Title
On the Move in Morocco: Historical Geographies of Race, Space, and Mobility, 1300s - Present

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/45c1f706

Author
Vukovic, Anita

Publication Date
2018

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
On the Move in Morocco:
Historical Geographies of Race, Space, and Mobility, 1300s – Present

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts
in Anthropology

by

Anita Vukovic

2018
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

On the Move in Morocco:
Historical Geographies of Race, Space, and Mobility, 1300s – Present

by

Anita Vukovic

Master of Arts in Anthropology
University of California, Los Angeles, 2018
Professor Laurie K. Hart, Chair

Much has already been written about Morocco’s recent migrant regularization reforms as a new moment for African geopolitics. In contrast, very little has been written about the way in which these reforms, the second phase of which was implemented in December 2017, articulate with the Moroccan state’s ongoing forcible displacements of black sub-Saharan migrants from northern coastal cities like Tangier, to more southern, out-of-the-way locales like Tiznit and Errachidia. Using ethnographic field notes from a preliminary research trip to Rabat and Meknes in summer 2017, this thesis attempts to situate such experiences of displacement within Morocco’s emergent landscapes of emplacement, too, by reconciling them with pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial geographies alike. A Braudelian-inspired historical overview is provided of the regional movements, land claims, and patterned internal and external displacements that have
shaped the modern nation-space of Morocco today, from the time of the Islamic conquest of North Africa and the writings of Ibn Battuta and Ibn Khaldun, through the decades of European intervention, to the ongoing Western Sahara conflict and recent EU projects of border outsourcing and fortification. In the process, I argue that the current moment does not, in fact, represent a deviation from Morocco’s previous histories or its entrance into a new geopolitical era. Rather, I interpret it as another iteration in a centuries-long process of localizing Moroccan state identity and power against a larger regional geography marked by immense racial, cultural, and sociolinguistic heterogeneity.
The thesis of Anita Vukovic is approved.

Aomar Boum

Susan Slyomovics

Laurie K. Hart, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2018
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract..............................................................................................................................................ii
List of Figures.........................................................................................................................................vi
Acknowledgements.................................................................................................................................vii
Note on Transliteration............................................................................................................................viii
Part I: Introduction.................................................................................................................................1
Part II: A Brief Consideration of History, Anthropology, and Historical Anthropology.............7
Part III: Conceptualizing Utility and Relational Concentrations......................................................10
Part IV: Interrupted Histories of Land, Movement, and People..........................................................16
Part V: Questions of Race, Ethnicity, and Identity.............................................................................28
Part VI: Conclusions and Further Research.........................................................................................42
Bibliography..........................................................................................................................................55
LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 1: The historical bilād al-makhzan and bilād al-sība of Morocco…………………………..21
Fig. 2: The “golden triangle” of development in Morocco…………………………………………32
Fig. 3: French colonial categories of race in Mauritania…………………………………………39
Fig. 4: Bilād al-makhzan and bilād al-sība today…………………………………………………45
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The language study and preliminary fieldwork required for this thesis was made possible with funding from the UC Berkeley Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES) for a 2017 Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) summer fellowship for Arabic in Meknes, Morocco.
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

All Arabic words and phrases in this paper appear in Modern Standard Arabic. For their transliteration, I follow the guidelines established by the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES). Moroccan city and other place names are in their accepted English form (Fez, Marrakesh, Tiznit, Tangier, Errachidia, Casablanca, etc.). Personal names of contemporary Moroccan figures take their preferred English spelling, as prescribed by IJMES.
Part I: Introduction

This paper is inspired by a ten-week preliminary research trip undertaken to Morocco last summer, in 2017, with the intent of establishing the groundwork for an upcoming project on the local integration of black female migrants from sub-Saharan African countries. Working mostly between the coastal capital city of Rabat and the inland imperial locale of Meknes gave me an interesting albeit brief look at the varying dynamics of migrant visibility that accompanied collective experiences of clandestine migration in Morocco. On the one hand were the migrants themselves, and the ways in which they made use of Rabat’s and Meknes’ vastly different urban landscapes in rendering their bodies, homes, and economic activities either highly visible or not. On the other was the manner in which migrants were similarly constituted by locals and state agents alike as a singular object of perception, as a thing seen and put into focus, to be consequently apprehended, debated, and re-organized within social space. Set against the larger, nationally diffuse discussion on sub-Saharan migration that has dominated Moroccan domestic and foreign policy since the late 1990s, were always the smaller, more localized conversations in which my Moroccan friends and colleagues took part – in their continuous reference to the black “African” migrants as being somehow more African than Moroccans; their skepticism of the authenticity of the Syrian refugees now settling the sidewalks of Meknes; and their anxiety over the clutter generated by migrants’ illicit street-side businesses, the black-ness of their skin, and their access to state rights and services that so infrequently reached Moroccan locals themselves. Taken together, these conversations seemed to reveal a general anxiety over the increasing visibility of black migrants in Moroccan national space, following the implementation of mass migrant regularization programs in 2013 and again in 2017.
Much has already been written about the manner in which these regularization reforms seem to indicate an overall shift in Morocco’s “pensée d’état”¹ and a strategic geopolitical reorientation with both its African and European neighbors². These reforms, undertaken in 2013 at the behest of the National Human Rights Council (Conseil nationale des droits de l’homme (CNDH) in French, and al-Majlis al-Watini li-Haqq al-Insan in Arabic), and by allowing for the mass regularization of thousands of irregular Sub-Saharan migrants, made Morocco the first African nation to re-legislate its previously repressive approach to migration; outside the scope of Africa, the program is also one of the most progressive national migration reforms undertaken to date globally. With the second phase of this program having recently concluded in December 2017, under which roughly 26,000 applications for regularization were submitted (Kasraoui 2017), forthcoming revisions are also anticipated to Law 02-03, an act that criminalized all irregular migration into the country following the 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks.

It was in this context that I first learned from some local friends about a phenomenon that now forms the socio-historical investigative impetus of this paper: that of the Moroccan state’s routine, forcible “deportations” of black sub-Saharan migrants from northern cities like Tangier to southern cities such as Tiznit and Errachidia (also known as Ksar es-Souk)³. A million questions immediately came to my mind, and at the moment still do: Would this phenomenon, for example, constitute forced migration or internal displacement? What does it mean to “deport” someone within rather than across national boundaries? How do local citizens of Tiznit and Errachidia react

¹ According to Abdelmalek Sayad’s famous phrase, immigration policy can be read as revealing how a state thinks about itself, i.e., its “pensée d’état” (1999).
² See, for example, Collyer & Cherti 2015; Berriane, de Haas, & Natter 2015; and recent works by Mehdi Alioua.
³ Although I was first alerted to this practice by friends, it has been documented extensively in both the online Moroccan and French presses, with first reports emerging in 2015. It was also confirmed to me by a representative of the Antiracist Group for the Support and Defense of Foreigners and Migrants (Groupe antiraciste d’accompagnement et de défense des étrangers et migrants (GADEM)) during an interview I conducted at their offices in Rabat in August 2017.
to and make room for these sudden displacements, and what is the next step, for internally displaced migrants and locals alike? Finally, what do these categories of migrants and movements even mean in the Maghrib?

It was thus that I first began to question the multiplicity of meanings and referents that different types of migration, (re)location, internal displacement, and expulsion might take in a country like Morocco during my stay there between June and August 2017. What contradictions necessarily arise between official policies that seem to embrace migrants and the realities that seek to displace them has consequently become a topic of critical concern to my future research, in evaluating the success with which normative migratory logics are translated not only legally in Morocco, but socially and spatially as well. This paper therefore forms only one part of an initial exploratory process, in considering how historical articulations of land, mobility, and racial identity might continue to persist within and shape local experiences, landscapes, and discourses of displacement and migrant incorporation.

Within the context of crisis, the national spaces that either emerge or recede from sight are of central importance to me. I see them as allowing me to conceptualize (in a manner similar to that undertaken by María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo (2016)) the regional histories of movement, identity, transhumance, land ownership, and political allegiance still salient in Morocco today, and the manner in which they articulate with not only the spaces from which migrants are now expelled but also those into which they are forced. In further foregrounding future questions of (1) how globally imported discourses of crisis management, containment, and visibility are actively working to reconfigure the nation-space of Morocco, (2) how “success” is accordingly defined and evaluated by Moroccan state actors and bureaucrats in relation to the country’s recent reforms, and
(3) what makes this particular post-colonial\textsuperscript{4} moment so special, I here seek to develop a view of the “structure of conjunctures” (Sahlins 1985) that has shaped modern Moroccan geographies of movement. This paper therefore engages deeply with the changing nature of North African borders and EU border-zones, and the way that they entangle with both bodily and non-bodily (i.e., political, social, economic) movements. In this vein, I am particularly interested in the impact of European colonial technologies of space-fixing like the French commune system, the Berber Dahir of 1930, and the imposition of state borders on pre-existing modes of governance and socio-spatial organization, stratification, and segregation. Taking, for example, the way that historical movements of people, goods, and services have served to both connect and distinguish the regions between Tangier, Tiznit, and Errachidia, I question how ideologically “useless” versus “useful” spaces continue to persist today, as indicative of the types of drama (here, associated with migration) that a state-in-transition or a state-in-crisis finds useful but only within particular places.

Much of this paper is thus concerned with preserving the tone of local dialogues, interactions, and discourses as I encountered them. I frequently employ the term “deportation,” always in quotations, when specifically referencing the forced relocations of migrants between Tangier, Tiznit, and Errachidia as they might occur from locals’ perspectives, since this was the term used by the Moroccan friend who first told me about them\textsuperscript{5}. When describing these trends and phenomena more generally, I adhere to prevailing legal and social scientific terminology by referring to them as internal displacements, i.e., of “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a

\textsuperscript{4} See Brown (2010) for a discussion of what the “post” in a “post-Westphalian” or “post-colonial” world order means, i.e., as a formation “that is temporally after but not over that to which it is affixed” (21).

\textsuperscript{5} Because this portion of our conversation took place in English, I am not yet aware of the French and/or Moroccan Arabic words that are also used locally to describe these “deportations.” This is a question that I would hope to address with future fieldwork in Morocco.
result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border” (UNHCR Emergency Handbook). The type of rhetorical maneuvering that this shift enables is emblematic of not only the ethnographic anthropological project as a whole, but also of the type of research I hope to carry out in service of advocating for regional specificity within certain migratory categories and the complete overhaul of others if necessary. In considering here, for example, how a label (i.e., of Internally Displaced Person (IDP)) that is typically applied to those who have not yet crossed an international border fits or does not fit with the experiences of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco today, we might further seek to consider how its categorical limitations might actually obscure larger exclusionary trends that, at the systemic level, do not differentiate according to nationality. In the paper at hand, it is the elementary logics of race and ethnicity that I will argue come most explicitly to the fore, tied as they are to pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial articulations of identity, territory, and nation.

This paper thus attempts to ground socio-historically a larger project on the difficulties that so often arise when translating what are essentially migratory logics in their most idealized form, into African national contexts with deep colonial histories, in which Western assumptions about displacement and emplacement, and “regular” versus “irregular” migration, i.e., as movement, do not necessarily cohere with local livelihoods, patterns of movements, and modes of political affiliation. Isolating these fissures and their repercussions requires us, at the very least, to begin to refashion our evaluative questions and research objectives. Going back once more to the forcible internal displacements of sub-Saharan migrants that first inspired this paper, we might not only want to ask why they are orchestrated at the state level, but also why they are called “deportations” by locals if they do, in fact, occur within the (highly contested) borders of the national territory,
since deportation per se implies the forcible expulsion of persons across nation-state borders. Do such inconsistencies reveal anything about the success or failure of these new policies and their overarching goals of collective integration? Might they instead illuminate the ways in which different regional, urban, and rural spaces are imagined by Moroccan nationals as constituting fundamentally distinct, quasi-national territories? And if not, if they are truly just a matter of mistaken translation, what might they instead indicate about the ubiquity of the global migration regime and its discursive categories?

