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Mos Christianorum: The Roman Discourse of Exemplarity and the Jewish and Christian Language of Leadership

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Mos Christianorum:
The Roman Discourse of Exemplarity and the Jewish and Christian Language of Leadership

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in History

by

James Michael Petitfils

2013
Prompted by recent research on “example” in the field of Classics, this dissertation sets out to better understand the various ways in which Jewish and Christian authors writing, for the most part, in the Imperial west participated in the ubiquitous Roman discourse of exemplarity as they contended for what they understood to be native ancestral leadership ideals. I first introduce the form, function, and broad popularity of the Roman discourse of exemplarity (chapter 1), and propose five prevailing characteristics of ideal Roman leadership (noble lineage, courage/martial prowess, eloquence, generous patronage, and piety), before testing them on multiple Roman works (chapter 2).
My project then explores the ways in which both the rhetorical form and moral content of this ancient conversation were appropriated and redeployed in texts celebrating non-Roman ancestral leaders. I begin with the Moses(es) of Josephus’ *Ant.* 2–4 and Philo’s *Mosis* 1–2, arguing that Josephus’ more sustained contact with Roman culture and politics significantly shaped his presentation of Moses’ exemplary leadership, while Philo’s account largely lacks such narratological and moral Roman coloring. Both authors, however, stress Moses’ all-encompassing paradigmatic piety. Chapters 4–5 focus on the leadership discourse in *1 Clement* and *The Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons*, two corporate letters deploying Christ and Christ-imitating ancestral *exempla* in the service of intracommunal issues of leadership. I demonstrate the robust participations of these two texts in the Roman discourse of exemplarity as well as their shared appropriation of many characteristically Roman leadership priorities (especially courage and agonistic endurance). At the same time, I argue, both texts advocate the rather un-Roman, Pauline leadership priority of humility (ταπείνωσιν) using Roman discursive tools, thus affirming the utility of Roman exemplarity for the preservation and articulation of non-Roman ancestral traditions.

Among other implications, my project encourages those studying Roman pedagogy and moral discourse to begin including texts often overlooked as belonging exclusively to the fields of Jewish or Christian studies. Secondly, for those interested in ancient notions of Jewish and Christian leadership, my project encourages the appreciation of both the similarity of developing Mosaic or Christ-oriented leadership traditions to Roman approaches and the possibility of their cultural peculiarity.
The dissertation of James Michael Petitfils is approved.

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“Paul and Honorable Leadership in the Ancient Mediterranean World,” presented at the annual Far West Regional Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society, April 2010: La Mirada, California. (oral presentation)
“The Martyrs of Lyons as Exempla of Christian Leadership,” presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, November 2010: Atlanta, Georgia. (oral presentation)

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Introduction

It is not only the contents of [philosophy] which we should know and constantly turn over in our minds; even more important are the records of the notable sayings and actions of the past. Nowhere is there a larger or more striking supply of these than in the history of our own country. Could there be any better teachers of courage, justice, loyalty, self-control, frugality, or contempt for pain and death than men like Fabricius, Curius, Regulus, Decius, Mucius, and countless others? Rome is as strong in examples as Greece is in precepts; and examples are more important.¹

As this quotation from the late first century rhetorician Quintilian suggests, the preferred ethical curriculum of an elite Roman education largely consisted of exemplary stories and descriptions of Rome’s native heroes.² Whether in the home, the classroom, the forum, or the arena, Romans were regularly encountering, digesting, and deploying narratives offering ancestors, ancient heroes, or contemporary notables as paragons of virtue or vice. As a growing number of scholars have demonstrated, moreover, this pedagogical preference for example over precept was in no way exclusive to the literate elite, but was shared by “…all of Roman society, from the loftiest aristocrats to the humblest peasants, laborers, and slaves” (Roller 2004: 6).³ Thus, when Roman writers, orators, or parents wished to articulate or inculcate their conceptions of virtuous leadership, they consistently deployed exempla (of varying degrees of sophistication) as rhetorical vehicles of the mos maiorum (way of the ancestors).⁴

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¹ Quint. Inst. 12.2.29; see Morgan (2007: 125).

² In his classic History of Education in Antiquity, H. I. Marrou summarizes, “…the old Greek education [was] an imitation of heroes in the Homeric style; Roman education was an imitation of one’s ancestors.” (1982: 236).

³ Cf. Hölkkeskamp (1996: 305–308); and Morgan (2007: 1–8). I will review these contributions below.

⁴ Marrou underscores the centrality of the ancestral ethic in Roman education: “Its fundamental idea, the thing it was based on, was respect for the old customs—mos maiorum—and to open the eyes of the young to these, to get them to respect them unquestionably as the ideal, as the standard for all their actions and all their thoughts, was the educator’s main task” (1982: 231).
This ongoing moral dialogue was inevitably a major feature of the ideological and didactic geography in which the members of non-Roman ethnic groups and voluntary associations throughout the empire organized their communities, socialized their boys and girls, and distinguished their leaders. How did these groups interact with and respond to this Roman cultural conversation? What effects, if any, did the Roman cultural penchant for ancestral exempla have on the literary production and moral instruction of these communities? More precisely, in what ways did such authors navigate, eschew, or participate in this ubiquitous didactic discourse as they contended for their particular understandings of ideal ancestral leadership? In the chapters that follow, I will begin to address these largely overlooked lines of inquiry by focusing on a small sample of texts 1) written in highly Romanized cultural contexts but 2) advocating non-Roman native traditions of exemplary leadership.⁵

While I will listen to a number of both ethnically and legally Roman and non-Roman voices participating in the polyvocal cultural interchange on exemplary leadership, my project culminates with a sustained exploration of two corporate

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⁵ In this dissertation I will be using the term “Roman” and the concept of “Romanness” in at least three (at times overlapping) ways. First, I will frequently use “Roman” as a geographic and ethno-linguistic label, signifying Latin-speaking Italian natives. This usage covers concrete historical actors (e.g. Cicero, Virgil, or Augustus) as well as mythic Roman ancestors (e.g. Romulus, Lucretia, or Horatius Cocles). It is often in this sense that I use the terms “Roman” or “non-Roman” to describe an ancestor or exemplary figure or tradition celebrated in a particular text. Legally, “Roman” may more broadly designate an individual possessing Roman citizenship, irrespective of their language or place of birth (e.g. Josephus or Plutarch). Finally, as a cultural label the term encompasses a series of discourses (moral and otherwise), practices, and material products (e.g. terra sigillata pottery, epigraphy, amphitheaters) originating in significant Italian urban centers and broadly disseminated and variously replicated throughout the Roman world (in the case of material culture, I do not mean that the products themselves were all produced in Italy, but that the preferences for such items and perhaps their designs originated in Roman centers). Culturally, though signifying recognizable and in certain cases relatively stable characteristics, “Romanness” was far from a monolithic, uncontested notion; it was constantly up for debate and re-negotiation, and its boundaries (as configured in various discourses) were continually in need of re-inscription. Moreover, participation in Roman culture was neither restricted to native Italians, Roman citizens, or elites. Rather, as my project will demonstrate with respect to Roman exemplarity, ethnically and legally non-Romans could actively participate in Roman culture and their deployment of even ethnically non-Roman exempla (e.g. Moses or Christ) could culturally be considered quite Roman.
correspondences produced by Christ-confessing communities in the western Roman Empire—namely, the *Letter of the Romans to the Corinthians* (*1 Clement*) and the *Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons* (*Lyons*). Following an extended survey of the form, function, and broad popularity of rhetorical *exempla* and exemplary discourse in the western empire, as well as a study of multiple texts liberally deploying leadership *exempla* (including the works of Cornelius Nepos, Cicero, Plutarch, Valerius Maximus, Flavius Josephus and Philo of Alexandria, et al.), I will seek to trace the way in which *1 Clement* and *Lyons* adopt, adapt, or eschew both the *form* and *content* of the Roman discourse of exemplarity as they deal with intracommunal issues of leadership and authority. In terms of *form*, I will examine the rhetorical and narratological shape of the *exempla* deployed in these texts. With respect to *content*, I will highlight the core values and leadership attributes celebrated in these non-Roman ancestral *exempla* in light of the popularly advertized attributes and morals characterizing paradigmatic Roman leaders.

In addition to synthesizing a diverse body of scholarship on “example” in Roman antiquity as well as outlining and textually substantiating several popular and relatively stable categories of exemplary Roman leadership, my project will provide a nuanced exploration of at least three texts (*Josephus’ Ant. 2–4; 1 Clement*, and *Lyons*) offering native paradigms of leadership in the cultural and political contexts of the Roman west. Among other contributions, my work demonstrates these authors’ robust participations in the Roman discourse of exemplarity as well as their relative appropriation and “naturalization” of many (though not all) traditional Roman leadership priorities. Moreover, I show the utility of the Roman discourse(s) to preserve and articulate distinctive “native” leadership traditions. In *Antiquities 2–4*, for example, while the
Josephan Moses reflects traditional Roman preferences for noble birth, martial prowess, and eloquence (among other leadership characteristics), these attributes are all dramatically eclipsed by and subsumed under the category of the paragon’s unparalleled piety. Both *1 Clement* and *Lyons*, to take another example, celebrate the courage and agonistic endurance of their *exempla* while simultaneously eschewing the cherished Roman leadership priorities of bloodline and traditionally ascribed honor. More conspicuously, these texts deploy characteristically Roman discursive practices to advocate the rather un-Roman, Pauline leadership priority of “humility” (ταπεινοφροσύνη).

Put differently, my project does not challenge the notion that these texts actively sought to present their non-Roman ancestral leaders (especially the figures of Moses and Christ) as distinct from and superior to traditional Roman *exempla*. Rather, I seek to demonstrate that even in the throes of cultural competition, the pedagogical approach and many of the leadership priorities in these authors’ native accounts reflect their specific historical moments and Roman cultural contexts. At the same time, especially in the cases of *1 Clement* and *Lyons*, participation in the Roman discourse of exemplarity did not necessarily discourage patently un-Roman virtues; on the contrary, the flexible and debate-welcoming conversation provided a rhetorically and narratologically intelligible means of inculcating such attributes in the context of the Roman west. In fact, the Roman preoccupation with ancestral models of leadership seems to have fueled the literary deployment of Christ and Christ-imitating authoritative paragons.

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6 This is not to suggest that authors intentionally modeled their narratives after the Roman discourse. Rather, the pedagogical approach was likely inherited simply due to these authors’ prolonged exposure to the cultural conversation—a conversation that, as I will demonstrate, was a perennial element of the moral and ideological ambiance of urban centers like Rome and Gaul.
Overview of Scholarship on Roman Example and Exemplary Leadership

While particular chapters in my dissertation will challenge scholarly assumptions and approaches related to those chapters’ specific topics and foci, my overall project is not fundamentally polemical. Rather, my dissertation seeks to fill lacunae in the study of 1) Roman example and moral pedagogy and 2) ancient discourse on leadership related to the figure of Christ. Because each major section of my dissertation includes extensive interaction with relevant scholarship and the last two chapters involve substantial historiographical reviews, I will limit the present discussion to the most significant projects dealing with the abovementioned fields.

Exempla and Roman Exemplarity in Scholarship

By far, the majority of scholarly attention on example (exemplum or παράδειγμα) in Roman antiquity deals with its deployment in formal rhetoric. The definitive works on this topic include two dissertations, namely, Hildegard Kornhardt’s Göttingen thesis (1936) and Bennett Price’s Berkeley dissertation (1975). Both consider the nature and various prescriptions for the use of example in the major ancient Greek and Roman rhetorical handbooks. Of course, other scholars additionally examining various nuances of such formal persuasive deployment share their focus.⁷

Furthermore, most works dealing with Christ and other Biblical figures as examples examine them in view of the Greco-Roman rhetorical handbooks. Michael

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⁷ Several of these studies provide a general overview at the rhetorical exemplum or παράδειγμα in ancient literature; see Lumpe (1966: 57), Hock and O’Neil (1986 and 2002); Kaufmann (1994) or van Der Poel (2009). Others treat the use of rhetorical exempla in specific Roman authors. Robinson (1986) and Stinger (1993), for example, treat the Ciceronian corpus, while Valerius Maximus is dealt with by a litany of scholars including Helm (1939), Klotz (1942), Honstetter (1981), Maslakov (1984), Bloomer (1987), Mueller (1994), and Skidmore (1996). Additionally, Mayer (1991) devotes an article to Roman historical exempla in Seneca.
Cosby (1988), for example, explores the rhetoric of exempla lists in antiquity. After examining the rules for exempla in the progymnasmata (systematically presented in a very helpful appendix), Cosby provides a rhetorical analysis of the example lists in Hebrews 11 as well as 1 Clem. 4–6; 9:2–12:8; and 17–18. Similarly, Hélène Pétré (1940) explores Tertullian’s formal deployment of exempla. Finally, with a later chronological focus than these projects, Elizabeth Goldfarb (2005) provides a comprehensive analysis of the fusion of classical exemplum and scriptural hero in the formation of a distinctive exemplary discourse in post-classical literature. Again, these studies are primarily limited to exempla (and related tools of persuasion) in the context of the rhetorical exercises and guidelines found in Greco-Roman progymnasmata.

Moving beyond this more narrow literary and rhetorical focus, Matthew Roller builds on the work of Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp (1996), directing scholarly attention to the broader social and cultural context of the Roman deployment of exempla. In his watershed article, “Exemplarity in Roman Culture: The Cases of Horatius Cocles and Cloelia” (2004), a work I will discuss in detail in chapter 1, Roller explores the Roman habit of mining the past for behavioral models and presents the main features of what he calls “‘exemplary’ discourse in Roman culture” (2004: 4). His focus on example as a ubiquitously deployed tool of moral formation and socialization in Roman culture,

8 Furthermore, many projects examining early Christ-confessing literature focus on rhetorical phenomena very similar to exempla. For example, in an effort to better understand the “pronouncement story” and its significance with respect to Gospel narratives, Vernon Robins and the “SBL Pronouncement Story Work Group” engaged in a 10-year study exploring pronouncement stories and the related rhetorical form χρεία. According to Robins, the somewhat broad rhetorical category of χρεία discourse “…concerns speech and/or action attributed to a specific person. Therefore, discourse which allows the personage behind it to disappear is not chreia discourse” (1993: xiv). The group’s study culminated in a number of publications, including Robins’ Ancient Quotes and Anecdotes: From Crib to Crypt (1989) and a series of articles in Semeia 64 (1993) outlining an expanded taxonomy of χρεία, and exploring pronouncement stories and χρείαι in the Gospels as well as Rabbinic and Hadithic literature.

9 For additional treatments of exempla in late antique Christian sources, see Studer (1985); Torvend (1990); Demoen (1996); and Ayres (2009).
though certainly not the first project to consider the moral utility of *exempla*,\(^{10}\) has been well received among Classicists and Roman historians.\(^ {11}\)

While these studies provide invaluable insights into the utility, form, and manifold application of examples and exemplary discourse(s) among self-identifying Romans, they do not consider the role of this didactic discourse in the moral formation and socialization of non-Roman communities functioning in areas conspicuously marked by Roman culture and politics. To my knowledge, Annette Reed remains the only scholar to investigate the participation of such groups (in this case, Jewish authors) in this pervasive pedagogical conversation.\(^ {12}\) Thus, no one has yet explored the interaction with and possible appropriation of elements of the Roman discourse of exemplarity by communities cultivating and espousing first and foremost Christian identities. Similarly, the portrayal of Christ and other biblical figures as paragons of leadership remains largely unexplored from the heuristic vantage point of Roman exemplarity. Rather than understanding Roman discourse on exemplary leadership and Christian discourse on the

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\(^{10}\) See, for example, Litchfield (1914) and Morgan (2007). In the latter work, Morgan studies the *exempla* preserved in Valerius Maximus’ *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* as sources for reconstructing both elite and “popular” morality. Cf. Skidmore (1996) and van der Blom (2010).

\(^{11}\) For example, Roller’s initial exploration of the widespread Roman pedagogical conversation has been developed in several works including Stem (2007), Langlands (2008); and a number of Roller’s own articles (2009, 2010, and 2011).

\(^{12}\) As I will discuss in more detail in chapter 3, Reed applies Roller’s schema to the presentation of Abraham in Philo, Josephus, and *The Testament of Abraham*. To be sure, Henry Nguyen employs Roller’s fourfold schema in his *Christian identity in Corinth: A Comparative Study of 2 Corinthians, Epictetus and Valerius Maximus* (2008). Nevertheless, he only applies Roller’s work to Valerius Maximus’ *Facta et Dicta*; see Nguyen (2008: 68–69). In addition to Reed, several scholars, though not using Roller’s work, have focused their research on the moral use of paradigmatic “biblical” figures (and exemplary events) in Jewish literature. Louis Feldman, for example, has devoted a number of books and articles to the portrayal of Moses in the works of Philo and Josephus (1992a, 1992b, 1993, 2005, and 2007), and Hindy Najman (2003) creatively explores how a number of pseudonymous works of the Second Temple period sought to participate in the “Mosaic Discourse” by replicating in their own literary products an exemplary event, namely, the Sinaitic revelation. I will discuss many of these works further in a subsequent chapter looking at Philo’s *De Vita Mosis* 1–2 and Josephus’ *Antiquities* 2–4.
topic as stable, disparate conversations, my project encourages scholars to view the latter as very much participating in the former.

Finally, the morally exclusivist claims and/or claims to cultural superiority promulgated by the Jewish and Christian texts I consider do not signal their repudiation of or insulation from the Roman discourse of exemplarity. On the contrary, such dispute and contestation was very much part and parcel to this didactic and ideological exchange. As Roller insists, the “…ubiquitous opportunities for debate and contestation are the lifeblood of exemplary discourse-this is how every example can be made anew, or deployed in a novel way, to meet the requirements of any new contingency” (2004: 7).

Along these lines, my study of culturally competitive texts celebrating non-Roman ancestors will further demonstrate that this Roman discourse, like its Hellenistic predecessor, could be, in the words of Annette Reed, “…creatively appropriated for the articulation of new expressions of local pride, ethnic specificity, and cultural resistance”

13 I use the term “Jewish” here in light of Shaye Cohen’s discussion of its complex and historically developing meaning outlined in his The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties (1999). There, Cohen nuances the ancient understandings of the Greek term Ἰουδαῖος, noting its original ethno-geographic nature: “a Judean is a member of the Judean people (ethnos) and hails from Judaea, the ethnic homeland. In the diaspora a ‘Judaean’ is a member of an association of those who hailed originally from the ethnic homeland, a person might be a Judaean even if he or she had not been born in Judaea” (104). By the second century B.C.E., following the Maccabean revolt, two new definitions of the term emerged—a political definition referring to those individuals and groups allied with the Judeans, and a cultural (or “religious”) definition which extended to those individuals and communities (including non-natives) who demonstrated loyalty to the God of the Judeans whose temple was in Jerusalem (105–106). Significantly, according to Cohen, Ἰουδαῖος should not consequently be understood in antiquity as referring to any clearly defined “religion of Judaism,” but rather as “the aggregate of all those characteristics that make Judeans Judaean (or Jews Jewish)” (106). For his full discussion, see Cohen (1999: 69–106). When using the term “Christian” or “Christians,” I am not referring to a reified category or a non-disputed monolithic identity fundamentally distinct from Judean/Jewish, Greek or Roman identities. Where I employ either “Christian” or the adjective “Christ-confessing,” I am simply referring to individuals, communities, or texts that espouse loyalty (of varying degrees) to the figure of Christ. In my fourth chapter treating the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons, I will use the term with more frequency as the protagonists in that text self-identify using such language.
Having sketched out my project’s relationship to the academic discussion of Roman example in antiquity, I will briefly introduce the major scholarship treating ancient discourse on leaders and leadership in voluntary associations oriented around the figure of Christ.

**Ancient Discourse on Leadership Related to the Figure of Christ**

The balance of scholarly attention regarding leadership in Christ-confessing communities focuses on the nature and development of church office and leadership structures. By far, the hegemonic line of inquiry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries deals with the “conflict” between charisma and office in early Christian communities. Rudolf Sohm’s influential *Kirchenrecht* (1892) laid the groundwork for a broad consensus in protestant scholarship arguing that as church “office” grew, spiritual (charismatic) power steadily diminished. More recently, a number of scholars have challenged the latter trajectory, including James Burtchaell (1992) and Alastair Campbell

14 In this way, my project aligns in many ways with Christopher Frilingos’ study of Revelation. Without denying the ideology of resistance embedded in the text, Frilingos attempts “…to read the book of Revelation as a cultural product of the Roman Empire, a book that shared with contemporaneous texts and institutions specific techniques for defining world and self” (2004: 5). Again, though his literary focus is different than mine, his words neatly capture a large portion of my agenda: “I seek to discern the power of the Apocalypse for subjects of the Roman Empire by embedding the book in this empire” (2004: 6).

15 Before moving on, I will make a few comments regarding my use of the terms “leader” and “leadership." With respect to the former, looking through the lens of cultural anthropology, Bruce Malina makes a distinction between “managers” who he claims are granted authority based on ascription (birth, custom, law), and “leaders” whose positions are dependent upon achievement (1986: 107). My dissertation will be interested in discourse relating to both forms of authority. Since I have not identified such a semantic distinction in the primary sources I consult, however, I will continue using the term “leadership” more broadly—denoting an individual in a position of communal authority.

16 Two of the more prominent twentieth century works along these lines include Käsemann’s (1964) and von Campenhausen (1969). Elisabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza (1983) likewise studies the trajectory from egalitarian communities to institutionalized leadership structures. Unlike most scholars in Sohm’s shadow, however, Fiorenza views the Jesus movement as the originally “charismatic” (to use Sohm’s language) organizations, while Paul’s letters signal a trend toward the implementation of patriarchal authority. Peter Haley outlines Sohm’s indelible influence on 20th century scholarship (1980: 185–197). For a review of the 20th century “consensus” view, see Clarke (1993: 2–6) and Campbell (1994: 3–19).
(1994). Both studies, in their own ways, argue that authority structures were in place from the very inception of the various Christ-confessing communities. Nevertheless, like Sohm, Käsemann, and von Campenhausen, these scholars are almost exclusively focused on the structural development of early Christian communities.

More recent studies interested in leadership in Christ-confessing texts tend to focus on the New Testament and consult its contents insofar they assist in a reconstruction of the social, political, and historical situations “on the ground” in the first century. Specifically, since the 1970’s with the resurgence of interest in social history among New Testament scholars, a litany of historians have turned their attention to understanding the social realia reflected in the documents of the New Testament and later Christ-confessing texts. The seminal works along these lines which interact with issues of leadership and authority—among other foci—including Gerd Theissen’s socio-historical study of Paul’s Corinthian correspondences (1982), Wayne Meeks’ now classic *The First Urban Christians* (1983), as well as many of the projects of Bruce Malina, Jerome Neyrey, S. Scott Bartchy and others in the Context Group.

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17 Burtchaell rejects von Campenhausen’s notion of two distinct veins of “Christian” leadership organization. He attempts to reconstruct the origin of leadership structures in the early church by postulating that the three-tier leadership model consisting of an *episkopos*, *presbuteroi*, and *diakonoi*, was not a later synthesis, but taken over as a whole from the synagogue. To be sure, Burtchaell contends that in the first century this structure was not as visible due to many “Christians”’ continued participation in the synagogue as well as the charismatic leadership of prophets and itinerant apostles. Nevertheless, by the late first century, he argues, when “Christians” were largely expelled from the synagogue, the displaced synagogue-going “Christians” revived the already present three-tiered leadership structure in the *ekklesiae*. Campbell, for his part, argues that from the start of the earliest Christ-confessing communities there existed forms of local structure. Engaging in a thorough study of the term “elder” in ancient Israel, 2nd Temple Judaism, Greco-Roman antiquity, and Christian documents into the early 2nd century, Campbell argues that the term was commonly applied to anyone in authority or a position of respect, and that it can describe an individual engaged in a range of roles and functions. In Pauline communities, Campbell contends, leaders of individual households were called *episkopoi*, and only after the groups had expanded was the designation “elders” consistently employed to describe leaders who now represented their churches in a larger Christian community within a city.

Perhaps more than any New Testament scholar, Andrew Clarke has devoted his career to social historical studies of leaders and leadership in Pauline communities and texts.\(^{19}\) Though he eschews tools from the social sciences in his own work, his research agenda is very much aligned with the socio-historical concerns of the abovementioned projects. His primary goal is to describe the (what he understands to be “countercultural”) prescribed and practiced models of “ministry” and structures of organization in Paul’s communities in light of the various Jewish and Greco-Roman leadership models.\(^{20}\)

Closely aligned with much of my own methodology, Andrew Clarke not only consults a broad sample of voices on leadership in the Roman Mediterranean, but he is careful to establish their relevance for the Christ-confessing communities he studies; that is, he takes the time to argue the latter’s likely exposure to the former priorities (2000: 145–172).\(^ {21}\)

Nevertheless, his project does not significantly address my primary interest, namely, the form, function, and essential content of the discourses on moral leadership themselves. That is, while Clarke focuses on the various manifestations of the Greco-Roman love of honor or the authority structures within Greco-Roman, Jewish, and

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\(^{19}\) In particular, see his *Secular & Christian Leadership in Corinth: A Socio-Historical & Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 1–6* (1993); *Serve the Community of the Church: Christians as Leaders and Ministers* (2000); and *A Pauline Theology of Church Leadership* (2008).

\(^{20}\) Clarke emphasizes Paul’s “…countercultural stance, preferring the notion of service (or ‘ministry’) to that of leadership” (2000: 250). In many ways the recent work of Jack Barentsen (2011) follows Andrew Clarke, albeit applying social identity theory to the Pauline corpus.

\(^{21}\) Joseph Hellerman, sharing Clarke’s interest in issues of status and polity in Paul’s letters, likewise builds a case for a robust intersection between elite and non-elite Roman notions of leadership and honor. In addition to his dialogue with modern scholarship on the issue (especially John Lendon’s *Empire of Honor* [1997]) Hellerman illustrates this connection using the many sub-elite inscriptions in Roman Philippi which replicate the aristocratic Roman *cursus honorum*; see Hellerman (2005). Wayne Meeks, dealing more with moral values, engages in a similar undertaking, noting especially education and rhetoric as vehicles for the transmission of traditionally Greek and Roman values even to many sub-elites (1986: 61–64).
Pauline communities, my project is interested in the language of leadership and its rhetorical and narratological deployment in the Roman world. At the same time, the few studies that come closest to my concern for moral discourse tend to focus on morality in Christ-confessing communities more broadly, foregoing a conversation on virtuous leadership.22

Methodologically, my dissertation approaches the sources differently than the above works. While most of these histories primarily seek to understand the realia behind the texts they consider, my dissertation—though not ignoring such socio-historical context—treats the major primary sources as cultural artifacts themselves participating in the polyvocal Roman discourse on exemplary leadership. In terms of focus, my project will contribute to bridging the gap between scholarship on morality, on the one hand, and those works dealing with leadership, on the other. To accomplish this, as I will outline more fully below, my dissertation will provide a systematic analysis of the Roman discourse on exemplary leadership as well as two nuanced case studies tracing the appropriation of Roman forms and values for the articulation of what the authors understand to be a non-Roman, Christ-like morality of leadership. My extended studies of 1 Clement and Lyons, furthermore, will illustrate both their moral diversity while at the

22 Though, examining different corpora than my dissertation treats, Wayne Meeks’ short monograph, Moral World of the First Christians (1986), endeavors to “…understand the moral formation of the early Christian communities…by trying to understand the symbolic and social world they shared with other people in their villages or cities” (1986: 15). To be sure, the balance of his project is driven by sociological concerns as Meeks invites “…the reader to join [him] in an effort to piece together, in our imagination, what we can of the world within which those words once worked” (1986: 16). Nevertheless, my dissertation similarly desires to confront these early communities’ “…involvement in the culture of their time and place” and likewise seeks to trace “new patterns they made of old forms, to hear the new songs they composed from old melodies” (1986: 97). In short, though my project is not sociological, I share Meeks’ general curiosity with respect to the nature of these communities’ participation in Roman culture. In addition to Meeks’ project, a number of studies restrict themselves more specifically to the moral discourse of Christ-confessing texts and authors in light of popular philosophical movements in the Empire; see Malherbe (1989); Engberg-Pedersen (2000); and most recently, Thorsteinnson (2010). The latter works are primarily comparative and draw (often overly general) parallels between Paul’s moral universe and that of many Greek and Roman philosophers.
same time their overlapping celebration of several relatively stable “Christ-like” virtues of leadership—for example, endurance, love, and humility.

Overview of Chapters

Before proceeding to the body of the dissertation, I will briefly summarize each chapter. In my first chapter, “The Discourse of Exemplarity in Greek and Roman Culture and Society,” I seek to accomplish two major goals. First, I provide a general introduction to “example” and exemplarity in the ancient Mediterranean world. Second, I endeavor to illustrate and underscore the utility of the (originally Hellenistic) discourse of Roman exemplarity for individuals and groups seeking to articulate, inculcate, and maintain what they consider to be native ancestral virtues. To accomplish these goals, I begin by introducing the role of example (παράδειγμα) in ancient Greek rhetorical theory, education, and patriotism. Here, I outline the use of example in two major rhetorical handbooks, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and Aristotle’s Rhetoric, before considering the pedagogic function of poetry and praise speeches celebrating moral examples on a more popular level in Greek society.

The balance of the chapter then considers in detail the development, characteristic elements, and popular deployment of a distinctively Roman discourse of exemplarity. My exploration of the latter begins by outlining a few general differences between characteristically Greek and Roman approaches to example. With these distinctions in place, I study of the exemplum in Roman formal rhetorical theory as it was represented in Auctor ad Herennium, the works of Cicero, and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, before occupying the balance of the chapter with an outline of the form, nature, popular
dissemination of, and pervasive participation in exemplary discourse in the late Republic and Empire. With respect to the widespread presence of this Roman moral habit, I focus on five sites that were well-suited for the deployment of leadership exempla. These venues include 1) education proper, 2) the display of imagines (waxen masks of late magistrates), 3) orations (especially funerary laudationes), 4) architecture and inscriptions, and 5) historiography.

