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Publication Date
2015

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Ethnicity in a Mythical Racial Democracy’s Metropolis:
Ethnic Identity and Politics in São Paulo, Brazil

A dissertation in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Angela Ju

2015
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Ethnicity in a Mythical Racial Democracy’s Metropolis:
Ethnic Identity and Politics in São Paulo, Brazil

by

Angela Ju
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles, 2015

Professor Barbara Geddes, Chair

My dissertation examines why different immigrant groups, particularly those that do not currently face much economic discrimination, on average, choose different strategies of political assimilation by the third generation. The answers to this question are important to understanding the political integration of immigrant groups of all income levels. The primary argument I make is that racial or ethnic identifications that result from experiencing discrimination often explain political behaviors and attitudes among immigrant groups. First, I argue that membership in a relatively exclusive ethnic group experiencing discrimination is associated with ethnic voting. Second, consistent with and extending Mary Waters’ (1996) argument, I argue that non-white immigrant groups are more inclined to support race-based government measures, such as racial
quotas for university admissions and government jobs that benefit other non-white groups because of personal experiences and awareness of racial discrimination in society. Furthermore, I argue that the agricultural cooperatives on which the first Japanese and Jewish immigrants worked provided them the social capital to form other ethnic community-based organizations, which facilitated their political incorporation in Brazil. This is an advantage not shared by current economic immigrants, and Catholic NGOs step in to help these current immigrants overcome this disadvantage.
The dissertation of Angela Ju is approved.

Roger Waldinger

Anthony Pagden

Barbara Geddes, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2015
To my siblings, Melissa and Stephen.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction

1.1 Research Question

1.2 Argument

1.3 Case and Site Selections

1.4 Race and Immigration Policy in Brazil before the Mass Immigration of Japanese and Jews

1.5 Historical Context of Japanese Immigration in Brazil from 1908 to 1954

1.6 Historical Context of Jewish Immigration to Brazil from 1904 to 1956

1.7 A Case Study of Race and Ethnicity in Brazil

1.7.1 The Construction of Race in Brazil: Race as Color and the Black-White Continuum

1.7.2 Ethnicity as opposed to Race

1.8 Plan of the Dissertation

1.9 Bibliography

2. Theories of Race, Ethnicity, Immigrant Acculturation and Assimilation, and Political Incorporation

2.1 Acculturation

2.2 Theoretical Models in Immigrant Assimilation and Political Incorporation

2.2.1 Classical Assimilation Model and the Pluralist Model of Political Incorporation

2.2.2 Neopluralist Approaches to Political Incorporation

2.2.3 Criticisms of Assimilation Models
2.2.4 Segmented Assimilation Model, Two-Tiered Pluralist Model of Political Incorporation, and Transnational Ties as a Psychological Exit Strategy……..27

2.3 Middleman Minority Theory……………………………………….………………..28

2.4 Ethnic Identification and Socioeconomic Status of the Third Generation…………..30
  2.4.1 Reactive, Symbolic, and Selective Categories of Racial and Ethnic Self-
  Identification……………………………………………………………………..30
  2.4.2 Symbolic Ethnicity…………………………………………………………30
  2.4.3 Third-generation Return to Ethnicity………………………………………32

2.5 Discrimination from the Point of View of Non-Targets………………………..33
  2.5.1 Prejudice Based on Origin versus Prejudice Based on Traits………………33
  2.5.2 Pigmentocracy…………………………………………………………………34
  2.5.3 Mulatto Escape Hatch Theory………………………………………………34
  2.5.4 Racial Triangulation………………………………………………………..36

2.6 Evaluating These Theories through Empirical Evidence in the Upcoming Dissertation Chapters…………………………………………………………………..36
  2.6.1 Chapter Three --- The Racial Identity Determinants of Brazilians of
  Japanese and Jewish Heritage…………………………………………………..37
  2.6.2 Chapter Four --- Ethnic Voting and Attitudes towards Racial Quotas among
  Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish Heritage……………………………………37
  2.6.3 Chapter Five --- Challenges to Ethnic Community-Based Organizing among
  Current Immigrants………………………………………………………………38

2.7 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...38

2.8 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….42
3. The Racial Identity Determinants of Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish Heritage………………45

3.1 Theories to be Evaluated…………………………………………………………………………………48
  3.1.1 Classic Assimilation………………………………………………………..48
  3.1.2 Segmented Assimilation……………………………………………………...48
  3.1.3 Reactive, Symbolic, and Selective Categories of Racial and Ethnic
  Self-Identification………………………………………………………………..48
  3.1.4. Ethnicity as “Cultural Capital”…………………………………………49

3.2 Source of Data………………………………………………………………………………….49

3.3 Methodology…………………………………………………………………………………50
  3.3.1 Educational Level………………………………………………………….50
  3.3.2 Monthly Income…………………………………………………………….50
  3.3.3 Gender………………………………………………………………......51
  3.3.4 Age…………………………………………………………………………51
  3.3.5 Analyzing Differences in Racial Identification……………………………52

3.4 Findings………………………………………………………………………………….52

3.5 Discussion………………………………………………………………………………54

3.6 Limitations………………………………………………………………………………56

3.7 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………58

3.8 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………67

4. Reasons Behind Ethnic Voting and Attitudes towards Racial Quotas among Brazilians of
Japanese and Jewish Heritage………………………………………………………………………69

  4.1 Research Design………………………………………………………………………….72
4.2 Findings and Discussion

4.2.1 Set #1: “Are you or would you be more inclined to vote for a candidate of [Jewish, Japanese] heritage in a local or national election for public office? Why?”

4.2.2 Set #2: “How much do you know about the various racial quota programs that have been implemented in Brazil? What do you think of these policies?”

4.2.3 Set #3: “Do you think that there is discrimination against people of [Jewish, Japanese] heritage in Brazil?”

4.2.4 Set #4: “While you were running for elected office, did you make an effort to reach out to the [Jewish, Japanese] community in São Paulo as part of your campaign strategy? Why?”

4.3 Conclusion

4.4 Bibliography

5. Challenges to Ethnic Community-Based Organizing among Current Immigrants

5.1 Recent Waves of Immigration

5.1.1 Haitian Immigration

5.1.2 Bolivian Immigration

5.2 Rights Accorded to Immigrants in Brazil

5.2.1 Healthcare
LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 Rodney Hero’s (1992) Two-tiered Pluralism – A Schematic Presentation…………………………..40

2.2 Claire Kim’s (1999) Racial Triangulation Model……………………………………………………………41

4.1 Count of Neighborhoods of Japanese Heritage Interviewees………………………………………………94

4.2 Count of Neighborhoods of Jewish Heritage Interviewees………………………………………………95

4.3 Count of Interviewer-Classified Responses to Question about living in the vicinity of many people of [Japanese, Jewish origin]………………………………………………………………………………………………………96

4.4 Count of Interviewer-Classified Responses to Question about Voting for a Candidate of [Japanese, Jewish] origin………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...
LIST OF TABLES

3.1 Variation in Racial Identification .................................................................61
3.2 Variation in Racial Identification, Jewish (Combining Uncommon Categories) ..........62
3.3 Variation in Racial Identification, Japanese (Combining Uncommon Categories) ....63
3.4 Variation in Demographic Characteristics by Ethnic Identification, (Jewish Origin) ....64
3.5 Variation in Demographic Characteristics by Ethnic Identification, (Japanese Origin) ....65
3.6 Demographic Determinants of Racial Identification .......................................66
5.1 Twenty Countries with the Most Foreign Children who Attended Schools without Presenting Documentation in the State of São Paulo in 2011 .................................................................130
5.2 Twenty Countries with the Most Documented Foreign Children who Attended Schools in the State of São Paulo in 2011 .................................................................131
LIST OF APPENDICES

4.A Full Responses of Jewish-heritage Interviewees who answered “yes” to Question about Voting for a Candidate of Jewish Origin.................................................................98


4.D Full Responses of Japanese-heritage Interviewees Opposing Racial Quotas.................103
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank everyone who has helped or supported me throughout this dissertation project. The following is a truncated list of people without whom I would not have been able to carry out this project. First of all, I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee for help with the research design of the project: Barbara Geddes, Anthony Pagden, David O. Sears, and Roger Waldinger. I would like to thank Graduate Student Affairs Officer Joseph Brown for his encouragement throughout my time at UCLA and for suggesting that I ask Barbara Geddes to be my dissertation chair.

There are a few people whom I would like to thank for prepping me for fieldwork in São Paulo. I would like to thank Antonio Carlos Quicoli for teaching me a large portion of the Portuguese and political trivia about Brazil that I know and for his advice on institutions to contact and where to stay during the course of my fieldwork in São Paulo. I would like to thank Stan Bailey at UC Irvine for his advice about wording interview questions regarding ethnicity in Brazil. I would like to thank my Portuguese conversation partner Telmo Estevinho for answering my questions about living in São Paulo while he was doing his own dissertation research at UCLA.

There are a number of Brazilians and American Brazilianist scholars that I would like to thank for their help with the data acquisition and data collection portions of the project. I would like to thank Simon Schwartzman for providing me with the dataset for the 1998 IBGE Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego that I analyze in Chapter 3. I would like to thank Gustavo Taniguti, Jeffrey Lesser, Marta Topel, and Sarah LeBaron Von Baeyer for meeting with me and helping me throughout the course of my fieldwork in São Paulo. I am especially indebted to Gustavo for lending me relevant books on the history of Japanese immigration to Brazil and for taking me to
Japanese events and sites of interest during my time in São Paulo. I would like to thank my dear paulistana friend Renata Lemos, who, since our undergraduate days, has constantly supported me in my intellectual endeavors.

Of course, I would like to thank all of the women I interviewed for Chapter 4 and NGO members I interviewed for Chapter 5 throughout my fieldwork in São Paulo from June 15, 2012 to December 11, 2012 and thereafter by email for the content of Chapter 4, including those whose interviews I ended up not analyzing because they were not actually third-generation Brazilians. Many of the interviewed women also helped me with strategies for more effectively finding other interviewees. For my second dissertation fieldwork trip for the month of July 2013, I would like to thank Willem, Cynthia, Cyrille, and Kumiko van der Spuy for their generosity in hosting me during this stay in São Paulo. I would also like to thank the two city councilmen from São Paulo and the city councilman from Taboão da Serra for participating in the interviews during July 2013.

Additionally, I would like to thank my classmate and friend Dov Levin for informing me of the “USIA Survey: Brazilian Opinion on Jews” and the Roper Center for making this data available to me. I would also like to thank Dov for forwarding me papers about immigration to Brazil from the International Studies Association conferences. Thank you to Sophie le Blanc for giving me permission to cite a conference paper.

I would like to thank the members of “The Unstoppable Dissertation Writing Group” and the “Metro DC Dissertation Support” Meetup Groups for keeping me accountable to the writing of my dissertation. Finally, I would also like to acknowledge fieldwork funding from the UCLA Department of Political Science, the J.A.C. and Helen A. Grant Endowed Fellowship in Political Science, UCLA Latin American Institute, and Faucett Catalyst Fund.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

In *The Racial State*, David Goldberg (2002) asserts, “The history of the human species, for all intents and purposes, can be told as the histories of human migration.” For my dissertation project, I focus on one of the histories of human migration that has not been as well-studied as the histories in other countries in the Western hemisphere that have had a similarly significant history of immigration. Brazil has historically been the fourth largest recipient of immigrants in the Western hemisphere, but its patterns of immigrant political incorporation have not been as thoroughly examined as those of Canada and the United States.

This dissertation deals with immigration to São Paulo, the largest city of Brazil. Although I have often heard Brazilians claim that ethnicity (based on national origin) is not as important in Brazil as it is in the United States, the list of hospitals in São Paulo that meet U.S. standards of healthcare, provided by my healthcare plan for my stay in São Paulo during my fieldwork, is an important example of the visibility of ethnicity in the city today. Among the most highly recommended hospitals were Hospital Sírio-Libanês (Syrian-Lebanese Hospital), Hospital Israelita Albert Einstein (Israelite Albert Einstein Hospital), and Hospital Nipo-Brasileiro (Nipo-Brazilian Hospital), all of which were exclusive, private hospitals not covered by Brazil’s universal healthcare system. Additionally, at the city’s financial center and most geographically elevated point, Paulista Avenue, remnants of the importance of São Paulo’s history of immigration can be seen not only in the Syrian-origin social club Club Homs but also in the Jewish-origin banks, Safra and Daycoval, and Japanese-origin bank Santander.

Despite the geographical site selection of São Paulo, Brazil, this project should interest audiences in the United States and those from countries with historically restrictive immigration policies. The history of the immigration to Brazil of the two groups on which I focus my
attention in this dissertation project is deeply intertwined with immigration policies of the United States. Japanese immigration to Brazil began in 1908 when the United States excluded the entrance of Japanese immigrants. Likewise, the significant flow of immigration of Ashkenazi Jews to Brazil began in 1924, the same year that the United States established a new system of quotas that practically closed the doors to Eastern European immigrants (Grinberg and Limoncic 2010).

An understanding of processes of immigrant political incorporation in Brazil is particularly important at this time. In 2012, the size of Brazil’s economy surpassed that of the United Kingdom. Brazil’s net migration rate has also recently moved from negative numbers to nearly zero, and its growing economy is expected to attract an increasing number of immigrants in the coming years. Unexpectedly, the Brazilian government’s framing of itself on the world stage as a growing economy that is attractive to foreign investments has also made it attractive to prospective immigrants (Le Blanc 2014). Because of these changes, recent legislative attention has been placed on a possible need to revise Brazil’s current immigration law to meet labor and humanitarian demands. Although loosely enforced generally, the current immigration law dates all the way back to Brazil’s “Foreigners’ Statute” of 1980 (Law 6815 of 19 August), based on the military government’s national security approach, which limited immigration with the intent to prevent leftist influences from entering the country.

1.1 Research Question

Predominant theoretical models of immigrant assimilation have had a difficult time distinguishing between racial/ethnic discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage in explaining lack of full assimilation to the majority society. In this project, I investigate two immigrant groups in Brazil with high socioeconomic status but whose members generally self-
identify as different racial categories from each other on government surveys to assess how well these theories explain the political incorporation of immigrants. The primary question that I ask is: Why do different immigrant groups adopt different strategies of political incorporation by the third generation? To answer this question, I investigate two immigrant groups, Jewish and Japanese, in Brazil that are both of high socioeconomic status but whose members generally self-identify as different racial categories from each other on government surveys to assess how well predominant theories explain immigrant assimilation and political incorporation.

The political incorporation of immigrants is central to the legitimacy of a representative democracy. When immigrant groups achieve political incorporation, they are likely to have their preferences and needs addressed by government. On the other hand, when immigrant groups do not achieve political incorporation, their interests and needs may not be met by government, thus undermining democracy.

Brazil is a particularly interesting country to study issues of race and ethnicity because of an existing national myth of racial democracy, popularized after the publication of American-educated, Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre’s (1933) Casa Grande e Senzala (commonly translated into English as The Masters and the Slaves). A primary argument of the book was that several factors, including the diverse history of Moorish and other occupations of the Iberian Peninsula, romantic relations between Portuguese men and Indigenous or African slave women from the beginning of the Portuguese colonization of Brazil, close relations between masters and slaves before the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888, and the relatively benign character of Portuguese compared to Spanish and English imperialism, prevented the emergence of strict racial categories in Brazil as had occurred in the United States. Since the publication of this

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1 The first generation is the immigrant generation, the second generation is composed of the children of immigrants, and the third generation is composed of the grandchildren of immigrants.
book, Freyre would argue that he was not the one who created the myth of racial democracy in Brazil. The term was not used in this book but was used in some of Freyre’s later works. The myth of racial democracy, however, largely became popular from the way his 1933 book was interpreted. This racial democracy myth is analogous to the Horatio Alger myth in the United States, the belief that anyone can climb the socioeconomic ladder if he or she works hard enough. Belief in this myth has made many Americans unaware of the relative lack of social mobility in the United States when compared to other developed countries, just as many Brazilians deny the existence of racism in Brazil.

Although there have been numerous studies by Brazilian and U.S. scholars challenging the popular conception of Brazil as a racial democracy (e.g., Skidmore 1993; Hanchard 1994; Guimarães 1999; Guimarães 2002; Guimarães 2004; Telles 2004), there have been far fewer studies that address the political implications of ethnicity in contemporary Brazil.² Similarly, many studies have compared the governmental and social construction of race in Brazil to the governmental and social construction of race in the United States (e.g., Andrews 1992; Marx 1998; Guimarães 1999; Telles 2004), but while the United States includes both racial and ethnic categories on its Census, Brazil has never allowed for ethnic categories on its Census (Lesser 2007).³

This lack of data has hindered research. In preparing for the 2000 Brazilian Census, the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE - Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) experimentally introduced a question about "origem" ("origin" or "ancestry") in its Census.

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² Jeffrey Lesser (1995, 1996, 1999, 2007) and John Tofik Karam (2007) provide notable examples. For the purposes of this project “race” is defined by the Brazilian census categories (“white”, “black”, “yellow”, “brown” and “Indigenous”), and ethnicity is defined by immigrant national origin.

³ One exception in the Brazilian Census is perhaps the “Indigenous” category, added to the Census in 1991, which is often considered to be a cultural identification rather than an identity based on lineage.
Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (Monthly Employment Research) in 1998 to test the possibility of introducing it as a variable on the Census but eventually decided against the inclusion of questions of ethnic origin on the Census. To this day, it remains the only actual published survey about the immigrant origins of Brazilians (Schwartzman 1999). The Brazilian government’s omission of the ethnicity category on the Census is significant because as sociologist Mara Loveman states, “Existing studies in the social history of statistics highlight how official numbers, backed by the authority of science and the state, do not merely describe social reality, but help to constitute it” (2009). The omission has led to a tendency to conflate race with ethnicity in social scientific studies of Brazil.

In this project, I bring attention to this understudied aspect of ethnicity. I demonstrate that studying the political implications of expressions of ethnic identity in the Brazilian context broadens the understanding of both race and ethnicity by revealing how race and ethnicity interact with one another.

1.2 Argument

The primary argument I make is that racial or ethnic identifications that result from experiencing non-economic discrimination often explain political behaviors and attitudes among immigrant groups. First, I argue that for members of a relatively exclusive ethnic group, experiencing discrimination is associated with ethnic voting. Second, consistent with and extending Mary Waters’ (1996) argument, I argue that non-white immigrant groups are more inclined to support race-based government measures, such as racial quotas for university admissions and government jobs that benefit other non-white groups because of personal experiences and awareness of racial discrimination in society. Furthermore, I argue that
transnational ties to their heritage country and the government of the heritage country also play a role in the immigrants’ strategies of political incorporation at the group level.

1.3 Case and Site Selections

The two immigrant communities in São Paulo on which I focus my analysis are Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish heritage. I have selected these two groups to compare because they as a whole have enjoyed relatively high economic success in present-day Brazil (Lesser 1999; Schwartzman 1999; Lesser 2007)\(^4\), Jewish Brazilians identify overwhelmingly as “white,” Japanese Brazilians overwhelmingly identify as “yellow” (Schwartzman 1999). Thus, by picking two of the groups with the highest incomes, I am able to somewhat control for income levels in evaluating whether differing racial identifications play a role in explaining ethnic identity and strategies of acculturation of these two groups. Additionally, selecting two groups that have obtained high socioeconomic status allows me to address the difficulties of predominant theoretical models of assimilation in distinguishing between racial discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage in explaining lack of full assimilation to the majority society.

According to historian Jeffrey Lesser, Syrian and Lebanese immigrants and their descendants had a physiognomy that allowed them to become instant Brazilians simply by changing their names to a Portuguese equivalent, but Japanese immigrants did not have a physiognomy that allowed them such a choice (1999). The analysis of semi-structured interviews in this study allows me to systematically and empirically test this claim with Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish origin. Finally, these groups are comparable historically because especially during the era of President Gêutulio Vargas from 1930 to 1945, Jews and Japanese have often been the target of nativist sentiments against immigration because of the

\(^{4}\) Those identifying as being of Jewish origin, of Arab origin and of Japanese origin, respectively, have the highest monthly salaries of named ethnic groups (Schwartzman 1999).
Brazilian elite’s beliefs about the unassimilable nature of these two groups and were often considered by Brazilian elites to be “economically desirable and culturally undesirable” as immigrants (Lesser 1995).

São Paulo is an ideal location to study both groups. Since 1960, São Paulo has been the world’s largest “Japanese” city outside of Japan or the city with the largest number of Japanese outside of Japan (Lesser 2007). The Jewish Congregation of São Paulo is the largest synagogue in South America with a membership of more than 2,000 families (Lesser 1995). Also, historically, elites in São Paulo have spread ideas about race and national identity to the rest of Brazil by means of the media, educational materials, and government policies (Weinstein 2003). Although at first blush it may seem counterintuitive to study immigrant acculturation in a country that had, until recently, a negative net migration rate and a high rate of return migration for its immigrants, São Paulo continues to be one of only two receiving metropolitan areas of immigration in Latin America that has over 250,000 foreign born residents (Price and Benton-Short 2007). São Paulo provides many examples of what Min Zhou and Rebecca Kim (2003) refer to as “global neighborhoods,” where immigrants of different national origins live alongside native-born minority groups beyond the inner metropolitan urban core, in their work on Chinese immigrant communities in Los Angeles and New York.

The next three sections provide the historical context of this dissertation project.

1.4 Race and Immigration Policy in Brazil before the Mass Immigration of Japanese and Jews

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5 A large portion of my third-generation Brazilian female interviewees’ grandparents immigrated to Brazil during the era of Gêutlio Vargas.
6 The other is Buenos Aires, Argentina.
In the decades preceding the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888, many abolitionists predicted an “evolutionist” process, resulting in the triumph of the “white element.” The abolitionists perceived European immigration as a way to not only fill the labor shortage resulting from the elimination of African slave labor but also as a way to speed up the “whitening” process in Brazil (Skidmore 1993).

The abolitionist belief in whitening became apparent in their reactions to the Chinese worker proposal of 1870 (Skidmore 1993). Brazil’s experience with Chinese immigration began in 1810 as part of King Dom João’s desire to make tea a major export commodity of Brazil. The passage of the Aberdeen Act in 1845, allowing the British navy to treat vessels transporting African slaves as pirate ships, motivated some Brazilian merchants to consider mass Chinese immigration (Lesser 1999). In 1870, when the idea of accepting Chinese laborers arose again in the Sociedade Central de Imigração (Central Society of Immigration), the proposal was rejected and the idea of it was continually debated and dismissed throughout the 1870s. According to the leading theoretician among the abolitionists, Joaquim Nabuco, who wrote the abolitionist manifesto of 1880, primary reasons for opposing these proposals were the belief that Chinese, like the Africans, were racially inferior to Europeans and the belief that they were less able to assimilate to Brazil than the African slaves. Even the backers of Chinese labor only supported temporary Chinese workers as a way to pave the way for European immigrants rather than permanent Chinese immigrants (Skidmore 1993). In the 1880s, Senator Alfredo d’Escragnolle Taunay, vice president of the Sociedade Central de Imigração, advocated an anti-Chinese discourse that consisted of a call for an end to all Chinese immigration. The abolition of slavery

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7 In 1807, rather than face capture by Napoleon’s forces, Prince Regent Dom João chose to flee and moved the royal court to Rio de Janeiro in 1808. About 15,000 individuals left Lisbon for Rio de Janeiro (Mullins 2006).
in 1888 and the declaration of the republic in 1889 brought about Taunay’s call and Brazil’s first immigration decree, decree law 528 (28 June 1890) article 1, banning Asian and African immigration without congressional approval (Lesser 1999).

