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The Politics of Knowledge
in Plato’s Statesman

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Classics

by

Brian Anthony Apicella

2016
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Politics of Knowledge

In Plato’s Statesman

by

Brian Anthony Apicella

Doctor of Philosophy in Classics

University of California, Los Angeles, 2016

Professor David L. Blank, Chair

This dissertation establishes that the Platonic dialogues Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman comprise a tightly woven trilogy which is unified both thematically and philosophically. Its focuses on the last dialogue in this list, relatively neglected by commentators, the Statesman. Despite the fact that Plato seems to take pains to alert us to the thematic unity of the Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman, not only has the unity of the dialogues not been adequately appreciated, but the Statesman has usually been treated as a mere curious appendage: a dialogue of interest primarily if not solely for insight into Plato’s late political philosophy. This thesis proposes that the Statesman is, rather, the culmination of this very important trilogy of dialogues, and that one can have a proper understanding of the dialogues and the philosophical issues with which they are concerned only if one understands the relation of the Statesman to the prior two
dialogues. In order to establish the unity of the three dialogues and the central importance of the *Statesman* for the epistemology developed in them, this dissertation seeks to show that the epistemological doctrines initiated but left in a state of incompleteness in the initial dialogue, the *Theaetetus*, find partial completion in the next dialogue, the *Sophist*, but are fully worked out only in the *Statesman*. The epistemology developed in the trilogy is an interrelational epistemology, as other scholars have maintained. This dissertation argues for a modified version of the interrelational model on which axiological and hierarchical relations play a role of maximum importance. By bringing this interrelational epistemology to fruition in the political context of the *Statesman*, where it is used to provide an account of human being and the polis, Plato discloses the ineluctably political nature of knowledge and philosophy.
The dissertation of Brian Anthony Apicella is approved.

Kathryn Anne Morgan

Giulia Sissa

Calvin G. Normore

David L. Blank, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2016
DEDICATION

This dissertation is for my wife, Avegail Gascon Flores, without whose patience, support, and admonishments this work never would have come to fruition.
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VITA

Brian Anthony Apicella is a graduate of The Ohio State University, where he earned a B.A. in Classics. He then undertook a post baccalaureate program of studies in Philosophy at Ohio University and earned a Master’s Degree in Philosophy from Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He taught as a high school Latin instructor before entering upon graduate studies in Classics at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Introduction: The Politics of Knowledge in Plato’s Statesman

i. The Interrelational Epistemology and the Politics of Knowledge

Plato’s early and middle dialogues almost invariably involve Socrates and his interlocutors trying, and ultimately failing, to answer a question of the form “What is X?” The assumption in these dialogues seems to be that the ability to explain in a definition what a thing is in and of itself or *auto kath’ hauto*, is necessary and sufficient for epistêmê of that thing. Whatever the status of this assumption in those earlier dialogues, in the later dialogues, as a number of commentators have argued, Plato seems to reject it in favor of what Gail Fine has dubbed an interrelational model of knowledge. On the interrelational model a grasp of what something is *auto kath’ hauto* may be necessary but it is no longer sufficient. It is not sufficient, according to Fine, because one must also be able to articulate how that object is related to other objects that comprise the same structured field.

If the advocates of the interrelational epistemology are right, this constitutes a significant shift in Plato’s epistemology. It also crowns the Theaetetus, the first of a trilogy of dialogues that also includes the Sophist and Statesman, with a special honor.

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1 Regarding the status of this assumption, a unitarian reading could accept that this is the working assumption in the earlier dialogues and that Plato rejects it in the later dialogues without having to give up the unitarian position in favor of the developmentalist reading. It might be that for pedagogical reasons Plato begins with a simpler epistemological model then replaces it with something more complicated in the later dialogues. And as Sedley (2004:168) points out, in the Republic, a dialogue structured by a “What is X?” question (where X is Justice), we can see traces of interrelational knowledge in Socrates’ talk about acquiring a synoptic grasp of the Forms (e.g. 537c). The Republic itself may thus have a proleptic function, preparing us for the later dialogues. Cornford (1957) provides a unitarian reading of the Theaetetus, defended by Chappell (2005). See Kahn (1996) for a unitarian interpretation of the dialogues that utilizes the notion of prolepsis. See Owen (1953) and Cherniss (1957) for the issues involved in the unitarian vs. developmentalist debate.


3 Plato actually leads us to expect a tetralogy, comprised of the Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman and the missing Philosopher. My take (sketched below in i and fully explicated in chapter 5) is that the Philosopher’s absence is by design not due to historical accident, such as Plato’s death or loss of interest. The absence of the Philosopher, I shall show, subtly signals that the philosophical life, the life of pure reason detached from practical and political concerns, is
For if the *Theaetetus*, as these commentators maintain, ends in aporia not due to Plato’s genuine perplexity but by design, and the aporia is only apparent, Plato’s intention being for the reader to midwife the correct answer which lies *in embryo* in the text, then the *Theaetetus* has the distinction of being the dialogue where Plato works out the interrelational epistemology, albeit subterraneously. This is especially fitting, seeing that the question that structures the *Theaetetus’* inquiry is “What is *epistêmê*?” Moreover, an implication of the answer to this “What is X?” question is that the answer to a “What is X” question is not sufficient, even if necessary, for knowledge of X.

The *Sophist*, however, is the dialogue commonly taken as the place where Plato fully and *explicitly* resolves the puzzles contained in the *Theaetetus*. For here Plato has his new main speaker, the Stranger from Elea, provide here an account of the *megista genê* (being, sameness, otherness, motion, rest, 254b8-257a12) which, as the basic elements of all things, are ontologically and epistemologically dependent on one another and thus require something like the interrelational epistemology to account for them, not possible or even desirable—in this world at least, where *epistêmê* must be employed to preserve ourselves and our fellow human beings in a parlous world. Philosophy, that is, is ineluctably political; the genuine philosopher is a statesman. The *Philosopher’s* absence also brings home the fragility and rarity of the good in the current cosmological configuration. The cause internal to the dialogues for the *Philosopher’s* absence is the fact that its projected interlocutor, Young Socrates, turns out to have a deficiently philosophical nature and the Athenians killed its projected main speaker, Socrates, who, my analysis shall show, is a concealed philosopher-statesman. See M. Gill (2012) for a different interpretation of the significance of the missing *Philosophos*. My take on the *Philosophos* is indebted to Morgan’s (1998) essay, which proffers a similar thesis on the not missing but incomplete *Critias*, a part of another (apparently) incomplete sequence of dialogues.

The precise relation that obtains between the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* will, again, depend on whether one subscribes to the unitarian or developmentalist line on the dialogues. For the former, the *Sophist* works out more explicitly answers to puzzles left apparently in aporia in the *Theaetetus*, where Plato actually invests the text with the resources the reader needs to resolve these puzzles. For the developmentalist, Plato offers in the *Sophist* the answers to philosophical puzzles about which he was genuinely perplexed in the *Theaetetus*. For the latter see McDowell (1973).

See also *Sph.* 253b8-254b8 for a description of dialectic and the interconnectedness of *genê*. 
since a grasp of one presupposes a grasp of all the other members of this field. The Stranger also provides here a solution to the problem concerning the possibility of false judgement, which is bound up with the question of not-being and which Socrates explicitly leaves in aporia in the *Theaetetus*.

This interpretation seems to leave little, if anything, to do for the *Statesman*, the third dialogue of the trilogy. And this is reflected in the literature, where the *Statesman* has suffered relative neglect; its relation to the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* and its contribution to the trilogy as a whole are rarely accorded much significance. The *Statesman*, it seems, is merely an odd political appendage to its properly theoretical cohorts. One comes across a few interesting contributions concerning philosophical method, if one make one’s way through this otherwise “weary dialogue”, as Ryle styles it, but the primary significance of the *Statesman* seems to be its role as a bridge between the lofty political theory of the *Republic* and the more mundane *Laws*. This makes for a trilogy with a rather tenuous philosophical unity among its parts, which seems unfitting given both the dramatic unity Plato seems at pain to establish and the nature of the interrelational epistemology developed therein, which is so concerned with grasping unified complex wholes via the relations between their parts. The three dialogues seem to be more akin to a heap than a unified trilogy.

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7 Studies devoted to the trilogy as a whole are relatively few: Klein (1977), Dorter (1994), Blondell (2006), Benardete (2007), M.Gill (2012). See Nehamas (1984) and Burnyeat (1990) for analyses that connect some of the dots between the *Theaetetus* and its sequels, the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, although they do not provide a full-scale analysis of the trilogy. See also McCabe (1994: 221-62, and passim), who devotes much space to this late trilogy where she sees Plato developing an interrelational epistemology.

The interpretation I offer builds on Fine’s and Burnyeat’s work on the interrelational epistemology, but with crucial modifications, detailed below, which result in a significantly different epistemology. It also shows that the development of this epistemology finds completion not in the *Sophist* but in the *Statesman*’s political context. My reading not only elevates the *Statesman*’s role by weaving it more intimately into the trilogy’s fabric, making for a trilogy tightly unified philosophically and dramatically and giving us a proper object on which to exercise the interrelational epistemology. It also shows that the *Statesman* is, in fact, the most important of the three dialogues, since here the work left unfinished by the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* finds completion. The other dialogues thus depend on the *Statesman*, and our understanding of the trilogy depends on grasping the *Statesman* and its relation to the other dialogues. Plato in this way invests the trilogy itself with a crucial dependency relation we shall find in the *Statesman* itself: the city’s other experts and citizens depend on the statesman for ontological and epistemological completion. One thing which becomes clear in the *Statesman* and which will be a central feature of my interpretation is the practical function of theoretical inquiry, including the trilogy’s inquiries into *epistêmê*, *sophistikê*, and *politikê*. These theoretical inquiries are undertaken, I shall show, for the sake of cultivating the young interlocutors’ (and readers’) intellectual nature, a necessary condition for eudaimonia for *nous*-animals. By having these inquiries and their purpose come to fulfillment in the *Statesman*’s political context, where we learn that knowledge and eudaimonia are maximally achievable only in the polis, Plato brings home the practical and political significance of *epistêmê*, the politics of knowledge.
I propose the following modifications to prior interpretations of the interrelational epistemology. I take a definition of or true belief about what X is *auto kath ’ hauto* to be necessary but insufficient for knowledge of X. One must also be able to provide a *logos* of its relations to all the other things that share the same field as X. I reject, however, the coherentist spin that commentators like Fine and Burnyeat put on this. That is, Plato is not merely concerned with the logical relations between the propositions that comprise belief sets. His focus, as Nehamas has argued, remains on grasping essences, and essences and their relations to other essences are the only proper objects of knowledge. This means that not all true propositions will be candidates for being transformed into *epistêmê* but only those having to do with what X is and with the essential relations that obtain between X and other essences. I might be able to *recognize* that Theaetetus is a human being and truly believe that he is the son of Euphronius, but I can know neither, since Theaetetus is not an essence (although the predicate ‘human being expresses an essential property). And given the “What is X” question that structures not only the *Theaetetus* but also the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, both Socrates and the Stranger seem to be on the hunt for essences in this trilogy. This is not to say that *epistêmê* of essences is

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10 This feature of my interpretation I borrow in full from Nehamas (1984).

11 In the view of Fine and Burnyeat, to use Nehamas’ example, my true belief that ‘This ‘a’ is in italics’ can be transformed into knowledge if and only if I am an expert grammarian, that is, if I can add a *logos* that accounts for ‘a’ and its relations to all the other letters. Yet this is not a belief that connects ‘a’ to other objects of an appropriate field. And even if we allow this belief to be a knowledge candidate, it is far from clear how a definition of ‘a’, even one that includes its relations to all the other letters, is necessary for knowledge of that fact (Nehamas, 244). My own take is that we have something like the two-world model from Republic V, where *epistêmê* of some essence X (where this now means a true belief about X plus a *logos* accounting for X in terms of other, related essences) is epistemically prior to (expert) recognition of instances of X. Our knowledge of X, that is, does not somehow allow us to transform true beliefs about X’s instances into knowledge (as Fine would seem to have it), but it does allow us (to expertly) recognize particular things that have (but are not) X. This will have to suffice for what is an obviously complicated and controversial issue. For an example of the two-world theory Fine criticizes (2003: 66-84, 85-116) see Cornford (1957).

12 We might also take *Tht*. 152c as evidence that knowledge can only be of essences, *ousiai*. Here Socrates says that since perception is knowledge, it is of what always is (τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί) and never false. The phrase τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί,
irrelevant to recognition of particulars, which I take to be part of practical judgment, a different capacity of soul for Plato. Rather, our epistêmê of essences, as epistemically prior to our practical judgments of sensible particulars, is of the utmost importance for the perfect unity of theory and practice required for genuine virtue and eudaimonia, as I explain below.

Second, although I follow previous commentators in taking the logos which we add to a true belief about what X is auto kath’ hauto to account for X in terms of all the other things that share the same field as X, my take on the nature of this logos differs significantly. On my reading the added logos must be a discursive account which completely enumerates and fully differentiates from X everything else related to X. As far as I have been able to discern, it has gone unnoticed that Plato intends the reader to midwife this tripartite logos Socrates’ logos of logos in the Theaetetus (206a-210a), where each of three types of logos, taken on its own, fails, under philosophical scrutiny, to be a sufficient addendum to turn true belief into epistêmê. The trick is to see that the three types fit together as functional parts and comprise a complex whole. On my

however, is ambiguous. If it means ‘of what is always’, that is, ‘of what is eternal’, then essences seem to be the obvious objects of knowledge. It could, however, also mean ‘is always of what is’, where ‘what is’ could include sensible particulars as well as essences.

13 Socrates, in fact, as I show in chapter 2, employs the tripartite logos to account for itself, that is, the conception of logos as a complex whole of functional parts. For he provides a discursive account that completely enumerates and fully differentiates from on another the three types of logos: discursive account, enumeration of elements, and differentiation. He leaves it to the reader, however, to fully midwife this conception by leaving unspoken (but subtly signaling) the connection or structure which binds the three together. My account differs from others who take the Theaetetus to be only apparently aporetic insofar as I take Socrates’ logos of logos to provide the correct but incomplete conception of logos. Others, like Fine and the Anonymous Commentator, take Socrates’ three accounts actually to fail and in this way to point us to some other kind of logos not considered by Socrates. The Anonymous Commentator thinks it is logos as an account of the aitia, which Socrates posits in the Meno (see Sedley (1996: 93-103) for the Commentator’s account). Fine (2003: 225-51) argues that Socrates’ spelling example at Th. 206ac indirectly provides the proper conception of logos as an account of the target in relation to all the elements that share its field. I think this is right as far as it goes. What Fine fails to see is that the three accounts of logos Socrates provides after the spelling example give us the blueprint for how to account for something that belongs to a complex field. I have much more to say about the spelling example in chapters 2 and 5.
reading the *Theaetetus* thus provides the interrelational epistemology *in embryo* for the reader to midwife. Yet it is only in the *Statesman*, I shall argue, that we see it *actuated* in the Stranger’s account of *politikê*. In fact, the Stranger’s account also completes the *Theaetetus*’ inquiry into *epistêmê* by applying the interrelational epistemology to *epistêmê* itself in order to acquire *epistêmê* of *epistêmê*, which the *Theaetetus* fails to do.

Additionally, the content of this *logos*’ differentiation consists not merely in accounting for how the target is similar to yet other than the other members of the same field, as we find in the method of division in the *Theaetetus*’ sequels. Rather, for some things, at least, this differentiation must also include any hierarchical and axiological relations that obtain among the members of that field. A proper grasp of human being as a *nous*-animal, for example, would require not just enumerating its elements, body and soul, and being able to explain how body and soul are different. One might also have to account for human being as a complex whole comprised of a sovereign intellect and subservient body, if intellect is superior to body and for this reason rules it. And this obviously presupposes a grasp of ends or functional properties in terms of a teleological framework in which body’s end is subordinate to intellect’s. Yet this much would give us only a true belief of what human being is *auto kath’ hauto*. To *know* human being would require mapping out human being’s relations to the other animals, completely enumerating and fully differentiating them from human being and from one another.

With the inclusion of hierarchical and axiological relations grounded in function, this gives us something more akin to the Great Chain of Being than an ordnance map.\(^{14}\) The absence of axiological, hierarchical, and functional properties from the method of

\(^{14}\) Skemp (1952: 74, fn. 3) uses the “ordnance survey” metaphor for the method of division, which suggests a value-free mapping of things (McCabe (1994: 221-62) offers a similar value-free account of division).
division, both from the Stranger’s practice and from commentators’ analyses, is a crucial blind spot with serious consequences, as I shall argue. Although traces of these relations can be found in both the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, their crucial absence becomes manifest only in the *Statesman*, where we also find the remedy for that absence in the great myth’s teleological framework.

A second necessary component of this differentiation is accounting for what the target is not, and this in two senses. First, one must be able to articulate how that object is other than all other objects comprising the same field, in addition to being able to explain how it is the same as those same objects. Humans are the same as pigs, for example, insofar as both are animals; yet humans are not (are other than) pigs insofar as they have two rather than four legs. Someone with epistêmê of human being, however, must also be able to account for what is not human being in the sense of ontological deficiency, a sense with obviously axiological implications. That is, we expect someone with knowledge of human being to be able to explain not just what constitutes proper human nature (or what human being is *auto kath’ hauto*) but also what it means to exceed or fall short of human nature. This sense of not-being has suffered relative neglect in the literature, and its role in the interrelational epistemology has, as far as I can tell, not been considered at all.

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15 The method of division I take to be an important part of the interrelational epistemology but not identical to it, since, as the Stranger makes clear in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, division is blind to the axiological relations that I take to be integral to the interrelational epistemology. We can see, however, that division utilizes enumeration of elements and makes (limited) use of differentiation, both of which are important elements of the interrelational epistemology. I treat the nature of division in more detail in chapter 3. Commentators have largely overlooked the importance of axiology for the interrelational epistemology. Those who do address the role of axiology in the trilogy (Rosen (1983: passim), Scodel (1987: passim)) usually focus on what they take to be the Stranger’s claims that axiological properties are irrelevant. As I argue in chapter 3, this is a misinterpretation. The Stranger states that the method of division ignores axiological properties; this does not imply, however, that we should. The Stranger, I show, in this way signals that we need a supplement to division, a teleological framework, that allows us to get at axiological properties.
For example, one would have to be able to account for human being’s elements (body and intellect) as well as the proper structure or arrangement for those elements (that intellect is superior to body and for this reason rules it). For not just any structure, for Plato, is sufficient for X being X. One must also be able to explain that body ruling intellect constitutes defective human being, that is, a nature that is human (no other animal is a composite of intellect and body) but not really human. And this, I note again, requires a teleological framework. So we again have a case where a grasp of what X is auto kath’ hauto is necessary but insufficient for knowing X. In this case it is things related to but not X in the sense of ontological defect, not merely in the sense of otherness. Although we glimpse not-being as ontological deficiency in Socrates’ account of his midwifery in the Theaetetus (148e6-151d7), Socrates provides a formal account of not being neither in this sense nor in the sense of otherness. The Stranger provides an account of not-being as otherness in the Sophist. Yet not-being as ontological deficiency, I shall show, is conspicuously absent, despite the fact that this is the sense we need to account for sophistry as ontologically defective philosophy, meaning that the Sophist’s inquiry falls short. Only in the Statesman do we get the technical tools and teleological framework required to account for ontological deficiency; it is also only here that we see not-being as ontological deficiency explicitly deployed in the Stranger’s account of the defective regimes and sham statesmen. In fact, this account of the sham statesman also

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16 Harte (2005) provides an analysis of Plato’s mereology in this trilogy, focusing on the importance of structure. Koslicki’s (2008: 91-121) mereological study situates Plato and Aristotle within the concerns of contemporary mereologists and also engages critically with Harte.

17 If we exclude the Statesman’s cosmos, that is, which is a zôon with intellect. Yet as a microcosm it is not so clear that human being is different in kind from the cosmos.
serves to complete the business left unfinished in the *Sophist*, as I shall argue in chapter 5.¹⁸

Just these modifications give us a very different picture of the interrelational epistemology than is found in previous accounts. One final item completes the picture, giving another unique twist to the model of the interrelational epistemology I offer here. For Plato, every field of expertise is related to every other field, and everything is related to everything else. Given the interrelational epistemology, this means that expertise in one field requires expertise in every field and to know one thing one must know everything. Contrary to Fine, knowledge cannot be limited to a specific structured field.¹⁹

This implication of the interrelational epistemology has scarcely gotten the attention it deserves from commentators. In fact, only Burnyeat seems to have given it any play at all.²⁰

Yet this has obviously serious consequences for the possibility of expertise and, less obviously perhaps, for virtue and eudaimonia. As I shall show, although extreme and however unappealing to modern intuitions, this implication makes sense if the arts, like an organism, comprise a complex whole of parts structured hierarchically according to function and share a common end, the human good. For experts, for Plato, do not make

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¹⁸ By technical tools I mean the resources provided by the measure doctrine in the *Statesman*, which accounts for judgments of something as genuine or as exceeding or falling short of some measure. In the latter two cases that thing suffers ontological defect, but is not nothing. This passage from the *Statesman*, as I explain in chapter 5, is presaged by the *Sophist*’s Original-Eikôn-Phantasm distinction, analyzed in chapter 3.

¹⁹ Yet see the footnote attached to the revised version of Fine’s essay in (2003: 251, f.n.32). Fine notes here that the best sort of knowledge for Plato is “more synoptic: it involves understanding the teleological structure of reality as a whole, seeing how various disciplines are related to one another and how they are organized around the form of the good.” Burnyeat (1990) explains how this startling conclusion follows from the extreme condition on knowledge expressed by Socrates in his second account of logos in the *Theaetetus*.

²⁰ Burnyeat (1990: 215-16) explains how this startling conclusion follows from the extreme condition on knowledge expressed by Socrates in his second account of logos in the *Theaetetus*. 
mistakes, and since the source of mistakes is incomplete knowledge, the expert must have a complete grasp of how his art works with the others to achieve their common end, if his work is to help rather than impede the actuation of that end. He requires, that is, epistêmê of epistêmê, second order knowledge of the other kinds of knowledge in addition to his own. As bad as this news is for the would-be expert, it gets worse. For a grasp of the arts’ common end, the human good, requires a complete grasp of human being, which means grasping everything else under and above the heavens. In fact, in the Statesman we learn that human being is very intimately related to the cosmos, since both are nous-animals. So one can be an expert weaver, for example, only if one is a cosmologist or sage. If a proper polis requires a community of experts, such a city would be a very rare thing.

Indeed, we also learn in the Statesman, that to be genuinely human, that is, truly virtuous and eudaimôn, one needs epistêmê of human being’s ousia to serve as the measure for our practical judgments of ourselves and others. Yet this means only the sage is genuinely human, so there will be an obvious dearth of genuine human beings. Although extreme, this makes sense if human beings are nous-animals and a proper nous or intellect—and, hence, a proper human being—is one structured by complete epistêmê. It also becomes less difficult to swallow if Plato models human virtue on expertise. Humans need epistêmê of human being’s ousia as a measure for proper practical judgments, that is, to act in accordance with the human good. Yet if human being, like a field of expertise, is itself a functional part of a more comprehensive whole (namely, the

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21 These theses are not unique to Plato. Speusippus, Plato’s nephew and heir to the Academy, held that to define one thing required the capacity to define everything (reported by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics 97a6-22). A version of the thesis that the arts require the sage’s complete knowledge for their proper functioning can be found in Seneca (Epistle 88) and Posidonius (Frag. 18 (in I.G. Kidd (1999)) = Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica II.2, 193b23). Strabo (2.7.5b11) reports that the Stoics held very similar views, e.g., the sage is the only true lover of music and literature, since only the sage grasps their proper use or end.
cosmos which is an organism, *zòon*) then it makes sense that our practical judgments require not only a grasp of human being’s *ousia* but also of everything else to which human being is related. A grasp of the human good, that is, presupposes an understanding of the good.

On my reading, then, the inquiry into *epistêmê* begun in the *Theaetetus*, which might seem to be a purely theoretical endeavor, is revealed in the *Statesman* to be of the utmost practical and political importance. This story offers an obviously very pessimistic take on the prospects for human happiness and the possibility of expertise. Yet there is a glimmer of light. For we also find out in the *Statesman* that not only is our age the only one in which *epistêmê* (and, thus, true virtue and maximum eudaimonia) is possible, nature also provides us a means for salvation. For despite the gods’ absence and the parlous and stingy nature of creation in this age, which makes polis life a necessity for mere survival, nature brings forth in human communities, just as it does in colonies of bees, individuals superior in body and soul (*Sts.* 301d8–e4): the statesman, the human analogue to the king bee. He alone has the complete *epistêmê*, including the deep grasp of human being’s *ousia*, needed as measure to rule himself and other human beings properly and to be genuinely virtuous and *eudaimôn*. For the true statesman, on my reading, is the philosopher or sage with his political hat on in the present age, when the philosophical life, the life of pure reason, is impossible.

The advent of a statesman is thus a great boon for non-sages. With his wisdom he can provide the cultivation of intellect *nous*-animals require for being properly human.

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22 See Bobonich (2002) for an interpretation that sees Plato offering a more optimistic take on non-sages’ intellectual capacities and prospects for happiness.

23 The Greeks seemed to assume the leader of the hive to be male (see Skemp (1952: *ad loc.*) and Rowe (1995a: *ad loc.*).
and for human eudaimonia. Most will inevitably fall short of complete epistêmê, given its difficulty, yet their natures will be improved via this epistemological grounding. And by submitting to the philosopher-statesman’s rule in the polis, experts and non-sages generally at least have an external ground to remedy their internal inadequacy, their soul’s incomplete epistêmê. This, coupled with the cultivation of intellect they receive from the statesman’s pedagogical program, gives them at least something approaching genuine expertise, virtue, and eudaimonia. This is not a one-sided deal, however; the philosopher-statesman also gets something substantial out of this arrangement. For with a nous perfected by complete epistêmê, including a grasp of the good, comes a desire to make everything else as good and beautiful as possible. In the absence of the god, the very embodiment of intellect, who desired to forge a cosmos by infusing chaotic primordial body with intellect, the statesman desires to imitate this activity at the sublunar level, crafting a good and beautiful polis from an ignorant human heap. If kept from the throne, his desires frustrated, the philosopher-statesman falls short of maximum eudaimonia. These, at least, as I shall argue, are some of the lessons to be learned from the Statesman’s great myth. The polis, then, serves as the necessary locus not only for securing bodily preservation in a parlous and stingy nature. The polis ruled by the philosopher-statesman’s right reason is also necessary for a life that is maximally good and beautiful for both sage and non-sage. The Statesman in this way discloses the politics of knowledge.

If this story is correct, it is fitting that the Statesman is the place both where the Theaetetus’ inquiry into epistêmê and the attempt to acquire epistêmê of epistêmê come

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24 In chapter 1 I explain the details of the educational program from the Statesman and show how Socrates and company actuate it in the dramatic action of the Theaetetus.
to completion and where the *Sophist*’s inquiry, which fails to account for the sense of not-being as ontological deficiency required by the interrelation epistemology and for the *Sophist*’s own account of sophistry, finds full realization. For, in this cosmic arrangement at least, the *Statesman*’s political context is the only place where *epistêmê* is possible and where *epistêmê* finds its proper employment ruling human beings and the other kinds of knowledge. This, I suggest, is not merely a clever literary device. Rather, by forcing the reader to grasp each of the three dialogues and puzzle out how they fit together to form a complex whole of functional parts, in which the *Statesman* is the most important part since the other dialogues depend on it, just as non-sages depend on the statesman, Plato cleverly forces the reader to employ the interrelational epistemology to properly grasp the dialogues themselves. This gives the reader the practice in dialectic required for cultivating one’s intellect and for becoming a statesman, who, as sage, is the master dialectician. Plato himself in this way, though absent, plays the statesman, attempting to make the reader good and beautiful through intellectual training.

In fact, this educational function we shall also see in the dramatic action of the trilogy, where both Socrates and the Stranger undertake theoretical inquiries the ultimate end of which is practical and political: to provide their young interlocutors the epistemological grounding required to be genuinely virtuous and good, to become statesmen. So we should expect even the Stranger’s apparently more treatise-like inquiries to make dialectical demands on the interlocutor (and reader), requiring active engagement to work through puzzles or to catch contradictions that the main speaker purposely deploys, the resolution of which yields important philosophical insights. The main speaker in this way tests the interlocutor’s nature to see if he has the right stuff
while at the same time cultivating his intellectual nature. Socrates and the Stranger, I shall argue, in this way instantiate the genuine statesman’s educational program, which tests and cultivates the natures of its charges. For nature, despite its stinginess in this age, has generously provided Athens with two statesmen, Socrates and the Stranger, and a potential statesman, the young Theaetetus.

ii. Chapter Summaries

I begin in chapter 1, *Playing the Statesman*, with an account of how Plato reveals via the *Theaetetus*’ dramatic action the deep unity with which he invests the trilogy. The practical and political themes that are prominent in the *Statesman*, where they receive formal treatment in *logos*, Plato presents to us in action in the *Theaetetus*’ drama. More specifically, Plato intimates via the *Theaetetus*’ dramatic action that *epistêmê* is necessary for perfected practical intelligence and that complete *epistêmê* and perfected practical intelligence comprise true virtue and wisdom, the marks not just of proper human being but also, on my reading, of the philosopher-statesman. My analysis focuses on the axiological judgments made by Socrates and Theodorus, which obliquely reveal *epistêmê*’s relation to practical judgments and genuine virtue and which presuppose a conception of human being as a complex whole comprised of sovereign intellect and subservient body. This conception of human being will play a crucial although oblique role in each of the three dialogues, as my subsequent analyses show. This model of human being and these related themes come fully to light, however, only in the final

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25 On my interpretation, then, even in the *Sophist and Statesman*, where the dialogue form might seem to have degenerated to being a mere vessel for delivering doctrine, the dialogue form remains an important medium for the expression of philosophical ideas and an effective device for stimulating philosophical thinking through active engagement with the text, as opposed to mere passive reception of doctrine. As such, we have the sort of philosophical writing that Plato describes in the *Phaedrus*. See Rowe (1996) for a more negative assessment of Plato’s use of the dialogue form in the *Statesman* and for a critique of Miller’s (1980) attempt to show that the dialogue form is a crucial element of the *Statesman*. For Plato’s use of paradox and apparent aporia to force the reader to actively engage the text to acquire philosophical insight, see Mackenzie (1982) and M. Frede (1996).
pages of the *Statesman*. In fact, Plato has Socrates and company act out in their instruction of Theaetetus the pedagogical program described at the end of the *Statesman* which provides an account of this unity of theory and practice. In this way the *Theaetetus* and its characters play the *Statesman*.

In chapter 2 I argue that the *Theaetetus*’ failure to account for *epistêmê*, the possession of which is necessary for virtue and wisdom, is only apparent. The first stretch of the inquiry into *epistêmê* (from Theaetetus’ first definition to the Midwifery Digression, 146c-151d), I argue, provides important insights into definitional principles that turn out to be elements of the interrelational epistemology: enumeration and differentiation of elements.  

In the Midwifery Digression, in fact, we see Socrates deploy a simplified version of what I shall argue is the interrelational epistemology. For he not only offers a true belief about what his expertise is but also provides a discursive *logos* that enumerates and differentiates from his expertise the other arts related to it. And this differentiation, I argue, which includes axiological and ontological relations, presupposes the conception of human being as a *nous*-animal and the teleological framework that we get only in the *Statesman*. Plato in this way shows us the interrelational epistemology in action before Socrates accounts for it in speech in the *Theaetetus*’ final section. This, I shall suggest, is also one way Plato indicates to us that the later account of *epistêmê* as true belief plus a *logos* only apparently fails. In fact, the very nature of Socrates’ midwifery and his use of the interrelational epistemology to account for it I take to signal that he is a concealed statesman.

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26 Discursiveness, on my account, constitutes the third property that comprises, along with enumeration and differentiation, the *logos* that must be added to a true belief about what X is *auto kath’ hauto* in order to have knowledge of X. The necessity that the *logos* be discursive makes more sense when we come to the *Statesman*, where the Stranger distinguishes between things for which an ostensive definition suffices and those which require a discursive *logos*.
Chapter 2’s analysis of the final act of the *Theaetetus*, Socrates’ Dream argues that Socrates’ failure to define *epistêmê* as ‘true judgment with a *logos*’ is only apparent and that from the Dream Theory’s wreckage Plato intends us to piece together the major components of the interrelational epistemology (true belief plus a *logos* comprised of discursiveness, enumeration of elements, differentiation) and to acquire an understanding of what the interrelational model entails: that to know anything requires knowing everything. Socrates in this way provides us the correct answer to the *epistêmê* question, but makes us work for it. Socrates does not, however, apply the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge to *epistêmê* itself, which means we fall short of *epistêmê* of *epistêmê*, for which we must await the *Statesman*. Plato provides these insights indirectly, requiring the reader to midwife them from the text, yet he also provides textual signposts that link this material to passages in the *Statesman* where these themes are treated more explicitly and fully. In this way the *Theaetetus* serves to midwife the *Statesman*, even if it depends on the *Statesman* for the completion of its inquiry, the account which produces *epistêmê* of *epistêmê*.

Chapter 3 shows how the *Sophist* remedies a deficiency suffered by the *Theaetetus* and in this way makes as essential contribution to the interrelational epistemology also. Yet at the same time it suffers a debilitating defect of its own. For although the *Theaetetus* provides important insights into the interrelational epistemology, even giving us a glimpse of it in action in Socrates’ account of his midwifery, Socrates nowhere provides the metaphysical basis required to justify his philosophical method. For the interrelational epistemology assumes pluralism and thus assumes the capacity to say that one thing is not another and so requires an innocuous sense of not-being. Otherness,
which the *Theaetetus* tries but fails to account for, is such an innocuous sense of not-being for which the *Sophist*'s Stranger provides the metaphysical ground. The *Sophist* thus resolves what the *Theaetetus* leaves in *aporia*.

Yet the resolution is not complete. The *Sophist*, like the *Theaetetus*, fails to account for the ontologically-loaded sense of not-being as ontological deficiency, which we see Socrates deploy in the Midwifery Digression: panderers, Socrates asserts there, are not *really* matchmakers; that is, pandering is not merely other than matchmaking but a defective form of it. Yet this the *Sophist* must do in order to complete its own inquiry. For the Stranger signals, I shall argue, that the sophist is not just other than the philosopher but an ontologically defective philosopher because he acts for the wrong end. The Stranger does work out a formal ontological framework which can account for ontological deficiency generally. The problem is that he also needs a conception of human being as a *nous*-animal and a teleologic system for the content of that framework, that is, to establish right and wrong ends. And this, I argue, we get only in the *Statesman*'s great myth. The *Sophist* comes to completion only in the *Statesman*, where the Stranger uses the formal ontological framework form the *Sophist* in conjunction with the great myth’s teleology to account for the greatest of the sophists, the *stasiastikoi politikoi*, as ontologically defective statesmen due to their actions being structured by appetite rather than intellect. So, although the *Sophist*'s account of not-being as otherness and its ontological framework constitute critical contributions, the *Sophist* gets us only halfway home. We must await the *Statesman* for the complete account of not-being which we need for the interrelational epistemology and to account properly for sophistry.
In chapters 4 and 5 I turn to the Statesman, where we see not only the interrelational epistemology actuated in full but also the Theaetetus’ and Sophist’s inquiries brought to completion. I show in chapter 4 that the first attempt to define politikê by the method of division deploys all the definitional principles we have already glimpsed in the Theaetetus. We get an enumeration of elements, differentiation of parts, and even a use of the arts’ various objects to differentiate the arts from politikê, which has human being as its object. If we have Socrates’ Midwifery Digression in mind as paradigm, however, several important items are glaringly absent: human being is conceived as wholly corporeal; intellectual soul is missing. Hierarchical and axiological relations are also absent. These omissions wreck the division. We need human intellect to complete our conception of human being; we also need a teleological framework to establish intellect’s superiority to body in the composition of human being. We need all this, I show here, to properly differentiate politikê hierarchically and axiologically from the other arts. The Stranger’s great myth, the crucial piece missing from the Theaetetus and Sophist, provides the required teleology. It also gives us the resources to complete our conception of human being as a complex whole comprised of subservient body and sovereign intellect. This complete conception of human being, I show here, we need not just to complete the account of politikê. Plato and the Stranger also want us to see that we need it for genuine virtue and eudaimonia, which brings home to us that the inquiry into politikê (and the trilogy’s other inquiries) is not merely a theoretical exercise but has a practical purpose of the utmost importance.

Finally, chapter 5 shows how the Stranger’s post-myth corrections result in a belief which is uniquely true about what politikê is but which is still lacking in
completeness and clarity. To remedy these deficiencies the Stranger uses the conception of human being acquired from the myth as the ground for a discursive *logos* that completely enumerates all the other arts related to *politikê* and fully differentiates them from *politikê* in axiological, hierarchical, and ontological terms. The interrelational epistemology contained *in embryo* in the *Theaetetus* is thus actuated by the Stranger in the *Statesman*’s political context in accounting for *politikê*. In fact, the *Theaetetus* comes to completion in an even deeper sense in the *Statesman*. For, as my analysis will show, the *logos* the Stranger adds to the true belief about *politikê* also serves a *logos* for the *Theaetetus*’ true belief about *epistêmê*, meaning that we come away not just with *epistêmê* of *politikê* but also *epistêmê* of *epistêmê*. Lastly, the portion of the Stranger’s *logos* that differentiates the statesman from his counterfeits or phantasms, the *stasiastikoi politikoi*, also completes the *Sophist*. For these factionalists are, as the Stranger says, the greatest of the sophists, and the Stranger here differentiates them from the statesman in terms of ontological deficiency, which he could not do in the *Sophist* due to the lack of a teleological framework. It is also here, as I shall argue, that the practical and political significance of *epistêmê* comes to light. For here we realize that the lack of *epistêmê* which renders the factionalists mere phantasms implies that *all* humans who fall short of complete *epistêmê* are merely phantasmal humans, since humans are *nous*-animals. Non-sages fall short of eudaimonia for this reason. This shortfall can be mitigated, however, if their city is ruled by a genuine statesman, who can properly rule non-sages who cannot properly rule themselves due to lack of complete *epistêmê*. The trick for the interlocutors (and for the reader) is to realize, as the Athenians did not, that they have two statesmen in their presence, Socrates and the Stranger, who can save them from their phantasmal.
existence. If my story is correct, Plato in this way brings each dialogue’s inquiry as well as the trilogy as a whole to completion in the Statesman’s political context, where Plato also brings fully to light epistêmê’s crucial practical and political importance. This is fitting. For in this age, the parlous Age of Zeus, the proper arena for epistêmê and the only place for a share of eudaimonia for both sage and non-sage is the polis. Non-sages’ profound dependency on the statesman, that is, is reflected in the Theaetetus’ and Sophist’s dependency on the Statesman. Plato in this way signals the special importance of both statesman and Statesman and discloses the politics of knowledge.
Chapter 1: Playing the Statesman

1.1 Introduction

The Theaetetus, with its inquiry into epistêmê and apparent focus on resolving abstruse epistemological puzzles, may easily be mistaken for a dialogue concerned purely with theoretical matters, oddly divorced from the Statesman’s political and practical concerns. This would make for a trilogy with a very loose philosophical unity. Despite its theoretical focus, this chapter argues, the Theaetetus’ inquiry into epistêmê has a practical and political end: to provide Theaetetus with the epistemological grounding necessary to render his natural virtue genuine\(^1\). An essential component of this grounding, which we find in the Theaetetus, is a grasp of the human essence or ousia which serves as the measure necessary for truly true practical judgments and genuinely virtuous action. The practical ends of epistêmê, which are registered very obliquely in the Theaetetus, find their most explicit and complete formulation only in the Statesman’s political context. The present chapter in this way demonstrates the philosophical unity of the trilogy and the Statesman’s special place in it.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) ‘Natural virtue’ is my term for what Plato describes in the Statesman’s section on pedagogy as ἀρετή (Ἀλλ’ ὅδε πάλιν, ἀνδρείαν γὰρ ὁμία σε ἑγεῖθαι μέρος ἐν ἀρετῆς ήμιν εἶναι, 306ab) or ἡθος (e.g., Οἱ ἐν τῷ κάρα τῷ σφέτερον καὶ τῇ ἐξόρου ἡθος καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ, 307c3) unrestrained by intellect and knowledge. Properly speaking these are inherent dispositions or impulses of the mortal part of the soul, which Plato has the Eleatic Stranger refer to as virtues, perhaps reflecting the vulgar unphilosophical understanding of proper virtue that the Stranger then corrects by indicating that those possessing them are not really virtuous until they are brought under the control of intellect (306c &ff.). Cf. Bobonich (1995) and Rowe (1995a, ad loc.).

\(^2\) Despite the pains Plato takes to link the narratives of the three dialogues, the philosophical unity of the trilogy is far from evident. For this reason, perhaps, the Theaetetus and Sophist are often taken as a unit, with the latter dialogue resolving the puzzles that the former leaves in aporia, due to Plato’s design (Fine (2003: 225-51), Sedley (2004)) or genuine perplexity (Ryle (1966), McDowell (1973)). The Statesman’s focus on political and practical matters seemingly detached from the epistemological and metaphysical concerns of its cohorts seems to make it the odd man out and to render the trilogy’s philosophical unity tenuous, at best. My reading demonstrates a profound philosophical unity for the trilogy and a role of maximum importance for the Statesman in it. For others who treat the trilogy as a unified whole see: Dorter (1994), Blondell (2006), Benardete (2007), M. Gill (2012), Sedley’s (2004: 1-15) interpretation of the Theaetetus as containing Plato’s mature philosophy in embryo, conveyed via Plato’s subtext, is similar to the reading I offer here. I too take the Theaetetus itself to serve as midwife but only for its two sequels, not, as Sedley holds, for mature Platonism as a whole.
Section 1.2 argues that the Theaetetus’ opening conversation between Euclides and Terpsion (Th. 142a-143c) provides a practical and political frame for the Theaetetus’ inquiry into epistêmê and for the trilogy as a whole. Plato presents here a portrait of the adult Theaetetus as an instance of genuine virtue and intimates that this achievement is closely tied to the inquiry into epistêmê he undertook in his youth with Socrates. The opening scene in this way suggests a close connection between epistêmê and virtue and provides a practical frame for the subsequent inquiry.

In section 1.3 I provide a close reading of Theodorus’ axiological assessments of Theaetetus made at the beginning of the dialogue proper (143e-144b) and of Socrates’ evaluations of those evaluations (144d-145b and 185e). We learn the following lessons. First, to be reliably true, practical judgments about a particular, like Theodorus’ axiological assessments, require epistêmê of the objective nature or ousia the particular instantiates. Second, for evaluations of humans this means grasping that human being itself is a complex whole of functional parts, one of which, intellect has truth-determination as its function. Third, since epistêmê is necessary for truth-determination, human being’s function, epistêmê, including epistêmê of human being itself, is necessary for virtue. Socrates confirms this by praising Theaetetus as kalos and agathos for using his truth-determining to determine the truth about human being’s truth-determining function and about human being itself. Each of these three lessons illuminates the practical significance of epistêmê and presages important passages in the Statesman.

I close this chapter in 1.4 with an analysis of the Statesman’s pedagogical program. The Theaetetus’ characters’ inquiry into epistêmê, I show here, dramatizes this program, the purpose of which, we learn in the Statesman, is to transform the natural
virtues of citizens into something resembling genuine virtue by providing the requisite epistemological grounding. If correct, this provides evidence for the trilogy being deeply unified philosophically: the characters at the very beginning of the trilogy undertake an inquiry into *epistêmê* not for mere disinterested theoretical purposes but to render Theaetetus truly virtuous. This also confirms my thesis regarding the practical import of *epistêmê* as a necessary condition for virtue. The *Theaetetus* and its cast in this way play the *Statesman*.

1.2. The *Theaetetus’* Frame (142a-143c): A Glimpse of Ends at the Beginning

1.2.a. Virtue and Knowledge

The dialogue opens with a conversation between two Megarians, Terpsion and Euclides. Terpsion has just left the agora, wrongly assuming he would find his fellow philosopher, Euclides there. He comes upon Euclides as the latter is just returning to Megara, having escorted a mortally wounded Theaetetus part of the way back to Athens. Theaetetus had presumably been fighting on behalf of Athens in a battle that took place near Corinth around 369 B.C. This sets the stage for an encomium of Theaetetus and, ultimately, for Euclides’ recounting of the young man’s joint inquiry with Socrates into the nature of knowledge, which forms the main body of the dialogue. This frame serves an important function. I argue that Plato presents this adult Theaetetus as an image of genuine virtue intended to contrast with the young Theaetetus we meet in the very next scene (143d-145c) who is merely naturally virtuous. Plato in this way subtly suggests that the inquiry into *epistêmê* as a boy played some significant part in grounding his virtue, making him genuinely virtuous. Plato intimates, that is, that *epistêmê* is necessary for

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3 See Sedley (2004: 1 (fn. 1)) for details on controversies surrounding the dating of the dialogue itself based on the date of Theaetetus’ death. As Sedley notes, Nails (2002: 274-77) places Theaetetus’ death in 391 BC.
virtue. Material from the end of the trilogy (*Statesman* 306a-311b), where Plato describes
the epistemological grounding that the statesman provides to render the citizens’ natural
virtue (qualifiedly) genuine, will show how Plato uses the *Statesman* to provide a
political and practical frame for the *epistêmê* inquiry from the very beginning of the
trilogy. For here at the beginning of the dialogue, at the end of Theaetetus’ life, we see
Theaetetus display the end (virtue) for which the *Statesman* indicates *epistêmê* is needed.

According to the Anonymous Commentator on the *Theaetetus*, the dialogue
initially had a different, rather flat frame⁴. Cornford attributes the replacement of the
original frame with the extant one to Plato’s desire to eulogize Theaetetus.⁵ This may be
part of Plato’s intention, but what seems surprising is the emphasis in the encomium not
on Theaetetus’ theoretical achievements, for which he was well known, but on his
courage in battle. This is not the sort of thing we would expect a master theoretician to
display, if we use the *Theaetetus’* subsequent Philosopher Digression as a measure (172c-
177d). This digression describes the theoretician as not even able to find his way to the
agora, unlike Socrates, say, or Terpsion and Euclides, who, we may infer, knew his way
to the agora quite well. For Plato, in a subtle touch, has Terpsion assume he would find
Euclides there. The agora detail as well as Theaetetus’ display of courage on behalf of his
fellow citizens both contrast with the radical theoretical detachment from his fellow
citizens of the philosopher of the digression. This should cause us at least to think twice

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⁴ The Anonymous Commentator describes the original frame as ὑπόψυχον IV.28-37. He also notes it had just about
the same number of lines (σχεδὸν τῶν ἰσῶν στίχων). The original frame’s content is lost, but the fact that it consisted of
the same number of lines perhaps suggests that Plato invested the architecture of the dialogues with special
significance. Sedley (2004: 80, f.n.43), for example, posits that Plato may have preserved the number of lines in the
new frame in order to keep the Philosopher Digression (172c-177c) at the exact center of the dialogue (which
observation Sedley takes from Polansky (1992: 141, f.n.95). In the *Statesman* (chapter 4) we shall see similar
architectonic features: the Measure Doctrine is, fittingly, at the exact middle of the dialogue and the question
concerning human being and eudaimonia is at the mathematical center of the great myth.

⁵ Cornford (1957: 15).
before assuming, as most commentators do, that Plato intends such a purely theoretical life detached from practical engagement as paradigmatic. In fact, the great praise that Plato has his two philosophers heap on Theaetetus here at the very beginning of the dialogue and of the trilogy for his courage on behalf of his fellow citizens should constitute significant evidence for what kind of human life Plato takes to be exemplary—one characterized by practical excellence, of which we are meant to see Theaetetus’ life as an instance.

If this is correct, the frame provides a practical setting which provides essential material for thinking about the proper human life: is it the socially engaged or the theoretically detached life that is best? I think it does yet more. I suggest that Plato intends us to think about Theaetetus’ practical activity and character, as described in the frame, in relation to the inquiry into epistêmê that occupies the dialogue’s main body. More precisely, given the adult Theaetetus’ exemplary character and what seems to be his genuine virtue (the textual evidence for this I provide just below), we are also intended to marvel at it and wonder how to account for it. For practical engagement is not sufficient for exemplariness, as we see in the Digression’s orator. He is a master of self-preservation (a contrast to Theaetetus’ self-sacrifice) yet mangles his soul in the process.

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7 Polansky (1992: 33-38) notes the emphatic and frequent use of forms of thauma in the frame and main body of the dialogue, suggesting that for Plato, as for Aristotle, philosophy begins in wonder—here in the wonderful person of Theaetetus. Long (1998: 124) borrows a similar formulation from Nehamas’ Sather lectures. According to Nehamas, Plato was baffled by Socrates. He could not understand how Socrates invariably chose the good and just thing to do in every situation. The Platonic dialogues are a record of Plato’s attempts to account for Socrates’ marvelous nature. I think this is a useful formulation and suggest that Plato intends us too to be baffled at the Socrates (and his double, Theaetetus) he presents to us in the this trilogy and to reflect on what must be presupposed to account for the activity he displays.
because, as Socrates makes clear, he scorns philosophical reflection on ‘What is X?’ questions. Specifically, he fails to reflect on what human being (174ab) and what human eudaimonia are (175cd), preferring particulars to universals. As a result, he preserves himself in parlous conditions but in the wrong ways and for the wrong reasons due to his ignorance (i.e., lack of epistêmê) of human being, the necessary measure for human action. I suggest that Plato wants us to see the young Theaetetus’ inquiry into the nature of epistêmê, instigated and guided by Socrates, as somehow the cause of the adult Theaetetus’ exemplariness in the practical sphere and of his genuine virtue, just as the Digression orator’s scorn of theoretical inquiry is the cause of his baseness. If so, then the adult Theaetetus seemingly instantiates a mixed life of practical action guided by epistêmê of human being. Plato in this way uses the dramatic action to display the priority of theoretical knowledge (epistêmê) to perfected practical intelligence (phronêsisis), the unity of the two comprising virtue. To establish this conclusion more firmly requires answering the following questions: what evidence do we have for Theaetetus being an exemplary human being possessing genuine virtue (dying pro patria is not necessarily virtuous)? Even if we have sufficient evidence to justify a belief in Theaetetus’ exemplariness and genuine virtue, what evidence is there, besides the just sketched Digression material, that this has anything to do with epistêmê?

The nature of the praise that Terpsion and Euclides accord to Theaetetus suggests that Plato wants us to see Theaetetus as exemplary and genuinely virtuous. Upon hearing from Euclides that people were praising Theaetetus for his conduct in the battle, Terpsion replies that that is not strange (Καὶ οὐδέν γ’ ἄτοπον). It would be much more astonishing
(πολύ θαυμαστότερον) if he did not conduct himself so.\(^8\) We might, perhaps, infer from this that the adult Theaetetus was known to act virtuously consistently, recognizing, unlike those who have merely some natural virtue such as natural courage, when and how to act in some certain way, a mark of genuine virtue, for Plato, and for epistêmê.

This, at least, is how the Statesman construes the difference between natural virtue and being really virtuous. The following is a very brief sketch of a complicated issue I return to in later sections.\(^9\) To be really virtuous requires having true beliefs about the just, beautiful, and good things along with grounding (hebaiôsis).\(^10\) The notion of ‘grounding’ does the most important work here. The naturally courageous, for example, may truly believe that it is necessary to charge rather than flee from the enemy at a certain time, but not because they understand why a charge is called for at this moment. Rather, they are naturally predisposed to believe this in every situation, with the result that what seems to them courageous is actually sometimes rash, and what is properly

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\(^8\) One may be rightly concerned here about the reliability of Euclides and Terpsion as reporters and evaluators of virtuous action. In this case, in fact, they are reporting others’ evaluations. As we see in the next section, Theodorus’ evaluations of beauty and ugliness come apart under Socrates’ criticisms. Although I do not think this undermines my interpretation, I do think it adds an important qualification to it and may very well have been intended by Plato to stimulate the sort of thinking about knowledge that we find later in the dialogue: Is Theaetetus as brave as he is made out to be? Or, is the nature of his bravery even more astonishing than his evaluators realize? Does the source of our beliefs matter, the person or way (hearsay vs. direct observation) we acquired the belief? Can we acquire knowledge about knowledge through a book based on a book?

\(^9\) I fill in some of the blanks later in section 1.4.

\(^10\) If a congenitally moderate soul, for example, gets a share of these true opinions with grounding it becomes really moderate and sensible (όντας σώφρον καὶ φρόνιμον, ὃς γὰς ἐν πολιτείᾳ, γίγνεται, 309e), as far as goes for a political context, at least. This qualifier (ὁς γὰς ἐν πολιτείᾳ) is as curious as it is essential. Plato seems to suggest that even this virtue is not really real virtue, but since these improved humans contribute to rather than harm the good of the city, they are virtuous parts qua citizens even if not virtuous qua human being. The qualification may also mean that, although they have some epistemological grounding from their education, they lack complete epistêmê, which is required for unqualified genuine virtue. Their virtue thus remains dependent on the political context governed by the complete epistêmê of the statesman. Cf. Rowe (1995a: ad loc.) who translates the qualifier as “as far as goes for a citizen (πολιτείᾳ)" and takes it to suggest a difference between the king’s and citizens’ wisdom.
courageous seems to them cowardly (e.g., holding ground rather than charging).\(^{11}\) Their beliefs, when true, only happen to be true, like the proverbial broken clock getting the time right twice a day. The ‘grounding’ seems to be \textit{epistêmê}, which allows one to have a \textit{truly true belief} \(^{12}\) that X is just, beautiful, and good; it allows one to understand and explain why X is so. But there are different ways of having epistemological grounding. Given the extreme difficulty of acquiring \textit{epistêmê}, most would likely be dependent on the complete \textit{epistêmê} of the genuine statesman as their \textit{bebaiôsis}, which means their genuine virtue is only qualifiedly genuine.\(^ {13}\) Their beliefs are grounded in intellect’s \textit{epistêmê} rather than mortal soul’s impulses, but the intellect is another’s, the law-giving statesman’s.\(^ {14}\) The statesman, being self-caused or self-grounded by his possession of

\(^{11}\) Cf. Lane’s (1998: 182-202) illuminating discussion of this, comparing and contrasting Plato’s account of distorted moral vision with Thucydides’ famous analysis of the same phenomenon in his account of the Corcyrean revolution (3.69-85).

\(^{12}\) The formulation in full (309c5-8): Τὴν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαιῶν πόρα καὶ ἀγάθων καὶ τῶν τούτων ἐναντίων ἄντως οὐσιάν ἄληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως, ὑπόσταν ἐν ταῖς νοηματικῶς ἐνέγκησι, θείαν φημὶ ἐν δαμασκίω γένεσθαι γένεσθαι. Rowe’s (1995a) translation seems to deemphasize the force of μετὰ βεβαιώσεως; he does this perhaps because it falls out of the attributive position between article and noun: “That opinion which is really true about what is fine, just and good, and the opposites of these, and is guaranteed…” I prefer to take μετὰ βεβαιώσεως closely with Τὴν…δόξαν as a phrasal unit (opinion with grounding) to explain the ὄντος, that is, what differentiates this true opinion from that of the naturally virtuous, whose beliefs are unreflectively grounded in impulse: “That opinion with grounding…which really is true [opinion]…”. Placing ὄντος οὐσιάν ἄληθῆ in the attributive position makes this qualification emphatic.

\(^{13}\) Cf. Rowe (1995a, ad loc.), who translates \textit{bebaiôsis} as “‘guaranteed’, that is, by the king, who \textit{knows}.” He also notes that “the verbal noun in question, and the verb itself, are regularly used of confirming the truth of something…” We should also note that this confirmation or grounding does not \textit{transform} the true beliefs into knowledge, as the \textit{Theaetetus’} additive formula (μετὰ λόγου, 201d-210a) is supposed to do. Rather, it renders them secure, that is \textit{truly} true, as the Stranger says (\textit{Pltc.} 309c-5-8), because grounded (qualifiedly) in \textit{epistêmê} rather than impulse. The reason seems to be that for Plato there are (at least) two kind of true belief: those about sensibles and those about \textit{ousiai}. True beliefs about the latter can be transformed into \textit{epistêmê} by adding a \textit{logos} (μετὰ λόγου) relating the \textit{ousia} to all other \textit{ousiai}. The former are practical judgments about sensible things that possess \textit{ousiai} and these can at best be made truly true by means of epistemic grounding, (μετὰ βεβαιώσεως) because there can be knowledge only of \textit{ousiai}, not of the sensible things that have \textit{ousiai}. This will have to suffice as my explanation for an issue that is not only complicated but controversial, since some (e.g., Fine (2003: 66-84, 85-116, 225-251)) will object to my assumption that we have here something like the two-world model of metaphysics and epistemology which most commentators see in \textit{Rep. V}. That Plato does want us to see two very different kinds of true belief/judgment can be ascertained from \textit{Thit. 187a-201c} and Sph. 263d-264b.

\(^{14}\) See fn.11 for Plato’s formulation of the qualification at 309c: they are really virtuous but only ὅς ἐς ἐν πολιτείας. To be clear: this is my interpretation of the citizens’ defectiveness due to dependence, that is external grounding. Plato is very reticent on this, but the relation of citizens to statesman seems to be based on the relation of the arts to \textit{politeikê}; the former are dependent on the latter due to \textit{politeikê’s} more comprehensive knowledge (303c305e). The externality of the citizens’ grounding seems to consist primarily in dependence on the statesman’s \textit{epistêmê} in the form of the education provided by the statesman as well as his laws, perhaps, if these are along the lines of the \textit{Laws’} preludes. Both
complete epistêmê, requiring no external anchorage, is the only genuinely virtuous human without qualification.

Yet why suppose that Theaetetus’ courageous actions and beliefs are properly grounded in epistêmê, and that he is thus genuinely virtuous with or without qualification? Perhaps the adult Theaetetus is naturally courageous and thus always acts so without discrimination and this is what Terpsion means by saying Theaetetus’ actions are nothing strange (Καὶ οὐδὲν γ’ ἣτομον). Two later passages force us to reject this interpretation and give us insight into the adult Theaetetus’ ethical makeup. First, we need to specify the sense in which the young Theaetetus is naturally courageous. In the conversation between Theodorus and Socrates, which immediately follows the frame, Theodorus describes the young Theaetetus as not only intellectually gifted but also, in terms of character, as naturally well disposed (εὖ πεφυκότα); he marvels at the mixture of gentleness and courage found in the lad, each appropriately and timely expressed, something Theodorus did not think possible (ἐγὼ μὲν οὖτ’ ἄν ψόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὅρῳ γενόμενον, 143e-144b). The naturally courageous in the Statesman passage, by contrast, have their dial naturally turned to one extreme, to maximum courage, until moderated by the statesman’s educational program. Theaetetus is already where he needs to be dispositionally, in the mean state, and Theodorus suggests this inclination to act

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15 Cf. the Anonymous Commentator IV.27 ff. He explains here that someone like Theaetetus, who is not only εὐφυὴς but also has all the εὐφυεῖαι (πάσας ἔχει τὰς εὐφυεῖς), will necessarily become ἀλλόγιος, if he practices them and there is no external impediment. Anon is explaining here Socrates’ prophecy, reported at 142cd by Euclides, that it was πᾶσα ἀνύψωσι that Theaetetus become famous if he comes to manhood. See Sedley (1996) for an interesting reading of important passages of the Theaetetus in light of Anon’s commentary.
gently or courageously at the right times, in the proper situations, and so on is congenital. He is not naturally courageous and thus we cannot explain the adult Theaetetus’ reliably courageous actions as merely congenital.

Plato also conveys this more subtly in Theodorus’ identification of Theaetetus as the lad enters the scene. Theaetetus happens to approach Socrates and Theodorus just as the latter is wrapping up his glowing report of the boy’s moral and intellectual qualities to Socrates. As the young Theaetetus arrives on the scene with his two companions, Theodorus indicates that he is the one in the middle (ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, 144c). His body, Plato seems to suggest, happens to occupy a physical position in the middle just as his moral qualities seem to be naturally in a mean state. The moral angle becomes clearer when we consider a passage from near the end of the trilogy. In the Statesman’s exposition of the Measure Doctrine we are told that all good and beautiful things (πάντα ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ, 284a) are produced by preserving the metrion, the mean between excessive and deficient states (ὅποσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀπωκίσθη τῶν ἔσχάτων, 284e), which measure we use to distinguish those of us who are bad and good (283e). In the frame Euclides also seems to use measure language. He describes the adult Theaetetus as καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν (142b), which, in addition to denoting class and aesthetic distinction, is also the standard description of someone of upstanding moral qualities.16 Read in light of the Statesman passage, where Plato uses this common phrase in a more technical context, Euclides’ claim that Theaetetus is καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν, if true, would imply that the adult Theaetetus instantiates due measure.

If this is correct, then both the young and the adult Theaetetus are ἐν τῷ μέσῳ; neither is naturally spirited. The reliability of the adult Theaetetus’ virtuous action must

16 Dover (1974: 41; 41-45) for the complete analysis of the phrase.
be explained by (qualified or unqualified) genuine virtue. The younger Theaetetus’
unreliably virtuous character (in addition to Theodorus’ suggestive language: εὖ
πεφυκότα) suggests merely natural virtue which requires grounding, bebaiōsis, to become
the adult’s genuine virtue, which, I suggest, Plato wants us to see as having come at least
in part via the inquiry into epistêmē. The Sophist provides interesting evidence for the
young Theaetetus’ unstable virtue. At Sophist 261bc Theaetetus, in the final stages in the
hunt for the sophist, expresses his exasperation that, after finally apparently resolving
the technical difficulty with not-being that had blocked their definitional snaring of the
sophist, they must now undertake the difficult task of showing how not-being in the form
of falsehood applies to judgment and speech. The Stranger gently admonishes him for his
lack of courage and resolution, saying:

Θαρρεῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρῆ τὸν καὶ σμικρὸν τι δυνάμενον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἀεὶ
προϊέναι. τί γὰρ ὃ ἀθυμὸν ἐν τούτοις δράσειν ἂν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδὲν ἐν
ἐκεῖνοις ἀνότων ἢ καὶ πάλιν εἰς τοῦπισθὲν ἀπωσθείς; σχολῇ ποιοῦν τὸ κατὰ τὴν
παροιμίαν λεγόμενον, ὃ γε τοιοῦτος ἂν ποτε ἔλοι πόλιν. (261b5-c1)

Theaetetus, one who is able to advance even a little bit each time must take
heart... For if one loses heart in these matters, what would one do in other
situations, if one doesn’t win through or is even driven back? Hardly, I suppose,
as the saying goes, would such a man ever capture a city.
Theaetetus’ courage, it seems, is, at this stage in his development, unreliable; he requires the Stranger’s exhortation to persevere in the face of great theoretical difficulties. I first tentatively suggest that Plato presents us here with a depiction of how the sage (the Stranger) can serve as bebaiōsis for another’s beliefs. The Stranger not only encourages Theaetetus by shaming him: if he cannot persevere in inquiry, what will he do in the rough and tumble of battle? He may also intimate why Theaetetus needs to persevere.

For, secondly, the instability of Theaetetus’ virtue may be due to its status as merely natural, pointing to a deficiency resulting from Theaetetus’ as yet imperfect theoretical knowledge. The Stranger implies that courage shown in theoretical endeavors translates to other spheres of activity, such as storming a city, which is, perhaps, a playful way of hinting at the priority of theoretical knowledge to practical intelligence. And the perseverance required to acquire this theoretical knowledge may prove even more difficult than steadfastness in battle. In any case, the ‘saying’ he uses to make his point is not incidental. We know from the frame that Theaetetus, although he failed to capture the city, nevertheless demonstrated admirable courage in action, winning praise from his comrades. Not coincidentally, perhaps, Socrates gained fame for precisely the same sort

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17 Cf. Tht. 145c where Socrates must enjoin Theaetetus to be courageous in adhering to his agreement to display the excellence Theodorus praised him for, lest Theodorus be charged with perjury (ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἔμμενε τῇ ὀμολογίᾳ). Theaetetus thus shows shaky courage even here, immediately after Theodorus’ praise of the boy’s courageous character. For the need for courage in dialectic see Blank (1993). See especially pg. 433 on Laches 194a-197c, where Laches registers a fear that his failure to provide a logos of courage may signify a deficiency in his life and deeds too.

18 But cf. NE III where Aristotle chafes at taking such things to be anything more than figurative uses of ‘courage’. If we push the text a bit more, we might take the Stranger to be suggesting here that 1) Theaetetus needs to show courage in acquiring epistémê since it is necessary for genuine courage and 2) Theaetetus needs to acquire experience in mastering his fears by means of intellect or reason—both 1 and 2 would one would need to storm a city courageously. Here the Stranger does for Theaetetus what Theaetetus will ideally one day do on his own: use his divine soul’s epistémê to measure out the proper action and to persuade the mortal part of the soul to act on it if there is resistance due, e.g., to fear. For the mortal/divine soul distinction (which I detail in 3.3) see Pltc..309c &ff. and Tim. 69c5-71e2 (for a more detailed account of the mortal soul’s affections and dispositions).

19 See, for example, Pltc. 285ac and 286d-287b on the difficult but necessary perseverance one must maintain in dialectical exercises.
of action in the retreat from Delium\textsuperscript{20}: courageous action in the face of defeat, indeed in the midst of a rout, a very dangerous instance of being ‘driven back’. Additionally, as previously noted, the adult Theaetetus, it seems, had developed a \textit{reliably} virtuous character (\textit{οὐδὲν γ’ ἠτοποῦν}), a property of genuine virtue. This was not a one-off. Some sort of development has taken place between his encounter with Socrates and the Stranger and his deeds at Corinth. One of the intervening experiences is, of course, the inquiry into \textit{epistêmê} and the theoretical training in dialectic he receives from Socrates and the Stranger.\textsuperscript{21}

The ‘saying’ also looks forward. For in the \textit{Statesman} this crew (the Stranger and Theaetetus’ companion, young Socrates, who takes over Theaetetus’ role of interlocutor) will attempt to ‘capture the city’, by giving a successful dialectical account of the structure of the properly organized polis in one of the final sections of the dialogue (287b-305e). Theaetetus will, in fact, show the philosophical courage necessary for completing the technical analysis of not-being, which is, as the Stranger’s pregnant statement cleverly intimates, a necessary technical step for completing the account of knowledge begun in the \textit{Theaetetus} and for capturing the city in \textit{logos} in the \textit{Statesman}. Moreover, if the perfection of dialectical knowledge is a necessary condition for \textit{politikê}, the possession of which constitutes the only legitimate claim to rule, and a proper technical analysis of not-being is required for dialectical knowledge, then there is another sense in which perseverance in this philosophical task is necessary for capturing the city, that is, in order to stake a legitimate claim to political rule. Theaetetus’ ultimate fate

\textsuperscript{20} For Socrates at Delium, see: \textit{Laches} 181b, \textit{Apology} 28e, \textit{Symposium} 221e.

\textsuperscript{21} It may be objected that, even if we accept the notion that Theaetetus acquired instruction in this trilogy that allowed him to attain eventually a perfected state, this ought to be attributed not to Socrates but to the Stranger, since the latter takes over and brings to completion the teachings begun by Socrates. I deal with this objection later in section 1.4 of this chapter, articulating the relation of Socrates to the Stranger.
suggests, perhaps, that capturing the city in *logos*, although necessary, does not, guarantee success doing so in the practical sphere due to parlous material and political conditions. However that may be, I hope at least to have made a persuasive case that Plato intends us to see Theaetetus as having undergone a significant moral development in the years after his youthful encounter with Socrates; that the unreliable, natural virtue of his boyhood has been stabilized, and that this stabilization has something to do with Socrates’ inquiry into *epistêmê* and the training in dialectic he undergoes with ES. In this way Plato dramatizes the priority of *epistêmê* to practical intelligence and virtue and presents us with an image of (qualified or unqualified) genuine virtue (the unity of theory and practice) at the beginning of the trilogy.

1.2.b. The Embodied Philosopher

One other important philosophical theme, which the *Statesman* explicitly thematizes, the *Theaetetus* registers more subtly in the presentation of Theaetetus’ death, namely the parlous nature of material and political conditions and how these dangers relate to human corporeal nature. Due to a hostile and stingy natural environment humans require the arts and polis-life to survive (*Pltc.* 273e-274e). They also require a properly governed polis if they are to live well, free from the dangers of a social environment, such as the perils of suffering injustice. The frame’s description of Theaetetus’ death and allusion to Socrates’ execution (*Tht.* 142c) register the perils humans face from both

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22 Theaetetus’ philosophical and moral development occurs, no doubt, over the course of many years after the events in the trilogy, the final fruits of which we see in the frame. Theaetetus’ youthful encounter with Socrates and the Stranger we are, perhaps, meant to see as a replay of Socrates’ youthful encounter with Parmenides. In both cases we have a promising youth whose encounter with a master philosopher proves to be a critical turning point in his intellectual development. In the trilogy, of course, we have two Parmenides figures, Socrates and the Stranger. But then in the *Parmenides* the youthful Socrates is first questioned by the Eleatic Zeno and then by Parmenides himself, which may suggest that Socrates is a concealed Eleatic, analogous to Zeno. Socrates alludes to this experience in the *Sophist*’s frame (217c), where the Stranger is first introduced.

23 See *Pltc.* 291a-303e, for example, on the ranking of regimes in terms of the degree to which they conduce to or inhibit eudaimonia.
nature and politics. For both men die a death resulting from a complex of causes. Theaetetus succumbs to bodily wounds and the dysentery he contracted while on campaign. In the *Phaedo* Plato provides a detailed (and likely stylized, given hemlock’s horrific effects on the body) account of Socrates’ execution by poison, emphasizing the corporeal by tracing the poison’s progress through Socrates’ body, which stiffens as life leaves it. Plato thus presents us with two bodily states in excess of due measure in the deaths of Theaetetus and Socrates, the former succumbing to the excess fluidity of dysentery, the latter to the paralyzing effects of the hemlock. This serves to make emphatic the philosophers’ physicality which renders them subject to the random disasters and dangers of the natural world, such as dysentery, despite how well ordered, how virtuous, his soul may be. Nature wrecks instantiations of human excellence.

Yet both deaths have the political decisions of the polis as their ultimate cause. Theaetetus dies performing his civic duty to Athens, and Socrates, of course, is executed by the polis for corrupting the young and introducing new gods (alluded to at 142c). In the political sphere the danger to human excellence can at least be minimized by having philosophers take the reins of the city, in this way ensuring that its best citizens are not squandered as a result of foolishly undertaken wars or executed for inquiry. Indeed, if the life of inquiry, by which humans acquire *epistêmê*, is a necessary condition for

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24 For an analysis of the significance of Socrates’ death in the *Phaedo* see C. Gill (1973), Most (1993).

25 Socrates’ acceptance of the Athenians’ death sentence is also a civic duty in accordance with the implicit compact he made with Athens by remaining an Athenian resident, as he emphasizes in the *Crito*. The choice of Terpsion and Euclides as speakers for the frame is also significant, perhaps. Both witnessed Socrates depart in death in the *Phaedo* after refusing Crito’s entreaties to escape from Athens in the *Crito*. In the *Theaetetus* Euclides recounts to Terpsion how he met a mortally wounded Theaetetus at the harbor, who refused Euclides’ entreaties to stay in Megara but insisted on making his way home, meaning Athens or death. Plato brings the two deaths together more explicitly by having Euclides say that, as he saw Theaetetus off, he was reminded of Socrates’ prophecy just before he died that Theaetetus would become *ellogismos* if he lived to maturity. Like the prophetic powers of swans which peaks near death (*Phd*. 84e-85b), Socrates prophesied truly Theaetetus’ future development. Theaetetus, that is, turned out in the end to share more than similar facial features with Socrates, as Socrates discerned. If my thesis is correct, he became another Socrates, a philosopher-statesman, whose life even mirrored Socrates’ tragic but noble death.
eudaimonia, as the *Statesman* makes plain, then this would be all the more reason for a philosopher to seek political power. Without the possibility of a life of inquiry, as Socrates’ young namesake will assert in the *Statesman*, life is not worth living (300a).²⁶

On my interpretation the adult Theaetetus has undergone some significant intellectual and moral development. The merely natural, and thus unreliable, virtue of his youth has been rendered stable. More or less complete epistêmê seems to be the cause of this stability, a property of (qualified or unqualified) genuine virtue. I see no way to determine decisively from the frame alone whether Theaetetus—or Socrates, for that matter—has complete epistêmê and thus unqualified genuine virtue, making him a sage. My theses regarding the unity of the trilogy and the story it tells about the ethical and political nature of epistêmê would not be affected if this should prove not to be the case. Yet, if the two are sages, then the trilogy takes on a truly tragic light which I take to be fitting for Plato’s pessimism: due to ignorance, tragic blindness, humans fail to recognize and tend to kill the very things that could save them. In section 3.5 I draw upon evidence from the *Statesman* to show that Plato teases us with the possibility that Socrates and the adult Theaetetus are genuine statesman whose deaths were caused by the city they tried to save.

1.3. Theodorus and Socrates: Playing the *Statesman’s* Pedagogy

The dialogue proper opens with a conversation between Socrates and Theodorus (143d-145b). The axiological assessments of Theaetetus’ body and soul that Theodorus provides here and Socrates’ assessments of those assessments provide valuable insights

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²⁶ The *Statesman*, in fact, near its end, alludes unmistakably to Socrates’ execution, and thus to the beginning of the *Theaetetus*, in its account of those executed for engaging in inquiry contrary to the written laws (299a-c).
into the relation *epistêmê* bears to practical judgment and virtue, as my close readings in 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 show. I begin in 1.3.2 with an account of the nuts and bolts of the *Statesman*’s Measure Doctrine which will provide the necessary framework for my discussions in the subsequent sections, where I shall argue that Plato intends us to see the traces of this important doctrine.

1.3.a. The *Metron*: *Statesman* 283b-287b

The Measure Doctrine’s place in the *Statesman* and the structure of the passage itself are all complicated matters, full analysis of which I postpone until Chapter 5.27 Here I explain in abstraction from their context the Measure Doctrine’s main features and their implications which will be necessary for analyzing the exchange of Theodorus and Socrates and for the remaining sections of this chapter. For the *metrion* doctrine is Plato’s most explicit statement on the relation of theoretical knowledge or *epistêmê* to practical intelligence, especially axiological judgments, and thus provides valuable insight into why we need *epistêmê*.