Chapter 2, “Notions of Exemplary Leadership in Roman Society and Culture,” attempts to identify and illustrate a handful of leadership virtues, abilities, and attributes that were widely recognized by both elites and non-elites throughout the empire. To be clear, I do not argue for an uncontested or ubiquitously embraced set of moral ingredients. Rather, my chapter seeks to identify a robust Roman idiom of leadership that regularly emerges in our extant sources and, though not slavishly reproduced by every author, commonly shapes ancient conversations about exemplary Roman leadership.

To this end, in consultation with a broad sample of largely late Republican and early Imperial sources (but at times extending beyond these parameters) and in conversation with modern scholarship, I outline and illustrate five broadly popular categories of exemplary leadership celebrated in our sources: noble lineage, courage/martial prowess, education and eloquence, generous patronage, and piety toward the divine. With this general polythetic and explicitly heuristic model of ideal “Roman” leadership in place, I turn my attention to a more focused literary sample. Here I will attempt to demonstrate the presence of these categories in the work of two Roman biographers (Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch) as well as their presence in two extant laudationes (Roman funeral eulogies). I conclude with a more extended study of Cicero’s
advice to his son in De Officiis—a work that liberally deploys Roman leadership exempla in order to provide a prescription for an emerging leader’s achievement of honor. In sum, the latter sources should illustrate the importance of the five categories I have delineated. Like any more or less hegemonic set of moral or social expectations, these categories were always open for adaptation, contestation, or exchange by particular authors and communities.

In short, while the first chapter clarifies the pedagogical and rhetorical tools and approaches generally preferred by both elite and non-elite Romans grappling with the question of ideal leadership, this chapter makes explicit many of the prized cultural values often associated with this leadership discourse. As I will explore in subsequent chapters, moreover, many of the texts explicitly contending for a non-Roman ancestral tradition still seek to claim unique ownership of (or establish a monopoly over) the key components in this polythetic taxonomy of ideal Roman leadership characteristics.

Having introduced and demonstrated the valence of both the form and characteristic content of Roman exemplary discourse on leadership, my third chapter, “Moses as an Exemplum of Native Leadership in Philo’s De Vita Mosis and Josephus’s Antiquities 2–4,” examines the way in which two first century Jewish authors deploy individual leaders as honorable and authoritative exempla. After briefly introducing each figure, I review their likely exposure to specifically Roman cultural forms and political realities (Philo likely writing in Alexandria Egypt and Josephus raised in the Levant but spending the latter half of his life writing in Flavian Rome). The majority of my chapter, then, is devoted to understanding how these champions of Jewish culture appropriate (or disregard) aspects of the Roman discourse of exemplarity in their narrative construction.
of Moses. I examine the degree to which they adopt, adapt, or eschew the traditional Roman leadership priorities outlined in chapter 2. I thus define the shared forms of ideal Jewish leadership that are in Philo and Josephus as well as their differences in priority.

I close the chapter by highlighting Philo and Josephus’ extreme exaltation of their exemplary leader in light of a concurrent trend in Valerius Maximus’ collection of ancestral Roman heroes—especially the latter’s celebration of the exemplary Scipiones. There, I notice how all three cultural advocates consolidate into one exemplary figure or family the aggregate of their preferred leadership characteristics and sanitize most (or often any) negative elements in the tradition. Tracing the latter discursive trend, I argue, will provide a clearer context for my study of the deployment of Christ and other biblical or Christ-following figures as exempla of leadership.

This chapter serves a number of purposes with respect to my overall project. First, I illustrate the complex cultural dynamics involved in effectively articulating an individual or community’s notion(s) of ancestral exemplary leadership in the crowded Roman Mediterranean marketplace of ideas and images. Secondly, because both Jewish authors write in contexts with very different levels of Roman cultural influence, this chapter functions as something of a test case, measuring the degree to which each deploys characteristically Roman discursive approaches and leadership priorities. Unsurprisingly, it is Josephus’ work, penned in the epicenter of traditional Roman political and cultural activity, that evidences far greater participation in the Roman discourse of exemplarity as well as a more significant appropriation of Roman leadership ideals. Finally, this chapter further demonstrates the general usefulness of my polythetic model of honorable leadership presented in chapter 2. In all, it clarifies both the utility of
this Roman discursive habit for the construction, maintenance, and advertisement of native (in this case Jewish) leadership priorities, and it provides a more robust context for my exploration of the deployment of Christ and Christ-like figures as leadership *exempla* in antiquity.

In the final two chapters of my dissertation, I study how the literary remains of voluntary associations oriented around the figure of Christ navigated Hellenistic and Roman moral conversations in their efforts to communicate or re-inscribe what they understood to be a distinctive leadership tradition. Specifically, I focus on *The Letter of the Romans to the Corinthians* (*1 Clement*) and the *Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons*, both of which were written by Christ-confessing communities in highly Romanized portions of the Empire.

My fourth chapter, “*Exempla* and Roman Exemplarity in *1 Clement,*” examines how the latter text appears to appropriate, adapt, or eschew Roman discursive practices and moral priorities as it articulates and inculcates its own conception of exemplary leadership. Consistent with the preceding chapter, my dual focus is on both the presence of the formal aspects of Roman exemplary discourse and the major leadership attributes advertized in the deployed *exempla*.

After introducing the work and reviewing its treatment in modern scholarship, I introduce the letter’s conspicuous use of examples. With these preliminaries in place, I explore the author’s selection of ancestral *exempla* before moving to an examination of the particular leadership characteristics advocated in the work (in light of the traditional Roman preferences outlined in chapter 2). In this survey, I pay special attention to those attributes fortified with the most numerous and most prominent *exempla*, analyzing each
of the extended *exempla* according to Roller’s outline of the Roman discourse of exemplarity.

I conclude the chapter by exploring two moral areas wherein Clement deploys significant and elaborated *exempla* which, though narrated using characteristically Roman discursive practices, seem to preserve largely non-Roman and, as I will argue, characteristically Pauline leadership priorities—namely, love (ἀγάπη) and humility (ταπείνοφροσύνη). In this discussion, I include a lengthy excursus exploring “humility” and the ταπείνο- lexeme in ancient Mediterranean literature. There, I establish the word-group’s largely (almost exclusively) negative literary use prior to its association with the figure of Christ. The letter’s celebration of such an unconventional virtue notwithstanding, my study argues that 1 Clement is still very much a cultural product of the Roman Empire insofar as it shared with contemporaneous texts and institutions specific approaches to constructing and inculcating what it understands to be a unique ancestral tradition of exemplary leadership.

In addition to its function in my dissertation’s larger exploration, this chapter contributes to scholarship on 1 Clement in two significant ways. First, whereas many scholars have suggested or assumed that the achievement of concord is the singular aim and organizing principle of the letter, I postulate a secondary (albeit complementary) agenda, namely, advocating a distinctive and ancestral morality of leadership “in Christ.” Secondly, while most modern studies of 1 Clement almost exclusively explore the letter in light of Hellenistic literary and formal rhetorical influences, I seek to understand 1 Clement as it both champions a self-consciously “native” leadership tradition and, at the same time, fits neatly within a Roman pedagogical and political context.
My fifth and final chapter, “The Martyrs of Vienne and Lyons as Exempla of Christian Leadership,” provides another case study of a text produced by a Christ-venerating voluntary association in the western Empire participating in—rather than ignoring, categorically subverting, or insulated from—broader Roman moral conversations on leadership. Here, I discuss two important (and often overlooked) matters: 1) the letter’s preservation in Eusebius’ *Ecclesiastical History* and 2) the presence and nature of Roman cultural forms and political realities in second century Gaul. The balance of my study then examines how *Lyons* interacts with both the form and characteristic moral content of the Roman discourse of exemplarity as it deploys its martyrs as, among other things, leadership *exempla*.

I close this chapter with a synthesis of the major leadership characteristics advocated in *Lyons* in light of both traditional Roman leadership priorities and in dialogue with those advocated in Josephus, Philo, and *1 Clement*. I argue that like *Ant.* 2–4 and *1 Clement*, *Lyons* thoroughly reflects the narrative approach that characterizes Roman exemplarity (meticulously noting actions, audiences, commemorations, and imitation). In terms of its appropriation of the Roman idiom of moral leadership, I demonstrate that, though differing in emphasis, *Lyons* aligns with *Ant.* 2–4 and *1 Clement* insofar as it underlines agonistic endurance and courage. With *1 Clement*, however, *Lyons* eschews bloodline as an authority-ascribing factor. Perhaps most interesting, in my view, both Christ-confessing texts celebrate above all the importance of love and the rather un-Roman leadership disposition of Christ-emulating humility. In both texts, furthermore, the latter virtue appears to be a distinctively Pauline preservation.
Beyond these contributions to the main focus of my dissertation, this final chapter has several implications for scholarship on Lyons and martyrological texts more generally. First, this chapter contributes to a growing body of research exploring the social and cultural utility of martyr acta. Along these lines, my study underscores the didactic potential of Lyons with respect to intracommunal issues of leadership and authority. That is, much more than seeking to ready people for persecution or public death, Lyons—in very Roman fashion—seeks to leverage the paradigmatic deportment of courageous heroes to inculcate or re-inscribe ancestral mores of honorable leadership.

Secondly, my project situates the imitatio Christi tradition evident in this letter within the context of Roman exemplarity. In short, far from a sui generis Christian phenomenon, the mimetic convention shares in a very Roman cultural impulse.

In the end, through the lenses of the aforementioned analyses, my project seeks to demonstrate that the Roman discourse of exemplarity was far from a monolithic, totalizing discourse; instead it provided a useful set of cultural tools by which ethnically or politically distinctive communities operating in its moral and rhetorical ambiance could articulate or re-inscribe native traditions.
Chapter 1: The Discourse of Exemplarity in the Ancient Mediterranean World

Writing to the emperor Trajan in the early second century C.E., Pliny the Younger ardently maintains, “We need example more than we need rule...Men learn better from examples, which are particularly good because they prove that what they teach can actually be done.”\(^{23}\) As we will see, this pedagogical penchant was not unique to a privileged few sharing Pliny’s education and elite values. Rather, as Matthew Roller observes, the preference for example over precept was shared by “…all of Roman society, from the loftiest aristocrats to the humblest peasants, laborers, and slaves” (Roller 2004: 6).\(^{24}\)

To provide a more robust foundation and context for my consideration (in subsequent chapters) of the importance of such *exempla* in ancient discussions on leaders and leadership, I will first provide a basic overview of the Roman discourse of exemplarity. After briefly introducing the role of example (*παράδειγμα*) in ancient Greek rhetorical theory, education, and the fostering of patriotic identity, this chapter will turn to a more sustained consideration of the development, characteristic elements, and popular deployment of a distinctively Roman discourse of exemplarity. My exploration of the latter will begin with a consideration of the *exemplum* in Roman rhetorical handbooks, only to occupy the balance of the chapter with an outline of the form, content, popular dissemination of and participation in exemplary discourse in the late Republic and early Empire. In addition to providing a general introduction to *exempla* and exemplarity in the ancient Mediterranean world, one of my chief goals in this chapter is to illustrate and underscore the utility of this originally Hellenistic discourse for

\(^{23}\) Pliny, *Pan.* 45.6.

\(^{24}\) See also, Hölkeskamp (1996: 305–308) and Morgan (2007: 1–8).
individuals and groups seeking to articulate, inculcate, and maintain a set of “distinctive” moral values or native virtues.

I. Examples (παράδειγματα) in Ancient Greek Rhetoric, Education, and Patriotism

I.A. The Greek παράδειγμα: Definition and Place in Rhetorical Theory

Since most modern scholarly treatments of example in Greek and Roman antiquity focus primarily on its place in formal rhetoric, I will only provide an abbreviated look at this topic before turning to its broader educational and social use and significance.

I.A.1. Defining παράδειγμα

The Greek term παράδειγμα originally signified a model or pattern in architecture or ceramics, although in Platonic metaphysics, παράδειγμα came to refer to the heavenly forms (for example, Rep. 592b). Any attempt at providing a specific and all-encompassing definition of example among Greek—or Roman—rhetorical theorists, however, quickly encounters the term’s diverse application. Bennett Price concludes his exhaustive study of παράδειγμα and exemplum in ancient rhetorical theory by emphasizing the impossibility of formulating a “universal” definition: “such a definition must contradict the teachings of one or more of the rhetors...and it would be a matter of (probably pointless) debate as to what (or whose) precepts should be ignored, what (or whose) precepts should be accepted as vital” (1975: 215). Accordingly, our


26 Price’s dissertation considers “example” in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Aristotle, Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero, and Quintilian.
understanding of “example” in Greek and Roman rhetoric must remain flexible, broad, and explicitly heuristic.

Kristoffel Demoen, looking at the use of example in the rhetoric of Gregory Nazianzen, provides just such a definition of παράδειγμα/exemplum:

the evoking of a history (from the Bible or from pagan tradition) which has or has not actually occurred, which is similar or related to the matter under discussion, which is implicitly or explicitly connected with this matter as argument (evidence or model) or as ornament, and which takes the form of a narration, a name-mentioning or an allusion. (1996: 25)²⁷

The major extant sources dealing with the proper use of παράδειγμα in Greek rhetoric come from two roughly contemporaneous fourth century B.C.E. works, the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and Aristotle’s Rhetoric. I briefly treat παράδειγμα as it is used in both works before turning to the broader use of example in Greek education and patriotic discourse.²⁸

I.A.2. Παράδειγμα in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum

It is in this late fourth-century rhetorical handbook that we first encounter an extended discussion of παράδειγμα as a technical term.²⁹ The author, ostensibly Anaximenes, places example as part of the inventio, where it falls under the category of proofs drawn from persons and their actions or words.³⁰ More specifically, the handbook—dividing παράδειγμα into expected/probable and unexpected/improbable—

²⁷ Demoen, like Price, recognizes the divergent opinions of rhetoricians: “the term ‘exemplum,’ as well as its Greek equivalent παράδειγμα, is a central concept in ancient rhetorical practice and theory, where it is not unequivocally used” (1996: 7).

²⁸ My discussion of these works will largely follow Price (1975: 10–83). For a helpful summary of “example” in these texts, see also, Cosby (1988: 93–105) and Demoen (1996: 36–41). The latter is largely based on Lumpe (1966).

²⁹ Price attributes this work to Anaximenes and dates it between 335–330 B.C.E. (1975: 13–14).

³⁰ See van der Poel: 2009: 334. Examples are never discussed as ornamental or stylistic in Rhet. ad Alex. See Price (1975: 35).
advocates the use of examples if one’s evidence is weak and requires further illustration. Regarding such probabilities, Price aptly summarizes the handbook’s advice: “If your opponent is arguing probabilities, think up all the probable matters that turned out improbably. If your opponent is arguing for an improbability...try to show that they were just lucky accidents which the audience should not rely upon for guidance.”

In short, rhetorical examples are not here advocated as moral models or for the purposes of ornament or style, but as supplements to a case lacking persuasive proofs. *Rhet. ad Alex.* prefers well-known figures from the past or present as subject matter, while making no comment with respect to the utility of mythic characters or events.

**I.A.3. Aristotle**

Like *Rhet. ad Alex.*, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* situates παράδειγμα in the *inventio* as a form of proof, nowhere discussing its ornamental or stylistic potential. There, example is given pride of place as a form of argument through rhetorical induction. In its evidential role, Aristotle subdivides παράδειγμα into two species: Historical examples (τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγεγήμενα), and invented examples (τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν). Invented examples

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31 *Rhet. ad Alex.* 34.2–7.


34 Marc van der Poel summarizes Aristotle’s understanding of the function of the παράδειγμα well: “In Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* the παράδειγμα occupies a central position in the *inventio* on the basis of the juxtaposition of rhetoric and dialectic, because just as reasoning by means of rhetorical syllogisms (ἐνθύμημα) is parallel to deductive reasoning in dialectic, so reasoning by means of παράδειγμα forms the counterpart of inductive reasoning in dialectic. Thus, Aristotle defines the example as a rhetorical induction, forming one of the two categories of artistic proof” (2009: 334).
include comparisons (παράβολαῖ) and fables (λόγοι).\footnote{Rhetoric II.20, 1393a 23–1394a 18. See van der Poel (2009: 334–335). Price provides a helpful diagram of Aristotle’s taxonomy (1975: 39).} Again in line with Rhet. ad Alex., Aristotle’s Rhetoric does not underscore the use of παράδειγματα in the service of morality.\footnote{See Demoen (1996: 38). For a complete analysis of παράδειγμα in Aristotle, see Price (1975: 36–83). In terms of technical treatments of rhetoric, emphasis on the role of example for moral formation will only begin to develop among the Roman theorists.} Despite the silence of these Greek rhetorical handbooks on the moral application of exempla, we shall see that the efficacy of example for general education and moral formation was widely appreciated and regularly advocated in other spheres of ancient Greek society and culture.

**I.B. The Pedagogic and Patriotic Use of παράδειγματα in Greek Culture**

Poetry and praise speeches offered two popular Greek venues for showcasing moral παράδειγματα. As this short exploration will hopefully demonstrate, examples were deployed from these pedagogical platforms with a primarily mimetic aim—the provision of noble examples for a younger generation to follow.

**I.B.1. Poetry in Greek Society**

I want also to recommend Homer to you. In your fathers’ eyes he was a poet of such worth that they passed a law that every four years at the Panathenaea, he alone of all the poets would have his works recited... These are the lines, gentlemen, to which your forefathers listened, and such are the deeds which they emulated. Thus they developed such courage that they were ready to die.\footnote{Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 102; J. O. Burtt, Trans., Minor Attic Orators, vol. 1. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 1941.}

Thus, the fourth-century B.C.E. Attic statesman and orator, Lycurgus, articulated the Classical Greek devotion to the poet Homer as well the celebrated instructional function
associated with his works. Noting Plato’s *Republic* (10. 606E) and Isocrates’ *To Nicocles* (530B), moreover, Clive Skidmore observes: “Homer provided the education of the Greeks and was the ultimate guide to conduct so that throughout antiquity it was not unusual to have learnt the works of Homer by heart” (1996: 4).

The primary qualities showcased in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* and prized as essential ingredients in the various configurations of Greek culture throughout the Archaic to Hellenistic periods included the broadly defined quality of ἀρετή (“virtue, courage, moral excellence”) and ἀγάπη (“the love of glory”). Skidmore summarizes well the nexus of these coveted qualities: “The ideal value to which everything must be sacrificed in Homeric society is arete, and glory is the recognition of it by one’s fellow warriors” (1996: 11). For the readers/hearers of Homeric literature, ἀρετή, though not clearly defined, was powerfully and persuasively modeled in the exploits, interactions, and dispositions of the epic heroes. As Annette Reed notes, far more than mere etiological tales or historicist reconstructions of the past, “...the writings of Homer held a place perhaps not dissimilar to that of the Torah/Pentateuch in Second Temple Judaism. From the recitation and memorization of Homeric verses, it was hoped that students would be inspired toward imitation” (2009: 189).

The moral content and mimetic function of poetry in the education and socialization of young and old in classical

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38 Marrou concludes, “It is not the Ulysses of the *Return* but the pure and noble figure of Achilles who embodies the moral ideal of the perfect Homeric knight. This ideal can be defined in one phrase: it was an heroic morality of honour. Homer was the source, and in Homer each succeeding generation of antiquity rediscovered the thing that is absolutely fundamental to this whole aristocratic ethic: the love of glory” (1982: 11).

39 She later confirms that even “[t]hose who protested [about the ethicizing interpretation of Homer], moreover, tended to critique the mythic content rather than the pedagogical and persuasive power of the method” (2009: 190). For a similar conclusion with respect to the pedagogical role of Homeric literature, see Marrou (1982: 12–13). Skidmore also surveys the pedagogical function of poetry in Spartan society (1996: 4–5).
antiquity, moreover, was anything but short-lived. Strabo, an originally Greek geographer and historian writing in Augustan Rome, affirms that:

...The great mass of women and common people cannot be induced by mere force of reason to devote themselves to piety, virtue, and honesty; superstition must therefore be employed and even this is insufficient without the aid of the marvelous and the terrible...Such was mythology, and when our ancestors found it capable of subserving the purposes of social and political life...they continued the education of childhood to maturer years, and maintained that poetry was sufficient to form the understanding of every age.\(^\text{40}\)

In short, while much changed with respect to literary preferences between the rise of Archaic Greek society and the emergence of the Roman Empire, a general recognition of the pedagogical value of poetry endured.

**I.B.2. Speeches of Praise**

In addition to poetry, the Greek *encomium*—a form of speech solely concerned with lavishing praise on its subject—was a genre with a morally didactic aim intended for socio-economically broad audiences. The set of topics covered in the *encomium* was relatively fixed. The composer was obligated to discuss the subject’s origin and birth, childhood development and training, accomplishments, and exemplary qualities.\(^\text{41}\)

Polybios, a Greek captive writing in Rome during the second century B.C.E., summarizes nicely the primary pedagogical function of the *encomium* in his own praise speech to Philopoemen: “For as one feels more roused to emulation and imitation (ζηλῶσαι καὶ μιμῆσθαι) by men that have life, than by buildings that have none, it is natural that the

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\(^{40}\) Strabo Geography 1.2.3–8. Transl. H.C. Hamilton and W. Falconer (1854–57).

\(^{41}\) Malina and Neyrey note that the prescribed content for these speeches “...remained exceptionally constant over centuries, from Aristotle (fourth century B.C.) through Quintilian (first century A.D.)” (1996: 6). For more on the formal requirements of this genre, see Malina and Neyrey (1996: 23–24).
history of the former should have a greater educational value." Thus, though the chief aim of the encomium certainly included the ascription of honor to one’s subject, its actual function remained the didactic deployment of παράδειγμα.

Nichole Louraux’s work on the Athenian funeral oration, a specifically Athenian form of praise speech, further confirms the pedagogic and patriotic potential of public praise speeches. Rather than praising an exemplary individual—the common practice of encomium—the Athenian funeral oration showcases an entire community, thus expressing “…an awareness of the originality of Athens and the choice of a political system that separates Athenian interests from those of Sparta” (2006: 94). Regarding these encomiastic eulogies, Louraux concludes that “…in praising the dead, the orators have a double aim: to instruct the young and to console the adults” (84). In sum, though the morally and politically didactic function of examples may not have been underscored in the Greek rhetorical handbooks, it certainly featured prominently in popular genres of poetry and praise speeches.

II. Exempla and Exemplarity in Roman Culture

Consistent with the trend noted in my discussion of Greek παράδειγμα, the balance of the scholarship on exempla in Roman culture focuses on formal rhetoric. Since the present study is mostly interested in the social and moral dimensions of the

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44 Regarding the communal emphasis, Louraux elaborates, “[t]he funeral oration ignores the exemplary characters that the historian was happy to isolate in the solitude of their decision; but to all the anonymous dead it attributes the same choice and the same end, so that their example may inspire emulation among the survivors (2006: 152).

45 For a discussion of this trend, see Goldfarb (2005: 30) and van der Blom (2010: 4).
Roman use of examples, I offer only a brief overview of the conceptualization of *exempla* among Roman rhetoricians. The balance of this chapter outlines both the broader discourse of exemplarity in Roman culture as well as a number of venues for the popular deployment of this discourse. My aim will, again, be to demonstrate the classical preference for using examples to inculcate core values and re-inscribe native identities.

**II.A. Definition and Taxonomical Matters**

The Latin term *exemplum* (“example, sample, exemplar”) seems to originate from the market for slaves or livestock. According to Hildegard Kornhardt, a seller would give an *exemplum* to the buyer for inspection; the “sample” presumably represented the general quality of the stock (1935: 2–5). Elizabeth Goldfarb, in her dissertation examining the use of Biblical *exempla* in late antique literature, notes how from this historically specific origin, *exemplum* soon “…absorbed the ideas related to παράδειγμα” and developed a much broader semantic range (2005: 33). Goldfarb aptly summarizes: “In general, *exemplum* has a wider field of meaning than the English *example*, including the meanings conveyed by *sample*, *exemplar*, and *hallmark*. Greek, Roman, and biblical ideas infused the word, which became associated with various other concepts, among them *forma*, *figura*, τύπος, παράδειγμα, and ύπόδειγμα” (31).

Scholars (both ancient and modern) have developed various categories describing the use of examples. As we saw with παράδειγματα, however, any attempt to formulate a rigid classification of *exempla* runs aground on the often contradictory ancient rhetorical taxonomies. Nevertheless, Goldfarb—standing on the shoulders of Demoen (1996) and Lumpe (1966)—has distinguished a few broad heuristic categories that will prove helpful

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in my consideration of exempla and exemplarity in Roman culture. Specifically, she distinguishes between the evidential, ornamental, and model applications of exemplum in ancient and late antique literature.\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Evidential} use is “...that made in support of an argument; these are examples that convince the hearer or reader of the point that the rhetor, or lawyer, or preacher is making.” \textit{Ornamental} use, on the other hand, is primarily used “...to show off the erudition of the speaker or writer.” \textit{Model} employment—whether positively or negatively—of an exemplum, “...is used in moral exhortation, or in education” (2005: 31).\textsuperscript{48} It is this “modeling” function of exempla in the service of socialization, moral formation, and identity construction that will prove especially important for this study.

While the Latin exemplum was greatly influenced by much of the ideological and rhetorical content associated with the Greek παράδειγμα,\textsuperscript{49} the Roman concept should not be simply equated with its Greek predecessor. Summarizing the complex cultural dynamics of Hellenization, Annette Reed defines it as a discourse “...wherein elements of Greek culture were creatively appropriated for the articulation of new expressions of local pride, ethic specificity, and cultural resistance” (2009: 195).\textsuperscript{50} Consistent with this analysis, it is possible to tentatively tease out something of a characteristically “Roman” approach with respect to the selection of exempla.

\textsuperscript{47} For an extended discussion of these categories, see Goldfarb (2005: 31–38).

\textsuperscript{48} This “model” use roughly corresponds with Litchfield’s notion of the exemplum virtutis in Roman culture (1914). Van der Blom also identifies a characteristically “moralizing” form of exempla, distinguishing it from “legal-historical” uses (2010: 15).

\textsuperscript{49} See Goldfarb (2005: 33).

\textsuperscript{50} Teresa Morgan, while not denying the distinctively Roman contributions to exemplary discourse, warns against “[t]he double misconception that exempla are more a Roman than a Greek genre, and that they are mainly to be found in oratory...There is little evidence that it is something distinctive of Roman culture, and none that it is distinctive of Roman oratory” (2007: 123).
The first major distinction between Greek and Roman exemplarity has to do with the selection of *exempla*. In short, Roman authors typically preferred their own domestic *exempla* rather than heroes derived from external sources. Goldfarb elaborates, “[d]irect ancestors were best, especially direct ancestors whose faces looked out at you from your household shrine. Failing these, however, a canon of Roman heroes, and eventually even Greek and barbarian ones, could be used to inspire excellence” (2005: 36). For example, in his first century C.E. *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia*—perhaps the best surviving collection of ancient *exempla*—Valerius Maximus maintains a clear partition between “internal” and “external” *exempla*. In a transition in his first book, he explicitly articulates his preference for the former: “So I will turn to external items...they have less authority, but may bring some welcome variety.” Hildegard Kornhardt notes the late Republican and early Imperial preference for older Roman *exempla*, against which any new *exemplum* would necessarily be measured (1935: 22). In short, given the choice, most Roman authors and rhetoricians desired old, familial *exempla*.

Secondly, while Roman authors did not pioneer the use of example for moral instruction, in their hands—excluding those discussing *exempla* in the context of formal rhetoric (reviewed below)—this moral utility was increasingly given pride of place. In his consideration of the function of *exempla* as symbolic representations of the *mos maiorum* in late Republican Rome, Andreas Haltenhoff concludes that for most Roman authors, teachers, and statesmen, the cherished behaviors and characteristics comprising the *mos*

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51 Reed further explains that Roman exemplary discourse “…seems to have been distinguished from its Greek precedents by a preference for figures and events from the historical past” (2009: 191).

52 Val. Max. 1.6. ext. praef. Trans. Shakelton Bailey, *LCL*. To be sure, in his study of education in the Roman Republic, Anthony Corbeill reminds us that Greek culture, history, and poetry was in no way eliminated or drastically subordinated by the flourishing of Latin literature and Roman political power. On the contrary, he concludes, “Greek culture has become more than merely an addition to the Roman world. It now functions as part of a tradition that supports Roman military and civic virtue” (2001: 275).
maiorum were not discussed as timeless, ahistorical ideals, but virtues firmly anchored in the concrete actions of historical characters.\textsuperscript{53} That is, even under Hellenistic influence, characteristic Roman virtues began to be firmly attached to native historical figures. Whether the pietas of Aeneas, the virtus of Horatius Cocles, or the fides of Regulus, with increasing regularity, one could not speak of timeless ideals, or developing ethical systems without couching them in “…a constellation of vivid human exemplars” (Brown: 1983: 2).\textsuperscript{54}

Finally, and closely related to the last point, coupled with the above preference for historical exempla, the Romans equally cherished paragons drawn from one’s direct family. Goldfarb highlights the familial stamp of Roman exemplarity:

> Even under Greek influence, the exemplum was distinctively Roman; this was particularly true of moral exempla, which retained a familial stamp. In theory, one’s true exemplum was one’s father. The parent as the model for the child is a well-nigh universal idea, but the Romans were especially invested in it, and this informs their descriptions of example and imitator and the relation between them (2005: 34).

Matthew Roller, further underscores the importance of family in Roman exemplary discourse:

> A prominent feature of Roman exemplary discourse is that the most compelling models for imitation often come from within the actor's own family. Certainly no actor is restricted to familial models, but the idea that certain patterns of behavior do or should run in families—that is, that the deeds done by member of a single gens demonstrate structural as well as categorical resemblances—is widespread in Roman culture (2004: 24–25).

\textsuperscript{53} See Haltenhoff (2001: 214–215). Van der Blom provides a good summary of the mos maiorum: “Mos was an unwritten yet central part of Roman society because, for example, many rules of the political and legal systems were based on tradition rather than laws and statutes. Similarly, mos guided social norms. In this way, mos had a normative function in the Roman republic. The ancestors were regarded as the creators of mos, and the collective actions and customs of the ancestors was termed mos maiorum” (2010: 12).