The freed slaves (*libertos*) sought salary conditions, better work hours, and the freeing of women and children from wage labor. The planters’ resistance to these demands brought about the subsidized immigration program, undercutting the bargaining position of Afro-Brazilians. These subsidies attracted the poorest emigrants from Italy, mostly coming with their families. This guaranteed employers a steady workforce when they set adult male wages so low that the women and children would have to work, further driving down wages (Andrews 1991). The labor conditions were so bad that on March 26, 1902, in response to persistent reports of mistreatment of Italian workers on São Paulo plantations, the Italian government prohibited its citizens from accepting subsidized passages to Brazil through the Prinetti Decree (Tucci Carneiro and Yumi Takeuchi 2010). The Italian government’s prohibition would remain in effect until the end of the subsidy program in 1927 (Andrews 1991).

Florestan Fernandes, one of Brazil’s most distinguished sociologists, had argued that because of the disadvantages that they faced due to the burdens of slavery, blacks were replaced by immigrants because, among many reasons, the immigrants were more highly skilled and possessed a capitalist work ethic (1972). American historians refute these claims. George Andrews (1991) notes that the overwhelming majority of the workforce was composed from immigrants from the rural areas of Southern Europe, who would not have been exposed to urban or industrial settings. Additionally, there was no evidence that any group was more capable than another of performing low-skilled factory work (Andrews 1991).
The two following sections discuss the history of immigration during the time period when the grandparents of my third-generation Japanese-origin and Jewish-origin interviewees in Chapter Four arrived in Brazil.

1.5 Historical Context of Japanese Immigration in Brazil from 1908 to 1954

Between 1908 and 1941, about 189,000 Japanese would enter Brazil, nearly all with some sort of subsidy (Lesser 1999). Japanese immigration to Brazil began with the landing of the ship Kasato Maru carrying 781 immigrants from the various provinces of Japan in the port of Santos in the state of São Paulo on June 18, 1908. The primary stimulus for this immigration was the stabilization of the price of coffee in Brazil in 1906 and the shortage of labor on the coffee plantations. Under the new immigration decree of 1907, the Japanese immigrants no longer required special Congressional approval (Skidmore 1993). The government of São Paulo discontinued subsidies for Japanese immigration in 1914, alleging that the project of introducing Japanese workers to the plantations was not a success because of the high rate of attrition of the Japanese on the plantations, as they quickly became economically independent. In 1917, when a flow of European immigration had diminished due to World War I, the São Paulo government began to subsidize Japanese immigration again, suspending it definitively in 1922. When the Law of Quotas was passed in the United States in 1924, however, the Japanese government began to look towards financing Japanese immigration to Brazil as a way to deal with its problem of overpopulation. The Japanese government subsidized the first cooperatives for Japanese emigration to Brazil in 1927 (Tucci Carneiro and Yumi Takeuchi 2010). Fidelis Reis, a federal deputy from Minas Gerais, introduced a bill that prohibited the entrance of immigrants “of the black race” and limited “the yellow race” to an annual quota of no more than three

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8 Due to subsidized immigration, by the 1920s, São Paulo had surpassed Rio de Janeiro as Brazil’s most important industrial center (Andrews 1991).
percent of the “Orientals” already in Brazil.” The bill reflected sentiments that the Japanese were inferior to Europeans but ethnically superior to blacks. A nationally elected Constituent Assembly gathered to frame a new constitution in 1934, the fulfillment of a promise by Getúlio Vargas’ provisional government. Article 121, Section 6 of this Constitution included national immigration quotas, restricting immigration by national origin to two percent of that group’s number in Brazil in the preceding 50 years. This restriction was aimed against the Japanese, who were perceived to be resistant to assimilation (Skidmore 1993).

Within the backdrop of World War II, Decree-law n. 383, passed on April 18, 1938, prohibited foreigners in Brazil from participating in political activities, wearing foreign symbols, maintaining informative media like newspapers and magazines, and promoting events. Decree-law n. 868, passed on November 18, 1938, provided the government the power to nationalize foreign or “ethnic” institutions of learning (Bernasconi and Truzzi 2002; Tucci Carneiro and Yumi Takeuchi 2010). These laws were aimed less against ethnic Italians, who were considered to be more assimilated, and more against ethnic Japanese and Germans (Bernasconi and Truzzi 2002). These decrees led to the closing of 200 Japanese schools in 1938 and many Japanese newspapers in 1941 (Ogawa 2008; Tucci Carneiro and Yumi Takeuchi 2010). On January 28, 1942, Brazil broke diplomatic relations with the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan). From that moment, Germans, Italians, and Japanese were treated by Brazilian authorities as enemies and spies. Citizens of Japanese origin living within 500 kilometers of the coastal regions were expelled and confined to areas watched over by the military. Decree-law n. 3.911 of December 12, 1941 required all financial transactions directed by Japanese, Italians, and Germans to only be allowed with previous authorization from the Bank of Brazil. By 1942, Japanese residents of areas of high concentrations of Japanese, such as Liberdade in São Paulo, received evacuation
orders from the Political Police. In February of 1942, the goods of foreigners related to enemy countries were frozen. Decree-law n. 4.166 on March 11, 1942, anticipated the repayment for war damages; the goods of foreigners related to the “subjects of the Axis” for all physical and legal persons would be responsible for the losses suffered by Brazil in the case of attacks carried out by their countries. As a guarantee of payment, a percentage of all bank accounts greater than 2,000 réis would be transferred to the Bank of Brazil (Tucci Carneiro and Yumi Takeuchi 2010).

In the same month, the Brazilian government ended diplomatic ties with Japan. After the war in Europe ended in May 1945, Brazil declared war on Japan to allow the U.S. military to continue to use bases in the Northeast (Lesser 1999).

In part, a result of the lack of news from Japan since 1941 when Japan was still gaining territory in Asia and the Brazil’s breaking of diplomatic relations with Japan led to the creation of secret societies by the most nationalist Japanese, the most famous of which was the Shindo Renmei (Way of the Subjects of the Emperor’s League) (Tucci Carneiro and Yumi Takeuchi 2010). The Shindo Renmei was led by a group of retired Japanese army officers and emerged after Gêutulio Vargas’ Estado Novo was toppled in the 1945 coup (Lesser 1999). The group promoted the victory of Japan in World War II and the death of “defeatists” who accepted the fact that Japan had surrendered; the murders began in March of 1946 (Lesser 1999). This period was known as the darkest moment of Japanese immigration in Brazil and brought about negative news reports about the Japanese community (Tucci Carneiro and Yumi Takeuchi 2010).

Diplomatic relations recommenced between Japan and Brazil in 1952. The post-1952 immigrants from Japan brought news from the homeland and new values. With the support of the Japanese government, the Japanese community in São Paulo participated in the celebration of
São Paulo’s 400th anniversary in 1954 and financed the construction of the Japanese Pavilion in Ibirapuera Park (Tucci Carneiro and Yumi Takeuchi 2010).

1.6 Historical Context of Jewish Immigration to Brazil from 1904 to 1956

Unlike Japanese immigration, it is much more difficult to trace the start date of Jewish immigration to Brazil. It has often been said that many of the first Portuguese colonists in Brazil were Jews escaping the Inquisition of the Iberian Peninsula. In this section, however, I focus on the period of Jewish immigration pertaining to the grandparents of the third-generation Brazilian women whom I interview for Chapter Four.

Few Jews entered Brazil in the nineteenth century, and there had been no major Jewish migration to Brazil since the Inquisition. From 1904 to 1924, the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA), founded by a Bavarian-born Jewish philanthropist living in Brussels, formed two Jewish agricultural colonies on the frontier of Rio Grande do Sul State. The ICA enjoyed the support of the British government that was committed to encouraging Russian Jews to resettle outside of the United Kingdom. The government of Rio Grande do Sul generally looked favorably upon these Jewish colonies because this immigration occurred during a time when immigration to Brazil fell because of a crisis in the coffee industry caused by overproduction (Lesser 1995).

After World War I, Jews began immigrating to Brazil in increasing numbers. After 1920, Jews made up as between 45 and 50 percent of immigration from Eastern Europe, many of them had been victims of czarist “Russification” policies. The United States’ National Origins Act in 1921, strengthened in 1924, enacted a quota system that practically eliminated immigration from Eastern Europe. As mentioned earlier, it was for this reason that the significant flow of immigration of Ashkenazi Jews to Brazil began in 1924. Canada, Argentina, and South Africa
enacted similarly restrictive policies during this time. Between 1920 and 1930, Brazil received about 30,000 Jewish immigrants, making it the third most important receiving country for Jews in the Americas after the United States and Argentina. Economic success in Brazil’s urban centers and cultural difference made Jews the target of nativist sentiment during the Depression; immigrants were expected to save Brazil’s agricultural economy and Europeanize the culture, and the Jews appeared to not do either. Starting in 1935, Brazil began denying visas to Jews (Lesser 1995).

As mentioned in the previous section, during the backdrop of World War II, restrictive decrees were issued against immigrants, though the government’s treatment of Jews improved in 1938. During these years, at least two militant communist Jewish immigrant women, Jenny Gleizer and Olga Benário Prestes, were deported by Vargas’ political police to Germany and handed over to the Gestapo (Crtrynowicz 2007). Foreign language (including Yiddish) newspapers had to print all pages with Portuguese translation to stay in business. New agricultural colonies had to admit Brazilian citizens at a minimum of 30 percent of their membership and could admit no more than 25 percent of one nationality, thus precluding exclusively Jewish settlements for refugees (Lesser 1995). A May 4, 1938 Decree, modeled after the United States’ policy, regulated the entrance of foreigners and reinforced the two percent nationality quota established under the Constitution of 1934. In 1938, only 500 Jews legally immigrated to Brazil, the fewest in years. Beginning this year, however, new regulations influenced by U.S. pressure put on friendly countries to allow Jewish refugees to enter allowed more Jews to enter Brazil than in any of the previous 10 years. Many of the anti-immigrant laws were never enforced in practice. On August 20, 1938, permanent status was given to all Jews with expired tourist visas who had not engaged in a list of criminal activities. Almost 13,000
visas were granted to Jewish refugees from 1939 to 1947, making Brazil the second largest recipient behind the United States of Jewish immigration in the Americas in these years. In August 1942, Brazil entered World War II on the side of the Allies. Many young Jews joined the Brazilian armed forces, Nazi propaganda lessened in the Brazilian press, and antagonism against Jewish refugees decreased (Lesser 1995).

After the state of Israel was established in 1948 until 1977, 6,268 made aliyah, their “return” to Israel. The first Israeli ambassador in Brazil, David Shaltiel, presented his credentials to President Getúlio Vargas on April 8, 1952 (Grinberg and Limoncic 2010). After the Suez crisis in 1956 and the rise of Arab nationalism, about 5,000 Jews from Egypt and other Arab countries immigrated to Brazil (Lesser 1995).

1.7 A Case Study of Race and Ethnicity in Brazil

1.7.1 The Construction of Race in Brazil: Race as Color and the Black-White Continuum

In Brazil, the term côr (color) captures the equivalent of the English language term “race” and is based on a combination of physical traits such as skin color, hair type, and nose and lip shape (Guimarães 1999; Telles 2004).

In his seminal Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil, Telles (2004), unlike previous scholars, analyzes both the “vertical” (material achievement) dimension of Brazilian race relations, which deals with differences between whites and blacks in areas including education, income, and occupation status as opposed to the “horizontal” (social) dimension of race relations, which deals with interracial social contact, friendships, and marriages. He argues that while there has been a greater degree of miscegenation and residential integration in Brazil than in the United States, racist thought and its effect on educational and economic outcomes continue to persist in Brazil today.
Telles (2004), like most of the other authors mentioned previously, does not include indigenous and Asian Brazilians in his analysis because they make up less than five percent of the Brazilian population. It is important to note that the inclusion of either or both of these groups in his study would have complicated his analysis because these two groups do not fall easily into the black-white skin color continuum. Indigenous identification on the Census is often considered to be a cultural identification rather than one based solely on lineage or côr. Brazilians of Asian descent, particularly of third generation Brazilian of Japanese descent, remain “Japanese” in much the same way that hyphenated ethnicities operate in the United States (Lesser 1996).

1.7.2 Ethnicity as opposed to Race

Victoria Hattam (2007) argues that in the U.S. context, race has come to be seen as hereditary, fixed, singular, and hierarchical, while ethnicity has come to be seen as rooted in cultural difference (e.g., language and religion) and understood as malleable, plural, and equal. The difference between ethnic and racial identity may prove to be important in social movement contexts. Tianna Paschel (2011) argues that black Colombians were successful in forcing the state to cede to their demands in part by framing their demands in terms of ethnic difference rather than racial equality as previous movements have unsuccessfully tried to do in the past. My project attempts to tease out the roles that both race and ethnicity play in immigrants’ strategies of political incorporation.

1.8 Plan of the Dissertation

In the second chapter, I lay out the theories of race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, immigrant acculturation and assimilation, political incorporation, and discrimination from the
point of view of those doing the discriminating that I will evaluate in Chapters Three, Four, and Five in the literature review.

For Chapter Three, “The Racial Identity Determinants of Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish Heritage,” I evaluate how Brazilians of Jewish and Japanese heritage identify racially and the determinants of racial identity. In order to answer the question of why different immigrant groups adopt different strategies of political incorporation by the third generation, it is important to address the role of racial identity and how Brazilians of Jewish or Japanese heritage identify racially. According to Waters (1996), white ethnicity and non-white racial identity operate differently. Because of the racism that they experience, non-white groups may share a need to band together in a reactive (and oppositional) way. In contrast, symbolic ethnicity for Waters’ white ethnic Roman Catholic interviewees leads to a lack of understanding of the ethnic or racial experiences, particularly discrimination, of non-white Americans (Waters 1996). By determining whether these groups generally identify as “white” or “non-white,” I am able to evaluate whether Mary Waters’ argument applies to the political behaviors and attitudes of these two groups. Evaluating the determinants of racial identity among Jewish-origin and Japanese-origin Brazilians allows me to demonstrate that race and ethnicity cannot serve as proxies for one another or for socioeconomic status.

The fourth chapter, “Reasons behind Ethnic Voting and Attitudes towards Racial Quotas among Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish Heritage,” presents the primary evidence for the argument that reactive ethnic and racial identification often explain political behaviors and attitudes among immigrant groups. First, I argue that reactive ethnicity (membership in a relatively exclusive ethnic group experiencing discrimination) is associated with ethnic voting. More Jewish than Japanese-heritage women report believing that there is discrimination against
people of their own ethnic origin in Brazil. As a result, the propensity to vote for a candidate of their same ethnic origin is greater among the Jewish-origin interviewees.

Second, consistent with and extending Mary Waters’ (1996) argument, I argue that non-white immigrant groups are more inclined to support race-based government measures, such as racial quotas for university admissions and government jobs that benefit other non-white groups because of personal experiences and awareness of racial discrimination in society. More Japanese than Jewish-heritage women report believing that there is discrimination against the racial group with which they identify, and there is much more support among the Japanese-heritage than Jewish-heritage interviewees for government racial quotas benefitting those identifying as “black” or “Indigenous.” The non-white racial identification of most of the Japanese-heritage interviewees is associated with a higher awareness of racial discrimination against other groups, which is the main reason behind support of the quotas.

In Chapter Five, “Challenges to Ethnic Community-Based Organizing among Current Immigrants in Brazil,” I argue that the agricultural cooperatives on which the first Japanese and Jewish immigrants worked in Southern Brazil provided them the social capital to form other ethnic community-based organizations (ECBOs), which facilitated their political incorporation in Brazil. This is an advantage not shared by current economic immigrants. In order to help current immigrants deal with this disadvantage, Catholic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) help newly arrived immigrants with social assimilation and political incorporation before these immigrants develop the social capital to form their own ECBOs. I discuss two such Catholic NGOs in São Paulo, Missão Paz and Centro de Apoio e Pastoral do Migrante (CAMI – Center for the Support and Pastoral of the Migrant), which provide services ranging from language classes to lobbying for immigrant voting rights in Brasilia. I compare these two
organizations with one Japanese ECBO, Centro de Informação e Apoio ao Trabalhador no Exterior (CIATE – Center of Information and Support to the Worker Abroad), and one Jewish ECBO, Confederação Israelita do Brasil (CONIB – Jewish Confederation of Brazil), that primary serve third generation Brazilians (grandchildren of immigrants) of these respective heritage groups in São Paulo to illustrate the relative funding challenges faced by the Catholic NGOs.

The sixth and final chapter ties together the main findings and broader impacts of the dissertation project in Brazil as well as other immigrant-receiving countries. I pay special attention to theoretical and policy implications as Brazil seeks to enhance its image on the world stage. This chapter also discusses recommendations for future research and limitations of the study.
1.9 Bibliography


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Chapter 2 - Theories of Race, Ethnicity, Immigrant Acculturation and Assimilation, and Political Incorporation

Presented in this chapter are the theories about the political incorporation and social acculturation of immigrants that I will evaluate in the next three chapters with empirical data from both the city of São Paulo and Brazil at large. The theories come from a number of social science approaches to race, ethnicity, and immigration from fields including political science, sociology, history, psychology and anthropology.

Beginning in the third chapter of this dissertation, I evaluate how well theories of race, ethnicity, social assimilation, and political incorporation of immigrants apply to São Paulo and Brazil. These theories were developed in Brazil as well as other immigrant-receiving countries, such as the United States and Canada. Because like Brazil, the United States has had a significant history of both African slavery and immigration beginning in the nineteenth century, the theories that have originated in the United States provide an interesting point of comparison for theorizing about race, ethnicity, and immigration in Brazil.

Although scholars typically distinguish between political incorporation and social acculturation and assimilation or discuss them in isolation from one another, I find these processes to be deeply intertwined within the context of this study because it is difficult to make progress towards political incorporation without already having made some progress in social acculturation and assimilation. For this reason, I discuss theories of the social assimilation alongside theories of the political incorporation of immigrants, and I demonstrate how these theoretical literatures relate to one another. I also explain how these literatures fit into the context of my dissertation project.
2.1 Acculturation

Writing about the Canadian context, social psychologist John W. Berry (1990) has suggested that there are four strategies of the acculturation process: assimilation (movement away from original culture and toward the dominant culture), integration (synthesis of the traditional and dominant cultures), separation/segregation (holding on to original culture and avoiding interaction with dominant culture), or marginalization (alienation from both cultures). Challenging the notion that majority elite discourse is hegemonic, Lesser similarly argues that immigrant minority elites have used three strategies of acculturation in Brazil: insisting on their own whiteness or asserting an “ultranationalist” Brazilian identity (Berry’s assimilation), and promoting the idea that Brazil would improve by becoming more “Arab” or more “Japanese,” (Berry’s integration) (Lesser 1999). Expanding on this integration strategy, he argues that immigrant communities have aggressively tried to negotiate a status that allowed for both Brazilian nationality and ethnic difference by creating a hyphenated identity (Lesser 1996, 1999). This “hidden hyphen” of ethnicity has remained “predominant yet unacknowledged” in Brazil today (Lesser 1999; Sansone 2003). Separation/Segregation is another possible strategy in São Paulo. In their work on immigrant Chinese communities in the U.S. metropolises of Los Angeles and New York, Zhou and Kim find that resistance to immigration from established residents reinforces immigrant ethnic identity as opposed to an American identity (2003).

When speaking of processes of acculturation in Brazil, one must take into account Gilberto Freyre’s arguments that African and Asian cultural elements had already been integrated into Portuguese and what would become early Brazilian culture from events happening prior to the Portuguese colonization of Brazil (e.g., Freyre 1933; Freyre 2003). According to Freyre, this integration of Asian and African culture into Brazilian culture began
with the early Portuguese trade with China and the African slave trade in Brazil. Even today, Freyre’s arguments still influence the way many Brazilians perceive processes of acculturation both theoretically and practically.

Similar to Lesser (1999), I use a comparative approach in studying immigrant ethnicity and strategies of acculturation and political incorporation. My project contributes to the literature on acculturation by evaluating the presence of Berry’s four strategies of immigrant acculturation (with special attention to assimilation, integration, and separation/segregation), ethnic identity, and politics in the Japanese and Jewish communities in São Paulo.

2.2 Theoretical Approaches to Immigrant Assimilation and Political Incorporation

Although the sociological literature generally relies on four primary factors to assess immigrant assimilation (socioeconomic status, geographic distribution, host country language attainment, and intermarriage), the theoretical models tend to focus most of their explanations on socioeconomic status. Thus, in this project, I pick two groups that are well assimilated according to the socioeconomic assimilation benchmark but that generally self-identify as different racial categories from each other on government surveys to assess how well standard theories explain the other factors.

2.2.1 Classical Assimilation Model and the Pluralist Model of Political Incorporation

The classic assimilation model theorizes that immigrants and their children follow a "straight-line" or a convergence process of assimilation to the majority society. Assimilation theory sees immigrants and subsequent generations becoming more similar to the majority population over time in norms, values, behaviors, and socioeconomic characteristics (Bean and Stevens 2003). This theory expects immigrants residing the longest in the host population and members of later generations to show greater similarities in values, behaviors and socioeconomic
characteristics with the majority group than immigrants who have spent less time in the host society (e.g., Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee 2003). This approach maps onto the pluralist conception of political incorporation; in which the first generation arrives, the second generation participates, and the third generation elects representatives and makes policy (e.g., Dahl 1961; Wolfinger 1965).\(^9\)

### 2.2.2 Neopluralist Approaches to Political Incorporation

Portes and Stepick (1993) propose a neopluralist approach in their study on Cuban immigrants in Miami, Florida. Their findings in Miami support Dahl’s approach, but while Dahl argued that social assimilation accompanies political incorporation, Portes and Stepick propose “biculturalism” as an alternative to assimilation. Using census data, surveys of Cuban refugees, and interviews with city leaders; the authors conceptualize and evaluate Miami as the United States’ first full-fledged experiment in bicultural living. For example, Cuban immigrants in Miami created the “Latinization” of the city’s political economy (Portes and Stepick 1993). Educationally, this model posits that school children who are bicultural perform better academically than students who are recent immigrants or students whose primary loyalty is to an in-group that is perceived as being in conflict with mainstream American white society (Portes 2013).

Peter Skerry (1993) proposes another neopluralist approach based on his study on Mexican immigrants in the United States. He argues that in the post-civil rights movement era, immigrants may now choose two options for political incorporation: as “individual citizens” or

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\(^9\) The two political scientists conceptualized the role of ethnic voting differently. While Dahl (1961) saw ethnic voting as a “transitional phenomenon” that declines as subsequent generations experience social mobility, Wolfinger (1965) believed that ethnic voting should be more prevalent among subsequent generations that have obtained middle class status.
as “members of an oppressed racial group.” The group-based logic of civil rights employed by African Americans provide immigrants with a strategic model of incorporation as “victimized racial claimant groups.” Unlike the proponents of the racial or ethnic disadvantage model that I discuss next, Skerry does not argue that racism blocks the political incorporation process for non-whites, even though he believes that discrimination is a valid concern for African Americans.