Plato explains that the art of measure divides into two subkinds of measure in accordance with the two different ways of partaking of greatness and smallness. Relative measure judges things in relation to one another with respect to some property, resulting in a judgment that each has a relational property with respect to one another. For example, Socrates is greater than Theaetetus and less than Theodorus with respect to tallness. Socrates partakes of greatness and smallness but only in relation to other things (283d10-e14, 284d1-8).28

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27 For analysis of ontological issues in the *metrion* passage see Sayre (2006: 171-190); Miller (1980: 64-72) and Lane (1998: 125-32) provide valuable discussion of the passage and its place in the dialogue as a whole.

28 Relative measure seems to be what the literature refers to as relational Cambridge change and shows up throughout the trilogy, e.g., in the *Theaetetus*’ dice example (154c). Sayre (2006: 171-90) has an odd take on relative measure
*Metron* measure judges something with respect to some property in relation to some objective standard, the *metron*, resulting in a judgment that something has some second order axiological property (283e3-6, 284a1-b1). For example, Socrates’ *logos* on the soul may be longer than Theaetetus’ and shorter than Theodorus’. Yet since there is a *metron* for *logoi*, namely, intellectual nature, we may also judge all these *logoi* in relation to the *metron*, which allows for judgments of excess, deficiency, and due measure, where being in due measure denotes that something instantiates τὸ μέτρον and is thus good and beautiful (ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ, 284a10-b1). In this case, a *logos* would be in due measure if and only if it helps to generate due measure in the interlocutor’s intellect, which means cultivating the intellect’s proper being.²⁹

Important to note is that the length possessed by a *logos* in due measure is not the *metron* itself but an instantiation of the *metron*, that is, what is fitting for the present circumstances because it conduces to or preserves the *metron*, intellect.³⁰ In other

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²⁹ See *Pltc.* 286d-287b, where the Stranger explains that the only thing that matters when it comes to judging the length of a logos is whether or not it makes us better dialecticians.

³⁰ This distinction is important but not uncontested, for, if I properly understand her interpretation, Lane (1998: 125-36, 182-202) seems not to distinguish between what is in due measure (that is, an instance of the measure) from the measure itself. What distinguishes statesmanship from the other arts, Lane contends, is the former’s capacity to recognize what is in due measure primarily in the sense of timeliness. *Politikê* is knowledge of timing; the general may know how to wage war but he does not know when or whether to wage war. Yet the capacity to recognize timeliness would seem to presuppose knowledge of the measure itself in terms of which a particular action is timely rather than untimely and this measure, if my interpretation is correct, is the human good, knowledge of which presupposes knowledge of human being. Whether or not a war should be undertaken at such and such a time will be determined by whether or not it contributes to the human good, which presupposes knowledge of human being. *Pace* Lane, the difference of the other arts from *politikê* is not that they lack recognition of timeliness altogether. Quite the contrary, each art has its own limited ends in terms of which to measure for timeliness—e.g., the general qua general knows when to deploy the cavalry. Yet the ultimate end of all the arts in terms of which their all actions must be structured is the human good, knowledge of which presupposes knowledge of human being, of which the other arts have only partial
situations a shorter or longer *logos* might be the fitting length. Differences in nature and intellectual capacity among interlocutors, for example, might call for more or less extensive *logoi*. In any case, one must know at the very least what the *metron* is to recognize what is fitting (measured (*metrion*), timely, necessary) for any given situation.  

Plato gives no concrete examples here, but we can see how this easily maps onto human action. If there is such a thing as human nature as a whole, which is comprised of body and soul, each of which has its own nature, then knowing the fitting action for any situation, where the fitting action is one that preserves or conduces to the properly human (that is human virtue or excellence), will require knowing what human being properly is. And if humans are primarily their soul, and a properly structured soul is a just soul, and body is subordinate to soul, then how we provide for our body (e.g., justly, courageously) will be more important than providing for our body. There will likely be situations, in fact, where we must risk harm to our body lest we harm our soul (e.g., by committing injustice or acting cowardly) so that we may preserve our humanity. For Plato, in short, to produce or preserve virtue in ourselves or in others requires, on my reading, knowledge of the human good, which requires *epistêmê* of human being itself as *metron* or standard.

31 For example, note the difference between Theaetetus and Young Socrates with respect to nature and capacity. At *Tht.* 185e Socrates expresses his delight at Theaetetus’ quick grasp of the notion of common properties, indicating that Theaetetus has saved him from having to make a long *logos* on the matter. Young Socrates, by contrast, often requires long digressions in the *Statesman* due to his excessively spirited nature, which makes him impatient and reckless (e.g., *Plt.* 262a, 283b).

32 In other words, for Plato man is not the measure in the subjective sense of the Protagorean *homo mensura* (as Plato depicts it, at least, in the *Theaetetus*). Rather, man is the measure in the sense that human being itself is the objective nature of which all humans are better or worse instantiations and which serves as that in terms of which such evaluations are made. The *Statesman*’s passage on the Measure Doctrine provides yet further evidence for the philosophical unity of the trilogy by providing the philosophical correction to the Protagorean thesis that occupies so much of the *Theaetetus*’ attention (151d-187a).
In addition to this sketch of two different kinds of measure we can also piece together from this passage in a bit more detail the relation that the metron bears to expertise, providing more insight into the relation between theoretical knowledge and practical intelligence.

**Metron 1**: *The being of the metron is necessary and sufficient for the being of expertise* (284d1-8).

Like much else here, Plato does not explain this proposition. The thinking seems to be that expertise is the capacity to produce and preserve good and beautiful things (284a5-b1) and to do so *kata logon* on each occasion\(^{33}\), and something is good and beautiful if and only if it instantiates the metron (283e3-6, 284a10-b1), occupying the middle between extremes of excess and deficiency. Thus, the being of the metron is necessary because, if there is no metron, then nothing is fitting, excessive, or deficient—it is merely greater or less in some respect than some other thing—and nothing can be beautiful and good or ugly and bad, which means there can be no expertise. And the being of the metron is sufficient because if the metron is, then the production of good and beautiful things, i.e., expertise, is.

**Metron 2**: *Knowledge of the metron and experience are necessary and sufficient to possess expertise.*

\(^{33}\) I take this phrase from 283c3-6 where ES says that we need to investigate excess and deficiency in general so that we may praise and blame *κατὰ λόγον* the things said on each occasion (*ἐξαιρέσει*) when they are spoken longer than is necessary or the opposite. I take the phrase *κατὰ λόγον* as ‘according to reason’ and to provide the criterion for expert praise and blame, doing work similar to if not the same as what *bebaiôsis* does for true opinion. Judgments made according to reason I take to imply the reliability that characterizes expertise, which is reinforced by the later use of *ἐκάστοτε*. Rowe (1995b: ad loc.) translates the phrase ‘proportionately’, which, though possible, would not do the same work conveying expertise and reliability. Even if we accept Rowe’s translation, we still have the use of *ἐκάστοτε* to do this work, however. For examples of *κατὰ λόγον* used in my preferred sense see *Laws* 689a8 and d7.
This is simply an epistemological framing of Metron 1—we need knowledge of the
metron in terms of which to make our axiological judgments if they are to be reliable
(284e2-8)—along with the experience requirement that I take from Theaetetus 149bc and
Statesman 285e8-286b1 (see also 286d4-287b2).34

Metron 3: The possession of expertise is necessary and sufficient to do the following on
each occasion kata logon 1) to recognize instances of due measure (goodness and
beauty) and defect (badness and ugliness, 283e3-6), 2) to bestow praise and blame
(286c5-d2), 3) to produce good and beautiful things (284a5-b1).
These expert capacities will play a large role in the subsequent analysis of Theodorus’
evaluation of Theaetetus. From Metron 2 and 3 we get:

Metron 4: Knowledge of the metron and experience are necessary and sufficient to do the
following on each occasion kata logon 1) to recognize instances of due measure
(goodness and beauty) and defect (badness and ugliness, 283e3-6), 2) to bestow praise
and blame (286c5-d2), 3) to produce good and beautiful things (284a5-b1).

This sketch of measurement’s two sub-kinds and how the metron relates to
expertise provides us insight into epistêmê’s practical application: Why do we need
epistêmê? Answer: to make reliably true judgments about τὰ γιγνόµενα; and it should

34 We become better dialecticians, for example, by doing dialectic, and dialectical nature, the final end of our activity,
ients as the metron for our dialectical accounts (see 285d4 &ff.). The length or brevity of an account is good or bad,
fitting or excessive, only relative to whether it makes us better dialecticians (286d4 &ff.). In fact, the dialectical inquiry
into statesmanship is undertaken to become better dialecticians concerning all things, not just statesmanship. This
seems to make the investigation into statesmanship incidental—we could just as well have inquired into shoemaking, it
seems to suggest, to become better dialecticians. Yet if the statesman is a master dialectician, then in becoming better
dialecticians via the inquiry into statesmanship we are making ourselves statesmen. So the subject of the inquiry is not
incidental. Also, if perfected humanity requires perfected intellect, and this means dialectical mastery, then we are also
perfecting our humanity via this dialectical practice, and the accounts are measured in terms of human being as metron,
that is how they contribute to the cultivation of our human being.
provide a sufficient framework for our analysis of Theodorus’ and Socrates’ evaluations. I note in closing an implication of Metron 1 that will be important for the next section. If it is permissible to speak of a metron (i.e., a particular kind of metron for a certain domain of objects) rather than the metron (the general kind), then it would follow that, if there is no metron either for a certain domain of objects (say, piles of sawdust) or for a certain domain of objects with respect to certain properties (e.g., noses with respect to complexion), then those objects cannot be beautiful or ugly (simpliciter or with respect to certain properties) in the ontologically freighted sense nor can there be an expertise about such objects. Nor can there be meaningful axiological judgments about such things. Theodorus, as we will see, assumes noses, eyes, and souls are all candidates for axiological judgment, which means there must be a metron for each. Socrates’ critiques of Theodorus reveal a number of important things, one of which is that even for those things that have a nature to serve as metron, such as noses, not all of their properties belong to that nature and only those properties that do may be used to measure a thing for fittingness or defect. Theodorus’ conception of nose and eye nature seems to be based upon the wrong properties, unfortunately, which vitiates his judgments of particular eyes and noses. Just from this we learn something valuable about why we need epistêmê—without it our grasp of τὰ γιγνόµενα is flawed. Theodorus’ judgments and Socrates’ critiques have, in fact, much more to teach us, as I now explain in detail.

1.3.b. The Measure and Mismeasure of Theaetetus

In response to Socrates’ query about intellectually promising Athenian youths Theodorus provides an axiological account of the young Theaetetus which Socrates then

35 The Stranger explicitly states that not all things are measurable by metron measure (Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ τοῦτο πάντα, 286d4-5); the context makes clear that τοῦτο refers back to metron measure at 286c8-d2 (ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ τῆς μετρητικῆς μέρος ὃ τότε ἔφαγεν δὲν μεμνήσθαι, πρὸς τὸ πρέπον).
criticizes. Theodorus’ report divides neatly into two sections, one a negative evaluation of Theaetetus’ body (143e-144a), the other a laudatory account of Theaetetus’ soul (144ab). This is followed by Socrates’ critique at 144d-145b. I begin here in 1.3.3.a. with an analysis of Theodorus’ censure of Theaetetus’ facial features and Socrates’ criticism of his censure, in both of which, I argue, Plato wants us to see traces of the machinery from the Statesman’s Measure Doctrine. On my analysis Plato provides important insights here into epistêmê’s relation to practical judgment and into human being itself, the measure for practical judgments.

Theodorus states 1) that Theaetetus is like Socrates with respect to his snub nose and bulging eyes, but that 2) Theaetetus’ nose is less snub and his eyes less bulging than Socrates’. This is harmless enough philosophically. These two judgments presuppose the existence of two kinds of things (noses and eyes) whose instances have a range of shapes (in this case snubness and bulgingness). Based upon Theodorus’ grasp of these kinds and shapes he judges that Socrates’ nose and eyes are similar to Theaetetus’ with respect to shape but that Socrates’ nose and eyes are greater (more snub and more bulging, respectively) relative to Theaetetus’ nose and eyes. This is a harmless use of relative measure, that is, measuring one thing with respect to some property relative to some other thing. Theodorus’ judgments in other words make no ontological commitments even about noses and eyes being instances of real kinds or natures nor about those instances being defective or measured in relation to some real kind or nature.

Less innocuous is Theodorus’ judgement that Theaetetus and, by implication, Socrates, are not beautiful (οὐκ ἐστι καλός, 143e8) on account of their snub noses and bulging eyes. Applying this ontologically freighted term to noses and eyes implies, if we
read this in terms of the Measure Doctrine\(^{36}\), that there is a nature that serves as *metron* for noses and one for eyes and that shape is at least one essential property belonging to those natures in terms of which we measure noses and eyes for defect or due measure. Theaetetus’ nose and eyes may be less snub and bulging, respectively, relative to Socrates’, yet the eyes and noses of both are defective because excessive relative to the *metron* and thus not beautiful. Presumably something like aquiline shape and mid-set eyes are essential properties for noses and eyes, respectively, in terms of which we may judge particular instances.

Theodorus does not explain why any particular shapes are normative nor why shape has anything at all to do with nose and eye nature. But Plato does, perhaps, intimate what faculty, in the case of bodily matters at least, Theodorus uses as the basis for sorting out essential from accidental properties and judging particulars according to how well they approximate essential properties: sexual desire (*epithumia*). Theodorus seems to believe that erotic desire for X because of P is a necessary and sufficient condition for X being beautiful with respect to P. I base this on 143e6-8 where Theodorus says: If Theaetetus were beautiful [with respect to his facial features], there would be suspicion that Theodorus desires him; but he is not beautiful [so there is no such suspicion]. Yet, according to the Measure Doctrine, if Theodorus’ axiological judgment—in this case, his blame—is to be trustworthy (*kata logon* on this and every occasion), then Theodorus must have *epistêmê* of nose- and eye-nature as *metron*. The operative question, perhaps, is whether Theodorus has *epistêmê* of body and has used it to judge *epithumia*’s reports *kata logon* or simply allows himself to be led by desire when it

\(^{36}\) Theodorus may certainly not intend his words to be taken so seriously, but the evidence I provide just below suggests Plato wants us to subject them to philosophical scrutiny, just as Socrates himself does.
comes to bodily matters, making his judgments *kata epithumian*.\(^{37}\) If Theodorus lacks *epistêmê* of bodily shapes, then he may be misled by *epithumia*. Worse, perhaps, his trust in *epithumia* may lead him to mistake aesthetic charm, to which *epithumia* responds, for beauty in the ontologically freighted sense, leading him to take certain shapes, due to their attractiveness, as essential properties of body. Yet perhaps particular shapes do not belong to the essential nature of bodily parts, like noses, and the application of *kalos* and *not-kalos* to instantiations of certain bodily shapes carries no ontological weight.

A few brief considerations lest, this reading seem a heavy construction rather than reflection of Plato’s intentions for how Theodorus’ seemingly casual statements should be read. First consider how Plato gets us to reflect on the use of *καλός* here. Just two Stephanus pages earlier, in the frame, Euclides had effusively praised the adult Theaetetus as *καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν*. Plato, I suggest, intends us to be startled when we hear Theodorus proclaim, contrary to Euclides’ judgment, that Theaetetus *οὐκ ἐστι καλός*, only then to qualify this by stating the corporeal features—in contrast to the psychological features Euclides’ judgment is based on—that render him not beautiful. At the very least it seems plausible that Plato in this way flags the importance of *καλός*, intending us to reflect on what seem to be two different uses of the term; one is applied to the soul’s nature, the other to bodily shapes’ aesthetic charm. *Καλός* seems to be ontologically freighted when applied to human souls (an ugly, because cowardly, soul would seem to be a defective soul); when applied to bodily shapes, this is not so clear: Is

\(^{37}\) As reason for taking *epithumia* seriously here, consider *Sophist* 228b which implies a complex soul whose parts may be at odds with one another. One kind of soul discord is when judgments or opinions are at odds with desires (*δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις*, 228b). In the person of Theodorus, I suggest, Plato presents to us an instance of such *stasis*. Theodorus’ problem seems to be that he gives *epithumia* free rein in bodily matters, failing to subordinate its impulses to intellect’s scrutiny. Theodorus deems his judgments worthwhile to speak and to heed (*ἄξιον*, Tht. 143e) but he is in fact one of the worthless ones due to his imbalanced soul (*τῶν φιλάρρωσ ἔχοντων*, Sph. 228b). I spell this out in more detail in 3.4’s analysis of *Theaetetus* 183c-187a where Socrates articulates the relation of intellect to mortal soul and perception.
an ugly, because aesthetically unpleasing, nose a defective nose?. Although Socrates’
first critique of Theodorus’ evaluation appeals to the latter’s lack of expertise in body as
grounds for dismissal, his second critique zeroes in on the different senses of καλός (as I
explain in 3.4).

Secondly, we should take Theodorus’ statements seriously—and more seriously
than Theodorus himself may intend them—because Socrates himself does at 144d-145b,
as I explain just below, and throughout the trilogy.38 Whatever Theodorus may have
intended, Plato wants us, like Socrates, to scrutinize his statements for philosophical
implications and presuppositions. Theodorus says much more than he realizes. For
example, Plato puts metron language in Theodorus’ mouth by having him point out that
of the lads approaching Theaetetus is the one in the middle (ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, 144c).
Whatever Theodorus intends by this—and in his mouth it likely carries no deeper
significance—Plato wants those of us who have already read the Statesman to see the
doctrinal significance, namely that Theaetetus’ spatial position represents his middle state
between dispositional extremes. Again, at 142b, before rendering his censure of
Theaetetus’ and Socrates’ facial features, Theodorus enjoins Socrates not to be vexed
(καὶ μὴ μοι ἄχθου) at him for speaking ἀδεως: ἀδεως δὴ λέγω. What he intends to say is
that he speaks ‘fearlessly’ or ‘frankly’. We who have read the Statesman’s metron
passage, however, might hear him saying that he speaks ‘unfittingly’ in relation to τὸ
δέον, one way of speaking or acting in due measure (Pltc. 284e). Plato’s—but not
Theodorus’—pun on τὸ δέον calls attention to the judgment being a metron judgment
and Theodorus’ misuse of it, that is that he speaks unfittingly in judging the facial

38 Cf. Statesman 257ac, where Socrates makes much philosophical hay out of Theodorus’ casual, but to Socrates’s
mind careless, remarks about the worth of sophist, statesman, and philosopher.
features unfitting. In any case, I maintain there are several senses in which Theaetetus may misuse *metron* measure here.\(^{39}\) He may apply *metron* measure 1) to something which has no nature\(^{40}\) to serve as *metron* or 2) to something which has a nature to serve as *metron* but that nature does not have a particular shape as an essential property or 3) to something which has a nature to serve as *metron* but lack *epistêmê* of that nature.

Even if my case for the pun on τὸ ὀδον fails to persuade, undeniable is the fact that Socrates criticizes Theodorus’ evaluation of Theaetetus’ body and does so on the grounds described in 3) above. Socrates makes the following claims, which seem to endorse Metron 3 and 4 and which will also be important for our consideration of his evaluation of Theodorus’ evaluation of Theaetetus’ soul.

1) A person’s possession of expertise in some field is necessary and sufficient for believing that person’s judgments in praise or blame on matters belonging to that field of expertise (144e; cf. Metron 3)\(^{41}\).

So,

2) If a person lacks expertise in some field, it is not worthwhile (ἀξιον, 145ab) to believe that person’s judgments in praise or blame on matters belonging to that field of expertise.

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\(^{39}\) A more obvious, and also very relevant, sense would be that it is unfitting to insult someone for their perceived ugliness. ‘Fearlessness’ is not always fitting; sometimes it is tactless, as here, rather than courageous to speak so. Speaking ‘fearlessly’ to a jury that may put you to death for doing so, as Socrates does, may sometimes be truly courageous—if done at the right time for the right reasons. This actually thematically rhymes with *Statesman* 306a-311b, details of which I provide just below and which the *Theaetetus*’ opening conversation dramatizes, as I argue in 1.4.

\(^{40}\) For example, piles of sawdust. For a pile of sawdust qua pile of sawdust there is, presumably, no nature, no being auto kath’ hauto, in terms of which to evaluate it as a fitting or deficient instantiation. We can measure it relative to something else (it may be too small, say, to soak up a puddle of oil sufficiently) but there in so nature or being for it to be judged in and of itself qua sawdust pile. Plato is notoriously reticent on how to distinguish between a *meros* (an arbitrary slice of reality or class) and an *eidos* (a natural joint of reality or natural kind). See *Pltc*. 262a-263b.

\(^{41}\) This principle is expressed in Socrates’ musician example. If the person claiming says two lyres are similarly tuned is an expert musician, we should believe him; if not, not (Ὁκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν ἑσθεῖος ἐπιστῆμα οὐ, ἐμοικίαν δὲ, ἡπιστῶμεν; 144e).
3) If a person has expertise in some field, it is worthwhile to believe that person’s judgments in praise or blame on matters belonging to that field of expertise.

Theodorus’ censuring judgments were made about matters of the body (nose nature and eye nature). Matters of the body (τοῦ σώματός τι, 145a) belong to the painter’s expertise, which Theodorus lacks. Socrates concludes it is not worthwhile to pay attention to Theodorus if he says, in praise or in blame, Socrates and Theaetetus share some corporeal likeness. Theodorus’ judgment might be true, in other words, but, since it lacks expertise as ground, we need pay no more attention to Theodorus than to anyone else, besides experts in facial features, if there are any.

In both Theodorus’ judgments and Socrates’ critique we thus seem to find traces of the Statesman’s Measure Doctrine and its account of the relation of theory to practice. Namely, that expertise is the necessary and sufficient condition for authoritative axiological judgments (Metron 3), and knowledge of the metron and experience are the severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for expertise (Metron 2). Theodorus lacks knowledge of the nature of human body with respect to shapes, the metron in this case, and thus his axiological judgment carries no authority. This provides evidence for the importance of epistêmê for practice as well as evidence for the unity of the trilogy, if I am correct that Plato wants us to see metron machinery at work here.

Two items produce a knot of complication for this story, however, that Plato resolves only later, as I argue in 3.4. First, Socrates’ claim that Theodorus’ axiological judgments are worthless because he lacks the painter’s expertise seems dubious. The

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42 This nicely sets up the subsequent inquiry into epistêmê because we would naturally want to know what it means to have knowledge, if we want our own axiological judgments to be authoritative and our trust in experts to be well founded. A grasp of the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge is one sense in which we need knowledge of knowledge.
Sophist uses the painter’s art to illuminate the nature of sophistry, a pseudo-art (Sph. 233e-234e). The painter uses his art to make “all things” in visible images; the sophist does the same thing in words, and both use their art to produce apparent rather than actual truth and beauty (235e-236a). This at least should raise our suspicions about the seriousness of Socrates’ criticism. Second, the Sophist seems to suggest that mimetic arts like painting appeal to what we find pleasing (χαριέστερον) rather than to the truth to pull off such deceptions. The painter, in other words, like the orator, perhaps uses his grasp of conventional beauty and value—that is what seems beautiful and valuable—to affect the populace. This ‘seeming’ however may very well be grounded in something other than knowledge, like desire. If so, then Socrates passes over but intimates what seems to be the obvious criticism of Theodorus, which would also amount to a criticism of the expert painter, namely that his judgments of bodily beauty are made according to what pleases epithumia rather than according to intellect’s knowledge, kata logon. In 1.3.4 we see whether bodily matters are beautiful or not depending upon whether they perform their function well, not upon shape, and that function is invisible to perception-based epithumia. Only the eye of reason, the intellectual part of the soul, can see it. This would mean that Theodorus’ axiological judgment about corporeal parts with respect to particular shapes is worthless not because he lacks expertise in bodily shapes but because there is no expertise for such things.

43 Sph. 234b: Παιδιᾶς δὲ ἔχεις ἢ τι τεχνικότερον ἢ καὶ χαριέστερον εἶδος ἢ τὸ μυθητικόν;

44 A primary function of intellect, in fact, as we learn there, is to judge the reports of the bodily senses, using its knowledge of such things as being and not-being, likeness, beauty—and also function itself—which are invisible to perception.

45 Theodorus’ problem seems to be a combination of 2) and 3) from above. Theodorus judges something which has a nature but shape is not part of that nature, as described in 2). Moreover, Theodorus does not have knowledge of what does constitute that nature, namely the capacities of nose and eyes.
Before that, in 1.3.3.b. I consider Theodorus’ evaluation of Theaetetus’ soul, which, in addition to providing more evidence of metron usage and providing insight into what it means to have epistêmê (a grasp of relations between parts is necessary⁴⁶), also provides insight into the soul that will prove useful for 3.4’s analysis.

Theodorus also provides an account of the young Theaetetus’ soul, which he effusively praises as wondrous (144a, 144b), recalling the praise Terpsion and Euclides confer on the adult Theaetetus. Unlike Theodorus’ evaluation of Theaetetus’ body, which Socrates deemed worthless, this judgment of the boy’s soul Socrates judges worthwhile to investigate. Plato intends us here too to see Theodorus and Socrates using metron machinery as well as elements of the Statesman’s pedagogical program, in particular its distinction of human types and division of the soul. This provides additional evidence for the unity of the trilogy. Additionally, although Socrates does not deem Theodorus’ evaluation worthless, as he did Theodorus’ evaluation of facial features, he only qualifiedly endorses Theodorus’ praise of Theaetetus’ soul. Socrates subtly suggests in this way that Theodorus has only partial knowledge of soul. Theodorus has a grasp of intellectual soul but fails to completely grasp the relation of intellect to mortal soul, that part of the soul that houses the dispositions.⁴⁷ This incomplete grasp vitiates his knowledge of soul as a whole and even of intellectual soul. Worse yet, Theodorus does

⁴⁶ What epistêmê is or what it means to have epistêmê is the primary concern of chapter 2, where I argue that Plato embeds an interrelational model of epistemology in the Theaetetus. In 1.3.3.b I provide only as much detail as is necessary to illuminate Theaetetus’ remarkable insight into human being itself. He grasps, as we will see, not only the complex structure of the human soul but also the relations between its parts.

⁴⁷ See Ptc. 309c for the mortal soul. As I explain below, Plato distinguishes between a divine part of the soul, that houses intellect, and a mortal part, in which sense capacities, bodily appetites, and desires reside.
not attempt to relate soul to body at all\textsuperscript{48}. He merely gives us a heap of a human: body and soul, but not the relations that obtain between body and soul.

Theaetetus is wondrously well natured (\textit{θαυμαστῶς εὖ περιφύκότα}), according to Theodorus, because he is a perfect mixture of manliness or courage (\textit{ἀνδρεῖον}) and gentleness (\textit{πρᾶπον}). To be so ready a learner (\textit{εὖμαθῆ}) while at the same time being exceptionally gentle and courageous beyond all others is something Theodorus would not have thought possible. Interestingly, Theodorus seems to measure these dispositions relative to capacity for learning (\textit{εὐμαθὴ}), the development of intellect. Manliness and gentleness are proper or improper depending on whether they conduce to or inhibit intellectual development. Theaetetus is blessed in having his dispositions naturally in the mean state, not inhibiting but actually serving his intellectual development. Others are not so lucky.

The unlucky many suffer some dispositional excess or deficiency that vitiates their intellectual development. For example, those who, like Theaetetus, are intellectually quick (\textit{ὀξεῖς}) and sharp-minded (\textit{ἀγχίνοι}) and have good memories (\textit{µνήμονες}) are usually also quick to anger (\textit{πρῶς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποι}). A courageous disposition, Theodorus seems to suggest, may provide a zest for learning based, perhaps, in a desire for honor and fear of the shame of failure, but in excess it may also make for a willful student\textsuperscript{49}, who is more manic (\textit{µανικώτεροι}) than manly (\textit{ἀνδρείότεροι}).\textsuperscript{50} Darting about

\textsuperscript{48} Except insofar as he contrasts Theaetetus' physical ugliness with his gifted intellectual nature. He does not, however, suggest any sort of functional relation between body and soul.

\textsuperscript{49} Cf. 150e-151b in the Midwife Digression where Socrates describes headstrong students who depart from him before their intellectual apprenticeship is complete. See also Miller (1980: 5-8) who sees Socrates' namesake, the Statesman's young Socrates, as an instance of a student with too spirited a nature, although he does not tie this to the Theaetetus. His unmeasured nature threatens to wreck the dialectical inquiry at several points. ES describes his disposition as a disease (\textit{nosēma}, \textit{Pltc.} 283b; \textit{cf. Sph.} 226b &ff. which describes soul discord as a disease (\textit{nosos}, 228a)) that requires purgation.
like ships without ballast they get swept away. Those who are too ballasted\textsuperscript{51} (ἐμβριθέστεροι) come to their studies sluggishly (νοθροί) and are full of forgetfulness. A disposition is thus truly gentle, Theodorus seemingly thinks, only if it conduces to intellectual development; an excessively gentle disposition is actually sluggish. Theaetetus’ blended nature allows him to come to his studies and inquiries smoothly (λείως), steadily (ἀπταίστως), and effectually (ἀνυσίως) with much gentleness, like a stream of silently flowing olive oil\textsuperscript{52}, so that one marvels that he accomplishes things in this way at such an age. 

Much of what Theodorus says here is quite good. First, we who have read the Statesman see obvious use of metron machinery in his use of excess and deficiency language. This as well as Theodorus’ use of the two basic human types from the Statesman’s pedagogical program (the courageous and the gentle, about which I provide more detail just below and in 3.5) provides evidence for the unity of the dialogues, namely that Plato intends this passage to be read closely with the Statesman’s metron doctrine and the pedagogical program that itself makes obvious and extensive use of metron machinery.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} This passage is saturated with the metron language of the Statesman’s pedagogical program, indicating that Plato wants the two passages to be read closely together. I detail the linguistic evidence in 1.4; but just consider Statesman 310d in relation to Theaetetus 144b (μανικότέροι ἢ ἀνδρείότεροι φύονται): When courageous natures interbreed over many generations the products of such unions eventually bloom with madness (ἀνδρεία… τελευτῶσα δὲ ἐξανθηκὸν παντάπασι μανίας) as opposed to anything resembling courage.

\textsuperscript{51} Literally “heavier”, presumably continuing the ship metaphor, they are ballasted which allows them to sit lower in the water and thus are more stable.

\textsuperscript{52} Fluidity as a property is thus in and of itself neither defective nor fitting—but is so only in relation to the nature of the thing to which it belongs. Fluidity in the body can be deadly, as we saw in the frame.

\textsuperscript{53} Linking these passages from the two dialogues does more work than just thematically unifying the dialogues. As I explain in 1.4, reading the Theaetetus passage in light of the Statesman sheds light on the nature of the Theaetetus’ inquiry into epistêmê and of Theaetetus himself.
Second, Theodorus seems to demonstrate insight into the nature and complex structure of soul. His distinctions are far from clear, but he seems to distinguish between a part of the soul that houses things like the dispositions and an intellectual part and even suggests that some sort of functional and hierarchical relations obtain between them. For Theodorus intellect is best; the function of the dispositions is to serve intellect by enhancing its learning capacity. This grasp of function allows Theodorus to do for dispositions something he fails to do for noses: he not only explains what makes an instance defective (the nose is too bulbous (snub); the soul is too spirited (manic)) but also why this is a defect (the soul is too spirited for learning; but: the nose is too snub for...?). His grasp of soul, its parts, and their relations thus seems to serve as a metron for Theodorus’ judgments of particular souls as a whole and for their parts. He deems Theaetetus a marvel because of his intellectual capacity, which is served and enhanced by his dispositions. He deems other students defective because of their intellectual shortcomings and explains the defect by appeal to defective dispositional factors. And the defect of a disposition is explained in terms of its functional relation to other parts and to the whole. A disposition is manic rather than courageous, for example, if it inhibits rather than promotes intellectual development, which is the good of the whole.

Additionally, Plato wants us to see this machinery at work in Theodorus’ evaluation, even if Theodorus himself fails to have a clear grasp on the distinctions and machinery visible in his account. Reading this passage in light of the Statesman’s pedagogical program (306a-311b) we see Theodorus using a psychological model similar to the one described there. Plato there divides the soul into two parts, a divine or immortal part (τὸ ἄειγενες, τὸ θεῖον, 309c), which corresponds to intellect, and a mortal
part (τὸ ζῷογενὲς, 309c) that houses the dispositions. For humans to be genuinely virtuous the divine part must be structured with knowledge and the mortal parts must be so constituted at least to be able to be persuaded by the divine part’s reasons.54 The outlines of this story and its division of soul are at least visible in Theodorus’ evaluation. The Sophist (228a-230e) also provides an account of soul, consistent with the Statesman’s, that is consistent with Theodorus’. For humans to be truly beautiful (κάλλιστον, 230e) and eudaimôn their soul must be structured with knowledge and purged of ignorance; lacking this purgation the soul is ugly and deformed (αἰσχρὸς, τῆς ἀμετρίας, 228a; αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἀμετρὸν, 228d). To be virtuous and well-ordered requires another kind of purgation: of the disease of discord (stasis) between the soul’s naturally related parts (τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς) which arises from some corruption (διαφθορᾶς, 228a). The examples provided are illuminating: judgments may be at odds with desires (δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις), spiritedness with pleasures (θυμὸν ἡδοναῖς), reason with pains (λόγον λύπαις, 228b), and all these with one another. Theodorus gives us examples of intellect at odds with the dispositions and explains the discord by a corruption of the disposition.

Theodorus gives us another example unwittingly in his evaluation of body. As I noted above and as I substantiate below, his own intellectual judgment seems to be at odds with his epithumia.

Given our evaluation of Theodorus’ evaluation we must be surprised when Socrates gives less than full throated endorsement of Theodorus’ evaluation of Theaetetus’ soul; especially since Socrates implies that Theodorus must have some expert knowledge of soul since he is a master of geometry, arithmetic, music, and all paideia (145a). According to the Measure Doctrine, having expertise is a necessary and sufficient

54 More detail on this in 1.4.
condition for authoritative axiological judgments (Metron 3), and one has expertise if and only if one has *epistêmê* of the appropriate nature (soul, in this case) and experience (Metron 4). Socrates endorses Metron 3 at 144e where he gets Theaetetus to agree that, if someone says two lyres are similarly tuned, we ought to believe him if and only if we discover he is an expert musician. Despite Theodorus’ intellectual pedigree, Socrates does not say we should simply believe him. Rather he says it is worthwhile for the one hearing Theodorus’ judgment to be eager to investigate the one praised for virtue and wisdom, 145b. Socrates seems subtly to indicate that, although Theodorus has some credible insight into soul which makes his evaluation of Theaetetus worthwhile to look into, this insight does not suffice for expert knowledge of soul nor, by implication, for us simply to believe it. Expertise requires both knowledge of the appropriate nature and experience. We know Theodorus has experience educating souls, so it must be his *epistêmê* of soul that falls short.

The explanation for Socrates’ qualified acceptance, I suggest, is that Theodorus has only partial knowledge of soul: a grasp of intellect, which he rightly deems best, and its relation to dispositions like spiritedness and gentleness. Yet his esteem for intellect seems to bring with it a certain disdain, perhaps, for the body, with which mortal soul’s

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55 Already noted in 1.3.3a. above. Όὐκοδ’ των θυτόν μὲν εἰρικτές ἐπειθόμεθ’ ἤν, ἑμοσον δὲ, ἡπιστοίμεν; 144e-145a.

56 Note how Socrates appropriates Theodorus’ phrasing (see fn. 57 below) from 143e4-6 to signal his critical evaluation and subtle correction of Theodorus’ claim to being a worthy evaluator. Socrates’ correction comes via a significant but subtle alteration of Theodorus’ phrasing: he uses an axiological determination (ἄξιον) to direct *thumos* (**προθυµεῖσθαι**), rather than letting *thumos* (or, as in Theodorus’ case, *epithumia*) lead the way and to direct the *thumos* of Theaetetus (ἄρ’ οὐκ ἄξιον τὸ μὲν ἀκούσαινε προθυµεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἔπαινεθέντα, τὸ δὲ προθύμως ἐαυτὸν ἐπιθεῖκνύσθαι).
This ignorance of body’s nature would seem to result in an incomplete understanding of mortal soul and, if mortal soul and body are intimately related to intellect, in a vitiated understanding of intellect itself and soul as a whole.

Theodorus, in short, seems to value intellect as an end in itself and the dispositions merely as instruments for the development of intellect, upon the perfection of which they may, perhaps, become irrelevant. Once the heights have been attained we may kick away the ladder. Theodorus seems, that is, to assume there is no essential relation between body and soul. Also, the body and its parts have certain shapes that are pleasing or not, Theodorus perhaps thinks, but this has nothing to do with soul’s intellectual capacity. For Theodorus human being is a heap: body nature and soul nature with no connection between the two and thus each with their own excellence or virtue. If this were so, then knowledge of the soul’s nature along with experience would be sufficient for expertise in soul matters and for authoritative praise and blame of particular souls for wisdom and virtue. On this model body and dispositions are not essentially bound up.\(^{57}\) This ignorance of body’s nature would seem to result in an incomplete understanding of mortal soul and, if mortal soul and body are intimately related to intellect, in a vitiating understanding of intellect itself and soul as a whole.

Theodorus seems to disdain to apply intellect to body in his evaluations of bodies, like Theaetetus’. He relies on the public’s conception of body which seems to be grounded in epithumia rather than reason. At the very least, he certainly does not contest Socrates’ assertion that he is ignorant about bodily matters, which indicates, perhaps, an assumption that body is an unworthy object of serious intellectual inquiry.

\[^{57}\] Theodorus seems to disdain to apply intellect to body in his evaluations of bodies, like Theaetetus’. He relies on the public’s conception of body which seems to be grounded in epithumia rather than reason. At the very least, he certainly does not contest Socrates’ assertion that he is ignorant about bodily matters, which indicates, perhaps, an assumption that body is an unworthy object of serious intellectual inquiry.

\[^{58}\] And this is true: body’s shapes have nothing to do with intellect’s function. But perhaps bodily nature is not comprised of shape but of certain capacities the function of which is essentially bound up with intellect’s function, as sketched in fn. 54 above.
related to intellect and are thus irrelevant to an evaluation of soul in and of itself.\footnote{If we are to reject Theodorus’ conception of the soul/body relation, then this may seem to constitute a major change in Plato’s thinking on the nature of body. For Theodorus seems to subscribe to the conception we find in dialogues like the \textit{Phaedo}, which counsels a disregard of body.} We could then justifiably trust Theodorus’ evaluation of Theaetetus’ soul as exemplary and his evaluation of himself as someone worthy to speak about such things and to whom it is worthwhile to listen.

Yet, if Plato maintains, as I think he does, that there is a deeper relation between divine and mortal soul, and that mortal soul is inextricably bound up with the body, and that intellectual soul has an essential practical function, namely to use \textit{epistêmê} as the ground for judgments on matters that come to it via body and mortal soul, then a grasp of the intellectual soul in and of itself, in isolation from body and mortal soul, may very well not be sufficient to have \textit{epistêmê} of it. Nor, by implication, will this grasp suffice for the possessor to make reliably true axiological judgments about particular souls—nor for us to trust them without further inspection. One would also have to understand divine soul’s practical function, its relation to mortal soul and body, which means grasping the latter two as well, to have a complete grasp of divine soul. But this seems to amount to knowing human being as a whole, which, on this model, is a \textit{structured} whole, not a human heap. This would also sever virtue and wisdom from \textit{epistêmê}. \textit{Epistêmê} might be necessary for virtue and wisdom but it is not sufficient. To be virtuous and wise a soul and a human being as a whole would require practical intelligence as well, the capacity to apply \textit{epistêmê} to the reports and demands of mortal soul and body.\footnote{Plato is unclear on all this, but, if bodily nature also comprises human being, then perhaps bodily nature’s perfection, health, is also necessary in some sense for virtue. Some minimal degree of bodily well-being would seem to be necessary at the very least so that illness does not inhibit intellectual development. Plato perhaps cleverly intimates this in noting in the \textit{Phaedo} that he was absent from Socrates’ death, and thus from the discourses about soul, due to illness. Plato in this way perhaps indicates that the \textit{Phaedo}’s condemnation of body should be taken with a grain of salt. The \textit{Statesman} suggests something similar for mortal soul’s dispositions: those with incorrigibly excessive drives are...}
we have good reason to test Theaetetus—not just because he might have an extraordinary nature but also because Theodorus’ evaluations of souls for virtue and wisdom cannot be fully trusted. Worse yet, Theodorus’ evaluation of himself as a worthy judge of souls would, shoddily based as it is on only partial knowledge of soul, indicate a doubly deep lack of self-knowledge: faulty knowledge of himself qua soul expert and qua human being.⁶¹

Unfortunately for Theodorus we have evidence that Plato and Socrates subscribe to the structured whole model of soul and human being rather than Theodorus’ human heap, which would explain Socrates’ qualified endorsement. We have already seen in the several sketches of the Statesman’s pedagogical program that Plato has the Stranger task divine soul with ordering mortal soul’s dispositions and judging its demands, which indicates an intimate relation between the two and a practical application of divine soul’s

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⁶¹ Theodorus has serious problems with axiology in this trilogy. He deems himself worthy to speak and for Socrates to hear from about a promising young Athenian, Theaetetus (ἐμοί τε εἰπέν καὶ σοι ἰσότας πάντο ἄξιον, 143e). Socrates signals to us that Theodorus has overvalued himself by appropriating Theodorus’ phrasing and altering it in such a way that emphasizes the qualification. Socrates does not say, if Theodorus praises a soul for virtue and wisdom, it is worthwhile simply to listen to him (ἐκ οὐκ ἄξιον τὸ μὲν ἰσότας προθυμιάσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἑαυτόν, 145b). This thesis gains in persuasiveness when we consider that Socrates more explicitly calls attention to Theodorus’ problems with axiology in the Statesman. There Socrates takes Theodorus to task for assuming sophist, statesman, and philosopher to be of equal value (τῆς τοῦτος ἄξιος, 257b). Axiology, on my reading, is a major player in the trilogy. It would be fitting therefore for Plato to register its importance here at the trilogy’s beginning and do so by having Theodorus commit a mistaken axiological judgment about himself (that he is a soul expert)—caused by his partial knowledge of human soul—indicating a doubly deep lack of self-knowledge. Partial knowledge of human soul also wrecks the Statesman’s first definition of politikê, as I argue in chapter 4.
epistêmê. In fact, to be genuinely virtuous, Plato explains there, one must act not on mortal soul’s impulses but in accordance with divine soul’s evaluation of those impulses. Manliness always says “Charge!”; divine soul determines whether the circumstances are fitting or not for this, whether this action would be courageous or reckless.\textsuperscript{62} The \textit{Theaetetus}, as I argue in the next subsection, provides its own evidence for an intimate relation between divine soul, mortal soul, and body that suggests Plato and Socrates subscribe to the structured whole model of human being which requires a thorough understanding of (and gives us further insight into) hierarchical and functional relations and an account of human being.

1.3.c. Socrates’ Reevaluation of Theodorus’ Evaluation (183c-187a)

Plato’s textual signals, detailed below, make clear that \textit{Theaetetus} 183c-187a is a companion passage to the scene just analyzed above, 143d-145b. The explicit purpose of \textit{Theaetetus} 183c-187a is to provide a final refutation of Theaetetus’ first definition of knowledge, the Protagorean thesis that knowledge is perception, by showing that perception is blind to truth and being, both of which knowledge of anything presupposes (186cd). My focus here will not be on the explicit argument, treated extensively by others, but on the implicit function of the passage.\textsuperscript{63} In the earlier passage we learned that trustworthy axiological judgments require epistêmê of the objective nature that the object of the judgment instantiates. We even acquired insight into human being itself by

\textsuperscript{62} See f. 52 above on spiritedness and fear, residents of mortal soul, being ‘foolish counselors’ (\textit{Tim.} 69c-71e).

\textsuperscript{63} For analysis focused on the explicit argument see Chappell’s (2005: 141-9) useful summary and analysis as well as Burnyeat (1990: 52-61). For the vexed question regarding the meaning of \textit{ousia} in this passage: Cooper (1970), Burnyeat (1976), Bostock (1988: 128-45). My interpretation of \textit{ousia} as ‘being’ in the sense of ‘essence’ is not without controversy. I take 186b5-8 to justify this sense for \textit{ousia}, but I remain neutral on the metaphysical import, i.e., whether \textit{ousia} refers to middle period separable Forms. Some like Cornford (1957: 102-8) have taken \textit{ousia} in the sense of ‘existence’ here. The sense of ‘being’ in Plato is an obvious hornet’s nest. It suffices here to note that ‘existence’ will not work: it would be manifestly absurd to say that being and not-being in the sense of existence and non-existence belong to all things (185c9-10), as Bostock (1988: 129).
uncovering the objective nature presupposed by Theodorus in his measure of Theaetetus: human being itself as a heap of body and soul. The implicit purpose of 183c-187a is to provide a more explicit account of epistêmê’s relation to practical judgment. It confirms that epistêmê of objective natures is necessary for our evaluations of particulars as good or bad to be reliable. This account, moreover, is grounded in a conception of human being as a unified complex whole that corrects Theodorus’ human heap conception and, in this way, provides us a proper understanding of the measure we need to properly evaluate ourselves and other humans. In an interesting twist Plato uses Socrates’ correction of Theodorus’ previous evaluation of Theaetetus to reveal that the possession of epistêmê is also necessary for being virtuous, that is, good and beautiful.

To establish the conclusion that knowledge is not perception, Socrates gets Theaetetus to agree to the following argument, which also serves to undermine the grounds of Theodorus’ judgments of Theaetetus’ soul and body at 143e-144b.\(^\text{64}\)

1) The soul is that by which (τῶ, 184d) objects are perceived; the sense organs (e.g., ears and eyes), which belong to the body (184e, 185d) and have a capacity to be affected (186d), are those things through which (ὅτως ὑπέρ) the soul perceives (184bd).

2) What the soul perceives through one sense organ (e.g., a sound) it cannot perceive through another sense organ (the eyes cannot see sounds) (184e-185a).

3) So, if the soul is aware of any properties common to all perceived objects, then its awareness of those properties comes through itself, not sense organs, and is not perception (185ce).

\(^{64}\) My summary of the argument closely follows that found in Chappell (2005: 145-6).
4) Yet the soul is often aware of common properties: being and not-being (τὸ “ἔστιν” and τὸ “οὐκ ἔστι”, οὐσίαν and τὸ μὴ εἶναι), sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, oneness—and beauty and ugliness, good and bad (καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν) (185a-186b).

5) The capacity for knowledge presupposes the capacity to grasp truths (186c).

6) The capacity to grasp truths presupposes the capacity to grasp being (186c).

7) Being is a common property awareness of which soul acquires through its own capacity rather than through the senses’ (as in 4), from 185a-186b).

8) So, the capacity for knowledge presupposes a capacity which in no way belongs to sense perception but to the soul’s reasonings about sense perceptions (186d).

9) So, knowledge is not perception (186d).

By differentiating human being’s various parts and their capacities and explaining how those parts and capacities are related to one another in terms of function and priority Socrates detaches knowledge from perception. Knowledge presupposes a grasp of being which the bodily senses cannot grasp (5-8), so knowledge cannot be perception. Yet Socrates’ explicit argument, as I shall henceforth refer to it, also has a subterranean purpose: to provide us an account of human being as a complex whole of hierarchically arranged functional parts that exposes the shaky grounds on which Theodorus made his judgements of Theaetetus’ body and soul much earlier at 143e-144b. I shall highlight the

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65 Chappell (2005) translates καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν as ‘the honorable and dishonorable’, which is a perfectly fine sense for the phrase. Yet this translation occludes what seems to me to be the obvious invitation to read this in terms of Theodorus’ evaluation of Theaetetus and Socrates as ugly and the fact, as I shall argue, that Plato wants us to see Socrates utilizing the very epistemological machinery he and Theaetetus lay out in this passage when he declares Theaetetus ‘beautiful not aischros.’
details for both body and soul and their relations that are significant for our evaluation of Theodorus’ judgments and Socrates’ account of human being.

Regarding body, we should note that Socrates provides an account of bodily features (eyes, ears, tongue, etc.) here not in terms of particular shapes, like Theodorus, but in terms of capacities and function. Socrates emphasizes that the things *through which* we perceive (eyes, ears, etc.) hot or hard or light or sweet things, for example, are parts of the body (τοῦ σώματος ἐκαστα, 184e6) with specialized capacities (δυνάμεως, 185a1; as in 2) above) to be affected by certain objects in certain ways and whose function is to transmit their affections to (intellectual) soul (186b). This itself suggests a distinction between the body and what Plato calls in the *Timaeus* (69c-71e) and *Statesman* (309c), but not here, the mortal soul, which houses the various dispositions and emotions as well as perception. The body is not just a lump of stuff, in other words, whose parts are differentiated and evaluated merely in terms of particular shapes. Rather, the body has parts with specialized capacities that any proper account must, presumably, take account of and any evaluation must be based in. Given the specification of capacities, Plato seems to suggest that a nose with a certain shape is not *necessarily* a good and beautiful nose, but that a nose is good and beautiful only if it performs its function well.66 I leave open for the moment the possibility that shape too is a necessary condition for good and beautiful noses and eyes and so on. I argue below, in my analysis of Socrates’ praise of Theaetetus, that Plato closes this possibility, leaving only functional properties as essential. If this is correct, then Theodorus’ evaluation of Theaetetus’ facial

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66 This may very well entail the organ having certain spatial configurations—the vessels in the nose must be of the size to allow certain things entrance while denying it to others (*Tim*. 66de)—but shapes will be evaluated in terms of function, which belongs to the respective being’s ousia or nature, not in terms of aesthetic pleasure, which belongs to the percipient’s epithumia-infused perception.
features was based upon, at best, incomplete knowledge of bodily nature: an inexpert grasp of proper bodily shapes but ignorance of function; at worst, shape is no part of the bodily organs’ nature at all and is thus altogether worthless as the basis for judgments.

Regarding (intellectual) soul, it has its own nature and capacities, as Theodorus is obviously well aware. Theodorus’ account did not, however, say anything about intellect’s essential directedness to body, the fact that its capacities and function are intimately tied to the bodily sense organs’ capacities and functions. Intellect is able—and it is, presumably, its function—to ascertain truth (4-9). It does this, with respect to perceptible gignomena, by using the sense organs as tools (διὰ τῶν οίνον ὑγάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὡσα αἰσθητά, 184d) and using its own grasp of the common properties to judge, e.g., one sight as different from or like or unlike another (185ae). Or it may perceive the hardness of what is hard and the softness of what is soft via the bodily senses but truly judge the perceived things as (being) hard or soft using intellect. The grasp of this truth about hard and soft things presupposes, for Plato, some grasp of the being (ousia) of hardness and softness, what each is in and of itself (τὴν δὲ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὅτι ἔστον, 186b), a capacity belonging solely to intellect.

If this sketch is accurate, then intellect bears an important hierarchical and functional relation to the bodily senses. To fulfill its own function, the ascertainment of truth, it uses the bodily senses, whose function is thus instrumental (οἶνον ὑγάνων) and subordinate to intellect’s. It has the capacity, in other words, to use the bodily senses’ capacity for access to the gignomena about which it judges (τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων, 186e). Plato thus has Socrates suggest an essential practical orientation for

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67 In the Statesman we will see that the city is structured in the same way that Socrates and Theaetetus explain the structure of human being here: the body-directed arts are subordinate to and used as tools by the soul-directed arts, and
intellect, directed at the *gignomena* in the world about us, judging them not just for likeness and unlikeness, but also for beauty and ugliness, goodness and badness (186a), being and usefulness (οὐσίαν καὶ ὀφέλειαν, 186c). A complete understanding of intellectual soul, required for authoritative evaluations of particular intellects, would thus seem to require, in addition to knowledge of what intellect is in and of itself, a grasp both of intellect’s relation to the body and body’s own capacities and function. Theodorus’ accounts, unlike Socrates’, evince a grasp of neither. Theodorus for this reason would have only partial knowledge of intellectual soul, which would explain Socrates’ qualified endorsement of his evaluation of Theaetetus’ soul.

Additionally, intellectual soul’s function, determining truth, provides another sense in which intellect’s function and capacities are prior to body’s. We just saw that intellect uses the bodily senses to get at the *gignomena* about which it seeks to ascertain the truth by using its own special capacity, its awareness and grasp of being (*ousia*). Yet truth belongs not just or even primarily to the *gignomena*. Truth belongs primarily to the being (*ousia*) in terms of which the *gignomena* are judged and which the *gignomena* have but are not and on which the truth pertaining to *gignomena* depends. And it is soul’s function to ascertain also this truth about being itself, the grasp of which is necessary for grasping truths about the *gignomena*.

This, at least, is my reading of 186b2-9. Socrates says here that the soul perceives the hardness of the hard thing and the softness of the soft thing by means of bodily sensation, touch (186b2-4). It may also use its awareness of common properties to

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68 The distinction between being and having X I base on Plato’s phrasing at 186b2-4, where Socrates speaks, e.g., of ‘the softness of what is soft’ (τὸ γιαλακσὸν τὴν γιαλακσότητα) or ‘the softness belonging to the soft thing.’ This much seems uncontroversial. I intend to again remain neutral on the metaphysical status of the *ousiai*, e.g., softness itself.

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all the arts are directed by *politikê*. The structure of the polis thus reflects the structure of human being, a sort of macrocosm. I detail this in chapter 5. See *Pltc.* 287b-305c for the structure of the polis.
calculate that the soft thing is different from the hard thing or the (tasted) bitter thing, and so on, as we have seen. Yet the being (ousia) of hardness and softness (what the hard and soft things have but are not), namely what hardness and softness are (καὶ ὅτι ἐστὸν), the soul itself determines (186b6-9). The soul ascertains truth about ousiai by utilizing its awareness of common properties on the ousiai themselves (separate from the hard and soft things), comparing the ousiai to one another (συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα) and attempting to grasp how the ousia of hardness is opposed that of softness, for example, and even grasping the being of that opposition (τὴν οὐσίαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἐναντίότητος) (186b6-9), a process very similar to the Stranger’s later descriptions of dialectic. We thus have another sense of truth, prior to that belonging to gignomena, that obtains and is grasped on the level of the ousiai themselves.

Now, if intellect’s function is the ascertainment of truth, then a good and beautiful intellect would presumably be one that has the capacity to ascertain truth in both senses: the truth of the ousiai and that of the gignomena, which presupposes truth in the previous sense. And the ascertainment of truth in both senses presupposes intellect’s capacity to grasp the ousiai. Given intellect’s importance, it may be tempting to lead a life of pure reason, to disregard the gignomena and the body through which we access them—as Theodorus perhaps does—yet Socrates’ account makes clear that intellect’s grasp of ousia has this very practical function, ascertaining the truth about the perceptible world.

On this reading, then, Socrates’ argument does much more work than its stated purpose, that is, to differentiate perception from knowledge. It works out a conception of

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69 This seems very similar to the several descriptions the Stranger gives of dialectic in the trilogy, e.g., Sophist 253de.

70 This would provide a good reason to acquire not just epistêmé but epistêmê of epistêmê (a distinction rarely observed in the literature), where this means grasping not just what knowledge is auto kath’ hauto but also its essential relations to other capacities, like perception.
human being itself as a complex whole of parts structured hierarchically in terms of function. This corrects Theodorus’ human heap model and shows that, for some things at least, to grasp their *ousia*, which is necessary for knowledge, requires accounting for the functional relations among their parts. This account of human being and how to grasp it as a complex whole of functional parts foreshadows the *Statesman*, where a failure to do this has disastrous dialectical results, as I explain in chapter 4. In the next section we see its importance as a measure for practical judgment.

Lastly, Socrates’ initial critique of Theodorus’ judgments (144d-145b) revealed why we need epistêmê: without it axiological judgments are worthless. We have just seen another reason: if a human intellect is good and beautiful only if it is a truth-determining intellect, and reliable truth determination requires knowledge of *ousiai*, then lack of this knowledge would imply a less than good and beautiful intellect. Since human being’s other function, truth determination about *gignomena*, depends on intellect, it would also imply a less than good and beautiful human being as a whole. This outcome would be especially fitting if the *ousia* about which one lacks knowledge is human being. Socrates, as I show in the next section (3.4.b.), discretely suggests that Theodorus suffers this deficiency due to his ignorance of human being’s *ousia*. It is Theodorus, not Theaetetus, who is *aischros* or *ou kalos*.

1.3.d. Socrates’ Praise and Blame of Theaetetus and Theodorus (185e)

After acquiring Theaetetus’ acceptance of the distinction between the soul, *with respect to which* we perceive, and the bodily senses, *through which* the soul perceives, Socrates asks Theaetetus to identify the bodily sense organ *through which* the soul perceives the common properties (*ὄργανα δι' ὅν*; 185c; *διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος*,
185d). Theaetetus insightfully observes that there is no such sense organ, that the soul itself through itself (αὐτῇ δὲ αὐτῆς) examines (ἐπισκοπεῖν) such properties as being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, and so on (185de). This answer delights Socrates since this is what he himself thinks (ὅ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔδόκει). Theaetetus’ insight has saved Socrates from having to give a long proof of this (μάλα συχνὸν λόγου, 186e). Socrates’ praise, in fact, is quite loaded, as I detail below: Καλὸς γὰρ εἰ, ὦ Θεαῖτης, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός· ὃ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλὸς τε καὶ ἁγαθός (For you are beautiful and not, as Theodorus was saying, ugly. For he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good, 185e).

Socrates’ praise of Theaetetus as καλὸς τε καὶ ἁγαθός and censure of Theodorus for falsely censuring him for being αἰσχρός is, first of all, an explicit reference back to 143d-145b, where Theodorus judged Theaetetus ou kalos, and an obvious invitation to read the two passages closely together. Second, and more specifically, this calls attention to the use of καλὸς τε καὶ ἁγαθός, reestablishing Euclides’ judgement of the adult Theaetetus in the frame as καλὸν τε καὶ ἁγαθόν (142b) and, it seems, ascribing it to a psychological state or capacity, like Euclides, rather than to bodily shapes, to which Theodorus ascribed its contrary (οὖκ ἐστι καλὸς, 143e). Both Socrates’ praise of Theaetetus and his censure of Theodorus require comment. I begin with Theaetetus.

First, Socrates’ bases his axiological judgment of Theaetetus as καλὸς τε καὶ ἁγαθός on the fact that the boy’s soul itself through itself has ascertained the truth—the truth about soul’s special capacity to ascertain truth based on its grasp of being and about soul’s relation to the bodily senses—and thus beautifully fulfilled its truth-determining function in determining the truth about its own nature or ousia. Axiological judgments,
we remember Socrates claimed, must be based in knowledge of the object’s nature or *ousia*. Socrates takes a *functional* property, truth determination, to belong to the nature or *ousia* possessed by the particular he is evaluating and thus emphasizes functional properties as *ousia* constituents and as the basis for praise and blame (I address shape’s status below). Plato in this way cleverly has Socrates confirm my reading of the explicit argument’s subterranean function, namely that it provides an account of human being in which functional properties have pride of place as *ousia* constituents.

Second, Socrates not only confirms the truth of Theaetetus’ account of human being (the boy spoke truly) but uses that account of human being to measure a particular human, Theaetetus himself, as *kalos k’agathos* for beautifully performing the function that that account had posited as the human function, truth determination. In this way Socrates calls attention to the importance of functional properties in that account and shows us the practical application of knowledge of human being: as a ground for practical intelligence to measure particular humans. In any case, we should trust Socrates has good grounds for making this axiological judgment, knowledge of human being, since he himself has claimed that such judgments are worthless without such grounding (144e-145b).

Socrates’ praise of Theaetetus also cleverly calls attention to Theaetetus’ remarkable achievement and the practical significance of the inquiry into *epistêmê*. The boy has successfully used his soul’s truth determining capacity to determine the truth about not just anything but about the soul’s very own *ousia*, its special truth determining capacity, and its relation to another *ousia*, bodily senses’ capacities. Theaetetus thus

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71 Advocates of a deflated Socrates might say this cuts both ways: Socrates might subtly signal at 144e-145b that his own judgment ought not be trusted. Yet, if we take it so, it would seem self-refuting, like the liar’s paradox. In any case, I provide further evidence for Socrates’ elevated status in 3.5.
demonstrates deep understanding of human being’s ousia as a whole—a kind of self-knowledge, as the dizzily reflexive nature of the passage emphasizes—which humans require as the measure for practical activity. For this demonstration of self-knowledge Socrates dubs him kalos and agathos, a formula for virtue, which emphasizes the ethico-practical aim of the inquiry, to make Theaetetus truly virtuous by acquisition of epistêmê.

Two objections might be raised. Socrates’ claim that speaking καλῶς is sufficient for being καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς, if ‘καλῶς’ means ‘truly’ and καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς is a formula for excellence or virtue, seems obviously false. If true, then virtue would be no special achievement. Second, even if we can strengthen the sense of the protasis to suggest something like ‘speaking knowledgably’, this seems to suggest knowledge is sufficient for virtue, while I have claimed it is merely necessary. Knowledge and practical intelligence, I have suggested, are the jointly sufficient and severally necessary conditions for virtue and wisdom.

Regarding the first objection, the explicit argument takes capacity to determine truth to presuppose a capacity to grasp ousia. By ‘speaking καλῶς’ Socrates seems to mean not merely true judgments but true judgments grounded in a grasp of ousia obtained via reasoning (ἐν…συλλογισµῷ, 186d). Theaetetus has not just spoken truly about the soul’s truth determining capacity, but has, by a process of reasoning, grasped this capacity’s relation to the bodily senses’ capacity and differentiated soul from bodily senses in terms of their differing capacities. Theaetetus thus seems to account for soul’s being, indeed human being as a whole, in a way that anticipates the interrelational epistemology and for this reason to have something more epistemically substantive than mere true judgment.
Regarding the second objection, we must remember that Theaetetus has shown adeptness in practical intelligence, judging the *gignomena*, namely by acting in ways fitting for particular circumstances, as Theodorus has described (143e-144b). Theaetetus’ ascertainment of the truth about human being’s *ousia* in the explicit argument shows not only a precocious capacity to ascertain truth (an intellectual virtue) but an astonishing grasp of the human being’s *ousia*, required for practical intelligence (i.e., to ascertain truth about the *gignomena*) as the measure for human activity. Socrates perhaps uses the explicit argument as a test, to see if he can tease out (or midwife) some inchoate understanding Theaetetus might have of human being’s *ousia*. Socrates does say, after all, that he wanted to see if Theaetetus thought the same thing as he about the soul and its relation to the bodily senses (185e). Theaetetus passes the test, evinces a grasp of human being necessary for proper practical judgment and truly virtuous action, and earns Socrates’ praise as καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός on this basis. That his grasp of human *ousia* is not complete is suggested by Socrates’ heavy hand in developing the argument as well as Socrates’ remark at 186c on the great difficulty of acquiring insight into being which comes about, if it does at all, with great difficulty, after a long time and much education. Theaetetus is a promising instance of the unity of theory and practice, but has a way to go before being fully καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός.

Theodorus is not so fortunate. Theaetetus has judged truly about human being itself, but Theodorus has judged falsely about a particular human being, falsely ascribing ugliness to Theaetetus, which mistake is caused by his flawed conception of human being.

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72 And Socrates explicitly refers us back to this passage via his censure of Theodorus.

73 τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὖσιν καὶ ὀφθέλειαν μόνης καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἄν καὶ παρατήγηται;
itself. Socrates intimates that Theodorus is the ugly one, for one who speaks ugly, because falsely, about something due to ignorance of its *ousia* is presumably *αἰσχρός* and *κακός*. Socrates does not spell this out. Yet if we have properly grasped what the explicit argument teaches about human being, then it is easily inferable from the explicit argument’s proposition that soul’s special capacity is ascertainment of truth based upon a grasp of being. A soul that cannot actualize its special capacity would be a bad and ugly one. Socrates, however, unlike Theodorus, has a sense of decency and due measure and does not articulate the implication. It would be inappropriately frank, perhaps, not fearless (cf. Theodorus’ ‘ἀδεώς’, 142b), to insult Theaetetus’ teacher in the presence of the boy.

In any case, we have a puzzle. Theodorus claimed that Theaetetus is ugly because of his facial features, his snub nose and bulging eyes. Here Socrates claims that Theodorus was wrong because anyone who speaks truly is beautiful and Theaetetus has spoken truly and is therefore beautiful. This seems obviously fallacious. Even if it is true that all truth speakers are beautiful *with respect to soul*, this does not imply that they are beautiful *with respect to nose and eye shapes* also. Socrates seems to have left out the qualifiers. We might very well have a physically repulsive truth speaker. We need not saddle Socrates with sophistry, however. Socrates seems to imply that Theaetetus is not ugly with respect to facial features because beauty and ugliness, goodness and badness,
being ontologically loaded terms, presuppose being (OUSIA) and being is comprised solely of functional properties. This makes a stronger claim than what we culled from the implicit argument, namely that functional properties (and maybe shapes) comprise OUSIAI.

If shapes of bodily sense organs constitute no part of their OUSIA, then ascriptions of beauty and ugliness cannot be based in their shapes and there can be no expertise about them with respect to shape. Socrates thus subtly revises the grounds for his previous criticism of Theodorus’ censure of Theaetetus’ facial features. Contrary to Theodorus’ judgment of himself as someone worthy to listen to, his judgment is worthless—but not because he lacks expertise in bodily shapes, as Socrates at first claimed. Rather, it is because there is no expertise in bodily shapes. Theaetetus is wholly beautiful because he performs his function well, speaking/judging truly about OUSIAI which is necessary for speaking/judging truly about the gignomena.

This acquits Socrates of sophistry, perhaps, but only to convict him of begging the question regarding shapes; for he gives no reason for their exclusion from essence. Plato, however, perhaps gives us a way to acquit Socrates of this charge also. Theodorus’ claim that Theaetetus is ugly because of his snub nose presupposes knowledge of nose nature and assumes that shape (say, aquiline but not snub) is an essential property of that nature. But this determination of shape as an essential property and of a specific shape (aquiline) rather than another (snub) is grounded, Theodorus implies, in epithumia’s desire (143e-144b) not intellect’s logos (ἐν…συλλογισµῷ, 186d). Yet, according to the explicit argument, both the capacity to grasp OUSIA, which knowledge presupposes, and the capacity to grasp beauty, which presupposes the capacity to grasp OUSIA—and Theodorus

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76 The Statesman’s metron passage makes clear the ontologically freighted sense of kalos k’agathos, as I explained in 3.2, being applied to particulars that properly instantiate the metron. Something can be beautiful in this ontologically loaded sense only if there is a metron (a nature or ousia) to instantiate.
disputes none of this—belong to intellectual soul not mortal soul, the seat of *epithumia* and perception as well as the other bodily affections.\textsuperscript{77} Whatever *epithumia* grasps does not belong to *ousia* and thus cannot be *kalos* when instantiated by particulars. One could make a case for certain shapes constituting nose nature, but the case would have to be based in intellect’s calculations (*kata logon*) not *epithumia*’s desire. The premises Socrates provides for the explicit argument may also thus be used to dismiss Theodorus’ ascription of ugliness to Theaetetus based on facial features as false.

For whatever reason, Theodorus has not deigned to apply intellectual soul’s calculations to body to determine if it has an *ousia* and, if so, what it is.\textsuperscript{78} Instead he relies on *epithumia*’s aesthetic inclinations for his conception of body itself and evaluations of bodies. Yet the reports of mortal soul are unreliable and need to be inspected by intellect, as we see in 3.5. In any case, Theodorus’ folly has grave consequences. His ignorance of the bodily senses’ capacity to provide information about the *gignomena* to intellect seems to blind him to elements of intellectual soul’s *ousia*, its capacity to use the senses to determine truth about the *gignomena*, leaving him with only partial grasp of soul.

From Plato’s subtext we thus acquire important insights into *epistêmê*: it is necessary for both practical intelligence and virtue. We even come away with an account of human being as a complex whole of parts structured hierarchically by function properties, *epistêmê* of which we need to perform our truth-determining function well, that is, to properly measure our own and others’ actions, and to be *καλός* τε καὶ ἀγαθός.

\textsuperscript{77} For the mortal soul’s population see *Timaeus* 69c5-71e2. The *Statesman* also situates *epithumia* in the mortal soul, as I explain in 3.5.

\textsuperscript{78} Cf. *Parmenides* 130ae on the extent of the Forms. Parmenides rebukes the youthful Socrates (not to be confused with the trilogy’s young Socrates) for a similar disdain: he takes hair and mud not to have Forms but to be merely what we see them to be, unworthy of philosophical consideration. If body and its parts have function properties, which are invisible to perception, then they are not merely what we see them to be.
Plato thus provides a fitting end to the first major section of the dialogue, on the
Protagorean thesis that knowledge is perception. Socrates shows us that, pace Protagoras,
human being, not each individual man, is the measure.

1.4. Playing the Statesman

Illuminating epistêmê’s intimate relation to both practical judgment and virtue has
allowed us to see the Theaetetus as aligned much more closely with the political and
practical matters of the Statesman. The philosophical unity becomes even more evident
once we realize that the Theaetetus’ inquiry into epistêmê is undertaken to test and
cultivate Theaetetus’ capacity for epistêmê, to make his natural virtue genuine. For Plato
wants us to see that Socrates and company in the Theaetetus dramatize the pedagogical
program in the Statesman (308b-311b), whereby the statesman renders the naturally
virtuous citizens truly virtuous by providing epistemological grounding. Establishing this
will confirm both the practical and political significance of epistêmê itself and of the
Theaetetus’ inquiry into epistêmê, revealing a truly profound philosophical unity for the
trilogy. For in playing the Statesman in this way the Theaetetus and its characters are
revealed to be working toward the same end as the Statesman and statesman: the
production of virtue and eudaimonia.

I begin with the linguistic and thematic evidence connecting the Theaetetus to the
Statesman 306a-311b. The Stranger in the Statesman and Theodorus in the Theaetetus
use similar language to describe the same two basic types of humans. The Stranger
explains that the class of humans is comprised of two basic but contrary types. Some
humans are congenitally courageous or manly (cf. ἀνδρείας); others are naturally gentle
and temperate (cf. σωφροσύνη, 306b). This echoes Theodorus’ description of the two
dispositions that Theaetetus marvelously mingles (προν, ἀνδρεῖον) at 144ab.\(^{79}\) The Stranger describes each human type as manifesting a virtue paradoxically at odds with the other virtue type (306a-308b)\(^{80}\), but it soon becomes apparent that these ‘virtues’ are actually innate dispositions or merely natural virtues that may do as much harm as benefit for their possessors and others. For the possessors of these dispositions are not able to modulate their actions to fit the time and occasion, with the result that their actions are often excessive or deficient, even resulting sometimes in the ruin of the polis (307e-308a). The Stranger’s description of these virtues in their excessive and deficient modes recalls Theodorus’ account of students whose defective dispositions ruin or inhibit their intellectual development. The excessively spirited, Theodorus says, are quick to anger (πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποι) and more manic than manly (μανικότεροι ἢ ἀνδρεῖότεροι, 144b1), which echoes the Stranger’s description of the naturally courageous as sometimes quicker than is timely (ὀξύτερα…τοῦ καιροῦ) and manic (μανίκα, 307b9-10).

In fact, interbreeding of the naturally courageous over many generations eventually results in the products of such unions ‘blooming with madness’ (ἐξανθέειν παντάπασι μανίας, 310d). The Stranger’s account of the naturally gentle also mirrors Theodorus’ description of excessively docile students who, being overly inert (ἐμπριθέστεροι), come to their studies sluggishly (νωθροί, 144b). The Stranger similarly describes the congenitally gentle, who are sometimes too ponderous and slower than is timely (βαρύτερα καὶ βραδύτερα, 307bc). Interbreeding among this type results in a soul more

\(^{79}\) Plato has the Ekleatic Stranger use a number of different terms to describe the contrary to the manly type: quiet (ἡσυχάς), temperate (σωφρονικά), gentle (τῆς ἡρεμίας, 307a), orderly (κόσμιοι, 307e).

\(^{80}\) For discussion of this theme see esp. Lane (1998: 182-202) whose account my own closely resembles but with significant differences, as detailed below. Valuable discussion can also be found in Bobonich (1995, 2002: 411-16) and Rowe (1995a: ad loc.).
sluggish than is timely (νωθεστέρα φύεσθαι τοῦ καιροῦ), in the end utterly crippled (310de).  

The Statesman makes explicit two items that remain obscure in the Theaetetus: that these dispositions and their desires are part of mortal soul (309c1-4, 310a-311b) and that the individuals who have them require a properly developed intellect or divine soul to be truly virtuous, which the politikos’ pedagogical program (308b-311b) provides. If the textual evidence just provided gives us license to read Theodorus’ description of Theaetetus in terms of the Statesman, then we can infer that despite his marvelous natural mix of gentleness and courage which allows him (almost) invariably to act in due measure, Theaetetus still requires epistemic grounding (presumably because these dispositions are merely impulses of mortal soul), and that the inquiry into epistêmê instigated by Socrates serves this purpose.

The Statesman does not make clear, however, the precise work that the pedagogical program does: how does the development of intellect, divine soul, affect mortal soul’s dispositions, resulting in genuine virtue? Our analysis of the Theaetetus from 1.3 helps to answer this question, which will in turn illuminate Theaetetus’ special nature. At Statesman 306a-308b the Stranger explains that the mortal soul always desires (τὸν ἔρωτα, 307e6; ἐπιθυμίαν, 308a6-7) the same thing, depending on its native disposition. The courageous always counsels action consistent with its desire for a warlike life; the gentle always advises action consistent with its desire for a quiet life (τὸν ἥσυχον ἄει βίον, 307e2-3). Mortal soul’s counsel is sometimes true, but it only happens

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81 νωθρός is exceedingly rare in the Platonic corpus. Used only in these passages from the Theaetetus and Statesman as well as two places in the Timaeus (86a5 and 86a6, on the sluggish nature of water and earth) and, interestingly, in the Apology’s famous gadfly image, where Socrates likens Athens to an excessively sluggish horse in need of a gadfly’s stings: ὥσπερ ἵππον μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναῖῳ, ὑπὸ μεγάθους δὲ νωθεστέρα καὶ δικαιῶν ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύοπος τινος (30e4-5).
to be true; worse, just as often it is false, sometimes with disastrous results. A courageously disposed soul, for example, always counsels “It’s necessary to stand and fight!” This advice would have been true and such action timely at Thermopylae but false and untimely at Dunkirk. In the latter case the action would have been more manic than manly; in the former, in measure but not really courageous.

