a description of something, even a loose one
that does not in fact describe the feel of the movement one is cultivating very well, helps one to
bring it into relief within one’s proprioceptive experience. “The swirl” may have been part of my
experience anyway, but turning this language on the experience gradually produced a distinct awareness of it.

The above examples are intended only to provide intuitive support for language as an additional mode of awareness, which may expand, for a given subject at a time, the range of things of which she can be aware, analogously to a sensory mode of awareness. They are not, of course, empirical evidence that the analogy holds. In general, there is not properly evidence for analogies. Analogies are more and less useful for various purposes. I have argued that the chain and file analogies are not so useful for understanding linguistic reference, because they make us think of linguistic reference in ways that do not match up with how it in fact seems to be. (This does not mean that these analogies could not be useful for other investigations.) The analogy with sensory perception that I am proposing in their place may be loose, but it should be held in mind that its role in the discussion of linguistic reference is to provide a picture: a mental starting point for thinking about the nature of reference. The history of work on the subject strongly suggests that we need such a starting point from which to launch the investigation of reference.

Although analogies are not empirically testable, empirical results may suggest that they will be more or less fruitful. It is worth noting that empirical research on the involvement of language in our broader cognition does provide some support for the analogy between language and sensory awareness. It suggests that there may be some kinds of things to be distinctly aware of which humans, at least, need to use language. One example is the mental states of others. Studies suggest that having linguistic constructions to describe these states, such as “believes that” and “thinks that,” is critical to becoming aware of other people’s mental states as distinct from one’s own. Another example is numbers. In human communities that lack terms for exact quantities, people are unable to replicate a given quantity of items—they cannot count the items and then count out again the same number of items—although they can approximate it.

128 See, for instance Pyers and Senghas 2009.
This suggests that if is possible to be aware of particular numbers at all, these people are not able to be aware of them, and it seems that the reason for this is that they lack language through which to be aware of them.\(^\text{129}\)

### 4.4.3 Lenses and names

The analogy between language, considered as a kind of system with which human beings are endowed, and a sensory system seems to be supported by intuitive, and perhaps empirical, considerations about the role language plays in individual cognition. But I have also suggested that the analogy reaches down a level, to the specific names and other referring expressions whose ability to “hook on” to particular objects is queried by the Reference Determination Question. My suggestion was that these linguistic expressions, understood as something more than “surface expressions,” have a role analogous to the role that eyeglasses, magnifying devices, and scopes of various kinds have in visual perception. Such devices enhance or focus the visual system so that the perceiver can be aware of a broader or different range of objects. Likewise, linguistic expressions, which may be thought of as networks of associations pulled together by association with a surface expression, focus a speaker’s linguistic capacity in ways that enable linguistic awareness of more things.

To begin to draw out the analogy, I will discuss a case originally introduced by Donnellan. Donnellan presents the case as follows:

Suppose a child is gotten up from sleep at a party and introduced to someone as 'Tom', who then says a few words to the child. Later the child says to his parents, "Tom is a nice man". The only thing he can say about 'Tom' is that Tom was at a party. Moreover, he is unable to recognize anyone as 'Tom' on subsequent occasions. His parents give lots of parties and they have numerous friends named 'Tom'. The case could be built up, I think, so that nothing the

\[^{129}\text{See Gordon 2004 and Dehaene et al. 1999.}\]
child possesses in the way of descriptions, dispositions to recognize, serves to pick out in the standard way anybody uniquely. That is, we cannot go by the denotation of his descriptions nor whom he points to, if anyone, etc. Does this mean that there is no person to whom he was referring? It seems to me that his parents might perfectly well conjecture about the matter and come up with a reasonable argument showing that the child was talking about this person rather than that.\footnote{Donnellan 1970, p. 343.}

We can easily remove from this case the supposition that the child was introduced to the man as “Tom.” Perhaps the child was introduced to the man as “Peter,” or by no name at all, or perhaps the child was introduced to a woman as “Mary.” None of this would change the intuition cited by Donnellan that the child is later referring to the person to whom he was introduced. Of course, this assumes that the person to whom the child was introduced is the one he has in mind to refer to. But Donnellan’s original case assumes this as well. The child’s having been introduced to someone as “Tom” does not entail that any later use by the child of “Tom” refers to that person. The child might forget the late night introduction entirely, have in mind a custodian named “Tom” at his school in telling his parents, “Tom is a nice man,” but forget that Tom is the custodian, and, with the party just having happened and parties much on his mind, tell his parents that Tom was at the party. It seems to me that children (not to mention adults) often get confused in these kinds of ways.

Consider the case where the child was introduced to the man but not by any specific name. (“Say hello to a new friend!”) The next morning the initial effects of this interaction in the child’s mind are giving rise to further effects: perhaps some synapses are being rewired for the formation of long term memory of the episode, and a continued emotional response of having felt safe and happy is triggering a desire on the child’s part to connect with his parents by sharing his feelings.\footnote{The description of these effects is meant to be rough.} The child knows many words, including the ones in the sentence, “Tom is
a nice man.” The name “Tom,” in particular, is a name he has heard before on some occasion or occasions. The name has various associations in the child’s mind. It may be associated with men and boys, for instance, since the child may have learned that it is something men and boys may be called. For simplicity, let us suppose these are the only associations the child has for “Tom.” The child’s remembering the interaction with the party guest the next day may involve, among many things, the activation of what I will loosely call his concept of man. This concept may be activated even if the person was a woman: the child’s memory may be too hazy to differentiate and the concept of man may be more easily accessed than that of woman. The concept of man is no doubt linked to many different proper names that the child knows, and if one of these is activated—in the child’s utterance of “Tom,” for instance—this gives the child a way to experience the person having ongoing effects in his mind.

In particular, the child experiences the person as “Tom.” He refers to the person as “Tom.” On the approach to linguistic reference as a way of experiencing things, this is analogous to the way that he might see the person as large, or hairy, or yellow, or pear-shaped. What does it mean to say that the child referentially experiences the man “as ‘Tom’”? One thing it means is that the child referentially experiences the man as detected in her mind by the name ‘Tom.’ The man is having various continued effects on the child and, as described, the name “Tom” is the tool—the lens, in the analogy I am suggesting—that focuses these effects to detect a particular man. This is quite a bare way of experiencing a thing, simply as activating a surface name. Of course, the mechanism of this activation is not so bare. As described, a network of associations are involved. This is somewhat akin to the way that a telescope might use a more or less complicated mechanism to allow one to see a particular planet as a white dot. All you see the planet as is a point of light, which the telescope has gathered and focused. Similarly, all you may referentially experience an individual as is detected by some surface name, like “Tom.” The surface properties of that name, for instance its sound or orthography, fill in your experience of the individual, just as the property of being a point of white light fills in your experience of the planet. But it is the
workings behind the scenes of the telescope’s lenses or the associative nexus around the surface name “Tom” that makes this possible.

In this case, presumably any man’s name (or name associated with men by the child) would do, as would “he,” or “that man.” But suppose the child had only ever met nasty people named “Tom,” and as a result the name was associated for him with negative emotion. This might make it unlikely that he would use that name to refer to the nice party guest he met. On the other hand, it might make the name “Tom” more likely to be used in referring to someone with whom he had an upsetting interaction. The idea is that the child’s various associations with the name prime it to be used in referring to things that have activated those associations. This is analogous to the way that a microscope’s power primes it to be used in seeing things that are of a size to be resolved by a human eye at that level of magnification.

This picture can accommodate the feeling that in some way the names we know must play a crucial role in our linguistic awareness of things. Take “Aristotle.” I associate a wide range of concepts, images, words, and the like with this name. I can get a sense of what some of them are by putting the name “Aristotle” to myself and seeing what comes up. There are words like “philosopher,” “ancient,” and “Greek,” images of a white bust of a bearded man and of The School of Athens, memories of reading some of Aristotle’s works, and so on. Slightly later, images of Jackie Onassis’s face and the words “who Jackie Kennedy married after Kennedy,” come to mind, and later still an image of a soccer coach I had in school and called “Aris,” but whose full name was “Aristotle.”

The first set of associations with this name seem to be dominant for me. I suspect this makes it unlikely that I would have a case like the Edgar/Edward case in which I called some everyday person “Aristotle.” Indeed, so odd was it for me and my classmates that our coach’s name was “Aristotle,” that we could not easily call him by it and slipped to the nickname “Aris.” Even then, when my associations with “Aristotle” were much fewer, the name was strongly “focused” (to reinforce the analogy with lenses) on things that called up associations with philosophy and the
ancient world. It would be difficult for me to say “Aristotle was a nice man,” and refer by “Aristotle” to some person I met at a conference a few months back, in an analogous way that it would be difficult for me to see my left foot through a microscope.  

Although it would be difficult to see my left foot with a microscope, it would be difficult to see a skin cell from my left foot without one. Analogously, although it would be difficult for me to refer to a new acquaintance using the name “Aristotle,” it might be difficult for me to refer to Aristotle without this name in some cases. Suppose I had been introduced to some of Aristotle’s ideas through a snippet heard on the radio and been fascinated by them. Suppose that at the time I understood that these were the ideas of an ancient and exotic thinker, but did not learn much else about him. Now a conversation I am overhearing is reminding me of something—I have that needling sense one gets when one is reminded of something but cannot say what. Let us suppose that the conversation is reminding me of Aristotle’s ideas, though, as stipulated, this is not evident to me. It seems possible that if the name “Aristotle” were associated in my mind with whatever I had retained of these ideas, or the memory of the radio show, then it might be activated—i.e., I might utter or say/hear silently to myself, “Aristotle...had ideas similar to those...”—thus allowing me to refer to Aristotle. The same would be true if I had mistakenly associated the name “Aristophanes” in this way. It is not the phonological or orthographic properties of the sign that matters, but the way it is integrated into my memory and associations. On the other hand, if I had not retained any particular name from these experiences, it is unlikely that having a surface name like “Bob” or “Tom” would help. Those

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132 I believe this point is connected to one made by Donnellan in a different way concerning communication. In response to the charge that his view of definite descriptions amounts to a “Humpty Dumpty” view of language, Donnellan notes that while the intention to refer to a particular object by a particular referring expression may be sufficient for referring to that object by that expression, the formation of such intentions is not unrestricted. To intend to refer to an object by a certain expression—that is, to intend to refer someone else to that object by that expression—one must have some expectation that one’s audience will be so referred, which one does not have in Humpty Dumpty type situations. (Donnellan 1968, p. 212.) I am saying something similar about what one can have in mind to refer to by a certain expression. I cannot really be intending to refer other people to a particular thing with a certain expression if I have no expectation of success, and I cannot really be referring myself to a particular thing with a certain expression if that expression is unsuited to give me awareness of that thing.

133 Frege 1879 uses a similar analogy, between types of language (i.e., formal and natural) and the use of a microscope versus the naked eye: each is good for some purposes and not others. At a finer grain, I am suggesting that specific words are like this, as well.
surface names would be strongly associated with “everyday” people, and would be unlikely to help me pick up on my being reminded of someone I experienced as ancient and exotic. Of course, if I could become aware that I am being reminded of some person, I could refer to him using an expression like “that person...” or “he, what’s his name?”. Names are only one kind of tool that is available and may, on some occasions, be the kind that does the job. In addition, the name may sharpen and add detail to the referential experience by activating further associations.