I finally move to situate these experiences within a larger framework of global “expulsions” developed by Saskia Sassen (2014) to take us beyond the “more familiar idea[s] of growing inequality,” informal segregation, hyper-policing, and mass incarceration that animate most political discourse today (1). I do so in order to enable a future analysis of the migratory project as a systemic whole in which each event is linked to the next – from the original moment of departure; to the other border crossings that inevitably follow, whether facilitated by transnational migrant social networks or smugglers; to the experience of forced “migration” in Morocco between Tangier and Tiznit or Errachidia, and the subsequent in-state movements this precipitates; and finally to the way that a black migrant man or woman experiences social integration post-regularization. Sassen’s theoretical framework of expulsions is especially useful in beginning to chart out such a terrain, insofar as it seeks to unify the various diverse sites of social, economic, bodily, and biospheric expulsion taking place today under the umbrella of a savage global sorting. In advocating for the kind of systemic interface that Sassen’s model thus enables between the multi-dimensional processes of expulsion, I here seek to identify its historical precedents and to make visible the pre-colonial and colonial methods of accumulation-by-expulsion that foreground present-day Moroccan geographies. These geographies did not appear out of nowhere. Rather, the
manner in which they increasingly articulate with the political economic expulsions of migrants and citizens alike might instead be analyzed in terms of their conjunctural reformulations, i.e., of pre-existing cultural meanings, practices, and beliefs about territorial integration, immobilization, socioeconomic marginalization, and environmental degradation. The fissures and cracks that thus arise between Westphalian ideological imports of “migration” and “regularization” and the everyday reality of their implementation will constitute the main focus of my larger research proposal, in looking at when, where, and why these fissures emerge; how they are apprehended through discourses of visibility and crisis, and managed through practices of expulsion; how these discourses subsequently provide a potent site for the articulation of local anxieties ensconced in the debate over migration and racial difference; and how these anxieties might themselves speak to an expanding global socio-economic structure of expulsion.

Part II: A Brief Consideration of History, Anthropology, and Historical Anthropology

As an undeniable product of the contemporary concerns over migration, inequality, and expulsion that seem to dominate both the popular and academic presses of today, this paper is situated squarely within the framework of a critical historical anthropology in which modern “flows” and mass “movements” can no longer be attributed to push/pull factors alone. Instead, I seek to develop a more holistic view of how historico-local dynamics and structures inform the unique migratory landscape of modern Morocco. In no small part, this paper employs the theoretical contributions of Marshall Sahlins and Fernand Braudel, himself a leader of the deeply influential French Annales school of history, in attempting to identify the various layers of meaning and moments of conjuncture at play in the case at hand.

The shift towards historical anthropology can itself be traced to the aftermath of World War II and more specifically to the period between the 1970s and 1980s. As anthropologists began
realizing and placing greater importance on the effects of Western colonization, the influence of prior disciplinary paradigms that emphasized structuralism (pioneered by Claude Lévi-Strauss) and functionalism (Bronislaw Malinowski and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown) were replaced by a new concern for developing non-Eurocentric frames of analysis, and for moving away from atemporal studies and the exoticization of the “primitive,” “non-industrial,” and “exotic.” The so-called historic turn of the period, i.e., towards an understanding how cultural histories shaped contemporary societal structures, was at the same time expedited by a complementary shift in the methodology of historians and historiographers. This shift was institutionalized in the mid-twentieth century by Braudel, who is today renowned for his longue durée approach to history in stressing inertia and the “other, submerged history, almost silent and always discreet, virtually unsuspected either by its observers or its participants, which is little touched by the obstinate erosion of time” (Braudel 16) and which “privileges a temporality that transcends rupture and discontinuity” (Harris 2004, 161-162). This historiographical approach is exemplified in Braudel’s monumental three-volume account of Mediterranean history, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II (first published in 1949), that combines three different overlapping tiers of analysis to this effect: (1) the relationship of humans to their environment, including geographical data on mineral deposits, flora, and fauna; (2) social history, or, “the history of groups and groupings” that fall under the gloss of cultures, societies, economic systems, and states; and (3) what one might call the “traditional history” most often told about individual persons, events, and eras (20-21).

Although never replicated in its structure, the book laid the foundation for the third and fourth generations of Annales school historians who together sought to emphasize “microhistories” – or, the social histories of cultural practices, mentalities, and everyday lives. Foremost amongst
the works produced by these later authors were *Montaillou* (1975) by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, who used inquisitorial records to reconstruct the livelihoods, physical worlds, beliefs, and mentalities of the inhabitants of fourteenth century Montaillou; *Il formaggio e i vermi* (1976), or, *The Cheese and the Worms*, by Carlo Ginzberg, which examines the beliefs and world-views of an Italian miller of Montereale, in chronicling the Roman Inquisition of the sixteenth century; and *The Return of Martin Guerre* (1983) by Natalie Z. Davis, which brings an infamous case of imposture in sixteenth century France to bear upon historical ideas about identity, property, family, and religion. At the core of each lay an emphatic reiteration of Braudel’s central claim: that it is ultimately “the continuities of the deepest structures [that are] central to history, beside which upheavals in institutions or the superstructure of social life [are] of little significance, for history lies beyond the reach of conscious actors, especially the will of revolutionaries” (Baofu 2012, 194).

Although this paper makes no attempt to delineate a complete ecological history of Morocco or to explore individual mentalities across different eras, I do to a large extent employ the kind of logic espoused by Braudel and his contemporaries in arguing that history should be analyzed in terms of structures of continuity rather than distinct ruptures. This is different from the premises under which I first set about this project, which I envisioned as a commentary on the new-ness of certain forms of movement, displacement, and localization taking place in Morocco today. As I delved further into my research and the relevant literature, what became most obvious and, in many ways, unavoidable was not necessarily where to put the boundary between “now” and “then” in Morocco, but rather the question of whether that boundary could even be argued to exist. Looking back, to attempt to establish such a boundary would have involved defining, analyzing, and reifying the very colonial rhetorics of historiography that I wanted to distance myself from (Braudel 18). My attempt to do so is reflected in the final form and argument of this
thesis. Instead of organizing, for example, the following chapters into pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras, they are presented through the interconnected thematics of race, space, and mobility. The effect, I hope, is one of enabling the exploration of the power of other forces in the determination of Morocco’s cultural geographies and social hierarchies.

In thus seeking to reconstruct the Moroccan present in terms of the past, I also use the analytical schematics of geography in order to “map” each layer on top of the other, whether human, historical, geographical, or otherwise. I rely to an equal extent upon the complementary work produced by Sahlins on structures of conjuncture, in which events are read as the “unique actualization of a general phenomenon, a contingent realization of the cultural pattern … [that occurs as] a relation between a happening and a structure (or structures)” (1985, vii, xiv). In order to then “explode” our sense of Moroccan history with the anthropological notion of culture and vice versa, as Sahlins might urge me to do, I pursue most broadly the themes of connection (versus separation), continuity (versus rupture), and reformulation (versus replacement) in the pages that follow. These themes traverse the historical terrains of space, race, mobility, statehood, and colonialism. They also frequently necessitate discussion of specific “events” whose context then always leads me to the next question, to which other questions must inevitably follow. In the end, what I attempt to present is not so much a snapshot of a particular moment in Moroccan history, or even an account of regional histories of movement and mobility, but rather a sketch of the larger systems, practices, and meanings in which local ideas of “history” and “migration” have come to operate.

Part III: Conceptualizing Utility and Relational Concentrations

To speak of sub-Saharan migration in present-day Morocco is, as I suggest, to thereby reference a long and complex history of regional movement, colonial conquest, and racialized
geographies, made all-the-more ambivalent and difficult for migrants to navigate today by the territorially demarcated nation-“states of fragmentation” that continue to dominate the post-colonial regional landscape (Silverstein 2005, 26). Although no official numbers are currently kept or provided by national and international organizations, the number of irregular migrants living in Morocco was estimated at 30,000 – 40,000 in 2015 (Anyadike 2015). An additional 6,187 unprocessed refugees and asylum-seekers also remained as of 2016, while at least 82% of the 26,000 applications that were submitted for regularization in 2017 are expected to be settled (Kasraoui 2017; UNHCR 2016). Given my overarching argument for the need to develop regional and temporal specificities within global migratory categories, I situate my discussion of these migrants within the interpretive framework offered by Mehdi Alioua (2006) in relation to “transmigration”. The sort of rhetorical maneuvering that trans-migration here makes possible is twofold for Alioua, in working to describe not only the transnational scope of these (and many other) clandestine migrations, but also the way in which migrants come to circulate collectively, as if in perpetual transit, within the nation-space of his native Morocco, as they increasingly bump up against and reorganize in the face of EU border infrastructures. The socially generative work of waiting that these border encounters and crossing attempts facilitate is equally important to his analysis, which focuses on the ways in which migrants, “while awaiting the crossing, or after a failure … have to reorganize in a safe and stable place where they can live while they redefine their migration project and reconstitute a small capital,” emphasis original (85). For Alioua, the success of these clandestine projects is then largely dependent on the very existence of such sites of misadventure and institutionally subterranean interconnectivity, “that cut across the nation-

6 A term greatly developed by Nina Glick Schiller, et al. to describe those immigrants “whose daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state” (1995, 48).
states, allowing [the] actors to circulate within and between them, despite the will to territorial control … They use dispersal in space as a resource, or to say it in their own words, ‘they go looking for their lives’” (85). The collective nature of these internal circulations in Morocco, while pointing to a high rate of “failure” at the EU border, at the same time actually enables migrants to “elud[e] and instrumentaliz[e] the legal frameworks and borders of the nation-states they traverse” (Alioua 85) – and reanimate along the way various contested histories of regional inter-connection and mobility still salient today.

Alioua thus locates the migrant’s agency in his/her ability to utilize spatial dispersal, whether as a result of forcible relocation or differential migratory trajectories, as a tactical advantage in carrying out their migratory project. It is also these forces that make cross-national sociocultural cooperation among migrants so critical at each step of the journey in order to face and overcome adversity. He writes that “if new sub-Saharan transmigrants continually arrive and circulate in the space of the Maghrib, it is because at each stage they find resource-persons who show them how to fit in, helping them to survive until the next departure. This relational concentration clearly implies a demographic concentration” (87). As indicated by the forcible “deportations” of migrants between Tangier, Tiznit, and Errachidia, the control and localization of these relational and demographic migrant concentrations remains a major concern for Moroccan state actors and residents alike. Of course, this is not to suggest that these initiatives are consciously formulated by the state in such explicit terms, but rather that strategies for managing migrants can reveal how utility is conceived by the state as it relates to local infrastructures, national histories, and socio-physical spaces.

Outside the realm of migration, the recurrence of such clusters and the networks they engender are readily visible when traveling Morocco by train. They recur in the natural world
almost constantly: in the dense sociality and vitality of a desert oasis, or the bright green, relatively lush and lively, almost canyon-like ridges that arise between the drier, more acrid brown hilltops of the Meknes countryside, where the rain flows easily downwards and the livestock are quick to follow. So, too, will a Western tourist’s eye almost unwittingly focus on the mass heaps of brightly colored garbage and debris that appear along the train tracks, sparsely at first, and then in ever greater density as you move closer to a small rural town – only to dwindle away again as you move onwards from it and onto the next station, where the heaps will appear once more. While easy to dismiss as an affront to Western environmentalism, these garbage-strewn landscapes could instead be more productively analyzed as indicative of differential global-social infrastructures and spaces for dealing with the categories of “waste” and “excess.” In this vein, we might also seek to consider the way in which certain spaces are made productive and useful depending on the visibility (or lack thereof) that they offer to different things as they appear in excess, whether they be plastic bottles or migrants. The fact that a space is filled with garbage does not, in fact, make it useless; it makes it very useful indeed for containing and holding that garbage!

