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Author
Omae, Masahiro

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Civil Wars With or Without an End: Postwar Violence and Civil War Recurrence

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in

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by

Masahiro Omae

December 2012

Dissertation Committee:
Dr. Ebru Erdem-Akçay, Chairperson
Dr. Bronwyn A. Leebaw
Dr. Yuhki J. Tajima
The Dissertation of Masahiro Omae is approved:

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

Committee Chairperson

University of California, Riverside
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Civil Wars With or Without an End: Postwar Violence and Civil War Recurrence

by

Masahiro Omae

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science
University of California, Riverside, December 2012
Dr. Ebru Erdem-Akçay, Chairperson

This dissertation explores the factors associated with and the mechanisms that produce civil war recurrence. I argue that the variation in the government’s use of violence after the war as a means of counterinsurgency explains the likelihood of the recurrence of a given civil war. More particularly, I argue that indiscriminate violence by the incumbent regime increases the incentive amongst civilians, who formally participated and/or supported the rebellion in the original war, to return to actively supporting the rebels once again, thus, increasing the likelihood of war recurrence. This is due to the fact that when ordinary individuals believe that their choice to remain neutral or being pro-government threatens their personal security, they may decide to reenlist in the rebel movement, thus increasing the likelihood of a renewed war. By employing both quantitative and qualitative methods, I show the presence of postwar violence by government, especially the indiscriminate variety, is associated by increased likelihood of civil war recurrence.
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“Mankind must put an end to war before war puts an end to mankind.”
– John F. Kennedy

The 20\textsuperscript{th} century has observed appalling carnage caused by a large number of wars. Two systemic wars that took place in the first half of the century were followed by a large number of internal wars in the latter half of the century. In an era where more than 80 percent of wars take place within, not between, states, and many of the victims were unarmed civilians, including women and children, it is of the utmost importance for the international community to understand the nature of an internal war and work toward the prevention of such atrocities.\textsuperscript{1}

The burgeoning literature on civil war has portrayed this type of war as being especially brutal and destructive. Consequently, when such a war is ended, all of the involved parties should have every incentive to maintain peace. However, a significant number of civil wars that appeared to be successfully terminated have recurred. According to Doyle and Sambanis (2000), about 25 percent of civil wars (28 out of 113) have recurred within five years of the original termination and the same number of cases continued to experience low-intensity residual violence. About 50 percent of the cases in this data (56 out of 113) suffered from some level of violence even after the war was declared terminated.\textsuperscript{2} However, the presence of low-intensity violence does not

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\textsuperscript{1} Fearon and Laitin (2003) reports that between 1945 – 1999, interstate wars constituted 25 out of 127 cases whereas there were 102 cases of internal (civil) wars where the internal wars causes five times as much deaths (16.2 million) than the cases of interstate wars (3.3 million).

\textsuperscript{2} In order to be considered as a recurrence, a case needs to meet the conventionally accepted definition of
necessarily produce a recurrence of large-scale violence. To explain this phenomenon, it is appropriate to begin this empirical investigation with the following questions: under what conditions is the recurrence of a civil war likely? More specifically, what factors transform low-intensity violence into full-scale civil war? Also, why would formerly warring parties prefer taking up again rather than maintaining peace?

Irregular war is the dominant technology of rebellion in the post-World War II period (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). An irregular war refers to an armed conflict between a rebel group and the incumbent government that involves asymmetry in military capabilities in favor of the government. As such, civil wars that are fought through irregular means require the support from the non-combatant population in mobilizing and sustaining the rebel movement as well as in shaping the outcome of the war (Kalyvas 2006). In other words, rebels need to heavily rely on civilian recruitment in making the movement possible. In order for the rebels to be able to effectively restart insurgencies, it is important for them to recruit potential rebels, and, more importantly, to motivate a large number of ex-combatants to reenlist with the rebel groups in support of the movement after deciding to stop fighting the original war. It is reasonable, then, to assume that whether a war recurs or remains terminated with some level of residual violence depends on the ability of the rebels to garner mass support from the civilian population. Considering that mass civilian support is necessary in sustaining a rebellion, under what conditions do civilians have an incentive to again support the rebel movement after returning to their normal lives?

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civil war presented in the COW data notes.
Argument

I argue that whether low-intensity violence in the post-conflict environment will lead to a recurrence of civil war largely depends on the presence and type of violence that the government employed after the termination of the original war. In particular, I argue that indiscriminate violence by the incumbent regime increases the incentive amongst civilians, who formally participated and/or supported the rebellion in the original war, to return to actively supporting the rebels once again, thus, increasing the likelihood of war recurrence. If the choice to remain neutral or being pro-government decreases the level of personal security, the ex-combatants and ordinary citizens may decide to join the rebel movement. On the other hand, the selective use of violence as a measure of counterinsurgency reduces such incentives since it makes participation in the rebel movement a costly option for these civilians.

When the incumbent regime employs a counterinsurgency effort that selectively targets only the active insurgents and their supporters, some level of collateral damage is possible. However, the intention of the government in employing selective violence is to identify and punish those who have actually committed violent acts against the government. If the government relied on selective means of counterinsurgency during the war, I argue that the use of such a strategy would greatly reduce the risk of war recurrence.

On the other hand, the government may indiscriminately use violence against the civilian population regardless of whether they are active combat participants or the supporters of a rebellion. If the government relies on the use of indiscriminate violence
in the fragile postwar environment as a means of eliminating residual threats by the remaining rebel combatants, it is likely that the war will recur under such conditions. Such behavior by the government signals to the ex-combatants as well as civilians that it is willing to eliminate potential threats through any means necessary, including killing those who may not be actively supporting the rebels. In such a situation, it may be safer for the non-combatants to align with the rebels instead of supporting the government or staying neutral. As a result, the use of indiscriminate violence by the government reduces the collective action problems for the recruitment efforts for the rebels, increasing the change of a subsequent war.

In many cases, however, the incumbent regime relies on both indiscriminate and selective violence in suppressing insurgent challenges. Government forces may indiscriminately attack a village while it targets its neighboring village in a selective manner as seen in the case of the Argolid during the Greek civil war (Kalyvas 2006). Even in cases where only the use of indiscriminate violence has been reported, the armed forces may only be employing indiscriminate violence in selected areas of the country where not every civilian of the country is targeted and affected in this manner. In these cases, I argue that the narrative of the war regarding the government’s use of indiscriminate violence influences the decision calculus of ordinary citizens in joining the rebel movement, even if one may not have directly experienced the effects of indiscriminate violence.

In the “fog of war” and the period immediately after where only limited information regarding the war at hand is available, one of the only informational
resources available to individuals are news reports and fact finding reports produced by various news agencies and international organizations as a basis for projecting the future behavior of the incumbent regime. Since a civil war, by definition, involves the use of violence in general, these reports often focus more on a specific type of violence, that is of the indiscriminate variety. These reports of the use of indiscriminate violence by the incumbent regime shape the general narrative of a war. More specifically, even if one did not personally experience indiscriminate forms of violence, the reported incidents involving such a scenario may motivate individuals to opt for joining the rebel movement in an effort to increase their likelihood of survival. Although one area of a country may only be experiencing selective forms of violence up until a certain point, the report of the use of indiscriminate violence in other areas may change the perception of the individuals regarding the potential future of being victimized by governmental use of indiscriminate violence.

In sum, the recurrence of civil war is a function of the dynamics of violence after the war. In this dissertation, I argue that the variation in the government’s use of violence after the war as a means of counterinsurgency explains the likelihood of the recurrence of a given civil war. When ordinary individuals believe that their choice to remain neutral threatens their personal security, they may decide to reenlist in the rebel movement, thus increasing the likelihood of a renewed war.
Plan of the Dissertation

In chapter 2, by relying on the existing literature, I develop a theoretical framework and testable hypothesis in examining the relationship between the type of postwar violence perpetuated by the government and the likelihood of a subsequent war. This theoretical framework suggests that the presence of indiscriminate violence by government in the postwar environment increases the incentives amongst the noncombatants to return to war, in order to increase their chance of survival; thus, the use of indiscriminate violence leads to a higher likelihood of war recurrence.

Chapter 3, first, introduces the dataset with which I examine the theory and hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. The dataset used in the current work is constructed using existing data sources (e.g., Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the CIRI Human Rights Data Program). Then, I present the results of the empirical analysis of the theory and hypotheses using large-N methods here.

The results of the quantitative analysis in this chapter support the main argument that the likelihood of recurrence is highly correlated with the presence of postwar violence, in general. More specifically, the presence of indiscriminate violence by the government in the postwar period increases the probability of recurrence while the use of selective violence as a means of counterinsurgency that directly targets the rebels had no significant impact on the likelihood of a subsequent war. Also, the level of physical integrity violations – extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, torture and disappearances - in the postwar environment are associated with the higher probability of recurrence. In general, the quantitative results in this chapter suggest that peace is
possible when the level of indiscriminate violence against the noncombatant population in the postwar environment is minimal.

To explore the mechanism that produces the above relationship between the presence of indiscriminate violence by the government and the recurrence of war and to supplement the quantitative findings, I provide in-depth case studies of the situations in Turkey and Bangladesh in chapter 4 and 5. Given the similarities between the two cases in terms of the origin and the nature of the war, I employ Mill’s Method of Difference in the analysis of the two cases here.

I have selected these two cases for my qualitative analysis due to their similarity in many aspects of past history and wartime dynamics which may influence the outcome of a civil war without controlling for them. Both of these cases involve conflict between the government and a minority ethnic group who originally sought secession as a solution for the discriminatory treatment and denial of their distinct identity. The main rationale behind the government’s mistreatment of the ethnic minority took place in the process of nation-building in Bangladesh and Turkey. Both the Kurds in Turkey and the Jummas (the Hill people) in Bangladesh suffered from political, social and economic exclusion. During war time, both the Bangladesh and Turkish governments relied on the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians to deal with threats from the insurgents. While many attributes are similar across the cases, the explanatory variable of interest to the current dissertation – namely, the type of postwar violence deployed by the government - varied greatly. These conditions made the current two cases my ideal pair for comparative case analysis.
The Turkish case, which explores the dynamics of the enduring conflict between the government of Turkey and the Kurdish rebels – the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), illustrates how the continued use of indiscriminate violence and the constant presence of physical integrity violations produced incentive among the Kurdish civilians in providing continuous support for the PKK in their struggle. Despite the presence of many favorable conditions to the termination of war, the Kurdish civil war in Turkey is currently ongoing.

The Bangladesh case portrays how the commitment of the government of Bangladesh and the tribal people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in finding a political solution to the civil war produced a successful negotiated settlement that is still in effect to this date despite conditions deemed to be unfavorable to a successful termination of a civil war. The government of Bangladesh originally relied on the use of intimidation and coercion in dealing with the insurgents in the Hill Tracts. However, the change in their counterinsurgent strategy that focused on the process of deliberation and transparency coupled with a tremendous reduction in the use of force in the Chittagong Hill Tracts lead to a series of peace negotiations that culminated in the Chittagong Hill Tract Peace Accord of 1997.

In the concluding chapter, I revisit the argument and the empirics presented in the current work in providing a comprehensive summary. I also outline the implications of my theory and findings for future policymaking and research.
“En la escuela nos enseñan a memorizer fechas de batallas, ero que poco nos enseñan de Amor.” - Los Fabulosos Cadillacs

In the previous chapter, I presented the central argument of the current dissertation; that is, the employment of indiscriminate violence by the government after a war increases the incentive amongst ordinary citizens and ex-combatants in supporting and actively participating in the rebellion in order to increase their change of survival. To effectively examine this argument, in this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework to examine and explain the argument as well as its implications by relying on the existing literature on civil war and collective action. Based on the theoretical framework developed in this chapter, I have also generated three hypotheses in thoroughly examining the claim that the government’s reliance on violence, particularly of the indiscriminate variety, increases the chance of war recurrence.

The Literature

In the literature on civil war termination and durable peace, various scholars have focused on the importance of the role of the rebel organizations in the post-conflict environment and developed two competing explanations (Hartzell 2009). The first school of thought argues that the creation of durable peace after a civil war requires the destruction of the rebel organization where the prospects of future victory in war by the challenger are virtually nonexistent (Licklider 1995; Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007; Wagner 1993). In other words, a complete victory by one side should produce an
enduring peace after a civil war since the losing side would be dissuaded from resorting to violence again due to the lack of military capacity. Moreover, rebel victory is thought to be the most stable solution since it would be very difficult for the defeated government to be able to reorganize and regain an adequate level of popular support in challenging the regime newly established by the adversary (Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007). Also, a rebel victory should contribute to an environment that facilitates a durable peace because rebels tend to favor and have incentives to liberalize the political space after a civil war (Toft 2009).

This approach, however, seems to suffer from a couple of serious challenges. First, the assumption that civil wars terminated by the military victory of one side eliminate all but one actor (e.g., government) may oversimplify the reality. Hartzell (2009) shows that of fifty-five (55) civil wars that were terminated by complete military victory, twenty-three (23) of the cases (41.82%) retained the organizational structure of more than one faction. This finding challenges the hypothesis that a complete military victory produces long-lasting peace because of the fact that such an outcome eliminates all of the rival factions. In other words, stability after civil wars have ended by one-sided victory cannot be fully explained by factors related to the number of rival factions. For example, when the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provos) signed the Good Friday Accords with the intent of ending the conflict in Northern Ireland in 1996, many noted that the Provos still retained the capacity to harm for another decade or so till they began the decommissioning process (Grisham 2009). Yet, the conflict in Northern Ireland has been successfully terminated through negotiated settlement.
Another problem associated with this theoretical framework is that it is unable to explain the reemergence of belligerents that were “eliminated” at the end of the original war terminated by one-sided victory. The multiple recurrences of war in Burundi exemplify this scenario.

While civil wars terminated by complete victory of one side are strongly correlated with the outcome of durable peace, the argument that such a relationship is based on the idea of the number of factional groups and their potential ability to rechallenge the government at the end of a war has not been well substantiated. It is possible that the reason that the government was able to declare victory was due to the fact that the ordinary citizens whose support was essential for the rebels had incentive to switch their loyalty in support of the government, contributing to the incumbent regimes ability to win the war. To examine this alternative proposition, an analysis of the incentives of ordinary citizens in the post-conflict environment would be necessary.

The second type of scholarship focuses on the importance of retaining the organizational structure of the belligerents, at least at the initial stages of post-war reconstruction, in producing durable peace. When a civil war is terminated by negotiated settlement, the organizational structure of the belligerent is kept intact, although the rebels will be required to disarm themselves at some point of the process. In other words, a negotiated settlement implies that both parties agreed to end a conflict as well as to the idea that each party will be part of the political processes after the war. Since the retention of the rebel organizational structure could possibly re-ignite a conflict, this strand of scholarship, in general, relies on the mechanisms that create a post-conflict
environment that produces the incentives for the former warring parties to comply with the terms of agreement.

Hartzell (1999; 2009) argues that an enduring peace settlement requires institutionalization of the power-sharing mechanisms. When the antagonists are disarming at the end of a war, they face serious concerns in sphere of security, politics and economics since the negotiated settlement implies the centralization of power in these areas in the hands of the government. As such, negotiated settlements that involve the institutionalization of a safeguard in at least one of these areas appear to increase the likelihood of durability in negotiated settlements. Institutionalized power-sharing mechanisms are designed to provide rivals with adequate incentives to not discount future prosperity by including them in future political and economic decision-making processes.

While the institutionalization of power-sharing may increase the probability of a successful negotiated settlement when implemented with a third-party guarantee, Walter (2002) shows that such a mechanism, in itself, is not sufficient in producing enduring peace. In the implementation phase of a negotiated settlement, the belligerents are faced with the prisoner’s dilemma where the option of reneging on the agreed terms becomes the dominant strategy in an environment that lacks credible commitment. As such, commitment problems amongst warring parties contribute to the failure of the implementation of a negotiated settlement even if both parties agreed to the terms of the peace accord. In sum, a durable negotiated settlement requires both a solution for short-term security concerns at the time of war-termination and for long-term political
problems that the post-war environment may produce. Consequently, the application of a third-party guarantor coupled with power-sharing arrangements become necessary.

Fortna (2004; 2008) demonstrated importance of an external force, finding that peacekeepers in general contribute to the durability of peace. She suggests that the presence of peacekeepers is essential in the post-civil war environment because they facilitate an environment where self-sustaining peace is possible even after the peacekeepers depart. Peacekeepers increase the cost of reengaging in violence by monitoring and enforcing the behavior of the former belligerents. They also reduce uncertainty about the intention of the former combatants by facilitating communication between them. Increased communication between former combatants can also dampen the effect of “spoilers” as well (Stedman 1997).

In terms of the political sphere, peacekeepers can assist the transition by deterring the political abuse of the former rebels. According to Fortna (2008), the presence of peacekeepers has reduced the risk of war recurrence by over half, according to the most conservative estimate. The presence of peacekeepers greatly reduces the risk of the recurrence of war in the cases involving the existence of “lootable” resources. When Fortna estimates the different models based on the invasiveness of the mission (e.g., consent-based or peace enforcement), the result is consistent across the models in terms of the damping effect of peacekeepers on the likelihood of recurrence. In other words, consent-based peacekeepers are as effective as more invasive peace enforcement missions.
Doyle and Sambanis (2000) also recognize the importance of peacekeepers in creating a durable post-civil war environment. In order to realize an enduring peace in the post-civil war environment, it is important to establish stronger institutions that facilitate mass political participation and ethnic diversity. Peacebuilding efforts, especially in a divided society, are necessary in preventing a possible recurrence of violence because they aim at restructuring political, economic as well as social institutions that foster a more peaceful environment. To this end, Doyle and Sambanis suggest that a peacebuilding strategy needs to address the local source of hostility, the local capacity for change, and the level of commitment from the international community (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 781). Their findings suggest that the probability for a successful peacebuilding with a minimum level of democratization requires greater international capability. The likelihood of success increases with the singing of a treaty and the presence of UN peacekeepers. This finding is consistent with the literature on the role of third-party involvement (Fortna 2004, 2008; Reagan 1996; Walter 1999, 2002). In addition, the level of economic development as well as available economic assistance contributes in an increased probability of successful peacebuilding. The role of economic factors in successful peacebuilding is consistent with the relationship with economic prosperity and the probability of war in the literature on civil war onset (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Toft (2009) is skeptical about the effect of the external security guarantor in producing durable peace after civil war. She notes that it is often the case that the failure of the negotiation processes and peace agreements can be attributed to the strategic
interest of the belligerents and not the inadequate third party guarantor (Werner 1999). In other words, the credible commitment theory that relies on the role of external security guarantors requires the assumption that both parties in the negotiation processes are sincere about their interests in terminating the conflict at that time. Also, the role the third party guarantors in the peacebuilding processes is often limited due to the cost associated with a more intrusive role as a peace implementer (Stedman 2001). While negotiated settlements emphasize demobilization and disarmament of the belligerents as well as the positive incentives (e.g., access to political institutions) in implementing a peace accord, it neglects the reconstruction and reformation of the security sectors (Toft 2009). The security sectors are the institutions which hold the legitimacy in the use of force in protecting the state and the civilians such as the military and the police forces. The problem with a negotiated settlement then is that it lacks the means to effectively punish the actors who are not complying with the peace accord. In the absence of stable and functioning security sectors, according to Toft, states lack the capacity to repress the resurgence of a future rebellion. As such, the post conflict environment that lacks security sector reform has a higher likelihood of war recurrence.

Although Toft's argument relies on the idea of balance between the potential benefit and harm for the former belligerents in explaining the likelihood of war recurrence, it appears that the potential for harm ultimately is the primary factor associated with a successful termination of a civil war whether the war is resolved by a one-sided victory or negotiated settlement. As for the cases of one-sided victories, she argues that it is the most stable form of termination due to the fact that the winning side
retains the repressive capacity. The winning side can potentially choose to offer benefits to the losing side, but it seems to be of secondary importance in terms of preventing the recurrence of war.

As for the cases of negotiated settlement, Toft argues that they are less stable than a war terminated by a complete victory since they lack the mechanisms to ensure the state's capacity to punish non-compliers and the ability to repress the reemergence of the rebel movement. As such, negotiated settlements require security sector reform that is designed to increase the state's repressive capacity by “refashioning and reinstitutionalizing the military” (Toft 2009). In other words, it is necessary to strengthen the harm capacity of the state in the cases of negotiated settlement because the future promises of security and the redistribution of political and economic power by themselves are not adequate enough in creating a durable peace. By implementing the reform of security sectors, negotiated settlements approximate the cases of one-sided victories in terms of the repressive capacity of the government. Although the credible promise of benefits appears to be essential for the process of democratization in the post-civil war environment, the credible capacity to harm is paramount in reducing the likelihood of a renewed war (Toft 2009, 48).