Another kind of tool that might be available are referential descriptions. Consider again Donnellan’s martini case, where the speaker refers to a particular man as “the man drinking a martini.” This description picks up on the various concepts the speaker has that are activated by her perceptual experience, and may thereby bring these into awareness (though she might have been non-linguistically aware of them already). In referring to this individual as “the man drinking a martini” the speaker referentially experiences him as picked up, in her mind, by that description, as in the “Tom” case. But she may also referentially experience him as, say, a man. Or as drinking a martini. Not only might we say “She referred to him as ‘the man drinking a martini,’” but we might also say, “She referred to him as a man.” Or: “She referred to him as drinking a martini.” This captures the fact that her referential experience using this description is an experience of properties beyond just the activation of a certain phonetic or orthographic string. Here, she is also made aware of—referentially aware of—some of the properties or concepts she has that have been activated by the thing to which she refers.

The properties may not be instantiated by the thing to which she refers—such referential “illusions” are possible, as Donnellan’s martini case, among others, shows. Similarly, if we take a Burgean view of names and hold that in referring to the man as “Tom,” the child refers to him as a Tom, then this, too, could be an illusory referring experience, if the man does not in fact have whatever features are required for being a Tom. One thing that should be noted about such

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134 As in Burge 1973.
illusory referring experiences is that the speaker need not be making a mistake or be in error. As discussed earlier, one can have a perceptual or a referring illusion and be perfectly aware of what is going on. The speaker in the martini case might be well aware that the man in question is a teetotaler who would never drink a martini, and yet refer to him as drinking a martini because the shape of his glass triggers that concept and she recognizes that it will be helpful in communicating her reference. (The communicative side of linguistic referring experience will be discussed in the next section.)

Another thing to note is that even linguistic expressions that enable illusory referring experience of a thing can make it possible for one to referentially experience the thing at all. For instance, suppose the child in Donnellan’s “Tom” case really met and remembered a woman, not a man, but recalled and referred to her as a man, say, using the description, “that man.” This expression may enable the child to become distinctly linguistically aware of the woman, even though the property as which—we might put it perspicuously as “through which”—the child thus experiences her is not in fact instantiated by her. Analogously, something that looks like a bump on a specimen viewed through a microscope from a certain angle may actually be a dent due to a “shape-from-shading” optical illusion. The microscope allows this illusion, but it also allows the observer to become aware of the dent, since the dent would not have been visible at all, either looking like a dent or like a bump, with the naked eye.135

4.5 Communication of reference

So far, I have elaborated the picture of linguistic reference as analogous to particular kinds of sensory perception mostly without addressing the communicative nature of linguistic reference. I have discussed the ways in which linguistic capacity, and the nexuses of associations that are involved in the possession of particular words, expand one’s ability to be aware of things

135 See, for instance, Wolf, Reid, and Schrauf 2003.
through one’s own mind. But clearly one of the most distinctive features of linguistic reference is that a speaker’s referring not only enables her, but also other people, those who hear and understand her speech, to gain awareness of things through her mind. One person’s linguistic referring experience of a particular thing can communicate that thing to someone else, so that this new person can also think about and refer to that thing. One of the key ways in which language seems to expand the range of our awareness is in allowing us to become aware of things through other people telling us about them.

This looks like quite a striking disanalogy with sensory perception. As discussed above, some forms of sensory perception may have a communicative aspect. But even if your gaze guides my eyes to something I would not have otherwise looked at or seen, I do not see this thing through your seeing and your experience of it, but through my own. Thus, some further discussion is in order of the way communication fits into the analogy. This section has two parts. The first aims to make coherent the notion of a communicative experience of a particular thing, in light of the disanalogy with standard sensory experience. The second expands on the role of names, in particular, in this picture of referential communication.

### 4.5.1 Communicative experience: the transmission of having-in-mind

If Jane sees Peter looking at something, she will follow his gaze and see, let us say, a beautiful butterfly that she would not otherwise have seen, because she would not have moved her eyes in that direction. This is a way in which visual communication can expand the range of our awareness. Linguistic referring can work in this way, as well. Suppose Peter says to Jane,
“You know, Picasso was not really that great, in my view.” Jane recognizes the name “Picasso,” and as a result experiences an activation of many of the usual dominant associations with the name. If Pablo Picasso himself is one of the individuals whose ongoing effects in Jane’s mind keep these associations alive, then their activation can focus her on him. But it also seems that Peter’s referring may enable Jane to be aware of Picasso even if she otherwise would have had no way to do this. For Jane may say back to Peter, “What is your specific criticism of Picasso?” and thus refer, herself, to Picasso. She may do this even if she is only playing along, trying not to appear ignorant, when in fact she has never heard of Picasso and does not know whether Peter refers with the name to a person, place, institution, sports team, or what have you. In spite of this, she now refers to Picasso—referentially experiences him—albeit without this experience activating many cognitive connections.

Presumably, as the conversation progresses Jane will gather information about Picasso, and later be able to apply this information in other conversations so as to broaden the nexus of associations she has around the name “Picasso.”\textsuperscript{137} In this way, the referring experience of Peter and perhaps other speakers enables Jane’s referring experience differently from how Peter’s looking at the butterfly enables Jane’s visual experience. Jane’s experience is through the experience of Peter and (perhaps) certain others.\textsuperscript{138}

Some may find this idea incoherent. Experience is by its nature private: available only to its one subject. This means there is an inviolable wall between the experience of one person and the experience of another. Jane’s visual experience and Peter’s visual experience may be of the same thing, the butterfly, but this is because this same butterfly is reflecting light into both of their

\textsuperscript{137} Keep in mind that Jane might forget that Picasso’s name is Picasso while maintaining the nexus of associations. The name is just one tool she has for picking up on Picasso’s ongoing effects on her. The next sub-section will discuss what I think is special about names.

\textsuperscript{138} Note also that Peter’s referring might focus Jane on someone else on whom she can focus through the name “Picasso.” Perhaps she has not heard of the painter, but knows a cafe called Picasso, and takes Peter to be talking about it. It is not hard to imagine a case about which we would say that Jane is in some sense referred by Peter to this cafe. This is complicated, however, by the fact that in some sense she is also referred to Pablo Picasso, because she is referred through Peter’s thinking and speaking. It is this possibility of Peter referring Jane to something which Jane may not have the independent ability to refer to that is of interest here.
eyes, leading to separate processing and separate experience. Jane cannot visually experience the butterfly through Peter’s visual experience: his experience is inaccessible to her.\textsuperscript{139}

But even if a person’s experiences are private, these experiences might have a kind of transparency for others. My inability to have your experience does not entail my inability to have my own experience \textit{through} your experience. To fix an image, imagine Room 1 and Room 2, whose adjoining wall contains a red-tinted window. The outer walls of Rooms 1 and 2 each contain an ordinary clear window. Directly outside of Room 1’s window is a pine tree. Directly outside of Room 2’s window is a bird house on a pole. From Room 2, I can visually experience the pine tree because Room 1 is transparent to me, even though I cannot experience the way the tree looks from Room 1. (And likewise for the bird house from Room 1.) That is, I can have an experience of the pine tree \textit{through} Room 1, though I cannot have an experience of the pine tree \textit{from} Room 1.

Admittedly, except perhaps in the strange case of the conjoined twins,\textsuperscript{140} this is not the way of human sensory experience. Other people’s sensory experiences are not transparent to observers. I do not see what you see by seeing you looking, unless I also look at the same thing. However, this kind of transparency might be a feature of emotional experience. There is much discussion in psychology of what is known as “intergenerational trauma”: the apparent ability of parents to emotionally communicate traumatic experiences in their own lives to their children. Aspects of this communication are often linguistic, but it can be non-linguistic as well, and appears to happen between mothers and pre-linguistic children.\textsuperscript{141}

The nature and mechanisms of intergenerational trauma are complex and a matter of dispute, but perhaps a simplified case can illustrate the conceivable transparency of emotional

\textsuperscript{139} As noted above, the conjoined twins call this idea into question. In the popular press, the question has been asked as to whether they have one mind or two, suggesting deep resistance to the possibility of one person experiencing through another person’s experience. That the twins seem to do just this makes writers find it hard to class them as two separate people. But in other ways, they clearly are two separate people.

\textsuperscript{140} See notes above.

\textsuperscript{141} See Schechter 2004 for a review and case study.
experience. A mother is traumatized by abuse she suffered as a child. One effect of this is that she lies awake at night in her room, terrified. Her pre-linguistic toddler daughter, who sleeps in the same room with her, picks up her mother’s fear and also lies awake, terrified.\textsuperscript{142} Although the mother may not immediately be able to put her fears into words, what she is fearing—what she emotionally experiences—is her childhood abuse. (Indeed, therapy may later help her to cognize and verbalize that this is what she experiences, this is the object of her fear.) Her daughter picks up this fear, which is a fear of something, even if neither mother nor daughter can say of what it is a fear. The daughter is not having a fearful experience of her mother, but with her mother. A plausible description of this case, I think, is that the daughter is emotionally experiencing her mother’s abuse through her mother’s own emotional experience of this abuse. The daughter’s emotional experience of the abuse is not the same as the mother’s, but it is an emotional experience of the same thing—a certain traumatic event or series of events in the mother’s life.

While ordinary perceptual experience does not have a communicative nature, it does not seem to be conceptually impossible that it might. Indeed, the case of the conjoined twins\textsuperscript{143} suggests that communicative sensory experience may even be a reality in one unusual case. The example of emotional communication and in particular the transmission of an object of emotion (such as a trauma) from parent to pre-linguistic child suggests a more mundane case of non-perceptual experience that is communicative. Of course, this interpretation of these cases as instances of communicative experience is open to question. But I think its plausibility at least shows that the notion is not obviously incoherent. Even if sensory experience is not (generally) communicative, an analogous kind of experience, like referring experience, might be, without calling into question the basic analogy between them.

\textsuperscript{142} Schechter et al. 2003.

\textsuperscript{143} See Notes 136 and 139 above.
4.5.2 Transmission and names

Let us return, then, to Jane and Peter’s exchange about Picasso. A baby may be born with a disposition to adopt the emotions of her caretakers, and thus to emotionally experience what they emotionally experience. But people are not born being able to recognize referential language and to reproduce it for themselves. A young baby could not become aware of Picasso through hearing Peter’s statement, nor could an adult who knows no English at all. In the sense articulated above, the transmission in this case of Picasso from one mind to another involves the attunement of Jane’s linguistic system. Part of knowing a particular language like English (to varying degrees) is the ability to hear words and phrases distinctly, instead of as a continuous flow of sounds. One who is fluent in English will hear speech in English as broken up into words and also into parts of speech, so even if Jane does not recognize “Picasso” as someone’s name, she will distinguish it as a referring expression—as an expression by which Peter is focusing on a particular thing. One need not have the concept of a word or referring expression to be attuned in this way. Even very young children appear to use syntactic clues to respond appropriately to unfamiliar referring expressions in their native languages.

