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While the United States has recently begun to explore new regional planning approaches to urbanization, other societies have experimented for decades with extensive regional management policies designed to structure growth in metropolitan areas. For example, since the 1950s several Canadian metropolitan areas have employed regional management policies to coordinate urban growth and transportation facilities. A reexamination of the regional planning experiences of this neighboring society with cultural and geographic characteristics similar to those of the United States could provide extremely useful information for understanding and improving American as well as Canadian metropolitan planning.

This paper presents an updated comparative examination of the institutional setting and relative successes of regional planning organizations in some of the largest and most complex metropolitan areas in Canada and the United States, and discusses their implications for metropolitan planning in other economically advanced societies.

STUDY METHOD

To conduct our comparative study, we reexamined a representative sample of large urban areas in both countries, and paired these areas in order to reflect regional differences in each country (Fallis 1990) and similarities among specific metropolitan areas on both sides of the border (Feldman and Goldberg 1987). We first selected the largest Canadian metropolitan areas and then chose what appeared to be counterpart regions in the United States (in terms of national function, social composition, location, geography, and relative size and history). We then paired resident teams of Canadian and American researchers, who studied the following set of selected paired metropolitan regions:

- Toronto-Chicago
- Montreal-Boston
- Vancouver-San Francisco Bay Area
- Edmonton-Houston
- Winnipeg-Minneapolis-St. Paul

Again, we set out to explore three hypotheses that might help explain the similarities and differences between the two metro governance systems. The first hypothesis is drawn from the research of Goldberg and Mercer (1986), who found significant urban contrasts between the two countries and argued that their findings were due to differences in a broad range of national social, economic and cultural characteristics. According to this hypothesis, differences are to be expected because of many mutually reinforcing social, economic and political variables reflecting the overall dissimilarities of the two social systems.
A second hypothesis claims that metropolitan differences can result primarily from conscious political decisions that shape urban development in both countries (Frisken 1986; Hall 1991). Indeed, Frisken fears that shifts in Canadian provincial governmental policies that increasingly favor suburban over central city areas may “Americanize” Canadian metropolitan areas. A third hypothesis is that urban policy making is increasingly influenced by autonomous global social and economic forces. That is, as the world economy becomes more open and competitive, the slightest diseconomies, such as congestion, pollution, and high housing costs, make established centers less desirable and induce continued decentralization of development (Hall and Hay 1980; Cherry 1984; Rothblatt and Garr 1986; Castells 1990). According to this hypothesis, urban development and policy making are driven by world trends, would be largely beyond local or national control, and result in increasing similarities of the two systems.

To retest these hypotheses, the paired study teams conducted research from 1995 to 1997. Using library research and data analysis, and interviews with other researchers, public officials, and representatives of the private and nonprofit sectors, the teams studied the process of regional planning in each of the paired metropolitan areas in the sample. The relative roles of public, private and nonprofit sectors were examined. Drafts of papers reporting on this research were presented by the end of 1997.

This paper presents some of the findings of our new collective enterprise and tentative conclusions drawn from them.

FINDINGS

As before, nearly every North American metropolitan area has some form of regional institutional arrangement to at least consider metropolitan issues (see Table 1). Yet, few of these institutions have the authority to govern. As shown on Table 2, our study confirms the view held by Goldberg and Mercer (1986) that Canadian metropolitan areas generally have more highly developed regional governance and planning systems with respect to the quality of planning and development than their American counterparts. This seems true despite the great regional and developmental variations in Canadian political styles, and despite the long history of promoting U.S. metropolitan planning, from the founding of the Regional Planning Association of New York in the 1920s to the formation of hundreds of Councils of Government (COGs) during the 1960s and 70s, because such institutions are almost always advisory (Harrigan 1993).

Toronto

Even the most highly regarded Canadian metropolitan governments are not without their limitations. Clearly Metro Toronto, established in 1954, was one of the most effective two-tiered metropolitan governments in North America, which rationally guided development and infrastructure within its domain. Metro, which had its directly elected council representing Toronto and five consolidated suburban communities, had authority for local plan review and regional tax sharing.
Metro was able to substantially meet the objectives of its 1980 plan to preserve downtown Toronto as the region's main commercial and cultural center; develop secondary centers of commercial activity and high density housing linked to public transportation, locate job sites throughout Metro's area to enable people to live closer to work; and provide housing of varying income and densities throughout its region (Nowlan and Stewart 1991; Frisken 1993). Nevertheless, most of the growth since the 1970s in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) has occurred beyond the boundaries and control of Metro. Although the Toronto area, with its 1996 CMA population of 4,264,000, does not have the large number of local governments found in U.S. urban areas, Frances Frisken (1993) observed, "the GTA has not entirely escaped local political fragmentation and complexity." Metro Toronto was surrounded by four outlying regional municipalities containing a total of 25 municipalities making development decision-making within the GTA increasingly difficult, especially when a number of these entities did not even have an agreed upon development plan until very recently. Indeed, as Frisken (1993) stated about the Toronto region:

> What has become increasingly apparent is that Metro as a whole is in competition with its regional neighbors (and their member municipalities) for population, economic investment and provincial funds for infrastructure.

In addition, Canadian metropolitan governments are not entirely autonomous within their own boundaries. The provincial cabinet, with its great powers of providing social and infrastructure services and reviewing land use decisions, still has the greatest potential to influence the character of public services and settlement patterns within a metropolitan region. This potential far exceeds the authority exercised by American states, which have usually given great deference to local governments, including home rule powers (Weiher 1991). Yet, in recent years the province of Ontario appears to have been reluctant to impose a clear development strategy for the Toronto area and has seldom overridden local planning preferences. The growing political influence of the expanding suburban areas and the concern of other portions of the province threatened by Toronto’s growing economic power have directed provincial resources for infrastructure and community services away from Metro to other areas. Thus, while the province of Ontario took great initiative in establishing Metro in the 1950s and reorganizing it with some political consolidation and directly elected representation during the following three decades, the province has become primarily a region-wide and province-wide mediator and consensus builder in recent years (Mellon 1993). This shift is reflected in Ontario's Office of the Greater Toronto Area which was established in 1988 to foster regional cooperation in the GTA, and whose influence is shown in Metro’s plan, *The Liveable Metropolis*, which was made to consider the future of the entire GTA (Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department 1992).

In 1995, in response to the economic recession of the early 1990s and the growing public concern over the excessive complexity of local government, the provincial government created the GTA Task Force to provide direction for the future governance of the GTA especially with regard to social equity, environmental protection and economic growth. The GTA Task Force recommended the creation of a Greater Toronto Council, that could replace the five existing
regional councils, and oversee service districts providing such services as transit and environmental control, and strengthen local governments in the delivery of community and social services. The Task Force also recommended that properties throughout the province be reassessed at their market value, and pooling non-residential assessments for educational purposes.

With little consensus over the Task Forces' report, the new Progressive Conservative provincial government generated its own efficiency driven policies for the region in 1996: to streamline Metro Toronto by amalgamating the six municipalities into one megacity, Toronto (over the wishes of residents of these communities); to reassess all properties with respect to current market values; and to download the costs of services to local governments (Rusk 1997A). While the bill was modified somewhat with regard to the taxation issues, its passage in April 1997 made Toronto the fourth most populous city in North America in January 1998 (Rusk 1997B).

At the same time, the more conservative and influential outlying suburban regional municipalities surrounding Metro remained separately unscathed by these dramatic changes. In addition, while the provincial government seems willing to consider a GTA-wide forum or services board to promote inter-municipal dialogue, it was not prepared to create a strong metropolitan government representing the entire GTA which could politically challenge the province itself. As Frisken points out about earlier provincial efforts for regional restructuring:

> Even when it decided to act, the government was not prepared to create a body that could perform as a GTA government. If such a body were put in place, it could claim to represent nearly half of the provincial population.

Even with this most recent dramatic initiative of Metro amalgamation, the provincial government was not seeking to foster a particular regional development policy. It was pushed by primarily economic drives to streamline, and to some extent disengage from, local government (Rusk 1997A). As Frisken concludes:

> Despite periodic interventions in Toronto affairs to further its own interests, the provincial government has seldom linked those interests to the production or implementation of a cohesive regional development strategy... It has preferred to rely on consultation with and among representatives of municipal governments as the principal way of dealing with metropolitan-wide issues.