Such topographies of utility and concentration occur in relation to people and within more developed urban spaces, too, as migrant clusters outside Fez, in Rabat and Casablanca, and across Tiznit and Errachidia indicate. In order to witness the vibrant and highly visible part of urban life that migrants now play in Rabat, for example, one only has to walk through the lower-income neighborhood of Takadoum or take a stroll down Avenue Hassan II and the various city streets that spiral out from it, directly adjacent to the central suq and sunbaked Atlantic coast where black

---

7 To conflate garbage with vulnerable peoples like black migrants is, of course, a dangerous discursive move. I am in no way advocating for this view, but only wish to illustrate, using a real-world example, how different spaces are made and used to hold different types of objects and (often racialized and marginalized) peoples alike. This is not a new idea, and one largely dependent on the important theoretical work on categories of purity, dirt, and hygiene contributed by Mary Douglas in *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (1966).
migrants line the streets hawking everything from knock-off watches and gold jewelry, to phone cards and kitchen cutlery. Just under 130 miles southeast in Fez, it is similarly impossible to ignore the transient migrant women’s camp erected outside the municipal train station, anchored by re-purposed tires, tarps, and pieces of metal wiring, steaming at a peripheral juncture but a few miles away from the dense urbanity of Fez’s ancient medina. Such hyper-dramatic imagery of “crisis” can be found at almost any relevant locale of migration today, whether that be in Morocco, the southern U.S., Greece, Kenya, or Jordan. The national dialogues of containing and re-directing migrant flows that inevitably follow therefore beckon us to engage with the concept of socio-spatial visibility as a necessary foil to any discourse on clandestinity, and one which is often objectified by state and non-state actors alike as something to be managed, expelled, and manipulated. This duality is especially salient in Morocco, insofar as the majority of its migrant populations hail from countries like Nigeria, Senegal, and Côte d’Ivoire; are physically marked as different by the color of their skin and made subject to racialized stigma; are also often rendered discursively visible, as a potent site for local and national debate alike on human rights versus security; and continue to live in precarious conditions typified by the migrant settlements of Takadoum and Casablanca, and the women’s camp in Fez.

While the chain of causality that connects such scenes with Morocco’s ongoing reforms and growing local anxieties has not yet been determined (and as such will form part of my future research), the central point here is that it is precisely these clusters of migrants, whether in urban Fez, Rabat, Tangier, and Casablanca, or the high steppe towns of Errachidia and Tiznit, that require further investigation if we are to learn more about how migrant visibility becomes re-appropriated by migrants, locals, and state actors alike in times of “crisis” and state failure. It is thus that we

---

8 See Silverstein 2005 for a historical overview of the discursive dichotomization of state security vs. human rights in Morocco, through the French protectorate period, the Years of Lead, and the early 2000s.
might approach the figure of the migrant not as an aberrant, externalized identity, but rather as a “regulatory element” that, through the collectivization of social and spatial relations, actually works to connect the “abandoned spaces [and] institutional voids” in Morocco with the more developed (Alioua 2006, 105), much in the same way that they connect each leg of the migratory journey to the next and each institutional fissure with its ideological counterpoint. While it is important to recognize, for example, the vast disparities that exist between Tangier, Casablanca, and Rabat on the one hand, and Tiznit and Errachidia on the other, it is also useful to consider

---

9 Tangier, which lies on the western entrance of the Strait of Gibraltar where the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea meet, is Morocco’s second most important industrial center after Casablanca and stands as a veritable tourist attraction in its own right, with an urban population numbering just under 240,000 (HCP 2014). With its sweeping views of the strait and orange-lit, blue-painted medina jutting almost cliff-like above, Tangier often feels, as a friend once so eloquently put it, like a city sitting “on the edge of the world.” Its port is located less than nine miles from the southern tip of Spain and is serviced by a multitude of international cruise lines and ferries connecting it to such varied European destinations as Barcelona, Tarifa, Athens, Lisbon, and Rome. Fifty years after independence, inflections of French and Spanish culture are everywhere – in the multilingual ease with which its inhabitants switch between Moroccan Arabic, French, Spanish, English, and sometimes even German and Chinese; the French-language street signs that adorn every corner; and the entirety of the colonial Ville Nouvelle that sprawls outwards, to the south and the west, from the city’s ancient medina. Roughly 600 miles further south on the western side of the Anti-Atlas Mountains and just 150 miles north of the disputed land border with Western Sahara, lies the city of Tiznit and the southern Moroccan region of Souss-Massa. With a total recorded population numbering just over 74,000 (HCP 2014), Tiznit sits at a strategic crossroads between the mountains, Atlantic Coast, Tafraoute region, and greater Moroccan Sahara. Its geographic utility underscores its historical role in the consolidation of Moroccan territory, the centralization of its state powers, and the aggregation of its tribal identities. From the age of the mighty Almoravid dynasty (1053-1139), which quickly spread outwards from Tiznit to encompass all of Morocco, Islamic Spain (regionally, al-Andalus), and parts of West Africa including Mali, Senegal, and the Ghana Empire, up through the present ʿAlawite dynasty, under which the first fledgling, unified Moroccan state began to take form, the area has served as a focal point for the contestation of local and regional authority. In 1881, for example, and under ʿAlawite dynastic rule, Tiznit was forcibly resettled in order to suppress a local dissident Berber uprising in the Souss. Only three decades later, in 1912, the city became a center of ideological dissonance once more when local forces, under the leadership of the populist Berber rebel Ahmed al-Hiba, overthrew regional French rule. al-Hiba consequently proclaimed himself the sultan of Tiznit and went on to conquer the remaining Souss by uniting the tribes of the Anti-Atlas Mountains, before being crushed and ousted by French military later that year (Boum & Park 2005, 153). Against this colored history, Tiznit continues to play a prized and important role in the production of Moroccan material culture, famed for the manufacture of silver jewelry and the cultivation of mint. 350 miles northeast of Tiznit lies the town of Errachidia, the capital of the southeastern Draa-Tafilalet province of the Atlas Mountains, with a total population numbering just under 91,000 (HCP 2014). The region is distinguished by the Tafilalet, the largest desert oasis of Morocco and the origin of the current ʿAlawite dynasty (1666 – present). It is irrigated by the adjacent watersheds of the Draa River to the west and the Ziz River to the east. The local economy was traditionally comprised of agriculture and pastoralism, although it has been adversely affected by increasing desertification of the pre-Saharan region in recent years (A. & A. 2013). Traditional arts and crafts, including pottery and rugs, are also integral to the regional economy. Historically known as Sijilmassa, the Tafilalet was the key locale linking the Mediterranean Muslim world to the gold and slaves of West Africa. It is estimated that between 757 CE and 1400 CE, hundreds of thousands of black slaves passed through the region on their way out of the Sahara and into the slave markets of the Mediterranean.
how these differences serve to connect them as much as they do to divide. What then makes these locales of forcible relocation in Morocco so interesting, is precisely the way in which vast movements and transfers of people, ideas, and capital have served historically both to conjoin and distinguish them throughout the troubled formation of the Morrocan nation-state. It is to this history that I now turn.

Part IV: Interrupted Histories of Land, Movement, and People

The juxtaposition of use, or utility, with land as an organizing administrative schematic in Morocco is a particularly salient one, and one actually codified in its cultural and political history. While the socio-spatial conceptualizations of a bilād al-makhzan (central land of storage/utility) versus a bilād al-sība (outer/hinterlands of dissidence) in Morocco have now been roundly dismissed by North African scholars as a pure fabrication of colonial statecraft, the historical landscape onto which these terms were mapped provide a viable place to start my analysis, given the way in which they entangle with Khalduinian geographies and the first Islamic conquests of the Maghrib, when the political configuration of the region was forming. This configuration was in actuality a rather variable constellation of differing tribal confederations that dominated different parts of the Moroccan territory at different points in time, as groups waxed in and out of obedience to the central Moroccan state after its establishment by the Idrisid dynasty in Fez at the end of the eighth century. The state’s territorial boundaries and political control remained highly variable over all but the most central areas (which would later come to be grouped under al-makhzan) throughout history as well (Boum & Park 2005, 4). A dogma of dissidence and the challenging of legitimacy – fitna, in Arabic – thus came to play as critical and regular a role in the definition of

---

The area also served as a historical site for “religious dissent, [an] incubator for puritanical religion, [a] nursemaid to numerous dynasties, and a pilgrimage site up to the twentieth century” (Dumper & Stanley 2007, 334).

10 Such an argument could, of course, be applied to any number of regional and/or transnational networks, if one only takes a cue from Frederick Cooper (2001) on cross-territorial, pre-colonial and colonial African processes.
the Moroccan empire as did the slow expansion of its central authority and its frequent “replacement by a new dynasty with a new source of legitimacy” (Boum & Park 5). The episodic appropriation and determination of legitimacy was, however, at the same time a process that depended as much on the tribal hinterlands as it did on the central state. Critical to these dynastic ebbs and flows was the base of support that each regime was able (or not) to establish among the different tribes comprising the Moroccan hinterlands, from where new rebel Berber (Amazigh) dynasties would often emerge, too. Historical examples of this dynamic abound. While the Saʿadi dynasty (1554-1659), for example, drew its support mainly from the Maʾqil tribes of the Draa Valley, the ʿAlawite dynasty (1666 – present) found solidarity with the Arab and Berber tribes of the Tafilalt and Angad, with the result that the close relationship between the Moroccan state and its tribal peoples remains even today an important national dynamic, no matter how confusing this “lack of definitive boundaries” appeared to European scholars, visitors, and colonists at the time of the Moroccan conquest (Boum & Park 4; Shoup 2006, 125).

The patterned rise and fall of dynastic powers, each with their own critical and revolving base of tribal support, eventually inspired Ibn Khaldun to write his authoritative, three-volume account of Maghribi history in Kitab al-ʿIbar (1375-1379), which solidified his place among the forefathers of sociology. Throughout the text, Khaldun expands upon the traditional Bedouin concept of ʿaṣabiyya (tribal solidarity, or group feeling) as a major force of both cyclic history and social cohesion, as well as a state’s emergence and its subsequent loss of legitimacy, collapse, and replacement. Both desert land (in terms of its utility) and movement (in its relation to land) emerge as major themes and as major drivers of human civilization, sedentarization, and the rise of royal and dynastic rule. Chapter 2 of Volume 1 of Kitab al-ʿIbar thus opens with the following: “It should be known that differences of condition among people are the result of the different ways in
which they make their living. Social organization enables them to co-operate toward that end and to start with the simple necessities of life, before they get to conveniences and luxuries. Some people adopt agriculture … Others adopt animal husbandry … Their social organization and co-operation for the needs of life and civilization, such as food, shelter, and warmth, do not take them beyond the bare subsistence level … Subsequent improvement of their conditions and acquisition of more wealth and comfort than they need, cause them to rest and take it easy. Then, they co-operate for things beyond the (bare) necessities” (Khaldun 249). If the cursory conceptualizations offered here so far of ʿaṣabiyya and the “differences of condition” (i.e., as both cause and effect of social organization) ring reminiscent of the “mechanical” and “organic” solidarities theorized by Émile Durkheim in The Division of Labour in Society, published over five centuries later in 1893 — know that it is no coincidence. Indeed, as chronicled by Mahmood Mamdani (2017), the first translations of The Muqaddimah (the introduction to and first volume of Kitab al-ʿIbar) appeared in Europe only four decades earlier, in 1854; Durkheim consequently “considered [the translation] important enough to have an Egyptian PhD student working on it” (10).

