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The fact that Mark G. Toulouse, a church historian, is writing about John Foster Dulles, one of the principal architects of America’s early Cold War foreign policy, underscores both the nature and the importance of this book. Toulouse, by looking at Dulles’s religious thought, attempts to better understand the post-1945 shift in Dulles’s attitude toward international affairs; the shift that led him to become America’s “complete” cold warrior. Since the main components of Dulles’s religious thought are fairly typical of the American Protestant tradition, Toulouse has made an important and specific connection between a facet of American culture and United States foreign policy. It is the sort of study that could help to break the logjam that American Cold War historiography has become.

Toulouse specifically addresses earlier studies such as Townsend Hoopes’s The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston, 1973), which were often, in Toulouse’s words, “guilty of interpreting the earlier years of Dulles’s life in light of the later years” (p. 117). Toulouse argues that there were in fact two Dulleses, the pre-1945 “prophet of realism” and the post-1945 “priest of nationalism,” who can best be distinguished in Dulles’s religious-international thinking.

Perhaps the best definition of Toulouse’s term, “prophet of realism,” was made by Dulles’s contemporary and sometimes colleague, Reinhold Neibuhr. According to the author, Neibuhr felt that

the task of the Christian involved the criticism of present events in light of the perspective gained through the Christian vision of the Kingdom of God....[He] “must have some perspective which lifts him above the prejudices of his time” (p. 88).

For Toulouse, evidence of Dulles’s qualifications as an exemplar of this sort of realism is abundant. In 1939, for example, Dulles had written against “nonrecognition by one state of a de facto situation in another state”; since no nation’s conduct was above reproach, moral indignation of this sort served, in Dulles’s mind, only to aggravate international tensions rather than ameliorate them (p. 99). Prophetic realism also lay behind Dulles’s acquiescence to the Dumbarton Oaks plan for a postwar international organization: “he urged acceptance of realistic steps toward his goal even though they fell far short of what a prophetic understanding of the Kingdom might demand” (p. 89).

The keystone of both the “early” and “late” Dulles philosophies was the concept of “moral law” and how it related to America’s role in the world.
In 1942, during his tenure as chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, Dulles asserted that "'moral law, no less than physical law, undergirds our world'" (p. 89). It "originated with God and its aim is the universal 'brotherhood of man'; invoking it served the purpose of revealing the differences between 'what is' and the 'what ought to be' of international policy" (p. 90). The most important point prior to 1945 was that, in Dulles's view, no nation was its representative. Every nation, including the United States, fell "short of recognizing and incorporating the moral law into its foreign policy" (p. 89).

It is the way in which Dulles, after 1945, begins to associate the United States with this supposedly universal and, in Toulouse's view, realistic component of international relations that forms the core of Dulles's transformation into a "priest of nationalism." Part of the shift was due to Soviet actions at international conferences from 1945 on. For instance, Dulles attended both the London Foreign Ministers Conference in 1945 and the first session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1946. The fervency and seeming intolerance of Soviet behavior at these meetings led Dulles to suggest that it was time to begin "'facing up to the Russian problem'" (p. 170). Dulles's animosity toward and intolerance of the Soviet Union further increased over the Russian use of the veto power in the Security Council as well as over Soviet ruthlessness in Eastern Europe.

But Toulouse argues finally that it was Dulles's growing understanding of Soviet ideology, especially its antireligious element, that transformed him:

he came to view Soviet attacks on religion as direct attacks on the moral law. Conversely, since the United States defended religious expression and religious freedom, he came to understand American policy as a defense of the moral law (p. 253).

By 1952, Toulouse asserts, Dulles had in fact come to identify the moral law with American policy. He had become the "priest" of American moralistic nationalism.

The problem is that if the primary catalyst of Dulles's transformation was his growing realization and understanding of Soviet ideology and its possible implications, then the reader comes away feeling that Dulles was less the open-minded realist prior to 1945 than simply narrow-minded and naive. Dulles appears open-minded only so long as the promise of compromise lay within certain acceptable moral boundaries he and many Americans viewed as valid. When compromise strayed outside of those limits, he became rather rigid. One wonders if his hardline would have developed sooner had he been better informed earlier on.

Further, Toulouse's application of the term "realism" may itself be culturally limited. The notion of compromise through negotiation that Dulles adhered to is quintessentially western, though not specifically religious. It
implies that there is a consensus or solution out there somewhere that has only to be discovered if the concerned parties are willing to discuss and debate long enough. Indeed, this was a basic tenet of classical liberalism, i.e., of western political theory. This is not to say that there is no hope in negotiation, but rather that the necessary compromise may require more than is comfortable for western sensibilities. Dulles's seeming change may have been less a transformation of religious thought than a head-on collision with cultural barriers.

If in the final assessment this book does not refute those historians who have viewed the early Dulles through the lens of the later—if his early openness existed only in the absence of the cultural opposition he would face as an actual policy maker—Mark Toulouse has still made an important contribution. He has shown that Dulles's religious thought did have an impact on his views on international relations and thus on his policy making. Toulouse has demonstrated how at least one strain of American thought, as it was manifest in this important historical figure, interpreted and reacted to events in this era and so contributed to the development of the Cold War.

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Ivo Petricioli. St. Simeon's Shrine in Zadar. (Skrinja sveta Simuna u Zadru).

The Monumenta Artis Croatiae series put out by Associated Publishers of Yugoslavia has announced its third volume St. Simeon's Shrine in Zadar by Ivo Petricioli, a study of one of the most unusual art treasures in the city, a topic that should demand the attention of historians and art historians alike. Petricioli has successfully solved the major iconographical and chronological problems of the unique fourteenth century gilded silver chest which holds a mummified body said to be that of the prophet Simeon who held the Christ child in his arms in the Temple at Jerusalem and who allegedly became a patron saint of Zadar during its period of economic and cultural flourishing in the Middle Ages. Petricioli explains the origins of the work using archival documents, provides the contract commissioning the sarcophagus to be built and elucidates on the artistic achievements of its craftsman, Franjo of Milan, within the context of Trecento European art.

In establishing Franjo as a first-rate craftsman and draftsman and in verifying the unity and quality of the composition Petricioli departs from five centuries of historiography which had either obscured the chest's origins or