Thus, this show of periodic provincial dominance will probably strengthen the independence of local governments and weaken urban regional cohesiveness. This, in turn, makes the establishment of a provincial backed GTA-wide institution, such as the proposed Greater Toronto Services Board, essential for generating a consensus about planning for the future development of the region.
Montreal

The Montreal region reflects a similar pattern of provincial behavior to the Toronto case. As the second largest French-speaking city in the industrialized world, with a 1996 metropolitan area population of 3,327,000, and as the cultural and economic capital of Quebec, Montreal itself plays a distinctive role without parallel in the rest of Canada. Yet, the function of ethnicity and history in Montreal metropolitan politics are somewhat akin to those in the Boston region.

The regional government in the Montreal area, the Montreal Urban Community (MUC), was established in 1970 primarily to rationalize transportation and police services. Initially, there were hopes that the MUC, which now represents Montreal and 28 much smaller communities, would become a strong metropolitan government with broad powers to implement a vision for the region (Sancton 1988). However, because of the political tensions between Montreal and these other cities (many of which are primarily anglophone), and because of the community council's requirement for double approvals (by the council and the city of Montreal) for action, MUC's activities have been greatly constrained. As Marie-Odile Trepanier states:

MUC's functions, except for police and transit, tended to be limited to noncontroversial technical matters such as sewage collectors or air pollution control.

From the outset, MUC boundaries were obsolete encompassing only about 71 percent of the metropolitan population in 1971, and dropping to 60 percent by 1986. The approximately 70 municipalities in the most rapidly growing part of the region, the outlying suburban ring, continue to increase their influence with the Quebec provincial government for public investment in infrastructure and other public services. For example, a major highway planned to link the Montreal area with the Ottawa region will be rerouted away from the city of Montreal to serve suburban areas instead (Simaerd 1989). Thus, like the Toronto case, the Quebec province seems to be involved in the politics of allocation and building a metropolitan consensus.

As Montreal's economy was faltering in the 1991 recession, efforts were made by the Quebec government to improve the region's economy and governmental structure. Consequently, the Task Force on Greater Montreal was created by Quebec's Minister of Municipal Affairs in April 1992, to study the region's territorial organization of municipal functions with a focus on regional planning and development. In December 1993, the Task Force presented its final report which presented a city-centered regional vision, with a new institutional framework for regional government and planning, the Metropolitan Region, which would be responsible for the entire Montreal CMA (not the partial coverage of the MUC), as well as new provincial ministry with a regional focus.
After much public discussion, and the 1994 elections bringing the Parti Quebecois to power, some of its Task Force's proposals began to materialize. In December 1995, a new Metropolitan Transportation Agency with responsibility for all regional public transportation facilities was created. In January 1996, a new cabinet post was established -- Minister of State for Greater Montreal, who became responsible for coordinating all provincial policies in the region. He would also chair a proposed Greater Montreal Development Commission (administered by a 40 member council mostly of municipal representatives) with powers concerned with regional planning and coordinating without specific management responsibility in the areas of economic development, land use, transportation, and waste management. Although a bill to establish this commission was adopted in June 1997, this commission has not yet been formed. Programatic implementation of the bill has also been delayed since it was supposed to occur over a two year period after the establishment of the commission.

Yet, the proposed actions will not reorganize local or regional municipalities, as was suggested by the Task Force, which will probably leave the metropolitan in a sea of indecisiveness. At the same time, the commission is likely to simply reinforce provincial dominance in the governance and planning activities of the Montreal area. As Trepanier concluded:

> the recent Development Commission conceived by the Minster of State for Greater Montreal seems to acknowledge this deadlock by keeping a [provincial] government control over most decisions.

**Vancouver**

Established in 1969, the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD), also showed great promise as a metropolitan government. It not only had a mandated planning function for the Vancouver region which in 1996 was comprised of 20 municipalities representing 1.8 million inhabitants, but also delivered a wide range of services to the area, such as water supply and hospital facilities. GVRD's board of directors consists of 30 members representing municipal and incorporated districts that were initially free to "opt out" of a particular function of the district. Thus, the board in fact had a voluntary characteristic by functional activity.

During its first decade and a half of functioning with uncertain provincial support, the GVRD generated a sophisticated regional planning process to guide development for an extended regional area through its Liveable Region Programme, which dealt with such issues as jobs/housing balance, employment, open space, rapid transit, and growth management. Yet, a series of conflicts with the provincial government as well as shifts to a more conservative provincial cabinet led to the removal of GVRD's regional planning authority in 1983. Consequently at that time, the GVRD was left essentially as an elaborate service district, not a new level of government.

Nevertheless, the GVRD continues to have significant influence on regional development because of its past work, prestige, and ongoing leadership in such important planning activities.
as the participatory process leading to the 1995 update of the Livable Regional Strategic Plan -- a set of broadly agreed upon policies for ensuring a more environmentally balanced metropolitan area through green space protection; building complete communities of housing and jobs; the development of a compact metro region; and increased transportation choice (GVRD 1996). In addition, the GVRD expects to implement its strategic plan by the continuance of its consensus/partnership process with local, provincial and federal government, such as its 1997 agreement with the province; site specific delivery of GVRD services; and a five year review process of regional goals achievement. In addition, the Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority (GVTA) was established in 1998 to plan and manage the metropolitan transportation system in cooperation with GVRD regional policies. As Smith and Oberlander conclude about the promise of this participatory regional governance approach:

The BC and Greater Vancouver experience would suggest that regional governance is a viable alternative to regional government. In Greater Vancouver, there is a clear capacity to act in a metropolitan setting, to find solutions to pressing policy dilemmas in areas such as land use and the environment, and to do so in a functioning intergovernmental arrangement involving local authorities, the regional district, and the province.

It appears that, even without formal authority, the GVRD through its evolving consensus building process will continue to play a central role in developing an effective regional planning and governance system as an alternative to formal regional governance in the Vancouver area.

Edmonton

The Edmonton metropolitan area is still a developing resource oriented region, which is more market oriented than our other Canadian study areas. Spurred by the post World War II petroleum boom, Edmonton's population increased nearly five fold to 515,800 during the 1947-81 period, while the entire metropolitan area nearly quadrupled to 741,000. By 1996, its metropolitan area population reached 863,000 covering 1,599 square miles.

Like several emerging cities in America's sunbelt, Edmonton's growth was reinforced with vigorous boosterism and governmental reformism, which pushed for extensive annexation of surrounding areas. That is, there was a drive to create a larger central city that would increase the economic importance of Edmonton and rationalize metropolitan government. Thus, between 1947 and 1981 Edmonton grew from about 40 to 234 square miles in area. In fact, its last large annexation proposal, which was only partially approved (due to opposition of adjacent municipalities) by the province in 1981, would have increased Edmonton's size to 888 square miles. Ted Thomas (1993) described this annexation showdown:

The provincial government resisted all proposals for regional government, likely out of fears of the influence such a unified government in its own backyard might have on provincial politics. By emphasizing repeatedly its commitment to local
autonomy of the communities within the region, the government was quite willing
to accept the inefficiencies and redundancies which followed from the policy.

After more than two decades of rivalry between Edmonton and its neighbors over
economic development and annexation issues, the Alberta cabinet established the Edmonton
Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission (EMRPC) in 1981. EMPRC's boundaries included
four rural and 15 urban municipalities in a 2,576 square mile area.

The commission's mandate was to "plan for the orderly development of the region..." (EMRPC 1987, 6). Its main functions were: to prepare and administer a regional plan; provide advice and assistance to municipalities when requested; act as the subdivision approving authority for the region; provide advice and recommendations on annexation matters; and seek and encourage public participation in the planning of the Edmonton region.

As part of its ongoing operations, the commission often served as a center for
coordinating the planning activities undertaken by other levels of government. The EMRPC guided growth and development matters of local and regional significance. The commission worked closely with municipalities by providing advice on land-use matters, but, except for subdivision approvals, served in an advisory capacity only. The goals and objectives of the commission concerned enhancing the commission's role as an intermunicipal forum.