2.2.3 Criticisms of Assimilation Models

An increasing number of scholars have started to criticize the paradigm of immigrant assimilation because of its focus on ethnicity and its lack of attention to race (e.g. Treitler 2015; Sáenz and Douglas 2015; Brown and Jones 2015). Many of the scholars argue for the inclusion of theories of racialization, the way in which people are incorporated into racial systems by racial categorization and taught the commonsense accorded to the hierarchy of races in that system, in immigration studies. Some of these scholars argue for the rejection of theories of assimilation altogether.

An alternative to the classic assimilation model is the racial or ethnic disadvantage model, which argues that the non-white immigrant's chances to completely assimilate to the majority society are "blocked" by continuing discrimination and institutional barriers to employment and other opportunities (e.g., Glazer and Moynihan 1963).

2.2.4 Segmented Assimilation Model, Two-Tiered Pluralist Model of Political Incorporation, and Transnational Ties as a Psychological Exit Strategy

The segmented assimilation model synthesizes the classical assimilation and the racial and ethnic disadvantage models by arguing that while many immigrants will find different pathways to mainstream status, others will find such pathways blocked, particularly as a
consequence of racial discrimination (e.g., Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2005). In terms of political incorporation, Rodney Hero’s (1992) “two-tiered” form of pluralism maps onto segmented assimilation. Hero argues that two-tiered pluralism allows full political incorporation for whites as posited by Dahl but only marginal inclusion for Latinos, African Americans, and other minorities in the United States (See Figure 2.1). Under two-tiered pluralism, there is formal legal equality (e.g., the right to vote and formal equality before the law), but practices that undermine equality for members of minority groups, for the most part, still exist (e.g., the legacies of historical discrimination). This leads to what Hero refers as “the marginal inclusion” of minorities in most aspects of the political process (1992).

One caveat that Reuel Rogers (2006) emphasizes from the findings of his semi-structured interviews in New York, however, is that while immigrants may experience barriers that include institutional resistance from political parties, racism, and their own home country ties, these home country or transnational ties provide even black immigrants (e.g., Afro-Caribbeans) with strategic and cognitive options for adjusting to life in the host country that are not available to native-born blacks. For example, they may evaluate work wages and hours in their new country with how they compare with employment opportunities back home.

Because a common critique of the segmented assimilation model is that it often uses racial discrimination to explain lack of immigrant assimilation when a plausible alternative explanation could be low economic status, I select two immigrant groups that as a whole have been able to obtain high economic status to compare for the purposes of evaluating this model in present-day Brazil.

2.3 Middleman Minority Theory
An alternative to segmented assimilation and the other theories of assimilation is the middleman minority theory. Generally, middleman minority groups occupy an intermediate rather than low social status. They typically concentrate in occupations in trade and commerce. Howard Becker referred to them as “middleman trading peoples” (1956). Hubert Blalock’s (1967) name for this group comes from the idea that they play a role of middleman between producer and consumer, employer and employee, owner and tenant, and elite and masses. In developing a theory of middleman minority groups, Edna Bonacich notes that middleman minorities are sojourners or immigrants who do not plan to settle permanently because of an attachment to their homeland. For this reason, they participate in occupations that are portable or easily liquidated. Because they plan to return to their homeland, middleman minority groups maintain strong ethnic ties and resist assimilation to the host country. Conflict between the middleman and host society results over economic (business) matters and the in-group solidarity of the middle man minority. This host country hostility further solidifies and isolates the middleman minority group and nurtures the love of the group’s homeland, reinforced through ethnic organization through institutions, such as in language and cultural schools. The host country’s efforts to restrict the middlemen minority group’s economic influence through laws or policies restrict the group’s alternatives. As a result, this increases the group’s occupational concentration.

According to Bonacich, two factors often prevent a return to the immigrant’s homeland. First, political conditions in the homeland may prevent a return. Second, business success in the host country makes a return to the homeland difficult. If the middleman minority individual decides to relinquish dreams of return to the homeland and socially assimilate to the host society, then he ceases to be a middleman minority. If he retains ties to the homeland and refuses to
socially assimilate to the host society, he remains a “stranger” in the host country (Bonacich 1973).

While this theory may have applied to Jewish and Japanese immigrants in São Paulo in the past, it is now more accurate for discussing less established immigrant groups in Brazil, such as the Chinese. I include this theory here mainly to contrast it with segmented assimilation theory.

2.4 Ethnic Identification and Socioeconomic Status of the Third Generation

2.4.1 Reactive, Symbolic, and Selective Categories of Racial and Ethnic Self-Identification

Bean, Stevens, and Wierzbicki (2003) examine the interaction between socioeconomic status and racial/ethnic self-identification. They identify three categories of racial and ethnic identification: reactive (more racial/ethnic identification as a result of experiencing socioeconomic discrimination)\(^{10}\), symbolic (more prominent but superficial racial/ethnic identification as a result of achieving socioeconomic success), and selective (more racial/ethnic identification than others in some ways to facilitate economic achievement). Using these categories as a guideline, I will examine the relationship between socioeconomic status and racial and ethnic identification among Jewish and Japanese Brazilians using 1998 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE - Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) data in Chapter Three.

2.4.2 Symbolic Ethnicity

\(^{10}\) An example of reactive ethnicity can be seen in Stepick and Portes (1993)’s study on Miami mentioned earlier in this literature review. Cubans in Miami went through a period of reactive ethnicity after the negative press from the Mariel boatlift crisis in 1980. Cuban-American groups actively created groups to confront the negative stereotypes, and within a decade, Cuban-Americans won election to every level of political office and received administrative government appointments.
The second level discussed by Beans, Stevens, and Wierzbicki, “symbolic ethnicity” was what Herbert Gans (1979) called the third generation’s pursuit of identity, which takes on an expressive rather than an instrumental role in people’s lives. This type of ethnic identity, unlike the ethnic identities of the first and second generation, is more of a leisure-time activity rather than something that is family-based or important for getting a job. According to Gans, ethnic symbols are often individual cultural practices that are “abstracted” from the traditional ethnic culture to become “stand-ins” for it. These practices are visible and clear to the third-generation ethnics, but they do not require much interference with everyday life. These symbols may include ethnic holidays, rites of passage, food, ancestral countries (rather than local ethnic organizations), and non-recent history. All of these symbols can be enjoyed and practiced without the presence of the ethnic community. Despite much focus on the third-generation, Gans also argues that the emergence of symbolic ethnicity begins with members of the first generation who often discard old ethnic practices when they reach their new host country and continues with members of the second-generation when they move out of ethnic neighborhoods and into suburbia. He sees symbolic ethnicity as consistent with the classic or “straight-line” assimilation model (Gans 1979).

Referring to Gans’ work, Mary Waters (1996) argues that symbolic ethnicity is an option that may only be practiced by white Americans in the present-day United States because the lives of black Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and American Indians are strongly influenced by race or national origin regardless of how much they may choose to identify with these social groups. The main difference between second and third generation Asian Americans and Latinos and their white ethnic counterparts is the fact that immigration of these two groups is continually occurring in the United States (Waters 1990). Because of the racism that they experience, non-
white groups may share a need to band together in a reactive (and oppositional) way (Waters 1996). Symbolic ethnicity for Waters’ white ethnic Roman Catholic interviewees leads to a lack of understanding of the ethnic or racial experiences, particularly discrimination, of non-white Americans (1990). Misha Klein (2012) argues that Jews in São Paulo can choose to “come out” as Jewish through the wearing of a kippah (a cap generally worn for prayer) or choose to “pass” as just Brazilian because the group is not defined by “race.”

In contrast, Richard Alba (1990), who is heavily influenced by Gans’ work, argues that even though the erosion of ethnic differentiation is much more advanced for European-ancestry whites, other groups such as Cubans, most Asian American groups, and many Americans of American Indian ancestry who are integrated into the white population are also beginning to undergo these processes. His research was based on an ethnic identity survey carried out in New York State from May 1984 to June 1985 with 524 respondents.

2.4.3 Third-generation Return to Ethnicity

An alternative to symbolic ethnicity derives from Marcus Hansen’s (1938) thesis of a third-generation return to ethnicity, based on his studies about immigrant groups in Europe and the United States. United States scholars who saw a revival of ethnicity among whites in the 1960s and 1970s argued that the assertion of ethnic identity has costs for the first and second generations. In contrast, the third generation is more secure in its place in society and can thus afford to assert a strong ethnic identity. These scholars found socioeconomic position to be positively associated with ethnic identity. In contrast to this revival of ethnicity thesis, Alba (1990), finding a positive association between education and ethnicity, suggests that ethnicity may be a part of the “cultural capital” transmitted through advanced education. He speculates that ethnic symbols and references can be useful in the complex signaling that individuals use to
establish relationships to others, not necessarily from the same ethnic group. I will evaluate whether there is support for Hansen’s thesis and Alba’s alternative idea in Chapter Three.

Because I examine the ethnic identities of third-generation Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish heritage in Chapter Four, I will be able to evaluate which models in this section best explain the ethnic identification of these Brazilians.

2.5 Discrimination from the Point of View of Non-Targets

In Chapters Three and Four, I evaluate U.S.-based theories about race and ethnicity within the context of Brazil. Because most of the preceding theories were derived within the United States, it is important to understand how scholars have conceptualized differences in how racial discrimination functions in Brazil and the United States before evaluating the theories in the Brazilian context.

2.5.1 Prejudice Based on Origin versus Prejudice Based on Traits

Brazilian sociologist Oracy Nogueira (1985) famously argued that prejudice in the United States is based on origin (preconceito de origem), while prejudice in Brazil is based on physical attributes and behaviors (preconceito de marca). In other words, what defines a black person in the United States is being the descendent of an African and slave, while in Brazil a black person is defined by skin color and dress. This is what allows for the relative ease of “passing” in Brazil, as opposed to the United States, as a black person ascends in socioeconomic status. He extended this argument to immigrants in the two countries. Nogueira argued that because of prejudice based on origin in the United States, there is more tolerance in the United States than in Brazil of immigrants who keep their language and cultural customs. In contrast, because of prejudice based on physical attributes and behaviors in Brazil, immigrants who maintain their
languages, religions, and customs are less favored than immigrants who assimilate to mainstream Brazilian culture and intermarry with other Brazilians.

2.5.2 Pigmentocracy

Related to Nogueira’s argument, scholars on race relations in Brazil have predominantly argued that racial discrimination in Brazil is largely based on darkness of skin color, also known as pigmentocracy. According to the pigmentocracy hypothesis, the darker on the black-white color continuum that someone is, the more discrimination the individual experiences from society.

2.5.3 Mulatto Escape Hatch Theory

One derivative of pigmentocracy is Carl Degler’s (1971) “mulatto escape hatch” theory, which provides one of the most widely held explanations of differences in how race has been socially constructed in Brazil as opposed to the United States. Degler argues that Brazil could not develop a biracial ideology or formalize rigid racial classification and domination because of the high level of mixing between races. Miscegenation supposedly also resulted in greater social mobility in Brazil, with mixed-race offspring having the ability to move up to a higher socioeconomic status than Blacks via a “mulatto escape hatch.” Following from this reasoning, race relations were less polarized in Brazil than in the United States. According to Degler, in the United States, more pronounced phenotypical differences provided the basis for official racial categories that reinforced socioeconomic discrimination. For a while, Degler (1971) along with other American scholars presented Brazil as a desirable alternative to race relations in the United States.

French sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant (1999) reference Degler’s work in order to criticize race scholars from the United States who study Brazil, like Michael
Hanchard, and accuse these American scholars of being culturally imperialist in their views of Brazil’s having a largely binary (black-white) racial system similar to that of the United States. According to Bourdieu and Wacquant, the United States is the only modern society to apply the “one drop rule” and the principle of “hypodescent,” according to which the children of one black parent and one white parent find themselves to be automatically classified as black. In contrast, racial identity in Brazil falls along a *continuum* of “colour.” They emphasize that the concept of “colour” in Brazil includes “fuzzy” phenotypical classifications of nose and hair as well as a person’s socioeconomic status with regard to income and education. Bourdieu and Wacquant argue that unlike in the United States, there is no stigma attached to the black racial category in Brazil.

In contrast, since the writing of Degler’s book, several scholars have noted that this “mulatto escape hatch” theory has never been convincingly supported by evidence in Brazil (e.g., Skidmore 1993; Hanchard 1994; Hanchard 2003). Thomas Skidmore (1993) argues that miscegenation was actually encouraged as part of the positivist whitening project in Brazil at the turn of the twentieth century. Michael Hanchard (2003), one of the American race scholars criticized by Bourdieu and Wacquant, in turn, criticizes Bourdieu and Wacquant for their failure to acknowledge that citizens of a nation-state do not necessarily subscribe to dominant ideologies put forth by their nation or by their government. Hanchard cites several instances of researchers finding that blacks and mulattoes are equally discriminated against in Brazil (2003). As he suggests in his *Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil, 1945-1988* (1994), the “mulatto escape hatch” theory is essentially a hegemonic, ideological articulation of “common sense” formed by elites that is intensely debated within Brazil (2003).
2.5.4 Racial Triangulation

An alternative to conceptualizing racial discrimination on a black-white continuum is Clare Jean Kim’s (1999) model of racial triangulation (See Figure 2.2). Kim’s model of racial triangulation of Asian Americans posits that the dominant Whites valorize Asian Americans (e.g., “the model minority”) more than blacks (e.g., “the urban underclass”) on cultural and/or racial grounds (Superior-Inferior axis) to dominate both groups, and whites construct Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners and unable to assimilate with whites and blacks on cultural and/or racial grounds (Foreigner-Insider axis) in order to ostracize them from the body politic and civic membership.

Kim argues that this model has persisted since the mid-1800s and only underwent minor changes in the post-1965 era in keeping with the norms of colorblindness. According to her, this triangulation model provides a normative blueprint for which groups deserve what, reproducing patterns of white power and privilege (Kim 1999). A partial example of Kim’s triangulation model appeared in the first chapter of this dissertation in the section regarding Brazil’s decision to not import Chinese workers on a massive scale to replace African slaves after abolition because the Chinese were not thought to be as capable of assimilation in Brazil as African slaves. It reasonably could be argued that Kim’s (1999) model integrates both Nogueira’s preconceito de origem and preconceito de marca on her Foreigner-Insider and Superior-Inferior axes, respectively. In Chapter Four, I examine whether my Japanese-heritage and Jewish-heritage respondents report experiencing or perceiving discrimination to similar extents on both of these axes.

2.6 Evaluating These Theories through Empirical Evidence in the Upcoming Dissertation Chapters
In the upcoming chapters, I will analyze statistical data, semi-structured interviews, and case studies to evaluate the theories I present in this chapter. While many of these theories may not have been intended to be applied outside of the countries in which they originated, I believe that they are worth evaluating in a country that has not produced many of its own theories about the political incorporation of immigrants.

2.6.1 Chapter Three --- The Racial Identity Determinants of Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish Heritage

In Chapter Three, I evaluate classic assimilation theory (e.g., Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee 2003); segmented assimilation theory (e.g., Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2005); Bean, Stevens, and Wierzbicki’s (2003) reactive, symbolic, and selective categories of racial and ethnic self-identification; and Alba’s (1990) attribution of ethnicity as “cultural capital” that is transmitted through advanced education, with respect to the individual-level racial identifications of Jewish and Japanese-heritage Brazilians and the determinants of these racial identifications through a statistical analysis of government survey data.

2.6.2 Chapter Four --- Reasons behind Ethnic Voting and Attitudes towards Racial Quotas among Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish Heritage

Then, in Chapter Four, I evaluate Mary Waters’ (1996) “symbolic ethnicity” paradigm by analyzing the roles of individual ethnic and racial identifications and perceived experiences of discrimination in political incorporation. I focus on the expressed political attitudes and behavior of Brazilians who are the grandchildren of immigrants. I evaluate Waters’ paradigm by analyzing the responses of third-generation Brazilian women of Jewish and Japanese heritage to the questions of the semi-structured interviews that I carried out in São Paulo.
I also evaluate Nogueira’s (1995) preconceito de origem (heritage-based prejudice) versus preconceito de marca (prejudice based on physical attributes and behaviors) and Claire Jean Kim’s (2000) Superior-Inferior axis versus Foreigner-Insider axis. I focus on whether interviewees from the two groups experienced discrimination and stereotypes based on beliefs about being from “closed communities” that are not assimilating to mainstream Brazilian society or beliefs about physical attributes and foreign-ness of their respective racial and ethnic group identities.

2.6.3 Chapter Five --- Challenges to Ethnic Community-Based Organizing among Current Immigrants

Finally, by including an analysis of the role of ethnic-based community organizations (ECBOs) in the political incorporation of immigrants and their descendants, I highlight the empirical importance of conceptualizing social assimilation and political incorporation as parallel processes. The social capital that the first Japanese and Jewish immigrants developed while working on the agricultural cooperatives allowed them to develop their own ECBOs, many of which are maintained by the descendants of the immigrants today, to fulfill their social needs and political interests.

2.7 Conclusion

Understanding how race, ethnicity, and discrimination affect the ways in which immigrants and their descendants are incorporated both socially and politically into the host country is central to answering my research question of why different immigrant groups, particularly those that do not currently face much economic discrimination, choose different strategies of political incorporation. The theories presented in this chapter propose the possible barriers that these immigrant groups face in their host country and how these immigrant groups
may react to those obstacles, influencing the strategic choices that these immigrants and their descendants make at both an individual and a collective basis. Understanding how race, ethnicity, and discrimination affect the political incorporation and social incorporation of immigrants also provides an important piece of the puzzle in understanding more general issues of the causes and effects of political and social inequities in the Brazil and perhaps other countries.
Appendices

Figure 2.1 Hero’s (1992) Two-tiered Pluralism – A Schematic Presentation

Figure 2.1. Kim’s (1999) Racial Triangulation Model
2.8 Bibliography


Chapter 3 - The Racial Identity Determinants of Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish Heritage

In order to answer my primary dissertation question of why different immigrant groups adopt different strategies of political incorporation by the third generation, it is important to address the determinants of racial identity and how Brazilians of Jewish or Japanese heritage identify racially. The importance of understanding how these groups identify racially at an individual level comes into play in my next chapter, where I examine the role of racial, particularly non-white, identity on respondent attitudes towards government racial quota programs.

Within the increasing volume of scholarship on race and ethnicity in Latin America, the focus has generally been on disadvantaged populations, such as Afro-descendants or the Indigenous. Although “white” is usually the racial identification at the top of Latin America’s pigmentocracy framework as mention in the last chapter, the racial identification of white persons has rarely been directly studied (Telles and Flores 2013).

Quantitative studies about “race” or “color” in Brazil have relied on the categories used by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE - Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics): “white,” “black,” “brown, “yellow,” and “Indigenous,” and often only analyze the first three categories to analyze income inequalities on a black-white continuum. In this chapter, I examine how Brazilians who identified as being of Jewish or Japanese origin on the

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11 The exclusive term “color” was used until the 1991 Census, which added the word “race” to the question, “What is your color or race?” This change coincided with the addition of the “Indigenous” category; previously, Indigenous Brazilians were generally classified as “brown.” There is speculation that the addition of the “Indigenous” category was brought about by pressures to provide relevant demographic data for World Bank initiatives on the protection of Indigenous territories (Nobles 2000).

As stated in Chapter One, in preparing for the 2000 Brazilian Census, the IBGE experimentally introduced a question about "origem" (“origin” or “ancestry”) in its 1998 Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME - Monthly Employment Research) to test the possibility of introducing it as a variable on the Census. IBGE eventually decided against the inclusion of questions of national origin on the Census. As of today, the 1998 Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego remains the only published survey with information about the immigrant origins of Brazilians. Interviews of over 90,000 Brazilians who were 10 years of age or older in the metropolitan regions of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, and Recife comprised this survey. The origin categories on this survey were: Brazilian, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, German, Indigenous, Black, Lebanese, Syrian, Japanese, African, Jewish, and Other (Schwartzman 1999).

In his summary of findings using mostly descriptive statistics from this survey, Schwartzman (1999) positions his study in conversation with Oracy Nogueira’s (1985) argument that prejudice in the United States is based on origin (preconceito de origem), while prejudice in Brazil is based on physical attributes and behaviors (preconceito de marca). In other words, what defines a black person in the United States is being the descendent of an African and slave, while in Brazil a black person is defined by skin color and dress. This is what allows for the relative ease of “passing” in Brazil as opposed to the United States as a black person ascends in socioeconomic status. Schwartzman’s findings undermine Nogueira’s argument; one cannot
simply substitute color or race for origin, especially since only a portion of the population that identifies as belonging to the “black” (preta) or “brown” color category also identifies as being of African or Black (negra) origin. There is a great diversity of national origin groups within each color or racial category. Schwartzman therefore concludes that it makes sense to study the Brazilian population not only in terms of “race” or “color” but also national origin. Relating to the two origin groups on which I focus my attention, Schwartzman finds that out of the groups that had started immigrating to Brazil after the abolition of slavery in 1888, the group of people who identify as being of Japanese origin has the smallest proportion of people also identifying as being of Brazilian origin (41.10 percent). The Jewish-origin respondents, however, are the post-abolition immigrant group that had the highest proportion of people who also identify as being of Brazilian origin (59.40 percent) (Schwartzman 1999).

In this chapter, I evaluate the factors that lead people who identify as being of the same national origin to choose different racial or color identifications. According to Mary Waters (1996), white ethnicity and non-white racial identity operate differently. Because of the racism that they experience, non-white groups may share a need to band together in a reactive (and oppositional) way. In contrast, symbolic ethnicity for Waters’ white ethnic Roman Catholic interviewees leads to a lack of understanding of the ethnic or racial experiences, particularly discrimination, of non-white Americans (Waters 1996). By determining whether these two groups generally identify as “white” or “non-white,” I will be able to evaluate whether Mary Waters’ argument applies to the political behaviors and attitudes of these particular groups in the next chapter.
3.1 Theories to Be Evaluated

Although this particular survey was not made to specifically evaluate the theories from Chapter Two, many of the implications of those theories may be analyzed from the data in this chapter.

3.1.1 Classic Assimilation

This theory (e.g., Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee 2003) would suggest that the more economically successful individuals should identify more with mainstream Brazilian society, meaning that they should identify as racially “white” and select “Brazilian” as an origin. Because both groups, as a whole, have the highest monthly incomes in Brazil, the theory would posit that, on average, individuals in both groups would select “Brazilian” as one of their origins and identify racially as “white.”

3.1.2 Segmented Assimilation

This theory (e.g., Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2005) would suggest that the more economically successful individuals may not identify with mainstream Brazilian society, perhaps maintaining a non-white racial identification and not selecting “Brazilian” as an origin. Because this theory posits that some groups may find pathways to assimilation blocked because of racial discrimination, it posits that, on average, individuals from a group that identify as non-white would not select “Brazilian” as one of their origins.