With this attunement in place, the passage of a particular thing from one mind to another through linguistic referring might be in a certain way easy, or cheap. Just as the baby’s emotional attunement allows her to experience fear of the abuse her mother suffered through her mother’s own fear of that abuse, so Jane’s linguistic attunement (knowing English) allows her to experience Picasso through Peter’s referring experience of him. In both cases, there is a profound lack of knowledge about the thing being experienced. The baby has no significant knowledge of her mother’s abuse: she could not describe it, or recognize the event if she saw a videotape, or the like; she does not know that it is abuse or what abuse is. Similarly, Jane has no

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144 The question of whether one literally hears words or hears the stream of sound that a non-speaker of the language would hear is a difficult one that I set aside for now. (See O’Callaghan 2009 for a review of the issue.) At any rate, a fluent speaker’s linguistic system, whatever that comprises, is able to distinguish words.

145 See, for instance, Hall et al. 2001.
significant knowledge of Pablo Picasso, and would not be able to pick him out of a line-up or
match her experience to some description of the man.

For this reason, attributing experience of the abuse to the baby or of Picasso to Jane might
seem cheap and easy. I want to acknowledge this. It is cheap and easy, just as seeing a particular
car is cheap and easy, even if the car zooms by you in an instant and is surrounded by hundreds
of other zooming cars. You still see that car at a certain moment, even if you could never
recognize it again or match it up with any description, and even if you have no idea what a car
is.\footnote{\textsuperscript{146}}

Cheap and easy as this transmission of Picasso from Peter’s mind to Jane’s may be, such a
view of the transmission might seem unlikely to explain my remarkable ability to refer to
Aristotle (or to Picasso, for that matter). It seems unlikely that a series of transmissions as low in
information transfer as that between Peter and Jane could transmit to me, over thousands of
years, the ability to refer to Aristotle. This might suggest that transmission of a thing from one
mind to another really requires more than the provision of the rather bare awareness I have
described. The logic would be that if Peter can transmit something he has in mind to refer to–
Picasso–in the manner described, then Jane at a later time may also have Picasso in mind to
refer to and may in a similar manner transmit Picasso to someone else, and so on. But then I
could have Aristotle in mind to refer to now simply as a result of just such a string of
transmissions.

Since this seems implausible, it must be that Peter does not in fact transmit Picasso to Jane
in the transaction described. For transmission to take place, more would be required. Perhaps
Jane would have to learn at least some basic identifying facts about Picasso (e.g., he was a

\footnote{\textsuperscript{146} Note that the cheap and easy-ness acknowledged here is not that of what Robin Jeshion has called “semantic
instrumentalism,” according to which just having the name “Picasso” allows Jane to refer to and think about Picasso. (See Jeshion 2010.) For reasons already discussed, the name does not ensure reference by Peter or Jane to any
particular person, but helps Peter to focus on Picasso and thereby to focus Jane upon Picasso, given that Picasso has
certain ongoing effects in Peter’s mind that a certain surface name and its nexus of associations are suited to pick up
on.}
painter) in the interaction. Or perhaps she would not truly have Picasso available to refer to in a separate conversation until she had reinforcement from other conversations, readings, movies, or the like about Picasso, although she might be able to make the easy “deferential” use described above just while speaking with Peter. These ideas fit well with viewing a person’s ability to refer to a thing as involving their standing possession of a vocabulary item, or a mental file on that thing. It seems plausible that such standing capacities might take time and reinforcement to acquire, as opposed to the cheap and easy ability to go along with the conversation in the moment.

But for the reasons already discussed, such pictures of linguistic reference run afoul of intuition. On reflection, intuition suggests that linguistic reference does not depend on stored links saved in names or files, but on a thing’s being present to mind to refer to on a given occasion. Jane’s awareness of Picasso simply through the brief exchange with Peter is enough for her to refer to Picasso, because Picasso’s effect on her, through Peter’s speech, is focused by (in this case) a name, “Picasso,” which she has also picked up in this same exchange. She need not have picked up the name, however. Perhaps Peter mumbled a bit when he said “Picasso,” and Jane did not catch the name. Still she might reply, “What is your specific criticism of this individual?” and refer, by “this individual,” to Picasso. As long as she has the appropriate linguistic attunement that some linguistic expression she knows distinguishes Picasso (however faintly or hazily, as in seeing a car speeding by) in the effect that Peter’s speech is having on her, she refers to Picasso. This is what intuition tells us, as well. Jane refers to Picasso.

Now, it is certainly true that if the whole exchange between Jane and Peter is as described, it is unlikely that Jane will in her turn transmit Picasso to a further person. Suppose that after the two part exchange described, and before Peter can answer Jane’s question, they are interrupted by a fire alarm and the conversation is not picked up again. What would lead Jane to refer, later on, to Picasso? If she remembers the name “Picasso,” she may Google it so as not to be

147 As it would be called in standard philosophical parlance.
embarrassed again, thus availing herself of much recorded history and conversation resulting from the transmission of Picasso between many other people.

But leave that aside for the moment. To simplify things, let us go back to Donnellan’s “Tom” case. Suppose the child’s parents, contrary to the original story, are not very concerned about who was talking to their son late at night during a party. They humor the child for a little while in a brief conversation about this person (whom I will call “Tom.”). “Oh, you liked Tom, did you? What did you and Tom talk about?” and so on. Then they go off to work and are absorbed in other things. When they get home the child, too, is absorbed by other things and talks about his friend Suzy from school. What would lead the child’s mother to refer to Tom at some later point? She might recall the conversation with her son at some point and refer back to Tom again (“Remember that man Sonny said he met at our party once? What did he say his name was?”). But just as likely, her son’s story would never lead to her speaking of Tom again. She would not transmit Tom to anyone else’s mind as a result of Sonny’s having transmitted him to her mind. (Very likely, Tom is someone she knows who was at her party, and she may transmit him/her to the minds of other people quite often in conversation. But Sonny’s transmission would not play a role in this.) If, on the other hand, she and Sonny’s father enjoyed musing from time to time about who the child might have met at the party, Tom might take on a mildly important role in their mental lives in this way, making it more likely that they would transmit him to the minds of others partly as a result of Sonny’s original reference to him.

What this suggests is that the development of associations with one’s linguistic awareness of a thing, and the social reinforcement of that awareness and those associations, make one more likely to have that thing in mind to refer to on further occasions. This is not surprising. The more associations are formed with one’s initial awareness of the thing, the more integrated that thing’s effects are in one’s ongoing mentation, and the more likely these associations are to be activated by further experiences and thus to bring the thing to awareness once again. This is much like the way in which, when scanning a crowd of people, those who are familiar or unusual
will “stand out,” leading you to become aware distinctly of them more often as you scan, whereas your distinct awareness of unfamiliar but unremarkable people will be brief and less likely to be repeated. They blend into the background. Similarly, your linguistic awareness of things you hear mentioned in passing without much information or reinforcement passes quickly and blends into the background of your mind.

Thus, it is indeed very unlikely that I would now be able to refer to Aristotle if there had not arisen a broad social and historical tradition of speaking and writing about Aristotle, which continuously enriches and reinforces individual people’s webs of association around their awareness of Aristotle. But this is not because the legitimate transmission of Aristotle from mind to mind requires such things. It is because such things make the transmission more likely to happen, over and over again.

This conclusion offers some insight into the special utility of names in the transmission of things from one mind to another. Names are not required for this transmission. Other kinds of referring expressions can be used to have a referring experience and so to refer others to a particular thing. Even versatile simple demonstratives like “this” and “that” and indexicals like “I” can be used to do this. A person could be referred to a particular thing just as cheaply and easily by a use of “this” as she could by a use of a name: for instance, if Peter had said to Jane, “You know, this was not really so great, in my opinion,” referring by “this” to Picasso, she could have been referred to Picasso in just the same way as in the original example. But if these were the only referring expressions we had, communication would suffer. “This” and “that” would be so versatile as to be unlikely to have many specific associations for any speaker. If the only way people were ever referred to things by other people was by the use of these versatile terms, it would be quite difficult for people to associate one referential awareness with another, and so to develop webs of associations around certain referring experiences. Any effort to see whether one referring using “this” was an experience of the same thing as another would require some sort of
comparison of the two circumstances of referring: were any of the same objects visible? Was the speaker in a similar emotional state?

Of course, this would be greatly helped by the availability of descriptive language. Even if Peter could only refer to Picasso using “this,” if he could go on to say, “This was a famous artist who was a founder of Cubism,” Jane could make associations with her referring experience beyond, say, what kind of muffin Peter was eating or where he was sitting when he spoke. But if these linguistic tools are available, so, in all likelihood, would be the tool of referentially used descriptions: Peter could say, “The famous artist who was a founder of Cubism was not really that great in my opinion,” or “A famous artist who was a founder of Cubism was not really that great in my opinion.” So let us set that aside, and consider the case where only versatile demonstratives or indexicals like “I” are available for referring.

It is hard to conceive of such a case with human language. Thinking about communication among non-human animals can be helpful. Many animals have various kinds of distinctive calls that communicate information about particular things in the animals’ environment. Two main factors seem to separate these calls from our linguistic referring expressions. One factor is that many of these calls are used to make, as we might put it, a complete statement. Consider the vervet monkey's famous alarm calls. These can be used to convey to the group the presence of a leopard, a snake, or an eagle. At least on one notion of reference, when a vervet monkey makes a leopard-type alarm call, she is referring to a particular leopard or group of leopards (if the call is appropriate), which she has spotted. Just as Peter transmits Picasso from his mind to Jane’s in the example I have been discussing, so this monkey transmits this leopard (or these leopards) from her mind to the minds of the other monkeys.

This call does not function like a linguistic referring expression, however, because it is used to convey, roughly, that the leopard is in the area. A monkey could not, using this call, refer another monkey to the same leopard later on, say, to indicate her ongoing fear of its return. This is because she will have learned, through training as a young monkey, when to make this call,
and this training will prevent her from using it in the absence of evidence of a leopard in the area.

But even if the leopard call could somehow be stripped of its predicative aspect, problems would remain for the transmission of the particular individual from mind to mind. Consider animal cohesion calls, such as those used by penguins. Penguins use these calls to identify themselves to their mates and offspring. Within a penguin species, the same type of cohesion call is used by all individuals, with certain features varying depending on the voice features of the individual. These calls might be thought of as full statements along the lines of “This is me,” but they might also be thought of as just indexical labels like “I” or “me.” It is not so clear that there is a difference between saying “This is me” and simply labeling oneself, by one’s call, “me,” anyway, in the absence of grammar. In either case, it makes sense to think of these calls as being like indexicals because the basic type of call is the same for all members of the species: it is the type of call they use for self-identification, just as “I” is the word we use in English for self-reference. This type of call does not identify a particular individual, but the penguins recognize the identification calls of their mates by certain features of the way they make the call. This is a bit like the way in which we can recognize our mates (or others we know) by their voices when they say, “It’s me,” on the telephone, even though, of course, if the words “it’s me” came through to us with all features of our loved ones’ voices removed, the words would not help us much.

