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The Sorted City: San Francisco, Hope SF, and the Redevelopment of Public Housing

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Author
Rongerude, Jane Marie

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The Sorted City:
San Francisco, Hope SF, and the Redevelopment of Public Housing

by

Jane Marie Rongerude

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
City and Regional Planning
in the
Graduate Division
of the
University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:
Professor Ananya Roy, Chair
Professor Judith Innes
Professor Karen Christensen
Professor Margaret Weir

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A Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant from the US Department of Housing and Urban Development funded the local component of my research efforts as I spent two years following the development and implementation of the Hope SF program. I also had the privilege to be a graduate fellow at the Institute for the Study of Social Change at the University of California. As a Fellow, I received financial support, a working space, and the opportunity to engage an exciting, interdisciplinary community of scholars focused on urban issues. I am especially thankful to Christine Trost and David Minkus for their feedback and assistance during that time.

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ABSTRACT

The Sorted City:
San Francisco, Hope SF, and the Redevelopment of Public Housing
by
Jane Marie Rongerude
Doctor of Philosophy in City and Regional Planning
University of California, Berkeley
Professor Ananya Roy, Chair

This dissertation examines the design of Hope SF, an innovative program in San Francisco that addresses both the physical decay of public housing properties and the social exclusion of public housing residents. Hope SF builds on the model of HOPE VI. Like HOPE VI, it attempts to remedy concentrated poverty and poor design by replacing class homogenous, dilapidated public housing sites with economically integrated, mixed-income communities. Projects achieve income diversity through increased density, phased development, and the one-for-one replacement of public housing units rather than the dispersal of residents. Because the program emphasizes integration, not relocation, every public housing family remains on-site. Service plans move public housing residents from their current condition of alienation and exclusion to their future as residents of new economically mixed neighborhoods.

While the Hope SF case provides numerous examples of best practices for local efforts to redevelop public housing, it also reflects the larger trends of localization, deregulation, and the retrenchment of the US welfare state. It provides a lens through which we can examine the differing landscapes of poverty and opportunity at this moment in the city. My analysis finds that Hope SF creates a geography of differentiated poverty: where poor households are pinned to a particular location, closely managed, connected to local workforce needs, and balanced on the threshold of exception. The overlapping public and private systems related to Hope SF and redevelopment create an infrastructure that sorts the affected population based on technical requirements and individual behaviors. While the lives of some public housing residents will be greatly improved as the result of Hope SF, others will lose not just their housing, but their right to remain in the city.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ENDURING PROBLEM OF SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING

As a Nation, we must act now to eliminate the public failure, the national disgrace, that we almost euphemistically call severely distressed public housing.


The research for this project spanned the period of time from Hurricane Katrina to the foreclosure crisis. Having these two events as bookends seems appropriate. Each was a national crisis that hit poor households the hardest and hit them in the place where they have always been the most vulnerable: housing. They reshaped urban landscapes and forced poor households out of their homes. They opened public discussions about the proper role of government, the unequal access to urban services across space, and the question of who deserves housing. While both affected rural areas and suburbs as well as cities, they were understood most profoundly through their affect on urban places.

In 1993, when the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH) issued its final report and the HOPE VI program was authorized, change seemed to be in the air. After more than two decades of disinvestment, the federal government had an interest in public housing once again. Neglected and decaying public housing properties—what came to be called severely distressed public housing developments—were contributing to a sense of urban crisis. Many of these sites were plagued by drugs, violence, high unemployment, and physical decay. The developments themselves were physically, socially, and economically cut off from the mainstream of the cities that surrounded them. They were primarily populated by people of color, a testament to the enduring legacy of segregation and unequal access to opportunity within US cities. Public housing had long ago stopped working as a form of temporary assistance for households needing to get back on their feet. Instead, public housing communities had become spaces of exclusion within the urban fabric: places of containment for a surplus population that held individuals within the city, but separate from the city. HOPE VI provided an opportunity for cities to demolish these sites and start anew. In doing so, local public housing authorities (PHAs) and elected officials hoped to remake both public housing and the city.

However, the story of the redevelopment of public housing and its relationship to the city is more complicated than the history of any single federal program. While HOPE VI was not without its controversy, it had a large foundation of support that included the public housing industry, development professionals, housing academics, and many elected officials. While critics expressed concern about the displacement of residents (CCC, 2003; NHLP, 2001) or the cost of the program (GAO, 2003), few people were opposed to the idea of tearing down public housing and replacing it with something else entirely. Furthermore, public housing programs were in a precarious position. This was during the administration of George W. Bush, and many industry professionals speculated that the federal government was getting out of the business of public housing altogether. PHAs were looking for creative ways to fund their work, stay afloat, and remain relevant. For many PHAs, redevelopment provided a solution. Using lessons learned from the federal HOPE VI program and from urban renewal before that, they created local initiatives to redevelop their public housing properties. In San Francisco, Mayor Gavin Newsom stepped forward with a proposal for such a program. He called it Hope SF.
This dissertation investigates Hope SF as a revelatory case study (Yin, 2003). It considers the local context as well as the practices of the public and private entities that carry out this work. Public housing is of course about housing, but it is also about public assistance to poor households and the distribution of poverty in space. For that reason, this study uses the redevelopment of public housing as a lens to consider how poverty is diagnosed and managed within the contemporary US welfare state. It examines the policies, ideas, and institutional relationships that shape Hope SF and calls attention to the historical and social processes of poverty management that are embedded in its practices. Hope SF is an example of both the retrenchment of the US welfare state and the emerging entrepreneurial practices of the local state. It highlights the vulnerability of San Francisco’s urban poor and asserts a role for the local state in providing basic resources for citizens in need. While the program provides numerous examples of best practices in the redevelopment of public housing, it also exemplifies the challenges of poverty management in the post-welfare era.

In 2009, the years of urban crisis have passed. It will be a while before poverty housing—housing for poor households—again reaches the status of a national crisis or natural disaster. In the meantime, cities across the nation will continue to find ways to redevelop their public housing properties. This dissertation argues that these projects contribute to a sorting of poor people and poor places that is flexible, dynamic, and context-specific. They create physical changes in the urban form, new networks of institutional relationships, and a reconfiguration of poor households across space. San Francisco provides one example. While recent changes in the presidential administration may improve the fortunes of America’s cities, programs such as Hope SF are likely to continue. This dissertation calls attention to the benefits and trade-offs inherent in such an approach.
A. San Francisco and the Hope SF Initiative

*We must recommit ourselves to the notion that every San Franciscan deserves a decent place to live.*

-Mayor Gavin Newsom

Quoted in the California Chronicle Blog
March 13, 2008

This initial overview introduces Hope SF and sets the stage for the discussions to follow. Chapter Three will provide a more in-depth exploration of the program, including its origins, important players, and policy details. Hope SF is an initiative of the City of San Francisco that endeavors to redevelop the city’s eight most distressed public housing sites, replacing isolated class-homogenous areas of concentrated poverty with economically integrated, mixed-income communities. It is run out of the Mayor’s Office of Housing (MOH), but includes institutional partnerships with other agencies and programs such as the San Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA), the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA), and Communities of Opportunity (COO), a local anti-poverty initiative that is closely aligned with “the city family.”

Hope SF began in several places at once. The program was initiated by Mayor Gavin Newsom, but the beginnings also overlap with a Request for Qualifications (RFQ) issued by SFHA. When the SFHA Executive Director needed ideas for redeveloping dilapidated public housing properties without federal dollars, he turned to the local development community for help. It is not surprising that he thought they would respond with innovation and new ideas. San Francisco has a well-established community of affordable housing developers that insiders consider to be creative and highly capable. The John Stewart Company, a local affordable housing developer, and its partners responded to the RFQ with a proposal to redevelop a site called Hunters View. This project went on to become the Hope SF pilot project.

Not long after taking office, Mayor Gavin Newsom set out to fix San Francisco’s distressed public housing developments through an initiative he called “Hope SF.” As a candidate, then-Supervisor Newsom was portrayed as a “business-oriented policy wonk (Gordon, Jan. 2, 2005),” and considered to be the more conservative candidate when compared to his primary competitor—green party candidate Matt Gonzales. In his inaugural address, Newsom laid out an agenda that included creating jobs, ending chronic homelessness, improving local infrastructure, building affordable housing, improving schools, and creating government accountability (Jan. 8, 2004). During his first year in office, he issued marriage licenses to same sex couples, appointed the city’s first female fire and police chiefs, and expanded a city program that he began as a Supervisor called “Care not Cash,” which substituted housing and food assistance to homeless individuals for general assistance money. He also began to refocus city resources on the Bayview-Hunters Point neighborhood, making the revitalization of that much neglected community one of the priorities of his administration (Gordon, Jan. 2, 2005).

Some of the Mayor’s colleagues describe him as a person with an interest in big ideas and on-the ground solutions. *New York Times* reporter Mark Leibovich put it differently, describing Newsom as “vivacious and something of a political thrill-seeker (2009).” In the same *New York Times* article, Mr. Newsom described himself as a person interested in creating “order-of-magnitude change, dramatic change.” Beginning with his first inaugural speech, the mayor promised, “We're not going to find excuses—we're going to find solutions. And we're going to find the very best and brightest people in this city and this nation to help us implement those
plans (Jan. 8, 2004).” For Newsom, solutions come from policy think tanks, talented individuals, and most of all from other cities.

At its most basic, Hope SF is a local program to redevelop the city’s eight most distressed public housing properties. The program is led by the Mayor’s Office of Housing (MOH) and was envisioned as a replacement for federal HOPE VI grants. It is important to emphasize that Hope SF has not built anything yet. The program is three years old and the first projects are still in predevelopment. Hunters View is scheduled to break ground in late 2009. This research analyzes the framework for the program and anticipates how it is likely to unfold over time. Development is an ever-changing and risky business. Not only will each redevelopment project be different from the others, but a single project is likely to change across time as location, resources, and market conditions all come into play.

What makes Hope SF a cohesive program is the Hope SF Principles, which provide an all-encompassing set of heuristics that are intended to guide the redevelopment of public housing in the city. Materials distributed by MOH provide this description of Hope SF:

The Hope SF initiative seeks to transform San Francisco’s most distressed public housing sites into vibrant, thriving communities. Every public housing unit will be rebuilt within mixed-income developments that include new affordable and market-rate homes, as well as parks and other public amenities for residents and neighbors alike. (2009c)

By increasing density at redeveloped public housing sites, developers can achieve a one-for-one replacement of public housing units while still adding a mix of income levels to the units. The program is made possible by: (a) high land values in the city; (b) a sophisticated and highly capable community of non-profit developers; and (c) a political culture that equates modernity with progressive values.

Hope SF represents a new generation of public housing program. It is innovative and even daring. It promises the one for one replacement of public housing units and no displacement of existing families. In order to make that happen, the program calls for increased densities at the public housing sites, phased development which allows for keeping residents on site during construction, and public and private efforts to match residents with appropriate services at each stage of development. The program emphasizes opportunity for residents over choice. Local developers take the lead on redevelopment projects, rather than the housing authority, and many aspects of the final deal are brokered with the direct participation of the Mayor’s Office of Housing (MOH). At the end of the day, the supporters of this program are making an argument that improving the spaces inhabited by very low income families living in San Francisco also improves the city.

This dissertation examines Hope SF at a particular moment in time and considers its likely impacts on the geography of poverty in the city. At first, Hope SF was nothing more than a catchy name and a general commitment to improving the quality of life in the city’s African American ghettos. The program has taken shape over the last three years. It now has a home within the institutional structures of the city government. It has a funding stream, a pilot project, staff, and guiding principles. Development teams have been approved for four different sites and the pilot project will break ground in late 2009. In the meantime, the social, institutional, and spatial implications of the program continue to unfold.
B. Three Geographies of Poverty

*Social relations, which are concrete abstractions, have no real existence save in and through space. Their underpinning is spatial. In each particular case, the connection between this underpinning and the relations it supports calls for analysis. Such an analysis must imply and explain a genesis and constitute a critique of those institutions, substitutions, metaphorizations, anaphorizations, and so forth, that have transformed the space under consideration.* (emphasis in the original)

- Henri Lefebvre

*The Production of Space* (1974) p.404
Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith

This dissertation identifies three geographies of poverty management present in US cities today: excluded poverty, dispersed poverty, and differentiated poverty. It considers the ways in which these geographies are shaped by federal policy, changes in the local political economy, and the unique history and ecology of a place. I argue that each geography reflects a particular way of thinking about poverty, creates a recognizable distribution of poverty in the city, and shapes the in/visibility of the urban poor. These geographies reflect different approaches to the territorialization of the city through the distribution and management of poor populations.

**Excluded poverty** is best encapsulated by the image of the ghetto, or more appropriately, what Loic Wacquant has come to term the hyper-ghetto (2007). These are racialized spaces of exclusion where the state manages poverty through systems of containment and control, and inhabitants exist outside of the social and economic mainstream of the city. Many traditional public housing communities fall under this category.

With **dispersed poverty**, poor households are separated from one another and from the city. This geography is captured by the image of the housing choice voucher. Households living in urban communities of concentrated poverty (excluded poverty) are relocated through both voluntary and involuntary programs away from areas where other poor people live (often the central city) into more affluent areas of the city or region. This approach relies heavily on the logic of the private housing market, informal systems of social control, and the institutions of civil society to manage individual poor households.

With **differentiated poverty**, poor households again are pinned to a particular location in the city as poverty places and the poor people that inhabit them are re-integrated into the fabric of the city. If excluded poverty is best represented by the ghetto and dispersed poverty by the housing voucher, then differentiated poverty is best represented by a map of the city. Imagine that poor households emerge from their previously excluded community as if they have arrived by train. Each person holds in her/his hand a map and on that map is an address, a place to call home. Those who can hold onto their place in the newly constructed community and remain in their newly constructed units will also have access to new opportunities and a better life. However, lose a unit and you must forfeit your map. Your place in the city is lost.

With differentiated poverty, policy-led gentrification brings more affluent households and improved neighborhood amenities into what previously had been an excluded community. The local state coordinates with private partners to closely manage poor populations in place. Poverty housing becomes tied to workforce needs and the ability of a household to meet behavioral expectations. Differentiated poverty brings with it a new geography of poverty within the city,
but also new systems of poverty management which include both genuine opportunity and increased risk for poor households. As spaces of exclusion become re-integrated into the city, poor households are left balancing on the threshold of exception.

These geographies do not represent singular frameworks that cities either adopt or reject wholesale. Rather, they are the result of years of changing urban policies and the dynamic demand for urban land. Each geography encapsulates social relations and the reproduction of poverty in a different way, grounding them in space. The framework put forward here is intended to call attention to the uneven characteristics of an urban landscape where all three exist simultaneously. It elucidates the ways that different policy approaches create different ways of organizing the city that in turn create different distributions of poverty. New policy regimes do not throw out what existed before, but instead reshape the vulnerable and in between spaces, the poverty spaces of the city.

**Excluded Poverty**

The geography of excluded poverty is captured by terms such as ghetto, barrio, or slum—terms that refer to ethno-racial institutions of enclosure and control that separate and isolate inhabitants based on both class and race. They serve as holding places for populations that are disenfranchised from both the economic and social life of the city. In these spaces of exclusion, poor households are kept isolated within the bounds of the city, trapped by policies that promote racial segregation and urban abandonment. These spaces are separated from the city, yet still of the city.

The inhabitants of these communities historically have been described as the underclass. Starting in the late 1970s, the idea of the underclass gained popularity as a way of understanding the urban multi-generational poor. In 1977, *Time* magazine broke the story of “The Underclass: A Minority within a Minority.” The article described the underclass in this way:

> Though its members come from all races and live in many places, the underclass is made up mostly of impoverished urban blacks, who still suffer from the heritage of slavery and discrimination. … Their bleak environment nurtures values that are often at odds with those of the majority – even the majority of the poor. Thus the underclass minority produces a disproportionate number of the nation’s juvenile delinquents, school dropouts, drug addicts and welfare mothers, and much of the adult crime, family disruption, urban decay, and demand for social expenditures.

Here we see the familiar components of earlier poverty definitions of race and moral failing. By mentioning that the values of the underclass are “nurtured” by their “bleak environment” the definition places itself as a direct descendant of the culture of poverty arguments.

Generally the story of the underclass goes along these lines: individuals become locked into poverty by a unique but maladaptive culture characterized by behaviors and values that cause them to make different choices from other classes and that keep them from succeeding. In this environment, social institutions break down, leaving people without solid family structures, an organized society, or acceptable social norms. Responsible men (defined as the middle class or working poor) are absent. Young men without guidance destructively rule the streets. Young women have babies and receive welfare. Violence, crime, and drug addiction are endemic. The underclass is almost always described as urban and black (Katz, 1986; Marks, 1991).

With much of the discussion regarding the underclass, poverty is a symptom of a deeper pathology and serves as further proof of the otherness of this group. Where the working poor
could be one’s neighbors, the underclass are viewed as exotic, defiant, and dangerous. Members of the underclass are understood to be responsible for their conditions and therefore undeserving of assistance (Auletta, 1981; Time, 1977).

In their book, *American Apartheid* (1993), Sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton argue that the enduring legacies of discrimination and segregation in the US have prevented urban communities of color, and specifically African American communities, from gaining equal access to housing opportunities. They call attention to policies that have created and maintained African American ghettos in American cities; communities characterized by physical decay and inadequate infrastructure, inadequate educational opportunities, unemployment, fragmented families, crime, and violence. Massey and Denton go on to argue that “The ghetto is part and parcel of modern American society. It was manufactured by whites earlier in the century to isolate and control growing urban black populations, and it is maintained today by a set of institutions, attitudes, and practices that are deeply embedded in the structure of American life (p.217).”

William Julius Wilson (1987, 1996) identifies structural changes to the urban economy and the social disorganization within the ghetto community that accompanied it as the root causes of inner city poverty. He points out that initially urban ghettos were largely racially homogenous, but heterogeneous in terms of class. He borrows from Allan Spear who terms such places as “institutional ghettos:” spaces that perpetuated and enforced racial segregation, but otherwise mirrored the structure and social life of the rest of the city. These communities were important sources of cheap labor, and residents had access to the social and economic life of the city. After the civil rights movement of the 1960s provided opportunities for mobility among the African American middle class, only those who could not afford to move elsewhere continued to resident within urban ghettos. Wilson places the primary locus for the deterioration of these communities and the emergence of what has come to be called “the underclass” on the loss of inner-city industrial and manufacturing jobs. In the face of mounting joblessness, inner-city communities began to experience a severe lack of resources and access to opportunity. Poverty became concentrated in specific places in the city, and the social and cultural deterioration of those communities followed.

The geography of exclusion is the geography of the post-industrial American city, where poor communities of color inhabit spaces set apart from the social and economic mainstream of the city. These spaces of advanced marginality, these hyper-ghettos, can be differentiated from earlier manifestations of the ghetto by the retrenchment of both work and welfare. The ghetto itself becomes the source of poverty for its inhabitants, who have no place in the labor market, no access to services, and no way out (Wacquant, 2008).

*Public Housing and Excluded Poverty*

Public housing developments in their incarnation as “the projects” provide a familiar representation of the geography of excluded poverty. Not every urban space of excluded poverty includes public housing developments and not every public housing development can be characterized as a space of exclusion; however, the two often overlap, and certainly much of the public housing stock that can be characterized as “severely distressed” occupies this type of space. From the early days of public housing policy, once the right to housing was emphatically rejected as a policy objective, public housing became something set apart from the rest of the city.
As the U.S. government began to build public housing in the late 1930s, these developments were carefully designed to avoid competition with the single-family home market. Initially, they were intended to be short-term dwellings for the deserving poor: working and middle class people who had been set back temporarily by the Great Depression. This ideal was enforced through stringent screening processes and policies meant to keep out those individuals that officials considered financially or morally incapable of living in public housing (Hall, 1988; Vale, 2000). These policies maintained an ideological connection between the public providing the housing and the public benefiting from the housing.

From those early days, housing was intertwined with employment or perceived employability. The work ethic of white middle- or working-class families was never in question nor was their employability. Families that received public housing were extensions of the employable white man, someone only temporarily set back by the Depression. Because his joblessness was considered to be temporary, as was the family’s residence in the projects, these families were seen as worthy public housing residents and families that the rest of the society could emulate.

After World War II, the economy was in full swing, but housing was in short supply. With the Housing Act of 1949, housing policy became stratified between the programs and subsidies designed to encourage middle class homeownership and public housing programs for the most needy. The Federal Housing Administration and Fannie Mae, both of which help upwardly mobile families finance new homes, became taken for granted as entitlements. Suburbanization swept across the country, transforming the urban landscape and creating new spatial divisions based on both class and race. Within the city, urban renewal and the construction of public housing developments reallocated the distribution of spaces of poverty. City leaders worried about the creeping threat of blight and urban decay, and accommodating the needs of the most vulnerable became contradictory to accommodating the needs of a broader public (Banfield, 1968). White families found jobs, received mortgages, and moved into the expanding new suburbs. Many of those who were poor or perceived as “other”—single-parent families, African Americans and other people of color, and immigrant families—had fewer options for upward mobility. Discriminatory practices in employment, housing, and lending left them tied to the city. Eventually, local housing authorities were forced to relax their screening procedures in favor of filling units. People without other options became seen as people who were unwilling to do better for themselves. The providing public and the benefiting public became two unrelated classes of citizens.

Influenced first by the architectural styles of social housing in Europe and then by the bold visions of Le Corbusier, public housing advocates pushed for the streamlined, functional forms of modernism in public housing design. As a result, public housing structures became architecturally distinct from other urban landscapes. The high-rise towers that most Americans associate with housing projects became the vernacular of choice and reinforced the notion that public housing is something separate from where families make their homes, lending architectural distance (Hall, 1988; Vale, 2000). Further policy changes in the coming decades continued to reinforce the belief that public housing is a social burden and a depository for the incorrigible and the very neediest. From here, the public housing story joins the earlier ghetto story. The phrases “housing project” and “ghetto” are often used interchangeably as are “public housing residents” and “underclass.”
Spaces of Exclusion and the City

In the last four decades, the federal government increasingly has handed off much of the responsibility for urban policies to the cities themselves; as Johnson’s War on Poverty transformed into Reagan’s “War on Welfare” (Katz, 1986) and then eventually, Clinton’s welfare reform. Always peripheral to the welfare state, public housing programs have been keenly impacted by the federal government’s changing attitudes toward social welfare programs.

However, even as funding has been cut and federal priorities have changed, public housing families have continued to occupy their public housing units and public housing land has remained federal public land. While most public housing officials continue to state that public housing should be temporary housing, in many cities the jobs that would make it possible for families to move elsewhere long ago left the city. These families are not easily removed and have few viable alternatives for housing. As a result, these poor households and the places where they live have remained fixed in space, and enduring part of the urban landscape.

In these spaces, the public land, the poverty housing structures, and the housed body have become one. While the city cannot accommodate these individuals, it also cannot remove them. These spaces of exclusion are necessary places of holding, neither supported by the city nor fully separate from the city. They remain as a type of poverty reservation within a larger urban landscape. Taken together, they form a geography of exclusion in the city.

Dispersed Poverty

In the post-HOPE VI era, the approach of poverty housing dispersal as a means to deconcentrate poverty is so deeply entrenched that it is taken for granted. With dispersed poverty, poor households are separated from one another, rather than the city. They receive vouchers and other incentives intended to direct them away from areas of concentrated poverty into more affluent areas of the city or region. This approach relies heavily on physical design, neighborhood effects, and the institutions of civil society to manage individual poor households.

In his investigation of poverty dispersal policy in the US, Edward Goetz (2003) explains that such programs have been part of the poverty management policy landscape since the 1960s. He divides these efforts into two generations of policy. The first generation of dispersal policy occurred from the late 1960s through the mid-1970s. These programs brought together both anti-discrimination and integrationist objectives. When the anti-discrimination component was stripped from the policy objectives, these programs were no longer able to generate sufficient political support and fell out of favor. The second generation of dispersal policy dates back to the early 1990s. After more than a decade of conversations in both the popular press and academic circles about the problem of the underclass, a consensus developed across political lines that poor, inner-city communities were dysfunctional or pathological and must be torn down. However, this happened without a corresponding agreement that more affluent areas would help to provide housing for lower income residents. The primary objective of this second generation was to deconcentrate poverty and anti-discrimination objectives were put to the back. The range of federal programs and policy mechanisms associated with this era include: scattered site programs, housing production programs, regional fair share programs, moving to opportunity, vouchers, moving to work, HOPE VI, demolition, the construction of mixed income communities, and desegregation lawsuits.

The geography of dispersed poverty is understood in terms of choice because poor households are housed within a larger range of unit typologies, supported by a greater variety of policy mechanisms, and distributed beyond the boundaries of the city. Residents are no longer
guaranteed a unit, but rather given a subsidy voucher which they use to find their own unit within the regional housing market. These programs have accomplished an overall reduction of public housing units. They have redistributed many low-income households across space and have encouraged some development of other formal housing arrangements for low and very low income households. They have created an opening within some suburban communities for low income households to make a home. At the same time, these poverty spaces are vulnerable, splintered, and highly susceptible to behavioral controls.

The regulatory gaze is no longer limited to the federal government or its proxy, the local public housing authority. Private property managers enforce strict lease agreements that link housing to behavioral and housekeeping requirements. With mixed income communities, property managers cater to the needs and sensibilities of market rate renters. Neighbors complain about households that they perceive as too noisy or that use public space in different ways. Developments are carefully designed with defensive space in mind and to minimize what could be conceived as potentially threatening places of contact between residents of different classes including parking, stairwells, and mail boxes.

Dispersed households are more vulnerably housed than public housing households. Costs are higher with vouchers. Voucher funding is more precarious within the federal budgeting system. Voucher costs rise every year, and unlike the decision to discontinue or cut funding for capital expenses of public housing structures, which leaves buildings in at times extreme disrepair, but they are still used to house tenants. These are private landlord and if the government stops funding vouchers, these landlords will stop housing their tenants.

In cities such as San Francisco where the waiting list for housing assistance is tens of thousands of families long, each housed household is infinitely replaceable. Poor households are expected to emulate their neighbors, but not to rely on them. Social networks are disrupted when households are dispersed. Commercial establishments such as grocery stores and banks and public amenities such as transportation access are to replace the networks of reciprocity that low income households rely on; however, these services are available to households only to the extent that they are able to pay for them. Poverty becomes more tightly managed and far less visible. This is the approach to poverty management of the splintered metropolis. Public systems distributing public goods exist side by side with private systems.

**Poverty Housing Policy and Dispersed Poverty**

When President Clinton took office and appointed Henry Cisneros as his Secretary of HUD, housing advocates were hopeful that the long era of decline in housing policy would come to an end (Bratt, 2002). Authorizing legislation for HOPE VI, the housing program which would become most associated with this administration, was passed in 1992, predating the Clinton administration; however, the program was not implemented until 1993. Through HOPE VI, local housing authorities applied for grants to demolish and/or renovate specific housing projects. Projects were rebuilt with better design and at lower densities; and social services are made available for residents and surrounding community members.

The 1995 Rescissions Act suspended the one-for-one replacement rule that had previously guided public housing redevelopment and modernization efforts. Previously, PHAs had to replace any demolition with at least 50% hard units. Now every demolished unit could be replaced with vouchers. The Omnibus Appropriations Bill (FY 1996) repealed the federal preference rule for public housing, which had given priority to homeless families; families with extremely high housing costs; or those living in dilapidated housing. Section 202 required all
PHAs to assess the “viability” of any property with 300 or more units and a vacancy rate over 10%. Nonviable developments were to be removed from the inventory within 5 years. Unlike previous generations of housing legislation that set production goals, this is the first piece of housing legislation with demolition goals. It included the goal to eliminate 100,000 units of deteriorated public housing.

The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA) further devolves authority from the federal government to local public housing authorities, permitting greater discretion in income targeting and deconcentration of poor residents and providing greater autonomy for public housing authorities. It set behavioral requirements for residents, requiring each adult resident to perform community service or participate in an economic “self-sufficiency” program for at least 8 hours a week. It attempted to encourage work by allowing public housing tenants to disregard increased income from employment for at least 12 months. It also required PHAs to link residents to social services. Finally, it allowed the use of Section 8 vouchers for homeownership programs sponsored by local PHAs.

Poverty housing policy in the 1990s was premised on a belief that public housing was plagued with problems, that the federal method of oversight had aggravated these public housing problems, and that public housing reform was in the best interest of low-income persons. While it recognized that more affordable housing was needed, it emphasized that the government had already invested over $90 billion in rental housing for low-income persons. Housing scholar Rachel Bratt summarized the record of the Clinton administration in the area of poverty housing in the following way:

Programmatically, many of the problems with public housing were addressed, with a number of key observers placing a great deal of faith in the HOPE VI program and in HUD’s overall efforts to provide opportunities for households to move to non-poverty areas. In addition, a crisis involving the renewal of Section 8 vouchers never materialized, as sufficient funds were appropriated to enable all households receiving assistance to keep their subsidies. And, finally, although thousands of subsidized units were lost during the 1990s, many of the problems with the project-based stock of housing were addressed, thereby enabling thousands of other households to continue occupancy in those developments. (2002, p.19)

With the possibility of housing production long over, maintaining any units and the remnants of a system had become an accomplishment

HOPE VI and the assorted public housing reforms that accompanied it, used poverty housing policy as a vehicle to achieve ideological objectives such as the privatization of social service provision or the incentivization of recipient self-sufficiency and movement into private job and housing markets. By redeveloping public housing properties and redistributing residents, they reshaped urban space to facilitate the movement of both housing and labor (Crump, 2003). In the geography of dispersed poverty, poor households are moved out of the central city and redistributed across the metropolitan region in order to reduce their proximity to one another. Households live in a variety of housing forms and oversight happens through individual leases and private managers. As existing spaces of exclusion are broken up, poverty spaces become more fine grained and poverty management takes on a greater behavioral focus. In this geography, housing is more flexible, but also more vulnerable.
Differentiated Poverty

With differentiated poverty, poor households are again cojoined with a particular location within the city. Here, however, it is that location of poverty housing that is being integrated into the social and economic life of the city, not the dispersed individuals as in the previous geography. Here local state intervention helps to manage poor populations and facilitate the expansion of capital into underutilized parts of the city. Specific actions include the valorization of public housing land, the implementation of new systems of property management, and the delivery of comprehensive supportive services. Through these systems, poor populations are sorted, a process often referred to in the field as “creaming.” These systems are not centralized, but taken as a whole they serve as an infrastructure that differentiates residents based on their ability and willingness to meet the demands of the system. The actions of individual bureaucrats, professionals, and managers ultimately identify who the city views as deserving of housing. They draw a line between those who will maintain their place in the city and those who will ultimately find themselves unhoused and on the outside.

The more that access to new opportunity and the provision of services are linked to place, the more individuals have to lose should they lose their place within the new housing community. In this geography, poverty management efforts are connected to local workforce needs and the revitalization of both people and places. As a result, this geography brings with it the threat of individual failure. Work requirements, behavioral expectations, the willingness to submit to comprehensive case management become criteria that help to separate those who remain in housing—and therefore in the city—and those who do not. Extensive waiting lists ensure a constant stream of available bodies to replace those who fall short. As a result, poor households remain balanced on the threshold of exception.

Because the federal government has stepped back from its responsibility for the provision of safe and sanitary poverty to poor households, an opportunity has emerged for the local state to have an increasing say in the local management of public housing. Increasingly, what they advocate for is a local version of the HOPE VI program—replacing public housing developments with mixed income communities. Redevelopment provides cities with the opportunity to valorize public housing land and make it available to the market. Through this process, formerly reserved public land becomes reintegrated into the fabric of the city. When the demand for land is accompanied by a demand for low wage workers, it creates the potential of re-entry into the city for both poor people and poor places

A geography of differentiated poverty begins with a framework that asserts if public housing land is to be brought back into the territory of the city, then the public housing residents living on that property must be given the same opportunity. Redevelopment sets residents into motion and separates them from the timespace of the ghetto. This movement is both metaphorical and very local. Residents are not displaced; they remain housed within the same community. It is one’s legitimate claim to this public housing place that provides an individual with a point of reentry into the city. As the old development becomes the new and public housing is replaced with a mixed income community, poor households come to rest on the threshold between spaces of exclusion and the city, but also between opportunity and bare life. Deserving households—those who are in good standing, those with minimal criminal records, those who pay their rent, those who meet other criteria established in the guidelines of the rebuilt housing communities—will find a place in the city. However, unlike the poverty dispersal programs where residents can in fact disappear within the city or the region, accountable only to the terms
of their leases, these residents will continue to be managed by both property managers and the local state.

The expansion and retraction of capital in uncertain global markets requires flexible boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. The geography of differentiated poverty creates a spatial framework that allows mobility and flexibility both in terms of land and labor. The state has a heavier hand here than it does in the case of dispersal. The management is more systematic. Redevelopment puts residents on a train for the purpose of arriving at the station. The station is the point of sorting, it is the platform where individuals are subject to the gaze of the state and pointed in the direction of inclusion or exclusion. Exclusion now carries a heavier cost as households that lose their dwellings also lose a place in the city itself. As all of the public housing in the city is redeveloped, residents find themselves without a way back in. They lose choice and opportunity, social citizenship and city citizenship. Regardless, the territory of the city is expanded.
C. Methodology

This research project uses an in-depth case study of San Francisco’s Hope SF program to analyze the changing geography of poverty and opportunity in US urban areas. It has two inter-related analytical components:

1) An investigation of localized systems of poverty management which comprise the current moment of post-welfare policy reform; and

2) A consideration of how those systems impact the institutional, physical and social geographies of poverty and opportunity in US urban areas.

This is an embedded case study where San Francisco provides the context and the Hope SF program is the primary unit of analysis. The Hope SF pilot project, Hunters View, is an embedded unit of analysis. As Hope SF progresses to include other sites, it would be possible to add additional embedded units of analysis.

This case is what Robert Yin (2003) describes as a revelatory case study, one where the researcher has access to a situation previously inaccessible to scientific observation. For this project, I have followed Hope SF during the earliest years of the program—from the Mayor’s announcement of a new policy initiative to its reification within the city’s institutional infrastructure. The city staff people engaged in the Hope SF program have had to wrestle with questions such as, “Should residents have the option to move off site?” “Who is responsible for infrastructure costs?” and “Should residents be listed on the lease in order to access services?” While these questions appear technical on one hand, they reflect deeper issues of access, framing, and legitimacy for residents. The answers determine not just how the city will go about doing its work, but who will have access to the opportunities promised by Hope SF. The developers at the Hunters View site have had to find answers to the challenges of resident participation, find a broad range of funding, and deal with an extremely volatile housing market. While these challenges will persist at other sites, the Hunters View team was the first to address the problems and the first to find answers. Their work will inform the iterations to come.

My research uses poverty housing programs as a proxy for poverty management programs more generally. While housing and poverty each have their own separate history and their own separate literatures, debates, and policy solutions, they also have a great deal of overlap. The progressive era reforms at the beginning of the Twentieth Century placed poor people in tenement housing and slums. Solutions included housing codes and model tenements, as well as social workers and family support. In the 1930s when academics and policy-makers were debating the formation of the US welfare state, housing was part of the conversation as well as old age pensions, support for mothers, unemployment insurance, and other programs. The case for housing was less well-received and the program remained at the margins of the US welfare state, but it nonetheless had a place in the national conversation. Urban renewal connected poverty and place through its policies of blight eradication and the idea that removing one would remove the other. The underclass debates, the idea of concentrated poverty, and ultimately, the diagnosis of the problems with urban public housing in the 1990s and beyond, draw a relationship between poor people and the poverty places where they make their homes.