\textsuperscript{54} For the nexus of exempla and the mos maiorum, see Haltenhoff (2001: 214–215).
Pliny the Younger’s encouragement to a youth confirms this Roman penchant for family exempla: “[you] are fortunate indeed to be blessed with a living example who is both the best possible and your close relative: in short, to have for imitation the very man whom Nature intended you to resemble most.”55 Having outlined these three Roman distinctives we will turn to a short consideration of exempla and exemplarity in Roman rhetorical theory.

II.B. Exempla in Specific Authors/Rhetorical Handbooks

In light of the diversity noted in the Greek rhetorical handbooks, it should come as no surprise that though Roman rhetoricians share many of the above-mentioned penchants, they do not perfectly agree with one another on the proper use of exempla in formal rhetoric.56 As I briefly examine three major Roman rhetorical authorities, namely, Auctor ad Herennium, Cicero, and Quintilian, I will attempt to note both their peculiarities as well as elements of emerging consensus among their approaches to deploying examples.

II.B.1. Auctor ad Herennium

This anonymous handbook provides a good point of departure for the present examination of the Latin handbooks as it is both the oldest of the three works, generally dated to the beginning of the first century B.C.E., and it “...show[s] the contents of Greek rhetorical teaching as it existed in the early first century B.C. and of the attempts to

55 Pliny, Ep. 8.13.2; see Goldfarb (2005: 34).

56 Price notes not only the differences “...between Aristotle and the Romans, but also...the differences among the Romans themselves” (1975: 213).
translate this into Latin” (Kennedy: 1994: 126–127).\(^57\) In terms of selection of exempla—which could include either deeds or sayings—\(Auct. \text{ ad Her.}\) prefers clearly identified and well known agents from the historical past (as opposed to fictatae fabulae).\(^58\) This text differs from our next two Roman rhetors in that \(Rhet. \text{ ad Her.}\) understands the exemplum to be purely for the purposes of stylistic embellishment rather than as a form of proof (inventio). Specifically, as Marc van der Poel summarizes, the use of exempla has “...four functions, namely, beauty, clarity, verisimilitude, and vividness” (2009: 335).\(^59\)

**II.B.2. Marcus Tullius Cicero**

Though much could be said with respect to the use of exempla in Cicero’s works spanning more than forty years, in light of the abundant scholarship on this topic and in anticipation of my extended examination of Cicero in the next chapter, the present discussion will be short.\(^60\) Cicero generally defines exemplum as a type of comparison which strengthens or weakens a case by the authority (auctoritate) or experience of a particular actor or event.\(^61\) Like \(Auct. \text{ ad Her.}\), Cicero advocates the deployment of well-

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\(^57\) Price agrees with this date range (1975: 88).


\(^59\) Price agrees: “\(Rhet. \text{ Her.}\) radically differs from Anaximenes and Aristotle in labeling exemplum a type of stylistic embellishment rather than a type of proof” (1975: 88). For an extended examination of the use of example in \(Auctor \text{ ad Herennium}\), see Price (1975: 84–101).

\(^60\) In addition to Price (1975), van der Poel (2009), and the very recent work of van der Blom (2010)—three works that I will rely more heavily on here—see, Kennedy (1994), Fogel (1994), Robinson (1986), Stinger (1993).

known figures from Rome’s historical past who have been distinguished by their eminent service.\textsuperscript{62}

Price observes that Cicero discuses \textit{exempla} “...almost exclusively in connection with judicial speeches” where he places them as forms of proof in the speech’s \textit{confirmatio}.\textsuperscript{63} In this context, while admitting their utility in rational or logical argument,\textsuperscript{64} Cicero gives pride of place to their function with respect to the emotions. Price summarizes this well:

\begin{quote}
Despite Cicero’s inconsistency on what might be called the theoretical level, a distinctive feature of his treatment of the \textit{exemplum} is the repeated attention that he pays to it as a means of persuasion directed not at the mind but at the heart of the listener (1975: 129).\textsuperscript{65}
\end{quote}

All of the foregoing observations, to be sure, must be seen in light of Cicero’s vast and often diverse treatment of example in formal rhetoric. Price concludes, “The most striking feature of Cicero’s view of the \textit{exemplum} is that he has no one view. The \textit{exemplum} is variously a constituent of \textit{comparabile}, a type of \textit{similitudo}, a \textit{locus}, and a Figure of thought. It is used for Proof, Amplification, and Ornament by philosophers, 

\textsuperscript{62} Summarizing a long passage in Cicero’s third \textit{Verrine}, van der Blom provides a good example of his use of notable native heroes: “Cicero then brings forward a number of exempla, to which he expects Hortensius to refer, namely Scipios, Catos, and Laeliuses as well as the elder Catulus, Marius, Scaevola, Scaurus, and Metellus. The wording of the passage, as well as the fame of the Scipios, Catos, and Laeliuses, suggest that these were Roman stock examples, which an orator could pick with the knowledge of being understood by the audience. Their authority as exempla is unquestionable” (2010: 74). On Cicero’s preference for historical figures of note, see also Price (1975: 120).

\textsuperscript{63} See Price (1975: 103 and 126).

\textsuperscript{64} See Price (1975: 119).

\textsuperscript{65} On Cicero’s view of \textit{exempla} as emotional stimulants, see also van der Poel (2009: 335). Continuing her discussion of Cicero’s third \textit{Verrine} speech, van der Blom confirms Price and van der Poel’s conclusions: “Before Cicero even starts to enumerate and discuss the possible imagined exempla brought forward by Hortensius, he gives a brief insight into the double function of exempla: to give authority to a point and to delight the audience. In this way, exempla have both an aesthetic and a practical function; both their form and their content are valued and can result in success for the orator” (2010: 74).
orators, and legal experts” (1975: 128). Nevertheless, as we will see in the next chapter, the technical rhetorical minutiae notwithstanding, Cicero unmistakably views exempla as powerful tools for teaching proper virtue.

II.B.3. Marcus Fabius Quintilianus

Quintilian, the last of our Roman rhetoricians to be considered here, was perhaps the first instructor in rhetoric officially funded by the state. He wrote his Institutio Oratoria in the 90’s C.E., which provides us with “...antiquity’s most extensive and detailed discussion of examples and comparisons” (Price 1975: 131). In terms of the content appropriate to exempla, Quintilian deviates slightly from the Roman insistence on native historical figures. Reviewing the technical use of παράδειγμα/exemplum, he notes the broader Greek use of the concept to refer to comparisons of similar things in general as well as those involving historical facts. The Romans, he continues, typically used exemplum to refer only to the latter, reserving similitude (Greek παραβολή) for all other non-historical comparisons (Inst. or. 5.11.1). Quintilian, however, allows for both historical and poetic fable to serve in the rhetorical category of exempla (Inst. or. 5.11.2), but his preference is clearly for historical matters (verae res).

66 For an extended interaction with exempla in Cicero’s rhetorical theory, see Price: 1975: 102–130.

67 To be sure, Price highlights both the positive and negative aspects of Quintilian as a source: “He provides us in V 11 with much valuable information, and, in part due to his eclecticism, much that is difficult to fully comprehend” (1975: 132).

68 See van der Poel (2009: 335); cf. Price (1975: 133). For Quintilian’s subdivision of these categories, see Demoen (1996: 46). On Quintilian’s preference for historical over fictitious exempla, see Price (1975: 191).
Quintilian situates the *exemplum* as a kind of proof. Specifically, he identifies the *exemplum* as an “extraordinarily strong” form of testimony, since it avoids suspicions of bias or prejudice accompanying typical forms of testimony. Finally, like the other Latin handbooks, Quintilian’s treatment of example does not involve its utility for moral instruction or developing an ethos of leadership priorities. In sum, while Cicero and Quintilian may disagree with *Rhet. ad Her.* in terms of the ideal rhetorical function of examples, all three works both advocate the selection and deployment of specifically historical Roman *exempla* and their rhetorical theories largely overlook the potential of *exempla* with respect to moral instruction and socialization.

As we now close the rhetorical handbooks and direct our attention to the broader discourse of exemplarity in the late Republic and early Empire, we will notice a very different preferred use of Rome’s native heroes and notable citizens, namely, we will see such *exempla* again and again deployed as pedagogical vehicles for the inculcation of virtue.

II.C. The Broader Discourse of Exemplarity

In a pioneering article written a century ago, Henry Litchfield looked beyond the narrow confines of formal rhetoric and traced the Roman employment of examples in the

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69 In this category, his *Institutio* divides *exempla* into 1) *exempla similia*, 2) *exempla dissimilia*, and 3) *exempla contraria*. See Demoen (1996: 41) and Price (1975: 171–172) for detailed treatments of Quintilian’s taxonomy.


71 For a further discussion of the various prescriptions for the formal rhetorical use of *exempla* in the extant *progymnasmata*, see Cosby (1988: 93–105). Cosby surveys Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero’s works on rhetoric, as well as Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria*. 
service of morality more broadly. Though a number of scholars have effectively investigated the broader social impact and significance of rhetorical training and practice, it has only been in the last decade or so that recent projects have seriously taken up Litchfield’s interest in the nexus specifically between exempla and ethics. In his groundbreaking 2004 article exploring the Roman habit of mining the past for behavioral models, “Exemplarity in Roman Culture: The Cases of Horatius Cocles and Cloelia”, Matthew Roller reaches beyond the study of exempla in Roman rhetorical handbooks, and outlines the main features of what he calls “‘exemplary’ discourse in Roman culture” (2004: 4).

Roller’s cogent and well-supported outline of this discourse will provide an invaluable heuristic framework as I turn in subsequent chapters to my ultimate line of inquiry in this dissertation, namely, the way in which exemplary figures are deployed in the service of creating, communicating, and maintaining a particular vision (or various visions) of honorable leadership. Thus, before closing this chapter with an examination of various “popular” venues for the deployment of exempla in Roman culture, I will first

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72 In addition to providing an extensive catalogue of exempla in Roman literature, Litchfield articulates his task as investigating “…some of the influences which led to the closing of what is, therefore, virtually an exemplary canon” (1914: 24).

73 For example, Cameron (1991); Brown (1992); Gleason (1995) undertake studies exploring the social significance and impact of broadly shared rhetorical practices in the ancient and late antique Mediterranean world. Cameron articulates well the more robust conceptualization of “rhetoric” that forms the basis of her study: “Finally, a problem with the word ‘rhetoric,’ for I do not (obviously) use it in its technical sense, but rather in the current, far looser sense it seems to have acquired, by which it can mean something like ‘characteristic means or ways of expression’; these modes may be either oral or written, or indeed may pertain to the visual or to any other means of communication” (1991: 13).

74 As mentioned in the introduction, Roller’s initial piece has been followed up with several articles. Roller claims to stand on the pioneering shoulders of Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, who initiated an approach to the study of Roman exemplary discourse that brought “…discrete cultural phenomena, such as the ‘theatricality’ of Roman society or the ‘messages’ of images, into focus as part of a larger whole” (2004: 9); cf. Hölkeskamp (1996).
carefully outline Roller’s framework and make a few comments with respect to its deployment among both elites and non-elites.

His outline of the interacting cultural phenomena which collectively constitute this discourse of exemplarity, and which are omnipresent in our extant Roman textual and material evidence includes four components: 1) actions, 2) audiences, 3) commemoration, and 4) imitation. The *action* of a narrative or visual depiction is “…held to be consequential for the Roman community at large” and is “…regarded as embodying (or conspicuously failing to embody) crucial social values.” The primary *audience* observing the action in the narrative “…place it in a suitable ethical category…and judge it ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in that category.” The *commemoration* of the deed, its communal effects, and its primary spectator evaluation can appear in the form of anything from a narrative, a statue, or even a scar. Such commemoration is designed to encourage secondary audiences to “…form their own judgments in full knowledge of what the primary audience thought.”

Perhaps most significantly for my present interest in Roman moral education and socialization, Roller distinguishes the implicit (or often explicit) mandate for *imitation*. He summarizes this mimetic aspect as follows: “…any spectator…whether primary or secondary, is enjoined to strive to replicate or to surpass the deed himself, to win similar renown and related social capital.” In short, understanding this discourse linking “…actions, audiences, values, and memory,” according to Roller, “…exposes what

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76 In a more recent elaboration of this model, Roller clarifies that such action is generally “…before members or representatives of the Roman community, which consists of those who share a particular set of practices, orientations, and values (i.e., the *mos maiorum*)” (2009: 216).

77 For each structural element described below, see Roller (2004: 4–5).
Romans from the late Republic onward took to be the normal or normative way in which social values were established and instilled, deeds were done and evaluated accordingly, and social reproduction occurred” (2004: 6). In terms of imitation, Roller explains that the ultimate goal of those participating in this discourse was not only to imitate a past action, but to strive to outdo it. In sum, according to Roller, “…looping through its four operations, then, exemplary discourse produces and reproduces the actors, deeds, judging audiences, monuments, and values that collectively constitute this way of knowing self and past in relation to one another” (2009: 217).

To be clear, Roller’s schema outlines one of the—if not the—preferred pedagogical vehicles in which individuals and communities in the Roman Empire advertized their particular moral ideals—including those ideals associated with leadership. That is, Roller is not necessarily describing the moral content exemplified by particular heroic figures; rather, his model outlines the form or delivery system favored by many or even most inhabitants of the ancient Roman world. More broadly, Roller’s schema examines the way in which ancient Mediterranean individuals and groups thought through, debated, digested, and deployed their own past in the service of a particular moral curriculum—a curriculum that could, and often was, based on

78 Looking at the case of Horatius Cocles, for example, Roller notes: “Although Horatius stands in the tradition as one of the earliest Roman military heroes, exemplary discourse does not permit his deed to be a first. In fact, several accounts identify models that he could be regarded as imitating and striving to surpass” (2004: 23).

79 Another important issue explored in Roller’s work on exemplary discourse deals with the different functional modes an example can take, namely, the illustrative and the injunctive. An example functioning illustratively “...is, or purports to be, an utterly typical instance of a series of similar objects, a ‘one among many.’” An example used as an injunctive, on the other hand, “...is singled out as distinctive, as crucially unlike other objects, especially in its ethical import (that is, uniquely good or bad), [and so demands]...that other objects should be like or unlike this one” (2004: 52).
dramatically different contents and assumptions from author to author.Commenting on the potential the discourse has for communicating very diverse and even contradictory moral ideals from very different points of view, Roller argues, “far from undermining the ethical cogency of the exemplum, these ubiquitous opportunities for debate and contestation are the lifeblood of exemplary discourse-this is how every example can be made anew, or deployed in a novel way, to meet the requirements of any new contingency” (2004: 7).

Furthermore, Roller notes that exemplary discourse attracted “...the populus Romanus at large, not just elites” (2004: 6). Thus, examining the various performances of this discourse in even Roman literature could provide at least a partial window into the pedagogical techniques of individuals and groups operating below the elite segments of Roman society. In her excellent study of popular morality in the early Roman Empire, in fact, Teresa Morgan includes the exemplum in her exploration of four genres—including proverbs, fables, and gnomai—which “…are as widely distributed across our written remains as it is possible to be” (2007: 5), and serve as “vehicles for popular morality.” Indeed, Skidmore highlights both the popular participation in exemplary

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80 Roller summarizes the flexibility and instability of this discourse: “while this (simplified) scheme may leave the impression of monolithic, seamless coherence, in fact the production of exemplary discourse is beset at every turn by instabilities, contradictions, and contestation. An action may be evaluated positively in one ethical category, but negatively in another; or perhaps different aspects of an action carry divergent value” (2004: 7).

81 In the burgeoning post-colonial historiographical interest in these grossly underrepresented non-elite segments of society, the problem of dearth of evidence has been paramount. Nicholas Horsfall in an earlier article (1996) and now a monograph (2003) has attempted to bridge this evidence gap by investigating broadly “popular” forms and forums for the transmission and convergence of elite and non-elite values and manners—including popular music, spectacle entertainments, and other broadly shared forms of education. Other scholars, especially those focused on the ludi and munera have taken up similar lines of inquiry. For a few examples, see Futrell (1997); Wiedemann (1992); and Toner (1995).

82 Morgan (2007: 6). Morgan combats the scholarly “oversimplification” considering exempla as elitist, arguing instead that “…the association of exempla with oratory is only part of the story…there is no reason
discourse as well as the potential for deploying socio-economically diverse exempla. 83

The socially inclusive element of the discourse will become very important as we turn in subsequent chapters to the largely sub-elite literature deploying the figure of Christ as an exemplum of leadership. With this in mind, I will conclude this chapter with a closer look at a few social and literary mediums for the broad dissemination and often popular consumption of exempla and exemplarity.

**II.D. Venues for the Deployment of Exempla in Roman Society and Culture**

My specific focus will presently be on five social and cultural sites in the Roman world that were well-suited for the deployment of exempla virtutis on both an elite and popular level. These venues, investigated here in no necessary order, include 1) education proper, 2) the display of imagines (waxen masks of deceased magistrates), 3) orations (especially funerary laudationes), 4) architecture and inscriptions, and 5) historiography. The degree to which one particular genre or institution likely favored a more elite or popular audience will, of course, vary. Throughout my investigation, I will attempt to trace this dynamic. My overarching aim in this section is to further illustrate the plausibility of Matthew Roller’s contention that “[e]xemplary discourse, then,

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83 “This aristocratic belief in education by examples, while originally confined to a small elite of the Roman population, in time became widespread among less exalted sections of society...whereas originally only an aristocrat’s ancestors were used as examples, later other Romans, then Greeks, and eventually men of all nations and status are being used to inspire imitation” (Skidmore 1996: 18).
encompasses all of Roman society, from the loftiest aristocrats to the humblest peasants, laborers, and slaves” (2004: 6).

**II.D.1. Roman Education**

The distinction between “Greek/Hellenistic” education and its “Roman” counterpart has been a subject of debate in modern scholarship. In his classic exploration of education in antiquity, Henri-Irénée Marrou sees very little difference between the two. Tracing the process of Greek influence on Roman education from newly-founded Rome’s interaction with Cumae (8th cent BCE), the Greek-influenced Etruscans, and Campania (Hellenized very early on), Marrou situates the key era of Greek influence between 214–132 BCE. It was then that Rome began greatly extending its empire to include Macedonia, Greece, and Pergamum.⁸⁴ After this, Marrou argues, both Greek language and culture gained hegemony in elite circles, in particular.⁸⁵ The balance of his treatment of Roman education, consequently, presents an essentially Greek system of education wherein “…the distinctive contribution made by Roman sensibility, the Roman character and the Roman tradition, only appear as slight alterations of detail” (1982: 242).⁸⁶

Recently, however, Anthony Corbeill has challenged Marrou’s largely unquestioned assumptions, arguing “…that the Romans of the Republic did not so much adopt the Hellenistic model of education as naturalize it, absorbing the attractive aspects into their own developing society while discarding those less pleasing” (2001: 261–262).

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⁸⁶ Such Roman “alterations” include little more than the Roman dislike of Greek athletics—especially the requisite nudity associated with Greek sport (1982: 248–249).
In his argument, Corbeill reviews several of its typical elements—including sympotic poetry, grammar and rhetoric, law, military training, and hunting—and concludes,

...the Romans appropriate Greek custom to enrich their educational practice, creating in the process something uniquely, if somewhat paradoxically, Roman. Without having what one might strictly call an educational system, the Romans used educational circumstances to reproduce social hierarchies within their own society (2001: 282).

In light of my project’s more narrow focus, the present discussion of Roman education will forego presenting the successive stages of a “traditional” Roman education, and will instead focus on the role and characteristics of exempla in Roman pedagogy.

In the early first century C.E., Valerius Maximus described what he understood to be a characteristically Roman instructional venue—the dinner table. Valerius celebrates how the elders would there “...recite poems to the flute on the noble deeds of their forbears to make the young more eager to imitate them” (2.1.9). His praise continues:

What more splendid and more useful too than this contest? Youth gave appropriate honour to grey hairs, age that had travelled the course of manhood attended those entering on active life with fostering encouragement. What Athens, what school of philosophy, what alien-born studies should I prefer to this domestic discipline?

As this quote suggests, the favored material reviewed in these sympotic “classrooms” consisted primarily of anecdotes of native Roman ancestors. Instruction in Rome’s ancestral tradition was not limited to the dinner table, however, but extended to almost every aspect of Roman pedagogy. Though he sees very little difference between Roman

87 For such an outline, see Marrou’s detailed, albeit perhaps overly-reified, presentation of an elite Roman education (1982: 230–277).

88 While they do not review it in detail, both Morgan and Kornhardt underscore the fundamental role exempla played in Roman education. Morgan, for her part states, “[t]here is also evidence that exempla were used in education, not only rhetorical education but also at a more elementary level” (2007: 129), and Kornhardt, decades earlier, likewise suggests that, the exemplum played a significant role in Roman education (1935: 26).

89 Val. Max. 2.1.9–10.
education and its Greek predecessor, Marrou does note the distinctively Roman fixation on imbuing the young with a morality anchored in Rome’s historical past:

Its fundamental idea, the thing it was based on, was respect for the old customs—*mos maiorum*—and to open the eyes of the young to these, to get them to respect them unquestionably as the ideal, as the standard for all their actions and all their thoughts, was the educator’s main task (1982: 232).

Roman pupils were not only encouraged to emulate great Romans of the past, however, but were also expected to look to the living and breathing example of their instructors. For most Romans, whether elite or otherwise, the idea educator was the father.\(^90\) In an illuminating passage worthy of extended quotation, Pliny the Younger affirms the central role of paternal exemplarity in an ideal education:

In ancient times it was the recognized custom for us to learn from our elders by watching their behavior as well as listening to their advice, thus acquiring the principles on which to act subsequently ourselves and to hand on in our turn to our juniors. Hence young men began their early training with military service, so that they might grow accustomed to command by obeying, and learn now to lead by following others; hence as candidates for office they stood at the door of the Senate house and watched the course of State councils before taking part in them. Everyone had a teacher in his own father, or, if he was fatherless, in some older man of distinction who took his father’s place. Thus men learned by example (the surest method of instruction).\(^91\)

In Pseudo–Plutarch’s *De Liberis Educandis*, moreover, the author stresses that even wealthy fathers able to hire instructors should always maintain a personal hand in their child’s training.\(^92\) In her exploration of Cicero’s use of *exempla*, Van der Blom notes a similar “element of exemplarity” in Cicero’s writing and personal instruction to his son—instruction I will look at more closely in the next chapter (2010: 29). Likewise, Plutarch

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\(^90\) See Marrou (1982: 232).


depicts Cato the Censor personally educating and modeling for his son (Cat. Mai. 20), and Juvenal goes so far as to blame what he saw as the degradation of Rome on fathers neglecting their obligations to train and provide examples for their sons (Sat. 14.31ff). In short, whatever forms Roman education may have taken over time and from situation to situation, it remained a venue whereby youth were trained, preferably by a paternal figure, “...through replication by example” (Corbeill 2001: 282).

II.D.2. Imagines in Roman Culture

Another prominent, and distinctively Roman, means of deploying exempla virtutis in antiquity was the display of ancestral waxen masks called imagines. Sallust, writing in the first century B.C.E., celebrates the impact these monuments had on the socialization and moral formation of prominent Romans:

I have often heard that Quintus Maximus, Publius Scipio and other illustrious citizens of our state, used to say that the sight of their ancestors’ portrait-masks fired their hearts with an ardent desire to merit honour. Obviously they did not mean that the actual mould of wax had such power over them, but that the memory of what others have accomplished kindles in the breasts of noble men a flame that is not quenched until their own prowess has won similar glory and renown. These realistic waxen masks, first mentioned in Plautus and unique to the Romans, were reserved for display by the family of a deceased relative who had held at least the office of aedile. In addition to serving as status symbols for an elite family—similar to lictors or

93 See Kornhardt (1935: 31).
fasces—these ancestral masks functioned as powerful exempla to both elite and more popular audiences.96

As the above comment by Sallust suggests, the enduring vision of one’s accomplished ancestors had a profound mimetic effect.97 Marrou articulates this process well: “…unconsciously at first, but very consciously later on, he was induced to model his outlook and behavior on a certain ideal which was, so to speak, the hallmark of his family” (1982: 235). Kornhardt, furthermore, notes the early age at which such mimetic desires were likely stimulated: “…man muss sich vorstellen, dass die Kinder, wie sie das Lesen an den Unterschriften der Imagines lernten, auch schon im frühesten Alter mit den Exempla ihres Hauses vertraut gemacht wurden” (1935: 16).98 These imagines were so popular that, as Clive Skidmore observes, “…by the time of Valerius Maximus, this term had become a virtual synonym for historical examples” (1996: 25). So much for the exemplary role these imagines held in the lives of elite Romans; what impact did these waxen masks have on less privileged segments of the population? In answering this question, I will examine two venues for popular exposure to these value-laden masks, namely, the daily salutatio, and elite public funerals.

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96 For a discussion of imagines as status symbols, see Flower (1996: 9–10). In her book, Flower thoroughly explores the social context and function of the imagines.

97 Flower suggests that the use of imagines emerged shortly after the conflict of the orders (1996: 59).

98 With respect to the imagines and their underlying inscriptions, Flower observes, “[t]he imagines and their tituli kept alive the traditional catalogue of aristocratic virtues…Naturally this created special pressure on the young, for whom the imagines served as didactic reminders while they were growing up. From their earliest youth their ancestors, as represented by the imagines in the atrium, were a part of everyday life, conditioning their self-esteem and expectations, as well as how others treated and viewed them” (1996: 220–221).
Though *imagines* were the exclusive privilege of the elite, their emotional and pedagogical impact was certainly not limited to that class. Flower notes their general accessibility to a broader audience:

A full understanding of the function of *imagines* depends on an appreciation of their most usual role, when displayed in their cupboards in the *atrium* as an integral part of life in the house both for the family and for any visitor, however humble (1996: 186).

During morning hours in the late Republic, when such *atria* featured more prominently, clients, slaves, and other dependents would traditionally call on their aristocratic patrons, gathering in the *atrium* for the daily *salutatio* (morning greeting). In this “most accessible room in an elite Roman town house,” the elite virtues exemplified by the ancestral images and described in the *tituli* were regularly advertized to, if not digested by, such sub-elite clients. While these morning greetings exposed a connected, albeit limited, portion of the *populus* to the exemplary function of *imagines*, the public funerals put on by elite families paraded the ancestors before increasing numbers of non-elites.

In their efforts to climb the *cursus honorum*, aristocratic Romans had a strong political need to foster the admiration of those voting in elections. Yet, as Flower indicates, politically ambitious families had reason to advertize to even humble audiences lacking direct electoral influence. She explains: “Crowds of humble supporters gave the impression of popularity for a candidate. The support of such ordinary citizens had an

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99 According to Flower, “[b]y the high Empire the *atrium* could be omitted completely or become no more than a passageway leading into the grander parts of the house. Such houses may often have been designed for a new class of wealthy patron without the family background to justify the maintenance of an aristocratic *atrium*” (1996: 193). Without commenting on the use or neglect of the *atrium*, Richard Saller, in his study of Roman Patronage, suggests that such *salutatones* continued during the early Empire, and were still delivered to elites—including those outside of the Imperial family. See also, Saller (1982: 128).

100 Flower (1996: 188).

important symbolic role to play even when they were not actually able to cast a decisive vote for their chosen candidate” (1996: 68). The aristocratic funeral, with its pageantry, emotional appeal, and entertainment value, was a powerful platform from which to coax such popular support.

Elite funerals, which took place during the day, began with a procession starting at the home of the deceased and continuing to the Forum. Very different from many funerals in the modern west, the elite Roman processions typically involved music, dancing, professional mourners, and, most significantly for our present study, actors and relatives wearing *imagines* and taking on the persona of deceased ancestors. Regarding the latter element of these conspicuous displays, Flower explains, “The primary use of the *imagines*...was to allow the ancestors to be represented as living and breathing Roman magistrates at the height of their careers, who had reappeared in the city to accompany their newly-dead descendant on his last journey” (1996: 91). By the end of the Republic, these funerals had become a regular fixture of public life and a primary source for popular history.

In a celebrated account in his *Histories*, Polybius reflects on the socially potent pedagogical role of the *imagines* in an aristocratic Roman funeral:

...when any distinguished member of the family dies they take them [the ancestral masks] to the funeral, putting them on men who seem to them to bear the closest resemblance to the original in stature and carriage. These representatives wear togas, with purple border if the deceased was a consul or praetor, whole purple if he was a censor, and embroidered with

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102 Flower notes the scheduling contrast between elite and non-elite funerals: “The public nature of elite funerals is further emphasized by their taking place during the day in contrast to the funerals of the poor and of children which took place at night. Paupers or slaves were probably buried more conveniently at night, a time when their friends and family might be able to attend” (1996: 97).


gold if he had celebrated a triumph or achieved anything similar. They all ride in chariots preceded by the fasces, axes, and other insignia by which the different magistrates are wont to be accompanied according to the respective dignity of the offices of state held by each during his life; and when they arrive at the rostra they all seat themselves in a row on ivory chairs. There could not easily be a more ennobling spectacle for a young man who aspires to fame (φιλοδοξοῖ) and virtue (φιλαγάθω). For who would not be inspired by the sight of the images of men renowned for their excellence (μεγετή), all together and as if alive and breathing? What spectacle could be more glorious than this?  

Here, Polybius does not discuss the exemplarity of the imaginines as of secondary importance in Roman society, but he attributes Rome’s entire excellence in bodily strength (σωματικῆς ῥώμης) and personal courage (φυσικῶς τόλμας) to their pedagogical deployment. Furthermore, with respect to the moral message articulated by this funerary display, Flower maintains that it was “…not crude or strident, but a complex and sophisticated reaffirmation of the whole range of Roman values and of the leading families as prime exponents of those values” (1996: 11). With the rise of the princeps and the end of the republic, this powerful pedagogical and political venue did not disappear, but rather “…flourished after taking on a new role in justifying the power of one man and his family with the state” (1996: 257). In short, whether put on by a republican noble or Roman emperor, with the central role of the imaginines, these funerals became more

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106 Poly. Hist. 6.52. See also Roller (2004: 1).

