The Problem: Imagining Nationalism and Islamism

The task of this paper is twofold: first, through a consideration of some important discursive issues, to explain the context of our present theoretical embarrassment, and second, through brief history of collective action to suggest some ways in which we can begin to understand the magnitude of the changes. I will argue that largely unnoticed by scholars, the repertoires of collective action in the Middle East in modern times have undergone two major transformations, and that these map onto major discursive shifts from Islamic moral economy to nationalism to Islamism. Deeply rooted strands of Islamic culture and the discursive structures of post-Enlightenment thought, these discursive changes have thus resulted in a far-reaching transformation in ideas of the polity, of legitimacy, as well as of personal identity.

As a world historian interested in both the history of European orientalism and modern Islamic history, I have long been struck by the similarities between the indeterminacy of our present time and that of the early twentieth century. One place where these indeterminacies come together is the Middle East. Unpredicted by all observers, an Islamic political revival is under way. Since the Islamic revolution in Iran
(1978-79), secular nationalism is in retreat in the region, confounding both Left and Right alike. Why is there an Islamist movement in Algeria (the erstwhile center of Third Worldism)? Why is Egypt, which was the leader of progressive Arab nationalism under Nasser, itself increasingly exposed to an Islamist challenge? How are we to understand these developments? Do they represent a retreat from modernity?

Accounting for the Islamist movement in the Middle East has thus far confounded all theories. For those concerned with theory and history this gap should induce more concern than it has so far. One way to remap the dimensions of this problem is through a consideration of the similar incomprehension that greeted the emergence of nationalisms in the area following the collapse of the Ottoman empire.

Following World War I, the Middle East came to modern politics. This transition, and the ways it was represented by nationalists and Western orientalists at the time, frames the contemporary transition from secular nationalism to political Islamic discourse in the area. I want to begin by briefly evoking this transition to nationalist politics, before raising some questions about the reciprocal moment of transition we are presently living.

First some background: in 1890, the Middle Eastern political scene from the Atlantic to the Hindu Kush was dominated by Islamic empires (Morocco, the Ottoman empire, the Persian empire, Afghanistan). A congeries of opposition movements (nationalist, Ottomanist, pan-Islamic) sought power. But they lacked both favor and money: the Islamic monarchies, heavily mortgaged to Western banks, remained a part of the existing order of things, pending
a decisive push from some quarter. For Muslim intellectuals the period 1880-1914 was a time of profound crisis. "Li madha ta'akhkhur al-muslimun?" ["Why are Muslims backward?"] asked Shakib Arslan in a famous book. The same question was being posed by many others.

While some sought to reimagine the Ottoman empire as a Turkish-Arab condominium, a region of linguistic national states, or a pan-Islamic empire, how to get from the decrepit Ottoman empire to the desired goal was far from clear.

By 1920, the Ottoman empire was a defeated power, stripped of its Arab provinces, with its territories occupied by British, French, Italian and Greek armies. The writ of the Ottoman sultan/caliph ran mostly to Istanbul and adjoining provinces, while in the interior Ataturk’s Grand National Assembly organized resistance. By 1924 the new Turkish Republic had abolished both the caliphate and the sultanate, and compelled a renegotiation of the Versailles settlement. Elsewhere the Qajar dynasty in Persia had fallen by 1920 to Reza Khan, ending a period of constitutional rule and inaugurating a new dynasty (soon to be known as Pahlavi) and a new imagined identity: Iran. Following a constitutional revolution in 1919, the Muhammadzai dynasty clung to power in Afghanistan with the blessings of the British. Morocco, the only old Islamic empire to succumb to direct colonial rule, became a French protectorate in 1912.