Mortal soul’s problem seems to be that it is blind to the *kairos*, a kind of due measure. It lacks the capacity to grasp actions as fitting and timely for particular situations. As remedy the Stranger prescribes epistemic grounding (*µετὰ βεβαιώσεως*) via development of intellectual soul, which somehow allows us to make *truly* true judgments about the good, beautiful, and just things (309c5-8). The precise nature of this epistemic remedy and how it relates to the *kairos* the Stranger leaves obscure. The following formulation, which borrows a critical premise from the *Theaetetus*, seems to capture the reasoning. For a judgment about what is beautiful, just, and good to be *truly* true requires a developed capacity to grasp what is in due measure (e.g., what is *kairon* or *deon*, etc.). Yet something is in due measure if and only if it is good and beautiful, ascertainment of which properties presupposes a grasp of *ousia*. So a developed capacity to grasp what is in due measure presupposes a developed capacity to grasp *ousia* (i.e., the respective *metron* or objective nature itself). *Ousiai* can be grasped by intellect.

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82 See 306a-308b (esp. 307c-308a, where the Stranger explains the dire consequences of insensitivity to timeliness). See Lane (1998: 132-36, 137-63) and McCabe (1997) for a detailed discussion of the *kairos*. Both Lane and McCabe take the *Statesman*’s epistemology to be a departure from the middle period’s focus on static, separate Forms, as in the *Republic*. Plato’s interest in the *Statesman* is on grasping the Good in time, as Lane puts it, apprehending what is in due measure as it appears in the flux of genesis. Lane takes due measure’s temporal aspect, the *kairos*, to be fundamental. Whatever the precise metaphysical status of the *metron*, it seems to be some objective standard different from the things that instantiate it by being in due measure and which, as we saw in the *metron* passage (1.3.2), we must grasp to see some particular thing or action as in due measure.

83 Where ‘what is beautiful’ means something that has beauty, not what is identical to beautiful, that is the beautiful itself. The passage makes clear that we are judging *gignomena* not the *ousiai* themselves.

84 From the *metron* passage (1.3.2) as well as from the explicit argument (1.3.4).
(divine soul) but not by mortal soul (Tht. 185a-186b). Therefore, intellect must be properly developed to provide the requisite epistemic grounding for judgments about what is beautiful, just, and good.

If this is correct, then the bebaiôsis (309c5-8) required for truly true beliefs is a grasp of the ousiai. This matches up well with what we saw in the Theaetetus (1.3.4) where we learned about the division of labor between bodily senses (mortal soul) and intellect. But here in the Statesman the lesson emphasizes the practical consequences of failing to develop intellect and trusting in mortal soul’s (sometimes untimely) desire-laden (τὸν ἐρωτα, 307e6; ἐπιθυμίαν, 308a6-7) reports of the gignomena: not just unreliable evaluations about noses and eyes but utter ruin for oneself and the city may result (307e-308a). It also importantly ties the capacity to grasp the ousiai to human virtue much more explicitly than the Theaetetus does, stating that it is necessary for genuine virtue (‘qua citizen, at least’ (309e6), as I explain in more detail below). To develop this capacity requires much effort and education, as Socrates states in the Theaetetus, but, as we have seen (1.3.4), the young Theaetetus has already demonstrated an astonishingly precocious development and seems to be an exceptional candidate for acquiring genuine virtue. He has, after all, acquired a grasp of human being’s ousia, which at the very least affords the insight that the reports of perceptions’ and dispositions’ desires about the gignomena require interrogation by intellect, not blind trust. This is a good starting point for ethical and intellectual development, which Theodorus seems to lack. In any case, the Statesman confirms the relation of epistêmê to virtue and wisdom (309e6), and the thematic and linguistic echoes it shares with the
Theaetetus justify mapping these insights onto that dialogue, taking its inquiry into epistêmê to serve a practical and political purpose.

Another element of the pedagogical program provides additional evidence for Theaetetus being an exceptional case and possibly a potential sage. Even after epistemic grounding, most citizens’ virtue, although described as genuine virtue, remains qualified. The naturally gentle, for example, become really wise and sensible (ὀντως σωφρον και φρόνιμον) but merely qua citizen not simpliciter (ὅς γε ἐν πολιτείᾳ, 309e5-8).\(^85\)

Presumably this means that their intellectual training provides them shared true opinions with grounding about the good, beautiful, and just things that serve as a rational basis in terms of which to give and receive logoi in place of mere appeal to natural dispositions’ desires.\(^86\) This renders them good citizens; to be good qua human would, presumably, require full epistemic grounding, complete epistêmê, which, we may infer, only the genuine statesman has.\(^87\) Their incomplete epistêmê presumably results in their intellectual vision, their grasp of due measure and the kairon, remaining somewhat distorted. This seems to explain the need for ‘human bonds’ as an epistemic supplement to properly compose the mortal soul (309c1-4; 310a-311b). They require these human

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\(^85\) See Rowe (1995a: ad loc.) for an explanation of this qualifier similar to mine.

\(^86\) See 307d1-5 for the conflict that arises from lack of shared true opinions. The Stranger is silent about the precise nature of this grounding, that is the content of these truly true opinions about the good, beautiful, and just. The content of the epistemic grounding seems to be something along the lines of the Laws’ preludes, if we are to take Pltc. 310a1-5 as a clue. Here the Stranger indicates that only those citizens born with corrigible dispositions and nurtured through laws (διὰ νόμων ἐμφύεσθαι) will serve as the material of the polis. I argue below that we may infer that the content of this grounding has at its base a grasp of human being. This is perfectly compatible with the thesis regarding the Laws. For the preludes’ function is to provide rules and to stipulate penalties along with the reasons for the rules and penalties and these reasons are ultimately grounded in some limited grasp of human being, an understanding of the human good. Some take all this to mark Plato’s new optimism about non-sages’ prospects for intellectual development, virtue, and happiness (see Bobonich (2002)). My analysis in chapter five will argue for a more pessimistic Plato: a human being who is merely good qua citizen is a mere phantasmal human being, and there is an ontological gulf between being an eikonic, which requires complete epistêmê, and phantasmal human being. Knowledge, again, has very serious practical consequences.

\(^87\) Establishing this will be the project of chapters 2-5, here I leave it as a reasonable hypothesis.
bonds also as an external constraint, perhaps, due to the fact that the natural dispositions’
tendencies remain in force even after epistemic grounding,\(^{88}\) which means they still
desire certain actions even when they recognize they are untimely.

The statesman provides these human bonds by serving as matchmaker, making
sure that offices are always shared by dispositional opposites to supplement and constrain
one another (311ab)\(^{89}\). The Stranger mentions another possibility: a person who has both
dispositional qualities may serve alone (311a). This seems intended to recall the young
Theaetetus who has not only a marvelous natural mix of courage and gentleness but also
an astonishing intellectual capacity, as Theodorus describes and Theaetetus demonstrates
for Socrates. Theaetetus seems to be that rare thing, an individual requiring no external
constraint at all. His naturally well mixed dispositions actually enhance his intellectual
development; most others suffer intellectual stunting due to their dispositional make-up,
as Theodorus states, which we are, perhaps, to infer as a cause of citizens’ incomplete
epistemic grounding and qualified virtue in the *Statesman*. The rarity of this dispositional
mix, coupled with his astonishing intellectual capacity, seems to mark him as capable of
acquiring complete *epistêmê* and genuine virtue qua human being not merely qua citizen
and of being the ground for his own and others’ virtue, wisdom, and happiness—a sage
and statesman.

Finally, the *Theaetetus’* dramatic action follows the sequence of the *Statesman’s*
pedagogical program, which I take to imply the practical end of the *Theaetetus’* inquiry

\(^{88}\) Plato, unlike the Stoics, seems to hold that there is no epistemological remedy for the passions. If one has a
disposition that strains toward one of the extremes (courage or gentleness), then even if one could acquire complete
*epistêmê* (and Plato seems to think that innately unmeasured dispositions preclude complete intellectual development as
a real possibility), one could at best be a continent individual. That is, one who knows, desires, and does the good, but
also has strong and innate desires from mortal soul that are not always in accordance with the good.

\(^{89}\) Cf. *Laws* 734e &ff.
and to suggest young Theaetetus is playing the potential, Socrates the actual, statesman. The statesman first tests citizen candidates in play (παιδιᾷ, 308d3) for incorrigible congenital defects: the irremediably spirited are killed or exiled, the incurably docile made slaves (308e9-309a3). Those who pass the test the statesman then hands over to educators, himself prescribing and directing the educational regimen (προστάτουσα και ἐπιστατοῦσα, 308d5-6; also 309e4-8). We see this same sequence in the Theaetetus’ opening act and subsequent dramatic action. Socrates opens the dialogue proper with an account of his philosophical activity: seeking out not just any intellectually promising youths but those of Athens, since his primary care (ἐκηδόμην, ἐπιμέλειαν) is for his own city (143de). After hearing about the marvelous young Theaetetus Socrates undertakes to test him (ἀνασκέψασθαι, 145b3; σκοπεῖσθαι, 145b7). In fact, he tests him in play (παιδιᾷ, 145e8-146a8). Socrates suggests they play a knowledge game, each attempting to say what epistêmē is. Those who answer incorrectly must sit down and be the donkey, as the children say when they play ball. The one who prevails without error gets to be king (βασιλεύσει) over the rest. This seems to be some serious play when read in light of the Statesman where Plato indicates that the only genuine statesman or king (indeed, the only genuinely virtuous human) is the one who possesses epistêmē.

This is contrary to the dominant interpretation of Socrates’ status in the later dialogues. On one influential interpretation of the later dialogues (see esp. Long (1998), who draws on Stenzel (1940); other versions can be found in Sedley (2004), Blondell (2006)) Plato abandons his conception of the properly philosophical life represented by Socrates—socially engaged activity using a personal dialectic—replacing it with a socially detached, academic conception, characterized by heavy logical machinery and impersonal dialectic. According to this story, the shift to the latter conception, which valorizes a life of theoretical detachment, Plato represents with the replacement of Socrates by the Stranger.

One significant problem for the claim that Socrates is a sage is his own disavowal of wisdom, that is, his famous claim to intellectual barrenness (150b) in the Theaetetus’ Midwifery Digression. I postpone tackling this passage which is obviously very problematic for my thesis. It is also problematic for Unitarians, like the Anonymous Commentator, who need to be able to reconcile this claim with the doctrine rich Socrates of the middle period dialogues. For Anon’s solutions see Sedley (1996: 93-103).

Paidiā or play is a recurring and important motif in this trilogy; see Morgan (2000, 164-78) for the significance of play, childishness, and leisure in this trilogy and other dialogues. Plato’s use of play will be significant for chapter 4’s
to have Socrates suggest that this inquiry is not just a test of Theaetetus’ intellectual capacity and dispositional make-up with the ultimate aim of providing the epistemic grounding necessary to be genuinely virtuous qua citizen; rather Socrates undertakes the inquiry, himself playing the statesman, to see if Theaetetus is another potential statesman or sage, capable of acquiring complete epistêmê and of being virtuous and wise simpliciter.

If the Theaetetus plays the Statesman in this way, it confirms my claim that the inquiry into epistêmê has a practical purpose, namely, to make Theaetetus genuinely virtuous by cultivating his capacity for epistêmê. Aligning it in this way with the Statesman’s more obvious political and practical concerns serves to unify the trilogy philosophically. Grasping this unity, seeing the practical end of the inquiry, gives us insight into the relation between theory and practice and allows us to avoid mistakes like Theodorus’, who befouled his own nature by taking epistêmê to have no practical import.

Why convey this important relation so obliquely, though? And why choose ill-fated individuals like Theaetetus and Socrates to represent the perfect unity of theory and practice? Intimating the relation between epistêmê and practice by having the Theaetetus play the Statesman prepares us for the Statesman by presenting us the pedagogical program in action before the Stranger presents it in logos at the trilogy’s end. More precisely, obliquely presenting the relation via the dramatic action makes the reader work

分析《Statesman》中的《逆向宇宙》之关系，其中萨特描述为一种游戏，其最终目的是通过纠正《逆向宇宙》对人性的观念来纠正《逆向宇宙》对人性的观念。参考摩根的分析（2000年，第179-84页）。

92 On Plato’s use of the dialogue form in the later dialogues see C. Gill (1996), esp. Rowe’s essay (pgs. 153-78). Rowe takes the dialogue form in the later works to have no real function, serving merely as a vessel for disseminating doctrine. Miller (1980: xxiii-xxxiii), a primary target of Rowe’s essay, offers a contrasting view in his reading of the Statesman.
for the insight, resulting in a much deeper understanding of it. In fact, Plato in this way plays the statesman himself by enacting the very pedagogical program at the level of the reader that Socrates employs in the drama. For the dramatic action gives us practice using our intellect to judge the *gignomena*, that is, the dramatic shadows. For example, the conflicting evaluations of Theaetetus trigger our intellect to reflect on what it means to be a *kalos* and *aischros* human being, which stimulates reflection on human being’s *ousia*, what we are qua human. Plato in this way, though absent, provides the epistemological grounding we need for genuine virtue.

The practice reading the *gignomena* that Plato provides via the dramatic action also has political significance. Due to the ignorance of the masses, Socrates says in the *Sophist* (216cd), philosophers appear in all sorts of shapes: sometimes as statesmen, sometimes as sophists. Ignorance of *ousiai* and lack of practice judging their instances in light of those *ousiai* may thus have dire consequences: by mistaking philosopher for sophist we may banish or kill the very thing we need to save the city. By presenting to the reader a genuine and potential statesman in action, Plato provides crucial practice reading instantiations of a very special sort. The fact that the ultimate cause of death for both Socrates and Theaetetus is the ignorance of the masses brings home the political import of *epistêmê* and its lack, the politics of knowledge.

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93 See fn. 12 on Nehamas’ thesis (summarized in Long (1998: 124) that one of Plato’s primary inspirations for writing the dialogues was Socrates’ inscrutability to Plato, his uncanny ability always to do the right thing, which Plato found baffling. The dialogues, on this reading, are a record of Plato’s wonder over Socrates and an attempt to account for Socrates and his actions philosophically. My reading of the function of Socrates and Theaetetus in this trilogy bears obvious resemblances to this: Plato intends us to try to puzzle out what makes them work. But I make no claims to the historicity of the portraits we find here nor to Plato’s attitude to these figures.
Chapter 2: The Theaetetus as Midwife to the Statesman

2.1. Introduction

Chapter one’s analysis focused on epistêmê’s relation to political and practical concerns, that is, why we need epistêmê, to show the tight unity of the trilogy and the Statesman’s essential role in it. What exactly epistêmê is, the Theaetetus inquiry’s explicit target, is yet to be determined. The present chapter argues that, despite Socrates’ admission of defeat, the failure of the Theaetetus’ investigation into epistêmê, the possession of which is necessary for virtue and wisdom, is only apparent. In the wreckage Plato provides us everything we need to cobble together the answer to the epistêmê question. This turns out to be the interrelational epistemology that we see fully deployed only in the final sections of the Statesman.

On my interpretation of the interrelational epistemology grasping what X is auto kath’ auto is necessary for epistêmê of X but it is not sufficient. One must also provide a logos of X accounting for X’s relations to every other knowable. For Plato, moreover, every logos is comprised of these three elements even if the application may vary depending on what is being accounted for. For example, if X is a complex whole, then to a true belief about X one must add a logos enumerating X’s elements and differentiating them from one another in terms of the whole. If X is a part of a whole, one must add a logos enumerating the other parts of the whole and differentiating them in terms of that whole.

1 And if this whole is itself part of a more comprehensive whole, then it would be necessary to account for it in terms of the parts of that more comprehensive whole also. Knowledge of X would thus require going all the way up and all the way down until one grasp the target in terms of every other knowable.

2 A significance difference my version has from Fine’s (2003: 225-51) is that Fine takes Plato to reject enumeration of elements as an implication of Socrates’ criticisms in the dream theory passage. Socrates claims there that elements are just as knowable as complexes and, Fine argues, that they are also known in the same way as complexes, namely, by
Take weaving as an example. I may have a belief uniquely true about weaving: that it is the productive art in charge of clothes-making. So weaving is a part of the genus productive art. To completely grasp the part, weaving, however, I must completely grasp the whole to which it belongs, which means adding a logos enumerating all the other parts of productive art and differentiating them from weaving. Yet, for Plato, weaving is also part of another complex whole: clothes-making, which is comprised of all the other arts that have a hand in making clothes. So to completely grasp weaving I must enumerate all the other parts of clothes-making and differentiate them from one another and from weaving in terms of the work they contribute to the whole’s product and end, clothes-making.

So in each case to know any part one must know the whole; and to know the whole one must know all the parts. The structure of knowledge, on this model, thus has a circular structure. Importantly, if the target is a teleologically structured complex whole (like an organism or wagon comprised of functional parts) or a part of such a whole, then the content of the differentiation may include hierarchical and axiological relations. We can glimpse this in the case of weaving just sketched. If some arts contribute only indirectly to clothes-making (e.g., shuttle-making) while others do so directly (weaving itself which intertwines the warp and woof), then the arts differ not only by having some

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3 To be clear, in accounting for weaving’s place in the productive arts we are actually accounting for the place of clothes-making within this genus, according to the Stranger’s account of weaving at Pltc. 279b-283b. The Stranger treats weaving as clothes-making because weaving is the most important part of clothes-making, just as politikê is the most important art among the community of arts that care for humans. So we have a genus, productive arts, of which clothes-making is a part. And weaving is a (very special) part of clothes-making.
unique property but also hierarchically and axiologically.\textsuperscript{4} Arts that contribute directly to the whole’s end are more important.

Section 2 argues that the first stretch of the inquiry into \textit{epistêmê} (from Theaetetus’ first definition to the Midwifery Digression) provides important insights into these definitional principles that play essential roles in the interrelational epistemology. In the Midwifery Digression, in fact, we see Socrates deploy a simplified version of the interrelational epistemology. He successfully utilizes enumeration of elements, differentiates and relates kinds of arts in terms of their objects, and distinguishes between counterfeit and genuine kinds and instances of kinds. For the full philosophical grounding for these actions and for their full employment, however, we must await the \textit{Sophist} and \textit{Statesman}.

In section 3 I argue that the final act of the \textit{Theaetetus}, Socrates’ Dream, serves a similar purpose. Its failure to define \textit{epistêmê} as ‘true judgment with a \textit{logos}’ is only apparent, and from the Dream Theory’s wreckage Plato intends us to piece together the major components of the interrelational epistemology (discursiveness, enumeration of elements, differentiation) and to acquire an understanding of what the interrelational model entails: that to know anything requires knowing everything. Although Plato provides these insights indirectly, requiring the reader to midwife them from the text, he also provides textual signposts that link this material to passages in the \textit{Statesman} where these themes are treated more explicitly and fully. In this way the \textit{Theaetetus} helps to midwife the \textit{Statesman}, where the \textit{Theaetetus}’ end is finally achieved. For despite

\textsuperscript{4} For Plato these hierarchical differences carry with them axiological differences: weaving, as a direct cause of clothes-making, is better than the contributory causes. Weaving itself, in turn, may be inferior to other arts because it contributes to bodily well-being as opposed to the soul’s; for the soul is more important than the body. Hierarchical and axiological relations will play a significant role in the following analyses. This is another important way my interpretation of the interrelational epistemology differs from Fine’s coherentist model.
providing the interrelational epistemology in embryo, in the Theaetetus Socrates does not apply its necessary and sufficient conditions to epistêmê itself, which means we are left merely with a true belief about epistêmê rather than epistêmê of epistêmê, for which we must await the Statesman. The Statesman thus has a very special place among the parts of the trilogy, as the dialogue where the Theaetetus and Sophist (as I argue in chapter 3), which both make crucial contributions to the interrelational epistemology, find their completion. To properly grasp the trilogy thus requires employing the interrelational epistemology to it that the trilogy itself develops.

2.2. Midwifing the Interrelation Model: Theaetetus’ First Definition (146c-147c)

Theaetetus’ first definition (146c-147c) provides our first glimpse of the definitional principles that comprise the logos component of the interrelational epistemology: enumeration of elements, differentiation, and discursiveness. Although Socrates’ criticism destroys Theaetetus’ definition, it is not wholly destructive. Socrates criticizes Theaetetus’ improper application of these definitional principles, not the principles themselves. Textual echoes with passages from the Statesman where these principles are properly deployed provide evidence for this and show how the Theaetetus serves as midwife to the Statesman.

Theaetetus gives the following as his first definition of knowledge (146cd):

Well, I think the things one might learn from Theodorus are knowledges (ἐπιστήμαι)—geometry and those you went through just now—and furthermore (καὶ ὁ) the art of shoemaking and the arts of the rest of the craftsmen, all these

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5 Socrates accounts for these three kinds of account or logos at Th. 201c-210b. Logos as discursive account does not get much attention in the Theaetetus and its inclusion among the kinds of logos is rather puzzling, since it seems so unimportant. But in the Statesman its importance becomes clearer. There the Stranger makes an important distinction between the greater things, which require a discursive logos, and the lesser things, for which an ostensive definition suffices (Plt. 286ab.).
together and each of them \((πᾶσαι τε καὶ ἐκάστη τούτων)\) are nothing other than knowledge.

Socrates then levels the following four criticisms against this proposed definition. Each of these criticisms calls attention to a definitional principle problematic not in and of itself but only in Theaetetus’ application of it. Each of them, I argue below, calls attention to important elements of the interrelational epistemology.

1. Theaetetus, having been asked for one thing, provides many things. His answer tells how many the knowledges are \((ὅποσαι τινές)\), as if they wanted to number them, rather than what knowledge itself is \((αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστίν, 146e)\).

2. Theaetetus has provided a complex rather than something simple \((ποικίλα ἀντὶ ἄπλοῦ,146d)\). For his answer explains what knowledge is of \((τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη), that is, the objects of knowledge, rather than knowledge’s whatness (146e).

3. Theaetetus’ definition is circular (147ad) since each of the kinds of knowledge which serve as the definiens of knowledge can be paraphrased as ‘knowledge of x’.

4. Instead of an easy, short answer—such as defining clay as earth mixed with water—Theaetetus’ definition goes about an interminable road \((περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὄδὸν, 147c)\) by indicating the of what \((τὸ δ’ ὅτου)\) of the various knowledges rather than the what of epistêmê.

Both Theaetetus and Socrates provide us with a list, but neither Theaetetus’ list of kinds of knowledge, as I explain below, nor Socrates’ list of criticisms is wholly
unstructured. After criticisms 1 and 2 Socrates says at 147a1 ‘Consider this too’ (Σκέψαί δὴ καὶ τὸδὲ), then gives criticism 3 and 4. Socrates in this way marks off criticisms 1 and 2, which I take to address general definitional principles⁶, from their ostensibly problematic consequences, criticisms 4 and 3, respectively. Socrates thus invests his list with a ring structure that Socrates also intends, perhaps, to convey philosophical significance: can we see the structure in what seems like a mere list? Might similar structural principles be lurking in Theaetetus’ list? However that may be, I address the criticisms in pairs, comprised of a definitional principle and its problematic consequence. I begin with criticisms 1 and 4.

2.2.a. Criticisms 1 and 4

According to Socrates’ first criticism, enumeration of knowledge’s kinds seems not just insufficient but also unnecessary for knowledge of knowledge.⁷ Socrates’ fourth criticism seems to support this interpretation; he complains that as a consequence of trying to list all the kinds of knowledge Theaetetus’ account went about an interminable road when a short and easy answer was available; namely, a statement of what it is, like Socrates’ definition of clay as ‘earth mixed with water’. This is obviously problematic for my claims that a grasp of what X is is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge of X and that we learn from the Theaetetus that enumeration of elements is a necessary condition for knowledge. On closer inspection, however, Socrates criticizes not the

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⁶ See Sedley (2004: 20-1) for a different account of the definitional principles in play here.

⁷ See Wittgenstein (1958: 20) and Geach (1966) for criticisms of Plato’s apparent dismissal of examples as irrelevant not only for knowledge but even for initial grasp of the target. A number of scholars have defended Plato against these criticisms (see, e.g., Burnyeat (1977a), Fine (2003: 248, fn. 29), Nehamas (1984: 226-8)), asserting that Socrates’ rejection of Theaetetus’ list is based on his desire for philosophical knowledge, a grasp of essence, which requires a definition and for which examples will not do. This is not to deny, in other words, that examples may help us acquire an initial grasp of the target, as Wittgenstein and Geach insist. This would, in fact, be a very odd position for Plato to hold given the Statesman’s paradigm doctrine (277d-279b) which the Stranger describes as a method that puts us on the path toward knowledge.
principle itself but Theaetetus’ application of it. In doing so Socrates calls our attention to an important definitional principle and its proper use. He even intimates its more extensive application in the Statesman and the insufficiency of grasping what X is *auto kath’ hauto* for knowledge of X.

First note that the gist of Socrates’ complaint is that he asked for an intensional account of knowledge, that is, of what knowledge is *auto kath’ hauto*; instead he was given an extensional analysis, that is, a list of the various kinds of knowledge. Yet an intensional analysis requires enumeration of elements also, namely, of the properties that constitute X’s essence. For knowledge this would be something like ‘a capacity of soul for grasping *ousiai*’.\(^8\) This intensional analysis, moreover, is also a partial extensional analysis of the widest kind, in this case ‘capacity’. So even the intensional account Socrates requests would require enumeration of elements in some sense.

Yet, if my interpretation of the interrelational epistemology is correct, then we need more. I claimed above that, on the interrelational model, if X is itself a complex extensional whole, to know X one must also be able to enumerate and differentiate its extensional elements. This Socrates seems unambiguously to deny by rejecting Theaetetus’ list of knowledge kinds and complaining about its interminability. He explicitly requests Theaetetus say what knowledge itself is. Neither Socrates’ request nor his complaint is as unambiguous as might at first appear. Socrates makes this request because he presumably wants to know knowledge and assumes that this means grasping knowledge’s definition, what it is *auto kath’ hauto*.\(^9\) Yet if what knowledge is *auto kath’*\

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\(^8\) If this is an acceptable formulation of *epistêmê*’s essence then what the inquirers in the Theaetetus are after is an explanation of what it means to grasp an *ousia*, that is, the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing an essence.

\(^9\) Socrates wants to know knowledge, what it itself is (*γνῶναι ἑπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστίν*, 146e).
hauto turns out to be the interrelational model, then by knowledge’s own definition grasping what knowledge is auto kath’ auto will be necessary but not sufficient for knowing knowledge.\textsuperscript{10}

Plato (and Socrates, as I explain below), in fact, signals to us both that such an answer would be insufficient for knowledge of knowledge and that the necessary supplement would be something like Theaetetus’ enumeration (and differentiation) of knowledge’s kinds. For Socrates’ complaint against the interminability of Theaetetus’ enumeration echoes a question asked by the Stranger in the Statesman.

At the conclusion of their account of weaving (Pltc. 283ab) the Stranger asks the younger Socrates why they did not answer immediately (εὐθὺς ἀπεκρινόμεθα) that weaving is the intertwining of warp and woof (πλεκτικὴν εἶναι κρόκης καὶ στήμονος ὑφαντικήν). Instead, they went about in a circle differentiating many things in vain (ἀλλὰ περιῆλθομεν ἐν κόκλῳ πάμπολλα διορίζομενοι μάτην;). Socrates’ namesake replies that he thinks nothing was said in vain. This is true but vacuous, as the Stranger makes clear.\textsuperscript{11} Had the boy been paying closer attention he would have been able to explain that just to arrive at this formulation of what weaving is required two complicated steps. They first had to separate weaving from all other productive arts, which required enumerating all the parts of this genus and differentiating them from weaving (279b-281d3). This

\textsuperscript{10} This opens up a gap, in other words, between knowing X and knowing what X is. Cf. Nehamas (1999, 224-6). The implications of this have not been clearly made by those who take the Theaetetus’ failure to define knowledge to be only apparent. Fine (2003: 225-51), for example, takes a true belief about X plus an account that relates X to other members of the same field as X to be necessary and sufficient for knowledge of X. Given this definition of knowledge, however, the Theaetetus is not as successful as she seems to make out. For it fails to account completely for knowledge insofar as it fails to relate it to other members of whatever ‘shared field’ to which knowledge belongs.

\textsuperscript{11} Young Socrates’ superficial grasp of the significance of the length of accounts is the Stranger’s motivation for introducing the Measure Doctrine (Pltc.283b-287b). The goodness or badness of an account is not to be measured in terms of its length or brevity but in terms of its end, that is, to properly account for the target and generate understanding in the inquirers.
provided an account of what weaving is: the productive art in charge of clothes-making.\textsuperscript{12} Yet this account, though true, is still unclear and incomplete (ἀληθές οὖ μὴν σαφές γε οὐδὲ τέλεον, 281d2-3). Next, to acquire a more complete grasp of weaving, they must articulate the structure of clothes-making, the proximate genus to which weaving belongs. They do this by enumerating the arts that contribute to clothes-making and differentiating them from one another and from weaving in terms of how they contribute to clothes-making’s product.

The Stranger teaches us in this way that the short and easy formulation of what X is auto kath’ hauto is insufficient. To truly grasp X requires enumerating and differentiating from it every other item of the more comprehensive whole (productive arts) of which it is a part (step one) and doing the same for the proximate whole (clothes-making) to which it belongs (step two). Step two reveals, in the case of weaving, an intricate network of hierarchical and axiological relations structured in terms of clothes-making’s end. Someone able to go round about defining many other things in this way has a much deeper grasp of the target than someone who can merely regurgitate what the target is in and of itself.

In Socrates’ complaint, I suggest, Plato wants us to hear a verbal echo with the Stranger’s question; they both contain a form of the same verb (περιέρχεται/περιήλθον) coupled with a notion of interminability (ἀπέραντον ὤδόν/ἐν κύκλῳ). Plato in this way intimates that Socrates teaches the same lesson in the Theaetetus, though more obliquely, that the Stranger explains in the Statesman. The lesson is that an

\textsuperscript{12} “In charge of” is my rendering of µέγιστον…µόριον. The Stranger indicates here that weaving is only one of a number of arts aimed at clothes-production, but it is the most important of them. For the Stranger describes weaving as the greatest part (µέγιστον…µόριον) of clothes-making (280a) and as the finest and greatest of the arts concerned with woolen clothing (281cd).
articulation of knowledge’s kinds, of the sort Theaetetus provides, is necessary for a complete grasp of knowledge, despite its apparent superfluity.13 This would make good sense if knowledge, like clothes-making, is a whole not merely of extensional parts but a complex structured whole comprised of functional parts arranged according to some shared end and under the direction of some master knowledge. The Statesman, in fact, reveals knowledge to be of such a nature and provides an account of it that mirrors the analysis of weaving sketched above: an enumeration of its elements and an account of their structural relations. Theaetetus may not be able to provide an account of his account anymore than young Socrates, but note how his list of knowledge’s kinds evinces the germ of structural understanding, making it more than a mere list: his use of καὶ αὖ marks a shift from the theoretical arts to the demiurgic arts, which, we learn in the Statesman’s analysis of the polis, are not only different from but worse than and ruled by the former.

On this reading, then, Plato calls our attention to an important definitional principle by having Socrates not reject enumeration but merely criticize Theaetetus’ improper application of it. The textual echo with the Statesman even gives us the resources for grasping the necessity of enumeration’s ‘interminable road’ and seeing in Theaetetus’ list at the beginning of the trilogy the rudiments of the complete analysis of knowledge’s structure that we find at the trilogy’s end, in the Stranger’s logos of the polis’ community of arts. In this way Plato uses the Theaetetus to midwife the Statesman.

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13 The lesson presumably applies to clay (and clay-making) too, that what it is auto kath ‘hauto is insufficient for knowledge of it. See Plt. 287b-289c. Without getting into the complicated details, I merely note that the arts are here differentiated from one another in terms of their function properties and hierarchical relations to one another and to the whole. Clay is the object, presumably, of the arts that provide raw material (sômata) for the other arts (288de). We thus get a much richer account of clay and the arts that use it than a mere statement of its whatness affords. Commentators usually take the Theaetetus’ clay example to allude to Parmenides question at 130cd on the extent of the forms (Are there forms for hair, mud, and dirt?) rather than this Statesman passage. Parmenides may suggest the same thing Socrates does in the Theaetetus: even lowly kinds like clay can be accounted for. The Stranger reveals in the Statesman just how rich such accounts may be. See Tim. 72d-81e, 90c-92c for a teleological account of the human body, including hair.
2.2.b. Criticisms 2 & 3

Socrates also objects that, instead of indicating what knowledge is, Theaetetus’ definition gives us the of what, that is, the various objects of the various kinds of knowledge (criticism 2). This not only misses the mark; it also suffers from vicious circularity (criticism 3). I argue that here too Socrates’ criticisms are not wholly destructive. They serve to call attention to a definitional principle integral to the interrelational epistemology —differentiation—that Theaetetus improperly applies and to an important feature of the interrelational model—circularity, but of a virtuous kind. Socrates, in fact, also alludes to a very important notion closely related to this circularity: the second order knowledge that characterizes politikē that we find in the Statesman.

Instead of explaining knowledge’s whatness, as Socrates had requested, Theaetetus’ list provides the various objects of knowledge, the of what, insofar as each art in his list can be translated into the form ‘knowledge of X’. Carpentry, for example, is the name for ‘knowledge of making things with wood’. Socrates’ criticism makes sense if it amounts to the rejection not of the principle itself of differentiating in terms of the object but of Theaetetus’ application of it. For Socrates wants to know what knowledge is auto kath’ hauto, and for this even an exhaustive list of the specific objects of knowledge (of making shoes, of working wood, etc.) would not suffice. The object itself of knowledge itself, however, may very well be an important part of epistêmē’s definition. In fact, we have already seen that Socrates differentiates (intellectual) soul from bodily senses by

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14 τὸ δὲ γ´ ἐρωτηθέν, ὦ Θεαίτητα, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, 146ε.

15 Unitarians like Cornford (1957) must insist on this since this is precisely how Plato has Socrates distinguish soul’s capacities in the Republic V: knowledge is of what really is and is unchangeing; opinion (doxa) of what both is and is not and is mutable. Ryle (1990: 146) and McDowell (1973: 114) criticize Unitarian readings of this passage. See Chappell (2005: 37-8) for a defense of Cornford’s reading.
appeal to their different objects, namely, *ousiai* and *gignomena*, respectively (183c-187a in Chapter 1.3). And since knowledge must be of *ousiai*, for the reason that knowledge must hit on truth which requires a grasp of *ousia*, we can define knowledge as a capacity of soul for grasping *ousiai* (186c). So, later in the *Theaetetus* Socrates provides an account of knowledge in terms of its object (187a1), *ousiai*, even if this still leaves unanswered the necessary and sufficient conditions for grasping *ousia*.16

If our target is some particular art, on the other hand, such as *politikê*, then the particular objects of particular kinds of knowledge may play an important role in demarcating the arts. We see this in the *Statesman* where a proper conception of *politikê’s* object, human being, is required to properly differentiate *politikê* both from other kinds of herd rearing and from the other arts that have human care as their end.17 A flawed conception of human being (mistaking human bodily nature for the whole of human being), as we see in Chapter 4, wrecks the division by occluding essential differences between the arts. We need not wait so long to see this employment of the *of-what*, however. As I detail in 2.4, Socrates uses his art’s object, intellectual soul, to differentiate his art from other kinds of midwifery. This prepares us for the *Statesman*, intimating the cause of the first division’s shipwreck (neglect of human intellect) and shows us that Socrates does not reject differentiation via the *of-what* as a definitional principle. Plato uses Socrates’ criticism here to call attention to this important principle and to explain its proper application.

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16 As Chappell (2005: 37-8) notes, Cornford, *pace* his critics, is well aware of this distinction. Also, if, as I explained in the previous section, the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge turn out to be the interrelational epistemology as I have described it, then, in addition to grasping knowledge’s intension, we need to account for knowledge as a complex whole comprised of kinds of knowledge. To do this we need to differentiate the various kinds of knowledge, which may very well require appeal to each art’s unique object. Such a process we see in the *Statesman*.

17 This thus mirrors the account of weaving, the paradigm for *politikê*, described in the previous section. Separation from the other kinds of herd rearing is what I described there as ‘step one’ (*Pltc*, 258b-268d); ‘step two’ (287b-211a) is accounting for *politikê* as the most important of the arts that care for human beings.
I suggest a similar analysis for criticism 3 (147ac). It calls attention to a perhaps ineluctable feature of any version of interrelational knowledge (including my whole/part version), circularity, by criticizing a vicious form of it. The trick is to find a virtuous kind of circularity.¹⁸ Socrates’ criticism has been the object of much controversy.¹⁹ I limit my analysis to a curious feature of the argument that has gone largely unnoticed by commenters and that ties the *Theaetetus* into the *Statesman* by alluding to the latter dialogue’s second order knowledge, which I take to have a circular structure.²⁰

Socrates argues that if S does not know knowledge (ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδός)²¹, then S does not understand knowledge of shoes. And if cobblerly is knowledge of shoes, then S does not understand cobblerly or any other technē. So it makes no sense to offer to S a definition of knowledge, as Theaetetus has done, that lists kinds of knowledge, like cobblerly or any other art. Theaetetus has, in other words, unwittingly smuggled the *definiendum* (knowledge) into the *definiens* (e.g., cobblerly) and thus produced a circular definition.

Understood in this way Socrates’ claim seems reasonable enough, namely, that if S does not know knowledge, S does not understand cobblerly. However, if we plug in

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¹⁸ For Fine’s (2003: 250-1) coherentist version, on which the propositions that comprise a belief set or field of expertise mutually justify one another, this would require that “the circle of our beliefs be sufficiently large, and the interconnections suitably comprehensive” to render the circularity virtuous. Fine calls attention to the multiple occurrences of the circularity problem in the passage under discussion here as well as at the end of the dialogue in the final version of *lægos* (208c-210a). Sedley (2004: 168, fn. 26) is skeptical that Plato ever abandoned hierarchical in favor of circular structure for his conception of knowledge. The version of the interrelational epistemology I offer actually incorporates both circular and hierarchical structure.


²⁰ Polansky (1992: 51) similarly takes Socrates’ talk of “knowing knowledge” to refer possibly to a special sort of knowledge. Polansky sees this as an allusion to the synoptic or comprehensive knowledge described in the *Republic’s* central books.

²¹ Οὖν ἐρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνήσσων ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδός, 147b4-5; Σκυτικῆ ἐρα ὑπὸ συνήσσων δὲ ἄν ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοεῖ, οὐδὲ τινὰ ἄλλην τέχνην, 147b7-8.
‘cobbler’ for S and are sensitive to the possible ambiguity in Socrates’ use of ‘understand’ and ‘know’, the claim seems far less reasonable. For then it seems to suggest that the cobbler does not really understand (have expertise in) cobblerly unless he knows knowledge. And if knowing something requires what I have described as the interrelational model, the claim becomes ridiculously extreme. For then to understand any art, a part of knowledge, one would have to understand all the other arts, that is, the arts as a whole, which entails an obviously circular movement.

In 3.3 below I argue that Socrates makes a more formal case for this extreme implication—to have one expertise one must have them all—in the Dream section, which is textually hitched to the Statesman. Here I merely suggest that the ambiguity in Socrates’ use of ‘understand’ and ‘know’ is deliberate and that Plato intends it here, at the beginning of the trilogy, as a faint trace of the politkos’ second order knowledge that we find in the Statesman’s final pages. This second order knowledge, we learn there, consists in the statesman’s knowledge of how the other knowledges must be structured and deployed to achieve the end all aim at but only politikê completely grasps, the human good. Socrates in this way calls attention to an important feature of the interrelational epistemology—circularity—by criticizing a vicious form of it and at the same time alluding to the form it takes in the Statesman.22

2.3. Theaetetus’ Account of Powers (147c-148b)

Theaetetus’ first definition of knowledge in terms of its kinds failed but used, albeit imperfectly, definitional principles—enumeration of elements and differentiation—

22 Socrates later in the dream theory passage (Th. 206ac) intimates what makes the interrelational model’s circularity virtuous: asymmetry of intelligibility. Elements are easier to grasp than the complexes they comprise. We can thus grasp a complex whole, like politikê, by grasping one of its more intelligible parts, like weaving. If this is accurate, then Socrates seems to allude to the use of paradigms, detailed by the Stranger at 277d-279b. This would mean that paradigms are not merely like the target but parts of the target. This interpretation of paradigms is significantly different from standard accounts. Cf. Kato (1995), Lane (1998: 21-74), Gill (2006; 2010; 2012: 140-2).
that comprise the interrelational epistemology as we see it deployed in the Statesman.

Theaetetus’ response to Socrates’ criticisms is even more impressive. Socrates wants a short and simple definition of what knowledge is auto kath’ hauto that gathers up Theaetetus’ list of knowledge kinds into a one. Theaetetus, by recounting how he accounted for mathematical powers, shows he understands what Socrates wants and how to provide it for some things. Theaetetus’ account shows much more. Plato intends us to see that just to arrive at his definition of powers Theaetetus employed a proper use of enumeration and differentiation of elements; in this way the account he recounts shows a proper but simplified use of the interrelational epistemology. Theaetetus’ account fails, however, to demonstrate an understanding that the content of differentiation may include axiological and hierarchical relations. Plato flags this critical shortfall in two ways: by textually hitching Theaetetus’ geometry lesson to the Statesman’s where the Stranger explicitly thematizes these relations. Also, as we see in 2.3, Plato has Socrates use these very relations in his account of philosophical midwifery. Theaetetus’ geometry lesson thus not only provides us a look at the interrelational epistemology properly but incompletely deployed. It also shows us that Theaetetus and the Theaetetus are pregnant with the interrelational epistemology. Although Theaetetus miscarries on this occasion, Socrates’ philosophical midwifery provides him the tools for future philosophical

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23 On my reading, in the final act of the Theaetetus, the Dream Theory and logos of logos (201c-210b), we see Theaetetus, under Socrates’ direction, try to provide a formal logos of the definitional principles he uses here in the first definition and in his account of his account of powers: enumeration of elements, differentiation, and verbalization. Theaetetus, in other words, uses the interrelational epistemology insofar as he uses the definitional principles that comprise it to account for powers. His failure to provide a logos of logos (where logos is understood to be a complex whole of functional parts: enumeration, differentiation, and verbalization) in the final section shows that he fails to grasp the philosophical ground for those principles. See Polansky (1992: 209-45) for a more ambitious interpretation of the Theaetetus’ final section’s relation to the rest of the dialogue. He takes the final section on logos to be a logos of logos insofar as its structure and content mirrors the structure and content of the dialogue as a whole, including itself. The dialogue thus achieves what Theaetetus fails to do; it accounts for itself and in this way achieves a sort of self-knowledge.
parturition. In much the same way the *Theaetetus*, by developing in embryo the interrelational epistemology we see fully developed at the trilogy’s end, serves as midwife to the reader and to the *Statesman*.

Theodorus, Theaetetus tells us, had been giving a demonstration concerning roots, showing how the numbers 3 through 17 (except for 4, 9, and 16) have powers for their roots. To do this he drew squares, showing for each number that the square that has that number for its area (the square of 3 square feet (τρίποδος), of 5 square feet (πεντέποδος), and so on up to the square of 17 square feet (ἑπτακαιδεκάποδος)) has sides that are incommensurable (by integers) in length with the sides of the one square foot square.²⁴ Theaetetus and young Socrates, realizing that the powers are unlimited in number, decided to try to gather them together under a single idea (συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἑν, 147de). They did so in two steps.

First, they divided number as a whole into two kinds. Those numbers able to be produced by multiplying equal integers, likening them to a square in shape, they named square or equilateral numbers. Numbers able to be produced only by multiplication of unequal integers and thus always contained by sides of unequal length they likened to oblongs²⁵ and called oblong numbers. Second, to get at the roots they distinguished between lengths and powers. Lengths they defined geometrically as the sides of a square the area of which is a square number; all the integers beginning with 2 are lengths.

²⁴ The sides of the 3 square foot square, e.g., would each be $\sqrt{3}$ which is incommensurable (by integers) with the 1 square foot square’s 1 unit sides.

²⁵ Theaetetus presumably means numbers such as 3, which can be produced (using integers) only by multiplication of unequals (3x1) and can be represented geometrically as rectangles. In the case of 3, it would be a rectangle with a width of 1 and length of 3.
Powers they defined geometrically as the sides of a square the area of which is an oblong number: $\sqrt{2}$, $\sqrt{3}$, $\sqrt{5}$, and so on are powers.

Theaetetus and young Socrates do a number of good things here. They successfully define their target, powers, gathering the unlimited examples of surds under single idea by means of a simple formula akin to Socrates’ definition of clay. Additionally, they arrive at their definition by using division on number, enumerating its two subkinds (square and oblong) and differentiating them in terms of contrary properties (production by equal or unequal integers). Theaetetus thus provides not just a list of elements but also an account of relations between them via his account of their difference.

Finally, note the remarkable insight Theaetetus stumbles upon. After dividing number into oblong and square numbers, Theaetetus then shifts, without remark, to analysis of these subkinds in terms of their constituent parts (the lines of the squares that have oblong and square numbers for area) rather than in terms of further subkinds, as we would expect in a division. Theaetetus in this way shifts to a Pythagorean-style analysis (explaining squares in terms of their more primitive constituents, lines) while at the same time displaying some understanding that the squares cannot be reduced to their lines, that they are more than their parts. For notice how Theaetetus explains the name he gave to what we call surds: he called them ‘powers’ ($\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\epsilon\varsigma$) because although they are not

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26 Sayre (1969 57-9) takes Theaetetus to use the method of division as we see it later in the Sophist. He here divides number according to its kinds. I think this is right; Sayre’s assertion that “[s]uch an achievement is knowledge in its proper form” goes too far, however, if my interpretation is correct that Theaetetus’ account falls short in critical ways. Taylor (1926: 324) similarly takes this to be a successful definition by dichotomy of ‘quadratic surds’.

27 Bostock (1988: 34-36) takes Theaetetus’ account to be disanalogous with the case of knowledge insofar as in the former case Theaetetus introduced, via mathematical generalization, a new concept while in the latter he seeks to analyze an already familiar concept. The two cases do seem importantly different, but the difference seems to be that ‘the many’ in the case of knowledge are kinds, while in the case of roots they are instances ($\sqrt{3}$, $\sqrt{4}$, etc.) that need to be gathered up into kinds.
commensurable with lengths (the sides of squares with square number areas), they have
the power (δύνανται) to form squares whose areas are commensurable with lengths.
Theaetetus thus shows that he has some grasp that a whole can be more than its parts: the
square comprised of powers for lines has a property, commensurability (with respect to
its area) with integers, that its parts lack.\(^28\) This is an important insight. For it means that
to completely account for some wholes we must provide something more than a list of
their parts. When differentiating parts we must account for whatever structural relations
obtain among those parts that make the whole they comprise more than their sum.\(^29\)

Structural relations, including axiological and hierarchical relations grounded in
function, are an essential aspect of the interrelational epistemology. Here, admittedly,
Theaetetus appeals to powers’ combinatorial function merely to explain their name
(δυνάμεις), not to do any real definitional work. And for wholes like numbers—mere
sums—we do not expect such relations.\(^30\) The appeal here to δυνάμεις, I suggest, calls
attention to the importance of this kind of property for some wholes and intimates that
Theaetetus has some inkling of its importance. Human body and soul, for example, may
have the capacity to combine to form a complex structured whole from which arises a
property, eudaimonia, that neither part has on its own. In fact, body and soul may each
have its own capacity (bodily nourishment and moral/intellectual perfection,

\(^{28}\) That Theaetetus has only a murky grasp of this we can see later in the Dream Theory, where Theaetetus cannot
defend his conception of a whole as comprised of but not equal to its parts (203e-205a). For the political significance of
this, consider the end of the Statesman where (306a-311b) we learn that the human community is comprised of contrary
natures (the spirited and the gentle) that must be rendered commensurable via education and intertwined like warp and
woof to produce a whole, the polis, that is beautiful and good, despite the imperfection of its parts.

\(^{29}\) Harte (2005) provides valuable analyses of the role of structure in the late dialogues’ mereology. See also Koslicki
(2008: 91-121) for a neo-Aristotelian mereology that also provides valuable analysis of Plato’s treatment of parts,
wholes, and structure.

\(^{30}\) If numbers are mere sums of homogeneous parts, one number will differ from another simply by having more or less
units. Numbers will not have functional properties in terms of which they may be distinguished hierarchically and
axiologically—unless we subscribe to something like a Pythagorean numerology that ascribes various values to
different numbers and mathematical entities, as Plato seems to do in the Timaeus.
respectively), and axiological differences between these capacities may determine how body and soul combine. If intellectual and moral perfection is more important than bodily nourishment because soul is nobler than body, for example, then body’s capacities would have to be subordinate to soul’s for eudaimonia to arise from the whole. In such cases the content of our accounts differentiating one thing from another must contain such axiological and hierarchical relations. So I argue, at least, in chapters 4 and 5 at length. I return to the significance of Theaetetus’ use of δυνάμεις here and how it links up with the Statesman in more abbreviated fashion just below.

Theaetetus’ account also sends up some red flags. Both Theaetetus and Theodorus use geometrical imagery to render their mathematical analyses more concrete. This geometrical imagery, however, may obscure as much as it reveals. For it may lead us to believe that shape and number of square feet (τρίπους, πεντέπους, etc.) are always legitimate criteria for differentiation of kinds and even that accounting for such properties is sufficient for accounting for some kinds and its relations to other kinds. Yet for some things shape is irrelevant. Shape, as we have seen (chapter 1.3), is no part of nose nature and thus need not be included in its definition nor considered in the evaluation of particular noses. Also, number of (square) feet may suffice to differentiate certain geometrical entities, but it may be a mistake to think this sufficient (even if necessary) to account for differences among other kinds of things. Humans, for example, differ from swine in footedness; yet it might be wrong to think this exhausts the differences between them. Given a certain teleological framework, humans may be nobler than swine and thus justly use them instrumentally. Theaetetus’ geometrical education, specifically his understanding of powers’ combinatorial capacity, may provide him a route to
understanding these very different kinds of relations (axiological and hierarchical relations grounded in \(\deltaυνάμες\)) that obtain among some entities (e.g., body and soul). This background in geometry may just as well lead him to assume that all relational properties are non-axiological (like the difference that obtains between oblong and square numbers) and in some cases even incidental to their possessors (like powers’ combinatorial capacities).  

The *Statesman* provides the evidence that Theaetetus’ geometrical understanding of enumeration and differentiation needs to be supplemented by a grasp of axiological and hierarchical relations grounded in function. By *Statesman* 266a5 the Stranger and young Socrates have defined *politikê* by division as a self-directive theoretical kind of knowledge. They have further specified it in terms of its object: it is concerned with the nurture of living things that are tame and live in herds on dry land, being footed, hornless, and non-interbreeding. Only one cut remains to make in order to fully grasp *politikê*’s object, human being, and *politikê* itself: humans’ two footedness distinguishes them from their complementary kind, four footed swine. The Stranger, however, does not immediately make this cut but first geometricizes human and swine then differentiates them in geometrical terms.

According to the Stranger, human being is naturally endowed to move in a way that in no way differs from the diagonal two-footed in power (\(\sqrt{2}\)) (\(\deltaι\μετρος \ ή \ δυνάμει \ διπούς\)). The Stranger, in other words, conceives of human being as a one unit square (i.e., a square with one unit sides and area). Its diagonal is the square root of the sum of

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31 If so, then Theodorus himself may be one of those corruptors of Theaetetus’ *ousia* that Theodorus refers to at 144d, as Polansky (1992: 41-2) suggests.
those sides: $\sqrt{2}$. The nature of the remaining kind (swine) differs from humans insofar as its nature is in power the diagonal of humans’ power, since it is naturally endowed with twice two feet ($\epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\rho\delta\upsilon\omega\upsilon\gamma\epsilon\acute{e}\sigma\tau\iota\pi\omega\delta\omicron\upsilon\delta\iota\varsigma\pi\epsilon\varphi\beta\omicron\kappa\alpha\iota\nu\iota\alpha$). That is, conceived geometrically swine’s nature (quadrupedal) is the diagonal of the square formed on human being’s diagonal, having a diagonal with a value of $\sqrt{4}$ in power.

Several considerations make it clear that Plato intends here to put us in mind of Theaetetus’ definition of powers. First, the Stranger emphasizes the geometrical frame for his final cut and gives as a reason for doing this young Socrates’ and Theaetetus’ grasp of geometry. Second, the Stranger geometricizes his objects then explains their difference in terms of a quantitative difference obtaining among their parts (the length of their diagonals), just as Theaetetus did. Plato likely intends the Stranger’s obvious punning on $\pi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ not only to tease us with a dubious analogy between geometrical entities and natural kinds (they both have feet as well as $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\epsilon\iota\varsigma\varsigma$) intended to justify analyzing them in the same way. It also recalls Theaetetus’ geometrical terminology: the squares with areas of three ($\tau\rho\iota\pi\omicron\omicron\delta\omicron\varsigma$) and of five square feet ($\pi\epsilon\nu\tau\iota\pi\omicron\omicron\delta\omicron\varsigma$) and so on up to seventeen ($\epsilon\pi\tau\alpha\kappa\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\kappa\alpha\iota\pi\omicron\omicron\delta\omicron\varsigma$).

Plato also signals to us that this geometrical account of human being and its difference from swine falls risibly short. Consider some playful textual clues in lieu of the necessarily long and complicated analysis of the Statesman passage that I postpone until chapter 4. The one unit square that Theodorus and Theaetetus used as the measure

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32 Using the Pythagorean theorem ($a^2 + b^2 = c^2$) to calculate the square’s diagonal, as we would the hypotenuse of a right triangle.

33 {ΝΕ. ΣΩ.} Ὅδε γὰρ οὖν ἄλλα τίνι δὴ τῷ δύο διαμερῶμεν; {ΞΕ.} ᾽Ωμερ καὶ δίκαιον γε Θεαίτητόν τε καὶ σὲ διανέμειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ γεωμετρίας ἄπτεσθον. 266a5-7.
for other squares is, on the Stranger’s account, human being geometricized. However, the one power (δύναµις) that Theodorus and Theaetetus mysteriously fail to account for, \(\sqrt{2}\) (their account of roots starts with 3 and ends, without explanation, at 17), is the very value of human being’s ‘diagonal’ that differentiates humans essentially from swine on the Stranger’s geometrical account. Plato in this way perhaps intimates the limits of Theaetetus’ quasi-mathematical method, a prototype of the method of division, when applied to natural kinds. That is, applied to human being (the one unit square) his method would fail to account for the essential property (\(\sqrt{2}\)) that differentiates it from other things. Admittedly, the Stranger does successfully use division to grasp that property of human being that differentiates it from other things, bipedalism (or \(\sqrt{2}\), the one foot square’s hypotenuse). Yet bipedalism, the Timaeus teaches us (91d-92c), is a capacity for the sake of some other capacity, intellectual soul’s development. Bipedalism allows humans to gaze up at the heavens’ eternal motions that humans need to reproduce in their own souls to achieve human perfection. The Stranger’s geometricization seems somehow to occlude instead of disclosing this deeper significance of bipedalism and as a result occludes the essential way humans differ from other things.

Geometry’s occluding effect seems to be due to its dependence on images which is mirrored in division’s reliance on perceptible properties and differences. Yet not all

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34 That is, the Stranger takes human being’s unique property, bipedalism, to be represented by the diagonal with a value of \(\sqrt{2}\), which is the value of the diagonal belonging to the one unit square.

35 See Polansky (1992: 41-2) for an interpretation that ties Theodorus’ list of roots to the definition of knowledge as true belief later in the Theaetetus and explains the significance of seventeen examples.

36 Note how the Stranger makes humans seem commensurable with swine via the geometricization: the former have \(\sqrt{2}\) the latter \(\sqrt{4}\) for diagonal. Yet \(\sqrt{4}\) is actually 2, and powers are not commensurable with integers.

37 Socrates notes geometry’s reliance on images and pictures in Republic VI. The limitations of division I account for in more detail in chapter 4. For a different interpretation of this see Lane (1998: 114-17), who takes division’s blindness to temporality to hamstring the first attempted division of politikē.
properties are visible. Some, like the capacity for bipedal locomotion, may be accessible to perception; others, however, like intellectual soul and the capacity for reason that the bipedal capacity serves, seem to be visible only to the eye of reason. Intellectual soul itself, since imperceptible, is presumably inaccessible to division also, which seems to explain its absence from the Stranger’s initial division (258b-267c). Without a grasp of intellect and its superiority to body, however, we reduce human being to its perceptible, bodily properties, which in turn erases the axiological and hierarchical differences between human being and other, non-intellectual animals. This makes humans no different from pigs except with respect to number of feet (266ad) and the same as birds except for human’s unfeatheredness (266de). This result, the Stranger admits (266bd), is laughable but irrelevant to division since the method is unconcerned with axiological differences, which are no doubt also imperceptible. This does not imply that we likewise should be content with division’s account of human being in terms of visible properties. I argue in chapter 4 that division requires a supplement, namely, the Stranger’s cosmological myth in the Statesman, which reveals human being’s invisible intellectual nature and the superiority of intellect to body, giving us the teleological framework required for properly accounting for human being in terms of its function, intellectual perfection, and differentiating it axiologically and hierarchically from other entities.

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38 This is bad news for the method of division and for geometry, for they cannot account for the very thing necessary for their own employment, intellect (or nous), and that allows for a grasp of their first principles. The non-philosophical sciences, including pre-Socratic physics, for this reason suffer from a crippling lack of self-knowledge and require philosophy as supplement.

39 In the Timaeus (91de) Plato provides an etiology of birds, explaining that they came about as a result of human devolution. Humans who tried to explain things like the heavenly motions in terms of visible instead of invisible properties lost ‘befowled’ their humanity. In the Statesman human being is reduced to a mere feathered biped as a result of using only visible properties to define it.
Theaetetus’ account of powers displays a proper, albeit simplified and incomplete, use of the interrelational epistemology by employing enumeration and differentiation of elements. His training in geometry even gives him a grasp of δυνάμεις, function properties, and appreciates how the relations they generate may give rise to a complex whole that is more than its parts’ sum. Absent from his account, however, is any use of axiological and hierarchical properties. This is fitting, perhaps, given the mathematical nature of his target. He needs to realize, however, that some properties give rise to axiological and hierarchical relations between things (humans and swine) and the parts of things (human being’s soul and body) and that these properties may not be graspable by his geometry. We need not wait for the Stranger’s geometry lesson in the Statesman to learn this, however. Socrates’ account of his midwifery displays a proper use of enumeration of elements and differentiation that includes hierarchical and axiological difference. As such it serves as a subtle correction to Theaetetus’ geometry lesson and displays a proper employment of the full-blown interrelational epistemology, albeit in simplified form. Socrates’ midwifery account in this way midwifes the Statesman.

2.4. Socrates’ Midwifery

Theaetetus confesses that, despite his successful account of powers, he cannot do the same for epistêmê, although he cannot free himself of concern for the question. Socrates responds by providing an account of his philosophical midwifery. Ostensibly this is merely meant to encourage Theaetetus: the boy’s nagging concern means he is pregnant and Socrates has the expertise to midwife his ideas. Commentators have tended to take Socrates’ account as a charming account of the philosophical life that, however,
plays no significant role in the dialogue’s technical concern with *epistêmê*.\(^{40}\) I argue, however, that Socrates’ account offers us the trilogy’s first glimpse of the interrelational epistemology, albeit in simplified form, not only by employing enumeration and differentiation of elements, as Theaetetus’ account had done, but also by differentiating his art in axiological and hierarchical terms from other arts by appeal to their different objects. Socrates in this way subtly corrects Theaetetus’ account and prepares us for the *Statesman*’s first division which fails as a result of ignoring hierarchical and axiological differences in the arts’ respective objects. In fact, Socrates even employs another kind of axiological judgement by distinguishing between genuine and counterfeit kinds and instances just as the Stranger does in the *Statesman*. Socrates’ account in this way serves to midwife the interrelational epistemology and the *Statesman*. What Socrates does not provide, however, is the theoretical framework required for his use of differentiation, which presupposes several different senses of not-being. For this we must await the *Sophist* and *Statesman*.

I first provide a sketch of the *Statesman*’s account of *politikê* tailored to the concerns of my subsequent analysis. The Stranger defines *politikê* by differentiating it from related kinds of knowledge, grounding these differences in *politikê*’s object, human being (258b-267c). The use of solely corporeal properties and neglect of intellect results, as I explained in the previous section, in the occlusion of axiological and hierarchical differences between humans and swine and between their respective arts, *politikê* and the swineherd’s art. The absence of intellect has one other consequence. It collapses all distinctions between *politikê* and the other arts that have humans for their object (267c-

\(^{40}\) But see Burnyeat (1977b) for an interpretation that sees this section as significant for the developmentalist thesis. Blondell (2006: 100, 250-3313) provides an analysis of midwifery’s significance for Socrates’ character and philosophical function in Plato’s conception of philosophical education.
268d). For if there are various ways of nurturing human corporeal nature (medicine, farming, gymnastics, and so on) and each is the province of a different expert, then all will claim the title of politikë if it is defined solely in terms of nurture of human corporeal nature.

Once the great myth provides us with intellectual soul as an element of human being, however, we can separate these nurturing arts from politikë by the fact that the latter attends to intellectual soul while the former attend only to human corporeal nature. And on the basis of intellect’s being divine while body is mortal, as the myth teaches, we can determine that politikë is nobler than and superordinate to the other arts, which it rules as intellect rules body. Important to note for present purposes is that some of the aforementioned activities geared for nurture of human corporeal nature have analogues that attend to intellectual nature and belong to politikë. The Stranger mentions, for example, the matchmaker (νυμφευτης) for marriages and the midwife (της μαιευτικης) who is expert in childbirth and the birth-bed (λοχειας).

We learn much later, after the great myth, that the politikos serves as matchmaker of soul types for political offices and brings forth true beliefs about the good, an analogue perhaps to the midwifing of children (Pltc. 309c-311b).

Turning to the Theaetetus, Socrates not only provides a successful logos of his own art but accounts for it as a kind of midwifery that also engages in matchmaking

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41 At Pltc. 268ab the Stranger mentions these as activities of the cowherd, but it is implied that they have analogues among the arts that tend to the human herd. In fact, the shepherd’s use of paidia and mousikë to soothe his animal charges is paralleled by the statesman’s use of paidia (308d3) and mousë (309d2) to cultivate the souls of his human charges. Also, the statesman’s intellectual use of paidia and mousë has an analogue in the human arts. For there is a class of productive art that produces paignia, playthings, like mousikë (288c1-8) not for the sake of intellectual cultivation, but, like the shepherd’s use of paidia and mousikë, for bodily (mortal soul’s) pleasure (προς τας ηδονας µονον).
(προμήχρωσ, προμωμαι), which seems to be Plato’s way of hooking the *Theaetetus* passage to the *Statesman* thematically and linguistically. Moreover, Socrates accounts for his art by properly utilizing definitional principles that Theaetetus improperly utilized in his first definition of *epistêmê* and by employing the relations (hierarchical and axiological) missing from (but not needed in) Theaetetus’ account of powers and from the Stranger’s account of *polítikê* and human being, where their absence proves disastrous. The larger significance of Socrates’ correction of both Theaetetus and the Stranger I explain below after detailing Socrates’ definitional work.

All that belongs to his own art, Socrates asserts, also belongs to ordinary midwifery; his differs only in midwifing men, not women, and in tending to souls in labor, not bodies (150b). Socrates here employs an *enumeration* in accounting for his own art by identifying it as a particular kind, philosophical midwifery, within a more general kind, midwifery, and *differentiating* it from another related kind, ordinary midwifery. This itself is an improvement on Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge. For Socrates provides not merely an enumeration of elements, as Theaetetus had done, but explicitly accounts for relations that obtain between them, even if this consists merely in difference or otherness as a result of having one property rather than another.

The content of this differentiation is grounded in the respective objects of the two arts, namely, men’s souls as opposed to women’s bodies; Socrates makes proper use of the object (the *of-what*). Since Socrates and company apparently already have some grasp of the wider kind (midwifery) to which their target belongs, Socrates’ use of the object

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42 In *Laches* (180cd) Nicias testifies to Socrates’ skill in matchmaking, praising him for hooking his son up with the musician Damon.

43 Theaetetus’ list of knowledges, it will be remembered (2.1 above), had an implicit structure insofar as Theaetetus off-handedly distinguished between theoretical and demiurgic arts.
simply sharpens their understanding of what they already grasp in order to grasp one of its subkinds. So Socrates avoids the vicious sort of circularity committed by Theaetetus, who tried to define knowledge by listing subkinds distinguished by their objects before they even had a rough and ready definition of knowledge.

Socrates’ account also shows us how to remedy the Stranger’s first definition of \textit{politikê}. Socrates uses human being’s complex nature to differentiate his own philosophical midwifery, which attends to intellectual soul, from ordinary midwifery, which attends to body. In this way he shows us how to correct the Stranger’s first division of \textit{politikê} which fails to distinguish statesmanship from the body-centered arts, due to its neglect of human intellect. Note additionally that in this \textit{Statesman} passage (267c-268d) Plato makes explicit mention of midwifery and matchmaking as two of these body-centered arts. This textual evidence suggests Plato intends to direct our attention back to Socrates’ midwifery account, where Socrates makes the proper distinctions as a result of having a proper grasp of human being’s complex nature (body + intellectual soul).\footnote{Plato in this way also perhaps provocatively identifies Socrates’ midwifery with statesmanship. If \textit{politikê} has its own kind of soul-directed midwifery (the statesman’s pedagogical program) and matchmaking (assigning political offices), then it seems that Socrates’ midwifery and matchmaking can only be that of \textit{politikê} since he distinguishes his own from the body-directed sorts. See \textit{Pltc.} 309c-311b for the statesman’s intellectual midwifery and political matchmaking. For Socrates’ matchmaking see \textit{Tht.} 150d-151b, where Socrates describes how he matches up students with the sophist most fitting for them when his \textit{daimon} prevents him from taking them himself. When political rule is not an option, the philosopher-statesman, perhaps, engages in philosophical instead of political matchmaking, educating the populace in the hope that they will one day accept philosophical rule.}

Socrates also makes important use of axiological and hierarchical relations grounded in function properties. These relations were missing from Theaetetus’ definition of powers—and rightly so, due to the mathematical nature of the target. The
absence of these relations from the Stranger’s account of human being and *politikê*, however, proves problematic, as I explained above. At 150ab Socrates explains that the function of ordinary midwifery is *less important* than his (ἐλαττων δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος) because women do not, like his patients, sometimes bring forth phantasmal offspring (ἐἴδωλον καὶ ἐἴδοδος, 150c; ἐἴδωλα, 150b) which are hard to distinguish from true offspring (γόνιμον τε καὶ ἀληθές, 150c; ἀληθινά, 150b). If women did do this, ordinary midwives’ greatest and most beautiful function (μέγιστον τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον) would be distinguishing true and not true.45

This explanation is puzzling, however. How does this truth determining function make Socrates’ art more important? Assuming that Socrates grounds this judgment not in mere difficulty, Socrates’ reasoning may be something like this. Ideas are soul’s offspring and, unlike human offspring, may be true or false, genuine or phantasmal. Also unlike human children, ideas remain part of and serve to structure their producer, the soul. For a soul to be genuine requires that it be structured by true and genuine ideas.46 This clarifies Socrates’ art’s importance. Its *greater* importance is perhaps because human body, unlike soul, is part of human nature but not an essential part, which explains why human children are not sometimes phantasmal. A child born with a physical defect, in other

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45 It is possible that *elatton* has a purely quantitative meaning here rather than the axiological sense (‘less important’) which is important for my reading. In that case, Socrates would be saying that ordinary midwifery is lesser in the sense that it possesses one less function than Socrates’ art, namely, discerning true and false products. If it did do this, Socrates says, this would be its greatest (*megiston*) and most beautiful (*kalliston*) function. Two things favor the axiological reading. First, *megiston*, which seems to go with *elatton*, must have an axiological sense; the quantitative meaning would not make sense. Second, consider Pltc. 285d-286b where the Stranger distinguishes between the greatest things (μεγίστως οὖσα καὶ τιμώτατα, 285e4; κάλλιστα δὲ τὰ καὶ μέγιστα, 286a6) and lesser things. Here the use of *megiston* is obviously axiological and the basis for the axiological difference has to do with the greatest things being bodiless and imperceptible. In the *Theaetetus*, on my reading, Socrates uses a similar basis for marking off his art as more important, namely, because it has imperceptible soul rather than body as its object.

46 See Sph. 226a-231b, from the Noble Sophist section, for the effects of ignorance and vice on the soul’s structure. At 228ce ignorance is likened to a disharmony and deformity of soul.
words—say, bulging eyes, snub nose, or even a missing limb—is still a human child\textsuperscript{47}. If, on the other hand, intellectual soul is what human beings \textit{truly} are and intellectual perfection is the human function, while body is merely instrumental (that is, subordinated to and ruled by intellect’s function), then humans require true and genuine ideas not just to have a genuine soul but to be genuinely human. This would render philosophical midwifery more important than ordinary midwifery.

On this reading Socrates grasps human being as a complex whole the parts of which are structured by a particular end (intellectual perfection), making human being a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. That is, human being is not just soul and body; proper human being requires a soul properly structured by \textit{epistêmê} that rules over a compliant body. Socrates uses this idea of human being as a complex whole as the ground for differentiating related arts as different in kind: one cares for soul, the other body. He also uses the hierarchical and axiological relations that obtain among those parts as the ground for establishing that his own art is better than ordinary midwifery. The Stranger’s flawed conception of human being as wholly corporeal blocks both these moves in the \textit{Statesman}.

Socrates’ account in this way remedies the absence of hierarchical and axiological relations from Theaetetus’ account of powers and shows us how to rectify the \textit{Statesman’s} dialectical errors. Additionally, if my reconstruction of Socrates’ conception of human being is correct, he builds on Theaetetus’ notion of \textit{dunamis} by intimating how

\textsuperscript{47} Socrates’ claim that ordinary midwives do not judge newborn infants for truth or falsity, for being genuine or phantasmal, is quite striking, since exposure of newborn infants for physical defects or some sort of unviability was surely not uncommon. Socrates’ odd claim perhaps suggests that midwifery, as commonly practiced, is in error. The only thing that makes for a defective human is a defective soul, which cannot be discerned until much later. \textit{Cf.} \textit{Pltc.} 210b2-4, where the Stranger claims that most people practice matchmaking in marriage for the production of children in the wrong way.
human being’s parts, like Theaetetus’ lines, may combine to form a whole that is more than its parts’ sum.

Finally, Socrates makes another kind of axiological distinction of maximum importance for the *Sophist* and *Statesman*: differences of worth grounded not in kind of function but in ontological deficiency or genuineness. Consider how Socrates differentiates kinds of matchmaking, one of midwifery’s functions (149d-150a). Midwives are the cleverest matchmakers, most skilled in pairing men and women for the sake of producing the best children, and of all their skills take their greatest pride in this one. They avoid matchmaking, however, because there is an unjust and artless (ἄτεχνον) kind of bringing together of men and women called pandering (προαγωγία) and they fear being accused (τὴν αἰτίαν) of engaging in it.

Socrates makes clear that pandering suffers axiological inferiority to midwifery’s matchmaking, yet the nature of this inferiority differs from that suffered by ordinary midwifery relative to intellectual midwifery. Ordinary midwifery’s inferiority is due to its object being less important than soul, intellectual midwifery’s object, in the make-up of human being. Its lesser worth reflects no internal deficiency; ordinary midwifery is a bona fide art that serves several important functions. Pandering, by contrast, engages in precisely the same activity with respect to the same object as midwifery’s matchmaking but does so in a different way: unjustly and without expertise. This explains, it seems, why Socrates characterizes pandering as not merely some other kind but a counterfeit and debased kind of matchmaking. It belongs only to those who are really midwives (ταῖς γε ὃντος μαίως) to practice matchmaking correctly; and panderers, Socrates implies, are not
really midwives. This language marks the instances as ontologically defective due to their lack of expertise and justice. Presumably the kind too suffers ontological defect, not qua kind but perhaps insofar as it has no nature of its own, no being auto kath’ auto. Its being is entirely parasitic on that of midwifery’s matchmaking. Socrates’ definition seems to indicate this by defining pandering in terms of matchmaking: pandering is unjust and artless matchmaking.

Socrates’ axiological differentiation of midwifery’s matchmaking from pandering prepares us for the treatment of ontological deficiency in the Sophist and Statesman. First consider the linguistic evidence for this connection. Socrates uses what the later dialogues reveal as philosophically marked language, namely constructions with ὄντως. Distinguishing those who are really midwives (ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις) from those who are not looks forward to Socrates’ distinction in the Sophist between counterfeit philosophers and those who are really philosophers (οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἄλλ’ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, 216c). This also anticipates the Stranger’s distinction in the Statesman between real statesmen (τῶν ὄντως ὄντων πολιτικῶν, 291c) and the leaders of regimes that are not genuine or even really real (οὐ γνησίας οὐδ’ ὄντως οὖσας, 293e). The matchmaker/panderer relation, I suggest, presages in this way the Sophist’s philosopher/sophist relation and the Statesman’s statesman/demagogue relation.

Socrates’ account also matches up thematically with what we find in the Sophist and Statesman. As is the case with real midwives and their counterfeits, real philosophers

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48 Th. 150a in full: οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα διὰ τὴν ἄδικον τε καὶ ἀτεχνὸν συναγωγὴν ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικός, ἂ δὴ προσγεία ὄνομα, φαινομενικαὶ καὶ τὴν προκομητικὴν ἄτε σεμνὰ ὀνομαί aι μαίαι, φοβοῦμεν μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐξέσεσθαι: ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις μόνης που προσήκει καὶ προνήμισανα ὀρθῶς.

49 Plato’s imagery also conveys that sophistry and demagoguery are not merely different in kind from philosophy and statesmanship but perverse forms of the latter. At Pltc. 292a8 &ff, the Stranger describes the sham statesmen as comprised of non-human beasts and half-human creatures, a band of lions, centaurs, and satyrs. In the Sophist the sophist is described throughout as a wild beast they are trying to track down (e.g., 226a, 231a).
and statesmen are difficult to distinguish from their sham versions. The reason for this difficulty, however, the later dialogues do not explain clearly. Read in light of Socrates’ account of matchmaking, however, we can see that it has to do with knowledge or ignorance of ends. Sophists and demagogues do precisely the same things with respect to the same objects as the genuine article but, like the sham matchmaker, without knowledge or expertise and thus unjustly. The knowledge they lack that results in defective activity is of human being’s end or function. I argue for this in detail in chapters 4 and 5. Here it suffices to note that the sham matchmaker brings men and women together not, like the real matchmaker, for the production of the best children, the right and honorable end, but, Socrates intimates, for mere sexual pleasure, an improper and shameful end. We see the matchmaker and panderer performing the same action—bringing men and women together for intercourse—but since the ends that structure that action, as well as the presence or absence of knowledge in the actor, are imperceptible, we often mistake one for the other. In the Statesman the Stranger similarly explains that the demagogue tries to do the same thing as the genuine statesman. For example, he deviates from the written laws when he discerns what seems to be a better course of action, just as the genuine statesman does. Yet because he merely apes the statesman’s

50 Socrates describes the difficulty of distinguishing philosophers from sophists (and statesmen) at Sph. 216c-217b. At Pltc. 291a-303e the Stranger undertakes the task of separating the genuine statesman and true regime from their perverse versions, a task he describes as altogether difficult (παγχάλεπον, 291c6).

