The Coordination of Social Contextual Features in Children's Use of and Reasoning about Honesty and Deception

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in Children’s Use of and Reasoning about Honesty and Deception
by
Matthew Eric Gingo

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requirements for the degree of
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Committee in charge:
Professor Elliot Turiel, Chair
Professor Susan D. Holloway
Professor Tania Lombrozo

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The Coordination of Social Contextual Features in Children’s Use of and Reasoning about Honesty and Deception

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by

Matthew Eric Gingo
Abstract

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Doctor of Philosophy in Education

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Professor Elliot Turiel, Chair

Honesty is generally considered a moral good and a central value in our society that should be upheld beginning early in childhood. In practice, however, lies are told and justified frequently. People lie in a variety of contexts for a variety of reasons, and while many of these lies and their motives are judged self-serving and morally reprehensible, other lies are judged the morally right course of action. What leads to these different assessments of deception? What sort of duty or circumstance leads to the judgment that deception is acceptable, or preferred to honesty? And, how do evaluations and judgments about deception change through development? Questions like these have been at the heart of philosophical debates for centuries, but have not been considered using any compelling psychological data.

This study examined the development of children’s judgments about noncompliance and deception of parents and teachers. One hundred and twenty participants from three age groups (8-, 10-, 12-years) were individually interviewed about hypothetical situations that describe a child whose parent or teacher gives him or her a directive that conflicts with the child’s chosen course of action. After appealing the directive without success, the child defies the directive and then deceives the parent or teacher about his or her noncompliance. Participants evaluated the legitimacy of the directive, the act of noncompliance, and the deception of the authority figure, justifying their judgment of each. The stories depicted prototypical acts in the moral, personal, and prudential domains.

Children’s judgments about noncompliance and honesty showed active weighing and prioritizing of different considerations in different contexts. Age-related, domain-related, and authority-related variance was found in evaluations of the acceptability of deception as well as the justification for those evaluations. The pattern of development in judgments and prioritization of the parameters and properties of social situations contributes to our knowledge about the reflective and flexible ways in which children approach moral judgments and coordinate honesty with other social goals. The findings suggest that by middle childhood children engage in complex coordinations of social and moral concerns, systematically endorse noncompliance and deception related to particular types of acts, and judge deception of teachers and parents in different ways.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

*The truth is rarely pure, and never simple.*

– Oscar Wilde

For centuries, philosophers, psychologists, and the general public have debated and discussed issues surrounding the moral choice between honesty and deception that each of us must confront. While positions and opinions about deception are plentiful, consensus on its wickedness or innocence is rare. Whether seen as treacherous or judged a necessary evil, the perennial moral conflicts involving honesty and deception have not changed much over the years, nor has the central question in these debates, which asks if lying is ever morally justified, and if so, by what means or in what circumstances?

In recent years the debate, and this question in particular, has played out in the media, with deception being alternately condemned and celebrated. Fueled in large part by the disproportionate attention the mass media has paid to scandal, rumors, and corruption, our airwaves are rife with reports of repugnant lies and accusations about all aspects of duplicity, prevarication, and innuendo. A seemingly endless parade of Wall Street executives, mortgage brokers, public officials, and political and religious leaders are introduced to the public on a daily basis as a result of being caught lying about corrupt investments, insider trading, taking bribes, living second lives, and embezzlement. The public’s interest and appetite for uncovered lies has led to provocative exposés about deception in scientific research, predatory lending practices, political cover-ups, fraudulent Social Security and Medicare claims, and false identities. While these lies have drawn the public’s ire and have led to assertions of moral decline (e.g., Bennett, 1998), not all lies have been judged similarly.

At the same time that malicious and self-serving lies receive indictments in both the media and in courtrooms around the world, we have also become familiar with lies and liars that are lauded in public opinion. Textbooks tracing the history of slavery in this country celebrate the bravery and moral fortitude of those individuals whose ‘underground railroad’ surreptitiously led plantation slaves to freedom in the north. In a similar fashion, lies told to Nazi officials for the purpose of protecting and disguising Jews in Europe during World War II are celebrated as acts of heroism both in national monuments and in popular Hollywood films.

The largely contradictory intuitions that we have about the permissibility of these different lies illustrate the central tension in the age-old debate about the moral requirement of honesty. Whereas self-serving lies and coercive lies, whether told to cover-up transgressions or for personal gain, are widely regarded as immoral acts erosive to trust and to relationships (Bok, 1978/1999; Lewis & Saarni, 1993), in certain situations lies are evaluated positively, even as moral necessity (Mill, 1896/2002). A common thread in situations like these is that the choice of being honest is pitted against other equally or more demanding values or priorities. When honesty comes at the expense of these priorities, it may not be judged worth the cost.

In the case of freeing slaves, or sparing the lives of Jews, many judge that lying was morally justified. Part of what makes the choice in these situations seem clear cut is that when deception is weighed against its alternatives – slavery and execution – deception appears a much less egregious transgression. But our moral choices about
honesty are not always so straightforward, that is, in our daily lives our choices between honesty and its alternatives are rarely so lopsided. Consider these recent debates also drawn from popular media: Is it justifiable for our government to tell the families of fallen soldiers that their loved ones died quickly and without pain, to spare them knowledge of a gruesome death? Are parents justified in exaggerating the praiseworthiness of their children’s performances to protect their self-esteem? Is it permissible to lie to one’s sexual partner about past experience, or inexperience, to maintain one’s privacy? Are guidance counselors justified in exaggerating minority students’ credentials to “level the playing field” and enhance their chances of being accepted into a college? Are teachers justified in lying about their sexual orientation to avoid parental scrutiny? In these cases, and others like them, evaluations of honesty and deception typically reflect diverse judgments, where some see deception as justified, and others believe the truth is required.

Debates like these, over when honesty is required and when deception is legitimate, raise questions about the development of reasoning about honesty and deception. The current investigation examines children’s judgments about the demands of honesty and the acceptability of deceit, how children’s reasoning about deception is structured, and how this structure is transformed through development. We know that in many aspects of children’s lives, deception is publicly prohibited but covertly sanctioned, and coming to learn the difference in these is one of the socialization goals of childhood (Bronson & Merryman, 2009). Children, who are routinely and explicitly told not to lie, are simultaneously shown and directed how to lie in socially and situationally appropriate ways. They are instructed to feign sincere thanks for unwanted gifts, to regard Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy as fact for the benefit of unknowing siblings, and to compliment grandma’s meatloaf. At the same time that children learn that these types of deception are required for smooth social relations, they are taught that anything beyond the inconsequential and occasional white lie is symptomatic of evil, and should be left to criminals, lawyers, and politicians.

As children gain experience navigating these conflicting messages they become familiar with the many factors that contribute to the defensibility of a lie. But how children reason about these factors, and where they draw the lines between the requirement of honesty and the acceptability of deceit is not well understood.

Deception and Morality

Dishonesty is and probably always has been a source of conflict, stress, and mistrust in social relationships around the world. The story of Adam and Eve, central to the explanation of the human condition in the Judeo-Christian tradition revolves around a lie. Ever since Eve told God, “The serpent deceived me, and I ate” we have been suspicious of deception’s power to manipulate our knowledge and actions. The manipulative power of deception has been articulated in all quarters of popular literature, ranging from Little Red Riding Hood and Pinocchio to Julius Caesar and King Lear, making us keenly aware that the possibility of deception exists beneath the surface of all of our relationships, between friends, parents and children, husbands and wives, governments and their citizens. Our knowledge of the ubiquity and power of deception has fueled the position that deception is wicked and that honesty should be valued above
all else.

If we are to address the multitude of concerns and problems that arise between people as a result of dishonesty, and if we are to understand how dishonesty is understood and evaluated by both deceiver and deceived, it is important to understand the developmental origins of deception, how children think about deception, and what forms of reasoning they use in making decisions related to it. It is also important at the outset to ask why deception is considered a moral transgression. While our understandings are limited in many of these respects, the moral implications of deception have been discussed extensively (e.g., Bacon, 1996; Bok, 1978/1999; Kant 1788/1949). To summarize these lengthy discussions, dishonesty is considered immoral for two central reasons. First, because of the damage it causes to relationships between people by eroding trust. Lies break the bonds of trust between people and cast a shadow of suspicion and discredit over all future dealings, statements, and actions. Wary of the veracity of others’ statements and actions, trust cannot be achieved, and without trust relations from friendships, to romantic partnerships, to societies fall apart. As Samuel Johnson (1753/2012, p. 50) warned, even the angels of hell do not lie to each other, for truth is required in all societies, and even the society of hell could not survive without it.

Second, deception is judged immoral because it treads on the deceived’s right to free choice. To the extent that knowledge is power, lies affect the distribution of power. People’s choices and decisions depend on their estimates and understandings of what is, and these understandings often rely on information and assessments provided by others. To be given false information renders people powerless to think about their choices. By manipulating thoughts lies in turn manipulate actions, eliminating or obscuring options and coercing people to act against their free will. Our understanding of this coercive aspect of deception, and our vulnerability to it, underpins the centrality of honesty both in moral philosophies (Bok, 1978/1999; Solomon, 1993) and in our everyday social lives. When people discover that they have been lied to they feel violated, and see in hindsight that the lie disabled their ability to make choices for themselves, unable to act as they would have had they known the truth. We consider honesty a moral duty because we value trust in our relationships and our freedom to make choices, and we judge that deception does harm by damaging both.

**Deception in Moral Philosophy**

In philosophic treatments of the topic, the question of when deception is morally defensible has received a fair amount of attention. One position, typified by Kant’s (1788/1949) absolutism, rejects the notion that lying can ever be morally sanctioned. Kant argued that lying could never be excused morally, because all moral duty and reason are grounded in truth and that the prohibition against lying is absolute. In his words (1949, p. 347): “To be truthful, honest, in all declarations, therefore, is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited by no expediency.”

A contradictory position holds that in instances when lying comes into conflict with an even greater duty, lying may be the moral course of action (Mill, 1896/2002; Sidgwick, 1874/1981). Unlike Kant’s, this position allows for certain exceptions to the prohibition against lying. For example, Sidgwick (1874/1981) and others taking a utilitarian stance have suggested that the moral implication of a lie depends upon the context of the lie. Therefore, when a lie will lead to ultimately greater good than honesty,
the lie may be justified on moral grounds. Others have gone so far as to suggest that in certain situations prosocial lies, told with the intention to help others, are not only acceptable but are not lies at all (Sweetser, 1987). Along these lines, it also has been argued that there are different categories of lies, some of which entail positive values, such as “rectifying the equilibrium of justice” (Bok, 1999, p. 83), that are not moral transgressions (Nyberg, 1993; Sweetser, 1987).

Those who believe that deception can be justified in certain cases have typically fortified their position by providing instances where honesty would lead to the violation of other moral duties (Mill, 1896/2002; Sidgwick, 1874/1981). The most famous example of this is the classic case of a murderer who comes to your door and asks if you know the location of his intended victim, who has taken shelter inside. Is lying to save a life all right? Though judgments vary, this hypothetical case illustrates that the moral principle of honesty may come into conflict with other considerations and principles when contextualized, and may be subordinated to them in certain cases.

Whereas philosophical treatments offer an important perspective on the way deception may be evaluated and justified when it conflicts with other priorities, an equally, if not more important perspective for the current investigation comes from looking at the judgments that children make in their daily lives. While they may not face circumstances as dramatic as a murderer knocking at the door, children frequently face choices between honesty and other options they may see as providing greater good. One area in which honesty is routinely subordinated to competing concerns is in the case of white lies. Beginning in early childhood we have evidence that honesty is rejected when it is thought that the truth would lead to greater harm than a lie. White lies provide an avenue for looking at the conflict between honesty and competing priorities and the ways these features and concerns are coordinated. In reviewing the research on white lies, we can begin to see patterns in the coordination of children’s priorities and the structuring of their judgments about honesty and deception.

**Deception in Psychology: White Lies and Coordinated Judgments**

The literature examining children’s lying dates back to early investigations of development. Beginning with the work of Binet (1896), Hartshorne and May (1928), and Piaget (1932), psychologists have been investigating deception as it relates to various aspects of children’s cognitive and social development. Of particular interest to the current research are studies of “white lies” – those told without malicious intent and seen as promoting greater good than the truth (Bok 1978/1999). Studies of white lies provide clear illustrations of children as young as 4-years-old subordinating honesty to other social and moral priorities. A common finding across a range of research on this topic is that beginning in early childhood children evaluate lies used to spare another’s feelings (e.g., about the desirability of a gift) more positively than self-serving lies (Bussey, 1999; DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996; Lewis, 1993). Additionally, studies have shown that while children in early and middle childhood generally have negative views of lying, they frequently judge that protecting the feelings of another takes precedence over honesty (Lewis, 1993).

Today there are three broad lines of research on children’s deception. The first line follows largely from Binet’s (1896) view that lying provided a window into children’s developing intelligence and cognitive abilities. Since that time, investigations
of lying in this tradition have focused on children’s social competence and cognitive skills (Riggio, Tucker, & Throckmorton, 1987; Vasek, 1986). Most recently this stream of research has concentrated on children’s theory of mind (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998; Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Peskin, 1992; Sodian, Taylor, Harris, & Perner, 1991), and has shown that young children’s judgments about lies and ability to mask deceptive behaviors is related to the development of cognitive skills, such as predicting mental states (Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989), and explanations of intention (Polak & Harris, 1999).

An important finding offered by this line of research is that beginning in early childhood, judgments about the acceptability of lying are sensitive to the intentions of those telling the lie (Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1991). Recent studies show that when lies are told with the intent of acting politely or to maintain social harmony (e.g., I don’t mind waiting for you; I like your new haircut) majorities of children aged 3 to 7 judged deception permissible (Broomfield, Robinson, & Robinson, 2002; Talwar & Lee, 2002). Broomfield and colleagues (2002) found that children as young as 4 years judged that story characters of a similar age should lie to a friend about liking an undesirable gift because telling the truth would ultimately damage the relationship with their friend. While endorsement of deception was increasingly common from age 4 to 9, justifications for lying were the same across ages. All of those endorsing deception did so because they judged honesty to be impolite or because they thought lying would spare the feelings of their friend. These findings suggest that children’s assessments of intent influence their judgments about the permissibility of a lie.

A second line of research has studied children’s lying from a social learning perspective. Beginning with Hartshorne’s and May’s (1928) study of character formation, this research has typically looked at the antecedents of lie-telling with a focus on predictive characteristics of individuals and families (Knox, Schacht, & Holt, 1993; Lindskold & Waters, 1983; Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986). With regard to evaluations of deception, much of the recent work in this area has also investigated judgments about white lies compared to lies told for personal gain (Heyman, Sweet, & Lee, 2009; Talwar & Lee, 2008). Studies have shown that children’s definitions and understandings of deception develop rapidly throughout childhood and early adolescence, and that by late adolescence lies that lead to a better state of affairs for the person being deceived are generally accepted (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). While the proportion of children giving positive evaluations of deception increases with age (Lee & Ross, 1997; Talwar, Lee, Bala, Lindsay, 2002), studies have shown that children as young as 3 years rate white lies that prevent harm to another more positively than self-serving lies (Fu, Lee, 2007). In fact, Heyman, Sweet, and Lee (2009) found that children aged 7 to 11 rated lies that result in good outcomes for the deceived more positively than true statements that led to embarrassment or would hurt another’s feelings. As with concerns about intent, this research suggests that children’s judgments about honesty and deception are also sensitive to the implications and consequences honesty and dishonesty have for others.

Two studies from this line of inquiry are of particular interest, as they bear on the ways children coordinate and apply conflicting social and moral rules related to honesty in their actual behavior. In a study of children’s white lie-telling behavior, Talwar, Murphy, and Lee (2007) investigated children’s lie-telling when receiving a
disappointing gift. Children aged 3 to 11 were promised a prize for taking part in a task, but upon completion of the task were awarded a bar of soap. When asked by the gift-giver how they liked their prize the majority of children told the gift-giver that they liked it, despite having told their parents privately that they did not. The results showed that with age the rate of deception increased. In the second study (Fu & Lee, 2007), conducted in China, children from 3 to 6 years were asked to grade pictures drawn by their peers. The supposed peers were actually confederates of the experimenter and were instructed to draw very badly. Participants of all ages provided higher marks when the confederate was present than the grade they reported once the confederate had left the room. While the authors did not probe these judgments for justifications, they concluded that the participants’ decisions to lie were based on social concerns related to politeness and amicability. Whether or not politeness was in fact their motivation, the results certainly show that in addition to endorsing dishonesty in hypothetical situations, beginning at least as early as 3 years children subordinate the requirement of honesty to concerns for others in their actual behaviors.

The third line of research, stemming from Piaget’s (1932/1997) studies of moral judgment, primarily focuses on children’s lying as it relates to their moral development and knowledge. Much of the research in this tradition has investigated children’s definitions of lying (Ruffman, Olson, Ash, & Keenan, 1993; Strichartz & Burton, 1990), and evaluations and ratings of lies (e.g., How bad is this lie? Which of these lies is worse?). Several of these studies have compared white lies and lies told out of self-interest. The findings from these studies, among others, suggest that children rate white lies, concerned with others’ wellbeing, more positively than lies told for personal gain (Bussy, 1992, 1999; Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, 1983). For example, Bussey (1999) reported that while preschool and elementary school children aged 4 to 11 gave negative judgments of all types of lies, with age their judgments of white lies became more positive. These findings were echoed in a study by Walper and Valtin (1992), who found that all types of lies were judged wrong early in elementary school, but that by late in elementary school white lies related to sparing another’s feelings, or for the purpose of acting politely were viewed positively. A consistent finding in this line of research has been that children’s judgments of white lies become progressively more positive with age, whereas antisocial lies are rejected regardless of age. In the case of antisocial lies, children judged these unacceptable on moral grounds, whereas their positive judgments of white lies were based on conventional concerns with politeness, or moral concerns that the truth would cause psychological harm (DePaulo & Bell, 1996; Heyman, et al., 2009; Peterson, et al., 1983). These findings suggest that children’s judgments about the acceptability of deception are contingent upon the type of act that the lie is used to obscure.

The studies in these three streams of research appear to indicate that children’s judgments of deception are multidimensional. In other words, the studies suggest that children’s reasoning about deception includes a variety of facets of the social situations, and are not bound to a single feature or type of reasoning. Rather than having a unitary, or singular, perspective on the permissibility of deception, the research on white lies suggests that children’s judgments of deception include consideration of both the moral requirement of honesty and the social rules of politeness. Together these studies suggest that children’s judgments of the acceptability of a white lie may include sensitivity to the
deceiver’s intent, the consequences for the deceived, as well as the act masked by deception. While these streams of research make important contributions to our understanding of children’s reasoning about deception, and suggest that children’s judgments about deception vary depending on situational variables, they have several limitations.

