Warfare and Expansion: An Ethnohistoric Perspective on the Numic Spread

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In 1958, Sydney Lamb proposed that Numic populations had spread across the Great Basin in comparatively recent times (after ca. A.D. 1000), presumably supplanting earlier inhabitants (Lamb 1958). Since its proposal, the spread hypothesis has received considerable attention (e.g., Taylor 1961; Gunnerson 1962; Euler 1964; Miller, Tanner, and Foley 1971; Fowler 1972; Goss 1977; Bettinger and Baumhoff 1982; Sutton 1984; Aikens and Witherspoon 1986). While linguists have generally accepted the Lamb hypothesis, archaeologists still have reservations, although recently the idea seems to have gained some tacit acceptance (cf. Bettinger and Baumhoff 1982).

One of the major questions inherent in the analysis of the hypothesis is how, in what many view as a marginal environment, could one hunter-gatherer population expand and replace another. Recently, several attempts have been made to explain this “replacement.” Bettinger and Baumhoff (1982) proposed a model in which dietary competition was emphasized, while Sutton (1984) suggested a physical occupation of important resource patches by Numic groups, thereby denying pre-Numic populations access to those resources.

One line of evidence regarding both the merit and method of a Numic spread are the ethnographic and ethnohistoric data, a consideration of which forms the basis for this paper. The data were gathered from various sources, including explorers’ diaries, government records, oral traditions, culture element distribution lists, ethnographies, and other researchers’ analyses of similar data. Two basic questions were asked: (1) were Numic populations expanding at contact, and (2) what was the method by which such expansions, if any, were accomplished?

As a result of this analysis (detailed below), I suggest that Numic populations were indeed expanding at contact, that this expansion was a consistent pattern all along the periphery of the territory occupied by Numic groups (Fig. 1), and that military force was a key method by which these expansions were accomplished. Further, it is suggested that these data support the Lamb (1958) hypothesis of a Numic spread late in time and that force may have been an important factor in any expansions of Numic groups in antiquity.

ETHNOHISTORIC ACCOUNTS

The importance of the ethnohistoric data relating to movements of Numic peoples and their neighbors just prior to direct (substantial) Euroamerican contact has not been totally neglected (e.g., Nichols 1981). Recent movements of Numic populations onto the Plains were discussed by Malouf (1968) and Wright (1978), and Kroeber (1959) noted recent ethnic spreads for the Monache, Chemehuevi, and Northern Paiute. A review of relevant ethnohistoric accounts of these and other groups on the periphery of Numic territory (Fig. 1) is presented below.

Kawaiisu

Zigmond (1986) reported that the Kawaiisu were peaceful and nonviolent, although
Fig. 1. Location of various groups noted in the text and the distribution of the Numic language groups (shaded) in the late 1800s (the ethnographic present): (1) Monache; (2) Northern Paiute-Paviotso; (3) Panamint; (4) Northern Shoshone-Comanche; (5) Kawaiisu; (6) Ute-Chemehuevi. Areas which various Numic groups appear to have controlled and/or heavily raided before being pushed back to their ethnographically recorded boundaries are represented by the crosshatching (adapted from Malouf 1968:Fig. 1; Hyde 1959; and other sources cited in text).
there may have been some hostility with the Southern Yokuts. The Kawaiisu do not appear to have been expanding or militarily active at the time of historic contact.

**Monache**

Although data are scant, it appears that the Monache, in east-central California, moved west across the crest of the Sierra Nevada within the last 200 to 300 years, displacing some Yokuts groups (Kroeber 1959:266), although Kroeber did not discuss the method by which this may have been accomplished. Bennyhoff (1956:7, and references therein) suggested that the Monache may have pushed the Miwok out of Yosemite by force but friendly contacts were also noted. Bettinger (1982:84) supported the recency of such an expansion and suggested that it may have been of a military nature. In contrast with their non-Numic neighbors, the Monache apparently conducted war for adventure, as a group rather than as individuals, employed surprise attacks, and viewed the abduction of women and children as a cause for war (Driver 1937:94). Powers (1877:453) reported that the Monache had crossed into California west of the Sierra “and pushed their invasion of California nearly down to the edge of the great San Joaquin plains.” The time frame and method of this “invasion” is not clear from Powers’ statement. Spier (1978:427) disputed Powers’ assessment, stating that hostilities initiated by the Monache usually stemmed from injuries attributed to the malevolent shamans, and that these problems rarely led to tribal hostilities (such as invasions).