Beyond its advisory capacity, the EMRPC seemed likely to run into major problems planning for the region. With the city of Edmonton possessing 73 percent of the region's population with only one-third of the votes, and the other rival municipalities having the remaining votes, it was extremely difficult for the commission to build a consensus for effective action.

Partly as a result of the economic recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new conservative Alberta provincial government was elected in the fall of 1992. In an effort to improve Alberta's economy, the new government adopted policies to streamline government which eventually led to the Municipal Government Act of 1995 which represented a major devolution of urban development responsibility from the provincial government to local government, and effectively dismantled the EMRPC and other formerly mandated regional planning commissions in Alberta.

At the same time, the provincial government encouraged individual municipalities to enter into intermunicipal agreements for managing area inside development. Consequently, 13 of the 19 municipalities represented in EMRPC formed the voluntary Capital Regional Forum, Ltd. in 1995 designed to provide an institutional setting for discussion and resolution of regional issues through task forces and strategic alliances. However, the success of this new voluntary regional institution is still uncertain. As Ted Thomas concludes:

To be successful in accomplishing its mission the Forum will have to rely on the social capital which was built up in the region during the past
forty-five years as it struggles to address the differing needs of rural, rural-urban, and urban constituents. It is yet to be seen if the norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement that enable citizens of diverse communities to trust one another and cooperate to achieve common regional objectives will enable the Forum to succeed in its mission.

Again, the voluntary nature of local community participation in the regional governance of the Edmonton area is still like those in American sunbelt metropolitan regions, such as the Houston area.

Chicago

The findings for the American metropolitan areas show similar variety in institutional forms, but far less success, in regional governance compared to most of the Canadian experience. The Chicago area, with its 8,590,000 residents in 1995 covering 5,660 square miles, brings the Canadian-U.S. differences into sharp relief. This third most populous metropolitan area in North America has, as Hemmens points out, "continued to be one of the most densely governed in the United States with over 1,250 local governments". And while there are regional planning institutions in the Chicago area, such as the Northeastern Illinois Regional Planning Commission (NIPC) for general planning and the Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS) for transportation planning, they have almost no authority to implement their plans. True, NIPC and CATS do provide useful information, technical assistance and regional images and serve as vehicles for metropolitan-wide cooperation. But few of their planning proposals have been accepted by the various cities, counties and special districts which they serve and by which they are governed (Hemmens and McBride 1993).

NIPC, which was established in 1957 with 33 commissioners reflecting local, regional and statewide interests, has no taxing authority and raises funds by contracting specialized planning services and through contributions of local governments in the region. In addition to CATS, NIPC's planning activities have to be coordinated with other influential regional special districts which provide important services, such as public transportation and sewers. At the same time, the city of Chicago and several sub-regional planning efforts in the form of outlying counties and suburban councils of government have also developed policies for major portions of the metropolitan area. These diverse public institutions coupled with private sector interests filtered through non-profit organizations, such as the Metropolitan Planning Council, make regional consensus building very difficult but very important for almost anything implemented in the region.

Major cleavages also exist along race and class lines which are reflected in the geopolitics of the region. Chicago, with its 1990 population 39.1 percent black and 19.6 percent hispanic residing in clearly defined minority neighborhoods, is one of the most segregated cities in the United States (Squires, et.al. 1987; Massey and Denton 1988). Rivalry among the various neighborhoods for jobs, housing and public services represents important controversies within
the city, and competition between Chicago and the outlying suburbs for economic development, tax revenues and public resources delineates major points of conflict within the region (Bennett et al. 1987).

Thus, only the most crucial area-wide problems are dealt with at the regional level, such as coping with excessive transportation congestion. For this reason, a considerable amount of cooperation was experienced by almost all parties concerned in a recent NIPC-CATS sponsored transportation planning process (2010 TSP Plan) for necessary highway and transit improvements. Indeed, our case study found that a 1987 survey indicated that a majority of the regional population believe that transportation is the only problem that can't be solved by localities independently; and that a 1990 survey revealed a broadening of regional concern to include overall spatial development.

Occasionally, an encouraging consensus is formed on other regional planning issues, such as a solid waste management plan, with the aid of the Regional Partnership -- a consortium of governmental (City of Chicago, NIPC, and the State of Illinois) and civic organizations that addresses important metropolitan-wide problems. In addition, with the assistance of 5 volunteer task forces, NIPC itself adopted a new plan, Strategic Plan for Land Resource Management, which attempts to deal with such issues as the regional jobs/housing imbalance (Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission 1992). However, it remains to be seen how well these plans will be implemented.

Yet, for most regional issues Hemmens characterize decision-making in the Chicago area as follows:

As things are presently organized, effective leadership is impossible. The traditional political planning process won't work in the future.....

And since potentially major actors, such as a regional planning institution, the private sector, and the state government, are unable or unwilling to lead in resolving issues, the result is usually inaction.

Boston

Even though the Boston region is the oldest U.S. metropolitan area in our study, it seems to experience governance problems similar to those in much of metropolitan America. With its 1995 population of 5,508,000 over 2,429 square miles, the Boston area has over 100 cities and towns, five counties and dozens of school and special districts.

Despite numerous attempts to create some form of metropolitan government for the Boston region since the 1880s, none has been established. Instead, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts created the first American regional special district in 1889, the Metropolitan Sewer District, and many others over the years for such activities as parks and transportation. It wasn't until 1963 that the state established a regional planning institution for the Boston area, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC).
As Irish Catholic immigrants starting to dominate Boston's population in the mid-nineteenth century, the old line Yankee protestant population tried to control Boston and its metropolitan area from the statehouse and eventually from local suburban government. This political cleavage continues on today with perhaps even greater intensity with the emergence of a significant minority group population in Boston (25.6 percent black and 10.8 percent hispanic in 1990) in recent decades. Thus, it is not surprising that historically regional services were provided by state dominated special districts. It is also not surprising that MAPC, the first regional planning agency for the area, was established as an extension of state government requiring representation of all local governments in the region (now 101) and state agencies and special districts, and having purely advisory planning functions. As Mark Gelfand (1993) observed about the state:

> It might have imposed metropolitan government upon the region, but chose not to do so because this would have created a major rival to its own authority.

After nearly three decades, MAPC finally developed enough of a consensus to adopt its first comprehensive regional plan, MetroPlan 2000, in Spring 1990, which calls for more focused sub-regional development and efficient infrastructure provision as well as a strengthened regional planning agency. And while there was initial opposition to the top down approach to the plan by local governments, a more local-regional collaborative planning process especially in the selection of the Concentrated Development Centers (CDCS), MetroPlan 2000 has received increasing local and state-wide support. As Gelfand indicates:

> MetroPlan 2000 got off to a rough start, but it now holds some promise of making an impact on the region.

**San Francisco Bay Area**

Clearly, the San Francisco Bay Area has a regional geography and settlement pattern quite different from those in most major North American metropolitan areas. While its development is dispersed around a 100-mile-long bay, the region is focused on three major central cities -- San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose -- each competing for its share of political, economic, and cultural resources.

Yet, similar to many American metropolitan areas, it has a decentralized multinucleated political and physical settlement pattern. With its 1995 population of 6,540,000 over a 7,403 square mile area, it is host to 602 units of government including 100 cities, 10 counties, and hundreds of special districts.
The most comprehensive look at regional planning for the Bay Area has been undertaken by the region's council of governments, the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG). Created in 1961, ABAG's organization is provided by contractual agreement between member cities and counties acting under the authority of the joint Exercise of Powers Act of the state of California. Its voluntary membership includes 97 cities and nine counties, which send representatives and dues to the organization (ABAG 1997).

Besides providing information and a forum for regional concerns, ABAG has the responsibility to create a regional plan in concert with other regional institutions, especially the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC). Its Plan, produced in 1970 and amended in 1980, called for a "City Center Region" that would focus increased housing density development near existing urban areas and provide open space buffers between cities. However, in the absence of authority to implement these policies, ABAG's plan met with very limited success. During the 1970s and '80s, housing densities did not increase, and urban sprawl continued to consume open space and generate traffic congestion at an alarming rate. This process of metropolitan expansion was reinforced by the 1978 Proposition 13 tax change in California, which encourages inlying local governments to capture the more fiscally desirable commercial and industrial activity and push service demanding residential development to the periphery of metropolitan areas. As an evaluation of ABAG's regional plan indicated (ABAG 1986, 3):

Today, what remains of open space is increasingly under development pressures. Annually, regional growth is consuming close to 7,000 acres of undeveloped land. It is only a matter of time before the remaining buffers will disappear.