107 Her thorough study later notes the appropriation and elaboration of these funeral spectacles by subsequent emperors (1996: 104–105, 223–224, and 242–256). On this appropriation, Flower concludes, “Changes in electoral practices and the growing influence of the princeps removed much of the basic function of imaginines as advertisements aimed directly at the electors. Nevertheless, their long and venerable history during the Republic and their place in the iconography developed by Augustus himself assured that the imaginines did not quickly become obsolete.” (1996: 256).
than a family’s opportunity to grieve or a politician’s ploy to assuredly garner votes; they became “pageant[s] of Rome’s history” accessible to even the most humble citizen.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{II.D.3. Popular Oratory and Exemplarity}

Another possible forum for popular exposure to exempla and exemplary discourse is that of oratory. After looking at popular oratory and exemplarity in general, I will transition to a consideration of funeral orations (\textit{laudationes}) more specifically. Along the way, I will seek to establish both the socially diverse audiences consuming these public speeches as well as the pedagogical function of orations.

Without question, in the ancient Roman world, a skilled orator had no trouble gathering a crowd. In her erudite study of rhetoric, deportment, and masculinity in the second sophistic, Maud Gleason underlines the exhilarating draw of public rhetoric:

the form of competitive masculine activity that proved most electrifying as a spectator sport was rhetoric. For the audience, its appeal was the spectacle of peak performance under dangerous conditions, with the risk falling exclusively on the performers while they, as the spectators, punished failure with ridicule. Indeed, a rhetorical performance, whether triumph or fiasco, was in some sense a collaboration between speaker and audience, and the educated audience relished being the ultimate arbiter of success (1995: 159).\textsuperscript{109}

George Kennedy summarizes well the growing esteem skilled orators were likely to enjoy:

\textsuperscript{108}See Flower (1996: 127).

\textsuperscript{109}Morgan likewise notes the expansive popularity of oratory: “Oratory of all kinds was delivered to mass audiences in lawcourts, public assemblies and town councils. During the Principate, epideictic oratory, delivered on behalf of a town in honour of visiting dignitaries, to honour local benefactors and politicians, or to mark a special occasion of almost any kind, by rhetors who were often paid by cities or emperors themselves to practice and teach their skill, was a prime form of public entertainment. In at least some places and times, it was common for the works of historians to be publically read and honoured in their native or adopted towns. Even philosophers could become local celebrities” (2007: 4).
The most famous sophists traveled widely, giving demonstrations of their skill in theaters or at religious festivals; became friends with powerful Romans, including emperors; and acquired a fame comparable to that of movie stars, athletes, and musical performers today (1994: 231).\(^{110}\)

While these figures and their displays were popular throughout the empire, they held particular currency in the Greek East.\(^{111}\) There, and Asia Minor specially, the most famous sophists—such as Favorinus of Arles and Polemo of Laodicea, the subjects of Gleason’s study—became local celebrities and set up their rhetorical schools.\(^{112}\)

These captivating spectacles were much more than mere idle diversions, however; popular public speeches had a clear pedagogical role. While viewing these displays of deportment and eloquence, popular audiences were taught, albeit unsystematically, “...something of how public life worked, a bit of geography, and a lot of history” (Horsfall 1996: 116).\(^{113}\) The curricula of public oratory also included strong moral content communicated, largely, in the form of *exempla*. Referring to increasingly popular epideictic rhetoric, Cameron notes the “...repeated allusions to stock examples (historical figures, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ emperors, kingly figures like Cyrus and Alexander), stock virtues, and stock themes” saturating its performance (1991: 84).\(^{114}\)

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\(^{110}\) He also indicates an additional venue for the consumption of rhetorical exhibitions: “The usual setting of declamation was a rhetorical school that was open, at least on certain days, to visitors. The teacher gave an exhibition of his own skill, often with some introductory explanation of the treatment of the case he was going to adopt, and others were welcome to join in” (1994: 168).

\(^{111}\) Cameron (1991: 79).

\(^{112}\) Kennedy (1994: 231).


\(^{114}\) In his examination of *exempla* in the four surviving collections of declamations (Seneca rhetor’s *Controversiae et Susoriae*, pseudo-Quintilian’s *Declamiones maiores* and *Declamiones minores*, and finally Calpurnius Flaccus’ *Declamationum excerpta*) Marc van der Poel notes “...[t]he *exempla* used by the declaimers are mostly Roman heroes who were well-known to the Roman audience” (2009: 337).
One form of rhetoric in particular, *laudationes* (funerary orations), was regularly performed before large and socially diverse audiences and centered on the celebration of native Roman *exempla*. Like the use of *imagines*, this form of speech emerged from the conflict of orders and was typically delivered by the adolescent son of the deceased.\(^{115}\) Performed from the *rostra* as the climax of a funerary procession (discussed above), these speeches were replete with *exempla*. Before the orator even began, the audience would already have been impressed with the “deceased ancestors” (that is, actors and relatives wearing ancestral *imagines*) seated conspicuously and chronologically on ivory chairs behind the speaker.\(^{116}\)

In terms of the content of these native—and somewhat rigid—Roman speeches, they seem to have mainly recounted “...a list of the accomplishments and virtues of the deceased and the deceased’s ancestors” (Kennedy 1994: 106).\(^{117}\) Polybius describes the traditional format of these speeches as well as their moral and emotional impact:

> Whenever any illustrious man dies, he is carried at his funeral into the forum to the so-called rostra, sometimes conspicuous in an upright posture and more rarely reclined. Here with all the people standing round, a grown-up son, if he has left one who happens to be present, or if not some other relative mounts the rostra and discourses on the virtues and successful achievements of the dead. As a consequence the multitude and not only those who had a part in these achievements, but those also who had none, when the facts are recalled to their minds and brought before their eyes, are moved to such sympathy that the loss seems to be not confined to the mourners, but a public one affecting the whole people.\(^{118}\)


\(^{117}\) Also, Flower (1996: 130).

\(^{118}\) Poly. Hist. 6.53.
Again, according to Polybius, the ultimate goal of these events is not provoking sorrow in the audience, but through the description of the exemplary ancestors, “...to turn out men who will be ready to endure (ὑπομένειν) everything in order to gain a reputation in their country for valour” (Hist. 6.52). In sum, whether at rhetorical exhibitions or laudationes, elites and non-elites alike frequently and voluntarily encountered exempla virtutis.

II.D.4. Architecture, Statues, and Inscriptions

Not only were socially diverse audiences audibly exposed to the exemplary deeds of noble Roman ancestors, but they visually encountered them in the statues and inscriptions throughout the Roman Empire. As Marc van der Poel observes, “...the memory of famous deeds and persons was present literally everywhere in the form of inscriptions on statues and buildings” (2009: 333). Though much could be said about the Roman erection of statues and inscriptions, I will only briefly introduce their role with respect to exemplarity before focusing on one particularly notable case of the exemplary use of such statues and inscriptions—namely, the Forum Augustum.

Regarding statues and inscriptions in general, in his exploration of traditional Roman uses of the past in the service of cultural maintenance, Tonio Hölscher identifies the way in which historical monuments, beginning to flourish during the first years of major Roman expansion (4th–3rd centuries B.C.E.), contributed to the construction and

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119 On the exemplarity inherent in the laudationes, see also van der Poel: 2009: 333; Skidmore: 1996: 17; and Kornhardt: 1936: 19. These speeches remained popular even in the empire. Flower describes: “For Augustus funeral oratory was a useful medium for presenting his ideas to a wide audience in a magnificent setting” (1996: 238).
maintenance of value systems due to their visibility and durable materials. Honorary public portraits (Ehrenbildnisse), for example, served far more than aesthetic purposes or a family’s electoral ambitions; these conspicuous depictions of celebrated statesmen advertized particular virtues, including *virtus*, *sapientia*, *pietas* and other cherished Roman ideals. Maud Gleason, for example recalls the Corinthians’ erection of a library-adjacent monument commemorating the famed Sophist Favorinus so as “...to inspire young men to diligence in literary pursuits” (1995: 10). Though such statues were almost exclusively erected by noble families and thus communicated what might be considered “elite” values, as Matthew Roller notes, given their conspicuous nature, the statues “...could collect the most eyes, from the widest range of Romans of every age, sex, and status” (2004: 20).

Looking at the case of Cloelia, a popular female *exemplum* who performed feats of bravery during the earliest years of the Republic, Roller more specifically articulates the way in which their honorary statues participated in the Roman discourse of exemplarity. Not only do these monuments “construct secondary audiences” for great deeds and advertize important social priorities, but, like Cloelia’s equestrian statue located “...in a ‘very crowded’ spot on the Sacred Way,” these statues of noble ancestors are “...imagined to be alive and sensible” to all the activities going on around them, where they can “...see and judge everything that occurs in the Forum” (2004: 37). Thus,


122 Commenting on the oration *Praise of Corinth*, Gleason notes: Indeed, the speaker concludes, there should be statues of Favorinus everywhere! (*Praise of Corinth* 26) The gods have equipped him for this very purpose: ‘to show the Greeks of Hellas that education can produce the same results as birth, to show the Romans, so freighted with their own dignity, not to neglect its enhancement by education, and to show the Celts that not even barbarians need despair of Hellenic culture when they look at his example’ (1995: 16).
not only do the monuments commemorate noble actions and create secondary audiences, but they encourage imitation by deploying the commemorated ancestors as themselves judging audiences able to dole out honor or shame.

A superlative example of the use of statues, inscriptions, and architecture to teach ancestral virtue is Augustus’ forum. The *Forum Augustum*, vowed by Octavius after the battle of Philippi in 42 B.C.E. and dedicated by the then *princeps* in 2 B.C.E., featured a grand temple to Mars Ultor, a central statue of Augustus on a triumphal chariot, and among the colorful displays of marble and architectural beauty, showcased a veritable “...Hall of Fame of distinguished Roman ancestors and statesmen, beginning with Aeneas and Romulus” (see Galinsky 1996: 198–203).123 This glorious complex possessed particular potential with respect to advertising *exempla virtutis* since it was a setting for daily life rather than a mere museum or sacred space solely reserved for ritual. In addition to being a place for business meetings and daily gatherings, Glainski notes that the Forum was even used at times for games, including beast hunts and horse races.124 The influence of this conspicuous display of ancestral heroes, moreover, was not limited to the population living in Rome, but was exerted over the provinces as well. Flower explains: “[t]he impact of this ‘series’ of Roman statesmen can be gauged from the fact that some or all were reproduced in various provincial towns, from whose inscriptions the *elogia* of the forum itself have been reconstructed” (1996: 229).

Aside from the ostensible purpose of the *Forum Augustum*—namely, the pious fulfillment of an oath to Mars Ultor—the complex served several agendas. Politically,

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123  Pliny considered it as one of the most magnificent architectural displays in the known world (*H.N.* 36.101–102).

Galinsky notes its aim “…to convey the idea of the imperium Romanum, if not Augustum, its conquests, and might” (1996: 199). Culturally, the compound can be read as a systematic presentation of Augustus’ vision for a new Roman order centrally featuring himself as leading citizen.\textsuperscript{125} Most interesting for the present study of popular participation in Roman exemplarity, however, are the pedagogical and moral purposes of Forum’s depiction of Roman ancestors.\textsuperscript{126}

In the latter regard, Augustus’ architectural and statuary presentation drew heavily upon the pedagogically efficacious imagines.\textsuperscript{127} Flower argues that the forum “…effectively served as the public atrium of the Julii and as the setting for Roman foreign policy as it was presented to official visitors to the city. Like an atrium in a house it was closely connected with the display of spoils and the memory of past triumphs” (1996: 228). More explicitly, in a dedicatory edict, Augustus explains the forum’s purpose, namely, to provide exempla by which the citizens of the Empire could judge his own rule.\textsuperscript{128} Thus, these heroes were not just paragons of leadership for the populus or even for aristocratic Romans; they were models for his own rule and that of the principes of future generations—models which he, of course, “left little doubt about his aim to overshadow…in merit, and hence in auctoritas” (Flower 1996: 232).\textsuperscript{129}


\textsuperscript{126} The layout of these heroes featured Aeneas and Romulus in central niches on alternate sides of the Temple, followed by scores of honorees proudly displayed with tituli underneath describing the offices and accomplishments of each figure (Flower 1996: 234). We know of twenty-seven of the original heroes. Most were chosen for military feats, while others were praised for their civilian virtues (Galinsky 1996: 206).

\textsuperscript{127} On the utility of imagines for moral instruction, see my discussion of the ancestral masks above.

\textsuperscript{128} Suet. Aug. 31.5.

\textsuperscript{129} Also, Galinsky (1996: 204).
II.D.5. Exemplarity in Roman Historiography

I will close the present examination of select venues for the broadcast historical exempla virtutis with a consideration of exemplarity in the Roman writing of history. In his study of the historians of ancient Rome, Ronald Mellor introduces well the ethical dimension of Roman historiography: “Roman historical writing must, therefore, do more than tell pleasant stories; it must make moral judgments. While Greeks had used philosophy to discuss the moral dimension of political issues, the Romans used history” (2004: 1). Even a cursory survey of the historiographic reflections of authors from the late Republic and early Empire quickly confirms Mellor’s observation.

In the preface to his celebrated Ad Urbe Condita, the Augustan era historian Livy, dismissing as of small importance the confirmation or denial of the veracity of poetic accounts describing Rome’s foundation, underscores the true focus of his work: “The subjects to which I would ask each of my readers to devote his earnest attention are these-the life and morals of the community; the men and the qualities by which through domestic policy and foreign war dominion was won and extended.” He then articulates the utility of this focus:

“There is this exceptionally beneficial and fruitful advantage to be derived from the study of the past, that you see, set in the clear light of historical truth, examples of every possible type. From these you may select for yourself and your country what to imitate, and also what, as being mischievous in its inception and disastrous in its issues, you are to avoid” (praef.).

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130 Skidmore traces the idea of history as a primary source for moral guidance to the famous 5th–4th century Greek rhetorician, Isocrates (1996: 8).

Cicero describes the moral task of history as “...the witness of the past, the light shed on truth, the life-giving force to memory, [and] the guide to life (magistra vitae).”\(^{132}\)

Plutarch ascribes similar historiographic presuppositions to Cato the Elder, as the latter trains his son in virtue (ἀρετή) by ensuring his *Origines* (a history of Rome) is written in large letters so his son can read and learn from historical examples recounted.\(^{133}\) Finally, though examples could be multiplied, Tacitus—without question one of the greatest Roman historians—articulates a similar value in the writing and reading of history—namely, extracting virtuous examples.\(^ {134}\) Mellor summarizes this moral task inherent in Roman historiography:

...by linking the present with the past, history would illuminate the contemporary state of society and provide both moral and practical guidance. Thus a Roman was encouraged to imitate the personal and civic virtues of his ancestors at the family hearth, in the Forum, or on the battlefield. This closely intertwined code of public and private conduct was called the *mos maiorum* – ‘the traditions of our ancestors’ – and formed the core of moral and political education at Rome (1999: 3–4).\(^{135}\)

In terms of the popular consumption of written Roman history, a history in which he maintains the dynamics of exemplarity are “omnipresent,” Matthew Roller argues that although the accounts themselves assume a literate audience with opportunities for leisure, through public recitations and other kinds of performance, the historical accounts

\(^{132}\) *De orat.* 2.9.36. See Leocrates (1964: 300).


\(^{134}\) He noting the depravity of his own age, he qualifies: “Non tamen adeo virtutum sterile saeculum ut non et bona exempla prodiderit.” (*Hist.* 1.3). See also, Poly. *Hist.* 1.35. For an extended list of Roman authors explicating the function of history in terms of exemplarity, see Roller (2009: 217–219).

\(^{135}\) Van der Blom avers: “History had a practical purpose of providing lessons for the present, and historians therefore focused on individuals rather than on abstract concepts or qualities and connections. These concrete actions of the ancestors, these *res gestae*, were turned into moralizing historical exempla, illustrating not only the quality of a particular action but also its position within *mos maiorum* in that each exemplum could be placed on a scale from good to bad” (2010: 14–15).
could be made available to broader audiences. Thus, written with a decidedly moral aim and potentially performed before socially vast audiences, these written histories reflect the Roman preoccupation with exemplarity.

**Conclusion**

In sum, whether woven into the fabric of education, conspicuously displayed in the form of ancestral masks, skillfully deployed in rhetorical performances throughout the Empire, publically commemorated in monuments and inscriptions, or meticulously recorded in written histories, *exempla virtutis* played no small role in the daily lives of elites and non-elites alike. Having introduced the robust role of example in Greek and Roman society and culture—including Roller’s heuristic schema—I next consider the prevailing notions of exemplary leadership in Roman society and culture.

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136 See Roller (2004: 6). In terms of the “omnipresence” of exemplarity in Roman historiography, having surveyed at least nine influential Roman historical writers and works, Roller forcefully concludes: “The dynamics of exemplarity are omnipresent in Roman historiography. One can readily find passage after passage in which reference is made to an action observed by a judging audience, a device for commemorating such action, the establishment of values or norms, or the imitation and emulation of a past action” (2009: 217). In a landmark article, George Nadel traces the relatively recent rise of “historicist” approaches in scholarship, wherein historians began to prioritize a historiographic approach intentionally neglecting *exempla* in favor of uncovering “what really happened” in a period or event. He sees the latter emphasis as only becoming hegemonic in scholarship by the nineteenth century. See Nadel (1964: 291–315).
Chapter 2: Notions of Exemplary Leadership in Roman Society and Culture

Anticipating her thorough study of four popular genres in the Roman Empire—including proverbs, fables, gnomai, and exempla—which are “...as widely distributed across our written remains as it is possible to be” (2007: 5), Teresa Morgan asserts, “...the degree of common moral ground between socially and geographically different groups is considerable, and...we can often talk meaningfully of the ethics of the Empire as a whole” (2). But were there widely-shared moral priorities with respect to leaders and leadership? Can one distinguish with any specificity particular “popular” characteristics which typically distinguished good leaders from bad ones in the late Republic and early Empire?

Though we cannot point to a fixed canon of Roman virtues universally appealed to and/or explicitly prescribed in an authoritative text, and while I will not be arguing for

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137 A number of scholars have also posited the existence of a general correspondence between the values held by elites and non-elites—especially with respect to leadership. Flower’s study of imagines presupposes a set of leadership values generally shared by socially diverse individuals. Regarding the “advertising” potential of the ancestor masks, she explains, “[s]uccessful advertizing is most often based on familiar concepts and values, rather than on the completely new or shocking. In turn, advertizing also contributes to a society’s expectations and standards in a subtle way. Its direct and repeated visual messages shape everyday life and have a subconscious effect. Advertizing is especially concerned with name-recognition, and this was certainly a feature of the use of imagines” (1996: 12). Later in her book, Flower explicates how the imagines appealed to these broadly-shared presuppositions about virtuous leadership: “Advertizing played a key role in suggesting that a man had the requisite character, qualities, and background to be a suitable leader” (1996: 68). Andrew Clarke, in his study of leadership priorities in the Pauline communities in light of various models in the Greco-Roman world, identifies the voluntary association as an institution in which “...the urban poor of Graeco-Roman society could exercise influence and a social unit which was small enough for each member of the group to have an identity. It is significant that in these groups honour, privilege and prestige operated in a way which closely paralleled the system which lay at the heart of administration at the civic level” (2000: 60). Though his focus is more narrowly on elite culture in late antiquity, Peter Brown, like Morgan, notes a geographically wide-spread set of cultural values and social codes in his examination of “...the traditional culture of the upper classes...imparted to them through the system of education that went by the name of paideia” (1992: 4). With Brown, Gleason traces elements of “...an empire-wide code of elite deportment” (1995: xxv).
an uncontested set of moral ingredients comprising the paradigmatic Roman leader, a number of general ideal leadership characteristics do emerge in our sources.\textsuperscript{138}

Consulting a broad sample of largely late Republican and early Imperial sources (but at times extending beyond these parameters), the present chapter will outline and illustrate five broadly popular categories of exemplary leadership celebrated in our sources—namely, noble lineage, courage/martial prowess, education and eloquence, generous patronage, and piety toward the divine. With this general polythetic model of ideal “Roman” leadership in place, I will turn my attention to a more focused literary sample. Here I will attempt to demonstrate the presence of these heuristic categories in the work of two Roman biographers (Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch) as well as their presence in \textit{laudationes} (Roman funeral eulogies). This chapter will conclude with a more extended study of Cicero’s advice to his son in \textit{De Officiis}—a work which both provides a helpful emic Roman prescription for an emerging leader’s achievement of honor and liberally deploys Roman leadership \textit{exempla}. In the end, the latter sources should illustrate both the importance of the five categories as well as the fact that, like any more or less hegemonic set of moral or social expectations, they were always up for adaptation, contestation, or exchange by particular authors and communities.

\textsuperscript{138} With respect to a “canon” of Roman virtues, though Henry Litchfield circumscribes a set of \textit{exempla virtutis} drawn upon by Roman “moral” writers, he admits that the popularity of this ill-defined group was due to the literary influence of Ennius and not the existence of an authoritative \textit{exempla} list (1914: 62–64). In a more recent numismatic study of imperial virtues, Noreña concludes: “The personalization of Roman virtues under Augustus did not, however, give rise to any ‘canon’ of imperial virtues, nor did the particular virtues associated with Augustus correspond to any pre-existing canon” (2001: 152). Pedersen, in his study of appointments to public offices in late antiquity, further limits the likelihood of an explicit canon of leadership virtues as he concludes that offices were not filled in accordance with a prospect’s measuring up to such a canon. Instead, he concludes, “[h]igher posts in the administration were generally filled on the basis of rough personal judgments” (1975: 198). My goal in this chapter is to tease out those generally held, and at times hotly debated, leadership ideals that may have informed such “rough personal judgments.”
Whereas my first chapter focused primarily on the rhetorical and pedagogical form of the discourse of exemplarity as well as popular venues for its performance, this section attempts to identify and illustrate a handful of leadership virtues and characteristics that were widely recognized by both elites and non-elites throughout the empire. Put differently, if the former chapter treated the preferred communicative vehicle of the Roman discourse on exemplary leadership, the present study deals with its typical moral freight.

I. Major Categories of Exemplary Leadership in Roman Society and Culture

I.A. Noble Lineage

In the early second century C.E. essay, *De liberis educandis*, the author begins his prescription for the ideal upbringing of elite young boys—the prime candidates for leadership in most ancient institutions—by warning fathers to avoid having children with women of low birth.\(^{139}\) He explains, “...those who are not well-born, whether on the father’s or the mother’s side, have an indelible disgrace in their low birth, which accompanies them throughout their lives, and offers to anyone desiring to use it a ready subject of reproach and insult.”\(^{140}\) The essayist then notes, “[c]hildren of distinguished parents are, of course, correspondingly full of exultation and pride.”\(^{141}\) As these lines suggest, contrary to many of our individualist presuppositions in the modern west, in the

\(^{139}\) In terms of authorship, Edmund Berry summarizes the scholarly consensus: “While this work is almost certainly not from the pen of Plutarch, it may belong roughly to the time of Plutarch” (1958: 387). He further notes the special place *De lib. educ.* has in ancient literature as it is “...the only complete Greek work on education which is extant” (1958: 387). Frank Babbit, in his translation of Plutarch’s *Moralia*, agrees with Berry’s authorial assessment and adds, “...the work reflects general attitudes toward education in the first century Roman World” (1986: 3).

\(^{140}\) Ps. Plut. *De lib. educ.* 1.B.

\(^{141}\) Ps. Plut. *De. lib. educ.* 1.C.
Roman Empire, evaluating an individual’s family line was an important factor in assessing his or her personal character and social worth.

Politically, moreover, possessing an honorable family heritage was also an advantage for any would-be office-holder in the late Republic and early Empire. In their discussion of rank and status in Imperial Roman society, for example, Garnsey and Saller identify “respectable birth” as a prerequisite for each of the three state-recognized orders (senatorial, equestrian, or decurial). They additionally highlight the value Romans placed on lineage as shown in the carefully protected system of Roman nomenclature featuring the *tria nomina*. These titles did more than distinguish Roman citizens from one another or celebrate an individual’s personal achievements, they situated the Roman citizen within his or her larger network of relatives and thus inherited honor.

Furthermore, while honor could certainly be achieved and virtue demonstrated without a noble lineage, parading a distinguished family line could only help a would-be leader find his way into authority. Describing the dynamics of election campaigns, Henriette explains,

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Finally, Martin Goodman expands on the perennial focus on family status among traditional Romans as illustrated in the formal social divisions between patritian and plebean as well as the less formal label of *nobilitas* (2007: 333–334).

143 See Garnsey and Saller (1987: 116–117). To be sure, Benet Salway, in his study of Roman onomastic practice from 700B.C.E. to 700C.E. argues for the more “fluid nature” of Roman naming and illustrates how the practice was susceptible “...not only to linguistic factors but also political and social developments” (1994: 144). Despite such fluidity in application, the fact remains that whether during the Regal period, Republic, or Empire, leadership candidates and prominent families demonstrated their concern for ascribed honor by carefully displaying and protecting their names.

144 Valerius Maximus celebrates a number of famous *exempla* not possessing illustrious family names: He mentions the consul Varro whose father was a butcher (3.4.4), Socrates the son of a midwife (3.4.ext.1), and Demonsthenes whose parents we don’t even know (3.4.ext.2), just to name a few notables without *imagines*. Henriette notes further exceptions to the rule demanding illustrious bloodline: “The most famous *novi* who nevertheless succeeded in becoming consuls were Cato Maior, the successful general C. Marius, and Marcus Tullius Cicero” (2010: 2).
the possession of nobilitas, was one of the main arguments that a candidate could employ because the qualities of a candidate were judged on the basis of the qualities of his forebears and not so much on his possible political programme. Therefore, it was common practice for nobilis politicians to refer to historical exempla, that is, the virtues and achievements of the ancestors, also in political life (2010: 2).  

If a candidate was elected, moreover, it was traditional for his first public speech to address the subject of his ancestors. In short, as Flower concludes, for an aspiring leader in the late Republic and early Empire, “[h]is public image could not be separated from that of his ancestors” (1996: 15).  

The rhetorical requirements for constructing an encomium (a formal speech of praise), moreover, illustrate the fascination with lineage among ancient Mediterranean orators and their audiences. As presented in our extant ancient rhetorical handbooks, the encomium is a central exercise in the progymnasmata—exercises meant to prepare rhetorical students for their own performances. Summarizing well the significance of encomium for the study of ancient Mediterranean culture, Bruce Malina and Jerome Neyrey note:

> [t]his part of the progymnasmata offers us clear access to how elite ancient Mediterraneans perceived and presented persons in their Hellenistic world. The encomium contains concepts of what persons at that time and in that

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145 Illustrating her point with Cicero’s attacks on Mark Antony in the Philippics, Flower outlines the common political debates focused on lineage: “...an opponent from a family of office-holders is attacked on the grounds that he is unworthy of his ancestors, while scorn can safely be heaped on a rival of humble birth” (1996: 150).

146 Political preference for the well-born, moreover, continued well into the imperial period. Goodman provides a telling example: “Emperors who wished to show their respect for the Senate and its traditions tended to contrive that descendants of such prestigious families were favored when it came to the election of the first pair of consuls for each year, in whose name the year’s date was recorded for posterity throughout the Roman world.” (2007: 334).
culture deemed important and essential for portraying human beings according to their cultural conventions and expectations (1996: 23).\footnote{147}

Whether prescribed for classical Athenian funeral orations or much later \textit{encomia} of emperors, one of the featured topics the handbooks call for in these praise speeches is an individual’s \textit{genos}, which should describe his nation, city, ancestors, and parents.\footnote{148}

Thus, the perennial expectation of Mediterranean audiences listening to formal praise of their leaders included a review of those leaders’ noble lineage. Malina and Neyrey succinctly capture this cultural disposition: “To know someone means to know their roots, ancestry, and genealogy. Noble families, moreover, stem from noble soil and live in noble poleis” (1996: 24).\footnote{149}

In addition to \textit{encomia}—a genre I will revisit when I consider other prominent leadership categories below—the unique prominence of \textit{imagines} demonstrates the potent concern for ancestry in Roman politics and society. Given the extended treatment of these ancestral masks provided in the first chapter, my discussion here will be brief. As I noted above, the prominent presence of the \textit{imagines} in the atrium and at funerals had a powerful political impact on clients and guests of all social stripes. Skidmore notes the political potential of these elite entrance halls filled with genealogies, records of ancestral achievement, trophies, and “[m]ost important of all...ancestral images (\textit{imagines})” (1996: 16).

\footnote{147} Discussing the \textit{progymnasmata}, Malina and Neyrey further affirm: “The authors of these documents thus are eminently qualified to be our reliable guides to how Mediterraneans understood and assessed each other, for their writings were considered normative in their own cultures” (1996: 5).


\footnote{149} To support this comment, they cite Aristotle’s \textit{Rhet.} 1.5.5 and Meander Rhetor 2.369.26–370.12; 2.371.5–14. See 1996: 25–26.
If the masks had a political impact on and exemplary role for broader audiences, they certainly impressed more directly-connected audiences. Flower describes formative influence *imagines* had on the moral and psychological development of well-born youth:

The *imagines* and their *tituli* kept alive the traditional catalogue of aristocratic virtues...Naturally this created special pressure on the young, for whom the *imagines* served as didactic reminders while they were growing up. From their earliest youth their ancestors, as represented by the *imagines* in the *atrium*, were a part of everyday life, conditioning their self-esteem and expectations, as well as how others treated and viewed them (1996: 220–221).

Far more than decorative reminders of largely irrelevant figures, the *imagines* powerfully and persistently re-inscribed for young elites the importance of bloodline and their obligation to live up to it.