A particular penguin, Penny, may have all kinds of associations with her mate, Guinness’s voicing of this call, but these same associations will not be activated in Penny’s mind by anyone else’s making the call. Likewise, any other penguin’s associations with Guinness’s voicing of the call will not be activated by, say, Penny’s voicing of the call. (That would activate only any associations they had with Penny’s voicing of the call.) Thus, there is no way for Penny to refer someone else to Guinness using this call. And once Guinness has died, no penguin can transmit him from their mind to the mind of another penguin (at least, not by means of these identification calls). This would clearly get in the way of Guinness being passed down through
the generations of penguins in the way that Aristotle has been through the generations of human beings. This is not because penguins cannot transmit things from one mind to another, but because their tools for doing so are limited.

Even if the vervet alarm calls were a bit more like penguin identification calls, and so might be viewed as demonstrative labeling devices like “this leopard” or “that eagle,” the same problem would arise for ongoing transmission. A monkey might then transmit an absent leopard that she continues to fear to the mind of another monkey, but this other monkey would have no way of connecting this leopard-awareness to some other leopard-awareness that is associated in her mind with this call. For the call would be associated with every leopard-awareness she remembers, just as, for me, a demonstrative phrase like “that car” might be associated with a number of car-awarenesses I recall, and with general images and descriptions of cars. So, while she might have and keep the leopard she has only heard about in mind, it is unlikely that any future activation of her leopard associations will bring it, in particular, back to her awareness. This is in the same way that if Peter commented wistfully to Jane, “That car was beautiful,” referring to a car Jane has never seen or heard about, and gave no further elaboration, Jane could get the car in mind, but would be unlikely to refer to it herself in the future, assuming she did not maintain some ongoing interest in the car Peter felt so wistful about. Demonstrative referring experiences are likely to lead communicants to form strong associations only with things that are immediately experienced by them in other ways than through the referring of the speaker, such as perceptually. This makes it difficult for them to be used in transmitting a particular thing from mind to mind, when that thing is no longer perceptually available.

Now, names would seem to be a relatively simple way to change this state of affairs. Compare penguin identification calls to those of bottlenose dolphins. Bottlenose dolphins’ identification calls vary greatly by individual dolphin in spectrographic contour, where this variation is not due to differences in the dolphins’ individual voices, but can be reproduced by
other dolphins and by human experimenters.\textsuperscript{148} Dolphins thus might be said to identify themselves by name rather than by an indexical-type call as the penguins do. Dolphins say, “This is Roger,” not “It’s me.” And, dolphins use each other’s distinctive calls, not only their own. Combined with the fact that dolphins can be taught artificial languages by people that involve names for particular things and types of things, this suggests that dolphins might indeed naturally develop tools quite similar to our names. To my knowledge, this has not been studied, but it seems possible that with these distinctive sounds that can be reproduced by any dolphin and associated with their various memories, a group of dolphins could achieve the social reinforcement needed to maintain a series of transmissions of an individual from mind to mind long after that individual had died.

As noted above, descriptions could accomplish this as well. But names seem to be a good deal simpler than descriptions. Indeed, names of a sort are a precondition for forming descriptions. We at least need labels for the attributes from which we form a description. And even with descriptions available to us, as they are in human language, names can be extremely efficient ways of engaging people’s thinking. This is not always the case. Saying out of the blue to someone, “John called me last week,” may leave her baffled. She likely has many different associations with the name “John,” and her mind may run off in multiple directions at once, leaving her wondering about whom you are speaking. You would get her thinking along the right lines much more efficiently by using even a somewhat vague description like, “My former student,” or “That guy from work.” But if you both know a man named “John Kilmurray,” and you say, “John Kilmurray called me last week,” referring to this person, this is likely to be a more efficient way to activate the associations she has that are tied to the ongoing effects John Kilmurray has in her thinking, than attempting to describe him would be.

\textsuperscript{148} Janik et al. 2006.
Conclusion

This chapter has motivated and developed a Referential Direct Realist picture of linguistic reference, the Focus Picture. Once linguistic reference is recognized as a kind of experience, that experience does not seem well suited to a representationalist treatment. Referential Direct Realism offers a better way of understanding the kind of experience we have in referring linguistically.

The Focus Picture uses sensory perception as an analogy from which to think about linguistic reference. The analogy is appropriate in light of the experiential nature of linguistic reference, and illuminates the role that linguistic expressions play in enabling such experience. The communicative nature of referring experience does not disqualify this analogy. Transmission of having a particular thing in mind can be accommodated on the Focus Picture by recognizing the way in which it is “cheap and easy,” and the way in which the feeling that it must be more difficult can be explained in terms of what leads to transmission rather than in terms of what is required for it.

However, Referential Direct Realism, like its perceptual counterpart of naïve or direct realism, does face counterparts of the challenges from hallucination and illusion. These have yet to be addressed, and will be taken up in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE: PROBLEMS OF REFERRING EXPERIENCE

5.1 Introduction

This chapter begins by raising a question about the “cheap and easy” view of the transmission of reference articulated in Chapter 4. This question is how such transmissions seem, in some cases, to result eventually in reference failure rather than in continued reference. The discussion of reference failure also raises broader questions for Referential Direct Realism, parallel to the questions raised for naïve realism about perceptual experience by the phenomenon of hallucination. How can reference be direct, when reference failure, as well as what I have called “referential illusion,” is possible without seeming different to the speaker from successful reference?

Section 5.2 begins by discussing the way in which reference transmission seems apt to degrade into reference failure. A decisive role for imaginative invention is identified as the critical factor, rather than a loss of epistemic grasp on the object transmitted. Section 5.3 reviews the problems of perceptual experience that threaten naïve realism about perceptual experience. I show that the problems of hallucination and illusion are really just special cases of a more general problem, that perceptual experiences do not seem to wear their particular objects on their sleeves. I argue that some form of “disjunctivism” is required to defend naïve realism, and I suggest that one anti-disjunctivist approach to defending naïve realism can actually be adapted as a way of making disjunctivism plausible. Section 5.4 spells out the analogous problems for Referential Direct Realism, and explains how a similar strategy can be employed to defend it. Finally, Section 5.5 shows how two classic problems of reference, the problem of informative identity statements and the problem of significant but failed reference, can be understood as problems of referential experience and perhaps also dissolved using the approach described.
This chapter does not purport to be a definitive defense of naïve realism about perceptual experience or of Referential Direct Realism. Rather, its primary aim is to distill what I take to be the essence of the problem facing these views and to provide an initial strategy for addressing them.

5.2 Reference failure and information loss

The picture of the transmission of reference from person to person that I presented in Chapter 4 views the transmission as cheap and easy, epistemically speaking. To come to have something in mind to refer to by means of hearing someone else refer to it in a language you understand requires no knowledge about the thing referred to, or ability to locate or recognize it. A potential problem for this view of referential “chains of communication” is that it might misclassify cases of reference failure as cases of reference.

Consider a case of iterative exaggeration. George tells Sandra that his sister took a weekend trip to Vegas. In a later conversation, Sandra exaggerates a bit and tells Cassie about her friend’s sister’s having won big in Vegas. Likewise, Cassie exaggerates and tells Farley about a woman she knows having been questioned for hours in Vegas due to her big win. Farley again exaggerates and tells Jean that a woman he heard about escaped with her winnings from a locked questioning room in a Los Vegas casino and is on the lam to this day. And so on. Perhaps eventually there is an “urban legend” about a wild grandmother from St. Louis who won millions at a Vegas casino, shot up the place, and escaped to Mexico.

All of this would have been generated by the supposed transmission of George’s sister from mind to mind. But surely those telling the urban legend are no longer referring to George’s sister. So the cheap and easy view of reference transmission cannot be correct. Perhaps Sandra and Cassie still have George’s sister in mind to refer to, but at some point the next person to hear the story simply acquires too little knowledge or grasp of the referent for the referent to be
passed on to her. Those who tell the story of the wild grandmother do not refer to George’s sister; rather their reference—using expressions like “the wild grandmother who shot up Vegas”—fails.\(^{149}\)

In addressing this concern, it is important to distinguish reference failure from uninformed or misinformed reference. Presumably, there is a difference between failing to refer (i.e., not referentially experiencing anything) and referring, but with little information or misinformation about the thing to which you refer. For instance, the speakers in Kripke’s Feynman and Peano examples do not fail to refer using the names “Feynman” and “Peano,” even though they are woefully under- and mis-informed, respectively, about the individual to which they refer. By contrast, intuitively, many users of “Pegasus” are not under- or mis-informed about some real horse to which they refer, but fail to refer by that name to anything at all.

Returning to the analogy with perception, the distinction between reference failure and under- or mis-informed reference is similar to, but perhaps not quite analogous to, the distinction between perceptual hallucination and illusion. Perceptual illusion is seeing a thing as being some way it is not. This seems to be distinct from seeing it correctly, but judging it incorrectly. Likewise, in the Peano case, for instance, the speaker’s reference to Peano as “Peano” is not illusory. (This might be because Peano, to whom she refers, “is a Peano,” (in the sense of Burge’s view of names as complex demonstratives\(^{150}\)) or it might simply be because his effects on her are picked up using the surface name “Peano.” On the latter way of looking at it, reference using proper names cannot be illusory; such reference is bare detection of a thing in the manner suggested in Chapter 4.)

So we have three categories: hallucination, illusion, and misjudgment. Sometimes the lines between these are fairly clear. If a straight stick partly submerged in a glass of water appears

\(^{149}\) Note that the apparent failure of reference is not explained by the fact that nothing fits such descriptions, since they are used referentially.

\(^{150}\) See Burge 1973.
bent to me, that is an illusion, not a hallucination or a misjudgment. I really am seeing the stick in the glass of water, and I need not judge it to be bent—I may easily correct for the effect of refraction and judge it to be straight. If I am alone in a bare room and I experience pink elephants dancing on the ceiling, that is a hallucination, not an illusion or a misjudgment. If I see a bent stick in a glass without water, and judge the stick to be straight because I think there is water in the glass, that is misjudgment.

But other cases are trickier. What if I am in a room full of people who appear to me as pink elephants? What if the stick in the glass of water appears to me as a bent snake rather than a bent stick? These appearances might be caused partly by elements we would be inclined to consider illusory (the refraction of light at the stick’s base and the gentle waves in the water, pink filters over the room’s lighting and the crafty arrangement of shadows), partly by elements that seem more hallucinatory (some psychological condition from which I suffer), and partly by elements that may be chalked up to misjudgment (perhaps I am a bit paranoid about snakes and jump easily to the conclusion that they are present). Should we say that I see the stick and the people, but see them illusorily as looking like snakes in water or pink elephants? Or should we say that I see them, respectively, illusorily as bent sticks and pink people, and in addition misjudge them to be snakes and pink elephants? Or should we say that in these cases I have hallucinations that are triggered in various ways by actual visual stimulus?

In the case of linguistic reference, the difference between referring to a thing as some way it is not and taking it to be some way it is not is sharper, though the distinction between reference failure and either of these suffers from a parallel lack of sharpness. In the Peano case, for instance, the speakers are misinformed about Peano, and take him to be some way he is not (i.e., they take him to be the discoverer of the axioms of arithmetic), but they do not refer to him as being some way he is not. (They might if they referred to him as “the discoverer of the axioms of arithmetic,” though.) On the other hand, consider the iterative exaggeration case just described. When, exactly, does under/mis-informed reference change to reference failure? It is intuitive
that Sandra refers to George’s sister despite her misinformation (Sandra’s exaggeration need not be intentional: she may have remembered George’s story as being more interesting than it was), and that the later recounts of the urban legend do not refer to George’s sister, but the point where and reason why the shift happens is difficult to identify.