In either method of conflict termination, the repressive capacity of the state, rather than the way in which a war is terminated, is the primary explanatory factor in terms of the likelihood of civil war recurrence. In fact, although Toft initially treats negotiated settlements as being fundamentally different from a one-sided victory, the failure or success of a war termination in both cases is ultimately attributed to the repressive
capacity of a state. Despite her efforts in explaining the durability of peace by incorporating both the cases of military victory and negotiated settlement in a comprehensive manner, the underlying logic of this theory appears to be unaltered from the first school of thought that relies on the number of actors who control the state's resources.

The existing literature suggests that the factors associated with the conditions of the immediate post-conflict environment affect the probability of durable peace by providing various safeguards against government exploitation of the rebels and the spoiler problem due to a lack of meaningful repressive capacity of the government. While this strand of scholarship identifies various post-conflict arrangements that appear to improve the likelihood of durable peace, it pays little attention to the decision-making dynamics of the government, rebels, and their potential supporters in deciding the course of action after the war.

While many scholars have focused on the way in which a civil war has been terminated in exploring the factors related to the recurrence of such a war, Quinn, Mason and Gurses (2007) and Walter (2004) have directed their attention to the role of individuals in the war-making process of a recurred war. While the existence of conditions that favor renewed civil war may make such a war possible, “[w]hether it becomes probable is a matter of choice by the potential protagonists” (Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007, 175). In other words, the potential protagonists need to have incentives to reverse their decision to stop fighting after the original war was terminated in order for
such a war to be resumed. Without individuals who are willing to return to life as combatants, the recurrence of war is a very unlikely scenario.

As such, Walter (2004) sheds light on the importance of the recruitment process in a renewed civil war. Since a rebel group typically does not have the luxury of a stranding army to call upon in times of need, it must rely on the support of individuals that is voluntary in nature. Consequently, for civil wars to resume, a large number of individual citizens must actively choose to re-enlist with an insurgent group. When the possibility of a renewed civil war is in sight, individuals make trade-offs between re-enlisting with a rebel group or staying at home while considering personal benefits and cost of both options. It is conceivable that individuals make the similar trade-offs at the beginning of the original war and the recurrent war. However, what differentiates the process of reenlisting from the initial onset is that individuals in the former are returning to war with full-knowledge of war-time living conditions. The implication of this fact is that there must be some factors that affect one’s decision to rule in favor of violent conflict which is most likely to produce higher individual costs than the choice of remaining in the condition of relative peace after the original war. In deciding whether to re-enlist after returning to normal life, individuals are thought to consider two factors in their decision calculus. First, Walter argues that citizens are more likely to re-enlist if they are severely dissatisfied with the existing quality of life conditions. In other words, the option to join the rebellion must appear to be more beneficial than the existing living conditions despite the risk of being killed in combat. The idea is that if there is a way to improve one's current living condition, he/she is likely to choose the option where the expected benefits
are greater than the status quo even with the possibility of death. In addition, individuals must perceive that they lack the mechanism of voicing their concerns about their dissatisfied living conditions. The option of joining a rebellion becomes more appealing when non-violent means of improving living conditions are unavailable. Put differently, the incentive for individuals to participate in a rebellion, thus making the recurrence of war possible, is greatly reduced in states with higher living standards and those with more open, competitive political systems that allow for the redress of grievances. Even with the presence of dissatisfaction amongst the citizens and the absence of a non-violent mechanism in addressing their grievances, it requires much more than dissatisfaction about their living conditions amongst ordinary citizens to risk their lives by reenlisting, especially when these individuals have a recent memory of violence in the original war.

Quinn, Mason and Gurses (2007) also highlight the importance of the role of the individual in the process of war-making among the cases of renewed wars. They posit that the recurrence of a civil war requires individual decisions that favor the resumption of war in addition to the structural conditions that make a war possible. Assuming that both the government and the rebels are unitary in nature – that is they have homogeneous interests regarding the ending and the resumption of war – they claim that renewed war is possible only when the expected utility of resuming the war is greater than that of sustaining peace even when the required structural condition (i.e., dual sovereignty) is present. More specifically, the presence of factors that decrease the probability and benefits of eventual victory, increase the cost and the rate at which cost is incurred, and
increases the benefit of maintaining the status quo contributing to durable peace after a civil war.

Although both Walter (2004) and Quinn, Mason and Gurses (2007) highlight the role of individuals in the process of war recurrence in making compelling arguments, their arguments may be incomplete in capturing the dynamics of civil wars. Their arguments implicitly rely on the collective action framework, that was originally advanced by Olson (1965), in explaining why individuals may support and join in a rebel movement in resuming the war despite the potential for incurring high personal cost. At first glance, the application of the logic collective action appears to be the most appropriate in incorporating the role of individuals in the decision to resume a war that was terminated once before. After all, rebel groups are typically seeking to achieve some type of public goods (e.g., secession, autonomy, democratization and economic security) while soliciting the non-combatants to incur personal costs.

However, the problem in their use of the classic collective action framework is the embedded assumption that non-participation is not costly. In other words, while both of the studies above considered participation to be accompanied by the potential for high personal costs only for the active participants, non-participation is always thought to be the safer option. This assumption does not allow for the possibility that the cost of non-participation and free-riding can be equal to or even exceed that of participation (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). More specifically, the cases of civil wars that employed the victimization of non-participants cannot be studied effectively through this formulation of an analysis based on the idea of public benefit versus personal costs.
In this regard, Petersen (2001) addresses the issue of free-riding and non-participation. He argues that an examination of community based organizations is essential in identifying the triggering mechanisms that drive individuals to join the local rebel organization. This is due to the fact that the distribution of threshold values for action is linked to observable structures, and, as such, one can identify the characteristics of communities that are conducive to the development of an insurgent group.

At the core of the triggering mechanism that Petersen presents is the relationship between the proportion of community members involved in underground activity and one’s threshold for participating in an armed rebellion. Some individuals are “heroes” who have a lower threshold for action whereas others are the “followers” who have much higher thresholds, requiring a significant number of community members who are already active in the armed rebellion. Consequently, a rebellion is possible when thresholds for action are greatly reduced to the point where the followers are willing to take up arms in challenging the incumbent regime.

The key mechanism that influences the level of thresholds is norms of reciprocity. In addition to a rational appraisal of the situation, Petersen (2001) argues that norms within a community can lower one’s threshold for rebellious action. More specifically, participation by some community members could pressure fellow members to reciprocate the action by accepting more risks. The stronger the community, of course, the more effectively it can enforce the norms, where peer pressure could produce meaningful outcomes. It implies that one’s decision not to participate then is likely in a situation where the perceived risk for participation is high but the norms of reciprocity are weak in
a given community. Non-participation becomes the rational choice in this situation based on the assumption that non-participants are not incurring the cost of active participation nor the punishment from the community organization for not reciprocating the norms. However, as with the classical collective action framework, this approach is relatively moot in situations where non-participants may face a similar level of risk as the participants due to the government’s decision to employ indiscriminate violence as a means to intimidate and deter a rebellious movement. No matter how weak the community pressure to reciprocate the norms to support the rebellious community action, individuals may participate in rebellion not for the greater good of the community but for increasing one’s chance of survival.

As such, a comprehensive theory of civil war recurrence, that relies on the role of individuals in explaining the mechanisms of a renewed war, must consider the decision calculus of both the would-be participants and the would-be non-participants. In addition to considering only the cost and benefit of participation, it is necessary to also include the potential costs and benefits of non-participation. To better assess the potential cost and benefit of both participation and non-participation, individuals may rely on the behavior of the government in deciding the course of action in the post-war period. More specifically, in the examination of motivation among the potential participants and non-participants, it is necessary to consider the effects of war time as well as post war behavior of the incumbent regime.

It has been noted that the emergence of an armed rebellion requires the condition of “dual sovereignty” (Tilly 1978). This condition is explained as a situation where “an
opposition group has the organizational capacity and popular support to initiate and sustain an armed challenge to the incumbent regime’s claim to sovereign authority in the nation” (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, 173). While the effectiveness of the insurgent challenge may be determined by the quality of each insurgent and the initial endowment of the group (Weinstein 2007), the level of popular support decides whether such a movement could emerge and be sustained to meaningfully challenge the status quo (Kalyvas 2004, 2006; Scott et al., 1970). As such, the first obstacle in launching an armed challenge against the government is to garner an adequate level of popular support; recruitment becomes the key. Unlike the state, a rebel group needs to rely on civilian volunteers when mobilizing since it usually does not possess a sufficient level of a standing army to effectively challenge the incumbent regime. In order to solicit support from the ordinary citizens who reside in the rebel-controlled area, rebel groups often perform state-like functions by providing various collective goods such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure much as governments do (Weinstein 2007). However, one of the most important collective goods rebels provide is the promise of the provision of protection from the government (Kalyvas 2006).

Civilian support, that is critical to the emergence and the durability of a rebellion, however, is not homogeneous in nature. The manner in which ordinary civilians participate in a rebellion varies across each individual (Lichbach 1995; Petersen 2001; Weinstein 2007). It ranges from merely being a sympathizer to actively engaging in the armed conflict. Also, one can actively support the movement but only through the provision of food, shelter, and variable local information to the rebels that is strategically
salient. Each one of these multiple roles that the participants of a rebellion take is essential in the organization of a sustained rebellion.

The participants of an armed rebellion are not stationary in the role they take in the organization; they move across multiple roles. For example, one can initially participate in the rebellion by providing material support but later may decide to engage in armed violence against the government. At the same time, it is possible for an individual who has been providing material support to the rebels may defect to the side of the government. In sum, as portrayed by Petersen (2001), ordinary citizens slide on the support continuum where the government and the rebel group are at the opposite ends of the scale, and the middle position is the point of neutrality. An examination of the factors that motivate the movement on the scale, then, should shed light on the conditions under which the emergence of durable peace is likely. Since the viability of a rebel movement depends on the level of civilian support that insurgents are able to sustain, it becomes easier for the government to contain such a movement if many individuals decide to withdraw his or her contribution from the rebels. For example, a former rebel fighter who may possess internal information can assist the government in eliminating the “identification problem”\(^3\) so that the counterinsurgency measures can be directed only to those who are directly involved in the movement, minimizing collateral damage to bystanders.

It is also important to note that the level of personal risk incurred by individuals in a civil war corresponds to the type of support one is providing for the rebel group (or to

\(^3\) See Kalyvas (2006: 89).
the incumbent regime). Presumably, those who are actively engaging in supplying material support and information are more likely to be the subject of punishment than those who are simply sympathetic to the rebel cause. Individuals who are actively engaging in armed violence, naturally, are most likely to “pay the highest price” (i.e., battle death or execution if caught). These assumptions are true if the government is discriminating between the individuals based on the level of support that one is providing to the enemy. However, if the government is relying on indiscriminate violence in quelling the rebellion, one may be victimized solely based on where one lives or how one appears.

To explain mass participation in a rebellion despite the potential for incurring high personal cost, various scholars have relied on private selective incentives as factors that are tipping the decision calculus in favor of participation. Relying on the insights from Olsen (1965), Lichbach (1995) presented a general framework in explaining how collective action problems facing potential rebels, namely the rationality for non-participation, are solved by the availability of private selective incentives for the participants. When selective benefits for the participants are provided in a private matter, the participating rebels are, in fact, receiving multiple payoffs for their contribution. The implication is that despite the existing incentive for the would-be rebels to free-ride, considering the potentially disastrous personal cost for joining the movement, the provision of private benefits overcomes the free-rider problem, making the option of joining more attractive. In addition, Lichbach notes that the provision of particularistic benefits by the rebel movement is sufficient in motivating the potential participants
whose grievances are rather specific in nature. In other words, it implies that the rebels, in many cases, are motivated by self-interests that may have little to no connection to a more general purpose of the rebel organization. This framework, however, relies on the assumptions that there is a clear difference in terms of potential individual cost incurred by those who decided to join and those who did not. In other words, it assumes that it is always safer to be a free-rider.

While the classic collective action framework treats one's decision to participate in the rebellion as a risky option, thus requiring some sort of private selective incentives, it has been argued that non-participation can actually be more risky than participation (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). When a challenge to the incumbent regime initially arises in the form of insurgency, the incumbent government often relies on the use of violence in managing it. Counterinsurgency efforts by the government are often characterized as being brutal and indiscriminate in an effort to discourage civilians from supporting such a movement (Weinstein 2007). The use of indiscriminate violence as a means of governmental retaliation is common, especially when the regime is lacking the institutional mechanisms, economic resources and political will in selecting less violent alternatives (Mason and Krane 1989). Indiscriminate violence against innocent civilians is often utilized based on the rationale that it deters people from collaborating with the rebels if they were to be sanctioned collectively (Kalyvas 2006). Additionally, it is designed to induce a change in behavior among the insurgents when the innocent civilians that they care about (e.g., ethnic kin) are being targeted.
When an insurgency is carried out on behalf of a minority ethnic and nationalist group, for example, the incumbent government often retaliates indiscriminately against the group without selectively targeting the actual culprit of the insurgent violence whether such a movement was popularly supported. In such a case, the appearance, the place of residence and other identifiable differences become the basis of retaliation. In order to manage the insurgent challenge from possibly becoming a popularly supported rebellion, a relatively weak government employs what is seemingly the most efficient means in discouraging the participation of the masses in such a movement.

Contrary to the intention of the government, however, “such indiscriminate violence can drive civilians into the waiting arms of rebel groups, especially when such groups are able to mobilize their forces to protect noncombatants from further harm and abuse at the hands of the government” (Weinstein 2007, 37; see also Kalyvas 2006). Goodwin (2001) posits that the armed rebellion becomes possible when the participants see “no other way out” in changing the existing political and socioeconomic condition that is personally influencing the lives of ordinary individuals in undesirable ways. No matter how severe the existing problem may be, he argues that people do not actively participate or support a revolutionary movement if such problems are not relevant to their ordinary day-to-day life. Additionally, the individuals who are ideologically in line with the movement still may not join, if there is another low-risk option available. In general, people take the path that imposes the least resistance and cost even when they are considering social movement as a means to challenge the incumbent regime (Goodwin 2001). Rebellion becomes a viable option when the individuals collectively perceive that
all other alternatives have been exhausted in escaping their predicament. The use of
indiscriminate violence by the incumbent regime creates a situation where staying neutral
and free-riding may be as risky as or worse than participating in the movement; as such,
“individuals may participate in rebellion not in spite of risk but in order to better manage
it” (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007, 183). Indeed, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) show
that there is a strong correlation between the decision to voluntarily join the rebel group
and the interests in improving one's personal security amongst those who participated in
the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leon. This logic seems to be especially
appropriate in explaining the case of war recurrence. Since the civilians have
experienced the way in which the incumbent government had dealt with the insurgency in
the original war, they are able to better estimate the behavior of the government and
assess potential personal risk when the incumbent regime is about to face another
insurgent challenge.

**Theory and Hypothesis**

While the existing literature on civil war recurrence has addressed various
structural challenges at the time of war termination and advanced a range of mechanisms
needed for producing durable peace, many of the theories suffer from the absence of the
explicit analysis of the role of individuals. These theories assume the likely preferences
and behaviors of relevant actors in a given structural arrangement at the end of a war in
explaining the process that produces durable peace. When the theoretical explanations do
consider the role of individual actors in a collective action framework, they are narrowly
forced on the motivations of the participants based on positive benefits, and tend to assume that non-participation is always the safest option. In this dissertation, I present an argument that relies on the idea that non-participation may be at least as costly as, if not more costly than, participation in some cases and how such a condition often motivates ordinary citizens to participate in a violent rebellion, making a recurrence of war possible. In other words, a successful war termination and durable peace requires a condition where non-participation is perceived to be the safest option for the masses in the post war period.

As mentioned earlier, the collaboration of ordinary citizens is critical in producing and sustaining a civil war. The level of popular support is believed to determine the outcome of a war as well. This is true for both rebels and the incumbent government. This is due to the fact that both the government actors and the rebels are faced with their inability to distinguish the supporters from the enemy since combatants from both sides hide amongst the general population in a civil war (Kalyvas 2006). However, various observations of historical cases of civil war note that the identification primarily hurts the incumbent regime.

In an effort to solicit collaboration from ordinary citizens in territories where neither the government nor the rebels have full-control in the Weberian sense, the incumbent regime may rely on the provision of benefits in appealing to the “hearts and

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4 Fearon and Laitin (2003) posit that countries with larger population facilitate the condition favorable to insurgency since it requires the government to employ more layers in monitoring the rebel activities in the peripheries.

5 Kalyvas (2006) cites the difficulties that U.S. military personnel had during the Vietnam war and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s as examples of how identification problems are used to the advantage of the weaker side in the context of irregular wars.
minds” of the individuals in such a territory. However, during and immediately after a war, individual security and survival becomes the most important “benefit” for ordinary individuals. As such, an attempt at inducing collaboration from the civilians requires the provision of security. Indeed, personal security during a civil war is one of the most important collective goods that the rebels often try to provide in exchange for their support (Weinstein 2007). In other words, “[a]s violence becomes the ‘main game in town,’ survival becomes increasingly central for civilians” (Kalyvas 2006). Under such conditions, individuals are interested more in limiting potential damage than pursuing positive motivations such as adhering to one’s ideology and ethnic interest (Leites and Wolf 1970, 127).

The implication of this claim regarding one’s decision in participating and supporting a particular political actor (i.e., government or rebels) is that ordinary citizens have incentive to join the side that is likely to provide their security (Kalyvas 2006). However, citizens theoretically have the option of staying neutral where individuals do not have to risk the potential cost of supporting one side or another. For example, if the rebels appear to be unable to provide a sufficient level of protection in exchange for one’s participation and support, ordinary citizens have no incentive to join the group. As a result, such a movement may dissolve to the point where the rebels are unable to meaningfully sustain a rebellion due to their inability to garner a sufficient level of support.

Although a position of neutrality may be the most preferred choice for ordinary civilians, the divergent conditions of war may lead them to one side or another. If a
government relies on the use of indiscriminate violence as a means of counterinsurgency in the period immediately after the war, civilians have incentive to side with the rebels who may be able increase their personal security, no matter how marginal the effect may be. The government may be able to gain support from individuals when the rebels resort to the use of indiscriminate violence as well. The use of indiscriminate violence has a daunting effect on the decisions of civilians in the post-war period. Even if the government shifts its counterinsurgency method to the use of selective violence in the post–war period, the history of indiscriminate violence early on may produce a severe commitment issue for ordinary citizens where they may perceive any violence by the government as a threat to their safety, resulting in joining the rebellion. In sum, the survival interest of civilians and the behavior of a government determine whether the emergence and sustenance of a rebel movement is possible, and thus, affecting the likelihood of a civil war recurrence.

If a high level of civilian support for a rebel group motivated by their interests in increasing personal security is a necessary condition for the continuation of an armed rebellion, this implies that sustained civil war termination requires the elimination of such incentives among the civilian population. In other words, if non-participation amongst the civilian population becomes the optimal choice in increasing their personal security, the collective action problem once again emerges for the rebel group, making the continuation of the movement difficult. By identifying the conditions under which ordinary citizens opt for supporting the rebel movement, one may be able to predict the recurrence of a civil war.
In the cases of civil wars that have ended without the presence of residual violence in the post-war period, there is no incentive for the civilians to seek protection from the rebels at all. In the absence of post-war violence, the option of remaining neutral becomes the optimal strategy for ordinary citizens. However, the presence of residual violence, regardless of its type, may motivate the non-combatants in associating once again with the rebels in the post-war environment. The rationale behind the use of violence in the postwar period may vary case by case. For example, the magnitude of continuous spoiler violence may require the government to rely on violence to bring domestic order. In such a scenario, the government may decide to selectively employ violence in targeting the actual culprits if the government has sufficient resources to do so. However, a government, that lacks sufficient resources in selectively and directly targeting the spoilers, may rely on seemingly efficient and effective indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas 2006).

Whatever the intention behind the use of violence in the postwar period, given the legacy of the original war, civilians may be sensitive to the behavior of the government regarding its use of violence. In an effort to increase the protection against potential threats to their personal security, the non-combatant population may adopt the option of siding with the rebels, a strategy that enables the rebels to remobilize the masses in challenging the incumbent regime again. As such, I hypothesize that
H1: The presence of residual government violence in the post-war period increases the likelihood that former insurgents will restart their armed rebellion again.

As noted above, it has been posited that civilians may join and support a rebel movement not in spite of potential individual risk but because of their interest in minimizing potential personal cost. In other words, civilian participation in a rebel movement is likely to occur when the individuals perceive that the rebel group can provide better individual protection than the government. If government forces are capable of targeting the culprits of the violence against the government directly, the risk of government violence against the individuals who are not active insurgents carrying out the violence is greatly reduced though collateral damage is possible. In this case, non-participation once again becomes a better option for the individuals.