In his first century C.E. collection of *exempla*, Valerius Maximus regularly notes the enduring virtue associated with noble families. The *Scipiones*, for example are omnipresent in his collection and are consistently evaluated in light of their family name. His accounts also provide a window into the political potency of an honorable family line in Roman elections. Celebrating Fabius Maximus’ moderation he recalls the latter’s charge to the electorate to “give the Fabian clan a holiday from the office”, since his family had consistently enjoyed the consulship for generations. Valerius then marvels at this great act of moderation because it was able to overcome “...even paternal affection, which is accounted the most powerful of all” (4.1.5). Without question, for Valerius

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150 I will explore Valerius’ portrayal of this family more in chapter 3.
Maximus and his contemporaries an honorable lineage was an invaluable political commodity and a potent source of personal motivation.  

I.B. Courage and Martial Prowess

A second characteristic that seems to distinguish exemplary leaders throughout our extant Roman sources is “courage and martial prowess.” For the purposes of this project, the notion of “courage and martial prowess” primarily encompasses virtus/ ἀνδρεία, but also can include fortitudo, patientia/ὑπομονή and their related actions and attitudes. Unlike noble lineage, one’s reputation for courage was not inherited, but had to be earned. As Roller explains, “[t]he ‘manly’ ethical categories of virtus and ἀνδρεία must...be won and maintained by the performance of consequential actions in the public eye, in this case normally (if not exclusively) through displays of valor in combat” (2004: 39–40).

151 Peter Brown emphasizes the endurance of Roman preoccupation with noble birth into late antiquity (1992: 38). Pedersen, surveying the appointees to public offices in late antiquity, also notes the importance of noble birth in the selection process (1975: 170).

152 Capacity for skillful military strategy and administration, moreover, is included in this category. To be sure, our sources frequently mix and match these attributes when describing a leader’s aptitude. Like we saw above with the attempt to find a universally agreed upon definition of exemplum among our rhetoricians, the sources simply do not agree or limit themselves to the same range of possible meanings. Nevertheless, as the following chapter will hopefully demonstrate, though the attributes may be given slightly different names, the general desire for a martially capable and courageous leader is ubiquitous in our sources.

153 In a more recent article, Roller further describes the Roman value: “Virtus was associated primarily with displaying aggression in combat. One seeks to be observed and acknowledged by one’s fellow soldiers and officers, and if possible by members of the broader community, as fighting with great physical courage” (2011: 188). Distinguishing them from the Homeric paragons of individualistic ἀρετή, Marrou underscores the community focus of Roman exempla virtutis: “The Roman hero, whatever his name—Horatius Cocles, Camillus, Menenius Agrippa, Octavius Augustus—was the man who, by his courage or wisdom, and in the face of great difficulties, saved his country when it was in danger” (1982: 235).
It is no surprise, therefore, that the Pseudo-Plutarch’s outline of an ideal education (De liberis educandis) gives preference to martial instruction. The author enthusiastically maintains:

I am anxious to say that which is of greater importance than all the rest: it is for the contests of war that boys must be practiced, by exercising themselves in throwing the javelin, shooting the bow, and in hunting… War has no place for a bodily condition produced by an indoor life, and a slenderly built soldier accustomed to military exercises forces his way through the masses of fleshly athletics (8.D).\(^{154}\)

In agreement with this anonymous treatise, Plutarch celebrates the military flavor of Roman education compared to the gymnasium which, in his view, led the Greeks to produce “elegant and lovely gymnasts” rather than men of war.\(^{155}\) More than a century earlier, Vergil celebrates the martial displays of the earliest exempla of young Roman nobility, including the performance of Ascanius (Iulus)—the paragon of Roman adolescence:

So intricate the drill of Trojan boys
Who wove the patterns of their pacing horses,
Figured, in sport, retreats and skirmishes—
Like dolphins in the drenching sea, Carpathian
Or Libyan, that shear through waves in play.
This mode of drill, this mimicry of war.\(^{156}\)

Having finished their primary and secondary educations, elite Romans from the middle republic on would traditionally begin their political career in the military. Generally this

\(^{154}\) With respect to the Roman incorporation of hunting into the education program of their youth, Corbeill observes: “In choosing the hunt as a form of exercise appropriate to the elite, a familiar pattern recurs: adopted Greek practice becomes Roman tradition. As with literary education, the Roman ideal depicted the father taking the initiative in teaching hunting and other physical exercise” (2001: 280).

\(^{155}\) Plut. Mor. 274D; See Corbeill: 2001: 279. In his discussion of education in the late Republic and early Empire, Corbeill notes the centrality of the Campus Martius for the physical exercise and military exhibitions of elite urban youths (2001: 278).

\(^{156}\) Verg. Aen. 5.765–770; Transl. Fitzgerald.
service would consist of joining an entourage attached to a general’s staff (the contubernium). In this context, Marrou explains, “...a potential leader had first to learn to obey, and in any case it would always be to the advantage of his political career if he was wounded or did something striking in battle” (1982: 234). As Plutarch observes, these youthful leadership prospects “...from the beginning were taught how to command by serving in the army.” This all to say, most well-to-do boys—the future leadership prospects in the empire—were raised with a robust military background.

It is unsurprising given its centrality in the socialization of their youth that Roman voting assemblies viewed proven virtus as a supremely attractive quality in a candidate for leadership. Discussing the Middle Republic, Roller notes, “...warfare was the most valorized single arena of civic performance and aristocratic competition...consuls—along with dictators and consulars whose commands had been extended—were the focus of especially intense interest in their role as military commanders” (2011: 183). Martin Goodman agrees, “[t]he Romans did not win their empire by accident but because the quickest route to prestige and power in their society was through successful leadership in war.”

The tactics of political candidates illustrate this well. In a republican election, for example, it was generally effective to display one’s battle scars to potential voters.

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158 Plutarch, Flam. 1.4.

159 Along these lines, one of the presuppositions undergirding the political efficacy of displaying one’s family imagines to the public, was that they could not be earned without the ancestor’s demonstration of military competence; cf. Flower (1996: 12).

Describing Horatius Cocles’ politically exploited limp—gained while defending the fledgling Republic at the Sublician Bridge—Roller concludes:

War wounds, and scars in particular, appear frequently in Roman texts as markers of valorous conduct. Wounds incurred in the proper way, located in the right part of the body, inscribe into the living flesh of the hero the record of his valor, for all the world to see, so long as the hero lives (2004: 12).

Valerius Maximus, likewise, lauds L. Siccius Dentatus in that he “...received five and forty wounds on his chest, but his back was clear of scars” (3.2.24).\textsuperscript{161} Further underscoring the political potency of these fleshly monuments to proven \textit{virtus}, Plutarch suspects that leadership candidates campaign for votes in togas without tunics underneath so as to expose their scars to possible voters.\textsuperscript{162} Thus, while advertising noble ancestry could certainly help in the political arena, displaying at least a level of one’s own martial prowess was all but essential.

Regarding the generally agreed upon elements in the \textit{encomium}, after 1) praising the subject’s origin and birth and 2) recounting his or her nurture and training, the orator was to turn to 3) a discussion of the accomplishments and deeds, bodily considerations, and “spiritual” excellencies. In this category any distinction in battle would be highlighted as would the concomitant attribute of \textit{virtus}/\textit{âvðœêía}. Moreover, descriptions of the subject’s body would highlight strength, speed, and other features suggesting military capability.\textsuperscript{163} In short, audiences experiencing \textit{encomia} were conditioned to

\textsuperscript{161} Sallust, similarly, recalls Marius’ speech in which he reminds the audience that they elected him not for his noble lineage, but for his martial distinction and “…scars in the front of the body” (Bell. Iug. 85.29). For more on noble and ignoble scarring in ancient Mediterranean mindsets, see Glancy (2004).


\textsuperscript{163} For a breakdown of these categories, see Malina and Neyrey (1996: 23–24); cf. Marrou (1982: 198–199).
expect that feats and features of strength, courage, and martial prowess would abundantly populate these praise-speeches.

The emphasis placed on courage did not wane in the Imperial era. During the Principate, rather, courage and martial prowess remained very much a significant leadership trait—one that was ideally exemplified by the emperor. Looking beyond the architectural and statuary iconography advertising the emperor’s military distinction—perhaps best exemplified in the Forum Romanum which dramatically displayed martial images including conquering Alexander the Great, militarily accomplished Romulus and the centrally featured triumphal Augustus—Carlos Noreña identifies virtus, among other attributes, as a key leadership ideal systematically communicated on Imperial coinage. Of the messages advertized by these coins, he concludes, virtus occupies 13% of citations of specific virtues. This imperial virtus, he explains, “…was the quality of manly courage displayed in any public action, especially in the performance of military exploits on behalf of the state” (2001: 159). In short, one did not have to walk the streets of Rome to encounter images of his or her supreme leader’s martial distinction, but could just as easily view Imperial virtus while purchasing goods in a provincial marketplace.

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164 Noreña (2001: 156). In terms of his sample size, Noreña relies on the reverse types of 148,421 imperial denarii minted between 69–235 C.E. These coins, moreover, “…were produced on a near-industrial scale and circulated throughout the whole of the Empire (and beyond its frontiers), and therefore reached the widest possible cross-section of the Empire’s population. All of this is well known. More important for this study is the fact that imperial coins have survived in sufficient bulk to allow for quantitative analysis an extremely rare opportunity for ancient historians” (2001: 147).

165 Further illustrating the importance of courage and martial distinction for the image of the princeps, Martin Goodman spotlights Augustus’ Res Gestae, which “…lists his military achievements not just by regions and peoples conquered but by numbers of victories acclaimed” (2007: 330). Goodman adds, “[e]ven the least militarily inclined of emperors, like Claudius, might feel himself impelled to present an image of himself as warrior in the conquest of Britain in order to justify his tenure of power” (2007: 330–331).
I will conclude the present examination of the Roman preference for militarily distinguished leaders by noticing the central role this characteristic plays in Valerius Maximus’ *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia*. In her study of popular morality in the early Empire, Teresa Morgan pays particular attention to Valerius’ collection, graphing the distribution of the main topics in his exemplary stories and noting their frequency.\(^{166}\) While several of the major categories correspond to the classical virtues shared by Greeks and Romans—for example, justice (*fides*/δικαίωσύνη) or self-control (*moderatio*/σωφροσύνη)—Morgan concludes, “[n]o single conventional virtue in Valerius’ collection is provided with as many exempla as courage, *fortitudo*” (2007: 137).

Even a cursory survey of Valerius’ *exempla*—exempla that, as I argue in the first chapter, were most likely disseminated to a socially diverse audience—encounters story after story of famous Roman leaders performing, or failing to perform, acts of courage and military brilliance.\(^{167}\) One story in particular provides a very telling, and quite curious, example of the weight Roman society placed on *virtus*:

> The earth subsided in the middle of the Forum leaving a sudden huge chasm. An oracle was given that this could only be filled with what made the Roman people’s greatest strength. This Curius, a young man of the noblest spirit and lineage, interpreted in the sense that our city chiefly excels in valour (*virtute*) and arms. Wearing his military decorations he mounted his horse, dug in spurs, and drove him head-long into that abyss.

\(^{166}\) For her detailed chart, see Morgan (2007: 159).

\(^{167}\) Valerius is careful to remind his audience that unlike most of them, *virtus* does not distinguish based on noble or ignoble bloodline, but “[s]he suffers lively dispositions stirred to action to enter her presence and gives them a draught of herself that is not generous or grudging from discrimination of persons. Equally available to all, she assesses the desire you bring, not your station...So it happens on the one hand that persons born in humble circumstances rise to the highest dignity and on the other that offshoots of the noblest family trees fall back into some disgrace and turn the light they received from their ancestors to darkness” (3.3.ext.7.). Having said that, however, most of his *exempla* still tend to originate from Roman families of high lineage.
On top of him all the citizens vied with one another in throwing down grain in his honour, and the ground in no time regained its former condition (5.6.2).  

He later includes several additional exempla involving brave men of high lineage proving their valor by risking—or giving—their lives in combat on behalf of the res publica, including Horatius Cocles (3.2.1; cf. 4.7.2), Cloelia, “...a girl, holding the light of valour (virtutis) before men” (3.2.2), Muncius Scaevola (3.3.1), and the self-sacrificing Decii (5.6.5–6).  

Beyond valorous acts of raw courage, a large portion of his work celebrates a different aspect of martial distinction, namely, the leader’s maintenance of military discipline. Valerius ambitiously concludes:

I come now to the chief glory and mainstay of Roman empire, preserved intact and safe up to the present time with salutary steadfastness, the tenacious bond of military discipline (militaris disciplinae), in the bosom and protection of which rests our serene and tranquil state of blessed peace (2.7.praef.).

Such discipline, in Valerius’ opinion, was the very disposition that originally won and currently safeguards Rome’s expansion. Whether modeling valor, bravery, endurance, or military discipline and strategy, if they were anything, Valerius

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168 Cf. Livy 7.6.

169 In his third book, Valerius provides a brief excursus clarifying the relationship between virtus, fortitudo, and patientia. He explains that fortitudo (bravery) is the “most weighty force and most effective muscle” of valor (virtutis). Fortitude (patientia), moreover, is so joined with bravery “...in similarity as to seem born with her or from her.” See 3.2.praf. and 3.3.praef.

170 A few paragraphs later, Valerius elaborates on the nature of military discipline: “For military discipline requires a harsh, brusque sort of punishment because strength consists in arms, and when these stray from the right path they will crush unless they be crushed” (2.7.14).

171 He urges, “[m]ilitary discipline jealously conserved won the leadership of Italy for Roman empire, bestowed rule over many cities, great kings, mighty nations, opened the jaws of the Pontic gulf, handed over the shattered barriers of the Alps and Taurus, made it from its origin in Romulus’ little cottage into the summit of the entire globe (2.8.praef.).
Maximus’ favorite exempla were military heroes. As we have seen, Valerius was not alone in his leadership preferences.

**I.C. Education and Eloquence**

Though martial distinction is certainly the most politically and socially advantageous avenue for an aspiring leader’s advancement, in the late Republic and early Empire, a good education proven by eloquence was also a cherished leadership attribute. Like courage and martial prowess, however, mastering a formal education and consistently demonstrating rhetorical skill required the leader’s individual effort and could not simply be inherited. Regarding the proper development of a free child, it is perhaps not a surprise, given the topic of the treatise, that *De liberis educandis* underscores the importance of a robust formal education, viewing it as “…the source and root of all goodness.” In a telling passage, the author acknowledges the generally shared social value of many of the leadership categories surveyed in this chapter, only to subordinate them in importance to the supreme value of learning.

...to sum up, the beginning, the middle, and end in all these matters is good education and proper training; and it is this, I say, which leads on and helps towards moral excellence and towards happiness. And, in comparison with this, all other advantages are human, and trivial, and not worth our serious concern. Good birth is a fine thing, but it is an advantage which must be credited to one's ancestors. Wealth is held in esteem, but it is a chattel of fortune...[b]ut learning, of all things in this world, is alone

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172 Plutarch’s biography of Cicero and Cicero’s own fatherly advice, surveyed later in the chapter, illustrate this point well.

173 See Gleason (1995: 159). Gleason earlier cites the eunuch sophist Favorinus as an example of a notable public figure distinguished not by birth, honorable physical attributes, or wealth, but exclusively by individually cultivating superlative rhetorical ability (1995: 17).

174 Ps.Plut. *De lib. educ.* 4.C.
immortal and divine....Strength is much admired, but it falls an easy prey to disease and old age.\textsuperscript{175}

In terms of the substance of this ideal education, the work urges fathers to “...withdraw their sons as far away as possible from the nonsense of ostentatious public discourse,” admitting that although it will certainly “...please the multitude”, such pandering to popular taste often leads to a morally loose lifestyle (\textit{De lib. educ.} 6.A–B).

For our author, it is only philosophy that provides the remedy for “the illnesses and affections of the mind” as it guides the emerging leader in the maintenance of morality and proper social relations (7.D–F). Devoting oneself to skill in popular rhetoric, on the other hand, merely wins “the favor of the vulgar herd” (6.C). Nevertheless, the text does not wholly eschew the value of rhetoric, but firmly warns against “triviality” or “vulgarity” in style (7.A), and advocates a strictly reflective disposition, rather than an impromptu approach to delivering speeches (6.C). Pseudo-Plutarch concludes: “I...would not assert that readiness of speech is to be utterly rejected, or again that it should not be used in its proper place, but that it is to be used like a drug, with caution” (6.E).

Though \textit{De liberis educandis} does not place much weight on the leader’s ability to influence through skillful elocution, Berry notes that in this area it does not represent the hegemonic trend with respect to proper education. He summarizes, “[b]oth Quintilian and Tacitus emphasize rhetoric and the training they describe is that of the orator” (1958: 389). In fact, as Corbeill explains, all the moral training in the world will be of no avail to the leader if his diction or general deportment is flawed: “transgression on any of these counts reveals not simply inferior training, but morally suspect character...Quintilian

\textsuperscript{175} Ps.Plut. \textit{De lib. educ.} 5.C–E.
equates the use of incorrect Latin diction with the destruction of Roman morality” (2001: 284).\footnote{176}{See Quintilian, \textit{Inst.} 1.6.44–45. Listing the leader’s requirements with respect to eloquence, Corbeill summarizes Quintilian: “his knowledge of vocabulary must be impeccable, since the misuse of one word can reveal a non-Roman (8.1); his ear must be attuned to the intricate niceties of prose rhythm \textsuperscript{[283]} (9.4.45–115); his use of gesture must be refined (11.3.65–183, which Quintilian boasts as the first written treatment of the subject); his manner of dress must be flawless \textsuperscript{(11.3.137–49)}” \textsuperscript{(2001: 282–283)}.}

In many ways, rhetorical ability—including effective speaking and proper deportment—became the singular proof of a leader’s proper education and set the speaker apart from the population by signifying his noble birth and moral worth.\footnote{177}{See Gleason (1995: xiii). She further explains, “\textit{Paideia}, for both Greek and Roman gentlemen, was a form of symbolic capital. Its development required time, money, effort, and social position (as Lucian saw clearly); eloquence was the essential precondition of its display” \textsuperscript{(1995: xxi)}. Peter Brown reviews the crucial importance of speech and temperament in discerning moral worth and leadership distinction well into Late Antiquity \textsuperscript{(1992: 42–49)}. Pedersen, likewise, notes the importance of eloquence in appointing leaders to public posts in Late Antiquity \textsuperscript{(1975: 187)}.}

With respect to these status distinctions, Libanius urges elites to “[u]se your tongues to make yourselves superior to your slaves, for now you are superior only by chance” \textit{(Or.} 15).\footnote{178}{See Gleason \textsuperscript{(1995: 164)}.}

Without question, speaking and acting in a rhetorically calculated fashion had more at stake than simply entertaining or persuading a crowd.

Elocuence, furthermore, was a capacity that would be called upon regularly in the public life of a would-be leader. Martin Goodman summarizes, “[t]he only aspect of educational accomplishment generally acknowledged as prestigious for Roman politicians was the art of rhetoric” \textsuperscript{(2007: 348)}.\footnote{179}{Goodman elaborates, “[d]uring the late Republic, when public life was conducted in an open arena before fellow politicians and a wider citizen audience, oratorical ability had provided an important route to political success, particularly for those deprived by lack of opportunity or talent of the rewards of military prowess” \textsuperscript{(2007: 348)}.} Maud Gleason agrees, “...all aristocrats had to be able to perform as public speakers, if only to do their duty at wedding banquets, defend their property in litigation, and participate as an educated equal in self-
consciously learned discussions at the baths” (1995: xx–xxi). In the Imperial era, with the emperor’s growing monopoly on significant military honors, eloquence began to increasingly eclipse military accomplishment as a primary method of establishing one’s masculinity.\textsuperscript{180} The effective performance of rhetoric not only had the ability to establish and defend a leader’s masculine honor in the public eye, but this “callisthenic” of manhood was actually thought to exercise the chest, vocal organs, maintain the bodies vital heat, adjust bodily humidity, and even improve the texture of one’s flesh.\textsuperscript{181} In short, if a leader could not foster bodily strength in military drills or earn renown on the battlefield, he could pursue both in the podium.

In his catalogue of \textit{exempla}, Valerius Maximus highlights a number of leaders showcasing powerful rhetorical ability (or deference for its influence) and vigorous intellect. To begin, Valerius Maximus explicates the nature and power of eloquence:

\begin{quote}
The ornaments of Eloquence lie in appropriate elocution and suitable bodily movement. When she has equipped herself with these, she attacks men in three ways: by herself invading their minds and by handing their ears over to the one and their eyes to the other to be charmed (8.10.praef.).
\end{quote}

Regarding his deployment of eloquent \textit{exempla}, though he offers far fewer than was the case with courage and martial prowess, the few that he does note underscore traditional Roman respect for rhetoric and education. To mention a significant example, in his eighth book Valerius notes the high regard for rhetoric held by “Divine Julius (\textit{Divus...Iulius})...the most perfect pinnacle of celestial deity and of human genius.” Caesar, he recounts,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{180} See Gleason (1995: xxii).
\end{flushright}
aptly expressed the force of eloquence when he said in his speech against Cn. Dolabella, whom he was prosecuting, that his excellent case was being wrenched away from him by L. Cotta’s advocacy. For on that occasion eloquence at its greatest complained of the power of eloquence (8.9.3).

Elsewhere in his collection, moreover, whether “L.Crassus, who was most famous for eloquence in our ancestor’s time,” or “the eloquent M. Antonius,” Valerius seems compelled to mention the leaders’ refined speech even when deploying them as *exempla* modeling unrelated virtues. Though based on the comparatively large number of courageous *exempla* included in his collection it seems clear that Valerius prefers the latter virtues above all else, as his account of the torture and death of the famed Orator Anaxarchus shows, in Valerius’ view, eloquence and bravery were in no way mutually exclusive leadership attributes:

...at last Nicocreon threatened to cut off his tongue, to which Anaxarchus replied: “Womanish young man, this part of my body at least will not be in your power,” and straight away he cut off his tongue with his teeth, chewed it up, and spat it into the other’s mouth, which was open in fury. That tongue had held the ears of many lost in admiration, above all king Alexander’s, as it wisely and eloquently expounded...But it perished almost more gloriously than it flourished, because by so brave (*forti*) an end it validated the illustrious performance of what it professed and not only adorned Anaxarchus’ life but rendered his death more renowned (3.ext.4).

If Valerius’ inclusion of this *exemplum* is any indication of the broader preferences shared by his contemporaries, the dual characteristics of eloquence and valor went a long way in distinguishing an attractive leader in Roman society. To be sure, he fails to include *exempla* specifically celebrating well-educated heroes, but he does maintain, “...our empire takes its increase and maintenance from vigour of mind rather than strength of body (7.2.ext.1a)” In sum, as this brief summary suggests, an ascendant
Roman leader without a proper education proven in eloquence would certainly be an exception in the late Republic and early Empire.

I.D. Personal Frugality and Generous Patronage

While the simple possession of wealth was a prerequisite for many official posts in the empire and certainly provided an individual or family with influence and favor in most voluntary associations, our Roman sources seem especially concerned that a leader balances personal frugality with generous patronage. In this section, after establishing the importance of wealth for a leader, we will focus on the latter two aspects.

Regarding the possession of wealth, Pseudo-Plutarch reminds his readership that before one can even try to implement his pedagogical advice, the individual must have financial means. In the middle of his treatise, the writer briefly pauses for what he calls a “minor matter,” namely, addressing those without sufficient funds:

But perchance someone may say, ‘What is this? You, who have promised to give directions in regard to the education of free-born children, are now evidently disregarding the education of the poor children of the common people, and you acknowledge that you are offering your suggestions to the rich only.’ To these it is not difficult to make reply. My dearest wish would be that my scheme of education should be generally useful; but if some, being needy in their private circumstances, shall be unable to avail themselves of my directions, let them lay the blame therefore upon fortune and not upon him who gives this counsel (De lib. educ. 8.E).

For this author, it was simply taken for granted that the ideal training of a young boy required a privileged financial status. As we will see, the same assumption undergirded many expectations for civic leadership in the Roman Empire.

In Rome itself, membership in the most prominent leadership association, the Senate, required substantial wealth—four hundred thousand sesterces in the late Republic.
and at least a million sesterces by the time of Augustus.\textsuperscript{182} At the provincial level, leadership in a city necessitated the candidate’s access to large funds. Not only were the leading posts generally unsalaried, but election into them and their performance required significant personal expenditure.\textsuperscript{183} As Clarke concludes, “[l]eadership had become the exclusive domain of the affluent” (2000: 32–33).\textsuperscript{184} In terms of popular rhetoric, the topic of “wealth,” though it does not factor as prominently as other attributes, nevertheless, was an important aspect to be mentioned in an encomium.\textsuperscript{185} Without question, one’s financial well-being was generally an important aspect in determining his or her fitness for leadership and this political and economic reality remained intact well into Late Antiquity.\textsuperscript{186}

Equally important to a leader’s possession of money were his emotional relationship with and proper use of it. Kennedy summarizes this well, “[t]he ideal early Roman male was...austere and laconic” (1994: 102). Our Roman sources, furthermore, consistently pride themselves on the “native” austerity and generous patronage of notable Roman citizens. Livy’s preface to his Ad urbe condita, for instance, begins with his famous praise for the exempla Roman history affords its students; the chief “Roman” attribute he highlights relates to wealth:

...there has never existed any commonwealth greater in power, with a purer morality, or more fertile in good examples; or any state in which avarice and


\textsuperscript{183} See Clarke: 2000: 45.

\textsuperscript{184} Martin Goodman similarly concludes, “Romans could not imagine entrusting political authority to anyone who was not rich” (2007: 340).


\textsuperscript{186} See Pedersen (1975: 181).
luxury have been so late in making their inroads, or poverty and frugality so highly and continuously honoured, showing so clearly that the less wealth men possessed the less they coveted (Ad urb. cond. praef).\textsuperscript{187}

On numerous occasions, moreover, Valerius Maximus showers praise on \textit{exempla} of what he calls “Italian austerity” (2.4.4). Providing an etiology for contemporary sacrificial practices, he nostalgically recalls “...the simplicity of the men of old; they would never eat lavish meals; used more gruel than bread (hence the \textit{mola} of sacrifices—they placated the gods with first offerings and food from their own diet” (2.5.5).

Moving from the frugality of the ancestors in general, Valerius showcases M. Curius, “the consummate pattern of Roman frugality and at the same time a clearly established model of bravery,” who would eat in the presence of the hostile Samnites on a rustic stool with a wooden bowl “[f]or he despised the riches of the Samnites, whereas the Samnites wondered at his poverty.” Valerius closes the episode enthusiastically recalling his defense of such austerity: “...tell the Samnites that M’. Curius had rather give orders to the rich than be rich himself...remember that I can neither be beaten in battle nor corrupted with money” (4.3.5a). Clearly excited about this distinguishing attribute, Valerius recounts a host of leadership \textit{exempla}, including the elder and younger Cato, Atilius and Cincinnatus, and Valerius Publicola “that crown of the Fasti” who, though he “held three Consulships greatly to the satisfaction of the Roman people”, nevertheless died worth an amount which did not even cover his funeral expenses” (4.3.11–12).\textsuperscript{188} He closes his catalogue of frugal exemplars with a fitting exhortation:

\begin{quote}
Why then do we rail at a moderate fortune in our daily and nightly grumbles as if that were mankind’s chief cross? Such a fortune suckled faithfully if not abundantly the Publicolae, Aemilii, Fabricii, Curii,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{187} Translation William M. Roberts (1912–1914).

\textsuperscript{188} See also, Val. Max. 4.4.1, 2; 3.11–12, and 4.4.2, 5–7.
Scipios, Scauri, and other pillars of virtue equal to these...no riches can be preferred to the poverty of men like these (4.4.11).

For Valerius, there was certainly no shortage of leading ancestors exemplifying “Italian austerity.”

As I mentioned above, in mainstream Roman society, an ideal leader had to strike a careful balance between personal frugality and generous patronage. Regarding the latter, Pseudo-Plutarch desires that this responsibly open-handed disposition be imbued into the lifestyle of emerging leaders: “For to have a generous heart in prosperity shows a man, to excite no envy withal shows a disciplined nature; to rule pleasure by reason marks the wise man, and not every man can master his passion” (De lib. educ. 7.F). The same desire for a leader’s generosity was ubiquitous in the face-to-face political cultures populating the Roman Mediterranean.

It was expected in any city throughout the empire that a leader’s wealth was not exclusively reserved for his personal support and enjoyment, but was to benefit the broader community. Gleason summarizes, “[w]ealthy citizens were expected to provide many urban amenities at their private expense: fuel to heat the baths, oil for the gymnasium, porticos for the marketplace, and public entertainment for the holidays” (1995: xxi) Goodman agrees, “[p]restige from wealth was reinforced by ostentatious munificence for the benefit of the wider community...the rich competed in currying favour from the populace by conspicuous expenditure on spectacles such as gladiatorial games or on buildings for public use or on other acts of very public philanthropy” (2007: 340). Thus, it was not enough that an aristocrat possess wealth and manage it

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189 He later comments on the role of such munificence in the Imperial period: “In the city of Rome itself, under the rule and patronage of emperors all grand donations to the public good were naturally made by the emperors themselves, whose wealth far outstripped all others. The provision of bread and circuses, derided
reasonably, he had to put it to work for both his immediate clients and for the good of the active members of society.

At the local civic leadership level, *duovirs* were required to provide an up-front sum of money as a kind of “institutionalized election promise.” Given these social obligations, the local notable’s generosity was necessarily selective. Though describing the leadership realities in the late antique eastern empire, much of Peter Brown’s assessment could just as well apply to the situation throughout the Mediterranean in earlier centuries: “Urban notables had presented themselves as standing at the head of an entire social hierarchy, made up of all active participants in the life of the city.” The poor, on the other hand, were largely neglected by elite benefaction since they essentially “belonged to no urban grouping” (1992: 91). Clarke, furthermore, warns against considering this elite generosity as some sort of selfless care for the less fortunate. He reminds us that local elites enjoyed tremendous social rewards in exchange for their benefaction, including privileged seating, legal protection, and the invaluable acquisition of honor (2000: 47). Whatever the motivation, a good leader was a generous one.

The emperor likewise eagerly broadcast his own honorable relationship with money. Carlos Noreña, in his study of virtue advertisement on imperial coinage, notes both *aequitas* and *liberalitas* as frequently mentioned leadership attributes. The former, by the satirist Juvenal as the only things which interested the city mob, was not just briber to achieve political quiescence (although it also served that function). The display of wealth also confirmed fitness to rule” (2007: 341).