Even if the distinction is vague, we can ask whether it separates speakers who reach some level of informedness from those who do not reach that level. In other words, is the distinction between reference failure and successful reference based on whether the speaker has sufficient knowledge or grasp of the thing to which she would refer if she referred at all?

It is useful to consider clear cases of reference failure. Take the example of “Pegasus.” The precise origin of the character of Pegasus, like that of most ancient Greek mythology, is not known. Let us suppose, as seems likely, that at some point a human being invented the character. A single person might have come up with the whole story of Perseus slaying Medusa and Pegasus’s flight from her neck and later deeds, or it may have been a group effort, with details added along the way. But let us suppose that someone came up with the character of the winged horse. This was an act of imagination, in which no winged horse was created. Thus, the storyteller’s attempt to refer back, using the name “Pegasus,” to a particular thing will fail. The imaginative act involved no awareness of a particular thing, but only, let us say, a bringing together of concepts such as that of a horse and that of wings.

The referring experience is like a visual hallucination: the imaginative act makes it seem as though there was awareness of a winged horse, but there was none, just as an invention of my mind (unaided, let us suppose, by any perceptual input) might make it seem as though I am aware of a pink elephant, though I am not. Of course, the storyteller is well aware that Pegasus does not exist. Likewise, someone having a hallucination of a pink elephant might be well aware that she is hallucinating and the elephant does not exist. Nonetheless, in referring using “Pegasus” the storyteller seems to be aware of something—a winged horse. And in looking around her the hallucinator seems to be aware of something—a pink elephant.
When there is clear invention, unaided by awareness of any actual particular thing as in the Pegasus case just described, reference failure seems assured. Likewise, when my mind is clearly “inventing” a visual experience, unaided and unrestrained by perceptual input, the experience seems clearly to be characterized correctly as a hallucination. Now let me consider a case that is less clear, where successful reference transitions into reference failure.

For this case, consider a somewhat different origin story for the character of Pegasus. Suppose that the author of the character possessed a brilliant white horse, the envy of all his neighbors. He even fashioned a draping of wings for the horse, which the horse proudly wore at all times. And his horse’s name was “Pegasus.” In coming up with his character to tell stories about round the campfire, the author was heavily inspired by his own, flesh and blood, horse. Perhaps the others said, “Tell us a good one!” and he began, “Well, did I ever tell you how I got Pegasus?” and proceeded to tell some version of the Perseus myth. This Pegasus character becomes a regular feature of story time, and it goes from there. The author starts out referring to his real horse Pegasus, but as the story continues, or if not right away, then perhaps on subsequent occasions of story telling, his reference begins to fail. Or so it might be argued. He creates a fictional character based on the real horse, and no longer refers to the horse that inspired the character.

A first thing to note is that it is no longer completely clear that reference fails in this case, either early on in the author’s first story, or centuries and millennia down the line, when Pegasus is an established part of mythology. It is not wildly implausible to say that these are, both initially and later, whether the fact is known or not, fictional stories about a real horse. I acknowledge, though, that intuition might push more strongly in the other direction, toward “Pegasus,” as used in the tradition of these stories, failing to refer. Perhaps our intuitions about the case would be swayed by whether the author intended to impress the neighbors with tall tales about his horse, or whether he intended to entertain them with what they all would know was a fictional story.
This suggests that a clear act of imagination and invention may create what Donnellan called a “block” in our attempts to referentially experience things. If a referring experience is the product of such an act, it cannot reach back past that act, even if that act was inspired by a real particular thing. By comparison, consider a case in which your visual perception of a particular red ball, in one instant, causes you to hallucinate a red ball (looking just the same, or perhaps just the same except having little gnashing teeth or something equally unlikely) in the next. (Suppose the proverbial mad scientist has rigged you up this way.) As you hallucinate, the red ball is still there, reflecting light into your eyes and so on. But the hallucination has “blocked” out the real red ball, so you no longer see it. This comparison makes vivid the idea of a referential block, though it does not explain its mechanism. The point to take from this is that if reference fails in the case of the inspired-by-real-life Pegasus story, the block that prevents reference from succeeding appears to be put in place by the decisive intervention of the imagination.

Compare this to a different case, in which imagination does not intervene decisively, but instead as reference is transmitted from person to person there is a gradual reduction in the speakers’ informedness. Suppose the author in my Pegasus story does not get into storytelling around the campfire at all. He only tells one of his neighbors about his remarkable horse. He goes on and on in a lot of boring detail. Although bored, the neighbor is impressed, and later tells a friend about the horse. He mostly gets the details right, only leaving out some and misreporting others in minor ways. Perhaps he reports the horse as having a few grey hairs on his back legs rather than a few brown hairs, and forgets to mention the horse’s height. Suppose that in this manner word of the horse is passed from person to person and town to town, so that at some point all the news that arrives to a distant town is that a new horse has been acquired in a village somewhere in the land. (Maybe horse acquisition is in general big news in this broad time and place.) Information has been stripped away, but this case seems closer to the Feynman

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151 See Donnellan 1974.
case than to the previous Pegasus cases. The reporters in the distant town are referring to (the real) Pegasus, though they know little about him and could not locate or recognize him. It seems to me that this intuition remains in place even if the story becomes corrupted as well as impoverished, and Pegasus is reported as a cow, or a plow. What is different between this and the other Pegasus cases is invention. No imaginative block is put in place, so transmission of reference proceeds.

This discussion suggests that the difference between reference failure and under/mis-informed reference success is not sharp. Even in cases where we are strongly inclined to diagnose reference failure, but where a particular object has inspired the reference, the intuition of reference failure is not unequivocal. But to the extent that some attempted transmissions of reference are indeed “blocked,” what blocks them is not a loss of knowledge about the candidate referent on the part of speaker or audience, but the decisive intervention of imaginative invention. This is in close parallel with the grounds for making out the (also fuzzy) distinction between perceptual hallucination and illusion or misjudgment.

To this it might be objected that not all reference failure is the product of the imaginative creation of fictions. Sometimes people fail to refer without realizing it. A child might tell her father about her friend “Mindy,” and her father may in turn tell the child’s mother, “Mindy is a new friend of Lauren’s from school. Lauren wants to invite her to dinner tomorrow.” If Mindy is an imaginary friend, the father’s reference fails. It is an open question whether children in general believe their imaginary friends are real, but if they do, then here we have reference failure without deliberate invention. Another kind of case is that of a schizophrenic who believes she is being stalked by a government agent. She has not deliberately invented this character, but nonetheless when she says, “The agent who’s following me is getting more aggressive,” her reference fails. In a different kind of case, Leverrier hypothesized the planet Vulcan in light of

\[152\] See Taylor 1999 for discussion.
the failure of Mercury’s orbit to conform to the predictions of classical mechanics. Leverrier did not deliberately invent the fictional planet, yet his reference using “Vulcan” failed.

To be sure, the decisive role of invention that I proposed is needed for reference failure does not have to be deliberate. Nonetheless, all of these cases do have a decisive role for invention. The child invented the friend, the schizophrenic invented the stalking FBI agent, and Leverrier invented Vulcan. Each had their motivations (of which they might be more or less aware): for companionship, to make sense of an unshakeable feeling of danger, to explain the irregularities in Mercury’s orbit. But one need not be aware that one is using one’s imagination in order to use it.

While not fatal to the cheap and easy view of the transmission of reference, the possibility of reference failure does raise challenges for the direct realist picture of referential experience that I have been developing, just as the possibility of hallucination does for the direct realist view of perceptual experience. The next two sections discuss this challenge.

5.3 The problem of perceptual experience

To get a grip on problems facing Referential Direct Realism, it will be useful to review quickly the classical challenge to naïve or direct realism about perceptual experience, since the problems will be analogous. A sprawling literature in the philosophy of perception of the past half-century investigates the possibility of preserving, or the advisability of not preserving, the naïve view of perceptual experience in light of the challenge from hallucination and illusion. I cannot, in the present work, boil it all down and capture all of its potential lessons for Referential Direct Realism. Instead, I will explain what I take to be at the heart of the challenge, what I take to be at the heart of resistance to a broad way of resolving it, and outline a strategy for easing this resistance. Then, in the next section, I will apply this approach to the problems of perceptual experience to parallel problems of what I have been calling “referential experience.”
First, a quick review of the challenge. Naïve realism holds that veridical perceptual experience is a relation to things perceived. The way things seem “from the inside” to the perceiving subject directly involves the particular objects she perceives and their instantiation of the properties, features, or attributes she perceives them as having. Her subjective experience is a kind of contact with these particulars, these instantiations of certain properties.

The overall problem of hallucination and illusion is that, intuitively, for any way that a veridical perceptual experience is from the inside, a hallucination or illusion could be exactly the same way from the inside. In the case of a hallucination, this would be so even though there would be no relation to a particular thing perceived. Given this, how could the veridical experience be, from the inside, a relation to a particular thing, if the experience could be the same from the inside without the requisite relatum? In the case of illusion, the experience could be the same from the inside as the veridical experience even though there would be no relation to an instantiation of the properties experienced. Given this, how could the veridical experience be, from the inside, a relation to a particular instantiation (i.e., to a particular thing instantiating these properties), if the experience could be the same from the inside without a relation to that instantiation?

The problem is that a veridical experience, hypothesized to be a direct relation to a particular thing instantiating certain properties, intuitively could be just the same from the inside in the absence of that thing, or in the absence of that instantiation. However, one need not appeal to hallucination and illusion to generate this problem. Consider a veridical visual perception of a red ball against a white background. Is it not intuitive that some other visual experience, also a veridical perception, but of a different but extremely similar red ball against a different but extremely similar white background, might be exactly the same way from the inside as this experience? In other words, could not the experience be just the same in the absence of that particular ball, that particular background, that particular instantiation of redness, and so on?
Here we have the problem without any appeal to perceptual misfire or inaccuracy. It seems to me that a naïve realist should view these experiences as being different from the inside, as being of different phenomenal kinds, as it might be put. She should view them this way because her position is that the way a veridical experience is from the inside is a relation to a particular thing instantiating certain properties. This creates a problem for naïve realism, since, intuitively, these experiences are not different from the inside; they are the same from the inside. The case shows that the heart of the problems of illusion and hallucination is not generated by the possibility of perceptual error, but by the intuition that the way experiences seem from the inside does not include any sort of marker of the particular thing they are of.

In my view, naïve realists about perceptual experience cannot accept this intuition at face value. The claim that hallucinatory and illusory experiences might be the same, from the inside, as veridical perceptual experiences, or that the experience of one red ball might be the same, from the inside, as the experience of a different red ball, is in direct contradiction of the naïve realist position that how the veridical experiences are from the inside is that they are contact with, or relations to, particular objects. If naïve realism is correct, then hallucinations and illusions cannot be the same from the inside as veridical perceptions, and veridical perceptions of one thing cannot be the same from the inside as veridical perceptions of another thing.