The provision of housing is an immediate way to make a material difference in the lives of poor people, and public housing is one of a handful of entitlement programs intended to do just that. However, given the absence of a right to housing in the US and the inadequate numbers of public housing units available in the country compared to need, who the state is willing to
extend housing to says a great deal about how we construct the boundaries of worthiness, inclusion, and ultimately citizenship.

Background: The Road to Hope SF

My interest in public housing began when I was working as part of a team evaluating the Community Supportive Services (CSS) Plan for a HOPE VI project in the Bay Area. Reading the housing authority’s HOPE VI application, I was struck by what seemed to me to be an obvious disconnect between the 5 year goals stated in the plan and the demographics of the population currently living on the site. This was a small development with less than 300 units. The households were almost evenly split between African-American and Latino families, and many of the Latino households included both citizens and non-citizens as well as documented and undocumented immigrants. One third of the households at the time were paying zero rent, which meant there was no formal income for the family. The surrounding neighborhood was largely abandoned, with burnt out storefronts and an empty adjacent lot which had contained a grade school before it was relocated and the building was demolished in reaction to local drug activities. Few of the children living on this site had seen other parts of their town, let alone the neighboring cities.

This community was located within a post-industrial city that was itself struggling; this was not a pocket of despair within a sea of prosperity but rather a sinkhole within a swamp. There was opportunity within the region, but for the most part, those networks did not extend to this community. Yet the HOPE VI application optimistically promised 95% employment within 5 years of the HOPE VI redevelopment. Of the current households on the site, due to restraints caused by immigration status, 95% of the adults were not eligible to work legally; and while the region had adequate job opportunities, few of them were in the surrounding community. From where I stood, it appeared that either the goals were optimistic to the point of ridiculousness or there were implicit expectations that a different population would be housed at the redeveloped site. I wanted to investigate this further.

I selected San Francisco as the site for my research because it appeared to provide an example of a successful HOPE IV program. The city was about to begin its fifth HOPE VI project at a development known as Valencia Gardens. San Francisco The city had been involved in the program since the very beginning. When the first President Bush convened the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, the Executive Director of the San Francisco Housing Authority at the time, David Gilmore, was a member. San Francisco’s first HOPE VI project, Hayes Valley, was one of the demonstration projects for the HOPE VI program. Since that time, SFHA had successfully completed three more HOPE VI development projects with a minimum of community protest.

HOPE VI projects are most often evaluated on the basis of resident outcomes and San Francisco appeared to score well in this regard. The return rates for displaced residents were much higher in San Francisco than elsewhere in the country, and a minimum of units were lost. In fact, the most recent generation of projects added additional affordable units to the properties increasing density at the sites. San Francisco appeared to be a model for a Progressive HOPE VI and a potential source of best practices informing what it takes to do HOPE VI well.

However, as I was making plans to begin my field work, the federal government, now under the administration of the second President Bush, appeared to be phasing out HOPE VI. In 2004, the HOPE VI program was initially provided with no funding in the HUD budget. Congress responded by adding allocations for the program, although still at a much lower level
than previous years. HOPE VI allocations went from averaging around $500 million a year from 1993 – 2003 to just over $126 million in 2004. In previous years, HUD had made as many as 28 HOPE VI grants. That year, it was only seven. While HOPE VI was initially available only to the largest cities in the nation, the distribution had become much broader. The 2004 grants went to: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, but also Allentown, Pennsylvania; El Paso, Texas; Greenville, South Carolina; Springfield, Ohio; Tucson, Arizona; and Tucaloosa, Alabama. San Francisco, a large west-coast city with tight connections to the Democratic party, had not been able to secure a HOPE VI grant since President Bill Clinton had left office. At least in the minds of SFHA officials, the two were connected.

HOPE VI appeared to be transitioning from what had been hailed as an innovative new approach to public housing and government to another aborted program from the past; the detritus of a previous administration. I was unsure if my own questions about the changing systems of poverty management in a post-welfare era, and specifically the reorganization of the local state within these efforts, could be answered well through exclusively historical research. It had been my intention to observe the program in action, as it was being conceptualized and shaped by the local players who were bringing it to life. My research design assumed an ability to follow the ins and outs of how that partnership was negotiated and implemented.

In an effort to make sense of these changes to the program, I spent a year attending conferences and talking to officials in the three large professional associations that serve public housing authorities: the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO), the Council for Large Public Housing Authorities (CLPHA), and the Public Housing Authorities Directors Association (PHADA). At local chapter meetings, regional meetings, and national conferences, I saw that HOPE VI was not dead. While some housing authorities (such as San Francisco) still had projects in the works, a much greater number were moving forward on projects that used the HOPE VI framework, even without the federal HOPE VI funding. They called it local HOPE VI, HOPE VI without the HOPE, revitalization or even redevelopment, but whatever the name, the framework was the same. Public housing properties were demolished and were replaced with new mixed income developments. Sometimes they were on the same site. Sometimes they were built elsewhere. Most of the time units were lost and communities were displaced in the process. The new buildings had better designs, new rules, and many more amenities than their predecessors. It was clear that with or without federal funding, HOPE VI was alive and well.

I returned to San Francisco and began looking for a place to locate myself for my research. I had already identified that a qualitative approach would be necessary to answer my questions about the institutional reforms associated with HOPE VI and its affects on systems of poverty management in the city. My first step was to approach the San Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA). In early meetings, I was pleased to learn about SFHA’s efforts to secure funding to redevelop a site known as Hunters View. After several rounds of unsuccessful grants, the agency was setting out to get help from other city agencies, including the well-funded and entrepreneurial Redevelopment Agency and well connected and sophisticated Mayor’s Office of Housing, as well as private sector developers, to carry out the project without federal HOPE VI funding. It seemed like the perfect case for understanding the redevelopment of public housing in this HOPE VI/post HOPE VI environment. I secured tentative permission to be included as a member of the development team which had just recently been formed. I thought I was off and running.
SFHA is the oldest public housing authority in California and the 17\textsuperscript{th} largest in the country. In 1940, the agency opened Holly Courts, the first public housing development west of the Mississippi. From the earliest years of the agency, its executive director was closely associated with the mayor’s administration. In the late sixties and early seventies, the SFHA executive director held national influence within the public housing industry (Baranski, 2007). However, since the mid-1970s, the agency has been on HUD’s troubled list more often than not. SFHA’s problematic past includes an executive director who was sent to jail on corruption charges, instances of staff corruption, receivership, sexual harassment lawsuits, lawsuits by residents for the neglect of properties resulting in death, and most notorious of all, a link to Jim Jones who was executive director of SFHA at the time that he took hundreds of San Francisco residents, many of them residents of public housing, to Jonestown, Guyana where they ultimately died.

However, now in the first decade of the new millennium, the agency seemed to have moved into a new era. It was managing more than 6500 public housing units as well as nearly 10,000 Section 8 and vouchered housing units. Executive director Gregg Fortner was well regarded as a capable administrator. Although the agency was still on shaky financial ground due to decreased HUD appropriations and lawsuit judgments, it was otherwise operating within the standards let by HUD. The agency appeared to be professional, capable, and transparent as staff went about their work. It was off HUD’s troubled agency list and seemed to have moved beyond its troubled past.

What I found is that while the agency was performing at much higher level that it had in the past, it still maintained a culture that was suspicious of outsiders. After my initial meetings, I found it difficult to secure follow up meetings. Initial offers of partnership never materialized. I was firmly situated on the outside and SFHA appeared reluctant to let me in. Of course, like public housing authorities across the country, the agency was also straining under the burden of increasing demand and decreasing funding. The staff people I spoke with one week were laid off by the time I tried to follow up the next week. The agency was trying to provide affordable housing to the city’s most needy residents, but that was becoming more and more difficult as the capital improvement needs for the agency’s portfolio continued to grow. Supervising a researcher required more time than the staff had to give.

Stymied at the Housing Authority end, I attended an open meeting of the SFHA Commission where the development team was presenting an overview of the work they hoped to accomplish at Hunters View. After the meeting, I presented my research interests to the developers and they welcomed me to the table. As a result, although I had intended to situate myself within the confines of the state, I found myself on the private side of the public/private partnership. This proved to be fortuitous. The developers were in many ways the opposite of SFHA. They were open with their information. They agreed to monthly meetings to keep me informed of their progress. They invited me to resident meetings and public meetings with various commissions and city agencies. While they did not provide me with unfettered access or invite me to meetings that were considered internal, overall they were far more open about their processes and progress than the housing authority.

Very quickly, a fourth member joined the development team, and that was the Mayor’s Office of Housing. The Mayor was interested in supporting the redevelopment of public housing in the city and Hunters View was to be the pilot project. When the public housing taskforce was convened, I was invited to observe as a member. The taskforce was convened by Mayor Gavin Newsom and Supervisor Sophie Maxwell who represented the district that included much of the
public housing in question. It was tasked with considering the issues pertaining to the 
redevelopment of public housing in the city, and make recommendations to the mayor regarding 
how the city should proceed. I was able to interview many members of the taskforce as well as 
the staff from the growing number of agencies involved in the project. I had the opportunity to 
follow the process as Hunters View changed from a singular project to the first installment of the 
promise of Hope SF.

Over the course of the two years I followed Hunters View and Hope SF, I conducted 
more than 100 personal interviews. I met with members of the taskforce which included housing 
advocates, representatives from labor, personnel from other agencies, public housing residents, 
and local planning advocacy groups. I attended more than a dozen public meetings as well as 
regular monthly resident meetings at the Hunters View site. I met with key staff people from the 
development team, the Mayor’s Office of Housing, SFHA, and housing advocacy organizations 
repeatedly and at times monthly to keep abreast of the progress of the project. I also met with 
consultants who assisted with particular areas of expertise such as resident participation or 
relocation. I attempted to touch every aspect of the work within the ever changing institutional 
landscape that surrounded it.

My research included interviews, observation, and participant observation. While trying 
to make sense of what I was seeing, I found myself trumped by the most basic question: what 
might be the consequences of such an approach? Following the Hope SF process and the well-
intentioned work of the dedicated and smart professionals directing the project, I heard many 
people talk about trying to do the right thing for this community. Housing would be improved, 
neighborhoods would be improved, even city services would be improved. And on top of that, 
residents would have access to a range of social services intended to help them access work and 
improve the material conditions of their lives. Every indication showed that some people’s lives 
would be improved as a result of these efforts. However, I began to notice was that no one was 
mentioning the difficult cases. These included the people who were known within the 
community to be engaging in criminal activity, the people who lived in units but were not on 
leases, or the people would not or could not follow the rules. It was these people who would have 
to leave the community for it to change. Not every tenant could or would be able to adjust to the 
new rules in the new community. Not everyone would find a place in promised San Francisco. It 
was this puzzle that drove my research and brought me to recognize the dynamics of sorting.

Talking to Residents

My research has focused on the institutions that are involved in the creation and 
implementation of San Francisco’s Hope SF program. I have followed the work of the Hunters 
View redevelopment team carefully, meeting repeatedly over time with developers and project 
managers, SFHA staff, and individuals from the Mayors Office of Housing. I have interviewed 
staff from the Redevelopment Agency, the Mayor’s Office of Economic and Workforce 
Development, the Mayor’s Office of Community Development, and Communities of 
Opportunity. I sat on the Public Housing Taskforce and observed multiple public meetings 
including those convened by the Hunters Point Project Area Committee, the Board of 
Supervisors, and the SFHA Commission.

By design, I have had very little direct contact with public housing residents. While there 
is often a resident or two speaking at public hearings related to this topic, and several residents 
also served on the public housing taskforce, most of my interaction with residents has been at 
resident meetings held at Hunters View. These meetings were facilitated by the development
team or consultants they hired. While each meeting covered a specific topic agreed to in advance, topics of conversation often wandered. Residents used these times to address a broader range of issues related to their living conditions. They made heartfelt appeals for inclusion and for assistance creating better lives for their families, as well as demands for changes to the process. They asked questions, challenged the professionals that were present, and argued with one another about the best approach for any given topic.

While I never spoke directly with any specific resident around a series of topics that I designed, my repeated presence at these meetings did provide me with a window into the resident experience throughout this process. When I quote residents or speak to their challenges as they relate to the redevelopment of Hunters View, I am using statements made at tenant meetings as well as my own observations.

Conceptual Framework

Because my work is situated in the discipline of planning, I believe that it is especially important to consider institutions. This is where planners do their work. My focus is on institutional dynamics. I look at these in a specific poverty management program (Hope SF) situated within a specific urban context (San Francisco). Qualitative methods provide the best techniques for addressing my questions. This research utilizes an in-depth case study approach that emphasizes context, relationships, and the daily practices of institutions over generalizability and aggregate data. I use qualitative research to construct an analytical framework that can help to build theory and influence policy (Snow, Morrill, and Anderson, 2003).

My research builds on both poverty theory and theories of the welfare state. Where other poverty-related studies have looked at poverty through the lives and behaviors of poor people or poor communities, my focus is on the apparatus of the state, or the specific institutions that are implementing poverty policy. Where welfare state theorists concentrate on particular tensions or shortcomings within the US welfare state, I follow the current contradictions within the state through the practices of the local state and the agencies and institutions that must make sense of them.

A significant body of literature has developed that examines either particular processes or outcomes associated with HOPE VI. This research project looks at how the entities within the local state go about doing the work of redeveloping public housing. Rather than explicitly contribute to the poverty or welfare state literature, most of the research on HOPE VI has been directed at program evaluations and new generations of HOPE VI policy (CCC, 2003; NHLP, 2002; Popkin et al., 2004). My research fills this gap by first by considering HOPE VI widely and capturing the new generation of local HOPE VI-style initiatives such as Hope SF. Second, I look at this entire effort as a project of poverty management with specific tensions and dynamics that emerge from its unique institutional and spatial arrangements. I examine the discourses, practices, and relationships that shape how the program is implemented by the Mayor’s Office of Housing, not for the purpose of evaluation but in order to make sense of the historical and social processes of poverty management embedded in those practices. This research considers these dynamics in terms of how they are transforming the landscape of poverty and opportunity in San Francisco while creating new spaces of poverty management.

Hope SF is a local variation on HOPE VI. It builds on the city’s experience with earlier HOPE VI projects and on the national experience of HOPE VI best practices. HOPE VI was a reform-minded program. Consistent with the more general efforts to reorganize the welfare state, this program was an attempt to transform the practice of public housing in the US. It also dealt
explicitly with the question of space. “A central premise of HOPE VI—and the broader public housing transformation effort that began in the 1990s—is that it would be possible to improve the lives of public housing residents by either helping them to relocate to better neighborhoods, or creating a new, healthier community on-site (Popkin et al, 2004).” In the program’s rhetoric, environmental change leads to specific changes in residents and surrounding neighborhoods. These changes then lead to increased economic opportunity and decreased racial segregation. Advocates of this policy claim it will break open existing spaces of social control, exclusion, and regulation and replace them with spaces that are more prosperous, integrated, and free. Hope SF continues in this tradition, although it changes the means of achieving positive neighborhood effects by increasing density rather than dispersing residents. However, it is this aspect of the program, that it is rooted in physical space both through the redesign of structures and the relocation of public housing residents, provides an excellent opportunity to investigate my claims regarding a new geography of poverty management.

Research Methodology
In order to analyze the geographies of poverty management, this project focuses on one paradigmatic case, Hope SF, to illuminate the local structures and processes that comprise poverty management in the US. It captures this project at the very earliest stages of its development as it begins to take shape in the public arena and within the institutional infrastructure of the city.

This research project is located in the following institutional sites:

1. The San Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA). This includes the executive director, staff, and housing commissioners.

2. The City of San Francisco family. These are the various agencies and departments within the city civil service that have some involvement with Hope SF. I interviewed people from the Mayor’s Office of Housing, the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, the Human Services Agency, the Mayors Office of Economic and Workforce Development, the Mayor’s Office of Community Investment, the Department of Public Works, Communities of Opportunity, the Planning Department, and the office of Supervisor Sophie Maxwell.

3. The Hunters View Community Partners. This is the development team for the Hunters View site. It includes the John Stewart Company, Devine and Gong, Ridgepoint Non-profit Community Housing Corporation, and the various consultants they employed during the period of time that I was following the project.

4. Tenant associations and advocacy groups. This includes the Hunters View Tenants Association, Hunters Point Project Area Committee, Housing Rights Committee of San Francisco, Council for Community Housing Organizations, and Coleman Advocates for Children and Youth.

I utilized the following research techniques as part of this dissertation project:

1. Interviews. All interviews were semi-structured and lasted approximately and hour and a half. I conducted these interviews in person. The interviewees were selected on the basis of purposive sampling. They included staff and executive directors from SFHA, representatives from the development team, staff from city agencies, staff from community-based organizations, consultants working on the Hunters View project, and policy-makers. I interviewed many of the individuals who served on the Mayor’s Public Housing Taskforce. I interviewed the individuals
working on the frontline of the Hunters View project in the city agencies involved in the project. I interviewed frontline staff from the Mayor’s Office of Housing, the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, SFHA, and the development team on multiple occasions.

2. Direct observation. In order to understand how those leading the project made sense of their actions, I needed to be able to study them in their own time and space, engaged in their everyday work. Whenever the possibility presented itself, I put myself in the arenas of knowledge production, decision-making, and institutional practice. My role for this project included both complete observer and observer as participant. I was not able to observe the daily practices of any one agency as I had hoped initially, but I did observe many instances of inter-agency interaction. I observed local hearings and public meetings as well as the tenant’s meetings at Hunters View. I also participated as a member of the public housing taskforce.

The technique of participant observation allows the researcher the opportunity to experience the ordinary routines and the conditions of daily life within a particular site or field. Through direct observation of how people act, the researcher is able to learn how people understand and experience those acts. Words are juxtaposed with actions. Meaning and understanding are revealed (Burawoy et al., 1991). In the case of institutions, rules, policies, and hierarchy are broken down and reconstructed in the face of observation. Daily practices acquire meaning as they are studied over time. The presence and practice of power is identified. These and other ethnographic approaches allow the researcher to learn about a particular social situation, but also from that situation.
D. Investigating the Sorted City

*The gay tolerance of San Francisco could accept, and be congenial to, all those with artistic talents or aspirations, to those who suffer from aspen-like sensitivity, to circle-squarers and amateur philosophers, to yearners for the infinite, to rebels against routine, and to those who, for no reason they could precisely define balk at the idea of the one-family suburban house with radio and refrigerators, babies, and golf.*

-Alex Small  
*The Chicago Tribune* (1945)

This dissertation argues that San Francisco’s Hope SF Initiative facilitates a geography of differentiated poverty in the city where poor households are pinned to a particular location, closely managed, connected to local workforce needs, and balanced on the threshold of exception. While the lives of some public housing residents will be greatly improved as the result of Hope SF, others will lose not just their housing, but their right to remain in the city.

I have located my research in San Francisco because of the city’s attributes, its history, and its political culture. San Francisco is a prosperous city, a global city, and a progressive city. The prosperity of the city provides it with resources that may not be available in other places. The Hope SF model relies on land values to help finance the deal. Demand for property is high in San Francisco, and the city has some of the highest home prices in the country. This prosperity has created challenges in terms of housing affordability, but also opportunity. City officials do not have to worry about attracting people to live in the city. The demand for San Francisco itself seems to have no ceiling. The Hope SF program is in part a creative attempt on the part of the city’s mayor and MOH to leverage that demand to improve the housing for the city’s poor and low income residents. Not every city in the United States is experiencing the same growth, demand, and prosperity as San Francisco. However, I was looking for this type of context, a city where opportunity is possible, in order to see what was possible when the work was situated within a highly beneficial context.

San Francisco is in many ways a typical twenty-first century city. It a city of shifting boundaries, at times a singular entity, at other times, one component of a larger metropolitan region, and at still other times, a node in the global economy. San Francisco is a city of spectacle that promises the luxurious and the fantastic to tourists seeking entertainment and new experiences. It is also a city of growing inequality, where the very rich and very poor live in close proximity and the middle class is finding itself priced out of the city. Finally, San Francisco is an entrepreneurial city. City leaders seek to maintain their spot on the global map by becoming the city that does everything right – the best environmental protection, the best parks, the best social programs, the best green building, the best restaurants. In San Francisco, homeless policy and workforce development programs are counted on the city’s of attributes. Redeveloped public housing is placed next to other urban megaprojects as signs of the city’s growth and prosperity. Redeveloped public housing projects are on their way to becoming the city’s most recent monuments to its progressive sensibilities. Something that the mayor and other city officials can tout as proof that San Francisco is both a city of prosperity and a city of justice.

San Francisco is the iconic progressive city, a place known for its left-leaning politics and tolerant social mores. Political scientist Richard DeLeon writes “San Francisco is an agitated city, a city of fissions and fusions, a breeder of change and new urban meanings. It is the
spawning ground of social movements, policy innovations, and closely watched experiments in urban populism and local economic democracy” (1992, 2). Here, candidates from the leftist outsider Green party stand a better chance of winning elections than do Republicans; politically charged issues such as marriage equality for gay and lesbian people and medical marijuana are embraced by the city’s residents and its political leaders; and residents are quick to march against war and injustice, which includes gentrification and the lack of affordable housing for low-income people. In the political culture of San Francisco, progressive values are the norm and dissent is expected and accommodated. Furthermore, San Francisco has a housing movement that is well established and researched and that dates back to efforts to fight urban renewal and the displacement of low-income families in the 1960s and rent control campaigns of the 1970s (Hartman, 2002). It is staffed by seasoned veterans who understand the city’s political environment and know how to keep their concerns in the forefront of any discussion about development. These people do not always win, but they know how to keep fighting.
E. Overview of the Dissertation

This introduction provides an overview of the case, the research methods, and the theoretical framework for the project. The following chapters lay out my findings and analysis. They provide more detail about San Francisco as a site of poverty management, Hunters View as both the pilot project for Hope SF, but also the imagined result of a city where poverty has been sorted and each piece put in its place. The following chapters provide a great deal more detail about the Hope SF case itself. While the innovations of the program are numerous and the potential details endless, what I have chosen to include here are those stories which best illuminate the dynamics of sorting at work and the dynamic institutional relationships that make the sorting possible.

Chapter two is titled, “From the Fillmore to Hope SF: Three Moments of Redevelopment in the Progressive City.” It starts off the dissertation with an examination of redevelopment in San Francisco at three moments in time: urban renewal in the 1960s and 1970s, HOPE VI in the 1990s and early 2000s, and Hope SF in the late 2000s and beyond. While these are not the only examples of the redevelopment of poverty places in San Francisco, each has a particular connection to the current practice that is important. Each affected the local geographies of poverty in different ways that are still reflected in the city’s human and economic landscape.

Urban renewal was responsible for the destruction of the Fillmore neighborhood in San Francisco’s Western Addition area. The Fillmore was home to a vibrant African American community with connections to the national jazz scene. Few of the displaced families ever returned to the area and it continues to serve as a warning for government intervention gone wrong in the city, especially regarding the city’s African American community.

While the HOPE VI program has a guiding set of objectives that unite most of the HOPE VI projects across the country, its implementation still looks different in different places. Cities such as Chicago, Atlanta, and Seattle are held up as examples and discussed across the country, both within the professional associations serving housing authorities as well as the developer community and the general public. Where the Chicago model emphasizes the deconcentration of poverty, Atlanta’s emphasizes values, and Seattle’s emphasizes community-building, San Francisco offers a progressive model of HOPE VI that emphasizes development done well. The San Francisco approach includes resident participation, a minimal loss of units, and partnerships between affordable housing developers and neighborhood-based community development corporations. Local experience with HOPE VI and the lessons learned from those efforts formed the foundation for the Hope SF program.

Hope SF picks up where HOPE VI left off. The two programs may not stay mutually exclusive. Each HOPE VI project is likely to apply for HOPE VI funding. However, during the course of this dissertation, the two existed separately in time. They also existed separately in space. HOPE VI projects happened in neighborhoods that were already experiencing gentrification. Hope SF projects will serve as the leading edge of gentrification in their neighborhoods. Most importantly, Hope SF is a program conceived of and enacted by the local state. In this sense it is both a continuation of and a significant departure from earlier efforts. This section lays out the origins of Hope SF, which will serve as the foundation for the rest of the dissertation.

Chapter Three explores the construction and meaning of the Hunters View imaginary. It starts with a brief history of the Hunters View community from its founding in the 1800s through to the present. I argue that Hunters View has been a community apart from the city’s mainstream for more years than not and has never been well served by either the city or SFHA. Next I
consider the recent emergence of Hunters View into the public consciousness as a pilot project for Hope SF. I argue that the confluence of several factors including African American outmigration in the city, developer relationships, and the release of a documentary film helped make this site an important place to begin the Hope SF program. Finally, I examine the changing discourse regarding public housing in San Francisco and relate it to the emergence of a Hunters View imaginary. Here, the underclass debates of the previous three decades are put aside as public housing residents become worthy public neighbors and the act of redevelopment becomes endowed with the symbols of justice, opportunity, and inclusion.

Chapter Four asks whether the redevelopment of Hunters View can be considered gentrification. This project defines gentrification as the class transformation of a neighborhood. I argue that a project such as the redevelopment of Hunters View can be considered gentrification even if the existing housing stock is not being reused and residents are not displaced. The Hope SF program minimizes displacement through the one-for-one replacement of public housing units, the addition of affordable tax-credit financed units to the site, and a policy of phased development that keeps residents on site during construction. I argue that Hope SF is an example of gentrification in the public interest. The financial model for the program depends on gentrification in two ways: (1) the city finances at least past of its commitment to the program by borrowing against future tax revenues from the site, and (2) the valorization of public land is used to provide a cross subsidy for the redevelopment of the public housing units on the site. I consider what the class transformation of a public housing site such as Hunters View means for the city in terms of affordability and the opportunity for very low-income families to find places to live that are sustainable over time.

While redevelopment provides a fairly straightforward path for the integration of the Hunters View real estate into the social and economic mainstream of the city, Hope SF targets both people and places. It promises the return of both real estate and residents into the fabric of the city. Chapter four argues that sorting requires three different components: (1) bodies in motion, (2) the threshold, and (3) processes for carrying out differentiation. Because Hope SF is still in its infancy and the first project has yet to break ground, this chapter considers possible outcomes based on the plans of the project at the time of my research. It identifies the processes that are in place and considers their meaning in terms of both sorting and space in San Francisco.
II. FROM THE FILLMORE TO HOPE SF: THREE MOMENTS OF REDEVELOPMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE CITY

It's hard to argue with a program that knocks down dilapidated public housing and builds modern buildings in their stead.

- Rachel Peterson
SPUR Newsletter (2005)

This chapter examines three moments in the history of San Francisco when the practice of redevelopment was used as a strategy to address both urban development and poverty management. The first is the urban renewal efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, specifically the demolition of the Fillmore neighborhood. The second is SFHA’s implementation of the HOPE VI program in the 1990s and early 2000s. Through HOPE VI, SFHA redeveloped five public housing properties that were located in neighborhoods of economic import to the city close to the central business district. The third is Hope SF and a renewed effort to finish up what HOPE VI left undone. The city’s experiences with both urban renewal and HOPE VI have helped to shape Hope SF. Each of these redevelopment efforts has contributed to the geographies of poverty present in the city today.
A. Remember the Fillmore: The Legacy of Urban Renewal in San Francisco

_The story of redevelopment in the Fillmore District has been told enough times that it has become our own cautionary tale about the evils of urban renewal._

_San Francisco Weekly (2002)_

When residents of San Francisco mention the “The Fillmore,” most likely they are referring to a subarea of San Francisco’s Western Addition neighborhood that once served as the cultural center of African American life in the city. This community was demolished in the 1960s and 1970s as part of the city’s efforts at urban renewal. Redevelopment in the Fillmore encompassed several projects that were officially called the Western Addition A-1 Urban Renewal Project and the Western Addition A-2 Urban Renewal Project. Demolition ignited community organizing in the 1960s, but it came too late to stop most of the destruction. Ultimately a vast area of the Fillmore neighborhood was demolished and thousands of African American households and businesses were displaced. Simultaneous redevelopment of the war time housing in Hunters Point presented an opportunity to relocate many displaced households to the more remote and more poorly served Hunters Point neighborhood. The result was the further isolation of San Francisco’s African American community.

Federal Policy and Urban Renewal

From the earliest days of the public housing debates within the US, federal policy has attempted to rectify the tension between a need to provide housing for the most poor and a conviction that the market is the best vehicle for the creation and distribution of housing. In their analysis of why US housing policy has failed to provide for a right to housing in the US, Peter Marcuse and W. Dennis Keating conclude that “Liberals and conservatives agree that the market should be the expected provider of housing for all, with the government acting only where the for-profit market ‘fails’ (2006, p.139).” The persistent decentralization of housing policy and its enduring emphasis on slum clearance, middle-class subsidies, and homeownership provide further evidence of a market-first orientation.

Ideas, institutions, and actors or interests all help to shape a given policy regime. With housing, it has been ideology, and not need or demand, that has determined “if” and “how” the government becomes involved; and the issues that shaped the debates more than seventy years ago continue to shape the debates today (Smith, 2006). These debates include the proper role of government in the provision of housing, the right to housing, state responsibilities to the poor, and how housing shapes the lives of those who inhabit it, in particular poor people. “The idealism of public housing advocates has often taken the form of environmental determinism, a belief that an improved residential environment will better the behavior as well as the conditions of its inhabitants (von Hoffman, 1996, p. 242).” Real estate interests argued to include slum clearance as part of a public housing program in order to prevent government interference with the market. Housing advocates made the same argument because they believed that rehousing families would cure the social ills of the city and eliminate slums from the urban landscape (Birch, 1975).

The National Industrial Recovery Act (1933) instructed the Public Works Administration (PWA) to engage in the “construction, reconstruction, alteration, or repair under public regulation or control of low-cost housing and slum clearance projects.” The legislation was intended primarily as a means to generate jobs, and slum clearance was included only at the
urging of housing reformers (von Hoffman, 1996). The Housing Division of the PWA administered the program and built between 20,000 and 25,000 units of housing within 4 years. When a federal court ruling (Unites States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville) determined that it was unconstitutional for the WPA to condemn land for housing construction, PWA ended their direct construction program. With the support of national real estate interests, cities had used the program to generate jobs and clear slum areas. Without a parallel tract that matched construction with clearance, the program could not generate sufficient political support to continue (Marcuse and Keating, 2006).

The Housing Act of 1937 established publicly owned and operated housing as a permanent part of the US welfare state for the first time. However, it also continued to link slum eradication to public housing construction. An equivalent elimination clause required local PHAs to demolish one slum unit for every new unit of public housing constructed. Income limitation meant that only those whose incomes were 20% below where market rate housing was affordable (those who would be unable to participate in the housing market on their own) would qualify for public housing. The 1937 Act also put into place the decentralized structure for public housing programs that continues in to the present. It established local public housing authorities, empowered through local authorizing legislation, as the entities that would own public housing properties and be responsible for assembling land, constructing new housing, and managing properties. While the Certain Lands ruling established that the federal government did not have the ability to use eminent domain, states did, and they could delegate that power to local authorities (Marcuse and Keating, 2006).

The Housing Act of 1949 is the legislation most associated with the urban renewal efforts of the 1950s and 1960s. Title I of the Act authorized “the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas,” and “the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family.” It reasoned that these two components, when taken together, would contribute to the development and redevelopment of the Nation’s communities (section 2 of the Act). Again, the construction of public housing is linked to the elimination of slum housing.

The Act allocated $1.5 billion for grants to local jurisdictions for urban renewal and allowed city leaders to determine both what counted as blighted urban areas and what were higher and better uses. The initial language of the Act stated that redevelopment should target areas that were predominantly residential, although this stipulation faded over time (Hall, 1988). Federal subsidies would cover up to two thirds of project costs, with the remaining costs covered by local government expenditures and earnings from the sale of land to private developers. The Act required states to have matching legislation to authorize local redevelopment agencies. Funding required that localities produced a redevelopment plan that was approved by a local legislative body and that included provisions for the temporary relocation of any displaced families. Local redevelopment agencies were empowered to purchase and sell land, exercise eminent domain, rehabilitate or raze buildings, and contract private developers to construct housing, commercial areas, and infrastructure.

The most controversial part of the 1949 Act was not Title I and urban renewal, it was Title III and the designation of national production goals for public housing. The final language of the Act represented a “strange but successful coalition of conservative and radical interests (p.228),” bringing together progressive housing advocates such as Catherine Bauer and the construction unions with anti-public housing forces led by the National Association of Real Estate Boards and the Urban Land Institute (Hall, 1988). The Act authorized the construction of
810,000 public housing units and provided money to finance construction and development of public housing properties. These were to be built primarily on land cleared through urban renewal as a way to replace lost units, although in practice they were often built in other parts of the city when they were built at all. Maintenance and operations costs would be covered by rents. In this framework, public housing and urban renewal worked hand-in-hand as strategies to reorganize the urban landscape. Poverty housing would be consolidated, regularized, and contained.

Urban Historian Peter Hall wrote of urban renewal, “In city after city – Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Hartford, Boston, San Francisco – the areas that were cleared were the low-income black sections next to the central business district; and the promised alternative housing did not materialize because ‘public housing, like the Moor in Othello, had done its reverence in justifying urban renewal and could now go (1988, p.229).’ The uneasy coalition that made the legislation possible did not hold together once cities and local housing authorities began to implement it. Housing advocates who had hoped to create a public housing program that housed the majority of Americans settled for experiments that put poor families in the modernist high rise towers that they had once hoped would remake the entire city. Meant to distinguish public housing communities in a positive way, it ultimately served to further differentiate and isolate inhabitants from the rest of the city (von Hoffman, 1996).

African American migrants, other poor communities, and communities of color were displaced from city cultural cores and downtown business districts as their homes were acquired by the city through eminent domain. Next, the dispersed population was relocated to communities that were now more isolated and more segregated. These practices were implemented and maintained through tools of the local state such as zoning, racially restricted covenants, and discriminatory lending practices as well as the siting of new public housing. As middle class white families suburbanized en-masse in the 1950s, public housing as well as institutionalized discrimination in the housing market served to anchor many poor families of color to ghettos within the inner city. “In the coming decades neighborhood-based strategies for addressing poverty would be increasingly shaped by the fact and consequences of urban African Americans’ physical, social, and economic exclusion from the life of the larger society (Halpern, 1995, 58-59).”

**Urban Renewal Comes to San Francisco**

In San Francisco, urban renewal is the purview of the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA). SFRA was incorporated on August 10, 1948 under the provisions of the California Community Redevelopment Law for the purpose of improving the environment of the city and creating better urban living conditions through the removal of blight. The Agency operates primarily in redevelopment project areas designated by the Board of Supervisors. Seven Commissioners appointed by the Mayor and approved by the Board of Supervisors govern the Agency. The Commission makes all policy determinations for the implementation of the Agency's programs. The Executive Director is charged with implementing all activities authorized in redevelopment plans and for other special projects in accordance with policies defined by the Commission (SFRA website, 2009). The agency has broad-ranging political and economic powers. As Frederick Wirt notes:

Like its counterparts in other cities, SFRA is a compound of public and private powers that provides a touch of the corporate state to local government in America. It can make and implement its own plans, move people from one section
of town to another, arrange massive sums for financing, condemn property, and promote all its wonders (1974, pp.297-298).