51 The Stranger also refers to sham matchmakers, namely, those who marry off their children for the sake of wealth or reputation instead of for the sake of producing good children, which requires attending to the congenital traits of potential parents (Pltc. 310ad). The true matchmaker must grasp what parental mixtures result in good offspring. The goodness of a child, moreover, is determined by how well the child’s congenital dispositional makeup conduces to learning and intellectual development. Theaetetus, as we have seen, seems to instantiate a marvelous mixture of courage and gentleness that is optimal for intellectual development. Additionally, this is another way in which ordinary midwifery is subordinate to philosophical midwifery. Its matchmaking function aims to produce the proper dispositions in the mortal soul of offspring so that they are properly disposed for cultivation of their intellectual soul through education. Ordinary matchmaking in this way ensures that the statesman has the right material for his political matchmaking.
actions without grasping what structures and guides those actions his actions turn out altogether badly. The knowledge he lacks, I argue in chapter 5, is of human nature and its end, which is needed to properly structure and govern the polis.

On this reading, then, Socrates also differentiates arts axiologically in terms of ontological deficiency or genuineness. From his account we can, moreover, discern that this axiological and ontological determination is grounded in the nature and end of the object: an art is genuine only if it knowingly promotes and preserves the object’s good. The genuine expert must thus have a deep understanding of his object’s nature, which requires a knowledge of the end that structures that nature, to properly perform his art and should be able, as Socrates does here, to differentiate it from counterfeit kinds based on this understanding. Socrates’ account, I suggest, in this way provides valuable insight into the nature and grounds of axiological judgments that play a critical role in the Statesman’s differentiation of politikê from counterfeit rivals (292a8 &ff).

If this is correct, then Socrates’ account of his midwifery serves to midwife the interrelational epistemology by employing the very definitional principles that comprise it. He not only properly employs enumeration of elements and differentiation to account for his art, as Theaetetus did in his account of powers; the content of his differentiations

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52 See Pltc. 301b10-c4, for example. Knowledge of ends may also explain a curious feature of the Sophist. The first six divisions that seek to track down the sophist seem, as commentators have noted (e.g., Notomi (1999: 43-73), Brown (2010)), to capture the philosopher as well, or at least some aspect of philosophy. This makes sense if philosopher and sophist do the same things but for different reasons and the first six divisions attend to perceptible capacities (like bipedal locomotion) rather than invisible ends. Also, as I argue in chapters 3 (for the sophist) and 5 (for the demagogue or tyrant), the end that ersatz experts pursue is mortal soul’s desire for pleasure, honor, and so on. These ends, however, must be subordinated to intellect’s desire for goodness and beauty. We also see the importance of ends for technê and how adjudicating between ends allows us to distinguish genuine arts from their counterfeit in the Gorgias, at 464b-466a. Socrates here distinguishes technai, which aim at the good, from kinds of kolakeia, all of which aim at some sort of pleasure, regardless of the food. Each of the latter he describes as masking themselves in the appearance of some particular technê. The pastry chef, for instance, masquerades as the doctor, pretending to know the foods that are best for the body. Unlike the doctor, however, the pastry chef is actually ignorant of this and gives the people what they desire rather than what they need.
also contains the hierarchical and axiological relations that were absent from Theaetetus’ account. Socrates’ account even contains a conception of human being as a complex whole structured in terms of function that serves as the ground for his axiological and hierarchical differentiation of his art from other arts. Insofar as Socrates presupposes the same conception of human being that the Stranger must struggle to acquire in the Statesman and employs it, as the Stranger does, as the ground for differentiating his target art from other arts, Socrates may also be said to midwife the Statesman.

Socrates’ account, however, fails to do two important things. First, he properly employs definitional principles—enumeration of elements and differentiation—that he has not philosophically grounded. Second, both enumeration and differentiation presuppose pluralism and thus the problematic notion of not-being. Socrates’ use of differentiation, in fact, employs not-being not only in the sense of otherness, which is problematic in itself, but also in the even more problematic sense of ontological deficiency. Chapter 3 tackles the problem of not-being, showing how the Sophist provides partial resolution to the not-being problems that the Theaetetus leaves unresolved. For their full resolution we must await the Statesman. In the final section of the present chapter I show how Socrates, in the Theaetetus’ final act, philosophically grounds the aforementioned definitional principles by providing an enumeration and differentiation of the elements of logos, enumeration of elements and differentiation.

2.5. Socrates’ Dream and Logos of Logos (201c-21b)

In this final section Theaetetus finally provides the kind of definition Socrates had requested at the beginning; that is, an intensional one like Socrates’ definition of clay as ‘earth mixed with water’. Knowledge, Theaetetus claims he once heard someone say,
is true judgment with a *logos*; a true belief without a *logos* is outside of knowledge, while things which have no *logos* are unknowable (201cd). Socrates requests that he explain the difference between knowables and unknowables. Socrates presumably wants him to explain why some things have no *logos* while others do, which requires knowing what a *logos* is or what it means to provide a *logos*. Theaetetus confesses he cannot. By his own definition of knowledge, therefore, even if his definition hits the mark perfectly (and Socrates seems to confirm it does: what else could *epistêmê* be, he asks besides a *logos* and true judgment?), he has only a true judgment about what knowledge is. For he cannot add a *logos* to his true judgment that knowledge is true judgment with a *logos* due to his ignorance of *logos* itself. This, presumably, is why Socrates refers to Theaetetus’ definition as a dream: in the *Statesman* the Stranger suggests a merely true belief is like a dream compared to *epistêmê*’s wakefulness.\(^{53}\) Socrates, in fact, seems to prophesy the failure of his own account in calling it a dream in return for Theaetetus’ dream (ἄκοντε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὄνειρατος, 201d).

If Theaetetus and Socrates are to awaken from this dream of knowledge they must provide two things. One is a *logos* of *logos*. All their efforts—Socrates’ dream theory as well as each of the three accounts of *logos*—fail, but fail fruitfully.\(^{54}\) For the dream theory’s (invalid) argument against structured wholes calls our attention to the crucial importance of structured wholes and their difference from sums. This is vital; for in the *logos* section Plato intends us to see that a proper *logos* is comprised of each of the three

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\(^{53}\) *Pltc.* 277cd and 278e. See Burnyeat (1970) for an account of the possible sources for the dream theory. Burnyeat rejects the possibility that Antisthenes is the dream theorist but later (1990: 164-73) entertains the possibility that Socrates is making creative use of Antisthenean materials. We might just as well see Theaetetus himself as the source of the dream theory’s materials, if my thesis is correct that this final section is an attempt to justify philosophically the principles Theaetetus and Socrates have already employed in their previous accounts.

\(^{54}\) For other interpretations that take the *Theaetetus*’ failure to be only apparent see, for example, Cornford (1957), Fine (2003: 225-251), Polansky (1992), Chappell (2005). Sedley’s (2004) multi-level reading of the text offers a complicated form of this thesis similar to what I offer here.
kinds of *logos*, that is, that *logos* itself is a structured whole comprised of functional parts not merely of subkinds. The failure to see this, I suggest, is due to Socrates’ argument against structured wholes. In fact, they fail to see that their discourse enumerating *logos*’ parts (discursiveness, enumeration of elements, difference) and differentiating them provides a *logos of logos* and the philosophical grounds required for a true understanding of the definitional principles that Socrates and Theaetetus have previously employed. Although Theaetetus fails to put the pieces together, Plato has Socrates provide the reader with the resources for doing so and in this way midwifes both the interrelational epistemology and the *Statesman*, where we see the interrelational epistemology fully deployed. The second thing required to arouse Socrates and Theaetetus from their dream of knowledge, however, the *Theaetetus* does not provide even *in embryo*. For to turn their true belief about what knowledge is *auto kath’ hauto* into knowledge of knowledge, *epistêmê* of *epistêmê*, they must, by their very own definition of knowledge, add to it a *logos*. And on my interpretation this means completely enumerating and fully differentiating from *epistêmê* from everything related to it. For this we must await the *Statesman*.

2.5.a. Socrates’ Dream (201d-205c)

Socrates provides the account Theaetetus could not; he just as quickly demolishes it. It was, after all, a mere dream in return for a dream. According to Socrates’ dream theory, complexes or syllables are knowable because they can be explained in terms of their elements and thus have a *logos*. Elements or letters, however, are atomic. For this reason they cannot be explained in terms of more basic components and have no *logos*.55

55 At the conclusion of the dream theory Socrates rejects this asymmetry of knowability. Fine (2003: 235-42) argues that he rejects asymmetry of *logos* and enumeration of elements as well. One significant difference between Fine’s
Socrates destroys the theory by attacking the asymmetry in knowability, beginning with the unknowability of elements which, I argue, Plato intends to call attention to the importance of structured wholes.

Socrates queries Theaetetus: if asked ‘What is SO?’ (τί ἐστι ΣΩ, 203a), what would he answer? Theaetetus replies that he would say ‘S and O’, which would serve as the logos of the syllable. Theaetetus would thus have knowledge of the syllable, but the individual letters, being indivisible and hence without logos, remain unknown. Socrates, however, is not so sure. If, he reasons, the syllable is both the letters or, if there are more than two, all the letters, then if we know the syllable we know the letters, in this case S and O. So according to the dream theory Theaetetus knows the syllable (SO) and hence S and O and is at the same time ignorant of S and O, a conclusion that is terrible and alogos, as Theaetetus describes it. We must therefore reject the theory’s asymmetry in knowability; if the syllable or complex is knowable, so too are the letters or elements.

Commentators have found Socrates’ own reasoning similarly alogos. According to Burnyeat and Sedley, Socrates’ reasoning is fallacious. He makes an illicit substitution instance in an opaque context by holding that if one knows SO one also knows S and O. This is like arguing that if one knows Theaetetus one also knows the son of Euphonius. Fine explains Socrates’ reasoning more innocuously: he assumes that

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interpretation and my own will be that Socrates retains enumeration of elements as one of the three principles comprising logos. As I have previously explained, the elements of an extensional analysis may still be complex intensional wholes (as the collections at the conclusion of divisions seems to show) and thus candidates for enumeration.


57 Or if Socrates knows the son of Euphonius, as Socrates does (Th. 144bd), then one knows Theaetetus, as Socrates does not. Th. 144bd may, perhaps, serve as evidence that Plato was not unaware of the linguistic based fallacies commentators have tried to saddle him with, e.g., assuming that if one knows X one knows X under all descriptions.
knowledge must be based on knowledge.\textsuperscript{58} If we know the syllable based on the its elements then we must know the elements also. I agree that Plato subscribes to some such notion, but we need not speculate on assumptions to explain Socrates’ reasoning. The present passage provides all we need. Theaetetus has agreed that the syllable \textit{is} all the letters rather than a some single idea arising from them. Socrates apparently assumes that this ‘is’ is the ‘is’ of identity and hence that complex wholes (like syllables) are identical to (all) their parts. If this is so, then if I know the syllable SO, I also know each of S and O simply because there is nothing else—such as relations between parts—to know except for the letters or elements.\textsuperscript{59}

Socrates’ assumption that all wholes are alls or sums of parts has consequences just as terrible for my interpretation of the interrelational model. For this would mean that any true judgement about what X is (identity) would be not only necessary for knowledge of X but also sufficient.\textsuperscript{60} There would be no work for the \textit{logos} to do. If I believe, for example, that human being is body and soul, and this is true, then I would have epistêmê of human being. On my construal of the interrelational model, however, this would remain merely a true belief until I enumerate all of human being’s parts and account for the relations in which each part is enmeshed. Enumeration, even of all X’s parts, is necessary but not sufficient for epistêmê of X. That this assumption is at work in Socrates’ first attack on the dream theory and that Plato intends us to be suspicious of it becomes clearer in Socrates’ second attack.

\textsuperscript{58} Fine (2003: 225-51).

\textsuperscript{59} Harte (2005: 32-47) for a similar interpretation and defense of Socrates’ reasoning.

\textsuperscript{60} That is, if a whole is identical to its parts’ sum, a true belief about what X is (identical to) presupposes a grasp of X’s parts. So there is nothing left for \textit{logos} qua enumeration to do.
The only other option for the dream theory is, ostensibly, for the syllable or complex whole to be a single form arising from the parts. Paradoxically, this means that the syllable or complex whole must be a sheer one, somehow containing the letters but not as parts of it. For if it consisted of parts it would be identical to all the parts, since the whole is the same as the sum or all. But the first prong already showed this to be untenable for the dream theory since it renders the parts as knowable as the complex. On the other hand, if the complex is a sheer one, possessing but not consisting in parts, it is indivisible and hence as unknowable as the elements. The dream theory thus dissolves under Socrates’ scrutiny, unable to maintain its asymmetry in knowability between complexes and elements.

The second prong’s argument is valid but Plato obviously wants us to see that its conclusion is false, for it implies that nothing is knowable. Plato in fact takes pains to flag the false premise for us: that the whole is the same as the sum or all. For Theaetetus’ dogged resistance to Socrates’ identification of whole and sum, which Socrates now argues for explicitly beginning at 204b, seems to be a sure sign that the reader should likewise be uncomfortable with this identification. In fact, although Theaetetus never provides here a precise formulation of what the whole would be if not the sum, he already possesses this insight, although he does not truly grasp it yet, if my interpretation of his geometry lesson is correct. In section 2.2 above we saw that Theaetetus has some understanding that the whole may be comprised of but not reducible to its parts. For a square comprised of powers for sides, he noted at 147c-148b, possesses a property

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61 See McCabe (1994: 158-61) for an interpretation that takes the dream theory to shift from an assumption of ontological plentitude to ontological stinginess, a dialectical movement that structures all the main sections of the Theaetetus. The trick is to find the proper ontological mixture of pluralism and monism.

(commensurability in area with the one unit square) that its parts do not. This still murky insight perhaps triggers Theaetetus’ resistance here.

In any case, Socrates also provides several bad arguments for the identity of whole and sum or all intended to trigger the reader’s suspicions of this identity. To establish this identity Socrates first shows that every all is equal to its number by providing three examples. Six is equal to its number of units; how those units are grouped or called (e.g., twice three, thrice two, and so on) is irrelevant. The same goes for all things comprised of number (204d1-2). The stade, for example, simply is its number. These two unproblematic examples set us up for the absurd third: an army is identical to its number (204d). If this were the case then the Achaeans scattered would be the same as the Achaeans properly drawn up in battle lines. Or, an army commanded by an expert general would be the same if commanded by a layman. Expertise would be irrelevant; yet we know from the Statesman (304e-305a) that Plato posits generalship as an important art. An army is a structured whole; it has a number of units but, unlike a sum or all, it is hardly reducible to that number.

After establishing that an all or sum is identical to its number, Socrates then claims that the number of anything is its parts. So an all or sum is equal to all its parts. Yet this, Socrates argues, means that the all or sum must be the same as the whole. For the all is that from which nothing is lacking and this is precisely what the whole is. For that from which something is lacking is neither whole nor all (205a). This argument is clearly fallacious. The fact that X and Y share a necessary condition does not imply their identity. That no part be missing is necessary for both the model airplane kit and the

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63 Or, say, the army with a gravely injured Theaetetus on the way back to Athens would be the same as one with a healthy Theaetetus in Corinth. See Harte (2005, chapter 1) for an interesting interpretation of this position as a form of Parmenideanism that also has a strong resemblance to modern theories of composition.
model airplane to be whole. Yet, although this is also sufficient for the former to be whole, it is insufficient for the latter, which also requires those parts to be arranged and connected in a certain way. Socrates’ bad arguments serve, I suggest, to intimate to the reader a third option for the whole’s nature, the middle way between the extremes of heapish plurality and sheer unity: structured wholes.

In identifying the all with the whole Socrates has mistaken a part (that is, one kind of whole, the all) for the whole, which in fact has two subtypes: the all and the structured whole. This particular part-whole mistake about the nature of wholes themselves is particularly dangerous because it blinds us to the possibility of making certain part-whole mistakes. One might, for example, think that logos itself is identical to its parts, the three kinds of logos, and not consider the possibility that perhaps logos is a structured whole comprised of functional parts, like an army, wagon, or human being. Such a mistake would prevent us from grasping that discursiveness, enumeration of elements, and an account of difference work together, each making a necessary contribution in accounting for anything, including logos itself. Such a mistake would thus prevent us from providing a proper logos of logos and prevent us from knowing knowledge. Precisely this, I suggest, accounts for the inquirers’ failure to provide a logos for Theaetetus’ true judgment that knowledge is true judgment with logos.

2.5.b. The Dream’s Aftermath (206ac)

Socrates’ analysis has shown that either the elements are just as knowable as the complexes or the complexes are just as unknowable as the elements. Both options contradict the Dream Theory’s characteristic asymmetry of knowability between elements and complexes. Socrates suggests that we abandon the Dream Theory’s
asymmetry in knowability and accept instead that not only are both elements and complexes knowable but that elements are more intelligible than complexes. Socrates offers no argument for this; instead he appeals to our experience in learning the art of grammar. The starting point was trying to distinguish *grammatikê*’s elements, each letter in and of itself (*auto kath’ hauto*), in order not to be confused by the arrangement of letters when spoken or written. In other words, our grasp of the individual letters was prior to and necessary for our understanding of the more difficult to discern syllables.

This short passage is surprisingly rich in significance. Most important for present purposes is the possibility that Socrates now jettisons enumeration of elements as a definitional principle, which would wreck my claim that the three kinds of *logoi* from this section are functional parts of a structural whole and together explain what it means to give a *logos*. For Socrates insists now that we can know elements but does not explain how we know them. If elements are knowable and we retain the notion that knowledge requires a *logos* then it seems we must jettison enumeration of elements, since elements qua elements obviously cannot be accounted for in terms of more primitive components.

What kind of *logos* then replaces enumeration of elements? Although Socrates never addresses this question explicitly, Fine contends that Plato has Theaetetus give us a

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64 Our grasp of elements is clearer (*ἐναργεστέραν*) and more authoritative (*κυριωτέραν*) than our grasp of complexes or syllables (206b). I take this asymmetry in intelligibility to be Plato’s answer to a vicious form of circularity that would infect this whole/part epistemology if parts and whole were equally knowable. For in the next section we learn that one of the lessons of the second version of enumeration of elements is that knowing the part requires knowing the whole, while knowing the whole requires knowing the parts. If the parts or elements are more intelligible than the whole, however, this allows us a way out of the circularity. We get to wholes via their simpler parts but do not really grasp those parts until we grasp the whole. Cf. Fine (2003: 248-51). Circularity is an important part of Fine’s version of the interrelational model but she seems not to see the significance of this passage for circularity problems. For her coherentist version she posits that the mutually justifying propositions that comprise a belief set or expertise must be sufficiently large in number to render the ineluctable circularity virtuous. But there is no hint of this in Plato’s text.

65 As Fine (2003: 235-42) suggests. My interpretation of the Dream section is heavily indebted to Fine’s. My rejection of her rejection of enumeration of elements is one major point of difference, however.
glimpse of the answer at 203b. After accounting for the syllable SO in terms of its elements, S and O, Socrates then asks for a *logos* of each of S and O. Theaetetus claims that this is impossible, for one cannot give the elements of an element. Sigma, he explains (203b2), is one of the voiceless letters, a mere sound like the hissing of the tongue. Beta, like most of the elements, has neither voice nor sound. Even the clearest of the elements, the seven vowels, have only voice, but no *logos*. According to Fine, Theaetetus in this way (unwittingly) gives an account of sigma not by enumeration but by explaining it in terms of other parts and elements belonging to the same field, accounting for how they are the same and different, as well as for rules of combination. To grasp any element completely, to have *epistêmê* of it, however, requires accounting for it in terms of *all* the other members of that field. The one who does that has expertise in that field.

My own interpretation of the interrelational epistemology follows Fine’s in all these details, but with significant additions and qualifications that I explain below. Here I only note that, unlike Fine, I take Plato to retain enumeration of elements for several reasons. First, it would be odd for Plato to jettison enumeration of elements here, before the second version Socrates provides at 206e-208b, which I analyze in the next section. Second, there is no need to reject enumeration of elements. We need only abandon the very marked notion of element utilized by the Dream theorist, according to which elements are sheer unities, having only a name. In fact, what Fine describes as a complete account of relations among a field’s parts or elements requires two kinds of enumeration: 1) of that field’s parts and elements and 2) of the parts and elements of those elements.

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66 Rules of combination enters rather surreptitiously in the second enumeration of elements analysis section, as we see in the next section. Socrates there smuggles in an important structural notion that renders the whole more than a mere sum of parts. This is an element of Plato’s interrelational epistemology that Fine does not fully exploit. She construes structural relations along the lines of coherentism, that is, as logical relations among the propositions that comprise a belief set or expertise. On my interpretation these structural relations are more akin to those found in complex wholes comprised of functional parts, like wagons and human beings.
1) should be clear: to account for the relations among all the parts and elements of a complex field presupposes an enumeration of all that field’s parts and elements. To account for sigma Theaetetus divides the genus, letter, into two subkinds, voiced and unvoiced. He then further divides the unvoiced into those with and without sound, and finally, after identifying sigma as an unvoiced letter with sound, differentiates it from the other members of this subgenus by describing it as a “noise like the hissing of the tongue”. Theaetetus thus sketches out a system of relations among the parts and elements of letter, but to do so requires an enumeration of those parts and elements. Moreover, this division of letter as a structured extensional whole is at the same time an enumeration of sigma’s parts and elements, the elements of an ‘element’, as described in 2). For the analysis of letter also enumerates sigma’s intensional parts, giving us what it is auto kath’ auto (an unvoiced letter with a sound similar to hissing). From this angle of inquiry, letter serves as an element of sigma taken as a complex intensional whole.

All this should sound familiar for what I have just sketched is the method of division from the Sophist and Statesman whereby one divides a complex whole successively into its parts until one reaches the target and then gathers up those parts that belong to the target, which serves as an enumeration of its intension. To reach politikê, for example, we would divide knowledge into practical and theoretical, then theoretical into directive and non-directive, and so on until we reach politikê. Going in the reverse direction, enumerating the more comprehensive kinds to which politikê belongs, gives us politikê’s intension: a directive theoretical art. Plato, I suggest, intends us to see

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67 As I have noted already, what counts as an element will thus be relative to the angle of inquiry.

68 In fact, given a complete analysis of letter, in addition to grasping what sigma is auto kath’ auto we can also draw upon that analysis to add a rich logos to sigma that enumerates all the other parts and elements of its field and explains their relations to sigma. Voiced letters or vowels, for example, are not just different in kind but also more clear than unvoiced letters and have a different function.
Theaetetus (unreflectively) using the same method we find in the later dialogues, of which an important component is enumeration of elements.

On my interpretation then, contrary to Fine, not only does Plato have no need to jettison enumeration of elements; we also have evidence from the trilogy’s later dialogues that enumeration of elements is an important definitional principle.

2.6. Enumeration of Elements Revisited (207a-208b)

With the destruction of the Dream Theory the inquirers need another logos of what is meant by the proposition that the most complete knowledge is a logos attached to a true judgement. To answer this they need to take another stab at a logos of what logos is (206c). Socrates proffers three different kinds of logos, each of which fails. What Plato wants us to see, however, is that this failure is not absolute; each is merely insufficient to turn a true belief into knowledge. The three kinds of logos are, in fact, the severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for that proper logos needed for knowledge. As such, they provide us the blueprint for the interrelational epistemology as we see it deployed in the Statesman.

This section focuses on the second kind of logos, another version of enumeration of elements. Socrates’ analysis, I argue, shows not only that enumeration is merely insufficient but also reveals what is required to remedy that insufficiency: complete knowledge. To know anything, in other words, one must know everything, which requires a complete enumeration and differentiation of knowables. The motivation for this extreme position—and an important part of my interpretation of the interrelational

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69 In this I build on Burnyeat’s (1990: 209-18) analysis. My attempt to improve on that analysis will consist in providing the motivation for subscribing to such an extreme formulation of epistêmê and showing how all this is closely intertwined with the Statesman.
epistemology—is function properties. Lastly, I show how Plato weaves into this passage threads from the *Statesman*, creating a fabric that unifies the trilogy philosophically.

The first *logos*, vocal expression of one’s thought with names and verbs (206de), Socrates dismisses in short order. For, since anyone with normal cognitive capacity can do this, it fails to separate true judgment properly from knowledge. *Logos* qua vocalization simply does no work. Although insufficient, however, the capacity to vocalize is, for Plato, necessary for a knowledge-haver.\footnote{See McCabe (2007: e.g., 266-81) on the necessity of joint inquiry, which presupposes capacity to verbalize true judgments. The *Statesman*’s myth (272bd) seems to convey the necessity of joint inquiry, too, which obviously requires the capacity to give and receive *logoi*. See also *Pltc*. 286ab on the need to be able to give and receive *logoi*. At *Pltc*. 286ab, as previously noted, the significance of the capacity to vocalize judgments in the sense of giving a discursive *logos* becomes clear. For here the Stranger distinguishes between lesser, perceptible things for which an ostensive definition suffices and the greatest things which require a discursive *logos*.}

Socrates’ second try is another version of enumeration of elements: to know anything requires adding a complete enumeration of elements to a partial analysis. If, for example, I account for wagon by naming its parts (“wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke”, 207a), this constitutes merely a true belief until I account for wagon in terms of its most basic parts, what Hesiod calls the “one hundred timbers of the wagon”. Socrates gives a second example, again using the grammar analogy. It would be absurd to think that someone knows Theaetetus’ name who merely provides the syllables. This merely constitutes a true belief. He must also be able to write out the letters in that order (ὄταν ἐξῆς γράφῃ, 208b) to have *epistêmê*.

Before analyzing Socrates’ rejection of this definition consider several important ways this is an improved version of enumeration of elements. First, Socrates smuggles in a notion of structure. In the second example one must not only provide a complete enumeration of letters but also arrange them in their proper order (ὄταν ἐξῆς γράφῃ, 208b). Socrates thus jettisons without comment the assumption that all wholes are mere
sums of parts. This should add to our suspicions regarding Socrates’ genuine 
commitment to this premise in the Dream Theory. Secondly, note how the addition of 
intermediate levels of analysis prevents true belief + logos from collapsing into merely 
true belief, the problem of the first version of enumeration. Here the logos makes a real 
contribution when added to true belief by explaining the target in terms of components 
more basic than those used by true belief. Intermediate analysis, in fact, seems to be what 
Socrates explicitly offers as the important innovation that salvages enumeration as a 
definitional principle.71 The solution that Socrates implicitly offers, I suggest, is structural 
relations grounded in function properties.72

For not only does structure do similar work separating true belief from 
knowledge; it also seems more fitting for things like wagons. For we may posit that 
someone who enumerates wagon’s intermediate parts has merely a true belief, not until 
his analysis goes further down, but rather unless he is also able to order or structure those 
parts. The nature of the parts Socrates lists (“wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke”), moreover, 
immates that this ordering would consist in differentiating the parts in terms of parts’ 
function properties and explaining how they work together to fulfill wagon’s cause or 
function. Even if Plato holds that a complete analysis must go all the way down, as it 
were, to ordered primitives (and he does seem to hold this73), nevertheless, the deeper 
lesson to be learned here, I suggest, which Plato makes us work for, has to do with

71 Thus Burnyeat (1990: 209-18), who takes intermediate levels of analysis also to be a possible solution to the problem of false judgement, analyzed but left unresolved by the inquirers in the earlier section on knowledge as true belief.

72 Sedley (2004, 168-74) has a similar interpretation; see esp. pg. 171, where Sedley emphasizes that in this iteration of enumeration of elements the elements are functional parts and are known by grasping their function within the whole. Sedley takes this to explain the second occurrence of enumeration of elements. The elements of the original version in the Dream Theory were primitive material components, according to Sedley.

73 Such as we find in the Timaeus’ account of the formation of solid structures out of ultimate triangles at 54d-55c.
structure and function. That is, even if one grasps all the elements, to have *epistêmê* one must also be able to order them—and an essential feature of that ordering will be function properties. This will gain in persuasiveness when I return to the wagon example just below.

Even this improved version of enumeration turns out (207b), alas, to be merely a dream. One still lacks knowledge of X, Socrates claims, if either of the following obtain:

1) one sometimes thinks that X belongs to one thing but at other times to something different; or
2) one thinks now one thing, now another belongs to X. Socrates illustrates the second example, again appealing to our experience learning to spell: I may spell Theaetetus’ first syllable, ΘΕ, correctly but misspell it as TE when spelling Theodorus’ name. This error, Socrates claims, indicates I do not know the part, ΘΕ, and thus do not know the whole, ΘΕ-ΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. We thus have a situation where I have a true judgment and a *logos* enumerating and ordering elements but still lack *epistêmê* (208b).

First note that Socrates’ counterexample merely shows the insufficiency of the improved version of enumeration. The remedy, however, is extreme. For now knowledge of a whole (call this implication KW), as Socrates’ illustration of 2) shows, requires being able to arrange its parts and elements not only as they occur in that whole but also as they occur in every other whole. Additionally, it follows from 1) that knowledge of a part or element (call this implication KP) requires that one grasp its relations to other parts and elements not just in some one whole but in every whole in which it occurs. Both KW and KP thus force the *logos* outside the bounds of a particular framework, forcing us to account for a much more extensive set of relations. Yet the motivation for this extreme

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74 This may also serve as an illustration of the first example. I do not really know the letter or element Ε if I put it in the right syllable (ΘΕ) when spelling Theaetetus but in the wrong syllable (ΤΕ) when spelling Theodorus.
position is puzzling. Read in light of the *Statesman*, however—and Plato intimates we should, as I explain below—it becomes clear that Plato subscribes to the extreme position and what his motivation is.

Consider the wagon example again. Revised enumeration required adding a complete enumeration and arrangement of wagon’s elements to a true belief enumerating wagon’s intermediate parts (wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke). Yet now, if we accept KP, and wagon is itself a part of a more extensive whole, such as the polis, then we must also be able to ‘spell’ it correctly as it occurs in that whole. The wainwright would then have to possess an understanding that extends beyond his own field, having the capacity to explain how his art and its object relate to each and all of the other arts and their respective objects that comprise the polis.

This position, though extreme, makes better sense if Plato takes complex wholes and their parts to be structured teleologically, that is, by function properties or final causes, and takes true expertise to be infallible. For if the proximate end of the wainwright’s art is the production of good wagons, but the *ultimate* end of each and all the arts is the generation and preservation of the human good, then true expertise in wagon-making needs a complete grasp of the human good. And this presumably requires understanding how the arts work together to achieve the good. Otherwise the expert wainwright may err. He may, for example, squander raw materials on wagons when they should be devoted to the production of arms, such as in war time.\(^7^6\)

\(^7^5\) Burnyeat (1990: 215-17) provides a deduction of the extreme conclusion that does not appeal to function properties.

\(^7^6\) That technicians may cause harm instead of good as a result of not understanding the wider significance of their respective art we see in both the *Statesman* and *Phaedrus*. In the *Statesman* (303e-305e) the Stranger explains that even the higher arts, such as generalship, require the statesman’s guidance. The general, for example, knows how to conduct war but not when and in what circumstances to do so. Only the statesman grasps this. The *Phaedrus*’ (274c-275b)
Plato, in fact, provides an account of wagon-making along these lines in the *Statesman*. At 287b-289b the Stranger provides an account of the city’s arts that do not craft the object itself but are necessary for its production, which he calls contributory causes (συναρτίους) and which he distinguishes from those that directly produce the object, which he calls causes (αἰτίας). The wainwright’s art he explains as one of seven contributory arts distinguished from the others in terms of its object, which he explains in terms of its final end: a vehicle (ὄχηµα), considered as a whole (πᾶν), is for the sake of some supporting base (τινος ἐφέδρας), always serving as a seat for something (θάκος ἀεὶ τινι γιγνόµενον, 288a).

The wainwright’s art, like its object, is not an end in itself, however, but is for the sake of other, more comprehensive ends. Plato intimates this by having the Stranger rearrange his enumeration of the seven arts at 289a7-c2. The most just (δικαίωτατα) arrangement, the Stranger says, would be to place raw materials first, then tools, vessels, vehicles, defense, paidiá, and nourishment. The Stranger leaves it to us to see that this arrangement would be most just because raw materials are needed to craft tools, and tools are needed for the other arts like vessel- and wagon-making which are for the sake of defense. The first six arts, in fact, are all for the sake of the seventh, the nourishing arts, while the contributory causes as a whole are for the sake of bodily well-being, a part of the human good.

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77 The distinction is made initially at 281de in the *logos* of weaving.

78 The original order of analysis is: tools, vessels, vehicles, defenses, paidiá, raw materials, nourishment. Also, the Stranger makes clear that the reordering of the art’s objects at 289ab is also a ranking of their respective arts themselves.
So, if KP obtains, this is rather disheartening news for the would-be wainwright. For in addition to needing to enumerate the elements internal to his own art and to account for how they work together to fulfill his art’s end, he must also grasp his art in terms of the more comprehensive whole of which it is a part, the contributory causes, and its end. And this requires enumerating all the other contributory arts and grasping how they work together with wagon-making to fulfill the whole’s end, bodily well-being. Without an understanding of this external network of relations the wainwright’s actions may harm rather than promote bodily well-being.

Now consider two further implications of KW and KP that we discern only in the Statesman. First, the contributory causes as a whole are for the sake of the causes, which promote human virtue. Together these two wholes thus form a yet more extensive whole of which the wainwright’s art is an element. By KP, the wainwright must know all the causal arts also, having the capacity to enumerate them and explain both how they work together for the sake of human virtue and how the causes and contributory causes work together for the sake of the end of the whole, eudaimonia. Yet this means that to know any art one must know all the arts—as well as the end, eudaimonia, that structures them. If each and all the arts does have the whole human good, eudaimonia, as its ultimate end, however, this extreme implication is more palatable.

Second, if all the arts ultimately aim at the human good, a structured whole, as just described, and this is grounded in human being’s complex nature, then the expert must, presumably, have epistêmê of human being. The Statesman reveals human being, as I argue in chapter 4, as a complex of living body governed by intellectual soul. Now,

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79 This as well as the subsequent claim that the end of the polis as a whole is eudaimonia is not explicit in the text. In chapter 5 I provide detailed argumentation for taking the city’s structure to reflect the structure of human being, with some arts devoted to bodily nourishment, others to soul’s moral and intellectual perfection.
given revised enumeration, to know human being one must be able to enumerate and arrange its elements, body and soul. Yet, given KW, even if I have the true belief that human being is comprised of body governed by intellectual soul, I do not have epistêmê of human being unless I can also provide a logos of those elements as they occur in other wholes. This is bad news for the would-be wainwright if the cosmos is a complex whole comprised of body and intellect, as we, in fact, learn in the Statesman. For then expertise in wagon-making requires expertise in cosmology also. In fact, if everything is body or soul or a mixture of both, then to know anything one must know everything. If so, then to be an expert one must be a sage—or be ruled by a sage. The Statesman, as I argue in chapters 4 and 5, provides evidence that Plato subscribes to these extreme positions which have very important political implications. The formal principles, KW and KP, that underlie these positions and that we find here in the Theaetetus, however, Plato never explicitly canvasses there. The Theaetetus in this way prepares us for the Statesman.

If this analysis is correct, then Socrates’ second logos of logos, despite apparent failure, provides epistemological insights of great importance. It shows that revised enumeration is indeed insufficient for epistêmê but also gives us the tools for working out the necessary supplement: complete enumeration and differentiation of knowables. This, I suggested, makes sense if the genuine expert, for Plato, is infallible and fallibility is caused by incomplete knowledge. With the Theaetetus’ wagon example Plato even intimates functional properties or ends as the motivation for accepting principles that demand infallibility beyond the confines of a particular expertise. I suggest that Plato uses the wagon example in this way to prepare us for the Statesman’s teleological
account of the polis and, by including wagon-making in that account, to serve as a thematic echo calling attention to the dialogues’ linkage.

As applied to the object at hand, *logos*, in addition to enumerating *logos’* elements—discursiveness, enumeration, differentiation—one must also be able to say how these elements differ in terms of function, explaining how they work together to achieve the whole’s end. Given the above analysis, one would also have to grasp how that end works to achieve any more comprehensive ends. One obstacle, already dealt with above (4.2.b), to grasping *logos* in this way is Socrates’ argument against a whole being more than the sum of its parts. The other is Socrates’ argument for the futility of differentiation as a definitional principle, to which I now turn.

2.7. Differentiation (208c-210b)

Socrates offers a third and final definition of *logos*. One has a *logos* of X if and only if one has the capacity to indicate the mark by which the object in question differs from everything else (τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν ὧ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν, 208c). Despite its initial promise this definition too comes up short—if we accept Socrates’ arguments. I suggest that the maieutic method that we have seen Plato use in previous sections is at work in this final passage also.80 That is, the failure of differentiation as a definitional principle is only apparent. Plato leaves it to the reader to deliver the proper understanding of differentiation but provides the tools for achieving this as well as textual evidence that links this passage to a critical passage in the *Statesman*. The *Theaetetus*, I argue, prepares us for what the *Statesman* makes more explicit: that differentiation may be partial or incomplete. But for knowledge it must be

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80 As Fine (2003: 244-47) notes, this final definition has not received much attention in the literature. For Fine its importance has mostly to do with the problem of circularity it calls attention to, the same sort of vicious circularity that *Theaetetus’* first definition suffers from. The trick, according to Fine, is to come up with a virtuous kind of circularity.
complete and an essential part of this differentiation is grounded in function properties. If correct, this is yet one more way in which the *Theaetetus* serves as midwife to the *Statesman*.

Socrates undermines the legitimacy of differentiation as a definitional principle by setting up a dilemma. If to know any X requires adding to a true judgment about X an account of its difference from everything else then either 1) the account of X’s difference is redundant or 2) the differentiation requirement results in a circular definition of *epistêmê*. The account of X’s difference is redundant and thus unnecessary because the necessary condition for judging X is also a sufficient condition for knowing X. For, Socrates claims, simply to have a judgment about X as opposed to anything else I must already have in mind the property by which X differs from everything else and not some common property. For example, if I have as the object of my judgment the human with snub nose and bulging eyes, my judgment will be about Socrates and any other human with these properties as much as it is about Theaetetus. Yet if I do judge having Theaetetus’ unique property in mind, I also know Theaetetus. This account of difference dissolves the difference between true judgment and knowledge.

One can avoid this outcome by positing that it is possible to have a true belief about X’s difference but that to know X one must *know* the difference. Yet, as Socrates notes, this results in a circular definition of knowledge: knowledge = true belief plus knowledge of the difference.

Socrates’ argument relies on several dubious assumptions. He seems to assume that judgment of X requires a complete grasp of what X *is*; he believes this perhaps because he assumes that what X *is* is comprised of some unique property. Yet if 1) what
X is a complex of essential properties, then this would allow for a partial grasp of X that allows for judgments about X while still falling short of knowing X. Or, if 2) there is some fact uniquely about X that follows from but is not a constituent of X’s essence, then by grasping this fact it is possible to have X in mind in some vague fashion without also knowing X. 81

The Statesman provides examples of both cases. By 268c the Stranger and Young Socrates have a true belief that is uniquely about human being: human being is a bipedal herd animal. Yet this falls short of knowledge because it omits human being’s intellectual soul and thus constitutes merely a partial grasp of human being. Even a complete inventory of what human being is—a complex of body and intellect—would, presumably, be insufficient for knowledge. For if Plato also makes certain teleological assumptions—and he, in fact, does, as I argue in chapters 4 and 5—then human being’s difference from other things may consist not only in possessing a unique property or set of properties but also in hierarchical and axiological relations that obtain as a result of having those properties. If intellect is nobler than body and for this reason has rule of body as one of its functions, then this may provide grounds for human being differing axiologically from other things. Swine, for example, due to lack of intellect, would be worse than and subservient to human being, which possesses intellect, just as body is subservient to, because worse than, intellect. The Statesman in this way exemplifies 1), that is, how it is possible to have a true judgment uniquely about X while still falling

81 This may allow us to avoid the redundancy problem but does it not impale us on the circularity problem? Requiring that one must have a complete grasp of X’s difference that allows one to differentiate X completely from everything else seems to amount to the requirement that one know the difference. I address this directly in the conclusion, where I appeal to Socrates’ claim of asymmetry of intelligibility between wholes and parts as a defense against the circularity charge.
short of knowledge of X because lacking a complete account of X’s difference from everything else.

A second important stretch of *Statesman* text provides evidence for 2). By 276c the Stranger’s division has separated *politiκê* from other kinds of herding—it is a directive kind of theoretical knowledge aimed at care of human herds—and even from other kinds of expertise in care of the human herd: its care is for the whole human community, and no other art would make this claim (*ἐπιμέλεια δὲ γε ἀνθρωπίνης συμπάσις κοινωνίας*, 276b). This grasp of *politiκê* allows us to have a belief uniquely true of it although it still falls short of knowledge. The shortfall, the Stranger claims, is due to the account of the difference using a property—care for the whole human community—that is too vague, resulting in a *logos* like a picture (*ζῶον*, 277c) merely sketched in outline without the vividness that comes from the mixing of paints. At the parallel point in the weaving division (279b-283b) the Stranger says that they would be saying something true about weaving but not clear and complete (τι ἄληθές, οὐ μὴν σαφές γε οὐδὲ τέλεον, 281cd) if they distinguish it as ‘the greatest and finest’ (τὴν καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην πασῶν, 281cd; μέγιστον...μόριον, 280a) of the arts aimed at clothes production. Weaving will not be sufficiently differentiated (ἰκανῶς ἦσται διωρισμένος, 281cd) until they peel away all the other arts that contribute to clothes-making.

The Stranger’s diagnosis of vagueness is itself vague. It is clear, however, that the requisite vividness must come from a detailed mapping of the whole teleological structure of arts that care for the human community that explains how statesmanship’s function works with that of the other arts to care for the human community. Given the
nature of human being in which that structure is grounded—intellect which, because nobler, rules body—this will include accounting for axiological and hierarchical differences among the arts. Arts that attend to body’s care, for example, will be inferior to and thus ruled by those that attend to soul’s virtue. Best will be that art that completely grasps human being and the human good as a whole and for this reason rules the others and in this way cares for the whole human community.

That such an account is needed is clear for several reasons. At 277c the Stranger likens their true belief about politikê (the greatest of the city’s arts that care for the human herd) to a picture (ὦσπερ ζῷον) which requires internal coloring to be added to its outline. He later likens the community of arts to a sacrificial animal (οἷον ἱερεῖον, 287c) that must be divided limb by limb, that is, according to its natural joints or functional parts. Plato in this way has the Stranger call our attention to the pun on ζῷον (picture/animal), clarifying that what the city qua ζῷον lacks is its teleological guts. The Stranger’s subsequent teleological account of the city’s structure (287b-311a) bears this out (see 280a-283b for the teleological logos of clothes making). The details of this account I provide in chapter 5. Here it suffices to note that, given a teleological structure, it is possible to have a true belief uniquely about X that falls short of knowledge of X because it fails to completely differentiate X from everything else. Complete differentiation requires detailing how X functions in relation to everything else in that teleological system and accounting for the axiological and hierarchical relations that obtain between functional properties. Important to notice is that this complete differentiation will require a complete enumeration of elements also.
The *Theaetetus*, despite its apparently failed account of differentiation, prepares us for these developments in the *Statesman*. It intimates, I suggest, the teleological content of accounts of difference. The accounts of both politikê and weaving, as we just saw, first form a belief uniquely true of the target but one that differentiates it with insufficient clarity from arts that share the same end. To provide the requisite clarity the Stranger provides a teleological account of the complete system of arts structured by their shared end. In the *Theaetetus*, at the beginning of the discussion of difference, Socrates uses the sun to provide a definition by differentiation: the sun is a heavenly body that goes around the earth (true belief) and of these it is the brightest (difference) (208d). Socrates never comes back to apply his later criticisms to this definition. Plato leaves it to us to see that any true belief uniquely about the sun presupposes a grasp of its difference as the brightest of the heavenly bodies; and that to a true belief that is uniquely about the sun—that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies—but too vague must be added a teleological logos of the whole system that enumerates all its elements and accounts for the unique function of each, including the sun’s, and how those functions relate to one another. Read in the light of the *Statesman* we expect but never get the requisite complete teleological account.

Even without the *Statesman* in mind, however, Socrates’ use of the sun should seem hardly fortuitous. The sun is obviously a philosophically loaded, indeed, teleologically freighted, image. Plato has Socrates use it here, I suggest, to put us in mind of the *Republic* where the sun is described as that on which visible things depend for visibility, generation, and nourishment. It is very similar to the Good, its father, but the Good does different work; it is the ground for intelligible things’ intelligibility, being,
and ousia (Republic 509bc). Plato’s allusion to this Republic material intimates to the reader the inadequacy of the proposed definition of the sun and the necessary supplement: an account of the teleological significance of the sun being the brightest of the heavenly bodies, which, to be complete, presumably includes differentiating it from the other heavenly bodies’ functions. The sun would, no doubt, also have to be differentiated from the Good, in terms of which everything’s intelligibility is intelligible.

Finally, circularity is not a problem. Our definition does not presuppose a grasp of the definiendum (knowledge), which would be problematically circular because uninformative: knowledge means a true belief plus a complete grasp/knowledge of the difference. Rather, it explains that a complete grasp of X’s difference means a complete enumeration and differentiation. We do, however, seem to have a circular genetic account: to know the whole one must know the parts and to know any part requires knowing the whole, namely, all the other parts and their relations. Yet asymmetry of intelligibility (3.2.c. above) renders this circularity unproblematic: we get to complex wholes via their simpler, more intelligible parts.

On this analysis, then, Plato intends us to see that differentiation, despite its apparent futility, is to be preserved as a definitional principle. The Theaetetus, in fact, not only prepares us for the important use of differentiation in the Statesman to define politikê and weaving; it even intimates the essential work it does in accounting for

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82 Cornford (1935) usefully explains the teleologic significance of the sun in his Timaeus commentary (see esp. pgs. 83 and 131), but does not tie this to this passage from the Theaetetus in his (1935). Also consider how Plato describes the sun in Epinomis (986e): “Of these three [the sun, the morning star, and an unnamed third] the one with sufficient intelligence [the sun] must be leader.” (Cooper’s (1997) translation). Cornford calls attention also to Albinus (Didasc. XIV.6): Ἡλιός μὲν γὰρ ἤγερσεν ἡγεμόνας πάντων, δεικνύς τε καὶ φαίνων τὰ σύμπαντα.

83 To grasp weaving, for example, requires grasping all its sub-arts and how they work together to achieve weaving’s end. Yet to grasp any sub-art requires grasping weaving as a whole and its end, that is, understanding how that sub-art works with all the other arts to achieve weaving’s end.
teleological systems like those found in the *Statesman*, if the above analysis of the sun example is on target.\footnote{Namely, the cosmological myth in the *Statesman* which the Stranger introduces by appeal to old tales about the sun reversing course once upon a time.}

2.8. Conclusion

In light of this analysis we may offer an amended definition of knowledge as ‘true belief plus a *logos* qua complete account of the difference’. Also, my interpretation above of the *Statesman* passage maintained that the ‘*logos* qua complete account of the difference’ means articulating a complete enumeration and differentiation of the parts and elements belonging or related to the target. If this is so, then Socrates and Theaetetus have provided the *logos* of *logos* needed for an understanding of what knowledge is *auto kath’ hauto* but that Theaetetus was unable to provide. For over the course of 207a-210b they have provided a discursive account enumerating and differentiating the elements of *logos*: discursiveness, enumeration of elements, and differentiation.\footnote{Notice how Plato calls our attention to this at 208c. After the apparent defeat of revised enumeration Socrates says one of the three kinds of *logos* still remains (τὸ λοιπὸν ἐδοξάς τῶν τριῶν). Theaetetus confirms this count, saying there is still one left (ἐὰν γὰρ ἐν λοιπῷ). After this enumeration he then differentiates the two they have already accounted for and asks what the third is, which turns out to be differentiation (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν διανοίᾳ ἐν φωνῇ ὀσπρὸς ἐξωλοκόν, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον διαφανὲς ἢ τρίτην υἱὸν ἢ τὸ ὀλον: τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεται). Plato in this way has Theaetetus employ a partial account of account by using the kinds of account together to produce that account. Unfortunately Theaetetus does not realize that he has used *logos* as a whole of functional parts (so *logos* is not a mere sum), the key insight of this last act. He even uses differentiation despite the fact that this is the remaining definitional principle of which Theaetetus seems to be ignorant. This passage intimates not only that *logos* is a whole of functional parts, all of which work together to achieve *logos’* end. It also shows us 1) that differentiation is possible, despite the subsequent failure to account for it, 2) that it is possible to have something in mind without knowing it (Theaetetus has differentiation itself in mind but obviously does not know it), 3) that Theaetetus is pregnant with much more than he realizes and than Socrates lets on.}

This does not give them knowledge of knowledge, however. It does not even give them a proper understanding of what knowledge is. For their account articulates the elements of *logos* and differentiates them, but the content of this differentiation does not include function properties. It does not explain *logos* as a complex whole structured by function, the parts of which work together to achieve some common end, and thus falls
short of a complete *logos of logos*. Socrates’ arguments against such wholes presumably obstructs this insight; Theaetetus’ resistance to and reluctant acceptance of those arguments indicates he is, after all, pregnant with something more than mere wind eggs. Presently, however, he falls short of the full grasp of *logos*, a part of knowledge, and so falls short of knowledge of knowledge.

Important to note is that even had they provided the complete *logos of logos* required for their definition of knowledge as ‘true belief with a *logos*’, they would still have fallen short of knowledge of knowledge. For by the revised definition of knowledge, to know knowledge requires adding to their true belief about what knowledge is a *logos* that articulates an enumeration and differentiation of all the parts and elements belonging or related to knowledge. If knowledge is a complex whole of arts as functional parts, like a wagon, then to know knowledge would require a complete enumeration and differentiation of these parts. The *Statesman* provides such an account of knowledge the bones of which we also glimpsed in Theaetetus’ first definition of knowledge.

By reflecting on the definitional principles already employed by Socrates and Theaetetus in their accounts at the beginning of the dialogue, the *logos of logos* section does, however, provide something of a grounding for those principles that figure prominently in the subsequent dialogues’ method of division. Socrates’ analyses even work out for us the extreme implications those principles have for knowledge (on Plato’s conception of them at least) and intimate the teleological assumptions that motivate Plato’s adoption of such a model of knowledge. All of this, I have argued throughout,

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86 In the language of the *Republic* the Theaetetus’ dialectical movement is back toward rather than from first principles. Dorter (1994), one of the few to provide an interpretation of these dialogues (including the *Parmenides*) as a unified whole, takes the *Republic*’s Divided Line as the structural principle that organizes the dialogues. See also Dorter (1999) for a treatment of these issues but with a focus on the *Statesman*. 
serves to midwife the interrelational epistemology despite the dialogue’s apparent failure. The *Theaetetus* in this way prepares us for the *Statesman*, where we see the full interrelational epistemology deployed in all its complexity and where we learn the practical and political implications of this extreme model of knowledge. One implication already canvassed is the rarity of genuinely virtuous individuals and of true experts that would obtain if complete *epistêmê* is a necessary condition for virtue and expertise and is as difficult to achieve as the above analyses claim. With the more detailed exposition of the interrelational epistemology provided in this chapter we can better appreciate just how great an achievement was the adult *Theaetetus’* if he did acquire genuine virtue—and how great a loss his death was for Athens. If this analysis of *Theaetetus* and of the *Theaetetus* is correct, then, despite the apparent failure of both, it would be fair to say that the *Theaetetus* midwifes the *Statesman* just as its inquiry ultimately midwifes the statesman in *Theaetetus*, despite its apparent failure.

The *Theaetetus* also falls short in several important ways. It fails to provide an innocuous sense of not-being which is required not just to account for false judgment but also for the important notion of complex wholes and the definitional principles, differentiation and enumeration, used to account for them. All these things presuppose ontological plurality and the ability to say that one thing is not some other thing. In his midwifery account, in fact, Socrates, as we have seen, uses not-being not only in this

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87 Socrates, on my reading, is one such individual. He claims, as we have seen, an expertise for himself (section 2.3) and that expertise seems to be grounded knowledge of human being as a complex whole of functional parts, which anticipates the *Statesman’s* conception of knowledge. If having one expertise requires having them all and grasping human being requires a grasp of everything else (as my analyses in 3.3 and 3.4 have argued), then in Socrates we seem to have the genuine statesman, who has complete knowledge of all the knowledges and of human being. If so, then a case could be made that Socrates’ account of his midwifery is a concealed account of statesmanship. This serves to prepare us not just for the *Statesman* but for the statesman. Plato, in other words, in this way gives us practice in recognizing the genuine statesman and distinguishing him from counterfeits who do the same thing. In the sequels, as I detailed in the previous chapter, the trick is to see that the Stranger and Socrates, despite their different methods, are the same, for their actions are structured by the same end. Both are concealed philosopher-statesman.
sense of otherness but also in the even more problematic senses of ontological and axiological deficiency. In the next chapter I show how the *Sophist* provides a partial resolution to these problems bound up with not-being, the full resolution and significance of which we find in the political context of the *Statesman.*
Chapter 3: The Worth of the Sophist

3.1 Introduction

In the Theaetetus’ Midwifery Digression, as we saw in chapter 2, Socrates uses the interrelational epistemology and a model of human being as a complex whole to account for his expertise. He fails, however, to provide an account of not-being. Yet he must. For one thing, he fails to account for not-being in the sense required for false judgment. Yet if false judgement is impossible, so too is expertise, including Socrates’ philosophical midwifery. Second, Socrates’ accounts of human being and the arts presuppose pluralism: different parts (body and soul), so different arts (intellectual and ordinary midwifery). So he needs an innocuous account of not-being as difference that allows him to say that one thing is not, that is, is different from, another. Thirdly, Socrates needs to account for not-being in a more problematic sense: as ontological deficiency. For his hierarchical distinctions between arts seem to presuppose ontological difference: ordinary midwifery is less important than intellectual midwifery because its object, body, is ontologically defective. He makes more explicit use of ontological defect

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1 The Stranger’s claim at 217bc (that they must undertake the inquiry into the sophist rather than the philosopher or statesman first) seems odd because we would expect the philosopher to be defined first, if the sophist is an imitator of the philosopher and thus must be defined in terms of the philosopher (Cf. M. Frede (1996)). That the Sophist accounts for not-being as otherness or difference, which we need to account for not-being as falsity, might explain the Stranger’s claim, however. For the sophist denies the very possibility of falsity and thus the very possibility of expertise, taken as the capacity to produce eikones of truth rather than false appearances. So if we want to maintain that the philosopher and statesman are experts while the sophist is not but merely imitates experts, we must first address the sophist’s challenge to the very possibility of expertise.

Additionally, although the Stranger does not provide a full account of the philosopher, he does offer up important aspects of the philosopher (e.g., seeking after truth and being) in terms of which the sophist can be defined. As I explain below, only in the Statesman, however, do we get the complete account of the statesman (the philosopher in his political context) in terms of which to define the sophist (in the form of the factionalists, the greatest of the sophists) as not just an imitator of the philosopher-statesman but as an ontologically defective philosopher-statesman. Cf. Notomi (1999), who takes the proposed inquiry to suffer circularity, since, according to Notomi, a grasp of the sophist presupposes a grasp of the philosopher, and vice versa. Notomi bases this thesis on the assumption that the philosopher/sophist relation is an analogue for the being/not-being relation (based on 253c-254b). The circularity of the latter the Stranger seems to indicate by suggesting that to get clear on not-being we also have to get clear on being (243be; see also Owen’s (1971) “parity assumption”). Circularity may obtain among the greatest kinds, like being and not-being, yet this is not necessarily the case for particular kinds, like sophistry and philosophy. For one thing, the fact that sophistry is an imitation of philosophy (Sph. 268c) indicates an asymmetry between these two kinds that does not seem to obtain between not-being and being.
in his account of panderers: they are not really midwives but counterfeits, as I explain in more detail below. Without not-being as ontological defect we cannot distinguish better from worse, good from bad, counterfeit from real.

Of these issues Socrates explicitly addresses only not-being’s role in false judgment, which he leaves in aporia (188a-200c). Plato signals to us that we should see Parmenides’ shadow here and, as I contend, in the passages sketched above by having Socrates pointedly refuse to refute Parmenides (183ce). So there is good reason to see the Sophist as completing the Theaetetus’ unfinished business. For in the Sophist we see a philosopher from Elea just as pointedly take on Parmenides, claiming to commit parricide by violating father Parmenides’ embargo on not-being (241d). To account for sophistry as an art that produces phantasms or falsity, which presupposes not-being, he accounts for an innocuous sense of not-being as difference. This account of not-being allows us to account for sophistry’s product, phantasms of truth or falsity, in terms of which it is defined. It also allows us to say, although the Stranger himself does not, that sophistry is not (is different from) philosophy since philosophy produces a different product, eikones of truth.

The Sophist’s worth, however, is not what it seems. For the Stranger nowhere explicitly accounts for not-being in the sense of ontological deficiency. Yet he must. For sophistry is not just some different art from philosophy, as the Stranger’s account would have it. Rather, as Socrates intimates in the frame, sophistry is ontologically defective philosophy and so not really philosophy. As I detail below, it does the same thing as philosophy but for the wrong, not merely a different, end. To establish this the Stranger

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2 See McDowell (1973), for example, who takes the Theaetetus’ aporetic passages and ending to be the result of Plato’s genuine puzzlement over the dialogue’s epistemological puzzles, which Plato more successfully addresses in the Sophist.
needs to tell a story about human being, something like this: that human being is a complex whole of hierarchically arranged parts: intellect, because divine, rules body, which, due to ontological deficiency resulting from its inherent unlimitedness, needs to be limited by intellect to really be. This would allow not only for different arts (different parts, different arts), but also for distinctions in worth: intellect-arts’ ends are more important due to intellect’s greater worth, so whatever ends body may have must be subordinated to intellect’s. It also gives us the needed ontological difference: an art is genuine only if structured by the proper ends. And if all the arts have intellect’s ends as their ultimate end, a body-art unstructured by intellect’s end or an intellect-art structured by one of body’s ends is a defective art.

This is, at least, a rough sketch of how the Statesman uses human being’s hierarchical structure to ground a hierarchical framework of ends that allows us to map out axiological relations among arts and to distinguish between genuine and sham arts. Socrates presupposes such a story in the Theaetetus to ground the axiological and ontological distinctions he uses to account for his midwifery in the Theaetetus. The Stranger’s failure to provide such a story hamstrings his ability to account for sophistry as ontologically defective philosophy and thus prevents him from defining sophistry properly. The Sophist is thus itself a sophist, the success of its inquiry a mere illusion. The Sophist in fact depends on the Statesman for completion, just as the sophist’s definition and appearing wise depend on the philosopher.

Despite its definitional failure, the Sophist makes a number of contributions important for the Statesman, which shall be the focus of this chapter. For although the Sophist never accounts for the sophist as an ontologically defective philosopher, Plato has
Socrates clearly intimate in the frame (216a-218b), as I argue in 3.2, that we should\(^3\) and gives us the textual tools for working out how we might provide such an account. This prepares us for the *Statesman* where to properly define the statesman we must differentiate him not only from other, less important experts, but also from counterfeit statesmen in terms of ontological deficiency (they are not *really* statesman, despite appearances).

Two important passages in the main inquiry also prepare us for the *Statesman* and provide us important tools for accounting for ontological defect. In 3.3 I argue that the Stranger inserts into the sixth division a contradiction intended to trigger our reflections on how to account for the nobility that distinguishes this sophist from his base relatives\(^4\). The lesson he intends us to learn is that to capture such distinctions requires a value-sensitive method, which division is not. Also, to ground such distinctions requires a conception of human being as a complex whole of parts structured hierarchically. The model of human being at work in the sixth division, however, is a human heap model. This reveals the *Sophist*’s deficiency while also preparing us for the *Statesman*, where the

\(^3\) The closest the Stranger comes to this is his contrast of philosopher and sophist at 253c-254b, which some take to explain the absence of the promised *Philosopher* dialogue. See, e.g., Frede (1996), Notomi (1999) and Gill (2012) for versions of this thesis. An obvious difficulty for such interpretations is the Stranger’s statement at the end of this passage that they will soon investigate the philosopher more clearly, if they should still wish to do so (254b). The conditional provides some wiggle room: perhaps they find this sketch sufficient and have no desire to pursue it further. The Stranger’s statement makes clear, however, that there is more they can say or more precise formulation to be had about the philosopher. On my interpretation, which I detail in chapter 4, the missing *Philosopher* reflects the impossibility of the purely philosophical life due to the parlous nature of our inescapable material conditions. In such conditions, the philosopher has a duty and a desire to produce as much goodness, beauty, and *eudaimonia* for his fellow humans as possible. If so, Socrates’ three kinds turn out to be one. Both sophist and statesman are defective forms of philosopher, but the nature of that defect is crucially different. The sophist suffers internal defect, a soul unstructured by *epistêmê*, while the statesman’s life is less than ideal due to parlous material conditions. Cf. Frede (1996: 149-51) who takes both sophist and statesman to be sham philosophers.

\(^4\) Most commentary has focused on whether or not the noble sophist is a disguised philosopher or merely a well-meaning sophist, but sophist nevertheless. The answer, since this is an obvious portrait of Socrates, determines whether this serves as an apology for or gentle deflation of Socrates. For works focused on these themes, see, Kerferd (1954), Trevaskis (1955-6), Gooch (1971). Although I address these questions, my primary concern shall be to show how this passage provides an important preview of the *Statesman*’s hierarchical system of arts and the conception of human being that grounds it. Notomi (1999) treats the passage, as do I, in terms of the wider context and themes of the dialogue.
Stranger deploys the great myth as a supplement to division to account for human being as an hierarchically structured complex whole, which then serves as the basis for sorting out the arts axiologically and in terms of ontological deficiency (as I show in chapters 4 and 5).

The second passage (235b-236d), which I tackle in 3.4, provides a more direct contribution to our grasp of ontological deficiency, that is, of how something can be X but not really. The Original-Eikôn-Phantasm distinction (OEP) provides us a general metaphysical framework and the language for articulating not-being as ontological deficiency in a way that is innocuous and unobjectionable to Parmenideans. This will be important once we have the teleological framework or hierarchy of ends in the Statesman that allows us to say that some supposed expert is not really an expert in X because his soul and actions are structured by the wrong ends. The OEP, I contend, gives us the resources to explain this “not really” in an innocuous way not just for sham arts. It also applies to the ontologically defective human beings and regimes we find in the Statesman and, in this way, figures importantly in the political themes we find in that dialogue.

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5 My analysis of the OEP distinction will serve as my very limited foray into the not-being theme. The vastness of the literature and difficulty of the topic obviously preclude a proper treatment of the theme here. A proper treatment of the OEP passage would show how the being/having distinction, which is central to the OEP, looks forward to the distinction made later between being auto kath’ hauto and being pros allo (Sph. 255d). This latter distinction is central to Frede’s (1992) analysis of the Stranger’s treatment of not-being, to which my take on the OEP is heavily indebted. The OEP distinction has received little attention in the literature. Rosen (1983) provides the most extensive analysis, which I criticize in 3.4. Blondell (2006: 314-96) grasps its wider significance as providing a conceptual framework for kinds of imitation, which she uses to frame the notion of philosophical appropriation. Brown (2010: 161-3) takes it not to do much important work in the Sophist.

6 The OEP, I show in chapter 5, provides the framework for the Stranger’s account of deviant regimes and lends bite to his devaluation of them, by opening up an ontological gulf between the proper regime ruled by the true statesman and the other regimes which are mere phantasms. If correct, this makes it hard to swallow the thesis that in his later works Plato shows more sympathy to less than ideal regimes and non-philosophers. See Rowe (2001) for an overview and criticism of this thesis. I follow Rowe in my own interpretation, which I detail in chapter 5. Also see Kahn (1995).
3.2: The Frame (216a-218b): Ends at the Beginning

The Sophist’s inquiry takes place on the day after the Theaetetus, and the participants are the same except for the significant addition of Theodorus’ guest friend, a stranger from Elea, whom Theodorus identifies as a philosopher from Parmenides’ circle.

In response to Socrates’ playfully expressed fear that the Stranger, unbeknownst (ἄγων) to Theodorus, is some sort of elenctic god (θεὸς ὁν τις ἔλεγχτικός), come to refute or expose (ἐλέγξων) them for their worthlessness (φαύλους) in argument (216ab), Theodorus assures him that the Stranger is no such sort (216bc). He is more measured (μετριότερος) than the enthusiasts for eristic (τῶν περὶ τὰς ἠριδας ἐσπουδακότων). Also, although Theodorus believes him in no way to be a god, he does consider him divine (θεῖος), for he calls all philosophers divine. After warning Theodorus about the difficulty of recognizing philosophers (216cd), Socrates persuades the Stranger to provide a logos of philosopher, statesman, and sophist. Beginning with sophistry, he produces five (or six8) divisions ending in definitions of sophistry, at which point the inquiry runs into

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7 In taking the Stranger to be divine but not a divinity Theodorus makes something like a distinction between having a property and being the property, which turns out to be a distinction of special importance to which I return later (3.5). See Rosen (1983) for a close reading of the opening conversation that takes it to set up the framework for the major philosophical themes discussed in the main inquiry. Notomi (1999: 1-26) also treats the frame as philosophically important.

8 The Stranger provides five divisions of sophistry between 221c and 231b. At 225e Theaetetus proclaims that the sophist has shown up for the fourth time as a practitioner of eristic. This makes the final division, the sophist of noble lineage, the fifth. In the summary at 231ce, however, they list six different kinds of sophistry. The problem seems to be that in the summary Theaetetus splits the third division, which the Stranger correctly recalls as defining the sophist as a retailer (see 224de for the division), into two and thus produces an additional division. The third division had taken the sophist in his role as retailer to traffic in both his own and others’ goods. Theaetetus takes trafficking in one’s own good to be a separate kind of retailing. The Stranger perhaps marks this for us with his comment that Theaetetus’ memory is good, which, if my reading is correct, we must take to be ironic. This discrepancy (assuming Plato intended it) may suggest that, by focusing on perceptible properties, i.e., what the sophist does, rather than what the sophist is, the first batch of divisions are comprised of non-essential properties of sophistry. As such they can be arranged in various ways, giving us various looks of the sophist, without consequence. We see something similar in the Statesman, where the Stranger provides a longer and shorter way of dividing human being, the object of politikê (265a-267a). The divisions are focused on human being’s perceptible properties, merely rearrange those properties, and produce equally absurd definitions of human beings. Both ways occlude any difference between humans and swine by ignoring intellect and intellect’s epistêmê as the essential property and organizational principle of human being. The Sophist’s divisions similarly collapse the difference between philosopher and sophist by focusing on perceptible properties (both sophist and philosopher do all the same things) and not focusing on the different ends for the sake of which they perform those
difficulties that set the stage for the problem of not-being that must be solved if the inquiry is to succeed and that comprises the core of the dialogue.

The details of Socrates’ warning (216cd) raise important questions, the answers to which Plato leaves us to puzzle over. First, Socrates distinguishes between real (ὁντως) philosophers and those who feign (πλαστῶς) to be philosophers. This importantly calls attention to ontological difference, yet Socrates neither identifies the ersatz philosophers nor explains what makes them ersatz. Second, Socrates lauds Theodorus’ judgment that all philosophers are divine, but then warns that philosophers are no easier to discern (διακρίνειν, 216c) than gods. Yet he does not explain what makes recognizing them so difficult. If they go about disguised, like the gods, what is the nature of this disguise? Third, he asserts that these real philosophers (not the ersatz sort) appear in all sorts of ways due to the ignorance of the rest of mankind. Yet he does not specify of what the people are ignorant, nor does he explain how this causes them to mistake philosophers for sophists, statesmen, and madmen. Nor does he explain how this ignorance causes differences in axiological evaluations: some think philosophers worth everything, others worth nothing.

Theodorus’ several judgments (216bc), however, in response to which Socrates gives this speech, provide us some resources for answering these questions. Theodorus assumes that no one who is divine and measured engages in eristic. Since all philosophers are divine and measured, no philosophers are eristic enthusiasts (τῶν περὶ τῶς ἔριδας

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9 Socrates suggests that they go about disguised, like the gods described in the Odyssey passage Socrates alludes to (Od. xvii. 485-7), either by their own design or due to the ignorance of the people (which I treat next in 3)). Yet the precise nature of this disguise is unclear, seeing that philosophers obviously do not have the gods’ shape-shifting powers.
ἐσπουδακότων), which Theodorus obviously takes to be some kind of disreputable activity: its enthusiasts are not measured and, a fortiori, not divine. Since the Stranger is a philosopher, Theodorus reasons, Socrates has no reason to fear him being an elenctic (ἐλεγκτικός) god come to refute (ἐλέγξων) them. Theodorus thus ascribes axiological and ontological properties to philosophers and to the enthusiasts for refutation (that is, eristic or elenchus) and uses these properties to distinguish the two kinds. So Plato here too calls attention to these kinds of distinctions in the frame, making their absence in the subsequent inquiry conspicuous and their explicit rejection suspect.

Yet Theodorus also seems to commit a mistake which is as illuminating as it is potentially tragic. He shows no grasp of the difference between eristic and elenchus: he takes Socrates’ elenctic god to practice the same art as the eristic enthusiasts. Yet if elenchus is, in fact, different from eristic and free of the latter’s deleterious properties, then it may very well be an activity that philosophers could engage in or even necessarily engage in. In either case Theodorus would have a flawed measure for identifying and evaluating philosophy’s instances, for his grasp of philosophy itself would be vitiated by his flawed grasp of elenchus itself. This means his judgment that the Stranger is a philosopher, even if true, only happens to be true. Worse, this also means that he mistakes practitioners of elenchus, like Socrates, for mere eristic enthusiasts, and, if elenchus is, in fact, an activity that philosophers necessarily engage in, then Theodorus will mistake elenchus-using philosophers, who are divine, for eristic enthusiasts, who are far from divine. This is bad news for philosophers if this is a common error and eristic is politically disreputable.

10 I suggest later in 3.3 that insofar as elenctic purification is described as necessary for human beings becoming eudaimôn and maximally beautiful, philosophers will necessarily be elenchus-users, given their desire that everything be as good and beautiful as possible.
If this is correct, Socrates’ warning about the difficulty of discerning philosophers seems to be aimed at the shoddy basis for, not the truth of, Theodorus’ judgment that the Stranger is a philosopher. Theodorus’ faulty grasp of philosophy, due to his flawed grasp of elenchus, Socrates hints, puts him at risk of misidentifying philosophers, like the rest of mankind. On this admittedly as yet slim basis we might conjecture that making recognition and valuation mistakes about philosophers results from mistaking a characteristic activity of philosophy, like elenchus, for some other activity, like disreputable eristic, which, we learn later, sophists use. We could then speculate that Socrates’ ‘feigned philosopher’ is the eristic-using sophist. I think these answers are, in fact, on target. Yet they leave much still obscure. The question concerning why philosophers are so difficult to discern, for example, simply gets shifted to elenchus. Why is it hard to differentiate it from eristic? Of what is Theodorus ignorant that causes his conflation of the two activities and puts him at risk of mistaking philosopher for sophist? If the sophist is the ‘feigned philosopher’, what makes him ontologically defective, not really a philosopher? Eristic? If so, then what makes eristic ontologically defective and why does using it rather than elenchus mean its practitioner is a sham expert rather than simply a different kind of expert? Passages from later in the Sophist as well as from the Theaetetus will allow us to answer these questions more precisely and to ground more firmly the speculations above.

A little later in the Sophist, in the fifth and sixth division\textsuperscript{11}, we learn that elenchus and eristic are different. This itself gives us good reason to think Plato wants us to see

\footnote{In the following I will use the count of divisions from the summary at 231ce, according to which there are six definitions.}
Theodorus has made a mistake in the frame. The details of these divisions also help to answer some of our questions. According to the fifth division (225a-226a), eristic is an acquisitive art. Of the acquisitive arts, it is a combative agonistic kind that deals in verbal controversy, pitting argument against argument. It is, further, an art of controversy done in private by means of question and answer, called antilogic (that is, exchange of discourse), unlike the other kind of controversy, forensic, which uses long speeches in public for cases of justice and injustice\textsuperscript{12}. Finally, it is a kind of antilogic practiced artfully (ἐντεχνον), rather than without art (unnamed contract disputation), concerning justice and injustice themselves, distinguished from a like kind of artful antilogic, garrulity, by the fact that it makes money. Practitioners of garrulity waste money. On account of the pleasure (ὁι’ ἡδονη) they take in garrulity, which brings no pleasure to most of the listeners, they let their household go to ruin.

Elenchus, by contrast, the object of the sixth division (226a-231e), is a kind of discrimination that purifies by rooting out false beliefs by using question and answer (230ad). It is done for the sake of, and is necessary for, the patients’ intellectual beauty (227d-228e) and eudaimonia (230e1-4). The Stranger subtly indicates elenchus’ fundamental difference from both types of antilogic by using discrimination for its widest kind rather than acquisition, which he used for the first five divisions. Elenchus is, thus,

\textsuperscript{12} How exactly the politikos might fit into this division is unclear. It might be that the one who practices dikanikê (forensic) is either the politikos or the demagogue. For, as we learn in the final division, both of the latter, like the practitioner of dikanikê, produce long speeches in public (268c). The demagogue, however, is ignorant and dissembles, while the politikos presumably speaks truly with knowledge. The practitioner of dikanikê would seem to match up better with the demagogue, however, since dikanikê, as an agonistic art, is not concerned with truth. If so, in the fifth division we see both the sham philosopher (the eristic) and the sham statesman, i.e., the practitioner of dikanikê or demagogue. (Just below I show how this practitioner of dikanikê matches up with the political man of the Theaetetus’ digression.)

If this is right, then we can see how easy it would be to mistake the true politikos for a demagogue or practitioner of dikanikê, just as the elenchus-user is mistaken for an eristic. What Socrates says in the frame, however, is that philosophers often appear to be politikoi. Since Socrates is speaking here of how philosophers appear to the masses, he must be using politikoi in the vulgar sense. That is, the people often mistake philosophers involved in politics for mere politikoi, practitioners of dikanikê or démologikoi.
an entirely different art from both eristic and garrulity, although each of the three do the same thing, that is, engage in refutation by question and answer. All three act for the sake of entirely different ends, although eristic and garrulity are more similar since they share the same widest kind, acquisition, and penultimate end, victory. So Theodorus did, in fact, make a mistake in taking eristic and elenchus to be the same.