3.1.3 Reactive, Symbolic, and Selective Categories of Racial and Ethnic Self-Identification

Bean, Stevens, and Wierzbicki (2003) identify three categories of racial and ethnic identification: reactive (more racial/ethnic identification as a result of experiencing socioeconomic discrimination), symbolic (more prominent but superficial racial/ethnic
identification as a result of achieving economic success), and selective (more racial/ethnic identification than others in some ways to facilitate economic achievement). Of course, there is no direct method of evaluating whether the survey respondents experienced racial or ethnic discrimination because there was not a question about this. The data, however, may shed light about whether racial identification is symbolic or selective rather than reactive. While the data does not allow the researcher to distinguish between symbolic and selective racial identification, they can show whether the respondents’ behaviors are consistent with one of these two categories. Unlike the two competing theories of assimilation, the focus here is on differences in self-identification of respondents within each group rather than differences between groups as a whole. If lower income members of a group identify as non-white, then that would be consistent with the reactive category. On the other hand, if higher income members of a group identify as non-white, that would be consistent with either the symbolic or selective categories.

3.1.4 Ethnicity as “Cultural Capital”

By including education as a variable in my analysis, I can evaluate whether Alba’s (1990) attribution of ethnicity as “cultural capital” that is transmitted through advanced education is consistent with this survey’s respondents. If I find that more educated survey respondents self-identify as non-white racially, then this would be consistent with Alba’s theory.

3.2 Source of Data

The IBGE’s Pesquisa Mensal do Emprego has been carried out on a monthly basis since 1980. It produces monthly indicators about the labor force, assessing fluctuations and medium and long-term trends of the labor market in the areas in which it is carried out. The survey constitutes an agile indicator responsive to the effects of economic conditions on this market in addition to servicing other important needs for the country’s socioeconomic planning. It covers
information including activation condition, occupancy condition, occupational position, average nominal and real income, and possession of formal work documents. Households serve as the unit of collection. As mentioned earlier, the only year in which questions about what ethnic (national) origin respondents considered themselves to have were included in the survey was 1998.

3.3 Methodology

I begin by presenting descriptive statistics that show how the respondents of Japanese and Jewish origin identify racially (Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3). Next, I determine whether there are differences in educational level, monthly income, gender, and age between people who identify with the two most common racial categories for each national origin group (Figures 3.4 and 3.5). What follows is a discussion of the variables selected for this analysis.

3.3.1 Educational Level

Educational level is a qualitative ordinal variable measured on IGBE’s eight-point scale: 0 = not literate; 1= only knows how to read; 2= first through third grade of primary education; 3= fourth grade of primary education; 4=fifth to eighth grade of primary education; 5= high school; 6=university; 7=Master and/or doctoral degree. An additional reason that I wanted to include educational level as a variable in this analysis is Alba’s (1990) finding of a positive association between education and ethnicity, suggesting that ethnicity may be a part of the “cultural capital” transmitted through advanced education. Alba speculates that ethnic symbols and references can be useful in the complex signaling that individuals use to establish relationships to others, not necessarily from the same ethnic group.

3.3.2 Monthly Income
The monthly income variable, one of IBGE’s primary variables of interest in this survey, is measured in Brazilian reais. Inclusion of this variable allows me to evaluate the classic assimilation theory, segmented assimilation theory, Bean, Stevens, and Wierzbicki’s (2003) three categories of racial and ethnic self-identification, and Alba’s attribution of ethnicity as “cultural capital.”

The first two variables, educational level and monthly income, were selected because they are both measures of socioeconomic status that are prominently featured in the literature on racial identity and inequality (e.g., Schwartzman 1999; Schwartzman 2007; Telles and Lim 1998).

3.3.3 Gender

Gender was selected for inclusion because for my semi-structured interviews with third-generation Brazilians that I analyze in Chapter Four, I only interview respondents of the female gender, so I am not able to address differences between the two genders in that chapter. For this reason, it is important for me to evaluate whether there are significant differences between the two genders in this chapter. Males were coded as 1, and females were coded as 0.

3.3.4 Age

Age was selected as an independent variable because the survey did not ask about the immigrant generation of the respondent, and through knowledge of the immigration patterns of Jewish and Japanese immigrants to Brazil, it is somewhat possible, though not completely reliable, to infer immigrant generation from age. Also, younger people may be more willing to identify with a non-white racial category than their older counterparts possible due to their possessing more tolerant attitudes (Schwartzman 1999).
3.3.5 Analyzing Differences in Racial Identification

Finally, for each national origin group, I only compare characteristics between the two most frequently identified color or racial categories (Figure 3.6). Because the outcome variables were dichotomous, I carry out a multivariate analysis using logistic regression, which is the standard technique for predicting dichotomous dependent variables. Since logit coefficients are not interpretable, I use odds ratios to interpret the results. I used Stata 12 to carry out this analysis.

3.4 Findings

Table 3.1 shows the number of Jewish-origin Brazilians and Japanese-origin Brazilians that reported identifying with each racial category. There were 182 Brazilians of Jewish origin and 683 Brazilians of Japanese origin. The table shows that there is substantial variation in ethnic identification for people of both Jewish and Japanese origin. This is important because if 99% of Jewish-origin Brazilians identified as white, then there would be no room to find determinants. Most Jewish-origin Brazilians identify as “white” (74.2%) or “brown” (17.6%), and most Japanese-origin people identify as “white” (31.0%) or “yellow” (58.9%). Because this table shows that there are only 182 Jewish-origin Brazilians in the sample, a relatively small sample size, only large differences can be detected as statistically significant. From this simple table, it is already apparent that ethnicity cannot be assumed to be a subset of race; not all Japanese-origin Brazilians identify as “yellow,” and not all Jewish-origin Brazilians identify as “white.”

Table 3.2 reveals the number of Jewish-origin Brazilians reporting each racial identification after combining less commonly identified groups into an "Other" category. This table shows that Jewish-origin people predominately identify as “white.” For this group, I will
compare mainly the differences in the characteristics between those identifying with the “white” racial category and those identifying with the “brown” racial category, which makes up a fairly small sample size.

Table 3.3 shows the number of Brazilians of Japanese origin reporting each racial group after combining less commonly identified groups into an "Other" category. This table shows that Japanese-origin Brazilians predominately identify racially as “yellow.” For this group, I will compare mainly the differences in the characteristics of those identifying with the “yellow” category to those identifying with the “white” category.

Table 3.4 presents the unadjusted differences in demographic characteristics (not accounting for co-variation between determinants). Income was missing on quite a few observations. To deal with this problem of missing data, I imputed income to be the median of each respective racial category (because I am interested in the effect of income on racial identification). Significance levels were assessed using a simple t-test. Without accounting for co-variation, Jewish-origin Brazilians who identified as “white” were significantly more educated and had higher incomes. There were no detectible differences in gender or age between the two groups.

Table 3.5 is the same as Table 3.4 but is shows the information for Japanese-origin Brazilians in demographic characteristics. Without accounting for co-variation, Japanese-origin Brazilians who identified as “white” had significantly lower incomes and were significantly older. Since these two determinants clearly co-vary, these effects are likely to go away or get smaller when included in the same regression model. Although women were more likely to identify as “yellow,” this difference was not statistically significant. There were no detectible differences in level of education.
Table 3.6 presents the results of the main logistic regression model. For Japanese-origin Brazilians, those that were more educated, had higher incomes, and were older were more likely to identify as “yellow” as opposed to “white.” These results imply that with each additional level of education, the odds of identifying as “yellow” relative to “white” increase by 34% (or are 1.34 times greater).

It is important to note from this model that for the Japanese-origin Brazilians, age is a strong predictor of identifying as “yellow.” The odds of reporting “yellow” as opposed to “white” are 20.4 times greater if a Japanese-origin Brazilian is over 60 years old relative to if that individual were between 10 and 20 years of age. The odds ratios are huge, and the gradient of the odds ratios increases as age increases; they get exponentially bigger and are strongly significant.

For Jewish-origin Brazilians, educational level and being young seemed to be strong predictors of racial identification. Jewish-origin Brazilians who had less education were more likely to identify as “brown” as opposed to “white.” Jewish-origin Brazilians who were between 21 and 45 were more likely to identify as “brown” as opposed to “white,” but this age effect did not hold for older ages. (This may be a sample size issue).

3.5 Discussion

The fact that Japanese-origin Brazilians who were more educated, had higher incomes, and were older were more likely to identify as “yellow” as opposed to “white,” suggests support for Portes and Zhou’s segmented assimilation theory mentioned in Chapter 2. One of the possible outcomes of segmented assimilation that they propose is that rapid economic advancement occurs along with “deliberate preservation of the immigrant community’s values and tight solidarity” (1993). It is possible that those who identify as “yellow” identify more with
traditional Japanese culture emphasizing educational attainment. Consistent with this hypothesis is Schwartzman’s finding that out of people who identify as “yellow,” those who identify as being of Japanese origin had higher median monthly incomes than those who identify of being of African, Brazilian, Indigenous, Italian, Black, or Portuguese origin. Also, those who identify as “yellow” are the least likely among the five color or racial categories to identify as “Brazilians” (1999). This finding is also consistent with Alba’s (1990) speculation mentioned in Chapter 2 that ethnicity may be a part of the “cultural capital” transmitted through advanced education for these Japanese-origin Brazilians.

It is important to note, however, that using 1997 PNAD data, Schwartzman finds that inequality in educational levels was a greater factor than inequality between racial categories in explaining inequality in average monthly income. Interestingly enough, he additionally finds that at every level of education, people who identified as “yellow” received the highest average monthly incomes out of the five Census racial categories (1999).

The fact that older age increases the likelihood that a Japanese-origin Brazilian will identify as “yellow” could also speak to generational differences with miscegenation. Miscegenation tends to be more common among younger generations. This explanation also may be consistent with outcomes for Jewish-origin Brazilians. Simon Schwartzman found that the proportion of all Brazilians who identify as “white” diminishes systematically while the proportion identifying as “brown” increases for the youngest groups, and he argues that the most plausible explanation for this trend is that the younger generations feel more comfortable identifying themselves as “brown” than do older generations (1999). Consistent with this theory is the fact that a majority of Brazilians now racially identifying as either “brown” or “black” on the census (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 2011). As will be mentioned in the
next chapter in my discussion of the qualitative interviews that I carried in São Paulo, I found that the racial self-identification of women who had one parent of Japanese origin and another of European origin had little to do with their phenotype and much more to do with which parent they identify more.

Using Bean, Stevens, and Wierzbicki’s (2003) terminology from the previous chapter, it is possible that “brown” racial identification among self-identified Jewish-origin Brazilians might be “reactive” (racial identification as a result of socioeconomic discrimination). In contrast, the findings show that “yellow” racial identification among self-identified Japanese-origin Brazilians might be either “symbolic” (more prominent but superficial racial identification as a result of achieving success) or “selective” (more racial identification than others in some ways to facilitate economic achievement).

3.6 Limitations

A major limitation of this chapter is that it relies on the analysis of a survey that relies on self-reported color or racial identification of the respondents. Following the recommendations of the United Nations, the Brazilian Census Bureau tells interviewers to collect race/color data based on respondents’ self-reports (Goyer and Domschke 1983; Pinto 1996; Telles and Lim 1998). It has been found, however, that interviewers often classify respondents themselves without asking the respondents about racial identification. As a result of this, Brazilian census data about race are a combination of self-classification of respondents and interviewer classification, causing income inequality estimates based on these data to be subject to an unknown combination of collection techniques. Classifications between interviewer and respondent are especially common among the least-educated Brazilians, while the most educated
respondents are most likely to self-classify consistently with the interviewer (Telles and Lim 1998).

Another limitation of this study is that there was no information provided in the survey about the extent to which each respondent identifies with each of the national origin groups listed or the strength of that identity, which are important elements in the study of ethnic identity (Waters 1990). The respondents were also not asked to rank their identities in order of importance to them. Additionally, there are drawbacks to only having survey data about the ancestry of Brazilians from a single year. This is because both the content and importance of the ethnic identities of an individual may change over a life course, even from survey to survey (Waters 1990). It has been found that millions of Americans and Brazilians change their racial identities from one census to the next (Pew Research Center 2014; Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 2011).

An additional limitation of this survey deals with the fact that it does not distinguish whether the Jewish-origin identification is Ashkenazi or Sephardic. Anecdotal evidence has suggested that Sephardic Jews are often perceived to be “brown,” while Ashkenazi Jews are perceived to be “white.” For this reason, there was initially some prejudice involving intermarriage between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews (e.g., Grinberg and Limoncic 2010; Klein 2012).

In their analysis of 1995 Brazilian census data, Telles and Lim (1998) find that compared with interviewer classification, respondent classification underestimates “whites’” income and overestimates the incomes of “blacks” and “browns,” to whom Telles and Lim refer as “nonwhites” in the article. Respondents with lower incomes were classified by interviewers as a darker category than they had self-classified, while those with higher incomes were classified by
interviewers as lighter category than they had self-classified. The authors argue that these findings support the ““money whitens” argument” about race relations in Brazil: interviewers whiten respondents with higher socioeconomic status and darken respondents of lower socioeconomic status. Thus, in cases of racial ambiguity, interviewers rely on social status to help them classify the respondents’ race (Telles and Lim 1998). Similarly, using data from the 2002 Brazilian Social Survey (Pesquisa Social Brasileira - PESB), Bailey et al. (2013) find in their study comparing six different methods of racial classification that racial inequalities in earnings are greater when race is defined by interviewers rather than respondents. Also, in analyzing the 2005 National Household Sample Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra Domicílios - PNAD) data, Luisa Farah Schwartzman (2007) found that higher levels of education increased the likelihood that a non-white parent would classify his or her child as “white” and lowered the likelihood that a “white” parent would classify his or her child as “black” or “brown.” In contrast, my findings demonstrate the limitations of conceptualizing race or color in Brazil solely along a black (non-white)-white continuum when including the “yellow” category in the analysis; Japanese-origin Brazilians of high-socioeconomic status are more likely to identify with the “non-white” category; it may be said that there is a “yellowing” effect in this case.

3.7 Conclusion

One of the major matters that this chapter highlights is the limitation of conceptualizing ethnicity as race or color in Brazil or solely along a black/white or non-white/white continuum. Ethnic identity based on national origin or heritage also cannot be assumed to be merely a subset of race.
I found that Japanese-origin Brazilians who were more educated, had higher incomes, and were older were more likely to identify as “yellow” as opposed to “white.” I argue that this provides some support for Portes and Zhou’s (1993) segmented assimilation theory or Alba’s (1990) attribution of ethnicity as “cultural capital” that is transmitted through advanced education.

I also found that Jewish-origin Brazilians who had less education and those who were between the ages of 21 and 45 were more likely to identify as “brown” as opposed to “white.” This finding about education is not particularly surprising in light of past studies showing a relationship between “white” skin color identification and educational level (e.g., Luisa Schwartzman 2007). The finding about age is consistent with Simon Schwartman’s (1999) argument that younger Brazilians feel more comfortable identifying as “brown” than their older counterparts and the fact that a majority of Brazilians now racially identify as either “brown” or “black” on the census (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 2011). Another possible explanation for this finding is that it underlies differences between Sephardic Jews, who anecdotally identify as “brown,” and Ashkenazi Jews, who anecdotally identify as “white” (e.g., Grinberg and Limoncic 2010; Klein 2012).

Most importantly, I found that most Brazilians of Jewish origin identify as “white,” and most Brazilians of Japanese origin identify as “yellow.” This distinction is important for evaluating Mary Waters’ argument of white ethnic identity as opposed to non-white racial identity in relation to political behaviors and attitudes in the next chapter. In Chapter Four, all of the 30 Jewish-heritage women I interviewed identified as “white” and 28 of the 30 Japanese-heritage women I interviewed identified as “yellow.” Thus, the analysis of the IBGE data in this
chapter demonstrates that these racial identification for Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish heritage are generally consistent across Brazil.
## Appendices

### Table 3.1. Variation in Racial Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>white</th>
<th>black</th>
<th>yellow</th>
<th>brown</th>
<th>indigenous</th>
<th>no response</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Origin</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74.2%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Origin</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 100.0%
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jewish Origin</th>
<th>white</th>
<th>brown</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>135</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74.2%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3. Variation in Racial Identification, Japanese (Combining Uncommon Categories)

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<thead>
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<th>white</th>
<th>yellow</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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</table>
Table 3.4. Variation in Demographic Characteristics by Ethnic Identification, (Jewish Origin)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jewish Origin</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Brown</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education Level (0-7)</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>1.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income (Reais)</td>
<td>800.96</td>
<td>304.09</td>
<td>496.87*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5. Variation in Demographic Characteristics by Ethnic Identification, (Japanese Origin)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japanese Origin</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Yellow</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education Level (0-7)</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monthly Income (Reais)</td>
<td>385.55</td>
<td>776.29</td>
<td>-390.74***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>-12.7***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6. Demographic Determinants of Racial Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Determinants</th>
<th>Ethnic Japanese Identifying as “Yellow” Compared to “White”</th>
<th>Ethnic Jewish Choosing “Brown” Compared to “White”</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logit Coefficients</td>
<td>Odds Ratios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0685)</td>
<td>(0.0919)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education (0-7)</td>
<td>0.293***</td>
<td>1.341***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0123)</td>
<td>(0.0125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (Hundreds)</td>
<td>0.0204*</td>
<td>1.021*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male=1)</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>1.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Relative to 10-20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>1.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.411)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-45</td>
<td>0.593**</td>
<td>1.810**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
<td>(0.517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-60</td>
<td>1.861***</td>
<td>6.432***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.303)</td>
<td>(1.951)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older than 60</td>
<td>3.017***</td>
<td>20.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.418)</td>
<td>(8.538)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.702***</td>
<td>0.182***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.352)</td>
<td>(0.0642)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.8 Bibliography


Pew Research Center. 2014. “Millions of Americans changed their racial or ethnic identity from
one census to the next.” Last modified May 5. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/05/millions-of-americans-changed-their-racial-or-ethnic-identity-from-one-census-to-the-next/


Chapter 4 – Reasons Behind Ethnic Voting and Attitudes towards Racial Quotas among Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish Heritage\textsuperscript{12}

Because much of the scholarship on ethnic voting and political attitudes towards racial quotas in Brazil has been conducted on Afro-Brazilians (e.g., Mitchell 2008; Bailey 2009), much less is known about the political attitudes and behavior of the descendants of immigrants who came to Brazil after the abolition of slavery in 1888. In this chapter, I ask, how do perceptions of ethnic discrimination and racial identity affect ethnic voting and attitude towards government racial quotas? To answer this question, I use interview responses about ethnic voting and attitudes towards racial quotas among grandchildren of Japanese and Jewish immigrants in São Paulo, whose grandparents immigrated to Brazil between the late 1910s and 1950s. The reasoning behind studying ethnicity in a specific setting is that ethnicity is dependent on context, a point that is often lost in national studies (Alba 1990). I pay special attention to reasons behind the differences in responses both between and among the two groups.

The primary theory that I evaluate in this chapter is whether racial or ethnic identifications that result from experiencing discrimination help explain political behaviors and attitudes among immigrant groups. First, I evaluate whether membership in a relatively exclusive ethnic group who experience social discrimination are more likely to vote for co-ethnics. Second, consistent with and extending Mary Waters’ (1996) argument, I evaluate whether non-white immigrant groups are more inclined to support race-based government measures, such as racial quotas for university admissions and government jobs that benefit other

\textsuperscript{12} Consistent with Alba (1990), I treat Jews as a national origin group because they can view themselves as a “people.” Only one of my interviewees from this group considered being Jewish as being defined more by religion than by culture and thought that Jewishness was not an ethnicity.
non-white groups because of personal experiences and awareness of racial discrimination in society.

I present an analysis of 60 semi-structured, open-ended interviews\textsuperscript{13} that I conducted in São Paulo in June to December of 2012.\textsuperscript{14} My interviews for this chapter took place during the campaign season and aftermath of the municipal elections for mayor and city councilmen in São Paulo.\textsuperscript{15} My interviews also occurred within the political climate of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff’s signing of The Law of Social Quotas on August 29, 2012. This law gives Brazil’s 59 federal universities just four years to ensure that 50 percent of the entering class comes from public schools. The law also requires public universities to assign their spots in accordance with the racial makeup of each of Brazil’s 26 states and the capital, Brasília. Out of Brazil’s 81 senators, only one voted against passage of the law.

To supplement evidence about the political implications of race and ethnicity from the rank-and-file interviews, I also include analysis of two of my interviews with São Paulo city councilmen that I carried out in July 2013. These interviews allowed me to discern whether campaign strategies centered on the national heritage communities of the councilmen and

\textsuperscript{13} UCLA IRB#12-000828

\textsuperscript{14} This fieldwork was funded by grants from the UCLA Department of Political Science, the J.A.C. and Helen A. Grant Endowed Fellowship in Political Science, UCLA Latin American Institute, and Faucett Catalyst Fund.

\textsuperscript{15} The initial election took place on October 7, 2012 in all major cities of Brazil. Because no mayoral candidate managed to capture a majority of the votes in São Paulo, there was a run-off election for mayor on October 28, 2012 between the two candidates with the most votes in the first round. The Worker’s Party (PT) candidate was Fernando Haddad, a second-generation (on father’s side) and third-generation (on mother’s side) Lebanese-heritage political theory professor at the University of São Paulo. The Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) candidate was José Serra, a second-generation (on father’s side) and third-generation (on mother’s side) Italian-heritage former mayor of São Paulo who had stepped down to become governor of the State of São Paulo. Haddad was Minister of Education under President Lula da Silva, and Serra was Minister of Planning and Minister of Health under President Cardoso.
whether they respond to a disproportionate number of requests from constituents of their own national heritages. They also allow me a reference for comparison with the responses of the women to the questions about to what degree they would be more inclined to vote for a person of their same heritage.

For this chapter, I select Jewish and Japanese-descended Brazilians to compare for a number of reasons. On average, they have both achieved high socioeconomic status by the third generation. Additionally, because none of the major candidates for the most-high profile position of mayor of São Paulo were of Japanese or Jewish heritage, it was not necessary to tease out whether the women who said that they voted for a candidate for city alderman of their same heritage did so for a number of reasons that comes with voting for the office of mayor (e.g., strategic voting, voting for or against a candidate of the president’s party). Also relevant to my group selection is the fact that the new Law of Social Quotas is targeted at increasing admissions of public high school attendees and Afro-descendants at Brazil’s federal universities. Both of the groups I select, Japanese and Jewish heritage, as a whole, have high rates of private high school attendance and generally fall into a racial category that is currently overrepresented at Brazilian federal universities in relation to the population of the state of São Paulo. I purposely select

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16 Each Brazilian citizen is required to vote and receives one vote for a city councilmen candidate. The top 55 vote getters become city councilmen. Because the very top vote getters often only receive slightly more than two percent of the total vote, and a candidate can land among the top 55 vote getters with just a fraction of less than one percent of the total vote, ethnic voting may result in successful ethnic candidates for city councilmen even among very small ethnic groups.

17 According to the 2008 IBGE Census, in the State of São Paulo, 70% identified as White, 24% identified as Brown, 4% identified as Black, 1.8% identified as Yellow, and 0.2% identified as Indigenous. According to an Ethnic-Racial Census carried out at the University of São Paulo in 2001, 79.9% of students identified as White, 7% identified as Brown, 1.2% identified as Black, 12.8% identified as Yellow, and 0.4% identified as Indigenous. For the purposes of public policy, Afro-descendant refers to someone identifying as Black or Brown (Universidade de São Paulo 2002). The vast majority of the "Afro-Brazilian" population view themselves as neither black nor white but as mixed-race (Bailey 2009). More recently, the University of São Paulo’s provost announced on June 13, 2013 that Japanese
groups that would, for the most part, not benefit directly from these quotas, so that there would be few reasons other than racial identity that would explain differences between the two groups.