Going into World War II, San Francisco was already a center of banking, business services, and corporate headquarters with a well-developed set of non-profit and public service institutions (Mollenkopf, 1983). It was also a union town with a booming manufacturing and industrial base which operated primarily in connection to the city’s ports. The war expanded the city’s industrial capabilities, but many of those jobs ended with the war. By 1960, San Francisco had experienced a significant reduction in its construction, manufacturing, and industrial jobs while employment in areas such as finance, insurance, real estate, and business services was on the rise. Urban renewal brought federal funds to the city while allowing city leaders to accomplish many different objectives simultaneously: generate construction employment, provide a favorable setting for the new service economy, remove blighted areas, displace the poor and minorities, improve the urban environment, keep middle class residents, and reduce the flight of high income taxpayers to the suburbs (Castells, 1983).

Stifled by political exhaustion that stemmed from entrenched patronage practices, fiscal constraints, growing need for public investments, and a tradition of allowing the private-market land use decisions, elected officials were slow to address the need for change after World War II; and SFRA accomplished little in its first decade (Mollenkopf, 1983). Business interests had a history of involvement in planning issues in the Bay Area and combined with their advocacy partners, Bay Area Council (BAC), the Blyth-Zellerbach Committee, and the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association (SPUR), formed a vocal constituency in favor of redevelopment in the city. In 1956, San Francisco’s Mayor was George Christopher, a Republican and small businessman who was wary of large scale urban renewal. When he won reelection in 1959 with the backing of downtown business interests, Christopher became a supporter of redevelopment. A pro-growth collation took shape which brought together downtown business elites, pro-growth political leaders, city planning professionals, more powerful administrators, and development interests (Mollenkopf, 1983). Christopher appointed the powerful and experienced M. Justin Herman as director of SFRA. With the backing of what Chester Hartman calls “The Redevelopment Booster Club,” and the technical skills and aspirations of Herman, Christopher pushed San Francisco’s urban renewal program into full swing. (Mollenkopf, 1983; Hartman, 2002; Castells, 1983).

Western Addition Project Areas 1 and 2

By the 1940s, the Western Addition neighborhood, located just to the west of city hall and minutes from the central business district, had become a focal point for Black and Japanese migration to the city. The neighborhood was one of the few areas in the city that had not been destroyed by the 1906 earthquake. Its housing stock included many stately Victorians often subdivided to create a greater number of units. Because of the proliferation of racially restricted covenants within the city, Western Addition was one of the few neighborhoods where African American families could purchase homes (Broussard, 1993). World War II initiated the movement of the two most populous groups within the neighborhood. Japanese families were relocated to internment camps at the same time that Black families came to the city looking for employment in wartime industries. The removal of Japanese families from their homes created empty units that were quickly appropriated as housing for the new migrants. One of the primary commercial strips through the neighborhood, Fillmore Street, became a hub for local African
American life and in particular a center of Jazz. It gained a reputation as the Harlem of the West Coast.

In 1945, the San Francisco City Planning Commission declared almost the entire housing stock of the neighborhood as blighted. In 1947, the San Francisco Planning and Housing Association published a pamphlet criticizing the blight of the area and generating concern for its affects on the rest of the city. In 1947, planning consultant Mel Scott completed a study which found the area to be substandard with more than half of the dwelling units in need of major repair or altogether uninhabitable. Scott criticized the unplanned nature of the neighborhood including its indiscriminate mix of uses, rear dwellings, and odd residential structures as examples of the neighborhood’s blight. He went so far as to link these physical attributes of the neighborhood to social pathologies such as juvenile delinquency, infant mortality, and vice. He recommended the city immediately embark on a formal program of redeveloping the neighborhood (Mollenkopf, 1983). Scott also made an explicit argument about how redevelopment could be expected to change the racial composition of the neighborhood:

The presence in the Western Addition District of a high proportion of negro and foreign born families presents a special problem. As was pointed out earlier, about 26% of the population in this District consists of Negroes, and another 9% Japanese, Chinese, and other foreign nationalities. In view of the characteristically low income of colored and foreign-born families, only a relatively small proportion of them may be expected to occupy quarters in the new development. (quoted in Klein, 2008, 16-17)

The removal of African American families was not an unfortunate by-product of the redevelopment of the Fillmore, but one of its intents.

Urban renewal was a program of economic development for cities and downtown business districts and not an initiative to relieve poverty. To the extent that it pertained to poverty management, the program relied heavily on arguments of environmental determinism. Much like the tenement house arguments at the turn of the Twentieth Century, advocates of urban renewal in San Francisco argued that blighted slum areas within the city were contributing to deviant behaviors of the people residing in the neighborhood as well as poverty, crime, poor health, and fire and safety concerns. Advocates of this approach argued that if left uncorrected, such areas contained the risk of contagion and the possibility of a general economic downslide of the rest of the city. Most of the areas targeted for urban renewal were located in or near the central business district and populated by African American households. City leaders were concerned that the underutilization of such valuable land would prove disastrous for the city’s economic well-being.

Largely in response to Scott’s report, the Western Addition was first designated a redevelopment area by San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors in 1948. The plan connected the redevelopment project to the economic well-being of the city by arguing that building and streetscape improvements would attract new business customers, residents and visitors to the Fillmore (SFRA, Western Addition A-1 webpage, 2009). The redevelopment of the neighborhood was carried out in two phases: Project A-1 and project A-2. The Western Addition A-1 Urban renewal project was established on May 28, 1956. On their webpage regarding this project, the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency provides the following description of their redevelopment work in this area:

Before redevelopment, the project area included 108 acres, of which 37 acres were streets, 13 acres were public parks, schools and institutional uses, 43 acres
were residential uses, and 15 acres were commercial and industrial uses. The population was 6,112. After redevelopment, it was envisioned that the residential uses would decrease to 29 acres, the parks, schools and institutional uses would increase to 25 acres, the industrial uses would be eliminated, and the population of the area would decrease to 3,724 (SFRA, Western Addition A-1 webpage, 2009).

Specific aspects of the plan included the widening of Geary Boulevard (the main thoroughfare connecting central San Francisco with the northwestern part of the city), the development of housing, a playfield, expanded school sites, St. Mary's Cathedral, the Japanese Cultural and Trade Center and medical facilities. A total of 2,009 new housing units were constructed in the A-1 Area.

Some four thousand families were moved out of the A-1 area in the 1960s when their properties or the homes they were renting were taken by the city using the powers of eminent domain. Many of these families moved into other parts of the Western Addition or the Bayview-Hunters Point neighborhood. While redevelopment changed the physical characteristics of a large piece of the neighborhood, it only compounded problems such as overcrowding in the rest of the neighborhood. It did nothing to improve the economic and social conditions of the neighborhood’s African American residents.

By the late 1960s, the Fillmore district had become the same kind of institutional and physical ghetto that had emerged in Chicago and Cleveland during the First World War. San Francisco’s image as a racially progressive city bore little relationship to the status of most blacks by the 1960s. (Broussard, 1993)

The Western Addition A-2 Project followed in 1964. This project area was significantly larger than the first, affecting more than 90 blocks. The Redevelopment Plan for the A-2 project area described the area as predominantly residential. The blight conditions it identified included, “residential buildings unfit and unsafe for occupancy; mixed and shifting uses; overcrowded dwelling units; inadequate provision for ventilation, light, sanitation and open spaces; obsolete platting; economic dislocation; and depressed property values.” It argued that these conditions contributed to problems in areas of health, safety, crime, and juvenile delinquency, as well as fire and accident prevention (SFRA, 2005).

This time, the agency ran into stiff community opposition. The Western Addition Community Organization (WACO) formed in the 1960s to lead the battle against further displacement in the neighborhood. When the A-2 Plan was approved, they immediately filed a lawsuit to stop redevelopment in the neighborhood. Ultimately, their legal action failed; however, “The success of the lawsuit caused a change in federal law on how redevelopment agencies were to implement their programs (SFRA, Western Addition A-1 webpage, 2009).” As a result of the neighborhood revolt, SFRA became more responsive to neighborhood groups, appointed African Americans to its board, began to monitor displacement more carefully, and began to invest in the construction of more affordable housing (DeLeon, 1992).

Between the two projects, hundreds of city blocks were torn down and rebuilt. In the process, businesses were shut down and thousands of families were displaced, sometimes more than once.

A U.S. Comptroller General’s study of SFRA files on Western Addition A-1 relocatees listed as satisfactorily closed found that nearly half of those examined had moved to unsatisfactory housing or were forced to accept massive rent
increases. About one-fourth of the dislocated A- residents were moved into deteriorated housing in the A-2 area and subsequently forced to undergo relocation a second time. (Hartman, 2002, p.64)

Property owners were compensated for their land and given Certificates of Preference which entitled them to priority on future sales of land in the area or spaces in city-funded affordable housing projects; however few were able to take advantage of the preference as luxury towers replaced affordable rentals and property values skyrocketed. All in all, approximately 5,625 certificates were issued. In 1998, almost 4,000 remained unused (Wagner, 1998). While replacement housing was built as part of both projects, it failed to replace the affordability of the lost units. Of the 2,009 new housing units constructed in the A-1 Area, 33% were federally subsidized for low and moderate income households and approximately 67% of the units were market rate.

A corollary redevelopment project to those in the Western Addition was the Hunters Point Project Area, which was active from 1969 – 2009. This area was part of the Bayview-Hunters Point neighborhood, the other predominantly African American community within the city. In its plan for the area, SFRA described it as a “137-acre hill area [that] was partly vacant land largely occupied by temporary wartime housing built by the federal government during World War II (San Francisco Redevelopment Agency website, 2009).” By 1969, the employment opportunities in the area were significantly diminished. While it enjoyed beautiful views and more space that the Fillmore, it was also more isolated with access to fewer city services. This redevelopment project tore down the temporary wartime housing that had been constructed for shipyard workers and replaced it with 1,750 units of new housing for low to moderate income families. Many Fillmore families found themselves relocated here.

The Western Addition A-1 project ended in the 1970s, but the A-2 Project did not officially end until January 1, 2009. It holds a place as one of the nation’s longest-running urban-renewal projects. The Redevelopment Agency that started the project is not the same agency as the one the serves the city today. However, while SFRA can point to the lessons learned and the units of affordable housing that were gained as a result of the project, the executive director himself acknowledges that “…none of that has been able to make up for the tremendous sense of loss the people who lived in the Western Addition feel in terms of the cultural fabric.” Activists, housing advocates, and especially the city’s remaining African American families continue to “Remember the Fillmore.”
B. HOPE VI in San Francisco: Redevelopment Continued

HOPE VI has been a laboratory for unprecedented innovation and a complete rethinking of the role of public housing in neighborhoods, cities, and national policy.

-Interview (February 28, 2007)

HOPE VI links poverty outcomes to place. The program uses redevelopment to fix dilapidated public housing and holds grand visions that the physical transformation of poor communities through improved design and income mixing will transform the life opportunities of poor households (von Hoffman, 1996). HOPE VI projects generally include a decrease in public housing units, the inclusion of non-public housing units, and a greater mix of incomes across the site. Public housing households are involuntarily displaced for redevelopment (Goetz, 2003). Here the geography of poverty becomes one of dispersal as public housing sites are rebuilt at lower densities and families are rehoused in other communities using housing vouchers. In the ideal, HOPE VI solves the problem of dense, isolated, crime-ridden projects that house only the most poor by replacing them with new communities that are more attractive, more integrated with their surroundings, and more mixed—both in terms of income and race.

In San Francisco, the HOPE VI program provided city leaders with an opportunity to return to their problem places on the map. This time the pockets of poverty were smaller and the redevelopment solution was much more specific. The city’s five HOPE VI projects targeted dilapidated public housing sites with a reputation for violence; but also developments in economically important neighborhoods that were already well into the process of gentrification. The projects with successful applications were located in neighborhoods close to the central business district: Western Addition, the Mission, and Fisherman’s Wharf. Explained one SFHA representative, with the HOPE VI model, “You need the community to be on a revitalization tract to have the investment sustained (Interview, March 5, 2007).”

San Francisco created a progressive model of HOPE VI, one that emphasized the preservation of affordable units on site and partnerships with affordable housing developers (Rongerude, 2007). Mixed income communities were achieved not by decreasing public housing units and bringing market rate units to the site, but by better integrating the public housing properties into the surrounding communities. At the same time, San Francisco’s HOPE VI program kept investment targeted at neighborhoods that were already integrated into the city—neighborhoods that were economically important as housing for upper middle class professionals, popular tourist destinations, and civic and cultural hubs for the city. Sunnydale, Hunters View, and the other developments on the periphery of the city had to wait.

The Changing Face of HOPE VI

HOPE VI has changed considerably over time. The initial goals of correcting obsolete physical design, deconcentrating poverty, adding community supportive services, and improving management practices, in short correcting problem projects, has shifted considerably over the years to emphasize goals of housing choice, neighborhood revitalization, mixed financing, and government reinvention. As the report “A Decade of HOPE VI” explains:

HOPE VI has not been “one program” with a clear set of consistent and unwavering goals. Rather, the program has evolved considerably during the past
In legislation, regulation, implementation, and practice. To an unusual extent, the program has been shaped more through implementation than by enactment. What was initially conceived as a redevelopment and community-building program evolved over time into a more ambitious effort to build economically integrated communities and give existing residents more choice in the private housing market. Because of the flexible nature of the program, local housing authorities have had tremendous latitude in how they chose to design and implement their local HOPE VI initiatives.

Yan Zhang identified four stages in the development of the HOPE VI program. Stage I (1993 – 1994) is more of the same in terms of housing policy. HUD stayed close to existing regulations governing public housing. NOFAs focused on revitalizing large, distressed projects through physical rehabilitation and/or reconstruction and supportive services. Stage II (1995 – 1997) was a period of significant public housing reform. Congress repealed a number of restrictions including one-for-one replacement and federal preferences for housing. HOPE VI redevelopment began to focus on demolition, the construction of mixed income communities, and the idea of housing choice. New Urbanist design and the concept of defensible space became important. Stage III (1997 – 2000) revolved around the enactment of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA), linking public housing reform to welfare reform. It added income-targeting policies and work requirements and promoted resident self-sufficiency. It further devolved authority from the federal government to state and local public housing authorities, permitting greater discretion in income targeting and deconcentration of poor residents. Stage VI (2001 – 2008) was a time of retrenchment. This phase focused on facilitating more flexibility in project financing, increasing program efficiency, and providing assistance to smaller PHAs (Zhang, 2004). During this time, allocations were scaled back significantly, although the program did continue. With a new administration in office, it remains to be seen what HOPE VI will look like into the future.

HOPE VI is emblematic of public housing in the post-welfare era. While it offers incremental improvements on previous approaches to poverty housing, the program does not increase supply, challenge prevalent assumptions of market supremacy as the mechanism for the delivery of housing services, or establish a right to housing in the US. Instead, HOPE VI asserts that public housing must be destroyed in order to be saved, not just in terms of the buildings, but also the underlying structure of the US public housing system. It pushes the responsibility for the redevelopment of severely distressed public housing properties toward local public housing authorities and lets the PHAs decide what properties to redevelop, how many public housing units to maintain, and how to structure financing. As a result, public housing shifts further away from the goals and restrictions of the welfare state toward a new life as a local initiative subject to the vagaries of local politics and priorities. Despite attempts by the Bush administration to end the program, it remains the dominant model for public housing in the US.

The Pre-HOPE VI Demolition of Public Housing in San Francisco

HOPE VI was not the City of San Francisco’s first introduction to the redevelopment of public housing. The city had been demolishing public housing since the 1960s when it tore down most of the temporary war worker housing constructed by the Navy. In the 1980s, SFHA redeveloped two of the public housing towers constructed as part of urban renewal in the Western Addition: the Annex to the Yerba Buena Plaza (known locally as the Pink Palace) and Yerba Buena Plaza West. These two developments were built in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
They accounted for 543 units of family housing. Plaza West was demolished and replaced with a new development, and the Annex was rehabbed and made into senior housing. After redevelopment, the properties included 198 units of senior housing and 211 units of family housing which amounted to a net loss of 134 units.

Geneva Towers was located in San Francisco’s Visitacion Valley neighborhood and was constructed by private developers to serve as housing for airport workers. The location of the project and its high rise design were unpopular and the developers were unable to achieve the rents they had hoped. In 1983, they sold the building to a syndicate formed by Associated Financial Corporation of Santa Monica, which owned thousands of low-income housing units nationwide. HUD acted as the lender for the investment group’s $22 million purchase of the property. After the owners repeatedly failed to repair life threatening maintenance problems in the buildings, HUD repossessed the property in 1991 and handed the management of the buildings over to SFHA (Chen and Burress, 1991). The physical conditions of the buildings continued to deteriorate, and SFHA demolished the towers in 1998 (The San Francisco Chronicle, 1998). The project replaced the original 576 family units located in two high rise towers with three different developments consisting of a total of 183 units of senior housing and 148 units of family housing. The developer, Mercy Housing, took over both management and ownership of the new properties. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the loss of affordable housing units that resulted from these three redevelopment projects.

Table 1. Redevelopment and Unit Counts (pre-HOPE VI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original number of family units</td>
<td>1,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total replacement units</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total FAMILY replacement units</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total loss of family units, pre-HOPE VI</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: San Francisco Housing Authority, San Francisco Chronicle

These experiments redeveloping public housing sites, and in particular the redevelopment of Yerba Buena Plaza West, were important pre-cursors to the city’s HOPE VI efforts. The redevelopment of Yerba Buena West into the Robert B. Pitts Plaza was one of the examples studied by the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH), and it was the only case study included in their final report (1992). The report noted that due to “a rare set of circumstances,” SFHA was allowed to demolish the previous structure and start from scratch. The report also noted that, “The impetus to rehabilitate the development was a combination of the City of San Francisco’s commitment to support affordable housing and HUDs support based on a settlement agreement to restore affordable housing to the Western Addition neighborhood following extensive ‘urban redevelopment’ of the area (p.E-4).”

The Yerba Buena case provided an example of several issues of interest to NCSDPH including a comprehensive design process, the willingness to keep a high rise design, the high costs required to modernize a high rise, the design of new construction, and resident involvement in the planning and design process (NCSDPH, 1992). While the final development represented a net loss of more than 100 units of public housing, the reduction in units was the result of funding limitations by HUD and not the preferences of SFHA. These characteristics (the emphasis on the design process, the willingness to maintain high densities at public housing sites, an emphasis on
preserving the site for affordable housing, and resident participation in the redevelopment process) continued to shape the redevelopment of public housing in San Francisco going forward.

San Francisco’s Model of Progressive HOPE VI

Each HOPE VI project is a unique development effort shaped by the local political, institutional, and economic context. Efforts can vary significantly from city to city and even from project to project within the same city, and as a result, it is difficult to generalize about HOPE VI outcomes or to talk about a single HOPE VI approach. However, certain cities have developed distinct models of HOPE VI which could be considered archetypal. Cities such as Chicago, Atlanta, and Seattle are held up as examples and discussed across the country, both within the professional associations serving housing authorities as well as the developer community and the general public. San Francisco offers another such model.

While Chicago is best known for the massive loss of units that has accompanied its redevelopment efforts, the San Francisco Housing Authority remains dedicated to protecting its supply of affordable housing. As a result, the loss of units in San Francisco has been minimal. While Atlanta emphasizes the creation of mixed-income communities where the majority of the units are market rate single family homes, San Francisco uses Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) dollars to fund its mixed income housing, combining public housing units where families are making 30 percent or less of the area median income with units for families making 30 to 60 percent of the area median income. Where the Seattle Housing Authority acts as its own developer for its HOPE VI projects, the San Francisco Housing Authority relies on the expertise of an extremely capable community of non-profit affordable housing developers. San Francisco offers a model of progressive HOPE VI where public housing has public support, resident voices are included in the development process, and public-private partnerships are mediated through the public-orientation of non-profit developers (Rongerude, 2007).

With its political connections and highly skilled non-profit development partners, the city has been effective in receiving and implementing HOPE VI grants. SFHA has received five HOPE VI grants dating back to the first round of grants in 1993, which means that San Francisco ranks fifth in total number of grants received. The city’s awards total $118.5 million. The city has leveraged an additional $186 million in private and public funds, bringing the combined revitalization funding for San Francisco’s HOPE VI sites to $304.5 million. While many agencies have struggled to complete their HOPE VI developments, all five of SFHA’s projects have been built and are fully occupied. San Francisco’s five HOPE VI projects are Bernal Dwellings, Plaza East, Hayes Valley, North Beach, and Valencia Gardens. See Figure 1 for a breakdown of the SFHA HOPE VI funding by project.
Consistent with San Francisco’s model of Progressive HOPE VI, each site minimizes a loss of units. When the new development has fewer units than the original site, this is somewhat offset by an increase in the number of bedrooms per unit. Tenant associations were active players in each of the projects, often serving as the relocation specialists who advised residents throughout the relocation process. In one case, opposition from the tenant association was enough to stop the project all together. In another, it resulted in significant delays until SFHA was willing to make concessions to residents. In the earliest rounds of HOPE VI funding, HUD encouraged the destruction of public housing towers and decreases in density in order to disperse concentrated poverty. As a result, the first three projects remained entirely public housing, even after redevelopment, although they did lose units. Later projects were built as mixed-income communities, but still stayed 100% affordable housing. See Table 2 for an overview of the final unit breakdowns for each project. SFHA chose to interpret mixed income as bringing together both very low-income and low-income families. Between the addition of affordable tax credit units at some sites and the new housing vouchers that SFHA was granted to help house families during relocation, the City of San Francisco experienced a net gain in affordable units from its HOPE VI program.

Table 2. Overview of SFHA’s 5 HOPE VI Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development name</th>
<th>Original # of units</th>
<th>Year built</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Final # of PH units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plaza East</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>192</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernal Dwellings</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayes Valley</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Beach</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>229</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia Gardens</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following is a brief description of each of San Francisco’s HOPE VI projects. The projects can be broken into two groups. The first set includes Plaza East, Bernal Dwellings, and
Hayes Valley. They predate the housing reform that characterized the second phase of HOPE VI projects. They are much more straightforward examples of efforts to improve physical design and decrease the density of the site. The developer is either SFHA or a large affordable housing developer with a national reputation. The second set includes North Beach and Valencia Gardens. These are much more creative projects that take advantage of regulatory changes that increased flexibility for PHAs to pursue mixed financing. The developers are high capacity local non-profit housing developers partnered with smaller, more community oriented development groups. The San Francisco economy was also in a dramatically different place from the recession of the early 1990s which characterized the first set of projects to the ever increasing upward trajectory of the late 1990s and the dot com boom. As a result, each set of projects included a different set of expectations for what could be accomplished through redevelopment.

**Plaza East**

HUD awarded SFHA its first HOPE VI grant in 1993. This project included two development sites: Plaza East and Bernal Dwellings. Both developments were towers built in the 1950s, when such designs were the apex of modernism, despite the fact that very little of the city’s residential housing stock was above three stories. Both project sites were located at the outer edge of gentrifying neighborhoods well serviced by transportation, schools, retail and commercial establishments, with easy access to a full range of urban amenities.

Plaza East was originally called Yerba Buena Plaza. It was the last remaining component of the complex of public housing towers built in the Western Addition during the urban renewal projects in the Fillmore. The original project had 276 units, mostly studio and one-bedroom. The new development replaced the high rise structure with Victorian style townhouses and flats for families. It included 193 units (19 1-bedroom, 105 2-bedroom, 50 3-bedroom and 19 4-bedroom). Every unit in the new project was designated for very low- and low-income, tax-credit eligible households earning no more than 60 percent of median income.

The development team for the project was McCormack Baron Salazar and Plaza East Housing Corporation, a nonprofit affiliate of the housing authority. The cost of the project was $43.2 million. HUD awarded SFHA $20.2 million in HOPE VI money for the project. The low-income housing tax credit equity financing for the project came from SunAmerica Corporation. SFHA contracted with McCormack Baron Management Services to manage the property after redevelopment.

**Bernal Dwellings**

This site was last minute addition to SFHA’s first HOPE VI request. Another development, Potrero Hill, had been part of the original plan. However, resident resistance was so strong that SFHA amended the proposal and replaced it with Bernal Dwellings. The Bernal Dwellings development was 208 units before demolition. The new development contained 160 new townhouses and flats. Construction was completed in September 2001.

The total cost of the project was $41.8 million. HUD awarded SFHA $29.9 for this site and the additional $11.9 came mostly from tax-credit financing. Financial partners included Bernal SPL, Inc (Special Limited Partner) and Bernal Financial Affordable Housing Fund II, LP (Investor Limited Partner). SFHA was the developer for this project. SFHA contracted with McCormack Baron Management Services to manage the property after redevelopment.
**Hayes Valley**

HUD awarded SFHA a HOPE VI grant for this site in 1995. Of San Francisco’s five HOPE VI sites, Hayes Valley had the worst conditions both in terms of the physical structures and the quality of life for residents. Built in 1962, the three-story barracks style structure was known as “Death Valley” because of the drugs, violence, and physical hazards associated with the development. The balconies which served as the external hallways of the building were falling away from the face of the structure, creating a significant hazard for resident safety. Neighborhood residents sued the San Francisco Housing Authority in 1990, saying it was responsible for muggings, shootings and other crimes that took place near the development. They lost in appeals court, but the suit put heavy pressure on SFHA to find solutions. This site was within visual range of City Hall and the surrounding area had become a trendy neighborhood with boutique shops and restaurants.

The total cost for redevelopment was $42.5 million. HUD granted SFHA a $22 million federal HOPE VI grant for the project. SFHA also used $15 million in low-income housing tax credit equity financing from SunAmerica Corporation. TRI Financial Corporation was the private sector financing partner. For Phase one of the project they provided a $1.7 million 40-year, FHA-insured, fixed-rate permanent construction loan. The phase two loan was approximately $2.3 million. TRI also provided underwriting and escrow services, and helped to usher the overall financing package through HUD. (Business Wire, 1997)

The HOPE VI project replaced the original 294 one-bedroom units with 195 low rise town houses with 1, 2, 3, or 4 bedrooms. Every unit in the new project is designated for very low- and low-income, tax-credit eligible households earning no more than 60 percent of median income. More than half of the units are reserved for residents earning far less than that. The development team included McCormack Baron and Related Companies of California, and a nonprofit affiliate of the housing authority, Hayes Valley Housing Corporation. They agreed to preserve all units for at this level of affordability for 75 years (Business Wire, 1997). The first half of the redeveloped site opened to residents in 1998, and the second half opened in 1999. This project was included in HUD’s baseline study of eight HOPE VI sites from across the country. Researchers noticed that this site had a much higher rate of return than the other HOPE VI sites and attributed this difference to the city’s extremely tight and expensive housing market (Buron, Popkin, et al, 2002).

**North Beach**

Built in 1952, the North Beach development was located near some of San Francisco’s biggest tourist destinations, including Fisherman’s Wharf and the cable car turnaround. The site consisted of 13 concrete buildings with 229 walk-up units across two city blocks. SFHA received a $400,000 HOPE VI planning grant from HUD in 1995 to study the site. They determined that due to the earthquake-weakened structures and the high crime rates of the neighborhood, neighborhood revitalization was necessary. When asked why North Beach was chosen as a HOPE VI site rather than a site in more severe physical distress, a city staff person replied, “It might not have been one of the Housing Authority’s top priorities, but it was definitely one of the city’s.” Mayor Willie Brown was in the office of the Secretary of HUD when he called the Executive Director of SFHA to let him know that the HOPE VI application for North Beach would be going forward (Interview, September 2006).

In 1996, at the time of their HOPE VI application for the North Beach site, SFHA estimated that this project would cost $69 million. Over time that number jumped to $106
million. HUD awarded SFHA a $20 million HOPE VI grant for North Beach in 1996; however, the agency had requested $30 million in its application and making up the missing $10 million proved to be difficult. Ultimately, the Mayor’s Office of Housing provided SFHA with the money on the condition that 112 affordable were units to the plan (GAO, 2003). The rest of the funding came from a variety of public and private sources. In 2001 HUD granted SFHA a $3.2 million HOPE VI demolition grant. The project received a $55 million 9% tax-credit allocation, the largest state or federal allocation since the program was created in 1986. Private-sector lenders for the project included Citibank and Related Capital. Citibank's interim financing of $56 million, of which $24 million converted to permanent financing at the completion of construction, was one of the largest loans of its kind in the company's nearly two-century history (Business Wire, 2004).

The revitalization plan called for 341 units including 229 public housing units (a one-for-one replacement for the units that were demolished) and 112 tax credit subsidized rental apartments for families with incomes below 50 percent of the city median income. The final development also included a parking garage for 323 cars and commercial and retail space surrounding the cable car turnaround area with Trader Joes, a specialty grocery store, as the anchor tenant. The development team for the project included BRIDGE Housing. The John Stewart Company and EM Johnson Interests developers. The John Stewart Company became the property managers for the redeveloped site once it opened in 2005.

Valencia Gardens

In 1943, SFHA built Valencia Gardens under the U.S. Housing Authority's slum clearance program. It was among the first developments constructed by SFHA and originally included 246 family units. By the time SFHA applied for HOPE VI funds to redevelop the site, the Mission neighborhood, where Valencia Gardens was located, had already become a focal point for local debates surrounding gentrification. This historically Irish then Latino neighborhood was minutes from downtown and serviced by two different stops on BART, the Bay Area Rapid Transit train system. The neighborhood had become a destination for nightlife and its largely Victorian housing stock was highly desirable. SFHA was awarded the HOPE VI grant for this project in 1997. Demolition began in 2002 and the site was reopened in 2006. The new development included 260 new units (218 family flats and 42 one-bedroom senior apartments).

SFHA’s development partner was Mission Housing Development Corporation. The total cost for the project was $71.7 million. Funding included a $23.2 HOPE VI grant. Project funders included: HUD; California Department of Housing and Community Development; the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency; Citibank Community Development; Federal Home Loan Bank; and tax credit equity from Alliant Capital Ltd. (Business Wire, 2005). The John Stewart Company became the property manager once the site was reoccupied.
C. San Francisco’s Hope SF Initiative

_Faced with the need to compete in the private real estate market while protecting the public interest, SFHA is rapidly adopting new and improved industry standards in operations and management, upgrading their staff, and above all, learning to lead complex, comprehensive redevelopment partnerships…The economic development generated by the SFHA’s [HOPE VI] model has been able to transform sources of community blight into engines of community renewal. One of SFHA's main goals is to replicate this form across the city's public housing sites._

- “Hope VI Transformation”
  San Francisco Housing Authority website (2009)

When the administration in Washington DC changed, so did the priorities of agencies such as HUD. HOPE VI fell out of favor, and San Francisco found itself unable to secure additional HOPE VI grants. Five projects had been redeveloped, but eight remained that were in far worse conditions than those that had been redeveloped. Hope SF began in several ways all at once. SFHA, the Mayor’s Office of Housing, the Communities of Opportunity Program, and the Mayor himself all claim a stake in starting the program. What is clear is that by 2004, eight public housing sites in the SFHA portfolio were generally accepted to be in severe distress. The lack of affordable housing in San Francisco had long reached crisis proportions, and Mayor Gavin Newsom came into office with the triple priorities of ending homelessness, decreasing poverty, and creating more affordable housing – all while increasing the economic prosperity of the city. Hope SF was born at the confluence of these events.

SFHA and Hunters View

Like local public housing authorities across the country, SFHA was the traditional entity responsible for the construction, management, and maintenance of the city’s public housing. After the agency’s most strategic sites had been redeveloped through HOPE VI, SFHA turned its attention to the sites it judged as the most physically and socially distressed. The agency identified eight sites which included approximately 2500 units. Most of these were located in the southeastern quadrant of the city, primarily in the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood. On May 27, 1999 SFHA submitted their first HOPE VI application for the Hunters View site. The application requested $34,984,274 in HOPE VI monies from which SFHA planned to leverage an additional $29.9 million in capital and community and supportive services funding and $23.8 million in tax exempt bonds. The opening pages of the application presented a familiar picture of decaying public housing buildings and dependent public housing residents:

Located in the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood (Bayview) in San Francisco, Hunters View, is severely distressed due to its 43 years of age, inadequate capital funding, profusion of toxic lead and asbestos, hazardous outdated mechanical and electrical systems, woefully deficient infrastructure, poor site configuration, indefensible open space and absence of accessibility for the physically disabled. The 1997-1998 El Niño storms ravaged the buildings and site to disaster proportions resulting in Presidential declarations of San Francisco as a Federal Disaster Area.
The extent of need for comprehensive revitalization is also based on residents’ socioeconomic indicators reflecting high unemployment, low incomes, low levels of educational attainment and high rates of single parent households and TANF recipients. Residents who are TANF recipients are now under enormous pressure to stabilize their lives, gain training and become employed. (SFHA, 1999, p.1)

Hunters View was not a large development. It originally consisted of fifty-five two-story and three-story buildings containing 10 one-bedroom units, 130 two-bedroom units, 112 three-bedroom units, 64 four-bedroom units, and 9 five-bedroom units. The terrain was hilly and isolated. Four private streets divided the property into three super-blocks and only one of those roads connected the site to the rest of the city. The physical design of the buildings was utilitarian. The barracks-style structures were sited both parallel and at angles to the street, most likely positioned to take best advantage of the views. They were wood frame construction with flat roofs and stucco walls. The exterior facing was plywood siding or cement plaster coated with lead based paint. Parking lots were situated around remote cul-de-sacs. In the 1980s four buildings were demolished and eight units were mothballed.

Exhibit C of the application, “Existing Conditions & Need,” further detailed the conditions at the site in the categories of physical distress, impact on the neighborhood, demographic distress, need for funding, and need for affordable housing in the community. Physical distress included cracked and clogged sewer lines; caved or split retaining walls, foundations and stairs; damaged sidewalks; unsafe handrails; and after the El Niño storms in 1997-8, an eight-foot deep sink hole in one of the roads. Buildings contained lead-based paint, asbestos in the roofing materials, deteriorating walls, water leaks, dry rot, fungus growing in exposed insulation, deteriorated roofs, pest infiltration, and mildew.

The report included numerous examples of what could only be characterized as slum conditions on the site: “Extensive site settlement and soil erosion have cracked and clogged sewer lines, which frequently results in unsanitary and foul sewage collecting on site, oozing in public areas and play yards and backing up into units. (p.17)” “The distressed exterior sheathing not only has high levels of lead-based paint, but also is severely deteriorated. Deterioration includes incidental defects such as missing batten boards, gaps and holes in the siding, broken wood trim, and holes in the cement plaster walls. (p. 18)” “Deep and persistent ponding and deficient ponding and deficient flashing conditions exist on all roofs resulting in rotting the roof material. The stress of this water weight is grave and threatens the integrity of the structure. (p. 18)” Across the site, the roofing systems, plumbing systems, sewer systems, and electrical systems were all in disrepair. As reported by SFHA itself, the very integrity of the buildings was at risk.

The application also noted the site’s potential for redevelopment:

“The site is severely underutilized, particularly in view of San Francisco’s acute housing needs and the scarcity of land. The site is wretched ‘project’ style public housing infested with rates, mold, mildew, and fungus. Because of deferred maintenance, inadequate Comprehensive Grant funding and vandalism, widespread deterioration exists throughout the site, including leaks, broken pavement, barren landscaping, dry rot, ponded roof water, worn interior and exterior finishes. (p.20)”
Once the application began to address the site’s impact on the neighborhood, it further stressed the economic assets of the site itself, “Located in a scenic hillside of Bayview, Hunters View’s woeful style of housing is highly visible and a blight on the surrounding neighborhood. Deteriorating building conditions are incompatible with the general good condition of the surrounding neighborhood. (p.21)” Their conclusion: “at Hunters View, no action short of total revitalization will alleviate the severe distress that exists for residents. (p.21)”

The demographic distress detailed in the report provides a picture of the poverty at Hunters View at the time. Eighty-five percent of the residents had incomes less than $20,000. The average income was $12,451. Seven percent of the households were working full time and seventy percent were receiving public assistance. Eighty-four percent of the households were headed by single women. The racial demographics were 67% African-American, 17% Asian/Pacific Islander, 9% white and 2% Native American. At Hunters View, 56% of the residents were children. Crime rates were high and high school graduation rates were low.