If the government is selectively targeting the rebels in its use of violent means of counterinsurgency, ordinary civilians would have every incentive to stay natural or side with the government. In this case, the government intends to only target those who actively assist the rebel group. However, if the government plans to indiscriminately deploy counterinsurgency forces based on the belief that such a method is an efficient means of dealing with the threats under the condition of resource scarcity, non-combatants may want to support the rebel movements in an effort in increasing their survivability, no matter how marginal the effect may be. The implication here is that ordinary citizens need to rely on observable indicators in determining whether it would
be beneficial for them to support the government or the rebels in an effort to maximize their chance of survival. For the non-combatants, one such indicator in determining the intention of the government in the use of force in the post-war period is the type of violence utilized as a part of post-war counterinsurgency efforts. In other words, the civilian population may rely on the information regarding the type of violence that the government used during the post-war period in discerning the intentions of the incumbent regime.

Simply put, civilians may defect from the rebel movement when the government refrains from the use of indiscriminate violence as a form of collective punishment in deterring collaboration with the rebels. As the incumbent regime abandons the use of indiscriminate violence as a counterinsurgency effort and begins to selectively target the participants of the rebel movement, it becomes more risky to be a part of such a movement, making the option of non-participation more attractive. If the collective inaction amongst the civilian supporters is achieved in this way, the war is likely to be terminated as long as the government refrains from reverting back to the use of indiscriminate violence. Based on this logic, I hypothesize that:

H2: The use of post-war indiscriminate violence by the government increases the likelihood that former insurgents resume and an armed rebellion.

The recurrence of war, then, becomes more likely when a significant number of civilians decide to reverse their decision to end their participation in a rebel organization
after the end of the original war. Since one of the primary motivating factors in supporting or participating in rebellion, I argued, is one's interest in improving one’s personal security situation, this implies that the security situation in the post-conflict environment may have changed dramatically to the point that civilians rejoined the rebel organization in various capacities. In addition to the employment of militarized counterinsurgency measures, the regimes that are facing insurgent threats often use other means of intimidation in an effort to deter the rebel group. When faced with various domestic threats, an incumbent regime is likely to commit human rights abuses, especially in the area of physical integrity (Poe et al. 1999; 2000). Physical integrity rights are defined as “the entitlements individuals have in international law to be free from arbitrary physical harm and coercion by their government” (Cingranelli and Richards 1999). Examples of physical integrity violations include extrajudicial killings, torture, disappearance, and political imprisonment.

Thoms and Ron (2007) have indicated that whereas harsh socioeconomic conditions rarely produce violent conflict directly, individuals tend to respond with violence when they are physically threatened or attacked. This is due to the fact that quiescence provides little to no protection when the government relies on repression as a means of counterinsurgency. As with the case of indiscriminate violence against the civilians discussed above, state repression in the form of the violation of physical integrity or personal security rights makes it easier for the insurgents to recruit future combatants and supporters, and to remain as a popular movement (Joes 2004). Therefore, I hypothesize that
H3: As the level of physical integrity violation increases, so does the likelihood that former insurgents will resume their armed struggle.

In sum, whether a civil war reignites after the initial termination is a function of whether the ordinary citizens have incentives to join a rebel movement in an effort to increase his or her level of personal security. The argument presented here suggests that the presence of post-war violence, particularly the use of indiscriminate violence by the government that threatens personal security, gives ordinary citizens incentives to side with a rebel group, making the recurrence of civil war possible. In the next chapter, I examine these hypotheses using quantitative evidence.
Chapter 3
Quantitative Analysis

In the previous chapter, I argued that the recurrence of civil war is, at least partly, a function of the level of potential threat to individual security in the postwar environment. In other words, the presence and type of violence by the government in the postwar environment motivates civilians to reenlist with rebel groups, making renewed rebellion more likely. Especially in cases when an individual’s personal security is threatened by the government, even when he or she may otherwise wish to remain neutral, it incentivizes the individual to join the insurgent group. Such a decision may be based on the belief that joining the rebel group will increase his or her level of personal security. Thus, I have argued that indiscriminate violence against ordinary civilians makes it easier for the rebels to recruit combatants since the use of indiscriminate violence by the incumbent regime removes the collective action problem that rebels faces under normal circumstances.

To examine the theory and hypotheses developed in the previous chapter, I estimated a logit model to identify the determinants of civil war recurrence using a dataset that includes cases which ended after 1989. Since the dependent variable here is dichotomous, the use of a logit model is appropriate. The results of the logit analysis will help identify the factors associated with the likelihood of recurrence. To examine the impact of the explanatory variables on the durability of peace after civil wars, I also estimate various predicted probabilities of statistically significant variables.⁶ The general

⁶ For this procedure, I used Clarify, a program developed by Tomz, Wittenberg, and King (2000).
finding of the quantitative analysis supports the argument of the current work that the presence of postwar violence increases the likelihood of a renewed war.

Data

To construct a dataset to conduct a quantitative analysis in examining the proposed arguments above, I relied on various existing datasets. The foundation of the dataset, including the dependent variable and various control variables, used in this study is based on the data provided by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Sambanis (2004). While various scholars, including Doyle and Sambanis, who study civil war often have included all of the appropriate cases from the post-World War II era, given the availability of data on postwar violence (the primary independent variable), I was confined to the cases of civil wars that were terminated after 1989 up to 2010. This is due mainly to the fact that dependable information on the primary explanatory variables (i.e., the indiscriminate or selective violence variables) was only available after 1989. A case of civil war is included in my dataset if it satisfied the coding criteria provided by Sambanis (2004). Since the current study concerns the mechanisms of civil war recurrence, any on-going wars have been excluded from the dataset.

In order for a case to be considered a civil war, according to Sambanis (2004), it must satisfy the following conditions. The conflict must be between a rebel group and the government who are politically and militarily organized with stated political objectives that take place in the territory of a state that is a member of the international system with a population of at least 500,000. To determine the onset of civil wars,
Sambanis supplements the widely accepted 1,000 deaths threshold requirement to mark the beginning of war.

Among many coding rules to supplement the Correlates of War coding, which many scholars of conflict studies rely on, one of the main rationales behind the adaptation of the definition of civil war developed by Sambanis (2004) is that it resolved many issues involving the coding of civil war that predominantly rely on the numerical threshold of 1,000 battle deaths in determining the starting and ending date of a war. More specifically, the issues addressed and accounted for by the Sambanis coding rules appears to be crucial to the current study as well as to the study of civil war recurrence in general. First, while many civil wars may begin with a high number of deaths in the first year, many others gradually accumulate causalities, leading to a large number of victims cumulatively. To account for this reality, he uses a range (500 – 1,000 deaths), instead of a clear threshold of 1,000 deaths, which is seemingly appropriate in determining the starting year of a particular war.\footnote{Sambanis coding rule requires a conflict to reach the 1,000 deaths cutoff point within three years of a year that the country experienced 100-500 deaths to be considered as a civil war.} For example, Country X experiences 600 deaths in 1990, 300 more in 1991, and 200 additional deaths in 1992. Under the Correlates of War coding rule, events in Country X from 1990 to 1992 would not be coded as a case of civil war because the annual death count did not reach the threshold of 1,000 between 1990 and 1992. However, under the Sambanis coding rule, since Country X experienced battle deaths of 600 and it accumulated 1,000 deaths (minimal threshold) within three years, 1990 would be the start date for a civil war in County X. Additionally, this coding rule is pertinent to the current work since it can more clearly distinguish the violence in the
postwar that eventually motivated the recurrence from the violence that was a part of the renewed war.

Second, to capture the intermittent nature of civil war, the coding rule requires that there needs to be sustained violence. This requirement is only applicable to on-going cases that did not produce clear outcomes. According to the Sambanis coding rule, a civil war is considered ended if the case meets one of the following criteria. First, if rebel victory produces a new regime, the war is coded as terminated. Second, if government victory leads to at least six months of peace, the case is considered terminated. Also, a peace accord that produces at least six months of peace after singing is noted as a terminated case. Finally, if the case is experiencing a stalemate or a cease-fire that produces at least two years of relative calm, the war is noted as a terminated case. If the case, however, does not meet any of the above categories but appeared to be fizzling out, I rely on the concept of sustained violence.

In theory, there could be a case where war was considered terminated due to a lack of sustained violence (three years of low-level violence that does not meet the numerical threshold) that reignites in the fourth year. For the purpose of the argument presented here, what is important is to examine what outcome a stalemate case (operationally defined as a terminated case) would produce given a different type of violence (or no violence) in the postwar period.

In order for the war to be considered continuing, an episode cannot have a three-year period that produced less than 500 deaths cumulatively. While the use of 1,000 deaths as a coding rule may create multiple episodes of war from one long enduring war
with sporadic annual death counts, this coding rule enables scholars to capture the intermittently produced violence in one episode of war. This rule in determining the ending year of a war is essential in the study of civil war recurrence. Similar to the issues addressed above regarding the starting dates, for the current study in particular, the use of the Sambanis coding rule assists in distinguishing, more clearly, the violence that is part of the original war from the violence that transpired in the postwar environment.

**Dependent Variable**

The outcome of interest in the theory presented here is whether a civil war has recurred after the original war was terminated. As such, the dependent variable used in the analysis is a binary variable that identifies whether a given conflict has recurred. The case of recurrence is coded with the value of “1”. If the incumbent government encounters challenges from multiple parties over different issues, the war is coded as a case of recurrence only if another conflict transpires between the government and the same challenger. For example, Sri Lanka experienced challenges from two different groups: the Janathā Vimukthi Peramuṇa (JVP) and the Liberation of Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The JVP, Marxist-Leninist political party, waged armed challenges in 1971 and again from 1987 to 1989 against the ruling party at the time. The LTTE is a separatist group that challenged the government of Sri Lanka in the name of secession and the creation of an independent state for the Tamil people in the northern and eastern part of the island. The civil war between the government and the LTTE lasted from 1983 to 2002 and again from 2006 to 2009. When coding the dependent variable, I did not
code the second JVP case as a recurrence even though the second Tamil cases began after 1989.

**Explanatory Variables**

Postwar violence

To examine the argument presented above, I have created a dichotomous variable, Postwar Violence, to measure the level of security threat against ordinary civilians in the postwar environment. This variable is coded “1” if there is any violence perpetrated by the government after the war has been terminated. I constructed this variable by first identifying the presence of indiscriminate violence and selective violence in a given country. In other words, I first created the dichotomous variables postwar indiscriminate violence and postwar selective violence based on two existing datasets. Then I constructed the postwar violence variable where it is coded “1” if either type of violence was present in the postwar environment.

For the postwar indiscriminate violence variable, I relied on the UCDP’s data on one-sided violence. One-sided violence is defined as violence against civilians that is deliberately and directly targeted by the government or non-state groups (Eck and Hultman 2007). The UCDP’s data on one-sided violence reports any episodes that produced at least 25 victims and is measured as a continuous variable. The data collection for this dataset was conducted by employing an automated events data search using VRA® technology.⁸ In addition to the automated data collection, Eck and Hultman

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⁸ See Bond, et al. 2003
relied on manual coding by individually reviewing each article that was included in the automated coding.

I code postwar indiscriminate violence variable as “1” if there is any reporting in the UCDP of one-sided violence on a country during the period of peace. If the data reports the number of deaths exceeding the threshold of civil war, according to the coding rule adopted here, that year marks the beginning of a new episode.\(^9\) In such a scenario, the case will not be coded as experiencing postwar indiscriminate violence if it is the only report during peacetime. If a country experiences both indiscriminate and selective violence in the postwar period, I coded such cases as having experienced only indiscriminate violence. In other words, the variables indiscriminate violence and selective violence are mutually exclusive variables even though, in reality, there would be many cases where both types of violence had been present after the termination of the war. The rationale for this coding is based on the assumption that in the presence of indiscriminate violence, the effect of selective violence is superseded and dominated by the former due to the media effect on civilians who hear about the indiscriminate violence. Since the presence of indiscriminate violence in the postwar period signals to the non-combatant population that the government has no interest in distinguishing the target of counterinsurgent violence, the civilians may decide to once again join and/or support the rebel movement regardless of any other factors. Under such a condition, any case of selective violence that follows an episode of indiscriminate violence in the postwar period

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\(^9\) See Sambanis (2004) for the details on the coding rule
condition produces the perception of the government that is indistinguishable from a government that only relied on the use of indiscriminate violence.

To measure the presence of postwar selective violence, I relied on the UCDP’s battle death dataset. As with all of the UCDP datasets, a report is made only in the cases that involve more than 25 deaths in a given case-year. I defined postwar selective violence as the use of armed force by the government of a state against illegitimate armed groups in a given territory. Based on this definition, the best indicator for selective violence in the postwar period appeared to be the presence of battle related deaths after the termination of war. I code this variable as “1” if there are any battle related deaths over 25 victims. As discussed above, this variable is coded “0” if there is less than 25 battle related death or if there are reports of indiscriminate violence for a particular case. In other words, the coding for “1” indicates that a particular case only experienced violence of the selective variety during the entire postwar period.

Physical Integrity

In many cases, the incumbent regime employs violent deterrence tactics against the masses that differ from direct military violence as a part of their effort in handling the threats from the rebels and their supporters. Among the examples are torture, unlawful and unwarranted incarceration, and extrajudicial excisions of “suspected” rebels. These tactics are characterized by their indiscriminate nature, where the use of these types of violence is based on evidence against the victims that are often founded on nothing but rumor and hunches. In order to examine the robustness of the argument presented here
that the recurrence of rebellion is partly a function of the presence of postwar government violence; I have included the CIRI physical integrity score in the model (Cingranelli and Richards 2010).

The CIRI physical integrity score is an additive index score noting the overall level of government respect for physical integrity rights in a country (Cingranelli and Richards 1998). This score ranges from “0”, which signifies that the government has no respect for physical integrity rights, to “8”, which is an indication that the government fully respects the physical integrity of the people. In creating this additive scale, Cingranelli and Richard examined four different indicators of physical integrity practices (extrajudicial killing, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearance) in a given country. Each category is scored from “0” to “2” where a score of “0” indicates frequent violations and “2” signifies no violation in that category. For this analysis I have included the CIRI scores for two years and five years after the year the war was terminated.

**Control Variables**

**Cost of Previous War**

I have included two measures of cost of a previous war to examine their potential effect on the likelihood of recurrence. First, the duration of war is measured in years as a continuous variable. To obtain this information, I simply subtracted the year of onset from the year that the war ended. If a war lasted less than a year (i.e., a case where it

---

10 I have excluded wars that are ongoing as of 2009 from my analysis.
started and ended in the same year), I coded it as having lasted for one full year. Second, I included the number of battle deaths as another indicator of the cost of a previous war. This variable is measured as a continuous variable and measured in 1,000s. I mainly relied on Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and the battle death datasets from the Peace Research Institution, Oslo (PRIO) for this information. The PRIO data include three different estimates of battle death: the low estimate, the high estimate and the best estimate. When the PRIO data was used to code this variable, I relied on the best estimate. When the best estimate measure was unavailable, I used the mean of the low and high estimates. Both the duration and battle death variables are log-transformed.

Conflict Issues

Some scholars such as Kaufmann (1996) have claimed that identity-oriented civil wars, especially of the ethnic variety, are difficult to terminate, given the indivisible nature of the issue. To account for the potential effect of identity issues, I have included a dichotomous variable coded by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) indicating whether a case is a civil war based on identity issues (coded as “1”). When the case is ambiguous and the war was fought by a distinguished identity group over issues that may not necessarily be ethnic or religious, I treated such a case as an identity-oriented conflict. This rationale is based on the claim that regardless of the “true” origin of the conflict, once war begins, the identity factor seems to take precedence under the condition of security dilemma (Kaufmann 1996).
Another factor related to the issue of the original war is the type of incompatibility that the warring parties are experiencing. In this light, a civil war can be categorized into two types. First, the rebels may be challenging the government in seeking territorial autonomy or secession. On the other hand, the rebels may be interested in taking over control of the government, often in the name of reform. Fearon (2004) suggested that these differences in the stated goals of insurgents lead them to divergent approaches in their effort in accomplishing their goals. First, insurgents who seek to control the government rely on the tipping mechanism that produces mass defections against the incumbent government (Fearon 2004). Since this mechanism typically produces an “all-or-nothing” outcome, civil wars that involve a coup d’état or popular revolutions are believed to be short. Whereas wars involving territorial issues, especially that of a historical “homeland”, tend to be longer and more difficult to resolve. Since the challengers of territorial wars often rely on gradual gains in military domination of a claimed territory in the hope that they will eventually gain full-control of the land or be able to induce an adequate level or concession from the government, such a war tends to be long and difficult to settle.

Toft (2003) sees territory as a factor that can be directly related to the issue of ethnic identity and security. Since one’s identity is often defined by her attachment to a particular territory, the territorial issues are intimately intertwined with the issues of identity. As such “[c]ontrolling territory is of great importance to ethnic groups and states because both actors believe their survival depends on it” (Toft 2003, 19). As such, any ethnic wars involving territorial issues may be difficult to terminate successfully, for
the complete resolution of territorial issues in the form of successful succession and independence is not commonplace.

How the Previous War Ended

It has been claimed that civil wars that end with a one-sided victory, especially when the victors are the rebels, create a more stable postwar environment than the ones terminated by negotiation. This is based on the idea that whereas negotiated settlement forces the formerly warring parties to coexist in the immediate postwar period, an outcome of complete victory requires the winning side to eliminate the organizational capacity of the rebels (Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007; Toft 2009). The rebel victory, especially, is thought to produce the most robust termination outcome founded on the idea that rebels are very much likely to open up the political system in the postwar political environment.

To account for the potential effect of the outcome of war termination on the likelihood of war recurrence, I have created four dummy variables: victory, settlement, and truce, cease-fire, or stalemate. The last category has been excluded from the statistical model as the reference category since the primary interest in including the information on the termination outcome is to examine the differences between one-sided complete victories and settlements in terms of their effect on the likelihood of recurrence. I also created the government victory and the rebel victory variables by identifying the winning side when the war was terminated by one-sided victory. The purpose of identifying the winning side was to examine the possibility that a rebel victory, in
particular, produces a more robust war termination outcome (Toft 2009). In creating these dummy variables, I have relied on Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Toft (2009) and the latest version of the Correlates of War.

I have also included a variable that measures third party intervention to capture the effect of the external actors in the model. Many scholars (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Regan 1996; Walter 2002, 2004) have suggested that the presence of a third-party actor reduces the decision to return to war after the termination of the original conflict, thus increasing the cost of a renewed war. This is based on the belief that such an actor can guarantee security among the formerly warring parties, especially for the weaker side. This variable is measured dichotomously where the involvement of an external actor at any period of the conflict is coded as “1”. In creating this variable, I relied on data from Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and the UCDP’s data on categorical variables of armed conflict.

Postwar Economic and Political Environment

To account for the potential effect of living conditions in the postwar environment on the likelihood of civil war recurrence, I included two variables that capture the quality of life. First, I relied on the Human Development Index (HDI) score from the United Nations Development Programme in addressing the economic aspect of living standards. The HDI is a composite score derived from three dimensions of the quality of life: health, education, and income. The level of life expectancy at birth was used as a proxy for measuring the quality of health in a given country. For the education dimension, the
index relies on two different indices. It is measured by the combination of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. Finally, the economic dimension is measured by gross national income per capita. A raw variable from each category has been transformed to an index score, expressed as a value between 0 to 1 by comparing to the minimum and maximum value possible for that category. The HDI composite score has been reached by calculating the mean of the scores from each dimension.\textsuperscript{11} I used the HDI composite scores two years after the end of the war termination for this variable.

To examine the effect of divergent postwar political conditions on the likelihood of recurrence, I included the Polity IV score in my model (Marshall, Jaggars, and Gurr 2010). More specifically, I use the combined polity score that measures the level of democracy on a -10 to 10 scale, where the score of 10 signifies a county that is most democratic. I relied on the Polity score from two years after the termination of the war to capture the lagged effect of this variable. The inclusion of this variable was to examine whether the countries that has less nonviolent political outlets would experience a higher likelihood of a renewed civil war.

**Findings**

The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 3.1 and 3.3 with civil war recurrence as a dependent variable. Models 1 and 4 examine the arguments presented here by controlling the cost and issues related to the original war. In Models 2

\textsuperscript{11} See the UNDP HDI technical notes for more details on the calculation processes.
and 5, I have included additional control variables to account for the potential effects of the outcome of the original wars. Models 3 and 6 are the full models that also include postwar quality of living variables. When estimating the models, I used a robust standard error with clustering on countries since my data includes multiple cases of civil wars from the same country.