4.1 Research Design

For the first part of my fieldwork, I conducted semi-structured interviews asking third generation Brazilians (grandchildren of immigrants) to describe what their ethnic (and other) identities mean to them, and how they experience these identities in their everyday lives. I asked respondents to discuss their experiences of discrimination, why or why they would not be more inclined to vote for a co-ethnic candidate in a local or national election, reasons for their political party preference, their views towards immigration policy and affirmative action (racial quota) programs and what they understand immigration policies and affirmative action to be. When applicable, I asked them to discuss the details of their involvement in ethnic or other organizations and how they chose to become involved with these organizations. If they had any experience with their country of national heritage, then I asked them to elaborate on these experiences.

Due to limited resources and the high cost of living in São Paulo, I limited my initial fieldwork to 60 interviews (30 from each group) over the course of six months (June 15, 2012 to December 11, 2012). Furthermore, I interviewed third-generation university-educated Brazilian women of Japanese and Jewish heritage to avoid introducing confounding variables of gender, immigrant generation, and educational level. I made this decision because I am most interested in possible differences between Japanese and Jewish descendants rather than gender differences, differences from the first to the third generation, or differences in educational level. Women rather than men were selected because culture (e.g., language) is generally found to be passed
descendants currently make up about three percent of São Paulo’s population but 14% of the university’s students.
through women, especially in multicultural families (e.g., Robinson 1989). Also, according to Halakha, the body of religious laws for Jews, including biblical, Talmudic, and rabbinic law in addition to customs and tradition, matrilineality is the principle that defines group membership. Children whose mother is not Jewish are not considered Jewish (Topel 2008). For mestiças, women of mixed ethnic heritages, the immigrant generation of the Japanese or Jewish-heritage parent was used to determine the subject’s immigrant generation; there were no interviewees who had parents of both Jewish and Japanese heritage. Third-generation Brazilians were selected because it was too costly to hire interpreters for first-generation immigrants. All sixty women were either in university at the time of the interviews or had completed their university education. I decided that it was important that these women were similarly educated because of Alba’s (1990) finding of a strong relationship between education and personal experiences with discrimination and stereotyping. Many of my interview questions focused on these personal experiences.

Because of the specificity of the target population, interview respondents were procured using a combination of contacts that I had made in São Paulo on a previous visit, snowball sampling (starting with university students), contacts provided by ethnic community organizations, and in-person recruitment at the University of São Paulo. An effort was made to select respondents from as many different neighborhoods of São Paulo as possible because one well-known determinant of vote choice in the United States is neighborhood. I was more successful at accomplishing this with the Japanese-heritage interviewees than with the Jewish-

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18 Interestingly, in a survey of 95 male and 101 female second and third-generation Japanese descendants in São Paulo in the 1980s, 30.1% of males reported being able to converse in Japanese without any difficulty, while only 17.4% of females reported being able to do so (Miyao 2002).

19 Foladare (1968) found that living in a neighborhood with high concentrations of people of the same status will increase the effect of that status as a source of political behavior.
heritage interviewees (See Figure 4.1. and 4.2). While the 30 Japanese-heritage interviewees came from 20 different neighborhoods (only three from the historically Japanese neighborhood of Liberdade), the 30 Jewish-heritage interviewees came from 14 neighborhoods (nine from the largely Jewish neighborhood of Higienópolis).

On a related note, interviewees were asked whether they believed that they lived in a neighborhood with a large number of people of [Japanese, Jewish] heritage. While the majority of my Jewish-heritage interviewees said “yes”, a majority of my Japanese heritage interviewees said “no” (See Figure 4.3). There was some subjectivity present in the responses to this question. One of the three Japanese heritage interviewees who lives in Liberdade, the historically Japanese neighborhood of São Paulo, was the person who answered “more or less,” which I categorized as “somewhat” in the graph. The other two Japanese heritage interviewees who live in Liberdade responded “yes.”

For my interviews with city councilmen conducted during July 2013, I did not place any limitations on gender or immigrant generation as I did with my initial interviews. The only requirement was that the politician be of either Jewish or Japanese heritage. I contacted politicians who were cited by media sources as being of one of these heritages and interviewed politicians who volunteered to participate in the study. This included a Jewish-heritage São Paulo city councilman, a Japanese-heritage São Paulo city councilman, and a Japanese-heritage city councilman of Taboão da Serra, a small town in São Paulo state that is south of the city of São Paulo. I do not include this last interview in this chapter because Taboão da Serra does not have a significant Japanese-heritage population and thus many of the interview questions that I had about Japanese-heritage voters and constituents did not apply to this city councilman. Both

20 The questions asked were all open-ended. I have categorized the responses in this paper for presentational purposes.
of the São Paulo city councilmen that I interviewed happened to be from the centrist PSDB (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira – Brazilian Social Democracy Party).

4.2 Findings and Discussion

In this section, I analyze and discuss the interviewees’ answers to four sets of questions, which have important implications for racial and ethnic identity as well as political incorporation in Brazil:

- Set #1: “Are you or would you be more inclined to vote for a candidate of [Jewish, Japanese] origin in a local or national election for public office? Why?”
- Set #2: “How much do you know about the various racial quota programs that have been implemented in Brazil? What do you think of these policies?”
- Set #3: “Do you think that there is discrimination against people of [Jewish, Japanese] origin in Brazil?” “Do you think that there is discrimination against people who identify as the category with which you identify on the Census? Why?”
- Set #4, asked of city councilmen: “While you were running for elected office, did you make an effort to reach out to the [Jewish, Japanese] community in São Paulo as part of your campaign strategy? Why?” “Do you receive and/or respond to more requests from citizens from the [Jewish, Japanese] community than from other citizens?”

In general, I found that more Jewish-heritage than Japanese-heritage interviewees believed that there is some discrimination against their ethnic heritage group in Brazil. The propensity to vote for a candidate of their heritage was greater among the Jewish-heritage interviewees; over half of the Jewish-heritage respondents indicated that they are or would be more inclined to vote for a candidate of Jewish heritage.
Both councilmen said that reaching out to voters of their respective heritages was a central part of their campaigns and that they receive a substantial number of requests from constituents of their respective heritages in comparison to other requests. The Japanese-heritage councilman, however, denied responding more to these requests than other requests, which is consistent with my finding of a low incidence of ethnic voting among third-generation Japanese-heritage women; he cannot rely solely on the Japanese-heritage constituents for re-election.

In contrast to ethnic discrimination, more Japanese-heritage interviewees (who mostly identify as “yellow”) than Jewish-heritage interviewees (who identify as “white”) indicated that there is currently discrimination against the racial group with which they identify on the Brazilian census. The non-white racial identification of 29 out of 30 of the Japanese heritage interviewees was also associated with a higher awareness of racial discrimination against other groups. For this reason, there was much more support expressed among the Japanese-heritage than Jewish-heritage interviewees for government racial quotas that benefit people who identify as “black” or “Indigenous” in Brazil. The main reason for supporting racial quotas was the acknowledgement of historical discrimination against black and/or Indigenous people and the need to correct that injustice. A more detailed discussion and analysis of these respondents’ answers to these questions follows.

4.2.1 Set #1: “Are you or would you be more inclined to vote for a candidate of [Jewish, Japanese] heritage in a local or national election for public office? Why?”

Sociologist Antonio Sérgio Guimarães (2002) has noted that “ethnic voting” in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro has been restricted to immigrant communities as opposed to black communities.21 In contrast, in Gladys Mitchell’s (2008) study, color identification as “preto”

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21 A well-known determinant of vote choice in the United States is ethnicity. Dahl’s (1961) famous study on ethnic voting in New Haven, Connecticut argues that ethnic voting is a “transitional phenomenon” and
(“black”) is a statistically significant predictor of voting for a black candidate. I thus included this set of interview questions to analyze ethnic voting among these Japanese-heritage and Jewish-heritage groups. Because Brazil has enforced compulsory voting for citizens who are 18 years of age or older,\textsuperscript{22} this set of questions was relevant to all of my interviewees as all of them were Brazilian citizens who were at least 18 years of age. One advantage of in-depth interviews, as opposed to surveys, is the opportunity to learn the reasons behind a respondent’s answers instead of just whether they are or would be more inclined to vote for a candidate of her same heritage.

I found that the Jewish-heritage third-generation Brazilian women were more inclined to vote for a candidate of Jewish-heritage than the Japanese-heritage women for a candidate of Japanese heritage (See Figure 4.4). Aside from the reason of voting for someone who is a friend of the family or being more inclined to vote for someone that the respondent knows personally, a common reason given among both groups for those saying that they would be inclined to vote for a candidate of their own heritage was the idea of promoting the common interests of the community. For examples of Jewish-heritage interviewees’ responses, please see Appendix 4.A.

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\textsuperscript{22} Voting is optional for Brazilian citizens who are between the ages of 16 to 18 years.
While the responses of the Japanese heritage interviewees who answered “yes” also referred to the community, another important element was shared culture. For examples of some of these responses, please see Appendix 4.B.

Some of the Japanese heritage women’s responses that differed from the Jewish women’s responses further illustrate that ethnic voting is much weaker among the Japanese heritage women than the Jewish heritage women in the third generation. Interestingly, psychological linkage of Japanese politicians with right-wing parties or bad experiences with Japanese politicians resulted in two of the Japanese heritage respondents saying that they would actually be less inclined to vote for a Japanese heritage politician. One 25-year-old anthropologist referenced the history of right-wing Japanese-heritage politicians in Brazil, “No, the majority of Japanese politicians are from parties of the right or extreme right,” while a 22-year-old student said, “No, absolutely no way. Because of the experiences that I've had with Japanese politicians, I don't trust them.” No Jewish-heritage respondent reported being less inclined to vote for someone of Jewish heritage. For both groups, the most common reasons named for not being more inclined to vote for a candidate of Japanese or Jewish heritage was that ethnicity had no impact on their vote choice or that the proposals of the politicians was the most important factor affecting their vote choice.

Furthermore, there was some evidence to suggest that ethnic voting among Japanese-heritage Brazilians was stronger in the second generation than in the third generation. Two of the Japanese-heritage interviewees who responded “no” to this question reported that even though they would not be more inclined to vote for someone of the same heritage, their parents, uncles, aunts or older relatives would vote for someone from the Japanese community. This also may have been the case for some of the other third-generation Japanese heritage interviewees.
who answered “no” to this question but did not mention their older relatives. Future studies including second generation Brazilians of Japanese heritage are needed to evaluate whether the second generation would be more inclined than the third to vote for someone of Japanese-heritage.

This set of questions relates to the outcome of political incorporation on which political scientists focus most attention. By voting for co-ethnics, members of a group may at least achieve descriptive representation at the municipal level. The next set of questions deals with beliefs of the two groups towards the incorporation of other non-white groups into Brazilian politics and middle class society.

4.2.2 Set #2: “How much do you know about the various racial quota programs that have been implemented in Brazil? What do you think of these policies?”

This set of question addresses a hot topic in Brazil during the course of my fieldwork. I use this set of questions to evaluate my extension of Mary Waters’ (1996) argument, positing that non-white immigrant groups are more inclined to support race-based government measures, such as racial quotas for university admissions and government jobs that benefit other non-white groups because of personal experiences and awareness of racial discrimination in society. Although the question that I asked was specifically about racial quotas, “How much do you know about the various racial quota programs that have been implemented in Brazil? What do you think of these policies?,” almost all of the respondents referred to racial quota programs at the university level and several of the respondents included a discussion of the quotas for students who attended public high school in their responses. The reason for this linkage is probably due to the fact that the recently passed Law of Social Quotas requires federal universities within the next four years to ensure that 50 percent of the entering class attended
public high school and requires public universities to assign their spots in accordance with the racial makeup of the state. For example, a 24-year-old Jewish-heritage school teacher responded, “It's cool because it gives opportunities to people who attended public schools. On the other hand, it's a form of racism. It segments people. It's implemented in the wrong form.” Likewise, a 19-year-old Jewish-heritage student explicitly mentioned both the racial quotas and the quota for public high school attendees, “I know the basics about the quota for blacks and the quota for students from public schools. Principally, I don't agree with the quota for blacks, because I think that it could generate even more prejudice, and I agree with the quota for students of public schools, but only as a temporary measure, until public education is improved.”

Uncovering this linkage between public school quotas and racial quotas in the minds of these interviews was one of the advantages of allowing interviewees to give in-depth responses as opposed to survey responses.

To determine whether the type of high school the interviewees attended affected their response, I collected information on how many of the interviewees went to public school for pre-university education and would thus qualify for quotas for federal universities reserved for students attending public high schools had they been in place when the women took the college entrance exam. Of the Japanese-heritage interviewees, 22 went to private school for pre-university education, one went to both public and private schools, and seven went to only public schools. Of the Jewish heritage interviewees, 27 went to private school for pre-university education and three went to both private and public school (See Figure 4.5). It should be noted that in all instances in which an interviewee went to both private and public schools for her pre-university education, she ended up going to private school for high school and thus would not have qualified for the quotas if they were in place at the time of her taking the college entrance
Another note of importance is that every single interviewee was either a university graduate or currently a university student. Aside from the fact that the Law of Social Quotas had recently been passed, this may have contributed to way most of the respondents thought of racial quotas at the universities in their responses to this question. Bailey (2009) had found a statistically significant negative correlation between level of education and support for racial quotas among Brazilians in Rio de Janeiro who identified along the black-white continuum. Because the issue of racial quotas was seen as relevant to most of the interviewees’ lives, most interviewees were able to give strong opinions in their responses to these questions. This was not the case for the questions I asked about immigration policy in Brazil; most interviewees did not know enough about immigration policy to produce strong opinions about it in their responses.

Next, I provide a general overview of support for racial quota programs within and between these two groups. While a little less than half (14 out of 30) of the Japanese-heritage respondents opposed the racial quota programs, an overwhelming majority (26 out of 30) of the Jewish-heritage respondents opposed the racial quota programs (See Figure 4.6). These levels of support are lower than those of the general Brazilian population. According to a 2013 public opinion poll by IBOPE (Brazilian Institute for Public Opinion and Statistics), 62 percent of Brazilians supported the 2012 quota law for public universities, and sixteen percent opposed the quotas. Reasons for opposing the quotas were usually framed within meritocratic arguments, arguments about the importance of improving basic education in Brazil, or arguments that the policies are polemical, are a form of discrimination or would exacerbate the problem of racial

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23 He also found a statistically negative correlation between white racial identification and support for racial quotas.
discrimination. For examples of the responses of Jewish and Japanese heritage interviewees, see Appendices 4.C. and 4.D., respectively.

My interviews revealed that support for the racial quota programs was not very high among either group. The Japanese-heritage interviewees did, however, as a whole, express a noticeably greater level of support than Jewish-heritage interviewees. While five Japanese-heritage interviewees expressed full support and an additional seven expressed some or conditional support for racial quotas, only one Jewish heritage interviewee expressed full support and another one expressed some or conditional support for racial quotas.

It is important to note here that while only nine of the 30 Japanese-heritage interviewees were of Okinawan heritage or heavily involved in the Okinawan community in São Paulo, four of the five Japanese-heritage interviewees who expressed full support of the racial quotas were either of Okinawan heritage or heavily involved in the Okinawan community in São Paulo. These particular interviewees generally expressed identifying more as Okinawan than as Japanese and believed that other Japanese descendants in Brazil discriminated against them. Some of these interviewees referred to the Okinawan community as “a minority within a minority.”

Because of the discrimination that they perceive from the Japanese community at large in Brazil, many active members of the Okinawan community in São Paulo tend to have more left-wing and working-class views and sympathies than the Japanese community in São Paulo. In response to an interview with Jeffrey Lesser in 1998, Luiz Gushiken, a former

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24 The Ryukyuan people of Okinawa are currently Japan's largest minority group. About 1.3 million live in Okinawa and 300,000 live in other areas of Japan. Okinawa is culturally close to southern China, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia due to its long history of trade with these regions.

25 Jeffrey Lesser in discussion with me, July 2012.
federal deputy in the Chamber of Deputies and national coordinator of the presidential campaign of the Worker’s Party at the time of the interview who would become the Minister of Communications under President Lula da Silva, said that his Okinawan heritage and leftist politics meant that Japanese-Brazilian voters rarely supported him (Lesser 2014).

Reasons for supporting racial quotas included the historical discrimination against Blacks (some also mentioned Indigenous) and the need to correct that injustice. For example, in response to the question about whether there is discrimination against people who identify as “yellow” in Brazil, a typical response from Japanese-heritage interviewees supporting racial quotas was that “[d]iscrimination against blacks and Indigenous is stronger.” In line with Mary Water’s argument, it appears that the non-white racial identification of these Japanese-heritage interviewees helped them to perceive discrimination against other groups in Brazil. Although it cannot be said that age was a predictor of attitudes towards racial quotas, in both groups, those who expressed full or partial support were young; they ranged in age from 18 to 31. Many in this age range for both groups, however, expressed opposition to racial quotas.

One might suspect from these numbers that students who have attended public schools would be more in favor of racial quotas that have been implemented alongside quotas reserved to those who attended public high school. Of the seven Japanese-heritage interviewees who only attended public schools for their pre-university education; however, only one expressed full support of the racial quota programs, three expressed some or conditional support, two were opposed to racial quotas, and one did not know whether she supported the racial quota programs.

In summary, responses to this set of questions appear to provide support for my extension of Mary Waters’ (1996) argument, positing that non-white immigrant groups are more inclined to support race-based government measures, such as racial quotas for university admissions and
government jobs that benefit other non-white groups because of personal experiences and awareness of racial discrimination in society.

The next set of questions addresses racial and ethnic discrimination, the justification behind many of Brazil’s recently passed quota policies.

4.2.3 Set #3: “Do you think that there is discrimination against people of [Jewish, Japanese] heritage in Brazil?”

“You think that there is discrimination against people who identify as the category with which you identify on the Census? Why?”

The first question of this set was included because many studies have shown that descendants of immigrants who experience discrimination tend to identify more strongly with the ethnic group and less strongly with the settlement country (Verkuyten and Nekuee 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Verkuyten and Brug 2002; Rumbaut 2005; Berry et al. 2006). Also, Citrin and Sears (2014) named perceived discrimination as one of their four components of ethnic group consciousness. Ersanilli and Saharso (2011), however, found that perceived discrimination had no significant effect on the ethnic identification of children of Turkish immigrants in Germany, France, and the Netherlands. The second question was included so that I could evaluate Mary Waters’ (1996) argument in the Brazilian context. Waters argues that symbolic ethnicity, the selective and generally shallow expression of ethnic heritage, is an option that may only be practiced by white Americans in the present-day United States because the lives of black Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and American Indians are strongly influenced by race or regional heritage regardless of how much they may choose to identify with these social groups. Due to the racism that they experience, non-white groups may share a need to band together in a reactive (and oppositional) way (Waters 1996). Symbolic ethnicity for Waters’

84
white ethnic Roman Catholic interviewees leads to a lack of understanding of the ethnic or racial experiences, particularly discrimination, of non-white Americans (1990). Consistent with Waters, Misha Klein (2012) argues that Jews in São Paulo can choose to “come out” as Jewish through the wearing of a *kippah* (a cap generally worn for prayer) or choose to “pass” as just Brazilian because the group is not defined by “race.” Brazilians of Japanese descent generally do not have this option. Another reason for including the second question is the lack of a pan-ethnic “Asian-Brazilian” identity in Brazil, similar to the U.S. Asian-American identity, making it interesting to see whether Brazilians of Japanese descent feel that they are classified along with Brazilians descendant from other Asian countries. The question of why allows the respondent to define and explain what she believes to be discrimination.

As stated earlier in the methodology section, according to the belief that race and ethnicity are only functions of class, it follows theoretically that these two groups, who have not experienced much economic disadvantage, should not, on average, report the existence of racial and ethnic discrimination against their respective groups. I did not find that this was the case. As a whole, there were more Jewish-heritage women (22 out of 30) who answered “yes” to believing that there is discrimination against Jewish heritage people in Brazil than Japanese-heritage women (9 out of 30) who answered “yes” to believing that there is discrimination against Japanese heritage people in Brazil (See Figure 4.7). In contrast, more Japanese heritage women (15 out of 30) than Jewish women (9 out of 30) said that there is at least a little discrimination against the racial category with which they identify on the Census (see Figure 4.8). All 30 Jewish-heritage women identified as “white” for the question asking them with what racial category they identify on the Census; descendants of both Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews identified as “white.” Consistent with Mary Waters’ (1990) findings in the United States,
many of their responses expressed a matter-of-fact attitude when asked with which racial
category on the Census they identify. Responses like one should be able to tell what her race is
“just by looking” were common among Jewish-heritage respondents. In contrast, one Japanese-
heritage woman identified as “white,” one did not identify with any of the categories, and the
other 28 identified as “yellow.” Because people who identify as “yellow” make up less than one
percent of the total Brazilian population, quantitative studies on racial attitudes in Brazil have
tended to exclude these people (e.g., Telles 2004; Bailey 2009). For the women who reported
having one parent of Japanese heritage and the other of European heritage, their racial or color
identification did not have to do with their phenotype; they all mentioned the parent with whom
they identify most as the determining factor. From a foreigner’s perspective, the one Japanese-
heritage women who identified as “white” appeared to me to have more typical physical
characteristics of a Japanese-heritage person (e.g., straight jet black hair) than many of the
interviewees identifying as “yellow” or the interviewee identifying with none of the categories.
Many of the Japanese-heritage respondents who identified as “yellow” expressed being
identified by other Brazilians as falling into the yellow category.

Evaluating Nogueira’s (1995) preconceito de origem (heritage-based prejudice) versus
preconceito de marca (prejudice based on physical attributes and behaviors) and Claire Jean
Kim’s Superior-Inferior axis versus Foreigner-Insider axis as discussed in Chapter Two, I found
that both groups experienced discrimination and stereotypes based on beliefs about being “closed
communities” not assimilating to mainstream Brazilian society or about physical attributes and
foreign-ness of their respective ethnicities, including “jokes and comments about slanted eyes”
for a Japanese-heritage respondent and being told “you are all foreigners” for a Jewish-heritage
respondent. Similarly a Japanese-heritage woman mentioned that people do not call a Brazilian

Very few respondents from either group mentioned experiencing discrimination because of stereotypes of inferiority of their group. In fact, both groups mentioned stereotypes about being assumed to be rich or intelligent due to their respective heritages. One exception was a Japanese-heritage woman who experienced being called “Japanese in a pejorative way in the streets,” but she mentioned that she did not think that this had any negative consequences. A few Jewish-heritage respondents mentioned being called “Christ killers” or the stereotype of being tightfisted with money, a stereotype that comes from the Middle Ages, when one of the few occupations that Jews could have was moneylending.