HUD denied SFHA’s 1999 HOPE VI application. After a change in federal administration followed by three more unsuccessful HOPE VI applications for Hunters View, SFHA came to believe that they were unlikely to secure additional HOPE VI funds. In 2002, the agency conducted a physical needs assessment which evaluated the conditions at every property in their portfolio. It grouped the developments into three categories based on their physical conditions: ones that need to be rebuilt and that would be maintained as well as possible until they could be rebuilt; ones that are generally fine, needing minor work; and ones that need substantial rehabilitation, but are worth the work. In the end, eight sites fell into the first category, including Hunters View.

One SFHA official pointed out the challenge in redeveloping these sites. “The remaining developments that need to be rebuilt are the tougher ones. Except in Potrero, they are not in neighborhoods that can easily sustain improvements. The other [HOPE VI] sites are surrounded by healthy housing markets, transportation, and amenities.” The agency needed a way to fund these redevelopment efforts without federal assistance. Rather than wait for a change in administration or rely on back channel tactics at the federal level to bring about funding, the agency turned to the local community of affordable housing developers.

From August 3, 2003 through September 30, 2003, SFHA put out a Request for Qualifications (RFQ) to developers to bring HOPE VI principles to other housing authority owned sites in need of development. Project financing had to be accomplished without expectations of federal HOPE VI dollars, and three principles had to be included in each proposal: (1) One-for-one replacement of public housing units; (2) An increase in the overall number of units on the property; and (3) A financial structure that split profits with SFHA to subsidize future projects.

They received two proposals for the Hunters View site. One came from Habitat for Humanity requesting part of the site for building sweat-equity homes. The other was from the Hunters View Community Partners (HVCP), which consisted of three parties—the John Stewart Company (JSCO), a mission-driven, for-profit affordable housing development company that had been involved in the city’s two most recent HOPE VI sites; Devine and Gong, a real estate finance and development services firm that specialized in affordable housing and frequently partnered with JSCO; and Rigdepoint Developers, a local group that managed two affordable housing developments in the neighborhood, one of which they had developed. From January 2004 through July 2005, the proposals were reviewed and scored. Eventually the teams were interviewed by an evaluation team consisting of SFHA, the Mayors Office of Housing (MOH),
and the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA). Those scores were sent to a second evaluation panel that also included residents. Finally, the HVCP proposal was accepted.

Gavin Newsom and the Offices of the Mayor

At the same time that SFHA was turning to the local affordable housing development community for help, the city’s leadership was starting to think about how to fix its public housing. Gavin Newsom took office as the city’s mayor in 2004. When asked why the mayor was championing the issue of public housing in San Francisco when most mayors prefer to keep their public housing out of the news, one senior staff person was quick to respond that the Mayor had always been concerned with public housing. As an example of this commitment, he mentioned that the Mayor held his first department head meeting at the Hunters View site in 2004. The Chronicle reported:

Soon after taking office, Newsom, who said "my philosophy is management by walking around," herded the recreation chief, public works director and other department heads into a van for a surprise field trip to a Hunters Point housing project. There, he pointed out cracked asphalt on the basketball courts, piles of garbage, street lights shattered by bullets and other disgraces that wouldn't show up in a San Francisco Convention & Visitors Bureau brochure. (Gordon, 2005)

At the meeting, Newsom asked his staff to explain why the city’s public housing was in a state of chaos. A staff person who was present at the meeting recounted that the mayor said to them, “This is the city, but it is not connected to the city. This is part of the city fabric, so it’s part of the city family. (Interview, April 10, 2007)” Staff people present that afternoon reported leaving the meeting with an understanding that improving public housing would be one of the mayor’s top priorities.

In May 2004 the mayor named Matthew Franklin as Director of the Mayor’s Office of Housing (MOH). Franklin had served three years in senior positions at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) during former President Clinton’s administration. His positions had included Deputy Chief of Staff to the HUD Secretary and Deputy Federal Housing Commissioner/General Deputy Assistant Secretary for Housing. In May 2003, he was appointed by former Governor Gray Davis as Director of California’s Department of Housing and Community Development. Having worked under Andrew Cuomo at HUD, Franklin was very familiar with the HOPE VI program and a champion of its goals to deconcentrate poverty, promote housing choice, and improve the physical design of public housing.

Franklin started at MOH with ideas about how to fix public housing in San Francisco. He was convinced that “HOPE VI had it right in owning up to failures of public housing in the past. Enough of San Francisco’s public housing is in disrepair that the city needed an aggressive redevelopment program. Also, there was a general desire to do something about it.” However, his public sector background was working at the state and federal levels of government. He hired Doug Shoemaker, a long time fixture in the San Francisco Non-Profit Developer scene, to be his Deputy Director. Shoemaker came with well-established local relationships and a reputation as someone reasonable, dedicated, and politically sensitive. He understood the minefields that both real estate and politics could be in San Francisco and knew how to navigate them effectively.

In May 2008, Franklin accepted a job as the executive director of the Mid-Peninsula Housing Coalition and left the Mayor’s Office of Housing. Some city insiders noted that Franklin recently had been on the outside of the mayor’s inner circle, in part due to a disagreement over the mayor’s emphasis on affordable homeownership. Shoemaker stepped up
and replaced Franklin, he hired local non-profit development professional Craig Adelman as his deputy. Adelman eventually became the senior person who oversaw the physical development side of MOH’s work. MOH’s policy director Amy Tharpe oversaw the human development side of MOH’s work.

The Mayor’s Office of Housing had direct ties to the mayor. It was MOH and not SFHA that was considered responsible for driving the production of affordable housing in the city. Although the mayor appointed the members of the SFHA Board of Commissioners, traditionally SFHA had remained separate from the other agencies within city government. Furthermore, SFHA was the only remaining agency in San Francisco that does not require civil service exams, and as a result, had long been used as a dumping ground for mayoral favors and appointees. Although everyone interviewed saw Gregg Fortner, SFHA’s executive director at the time, as competent, no one had confidence in the agency’s ability to effectively implement its own programs, let alone take on additional responsibilities.

MOH on the other hand, was the entity responsible for guiding and coordinating the City’s housing policy. Their mission, as stated on their website was, “to provide financing for the development, rehabilitation and purchase of affordable housing in San Francisco.” Their tasks included administering programs to finance the development of affordable housing by non-profit and for profit developers, providing financial and educational assistance to first-time homebuyers, and finance housing rehabilitation costs for low-income homeowners. While they did not administer Section 8 vouchers (the Section 8 Program remains the purview of SFHA), provide emergency shelter, or manage affordable housing, MOH was the department that was responsible for monitoring and ensuring the long-term affordability and physical viability of the City’s stock of affordable housing. Ultimately Hope SF would be shaped, vetted, and implemented largely through the work of MOH.

The mayor’s first State of the City address in October 2004 was also the mayor’s first public mention of his intention to redevelop public housing. “I am today announcing the creation of a local HOPE VI program that will replace failed public housing developments with vibrant communities. These communities will blend new housing, mixed income and commercial development. No longer will our public housing be isolated from the rest of the city.” At this point, there was no program, only an idea; however, two key tenants of the plans to come can be found in that early statement. The first is replacing public housing with mixed income communities. The second is rejoining public housing with the rest of the city. Another city official later reiterated this same idea of reclaiming public housing sites as parts of the city: “San Francisco is getting involved there now, where before it was hands off because this was a federal problem (Interview March 27, 2008).”

In January 2005 the Mayor made another important hire to his staff. He hired Fred Blackwell to lead the Mayor’s Office of Community Development (MOCD). Blackwell came from the philanthropic world where he had been working first for the San Francisco Foundation and then Annie E. Casey. He was a local and a planner. He received his master’s degree from the University of California, Berkeley’s Department of City and Regional Planning. On their website, MOCD stated that their mission was “to partner with the community to strengthen the physical, social and economic infrastructure of San Francisco, particularly its lowest income neighborhoods and communities.” MOCD was responsible for administering the city’s Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) money as well as its Emergency Shelter Grant Program. Staffers from the department explained that CDBG money is associated with “an improvement both in the environmental conditions and human conditions for low and moderate
individuals and families.” They went on to say that, “In San Francisco, it is very difficult to have a conversation and think about that universe without landing pretty quickly in public housing. (Interview, April 10, 2007)”

MOCD used its resources to develop “flexible, locally designed community development strategies to benefit low and moderate income persons, aid in the prevention or elimination of slums and blight, and meet other urgent community development needs. (MOCD website, 2009)” In doing so, MOCD landed in public housing in three main ways. First, there was the setting of departmental priorities for the CDBG funds. Agency leaders explained that, “Over the years, programmatic priorities that come out of this office in terms of spending CDBG money have asked the community-based organizations receiving money through this office to look really thoroughly at the impact of their work on individuals living in public housing.” This funding stream then created a relationship between MOCD and the non-profit organizations doing work in public housing communities. The second way was through relationships with other agencies working in these same communities. MOCD contributed funds to MOH projects and San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA) projects. The third way was the funding of its own initiatives.

While MOCD had long been involved in public housing through its distribution of CDBG money, in terms of the current push to redevelop public housing, the agency took a back seat to MOH. The exception was the Communities of Opportunity Initiative (COO), which began in 2005. Dwayne Jones, a former community organizer and cultural anthropologist by training, was hired to head the program. MOCD designed the Communities of Opportunity (COO) Initiative as a response to findings from their Community Voices project, which was initiated in 2003. The final report was released May 2005. The people who created COO envisioned the program as a comprehensive initiative to foster strong families, communities, and neighborhoods throughout the city. The COO initiative would pilot in the Southeastern Sector of San Francisco, including both the Bayview Hunters Point and Visitacion Valley districts, because these communities had the highest need residents.

The parties developing the project also took an interesting geographic approach to targeting their efforts. According to the report, “available information from city departments shows that there are four street corners in these districts that are within walking distance of the largest proportion of individuals who utilize city services. (2005)” These four corners are also associated with specific public housing developments: the intersection of Middlepoint and Westpoint is located at Hunters View, Oakdale and Griffith is at Hunters Point (A and B), Fitzgerald and Griffith is at Alice Griffith, and Sunnydale and Santos is at Sunndydale. These sites (Hunters Point A and B are considered two separate sites) are what SFHA and city officials refer to as “the big five.” COO would work to create simultaneous interventions at these sites in four areas of need: economic development and job creation; safe and affordable housing; effective and efficient social services; and developing social capital. COO’s role in connecting these four service areas within the city bureaucracy would continue to co-evolve with Hope SF.

In his 2005 State of the City address, the mayor officially rolled out the COO program. In doing so, he identified COO as the lead agency in the city’s efforts to combat poverty. While he did not promise additional resources, what he committed to was a new approach to service delivery. He connected this new approach to freedom and resident empowerment. Through COO, residents would be given standing as city citizens.

Though we cannot defeat poverty or crime with a single camera or a single program, we can create lasting and visible achievements that will sustain the
expectation that each year will bring greater opportunity than the last. That is why we created the Communities of Opportunity. To rethink and retool the way the city delivers services in partnership with CBOs and residents. It empowers one lead agency to affect change, with the freedom and capacity to do what is right for the community. Instead of City Hall telling residents what they need, Communities of Opportunity puts decision making in the hands of real people.

The mayor went on to describe COO’s early accomplishments.

Under the leadership of the residents of Alice Griffith, where we piloted this initiative, we created a parent university, expanded day care, resurfaced streets, planted greenery, refurbished housing and built a new Opportunity Center. There residents can find training connected to real jobs, access the working families credit and health care, and learn how to build assets. And that is the key – because whether you’re living in Alice Griffith, Bernal Heights, the Sunset or the Richmond – it’s jobs and asset building that will erase poverty and ease the burden for our working families and middle class. For our working families the equation is simple: a stable high-paying job makes it possible to build assets – and assets make it possible to buy a home and raise a family in the City.

This scenario lays out the possibility of a middle class life for public housing residents, explicitly connecting Alice Griffith to the city’s middle class strongholds of Bernal Heights, the Sunset, and the Richmond. In doing so, the mayor connected the middle class to the public housing sites and public housing sites to the rest of the city. At the same time, he made it clear that the families receiving assistance would be working families.

In 2006 it was time to take on the physical improvements needed at SFHA’s eight worst sites. The mayor talked to the leadership at MOH and instructed them to “do something big.” After two months of conversations with national redevelopment experts, the redevelopment agency, SFHA, and housing officials in other big US cities, they came up with Hope SF. One city staffer described the program at this stage as “a set of city policy verticals” saying “it includes housing and signature issues.” Hope SF would use the HOPE VI strategies of replacing public housing sites with new mixed income developments and incorporating supportive services. The financing, the process, and the development specifics were yet to come.

Once the big idea was put forward and given a name, it began to gain momentum. In September the mayor visited the New York City Housing Authority, and soon after he stated publicly that he would devote “all of his political capital” to ensuring city voters approve a $100 million bond for public housing redevelopment. Administration officials envisioned that the bond money would then be used to leverage additional private money and the collective funds would fill in the gaps that had previously been filled by federal funding (Knight, 11/20/2006). However, in California bonds require a supermajority to pass and the mayor was going to need a broad coalition of support to be successful. Voters had defeated affordable housing bond measures in both 2002 and 2004 (Vega, 2006) and the mayor did not want to risk another failure. When asked by a reporter why he thought voters would feel differently this time, the mayor emphasized that the status quo was creating danger for the rest of the city. “If people knew the conditions people were living in in their city—our city—their positions would change… This housing contributes to a big portion of our crime. A big portion of our resources go to health in emergency rooms, schools. It’s all interconnected.” Middle and upper class citizens would pay to redevelop public housing because doing nothing would cost them too.
In October 2006, the mayor’s annual State of the City Address was titled: “Tackling the Unfinished Business of San Francisco.” He used the opportunity to unfurl his plans to the city at large and to build a case that the redevelopment of public housing was in the city’s collective best interest.

…[W]e are initiating Hope SF – an effort to rebuild our most distressed San Francisco housing authority properties into mixed use, mixed income communities. Creating more low-income housing, more middle-income housing, and more housing overall. Too many of our Housing Authority projects are scars on the landscape of San Francisco. They were built in an era when the federal government was focused on temporary, cheap housing. They were dropped into isolated locations because the land was cheap and there was no neighborhood opposition. And they were built without reference to the underlying problems of poverty and unemployment – which caused people to need the housing in the first place.

His statement explicitly placed the blame for the current problems of public housing with the local housing authority, and by association, the federal government. On the other hand, he placed the solution solidly on the lap of the city. His statement connected the eradication of these scars to reconnection with the city, employment, and an end to poverty.

The mayor was quick to reassure his audience that Hope SF was not another example of urban renewal. He said:

There is another terrible chapter in this story – and that is the shameful history of redevelopment across this country and in San Francisco. We did something terribly wrong when we tore down our historic neighborhoods and replaced them with housing projects that are historic mistakes. We displaced and drove out families. And we incurred a debt to the people of those destroyed neighborhoods that has yet to be repaid. I can tell you right now – we are going to repay that debt – starting with restoring each of these housing projects to something much better than the original construction and something better than what was destroyed… Right now these projects are not just some of the worst places to live. They are in some of the most isolated communities, far from jobs, services, and even the simple things like a supermarket or pharmacy. And ironically, they are also in some of the least dense areas of our city. We can use that accident of history to repair the damage caused by these projects. Because within the footprint of these projects is the space to replace each and every Housing Authority unit. But that’s just for starters.

For most of the “Big 5” developments, his statement was misleading. These were built far enough on the periphery of the city that, for the most part, the construction of these developments did not replace previously existing neighborhoods. However, many of the families housed at these sites were originally residents of the Fillmore neighborhood where the city used eminent domain to force families out of their homes and then bulldozed block after block for redevelopment. Before urban renewal, the Fillmore had been a thriving African American community in the heart of the city. Today, “Remember the Fillmore” was a call to arms for many of the African American families in the Bayview neighborhood.
The mayor went on to say that his plan did more than just fix the city’s decaying public housing structures, it also repaired the city’s past mistakes with redevelopment and in doing so, reconciled public housing sites, public housing residents, and the rest of the city.

The goal is to leave the city with better neighborhoods, more housing, and finally – a clean conscience when it comes to the terrible history of neglect in public housing. Hope SF will rebuild 2,500 new Housing Authority units, up to 1,000 new low income units, and we can help pay for this with 2,500 new family units for sale. We will create new neighborhoods… Preserve existing neighborhoods by relieving the pressure for new housing… And create new economic opportunities. And finally – perhaps most importantly – right a wrong. From where we stand today – at the nexus of the Bayview, the Excelsior and Visitacion Valley – we can see the future of San Francisco. A city we can all live in… A city that doesn’t pit one group against another and let them fight it out… A City – not just for the few… but a City for All. It’s both the big ideas – and the small things – that together add up to a City we can all call home.

While many saw the Hope SF idea as a promising opportunity, or at least a needed one, few were pleased by the mayor’s attempt to go it alone. At this point, residents, advocates, and the business and development communities had been left out of the Hope SF process. While the mayor was saying that he anticipated a $100 million bond measure would go forward, other administration officials were cautioning that there are still many conversations to be had that could raise or lower that number. They decided that a taskforce would be the most effective way to pull those conversations together.

The Public Housing Taskforce

In the fall of 2006, the Mayor’s Office of Housing and the Mayor’s Office of Community Development assembled a public housing task force. Department leadership hoped to bring taskforce members through the same thought process that they had just gone through with the mayor, and in doing so, build grassroots support for a possible general obligation bond to finance their public housing efforts. They were also looking for assistance conceptualizing a program that could address the entire picture of poor neighborhoods, one that could move beyond the real estate side of development and look at the human side such as supportive services. Explained one city official, “There is a recipe in this town: find out who are the interested constituents and bring them all in at once. You can’t just bring in a slice and run it through. (Interview, November 2007)”

Formally, the taskforce was appointed by Mayor Gavin Newsom and Supervisor Sophie Maxwell and charged with the development of principles that would guide the process of revitalizing the city’s public housing properties, the identification of funding needs, and the formation of a menu of financing options. The group was comprised of a wide range of stakeholders including representatives from labor, the chamber of commerce, planning organizations, affordable housing advocates, tenant advocates, civil rights advocates, public housing tenants, local foundations, neighborhood organizations, and representatives from the Redevelopment Agency and SFHA. Attendance was dynamic with different players participating at different times. Most of the representatives from the business community participated only at the very beginning of the process. More tenants and community organizers came to the table over time. Individuals with specific interests, such as representatives from local foundations, attended only the meetings that were relevant to their interests, such as those focused on the mix...
of units and the concomitant funding needs. Doug Shoemakers from the Mayor’s Office of Housing facilitated the process with Fred Blackwell what at the time was with the Mayor’s Office of Community Development. Dwayne Jones, the Director of Communities of Opportunity participated as well. Developers were not included in this part of the process.

At this point in its development, “Hope SF” was a phrase and an idea but lacked the concrete components necessary for actual implementation, including policy guidelines, dedicated staff, and a funding stream. High level city staff people had created the outline of a plan and the mayor had given it his support, but in San Francisco such an effort had to be vetted through a more complicated political and public process. The taskforce was that effort. The taskforce was not intended to serve as a consensus-building body. Rather, it would facilitate the political exchanges that had to happen in order for such a deal to move forward.

The taskforce met from November 2006 through February 2007. The initial meetings introduced participants to HOPE VI and national public housing issues as well as the specific issues surrounding public housing in San Francisco. Participants toured the North Beach and Valencia Gardens HOPE VI sites and were introduced to the Hunters View project. As they began to think about their goals and possible recommendations, they were presented with the potential for city-wide public housing revitalization of public housing developments with one-for-one replacement of units. They learned about redevelopment efforts in other cities and had the opportunity to speak to a panel that included a public housing resident, developer, and civic leader involved in the redevelopment of public housing in Chicago. Participants were asked to consider how to facilitate resident services, economic development and neighborhood linkages. They discussed funding mechanisms and, with the help of a redevelopment spreadsheet created by the Mayor’s Office of Housing, they considered the trade-offs necessitated by different levels of affordability within the final mix of units. The final meetings discussed potential options for San Francisco and finally shaped the recommendations that the taskforce would present to the Mayor and Supervisor Maxwell.

The taskforce took for granted that the city’s public housing, at least the eight most distressed sites, would be redeveloped. Even those participants most distrustful of SFHA or the mayor’s administration agreed that these sites had fallen into such disrepair that there was little choice but to redevelop them. The tension within the committee therefore was not whether or not to redevelop these sites or whether or not there would be one-for-one replacement of public housing units. Instead, it centered on questions of how much new affordable housing would be built, and what proportion of new units would be market rate. As one city staff person explained, “This is an attempt to lay out a concept and a set of principles to get people excited about talking about it and excited about finding funding for it. (Taskforce Meeting, February 21, 2007)”

The market rate question was an important one because it rested at the core of the redevelopment model being pursued by both the city and SFHA. San Francisco had famously high land and housing costs. Even at these sites, most of which were located in areas of the city that had traditionally been considered affordable, the demand for land was high and on the rise. Many of the sites had views and were connected to other improvement efforts such as light rail construction or industrial land redevelopment. The density on the public housing properties would be increased to allow for the replacement of existing public housing units and the addition of affordable tax credit units and market rate units. The sale of the market rate units would provide a cross-subsidy for the redevelopment of the public housing units. This cross subsidy was the first critical component of the Hope SF financial model.
The second part of the funding model was the question of debt financing. Initially, the mayor had hoped to pass a general obligation bond. While the taskforce was supportive of a bond, polling revealed that there may not have been enough support within the city’s voting public to meet the state’s supermajority requirements. Foundation funding was an important piece in the financing the Hunters View project, but gaps still existed where federal funding was no longer available. It would not be until more than halfway through the process that the Mayor’s Office was able to find a solution. The city’s charter allowed for the city to incur debt in order to finance public works, such as the building of fire houses or other public buildings. However, the San Francisco city charter had a wrinkle that included affordable housing on that list. The mayor would go to the Board of Supervisors and request $95 million in debt financing to be paid as a line item in the city’s budget over the next 30 years. Voter approval would not be necessary.

Behind the scenes there were additional issues to be resolved. Years of mistrust existed between public housing residents and SFHA and between Bayview residents and the Redevelopment Agency that were not going to disappear quickly. The general good faith that existed around the taskforce table did not always extend to constituents or to colleagues beyond the table. Furthermore, struggles and breakdowns in communication between agencies at times resulted in missteps that furthered the mistrust. For example, at one meeting, an affordable housing advocate cautioned that while the Mayor’s Office of Economic Development might have leaked news about projects as a result of their enthusiasm for the work, when news articles ran reporting plans to redevelop the Alice Griffith public housing site before there had been any community meetings over the same topic, some community organizers saw it as evidence of dishonesty. When staff people at SFHA defended themselves by insisting that “There is no plan and no funding right now. It is hard to go to the community with something that is not even real,” the problem only became worse. On another occasion, a tenant advocate on the taskforce asked if the Mayor’s office was doing any polling to measure support for a possible bond. The taskforce was given assurances that no such polling was in the works. The next day the San Francisco Chronicle ran a story reporting the polling figures over a possible bond to finance the redevelopment of public housing.

The most contentious meeting was the week Doug Shoemaker presented a prototype financial spreadsheet for a future Hope SF project. Using this tool, it was possible to alter the different percentages of each type of housing on a given site and have those changes reflected in the bottom line of the project. The more public housing and affordable housing units were added to the project, the more expensive it became. While there were those at the table who wanted to see the sites remain entirely subsidized housing, those configurations were quickly eliminated as cost prohibitive. Market rate units came to be accepted as essential for the cross-subsidy they would provide. Public housing units would be replaced at one-for-one and only one-for-one, ultimately comprising no more than 20% of a site. The remaining number of units would be split between market rate and tax credit financed affordable housing units. Increasing the number of affordable housing units would require higher densities and/or more grant money.

The taskforce presented its final recommendations to Mayor Newsom and Supervisor Maxwell on March 23, 2007. Many of the initial participants in the taskforce did not attend this final meeting. Most those who were in attendance were the tenant advocates, community organizers, neighborhood representatives, public housing tenants, and city staff people from the committee. Fred Blackwell began the meeting by saying that this had been a group that was interested in getting things done. “The group was chomping at the bit from the beginning to talk
about steps.” After a brief introduction by one of the neighborhood representatives on the committee, the document itself was reviewed. The first step was a vision statement:

As a result of chronic underfunding by the federal government, the future of public housing in San Francisco and the nation is at risk. While we firmly believe that the federal government has a responsibility to increase the funding for public housing, San Francisco must take action quickly to ensure no loss of public housing in our city. Hope SF provides a vision for rebuilding our most distressed public housing sites, increasing affordable housing and homeownership opportunities, and improving quality of life for existing residents and the surrounding communities.

The vision statement began with a reference to the federal government, establishing blame for the current conditions at the city’s public housing properties and acknowledging that funds for these efforts have traditionally come from the federal government. However, as it continued, the statement recognized that there has been a shift of responsibility. Cities more generally, and San Francisco more specifically, were now the entities that must take action in regard to public housing. While much of this language was included to mollify fears among city leadership that by providing funds to fix the problem would result in further cuts from HUD, it reflected a larger national trend of increased decentralization in the responsibility for public housing. The statement also made it clear that redevelopment in San Francisco was about saving public housing, not losing units. Redevelopment was never mentioned without this caveat: San Francisco was committed to one for one replacement.

The next section of the report was dedicated to outlining a series of eight principles that the taskforce believed should guide the city’s Hope SF work.

1. **Ensure no loss of public housing** by replacing every distressed public housing unit with a high-quality public housing unit, with a commitment to minimize displacement of existing residents by phasing development and emphasizing on-site relocation.

2. **Create an economically integrated community** that includes a housing ladder of public housing, affordable housing, and market-rate housing, with a priority on addressing the need for family housing

3. **Maximize the creation of new affordable housing** on the public housing sites while rebuilding as many distressed public housing sites as possible and fund the rebuilding of the public housing using profits from the market-rate housing.

4. **Ensure high levels of resident participation and involvement** in Hope SF planning and implementation, including the support of resident-driven occupancy criteria.

5. **Ensure that Hope SF provides economic opportunity** through appropriate job training and services and produces long-term, viable employment opportunities for the existing residents and contracting opportunities for local, small and disadvantaged businesses.

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1 New York City’s HUD funding was cut after Mayor Bloomberg stepped in and provided funds from the city to cover a shortfall in the budget of the New York Housing Authority (NYHA). The shortfall had not been the result of improper administration on the part of NYHA, but rather the decision by Congress to underfund the HUD budget. In future years, HUD refused to return the NYHA appropriation to its original amount, leaving the city with an annual obligation for what had been intended as a one time emergency measure.
6. **Integrate Hope SF with neighborhood plans** to improve schools, parks, transportation, safety and other amenities in their communities.

7. **Create environmentally sustainable and accessible communities** by committing to incorporating green building principles and design elements that meet the long-term needs of the community.

8. **Build a strong sense of community** by including existing and prospective residents as well as neighbors in the planning and development process.

Again, one for one replacement was emphasized and then reinforced by the call for on-site relocation. Mixed income communities, or “Economically integrated communities” as they were referred to in the document, were to be accomplished by bringing higher income residents to the sites rather than vouchering out public housing residents to other communities.

The mayor was pleased with the taskforce’s proposals, “I am sitting here pinching myself and thinking it cannot get much better.” He praised the commitment to green building and the connection to neighborhood planning included in the principles. He asked for the improvement of public transportation links to these sites as well. He repeated the city’s commitment to no loss of public housing units, one-for-one replacement, and an increase of economic opportunity in these communities. Finally, he emphasized his expectation that resident participation be placed at the center of the redevelopment efforts at each site, warning: “This is dead on arrival if we do not find a way to deal with real participation.” Taskforce members added a few comments of their own, calling for a broad based communication strategy and a strong process with good voices at the table. They warned that the mayor should “expect demands from resident leaders.” and suggested that any work that happens at these sites “has to be community building too.”

One participant at the table pointed out that one of the barriers to support for the proposal was the poor public image of SFHA. The mayor’s response was that there needed to be new mechanisms for accountability and oversight. He added that he was looking for a guarantee of better working relationships between SFHA and the city. He said that Nancy Pelosi was looking for a model housing authority in her district and a change in the current narrative of “cut, cut, cut” in relation to public housing. Supervisor Maxwell added, “Housing Authorities are going to change. We need to educate people about that and find a way to move them out of housing authority properties. We need to educate people so they do not think it is us doing this to them.” The mayor’s final words before closing the meeting were words of praise, “Thank you. This is great. It is utterly historic, but only if we implement it. I do not disagree with a word or line in here. You have my intense commitment to make this effort work well.”

**Hope SF: Redevelopment Revisited, Again**

The origins of the Hope SF program reveal a conscientious effort on the part of city leaders to do redevelopment in a better way. The program brings together the ideals of an ambitious and progress-oriented mayor with welfare state retrenchment and the specific geography of poverty and race in San Francisco. These beginnings reflect both the enduring legacy of urban renewal and the on-going poverty anxieties of the city. City leaders express a desire to do the right thing, both for public housing residents and for the city. Hope SF, like previous generations of programs redeveloping poverty places, makes the argument that redevelopment accomplishes both.

Hope SF provides an example of the local state stepping in as the welfare state is stepping out. Had SFHA been able to continue to acquire HOPE VI grants, city officials may not have
found a need to become directly involved or to facilitate the redevelopment process. In previous generations of redevelopment, federal programs created the incentive for cities to engage in redevelopment projects. In the case of Hope SF, the city is taking the lead and finding alternative ways to fund the work.

How that work takes shape is important in San Francisco. The Hope SF taskforce did not meet for a significant enough duration to generate significant new ideas or engage in consensus-building. Instead, it was a moment of political theater intended to bring the right people together around the table. Representatives of the redevelopment agency, MOH, MOCD, COO, SPUR, labor, the chamber of commerce, affordable housing advocates, tenant advocates, civil rights advocates, public housing tenants, local foundations, and neighborhood organizations were all present at the first meeting of the taskforce. It was less important that the interests assembled agreed with one another than that they bought into the plan. Negotiations happened both at the table and behind the scenes, but everyone who needed to be consulted in the decision-making process was. As a result, the initiative has moved forward with very few surprises or disruptions.

The mayoral backing of Hope SF has been critical for moving it forward, but that progress could not have occurred without a core group of dedicated staffers from multiple agencies who were deeply familiar with the requirements and challenges associated with developing affordable housing in San Francisco. Hope SF began as a phrase and an idea. It has developed into a very real on-the-ground program with projects underway at multiple sites, designated funding sources, policies and programs, and staff. It has received broad support both within the family of city agencies and departments and across the range of civic stakeholders. Departments have found new ways of coordinating their work and getting things done in support of the initiative. Because the program is new and still a work in progress and because it has buy in from the directors of several key agencies, staff have been able to experiment with the best way to go about accomplishing the work. The program has remained flexible and responsive to the constantly changing conditions related to each development project. Even when key players have moved on, the program has continued to progress.

Hope SF provides a new way to think about poverty and the city. It embraces the claim the poverty places are urban places and that the poor people that inhabit them are residents of the city. This framework makes a claim that it is in the public’s interest to facilitate the expansion of capital. Redevelopment is not displacing residents, like in the Fillmore, or dispersing residents, as often occurred with HOPE VI, but instead is making the effort to integrate them. In the case of Hope SF, the redevelopment of public housing can be viewed as an effort to engage in a new type of progressive modernity, one where redeveloped public housing becomes a monument to the progressive city.
III. THE CREATION OF THE HUNTERS VIEW IMAGINARY

*I’ve always been in Hunters Point. I came to Hunters Point, I’ll always be Hunters Point. When I go there, I’m home.*

-Pat Womack, Previous resident of Hunters Point
Quoted in “Hunters Point Shipyard, a Community History” (2000)

Within the context of Hope SF, Hunters View takes on the status of social imaginary, “an enabling but not fully explicable symbolic matrix within which a people imagine and act as world-making collective agents (Gaonkar, 2002).” Hunters View has come to be understood as a unique location within San Francisco, imbued with its own history, memory, and patterns of daily life. A place of forgotten promises, but also a place of new hope. As the pilot project for Hope SF, Hunters View becomes something more than a site of concentrated poverty or racial exclusion within the San Francisco landscape of plenty. Once mentioned in the local press only in relation to violence, poverty, or hopelessness and understood by social service providers as one of seven corners of despair within the city; it has become rich with the symbols of opportunity, justice, inclusion, and citizenship that constitute the Hope SF program. Charles Taylor explains that “The social imaginary is not a set of ideas; rather it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society. (2002)” It is through the making sense of this emerging Hunters View that Hope SF has taken shape.

The current efforts to redevelop public housing in San Francisco are a work in progress. Hope SF began as “a brand without an official program or budget—an aspiration (Interview March 9, 2007).” It has evolved into a set of eight principles, a financial model, eight target sites, and a pilot project. The program continues to unfold, requiring countless individual and collective decisions by project managers, policy makers, bureaucrats, consultants, planners, designers, intermediaries, residents, and neighbors. The Hunters View imaginary shapes how Hope SF is understood within the city and how it is carried out through the work of every party involved. Hope SF in turn shapes what is possible for Hunters View. The challenge comes in the space between what is dreamed and what is possible.

I will begin with a brief history of Hunters View starting with the community’s beginnings as a fishing and shrimping camp in the mid 1800s through its productive years as a center of war time industry and culminating in its eventual decline into an inner city ghetto. I will make the argument that Hunters View has been a community apart from the city’s mainstream for more years than not and has never been well served by either the city or SFHA. Next I will consider the recent emergence of Hunters View into the public consciousness as a pilot project for Hope SF. I will argue that the confluence of several factors including African American outmigration in the city, developer relationships, and the release of a documentary film helped make this site an important place to begin the Hope SF program. Finally, I will examine the changing discourse regarding public housing in San Francisco and relate it to the emergence of a Hunters View imaginary. Here, the underclass debates of the previous three decades are put aside as public housing residents become worthy public neighbors and the act of redevelopment becomes endowed with the symbols of justice, opportunity, and inclusion.
A. Hunters View as a Community Apart

_This is Hunters View, the public housing development perched on the hills of Hunters Point recently deemed by federal inspectors to be one of the worst such complexes in the country. Rats and mice infest the crumbling, barracks-style buildings. Raw sewage bubbles up through grates in the cement, creating smelly pools. Shattered glass lies scattered on the grounds. Plywood boards cover dozens of vacant units. And mold is everywhere. “People live through this every day, and don’t nobody do a damn about it,” said [Tamika] Trammell, a thirty-two year old mother of three. “It makes me feel like we’re nobody – like we don’t even exist up here.”_

-Heather Knight

_The San Francisco Chronicle_ (2007)

With the exception of the harried years of World War II when San Francisco was the center of the United States’ wartime shipbuilding industries and the Hunters Point Naval Shipyard was the center of those efforts, the Hunters View development has always been a community apart from the civic, social, and economic mainstream of San Francisco. The site is located on the side of the Hunters Point hill, known as “the hill” to many in the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood. Residents enjoy some of the best weather in San Francisco with more sun and less fog and wind than most of the city. The views are unusual and breathtaking, encompassing much of San Francisco’s eastern industrial shoreline along the bay and stretching east past downtown and the Bay Bridge to Oakland. Middle Point Road provides the only access in and out of the property. Signs inform passers by that they are entering Hunters View, and the individuals often sitting on those signs signal to visitors that no one enters unnoticed. Several other low income housing developments abut the property as does a now abandoned PG&E power generating plant. Also on the hill sits Malcolm X elementary school and next to it a series of buildings and fenced outdoor spaces known as Hunters Point Community Youth Park. Both are owned by the San Francisco Unified School District. One bus line runs through the community and MUNI, the municipal transportation agency, cancels service for months at a time after incidents of violence on the line. There are no formal retail establishments on the hill, and the neighborhood’s close proximity to bayside industry and the naval yards is no longer a benefit to residents. Few industrial jobs remain.