Throughout Kitab al-ʿIbar, Khaldun offers a detailed and conceptual meditation on movement, nomadism, and sedentarization, in which he — if at times too reductively and teleologically — theorizes the progression of communal life from an a priori basis of nomadic subsistence through the stages of urbanization and sedentarization, which for him come to represent the “natural goal” of nomadic life (252, 255). The presence of ʿaṣabiyya, of course, remains integral to this evolution, and to the capacity of any newly sedentarized tribe or group for reproducing and maintaining its now-requisite superiority (Khaldun 287). In Chapter 3 of Volume 1, Khaldun brings these threads full circle when he asserts that it is only through the sedentarization and extension of originally-tribal group feeling that an emergent royal authority or dynastic power
can arise and perpetuate itself. So, too, do religion and all religious propaganda come to play just as critical a role for him in the historical organization of the Maghrib as they did for the European empires, in providing a fledgling dynasty with another source of power that, in and of itself, further concentrated the affinities already engendered by `asabiyya (Khaldun 320). Using the mighty Almoravid and Almohad dynasties as examples, Khaldun elucidates for us how the doctrines of fitna and Islam, in their communal versus strictly territorial affects, provided the main locales and buttresses of power in the consolidation of the early Moroccan state, which “held a [strictly] moral power over the community of believers, and hence a geographical frontier drawn on the ground made little or no sense” (Boum & Park 4). As Khaldun further notes, “In the Maghrib, there existed many tribes equaling or surpassing [the Almoravid and Almohad dynasties] in numbers and group feeling. However, their religious organization doubled the strength of their group feeling through (their) feeling of having (the right religious) insight and (their) willingness to die, as we have stated, and nothing could withstand them” and their power (321).

What then came to characterize the historico-political Moroccan landscape was precisely the kind of branching, seemingly disorganized, and loosely-territorial network of power relations held together by kinship and religious group feeling that first confronted European colonialists. Under the pre-colonial administrative system, often referred to as the jaysh (i.e., “army”) system, local forms of socio-political organization persisted and even thrived in the face of the central Moroccan state: tribal groups settled and moved across state-owned lands at will in exchange for providing their man-power whenever the Sultan required it; as long as taxes were paid and troops supplied, there was little reason to fear any governmental intervention (Shoup 123, 127). Each tribe also appointed itself a local leader to act as a governmental liaison, or qāʾid (i.e., “leader”), with the central territory of al-makhzan (literally “storage,” in Arabic), a term that, while originally
referring to the actual physical places where governmental taxes were stored, slowly expanded to acquire the territorial and geographical connotations that later made it so useful to French military officers in the early 1900s. Under the Almoravid (1053-1139), Almohad (1139-1212), and Marinid (1245-1465) dynasties, the meaning of \textit{al-makhzan} grew to include the decentralized storage of all local tax revenues, with the result that by the time of the Sa\c{c}ad (1517-1659) and new Sharifian Empire, \textit{al-makhzan} had become the normal colloquial term for referring to the Moroccan government in general (Boum & Park 226). The related term \textit{bil\text{"a}d al-makhzan} and its antonym \textit{bil\text{"a}d al-s\text{"i}ba}, here conjoined with the Arabic word \textit{bil\text{"a}d} (land, country, territory, soil, etc.) in a grammatical \textit{id\text{"a}fa} structure\textsuperscript{11}, were also increasingly used to divide informally the state territory into those areas (i.e., of the \textit{makhzan}) paying standard taxes and administered more or less directly through state officials, and those more rural, tribally affiliated areas (i.e., of the \textit{s\text{"i}ba}\textsuperscript{12}) not paying regular taxes and administered under the leadership of local tribes and/or religious brotherhoods (Boum & Park 226; Shoup 123). These rural, predominantly Berber tribes and regions, in addition to providing taxable markets and conscript-able manpower, also continued to provide the critical source of tribal support that had by then become the hallmark of Morocco’s famous revolving dynasties, as observed and theorized by Khaldun. The borders between \textit{al-makhzan} and \textit{al-s\text{"i}ba}, while territorially unfixed and ideologically flexible, offered strategic sites for the performance of state control, too; from 1672 to 1727, for example, the “Warrior King” Mawlay Isma\text{\text{"i}}l ibn Sharif of the \text{"Alawite} dynasty undertook to build 70 qasbas along the border of the maximally taxable \textit{al-makhzan} in order to maintain its physical size (Boum & Park 226).

\textsuperscript{11} An Arabic grammatical structure used to indicate possession via the deferral of meaning. Here, \textit{bil\text{"a}d al-makhzan} can thus be roughly translated as “the land of storage.” As a further example, if one wished to refer to the son (\textit{ibn}) of \text{"Ali}, one would say \textit{ibn \text{"Ali} – in English, literally “[the] son [of] \text{"Ali}” where the definite “the” and possessive “of” are implied by the very structure of the \textit{id\text{"a}fa} itself.

\textsuperscript{12} Here, referring to “the land of dissidence.”
The pre-existing though inherently flexible schematic of a *bilād al-makhzan* and *bilād al-sība* consequently served as the basis for the flattened colonial rubric of a “useful” versus “useless” Morocco that was later imposed upon the region. Much has already been written about the manner in which this schematic was reinterpreted and re-appropriated in dividing the country’s economically productive regions from its less-productive and “useless” regions after the establishment of the Spanish and French protectorates in 1912; see Figure 1, right, for a graphical representation of the French colonial *bilād al-makhzan* (white) and *bilād al-sība* (shaded)\(^{13}\), which continues to provide a basis for the imagining of the post-independence Moroccan state, as will be discussed later. In tracing the creation of the Moroccan colonial archives, Edmund Burke III (2007), for example, illustrates how surveys and ethnographic data gathered on the relationship between *al-makhzan* and *al-sība* helped to imagine a “traditional Morocco” that could justify French intervention as well as provide a template for the future colonial state (2). By focusing on (1) the functioning of the *makhzan*, (2) the role of Berber populations, (3) the nature of rural societies, and (4) the nature of Moroccan Islam as it related to political legitimacy, the French thus pursued a two-pronged military strategy that helped to position them as the friend/protector of the *mazkhan* while at the same time allowing them to portray Moroccan resistance as the “traditional grumbling of the *siba* tribes” (Burke 5).

It was also at this historical juncture that the institutionalization of movement took off in a new direction and laid the foundation for “migration” as it seems to play out in the region today, as a relatively recent and violent intervention against a considerably vaster history of cross-regional movement, pastoralism, and nomadism. To clarify, and in further integrating the seminal work of Sahlins, I do not see such an analysis as necessarily dichotomizing pre-colonial Moroccan landscapes and histories of movement with their colonial and post-colonial counterparts. Instead, I seek to foreground the confrontations between them as existing in a “structure of the conjuncture,” or a “set of historical relationships that at once reproduce the traditional cultural categories and give them new values out of the pragmatic context” (Sahlins 1985, 125). The resultant relationships, categories, and practices do not, as Sahlins argues, stand in opposition to one another, as we might assume would Moroccan iterations of history and structure, stability and change, past and present, infrastructure and superstructure, and system versus event (143-145). It is rather in the very synthesis of these contraries that the “creative action of the historic subjects” unfolds and illuminates the manner in which individual and group culture reflects exactly “the organization of the current situation in the terms of a past” (Sahlins vii, 155). The notion of French colonialism in Morocco as an “event” must thereby also be interrogated, not as a given historically significant moment in and of itself, but rather as a moment whose very existence and significance is dependent precisely on the structure and cultural history that facilitates its occurrence, recognition, and subsequent interpretation and re-interpretation (xiv, 153). For, as Sahlins notes, “Event is the empirical form of system” (153), and it is only “as it is appropriated in and through the cultural scheme [that] it acquire[s any] historical significance,” emphasis original (xiv).

In this way, the current section (i.e., Part IV: Interrupted Histories of Land, Movement, and People) employs the notion of interruption not as a distinct break from or disjuncture with a pre-
existing reality, but rather as a conjuncture – a moment in time that provokes and conjoins new meanings and modes of movement that, despite their new-ness, continue to resonate with and make use of prior cultural concepts and practices. In emphasizing the re-production of associated values, pragmatics, and hierarchies in Morocco, I also wish to stress the continuities of movement as they relate to regimes of migration, in which subjects creatively use pre-existing “cultural categories and schemes of practice” in the face of both threat and opportunity (Mascarenhas & Vasconcelos 2009, 323). It is precisely the ways in which such categories and practices are deployed anew that this paper seeks to grapple with, in considering how the constants of geography, territory, and movement are re-articulated by different subjects at different points in time, and under different circumstances. The theoretical work contributed by Sahlins on historical anthropology therefore provides the overarching framework against which I interpret Morocco’s current moment in the centuries-long process of localizing state identity and power amidst a larger national geography marked by immense racial, cultural, and sociolinguistic heterogeneity and instability.

As further argued by P. Nick Kardulias and Thomas D. Hall (2018), taking a “macro-view” of human migration is also critical if we wish to identify the general mechanisms that characterize it within a systemic context. In so doing, we can, for example, begin to map the ways in which constant interaction between human societies and across vast geographical distances did periodically engender cultural transformations and differential assumptions about what constituted nomadism versus mobility versus migration versus immigration. For Kardulias and Hall, one of the mechanisms that emerges most prominently from the millennia-old history of human movement – and, consequently, confrontation – is exactly that of separation, or, the entrenchment of the boundaries, frontiers, and borders that we now see as critically framing processes of ethnic and state identification. The gradations that occur between them further recall Ladis K. D. Kristof’s
landmark essay on “The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries” (1959), in which he distinguishes between frontiers (i.e., as zones of transition and integration from one ideological or ethnic “sphere” to another) and boundaries (i.e., as spatial expressions of a given legal order, or a meeting place and zone of separation between two mutually exclusive socio-ideological worlds), the former of which “is precisely [that] watering down of loyalties and blurring of differences that [a central government attempts] to forestall by substituting frontiers with a controlled and exact borderline … [For, although] frontier conditions may sometimes be deliberately created by governments, the state tends to view frontiers and frontiersmen as a temporary expedient. The ultimate goal is a boundary, not a frontier” (Kristof 273). In thus returning to the contemporary case at hand, I am not suggesting that movement and space – as they relate to pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Morocco – can be seen as taking separate and discrete forms. Rather, I want to stress the way they manifest different historical meanings and practices that can exist only in relation to one another. The migration regime is indeed as generative of new meanings as it is fateful for old ones, as the current situation in Morocco would seem to indicate. It is, however, the very rigidity and violence with which the Westphalian paradigm of “migration” has been institutionalized in post-independence Morocco that strikes me as most troubling, given its inconsistency with current border dynamics and ways of living.