This seems to put the naïve realist in a difficult and counterintuitive position. As discussed, it seems that the consequent of the sentence at the end of the last paragraph is intuitively false. But this intuition merits some examination. I have presented the intuition in terms of various claims that, intuitively, two different experiences might be the same from the inside. Now, obviously, no two experiences are the same experience, so the intuition is that these experiences are the same in some “inside” respect. By hypothesis, that respect is not their presentation of the same particular object. So what is it? The natural thing to say is that intuitively they would seem the same to me, so the respect in which they are the same is the way they seem to me. But this is just to repeat that intuitively they would be the same from the inside, and provides no further
specification of the respect in which they would be the same. One could say that they would have the same phenomenal character, or phenomenal qualities, but again this is either just to put new terms to the same idea, or it is to postulate theoretical entities that presumably are not part of the intuition of sameness.

Because the intuitive respect of sameness is so tricky to pin down, those seeking a neutral characterization of the intuition often employ the notion of indiscriminability. On these construals, the intuition that makes trouble for naïve realism is that the different experiences could not be distinguished by the experiencer: she would not be able to tell them apart. They would be, in the standard terminology, “indiscriminable.” This is also a tricky intuition, since one can only have one experience at a time, so discrimination of one experience from another will always involve memory and comparison, and thus might not be a perfect guide to any intrinsic “phenomenal qualities” of either experience. Importantly, once the intuition is put in these terms, it no longer directly contradicts the view of the naïve realist. For the claim that a person would not be able to tell the difference between, say, a veridical experience of a red ball and a hallucination of one is consistent with the claim that nonetheless there would be a difference between the two experiences, and even that there would be a difference in how they are for her, from the inside.

Views that are typically called “disjunctivist” make hay out of this bit of breathing room, making the case, in various specific ways, that veridical perceptual experiences are not the same from the inside as illusory or hallucinatory experiences. It seems to me that the primary complaint against disjunctivism, in spirit if not in letter, is that it does not seem plausible that such a big and important difference in the way things seem to you as the absence of the thing that shapes your experience would be undetectable by you.

Other arguments suggest that there might be some differences in the way things seem to you that you do not detect. A famous example involves comparing color swatches of slightly different hues. Your visual experience of swatch 1 may seem the same as your visual experience of swatch
2 in side by side comparison, and likewise for swatches 2 and 3 and 3 and 4, and yet, a side by side comparison of 1 and 4 might provide experiences that you can discriminate. Assuming that your ability to discriminate 1 from 4 implies that your experience of 1 and your experience of 4 are different from the inside, this suggests that your experiences of 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4, respectively, were different from the inside even though you could not tell they were different, since sameness in any given respect is transitive.¹⁵³

But this seems to be a very different kind of case from that of not being able to discriminate a hallucination from a veridical perception. The color swatch case is one in which, presumably, there is a very small difference in how things are from the inside that you cannot detect, but as it increases, you become able to detect it. By contrast, if the naïve realist were correct that how things are from the inside in a veridical perception is presenting this particular thing, then the absence of that thing should be a very big difference between the veridical perception and the hallucination. There is no obvious way to make the difference bigger, as happens in the color comparison case, such that eventually it might be detected.

This, then, is what I think is so hard to swallow about disjunctivism. The idea that I might be unable to detect such a big difference in how things seem to me between two experiences runs counter to the grip we take ourselves to have, at least on our own inside perspective, across different experiences. But naïve realism needs disjunctivism, where disjunctivism is understood as claiming that certain indiscriminable experiences are nonetheless not the same from the inside. At least, naïve realism needs disjunctivism if the intuition is accepted that a veridical perception of an object might be indiscriminable from a hallucination, illusion, or veridical perception of a different object.

Some naïve realists have argued against disjunctivism about experiences on the grounds that naïve realism can and should instead embrace disjunctivism about the objects of experience. In this way of thinking, veridical perceptual experiences and hallucinations and illusions might be

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¹⁵³ Siegel 2004 gives a detailed example. Putnam 1999 deploys considerations of this kind in defense of naïve realism.
the same kind of experience in the sense of presenting or relating directly to their objects, and yet differ in that they present or relate to different objects. However, it seems to me that from the perspective of naïve realism, this still amounts to disjunctivism about experiences, because for a naïve realist an experience of a different thing is an experience that is of a different kind from the inside.

So the challenge for the naïve realist is to make disjunctivism more palatable. I think this can be done by adapting some aspects of the putatively anti-disjunctivist approach just mentioned. The form of disjunctivism that this approach has targeted appeals to a notion of fundamentality, and claims that the fundamental experiential, or from-the-inside, nature of veridical perceptual experiences is relational while the fundamental from-the-inside nature of hallucinatory or illusory ones is not. The approach involves arguing that in fact it is plausible that both veridical and non-veridical experiences are relational, and so of the same fundamental from-the-inside kind. The difference is that veridical experiences are relations to different kinds of things from non-veridical experiences. In particular, the strategy is to claim that veridical experiences are experiences of properties (or universals)–the ways things seem to the subject–as well as particular objects’ instantiation of these properties. Hallucinatory experiences, by contrast, are experiences only of properties and not of the particular objects instantiating them. Illusory experiences are of sensible properties and some of their instantiations by particulars, but not of all of their instantiations by particulars. This is supposed to both explain what might be in common between certain veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences, while blocking the implication that the experiences are thus of fundamentally different kinds.

Ultimately, I do not think that such accounts offer a full defense of naïve realism from the challenges discussed, nor are they non-disjunctive. As discussed above in the example of the indiscriminable veridical perceptual experiences of different red balls, from the perspective of naïve realism, a difference between two experiences with respect to what is presented in the

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154 The approach is pioneered by Johnston 2004, and adapted as a defense of naïve realism by Conduct 2012.
experiences is a difference, a *big* difference, in the way they are from the inside, and thus in the relevant nature of the experience. Thus, the problem stands of how to reconcile naïve realism with the intuition that in such cases the difference would, intuitively, be undetectable.

But the approach does offer some resources here. It suggests a way of making plausible our intuitively established inability to discriminate between pairs of experiences that, according to naïve realism, are very different indeed, from the inside. Instead of being an alternative to disjunctivism, the approach may provide the tools to defend its plausibility.

Discrimination involves comparison. Comparison calls upon properties, universals, ways things are. To compare two apples, I have to consider their color, their shape, their taste, and so on. I cannot compare their particular identities. At issue in the present discussion is the comparison of two experiences, two *ways things are from the inside*. To compare these from-the-inside experiences, I need to consider their properties. Their properties are not ways things are from the inside. *They* are ways things are from the inside. For the naïve realist, the way a veridical experience is from the inside is the presence of *x instantiating F*, for some object *x* and some features *F*.

This is what the arguments from hallucination and illusion are supposed to show cannot be the case. For one could have an experience indiscriminable from such an experience in the absence of *x instantiating F*. The approach under consideration attempts to explain that indiscriminability by appeal to the fact that an experience is in common across such a pair: the experience of, i.e., direct relation to, the property or universal *F*. I have argued that this does not explain indiscriminability from a naïve realist perspective, since for a naïve realist someone having a veridical perceptual experience is directly related to *x instantiating F*, not to *F* uninstantiated or instantiated by something else, and this is a difference in how the experiences are from the inside.
However, these ideas might help explain how there could be indiscriminability between two experiences even though there is in fact a real difference in how the experiences are from the inside. While a veridical perceptual experience may be contact with an instantiation of F by x, that contact cannot involve experiencing the instantiation as an instantiation of F by x. The reason is that this, too, would have to be a veridical experience, since of course the instantiation of F by x is an instantiation of F by x. But then this would require that the perceiver experience not only the instantiation of F by x and the property of being an instantiation of F by x, but also the instantiation of this latter property by this particular instantiation. And this would iterate, requiring the perceiver to experience an infinite number of instantiations. That would produce an extremely implausible account of perceptual experience. So instantiations of properties by particular objects are experienced by perceivers in veridical perception, but they are not experienced as thus-and-so.

This means that in neither a veridical nor a non-veridical experience would one experience the instantiation of a property like being an instantiation of F by x, where x is some particular thing. Thus, when comparing two experiences, one an experience of x instantiating F and one merely an experience of F (as in a hallucination), the only property one would have been in contact with in either experience would be F. The particular x’s instantiation of F would not show up in any experienced property. But the ways the experiences are from the inside can be compared only with respect to the properties that the subjects experience in having them. Thus, in making a comparison, they will not be able to discriminate between the two, because the respect in which the two experiences are different for them is in the particular instantiations they experience, not in the properties they experience and could employ in making a comparison.

The foregoing is not intended as a comprehensive answer to the problem of perception on behalf of the naïve realist. It is only intended to highlight the basic way in which I think the problem gets a grip on naïve realism, the way in which disjunctivism seems unavoidable by the
naïve realist, and one reason for thinking that disjunctivism may not be as counterintuitive as it seems at first blush. My primary interest is in the way these considerations apply to Referential Direct Realism. The next section takes this up.

5.4 The problem of referential experience

I explained in Chapter 4 the ways in which referential experience can be “illusory”—we can refer to things as ways they are not, at least if we use descriptions referentially—and “hallucinatory,” or failed. It is also, obviously, the case that one can refer to many different things as, simply, “John,” or “that guy,” or “this,” creating plenty of cases parallel to the red ball case discussed in the previous section. There may be other modes of experience that help to differentiate such pairs, for instance associative thinking. My overall experience of referring using “John” to John Smith may therefore be quite different from my overall experience of referring using “John” to John Jones. Likewise, if the two red balls in the example each were emitting a distinctive sound, different from one another, in the two experiences, the overall experience of each would be different. Nonetheless, they would be visually indiscriminable, as the two experiences of referring using “John” may be linguistically indiscriminable.

A linguistic case that removes differentiation from other modes of experience is the following. Consider my experience of referring to the pianist Liberace. Liberace had a twin who died at birth. It is imaginable that if Liberace had died at birth and his twin lived, the twin might have pursued the musical career and acquired the fame that Liberace actually pursued and acquired. In such a case, my experience of referring, using “Liberace,” to this twin might be just the same from the inside, linguistically and in all other ways, as my actual experience of referring to Liberace. But again, how could this be if the way my actual experience is, from the inside, is a direct relation to Liberace?
Given all of this, how could successful referential experience be, from the inside, direct contact with the particular thing referred to? The first step in addressing the problem in line with the strategy sketched in the previous section for dealing with the problem of perceptual experience is to treat successful referential experience, as it is from the inside, as direct contact with a particular thing instantiating a property or attribute. In the case of reference using a proper name “N,” I have suggested that the attribute whose instantiation is experienced might be as bare as activating or being focused by the surface phonetic features of “N.” In the case of reference using a definite description like “the man drinking a martini,” instantiations of attributes such as being a man and drinking a martini might also be experienced.

On this picture of things, what is the difference between my successful referential experience of Aristotle, using “Aristotle,” and my failed referential experience using “Aristotle” in an imagined case in which the whole Aristotle tradition is an elaborate ruse? In the successful case, my experience is direct contact with Aristotle’s instantiation of the attribute of activating a certain series of phonetic features in my speech. In the failed case, my experience is direct contact with this same attribute, but uninstantiated. In parallel with what I claimed about naïve realism, Referential Direct Realism should view these referring experiences as different from the inside. However, the intuition of indiscriminability, in spite of real difference, is explained, as above, by the fact that the instantiation of the attribute by Aristotle is experienced in the successful case, but not experienced as such, and thus yields no experienced property to set it apart in comparison with the failed case.