The neighborhood is geographically separated from the rest of the city by hills and its close proximity to the Bay. Before the major infrastructure investments that accompanied the expansion of wartime shipbuilding industries during World War II, Hunters Point was without direct public transportation links to downtown and much of the surrounding neighborhood was not served by paved roads or city sewage systems. Industrial, commercial, and residential land uses were built side by side. The close proximity to heavily polluting industry combined with the presence of naturally occurring asbestos in the soil has resulted in a deadly mix of environmental contaminants and high levels of asthma and cancer for residents. In terms of public land, three of the city’s five largest public housing sites are located in this neighborhood as well as Candlestick Park football stadium and a large state park. While the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood has the highest homeownership rates in the city, it also contains much of the city’s poverty, including the one high poverty census tract in San Francisco. It is also one of San Francisco’s few remaining African American neighborhoods.
Advocates for the neighborhood point out that Bayview Hunters Point has a rich cultural history and has long been the center of what residents describe as a close knit residential community. This is a place where families live, where they help each other out, where roots run deep. What Bayview Hunters Point has never been is a thriving commercial center or a transportation hub with strong links to the downtown business district. Residents living in Hunters Point often came to this neighborhood because of its proximity to industrial jobs and the absence of racially restricted covenants in the neighborhood. When those jobs left, the neighborhood that was once an industrial center of national import was forgotten. It became a leftover artifact hampered by environmental degradation, racial segregation, and poverty. It remained a community apart from the city and never a part of the city.
The Early Years of Hunters View and Hunters Point Hill

Now at this date we can boast of a community: We have industries, we have small business firms, we have potential sites for many more, to say nothing of unlimited home sites available... To date the district can boast of a large dry dock... several taverns, two boulevard cafes, a riding academy and several shrimp markets.

-Herman Lehrbach, Hunters Point resident

The San Francisco Chronicle. (Dec. 19, 1940)

Hunters Point began in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries first as a stopping place for European fishermen and then Chinese shrimping camps. In the mid-1850s, city leaders moved slaughterhouses out of the city center and into the Bayview. An area known as Butcher Town developed in the neighborhood and included not just slaughter houses, but also tanneries, tallow works, and butchers as well as other light industry. In 1890, a group of capitalists led by J.P. Armour purchased 20,000 acres in the area to build meat packing and storage facilities (Chicago Daily Tribune, 1890). At one time these businesses employed more than 3,500 people. The Hunters Point shoreline includes a serpentine promontory extending 6,000 feet into the bay that provided an excellent site for locating shipbuilding and repair. A dry dock built on the site in 1903 was the largest on the West Coast at the time. Later Bethlehem Steel located their shipbuilding operations at the site and further developed the shipyard. As the nation’s maritime industry developed, so did Hunters Point.

Anchored in these local industries, a small community began to coalesce. By the 1930s, Hunters Point included more than one hundred homes and a handful of small businesses including restaurants, saloons, and boarding houses. The Hunters Point hill sits in between the Butcher Town area (now Bayview) and what would become the naval shipyards. Settlement happened more slowly on the hill than in the surrounding flatlands, and well into the 1930s, housing remained clustered on the hill’s lower perimeters while cowboys herded sheep up Innes Avenue to graze on the hill (O’Brien, 2005). In contrast to much of San Francisco, the Hunters Point neighborhood was known for its diversity. While the neighborhood was primarily Italian, Maltese, and Chinese, it included French, Irish, Greek, Mexican, German, and African-American families as well, all living side by side. One account of the Bayview Hunters Point district during this time describes a tight knit community:

Some spoke English and some did not, but everyone communicated. Nicknames were common, almost required. Everyone knew each other at least by sight, and everyone looked out for each other. It was a great place to live. In the summer it could take two hours to go two blocks. Many people sat in front of their garages to visit. The smell of homemade wine lingered in the air. Kids played ball in the park. A Sunday family outing usually included buying a pound of shrimp wrapped in newspaper for a quarter. The only thing to beware of in that part of town was the shift in wind that could blow a nasty stench from the tallow works (O’Brien, pp. 8-9).

Historically the Bayview has been underserved by the city, a persistent dynamic that has shaped the neighborhood as much as the shipyards, deindustrialization, and segregation. A community history of Hunters Point prepared by the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency states, “From early on, the community faced extraordinary battles to gain simple improvements
that came easily to other sectors of San Francisco. (1996, p. D-4)" In the late 1930s, residents
formed The Hunters Point Improvement Association hoping to bring much needed city resources
to their neighborhood. They pressed city leaders for paved roads, public transportation lines, and
the completion of sewer lines; but it was not until the major shipbuilding push of the 1940s that
the neighborhood became fully connected to city’s the infrastructure systems. Residents often
went elsewhere for basic needs such as groceries, unless they were willing to higher prices at the
small, local markets. Even when the neighborhood was at the peak of its productivity, most of
the local commercial enterprises catered to the working population of the shipyards rather than
the families who lived in the neighborhood. While many of the city’s African American families
lived in Bayview and attended church in Bayview, it was the Fillmore which served as the
entertainment and cultural center of the city’s African American community. In fact, the lack of
recreational and entertainment resources in the community would become a source of conflict
with the city in the 1950s.

**World War II and the African American Migration to San Francisco**

Following the United States’ entrance into World War II, the entire San Francisco Bay
Area experienced rapid growth as wartime industries drew rural workers from across the country.
The San Francisco Chamber of Commerce estimated that between 1940 and 1943, 94,000 new
people migrated to the city. Aside from the sheer volume of growth, unrivaled since the days of
the gold rush, the most notable demographic change during this time was the transformation of
the city’s African American population. San Francisco had never had the large, industrial black
working class found in many other cities. Fewer than 5,000 Blacks were living in San Francisco
in 1940. From 1940 to 1945 the city’s African American population jumped more than 600%,
increasing to 43,460 by 1950. Most migrants were job seekers from the South coming to work in
the city’s wartime industries. When they arrived, ready to start a life free from the oppression
and servitude of the south, many were unable to find places to live. Racially restricted covenants
prevented African Americans from living in most of the city. Telegraph Hill, the Fillmore, and
the Bayview were three of the exceptions and as a result, many African American migrants
settled in the Bayview where they were close to work. As historian Albert Broussard notes in his

The World War II migration of black southerners to San Francisco not only
accelerated residential segregation and heightened racial tensions, but also laid the
groundwork for the creation of a black ghetto in the postwar era. The large
number of blacks who were denied access to housing and public accommodations
also raised some serious questions about San Francisco’s liberal race relations
image. (p.179)

In 1940, the Navy acquired the Bethlehem Steel dry docks, turning it into the Hunters
Point Naval Shipyard. Between 1939 and 1946, the Navy invested $87 million at the Hunters
Point Naval Shipyard. This included both vast public works projects and shipbuilding. Streets
were finally paved, sewer lines completed, and public transportation began running closer to the
hill. In 1943, the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce proclaimed that San Francisco had
become the shipbuilding center of the world. The labor force at the Hunters Point Naval shipyard
grew from 8,024 in 1943 to 18,235 in August, 1945, and the Bayview community grew from a
population of 8,000 residents in 1940 to more than 20,000 by 1945. One-third of the population
was black, making the area one of San Francisco’s most integrated neighborhoods (Broussard,
1993; Human Services Agency, 2005). Housing, however, was a perpetual problem, and in 1943,
recruitment of shipyard workers had to be temporarily suspended because of the severe housing shortage in the city. The federal government quickly stepped in. The Navy quickly constructed the Hunters Point housing project consisting of 5,500 housing units which were then managed by the San Francisco Housing Authority. Thousands of additional units were also constructed in Hunters Point, many located on the sparsely populated Hunters Point hill.

War-related changes in public housing policies made the SFHA the largest landlord in the City… Many of these units were concentrated in Hunter’s Point, where land was easily secured and close to defense jobs, as well as in areas that private industry considered less desirable… These locations eventually became the sites for permanent housing projects after the war. (Historical Evaluation, 2007, pp.8-9)

By 1945 the San Francisco Housing Authority was overseeing 12,233 housing units built for civilian shipyard workers. (SFRA, 1996)

Even before the war, housing had been a problem in San Francisco where supply was never able to keep pace with demand and much of the older stock had been destroyed in the 1906 earthquake. The problem was especially acute for African Americans looking for housing. Charles S. Johnson, a sociologist studying the living conditions of San Francisco’s African American population during this time noted, “Underlying the entire questions of Negro housing in San Francisco—both public and private—is the issue of residential segregation. (as cited in Broussard, 1993)” One researcher estimated that between 80-90% of the housing in the Bay Area region was closed to blacks at the time due to racially restricted covenants. In 1940, the vast majority of the city’s black population lived in three census tracts. While those areas were integrated and predominantly white, they remained the primary residential location for most African Americans throughout the war years and beyond. The units that were available, such as in San Francisco’s Fillmore neighborhood in the Western Addition section of the city, were often substandard and expensive (Broussard, 1993).

After its incorporation in 1938, SFHA conducted an assessment of the housing needs in the city and determined that 46,000 units were substandard. In response, the agency made plans to construct 11 buildings for a total of 2,855 units and was able to construct five developments before the start of World War II: Holly Courts, Potrero Terrace, Sunndydale, Valencia Gardens, and Westside Courts. Of these five, African American families were only permitted to live in Westside Courts which was located in the Western Addition. The agency’s official policy regarding segregation was one of “neighborhood pattern,” meaning that the racial composition of the housing development would match that of the surrounding neighborhood. This policy began in 1942 and was fully in effect while SFHA was managing the temporary war worker housing. One SFHA Commissioner, Alice Griffith, resigned in protest, but the policy continued. In 1953 the San Francisco Board of Supervisors intervened, requiring that the agency stop using the policy on all new construction, but allowing it to continue with existing properties as well as those associated with defense department housing. The issue was finally settled in 1954 when the US Supreme course declined to hear the case, upholding a lower court’s finding that such a policy was unconstitutional under the 14th amendment. However, the legacy of segregation within SFHA properties continues to have a profound influence on the demographics of public housing developments across the city.
From Working Class Enclave to Ghetto

Shipyard production did not end with the war, although employment levels scaled back significantly after 1945. At its peak, the shipyard employed 18,235 people and was producing a ship a day. By 1949 the shipyard had cut back to 6,000 civilian workers. Because other employment sectors had not integrated, the closing of the shipyards was catastrophic for the city’s African American population. Within two years after the war, the unemployment rate among African Americans was 30% (Human Services Agency, 2005). Despite doing $31 million worth of ship repair in 1949, the Navy came close to shutting down operations that year. The shipyards were central not just to Hunters Point, but to the industrial base of the entire city. City delegations were sent to Washington and workers held rallies on the yard protesting the shutdown. Eventually the government agreed to keep the shipyard open; however, larger change was in the works. Starting in the 1950s, San Francisco’s economy, which was built on its port and manufacturing base, began transitioning to an economy based on advanced service jobs in the corporate headquarters and financial/business service sectors. First the Korean War and then cold war military needs kept the shipyard in production. There would be several more shipyard closure scares in the coming decades until the military finally ceased its operations in 1974. (San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, 1996)

Even as the shipyards were scaling back production, African American migrants continued to arrive in Hunters Point. In 1948 there were 6,000 families living in shipyard housing. Some of those units were in poorly constructed buildings that had been intended as temporary structures, but others were in new housing developments located on the hill and provided attractive homes for the families that first occupied them. Because of the limited housing opportunities in the rest of the city, SFHA made much of this housing available to African American families. The diversity of the neighborhood made such integration possible even within SFHA’s neighborhood pattern policy. In 1953, SFHA permanently acquired the war worker housing they had been managing. The Hunter’s View public housing development was completed in 1956, by some accounts constructed on the foundations of the temporary buildings that had preceded it. Greater and greater numbers of single family homes were appearing in the flatlands that had once been Butcher Town and near 3rd Street. The neighborhood was transitioning to a more permanent, family-oriented community (O’Brien, 2005).

Multi-family housing developments built during the war years or in the years immediately following covered much of the Hunters Point hill, and much of this housing was managed by SFHA. Many of these projects had been built quickly and with low quality materials. Housing was dense with few amenities or recreational opportunities. From the perspective of residents, they were paying rent to the city and deserved a better living environment that was more like what was available to residents in other parts of the city (SF Planning Department and SFRA, 2000). In 1954, a group of Hunters Point residents formed the Hunters Point Project Committee in an attempt to get SFHA to improve conditions for residents of the hill. Records to not specify if these tenants were exclusively from Hunters View or from a collection of projects on the hill, but clearly residents felt a commonality created by their location. They were asking for $12,000 from the city to redevelop the community theater into a recreation department. In response, SFHA released a former army gymnasium for residents to use part time. The Committee appealed to the mayor, arguing that SFHA should not have the right to dictate what city services they receive, but their appeal was rejected (SF Planning Department and SFRA, 2000). Despite their loss, Hunters Point residents would come together again in the future to challenge SFHA’s neglect of their community.
As these early manifestations of Hunters Point—first as a tight-knit pastoral community then as an industrial working class enclave—faded away, the community transitioned to another familiar urban archetype: that of the inner-city ghetto. Hunters Point never had strong transportation links to the rest of the city, and the few that were put into place during the war years eventually were shut down. Manufacturing and industrial jobs began to disappear from both the neighborhood and the city. In the 1960s, many of the black families in the Fillmore that were displaced due to urban renewal relocated to the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood, further concentrating and isolating the city’s African American community. Most of the white families in the neighborhood moved elsewhere, and the Bayview Hunters Point community, including the Hunters View development, was soon occupied primarily by low income people of color. According to the US Census, African Americans accounted for 25% of the total Hunters Point population in 1950, over 52% in 1960, and over 79% in 1970.

In the 1960s, public housing tenants across the city began to organize themselves and demand more say in how SFHA administered funds. They pushed for changes in eviction procedures, more services, and better living conditions in their housing developments. Tenants from the developments in Hunters Point provided valuable leadership in that movement, furthering the opportunities for public housing tenants across the entire city. Explains historian John Baranski, “Struggles over redevelopment and public housing policy radicalized participants and constructed political identities around their tenancy and place. (2007, p.434)” Across the city, tenants were forming tenants unions and receiving training and support from the National Tenants Organization.

Once again, Hunters Point residents organized themselves and set out to improve conditions for those living on the hill. In 1966, the Hunters Point Tenants Union (HPTU) sent a letter to the head of SFHA with 22 questions, giving him approximately three weeks to respond or they would start a rent strike (Baranski). Their action was delayed when race riots erupted in the Bayview in 1966 after a white police officer shot and killed an African American youth running away from a stolen car. Even then SFHA failed to take action and while the agency stalled, claiming that they were looking for funds to make the repairs that tenants were demanding, the HPTU moved forward with the rent strike. HUD and other federal agencies declined to provide SFHA with the necessary funds, but nearly a year after residents sent their original letter, the city found money and began repairs. Hunters Point residents would eventually win one of two new tenant spots on the SFHA Board of Commissioners, providing tenants with a voice at Commission meetings that endures today.

The naval shipyards closed in 1974. A private company leased the property and continued to run the facilities until 1994, but to little benefit for the neighborhood. Employees came from elsewhere, and the new company had none of the connections to the neighborhood that the Navy had developed in recent years. Without the shipyard, critical job training and youth programs disappeared, along with many of the neighborhood’s commercial enterprises. Jobs in the neighborhood became few and unemployment was high. One long time resident who helped develop housing in the neighborhood in the late 1960s connects the loss of the shipyard to the loss of employment for Black men in the city: “Since [the 1970s], there has been a decrease in the number of jobs and the kinds of jobs that attracted the blue collar type. It’s not just about education. There were a lot of black men who had degrees but got these jobs. Others were not available. (Interview, August 20, 2008)”

Then in the 1980s, the crack epidemic hit Hunters Point as well as other public housing sites across the city. With it came increased gang activity and violence. As the neighborhood
declined, with little attention or intervention from either the city or SFHA, so did Hunters View. In 1988, HUD named Hunters View as one of eleven SFHA developments that were “virtually out of control” due to delayed maintenance, vandalism, and drug activity (Del Vecchio, 1988). SFHA responded with increased police presence and plans for physical renovations, but funding from HUD took several years. In 1990 SFHA received an $18 million grant from HUD to renovate units at Hunters View, Bernal Dwellings, Westbrook, and Sunnydale (The San Francisco Chronicle, 1990). Some units were improved in the short term; but cosmetic changes were not enough to alter the realities of life on the hill.

Again in the early 1990s, residents from Hunters Point took action to try and improve their lives. A group of public housing residents came to believe that they could do better for themselves than SFHA was doing. Following a push for the privatization of public housing led by Republican Jack Kemp, Secretary of HUD from February 13, 1989 – January 19, 1993, leaders from Hunters View and the Allemany development formed an organization to advocate for turning the management of SFHA properties over to the tenants. In 1992, 12 public housing residents met with Vice President Dan Quayle at Hunters View to discuss their proposal (Roberts, 1992). Ultimately, the SFHA Board of Commissioners rejected the proposal. At that vote, the two tenant representatives voted in favor of the proposal, arguing that they needed to represent the views of their constituents. Mayor Frank Jordan opposed the proposal and promptly removed both of them from the Commission.

Today, less than one-third of the households in Hunters View are employed. While this number is low, it is the highest employment rate at any of the Hope SF sites. In April 2006, the average household income at Hunters View was $15,596 and every household qualified as living in poverty. This contrasts sharply to the rest of the city. The Association of Bay Area Governments estimated San Francisco’s household median income was $65,519 in 2007 and reported that only 11.7% of the larger San Francisco population was living in poverty during that same year. In terms of the racial and ethnic composition of families living on the site: 66% of the households identify as black and 16% as Asian or Pacific Islander. The remaining 18% identify ethnically as Latino. In 2007, the Association of Bay Area Governments provided the following racial and ethnic demographic data for the city of San Francisco using ACS estimates: 53.9% white, 6.8% black, 32% Asian or Pacific Islander, 7.3 % other (including two or more races); an additional 14% identified ethnically as Latino. While the demographics at Hunters View are telling, they are not unique. Each proposed Hope SF site tells a similar story.
B. A Pilot Project is Born

*Hope SF begins with Hunters View.*

- *Hope SF: Hunters View*
  Mayor’s Office of Housing

After decades of neglect, Hunters View has caught the city’s attention as the pilot project for Hope SF. No one that I interviewed suggested that Hope SF was created with a particular pilot project in mind. The elected officials, SFHA representatives, and city staff people involved in this project needed a pilot site that could be successful, one that had meaning within the city and that could serve as a flagship for their future efforts. Hunters View fit that bill, but at the same time, it seemed to emerge on its own. From the perspective of the people I spoke to, Hunters View became the pilot project for Hope SF because of a timely application submitted by a knowledgeable development team.

The site was part of the initial FRP because, as an early chapter explained in some detail, it was suffering from such extensive capital improvement needs that the already uninhabitable units would be condemned in the near future if left as is. The unique physical attributes of the site made it appealing—located on a hillside with an extensive view of the bay and surrounding shorelines—and the sparsely populated property consists of almost 20 acres, a rare opportunity in built out San Francisco. While each of these characteristics helps to explain why Hunters View is a good target for redevelopment, they do not explain why it makes a good pilot project. The answer cannot be found in the intrinsic qualities of Hunters View nor in the differences between Hunters View and other public housing developments in the SFHA portfolio. Instead, it comes from the confluence of three external factors: (1) the decreasing African American population in San Francisco; (2) a network of organizational relationships that came about because of the development’s proximity to two other affordable housing developments, and (3) its feature role in a hip hop documentary.

**San Francisco’s African American Outmigration**

San Francisco has never had a large African American population. At the height in 1970, African Americans accounted for less than 14% of the city’s total population. By 2005, that percentage had dropped to 6.5%. Translated to numbers this means that San Francisco’s black population has dropped from 96,000 people in 1970 to an estimated 47,000 in 2005 (Fulbright, 2007). Nationally, African Americans make up about 12.1% of the overall population. Currently, San Francisco’s African American population is lower than other West Coast cities including Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle. As the New York Times reported in 2001, San Francisco has become, “…a city where blacks have little clout, few cultural institutions and only one remaining neighborhood, the homely, lonely Bayview-Hunters Point, best known for a sewage treatment plant and radioactive Superfund site (Nieves).”

Such a demographic shift is not entirely surprising given the struggles that many African American families have faced trying to build a life in San Francisco. The forced dispersal of thousands of Black households from the Fillmore in the 1960s and 1970s combined with declining manufacturing and industrial work appears to have started a trend that was never reversed. Under Newsom’s administration, city leaders have been trying to change that. The Mayor explained: “This is an issue of deep concern to my administration. African Americans have made and continue to make important contributions to this City so to sit back and watch
while their numbers continue to dwindle is simply unacceptable. (Mayors Office of Communications, 2007)” A taskforce was formed within the Mayor’s Office of Community Investment to investigate the problem and make policy solutions. An early agenda for a taskforce meeting framed the group’s understanding of the issue at hand. “The issue of African American decline should not solely be understood as one of out migration, but should also be understood as an issue of retention and attraction. (Taskforce, 2007)”

Task Force findings paint a bleak picture of life for African Americans in San Francisco. For example:

- The percentage share of very low income households increased from over one-half of African American households in 1990 to over two-thirds in 2005.
- In 2000, one quarter of African Americans lived in poverty, more than twice the population of non-African Americans.
- The unemployment rate of African Americans in the labor force from 1990 to 2005 was consistently over twice that of non-Blacks.
- From 1997 to 2002, Black-owned businesses declined by nearly one quarter and Black business receipts fell by 60.7 %.
- Only 35% of African Americans in San Francisco are homeowners, the lowest rate across the city.
- At 4,743, African Americans compose nearly one half of the residents living in public housing. One third of the 9,799 Section 8 voucher holders in San Francisco are African Americans.

While the documentation from the taskforce never explicitly mentions redevelopment as a contributing factor to the city’s decreasing population, many of the city’s African American leaders believe it has everything to do with it. With urban renewal, families lost their roots, their homes, and at times their businesses. While Bayview Hunters Point offered community for many, it was more isolated and more impoverished than the Fillmore. The jazz clubs and cultural life that existed in the Fillmore could not be recreated.

In most US cities where African American out-migration is occurring, those leaving tend to be middle class households moving to the suburbs (Whelan, 2001; Clark, 2007). In San Francisco, it is both the working and middle classes that are leaving as the city’s cost of living, and in particular the cost of housing, continues to increase. A study by researchers from San Francisco State University (Ginwright and Akom, 2007) sought to provide more detail to picture of the out-migration phenomenon. They reported that those individuals most likely to leave were 45 and under and residents who had lived in the city for less than 20 years. Furthermore, they reported that African Americans neighborhoods were diminishing and that lower income residents are as likely as middle income residents to leave. One problem with the study is that it asks respondents to self-report whether they were likely to leave the city in the next three years, though these reports may not match actual actions. However, it still is useful in shaping a picture of who is content in the city and who is looking for a way out. When thinking about redeveloping public housing, local policy makers have to consider that poverty dispersal programs are likely to result in further loss of African American families and that the younger generations are seeing more opportunities elsewhere.
As the number of African Americans in the city has decreased, public housing residents have become a larger piece of the African American constituency in the city. Any effort to redevelop public housing in San Francisco was going to have to take this into account. Hope SF fits into a larger set of policies aimed at retaining African American families in San Francisco. The pilot project would have to stay true to the principles: keeping residents on site and structuring redevelopment in a way that created integration, rather than relocation. Residents would need to be kept on site. One city staff person deeply involved in shaping the program explained, “A key component of HOPE VI is giving people a choice with vouchers. Here people want one-for-one replacement, so they don’t want the option, even if it is resident driven…We want people to stay in San Francisco. [Vouchers] won’t even be on the agenda. (Interview, November 2007)” Redevelopment had displaced Black households before and it would not happen again with Hope SF. As a result, the pilot project needed to be one of the city’s primarily African American public housing developments located outside of the Western addition: Hunters View, Westbrook, Hunters Point, Alice Griffith, Potrero Terrace, or Sunnydale.

A Network of Relationships

One can go down the list of public housing family developments in the city’s southeastern neighborhoods and give reasons why most would not be the ideal choice for a pilot project. This is not to say that such a methodical or deliberate approach was ever used, no one I interviewed ever spoke of a selection process or even a conversation where one site was targeted or singled out above the others. Such actions would have undermined the objectives of the RFQ, which was intended to open up SFHA’s distressed properties to the possibilities of the market. That being said, some locations offered a higher potential for success than others. For example:

- Potrero Terrace was risky because of the potential for tenant opposition. In 1992, the residents had been able to generate significant enough resistance to SFHA’s proposed HOPE VI redevelopment project for the site that SFHA ultimately changed their application and went with another development instead.

- Sunnydale was too large to work within the phased development framework of the model. At 50 acres and 750 units, it would not be possible to generate enough change in the first phase that the developer could easily sell the market rate units and provide the expected cross-subsidy. Sunnydale also does not have the view advantages of other sites.

- Hunters Point includes three different sub-sites which makes it more complicated.

- The redevelopment of Alice Griffith had already been included as part of the Lennar contract to redevelop the shipyards and Candlestick Park.

That leaves Hunters View and Westbrook. The two are nearly identical in terms of size, density, demographics and location. They are discreet developments with clear boundaries, just under 300 units and almost 20 acres. They are situated less than a mile apart on the hill. Hunters View made sense for the John Stewart Company (JSCO) and its partners because they were familiar with the site and had established relationships on that part of the hill. They were not thinking about why other sites did not work. They simply knew that Hunters View would work for them.

The relationship between JSCO and SFHA dates back to the early 1990s when the company took over management of the Geneva Towers development. Geneva Towers was located in Visitation Valley, one of the southern-most neighborhoods in San Francisco. The city’s largest public housing development, Sunnydale, was next door to the site. The Geneva
Towers development was originally built to provide low cost housing to airport employees, but the apartment towers were not popular with San Franciscans and the property owners eventually turned to SFHA for tenants and subsidies. The two 20-story buildings contained 576 units and nearly 2000 people. The owners put little effort into maintaining the property and soon it had a reputation for both danger and disrepair. In 1988, the city of San Francisco sued the owners claiming that the inadequate fire safety systems combined with elevators that frequently malfunctioned or other needed repairs made the buildings dangerous to human life (Lempinen, 1988). HUD became involved and in 1991 took ownership of the buildings. Once SFHA had responsibility for the buildings, the agency hired JSCO to manage them, hoping the private management company would be able to turn the properties around. Ultimately, the costs for maintenance and repair made the continued operation of the building untenable. In 1994 SFHA applied to HUD for permission to tear down the towers and replace them with lower density affordable housing units at the site. Their proposal was accepted and the towers came down in 1996.

In 1997, SFHA applied for HOPE VI funding to redevelop the North Beach site (see Chapter III for a full description of the North Beach project). The development team for that project included: BRIDGE Housing, The John Stewart Company, and Em Johnson Interests. In 2003, when SFHA sent out the RFQ for ideas to redevelop their remaining distressed properties, JSCO was in the final stage of the North Beach project and in line to become the property managers for both North Beach and Valencia Gardens once redevelopment was complete. JSCO also had a number of SFHA administered section 8 units in the buildings it managed at the time. The relationship between SFHA and JSCO dated back more than a decade and the two entities understood how to work together.

JSCO was also familiar with the Hunters View property. As a representative from the developers explained:

We were the only ones to submit a proposal for the original RFQ. This was pre-Hope SF. No one knew if the city would set up with funding, or anything else. We were already managing two neighbors so we knew the community. We knew the impact of Hunters View. It was the tail wagging the dog. We knew it would make management easier. (Interview, August 20, 2008)

The company managed the Jackie Robinson Apartments, a low income development adjacent to Hunters View. Ridgeview Terrace, a second low income property adjacent to Hunters View, was owned and operated by Ridgepoint Non-Profit Housing Corporation. In 2001, Ridgepoint’s president, Larry Hollingsworth, decided to buy the Jackie Robinson property. He turned to Devine and Gong, a financial consulting and real estate development firm based in San Francisco, to help him with the financing. Devine and Gong and JSCO have a long history of working together, and this project is just one example of many. Ridgepoint’s efforts to purchase Jackie Robinson Apartments brought together the team that would become Hunters View Community Partners. Together they had the experience working with SFHA, the experience redeveloping and managing public housing, and the experience with the neighborhood that all parties believed would be necessary for the project to be successful.
Before the late 1990s, Hunters View was one problem project in a portfolio of problem projects run by a problem housing authority. The development gained brief notoriety in 1992 with the visit of Vice President Dan Quayle, but otherwise there was little that differentiated it from the other housing developments on the hill. In the late 1990s, that started to change. In 1997, a fire in a Hunters View housing unit killed grandmother Lois Evans and five young children. Firefighters were able to keep the fire from spreading to other units, but it burned too quickly to save either Evans or the children who had been sleeping inside. Ms. Evans’ family blamed the fire on a faulty heater that she had requested SHFA to fix on several occasions and the absence of any smoke detectors in the unit. The courts agreed, ultimately awarding the family $12 million in damages, $9 million to be paid by SFHA (Gordon, 2005). The fire became a vivid warning of the danger that the conditions at SFHA’s properties were posing for residents.

Next, the violence that had long been part of life in Hunters View intensified as the Westmob gang from Hunters View began to battle the Big Block gang from Westbrook over hip hop supremacy and perceived slights in the lyrics from songs produced at their respective recording studios. From mid 1999 through June 2001, more than 100 drug or gang-related shootings occurred in Hunters Point (Wagner, 2001). These were the heady years of the dot com boom, when much of San Francisco seemed to be experiencing ever-increasing wealth. Few would have considered San Francisco a likely location for one of the most desperate ghettos in the country, but Hunters Point had become such a place. Even so, it is unlikely that most San Franciscans thought about Hunters Point or even felt it presented much of a threat to the city. The community’s removed location in the Southeastern part of the city made it easy to avoid and easy to forget.

Then in 2001, a documentary called, “Straight outta Hunters Point” hit the film festival circuit and started to gain attention. The film was a project of Kevin Epps, a Black man in his early 30s who was born and raised in the Hunters View development. Perplexed by the violence that had engulfed Hunters Point, he used his documentary as a way to investigate the roots of the problem. Epps had spent the first 30 years of his life living on the hill. He had found a refuge in the Hunters View Youth Park. He knew the people and the pathways. In film he found a methodology and a voice, and with it he brought attention to a long ignored piece of the city. Epps did not offer solutions, but instead provided a raw look at the reality of life in Hunters View and the violence of gang life in San Francisco.

“Straight outta Hunters Point” made Hunters View the symbol for San Francisco’s failure to deliver on its promises to the African American migrants that came to the city decades earlier. Epps showed the on-going environmental hazards, the poverty, and the violence that were part of daily life in Hunters Point, using Hunters View as ground zero for his investigation. In doing so, he brought to life a part of the city which shared the same views and the same beautiful landscape, but none of the promise or prosperity of the rest of the city. In 2004 when Newsom held his first senior staff meeting at Hunters View, he was there for a reason. If he was going to bring change to the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood, he had every reason to start it right there.
C. Constructing the Hunters View Imaginary

*A house constitutes a body of images that give [hu]mankind proofs or illusions of stability.*

-Gaston Bachelard

*The Poetics of Space* (1969)

Housing authority and city staff people, elected officials, advocates, and residents agree that the city’s decaying public housing sites cannot remain as they are. All parties involved view the current situation as critical and agree that the city must take immediate action or the units will be lost to demolition. Groups that would usually find themselves on opposing sides of public housing battles have been forced by the seriousness of the situation to find a way to move forward together, and the usual concerns or distrust over one another’s motives have been set aside in favor of action. One advocate captured this decision to suspend disbelief when commenting on the Hope SF program, “I don’t see how we can retain control and oversight once we launch. Yet, I do very much want to see these units preserved and not razed or left to deteriorate as in other cities (Personal correspondence, February 22, 2007).”

It is not that other points of view have not surfaced, for example Supervisor Chris Daly, a long time political opponent of Mayor Gavin Newsom, tried to prioritize repairs that would take place immediately over redevelopment that he argued would take years to complete. He took his battle to the Board of Supervisors’ Budget Committee, but his heavy handed approach only resulted in Board Chair Aaron Peskin removing him from the committee (Buchanan, 2006). Daly was portrayed in the local press as fringe and unrealistic (Daly’s Political Games, 2007, p.B8), and the vast majority of support coalesced around the Hope SF approach. I argue that a Hunters View imaginary has taken shape in the city that explains how redevelopment became the “natural” solution for fixing dilapidated public housing properties in San Francisco and how Hunters View came to embody those efforts. This imaginary is imbued with symbols of justice, integration, opportunity, and agency that link the site and the act of redevelopment to the progressive values of the city. It provides the vision of a modernity where poverty anxieties are solved with the physical transformation of poverty spaces and where the chaos of social exclusion is put into its proper place through services that connect opportunity to housing. This is an imaginary of a city that is planned, rational, and just; where one’s place in the city provides legitimacy and rights to the benefits of citizenship. In the Hunters View imaginary, redeveloped public housing sites become San Francisco’s monuments to a city of success.
Redevelopment as an Act of Justice

Our liberal, forward-thinking mayors, notably Willie Brown and Gavin Newsom, have failed to pay more than lip service to the abomination that is public housing in San Francisco. It continues to exist, out of sight, out of mind, under our very noses, while we happily appease our guilty consciences by making well-meaning donations to places in the far corners of the globe whose names we can barely pronounce. To be a moral force in the world, this country must first set its own house in order.

-Carol Haskill, San Francisco resident
Letter to the Editor (2008)

In the Hunters View imaginary, redevelopment is a way of restoring justice to long neglected African American communities in the city. It accomplishes this by righting an historic and enduring wrong, the destruction of the Fillmore neighborhood. In his 2006 State of the City Address, Mayor Newsom promoted the Hope SF program as a way for the city to “...create new neighborhoods… Preserve existing neighborhoods by relieving the pressure for new housing… And create new economic opportunities. And finally – perhaps most importantly – right a wrong.” The Fillmore is one of the primary symbols regarding redevelopment in San Francisco. It comes up often during discussions about Hope SF, sometimes invoked by residents or community members who admonish those present to “Remember the Fillmore,” other times by city staff people who promise that the Fillmore will not be repeated. Because of this history, eminent domain and displacement are especially charged words and likely to bring emotion when evoked. Because of this history, the first Hope SF principle promises to “Ensure no loss of public housing by replacing every distressed public housing unit with a high-quality public housing unit, with a commitment to minimize displacement of existing residents by phasing development and emphasizing on-site relocation.” Units will be replaced. Families will remain in their communities.