Note further how difficult it must be on this account to distinguish the practitioners of these arts. Perception reports the same data for each, yet the perceptual data are qualitatively different due to being structured by different ends.\(^\text{13}\) Given the imperceptibility of ends, discerning the ends that structure actions is hard even if one grasps the requisite *ousia*, of which the end is presumably a part and in terms of which particulars and their actions must be judged. In fact, grasping *ousiai* and advantage (which, I propose below, is bound up with the notion of ends), we remember, comes about, if at all, only after a long time, with much trouble and education (*Tht.* 187c). So, if elenchus is a skill of the philosopher and very similar to eristic, we can understand why it would be so difficult to discern the philosopher and so easy to mistake him for some other type, like the sophist who uses eristic.

In fact, the Stranger’s division of antilogic into eristic and garrulity seems to constitute such a mistake. There are, perhaps, those who practice antilogic simply for pleasure. That we should count this as an art, however, is dubious. Garrulity, I suggest, is

\(^\text{13}\) Cf. Brown (2010: 165-70), who argues that sophistry is a sham expertise because it has no unique goal or end. All of the first six divisions, she notes, capture Socrates as well, whom Brown assumes to be a philosopher. Division cannot yield a definition unique to sophistry because it is not a real *technē* and has no essence. She criticizes Cornford (1957) and Notomi (1999), who take the seventh division of sophistry as antilogic to successfully define it as a kind of expertise. Working in favor of Cornford and Notomi is that in the final division (264c-268d) the Stranger explicitly offers *phantastikê* (266de) as a kind of image-making expertise and places sophistry within it as a subkind. Brown appeals to Plato’s pedagogical or philosophically constructive use of *aporia* (borrowed from Frede (1996: 143)) to explain such inconsistencies which he intends to disturb us, to stimulate philosophical reflection, and in this way make the reader do the work to arrive at the truth. Although my interpretation differs with respect to the work ends do in the divisions, I offer a similar take on Plato’s use of *aporia* in sections 3.3 and 3.4.
simply how elenchus appears to “the rest of mankind” due to their shoddy grasp of ends.

Some ends, however, are easier to ascertain from perception than others. The masses can perceive, for example, exchanges of money following an action; they then infer from this that the action was done for the sake of wealth. The same action done without an exchange of money they assume is another kind of antilogic, distinguished from eristic by its different end, which they assume must be pleasure. If not for wealth, then for what else besides pleasure could the action have been done? Surely not for reputation or honor: the garrulous man annoys others and his household suffers ruin. The “rest of mankind”, due to intellectual laziness or ineptitude (or disdain for philosophy, as I explain below), have a faulty grasp of human being, I propose. They mistake a part, mortal soul, which desires pleasure, wealth, and honor for the whole. For they live their own lives according to mortal soul’s desires and grasp, accordingly, all others’ actions in terms of mortal soul’s ends. They have no grasp of intellectual soul and its desires for things such as goodness, justice, and beauty, which structure actions for some people. These ends are exceedingly difficult to discern from perceivable actions, so it is no wonder the elenchus-user, who acts for the sake of intellectual beauty and eudaimonia, yet takes no money, is mistaken for a pleasure-seeker due to the public’s ignorance of ends.

Plato encourages this line of thought by working into the description of the garrulous type an obvious portrait of Socrates, since in Socrates we have someone who, like the garrulous type, lets his house go to ruin by spending all his time practicing refutation gratis. Yet, he acts not for the sake of mere pleasure and victory, as the garrulous type seems to do, but, as we learn in the Theaetetus, for the sake of truth and
the good of his interlocutor (*Tht*. 210bc), like the sixth division’s elenchus practitioner.\(^{14}\)

So we suspect that some instances of the garrulous antilogician are, perhaps, really misunderstood elenchus-users, like Socrates. If this is correct, Plato has the Stranger reproduce in this division the very identity mistake that doomed Socrates: mistaking one art, elenchus, for another activity, garrulity, a kind of antilogic easily lumped together with the politically dangerous eristic of the sophist. This is also the very sort of mistake Theodorus commits in the frame which, as Socrates hints, puts him at risk of mistaking philosopher for sophist.

Important to note, finally, is that the Stranger does not differentiate these three skills axiologically in terms of their ends, and for good reason: he lacks the teleological framework required for this which we get only in the *Statesman*. It might be the case, for example, that, as we learn in the *Statesman*, intellectual soul is superior to mortal soul, so those arts and skills aimed at achieving its ends are superior to those aimed at mortal soul’s ends. But we cannot assume this. The Stranger intimates, however, that garrulity seems to be the worst of the bunch because in seeking pleasure the garrulous type ruins his household. Yet, if an apparent garrulous token is sometimes actually an elenchus-user as perceived by the masses, and the elenchus-user seeks the good of intellectual soul, and intellectual soul is more important than mortal soul, then in sacrificing his external goods for the sake of the soul’s goods, the elenchus-user turns out to be better than the wealth and victory seeking eristic. So here we have an explanation for how philosophy can be

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\(^{14}\) Plato perhaps expects us to remember from the *Theaetetus* that Socrates eschews ‘smiting argument against argument’ (τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς λόγοις, *Tht*. 154d), which is a property of both kinds of antilogic. The use of λόγοι πρὸς λόγους at *Spk*. 225a seems to be a deliberate echo to remind us. He also refuses to claim victory, in contrast to the antilogicians (ἀντιλογισταὶ, 164cd), when his argument hinges on questionable linguistic moves. This agonists do (ἀγωνισταὶ, 164cd), who are out for mere victory, by hook or by crook, regardless of truth.
valued by those ignorant of ends as worth nothing. Those with knowledge of its end, the soul’s goods, know it is worth everything.

This story provides answers to all but one of the questions raised above about the frame: what makes the ‘feigned philosophers’ ontologically defective? Philosophers, I have suggested, are elenchus-users and get mistaken for sophists because sophists are eristic-users. For eristic and elenchus differ only with respect to their ends, which are difficult to discern. This is enough to make eristic and elenchus different skills and the arts to which they belong different arts. Yet, if sophists are in fact the feigned philosophers, what we need is a basis for saying that eristic has the wrong end, which makes it a sham or ontologically defective version of elenchus and the art to which it belongs, sophistry, a sham version of philosophy. Two passages from the Theaetetus provide resources for establishing this basis.

Socrates’ digression on the philosophical life (Th. 172c-177c) serves as a rhetorical or dialectical refutation of the moderate Protagorean thesis (171d-172c) that, although advantage (συμφέροντα, 172ac) is objectively determinable, ideas like justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness (καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ, 172a), are culturally relative and thus similar to things like hot and cold, which are relative to the individual perceiver. On this thesis one could acquire what is advantageous to oneself without consideration of the justice or beauty of the acts one uses to acquire it.

15 That is, it could be that Theodorus simply mistook one genuine kind of refutation, eristic, for the whole, which is actually comprised of two genuine kinds of refutation: eristic and elenchus. This in turn puts him at risk of mistaking philosopher for sophist, both of which are genuine arts. We would then have to find another candidate for the ontologically defective ‘feigned philosophers’.
In lieu of a demonstration of this thesis’ falsity, Socrates presents a portrait of two lives, the philosopher’s and the orator’s. The orator would seem to match up with the forensic controversialist of the *Sophist*’s fifth division (225b), distinguished from our antilogicians insofar as he uses long speeches instead of question and answer. Both antilogician and forensic orator, however, are motivated not by truth and justice, but by victory, wealth, and honor. The orator lives a life engaged in the courts’ contests (ἀγῶνες, 172e), seeking what he takes to be his advantage: winning his case by hook or by crook. For he thinks he cannot prevail with truth and justice (173a), so he resorts to lies, flattery, crooked actions, and requiting injustice with injustice (172d-173b). He believes that in winning the contest he saves his client’s life (ψυχῆς, 172e) and preserves his own in the city (176d), presumably via political capital from his successes. Yet in reality his unjust actions disfigure his soul; it becomes small and warped (σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς, 173a), bent and stunted (κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλῶνται, 173b). The lesson seems to be that external goods (honor, victory, lineage, 174b-175b) and the goods of the body (self-preservation) are not ends in themselves; they must be subordinated to the goods of the soul: wisdom, justice, and beauty (176a-177a). An action is advantageous, that is, if and only if done in accordance with these latter goods.

Socrates’ story makes clear that the forensic orator pursues the wrong end, victory by hook or by crook, for it results in ontological defect: a perverted soul. We can infer that the eristic-using sophist, who pursues the same end, victory by hook or by crook, not truth, and differs from the forensic orator only in using question and answer in private instead of long speeches in public, suffers the same ontological defect due to

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pursuing the wrong end. And if all arts are aimed ultimately at the human good, then neither forensic oratory nor sophistry is really an art.

Consider further that the necessary remedy for the orator, according to Socrates, is philosophical investigation of universals like justice and injustice, wretchedness and eudaimonia, grasping what they are and the proper way for humans to acquire happiness and escape misery (175ce). Also required is knowledge of human being itself and what it is proper for such a nature to do or suffer, as distinct from all other natures (174b). The orator (and eristic-user) evidently has an incomplete conception of human being and thus a flawed measure for his actions due to his disdain for philosophy. For his neglect of intellect results in a flawed grasp of intellect itself. His stunted intellect mistakes intellect for mere cunning (δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας, 176d; τῆς δεινότητος, 177a) or instrumental reason, taking it to be the handmaiden of the mortal soul’s desires for external and bodily goods. Yet intellect is the proper sovereign, for it is intellect (διάνοια, 173e) that grasps human being itself and what it is proper for a human being to do or suffer; in terms of this it measures mortal soul’s desires, determining whether to act on them and, if so, how to do so justly. So Socrates’ tale dogmatically asserts, at least. For the proper proof of all this we must await the Statesman’s cosmological myth, which establishes the priority of intellect and its ends.

If this reading is correct, there is good and bad news for the forensic orator. The good news is that forensic oratory, understood as the pursuit of court victory justly, would seem to be an echt art after all. The forensic orator can be a genuine expert as long as he subordinates his art’s proximate end, court victory, to all the arts’ ultimate end, the

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17 Socrates’ interlocutors might agree that there is an intellectual soul, that in a proper arrangement it governs mortal soul’s desires, and that true happiness consists in acting in accordance with intellect’s orders, that is, justly and wisely. Yet the orator is under no obligation to accept all this. He might reject intellect and the goods of the soul altogether.
human good. The bad news is that to grasp this ultimate end requires, as Socrates suggests, grasping human being itself. To do this, we learn in the Statesman, requires expertise in cosmology, that is, grasping human being’s end and ousia in terms of the cosmos of which it is a part.\textsuperscript{18} If so, the implication seems clear: the only true orator is the sage or philosopher—or one who is ruled by a philosopher, as mortal soul is ruled by intellect. Eristic’s case is slightly different. Unlike forensic oratory, which has a proper proximate end that needs to be subordinated to a higher end, eristic has no proper proximate end that survives philosophical correction. For eristic engages in verbal controversy for the sake of victory, regardless of truth, in disputes about justice and injustice themselves and about the rest in their universal aspect (περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγως, Sph. 225c). To do this justly, that is, for the sake of removing obstacles to (and, presumably, eventually acquiring) the truth about these universals, simply is what the Sophist’s sixth division describes as elenchus and the Theaetetus’ digression describes as philosophy. This not only serves as a proof for eristic’s being a sham version of elenchus due to having the wrong end. It also allows us to tie elenchus together closely with philosophy, which I left as mere speculation above. Either elenchus is the same as philosophy or the only true user of elenchus is the philosopher.\textsuperscript{19}

Socrates’ digression on midwifery (149a-151d) is the second passage providing evidence that sophistry is ontologically defective. In fact, Plato uses it, I propose, as

\textsuperscript{18} The flying philosopher of the digression perhaps looks forward to the Statesman’s great cosmic myth. His soul is borne everywhere, below the earth and above the heavens, investigating the whole nature of each of the beings in its universal aspect, 173e-174a.

\textsuperscript{19} I expand on this in section 3.3’s analysis of the noble sophist’s use of elenchus.
something of a model to prepare us for the *Sophist*’s frame, providing valuable evidence for my thesis that ignorance of ends explains both the ontological deficiency and recognition mistakes discussed there. For according to Socrates, matchmaking is a characteristic activity of midwifery (149d-150a); the one, in fact, of which they are proudest. For they are the cleverest matchmakers (προμήκτηριαί εἰσι δεινόταται) due to knowing what kind of woman paired with (συνοδοῦσαν) what kind of man will produce the best possible (ὁς ἀρίστους) children. They do not engage in this activity, however, because there are others who engage in the same activity, pairing men with women (συναγωγήν), but who do it unjustly and artlessly (ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχθον). It is called procuring (προαγωγία) and is done, presumably, for the sake of the clients’ sexual pleasure. Midwives refrain from matchmaking lest they be accused of procuring. Only real (ὅντως) midwives, Socrates asserts, perform matchmaking properly (ὁρθῶς).

Consider first the evidence that Plato flags this passage as a model for understanding the *Sophist*’s frame. Here too we see, and see more clearly, how the people mistake instances of one skill, matchmaking, for a sham, disreputable version of it, procuring, which leads to another mistake: conflating the real experts, matchmaking midwives, with ersatz experts, the procuring sham midwives. Along with the identity mistake comes axiological error: the people take what is worthy, midwifery, to be worth nothing. Socrates makes clear here, as the *Sophist*’s frame does not, the cause of these

20 Cleverness (deinotēs, which I translated as ‘cunning’ above with respect to the orator (v. *Tht.* 176a, 176d)) is not bad in and of itself. Understood as know-how (or instrumental reason, means-to-end reasoning, etc.) it is, in fact, very important for achieving ends. Essential, however, is that one grasps the right ends (the good: justice, beauty, etc.), as the orator does not, so that one chooses the proper (i.e., just and beautiful) means for achieving the end. Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1144b21-29: “Now virtue makes the decision correct, but the actions that are naturally to be done to fulfill the decision are the concern not of virtue, but another capacity…called cleverness, which is such as to be able to do the actions that tend to promote whatever goal that is assumed and to achieve it. If, then, the goal is fine, cleverness is praiseworthy, and if the goal is base, cleverness is unscrupulousness; hence both intelligent and unscrupulous people are called clever” (Irwin’s translation).
mistakes: ignorance of the different ends that structure the perceptually identical actions of matchmaking and procuring\textsuperscript{21}.

Additionally, Socrates plainly sets up ordinary midwifery, which attends female bodies in labor, as an analogue to his intellectual midwifery, which treats male souls in travail. Plato no doubt intends us to expect, as analogue to the procuring pseudo-midwife, an ersatz version of the elenchus-using intellectual midwife which, I suggest, we do not get until the \textit{Sophist}'s frame: the eristic-using sophist. The midwives’ fear of being mistaken for pseudo-midwives and charged with procuring, however, is an obvious and ominous reference to the political danger philosophers face due to their activities’ similarity to sophistry’s. This danger Socrates makes explicit at the end of the \textit{Theaetetus}, where he indicates he must go face Meletus’ indictment (210d). Plato hooks the \textit{Sophist}'s frame to both the \textit{Theaetetus’} end and the midwifery digression, I suggest, by having Socrates playfully express his fear that the Stranger has come to judge and refute them because they are worthless (\textit{φαύλους}) in argument (216ab). Socrates seems to suggest here he fears the Stranger will mistake him for a sophist, as people like Meletus have done.

Most important for my purposes is this digression’s clarity on how ignorance of proper ends results in ontological defect. After his account of procuring, Socrates explicitly states that matchmaking is done properly (\textit{ὀρθῶς}), only if done by real (\textit{ὀντως}) midwives\textsuperscript{22}. Socrates clearly indicates here that procuring is not a different art that

\textsuperscript{21} Given the imperceptibility of ends, even those with knowledge of ends would be susceptible to making recognition mistakes about particulars. The knower of ends and \textit{ousiai}, however, presumably does not assent to a belief about some particular \(S\), that \(S\) is \(X\) or that \(S\) is doing \(X\), until the requisite investigation and/or interrogation has been done. The giving and receiving of \textit{logoi} would presumably be required to determine whether some individual is a sophist or philosopher, matchmaker or procurer.

\textsuperscript{22} ταίξ γε ὄντος μαίας μόνας που προσήκει καὶ προμὴθεσθαι ὀρθῶς, 150a.
happens to be disreputable. Rather it is matchmaking but matchmaking done incorrectly, by which Socrates evidently means unjustly and artlessly, as he described it previously. The missing but obvious premise by which Socrates implies this conclusion via modus tollens is that those who procure are not really midwives, which explains why their matchmaking is not proper.

Neither here (for ersatz midwives) nor in the frame (for feigned philosophers), however, does Socrates specify the cause of ontological defect, what makes someone or something not really X. Yet from the midwifery digression we are, no doubt, meant to infer ignorance or absence of proper ends as the cause of ersatz midwives’ ontological defect. And if we take this midwifery passage as a model for the Sophist’s frame (as the linguistic and thematic echoes perhaps invite us to do: both passages distinguish those who are really (ὄντως) X from counterfeits), this would also explain the ontological defect of the Sophist’s feigned philosophers. For Socrates makes clear that matchmaking’s proper end is the production of the best children possible, which true midwives grasp and use to structure their activity. The ersatz midwives take the sexual pleasure of their clients as their end and structuring principle, which is evidently the wrong end if it causes them to act unjustly and artlessly.

So Socrates asserts dogmatically, at least, since he never gives the grounds for the belief that pleasure is not just a different end but the wrong end for sexual activity. Socrates needs to tell a story establishing that, because intellect is superior to mortal soul, its ends take precedence over mortal soul’s. And producing the best children possible serves intellect’s ends, while pleasure serves mortal soul’s, so pleasure is to figure only

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23 The Sophist uses this language at 217c: οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἄλλ᾽ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι. Socrates then goes on to explain how philosophers are mistaken for politikoi and sophists. The Theaetetus, as we have just seen, distinguishes those who are really midwives (ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις, 150a) from their look-alikes, the panderers, for whom they are often mistaken.
incidentally, if at all, in the sexual pairing of men and women. Yet for this we must await the *Statesman*, where the great myth establishes the divinity of intellect and the ontological defectiveness of body and, hence, the sovereignty of intellect and the priority of its ends in the human composite. We also learn there that a good child is one whose mortal soul has the right dispositional mix for obedience to intellect, neither too spirited nor too timid to act on the demands of (its own or others’) intellect. In pairing men and women one must consider only the disposition of each parent, reckoning the kind of mortal soul their mixture will produce in the child. Matchmaking must, thus, be conducted for the sake of the future child’s intellect and not for the sake of the parents’ mortal souls’ desire for pleasure (or wealth or honor). Proper matchmaking obviously requires a profound grasp of human nature, so profound that it seems the real midwife, the only one who does matchmaking correctly, would be the philosopher or, second best, a midwife under the rule of a philosopher, as mortal soul is under the rule of intellect.

Taking Socrates’ account of midwifery as our model for the *Sophist*’s frame allows us to posit that the eristic-using sophists suffer ontological defect for the same reason as their analogue, the procuring ersatz midwives: ignorance of proper ends. On account of this ignorance, sophists are not really philosophers and so do not refute properly. For their actions are structured by ends established not by intellect but by mortal soul: victory, by hook or by crook, in verbal controversy for the sake of wealth.

Socrates’ problem, as I have noted, is that he merely assumes the model of human being itself required to establish the hierarchy of ends which he needs to account for the

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24 At *Statesman* 286d the Stranger indicates that, in evaluating the length of *logoi*, pleasure is to factor in only incidentally, if at all. The only proper measure for such evaluations is whether or not the *logos* makes us better dialecticians, that is, whether the *logos* improves our intellectual nature.
procurer’s ontological deficiency. The *Sophist* suffers the same problem. For if sophistry is, in fact, ontologically defective and this defect is to be explained in the same way as I have explained procuring’s, then the *Sophist* needs a hierarchy of ends grounded in human being’s hierarchical structure. The *Sophist* nowhere explicitly provides such an account. Outside the frame, in fact, there is not even an explicit mention of sophistry’s ontological deficiency—except for the Stranger’s ascription of nobility to the elenchus-user and suggestion that the eristic-using sophist is base in the *Sophist*’s sixth division. With this move, as I explain in the next section, the Stranger triggers a dialectical movement that provides us indirect access to the hierarchical framework grounded in human being itself which is needed to grasp the sophist as ontologically defective and which prepares us for the *Statesman* in several important ways.

3.3. The Sophist of Noble Lineage (226a-231b)

3.3.a. The Worth of Elenchus

The *Sophist*’s sixth division has a place of special importance in the dialogue. Commentators have claimed to find in this division’s elenchus-user a portrait of Socrates and even the philosopher concealed as a noble sophist.\(^{25}\) I address both of these theses in the following, but my primary aim shall be to show how this division indirectly provides us the resources to do what the explicit inquiry fails to do: to establish (provisionally, as I explain below) that eristic-using sophistry is not just some *different* art with a *different* end, but corrupted elenchus, ontologically defective philosophy. It is not *really*

\(^{25}\) See, for example, Taylor (2006), who takes the sixth division to indicate that Plato now considers Socrates a sophist. Notomi (1999: 277-9), in a curious formulation, takes the elenchus-user to be an “apparition of the sophist”, by which he means a philosopher who appears like a sophist and may be Socrates.
philosophy because it refutes for the sake of the wrong end. If my previous analysis is correct, to do this we need an hierarchical framework of ends grounded in a conception of human being itself as an hierarchically organized complex whole. This the sixth division gives us, albeit indirectly via elenctic refutation. Plato has the Stranger set up a contradiction: he denies the relevance of axiological difference, gives us a value-free account of elenchus, then differentiates the elenchus-user axiologically from other sophists: the former is noble while the latter, he intimates, is base. To relieve ourselves of the contradiction by accounting for elenchus’ nobility and eristic’s baseness requires supplementing (or jettisoning) the value-blind method of division and replacing the sixth division’s human heap model (on which all parts are equal in value) with a conception of human being as a complex whole of hierarchically ordered parts to ground the hierarchy of ends required to establish that the eristic is base because he refutes for the wrong end. Via some tricky dialectical work we thus get the tools required to account for the

26 It might be objected that we can still maintain a distinction between elenchus and eristic, and thus between sophistry and philosophy, even after correction. Perhaps the improved eristic remains motivated by mortal soul’s desire for wealth and victory but subordinates these ends to intellect’s desire for truth. He seeks truth about universals, in other words, but is also motivated by a desire for wealth and victory in these verbal contests. Perhaps he uses Prodicus’ business model: he is happy to help others acquire truth, but only for a fee, and the more you pay the more truth you get. For Plato, however, intellect desires not only truth about universals; it also desires that everything be as just and beautiful as possible. This, at least, is what motivates the Timaeus’ demiurge to construct the cosmos, what seems to motivate the Statesman’s demiurge to order chaotic matter by investing it with intelligence, and what seems to drive the elenchus-user not only to seek the truth about universals but also to help others do so too. For the human soul, as we learn in this passage, requires elenctic refutation, which purges soul’s false ideas about universals and opens it to their truth, to be made maximally beautiful and to be truly happy. So, the eristic-user, if he has truly undergone correction and his activity is structured by intellect’s desires, might still take money for his services (to maintain his household, for example), but he will seek to beautify others via elenctic refutation even in the absence of money, as Socrates does to the ruination of his household, for he desires everything to be as beautiful (and just: what it means for a soul to be just, as we shall see, the sixth division leaves uncertain) as possible.

27 In the introduction to the sixth division Plato may signal to us that the value-blind method of division must be supplemented with some device that allows us to capture axiological relations. For Socrates says here (226a) that the sophist is not to be captured τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, and Theaetus replies that they must use both. The literal translation of τῇ ἑτέρᾳ is “with the other”, a common idiom for “with the other hand” where χείρ is implied. Yet this may also be a playful way of saying that the one method, i.e., the method of division (τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ, 227a; the feminine τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, that is, may also imply μεθὸδος), is not adequate for capturing the sophist; one must use both methods, i.e., some other value-sensitive method. The sixth division, as I explain below, is a division of kinds of division. One branch of this division is comprised of value-sensitive kinds of separation or division, while the other consists in value-blind kinds, like the method of division itself (see 226d for the distinction). The introductory exchange may, in fact, look forward to the Stranger’s introduction of the great myth in the Statesman. There, as I show in chapter 4, after the value-blind
eristic-using sophist’s baseness and ontological defect (he is not a real but a counterfeit elenchus-user), which the explicit inquiry fails to do. This work also prepares us for the Statesman, where we also need this complex whole model of human being and a value-sensitive method to properly and fully differentiate politikê not only from its counterfeits but also from rival arts.

That Plato and the Stranger want us to see the elenchus-user, the target of the sixth division, as not just a different kind of sophist, but as an improved eristic-using sophist is intimated by the Stranger placing elenchus under a different greatest kind (division (διαιρετικά, διακριτικήν 226cd) instead of acquisition) from the other divisions of sophistry and making (illicit, as we shall see) use of axiology to differentiate the elenchus-user. His is a sophistry noble in lineage or genos (ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική, 231b). Furthermore, Plato wants us to hear, I contend, in γενναία an echo with Socrates’ noble midwife (γενναίας, 149a), whose match-making is perceptually identical to those who practice procuring. Practitioners of procuring, however, as we have seen, structure their actions by the wrong end, making their actions unjust and themselves ontologically defective: they are not really midwives. Similarly, Theaetetus thinks the Stranger’s description of the elenchus-user’s activity seems very much like sophistry (231a). That might be so, according to the Stranger, but so too does a dog, the tamest (ἡ µερωτάτω) of animals, seem like a wolf, the most savage or wild (ἄγριώτατον). 

division of politikê suffers shipwreck, the Stranger says that to correct course they need to travel some other way or route (δεὶ καθ᾽ ἐξήπαν ὁδὸν πορευθῆναι τινα). This other way turns out to be the great myth which provides the teleological framework that serves as the ground for making axiological distinctions. I touch on the Statesman’s relation to the sixth division in more detail below.

28 The wild/tame distinction perhaps looks forward to the Statesman where the Stranger states that a courageous soul that has not been tamed by the statesman’s pedagogical program runs the risk of devolving into a bestial nature (πρὸς θηριώδη τινὰ φύσιν, 309e), an obviously ontologically defective state. A recurring metaphor used by the Stranger in the Sophist for their inquiry, in fact, is that of a hunt for the beast-like sophist (τὸ θηρίῳ 226α, τὸν θηριαν 235α). Cornford
similar perceptual data, in other words, wolf and dog have very differently structured souls. The Stranger means to say that the sophist, too, might look like the noble elenchus-user but has a savage soul, which, if we take our cue from the Midwifery Digression, seems due to his ignorance of proper ends. The Stranger’s problem, as I explain below, is he has no grounds for these axiological and ontological claims, by his own admission.

To define this noble sophist the Stranger first divides division into purification, which divides worse from better, and a nameless kind of division that divides like from like (226d)\textsuperscript{29}. This nameless kind, as I expand on below, seems to refer to the method of division itself.\textsuperscript{30} There are two kinds of purification arts. One purifies bodies (226e-227a) and divides further into those that purify inanimate (such as the fuller’s art) and those that purify animate bodies. The latter divides again further into those that remove internal impurities (like gymnastic and medicine) and those that remove external ones (like the bather’s art).

(1957: 180-82) suggests that we are intended to think of Rep. 375ae, where the philosophical guardians are likened to dogs.

\textsuperscript{29} The Stranger establishes the superordinate art, \textit{diakritikê}, by reference to servile household tasks (226ac) many of which have to do with weaving, e.g., carding, combing, separating. This seems, for one thing, to be a use of collection to establish a wide kind. It may also forecast the \textit{Statesman}’s use of weaving as a paradigm for statesmanship. We learn in the \textit{Statesman} that the weaver combines the warp and woof, which are fashioned from the wool separated by the arts of separation (\textit{Pltc.} 282b-283a). So too the statesman weaves together the citizens’ souls via his educational program (\textit{Pltc.} 309c) after separating out defective humans by testing them in \textit{paidiâ} (\textit{Pltc.} 308b-309a). After their education he weaves the citizens together in political offices. It might be that division, as an art of separation, also requires a complementary, synthetic art (cf. \textit{Pltc.} 282b where the Stranger says there are two kinds of expertise in every sphere: \textit{ἡ συγκριτικὴ} and \textit{ἡ διακριτικὴ}). Perhaps division prepares the material for dialectical inquiry by separating out all the kinds in terms of mere difference, which some other art or method weaves together by means of axiological and hierarchical relations. Division is thus akin to the slavish tasks described at 226ac. This, at least, will be the story I tell here and in chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{30} I take this observation from Rosen’s book on the \textit{Sophist} (1983: 115:131; see also Rosen’s (1995)). My interpretation importantly differs from Rosen’s regarding the Stranger’s attitude toward division’s blindness to value. Rosen takes the Stranger to be a proto-positivist, who, accordingly, sees division’s value-blindness as a positive feature. Scodel’s (1987: 20-73) interpretation of the \textit{Statesman} follows Rosen in this regard. Rosen (in his interpretation of the \textit{Statesman} (1995: e.g., 126) and Scodel (e.g., pg. 161) run into major difficulties in their interpretations of the \textit{Statesman}, where the Stranger makes ample use of axiology in the second half of the dialogue after the great myth. Rosen is forced to posit an unexplained rejection of positivism by the Stranger in the \textit{Statesman}. Scodel simply registers his bafflement over the Stranger suddenly becoming “Socratic”, that is, concerned with virtue and value. On my reading, which I sketch later and explain fully in chapter 4, the Stranger deploys the great myth in order to rectify division’s value-blindness.
The other purification art cleanses the soul of badness and is itself comprised of two kinds which purge two different kinds of badness (227d-228e). One kind is a corrective art (ἡ κολαστικὴ) most like Justice (Δίκη, 229a). It purges discord (στάσιν, 228a) from the soul, just as medicine removes disease from the body: discord and disease are both corruptions that cause conflict among things naturally related (φύσει συγγενοῦς, 228a, 228b). Discord in the soul goes by many names and obtains when the soul’s parts oppose one another\(^{31}\). It occurs, for example, when judgments conflict with desires (δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις), spiritedness conflicts with pleasures (θυμὸν ἡδοναῖς), and reason is at odds with pains (λόγον λύπαις).

The other art of soul purification, instruction (διδασκαλική), rectifies deformity (ἀσχος, 228a; δυσειδὲς, 228c) in the soul, and deformity is nothing other than lack of measure (ἀμετρίας, δυσειδὲς, 228c). For a soul, being unmeasured and ugly means being ignorant (ἀγνωστόν, ἀνόητον 228d). For the soul naturally aims at truth (ἐπ’ ἀλήθειαν ὀρμωμένης ψυχῆς, 228cd), and truth comes about when the soul’s proportions match the object’s proportions. If a soul is ugly, that is, has inaccurately reproduced the object’s proportions, it is ignorant of the object. Its understanding of the object goes astray (παραφόρου συνέσεως γιγνόμενης, 228d)\(^{32}\). The noble sophist’s elenchus is a kind of instruction that removes ignorance not about handicrafts’ know-how, like demiurgic instruction (229d). Rather, its instruction is a gentle kind of education (παιδεία, 229d), which removes stupidity. By exposing contradictions in the interlocutor’s (τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον, 230d) belief set, elenchus (ἐλέγχων, 230d) removes the obstructive conceit.

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31 Discord in the soul takes the form of hubris, injustice, cowardice, and intemperance (228e, 229a).

32 This, at least, is my interpretation (indebted to Fowler (1977: ad loc.)) of the difficult archery example at 228c: to hit a moving target requires that the speed of the projectile be in measure with (συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα) that of the target.
that one is clever (δεινός, 230a) and knows what one does not (229c), thus taming the headstrong (ἡμεροῦντα, 230b) and opening up his soul to the reception of truth, which beautifies it (230bd). In fact, elenctic purification is necessary for achieving maximum intellectual beauty (κάλλιστον), which is necessary if one is to be truly eudaimôn (τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα, 230e).

The Stranger thus successfully defines elenchus by dividing it from kindred arts of purifying division and in the process even gives us an account of human being. For the Stranger discriminates the arts in terms of their object (as we saw Socrates do in the Midwifery Digression in chapter 2), and the purifying arts most akin to elenchus have a shared object: human being. He attributes, as we see above, different arts to the different parts of human being.

The Stranger’s problem, as we have seen, is that he also wants to ascribe nobility to the elenchus-user and baseness to the eristic. Yet he does not explain the basis for this axiological distinction. A model of human being as an hierarchically structured whole of parts could serve as such a basis. The Stranger, however, conceives of human being as a heap of parts, all of equal worth, which provides no grounds either for value distinctions among those parts’ respective arts or, as I explain more fully below, for ascriptions of nobility and baseness due to being structured by the proper or improper ends, respectively. First consider the evidence for the Stranger’s human heap model.

The Stranger gives us many parts, indeed, even the parts of parts of human being, but without any organization. He distinguishes body and soul, and even divides body into its internal and external parts (226e-227a). Yet he insists that all arts are equal in value
(227ac), presumably because all the objects of the arts, including human being and its parts, are of equal worth, as I explain in more detail just below.

Soul’s divisions he also provides but less directly and in a jumble, which suggests the equality of soul’s parts. In accounting for kolastikê the Stranger, as we saw, describes the conflicts in the soul, which kolastikê’s justice resolves, and in doing so enumerates the parts of soul: logos, doxa, thumos, epithumia, pleasure, pain. Although the Stranger does not sort these out, we can discern intellect, comprised of logos and doxa, and mortal soul, comprised of thumos, epithumia, pleasure, and pain.

Importantly, the Stranger also indicates that a natural kinship obtains among these parts (φύσει συγγενοῦς, 228a): they are all parts of the same whole. Yet he curiously does not specify what constitutes a proper or just relation among these parts and what constitutes a corrupted relation requiring kolastikê’s correction. For example, an unjust soul, the Stranger indicates, is one in which doxa is in conflict with epithumia, but the just arrangement the Stranger does not specify: should doxa rule epithumia or vice versa? It seems that the most we can say is that a just soul is one free of stasis, where that means, in cases of disagreement, either intellect submits to mortal soul or mortal soul submits to intellect. For, if all parts are equal, as the Stranger’s account of soul seems to suggest, we have no grounds for adjudicating what should rule and what should be ruled.

The Stranger’s ascription of nobility to elenchus, which cares for intellect, and intimation that eristic, which services mortal soul’s desires, is base, however, indicates that we need something like the structured whole model of human being with intellect acting as sovereign. On such a model all other parts’ desires and ends would necessarily

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33 The Stranger nowhere in this division indicates that intellect is the soul’s sovereign, and this, accordingly, plays no role in the definition of elenchus, which takes intellect as the object of its care. I note, however, that in a later passage
be subordinated to intellect’s desire for truth and beauty as well as, presumably, for justice instead of stasis. If this is the case, the elenchus-user deserves the Stranger’s honorific because his activity is structured by intellect’s ends in two different senses. For his refutation is done for the sake of the interlocutor’s intellect’s desire for truth and beauty, to which elenchus opens the way by removing obstructive false beliefs. The interlocutor needs elenchus’ purgation of falsity, the Stranger says (230e), to be maximally beautiful in those things he needs to be truly eudaimôn. And on the sovereign intellect model this would be because a maximally beautiful intellect is both good in itself and, since it is soul’s sovereign, necessary for properly ruling the whole human being, that is, for justice in the soul. If so, the elenchus-user renders a service needed for the interlocutor’s beauty of soul and just intellect, both of which promote his eudaimonia.

Additionally, the elenchus-user’s activity is, apparently, structured by his own intellect’s desire that truth, beauty, and justice obtain not just in himself but also in others, which implies that he himself has a just soul (his activity is structured by intellect’s desires, as is proper), which in turn suggests he has a beautiful intellect.

34 Intellect’s innate desire for truth and beauty is easily inferred from the two propositions at 228cd: all ignorance, which makes souls ugly, is involuntary and ignorance is nothing other than the aberration (παραφροσύνη) of a soul aiming for truth (ἐπί ἀλήθειαν ὁρμώμένης), when the understanding passes by the target (παραφόρου συνέσεως).

35 With intellect as sovereign it would naturally desire justice, where justice is an ontologically freighted second order property that arises from a soul whose parts are properly arranged. On the sovereign intellect model the proper arrangement would be one in which intellect rules over the other parts.

36 This passage perhaps hooks into a passage of great importance in the Statesman’s great myth, which also indicates the need for philosophical activity for eudaimonia. At Sts. 272bd the Stranger explains that, if the residents of the Age of Kronos used their unending leisure for philosophical investigation, conversing among themselves and with the animals, instead of wasting their time in the pleasures of food, drink, and storytelling, then they exceeded us by far in eudaimonia. I analyze this passage in detail in chapter 4.
assuming only a beautified intellect justly rules the soul. For, if not by intellect’s desires, how else are we to explain the elenchus-user’s motivation for taking up the toil of refutation? For we know he does not do it for monetary gain or pleasure, like, respectively, the fifth division’s eristic and garrulous type. The elenchus-user’s nobility would thus arise from his own soul’s beauty and justice and from his intellect’s desire to make others beautiful and just also, which structures his elenctic activity and, as I explain below, provides important insight into the elenchus-user’s identity and the nature of the true philosopher.

With this structured-whole model we can also account for the Stranger’s intimation that the eristic-using sophist is base. For, with the hierarchy of ends grounded in this model, we can say that his refuting is structured by the wrong end: his soul is ruled by mortal soul’s desire for wealth-bringing victory in verbal contests without regard for truth instead of intellect’s desire for truth and beauty. Since his activity is identical to elenchus except for its end, once corrected by mortal soul’s submission to intellect’s rule, the eristic becomes an elenchus-user, as we saw above (3.2). The eristic, that is, to tweak the Stranger’s formulation, is revealed as a base elenchus-user. The eristic would thus have an ugly intellect, since he has, at the very least, a false idea of human being itself.

For he apparently mistakes mortal soul for soul’s rightful sovereign and intellect for mere

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37 The motivation of the sixth division’s elenchus-user seems more complicated than the Theaetetus’ philosopher of the digression (Thr. 172c-177c). Both seem motivated by their own intellect’s desire for truth about universals but the elenchus-user also apparently has a desire to purge others’ intellects of falsity and open them to truth, which, we learn here, beautifies the interlocutor’s soul. The elenchus-user thus has a desire to beautify his own soul with truth and to make others beautiful also. If so, this illuminates a shortcoming of the digression philosopher: even if his intellectual desire is nobler than the desires of orator and eristic, which originate in mortal soul, nevertheless the digression philosopher’s desire is just as selfish and private. Just as the garrulous lets his household go to ruin for the sake of his private pleasure in refutation, so too the digression philosopher pursues a life of pure reason oblivious to the needs of the polis in which his body dwells. He is oblivious not only to what his neighbor does, but even to whether his neighbor is a human being or some other creature (Thr. 174b). I return to the digression philosopher in chapter 4’s analysis of the proper life for the philosopher in the Age of Zeus. See Rue (1993: 87-92) for a reading of the philosopher of the digression in the Theaetetus that takes him to have an unmeasured absorption in universals.
instrumental reason. He would, consequently, also have an unjust soul, since he allows his mortal soul to usurp intellect. On the structured whole model, the eristic turns out to be not merely a base and defective elenchus-user; he is also a base and defective human being.38 This is the closest the *Sophist* comes, via this very indirect route requiring the complex-whole hypothesis, to grasping the sophist as ontologically defective, that is, as not *really* an elenchus-user (and not *really* a human being) due to refuting for the wrong end. For the confirmation of the complex whole hypothesis, however, we must await the *Statesman*’s great myth.

On the human heap model, on the other hand, we have no grounds for ascribing nobility to the elenchus-user and baseness to the eristic. For all parts and, hence, all arts and ends, are equal. And without an hierarchy of ends, eristic is not counterfeit elenchus, but just some different kind of refutation due to its merely different end. So, in the quarrel of all against all in the soul, we have no way of adjudicating the different claims to soul’s throne. The eristic-using sophist can even admit accept the Stranger’s claim that elenctic correction of intellect is necessary for intellectual beauty and *eudaimonia*. He would, however, presumably insist that that this is because what we call sovereign intellect is actually instrumental reason, the slave of mortal soul’s desires, and instrumental reason refined by elenchus has the cunning needed to achieve mortal soul’s desires best and to acquire *eudaimonia*.

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38 He also makes his clients base by teaching them (for a fee) the sophistical tricks they need to satisfy their mortal soul’s desire for wealth-bringing victory in controversies. Thus convinced of their wisdom, which is, in fact, merely cleverness at achieving mortal soul’s desires, his clients remain anchored in their ignorance, resistant to elenctic purification, with an unjust soul and ugly intellect.
The Stranger is stuck with the human heap model, however, because of the method he uses. For the Stranger’s “method of argument” (τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ), which we call division or diairesis, honors (τιμῶ) all arts equally because, he says, it is only concerned with grasping what is related and not related for the sake of acquiring nous.\(^{39}\) Division treats all arts equally, not reckoning any art more ridiculous (γελοιότερα, 227b; γελοῖα, 227a) or dignified (σεμνότερον, 227b) than any other. Even those arts that care for not only bodies but soulless bodies, like the fuller’s art and ornamentation, are treated as equally dignified (227a).\(^{40}\) Because of this blindness to axiological distinctions, division seems to assume that it is not only necessary but also sufficient for acquiring nous. In fact, the arts’ equivalence in worth seems, as I suggested above, to be grounded in the assumed axiological equality of the arts’ respective objects. Medicine, for example, which purifies body’s internal parts, is worth no more than the art of sponging, which cleanses body’s external surface (227a). Nor is generalship, which hunts humans, a worthier kind of hunting than louse-catching (227b). Similar claims made by the Stranger at a similar junction in the Statesman’s inquiry (Sts. 266bd) seem to back up the notion that the arts’ equality is grounded in the equal worth of their objects. The first attempted division of politikê results in human being and swine being placed on the same diairetic level, distinguished only by number of feet, which has an even more ridiculous (γελοιότερος, 266c) result: their respective experts, the king and swineherd, turn out to be

\(^{39}\) τοῦ κτίσματι γὰρ ἐνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ συγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρόμενη τιμῇ πρὸς τούτῳ ἦς ἱκον πάσας (227ab).

\(^{40}\) Read in light of the Statesman, this passage seems to send up obvious red flags. As I show in chapter 4, one function of the Stranger’s great myth is to establish the superiority of intellectual soul to body, based upon the former being divine and the latter inherently chaotic and dependent on divine intellect, with which the demiurge infuses it to create a cosmos, for really being anything at all (see, e.g., Sts. 269cd). That arts that attend to soulless bodies are of equal worth to those that care for ensouled ones, due to soul and body being of equal worth, turns out to be risible after all. Perhaps the Stranger playfully mistakes a part of kosmētikê, as an art of arrangement, for the whole. One part adorns the exterior surface of soulless bodies; another, much more important art arranges the parts of ensouled beings, like humans and the cosmos.
analyses in division’s eyes. This may seem like a ridiculous turn (πρὸς γέλοια, 266b), the Stranger says, but their method of argument is not more concerned with what is more dignified (σεμνότέρου, 266d) than with what is not.

Division’s axiological blindness, however, seems to be rooted in its ontological blindness, that is, the inability to grasp ontological deficiency and genuineness. At 226d the Stranger divides division into two related subkinds. Purification separates worse from better and throws out the worse while retaining the better. And the worse is apparently what is ontologically defective or what causes ontological defect. For, as we have seen, elenctic purification beautifies intellect by purging it of the falsity that renders it unmeasured and ugly. The other kind of division divides like from like (τὸ δ’ ὀμοίου ἀφ’ ὀμοίου) without regard to better and worse. It is nameless but seems to be the Stranger’s “method of argument” that we call division or diairesis. For dividing like from like seems to be what the Stranger means by his method of argument grasping what is related and unrelated without regard to worth. This, in fact, is what he does in dividing like-like

41 The slavish tasks described at 226b6-7 seem to be examples of separating better from worse, rather than like from like. διηθέν (to filter) and διαττάν (to strain) seem to refer to the removal of impurities from water or wine (see Crat. 402cd), while βράττειν (to winnow) refers to separating the chaff from the grain. In each case the worse thing is something that compromises the quality of the respective item resulting in that item not being what it properly is (from an anthropocentric perspective, at least). To do this in logos would be a bit different, since we are not actually removing an impurity from something but distinguishing a proper kind from those kinds the instances of which are ontologically deficient due to some impurity or defect.

Regarding the fourth kind listed here, διακρίνειν, Campbell (1867: ad loc.) speculates it might be an error for διακινεῖν (to shake up and down). This would go well with βράττειν, as a kind of purification of grain. It would also give us a symmetrical construction (two ways of purifying liquids, two ways of purifying solids) that we would lose if we retain διακρίνειν and take it as a part of the process of weaving, as Fowler (1928: ad loc.) does. Fowler cites Crat. 338b (it should be 388b), where a form of διακρίνειν is used to denote separating the warp and woof. But this kind of separation seems to be one which divides like from like, the kinds of which are listed at 226b9-11.

42 Thus Rosen (1983: 115-31).

43 This becomes clearer when we consider division as practiced by the Stranger. E.g., in the sixth division a superordinate kind is established by gathering together many related kinds of things involving division (διαμερισμάτω, 226c1-2). The superordinate art of which these are subkinds the Stranger dubs διαιρετική. The second step then separates the kinds of διαιρετική into καθαρός, which divides better from worse, and an anonymous kind, which divides like from like (226d), of which I take to be the method of division to be one subkind (along with, e.g., ἐξαίνειν, κατάγειν, κεκρίζειν, 226b9-11). This second step separates what is related from what is unrelated, namely, the kinds of division that comprise καθαρός from the kinds that comprise the anonymous kind. This can also be see, however, as
division from better-worse division, which are related or like insofar as they share the same *genos*, without regard to which is better or worth more.

If this is correct, the Stranger seems to use this division of division, for one thing, to call our attention to division’s crucial deficiency and need for supplementation. For if an art’s worth is grounded in the worth of its object and the parts of human being differ in worth due, as we learn in the *Statesman*, to ontological differences, then not only does division’s blindness to ontological difference and axiology produce a flawed idea of human being as a heap, which distorts its grasp of the arts’ relations, rendering them all equal. This also means that division itself suffers deep self-ignorance. For, due to its double blindness, it cannot even know that it does not know that, because it cares for *nous*, which is divine, it is superior to other arts that care for body, which is ontologically defective by nature. Division, that is, since it cannot properly differentiate itself from other arts, cannot properly account for itself due to its blindness to axiology and ontological difference. It itself thus falls short of the *nous* it takes for object and causes those who practice division to suffer *nous* deficiency.

Division itself cannot, of course, undergo elenctic purification to purge its disfiguring ignorance. It can, however, be corrected by supplementation, for which we must await the *Statesman*’s great myth, which, like elenchus, discerns ontological and axiological difference.44 Plato and the Stranger can, however, perform elenchus on the reader, using contradictions in the belief set constructed for us by the Stranger to purge us

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44 See Griswold (1996: 157-201) and Morgan (2000: 179-84) for discussions of the limits of method in Plato, which I discuss in more detail in chapter 4’s analysis of the *Statesman*’s great myth.
of a false conception of human being and division. This, I suggest, is the function of the
Stranger’s axiological ascription of nobility to the elenchus-user after denying, shortly
before, the relevance of axiological distinctions. This crash up of propositions is intended
to force us to reflect on what would be required to justify the Stranger’s ascription of
nobility to the elenchus-user. If my analysis above is correct, we need to jettison the
human heap model and replace it with a model of human being as a complex whole of
hierarchically and axiologically arranged parts under intellect’s rule. This provides the
grounds for the hierarchy of ends that allows us to account for the sophist’s ontological
defect, despite the explicit inquiry’s failure to do this. This means that, due to division’s
double blindness, we also have to reject the notion that division is sufficient, even if
necessary, for acquiring nous.\(^{45}\)

To make us work for these important insights, the Stranger and Plato deploy
elenchus disguised as mere division. The disguise is very fitting in a dialogue so
concerned with the perils of appearance and in a division in which we find the
philosopher disguised as a noble elenchus-using sophist, as I explain below. Also fitting
is the tricky dialectical work the Stranger’s concealed elenchus makes us do to acquire
the proper conception of human being itself. For we need this not just for the definitional
work just detailed but also for our own ontological integrity. We need to be purged of the
human heap model or whatever flawed conception we might have of human being itself
that mars our intellect, preventing it from justly ruling the composite and blocking our
road to *eudaimonia*. The text on the elenchus-user, I suggest, effects the elenctic
purification we need for *eudaimonia* and in this way takes the place of the absent flesh

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\(^{45}\) Division, due to its double blindness, in other words, mistakes the sum of human being’s parts for the whole. It is blind to the axiological relations that must obtain among those parts in order for a human being to really be a human being and not a mere human heap.
and blood elenchus-user. If the elenchus-user, the noble sophist, is, in fact, the philosopher, Plato in this way makes present the apparently absent philosopher and Philosopher, even if he and it are hard to discern through the mists of appearance.

The work we do to acquire these insights also prepares us for the Statesman. For there too division’s double blindness, as I argue in chapter 4, results in a flawed conception of human being as a heap of equal parts that cripples the inquiry. This leaves us with a heap of a city and a quarrel of all against all in the arts. We also get there the necessary supplement to division in the form of the Stranger’s cosmological myth. This myth not only gives us the resources for acquiring the proper conception of human being as an hierarchically structured whole, which we need to structure the arts. It also provides a much firmer foundation for that conception by making explicit what we had to arrive at by inference and supposition above: the axiological superiority of intellect to body and mortal soul. In the Statesman we learn this is due to the former’s divinity and the ontological defect of the latter two. So, although the Sophist gives us a subterranean route to the conception of human being we need to account for sophistry as defective philosophy and which we will also need to separate the statesman from his rivals and counterfeits, it is only the Statesman’s myth that explicitly provides all the resources necessary to properly ground this conception of human being and, thus, to truly complete the Sophist’s inquiry by properly grasping the sophist as ontologically defective. The Sophist’s worth is ultimately dependent on the Statesman.

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46 The Stranger’s great myth in the Statesman, as I show in chapter 4, employs a similar dialectical strategy in its discussion of human eudaimonia. The dialectical work Plato and the Stranger force us to do there to grasp eudaimonia serves to cultivate our intellect and promote our eudaimonia. See Mackenzie (1982) and Frede (1996) for similar interpretations of Plato’s use of paradox and aporia to stimulate philosophical reflection and insight.
3.3.b. The Concealed Philosopher

Commentators are generally agreed that the sixth division serves as a portrait of Socrates, the dialogues’ most famous elenchus-user. Some also take it as a critique or demotion of Socrates, perhaps marking a shift in Plato’s philosophy away from Socrates’ personal dialectic to the Stranger’s impersonal division and use of heavy logical machinery. According to this story, Plato fittingly has the Stranger, Socrates’ philosophic successor, reveal, via the Stranger’s method of division, that Socrates is a well-meaning sophist, but merely a sophist nevertheless.

If my interpretation is correct, however, the sixth division serves as a powerful apology for Socrates. For if the sixth division’s elenchus succeeds in purging us of the human heap model and opening our soul to the complex whole model with its hierarchy of ends, we then realize that there’s an ontological and axiological gulf separating noble elenchus-users like Socrates from their base counterfeits, the eristic-using sophists. We also realize that elenchus-users like Socrates perform a critical function by perfecting that part of us, sovereign intellect, that we need for our eudaimonia, not just because a beautiful intellect is intrinsically good, but also because only a beautiful intellect properly rules the composite. The Athenians’ execution of Socrates thus takes on a truly tragic

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47 Cornford (1957: 177-83), for example, takes the noble sophist to be a portrait of Socrates, whom Cornford assumes to be a genuine philosopher, and to be an instance of the sort of mistake Socrates mentions in the frame: mistaking the philosopher for a sophist. Notomi (1999: 60-73) has a similar take. Taylor (2006), as already mentioned, takes the sixth division to indicate that Plato now considers Socrates a sophist. This aligns with Long’s (1998) interpretation of the Socrates of the later dialogues as suffering philosophical demotion due to no longer being a proper spokesman for the more technical later philosophy.

48 Rosen (1983: 61-9, 130-1) has a somewhat different interpretation. For Rosen, the Stranger takes Socrates to be a sophist, who, despite his good intentions, does as much harm to his interlocutors as good. For, after purging them of false beliefs, he leaves them with no positive teaching with which to replace their previous beliefs. The Stranger, however, on Rosen’s analysis, does not speak for Plato. Plato intends us to see that, despite the Stranger’s impressive technical machinery, his inquiry into not-being does not succeed and his philosophical prosecution of Socrates fails.
light. By mistaking elenchus for eristic they kill off the very person whose art allows them to acquire intellectual beauty and to justly rule themselves and their city.

There seems, in fact, to be good reason to think that the sixth division is not only itself a concealed instance of elenchus, but that the elenchus-user it accounts for is revealed, via that elenchus, as a concealed philosopher. For one thing, my reading narrows the gap between the Stranger, who is explicitly identified as a philosopher, and Socrates by revealing the Stranger too as an elenchus-user\(^49\). But the most compelling reason to take the elenchus-user to be a philosopher is that he undertakes to bring measure and beauty to what is disordered and ugly and in doing so seems to imitate god. This makes him not a god but divine, as Theodorus asserts, without explanation, about philosophers in the *Sophist*’s frame (216bc). For, as we learn in the *Statesman*, the demiurge created the cosmos by infusing primordial body, which is inherently bereft of order and harmony (άταξίας 273b; ἀναρμοστίας 273c), with divine intelligence (*phronēsis*, 268d). In this way he brought beauty and order to what was originally disordered and chaotic and continues to do so each time chaotic body reasserts itself (272de). This, as we have seen, is what the elenchus-user does for the human soul which Plato has the Stranger describe with language that seems to echo the *Statesman*: his elenctic purification of ignorance removes disorder and ugliness from the soul.\(^50\)

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\(^{49}\) Elenchus, however, can no more get at axiological relations and first principles than the method of division. Elenchus, at best, allows us to acquire consistent belief sets. We can posit, for example, that human being is either a complex whole or a heap and work out the implications for each possibility, resulting in two consistent belief sets, if our dialectical skills are up to snuff. And this is no small accomplishment, since it gives us something like a comprehensive understanding of human being. Yet neither elenchus nor division can adjudicate between first principles and the belief sets generated from them. This adjudication requires something like dialectical proofs. In chapter 4 I show how the Statesman’s great myth provides such a dialectical proof, establishing the complex-whole model of human being with sovereign intellect. See *Sph.* 265cd for an example of the problem of adjudicating first principles. The Stranger here asks Theaetetus whether the various beings have come about by chance or through divine craftsmanship. Theaetetus opts for the latter (although he often vacillates), saving the Stranger from having to try to convince him with argument coupled with compulsory persuasion (τὸ λόγῳ μετὰ πεθοὺς ἀναγκαίᾳς, 265d).

\(^{50}\) E.g., ψυχὴν ἄρα ἁνόητον αἰτχρᾶν καὶ ἁμέτρον θετέον, 228d.
Additionally, the demiurge takes up the burden of beautifying what is ugly presumably because, like the *Timaeus*’ demiurge, he is himself good, and from his goodness arises a desire that everything else be good like him (*Tim.* 29e-30c).\(^{51}\)

Plato, I contend, wants us to see that the elenchus-user undertakes the burden of beautifying souls, despite its obvious political danger, for the same reason. He desires everything else to be good because he is good himself. And for Plato, knowing the good and being good seems to be sufficient for undertaking the burden of making everything else good too. Why else would one risk death for the sake of doing elenchus and even choose death rather than desist from it, as Socrates does, if one did not have knowledge and possession of the good as the anchor of one’s desire? The midwife, as we saw (*Tht.* 150a), refrains from her matchmaking, the capacity of which she is proudest, because she fears losing not her life, like Socrates, but merely her reputation. The elenchus-user would thus seem to be more than an expert at exposing inconsistencies in a belief set. He himself would, rather seem to have *epistêmê*, including knowledge of human being.

To anticipate themes from the *Statesman*, I suggest that the elenchus-user is the guise the philosopher takes in the Age of Zeus when he is kept from the city’s throne\(^{52}\). His perfected soul desires to bring order and beauty to his fellow citizens, who, in the absence of the Age of Kronos’ nurturing shepherd gods, must rule themselves yet require

\(^{51}\) The *Statesman*’s divine demiurge is not entirely absent from the Sophist. In the final stretch of text (264c-268d), which resumes the interrupted seventh division, the Stranger distinguishes between divine and human production (265b-266d).

\(^{52}\) There is, of course, nothing stopping the philosopher from supplementing his use of elenchus and/or division with axiological considerations. Division and elenchus are blind to value, but the philosopher surely is not. In fact, in the *Statesman* (287b-305e), after using division to separate *politiê* from all the other arts, the Stranger than differentiates it axiologically from the other arts that care for human being. And in the *Sophist* itself, as we have seen, the Stranger differentiates the elenchus-user from the eristic in axiological terms, although he has not yet provided the grounds for this differentiation.
a beautified intellect to do so justly. We might even get a glimpse of the philosopher-statesman in the practitioner of kolastikê. His corrective art brings a halt to the “civil discord” (stasis, 228a) in the soul by imposing the proper arrangement among its many parts just as the statesman does for the city’s arts, which presupposes not only a deep grasp of human being but also the complex whole model of human being, without which there would be no art to arrangement53. If so, kolastikê might just be another hat the philosopher of the Age of Zeus wears if he is kept from the throne.

This masquerade is not mere embellishment. The text’s elenctic purification, if my analysis is correct, purges us of the distorted ideas that distort not just our soul but also our soul’s judgments about particular instances of those ideas. Plato’s text not only forces us to work to acquire a proper grasp of ousiai, it also gives us practice recognizing instances of those ousiai. Plato in this way challenges us to recognize that Socrates is himself a philosopher and that, despite their perceptible differences, he and the Stranger are the same because their souls are structured by epistêmê54. This contrasts with the case of philosopher and sophist, who appear the same but are different due to having very differently structured souls, as I detail in the next section. Plato in this way uses the dialogue’s drama to enact on the reader the pedagogical program described at the end of the Statesman. It also brings home the very real and tragic consequences intellectual mistakes often have. For the Athenians, due to their own ignorance, mistake a philosopher for a sophist and kill the very thing they need for their own eudaemonia.

53 Cornford (1957: 179) observes that the Stranger’s description of the stasis in the soul recalls a similar description in the Republic (e.g., 440b), where the conflicts among the three parts of the soul are likened to political strife.

54 Socrates, of course, famously claims to be barren of wisdom, like the women who serve as midwives (Th. 150cd). How and how seriously we should take this claim, however, is uncertain. This is a very problematic claim for the ancient Platonists, who have unitarian assumptions about the dialogues. That is, if Socrates is doctrine-rich in the Republic, he must be in the Theaetetus too, if the unitarian hypothesis is correct. To see how the Anonymous Commentator explains Socrates’ barrenness, see Sedley (1996: 93-103).
3.4. The Original-Εἰκόν-Phantasm Distinction (235b-236d)

In the *Sophist*’s central section the Stranger undertakes the long and difficult task of accounting for an innocuous sense of not-being. The Stranger needs this to account for the possibility of the sophist’s product, false judgment, in the face of Parmenidean objections. For false judgments—understood as believing that what is, is not or that what is not, is—are bound up with not-being. The Stranger’s account of not-being as difference or otherness allows him to account for two kinds of statements, negative predications and negative identity statements, which he then uses to account for false judgments. In accounting for false judgement the *Sophist* thus resolves what the *Theaetetus* left in *aporia* and in doing so seems to capture the sophist by defining him in terms of his product. This also provides the metaphysical basis required to justify Socrates’ philosophical method in the Midwifery Digression. For the interrelational epistemology he employs there assumes pluralism and thus assumes the capacity to say that one thing is not another and so requires an innocuous sense of not-being.

Yet the resolution is not complete, and the sophist slips the Stranger’s snares. For nowhere does the Stranger account for not-being in the sense of ontological deficiency. Socrates, as we have seen, presupposes such a sense in the Midwifery Digression: panderers are not *really* matchmakers; that is, pandering is not merely other than matchmaking but a defective form of it. And if my previous analyses are correct, the Stranger needs not-being in the sense of ontological deficiency to properly define the

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55 A proper treatment of the OEP passage would demonstrate its close relation to the Stranger’s later account of not-being as difference as employed in negative predications and negative identity statements, which is obviously beyond the scope of this work. I therefore limit my analysis to the confines of the OEP passage. I note, however, that my use of the being/having distinction, which does essential work on my analysis, is based on Frede’s (1992) interpretation of the *auto kath’ hauto/pros allo distinction* from *Sph.* 255d. The *locus classicus* for not-being in the *Sophist* is Owen (1971), which has given rise to an extensive literature. Other important works include Lee (1972), Keyt (1973), McDowell (1982), Bostock (1984), Brown (2008).
sophist: the sophist is not the philosopher in the sense not just of being other but of being defective.

At 235b-236d, however, the Stranger makes a tripartite distinction between originals, \( eikones \), and phantasms (OEP) which ostensibly serves as a framework in terms of which to explain the sophist’s product, the deceptive \( logoi \) which he uses to produce false beliefs in the souls of his interlocutors. These false \( logoi \) are mere phantasms, discursive images of some object that distort the object in such a way as to appear to be accurate representations, or \( eikones \), of that object. On my reading Plato wants us to see that the OEP also applies to the sophist himself, although this is not explicitly done until the Statesman, and provides a formal framework in terms of which to articulate the sophist’s ontological deficiency once we have the requisite framework of ends.\(^{56}\) Once we do have that system of ends, the OEP distinction allows us to deliver a real sting to the sophist. The sophist, we are meant to see, is not merely some different kind of expert from the philosopher. Rather, his lack of \( epistêmê \) and wisdom make him a merely phantasmal philosopher and sham expert. This lack amounts, in fact, to an ontological deficit that renders the sophist not even really human.

I begin with an analysis of the Stranger’s OEP distinction (235d-236d) and its ontological implications (239c-240b), which will require a very brief excursion into the Stranger’s later account of the \( megista genê \). The Stranger makes a crucial distinction here between being \( auto kath’ hauto \) and being \( pros allo \) (255ce) which, I argue, is previewed in the OEP passage where it does important work establishing that \( eikones \) suffer ontological defect due to dependency on the original: through imitation they are

\(^{56}\) Rosen (1983: 147-74) provides the most extensive analysis of the OEP, which has otherwise suffered relative neglect in the literature. See Blondell (2006: 314-96) for an insightful interpretation of the OEP and interesting application of it to the philosophical significance of the dramatic action.
pros allo what the original is auto kath’ hauto. Phantasms suffer even more severe ontological defect since they merely appear to be eikones, that is, copies which accurately imitate the original. The OEP passage, in fact, signals that these relations obtain not only among material originals and their copies, but also between immaterial originals, i.e., properties like wisdom, and the particular things, like souls, which possess them or may seem to possess them. I conclude with a preview of the important work the OEP does in the Statesman. For the OEP’s framework prepares us for the Statesman’s crew of sham statesmen and regimes (291a-303d), which we must differentiate from the true statesman and his regime in terms of ontological deficiency. In addition to this definitional function, the OEP also does important political work. 57 It allows us to open up an ontological gulf between the phantasmal regimes ruled by non-sages and the sage’s genuine regime, which is the only hope non-philosophers have for rescue from their own phantasmal condition.

To corner the sophist in one of its parts, the Stranger divides the image-making art (εἰδωλοποιικὴ τέχνη 235b-236d) into two subkinds: eikastikê and phantastikê. 58 Eikastikê (235de) produces what we call eikones, because, although other (ἕτερον, 236a) than the original, they are like (εἰκός) it. Eikones, that is, are accurate copies of some original (παραδείγματος) insofar as they reproduce the actual proportions or measures (συμμετρίας) of the original in length, breadth, depth, and since they provide the original’s colors.

57 In chapter 5 I argue that this application of the OEP in the Stranger’s account of regimes causes difficulties for the thesis that Plato moderates his political philosophy in the later dialogues and is more optimistic about regimes led by non-sages. See Rowe (2001) for a critique of the thesis that Plato evinces a more sympathetic view of democracy in the Statesman.

58 For the full analysis of sophistry as a productive art, see the final division Sph. 263b-268d. In the following I focus on only the details most important for my analysis. See Notomi (1999: 270-301) and Brown (2010: 157-63) for more detailed analysis.
Phantastikê (235e-236a) on the other hand, abandons the actual proportions of beautiful things. Instead of using the proportions that are beautiful (οὐ τὰς οὖσας συμμετρίας), it uses those that seem beautiful (τὰς δοξούσας εἶναι καλὰς). Practitioners of phantastikê, in other words, distort the actual proportions of some beautiful original to accommodate the viewer’s perspective. For, if they reproduced the actual proportions (τὴν τῶν καλῶν ἀληθινὴν συμμετρίαν), the things at the top would appear smaller than they ought (συμκρότερα μὲν τοῦ δέοντος), while the things below would appear too big (μεῖζον). A phantasm of some original may thus inaccurately reproduce the original, but if produced by one skilled in phantastikê the phantasm will appear even more like the original than the eikôn, which actually is like the original.

Several pages later at 239c-240c the Stranger works out the ontological implications of the OEP distinction. His interrogation of Theaetetus here results in the assertion that a copy is not only not really the original, but its not being the original means it not really is (240b7-8). The Stranger arrives at this proposition by getting Theaetetus to admit that, although the copy (eidôlon) is some other such thing (ἕτερον τοιοῦτον) likened to a true thing (i.e., an original), the copy is itself not a true thing. And since the true is what really is (ὁντως ὅν), the copy not really is, despite its likeness to the original.

The nature of the copy’s ontological deficiency is unclear, but it seems to be due to the copy’s ontological dependency on the original. In other words, since a copy is not an original, which is a true and really real thing, but merely possesses what belongs to some original, its being depends on the original, and this dependency vitiates its being. On the other hand, the copy acquires some purchase on being insofar as it does somehow
possess something which is really real, the original of which it is a copy, although it is
itself not that really real thing. Several examples from the text may help to clarify some
of the obscurities in this account.

First, later in the account of the megista genê the Stranger distinguishes two
senses or ways of being: some of ‘the things which are’ are spoken of auto kath’ hauto
while others are always spoken of pros alla (255ce). This distinction he then employs, as
Frede shows, to account for the innocuous sense of not-being as otherness (255e-258c),
where it does crucial work59. This account is obviously too complex to detail here; a brief
sample of the Stranger’s argument suffices, however, for my purposes. At 256a3-b4 the
Stranger explains how Motion is the Same and not the Same and why this is not
problematic. Motion is the Same insofar as it partakes of the Same and thus possesses
sameness as a property; and this partaking or having relation is what the Stranger means
by “being pros alla”. On the other hand, it is not the Same insofar as it partakes of
Otherness with respect to what is auto kath’ hauto the Same. Motion is other than what is
auto kath’ hauto the Same because Motion has its own nature: it is auto kath’ hauto
Motion. The sense of not-being as Otherness along with the two senses of Being in this
way allow us to say what otherwise might seem intolerable: that Motion is and is not the
Same.

The image-original relation, I propose, should be understood along these lines.
The great difference being that things like the megista genê have their own nature, which
I take to be what the Stranger means by being a true and real thing at 240ab. For this
reason they suffer no ontological defect as a result of partaking of but being other than

59 M. Frede (1992: see esp. 399-402).
some true thing, since they do not depend on those other true things for their being\textsuperscript{60}. Motion, for example, may depend on Sameness for being the same insofar as it is (*pros alla*) the Same. But since Motion has its own nature or is *auto kath’ hauto* Motion, this dependency implies no ontological demotion. On the other hand, if something has no nature of its own, then the only purchase it gets on *really* being is through being *pros allo*, that is, through partaking of things which are *auto kath’ hauto*. That Plato intends us to read the OEP relation in terms of the later technical work on Being and Otherness is suggested, perhaps, by the several uses of ἕτερον (236a9, 240a10, 240a12) in the discussion of images.

For Plato, then, *eikones* suffer serious ontological defect despite the fact that they accurately reproduce the properties of some original. A colossal statue of Alcibiades, for example, may accurately reproduce Alcibiades’ parts and the beautiful proportions of those parts, and for this reason it may, as Theaetetus says (240b), really be an *eikôn*. Yet, since those parts and beautiful proportions belong not to its own nature but to Alcibiades’, the *eikôn* only is *pros allo*. It may be objected that an *eikôn* does possess a nature, and that this is what Theaetetus means when he asserts that a likeness of an original really is an *eikôn*. Even so, it belongs to an *eikôn*’s nature, paradoxically perhaps, to be dependent on the nature of something else. An *eikôn*, that is, is always of something, which for Plato amounts to ontological defect.

\textsuperscript{60} The Stranger has no set technical terminology for the relations that obtain among the great kinds. Sometimes he speaks of the *megista genê* partaking of one another (e.g., *metechein* is used at 255d, 256a, *et passim*; *metalambanein* at 259b *et passim*), at other times he says they combine (e.g., *koinônein*: 254b *et passim*) or mix (*mignusthai*: 256b *et passim*) with each other. The participation relation that obtains between things like the great kinds and particular things, as I suggest here, must be very different. See Silverman (2002) for another account of the participation relation and how it differs depending on whether it obtains between kinds (or Forms?) or between particulars and kinds or, as I suggest, universals.
Phantasms must suffer an even worse fate. As images, they too, like eikones, only are pros allo; they depend on some original for any purchase on really being. Eikones, however, at least have some real attachment to the original via the likeness relation, which I take to be the analogue to the combination or participation relation that obtains among the megista genê. Phantasms, on the other hand, only appear like the original and have no actual likeness to it. A colossal statue of Alcibiades, for example, may reproduce Alcibiades’ parts and, from a certain perspective, even the proportions between those parts that make the statue appear to have something like Alcibiades’ beauty. In actuality, however, its proportions are distorted in order to accommodate the viewer’s perspective, producing merely a phantom of the beautiful Alcibiades. Someone skilled in phantastikê, in fact, may be able to produce phantasms that appear even more like the original than eikones. This appearance relation, however, makes for severe ontological defect, since the phantasm has no real connection to the original at all. It merely appears to be an eikon, that is, a copy which possesses a likeness to or is pros allo the original.

A problem with this account is that things like Alcibiades are not obviously the sort of things that are auto kath’ hauto, nor is there an obvious ontological dependency relation that obtains between a material original and its copies. Alcibiades is temporally prior to his copies, and this no doubt makes for epistemic priority: to recognize the copy as of Alcibiades requires prior acquaintance with Alcibiades. Not so obvious is that this temporal priority or any other feature of this kind of copy-original relation also makes for ontological dependency. In other words, temporal priority does not seem to be a basis

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61 The easier case for ontological dependency would be copies such as mirror images and shadows, which Plato lists as copies at 239d and 266bc. Another way of expressing the problematic nature of the copy-original relation as it obtains among material things is that the likeness relation is symmetrical between the material original and its material copies. This symmetry in likeness generates third-man problems that wreck the youthful Socrates’ theory of Forms in the...
for any kind of metaphysical ownership of properties\textsuperscript{62}. Otherwise, the young Theaetetus’ physical resemblance to Socrates would make him a copy of Socrates and thus ontologically dependent on Socrates, which seems absurd.

In fact, in the Statesman Socrates seems to take his likeness in facial features to Theaetetus and likeness in name to young Socrates merely as a starting point. He seems to suggest that another, deeper sort of resemblance, which can be ascertained only through discourse (not perception), might obtain between him and the youths (\textit{Pltc}. 257d-258a). He presumably wants to ascertain whether his soul and theirs share a likeness, and the likeness he is searching out διὰ λόγων presumably consists in being wise or having the capacity for wisdom\textsuperscript{63}. And it is immaterial and imperceptible universals like wisdom, I maintain, and the particulars that possess them for which the OEP distinction is intended to provide an ontological framework. The Stranger’s statues and paintings and their material originals I take as examples intended to give us insight into a more difficult kind of copy-original relation and the real target of the OEP distinction: material copies and the immaterial universals they somehow possess.

\textit{Parmenides} (132d-133a). Proclus (\textit{In Parm}. 913.11-14) denies the symmetry assumption for paradigms or originals and their copies.

\textsuperscript{62} Material particulars like Alcibiades, as I explain just below, seem to be originals only in a very loose and non-philosophical sense. On another note, the final definition of knowledge as a grasp of the difference in the \textit{Theaetetus} (208c-210b) perhaps illustrates the problem particulars have with ownership of properties and how this foils trying to define particulars. Every attempt to define Theaetetus in terms of his properties (snub nose, bulging eyes) also captures Socrates and anyone else having these features, no matter how finely-tuned the description. Particulars are just not the sort of thing which can be defined (which also means they cannot be known, presumably, although they can be recognized) since they are not anything \textit{auto kath’ hauto}.

\textsuperscript{63} At the very least Socrates wants to find out whether the youths are potential philosophers. On my reading, however, the philosopher is the one whose soul possesses wisdom as a property. It might be objected that for Plato the philosopher is someone who desires wisdom but is not wise, a formulation we find in earlier dialogues. The \textit{pros allo/auto kath’ hauto} distinction, however, allows us to reconcile these apparently inconsistent formulae: the philosopher is wise (or is \textit{pros allo} Wisdom) but is other than what is \textit{auto kath’ hauto} Wisdom. See Sedley (1996: 93-103) for the Anonymous Commentator’s similar explanation for the philosopher’s relation to wisdom. Anon’s concern is to explain away Socrates’ disavowal of wisdom in his account of his midwifery in the \textit{Theaetetus} (\textit{Tht}. 148e-151d).
The ontological deficiency that results from the dependency relation makes much more sense when the originals are immaterial universals, like wisdom, rather than material particulars, like Alcibiades. The Stranger, in fact, suggests to us how the OEP distinction maps onto the particular-universal relation by pointing us back to his discussion of the soul at 227c-228e. In his division of the image-making arts, as we have seen, a phantasm is described as a copy that lacks the true proportions (symmetria) of some beautiful original but appears like the original, that is, it appears to be an eikôn of the original. But this is only because it is not viewed from a beautiful perspective or position. With a change of position the spell dissolves and the copy is revealed as actually ugly. These three notions form the OEP passage—beauty, symmetria, beautiful perspective—signal that we should read the Stranger’s account of the soul at 227c-228e, where we first encounter these three notions, in terms of the OEP distinction.