First, the postwar violence variable produced positive and statistically significant results across the models. In other words, the findings support the hypothesis that the presence of postwar violence perpetrated by the government, regardless of its type, increases the likelihood of renewed war. When I estimated the predicted probability of a subsequent war based on the Model 3 on Table 3.1, the presence of postwar violence increased the likelihood of a renewed war by 35.8 percent while all of the other variables were held at the hypothetical mean.¹²

When I differentiated the types of postwar violence (i.e., indiscriminate or selective) employed by the government, only the indiscriminate violence variable produced positive and statistically results across all models. These results support the hypothesis and the general argument that when the individual security of ordinary civilians is threatened, regardless of whether one actively supports the rebel movement, it increases the probability of civil war recurrence. In terms of substantive effect of postwar violence perpetrated by the government on the likelihood of a renewed war, the

¹² The predicted probability of recurrence is estimated based on model 1 of Table3.1 using Clarify developed by Tomz, Wittenberg, and King. The results were similar when estimated using other models from Table 1. The predicted probability of recurrence ranged from 27 to 34 percent. More detailed on the estimation methods, please refer to King, Tomz, Wittenberg (2003).
use of indiscriminate violence by the incumbent regime increases the probability of recurrence by 45 percent.\textsuperscript{13}

In addition to the effect of direct military violence in the postwar period, I also examined the effect of physical integrity violation on recurrence. Table 3.3 presents the results of the regression analysis. The inclusion of various control variables for the models in Table 3.3 mirrors that of Table 3.1. All of the physical integrity variables produced negative and statistically significant result across the models in the analysis. Since a higher physical integrity score indicates better human rights practice, the negative coefficients denote that the likelihood of recurrence is higher in countries where one faces a higher level of threat against his/her physical integrity.

Based on the physical integrity score 2 years after the termination of a war, a change in the score from the mean to the score one standard deviation away from it reduces the probability of recurrence by 11 percent.\textsuperscript{14} The other models based on the physical integrity score after two years produced very similar results ranging from a 10 to 12 percent decrease in the predicted probability of recurrence.

When I estimated the same models using the physical integrity score 5 years after the termination of a war, the quality of human rights practices in the postwar environment had a more pronounced effect on the likelihood of renewed war. Based on Model 6 of Table 3.3, a change in the physical integrity score from the mean to the first standard deviation, while all of the other variables were held constant at the hypothetical mean, produced a reduction in the predicted probability by about 18 percent.

\textsuperscript{13} To estimate the effect of indiscriminate violence on recurrence, I used the result from Model 6 of Table 1.
\textsuperscript{14} Estimated based on Model 5 of Table 3.2.
The postwar economic indicator, measured by the HDI, also appeared to affect the likelihood of recurrence, according to the result of Table 3.1. The variable produced a negative and statistically significant result, indicating that the higher the HDI score, the less likely that a country would experience recurrence of war. A change in the HDI from the 25th percentile to 75th percentile, ceteris paribus, reduced the probability of recurrence by about 26 percent. However, the effect of the HDI appeared statistically insignificant when it was included in the analysis of the effect of physical integrity violations on the likelihood of recurrence.

The settlement variable produced positive and statistically significant results across all of the models. This result indicates that wars terminated by negotiated settlement increased the likelihood of recurrence. More specifically, if a war was terminated by negotiated settlement, it appears to increase the likelihood of recurrence by 42 percent while the effects of other variables were held constant at the hypothetical mean. Also, the models here controlled for the presence of third-party intervention that is believed to ameliorate the shortcomings of negotiated settlement (Walter 2002).

This is partially consistent with the existing findings that negotiated settlements, in general, produce fragile termination outcomes. However, it diverges from the existing findings in that even with the presence of third-party intervention, the negotiated settlement appears to produce precarious peace.

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15 Estimated based on Model 3 of Table 3.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Postwar Violence</strong></td>
<td>1.684**</td>
<td>1.953***</td>
<td>2.207***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.734)</td>
<td>(0.729)</td>
<td>(0.812)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indiscriminate Violence</strong></td>
<td>1.639**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.121***</td>
<td>2.218***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.722)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.762)</td>
<td>(0.852)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selective Violence</strong></td>
<td>0.970</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>0.987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.717)</td>
<td>(0.731)</td>
<td>(0.804)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration (ln)</strong></td>
<td>-0.311</td>
<td>-0.568</td>
<td>-0.575</td>
<td>-0.349</td>
<td>-0.744*</td>
<td>-0.768*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.291)</td>
<td>(0.393)</td>
<td>(0.424)</td>
<td>(0.276)</td>
<td>(0.409)</td>
<td>(0.446)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battle death (ln)</strong></td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.252)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity</strong></td>
<td>0.274</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.0896</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.679)</td>
<td>(0.729)</td>
<td>(0.721)</td>
<td>(0.668)</td>
<td>(0.707)</td>
<td>(0.706)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Incompatibility</strong></td>
<td>-0.223</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>1.335**</td>
<td>-0.407</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
<td>(0.475)</td>
<td>(0.614)</td>
<td>(0.464)</td>
<td>(0.468)</td>
<td>(0.613)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victory</strong></td>
<td>1.679</td>
<td>1.152</td>
<td>2.101*</td>
<td>1.806</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.106)</td>
<td>(1.095)</td>
<td>(1.169)</td>
<td>(1.214)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Settlement</strong></td>
<td>2.687**</td>
<td>2.241**</td>
<td>3.248**</td>
<td>2.919**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.153)</td>
<td>(1.128)</td>
<td>(1.290)</td>
<td>(1.373)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third-party Intervention</strong></td>
<td>-0.718</td>
<td>-0.951</td>
<td>-0.863</td>
<td>-1.144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.733)</td>
<td>(0.758)</td>
<td>(0.699)</td>
<td>(0.733)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HDI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-5.098**</td>
<td>-3.920*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.199)</td>
<td>(2.184)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td>-0.00102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0163</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0213)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0328)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-2.967*</td>
<td>-5.268**</td>
<td>-2.652</td>
<td>-2.964*</td>
<td>-6.102**</td>
<td>-3.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.603)</td>
<td>(2.237)</td>
<td>(2.225)</td>
<td>(1.568)</td>
<td>(2.589)</td>
<td>(2.673)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>pseudo R²</strong></td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 3.2 – Predicted Probabilities of Selected Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Probability of subsequent war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postwar violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in probability</td>
<td>0.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiscriminate violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in probability</td>
<td>0.454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th percentile</td>
<td>0.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th percentile</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in probability</td>
<td>-0.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiated settlement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in probability</td>
<td>0.425</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predicted probability on this table is estimated based on Model 3 of Table 3.1, except for indiscriminate violence variable which is based on Model 6.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Integrity (t+2)</td>
<td>-0.372* (0.197)</td>
<td>-0.474** (0.218)</td>
<td>-0.419** (0.207)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Integrity (t+5)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.574*** (0.174)</td>
<td>-0.571*** (0.168)</td>
<td>-0.527*** (0.165)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration (ln)</td>
<td>-0.000740 (0.362)</td>
<td>-0.152 (0.325)</td>
<td>-0.0163 (0.448)</td>
<td>-0.363 (0.384)</td>
<td>-0.00251 (0.464)</td>
<td>-0.328 (0.383)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle death (ln)</td>
<td>0.0144 (0.233)</td>
<td>-0.130 (0.221)</td>
<td>-0.0181 (0.264)</td>
<td>-0.0611 (0.255)</td>
<td>-0.0419 (0.282)</td>
<td>-0.0613 (0.258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>1.274 (0.801)</td>
<td>0.696 (0.699)</td>
<td>1.334* (0.728)</td>
<td>0.609 (0.717)</td>
<td>1.165 (0.732)</td>
<td>0.608 (0.731)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>-0.391 (0.519)</td>
<td>-0.792 (0.620)</td>
<td>0.135 (0.541)</td>
<td>-0.190 (0.699)</td>
<td>0.592 (0.690)</td>
<td>0.257 (0.757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.399 (1.222)</td>
<td>1.441 (1.173)</td>
<td>1.299 (1.279)</td>
<td>1.019 (1.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.342** (1.045)</td>
<td>2.139* (1.254)</td>
<td>2.407** (1.194)</td>
<td>1.789 (1.247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.857 (0.855)</td>
<td>-0.915 (0.789)</td>
<td>-0.976 (0.859)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.392 (2.321)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0404 (0.0546)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.014 (2.332)</td>
<td>1.873 (2.111)</td>
<td>-1.693 (2.440)</td>
<td>0.574 (2.470)</td>
<td>-0.894 (2.493)</td>
<td>1.871 (2.503)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 72 72 68 67 67 66
pseudo $R^2$: 0.108 0.165 0.184 0.208 0.192 0.220

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Figure 3.1 - Predicted Probability on Physical Integrity (t+2) and Renewed Rebellion

Figure 3.2 - Predicted Probability on Physical Integrity (t+5) and Renewed Rebellion
This result suggests that in the presence of postwar violence, civil wars terminated by negotiated settlement may make it easier for a war to recur because the cost for the rebels in their recruitment process is much lower since they do not have to start the process from the ground up in these cases, unlike the wars terminated by one-side victory. Since negotiated settlements do allow for both sides to keep respective organizational capacity at the end of the original war (Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007; Wagner 1993), it is possible that it takes a shorter time for the rebels to remobilize the non-combatant population and effectively challenge the incumbent government in the cases terminated by negotiation. Also, violence can be strategically used to gain leverage and to induce concessions from each other in the process of negotiation while recuperating militarily. However, the results of additional analysis produced statistically non-significant results for the interaction variable between the presence of postwar violence and negotiated settlement while postwar violence individually remained significant.16

One important fact is that a reason is required in order for a war terminated by negotiated settlement to recur. In other words, negotiated settlements do not cause recurrence, but act as a catalyst when the rebels and non-combatants face potential physical threats from the incumbent government in the postwar period. As such, this result does not directly challenge the present findings that the presence of postwar violence perpetuated by the government increases the likelihood of civil war recurrence.

16 The results of alternative models are presented in Appendix A.
Robustness Test

In order to avoid the possibility that the finding here is solely contingent on how the dependent variable - war recurrence - is coded, I have conducted additional regression analyses using a more restrictive coding rule to examine the robustness of the argument presented here. The cases where there is at least a two-year “peace” period from the time of termination are to be considered an episode of a recurrence for this alternative analysis. Also, any cases that were originally coded as recurrence but do not meet this new coding rule, have been combined with the episode prior to it. For example, if Country X experienced a set of wars; the first episode lasting from 1990 to 2000, and the second one beginning in 2001 and terminating in 2005. Under this alternative coding rule, I would treat this case as being a single episode of civil war that began in 1999 and ended in 2005 since there are less than two years between the cases.

According to the Sambanis coding rules for recurrence on which I relied, the interwar period (period between the original war and the subsequent war) could be as short as six months for a war to be considered a case of recurrence if the war has been terminated through negotiated settlement. It is possible that the warring party has signed on to a peace agreement with the intention of returning to war after a short period of recuperation. In other words, a period of relative calm that a peace accord may have created may simply be a lull in the war, not end to the war.

17 Sambanis already uses the presence of a two-year period of relative calm in coding the cases of civil war that ended without a formal cease fire agreement or negotiated settlement. As with other numerical thresholds used for coding variables, the use of a two-year threshold is arbitrarily selected here. I believe that it is the duration of relative calm that is sufficient enough to reject the possibility that the peace period between the two sets of wars was not a lull in the war.
The results of regression analysis using the alternative coding for the recurrence variable are presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. In general, the results here reflect the general patterns consistent with the main regression analyses, although some of the variables of interest have lost statistical significance. Also, some of the variables that originally were insignificant produced statically significant results. As with the results from the original regression analysis, Table 3.4 indicates that the presence of post-war governmental violence is likely to be associated with a higher chance of recurrence. The persistence of indiscriminate government violence in the postwar period, in particular, has produced positive and statistically significant results here. While the basic models (Models 1 and 4) did not produce statistically significant results, the direction of the coefficients was correct. This may be due to the fact that the presence of postwar control variables is needed in the model to effectively explain the effect of postwar violence under strict coding of the dependent variable. The rest of the models in terms of these variables were consistent with the findings in the main regression results presented earlier. Also, the effect of negotiated settlement on the likelihood of recurrence was consistent with the original analysis. Positive coefficients indicated that wars terminated by negotiated settlements have a higher likelihood of experiencing a subsequent war.

The results of this alternative analysis also revealed a couple additional consistent results. First, the duration of the war is inversely related to recurrence. Many of the models produced statistically significant results. This result seems to support the claim that war fatigue induces incentives amongst the individuals not to return to war. Second, the number of battle deaths appeared to be positively associated with the probability of
war recurrence. This result indicates that the more costly the original war was, the more likely it to face a subsequent war.

The results presented in Table 3.5 show the relationship between the presence of physical integrity violation and the likelihood of civil war recurrence. Unlike the original analysis, the physical integrity score of a given country two years after the termination of the conflict produced no statistically significant results though the direction of the coefficients were correct. However, the physical integrity score five years after the termination of a war produced statistically significant results across the models as observed in the original regression results. Negative coefficients indicate that an improvement in a state’s physical integrity practice is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of recurrence.

Some of the explanatory variables of interest to the arguments presented here lost statistical power in the alternative analysis. However, the claim that the persistence of government violence – especially of the indiscriminate variety – in the immediate postwar period increases the likelihood of a subsequent war, has been generally supported even with the use of alternative coding for the recurrence variable. In other words, the findings in this section do not rely solely on how to define and operationalize the concept of war recurrence.
Table 3.4 – Explaining Renewed Rebellion Using Alternative Coding for Dependent Variable: Logistic Regressions

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<td>-0.986**</td>
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<td>(0.390)</td>
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<tr>
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Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 3.5 – Physical Integrity and Renewed Rebellion Using Alternative Coding for Dependent Variable: Logistic Regressions

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Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Conclusion

The quantitative findings presented in this chapter produced two general conclusions in explaining the recurrence of civil war. First, factors related to the security conditions of individuals, not the cost related to the original war or the issues over which the parties may have fought, appears to best explain the recurrence of civil war. To fully examine the relationship between the physical threats that individuals face and the likelihood of a renewed war, I have used three different indicators to conduct the analysis.

I examined the effect of the presence of postwar violence, in general, on recurrence. While controlling for various competing hypotheses, the results indicated that the presence of postwar violence increases the likelihood of a renewed war. I also differentiated the types of postwar violence to examine the claim that individuals are likely to reenlist in the rebel movement when they see no other way to improve their level of individual security. The results of the regression analysis suggest that the presence of indiscriminate violence (but not selective violence) fosters an environment prone to war recurrence. Additionally, I have examined the relationship between recurrence of civil war and the physical integrity practices of a given country. The results of the regression analysis indicate that countries with more frequent reports of physical integrity violence (i.e., extrajudicial killings, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearance) in the postwar period are more likely to experience another episode of war. As presented in Table 3.2 above, the presence of postwar violence, more specifically of the discriminate
variety, as well as the presence of physical integrity violence substantially increases the likelihood of a renewed war.

Second, one of the outcome variables that indicates whether war was terminated through negotiated settlement produced consistent results across all of the models. I believe that this outcome does not directly challenge the argument presented there. Simply put, the type of termination outcome does not directly induce another episode of civil war. However, it may facilitate an environment where it is easier for the rebels to mobilize ordinary citizens when a reason to do so arises. The argument presented here identified one of the reasons why individuals reenlist with the rebels, thus making recurrence possible, was when one’s physical safety was threatened. The wars terminated by negotiated settlement may make it easier for a war to be reignited if the individual security of the masses comes under threat.

In the following two chapters, I present qualitative case studies to shed light on the processes and mechanisms of the argument presented here. In the first case study involving the Kurdish struggle against the government of Turkey, I show that despite an environment that appeared to be favorable to successful termination of the enduring war in Turkey, notably the presence of costly signals from the PKK leadership, the decision of the Turkish government in utilizing indiscriminate violence led to a recent renewal of war following a period of relative calm.

In the second case study concerning the case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, I present evidence to substantiate the claim that the absence of indiscriminate violence was one of the primary reasons that explains the absence of war
recurrence despite a postwar environment that appeared to be conducive to such an outcome. In this case study, I intend to show that the presence of negotiated settlement in the Chittagong Hill District, though it appeared to be rather fragile, did not lead to recurrence of war due to the fact that the government of Bangladesh decided not to rely on indiscriminate violence in handling unresolved issues in the postwar environment.
Chapter 4

The Kurdish Struggle

“It's not the bullet with my name on it that worries me. It's the one that says ‘To whom it may concern.’” -Anonymous Belfast resident, quoted in London Guardian, 1991

Introduction

The Kurdish armed struggle began in 1984 after the members of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) attacked police and gendarmerie bases in Şemdinli, Hakkâri Province and Eruh, Siirt Province. With the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, one of the founders and the leader of the PKK, in 1996, the Kurdish-Turkish conflict appeared to mark the end of the war with the government’s claim to victory. In fact, the end of the war produced a brief period of relative calm, and many favorable conditions in realizing a durable peace was present at the time. However, the war reignited between the Kurdish rebels and the Turkish government in 2005 despite the factors conducive to peace. I argue that peace failed in this case because of the persistence of indiscriminate violence in the post 1999 period leading up to the recurrence of war in 2005.

In the previous chapters, I developed a theory of civil war recurrence and identified that factors associated with one’s individual safety in the immediate postwar period appeared to increase the likelihood of civil war recurrence. More specifically, when ordinary civilians face the potential for one-sided indiscriminate violence,

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18 The Sambanis coding rule for civil war onset (2004) codes a country as having a civil war onset if the country experiences less than 500 deaths in a given year but reach the 1,000 deaths threshold in the next three years. In 2005, Turkey experienced 330 death followed by 210 in 2006 and 458 in 2007, according to the “best estimates” provided by the UCDP. As a result, Turkey can be considered as being experiencing the recurrence in 2005. However, based on the high fatality estimate, the recurrence happened in as early as 2005.
including physical integrity violations perpetrated by the government, such an environment incentivizes non-combatants to join and support a rebel group, making it possible for a subsequent war. In this chapter, by relying on the case of the Kurdish struggle in Turkey, I illustrate how the decision of the government to rely on the use of indiscriminate violence as part of a counterinsurgency measure in the postwar period has led to the recurrence of war, despite the presence of factors that were seemingly conductive to achieving durable peace.

The Origins of the Kurdish Struggle and the Parti Karkerani Kurdistan (PKK)

Under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, Kurds enjoyed relative autonomy in managing their own affairs. However, due the Ottoman millet system under which the Kurds experienced autonomy based on tribal alliances and geographical distance, they were never recognized as a minority group when the new Republic emerged because Kurds are Muslim as are Turks. Since religious affiliation was a major attribute of one’s identity, both Turks and Kurds shared the same privilege of being a part of the larger Muslim community under the Ottoman Empire (Ozcelik 2006). The notion of Kurdishness was not politically salient in the eyes of many Turks, except for the Kurds themselves.

After the First World War, the Allies included the Kurds in the process of partitioning the Ottoman Empire at the Sèvres Conference in 1920. The Treaty of Sèvres signed between the Allied Powers and the Constantinople government had envisaged full autonomy of the minorities including the Kurds and promised the Kurds their
independence within a year (McDowall 2004; The Treaty of Sevres 1920). This idea was generally captured by one of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points that states that “the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development” (Wilson 1909). In 1922, the Iraqi government recognized the autonomous rights of the Kurds within its borders, according to the provision of the treaty. However, in Turkey the emergence of the new political leader, Mustafa Kamel Atatürk, and the war of independence that he led consequently contributed in upsetting the realization of Kurdish independence. As a result of the war and various events that followed, no signatory country of the Treaty of Sèvres, with the exception of Greece, ratified it, and the provision of Kurdish autonomy was never implemented. In addition, the Treaty of Sèvres was superseded by a new accord, the Treaty of Lausanne, in 1923 which restored to Turkey the Kurdish-dominated area that was originally granted to the Kurds under the Treaty of Sèvres. Although the Kurds fought alongside with the Turks in the War of Independence against the Great Powers, the Treaty of Lausanne failed to even mention the Kurdish issues aside from some vague assurance of cultural and linguistic minority rights (Ciment 1996).

In the process of consolidating Turkish nationalism, Atatürk was not going to tolerate “the presence of a large minority of citizens who raised objections to the idea of Turkish nationalist ethos, but actively promoted their own nationalist agenda” (Ciment 1996). If fact, the presence of ongoing challenges from the Kurds was problematic for the Turkish nationalists. A few Kurdish nationalists consisting mostly of former officers
of the Hamidiye, founded a secret organization known as Azadi in the early 1920s (Ciment 1996). Through the effort in soliciting support from the Kurds in the countryside, the members of Azadi connected with Sheikh Said, an influential political and religious leader who called for an immediate declaration of Kurdish independence. In February 1925, Sheikh Said along with the members of Azadi began a rebellion against the Turkish government. This rebellion is thought to be the first large-scale Kurdish nationalist movement (Olson 1989). Although Said’s forces were able to control a large area of Turkish Kurdistan, the Turkish government responded with harsh and brutal reprisals, establishing a pattern of Turkish strategies in managing Kurdish uprisings (Ciment 1996).