190 Clarke 2000: 43.

191 Similarly, Gleason explains, “what the benefactor bestowed in material gifts to his fellow-citizens was returned to him in symbolic form as deference or gratitude. This is an example of what Pierre Bourdieu would call the conversion of economic capital into symbolic capital, producing ‘relations of dependence that have an economic basis but are disguised under a veil of moral relations.’ This transformation works only by grace of a kind of collective disavowal of what is really going on; the exchange of munificence for deference must appear on both sides to be voluntary, or the game is spoiled” (1995: xxi).
represented on a notable 24% of the coins in Noreña’s sample specifically related to fiscal issues as it “…advertised the honest administration of the mint” (2001: 159).

Liberalitas, showing up in 12% of the sample, celebrated the emperor’s personal generosity—an attribute that was becoming increasingly “…fundamental to the structure of imperial ideology” (159–160). Commenting on the mint’s advertisement of “…the worldwide benefits of imperial generosity”, Clifford Ando observes,

[t]his latter was a message particularly suited to iconographic representation. The rapid diffusion of imperial imagery in this form created a visual language whose very simplicity rendered it almost universally intelligible and uniquely flexible. Most important…as a semantic system imperial iconography was available to provincials, too (2000: 213–214). 192

In short, while few inhabitants of the Roman Empire would ever see the emperor in person, most would daily encounter advertisements for his generosity.

Valerius Maximus—who celebrates liberality only if it stems from the proper motivations, namely, “true judgment and honorable good will”—showcases two episodes featuring Fabius Maximus to illustrate both the incorrect and the correct exercise of generous patronage. In the first episode, while throwing a public banquet in his uncle’s honor his unseasonable frugality is read by the city as a lack of generosity. The city, Valerius tells us, “…by its votes took its revenge for the shame of the banquet” (4.8.1). Evidently, Fabius eventually strikes the correct balance between honorable austerity and well-judged generosity as he sells his only farm to pay a ransom to Hannibal that the senate could not afford.

192 Augustus’ generosity, moreover is articulated throughout his Res gestae, though as Ando qualifies, “…we must recognize that even a brief text like the Res gestae of Augustus had a limited audience: inscribed on sheets of bronze and attached to his temples, it accomplished the majority of its ideological work not through its content as such, but through its magnificence as a physical monument to the achievements of his reign and thus, ultimately, as a bulwark of support for his heirs” (2000: 143).
Consequently, Valerius assures us, “Fabius Maximus [is] praiseworthy to this day” (4.8.1). As these exemplary stories underscore, the Roman public kept a close eye on not only the leader’s possession of money, but his use of it on behalf of the community. Turning now to the final category of exemplary leadership, we will quickly note that such community care ideally extended beyond the mortal members of Roman society.

**I.E. Piety toward the Gods**

Toward the middle of the first century B.C.E., Marcus Tullius Cicero made this unqualified declaration about the religious piety of the Roman people: “[I]n piety and religious scruple and in that particular wisdom that consists in the recognition that everything is ruled and governed by the divinity of the gods, we surpass all peoples and nations” (*Har. Resp.* 19). As we will see below, Cicero was not alone in this Roman boast. But to what does the attribute of “piety” (*pietas*/*euvse,beia*) refer?

**I.E.1. Definition**

As even a brief survey of contemporary scholarship shows, during the late Republic and early Empire the term *pietas* had a fairly broad semantic range. In his survey of Roman Religion, David Potter underscores that “…*pietas* was not simply a ‘religious’ concept,” but encompassed a “…dutiful respect toward members of one’s family, toward others with whom a person shares social relations, and toward the norms of society” (1999a: 125). Likewise, Teresa Morgan defines *pietas* as “…an attitude

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193 Valerius also applauds the purposeful generosity of Q. Considius: “When the commonwealth was thrown into shock by Catiline’s madness, so that even the rich could not pay their creditors the money they owed because property values had sunk in the upheaval, he would not let his agents call upon any of his debtors (he had fifteen million sesterces out on loan) either for principal or interest…an amazing attestation that he lent out his own money, not his countrymen’s blood” (4.8.3).
towards family, country and gods which encompasses loyalty and devotion” (2007: 143). In short, the Roman virtue of piety included both a horizontal component (human relationships) as well as a vertical one (relationships with the divine).

In one of the few articles specifically treating the notion of Roman *pietas*, Hendrik Wagenvoort argues for a shift in the usage of the word during the period of transition from Republic to Empire. He ends his look at Cicero’s use of the term by concluding that “[w]e can see clearly that, since the year 45, *pietas* has changed its content for Cicero, or at least that the emphasis has shifted, and that instead of being applied to one’s country, parents and relatives, it is applied, in the first place, to the gods” (1980: 9). Almost 90 years later (Wagenvoort’s article was originally written in 1920), Clifford Ando observed a similar application of the term: “Piety at Rome consisted principally in the observance of *religio*, religious scruple” (2008: 126). The present study will focus on this aspect of Roman piety, namely, *pietas* in matters of *religio*.

Since Roman presuppositions with respect to human relationships with the divine are often quite foreign to our modern understandings of religion in the west, without going into a thorough review of its practice, a brief excursus on the nature of Roman religion is perhaps warranted.

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195 Wagenvoort argues that this shift is reflected in Cicero’s attempts at finding justification for Roman expansion. Rather than the Greek polemics branding Roman conquest as driven by greed, or the worn out Republican arguments claiming that Roman expansion was somehow “good” for those conquered, Cicero, according to Wagenvoort, re-envisioned the spread of Roman power as the fulfillment of a divine destiny, and thus a form of *pietas* to the gods (1980: 14–19).
I.E.2. Excursus: The Nature of Roman Religion

a. Public vs. Private Practice

Beard, North, and Price define Roman religio as “…the traditional honours paid to the gods by the state.” They further explain that “[t]he focus of the term was on public, communal behavior towards the gods of the state” (1998: 216). Thus, unlike many modern conceptions of private religious devotion, the piety of the Romans was largely displayed in a public context. In terms of household religion, it is difficult to know with certainty the details of religious practice in the private sphere due to the paucity of our extant evidence.196 John Scheid suggests that this lacuna does not, however, invalidate our analysis of the practice of religio in the Roman household. Rather, he postulates a significant continuity between public and private Roman religion: “Every ordinary Roman was capable of understanding the primary meaning of the rituals, particularly because, in his family, he himself would perform rites very similar to those celebrated in public places by magistrates and priests.”197

b. Formalism and the Mos Maiorum

Another distinguishing characteristic of Roman religio was its formalism and commitment to tradition. While, as we will see shortly, the empirical epistemology underlying the Roman approach to religion could theoretically overrule such

196 Discussing the scholastic study of Roman household religion, Beard, North, and Price criticize the tendency of historians who fill the gap in our evidence with anachronistic and ethnocentric hypotheses: “…it is clear that historians have tended to project into this area, about which we really know so little, the elements that they postulate as essential to any religion – personal prayer and contact with the divine, deep feelings and beliefs about man’s relation to universal forces – that seem to be missing from the religious life of the Romans” (1998: 49).

commitment, in most instances the Romans sought to do things according to the *mos maiorum* (“way of the ancestors”). Potter summarizes, “[i]deally, no Roman would worship a god, either new or alien, unless that god had been officially recognized, and a Roman would worship the gods whose cults had been established by their ancestors” (1999a: 117–118). Though such conscious lack of spontaneity and innovation may seem religiously wanting to many modern readers valuing more individual, personal expression of religion, Beard, North, and Price remind us that

> if we accept that the Romans’ religious experience might be profoundly different from our own, then we do not necessarily have to search out a context for the personal expression of individual piety; we do not, in other words, have to find a context in which to imagine the Romans being ‘religious’ according to our own preconceptions of religiosity (1998: 49–50).

In sum, for the pious Roman worshipper, ancestral tradition always trumped religious trend.

c. Orthopraxy

In addition to its dedication to the *mos maiorum*, Roman civic religion emphasized orthopraxy over orthodoxy. In his most recent survey of Roman religion, Jörg Rüpke points out that any investigation into the piety of the average inhabitant of Rome cannot proceed by “…trying to systematize a theology that is at best merely implicit” but can only succeed by “…describing practice, and tackling its explicit and implicit assumptions, its problems and contradictions” (2007: 67). Similarly, Scheid

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198 Potter goes on to highlight “…the thought process of the Roman world that routinely endowed important institutions with founders in the distant past” (1999a: 121). Furthermore, Scheid notes that “[i]t was the founders of Rome, of other towns or of individual families who founded the religion of these communities and dictated its rules” (2003: 20).

In so far as the only dogma was the obligation to observe rituals, individuals were perfectly at liberty to conceive of the gods, religion and the world however they pleased” (2003: 19). Finally, Potter succinctly captures the disposition of Roman piety: “Pietas was defined through action, and so was impietas” (1999a: 126).

d. Empirical Epistemology

By all accounts, “Roman religion” was a large house with many rooms. It accommodated a vast array of acceptable practices, institutions, and attitudes. With such plurality, how can one meaningfully speak of Roman religion as a more or less distinguishable entity? In a recent monograph, Clifford Ando attempts an answer to this question. He argues that Roman religion had an “epistemological basis” and this basis “...conditions the manner in which Roman religion can be studied” (2008: 2). According to Ando, in their efforts to placate the gods the Romans paid close attention to those methods which worked and those which did not. This empirical methodology, while encouraging them to appreciate the findings—and thus traditions—of their ancestors, allowed the Romans to deviate from tradition where the situation called for a different tactic. Ando summarizes,

Romans could esteem the piety of their ancestors even as they recognized a necessity to act on the basis of more recent evidence. In other words, in matters of religion, their esteem for mos maiorum was dispositional and did not extend to practice (2008: 15).

To be sure, later in his work, Scheid does spend some time speculating about the extent of Roman religious belief: “As we have seen, the only religious ‘belief’ for Romans consisted in the knowledge that the gods were the benevolent partners of mortals in the management of the world, and that the prescribed rituals represented the rightly expected counterpart to the help offered by the immortals” (2003: 173).

See also MacMullen (1981: 2) and Marrou (1982: 237).
In short, at its core Roman religion was driven by an empirical epistemology—studying
the gods’ interaction with both human communities and the natural order and adapting its
ritual practice accordingly.  

*e. Religion and Society*

Before moving to a consideration of *pietas* and Roman leadership, one final
quality of Roman religion is worthy of note. Not only was Roman *religio* largely a public
phenomena, as we looked at above, but it was fundamentally a group-oriented activity.
Scheid explains, “[t]his was a social religion, closely linked to the community, not the
individual. It involved individuals only in so far as they were members of a particular
community” (2003: 19). Additionally, Scheid points to the plurality of religious practice
commonly categorized under “Roman religion” as mirroring the plurality of Roman
social groups, including “the city, the legion, the various units in the legion, colleges of
public servants, colleges of artisans, sub-districts of the city (‘wards’ or ‘quarters’),
families and so on” (2003: 19). Hence, an individual Roman’s practice of *religio* would
be closely connected to his or her social group(s).

Further unpacking the nexus between religion and society in the late Republic and
early Empire, Rüpke has recently argued that Roman sacrifice re-inscribed the social
order, and John North affirms that *religio* formed the essential basis for one’s Roman

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202 Scheid also distinguishes Roman religion on the basis of its rational disposition (2003: 21, 157). It is this
rational underpinning that, for Scheid, forms the major distinction between *religio* and *superstitio*—the
latter foregoing rationality in favor of fear (2003: 21).

203 Rüpke speculates on the social function of one of the central elements of Roman religion, namely,
sacrifice: “[t]he primary function of sacrifice is to define hierarchies” (2007: 145). He then outlines how
sacrifice reinforces the distinction between gods and humans, between more and less honorable humans,
and finally between humans and animals (Rüpke 2007: 145–148). See also, Beard, North, and Price (1998:
215) and Potter (1999a: 121, 139).
identity. In sum, Roman religion was a social phenomenon with far-reaching social implications.

**I.E.3. Leadership and Roman Piety**

Given the social dimension of Roman religion, it is not surprising that, in our sources, while *pietas* is a virtue advocated for all Romans, it is a particularly vital attribute for their leaders—the ideal performers of public ritual. Valerius Maximus, who devotes his entire first book to matters of *religio*, showcases the traditional commitment to religious scruple shared by Rome’s leadership:

> For our community has ever held that all things must yield to religion, even in the case of personages in whom it wished the splendour of most exalted dignity to be displayed. So holders of state power (*imperia*) never hesitated to minister to holy things in the belief that theirs would be the governance of human affairs only if they gave good and faithful service to the power of the gods (1.1.9).

In a later episode, Valerius illustrates the danger inherent in leaving public *religio* in socially unworthy hands. He describes how due to the Potitius family’s lack of scruple regarding the social status of ritual performers, “Hercules…exacted a grievous and manifest penalty for the degrading of his cult.” Valerius continues, “[t]he Potitii had held the celebration of his rites as a gift assigned to their clan…[b]ut at the prompting of Censor Appius they transferred it into the lowly (*humile*) hands of public slaves.” As a result, “the name of Potitius almost became extinct and impious Appius was struck blind”

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204 See North (2004: 228).
This all to say, organizing and leading major elements of mainstream religion in Rome was a job best left to her public officials.

Thus, socializing potential leaders with a reverence for religious scruple was of first importance. Pseudo-Plutarch underscores the value in training the young in piety, placing such instruction in his list of the relational obligations taught by philosophy. Such reverence for the divine was not largely aimed at the leader’s personal relationship, but had enormous practical payoff in the day to day exercise of local leadership. Clarke recalls the omnipresence of “religious” responsibility in Greco-Roman public business:

The meetings of both the council and the combined assembly were consequently conducted within a prominent religious ambiance. Their gatherings were announced by a herald and marked by a number of cultic practices: prayers were offered, curses were rectified against speakers who might maliciously wish to mislead the people, and a purificatory sacrifice of a piglet was ordinarily conducted at the start of business of the gathered assembly (2000: 21–22).

Without question, pietas was important for persons of note in the empire. Any individual considered worthy to be eulogized with an encomium could expect that his proper relationship with the divine would be emphasized as part of the orator’s discussion of the subject’s accomplishments and deeds “of the soul.”

In the same way, in the imperial period, the emperor’s pietas would figure prominently in advertisements of his virtue. Augustus’ Forum proves a great example.

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205 Beyond these exempla, Valerius Maximus provides several additional episodes relating leaders’ behavior (both positive and negative) in relation with the gods. See, for example, Val. Max. 1.1.14; 1.4.3, and 1.6.1–8.

206 Ps. Plut. De lib. educ. 7.E.

207 He further notes that political and religious buildings were deliberately constructed side by side (2000: 25).

Not only was it a product of a vow to Mars—and thus featuring a massive temple to Mars Ultor—but positioning the large statue of pious Aeneas carrying his father and the lares of Troy in such close proximity to Augustus’ triumphal image underscored the piety of the princeps.\textsuperscript{209} Throughout the Empire, the pietas of the imperial family(ies) was widely advertized with help from the Roman mints. Noreña reports that pietas, a virtue giving “...symbolic expression to the emperor's fulfillment of his obligations to the gods, to his family, and to his subjects,” is a leading description of the emperor represented on 20% of the coins he sampled (2001: 159). In sum, whether their emperor or local magistrates, the populus Romanus evidently desired leaders with firm commitment to the entire community—including its divine members.

The foregoing categories were, of course, not the only aspects praised in exemplary leaders throughout Roman antiquity. The classical virtues of justice (iustitia; δικαιοσύνη) and temperance (modestia; σωφροσύνη) were critical in the eyes of many authors, and factors such as an individual’s age, beauty, or even hometown could be considerations in leadership discussions.\textsuperscript{210} Nevertheless, while a particular author could place more stock in one category over another—or at times completely neglect to mention a category—noble lineage, courage and martial prowess, education and eloquence, generous patronage, and piety were broadly considered to be aspects of honorable leadership. I will continue this chapter looking at a few sources wherein at least four of the categories are conspicuously clustered together, namely, the biographies

\textsuperscript{209} See Galinsky (1996: 204).

\textsuperscript{210} As we will see with Cicero, justice and temperance were given pride of place in his moral expectations for a good leader.
of Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch as well as two ancient *laudationes* (funeral orations). The former illustrate those values believed to be essential in situating a noble leader’s personality, morality, and social position; the latter were regularly performed before large and socially diverse audiences and thus were likely effective vehicles for disseminating elite notions of virtue (see the discussion on this in chapter 1). I will then conclude the chapter looking at Cicero’s advice to his son in *De officiis*, wherein the orator advocates many of the aforementioned leadership categories as sure avenues for the acquisition of honor and leadership in Roman society.

II. Exemplary Leadership in Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch

In his *De excellentibus ducibus*, Cornelius Nepos, writing during the last half of the first century B.C.E., begins each of his extant biographies by reviewing the respective general’s most important characteristics. Among the various virtues and honors typically mentioned, four take pride of place in his work (and, significantly for this study, relate to my categories of honorable leadership)—namely, the leader’s lineage, military background, education and/or eloquence, and his role as a generous patron. Nepos’ description of Alcibiades (the early fifth century Athenian general), for example, summarizes:

“Alcibiades, the Athenian, son of Clinias…[b]orn in the most famous of cities *of a very noble family*, he was by far the handsomest man of his time. He was skilled in every accomplishment and of abundant ability (for he was *a great commander both on land and sea*); *in eloquence he was numbered among the best orators*, since his delivery and his style were so

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211 To be sure, in the Roman literature I will explore below, “piety” tends to receive the least explicit treatment. As we have seen above, however, it is by no means a secondary leadership virtue, and whatever the reason for its seeming neglect, it was taken for granted that a noble leader would demonstrate respect for those upon whom his existence depended.
admirable that no one could resist him. *He was rich; energetic…, generous*, magnificent not only in public, but in private, life (*Alc.* 1.1–3, italics mine).

Similar categories drive his biography of Cimon the Athenian. After mentioning Cimon’s unfortunate delinquency in ascribed honor, Nepos summarizes the aspects of the Athenian which helped him climb out of his inherited social deficit:

> Having in this way gained his freedom, Cimon quickly rose to the first rank in the state; for he had a *fair amount of eloquence, extreme generosity,* and *wide knowledge both of civil law and of the military art,* since from boyhood he had accompanied his father on his campaigns. He *therefore* gained control over the city populace and had great influence with the army (*Cim.* 2.1, italics mine).²¹²

Penned over a century after Nepos’s works, Plutarch’s *Vitae* reflects similar leadership priorities.²¹³ In his biography of Pompey, to take one example, Plutarch begins his account by discussing the general’s family history (*Pomp.* 1.1) and then he moves to a discussion of Pompey’s acquired honor:

> There were many reasons for the love bestowed on Pompey; his *modest and temperate way of living, his training in the arts of war, his persuasive speech,* his trustworthy character, and his tact in meeting people…For in addition to his other graces, he had *the art of giving without arrogance* (*Pomp.* 1.3, italics mine).

²¹² Again, in order to assure his audience that he would thoroughly describe the life and habits of the fourth century general, Epaminondas the Theban, he wrote: “[I]t seems to me that I ought to omit nothing which contributes to that end. Therefore I shall speak first of his family, then of the subjects which he *studied* and his teachers, next of his character, his natural qualities and anything else that is worthy of record. Finally, *I shall give an account of his exploits,* which many writers consider more important than mental excellence” (*Nep.* Ep. 1:3–4, italics added). Finally, while each general’s *vita* contains its own balance of strengths and weaknesses, the same four praiseworthy categories become ubiquitous in Nepos’ work: (lineage) *Di.* 1:1–3; *Dat.* 1:1; *Eum.* 1:3; *Ca.* 1:1; *Att.* 1:1; (courage and/or martial prowess) *Thr.* 1:1–3; *Di.* 5:4; *Iph.* 1:1–3, 3:1; *Dat.* 2:1, 7:1; *Ep.* 2:5–6, 5:4–5; *Eum.* 3:3–4, 4:2, 11:4–5; *Reg.* 1:4; *Ham.* 4:3; *Han.* 1:1; *Ca.* 1:2; *Att.* 22:1–4; (education and/or eloquence) *Di.* 1:3; *Dat.* 6:8; *Ep.* 2:1–3, 5:1, 6:4; *Ca.* 3:1–2; *Att.* 1:2–3, 4:1; (generous patronage) *Alc.* 3:5, 11:4; *Ep.* 4:2; 17:7:3–4; *Ag.* 8:4–5; *Phoc.* 1:1–4; *Att.* 2:4–6, 4:4, 6:1–5, 11:3–6.

²¹³ Plutarch lived from approximately 50–120CE. While he spent most of his life in Chaeroneia (Northern Central Greece), he lived in Athens and Rome for long durations.
In his description of the great orator Marcus Tullius Cicero, though Cicero did not come from a high family line nor did he have a distinguished military career but was almost exclusively known for his rhetorical ability, Plutarch still feels compelled to mention the orator’s standing in these categories.

Beginning with a review of Cicero’s family line (Cic. 1.1–2), our biographer moves quickly to an extended celebration of Cicero’s superlative academic performance and rhetorical ability (Cic. 2.1–4.7). Again, though Cicero was little-known for his military exploits, Plutarch is careful to remind his readers that, “for a little while he also did military service under Sulla in the war against Marsians” (Cic. 3:1). Finally, a bit later in the biography, we find out that Cicero was both personally thrifty (Cic. 7:3) while at the same time generous to those under his leadership (Cic. 8:1). In sum, though separated by over a century, both Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch seem compelled to discuss a leader’s birth, martial prowess, education and eloquence, and patronage. As we turn to a consideration of two extant laudationes (funeral speeches), we will note a similar set of leadership preferences.

III. Laudationes and Exemplary Leadership

The pageantry of elite Roman funerals had a robust pedagogical function. As Harriet Flower concludes, “[t]he traditional catalogue of virtues displayed within the framework of the aristocratic funeral expressed the needs and aspirations of Roman society” (1996: 279). Not only did the parade of imagines, the accompanying religious rituals, and their lavish expenditure display many of the categories outlined above, but

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214 Since the funerary oration has been discussed at some length in the previous chapter, my present treatment will be brief.
the culminating element of an elite funeral—namely, the laudatio—centered around leadership virtues. As we consider the extant portions of two funeral speeches, we will note the conspicuous presence of the Roman idiom of leadership outlined above.

In the oldest extant laudatio (late third century B.C.E.), preserved by Pliny the Elder in book seven of his Naturalis Historia, Q. Caecilius Metellus eulogizes his father Lucius, who Pliny tells us “...was priest, twice consul, dictator, Master of Horse, member of the Board of Fifteen for land distribution”. In this speech, the eulogizer lists the ten “greatest and best things (maximas res optimasque) which prudent men spend their lives in search of.” All but the last of our above-mentioned leadership categories appear in the laudatio. Pliny records the following:

In this speech, he left it in writing that his father had achieved the ten greatest and best objectives in pursuit of which wise men spend their lives. That is to say, he had aimed to be a first-rate warrior, a most accomplished orator, and the bravest of generals; to have control of affairs of the utmost importance, to enjoy the greatest honour, to possess supreme wisdom and to be acknowledged as the foremost senator; to make a large fortune in an honourable fashion, to leave behind him many children, and to be the most distinguished individual in the country. According to the son, all these things had been achieved by his father and by no one else since the foundation of Rome (Nat. 7.139–140, italics mine).


217 The speech does not explicitly mention Lucius’ piety, though we know one could not function in “the highest offices” without meticulously tending to issues of religio. Moreover, the fact that Pliny introduces the record by recounting Lucius’ priestly offices assumes the figure’s piety. In terms of lineage, while we do not hear of Lucius’ own ancestors (whose imagines presumably surrounded Quintus as he spoke), he does show concern for ascribed honor insomuch as he “left many children” to enjoy their inherited name.

218 Cf. Flower: 1996: 135. Regarding this fragment, Flower elaborates: “In this case the summary of the ten most important aristocratic virtues, of which Metellus is made the ultimate example in each category, could not be more telling for any investigation of aristocratic values and their relation to funeral ceremonies. In its very form it points to the development of history written in terms of individual exempla, measuring careers through the ages by a seemingly absolute standard of excellence” (1996: 139).
In a second fragmentary preservation of what is likely a *laudatio*, and the last I will consider here, Aulus Gellius recounts the words of Sempronius Asellio about P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus (late 2nd century B.C.E.). Gellius only briefly summarizes this account in his *Noctes Atticae* while deploying Crassus, “a distinguished and eminent man” (*clari atque incluti viri*), as an *exemplum* of military discipline. Similar to the above *laudatio* preserved by Pliny, the eulogizer notes attributes corresponding to four of our five categories. In this case the late subject’s martial prowess is not explicitly mentioned—though based on Gellius’ exemplary use of Crassus, he clearly had a reputation for effective military leadership:

>This Crassus is said by Sempronius Asellio and several other writers of Roman history to have had the five greatest and chiefest of blessings; for he was very rich, of the highest birth, exceedingly eloquent, most learned in the law, and chief pontiff (Gel. 1.13.10, italics mine).219

The original eulogies were anything but impromptu speeches to small audiences lauding arbitrary attributes; they were highly intentional messages to the broadest audiences featuring invaluable leadership qualities. As Flower concludes, these socially and culturally powerful broadcasts “…created the impression and often the conviction of a consensus within society which recognized the achievements of the individual and gave him an absolute position within the social order.”220 As we conclude with Cicero’s fatherly advice on issues of leadership and social prestige, much of his instruction fits well into my heuristic categories. As we will see, moreover, the Orator’s advice not only aligns with my tentative model, but he illustrates well the Roman penchant for teaching with *exempla*.

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IV. Honorable Leadership in *De Officiis*

In the fall of 44B.C.E., Cicero penned his last known letter to his son studying in Athens. *De Officiis*, as he would title it, was a collection of three books which served as a substitute for the Roman Senator’s presence. Dyck summarizes, “[i]t was meant as a call to order, an emphatic reminder of his [Cicero’s son’s] responsibilities to himself, his family, and his society” (1996: 13). As an open letter, however, this ostensibly father–son communication was also meant “…for an entire category of young readers in need of similar advice, as they sought, not merely a career, but a set of guiding principles for life” (1996: 16). This letter, moreover, encapsulates Cicero’s years of experience as a senior statesman and provides a prime opportunity for him to, “…sum up his achievements and the lessons that Marcus could gain from them” (Henriette 2010: 320). Thus, as Cicero communicates what he believes are the proper activities and aspirations of Rome’s next generation of elite young men, we can be certain that his advice is coming from a place of deep conviction and is informed by decades of political experience.

The second book of *Off.* provides a particularly good point of departure for our look into Cicero’s conception of an honorable leader as here our Orator focuses his discussion on those socially valuable characteristics and behaviors “…by which we can gain the ability to win and hold the affections (*studia*) of our fellow-men” (*Off.* 2.19).

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221 Andrew Dyck translates *Officium*, a Ciceronian adaptation of the Greek term καθήκον, as “appropriate action” (1996: 8).


223 This study will use the English translation of Walter Miller (*LCL*: 1913).
To begin his catalogue of honorable activities and attributes, Cicero returns to a subject which he dealt with exhaustively in his first book, namely, the leader’s virtues. Writing with the fresh memory of the ambitious, and in Cicero’s mind, abusive leadership of Julius Caesar, Cicero begins his discussion by first delineating the various motives leading individuals to submit to another’s authority (*imperio*) and power (*potestati*). Of these motives, including fear, desire for advancement, and greed (*Off.* 2.22), he reminds his son that “[t]he highest, truest glory depends upon the following three things: the affection, the confidence, and the mingled admiration and esteem of the people” (*Off.* 2.31). Cicero then proceeds to discuss those virtues, accomplishments, and attributes that best win this admiration. Among the items worthy of such esteem, Cicero underscores the importance of family lineage, briefly covers military distinction only to prefer acts of civic courage, firmly advocates rhetorical ability, and provides a prolonged excursus on the effective use of money. The importance of a leader’s pious responsibility to the gods, however, is only indirectly touched upon.²²⁴

*IV.A. Noble Lineage in De Officiis*

Cicero continues his exhortation to his son—who was evidently “…not taking his studies seriously enough”—by reminding him about the importance of ascribed honor.²²⁵

Although Cicero himself was a *novus homo*, in that no member of his family had previously been a senator, he nonetheless recognizes the palpable social reality of one’s family name:

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²²⁴ To be sure, Cicero spills much ink on the topic elsewhere. See his *De Haruspicum Responsis, De Natura Deorum*, and *De Divinatione* for his focused discourse on *pietas* in matters of *religio*.

²²⁵ Dyck (1996: 12).
For, if anyone in his early youth has the responsibility of living up to a distinguished name (celebritatis et nominis) acquired either by inheritance from his father (as, I think, my dear Cicero, is your good fortune) or by some chance or happy combination of circumstances, the eyes of the world are turned upon him; his life and character are scrutinized; and, as if he moved in a blaze of light, not a word and not a deed of his can be kept a secret (Off. 2.44).²²⁶

Similarly, in his first book Cicero describes his son’s possession of “…the inheritance of that glory of mine and the duty of imitating my deeds” (Off. 1.78), before deploying the exempla of Autinus, the son of Publius Mucius, and Africanus, the son of Paulus who strove to “attain eminence in the same department of service” as their distinguished fathers (Off. 1.116). These examples are then followed up with a pair who not only inherited distinction from their fathers, but “…have added luster of their own”, namely, “Africanus, who crowned his inherited military glory with his own eloquence”, and “Timotheus, Conon’s son,” who “…proved himself not inferior to his father in military renown and added to that distinction the glory of culture and intellectual power” (Off. 1.116).²²⁷ Cicero closes this discussion summarizing the incalculable worth of a virtuous family name: “The noblest heritage, however, that is handed down from fathers to children, and one more precious than any inherited wealth, is a reputation for virtue and

²²⁶ Off. 2.44. Henriette outlines well Cicero’s approach to dealing with his own lack of noble bloodline: “Whilst rejecting this argument from ancestry, Cicero adopted a similar tactic and argued for three alternative claims to ancestry: that some Romans were such great men that they stood as exempla for all Romans; that past homines novi stood as exempla for aspiring new men; and, finally, that one could choose to imitate specific historical individuals as one’s personal exempla... The third claim, that from personal exempla, is by far the most substantial and sophisticated of the three claims in Cicero's works” (2010: 152).