A book on redevelopment by psychiatrist Mindy Fullilove called Root Shock has been influential in the shaping of Hope SF. Fullilove mentions the Fillmore explicitly in the first chapter of her book. She explains that during urban renewal, “Major chunks of the jazz world—the Fillmore in San Francisco, the Hill district in Pittsburgh, and the South Side of Chicago, among them—were torn up by urban renewal, and the structure of home-street-club was destroyed (p.16).” Once again proof that the Fillmore had been a particular kind of place and a kind place that is now lost. Fullilove’s larger argument is that an interconnectedness existed in these neighborhoods before urban renewal, an interconnectedness that was rooted in place as much as the people in that place. When those communities were destroyed, the inhabitants experienced “Root Shock” which she defines as “the traumatic stress reaction to the destruction of all or part of one’s emotional ecosystem (p.11).” Because it has been left untreated, the affects of that trauma have been enduring and the injustice continues.

The Fillmore does not exist only in the past tense in San Francisco. Urban renewal displaced Black families and destroyed a vital Black neighborhood. Because many of the persons displaced found themselves in Hunters Point, a direct line connects the destruction of the Fillmore and the creation of Hunters View. The Fillmore, then, also provides public housing residents with legitimacy in their quest for city citizenship. It is proof that they once occupied a central part of the city, a part that is largely gentrified today, blocks from city hall, and
undeniably included. It also acknowledges the city’s culpability and provides a moral impetus for action. Finally, it serves as a vision for a different type of African American space than what exists in the city today—a lively neighborhood with cultural attributes that are desirable to the status quo and provide economic value to both the residents and the city. As either a community that contributes to the city or a community that was destroyed, the Fillmore is what was and what could be.

The Fillmore is one symbol of injustice that runs though the public housing discourse in San Francisco. Another is the physical decay of public housing buildings, the manifestation of SFHA’s failure to deliver on the obligation to provide safe and sanitary housing for low income people. For example, in 1995 The Examiner named SFHA as “the city's worst slumlord.” and described the public housing under their watch as a “square mile of squalor.” The article painted this picture of public housing in San Francisco.

In the homes of its tenants, sewers regularly back up; heaters emit strange, foul-smelling fumes; lead paint peels from walls; asbestos-laden tile crumbles. Children play amid strewn glass; they are burned by sparks that fly from faulty electrical outlets; they learn early about life’s most hideous dangers, from pit bulls that roam hallways and courtyards, to rats, to bullets. Drug dealers and violent crime are facts of life. Most of The City's murders and violent assaults occur in or near these homes. Residents lock their doors and don't look out when they hear screams and gunfire. (Goldberg and Marinucci, 1995)

Much like the depictions of tenement slums at the end of the nineteenth century, crumbling buildings, landlord neglect, and crime all come together in this account. It is unnecessary to provide the name of the particular development as the image encompasses them all. Such accounts emphasize the otherness of both public housing spaces and, by association, public housing residents. These are places to avoid, not places to embrace.

The image shifted once the efforts to redevelop Hunters View started appearing in local newspapers. On August 11, 2005, a headline in The San Francisco Chronicle read “Hunters View up for Redeveloping: Housing agency to consider plan at meeting today.” In the article, reporter Ilene Lelchuk wrote that later that day the SFHA Board of Commissioners would be voting whether to enter into an exclusive negotiating agreement with John Stewart Company and its partners to redevelop Hunters View. The article began with a description of the site:

The Hunters View public housing project in San Francisco isn’t pretty, with 50-year-old barracks-style apartments, leaks and mold, graffiti on the streets, weeds on the hills and a reputation for danger. Yet the 22 or so acres with panoramic views of the bay and sheltered by hills from the fog has some developers excited – and offering to rebuild the decrepit public housing so they can add some market-rate apartments and housing on the land.

In Lelchuk’s description, the problem is the neglect and physical decay of the properties. The opportunity is the land, the location, and the low density of the site. The envisioned outcome is a mixed income community. There is no mention of the residents, only the property—as if these conditions exist in a distant, unoccupied territory. After more than a decade of Hunters View appearing in the news only in relation to violence and neglect, it is the open vistas of a vacant property that is best captures the potential of Hope SF and the possibility for change.

This set of images is repeated again and again. The urgency of the situation, the extent of the decay, and the promise of redevelopment all become embodied in Hunters View. On August
30, 2007, *The Chronicle* reported that, “Hunters View – not Sunnydale – ranks as S.F.’s worst complex.” The article went on to say that recent HUD inspections gave the development a score of 25 out of a possible 100, making it one of the worst public housing developments in the nation. September 17, 2007, *The Chronicle* warned, “Fixing mess at Hunters View won’t be quick, easy or cheap.” This article corresponds with the Mayor’s announcement of the start of Hope SF. The next headlines, which were on November 16, 2007 and November 17 respectively, reported that “Ceiling break at public housing unit draws Third World comparison,” and that “S.F. probe finds foul water, not sewage, doused boy in public housing.” These public housing sites might be different that the rest of the city and they may exist out of site from most of the city, but Hope SF makes the claim that they are still within the territory of the city. In the Hunters View imaginary, proximity creates obligation. Opposing redevelopment has become the equivalent of opposing public housing all together.

**Redevelopment as a Vehicle for Resident Agency and Voice**

In the Hunters View imaginary, the city engages in redevelopment as a response to resident needs. Residents are no longer ignored, but instead have a voice and the opportunity to shape their own futures. The emphasis on participation makes the project familiar and more like other neighborhood improvement efforts in the city. In the San Francisco political culture where public participation is a required and expected component of every project, residents are the plaster and lathe that provide a project with legitimacy. The resident participation process provides the symbol of a collective resident voice. Through this process, residents and developers negotiate the terms of redevelopment and put into place the details which will enable both people and place to be transformed.

Resident concerns add weight to the city’s case that immediate action is needed. For example, on August 12, 2005, *The Chronicle* reported that the SFHA Commission had voted to move ahead with plans to redevelop Hunters View (Lelchuk). The article included mention of residents’ fears of displacement and Commissioners’ fears that such projects would contribute to shrinking the city’s African American population. One resident was quoted who said, “This place really needs to be redone…Putting it off isn’t going to help anything.” The message is that despite the fears and misgivings of both residents and their champions, the problem is so large and so obvious, that even residents agree that the current buildings must go. It conveys an image that the decision to redevelop the site does not come from city officials or developers alone. Residents are calling for action. Explained one city professional deeply involved in the project,

...The first thing to do was to test the appetite of the community. It’s one thing for you to say you want new housing, it’s another thing for you to go through the mechanics to achieve that. So we had to test the water and see how dissatisfied were folks really with their living conditions that would warrant this level of investment. Because it wouldn’t be a community decision to rebuild public housing, it would be a city decision. And so in that context, you had to have a call to action yes, by those folks who lived there, but almost a moral obligation by the larger city to say ok, this is part of the fabric of our city. We’ve got to do something (Interview, December 2008).

By emphasizing the resident voices that are calling for change, the Hunters View imaginary taps into the city’s larger political culture. San Francisco is a city with a deep history of community organizing and activism. Decision-makers and housing authority officials see groups such as the San Francisco Housing Rights Coalition, Coleman Advocates for Children
and Youth, ACORN, and San Francisco Organizing Project as ever present adversaries who are ready to hold them accountable for how their decisions affect low income people in the city; and neighborhood groups often wield significant power within local politics. However, while the expectation for participation remained at center stage with Hope SF, the infrastructure necessary to make it happen was glaringly absent at Hunters View. The tenants association did exist, but it garnered very little influence with SFHA and had little capacity to organize residents. Outside community organizers had no presence in this community, nor did city social service organizations.

The Hope SF Principles state that projects are expected to: “Ensure high levels of resident participation and involvement in Hope SF planning and implementation, including the support of resident-driven occupancy criteria.” Residents are present at every step of the process, from the public housing taskforce to the SFHA Commission to the development meetings on the site. Resident buy in is essential for keeping the project moving forward: they have to sign off on the relocation plan and pass on their right of first refusal. However, resident participation is a tricky endeavor. While the presence of residents is easy to achieve, meaningful input is something else altogether.

When the development team wanted to set up a participation process that allowed them to work with residents throughout the redevelopment process, they were starting from scratch. There were no relationships to build on, no history of trust or shared common interest. SFHA touted their experience working with residents in their HOPE VI projects and planned to apply their process to this new project. However, the developers were wary of being associated with the housing authority. Residents had numerous, legitimate issue with SFHA and the development team did not want that baggage to affect their ability to get things done. SFHA was the old and they very much wanted to keep that separate from the new.

There is a history there. There is baggage associated with SFHA and we want to have some distance from that. SFHA is more removed from the process. They do not always have the most current information and sometimes when they do talk, it is inaccurate. They are not always on message… Residents kept asking what they were supposed to do for the next 2-3 years until their units are redeveloped. They are done. They have rats and raw sewage running down the hill now. They want SFHA to do something now. We are really the ones driving the project. (Interview, September 6, 2006)

At most meetings, resident attendance was low. It was not uncommon for the development team and their cadre of associates to outnumber the residents. The project manager from the development team found herself in a difficult position. She had to figure out how to generate enough resident participation that the process carried legitimacy and decisions could be carried out with a degree of certainty. Her first step was to hire a consultant to run the resident participation aspect of the program. Having an outside person present to facilitate made the meetings go more smoothly, but did not necessarily improve attendance.

Another approach was to contract with COO to do outreach to residents. COO was able to secure some outside funding for resident capacity building and leadership development. The idea had been to train a small number of organizers who would then work with residents to hold informational living room meetings where residents could come together and talk about redevelopment. This also did not create the kind of indigenous resident movement that organizers were hoping for. Finally, the development team resorted to paying the Tenant Association President and Tenant Association Board Members to attend the meetings. While
attendance was achieved with this approach, it is unclear that it achieved genuine participation. On one hand, the developer reported that after she started paying for participation:

This meeting had good attendance. There were about 30 people there. It was our strongest turnout yet. We are now paying [Tenants Association] board members to attend. We are learning that money matters. If it gets them to come and play a leadership role, then I’m ok with it. [The President of the Tenants Association] has been busy saying that they cannot meet with us because they do not have a board. We paid three board members to attend including [the President of the Tenants Association] (Interview, September 6, 2006).

On the other hand, she worried over the potential flaws to this approach:

We have been worrying about this for a long time and right now I feel like doing something is better than doing nothing, but at the same time this is not good. The people who get paid also have to face accusations of being pawns for the developers. We need to understand the shortcomings of [the President of the Tenants Association] and the board and know that you cannot rely on them to represent everyone’s point of view (Interview, September 6, 2006).

One of the primary symbols of resident agency within the Hunters View imaginary is the Hunters View Tenants Association, the formal body representing residents of the SFHA Hunters View property. It has a president and a board that is voted into office by the residents of Hunters View. The current president is Tessie Esther, a forceful woman who has a long history at Hunters View, with children and grandchildren living on the site. Ms. Esther might be better understood as the informal mayor of Hunters View rather than the president of the Tenants Association. The extent of her constituency is unclear, but she is the irrefutable gatekeeper to the community. Meetings do not happen unless Ms. Esther agrees to them, and no one present at the resident meetings ever loudly disagrees with her. When unexpected visitors show up at the meetings, often with offers of assistance to the community, she has invited them.

Not long after the Hunters View project came on line, a new president was voted into office, replacing Ms. Esther after she had held the office for many years. Due to an unfortunate family tragedy the new president withdrew from her position. Ms. Esther, who had stepped down and become Vice President, returned to her place as the primary tenant leader. She became the point of contact for the John Stewart Company when they wanted to begin holding regular resident meetings about redevelopment of the site, and they saw her as a singular challenge that had to be resolved if resident participation were to occur in a meaningful way.

Margaret Campbell, the Hunters View project manager from the John Stewart Company was the first point of contact for the development team when it came to managing the resident participation process. She was the one responsible for making sure that the residents signed off on the project and that resident input was managed in a meaningful way. From the beginning, Margaret saw this as a significant challenge, one for which she, as a development professional, was not well-equipped. Margaret was the person most often in direct contact with residents. She was unsure how to read the political landscape at the site, and while she knew that Tessie was the president of the Tenants Association, she did not know how representative Tessie’s views were of the sentiments of the larger resident population. After six months, when Tessie decided that there would not be any more meetings, Margaret was the one who had to find a way to get the process started again.
The first resident meeting I attended was chaotic. Meetings were held in a vacant public housing unit set aside for such gatherings. Chairs were set up in rows across the width of what would have been the apartment’s front room with a narrow aisle dividing the chairs into two groups. Directly across the room from the front door was the entrance to the kitchen and next to that a flight of stairs led to the second floor. Several large wooden desks were clustered on one end of the room and the rest of the furniture was folding tables and chairs. Posters, resident artwork, inspirational messages, and announcements were posted on room’s gray cinderblock walls. The windows were small and covered with bars. The lights were fluorescent.

Tessie called the meeting to order. She introduced the guests who were present that night. Margaret from the John Stewart Company was there to talk about the redevelopment of the site and another woman was there to talk about creating a community garden. Margaret went first. The meeting was loud, but not unfriendly. The dozen or so residents attending the meeting were concerned about displacement, but also seemed cautiously optimistic about the possibilities that the redevelopment of Hunters View could provide for them and their families.

Once the redevelopment presentation was over, the next guest was given the floor. She was a San Francisco resident who had been inspired by recent newspaper accounts of the activism of Hunters View residents which had contributed to the closing of the PG&E power plant abutting the property. She had convinced her upscale church congregation to donate the necessary resources to build a community garden at the site, and she was there with a landscape architect to talk about what residents would like to have included in such a resource. Her timing could not have been worse. The woman and the landscape architect seemed nervous. The room was already rowdy from the previous presentation, and it made no sense to talk about adding a garden right after someone else had been talking about tearing down the site. Soon, even Tessie was asking the woman why she was there. Eventually, the guest was asked to come back later, after the redevelopment question had been settled.

This same dynamic would appear over and over again in resident meetings. In this case, both of the outside professionals claiming an interest in helping the Hunters View residents were clearly outsiders in terms of geography, class, and race. They had no stakes of their own in Hunters View. In the future they would be African American. They would be lawyers, engineers, housing professionals, and real estate professionals who would say they were of the community, who would give their credentials in terms of their professional expertise, but also their cousins and aunts and uncles who had lived on the property and time spent in the surrounding neighborhood. They would be individuals who used this claim to legitimize their interest in the welfare of the community. Again they would be unexpectedly included on the agenda and again their message would be in direct opposition to what was being presented by the redevelopment team. Over time, I began to develop hypotheses for this phenomenon. Perhaps Tessie, and thereby the residents, was including contradictory information as part of an effort to make sense of the situation. Why should she trust any one source? Another was that perhaps she was simply not in a position to say no. With decades of almost no offers of help at all, residents were not likely to turn away anyone who wanted to do something for their community. At the end of the day, they had no way to know which person was telling the truth and which offer would turn into something real.

While SFHA staff people speak in glowing terms about the tenant associations at their properties and the central role they play in any given redevelopment process, the reality at Hunters View is that the tenants association is something very different from the collective voice of residents imagined by most advocates for this type of structure. Given that this community’s
activism had helped to shut down the PG&E power plant that abutted the property, I expected to
see a well developed organization with capable leaders who knew how to engage the system and
insist on their rights. Instead what I found was one woman with a strong voice and a larger
community that remained at a distance. Whether it was engaging Hope SF, shutting down the PG
& E plant, or building a community garden, each idea originated with individuals or
organizations outside of the Hunters View community. Tessie provided access and an audience,
but the momentum for the project, the resources to support it, and even the framework for
negotiating a partnership with residents had to come from outside Hunters View.

The idea of community voice in and of itself is problematic within the Hunters View
imaginary. The questions of who has a stake in the property, who should benefit from
redevelopment, and whether it should happen at all are contested within the community of
people living at the Hunters View property. Then there are other people within Bayview Hunters
Point, the city, and even the region who see themselves as having a connection to Hunters View
and a legitimate stake in what happens there. These questions were present, if silent, within the
room at each tenant meeting. They were there when each presenter was asked question about his
or her right to be there and in response offered his or her credentials in terms of the community.
They were there when residents asserted their right to stay on the site as well as their right to
leave. They were there when residents talked about what happened to their family in the Fillmore
or their hopes for better place to raise their children, about family who had stayed, and family
who had moved away. For the development team, resident voice was about receiving specific
feedback from the people living on the property in order to comply with regulations and help the
process move forward smoothly. For residents, it was about seeking out every possible
opportunity, about speaking the past and the present, and creating as much space as possible for
their entire community, as they defined it, in the unknown future that was at the end of the day,
out of their control.

Redevelopment as a Tool for Promoting Integration

In the Hunters View imaginary, redevelopment reintegrates excluded communities within
the territory of the city by rebuilding them as economically integrated neighborhoods. The
architects of the Hope SF program see it as a coordinated effort to create neighborhood change
through a two-pronged program of human and physical development. The catalyst for that
change is redevelopment. In the vision of policymakers, the concentrated poverty that
characterizes the site in 2008 would be replaced with a mixed income community, a nostalgic
vision of a heterogeneous community where the classes live next to one another, becoming
connected through an understood common interest based on their proximity and the shared
consumption of public resources. The goal of integration and inclusion is important enough to
the program that three of the eight Hope SF Principles speak to how such a goal might be
achieved:

- Create an economically integrated community that includes a housing ladder of public
  housing, affordable housing, and market-rate housing, with a priority on addressing the
  need for family housing.
- Integrate Hope SF with neighborhood plans to improve schools, parks, transportation,
  safety and other amenities in their communities.
- Build a strong sense of community by including existing and prospective residents as
  well as neighbors in the planning and development process.
Because public housing residents are not supposed to be displaced, integration will be accomplished by bringing the city to them. Housing ladders will be put into place, amenities will be improved and maintained, planning and development will build community.

Hope SF departs from the usual redevelopment scenario of relocation and decreased density. Instead, public housing residents remained on the property, every public housing unit is replaced on site, and density is increased as affordable housing and market rate housing are added to the mix. Hope SF is a program of integration rather than relocation for residents, one that invests in both the public housing households living on the site at the time of redevelopment and the place on the map they call home. The San Francisco approach challenges research that finds mixed income communities provide limited benefit to very low income households. It hypothesizes instead that a different outcome will result when projects start with the goal of retaining 100% of the public housing families in a community, city resources are realigned to support that goal, and residents are heavily involved in the process. In this context, Hope SF supporters believe it is possible to transform not just public housing communities, but the very landscape of poverty and opportunity in the city.

Beginning with his first State of the City Address (2004), Mayor Gavin Newsom acknowledged the separation between the southeastern neighborhoods and the rest of San Francisco.

In truth, while we are one city united in name, we remain separate communities. In our city’s southeast, there’s a San Francisco that is a community apart. Separated by geography, violence, and decades of neglect. Despite over 40 years of promises, programs, speeches, high rhetoric, and good intentions, economic and social conditions in the southeast are getting worse not better. It’s there, in the Bayview, Hunters Point, Visitacion Valley and Potrero Hill that our problems are magnified.

These four communities encompass the Hope SF sites and the remaining public housing properties that the city is hoping to redevelop. These are not the only communities which contain public housing in the city or the only communities with poverty. The Mission neighborhood has two public housing family developments, both of which were redeveloped through HOPE VI. Chinatown has two aging family developments that have not been redeveloped. Both neighborhoods have long been home to many low-income and poor families. While these neighborhoods continue to house some of the city’s poor, they are also firmly embedded in the fabric of the city. Neither neighborhood experiences the same social and economic exclusion that is part of the day today reality of life at the Hope SF sites.

Integration incorporates the ideals of justice and agency mentioned earlier, but places both in space. On November 11, 2005, The Chronicle headline read, “City to negotiate housing project plan.” The short article reported that previous day the SFHA Commission had voted to enter into an exclusive negotiating agreement with John Stewart Company for the Hunters View site. The article ended with a quote from a resident comparing Hunters View and the Fillmore, “The Caucasians want it, and now they got it.” As a space of exclusion and of African American community, the site of Hunters View still remains contested. Residents do not take for granted that integrating the Hunters View land into the city will mean integration of its residents as well.

Bringing market rate units to the site is critical to re-envisioning Hunters View. Perhaps this is why in interviews with SFHA staff, city staff, and other members of the development team, the idea that mixed income housing is good social policy or even a moral imperative comes up again and again.
The over concentration of non-working poor was a huge mistake. We are landing in mixed income out of necessity, but I still think it is right (Interview, November 2007).

Mixed-income, mixed-use community where there are opportunities for self-sufficiency, economic development, and work force empowerment. Opportunities here to get folks in unions, get the kids… put programs there and get the kids off the streets. I describe myself as a social architect. It’s finding ways of revitalizing communities (Interview, November 2006).

It will create more affordable housing for families. It will create better housing and economic and social opportunities for current residents. We are hoping it changes perceptions about people when we create an environment where they will come together and live together. We are hoping for that social learning (Interview August 2008).

The media says that we are redeveloping public housing in exchange for the right to develop market rate units on the site. The only reason we are putting market rate units there is because it is good social policy and it allows us to finance the project… we put social benefit first (Interview, August 2008).

In these quotes, people from the city and the development team link mixed income housing to improvements in neighborhood conditions, outcomes for residents, access to opportunity, and community building. The underlying logic is that if concentrating poverty is responsible for social exclusion, then integrating poor households will improve the lives of those households.

The idea of mixed income communities as an alternative to concentrated poverty incorporates a bundle of assumptions about neighborhoods and the way that the people living in those neighborhoods structure their lives. It offers a romantic and sentimental view of city life based on the assumption that people of different classes living in cities used to live in close proximity to one another and as a result, shared a common sense of destiny and purpose. This view has been largely shaped by the work of Jane Jacob’s and her accounts of life in the West Village in New York in the 1960s. In contemporary efforts to deconcentrate poverty, advocates of mixed income housing speak of the importance of neighbors as role models and the access to job markets and services that higher income neighbors can bring to poor neighborhoods. However, the more powerful aspect of mixed income communities may be their ability to garner broad public support and the vision they supply of a public housing community that resembles the rest of the city. With mixed income communities, poverty disappears.

**Redevelopment as the Extension of Opportunity to Public Housing Residents**

In the Hunters View imaginary, redevelopment brings opportunity to public housing residents. It brings better homes and living conditions. It brings well paying jobs and the potential to enter into skilled tradeswork that will continue to bring higher wages to those households into the future. It brings access to market goods and services that have never been readily available in the community. By making housing in the community available to the market, the market will provide opportunities for residents that they have previously been denied.

No one denies that residents at Hunters View have not had access to many of the public services or amenities that are available to the rest of the city. Street lights work infrequently. Neighborhood schools are low performing. Open space is unkempt and dangerous. The one bus
line running through the neighborhood runs infrequently and retail services are all but absent from the community. On May 31, 2006 *The Chronicle* ran an article titled, “Bayview-Hunters Point, SF’s invisible majority: Area with highest density of children is most underserved.” The article draws attention to the high density of families with children living in the Bayview, its relatively inexpensive housing stock, the social problems in the neighborhood, and the paucity of services. It also talks about recent city efforts at neighborhood improvement and includes the planned redevelopment of Hunters View as an example.

While city agencies are aware of what is missing in Hunters View, they are also aware of what is being used. Residents consume high proportions of the human services offered by the city. The Human Services Agency produced a report in 2005 called *The Seven Key Street Corners for At Risk Families in San Francisco*. In this report, the Agency reported findings from recent spatial analysis of where most of the agency’s resources were being used in the city. They were able to link utilization of services and place, finding that most of the families requiring their services lived within a half mile of one of seven street corners in the city. Six of those street corners were located at public housing sites, including Hunters View, and the seventh was in the Tenderloin, the skidrow district of San Francisco and home to most of the city’s Single Resident Occupancy (SRO) units.

Bringing opportunity to Hunters View solves both sides of the problem. It provides residents with a pathway to self-sufficiency. It brings the potential for access to the market, and with it, all the goods and services that more affluent residents of the city take for granted in their communities. As residents’ lives improve, their need for health and human services diminishes. However, these transformations depend on one critical element: that the residents of Hunters View are able to find jobs that provide a living wage.

The Spring 2009 Hope SF Community newsletter announced that “Jobs are Coming to Hunters View.” It goes on to say that “Construction related jobs as well as ‘end use’ jobs, like property management in the new development, will result directly from the redevelopment of Hope SF sites (2).” The promise of living wage jobs for residents is the most concrete manifestation of redevelopment opportunities for residents. Because any work involving HUD or the redevelopment agency stipulates community benefits in the form of hiring community members as part of the redevelopment workforce, the possibility of attaining this work is real. The newsletter goes on to say, “The Office of Economic and Workforce Development, Communities of Opportunity, the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency and the development team are working on the job training, employment opportunity and local contracting plans to ensure that residents of Hunters View and the broader community can take advantage of the opportunities that result from this revitalization.”

The city staff people managing Hope SF have instructed developers to start services for residents during pre-development as a way to better prepare residents for taking advantage of the economic opportunities that accompany redevelopment. Offering these services well in advance of construction is critical if residents are to become solidly employed. For example, the San Francisco Office of Economic and Workforce Development runs a program called CityBuild Academy which prepares individuals for work in the skilled trades.

CityBuild Academy is a 12-week, highly structured pre-apprenticeship program with hands-on and classroom training designed to prepare residents for various skilled trades and jobs in today's construction industry. The classes start at 7:00 am and end at 3:30 pm, Monday thru Friday. The primary mission of the Academy is to offer San Francisco residents state-of-the-art introductory
construction skills training that will prepare them for entry-level work in various skilled trades.

Residents are notified each time a new cohort begins. However, the program has qualifications for applicants. They include: San Francisco residency; high school diploma or GED; valid California driver's license; U.S. citizenship or proof of eligibility to work in the U.S.; ability to pass drug tests; and ability to communicate effectively in English. Predevelopment services have to start years in advance of breaking ground in order for residents to be able to (1) meet the qualifications, and (2) complete CityBuild in time to be able to take advantage of these jobs.

For those who do not qualify for that kind of work or who are not interested in it, the job prospects are less clear. The Department of Economic and Workforce Development has several one stop career link centers in the city that provide general employment services, support, and referrals to other employment and training opportunities. A new site is being opened near Hunters View to provide assistance to residents. However, even these services miss the fundamental problems facing Hunters View residents looking for work in the city. San Francisco’s economy is split between technology and knowledge economy jobs and tourism and the accompanying low skill service sector jobs. Residents cannot find employment in the former and cannot support their families in the latter. Within the Hunters View imaginary, opportunity, services, and jobs are almost interchangeable. The city has hired consultants to help with the predevelopment social services planning for each site and developers must have their own social services plans for once development begins. Still, there are unresolved conflicts within this triad of opportunity, services and jobs. Will residents who find work during redevelopment still have access to jobs once construction at the site is over? How can Hunters View residents ever gain access to the wider universe of jobs in San Francisco unless education in the community is addressed? And what about those households who simply cannot rise to the occasion, will they have a place in the new Hunters View? Will they have a place in the city?
IV. A Return to the City: Hope SF and the Effort to Transform Residents & Real Estate

Hope SF pioneers a new model for public housing based on the core belief that housing investments must take family needs into account. Hope SF promises more than physical transformation; it will transform lives by offering residents opportunities to grow and thrive.

- Mayor’s Office of Housing
Hope SF: More than Housing, 2009

Hope SF promises a return to the city. The program’s theory of change hypothesizes that when very low income public housing communities are replaced with denser mixed income neighborhoods, the holes in the urban fabric, those forgotten spaces of poverty and neglect where public housing exist, will emerge as working neighborhoods integrated within the larger city of San Francisco. Through the act of redevelopment, dilapidated public housing properties become San Francisco neighborhoods, and public housing residents become San Francisco citizens. Unlike HOPE VI, which generally attempts to revitalize neighborhoods by improving the physical design of properties and dispersing public housing residents, Hope SF sets out to do more than improve poverty housing. It seeks to transform BOTH people AND places. Through the implementation of a two-pronged program of social and physical transformation, Hope SF attempts to prepare both real estate and residents for reentry into the city and a future of economic opportunity.

Consistent with much of US housing policy, Hope SF assumes that the profit-driven market is the best tool for the provision and allocation of housing. The program places each Hope SF redevelopment project within a unique public/private partnership that brings together public land, public and private capital, market expertise, regulatory flexibility, and political will. As an earlier chapter explained in detail, Hope SF is a program of the local state, spearheaded by the Mayor’s Office of Housing. Each public housing site redeveloped through Hope SF will have its own development team, and San Francisco has a unique community of affordable housing developers that the city is relying on to do this work. The financial model assumes that the fee-simple sale of market rate units added to the site will cross-subsidize the cost of redeveloping the public housing units. Financing relies on a tax increment model. It anticipates increased tax revenues as public land becomes private land and the site improves over the course of phased development. Gentrification is neither friend nor foe in the Hope SF policy framework, but a powerful force to be watched carefully and used with caution.

The human services component of Hope SF is not secondary to the program’s physical development efforts. It is intrinsic to the development project and the primary tool for the differentiation of poor households. The San Francisco approach hypothesizes that when projects start with the goal of retaining 100% of the public housing families in a community, city resources are realigned to support that goal, and residents are heavily involved in the process, then redevelopment will transform both residents and their homes. However, the retention of public housing units is not the same as the retention of public housing households. The push for resident retention means that within the Hope SF discourse, opportunity has become antithetical to choice and the question of housing deservingness has been left off the table altogether. While public housing residents are able to remain in place during construction, their tenure becomes less secure, not more secure as a result of redevelopment.
This chapter has four parts. The first part defines gentrification and questions the assertion that gentrification can be used as a tool to provide benefits to low-income communities. Part two examines how Hope SF approaches the physical development of a site. It considers some of the peculiarities of San Francisco that are instrumental in shaping the Hope SF efforts including the ecology of non-profit developers and SFHA’s past experience with HOPE VI. These factors help to mediate the potentially negative aspects of redevelopment and gentrification and enhance the program’s pursuit of equitable development. Part three examines how Hope SF approaches human development, including the program’s emphasis on integration instead of integration, the rental assistance plan, and the plans for social service delivery. In the final section, I argue that inclusion is not as straight forward as Hope SF would suggest; and I highlight four unresolved contradictions within the model’s framework: (1) choice, (2) time, (3) deservingness, and (4) boundaries. While a program of gentrification in the public interest may indeed be the best tool available to local governments for bringing much needed capital and revitalization into spaces of exclusion such as Hunters View, it will never provide a right to housing or guarantee a living wage. Instead, I argue that the inherent tension between capital accumulation and social goals in Hope SF will undermine the expansive goals of the program and facilitate a geography of differentiated poverty within the city.
A. Gentrification in the Public Interest: The Pursuit of Development without Displacement

*Gentrification’s impacts can have positive or negative effects, depending on both the circumstances of the neighborhood and metropolitan area, and on the constituency affected.*

- Maureen Kennedy and Paul Leonard  
  *Dealing with Neighborhood Change: A Primer on Gentrification and Policy Choices* (2001)

The Hope SF program posits that it is possible to achieve reinvestment and diversity at the neighborhood scale without the segregation, polarization, and displacement associated with gentrification. The leadership shaping Hope SF rejects the way that gentrification is generally conceived, arguing that the term only applies to instances where neighborhood changes leads to displacement. They claim that because their approach to neighborhood change prevents displacement, it cannot be considered gentrification. This argument is at least in part a reflection of the potentially volatile nature of conversations about gentrification in San Francisco, but it also reflects a larger trend in urban policy that views the class transformation of low income neighborhoods through the construction of mixed income neighborhoods as emancipatory social policy. This section asks whether a project like Hope SF in fact can be considered an example of gentrification or whether to do so stretches the term beyond the limits of usefulness.

A Brief Look at the Literature

In popular terms, gentrification is most often understood as a process by which lower income inner-city people of color are displaced by white, middle class professionals who are attracted to a community’s urban location, cultural amenities, and desirable housing stock. Whether or not individual indigenous households are indeed displaced in the process of gentrification, the overall class composition of a neighborhood undoubtedly changes and with it, the geography of poverty within the city. The key agents fueling gentrification may be state actors, developers, or individual households, but in each case, the process is one of capital accumulation through property development (Beauregard, 1986).

This paper defines gentrification as a process of neighborhood change, but a particular type of change where lower income residents, local businesses, and community institutions within a particular geographic area are replaced by higher income residents as well as the businesses and institutions that cater to them. Displacement may happen in the short term through relocation or evictions or over the long term through rent increases that drive out businesses or prevent future generations from finding housing that they can afford in the neighborhood. The larger urban context is important, and efforts to transform low income communities must be considered within a larger urban framework of housing affordability, systems of poverty management, and the distribution of opportunity across space. “Gentrification is no longer about the narrow and quixotic oddity in the housing market but has become the leading residential edge of a much larger endeavor: The class remake of the central urban landscape (Smith, 1996, p.39).” Following in the tradition of researchers such as Wyly and Hammel (1999), this analysis recognizes gentrification “as a process that is fundamentally rooted in class and inherently geographic in its manifestation.”

The term gentrification has been heavily debated within the scholarly literature since Ruth Glass first coined the term in 1964. While initial research on the topic became divided
between those using supply frameworks versus those using demand frameworks for understanding the causes of gentrification, as a whole it was largely critical and focused on how the gentrification process contributed to the displacement of low income people. More recent trends in the literature include the consideration of gentrification as a neutral or at times positive manifestation of urban change. Two recent reviews of gentrification research by Loretta Lees (2000) and Tom Slater (2006) capture the diversity within the field. Each challenges claims that gentrification is a process that can be considered either negative or positive and calls for a return to a more critical approach to the topic.

In her article, “A reappraisal of gentrification: Toward a ‘geography of gentrification’ (2000), Loretta Lees categories the previous decade’s literature on gentrification into four themes: the emancipatory city (Caulfield, 1994; Keith and Pile, 1993; Bondi, 1991; Warde, 1991), the new middle class (Ley, 1996; Butler, 1997; Bridge, 1995), the revanchist city (Smith, 1996; Butler, 1997; Bondi, 1991; Lees, 1996; Jacobs, 1996), and finally domestic technologies (Redfern, 1997). She argues for a reorganization of the field with a focus on the geography of gentrification and calls for new research which addresses super-gentrification, the global city, race and gentrification, and liveability/urban policy. Quoting Harvey (1995, p. 95), she urges gentrification researchers to “keep ‘issues open and tensions alive’” and to reconsider whether gentrification does in fact provide a solution to urban decline.

In his article “The Eviction of Critical Perspectives from Gentrification Research (2006)” Tom Slater also challenges recent literature that casts gentrification in a positive light (Zukin and Kosta, 2004) and argues that without a critical perspective, it is impossible to mount meaningful political challenges to the process. He identifies three causes for this turn away from critical analysis within the field of gentrification research. The first is the resilience of theoretical and ideological squabbles that pit cultural explanations of gentrification (Ley, 1987) against economic explanations (Smith, 1986) at the expense of recognizing that gentrification is a multifaceted process that is an expression of urban inequality happening on the ground. Second, he points to the lack of qualitative accounts of displacement, and is especially critical of the work of Lance Freeman and Frank Braconi (2002; 2004) who argue that displacement in gentrifying communities is minimal and that most households stay put because they appreciate the improvements that gentrification brings to their neighborhoods. The third cause Slater identifies is the neoliberal turn in urban policy and its accompanying emphasis on deconcentrating poverty through the construction of mixed income communities. Here he calls attention to the work of Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Smith, 2002; Slater, 2004b; 2005; as well as many of the articles in Atkinson and Bridge, 2005. While Slater acknowledges that an emphasis on social mixing is not always the result of neoliberal policy interventions, he also points out that often “gentrification disguised as ‘social mix’ serves as an excellent example of how the rhetoric and reality of gentrification has been replaced by a different discourse, theoretical and policy language that consistently deflects criticism and resistance (p.751).”