Despite the finding that more Japanese-heritage women said that there was at least a little discrimination against the racial category with which they identified on the Census, I did not find support for the hypothesis that those who believe that there is discrimination against the racial group with which they identify would express more favorable attitudes towards racial quotas. The Japanese-heritage women who identified as “yellow” and who responded that there is racial discrimination against that category of people in Brazil often were not the same people expressing favorable views towards racial quotas. Perhaps the lack of a pan-ethnic “Asian-Brazilian” identity negates a relationship between racial identity and political attitudes. Instead, I found that many of these women supported the racial quotas were those who did not believe that there was racial discrimination against people who identified as “yellow” said that people who identified as “black” or “Indigenous” experienced much more discrimination, which would be consistent with Asian American attitudes towards affirmative action in the United States (Ramakrishnan et al. 2008) and probably with the views of other Brazilians in general who think about racial discrimination. Thus, the non-white racial identification of the Japanese-heritage
interviewees is associated with a higher awareness of racial discrimination against other groups, which is the main reason behind support of the quotas, but the individual experiences or beliefs about discrimination does not seem to affect attitudes about discrimination toward others.

It is important to note, however, that some people who had responded “yes” to questions about discrimination against Japanese/Jewish-heritage people in Brazil and discrimination against the racial group with which she identifies on the Census had stated that they had never personally experienced discrimination. For example, one Jewish-heritage woman emphasized that discrimination is generally directed against a group and not against a person:

Yes, but more against a people, not against a person. For example, in graffiti of swastikas on walls, in newspaper material with deviation of opinion, in public opinion. Some people had told me about prejudiced comments that they experience principally in relation to Israel. But I don't think that this exercises great influences in the day to day of Jews in São Paulo.

Three of the Japanese-heritage interviewees who answered “yes” to the question about discrimination against the racial category said that the Japanese are looked upon highly but there is more discrimination against the Chinese and/or Koreans. On the other hand, another Japanese-heritage interviewee responded “yes” because other Brazilians cannot tell the difference between Japanese and Chinese or Koreans, and she considered this to be a form of discrimination.

Related to the preceding interviewee’s response, I would like to emphasize that what one person believes to be discrimination is not necessarily what another person believes is discrimination. For example, while some Japanese-heritage respondents viewed stereotypes about Japanese heritage people doing well on the vestibular (college entrance exam) as positive, others viewed these stereotypes as a form of discrimination. Another example of subjectivity is a Jewish-heritage respondent perceiving criticisms against the actions of the Israeli state to be an example of discrimination against Jews in Brazil. Other Jewish respondents may not have...
agreed that these criticisms were an example of discrimination. Likewise, one of the Jewish-heritage respondents said that there was discrimination against whites in Brazil because of the assumption that whites are rich. Other respondents who identified as white may also agree with the existence of this assumption but not perceived it to be discrimination.

The previous three sets of interview questions revealed different facets of the political incorporation of the grandchildren of Jewish and Japanese immigrants. Voting is the primary outcome of political incorporation on which political scientists focus because by voting for co-ethnics, members of a group may at least achieve descriptive representation at the municipal level. The grandchildren of Jewish immigrants were more inclined to vote for a co-ethnic than were the grandchildren of Japanese immigrants. I argued that this was because more grandchildren of Jewish immigrants believed that there was discrimination against Jewish people in Brazil than grandchildren of Japanese immigrants believed that there was discrimination against people of their same heritage in Brazil. Many of the respondents who said that they would be more inclined to vote for a Jewish candidate said that they would do it to protect the interests of the Jewish community. The set of questions about racial quotas speaks to attitudes about how other non-white groups should be incorporated into Brazilian politics and society. For responses to these questions, the non-white racial identification of the majority of the Japanese descendants was associated with a higher awareness of racial discrimination against other groups. For this reason, the Japanese descendants were more inclined to support racial quotas that benefit other non-white groups. The set of questions about ethnic and racial discrimination deals with what have traditionally been considered barriers to political incorporation. While more grandchildren of Jewish immigrants said they believed that there was discrimination against people of their own heritage, more grandchildren of Japanese immigrants
said that they believed that there was discrimination against people of their own census racial
category.

In order to provide a glimpse of the political system from another point of view and of the
role of local-level politicians in the political incorporation process, the next set of question asks
about the personal experiences of the municipal councilmen that I interviewed.

4.2.4 Set #4: “While you were running for elected office, did you make an effort to reach out
to the [Jewish, Japanese] community in São Paulo as part of your campaign strategy? Why?”

“Do you receive and/or respond to more requests from citizens from the [Jewish, Japanese]
community than from other citizens?”

The first question addresses the perceptions of politicians about the existence and extent
of ethnic voting among voters of their respective heritages. The second question speaks to the
degree to which the city councilmen engage with constituents of their respective heritages. I also
asked this question because it has been found that people from minority backgrounds are less
likely to contact urban officials in the United States, and I want to evaluate whether this is the
case in Brazil (Hero 1986; Verba and Nie 1972). This question is important because citizen
contact may change the allocation of public services (Hero 1992).

The 57-year-old, Japanese-heritage city councilman in his fifth term in the Câmara
Municipal and 45-year-old, Jewish-heritage (also Italian heritage) city councilman in his second
term in the Câmara Municipal whose responses I include in this section are both members of the
centrists PSDB (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira – Brazilian Social Democracy Party) as
of July 2013. What I found was that both city councilmen said that they made an effort to reach
out to voters of their respective heritages when campaigning, which indicates that the votes of
their co-ethnics were not taken for granted. The Jewish-heritage city councilman explained,
“Yes. One-third of my campaign was based in the Jewish community, where I sought greater interaction through lectures, seminars, and meetings. I also campaigned in areas where the Jewish community is concentrated, as [I did] in the Italian community.” Similarly, the Japanese-heritage city councilman said, “Yes, as I have already said, my father was a state deputy. I already had ties with Japanese descendants; this helped our campaign.”

To the question about receiving or responding to more requests from constituents of their respective heritages, the Jewish-heritage city councilman responded, “Yes. I receive more requests from the two communities (Jewish and Italian) as a result of being more present in the events and also in the social networks of these communities.” Likewise, the Japanese-heritage city councilman admitted receiving a significant number of requests from the Japanese community, “In reality we receive many solicitations from [Japanese] descendants, but they don’t represent the greatest demands. The greatest demands deal with the environment and then with relation to the communities [of the neighborhoods] that I represent: Vila Mariana, Saúde, Ipiranga.” The city councilman of Jewish and Italian heritage relies to a greater extent on the votes of constituents of his respective heritages than the councilman of Japanese heritage; he receives requests from his communities of heritage and has proposed a law requiring the teaching of the Holocaust in history classes in the city’s schools. In contrast, the city councilman of Japanese heritage said that he has focused on his community of heritage to a lesser extent. This councilman’s response complements the finding of a lower incidence of ethnic voting among third-generation Japanese-heritage women as opposed to Jewish-heritage women indicated in the responses to the first set of questions discussed. The Japanese-heritage councilman, to a greater extent than the Jewish and Italian-heritage councilman, cannot rely solely on the Japanese-heritage constituents for re-election. Of course, the disadvantage of interviewing only being able
to interview one councilmen of each group is that the responses reveal their personal experiences and may not speak to more the more general experiences of other councilmen of their respective heritages.

4.3 Conclusion

The findings in this chapter have important implications for the main question of political incorporation of different immigrant groups with which this dissertation deals. I find evidence that racial or ethnic identifications that result from experiencing non-economic discrimination help explain political behaviors and attitudes among immigrant groups.

Voting is the primary outcome of political incorporation on which political scientists place most importance because members of a group may achieve descriptive representation at the municipal level through ethnic voting. From the interview responses, I found that more Jewish-heritage than Japanese-heritage interviewees believe that there is some discrimination against their ethnic heritage group in Brazil, and the propensity to vote for a candidate of their heritage is greater among the Jewish-heritage interviewees. Over half of the Jewish-heritage respondents indicated that they were more inclined to vote for a candidate of Jewish heritage. Thus, the catalyst behind ethnic voting appeared to be the belief that there is discrimination against people of one’s own heritage.

Additionally, attitudes towards racial quotas reflect beliefs about how other non-white groups should be politically and socially incorporated into Brazil’s middle class. I found that the non-white racial identification of the majority of the Japanese-heritage interviewees was associated with a higher awareness of racial discrimination against other groups. As a result, the Japanese-heritage interviewees were more inclined to support racial quotas for university admissions and government jobs that benefit other non-white groups. Particularly interesting is
the disproportionate level of support for racial quotas from those Japanese-heritage women who identified with the Okinawan community in São Paulo, a group that often sees itself as “a minority within a minority.” These findings reinforce the evidence from the last chapter that race and ethnicity reflect different elements of identity and demonstrate the role that each plays in political incorporation.
Appendices

Figure 4.1. Count of Neighborhoods of Japanese Heritage Interviewees

![Bar chart showing the count of neighborhoods of Japanese heritage interviewees.](image-url)
Figure 4.2. Count of Neighborhoods of Jewish Heritage Interviewees
Figure 4.3. Count of Interviewer-Classified Responses to Question about living in the vicinity of many people of [Japanese, Jewish origin]

Do you live in a neighborhood with many people of your origin?

- Yes
- Somewhat
- No
- No, but growing up, my family did.

Japanese-origin
Jewish-origin
Figure 4.4. Count of Interviewer-Classified Responses to Question about Voting for a Candidate of [Japanese, Jewish] origin
Appendix 4.A. Full Responses of Jewish-heritage Interviewees who answered “yes” to Question about Voting for a Candidate of Jewish Origin

“Yes, because it pertains to my community/religion.”

“Yes, because I believe that the communication between the Jewish community and the government would be easy and more efficient, attending to the expectations of both sides.”

“The Jewish community, as the Japanese, I believe, tend to believe in its members, given the commandments that we should respect and the rules of family to which we are all subjected. We tend to choose Jewish politicians, as medical doctors and other professionals.”

“Yes, if he were a good politician because it would provide more security to have someone who fights for our interests and rights.”

“Yes, I wouldn't vote for a candidate if I don't agree with his proposals. If I agree, I would because he could defend the community against any form of discrimination and show the community that Jews think collectively; Jews don't just take care of other Jews.”
Appendix 4.B. Full Responses of Japanese-heritage Interviewees who answered “yes” to Question about Voting for Japanese-origin Candidate

“Yes, because I favor the community.”

“Yes, I don't know how to say this, but the Japanese have better intentions.”

“Yes, I think that it would directly benefit the colony.”

“Yes, for being Japanese, they have a culture. I support that culture.”

“Yes, because generally candidates of Japanese heritage defend the maintenance of the culture. They defend the interests of the group.”
Figure 4.5. Count of Interviewer-Classified Responses to Question about Pre-University Education

Pre-University Education

- Private Schools
- Both Private and Public
- Public Schools

Japanese-origin
Jewish-origin
Figure 4.6. Count of Interviewer-Classified Responses to Question about Racial Quotas

![Attitudes Towards Racial Quotas]

- Full Support
- Some/Conditional Support
- Opposition
- No opinion/Don't know

Japanese-origin
Jewish-origin
Appendix 4.C. Full Responses of Jewish-heritage Interviewees Opposing Racial Quotas

“I think that these policies are more of a form of discrimination than a benefit because it shows that they are inferior to others and therefore need quotas.”

“I don't agree much with this quota policy, in my opinion it's only makes the model of prejudice that exists in society grow.”

“The most visible has been that of the racial quotas in universities. In the form as its being worked, I am against it, because: It doesn’t consider the training of the university student, it could make the level of professional training suffer abasement. It doesn't solve the problem, of inequality of opportunities in relation to ethnicity, because it doesn't work at the base of the issue: quality, accessible public education for all Brazilian citizens. So, if the school worked, all students would have equal opportunity to enroll in good public colleges/universities, and not only students from private schools. And so it would be able to diminish socio-economic inequality.”

“I know about this because I work at a federal university. I am against the form in which they're being implemented because I think that the government should focus on basic education for the most needy students. It's not necessary to have a policy of racial quotas at the university because they would have the same conditions of competition as any other student. We professors wouldn't have to lower our level of teaching so that these students can understand the material.”

“I know the law of quotas for blacks in public universities and I think that what should be made are quotas for those who did not have reasonable elementary and middle schooling. For me it's a problem of basic education in Brazil and not racial.”
Appendix 4.D. Full Responses of Japanese-heritage Interviewees Opposing Racial Quotas

“I know about it in the schools. The policies valorize black people a lot. I don't think it's effective. It doesn’t give much chance to people who aren't prepared to enter college.”

“It's a policy for the media (mediatista). People need to satisfy different political interests. It's polemical.”

“I am against it because it involves a lot of prejudice.”

“I'm against these policies; it's not a solution. The problem is basic education.”

“I don't agree with them because it's not going to be the race of a person that determines if a person will pass the vestibular. It's financial. It should be by merit.”
Figure 4.7. Count of Interviewer-Classified Responses to Question about Discrimination against People of [Japanese, Jewish] origin in Brazil

Discrimination against people of your origin in Brazil

Japanese-origin

Jewish-origin

Yes       A Little/Not Much    No     Maybe

0         5       10       15       20       25
Figure 4.8. Count of Interviewer-Classified Responses to Question about Racial Discrimination against group with which the interviewee identifies on the Census

The chart above shows the count of responses to the question about racial discrimination in Brazil against the group with which the interviewee identifies on the Census. The responses are categorized as 'Yes, (at least a little)', 'No', and 'No Response'. The chart compares Japanese-origin and Jewish-origin responses.

Japanese-origin responses are shown in blue, and Jewish-origin responses are shown in red.
4.4 Bibliography


Chapter 5 – Challenges to Ethnic Community-Based Organizing among Current Immigrants

In the previous chapter, I investigated political incorporation through the political attitudes and behaviors of third-generation Brazilians and municipal-level elected officeholders’ level of engagement with their heritage communities. Aside from having the option of contacting their elected officials with concerns on an individual basis as discussed in the previous chapter, immigrants and their descendants can organize collectively to achieve their political objectives. Thus, to build off of my findings in Chapter Four, in this chapter, I address the roles of government social policy and civil society in immigrant political incorporation, particularly non-governmental organizations (NGOs), not-for-profit citizens’ organizations that function independently from the government, in the political incorporation of immigrants and their descendants. Today, many descendants of Japanese and Jewish immigrants in São Paulo are involved in NGOs that promote their heritage and are ethnic community-based organizations (ECBOs). One question that logically follows from the discussion of the political incorporation of Japanese and Jewish immigrants and their descendants is how generalizable their experiences would be to current immigrants who enter Brazil without many economic resources.²⁶

Even though many descendants of Japanese and Jewish immigrants in other countries have also achieved high socioeconomic status, it is important to understand the context in which these immigrants in a particular country were able to do so. As stated in Chapter One, even though the Japanese and Jewish immigrants that arrived in Brazil from 1910 to 1950 generally entered the country with few economic resources, the Japanese immigrants had the help of the

²⁶ Brazil is still considered part of the Global South, and many of its current immigrants are from the Global South. As a result, this is a question of interest to South-South migration in general.
Japanese government in forming their own agricultural cooperatives,\textsuperscript{27} while the Jewish immigrants had the help of the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA), founded by a Bavarian-born Jewish philanthropist living in Brussels, in forming two Jewish agricultural colonies on the frontier of Rio Grande do Sul State from 1904 to 1924.\textsuperscript{28} Because resources are pooled in cooperatives, and cooperatives strive to maximize the benefits they generate for their members, participation in cooperatives provided both Japanese and Jewish immigrants with the social capital and collective organizing experience to develop other forms of ethnic community-based organizations in Brazil. Thus, it was much easier for the Japanese and Jewish immigrants to form ECBOs than it currently is for Haitian and Bolivian immigrants. The descendants of these humble Japanese and Jewish immigrants pursued economic advancement through education, providing them the skills and financial ability to form and maintain ECBOs that promote their ethnic heritage in Brazil and allow them to engage with their countries of heritage. The educational attainment of these children of immigrants, often with the intention of bettering their

\textsuperscript{27} In Japan, the cooperative movement began in the Tokugawa shogunate, taking inspiration from the credit cooperatives of France and Germany, but the law of the cooperatives was passed by both houses of Japan’s legislative branch in March 1900 (Fisher 1938; Baldiserra, Takitane, and Yamada 2005). When the United States denied entry rights to Japanese immigrants in 1908, a Japanese-Brazilian agreement led to the large scale immigration of Japanese to Brazil (Lesser 1995). By 1920, the rural cooperative movement had expanded to the point where many Japanese immigrants to Brazil had experience working on agricultural cooperatives in Japan (Baldiserra, Takitane, and Yamada 2005). As discussed in Chapter One, the Japanese government’s decision to subsidize the cooperatives came after the government of São Paulo decided to end subsidies for Japanese immigrants because these immigrants quickly became economically independent and left the plantations. During World War II, the Agricultural Cooperative of Cotia, a Japanese cooperative founded in 1928 that became the largest cooperative in Brazil by the 1930s, was exempt from asset freezes but put under supervision of the government (Lesser 2007; Japanese National Diet Library 2014).

\textsuperscript{28} The Jewish cooperative movement began around the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. The cooperative was used as a strategy against economic discrimination (Szeskin 2007).
business acumen for the cooperatives and small businesses set up by the first generation, demonstrates the importance of socioeconomic assimilation in allowing political incorporation and collective political action of immigrants as discussed in Chapter Two.

I focus on the challenges of ethnic community-based organizing faced by current Haitian and Bolivian immigrants in this chapter. São Paulo-based, Bolivian-born lawyer, activist, and politician Ruth Camacho advocates for pan-Latino ECBOs in the form service centers for Latin American and particularly Bolivian, Peruvian, and Paraguayan immigrants that could provide them information about access to education, healthcare, public safety, and workers’ rights in addition to providing them a Latin American recreational center and cultural space within São Paulo (Bolivia Cultural 2015). In the context of insufficient federal and local level government attention to social services for immigrants, ethnic community-based organizations (ECBOs) may provide a solution. Ethnic community-based organizations have the advantage of being able to provide culturally appropriate services (Newland, Takaka, and Barker 2007). Recently-arrived immigrant group, such as Haitians and Bolivians, however, have had a difficult time forming organizations like the one described by Ruth Camacho.

In this chapter, I analyze the obstacles to ethnic community-based organizing faced by new immigrants as a group strategy for social assimilation and political incorporation. I start by providing background on Haitian and Bolivian immigration to Brazil, then discuss their rights as documented and undocumented immigrants, and analyze the role of Catholic NGOs in aiding these immigrants. I discuss one example of a Japanese ECBO and an example of a Jewish ECBO that largely serve third-generation Brazilians of those respective heritages in order to compare the advantages that these ECBOs have over the Catholic NGOs serving newly arrived immigrants. I argue that Catholic NGOs fill a void that exists before these current immigrants
are able to form ethnic community-based organizations that help group members with the processes of social assimilation and political incorporation.

5.1 Recent Waves of Immigration

In addition to the established Japanese and Jewish communities on which much of this dissertation focuses, I will address the more recently-arrived immigrant groups in this chapter, particularly Haitians and Bolivians. Like the Japanese and Jewish immigrants who came to Brazil from 1910 to 1950, many of these immigrants enter the country completely destitute. These new immigrants, however, often lack the social capital of the Japanese immigrants, who had the support of the Japanese government in forming their own agricultural cooperatives, or the Jewish immigrants, who had the support of the Jewish Colonization Association in forming their own agricultural cooperatives and experience in participating in associational life before arriving in Brazil. As a result, it is difficult for these immigrants to form their own ethnic community based organizations (ECBOs) to protect their own interests or promote their own cultures.

5.1.1 Haitian Immigration

Haitian immigration to Brazil has been more qualitatively than quantitatively significant in Brazil in recent years. Brazil has received approximately 20,000 Haitians since the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince, Vestiges of the national security approach to immigration policy, which treats immigration as a threat to national security, developed under the military dictatorship in 1980 were apparent in the way in which the Brazilian government handled the Haitian immigrants have received a disproportional volume of negative news coverage. For example, in Manaus, the capital of the state of Amazonas, a news article reported the death of a Haitian immigrant due to AIDS. The author called for the systematic HIV testing of all Haitian immigrants to prevent the spread of an AIDS epidemic in Amazonas state (Matos 2012).
new Haitian arrivals. The National Committee for Refugees (CONARE – Comitê Nacional para Refugiados), the public organ that deliberates over the granting of refugee status, decided that these Haitian arrivals could not be considered refugees because the protection of those who are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin due to natural disasters or poverty did not fit into the scope of either the 1951 Refugee Convention in Geneva or Brazilian law. After undergoing pressure from the United Nations Refugee Agency and Catholic NGOs, CONARE forward the case to the National Council of Immigration (CNIg – Conselho Nacional de Imigração), which decided to grant these Haitian arrivals “humanitarian visas” (le Blanc 2014). After negative press reports about the “invasion” of Haitians into Northern Brazil in Brazil’s premier newspaper *O Globo* (Carvalho 2012), the government restricted these visas to 1,200 Haitians each year, administered by its Ministry of Foreign Relations via the Brazilian Embassy in Port-au-Prince. The requirements for these visas include a $200 fee, valid passport, proof of residence, and lack of a criminal background. These visas are valid for five years, after which the Haitian must have proof of employment in order to obtain permission to continue to stay in Brazil. Brazil received praise from the UNHCR for this action (United Nations Refugee Agency 2011). Because of these requirements, Haitian immigrants in Brazil are not among the poorest because of the thousands of dollars required to reach and enter the country either legally by plane or without documented status through the help of smugglers (le Blanc 2014).

5.1.2 Bolivian Immigration

30 This quota system was suspended in April 2013 and lifted in April 2014.

31 Bolivians experience many forms of discrimination in Brazil. It is not uncommon to see news reports on television and in print of Bolivians being arrested for participating in the cocaine trade on Brazil’s premier newspaper *O Globo* (e.g., G1 Maranhão 2015). News stories like these ran regularly on Brazil’s oldest television network Rede Record de Televisão during my stay in São Paulo from June to December 2012. Young Bolivians attending public schools in São Paulo face
Bolivians, on the other hand, make up one of the largest immigrant groups in Brazil and often come from poorer backgrounds than Haitian immigrants. According to 2010 Census data, the top sending countries of immigration in order of number of immigrants are: the United States, Japan, Paraguay, Portugal, and Bolivia. Because Bolivians often already have accepted a job offer in São Paulo before entering Brazil, they are able to negotiate payment with smugglers (le Blanc 2014). Brazil became a destination country when the Argentine economy was facing collapse.\footnote{32} Before that point, Bolivian immigrants to Brazil were predominantly highly educated, particularly from the medical fields. It was only beginning from the 1990s that Bolivian immigration to Brazil acquired its current characteristics of garment workers employed in sweatshops. This immigration coincided with the time that many former Korean garment workers had accumulated enough capital to open their own small garment factories, thus replacing the predominantly Jewish factory owners in the historical garment-making districts within Brás, Parí, and Bom Retiro.\footnote{33} The Bolivian immigrants replaced the predominantly Korean garment workers, a group that was also largely undocumented. Most of these Bolivian immigrants travel to Brazil on tourist visas and then stay in Brazil after the 90-day visa has expired (Bermudes 2012).