As a result, in the 1930s, the notion and the expression “Kurdishness” including the use of the Kurdish language in private was banned. The Turkish government officially declared that Kurds were “mountain Turks who had forgotten their language” (Ciment 1996, 132). The practice of denying the existence of Kurdish identity and discrimination against Kurds has continued to the present day as exemplified by the indictment and imprisonment of Leyla Zana in 1994. Zana, a former Kurdish member of parliament who represented the Kurdish people, added a sentence in the Kurdish language after taking the oath of office in Turkish. The denial of cultural rights for the Kurds has also been illustrated by restrictions on the teaching of the Kurdish language in school in modern days.

By the mid 1950s, Turkey’s repression of the Kurdish nation appeared to be complete. One British diplomatic observer in the Kurdish area of Turkey in 1956 noted
that “I did not catch the faintest breath of Kurdish nationalism which the most casual observer in Iraq cannot fail to notice” (McDowall 2004, 402). Despite the effort by the Turkish government to completely eliminate the sense of Kurdishness from the Republic, it was unable to eradicate Kurdish nationalism. The consistent presence of a Kurdish nationalist movement in neighboring states as well as the shift in the domestic polity towards a new approach to civil and political rights appeared to inspire various changes amongst the Kurdish population in their attitudes towards the issues at hand (Marcus 2007).

In the 1960s, there appeared to be a light at the end of the tunnel for the Kurdish people. The military coup of 1960 to challenge Menderes’ increasingly authoritarian rule was founded on various progressive ideas which were supported by the educated elite population. A new constitution, that these academics were invited to draft, enshrined basic freedoms, which had been limited since the founding of the Republic. With the emergence of a legal socialist party, the Turkish Workers Party (TIP), the Turkish Kurds hoped for real changes in “the most liberal period the people had known” (Marcus 2007, 19). However, the dreams of many Kurds were short lived in this “liberal” era. The attitudes of the State towards the Kurds did not progress as some had hoped. Many of those involved in various Kurdish-language publications were arrested and charged (McDowall 2004). In addition, when general amnesty was granted to those who had partaken in the coup in 1960, over 500 incarcerated Kurds alone were exempt from the proclamation (Ciment 1996, 48). This is a further indication that the discriminatory treatments of the Kurds continued despite some sign of progress.
The continuous struggle at home as well as a series of events that took place in Iraq – the creation of a new Iraqi government and the return of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the prominent Kurdish nationalist – prompted the creation of the underground Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey (TKDP), the first nationalist party since the last rebellion in 1938 (Marcus 2007). While the TKDP called for the creation of a Kurdish federation in Turkey, if necessary with the use of force, the party was not very popular amongst many Kurds. They appeared to be turned off by the fact that the TKDP’s traditional, conservative agenda did not represent them effectively and the party leadership represented the interests of the wealthy.

Although the Turkish left, who were critical of the policies of the state, were seen as a medium through which the realization of democracy and the protection of Kurdish rights was possible, the TIP were relatively silent on the Kurdish issues. While many Kurds were ideologically in line with the socialists, those hoping to coalesce with the TIP were dissatisfied by the fact that the socialists had no clear agenda regarding the Kurdish struggle (Marcus 2007). As a result, the leftist Kurds sought separate venues in advancing their political agenda. Consequently, several radical Kurdish organizations were formed, but they were soon declared illegal and shutdown. The most tenacious amongst them, the Parti Karkerani Kurdistan (PKK), survived as a voice of the Kurdish people from the repressive and violent measures of the state.

In 1973, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader who came to symbolize Kurdish independence and the founders of the PKK, influenced by the concept of self-determination of nations and other leftist ideologies, started a research group generating
new approaches and potential solutions for the Kurdish problem (Marcus 2007). Although Öcalan and others sought to work with the Turkish leftists in achieving progressive changes for both the Kurds and Turks, the negative reaction from the Turkish left convinced Öcalan and his friends to seek the change on their own. Originally, they focused on mobilizing university students in realizing desired changes and progress for the Kurdish people. However, by this time, Öcalan and his supporters began to focus on bringing their ideas and struggles directly to the people in the Kurdish dominated area in the southeast of Turkey. In order to be politically salient and to garner support from the people, Öcalan and his group began attacking right-wing extremists and Turkish nationalists, debating and fighting militant leftists who denied the idea of Kurdish nationalism, and holding public demonstrations in delivering their message to the Kurdish populous (Marcus 2007). While many Turkish and Kurdish radical groups at the time sought some sort of legal front in disseminating their message, Öcalan and his group focused on individual contact with the people on the ground. The rationale for this decision was based on the idea that the use of legal or democratic means was useless in challenging the Turkish government who does not believe in such values.

In the 1980s, the continued presence of the post-coup government’s restrictive policies on political participation and freedom of association led may political organizations, including the PKK, to advocate the use of violence in advancing their political goals (Yildiz and Breau 2010). In pursuing their political agenda of equality for the Kurds, the PKK began their open confrontation against the Turkish state in 1984 by attacking a few military targets. This marked the beginning of a new chapter for the
struggle in the southeastern region where violence continued to rise from this point on. As the attacks from the PKK against the state continued, the government replied with further repression and relentless violence.

First, the government planned to manage the situation in the southeastern Turkey by arming the Village Guards. They were state-sponsored civilian militia created in 1986 to protect civilians from the attacks and reprisal from the insurgent groups such as the PKK. However, due to the fact that guards were inadequately supervised and often abused their position in achieving personal interests, “the village guards system exacerbated lawless violence in the region, in particular against civilians” (Yildiz and Breau 2010, 16). In addition, the implementation of the Village Guards system cornered the Kurdish civilians between “a rock and a hard place”. Villages who refused to be part of the system or that were unable to produce volunteers to the Guard system were seen as PKK sympathizers, thus making them a target of state violence. On the contrary, villages that escaped state violence by singing up with the Village Guards system were seen by the PKK as the agents of the state, thus risking reprisal by the insurgents. Despite the fact that the Village Guard system created nothing but insecurity, the system is still in use to this date.

Second, the Turkish government adopted the use of forced evacuation as a measure in combating the threats from the PKK in the southeastern region. When executing the planned and forced evacuation, the armed forces were supposed to distinguish rural civilians and armed insurgents. However, unable to effectively identify the insurgents, the Turkish soldiers often relied on the use of indiscriminate violence
including, “torturing civilians, extrajudicial killings of non-combatants, abductions and disappearances and the destruction of Kurdish villages, property and crops” (Yildiz and Breau 2010, 17). It was estimated that by 1999 about 3,500 villages had been forcefully evacuated, and as a result, 3-4 million people, mostly Kurds, have been displaced (Yildiz 2005). Consequently, the economic infrastructures of the Kurdish dominated regions were eradicated, leaving the Kurds in a politically and economically difficult place.

Yildiz (2005) noted that the purpose of forced evacuation was not only to identify and eliminate the insurgents, but also to eliminate the Kurdish dominated region in the country. In general, the use of intimidation and violence by the government against the Kurdish populations pervaded this period and beyond.

Despite a long history of discrimination and violence against the Kurds, a peaceful resolution appeared to be within reach for a short period after 1991 when the True Path Party government deviated from its past policy regarding the Kurdish issue by signaling their willingness to examine the issues at hand (Yildiz 2005). With the inauguration of Prime Minister Tansu Çiller in 1993, however, the attitude of the Turkish government towards the Kurdish issues quickly reverted back to the norms of violence, which remains so to present.

When Çiller took the office of Prime Minister in 1993, instead of seeking a political solution to the difficult and unpopular Kurdish issue, she delegated it to the military who had been eager to handle it in a coercive way without civilian interference (Marcus 2007). The latter half of 1993 saw an increased number of indiscriminate violence against Kurdish activists (not PKK members). Many of them were harassed and
detained for allegedly aiding the PKK. Around this time the number of unsolved death of Kurdish activists rose tremendously (Marcus 2007). When Mehmet Sincar, a parliamentarian from Democracy Party (DEP) visited Batman to investigate the murders of Kurdish activists in the area, he fell victim to the same kind of crime he was investigating (U.S. Department of State 1993). As a result of a series of attacks involving Kurdish activists as targets of random killing that began in the latter half of 1993, some Kurds to flee their hometowns out of fear of repression. However, many younger and angrier members of the DEP chose to join the PKK instead of waiting to be arrested or assassinated by the security force or agents of the state (Marcus 2007).

In sum, the origin of the current Kurdish struggle appears to lie in various policies that politically, economically, and culturally marginalized the Kurdish minority that the Government of Turkey pursued in the name of unifying the country under the banner of Turkish nationalism. The existing literature on nationalist and ethnic civil war may suggest that the solution to cases such as this would require granting autonomy to the minority nationals based on the idea that increased autonomy would solve the core problems for the nationalist struggle, that is the marginalization and, in some cases, forced assimilation. While these factors may have originally motivated the Kurds in mobilizing to challenge the incumbent regime, a very specific area of policy decisions, namely the types of violence that the Government relied on, determined whether a non-violent approach to the issue was possible at various points in the history of the Kurds in Turkey.
The Latest Attempt at a Peaceful Resolution

In August 1999, Öcalan, in custody, publicly announced his intention to end the armed struggle and requested PKK forces to withdraw from Turkey in search for a more peaceful resolution to the Kurdish struggle (Marcus 2007). His commitment to a non-violent solution for the Kurdish issues appeared to be sincere. First, in his written statement, Öcalan stated that the struggle of the PKK for Kurdish independence was a “historic mistake.” (The Guardian 2000). In addition to the withdrawal of about 2,000 PKK rebels from Turkey, Öcalan also demanded that a group of high-ranking PKK officers turn themselves in to Turkey, and 16 officers of the PKK were arrested, and put on trial for their association with the group (Marcus 2007). Needless to say, such a move would seriously impair the organizational capacity of the PKK and may directly affect the ability of the rebels in producing an effective resistance. Despite the fact that “[t]here was almost nobody, from the highest level to the lowest, who thought this was the right thing to do,” according to one of the PKK fighters, every order from Öcalan, behind the walls of a prison, were followed by the members of the PKK (Marcus 2007).

As another indicator of the PKK’s commitment to pursing the Kurdish interests through non-violent, democratic means was its decision to drop the word “Kurdistan” from its name, indicating that the group was abandoning its demand for Kurdish independence (Yildiz 2005). Although limited violence amongst the factions of the PKK continued, the focus of the Kurdish citizens of Turkey shifted from demanding outright independence to educational, cultural, and limited political rights within the structure of the Turkish state, (Kirişçi 2010). As a result of the change in strategy of pursing their
goals from a military approach to a political one, the military force of the PKK was
greatly reduced; consequently, it posed little real threat to the state of Turkey. These
costly signals appear to indicate that Öcalan and the PKK genuinely desired to resolve the
Kurdish issue through democratic solutions. Various concessions made by the PKK
leadership after the arrest of Öcalan in 1999 lead to a unilateral ceasefire, which
subsequently caused a great reduction in hostilities and remained so for the next five
years (Yildiz 2005).

This was not the first time that the PKK attempted to end the Kurdish struggle
through violent means. In mid-March of 1993 the PKK declared a unilateral cease-fire
and stated that it wished to pursue it objectives through the democratic channels available
in Turkey. According to Amnesty International (1993), both the execution of village
guards by the PKK as well as of government opponents halted during this period. It
seemed as though the intentions of both the PKK and the Turkish government in ending
the conflict appeared to be sincere based on the observation that they refrained from the
use of violence during the time of cease-fire. However, the PKK ambush of a convoy of
soldiers on May 24th of that year marked the disintegration of the cease-fire despite the
fact that the PKK leadership publicly expressed regret about the incident. Although this
incident appeared to be an isolated event not sanctioned by the PKK organization, the
Turkish government retaliated against the Kurds with a large-scale military operation
covering the entire Kurdish region. As a result, the PKK announced the end of the cease-
fire on June 8th of that year.
An important part of government operations were security raids on villages that refused to join the village guard system and, therefore, suspected of being supporters of the PKK. The members of the villages were assembled in the village square, and those selected for interrogation were either taken away to a police station, gendarmerie post or other place of interrogation in the village itself. Unprotected by the most basic safeguards against torture, such villagers were and still are frequently exposed to the most brutal treatment – sometimes resulting in terrible injuries or even death. An eye-witness account of an incident in the village of Ormaniçi on February 20th, 1993 illustrates the brutality of the counterinsurgency effort by the security personnel acting on behalf of the Turkish government.

According to an eye-witness account from the muhtar, the village head man, the village was first surrounded by a large number of the Village Guards and individuals wearing masks, presumably members of the special forces. Then, they began randomly firing at houses, and the soldiers started to search the houses for suspected supporters of the Kurdish rebels. This is when one of the soldiers was fatally shot by a bullet coming from the outside of the house. The Village Guards retaliated by launching rocket-propelled grenades and mortars causing damage to property and the death of a child. Additionally, the men were made to lay face down all day in sub-zero temperatures and subjected to beatings and torture (Amnesty International 1993).

The retaliatory violence against the Kurdish villagers for the death of a soldier during the Ormaniçi incident appeared to be brutal and excessive. More importantly, the victims of state cruelty are selected at random. Even if it is true that one of the Kurdish
villagers pulled a trigger resulting in the death of one Turkish soldier, the security personnel needed to identify the actual culprit instead of essentially punishing the whole village. The use of such tactics by the Turkish government was common practice as a means of punishment for those villages that refused to join the village guard system and as a way of deterring the Kurdish population from aiding and abetting the Kurdish movement led by the PKK. In many cases, there was no conclusive evidence to suggest that the villages that refused to join the village guard system were actively supporting the PKK.

Unlike the responses of the Turkish government in 1993, as far as the responses to the changes in the PKK’s strategies are concerned, the state appeared to be reciprocating at first in resolving the Kurdish situation in 1999, despite the occasional violence perpetrated by rogue PKK insurgents. Based on the idea of cultural rights introduced by the Accession Partnership documents, the European Union called for an end to the policy banning Kurdish people from using their mother tongue when broadcasting as well as for promoting and protecting cultural diversity and rights including education in their mother tongue (Kirişçi 2010). This policy prescription reflected the general will of the Kurdish population as they have moved from seeking secession to demanding educational, cultural and limited political rights in a non-violent manner as a solution to the issues of Kurdish identity. Such a recommendation led the government of Turkey to adopt constitutional amendments and legislative reforms in

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19 The Accession Partnership documents assists the Turkish government in meeting the accession criteria of the European Union by specifying various political conditions that Turkey needs to meet before the consideration for the EU membership.
October 2001 and August 2002 pertaining to broadcasting and education in the Kurdish language that appeared to be an important first step in approaching the Kurdish problem (Kirişçi 2010).

The PKK, having renamed itself by this time as Kongra-Gel, decided to withdraw from the unilateral ceasefire that produced a short period of relative calm. One of the primary reasons for this decision by the Kurdish rebels was the fact that the Turkish government did not appear to reciprocate the PKK’s stated interest in achieving democratic solutions regarding the Kurdish situation. It has been reported that state military operations against the PKK continued even after the declaration of the ceasefire that were followed by various costly signals on the part of the PKK (Agence France Presse 2004). Turkey’s military response to the PKK was not limited to attacks on the PKK itself, but amounted to a full-scale assault on the Kurdish countryside (Yildiz 2005, 105). Such attacks have victimized the non-combatant population in the region. The PKK arrived at this decision despite the fact that a large faction within the organization desired to renounce the armed struggle indefinitely (Dymond 2004).

Due to the treatment of the Kurdish problem as a security issue rather than a social conflict, Kurds who emphasize or act on their ethnic identity have been labeled and treated as internal enemies by the government (Ergil 2007). Saraçoğlu (2011) noted that the PKK was seen as a marginal group created by international forces and that ordinary Turks differentiated ordinary Kurds from the PKK insurgents up until the 1990s in the cities. As a result of the prevalent image of ordinary Kurds being different from the PKK, the Kurds in the cities were not subjected to collective violence or pervasive
discriminatory practices event at the height of the war (Saraçoğlu 2011, 24). However, there was a shift amongst urban Turks in regards to their beliefs about the linkage between the PKK and ordinary Kurdish migrants in the cities. The intensification of visible acts of Kurdish nationalism (e.g., sporadic clashes between the Kurdish protesters and the police, and the display of Kurdish symbols) proved that “the PKK has considerable influence over the Kurdish migrants who take part in Kurdish nationalist mobilization in the western cities” (Saracoglu 201, 151). Increased opportunities for the city Turks to observe the link between the PKK and ordinary Kurds through various nationalist activities in the city, created the illusion that all Kurds support the PKK and its agenda.

The notion of Kurdishness, thus, has been declared illegal, deserving military repression during war. This attitude towards the Kurdish population explains the government’s reliance on the use of indiscriminate violence in curbing the perceived threats from the Kurdish population in general. Consequently, state security operations became notorious for extremely high casualty rates, extra-judicial killings of non-combatants, torture of civilians and the destruction of Kurdish villages and this trend appeared to continue even after 1999 (Yildiz 2005, 105). In fact, extrajudicial killings of civilian Kurds, in particular, have steadily increased since 2000, according to the State Department’s human rights report.

The story of a man named Haci from Diyarbarkir illustrates how one’s Kurdish identity could result in becoming the target of state violence. Haci, who did not want to share his last name for fear of being identified, told a journalist that he was tortured and
incarcerated for 70 days for his PKK sympathies (Fleishman 2001). Although Haci’s passion for the PKK was strong and his brother joined the PKK, he did not participate in the armed struggle. Given the history of the relationship between the Turkish government and the Turkish Kurds, it is no surprise that many Kurds are emotionally connected to the PKK and its violent struggle. Haci worked construction in Ankara after high school but eventually drifted back to Diyarbakir. This is when he was chased, handcuffed, blindfolded, and arrested for his sympathies for the PKK. During the three-day long torture, the police kept telling Haci that he was a Turk. His refusal to accept such a claim, and his persistence in declaring his identity as a Kurd ended up with him in jail for 70 days until a judge ordered his release.

The continued state violence and human rights violations in the Kurdish Southeast perpetrated by police, the gendarmerie and other public authorities appeared to be solely based on the fact that they are Kurds and not because they are the identified members of the PKK (Yildiz 2005, 92). Ismet Aksu, a fruit vendor in Istanbul who evacuated from the southeast stated that because he was involved in the Kurdish political struggle, the soldiers burnt houses in his village (Robberson 2000). The general implication here is that the ordinary Kurds are likely to suffer the brunt force of the Turkish government in their claimed homeland whether one is actively supportive of the PKK and its violent approach. Under such a condition where even the position of neutrality threatens one’s safety and physical integrity, an individual may be incentivized to join the rebel group, namely the PKK, when it is perceived that such a choice is likely to increase one’s chance of survival. It appears that the decision of the Turkish
government to continuously rely on indiscriminate violence including various physical integrity violations led many Kurds, including the non-combatant populations, to perceive the situation as presenting no way out other than siding with the rebels which may marginally increase one’s individual safety.

Many (e.g., Ergil 2007) claim that the PKK’s inability to shed its notoriety as a terrorist organization and its unwillingness to disarm and disband are obstacles to peace in the Kurdish area of Turkey. However, the decision of the PKK to retain its organizational capacity may be justified as it waits for the government to change and abandon violent approaches to the Kurdish issue. Although Öcalan’s decision to pursue a democratic solution in achieving the Kurdish cause may have been driven by his interest in saving himself from the fate of the death penalty, a costly signal that followed his declaration in ordering top-ranking officials of the PKK to surrender seemingly supports the sincerity of his calls for a peaceful resolution.

One series of events in Diyarbakir in 2006 particularly highlights the favorable attitude and the behavior of the national government regarding the use of indiscriminate violence in managing Kurdish dissidents. On March 28, 2006, funerals were held for four of the 14 guerrillas killed days before by the Turkish army in Diyarbakir. Fact-finding mission reports on the issue of the use of indiscriminate violence in Southeast Turkey jointly produced by the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) and Bar Human Rights Committee (BHRC) noted that the funerals proceeded peacefully despite the large number of attendees and security personnel (KHRP/BHRC 2006). The mayor of Diyarbakir in conjunction with the local NGOs urged both the attendees and security
personnel to return home and to their stations after the funerals. The KHRP/BHRC report (2006, 18) noted that the PKK had explicitly decided to avoid violent retaliation for the killings of the 14 guerrillas, rather they encouraged peaceful protest. As such, the funeral goers appeared to not have armed weapons. Aside from the anger manifested in the form of throwing stones, the funeral goers were peaceful, reflecting the PKK’s message.