Another problem facing ABAG has been the drastic cutback of its federal funding that decreased from 85 to 17 percent of its annual budget during the 1976-97 period. As a result it has expanded its activities by providing many revenue-generating services to local governments, such as group liability insurance, credit pooling, and technical training. Indeed, nearly two-thirds of ABAG's staff work on these activities in order to support the remaining staff engaged in regional planning activities. Despite the revenues from these services, ABAG does not have the staff to fully conduct the comprehensive studies and persuasive planning required for traditional regional planning and implementation. In addition, the expanding region has become more complex and difficult to plan for.

To economize on its limited resources, ABAG appears to have shifted to a strategic planning approach involving identifying specific regional problems and generating realistic solutions. Jones and Rothblatt (1993) observed this about ABAG's new approach:

The current planning process (a kind of strategic planning) consists of ... activities which are both consecutive and overlapping. The planning agenda arises from reactions to acknowledged problems or crises and from deliberate attempts to anticipate problems.
In the absence of an enforceable regional plan, many planning activities have been undertaken by numerous public and private actors at varying scales of operation: growth limiting regulations beyond traditional land-use controls have been adopted by more than half of the region's local governments; and several subregional organizations of local governments and counties have attempted to limit automobile use, through such measures as trip reduction and transportation demand management ordinances. Also, Bay Area-wide organizations representing the private sector, environmental groups and other public interest organizations, for example, the Bay Area Council and the Greenbelt Alliance have been generating their own long-term comprehensive regional plans; and at the state level, legislation and initiatives have been passed to help control transportation congestion and air pollution.

In the wake of the Bay Vision top-down planning failure in 1993, ABAG began to encourage the collaboration of clusters of local governments to generate comprehensive subregional plans to address development patterns, mobility, natural resources, and economic vitality in 1994. In parallel, MTC, whose regional influence has grown from its role as MPO for the well funded ISTEA, has embarked on a program of integrating transportation and land use planning at the community scale.

It appears that the Bay Area continues to have a process of collaboration of public and private interests to cope with urgent metropolitan problems of broad concern. However, this collaboration appears to be setting the stage for effective metropolitan management in the future through activities within the Bay Area at the subregional level of activity. As Rothblatt and Jones concludes:

> it seems likely that the future metropolitan governance system of the Bay Area will depend primarily on the subregional, rather than regional, level of management.

**Houston**

Similar to most American sunbelt regions, the Houston area has grown rapidly since the end of World War II especially with the rise in oil prices during the 1970s. By the early 1980s, the population in the metropolitan area had increased to 3.0 million, and Houston with 1.7 million persons became the fourth most populous city in North America in 1983. Growth has come from extensive annexation of adjacent areas as well as from migration and natural increase.

Houston, like Edmonton, was a newly emerging city located next to large tracts of unincorporated land when it launched its annexation drive. Employing its extraterritorial jurisdictional (ETJ) authority provided by the state legislature since 1963, Houston was able to control development beyond its boundaries and annex as much as 10 percent of its area annually. The growth of Houston through annexation has been dramatic. Houston's land area increased from 160 square miles in 1950 to 434 square miles in 1970, and to 556 square miles in 1980. And this geographic expansion enabled Houston to capture the lion's share of regional growth so that by 1980 Houston had a majority of the metropolitan population within its boundaries -- the only central city of the 10 most populous urban regions in the U.S. to do so.
Houston's growth has not occurred without conflict. Certain minority communities have suffered as a result of the growth plans of the predominantly white business elite. The first decisions that caused the destruction of minority residential communities were made by white leaders in the interest of business-oriented growth (Fisher 1990). In addition, the Houston area experienced a fiscal crisis in 1983. Houston found its expenditures rising much more rapidly than tax revenues. The crisis has been partially attributed to the oil/gas recession that hit Houston in 1982 and partially to the costs of growth. Increases in the costs of services and also in the level of spending, and lack of planning by government officials together caused cutbacks in services.

Another important constraint has been placed on Houston's annexation policies -- a 1978 U.S. Department of Justice requirement to make its city council more representative of its minority population by shifting from an at-large to a partially district city council. This resulted in the election of some minority councilpersons who do not want their numbers further diluted by annexing predominantly white suburbs (Harrigan 1993).

The Houston-Galveston Area Council (H-GAC) is the regionwide voluntary association of local governments and local elected officials in the 13-county Houston-Galveston area (Gulf Coast Planning Region). It serves a vast area of 12,500 square miles, which contained over 3,700,000 people in 1985 (the smaller Houston SMSA has an area of 7,750 square miles and had a 1995 population of 4,168,000). H-GAC was organized in 1966 by local elected officials after authorization by state enabling legislation.

With the mission "to serve as the instrument of local government cooperation in promoting the region's orderly development and the safety and welfare of its citizens" (H-GAC 1988, 4), H-GAC is the regional organization through which local governments consider regional issues and cooperate in dealing with areawide problems. In 1996, H-GAC's membership reached 149 local governments -- all 13 county governments, 106 cities, 19 school districts, and 11 soil and water conservation districts (H-GAC 1996). Membership is voluntary, but nearly all major general-purpose local governments in the region are members.

H-GAC is governed by local elected officials who are selected by, and responsible to, the local governments that are members of the council and hold the real decision-making power. Member local governments annually designate their representatives to H-GAC's General Assembly, which meets at least once a year. A 33-member board of directors (all locally elected officials) provides more specific guidance and policy making through its regular monthly meetings. Member local governments pay annual dues based generally on population. These funds are supplemented by appropriations and grants from the state of Texas and contracts and grants from the federal government.

Under the federal ISTEA legislation, H-GAC is the designated Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for the Houston-Galveston - Brazoria CMSA. As such, H-GAC has responsibility of its 1996 Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP) which calls for $2.6 billion of funded transportation investments in the region over the next three years. And while the
implementation of ISTEA has enhanced the regional influence of H-GAC, and increased coordination, participation in the transportation planning process, it has, as Robert Thomas and David Hawes indicate, "not diminished the area's penchant for highway projects".

Still, Houston's political and business actors have had an overpowering influence on the metropolitan development. As Thomas and Hawes conclude about Houston's regional influence:

....there were no serious challenges to city political dominance over the metropolitan area. Consequently, business and economic interests centered their attention on city politics. Urban growth decision making largely came down to what was decided in the City of Houston.

Time will tell, however, whether or not Houston will be able to maintain its dominance over the region. With annexation becoming increasingly unattractive and regional planning institutions gaining in importance, the balance of population growth and political influence may yet shift to the outlying suburban areas, making the policy making process more metropolitan-wide in nature.

**Minneapolis - St. Paul**

The Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area is in many ways like most large U.S. urban regions. With its 1995 population of 2,723,000 over 5,049 square miles embracing 272 local government units, the Twin Cities region looks as politically complex as the next American metro area. In fact, having two central cities often in competition with one another as well as with the surrounding suburbs, the political structure of the Minneapolis-St. Paul area appears to be quite dispersed, American style.

Closer examination, however, the Twin Cities area is the most Canadian of our U.S. study regions. With its relatively homogeneous population from publicly oriented northern European backgrounds and small minority populations (central cities had 10.6 percent black and 2.9 percent hispanic in 1990), its citizens seemed to arrive at a regional planning consensus more easily than most American metropolitan areas. Indeed, it is widely believed that it was this consensus-building characteristic that enabled the state of Minnesota to establish what is perhaps the most successful experiment in metropolitan governance in the United States -- the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities.

The council was created by the Minnesota legislature in 1967, replacing a largely ineffective advisory regional planning commission called the Metropolitan Planning Commission. The Metropolitan Council's mission is to coordinate the planning and development of the Twin Cities area -- a responsibility that has expanded over the years to include not just physical development and transportation issues but social programs, such as subsidized housing. However, the council is not truly a level of general government. The state legislature establishes the council's taxing power and responsibilities that usually are limited to functions that cannot be
performed by city and county governments. In fact, regional services were initially provided by other metropolitan agencies, such as transit and waste control commissions. The council provides the regional oversight and coordination of these services.