The studies on white lies look at just two aspects of children’s social worlds – the moral rules of honesty and harm, and the social conventions of politeness and social harmony. However, a great deal of research on children’s social and moral development has shown that children’s social judgments are not two-dimensional, but instead are multifaceted, and include several different domains of reasoning (for a review, see Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1998). The studies on white lies overlook the diversity, or heterogeneity, of children’s thinking, and suggest that children’s reasoning about lying is limited to just two dimensions of social cognition. Extensive research on the domains of children’s social knowledge has shown that in addition to moral and conventional reasoning, children also have unique domains of reasoning related to personal choice (Nucci, 1981; 2001), and prudential and pragmatic concerns (Tisak, 1986). By leaving these coexisting domains out of their analysis, the research on white lies provides only a partial picture of children’s reasoning about deception. A central contention of the current study is that a developmental theory that takes seriously the heterogeneity of children’s thought is necessary to understand the processes by which children coordinate the various competing social and moral concerns in their decisions to deceive or tell the truth.

A second limitation of the extant research on children’s judgments about deception, illustrated in the work on white lies, is that child development is primarily characterized in global terms. The first of these global characterizations is related to developmental stage models of moral development (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971). In this line of research, children’s judgments about lying develop through a process of differentiating principles of justice from nonmoral concerns. In this formulation, moral reasoning proceeds through a sequence of progressively more principled stages. Age-related changes in children’s judgments of the permissibility of deception reveal the gradual differentiation of moral principles from social norms, and prudential and practical concerns. Interpreted from this perspective, younger children reject white lies with greater frequency than older children because they cannot yet differentiate the moral principles underlying honesty from the societal rules prohibiting dishonesty. As children develop they become more accepting of white lies, because they have attained a more principled understanding of the moral requirement of honesty that is differentiated from the societal requirement. Thus, older children may see dishonesty in a white lie as accomplishing a moral end, whereas younger children, for whom concepts of morality and convention are conflated, cannot differentiate moral ends from rules prohibiting deception.

The second global characterization of children’s development has led to the view that what develops in children’s judgments about deception is an understanding of when lying is socially acceptable. The aspect of development that is emphasized in research stemming from this perspective is accommodation to social standards. Children’s judgments about the permissibility of deception are couched in terms of acquiring social competencies and adjusting to group norms about appropriate and permissible deceit. While debate over the processes of development exists, a great deal of research has
shown that moral development is not a process of internalizing social standards, but involves the active construction and elaboration of concepts of justice, welfare, rights, and ways people should treat one another (for a review, see Nucci & Gingo, 2010).

Rather than a theory of social competence, a developmental theory that takes seriously the child’s active construction of social concepts and social understandings is necessary to understand the ways in which children judge the permissibility of deception and the requirement of honesty. Whereas conventional issues of politeness may lend themselves to processes of internalizing social expectations, issues related to honesty and competing social concerns, are better understood from a developmental perspective that includes systematic analysis of the ways in which children think about their social environment, assess rules and directives, attempt to affect change in their social relationships, and coordinate concerns and conflicting priorities. Development, in this sense, does not imply accommodation, but is generated from reciprocal individual-environmental interactions (Piaget, 1956/1973; Turiel, 1983).

The current study approaches children’s reasoning about deception from the social cognitive domain perspective (Turiel, 1983; 1998). In this framework, children’s thought is seen as heterogeneous, and inclusive of a number of coexisting, but independent conceptual systems. The overriding notion of social development is that thought is constructed, organized, and transformed through the child’s reciprocal interactions with their social environment. As with other structural-developmental theories, research in the domain perspective is premised on the notion that moral and social development can be best understood through the study of moral and social judgments (Smetana, 2006). Unlike other structural theories, however, which view moral development in terms of a gradual differentiation of moral concepts like justice, from nonmoral concepts related to prudence, social norms, and pragmatics (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971), research from the domain perspective has shown that each of these conceptual systems is an independently organized system (Nucci, 1981; Turiel, 1983; 2002).

In the following section, the general cognitive developmental approach to moral development is discussed. This is followed by a discussion of the social cognitive domain perspective, and recent research that bears on the current investigation of children’s judgments about honesty and deception.

Constructivist Approaches to Moral Development

In the psychological literature on moral development conflict between moral principles has received extensive consideration. Just as philosophers have explored morality by examining how individuals choose between moral alternatives, psychological research on morality has often focused on moral judgment and moral choice. Nearly all of the current perspectives on moral development and moral judgment have been substantially influenced by the work of Piaget (1932/1997). Based on extensive observation of playground games and interviews of children related to their conceptions of moral rules, Piaget formulated a structural-developmental theory of moral development.

Premised in large part on his research on children’s judgments about deception of authorities and peers, Piaget (1932/1997) proposed that morality developed through three distinct periods. Prior to the age of approximately six years, children are pre-moral and
do not see rules as binding or obligatory. In the second stage, children view moral rules as emanating from adults, and view morality as obedience to these rules. In this *heteronomous* stage what is seen as right is unilateral respect for adults and the fixed set of rules that are imposed by them. Piaget argued that unilateral relations with parents and teachers, who determine external sets of rules, further cement children’s heteronomous moral orientation. To move to the third stage of moral development, *autonomous* morality, where concepts of reciprocity and mutual respect replace unilateral respect for authority, children must gain experience cooperating with equals. Through social experience and by taking the perspective of equals, children come to view rules as mutually constituted through general consensus and changeable through mutual agreement. By constructing and elaborating rules with equals, concepts of reciprocity, equality, and cooperation develop and morality becomes differentiated from constraint and respect for authority, and therefore autonomous.

In the case of lying, children’s respect for the rule of honesty goes from being bound to fear of punishment, to respect for authority, to a principle of mutual respect. Piaget (1997) describes the progression in this way:

> We can, indeed, distinguish three stages in this progress. In the first stage, a lie is wrong because it is an object of punishment; if the punishment were removed, it would be allowed. Then a lie becomes something that is wrong in itself and would remain so even if the punishment were removed. Finally, a lie is wrong because it is in conflict with mutual trust and affection. Thus the consciousness of lying gradually becomes interiorized and the hypothesis may be hazarded that it does so under the influence of cooperation (p. 171).

Extending Piaget’s (1932) work, Kohlberg (1969, 1971) formulated a six-stage structural-developmental theory of moral development. Like Piaget, he believed that the early stages of morality were based on deference to unilateral authority, though he attributed greater importance to children’s fear of punishment than their reverence for authority. In Kohlberg’s view moral reasoning was part of an all-encompassing structure of thought that became increasingly differentiated through development. Each successive differentiation was seen as a stage, or structure, in which truly moral concepts of justice became progressively more distinct from more primitive nonmoral concerns. In this system early morality was concerned with punishments (stage 1) and rewards (stage 2), before sequentially progressing through concerns with social expectations (stage 3) and conformity to authority (stage 4), to the stages of principled morality (stages 5 and 6). Kohlberg (1971) summarized this sequence of differentiation in this way:

> The individual whose judgments are at stage 6 asks ‘Is it morally right?’ and means by morally right something different from punishment (stage 1), prudence (stage 2), conformity to authority (stages 3 and 4), etc. Thus, the responses of lower-stage subjects are not moral for the same reasons that responses of higher-stage subjects to aesthetic or other morally neutral matters fail to be moral (p. 216).

In his research, Kohlberg (1969, 1971) used moral dilemmas, which pitted moral alternatives against one another, to investigate morality and moral development. The most well known example of these dilemmas is “Heinz and the Drug”, in which a man’s choice to steal a drug he could not obtain otherwise to save the life of his dying wife was assessed by study subjects. Of interest was why the subjects decided that stealing was all
right or not all right.

Individuals’ reasons were seen by Kohlberg as reflective of the status of their progression through this invariant sequence of more and more advanced stages of morality. For example, if subjects determined Heinz should not have stolen the drug because he could be punished for stealing, they were considered pre-moral (stage 1), whereas if subjects determined stealing the drug was wrong because it broke the laws of the land, they were considered in the conventional level (stage 4), a level below true morality.

An important aspect of Kohlberg’s (1971) global formulation was that any heterogeneity of thought or judgment was assumed to be between stages, while homogeneity was assumed within each stage. Thus, variations in judgments and reasoning about dilemma were reflective of different stages, or levels, of moral reasoning. This understanding of morality as a developmental progression led research on morality to focus on the process of transitions between stages. Of particular interest was the transition from the conventional stage of thought, in which morality was undifferentiated from social conventions to the next stage of thought, in which conventional issues like social norms and authority status were distinguished from issues of justice that transcend specific concrete rules and authority demands.

If we apply this system to judgments about honesty, we arrive at the conclusion that the individual who, when faced with the choice between honesty and deception, decides to tell the truth because the dictates of society or authority require honesty is not truly moral, but conflates morality with conformity and rule contingency. Just as in the case of stealing the drug, acting honestly or dishonestly for reasons outside the principle of justice, reflects an immature morality, premised on subservience to authority. Because we are all bound to this invariant developmental sequence children are incapable of making truly autonomous moral judgments until they reach adulthood. Ultimately, this notion rests on the central theoretical position that issues of punishment, prudence, conformity to authority, and morality are encompassed in a single structure of thought and a single developmental pathway, rather than each being a distinct conceptual system, or domain, with an independent developmental pathway.

In a third theory of moral development, Damon (1977) has suggested that Piaget’s (1932/1997) and Kohlberg’s (1969, 1971) theories, attribute too much weight to the subservience and submissiveness of children to adult constraint and authority. In his formulation, children’s moral knowledge is actively constructed through their reflections on everyday justice conflicts, rather than emanating from parental constraint. For Damon, understanding of authority was based upon particular sets of attributes that made authorities unequal to children (e.g., physical strength, experience). This understanding of inequality represented an important difference between knowledge of authority, formed in asymmetric relationships, and moral knowledge, formed in the mutuality and reciprocity of peer relations. Through interviews with children of various ages, Damon found that even young children rejected the authority of parents to direct unjust acts like hitting or stealing. These findings led him to reject the notion that morality developed out of submission to parental authority, and to assert that principles of justice could come into conflict with authority from an early age. Based upon his investigation, in which children of all ages subordinated unjust demands of authorities to principles of justice, Damon concluded that reasoning about authority and reasoning about morality developed
independently and in distinct ways.

Damon’s (1977) view that Piaget (1932/1997) and Kohlberg (1969, 1971) had overestimated the role of authority and constraint in children’s moral development is widely supported by a large number of studies conducted from the social domain perspective (for reviews, see Nucci & Gingo, 2010; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006). These studies have shown that from an early age, children make distinct judgments about the generalizable and prescriptive nature of moral issues related to justice, rights, and others’ welfare, that differ from judgments about nonmoral social conventions, which are contingent on rules and authority directives. Whereas research rooted in the domain perspective has supported Damon’s notion that reasoning about justice and reasoning about authority are rooted in independent developmental systems, it has also revealed a more complex relationship between the two.

In the current study, children’s judgments about noncompliance and deception are investigated from a social domain perspective, in which moral, conventional, psychological, and prudential knowledge are organized into qualitatively distinct conceptual systems (Turiel, 1998). From this perspective, the choice to deceive is not seen as evidence that an individual has not yet developed morally, instead it is proposed that from an early age children weigh moral principles, like honesty, against other moral and social priorities. An instance of deception, therefore, reflects the child’s prioritization of a competing concern in the situation.

From the social domain perspective, the differentiation theories of Piaget (1932/1997) and Kohlberg (1969, 1971) are inadequate accounts of moral development not only because they underestimate the child’s ability to make autonomous judgments, as Damon (1977) had suggested, but because they underestimated the child’s ability to differentiate between qualitatively different experiences in their construction of social knowledge. In the social domain perspective, from a young age children think about morality – those acts related to justice, rights, and welfare – as prescriptive, obligatory, and universal, regardless of the directives of authorities (Turiel, 1983). These thoughts comprise an organized structure that is conceptually distinct, and develops independently of those systems of thought related to social conventions, personal jurisdiction, and prudence (Nucci, 2001; Turiel, 2002). Rather than a single system of social thought becoming progressively more differentiated, the social domain perspective argues that qualitatively different social experiences early in childhood lead to qualitatively different conceptual systems, or domains, each with a distinct developmental pathway.

Social Domain Approach to Moral Development

A great deal of recent research generated using the social domain model has provided a wealth of information on children's reasoning and understandings about issues ranging from gender hierarchy (Conry-Murray, 2009), to rights (Helwig, 1997; Neff & Helwig, 2002) and exclusion (Bottema, 2011; Hwang, 2011; Killen & Stangor, 2001), to physical and psychological harm (Helwig, Hildebrandt, & Turiel, 1995; Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001), to issues of autonomy and personal choice (Nucci, Killen, & Smetana, 1996).

In the domain approach, three domains of social knowledge have been identified and defined: (a) the moral (concerning issues of justice, rights, and harm to another); (b)
the social-conventional (concerning social organization, behavioral uniformities, customs, and etiquette); and (c) the psychological (concerning issues of autonomy, personal jurisdiction and choice, and self-esteem). A large number of studies have demonstrated that from an early age children discriminate between these forms of reasoning in their evaluations of acts, issues, and transgressions (for a review, see Smetana, 2006). In addition to these social domains, recent research has suggested a fourth nonsocial prudential domain, comprised of issues of self-inflicted harm, health, safety, and comfort (Tisak, 1986; Tisak, Nucci, & Jankowski, 1996). Research on the topic has shown that elementary school-aged children make distinctions between the implications of harm that is social in nature, and harm to oneself, which is nonsocial. For example, children distinguish between moral issues of harming another (e.g., a child is pushed off his bike and skins his knees) and prudential issues of harming oneself (e.g., a child jumps off his bike and skins his knees), despite the fact that the consequences of the acts are the same (Tisak, 1986). Moreover, Tisak found that children judged moral rule transgressions that had minor consequences more wrong than transgressions of prudential rules with substantial consequences, indicating that children are concerned with the type of act, rather than the gravity of the repercussions.

Researchers working from the domain approach have primarily relied on two methods to assess how children think about acts in the different domains. The first method has been to assess the stability of children’s judgments by asking them a series of domain-specific categorization questions, known as criterion judgments (Turiel, 1983, 1998). The criteria for moral judgments are said to be generalizability, inalterability, and non-contingency on rules, authority, or punishment. In contrast to moral rules, it is proposed that social-conventional rules need not be applied generally to all persons or groups, are authority or punishment contingent, and are alterable with group or authority consent. The classification of acts or rules as moral or conventional is determined by asking questions related to these criteria, such as, “Do parents have to follow that rule”; “If there was no rule against it would it be all right”; and “Could the adults get together and change that rule if they wanted?” For example, children judge that eating with your hands at the dinner table is wrong, but judge that if there were no rule against it that it would be all right. Conversely, when asked if hitting would be all right if there were no rule against it, children judge that it would remain wrong despite the absence of a rule. The psychological domain is characterized by third set of criteria that includes issues that are not a matter of right or wrong in the moral or conventional sense, but are up to the individual (Nucci, 1981). Nucci asked children and adolescents to classify various acts as contingent on authority (conventional), independent of authority or punishment (moral), or matters that could not be judged right or wrong, but were up to personal choice. He found that issues including hobbies, hairstyles, and friend selection were seen as matters of personal jurisdiction, not governed by either rule system. Just as the psychological domain is characterized by issues that pertain only to the individual, rather than issues of right or wrong, the prudential domain includes issues of harm that only directly affect the actor (e.g., eating fatty foods), so that the harm is not governed by moral or conventional rule systems.

The second method of assessing children’s thoughts about acts in the different domains has been to classify the reasoning they use to support their evaluations of various acts. Rather than probing each evaluation with criterion judgments, this method
involves asking children to provide a justification for their judgments. These justifications are then assessed using the domain specific criteria. Justifications categorized as moral make reference to issues of harm, fairness, justice, or rights. Justifications classified as psychological make reference to personal choice, privacy, or the limits to external jurisdiction, and conventional justifications are premised on rules, authority, or the need for behavioral uniformities and organization. This method has been used in numerous studies to validate the theoretical criteria used to establish the different domains (for a review, see Smetana, 2006).

In contrast to traditional stage models, which assume that in each stage of development people apply the same form of reasoning homogenously across situations, the domain approach has shown that from early in childhood individuals apply qualitatively different forms of reasoning to a range of situations. In this perspective, individuals’ judgments are heterogeneous and may reflect the application of reasons from one domain (e.g., moral or personal) or more than one domain (e.g., both moral and personal). Judgments reflect the interpretations of the features of each situation. Therefore, from this perspective, judgments are necessarily contextual in the sense that interpretations of context are part of individuals’ evaluations, and are related to the kind, or domain, of reasoning that is applied to the situation. Because the social domain model is context-specific rather than stage-specific, it is expected that from an early age judgments will be multifaceted, reflecting the various features of the situations being assessed (for a discussion of context in this perspective, see Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). In the case of evaluating deception, for example, one would predict that judgments would reflect issues related to the act being obscured by the deception, as well as the relationship between the deceiver and the deceived.

Based on this prediction, a principal aspect of the current project was to study the ways in which children's reasoning about directives, noncompliance, and deception varied in specific domain-related contexts, as well as how children of different ages evaluated these acts in situations that vary in terms of authority relationships and social expectations. A corollary to this aspect of the research was an interest in examining the nature of children’s coordinations at different ages for the purpose of understanding whether there was an observable developmental pattern in the way these social concepts were coordinated.

This idea of multiple forms of reasoning coming together in a single judgment adds a layer of complexity to explanations of how individuals make decisions about the legitimacy of deception. Unlike judgments about straightforward situations, like unprovoked harm, in which a single form of reasoning predominates, complex situations require the balancing of multiple, overlapping considerations from social and nonsocial domains. Recent research conducted in the social domain framework has begun examining these “mixed-domain situations” (Smetana & Turiel, 2003) in which multiple forms of reasoning are coordinated in the evaluation and categorization of an act. Studies have included a variety of topics in which issues such as, justice, rights, social norms, authority directives, personal choice, and prudence come into conflict and must be prioritized. These include studies of the bounds of parent-child and teacher-child jurisdiction (Chen, 2010; Nucci, 2001; Smetana & Bitz; 1996), cultural expectations in patriarchic societies (Turiel & Wainryb, 1998; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994), issues of homosexuality (Horn, 2006), and religious prescriptions (Nucci & Turiel, 1993), as well
acts of subversion and resistance (Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Turiel, 2002). Individuals’ judgments about these situations were typically complex, because they involved the coordination of concerns about justice and rights with considerations about social customs and conventions, and personal choice and freedoms. The results of these studies have shown that mixed-domain situations involve a great deal of contextual and developmental variation in judgments. The studies also showed that in some cases children, as well as adolescents and adults, subordinated moral principles they judged important to other concerns, including conventions, personal choice, and other moral concerns when they were situated in complex circumstances.