Here, we remember, ignorance is an evil that afflicts the soul. The Stranger likens it to a deformity: an ignorant soul is an ugly soul. The ugliness is due to a lack of the proper proportions (symmetria), by which the Stranger seems to mean the wrong measure (amteria) between the soul and the objects it attempts to grasp, which are, presumably, the universals about which the eristic-user engages in disputation (such as justice itself, injustice itself, and other such things (225c)) and about which the elenchus-user seeks to his interlocutor’s soul’s false beliefs. I maintain that the Stranger wants us to see that a soul’s lack of symmetria which results in an absence of beauty renders it a phantasm, just as the statue’s failure to reproduce the original’s symmetria gives it merely the appearance of beauty. Such a soul may seem to be a proper soul (as I clarify below), but it is no more really a soul than the phantasmal statue of Alcibiades is really an eikôn of
Alcibiades, despite appearances. The ontological deficiency, moreover, makes much more sense in the case of souls. A soul that lacks the proper proportions cannot hit its targets, which means it cannot perform a soul’s proper function: truth determination (228c8-d2).

On the other hand, a soul which is beautiful through possessing the proper measure or *symmetria* may really be a soul, which is to say a proper soul which can perform soul’s truth-determining function. Yet even a proper soul would seem to be marked by dependency and hence ontological deficiency. The proportions or *symmetria* that structure it are copies of the universals which it has as its proper objects, and a soul that accurately reproduces these universals in itself is not only beautiful; presumably it is also wise or knowing. So a soul is really a soul only if it is wise. But no soul is wisdom *auto kath’ hauto*; a soul can only be wise *pros allo*, which means it partakes of wisdom or is an *eikôn* of wisdom.

Put another way, if there is such a thing as soul-nature, and soul-nature is comprised of certain properties, then possessing some of those properties may be sufficient for being a soul, but insufficient for really being a soul. This must be the case, since a soul which lacks the *symmetria* proper to it is, after all, still a soul. It is just an ugly soul and for this reason is not really a soul. Yet even a soul that possesses all the properties that belong to soul-nature and for this reason is really a soul still suffers ontological deficiency. For it is not that nature *auto kath’ hauto* but only *pros allo*, which makes it an *eikôn* of soul-nature. It may really be an *eikôn* of soul-nature, but its really being is dependent on something else, namely, the soul-nature it instantiates, which renders it ontologically deficient.
One might object to the instantiation language in my account, but the Stranger’s use of being *pros allo* to express the partaking or combination relation that obtains between the *megista genê* seems to sanction this use. The Stranger makes clear there, as we have seen, that the great kinds acquire properties through combination with other kinds. Particulars, too, must obviously partake of the *megista genê*, since everything is (*pros allo*) the same, different, and so on. The crucial difference is that particulars, unlike kinds, are not what they are *auto kath’ hauto*; otherwise it would not be possible for souls to be ugly. For this reason their being depends on something else which is *auto kath’ hauto*, like soul-nature. Evidence that there are such natures and that something like the participation relation obtains between them and particulars we saw in chapter 1’s analysis of the Measure Doctrine from the *Statesman*. There the Stranger distinguishes between the *metron*, which signifies some objective nature, and *metria*, things that are in due measure. The *metron* serves as the model or blueprint for expert production. By bringing it about that their products are in due measure, experts makes them good and beautiful (*Pltc*. 284a6-b1). Without it they are bad and ugly (*Pltc*. 283e4-7).

Finally, it might be unclear how my interpretation accounts for an important aspect of phantasms. My interpretation has emphasized phantasms’ status as defective copies as a result of distorting the original’s proportions. But according to the Stranger these distortions also allow the phantasm to appear more like the original than the *eikôn*. How this works for material originals’ material copies is clear from the Stranger’s account: the proportions of the phantasm’s parts are adjusted to fit the viewers’ spatial position. How this maps onto the universal-instance relation, especially as it pertains to
imperceptible souls, might be less evident, but I propose that it works in the following way.

The Stranger, as we have seen, attributes phantasms’ power of deception to a trick of perspective. They appear more like the original than eikones only because the viewers do not perceive their them from a ‘beautiful perspective’ (ὅτα τὴν οὐκ ἐκ καλοῦθεν, 236b5). A shift of spatial position, however, would reveal their distorted proportions and phantom beauty. Since souls are imperceptible, mistaking an ugly and ignorant soul for a beautiful and wise one cannot be due to the subject’s spatial position relative to the object. It may, however, still be due to not having a ‘beautiful perspective’. For if one is ignorant of things like wisdom, courage, temperance, and other such universals, then one not only has an ugly soul, as we saw at 227c-228e. One also does not judge accounts and instances of those universals from a beautiful perspective. Plato calls our attention to the notion of perspective in this intellectual sense just before the OEP passage’s talk of beautiful spatial positioning. At 234c2-8 the Stranger describes an art that uses verbal images to bewitch the young so that the images appear to them to be true. It is able to do this because the young still stand far from the truth of things, language which Plato repeats at 234d5-6 and 234e4-5.

Due to the sophist’s interlocutors’ ignorance of universals, in other words, and the sophist’s verbal trickery, the sophist’s discursive reproductions of those universals appear true despite their falsity, in much the same way that material originals’ material phantasms do. Additionally, his deceptions and his interlocutors’ ignorance allow the sophist himself to appear to be wise, as the Stranger asserts at 234c7-8. In reality he does not really know the universals he appears to know (234a8-11) and for this reason must
have an ugly soul. The sophist, then, not only creates phantasms. It seems Plato wants us to see that the sophist is himself a phantasm, a false image of wisdom, while the philosopher or *sophos* is an *eikôn* of wisdom, since his soul actually possesses the *symmetria* which the sophist’s soul only appears to possess. His art of deception, in fact, not only allows him to appear to be an *eikôn* of wisdom, as we would expect of a phantasm. In the eyes of the people he perhaps makes for an even more convincing *eikôn* of wisdom than the philosopher, since he enriches himself through his art. Only a garrulous fool would engage in verbal dispute for its own sake, allowing his household go to ruin, like Socrates and the Theaetetus’ philosopher of the digression.

If this is correct, then the OEP distinction allows us to articulate just how severe the sophist’s ontological defect is. He merely appears to be that which partakes of but is other than wisdom: he is a defective *eikôn* or inaccurate copy of wisdom, a sham philosopher. The indictment, in fact, seems to be even graver, since in producing false beliefs in his interlocutors’ souls (240d), he makes their souls worse instead of better, uglier instead of more beautiful. He produces yet more phantasms like himself.

Plato, however, never has the Stranger explicitly apply the OEP distinction to the philosopher/sophist relation. Yet he indicates we should think about such an application, I propose, by having Theaetetus state at the very end of the dialogue that the sophist is an imitator of the wise man (268bc). This imitation would be commendable if he imitated the wise man’s wisdom, but he merely apes the wise man’s actions. He does what the wise man does, but he acts without the wisdom or knowledge of the *sophos* and for the sake of his mortal soul’s desire for wealth rather than intellect’s desire for beauty and truth. The reason we do not get a more explicit application of the OEP to the
philosopher/sophist relation is perhaps because it would not yet have any real bite. The
sophist may be a sham philosopher, but this ontological demotion will not have any real
bite until the Statesman, where the Stranger establishes the priority of intellect’s ends and
epistêmê as a necessary condition not only for genuine expertise but also for human
eudaimonia. For as things stand in the Sophist, the sophist can shrug off our censure of
him and blithely admit he is not really wise due to lacking epistêmê. For he can still lay
claim to having expertise based on his doxastikê (233c), which he uses to appear wise
and, in this way, to fulfill his mortal soul’s desire for wealth.

Once we do have the aforementioned resources from the Statesman, however, the
OEP gives us the framework to grasp and articulate just how radically defective non-
philosophers are and just how important the sage is. The sophist, since he lacks epistêmê
and acts for the sake of mortal soul’s rather than intellect’s ends, is not an expert at all,
but a phantasmal sophos whose only link to wisdom is his aping of the philosopher’s
actions. This same analysis will apply in the Statesman to the leaders of the various other
kinds of regime. Lacking epistêmê, they and their regimes are mere phantasms. An
ontological gulf separates the true statesman and his regime from other politicians and
their regimes. In fact, if having an intellect structured by epistêmê is necessary for
expertise, and epistêmê is as difficult as I have claimed, then the only true expert will be
the sage. All others will be mere phantasms. So, although we get the requisite teleological
content only in the Statesman, the Sophist’s OEP gives us the framework required to
properly separate politikê from its rivals in terms of ontological deficiency.

Finally, if an intellect structured by epistêmê is necessary for eudaimonia, as the
Sophist intimates (230de) and as the Statesman confirms (272bd), and eudaimonia is
necessary for being properly human, all others besides the sage will be mere phantasmal human beings. They may look like genuine human beings insofar as they have all the same perceptible properties of a human being. To their fellow non-sages they will even appear more like proper humans than the sage, since they abstain from the sage’s apparently mad behavior. Yet if epistêmê is needed for having a properly structured intellect (otherwise it is ugly and without measure, 228d) so that it can properly structure the whole soul (otherwise the soul is sick, 228b), including mortal soul and the body in which it inheres, then they are mere human heaps. They are not really human beings at all, however fair they may appear.

The only hope non-sages have is the advent of the genuine statesman, the sage in the political sphere. Submitting to the sage’s authority (as opposed to just mimicking his actions, as sophists and sham statesmen do) is the only chance non-sages have for mitigating their otherwise entirely phantasmal existence and rehabilitating somewhat their degraded ousia. For this, as we shall see in the next chapter, is precisely what the demiurge does in the Stranger’s great myth. He creates a beautiful and ordered cosmos from the intrinsically chaotic primordial body (269d, 273b) by infusing it with intelligence (269cd). The statesman imitates the god’s action at the sublunar level by crafting a well ordered polis out of the unruly human heap. The Stanger, I note, does this in speech in the Statesman (as I detail in chapter 5) and is introduced in the Sophist as not a god, but divine. This suggests that we have in the Stranger an eikôn of the divine demiurge, a genuine statesman who arrives to rescue us from our phantasmal existence just as the demiurge returns to rescue his cosmos when, due to the corruption of its intelligence, it is no longer really a cosmos at all.
Chapter 4: The Statesman’s Measure of Man

4.1 Introduction

The Statesman’s inquiry into politikê takes place on the same day as, and immediately after, the Sophist’s inquiry. With this, along with Socrates’ mention (Sts. 258a) of his encounter with Theaetetus the previous day (referring to the events of the Theaetetus), Plato emphasizes the dramatic unity of the three dialogues.¹ The dramatic unity, however, serves to signify the deeper, philosophical unity of the three dialogues. We see this unity in the Statesman’s first attempt to define politikê by the method of division, which deploys all those definitional principles that we have already encountered in the Theaetetus. We get an enumeration of elements, differentiation of parts (relations), and even a use of the arts’ various objects to differentiate the arts from politikê, which has human being as its object. The division fails, however, due to a number of mistakes made by the Stranger and his new interlocutor, Socrates’ younger namesake (YS). To correct their errors the Stranger deploys his great cosmological myth. By fully unraveling these mistakes, which the Stranger himself diagnoses but only partially resolves, and grasping their relation to the myth, which the Stranger leaves vague, we acquire crucial philosophical insights that confirm my account of the interrelational epistemology and of the significance of epistêmê.

I begin in 4.2 with an analysis of the failed first attempt to divide politikê (258b-268c). The division fails, I argue, due to the Stranger’s flawed conception of human being itself, politikê’s object, a proper grasp of which is needed to properly differentiate

¹ See Lane (1998: 7) for a more pessimistic take on the unity of the trilogy.
politikê from other arts. The Stranger assumes that human being is a heap of equally valuable corporeal properties, whereas it is in fact a complex whole of body and intellect, in which intellect dominates because it is nobler. The Stranger has committed two mistakes. An incomplete enumeration of human being’s parts leads him to mistake a part of human being (body) for the whole (body and intellect). He also fails to account for the axiological and hierarchical relations of those parts. To properly grasp human being itself thus requires my proposed model of the interrelational epistemology: complete enumeration and differentiation of elements, where differentiation includes axiological and hierarchical relations. Only this gives us a complete grasp of something, which inoculates us from mistakes and thus makes us true knowers.

In 4.3 I clarify the function of the great myth, which the Stranger leaves obscure. The myth’s central purpose, I argue, is to remedy the aforementioned errors and allow us to acquire a proper grasp of human being’s nature and structure, which then serves as the ground or measure for the Stranger’s logos of the polis after the myth. For, as I show in 4.4, the myth introduces intellect, the element missing from the Stranger’s enumeration, and provides the absent axiological relations by establishing intellect’s superiority to body. The grandness and elaborateness of the myth, however, suggest a grander purpose than the resolution of these rather mundane errors. I argue here that the myth serves as a necessary supplement to division, the value-blindness of which reduces human being to a heap of properties. This shows that division is part of but not identical to the

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2 Rosen (1979, 1995), Scodel (1987), and Dorter (1999) also focus on the faulty conception of human being to draw lessons about method and the Stranger but do not register the deeper importance of grasping human being.

3 The myth has proven a difficult nut to crack for interpreters, for its elaborate cosmology seems to have little to do with the surrounding dialogue. Some take it as serious cosmology (e.g., Skemp (1952), Mohr (1978, 1985a, 1985b. See Dillon (1995) for its Neo-Platonic interpretation), or as teaching political lessons (Vidal-Naquet (1978)) but do not explain its relevance to the dialogue as a whole. Lane (1998: 99-136) is one of the few to tie the myth closely into important themes in the dialogue (but also see Ferrari (1995)), as shall my own interpretation.
interrelational epistemology. For its elements (discursive enumeration and differentiation) are necessary but not sufficient for epistêmê, which also requires an account of axiological and hierarchical relations. I also explain here how the Stranger’s deployment of cosmology to account for human being also confirms my contention that knowledge of X requires not just grasping what X is auto kath’ hauto but relating it to everything else knowable.

I then analyze the myth in 4.4, showing how it is tailored to correct our conception of human being, which we need to properly define politikê. We come away with not only a proper grasp of what human being itself is (for which the Stranger importantly makes us do the dialectical work) but also a deeper understanding of the significance of epistêmê. For at the very center of the myth we learn that epistêmê of human being (and, by implication, of everything else) is a necessary condition for human eudaimonia and that epistêmê is possible only in the parlous and godless Age of Zeus. I conclude by working out the ethical and political consequences of this position.

4.2 Human Heaps, Political Heaps (258b-268c)

After a playful exchange between Socrates and Theodorus (257ac), which begins the dialogue and to which I return just below, the Stranger and YS undertake to define politikê, which eventually requires grasping human being itself. We need to know human being because politikê, like all arts, is defined in part in terms of its object. The first definition of politikê fails, I argue here, due to a flawed conception of human being. The Stranger and YS mistake part for whole: they take corporeal nature for the whole of

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4 Godless in the sense that the cosmos is not directly governed by the divine demiurge nor are its parts tended by shepherd gods, as is the case in the Age of Kronos. Pltc. 274cd, however, indicates that at the beginning of the Age of Zeus the Olympian gods instruct humans in the use of fire and in the banausic arts. Erler (1995) addresses the controversy over godlessness in the Age of Zeus and related issues.
human being, ignoring intellectual nature. This mistake is compounded by their failure to 
map out the axiological relations among human being’s parts. The result is a conception 
of human being as a heap of corporeal properties instead of a structured whole of body 
and sovereign intellect.

The inquirers use division to define politikê by locating it in a wide genus, 
epistêmê (258b), then in sub-genera of successively smaller extension until they arrive at 
their target. After determining politikê as a self-directive kind of theoretical knowledge 
(261a), they further specify it in terms of its object. It is knowledge aimed at nurture of 
human being, which they eventually determine to be a featherless biped or non-
interbreeding biped. This absurdity seems to result from using only corporeal properties.
The stranger however does not zero in on this. The problem, he says, is that, with politikê 
so defined, many other experts at human nurture will claim and quarrel over the title of 
politikê: doctors, midwives, farmers and so on (267c-268c). The stranger then deploys the 
myth to rectify the definition and separate politikê from the other arts, without specifying 
the cause of the first division’s inadequacy, thus leaving the function of the myth, which I 
demystify in 4.3, mysterious.

The culprit seems to be the assumption that statesmen nurture (cf. trophê, 261d- 
262a) their subjects, yet the stranger does not explain what motivated this assumption. I 
contend it is the materialistic conception of human being: merely corporeal humans, sans

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5 See the exchange between Moravcsik (1973a, 1973b) and Cohen (1973) for a debate on whether division is 
intensional (Moravcsik) or extensional (Cohen). Rowe (1995a) takes it to be along the lines of Cohen’s “super clean 
model” of extensional analysis. As I argued in chapter 2, division would seem to both intensional and extensional. See 
also Lane (1998: 21-60), and Sayre (2006: 52-72), Wedin (1987) for useful discussions of division.

6 Cf. Clark (1995), for whom this is not absurd at all but an indication that for Plato, in contrast to Aristotle, humans are 
not all that different from other animals. Below I provide a more detailed catalogue of the corporeal properties used to 
define human being.
intellect, require only bodily nurture. And if all the bodily parts of human being that require nurture are of equal worth, then we have no way of adjudicating the claims of their respective arts to politikê. Our heapish human being thus results in a heapish city or community of arts. The following passages from both before and after the myth support my contention that it is the human heap model that wrecks the division and that this mistaken conception of human being results from two other mistakes: leaving out intellect from the enumeration of human being’s elements and the failure to relate those elements axiologically.

4.2.a. Pre-Myth Absence of Intellect

Intellect’s absence from the division should be obvious if we have Socrates’ account of his midwifery in mind from the Theaetetus (149a-151d). And based upon the textual and thematic connections between the two passages, which I recorded in chapter 2, Plato does intend us to have it in mind. There we saw Socrates distinguish his own midwifery from other kinds in terms of their different objects: Socrates’ art has soul, while ordinary midwifery has body, for object. He even claims his art is more important and does so, I argued, based on the assumption that his art’s object, soul, is nobler than body, ordinary midwifery’s object. So Socrates’ account of midwifery gives us a model for grasping the defects of the Statesman’s division: absent intellect and axiology.

Socrates may even play the philosopher-statesman in his role as elenchic midwife, as I

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7 The Stranger seems to be assuming the first principles of pre-Socratic materialism, namely, that there are only corporeal properties. Complex beings are to be explained by what kinds and quantity of these properties they possess and the proportions between them. They leave out intellect and, for Plato, thus suffer a very deep deficiency in self-knowledge, since without intellect they cannot account for how they provide such accounts. As I explain later, this failed division serves as a dialectical argument against pre-Socratic first principles. Plato’s predecessors take center stage in the Sophist (242b-251a), so their less obtrusive presence here should not surprise. See McCabe (2007: esp. 141-64) for an analysis of Plato’s handling of past philosophers in this trilogy.
have suggested. If so, he shows us at the beginning of the trilogy precisely how to
differentiate politikê from the other arts.

The Statesman itself, in its pre-myth portion, also calls our attention to intellect’s
absence. After determining that politikê is a self-directive kind of theoretical knowledge,
the Stranger and YS further specify it in terms of its object and function (261b-262a): it is
done for the sake of bringing into being animate (rather than inanimate) things, which it
collectively nurtures in herds (rather than singly). The Stranger then asks YS to make the
next cut by dividing collective herd-rearing in two. YS does so by distinguishing the
nurture of humans from that of animals (262a), but does not explain the basis for this cut.
It seems to be that humans have intellect while other animals do not.

Plato appears to mark this passage as significant by having YS make here the
inquiry’s first mistake. YS has, for one thing, made a methodological error, according to
the Stranger, by slicing off a small part (human herd-rearing) and leaving behind a large,
undivided genos (animal herd-rearing). The Stranger uses this as an opportunity for a
digression on method (262a-263b), explaining the need to cut down the middle in order
to arrive at genuine genê. After the general discussion of method the Stranger returns to
YS’ specific cut and confirms the suspicion that YS had intellect in mind as the
differentia separating humans from all other animals. The problem with YS’ cut, the
Stranger says, is that there might be some other intellectual animal, such the crane (εἰ ποὺ
φρόνιμον ἐστὶ τι ζῷου ἔτερον, οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ τῶν γεράνων, 263d), in which case our

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8 But this is not the dialogue’s first mistake. Theodorus makes a flawed axiological judgment in the frame at 257ac,
which I address below.

9 For analysis of the digression on method, including the eidos/genos distinction, see Wedin (1987) and Sayre (2006).
See Miller (1980: 16-33) for an analysis that treats the passage in the wider context of the dialogue.
definition of *politikē* would be vitiated as a result of not properly marking off its object.\(^\text{10}\)

To avoid this, we must undertake a more precise division of the animal *genos* and not hurriedly slice off human being from the other animals, as YS had done.

The problem is that intellect, *phronēsis*, never comes up again in the ensuing division. Instead, the Stranger works through an array of properties belonging to (bipedal, wingless, etc.) or related to (e.g., non-interbreeding) corporeal nature, resulting in two equally risible definitions of human being: as a featherless biped (266e) and as a non-interbreeding biped (265e-266d).\(^\text{11}\) Plato in this way has the Stranger call attention to intellect, making its subsequent absence conspicuous and intimating that this absence is a cause of the manifestly absurd definitions of human being we end up with. In the language of the interrelational epistemology, we have an incomplete enumeration. We do not meet *phronēsis* again until the myth, where it plays a role of maximum importance.

Before moving on, I note two additional important things the Stranger does here. First, how seriously the Stranger intends us to take his claim that the crane too may be *phronimos* is uncertain. It does turn out, however, that there is another animal that possesses *phronēsis*. Namely, the cosmos, which the Stranger describes in the myth as an animal (ζῷον) endowed with *phronēsis* by the god who created it (269cd). To properly grasp human being, as I show later, requires not differentiating human being from the cosmos, as if they belonged to the same *genos* (*phronimon* animal) and as we would have

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\(^{10}\) This passage looks forward to a passage of great importance in the myth, which I analyze in detail later. At 272bd the Stranger claims that a necessary condition for *eudaimonia* is investigating the whole of nature to see if there is some nature with a unique capacity for the gathering together of *phronēsis* (ἐἰς συναγωγὴν φρονήσεως) that distinguishes it from everything else (τι διαφόρον τῶν ἄλλων). The trick is to realize that this is a self-portrait or mirror of their own inquiry into *politikē* and human being (the nature with a unique capacity for *phronēsis*), which indicates (among other things, as I detail later) that intellect is the key property we should be searching for.

\(^{11}\) I provide more detail on the longer and shorter ways that result in these definitions just below in my discussion of axiology.
to do if the crane too were *phronimos*. Rather, as a microcosm of the cosmos (both are composites of sovereign intellect and body), we must understand human being in terms of the cosmos, the “longer syllable” of which it is a part or letter. So there is, in fact, some other *phronimon* animal which we need to know in order to know human being.

Second, the subsequent division (detailed below), which differentiates human being from other animals solely in terms of corporeal properties, is not worthless nor does its worth consist merely in showing the absurdity that results from intellect’s absence from human being’s definition. Rather, as we learn in the myth (272bd), our attainment of eudaimonia requires cultivation of intellect through philosophical inquiry. And this means, as the Stranger describes it there, conversing with the animals and with one another to determine whether any nature possesses a unique capacity and perceives at all better than the rest for the accumulation of *phronēsis* (272bd). The goal of philosophical inquiry, in other words, is to grasp this *phronimos* being (ourselves and the cosmos of which we are part and microcosm), but to truly grasp it requires working out how it is different from all other things. So the Stranger’s advice at 263de, that we should work through the other properties that belong to the animal *genos* instead of just jumping straight to the differentia, *phronimos*, looks forward to the myth. It is also what we would expect from the interrelational epistemology: to *really* know what it means to be *phronimos* (and to know ourselves qua human being) requires knowing everything else too. Intellect’s absence renders human beings *seemingly* commensurable with other

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12 This is a paraphrase of 272bd, which I return to later in 4.4 in my analysis of the myth: εἰ μὲν τούτον οἱ τρόφιμοι τοῦ Κρόνου, παροῦσις αὐτοῖς οὕτω πολλῆς σχολῆς καὶ δυνάμεως πρὸς τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀνθρώποις ἄλλα καὶ θηρίοις διὰ λόγων δύνασθαι συγγίγνεσθαι, κατεχόντων τούτως σύμμαχον ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν, μετὰ τε θηρίων καὶ μετ’ ἀλλήλων ὁμιλοῦσιν, καὶ πυθανόμενου παρὰ πᾶσις φύσεως εἰ τινὰ τις ῥᾴδιαν δύναμιν ἔχουσα ἤσθεντο τι διαφοροῦν τῶν ἄλλων εἰς συναγημὸν φρονήσεως…
animals, whereas they differ from other animals as much as humans, who have a portion of the divine, differ from divinity itself.

4.2.b. Pre-Myth Absence of Axiology

Yet, even if the Stranger had included intellect in his enumeration, this would have sufficed neither to properly mark off humans from other animals nor to give intellect’s attendant art just claim, over other arts’ objections, to the title of politikê. What we need is an axiological distinction establishing intellect’s superiority to other properties. This would elevate humans, as intellect possessors, above other animals. It would also allow us to rank the arts that tend to humans over arts aimed at other animals, like the swineherd’s art. This would, additionally, give the art that tends human intellect just claim to the title of politikê, establishing it as prior to and sovereign over the arts that nurture human body. As things stand, not only is intellect absent. Axiological distinctions are also off the table because our method, division, as I explain below, is blind to axiological distinctions, leaving us with a human heap of corporeal properties of equal worth and a quarrel among the arts over the title of politikê.

The Stranger brings home the consequences of intellect’s and axiology’s absence at 266ad. Resuming the inquiry (at 264b) after YS’ ostensible mistake, the Stranger determines that the statesman nurtures herd animals which dwell on dry land (264be) and are footed (264e). At this point the division has two different routes it can take to their target, the Stranger says, a longer and shorter way (265ab). At YS’ request they take both, beginning with the longer. They then determine that the statesman’s nurture is of

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13 Chapter 2 analyzes the connection between this passage and Theaetetus’ geometry lesson in the Theaetetus (147c-148b), including the link between geometry, division, and axiology.

14 I treat the “shorter way” in the next subsection (4.2.c.).
hornless, non-interbreeding, bipeds (265b-266d). The Stranger himself calls attention to the laughable (πρός γέλωτα, 266b) results of their division. First, the difference between human beings and swine emerges only in the last cut and consists merely in number of feet. Humans are non-interbreeding bipeds, while swine are non-interbreeding quadrupeds. A second, even more risible consequence is that this means the king or statesman differs from the lowly swineherd only insofar as his charges have two feet instead of four. The Stranger reminds YS, however, about what they learned in the inquiry about the sophist, namely, that these seemingly laughable implications are irrelevant for their method of argument. For division is blind to axiological distinctions; it is no more concerned with what is more august than with what is not (266d).

Yet just because division is unconcerned with these axiological distinctions does not mean we should be too. In fact, Plato has already flagged the importance of axiological relations and prepared us to be troubled by the reductive results of axiological absence. For in the frame (257ab) he has Socrates rebuke Theodorus for his value-free judgment of the relations that obtain between philosopher, statesman, and sophist. After Socrates expresses his indebtedness to Theodorus for his acquaintance (γνωρίσεως) with Theaetetus and the Stranger, Theodorus replies that Socrates’ debt will be three times as great once they complete the statesman and philosopher. Socrates chastises Theodorus for assuming that these three types are of equal worth (τῆς ἱσης ἀξίας), when, in fact, they differ more in honor than can be expressed according to his art’s proportions (οἱ τῆ τιμῇ πλέον ἄλληλων ἀφεστάς ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τὴν τῆς ὑμετέρας τέχνης). Geometry, in

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15 See chapter 3 for an analysis of the Stranger’s description of division in the *Sophist* (227ae), to which he alludes here. Important to note is that neither here nor in the *Sophist* passage does the Stranger ever claim that the value-blind method of division is sufficient to account for anything, contra Rosen (1983: 23-26; 1995) and Scodel (1987: passim), who take the Stranger to be a proto-Positivist for whom there are only facts. See Gonzalez (2000) for a critique of such readings of the Stranger.
other words, like division, cannot capture axiological relations. Yet, as Socrates makes clear, this means neither that such relations do not obtain nor that they are irrelevant. Quite the contrary; they are of great importance, according to Socrates. The Stranger’s labored geometrical analogy at 266ab, likening human being to a square’s diagonal with a value of $\sqrt{2}$ and swine to one with a value of $\sqrt{4}$, is no doubt intended to remind us of Socrates’ remarks in the frame about geometry’s value-blindness, signaling that division’s blindness is likewise a defect rather than a virtue.

Neither Socrates nor the Stranger ever explains the cause of geometry’s and division’s value-blindness. If we remember the Sophist however, as the Stranger urges us to do, then we recall that division’s axiological blindness seems to be rooted in insensitivity to ontological difference, that is, its inability to distinguish the better from the worse, the proper from defective.16 The Stranger intends us to see here, I suggest, that other animals, despite what division says, are axiologically inferior to humans because they are ontologically defective. And this defect is due to lack of intellect. If humans

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16 Sph. 226be, analyzed in chapter 3. Yet what explains geometry’s and division’s ontological blindness? And what exactly are the axiological relations that obtain among philosopher, statesman, and sophist that Socrates refers to? It seems that both geometry and division are based in perception, which means both are blind to ontological defect, since perception cannot grasp ousiai, only intellectual soul can. And it is ousiai in terms of which ontological defect is grasped. See Rove (1995a, 1995b) for evidence for division being perception-based. Geometry’s reliance on images, which seems to indicate its reliance on perception and kinship to division, is well known from Rep. VI. So Rosen (1983) et al. are correct to see a connection between division and mathematics. But it would be wrong (indeed, bizarre) to see any hostility from Plato to mathematics per se (the absurdly reductionist conception of human being that division produces is supposed to signal this, per Rosen) and to the Stranger. Theodorus’ geometrical proportions, like division, can distinguish like from like, that is, reveal a difference between things that are the same in some respect. For example, geometry says: gymnastic: body :: elenchic : soul. Division says gymnastic and elenchic are like insofar as both belong to the genos “purification”, but differ in their objects. But neither division nor geometrical proportion can say that elenchic is more valuable due to the greater value of its object. For this greater value is rooted in soul’s divinity and body’s ontological deficiency (it is inherently chaotic, as we learn in the myth).

The relation between philosopher, statesman, and sophist I address at the very end in chapter 5. Here it suffices to note that the sophist, as I argued in chapter 3, is an ontologically defective philosopher due to lack of epistêmé. The statesman and philosopher are the same formally since they both have a soul structured by complete epistêmé. They differ only with respect to material or external circumstances. The philosopher who finds himself in the parlous Age of Zeus must serve as statesman, taking up the reins of political rule to bring order, beauty, and goodness to the heapish city and his defective fellow humans. Sadly, the purely philosophical life, the life of pure reason, is contingently impossible, as we learn from the myth. The absence of the Philosopher is thus intentional and fitting. If this is correct, the philosopher and statesman are of equal value, although the purely philosophical life is most choiceworthy. The sophist, as ontologically defective (a phantasm, in the Sophist’s lingo) is worth nothing at all.
were merely a heap of equally valuable corporeal properties, then they would, in fact, be commensurable with swine. Being two-footed instead of four-footed, they would differ from but share a common measure with pigs. Yet, despite their similar appearance, humans are no more commensurable with swine than $\sqrt{2}$ is commensurable with $\sqrt{4}$, as the Stranger subtly suggests via his geometry analogy.

To substantiate my claim about ontological defect requires dipping into the *Timaeus*. We learn there that bipedalism is necessary for (a co-cause of\(^{17}\)) the human good insofar as humans need it to develop their intellect, the cause of the human good. Standing upright allows humans to observe and grasp with intellect the eternal motions of the divine cosmos, which they reproduce in their own soul to become as divine as humanly possible. Thus understood, bipedalism signifies an unbridgeable ontological gap between humans and their quadrupedal kin due to the former’s possession of intellect, which allows them to become godlike\(^{18}\). Other animals, due to their wholly corporeal nature, suffer ontological defect, rendering them axiologically inferior to humans. Plato brings this home in the *Timaeus* by explaining that non-human animals once were

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\(^{17}\) In fact, body as a whole (including mortal soul and its capacities, like perception) is a co-cause or contributory cause (*sunaitia*) of the human good (see 44d-45b for body as co-cause, 91d-92c for bipedalism, and 46c for Plato’s cause/co-cause distinction). That is, it is necessary for the human good but not a direct cause of it, like intellect. As Timaeus says at 46e: “[W]e must describe both types of causes, distinguishing those which possess understanding and thus fashion what is beautiful and good, from those which, when deserted by intelligence, produce only haphazard and disorderly effects every time” (Zeyl’s translation). The cause/co-cause distinction that Timaeus uses to explain the hierarchical structure of the human organism is also used by the Stranger, as I explain in chapter 5, to explain the hierarchical structure of the polis. This, which has gone unnoticed by commentators, I take to indicate that the structure of the polis is grounded in the structure of human being.

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\(^{18}\) Strictly speaking, bipedalism is not a sure sign of intellect and of human being’s ontological difference from all other animals, since birds are also bipedal but do not possess intellect. Their bipedalism does, however, perhaps illuminate the fact that bipedalism is necessary but insufficient for possession of intellect. In the *Timaeus* (91de) we learn that birds are the descendants of “innocent but simpleminded men, men who studied the heavenly bodies but in their naivety believed that the most reliable proofs concerning them could be based upon visual observation” (Zeyl’s translation). The Stranger’s ‘shorter way’ (266de) reveals the close kinship between birds and humans by having them share the same line of division until the final cut that separates feathered (birds) from featherless (humans) bipeds.
humans but, due to their neglect of intellect, they devolved into mere animals. They are not just different from humans; they are ontologically defective humans and, with their divinity extinguished, worth less. Quadrupeds, in fact, are explained as the descendants of men who disdained philosophy and ignored the heavens, allowing themselves to be dragged down by mortal soul’s appetites instead.

The traces of this story from the Timaeus we can discern in the Stranger’s myth. For when we turn our mind to the Stranger’s cosmos in speech, we learn that pre-cosmic body, although it is, is not really anything until the demiurge infuses it with phronësis, turning it into a cosmos. The Stranger also intimates there that human beings are not really human unless they cultivate intellect via philosophical inquiry and resist the temptation to indulge body’s (that is, mortal soul’s) appetites to the neglect of intellect. By turning our mind to the cosmos in speech we learn that we must turn our mind to the cosmos itself, if we are to be truly human and eudaimón. From the pre-myth passages, I suggest, the Stranger intends us to discern the need for intellect and an axiological or hierarchical framework establishing its superiority to body. Otherwise humans are no more than two-footed pigs, the statesman is merely a glorified swineherd, and the quarrel among the nurturing arts for the title of statesman is irresolvable. The myth, I show in 4.4, meets the need for intellect and axiology.

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19 Plato, that is, explains the present state of things by deviation or corruption of a perfect creation, not chance-based evolution. This is what we would expect from a providential conception of things. This passage from the Timaeus also recalls Statesman 309de, where the Stranger says that the naturally courageous devolve into wild beasts without the proper epistemological grounding for their courageous disposition.

20 “Land animals in the wild, moreover, came from men who had no tincture of philosophy and who made no study of the heavens whatsoever, because they no longer made use of the revolutions in their heads but instead followed the lead of the parts of the soul that reside in the chest. As a consequence of these ways of theirs they carried their forelimbs and their heads dragging toward the ground, like toward like. The tops of their heads became elongated and took all sorts of shapes, depending on the particular way in which the revolutions were squeezed together from lack of use. This is the reason animals of this kind have four or more feet. The god placed a greater number of supports under the more mindless beings so that they might be drawn more closely to the ground” (91e-92a, Zeyl’s translation).
4.2.c. Two Pre-Myth Heaps

4.2.c.i. The Human Heap

The Stranger’s “shorter way” (266de), which immediately follows the digression on axiology at the end of the “longer way”, provides additional evidence that the Stranger does, in fact, assume a human heap model and that we should be dissatisfied with it, taking it to result in a heapish city and to be the cause of the quarrel over statesmanship.

The Stranger, as we recall, after establishing that the statesman nurtures herd animals that are land- (rather than water-) dwellers and footed (not winged) (264be), then proposes a longer and shorter way of finishing the division. The longer way, just analyzed, divided the footed animals further, determining humans to be hornless, non-interbreeding, bipeds. The shorter way (266e) also begins from the footed genos. It then locates human being first in the two- (rather than four-) footed genos, then among the wingless bipeds, giving us the notorious definition, ridiculed by Diogenes of Sinope, of human being as a featherless biped.21 The joke, however, is on Diogenes, who obviously did not get the joke. For we are meant to learn from the longer and shorter way, I contend, that without intellect and axiology human being is a mere heap of body stuff which happens to be arranged in superficially different shapes from other animals. And the Stranger intends us to be disturbed by this, much as Diogenes reportedly was.

For note how the Stranger reveals the lack of any priority or posteriority among the properties. He shifts, in the shorter way, two-footedness to immediately after footedness. He then splits two-footedness (in the shorter way’s final cut) into feathered and unfeathered. Yet he has already established winged as the contrary to footed, the

21 Diogenes Laertius (6.40). In response to Diogenes holding up a plucked chicken as an instance of Plato’s human being, the Platonists are reported to have added “with broad nails” to “featherless biped.”
property from which both the shorter and longer way begin. And if winged and feathered are the same property, then he has made winged/footed (feathered/unfeathered) both posterior and prior to two-footedness. Additionally, he has included a kind’s contrary (winged/feathered) within that very kind (footed), which seems to violate the principle of contradiction. Third, the shorter way simply leaves out hornless and non-interbreeding entirely. Their inclusion in the longer way seems just as arbitrary as their exclusion from the shorter. The lesson we are supposed to learn from the sum of these oddities, I propose, is that, if human being is wholly comprised of equally valuable corporeal properties, then it differs from other animals in no really significant or essential way. Human being’s properties, that is, can be shuffled and reshuffled in any number of ways. One way shows how it differs only quantitatively from pigs, another how it is merely a plucked bird (a molted crane, perhaps). The fitting length of our logos, moreover, is, as we learn later (286b-287b) supposed to be determined by the nature of the definiendum. The fact that the longer and shorter way are equally sufficient suggests that our object really has no nature at all but is a mere heap of arbitrary properties.

4.2.c.ii. The Heap of a City (258e-259c)

From the very beginning of the inquiry the Stranger’s (and Plato’s) strategy has been a sort of reductio: silently assume the human heap model, detail the absurd and

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22 Thus Dorter (1999: 207-213). Attempts have been made to account for the formal principles at work in division (e.g., Wedin (1987), Sayre (2006: 52-72)). Yet, even if division does work according to determinable formal principles, it seems to be an empty formalism if there is no way of determining posteriority and priority of content.

23 In other words, herd-rearing on dry land splits into two subkinds: of the footed and of the winged. So X being footed implies X is not winged. The Stranger then, in the shorter way, splits the footed into the two- and four-footed, and the two-footed genos into unfeathered and feathered (winged). Yet feathered/winged cannot be a subkind of two-footed, since two-footed itself is a subkind of footed, which has already been established as the contrary of feathered/winged.

24 Put another way, neither the longer nor shorter way makes us better dialecticians, which serves as the measure for accounts when our account giving is undertaken for training purposes (286d-287b). Reading them in tandem, however, does, since doing so reveals the dialectical errors and oddities the two accounts contain.
unacceptable results, and force the interlocutor (and reader) to figure out that the human heap model (itself the result of intellect’s and axiology’s absence) is the cause. The Stranger signals this to us at the very beginning of the inquiry by depicting the city as a heap (ὄγκος, 259b25) which should disturb us as much as it did Aristotle.26 This description of the city comes in an argument (258e-259c) the Stranger deploys after the very first cut of the division, distinguishing theoretical form practical epistêmê. A brief analysis of this argument will reveal the significance of the heapish city and its relation to our heapish human being.

Before locating the statesman in theoretical knowledge (as he does at 259c), the Stranger makes an argument regarding the relation between the possession of expertise and its employment. He first asks YS if the names statesman, king, slave-master, and household manager denote four different kinds of expertise or are merely different names for the same art (258e)27. The Stranger then makes a sudden shift (258e11), and provides an argument that seems intended to establish that the possession of expertise, regardless of material circumstances, is sufficient for claiming the title belonging to that expertise. For example, a private citizen who has the capacity to advise doctors concerning medical matters deserves the title “doctor” as much as the practicing publicly appointed doctor (259a). The same goes for a private citizen who possesses politikê and is thus able to

25 Oγkos is a technical term for heap in the Parnmenides 164d-165b: if the one is not, the others are reduced to mere ogkoī.

26 Aristotle, Pol. 1.1. According to Aristotle, the polis differs from the other sorts of human association not merely in size but in kind, due to being comprised of different elements and having different ends. The household, for example, is for the sake of sustenance, mere living. The polis is for the sake of living well. Plato would agree with all of this. This passage of the Statesman has not received much attention from modern commentators. But see Harvey (2006), who correctly sees that this distinction is rectified later in the dialogue by positing different ends for household and polis. Harvey does not note, however, that in this later treatment of the polis (287b-290e) we get an hierarchy of ends in which the household’s end is subordinated to the polis’.

27 This is reminiscent of Socrates’ question in the Sophist (217ab) about the philosopher, statesman, and sophist.
advise the king on political matters. Although he does not possess the throne, he deserves the name *basilikos*, because he possesses *basilikê* or *politikê* (259ab). This argument seems sound. How it relates to the original question, however, is unclear. There would seem to be no problem, if the Stranger’s point is merely that the possessor of *politikê* deserves the name statesman or king even if he is blocked from the throne and practices some other, related art (such as household management—or intellectual midwifery). And I think, in fact, both that this is one lesson we are to draw and that we are intended to see that it subtly suggests it applies to Socrates and the Stranger.

The passage has another function, however. For the Stranger, at 259b7, takes the argument in a very problematic direction. After getting YS to agree that the household manager and slave-master are the same, he claims that they must be the same as king and statesman too, since there is no difference, with respect to ruling (προς ἀρχὴν), between a large household and a heap of a small city (σμικρᾶς αὖ πόλεως ὄγκος, 259b9-a1). So we do, in fact, have four different names for the same art. If so, the Stranger is getting at something much more controversial than the point sketched above. For here the assumption is not merely the sufficiency of knowledge and irrelevance of material conditions for just claim to the title of expert: an unemployed master mechanic is still a master mechanic. Rather, the Stranger is claiming that expertise is unaffected by material conditions in the sense of the art’s object. Ruling humans, he assumes, is the same regardless of the kind of political association to be ruled. This is like claiming that a

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28 Campbell (1867, ad loc.) takes Aristotle’s criticisms in Pol. 1.1 to have overlooked the qualification προς ἀρχὴν. It is true that Aristotle’s criticism here focuses on the different elements of polis and household, but the point Aristotle goes on to make is that the different elements require different kinds of rule.
master mechanic and a NASA jet propulsion engineer are the same because there is not that much difference, in terms of mechanics, between a large car and a small spacecraft.\(^{29}\)

In short, Aristotle’s complaint seems to be correct: household and polis not only differ in size; they also have very different ends requiring very different kinds of knowledge. The former is for the sake of living, daily sustenance, the latter for the sake of living well, which requires a much more complex political structure and a more sophisticated understanding of ruling.\(^{30}\) Aristotle’s characteristically uncharitable reading, however, neglects to consider that this might be precisely the response Plato and the Stranger want. The Stranger, in fact, would note that Aristotle begs the question regarding the natures not only of polis and household but also of human being. For if human being is wholly corporeal, requiring only bodily nurture, then there is no difference between living and living well. If so, the difference between a household and polis is no more significant than the difference between a small and large herd of pigs, and a statesman is the same as a household manager and not much different from a swineherd. If Aristotle wants his polis/household distinction, the Stranger would contend, he needs to show that humans are more than the sum of their corporeal properties and thus require more than the bodily nurture the household provides.

The proof that Plato and the Stranger want us to be suspicious of the polis/household distinction as formulated here and of the consequences it has for statesmanship comes after the myth. There we see that not only do the arts associated with the household have a different end (nurture) than statesmanship, they are also

\(^{29}\) In other words, material conditions in the sense of availability of the proper object of an expertise might not affect one’s claim to be an expert. A king is a king with or without a kingdom. But material conditions are not irrelevant simpliciter.

subordinated to another set of arts, and all are under the rule of politikê. Instead of an onkos, we get a polis comprised of hierarchically structured arts. The ground for that structure, as I show in 4.4, comes from the myth, which shows that human being is an hierarchically structured whole not a heap.

If this is correct, the function of this passage, I propose, is to give us a heapish city at the very beginning of the inquiry which contrasts with the intricately structured polis we find after the myth at the dialogue’s end. Plato and the Stranger, I contend, intend us to be bothered by the polis/household formulation, as Aristotle was, and to ferret out the heapish conception of human being, which gradually comes to light in the division, as the likely cause of the heapish city. As the ground of the structured city the Stranger fashions after the myth we are supposed to see a newly acquired conception of human being as a structured whole and to grasp that we acquired it from the myth which separates our two cities. Nowhere, however, does Plato have the Stranger make explicit the fundamental work that our conception of human being does in all this. Making us work so hard for the proper conception of human being, however, and its relation to politikê is fitting. For as we learn in the myth, a proper grasp of human being is necessary not just for politikê and for accounting for politikê. We also need it for our own eudaimonia. And if human being is, in fact, an hierarchically and axiologically structured whole, then a listing its elements will not suffice. We need my proposed model of the interrelational epistemology.

4.2.d. Post-Myth Intellect and Axiology (274e-277a)

An obvious objection to my analysis of the cause of the first attempted division’s failure is that the Stranger makes no mention of intellect’s and axiology’s absence in his
own post-myth diagnosis of the failed division. He does not even mention human being at all, not explicitly at least. Yet all these items, as I explain here, we can discern in the Stranger’s postmortem. The purpose for the Stranger’s caginess is, again, to make us work for the proper conception of human being and in this way acquire a properly philosophical grasp of it and of the political and epistemological implications it brings.

In his post-myth diagnosis (274e-277a), the Stranger attributes the failed division to two mistakes: they mistook a divine shepherd from another cosmic cycle for the human statesman of this age, and this led them to mischaracterize the statesman’s activity as nurture, since presumably shepherds provide all the needs of the flock and all their needs are for nurture. Yet the stranger’s diagnosis fails to explain the root cause: why did they have shepherd kings in mind in the first place? Nostalgia for a golden age of shepherd-gods? Perhaps, but at the root of all this, I maintain, is a mistake that takes humans as wholly corporeal. If humans are just living bodies, like swine, a nurturing shepherd seems their proper kind of ruler. This materialism goes hand in hand with a hedonistic conception of the human good. Humans as mere bodies have pleasure and the absence of pain as their proper state. Who better to achieve this than a golden age Shepherd-god?

To correct course the Stranger distinguishes divine shepherds from mortal herdsmen of humans (274e-275c). He also replaces ‘nurture’ (trophê) with ‘care’ (epimeleia) to describe how this herdsman rules humans (275c-276c). ‘Care’, the

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According to Miller (1980: 40-7), the assumption that the human ruler is akin to a shepherd comes from Homer, who often refers to the Greek chieftains as shepherds of the people. See also Lane (1998: 117-36) and M.-L. Gill (2010, 2012: 179-87). Clark (1995) argues that this might not be so wrong after all.

The golden age will, in fact, be an important element of the myth (4.4), where we are to learn that the true golden age is not necessarily the time of material abundance but that in age in which humans have the capacity to be what they are, intellectual beings, despite material circumstances. For the ambiguity of the Statesman’s golden age see Vidal-Naquet (1978)
Stranger claims, applies to all kinds of herd-keeping and is inclusive of but not reducible to bodily nurture. This seems to imply that humans have more than corporeal properties; otherwise ‘nurture’ would have sufficed. Based on the myth, we are presumably intended to infer that the additional property is intellect, which requires (as we learn later in the Statesman (309d)) the statesman’s “kingly music”, paideia, rather than nurture. The Stranger further claims that this allows them to separate off the other claimants to kingly rule or politikê. For none of the nurturing arts would claim to care for the whole human community (276bc). So politikê seems not only to have a different object than the nurturing arts (intellect), but the greater worth of politikê’s object seems to justify politikê’s claim to care for the whole community by ruling the other, nurturing arts, just as intellect cares for the whole human being by ruling body. The axiological inferiority of their object (body) presumably explains why the nurturing arts, previously so contentious for the title of politikê, now concede that the kingly ruler has a better and prior claim to it (276bc). That they are now forced to concede this, I contend, is due to the work done by the myth introducing intellect and axiological relations, as I explain in 4.4.

On this interpretation, then, the statesman must grasp not only his art’s proper object, intellect, but also human corporeal nature and its relation to intellect, if he is to properly care for the whole community of citizens and arts, including those arts that nurture body. The statesman, that is, must have a complete grasp of human being as a structured whole, in terms of which he structures and rules the other arts. We too require the same thing to account for politikê and its relations to the other arts, as I detail in chapter 5.

33 309b, 309d. Also see 275c where ES indirectly provides paideia as the other kind of care in addition to trophê.
If this analysis is correct, both axiology and intellect, which were conspicuously absent in the pre-myth division, are discernible, albeit obliquely, in the Stranger’s analysis. We can also see at work here, again obliquely, the model of human being as a complex whole structured hierarchically and axiologically instead of the human heap model. As I argue in 4.4 and 4.5, the myth is the source of these crucial developments, which provide the requisite resources for articulating the intricate structure of the polis and defining the statesman in the dialogue’s post-myth passages, which chapter 5 explains.

4.3. The Myth’s Many Functions

4.3.a. The Myth’s Epistemological Function

At 267c5-268c3 the Stranger explains that the their definition fails to distinguish statesmanship from other arts. To correct the definition the Stranger deploys an elaborate cosmological myth (268e-274e)\textsuperscript{34}. The Stranger explains how the cosmos is a living thing, produced by a divine demiurge by mixing chaotic primordial body, the source of all evil, with divine \textit{phronēsis}, the source of all good. This cosmos also possesses a native motion and changes, since it is a mortal thing, and since rest and immutability belong only to the most divine things. Sometimes it spins on its axis in one direction unguided by the god who created it, during which time all living things that comprise it as parts also change, growing and aging as just as we see them do now. At a determined time, however, when the cosmos begins to come undone due to the fading power of its \textit{phronēsis} and concomitant reassertion of primordial body, the god again takes hold of the cosmos and rejuvenates it by spinning it in the opposite direction. During this time its

\textsuperscript{34} What follows is a very brief general sketch of the main elements of the myth. Below in 4.4 I provide a more detailed, systematic analysis of the myth.
constituent parts are rejuvenated too, aging backward in mind and body, and each genos of living thing is nurtured by a lesser divinity, a shepherd god. This cycle of degeneration and renewal at both the cosmic and microcosmic levels apparently continues forever.

The myth, as we can see from this brief summary, does quite a lot. It accounts for the basic elements of the creation, explaining how they comprise a cosmos, how those elements relate to one another, how the things comprised of them are affected at both the cosmic and microcosmic levels. If we take the Stranger’s post-myth analysis at face value, however, the major flaw in the first phase of division that needed correction via the myth was merely their mistaking present day human rulers for the all-nurturing shepherd gods of the previous cosmic cycle. The use of so grand a myth to remedy what seems so minor a problem has justly made scholars uncomfortable. They have, accordingly, proposed other functions for the myth. Rarely, however, is the myth accorded any function essential to the dialogue as a whole, and no interpretation sees it, as I do, as centrally concerned with human being. Rowe, for example, attributes its seemingly excessive length and detail to Plato’s “writerly exuberance.” Some simply take it as a long, gratuitous digression into cosmology. Others, like Lane, take the Stranger’s post-myth analysis at face value, but with a twist. According to the Stranger, they mistook a divine shepherd, who provides all the requisite nurture for all humans, for the human

35 The Stranger details the conflation of human and divine shepherds at 274e-275c. See 274e-276e for the whole post-myth analysis.


37 Rowe (1995a: ad loc.).

shepherd, who cares for the whole human community. The myth, according to Lane, allows the Stranger to show that these shepherds belong to some other cosmic epoch, not their own\(^{39}\). The twist, according to Lane, is that division is blind to temporal distinctions, hence the need for the myth to separate divine from human herdsman of humans. Lane’s analysis, by tying the myth closely to division’s insufficiency, thus nicely provides an essential role for the myth. I offer a similar analysis that incorporates Lane’s interpretation but with significant differences, which I detail in 4.4.

If my analysis is correct, the myth serves an essential epistemological function. For the first division gives us a belief uniquely true of human being (nothing else is a featherless (or non-interbreeding) biped), but one that leaves out human being’s intellectual nature, leaving us with human being as a heap of corporeal properties.\(^{40}\) This results in a definition that is true but not uniquely true of the kingly statesman. The experts in nurture have just as good a claim to politikê as the king, whom they nurture. On my reading, then, we should expect the myth to be tailored to showing that human being is a complex whole, like the myth’s cosmos, not a heap, by introducing intellect to complete the incomplete enumeration of human being’s elements and by relating those elements axiologically. The Stranger’s introduction to the myth, I contend, signals to us, in fact, that we should expect the myth to do exactly this, allowing us to rectify the definition of politikê.

\(^{39}\) The myth thus serves not only as a necessary methodological supplement to division. It also has a practical purpose insofar as it extinguishes our desire for the AK’s golden age, which is separated from us by an unbridgeable temporal gulf. Miller (1980: 40-7) also takes the myth to be an antidote for nostalgia, namely, for Homeric “shepherds of the people.”

\(^{40}\) If so, we have here an example of how we can have a belief uniquely true about something but fall short of epistêmê of it. See chapter 2 (2.3.4) for the puzzle about differentiating uniquely true beliefs from epistêmê.
Consider first the apparent conclusion of their division of \textit{politikê} (summarized at 267ac), where the Stranger registers his suspicion that they have provided a \textit{logos} of the statesman but not altogether \textit{teleôs}, completely (οὐ μὴν παντάπασί γε τελέως, 267d1). The Stranger does not specify in what way the definition is not \textit{teleôs}; he simply explains its unacceptable implication: all experts claim to be the statesman qua herd-nurturer. I suggest this \textit{teleôs} has a loaded sense here. It indicates the division’s incomplete enumeration due to intellect’s absence. It is also a pun on \textit{telos} qua final end: due to intellect’s absence our division is also missing human being’s end or \textit{telos}, for human beings are essentially intellectual or rational animals.

One Stephanus page later the Stranger uses similarly loaded language. At 268d2-3 the Stranger says that they must shear off all the rival claimants to \textit{politikê} if they are not to disgrace their \textit{logos} at its end (ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει), again punning on \textit{telos}.\(^{41}\) Their \textit{logos}, in other words, would suffer disgrace, if at its \textit{telos} qua terminus it fails to provide a proper definition of \textit{politikê}. It would also, however, feel shame for the \textit{telos} qua final cause it uses to explain statesmanship and its object, human being.\(^{42}\) For by leaving out intellect, their \textit{logos} reduces humans to two-legged swine and the statesman to a mere nurturer of other humans, no different axiologically from the swineherd. The Stranger thus suggests we need a different end to establish the proper axiological status of humans and statesmanship and to properly grasp the axiological relations they bear to other related things. On my analysis, intellect and its axiological superiority to body, which we find

\(^{41}\) εἰ μὴ μέλλομεν ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει κατασχῦναι τὸν λόγον.

\(^{42}\) For this sense of ἐπὶ see Liddell-Scott III.1.
grounded in the myth, are missing, and the myth is deployed to remedy these deficiencies.

The Stranger gives a somewhat more direct nod to the myth’s role as axiological supplement at 268d5-6, where he states that to avoid this shame they must travel by some other road (καθ’ ἐτέρων ὁδῶν) from another starting point (ἐξ ἀλλῆς ἀρχῆς). The Stranger’s language is again loaded. The only hodos they have used thus far is division, the methodos of argument (τῇ τοιοῦτῳ μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων, 266δ) which is oblivious to axiological distinctions. If so, the myth sets off from another archē in the sense, perhaps, of a first principle rather than of a beginning. From the myth it seems that this archē is the assumption that intellect exists, is superior to body due to body’s ontological defect, and for this reason rules body.43

That the myth will also correct the division by introducing intellect and thus complete the enumeration of human being’s elements the Stranger perhaps intimates with his final injunction to YS before starting the myth: “Well then, pay attention to my myth” (ἄλλα δὴ τῷ μύθῳ μου πάνω πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν, 268e4). This is a common enough phrase, but the Stranger’s demand that YS apply his nous to the tale may playfully forecast the important role nous plays in the myth’s cosmology. This will gain in persuasiveness via my elaboration just below on the role of nous in the myth.

If this is correct, the Stranger forecasts the work the myth will do that will allow us to correct our definition of human being and, in turn, politikē. Yet my interpretation

43 At Sophist 265ce the Stranger explains that there are two ways to account for the whole. Everything is either the work of divine craftsmanship (θεοῦ δημοσιωργοῦντος) or everything comes about spontaneously (ἀπό τοῦτος αἱτίας αὐτοματῆς) without ordering intellect (ἀνευ διανοίας). For Plato these are first principles, which, as such, cannot be demonstrated. The Statesman’s tale, I propose, is a mythologized version of the teleological assumption (serving as a dialectical argument, as I explain below), intended to divest us of the spontaneous order assumption, which seems to be how Plato understands pre-Socratic materialism. I offer more detail on this below.
too is vulnerable to the aforementioned objection: do we really need elaborate cosmology to remedy intellect’s and axiology’s absence? We do if my interpretation of the interrelational epistemology is correct. For even if we grasped all human being’s parts (body, intellect) and their relations (intellect rules body since it is nobler), we would have a belief uniquely true about what human being is, but we would not have *epistêmê* of human being. Knowledge of human being would require the capacity to spell correctly human being’s elements in any other syllables in which they occur, as we learned from the *Theaetetus* in chapter 2. And since the the cosmos, as we learn from the myth, is a composite of intellect and body, like human being, then we must grasp the cosmos to grasp human being.\(^4^4\)

We also need the myth in all its elaborateness if to know human being requires knowing everything else. For if knowing human being requires the capacity to spell other syllables containing its elements as well, as my interpretation of the interrelational model demands, and everything is intellect, body, or a mixture of both, then to know human being we must know everything else too. In fact, since human being and everything else, as we learn from the myth, are the constituent parts of the cosmos, they are all letters or syllables of the same word. So we need the capacity not only to correctly spell each thing individually but also to account for how they fit together to spell the cosmos. This seems to make sense, as I argued in chapter 2, if what we seek to know is a cog in a teleological system, which means we need to know not just that cog in and of itself but also how it works in relation to every other part of the system to achieve the whole’s end. The

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\(^4^4\) This extreme condition on knowledge I argued for in chapter 2’s (2.3.3) analysis of *logos* as enumeration of elements in the *Theaetetus* (206e-208b10). See *Phil.* 27c-31b for an interestingly similar use of the microcosm/macrocosm distinction see Frede (1993: xxxix-xli) and Kahn (2010) for analysis.
Stranger’s playful myth does not, of course, articulate this system in all its intricate details, which would require something like the *Timaeus*. It does, however, give us the resources (the basic elements and hierarchical framework) to work out these details ourselves, and the Stranger intimates we must. For at the center of the myth, as I explain in 4.4, the Stranger suggests that to truly know human being requires grasping every other sort of nature too (272b9-d2). And truly knowing human being is a necessary condition for our eudaimonia.

On my interpretation, then, the myth serves an essential epistemological function. It gives us the resources to correct the first definition of human being and to acquire *epistêmê* of it in accordance with the demands of the interrelational epistemology. For it allows us to complete the enumeration of human being’s elements, to relate those elements axiologically and hierarchically, and to account for human being in terms of the whole cosmos and the other parts of the cosmos. The fact that my interpretation can account for the otherwise puzzling size and elaborateness of the myth weighs significantly in its favor. And if it is, in fact, correct, then, since it relies on what I have argued is the interrelational epistemology found *in embryo* in the *Theaetetus*, this also serves as significant evidence for the unity of the trilogy and the *Statesman*’s special place in it.

4.3.b. The Myth as *Paidiâ*

In his introduction to the myth, the Stranger also describes it with a very marked term, *paidiâ*. The “other way” they must travel to avoid bringing shame on their *logos*.

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45 See Morgan (2000, 164-78) for the significance of play, childishness, and leisure in this trilogy and other dialogues. My thesis that the myth is a playful kind of *didachê* or provisional *logos* is indebted to Morgan’s (179-84) analysis of Plato’s use of myth as a supplement to remedy the limits of language and method.
at its end, he says, is the employment a large part of a great myth, which the Stranger
describes as mixing in paidiá (παιδιάν ἐγκερασμένος, 268d8-9). The Stranger
emphasizes the word by immediately repeating it. After YS assents to the “other way”,
the Stranger enjoins him to mind his myth (πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν), as children do (καθάπερ
οἱ παιδες), for “it’s certainly not many years since you left paidiá” (πάντως οὐ πολλὰ
ἐκφεύγεις παιδιάς ἔτη, 268e4-5). I explain here how the Stranger’s use of paidiá signals
to us that the myth also has a practical and political function closely connected to the
epistemological function just described. And this is precisely what we would expect if
my thesis is correct that epistêmê has an essential practical orientation and that the
inquiry into epistêmê begun in the Theaetetus has a practical end, namely, to ground
Theaetetus’ natural virtue.

The Stranger’s use of paidiá signals, first of all, that he is going to do what the
sophist seems to know how to do: make all things (in speech) (ποιεῖν καὶ δρᾶν μιὰ τέχνη
συνάπαντα, Sph. 233d). As Theaetetus says in the Sophist, the Stranger must be telling
a joke (paidiá, Sph. 234a) in claiming that there is an art that can make all things. The
Stranger responds with a seemingly rhetorical question: “When someone says that he
knows all things and could teach them to another for a small fee and in a short time,
mustn’t we consider it a joke (paidiá)?” The conjunction is certainly a joke, but the first

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46 Paidiá in the form of poetry and myth to educate children is an important theme of Rep. III, of course. The Stranger’s
myth is, perhaps, a philosophical, that is, a proper, use of myth (especially with respect to its presentation of divinity) in
contradistinction to harmful use of poetry and myth discussed in Rep. III. See also Plutarch’s De audiendis poetis and
Strabo I.

47 εἰ τις φάη μὴ λέγειν μηδ’ ὄντλεγειν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν καὶ δρᾶν μιὰ τέχνη συνάπαντα ἐπισταθαι πράγματα, 233d. The
sophist, of course, does not really know how to do this. He uses his antilogic (μιὰ τέχνη), verbal trickery, to make it
seem like he does.

48 The Stranger’s injunction at Sph. 233d (καὶ μοι πειρῶ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εἰ μᾶλλο ἀποκρίνασθαι) would seem to be
an additional verbal echo tying this passage more strongly to Statesman 268ce.
conjunct, the claim to know all things is not so obviously risible. If human beings could
know all things, in fact, ours would be a blessed (μακάριον) genos, as Theaetetus claims
at Sph. 233a49. The Stranger’s cosmology, I suggest, is an account of all things but
properly qualified as mythos and paidiā. It is not a “joke” but a playful tale in place of a
serious logos, which would require a lifetime to grasp properly. This paidiā serves a
serious purpose however: it gives us a model for how to acquire epistêmê by accounting
for all things and their relations in terms of the basic constituents of reality, divine
intellect and chaotic body. In providing this model the Stranger gives us the blueprint for
becoming eudaimôn or makarios.

The Stranger’s use of paidiā in the Statesman also signals that his myth will be an
improved version of the pre-Socratic materialist cosmologies, which, in explaining all
things, either leave out nous altogether or have it do no real work, as Socrates complains
of Anaxagoras in the Phaedo (97b-99d). For at Sophist 242cd the Stranger complains that
all his predecessors who have undertaken to mark off the number and kinds of beings
have spoken carelessly: “Each one seems to me to tell us some story (μῦθον), as if we are
children (παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν).” He then surveys the kinds of mythoi told by the
different philosophical schools, such as the Ionians and Eleatics. This passage has an
obvious echo with the Stranger’s injunction to YS in the Statesman at 268e4-5 to mind
the Stranger’s myth, as children do (καθὰδες οἱ παιδες), for it is not that many years
since YS left behind paidiā (children’s games) or paidia (childhood) (πάντως οPERATURE θεὶ πολλὰ

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49 In the Sophist Plato leaves this as an apparently impossible achievement. That it is only apparently impossible Plato
perhaps suggests by putting this per impossible claim at 233a in the mouth of the youthful Theaetetus. It might seem
that in putting this in Theaetetus’ mouth Plato emphasizes the impossibility of perfect knowledge (thereby blocking this
as a path to human happiness), since the Stranger says just before that the young perhaps see such things more sharply.
But the Stranger is being ironic. Just one Stephanus page later at 234c the Stranger asserts that the sophist is able to
ensorcell the young with words because they still stand far from the truth of things.
The Stranger’s order to “mind the myth” (ἄλλα δή τῷ μοῦθῳ μου πάνο πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν, 268d) playfully indicates that he will improve the materialist cosmologies surveyed in the Sophist by adding nous to the tale. The addition of nous in the sense of ordering intellect will require explaining things by formal and final causes in addition to the material and efficient causes used by pre-Socratic cosmologists.\(^{51}\)

If so, the Stranger’s injunction to “mind the myth” seems to have a practical angle to it too. YS must actively engage the myth (not passively receive it for pleasure) by applying his nous to it to grasp what the myth describes as the nature and work of nous at the cosmic level. In this way he acquires insight into his own nature as a nous-animal and its proper work at the sublunar level. And at the same time he works to perfect that nature by using nous to grasp nous. The Stranger thus puts his interlocutors (and us) on the path to acquire the self-knowledge so lacking in the pre-Socratic cosmologies, which absurdly leave out the very thing required to produce such rational accounts: nous or intellect. And this self-knowledge, we learn at the myth’s center, is a necessary condition for eudaimonia.

Finally, the Stranger’s use of paidiá in the myth’s introduction also points us to passages in the Statesman itself which provide further confirmation of the myth’s practical function. Right before his introduction to the myth and on the same Stephanus page the Stranger describes how the cowherd uses paidiá and music (παιδίας καὶ μουσικῆς) to soothe (παραμιθεῖσθαι) his charges (268b1-3). The mention of paidiá here

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\(^{50}\) For as Rowe (1995a: ad loc.) indicates, instead of παιδίας (accusative plural) we could also read παιδίας (genitive singular), since Plato’s text would be without accents. Whichever word we read, as Rowe notes, there will be a pun on the other. The pun’s function, which Rowe does not explain, seems to be to connect this passage to both Sophist passages just discussed: 233d-234a, where Theaetetus refers to the claim to know all things as paidiá, and the just discussed 242c.

\(^{51}\) This terminology is obviously Aristotle’s not Plato’s. Despite the lack of a set technical terminology, the notions of formal and final causes are evident in the text, as I have tried to show above.
and the pun on παραμυθεῖσθαι suggest, on one level, that the Stranger, like a cowherd, uses his μῦθος as a kind of paidiá to soothe, παραμυθεῖσθαι, their fear (ἔφοβήθημεν, 268c) about bringing disgrace to their logos.

The Stranger’s use of paidiá at 268d8 also looks forward and strikes deeper. For in the dialogue’s final section on the statesman’s pedagogical program (306a-311b) we learn that there is also a kingly music (τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μούση, 309d1-4) which the statesman uses to “soothe” human beings. They receive this education, however, only once the statesman has tested them in paidiá (παιδιᾷ πρῶτον βασανεῖ, 308d5). The Stranger’s description of the myth as paidiá, I propose, intimates that it is just such a test. Its content I take to be a playful version of the statesman’s kingly music that YS will receive if he passes.

For the “soothing” that humans require from the statesman’s kingly music, if chapter 1’s analysis of the pedagogical program is correct, is the epistemological grounding that allows them to discern the proper or measured thing to do on each occasion. Without this grounding humans’ actions, like animals’, are dictated by the naturally gentle or spirited impulses of mortal soul. And YS, as the Stranger makes clear at critical points in the dialogue, suffers from an excessively spirited disposition that needs to be moderated. The Stranger, however, never reveals the content of this epistemological grounding except to say that the statesman brings about in the divine soul beliefs with grounding (bebaiōsis), which are really true, about the beautiful, just, and

52 “Soothe” is my word, not the Stranger’s. But this seems to be an accurate description of the effect that the statesman’s educational program has on the souls of the excessively spirited and excessively gentle types. The kingly music which tames souls in this way seems, in any case, to point back to 268bc, where the Stranger describes the shepherd’s use of music and paidiá to soothe his animal charges.

53 Sts. 306a-308b, analyzed in chapter 1.

54 E.g., 262a, 277a, 283b. See Miller (1980: 3-15) for an analysis of YS as an instance of a naturally spirited type and the significance of his disposition for the inquiry. See Rowe (1996) for a critique of Miller.
good things (309c). This grounding (bebaiôsis), I maintain, is the cosmologically grounded grasp of human being that we acquire from the myth. This grounded grasp of human being itself serves as the necessary measure in terms of which we judge our own and others’ actions as beautiful, just, and good or not.\textsuperscript{55} The myth is a test in paidiá to see if YS (and we readers) is a worthy candidate for the demythologized version of the kingly music that provides the grounded grasp (that is, epistêmê) of human being itself.

Does YS pass the test? Alas, no, it seems. His inability to answer the Stranger’s question regarding human eudaimonia, as I detail below, reveals him as incapable of making use of the myth’s resources to grasp human being itself, which he needs to moderate his spirited disposition. Incorrigible natures, the Stranger says, suffer execution or exile in the city ruled by the true statesman (308e4-309a2). We do not have such a city in the Statesman; and even if we did, YS’ spiritedness surely does not merit political exile\textsuperscript{56}. But Plato perhaps subtly signals YS’ philosophical exile by having no mention made of him in the Theaetetus’ frame (142a-143c). Unlike Theaetetus, who is remembered and praised by Terpsion and Euclides, YS is forgotten, surviving merely as a

\textsuperscript{55} As I explained in chapter 1, for most citizens, of course, due to the difficulty of the interrelational epistemology’s demands, this grounding will be incomplete and they must be satisfied with really true beliefs rather than epistêmê. But even this is immensely better than basing beliefs on their natural dispositions’ counsels, which always counsel the same thing and thus only sometimes happen to be true. For this reason they remain dependent on the philosopher-statesman, who has epistêmê due to his complete grounding and who thus serves as the ultimate bebaiôsis for non-sage citizens. Rowe (1995a) similarly suggests that the statesman himself serves as bebaiôsis for the citizens but does not explain in what precise sense. Additionally, the Stranger does not use the measure language that I employ here. But Plato no doubt intends us to see the Measure Doctrine (283b-287b) at work here, according to which one must grasp the metron to recognize what is in due measure and is hence good and beautiful. The unspoken metron in this passage, I have suggested, is human being itself.

\textsuperscript{56} YS does, after all, excel in mathematics despite his excessive spiritedness. His excessive nature may, however, prevent him from achieving the intellectual heights and moral development which might otherwise have been attainable. We should remember what Theodorus says in his opening conversation with Socrates in the Theaetetus about spirited types like YS (143e-144b): those with sharp minds and good memories usually are also usually quick to anger and get swept away, being more manic more than manly.
negative example in the *Statesman*. This may also be one explanation for the missing *Philosopher*. Unlike Theaetetus who passes Socrates’ testing in *paidiá* in the *Theaetetus* and is then handed over to the Stranger for philosophical instruction, YS fails his test. So there is no need for the *Philosopher*, since YS fails to graduate from philosophical preliminaries. The missing *Philosopher* would thus subtly signal that YS never became a philosopher.

4.4. The Myth of the Reversed Cosmos

4.4.a. The Myth (268e-274e)

The Stranger reproduces the cosmos in speech to give us the resources to save human being from heapishness and put together the complex whole model of human being needed to properly differentiate human being from other animals. After acquiring a grasp of human nature from the myth’s cosmology, the Stranger then uses it, in the passages after the myth (analyzed in chapter 5), to produce a structured polis in speech in place of the previous heap and to differentiate the statesman from other experts. The Stranger gives us invaluable resources in the myth but, as my analysis will show, makes us do the work of putting all the pieces together. This is precisely what we would expect if this a testing in *paidiá*, designed to examine and cultivate the interlocutors’ (and readers’) *nous*.58

The Stranger does, however, give us a model, at the beginning of the myth, for the work we are to do (268e-269c). He pieces together the myth from three different tales

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58 My take on this is inspired by Lane (1998: 111-14). She takes the Stranger’s work putting together the myth to be an instance of the necessity for humans to be autonomous in the godless Age of Zeus, in imitation of the cosmos, which is unguided by the god in this age. Her account does not, however, flesh out the metaphysical and epistemological lessons we are to learn from the Stranger’s action. I return to this passage below with further modifications of Lane’s analysis.
(humans’ autochthonous birth, the reversal of the heavens, the kingship of Kronos) which have come down to us as scattered and unconnected due to the great lapse of time since the events they record. He turns this heap of a myth\textsuperscript{59}, the cosmos in speech, into a structured whole by explaining how all three were caused by the same pathos and form a single mythos. The myth itself, in fact, recounts the demiurge doing the same thing: he puts together a structured whole, a cosmos, by infusing an unruly heap, primordial body, with ordering intellect, phronēsis. The trick is to see that we must imitate the Stranger and the god. Using the resources of the myth we must piece together human being into a complex whole of hierarchically structured parts.

The myth’s major steps are as follows\textsuperscript{60}.

1. The cosmos is at times accompanied by the god; at other times not. (269c4-5)

2. When not accompanied by the god, the cosmos moves in the direction opposite to the one when accompanied (269c5-7).

3. The cosmos is a living creature (ζῶον ὄν) (269d1).

\textsuperscript{59} At 277b the Stranger refers to his tale as ὄγκον ἀράµενοι τοῦ μύθου, a heap of a myth, echoing his earlier description of the polis as a πόλεως ὄγκος (259b), heap of a city. I return to 277b below. For since this description occurs after the myth, this poses problems for my claim that the Stranger successfully fashions the myth into a structured whole.