**5.2 Rights Accorded to Immigrants in Brazil**

discrimination from their Brazilian classmates. They often hear, “What are you doing here? Go back to your country!” (Bermudes 2012). These portrayals contribute to the discrimination faced by Bolivians; the police often treat them as cocaine dealers.

\footnote{32} Brazil is now the South American country with the second largest Bolivian immigrant population after Argentina (Bermudes 2012).

\footnote{33} Currently, often with the help of Catholic NGOs like CAMI, some of these garment factories are owned by Bolivians.
When an immigrant enters a new country, one of the major political concerns is being able to access public services to which he or she is legally entitled. To do this, the immigrant needs to know what rights he or she has and to what public services he or she is entitled. Non-governmental organizations in Brazil often take on the role of informing immigrants of their rights.\textsuperscript{34} In this section, I address the public services and rights to which these immigrants are entitled currently. The Catholic NGOs that I mention in this chapter help these immigrants access these services and rights.

5.2.1 Healthcare

Brazil provides some rights to all immigrants, regardless of documented status, such as access to its universal healthcare system. As a result of Brazil’s universal healthcare policy, one public health study in São Paulo found no significant differences in healthcare access and treatment outcomes between Bolivians and Brazilians with tuberculosis (Martinez et al. 2012).\textsuperscript{35}

Education

In contrast, the right of undocumented children and adolescents to attend public school has been more controversial at the federal level. While the 1998 Brazilian Constitution recognizes education as a universal right, the Brazil’s “Foreigners’ Statute” of 1980 (Law 6815 of 19 August), passed during the military dictatorship to prevent leftist influences from entering the country, requires the possession of an identity card for foreigners for enrollment in educational institutions of any level, thus preventing undocumented children from exercising the

\textsuperscript{34} During an interview with me in December of 2012, Marina Novães, a representative of the Centro de Apoio e Pastoral do Migrante (CAMI – Center for the Support and Pastoral of the Migrant), reported that instead of informing the immigrants of the rights to which they are entitled when the immigrants approach them, bureaucrats from local government service agencies often just refer them to local NGOs like CAMI.

\textsuperscript{35} Female immigrants, however, often experience difficulty in accessing the public healthcare system in São Paulo (Pattussi 2013).
right to universal education. In 1995, however, the State of São Paulo, under then newly-elected Governor Mario Covas, legislated against preventing undocumented children from attending public schools, using the Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente (ECA – Statute of the Child and of the Adolescent), a federal law signed on July 13, 1990 by President Fernando Collor, as a legal basis. Thus, today in the State of São Paulo, all children and adolescents, regardless of documented immigration status have legal access to public (and private) primary and secondary school education. Public university entrance, on the other hand, is not available to immigrants with undocumented status (Waldman 2012). This is a substantial problem because it is reasonable to assume that a substantial number of these immigrant children will continue to reside in Brazil after finishing their secondary school education. The lack of the ability to obtain a university degree in Brazil will limit the types of employment they would be able to procure in the country in which they were raised. Higher education was the path to economic mobility pursued by many sons and grandchildren of Japanese and Jewish immigrants. As can be seen through a comparison of Tables 5.1 and 5.2 in the appendix, there are many more foreign students attending primary school in the State of São Paulo without presenting documentation than there are presenting the documentation required under the 1980 Foreigners’ Statute.\textsuperscript{36}

5.2.3 Voting Rights

One obstacle that immigrants currently face in their political incorporation is their lack of voting rights in a country in which voting is compulsory for citizens who reach the age of 18. Article 14, Section 2 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 states that foreigners, with the

\textsuperscript{36} One caveat that is worth mentioning is that it may be that case that because documentation is not required for primary and secondary school attendance, many parents, particularly those from developed countries who do not plan to stay in Brazil permanently, do not bother to procure or present official documentation for their children.
exception of Portuguese citizens who meet certain requirements, and conscripts currently serving in the military cannot register to vote. This makes Brazil one of the only South American countries that does not allow immigrants to vote at least at the municipal level.

Allowing immigrants to register to vote is important because it should make politicians more responsive to their needs and the needs of their children, such as the right of undocumented children to attend Brazil’s public schools. Voting rights for immigrants is central to their political incorporation. When immigrant groups do not have the right to vote, their interests and needs may not be met by the federal and subnational governments, thus undermining democracy. Also important is the consideration that permitting immigrants to vote at least at the local level could provide the federal government a solution for keeping its subnational governments accountable to the needs of immigrants, perhaps taking some of the service provision or funding burden off of the NGOs. Finally, having the right to vote could increase the civic and political awareness, feelings of political efficacy, and sense of belonging of immigrants in their new country, especially considering that voting is compulsory for all Brazilian citizens once they reach the age of 18.

5.3 Sources

In order to understand challenges faced by immigrants as well as NGOs that serve recently arrived immigrants, I analyze interviews with key leaders of NGOs that support migrants from my six months of fieldwork in São Paulo from June through December of 2012, the organizations’ websites, and the printed informational literature provided by these NGOs. I give special attention to the two major organizations that provide services to newly arrived immigrants in the city of São Paulo. Aside from the fact that they are the two major NGOs that
provide immigrant services in São Paulo, I select these two organizations because government officials often direct newly arrived immigrants to these two organizations.

The first is Missão Paz, an organization founded by the (Catholic) Missionaries of Saint Charles Scalabrianians that currently serves migrants and refugees mostly from other parts of Brazil, Haiti, the Spanish-speaking countries of Mercosul/Mercosur\(^{37}\) (Southern Common Market customs union), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Syria. It offers services through the Centro Pastoral dos Migrantes (CPM – Pastoral Center of the Migrants) and the Programa de Mediação (Program of Mediation) around five axes: work, legal regularization of immigration status, health, community and family, and education (Missão Paz 2015).

The second organization that I analyze is Centro de Apoio e Pastoral do Migrante (CAMI – Center for the Support and Pastoral of the Migrant), one of the main NGOs in São Paulo that provides information and services to immigrants and Brazilian internal migrants. The Center also lobbies for immigrants’ political rights (e.g., voting) in the capital city of Brasilia. It is a branch of the nationwide Serviço Pastoral dos Migrantes (SPM – Pastoral Service of the Migrants) and founded in July of 2005. The Center primarily serves immigrants within the city of São Paulo that are from other Mercosul/Mercosur member countries (e.g., Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, and Ecuador) and migrants from Brazil’s Northeastern region. Its mission is to: 1) mobilize immigrants to fight for their rights, citizenship, and social, cultural, and political empowerment;

\(^{37}\)The basis of Mercosul (Portuguese) or Mercosur (Spanish) originated in 1985, when civilian Presidents Raúl Alfonsin of Argentina and José Sarney of Brazil signed the Argentina-Brazil Integration and Economics Cooperation Program (PICE - Programa de Integração e Cooperação Econômica Argentina-Brasil (Portuguese) or Programa de Integración y Cooperación Económica Argentina-Brasil (Spanish). Mercosul/Mercosur was formed in 1991 with the signing of the customs union agreement by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay (Mullins 2006; Burges 2009). Today, these four countries and Venezuela are full members. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname are associate members, and Bolivia is currently in the process of becoming a full member. Mexico and New Zealand are observers.
2) combat slave labor, xenophobia, and human trafficking; and 3) to promote decent employment as well as the recognition and strengthening of cultural and religious identity and diversity (Centro de Apoio e Pastoral do Migrante 2015).

5.4 A Civil Society-Centered Strategy for Immigrant Incorporation

In addition to helping immigrants fill out their official immigration, identification, and employment paperwork; these Catholic organizations take on the role of the ECBOs of the more established immigrant groups by educating and advocating for immigrants though making demands on the federal government for voting rights.

5.4.1 Language Services

The Brazilian bureaucracies, for the most part, at both the federal and local levels do not provide language services to immigrants or to foreign visitors. As of my fieldwork stay in São Paulo from June to December 2012, the Department of the Federal Police Regional Superintendence office, where foreign tourists go to get their tourist visas extended, did not offer English or any other language services, even though few tourists are proficient in the Portuguese language. The bureaucrats working at this federal office sometimes relied on Google Translate, the free online translation service, in trying to communicate with the foreign tourists. Additionally, in the few instances in which English translation was present on official forms or documents, the English was often riddled with errors. Thus, even in areas of government services where language services are essential, they are generally not provided.

In order for immigrants to be informed of their rights, it is necessary to be able to communicate with them in a language in which they are fluent. Although Missão Paz provides informational booklets in Portuguese, Spanish, English and French; CAMI only provides informational booklets in Portuguese and Spanish that tell immigrants about their rights and
about working in Brazil. Having the ability to understand one’s rights is essential to the political incorporation of the immigrant. Being able to communicate with other Brazilians allows for the social assimilation of the immigrant.

5.4.2 Job Skills Training

To become productive members of the Brazilian workforce and tax base, immigrants must develop job skills that they may not have at the time of immigration. Many Bolivian immigrants, for example, have legal documents, but do not have employment or the recognized qualifications and language skills that would help them to procure employment (le Blanc 2014). In addition to Portuguese language and citizenship classes, Missão Paz and CAMI offer courses to immigrants on worker’s rights, informatics, model-making for the textile industry, fashion, administrative assistance, graphic design, industrial electronics and installation, civil construction, machine operation, mechanics, food retail services qualifications, beauty, retail training, health, domestic service qualifications, and hotel work (le Blanc 2014; Missão Paz 2015; Centro de Informação e Apoio ao Trabalhador no Exterior 2015). The fact that for CAMI, Portuguese and citizenship are conceptualized alongside one another as part of the same course emphasizes the organization’s commitment to the political incorporation of immigrants and one of its stated core values of democratic participation (Centro de Informação e Apoio ao Trabalhador no Exterior 2015). As stated in the previous section, language skills are central to the political incorporation and social assimilation of immigrants.

Another way in which CAMI helps immigrants with economic advancement is through teaching Bolivians in the garment industry how to purchase and run their own factories, allowing them to occupy a position that was once occupied by Jewish immigrants.

5.4.3 Voting Rights Advocacy
Related to democratic participation is the issue of voting rights. What makes CAMI particularly interesting as an NGO is that aside from providing social services to the immigrants, it also currently advocates and lobbies for immigrants’ voting rights in Brazil’s capital city of Brasilia, serving as an example of civil society making demands on the federal government to facilitate the political incorporation of immigrants.

5.5 Examples of Current Community Organizations Serving Japanese and Jewish Immigrants and their Descendants in Brazil

In order to distinguish the challenges faced by NGOs providing services to immigrants from the most recent waves rather than NGOs providing services to the more established communities on which much of my dissertation focuses, I briefly highlight two largely ethnic community based organizations (ECBOs) that primarily but not exclusively serve the Japanese and Jewish communities in São Paulo as well as other parts of Brazil. The majority of the leadership are descendants of Japanese and Jewish immigrants. This discussion of NGOs serving the Japanese and Jewish communities in Brazil also emphasizes the role that NGOs play in the political incorporation of the descendants of immigrants.

5.5.1 Centro de Informação e Apoio ao Trabalhador no Exterior (CIATE)

Part of the coming of age of many third-generation (as well as second and fourth-generation) Brazilians of Japanese descent is a pilgrimage to Japan that includes working in a factory to take advantage of saving up money with the stronger U.S. dollar as compared to the Brazilian real. In 1990, the Japanese government started issuing thousands of special work visas to descendants of Japanese immigrants, particularly Brazilians and Peruvians to deal with its growing industrial labor shortage. These Latin American guest workers, known as Dekassegui, quickly became the largest group of foreign blue collar workers in the largely anti-immigrant
Helping with this rite of passage is the Centro de Informação e Apoio ao Trabalhador no Exterior (CIATE – Center of Information and Support to the Worker Abroad) an NGO that was established in October of 1992 and located in the historically Japanese neighborhood of Liberdade in the city of São Paulo. It is recognized by the governments of Brazil and Japan as well as the Association of Japanese and Nikkeis Residing Abroad. The organization administers informational and orientation services to Brazilian migrants before their departure to Japan (e.g. Japanese classes), during their stay in Japan (e.g., information on paying income taxes in the two countries), and after their return to Brazil (e.g., information on returning to the Brazilian workforce). The Center also provides these migrants with informational workshops, talks, and material about social security (e.g., health, unemployment, and worker’s compensation) and retirement benefits in Japan (Centro de Informação e Apoio ao Trabalhador no Exterior 2015).

Aside from the fact that this organization deals with migration to and from both Brazil and Japan, what makes it unique from the other organizations mentioned in this paper and many migrant-serving organizations in general is its lack of an explicit religious affiliation. This is perhaps reflective of the fact that by the third generation, many Japanese descendants do not maintain the religion of their ancestors as was the case with many of the descendants I interviewed in the last chapter. The fact that the organization is recognized by both the Brazilian and the Japanese governments suggests that both governments acknowledge and encourage the transnational ties that these Japanese descendants often maintain. Both countries also stand to

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38 After the recession hit Japan in 2008, however, the Japanese government offered to pay thousands of blue collar Latin American immigrants to leave Japan and never return to seek work again. The government offered the workers $3,000 towards airfare and $2000 per dependent, allowing them to pocket any money left over after purchasing airfare (Tabuchi 2009).
benefit from receiving income taxes from the Brazilians who go to Japan to work. Additionally, Japan benefits in being able to fill jobs that its own citizens typically do not want to take (Tabuchi 2009).

5.5.2 Confederação Israelita do Brasil (CONIB)

Established in 1948, the Confederação Israelita do Brasil (CONIB - Jewish Confederation of Brazil) is the body in charge of the political representation and coordination of the Brazilian Jewish community. Organized communities in fourteen units of the federation are affiliated with the institution. According to its organization summary, CONIB is a non-profit organization guided by principles such as peace, democracy, social justice, inter-religious dialogue, and the fight against intolerance and terrorism (Confederação Israelita do Brasil 2015).

According to CONIB’s website, the institution stresses its non-partisan character and its representativeness of the most diversified sectors of the Brazilian Jewish community, regardless of their religious or political inclinations. During these past six decades, CONIB has served as a channel of communication between the community and the federal executive, legislative and judicial branches. It also seeks to develop closer ties with the institutions of Brazilian civil society. The Confederation encourages and supports initiatives in the social, political, cultural and educational spheres, reinforcing the sense of community and the Jewish-Brazilian identity. It supports the State of Israel, the Zionist movement, and the Middle East peace dialogue (Confederação Israelita do Brasil 2015).

The organization promotes trips to Israel taken by people who are integral to the formation of public opinion, such as journalists, politicians, intellectuals, and artists to allow them to get to know the Israeli reality and to develop a sympathetic view towards the country. For example, CONIB, along with Israel’s Ministry of Tourism, recently invited popular Jewish
Brazilian soap opera actor Mateus Solano to take his first trip to Israel in June 2014 (Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo 2014).

The São Paulo unit of CONIB is called the Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP – Israeliite Federation of the State of São Paulo) and is located in the Pinheiros neighborhood of the city. The Federation covers principal aspects of Jewish community life, such as education, religion, social assistance, funeral services, sports, health, youth, senior citizens, and support to the communities on the coast and in the interior of São Paulo State. Its main objective is to strengthen Judaism, preserving the continuity of Jewish values and traditions. The Federation was founded in 1946 by Jewish refugees from World War II, many of whom had already come from quite structured Jewish entities (Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo 2015).

5.5.3 How these Organizations differ from Organizations Serving Immigrants from the Most Recent Waves

What is notable about these two organizations just discussed above as compared to the organizations mentioned earlier that are serving immigrants from the recent waves is that they are largely composed of co-nationals or descendants of the respective heritage to which the group primarily caters, making them ethnic community-based organizations (ECBOs). This difference is reflective of the fact that my case selections of the Japanese and Jewish communities were based in part on both groups’ not currently facing major economic obstacles to political incorporation as stated in Chapter One. The Japanese and Jewish communities are relatively well-established in Brazil, so their organizational capabilities and resources are greater than those of recently arrived immigrant groups.
Also notable about the two organizations are their level of involvement in transnational politics, especially the politics of the respective country of heritage. Benefitting from the first-world status and the sound state capacity of the respective heritage countries, CIATE receives support from the Japanese government that wants to fill its factory jobs, and CONIB collaborates with the Israeli government that wants to promote a positive public opinion about Israel within Brazil. The website of CIATE is available in both Portuguese and Japanese, and CONIB’s is available in Portuguese, English, and Hebrew. In contrast, the website for CAMI is available in Portuguese and partially in Spanish, and the website for Missão Paz is only available in Portuguese. Under the current context of the Brazilian governments’ insufficient support for immigrant services provision, if recently-arrived immigrant groups want to form EBOs, they will likely need support from outside of Brazil. This may involve their home governments or, more likely, already-existing transnational networks that receive resources and support from the developed world.

5.6 Present Challenges Faced by NGOs Serving Recently-Arrived Immigrants

Aside from the challenges already mentioned in the chapter of providing native language material to newly arrived immigrants who speak a language other than Spanish, such as Haitians, Brazilian NGOs serving newly arrived immigrants face other challenges in carrying out their programs.

Unlike organizations that serve mostly the Japanese or Jewish communities in Brazil, a primary challenge faced by Brazilian NGOs serving recently-arrived immigrants from countries that do not come from the developed world, such as Japan or Israel, is the difficulty of procuring funding from international donors and diversifying funds. Ironically, the same economic forces that pull immigrants towards Brazil are pushing foreign donors away. During my December
2012 interview with Marina Novães, an attorney who works for CAMI, she informed me that CAMI was primarily funded by the Brazilian government and private donations. Paulo Illes, director of CAMI, recognizes the difficulty of finding funding for CAMI’s programs because of the perception by European donors that Brazil is a developed country that no longer needs this financial assistance. The NGO’s largest donor, however, is currently a Roman Catholic NGO that is based in Europe (le Blanc 2014).

The federal government has not yet reached a point where it is pursuing strong alliances with civil society as a way to deal with immigrant services provision as it has with the HIV/AIDS movement as discussed by Rich (2013). Until it does, it is unlikely that government funding will meet the programming needs of NGOs like CAMI that provide services to immigrants from the most recent waves.

Additionally, unlike the two ECBOs mentioned in this chapter, NGOs that serve recently-arrived immigrants are attempting to aid people who do not possess the same rights of Brazilian citizenship as subsequent immigrant-descended Brazilians. For this reason, the services needed by these immigrants often deal with their most basic needs as opposed to emphasizing an ethnic heritage. These immigrants are more dependent on the government for services like healthcare and education, so they are more affected by any deficiencies of government social policy provision than are the subsequent immigrant-descendent generations.

5.7 Discussion

While the Japanese and Jewish immigrants who came to Brazil from 1910 to 1950 were, for the most part, impoverished, they had advantages that current destitute immigrants lack. The Japanese immigrants were able to form their own agricultural cooperatives because the Japanese government subsidized them as a way to deal with the problem of overpopulation within Japan.
Likewise, the Jewish immigrants were able to form their own agricultural colonies due to funding from the Jewish Colonization Association. I argue that because resources are pooled in cooperatives, and cooperatives strive to maximize the benefits they generate for their members, participation in cooperatives provided both Japanese and Jewish immigrants with the social capital and collective organizing experience needed to develop other forms of ethnic community-based organizations. Many of the first Japanese immigrants had experience with agricultural cooperatives in Japan and were able to contribute these experiences in Brazil. Japanese cooperatives in Brazil were fundamental in the development of the Brazilian agricultural sector. Additionally, the Jewish cooperative movement served as a strategy against economic discrimination, and Jews fleeing war and revolution in Europe were able to form ECBOs like FIESP, modeled after organizations in which they were involved in their home countries before emigrating to Brazil.

The activities of Missão Paz and CAMI help Haitian and Bolivian immigrants overcome the disadvantages of not being able to collectively organize to promote their own social assimilation alongside the political incorporation within Brazil. These NGOs’ activities involve helping immigrants with social assimilation through learning the Portuguese language as well as political incorporation through advocating for immigrant voting rights in Brasilia.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter relates back to the larger dissertation question of why different immigrant groups choose different strategies of political incorporation by addressing constraints to ethnic community-based organizing that are faced by some current immigrants. The first constraint mentioned in this chapter is social capital. While the cooperatives provided early Japanese and Jewish immigrants with the social capital to form ECBOs from the very beginning of their
arrival in Brazil, current Bolivian and Haitian immigrants do not have the same level of social capital when they arrive because the nature of their migration is not subsidized or organized by Brazil or their home governments. Catholic NGOs, such as CAMI and Missão Paz, fulfill the role of the ECBOs before newly-arrived immigrants are able to form them. The second constraint mentioned in this chapter is economic. The Japanese cooperatives in Brazil were subsidized by the Japanese government and the Jewish cooperatives in Brazil were funded by the Jewish Colonization Association. The descendants of these Japanese and Jewish immigrants pursued economic advancement through education, providing them the skills and financial ability to form and maintain ECBOs that promote their ethnic heritage in Brazil and allow them to engage with their countries of heritage. For undocumented immigrants, however, attendance at public universities, which are considered more prestigious than private ones, is not an option for economic advancement. Even attendance at primary and secondary schools is often barrier. The Catholic NGOs that aid these newly-arrived immigrants thus play a central role in helping regularize their immigration status, allowing them to attend Brazil’s public higher education institutions, providing them with the social capital, skills, and financial ability to form and maintain ECBOs that promote their cultures within Brazil and perhaps allow them to engage with the politics of their heritage countries.

This chapter demonstrates the intersections between policy, immigrant social assimilation and immigrant political incorporation. In particular, relating to my argument in Chapter Two that processes of social assimilation should not be conceptualized independently of processes of political incorporation, I demonstrate that the social capital of the Japanese and Jewish immigrants from the 1910s to the 1950s allowed them to pursue their communities’ political interests within Brazil. Because the migration of current Haitians and Bolivians was not
subsidized nor organized by Brazil or the sending countries, these immigrants generally lack the social capital of the Japanese and Jewish immigrants of previous generations to get their political interests addressed. The Catholic NGOs that step in to fill this void thus simultaneously address their social assimilative needs (e.g., language) as well as political interests (e.g., voting).
## Appendices

### Table 5.1 Twenty Countries with the Most Foreign Children who Attended Schools without Presenting Documentation in the State of São Paulo in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>4,210</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>4,441</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>231</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>205</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>184</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>461</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>139</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,362</td>
<td>1,284</td>
<td>3,646</td>
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<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>189</td>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>1,302</td>
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<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>8,805</td>
<td>5,377</td>
<td>14,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Total</strong></td>
<td>9,732</td>
<td>6,649</td>
<td>16,381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** 2011 School Census of Basic Education/Secretary of Education of the State of São Paulo
Table 5.2 Twenty Countries with the Most Documented Foreign Children who Attended Schools in the State of São Paulo in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Total</strong></td>
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Source: 2011 School Census of Basic Education/Secretary of Education of the State of São Paulo
5.9 Bibliography


Chapter 6 – Conclusion: The Political Incorporation of Immigrants and the Changing Diversity of Brazil

The political incorporation of immigrants is central to a country’s wellbeing. Thiess-Morse (2009) finds that the more strongly Americans feel a sense of common identity with the American people, the more likely they are to help in a crisis or disaster, volunteer in their community, fight in wars, and pay taxes. Much of this study deals with the often paradoxical nature of immigrant incorporation in Brazilian society. I focused the project on two well-established immigrant groups that are similar in many important respects. Japanese restaurants currently outnumber churrascarias (Brazilian meat barbeque grills) in São Paulo (Nishihata 2008). The Brazilian practice of prestações, payments in credit card installments over a period of time that total a slightly higher purchasing price rather than full payment at the time of purchase for consumer products, in retail has been attributed to Jewish immigrants (Klein 2012). Despite this evidence of the contribution of elements of Japanese and Jewish culture to Brazilian culture, the Japanese and Jewish communities in São Paulo are often perceived by other Brazilians as being “closed communities” that are not well integrated into mainstream Brazilian society. These two heritage groups, however, differ most importantly for the purposes of this dissertation about political incorporation, in how they generally identify racially at the individual level on the Brazilian census. While Brazilians of Jewish heritage tend to identify as racially “white,” Brazilians of Japanese heritage tend to identify as “yellow.”