Both the Less and the Slater reviews of the gentrification acknowledge an existing tension between the understanding of gentrification as a harmful process of destruction/displacement and gentrification as a potentially emancipatory process of creativity/revitalization. However, as a process of urban change, gentrification is likely to include both. While most theorists seem to be aware of the destructive side of gentrification, most practitioners focus on its potential for creation and revitalization. The equitable development literature lauds the possibilities of a kinder and gentler gentrification, one that
benefits both the gentrifiers who gain access to urban life and desirable housing stock and the indigenous households who gain access to urban amenities and improved quality of life.

The Pursuit of Equitable Development

Progressive policy think tanks such as Policy Link and Brookings as well as affordable housing intermediaries such as LISC promote the possibility of equitable development, “the creation and maintenance of economically and socially diverse communities that are stable over the long term, through means that generate a minimum of transition costs that fall unfairly on lower income residents (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001, p.4).” Equitable development, they suggest, provides an alternative to the displacement and neighborhood changes associated with gentrification. It provides a framework “for evaluating whether an aspect of the gentrification process is “good” or “bad,” for debating whether it warrants hearty support or intervention, and for deciding the next steps to take in optimizing the positive aspects of gentrification and minimizing or eliminating its downsides (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001, p.4).” With the right tools, cities and their private partners can engage in neighborhood revitalization and minimize the negative externalities for the low income households that live there.

This approach as outlined by Kennedy and Leonard (2001) separates the drivers of neighborhood change, the process, and the consequences. The drivers are varied and include job growth, housing market dynamics, the preferences of individual households, public incentives, and policy interventions. The process is best described as the collective decisions of individual actors and the resulting transactions that when taken together account for an upward economic trend in a particular area over a period of time. The consequences are varied and up for interpretation depending on who you are and where you are standing. Property values rise, tax revenues increase, the area becomes more diverse in terms of both race and class, local commercial and retail establishments change, some households are displaced. If the drivers are inevitable and often desirable and the outcomes can vary, they key is to regulate the process to maximize the positive and mitigate the negative.

Advocates of equitable development urge municipalities to anticipate gentrification, identify leading indicators, and put policies in place early to mitigate potentially harmful consequences and maximize equitable outcomes. An unanswered question is whether a policy of development without displacement, even when enacted early and imbued with the qualities of equitable development described above, can provide a viable alternative to the retrenchment of the state in poor communities. An improvement in the material conditions of existing residents is assumed, but by no means guaranteed. “Gentrification creates costs and financial resources that can offset them. At the regional level, the gentrification process as a whole is driven by factors that can help resolve its adverse consequences. The key issue is how best to link local residents and institutions with resources at the neighborhood, city or regional levels. (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001, p.26).” In this framework, investment, gentrification, and equitable development form a virtual cycle of neighborhood revitalization. However, in the current climate of decentralization and privatization, neither the intermediaries nor the resources necessary to capture positive outcomes for low-income residents are guaranteed.

Unlike the local HOPE VI projects, the plan for Hope SF relied less on the momentum of the market and more on local state intervention to generate the opportunities for capital accumulation that would lead to gentrification and neighborhood change. Consistent with the third wave of gentrification described by Hackworth and Smith (2002), the Hope SF redevelopment projects were located further away from the central business district than previous
efforts; they were positioned on the leading edge of reinvestment in their neighborhoods; and they were heavily supported by the efforts of the local state. Up to this point, gentrification in these areas had been slow, if one could say it had happened at all. Hope SF planned to take care of the worst housing on the block, bring investment into excluded neighborhoods, and in doing so, open the door for further investment by private actors.

At presentations, public hearings, and community meetings, in written documents and spoken testimony, people from city departments, the housing authority, and the development team all repeated the same message: Change is coming. We can get in early and use it to our advantage, or we can watch it push us out. Explained one city staff person:

We will not create a sustainable future for current residents who are in peril without an initiative like this. It can have a catalytic effect for the surrounding neighborhood. These developments are the classic proverbial worst housing on the block. They are holding back the surrounding community. When they are redeveloped, there will be residual effects for the surrounding community. People will feel safer… Some folks would make a gentrification argument. The neighborhood is changing anyway. If we can do it in a thoughtful way, people will be in a better place when that happens (Interview, November 2007).

In this framework, gentrification is equated with neighborhood change. It implies that gentrification is a force that cannot be stopped, but can be directed. Gentrification becomes a neutral force of change, the manifestation of market forces at work. It can displace families and ravage existing communities or, if it is carefully managed, it can be used to achieve social benefits and to create public goods.

Having examined both the critical theoretical literature and the optimistic practical literature, the next step is to ask if we should consider gentrification any differently in the case of Hope SF given (1) it is public housing that is being redeveloped, and (2) residents are not being displaced.

**Public Housing and Gentrification**

Generally public housing is considered to be a barrier to gentrification, a physical presence that discourages an influx of more affluent households and provides rent control for a subgroup of indigenous neighborhood residents. Improvements to public housing properties are likely to result in increased property values in the surrounding area, but as long as public housing units remain, they prevent the wholesale class change of the neighborhood. Provided that housing developments remain situated on public housing land, at least part of the real estate within a neighborhood remains reserved for low income families into perpetuity and unavailable for market exchange.

Public housing has functioned historically as a mechanism for regulating urban land markets—keeping surplus land out of the market during periods when demand for urban land was low. With a renewed interest in urban living and a push for cities to provide entertaining and lively downtowns, cities are seeing new opportunities in their public housing stocks. Wyly and Hammel argue in their study of HOPE VI redevelopment that existing gentrification makes the integration of redeveloped public housing possible, and that in turn, the redevelopment of public housing encourages more private market investment in a neighborhood (1999). Certainly, in the case of San Francisco’s five HOPE VI projects, each was located in an already gentrifying neighborhood that was well integrated into the urban fabric of the city. Even without the addition of market rate units, the redevelopment of public housing at each site contributed to a growing
sense of improvement in each neighborhood. Following the completion of the HOPE VI project, private investment in each neighborhood continued to expand. By the 2000 census, none of the census tracts containing HOPE VI sites still qualified as high poverty areas.

Redevelopment projects that transform public housing sites into mixed income communities often include the valorization and then privatization of public housing land. Within a redevelopment transaction, the PHA and its development partners must negotiate issues such as who will own the land, who will own the improvements, who will manage the properties, and what will be the terms of any leases. Neither HOPE VI nor Hope SF provides a template for how to structure such agreements. Financing, unit counts, ownership, and other details are worked out on a project by project basis. As one city staff person who worked closely with the physical development aspect of Hope SF pointed out, development conditions are dynamic. Projects will vary from site to site, but also from phase to phase within a single project. The parties involved must have the capacity and experience to anticipate changes and adapt to them. Private actors are much more likely than PHAs or other city agencies to have the appropriate skills.

HOPE VI provided public housing authorities across the country with an opportunity to work with private sector partners and gain experience navigating the market dynamics related to development while redeveloping their housing stock. These efforts generated expertise. More than a decade of HOPE VI resulted in a small collection of developers with a national reputation for their expertise in the redevelopment of public housing, firms such as Community Builders in Boston or McCormack Baron Salazar in Saint Louis, as well as a larger circle of developers who have built up local or regional experience. Industry publications, awards presentations, and public housing industry conferences have helped to establish certain best practices and disseminate knowledge within the industry. In San Francisco, SFHA’s experience with HOPE VI has made both agency leaders and city officials confident that the redevelopment of public housing can be successful when public and private entities work together. After completing five HOPE VI projects, the agency knows how to engage private partners, where to look for financing, and what can be expected from the community at large. A model emerged from those experiences which directly informed the efforts of Hope SF.

The first component of the San Francisco model was the commitment to preserve every unit of public housing in the city to the greatest extent possible. Explained one SFHA staff person:

The San Francisco model recognizes the importance of preserving some housing for very low income households. We do not have any other land. We do not have any other sources of money to build housing for very low income people – other sources of affordable housing are for a different class of people. That works in our favor. There is a commitment to preserving the affordable housing that we have. Other cities are more willing to throw it away. If success is rebuilding public housing, we were successful in that. (Interview, March 2007)

The first three HOPE VI projects in San Francisco resulted in a net loss of 230 units (18% of the redeveloped units); however SFHA is careful to talk about those projects in terms of bedrooms, rather than units. Because properties were rebuilt with larger units that were better suited to the needs of current residents, the final count included an increase in bedrooms, but a decrease in units. The city’s final two HOPE VI projects replaced every public housing unit with a public housing unit and added other affordable housing units to the site. Overall, San Francisco’s model is one of preservation.
The next component of the San Francisco model was to partner with developers who were capable of taking charge of the development side of the project. “Picking good developer partners is critical. These are very complicated deals with lots of pitfalls and obstacles. It’s very easy to trip up without a good partner (Interview, March 2007).” SFHA preferred proposals that teamed higher capacity developers who might even be national in scope with local community-based developers. In the case of the Valencia Gardens project, that meant that the development team included both BRIDGE housing, a national non-profit developer with offices in the Bay Area, and Mission Housing Development Corporation, a neighborhood-based community development corporation.

The public side of the partnership facilitating each of the city’s HOPE VI projects extended beyond the institutional boundaries of SFHA. Previous mayors had been involved in choosing projects, keeping developers on the project, and contributing funding through MOH or the prioritization of tax credit financing. Development in San Francisco is by and large a political process, and one that does not include SFHA. These projects could not have moved forward without the buy-in of the mayor.

The third piece of the model was to leverage public resources to bring in additional financing to the project. For federally-funded HOPE VI projects, HUD funds provided a starting place for financing projects, but not enough to cover the entire cost of redevelopment. Instead, HUD empowered local agencies to use a range of financial arrangements and debt structures to finance their deals. Projects had to be attuned to the challenges and opportunities of local market conditions. Public goals of expanding affordable housing opportunities or achieving poverty alleviation were secondary to creating a project that was politically viable and fiscally sound. On the HOPE VI pages of SFHA’s website, the agency praises changes to federal regulations which make these types of public-private ventures possible:

Mixed financing is the most important financing tool available to SFHA [for] revitalizing distressed public housing. It utilizes the formation of new public and private partnerships to ensure long-term sustainability of public housing. The goal of mixed-finance development is to leverage or bring in substantial additional public and private resources not previously available to SFHA. As federal funding for public housing modernization dwindles and aging public housing capital improvement needs soar, outside leveraged public and private resources are critical for building market quality affordable replacement housing (SFHA Mixed Financing Webpage, 2008).

Mixed-financing strategies bring in resources that would not otherwise have been available to public housing. The San Francisco model posits that market-based approaches to the redevelopment of public housing expand opportunity and improve the quality of the housing.

Beyond any ideological preferences regarding the proper role of government in housing, most see the marrying of public and private entities to carry out these projects as a practical necessity. To begin with, the public sector has proven unwilling to adequately fund either the maintenance of these structures or their redevelopment. In San Francisco, SFHA recognizes that it does not have the capacity to act as its own developer and this sentiment is shared by city agencies, city officials, and affordable housing developers in the region. The technical demands of redevelopment require relationships with private sector partners whose capacities are more suited to the work at hand than those of most public housing agencies. However, regardless of how skillful or dedicated these new partners may be, they are by definition more oriented toward the task of development and the demands of the local market than the protection of social welfare.
and the provision of public goods. In its enthusiastic support of mixed financing, SFHA is making a claim that if the federal government cannot save us, the market certainly will.

Gentrification and Hope SF

As a starting place for understanding gentrification as it applies to Hope SF, I have reviewed the gentrification literature, the claims surrounding equitable development, and the question of the relationship between public housing and gentrification. Based on this investigation, I argue that Hope SF is indeed an example of policy that promotes gentrification. Because of the program’s close adherence to the principles of equitable development and its socially-minded objectives, I describe it as an example of gentrification in the public interest. Of course, because the projects have not been built, it is difficult to predict what exactly will happen on the ground or how the project will play out over time. The Hope SF commitment to preventing displacement and integrate social service planning into the development project adds additional wrinkles to consider. The next two sections address the physical and human development components of Hope SF respectively.
B. Hope SF, Physical Redevelopment, and Hunters View

*Public housing investment is shaping what a neighborhood and a city look like.*  
-Interview (February 28, 2007)

When the mayor and his staff decided to take on the challenge of redeveloping the city’s most severely distressed public housing sites, they were aware that they were moving into an area that previously had been the purview of the Federal government. Before they fully committed city money to the effort, they wanted the source of the problem to be clearly acknowledged as federal disinvestment. From their point of view, these sites were federal land, not city land, and the failure of public housing was a federal failure. The mayor would rescue these properties, but he did not want to be held accountable for the decay. Furthermore, the recent experiences of New York City gave city policymakers pause. One staffer explained, “Mayor Bloomberg gave $100 million out of the city budget to the New York Housing Authority as a one time emergency transfer to cover shortfalls when HUD was not fully funded last year. This year the New York City Housing Authority found that their budget had been cut by $100 million. HUD expected the city to cover that amount every year going forward.” San Francisco did not want to find itself in a similar position.

Ultimately, the mayor and his staff decided to move ahead with the program despite the potential risk to SFHA’s budget. However, the preamble to the Hope SF principles clearly points a finger at the federal government as both the cause of the problem and the entity with the responsibility to fix it:

> As a result of chronic underfunding by the federal government, the future of public housing in San Francisco and the nation is at risk. While we firmly believe that the federal government has a responsibility to increase the funding for public housing, San Francisco must take action quickly to ensure no loss of public housing in our city. (Hope SF Principles, 2007)

Embedded within the criticism of Republican policies and decreased federal funding, one also finds a deeper criticism of the very idea of a federal housing program. The statement makes a claim that innovative metropolitan leadership can remedy federal failures. In doing so, they are changing the direction of public housing. Their focus remains on maintaining the existing number of units, not strengthening social citizenship. The authors are not making a call for a strengthened federal housing program or greater leadership to strengthen social welfare programs such as public housing. Their request for federal assistance is limited to increased funding and, in turn, an expansion of the decentralization at the core of the US public housing system.

This Hope SF preamble both made the call to save public housing and answered it, and in doing so, it claimed public housing for the city. The commitment to maintaining the city’s current number of units of public housing stated in the principles was consistent with the city’s progressive policy orientation and the mayor’s political platform. It was intended to reassure potential critics that San Francisco would not follow the paths of Chicago and Atlanta where large numbers of units were lost when public housing was redeveloped. However, SFHA had a waiting list of approximately 52,000 families requesting public housing assistance. The commitment to maintain the current unit count could also be understood as a commitment to maintain *only* the existing number of public housing units. Additional subsidized units on these properties would be different from public housing, more flexible and for low income rather than very low income families. As the federal government retreated, the city was stepping in to direct
the future of these sites; however, the city had no intention of expanding the federal presence at these sites or increasing the number of units beholden to the restrictions of the federal public housing program.

The transition from federal to municipal responsibility also changed the nature of the endeavor. “Hope SF provides a vision for rebuilding our most distressed public housing sites, increasing affordable housing and homeownership opportunities, and improving quality of life for existing residents and the surrounding communities. (Hope SF Principles)” With Hope SF, public resources would be extended beyond the provision of housing for very low income families living on less than 30% AMI. The addition of affordable housing units extended the subsidy to families making up to 60% AMI. Not mentioned, but even more important are the envisioned market rate units which will be built on the site, subsidized in part because the developer will not have to carry land costs. The intention of Hope SF was not to further the original goal of the US public housing system to ensure that every family had “a decent home and decent living environment” by providing a safety net for the country’s poorest citizens. It was to take sites that were distressed, add households earning higher incomes, and ultimately create working neighborhoods that economically contributed to the city. In this way, it intended to return public housing lands and public housing residents to the city.

The Institutional Landscape
From the very earliest imaginings among SFHA staff and city policymakers, Hope SF was envisioned as a public/private endeavor. This relationship applied not only to who would redevelop individual sites or how the projects would be funded, but how the project would be initiated, shaped, and carried out. Unlike urban renewal of the 1960s and 1970s, Hope SF did not have a growth coalition pushing the program forward, and city leaders needed a broad base of support to make the program possible.

In true San Francisco fashion, Hope SF was first an idea and then a taskforce. The taskforce brought together leaders from relevant city departments, representatives from business and labor, as well as residents and advocates. One high-level city staff person involved in creating the Taskforce described the participants in this way:

“It was a group of people who represented political power in town. There were specific constituencies represented there – non-profits, labor, business, developers. There is a desire to touch and feel like this before giving support to a new initiative. It was also folks who had constituencies they needed to assure. It’s a comfort level for some. Those are the people the Board of Supervisors turns to. This is a town where you need to go to that labor – to have people actively engaged (Interview, November 2007).”

Developers were deliberately left off the taskforce, in part due to concerns that their participation would compromise the integrity of the group’s deliberations. A separate system to inform developers and engage them in conversations about the process would be developed later. The objective of the taskforce was for members to inform city staffers (and through them the mayor) about what was needed and what was possible. The taskforce did not approve sites, select developers, or oversee projects. Instead, it provided an opportunity for the mayor and the staff people overseeing the process to generate a broad base of support for redevelopment and to identify areas of concern that could derail the project in the future. Throughout the beginning stages of the process, policy continued to be shaped at least in part to the reactions of this group.
The Hope SF program required an unusual amount of interagency collaboration in addition to the usual combination of public and private entities. The public sector included the development team, SFHA, MOH, SFRA, other city departments and agencies, COO, and philanthropic organizations. These entities brought different skills, resources, and at times different objectives to the overall Hope SF effort and to the specific project as it unfolded at each Hope SF site.

Within the Hope SF endeavor, SFHA’s most important task was to contribute land. However, that land was both underutilized and occupied. These sites had become de facto reservations of the very low income. Residents could be neglected, forgotten, and excluded, but for the most part, they could not be evicted. SFHA also managed the properties, advocated for resident participation, and maintained communication with HUD. As long as SFHA owned the property, HUD would continue to audit operations and the project had to be compliant with HUD regulations.

The Mayor’s Office of Housing was the entity that provided the vision and the momentum that carried Hope SF from a catchy phrase to an institutional reality. They became the central office for Hope SF, the body that carried out day to day oversight of the development projects, provided funding, and managed the interagency communication necessary to make the project work. Said one city insider, “If the city is going to invest, then they want an entity that they can work with and trust. In this town it is MOH. It does not have to be that way. Elsewhere it might be another city department. (Interview, November 2007)” Through the Mayor’s Office of Housing, other city agencies were brought in and engaged in the process. The agencies participating in Hope SF included: San Francisco Redevelopment Agency; Human Services Agency; Department of Planning; Department of Public Works; Department of Children, Youth, and Families; The Mayor’s Office of Community Development; Mayor’s Office of Economic and Workforce Development; Communities of Opportunity; and the San Francisco Unified School District.

The San Francisco Redevelopment Agency was a close institutional partner to the Mayor’s Office of Housing. During Gavin Newsom’s administration, both agencies were moved to the same floor of a city office building. Then in 2007, Fred Blackwell replaced Marcia Rosen as the director of the Redevelopment Agency. In his previous position as the director of the Mayor’s Office of Community Development, Mr. Blackwell had already built deep relationships with MOH and had been a central figure in the design of Hope SF. The Agency had several long standing development areas in Hunters View (Parcels A and B) and the Hunters View site was located within Parcel A of the Hunters View Redevelopment Area. The Agency brought money to the table and a plan for the redevelopment area. They also brought requirements for affordable housing and local hiring. The Project Area Commission which oversaw community input and approval in the redevelopment area added another level of oversight for the project.

While the city family concerned itself with questions of policy, city services, and the nitty-gritty questions of finance, the nuts and bolts responsibility for the physical redevelopment of the site fell to the development team. The development team did what every developer would do when engaged in a large urban project. They were arranging the financing, creating and adjusting the proforma, working with architects, acquiring permits, hiring consultants, managing regulatory requirements, and hiring contractors and subcontractors as needed. For the Hunters View project, they were also coordinating heavily with MOH and the Redevelopment Agency. They were pursuing philanthropic dollars to cover pre-development costs or help with gap financing. They were meeting with residents about everything from building designs to
relocation plans to job training and designing services plans for residents once they moved into the new buildings. They were creating a social services plan for the site once construction was over.

A final category of partners in this endeavor was the philanthropic organizations that were providing resources to the project. Their involvement is not limited to financing. For example, Enterprise Community Partners (ECP) was heavily involved in Hope SF and Hunters View, at times serving as advisor, technical assistance provider, and fundraiser. ECP’s program areas included mixed use housing, green buildings, and supportive services. The agenda-setting and accountability of funders is different from public agencies who are responsible to Commissions, the Mayor, the Board of Supervisors, interest groups, and voters. While they were the entities most likely to bring in a sense of public good and public service to the partnership, most were no more local than HUD, their support over time was no more dependable than HUD, and their missions and programmatic areas of interest, even when consistent with a larger public interest, were independent from the larger pursuits of social citizenship and mutual support that are often attributed to public social welfare programs.

San Francisco’s Non-profit Developers: Development in the Public Interest

San Francisco has a well-established community of developers, both non-profit and for-profit, that focuses on affordable housing. It includes large regional developers with hundreds of employees such as Mercy Housing and Bridge Housing as well as smaller community based development corporations such as the Mission Community Development Corporation, Tenderloin Neighborhood Development Corporation, and Asian Neighborhood Design. While the presence of affordable housing developers in San Francisco is not unique, the capacity of this group is. Collectively, this group has built and managed tens of thousands of units of housing. Says one observer of housing policy in San Francisco,

The Bay Area has the strongest infrastructure for affordable housing development in the U.S. The Bay Area non-profits are able to produce an extraordinary amount of housing. Here we have large regional developers who are located in the city, like Bridge and Mercy Housing. We also have [Community Development Corporations] like Bernal Neighborhood Development Corporation, Tenderloin Neighborhood Development Corporation, Citizen’s Housing, Community Housing Partnership. They are really savvy. They are very capable of pulling off large, complex projects (Interview, June 2007).

A 1998 report investigating affordable housing strategies in the San Francisco Bay Area (Christensen, Sadik, and Lim) found that Bay Area affordable housing developers were dealing with an increasingly complex development environment. Organizations were often targeting multiple populations, incorporating diverse goals into their projects (services, economic development, etc), and pursuing multiple sources of funding. At the same time, the sector showed signs of volatility, and competition between affordable housing developers was on the rise. Factors that affected where these developers chose to pursue projects included: sociopolitical environment, housing need and opportunity, funding, availability of land, and neighborhood opposition.

The Christensen et al report identified considerable diversity among the 74 nonprofit housing developers that were active in the Bay Area in 1996, “The organizational structures range from one to two persons operating out of a room in a small city to sophisticated organizations professionally staffed and catering to markets across California, and in some cases
across the United States (p.4).” In 1994 Edward David Morris investigated the San Francisco Bay Area’s Non-Profit Housing Development Community and found that two-thirds of the non-profit developers in operation at the time had been in existence since 1980. The oldest had been producing housing in the region since 1949. San Francisco alone had 18 different organizations. Most of those developers come out of the tradition of community development and as a result, the majority focused on serving neighborhoods (Morris, p.8).

This community has the necessary capacity to pull off both the redevelopment of public housing and the development of mixed-income housing. The presence of multiple firms in the region creates competition and forces developers to keep their skills sharp. In a booming real estate market like San Francisco, non-profit developers must be skilled at the development process, but also at fostering and maintaining the same types of relationships with decision-makers that are often associated with for-profit developers. Reported one industry insider:

The non-profit development community, in terms of San Francisco, has more than 20,000 units of non-profit affordable housing. This is in part because developers here have worked effectively with the City to get state money. They are politically skilled, savvy, and competitive. There are also folks in the private sector who are interested in public housing and affordable housing and these new models [of public housing redevelopment] (Interview, June 2007).

At one meeting of the Hope SF taskforce, a participant suggested that San Francisco consider other models for structuring its redevelopment projects, perhaps one more like Seattle where the housing authority was the project developer; enabling the agency to capture the development fees. A senior city staff person responded without pause, “There would be no need to do that in San Francisco. We have a very strong community of non-profit developers.” The Mayor’s Office of Housing had deep connections with the city’s non-profit developer community and had provided funding for projects providing thousands of units of affordable housing in the city. With the possibility of a public agency acting as developer off the table, the next step was to shape a public/private partnership to carry out the work.

The San Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA) seemed content to leave the task of development to the developers. This approach had resulted in a successful history of completed HOPE VI projects even when SFHA was otherwise ranked as a low-performing agency. In these endeavors, SFHA was responsible for housing very low income people and managing resident participation in a redevelopment project. One SFHA official explained, “The industry puts business before philosophy. We are providers of public housing to low-income people. Sometimes we lose our mission and get caught up in what is sexy. We think we are developers, not social service providers” (Interview, September 2006). The details of physical development were handled by someone else.

In many ways, Hope SF was a continuation of the San Francisco model of HOPE VI which used public/private partnerships and mixed financing to complete developer-driven projects. The housing authority owned the land, kept track of HUD reporting, and helped facilitate a resident participation process, but the developer ran the project, made the deals, and collected the developer fees. Over the course of a redevelopment project, SFHA’s role on the property diminished as the developer’s role expanded. Because completed projects were managed by the developer or by a private management firm, it was the developer who was left with the responsibility for residents in the end; although, SFHA remained the title holder for the land under the new public housing buildings.
The Funding Model

When SFHA issued the original RFQ to redevelop its remaining severely distressed sites, the expectations of leaders within the agency was that adding market rate units to existing low density public housing sites would create sufficient cross subsidies to cover the entire cost of redevelopment. In this model, the developer would “captur[e] the latent value of the existing underutilized site (MOH, 2009a)” and then use that value as capital to rebuild the public housing units. SFHA left it up to developers to tell them how they would use mixed financing strategies to fund such a project.

The Hope SF Taskforce also considered how to generate funding for the program. Organizers asked taskforce members to think about how the city could generate funding for the project beyond what was available through MOH and SFRA. Initially the taskforce discussed a general obligation bond, but in California, a super majority (2/3) vote was necessary to approve such bonds. The mayor had tried unsuccessfully in a previous election to pass a bond that would finance affordable housing development in the city. It had been a very slim loss, but the mayor and his people had reason to be concerned that they would not be able generate sufficient public support to pass a bond.

Ultimately, policymakers in consultation with the city attorney’s office found an answer within the city’s charter. It empowered the city to take out debt to finance infrastructure or public works related projects such as the construction of police stations or firehouses; however, it also included affordable housing as an item in that category. This debt would borrow against the future tax earnings generated by development on the site. Because the site was public land before redevelopment, it did not generate tax revenue for the city. Simply by redeveloping the site and adding market rate units to the mix, the city would increase its future tax revenues. This approach required approval from the Board of Supervisors, but it did not require a super majority approval from the general public in an open election. After receiving approval from the Board of Supervisors, the city committed $5 million a year for the next 30 years from its general fund to set up a Hope SF Fund to be distributed by MOH.

The Hope SF financial model was built around the idea that developers could finance the project at least in part by leveraging land values. This is where gentrification found its place at the very center of Hope SF. The land was being provided to the developers at no cost. The new units would be more affordable than units in other parts of the city because of the “the existing negative issues that Hunters View buyers will have to deal with (SL Slate and Associates, 2008, 5).” A 2-bedroom, 1-bathroom unit in the first phase of the project was projected to have a base price of $382,000. San Francisco did not have units in that price range, and so developers would be able to take advantage of pent up demand.

Both the financial models for the project and the pricing for the new units assumed that property values at the site would increase from phase to phase of the development project. The Hunters View Market Feasibility Study pointed out that, “The appreciation rate in San Francisco had averaged nearly 10% annually over the past 5 years (including 2½ very good years and 2½ weak market conditions) (SL Slate and Associates, 2008).” The pricing matrix for the project anticipated appreciation as well as the ability to garner higher percentages of added value for premiums such as end units or larger decks in the later phases of the project. “We recognize that with each new phase that is completed, the new home community moves towards becoming a strong neighborhood. With that change would come the ability to charge more for the view premiums.”
Development would happen in three phases. The more the site appreciated from phase to phase, the more the developers will be able to charge for the units and the premiums associated with the units. There is room to debate whether the changes at the site could be considered gentrification, although the question here is really one of boundaries. The neighborhood surrounding the site can be expected to experience increased property values and with that, gentrification. At the very least, the project would introduce the first wave of gentrifiers, people who would help to stabilize the neighborhood but were likely to be displaced in future waves if appreciation continued. At the same time, it would put checks on gentrification in place. The majority of the site would remain public or affordable housing.

Beyond the cross subsidy generated from the site itself, the funding became more variable and more competitive. Dollars from the Hope SF fund have been committed to four projects at this time: Hunters View, Sunnydale, Potrero Terrace, and Westside Courts. The fund had a set amount available to distribute each year and the developers for these projects had to apply for the funding when they were ready to make use of it. Conflicts were possible if several projects request funding at the same time. Philanthropic dollars as well as much of the state and federal money came from specific pots which were earmarked for specific kinds of projects. The developers would have to apply for that money, which involves resources. It also put Hope SF projects in competition with other affordable housing projects in the city, state, and nation including other Hope SF projects. Figure 3 provides a breakdown of the various funding sources anticipated for the affordable housing component of the Hunters View project.

Figure 3. Anticipated Sources of Financing for the Hunters View Redevelopment Project

Mayor's Office of Housing. (2009a)

The funding model for Hope SF as promoted in the Hope SF literature continued to tout the cross-subsidy as the primary mechanism for funding the public housing and affordable housing components of the Hunters View project. Figure 3 replicated a breakdown of the Hunters View funding that was included in a 2009 MOH brochure on the Hunters View project.
The figure showed that the cross-subsidy accounted for more than 50% of the total funding for the project. Federal subsidies were anticipated, but had yet to be dedicated. They accounted for only 12% of the project funding and were equal to the city’s contributions (SFHA money and the Hope SF fund).

The Model in Practice: Financing Hunters View

In practice, financing the project has been complicated. First of all, even though housing prices in San Francisco are high, they are not high enough to generate sufficient surplus to cover all the costs of redeveloping every public housing unit on a given site. The new market rate units will be geared towards middle class families; they are not going to be luxury towers. Also, the housing market underwent significant changes during the course of Hunters View. While this “correction” in the housing market only slightly brought down housing prices in San Francisco, it made market rate projects more difficult to finance. In addition, the topography of the Hunters View site has proven to be a greater challenge than expected, increasing project expenses.

The developers of the Hunters View project expect to replace the current 267 public housing units with 800 units that are a mix of public housing, affordable housing, affordable home ownership, and market rate units. Market rate will account for 40% of the total units built. Public housing will account for 33% and the rest (27%) will be affordable units and affordable homeownership units. In September 2009, the total cost of the entire project was estimated upward of $450M.

The Hunters View site is still in predevelopment. The on-going uncertainty with mortgage and lending markets in 2009 has changed some of the original intentions for how Hunters View would be developed. Initially all three development phases were to contain all three types of housing: public housing, tax credit affordable units, and market rate units. The development team has been able to secure public funding for both types of subsidize units, but the market rate units have proven to be more difficult. As a result, the first phase will not include market rate units.

The development team formalized their relationship into an entity called Hunters View Associates, L.P. (HVA). It consisted of The John Stewart Company, Hunters Point Affordable Housing, Inc. (a subsidiary of Ridgepoint Nonprofit Housing, Inc.), and Devine & Gong, Inc. Each phase of the rental housing will be owned by a limited partnership with Hunters View Associates, L.P. as the general partner (responsible for day-to-day management of the project) and a tax credit investor as the limited partner (which has limited involvement in the day-to-day operations). There will likely be a different limited partner for each phase. Each building will include a mix of public housing and non-public housing affordable units. HVA will lease the land underneath the rental units from SFHA under a long-term ground lease. SFHA will have an option to purchase the rental buildings after 20 years. The various public funding sources needed to build the residential units will impose income restrictions on the property for at least 55 years.

Infrastructure costs are paid through a number of sources. The largest is the State Prop 1C infill infrastructure grant program which was approved $30M for the Hunters View project earlier this year. SFRA has committed $16,087,186 to date and these funds are associated with Master Planning Predevelopment (all phases) and Phase I predevelopment and construction for both Rental and Ownership units as well as infrastructure. These are loan funds that are committed to the developer (Hunters View Associates, L.P.) and carry the same restrictions and requirements that any of our affordable housing funding would carry though they're modified to accommodate the other lenders and the unique structure of this deal (smaller deal issues such as
how the loans are secured). HVA will build the streets and then dedicate them to the city. The parks will be privately owned, most likely by a master homeowners association, which will include the rental building owners and the for sale building owners. At the time of this writing, HVA and SFHA had not yet come to an agreement about whether the land beneath the for sale units would be transferred to the new owner or leased. Parties involved in the negotiation reported that it seemed likely the ownership of the land would transfer with the sale. The terms of the long-term ground lease were also in negotiation, but were likely to be 75 years.

The total projected cost for the Hunters View redevelopment project as of July 2009 was $246,197,852. This number included both hard costs and soft costs (architecture, permits/fees, financing fees, developer fee, and others). Expenses can be broken down into three categories: Demolition, Residential, and Infrastructure and Development. The projected costs for each category were as follows: Demolition ($3,529,844), Residential ($195,678,940), and Infrastructure and Development ($46,989,069). Because the land was SFHA land, the land costs for the project were $0. The development team is paid exclusively through the development fee, which for this project was $1.2 million. Table 3 provides an overview of the projected sources of funding for the total project.

### Table 3. Funding Sources for Hunters View Redevelopment Project

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<td>Infill Infrastructure Grant program (Prop. 1C)</td>
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<td>SFHA – HOPE VI</td>
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<td>SFHA – Federal Stimulus money</td>
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<td>SFHA – Public Housing Replacement Factor Funds</td>
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<td>SFHA – Neighborhood Improvement Grant</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>$246,197,852</td>
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San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (July 31, 2009)

The table above provides a snapshot of the development team’s funding assumptions as they were captured in the project proforma at a particular moment in time. As one of the city staff people helping to facilitate the project explained:

The entire proforma is a succession of assumptions and because of that it changes constantly. Some of the Federal Stimulus is an assumption, the IIG funds coming from the State are committed but that doesn't assure that something won't happen to the State budget again and make those funds un-releasable. The Tax Credit Equity is based upon certain assumptions that we feel are reasonable, but the tax credit market changes and that figure could go down (or up). That said, I think
that most of the sources are fairly reliable and/or committed other than the HOPE VI [funds] (Personal Correspondence, September 23, 2009).

The projected breakdown of funding sources by category reported in the MOH literature turned out to be quite different than how the project actually played out. Figure 3 provides a breakdown of funding course based on the SFRA funding summary for the project.