For example, in a study of adolescent reasoning about civil rights and conflicting moral precepts, Helwig (1995) found that adolescents who strongly, and almost unanimously, advocated for rights to free speech in the abstract were quick to suspend that advocacy when free speech would lead to psychological harm. The judgment that free speech was a universal right fell from 99% when evaluated in the abstract to 50-65% when it conflicted with other rights and moral concerns. In one instance, 50% of the participants judged that freedom of speech was not justified when that speech was racially discriminatory in nature, because of the harm it may cause. Helwig’s findings highlight the variability between moral evaluations in the abstract and in social context, and illustrate the sort of coordination of concerns that takes place when moral principles and priorities come into conflict in applied contexts.

In studies of honesty, a similar pattern of coordination has been found. One example comes from a study of physicians’ judgments about deceiving insurance companies about certain procedures to provide care for patients (Freeman, Rathore, Weinfurt, Schulman, & Sulmasy, 1999). When evaluating a series of lies told to insurance companies, the majority of physicians in this study judged that their hypothetical counterparts were justified in deceiving insurance providers in life threatening cases (58% approval), but rejected deception in cases of elective procedures, such as plastic surgery (2.5% approval). Overall, the evaluations of deception were positively correlated with severity of the patients’ conditions. These physicians clearly valued honesty but subordinated it to patient health in certain cases. Their judgments demonstrate that not all lies are viewed or evaluated in the same way, and that judgments about deception are not absolute, but hinge on salient situational features. In this case, deceiving the insurance companies was judged legitimate and honesty subordinated to concerns for “the traditional ethic of patient advocacy and to resist the new ethic of cost control that restricts patient and physician choice” (Freeman, et al, 1999, p. 2264).

Recent studies of honesty and deception in close relationships provide further insight into the variables being evaluated and coordinated in individuals’ judgments about the legitimacy of deception. In the first of these studies, Turiel and his colleagues (Turiel, Perkins, & Mensing, 2009) investigated deception as a means of circumventing perceived inequalities in spousal relationships. It was found that adults judged deception legitimate in certain circumstances, but not others, depending on the type of act and the gender of the actor. Majorities of participants in this study judged that deception was a legitimate response to unjust attempts by a spouse to control certain behaviors, especially those related to individual health and personal choice (e.g., attending Alcohol Anonymous meetings). This pattern of judgment was age-related, with older adult participants endorsing deception more frequently than emerging adult participants.
Participants’ judgments also reflected a sensitivity to gender inequalities in the family, judging in certain cases that deception was legitimate for women, but not for men (e.g., maintaining secret bank accounts). The variance between judgments of deception by women and men was attributed to the asymmetry of power and control that men have in the social hierarchy.

In a second study of deception, Perkins and Turiel (2007) found that, like adults, adolescents also weighed honesty against competing social and moral concerns, including the relative positions of power between the deceiver and the deceived. As with the research that investigated deception between adult spouses (Turiel et al, 2009), Perkins’ and Turiel’s study of adolescents found a pattern linking the type of act being concealed and the social status of the actors with judgments about the acceptability of deception. Additionally, and consistent with the research on the use of deception to subvert unwarranted control by insurance companies and spouses, Perkins and Turiel found that adolescents positively evaluated deception of parents in cases where the parents’ control over their adolescent child was judged illegitimate. Moreover, while the vast majority of participants positively evaluated honesty in the abstract, in the context of the situations many subordinated honesty to other concerns, such as physical and emotional welfare, and in instances where deception was judged a legitimate way of redressing asymmetries in social status that infringed on individual autonomy and privacy.

With regard to evaluating unequal social status, adolescents endorsed deception of parents, but not peers, in the face of immoral dictates (e.g., restricting friendships on the basis of race), as well as when directives restricted activities considered within the adolescents’ personal jurisdiction (e.g., who to date). Adolescents also rejected deception of both parents and peers in cases related to prudential acts, those concerning health, safety, and detriment to oneself (e.g., riding a motorcycle).

Though the attempts of both parents and peers to control moral and personal situations were rejected in this study, deception was endorsed more in the case of parent directives. It appears that deception was seen as a legitimate means of redressing asymmetries in power in the parent-adolescent relationship, but rejected in the context of equal social status, where negotiation was seen as possible and preferred. In each of these cases judgments varied by context and were applied flexibly, coordinating concerns about dishonesty with other social considerations, including the legitimacy of authority, the alternatives to deception, and the balance of power between the parties.

In a related program of research, Smetana has investigated judgments about secrecy and disclosure between adolescents and their parents (Smetana, 2008; Smetana, Metzger, Gettman, & Campione-Barr, 2006). Though these investigations do not directly bear on judgments about deception, they may have particular significance for the current project because secrecy and deception are both forms of information management and may be viewed similarly in judgments about restricting information from parents and authorities (Cumsille, Darling, & Martinez, 2010; Kerr & Stattin, 2000). Smetana’s (2008, Smetana, et al, 2006) work has shown that as children come to see a greater number and diversity of activities as legitimately personal issues, they may come into conflict with parents who claim conventional jurisdiction over those issues. Further, this research has shown that when acts are viewed as matters of personal choice, majorities also view secrecy about those acts a legitimate means of maintaining control or privacy. Judgments about secrecy were heterogeneous, however, with majorities of adolescents
rejecting secrecy about acts of a prudential or moral nature, and accepting secrecy about issues related to personal and peer activities. This research suggests that adolescents’ judgments about restricting parents’ knowledge through deception may also vary by domain. Deception may be seen as justified when it serves as a means of restricting control perceived as unwarranted, and judged unjustified when it concerns acts seen as legitimately legislated by parents.

Other evidence related to judgments about deception, which reflect the coordination of various social concerns, comes from research on cultural norms and practices. For example, both psychological and anthropological studies have shown that peoples in subordinate positions, such as women in patriarchal societies, are often accepting of deception as a form of resistance against directives and practices that unjustly restrict individual rights, such as access to medical care, schooling, work, and desired recreational activities (Abu-Lughod, 1993; Goodwin, 1994; Turiel, 2002; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994; Wikan, 1996). In these cases, deception has been endorsed as a way to resist and circumvent inequality in cultural practices, and was judged a legitimate means of subverting illegitimate authority. Considering the personal risks and cultural expectations involved, it is clear that these judgments are not straightforward, but require the coordination of the competing demands of authority, cultural norms, honesty, and justice.

These findings specific to adolescents’ and adults’ judgments about deception in various social contexts raise questions related to the development of reasoning about deception. We know little about the development of children’s conceptions of the acceptability of lies, what factors they consider in arriving at their judgments at different ages, and if they resolve the conflicts between honesty, personal choice, social expectations, authority mandates, and moral principles in similar, or very different ways than adolescents and adults. Important, yet unaddressed questions include: What factors pre-adolescent children consider in arriving at their judgments at different ages; how they conceptualize, evaluate, and justify deception during this period; and how coordination and application of social and moral judgments about deception change across these years.

Deception and Defiance in Authority Contexts

In addition to the coordination of honesty with other types of concerns and moral principles, a related concern, central to the present study, is how children reason about authority in their judgments concerning the legitimacy of deception. Because children typically have a lower status in the social hierarchy than the adults they interact with, particularly parents and teachers whose authority is ascribed (Braine, Pomerantz, Lober, & Krantz, 1991), and because of the societal norms that typically accompany these social position, children’s relationships and dealings with parents and teachers are generally asymmetric. Because of this asymmetry in social status, children’s view of deceiving parents and teachers may be similar to the adolescents and adults with lesser social status discussed earlier. Thus, they may also view deception as a legitimate means to redress imbalances in power that they cannot effectively confront in an overt manner. While children’s judgments about the legitimacy of deceiving different authorities has not yet been investigated, recent research on obedience and disobedience has found that children as young as 4 years rejected the directives of otherwise legitimate authorities if their
directives were seen as violating moral principles or as overly restrictive to children’s individual freedoms and prerogatives (Damon, 1977; Laupa, 1994; Weston & Turiel, 1980; Tisak, 1986). These studies showed that children evaluate the type of directive, as well as the type of authority figure giving the directive when making judgments about obeying or disobeying commands of authorities.

Damon (1977) found that children rejected the legitimacy of authority (parents and team captains) to direct unjust acts, such as stealing, hitting, and lying, despite endorsing parental authority to make a variety of other rules. Moreover, Damon found no developmental differences in children’s judgments about the unacceptability of unjust acts, or of the illegitimacy of parents to command them. Regardless of age, children rejected the legitimacy of authority to command immoral acts. Along these lines, numerous studies have revealed that across a wide range of ages children endorse obedience to parents’ (Smetana & Asquith, 1994; Tisak, 1986) and teachers’ (Laupa, 1991; Kim & Turiel, 2006) rules related to upholding moral principles, but reject rules that regulate children’s personal choices (Smetana & Asquith, 1994; Smetana & Bitz, 1996). In each of these studies, the fact that children across a wide range of ages, made similar judgments about certain kinds of acts and authority demands conflicts with Piaget’s (1997) notion that deference to authority comprises a unique stage of moral reasoning that is transformed through development. The data appear to suggest instead that moral reasoning, and reasoning about authority may be best understood as part of a more comprehensive system of social development, including distinct domains of thought.

Laupa’s (1991; 1994; 1995) research on children’s authority concepts and reasoning about obedience to authority has also shown that beginning in the preschool years, children’s reasoning about the legitimacy of authority is largely based on the acts that authority figures attempt to regulate. Consistent with the domain perspective, this research showed that children evaluate the legitimacy of authority differently with respect to the type of act being regulated. Children’s judgments about authority directives involved the coordination of reasoning about authority status and reasoning about the content of the directive. For example, elementary school aged children judged that acts pertaining to another’s rights or welfare (moral domain) were not contingent on authority or subject to alteration, whereas acts related to harmonious functioning within social systems (conventional domain) were contingent on the authority figures who controlled them (Laupa, 1995). A consistent finding in this work was that children largely endorsed the legitimacy of authorities’ directives to act morally (e.g., don’t hit your brother), prudentially (e.g., wear your seatbelt), and to follow established conventional rules (e.g., it’s bedtime), but reject directives that violate moral principles (e.g., you can steal that toy), or personal prerogatives (e.g., you have to be friends with Tom). In situations where the authorities’ directives were judged illegitimate and rejected, majorities of first-, third-, and fifth-grade students endorsed noncompliance with the authority figure (Laupa & Turiel, 1986).

Furthermore, studies of children’s authority concepts have shown that young children evaluate and make judgments about authority dictates based upon the attributes of the authority figure, such as perceived knowledge and social position (Damon, 1977; Laupa, 1991), and with respect to the context and setting in which the authority issues them (Laupa, 1995; Laupa & Turiel, 1993). These studies have shown that children aged
6 to 12 understand authority as a social relation that changes from context to context, rather than as a stable individual characteristic. For example, Laupa (1995) has shown that as early as the first grade children rejected the authority of parents to make school rules, and for teachers to make rules that apply in the home, despite viewing both as legitimate authorities in their specified contexts. In a related study, Laupa (1991) found that children’s conceptions of authority were linked to the development of the underlying concepts of social order and social systems. She found that children viewed authority as transferable between persons, rather than a fixed social status. In fact, majorities of elementary school students judged a peer whose authority was delegated by a parent or teacher to possess an equivalent level of legitimacy as the person who had delegated it. Thus, rather than having a unilateral respect for adults and a unitary conception of social rules, as suggested by Piaget (1997), it appears that children view authority as an aspect of social organization, and evaluate directives based upon the attributes of the authority in a given social setting.

Consistent with these findings, other research on children’s conceptions of authority has indicated that children’s perception of teachers and parents as “epistemic” authorities is contingent on the type of activity, knowledge, and expertise considered (Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Brosch, 1991; Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Peleg, 1990). These studies indicated that children aged 9 and 10 evaluate the legitimacy of parent and teacher authority differently with regard to different issues. Teachers were typically regarded as more legitimate authorities than parents with regard to formal content and procedural knowledge (e.g., knowledge about subject specific studies, including mathematics, science, and history), but with age, children viewed teachers as less knowledgeable, and their authority as less legitimate. In contrast, parents were seen as more knowledgeable authorities in areas of interpersonal relations, appropriate pastimes, physical appearances, and choice of friends than teachers, but with age this view also declined.

These studies show that children evaluate authority in relation to the types of activities being commanded. They also raise questions of how children integrate evaluations of various kinds of authority figures with other social concerns in making judgments about the legitimacy of deceiving an authority. It is an open question as to what similarities and differences exist between children’s judgments about the requirement of honesty and the acceptability of dishonesty, and the requirement of obedience and the acceptability of disobedience. It is possible that, like evaluations of obedience to parents and teachers, children’s evaluations of deception reflect a differentiation of social roles and contexts. For example, the children in Laupa’s (1991, 1995) studies may have evaluated deception negatively in cases where parents or teachers were viewed as legitimate authority, but judged deception acceptable when the authority was seen as illegitimate. Alternatively, children may have broadly rejected the legitimacy of deception regardless of their evaluations of parent and teacher authority, judging lying about certain acts wrong regardless of the authority relationship or context. Though questions exploring the relationship of deception and obedience to authority were not explored, Laupa’s (1991, 1995; Laupa & Turiel, 1986) findings show that young children consider authority status when assessing the legitimacy of defiance, and coordinate those concerns with the domain of the authority’s directive.

These findings related to children’s judgments about authority and obedience are consistent with Perkins’ and Turiel’s (2007; Turiel, et al, 2009) findings related to
adolescents’ and adults’ judgments about deception. Both strands of research showed that individuals’ judgments were contingent on the relative social positions of actors in certain types of situations. Taken together, these findings suggest that evaluations of the social statuses of the deceiver and the deceived may also be an important component of children’s judgments about deception. By bridging these lines of research in the current study, it was possible to investigate how evaluations of authority relationships were coordinated with other social concerns in children’s judgments about honesty and deception.

Statement of the Research Problem

Prior research with adolescents and adults has shown that judgments about honesty and deception are diverse and are based upon various facets of the situation being evaluated (Freeman, et al, 1999; Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Turiel, et al, 2009). These studies indicated that adults’ and adolescents’ judgments about honesty and deception include the coordination of concerns about the acts being lied about and the social relationship of the persons involved. These studies also showed that in the abstract adolescents and adults endorsed honesty, but when honesty was pitted against other valued moral and social concerns some judged deception a legitimate course of action. Together, these studies highlight an interesting difference between individuals’ evaluations of honesty as an abstract moral principle and the way the principle is applied in diverse and multifaceted social contexts. Honesty was judged a moral imperative on one hand, and was applied flexibly and reflectively in coordination with other moral and social concerns on the other hand. Thus, understandings and applications of honesty and deceit do not appear straightforward in adolescent and adult judgments. Rather, these instances of honesty being subordinated to other concerns demonstrate that individuals make judgments about the acceptability of deception based upon a process of weighing and balancing the salient features of a given situation.

It is not clear, however, what concepts about honesty and deception are held at earlier ages or how honesty is coordinated with other concerns at earlier points in development. Research on children’s judgments about deception is limited and has not addressed questions related to the broader social context, such as, to whom, and under what circumstances deception is judged legitimate at different ages. In the absence of research on the ways these facets of social situations combine to affect the evaluation and justifications for deception, gaps remain in our knowledge of why children judge some lies legitimate and others illegitimate.

Whereas some believe that children lie “indiscriminately” to avoid punishment and conflict (Bronson & Merryman, 2009), an alternative position argues that deception reveals a more complex and coordinated system of moral and social judgment. The overarching proposition in this study is that children do not approach lying indiscriminately or reason about honesty and deception as global constructs, or in a uniform way, but from an early age judge and make decisions about deception that vary in relation to the features of the greater social context.

The current study was designed to address three unexplored aspects of children’s judgments. Research on social development has shown that different types of acts are judged in conceptually distinct ways in children’s reasoning (Nucci, 2001; Turiel, 1998).
However, these investigations have not examined children’s judgments about deception. Therefore, the first aspect of the current study was to examine judgments about deception in different domains in children from 7 to 12 years of age. This aspect of the investigation was designed to examine whether children’s judgments about the legitimacy of directives, noncompliance, and deception systematically varied with regard to their age.

Moreover, the various research programs that have investigated children’s deception, have not yet examined power asymmetries and social inequality in children’s judgment about deception. The second aspect of the present study was, therefore, to investigate perceptions of control, jurisdiction, and legitimacy by assessing children’s judgments about parents’ and teachers’ directives, and children’s noncompliance and deception of parents and teachers. This aspect of the investigation was designed to examine whether children’s judgments about the legitimacy of directives, noncompliance, and deception systematically varied with regard to authority type.

Finally, research on children’s deception has primarily focused on how children weigh the moral principle of honesty against the conventional norm of politeness in white lie situations. Studies of deception have not yet examined how the principle of honesty is weighed and balanced with personal, prudential, or other moral concerns in the judgments of preadolescent children. Consequently, a third aspect of interest was the way children between 7 and 12 years coordinated and prioritized these social concepts in making their judgments. This aspect of the investigation was designed to examine whether children’s judgments about the legitimacy of directives, noncompliance, and deception systematically varied with regard to the domain of the act in question.

Children between the ages of 7 and 12 were selected for the present study based upon prior research that has shown that during this period children’s conceptual knowledge about deception (Broomfield, et al., 2002; Bussey, 1999; Heyman, et al., 2009; Vasek, 1986) and conceptions of parent and teacher authority (Laupa, 1991, 1995; Laupa & Turiel, 1986, 1993) go through systematic changes.

Parents and teachers were selected as authority figures due to children’s familiarity with both parent and teacher roles in their respective social institutions (home and school; Braine, Pomerantz, Lober, & Krantz, 1991; Laupa, 1991), and based upon the findings that show that children judge their authority as legitimate, but bounded to specific jurisdictions (Laupa, 1995; Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Houminer, 1990; Smetana & Bitz, 1994). In addition to differentiating between the physical settings in which each authority has legitimacy, children in these studies also based their judgments of legitimacy of parents’ and teachers’ authority on different attributes, including social position (e.g., an official authority position in a given social organization), and knowledge (e.g., expertise in an area relevant to the command being given; Laupa, 1991, 1994). Thus, the attributes that endow teachers and parents with the authority to give directives, and the boundaries that restrict that authority may be judged differently.

Children were presented with hypothetical situations that described a similarly aged child whose parent or teacher gave her or him a directive that conflicted with the child’s chosen course of action. After appealing the directive without success, the child covertly defied the directive and then deceived the parent or teacher about his or her noncompliance. The stories presented situations in which honesty came into conflict with moral, personal and prudential concerns. Participants were asked to evaluate the
legitimacy of the directive, the act of noncompliance, and the deception of the authority figure, and were asked to justify their judgment of each.

Based on prior research on domains of social reasoning (Turiel, 1983; 1998), it was expected that there would be age-related differences in judgments about directives, noncompliance, and deception about some acts, but not others. Previous research on children’s developing personal sphere (Nucci, 1981, 1996) suggested that age-related differences could be expected in judgments about the personal situations. Based upon this research, it was expected that older children would endorse noncompliance and deception more than younger children, and that younger children would endorse compliance more than older children. This expectation is also consistent with prior work on children’s predictions of rule-following behavior where rules and individual preference were in conflict (Kalish & Shiverick, 2004; Lagattuta, 2005).