*   *   *

During the French Protectorate period in Morocco, which lasted until 1956, colonial administrators employed a cruel pacifying logic of primitive accumulation similar to that used by the Ottoman Turks and later European powers in Northern Arabia decades earlier, in undertaking to re-appropriate and fix in space local customs, hierarchies, markets, modes of governance, and tribal territories, in order to consolidate authority over the seemingly disorganized social and
political make-up of each territory\textsuperscript{14}. As their sinisterly Marxist-Foucauldian reasoning went, it was only by destroying traditional tribal autonomy over land and body that they could create a new body of political subjects as citizens, that could now be claimed by the government, documented, surveilled, taxed, conscripted, and made obedient. While Michel Foucault locates the emergence of modern governmentality in the eighteenth century, when the economy and its internal logics (i.e., of management) were first introduced into the political practices of the time, this emergence was not standardized across the globe and throughout history. It was, however, necessarily matched by the rise of a burgeoning political economy that implicated any developing nation-state (such as Morocco) with the logics of management as well, in maximizing the productive capacity of each new citizen-subject and “exercising towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and [behavior] of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods” (Foucault 1991, 92). Critical to the formulation of this population, then, was precisely the notion of difference and division that came to play such an integral role in twentieth century Moroccan colonialism and nationalism, in terms of how the Moroccan population was made economically productive and how it was at once territorially inscribed, socially differentiated, and “spatially incarcerated” within places like the bilād al-makhzan and bilād al-sība (Gupta & Ferguson 1992, 14). These objectives traversed the realms of the bodily, the physical, and the social, in anticipating a shift in belonging from the traditionally local level – i.e., smaller city-states and serf-powered manors in Europe, or tribes and the jaysh system in

\textsuperscript{14} The corollaries here abound regardless of time and space. In Arabia, the Ottomans waged an aggressive military campaign around Bedouin tribal pacification and sedentarization in the Syrian steppes during the 1860s, under the explicit assumption that, once settled, these tribes would not only pose less of a military threat but would also provide an additional source of agriculture that could be taxed, labor that could be controlled, and men that could be conscripted (Toth 2006, 60). European rule in the region throughout the 1920s and 1930s adopted a similar attitude toward the control of land and movement. In perceiving the nomadic bādiyya populations as a serious threat to their “town order and ‘imperial’ plans,” local European officials devoted most of their energy to devising various politico-military systems of containment, the overarching structure of which quickly grew to include new national borders, checks on migration, and treaties on Bedouin legal status, extradition, and raiding (Toth 69).
Moro – to the national (Marx 2011; Torpey 2000). By thus engaging with the political economic work of Foucault, Karl Marx, and John C. Torpey, we can begin to grapple with the sort of social power relations that undergirded the history of state consolidation and territorial institutionalization in North Africa and the Middle East, greatly intensified as it was by foreign intervention, imperialism, and colonization – from the enforced sedentarization of Bedouin tribes in Arabia, to the mapping and drawing of tribal boundaries in Morocco; to the placement of French officials across Morocco to “gather social and political data in anticipation of the French military occupation” (Shoup 129); to the implementation of international borders, the French commune system, and a new, post-independence irrigation scheme; to the division of Morocco according to its economically productive and un-productive regions; to the re-incorporation of newly dispossessed subsistence farmers and pastoralists into the nation-state as proletarian citizens, whose movements (and identities) could be further documented, controlled, and restricted by the various state mechanisms now in place; and finally to the institutionalization of previous forms and ideologies of movement as migration, in which people now crossed national borders as they entered unto national spaces as new subjects – whether as citizens, migrants, or refugees, via the varying degrees of regularity and irregularity that accompanied each.

The colonial policies that re-shaped Morocco and the greater Maghrib were in this way largely driven by objectives of space-fixing, de-tribalization, and sedentarization as the direct antitheses to what were then a series of more flexible borders, modes of tribal governance, and nomadic movements. The imposition of national and regional borders was a critical part of this process and one whose specter still haunts the geopolitical landscape of North Africa today, smoldering in its “unresolved tension[s over] the definition of the nation-state” and manifest in the
innumerable border wars and skirmishes that continue to erupt between Morocco and Algeria¹⁵, and the perpetual “states of fragmentation” in which their nationalisms now exist (Silverstein 2005, 26). Indeed, as early as 1907, a number of French researchers were dispatched throughout the country to record all aspects of Moroccan life, the results of which were compiled into Tribus et Villes du Maroc (1915) and Archives berbères (1920), and used to create Carte des tribus in 1933, which did for the first time “firmly [place] ‘borders’ around territories and [bind] tribal peoples to specific geographical areas” (Shoup 129). The contemporaneous extension of French control into tribal areas under officers of the Affaires Indigènes was also supplemented by the presence of dawāʿir, or cercles (circles) in French, within each new tribal territory, whose administrative remains can still be found in Morocco today and function can be roughly equated to that of a county in the U.S or the U.K. Working together with the local officers of Affaires Indigènes, the dawāʿir administrators served at first to monitor and document, and then to control and restrict, and name and categorize, the tribal movements that took place across what were now different and distinct territories (Shoup 130).

The weaponization of native land against colonial subjects is a recurrent phenomenon throughout history and one whose drama played out almost predictably in Morocco as well, as the predominantly Berber, tribally oriented, transhumance pastoralists of al-sība found themselves sequestered in seasonal pastures throughout the year as their livestock and livelihoods withered away. Thus ruined and forced to submit to French control, to remain in their now-explicitly demarcated tribal homelands, and to comply with extensive monitoring, the processes of primitive accumulation and colonization that wreaked havoc upon rural Moroccan Berber pastoralists did

¹⁵ Most recently, territorial tensions erupted at the Moroccan-Algerian border in May 2017 over the placement of 41 Syrian refugees, who remained trapped in a desert buffer region between the two countries before they were re-admitted by Algeria in June.
frequently translate into a loss of (group) identity and feeling – or, ʻaṣabiyya – as well, as dispossessed tribal peoples were transformed into a rural proletarian class laboring for new, often French land owners and capitalists. These efforts, concentrated predominantly in the region of al-sība, were at the same time accompanied by a body of policies that both linked back to and sought to sow further divisions with the region of al-makhzan, increasingly racialized as the center of fanatic Arabophone, urban administration and revolt, versus the allegedly peaceable, traditionally Berber, rural, tribal hinterlands. The pivotal moment in this classic divide-and-conquer trajectory came on May 16, 1930 with the imposition of the Berber Dahir, which sought to officiate the national division between the two regions and to provide a completely separate judicial system for the Berber areas. Although this legislative move came after decades of differential colonization – in which Berbers were viewed as potential colonial allies and targeted for Christian missionization and French acculturation; separate French colonial schools were built for Berber children on Berber land; and a separate judicial system based on customary Berber law versus shari’a law was proposed – the Dahir aroused such enormous protests throughout Morocco and the rest of North Africa and the Middle East that French powers were forced to abandon officially these pretenses on April 8, 1934 (Boum & Park 69).

Part V: Questions of Race, Ethnicity, and Identity

What such colonial interventions did succeed in, however, was providing for a lasting legacy of border-making that continues to cut across North and West African lands and peoples today, the racial and ethnic composition of which further complicates questions of regional migration, crisis, and displacement. For, while the mere shuttling of problematic migrants across different Moroccan terrains certainly presents its own issues, these cannot be discussed without acknowledging the racial politics that accompany them. As part of my future research, I will
interrogate how the very black-ness of the majority of migrants who have made their way to Morocco offers a strategic socio-spatial site for the performance of state control and sovereignty in dealing with the systemic fissures, inconsistencies, and breaches that have arisen and will likely continue to arise in its institutionalization of migration reforms, one technique of which, of course, presents itself in the internal displacements of black migrants to more rural, less visible, sparsely populated areas of the country.

To ask a Moroccan about race is to arouse a certain visible anxiety and response of denial that, when taken at face value, can prove surprising to an American traveler. The history of race as it relates to land, power, and culture in the region is a dense and complex one, that speaks to the multiple “states of fragmentation” in which modern Moroccan nationalism and identity continue to exist (Silverstein 2005). So, too, is the task of defining a singular Moroccan identity seemingly impossible, given the way it refracts across the various terrains of ethnicity, lineage, tribalism, religion, and political allegiance. Indeed, all of the material presented above (in Part IV: Interrupted Histories of Land, Movement, and People) is not to say that the colonization of Morocco and the expansion of its central state authority occurred in a unilinear direction and without contestation. Very much the opposite is true, as the pacification of delinquent rural groups, dissident Berber tribes, and ethnic and racial tensions presented and continues to present major obstacles to the territorial integration of both pre- and post-colonial Morocco, albeit to a relatively lesser degree than was observed during the pre-Sharifian dynasties (Cory 2008). While Berber customs today enjoy a greater degree of incorporation into “normative” Moroccan culture\textsuperscript{16, 17}, ethnically Berber regions (often of the colonial \textit{al-sība}) still experience widespread repression and

\textsuperscript{16} The Berber language of Tamazight was recognized as an official language of Morocco in 2005.
\textsuperscript{17} In large part due to the wide participation of southern Berbers in the 1975 Green March upon Western Sahara under King Hassan II, and their continued silence on the question of the territory and Sahrawi peoples (Silverstein 2005, 32).
deprivation. This reality was most recently brought to international attention by the months-long protests that consumed the northeastern Rif region during the summer of 2017, which later morphed into the larger social movement known as al-Hirak al-Shabi (or, The People’s Movement). Foremost amongst the issues that motivated the protests was that of economic and infrastructural under-development; the spark that then ignited them was the death of local fishmonger Mouhcine Fikri in al-Hoceima, who was crushed by a garbage compacter while trying to retrieve fish that had been confiscated by the police for being caught out of season. By the time I left Meknes for Rabat in mid-August, the protests had become a main topic of daily conversation. Even Sophia\textsuperscript{18}, a French-raised Moroccan national in her 60s who owned and operated a local riad in Meknes’ ancient medina, made the nearly 300 mile round-trip to participate in the protests in the days leading up to the anniversary of King Mohammad VI’s enthronement (I myself had left Morocco by the time she returned to Meknes, and thus did not hear about her experiences in the north).

It is against such a terrain already-laden with civil strife that the question of migrant integration and access to services and rights not readily accessible to many Moroccan nationals plays out. During an interview I conducted at the Antiracist Group for the Support and Defense of Foreigners and Migrants (Groupe antiraciste d’accompagnement et de défense des étrangers et migrants (GADEM)) in Rabat in August 2017, an organizational representative commented that it was precisely in these “transition areas” of the country (i.e., those facing disproportionate economic and development difficulties) that they expected tensions to develop more visibly between locals and migrants as the reforms continued to roll out. However, while Meknes, the Rif, and al-Hoceima would certainly fall in with such areas, the question of migration remained largely

\textsuperscript{18} Name changed for anonymity.
absent from, or entirely peripheral to, the protests that consumed them during my stay in Morocco that summer. Instead, the protests seemed to speak to a deeper historical cleavage between traditionally Arabophone and Berberophone social spaces that has progressively deepened since the early sixteenth century, and upon which current migratory dynamics might be mapped as well. While the colonial rubric of a *bilād al-makhzan* versus *bilād al-sība* allows us to start thinking about such trends towards regionalism, it is ultimately Morocco’s history since its independence in 1956 and the way that the monarchy continues to use this model as a viable mode of dividing the country that matters most for reconfiguring current national geographies. The applicability of Sahlins’ theory on structures of conjuncture provides potent ground for future ethnographic analysis here, too, in tracing relationships between changes in local practice, systems of meaning, and structures of power.

In considering the juncture between colonial and post-colonial Morocco, the policies of King Hassan II, who succeeded King Mohammed V in 1961, offer a viable place to start. Under Hassan II’s rule until his death in 1999, zones of deliberate de-development were maintained and added that overlay the colonial configuration of the *bilād al-sība*; southern areas of the country were kept deliberately underdeveloped as well. The resultant configuration of a “golden triangle” between Laayoune (Western Sahara) to the south, Tangier to the north, and Fez to the east, as depicted in Figure 2 below\(^\text{19}\), illustrates the segregation still felt today between a developed Arab core and an underdeveloped Amazigh/Berber periphery (Chtatou 2017). Although firmly rooted in colonial policies of space-fixing and geographies of racial separation, the corporealization of

such mappings can also be traced along the heightened, post-independence ideological tensions that emerged between Arabs and Berbers as they attempted to define a singular, prototypical Moroccan identity. Indeed, as Paul Silverstein (2010) notes, even today many activists in southern Berberophone regions still refer to them as the *bilād al-sība* (84). Ongoing Berber regionalism has thus proved continually instrumental in constructing a collective identity in opposition to the Arabophone core of the *makhzan*, the dichotomous cartographic symbolism of which became increasingly useful in the early post-independence years when the dominant Istiqlal party made Islam and Arabic the national religion and language of the largely Berberophone nation (Silverstein 2005, 27). Resultant tensions culminated explosively in the so-called “Years of Lead” between the 1960s and 1980s, which were characterized by the extreme use of state violence and military intervention to suppress movements for regional autonomy and ethnic self-determination. Many of these movements occurred in the peripheral Berber regions in, for example, the southeastern Tafilalet province in 1957 and the northern Rif mountains in 1958, and again between 1972-1973, when Berber groups in the Middle Atlas, High Atlas, and pre-Saharan southeast attempted to secede collectively. In the national media, the very notion of a collective Berber ethnic identity was frequently dismissed as a colonial artifact and obstacle to national integration (Silverstein 2010), while the Rif region became subject to military rule and economic marginalization for its role in the 1958 and later 1984 uprisings.