\textsuperscript{60} My analysis follows the traditional interpretation of the myth, on which there are two cosmic periods, the Age of Zeus (AZ) and the Age of Kronos (AK). During the AZ, the cosmos spins on its own unguided by the divine demiurge, and all living things age and grow in the ways familiar to us until the god returns to again take control of the cosmos. This initiates the AK, during which the god forces the cosmos to spin in the opposite direction, and all things age and grow in reverse. This cycle presumably repeats itself infinitely. Lovejoy and Boas (1935) were the first to propose three stages for the myth’s cosmic cycle, and a version of this interpretation has been championed more recently by Rowe (1995a: 11-13) and Brisson (1995). On the three-stage model, the cosmos spins in the same direction during the AZ and AK, and in neither do living things undergo backward growth and aging. Reverse cosmic motion and backward growth and aging occur only during the transition from the AK to the AZ, when the god lets go of the cosmos. At the moment of release great cataclysms occur as the cosmos’ corporeal element suddenly forces it in the opposite direction. In time, the cosmos is able to reassert mastery over its bodily nature and proceed to spin again in the same direction it did during the AK, but this time under its own rational power, until that rational power dissipates and the god again takes control. According to Rowe, an important consequence of the three stage interpretation of the myth is that it allows the cosmos to move while under its own power in the same direction that it does while guided by the god. This is what we would expect, since the cosmos is a rational animal. See Lane (1998: 101-11) for what I take to be a convincing defense of the traditional interpretation and critique of the three-stage theory. Lane notes that the cosmos’ opposite rotation during the AZ is not as problematic as Rowe seems to think. The Stranger, for example, asserts that the reverse motion the cosmos undertakes during the AK is actually the smallest possible variation of its movement (see 269de). Also, as my interpretation will show, what is crucial is not so much the direction of the motion but whether that motion is governed by intellect in accordance with the god’s didachē.
4. The cosmos obtained intelligence (φρόνησιν) from the god, the one who put it together at the beginning (269d1).

5. The reverse movement is inherent to the cosmos by necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔµφυτον) (269d2-3).

6. Only the most divine things can remain permanently in the same state (269d5-6).

7. The cosmos has a share of body (σώματος δὲ φύσις) (269d6-7)

8. The cosmos has acquired many blessed things from its creator, but body is not one of them (269d9-e1).

9. From the one who put it together it has obtained all good things. From its pre-cosmic condition (τῆς ἐμπροσθεν ἔξεως), however, spring all harsh and unjust things in the heavens (273b7-c2).

10. Primordial body (τὸ σωματοειδὲς) partook of much disorder (ἀταξίας) before coming into the present cosmos (273b4-6).

11. The cosmos cannot remain in the same state permanently (269e1-1).

12. The cosmos takes care (ἐπιμέλειαν) of itself and its parts utilizing the teaching (διδαχὴν) it obtained from the demiurge, its father, in the previous age (273b1).

13. At the beginning it fulfills the teaching more accurately; at the end more dimly (273b3-4).

14. The cosmos gradually forgets the teaching. As its forgetfulness increases its ancient disharmonious condition (τὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς ἀναρμοστίας πάθος) comes to hold sway (δυναστεύει) until it no longer produces any good and is in danger of destruction (273c6-d1).
As we see from steps 1-5 the cosmos consists of two successive and apparently infinitely recurring cycles characterized by contrary motions. Sometimes, in what most call the Age of Kronos (AK), a god steers the cosmos. But at a predetermined time, recognized by the god, he lets it go and departs to his watchtower, and it spins in the opposite direction on its own, a time we can call the Age of Zeus (AZ). In 6-11 the stranger explains the cause of this contrary motion, indirectly giving us the ontology required for resolving our problems. When released by the god, the cosmos moves on its own in the opposite direction, being a living animal (ζῷον, 269d1) endowed with god-given phronēsis, intelligence. Yet it is not phronēsis that causes the contrary motion, but the fact that it is a living creature: that means it is endowed with body, which is not one of the divine things, but rather the source of all that is bad [9,10]. Since only the most divine things may remain permanently unchanged, the cosmos, being composed in part by body, must change [11, from 6-10].

The cosmos itself is a product of the god: a mixture of a primordial, unlimited corporeal element and phronēsis, which the god imposed upon the body as limiting principle.61 The ontology thus gives us the resources for articulating the complex structure of wholes such as the cosmos and humans as mixtures of body and intellect. It also gives us the value framework for ordering those elements: intellect is divine and thus should rule the non-divine unlimited body. Only when this set of elements and this arrangement of them obtains is it a proper cosmos from which arise beauty and goodness (273be).62 So even at this stage we have enough of a framework to distinguish the

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61 The ontology in play in the myth seems to be the Philebus’ four-fold ontology (23b-27c): limit, unlimited, mixture, cause.

62 The myth indicates, in other words, that goodness and beauty are second order properties that arise from the cosmos if and only if both the proper elements are possessed and the elements are in the proper order (not just any order will
nurturing arts as body-centered from statesmanship as intellect-centered. We also have the requisite grounds for value-ranking the body-centered arts as less noble and subordinate to an intellect-centered art. This assumes of course that human structure mirrors cosmic structure. The stranger’s subsequent account of the cosmic motions moves down to this human level.

During the AK the cosmos is divinely governed, with the god’s intelligence, the source of all its good, providing an external brake on unruly body to supplement the cosmos’ internal ordering principle, *phronēsis*. Once released by the god, the cosmos reverses the direction of its rotation but initially fares well because it remembers the god’s *didachê* or teaching [steps 12-14]. In time however forgetfulness sets in, pre-cosmic body reasserts itself, as the cosmos comes to the brink of dissolution into its pre-cosmic chaotic state. In both the AK and the *early AZ* divine intelligence limits body, either externally by the god or internally through recollected *didachê*. At the cosmic level these two ages are indistinguishable formally. At the human level things are much different.

During the AK, a shepherd-god caters to all human needs. Food springs from the earth without toil. There is no sexual reproduction; humans sprout from the earth old and grey, and age backwards, growing younger. An apparent golden age.63 Yet humans become child-like in soul also; their life is marked by increasing immaturity, dissipating

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63 See Vidal-Naquet (1978) for the dark recesses ascertainable in the *Statesman*’s depiction of the golden age, which suggest it is not so golden.
wisdom (πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ νεογενός παιδός φύσιν ἀπῆλ, κατά τε τὴν ψυχήν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀφομοιούμενα, 270e). The stranger says they rose again from the earth, remembering nothing of the past (ἐκ γῆς γὰρ ἀνεβιώσκοντο πάντες, ούδὲν μεμνημένοι τῶν πρόσθεν, 270a). This age is thus emphatically marked by forgetfulness, not recollection. In this way the myth calls attention to human intellectual nature. At the appointed time the gods depart, leaving humans, like the cosmos, to fend for themselves. The stranger tells us little about the humans in the early AZ and nothing about them in its late stages. Yet the same changes that occur at the cosmic level occur also in its parts, including at the human level (καὶ τὰλλά τε πάντα μετάβαλλε, ἀπομιμούμενα καὶ συνακολουθοῦντα τῷ τοῦ παντὸς παθήματι, 273e). So we can infer that humans of the late AZ are marked, like the cosmos, by oblivion, not recollection. Also like the cosmos, the humans of the early AZ must be characterized by recollection of the gods’ teaching. And the myth ends, of course, with an account of the gods providing early AZ humans didachê in the arts before departing (ἐκ τούτων πάντων ἐν μεγάλαις ἀπορίαις ἦσαν. δόθη δὴ τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα παρὰ θεῶν δῶρα ἡμῖν δεδώρηται μετ’ ἀναγκαίας διδαχῆς καὶ παιδεύσεως, 274c). Humans, like the cosmos, are now on their own and must now do their own work.

After his account of the phenomena at the human level during the AK, the stranger abruptly asks YS if he would be able to say which set of humans was more eudaimôn: those of the AK or we of the AZ (κρίναι δ’ ἀυτῶν τὸν εὐδαιμονέστερον ἢρ’ ἄν δύνατο τε καὶ ἐθελήσειας; 272b) 65. Significantly, YS admits he cannot (οὐδὲν ὑπερεί), leaving

64 Scodel (1987: 78, 74-89) rightly makes much of this parallel or isopathology, as Scodel puts it, between the cosmos and its parts.

65 The central importance of this passage, where ES gives us the resources for understanding the necessary and sufficient conditions for human eudaimonia and for grasping what human being properly is, Plato perhaps signals to us by placing it at the precise center of the myth (Friedländer (1973: 198, 205) has interesting observations on the significance of the dialogue’s architecture). At the middle of the myth, that is, as the later Measure Doctrine puts it (see
the stranger to answer. The Stranger does not answer directly. Instead he gives us a pair of conditionals, leaving us to fully answer the question. According to the Stranger, if the humans of the previous age used their god-given leisure for philosophical inquiry, then they were far happier than humans of our age. If however, they indulged in food and drink and mere storytelling, this conclusion too is easily judged, he says. The conclusion, however, does not seem so obvious. Yet it is fitting that the Stranger leaves it to us to work out the conditionals’ implications: just as the cosmos and humans must make their own way during the god’s absence by using his teaching, so too must we use the resources of the myth to fully answer the question of who is more eudaimón.

The first conditional seems to imply that philosophical activity and pleasure are jointly sufficient for happiness. The second conditional is very vague, but seems to say: If one has bodily pleasure but not philosophy, then one does not have eudaimonia, which implies that philosophy is a necessary condition for happiness: pleasure alone does not suffice. Is pleasure also necessary for happiness, or does intellect alone suffice? The pleasure question is left tantalizingly undetermined in the stranger’s formulation.

284e), we grasp the mean or measure (human being itself) we need to grasp to remove ourselves from the extremes to the middle and achieve goodness, beauty, and eudaimonia. The Measure Doctrine itself is, fittingly, at the precise center of the dialogue as a whole: 283b-287b.

66 The passage in full: Εἰ μὲν τοῖς ὑμῖν οἱ τρόφυμοι τοῦ Κρόνου, παρούσιας αὕτως ἐστὶν πολλῆς σχολῆς καὶ δυνάμεως πρὸς τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀνθρώποις ἄλλα καὶ θηρίως διὰ λόγων δύνασθαι συγγένεσθαι, κατεξήρυξα τοὺς σύμπασιν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφικάν, μετὰ τε θηρίων καὶ μετ’ ἄλληλον ὡμολογίας, καὶ πυθανόμενοι παρά πάσης φύσεως εἰ τινὰ τις ἢ δύναμιν ἔχουσα ἤσθεν τι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων εἰς συναγωγῆς φρονήσεως, ἐκκριτόν ὅτι τόν νῦν οἱ τότε θηρίοι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν διέφεραν· εἰ δ’ ἐμπιστεύεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὸν διαλέγοντο πρὸς ἄλληλος καὶ τὰ θηρία μόνος οὐδὲ καὶ τὰ νῦν περὶ αὐτῶν λέγονται, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς γε κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὁδὸν ἀποκηρυσθήσατο, καὶ μᾶλ’ εκκριτόν.  

67 That Plato and the Stranger want us to reflect on the relation between intellect and pleasure is suggested by 286de, where the Stranger says that pleasure should not be used as measure for the proper length of a logos. Pleasure is merely an incidental consideration (parergon). The primary consideration is whether the inquiry makes us better dialecticians, that is, cultivates our nous. So nous is the proper measure or end in terms of which logos are judged. This presumably applies to other situations. There are times when we must forego body’s desires (even if there are proper desires for body, such as for the pleasure of health), if they conflict with intellect’s desire for goodness, beauty, and justice. For the sake of our soul’s desire for justice and abhorrence of injustice, for example, we might have to risk bodily pain and even death, as Socrates did under the Thirty Tyrants (Apology 32ce).
Philebus says yes: intellect alone will not do, pleasure too is needed. But we have resources internal to the Statesman to answer the question. Humans, like the cosmos, are composites of body and intellect. If the pleasure of, say, health or temperance, is proper to the body’s optimal condition, then it seems some pleasure is also necessary for eudaimonia. We thus have pleasure and intellect as the severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for happiness. Yet this leaves undetermined the relation between pleasure and intellect. Is the human good a mere sum of pleasure and intellect, or a structured whole, with one governing the other? The myth’s cosmology allows us to make the value judgment that what was missing from the first division, intellect, as god-given, must govern pleasure, as body-related and in itself unlimited and therefore dangerous. With this we have the corrected conception of human nature and its good required for correcting our definition of politikê.

With these results and the material from the account of the ages we can also answer the eudaimonia question. Humans are marked by increasing immaturity in body and soul, by forgetfulness, in the AK. Since recollection is necessary for philosophy, and

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68 The competition between pleasure and intellect for the title of the human good is, of course, the central theme of the Philebus. See, e.g., Cooper (1968, 1977), Moravcsik (1979), Sayre (1987), D.Frede (1993, 1996, 2010).

69 Tim. 44bc suggests that proper bodily nourishment (trophê) is a necessary supplement to intellect’s paideia if one is to be wholly complete and entirely healthy. This passage from the Timaeus admittedly makes no direct linkage between nourishment and pleasure, but the Philebus does. There is a certain class of pleasure which Socrates calls “necessary pleasures”, which are those pleasures that come about as the natural restoration of some lack, such as thirst or hunger (Phlb. 31b-36c, 62e). Socrates and Protarchus include them in the good life based upon the fact that they are necessary. As D. Frede (1993: 76, fn. 2) notes, however, these pleasures are not included in the subsequent list of goods, which suggests that such pleasures may be necessary for human happiness but they are not constituents of the human good or happiness. Another sense in which they might be necessary we can perhaps discern in the Timaeus passage. Excessive pain from deprivation of nourishment, just like excessive pleasure from overindulging, would seem to wreck the motions of the soul required for intellectual functioning. The Stranger’s later division of the arts into causes and contributory causes or co-causes in the Statesman (see 281d-282a for the initial distinction; 287b-289c for the arts that are co-causes; 289c-305e for the causes) may also suggest that the proper satisfaction of body’s desires, which brings along with it the necessary pleasures, is necessary for but perhaps not a constituent of the human good and human happiness. Contributory causes, as I explain in chapter 5, are necessary for the production of some thing but have no direct hand in producing it. In the account of the polis those arts that have body as their object are designated contributory causes.
philosophy is necessary for eudaimonia, it follows that these humans do not have eudaimonia. Yet in assessing the AZ humans, we must not repeat the identity mistake of the first division, mistaking part for whole. The *early* inhabitants of the AZ, but not the *late* inhabitants, are characterized by recollection and are thus capable of philosophy. So, to answer the stranger’s question: the early inhabitants of the AZ are at least capable of eudaimonia, and are in this sense better off.

The myth allows us to do yet more work—and perhaps the most important work. By formulating the eudaimonia question as he does, the stranger forces *us* to do almost all the philosophical work to answer it: he craftily gets us to engage in the very activity we determined to be the necessary condition for eudaimonia. This marks us as identical with the early AZ humans, the only humans capable of recollection and thus of philosophical inquiry and eudaimonia. Finally, insofar as the proper aim of philosophical inquiry is determining whether there is anything that uniquely has a nature suited to *phronēsis*, and we have determined that the early AZ humans have the nature that uniquely has this capacity, it follows that our own nature qua humans is the proper object of philosophical inquiry. The fact that we are identical with these humans emphatically marks philosophical inquiry, and thus our own inquiry, as aimed at self-knowledge.

The myth thus serves not merely as a corrective supplement to division but as a mirror of our own activity and thus as a stimulus to self-reflection and self-knowledge.71

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70 As McCabe (1997: 108, fn. 63) puts it, they are mere mollusks, an image she borrows from *Phlb.* (21b-c).

71 The Stranger no doubt wants YS to recognize that the activity described at 272b8-d2 (inquiring into the whole of nature to try to track down that nature with a unique capacity *for phronēsis*) is a mirror of their own activity in the first attempted division trying to separate humans from all other beings. YS, however, apparently does not recognize this portrait of their prior intellectual activity. If he did, he would realize that this very intellectual activity marks him as an instance of that nature with a unique intellectual capacity. His inability to reflect on and account for his own activity marks him as suffering deep self-ignorance. This, however, is what we would expect of geometers, who notoriously do not ground their first principles (*Rep.* VI). This also stands in contrast to Theaetetus’ account of his geometrical discovery in the *Theaetetus* (147c7-148e5), an impressive display of philosophical reflection on his own activity.
Ultimately it's a test: have we, according to the alternative descriptions of the life of humans in the AK, read the myth philosophically or indulged in it as a source of mere pleasure, as mere storytelling? I suggest the myth reveals the ultimate cause of the first division’s mistake as inadequate self-knowledge: ignorance of our own nature and good. Our inquirers, the Stranger and YS, mistook body for the whole of human nature and, it seems, bodily pleasure for the human good, resulting in nostalgia for the unimpeded bodily pleasure of the AK, an apparent golden age which on reflection is not so golden. Much more than a methodological fix, the myth reveals us in this age, the parlous AZ, as uniquely capable of philosophical activity, and thus as the sole candidates for eudaimonia, as living in the best actually possible age of all. Lane’s thesis that the myth’s cosmology serves to open up a temporal chasm to close us off from the time of divine nurture and to extinguish nostalgia I take as a second best remedy, intended for those able to indulge in pleasant storytelling but not to do the work required for philosophical insight. Nostalgia for such a hedonistic life, a life revealed as subhuman, is genuinely and most effectively extinguished through knowledge of human nature, what we properly are and should be—through philosophical self-knowledge. This the myth provides. Yet Plato, like the absent god, makes us do the work to grasp it and thereby to become what we properly are.

4.4.b. The Myth’s Aftermath

The Stranger’s myth on my interpretation thus plays a role of maximum importance in the Statesman and in the trilogy as a whole. For the teleological system and axiological framework grounded in the myth’s ontology (unlimited primordial body, ordering divine intellect) allow us to grasp human being as a complex whole of
hierarchically arranged parts (intellect is divine and thus rules body) instead of as a heap or unstructured sum of corporeal properties. We can now properly distinguish humans axiologically from other animals: as a nous-animal human being is not just different from but superior to other animals, which lack intellect, like swine, and may justly use them as means, just as intellect uses body. And due to the greater worth of his charges, the statesman, we can now say, is more important than other herdsmen, like the swineherd. Also, due to intellect’s superiority to body and body’s need of intellect as limiting principle, we can see how intellect’s ends should trump and structure body’s. So, only that expert who tends to intellect and grasps its nature and relation to body has just claim to the title statesman and to care for the whole city, just as intellect cares for the whole composite. This, in fact, I detail in chapter 5, where I explain how the Stranger uses this model of human being to fashion a structured polis out of the heap of a city and defines statesmanship by articulating its relations to all the other arts that comprise the city.

Additionally, by means of the myth we grasp not only what human being is in and of itself. We also acquire an understanding of human being itself as a functional part of a larger whole, the cosmos (as argued above in 4.3.a). And, as the Stranger subtly suggests in the myth, the work we did in the first attempted division was not in vain. For to truly know human being (as the nature with a unique capacity for phronēsis\(^{72}\)) we also need to grasp it in terms of all the other animals and natures that comprise the whole (272b8-d2).

In the parlance of the Theaetetus, the myth teaches us not only how to spell human being by spelling out its parts in accordance with its telos or end. It also spells human being’s letters both in the larger syllable or word to which human belongs, the cosmos, and in all

\(^{72}\) The cosmos, of course, is also a phronimon animal and the myth’s god or demiurge is obviously an agent of nous if not nous itself. The relation of the cosmos and demiurge to human being I explain further just below.
other parts of the cosmos. We thus have a true belief about what human being is *auto kath’ auto* which is grounded in a *mythos* that accounts for everything else too and their relations (including axiological and hierarchical) to human being. On my interpretation of the interrelational epistemology, this is precisely what we need to have *epistêmê* of human being—once we replace the *mythos* with a *logos*, that is. Yet, although this seems to match up well with the model of the interrelational epistemology I argued for in chapter 2 (2.3.3), should we really see so much of the *Theaetetus* at work here in the *Statesman*? We should, if my account of the two dialogues’ textual and thematic echoes in those chapters was persuasive. Another good reason: the Stranger tells us to. For the Stranger’s forging of a unified myth from three scattered and apparently unrelated tales also serves, I suggest, as a model for how we are to read the three dialogues as a tightly unified whole.

4.4.c. Two Objections

Before working out the implications of all this, consider two objections. First, after the myth the Stranger claims that the myth is a mere heap after all (*θαυμαστὸν ὄγκον ἀράμενοι τοῦ μύθου, 277b*). Due to their desire to give the king an appropriately grand myth and to do so quickly, they included more than was necessary to perfect the shape of the king (277a), which presumably required separating the human statesman...

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73 The Stranger perhaps hints that the myth is not actually a mere heap by likening it to a work of art, a sculpture (277ac). Plato perhaps signals to us (via the talk of sculptures, paintings, use of paints, the trickiness of appearance) that we should read this passage in light of the *Sophist’s* OEP distinction (235d-236d). There, as we saw in chapter 3, the Stranger explains how phantasms seem fair and accurate reproductions of an original but are actually distorted (the logos of the king seems complete to YS). *Eikones*, on the other hand, like colossal statues, appear to be distorted copies, but in reality accurately reproduce the original’s proportions. The Stranger’s myth, which he likens to a statue with distorted proportions, may in fact be an *eikôn*, the beautiful proportions of which can only be discerned from a properly elevated intellectual perspective.
from the divine shepherd. So perhaps interpreters like Rowe are right, and I have read too much into the myth. Plato’s writerly exuberance got the better of him and he has the Stranger own up to it here. The Stranger, however, signals that we should reflect more carefully on his claim. Because of their desire for a grand myth, he says, they included too much and failed to put a proper end (telos) on it (πάντως τὸ μὴθῳ τέλος οὐκ ἐπέθεμεν, 277b) in the sense of a stop. The Stranger, I suggest, puns on telos here and challenges us to see that, despite appearances, they have, in fact, put a proper end on the myth insofar as its end, i.e., its function, is to reveal the human end. And as we have seen, all the elements of the myth contribute to this. To grasp the unity of something—whether it be a myth, a trilogy of dialogues, or human being itself—requires grasping the telos that structures the parts of that thing. Otherwise we see only a heap.

The second objection is that the work the myth does is unsatisfying, even if satisfactorily coherent. The materialist will grant that the hierarchically structured whole model of human being and the teleological system itself which allows for this account of human being follow from the myth’s ontology of chaotic primordial body, which produces all badness, and divine ordering intellect, which is the source of all good. Yet this is all mere dogmatic assertion. Perhaps there is no nous, no divine ordering intellect, and everything comes about by chance (see Sph. 265ce: ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης). Perhaps humans likewise lead random or spontaneous lives.

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74 The Stranger never specifies the supposedly superfluous parts of the myth that made it excessively long, and commentators have identified various elements of the myth as the intended target of this censure. Skemp (1952: 82-112), for example, speculates that Plato had developed new insights into heavenly motion, which he slipped into the Statesman’s myth on which he happened to be working at the time. On my reading, of course, the myth suffers no defect due to excessive length, since an account of the cosmos is required to grasp human being. The use of a large example to grasp the human king and human being, in fact, should perhaps remind us of Socrates’ procedure in the Republic, using the city as an analogue for the human soul and its relation to justice.

75 Rowe (1995a: ad loc.). Lane (1998: 117-35) too takes the excessive length of the myth, to serve as a bad example of an example and as a springboard for the digression on the Measure Doctrine.
sprouting up spontaneously like the *Theaetetus*’ Heracliteans (αιτομαται ἀναφύονται, 180b) and the humans of the AK (271e-272b). It might be that humans have no proper end and no sovereign intellect that could grasp that end, if there were one, and structure actions accordingly. Maybe humans are not so different from other animals after all. Like other animals, they are slaves to the spontaneous desires of mortal soul; they are just more clever at attaining those desires (*Tht.* 174ce).

We have available several answers to this objection. For one thing, by labeling the story a kind of paidiâ the Stranger seems to emphasize its status as mythos as opposed to logos, that is, a proper rational account. If so, it would be wrong to criticize the Stranger for dogmatic assertion. The myth, in other words, makes an essential contribution to separating the politikos from his rivals and, on my reading, disclosing the human essence. But, with respect the question concerning human being, we come away merely with a true belief about what human being is auto kath’ hauto plus a mythos. To acquire epistêmê of human being will require replacing the mythos with a logos.

Second of all, if the first attempted division is, as I proposed above, a reductio intended to stimulate reflection on first principles, then Plato and the Stranger are making no claims to have demonstrated the existence and nature of intellect. What we have is a dialectical argument. The Stranger assumes human being is a heap of corporeal parts sans intellect and works out the implications for human being and the statesman. If we find them absurd, this serves as a dialectical proof against this conception and we must find another first principle or starting point (remember archê, section 4.3.a), that is, another conception of human being with more acceptable implications. The myth provides (or,
rather, makes us work for) both this different staring point and even a playful version of the *logos* that would be required to know it on the interrelational epistemology.

Plato and the Stranger cannot, of course, *demonstrate* that human being is a *nous*-animal rather than a corporeal heap and that intellectual perfection is the human end and a constituent of human eudaimonia. But note the dialectical trap that Plato and the Stranger set for the materialist. As soon as the materialist objects to the myth’s *nous*-infused human and cosmos, he refutes himself. For his objection means that he did not partake of the myth like the AK’s swinish layabouts, who indulge in tales for mere pleasure. His very philosophical engagement with the myth points to a desire that cannot be explained by body’s, that is, mortal soul’s, appetites. It points to an *intellectual* desire for truth and suggests a deficit of happiness if that desire goes unfulfilled. So, at the very least, we get a dialectical proof of intellect as a part of human nature and intellectual perfection as a constituent of human *eudaimonia*. For the objecting materialist to deny this would be as absurd as the pre-Socratics, who use their intellects to produce elaborate cosmologies in which intellect produces nothing.

4.4.d. Political and Practical Implications

So, the good news, on my interpretation, is that the Stranger and YS (whether YS realizes it or not) acquire from the myth a true belief about human being, namely, the complex whole model necessary to advance the inquiry into *politikê* by extricating the statesman from other experts, as I detail in chapter 5. The bad news is that, if *epistêmê* of human being is required for *epistêmê* of *politikê*, the results of our inquiry must remain provisional until we replace our *mythos* of human being and cosmos with a *logos*. Even worse, we now know that such a *logos* will require accounting for human being in terms
of the cosmos and everything else. To know human being we must know everything, which makes the prospects for a successful inquiry rather bleak.

We have, in fact, bad news in heaps. For, given the difficulty of acquiring *epistêmê* of human being and the fact that this, according to the myth, is necessary for human *eudaimonia*, our prospects for being properly human, that is, truly *eudaimôn*, are grim. For humans, being *nous*-animals like the cosmos, require intellectual perfection, complete *epistêmê*, to really be what they are. So the identity mistakes resulting from incomplete knowledge do more than wreck the inquiry; they also foil our chances for *eudaimonia* by fouling up the model or measure we need to live a properly human life. The Stranger’s myth illustrates this on the cosmic level. As the cosmos forgets the god’s *didachê* (*προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ λήθης ἐγγιγνομένης*, 273c), as we have seen, the cosmos produces more bad than good, the disorderliness of primordial body in the end blossoms again (*τελευτῶντος δὲ ἔξανθει τοῦ χρόνου*, 273d), and it comes to the brink of dissolving into an unlimited sea of unlikeness instead of a cosmos. So too, we learn later, humans deprived of the statesman’s epistemological grounding, which is needed to master bodily soul’s demands, devolve into mere beasts (*πρὸς θηριώδη τινὰ φύσιν*, 309e) and in the end bloom with madness (*τελευτῶσα δὲ ἔξανθεῖν παντάπασι μανίαις*, 310d). These humans have the same perceptible look as genuine humans, but are not really humans at all due to defective intellect. They are mere bodily heaps, featherless bipeds or, in the *Sophist*’s language, phantasms of human being.76 What both cosmos and

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76 Plato seems to distinguish degrees of heapishness, however. Some phantasms, that is, are better than others. As I explain in chapter 5, those regimes other than the genuine statesman’s are described as mere images (*Pltc*. 303c) which are not really regimes at all (*Pltc*. 293ce). Those deviant regimes that are law-abiding, however, are less bad than the lawless ones. Humans too would seem to be subject to degrees of ontological deficiency. Best of all is to be a statesman-sage, a genuine human. One’s phantasmal state, however, may be ameliorated by being ruled by one or by one of the more salutary (although still phantasmal) regimes. I give a preview of this just below in my explanation of the relation the sage bears to non-sages.
humans seem to require is self-knowledge, *epistêmê* of their own nature as the measure necessary for good and just action and to become and be what they properly are. And acquisition of *epistêmê*, for most, is impossible.\(^{77}\)

The cosmos, at least, has a god from whom to acquire the *didachê* needed to properly rule itself in the god’s absence. The only hope for humans is that some sage comes along from whom non-sages may acquire some salvation from their phantasmal existence by submitting to his *epistêmê*-based rule as body submits to intellect. And if *politikê* requires knowledge of human being, and knowledge of human being requires knowledge of everything else, the statesman is the sage. This is a thin hope, however, given the difficulty of acquiring *epistêmê* and, consequently, the rarity of statesmen.

 Luckily enough, the Stranger, like Socrates, seems to be just such a philosopher-

\(^{77}\) The deep connection between theory and practice, which results in profound practical implications for theoretical mistakes, we have already seen in chapter 3’s analysis of the orator of the *Theaetetus*’ digression on the good life (172c-177b). The orator’s incomplete knowledge of himself qua human being wrecks his life and his chances for *eudaimonia*. He either mistakes part (body) for whole (body and sovereign intellect) or mistakes the relation between body and intellectual soul. That is, he has a complete enumeration but mistakenly takes body’s appetites as sovereign and intellect for mere instrumental reason, subservient to body. What most interpreters have not realized is that the philosopher of the digression is also a negative example (but see Rue’s (1993) insightful analysis). As a result of mistaking part (intellect) for whole (sovereign intellect and body), he apparently thinks himself a god. His body is present in the city, but his soul flies above the heavens and under the earth (173c), oblivious to things at the human level, including his own nature. His focus is on human being itself, but he does not even know if his neighbor is a human or some other animal (174ab). This implies that he does not really grasp human being itself (and himself), if knowledge of X is necessary and sufficient for expert recognition of X’s instances. In fact, he seems to lack knowledge of knowledge insofar as he does not realize that *epistêmê* has an essential practical function judging perception’s reports in light of intellect’s grasp of *ousiai* (see *Tht*. 185c-187a, analyzed in chapter 1). So we should not, as most commentators do (e.g., Barker (1976), Bradshaw (1988), Polansky (1992: 134-48), McPherran (1993)), take this philosopher’s obliviousness to politics and practical matters to be what Socrates means by imitating God (176ac). Imitating God, as we learn from the Stranger’s myth, means using intellect to bring beauty and order to what is ugly and chaotic. The Stranger himself, after going down to the elements of things (the *megista genê* of the *Sophist*) and up above the heavens (the *Statesman*’s cosmology), returns to the human level to construct the proper polis in speech, as I explain in chapter 5. The philosopher of the digression, unlike the Stranger, seems to mistake the chaotic AZ, in which the philosopher must toil for the sake of beauty, for the AK, in which gods provide all humans’ material needs and a philosopher could thus live the life of pure reason, if reason were possible in that age, as it is not. So the philosopher of the digression, due to his incomplete knowledge, also makes mistakes which result in him not living the human life proper to his world and not really having *eudaimonia* (even if his life is better than the orator’s, since he at least lives an intellectual rather than appetitive life). That Plato perhaps intends us to recall the philosopher of the digression when we are reading the *Statesman* and to see him as an illustration of the practical consequences that come about from the mistakes the Stranger makes is indicated by the thematic echoes. This philosopher, like the Stranger, mistakes the king for a swineherd and human beings for mere animals, different from other beasts only in their capacity for treachery (174de).
statesman. For he plays the statesman, like Socrates, by enacting, in his inquiry with YS, the very pedagogical program he attributes to the statesman at the end of the dialogue.

All humans, moreover, as microcosms which partake of isopathology with the cosmos, must always imitate the cosmos, whether it be the god-guided AK or godless AZ (274d). In the AZ, however, during which the gods depart and the cosmos spins in the reverse direction, matters are complicated. As Lane notes, imitation of the cosmos in the AZ does not mean humans spin in the opposite direction, as the cosmos does. Rather, humans imitate the cosmos’ autonomy. Lacking the gods’ care (τῆς ἐπιμελείας, 274d4) they, like the cosmos, take care of (τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, 274d5) themselves, which Lane refers to as second-order imitatio.78. This is true, but more can and must be said about this. It is not just the cosmos’ autonomy that humans must imitate in the AZ. Rather, humans imitate the cosmos’ imitation of the demiurge, the god who made it. This means grasping the didachê of the cosmos’ craftsman and father79. This didachê is apparently the blueprint the demiurge uses to make the cosmos out of phronēsis and body. It is a logos of the cosmos itself. In its father’s absence the cosmos must make itself by using this didachê as the model or measure to rule itself. And it makes perfect sense for humans to imitate the cosmos’ imitation of this didachê since, as microcosms, the blueprint for the cosmos is also a blueprint for themselves. In imitating the cosmos, in fact, humans


79 The status of the god’s didachê in the AZ during his absence is not exactly parallel to the absent father’s logos in the Phaedrus at 275de, since the god himself seems to have implanted this didachê into the cosmos at its creation and to reeducate the cosmos with it during its periods of rejuvenation during the AZ. For humans, on the other hand, the god’s didachê would, in fact, seem to be something like the absent father’s logos, since humans must grasp that didachê on their own, without the benefit of the god’s direct instruction. They do this, as I have suggested, by reading the motions of the heavens, which are governed by that didachê in the early AZ, and imitating those motions by reproducing them in their soul (cf. Tim. 91d-92c).
actually imitate the god and become godlike, just as Socrates enjoins in the *Theaetetus*. So, since both humans and cosmos imitate the god’s blueprint or didachê, this, strictly speaking, is not imitation of imitation.

So Lane’s point about what she calls second-order imitation turns out, with the proper tweaking, to be on target and even more significant than her analysis lets on. If humans were merely to imitate the cosmos’ perceptible properties, that is, spin in the opposite direction, their mimesis would be the bad kind that, I argued in chapter 3, the sophist engages in. For the sophist imitates not the original, wisdom, but the perceptible properties of that which has but is not (*auto kath’ hauto*) the original, namely, the philosopher, who has but is not wisdom. As such the sophist is a mere phantasm, an imitation of what imitates the original. This same analysis, as I proposed above, applies to those humans who have all the perceptible properties of human being but lack an intellect structured by epistêmê. We will also see (in chapter 5) the Stranger apply this framework in his account of the statesman’s imitators. For the tyrant does the same things as the statesman (he deviates from the written law) and so has the same perceptible look as the statesman, but his actions are structured by his mortal soul’s epithumia (*Sts.* 301bc) while the true statesman’s are structured by his intellect’s epistêmê of human being.

More pertinent to the present analysis is that, if this is correct, only the sage, the philosopher-statesman, will be able to imitate the god by grasping the god’s didachê which he needs to properly rule himself. And this imitation will consist not merely in

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80 *Tht.* 176a-177b.

81 That is, if grasping the didachê means, as I contend below, having complete epistêmê. On my reading, then, we should not see Plato in these later dialogues as optimistic about non-sage’s capacity for reason and prospects for eudaimonia as some contend (e.g., Bobonich (2002: 209-215)). Even those non-sages fortunate enough to have a statesman for ruler will still be mere phantasms of proper human beings. That is, they will still be defective human beings, due to their incomplete epistêmê; they will just be better off phantasms. A similar analysis applies to Plato’s
grasping the god’s didachê and using it to rule himself. He will also use that didachê to save non-sages, to some extent at least, from their phantasmal existence by forging a properly structured polis in which he may educate and rule them since they cannot properly rule themselves. For this is precisely what the god does in forging the cosmos at the beginning and revivifying it each time the cosmos comes unbuckled due to forgetfulness of the didachê. The god condescends to save the cosmos due, it seems, to paternal love or concern (κηδόμενος, 273d5): the cosmos is his child. The deeper reason, I propose, which explains why he condescended even to create the cosmos from chaotic body, is an intellectual desire for beauty and order. And this serves as my explanation for why the philosopher-statesman would take up the burden and danger of ruling the city. The life of pure reason, in which one indulges in philosophical reflection without a worry about material circumstances, may be the best and most eudaimôn life conceivable for a nous-animal like human being. But this is not our lot, as we learn from the myth. We residents of AZ must struggle for our intellectual perfection and eudaimonia in a parlous and stingy nature. And if we achieve that intellectual perfection, along with it comes an intellectual desire to render our chaotic world and our defective fellow humans as beautiful and good as possible, as the god does.

views of less than ideal regimes, as I show in chapter 5 His view of democracy, for example, has not softened as much as some have contended, if it has softened at all. See Rowe (2001) for a critique of the thesis that there is a rapprochement with democracy in the later dialogues.

82 Unspoken in the Statesman but expressed in the Timaeus at 29e-30c.

83 In contrast to the Republic (VII), where the philosopher kings return from their contemplation of Forms to the cave out of gratitude for the education they received from the city that developed their capacity to grasp Forms.

84 If so, the fact that the philosopher of the digression in the Theaetetus (172c-177b), does not have a desire to interrupt his philosophical reflections to help his fellow human beings indicates he does not have complete epistêmê. At the very least his absorption in the life of pure reason seems to indicate an ignorance of human intellect’s practical function, judging perceptions in terms of ousia. See f.n.63.
Importantly, this is precisely what the Stranger and Socrates do. Socrates, for example, out of concern (ἐκηδόμην, Tht. 143d, perhaps echoing κηδόμενος at Sts. 273d5) for Athens, seeks out promising youths to test for philosophical potential. The Stranger, in fact, in the very act of providing the mythos, imitates the god. For the god, we remember (274ce), returns at the end of the AZ, when the cosmos, due to forgetfulness of the god’s didachê, begins to break apart. The god takes hold again of the cosmos’ rudder and restores it, presumably with his didachê, rendering it immortal and ageless. So too the Stranger arrives at a time when, due to forgetfulness, the account of the cosmos, as we have seen, has fractured into three scattered pieces (διεσπαρµένα), reported separately from one another (ἐἴρηται χωρὶς ἓκαστα ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων, 269b5-c3). From this heap of fragments the Stranger puts together again the cosmos in speech, just as the god stitches together again the actual cosmos. More than that, in doing so the Stranger gives us the god’s didachê, albeit in paidiá. For the myth, which describes the god’s application of didachê, is itself a playful version of that didachê, I suggest. Just as the actual cosmology (i.e., the didachê) gives the cosmos the requisite self-knowledge of itself qua cosmos, the model and measure it needs to rule itself, so too the Stranger’s cosmology gives us, if we can do the dialectical work, a playful version of the requisite self-knowledge, the model and measure we need to properly rule ourselves qua nous-animals and, as such, microcosms. The statesman’s paideia, which we get if we pass the test, is, I propose, a demythologized version of the mythos; it serves as a divine bond that fits

85 If so, then the myth, as a playful kind of didachê, seems to be a piece of (philosophical) rhetoric. At 304cd the Stranger distinguishes two different ways of persuading the masses and crowd: rhetoric, which uses stories (mythologia), and didachê. The Stranger does not specify the means didachê uses to persuade. In the Sophist, however, he tells Theaetetus that, if the lad had not consented to the proposition that the creation comes about through reason and divine knowledge that comes from God (rather than spontaneously), he would have tried to make him agree to this by means of logos and forceful persuasion (265ce). Persuasion via logos is, perhaps, what the Stranger means by didachê in the Statesman at 304cd. Using didachê/logos might mean employing a more scientific, demythologized version of the Statesman’s cosmology, something along the lines of the Timaeus’ account of the cosmos (but even this is described as a likely tale (ἐξήγη τὴν μυθόν, 29d)).
together the immortal part (τὸ ἀειγενές) of soul (309c1-3), just as the god’s didachê renders the cosmos divine and ageless (ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγήρων, 273e3).

If this is correct, then much more is at stake than a correct definition of human being and politikê, just as there was in the Theaetetus’ inquiry into epistêmê itself. In playing the statesman by testing their interlocutors’ capacity for epistêmê of human being (which entails complete epistêmê), the Stranger and Socrates are testing and cultivating their potential to become genuine philosopher-statesmen, who alone have true eudaimonia and who alone can maximize non-sages’ happiness. Playing the statesman, however, is all that Socrates and the Stranger can do due to obviously infelicitous political circumstances. This allows them to rescue promising youths, like Theaetetus, from ruination. But ideally they would have the political power to use their epistêmê to turn the heapish city into a whole which is properly structured by the human good. In such a city all corrigible non-sages, submitting to their rule, would have their best shot at maximizing their eudaimonia. The Stranger cannot get his hands on the actual city but he can produce the properly structured city in speech. As I show in chapter 5, the Stranger descends from the cosmos and uses the complex whole model of human being acquired therefrom not only to define the statesman by fully differentiating him from other experts but also to forge in speech the properly structured city in imitation of the demiurge’s creation of the cosmos. Both our grasp of the statesman and the statesman’s rule of the city, as we shall see, require my proposed model of the interrelational epistemology.

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86 Socrates’ trial, of course, serves as the background for the whole trilogy. See C.Gill (1995) for analysis of how the Stranger persuades YS (and the reader) of the fittingness of the true statesman’s violation of the written law, when he deems it fitting.
Chapter 5: The Politics of Knowledge

5.1 Introduction

The Stranger’s post-myth corrections (274e1-277c6) produce a definition of \(\text{politikê}\) as a self-directive kind of theoretical \(\text{epistêmê}\) which humans (not shepherd-gods) use to provide care by consent (not by force) to the whole human herd, that is, the whole community of arts and humans (276ab). And according to my analysis in chapter 4, the humans the statesman rules are \text{nous-animals}\(^1\). YS, not unreasonably, finds this satisfactory. It does, after all, separate the statesman from other human herders (only he cares for \text{nous-animals}) and from other caretakers of \text{nous-animals} (only he cares for the \text{whole} human community). They seem to have not only a true belief but one uniquely true of \text{politikê}. The Stranger, however, finds the definition incomplete and insufficiently clear (277a3-c6). This sets the stage for the dialogue’s and trilogy’s final stretch in which we see the Stranger fully deploy the interrelational epistemology in conjunction with the complex whole model of human being to capture the city in speech. In doing so he completes not only the account of \text{politikê} but also important unfinished business from the \text{Sophist} and \text{Theaetetus}.

To their uniquely true belief about what \text{politikê} is \text{auto kath’ hauto} the Stranger adds, as prescribed by my proposed model of the interrelational epistemology, a \text{logos} that provides a full analysis of \text{politikê}’s care. That is, he fine tunes the differentia “for the \text{whole} human community”, which separates \text{politikê}’s care from the other arts’, by

\(^1\)The by force/by consent differentia, as I explain in 5.5, is ultimately rejected. Knowledge is necessary and sufficient for proper rule, whether by force or by consent. Also important to note is that, on my reading, there is one, continuous account of \text{politikê}. The Stranger does not, in other words, begin a new definition of \text{politikê} after the myth. Rather, the myth and the post-myth corrections allow the Stranger to correct course and continue the account begun at 258b. For detailed analysis of the \text{Statesman}’s structure, see Rowe (1996), who also subscribes to the continuous account interpretation.
enumerating all the knowledges that comprise the community of arts, a complex whole of
which politikê is the most important part. He also differentiates them from politikê and
from one another, and the content of this differentiation contains axiological, hierarchical,
and functional relations that are grounded in human being’s complex structure.

This analysis at the same time completes the *Sophist* because the Stranger
differentiates the genuine statesman from the *stasiastikoi politikoi* (291a-303d), the
greatest of the sophists, in terms of the latter’s ontological deficiency, which the *Sophist*
failed to do for the philosopher/sophist distinction. The Stranger’s supplemental *logos*
also completes the *Theaetetus*. For the *Theaetetus*, as I argued in chapter 2, contains *in
embryo* the answer to the question “What is *epistêmê*?”: true belief about what X is plus a
*logos* that completely enumerates and fully differentiates from X everything related to X.
The *Theaetetus* fails, however, to add a *logos* to this true belief about what *epistêmê* is
*auto kath’ hauto* and so fails to achieve *epistêmê* of *epistêmê*. The Stranger’s *logos*,
however, does so by completely enumerating and fully differentiating all the arts that are
related to *epistêmê* as its parts. It also accounts for the relation *epistêmê* as a whole bears
to practical intelligence, the two constituent parts of expertise or human wisdom and the
necessary ingredients for *eudaimonia* in the Age of Zeus.

The Stranger in this way brings the accounts of *epistêmê, sophistikê*, and *politikê*
to completion at the same time in the *Statesman*’s political context, which is fitting. For,
as we shall see, *politikê* is, in a sense, *epistêmê* with its political crown on. And in the
perilous Age of Zeus, the political context of the city is both the only place where
*epistêmê* is possible and the arena where it finds its proper and necessary use. It is also
exceedingly difficult to acquire. This is bad news if humans depend on the proper polis
for maximum *eudaimonia*, and a proper polis requires a statesman. As luck would have it, the Athenians just might have two, Socrates and the Stranger, as well as a potential statesman in *Theaetetus*. And the Stranger’s account of *politikê*, as I shall show, serves as a means for the absent statesman to make yet other statesman. At the very least it gives non-sages the tools to recognize a genuine statesman, should he appear, and not destroy him, as the Athenians did, and in this way ruin their only hope for happiness. The *Statesman* in this way completes the trilogy by fully midwifing *epistêmê* and bringing to light the politics of knowledge in the present age, the Age of Zeus.

I begin my analysis in 5.2 with an interpretation of the Stranger’s doctrine of paradigms (277c-279b). Paradigms serve a number of different functions, as other commentators have shown. According to Gill, they provide methodological insights, such as the possibility of non-dichotomous division, which illuminate how to account for the target. They also prove more content-related insights. The weaving paradigm, for instance, gives us a model for understanding the statesman’s characteristic activity in weaving together the city’s parts. My interpretation proposes an additional function that ties the section of paradigms and the subsequent account of the polis closely in with the *Theaetetus*. Paradigms, I argue, allow us to acquire an initial grasp of a complex whole via an account of one of that whole’s more easily grasped parts. This epistemic route to the whole via its parts should put us in mind of Socrates’ account of the asymmetry of intelligibility between complex wholes and their parts section in the *Theaetetus* (206ac).

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2 That is, if my interpretation of Socrates’ and the Stranger’s role in the dramatic action in previous chapters is on target, namely, that both play the statesman by enacting the *Statesman*’s educational program. On another note, what I mean by ‘proper polis’ will become more clear in what follows.

In 5.3 I revisit the measure doctrine, which, I argue, does three important things. First, it serves as a step in providing the missing logos for the true belief about epistêmê, since it accounts for epistêmê’s relation to practical judgment, which is related to epistêmê as the other constituent part of expertise or wisdom. Second, The Stranger later draws on its account of due measure in order to distinguish the statesman as the only expert who recognizes due measure. The Stranger’s measure of Young Socrates (YS) in this passage in terms of intellect provides an instance of the use of human being’s ousia as the measure for particular humans and suggests that the Stranger is himself a statesman. Third, the Stranger provides an ontological framework which is intended to recall the Sophist’s OEP distinction and which the Stranger later employs to account for the ontological deficiency of the statesman’s counterfeits, the stasiastikoi politikoi.

Armed with the resources of the paradigm passage and measure doctrine the Stranger then begins the assault on the city that completes the logoi for epistêmê, sophistikê, and politikê. In 5.4 I explain how the Stranger provides a complete enumeration and differentiation of the community of arts, showing how it is a complex whole of hierarchically arranged functional parts of which politikê is the most important. 5.5 analyzes the Stranger’s account of the stasiastikoi politikoi, the greatest of the sophists. This group of sham statesman the Stranger is able to account for in terms of

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4 The measure doctrine has generated a variegated literature. See Lane (1998: 125-32) for an analysis that accounts for the function of due measure within the larger context of the dialogue. For other useful articles focused on the notion of measure see Wilson (1980), Hoffmann (1993), Marquez (2006), Harvey (2009). Hutchinson (1988) discusses conceptions of due measure in the wider context of the sciences in the 4th century.

5 Analyzed in chapter 3.

6 My interpretation of this important stretch of text most resembles that of Miller (1980: 82-4), who takes the account to be structured in terms of autonomy. That is, Miller takes the Stranger’s account to arrange the arts from least to most autonomous, finally arriving at the statesman. This is true enough, but, on my interpretation, the Stranger has a more ambitious design. He seeks to reproduce the city in speech using human being’s ousia as the ground for mapping out the hierarchical structure of the community of arts in full and the statesman’s essential place in it as the organizational principle of the whole.
ontological defect because we now have the requisite teleological framework (via the myth) that was missing from the *Sophist* and prevented the Stranger from properly accounting for the sophist as a defective philosopher. The Stranger in this way completes the *Sophist* in accounting for the statesman. I close in 5.6 by explaining how this completes the *logos* required for a complete and maximally clear grasp of *epistêmê, sophistikê,* and *politikê* and by working out the important political implications of the Stranger’s account of expertise.

5.2. The Stranger’s Dream of Epistêmê (277a-279b)

The adjustments made by the Stranger after the myth (274e-276e) produce a definition or true belief about what *politikê* is.\(^7\) The belief is, in fact, uniquely true of *politikê*: a self-directive kind of theoretical *epistêmê* which humans (not shepherd-gods) use to provide care by consent (not by force) for the *whole* human herd, that is, the whole community of arts and humans qua *nous*-animals. This satisfies YS, but not the Stranger, who finds it deficiently clear and complete (277ac). The problem, he intimates, has to do with the differentia regarding care namely, that the statesman’s care is for the whole community not just for some part of it, as is the case for the other experts.\(^8\) Although it separates the statesman from the other experts, it must be more finely tuned. What they have now is like the external outline (τὴν ἔξωθεν μὲν περιγραφὴν) of a picture (ζωον); for completeness and maximum clarity they need to color it in. The Stranger’s diagnosis and remedy is itself characteristically unclear. They need, I argue, to add to their uniquely true belief a *logos* on the model Socrates provides in the *Theaetetus,* namely, one that

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\(^7\) The Stranger does not use true belief talk here, but does so in the weaving account, as I explain below.

\(^8\) An additional differentia used by the Stranger in this passage, the by force/by consent distinction, is ultimately rejected, as I explain in 5.5. The Stranger jettisons this differentia in his analysis of the *stasiastikoi politikoi,* a valuable account of which is provided by C. Gill (1995).
completely enumerates and differentiates from \textit{politikê} the other parts of the complex whole to which it belongs, the community of arts. And this differentiation will include the hierarchical, functional, and axiological relations that, I have argued, characterize the interrelational epistemology. In this section I focus on the account of paradigms, which the Stranger provides before resuming the inquiry into \textit{politikê}. The paradigm account and the weaving paradigm I take to be the first step in providing this \textit{logos} and to contain important evidence that Plato wants us to see this final movement of the \textit{Statesman} to mirror the \textit{Theaetetus’} final section (\textit{Th.} 201c-210b), where Socrates provides the \textit{logos} of \textit{logos} which we see the Stranger employ to complete the inquiry into \textit{politikê}.

\textbf{5.2.a. True Belief Plus Logos}

Consider first some formal aspects of the Stranger’s account that seem intended to put us in mind of the \textit{Theaetetus’} account of knowledge as true belief plus a \textit{logos} and thus to put us on the lookout for the interrelational epistemology in the final section completing the definition of \textit{politikê}. The Stranger himself makes no mention of true belief at 276ac. Later, however, in the account of weaving (279b-283b), which in its capacity as paradigm mirrors \textit{politikê}’s account, we do find such language. The Stranger places weaving in a wide kind, productive arts (279c6-8), then divides until they have it defined as that defensive productive art that has the greatest share (\(\mu\acute{e}g\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\).\(\mu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\), 280a4) in cloak-making. The Stranger reformulates the differentia later as “the best and greatest (\(\tau\eta\nu\ k\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\eta\nu\ k\alpha\iota\ \mu\epsilon\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\eta\nu\)) of all the arts that care for woolen clothing”

\textsuperscript{9} The pun on \(\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu\) (picture/animal) I take to signal the use of functional and axiological relations which heretofore have not been utilized. With the myth’s teleological structure and conception of human being as a \textit{nous}-animal, we now have the ground required for establishing these relations. The “internal coloring” missing from their sketch, that is, is like the functional guts of an animal. I marshal more textual evidence for the advent of axiological and hierarchical relations just below. \textit{Cf. Phaedrus} 264c on the notion that every speech must be like an animal or living thing (\(\delta\sigma\tau\omicron\ \zeta\omicron\omicron\nu\)).
This brings weaving’s account to a point analogous to where the Stranger broke off the account of politikê (277ac), sketched just above. Their analysis, the Stranger says, has produced something true, but it will be neither clear nor complete (τι ἁληθὲς, οὐ μὴν σαφὲς γε οὐδὲ τέλεον, 281d1-3) until they strip off all the arts around weaving that contribute to the generation of its product and end, woolen garments for the sake of bodily protection.

I note first that their belief about what weaving is is not only true. It is uniquely true of weaving. It alone of the productive arts both produces woolen garments for the sake of protection and performs the chief work in this. Second, this “stripping off” of the other, co-operative arts (which shows us the next step to take in politikê’s account, as I explain below) I take to be the logos the Stranger needs to add to this true belief to completely grasp weaving. Just in this brief sketch we can see, I suggest, traces of Socrates’ attempt to account for epistêmê as true belief plus a logos in the Theaetetus’ final section. There, in his final attempt to define logos as grasping the target’s difference from everything else (208c-210b), we saw Socrates (in chapter 2) provide a definition of the sun as an example. The sun is the brightest (λαμπρότατον, 208d1-3) of the heavenly bodies that go about the earth. Like the definitions of weaving and politikê, this one defines the target by locating it within a complex whole (the heavenly bodies) and providing the differentia, the criterion by which it differs from other members of that whole.

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10 281c7-d3 in full: πότερον οὖν ἡμιν ὁ περὶ τῆς ύφαντικῆς λόγος, οὐ προειλόμεθα μέρους, ἵκανος ἐσται διωρισμένος, ἵνα ὅπερ αὕτην τῶν ἐπιμελεῖν ὅπως περὶ τὴν ερεύνην ἔσηθεν, εἰς τὴν καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην πασῶν τιθόμεν: ἢ λέγομεν μὲν ἄν τι ἁληθὲς, οὐ μὴν σαφὲς γε οὐδὲ τέλεον, πρὶν ἂν καὶ ταῦτας αὕτης πάσας περιέλωμεν;

11 Thus Gill (2010: 193-8) on the mirroring function of the weaving paradigm.
What wrecked this definition of *logos* was the inability to explain how we could have a belief uniquely true of X that was not also sufficient for *knowing* X, thus rendering the addition of a *logos* superfluous. It seems that a grasp of X’s difference from everything else is necessary just to have a belief uniquely true of X. From the Stranger’s work in the *Statesman* we realize that our grasp of the differentia can yield a belief uniquely true about the target yet still fall short of *epistêmê* of it, if the differentia is too vague. In such a case, to our true belief about how the target differs from everything else, we must add yet more true beliefs about how it differs from everything else. Yet these additions are not superfluous, like the twirling of a scytale, as Socrates claims in the *Theaetetus* (209de). For we are not adding the same true belief, which would be futile and absurd, but a series of true beliefs differentiating each member of the complex whole from every other, including the target, which at the same times amounts to an enumeration of the members.

In fact, the *Theaetetus* itself provides this solution for us, albeit subterraneously, according to my contention from chapter 2, namely, that Socrates’ three accounts of *logos* (discursiveness, enumeration, differentiation) are functional parts that together comprise *logos*. For this means that Socrates adds to their belief uniquely true about what knowledge is—a true belief which has a *logos*—a *logos* that more finely articulates the

12 We saw something similar in chapter 4. The definition of human being as a non-interbreeding biped rather than a non-interbreeding quadruped amounts to a uniquely true belief about human being but uses an accidental property, “bipedal”, instead of human being’s essential property (*nous*) to mark human being off from other animals. In Plato’s terminology, the Stranger, due to an incomplete grasp of human being’s *ousia*, here uses a co-cause unique to human being separate it from other animals instead of its cause (*nous*). The cause/co-cause distinction, as I explain later, plays a crucial role later in the weaving paradigm and the *logos* of *politikê*, as both Lane (1998: 47-61) and Gill (2010: 193-8) also maintain.

13 This is an odd example for Socrates to use to illustrate the futility of adding yet more true beliefs. For the scytale at each twist produces something new and turn by turn gradually reveals the encoded message in full. This is perhaps Socrates’ way of signaling that this definition is more fruitful than his criticism lets on and even of giving us the solution to the puzzle.
differentia “which has a logos” by enumerating and differentiating the three parts of logos. And this enumeration and differentiation amounts to a set of true beliefs. The hitch for our true belief about epistêmê is that, according to the logos of logos, epistêmê’s own definition demands that we enumerate and differentiate everything related to epistêmê in order to transform our true belief about what epistêmê is into epistêmê of epistêmê. This the Theaetetus does not do in its final section. Only in the Statesman’s political context do we see the interrelational epistemology applied to epistêmê itself, as I explain below (5.6).

At the very least this evidence suggests that the same conceptual apparatus is in play in the final sections of the Theaetetus and Statesman, signaling that we should not be surprised to find the interrelational epistemology deployed in the subsequent account of politikê. My explanation of the paradigm passage in the next section includes an examination of how the Stranger’s imagery and language ties the Statesman’s and Theaetetus’ final sections more closely together, thus calling attention to the Statesman’s use of the Theaetetus’ logos of logos.

5.2.b. Paradigms and the Dream of Epistêmê

To grasp politikê completely and with maximum clarity, the Stranger and YS must add a logos explaining more precisely politikê’s role as the caregiver for the whole community of arts and humans. Without this logos their grasp of politikê is a mere dream. For we know all things, the Stranger says, as if in a dream (oĩov ὄναρ) and yet are ignorant of them as it were when awake (ὡςπερ ὑπάρ, 277d). That is, the grasp we have of something via true belief is dreamlike, amounting to ignorance relative to epistêmê of it, our waking state. This, the Stranger claims, is the condition we are in concerning
epistêmê of things (277cd), including, on my interpretation, epistêmê itself. Moreover, for some things, like politikê, we require an epistemological tool, paradigms, to help us produce the rousing logos. I discuss just below the Stranger’s weaving paradigm and the specific work it does for the statesman’s logos. I consider first several important items in the general account of paradigms and how this passage hooks into the Theaetetus’ account of logos.\(^\text{15}\)

According to the Stranger’s account there is an asymmetry of intelligibility among things that allows us to acquire a waking vision of even the greatest things. Lesser things can be adequately accounted for via ostensive definition, presumably because they are embodied and thus perceivable. Yet they are also candidates for discursive accounts. To awaken from our dreams of the greatest things, on the other hand, we require a stronger sal volatile. The greatest things can only be accounted for via discursive logoi, since they are bodiless, which also makes it more difficult to account for them.\(^\text{16}\) To remedy this, the lesser things, for which it is easier to provide a discursive account given their greater epistemic accessibility via perception, we use as paradigms for accounts of the greater things.

We come to be using a paradigm, the Stranger says, when we produce an account of a lesser thing which we can then use as a model to account for the greater thing (278c4-7). Since they share some property in common, the true belief our account

\(^{14}\) The Stranger may signal this via the ambiguity in his phrasing at 277d5-6: καὶ μάλ᾽ ἀπόστασις εὐκά γε ἐν τῷ παρόντι κινήσας τὸ περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν. The Stranger, that is, seems to have roused (κινῆσαι) us to the condition we are in concerning epistêmê of all things or concerning epistêmê itself. The first possibility, in any case, would include epistêmê itself.

\(^{15}\) The analysis that follows is a very condensed and simplified account of a complicated stretch of text, analyzed in detail by Owen (1973) in his critique of Skemp (1952: 66–82).

\(^{16}\) More specifically, it is difficult to account for them without the use of paradigms, 277d1-2. But it is not impossible. This is a problem for Lane’s interpretation on which paradigms serve as a necessary organizational principle bringing a focus to the dizzying number of properties one must sort through when engaged in division.
produces about the lesser thing, when we bring it together with the target, also produces one about the greater thing, thereby giving us an epistemic inroad to the greater thing. To illustrate paradigm use the Stranger uses an account of a child’s spelling lesson. When first learning their letters, the letters children judge truly in the shortest and easiest syllable they often judge falsely in other, more difficult syllables. By placing the easier syllables side by side with the more difficult and pointing out their common elements, the teacher allows them to grasp the letters more easily in the problem syllable.

Weaving’s account, as I explain below, illuminates a special property weaving shares with politikê, giving us a true belief about politikê which facilitates producing the requisite logos differentiating politikê from the other parts of the complex whole to which it belongs, the community of arts. This is a version of the standard interpretation of paradigms and of the work the weaving paradigm does. What has not been noticed is that weaving is not just similar to politikê in some significant way, making it a good paradigm candidate. Weaving is also part of the same complex whole to which politikê belongs, the community of arts. The Stranger calls this to our attention later in the account of the polis subsequent to the weaving paradigm by including weaving among defensive arts that he differentiates from politikê (288b1-8). So, it seems that we access a complex whole, like the community of arts, via its parts, and since some parts are more intelligible than others, we begin with the more intelligible parts, like weaving.

17 See Lane (1998: 61-74) for a somewhat different interpretation of paradigms’ function and the relation of paradigms to division. Lane draws on McCabe (1994: 4, and passim) and Scott (1987: 6, and passim) to produce an account on which paradigms play a necessary role in the transformation of true beliefs into epístēmê. On my interpretation paradigms are neither absolutely necessary nor as important. They serve as a methodological crutch, providing a true belief that opens up an epistemic route to the target. Yet this is only the first step of a long, complicated process. To this true belief we must attach yet other true beliefs, “turning the scytale” until we have entirely unscrolled the whole of which the target is a part, in the case of politikê.

18 See Kato (1995) for a useful, detailed analysis of the paradigm passage.
This also means weaving’s account not only gives us crucial insight into \textit{politikê}\textsuperscript{19}; the true belief it provides about weaving also serves as the first stitch of the \textit{logos} accounting for each member of the community of arts that we need to weave and add to our true belief about \textit{politikê} so that we can wake up from our dream of \textit{politikê} to \textit{epistêmê} of it. That we are meant to see that the Stranger uses the interrelational epistemology in this final section, and that the weaving account is the first step, Plato signals via the imagery, which hooks this section of the \textit{Statesman} into the \textit{Theaetetus’} crucial final section.

\textit{Theaetetus}, as we remember, offers as his final definition of \textit{epistêmê} that it is true belief plus a \textit{logos} (\textit{Tht.} 201cd), yet cannot provide a logos explaining the work \textit{logos} does in turning true beliefs into knowledge, nor why some things have a \textit{logos}, making them knowable, while others do not, rendering them unknowable. By his own definition he thus has only true belief about \textit{epistêmê}, a mere dream of it. Socrates offers his own account of \textit{logos}, describing it as a dream in return for \textit{Theaetetus’} dream (\textit{ἄκουε δὴ ὑναρ ἀντὶ ὄνειρατος}, 201d). In this way he forecasts the failure of his account (analyzed in chapter 2), on which complexes have \textit{logoi} and are knowable while their elements have no \textit{logoi} and are unknowable, although they are perceivable. The dream imagery, used to signify epistemic deficiency to be remedied by a \textit{logos}, is one barb of the hook that connects the \textit{Theaetetus’} and \textit{Statesman’s} final passages.

Also significant is the asymmetry of intelligibility central to both passages. In fact, after the dream theory’s destruction, Socrates revises his account of asymmetry:

\textsuperscript{19} Weaving’s disclosure of the cause/co-cause structure of the cloak-making arts to which weaving belongs plays a crucial role, as I explain below, in accounting for \textit{politikê} as a part of the whole community of arts. Lane (1998: 163-81) and Gill (2010: 193-8) also note that the weaving paradigm provides the process and activity in terms of which the statesman’s political activity is to be understood: weaving together the citizens of the polis.
elements, he now claims, are not only knowable, they admit of a much clearer and more authoritativke knowledge than the complexes (206ab). This is why we master elements first before tackling the complexes they comprise. This matches up with what we find in the Statesman, where the Stranger begins his logos of the community of arts with weaving, one of its parts. The Stranger innovates, as we saw, by positing an asymmetry of intelligibility among the parts themselves also: elements show up more clearly in some parts than in others.

Plato sinks the barb in deeper by having Socrates, in this same section (206ab), use a child’s spelling lesson to illustrate this asymmetry and the implications it has for learning, just as the Stranger does. When just starting to learn letters, children master the individual letters first so that they are not disturbed when those letters are placed in spoken or written complexes or syllables (206a8). Socrates then proceeds, on my interpretation, after his revised asymmetry account to use this same pedagogical strategy to provide a logos of logos. That is, he accounts for each of the elements of logos (discursiveness, enumeration, differentiation) which together comprise logos itself, and in discursively enumerating and differentiating the elements even provides a proper logos of logos. He does not, however, apply this logos to epistêmê itself, leaving them with a mere true belief, a dream of knowledge.

Based on the totality of the correspondences, I propose that in the Statesman we should expect the Stranger, after the discourse on paradigms (the locus analogous to Socrates’ revised asymmetry account), to apply Socrates’ logos of logos. As I show in 5.4, he accounts for each part of the community of arts, discursively enumerating and differentiating them from one another and from politikê. He in this way provides the
logos required to complete and maximally clarify our understanding of politikê as the self-directive epistêmê which cares for the whole human community of epistêmai and humans. This account at the same time, as I show below (5.6), serves as the logos that needs to be added to the true belief about what epistêmê is. In the Statesman we thus fully awaken from our dreams to epistêmê of both politikê and epistêmê.

If this interpretation seems overwrought, I note that it merely employs the Stranger’s recommended pedagogical strategy to our reading of the dialogues themselves. Based on properties shared by the Statesman’s and Theaetetus’ final passages (dreams, spelling lessons, asymmetry accounts), we use the Theaetetus’ final passage, where the interrelational epistemology is relatively more manifest since it is the explicit object of investigation, to acquire insight into how to read the Statesman’s final passage, where the Stranger, less obviously, actuates the interrelational epistemology that lies in embryo in the Theaetetus. Like weaving and politikê, the Theaetetus and Statesman are thus functional parts belonging to the same complex whole, the trilogy of dialogues. And if the interrelational epistemology must be used to grasp any complex whole, then it should be no surprise that Plato expects us to employ it on the trilogy itself.

5.2.c. The Weaving Paradigm (279b-283b)

The details of the weaving account have been adequately treated by others.20 I focus here on the specific work the weaving account does in its role as paradigm. There are two items of particular importance for my interpretation: the two properties that the weaving paradigm discloses (being a cause or co-cause) and the work this disclosure does (and cannot do) for the account of politikê.

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As Gill observes, the weaving account reproduces in its structure the account of *politikê* up to the point of impasse.\(^{21}\) That is, it locates weaving in a wide kind, the productive arts (just as he placed *politikê* in *epistêmê*), then strips off the other kinds of productive arts until they have weaving defined as the defensive productive art that has the greatest share in the production of cloaks for the sake of bodily protection. This definition, just like *politikê*’s that resulted from stripping off all the other kinds of *epistêmê*, will not be complete and maximally clear until we differentiate weaving from all the arts that co-operate in cloak-making, giving us a complete understanding of its status as the greatest. As Gill also rightly observes, the remainder of the paradigm digression (281d-283b), which separates from weaving all the arts that help it in cloak-making, shows us how to overcome the impasse in *politikê*’s account and do the same for the arts that help the statesman care for human being.

The most important move the Stranger makes here, on my reading, is his distinction between causes and co-causes (281de), the properties or “letters” more easily spelled in weaving’s *logos* than in *politikê*’s.\(^{22}\) Causes, he explains, bring the thing itself to completion. Co-causes, on the other hand, do not craft the thing itself, but provide to the causes the tools without which they would not be able to perform their assigned tasks. For cloak-making, co-causes include spindle-makers, shuttle-makers, and other tool-makers (281e-10). Among the causes we find warp-makers, woof-makers, and, of

\(^{21}\) Gill (2010: 193-8).

\(^{22}\) Lane (1998: 33-61) and Gill (2010: *passim*) also take this feature to be of special importance. Gill and Miller (1980: 60-64) also take the shift to non-dichotomous division (at 282b1 in the weaving division) to be an especially significant contribution of the weaving paradigm. This shift in methodology, which also characterizes *politikê*’s account, seems to be due to the post-myth introduction of hierarchical and axiological relations to account for complex wholes like the community of arts and the cloak-making arts, which I take to be the deeper significance of the introduction of non-dichotomous division. Method, in other words, follows the nature of the object, and the objects analyzed after the myth are hierarchically ordered complex wholes the relations of which cannot be captured by dichotomous division.
course, the weaver who is the most important cause (an axiological distinction) because he weaves together the warp and woof to produce the thing itself, woolen cloaks which protect us from the elements.

Uncovering this set of properties\textsuperscript{23} that obtain among the cloak-making arts allows the Stranger to organize those arts hierarchically according to how each art’s particular work or function contributes to the common end. And as we can glean just from this bare-bones sketch of the weaving \textit{logos}, not only does an hierarchical relation obtain between causes and co-causes (the latter are for the sake of the former); even among the arts that comprise each set there obtains such an hierarchical relation. Woof-making, for example, is not an end in itself but for the sake of the weaver’s work. The Stranger in this way attaches to the true belief about weaving a \textit{logos} that enumerates and differentiates from weaving the other arts that comprise the complex whole, cloak-making. I also note that since this differentiation includes hierarchical, functional, and axiological relations grounded in cloak-making’s end, the Stranger’s analysis is at the same time a synthetic account that maps out cloak-making as a complex whole.\textsuperscript{24} This \textit{logos} serves as the model for the \textit{logos} the Stranger goes on to attach to the true belief about politikê, which I detail in 5.4. And it is precisely in keeping with the tripartite \textit{logos} in my proposed model of the interrelational epistemology.

\footnote{That is, the property of being a cause or co-cause.}

\footnote{This is an important feature of the Stranger’s account of the polis also, as I suggest below (5.6). In using human being’s \textit{ousia} as the ground for mapping out the hierarchical and axiological relations among the community of arts, the Stranger produces a synthetic account of the community of arts, forging the city in speech just as the statesman uses his grasp of human being to craft a properly structured polis.}
5.2.d. The Importance of Ends

Two items require clarification before moving on. First, politikê, like weaving, seems to have perceptible likenesses or images in the sense of instances and thus to be, like weaving, a candidate for ostensive definition. Yet this would mean that statesmanship is a lesser thing, not a greater needing a discursive logos aided by a paradigm. I propose that the solution to this puzzle has to do with the product and end for each art. Weaving’s product and end, woolen cloaks for protection against the elements, is common, uncontroversial, and perceptible. This makes sorting out causes and co-causes, which requires a grasp of the product and end, relatively easy. In fact, for an ostensive definition, I can simply point to a weaver at work intertwining warp and woof and say “That is weaving.” We can be sure that we are pointing to an actual weaver by examining his product to see if the cloak is well made and keeps us warm. Politikê’s product and end, good human beings for the sake of eudaimonia, are neither uncontroversial nor perceptible. Since proper human nature is controversial (are humans featherless bipeds or nous-animals?) what arts count as causes is not as clear as in the case of weaving (are they those that care for body or those that care for intellect?). Nor does politikê have perceptible likenesses to which to point for an ostensive definition. This does not mean there are no instantiations of politikê. It simply means that for politikê’s instances perception’s reports do not suffice. The statesman and his counterfeits

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25 A different sort of objection arises if we take both weaving and politikê to be capacities, which are imperceptible. Then, weaving would seem to be just as much a greater thing as politikê, since it too is imperceptible.

26 As I explain below, the necessary conditions for expertise are later revealed to be much more demanding. The common weaver we expect to have an adequate grasp of his art’s proximate end, the body’s protection; but if body’s good is subordinate to the human good as a whole, the most important part of which is intellectual nature, then it might be that the weaver must grasp his art’s proximate end in terms of this more comprehensive end, the human good, which proves to be a much more extreme condition on expertise.
do the same things, but for different ends, and thus have the same perceptible look. Nor do we have recourse to the genuine statesman’s product, good human beings, to ensure that we are in fact pointing out a genuine statesman. Good human beings have no perceptible likenesses either in the sense that a good human, like Socrates, has the same perceptible look as a bad one, like the sophist. They do the same things but for different reasons, and reasons cannot be perceived.

This, at least, is my explanation for politikê’s status as one of the greatest things and, hence, its need for a discursive logos aided by a paradigm. This also brings us to the second item needing clarification, namely, what the weaving paradigm does and what it cannot do. The weaving paradigm gives us a formal structure that we can apply to politikê’s account, as others have noted. It has escaped the notice of commentators, however, that it cannot supply the content for that formal structure. That is, the weaving paradigm shows us how to account for a part (politikê, weaving) of a complex whole (the community of arts, the cloak-making arts), by using the cause/co-cause framework in conjunction with the whole’s end (the human good, the body’s good) to map out all the constituent parts and their relations. The weaving paradigm cannot, however, tell us what counts as a cause and what counts as a co-cause among the community of arts. To determine this we require a grasp of the community of arts’ product and end, the human good, and this requires the grasp of human being’s ousia acquired from the myth, as I explain in more detail in the next two sections.

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27 I take this to be an important point, much in keeping with what I argued to be a central concern of the Sophist, namely, the inadequacy of perception for distinguishing instances of a kind from their counterfeits. I return to this in detail in 5.5. The difficulty of discerning statesmen has not gotten much play in the literature, but see Rowe (1995a: 211-212), who provides useful analysis.
5.3. The Measure Doctrine Revisited (283b-287b)

After the weaving paradigm and before launching the *logos* of *politikê* the Stranger provides an account of due measure ostensibly to inoculate YS against a sickness (*tà vòσῆμα*, 283b5-c1) that he might otherwise be at risk of contracting in the future. The sickness is misology, resulting from displeasure over the length and difficulty of *logoi*, such as the weaving account they just went through. The account of due measure is intended to give YS insight into the nature of excess and deficiency so that he may properly accord praise and blame on each occasion, such as regarding the length of *logoi*. Although the Stranger plays off the measure doctrine as a mere digression, I take the placement of the passage to signal its special importance and not merely to be a clever way of instantiating measure in the dialogue by situating the measure doctrine at the dialogue’s center, drawn away from the extremes. The measure doctrine, I explain here, performs several definitional functions important for acquiring *epistêmê* of *epistêmê* and completing the account of *politikê*.