Also in regard to age- and domain-related differences, it was expected that there would be age-related differences in judgments of prudential situations. Previous research has shown that children view parents as legitimately controlling prudential matters, though these matters may become points of conflict in early adolescence when boundaries of autonomy are being renegotiated (Smetana, 1988, 2002; Tisak, 1986). It was expected that the oldest group of children would view these prudential matters as within their personal jurisdiction, while the younger participants would view parents and teachers as legitimately controlling these matters. Moreover, research has shown that children of a broad range of ages disagree with directives that would lead to violations of moral principles, and agree with directives that promote them (Damon, 1977; Laupa & Turiel, 1986; Tisak, 1986; Turiel, 1983). Therefore, it was expected that across ages children would reject the legitimacy of immoral directives. It was also expected, based upon the findings of prior studies that have shown that children become more accepting of pro-social deception with age (Bussy, 1999; Heyman, et al, 2009; Peterson, et al, 1983), that children’s judgments about the legitimacy of deception in the moral stories would increase with age.

Finally, the type of authority figure giving the directive was expected to be a source of variation in judgments. Based on prior research related to parents’ and teachers’ authority directives (Damon, 1977; Laupa, 1995; Laupa & Turiel, 1986), it was expected that children’s judgments would reflect authority related variance in the personal and prudential situations, but not in the moral situations. It was expected that children’s judgments about deceiving parents and teachers would reflect a coordination of characteristics of both the acts and the attributes of the authorities issuing the directives to do those acts. Due to a paucity of research on the topic, just how these authority types would differentially affect children’s evaluations and justifications at different ages was considered an open question.

In summary, then, the primary aim of this research was to examine age-, authority-, and domain-related differences in children’s judgments about authority directives, noncompliance with those directives, and deception about that noncompliance. Specifically, the research focused on how authority type and the type of act in question affected children’s evaluations and justifications of directives, noncompliance, and deception across middle childhood.
Chapter 2: Methods

Participants

The participants were one hundred and twenty children attending elementary and middle school in a suburban community in New England. Participants were divided equally into three age groups; second and third graders (20 females and 20 males, $M = 8.28$ years, $SD = 0.51$); fourth and fifth graders (20 females and 20 males, $M = 10.45$ years, $SD = 0.60$); and sixth and seventh graders (20 females and 20 males, $M = 12.23$ years, $SD = 0.67$). Participants were 108 Caucasian Americans, 9 Asian Americans, and 3 African Americans, equally divided by age group. The total number of participants selected was based upon a statistical power analysis estimated for a medium effect size (Stevens, 1992).

Participants were recruited from two schools serving the same geographical region, both of which served students from Kindergarten through eighth grade. This region is made up of predominately middle- and working-class Caucasian families. Ethnicity was not part of the selection criteria during the recruitment or selection of participants, however, according to school administrators the ethnic diversity of the sample is representative of the schools at large. Also according to school administrators, there were no substantial differences in the mean incomes of the families of the students at the two schools.

Participants were recruited through classroom presentations made by the researcher, who gave a brief description of the study procedures. Recruitment letters as well as consent and assent forms were sent to the parents of all students in each of the classes that received presentations. Students who chose to participate and whose parents granted them consent returned their permission forms to their classroom teachers. Student recruitment continued until an adequate number of females and males from each age group had registered for the study. In instances where more students of a given age group returned permission forms than were necessary a random drawing determined which students would participate.

Design and Procedures

The study included participants’ judgments about three types of behavior: authority directives, noncompliance with those directives, and deception of the authority about the noncompliance, in two types of relationship: child-parent, and child-teacher. To allow for comparison of assessments across a range of issues and authority types, interviews were designed to elicit participants’ judgments about directives, defiance, and deception of parents and teachers in each of three social cognitive domains; the moral domain, the personal domain, and the prudential domain (Nucci, 2001; Turiel, 1998).

The protagonist in each story was a child described as being the same age and grade as the participant. Six of the stories depict a child’s parent or teacher giving them a directive to act in a certain way that the child openly disagrees with and attempts to change his/her parent’s or teacher’s mind. When the parent or teacher refuses to be swayed the child covertly defies the directive, and subsequently lies about their act of noncompliance, telling the parent or teacher that they did what they were told to do. In
the seventh story, there is no directive or noncompliance. The story depicts the child lying about a misdeed.

Independent samples of 60 participants (20 from each age group, equal parts male and female) assessed either the parent or teacher authority conditions. The content of the stories was the same for child-parent and child-teacher conditions with the exception of the authority figure and the physical context. In the child-parent stories the physical context is a park near the child’s home, whereas in the child-teacher stories the physical context is the playground at the child’s school.

Six of the seven stories bring honesty and compliance with authority into conflict with other concerns. The seventh story was an unconflicted story, meaning that honesty was not posed in conflict with other domain-related concerns. Of the conflicted stories, two brought honesty and compliance into conflict with moral concerns, two brought honesty and compliance into conflict with personal jurisdiction, and two brought honesty and compliance into conflict with prudential concerns. The seventh story depicts a child’s act of deception to conceal a misdeed, absent a directive or act of noncompliance. The unconflicted story (Cup) depicts a child who breaks a parent’s or teacher’s coffee cup and lies about the misdeed. This story is presented without a directive or act of noncompliance and is included for the purpose of examining children’s general concepts about lying, and for comparing children’s judgments about deception when honesty is not in conflict with other concerns or commitments.

The categorization of each story as moral, personal, or prudential was based on research that has delineated the prototypical issues comprising each domain (Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981, 1988; Turiel, 1983, 1998). Consistent with this research, the stories classified as moral involved issues of harm and fairness. In these stories the authorities direct the child to act immorally, causing harm or acting unfairly to peers. In one story (Kick) a child is directed by the authority to kick a classmate to teach him or her a lesson. In the second moral story (Cut) the protagonist is directed to cut in line instead of waiting for his or her turn to participate in a desired activity.

The stories classified as personal involved issues of personal preference and jurisdiction. In these stories the authority gives directives regarding friend and activity choices. In the first story (Friend) a child is directed to end one friendship and to befriend another child of the authority’s choosing. In the second story (Draw), the protagonist is directed to give up his or her choice of leisure activities (drawing) replacing it with the authority’s preference (soccer).

The stories classified as prudential involve issues of personal safety and wellbeing, but are stories that also have components of personal choice (what Smetana, 1989, p. 1053, has called “mixed-domain issues”). In these stories the authority’s directive appeals to safety concerns. The first of these stories (Climb) depicts a child who receives a directive not to climb to the top of a rock-climbing wall, and the second (Hat) depicts a child who receives a directive to wear a hat and gloves on a cold day.

Order of presentation of the stories was randomized. One story from each domain depicted a male protagonist and a male authority figure (father or male teacher), while the second story depicted a female protagonist and female authority figure (mother or female teacher). (See Appendix A for the complete interview protocol).

Following the presentation of each story, participants were first asked to summarize what they had been read to ensure that they had fully understood the events
depicted. Participants who provided incorrect or substantively incomplete stories were reread the story to correct their misunderstanding. Participants were then asked to evaluate the three aspects of the story and to justify their evaluations.

For example, in the moral story “Cut,” participants were read a story in which the parent or teacher told the protagonist to cut a line of comparably aged children waiting their turn to use a piece of playground equipment. The protagonist rejected this directive and secretly waited his or her turn. Later, when probed by the parent or teacher, the protagonist lied, saying that they cut in line.

Participants then provided their evaluations of the three aspects of the story. The first evaluation dealt with the authority figure’s directive. Specifically, participants were asked to evaluate the legitimacy of the directive: Was it all right or not all right that the teacher (parent) told [protagonist] to cut the line? The participant was then asked to provide a justification for his or her evaluation: Why was it (not) all right for the teacher (parent) to tell [protagonist] to cut the line?

The second evaluation was of the protagonist’s act of noncompliance. Specifically, participants were asked to evaluate and justify their evaluation of the child’s noncompliance with the directive: Was it all right or not all right that [protagonist] decided not to cut in line? And, Why was it (not) all right that [protagonist] did not cut in line?

The third evaluation was of the protagonist’s deception of the authority figure about their compliance. The participants were asked to evaluate and justify their evaluations of the lie that the protagonist told to their parent or teacher: Was it all right or not all right that [protagonist] told his (her) teacher (parent) that he (she) cut the line? And, Why was it (not) all right that [protagonist] told his (her) teacher (parent) that he (she) cut the line?

Finally, after evaluating and providing justifications for all of the stories, participants provided judgments about two abstract questions: (1) In general is it all right or not all right to lie to teachers (parents)? Why (not)? (2) Is it ever all right to lie? Why (not)?

The researcher individually interviewed each participant for 40-50 minutes in private offices in the media center or library of the schools. All interviews were audio recorded for later transcription and analysis. At the outset of the interview participants were reminded that the interviews were confidential and anonymous and that there were no right or wrong answers to the questions they would be asked. The format followed the developmental clinical interview method, which allows the interviewer to probe children’s reasoning and responses (“Tell me more about that.” or “What makes you think that?”) while following a scripted series of questions (for a detailed description of this method, see Damon, 1977; Piaget, 1932; Turiel, 1983).

Coding

As described above, participants were asked to make two types of judgments in each story, referred to as evaluations and justifications. Two coding systems were used to categorize these judgments, one for evaluations, and another for justifications. Evaluations were coded using a standard dichotomous framework reliably used in prior research. Following this system, act evaluations were coded positively or negatively based upon the participants’ judgment that the act was all right or not all right. Consistent
with prior research (Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci & Turiel, 1993), a binary coding procedure was used. Positive evaluations were coded with a 1, and negative evaluations were coded with 0.

The coding system developed to analyze justifications was based upon a coding scheme first used by Davidson, Turiel, & Black (1983), and widely used in subsequent research on social and moral reasoning. To code justifications a scoring system was formulated using a sub-set of the interviews (30%), equally divided by authority condition, sex, and age group. As with other modifications of this coding scheme (Kahn, 1992; Smetana, 1995), the categories were adapted to address the particular justifications given by the participants in this study (see Appendix B for full category descriptions).

Justifications were coded for the participant’s principal line of reasoning. In cases where participants provided more than one justification, the interviewer probed for the primary line of reasoning. As shown in Appendix B, sixteen categories were used to code the justifications. The categories generated refer to such concepts as preventing injustice, avoiding punishment, maintaining relationships, and personal jurisdiction. The same coding system was used to justify judgments of directives, noncompliance, and deception in all of the stories and abstract assessments.

For the purpose of statistically analyzing the justifications, each response was transformed using a binary classification procedure. In this procedure the justification category that was used to support the evaluation was coded in the affirmative (1). Each justification category not used to support a given evaluation was coded as a negative response (0).

Reliability

An independent scorer, trained in the application of the coding system and blind to the age, sex, and ethnicity of participants, scored 20 percent of the interviews. Reliability coding was calculated for the evaluations and justifications of randomly drawn participants, evenly divided by relationship condition, sex, and age group. Using Cohen’s kappa, inter-rater agreement for the evaluations was $\kappa = .91$. Reliability for the coding of justification categories was also measured using Cohen’s kappa; inter-rater agreement for directives was $\kappa = .84$; for noncompliance, $\kappa = .79$; and for deception, $\kappa = .81$. 
Chapter 3: Results

The results are presented in two parts – evaluations and justifications. First, for each of the stories, the evaluations of the directive, noncompliance, and deception are examined. For each of these, evaluations are compared by age, sex, story domain, and by authority type, and the extent to which the evaluations are affected by these variables is investigated. In the second section, justifications for the evaluations are explored. Justifications for evaluations of directives, noncompliance, and deception are compared by age, sex, story domain, and authority type, and the extent to which these variables influence each justification is examined.

For both evaluations and justifications, data from the unconflicted story and abstract assessments are presented before the data for the conflicted stories. The assessments within each conflicted story are presented in the order in which they appeared in the stories and were obtained in the interview (directives, noncompliance, and then deception).

Overview and Structure of Analysis
The goal of the statistical analysis was three-fold: (1) To compare the evaluations and justifications for directives, noncompliance, and deception between parent and teacher conditions; (2) To compare the evaluations and justifications of the three age groups; (3) To compare the evaluations and justifications for the three story types (moral, personal, and prudential), the unconflicted story, and abstract assessments. Evaluations were analyzed using analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedures to determine whether there were any significant differences between independent groups.

The primary affordance of ANOVA is that it can be used to analyze data in which there are several independent variables, and when there are variables with more than two levels. In analyzing these situations, ANOVA describes what effect independent variables, and interactions between independent variables, have on the dependent variable. In this approach, a model that includes all independent variables is generated to test for interaction and main effects. Subsequent, follow-up models are then generated to test and predict the response on specified dependent variables (e.g., evaluation of parental directive) based upon combinations of independent variables (e.g., age, sex, domain).

Justifications were analyzed by means of multinomial logistic regression (MLR). The primary affordance of MLR is that it is well suited for describing and testing hypotheses about the strength of relationships between categorical dependent variables and one or more categorical or continuous independent variables. MLR determines the proportional impact of multiple independent variables presented simultaneously to predict membership in each of the categorically distributed dependent variables. In other words, MLR modeling was used to predict the probability that a particular participant would use a particular kind of justification in each story assessment.

Specifically, MLR was selected to analyze justification data for two reasons. First, MLR is a procedure by which estimates of the partial contribution of each explanatory variable, as well as the net effects of the explanatory variables, on a dependent variable can be tested and explained. Second, MLR provides an effective and reliable way of obtaining the estimated probability (odds ratio) of belonging to a specific
population based upon categorical responses. That is, MLR measures each independent variable’s (e.g., age, sex, authority condition) partial contribution to the variations in the dependent variable (justification), and provides the likelihood of an individual providing a particular justification based upon their membership in various grouping categories (e.g., age, sex, and authority condition).

Evaluations

Statistical Procedures
For analyses of evaluations, the overall design was first tested for significance using $2 \times 2 \times 3 \times 7$ (Authority Type: parent, teacher $\times$ Sex of Participant: female, male $\times$ Age Group: 8-year-olds, 10-year-olds, 12-year-olds $\times$ Story: Kick, Cut, Friend, Draw, Climb, Hat, Cup) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor for each act-evaluation (directive, noncompliance, deception) separately. Results indicated no significant effects of sex, therefore this variable was combined in subsequent analysis. Similarly, there were no significant differences between stories within each domain. In fact, Spearman correlations of evaluations within domain and act were high (moral domain: directives, $r^2 = .812$, noncompliance $r^2 = .585$, deception $r^2 = .900$; personal domain: directives, $r^2 = .763$, noncompliance $r^2 = .885$, deception $r^2 = .716$; prudential domain, directives $r^2 = .768$, noncompliance $r^2 = .707$, deception $r^2 = .757$; all $p < .001$). Therefore stories were combined by domain in subsequent analysis. Thus, for each act-evaluation in the conflicted stories, a $2 \times 3 \times 3$ (Authority Type $\times$ Age Group $\times$ Domain) repeated measure ANOVA was conducted to test for between subject effects of authority type and age group, and within-subject effects of domain. Post hoc effects tests were used to compare the age groups, while pairwise comparisons were used to compare domain effects across age group and authority type. In cases where the assumption of sphericity was not met, corrections were made using Greenhouse-Geisser adjustments (Stevens, 1992).

Evaluations of Deception in Unconflicted and Abstract Assessments

Unconflicted Assessment
Evaluations of deception were examined using a story that depicted a child lying to their parent or teacher, but unlike other stories, did not depict a directive or act of noncompliance. This story was used to assess participants’ judgment about deception outside the context of a directive or violation of a directive. In this story deception is used to cover up a misdeed (the protagonist accidentally breaks his or her parent’s or teacher’s favorite coffee cup, and when asked what happened feigns ignorance, knowing he or she will not be found out). Evaluations of deception were assessed by asking participants if they thought it was all right or not all right that the protagonist lied in a given story. A large majority of participants judged that deception in this situation was not all right (95% parent condition; 97% teacher condition). Due to this largely one-sided judgment, the frequencies in most cells were too small to permit a statistical analysis. Table 1 shows the distribution of judgments by age group, and authority condition. Observation suggests that there were no differences between conditions, sexes, or across age groups.
Table 1

Percentage of Negative Evaluations of Deception in Unconflicted and Abstract Assessments, by Authority Type, and Age Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Unconflicted</th>
<th>Authority Specific</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-yr-olds</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-yr-olds</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-yr-olds</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abstract Assessment

Following their assessments of each of the seven stories, participants made three abstract assessments of deception. First, participants made an authority specific assessment. They were asked if lying to teachers or parents (depending on condition) was generally all right or not all right. A large majority (N = 115) responded that it was generally not all right. Once again, the frequencies in many cells were too small to permit a meaningful statistical analysis (see Table 1).

Second, participants were asked if lying in general was all right. Ninety eight percent of participants (N = 118) judged that lying in general was not all right, while no participants judged that it was generally all right. Given this result, no further statistical analysis of the general assessment was warranted.

The final assessment made by participants was in response to the question, “Can you imagine any situations where lying would be all right?” The majority of participants (71%) indicated that they could imagine a situation in which deception was all right. Chi-square analysis showed no significant effects of age group or authority type on frequency of participants’ affirmative responses (see Table 2). A description of the situations participants generated is provided in the section on justifications.

Table 2

Percentage of Positive Evaluations of Imagining a Case of Legitimate Deception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Imagined Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-yr-olds</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-yr-olds</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-yr-olds</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evaluations of Conflicted Stories

Evaluations of Directives

Evaluations were obtained by asking participants to judge if it was all right or not all right for the parents or teachers depicted in the stories to direct the protagonist to act in a particular way (e.g., Was it all right or not all right for Thomas’s dad to tell him to kick Jeff?). An ANOVA that included all of the independent variables (age, domain, and authority type) was then run for the evaluation of the directives. The resulting model indicated significant main effects for age \( F(2, 117) = 12.09, p < .001 \) and domain \( F(1.79, 213.25) = 177.36, p < .001, \eta = .61 \), but not for authority type. Because domain was the repeated measure, separate follow-up ANOVA were conducted within each domain to further examine the relationships between evaluations and independent variables.

Evaluations of Parental Directives

As shown in Table 3, only a small proportion (7%) of participants judged that it was all right for parents to give directives to kick another child or to cut a line of children waiting to take a turn at a game (moral issues). In contrast, a large majority (90%) judged that parental directives that restricted rock climbing or required wearing hat and gloves (prudential issues) were all right. In the personal domain, 38 percent of participants judged directives that restricted friendships or activity choices were all right.