The (one-sided) violence broke out, according to the report, when the funeral goers passed 10 Nisan Police Station on the way back from the cemetery. It has been reported that the police had set up a road block and began to intimidate the funeral attendees, who were not particularly behaving violently, with the use of water cannons, tear gas and batons; several reports indicated the use of firearms by security forces as well (KHRP/BHRC 2006, 19). In addition, the police personnel were also reported to intimidate and harass shopkeepers with stones and metal pellets fired with sling-shots (KHRP/BHRC 2006, 19). Many shopkeepers in the city decided to close their shops, some out of protest and others to avoid being targeted by the protesters. Unlike the expectation that the protesters would be the ones looting the shops, security personnel began to attack these establishments in punishment for closing. As a result of the use of seemingly unnecessary violence initiated by the agents of the state, the Kurdish dissidents in various parts of the city replied with violence. It is believed that the decision of the security forces to intimidate the Kurdish protestors who attended the funeral with indiscriminate violence led to their decision in resorting to violence in reply.
Even public officials were not insulated from the violent behavior of the security forces. When Osman Baydemir, mayor of Diyarbakir, was traveling to meet with the Governor of the province to discuss the issues related to the violence in the city discussed above, a group of armed police attacked his convoy. According to the KHRP/BHRC report (2006, 20), “[p]olice held a pistol to the head of one of the Mayor’s guards, and threatened to kill Baydemir, while another of his guards was cut on the forehead.” Although no fatality occurred in this encounter, the cars that the Mayor travelled in were reported to be damaged. As quoted in the report, a member of İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association of Turkey, IHD) noted that if the armed police could behave in this manner toward the Mayor, one can only imagine how they would conduct themselves with ordinary people in the street.

The annual State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices also reported that the recurrent patterns of human rights violations by the Government of Turkey. This report supported the claim that the inability of the Kurdish population in the Southeast to ensure one’s physical security after the 1999 cease-fire and the period of relative calm led to the decision of the masses to once again support the PKK in its struggle. Despite the seemingly favorable initial reaction by the government after Öcalan and the PKK denounced violent approaches in realizing various Kurdish interests, the continued use of violence and counterinsurgent tactics that grossly violated the physical integrity of many in the Kurdish dominated area remobilized the masses in return to the familiar life of violent struggle. Though the number of victims who suffered from various incidents were relatively small, the repeated nature of these incidents was
important in shaping the narrative of the Kurdish struggle against the Government of Turkey. Those who decided to return to the life of insurgents may not have been directly affected and suffered from the violent act of the agents of the State. However, the fact that one may anytime be targeted because he or she is Kurdish, may have been just sufficient in tipping the scale to the option of re-enlisting with the PKK in the presence of continued violence. Interviews with a few teenage Kurdish villagers after the aforementioned event in 2006 illustrate this point.

Sevder and his friends Cevat and Sinan, teenage boys from Diyarbakir, joined the rebellion after the three tragic days that followed the riot that erupted during the funeral of 14 Kurdish rebels killed in an ambush by Turkish security forces (Traynor 2006). The boys, along with many Kurds in the area, are fed up with discriminatory practices by the Turkish government was well as with the persistence of indiscriminate violence by the government. After such violent episodes like the one observed in 2006, many Kurds have decided to manage the situation by “going into the mountains,” indicating that they are voluntarily joining the PKK and its armed struggle. Cevat stated that "We're fed up of the discrimination. It doesn't have to be like this, [b]ut every time they do something like this, more people go into the mountains” (Traynor 2006). Indiscriminate violence along with the use of illegal torture during unnecessary detentions have led to about 1,000 locals joining the ranks of the PKK within a few months after the March 2006 incident.

In 2000, the State Department reported that due to the decline in PKK related terrorist acts by 90 percent since 1999, fewer cases of abuse of detainees were reported as
the number of overall detentions declined in the Southeast. It is important to note that the evidence upon which one’s detention is founded has been arbitrary. In many cases, it seems that being in the wrong place at the wrong time was sufficient for one’s detention and to suffer violent treatment as a criminally accused detainee. In 2001, *The Human Rights* report noted that “Security forces continued to target active PKK units *as well as those persons they believed supported or sympathized with the PKK*, and conducted operations against villages throughout the region which yielded ammunitions caches” (U.S Department of State 2001; emphasis added). One specific case documented in the same report notes that chanting slogans was enough to justify detention of 28 youths on the basis that they supported the PKK and its activities. The Village Guards as well as the special unit of the police often were cited as perpetrators of the illegitimate use of violence, including extrajudicial killings, torture and kidnapping. Despite continued reporting of human rights abuse perpetrated by the government, reported cases of torture and incommunicado detentions fell, corresponding to the decline of PKK violence to the level of near-absence as reported in 2002.

In terms of the number of civilian deaths from 2000 to 2005 as reported by the Human Rights Foundation (HRF), there is a steadily increasing trend. Despite the report that the PKK organization appeared to be keeping their commitment in achieving the Kurdish interests through non-violent means, though there are reports of isolated incidents, the government, especially the security forces and the police, have not been holding up their end of the bargain. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the number of extrajudicial civilian deaths had more than doubled from 20 reported cases in 2000 to 52
in 2005 based on the HRF reports presented in the *Human Rights Reports* produced by the U.S. State Department. Although this increasing trend may appear to be miniscule in terms of its absolute value, the context within which this trend is observed as well as its relationship to the battle field are significant to the arguments presented here.

First, unlawful killings of civilians continued to take place after the violent conflict had voluntary halted by the PKK in 1999, despite the fact that the number of battle deaths gradually declined during the two years immediately after the cease-fire. As with the cease-fire of 1993, the PKK unilaterally declared the end of conflict without any institutional guarantee of their safety in the postwar environment. Although voluntary disarmament would have been a clear costly signal in demonstrating the PKK’s intention in ending the war, such a process never took place after the declaration of a cease fire. This may be due to the nature and the timing of the cease-fire. Since the winter in
southeastern Turkey would make any effective armed operations impossible, the PKK used this seasonal factor strategically to appear to the government as if the insurgents were willing to cooperate in realizing the end of the war. The military was aware of this fact due to the past pattern of PKK attacks that began at the end of winter. As a result, the government never took the “seasonal” cease-fire from the PKK seriously. However, several PKK leaders have turned themselves in to the government in supporting the claim that the PKK is now interested in realizing Kurdish interests through non-violent means. While the true intention behind the unilateral cease-fire remains unclear, the PKK leadership declared that the PKK and the Kurdish population in general were fatigued by the enduring violence and were ready to resolve the conflict. However, the Turkish government continued to rely on the use of violence against the Kurdish population, often in an indiscriminate matter, in an effort to eliminate potential threats from the PKK. Facing the possibility of being randomly targeted by the government because of one’s Kurdishness, the non-combatant population had every incentive to support the PKK who is willing to and may be capable of protecting them.

The incidents of government violence may have directly influenced the civilians’ decision to once again join and support the PKK insurgents for those who experienced or observed the violence directly. However, what is more important is the fact that the reports of violence also have a constitutive effect in shaping the narrative of the Government’s use of indiscriminate violence. I argue that the stories about the Government’s use of violence against the ordinary civilian population because of their Kurdishness has produced the belief amongst them that it is better to secure oneself from
the Government by supporting the PKK rebels, as illustrated by the story about an increase in the number of teenage recruits to the PKK after the March 2006 riot

According to a daily Turkish newspaper, *Sabah*, survey research conducted by the International Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime (UTSAM) based in Ankara asked various questions regarding the motivation of individuals joining the PKK in their armed struggle. Among many questions, the survey asked if forced migration and the government’s persistent practice of extrajudicial killings had motivated his or her decision to join the rebels. As for the effect of forced migration, over 66 percent of the respondents noted that it prompted them to participate in the PKK. Also, over 62 percent of the respondents supported the claim that extrajudicial killings of fellow Kurds prompted them to join the rebellion (*Haber* 2011).

Additionally, Meral Danis Bestas, deputy chairwoman of the Peace and Democracy Party, noted that the unkept promises of reform coupled with a massive police crackdown have prompted increased violence in recent years. According to the news report, in the southeast, several hundreds of Kurds, including local elected officials, have been rounded up by the police on the basis of collaborating with the PKK (*Agence France Presse* 2010). As a result, many, including a large number of teenagers, have gone into the mountains in support of the PKK.

These practices are some of the reasons that a seemingly small increase in the number of reported cases of extrajudicial killings of civilians has coincided with the tremendous increase in the number of battle deaths; an indication that there is an increase
in the intensity of war, which often requires the increased participation of the non-combating population in the war effort as noted in the earlier chapter.

The above mechanism explains why the number of battle deaths dipped in 2002, but immediately began to increase in the following years, leading to the end of the unilateral cease-fire by the PKK in 2004 and the eventual return to war. It is quite possible that both sides were recuperating militarily during the ceasefire after 1999 for an uncertain future while waiting for a political development. More specifically, the Kurds may have been counting on Erdoğan’s “Kurdish initiative” in potentially seeking political and social equality for the Kurds; and, at the same time, the government may have been waiting to see if this new political solution could have won the hearts and the minds of the Kurdish people. After the declaration of a unilateral cease-fire by the PKK, the number of battle deaths tremendously declined from 187 in 2000 to 56 in 2003. However, this trend has immediately been countered by the rise in the number of battle deaths in 2004 at 180 to 330 in 2005, an increasing trend which eventually accumulates to satisfy the beginning of war. The violence in the southeast had reached its pre-1999 level.

The Future of the Kurdish Struggle and the Prospects for Peace

Aside from the reality that the conflict between the Turkish government and the Kurds had escalated to the pre-1999 level in recent years, the prospects for peace in southeast Turkey appeared to be rather grim due to the fact that the government’s reliance on indiscriminate violence against civilians in the name of counterinsurgency continues.
The use of indiscriminate violence by the government persists despite efforts by the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi or DTP) and its successor the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi or BDP), in reaching a political solution to the Kurdish problems and some positive reactions from the Turkish government.\(^\text{20}\)

The DTP/BDP is thought to be different from its processors (e.g., the Democratic People’s Party, or DEHAP) based on its diversity of opinions and its relative weak links to the PKK, giving some level of legitimacy to the party (Kirişci 2010). The DTP/BDP was not necessarily seen as a political wing of the PKK which might have been the case with the DEHAP. Even a symbolic gesture of cooperative attitude between the Kurds and the Turks was seen when a leading member of the DTP, Ahmet Türk, shook his hand with Devlet Bahçeli, the then-leader of the right-wing Nationalist Action Party (Kirişci 2010).

In the latter half of the 2000s, the DTP/BDP initiated various discussions and debates addressing the Kurdish problem in search of a political solution. The effort of the DTP/BDP has prompted changes in attitude amongst the members of the ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and other politicians. For example, Beşir Atalay, the then-the Minister of the Interior, publically contemplated the idea of reinstating the names of places which have been “Turkified” (Kirişci 2010). Similarly, İlker Başbuğ, the Chief of the General Staff at the time, had suggested the idea that citizens of Turkey

\(^{20}\) The DTP was banned in 2009 by the Constitutional Court of Turkey on the basis that the party has become "focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country and the nation" (BBC Dec 2009 Turkish Top Court Bans…..).
could be called “of Turkey (Türkiyeli)” as opposed to the label of “Turkish” (Kirişçi 2010). While these developments do not necessarily indicate that the Kurdish problem is on the verge of being solved politically, they might have been a good starting point in showing the government is willing to work with the Kurdish people through legitimate political processes vis-à-vis the DTP/BDP. However, the persistence of the dependence of the government on coercion and intimidation appeared to inhibit any chance of reaching a political solution.

In addition to the persistent practice of extrajudicial killings by security forces, police, and the Village Guards, the recent events of aerial bombings in the Kurdish areas appears to have further contributed in the Kurds belief about the intention of the Turkish government in dealing with the Kurdish problem. Unless the Turkish government convinces the Kurdish population with its peaceful intentions in resolving the conflict and does so by abandoning its current reliance on the use of indiscriminate violence, peace between the Turks and Kurds would be improbable.

In 2007, The State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices reported that Ejder Demir, a Kurdish-origin Turkish citizen, was shot and killed by security forces in the Asagi Kockiran village in southeastern Turkey. Based on eyewitnesses’ testimony, the Human Rights Association and Mazlum-Der (The Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People) reported that Demir was shot by a soldier in his back without any warning as he exited his house and turned around as requested by the armed forces. However, the government maintained that Demir was attempting to flee when he was shot, according to the Human Rights
Despite requests from the nongovernmental organizations to investigate the incidents, no examination has been conducted to date. In addition, the cases of extrajudicial killings of civilians who ignored the stop warning specifically in the southeastern region continue to fill the pages of the *Human Rights Report*.

The reliance on the use of indiscriminate violence in dealing with the Kurdish problem has further been illustrated by the recent tragedy that took place around Roboski village of Uludere district. Although the case is surrounded by many unanswered questions, it may exemplify the relationship between state repression and the emergence of motivation amongst the Kurds in supporting and, in some cases, actively participating in the PKK’s armed struggle.

On December 28, 2011, the Turkish armed forces conducted aerial bombardment of the area closed to Roboski, resulting in 34 Kurdish civilian deaths, 17 of which were children (The Kurdish American Human Rights Campaign 2011). Although the Turkish government has claimed that it was an administrative accident, there are some reasons to believe that it may have been intentional. In other words, the government may have been aware of the fact that those targeted were not members of PKK but rather civilians involved in a small-scale cross border cigarette smuggling operations (Doğu Ve Güneydoğu İlleri Barolari 2012).

The Turkish military claims that warplanes launched air strikes after drones spotted suspected rebels of the PKK (*The Daily Telegraph* 2011). Based on the intelligence report that Kurdish rebels were planning to launch attacks on the border outpost and reported activity from the border area by a drone, the Turkish government
preemptively deployed air strikes on the suspected insurgents. However, the reports based on local government officials identified the victims to be civilians under the age of 30, many of them children. Fehmi Yaman, mayor of Uludere in Sirnak province stated that "The state knew that these people were smuggling in the region. This kind of incident is unacceptable. They were hit from the air" (Beaumont 2011). In addition, after the incidents, officials from the Turkish Intelligence Service rejected the claim made by the military that they were responding to the intelligence report from the TIP (Hürriyet Daily News 2011). The ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP) also recognizes the mistakes that the military made in identifying the target.

However, there are some reports that the military may have attacked the area knowing that there would be Kurdish civilians involved in smuggling operations in the area. According to the report by Turkish journalist Mehmet Baransu “the decision to bomb was made despite officials’ suspicion that those being targeted were smugglers, rather than PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party) members” (The Kurdish American Human Rights Campaign 2011). Despite this suspicion, the military went ahead with the plan. The joint investigative delegation consists of representatives from 12 provincial official bar associations in the east and southeast have also concluded that “there is strong evidence to suggest that this massacre was carried out in a ‘premeditated’ way” (The Kurdish American Human Rights Campaign 2011). This massacre elicited broad condemnation from both international and domestic actors.
Although the Roboski massacre was one of a few cases of airstrikes that took place in Turkey, it was not the only incident of aerial bombing against the non-combatant population. The Turkish government has relied on the use of air strikes as a counterinsurgency measure prior to the incident. Between mid-July and December of 2011, the joint Iranian-Turkish cross-border attack in the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq killed more than a dozen people and displaced thousands of Kurds (Human Rights Watch 2011). While the incidents took place outside of Turkey, their effects on the belief about the government and its intention amongst the Kurds in Turkey, I argue, further incentivized them to be sympathetic with the PKK and to support the violent struggle against the government.

Although the military from both countries claimed that they were responding to cross-border attacks from the insurgent group, the “retaliatory” attacks caused severe damage to the non-combatants. Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East Director at Human Rights Watch stated that “Iran may say it is responding to armed attacks from Iraqi Kurdistan, but its own attacks, including the indiscriminate use of rockets near civilian villages, are causing grave harm to civilians” (Human Rights Watch 2011). In addition, despite the claim about the eminent cross-border threats coming from the military camps in Iraq, the affected areas were not military in nature at all. The investigative team of the Human Rights Watch that visited the affected area reported that “many of the areas attacked are purely civilian and have no armed groups conducting attacks against Iran and Turkey or any other potential military target” (Human Rights Watch 2011). While there is no doubt that some areas have been under the control of the PKK, the villages in
the affected areas from the aerial bombardment by Turkish and Iranian governments clearly were not PKK territory. In addition to killing innocent civilians through the use of indiscriminate violence, such tactics have caused many to be internally displaced persons in their own homeland. This further incentivized the ordinary Kurds to join the struggle against the Turkish government, which makes it difficult to resolve the Kurdish problem in any way.

**Conclusion**

Ever since the birth of the Turkish Republic after the First World War, the Kurds have been politically, economically, and socially marginalized and suffered harsh treatment at the hands of the government. Violence and intimidation peaked during the period after 1984 when the PKK began open conflict against the state. There were numerous unilateral cease-fires from the PKK throughout the struggle, but the events that followed the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan appeared to show promise of a peaceful resolution. Not only did Öcalan publically recognize that the idea of Kurdish liberation through violence and secession that they envisioned in the 1970s was wrong, but he also ordered high ranking members of the organization to turn themselves into the authorities. Öcalan also demanded the rank and file of the PKK to withdraw to the mountain areas of Turkish/Iraqi Kurdistan. To some extent, the Turkish government also seemed to be on the same page about the resolution of the Kurdish problem. Many of the conditions necessary for peace appeared to be present at the time.²¹

²¹ See Fortna (2008) and Toft (2010)
However, continued physical threats against non-combatant populations coupled with gross human rights violence by the government, superficially in the southeastern area of Turkey, led many Kurds to sympathize with the PKK and supported the Kurdish struggle through means of violence. Despite the presence of conditions conducive to peace in 1999, the persistence of indiscriminate violence against the civilian Kurds shaped the narrative of war that merely being a Kurd caused grave threat to one’s personal security and physical integrity, necessitating a way to protect oneself. For many Kurds, the solution to this situation was to seek refuge under the wings of the PKK insurgents. In sum, the government’s constant reliance on violence and coercion and the ordinary Kurds’ need to be protected led the war to reemerge again in the 2000s, almost immediately after the signing of a promising resolution.

One of the primary lessons learned from the Kurdish case in terms of a way of achieving a resolution to a civil war is to disincentivize the civilians from reengaging in war. In other words, civilians are very unlikely to going back to war if doing so is more costly than the option of living an “ordinary” life. Since a successful mobilization leading to the onset of civil war requires a large number of non-combatants to enlist with the rebels, a lack of rationale for enlisting implies that the emergence of a full-scale war is very unlikely. If the Kurdish problem is to be resolved, the first thing that needs to be done is to reconsider the ways in which the Turkish government has been approaching the issue. While it is necessary to manage the real threats coming from the PKK, the government needs to focus on distinguishing PKK insurgents from ordinary Kurdish civilians. By selectively targeting the actual threats, the perception of the ordinary Kurds
regarding the intention of the government will, with some time, shift to the point where
the government could win their hearts and minds in working towards a peaceful
resolution. Violent struggle will ensue with the government’s continued reliance of the
use of indiscriminate violence against the Kurdish civilians in the Kurdish southeast.
"It isn't enough to talk about peace. One must believe in it. And it isn't enough to believe in it. One must work at it." – Eleanor Roosevelt

The Civil War in the Chittagong Hill Tracts

Although the peace process in resolving the conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts endured over a long period of time, the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord of 1997 appeared to be effective in terminating the war that lasted for 25 years. Although post-accord environment appeared to be more conducive to the recurrence of civil war in the region than stability and peace, and despite the presence of various political and economic challenges, the war between the government of Bangladesh and the Hill people so far has not been reignited. Although there are reports of violence between the insurgent in the CHT and the government security forces, the severity and the intensity remains low to the point where the violent conflict between the government and insurgents can be seen as virtually non-existent. Based on an interview with one of the Hill people, Fortna (2008) noted that the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) was in a weak position to return to war because its constituents were fatigued by war and they would not have supported them. While it is probably true that the non-combatants were war weary, which produced an end to this long enduring war, the decision not to support the PCJSS was only possible in an environment where their lives

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22 Quinn, Mason and Gurses (2007) and Toft (2010) noted that peace produced after a civil war terminated by negotiation is precarious. This is especially true if such a peace process lacks a third party security guarantor as Walter (2004) illustrated.

23 The UCDP defines a conflict as a violent episode that killed at least 25 civilians. Although there are reports of clashes between the government and the rebel group, the number of causalities remains well below this threshold.
were not in immediate danger because of their decision. Thus, I argue that relative peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts was made possible by the changes in the government’s counterinsurgency policy; that is, the shift from relying on the use of indiscriminate violence against unarmed populations to adopting the measures that facilitate defection amongst the supporters of the insurgent groups. Targeting those who were directly involved in an armed struggle against the insurgents while minimizing collateral damage to the rest of the population created an environment where the non-combatants had no incentive to actively join or support the rebel group.