James and Graziani (1975:68-81) summarized the ethnographic data on the relationships between the “Paiutes” and Sierran California groups (Washo, Maidu, Miwok, and Yokuts). While hostilities certainly did exist, and some appear to have been rather intense (e.g., Gayton 1948:159-160), James and Graziani (1975) did not report instances of territory being taken.

**Northern Paiute**

Kelly (1932:186) reported that Northern Paiute groups had pushed the Klamath out of Surprise and Warner valleys within the last several hundred years.

The Klamath are said to have held Warner and Surprise valleys prior to the occupancy by the Gidu’tikadu [Surprise Valley Paiute]. At that time, the latter were living the other side of Steens Mountain, southeast of Burns, Oregon. Although outnumbered, the Paiute “got the best of them all the time” and finally drove them out and took possession.

The description of the Surprise Valley Paiute (Kelly 1932) may have been based on data obtained from individuals who entered Surprise Valley after the establishment of Fort Bidwell in the 1860s (Voegelin 1956:4; Layton 1981:130-131). However, Layton (1981:130) suggested that Surprise Valley had previously been occupied by “pedestrian Paiute” groups who abandoned the area about 1820 due to pressure from mounted predatory bands (possibly other Paiute) from the north.

While there is no mention of lost territory in Spier’s (1930) ethnography of the Klamath, it seems that the Klamath continually were at war with the Paiute north and east of them, apparently well into the 1800s (Layton 1981). It was also explicitly stated by the Surprise Valley Paiute that they were never at war with other Paiutes and even received military assistance from the Ban­nock in fighting the Klamath (Kelly 1932), although these data may reflect a very late situation. Another Northern Paiute group (from Pyramid Lake) apparently moved into Honey Lake Valley in comparatively recent
times, displacing Maidu-speakers (Nichols 1981).

Powers (1877:452) observed that Northern Paiute had occupied a portion of eastern Washo territory. Powers had the impression that the Paiute "seem to be later arrivals [than the Washo]." The Washo situation is confused, however, by the presence of Northern Paiute loan words in Washo (Michael J. P. Nichols, personal communication 1985). These consist of about a dozen words for various plants and animals from the desert area and may indicate a recent movement of the Washo eastward, into the Basin. The Northern Paiute seem to have had fairly peaceful relations with the Washo since the mid-1800s.

The Achumawi, south of the Klamath, also were enemies of the Northern Paiute. According to Curtis (1924:130), the earliest wars related in Achumawi oral tradition were with Northern Paiute who were portrayed as invading Achumawi territory sometime near the end of the 1700s. The Northern Paiute were said to have taken no prisoners and mutilated the bodies of their victims (Curtis 1924:130). A confederation of Achumawi, Atsugewi, Modoc, and Warm Springs Indians (Klamath?) were reported to have finally defeated the Northern Paiute in a large battle, and the hostilities ended (Curtis 1924:130). Northern Paiute (Paviotso) oral tradition does not note such a defeat, but instead relates a victory over the "Pitt River" (Achumawi) in which all but two of the Achumawi, who were left to spread the word, were killed in a pitched battle (Lowie 1924:242).

The Northern Paiute have a legend of a "small tribe of barbarians" (Hopkins 1883:73) being driven out of the Humboldt Sink area of west-central Nevada and exterminated by the Northern Paiute several hundred years ago. According to the story, the Northern Paiute tried to assimilate these other people by taking some of them "into their families, but they could not make them [the other people] like themselves. So at last they [the Northern Paiute] made war on them" (Hopkins 1883:73-74).

The Northern Paiute referred to these people as Sai-i, or sai-duka’a, "tule-eaters," the same name the Northern Paiute called the Achumawi (Loud and Harrington 1929:1, 166), although Hopkins (1883:73-75) stated that these "other people" spoke a Northern Paiute language (see Hattori [1982] and Aikens and Witherspoon [1986] for discussions of the possibility of Penutian-speakers in the Humboldt Sink). In other studies, the Sai-i are identified as Achumawi (Hokan-speakers) (e.g., Loud 1929:162; Steward 1938:271; O. Stewart 1941:440-441).

Hopkins (1883:75) noted that:

all of the people round us [the Paviotso] called us Say-do-carah [similar to sai-duka'a, "tule-eaters," see Loud and Harrington 1929:166]. It means conqueror; it also means "enemy." I do not know how we came by the name of Piutes.