Instead of representing local governments and special districts, as the previous Metropolitan Planning Commission had done, the governor of Minnesota appoints the members of the metropolitan council. In the beginning pairs of state senatorial districts were used for representation, but the Metropolitan Reorganization Act of 1974 redefined the districts, and now distinctive boundaries are served. The 1974 act also increased the number of council members from the original 15 to 17. Except for the council chair who was to represent the area as a whole, each member would represent, on a one-person/one-vote basis, a particular district.

Thus, the basic task of the council is to represent regional interests in certain designated areas over that of the more narrow local interests. To ensure that the council would not become the captive of local governments was one of the major reasons why council membership was not comprised of local government officials who might reflect only parochial viewpoints.

The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council has also made considerable contributions toward financial equalization. Legislation in 1974 passed the fiscal disparities law, and although the law is not directly related to the Metropolitan Council, without it there would be great difficulty in implementing regional land-use policies. This is because the law, by dividing the commercial/industrial tax base among the communities in the area, reduces the communities' incentive to compete for such development. Tax-base sharing requires each community to contribute 40 percent of its commercial/industrial tax base growth since 1971 into a metropolitan pool that is then redistributed according to each community's population and overall tax base. As Judith Martin points out about this common tax base, "the pool of shared money approached $260 million in 1995."

Additional legislation further expanded the council's authority to review the metropolitan significance of major public and private projects, which meant it could block major development proposals that conflicted with its regional plan called the Development Guide. This authority included local applications for federal and state assistance.

Clearly, the regional gains for the Twin Cities area have been real and positive, and the following outcomes are directly attributable to Metropolitan Council (Whiting 1984):

- resolving complex regional problems,
- distributing equitably regional tax revenues and social resources, such as subsidized housing,
- overseeing basic metropolitan services,
- preventing such unneeded capital undertakings as an excessively heavy rail transportation system,
- providing information about the region and its needs.
The council's success can be attributed to its primary role of policy-maker rather being caught up in the details of a service provider. Also, with state-backed revenue and taxing authority, it is not dependent on the uncertainties and political pressures of voluntary local government membership. In addition, many of the council's powers were politically digestible in that they were awarded incrementally by the state legislature over a number of years.

After being challenged by an incoming conservative administration in the early 1990s, the council has emerged with what Judith Martin describes as "new leadership, new operating responsibilities, and a new sense of urgency about the need for planning". For example, in 1993 the state legislature placed the operating responsibility of regional transit and waste management to the council; and the council published regional guidance planning reports, such as Metropolitan 2015 - Vision and Goals (1992), and Regional Blueprint (1994) which suggested regional development patterns involving greater neighborhood/ subregional decision-making, expanded investment in transit and telecommunications networks and improved environmental controls; and was chosen as the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) to administer millions of ISTEA dollars in the region.

Yet, the council has had its limitations. It was sometimes bypassed in the making of important facility decisions, such as the location of a domed stadium, shopping mall, and trade centers (Whiting 1984); and its development policies have not stopped the continued decentralization of the Twin Cities metropolitan area. Indeed, as Judith Martin points out:

while the Metropolitan Council has attempted to modestly manage 'leap-frog' development within the seven county area, it has had no impact on what occurs in the surrounding counties beyond it's official boundaries.

Nor has the council resolved serious problems in the Twin Cities region that exist elsewhere, such as increasing poverty and social tensions in the central cities, and central city-suburban competition. Thus, how well the council will handle the increasingly diverse and less manageable socio-economic metropolitan challenges of the 21st century cannot be predicted.

DISCUSSION

A diverse pattern of metropolitan governance continues in both countries reflecting the wide spectrum of regional and cultural qualities of these continental scale societies. With the exception of Alberta, the relative political dominance of the provincial government in local policy making under the Canadian federal system (L'Heureux 1985) has caused more robust metropolitan governmental and planning institutions to be established in Canada than in the United States. And it seems likely that the importance of provincial authority and influence that has developed in the Canadian federation since World War II will continue, if not increase, in the foreseeable future as a result of recently proposed constitutional reforms and provincial actions. (Smiley 1987, 1989; Fraser 1992; Rusk 1997 a,b).
Table 2 shows that this provincial dominance in the Canadian regional planning process has generally been associated with mandatory metro agency review of local plans and some regional tax sharing, which, in turn, have helped to generate greater benefits in Canada than in the United States in terms of the quality of regional planning and actual development. Of the American regions, only the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, with its high level of state involvement in the planning process, mandatory regional review of local plans and partial revenue sharing, has created regional planning and development benefits comparable to those of the most successful Canadian regions.

At one extreme, the Chicago region, with over 1,200 units of competing local government and no formal centralized metropolitan government with review and taxation authority, seems virtually unmanageable. Indeed, Table 2 indicates low scores for Chicago on quality of planning and development. Yet, Hemmens found that coalitions can be formed incrementally to build a consensus to deal with a critical problem, such as traffic congestion, and apparently enough adjustments are made to the system so that the region continues to function and grow.

At the other end of the spectrum, we have Canadian urban areas, such as the Greater Toronto Area possessing one provincial office for the region, four two-tiered governments with considerable authority and which has only 25 municipalities (since the six Metro Toronto municipalities were amalgamated into one megacity, Toronto). Accordingly, Table 2 shows relatively high planning and development scores for Toronto. And while each province has some form of municipal fiscal equalization, Frisken and Trepanier found in Toronto and Montreal that there is increasing competition among Canadian local governments for economic development, population and provincial funds and infrastructure -- despite the presence of metropolitan government.

How then can we explain these differences and similarities we've encountered? Are they still the result of factors we have hypothesized about the differences between the two countries: national and/or regional social, economic and cultural characteristics; and contrasting conscious public policies shaping urban development? Or are our new findings due to global social and economic forces?

Political Culture Influences

Although more similar to one another than most western democracies (Birch 1986), it seems clear that there are significant longstanding differences in political culture between Canada and the United States. As Lipset (1990, 225) observed in his comparative study of values and institutions in both countries:

The United States and Canada remain two nations formed around sharply different organizing principles. Their basic myths vary considerably, and national ethoses and structures are determined in large part by such images. One nation’s institutions reflect the effort to apply universalistic principles emphasizing
competitive individualism and egalitarianism, while the other's are an outgrowth of a particularistic compact to preserve linguistic and provincial cultures and rights and elitism. Ironically, ... the conservative effort has stimulated an emphasis on group rights and benefits for the less privileged; the liberal one continues to stress more concern for the individual but exhibits less interest in those who are poor and outcast.

Clearly, these differences have influenced policy making for, and the character of, metropolitan areas in both countries. As Goldberg and Mercer (1986) argue, the high degree of American metropolitan political fragmentation reflects the more individualistic market orientation of the American political ethos and makes centralized metropolitan planning and management more difficult in the United States than in Canada where there is a greater value placed on collective and government action. In addition, it's suggested that the greater racial homogeneity and tolerance of cultural diversity and the more supportive safety net of social and economic assistance for the disadvantaged in Canada has made its central cities safer and more livable for traditional families than those in the United States (Feldman and Goldberg 1987). Indeed, Canadian central cities have been shown to be more fiscally and economically viable (with provincial support), and have more compact development and better infrastructure, such as transit facilities, than their American counterparts (Goldberg and Mercer 1986; Artibise 1988).

While the general tendency of American fragmentation of local government is corroborated by our study (see Table 3), and that such fragmentation is nationally on the rise (see Table 4), there are striking variations. For example, the Minneapolis - St. Paul area, which was found to be the most fragmented U.S. region (in terms of general purpose local governments per million population), has the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council -- the most "Canadian-like" centralized and effective metropolitan governance and planning system of our American study areas; and on the Canadian side, Montreal which was found to be the most fragmented of the Canadian regions has the Montreal Urban Community -- a well established metropolitan government, which, by American standards, is still quite strong (see Tables 1 and 2).