At the conclusion of the conflict in 1997, the government of Bangladesh did not concede entirely to the demands of the PCJSS – representing the voice of the Hill people. In fact, the issue of constitutional recognition of the distinctiveness of the Hill tribes - one of the most essential demands of the Hill people and one of the original reasons for the armed struggle – was not incorporated in the final version of the peace accord. This is one of the demands that the PCJSS consistently pressed for throughout the peace process. Despite the significance that the constitutional recognition of the Hill tribes as culturally distinctive inhabitants within Bangladesh carried, the Hill people accepted a compromised solution to the issue of constitutional protection at the end, though there are some de facto recognition of their distinctiveness and entitlement to political autonomy. The creation of an autonomous legislative body in the Chittagong Hill Tracts - which was the compromised solution to the constitutional protection that the PCJSS desired – signaled to the tribal inhabitants of the region that the government of Bangladesh was willing to reach a solution short of a continued war. The significance of this negotiated
outcome is its implication on the future of the tribal inhabitants. That is, the government of Bangladesh is willing to coexist politically and culturally with the Hill people, suggesting that the government is no longer a threat to the existence of the Hill tribes.

The reason that this conflict was successfully terminated, despite the presence of various conditions that may have led one to project otherwise, is due to the fact that the ordinary Hill people no longer perceived the government of Bangladesh as issuing threats to their physical safety and existence. In chapter 2, I have argued that in order for the rebellion to sustain, there must be an immediate security threat from the government that challenges the safety of the individuals who reside in the rebel-controlled territories, including rebels themselves. Accordingly, I posited that a successful war termination requires an incentive for the insurgents and the individuals in the rebel territory to collaborate with the government instead of supporting the rebel organization. This incentive to defect from the insurgency group is only conceivable if such a strategy yields more safety than otherwise. The implication of this argument is that the government must be able to credibly promise their intent in not exploiting the disarming rebels and, at the same time, provide protection for the defectors from rebel retaliation. In the case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts peace process, there were observable actions that the government of Bangladesh took in ensuring the security of individuals defecting from the insurgent movement.

It must be noted that the government of Bangladesh under various presidents and prime ministers continually initiated peace talks with the PCJSS throughout the conflict. Although the government had relied initially on the use of indiscriminate violence in
dealing with the attacks from the Shanti Bahini, the military wing of the PCJSS, the sincerity of the government in peacefully resolving the issue, accompanied by costly signals, appeared to be genuine throughout the enduring peace process. I posit that the willingness and visible effort by the government of Bangladesh to negotiate peace with the PCJSS signaled to the Hill people the government’s intention of resolving the issue through means other than war.

A Brief History of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Origin of the Conflict

During British colonial rule, the Chittagong Hill Tracts were granted the special status of an autonomously administrated district regulated by the CHT Regulation of 1900. One of the main features of this document, in an effort to protect the autonomy of the area, was to bar the sale and transfer of land to non-indigenous people as well as to restrict the migration of non-tribal people to the area (Pandy and Jamil 2009). The protection of the Chittagong Hill Tracts area was also afforded by the Government of India act of 1935 by claiming the CHT as being a “Totally Excluded Area.” While the issues related to civil, criminal, and jurisdictional matters were presided over by the administration of a deputy commissioner, the circle chiefs retained power over customary matters. Since the local structures were not altered, the Hill people in general were not affected by these developments (Mohsin 2003).

After the partition of British India that created India and Pakistan in 1947, the Chittagong Hill Tracts were allocated to Pakistan to compensate Pakistan for their loss in

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24 This act granted a large measure of autonomy to the provinces of British India and instilled the foundations of the Federation of India.
25 In 1881, the government of Bengal divided the Chittagong Hill Tracts into three circles – Chakma, Bohmang, and Mong.
the partition of Punjab, the CHT was given to East Pakistan at the time despite its geographical location and the Hill people’s plea for a merger with India. Although the population of the Chittagong Hill Tracts were 95% non-Muslim at the time of partition, the area was granted to Pakistan on the rationale that while the Hill people depend on Bengalis for their economic well-being, the Bengalis also depends upon the Hill Tracts (Hodson 1969). In 1955, the provincial administration in Dhaka decided to withdraw the special status given to the Chittagong Hill Tracts under past legislative acts under British India by integrating the area to the province and extending its control in the Hill Tracts. However, the Chittagong Hill Tracts were declared a special area by the central government and placed under the direct control of the Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs where a deputy commissioner directly reports to Karachi (Ali 1993).

The Pakistani Constitutional amendment of 1963 marked the beginning of the encroachment on the autonomy for the Hill people. The amendment eliminated the restrictive regulations on the migration of non-tribal populations to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which, consequently, prompted a large-scale migration of Bengali settlers to the area due to the scarcity of arable land and the pressure of increasing population in the area outside of the Hill Tracts (Panday and Jamil 2009). The increased number of the migration of Bengalis accompanied the abuse and misappropriation of the land and resources of the Jummas in the homeland, challenging their livelihood.

The Kaptai Dam project exemplifies the misappropriation of the land and resources that the Jummas experienced by the hegemony of the Bengali settlers. The

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26 The Chittagong Hill Tracts are adjacent to the Northeastern Indian states of Tripura and Mizoram and geographically not contiguous with the political center of Pakistan.
construction of the Kaptai Dam displaced approximately 100,000 people (Roy 2008, 488). This development project was damming to the Hill people in many ways. Not only did the construction of the dam end the geographic and social isolation of the Hill people, but it also revoked the special autonomous status that survived throughout their history (Minorities at Risk Project 2006). In addition, the dam submerged 40% of the total area of the Chittagong Hill Tracts while the Hill people did not benefit vocationally from the construction (Mohsin 2003). Since this dam project took away large cultivable areas, it stripped the livelihood of many Hill people and displaced many.

The marginalization of the Hill people continued under the government of Bangladesh after its independence in 1971. Since the only commonality between the people of East and West Pakistan was religion and the presence of the alleged discriminatory practice against Bengalis in all aspects of life, coupled with the existing contention over the state language, a nine-month war of independence resulted. After the war of independence, the Bengali political elites adopted the concept of nation-state as a paradigm of political development. As a result, the government of Bangladesh adopted a policy of imposing homogeneity to compel conformity from various actors under the banner of “Bengali nation.” The roots of the conflict can partly be blamed on the unwillingness of the government of Bangladesh to consider the Hill people’s demands for autonomy and constitutional safeguards at the time of independence. During the framing of the Bangladeshi constitution after its independence, the Hill people’s demand was first expressed by Manobendra Narayan Larma, a representative of the Hill people and the
founder of the PCJSS, the organization that represents the unified voice of the Hill people.

Their demands appear to mostly concern the protection of a distinctive Hill identity, which was being challenged by the state-formation process at the political center after Bangladeshi independence. Although the Chittagong Hill Tracts is home to numerous tribes with distinctive languages, cultural practices and customs, the tribes constructed an overarching Jumma identity based on their shared historical occupation of a slash and burn cultivation and, more importantly, on their common historical experience of oppression and marginalization (Mohsin 2003). The implication of the construction of the Jumma identity is that their collective identity as non-Bengalis was the most salient issue for the tribal inhabitants because of the effect of such identity on their future political, social and economic prospects. More specifically, the steps taken by the Bangladeshi government in the name of national unity and state-formation have taken away the dignity as well as the livelihood of the Hill people.

The Hill people demanded that the Chittagong Hill Tracts were to regain its legislative autonomy, and they sought the continuation of the offices of tribal chiefs, the system that emerged under British occupation. While the system of indirect rule adopted during the time of British colonialism did not alter the local political, social, and economic institutional arrangements, the centralization of political and economic power

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27 The government of Bangladesh was suspicious of some of the tribal populations in the postwar period since the chief of the Chakma tribe, the most dominant tribe in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, sided with Pakistan during the war (Amnesty International 2000). As such, the Bengali soldiers raided houses and jungles of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in search of enemy combatants, according to Mohsin (2003). This may be an additional reason for seeking constitutional protection of the Hill people in the framing of the constitution of Bangladesh.
that began after the partition intruded upon their way of life. As such, the requisition of local political autonomy was essential for the Hill people in reclaiming their cultural autonomy and identity.

They also pressed for the retention of the 1900 CHT Manual and the restriction on the amendment of the Manual and demanded a ban on the influx of Bengali settlers into the Chittagong Hill Tracts. As noted above, the CHT Manual of 1900 granted special status to the Hill Tracts where it banned the settlement of non-tribal populations in the area and placed special restrictions on the transfer of land to non-indigenous population. This is due to the fact that the erosion of the Jumma identity and their way of life was prompted by the mass migration of Bengalis seeking land and resources. The implementation of these changes was believed to protect the Hill people from further encroachment on their autonomy by Bengalis.

Prime Minster Sheikh Mujibur Rahman rejected the demands from the tribal inhabitants of the Hill Tracts and advised them to assimilate to the new Bengali identity. In this regard, the Bangladesh constitution of 1971 that was adopted after the war of Independence with Pakistan specifically states:

“The unity and solidarity of the Bengali nation, which deriving its identity from its language and culture, attained sovereign and independent Bangladesh through united and determined struggle in the war of independence, shall be the basis of Bengali nationalism (The People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 1972).”

In addition, the constitution called for cultural and linguistic unity in the state of Bangladesh. The ruling Awami League perceived any demands for autonomy, at the
time of the framing of the nation-state, as not compatible with the spirit of the new constitution because of the inherent danger of secession such a demand may prompt. Despite the appeals from Manobendra Narayan Larma amongst the Hill people in distinguishing one’s national identity (i.e., Bengali, Chakma, and Marma) and citizenship (i.e., Bangladeshi) within Bangladesh, the political elites pursued the vision of a unified nation-state under the banner of Bengali nationalism. During the period of military rule from 1975 and 1991, the concept of secularism that was championed at the birth of Bangladesh was replaced with Islamism, despite the fact that virtually none of the tribal population was Muslim. To resist the discriminatory policies and practices of the Bangladesh government, Shanti Bahini, the military wing of the PCJSS, began attacking the military and paramilitary targets as well as the Bengali settlers in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the mid 1970, marking the beginning of a long enduring civil war that lasted until the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord in 1997.

**The Dynamics of War-time Violence**

At the early stage of the conflict between the Hill people and the government of Bangladesh, the use of indiscriminate violence by the government had been reported by Amnesty International. However, successive administrations have become reliant on dialogues with various organizations representing the interests of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in exploring a solution to the conflict rather than depending on the use of violence in general.
An ambush attack on military personnel by the members of Shanti Bahini in 1980 motivated by years of political and economic exclusion of the Hill people marked the beginning of the three-decade long conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. A report from Amnesty International noted that the first armed attack by the Shanti Bahini insurgents on March 10, 1980 killed 22 soldiers in the village of Kaukhali. Instead of seeking those who were responsible for the killings of the soldiers to bring them to justice, the Bangladeshi government instead retaliated by deliberately firing on two groups of unarmed tribal people two weeks after the incident (Amnesty International 2000). Although this is the first widely publicized case of unlawful killing of tribal people, the massacre of Jumma people had already been adopted as a practice of driving them out to clear the land for the Bengali settlers (Arens 2011).

According to a statement cited in the report by Amnesty International (1986) on the issue of indiscriminate violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the commander of the local army camp instructed the local leaders to assemble in the market for a meeting where the army then began firing at the local leaders and the people, killing many unarmed villagers. Similarly, on the same day, the army asked local people to gather for the reconstruction of the Poapara Buddhist Temple where they were ordered to line up and then shot by the soldiers. Upendra Lal Chakma, a Member of Parliament representing the Chittagong Hill Tracts area, estimated at the time that over 200 people had been killed by the aforementioned events (Amnesty International 1986). Furthermore, it has been reported that young women were held up and raped by the military in the days following the incidents (Arens 2011).
The members of Bangladesh army were not the only ones involved in the incidents involving the use of unlawful and indiscriminate violence. The army recruited new Bengali settlers in the Chittagong Hill Tracts to form armed groups know as Village Defense Parties and equipped them with firearms to resist the violence from Shanti Bahini (Amnesty International 2000). While the intention of the creation of such forces might have been to delegate the security duties to the volunteers in the villages, it has been reported that the non-tribal (Bengali) settlers in the area have partaken in violent activities independently, including the looting and burning of houses as well as the killing of tribal persons (Amnesty International 1986; Arens 2011).

Another incident that took place in the town of Barkal on May 31 and June 1 of 1984 illustrates the brutality of the counterinsurgency tactics employed by the government of Bangladesh and its armed forces. According to the report from Amnesty International, settlements of non-tribal people at Gorosthan, Bhusanchara and Chota Haria were attacked by members of Shanti Bahini, causing over 100 civilian deaths. The insurgents also attacked three Bangladesh Rifles’ camp to frustrate law enforcement. As gruesome as this series of attacks by Shanti Bahini might have been, the retaliatory attack by the government and the armed forces against the non-combatant population was just as unacceptable.

According to eye-witness testimony provided to Amnesty International, the Army came to Het Baria accompanied by a large group of non-tribal Bengalis some of whom were armed on May 31, 1984. Multiple accounts of the event portray the cruelty of the
armed forces. Many of the victims of the brutality of the armed forces were women and children. A villager recounted the event:

“I saw two women getting raped and then killed by bayonets. One Aroti, who is my distant cousin, was also raped by several soldiers and her body was disfigured by bayonets. Several people, including children, were thrown into burning huts … Even now I sometimes wake up in a cold sweat remembering the sight of the soldiers thrusting bayonets into private parts of our women” (Amnesty International 1986).

Another eye-witness account by a villager from Suguri Para further show malice of the Bangladeshi military:

“My friend Sanat was tortured and asked for the whereabouts of the Shanti Bahini people. When he said ‘No’, the soldiers forced of our villagers at gunpoint to bayonet him to death. There were hardly a women who was not raped and I can’t believe how some many of us survived … Many of the children were blown to bits with automatic weapons” (Amnesty International 1986).

These accounts were selected samples of the violent episodes perpetrated by the government that took place during the conflict. The use of indiscriminate violence against the unarmed tribal population by the armed forces as well as Bengali settlers shaped the belief amongst the Hill people regarding the intention of the government in handling the issues regarding the Chittagong Hill Tracts. It is exemplified by Upendra Lal Chakma’s belief that “the government is looking for a genocidal solution to the problem of ethnic minorities” (Anti Slavery Society 1984, 61).
The Path to the 1997 Peace Accord

The Chittagong Hill Tract Peace Accord is the product of a long negotiation process with multiple attempts at reaching a compromise that were often initiated by the government of Bangladesh. The first series of attempts at negotiation with the insurgents took place under the Rahman administration in 1977. Based on the belief that the root problem of the conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts was economic in nature, Zia Rahman established the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board (CHTDB), hoping to alleviate the tension in the Hill district. However, it was perceived by the Hill people that the conflict is rooted primarily on identity issues rather than being a solely economic problem, and thus the creation of the CHTDB provided no significant change in their struggle. In addition, not only was the establishment of the CHTDB by Rahman ineffective in resolving the conflict in the Hill region, but it also raised suspicions among many of the Hill people. More specifically, the Hill people believed that the Government of Bangladesh established the Board as a means to exploit the resource rich land in a peaceful and apparently legitimate manner (Mohsin 2003).

The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord that ended the protracted armed struggle between the government of Bangladesh and the Hill people did not resolve many of the issues that appeared in various versions to the basic demands of the Hill people. First, although the Accord recognized the Chittagong Hill Tracts as a tribal inhabited region, it did not officially recognize the Hill people as Jummas (Mohsin 2003). Based on the belief of the government that there shall only be one nation (i.e., Bengali nation) within the border of Bangladesh, it took an uncompromising stance on the issue of
constitutionally recognizing the Hill people as a culturally distinct people. Although the constitutional recognition of the uniqueness of the Jumma identity and associated rights and privileges were never realized, the administrative and economic provisions of the Accord reference the special rights of the Hill people. In other words, the Peace Accord appeared to grant the Hill people *de facto* recognition through the granting of legislative autonomy which apparently was acceptable by the PCJSS, and thus by the tribal people.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts has been an important strategic location, given the situation in Northeastern India and because it is rich in natural resources. Although the Chittagong Hill Tracts consists of only 8 percent of the national territory, it contains about 60 percent of its reserve forest (Ali 1993). Also, deposits of gas, coal, and copper have been found in the forests of the region (Mohsin 2003). The Hill people perceived the development of the CHTDB as a threat to their future economic well-being even though the government of Bangladesh claimed the primary purpose of the establishment of the board was to facilitate regional economic development. Due to the fact that the CHTDB was to be administrated by Bengalis, the Hill people accused the board as being an institution that catered to the interests of outsiders, namely the military and the settlers (Mohsin 2003). Needles to say, the negotiation effort under the Rahman administration failed due to a misunderstanding of the issues as well as to a lack of trust amongst relevant actors.

The effort by the Bangladesh government in negotiating peace with the Hill tribes resumed under President H. M. Ershad in the early 1980s. Despite the presence of continued armed attacks from the Shanti Bahini, the Ershad administration displayed its
interest in reaching a resolution to the war by announcing in 1983 an amnesty for all insurgents who surrendered. This offer continued to be on the table until 1985, consequently producing over 3,000 defectors from the Shanti Bahini (Amnesty International 1986). In 1985, a dissident faction of the Shanti Bahini, the Priti group, surrendered as a result of his peace initiative (Mohsin 2003). Despite this, no substantial change has been made in the governance of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. However, one important fact to be noted is that the government agreed to return the illegally dispossessed lands to the affected Hill people and to halt further population transfer of non-tribal populations to the area (Mohsin 2003; Roy 2008).

Although the Bangladeshi government had been actively seeking a resolution to the situation in the Chittagong Hill District, incidents of attacks on the military targets by Shanti Bahini increased in 1986 (Amnesty International 1986). Instead of relying on the use of indiscriminate violence in inducing concessions from the insurgents based on fear and intimidation, the Ershad administration instead offered a second amnesty for those who surrendered.

Despite the history of failed attempts at reaching an agreement, the peace effort under Ershad continued in 1988. Recognizing its role as a unified voice of the Hill tribes, the government began primarily negotiating with the PCJSS around this time. Given the fact that it was formally acknowledged by the government as the representative of the Hill tribes, the PCJSS presented to the government the minimally acceptable demands as conditions for settlement. First, the PCJSS demanded the constitutional protection of the
Jumma’s rights to self-determination. It called for the establishment of its own legislature and also renaming the region as Jummaland (Mohsin 2003).

Second, the Hill people through the PCJSS demanded that any Bengali settlers who entered the area after the Bangladeshi independence be removed. As a result of an exponential rise in Bengali migration, the Hill people became increasingly marginalized politically and economically in the area they consider their homeland. It also contributed to the displacement of the indigenous population. The PCJSS reasoned that the expulsion of recent Bengali migrants was necessary in protecting the rights and prosperity of the Hill people as well as its cultural distinctiveness. The PCJSS also demanded the Chittagong Hill Tracts to be demilitarized and requested U.N. peacekeepers.

Lastly, the PCJSS demanded that the government of Bangladesh retain the Chittagong Hill Tracts Manual of 1900 and to enact a constitutional amendment that prohibits any revision to it. The CHT manual, adopted by the British government in 1900, described, in detail, how to properly administer the area inhibited by the people from various tribes. This regulation vested the administrative authority over all civil, criminal, and jurisdictional matters in the hands of a deputy commissioner while the tribal chiefs reserved control over customary matters. It also facilitated communication between the government and the local leaders by forming an advisory council of chiefs who were to assist the deputy commissioner. Since this arrangement was acceptable by the Hill people at the time of implementation, for it is minimally intrusive to the tribal ways of life, the PCJSS reverted to this institutional arrangement as a means to regain rights to self-determination.
Although the Ershad administration signaled its determination to resolve the conflict with the inhabitants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts through means other than violence, it rejected the demands made by the PCJSS based on the fact that they were contradictory to the Bangladeshi constitution which embraced the idea of a unified Bangladesh. The PCJSS was not willing to accept any alterations to their list of demands. As a result, the PCJSS withdrew from the peace process. At this point of the process, neither party was willing to compromise on their demands. However, the Ershad administration continued its negotiation efforts with local indigenous leaders, culminating in the creation of district level councils though the PCJSS and the Hill people, in general, rejected the newly established district councils (Mohsin 2003).

A new series of negotiations began in 1990s under Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. The Zia administration, unlike the previous ones, “wanted to wrest the CHT from military control in terms of decision making and administration” (Mohsin 2003, 40). This move did not necessarily mean that the government of Bangladesh was going to meet the demands of the PCJSS to withdraw all military personnel. However, the Shanti Bahini, the military wing of the PCJSS, responded to this change in the government’s strategy by unilaterally declaring a cease-fire starting in 1992, and it kept extended it until the struggle between the Hill people and the government was concluded by the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord in 1997.

In 1996, the government of Bangladesh led by the Awami League, who came to power with the promise of resolving the Chittagong Hill Tracts problems, reinitiated peace negotiations. As opposed to the pro-Islamic posture of the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party (BNP), the Awami League was viewed by many as being moderate towards the problems surrounding the Chittagong Hill Tracts, including India, who revised its attitude towards Bangladesh as well as the Chittagong Hill Tracts issue. Consequently, the negotiation between the government led by the Awami League and the Hill people supported by the Indian government eventually culminated in the signing of the Peace Accord (Hossain 2008).