²²⁷ Consistent with these earlier exempla, he introduces his third book with a patriarchal exhortation communicating his “eager anticipation” that his son will “imitate [his] industry,…emulate [his] course of political honors, and…perhaps, rival [his] name and fame” (Off. 3.6). Cicero does qualify the above exempla noting that there are some circumstances in which a son cannot follow his father’s path, noting Publius Cornelius Scipio who “…followed his fathers path, but couldn’t follow in military matters due to physical weakness” (Off. 1.121).
worthy deeds; and to dishonor this must be branded as sin and a shame” (*Off. *1.121).\(^{228}\) Clearly, Cicero understood that his son’s political success in the honor-driven Roman political scene would be both assisted by and measured against the Ciceronian family name.\(^{229}\)

*IV.B. Courage and Martial Prowess in De Officiis*

Cicero continues his adumbration of the praiseworthy characteristics and activities of an aspiring young leader by acknowledging another essential category of honorable Roman leadership, namely, martial ability. Although Cicero qualifies his advice with a fatherly reminder that “[w]orks of the soul (*animi*) are more important than those of the body (*corporis*)” (*Off. *2.46), nevertheless, as a prominent participant in Roman politics, he understood the proper route for young aspiring leaders: “Well, then, the first thing to recommend to a young man in his quest for glory is that he try to win it, if he can, in a military career. Among our forefathers many distinguished themselves as soldiers” (*Off. *2.45).\(^{230}\) In light of Cicero’s own minimal military background, his advice in this regard seems to better reflect the values of the *populus Romanus*, with its

\(^{228}\) Commenting on *Off.* 1.121, Andrew Dyck explains: “Presumably the reason for this counsel is that one is likely to have inherited some of the same *ingenium*” (1996: 293).

\(^{229}\) Related to his interaction with both ascribed honor and the virtues of a leader, Cicero implores his audience to regularly and consistently exercise filial piety (*Off.* 1.12, 54–55, 58).

\(^{230}\) In the same paragraph Cicero praises his son’s success in this area: “when Pompey placed you in command of a cavalry squadron in this war, you won the applause of that great man and of the army for your skill in riding and spear-throwing and for endurance of all the hardships of the soldier’s life” (*Off.* 2.45). See also Corbeill (2001: 278).
“…passion for military glory” (*Off.* 1.61), than it reveals his own personal leadership preferences.\(^{231}\)

His view of ideal courage is perhaps best understood as one reviews the numerous qualifications he places on the inherent worth of one’s military prowess. In the first book, for example, Cicero reminds his son that although “[m]ost people think that the achievements of war are more important than those of peace[,]…this opinion needs to be corrected” (*Off.* 1.74). “There are, therefore, instances of civic courage,” he continues, “that are not inferior to the courage of the soldier. Nay, the former calls for even greater energy and greater devotion than the latter” (1.78).\(^{232}\) He undergirds this view with a litany of *exempla*, including himself, who equaled if not surpassed their military counterparts in bravery.\(^{233}\) Whatever his personal opinions on the value of martial prowess and courage, however, he still populates his letter with an abundance of *exempla* of courage in combat.\(^{234}\) In short, despite his own preference for civic courage, as we

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\(^{231}\) Henriette provides a helpful summary of Cicero’s own military background: “During the 80s bc, Cicero served on the staff of Pompeius Strabo, and probably met the son of the general, Cn. Pompeius, the later Magnus. Later, he served with Sulla, and notably not with Sulla's enemy Marius, Cicero's fellow Arpinate. Cicero does not emphasize this military aspect of his education, which normally formed an important step up the ladder for the politically aspiring young *eques*. His later reluctance to take up a military command and his impatience as to the end of his tenure as provincial governor in Cilicia attest to his lack of taste for campaigning” (2010: 32).

\(^{232}\) See also 1.65 and 1.81. Andrew Dyck comments on Cicero’s advice, “[t]his program is in line…with…Cicero’s own talents and preferences;” (1996: 205–206).

\(^{233}\) Here, Cicero compares brave civic leaders—including, Solon (1.75), Lycurgus (1.76a), Publius Nasica (1.76b)—with corresponding military leaders—namely, Themistocles, Pausanias and Lysander, and Africanus. He then notes his own salvation of the republic as well as Marcus Cato’s brave counsel with respect to the third Punic war (*Off.* 1.77–79). He concludes this list by stating, “And so diplomacy in the friendly settlement of controversies is more desirable than courage in settling them on the battlefield… [w]ar, however, should be undertaken in such a way as to make it evident that it has no other object than to secure peace” (*Off.* 1.80).

\(^{234}\) These include famous names like the *Decii*, the *Scipiones*, and Marcus Atilus Regulus (*Off.* 3.15–16; 99). In the first book, moreover, Cicero admits the rhetorical attraction to such *exempla virtutis*: “…Hence there is an open field for orators on the subjects of Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, and Leuctra, and hence our own Cocles, the Decii, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, Marcus Marcellus, and countless others…” (1.61).
have seen above, Cicero could not seriously discuss a leader’s acquisition of honor without at least mentioning the importance of some form of military distinction.

**IV.C. Rhetorical Ability in De Officiis**

Having mentioned the most obvious route to public esteem (i.e. courage and proven martial ability), Cicero rushes to the praise of that honor-attracting quality that he himself was known for, namely, eloquence.\(^{235}\) Here, after making a distinction between debating power/oratory (*contentio/oratio*), and conversation (*sermo*), Cicero ranks them according to their respective abilities to win public acclaim: “…there can be no doubt that of the two this debating power…counts for more toward the attainment of glory.”\(^{236}\) He then cites letters of fatherly advice (much like the one he is writing) from “three of the wisest men in history”—namely, Philip to Alexander, Antipater to Cassander, and Antigonus to Philip the Younger. In these letters, Cicero continues, the authors “…instruct their sons to woo the hearts of the populace to affection by words of kindness and to keep their soldiers loyal by a winning address” (*Off.* 2.48).

Continuing on, the Senator lauds the political expediency of oratory since, in the forensic speech, the “eloquent and judicious speaker” can stir “the hearts of thousands at once,” and contends, “…if his speech have also dignity combined with moderation, he will be admired beyond all measure, especially if these qualities are found in a young

\(^{235}\) Cicero mentions his own rhetorical ability at the outset of *Off.* (1.2) and in his second book he makes clear that his writing on philosophy and statecraft is but a meager substitute for his true love—oratory (*Off.* 2.3). Henriette affirms, “Cicero's success was founded not on military office, nor specifically on patronage from a powerful nobilis family, but to a greater extent on his oratorical skills and the supporters which his advocacy earned him, including the equites” (2010: 34).

\(^{236}\) *Off.* 2.48a. To be sure, despite his preference for public performances of rhetoric, a large portion of his first book is dedicated to the Roman gentleman’s eloquent deportment in conversation and daily public intercourse (*Off.* 1.25–146).
man” (Off. 2.48b–c). Cicero finally deploys an *exempla* list of leaders “exciting the highest admiration” by their speech, including, Crassus, Marcus Antony, Publius Sulpicius (Off. 2.49), and Cicero in his own defense of Sextus Roscius against Sulla (Off. 2.51). In short, for Cicero it is not the sword that excites “…the highest admiration”, but the public demonstration of rhetorical ability.\(^{237}\)

Conspicuously, nowhere in *Off.* 2.17–85 does Cicero mention the importance of a formal education for the leader’s attainment of honor. To be sure, earlier he admits that “…we think it glorious to excel” in “…learning and knowing” (Off. 1.18), and the very project of *De Officiis*, as a collection of fatherly “…precepts [that] must be laid to heart by all who look forward to a career of honor” (Off. 3.6), is a pedagogical one. Nonetheless, on the whole Cicero seems to favor the practical over the theoretical (Off. 1.153), and where he does recommend an education he is careful to clarify that “[t]he principal thing done, therefore, by those very devotees of the pursuits of learning and science is to apply their own practical wisdom and insight to the *service of humanity*” (Off. 1.156, italics mine).

**IV.D. Generous Patronage in De Officiis**

Regarding money, while it is not essential in Cicero’s mind, he has no fundamental problem with the accumulation of wealth, “provided it hurts nobody” (Off. 1.25). The best means of securing such “harmless” gain, moreover, is agriculture since

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\(^{237}\) The Senator later describes the power of eloquence employed as an honor-achieving *beneficium*: “…what is better than eloquence to awaken the admiration of one’s hearers or the hopes of the distressed or the gratitude of those whom it has protected?” (Off. 2.66). Quite in step with the pedagogical preferences of his culture, Cicero claims that the best way to improve one’s clarity and smooth rhetorical delivery is by “imitating those who speak with smooth and articulate enunciation”, including, the two Catuli, Lucius Crassus, and the witty and humorous Caesar, who surpassed them all as “even at the bar he would with his conversational style defeat other advocates with their elaborate orations” (Off. 1.133).
“...of all the occupations...none is...more profitable, none more delightful, [and] none more becoming to a freeman” (Off. 1.151). What is more important than possessing money in Cicero’s mind, however, is the leader’s attitude toward and use of wealth. He clarifies, “...there is nothing more honourable and noble than to be indifferent to money, if one does not posses it, and to devote it to beneficence and liberality, if one does posses it” (Off. 1.68b).

It is this very topic, in fact, with which he closes his prescription for the praiseworthy pursuits of an aspiring leader. Already, Cicero has reminded his audience that “…the love of people generally is powerfully attracted by a man’s mere name and reputation for generosity…” (Off. 2.32), but in 2.52–85, he details the best way to effectively demonstrate such “…kindness (beneficentia) and generosity (liberalitate)”:

The manner of showing it is twofold: kindness is shown to the needy either by personal service, or by gifts of money. The latter way is the easier, especially for a rich man; but the former is nobler and more dignified and more becoming to a strong and eminent man (Off. 2.52).

Cicero’s preference for patronage in the form of personal service is not surprising since as a legal advocate he regularly provided invaluable non-monetary assistance to his clients. Yet, his partiality in this direction is also the result of what he perceived to be

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238 Commenting on the ideal of frugality, Cicero later adds: “One’s physical comforts and wants, therefore, should be ordered according to the demands of health and strength, not according to the calls of pleasure. And if we will only bear in mind the superiority and dignity of our nature, we shall realize how wrong it is to abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and voluptuousness, and how right it is to live in thrift, self-denial, simplicity, and sobriety” (Off. 1.106).

239 “Now that I have set forth the moral duties of a young man, in so far as they may be exerted for the attainment of glory (ad gloriam adipiscendam), I must next in order discuss kindness (beneficentia) and generosity (liberalitate)” (Off. 2.52).

240 He backs this assertion by again citing Philip’s fatherly letter to Alexander advising the young ruler not to corrupt with money (Off. 2.53). Cicero continues, “Nevertheless, we should sometimes make gifts of money; and this kind of liberality is not to be discouraged altogether” (2.54).

241 Off. 2.65–66.
the politically-motivated abuse of gift-giving by ambitious and wealthy public figures trying to make their way up the *cursus honorum.*

Where Cicero does advocate the leader’s use money in the pursuit of honor, a recourse that even he had to take earlier in his political career (*Off.* 2.58), he places a number of limitations on such expenditures. First of all, in Book One, he qualifies that an “…act of kindness shall not prove an injury either to the object of our beneficence or to others; in the second place, that it shall not be beyond our means; and finally, that it shall be proportioned to the worthiness of the recipient” (*Off.* 1.42). Cicero then urges his son to ensure that his generosity both discriminates based upon the character of his clients (*Off.* 1.45; see also 2.71) and protects the existing social order. Secondly, Cicero encourages balance in the aspiring leader’s giving: “One’s purse, then, should not be closed so tightly that a generous impulse cannot open it, nor yet so loosely held as to be open to everybody” (*Off.* 2.55).

Finally, rather than over-spending on the lavish public entertainments expected from an aedile, Cicero suggests a material patronage of a different sort: “The generous, on the other hand, are those who employ their own means to ransom captives from brigands, or who assume their friends’ debts or help in providing dowries for their daughters, or assist them in acquiring property or increasing what they have” (*Off.* 2.56). Cicero then illustrates both expressions of generosity—superficial spending on

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242 *Off.* 2.55–58; see also 1.44.

243 Cicero cites Julius Caesar’s redistribution of property as an *exemplum* of unjust generosity (1.43).

244 *Off.* 1.50.

245 A few lines later, Cicero explains that “[r]ansoming prisoners from servitude and relieving the poor is a form of charity that is a service to the state as well as to the individual” (*Off.* 2.63).
entertainments and the more honorable spending—with corresponding exempla. Of those
spending too lavishly to win popularity, Cicero includes Publius Crassus (“the Rich”),
Lucius Crassus, Gaius Claudius, the Luculli, Hortensius, Silanus Lentulus who, “eclipsed
all that had gone before him,” and Pompey whose “exhibitions in his second consulship
were most magnificent of all” (Off. 2.57). While Cicero views the latter expenditures as
immorally large, he also recognizes the political liability inherent in neglecting to finance
such public events and amenities. Illustrating this, he references Mamercus, a rich man
who avoided the aedileship to save money, only to lose his election for consul (Off.
2.58a).

His final cluster of exempla deploys prominent leaders (including himself) who
won office by spending only reasonable sums in the quest for office.246 Such political
realities notwithstanding, Cicero still views caring for prisoners and relieving the poor as
a form of generosity that he prefers to funding public exhibitions since the former are “a
service to the state as well as to the individual” while the latter are best suited to “...those
shallow flatterers...who tickle with idle pleasure, so to speak, the fickle fancy of the
rabble” (Off. 2.63). In the end, Cicero concludes, “...the greatest privilege of wealth is,
beyond all peradventure, the opportunity it affords for doing good, without sacrificing
one’s fortune” (Off. 2.64).

Equal in importance to the emerging leader’s use of money is his maintenance of
a healthy emotional relationship with it. Personally, Cicero is very concerned that his son
avoid avarice (Off. 1.24) and “...ambition for wealth; for there is nothing so characteristic

246 In addition to himself, these exempla include, Orestes, Marcus Seius, and Milo, Lucius Philippus, Cotta,
and Curio (Off. 2.28–29). Cicero is ambivalent about Pompey’s lavish financial outlay for theaters, temples
and other public structures (2.60).
of narrowness and littleness of soul as the love of riches” (*Off.* 1.68a). With respect to leadership and public opinion, more importantly, he declares at the close of his second book, “[t]here is…no vice more offensive than avarice, especially in men who stand foremost and hold the helm of state. For to exploit the state for selfish profit is not only immoral; it is criminal.”

Cicero references the elder Africanus’ praiseworthy reputation for integrity in administering public funds (*Off.* 2.75), and the younger Africanus is displayed imitating this ancestral example in not profiting from the destruction of Carthage. Conversely, the Gracchi merely provoked strife in their attempts at land redistribution. This all to say, for Cicero it is proper patronage, not merely wealth, which qualifies one for true leadership.

**IV.E. Piety and Other Cardinal Virtues in De Officiis**

In *Off.*, Cicero only minimally interacts with the category of piety (*pietas*) toward the gods. In his first book he mentions the supreme importance of one’s “duty to the immortal gods” (*Off.* 1.160), but he takes for granted that his audience will know what that duty includes. In the second book he mentions that “[w]orship and purity of character will win the favor of the gods” (*Off.* 2.11), and in the third book he explains that the Gods have established human fellowship and desire to have it maintained (*Off.* 3.28). Beyond

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247 *Off.* 2.77. A few lines earlier, Cicero advises, “...the chief thing in all public administration and public service is to avoid even the slightest suspicion of self-seeking” (2.75).

248 *Off.* 2.76.

249 *Off.* 2.80. Aratus, who Cicero praises as a “...great statesman, and worthy to have been born in our commonwealth”, handled land issues much better than the Gracchi (2.81–82).

250 Again, see his *De Haruspicum Responsis*, *De Natura Deorum*, and *De Divinatione* for extended Ciceronian treatments of piety with respect to the divine.
these references, to my knowledge, Cicero does not expand on the importance or exercise of piety.

Additional virtues which are not included in my heuristic taxonomy above are discussed in relation to leadership at some length. While these are by no means absent in traditional Roman leadership discourse, they are evidently treasured by Cicero. Although after introducing his discussion in Book 2 on virtue and honor, Cicero admits that “…he who has one virtue has them all” (Off. 2.35), he seems to give the virtue of justice (iustitia) a significant role in the agonistic quest for honor: “…justice, above all, on the basis of which alone men are called ‘good men,’ seems to people generally a quite marvelous virtue.”

In the following paragraph, he points his son to the historical link between statesmanship, justice, and honor:

This, then, is obvious: nations used to select for their rulers those men whose reputation for justice was high in the eyes of the people. If in addition they were also thought wise, there was nothing that men did not think they could secure under such leadership. Justice is, therefore, in every way to be cultivated and maintained, both for its own sake (for otherwise it would not be justice) and for the enhancement of personal honor and glory (Off. 2.42–43).

As a prominent political figure during the rise and fall of Julius Caesar in the turbulent years of the late Republic, Cicero knew all too well the general tendency for newly empowered leaders to “…fall a prey to ambition for either military or civil authority” or

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251 Off. 2.36. Jerome Neyrey, in his study of Josephus’ Vita in light of the rhetorical genre of encomium, provides a helpful summary of the cardinal virtue of justice as it was defined by various Greek philosophers and teachers of rhetoric (1994: 194).

252 Cicero similarly reminds his son, “If, therefore, anyone wishes to win true glory, let him discharge the duties required by justice. And what they are has been set forth in the course of the preceding book” (Off. 2.43). See also Off. 1.20, 63, 88, and 157.
to be “…carried away by it so completely that they quite lose sight of the claims of justice.”

Justice, however, was not the only virtue he frequently recommends for the social success of an aspiring young leader; throughout the letter, Cicero underscores the importance of a statesman’s temperance (modestia/ temperantia). Jerome Neyrey provides a succinct definition of the classical virtue of temperance: “Aristotle defined this as, ‘…the virtue that disposes us to obey the law where physical pleasures are concerned’ (Rhet. I.1366b. 14–15). It might well be defined in terms of ‘self-control’ or ‘abstinence’” (1994:193). Cicero continues his advice by advocating such self-denial:

[T]hose are regarded with admiration who are thought to…be free from all dishonor and also from those vices which others do not easily resist. For sensual pleasure, a most seductive mistress, turns the hearts to the greater part of humanity away from virtue; and when the fiery trial of affliction draws near, most people are terrified beyond measure (Off. 2.37).

In his first book, moreover, the Orator explicitly connects this virtuous disposition with political leadership:

Statesmen, too, no less than philosophers – perhaps even more so – should carry with them that greatness of spirit and indifference to outward circumstances to which I so often refer, together with calm of soul and freedom from care, if they are to be free from worries and lead a dignified and self-consistent life (Off. 1.72).

In short, for Cicero, honored leaders were not only the physically superior, the financially prosperous, or the well-educated; praise-worthy statesmen were to be paragons of justice and temperance. To say it all, in addition to the latter attributes, in his De Officiis Cicero seems to prefer a well-born, eloquent leader who has demonstrated bravery in the civic

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253 Off. 1.26. Similarly, see Off. 1.62.

254 For more Ciceronian quotes on temperance see Off. 1.69, 79, 89, 92–93, 98, 100–103, and 128.
arena, if not on the battlefield, and who carefully balances personal frugality and reasonable generosity as a patron.

**Conclusion**

The foregoing study began by outlining five broadly shared categories of exemplary Roman leadership (noble lineage, courage/martial prowess, education and eloquence, generous patronage, and piety toward the divine). With this heuristic outline of the Roman idiom of exemplary leadership in place, I demonstrated its relative importance in the biographies of Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch, the two extant *laudationes*, and Cicero’s *De Officiis*. All this contributes to my larger project in two major ways. First, while the prior chapter clarifies the pedagogical and rhetorical tools and approaches generally preferred by both elite and non-elite Roman’s grappling with the question of ideal leadership, the present chapter makes explicit many of the prized cultural values often associated with this leadership discourse. As we will see in subsequent chapters, moreover, many of the texts explicitly contending for a non-Roman “native” tradition still seek to claim unique ownership of (or establish a monopoly over) the key components in this polythetic taxonomy of Roman leadership characteristics.

Second, without diminishing the fact that these attributes and accomplishments frequently play a robust role in ancient Mediterranean conversations on leadership, my closer examination of specific texts demonstrates that individually these categories always remained up for debate. Thus, for example, though he largely agrees with the shared Roman opinions on ideal leadership outlined above, the fact that Cicero shows little enthusiasm for the quintessentially Roman value of courage in combat, preferring
instead the leader’s eloquence, proper patronage, and justice and temperance, illustrates well the enduring room for contestation on the topic.

The general tendency of authors and texts to describe issues of birth, courage, eloquence, wealth, and piety with respect to a leadership figure, moreover, makes it all the more noteworthy when a text either ignores or rejects one or a number of these characteristics. Likewise, the more or less enduring valence of these categories brings into sharper relief a text’s celebration of an attribute or disposition either ignored or considered ignoble by a number of hegemonic participants in the Roman discourse.

Before examining texts using Christ and other “Christ-imitating” figures as leadership exempla, I will devote the following chapter to the way in which two first-century Jewish authors respectively deploy ancestral leaders as honorable and authoritative exempla. In so doing, my study will seek to illustrate both the relative popularity and context-specific appropriation of the formal aspects of the Roman discourse of exemplarity by socially and ethnically diverse Mediterranean authors as well as their use of the discourse to articulate native leadership ideals.
Chapter 3: Moses as an Exemplum of Native Leadership in Philo’s De Vita Mosis and Josephus’s Antiquities 2–4

While a great deal of ink has been spilled exploring the influence of Greek culture and politics on Jewish communities and texts in the eastern Mediterranean, the present chapter will consider the appropriation of more specifically Roman values and cultural forms by two Jewish authors from this region—namely, Philo of Alexandria and Flavius Josephus. After reviewing their likely exposure to specifically Roman cultural forms and political realities, I will explore the way in which these thinkers appropriate aspects of the Roman discourse of exemplarity in their narrative construction of Moses. At the same time, I will examine the degree to which they adopt, adapt, or eschew the traditional Roman leadership priorities outlined in the previous chapter.

This exploration will close by highlighting Philo and Josephus’ extreme exaltation of their exemplary leader in light of a concurrent trend in Valerius Maximus’ collection of ancestral Roman heroes. As a whole, the present chapter aims to illustrate both the utility of this originally foreign discursive habit for the construction, maintenance, and advertisement of “native” (in this case “Jewish”) leadership priorities, as well as providing a robust context for my exploration of the deployment of “Christ” and “Christ-like” figures as leadership exempla in antiquity.

255 My focus on these authors’ appropriation of and interaction with Roman cultural trends does not deny the robust influence of Greek culture and politics on their literature, but simply seeks to, in the words of Annette Reed, “...move beyond the all-too-common appeals to an undifferentiated ‘Greco-Roman’ culture in research on early Judaism” (2009: 188). In this way, my methodology follows Reed (2009) and Osterloh (2008). Osterloh, to be sure, focuses more specifically on Roman political discourse and the Hasmonean Dynasty. For major voices in the recent scholarly conversation on Judaism and Hellenism, see Hengel (1974), Levine (1998), Gruen (1998), and Collins (2000).

256 As explained in my introduction, I use the term “Jewish” here in light of Shaye Cohen’s discussion of its complex and historically developing meaning (1999).
Before turning to their respective literary portrayal of Moses, I will briefly introduce both authors, beginning with Josephus, and seek to outline their likely proximity to and participation in Roman politics and culture.

Josephus (ca. 37–115 C.E.) was a Jewish general in Galilee who became a prisoner-of-war following general Vespasian’s conquest of Jotapata during the first Jewish revolt (ca. 66–74 C.E.). After predicting Vespasian’s ascent to the Imperial throne, Josephus (Flavius) became an imperial client and wrote a series of works for his Roman patrons. The Jewish Antiquities, his largest extant work, likely finished during Domitian’s reign (ca. 93–94 C.E.) and including 20 volumes with over 60,000 lines of text, was designed as “…a handbook of Judean law, history and culture for a Gentile audience in Rome…keenly interested in Jewish matters…[and desiring]…a comprehensive but readable summary of the Judean constitution and philosophy: origins, history, laws and culture” (Mason 1998: 101).

Like his much younger contemporary, Philo (ca. 20 B.C.E.–50 C.E.), was a prolific writer and noted leader in his community. He was a member of the leading Jewish family in Alexandria—his brother was an alabarch (controller of customs) and his nephew, leaving behind traditional Jewish customs, went on to become a procurator of Judea and then governor of Egypt. Philo’s recognized leadership was proven in 38 (or 39) C.E. as he was selected to head an envoy send to Rome to plead a case to the emperor Caligula on behalf of a portion of the Alexandrian Jewish community. His voluminous

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257 For a general introduction to Josephus’ life as well as a substantial bibliography of Josephan scholarship, see Rajak (2002).

258 Other than Philo’s own work, Josephus provides our only other primary source on the former’s life and career. The balance of Josephus’ brief discussion centers around Philo’s political life as well as that of his brother and nephew. In Josephus’ evaluation, Philo was “a man eminent on all accounts” (Ant. 18.259 and 20.100). See Sly (1996: 4).
extant literary works (written in Greek) consist mostly of allegorical expositions and commentary on the Pentateuch.\textsuperscript{259}

Though, as we will see, both writers differ in a number of specifics, Tessa Rajak summarizes well Josephus and Philo’s comparable background and experience: “From a base within the small Jewish social elite of the Roman east, each acted for a period as political leader, defender of the Jews and delegate to the emperor” (2001: 199). But how “Roman” was Josephus and Philo’s “Roman east”? Before turning to their more specific contexts (Galilee/Judea and Alexandria respectively), I will review the degree of Romanization in the east in general.\textsuperscript{260}

\textbf{I. Josephus and Philo’s Relative Exposure to Roman Culture and Politics}

\textbf{I.A. Romanization in the East}

In his work on Romanization in the early Imperial period, Ramsay MacMullen begins his discussion focusing on the eastern Mediterranean. Due to the deeply rooted and highly developed cultures in the east, he contents, relatively few Roman cultural, administrative, or technological innovations had considerable staying power. According to MacMullen, following Actium (31B.C.E.) and in the wake of the massive settlement of Roman veterans (up to 60,000 in 20 years!) it was not Roman law, language or imperial veneration that represented significant and lasting marks of Romanization.\textsuperscript{261} Rather,

\textsuperscript{259} For the classic introduction to Philo, see Sandmel (1979). For a more recent introduction, see Morris (1987); Grabbe (1992: 372–374); or Amir, Yehoyada and Maren Niehoff (2007: 59–64).

\textsuperscript{260} The balance of my discussion of the Roman east in general will follow MacMullen (2000).

\textsuperscript{261} Regarding law, he notes the abundance of exceptions and treaties negotiated at the time of surrender as well as the local Roman governor’s flexibility in law enforcement as factors mitigating local conformity to official Roman legislation (2000: 9–11). In terms of Latin, moreover, MacMullen summarizes, “Latin did not take root for ordinary communication. It generally vanished within a generation or two in immigrant
MacMullen lists only a handful of attractive, and thus enduring, Roman ways in the east. These include gladiatorial exhibitions (munera), systems of land measurement, and a few architectural and technological innovations.262

Of the abovementioned Roman contributions in the east, the munera were as popular as they were value-laden. J.P. Toner summarizes:

The games were appropriate for the conditions of the new imperial order because they drew on traits, themes, and developments that were highly significant to the Roman way of life—the need to have honour and to avoid shame, the need to display publicly one’s manliness, the need to act properly in the public sphere of life—all of which came together, articulated through the symbolic use of violence (1995: 39).

In addition to the munera, Roman architectural trends and material culture—often marked by the values of displaying Roman superiority, reciprocity, and triumphal

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262 With respect to the munera, MacMullen cites Antiochus IV Epiphanes’ eventually welcomed eastern introduction of these violent spectacles following his long sojourn as a hostage in Rome (MacMullen: 2000:16; cf. Livy 41.20). MacMullen summarizes further, “...a century after Antiochus; and with an increase in both the Roman presence and our sources we hear rather casually of gladiatorial exhibitions in a scattering of Greek cities over the course of the next generation“ (2000: 16). Moreover, as we will see, amphitheaters increasingly appeared in urban centers throughout the east—including Jerusalem and Alexandria. As to architecture, Roman concrete proved particularly useful in construction and Roman architecture—especially aqueducts and sizeable public baths—consequently flourished (MacMullen 2000: 17–19).

263 Toner further reflects on these moral messages: “The manner of death and the display of bravery counted, and these were highlighted by the proximity of death...What counted was the ability, itself an expression of virtus (bravery/manliness/virtue), to master oneself, and one’s body; to master the slightest movement when face to face with death” (1995: 39). Alison Futrell, likewise, highlights the arena as a site for the dissemination of Imperial ideology. In addition to the communication of Roman virtues, however, she focuses more on the role of the amphitheater as a center for celebrating the imperial cult: “The amphitheater encouraged a large number of participants to join in the celebration of the central authority, thereby confirming the divine status of the emperor and legitimizing his rule The establishment of this sort of corporate identity in the provinces was a more important goal in the early Principate, when a new series of social relationships was being established, running vertically and horizontally, between center and periphery, on many levels and involving many social groups. The amphitheater accommodated and fostered the formation of such communal bonds” (1997: 6).
display—increasingly gained a foothold.\textsuperscript{264} Other than these aspects of “Romanization,” Greek culture remained hegemonic in the east; MacMullen concludes, “The Romans, to no one’s surprise, won out where arms, administration, and practical technology were in question. As to the rest, in familiar words, captive Greece took Rome captive” (2000: 29).