A similar story was related by Harry Openheim, a Northern Paiute, to John Reid (Reid 1973) (also see Loud and Harrington [1929:Appendix 4], and Lowie [1924]). Openheim related stories of at least several other battles with (presumably) the same group that Hopkins discussed. From Openheim's narration, it appears that the Paiute were the intruders and eventually killed or drove the other group into Oregon.

In southeastern Oregon, Teit (1928:101) recorded a large number of tribal and/or group movements from south to north.

The pressure from the Snake [Northern Paiute] seems to have resulted in, first, a displacement of Sahaptian by them; second, in a displacement of the
Waiilatpuan tribes (the Sahaptian Cayuse and Molale) either by Sahaptian or Snake or both; third, in a displacement of Salish tribes by Sahaptian and Waiilatpuan, but chiefly by the former.

The extent of such a Northern Paiute move into Oregon is uncertain (see Teit 1928; Berreman 1937; Murdock 1938; Ray 1938; and O. Stewart 1938 for the arguments). Teit (1928) dated the majority of the movements of Northern Paiute into Oregon as post- A.D. 1750. Berreman (1937) agreed and argued that the use of horses were a major factor in their success, although the entry of horses into the northwestern Basin is poorly dated (Layton 1978).

The military balance began to shift in favor of the Sahaptian when they got both horses and firearms, and were able to push the Northern Paiute (who did not have firearms) south, reclaiming some territory lost to the Northern Paiute in earlier conflicts (Ray 1938:391) (a pattern repeated by the Blackfoot against the Northern Shoshoni). While the specifics of these various movements are poorly known, it appears reasonably certain that the Northern Paiute did move into southeastern Oregon late in time and disrupted the groups then there.

Northern Shoshoni

Northern Shoshoni expansion onto the Plains is reasonably well documented (e.g., Shimkin 1938, 1939; Hewes 1948; Malouf 1968; Wright 1978). Malouf (1968) discussed Shoshonean movements northward into the Plains, and suggested that they had moved as far north as Canada and as far east as the Dakotas (see Malouf 1968: Fig. 1). Malouf (1968) further noted that the Northern Shoshoni had been repelled by the Nez Perce and had remained enemies with them until the 19th century. Shimkin (1939:20) believed that the Northern Shoshoni entered the Plains just after A.D. 1500, certainly pre-horse. Hewes (1948:54) supported this dating and suggested that the Northern Shoshoni reached as far east as the Black Hills and the western-most portion of Nebraska.

While the acquisition of the horse has traditionally been viewed as the major factor enabling the Northern Shoshoni to move onto the Plains, it appears that the Northern Shoshoni had unfriendly contacts with the Blackfoot and Flathead prior to the introduction of the horse (Haines 1938; Hyde 1959; Malouf 1968; Wright 1978). The early ethnohistoric accounts (see below) suggest that the Northern Shoshoni were organized for foot warfare on the Plains, and that their incursions onto the Plains predated their acquisition of horses (also see Keyser 1979).

Secoy (1953) discussed two patterns of warfare in what he called the Pre-horse-Pre-gun period: surprise attacks against small targets and formal large-scale battles, both using infantry. Secoy used an early account (after Thompson [1916]) of a Northern Shoshoni-Blackfoot battle (in about 1730) as his example of the military technique of the Pre-horse-Pre-gun period. Secoy (1953:34) described the 1730 battle as the “first Snake-Blackfoot battle” and later (1953:36) described the “second Snake-Blackfoot battle,” which apparently occurred about 1740. In the original account (Thompson 1916:328-332), there is no indication of the battles being the “first” or “second”; on the contrary, one gets the impression that the animosity had been longstanding. The story was related to Thompson (in about 1790) by a Cree named Saukamappee (“Young Man”) who had joined the Blackfoot and had participated in the hostilities in 1730.

The Piegans [Blackfoot] were always the frontier Tribe, and upon whom the Snake
Indians made their attacks, these latter were very numerous, even without their allies . . . when we had crossed [a river in preparation for the battle] and numbered our men, we were about 350 warriors . . . they [the Shoshoni] had their scouts out, and came to meet us [on foot]. Both parties made a great show of their numbers, and I thought they were more numerous than ourselves. After some singing and dancing, they sat down on the ground, and placed their large shields before them . . . . We did the same . . . . Theirs were all placed touching each other . . . [after some exchanges of arrows in which several men on both sides were wounded] . . . night put an end to the battle, without a scalp being taken on either side, and in those days [pre-horse] such was the result . . . the great mischief of war then, was as now, by attacking and destroying small camps of ten to thirty tents, which are obliged to separate for hunting [Thompson 1916: 328-330].