These largely different appraisals of the stories revealed a significant main effect of domain of story on participants’ evaluations, \( F(1.78, 105.53) = 92.12, p < .001, \eta = .61 \), indicating that participants’ evaluations of whether directives were all right or not were contingent on the domain of the acts the parents were regulating. Tests of within-subjects effects showed that for each age group the effect of domain was significant (8-year-olds, \( F(1.30, 24.69) = 48.47, p < .001, \eta = .78 \); 10-year-olds, \( F(1.44, 27.36) = 21.96, p < .001, \eta = .54 \); 12-year-olds, \( F(2, 38) = 31.08, p < .001, \eta = .62 \)). Planned contrasts showed that the two younger groups ratings of prudential directives were significantly more positive than their ratings of personal directives (both \( p < .01 \)), and that they rated personal directives significantly more positively than moral directives (both \( p < .01 \)). In contrast, the oldest group’s evaluations of moral and personal directives did not differ, though both of these were endorsed significantly less than prudential directives (both \( p < .01 \)).

While there was general agreement among age groups about the unacceptability of directives to act immorally, and the acceptability of directives to act prudentially, there was a statistically significant main effect of age group on evaluations within the personal domain, \( F(2, 57) = 6.18, p < .01 \). Post hoc simple effect tests revealed that the proportion of positive evaluations was significantly lower for 12-year-olds (10%) than for both 10-year-olds (45%) and 8-year-olds (60%; both \( p < .01 \)). Ten-year-olds also gave significantly fewer positive evaluations than 8-year-olds \( (p < .01) \). It appears that with each increase in age level, participants were significantly less accepting of parental directives related to personal issues.
Table 3

Percentage of Positive Evaluations of Directives by Story Domain, Authority Type, and Age Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Moral</th>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Prudential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-yr-olds</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>60&lt;sup&gt;b, d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-yr-olds</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>45&lt;sup&gt;b, e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-yr-olds</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;b, f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages with different superscripts differ at p < .05, or .01. Superscripts “a,” “b,” and “c” (p < .05) indicate domain differences within age group and authority type. Superscripts “d,” “e,” and “f” (p < .01) indicate age group differences within each domain and authority type.

Evaluations of Teacher Directives

As shown in Table 3, only a small proportion of participants (7%) evaluated teachers’ directives in the moral stories positively. In contrast, a large majority (90%) gave positive evaluations of teachers’ directives about the prudential issues. Whereas there was large-scale agreement in the evaluations of moral and prudential directives, evaluations of personal directives were less one-sided. In the personal stories, approximately a third (32%) of the participants gave positive evaluations of teacher directives.

Statistical examination of these evaluations showed a significant main effect of the domain of the stories on participants’ ratings of whether the directives were all right or not all right, $F(1.79, 105.86) = 84.84, p < .001, \eta = .59$. Within-subjects analysis showed that the effect of domain was significant within each age group (8-year-olds, $F(2, 38) = 25.29, p < .001, \eta = .57$; 10-year-olds, $F(1.54, 29.23) = 29.51, p < .001, \eta = .61$; 12-year-olds, $F(2, 38) = 57.90, p < .001, \eta = .75$). As Table 3 shows, pairwise comparisons revealed that the two younger groups endorsed prudential directives significantly more than personal directives (both $p < .01$), and they endorsed personal directives significantly more than moral directives (both $p < .01$). The oldest group’s evaluations of moral and personal directives did not differ, and both were endorsed significantly less than prudential directives (both $p < .01$).

There were no significant age group effects on evaluations in either the moral or prudential stories, however, there was a statistically significant effect of age on evaluations of teachers’ directives in the personal stories, $F(2, 57) = 5.74, p < .01$. Post hoc simple effect tests showed that this effect was due to the fact that 12-year-olds gave significantly less positive evaluations (5%) of directives restricting personal choice than either the 10-year-olds (40%) or the 8-year-olds (50%, both $p < .01$). There was not a significant difference between the evaluations of the two younger groups. While the participants in the younger age groups were generally split on their evaluations of teacher directives, they accepted directives restricting personal choice significantly more than the
oldest group.

Comparison of Parent and Teacher Directives

The initial ANOVA run on the saturated model indicated there were no statistically significant differences between evaluations of parent and teacher directives. As described above, participants evaluated the directives of parents and teachers largely the same way across age groups and domains. Table 3 shows that evaluations of both authority types followed a similar pattern, with large majorities of children in each age group rejecting directives to act immorally and endorsing directives around issues of prudential concern. The pattern of evaluations for personal issues was also similar for parents and teachers. At each age level the ratings of directives were similar across conditions, with ratings becoming progressively less positive as age increased.

Evaluations of Noncompliance

Evaluations of noncompliance were obtained by asking participants to judge if it was all right or not all right for the protagonists depicted in the stories to not comply with their parent’s or teacher’s directives (e.g., Was it all right or not all right that Thomas decided not to kick Jeff instead of doing what he was told?). Following the same procedures as described for the analysis of the directives, a 2 (authority) x 3 (age group) x 3 (domain) ANOVA was run for the acts of noncompliance. The resulting model showed significant main effects of both domain, $F(2, 238) = 114.79, p < .001$, $\eta = .57$, and age, $F(2, 117) = 12.67, p < .01$, but not authority type. Because domain was the repeated measure, follow-up ANOVAs were then conducted in each domain to assess the relationship between the evaluations and independent variables.

Evaluations of Noncompliance with Parental Directives

Noncompliance with moral directives to kick a peer or cut in a line of peers was widely accepted (93%). In contrast, noncompliance with directives aimed at controlling friend and activity choices was evaluated positively by a small majority (55%) of participants, while a minority (13%) gave positive ratings to noncompliance with directives aimed at maintaining the protagonists’ safety.

Tests of the variance in ratings of noncompliance revealed a significant main effect of domain on participants judgments, $F(1.81, 106.93) = 70.30, p < .001$, $\eta = .54$. A test of within-subjects effects showed a significant main effect of domain for evaluations in each age group (8-year-olds, $F(1.54, 29.24) = 29.51, p < .001$, $\eta = .61$; 10-year-olds, $F(1.43, 27.30) = 26.98, p < .001$, $\eta = .58$; 12-year-olds, $F(1.42, 26.98) = 22.08, p < .001$, $\eta = .54$).

As presented in Table 4, pairwise comparisons showed that 8-year-old participants evaluated each of the three domains significantly differently ($ps < .01$). Ten-year-olds evaluated noncompliance more positively in the moral stories than in the personal stories and prudential stories (both $p < .01$), but their evaluations of personal and prudential stories did not vary significantly. The 12-year-olds evaluated noncompliance in the moral and personal stories more positively than prudential stories (both $p < .01$), but did not evaluate moral and personal stories differently.

As Table 4 indicates, roughly the same proportion of participants in each age
group gave positive ratings to noncompliance with moral directives. However, participants’ ratings of noncompliance in the personal and prudential stories varied with age. When considering the personal stories, minorities of both 8-year-olds (40%) and 10-year-olds (40%) evaluated noncompliance positively, in comparison to a majority (85%) of 12-year-olds. This variance was significant, \( F(2, 57) = 6.33, p < .01 \). Post hoc tests showed that 12-year-olds’ evaluations of noncompliance in personal stories were significantly more positive than the ratings of the two younger age groups (both \( p < .05 \)).

A similar, though statistically insignificant (\( F(2, 57) = 2.06, p < .13 \)) age-related pattern was seen in judgments about noncompliance in the prudential stories. As displayed in Table 4, proportions of participants endorsing noncompliance increased incrementally with age (5% of 8-year-olds, 10% of 10-year-olds, and 25% of 12-year-olds).

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Moral</th>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Prudential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-yr-olds</td>
<td>90(^a)</td>
<td>90(^a)</td>
<td>40(^{b,d})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-yr-olds</td>
<td>95(^a)</td>
<td>95(^a)</td>
<td>40(^{b,d})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-yr-olds</td>
<td>95(^a)</td>
<td>95(^a)</td>
<td>85(^{a,e})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages with different superscripts differ at \( p < .05 \), or .01. Superscripts “a,” “b,” and “c” (\( p < .01 \)) indicate domain differences within age group and authority type. Superscripts “d” and “e” (\( p < .05 \)) and “f” and “g” (\( p < .01 \)) indicate age group differences within each domain and authority type.

**Evaluations of Noncompliance with Teacher Directives**

Majorities of participants gave positive evaluations of noncompliance with directives to act immorally (93%) and directives that restricted personal choice (67%). In contrast, noncompliance with prudential directives was endorsed by 27 percent of participants in this condition. Analysis of these results showed that the evaluation of noncompliance was significantly affected by the domain of the directive, \( F(2, 118) = 46.47, p < .001, \eta = .44 \).

A test of within-subjects effects showed that domain had a significant main effect in each age group (8-year-olds, \( F(2, 38) = 25.29, p < .001, \eta = .57 \); 10-year-olds, \( F(2, 38) = 10.84, p < .001, \eta = .56 \); 12-year-olds, \( F(2, 38) = 19.32, p < .001, \eta = .50 \)). As Table 4 indicates, pairwise comparisons showed that 8-year-olds evaluated noncompliance in the moral stories more favorably than in the personal stories, and in the personal stories more favorably than in the prudential (\( ps < .01 \)). In contrast, 10-year-olds evaluated noncompliance in the moral stories significantly more positively than in personal or prudential stories (both \( p < .01 \)). For the 12-year-olds, noncompliance with moral and personal stories was seen significantly more positively than noncompliance with directives in the prudential stories (both \( p < .05 \)). Evaluations of noncompliance in the
moral and personal stories were not significantly different from one another.

As Table 4 shows, evaluations of noncompliance in the moral stories were quite similar across age groups. In contrast, ratings of noncompliance in the personal and prudential stories varied across age groups. In the personal domain, there was a significant main effect of age on evaluations, F(2, 57) = 7.35, p < .01. Post hoc analysis found that significantly more 12-year-olds (95%) endorsed noncompliance than 10-year-olds (60%, p < .05) or 8-year-olds (45%; p < .01).

Evaluations of noncompliance in prudential stories was also significantly affected by age group, F(2, 57) = 3.75, p < .05. Post hoc tests showed that 12-year-olds gave significantly more positive ratings (40%) than 8-year-olds (5%, p < .05). However, the differences between the oldest and middle age groups, and the middle and youngest age groups were not significant.

Comparison of Noncompliance with Directives of Parents and Teachers

As noted above, the initial ANOVA showed no significant differences between the evaluations of noncompliance in the parent and teacher conditions. However, separate analysis within each domain, did show authority-related differences in evaluations of the prudential stories. Participants in the teacher condition gave twice as many positive evaluations of noncompliance (27%) as their counterparts in the parent condition (13%), though this difference did not reach significance, F(1, 118) = 3.21, p < .06. For these stories, in both authority conditions there was a linear trend in noncompliance, indicating that as age increased, endorsement of noncompliance increased as well, however, as mentioned previously, this trend was only statistically significant in the teacher condition.

Noncompliance in the moral stories was judged similarly across ages in each condition (see Table 4). In contrast, at each age level in the personal stories participants judged noncompliance with teachers more favorably than noncompliance with parents, but this difference did not reach significance.

Evaluations of Deception

Evaluations of deception were obtained in the interviews by asking participants to judge whether or not it was all right for the protagonist in each story to deceive their parent or teacher about their act of noncompliance (e.g., Was it all right or not all right that Thomas told his dad that he did kick Jeff, even though he didn’t kick him?). A 2 (authority) x 3 (age group) x 3 (domain) ANOVA for evaluation of deception revealed significant main effects of story domain, F(1.71, 203.77) = 13.13, p < .01, η = .10, age group, F(2, 117) = 15.00, p < .001, and authority type, F(1, 118) = 10.40, p < .01, on evaluations of deception. Because the domain was the repeated measure, follow-up ANOVA procedures were then run for each domain to further examine the relationship between the evaluations of the deceptions and the independent variables.

Evaluation of Deceiving Parents

Across all stories, deception of parents was generally not approved by participants of all ages. In each domain, participants approving of deception were in the minority. Of the three story types, deception in the moral stories was approved most frequently (30%), followed by deception in the personal (20%) and prudential (12%) stories. Tests of
within-subject effects indicate that domain of story did not have a significant affect on participants ratings of deception overall, or within any age group.

As displayed in Table 5, within each domain, the proportion of participants approving of deception increased with age. In the moral stories, there was a significant main effect of age group, $F(2, 57) = 5.24, p < .01$, indicating that as age increased approval of deception increased as well. Post hoc effect tests showed that this difference was due to significantly more positive ratings by 12-year-olds (50%) than 8-year-olds (10%; $p < .05$). The post hoc tests also showed that there was no statistical difference between the evaluations of the 10-year-olds and either the oldest or youngest groups.

Within the personal stories, there was also a significant main effect of age, $F(2, 57) = 4.46, p < .05$, indicating that as age increased approval of deception also increased significantly. Post hoc effect tests demonstrated that, like the moral stories, 12-year-olds approved of deception significantly more than 8-year-olds (40% and 5%, respectively; $p < .05$), whereas the middle age group (15%) did not differ significantly from the oldest or youngest groups.

In the prudential stories, 25 percent of the oldest group endorsed deception, in contrast to 5 percent in each of the younger two groups. This trend approached, but did not reach, statistical significance, $F(2, 57) = 2.95, p = .06$.

**Table 5**

*Percentage of Positive Evaluations of Deception by Story Domain, Authority Type, and Age Group*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Moral</th>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Prudential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-yr-olds</td>
<td>10$^c$</td>
<td>10$^c$</td>
<td>5$^e$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-yr-olds</td>
<td>30$^g$</td>
<td>70$^{a, f, h}$</td>
<td>15$^g$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-yr-olds</td>
<td>50$^{d, i}$</td>
<td>65$^{a, f, j}$</td>
<td>40$^{d, i}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages with different superscripts differ at $p < .05$, or .01. Superscripts “a” and “b” ($p < .05$) indicate domain differences within age group and authority type. Superscripts “c” and “d” ($p < .05$) and “e” and “f” ($p < .01$) indicate age group differences within each domain and authority type. Superscripts “g” and “h” ($p < .01$) and “i” and “j” ($p < .05$) indicate authority type differences within age group and domain.

**Evaluation of Deceiving Teachers**

As shown in Table 5, evaluations of deception varied by domain. Nearly half (48%) of participants evaluated deception positively in stories where the protagonist elects not to comply with a directive to kick a peer or cut in a line of peers waiting their turn, but says that they followed the directive. In contrast, roughly a third (37%) of participants positively judged deception about noncompliance with directives that restricted personal choice, and 12 percent gave positive judgments of deception about noncompliance with matters related to prudential concerns.

Tests of the variance showed a significant main effect of domain on the evaluations, $F(1.68, 99.09) = 11.15, p < .01, \eta = .16$. Pairwise comparisons showed that
The effect was due to 10-year-olds and 12-year-olds giving significantly more positive ratings of deception in the moral and personal stories than in the prudential stories (ps < .05; see Table 5).

There was also a significant main effect of age on the evaluations of deception in the moral and personal, but not the prudential stories. In the moral stories, the youngest group approved of deception significantly less than the older groups, F(2, 57) = 12.57, p < .001. Majorities of both the 10-year-olds (70%), and 12-year-olds (65%) endorsed deception more than 8-year-olds (10%). Post hoc analysis found that both of the older groups gave significantly more positive ratings than the youngest participants (both p < .01), while the ratings of the older two groups did not vary significantly.

In the personal stories, the significant main effect of age on evaluations of deception, F(2, 57) = 9.25, p < .001, was also due to differences between the evaluations of the two older groups and the youngest group. Post hoc effect tests showed that 12-year-olds, and 10-year-olds gave significantly more positives ratings (60% and 45%, respectively) than the 8-year-olds participants (5%; p < .01, and p < .05, respectively). There was not a significant difference between the two older groups’ evaluations.

Comparison of Deception of Parents and Deception of Teachers

As was previously mentioned, the ANOVA for the full model indicated a significant main effect of authority type on evaluations of deception, F(1, 118) = 10.40, p < .01. Separate analysis was conducted within each story domain to examine this effect. There was a significant affect of authority type on evaluations of deception in both the moral stories, F(1, 118) = 5.96, p < .05, and personal stories, F(1, 118) = 4.44, p < .05, but not in the prudential stories. As shown in Table 5, deception of teachers was endorsed significantly more than deception of parents about both moral issues (48% and 30%, respectively) and personal issues (37% and 20%, respectively).

Though the age × authority interaction did not reach significance, pairwise contrasts suggest that the authority-related variance in evaluations could be attributed to differences in the judgments of the older two groups. Whereas the youngest group’s evaluations were not affected by authority condition, the 10-year-olds in the teacher condition gave 40% more positive evaluations in the moral stories, and 30% more in the personal stories, than their counterparts in the parent condition (both p < .01). The oldest group rated deception of teachers 15% higher in the moral stories, and 20% higher in the personal stories, than their counterparts in the parent condition (both p < .05).

Justifications

Statistical Procedures

Justifications for each of the evaluations were obtained by asking participants’ to explain why they evaluated each act as all right or not all right. These justifications were categorized using the coding system described in Appendix I. Justifications for evaluations of each directive, act of noncompliance, and deception, were obtained and coded in the same way. Coding procedures limited each participant to one justification per evaluation. In those instances where participants provided more than one justification, the experimenter used probing questions to determine which justification was the primary line of reasoning.
The relationship between the justifications and the explanatory variables was examined using multinomial logistic regression (MLR). Because the primary variables of interest were age group and authority condition, MLR analyses were performed with age group and authority type as the predictors and the type of justification as the predicted for each of the assessments, resulting in three models for effect of age group, effect of relationship, and their interaction. These procedures tested the partial contribution of age group and authority type for each justification type, and predicted the likelihood that a participant with a particular set of grouping (explanatory) variables would use a particular type of justification.

The tables present the percentage of participants who used each type of justification in response to each of the assessment questions. Several justifications were used frequently in one assessment type (directives, noncompliance, or deception), but scarcely or not at all in other assessments, making statistical comparisons across the three assessments impossible. In these cases, MLR was run for each of the three assessments separately, and a an inclusion criteria of .10 frequency or higher was applied to the full model (fourteen categories), meaning that only those justifications that were used by 10 percent of participants in a given assessment were included in the follow-up comparisons (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). In cases where cell samples were zero, Agresti’s (1996) zero-cell procedure was used to avoid the problem of infinite comparison estimates. Following Agresti, a sensitivity analysis of goodness-of-fit statistics and parameter estimates resulted in a flat increase of 0.041 per cell.

In the initial analyses, sex was included as a parameter, however, because it had no statistically significant effect on justifications, it was removed from the analysis to increase the cell frequencies for other factors. Similarly, the initial analysis was conducted on the full set of six conflicted stories, however, since there were no statistical differences in justifications between stories within each domain, these stories were collapsed by domain to increase cell frequencies.