Figure 2
Each successive, increasingly powerful Interior Ministry was thus appointed in the name of centralizing “political authority, the surveillance of dissent, the ongoing economic marginalization of Berberophone regions in favor of more loyal areas, and explicit processes of cultural assimilation through the Arabization of the media and the school system” (Silverstein 2005, 26-27; Shoup 2006). This agenda was realized from the outset by the very first Minister of the Interior of the newly independent Moroccan state, Hassan Zimmuri. Instead of dismantling, for example, the large “urban commune system” inherited from the French, Zimmuri began the project of further expanding it into rural areas between 1958 and 1960. Undergirded by an incipient nationalist logic, Zimmuri sought deliberately to impose commune borders across rural Berber lands, in order to break any remaining tribal political, economic, and social ties “in favor of a new loyalty to local areas – and eventually to the Moroccan state by centering people’s loyalties on purely territorial ties and not to kinship ties” (Shoup 134). This passion project was at the same time reinforced by the implementation of new irrigation schemes that necessitated the reorganization of farmlands into even blocks that could be more easily administered by the Ministry of Agriculture. Undertaken in the name of detribalization, such local restructurings were most successful in the Atlantic coastal plains surrounding the central administrative stretch between Casablanca, Rabat, Kenitra, and Tangier where similar policies had already been pursued since the early Protectorate period. Many traditional grazing areas were lost as well, forcing even greater numbers of pastoralists and subsistence farmers to sell their land and join the burgeoning rural proletariat of Morocco (Shoup 136)\footnote{This post-independence trajectory in its fixation on land, movement, and identity mirrors that of Morocco’s southwardly neighbor, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, under Mukhtar Ould Daddah, the country’s first president after its independence in 1960. During his rule, which lasted until 1978, Ould Daddah set as his central objective the consolidation of the Mauritanian nation-state. He sought to do so via the sedentarization of the yet-pastoral and largely nomadic Mauritanian populace, insofar as, for many members of the Arab league at the time, the biggest objective in modernization and development was to appropriate remaining nomadic desert territories for agriculture. In Mauritania, nomadic groups continued to cross into Mali, Senegal, Morocco, and the Spanish...}. 


Various voluntary and involuntary forms of movement also played a critical role in the forcible reintegration of post-independence Morocco and its incorporation into the global political economy. Under Hassan II, forcible internal “deportations” became a common tactic for controlling and disappearing dissidents and relocating them to the southern stretches of the country where the majority of its secret prisons were held. The infamous Tazmamart prison (now closed) of the southeastern Atlas Mountains, located between Errachidia and Midelt, provides just one example of a time, place, and form that signals “[to many] Moroccans … the most abject disappearance … a context that forced many [of them] into silence and complicity” (Slyomovics 2005, 57-58). The prisons of Agdz and Kalaat M’Gouna were similarly located to the southeast of Marrakech, while Temara and Ain Aouda were located more centrally near Rabat, and Derb Moulay Cherif within the very heart of proletarian Casablanca itself. More recently, since the opening of the industrial Tangier Med Port at the Strait of Gibraltar in 2007, a number of instances of displaced locals, refugees, and entire villages alike have also been reported, allegedly in order to make room for the port’s heavily armed and surveilled construction projects and infrastructures (Rothenberg 2015). So, too, might we incorporate into this pattern the Green March of 1975, in which Hassan II mobilized approximately 350,000 Moroccan civilians, supported by 20,000 royal soldiers, to march south from Tarfaya into the Saharan fringes of an ideologically “greater” Moroccan nation-state on November 6 (Abi-Mershed & Farrar 2014, 17; Mohsen-Finan 2014, 280). The event and its nearly 45-yearlong aftermath have in effect displaced tens of thousands of

---

Sahara until 1975, when Spanish colonial powers suddenly withdrew and the territory became the subject of land claims and violent contestation between Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria. In thus neutralizing the threat presented by these movements, Ould Daddah made his priority not so much one of nomadic sedentarization, but rather the disappearance of tribes and traditional powers altogether. These, he reasoned, could then easily be replaced by modern political classes and affiliations organized around the emergence of a new national party (Cervello 2006, 148-149).
Sahrawi persons, who are now scattered across Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria where they continue to live in refugee camps and informal settlements.

Such practices of forced internal displacement as a result of conflict, climate change, or economic development are not, of course, unique to Morocco: Turkey, Myanmar, and Syria offer just a few of the most cited and most recent cases. It is worth pointing out that, although this paper is less interested with the displacements of citizens and more interested with those of foreign migrants, the two phenomena might not be mutually unintelligible; indeed, this paper argues very much the opposite. As such, it does not grapple at length with the category of IDP’s, who are defined by the UN as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border” (UNHCR Emergency Handbook). Insofar as the social boundaries between “good” (desirable) and “bad” (undesirable) citizen have already been theorized as roughly equating those between citizen and foreigner, i.e., in terms of how each is apprehended by the state, it is also how ongoing forcible relocations of migrants continue to map onto and reconfigure nation-state geographies of race, citizenship, and displacement that is under critical investigation here. For, while the label of IDP is applied to those displaced persons who have not crossed an international border, I would suggest that its categorical limitations might actually be working to obscure larger exclusionary trends that, at the systemic level, do not differentiate according to nationality. Rather, it is the elementary logics of race and ethnicity that come more explicitly to the fore in the case at hand, tied as they are to pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial articulations of identity, territory, and nation.
It is thus upon the very question of land, identity, and movement that Silverstein argues we can still (at least partially) map regional inter-group relations in Morocco today, as they continue to connect Arabs, Berbers, and blacks in active “contestation over the definition and control of the ‘local’” (2005, 31). What constitutes “the local” versus “the national” in Morocco is indeed very difficult to define, given their relation to traditional forms of transhumant subsistence and nomadic movements that make the territorialization of space an almost impossible task. Historically speaking, traditional nomadic and pastoral livelihoods in North and West Africa did necessitate and manifest vast systems of interconnection and inter-dependency between Arabs, Berbers, and black Africans, whose relations continue to be re-shaped by the ideological aftermath of Moroccan colonialism and independence. In transhumant Berberophone regions and especially those of the southern pre-Sahara, for example, local activities have long been supplemented to a great degree by state services, goods, and markets (Marx 2006) that lay well beyond the fluctuating borders of “the local.” These tribes relied to an equal extent on the field labor of the Haratine: a sedentary black population indigenous to the Saharan fringe of North Africa since well before the Islamic conquest, who were historically exploited and enslaved by Berber populations of the pre-Saharan territories without recourse to legal rights nor to the right to land ownership and inheritance (Boum & Park 70; Silverstein 2005). According to Bruce S. Hall (2005, 2011), who tracks the development of pre-colonial ideas about race in the Sahara, the centuries-long formation of these inter-ethnic and inter-racial tensions stretch back all the way to the infamous travels of Ibn Battuta in the 1300s, as increasingly powerful Arabic- and Berber-speaking nomadic groups entangled with and bumped up against the Haratine of the Sahara Desert (2005, 340). It is precisely such histories that Silverstein (2010) also points to in elaborating his argument on the way that black-
ness and the former Haratine have come to play a role in mediating modern “Arab-Berber relations, as well as the ideological production of ethnic identity that emerges from these contests” (84).

Local conceptualizations of “race” and identity as they map onto Arab, Berber, and black identity today did not necessarily arise through the discourses of color, phenotype, and quasi-scientific, biological taxonomies that are most commonly associated with ideas about race in the Western world. Rather, it is to the dominance of pre-colonial assemblages of tribes that Hall turns, in delineating how issues of honorable lineage, territorial control, and resource allocation first worked to shape the racial landscape. The latter two concerns played a critical role in determining local power structures over the course of the late 1500s, as progressive environmental desiccation continued to undermine the viability of regional agriculture. When competitions between (Arab and Berber) nomadic herders and (black) sedentarized farmers ensued over the increasingly scarce plots of fertile land, it was the former that rose to dominance. Sedentary communities were thus forced to migrate further south or enter into subordinate relations with pastoral overlords, for whom the increasing aridity of the period did provide another tactical advantage (Hall 2005, 344).

As new Arab and Berber political formations spread further south, medieval and predominantly black states like Ancient Ghana, Mali, and Songhay became the sites of “new ideologies of social [organization] and racial difference [that] developed as corollaries to the changing political circumstances. With their increased power vis-à-vis agriculturalists, Arabic- and Berber-speaking pastoralists began to use racial identity as a more explicitly ideological justification of their position of domination over sedentary communities” (Hall 2005, 344) – by, essentially, constructing “race” to legitimate power structures surrounding land, nomadism, and sedentarization that became increasingly racialized in phenotypical terms like “black” and “white” in the years leading up to European intervention.
These hierarchies became entrenched over the course of the 1600s, as spreading nomadic power saw a simultaneous influx of (1) ideas about normative “white” Arabo-Islamic culture that connected local Arabic- and Berber-speaking groups with important Islamic figures with whom they could claim an honorable lineage, and (2) the re-writing of local historical relations by Arabo-Berber intellectuals in a way that imputed them with religious authority and Islamic orthodoxy (Hall 2005, 345). Ideologically buttressed and increasingly codified through discourses of genealogy, mobility, and nobility, changing ideas about “race” in North and West Africa can thus, as suggested by Hall (2005, 2011), be seen perhaps most productively as mirroring the growth of ideas that connected people throughout these remote regions with honorable figures in Arab-Islamic history. The vitality of these new politics, epitomized by the rise of the Sharifian dynasties in the mid-1500s (whose rulers claim direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad), underscore the “Khaldunian cycle” in a way that even Khaledun himself could not have predicted when he wrote about the utility of religion in reinforcing claims to power, territory, and political legitimacy.

With increasing foreign contact, regional discourses had already incorporated much more Westerly-racialized ideas of “black” versus “white” by the time European travelers penetrated the African Sahel in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Hall 2005, 340). These relations were, however, both fueled and reformulated by the advent of foreign imperialism and intervention in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which brought with them new logics of phenotype, race, space, and power. When, for example, the French arrived in Morocco and undertook to pacify the tribes of the rural hinterlands by fixing them in place, what they did, by recognizing Berber tribal land claims and landholding relations, was to recognize implicitly Berber

---

21 For an interesting analysis of the Sharifian Empire as having “broken,” at long last, the Khaldunian cycle by institutionalizing a new form of ḍaṣabiyya specific to emerging geopolitical and economic forces of the time, see Cory (2008).
dominion over the Haratine as well (Silverstein 2005, 31). Similar events unfolded in Mauritania, a region which, since its creation in 1902 as the colonial Territoire Civil de Mauritanie, was conceptualized as providing a strategic link between France’s North and West African territories. In imposing new territorial borders across the region, so, too, did the French divide it socially according to principles of racial segregation (see Figure 3, below) that pitted the *Maures* (further divided between *blancs* and *noirs*) living to the north of the Senegal River, against the *Noirs africains* to the South, while the African, Berber, and Arab inhabitants of the Western Saharan territories continued to identify as *bidân*. As an ethnic and a status term, *bidân* soon came to refer to the “free and noble” men of the region while the servile Haratine, referred to by colonists as *Noirs africains*, were increasingly racialized as docile, stupid, land-bound, and easily manipulated. In a manner akin to what happened in rural Morocco, the French attribution of political and territorial dominance to the *bidân* thus came at the expense of the Haratine, who now constitute a majority of the national populations in large migrant-sending countries like Senegal and Mali (Cervello 2006, 145-146).