Secoy stated (1953:35) that “during the first phase of their life on the Plains,” the Northern Shoshoni “retained the old Pre-horse--Pre-gun military technique pattern” and did not risk their few horses in battle. Secoy did not speculate where the Northern Shoshoni learned this “old” pattern, but if they were proficient in it, as they appeared to be from Thompson’s account, it may be that they had been practicing it for some time. Shimkin (1939:21) believed that this battle took place in Saskatchewan and that the Northern Shoshoni did not have horses. If so, the pedestrian expansion of the Northern Shoshoni must have been well advanced.

Another battle was fought between the Northern Shoshoni and Blackfoot about ten years later (Secoy 1953:36) in which horses were again not used, although the Northern Shoshoni apparently possessed them in small numbers and the Blackfoot had heard of them (Thompson 1916:330). The usual infantry battlelines were formed (described above) and the fighting was initially similar to the earlier battle. This time, however, the Blackfoot had several firearms and succeeded in routing the Northern Shoshoni, chasing them on foot (Thompson 1916:332). Secoy (1953:37) noted that by 1742-1743, the Northern Shoshoni were well supplied with horses and were using cavalry in their military operations.

While the antiquity of the pattern is not established, it seems clear that the Northern Shoshoni first entered the Plains on foot and in force. This expansion seems to have been underway prior to their receiving horses, or at least prior to horses becoming an important military factor. However, the importance of the acquisition of horses should not be underestimated. Although the Northern Shoshoni appear to have already been expanding on foot (e.g., Shimkin 1939:21), they “expanded explosively in all favorable directions” (Secoy 1953:33) when they got horses in quantity.

The Northern Shoshoni probably obtained horses about 1690 from the south and are responsible for their introduction onto the northern Plains (Haines 1938:436). The Northern Shoshoni apparently made full use of their advantage in being mounted against their northern and eastern neighbors who were not. They pushed farther out onto the Plains, displacing the Blackfoot and Crow, although the Crow were fairly successful in resisting their incursions. The Northern Shoshoni attacked in large war parties and preferred to attack small camps or villages at dawn (a pattern noted by Secoy [1953]), killing the men and taking the women and children.

In 1742, the explorer Chevalier de la Verendrye noted the effect of Northern Shoshoni incursions in North Dakota.
we reached a village of the *Gens des Chevaux* [identified as probably Cheyenne or Arikara]. They were in a state of great desolation. There was nothing but weeping and howling, all their village having been destroyed by the *Gens du Serpent* (Snake Indians) and only a few members of their tribe having escaped. These Snake Indians are considered very brave. They are not satisfied in a campaign merely to destroy a village, according to the custom of all other Indians. They continue their warfare from spring to autumn, they are very numerous, and woe to those whom they meet on their way!

They are friendly to no tribe. We are told that in 1741 they had entirely destroyed seventeen villages, had killed all the old men and old women, and made slaves of the young women and had traded them at the seacoast for horses and merchandise [Blegen 1925:118].

While the Northern Shoshoni were very successful on the Plains for awhile, the Blackfoot received help from the Cree and Assiniboine in their fight with them (e.g., Thompson 1916; Secoy 1953). Moreover, the Blackfoot soon obtained horses too and, in addition, they received firearms prior to the Northern Shoshoni, firearms having come into the region from the north. These factors, coupled with a larger population and larger, more defensible camps, were probably great advantages for the Blackfoot who, with the Gros Ventres (Secoy 1953), were able to push the Northern Shoshoni back out from most of the Plains area.

After having pushed the Northern Shoshoni out of the Plains, the Blackfoot seem to have held them in contempt.

The Snakes are a miserable, defenseless nation who never venture abroad. The Piegans call them old women, whom they can kill with sticks and stones [Henry and Thompson 1897:726, written about 1811].

Zenas Leonard (1934:80) alluded to the Blackfoot/Shoshoni hostilities in his observations of the Northern Shoshoni in 1831.

The Snake Indians, or as some call them, the Shoshonies, were once a powerful nation, possessing a glorious hunting ground on the east side of the [Rocky] mountains; but they, like the Flatheads, have been almost annihilated by the revengeful Blackfoot, who, being supplied with firearms were enabled to defeat all Indian opposition.

Leonard’s use of the term “revengeful Blackfoot” may support the thesis that the Northern Shoshoni had taken Blackfoot territory earlier (also see Morse [1822:34n] and Odgen [1950:145]). The observations of Hale (1846:224) in 1841 also support this idea.