In a little over thirty years, the Middle East came to modern politics. In this transition, the key events were the abolition of the Ottoman sultanate in 1923 and of the caliphate in 1924, which desacralized the Islamic past even as they completed the delegitimization the old
Islamic elites. In addition, the Bolshevik revolution, which while largely contained by the Allies, set off deep reverberations throughout the region. For the next fifty years Middle Eastern politics was largely contained within the homogenizing discourse of nationalism. Although nationalist histories portray a seamless transition from the pre- to the post-war political eras, the Ottoman empire did not devolve in an orderly way into any of its alternative futures. Generally left out of the narrative are the beginnings of modern politics in the area, including the Persian constitutional revolution of 1906, the Young Turk revolution of 1908, and a lesser movement in Morocco in 1908.¹ These "Islamic revolutions" together with the first precocious signs of labor militancy, and the emergence of Mazzinian-style nationalist groups like Young Egypt, Young Tunisia and Young Algeria all point towards other futures. They and a host of ephemeral popular movements without a name pulled in different directions. Only later, following the development of the official nationalist histories, was it possible to retrospectively rebaptize as nationalist the eclectic and experimental social movements of this period.⁴

If Middle Eastern nationalist histories emphasize continuity and downplay discordances, how did European orientalists understand this transition at the time? Mostly they continued as before — producing studies of obscure manuscripts, folk traits, rural sufism and popular religion. A central premise of pre-war orientalism was that Islam was retrograde and incapable of change, and that Pan-Islamic or mahdist uprisings were imminent. Despite Ottoman calls for jihad, however, a pan-Islamic rebellion failed to materialize during the war. When nationalist movements began to flex their muscles following the war, a new analysis
seemed required. But no such analysis was forthcoming. Rather than addressing the cultural and political stirrings of the Ottoman *fin de régime*, orientalists kept their eyes firmly planted on the rear-vision mirror.

A case in point is the reception of the first stirrings of what would later be recognized as nationalism in Algeria. When the Algerian Muslim leader Amir Khaled, the grandson of the resistance hero Abd al-Qadir, and a graduate of St. Cyr, publicly opposed certain onerous features of French rule (while steadfastly professing his loyalty to France) in 1921, he was denounced by the French press as "the mahdi of North African Bolshevism." The diagnosis was accepted by many French orientalists. The fact that Amir Khaled was neither an agent of the Comintern, nor an Islamic millenarian, does not appear to have troubled them overly. Similar confusion existed in the minds of European observers of the emergence of the Turkish resistance movement to the imposed World War I peace settlement. Was Ataturk a pan-Islamist? a crypto-Bolshevik? a Turkish Mussolini? The most surprising thing is that so few could see that he was a nationalist.

This example, which is far from unique, points to a forgotten fact: that European observers were extremely slow to comprehend the challenge posed by nationalism. Here we see the power of the discourse of Orientalism — the repository of stereotypes, essentialisms and binary logic. To the end of French Algeria, many French observers remained convinced that Algerian nationalism was a communist plot. In the inter-war period, nationalist histories (like George Antonius’s canonical Arab nationalist history, *The Arab Awakening*) emphasized
that the transition from pre- to the post-war political contexts was a seamless one, in which subaltern struggles and alternatives voices were either recoded as nationalist, or simply erased. The orientalist view on the other hand, emphasized the alleged continuities of essentialized features of Islam, and denied history.

How do we explain the failure of theory in the case of the discursive transition which the Middle East underwent in the post-World War I world? Beyond the gaps and absences, as well as the ideological amalgamations, it is interesting to note that nationalist intellectuals and orientalist commentators both truncated history in parallel but opposed ways, although for different reasons. Said gives us an orientalism to which the antidote is nationalism. Here I'd like to suggest that despite their evident opposition, orientalism and nationalism are deeply interconnected. On one level, that of direct influence, it has been known (although mostly little remarked) for some time that orientalist texts were often appropriated by nationalists in order to legitimate their claims about the volk. Thus for example, Leon Cahun's texts served as a source for the Ataturkian nationalist theorists and Gobineau's texts about the Persian origins of the ancient Aryans were utilized by the Reza Shah's theorists of the Pahlavi state.

At a deeper level still, I'd like to argue that as products of the European Enlightenment, orientalism and nationalism are deeply imbricated in one another in ways hitherto largely unsuspected. Thus, for example, orientalists revalorize and systematize the indigenous pasts of Asia. As an Enlightenment discourse, one can note, orientalism assumes a world of ethnic nations, while in observing non-Western
societies, it pre-marks their ethnic faultlines, tracing in advance the borders along which new lines of cleavage would emerge and new identities would blossom. Nationalism, like orientalism, is imbued with idea of progress, accepts the idea that human history unfolds according to stages and regards non-modern traits as survivals from an earlier age. Indeed, nationalists are inside-out orientalists, who revalorize what orientalists perceive as lack. Thus orientalism in effect summons nationalism into existence. Also we can note that orientalism’s critique of religion was adopted by nationalists, who sought to portray themselves as secular, in opposition to the retrograde forces of religion. In any effort to rehistoricize orientalism and nationalism, these intellectual operations must be systematically unpacked.