Justifications for Deception in Unconflicted and Abstract Assessments

Unconflicted Assessment

It will be recalled that the vast majority of participants gave negative evaluations to deception in this situation. Analysis of the justifications for these judgments showed that the reasons behind the largely uniform evaluations of deception were diverse. Three justifications met the criteria for inclusion and were subsequently analyzed by way of MLR analysis. As presented in Table 6, the majority (62%) of participants justified their rejection of deception in this case based on concerns with the act of deception being wrong without further elaboration (Unjust/Wrong). Equal numbers expressed concerns with guilt (10%; Guilt) and punishment (10%; Punishment). Although there appears to be an age-related pattern in justifications, neither age group nor authority condition were significant predictors of justifications.
Table 6
Percentage of Justifications for Evaluations of Unconflicted, Authority Specific, and General Assessments of Deception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>8-yr-olds</th>
<th>10-yr-olds</th>
<th>12-yr-olds</th>
<th>Ages Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconflicted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unjust/Wrong</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority Specific</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unjust/Wrong</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship Trust</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unjust/Wrong</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship Trust</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Superscripts “a” and “b” indicate significant differences (p < .05) between age groups within a given justification.
Abstract Assessments

Participants justified their responses to three questions, (a) whether or not lying to a parent or teacher (based on condition) was generally all right, (b) whether or not lying in general was all right, and (c) whether or not they could think of a situation in which lying was all right.

In the authority specific question, the majority of participants (75%) justified their evaluations of deception of parents and teachers by explaining that lying was wrong without elaboration (Unjust/Wrong). Several participants (21%) gave justifications related to the requirement of honesty in trusting relationships (Relationship Trust). To examine developmental differences in justifications, an MLR analysis was performed with age group as the predictor and the type of justification as the predicted. The model was significant, \( \chi^2(4, N = 120) = 23.23, p < .01 \), Nagelkerk R\(^2\) = .21. A priori comparisons with Relationship Trust as the reference for the predicted category and 12-year-olds as the reference for the predictor variable were then performed. As displayed in Table 6, 12-year-olds, but not 10-year-olds, gave significantly more Relationship Trust justifications than 8-year-olds, \( \beta = 1.25, \text{Wald} = 4.99, p < .05 \), odds ratio = 3.44. Accordingly, the oldest participants were statistically 3.44 times more likely to use Relationship Trust to justify their evaluations than the youngest participants. In contrast, there was not a significant effect of age on the use of the Unjust/Wrong justification. A second MLR with authority type as the predictor and justification type as the predicted found no significant differences in justifications based on authority type.

Similar justifications were used for the evaluations of deception in general. Once again, the two justification categories that met the inclusion criteria were Unjust/Wrong (79%) and Relationship Trust (13%). MLR analysis was performed with age group and authority type as the predictors and the type of justification as the predicted. As shown in Table 6, no significant differences were found in justifications based on age group or authority type.

The final assessment made by participants was an explanation rather than a justification, per se. Participants who provided an affirmative response to the question: “Can you imagine any situations where lying would be all right?” (N = 85, 71%) were asked to describe such a situation (“Can you give me an example of when it would be all right to tell a lie?”). Of the 85 participants asked, 81 (95%) provided a situation in which they judged deception all right. All of the situations generated were then coded using the system developed for the justifications. As shown in Table 7, the vast majority (90%) of these situations fell into one of four of the categories. Nearly half of all situations involved reasons related to self-preservation (Prudential Concerns), such as lying to potential kidnappers, bullies, and murderers (41%). A large number of participants also generated situations in which lies were told to prevent harm or injustices to another (31%; Preventing/Righting Injustice). The third most common situation involved so-called white lies, such as lying to veil the contents of birthday gifts or the preparations for a surprise party. These situations primarily involved concerns about hurting the feelings (Harm/Welfare) of the gift giver and recipient that would arise as a result of spoiling a surprise (10%), and concerns with violating trust (Relationship Trust) related to not keeping a secret (9%).
Table 7
Percentages of Participant Generated Situations in which Lying was Judged All Right

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation Type</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>8-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th>10-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th>12-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ages Combined</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential Concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing/Righting Injustice</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm/Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = (81)
Due to the possibility of contamination from the preceding interview questions, no formal statistical analyses were conducted to test the relationship of the participant-generated situations and the explanatory variables. However, as is presented in Table 7, there appear to be linear trends in the generation of Prudential situations and situations related to Preventing/Righting Injustice. With increased age participants generated less Prudential situations and more situations related to Preventing/Righting Injustice. The type of story generated by participants did not vary significantly between authority types.

*Justifications for Evaluations in Conflicted Stories*

**Justifications for Judgments about Directives**

Justifications for directives were obtained by asking participants to explain why they judged the authority’s directive to be all right or not all right. Following each evaluation, participants were asked: Why was it [all right/not all right] for the [teacher/parent] to tell [protagonist] to _____ [act]? Tables 8-10 provide the proportions of participants who used each category to justify their evaluation of the authorities’ directives. As these tables indicate, overall, participants did not provide a wide range of justifications. Five categories met the inclusion criteria for directives: Preventing/Righting Injustice, Harm/Welfare, Unwarranted Control, Personal Choice, and Prudential Concerns.

**Justifications for Directives in the Moral Domain**

Justifications for judgments about moral directives primarily fell into three categories, accounting for 92 percent of the justifications (see Table 8): Preventing/Righting Injustice (60%), Harm/Welfare (19%), and Unwarranted Control (13%). All three of these categories were used exclusively to justify negative evaluations of the directives.

MLR analyses were performed on each of these justifications to test the effects of age group and authority type on participants’ justifications. The first model, with age group as the predictor and the justifications for the moral directives as the predicted was significant, \( \chi^2(6, N=120) = 28.30, p < .01 \), Nagelkerk R^2 = .24. A priori comparisons with Unwarranted Control as the reference for the predicted variable and 12-year-olds as the reference for the predictor variable showed that 12-year-olds used significantly more Unwarranted Control justifications than 8-year-olds (28% and 0%, respectively), but not 10-year-olds (10%), \( \beta = 1.70, \text{Wald} = 2.66, p < .01 \), odds ratio = 5.50. Thus, the oldest participants were 5.5 times more likely than the youngest group to use justifications related to the limits of authorities’ jurisdiction (Unwarranted Control) when rejecting parents’ and teachers’ immoral directives. No significant age group differences were found for the Preventing/Righting Injustice, or Harm/Welfare justifications. Across age groups, participants used these two justifications to reject immoral directives with similar frequency.

The effect of authority type was tested in a second MLR analysis, where authority type was the predictor and the justifications was the predicted. This model approached, but did not reach significance, \( \chi^2(3, N = 120) = 7.31, p = .063 \). As Table 8 depicts, children justified their judgments of immoral directives in similar ways, regardless of the authority figure giving that directive.
Table 8
Percentage of Justifications for Evaluations of Directives: Moral Stories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>8-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th>10-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th>12-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ages Combined</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing/Righting Injustice</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm/Welfare</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwarranted Control</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Choice</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (60) (60) (120)

Superscripts “a” and “b” indicate significant differences (p < .01) between age groups within a given justification.
Justifications for Directives in the Personal Domain

Eighty percent of the justifications for evaluations of directives in the personal stories fell into three categories (see Table 9): Unwarranted Control (43%), Personal Choice (19%), and Prudential Concern (18%). Personal Choice and Unwarranted Control were used exclusively to justify negative evaluations, while Prudential Concern was used primarily to endorse directives.

A MLR analysis was performed to test the partial contribution of age group and authority type on each of these justifications. In the first model, with age group as the predictor and the type of justification for the personal directives as the predicted, there was a significant main effect of age, $\chi^2(6, N =120) = 23.60, p < .001$, Nagelkerk $R^2 = .20$. A priori comparisons with Unwarranted Control as the reference for the predicted category and 12-year-olds as the reference for the predictor category showed that 12-year-olds used Unwarranted Control justifications significantly more than 8-year-olds (58% and 25%, respectively), but not 10-year-olds (48%), $\beta = 2.37$, Wald = 10.27, $p < .01$, odds ratio = 10.75. These results indicate that the oldest group was 10.27 times more likely than the youngest group to appeal to issues of Unwarranted Control when rejecting the legitimacy of directives that restricted personal freedoms and preferences. As indicated in Table 9, the use of Prudential Concern and Personal Choice justifications did not vary significantly across age groups.

To test the relative contribution of authority type to participants’ justifications, a MLR analysis with authority type as the predictor and the justifications as the predicted was performed. The model showed a significant main effect of authority type, $\chi^2(3, N =120) = 12.61, p < .01$, Nagelkerk $R^2 = .13$. A priori comparisons with Unwarranted Control as the reference for the predicted category and the teacher condition as the reference for the predictor category were performed. Analysis showed that participants who evaluated teachers’ directives used Unwarranted Control justifications significantly more than participants who evaluated parents’ directives, $\beta = 1.88$, Wald = 10.61, $p < .01$, odds ratio = 6.58. In other words, when rejecting directives participants in the teacher condition were 6.58 times more likely than those in the parent condition to do so for reasons of Unwarranted Control, (55% and 32%, respectively). There were no significant differences between authority conditions in the use of Personal Choice or Prudential Concern justifications.

However, there was a significant age group × authority type interaction on Personal Choice justifications, $\chi^2(2) = 13.44, p < .01$. This effect was due to the fact that with increased age the use of the Personal Choice justifications increased in the parent condition, but decreased in the teacher condition.
Table 9
Percentage of Justifications for Evaluations of Directives: Personal Stories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>8-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th>10-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th>12-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ages Combined</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing/Righting Injustice</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm/Welfare</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwarranted Control</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal Choice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential Concerns</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (60) (60) (120)

Superscripts “a” and “b” indicate significant differences (p < .01) between age groups within a given justification. Superscripts “c” and “d” indicate significant differences (p < .01) between authority types within a given justification.
**Justifications for Directives in the Prudential Domain**

For the directives in the prudential stories, only **Prudential Concern** met the inclusion criteria. The vast majority of participants (92%) justified their evaluations with reasons that concerned individual safety. As presented in Table 10, at least 88 percent of each age group used this type of justification. Chi-square analysis confirmed that there was no difference across age groups in the use of the justification. Similarly, analysis showed no significant effect of authority type in the use of **Prudential Concern**, in fact the values were identical (92%).
Table 10
Percentage of Justifications for Evaluations of Directives: Prudential Stories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>8-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th>10-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th>12-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ages Combined</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing/Righting Injustice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm/Welfare</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwarranted Control</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Choice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential Concerns</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>(20)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 120
Justifications for Judgments about Noncompliance

Justifications for evaluations of noncompliance were obtained by asking participants to explain why they had judged the protagonist’s act of noncompliance to be all right or not all right. After providing their evaluation, participants were asked: Why was it [all right/not all right] that [protagonist] did not ____ [act]? Tables 11-13 show the proportions of justification given by each age group in each condition. Overall, six different categories met the justification criteria for noncompliance: Preventing/Righting Injustice, Harm/Welfare, Unwarranted Control, Personal Choice, Prudential Concerns, and Punishment. Because several of these justifications were used in only one of the three domains of story, statistical analysis was run within each domain separately.

Justification for Noncompliance in the Moral Domain

The vast majority (91%) of justifications for noncompliance with authorities’ directives fell within three categories: Preventing/Righting Injustice (63%), Unwarranted Control (18%), and Harm/Welfare (10%). While a majority of those providing justifications related to Preventing/Righting Injustice endorsed noncompliance, all of those using Unwarranted Control and Harm/Welfare justifications endorsed noncompliance.

A MLR analysis was used to test the contributions of age group and authority type on participants’ use of these justifications. The first model, with age group as the predictor and the justifications for the moral directives as the predicted was significant, \(\chi^2(6, N=120) = 28.02, p < .001\), Nagelkerk R\(^2\) = .23. A priori comparisons with Unwarranted Control as the reference for the predicted variable and 12-year-olds as the reference for the predictor variable showed that 12-year-olds used significantly more Unwarranted Control justifications than 8-year-olds (30% and 3%, respectively), but not 10-year-olds (20%), \(\beta = 5.57, \text{Wald} = 29.66, p < .01, \text{odds ratio} = 9.51\). This analysis predicts that 12-year-olds were 9.51 times more likely to use justifications related to Unwarranted Control than 8-year-olds when assessing noncompliance with immoral directives. As Table 11 shows, there was not a significant effect of age group on the use of the Preventing/Righting Injustice or Harm/Welfare justification categories.

The effects of authority type were also examined using MLR analysis. The resulting model showed significant effects of authority type on justifications, \(\chi^2(3, N =120) = 7.88, p < .05\), Nagelkerk R\(^2\) = .09. A priori comparisons with Unwarranted Control as the reference for the predicted variable and the teacher authority type as the reference for the predictor showed that participants in the teacher condition used significantly more Unwarranted Control justifications than participants in the parent condition, \(\beta = 1.29, \text{Wald} = 5.49, p < .05, \text{odds ratio} = 3.66\). Thus, participants’ use of the Unwarranted Control justification was 3.66 times more likely in the teacher condition than in the parent condition (27% and 8%, respectively). A similar model, with Preventing/Righting Injustice as the reference for the predicted was also significant, \(\beta = -.861, \text{Wald} = 4.99, p < .05, \text{odds ratio} = 2.36\). The use of Preventing/Righting Injustice was 2.36 times more likely in the parent condition than teacher condition (72% and 53%, respectively). Harm/Welfare justifications were used equally in the parent and teacher conditions (10%), and therefore were not analyzed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>8-yr-olds</th>
<th>10-yr-olds</th>
<th>12-yr-olds</th>
<th>Ages Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing/Righting Injustice</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm/Welfare</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwarranted Control</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Choice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (60) (60) (120)

Superscripts “a” and “b” indicate significant differences (p < .01) between age groups within a given justification. Superscripts “c” and “d” indicate significant differences (p < .01) between authority types within a given justification.
Justifications for Noncompliance in the Personal Domain

Justifications for judgments about noncompliance in the personal stories were primarily of three types: **Unwarranted Control** (32%), **Personal Choice** (26%), and **Punishment** (18%). No other categories reached the 10 percent inclusion criteria.

**Unwarranted Control** and **Personal Choice** were both used to endorse noncompliance, whereas fear of **Punishment**, was used to justify why noncompliance was not all right.

MLR analysis was performed to test the partial contributions of age group and authority type on these justifications. The first model, with age group as the predictor and the justifications for noncompliance as the predicted was significant, $\chi^2(6, N =120) = 28.76, p < .001$, Nagelkerk $R^2 = .24$. Comparisons were performed iteratively using each of the three justifications as the reference category for the predicted and the 12-year-olds as the reference for the predictor.

The main effect of age group was significant on each of the three justification types. As displayed in Table 12, analysis showed that 12-year-olds used significantly more **Personal Choice** justifications than 10-year-olds (43% and 13%), but not 8-year-olds (23%), participants, $\beta = 1.64$, Wald = 8.17, $p < .01$, odds ratio = 5.17. In other words, the oldest group was 5.17 times more likely than the middle age group to appeal to personal choice, but not significantly different than the youngest group. Both 12-year-olds and 10-year-olds used **Unwarranted Control** to justify noncompliance significantly more than 8-year-olds (43%, 38%, and 15%, respectively), $\beta = 1.43$, Wald = 6.88, $p < .01$, odds ratio = 4.19, and $\beta = 1.22$, Wald = 4.95, $p < .05$, odds ratio = 3.40. Both 8-year-olds and 10-year-olds used significantly more **Punishment** justifications than 12-year-olds (30%, 23%, and 3%, respectively), $\beta = -2.82$, Wald = 6.93, $p < .01$, odds ratio = 16.66, and $\beta = -2.43$, Wald = 5.03, $p < .05$, odds ratio = 11.36.

A MLR analysis was then performed with authority type as the predictor and the type of justification for noncompliance as the predicted. The main effect of authority type on justifications was significant, $\chi^2(3, N =120) = 25.53, p < .001$, Nagelkerk $R^2 = .25$. Comparisons with **Unwarranted Control** as the reference for the predicted and the teacher condition as the reference for the predictor showed that participants in the teacher condition justified noncompliance with **Unwarranted Control** justifications significantly more than participants in the parent condition (42% and 22%), $\beta = .949$, Wald = 5.39, $p < .05$, odds ratio = 2.58. Participants also used **Punishment** justifications significantly more with teachers than with parents (27% and 10%), $\beta = 1.19$, Wald = 5.19, $p < .05$, odds ratio = 3.26. As indicated in Table 12, these findings show that when rejecting noncompliance in the personal stories, participants in the teacher condition did so using **Punishment** justifications 3.26 times more than participants in the parent condition, whereas when participants endorsed noncompliance in the personal stories, the teacher condition yielded 2.58 times more **Unwarranted Control** justifications than the parent condition. There was not a significant effect of authority type on **Personal Choice** justifications, indicating that participants used this justification similarly in each condition.
Table 12
Percentage of Justifications for Evaluations of Noncompliance: Personal Stories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>8-yr-olds</th>
<th>10-yr-olds</th>
<th>12-yr-olds</th>
<th>Ages Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing/Righting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injustice</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm/Welfare</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwarranted Control</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15(^a)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Choice</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential Concerns</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30(^a)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N =

(20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (60) (60) (120)

Superscripts “a” and “b” indicate significant differences (p < .01) between age groups within a given justification. Superscripts “c” and “d” indicate significant differences (p < .05) between authority types within a given justification.
Justifications for Noncompliance in the Prudential Domain

Justifications for judgments about noncompliance in the prudential stories were examined using MLR procedures to test the contributions of age group and authority type on participants’ justifications. Three justifications for noncompliance in the prudential stories met the criteria for analysis: **Prudential Concern** (63%), **Personal Choice** (13%), and **Punishment** (10%), and accounted for 86 percent of justifications. In these stories, **Prudential Concern** and **Punishment** were both used to reject noncompliance, whereas those using **Personal Choice** justifications did so to explain why they judged noncompliance all right.

A MLR procedure with age group as the predictor and the justifications for noncompliance as the predicted was significant, $\chi^2(6, N = 120) = 30.23, p < .001$, Nagelkerk $R^2 = .25$. A priori comparisons with **Prudential Concerns** as the reference category for the predicted and the 12-year-olds as the reference for the predictor, showed no significant effect of age group on the use of prudential justifications (**Prudential Concerns**). As Table 13 shows, more than half of each age group used this justification type when providing the reason for their judgment of noncompliance. There was a significant main effect of age group on the use of the **Personal Choice** justification. Sixth and seventh grade participants used significantly more **Personal Choice** justifications to support their evaluations of prudential noncompliance than 8-year-olds (30% and 3%, respectively), but not 10-year-olds (10%) participants, $\beta = 1.59$, Wald = 3.92, $p < .05$, odds ratio = 4.95. The effects of age group on the other justifications were not significant.