The Shoshonies formerly inhabited the country of the Blackfoot, and there are old men among the former who are better acquainted with the defiles and secret passes of the country than the Blackfoot themselves.

After being pushed south and west by the Blackfoot, the Northern Shoshoni were left with only the marginal Plains environment (see discussions in Fox [1976] and Wright [1978]). To the south, the Crow and Cheyenne, and later the Arapaho, having the same advantage (firearms) over the Northern Shoshoni, began to push them west, out of the central Plains (Malouf 1968). From about 1727 on, the Comanche (then only recently separated from the Northern Shoshoni) supplied limited numbers of French firearms to the Northern Shoshoni (Hyde 1959) that were used in an attempt to counter the Blackfoot advantage, but the guns were too few to stem the tide.

Although the Northern Shoshoni did not generally appear to be hostile or aggressive
at the time of Euroamerican contact (Hale [1846:199] did call them "warlike"), it is possible that they had been so badly mauled by the Blackfoot (as noted by Odgen [1950:145]) that they were disorganized and demoralized. If this were so, it may help explain the general ethnographic perception of the Northern Shoshoni as being peaceful and destitute (cf. Steward 1938).

Keyser (1975), in an analysis of the shield-bearing warrior motif in the rock art of the northwestern Plains, suggested that the Northern Shoshoni borrowed the motif from the Fremont and spread it onto the Plains during the late prehistoric-historic periods. Keyser (1975:210) noted that the shield motif is also present in the southern Plains, within the Comanche area, and includes horses, an indication that they are late. Keyser (1979) argued that the (apparent) absence of horses in the northern examples indicates that the Northern Shoshoni were on the Plains prior to the acquisition of horses.

Comanche

The Comanche incursion into the Plains is reasonably well known and is only summarized briefly here (following Hyde [1959] and Wallace and Hoebel [1952]). The Comanche split from the Northern Shoshoni, somewhere in eastern Idaho and/or western Wyoming and entered the Plains around 1700 (e.g., Wallace and Hoebel 1952), just after acquiring horses. They entered the southern Plains in two large divisions, with the *Yamparikas* moving south prior to the *Kwqaharis* (Hyde 1959:55). They were in New Mexico by about 1705, where they entered into trade and warfare with the Spanish (Casagrande 1954). Even while the Comanche were trading with the Spanish, they were "overbearing" (Bolton 1917:392) and raided the settlements.

Prior to the arrival of the Comanche, the Apache controlled the southern Plains, but were pushed out in the early 1700s by the Comanche and Ute from the north (Hyde 1959) and the Caddoans from the east (Secoy 1953:80). The Comanche would wait until the Apache were in their rancherias (during the agricultural season) and then attack the rancherias one by one in overwhelming strength (Secoy 1953:31). It should be noted that although the Comanche had horses, so did the Apache. The Comanche appear to have been able to defeat the Apache because they were able to concentrate greater strength at particular spots at times of their choosing and did not let the Apache gain the initiative.

... the Comanche and Utes [also pushing out onto the Plains] did not let up on their defeated enemies. They followed the fleeing Apaches and Padoucas, driving them in on the New Mexican border and continuing to raid them. They probably then extended their attacks to the Apaches of the Canadian River [Hyde 1959:96].

The Comanche started raiding Pecos in 1744 (Hyde 1959:103) and while the Spanish counterattacked in 1748, they met with only moderate success. With French encouragement and arms, the Comanche pushed south to the Red River in 1748-50 (Hyde 1959:107-108). The French and Indian War (1755) resulted in the cutoff of arms and supplies to the Comanche, and secondarily, to the Northern Shoshoni.

The Comanche resumed raids into New Mexico in 1760-1780. About the same time, they began expanding their military operations into Old Mexico (Hyde 1959:116). A smallpox epidemic in 1780-1781 severely affected the Comanche and Northern Shoshoni, disrupted their military operations, and forced the Northern Shoshoni to retreat.
even further south and west under pressure from the Blackfoot. It took many years for the population to recover from the epidemic. The Comanche were subdued by the United States military about 1875.

Ute

The Ute were also active on the southern Plains during the early 1700s. Hyde (1959:63) noted that the Ute appear to have entered the Southwest “through the Colorado mountains, poor, all afoot” sometime prior to 1680 (Secoy 1953:28; also see Tyler 1951, 1954). The northern limit of horses did not include Ute territory north of New Mexico at that time (Secoy 1953:104) so they probably did not have access to horses (Secoy 1953:28-29).