If we move to the contemporary era, we can note that much the same consternation greated the 1978-79 Iranian revolution. As I have shown elsewhere, most scholars saw in the emergence of the Islamist movement, the upwelling of a civilizational essence. To be schematic, one can say that neo-orientalist analyses collapsed the histories of Islamic societies to the history of the state, a state in which it is culture (read religion) which is the central organizing principle. In this way they dispense with other explanatory devices than religion. For the theorists, Islamic fundamentalism has a genealogy, but its history is only the repetition of well established patterns. Islamic polities lack a civil society: from this it follows that their politics can only be a politics of domination. In the absence of intermediary bodies, there is no hope for democracy in the region.
The inability of social scientists either to situate historically the emergence of Islamism or to theorize it is matched by the nationalist inability to do the same. I have argued above, that nationalism is already encoded within the orientalist project. It is time to add that fundamentalism is as well — as the excluded other implicit in nationalist discourse. By positioning religion as the anti-Enlightenment, that which must be gotten beyond for progress to occur, nationalists like other followers of the Enlightenment summon into existence the very thing they so wish to deny. By conceptualizing religion as a repository for all that is anti-modern, the Enlightenment encapsulated fundamentalism and essentialized believing religionists of whatever sect. But conceiving of the relationship between modernity and religion in terms of a totalizing opposition, locks us all into a Weberian iron cage from which there is no exit. It is but a step to the Orient/Occident dualisms of classical orientalism, and all the rest of the now well known apparatus of cultural sorting and stereotyping described in Edward Said’s Orientalism.

Is Islamism anti-modern? The question as put it will now be seen is seriously flawed. For it is clear that at the discursive level, fundamentalisms of whatever kind are fully modern as well. This becomes clear in Sami Zubaida’s important book, Islam, the People and the State. By accepting the nation-state model, as well as constitutions, republics and democracy, he argues, the Iranian republic is thoroughly modern. While the Iranian ulama may historically have adopted an oppositional stance toward the Qajar monarchy, it never sought to reshape political norms (and was thus not ”revolutionary”). Moreover, a close examination of the Khomeini’s doctrine of ”valayat-i faqih” (“the guardianship of the jurist”) reveals it to be a
modern origin, rather than being a traditional political idea. Islamist movements, Zubaida concludes, are best understood as "a populist nationalism with 'Islam' as the identifying emblem of the common people against the 'alien' social spheres in their own country which had excluded and subordinated them." In sum, there is very little about present day Islamist belief or practices that would be recognized by a Muslim of an earlier time.

I do not have the space here to further develop this series of reflections. If you are interested in more, I would refer you to my forthcoming article in the February 1998 Theory and Society, which I understand has been made available to conference participants. Now I must hasten along to the second part of my demonstration, to link the discursive transformations in the language of politics of the Middle East to the on the ground changes in the repertoires of collective action.

**Repertoires of Urban Collective Action in the Middle East**

As a result of the emergence of the modern state and the global economy in the nineteenth century, the old agrarian society in the Middle East was progressively unhooked from its moorings, and old patterns of collective action, rooted in the Islamic moral economy were supplanted as new solidarities based upon ethnicity (linguistic as well as religious) class and (more precariously) gender emerged. The complex interaction of these solidarities, in particular the connections between the national
struggle and the class struggle, provide a rich terrain for historical research. At stake for individuals are intensely subjective notions of ethnic, class and religious identity. The history of the changing patterns of collective action provide one important means of studying these shifts on the level of societies. In this section, I seek to provide a broad framework for understanding these changes.