As pointed out earlier, despite fewer units of local government to coordinate and the centralizing authority of metropolitan government, Canadian central city - suburban conflicts over development and public resources have been increasing in recent decades. This is the case because during the past 25 years the bulk of metropolitan development and population growth has occurred in the outlying suburban areas, often beyond the boundaries of metropolitan governments -- boundaries which provincial governments have been reluctant to extend because of concerns over the potential political influence of expanding metropolitan governments. In some ways, the central-city suburban competition could become more pronounced in Canada since the fewer governmental units are more populous and potentially more influential than those in the U.S. and some, like the regional municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area, may become more politically formidable than their smaller sized American counterparts. And despite strong provincial resistance, Canadian local governments appear to be increasing their pressure for more autonomy and resources (L'Heureux 1985; Woodside 1990).
The highly decentralized pattern of American metropolitan policy making and physical development has come under increasing U.S. criticism as its heavy automobile dependency has been causing near gridlock congestion with a corresponding decline in environmental quality. As a result, a spate of sub-regional, regional and statewide growth management efforts have emerged throughout much of the urbanized United States. Our own Boston, Chicago and San Francisco case studies revealed the emergence of multijurisdictional sub-regional planning institutions to manage urban growth. In fact, during the 1970-90 period, no fewer than 14 states have adopted some form of growth management policies involving the improvement of transportation, environmental quality and/or land development, at the local, regional and state levels of government (DeGrove 1989; Chinitz 1990; Turner 1990; Lewis 1992).

With regard to social diversity, it does appear that Canada's relative social homogeneity has made collective action, including spatial redistribution policies for such services as social housing, more feasible in its central cities. Indeed, the only American study area with any metropolitan governmental success -- the Minneapolis - St. Paul area -- had the most homogeneous population of our U.S. study regions during the 1960s, when major innovations in its metropolitan governance system occurred.

Although Canada has long had a culturally diverse population regionally, it has become more racially and culturally diverse within regions, as recent immigration patterns have settled increasing numbers of newcomers from Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America (Lipset 1990). Much of this settlement has occurred in Canada's major urban areas so that by 1986 substantial portions of the metropolitan populations were foreign born: Toronto 36.3 percent; Montreal 15.9 percent; Vancouver 28.8 percent; Edmonton 18.4 percent (Malcolm 1990). As diversity has increased, groups representing Canada's newest immigrants have emerged, and level of political divisiveness and social backlash in major urban areas has risen (Lipset 1990; Malcolm 1990). A recent study of all of Canada's CMAs reveal a "deepening residential segregation as measured by declared ethnic origin and by income" (Bourne 1989, 325). Thus, while neighborhood activism has been vigorous in Canadian cities, such as community involvement with housing, urban renewal and highway projects in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver during the urban reform movement in the 1960s and early 1970s (Harris 1987; Leveillee and Leonard 1987; Caulfield 1988), this recent community action appears to be more pronounced along racial and ethnic lines than in the past (Burns 1990; Abbate 1992).

And while in the United States there is some evidence of a slight lessening of residential segregation in certain western metro areas, such as the San Francisco region (Miller and Quigly 1990), substantial inequalities persist in most American urban areas (Beauregard 1990; Chakravorty 1996; Kain and Zax 1996). The Fainsteins (1989) argue that despite the emergence of black political leadership in many of the largest U.S. cities, the American black community is just as segregated as before and has actually lost economic ground with respect to the white population during the 1970s and 80s. Indeed, Wilson (1989), Downs (1991), Galster (1991) and Massey and Denton (1993) suggest that, in the absence of appropriate social and economic programs to assist the most disadvantaged to improve their lives, the poverty in black ghettos could be perpetuated indefinitely in American central cities. Unfortunately, it took the recent
riots, protesting the plight of disadvantaged minorities in Los Angeles and other American cities and resulting in dozens of deaths and over a billion dollars in property damage, to generate a renewed national interest in the problems of the central city poor in the form of new federal urban aid legislation (Krauss 1992) and an important electoral issue (Roberts 1992). Consequently, many urban observers believe that the real test of success of American regional and national governance systems is their ability to deal successfully with the problems of disadvantaged inner city neighborhoods, such as the pernicious effects of concentrated poverty on neighborhood residents and their social and economic isolation from opportunities throughout the metropolitan community. (Goldsmith and Blakely 1992; Cisneros 1993; Downs 1994; Bollens 1997; Chakravorty 1997; Krumholz 1997; Altshuler 1998).

Policy-Making Influences

When we examine the policy making process, it seems clear that provincial government has substantially moderated its support for metropolitan government. In each of our Canadian case studies, the provincial government has either not supported metropolitan government to the extent of permitting its territorial authority to keep pace with regional development, or, in the cases of Vancouver and Edmonton, significantly limited its authority. Such constraints on metropolitansim placed by a senior level of government (the province or state) is similar to the long-standing plight of U.S. regional institutions (Wright 1988) and documented by Hemmens, Gelfand and Martin in our Chicago, Boston and Minneapolis - St. Paul case studies. This shifting of provincial roles has transformed each province into, what Trapanier (1993) called, "a facilitator rather than simply a mandator," clearly reflecting the growing development and political influence of outlying suburban communities. Apart from changes in the Canadian political value system that might divert resources away from central cities as Frisken (1986) fears, the sheer weight of the growing suburban influence would divert provincial resources to outlying areas.

Still, some of Frisken's fears may be well founded. It does appear that in addition to growing suburban influence, there has been a shift favoring the market mechanism in Canadian political values. Despite the 1993 and 1997 national victories of the Liberal Party led by Jean Chretien, the increasingly conservative fiscal governmental policies in Canada and the North American Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Mexico reflect the Canadian movement toward Anglo-American market oriented values (Cooper et.al. 1988; Cannon 1989; Trueheart 1993; Associated Press 1997). In addition, the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 encourages constitutional litigation about individual rights similar to that found in the United States. While rapid change on the part of the Canadian judiciary in land use matters is not yet fully evident (Feldman and Goldberg 1987), in the long run judicial changes are likely to make "Canada a more individualistic and litigious culture" (Lipset 1990, 225).

Thus, our Canadian cases demonstrated that during the past decade provincial governments have been less willing to intervene in the political market place of their urban areas. However, as demonstrated by the Toronto and Montreal studies, it seems likely that provincial
governments will not relinquish their potential authority to initiate strong metropolitan guidance, and will not abandon policies assisting the central city, such as municipal fiscal equalization and social services, since such policies clearly reflect the long standing social equity values deeply ingrained in Canada's political culture. In addition, unlike most U.S. metro areas, Canadian central cities have retained high proportions of influential middle class households and through decentralization of social housing have moderated the growing political power of the suburbs. Thus, recent policies within urban regions, such as Toronto and Vancouver, clearly demonstrate the ongoing Canadian commitment to strengthen the central city and limit suburban sprawl (Artibise 1988; Bourne 1992; GVRD 1996).

Of course, business and other interests have long urged federal, provincial and municipal governments to encourage investment and development in the major central cities (Dyck 1986; Leveillee and Leonard 1987; Leo and Fenton 1990). But as industrial and commercial activity began to decentralize (following residential development), the influence pattern has clearly been altered and directed increasingly toward servicing outlying shopping centers, industrial parks and office centers. Yet, with the possible exception of Montreal, there is little evidence in our Canadian case studies of private or nonprofit interests being directly incorporated into the broad regional planning process, that is, beyond lobbying as narrow special interest groups. Thus, Table 2 shows only a low to moderate involvement of private and non-profit groups in the Canadian planning processes.

In contrast, in the United States there appears to be a growing tendency for public and private interests to collaborate on solving pressing metropolitan problems of great mutual concern (Weaver and Dennert 1987). In what may be a new form of American regional corporatism, the major private sector organizations appear "public-like" --- behaving more like public institutions than private firms with a telescopic lengthening of their time horizons and broadening of their views about regional development and the public good. For examples, the organizations representing major business interests, such as the Bay Area Council and the Santa Clara Valley Manufacturing Group in the San Francisco Area and the Metropolitan Planning Council in the Chicago region are still heavily involved in metropolitan planning activities. A similar pattern has emerged among non-profit environmental groups in the Bay Area in the form of the Greenbelt Alliance, which joined with business interests in an attempt to create a development strategy for the entire region, Bay Vision 2020 (1991). This pattern is clearly shown in Table 2 which indicates a relatively high importance of the private and non-profit sectors in the American planning processes. Indeed, many observers of the U.S. metropolitan scene believe that it will be essential for the private and non-profit sectors to be engaged in regional issues for strengthening U.S. metropolitan governance and planning (Rothblatt 1992; Peirce 1993; Downs 1994; Krumholz 1997).