Hyde (1959:53, 63) noted that the Ute entered northern New Mexico in a non-hostile manner, intermarried with Navajos and Apaches, and gained a position in the San Luis Valley, at the head of the Rio Grande. Later (for reasons not understood, perhaps related to obtaining horses) the Ute began raiding their neighbors, with the assistance of the recently arrived Comanche (Hyde 1959:64). By the time the Americans entered the New Mexico area, the Ute were well-defined and warlike . . . [and an] effective war leadership and organization was in evidence among all the Ute bands [Zingg 1938:148].

The Ute and Comanche had driven the Apache from southern Colorado by 1718 (Hyde 1959:71), using a hit-and-run military technique. Although the Apache mounted punitive military expeditions against the Ute, the latter were able to elude the Apache due to their high mobility (cf. Tyler 1951:161), keeping the choice of battle to themselves. The Ute were apparently raiding Taos, New Mexico, from 1680 on and started raiding the Navajo about 1690 (Hyde 1959:56). The Ute drove the Apache south of the Arkansas River prior to 1718 (Hyde 1959:71) while the Comanche were operating north of the river.

Opler (1940:164) argued that the Ute interest in warfare centered on obtaining loot and reported that the Ute and Comanche were often enemies, although being allied at certain times. Opler (1940:162) noted that to the Ute:

Warfare, then, was more the result of horse raiding and buffalo hunting than any desire on the part of the Ute to win prestige . . . . There were no war honors institutionalized in the culture.

Smith (1974) generally agreed with this assessment.

The peace and cooperation that had existed between the Ute and Comanche (but see Opler [1940]) came to an end about 1749. It is not clear why this happened, but the Comanche having firearms and the Ute not having them may have caused some jealousy among the Ute (Hyde 1959:96). At about the same time that the Comanche began receiving firearms from the French, the Comanche suddenly attacked the Ute and drove them from the Plains into the mountains (Hyde 1959:106). The Ute were heavily engaged in warfare with the Navajo at the time and were unable to cope with the attacks. They even made defensive alliances with some Apache groups that they and the Comanche had recently defeated (Hyde 1959:106). The Ute and Comanche have been unfriendly ever since.

Escalante recorded “Cumanches” northwest of the Great Salt Lake in 1776 (Bolton 1950:171) and noted that the Ute were afraid of the Comanche, perhaps as a result of their earlier dispute (1950:153). Escalante recorded Comanche in both western Colorado and New Mexico but distinguished them
from the group in northeast Utah by calling the former “Cumanches Yamparicas” (Bolton 1950:153).

The term “Yamparicas” probably refers to the Yamparikas group of Comanche, the first to split from the Northern Shoshoni and move south (Hyde 1959:55). The Ute reference to “Cumanches” to their north may reflect a general Ute term for the Northern Shoshoni, or an ethnic lumping by Escalante. Nevertheless, it appears that the Comanche occupied much of central and western Colorado as late as 1776 and the Ute entry into that area (their ethnographically recorded territory) may post-date that time.

**Southern Paiute**

Both Steward (1938:185) and Manners (1974:192) argued that warfare was unimportant to the Southern Paiute. The analysis of Southern Paiute oral tradition relating to Southwestern groups by Pendergast and Meighan (1959) suggested that there was peaceful contact between the Mukwitch (Anasazi and/or Fremont) and the Southern Paiute. The informants noted, however, that the Mukwitch were being raided by the Ute and Shoshoni from the north (1959:130) (also see Fowler and Fowler 1981).

However such peacefulness was not characteristic of all Southern Paiute groups. During the last 200 years or so, the Chemehuevi, a Southern Paiute group in the Mojave Desert (Kelly 1934:549) (Chemehuevi is a Mohave word for Southern Paiute [Kroeber 1959:261]), appear to have displaced the Mohave (a Yuman group) from the Mojave Desert in eastern California and along portions of the western bank of the Colorado River (Lerch 1985). Kroeber (1959:262 [following García]) had placed the Chemehuevi in the Mojave Desert west of the Colorado River by 1776 (also see K. Stewart 1968:13), and suggested that they moved into the desert areas which had been abandoned due to other population movements along the Colorado River (also see Rogers 1936:38; Kelly 1934:556; Van Valkenburgh 1976:2). Kroeber (1959:294) contended that the Chemehuevi had recently moved (in the late 1700s [perhaps after Rogers 1936:38]) south from the Las Vegas area (also see Kelly 1934:556) and that this movement had occurred “within the desert.” The Chemehuevi were not living on the Colorado River in 1776 (K. Stewart 1968:13). Only later (1830-1840), owing to disruptions caused by warfare between the Mohave and the Halchidhoma, did the Chemehuevi occupy portions of the western bank of the Colorado River and become farmers (Kroeber 1959).