While important advances have been made in our understanding of the unfolding of Islamic political thought in the modern world, the same cannot be said of our grasp of collective action. Instead of social conflict, most Western scholars (be they Weberians, Marxists or Durkheimians) emphasized social stasis, or what Bryan Turner calls "the no-revolutions thesis." By this view, which invoked the classical theory of the Islamic state, revolts were illegitimate, and social quietism and the support of existing governments (and more generally of traditional values) were the chief features of Middle Eastern societies. The theoretical basis of "oriental despotism" in Western scholarship is thus well grounded in doctrine of the Islamic state.

For purposes of analysis, the history of urban collective action in the Middle East can be divided into three major periods. The first phase, from 1750 to 1900, collective action took the form of what I have called the Islamic moral economy. While the origin of this form of collective action goes back to the classical Islamic period, it appears to have assumed the form of a specific repertoire in the post-Mongol era. Between 1750 and 1900 collective action had two main causes: subsistence food crises
and the exorbitant fiscal demands of the janissary/Mamluk elite. Propelled by the grievances of artisans and the urban lower classes, the crowd played an important role in the politics of the period. Significant urban protest movements occurred in Istanbul, Cairo, and Damascus -- though other cities (Aleppo, Mosul, Fez, Tunis) were also affected.

Repertoires of collective action were variants of the Islamic moral economy. Typically, movements began with the gathering of the crowd at the central mosque, where following much discussion, demands were fixed and prominent members of the ulama selected to bear the grievances to the authorities in solemn procession from the mosque to the citadel (where the governor resided). Based upon the solidarities of the urban quarter, Islamic guilds, and sufi brotherhoods, the crowd was drawn from artisans, workers, and Islamic students (Ar. talib). Violence was generally limited (at least on the part of the demonstrators), killings were few, and the targets of the crowd selected (rather than random): grain storehouses, the homes and shops of profiteering officials and merchants, the collection points for the hated market taxes (Ar. maks). The style of collective action associated with this Islamic moral economy was the product of a particular set of structures and historically determined cultural understandings, and did not change until the twentieth century. From around the middle of the nineteenth century, urban protest movements gradually faded away throughout the region -- except for popular uprisings against European intervention in Tunisia and Egypt in the 1880s, and Morocco and Libya prior to World War I.
What explains this waning of urban protest in the latter half of the nineteenth century? First, the implementation of the Ottoman tanzimat reforms (and the parallel but weaker reform impulses in Iran and Morocco) gave Middle Eastern states a new repressive capacity, and limited the occurrence of urban movements. The ulama, who had played a leading role in the urban crowd, gradually lost their influence as a result of increased governmental controls, and shifting intellectual climate. While their influence upon the inhabitants of the popular quarters persisted well into the twentieth century, the overall trend is clear.

A second factor in the waning of urban protest in the last half of the nineteenth century was the changing morphology of the Middle Eastern city. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the urban core and the handicraft industries which sustained it had fallen into decline, and the old social networks which had controlled politics had begun to breakdown. The old notable families had begun to relocate to suburbs outside the old city walls, such as Zamalak in Cairo, or the garden suburbs of Damascus. As a result, their clienteles became less easily controlled.16

The old political framework was definitely shattered by World War I, the Ottoman defeat, the rise of a Turkish republic, and the abolition of the caliphate in 1924. The post-World War I era also marked the reemergence of the urban crowd as a major political force, and the crystallization of new forms of peasant and worker protest. A
new style of politics was beginning, and with it new forms of popular political movements: the first strikes, boycotts and student demonstrations date from this period. For the next two generations, urban politics in the Middle East was dominated by nationalist movements. The weakening of notable control left openings for the emergence of new political actors espousing new political slogans. In this changed context, the old Islamic moral economy no longer served as the cultural framework for the articulation of grievances. The old repertoire of collective action, based on the gathering of the crowd at the mosque, solemn processions to the seat of government, and the presentation of petitions to the authorities were replaced by demonstrators marching under the banners of youth and workers' organizations or political parties."

The last major ulama-led demonstrations occurred prior to 1914 in most of the region except Iran and Morocco.