A second MLR analysis with authority type as the predictor and justification type as the predicted was conducted to examine the effect of authority on justifications. The model was significant, $\chi^2(3, N = 120) = 12.21, p < .01$, Nagelkerk $R^2 = .13$. A priori comparisons with **Punishment** as the reference for the predicted variable and the teacher condition as the predictor variable category were performed. As Table 13 displays, participants feared **Punishment** significantly more in the teacher condition than the parent condition (18% and 1%), $\beta = 2.76$, Wald = 5.68, $p < .05$, odds ratio = 15.62. There were no significant differences between conditions for either **Personal Choice** or **Prudential Concerns** justification types.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>8-yr-olds</th>
<th>10-yr-olds</th>
<th>12-yr-olds</th>
<th>Ages Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing/Righting Injustice</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm/Welfare</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Unwarranted Control</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal Choice</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential Concerns</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (60) (60) (120)

Superscripts “a” and “b” indicate significant differences (p < .05) between age groups within a given justification. Superscripts “c” and “d” indicate significant differences (p < .05) between authority types within a given justification.
Justifications for Judgments about Deception

Participants’ justifications for their evaluations of deception were obtained by asking participants: Why was it [all right/not all right] that [protagonist] told [his/her] [parent/teacher] that [he/she] ____ [act]? Participants’ responses were coded in the same fashion as their justifications for directives and noncompliance. Tables 14-16 display the proportions of justifications for each age group in each condition. Across stories and participants, six categories met the inclusion criteria for justifications of deception: Preventing/Righting Injustice, Punishment, Relationship Obligation/Respect, Relationship Trust, Personal Choice, and Prudential Concern. Several of these categories were specific to one or two story domains, therefore the statistical analysis of these justifications was conducted within the appropriate domain(s).

Justification for Deception in the Moral Domain

The contributions of age group and authority type on participants’ justifications for their judgments about deception in the moral stories were examined using MLR analysis. As shown in Table 14, the majority of participants (83%) used one of four categories to justify their judgment about deception: Preventing/Righting Injustice (39%), Punishment (18%), Relationship Trust (16%), and Relationship Obligation/Respect (10%). Participants in both conditions used Punishment and Relationship Obligation/Respect exclusively for the purpose of rejecting deception, whereas Relationship Trust and Preventing/Righting Injustice justifications were used both to reject and to endorse deception.

MLR analysis was conducted to assess the partial contribution of age group and authority type on each of these justifications. A MLR with age group as the predictor variable and the justifications for judgments about deception as the predicted variable was not significant. As such, participants’ age group did not predict their use of the various justifications.

The second model, with authority type as the predictor and justification type as the predicted was significant, $\chi^2(4, N = 120) = 15.24, p < .01$, Nagelkerk $R^2 = .16$, indicating that authority type was a significant predictor of the justifications for deception. A priori comparisons with Relationship Trust as the reference for the predicted category and the teacher condition as the reference for the predictor showed that participants in the parent condition used significantly more Relationship Trust justifications than participants in the teacher condition (27% and 5%, respectively), $\beta = 2.16$, Wald = 7.80, $p < .01$, odds ratio = 8.67. Thus, participants’ were 8.67 times more likely to appeal to issues of Relationship Trust in the parent condition than the teacher condition. Authority type did not have a statistically significant effect on the use of any of the other justifications.
Table 14
Percentage of Justifications for Evaluations of Deception: Moral Stories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>8-yr-olds</th>
<th>10-yr-olds</th>
<th>12-yr-olds</th>
<th>Ages Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing/Righting Injustice</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship Trust</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligation/Respect</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Choice</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential Concerns</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (60) (60) (120)

Superscripts “a” and “b” indicate significant differences (p < .01) between authority types within a given justification.
Justification for Deception in the Personal Domain

The contributions of age group and authority type on participants’ justifications for their evaluations of deception in the personal stories were examined by means of MLR analysis. As Table 15 shows, four justifications for judgments about deception in the personal stories met the inclusion criteria: **Punishment** (23%), **Personal Choice** (21%), **Preventing/Righting Injustice** (13%), and **Relationship Trust** (12%). Participants used Punishment and Relationship Trust justifications to reject deception in the personal stories, whereas **Personal Choice** was used exclusively to endorse deception. Participants gave **Preventing/Righting Injustice** justifications for both positive and negative evaluations of deception.

To test the effect of age on the use of justifications, a MLR analysis was carried out with age group as the predictor and the type of justification for judgments about deception as the predicted. The effect of age group was significant, $\chi^2(8, N=120) = 28.19, p < .001$, Nagelkerk $R^2 = .24$. A priori comparisons with **Personal Choice** as the reference for the predicted category and 12-year-olds as the reference for the predictor category showed that 12-year-olds used **Personal Choice** to justify their judgments significantly more than both 8-year-olds (43% and 3%, respectively), $\beta = 3.20$, Wald = 8.21, $p < .01$, odds ratio = 24.55, and 10-year-olds (43% and 18%, respectively), $\beta = 1.46$, Wald = 5.70, $p < .05$, odds ratio = 4.31. As Table 15 shows, age group was not a significant predictor of the other justification types.

An MLR analysis with the parent condition as the predictor variable and justification type as the predicted revealed a significant main effect of authority type, $\chi^2(4, N=120) = 25.77, p < .001$, Nagelkerk $R^2 = .26$. A priori comparisons of the justifications across authority types showed that two categories, **Relationship Trust** and **Punishment** were significantly affected by authority type. Participants in the parent condition were significantly more likely (16.32 times so) to use **Relationship Trust** to justify their judgments about deception than participants in the teacher condition (22% and 2%), $\beta = 2.79$, Wald = 6.99, $p < .01$, odds ratio = 16.32. In contrast, participants in the teacher condition expressed concerns with **Punishment** to justify their judgments significantly more than participants in the parent condition (33% and 13%), $\beta = -1.57$, Wald = 8.45, $p < .01$, odds ratio = 4.80.
Table 15  
Percentage of Justifications for Evaluations of Deception: Personal Stories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>8-yr-olds</th>
<th>10-yr-olds</th>
<th>12-yr-olds</th>
<th>Ages Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing/Righting Injustice</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship Trust</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligation/Respect</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Choice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3^a</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (40) (20) (20) (20) (60) (60) (120)

Percentages with different superscripts differ at p < .01 or .05. Superscripts “a” and “b” (p < .01) and “c” and “d” (p < .05) indicate significant differences between age groups within a given justification. Superscripts “e” and “f” indicate significant differences (p < .01) between authority types within a given justification.
Justification for Deception in the Prudential Domain

A large majority (70%) of participants justified their evaluations of deception about prudential acts with Prudential Concerns. As Table 16 indicates, no other justification type met the inclusion criteria. The contributions of age group and authority condition to justifications were assessed by means of MLR analysis. Neither age group nor authority type had a significant effect on the justification of deception in prudential stories.
Table 16
Percentage of Justifications for Evaluations of Deception: Prudential Stories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>8-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>10-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>12-yr-olds</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Ages Combined</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing/Righting</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injustice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relationship Obligation/Respect</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Choice</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential Concerns</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>(20)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(120)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4: Discussion

Sustained interest in and debate over the moral question of when deception is acceptable and when honesty is required has led developmental psychologists to address this issue in both their research programs and theoretical frameworks (e.g., Heyman, et al, 2008, Lewis, 1993; Piaget, 1932/1997; Turiel, 2002). One approach to addressing this issue is to investigate children’s social cognition and moral judgments about the use of deception in a variety of situations that position the choice of honesty against other moral and social choices. Another approach to this question is to investigate children’s reasoning about intent, social relationships, and priorities, as reflected in their differing judgments about why it is all right or not all right to lie to different people. In this project, these two approaches were integrated. The research focused on how children coordinated and prioritized concerns from different domains of social knowledge, including moral, personal, and prudential conceptual domains, and how these concepts were applied in children’s judgments about the acceptability of deception and noncompliance. Additionally, the research investigated the differential considerations applied to parents’ and teachers’ directives when those directives were pitted against children’s moral, personal, or prudential judgments.

The central hypothesis of this study consisted of two related parts. First, it was expected that children’s evaluations of the legitimacy of directives, deception and noncompliance would vary with regard to social components of each situation, rather than varying exclusively as a function of age. In other words, rather than making unitary moral judgments at each age or stage, as suggested by Kohlberg (1971), children’s judgments were expected to vary systematically based on their interpretation of factors within the larger social situation. Second, and more specifically, it was expected children’s justifications for their judgments would vary systematically with regard to domain of act, authority type, and participants’ ages.

The results of this study support the proposition that participants’ evaluations and justifications of directives, noncompliance, and deception vary in relation to the type of authority and type of act being assessed, as well as the age of participant. These results indicate that children do not make judgments about deception in a unitary way, but coordinate multiple concerns when evaluating and making decisions about honesty and deception. The analyses of these findings support the overarching theoretical proposition that children’s reasoning about honesty and deception is multifaceted, and involves multiple forms of reasoning related to the larger social situation in which decisions about deception are embedded. These results support what previous research (e.g., Helwig, 1995) has shown – that while children may understand and endorse moral principles in straightforward contexts and situations, they also may subordinate moral concerns and principles to other considerations when evaluating complex contexts and multifaceted situations.

The Coordination of Social Judgments

Although children are faced with judgments about honesty and deception in straightforward situations that lack competing concerns, they also face decisions about these concepts in multifaceted situations where concerns with honesty are pitted against
concerns with fairness, causing harm, personal choice, and individual freedom. In this study children assessed both kinds of situations – the unconflicted, and the conflicted. In the unconflicted situation, children reasoned about a child who broke a cup and then lied about breaking it. They also made two judgments about the acceptability of lying in general. First they were asked if it was generally all right or not all right to lie to parents or teachers (depending upon condition), and then they were asked if it was generally all right or not all right to lie.

In the conflicted stories, the choice of acting in compliance with authority, and being honesty about one’s actions, were pitted against competing choices. Children assessed situations in which a hypothetical peer who was given a directive by a parent or teacher that she or he did not comply with for moral or personal reasons lied about her or his compliance. Children made judgments about whether or not the subordination of honesty and compliance to other concerns was legitimate. The directives were of three kinds: moral – involving commands to cause harm or act unfairly; personal – involving restrictions to friend and activity choice based on authority preference; and prudential – involving restrictions to activities based on health concerns.

As was predicted, sometimes children’s judgments about honesty in unconflicted and general situations differed from their judgments in the conflicted stories, both in their evaluations and justifications. Across age groups (8-, 10- and 12-year-olds), virtually all of the children judged that lying in the unconflicted situation was wrong. Likewise, in the general assessments of lying, participants were nearly unanimous in judging that lying was wrong. Regardless of age or authority type, participants justified these judgments with moral reasons related to injustice, or reasons related to maintaining trust in their relationships. However, despite judging that lying was generally wrong for these reasons, the majority of participants also said that they could imagine a situation in which lying would be the right thing to do. This belief was borne out in participants’ judgments about the conflicted situations. When honesty was pitted against other moral or social concerns inherent in the nature of certain acts, some children subordinated concerns with honesty to these equally or more pressing interests, and judged deception a legitimate act.

These findings align with prior research on the application of moral principles that suggest that while people value moral principles in the abstract, they apply these principles flexibly when they come into conflict with other values (Killen, 1990; Turiel, 2002). As expected, within their overarching belief that honesty was a moral end, in general children’s judgments of directives, noncompliance, and deception reflected domain-related, authority-related, and age-related variance. Children attended to the moral aspects of deception, but did so in the context of the other competing concerns.

The results of this study also indicate that children’s judgments about noncompliance and deception of parents and teachers are connected to children’s beliefs about the legitimacy of parents’ and teachers’ directives. In both the moral and personal domains, but not the prudential domain, children largely rejected the legitimacy of the parents and teachers directives. The majority’s perception that these directives were illegitimate corresponded to the belief that noncompliance, and in some cases deception, was legitimate. In contrast, majorities accepted parents’ and teachers’ directives in the prudential situations and in turn rejected noncompliance and deception.

As predicted, children’s judgments varied by domain. Within this domain-related pattern, there were numerous age-related variations. In the situations in which children
were directed to act immorally (kick a peer, cut peers in line for an activity), the vast majority of participants rejected parents’ and teachers’ directives, and judged that noncompliance with these directives was legitimate. For the most part, participants of all ages justified their rejection of these directives and endorsement of noncompliance on moral grounds or based upon the notion that such directives were beyond the limits of warranted parental and teacher control. Children judged that the implications of causing harm or unfairness outweighed concerns related to compliance in the moral stories. When directives came into conflict with moral principles, children of all ages chose the act consistent with the moral principal rather than compliance with parents’ and teachers’ directives. This finding is consistent with prior research related to children’s judgments about the acceptability of different acts, and the limits of authorities to command them (Damon, 1977; Laupa, 1991, 1995), and supports the notion that children’s morality is not constrained by submissiveness to adult authority (Damon, 1977; Turiel, 1983). The findings also extend this prior research and suggest that beyond judging parents’ and teachers’ immoral directives unacceptable, children support resisting those directives through covert noncompliance.

Although the vast majority of participants in each age group and authority condition rejected directives and endorsed noncompliance in the moral situations, considerably fewer participants endorsed deception. And whereas there were no age differences in evaluations of directives or noncompliance in the moral stories, judgments about deception varied by age group. The finding that older children accepted deception more frequently than younger children was anticipated and is consistent with research that has shown that children become more accepting of prosocial lying in late childhood (Heyman, et al, 2009; Peterson, et al, 1983).

One interpretation of the finding that children judge deception differently at different ages is that children of different ages have different moral systems – young children’s judgments are based on rule-following and social norms, whereas older children are able take into account the intent of the deceiver and the deceived (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971; Walper & Valtin, 1992). The analyses of the evaluations in the present study contradict this interpretation, however. A more adequate explanation must take into account the fact that children were not submissive to adult authority, but explicitly rejected it, and endorsed noncompliance with it. In this interpretation, the age differences seen in children’s judgments of deception are not indicative of different moral systems, but indicate that the salience or prioritization of the features being weighed differed with age. This proposition is in line with Asch’s (1952) view that “different and apparently opposed practices and values are frequently not the consequence of diversity in ethical principles but of differences in the comprehension of a situation – differences in situational meaning” (1952, p. 377). In this case, it is proposed that younger children viewed and valued the requirement of honesty differently than the older children, and made judgments that aligned with that view.

When considering situations involving personal choices and freedoms (selection of friendships, selection of recreational activity), the majority of participants rejected parents’ and teachers’ directives that restricted children’s choice. These judgments were age-related, with directives being accepted by fewer participants with each increase in age. The vast majority of participants who rejected the directives at each age judged that the parent or teacher had overstepped the bounds of their authority into the child’s sphere
of personal choice, and that their control was unwarranted. This finding was expected and is consistent with prior research that has shown that with age children lay claim to an expanding sphere of activities as matters of personal choice and reject parents’ control over these activities (Nucci, 1981, 2001; Smetana & Asquith, 1994).

The present research also builds on these findings by showing that in addition to disagreeing with parents’ and teachers’ restrictions of personal freedoms, the majority of children also endorsed noncompliance with those restrictions. This finding was age-related, with the oldest participants endorsing noncompliance with greater frequency than the younger age groups. A similar age-related pattern was found in judgments about the acceptability of deception. As participant age increased so did their acceptance of deception about personal issues.

These age-related differences in evaluations may be seen as an indication that judgments about the legitimate extents of parents’ and teachers’ jurisdiction are connected to judgments about the legitimacy of noncompliance and deception of parents and teachers. This would suggest that as children take on greater control of their personal choices they may see noncompliance and deception as legitimate ways of maintaining their personal jurisdiction. Further support for this argument comes from participants’ justifications for their judgments. Older children were more likely than younger children to justify their decisions about directives, noncompliance, and deception with claims that parental control was unwarranted and on the basis of personal choice. These findings also speak to the different ways personal and moral concerns are prioritized and coordinated at different ages. The younger the participant the more likely they were to prioritize honesty over personal choice. In contrast to minorities of the younger age groups, half of the oldest group of participants thought deception about the personal situations was legitimate. The majority of these 12-year-olds judged that deception was all right for the purpose of maintaining jurisdiction over issues of personal choice, and rejected parent and teacher control as unwarranted.

As predicted, contrary to their judgments about moral and personal situations, the vast majority of participants endorsed parents’ directives about matters that were prudential in nature, and rejected noncompliance and deception in those situations. Although majorities of each age group endorsed the directive and rejected noncompliance and deception, their evaluations showed an age-related pattern similar to judgments in the personal domain. With increased age, participants’ became less accepting of the directives, and more accepting of noncompliance and deception. These results may be understood in much the same way that this pattern was interpreted in the personal situations. That is, age-related differences in these evaluations may indicate that judgments about parental and teacher jurisdiction are connected to judgments about directives, noncompliance, and deception.

The youngest participants judged the situations in the prudential domain (wearing a hat and gloves on a cold day, and not climbing a rock-climbing wall) as falling within their parents’ legitimate jurisdiction. With age, however, children increasingly saw these as matters within their personal jurisdiction. This interpretation of the results is further supported by the analysis of the justifications. In each of the assessments (directive, noncompliance, deception) the oldest group of participants appealed to reasons of personal choice to justify their evaluations more than the younger groups of participants. This interpretation is also consistent with prior research that suggests that many parent-
child conflicts occur over issues that children consider matters of personal choice, but that parents consider within their purview (Smetana, 2002; Smetana & Asquith, 1994). The current findings suggest that with age children increasingly view a wider range of matters as within their personal sphere, and that they also become more willing to disobey and lie to parents about such matters.

In addition to the domain- and age-related differences in children’s judgments, there were differences between judgments of directives from parents and from teachers. For the most part, children evaluated directives and noncompliance with parents and teachers similarly, however, in their assessments of deception parents and teachers were different. These differences were apparent both in children’s acceptance of deception, and their justifications. This finding was unexpected, as prior research had not compared children’s judgments of deceiving parents and teachers.

In the context of the moral situations, the older age groups, but not the youngest age group, evaluated deception of teachers more positively than deception of parents. In the youngest group, justifications for deception were similar for both authorities. In contrast, the two older groups’ justifications indicated a concern for trust in the parent relationships that they did not show in the teacher relationships. In fact, none of the children in the older groups rejected deception of teachers on the basis of relationship trust. The older children’s judgments show that authority type is an important aspect of their judgments. Their justifications showed that when considering deception of parents, trust was a particularly salient consideration. In contrast, when considering deception of teachers, relationship trust was not a factor.

Differences between judgments of parents and teachers were also found in the personal situations. In the personal situations, children’s evaluations of directives and noncompliance in the parent and teacher relationships were similar, however their justifications varied by authority type. Children were much more likely to reject directives and endorse noncompliance on the basis of unwarranted control when evaluating teacher authority than parent authority, suggesting that they saw teachers as having less legitimate control over personal issues than parents. When judging noncompliance and deception, children were considerably more concerned with punishment in the teacher relationship than in the parent relationship. Similar to the moral situations, children in the older two age groups, but not the youngest age group, judged deception of teachers more positively than deception of parents. Children justified these different judgments by expressing greater concern with punishment in the teacher situations and greater concern with having trusting relationship in the parent relationships.