Meanwhile, some of the American public regional institutions, such as ABAG in the San Francisco region and NIPC in the Chicago area, are marketing extensive services to communities while retreating from the idealistic, but ineffectual, long-term comprehensive approach for a more practical strategic planning process with shared local-regional responsibilities. This also seems to be the case for the public regional transportation agencies (Metropolitan Planning
Organizations) which administer tens of billions of federal ISTEA funding for major regional transportation facilities. Accordingly, these public institutions seem to have become more "privatized" --- behaving increasingly more like private firms than public institutions.

While these two sets of U.S. organizations are unlikely to become identical because of the differences in accountability between public and private entities, a substantial convergence of their views and methods seems to be underway. A question remains, however, whether this new public-private collaboration has risen solely for short-term crisis management in the absence of an effective metropolitan guidance system which retreats in economic downturns, or truly represents a new institutional arrangement designed for conducting effective long-term regional planning (Downs 1994; Foster 1997).

As mentioned earlier, over a dozen American states have adopted growth management laws designed to rationalize land use, infrastructure provision and protect the environment. Some of these policies, such as those in Oregon and Florida, have established new metropolitan planning institutions with local planning review responsibilities (Gale 1992; Lewis 1992). Although the full powers of these new regional institutions will probably be tested eventually in the courts, an American movement toward more effective metropolitan guidance systems is apparently underway.

Global, Social and Economic Influences

The global social and economic forces impinging on the urban systems of advanced democracies during the past two decades, have effected one clear overall change: decentralization of people and jobs (Hall 1990; Vernon 1991; Wannop 1995). Clearly, every metropolitan area we examined in our study in both Canada and the United States exhibited substantial decentralization of population, economic activity and political influence to outlying areas. Even the urban regions having the most advanced forms of metropolitan governance, such as those in the Toronto and Minneapolis - St. Paul regions, were unable to contain and control this rapidly expanding growth. Indeed, studies of recent development of major urban areas throughout Canada, the United States, Western Europe and Japan have clearly documented this decentralization pattern (Cherry 1984; Blumenfeld 1986; Bourne 1989; Garreau 1991; Zheng 1991; Summers 1993; Wannop 1995; Elliot 1997).

Many researchers of urban systems in the industrialized world agree that some form of evolutionary process may be at work (Rothblatt and Garr 1986; Dwyer 1987; Alonso 1991; Van den Berg 1993; Elliot 1997). The theories suggest that the initial stages of development occur around a few favored growing areas which attract great concentrations of investment, population, and resources in order to create economies of agglomeration necessary for improved efficiency in the production, distribution, and consumption of desired goods and services.

Table 5 shows a model of metropolitan development: the first stage represents 'concentration' through 'polarization effects' -- the growth of large urban centers which dominate and drain the hinterlands of people, resources, and capital. Eventually, a kind of 'trickling down
effects' occurs. Diseconomies of scale in large urban areas (e.g., traffic congestion, overcrowding, high land costs, pollution) and new investment opportunities in other regions, and government policies to re-direct economic growth away from heavily-developed areas overtake the 'polarization effects' and a process of decentralization sets in. Decentralization is manifested first in the growth and subsequent dominance of suburban rings, then in the decline of the central cities, and eventually with population and economic dispersal away from the older or larger metropolitan areas to new growth poles in smaller urban regions and to outlying, less-developed areas. An additional "reurbanization" phase has been suggested by Newman and Kentworthy (1989) through expanding high density core areas of the largest central cities along transit corridors and restraining automobile infrastructure. This view implies that public policies themselves could become an important factor shaping the evolution of metro areas (Bourne 1992).

According to this model, the United States is functioning around Type 5, Absolute Decentralization, and Canada is moving toward Type 4, Relative Decentralization. However, because the global economy is becoming more competitive and open, the metropolitan decentralization process may be accelerating. That is, as our urban markets expand and become more competitive, firms in these markets must not only become more efficient themselves, but also must have the support of a well managed and supportive metropolitan environment. With the slightest diseconomies in an urban region, such as increased traffic congestion and housing prices, firms begin to move to less costly areas. In the advanced societies, the breadth of location and high quality of infrastructure can accommodate this decentralization while the reverse is true for the less developed countries or regions.

Some observers, like Chisholm (1989), Parks and Oakerson (1989) Sancton (1992); and Husock (1998) argue that such a decentralized system of public service provision adapts better to rapidly changing conditions, and is often more efficient in satisfying local consumers than centralized and hierarchical urban development and authority are. In fact, Peter Gordon and his colleagues (1989; 1997) found that the decentralization process has generated polycentric metropolitan structures that continue to disperse and have enabled the largest urban areas in the United States to grow significantly in recent decades while actually not increasing the average commuting times.

This process of metropolitan decentralization is likely to continue, not only because of global economic forces of dispersion and deconcentration, but also because of the emergence of what Manuel Castells (1990) calls the "Informational City" -- the spatial spread and restructuring of urban activities due to our increasing capacity to substitute communication of information for transportation of goods and people. The pressure for decentralization is being reinforced further by the large numbers of baby boomers who are still participating in the low-density single family housing market (Dowall 1984; Moore 1991). Such housing preferences are often related to a desire for living outside the large central cities, in smaller communities where it is easier to control socially sensitive public services, such as schools and police (Rothblatt 1982; Parks and Oakerson 1989; Hughes 1991; Downs 1994).
The local governments compete to capture revenue enhancing commercial and industrial activities. In the absence of a metropolitan-wide tax sharing mechanism in the United States (excepting the Twin Cities area and the Louisville-Jefferson County region in Kentucky), and in the presence of a partial fiscal municipal equalization in Canada, communities are reluctant to forgo the potential revenues from commercial and industrial activity and accept the much needed, but less tax rewarding, residential development (Kitchen and McMillan 1985; Rothblatt and Garr 1986; Nunn and Rosentraub 1997). Consequently, there is a tendency for in-lying local governments to capture the more fiscally desirable commercial and industrial activity and push service demanding residential development to the periphery of metropolitan areas (Dowall 1984; Downs 1994).

CONCLUSIONS

The overwhelming forces of metropolitan decentralization, most of which are related to long-term global social, economic and technological factors, may be beyond the control of regional or even national public policy. Although the process may not automatically preclude successful policies to sustain viable central cities (Bourne 1992), it seems likely that in regions of advanced economies, settlement patterns of major metropolitan areas will become more similarly decentralized and multinucleated (Elliot 1997; Lefevre 1998).

This study suggests that policy choices are available that would help industrialized societies to rationalize what appears to be inevitable continuation of metropolitan decentralization. For each metropolitan area, there should be:

- An overarching institutional arrangement with the capacity to build a consensus for a comprehensive long-term shared image of where the region is, and where it should be going.

- Strong incentives for the broad institutional participation of, and power sharing among, all interested public, private and non-profit organizations within the region. This could be facilitated with a bottom-up subregional planning process, and community outreach programs.

- The participation of the next higher level of government (state, province, republic) so as to provide appropriate devolution of power, coordination and administrative processes for dealing with local governments and the eventual expansion of development beyond the initial geographic boundaries of the regional institution.

- Appropriate authority, resources, and incentives to help implement regionally approved policies. In addition to a council/commission decision process and authority to review local plans, this would need some built-in procedure for dispute resolution leading to binding agreements, such as mediation and arbitration.
• A mechanism for metropolitan-wide property tax and general revenue sharing so as to minimize inter-jurisdictional competition, which can distort development patterns and undercut regional consensus building.

The province or state has the ability to devolve the appropriate authority to a metropolitan institution and modify local government tax policies (Cullingworth 1994). Our study has shown that, while the metropolitan management system is far more developed along these lines in Canada than in the United States, Canadian metropolitan areas are becoming institutionally out-stripped by the decentralization process, both in regional planning authority and in tax equalization policies (Frisken 1986). Consequently, despite recent efforts to streamline local governments, Canadian provincial government may be moving toward more flexible regional planning institutions, with the ability to mediate between increasingly diverse communities in expanding metropolitan areas, such as the Greater Toronto Services Board proposed in 1997 and the creation of the Greater Montreal Commission in 1997 to foster regional cooperation and planning in the Toronto and Montreal areas (Mellon 1993; Trepanier 1997).