In this dissertation project, I set out to explore why different immigrant groups, particularly those that do not currently face much economic discrimination, choose different strategies of political incorporation. The primary argument I make in this dissertation is that racial or ethnic identifications that result from experiencing discrimination often explain political
behaviors and attitudes among immigrant groups. First, I argue that membership in a relatively exclusive ethnic group experiencing discrimination is associated with ethnic voting. Second, consistent with and extending Mary Waters’ (1996) argument, I argue that non-white immigrant groups are more inclined to support race-based government measures, such as racial quotas for university admissions and government jobs that benefit other non-white groups because of personal experiences and awareness of racial discrimination in society. Furthermore, I argue that transnational ties to their heritage country and the government of the heritage country also play a role in immigrants’ strategies of political incorporation at the group level, which is a piece of the puzzle that is not adequately addressed in existing models of the political incorporation of immigrants.

In this final chapter, I summarize the main empirical findings, theoretical implications, policy implications, recommendations for future research, and limitations of the dissertation project.

6.1 Empirical Findings

In Chapter Three, “The Racial Identity Determinants of Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish Heritage,” I found that Japanese-heritage Brazilians who were more educated, had higher incomes, and were older were more likely to identify as “yellow” as opposed to “white.” I argue that this provides some support for Portes and Zhou’s segmented assimilation theory or Alba’s attribution of ethnicity as “cultural capital” that is transmitted through advanced education. Another finding from this chapter was that Jewish-origin Brazilians who had less education and those who were between the ages of 21 and 45 were more likely to identify as racially “brown” as opposed to “white.” Most importantly, I found that most Brazilians of Jewish heritage identify racially as “white,” and most Brazilians of Japanese origin identify as “yellow.” This
distinction is important for evaluating Mary Waters’ argument of white ethnic identity as opposed to non-white racial identity in relation to political behaviors and attitudes in the next chapter.

Then, in Chapter Four, “Reasons behind Ethnic Voting and Attitudes towards Racial Quotas among Brazilians of Japanese and Jewish Heritage,” the findings have important implications for the main question of political incorporation of different immigrant groups with which this dissertation deals. I find evidence that reactive ethnic and racial identification often explain political behaviors and attitudes among immigrant groups. From the interview responses, there was evidence that membership in a relatively exclusive ethnic group experiencing discrimination (reactive ethnicity) is associated with ethnic voting among Jewish-heritage respondents. Additionally, consistent with and extending Mary Waters’ (1996) argument, I found evidence to suggest that non-white immigrant groups are more inclined to support race-based government measures, such as racial quotas for university admissions and government jobs that benefit other non-white groups because of personal experiences and awareness of racial discrimination in society. Particularly interesting is the disproportionate degree of support for racial quotas from those Japanese-heritage women who identified with the Okinawan community in São Paulo, a group that often sees itself as “a minority within a minority.” These findings reinforce the evidence from the third chapter that race and ethnicity cannot serve as proxies for one another or for socioeconomic status.

Finally, in Chapter Five, “Challenges to Ethnic Community-Based Organizing among Current Immigrants in Brazil,” I find that current immigrants face a disadvantage of not having the experience of working on an ethnic cooperative that allows them to develop the social capital needed to form their own ethnic community based organizations (ECBOs) when compared to the
Japanese and Jewish immigrants from the 1910s to the 1950s. Instead, Catholic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) help newly arrived immigrants with social assimilation and political incorporation before these immigrants develop the social capital to form their own ECBOs.

6.2 Theoretical Implications

In this dissertation project, I analyze the roles of both race and ethnicity in conceptualizing the processes of immigrant political incorporation. This inclusion allows me to address the noticeable absence of such theoretical approaches in the immigration studies literature.

In Chapter Four, I find that some theories that were developed in the United States to explain the role of race and ethnicity in the political attitudes and behaviors of Americans also apply in São Paulo. I argue that racial or ethnic identifications that result from experiencing discrimination often explain political behaviors and attitudes among immigrant groups. What this means is that membership in a relatively exclusive ethnic group experiencing discrimination is associated with ethnic voting. Also, consistent with and extending Mary Waters’ (1996) argument, this means that non-white immigrant groups are more inclined to support race-based government measures, such as racial quotas for university admissions and government jobs that benefit other non-white groups because of personal experiences and awareness of racial discrimination in society.

Chapter Five highlights the importance of integrating the conceptualization of social assimilation and political incorporation as parallel processes. The chapter deals with the challenges of South-South migration for migrants and the underfunded Catholic NGOs who assist them. The social capital that the first Japanese and Jewish immigrants developed while
working on the agricultural cooperatives allowed them to develop their own ECBOs, many of which are maintained by the descendants of the immigrants today, to fulfill their social needs and political interests.

This dissertation may also contribute theoretically to the growing field of Immigration Studies within Brazil because of its implications for other groups that immigrate to Brazil. One of the reasons that I purposely selected two high socioeconomic status groups is that if racial or ethnic discrimination still occurs against high socioeconomic status groups, discrimination would be expected to occur against groups that are of lower socioeconomic status as well. Thus, this study has implications that may be applicable for other groups that immigrate to Brazil who are of lower socioeconomic status, particularly those from other Mercosul/Mercosur (Southern Common Market customs union) countries.\textsuperscript{39} Specifically, one of the assumptions of my project is that immigrants and refugees who are identified as “Indigenous” or “black” by Brazilians (e.g., Bolivian immigrants of Indigenous heritage or Haitian refugees)\textsuperscript{40} would be expected to face more discrimination than immigrants from other countries who are racially identified as “white” (e.g., Argentinean immigrants of European heritage or other immigrants from the developed world).

\textsuperscript{39} The basis of Mercosul (Portuguese) or Mercosur (Spanish) originated in 1985, when civilian Presidents Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina and José Sarney of Brazil signed the Argentina-Brazil Integration and Economics Cooperation Program (PICE - Programa de Integração e Cooperação Econômica Argentina-Brasil (Portuguese) or Programa de Integración y Cooperación Económica Argentina-Brasil (Spanish). Mercosul/Mercosur was formed in 1991 with the signing of the customs union agreement by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay (Mullins 2006; Burges 2009). Today, these four countries and Venezuela are full members. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname are associate members, and Bolivia is currently in the process of becoming a full member. Mexico and New Zealand are observers.

\textsuperscript{40} Some Haitian refugees are surprised at the discrimination that they experience in Brazil after having heard about its “racial democracy” (le Blanc 2014).
This project may also help to explain similar processes of political incorporation in other parts of the world, particularly among immigrant groups that are of high socioeconomic status by the third generation in metropolitan cities that receive a large number of immigrants, not only in traditional receiving countries in the Global North (e.g., countries in North America and Europe, Australia, New Zealand, etc.) but also relatively new or reemerging receiving countries in the Global South (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, Singapore, South Africa, and Argentina) (Price and Short 2007). It is important to remember, however, that case studies generalize to theory and not to other cases (Yin 2008). Thus, while some of my findings, such as the role of racial identity on attitudes towards race-based government policies and the role of NGOs in the political incorporation of immigrants within the context of political decentralization of a federal system may be generalizable, specific electoral rules at the local level determine whether ethnic voting is likely to successfully elect ethnic candidates for political office in the first place.

6.3 Possible Policy Lessons to take from Brazil Regarding the Political Incorporation of Immigrants

Although the survey data analyzed for this project was gathered in Brazil, and the original qualitative data for this project was collected in the city of São Paulo, the project may offer insight into similar policies that may be implemented in the metropolises of current immigrant receiving countries mentioned above as well as future immigrant receiving countries. In addition to policy implications for government surveys as indicated in the empirical findings section, other policy implications that arise from the specific context of this project include those relating to government policies to aid incoming immigrants and perhaps their offspring. For example, many Brazilian practices and laws in education, healthcare, and politics have
contributed to the upward mobility and achievements of the children and grandchildren of immigrants from humble origins.

6.3.1 Education

Cultural perceptions affect the acknowledgement of one’s educational credentials, which have an enormous impact on socioeconomic mobility. A university degree in Brazil earned through evening courses is as prestigious as one earned through taking courses during workday hours, thus allowing immigrants and children of immigrants to work during the day while earning a prestigious university degree at night. Unlike in countries like the United States, there is no stigma attached to a degree earned in “night school” (IBGE 2008). This cultural perception is central to the social mobility of immigrants and their descendants in Brazil. Additionally, enrollment at public universities in Brazil is free; thus, anybody who secures entrance into a public university does not have to worry about paying for tuition. Public universities in Brazil are also generally considered to be of higher quality than private ones.\footnote{Paradoxically, private primary and secondary schools are generally of higher quality than public ones. Because of the difficulty of the vestibular, the college entrance exam, for public universities, students who attended private high schools, generally have an advantage over students who attended public high schools.} The ability of immigrants and their children to attend public universities free of charge has been one of the reasons attributed to the successful climb in socioeconomic status of immigrant families in Brazil (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 2008). One caveat, as mention in Chapter Five, is the fact that undocumented immigrant students currently do not have access to entrance to public universities in Brazil.

At the primary and secondary educational level, access to both private and public schools are available to all children and adolescent immigrants who have official documentation in
Brazil. Additionally, in the State of São Paulo, basic and secondary education is a legal right to all children and adolescents regardless of their immigration documentation status (Waldman 2012).

6.3.2 Healthcare

Another public service available to immigrants in Brazil is healthcare. All persons residing in Brazil are entitled to treatment from Brazil’s universal healthcare system regardless of immigration documentation status. Services available under the Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS - Unified Health System) include: 1) preventative care, 2) family planning, 3) free distribution of medications, vaccines, and condoms, and 4) guidance in the control of rodents, insects, and other animals. As a result of this right, one public health study in São Paulo found no significant differences in healthcare access and treatment outcomes between Bolivians and Brazilians with tuberculosis (Martinez et al. 2012).

6.3.3 Local Electoral Politics

Politically, as emphasized in Chapter Four, each Brazilian citizen in São Paulo’s municipal election only gets one vote for city alderman, for which there are 55 positions. The result is that it is possible for a candidate to win with less than a fraction of one percent of the total vote. This allows ethnic voting among even relatively small ethnic groups to successfully elect ethnic candidates. Many of these city councilmen then go on to become state and sometimes federal-level elected officials, providing these immigrant communities with symbolic, descriptive and perhaps even substantive representation. Because local electoral rules vary greatly in different countries, this is one aspect of my dissertation project, which may not be very generalizable to other locations.

6.4 Recommendation for future research
To fully examine processes of political incorporation of a given immigrant group, one must have information on first through third generation members and perhaps even subsequent generations of the immigrant group. Thus, the first recommendation for future research I have is a survey that includes immigrants and the two subsequent generations of various national origin groups, with oversampling of relatively small groups. Additionally, because prejudice and discrimination against a target group are defined by the beliefs and intentions of people who are not part of the target group, I also recommend a survey of Brazilians not from either group on their attitudes towards Brazilians of Jewish, Japanese, and other heritages that have average incomes and levels of education along all socioeconomic statuses. Related to my first recommendation for future research would be carrying out semi-structured qualitative interviews of first to third generation female and male Brazilians.

I would also recommend the inclusion of other historically important or recent immigrant groups in future survey research and qualitative studies. Historically important immigrant groups that could include Italians, Syrian-Lebanese, German, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Scandinavians. Recently-arrived immigrant groups include Koreans, Chinese, Taiwanese, Filipinos, Indians, Haitians, and immigrants from the member countries of Mercosul/Mercosur (e.g., Bolivia, Argentina).

I would also recommend an in-depth and perhaps large-N survey of characteristics of registered and the services offered by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that aid immigrants in São Paulo State. More generalizations about these NGOs could be drawn in a study that covers a larger number of NGOs. Additionally, it would be informative to measure whether there is an increase in the numbers of these types of NGOs over the next couple of years.
and whether the types of services that they offer change over time or with different immigrant groups.

6.5 Limitations of the study

Some of the limitations of the study have been covered in the previous section and chapters. They have to do with the limited budget of this project; I did not have the funds to carry out my own survey, and I had to limit the number of qualitative interviews I could do. The 1998 IBGE survey that I analyzed in Chapter Three did not include information about immigrant generation. Thus, I was not able to analyze changes from the first to subsequent immigrant generations. It also had a small sample size of Jewish-origin Brazilians and did not distinguish between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews.

Similarly, due to budget constraints and resulting limitations of time, the qualitative research portion of the dissertation project relied on semi-structured interviews with only third-generation female respondents in Chapter Four. The semi-structured interviews mentioned in the previous section with first to third generation Brazilians of both genders would help fill this gap in a future study.

Additionally, the number of NGOs covered in Chapter Five was limited by the time I had for fieldwork in São Paulo. A more extensive study of registered NGOs as mentioned in the last section would allow better generalizations about the role of NGOs in the political incorporation of immigrants in Brazil.

6.6 Brazil’s Rise as a Middle Power

Several factors have made Brazil into an immigrant destination. For many decades, Brazil has sought to become a global actor, and as of 2013, Brazil is the world’s fifth largest country in terms of population after China, India, the United States, and Indonesia. Brazil’s
desire to become a global actor has been reflected in its foreign policy. This could be seen, more recently, through its push for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (Mullins 2006; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009). In recent years, it has appeared as if Brazil may be fulfilling former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s call for more outward looking policies for Brazil. Brazil has received much international media attention as the recent host of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup in 2014. It has also received attention in the sporting world as the upcoming host of the Summer Olympic Games in 2016.

In addition to the country’s prominence in hosting these prestigious sporting events, the size of Brazil’s economy surpassed that of the United Kingdom in 2012. Brazil has attempted to gain independence from the United States through developing its importance at the regional level in South America. It has sought to do this particularly through its involvement and use of Mercosul/Mercosur as a means of competitive insertion on the world stage (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009; le Blanc 2014).

However, ever since redemocratization in the 1980s, Brazil has sought to become more autonomous as a country or have the ability to “to practice a foreign policy free from external constraints placed upon it by powerful countries such as the United States” (Vegevani and Cepaluni 2009). This desire has extended into Brazil’s relationships with other developing countries. The previous administration of President Lula da Silva and current administration of President Rousseff have not fully wanted to rely on Brazil’s participation in Mercosul/Mercosur or the country’s association as part of the world’s five major emerging economies, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), whose relations President Cardoso had sought
as a means to balance power against the United States (Vegevani and Cepaluni 2009; Sotero 2013).

President Lula da Silva’s foreign policy, while maintaining multilateralism, defended national sovereignty to a much greater extent than that of his predecessor President Cardoso (Vegevani and Cepaluni 2009). One such example of the Lula da Silva’s government’s priority of defending national sovereignty and business interests over maintaining cordial relations with other developing countries is that in the last couple of years, the governments of Bolivia and Ecuador have been unpleasantly surprised by the Brazilian state’s interference in disputes with Petrobras, a Brazilian-state controlled multinational energy company, and BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank), a federal public company associated with the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Trade within the respective countries. When Bolivian president Evo Morales’ government threatened to further seize Petrobras’ assets after the company’s discovery of offshore gas reserves in 2006, then Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations Celso Amorim threatened to have Petrobras leave Bolivia, an action which would have financially ruined Bolivia’s economy. Likewise, when Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa announced that he would not repay BNDES loans, Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim swiftly increased pressure on Ecuador to repay these loans, fearing that other countries would follow Ecuador’s lead (Burges 2015).

6.7 Brazil’s Current Challenges as a Country of Immigration

6.7.1 Outdated Immigration Legislation

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42Amorim also served as Minister of Defense under President Rousseff from August 2011 to January 2015.
As Brazil’s economy continues to grow, and the country seeks to become a middle power, it will attract an increasing number of immigrants. Although loosely enforced generally, the current immigration law dates all the way back to Brazil’s “Foreigners’ Statute” of 1980 (Law 6815 of 19 August), which is based on the military government’s national security approach. This approach limited immigration with the intent to prevent leftist influences from entering the country. As a result, unlike Argentina, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, all of which had taken measures to regularize undocumented migrants through a human rights approach, Brazil has been much slower to follow suit because of its justification of “national interest” (Ferretti 2002).

Vestiges of the national security approach to immigration policy developed under the military dictatorship in 1980 were apparent in the way in which the Brazilian government handled new Haitian arrivals after the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince. The National Committee for Refugees (CONARE – Comitê Nacional para Refugiados), the public organ that deliberates over the granting of refugee status, decided that these Haitian arrivals could not be considered refugees because the protection of those who are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin due to natural disasters or poverty did not fit into the scope of either the 1951 Refugee Convention in Geneva or Brazilian law. It was not until after receiving international pressure as well as pressure from domestic Catholic NGOs that the Brazilian government decided to grant these Haitians “humanitarian visas” as discussed later in this chapter.

6.7.2 Human Trafficking

Despite the fact that Brazil’s Ministry of Justice prohibited the entrance of anyone who is included in the National System of Wanted Persons (Sistema Nacional de Procurados e Impedidos) as a "member of a group involved with violence in stadiums” during the World Cup
in 2014 (Soares 2014b), one of the effects of hosting the World Cup was a noticeable increase in human trafficking in Brazil (Jiang 2015). Based on the way in which Brazil defines the crime of human trafficking, the country has not met international expectations in controlling human trafficking. Brazil defines human trafficking as a movement-based crime in Article 231 and 231-A of its criminal code. This definition of human trafficking does not include people who are not physically forced to work but are instead threatened with deportation or tricked into indentured servitude. The international standard, on the other hand, defines human trafficking as the act of recruitment and transfer of human beings for exploitation (Jiang 2015; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes 2014). In 2012, the Brazilian Congress passed legislation that placed more penalties on employers who have been found to force employees to work in “slave-like” conditions (Looft 2012).

6.7.3 Undocumented Immigration

As a country with a need for labor, Brazil also has started to deal with a growing number of undocumented immigrants. Acre, a state in Brazil’s westernmost region, has started receiving thousands of undocumented immigrants who are often smuggled through the porous borders of high vegetation that are difficult to patrol from Peru and Bolivia. The immigrants come from countries as far away as Senegal, Nigeria, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Ghosh 2013; Saxena 2013; Gogolak 2014). Because of the country’s economic growth, recent legislative attention has been placed on a possible need to revise Brazil’s current immigration law to meet labor and humanitarian demands. On July 2, 2009, Brazil passed a law granting amnesty for those in Brazil who entered the country irregularly or without documentation by allowing the immigrants to apply for temporary and eventually permanent residency (Soares 2009).

6.7.4 Humanitarian Visas
Additionally, in recent years, Brazil has had to deal with the arrival of immigrants from countries like Haiti, who, as mentioned earlier, are partially attracted to Brazil due to the belief that Brazil is a racial democracy and the resulting belief that they will not face discrimination in Brazil because of their skin color (le Blanc 2014). In 1997, Brazil passed a specific law of refugees (Law 9.474/97 of 22 July) that established that having suffered from “gross violations of human rights” is a reason for granting asylum. Additionally, the Conselho Nacional de Imigração (CNI – National Council of Immigration), an agency linked to the Ministry of Labor, passed a resolution in 2012 to authorize Haitian immigration to Brazil under a category of the humanitarian visa (le Blanc 2014). As of 2012, Brazil also allows victims of human trafficking to qualify for these humanitarian visas for permanent residence (United States Department of State 2013).

6.7.5 Attraction of “Irregular” Forms of Migration

Also, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, several other factors make Brazil an appealing country of regular and “irregular” immigration both currently and in the upcoming years. These factors include the free access to public education for all children and adolescents in the State of São Paulo, which is a primary receiving state of immigration, and a universal healthcare system available to all residents in the country without regard to documented immigration status (Martinez et al. 2012; Waldman 2012). While these factors may draw highly educated immigrants from the professional technical and scientific fields that Brazil is currently seeking, they may also present a double-edged sword of attracting less desirable forms of migration into the country from the Brazilian government’s point of view. Regardless of the circumstances of immigration, the Brazilian government will need to deal with the incorporation of all of these immigrants.
6.8 Conclusion: The Political Incorporation of Immigrants and the Changing Diversity of Brazil

Many of the findings of this project are relevant to the politics of an increasingly diverse Brazil. The growing significance of immigration in Brazil is happening within the context of a majority of Brazilians now racially identifying as either “brown” or “black” on the census. Additionally, this rising importance of immigration has been happening in the context of an increasing body of legislation extending government quota programs, such as law passed on June 9, 2014 that allocates 20 percent of executive branch positions to Brazilians identifying as “black” or “brown” according to census classifications (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 2011; Soares 2014a). As I found in Chapter Four, non-white racial identification among individuals from immigrant groups are associated with increased levels of support for race-based government policies, particularly racial quotas. One possible trajectory is that an increasing percentage of federal university students or government workers will reflect the national origins of the most recently arrived immigrants by the generation of these newest immigrants’ grandchildren.

The implications for an increasingly diverse Brazil do not stop with political attitudes; they may enter into electoral politics in this country where every citizen over the age of 18 must vote. A relevant finding from Chapter Four was that a belief in ethnic discrimination against the group with which an individual immigrant group identifies is associated with higher levels of ethnic voting. With an increasing number of immigrants of different national origins in Brazil, it is likely that the faces of city and state-level politicians will begin to mirror those of the recently arrived immigrants who perceive discrimination against their countrymen, such as Bolivian-born lawyer, activist, and 2010 and 2014 State Deputy candidate Ruth Camacho whom I mentioned in
Chapter Five. One well-established immigrant community that has successfully elected mainstream politicians at all levels of government in Brazil is the Lebanese (Karam 2007). Eventually, perhaps local-level politicians from the most recently-arrived immigrant groups can rise in the political ranks to national-level prominence and occupy positions at the federal level and in the executive branch, just as many politicians of Lebanese heritage have accomplished in Brazil.

As Brazil surpasses 30 years of redemocratization, the political incorporation of immigrants is central to the legitimacy of its representative democracy. As stated in Chapter One, when immigrant groups achieve political incorporation, they are likely to have their preferences and needs addressed by their host country’s government. On the other hand, when immigrant groups do not achieve political incorporation, their interests and needs may not be met by the government, thus undermining democracy. Presumably, the election of political office holders from these immigrant communities will provide the communities with symbolic, descriptive and perhaps even substantive representation. One of the ultimate signifiers of the achievement of political incorporation of an immigrant group is the presence of elected representatives and civil society groups in the political arena that effectively address and promote the interests of the immigrant group.
6.9 Bibliography