**Figure 3: French colonial categories of race, as used in Mauritania**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French racial categories</th>
<th>Associated attributes and vices</th>
<th>Further subdivisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maures</strong> [north of the Senegalese River]</td>
<td>Nomadic; characterized as savage, bloodthirsty, lazy, and prone to hypocrisy and lying.</td>
<td><strong>Maures blancs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noirs africains, or the Haratine</strong> [south of the Senegalese River]</td>
<td>Subservient to the <em>bidân</em>; sedentary; characterized as docile, stupid, easily manipulated, and timid.</td>
<td><strong>Maures noirs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bidân</strong> [Africans, Berbers, and Arabs of the Western Sahara territories]</td>
<td>“Free and noble men”; attributed with political power and territorial dominance by the French.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

22 Cervello 2006, 145-146.
It is here that we might therefore see it appropriate to integrate Moroccan history more closely with the greater body of African history and anthropology from which it is too often sundered, if only – at first – by using Mamdani’s landmark analysis of colonial racial and ethnic bifurcation throughout Africa in *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (1996) to explore how, even today, the “legacy of such [colonial] clichés and prejudices remains strong in contemporary social life and largely accounts for the continuing ethnic struggles” that grip the Sahelian and North African regions (Cervello 146). At the same time, we might also look to Morocco as a special case in seeking to understand how, in a manner inspired by Sahlins, colonial legacies in Africa have built upon and consequently re-built residual local meanings, structures, geographies, and practices, many of which could be brought to bear on an intensive study of movement. So, too, do neo-colonial ideological regimes (like migration) that continue to differentially enable or disable certain meanings require our attention in rediscovering pre- and post-colonial African landscapes. Here, the work of Chouki El Hamel in his own landmark text on *Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam* (2013) is, as always, exemplary. In tracing the history of black slavery in Morocco from the 1500s to the early 1900s, El Hamel succeeds in dislocating the question and problem of race in Morocco from the worn-out terrain of colonial intervention. He re-locates it only partially in Islam, and even more-so in the complex process of localizing the Moroccan state. Through a close examination of Mawlay Ismail ibn Sharif’s forcible military conscription and enslavement of over 150,000 black Moroccans and Haratine during his reign from 1672 to 1727, El Hamel offers several critical interventions on the role that Islam and the Islamization of North Africa played in the development of the slave trade and race in Morocco, particularly within the Draa-Tafilalet region. By looking at the contradictions that arose between Mawlay Ismail’s military projects and Qur’anic, hadith, and Sunni legal
writings on slavery, El Hamel argues that we can discern a “crucial turning point in Moroccan history, one that shaped the future of racial relations and black identity and that revealed the disjunction between Islamic ideals and historical realities” (9). These historical realities expose a violent though thoroughly integrated regional history of confrontation, in which sub-Saharan and West African slaves were traded along vast networks of commerce, conquest, and religion that wound throughout Morocco and West Africa, and helped lay the cultural-geographic foundations of the region today. The scope of these networks reached their peak at the end of the sixteenth century, soon after Mawlay Ismail began conscripting his Haratine army in the 1670s (Glasser 2014). Although El Hamel’s timeline of analysis ends with the advent of European intervention, it critically enables a consideration of how colonial and post-colonial histories articulate with local logics of race, geography, and religion.

Historico-regional ideas about “race” thus appear to take many forms in their relation to the expansion of Moroccan state power, the reorganization of local society, the question of land ownership and mobility, and the continual de/re-territorialization of state borders. Indeed, it has been noted that it was upon these very black troops that Mawlay Ismail actually relied in order to bring under control the vast swaths of the Sahara that then constituted part of the *bilād al-sība*, in Tuwat (Algeria) and Taghaza (Mali), and as far down as Trarza (Mauritania), where ĉAli Chandora swore allegiance to him in return for recognition of his authority (Abi-Mershed and Farrar 2014, 10). It is, furthermore, upon the very construction of a *bilād al-makhzan* and *bilād al-sība* that the nation-state of Morocco continues to pin its unrelenting claims over the Western Sahara territory and its peoples today, as products of centuries of interaction between Arab, Berber, and black African populations. The historically fluctuating nature of regional borders, as well as the spiritual dimensions of dynastic power rather the temporal or spatial, are often invoked as proof of the
legitimacy of Morocco’s territorial claims, while others note that the nomads of Western Sahara did in fact pay religious allegiance and monetary tribute to the Moroccan sultan at various points in history (Boukhars & Roussellier 2014, xvii; Castellino & Redondo 2014). Although the Spanish have argued that, at its largest, the Moroccan empire extended only to the southern Draa River, Morocco claims that the entirety of Western Sahara, as well as parts of Mauritania and Algeria, were included in the larger *bilād al-sība* at different times under the Sharifian dynasties (Castellino & Redondo 33). What then comes to characterize the ongoing Western Sahara conflict is exactly the sort of contradictory and ideologically inconsistent claim over territory and group identity upon which many post-colonial national conflicts are similarly predicated, in failing to connect historico-local conceptions of land, movement, and people, with imperialist Westphalian logics of nationhood. In Morocco, the question of Western Sahara thus inverts itself until it becomes almost unrecognizable, fixated as it is on the task of placing territorial borders upon the terrain of the historically de-territorialized, culturally celebrated, racially diverse, and geographically fluid region of *al-sība*.

**Part VI: Conclusions and Further Research**

To speak of irregular sub-Saharan migration in present-day Morocco is to thereby reference a long and complex history of patterned displacements, regional movements, colonial conquests, and changing ideas of race and power, made all-the-more ambivalent and difficult for migrants to navigate today by the now-territorially demarcated, perpetual nation-“states of fragmentation” that continue to dominate the region and provide us with indelible reminders of twentieth-century European intervention. It is literally upon this “fragmented ethnic and racial landscape that the current crisis over African trans-migration [into Morocco] takes place” (Silverstein 2005, 32), with the majority of irregular migrants today hailing from such traditionally-Haratine, West African
nations like Mali (13%) and Senegal (13%), while others come from Nigeria (16%), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (10%), the Ivory Coast (9%), Cameroon (7%), Guinea (5%), and Gambia (5%) (De Bel-Air 2016, 3; Cervello 146). The yet-unresolved issue of the Western Sahara territory and the question of Morocco’s southern border – in constant competition as it is with the interests of Algeria, the United Nations, and the Polisario front – only compound the experiential ambivalence of regional migration. While the southern border remains relatively porous and, in combination with relaxed visa requirements for individuals from Mali and Senegal, easy to navigate for migrants and smugglers alike, Morocco’s northern borders and razor-wire fences at Ceuta, Melilla, and the Strait of Gibraltar stand as a veritable fortress and black hole for the continual expenditure of capital, infrastructure, personnel, and resources in performing what Ruben Andersson aptly terms “the business of bordering Europe” (2014).

It is precisely the question of how such a historically complex, politically ambivalent socio-national landscape is navigated that I seek to answer with future research in the region and for which I attempted to fashion this paper as a springboard, in order to enable an understanding of the multiplicity of meanings and referents that different types of regular versus irregular migration, (re)location, and movement take in a country like Morocco. In fashioning new conceptual categories to talk about the Moroccan state, its migrants, and their experiences, I heed Alioua’s call and similarly seek to expand the current frameworks of transmigration to account for those migrations and social relations that, while stretching across modern nation-state borders, occur within the context of complexly non-Western regional histories, and as such might be felt, enacted, and understood at the local (Moroccan) level as functioning outside of explicitly Westphalian nation-state logics. Such a project ultimately becomes an issue of developing a general theory on the politics of mobility, in which mobility includes voluntary and involuntary forms of movement,
migration, displacement, and resettlement alike. The politics of these differential mobilities should be explored not only in respect to the way in which they are both productive of and produced by differential social power relations, but also the manner in which they can be read as constellations of “broadly traceable histories and geographies … [or, geographically particular] patterns of movement, representations of movement, and ways of [practicing] movement that make sense together” (Cresswell 2010, 18-21).

The use, manipulation, and crossing of physical, social, and political spaces is as central a motif to this project as it is to the vast majority of Moroccan history. To this end, I argue that the etymology of terms like bilād al-makhzan and bilād al-sība, while at times diversionary, can help us think through such historical and geographical specificities. They can also tell us a great deal about how the nation-space of Morocco has been and is still localized, territorialized, and realized today in relation to the identities of those who cross it and the people and terrains they enclose, as well as the policies enacted in order to regulate each. It is thus that the phenomenon that first inspired this paper – the internal “deportations” of sub-Saharan migrants from Tangier to Tiznit and Errachidia – might inspire us to consider how productive/useful versus non-productive/useless spaces still persist in Morocco and across the globe today in terms that relate to the management of blackness, crisis, visibility, and mobility. The fact that colonial and post-colonial mappings of the bilād al-makhzan and bilād al-sība dovetail seamlessly with the model of the “golden triangle” as well as the displacements taking place between Tangier, Tiznit, and Errachidia today is but one (rather cursory) place to start, as illustrated by Figure 4, below. Of more significant potential is the way that such socio-spatial mappings could facilitate new understandings of the collective
imagination of the state as it relates to demographic concentrations and emergent post-national identities. So, too, might such a project help us re-shape our definitions of “success” and “failure,” by illuminating the ways in which differential conceptualizations of nation versus region, citizen versus migrant, displacement versus relocation, and integration versus exclusion affect programmatic implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

Indeed, it is precisely the problem of translating institutionalized migration discourses, categories, and structures into a specifically Moroccan and larger North/West African context that seems to have incited the “crisis” of visibility surrounding irregular and newly emergent “fragmented” migration trends into Morocco before the most recent reforms were announced in 2011 and implemented in 2013. As has been documented extensively by other scholars, the increased fragmentation and extension of migratory trajectories across Morocco and over both time and space can be traced all the way back to the early 2000s and attributed to the increasing militarization of EU borders and spikes in violence and migrant mortality rates along them. These trends came to dominate the region after Spain’s ascension to EU membership in 1986, which effectively worked to “strand” migrants in border-zone countries like Morocco for years while
planning their next move (Andersson 2014; Collyer 2006 & 2010; Ribas-Mateos 2005). Combined with the porosity of the southern border and the continued criminalization of all irregular migration into Morocco, the securitization of the northern border did leave many pre-2011 sub-Saharan transmigrants “under the purview of neither citizen rights nor refugee protection, neither benefitting from the tacit support of corrupt border officials nor subjected to intense police surveillance as in Europe” (Silverstein 2005, 32-33). Seven years and two cycles into these reforms, however, the “crisis” has not ended but rather seems to have created itself anew, in new physical forms, new discursive categories, new localities, and new types of citizens. The daily conversations that continue to take place among Moroccan nationals about the place of black sub-Saharan Africans in their society similarly point towards a general anxiety about the ways in which increasing black migrant integration and institutional visibility might affect local culture, customs, and livelihoods.

The dimensions and manifestations of this visibility, as previously discussed, are multiple. During an interview I conducted in 2017, a high-ranking member of the CNDH insightfully pondered over the way that religion and Islam – as the source of state legitimacy in Morocco – might themselves become a new site for articulating these anxieties, should large numbers of Christian migrants from West Africa continue to arrive, regularize, and integrate more visibly, by seeking to re-open and refurbish previously abandoned churches in Sunni Muslim-majority Morocco. While the Moroccan constitution formally grants freedom of religion and worship to its civilians, it is common knowledge that many Christians, whether foreign-born or local converts, continue to worship in secret out of fear of retaliation and social exclusion23. According to the most recent “International Religious Freedom Report” released by the U.S. Department of State (2017), non-Sunni Muslims currently make up less than 1% of the total national population and

23 Various pop culture sites like Lonely Planet, Vice News, and Trip Advisor, for example, have all published articles or forums on this very topic.
include roughly 30,000 Roman Catholics and 10,000 Protestants, the majority of whom hail from sub-Saharan countries and reside in major cities like Casablanca, Tangier, and Rabat. The question of religion and political sovereignty thus looms large against the current migratory landscape, as black, predominantly Christian migrants continue to stream into urban centers that not only constitute the main sites of political power in Morocco but are also most closely associated with the production and performance of modern Moroccan identity as well.