Encouraged by the expansion of the press and the growth of literacy, linguistic nationalisms emerged. While they represented a response of elite groups to currents of change, they also had a popular dimension. Finally, the slogans themselves, the language of the crowd, underwent a profound transformation. Such events as the 1919 thawra in Egypt, the Syria Great Revolt (1925-7), the Palestinian general strike of 1936-39, or the nationalist demonstrations of the 1940s and 1950s were distinctively new events in a number of respects. Thus, for example, they embodied new organizational and ideological methods. They also involved not regions, but entire countries, not just rural or urban groups, but coalitions of elite and popular forces. While their
suppression led to the strengthening of colonial rule in the short run, they pointed toward the new constellations of political forces which were to emerge in post-war nationalism. In at least some cases, notably Egypt and Tunisia, labor activists appear to have been recruited from the old Islamic networks, especially the Sufi brotherhoods and Quran school teachers. Connections between the class struggle, the national struggle, and the Islamic struggle for justice in an immoral world are intricate, and the Middle Eastern experience of working class formation differed in important respects from that of the West.

The achievement of national independence in the 1950s (except Palestine) consolidated nationalist forms of collective action. As the state appropriated the language of nationalism and of class politics, but its failure to deliver the goods soon exposed it to the critiques of Islamist opponents. The gulf between the rulers and ruled increased further by the debacle of the 1967 June War. By the mid-1970s, it was evident that skewed national priorities, rampant corruption and increased repressiveness had substantially undermined the national consensus in most countries in the region. As long as the oil boom persisted, these changes remained hidden. With the oil slump of the late 1970s, however, collective action dramatically reemerged to challenge incumbent regimes.

Since the mid-1970s, the forms of urban collective action have once again begun to shift, inaugurating a third major regime of social movement types: post-nationalist
and Islamist movements. For the moment, no distinct repertoires have emerged, rather elements of several different types co-exist. Movements clearly drawing upon the legacy of labor militancy appear alongside new forms of food riots and explicitly Islamist forms of social protest." These new urban social movements differ from the previous repertoires of collective action in several respects: one looks in vain for ulama-led demonstrations, processions from the mosque to the citadel, or the forms and repertoire of the nationalist forms of collective action.

A first subtype represents a continuity with the previous period. These movements employ the language of secular nationalism and includes strikes, labor unrest, and demonstrations which draw upon the nationalist forms of collective action. They include the wave of strikes and labor unrest that inaugurated Lebanon's unfinished revolution (1976-1984), the Iranian revolution (1977-78) and the 1985 Sudan uprising which overthrew the al-Numeiry government, as well as protests in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt.

A second subtype of post-nationalist and Islamist movements is what we may term the I.M.F. food riot. Protests of this sort have occurred in Egypt (1977), Jordan (1984), Tunisia (January 1984), and Morocco (September 1979, September 1980, May 1981, July 1983, and January 1984). All took place within a short time after the proclamation of the reduction or elimination of government food subsidies. These movements had a number of things in common. First, they have no central spatial focal
point. Rather, the targets of the crowd’s wrath included government agencies, luxury hotels and restaurants—the most visible and flagrant transgressions of culturally grounded notions of justice. The protesters appear to have been drawn chiefly from students and recent urban migrants, mostly unemployed young men. Although the slogans of the crowd have not invoked the old language of Islamic protest, just beneath the surface one can detect a residue (in the recent Algiers riots one of the slogans chanted by the crowd was: "Ali Baba, yes! The forty thieves, no!") They represent visible and flagrant transgressions of culturally grounded notions of justice: international consumption styles, corruption, and gross inefficiency.

Finally, there is a third category of movements—those which visibly take their origin in Islamic political militancy. Far from being the dominant type, however, they have been relatively few in number, though their appeal may be growing. The scattered movements of Egyptian Islamic militants of the late 1970s, the 1980 Aleppo and 1981 Hamah uprisings in Syria, the 1980 Great Mosque uprising in Saudia Arabia are all examples. As their listing suggests, however, there are significant differences as well as similarities among them. Within the post colonial state, new forms of collective action are gestating.