In Donnellan’s case of (successfully, but, if you will, illusorily) referring to someone drinking water as a man drinking a martini, the speaker has direct contact with a particular’s instantiation of the attribute of being picked up in her speech by a certain surface expression. She also has direct contact, perhaps, with certain attributes: being a man, drinking a martini.

\[155\] Note that simply referring to him as “the man drinking a martini” is not illusory, since that is the surface expression he is picked up by in your speech. What is illusory is referring to him as drinking a martini. See discussion in 4.4.3.
Recall from the discussion in Chapter 4 that these attributes were part of the network of associations involved in activating the particular linguistic expression that she used. The utterance of this expression, “the man drinking a martini,” highlights these attributes that are so closely linked in her mind to the component expressions, allowing her to experience them as well as the man to whom she refers. That is not to say that she refers to the attribute of being a man or drinking a martini. She refers to the man as having these attributes, and thus they are part of her experience. The particular tool she uses to refer, because of its descriptive nature, allows her to bring into focus more features of the thing to which she refers, even if inaccurately. (This is like the case of the microscope allowing one to misperceive the bump as a dent, but at least to resolve the feature at all.) 156

Finally, in the many cases of referring to different particular objects in the very same way, this account allows that these experiences are all different from the inside. They are different referential experiences from the inside, and not merely differentiated by other kinds of cognitive experience. In the Liberace case, my experience is a direct relation to Liberace’s instantiation of the attribute of being picked up by this surface name, “Liberace.” My experience of referring to Liberace’s twin would be different, from the inside. Nonetheless, the two would be indiscriminable because of the lack of experienced properties that would differentiate them upon comparison.

5.5 Referential Direct Realism, direct reference, and reference puzzles

The foregoing is a strategy for defending a picture of linguistic reference that is direct in a certain sense: the sense of “direct” that has been operative in discussions of perceptual experience. Various views and claims about linguistic reference use the term “direct,” so let me be clear about the directness of my picture. The picture is direct in that it portrays referring

156 See 4.4.3.
experience as a relation to the thing referred to, rather than as a representational state involving a linguistic representation type. This picture differs from other views that might go under the heading of “direct reference” views because of its focus on referring experience. The picture locates the way in which reference is direct in the experience of referring. The experience is simply a relation to an object, not a representation of it.

This is a different idea from what Kaplan, who coined the term, called “direct reference.” There are affinities between the two ideas, however. Kaplan illustrated his idea of direct reference using the notion of a singular proposition. He said that one could think of a directly referential expression as contributing a particular object to a proposition expressed using it, rather than contributing any sort of descriptive attribute or condition. Thus, Kaplan got the idea of direct reference across by asking us to envision a kind of abstract structured entity, a proposition, with a concrete object as a constituent of it. Importantly, on this picture—and, as Kaplan stressed, it was “really a picture and not a theory”—what was in the proposition was the object itself, not a representation of it. Similarly, in my Referential Direct Realist picture the object itself is in the referring experience: the referring experience is contact with that object, not the representation of that object (nor, as a counterpart of the sense datum theorist might hold, contact with a stand-in of some kind for the object). So at least the way that Kaplan illustrated his notion of direct reference has something in common with my notion of Referential Direct Realism.

Like direct or naïve realism about perceptual experience, Referential Direct Realism faces a challenge from its own version of the arguments from hallucination and illusion, which I have diagnosed as symptoms of the more general problem that experiences of different particulars instantiating attributes (with the limit case being no particulars instantiating attributes, as in reference failure) intuitively may not be discriminable from one another. While these puzzles, in

157 See Kaplan 1989, especially pp. 494-497. Kaplan never made such singular propositions part of his official view. They were for illustrative purposes only.
these forms, about linguistic reference have not exercised philosophers, closely related puzzles have been classic problems for “direct” views of linguistic reference, at least as far back as Mill’s view that names just name, and do not have meaning or significance beyond naming particular things. Perhaps the two most classic are Frege’s puzzle of informative identity statements and the puzzle of significant statements involving reference failure. In this section, I will explain how these classic puzzles about linguistic reference can be understood as versions of the problems of referential experience that I have been discussing.

5.5.1 Frege’s puzzle of informative identity statements

As presented by Frege, the puzzle of identity statements is how to explain the difference in what Frege calls “cognitive value” between a sentence in which the same name occurs on either side of a copula (as in “Hesperus is Hesperus”–Frege describes this schematically as a sentence of the form “a=a”) and a sentence in which different names occur on either side of the copula (as in “Hesperus is Phosphorus”–Frege describes this schematically as a sentence of the form “a=b”), if both names refer to the same thing. The difference in cognitive value, according to Frege, is that any sentence of the first kind is analytic and knowable a priori, whereas sentences of the second kind may not be knowable a priori and may be informative—“valuable extensions of our knowledge.” There would seem to be a difficulty in explaining this for a view, like Mill’s, which holds that names only name things: that all one does in using a name is refer to the thing named. For on such a view, there appear to be no resources to explain why the use of a different name, as long as the thing referred to is the same, would make a difference.

As is well known, Frege solves this problem by abandoning the view that names only name things (so that the assertion of identity involving two names would simply involve relating an object to itself), and asserting that names also have senses that determine these referents. It is at

\[158 \text{In Frege 1892.}\]
the level of sense that cognitive value is to be found, so identity statements involving two
different names (with two different senses) will have different cognitive significance from
identity statements involving just a single name, with a single sense, used twice.

As Stavroula Glezakos has argued, this is not a puzzle, as presented. This can be seen by
asking what is required for a sentence to be of the form “a=a” rather than “a=b.” If what is
required is simply for the same sign (where a sign is, roughly, Almog’s notion of a surface name)
to be repeated on either side of the copula, then it is not the case that statements of the form
“a=a” will be knowable a priori and constitute no valuable extension of knowledge. To see this
one only need notice that two things may have the same name. Since “Jessica Pepp” is a name
for several people, it could certainly be the case that the sentence “Jessica Pepp is Jessica Pepp,”
as used on some occasion would not only not be knowable a priori, but would be false. If we
add to the requirement that the same sign for the same referent must be repeated, we still do not
get Frege’s result. I may think that I know two people both named “Bill Smith.” One is a
sensible, quiet man I chat with on the bus each morning. Another is a stand-up comic who
performs weekly at a comedy club I frequent. At some point I may develop a hypothesis, and
then confirm this hypothesis, that I might express as, “Bill Smith is Bill Smith.” Supposing this is
true, it was not knowable a priori and valuably extends my knowledge. Thus, these two ways of
making out the requirement for being of one form rather than the other do not support the
obvious difference in cognitive value between the forms that Frege claims. The difference may
be supported, Glezakos notes, if what is required to be of the form “a=a” rather than “a=b” is for
the same sign with the same sense to be repeated, rather than any signs (same or different) with
different senses. But this would be to use the theoretical notion of sense to establish the
existence of the puzzle that the notion is supposed to solve. The view that names simply name,
and do not have anything like sense, is not vulnerable to a puzzle generated in this way.

159 In Glezakos 2009.

160 I am adding this way of making out the requirement in terms of repeating the same sign. Glezakos deals only with
the next two ways of making it out that I will discuss.
I think Glezakos is right that Frege has not articulated any genuine puzzle for those who hold that names, as used, simply refer to their referents. A critical point emerging from her discussion is that whether an identity statement is informative or not depends not on its “form,” but on the way it is being used on a particular occasion. In the example above, the double use of the same name (“Bill Smith”) with the copula of identity extends my knowledge in exactly the same way that the statement, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” might have extended a Babylonian’s.

There might still be a puzzle lurking, though, along the lines of: how can any identity statement be informative, or knowledge-extending, whatever its “form”? Another way of posing this question is, how could experiences of referring twice to the same thing be indiscriminable from experiences of referring first to one thing, then to another? For instance, I take it that Senator Joe Lieberman and actor Max Wright are two different people, despite looking and sounding quite a bit alike. I might say, “Joe Lieberman and Max Wright look and sound quite a lot alike.” The experience I have in doing so is, intuitively, indiscriminable from the experience I would be having if in fact there was just one person who has been going by these two names and carrying out the various political and theatrical exploits that we take to have been carried out by two different men. It is because of this intuition that such experiences would be indiscriminable that it is also intuitive that identity statements could be informative. For one who was in the counterfactual situation described would be informed by being told, “Joe Lieberman is Max Wright.” If her experience were discriminable from the experience in the actual situation where there are two distinct men, then the identity statement would not be informative to her. Indeed, in making the statement, “Joe Lieberman and Max Wright look and sound quite a lot alike,” she would be joking or attempting to mislead.

The same would go for an identity statement like, “Paderewski is Paderewski,” or simply “That is that.” All of these can be informative because an experience of referring to two different

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161 The famous example from Kripke 1979.
things successively using these expressions is, intuitively, referentially indiscriminable from an experience of referring with them to the same thing twice.

This shows how the puzzle of informative identity statements can be seen as a version of the general problem of referential experience. If the approach to this problem that I have sketched is on the right track, then the solution to the puzzle involves recognizing the practical upshots of indiscriminability: sometimes we cannot tell whether we are referring to two different things, or twice to the same thing. This is not because the two experiences are the same, from the inside. They are different, as one is successive contact with two different things through one's mind, and one is contact with the same thing twice. But comparison by attributes experienced will not pick up this difference.

5.5.2 Significant statements involving reference failure

Some similar points can be made about the problem of significant statements involving reference failure. Here, the basic problem for any view on which names (as used) serve only to refer to particular objects is that a name, as used, may fail to refer to any particular object. Examples include the already discussed cases of uses of “Pegasus” and “Vulcan.” Yet, these expressions, as used, and the statements made using them, still seem to be meaningful, or significant. Saying, “Pegasus flew,” is not the same as saying, “Flew,” with a little blank space or gasp at the start of the utterance, or to saying, “Blugabluga flew,” where “Blugabluga” is a nonsense word that just pops into your head. Your use of the name “Pegasus,” in particular, has some importance to your and your audience’s experience. As it is usually put, it is “meaningful” or “significant.” Where does this significance come from, if all the name could do is refer and yet
it does not refer? Why is “Pegasus,” as used, significant, while “Blugabluga” would not be? More generally, why are some non-referring expressions significant, while others are not?  

This divide between significance and non-significance can be understood as a divide between ways people experience particular utterances. If a tic or other misfire leads me to utter, “Blugabluga,” I do not experience this in the way I experience referring. Nothing seems present to my mind through this utterance; nothing seems to be picked up by the surface phonetic string “Blugabluga.” By contrast, if I utter “Pegasus,” as a result of a chain of mental activity that began with my being told the story of Perseus and Pegasus and the rest, this well may be a referring experience, an experience involving the feeling of a particular object’s presence to mind. This is like the difference between hallucinating a pink elephant and losing one’s vision momentarily. If I hallucinate a pink elephant, I have a visual experience, involving the feeling of a particular object’s presence before me. If I just lose my vision, I have no visual experience, as, in the “Blugabluga” case, I have no referring experience.