There is also movement to structure the highly decentralized American settlement and authority pattern at the state or substate level with urban growth management policies. Recent efforts in the United States have already tried to centralize metropolitan policy making, such as the 1985 Florida Growth Management Act requiring infrastructure provision (often with regional implications) concurrent with new local development, and compact urban expansion; and the Proposition 111, passed in California in 1990, initially requiring plans from localities to help manage metropolitan congestion in order to be eligible for state funding; and the ISTEA federal legislation (which was extended in 1998) funnelling tens of $ billions through Metropolitan Planning Organizations (Fulton 1990; DeGrove 1991; Innes 1992; Bollens 1997).

It appears that the character of metropolitan development and the institutional response to it in both countries continue to converge. The trends we have observed primarily reflect the globalization of urban economic and social development and corresponding governmental adaptation. However, each metropolitan area and province/state will have to decide how to deal on its own terms with the forces pushing for a more uniform urban world. That is, regional policymakers will need to create what Lefevre (1998, 23) calls a synthesis of “the response to economic competition and the keeping of values which are specific to their territory.” In the end, the success of these efforts will have as much to do with changing old values as creating new regional institutions.
NOTES

1. With the assistance of project cochairs Andrew Sancton (University of Western Ontario) and Donald Rothblatt (San Jose State University), the following Canadian and American researchers were organized to conduct our comparative study:

   a) Toronto  Frances Frisken (York University)
       Chicago  George Hemmens and Janet McBride (University of Illinois at Chicago)

   b) Montreal  Marie-Odile Trépanier (Université de Montréal)
       Boston  Mark Gelfand (Boston College)

   c) Vancouver  H. Peter Oberlander (University of British Columbia)
       San Francisco  Patrick Smith (Simon Fraser University)
       Victor Jones (University of California, Berkeley)
       Donald Rothblatt (San Jose State University)

   d) Winnipeg  (not studied)
       Minneapolis  Judith Martin (University of Minnesota)

   e) Edmonton  Theodore Thomas (Mills College)
       Houston  Robert Thomas (University of Houston)
       David Hawes (University of Houston)

2. We were unable to arrange for a study of the Winnipeg metropolitan area.

3. The few instances of establishing American metropolitan governmental authority, such as city-county consolidations (e.g., Indianapolis, Nashville) which have worked in only a handful of medium size regions, and a federally mandated (A-95) review process for grant applications which was rescinded in 1983, have also met with limited success because of development overspill and local government opposition (Horan and Taylor 1977; Kweit and Kweit 1990).
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<td>Boston</td>
<td>Metropolitan Area Planning Council (1963)</td>
<td>COG (g)</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
<td>136/25</td>
<td>Local Govts plus 31 State Selections</td>
<td>Partial</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Association of Bay Area Governments (1961)</td>
<td>COG (g)</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>101/35</td>
<td>Local Governments</td>
<td>Partial</td>
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<td>Houston-Galveston Area Council (1966)</td>
<td>COG (g)</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>149/33</td>
<td>Local Governments</td>
<td>Full</td>
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<td>Minneapolis-St. Paul</td>
<td>Twin Cities Metropolitan Council (1967)</td>
<td>Special Council (h)</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>State Governor by Regional Districts</td>
<td>Partial</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(a) The six municipalities which comprised Metropolitan Toronto were amalgamated into one city, Toronto, in January 1998. Metropolitan Toronto was created in 1954.
(b) The Montreal Urban Community replaced the Montreal Metropolitan Corporation which in turn replaced the Montreal Metropolitan Commission which was established in 1921.
(c) The Capital Regional Forum replaced the Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission which was created in 1981.
(d) Complex service district with infrastructure review authority and advisory planning function.
(e) Advisory municipally-owned service agency.
(f) Advisory planning commission.
(g) Council of Governments.
(h) Council with special review and taxation authority.
(i) Board of Directors or Executive Committee membership.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Control of Metro Planning Agency</th>
<th>Importance of Role in Regional Planning Process</th>
<th>Benefits of Metro Planning Agency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Metro Agency</td>
<td>Metro Agy Rev Sharing Available</td>
<td>Provides Useful Forum Local Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Fedl Govt</td>
<td>Generates Regional Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Priv Sector</td>
<td>Improves Regional Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Profit</td>
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<td>(a)</td>
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**CANADA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
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<th>Role in RPT</th>
<th>Role in PLAN</th>
<th>Fedl Govt</th>
<th>Priv Sector</th>
<th>Non-Profit</th>
<th>Rev Sharing</th>
<th>Review of Local Plans</th>
<th>Available</th>
<th>Provides</th>
<th>Generates</th>
<th>Improves</th>
<th>Development</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
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<td>High</td>
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<td>Moderate</td>
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<td>Moderate/High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
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<td>Moderate</td>
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<td>Mandatory</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low/Moderate</td>
<td>Low/Moderate</td>
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<td>Low/Moderate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
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<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>Mandatory</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low/Moderate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low/Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Voluntary(c)</td>
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**UNITED STATES**

<table>
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<th>City</th>
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<th>Role in RPT</th>
<th>Role in PLAN</th>
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<th>Priv Sector</th>
<th>Non-Profit</th>
<th>Rev Sharing</th>
<th>Review of Local Plans</th>
<th>Available</th>
<th>Provides</th>
<th>Generates</th>
<th>Improves</th>
<th>Development</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Local</td>
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<td>Voluntary(d)</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
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<td>Moderate</td>
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<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low/Moderate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate/High</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minneapolis-St.</td>
<td>Metro &amp; Local</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate/High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Paul</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(a) The extent to which Metro Planning Agency has successfully guided regional development in terms of efficient and coordinated land use, transportation and services system and appropriate financing for development needs.
(b) Metropolitan Toronto was transformed into one megacity, Toronto, in January 1998.
(c) The Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission was replaced in 1995 with the municipally-owned Capital Regional Forum.
(d) Voluntary for local governments excepting counties.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>METROPOLITAN AREA (a)</th>
<th>POPULATION (THOUSANDS)</th>
<th>POP AREA (SQ. MILES)</th>
<th>LOCAL GOVTS. (b) DENSITY (POP/SQ. MILE)</th>
<th>GOVT. (MUNICIPALITIES AND COUNTIES) DENSITY (LGOVT./MPOP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CANADA (1996)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>4,264</td>
<td>2,155</td>
<td>1,979</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>2,460</td>
<td>102</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>1,599</td>
<td>540</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>2,572</td>
<td>1,591</td>
<td>1,617</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td><strong>UNITED STATES (1995)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>8,590</td>
<td>5,660</td>
<td>1,518</td>
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<td>5,510</td>
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<td>San Francisco (c)</td>
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<td>7,403</td>
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<td>4,164</td>
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<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>5,505</td>
<td>5,658</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>157</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(a) Canadian metropolitan areas are Census Metropolitan Areas. American metropolitan areas are Metropolitan Statistical Areas or, where applicable, Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas.
(b) Does not include school and special districts, and regional municipalities.
(c) Ten county U.S. Census definition of the San Francisco Bay Area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Units</th>
<th>1972 No.</th>
<th>Per Metro Area</th>
<th>1982 No.</th>
<th>Per Metro Area</th>
<th>1992 No.</th>
<th>Per Metro Area</th>
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<tr>
<td>General Government</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>12,444</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13,397</td>
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<td>Special Districts</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>11,725</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13,614</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>School Districts</td>
<td>4,758</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5,692</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5,993</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,185</strong></td>
<td><strong>87</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,861</strong></td>
<td><strong>94</strong></td>
<td><strong>33,004</strong></td>
<td><strong>123</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5  A MODEL OF METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT STAGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Population Change Characteristics</th>
<th>Core</th>
<th>Ring</th>
<th>Metropolitan Area</th>
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<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Absolute Centralization</td>
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<td>++</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Relative Centralization</td>
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<td>Reurbanization</td>
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Sources:  