Open hostilities broke out between the Chemehuevi and Mohave in 1865-1867 but were indecisive (Kroeber 1959:294; Kroeber and Kroeber 1973:39-46, 82-89). Kroeber (1959:295) felt (apparently from a Mohave source) that the Chemehuevi originally moved onto the Colorado River as “poor relations or hungry friends” and were “tolerated” by the Mohave. However, it seems that the Chemehuevi and Mohave may have been hostile to each other prior to the “war” of 1865-1867, since Chemehuevi traders would not enter Mohave territory (actively guarded by the Mohave) as early as 1854 (K. Stewart 1968:16).

An analysis of the Chemehuevi-Mohave hostilities by Kroeber and Kroeber (1973) (from Mohave sources) does not greatly clarify the situation. They did suggest, however, that the Chemehuevi may have taken advantage of a Mohave decline to further their interests.

In a Mohave account of the fighting, an informant stated:

I don't know why the Chemehuevis attacked. Maybe it was just meanness. The Mohaves were pretty generous to
them and gave them all they needed, so I don't see why they came and fought [K. Stewart 1968:20].

A Chemehuevi informant held a slightly different view.

The Chemehuevis didn't like to fight, but their enemies kept on bothering them . . . The Chemehuevis didn't like war [K. Stewart 1968:21].

Roth (1977:273) generally agreed with the concept of a recent Chemehuevi incursion into Mohave territory.

This [Blythe, California, on the west bank of the Colorado River] was the southernmost penetration of Chemehuevis, who, in the centuries before American settlement, had been gradually pushing south and west [east?] from out of the desert.

Roth (1977:282) further suggested that as Mohave fortunes declined, the Chemehuevi "had grown stronger, aggressively taking advantage of new economic opportunities and moving into new areas."

During a confrontation with United States troops over the killing of a white man in 1880, the Chemehuevi (including families) fled into the mountains west of the Colorado River and threatened the entire population of the area (Roth 1977). The military took the threat seriously as the Chemehuevi were heavily armed and willing to fight. Roth (1977:277) noted that the military considered the Chemehuevi women to be very able fighters as well. The incident was ended peacefully.

In a more recent paper using data probably not available to Kroeber, Lerch (1985) argued that the portion of the Mojave Desert west of the Colorado River had not been abandoned by the Mohave but was inhabited by a group of "Desert Mohave." He then contended that the Chemehuevi invaded the Mojave Desert, and after much warfare, the Chemehuevi succeeded in killing nearly all of the Desert Mohave, thus gaining control of the desert west of the Colorado River.

The Chemehuevi originally came from the north - they must have for the country up by nevagant? Mtn. [Spring Mountains, Charleston Peak] is their story country. They used to be mountain people but kept drifting down south, drifting down south. The Desert-Mohaves lived at Providence Mts., Old Woman Mountain and clear out to Soda Lakes [about 80 miles west of the Colorado River]. The Chemehuevis fought these Desert Mohaves in a long warfare of many years and killed nearly all of them, but a few of them escaped and lived among the river Mohaves. The reason for this fight was that the Desert Mohaves held the springs and the Chem. [Chemehuevi] wanted them [Harrington 1986:reel 146, frame 144].

In the meantime, however, the Chemehuevi had succeeded in moving even further south, partly due to the decline of the Halchidhoma, whose military power had blocked their progress earlier (Kroeber 1959:262). K. Stewart (1968) argued that the Chemehuevi did not coalesce as a tribal unit until they occupied a portion of the west bank of the Colorado River. At that time, "an incipient national consciousness began to stir among [them]" (1968:26). Whether Stewart's assessment implies a lack of unity and ethnic recognition among the Chemehuevi prior to their gaining the west bank of the Colorado is questionable. If anything, it
would appear that the Chemehuevi were quite “nationalistic” prior to the 1850s.

MILITARY FORCE AS A FACTOR IN NUMIC EXPANSIONS

It is the general view that warfare was rarely practiced in the Great Basin, especially with those groups lacking horses (e.g., Steward 1938:185, 238; Manners 1974:192-193). Linton (1944) argued that small “nomadic” populations could not be a military threat to settled groups, a thesis that seemingly ignores the disruptive power of raiding (e.g., the Comanche and Ute against the Apache [Wallace and Hoebel 1952:288], the Apache against the Spanish [cf. Spicer 1962:238]).