As already discussed, my knowing that I am not really referring to anything by “Pegasus” does not undermine the fact that I am having a referring experience as if I were, any more than my knowing I am hallucinating undermines the fact that I am having a visual experience as if there were a pink elephant before me. My referring experience using “Pegasus” is linguistically significant in much the same way that my visual experience while hallucinating is visually significant—it is not just a blackout in my visual experience.

Understood as a problem about referring experience, the problem of significant but failed reference closely parallels the problem of hallucination for naïve or direct realism about perceptual experience. For the problem becomes: how could a referring experience, such as my referring to Aristotle using “Aristotle,” be a relation to a particular thing, Aristotle, as Referential

162 I am assuming that your utterance of “Blugabluga” here is not a case of your having misremembered Pegasus’s name or having forgotten it altogether and substituted a made-up placeholder. People often do this, as in, “You know, what’s his name—whosydiggy—he brought the beer.” There, “whosydiggy,” as used, might refer to a particular person, Bill Smith or whoever it may be. I am imagining a case where some tic, perhaps, makes you blurt out “Blugabluga,” with no involvement of any thinking that has origins in the story of Pegasus.
Direct Realism holds, if I could have an experience that would seem just the same—be just as significant—without it being a referring experience of any particular thing, as in the case of “Pegasus”? In turn, on the approach I am suggesting, the solution is that referring experience can very well be a relation to a particular (instantiating, e.g., the attribute of being picked up by the surface name “Aristotle”), and hence be different, from the inside, to an experience of reference failure. This is not in conflict with the intuition that such experiences could be indiscriminable, because discrimination requires comparison, which is on the basis of experienced properties, and the needed higher order properties are not experienced.

**Conclusion**

Analogous problems threaten Referential Direct Realism as threaten naïve realism about perceptual experience. While these problems have not typically been addressed as such, puzzles about reference that have been of traditional interest can be seen as versions of these problems. This chapter has attempted to distill the essence of these problems, which is that differences in which particular things and instantiations a perceiver or a speaker encounters in perceiving or referring intuitively would not show up in comparisons of different experiences. I have explained that the insensitivity of comparisons to such differences need not imply sameness in the experiences compared. In fact, there is a very good reason why comparisons would be insensitive in this way even though the experiences are different. The reason is that for the comparisons to pick up such differences would require an unrealistic proliferation of experienced instantiations.

Together with the motivation explained in Chapter 4, this provides an initial case for Referential Direct Realism. The Focus Picture of linguistic reference that I set out in Chapter 4, which is a Referential Direct Realist picture, stands as a viable alternative to the Capture Picture and its various developments.
CONCLUSION

I will conclude by providing a bird’s eye view of the project in which this dissertation has been engaged. I first emphasize, as I have throughout the dissertation, that analogy plays a central role in my discussion. One reason for this is that it is not clear how else to get started on a study of linguistic reference. We intuitively have some sense of what linguistic reference is, but since we cannot see, hear, or touch it, we soon have need for pictures and imagery even to set out what it is we wish to understand. Certainly, historical approaches to the topic have been heavily grounded in analogies, with much effort put into finding better analogies by which to pin down the slippery phenomenon of reference.

But another reason for the centrality of analogy is that much of my discussion is a kind of reversal of an analogy with a long pedigree in the philosophy of perception. This is the analogy between perceptual experience and language. Intentionalists or representationalists about perceptual experience have long drawn this analogy as a way to deal with the problem of perception. How is it possible that a veridical and an illusory or hallucinatory experience could be indiscriminable? It is possible because perceptual experience, like language, is representational, and so can represent things as being ways they are not, including representing particular things that do not exist. I reverse this strategy insofar as I develop a picture of linguistic reference by drawing an analogy with perception. In light of what I argue to be the failure of other standard pictures, the analogy with perception provides an alternative way of picturing reference.

Consider the perceptual representationalist’s strategy in more detail. The idea behind the strategy is that the features of perceptual experience that generate the problem of perception—the non-guarantee of the existence of things or instantiation of properties experienced—are also features of language, and yet are unproblematic with respect to language. Like perceptual experience, language guarantees neither the existence of things, nor the instantiations of
properties, spoken of. This is not a problem about language, the thinking goes, because language is representational, and representations can stray from reality. So, if we can see our way to treating perceptual experience, too, as representational, the problem of perception is solved.

Stepping back for a moment from the term “representation,” let us look more closely at the unproblematicity of language’s non-guarantee. In the case of perception, the problem of perception is a tension, of which only one side is this non-guarantee of existence or instantiation. The other side of the tension is the intuition of presence: the naïve sense that my perceptual experience directly involves the things and properties I experience; that my experience is a relation I bear to them. There is a problem because these two intuitive ideas about perceptual experience are in tension. For there not to be a parallel problem with respect to language, given that there is one side of the tension, there must not to be the other. The intuition of presence must be missing.

This gives some insight into the operative notion of representation. First, note that what must be the desired analog of perceptual experience is linguistic experience, not just “language” in some broader sense. The crucial intuition with respect to perception is not merely that we might have perceptual experience as of things that do not exist, or as of things instantiating properties they do not. It is that such experiences might be indiscriminable from veridical experiences. Without the indiscriminability intuition, there is no problem, since the discriminability of these experiences from veridical ones might well be explained by their not seeming like the presence of these things and properties. This means that for language to be a useful analogy, the analogous phenomenon with respect to language must include this intuitive indiscriminability as well. The analogous phenomenon is not merely that some uses of language fail to refer or claim that things are ways they are not. It is that such uses are potentially indiscriminable from uses that succeed in referring or are truthful. But then the question is, indiscriminable to whom? It is not that they are indiscriminable to anyone, from any perspective. This is in the same way that the intuition about perception is not that there are
potential hallucinations (for instance) that no one could distinguish from veridical perceptions. An outside observer would typically be able to distinguish someone’s having a hallucination from their having a veridical perception. Even in trickier cases, a sophisticated neuroscientist would likely be able to tell. At any rate, the intuition is that the person having the experience would not be able to tell. This shows that the intuition in play is about a certain perspective on language: language as experienced by its users. In David Kaplan’s phrase, the intuition is about “what it is like to live within the language.”\textsuperscript{163}

Given this, the unproblematicity of this indiscriminability intuition about language relies on our not having the intuition, even naïvely, that our linguistic experience is the presence or presentation of the things of which we speak. The experience is representation: it stands for things (and their instantiation of various properties) in the absence of these things and instantiations.

One lesson of this dissertation is that with respect to linguistic referring experience, this intuition of absence (as opposed to the intuition of presence in the case of perceptual experience) can be undercut. As just discussed, the intuition of absence is closely connected to the idea that referring expressions stand for the things to which they refer: they are present in experience in place of those things. This might be because they “save” that referent, as on the Save Picture of proper name reference. It might be because they save a rule that picks out that referent when applied to a context of use. It might be because they express a condition that picks out that referent. Whatever the specifics, this standing for a particular thing is independent of the thing’s presence in the speaker’s experience. This is illustrated most clearly in thinking about the Condition View, which allowed that someone isolated alone in a room, who has never heard of Aristotle or read any of his works, can form a phonetic string, \texttt{ˈærəstəl}, associate with it the condition of being the greatest philosopher of antiquity, and thereby refer using that expression

\textsuperscript{163} Kaplan ms.
to Aristotle. But the more modern versions of the Save Picture also embrace this idea of linguistic reference without presence. For they treat names as repositories which, once invested with their referents, stand for those things whenever used, regardless of what the speaker has in mind on a given occasion.

I have tried to argue that these pictures are inaccurate. Linguistic referring is always to things that at least seem to be present in mind. Presence in mind is not the same as presence in a visual field, for instance, but it is an analogous kind of presence. The attempt to hive off a kind of reference that expressions have independently of what is present in mind, through the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference, turns out to be a means of insulating any view of the reference relation from counterexamples. It involves stipulating a relation rather than illuminating an intuitive phenomenon.

These arguments put pressure on the view of language as an unproblematic case by analogy with which to solve the problem of perception. Instead, linguistic experience—at least, linguistic referring experience—faces its own tension between intuitive presence and indiscriminability intuitions. I have made a preliminary case for upholding the intuition of presence and maintaining a Referential Direct Realist picture of linguistic referring experience.

The notion of linguistic reference has played an important role in modern formal semantic theory. Richard Montague’s project of treating English as a formal language, and its followers, have aimed to show how values might be assigned recursively to any complex expression of English (or other natural language) given an assignment of values to basic expressions. This approach models linguistic significance on a structure for a logical notation, consisting of a universe of individuals and an interpretation function mapping any well-formed expression of the notation to some individual in the universe (which might be a truth value) or to some set of individuals, set of ordered pairs of individuals, or the like. In the case of a natural language, the

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individuals in the universe of the structure to be specified would correspond to the actual
individuals talked about in the language, the sets of individuals to the properties attributed, and
so on. (For a logical notation, structures may be specified in any way one likes, but in modeling a
natural language in this way we aim to match the already existing semantics of the language.)
The natural language counterparts of the (well formed) strings of a logical notation are linguistic
expressions, including referring expressions. Linguistic reference, then, is modeled as the
mapping of referring expressions to their values, the individuals to which they refer.

But what are referring expressions? The closest approximation seems to be Almog’s
“surface” expressions, or perhaps in the case of names, surface expressions combined with some
sort of disambiguating mark, a whispered inner subscript, so to speak. Referring expressions are
the constituents of the “inside” experience of linguistic reference, which need mapping to the
“outside” individuals for which they may stand. In this way, formal semantics treats linguistic
reference as a mysterious connection between one kind of entity—an inside, experiential entity:
the expression—and another kind of entity, an outside particular thing. Grounding this
connection requires answering the Reference Determination Question.

But this model of linguistic reference, and of natural language in general, assumes the
Capture Picture from the outset, in its strict separation, and need for reconnection, between
inside and outside. It assumes that an object referred to could not be “on the inside,” and be as
much a part of the speaker’s referring experience as the surface name she uses. If this
assumption were questioned, and if a Referential Direct Realist picture were auditioned to
replace the Capture Picture, standing word-object links would no longer immediately be at the
center of the project of understanding how language reveals the world to us. For a separation
between word and object, inside and outside, would no longer be presumed at the outset.
Instead, we might approach this project in much the way we approach the project of
understanding how perception reveals the world to us. Broadly, this is through a combination of
empirical research on the relevant systems and philosophical inquiry into the nature of experience.

So my message might be summed up by saying that I think in philosophy we have moved too fast with respect to language. We have committed to a picture—a way of envisioning and getting a grasp—of language which, while natural and intuitive at first glance, cracks under pressure. The criticisms of Kripke and Donnellan administered the initial pressure, but the form of argument they put forth, I have argued, can be extended further. Indeed, it goes so far as to suggest that this picture, the Capture Picture, may not serve us well in the philosophical investigation of language. At the very least, I think it is worth considering alternatives. Articulating the plea that this be done, and taking the first steps on the path to doing it, have been the primary aims of this work.