One interpretation of the authority-related differences supported by the current findings on personal judgments is that children view teachers as illegitimately regulating a number of areas that are outside of their jurisdiction. Indeed, teachers do regulate a number of issues that are typically considered areas of personal choice for 10- and 12-year-olds, such as where they can sit, when they can speak, with whom they can partner on joint tasks, when they can go to the bathroom, that are not regulated by parents or in out of school contexts. In the context of the classroom these activities may fall within the legitimate conventional authority of the teacher, but having experienced the freedom to control these in the home environment, children may see teacher authority over such issues unwarranted. This assertion is further supported by the findings of a study.
investigating children’s positive and negative feelings about school rules (Arsenio, 1988). Arsenio found that majorities of fifth-grade boys rejected teacher control of nonacademic school events, such as restrictions on bathroom breaks and free time. The fact that in the current study the teacher directives were made at recess may have differentially affected children’s views of teacher authority and parent authority. Children may view parents’ authority as extending over a set of behaviors regardless of physical context, while viewing teacher authority as restricted to certain limited environments, such as the classroom.

Furthermore, the different views of lying to parents and teachers highlights the crucial link that trust may play in considerations about deception. Researchers have shown that as children grow older and receive less direct management by parents and increasingly control their own activities, both parents and children indicate that trust becomes an increasingly important component of their relationship and the quality of their relationship (Kerr, Stattin, Trost, 1999). At the same time, numerous studies have shown that fifth and sixth grade classrooms are characterized by greater emphasis on teacher authority and discipline, and decreased opportunities for student choice than early elementary classrooms (Eccles & Midgley, 1989; Eccles, Midgley, & Alder, 1984). Just as parents are affording children greater autonomy and decision-making, teachers are restricting children’s choice to greater degrees – in many cases over similar issues. Greater personal choice and control may be a particularly important component of children’s perception of fairness at home and in school. Increased trust by parents paired with control over issues at home that are restricted and controlled by teachers at school may result both in children seeing teacher control as unfair and unwarranted, and seeing parents as trusting and trustworthy. If children see teacher rules as unfairly treading on their freedoms they may also see lying a morally defensible act. In contrast if they view parents as providing opportunities for decision-making based on mutual trust they may see parental directives as legitimate and may not risk damaging trust by lying.

The finding that both the 10- and 12-year-old groups, but not the 8-year-old group, evaluated the deception of teachers more positively than deception of parents in moral and personal situations suggests that authority type becomes a more salient component of children’s judgments as they develop. These findings also suggest that with age children view the authority of parents and teachers in different ways, and as a result have different concerns related to lying in each type of relationship.

In line with other studies (Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Brosch, 1991; Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Peleg, 1990), the current findings suggest that with age children’s reasoning about parent and teacher authority becomes increasingly differentiated. Younger children judged both authority types similarly, and provided similar justifications for their judgments. Older children, on the other hand, had more positive views of deceiving teachers than parents, and justified their judgments – both positive and negative – with different types of reasons for the two types of authority. These findings, which illustrate that there is a connection between judgments about deception and the relationship of the deceiver and the deceived, support prior work that has shown that children conceptualize parental authority differently from teacher authority (e.g., Laupa, 1995; Smetana & Bitz, 1996). The findings also augment prior work by showing how children integrated the different considerations of these authority figures in their judgments about defying directives, and telling lies. It appears that judgment of parents’
and teachers’ authority is related to different criteria at different ages. One interpretation of this authority-related variance is that as children grow older they view the scope of teachers’ power as conferred by their social position, whereas children view parents as having achieved power through their relationship status with the child. This proposition is supported by the finding that children feared punishment when deceiving teachers, but feared damaging trust when deceiving parents.

An alternative interpretation of the increased acceptance of deception is that rejection of authority and use of deception is a stage of development into which children progress as they approach adolescence (e.g., Bronson & Merryman). There are several problems with this interpretation of the current findings. First, there were many cases in which majorities judged an authorities’ directive wrong for moral or personal reasons, but rejected the legitimacy of deception. The fact that dramatically fewer children, across ages, accepted deception in situations where they endorsed non-compliance suggests that children place a high value on honesty even concerning acts that they disagree with. Second, the vast majority of participants at each age endorsed adult authority to restrict activity on the basis of prudential concerns, and rejected noncompliance or deception about such activities. Third, the findings of this study align with the findings on adolescents’ judgments (Perkins & Turiel, 2007) to show a developmental trajectory across middle childhood and into adolescence. Together these studies show that children do not think about these concepts in a global way, nor do they consistently reject adult authority or endorse deception at any age.

Conclusion

Judgments about honesty and deception should be considered within the social contexts of the situations in which they occur. In this study, there were instances in which children judged deception acceptable for reasons of fairness and avoidance of harm, concerns with personal choice, and to redress imbalances in, and overextensions of power. In other situations, deception was rejected for moral reasons, concerns with relationship maintenance, and for conventional concerns with the extent of authorities’ jurisdiction. In fact, children in each age group made clear distinctions between deception in each of the types of situation – moral, personal, and prudential – and provided reasons for their judgments that were rooted in different social conceptual systems. Children’s evaluations of deception and justifications for deception also reflected clear distinctions between parents and teachers, however, this distinction was only reflected in the judgments of the older groups of children. This finding supports prior research (e.g., Broomfield, et al, 2002), and suggests that with age children attend to a greater number of contextual variables in their judgments about the acceptability of deception.

As predicted, younger children were less accepting of deception of parents and teachers than were older children. This finding suggests that the salience of various situational features may change with age, and that children of different ages may coordinate and prioritize these contextual features differently in making their decisions about honesty and deception.

Using the domain approach to study children’s developing social judgments, this study showed that children’s evaluations and justifications for deception hinge on the type of act the deception is being used to obscure and the perceived intentions and social
statuses of the deceiver and deceived, as well as the age of the child making the judgment. The domain approach holds that moral and social judgments are responsive to the conditions and factors that form the context of social interactions, and that analysis of social judgments must account for the effects of these conditions and factors. Prior studies have shown that context has a considerable impact on patterns and priorities of social and moral judgments (e.g., Helwig, 1995; Wainryb, 1991). Consistent with these studies, the results of the current research indicate that children value the universal and prescriptive nature of the moral principle of honesty, but do not apply this principle uniformly across social contexts. Moreover, children’s rejection of authorities’ directives and choice to deceive authorities in certain contexts demonstrate that judgments about honesty are not solely matters of social harmony or social conventions.

The findings reported here indicate that the moral implications of deception are not always of greatest concern when children make choices about telling lies. In some cases deception was conceptualized as wrong acts, while in other instances it was viewed as a way to redress immoralized directives or unwarranted control. Just as research has shown that adolescents (Perkins and Turiel, 2007) and adults (Freeman, et al, 1999) judge that deception is justified to counteract injustice and to prevent harm, the current research suggests that children are also engaged in weighing and balancing the requirement of honesty against other concerns. This research augments and extends the work on adolescents and adults judgments about the legitimate use of deception by providing a view of the development of these judgments across middle childhood. As with adolescents’ and adults’ judgments of deception, these findings suggest that children’s judgments about honesty are coordinated with various factors embedded in the social situation being assessed, and that those factors, and their salience, may change with development.

By 10 years of age majorities of children judged deception a legitimate means of countering certain types of directives in relationships of unequal power, but rejected deception about other types of directive. The contextual variation seen in children’s judgments suggest that they weighed and balanced the moral ends of honesty with other salient moral, social, and conventional aspects of the situations. Based on this research, it is proposed that by middle childhood moral concepts of honesty, conventional concepts of authority, and personal concepts of autonomy intersect with the domains of acts and perceptions of mutuality in relationships in children’s judgments of deception.

This research bears on the development of social and moral reasoning, and more specifically the development of children’s conceptions of honesty. Children uniformly valued the principle of honesty, but when applying this principle in complex contexts sometimes subordinated honesty to other considerations. The evaluations of deception indicate that the honesty is influenced by contextual variation and weighed differently against various competing considerations. The justifications for these evaluations demonstrate that reasoning about honesty is multidimensional and involves the coordination of various social concepts, including convictions about fairness and justice, beliefs about the extent of authorities’ control, notions of a personal sphere, and concepts of trust and rapport in relationships. This suggests that the development of children’s reasoning about honesty and deception is tied to the development of their reasoning about these concepts, and cannot be reduced to global stages of moral development or to a process of becoming familiar with social norms about the appropriate use of deception.
The results further indicate that the development of children’s reasoning about honesty corresponds to parallel development in reasoning about personal autonomy, social structures and hierarchies, and the qualities of different relationships.

Future research should consider these parallel developmental processes by looking at the relationship of different types of acts and authority figures to children’s judgments about deception. The present research was limited to prototypical events in each of the domains investigated, as well as prototypical authority relationships. Future research should consider more complex social contexts to better understand what factors children consider important at different ages, and to understand how children coordinate these many factors in their judgments of honesty and deception. Moreover, despite showing that different moral and social concerns have different salience across middle childhood, the qualitative changes and sequencing of children’s moral reasoning and priorities require greater specificity. Future work should consider the normative developmental sequence of moral priorities across childhood.
References


Early Education and Development, 7(2), 137-148
Appendices

Appendix A

Sample interview protocol: Parent Condition

Opening line of each story: This is a story about X [name of protagonist] who is your age and who tells a lie to her/his parent about something that happened at home:

Personal 1: Draw. Lucy’s favorite activity is drawing pictures. She draws them everyday on the picnic tables at the park near her house. Lucy’s mom thinks drawing pictures is boring and that she should join the soccer game with the other kids instead. Lucy tells her mother that she really likes drawing and doesn’t like to play soccer, but her mom won’t change her mind and tells Lucy she has to play soccer instead. Then the mom leaves the playground and goes back home for a meeting. While her mom is gone Lucy sits at the and draws pictures instead of joining the soccer game. Later that day, Lucy’s mom asks her if she played soccer and Lucy says ‘yes’ even though she’d been drawing pictures.

Personal 2: Friend. Josh and Mike are good friends, they hangout together everyday at the park near where they live. Josh’s dad doesn’t happen to like Mike and tells Josh that he shouldn’t be friends or play with him anymore because he doesn’t seem very fun. Josh tells his dad that he really likes Mike and that he wants to continue to play with him, but his dad won’t change his mind. Later, when his dad goes to work Josh plays with Mike. When Josh comes home after playing at the park his dad asks if he was playing with Mike, and he says ‘no’ even though he had been playing with him.

Moral 1: Kick. Thomas has a bruise on his knee where his friend Jeff accidentally kicked him while playing soccer in the park near his house. Thomas’s dad thinks that if you get kicked you should kick back. Thomas knows that it was an accident and tries to tell his dad that he shouldn’t kick Jeff. But his dad says that the next time they play soccer he should kick Jeff to get even. The next day the dad sends Thomas to play soccer while he has a meeting inside. While they are playing soccer Thomas decides not to kick Jeff. At the end of the day Thomas’s dad asks if he kicked Jeff and Thomas says ‘yes’ even though he didn’t kick him.

Moral 2: Cut. Anne is in line to use the slide at the park near her house. Anne’s mom is in a hurry and thinks she should be able to just cut in front of other kids even though there is a line. Anne tells her mom it’s not fair to cut the line, but her mom won’t change her mind and she says Anne has to. Then the mom goes to use the bathroom. While her mom is gone Anne waits in line to use the slide. When her mom gets back she asks Anne if she cut the line and Anne says ‘yes’ even though she had waited her turn.

Prudential 1: Climb. Jenny wants to climb to the top of the climbing wall at the park near her house. Jenny’s mom thinks that the wall is too high and too dangerous to climb and tells her she should find something else to do instead. Jenny tells her mom that she
will be careful, but her mom won’t change her mind and says she doesn’t want Jenny to get hurt. Then she leaves and goes back home. While her mom is gone Jenny climbs to the top of the wall. Later, Jenny’s mom asks her what she did at the park and she tells her mom she was playing baseball, even though she had climbed the tower.

**Prudential 2: Hat & Gloves.** Jeremy doesn’t want to wear a hat or gloves to play at the park near his house even though it is cold outside. Jeremy’s dad thinks that it is too cold outside to play without a hat and gloves. Jeremy tells his dad that he will be fine and that he doesn’t think it’s too cold, but his dad won’t change his mind. Once Jeremy goes outside he takes off his hat and gloves and plays without them. When he comes back in his dad asks if he’s been wearing his hat and gloves, and he says ‘yes’ even though he was playing with out them.

**Unconflicted. Cup.** Sarah is being careless while using her mom’s coffee cup and accidentally breaks it. No one is around to know what happened. Later, when her mom comes in and finds the broken cup on the floor she asks Sarah if she knows what happened. Sarah is sure that no one knows she broke the cup, so she tells her mom that she has no idea how it got broken so that she won’t get in trouble.
## Appendix B

### Justification categories for directives, noncompliance, and deception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Justification Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uncodable</td>
<td>Participant’s justification is not codable. [e.g., “He shouldn’t lie because that would be lying.”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Justification</td>
<td>Participant does not justify response. [e.g., “I don’t know.”]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harm/Welfare</td>
<td>Participant indicates that directive, noncompliance, or deception is acceptable or unacceptable because it would cause harm or jeopardize another’s welfare. May reference psychological or physical state of the actors. [e.g., “I think it’s fine if she doesn’t do it, because she told her to kick somebody, and you could really hurt them, so it’s ok to not hurt somebody even if it was the teacher telling her.” “He shouldn’t lie to his mom because she loves him and she would have really hurt feelings.”]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preventing/Righting Injustice</td>
<td>Participant indicates that noncompliance/deception is acceptable or necessary to avoid or right an injustice (or unjust directive). Can be used to justify positive or negative evaluations of directive, noncompliance, and/or deception. [e.g., “Lying is all right, because he told him to cut the line, and cutting isn’t fair so he has to lie.”]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confronting Injustice</td>
<td>Participant indicates that noncompliance/deception is unacceptable because it would be the same as accepting the directive/restriction. Participant indicates that the protagonist should challenge the directive and tell the truth about noncompliance. Generally used to support positive evaluations of noncompliance, and negative evaluations of deception. [e.g., “No he shouldn’t lie, he should just say ‘no I didn’t kick him like you told me because kicking is wrong and I won’t hurt my friends.’”]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unjust/Wrong</td>
<td>Participant indicates that directive, noncompliance, or deception is not acceptable. Concern is exclusive of other categories (e.g., conventional concerns, relationship concerns, welfare concerns), and focuses on noncompliance or deception as indefensible. Used to support negative evaluations of noncompliance or deception. [e.g., “That’s not ok, because lying is never the right thing to do, it’s always bad, you should always tell the truth.”]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prudential Concerns</td>
<td>Participant indicates concern for the physical or psychological wellbeing (or future wellbeing) of the protagonist. Can be used to justify positive or negative evaluations of directive, noncompliance, or deception, and may reference the exclusion of prudential concern. [e.g., “He shouldn’t lie to her because she is just trying to protect him and make sure he doesn’t get frostbite.” “I don’t really think he could get hurt doing that, so I really don’t have a problem with it. He seems kind of over-protective.”]</td>
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<td>Punishment</td>
<td>Participant indicates that the resulting punishment or loss of benefits (or associated risk) out-weigh the positive outcomes of noncompliance or deception. Used to support negative evaluations of noncompliance or deception. [e.g., “If he lies he will get grounded and lose privileges.” “She shouldn’t lie because it’s not worth it. If she gets caught she’ll lose her mom’s trust and then she’ll watch her like a hawk and always call up and check on her.”]</td>
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<td>Guilt</td>
<td>Participant indicates that resulting feelings of guilt out-weigh the positive outcomes of noncompliance or deception. Used to support negative evaluation of noncompliance or deception. [e.g., “She would just feel so bad inside and that guilt would go with her, so it’s better to just get in trouble and not have to think about it.”]</td>
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<td>Type</td>
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<td>Relationship maintenance</td>
<td>Participant indicates that harmony in the relationship with parents/teachers is more important than pursuing their desired course of action or more important than telling the truth. Can be used to justify positive or negative evaluations of directive, noncompliance, and/or deception. [e.g., “It’s ok to lie in this case because she doesn’t want to get in a big fight.” “She shouldn’t lie because her mom loves her and she shouldn’t do anything to make her think she doesn’t love her too.”]</td>
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<td>Relationship obligation/respect</td>
<td>Participant indicates that the relationship has requirements that the protagonist should adhere to. Typically indicated with reference to obligation to support family members. Can be used to justify positive or negative evaluations of directive, noncompliance, and/or deception. [e.g., “You just have to do what your mom says, because she brought you into the world, so you are her kid and you should listen to what she tells you.” “Teachers are supposed to help the kids and get them ready for being a grown up, so they shouldn’t tell him bad things, teachers have to show them the right thing because they’re the teacher and he’s a kid”.]</td>
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<td>Relationship trust</td>
<td>Participant indicates that honesty is required for trust and that trust is required for a good relationship. Distinguishable from Pragmatic Trust because of the focus on notion that trust is important for a good relationship rather than on loss of individual benefits associated with trust. Used to reject noncompliance or deception. [e.g., “It’s not all right to lie because they have to be able to trust each other. He has to be honest so that they can keep the trust between them.”]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rules &amp; regulations</td>
<td>Participant indicates that rules for social organization should regulate actors’ actions. Can be used to justify positive or negative evaluations of directive, noncompliance, and/or deception. “He shouldn’t lie because lying is against the rules.” “She doesn’t have to do it because the teacher is telling her to break a rule, she should tell her parents.”</td>
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<td>Personal choice</td>
<td>Participants indicate that personal preference should (or does) govern the protagonist’s judgment and actions. Can be used to justify positive or negative evaluations of directive, noncompliance, and/or deception. [e.g., “She doesn’t have to play soccer, she can do what she wants since it’s her free time.” “She really shouldn’t lie, she should just say ‘She’s my friend, I appreciate your concern, but I pick my own friends’”.]</td>
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<td>Unwarranted control</td>
<td>Participant indicates that teacher/parent should not have control over protagonist’s actions (without referencing harm/welfare concerns). Typically indicated with reference to parent/teacher overstepping the bounds of their jurisdiction. Used to justify positive evaluations of noncompliance and/or deception. [e.g., “I don’t think lying is good, but I think it’s all right for her to lie to her mom, because she doesn’t have the right to try to control who her friend can be”.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mutuality/compromise</td>
<td>Participant indicates that parent/teacher and protagonist should compromise to arrive at a mutually acceptable course of action. Focus is on balancing competing concerns and equal status in governing the act. Can be used to justify positive or negative evaluations of directive, noncompliance, and/or deception. Typically used when rejecting the directive, the noncompliance, and the deception. [e.g., Even though he shouldn’t tell him he can’t draw, Justin shouldn’t lie. Maybe they can talk and say ‘ok you play soccer one recess and draw one recess, back and forth’ then they’re both happy’].</td>
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