The above review reveals several apparent consistencies for the ethnohistoric period: (1) Numic populations on the periphery of their territory were usually at war with, and expanding against, their non-Numic neighbors; (2) the application of military force was consistently employed in the known expansions; (3) Numic groups rarely fought among themselves (the late Ute-Comanche enmity being a notable exception); and (4) until unilaterally armed with guns, other groups did not expand at the expense of Numic groups (the Washo example being a possible, but very uncertain, exception).

Where such data exist, they often illustrate a similar military method on the part of Numic populations: isolated groups of the enemy were attacked with overwhelming force and destroyed when possible. This tactic is also mentioned in Numic myth (e.g., Lowie 1924:80-81, 242) and in deed (e.g., Blegen 1925:118; Wallace and Hoebel 1952:288). Personal prestige does not appear to have been as much of a factor as the destruction of enemy populations and habitations (e.g., Opler 1940), although this may not have been as true in southeastern Oregon (e.g., Ray 1938).

The Numic groups seem to have enjoyed a military superiority over other groups including those with larger total populations. Their ability to disperse their own population and then gather a large number of men together for military actions (fission-fusion, a well documented economic tactic in the Great Basin [Steward 1938]) may have been an important factor.

To be sure, the acquisition of horses was an important factor in some of the expansions of Numic groups, most notably that of the Comanche. However, the Northern Shoshoni appear to have been already expanding onto the Plains prior to getting horses and their obtaining horses may have only speeded up an already ongoing process (Shimkin 1939:21). The Monache did not have horses when they (apparently) crossed the Sierra Nevada nor did the Chemehuevi when they (apparently) invaded the eastern Mojave Desert.

Secoy (1953:23) noted that early Apache raiding may have been motivated by the lure of captives which they sold to the Spanish as a “cash crop.” As it appears that the Northern Shoshoni conducted a similar trade in captives with groups on the Pacific coast (e.g., Blegen 1925:53), it may be that a similar motivation was in operation there.

In pre-horse times, the settlement pattern on the Plains was probably somewhat similar to that of the Great Basin, with most of the population being concentrated near water sources (rivers) with much of the area being inhabited only seasonally (cf. Wedel 1963). Such a situation would have been very familiar to the Northern Shoshoni who would have encountered large areas without permanent populations. The Numic basketry technology (specifically twined water bottles) may have enabled the Numic groups to more
efficiently exploit the rather arid High Plains.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper is to document population movements by Numic peoples during the ethnohistoric period. That they appear to have been expanding at the time of historic contact all along their perimeter may reflect a continuation of a general expansion through the Great Basin which may have begun in antiquity (within the last millennia [cf. Lamb 1958]). Further, it appears that Numic populations of the ethnohistoric period (at least on their perimeter) were militarily aggressive and inclined to exploit their non-Numic neighbors. The fact that the Numic groups did not generally fight among themselves but were at war with virtually all their neighbors supports this contention. This territorial expansion appears to have predated the acquisition of the horse although horses were a very important factor in some of the expansions of Numic populations, especially the Comanche.

The presence or absence of horses is not the crucial point. The pattern of territorial expansion was not limited to those groups which were mounted; Numic groups were expanding onto the Plains (much of which was sparcely populated) prior to the introduction of the horse and other pedestrian Numic groups were also expanding. Horses only meant that Numic populations could expand more rapidly. Other non-Numic groups also had horses (e.g., the Apache) but did not expand at the expense of Numic populations (except the better-armed Blackfoot and Sahaptian apparently taking back lost territory).

Numic populations seem to have consistently applied force and were only halted or pushed back by coalitions of greater size and/or better weapons (e.g., firearms). Since the use of force was apparently so important in the ethnohistorically documented expansions, it is possible that force may have been an important factor in the postulated replacement of the predecessors of the Numic peoples throughout the Great Basin over the past millennium.

NOTES

1. The term “Snake” was broadly used by early explorers, immigrants, and United States Government personnel (cf. Voegelin 1955, note 2) to refer to various groups of Northern Paiute and Northern Shoshoni. Use of the term is avoided here except in direct quotes.

2. Hyde (1959:121) suggested that this group of Shoshoni was ancestral to the Lemhi Shoshoni, called Tukuarika or Mountain Sheep Eaters. He did not cite the source of his data.

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