Philanthropic organizations have been another source of funding for Hope SF. Occasionally this money came without conditions or an agenda. For example, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) gave the John Stewart Company a $50,000 grant in the first years of the Hunters View Project. The grant was because LISC thought the project was a good one and it fell into the categories of work that LISC supported. However, most of the time, funders have program areas that come out of their missions and are intended to support their theories of change. When they give money, they are looking for specific outcomes that may or may not be in line exactly with what the developers are trying to do. For example, the Ford Foundation selected the Hunters View project as a recipient for a $1 million predevelopment loan. With that came an addition $200,000 to fund an evaluation and programmatic work. Enterprise Communities has been deeply involved in shaping the Hope SF program and specifically the Hunters View project. Enterprise has a green building program as well as its community development work. They have pushed heavily for green building to be a priority within the Hope SF program.
C. Planning for Human Development at Hunters View

Severely distressed public housing developments are differentiated from other public housing developments by the tremendous isolation and lack of attention that the former receive in virtually all areas of service delivery. These public housing communities are often abandoned by the very institutions that exist to serve the overwhelming needs of low-income families.

The Final Report of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (1992)

Hope SF’s development without displacement approach extends the project of development beyond the boundaries of real estate to include the residents themselves. Every aspect of the project considers the elements of both physical and human development. Pre-development focuses on finalizing designs, meeting regulatory requirements, and filling in financing gaps. It also directs services at residents to prepare them for the changes to come. “The goal of the pre-construction period is to stabilize existing families so they can take advantage of the unprecedented housing and economic opportunities created by Hope SF. Services start well before demolition begins to ensure that resident's needs are addressed preemptively, and that support continues throughout the redevelopment process. (http://www.sfha.org/hopesf/more_than_housing.htm)” These transactions are designed to resemble the market, but they are in fact meticulously constructed and facilitated in conjunction with the state.

While the Hope SF principles take a strong stand that public housing residents will not be moved, the other side of that statement is that they cannot be moved. The public housing land comes occupied with residents who must remain in place. Current residents must be accounted for in the midst of the transaction. These individuals have been bonded to the land, or perhaps bound to it. Their claim to accessing opportunity receives legitimacy from their leases.

The combination of public housing, affordable housing, and market rate housing that is being constructed in each phase of the Hunters View project is described as a housing ladder. The idea behind the housing ladder is that it allows residents to progress up and out of poverty by providing housing at varying levels of affordability. So while gentrification is typically characterized as an existing set of low income residents being replaced by a new set of more upwardly mobile residents, in this case the expectation is that the low income residents will become transformed with their neighborhood. They will join their higher income earning neighbors on the upper rungs of the housing ladders, leaving room on the bottom for the next group of people who need assistance moving up and out.

Hope SF attempts to create positive outcomes for both public housing households and the surrounding neighborhoods and explicitly links the positive transformation of one to positive outcomes in the other. It calls for a physical, institutional, social, and economic transformation of the site. The Hope SF policy of redevelopment with retention necessitates a more flexible and robust attention to service delivery as well as community building, tenant capacity building, and the identification and support of existing social service networks in the community. It places the point of intervention not on the individual or the unit of housing, but on the resident community. Rather than push residents into situations where they might not have access to new social networks, it seeks to strengthen the capacity of existing social structure to meet the needs of its members. It brings the city to public housing residents while inviting public housing residents back into the city.
Hope SF advocates claim that because residents are not being displaced, they will be able to benefit from redevelopment and the result will be true neighborhood renewal. The *Hope SF Service Connection Plan* explains:

Hope SF is a critical piece of a larger puzzle that the City is putting together connecting both physical and development and human development to transform some of our most disconnected communities. Hope SF, along with infrastructure improvement such as the Third Street Light Rail, business development along the 3rd Street Corridor, and the Shipyard Redevelopment project provide the needed changes in the environment to revitalize struggling communities. But as the City learned from its experience in the Fillmore, physical development without a parallel human development effort often results in gentrification and displacement. (2009)

This section investigates three components of Hope SF’s human development program: the program’s emphasis on integration, the Rental Assistance Plan, and the extensive social services planning process.

Integration, Not Relocation

At first glance, the Hope SF initiative can be understood within a fairly standard framework of urban expansion. Given the high land values in San Francisco, its location on a peninsula, and the strong local preferences for buildings under four stories, there are few opportunities for expansion within the borders of the city. The proposed Hope SF sites encompass most of the remaining large parcels of land within the city which could be considered to be underutilized. As a representative of SFHA explained, “It’s about the highest and best use of the land. (Interview, March 5, 2007)”

Because the Hope SF sites are public housing, each project takes reserved federal land, public housing land, and makes it available for private development. Hoping to prevent the neighborhood dissent and community upheaval created by previous generations of redevelopment, the city officials and policymakers creating the program have taken eminent domain and displacement off the table. Low income households are promised a right to return to their spot on the map. The one for one replacement of public housing units is a fundamental tenant of the program, mentioned in every document, hearing, and conversation regarding Hope SF. The principle of one for one replacement is accompanied by a commitment to phased development. In the case of Hunters View, redevelopment has been broken into three phases. Each phase will entail only one piece of the property. The rest will remain in tact. Residents may be moved from one area of the property to another to accommodate the demolition and reconstruction of buildings, but the development team and city staff people have promised that they will never be removed from the property entirely.

Hope SF gives credence to a historical connection to place. “We want the people who have been living in this distressed community for 20 or 30 years to be able to experience the new rebuilt community. We have a commitment to decrease displacement to the greatest degree possible. (Interview, April 2007)” The commitment to “minimize displacement of existing residents by phasing development and emphasizing on-site relocation” that is part of the first Hope SF principle comes into play once again. As the previous chapter explained, resident transformation is linked to the physical transformation of the public housing site. This connection is powerful enough to the foundations of the Hope SF program, that it overshadows
other traditional elements of the discourse surrounding the redevelopment of public housing, such as choice.

At one of the monthly resident meetings to discuss redevelopment, I observed the following:

*The topic of Section 8 vouchers came up. A resident mentioned a cousin who had been relocated during the course of the North Beach HOPE VI project and had been given a Section 8 voucher. She was now living in Oakland with her family in a small single family home. The resident wanted to know if they would have that choice too. Other residents chimed in, “Yeah, what if we’re sick of it here. What if we want to move?” “They got vouchers, why can’t we?” Members of the development team tried to explain that North Beach was a HOPE VI project and this was not. They did not have vouchers available to them. Then a community organizer hired by Communities of Opportunity stood up. She introduced herself to the group and explained that while she didn’t live on the site, she had people who did, and she had spent plenty of time there. She cared about what happened there. Then she told those present that they didn’t want to move. This was their place. These changes were for them. Why would they want to go somewhere else? Why would they want to leave the city?*

The meeting soon broke up and no one felt the need to respond to the organizer’s questions. I saw in her comments the operationalization of the concern among high-level city staff people regarding African American outmigration. While the development team spoke to the difference between HOPE Vi and Hope SF, specifically noting that while that program displaced people even if it was in the form of offering vouchers, this program would not. However, the organizer, trained by people at COO for the purpose of engaging residents in the development process and keeping lines of communication open through informal living room meetings had a different message. This is your place. These are your changes. Leave here, and you leave the city.

**Rental Assistance Program (RAP)**

In early 2007, advocates from the Bar Association of San Francisco’s Volunteer Legal Services Program (VSLP), Bay Area Legal Aid, ACORN, Evictions Defense Collaborative, and Housing Rights Commission began to notice a disturbing increase in public housing evictions. A memo from VSLP written in mid-2007 regarding this topic noted that SFHA filed a total of 166 evictions against its conventional housing tenants in 2006. Of these, 130 (78%) were filed during the four months spanning September through December 2006, and 38 (23% of total) were filed on the two days of December 28-29 alone. At the time the memo was written, 56% of those eviction cases had already resulted in the tenants losing their housing and an unknown number more were likely to lose their housing later as cases continued or families were unable to meet the payment schedule established in their settlement agreements. The memo predicted that based on the number of evictions that had already been filed in 2007, SFHA was on track to evict more than 200 families that year.

The increase in evictions stemmed from a number of events happening simultaneously. To begin with, every year there are households who fall behind on their rent, often as the result of an unforeseen emergency (VSLP, 2007). SFHA’s eviction procedures were lengthy and complicated, further compounding the problem. Often by the time the tenant began a settlement conference with SFHA, the total amount of back rent owed was beyond an amount s/he could reasonably repay. The next factor was that SFHA had begun to regularly use HUD’s internet-
based Enterprise Income Verification (EIV) system to confirm that residents were properly reporting their household incomes. HUD describes EIV as “a web-based, state of the art system” and praises its ability “to share income data in other federal databases with public housing authorities to improve their income verification process (O'Halloran, 2007).” Because SFHA rents are set at 30% of a household’s income, underreported income means underpayment of rent. While in some cases tenants had tried to report increases in household income and SFHA had failed to make the proper adjustments, the result was still the same. Families were now being charged for back rent owed. When they were unable to pay it, they often found themselves facing eviction proceedings. The third factor, which did not directly contribute to the evictions, but certainly added to the sense in the community that a problem was afoot is that Hope SF was underway at Hunters View.

The nine-page VSLP memo was the first response by local public housing advocates to a troubling trend in public housing evictions. In the memo they detailed the nature of the problem and also made suggestions to improve SFHA policies and procedures regarding tenant income verification, rent collection, and eviction procedures. Their policy suggestions included: an early intervention system to resolve back rent issues, back rent caps for non-payment cases, improved training of property managers, improved methods for adjusting rents either up or down when a tenant’s financial situation changes, and the implementation of systematic and equitable methods of working out repayment plans with tenants. The memo also pointed out that that SFHA needed to take into account its failure to provide either services or habitable units for many of the households facing eviction. They asked for an amnesty on back rents until tenants had been more fully informed of the new EIV system and until SFHA corrected their systems and accounting errors.

The memo was effective. It was soon circulated not just to SFHA, but also MOH and other parties involved in Hope SF. Tenants at the Hope SF properties were already worried that SFHA would evict them to save expenditures on moving costs and to make way for market rate consumers, and the memo provided proof that the number of evictions had increased since the roll out of Hope SF. It also spoke to another problem, that of management and accounting errors within SFHA. MOH requested that SFHA conduct a file audit of rent payments for each household at the Hunters View property. They wanted to know who was really in risk of being evicted for non-payment of rent. They were shocked to discover that at least 60% of the households living on the site were behind in their rent and that the problem went beyond non-payment of rent. SFHA did not always calculate rent correctly, at times overburdening households with rent costs that they could not afford. In some cases, tenants were withholding rents because of needed repairs. Other times, tenants would choose not to pay their rent when they learned that their neighbors had not been paying rent. If SFHA followed through with the evictions it was legally entitled to do for nonpayment of rent, most of the development would have to leave. To further complicate matters, owing back rent not only left tenants vulnerable for eviction, it took them out of good standing with SFHA.

The status of “good standing” is one of the primary criteria used to determine a public housing resident’s right to return after a property is redeveloped. The former Undersecretary for Public and Indian Housing at HUD, Orlando Cabrera, described the concept of good standing and its importance within the context of redevelopment when he provided testimony to Congress about the HOPE VI program. He said:

In terms of reoccupancy, HUD currently requires that all HOPE VI grantees provide original residents first right of return to the revitalized site. However, first
right of return is only open to residents that remain in good standing with the housing authority. In many cases, residents are in bad standing with the agency because of criminal activity on the site, lease violations or other issues that undermine public safety and community stability. (2007)

The exact definition of good standing is set by each housing authority. At a minimum, it requires that tenants are current on rent and have no outstanding fees owed to the housing authority. It may require other factors such as no criminal charges of any kind, evidence of efforts to achieve self-sufficiency, or citizenship status. HUD is deliberately vague on this topic as well as the larger topic of reoccupancy criteria, believing that to do otherwise “would limit resident and housing authority efforts to screen tenants and define the standards of their community consistent with local concerns (Cabrera, 2007).” While Hope SF is a local program, it remains heavily influenced by the rules and regulations as well as the guiding philosophies of HOPE VI. City leaders remain optimistic that future projects will receive HOPE VI funds, and as a result, projects closely adhere to HOPE VI guidelines. The requirement of good standing remains.

Once the problem had been identified, the staff people at MOH, COO, and SFHA came together to find a solution. They rolled out a pilot project called “Back on track” and later expanded the project, calling it the “Rental Assistance Program (RAP).” The RAP standard operating procedures explain that the mission of the program is “to ensure that current residents of Hunters View are provided with the simplest possible process to transition into Good Standing and secure housing in the redeveloped Hope SF housing (Saenz, 2008).” It goes on to say that “Hunters View was the chosen location to implement RAP based upon its selection as the first Hope SF redevelopment location.” The program is innovative and timely. It provides a concrete example of the type of results promised by advocates of localization and a specific best practice that could be adopted by other local governments hoping to take on the redevelopment of public housing while keeping residents in place. It shows that decentralization can at times facilitate flexibility, creativity, and positive local outcomes.

RAP began in March 2008. It has four components:

1) Work with residents to determine current rent and back owed amounts (“right sizing rent”);

2) Provide incentives for on-time rent payments;

3) Establish new, affordable payment plans for tenants who owe back rent, allowing them to come into “Good Standing”; and

4) Forgive any remaining balance after two years of timely payments (“debt relief”).

A tenant becomes involved in the program when s/he begins conversations with an SFHA property manager, SFHA Office of Fair Housing staff person or independent outside advocate to evaluate their current rent and the total amount of back rent owed. Ultimately HRC and BALA received funding from the Hope SF fund to do this work. Once these totals have been agreed upon, a payment plan is set up. The monthly payment toward back rent cannot equal more that 7.5% of a household’s monthly income, which would put total monthly payments to SFHA with rent at 37.5% of the household’s monthly income. Once the payment plan is agreed upon, tenants then have one week to make a down payment equal to half of their current rent. Upon signing a Payment Plan, the household qualifies for a one time Maintenance Fee Waiver that eliminates all outstanding maintenance fees.
The program includes other incentives as well. All tenants are eligible for payment incentives. After three consecutive on-time payments, the household receives one of the following:

1) If current on rent, the household receives a $150 gift card;
2) If the household’s payment plan will pay off all back rent within two years, the household also receives a $150 gift card;
3) If the household owes more in back rent than can be paid off within two years, the household will receive a $150 credit towards back rent.

Failing to make three consecutive payments one three month period does not affect a household’s eligibility for the next three month period. The incentive plan will last for two years and COO pays for the gift cards. The final incentive is the “debt relief” incentive. After two years of timely payments, any outstanding balance is forgiven and paid off using emergency rental assistance funds from the Human Services Agency.

The RAP uses a carrot AND stick approach to achieve the desired outcome from tenants. While it was structured to include numerous incentives for residents to engage in and continue with the program, there are serious repercussions for those who fall short of their agreements. RAP is a one-time offer available only to residents who are not in the process of eviction for a cause other than non-payment of rent. Residents will be considered in default if they are late more than four times in two years and will be ineligible to continue. The operating procedures explain,

The Primary goal of the Hunter’s View Rental Assistance Program (RAP) is to ensure that all residents continue occupancy and are afforded opportunities to become active participants in the planning of the redevelopment of their community. Additionally, we strive to change the behavior of tenants who have become accustomed to not paying their rent. The behavior change is structured through positive reinforcement practices such as maintenance fee waivers, rent credits, and gift cards. However, it is also critical that consistent negative behaviors be addressed with repercussions such as 14-day “pay or vacate” notices. Each 14-day notice that is mailed includes information on enrollment into RAP. It is out intention to provide support to residents who aim to achieve good standing. Unfortunately, some residents choose not to receive the support provided to them and SFHA must respond with consistent action; including proceeding with the eviction of residents (Saez, 2008)

Rent notices (including amount owed for payment plan) are mailed out by SFHA on the 25th of each month. Residents are expected to pay their total monthly amount by the 5th of each month. On the 10th of the month, 14 day “pay or vacate notices” are printed out and delivered to the appropriate office within SFHA. The property manager goes through the notices and removes any with recent payments. On the 13th, the property manager serves all outstanding 14 day notices in person. This is entered into a common system. The Fair Housing Office checks to see who has been served a notice and prioritizes outreach to that household. From there, the case would continue through a now standardized set of procedures. Tenants have the opportunity to adjust their payment plans or seek outside assistance for more complex issues. All unresolved cases are sent to SFHA’s legal department by the end of the month. Eviction cases are either resolved or tenants are removed from the property by the end of the third month (Mirian Saez,
Letter to Hunters View Residents regarding Hope SF Resident Assistance Program, n.d.). In the case of Hunters View, good standing becomes an indication that a tenant can adhere to certain behavioral expectations over a prolonged period of time. Paying rent on time and paying off rent debt allows residents to earn their place in the new development.

Through RAP, SFHA has been able to double the amount of residents on a payment program. This effort will help tenants transition to good standing and secure housing in the redeveloped HOPE SF housing complex. Of the 151 units at Hunters View, 135 are now current on rent and participating in the payment program. All of the remaining residents have been engaged by outreach workers. As Interim Executive Director, Miriam Saez, wrote in her letter to Hunters View residents explaining the program,

This plan gives every resident the opportunity to address any back rent issues and get in good standing in time for the new development at Hunters View. We are moving beyond the issues of the past and look forward to working with you all to build a community in which all current residents benefit from Hope SF.

Social Service Planning

The first phase of social service planning for a Hope SF project focuses on the period of time leading up to the physical relocation of residents and the first round of demolition of structures on the property. Because Hope SF attempts to address BOTH the human and physical aspects of poverty, the planning of social services has been as central to the task of redevelopment as the physical planning of the site. A pamphlet by MOH titled “Hope SF: More than Housing” explains, “To attain out goals for vibrant, mixed income communities, Hope SF must create a bridge between the immediate needs of existing public housing residents and the future needs of an economically diverse community (2009b).” Social services are being planned and put into place in order to create a bridge that will move residents successfully from the Hunters View of today to the Hunters View of tomorrow. The City and County of San Francisco’s Service Connection Plan adds that, “One of the major challenges of this initiative will be to ensure that those efforts connect where needed, and that communication with stakeholders whose interests span both efforts be coordinated (2008).” Table 4 shows the planned physical and human development components and where they fit with the larger Hope SF development strategy.

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<th>Human Development</th>
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<td>Resident engagement/community building</td>
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The Services Connection Plan divides Hope SF efforts between the physical and human development efforts of the program. The table below outlines how responsibilities are divided...
between the two. Within the Human Development arena, the program is further divided into three phases: the phase leading up to demolition, the phase during demolition and construction, and the final phase covering reoccupancy and beyond. The issue of service planning was first brought before the Hope SF taskforce on September 17, 2008. At that time, Hope SF representatives from MOH and the Redevelopment Agency explained that social services had been broken into two phases for each site, and that each phase would require its own social service plan. The first plan covers services for the pre-development stage. This part would be carried out by city agencies. The second would begin with the breaking of ground at a site. That plan would be a site-specific long-term services plan, created and implemented by the development team and its consultants “in the revitalized community (Hope SF Taskforce, 2008).
D. A Return to the City or a Sorted City? Four Contradictions within the Hope SF Model

“*There is also a risk for social engineering and environmental determinism. People are saying look, these changes do not help us feed our children or buy medication. We do not bring social services to the table. We build things.*

- Interview, September 2007

Inclusion is not as straight forward as Hope SF would suggest. While a program of gentrification in the public interest may indeed be the best tool available to local governments for bringing much needed capital and revitalization into spaces of exclusion such as Hunters View, it will never provide a right to housing or guarantee a living wage. Instead, I argue that the inherent tension between capital accumulation and social goals in Hope SF will undermine the expansive goals of the program and facilitate a geography of differentiated poverty within the city. These tensions are manifest in four unresolved contradictions within the model’s framework: (1) choice, (2) time, (3) deservingness, and (4) boundaries.

Choice

The first unresolved contradiction I have identified is that of choice versus opportunity. City officials describe Hope SF as a program of integration, not relocation. The discourse surrounding the program emphasizes that redevelopment will bring opportunity, but is surprisingly void of the mention of choice, a mainstay of the HOPE VI discourse. While residents are put front and center in their own sorting and the shaping of their future trajectories, they do so with a severely constrained set of options. Within this context, limited “choices” come to mean expanded “opportunity.”

The tension between choice and opportunity has emerged at least in part from the local context. The architects of the program were rightfully concerned with displacement and deliberately designed the program in such a way that displacement would be minimized. First of all, gentrification is a well-established topic of protest in San Francisco. Displacement had to be minimized if the program was to be politically viable. Secondly, policymakers were aware of the African American outmigration happening in the city and did not want the redevelopment of these sites, where a majority of the households were African American, to exacerbate the problem. Finally, because the program is a local initiative and not currently funded by the HOPE VI program, SFHA did not have Section 8 vouchers it could use to relocate households. The end result was that everyone would stay in place.

However, as the Hunters View project moved closer to breaking ground, the displacement question became more complicated. The soil in the Bayview-Hunters Point neighborhood contains naturally existing asbestos. Residents were at risk for increased respiratory problems if they remained on site during construction. Some disabled households could not be relocated onsite because accessible units were not available. Some people simply wanted to leave. Some of the same staff people who had been passionate about preserving social networks and keeping residents on site began to advocate that residents be given the choice to leave. The risks of staying became higher than the risks of relocating.

It is important to note that I did not find any evidence that either the Hope SF policymakers or the various individuals implementing the program are attempting to force residents to stay on site. From the first whisperings of the program, the threat of displacement was cause for concern, and a great amount of effort went into mollifying those fears. What is
interesting is how opportunity came to replace choice once displacement was off the table. By
keeping residents in place, policymakers can take a geographic approach to focusing city
services. In turn, a household’s ability to access services becomes connected to place as well. A
hybrid citizenship begins to emerge from this tension where one’s ability to remain in the city
becomes connected to one’s ability to remain in this place.

**Time**

The Hope SF framework never addresses the question of time. The program puts an
emphasis on preventing the displacement of current residents; however, future public housing
residents as well as the future generations of current public housing residents do not receive the
same consideration. These future tenants will face different screening processes, rental criteria,
and a much more expensive neighborhood for housing. Households are keeping their place on
the site and gaining access to opportunity in exchange for a place for their children who would
be unlikely to be able to afford to live in the community. Displacement is likely to occur, but in
much more diffuse ways and in the future.

The question of time is addressed in part through the inclusion of “housing ladders” and
progressive social services that extend from addressing the critical and immediate needs of
families in crisis in the short term to neighborhood-based amenities in the near future that serve a
wide range of families. The program’s emphasis on opportunity is closely connected to
expectations for workforce development. Over time, poor households are expected to become
upwardly mobile. Progress becomes the implicit answer to the threat of displacement.

**Deservingness**

This contradiction is one of housing deservingness versus the legitimacy a household’s
claim to a place in the community. Context comes into play here. Many of the households in the
Bayview-Hunters Point neighborhood can trace their tenure back to displacement from San
Francisco’s Fillmore neighborhood during urban renewal in the 1960s and 1970s. City leaders
are very interested in correcting that historical abuse and as a result, are likely to see residents’
claims to their community as legitimate. On the other hand, San Francisco has a waiting list of
52,000 households waiting for public housing assistance. Each spot is immensely valuable and
many would argue that each of those families have just as much of a claim to the opportunities
that Hope SF will bring.

Not city officials, SFHA staff people, nor members of the development team have openly
discussed what will happen with the residents who cannot/will not meet the expectations of the
new developments. Good standing has been defined liberally to allow as many residents as is
legally allowable to make it into the new development. However, from there new standards will
apply. As the final severely distressed sites are redeveloped, those who are evicted will find
themselves unable to access housing in the city. Their silence on this issue makes the civic
question of who deserves housing into a technical one – who can honor their lease? The social
contract will be replaced by the rental contract.

**Boundaries**

To a certain extent, the gentrification question in this case is so dependent on the issue of
boundaries that it becomes irrelevant. It is easy enough for policymakers to ensure that no public
housing residents are displaced from the site. The Hope SF principle calling for the one for one
replacement of public housing units means that even if current households move on, the subsidy will remain for future tenants and the same level of affordability.

However, Hope SF is intended to serve as a neighborhood revitalization effort as much as a program to revitalize public housing sites. The same protections that exist for public housing residents have not been put into place for residents of surrounding neighborhoods. Initially, concerns of displacement will be offset by the influx of affordable units that will come on line as the project is completed. However, again over time, these households are likely to face the same displacement efforts that affect any lower income resident in a neighborhood undergoing a rapid class transformation.

Finally, Hope SF raises the question of how each site should be situated within its larger metropolitan and regional context. As each Hope SF site is redeveloped, there will be fewer places of exclusion within the city. On one hand, more residents will gain access to becoming full citizens of the city engaged in the economic and social mainstream of city life. On the other hand, there will be fewer and fewer places for households who are struggling to get by. Unless contingency and emergency services become an integral part of social service planning, a medical emergency, the loss of a job, or a family crisis could leave a household suddenly unable to make rent and unable to find alternative housing. If services remain connected to housing, then families who lose their housing, also lose their support.

While public housing households may not become displaced, other very low income households will. Drawing boundaries around the public housing site, the neighborhood, the city, and the region will all produce very different results. Hope SF will reduce poverty in San Francisco. In part because public housing sites will become mixed income communities, reducing poverty concentrations at the site. In part because informal housing arrangements will become more difficult to maintain as redeveloped sites are more closely managed both by private property managers and more affluent members of the community. Hope SF is likely then to contribute to the ongoing trend of the suburbanization of poverty in the Bay Area.

Conclusion

The retention of public housing units is not the same as the retention of public housing households, and planning challenges emerge when cities reclaim public housing communities as their own. In the Hope SF framework, gentrification is equated with neighborhood revitalization. It implies that gentrification is a force that cannot be stopped, but can be directed. Gentrification is merely a neutral force of change, the manifestation of market forces at work. It can displace families and ravage existing communities or, if it is carefully managed, it can be used to achieve social benefits and to create public goods. The program’s two-pronged approach of physical and human development attempts to bring these benefits to both the people and places associated with San Francisco’s most severely distressed public housing sites.

The services component of Hope SF is not secondary to the program’s physical development efforts; it is intrinsic to the development project. A city document titled, “Hope SF: More Than Housing” explains, “To attain our goals for vibrant, mixed income communities, Hope SF must create a bridge between the immediate needs of existing public housing residents and the future needs of an economically diverse community (MOH, 2009b).” The San Francisco approach hypothesizes that when projects start with the goal of retaining 100% of the public housing families in a community, city resources are realigned to support that goal, and residents are heavily involved in the process, residents will be as transformed as their homes. Today’s public housing residents will become city citizens in the redeveloped community of tomorrow.
However, the retention of public housing units is not the same as the retention of public housing households.

While the Hope SF case provides numerous examples of best practices for local efforts to redevelop public housing within a framework of equitable development, it also reflects the larger trends of localization, deregulation, and the retrenchment of the US welfare state. The inherent tension between capital accumulation and social goals are likely to undermine the expansive goals of the Hope SF program and facilitate a geography of differentiated poverty within the city. While the lives of some public housing residents will be greatly improved as the result of Hope SF, others will lose not just their housing, but their right to remain in the city.
V. CONCLUSION: DIFFERENTIATED POVERTY AND THE SORTED CITY

The whole history of life has been characterized by an incessant diversification and intensification of the interaction between inside and outside.

-Henri Lefebvre
The Production of Space (1974)

San Francisco’s Hope SF program is the reflection of a progressive city’s desire to right historical wrongs and assist the most needy of its neighbors at a time when the federal government has been shedding many of its historical social welfare commitments. The discourse surrounding the program frames the city’s severely distressed public housing properties as evidence of the failure of the federal welfare state. In this narrative, the city becomes the hero that steps in when the negligent federal government leaves the scene. Hope SF is promoted as a program of promise and opportunity. Redeveloped public housing sites are re-imagined as monuments to the city’s progressive sensibilities, proof that San Francisco is both a city of prosperity and a city of justice.

Although Hope SF is more a plan than a reality at the time of this writing, the program’s financial model, its dual emphasis on people and place, its promise of integration rather than relocation, and its commitment to expand the supply of affordable housing in the city offer innovative solutions and best practices that other cities would do well to replicate. In terms of future research, evaluation of the program’s successes as well as its inevitable short-comings would provide valuable information for researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners as they shape future generations of HOPE-based policies in cities across the nation. In addition, a systematic investigation of the processes and impacts of gentrification at the Hope SF sites, in the surrounding communities, and in the city as a whole would fill a significant hole in the literature and help to answer the now hotly debated question of whether gentrification can indeed serve as a neutral force that can be carefully managed to create positive neighborhood change.

However, this dissertation set out to do more than provide policy analysis or evaluate the Hope SF framework. It sought to understand Hope SF as a localized system of poverty management operating within the current moment of post-welfare policy reform. It undertook this investigation not for the purpose of unearthing a new set of best practices, but to expand our understanding of how such a system might impact the institutional, physical and social geographies of poverty and opportunity in the city.

This dissertation identifies three geographies of poverty management found in US cities today: excluded poverty, dispersed poverty, and differentiated poverty. I argue that each geography reflects a particular way of thinking about poverty and each changes the distribution of poverty in the city and the in/visibility of the urban poor. Each corresponds with a particular set of policy approaches to the problems of affordable housing, poverty management, and urban redevelopment. These geographies reflect different approaches to the territorialization of the city through the distribution and management of poor populations.

Excluded poverty is best encapsulated through the image of the ghetto. These are racialized spaces of exclusion where the state manages poverty through systems of containment and control, and inhabitants exist outside of the social and economic mainstream of the city. With dispersed poverty, poor households are separated from one another, rather than the city. Housing policies include vouchers and other incentives intended to direct them away from areas of where other poor people live (often the central city) into more affluent areas of the city or
region. With differentiated poverty, poor households again are pinned to a particular location in the city as poverty places are integrated back into the fabric of the city. Policy-led gentrification brings more affluent households into the previously excluded community as well as improved neighborhood amenities. The local state coordinates with private partners to closely manage poor populations in place. Poverty housing becomes tied to workforce needs and the ability of a household to meet behavioral expectations. Differentiated poverty brings with it a new geography of poverty within the city, but also new systems of poverty management which include genuine opportunity and increased risk for poor households. As spaces of exclusion are integrated into the city, poor households become balanced on the threshold of exception.

If excluded poverty is best symbolized by the ghetto, then concentrated poverty is best symbolized by the housing voucher, and differentiated poverty by the train platform. As households step off the train, some will be directed toward new opportunity and a better life. Others will find themselves without a safety net to fall back on, without options, and without a place in the city. These geographies do not represent singular frameworks that cities either adopt or reject wholesale. Rather, they are the result of years of changing urban policies and the dynamic demand for urban land. Each geography encapsulates social relations and the reproduction of poverty in a different way, grounding them in space. The framework put forward here is intended to call attention to the uneven characteristics of an urban landscape where all three exist simultaneously. It elucidates the ways that different policy approaches create different ways of organizing the city that in turn create different distributions of poverty. New policy regimes do not throw out what existed before, but instead reshape the vulnerable and in between spaces, the poverty spaces of the city.

This dissertation argues that the Hope SF program will contribute to a geography of differentiated poverty in San Francisco. Hope SF is an example of policy-led gentrification that sits on the leading edge of neighborhood change and reinvestment at each redevelopment site. The financial model for the program depends on gentrification in two ways: 1) the city finances at least past of its commitment to the program by borrowing against future tax revenues from the site, and 2) the valorization of public land provides a cross subsidy for the redevelopment of the public housing units on the site. By emphasizing the replacement of public housing properties with economically integrated neighborhoods, the program anticipates the class transformation of the neighborhood. By emphasizing the one-for-one replacement of public housing units and zero displacement of public housing households, the program posits that such changes can create opportunity for poor households if they are kept in place. However, while redevelopment provides a fairly straight forward path for the integration of public housing real estate into the social and economic mainstream of the city, its potential to provide sustainable change for very low income households is less clear.

The Hunters View site has become the Hope SF pilot project, and Hope SF receives much of its meaning through an emerging Hunters View imaginary. The Hunters View development has remained a community apart from the city’s mainstream for more years than not. It has never been well served by either the city or SFHA. While the Bayview-Hunters Point neighborhood has seen previous generations of redevelopment initiatives as well as occasional public housing renovation efforts, this is the first time the city has initiated a massive neighborhood revitalization program that includes both public housing properties and the surrounding communities. The confluence of several factors including African American outmigration from the city, developer relationships, and the release of a documentary film helped make Hunters View an important place to begin the Hope SF program. Here, the underclass
debates of the previous three decades are put aside as public housing residents become worthy public neighbors and the act of redevelopment becomes imbued with the symbols of justice, opportunity, and inclusion.

The Hunters View imaginary establishes the righteousness of using city resources to redevelop dilapidated public housing properties. However, justice, opportunity, and inclusion are difficult outcomes to measure. The ability of the city to capture and broadcast a return on this investment will affect the success of the program moving forward. It will also provide a canary in the coal mine of sorts as to what outcomes can be expected from similar projects elsewhere.

My research found that the overlapping public and private systems surrounding Hope SF and its associated redevelopment projects create an infrastructure that ultimately will sort the affected population of poor households based on technical requirements (such as an adequate credit rating) and individual behaviors (such as work requirements). This infrastructure depends on both physical development systems that put households in motion and human development systems that coordinate and sort individuals. While the lives of some public housing residents will be greatly improved as the result of Hope SF, others will lose not just their housing, but their right to remain in the city.

The social service component of Hope SF is part of what makes the program unique. The program’s architects are not content to stop at creating physical change in severely distressed public housing communities. Their theory of change anticipates that a comprehensive program of social services focused at the place of housing will provide residents with a pathway out of the ghettos that have kept them isolated from the city for decades. Their objective is to develop a system where physical and human development work together to transform both people and places. Programs such as workforce development, family supportive services, and case management create bridges that will help residents move from their current life of exclusion and poverty to one of opportunity and a new economically integrated community. Although few new resources are available to fund these service programs, city agencies are strategically placing their services at or near the sites. As the site becomes part of the city, a separate track of city services for public housing residents becomes unnecessary. The plan shifts from supporting individuals and their households to improving services that are available in every community: functioning infrastructure, better schools, green space, and transportation systems.

Hope SF does not extend social citizenship or recognize a right to housing. In this way, it stays within the traditional bounds of US housing policy. HUD uses means-testing as well as criminal records to determine who does or does not qualify for public housing subsidies. Traditionally SFHA has not evicted most households that fall behind on their rent, an implicit recognition that without public housing, these households would be homeless. To date, the city officials shaping Hope SF have avoided the question of who they are willing to leave unhoused. Terms in the Hope SF materials such as “resident driven occupancy criteria” hint that lines will be drawn, whether by city officials, residents, advocates, or property managers. Without a public debate, the question will be answered through the daily practices of property management and lease enforcement. However, in a city where the waiting list for public housing subsidies is more than 50,000 households long, such distinctions remain somewhat arbitrary and each poor household is easily replaced.

Because Hope SF is still in its infancy and the first project has yet to break ground, this dissertation can only predict possible outcomes based on the plans of the project at the time of this research. I have identified the processes that are currently in place and have considered their meaning in terms of both sorting and space in San Francisco. Hope SF is a project of the city—a
wealthy, progressive city that seeks to maintain its place on the global map. It provides a framework of inclusion without redistribution which gives equal consideration to public goods, social welfare, and economic development. It provides public housing residents with a new lease contract, but not a social contract. The inherent tension between capital accumulation and social goals in Hope SF will undermine the expansive goals of the program and facilitate a geography of differentiated poverty within the city. Some will find a much improved future. The question that remains unanswered is whether that is enough.
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