The tripartite approach to peace negotiation was successful due to the fact that all of the parties involved had demonstrated considerable commitment to realizing a peaceful solution to the problem at hand. As far as India is concerned, it was able to pressure the PCJSS and Shanti Bahini to sign the accord by relying on the leverage it had over them (Mohsin 2003). India had assisted the PCJSS, Shanti Bahini, and refugees based on its strategic reasons in dealing with the problems in Northeastern states by providing a safe haven for the insurgents as well as a food supply to the refugees. By expelling the members of the PCJSS as well as the refugees from India, in the absence of state repression, they were put in the position where it only made sense to sign the accord.

It has been noted that the mindsets of the PCJSS leadership has gone through a qualitative change as well (Hossain 2008). In 1996, they revised their demands from the government of Bangladesh to reflect the wishes of both parties in achieving a political solution. For example, instead of seeking outright autonomy of the Chittagong Hill Tracts which was perceived as threatening to the viability of Bangladesh, the Hill people sought regional autonomy within the framework of the constitution. The PCJSS
leadership demanded the recognition of the Chittagong Hill Tracts as a special administrative area inhabited by various ethnic (tribal) communities and to be renamed as Jummaland. They also called for the establishment of an autonomous “Regional Council” that retained substantial authority over local affairs. In addition, the Hill people demanded the reservation of 3 seats in the national legislature for each of the Hill Districts and the creation of the Ministry for the Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs. Lastly, the Hill people called for the eviction of all Bengali settlers in the area who migrated since 1947. It appears that the Hill people were hoping to achieve a solution within the framework of the state of Bangladesh.

As far as the government of Bangladesh is concerned, as noted above, its counterinsurgency policy has evolved from reliance on violence, as seen in the earlier stage of the conflict, to searching for a political solution based on compromises. To reiterate its electoral promise of finding a political solution, the Awami League government, led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, established the National Committee on the Chittagong Hill Tracts, consisting of the members of the Awami League as well as of opposition parties (the BNP and Jatiya Party) in working toward this endeavor (Amnesty International 2000). The National Committee and the PCJSS continued to convene several times after the first meeting in December 1996 until the signing of the Peace Accord in 1997.

The Peace Accord of 1977 immediately brought important changes to the relationship between the government and the Hill people. First, although the government takes an uncompromising position on the issue of demilitarization, the Peace Accord
immediately stopped armed hostility between the government and the rebels. The Accord also repatriated refugees from neighboring Indian states. To incentivize compliance with the Accord, it extended general amnesty to the members of Shanti Bahini who had surrendered as well as all members of the PCJSS. More specifically, in addition to the withdrawal of all arrest warrants, cases against them and court sentences passed, the Accord provided for the release of any of their jailed members (Amnesty International 2000). Such amnesty was not extended the members of the military and the police force who had committed human rights violations in the past.

The Peace Accord of 1997 also constructed a new institutional framework in administering the Chittagong Hill Tracts that protects the distinct identity and cultural practices within the structure of the state of Bangladesh. It established the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council with 22 elected members who serve a 5-year term. Two-thirds of the seats in the Regional Council are to be reserved for the tribal people with a special quota for each tribe; the rest of the seats were to be elected from the non-tribal population by the three Hill District Councils. While the composition of the Regional Council guarantees a tribal majority, it is inclusive of the non-tribal inhabitants of the Hill Tracts. The Regional Council is in charge of general administrative matters, including law and order, and its decision will be final in the case of a lack of harmony amongst the three Hill District Councils. The Peace Accord returned some political autonomy to the tribal inhabitants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

The initial implementation of the clauses specified in the Peace Accord, I argue, was possible because of the general attitude of the government of Bangladesh during the
time leading up to the signing of the Accord that rejected the use of indiscriminate violence that the government initially relied on at the earlier stage of the war. It has been claimed that the success of the Peace Accord lies in the presence of a long cease-fire during the negotiating process because it creates a great deal of pressure on the rebels to forsake war and settle for peace since such an environment allows them to interact with society without fear of arrest and or death (Roy 2008). Under such a condition, the non-combatant population has no incentive to actively support the rebels in order to increase one’s physical security. Despite the past practices of human rights violations as well as the use of indiscriminate violence against the civilians in the Hill Tracts, the shift in the counterinsurgent efforts – from the one based on intimidation and threats to the one based on “winning the hearts and the minds” of the non-combatants - prompted a change in the narrative of this war amongst the non-combatant populations.

**Beyond the Peace Accord**

Although the Peace Accord was successful in the sense that it symbolized the end of a sustained civil war between the Hill people and the government, and it has prevented thus far, a subsequent war, it has yet to produce an environment without violence. After the singing of the Peace Accord, violence erupted amongst the tribal population over the disagreement regarding the future implications of the signed Accord.

In the post Peace Accord environment, the PCJSS and the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF), a regional political organization founded in 1998 which has opposed the accord and pledges to seek full autonomy of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, have
been clashing violently despite the fact the members of the both parties have suffered from the atrocities committed by the government of Bangladesh (Panday and Jamil 2009). The UPDF has charged that the PCJSS and its military wing, Shanti Bahini, are not representative of the voices of all of the Hill people, and they resent the fact that the PCJSS is in charge of the Accord when there are many who reject it. Since the presence of an intra-indigenous conflict drew attention away from the struggle between the tribal people and the settlers, it may be necessary for the intra-indigenous tension to be handled accordingly.

Additionally, the inability of the political actors to contain the violent behavior of Bengali settlers as well as the military in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the postwar environment is challenging in achieving a peaceful relationship between the Bengalis and the tribal populations at large. It may be the case that the tribal inhabitants of the area continue to live in fear of attacks not from the government but from the Bengali settlers in the area even in the post Peace Accord environment. An incident that took place in the Mahalchari area of the Khagrachari District in 2003 illustrates the concerns of the tribal population.

According to a report provided by Amnesty International (2004), on August 24, 2003, a Bengali businessman was allegedly kidnapped by assailants believed to be tribal inhabitants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. A large group of Bengali settlers issued an ultimatum that the Hill people would suffer from retaliatory attacks if the kidnapped individual was not found. The tribal leaders had conducted a search to locate the victim to no avail. On August 26, Bengali settlers demanded all of the shops in the area to be
closed in observance of strike. Some tribal people ignored this demand, and chased the settlers away in some cases (Amnesty International 2004). The dialogue between the tribal people and the Bengali settlers escalated to a violent situation.

Bengali settlers returned to the shops that refused to follow the demand of closure with a group of men in plain clothes, who were known to the tribal population as soldiers. As Binud Bihari Khisha, one of the shop owners continued to refuse to concede to their demands, he was attacked by the settlers while the soldiers stood there; he died as a result of injuries sustained by this attack (Amnesty International 2004). According to the report, the Bengali settlers, accompanied by a group of soldiers, rampaged through the village, setting houses on fire, looting, killing and torturing tribal people. This horrific event produced two deaths, one of which was a baby who was strangled to death, one rape victim, many injuries, 312 burned houses, 68 houses looted, and four temples disgraced (Amnesty International 2004). Although the government was not directly involved in this incident, the presence of soldiers accompanying the settlers who have committed violence against the tribal population is an indication that the political actors lack ability in dealing with the armed forces and security personnel.

Another episode of violence that took place in Sajek Union under the Rangamti district in February 2010 illustrates the tension between the Bengali settlers and the Hill people as well as the military’s general attitude in support of the settlers. According to the report by the Asian Centre for Human Rights (2010), on February 19, 2010, a group of illegal Bengali settlers backed by the army burnt down at least 200 to 300 houses of the indigenous people, seven shops in Ladumani bazaar, a village centre at Gangaram
Doar village sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme, a church and a temple. As people escaped from the burning houses, the army personnel opened fire at the Jummas, killing at least 6 and injuring at least 25, and displacing at least 1,500 villagers, according to the report. The investigative bodies (independent observers and human rights activists) were denied entrance to the affected area by the military and the illegal settlers. The Minster of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs visited the affected area and promised to take action against those who were responsible for the attacks; however, he treated the incident as a case of intercommunal violence where the criminal elements from both the indigenous and Bengali communities were to blame (Asian Centre for Human Rights 2010). It appears to be the case that the lack of political actors in holding a clear command of the military may have prompted this event as well as other atrocities committed against the Jummas in the past.

Despite the presence of violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the government of Bangladesh and the Hill people have not returned to a large scale war since the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord. This is due to the fact that the government’s continuous effort in finding a political solution to the CHT problems shaped the narrative in the way that the Hill people, in general, believe that Bangladesh is sincere in addressing the issue. A change from the government’s dependence on the use of indiscriminate violence in the earlier stages of the struggle in dealing with the insurgents to its reliance on political dialogue reconstructed the image of the Bangladesh government to some extent. However, without effectively addressing these issues, the
current condition of continued violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts may eventually
induce a subsequent war.
Summary of Theory and the Findings

In explaining the recurrence of civil wars, I have argued that the re-emergence of a civil war depends on the presence and type of violence that the government used in the period immediately after the termination of the original war. More specifically, the presence of government violence, particularly indiscriminate violence, against the noncombatant population in the postwar period increases the likelihood of a subsequent war. This is due to the fact that it may be easier for rebels to recruit the victims (noncombatants) of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by the incumbent regime, garnering sufficient support for initiating and sustaining a rebellion. When the incumbent regime selectively targets only the active rebels, then those who are risk-acceptant amongst ordinary civilians would be the only ones who would actively participate in the rebellious movement. This is based on the belief that the option of non-participation is always the safest choice in such a situation. However, when the option of staying neutral in the aftermath of a civil war imposes a similar level of risk as active participation due to the randomness of government violence, it essentially reduces the cost of participation amongst the noncombatants, making the recurrence of war more likely.

The quantitative analysis presented in chapter 3 indicated that the use of indiscriminate violence by the government as well as the presence of physical integrity violations effectively predicted the increased likelihood of a subsequent war. When the
government relies on intimidation and threats against the noncombatant population as a part of the counterinsurgency strategy in the period immediately after the termination of a war, it increases the probability that such a case will recur. On the other hand, according to the results of the analysis, the presence of selective government violence had no effect on the likelihood of war recurrence. Although the government may utilize coercive measures in dealing with the residual violence in the postwar environment, the recurrence of war is unlikely when the government uses violence in a selective and targeted manner.

In addition to the variable that only observed the presence of random killings of civilians by the government in a combat situation, I have also examined the relationship between the persistence of physical integrity violation - extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, use of torture and disappearance – and the likelihood of recurrence. The result of the quantitative analysis demonstrated that the government’s reliance on violent measures that violate individuals’ physical integrity tremendously increases the probability of war recurrence.

The results of the statistical analysis also revealed a consistent finding that wars terminated by negotiated settlement had an increased likelihood of a subsequent war. This result is consistent with the findings of the existing literature that negotiated settlements are likely to produce precarious peace. The models produced this result while the presence of third party intervention was accounted for.

While the use of quantitative analysis was useful in indentifying the factors that are associated with the recurrence of war, it was unable to sufficiently explain the mechanism of how the persistence of indiscriminate violence and physical integrity
violations increase the likelihood of the renewal of a civil war. The results of the quantitative analysis do not tell us whether the previously expressed claim that the government’s use of indiscriminate violence and other intimidating strategies based on violence increases the incentives amongst the noncombatant population to join the rebellion is true. Also, we do not know whether it is really the case that the probability of war renewal is increased because of the use of such tactics by the incumbent regime removes the collective action problem that rebels face under normal circumstances in recruiting prospective fighters as I claimed earlier. To effectively address these questions, I have provided an in-depth qualitative analysis of the dynamics surrounding the case of the Kurdish struggle in Turkey and the peace effort in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh.

The Turkish cases demonstrated that despite the presence of factors favorable to the successful termination of a civil war, the persistence of indiscriminate violence by the government contributed in the perpetuation of the PKK rebellion in the southeastern area of Turkey.

The conditions surrounding the cease fire that took place after the arrest of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 appeared to be favorable to a successful termination of the case. Many saw the capture of Öcalan and the statement he made as symbolic of the de facto end of the war. While in custody, Öcalan publicly announced that the reliance on violence in resolving the Kurdish struggle was a mistake and that the PKK will seek a political solution founded on a non-violent approach. Öcalan also ordered high-ranking officers of the PKK to turn themselves into the Turkish government
from his prison cell, and the order was followed by 16 individuals who were charged with associating with the PKK. The general attitude amongst ordinarily Kurds displayed war fatigue, and many concurred with the non-violent approach in resolving the discriminatory and violent treatment of Kurds in Turkey. The level of armed activities by the PKK dramatically fell immediately after the arrest of Öcalan, and the level of violence by the government also followed. The Kurdish area of Turkey experienced a period of relative calm.

The observation that there was a decrease in the number of violent incidents did not mean that the tension between the Turkish government and the Kurds was fading. There still were many reported incidents of public demonstrations, which, in some cases, lead to a violent clash between the Kurdish population and the Turkish government. And the failure of the Turkish case that produced a subsequent war in the 2000s was mainly due to the manner in which the Turkish government dealt with public demonstrations that were aimed at addressing Kurds and their reliance on the use of indiscriminate violence in managing episodes of low-level and isolated violence. The use of reprisal violence by the government that targeted the noncombatant villagers, including women and children, was a common practice in southeastern Turkey even in the period of relative calm.

Although there were some indications that the Turkish government was reciprocating the change in the strategies in addressing the Kurdish issues through non-violence means after 1999, it appears that they had reverted back to their previous way of dealing with the problem based on intimidation and threats. The persistence of indiscriminate violence against the civilian Kurds shaped the narrative of the war and the
the postwar period that one’s claim to Kurdishness threatened one’s personal security and physical integrity even when she or he remained neutral. As a result, many Kurds relied on the PKK in seeking refuge from the brunt of governmental violence. In sum, the dependence on indiscriminate violence against ordinary Kurds motivated them in supporting the rebels at the time of relative calm, producing a subsequent war in the southeastern area of Turkey.

In chapter 5, I presented the dynamics surrounding the war and the peace process in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh. Many conditions surrounding the Chittagong Hill Tracts case that motivated the original armed rebellion was similar to the Kurdish case. In both cases, the interest of government in creating a sense of nationalism in the country by forcefully and violently assimilating the minority nationals prompted armed challenges from the minority group. However, the outcomes of the wars diverge despite the similarities surrounding the origin of the wars. As such it enabled me to compare the two cases highlighting the mechanisms that ignite a subsequent war.

Originally, the government of Bangladesh relied on the use of intimidation and coercion in dealing with the armed rebellion in the Chittagong Hill Tracts area. The noncombatant population of the Hill area was gravely affected by the indiscriminate violence that the government employed as part of their counterinsurgency strategy. However, a change in the attitude and the policy of the government in managing the conflict in the Hill area induced a reciprocal change from the insurgents. In 1983, the government of Bangladesh began to offer general amnesty to all of the Shanti Bahini insurgents who surrendered. About 3,000 rebels accepted this deal and surrendered.
Although it took more than 10 years from this point to achieve a peaceful resolution of the war, the change in the government’s counterinsurgency strategy produced a very different condition for the Hill people in considering the option of abstaining from the war. Since the government continued to selectively target only those who were actively participating in the war, the choice to stay neutral became an acceptable decision amongst the ordinary Hill people.

The finding that a long peace process eventually produced a successful negotiated settlement challenges some of the existing explanations in creating peace at the end of a civil war. It has been argued that wars terminated by negotiated settlement only produce precarious peace even with the presence of a third party guarantor. However, as the Chittagong Hill Tracts case presented here indicates, it is possible to have an enduring period of relative peace even if the case was terminated by negotiation. However, the recent incidents of clashes between the Bengali migrants and the tribal populations that involved the use of indiscriminate violence warns us that the recurrence of war becomes increasingly probable as ordinary citizens perceive that their personal security is at risk.

**Theoretical and Policy Implications**

One of the primary implications of the current theory and its findings is that the focus on minimizing physical harm to ordinary citizens and the ex-combatants who have decided to disarm at the end of the original war must be the priority in the period of postwar reconstruction. While a situation may require the government to rely on the use of coercive measures in managing threats from the spoilers and in maintaining order in
the immediate postwar period, the use of violence must be limited so that the probability of a subsequent war can be minimized. More specifically, the use of indiscriminate violence by the government must be avoided virtually at any cost. This is due to the fact that the use of indiscriminate violence by the government incentivizes the individuals to opt for joining and supporting the rebels instead of supporting the government or staying neutral.

In addition, the current findings supplement some of the existing theories regarding the civil war and conflict resolution. One of the most consistently stable findings in the literature is that civil wars terminated by negotiation are precarious unless a third party security guarantor is involved in the situation, in which case it produces strong peace after the termination of war (Walter 2001). However, the role of a third party intervener and its effects on the peace outcome has been challenged by contradictory findings. It has been argued that the policy that reforms the security sector in the postwar environments strengthens peace instead of relying on the presence of a third party guarantor (Toft 2010). The theory presented in this dissertation bridges these two explanations by presenting the causal mechanism for war recurrence at the micro level.

In achieving durable peace, the mere presence of a third party is not sufficient. Such an intervener needs to make sure that former warring parties are not out of compliance, especially the government, in terms of the use of coercive measures in the postwar period. In addition to minimizing the presence of violence in general, a third party involved in a war termination effort must prevent the government’s use of
indiscriminate violence against the non-combatant population. However, the absence of a third party intervener does not imply that the recurrence of war is inevitable. As long as the government does not revert to the use of indiscriminate violence even in the presence of violent challenges from the spoilers and residual insurgent threats, peace is possible without an intervention.

On the other hand, security sector reforms aim at restructuring the infrastructure of security apparatuses so that the state retains effective repressive capacity in managing threats from rebels. Civil wars terminated by negotiated settlement are thought to only focus on positive incentives in complying with the terms of the settlement while ignoring the factors associated with the repressive capacity of the involved parties in the case of non-compliance. As a result, negotiated settlements dramatically increase the probability of recurrence unless security sector reforms are implemented. This is thought to be true even in cases involving a third party because of the temporary nature of third party involvement. The implication of an increase in the repressive capacity of the state is that states can choose to rely solely on the use of selective violence by targeting the insurgents directly.

At the core of both of the theories is the idea that a measure that controls the behavior of the armed forces is a necessary condition for durable peace. A third party intervener appears to increase the likelihood of durable peace because it can monitor and enforce the terms of agreement for the former warring parties not to revert back to relying on violence in managing disagreements that may arise in the postwar period; more specifically, it can monitor violent behavior of the government against civilians.
Security sector reforms contribute in strengthening the repressive capacity of the state where reliance on indiscriminate violence as a means of intimidation becomes unnecessary since the availability of an adequate level of resources allows the armed forces to rely on the selective use of violence if necessary. In other words, what is necessary in producing durable peace is to reduce the level of violence in the postwar period, especially the government’s use of indiscriminate violence against non-combatants. The institutional solutions presented above are some of the examples of how the goal of reducing and eliminating the use of indiscriminate violence can be achieved.

When the international community decides to intervene in a case of civil war as a peacekeeper, the main focus of such a mission must be addressing the issues related to the use of indiscriminate violence by the state. The conditions surrounding a case may make some policy options impractical or implausible. Also, the reliance on a particular method based on existing theoretical findings may be inappropriate and ineffective for the case in question. The implications of the current theory and findings are that as long as the intervening party, if any, and/or the policy implemented prioritizes the reduction and elimination of the government’s reliance on indiscriminate violence, such a case will produce durable peace even in the absence of a third party or security sector reforms.

In examining the role indiscriminate violence in the current research, I only considered the effect of the government’s use of such violence. The reality, however, is that rebel insurgents often rely on violent measures in coercively recruiting civilians in fighting a war against the state. As such, future research may be needed to consider the interactive effects of indiscriminate violence by both insurgents and government actors.
It would be interesting to examine the behavior of non-combatants and ex-combatants when they face indiscriminate violence from both rebels and the government. Under such conditions, would civilians choose to ally with one side or another? If so, what factors contribute in the decision calculus of the non-combatant population? These questions will further extend our knowledge of the effect of violence, in general, against civilians on the emergence of a subsequent war.
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Appendix A: Additional Logistic Regressions

Table A.1 - Explaining Renewed Rebellion: Additional Models

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<td>Settlement X Indiscriminate Violence</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.284)</td>
<td>(1.379)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>-5.021**</td>
<td>-3.962*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.214)</td>
<td>(2.173)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.00534</td>
<td>0.0157</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0216)</td>
<td>(0.0299)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-5.913**</td>
<td>-6.027**</td>
<td>-3.742</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.527)</td>
<td>(2.453)</td>
<td>(2.536)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01