How are we to understand the appearance of new repertoires of collective action in the Middle East? The emergence of post-nationalist and Islamist styles of urban protest are clearly linked to both to the crisis of the development state since the
1970s, occasioned both by the unprecedented demographic explosion in the region, the globalization of the world market, and the specific regional impacts of oil boom and bust cycles since the mid-1970s. Other papers at this conference will follow out some of these themes. Here I’d like to suggest several factors which may be worth further investigation. One is the impact of globalization and demographic increase upon the morphology of Middle Eastern cities. As rural migrants have flocked to the cities, vast new shanty towns have sprawled in all directions, and entire new quarters have been constructed, while the city center has been inundated with migrants. Urban services have largely broken down under the strain, providing still further reasons for the grumbling of the popular classes.21

A second factor is the increased the disparity in income distribution between the elites and the rest of the population. In the redistribution of national income which has occurred in most Middle Eastern countries since 1973, the middle classes have come under intense pressures, and official statistics suggest that many have simply fallen out of the middle class altogether. Sharp divergences in standard of living have heightened social tensions: there seems a consensus that conditions have sharply worsened for the growing mass of urban poor, particularly so for youths under twenty-five.

A third factor is the discursive shift associated with the collapse of the development state. The ability of the state to coopt dissent has steadily weakened since the 1970s, despite its control of the media, and (at least at the outset) of labor unions,
student union and professional associations. No longer able to provide basic services to the population, the state has retreated into itself. Fearful of protest, and increasingly dependent upon the state security apparatus for support, Middle Eastern states have increasingly lost control of entire urban neighborhoods. In the interstices created by the withdrawal of the state, Islamist neighborhood associations have pioneered new forms of the delivery of social services, including, credit, medical clinics, schools and even transport. In a recent article Asaf Bayat provides a dramatic portrait of just how far this process of disengagement has gone in Egypt.  

As evidence of the discursive shift, one can note that Islamists accept the main lineaments of modernity, including the modern state, the progressive vision of the liberal project (the developmental state), and the nationalist valorization of ethnicity (which they redefine as religion). Further, in their critique of rural culture, including Sufism, lineage-based politics and heterodox rural beliefs and practices, Islamists are characteristically urban and modern. The urban world of their imagining is itself distinctively modern, not the pre-modern world of urban religious associations (guilds, futuwwa men's groups and neighborhood organizations of the quarters). From an Islamist point of view, the military elites, who had previously been widely accepted, are viewed as being part of the problem, not part of the solution, while the cosmopolitan civilian elites, whose cultural role had been salient in an earlier age, are viewed with suspicion. Most crucially, the polity imagined by the Islamists (at least the Sunni ones) relegates the ulama to the sidelines. (Previously the ulamahad been central to the pre-
modern Islamic political order, serving as intermediaries between the military elites and the people). All of this underscores the extent to which the Islamists are to be seen as a distinctively modern phenomenon.

My conclusion will be brief. In this paper I have argued that far from being explainable as the upwelling of essential Islamic cultural traits, or the impact of the oil boom, the transformation of protest in the Middle East is linked both to profound discursive shifts in the language of politics and the transformation of Middle Eastern society over the last two centuries.

In conclusion, I'd like to leave you with my definition of Islamism. Islamism is: (1) a specifically Islamic form of piety and religiosity; (2) a discursive language, calling for moralization of the public sphere (especially including enforcement of restrictions on feminine dress and comportment), (3) a critique of development state; (4) a form of cultural nationalism; (5) a repertoire of collective action; (6) a sociological response to rapid demographic growth, urban migration, and the withdrawal of public resources from urban neighborhoods by the state; and (7) a specific response to the post-1970s oil boom and rapid globalization of the world economy.
Endnotes

1 Robert Malley, The Call From Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution and the Turn to Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).


See Hamid Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Iranian Ulama."


15 For further elaboration of this argument, see my "Understanding Arab Social Movements," Arab Studies Quarterly 8, 4 (Fall 1986), 333-345.

16 On these changes, see for example Philip S. Khoury, "Syrian Urban Politics in Transition: The Quarters of Damascus during the French Mandate," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 16 (1884), 507-540.


18 See, for example, Ellis Goldberg, "Muslim Union Politics in Egypt: Two Cases," and Joel Beinin, "Islam, Marxism, and the Shubra al-Khayma Textile Workers: Muslim Brothers and Communists in the Egyptian Trade Union Movement," both in E. Burke and I. Lapidus (eds.), *Islam, Politics and Social Movements*.


21 On the impact of the petroleum boom on Muslim urban networks, see Burke and Lubeck, *op. cit.*