First, it accounts for the relation between theoretical knowledge and practical judgment, which we need for a complete definition of *epistêmê* and *politikê*. Regarding the latter, the capacity to discern what is in due measure turns out to be a distinguishing feature of the genuine statesman, as I explain in 5.4. This passage also provides the metaphysical tools the Stranger will need to distinguish the statesman from his

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28 See, e.g., 284e11-285c2, where the Stranger explains to YS the importance of mapping out exhaustively all the relations that obtain among kinds and not making sour faces about it (*δοσολογούμενον*, 285b4). That is, despite the displeasure of the task, one must push through with the dialectical investigation for the sake of becoming better dialecticians (285d, 287a), which means, presumably, developing one’s *nous*. In the Sophist, we recall, the Stranger claims that division attempts to grasp that is and is not related in all the arts for the sake of acquiring *nous* (*τὸν κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἑνὸς νοῦ τοιοῦτον τέχνην τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ συγγενὲς κατανοεῖν περιομένην*, 227ab).

29 Sayre (2006: 171-90) also calls attention to the fitting place of the due measure account in the *Statesman*’s architecture. For different interpretations of this passage’s significance and function, see esp. Miller (1980: 55-72), McCabe (1997), Lane (1998: 125-32).
counterfeits, the stasiastikoi politikoi (291a-303e), which distinction I analyze in 5.5. The measure doctrine earns its central place in the dialogue, in part at least, for these contributions it makes toward defining epistêmê and politikê. Just as important, if not more, as I explain in closing this section, is the insight it provides into the human essence and into how to use it as measure.

5.3.a. The Epistemological Function of the Measure Doctrine

The Theaetetus, on my interpretation, provides us a true belief about what epistêmê is auto kath’ hauto, namely, that it is true belief plus a logos. It does not, however, provide us the logos needed to turn our true belief about epistêmê into epistêmê of epistêmê. It does, on the other hand, provide us a logos of logos. The logos added to our true belief about the target’s essence must completely enumerate and differentiate from that essence all the things related to that essence. This means that if epistêmê is part of a complex whole, we must be able to spell it out correctly in that larger complex. This the measure doctrine does for us by providing a general account of the relation of theoretical knowledge, epistêmê, to practical judgement, the perfect unity of which presumably constitutes expertise.

The technical details of the measure doctrine I have already worked out in chapter 1; here I simply revisit a few of the most pertinent details. According to the Stranger’s account, the being of the metron is necessary and sufficient for the being of each kind of epistêmê or expertise (284d1-8). For the business of each expertise is to produce good and beautiful things, and something is good and beautiful if and only if it is in due measure, where being in due measure seems to mean being in possession of the metron (284a5-b1). The expert, then, is the one who can reliably recognize and produce what is
in due measure and, thus, what is good and beautiful, and this presupposes epistêmê of the metron. A metron, moreover, seems to be some sort of universal nature or, more specifically, an ousia. To be a proper, that is, good and beautiful, instance of its respective kind a thing must conform to the metron proper to it (284a5-b1), and this seems to mean that it must come to be that kind’s ousia, however briefly. This, at least, is what I take to be the import of the cryptic phrase, to which I return just below, “the necessary essence of genesis” (τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκαῖαν οὐσίαν, 283d8-9). Not every instance of production will necessarily conform to the limits prescribed by the target ousia or metron, otherwise there would be no expertise or expertise would not be an achievement. And only those instances that do so conform count as really being an instance of the target ousia. The expert is the one who grasps the ousia/metron and for this reason can reliably recognize good and bad instances of it and can generate proper instances of it.30

The measure doctrine thus gives us an account of the relation of epistêmê to practical judgment, where practical judgement is an intellectual capacity aimed at particulars (such as speeches, actions, humans, 283e4-7) while epistêmê has ousiai or universals for its proper objects. And epistêmê is prior to practical judgment insofar as it is the ousiai grasped by epistêmê that we use as metra for our evaluations of particulars. With this we get one piece of the logos that needs to be added to the true belief about epistêmê to acquire epistêmê of epistêmê.

30 The Statesman’s passage on measure seems to echo with what we find in the Philebus’ fourfold ontology (Phlb. 23b-27c). In that passage Socrates describes the joint offspring of apeiron and peras as "a coming into being (γενόσαν εἰς οὐσίαν) created through the measures imposed by limit" (26d). If the Statesman and Philebus are talking about the same kind of thing, then the peras which brings about a coming-to-be into essence when applied to the apeiron seems to be what the Statesman calls the metron, which brings it about that something is in measure (metrion).
5.3.b. The Ontological Function of the Measure Doctrine

The measure doctrine also has an obvious ontological component with axiological implications. Less obvious, and unnoticed by commentators, is that it provides the resources the Stranger later draws on to differentiate the statesman from his counterfeits, the stasiastikoi politikoi, who, as I explain in 5.5 are not really statesmen at all, because their rule is epithumia-based rather than epistêmê-based. Their regimes, moreover, are not really regimes at all but insubstantial images of varying worth yet incomparable in worth to the true regime, which is like a god among men.

These ontological distinctions along with their axiological implications are already evident in the analysis offered just above. For the Stranger is clear that the presence of the metron is what renders things in due measure and thus good and beautiful, while its absence results in things exceeding or falling short of due measure, which, we may infer, makes them bad and ugly (284a5-b1). And if the metron is the necessary ousia of genesis as I suggested above, then the Stranger evidently takes the presence or absence of the metron to mark off degrees of being. For not everything that comes to be possesses the metron, as I explained above; otherwise we would not need experts to produce and preserve the metron in things.31 So the import of the Stranger’s curious formula seems to be that the metron is necessary for something coming to really be an instance of some kind. On the other hand, those things from which the metron is absent are but are not really, that is, they have not come to be what they properly are. As

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31 Rowe (1995a: ad loc.) translates κατὰ τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκάζους οὐσίαν as: according “to what producing things necessarily is.” Campbell has: “according to the otherwise impossible existence of production.” According to Rowe (pg. 207), “the reference…must be to the claim in 284ab that a large number of other ‘arts’ or kinds of expertise are inseparable from this second part of the ‘art of measurement.’” Both Rowe and Campbell thus focus on how the arts depend on this ousia/metrón for their existence but do not make clear that the arts’ object are also dependent on the ousia/metrón for their proper being.
such, they suffer not-being, not in the sense of absolute not-being but in the sense of ontological defect.\textsuperscript{32}

This, at least, is what the Stranger seems to suggest at 284a8-b1, where he says that “all the arts guard against the more and less than what is in due measure, not as something which is not (οὐχ ὡς οὐκ ὃν, that is, not as absolute not-being) but as something that is troublesome for their activities.”\textsuperscript{33} And again at 284b6-10: “So, just as in the case of the sophist we compelled not-being to be, when the logos eluded us down this path, must we now too in this way compel the more and the less to be measurable not only with respect to each other but also with respect to the production of due measure?”\textsuperscript{34}

The Stranger’s claim here, when taken with the previous passage, seems clearly to be that things which exceed or fall short of what is in due measure are kinds of not-being.\textsuperscript{35}

The measure doctrine thus gives us an ontological scheme that recalls the \textit{Sophist}’s OEP distinction, which provided the general framework for not-being in the sense of ontological deficiency. That Plato wants us to have the OEP in mind is signaled, I suggest, by the explicit allusion to the \textit{Sophist} both in this passage and later at 286b8-9, where the Stranger again explicitly refers to the treatment of not-being in the \textit{Sophist}. In 5.5 I explain how the Stranger draws upon the measure doctrine to differentiate the

\textsuperscript{32} Or something may not be the sort of thing that has a \textit{metron}, an objective measure. A heap of sawdust, for example, would seem to have no proper nature or \textit{ousia} to instantiate, so we do not have objectively better or worse sawdust heaps. Nor is there a \textit{metron} for Socrates qua Athenian, since there is no Athenian \textit{ousia}, although he does have one qua human being. If so, this aspect of the measure doctrine seems to be related to \textit{Sts}. 262a-263b, where the Stranger distinguishes between an \textit{eidos} and a \textit{meros} (263b7-10).

\textsuperscript{33} ἄπασαι γὰρ ἢ τινάρταί ποι τὸ τοῦ μετρίου πλέον καὶ ἐλλεητὸν οὐχ ὡς οὐκ ὃν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὃν χαλεπὸν περὶ τὰς πράξεις παραφυλάττονι.

\textsuperscript{34} πότερον οὖν, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ προσηναγκάσαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὃν, ἕπαινη κατὰ τοῦτο διώργανον ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος, οὕτω καὶ νῦν τὸ πλέον ἢ καὶ ἐλλεητὸν μετρήμα προσηναγκαστέον γένεσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον ἄλλα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν;

\textsuperscript{35} In other words, the Stranger is not simply saying that the more and less is similar to not-being insofar as both are controversial things which must be shown nevertheless to exist. Rather, the more and less is a kind of not-being, ontological defect, which must be shown to exist just as they showed not-being qua otherness to exist in the \textit{Sophist}.
genuine statesman and the *stasiastikoi politikoi* in terms of ontological and axiological
difference and in defining the statesman in this way also completes the *Sophist*, where he
failed to draw upon the OEP distinction to define the sophist as an ontologically defective
philosopher.\(^{36}\)

5.3.c. The Stranger’s Measure of Young Socrates

In closing this section I note one additional contribution significant for the next
two sections. Namely, the measure passage itself provides an instance of using the
*metron* to recognize a lack of due measure in something and to remedy that lack by
bringing that thing into due measure.

The Stranger suspects that YS is prone to suffer an illness (τὸ νόσημα, 283b5-c1),
which means he is less good and beautiful than he ought to be and thus lacks due measure
in some sense. The malady, as I noted above, is apparently misology, to which the
Stranger takes YS to be prone due, perhaps, to the boy’s spirited disposition.\(^{37}\) This might
make him impatient with long *logoi* and prevent him from engaging them with the
requisite seriousness and attention.\(^{38}\) The Stranger’s general account of the *metron*
presumably seeks to inoculate YS against misology by providing the insight that proper
and reliable evaluations of things, including actions and *logoi*, require a grasp of the

\(^{36}\) The Stranger does not draw upon the OEP in the *Sophist* to define the sophist as an ontologically defective
philosopher, as I argued in chapter 3, because he did not yet have the teleological framework to supply the content for
the OEP’s formal framework. Now, with the Stranger’s great myth, he has such a teleological framework, as I explain
below in 5.5.

\(^{37}\) For YS’ spirited disposition and how it negatively impacts the Statesman’s inquiry at key points, see Miller (1980: 1-
8). See Rowe (1996) for a criticism of Miller.

\(^{38}\) At 285b the Stranger says that when analyzing a community of things, one must resist making a face
(δυσωπούμενον; 285b4) and stopping until one has mapped out all the differences and likenesses that obtain among the
members of the community. That is, for the sake of cultivating one’s *nous* one must be able to resist the pain and
displeasure that often arises from the tedium of dialectical inquiry. Also, at 286d-287b, in discussing how one becomes
a better dialectician, the Stranger says one must not become irritated at the length of *logoi*. The pleasure we take in a
*logos* is, at most, an incidental consideration (parergon), as is the case with a *logos’* length. The only legitimate
criterion for judging *logoi* is whether they make us better dialecticians. These passages also seem to indicate that the
malady the Stranger refers to is misology.
proper *metron* in terms of which to measure them. The proper *metron* for *logoi*, according to the Stranger, is not the pleasure they afford, nor their length or brevity, but whether or not they make us better dialecticians.

The Stranger leaves it to YS (and us) to make the calculation that dialectical ability is an intellectual capacity and, thus, that human intellect constitutes at least part of human being’s *metron*\(^{39}\). And this means one can be good and beautiful only if one’s intellect is properly cultivated, since all good and beautiful things come about through the preservation of the *metron*, as the Stranger’s general account claims (284a10-b1), while the opposite things come about through its absence (283e3-6). From the myth, in fact, we know that intellect is the most important part of human being’s *ousia* and for this reason should carry the greatest weight in our evaluations of *logoi*, actions, and individual humans. Pleasure, an object of body’s or mortal soul’s desire, is merely an incidental consideration (*πάρεργον*, 286d4-6).

This interpretation gains in persuasiveness when we recall that in the *Sophist* baseness in a soul is a kind of sickness (*νόσον*) and stasis among the soul’s parts (*στάσιν ἄρα καὶ νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν λέγοντες ὁρθῶς ἐροῦμεν*, 228b), e.g., when judgments conflict with appetites, spiritedness with pleasures, reason with pains (*δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν ἠδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις*, 228b). Now that we have the *nous*-model

\(^{39}\) Nowhere in this passage does the Stranger explicitly state that human being has an objective nature that serves as a *metron*, but we should see that this is the case for several reasons. First, in the *Theaetetus* the philosopher of the digression seeks to grasp what human being is and what it is fitting for such a nature to do or suffer different from the rest (*Tht*. 174b). What this philosopher is after seems to be an objective human nature, and this objective nature seems to serve as the measure for what is fitting for it to do and suffer. This serves as a contrast to Protagoras’ subjectivist man-measure doctrine. The digression, as I argued in chapter 3, serves as an alternative to this subjectivist version of the human measure. Second, it is true that the Stranger only speaks of things such as *logoi* and actions being in due measure or lacking it, such as at 283e. But the *metron* or measure in terms of which these actions and *logoi* are judged excessive or deficient would seem to be human being itself. An action or *logos* is in measure if and only if it promotes and/or preserves the human good. A *logos*, to use the Stranger’s example, is not in and of itself too long, too short, or just right. Rather, the proper length of a *logos* is determined by whether or not it cultivates the interlocutor’s dialectical capacity, the most important part of the human composite, on my interpretation. And it is in this sense that human being serves as the *metron* for *logoi* as well as for actions and particular human beings.
of human being, grounded in the myth’s teleological framework, which we lacked in the *Sophist*, we know that in a properly governed soul mortal soul’s appetites, pleasures, pains take a back seat to intellect and its desire for truth, beauty, and goodness. And presumably properly governing one’s mortal soul requires an intellect beautified by the purging of ignorance (*Sph. 230de*) and through dialectical inquiry, such as grasping the relations among the arts for the sake of acquiring *nous*, as the Stranger says at *Sph.* 227ab.\(^{40}\) Lacking such purgation and dialectical cultivation the intellect remains unmeasured (*ἅμετρον*, *Sph.* 228d; also *ἀμέτρίας* at 228a and 228c).

One important function of the account of due measure seems to be to instill due measure in YS, and thus beautify him, by purging him of an especially debilitating kind of self-ignorance, ignorance of human being’s *ousia*, and of its crucial use as a measure for evaluations of actions and *logoi* as well as of ourselves and other human beings.\(^{41}\) This also seems to be the primary reason for the measure doctrine’s central location in the dialogue’s architecture. At the center of the great myth the Stranger gave us the resources for discovering human being’s *ousia*. Here at the center of the dialogue as a whole the Stranger shows us how to use knowledge of that *ousia* as a measure in practical judgments of sensible particulars, including ourselves.

The general account of due measure in this way illuminates the danger of misology and the practical importance of dialectical inquiry in general: we need the latter to perfect our intellectual nature, which is itself the necessary, particular measure for our practical judgements. It also calls attention to the practical purpose of this particular

\(^{40}\) At *Sph.* 227ab the Stranger says of their method of argument: τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἔνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ συγγενὲς κατανοεῖν περιομένη τιμὴ πρὸς τὸν ἐξ ἰσού πάσας.

\(^{41}\) See Miller (1980: 55-72) for another interpretation of how the account of due measure itself produces due measure.
dialectical inquiry into politikê. This is no mere academic exercise. In cultivating YS’ nous via dialectical exercises and conferring insight into human being, the Stranger not only makes YS a better dialectician, he also seeks, I propose, to provide the epistemological grounding and measure YS requires to rule himself properly, that is, for genuine virtue. Socrates’ inquiry into epistêmê in the Theaetetus, I argued in chapter 1, has the same deeper purpose. In fact, the explicit object of the dialectical inquiry, politikê, is not as arbitrary as the Stranger makes it out to be, if the ultimate goal is to become better dialecticians concerning all things. For if politikê requires knowledge of all things (as it does, as I show below), then in becoming a better dialectician concerning all things, one comes to be a statesman. If so, the ultimate aim of the inquiry into the statesman is to produce statesmen, individuals able to rule themselves and others.

This also provides more evidence that the Stranger is himself a politikos, since, like Socrates in the Theaetetus, he plays the statesman by trying to provide the epistemological grounding his interlocutor needs for genuine virtue, in accordance with the statesman’s pedagogical program detailed at 308b-311a. In the next two sections,

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42 If so, both Socrates and the Stranger instantiate the statesman’s pedagogical program described at Str. 308b-311a. See 309c-310a for the epistemological bebaiôsis, that is, the relation between epistêmê and genuine virtue.

43 See the exchange at 285d4-7:
Ξένος: τι δ’ αὐτὸν ἦμιν ἢ περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζήτησις; ἕνεκα αὐτοῦ τούτου προβέβλησιν μάλλον ἢ τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικοτέροις γίγνεσθαι;
Νεώτερος Σωκράτης: καὶ τούτο δήλον ὅτι τοῦ περὶ πάντα.

44 That the statesman must be a master dialectician or sage we have already seen in chapter 4, where I argued that complete knowledge of human being requires knowledge of everything else too. Since human being is politikê’s proper object, it follows that the genuine politikos must be a sage or master dialectician.

45 Note that the Stranger later refers to the conflicts that arise between the naturally spirited and naturally gentle types in a city as a νόσος (307d8). It is the statesman’s task to purge this disease by bringing the disposition types into due measure via the epistemic grounding his training provides. Also, in chapter 4 I argued that the Stranger’s use of paidiâ in the form of the myth also signaled his role as statesman, since paidiâ is an element of the statesman’s pedagogical program and since the grasp of human being’s ousia we acquire from the myth is an important aspect of that program’s epistemological grounding. We should also perhaps recall Sophist 227d-228e, where the Stranger likens the internal discord of the soul to a νόσος or νόσηµα. Such a νόσος in a body is a disturbance of the nature or natural equilibrium of the humors, which the technê of medicine seeks to preserve or reestablish. Such a conception implies the existence of a metrion state of the elements for each individual. In a soul the elements are not humors but parts of the soul (intellect,
moreover, I show how the Stranger employs human being’s *ousia* not only to separate the statesman from his congeners and counterfeits. He also uses it as the measure for organizing the community of arts into a complex hierarchically organized whole. The Stranger’s evident grasp of human being’s *ousia* and use of it in crafting the city, I propose, suggest that the Stranger himself possesses *politikê*, the necessary and sufficient condition for being a statesman.46

5.4 The Capture of the City in Speech (287b-290e, 303d-305e)

Armed with the insights from the weaving paradigm and the grasp of human being’s *ousia* acquired from the myth, which the *metron* passage has taught us how to use as measure, at 287b the Stranger begins the dialectical assault that results in the capture of the city in speech. I focus here primarily on how the Stranger transforms the dreamlike true belief about *politikê* into waking *epistêmê* of it by adding a *logos* that accounts for the whole community of arts and *politikê*’s special place in it as the most important cause of human happiness. He in this way actuates the interrelational epistemology to account for *politikê*. This stretch of text also fulfills two additional functions which it is necessary to keep in mind and which I explain in the aftermath (5.6). This *logos* also awakens us from our dream of *epistêmê* by accounting for all the kinds of knowledge that are related to *epistêmê* itself as its constituent parts. Second, the Stranger’s *logos* of the community of arts not only differentiates *politikê* from the other arts but also provides a full account of the functional and hierarchical relations that obtain among those arts. His analysis is thus at the same time a synthetic account that transforms the heap of a city into a complex desires, etc.) which may conflict with one another. When they do, the soul suffers νόσος or *stasis* and commits acts of hubris and injustice. *Kolastikê* is the art that seeks to restore the natural equilibrium among the soul’s parts.

46 That one is a statesman iff one possesses *politikê* (that is, regardless of whether one also possesses the throne) is stated at 259b3-5 and again at 292e9-293a1.
whole of arts with an hierarchical structure grounded in human being’s *ousia*. The Stranger in this way imitates the statesman by doing in speech what the latter does in deed. And both Stranger and statesman imitate the cosmos that imitates the god by obeying the god’s *didachê* during the god’s absence: they use intellect to bring order, beauty and goodness, to a world that tilts toward chaos.

5.4.a. Function, Hierarchy, Axiology

A significant difference that obtains between my interpretation of the interrelational epistemology and those of other scholars is that, on my interpretation, the *logos* added to a true belief plays a crucial role in accounting for the hierarchical, functional, and axiological relations that obtain among the elements of a complex whole. Consider first how Plato signals that functional and hierarchical relations grounded in human being’s *ousia* will play an important role in the *logos* of the community of arts, establishing *politikê* as its most important part.

The Stranger himself signals this in his description of their account of *politikê* as a *zôon* (277c1), accurate enough in outline but requiring internal coloring for maximum clarity and completeness. The weaving paradigm, this intimates, will show us how to map out the teleological guts of *politikê*. That the Stranger puns on *zôon* (figure, painting / animal) here is signaled by his use of *zôon* three lines later at 277c4: a verbal *logos* is the

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47 Unlike, for example, the interpretations of Fine (2003: 225-51) and Burnyeat (1980: 186-88), who take the interrelational epistemology to account merely for the logical relations that obtain between propositions, akin to coherentism. Also, like Nehamas (1984), I take the interrelational epistemology’s objects to be restricted to *ousiat*, essences or propositions about *ousiai*. Not every true belief or proposition, that is, is a candidate for being converted into knowledge. Only those that have to do with what X is are *epistêmê* candidates. My belief that human being is a nous-animal, for example, can be converted into knowledge, but not my belief that human beings existed in the Age of Kronos.

48 The post-myth stretch of text, saturated as it is problematic for Scodel (1987) and Rosen (1983), who take the Stranger to be an un-Socratic proto-positivist who denies the reality of value, goodness, and beauty. In his later work on the *Statesman* Rosen (1995) posits that the Stranger abandons his value-free analysis in the *Statesman*, but does not explain why. Scodel maintains that in the final stages of the Statesman the Stranger, inexplicably, suddenly becomes Socratic. This is perfectly explicable, however, if my interpretation of the myth is correct, namely, that it introduces the teleological framework required as a supplement to value-blind division.
proper medium for revealing every living thing (πᾶν ζῶν). This is because, I suggest, living things are comprised of functional parts, the proper work and arrangement of which is best grasped via verbal rather than ostensive logos. The community of arts under the care of politikê is itself like a sacrificial animal (οἶν ἱερῖν, 287c3-5), the Stranger says later just before launching into the logos of politikê. As such, they must carve it up limb by limb, that is, according to its natural joints or functional parts. The polis, that is, is an animal like the humans that inhabit it and like the cosmos, itself an animal (ζῶν ὄν καὶ φρόνησιν εὐληχὸς ἐκ τοῦ συναρμόσαντος αὑτό κατ᾽ ἀρχάς, 269d), of which the polis and its human occupants are microcosms. If so, we should expect the polis to have the same constituents and structure as humans and cosmos: body subordinated to divine intellect.

The Stranger, of course, also makes explicit appeal to functional and hierarchical properties. At 287b, after wrapping up the measure doctrine, he indicates that they must now bring the weaving paradigm to bear on the statesman. Whatever other work the weaving paradigm does⁴⁹, the Stranger explicitly states that its distinction between causes, which produce the thing itself, and contributory causes, which provide the tools necessary to produce the thing itself, will provide the formal framework for their account of the community of arts (287b4-7, 287c7-8). Cause and contributory cause are manifestly functional notions which imply hierarchical arrangement. The Stranger, however makes explicit neither that human being’s ousia serves as the measure for determining which arts count as causes and which function as co-causes, nor that the thing itself with respect to human being is intellect. This, however, as my following

analysis shows, we can easily infer from the Stranger’s arrangement of the community of arts.

5.4.b. The Co-Causes (287b-289c)

A complete and maximally clear grasp of politikê requires an account of the whole community of arts for which it cares and of politikê’s special place in it. The Stranger begins his logos by first splitting the whole community of arts into two large parts, the causes and co-causes. He then divides each of these two parts further, for the causes and co-causes are each comprised of seven sub-kinds of expertise. Furthermore, hierarchical and axiological relations obviously obtain between causes and co-causes. The causes are more important since they care for the thing itself, while the co-causes merely produce the things necessary to produce the thing itself. They are thus for the sake of and less important than the causes. Less obvious is that hierarchical and axiological relations also obtain among the sub-arts that comprise the causes and co-causes, as I explain below in my more detailed accounts of the causes and co-causes.

First, however, consider how the Stranger’s logos of the community of arts follows a pattern familiar to us from the Theaetetus, suggesting that he employs the interrelational epistemology’s version of logos here, namely, complete enumeration and full differentiation. For we remember that Socrates illustrates his second account of logos, enumeration of elements (Th. 206e-208b), via an account of a wagon. His account first divides wagon into its mid-level functional parts (wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke) just as the Stranger splits the community of arts into causes and co-causes. He then divides wagon down further into its elements, the “one hundred timbers of the wagon”.

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We see the Stranger make the same move in dividing the causes and co-causes down into their constituent sub-arts.

We also recall Socrates’ dissatisfaction with this account, which he expresses via a spelling example. To know a complex syllable a complete enumeration of its letters is no doubt necessary, but it is not sufficient. One must also know each of its letters, and to know a letter one must be able to spell it correctly as it occurs among the other letters both of its proximate syllable and of every other syllable in which it occurs. For things like wagons and the community of arts, spelling out the elements presumably means differentiating the parts in terms of the functional and hierarchical relations that obtain among them. This has an important consequence for expertise, which I explain below. Here I note that the Stranger’s spelling example in the paradigm passage (277e-278d) perhaps also serves to put us in mind of Socrates’ account of logos as enumeration of elements when we come to the Stranger’s account of the polis.

A closer look at the Stranger’s account of the co-causes (287b-289c), with which he begins his logos, discloses more clearly the interrelational epistemology and the use of human being’s ousia as structuring principle. The Stranger begins by enumerating seven kinds of contributory causes, emphasizing the act of enumeration by numbering each step. First come the tool-making arts, second the vessel-making arts, third the vehicle-making arts, fourth the arts that produce defenses, fifth the arts that make kinds of paidiá, sixth the arts that work up raw materials, seventh the arts that produce bodily nurture.51

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50 Socrates expresses this extreme condition on knowledge at Thet. 207d-208b. It is unclear whether Socrates means that knowledge of a syllable requires actually having grasped its elements in all other syllables in which it occurs or merely having the capacity to do so by, e.g., having mastered the rules of combination for those elements.

51 Each set of arts is itself comprised of an indeterminate number of specific arts. The arts that produce defenses (288b), for example, include builders, weavers, armorers. This list is, presumably, neither exhaustive nor hierarchically
The Stranger in this way also differentiates each art both from the other co-causes by identifying its proper object or product and from politikê by getting YS to agree at each step that politikê has some different object.

The Stranger emphasizes the use of functional and hierarchical relations to differentiate the arts by reordering the arts after his initial enumeration to produce a complex whole where before we had an unstructured list of elements. It would be most just, the Stranger says (289ac), to place raw materials first, then tools, vessels, vehicles, defenses, paidîa52, and, finally, nourishment. I take the Stranger in this way to arrange the arts hierarchically in terms of how their respective product’s end contributes to the final end for the co-causes as a whole: bodily well-being.53 The arts that produce raw materials, for example, are necessary for and for the sake of the tool-making arts. The tools produced by these arts are, in turn, necessary for and for the sake of yet other arts. The first six co-causes are all for the sake of and subordinate to the seventh co-cause, the arts that provide nourishment and are most responsible for bodily well-being.

Just in this first phase of the Stranger’s account we can see the tripartite logos of the interrelational epistemology at work. For to account for the co-causes the Stranger completely enumerates and fully differentiates the arts that comprise this complex whole. And that differentiation includes the functional and hierarchical relations (here grounded

52 It might seem surprising to find paidîa listed among the co-causes, since paidîa is an important part of the statesman’s pedagogical program (308d3). As such it is for the cultivation of intellect (the myth, we remember, was an instance of paidîa) not for the nourishment of body. Yet, for one thing, all the kinds of paidîa seem to be tools, so all are co-causes in some sense. Also, we simply seem to have two kinds of paidîa. Some kinds of paidîa seem geared to bodily well-being, such as the shepherd’s paidîa and music that soothes and comforts his charges (presumably, it soothes their mortal souls’ anxiety and fear). The kinds of paidîa listed at 288c, among which are music and kosmos, likewise are all produced solely for the sake of pleasure, an object of mortal soul. The statesman’s paidîa, such as the account of the kosmos, are for the sake of intellect.

53 See Miller (1980: 82-4) for a somewhat different interpretation of this reordering.
in the co-causes proximate cause, bodily well-being\textsuperscript{54} that, I have argued, are crucial players in the interrelational epistemology. Additionally, we see that the Stranger works up to knowledge of the whole from the parts and begins with the more intelligible parts, the co-causes, which have perceptible products and ends.

Finally, the Stranger does not explicitly state the organizational principle he uses for his rearrangement of the co-causes. On my reading, the co-causes are arranged according to how they contribute to the end for the seventh class of arts, the nourishing arts, which have bodily well-being for their end. Since the co-causes by definition do not produce the thing itself but only provide tools for the production of the thing itself, we may infer that not body but intellect is the thing itself and that the causes bring it into being, as I explain in the next subsection.\textsuperscript{55} The myth’s complex-whole model of human being as a composite of sovereign intellect and subordinate body is the measure for the properly ordered city.

\textbf{5.4.c. The Causes (289c-290e, 303d-305e)}

The co-causes as a whole are subordinate to and for the sake of the causes, among which, the Stranger says, we shall find those who dispute with the king concerning the woven fabric itself (289c). And the Stranger uses the same procedure that he used for the co-causes in his account of the causes. That is, he enumerates the causes’ constituent

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{54} The designation as a cause or co-cause I take to be relative to the end under consideration. Weaving, for example, is a cause among the cloak-making arts, but relative to the nourishing arts it is a co-cause, since it provides a tool for body’s well-being. The nourishing arts, like medicine, are causes with respect to body’s end, but they along with the arts subordinate to them are co-causes relative to human being’s ultimate end, intellect. The co-causes provide a tool for the causes, I suggest, in the sense that body is a tool for intellect. The \textit{Timaeus} (44de), in fact, claims that the gods gave body to intellect to serve as its crew or set of servants (ὑπηρεσίαν, 44d7).

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Tim.} 46ce uses this same terminology, explicitly identifying the causes that belong to intelligent nature as the primary causes (τὰς τῆς ἐμφύλιας φύσεως, 46d8) while the secondary causes or co-causes are visible bodies (πῦρ δὲ καὶ ἄθροι καὶ γῆ καὶ ἵππον σώματα πάντα ὦρατα γέγονεν, 46d6-7). In the Statesman this scheme maps onto the arts inssofar as those arts that attend to human being’s co-cause (body) are designated co-causes, while those that care in some way for human being’s cause (intellect) are labeled causes.
\end{footnotesize}
classes and differentiates them from one another and from politikê in terms of hierarchical and functional relations. This allows us not only to separate politikê from the other causes but also to grasp how it is the most important of the causes, analogous to the nourishing arts among the co-causes.

The Stranger begins his account of the causes at 283c4. He eventually distinguishes eight classes\textsuperscript{56}, each of which makes some direct contribution to the woven civic fabric itself. On the basis of this contribution they dispute with the king over the claim to the final product, just as the spinners and carders in the weaving paradigm dispute with the weaver over the woolen garment (282a-283a). These classes are distinguished from the statesman, however, in being subordinate to others (289c4-d1).

The precise nature of the subordination in each case the Stranger does not make explicit\textsuperscript{57}. But the Stranger does indicate that there are degrees of subordination, and this seems to serve as an ordering principle. Slaves, for example, are the most subordinate of the causes since they are bought and sold as mere possessions (289de)\textsuperscript{58}. The digression begun at 291a1 (on counterfeit statesman 291a-303d, analyzed in 5.5) also seems to provide a clue to the organization of the causes by splitting the eight causes into two sets. This split suggests that we have a set of what I will call lesser causes (slaves, traders, traders, traders).

\textsuperscript{56} As I explain below, this list of eight is reduced to the number seven if we realize that ‘priests’ is a sham class, concealing the genuine statesman and the Stranger.

\textsuperscript{57} No hierarchical relation obtains among the greater causes, it seems: at 305d the Stranger says none of them controls the others, nor does any control itself.

\textsuperscript{58} The class of slaves is curious, since the causes are presumably constituted by kinds of expertise, but the work performed by slaves obviously does not constitute an expertise. It might be that this is the Stranger’s way of analyzing oikonomikê, which has slaves as its object. The Stranger has a habit of conducting his analysis sometimes in terms of the arts themselves and at other times in terms of their objects. For example, the arts that comprise the co-causes (287c-289c) are grouped according to the possessions they produce (carpentry, pottery, and bronze-working are all attached to vehicles, 288a), among which a rank-ordering obtains (289ac), as we saw. Treating oikonomikê in this way would seem to be fitting since slaves are a kind of possession. As Miller (1980: 84-6) notes, slaves seem to occupy a transitional space between the inanimate possessions produced by the co-causes and the rational agents who make up the causes.
functionaries, priests, 289c-290e) and greater causes (rhetoricians, generals, judges, 303d-305e), both of which are subordinate to the politikos, who is the greatest of the greater causes since he is most autonomous and has the knowledge required to rule the others.

I take both lesser and greater causes to be structured by intellect in the following way. The thing itself which they produce is the human community woven together into a harmonious, complex whole by interweaving the manly and mild disposition types that populate the city (311bc). This is not a mere herd, in other words, a heap of individuals each comprised wholly of bodily properties, for which the arts comprising the co-causes would suffice. The human community is held together by means of an intellectual bond, the like-mindedness and friendship (ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ φιλίᾳ, 311b9) that presumably comes from the statesman’s pedagogical program that forges common true beliefs about the good in the divine or intellectual souls of the citizens (309c5-8, 310e5-311a2).

Yet, since most humans, even after this education, must no doubt fall short of the intellectual perfection required for properly recognizing instances of the good, they remain dependent on others.\(^{59}\) That is, they must be ruled, if the civic fabric is to be maintained and not torn asunder by human folly. The lesser and greater causes serve this function, preserving the integrity of the civic fabric through rule over some part of it (such as the household manager) or over the whole in some aspect (such as judges). Since, however, these experts themselves fall short of intellectual perfection (as I explain below), they themselves must be ruled by the politikos, who depends on nothing except

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\(^{59}\) See, e.g., 311a, where the Stranger explains that wherever possible offices should be shared between spirited and gentle types, presumably so that their contrary natures balance one another out. Each thus arrives at due measure via an external constraint; best, of course, would be to arrive at due measure through complete epistémē, which allows one to rule oneself and others properly.
his own *epistêmê*, if the polis is to be properly ordered. This is one reason why the statesman is the most important cause.

Additionally, the statesman’s pedagogical program cultivates citizens’ intellects, the necessary preparation for their inclusion in the civic fabric, if that fabric is to be harmonious. He also maintains the integrity of that fabric, ensuring that the *eudaimonia* belonging to a city is maximized, by ruling over the causes that rule the human community. If so, the polis, like human being itself after which it is modeled, is a structured whole of functional parts requiring not only all the proper parts but also a certain arrangement of those parts, if goodness, beauty, and *eudaimonia* are to supervene upon the complex whole. And in the Age of Zeus a human’s happiness requires residency in a *eudaimôn* polis, that is, one ruled by the statesman’s *epistêmê*. So we can see the importance of the statesman in the fact that both city and citizen depend on the statesman for their proper being and *eudaimonia*.

To fully awaken from the dream of *politikê* requires a closer look at the statesman’s special knowledge, however. This will provide crucial insights into the basis for *politikê*’s knowledge, its relation to the other arts, and the nature of expertise.

### 5.4.d. The Statesman as Philosopher

The lesser causes, since they are more obviously subordinate, are more easily distinguished from *politikê*, which cares for the whole and is thus subordinate to nothing. Heralds, for example, who belong to the class of functionaries (290b1-4), give commands for the maintenance of the human community, yet these are commands they convey on behalf of others. Heralds are thus obviously servants; no one would mistake a herald for the one who cares for the whole community.
The same cannot be said for the greater causes (303d-305e). For orators, generals, or judges might very well seem to care for the whole and thus to be the primary cause, since the scope of their work, like the statesman’s, seems to embrace the whole community. For this reason, presumably, the Stranger calls this set of causes those that are honored and related to \( \textit{politikê} \) (\( \tau\alpha\;\tauι\mu\alpha\;\kappa\alpha\;\sigma\nu\gamma\varepsilon\nu\eta \), 303e). This also seems to explain why the Stranger breaks the treatment of causes in two by inserting between them the account of the \( \textit{statsiastikoi politikoi} \) (291a-303d). Doing so marks the last three causes as importantly different from the first four. It also aligns them more closely with the \( \textit{statsiastikoi politikoi} \), the counterfeit statesmen, who may seem to be \( \textit{politikoi} \) since they do the same things as the \( \textit{politikos} \) but are in fact not causes at all or even experts. As such they are not just different from but alien and hostile to \( \textit{politikê} \) (\( \acute{a}l\lambda\lambda\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\iota\alpha \;\kappa\alpha \;\tau \alpha \;\mu\eta \;\phi\iota\alpha \), 303e). Both the greater causes, as I explain here, and the \( \textit{statsiastikoi politikoi} \), whom I treat in 5.5, fall short, however, in similar but importantly different ways with respect to knowledge, which distinguishes them from the statesman. And this epistemic shortfall, as I show, has important ontological consequences.

Rhetoricians, generals, and judges all fall short in the same way. Each of these experts is concerned with some legitimate, particular field of activity, yet they do not control one another; in fact, they do not even control themselves (305d8-9), which signifies a crucial sort of self-ignorance. Their shortfall consists in their inability to recognize due measure. That is, they cannot grasp what is the proper and what the improper time to employ their respective expertise (\( \acute{e}g\kappa\alpha\rho\iota\alpha \;\tau\epsilon\;\pi\acute{e}\omicron\;\kappa\alpha\;\acute{a}k\kappa\alpha\rho\iota\alpha \), 305d1-4). The orator, for example, knows how to persuade using stories (\( \acute{d}\iota\alpha\;\mu\omicron\theta\omicron\omicron\omicron\gamma\iota\alpha \), 305d1-4).
304d1), but does not recognize the proper time and circumstances for persuasion\textsuperscript{60}. For in some situations force rather than persuasion is the fitting action or what would be in due measure. Only the statesman grasps the proper time for these arts’ deployment, and for this reason the other arts are dependent on the statesman for their proper employment. The Stranger’s differentiation thus not only separates the statesman from his closest congeners, it also accounts for an hierarchical and axiological relation, grounded in function or ends, that obtains among them. The other causes are dependent on, and thus less important than, \textit{politikê} because they cannot recognize the timeliness of their own respective art’s actions.

The Stranger does not explain the source of the causes’ epistemic deficiency, but it seems very similar to that suffered by citizens who are naturally spirited. The latter, because of their excessive appetite for a martial life, always act spiritedly, blind to whether an action is timely or untimely (307b4-6).\textsuperscript{61} Consequently, such types often act contrary to the good and wreck themselves and the city (308a4-9). Their blindness to the human good is evidently due to ignorance of human being’s \textit{ousia} as measure, knowledge of which is prior to recognition of the good, according to the measure doctrine. Since the causes also suffer blindness to due measure or timeliness, we can infer that they too suffer ignorance of human being’s \textit{ousia} as \textit{metron}. Unlike the spirited types who, in the absence of intellect’s grasp of the human measure, go astray by obeying their mortal soul’s \textit{epithumia}, the experts who belong to the class of causes would seem to suffer from incomplete knowledge of human being’s \textit{ousia}. This means they have a flawed measure

\textsuperscript{60} Cf. \textit{Laches} 196cd: the doctor’s knowledge, Nicias claims, is limited to health and disease. His medical knowledge cannot tell him in what circumstances it is better for the patient not to be healed.

\textsuperscript{61} The same analysis applies to the naturally gentle.
for action and so sometimes cause harm rather than good. The general, for example, might wreck the city by going to war when diplomacy would have been the timely action. Due to this incomplete grasp of human being, the other causes depend on the one that has epistêmê of human being and everything else, the statesman.

The ability or inability to grasp the human metron not only does definitional work separating the statesman from the other causes; it also has important political and practical consequences. For the epistemic deficiency sketched above is graver, I maintain, than the Stranger lets on here. Lacking a complete grasp of the human good, the expert may employ his art at the inopportune time and harm rather than help the city and its citizens. A deficient grasp of the human good, that is, opens the expert to making mistakes. Yet experts, for Plato, do not make mistakes. So it seems that a complete grasp of the human good is necessary for genuine expertise, and a complete grasp of the human good requires a complete grasp of human being’s ousia to serve as measure.

This is very bad news for the would-be expert if Socrates’ extreme condition for knowledge from the Theaetetus obtains (207d-208b): to know a syllable one must know all its elements; and to know any element requires being able to arrange that element correctly as it occurs not just in that syllable but in every syllable of which it is a part. For the elements which comprise human being (sovereign intellect and subservient body), as we saw in chapter 4, also comprise the cosmos and everything else (that is, everything is

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62 Even the co-causes presumably grasp the metron in some respect. The physician’s grasp of the human body’s nature, for example, serves as the metron that allows him to recognize the critical moment for a change in dietary regimen. His incomplete knowledge of human being, however, prevents him from knowing when a patient should be healed and when he should be refused medical attention or even harmed.

63 As Socrates says at Thet. 152c: αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ἄντων ὡς ἂν ἕστω καὶ ἀγαθῆς ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὕτω (So perception is of what always is and, since it is knowledge, is infallible). Socrates also implies the infallibility of expertise at Thet. 144d-145b, as I argued in chapter 1, in his discussion of Theodorus’ praise and blame. In the Statesman’s frame Socrates reminds us of this property of expertise (and perhaps of Thet. 144d-145b) by playfully chastising Theodorus for his faulty axiological judgment (257ac).
either body, intellect or a composite of them). And this means that to grasp human being one must be able not only to enumerate and differentiate its elements but also to spell out those elements as they occur in the cosmos and in everything else. The fact that the Stranger has to deploy the myth’s elaborate cosmology to account for human being’s ousia I took in chapter 4 as evidence for Socrates’ extreme condition being in play.

We can also see how the extreme condition is in play in the logos of the community of arts deployed to define politikê. For our complete grasp of politikê requires a logos enumerating and differentiating the community of arts for which politikê cares. Since politikê is itself a part of this community, one would have to spell out its relations to every other art, if the extreme condition were in play, not just the relations it bears to the other causes or even just these relations plus the relations that the causes as a whole bear to the co-causes as a whole. The fact that the Stranger takes the trouble not only to enumerate and differentiate each co-cause from politikê in terms of its product but also, after doing so, to arrange them hierarchically suggests that the Stranger employs the extreme condition in his account of politikê.\(^6^4\)

Presumably the statesman himself must possess such an understanding of his own art, having the capacity to account for its relations to all the other arts and to organize the arts, as the Stranger does, in terms of human being’s ousia. And this is what we would expect of the expert who cares for the whole which has as its end the production of the human good and eudaimonia. Yet the same requirement must also apply to the other arts,

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\(^6^4\) The spelling example used in the Statesman’s paradigm account (277e-278d) may also signal to us that we should have the extreme condition in mind when reading the accounts of weaving and politikê. For in the Theaetetus Socrates again deploys a spelling example (207d-208b) a second time and does so to illustrate the extreme condition. Burnyeat (1990: 209-18), in fact, uses a premise from the Statesman’s paradigm account to make his argument concerning the extreme condition go through: that an implication of the extreme condition may be that to know one thing one must know everything. For at 278c9-d6, Burnyeat points out, the Stranger suggests there are basic elements or letters that comprise all things (τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα). If so, then given the extreme condition, to know one thing one must know everything.
since they too are parts of the same whole. So to know weaving, the weaver must be able
to account for his art as a part of the defensive arts and as the greatest of the defensive
arts among those devoted to clothes-making, as we see in the weaving logos. This is not
unreasonable. Yet given the extreme condition, the weaver must also be able to spell out
his art in terms of both the other co-causes (the whole to which the defensive arts belong)
and the causes, since weaving and all these other arts comprise the community of arts.
And if human being’s ousia serves, as I have argued, as the organizational principle for
the polis, which one must know to account for the community of arts, then the weaver
must also be adept in cosmology, like the statesman.

The statesman, then, must be a sage. This also means that, if the other arts are to
be employed properly, their practitioners must be sages or under the rule of a sage. The
sage, in short, is the only true expert, since only he has the complete epistêmê which
inoculates one against mistakes. The central importance in all this of grasping human
being’s ousia also brings home the depth of the other arts’ self-ignorance and of their
consequent dependency on the statesman. Ignorance of human being’s ousia not only
prevents the would-be expert from understanding his art’s proper place in the whole
system of arts and from recognizing the proper time for his art’s use, resulting in an
inability to rule himself qua expert. It also means he cannot rule himself qua human
being, since he lacks the measure required for recognizing the good and beautiful thing to

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65 This is not an uncommon position among later philosophers. We see the dependency of the other arts on philosophy
in both Seneca (Epistle 88) and Posidonius (Frag. 18 (in I.G. Kidd (1999)) = Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica II.2,
193b23). Also, according to Strabo (2.7.5b11), for the Stoics the sage is the only true lover of music and literature,
since only the sage grasps their proper use or end. This is similar to the notion that the sage is the only true expert. So
know-how, for Plato, is necessary for expertise but it is not sufficient. One must also grasp an art’s end any more
comprehensive ends that one’s art serves.
do. Self-knowledge thus lies at the root of both expertise and individual virtue. So the sage is not only the only true expert; he is also the only proper or genuine human being.

Socrates perhaps signals to Theaetetus (and us) the importance of self-knowledge and the difficulty of obtaining it by using Theaetetus’ name in the spelling example he employs to illustrate the extreme condition (207e-208b). For Theaetetus to know \( \Theta\varepsilon\alpha\iota\varepsilon\tau\varepsilon\tau\varepsilon\sigma \) he must know how to account for each syllable (such as \( \Theta \)) and the elements of each syllable (\( \Theta \) and \( \varepsilon \)) not only as they occur in \( \Theta\varepsilon\alpha\iota\varepsilon\tau\varepsilon\tau\varepsilon\sigma \) but also as they occur in other words. And as we have learned from the myth, Theaetetus qua human being shares elements with the cosmos and everything else. So for Theaetetus to know Theaetetus qua human being Theaetetus must be an adept in cosmology. He must be a sage.

On this reading, then, the Stranger actuates the interrelational epistemology, contained in embryo in the Theaetetus, to account for politeikê by first arriving at a true belief about what politeikê is auto kath’ auto and then adding a logos to that true belief. This logos, following the Theaetetus’ tripartite model of logos, seeks to provide a discursive account that completely enumerates and fully differentiates politeikê from the other arts that care for the human herd. And that differentiation, as I have shown, includes the hierarchical, functional and axiological relations that I have argued are an important part of the interrelational epistemology. By mapping out these relations, grounded in human being’s ousia, the logos has reproduced in speech the properly organized city and revealed politeikê’s place of special importance among the arts that comprise the community of arts. In the statesman-sage’s absence genuine expertise is not possible and both city and citizens fall short of maximum eudaimonia. For only a statesman-sage can
acquire the grasp of human being’s ousia required as measure for both expert activity and individual virtue.

The last step required to awaken fully from our dream of politikê to waking epistêmê of it is to differentiate the genuine statesman from his imposters. As we shall see in the next section, the teleological framework and complex whole model of human being which have provided a crucial foundation for the analyses thus far also play an essential role in accounting for the stasiastikoi politikoi as not just other than the statesman but ontologically defective.

5.5. The Worth of the Statesman (291a-303e)

5.5.a. The Statesman and his Shadow

The Stranger, on my interpretation, has used his grasp of human being’s ousia as the ground for mapping out the hierarchical and functional relations among the arts that comprise the city, accounting for the statesman’s axiological supremacy among the experts. Only the statesman has the complete grasp of human being’s ousia, the metron needed to organize the city and to recognize the human good, that is, what is in due measure, as it appears in the flux of genesis. To complete the logos needed for waking epistêmê of politikê, however, we must account for how the statesman differs ontologically from those who, like the causes, are very similar to the statesman but, unlike the causes, are alien and hostile (303e8) to him: the stasiastikoi politikoi or factionalists.

On my reading, the factionalists suffer an ontological defect that amounts to a metaphysical gulf separating them from the genuine statesman. This defect, moreover, results from their ignorance of human being’s ousia and from their actions being
structured by mortal soul’s rather than intellect’s desire. If so, the Stranger here accounts for the ontologically grounded axiological distinction between the sophist and philosopher, concealed as elenchus-using noble sophist, which the Stranger could not account for in the *Sophist*. The difference is the myth: the Stranger now has the teleological framework establishing that intellect is best, that its perfection is necessary for eudaimonia, and that its desires should rule mortal soul’s appetites. If so, in bringing the inquiry into politikê to a successful conclusion the Stranger also resolves the *Sophist*’s unfinished business. For these factionalists, as the Stranger twice notes (291c3, 303c3-5), are the greatest sophists among the sophists.

Consider first some of the ample evidence that the factionalists suffer ontological defect. At 291a1 the Stranger breaks off his discussion of the causes when there comes on the scene a motley band comprised of men resembling lions, centaurs, satyrs, and shifty beasts (πολυτρόποις θηρίοις, 291b2). The Stranger thus describes the factionalists as less than human, just as he depicted the sophist as a shifty wild beast (τὸ ποικίλον εἶναι τοῦ τὸ θηρίον, Sph. 226a) in the *Sophist* and later in the *Statesman* describes the spirited types who degenerate into some sort of beastly nature (θηριώδη τινὰ φύσιν, 309e) if they fail to get the epistemological grounding provided by the statesman’s pedagogical program. The regime ruled by the genuine statesman, by contrast, we separate out, like a god from men, from the other regimes, which suggests an ontological difference. We may, presumably, assume the statesman himself is to the factionalists as a

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66 Argued in chapter 3. The Stranger, as I argued there, intimates that the sophist is a sham philosopher, not just some other expert, because he does the same things as the philosopher but for the sake of the wrong end (mortal soul’s desires instead of intellect’s) not just some different end. To establish this would require a teleological framework of ends, which the *Sophist* lacks.

67 Cf. the image of the unjust soul at *Rep.* 588ae.
god is to men (or a man to beasts), if he possesses perfected divine intellect and imitates the god in his rule of the polis, as I have argued.\footnote{Also see 301d8-e4, where the Stranger likens the genuine statesman to a king bee born in a hive, one immediately superior in body and soul.}

The Stranger also makes use of the language of ontological defect and genuineness familiar from important passages in the \textit{Sophist} (οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ’ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, \textit{Sph.} 216c) and \textit{Theaetetus} (ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις, \textit{Th.} 150a). He says, for example, we must remove the factionalists from those who really are statesmen (τὸν ὄντως ὄντων πολιτικῶν, 291c4-5) and uses a similar formulation at 300c8 (τὸν ὄντως πολιτικόν). He uses the same language for regimes. The regime ruled by the genuine statesman is alone a regime (293c5-6; see also 297d4-5, 301d5-6, 301e3-4); those ruled by others are not genuine nor even really regimes at all (οὐ γνησίας οὖδ’ ὄντως οὕσας, 293e3). Regimes ruled by factionalists are mere images, the greatest images (εἰδώλων μεγίστων, 303c2-3), in fact, and their rulers are themselves of the same sort.

What makes the factionalists so difficult to distinguish (παγχάλεπον ὄντα ἀφαιρεῖν, 291c5) from the genuine statesman is also the source of their ontological deficiency. They do the same things as the statesman (ταὐτὸν δρόσι κατὰ δύναμιν ὅπερ ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἐκεῖνος, 300d) but for the wrong reason or end.\footnote{The Stranger seems to provide an interesting example of this at 290c8-291a4, where he discusses priests, the fourth of the causes. This is the last cause discussed before the Stranger veers off into the account of the factionalists at 291a, which seems to closely align priests closely with these sham statesmen. The Stranger’s comment, after discussing priests, that they must investigate these priests as well as the “large crowd” just emerging (i.e., the factionalists), also seems to suggest that the priests may not be causes after all, but counterfeit statesmen, like the factionalists. These priests are expert in making sacrifices pleasing to the gods and in acquiring good things from the gods for the people (290c8-d3). The most solemn and ancestral sacrifices in Athens, in fact, are assigned to the king chosen by lot, the Stranger notes (290e5-8). If YS had attended seriously to the myth, he would object that in the Age of Zeus there are no gods to whom to sacrifice and from whom to ask for good things, so these priests are mere mountebanks. Also, like factionalists, they seem to be motivated by their mortal soul’s desire for honor or reputation (290d7-8), not by intellect’s desire for goodness. And the basis for the authority of these king-priests is chance, not \textit{epistêmê}, which, as the account of the factionalists establishes, is the only legitimate basis for genuine rule. The Stranger, on the other hand, also offers up a sacrifice, the polis which he divides like a sacrificial animal (287c3-5), and he does so, presumably, on the basis of \textit{epistêmê} (not lot) and for the sake of making YS good and beautiful through the cultivation of his intellect. For in the Age of Zeus, we do not get goods from the gods; rather we...} For the factionalists, like the
eristic-using sophists, are ruled by their *epithumia* and ignorance (τις ἐπιθυμία καὶ ἄγνωσις τοῦτον τοῦ μιμήματος ἠγομένη, 301c), and their actions are structured by a desire for profit or personal favor (ἡ κέρδους ἔνεκέν τινος ἢ χάριτος ἰδίας, 300a5).

What the factionalists are ignorant of is how to rule human beings (περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς, 292d3), just about the most difficult and most important knowledge to acquire, the Stranger says (σχεδὸν τῆς χαλεπωτάτης καὶ μεγίστης κτήσασθαι, 292d4).

And knowledge of how to rule human beings no doubt presupposes knowledge of human being’s *ousia*, which, if we have grasped the myth properly, is a composite of body and intellect, in which divine intellect must rule body, which is inherently disordered. This acquisition from the myth, I contend, provides the Stranger the grounds for marking off the factionalists as ontologically defective statesman, the lack of which grounds in the *Sophist* prevented him from similarly demoting the eristic-using sophists as ontologically deficient philosophers. That is, with the myth’s teleological framework and model of human beings as *nous*-animals we can now justifiably assert that sophist and factionalist are sham experts because they act for the sake of the wrong end, their own mortal soul’s *epithumia*, not merely a different end. The genuine statesman acts for the sake of intellect’s desire for beauty and goodness.

must make ourselves good and divine by imitating the *didachê* of the absent god. The account of priests in this way reveals priests to be a sham cause, like the factionalists, who do the same things as genuine statesmen but without knowledge and for the sake of mortal soul rather than intellect. The true priest is the statesman, and the Stranger seems to be such a statesman.

Note, finally, that this reduces the number of causes from eight to seven, placing the statesman, the last discussed cause, in the seventh position. Seven seems to be a significant number for Plato. There are also seven co-causes, seven regimes, and seven sophists (in the *Sophist*), and seven deductions in the *Parmenides*. Plato seems to invest the dialogues with some playful numerology by using the Pythagorean hebdomad, which, according to Philo, the Pythagoreans likened to the ruler of all things, the Logos or God (see Dillon (1996: 155-7) for an account of the hebdomad).

70 The non-sage experts analyzed above suffer a similar defect due to their incomplete knowledge of human being’s *ousia*. The difference is that, unlike the factionalists, their epistemic deficiency is not coupled with subservience to mortal soul (although, no doubt, there could be cases like this: a doctor who has a lust for money and so accepts bribes to harm patients). They act for the sake of the right end, intellect’s desire for the human good, but have an incomplete grasp of that end.
If factionalists were genuine experts their activity would be for the sake of cultivating their subjects’ *nous*, which those subjects need to control their mortal soul and to be good and beautiful human beings. For the expert is the one who produces good and beautiful things by means of his knowledge of the *metron* (284e2-8). In fact, the genuine statesman’s ability to measure particular circumstances, using human being’s *ousia* as measure, and produce the better from the worse for citizens and city is what justifies his disregard of written laws and use of force. The sophist and factionalist at best obstruct their subjects’ route to goodness and beauty; at worst, they make them worse. The factionalists are the greatest of the sophists presumably because they corrupt not just individual students, like the eristic-using sophists, but entire populations through their mismanagement of the polis, the proper function of which is the production of good, beautiful, and happy humans. In fact, since both sophist and factionalist are ruled by their *epithumia* rather then their intellect’s desire for beauty and goodness, they are themselves defective human beings as well as sham experts.

Ignorance of human being’s *ousia* and the human good renders both factionalists and the regimes they rule mere phantasms. In fact, the same reasoning seems to apply to all the arts that care for humans and to humans themselves. The arts’ practitioners are mere phantasms because, whatever their art’s proximate end and however completely they grasp it, the ultimate end for all the arts that care for human beings is the human good. Nothing short of sagehood is sufficient for the complete *epistêmê* of human being’s *ousia* required for recognition of the human good and for making things better rather than

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71 See C. Gill (1995) for a detailed analysis of the argument by which the Stranger establishes this.
worse. Human beings, of course, fare no better. All but the sage will be mere shades if complete *epistêmê* is required for being a proper *nous*-animal. The Stranger’s account of the ontological difference between genuine statesman and his counterfeits, the factionalists, thus does important definitional work for both the *Sophist* and *Statesman*; it at the same time provides insight into the political and practical importance of the statesman. In the statesman-sage’s absence the city and the humans who inhabit them are reduced to mere not-beings. Yet, as the Stranger suggests in his ranking of regimes, not-beings are not nothing, and some not-beings are better than others.

5.5.b. The Ranking of Regimes (302b-303d)

I close this section, and my analysis of the *Statesman*, with a brief consideration of the Stranger’s ranking of regimes (302b-303d), which seeks to identify the best regime for human happiness after the statesman’s regime. The Stranger flags this passage as important, and a fitting place to end this analysis, by first describing it as a digression (πάρεργον, 302b7) from the task at hand, namely, defining *politikê*. He immediately backtracks, however, saying that everything all of us do is perhaps for the sake of such a thing. The Stranger in this way intimates that the inquiry is more than a mere academic exercise in definition. Rather, as I have maintained throughout, the *Statesman*’s inquiry

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72 Polansky (1992: 41-2) takes Theodorus himself in the *Theaetetus* to be one of the caregivers who, according to Theodorus, have corrupted Theaetetus’ *ousia* (in the sense of ‘being’ rather than Theodorus’ intended sense of ‘property’, *Th.* 144d) due to his disdain for philosophy and openness to Protagorean relativism. On my interpretation, this is correct and would be applicable to all the experts in the city. Note, incidentally, Theodorus’ offhand remark here that Theaetetus is remarkably liberal with his money, suggesting that the boy has a naturally well-disposed mortal soul, making him a good candidate for a statesman.

73 See Rowe (2001) for a valuable analysis of this stretch of text, which resolves some thorny issues (such as explaining the less than clear sense in which the deviant regimes imitate the genuine regime) and contests (correctly, to my mind) the notion that in the *Statesman* Plato undertakes a rapprochement with democracy.

74 ὡ μὴν ἄλλ᾽ εἰς γε τὸ ὅλον ἵσως ἀπανθ᾽ ἐνεκα τοῦ τοιοῦτου πάντες δρόμεν χάριν, 302b7-8.
and the whole trilogy seek to discover and actuate in its participants the conditions necessary for human *eudaimonia*.

The ranking of regimes contributes to this end by disclosing what we must do to maximize our *eudaimonia* in the Age of Zeus in the absence of the statesman-sage. We must seek to establish that regime which, because most conducive to intellectual inquiry, gives us the best opportunity for intellectual development. For the same reason, such a regime also is also most likely to produce a statesman, who, because of his *epistêmê*, would be among the living as Tiresias is among the phantasms in Hades (*Meno* 99e-100a). Such a one would be able to ameliorate non-sages’ phantasmal existence through rule by right reason and even, given naturally gifted charges, produce more statesmen like himself. Just such an inquiry Socrates and the Stranger undertake in this trilogy with the aim of giving Theaetetus and YS the knowledge they need to become truly virtuous and genuine statesmen. The fact that this inquiry comes to completion in the *Statesman’s* political context with its account of *politikê* brings home *epistêmê*’s practical importance and the politics of knowledge in the Age of Zeus.

The factionalists, as we have seen, as well as the regimes and humans they rule, are mere phantasms, not-beings. In the language of the measure doctrine, they fall short of beauty and goodness because they are not in conformity with the *metron* (284ab), the *ousia* necessary for the production of a proper instance. Yet things that lack due measure are not entirely not, as my analysis of 284b from the passage on due measure maintained (5.3). And the *Sophist*’s OEP distinction (*Sph.* 235b-236d) clarifies in what sense they are not. An *eikon*, we remember, is something which has but is not some

75 τὸ δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἁναγκαίων οὐσίαν, 283d.
original. The genuine statesman has complete *epistêmê*, which means his intellect is in its proper state and rules over his bodily component, making him properly human. Yet he is not *epistêmê* itself. The phantasm, on the other hand, neither is nor has the original, although it seems like the original because it imitates what has but is not the original, the *eikon*. And it imitates the wrong thing insofar as it imitates the *eikon*’s perceptible properties rather than the original that structures those properties. Phantasmal humans, like the sophist, have the same perceptible look as *eikon*ic humans, like Socrates, and may even do the same things. Yet their lack of *epistêmê* means their soul is not properly structured, which means that, despite appearances, they are not *eikon*ic humans. And their actions, even if perceptibly the same as the *eikon*’s, are done for the wrong reason or are structured by the wrong end. This makes distinguishing phantasms and *eikones* exceedingly difficult (303c8-d2). Phantasms thus are not nothing; they have all the same parts as the *eikon* but suffer ontological deficiency due to those parts lacking the requisite structural principle. Phantasms do have, however, a truly degraded existence since they bear no direct relation at all to the original: they depend on what depends on the original.

In the factionalists’ case, they imitate the statesman but imitate the wrong thing. They do the same things as the genuine statesman, namely, rule without regard for the written law (300d9-e2). But they do so not on the basis of complete *epistêmê*, including *epistêmê* of human being, which is the only secure ground for preserving or producing the good (301d6-7). They are thus mere phantasms. On the other hand, if they were to reproduce the statesman’s expertise, they would no longer be imitations of the statesman but genuine statesmen themselves (300d9-e2). We must keep in mind, however, that the statesman himself is merely an *eikon*. In the Age of Zeus he imitates the cosmos by
reproducing in his soul the god’s didachê, which is accessible via the cosmos’ motions, which are structured by that didachê. The factionalists’ imitation is thus as absurd as would be the attempt to imitate the cosmos in the Age of Zeus by engaging in counter-normal rotation rather than by reproducing the intelligence that informs that rotation.

An ontological gulf thus separates the eikonc statesman from the phantasmal factionalists. Yet not only are these phantasmal statesmen and their phantasmal regimes not nothing; the Stranger even distinguishes between three different kinds of phantasmal regimes and differentiates each of them from even worse versions, before determining which are the easiest and which the hardest to live in. The better phantasmal regimes are those governed by written laws, of which there are three kinds: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The worse phantasms are the lawless regimes, which are phantasms of the prior three phantasms: tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. We can thus see how the OEP framework gets repeated at this lower ontological level. Phantasms of the second degree imitate first degree phantasms, but in imitating the latter’s numerical property (rule of one or few or many) instead of their law-abidingness they imitate the wrong thing.

It is not immediately clear what makes the law-abiding regimes better, less phantasmal, than the lawless ones. This seems especially puzzling since in the law-abiding regimes all the kinds of expertise suffer ruin, as Young Socrates claims, as a result of non-experts imposing laws upon experts and preventing inquiry (ζητείν, 299e8), making life unlivable (ἀβίωτος, 299e6-300a2). Young Socrates overstates the case, yet hits upon a crucial insight, indicating that his soul has, perhaps, grasped on some level the myth’s deep teaching on philosophical inquiry. These laws may hamper expert activity
and intellectual inquiry, but they do not eliminate either one. In the lawless regimes, as the Stranger says in correction (300b1-6), all expertise is overturned to an even greater degree, presumably due to inquiry being even more difficult. The law-abiding regimes at least have laws that are established on the basis of much experiment (ἐκ πείρας πολλῆς, 300b1-6) and through persuasion. The law-abiding regimes are thus at least intellect-based, even if imperfectly so, and not subject to the non-rational whims of mortal soul’s epithumia, as is the case in the doubly phantasmal regimes. And the greater possibility of intellectual inquiry in the former makes the emergence of a genuine statesman more likely. For we recall from the myth’s crucial passage (272b8-c6), as YS perhaps remembers, that intellectual perfection acquired through inquiry is necessary to achieve proper humanity and maximum eudaimonia.

The Stranger in this way again makes use of human being’s ousia, this time as the measure for completely differentiating six phantasmal regimes in terms of the degree to which they are intellect-governed and conduce to intellectual development and eudaimonia. The Stranger even orders these phantasmal regimes hierarchically. The law-governed regimes are better to live in, and of them monarchy is best, democracy worst. Of the lawless regimes monarchy’s phantasm, tyranny is worst, while democracy is the easiest to endure. For democracy’s power is diluted by being distributed among many offices, lessening the amount of harm it can do.77

76 My interpretation is indebted to Rowe’s (2001). Rowe, however, takes the better phantasmal regimes to imitate merely the law-abidingness that characterizes the genuine statesman’s regime in his absence. On my interpretation it is not just law-abidingness that is crucial but the fact that the laws abided by are the results of intellectual inquiry and not merely the expression of mortal soul’s desires. Establishing written laws in the Statesman based on much experiment is perhaps analogous to the grasping of ousiai and of advantage only with time and through great difficulty and paideia in the Theaetetus (186bc).

77 As Rowe (2001: 65) notes, this hardly constitutes a rapprochement with democracy, especially when we consider that the explicit background for this trilogy is the trial and execution of Socrates at the hands of the Athenian democracy, which seems to be alluded to at 299be. On my interpretation Plato uses the OEP distinction to emphasize
The best regime, however, is the seventh, which differs from the others as a god from men, the regime ruled by the statesman-sage, who, because of his complete epistémê, governs the only correct regime and guides it in eudaimonia (διακυβερνῶντα εὐδαιμόνως, 301d5), as the god does the cosmos (τοῦ παντὸς ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης, 272e3). This stretch of text, I suggest, mirrors the crucial passage in the myth (272b1-d2), where the Stranger discloses the proper nature of human being and the happiest conceivable human life. The best human life would be the one in the Age of Kronos, where, with the abundant leisure provided by nurturing shepherd-gods, one could cultivate one’s intellect via philosophical inquiry, and thus maximize one’s eudaimonia, untroubled by material needs.78 Those who fall short would at least have gods to guide them. In the parlous Age of Zeus, on the other hand, epistémê and eudaimonia are achievable only in the political context of the polis under the guidance of a statesman-sage. The account of factionalists and the ranking of regimes brings home to us that to save ourselves and our fellow citizens we must become statesmen or at least establish the conditions that make his advent most possible.

5.6 The Politics of Knowledge

In the Statesman’s final passages the Stranger thus brings to completion the inquiry into politikê by providing a complete enumeration and differentiation (including hierarchical, functional, and axiological relations) from the statesman of all those arts related to statesmanship as providers of care to the human herd. In doing so, in fact, he completes the Theaetetus and Sophist as well. For to account for politikê he actuates the

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78 That is, the life of pure reason in the Age of Kronos is the best conceivable human life; but, as we know from the myth, philosophical inquiry is impossible in that age due to the reverse development of soul.
interrelational epistemology which the *Theaetetus* contains *in embryo* and utilizes the great myth’s teleological framework to differentiate the genuine statesman in terms of ontological deficiency from the *stasiastikoi politikoi*, the crucial difference between philosopher and sophist also, which the Stranger could not account for in the *Sophist* due to the lack of such a framework.

The *Theaetetus*, in fact, comes to completion here not just via the actuation of its interrelational epistemology, but also in an additional, especially fitting sense. For in the *Theaetetus* Socrates and Theaetetus arrive at the belief, presumably true, about what *epistêmê* is *auto kath’ hauto*: true belief plus a *logos*. And if my interpretation is correct, they even provide a *logos of logos* according to which a *logos* is a discursive account that completely enumerates and differentiates from the target everything related to the target. They fail, however, to provide the *logos of epistêmê* itself, which is required by their own definition of *epistêmê* and *logos*, to acquire *epistêmê of epistêmê*. This the Stranger does in the *Statesman* by accounting for *epistêmê*’s relation to practical judgment in the measure passage, the other constituent part of expertise or wisdom. He also provides an exhaustive account of the kinds of knowledge, which are related to *epistêmê* as its parts. Fittingly, the Stranger provides, in the trilogy’s final stages, a complete enumeration and differentiation of the kinds of knowledge, relating them hierarchically and axiologically. He in this way completes the partial list of knowledges, with a discernible but minimal structure, which Theaetetus provides at the beginning of the trilogy (*Tht.* 146cd), as his first answer to the question “What is *epistêmê*?”

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79 To be clear, I take there to be one continuous division in the *Statesman*, like Rowe (1996). That is, the division of *epistêmê* used to define *politikê* which begins the inquiry (258b) but suffers shipwreck is not abandoned, in whole or in part (except for the model of human being) after the myth, where it may seem the Stranger begins the division anew. Rather, the first, dichotomous division of the *epistêmêai* into practical/theoretical, directive/non-directive, and so on is retained. But the more specific kinds (defensive arts, etc.) and specific arts (weaving, medicine, etc.) are then
The questions concerning epistêmê and politikê thus come to completion at the same time in the Statesman’s political context. This is doubly fitting. For in the Age of Zeus the polis is the proper place for the possessor of complete epistêmê, who provides amelioration for non-sages’ phantasmal existence through his proper governance of the polis and via the pedagogical program which provides the epistemological grounding required for something at least approaching genuine virtue. Genuine virtue and maximum eudaimonia, that is, come only with the sage’s complete epistêmê. By submitting themselves to the sage, however, who serves as their bebaiôsis, non-sages can at least better their portion of eudaimonia.

The statesman-sage, on the other hand, needs to rule in the Age of Zeus, if he is to achieve maximum eudaimonia. Complete epistêmê is not enough, since with intellectual perfection and a complete understanding of the good a human not only becomes good and beautiful but also desires that everything else be maximally good and beautiful too.80 The sage, if kept from the throne, suffers no deficiency in soul, but his intellectual desire to render the city and citizens good and beautiful is frustrated, diminishing his eudaimonia. The same dependency relation that obtains between sage and non-sage, in fact, fittingly obtains among the dialogues of the trilogy itself, if the Theaetetus and Sophist depend on the Statesman’s political context for their completion. Plato in this way emphasizes the politics of knowledge in the Age of Zeus and reveals the true worth of the Statesman, which has proven as difficult to discern as the nature and value of Plato’s politikoi.

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80 A key premise borrowed from the Timaeus (29e-30c) and strongly suggested by the Statesman’s myth as the explanation for the Demiurge undertaking the creation of the cosmos from chaotic primordial body.
The trilogy’s function, however, as I have argued throughout, is not merely theoretical. That is, Socrates and the Stranger undertake to define *epistêmê*, sophistry, and *politikê* not merely as an academic exercise. These definitional exercises are intended to cultivate the intellectual souls of the interlocutors (and Plato’s readers), providing the epistemological *bebaiôsis* that both Theaetetus and YS need to ground their natural virtue and to become genuinely virtuous. At best, the series of inquiries put them on the path to *epistêmê* of *epistêmê* so that they become *eikones* of wisdom, genuine *politikoi*, rather than phantasmal sophists or factionalists.

Socrates and the Stranger in this way themselves act as statesman, despite being denied the throne, by attempting to render their charges good and beautiful. In the *Statesman*, in fact, Plato most explicitly reveals the game by having the Stranger use the grasp of human being’s *ousia*, acquired from the cosmological myth, to forge from a heap of a city a complex whole structured hierarchically according to human being’s end. He thus does in speech what the genuine statesman does in deed, and both speech and deed are imitations of the demiurge’s forging of a cosmos from chaotic primordial body. The fact that the Stranger only does this in speech is no mark against him, since, as the inquirers claim at two different points in the *Statesman* \(^{81}\), merely the possession of *politikê* is sufficient for being a statesman.

In fact, Plato in this way himself plays the statesman. For by writing the dialogues in such a way that requires the reader to engage in dialectical thinking in order to grasp crucial teachings contained in the dialogues and the relations that obtain between the dialogues, Plato makes the reader a better dialectician. He in this way cultivates the

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\(^{81}\) 259b3-5 and again at 292e9-293a1.
readers intellect, providing the epistemological bebaiōsis required to become good and beautiful and maximally eudaimón—to become genuine statesmen-sages and in this way to save ourselves and our fellow citizens. At the very least, we should come away with an understanding sufficient for recognizing such a sage, should he appear. The fact that the trilogy ends with a successful capture of the city in speech should remind us of the adult Theaetetus’ failure to capture the city in deed, his death the result of Athenian political folly. The absence of the Philosopher, which was supposed to be undertaken by Socrates and YS after the Statesman, performs a similar function. This absence signals that the philosophical life, the life of pure reason, although conceivable, is not possible in this cosmos. For us, epistêmê and philosophy are inextricably political. This absence perhaps also subtly alludes to the political execution of Socrates (he did not live long enough to account for the philosopher) and the philosophical failure of YS (his nature proved inadequate for philosophical inquiry), suggesting the stinginess of nature and the dangerous state of politics in our world, where, due to ignorance, we kill our source of salvation. Plato in this way brings home the political consequences of epistêmê and ignorance, the politics of knowledge in the Age of Zeus.

82 A subtle way of extinguishing nostalgia for a golden age like the Age of Kronos. The life of pure reason is not possible, we remember, because, according to my interpretation of the myth, reason is not possible in the AK, the time when humans have infinite leisure and all their material needs are provided by shepherd gods. In the parlous AZ, where humans do have the requisite intellectual capacity for philosophy, humans must fend for and rule themselves. The philosopher must serve as statesman. For a different explanation for the missing Philosopher see M.-L. Gill (2012).

83 As I proposed in chapter 4, Plato perhaps subtly suggests that YS turned out to be a dud by having Euclides and Terpsion provide an encomium of Theaetetus in the Theaetetus’ frame but make no mention of YS. YS thus remains a shade, remembered only as one of the many negative example in the dialogues (such as Meno and Cratylus). See Miller (1980: 5-8) for analysis of YS, whom Miller takes as a model for the students in the Academy.


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