The continued practice of relocating black migrants from northern to southern regions, from the land of an ideological al-makhzan to that of al-sība, would therefore seem to indicate an ongoing state-level preoccupation with managing such relational and demographic concentrations (Alioua 2006), in terms of where they are most “useful” or desirable and where they are not. In order to go beyond the specter of “crisis,” then, and to invert its performative logics – or to ask even what it is performing – it is necessary for migration scholars and activists to make equally visible the state spaces into which migrants are expelled and in which they are forced to become “invisible” once more, rather than just focusing our attention on the borders and boundaries where crisis, hysteria, and state-hood are most easily produced (Brown 2010). Utilizing Janet Roitman’s analytical framework of Anti-Crisis (2014) and Andersson’s work in Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe (2014), we can start to rudimentarily track the types of state sovereignty that the proclamation of “crisis” at the northern EU-Moroccan borders did call attention to and have made continually possible in the name of reinstating normality. In strategically re-positioning itself as the gate-keeper to the EU and an ever-emergent regional super-power, and placing itself squarely within the global moment of the modern (i.e., as a moment of besiegement (Hage 2016)), Morocco, I would argue, has not, in fact, deviated from previous histories or entered a new geopolitical era, as its proponents and other scholars assert. Rather, its
ongoing attentive-ness to the northern cities, regions, and borders might be better interpreted as a new iteration in its centuries-long process of localizing state identity and power against a larger national geography marked by immense racial, cultural, and sociolinguistic heterogeneity.

In this vein, the utility of the northern regions for centralizing global attention upon the specter of crisis seems to only further enable Morocco’s political economic integration into modernity, useful as these spaces have become for facilitating the militarization of border fences, the funneling of capital and investment into migrant deterrence programs, the expansion of Frontex’s EU border patrol operations, the construction of new off-shore detention centers, and the research and development of innumerable new border control technologies like radar, satellites, advanced information systems, and intricate surveillance networks (Roitman 2014; Andersson 2014). While northern Morocco is certainly “productive” for enabling the types of border spectacle that Nicholas De Genova conceptualizes in his now-landmark paper on “Spectacles of Migrant ‘Illegality’: The Scene of Exclusion, the Obscene of Inclusion” (2013), such spectacle is, fundamentally, performative, i.e., of something – here, of sovereignty, modernity, and the need for governmental intervention, whose coverage across various media, organizational, and academic channels further perpetuates the very businesses that “crisis” itself operationalizes (Andersson 2014; Brown 2010; Roitman 2014). The footnote to this performance is, of course, that it is fundamentally predicated on the ability to control certain parameters, or, to include some aspects and exclude others. It is in this way that the displacement of black migrants from cities like Tangier might be read as part and parcel of a larger performative logic that overlays historical Moroccan geographies of race, space, and the expulsion, containment, and disappearance of dissidents and migrants alike in times of crisis and systemic overflow. Indeed, the drama of migrant precarity as it unfolds across these southern stretches now makes these regions impossible to dismiss as places
of mere useless-ness to a nation-state-of-crisis, whose representatives and bureaucratic officials would rather not trade in images of migrants dying on the Sahara, being shuttled back and forth to the rural hinterlands of Errachidia and Tiznit, and becoming entrapped in prostitution rings in Laayoune.

The south in this case remains, instead, incredibly useful for containing and operationalizing the violent expulsionary logics of the nation-state in its attempts to grapple with emergent systemic fissures, much in the same way that the rural hinterlands of Morocco were never truly useless to its dynastic powers, insofar as they provided the critical base of tribal support and conscript-able manpower to each emergent dynasty; the post-colonial bilād al-sība was never truly useless to the Moroccan nation-space of the makhzan, insofar as its control, marginalization, and under-development served to entrench further the makhzan’s power and to repress and sequester its dissidents; the pre-Saharan expanses of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania were never truly useless to their French colonizers, insofar as they served to connect and sustain their other regional territories; and the vast swaths of un-patrolled desert land between the U.S. and Mexico have never truly occupied a place secondary to the high-drama performances of bordering that take place elsewhere, insofar as they continue to map the borders between life and agonizing death along the countries’ desert edges themselves (De León 2015). It is thus in light of such seemingly dichotomous though intricately inter-dependent scenes and geographies that “the frail ideological dichotomy of ‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’ utterly collapses” (De Genova 1181).

Of course, this all is not to say that these policies, initiatives, and activities are consciously formulated by the state, but rather that the effects of its various failures and successes can provide helpful insight into the manner in which land and people are collectively imagined and institutionally rendered visible and/or invisible, and what this says about how national
infrastructures and socio-physical spaces are used to hold some things and not others. Drawing upon local histories of race, movement, land, and identity, we can furthermore start to see how certain movements by certain peoples through certain places have historically constituted an important site for the formation and contestation of group feeling, political legitimacy, and different ways of belonging to the nation-state – the formations of which are now undergoing a rapid reconfiguration in the transition between post-colonial nationalism and post-nationalist sovereignty. As my future research will try to show, the normative categories of citizenship and migration do not hold, if they ever did hold in a place like Morocco. The figure of the modern migrant consequently provides us with innumerable possibilities for apprehending new forms of identity, types of belonging, configurations of national space, political structures, and racial geographies, as they are reformulated at sites of systemic fissure. If we start with the migrant and look at the migratory project as a systemic whole, what emerges is a series of movements and expulsions that connect diverse global regions as much as they do divide – from the original moment of departure; to the other border crossings that follow, including the relatively easy crossing into Morocco via Western Sahara versus the infrastructural obstacles that face potential border-crossers at Ceuta and Melilla; to the experience of forced “migration” in Morocco between Tangier and Tiznit, and the subsequent in-state movements it precipitates; and finally to the way that a black migrant man or woman experiences integration (or continued displacement) post-regularization. Indeed, according to a recent 2016 survey conducted by Fouzi Mourji, et al. with a sample size of 1,453 sub-Saharan migrants across Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, Salé, and Mohammedia, the uptick in migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Morocco can be read primarily as a consequence of unequal global development – as a matter of “searching in the north [i.e., the
EU and Morocco] for those resources not found at home” (my translation), despite nearly 50% of respondents indicating that they had already attained some level of higher education (8, 26).

Set against a larger regional backdrop dominated by failed structural adjustment programs, modernization and development projects, on-going environmental degradation, neo-extractivism, large-scale foreign land acquisitions, and post-colonial nation-building, the task of confining the movements and expulsions that continue to emanate from these processes within the Westphalian paradigm of migration makes little to no sense at best, if we wish to understand better the local histories and experiences that often make its applicability to areas of the global South so untenable. Here, the conceptual structures of land and geography offer many more possibilities than just locating borders, regions, and nation-states, and tracing the origins, trajectories, and “destinations” of those who are expelled within and across them. As argued by Sassen (2014), the very nature of global finance capitalism and its associated material practices are actually working to “transform sovereign national territory into a far more elementary condition – land for usufruct” (82). In the context of foreign land acquisitions, this process not only degrades the governments that sell and lease it, but also the meaning of citizenship for the people it expels, and the very water and earth that are quickly extracted from it, too (Sassen 83). Largely Third World, post-colonial national territories, as a result, “become merely land” once more (Sassen 83) – or, land to be bought, sold, fought over, and expelled from, in a manner that recalls Ghassan Hage’s argument on the systemic interface between environmental, migratory, and neo-colonial discourses of crisis and besiegement (2016). Nowhere does this trajectory become more visible than in Africa, where Morocco and its largest migrant-sending countries like Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo all figure amongst the most-targeted countries for foreign land acquisition and thus for civilian displacement and environmental degradation as well, as investments continue to crowd
out and expel other pre-existing material economies (Sassen 98, 106). Indeed, the politics of resource extraction occupy no small space in Moroccan history; the skirmish that erupted with Algeria in October 1961, for example, in a dispute over the exact location of the border, was in large part fueled by the fact that the area might hold valuable mineral deposits (Fairmont 1978, 16). So, too, is Morocco’s place as a global leader in phosphate production entirely predicated upon its continued control of the Bou Craa mine of Western Sahara, where 10% of its phosphate output is mined annually (Kasprak 2016).

By following the theme of expulsions, we are also better able to position ourselves to make previously invisible spaces newly visible and to investigate new logics of management as they develop, succeed, and fail in relation to people, capital, and territories alike. When, for example, in his imaginative paper on “The New ‘Peculiar Institution’: On the Prison as Surrogate Ghetto” (2000), Loïc Wacquant takes us through the history of his four “peculiar institutions” (i.e., chattel slavery, the Jim Crow system, the urban ghetto, and the prison), each of which served to “define, confine, and control” African Americans in the U.S., and shows us how each evolved as a response to the declining authority of the previous – culminating in the re-emergence of the prison system in order to maintain racial separations after the ghetto “was rendered partially obsolete by the concurrent transformation of economy and state and by the mounting protest of blacks against continued caste exclusion, climaxing with the explosive urban riots chronicled in the Kerner Commission Report” (318) – what we are confronted with is not so much an understanding of race per se in American history, but rather an unsettling picture of how a state responds when people can no longer be held by their “correct” places, when the borders start to crumble and when transgression threatens the existing norms of racial segregation. So, too, might we try to analyze the spaces in North and West Africa – whether urban, rural, architectural, fenced-in, or otherwise
– that become re-appropriated for managing certain “problematic” populations during moments of immense transition that require new ways of making people, land, and identity mean (something). The field of migration studies is especially suited to this task, given the manner in which different forms of institutionalized movement (i.e., as migration, deportation, or displacement) have been historically appropriated by states in order to supplement political projects of the moment – whether in relation to the U.S. abolitionist movement of the mid-1800s (Jung 2009), or the Green March upon Western Sahara in 1975 – and to alleviate the impacts felt during times of both increased voluntary emigration and economic recession (Walters 2010).

Indeed, the increasingly reactionary nature of modern migration discourses and policies, as well as the expansion of infrastructures of immobility and racial separation epitomized by not only the ghetto, prison, or concentration camp, but also by the refugee camp, gated community, and quarantine zone, have already led a number of scholars to theorize the post-national age of globalization as a “mobility regime” (Shamir 2005) marching quickly down the path towards a hyper-demarcated “enclave society” (Turner 2007). Central to many of these academic and political discussions alike is always the racialized image of the migrant, the refugee, the nomad – the mover – whose very presence within the nation-state offers a potent site for the “invention of all kinds of new forms of surveillance and identity documentation” that frequently bump up against, entangle with, and even create anew historico-local geographies of people, race, and space (Cresswell 29). The associated images of “excess,” of “overflow” – of “crisis” – are then critical to such meaning-making moments of institutional fissure and transition, in justifying or even enabling the new logics of population management that inevitably follow, wherein social or economic expulsions are accompanied by geographical ones as well … or, when individuals who cannot fit into neat categorical places are assigned to physical ones instead.
At the same time, the investigation of these new logics as they relate to migrants need not necessarily be a somber activity. Instead, I see it as providing a practical way for migration specialists, lawyers, and practitioners to advocate for the development of regional specificity within certain categories, and the complete overhaul of others if necessary. Such projects have already been taken up by several scholars, most notably by E. Tendayi Achiume, a migration and human rights lawyer currently serving as the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance. In her recent work, Achiume advocates for radically reorienting global approaches to unauthorized African political and economic migration towards the EU and other Western entities, by instead understanding it as decolonization, or, “international movement that responds to the asymmetrical benefits structure of co-dependence in the contemporary global order and seeks to achieve a more equitable relationship between center and periphery” (2017, 143). Isolating systemic fissures in Morocco thus becomes a task of paramount importance, in not only adding to collective knowledge and advocating for situational justice, but also in recognizing and bringing to the light the places in which the expelled now increasingly find themselves. As so eloquently put by Sassen, these spaces deserve to be made “conceptually visible … [T]he space of the expelled … is not simply a dark hole. It is present. [These spaces] are, potentially, the new spaces for making – making local economies, new histories, and new modes of membership” (222).
Bibliography