Having quickly sketched out the situation in the eastern provinces in general, I will now treat those aspects of Roman culture likely experienced by Josephus and Philo specifically. Starting with Josephus—who spent approximately 30 years of his life in the Galilee and Jerusalem and the rest in Rome—I will briefly discuss Romanization in the Levant as well as Jewish-Roman relations in the Rome, before focusing on Josephus’ personal background and “Romanization.”

**I.B. Josephus’ Exposure to Roman Culture and Politics**

In terms of the introduction of Roman culture in the Levant, two non-Roman leaders played significant roles. In the mid second century B.C.E., Antiochus IV not only introduced gladiatorial spectacles but conducted a 30 day festival commencing with a parade of his soldiers in Roman deportment. In addition to these festivities, in Roman magisterial fashion, Antiochus was in the habit of judging lawsuits from a curule chair.\textsuperscript{265} Over a century later, in the words of Lee Levine, Herod the Great fostered a policy seeking “to integrate his kingdom as much as possible into the warp and weft of the Roman world” (1998: 46). Consequently, according to Josephus, Herodian Jerusalem soon showcased at least three major institutions of Roman entertainment—a theater,

\textsuperscript{264} See MacMullen (2000: 24).

amphitheater, and hippodrome. Further reflecting the Roman penchant for monumental display, Herod regularly broadcast the titles and triumphs of Augustus on many of his structures.

Roman trends were not exclusively introduced from political leaders, however. In Jerusalem, significant areas of Romanization have been identified in the lives of private citizens. Excavations in the 1960’s of the city’s Jewish quarter have uncovered numerous examples of Roman artistic styles and goods. In short, from public institutions to private residences, Josephus’ Jerusalem and the Levant in general would have offered the historian regular encounters with Roman culture.

In Rome, where Josephus spent the remainder of his life, it goes without saying that he would have daily encountered Roman culture—including the ongoing Roman discourse of exemplarity (outlined in my first chapter) and the regular celebration of the leadership characteristics outlined in the previous chapter. But in light of the past expulsions of Jews from Rome or the circumstances leading to his tenure in the Capital—i.e. his role in the Jewish Revolt—would Josephus’ experience of the Romans, their politics and their mores have been primarily negative?

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266 Ant. 15.267–79. In Levine’s analysis, “Herod constructed these buildings with the intention of introducing typical Roman institutions into his capital, thus placing Jerusalem in the cultural forefront along with other major urban centers of the East” (1998: 55). MacMullen further details the operation of amphitheatres in Herod’s realm: “…in his amphitheatres at Caesarea and Jerusalem and other cities, they watched entertainment of a Roman sort: gladiatorial combats and fights with wild beasts” (2000: 22).

267 Ant. 15.279; see MacMullen (2000: 23).

268 Levine describes the remains: “Among the most relevant finds in this regard are mosaic floors featuring geometric and floral designs, frescoes similar to those found at Pompeii featuring architectural designs, colored panels, imitation marble, stucco used in imitation of ashlar blocks or architectural and floral motifs...imported western and eastern terra sigillata, fine or thin-walled ware, Pompeian red ware, Italian amphorae, and perfume bottles” (1998: 49).
Recently, Erich Gruen has challenged the notion that Jews did not or could not fit comfortably in Rome. He argues this in a large part by pointing out both the ad hoc nature the expulsions as well as the fact that our sources indicate such actions were rarely aimed exclusively at Jewish communities, but extended to a number of groups in Rome. Likewise, though Jews in Rome could not escape the discouragement inevitably provoked by the Flavian propaganda advertising *Judea Capta* or the first-hand view of the rebuilt Temple of Jupiter funded by the *fiscus Judaicus*, there remains little evidence that Jewish groups were targeted for ongoing persecution or discrimination in Rome.

Gruen summarizes the situation well:

> the Great Revolt itself does not appear to signal a watershed in Roman discourse on the Jews...the Jews of Rome did not take part in the insurrection. And no obvious shift can be discerned in the perception of Jews, or rather the characterization of Jews, in our Roman sources. This is an unexpected conclusion—but a significant one (2002: 42).

On the contrary, despite their perhaps frustrated subjective experience following the Temple’s destruction, as Martin Goodman points out, a great number of Jews in Rome still enjoyed privileges including Roman citizenship. In short, Josephus’ life in Rome would not have been marked antagonism or hostility simply due to his Jewish identity.

So how might one characterize Josephus’ position and experience when in Rome? To ask a related question, in terms of his historiography, how “Roman” was Josephus?

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269 Gruen summarizes, “Ad hoc circumstances and real or presumed crises called forth the actions...government action (in the testimony that has come down to us) never fastened on them alone: Chaldeans, magicians, Egyptians, collegia, or some other groups simultaneously came under the state strictures” (2002: 52–53). For his extended discussion, see 2002: 29–53.

270 On the psychological discomfort likely initiated by much of the Flavian celebration of victory against Judea, see Goodman (1994: 331).

271 Goodman argues, “[m]ost of the Jews of Rome were Roman citizens. In Roman law, all slaves who had been owned by a Roman citizen and formally granted their liberty in front of a magistrate received citizenship and could hand it on to their descendants in perpetuity (1994: 330).
With respect to Josephus’ status and experience in Rome, in one of the few articles specifically treating Josephus’ Roman identity, Martin Goodman argues for the historian’s relatively comfortable social position in the Capital:

He was an important person in Roman society. Titus and Agrippa II took him seriously enough to give their approval to his work (cf. *Life* §§ 362–67). According to Eusebius (*Hist. eccl.* 3.9.2), he won sufficient prestige to be honoured with a statue in the city and for his work to be placed into public libraries. It is undoubtedly right to insist that he was never as close to the centre of imperial power as he liked to suggest he was (1994: 332). 272

Josephus also enjoyed Vespasian’s grant of Roman citizenship (*Life* 423), and according to Goodman, as a man in his early thirties was “young enough to adopt a new persona and new values, particularly when it is expedient” (1994: 333).

Without question, by the time he wrote *Antiquities*, Josephus would have enjoyed a respectable Roman status and have been well acquainted with and likely influenced by Roman politics and culture. 273 But what impact, if any, did his long tenure in Rome—and thus his extended exposure to Roman discourse on exemplary leadership—have on his historiography and portrayal of ancestral heroes? While scholars have long noted the

272 To be sure, Goodman notes, “[o]ne may doubt whether he had much social contact with Jews among the Roman plebs, let alone whether he mingled in Sabbath services in the slums of Trastevere (although it is a plausible conjecture that he attended a synagogue somewhere in the city), but it is perhaps not so impossible that such Jews might have joined the morning salutatio at his house to ask for his help and amicitia” (1994: 333).

273 Goodman argues, however, that in the final analysis, Josephus never understood his identity as a Roman and did not interpret in the same way a native Roman would. Rather, “Rome in Josephus’ histories is always a distant Italian power, an alien state with which Jews, like other provincials, must do business, rather than an empire to which its inhabitants can feel proud to belong” (1994: 336). Regarding his Roman nomen, Goodman points out: “The earliest extant use of the name ‘Flavius Josephus’ seems to be in the manuscripts of the *Jewish War*, where it is found in the title of the work in Codex Parisinus 1425 (Schürer 1973–87: 1. 47, note 4). It is unlikely that the title in the manuscripts originated with Josephus” (1994: 336).
influence of Greek historiography on Josephus,\textsuperscript{274} following a brief survey of Philo’s Alexandria and experience with Rome, my project will consider in more detail the influence of Roman discourse on Josephus’ work.\textsuperscript{275}

\textbf{I.C. Philo’s Alexandria and Experience with Rome}

Turning to Philo’s encounter with Rome and Roman culture, as we will see, compared with Josephus’ half-lifetime in the capital, the Alexandrian had significantly less interaction with traditional Roman discourse. Nevertheless, Philo’s hometown was not untouched by Roman administrative and cultural approaches and the philosopher himself reflects a relatively high view of the Empire and shares a number of traditional Roman perspectives.

Once the center of Alexander’s kingdom, following Actium in 31 B.C.E. Alexandria had become perhaps the most important Roman province.\textsuperscript{276} Despite the \textit{longue durée} of much Egyptian culture and administration, Roman hegemony brought a not insignificant Roman political and cultural presence to Alexandria. Beyond the most immediate manifestations of “Romanity”—for example, the Roman fleet patrolling the Alexandrian harbors or the Imperial officials parading through the city—many changes in the administration of Alexandria were real and noticeable.\textsuperscript{277}

\textsuperscript{274} Arthur Droge, for example, notes Josephus’ use of the Hesiodic tradition of the Golden age and subsequent decline in his presentation of Genesis (1989: 41–47), and scholars have identified the influence of Thucydides and Herodotus in his themes and language (Schwartz 2010: 93).

\textsuperscript{275} In this way, I will be following the lead of Annette Reed in her excellent investigation of Josephus and Philo’s portrayal of Abraham in light of Roman discursive practices (2009: 185–212).

\textsuperscript{276} In terms of importance, Dorothy Sly estimates that the city included up to 500,000 persons at any given time and was the chief trading center in the Empire (1996: 45, 83).

\textsuperscript{277} Naphtali Lewis notes, to take two examples, the new role of Roman officials despite bearing old Ptolemaic titles, and the, at times significant contrasts between Ptolemaic penalties and those assessed by
Perhaps more noticeable than these—largely technical—administrative changes would have been the public Imperial celebrations and the facilitation of gladiatorial exhibitions in Roman Alexandria. Regarding the latter, as we reviewed above, these Roman games were far from morally neutral festivities and regularly functioned as vehicles for distinctively Roman values and political priorities. In addition to these festivities, Imperial architecture and statuary peppered the Alexandrian landscape. Of those structures materially instantiating the Imperial presence, the great Sebasteum (or Caesareum) constructed beside the Alexandrian harbor and marking Augustus’ arrival by ship on August 1st 30 B.C.E. is the most celebrated. Philo’s extended praise of the commemorative complex suggests its imposing and value-laden nature:

There is no precinct like our so-called Sebasteion, temple of Caesar, the protector of sailors. It is situated high-up, opposite the sheltered harbours, and is very large and conspicuous; it is filled with dedications on a unique scale, and is surrounded on all sides by paintings, statues, and objects of gold and silver. The extensive precinct is furnished with colonnades, libraries, banqueting-halls, groves, gateways, open spaces, unroofed enclosures, and everything that makes for lavish decoration. It gives hope of safety to sailors when they set out to sea and when they return (Legat. 150–151).

Though we do not know the exact nature of the “paintings, statues, and objects of gold and silver” adorning the Sebasteion, we do know that, for Philo and arguably for many of his fellow Alexandrians, they stimulated a sense of Augustan grandeur and celebrated the

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exemplary leadership of the princeps.\textsuperscript{280} This all to say, like Josephus’ Jerusalem, Philo’s Alexandria bore the cultural and administrative stripes of the Roman Empire.

His hometown was not the only site offering Philo exposure to Roman culture and politics; in addition to the comparatively limited cultural display in Alexandria, the philosopher was not unfamiliar with Rome itself—a city, as I reviewed earlier, positively saturated with images and messages communicating and inculcating Roman notions of exemplary leadership.\textsuperscript{281} As the leader of an embassy to Caligula in the wake of a localized outbreak of violence against the Jewish communities of Alexandria,\textsuperscript{282} Philo had to remain in Rome for several months awaiting his embassy’s disappointing meeting with the Emperor.\textsuperscript{283} In short, though Philo was not in Rome nearly as long as Josephus, he was in the capital enough to have, in the words of Maren Niehoff, “...imbibed the cultural as well as political climate” (2001: 88).

Beyond these encounters with Roman administration and culture, as an elite member of the Jewish community in Alexandria, Philo was already relatively well

\textsuperscript{280} Sly summarizes, “[t]he symbolism it held for him comes clear in Philo’s last statement: sea travelers passing through the harbour can rest assured that there is a strong pilot at the helm of the ship of state” (1996: 41). In addition to the Sebastion, we know of two red granite obelisks imported from Heliopolis and fixed in place in Alexandria to further commemorate Augustus. See Sly (1996: 85).

\textsuperscript{281} To be sure, due to the challenges inherent in dating Philo’s extant works, his time in Rome could very well have followed the composition of Mos. 1–2 (the focus of the present chapter), thus eliminating his exposure to the city as an influence on his portrayal of Moses in this work.

\textsuperscript{282} For the sequence of events as well as an analysis of the causes and consequences of the pogrom, see Gruen (2002: 54–67); cf. Sly (1996: 169–177). Regarding the primary aggressors in the violent anti-Jewish outbreak, Gruen concurs with Schäfer (1998: 156–160) in arguing that the disenfranchised Egyptians, not the Alexandrian Greeks, fomented the turmoil: “Insofar as jealousy and animosity might be justified and intelligible, they are much more readily ascribable to Egyptians than to Greeks. The former stood at the bottom of the social and political structure. Rights guaranteed to the Jews in a Hellenic community where Egyptians lacked any standing whatever would surely generate a bitterness that seethed just below the surface” (2002: 63). Moreover, Gruen concludes, the episode was an exceptional case in an otherwise peaceful and politically comfortable Jewish experience in Roman Alexandria (2002: 67).

\textsuperscript{283} On Philo’s longer than expected wait in Rome, see Sly (1996: 176–177).
positioned in the Imperial network. First of all, compared with Greeks and especially native Egyptians, the Alexandrian Jewish communities enjoyed a comfortable political relationship with Rome. Not only were the Jews permitted to be led by their own ethnarch—a political privilege even the Greeks did not enjoy, but in part due to their support of Roman troops during the final years of Ptolemaic rule, Augustus commemorated their loyalty in a stele confirming their religious protections and political privileges (C. Ap. 2.37, 61). Despite the pogrom of 38 C.E.—a situation Gruen contends was “altogether exceptional” and did not reflect Roman policy toward Alexandrian Jews (2002: 67)—as a socio-religious body the Jewish community fared well in Roman Egypt.

Philo, moreover, was not just a part of this community; he was a big part. With a wealthy brother turned Alabarch (Josephus, Ant. 18.259) and a nephew who went on to become the prefect of Egypt (Josephus, Bell 5.45–46, 510; 6.237–42), one could safely argue that Philo was part of one of the most powerful families in Alexandria. Such a position would naturally invite regular interaction with Imperial officials and would place Philo and his family in a position as power brokers between Rome and much of the Alexandrian Jewish community. But did his encounter with Roman culture or

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284 See Barclay: 1996: 40.


286 Gruen summarizes the situation well: “The evidence, ambiguous, complex, and frustratingly fragmentary, nevertheless converges on a central point. The Jews of Alexandria did not suffer oppression under Ptolemaic or Roman governance; they enjoyed freedom to perform traditional rites and to worship the divinity in their own way; and they possessed (unspecified) civic privileges in the larger community” (2002: 78). Likewise, Barclay concludes, “the Jews in Egypt could be regarded as a privileged group at a time when privileges were scarce” (1996: 49).

287 For more on Philo’s family, see Barclay (1996: 68, 105–106). Regarding Philo’s role as a mediator between Roman and the local Jewish community, see Niehoff (2001: 112).
proximity to Roman power demonstrably influence his worldview or at least foster an appreciation for Roman culture and leadership? And more specific to the aim of this chapter, did his exposure to Roman *mores* and discursive practices leave any detectable mark on his historiography or outlook on exemplary leadership?\footnote{The results of this chapter should directly contribute to answering the latter question.}

With respect to the first question, we can cautiously answer in the affirmative. Maren Niehoff (2001) has carefully outlined several areas wherein Philo maintains a high view of Imperial leaders and seems to reflect a number of Roman sentiments and cultural dispositions. She argues that, contrary to most of Philo’s Jewish contemporaries, he appropriated a perspective on bloodline that conformed well to Roman preferences and policies insofar as it preferred matrilineal descent.\footnote{Niehoff observes, “Rome’s impact on Philo’s definition of Jewish descent can especially be appreciated by considering the fact that his matrilineal legislation contradicted his medical doctrine. While he enhanced the mother’s civil status and introduced a degree of matrilineality, he virtually denied her genetic contribution to her offspring” (2001: 27). Later, and more significantly for my project, Niehoff underscores the exegetical influence this distinctively Roman perspective plays in Philo’s work: “Applying contemporary Roman concerns to the Biblical stories...He was the first Jewish exegete who retroactively improved the status of foreign mothers in order to protect their offspring” (2001: 31).} Additionally, Niehoff suggests that Philo constructs his image of the Egyptians based on Roman—and particularly Augustan—stereotypes.\footnote{Niehoff 2001: 54. As it did with issues of bloodline, such ethnic conceptualization colors his exegesis. Joseph and Moses, for example, are deployed as *exempla* modeling how Philo’s contemporary Jews should dwell in Egypt—though these ancestral heroes lived physically in the country, they were always on a spiritual exodus (Niehoff: 2001: 74). Likewise, Philo’s Pharaoh functions as the quintessential barbarian leader (Niehoff: 2001: 55).} Finally, Niehoff contents that just as Romans modeled themselves as protectors of Greek culture and superior exemplifiers of cherished Greek values, Philo both affirms Roman “Greekness” and manifests similar Roman passion for exemplifying Greek values.\footnote{Niehoff summarizes, “[t]his interpretation not only enabled Philo to accept Roman dominion in the Greek East, but also to define the place of the Jews in relation to the Greeks and Hellenism in}
In addition to reflecting Roman priorities regarding bloodline, the role of Egyptians, and the superlative demonstration of Greek virtue, Philo’s works, in the words of Maren Niehoff, “are of special value because they are the first detailed expression of a sustained pro-Roman attitude on the part of a Jewish intellectual” (2001: 112). The balance of Philo’s Imperial affection is directed at Augustus. Particularly noteworthy given my focus on discourse on exemplary leadership in the Roman Mediterranean, Niehoff summarizes,

Philo explicitly presented Augustus as the model of an imperial ruler, implying that any successor departing from the norms he established was no emperor in the true sense. Philo moreover imputed Augustan respect for Jewish customs to the whole imperial household (2001: 132).

Of those leadership attributes celebrated in Philo’s Augustus, the Alexandrian notes his philosophical acumen (*Legat*. 310, 318), his superior and paradigmatic benefaction (*Flac*. 74; *Legat*. 149), as well as his piety in regularly offering sacrifices to the “Most High God” (*Legat*. 157). In Philo’s work, as Niehoff concludes, “Augustus is heralded as a philosopher-king in the style of Moses” (2001: 132).

In sum, though he did not spend contemporary Alexandria. His sense both of affinity with Greek culture and superiority over it aligned him with the leading class of his country” (2001: 158) Much of Philo’s casting the Egyptians in the role of the “barbarian other” relates to this Roman disposition of appropriating and perfecting Greek values. See Niehoff (2001: 53–54).

Furthermore, Philo describes Augustus as the paradigmatic σωτήρ καὶ εὐσφρέτης (*Flac*. 74) and as “the first and the greatest and the common benefactor” (*Legat*. 149); see Niehoff (2001: 81, fn. 25).

Philo describes Augustus as the paradigmatic σωτήρ καὶ εὐσφρέτης (*Flac*. 74) and as “the first and the greatest and the common benefactor” (*Legat*. 149); see Niehoff (2001: 81, fn. 25). On Augustus’ philosophical insight and piety, see Niehoff (2001: 132). Philo’s glowing description of the *Sebasteion* (*Caesareium*), mentioned in my discussion of Roman architecture in Alexandria, again illustrates his affections (*Legat*. 150–151).

The Alexandrian, moreover, saw no fundamental problem with Imperial cult as practiced in the Augustan east. Niehoff summarizes, “He praised Augustus for his more than human nature [*Leg*. 143], and enthusiastically discussed the Alexandrian *Caesareum* which was dedicated to Augustus in his cultic function as protector of sailors...Philo also expected the Jews to go through the regular motions of the imperial cult and express in the synagogues τὰ ὀφέλημα to their benefactors” and ὁσίότης to the whole Augustan house (*Flac*. 48–9). He took for granted that “gilded shields and crowns, monuments and inscriptions” were set up in Egyptian synagogues” (2001: 118).
nearly as much time in the capital as Josephus, Philo of Alexandria was not altogether a stranger to Roman culture and politics.

II. “A Tale of Two Moseses”

Having reviewed both Josephus and Philo’s proximity to Roman politics and culture—including several possible opportunities for their exposure to and interaction with the Roman discourse on exemplary leadership—I will now turn to their respective portrayals of Moses. As test cases representing “non-Romans” adopting, adapting, or subverting Roman discourse in the service of advertising a “native” morality and ethos of leadership, my study will focus on both the content (moral and otherwise) of Josephus and Philo’s respective leadership preferences as well as the discursive form (i.e. narrative approach) of their presentation of Moses’ exemplary leadership. Starting with Josephus’ Moses (Ant. 2–4) then moving to Philo’s Mos. 1–2, my analysis will be organized around the categories of exemplary Mosaic leadership promoted by each author in light of the traditional Roman categories reviewed in chapter 2.

To evaluate their deployment of the formal aspects of the Roman discourse of exemplarity, in my discussion of each author’s most cherished leadership characteristics, I will select a narrative sample or so and analyze it according to the four-fold pattern outlined by Roller (action, audience, commemoration, imitation). In the end, my study will not only provide a more nuanced sketch of Josephus and Philo’s respective leadership priorities, but it will also provide a more clear perspective on the role that

81). Philo’s major problem with Caligula’s proposal to erect a statue in the temple had to do with the latter’s disregard for Jewish anionic worship—not necessarily with the idea of Imperial veneration. See Niehoff (2001: 83).
Roman discursive strategies and leadership values played in these historians’ construction and presentation of their “unique” ancestral leader.

**II.A. Josephus’ Moses (Ant. 2–4)**

Modern scholars have long noted the role of Moses as an *exemplum* of leadership in Josephus’ *Antiquities*. In her introduction to Josephus’ life and works, for example, Tessa Rajak identifies both the historian’s concern for leadership and the role of Moses in addressing this concern: “Embedded in Josephus' narrative, and particularly in his biblical history...appear thumbnail sketches of political skill in action and of the correct or faulty exercise of power. It is once again Moses who stands out unchallenged as the perfect model” (2001: 208). Louis Feldman similarly underscores the central position of Moses in Josephan historiography: “Inasmuch as the reputation of a nation depended so heavily upon the qualities of its leadership… it was particularly effective for Josephus to glorify the personality of Moses for his primary audience, which consisted of non-Jews” (1993: 326). Finally, in light of the burgeoning discourse of exemplarity in the late Republic and early Empire, Jonathan Edmondson observes that Josephus’ presentation of Moses was penned for “…Romans from the city of Rome, who looked to history to provide moral *exempla* for good and bad conduct” (2005: 197).

But which leadership attributes are exemplified by Josephus’ ancestral hero? Moreover, how does Moses size up to the categories of exemplary leadership outlined in

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295 Schwartz likewise notes the significant role of Moses in Josephus’ history: For its part, the *Antiquities* was written to celebrate Moses, but also to show that when the Jews followed God’s laws, they prospered, and when they neglected them they suffered” (2010: 92).

296 Edmonson: 2005: 6. Christina Kraus similarly concludes that Josephus’ paradigmatic portrait of Moses in *Ant.* 2–4 was composed to be intelligible to a Roman (or Roman influenced) audience with a “…growing preoccupation with exemplarity” (2005: 197). See also Reed (2009: 190).
As we will see, the Josephan Moses would certainly meet traditional Roman expectations, as he is above all a courageous general, in addition to being well-born, capable in addressing a crowd and able to effectively meet the material needs of his community. The seminal virtue celebrated by Moses and undergirding every other aspect of his leadership, however, is that of piety. Thus, while Moses could certainly measure up to any of the heroes showcased in the *Forum Augustum* or celebrated in Valerius Maximus’ *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia*, for Josephus, his ability to do so hinges on his proper relationship with the Hebrew God. To demonstrate this I will analyze the Mosaic exemplification of each Roman leadership category in turn before concluding with the importance of the hero’s piety in *Ant.* 2–4.

**II.A.1. Noble Lineage**

On the topic of noble lineage, though his text does not include a narrative segment constructed with the discursive elements identified by Roller, *Ant.* 2–4 reflects a robust concern for bloodline. To begin with, our historian is careful to establish Moses’ inherited honor. In his second book, Josephus showcases Moses’ father Amaram as “…a Hebrew of noble birth” (*Ant.* 2.210), and he further elevates Moses’ family legacy describing Amaram as a pious man of God interceding on behalf of his fellow Hebrews (*Ant.* 2.211).

Furthermore, in the context of the Egyptian princess Thermuthis’ naming and nurturing Moses, Josephus includes a telling commentary:

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297 These broadly popular Roman categories include noble lineage, bravery/martial prowess, education and eloquence, generous patronage, and piety toward the divine.

298 Also, in *Ant.* 3.86, Josephus shows his concern for ascribed honor by referring to Moses as the “…son of Amaram and Jochabadd.”
And all agree that, in accordance with the prediction of God, for grandeur of intellect and contempt of toils he was the noblest Hebrew of them all (ἄριστος Ἑβραῖος). [He was the seventh from Abraham, being the son of Amram, who was the son of Caath, whose father was Levi, the son of Jacob, who was the son of Isaac, the son of Abraham.] (Ant. 2.229). 299

Though Thackeray’s above English translation brackets the latter portion of the verse, in the original Greek this explication of Moses’ lineage is connected to the opening statement with the postpositive causal conjunction “γὰρ.” Thus, a more accurate translation of this passage would read, “...he was the noblest [or best] Hebrew of them all. For he was the seventh from Abraham, being the son of Amram...” In short, in Josephus’ presentation, Moses’ nobility is, at least in part, a direct consequence of his honorable bloodline. 300

II.A.2. Bravery/Martial Prowess

Again corresponding well with Roman presuppositions, in Ant. 2–4 Josephus is careful to paint Moses as a military leader. To begin with, while Moses is never called στρατηγός (“general”) in the LXX, in Ant. 2–4 he is given this title fifteen times (2.241, 300

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299 Translation, Thackery (LCL), 1930.

300 In addition to his lineage, Josephus suggests Moses’ divinely ascribed honor in several ways. First, God appears to Moses’ father in a dream and foretells Moses’ birth and greatness (Ant. 2.215); second, “…their belief in the promises of God was confirmed by the manner of the woman’s [Moses’ mother’s] delivery, since she escaped the vigilance of the watch, thanks to the gentleness of her travail, which spared her any violent throes” (Ant. 2.218); finally, as a child, Moses displayed an unparalleled physical beauty (Ant. 2.224). To be sure, such concern for lineage has a firm place in the traditions of the Hebrew Bible and should not be exclusively ascribed to Roman influence. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Josephus’ Moses could measure up with many of the well-born leaders celebrated in Roman antiquity. In addition to his comments on Moses’ inherited honor, Josephus mentions that of other figures in the narrative. For example, he notes Phineas’ exaltation above his colleagues by virtue of “…his father’s rank—for he was son of Eleazar the high-priest (and grandson of the brother of Moses)” (Ant. 4.152). Josephus also describes some of the “leading men” as “persons conspicuous through the virtues of their ancestors” (Ant. 4.140; also 4.54). I will revisit the issue of Moses’ bloodline in my discussion of Piety in Ant. 2–4 below.
Further advertising Moses’ general martial ability, Josephus embellishes the biblical account by having Moses mention his combat credentials to Pharaoh (Ant. 2.282), and by reporting the Israelites’ “…praises of their general” and Raguel’s (Moses’ father-in-law’s) admiration for “…the gallantry (ἀνδραγαθίας) which he (Moses) had devoted to the salvation of his friends” (Ant. 3.64–65).

Moses’ unequaled military prowess is further showcased in his capacity to organize the camp for combat, quickly accessing the military weaknesses of the Hebrews (Ant. 3.5) and, as a sagacious general, remedying them (Ant. 3.48–51). Part of Josephus’ description of this Mosaic military preparation includes the extra-biblical detail that in readying the Hebrews for a hostile encounter with the Amalekites—who were the “most warlike of the peoples in those parts” (Ant. 3.40)—Moses “…passed a wakeful night instructing Joshua how to marshal his forces” (Ant. 3.51). He further explains that the Hebrews’ military preparedness was one of Moses’ top priorities (Ant. 3.287).

Josephus’ concern to display Moses’ superlative martial qualities is probably best illustrated in the historian’s extra-biblical addition describing Moses’ triumph over the Ethiopians while a general in Egypt (Ant. 2.238–257). Introduced as a “signal proof” to the Egyptians of both Moses’ “merits (την ἀρετήν) and that he was born for their

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301 See Feldman (1992b: 13); see also Damgaard (2008: 221).
303 Feldman notes that, as illustrated in the above reference to the unparalleled “warlike” nature of the Amalekites, Josephus regularly exaggerates the peril that the Israelites were in so as to enhance Moses’ military leadership and victory (1992b: 22).
304 Among current scholarly assessments of the possible motivations driving Josephus’ inclusion of this extra-biblical anecdote, Feldman notes 1) Josephus’ embarrassment over his hero’s killing of the Egyptian (Ex. 2:11–12), 2) Josephus’ explanation of the cause of the Egyptians’ hatred of the Jews, and 3) the story’s enhancement of the military reputation of the Jews (Feldman 1992b:16–20; see also, Damgaard 2008: 222).
humiliation (τὸ ἐπὶ ταπεινώσει μὲν τῇ ἐκείνων), this episode first embellishes the power of the invading Ethiopians (*Ant.* 2.240) before describing the valorous military leadership of the Hebrew hero (*Ant.* 2.241–257). The narrative elements comprising the episode, moreover, correspond well with Matthew Roller’s four-fold outline of the Roman discourse of exemplarity.

**Action**

In terms of specific actions demonstrating Moses’ valor (ἀρέτη), the historian includes both his paragon’s sagacious generalship as well as his personal courage in battle. Regarding the former, Josephus describes Moses’ orchestration of a “marvelous stratagem (στρατηγήμα θαυμαστόν)” whereby he bravely leads the Egyptians through dangerous terrain to facilitate a successful surprise attack against the Ethiopians. Following this victory, we are told, Moses proceeds to assault additional cities resulting in the “...great carnage of the Ethiopians” (*Ant.* 2.248). As to the latter, Moses’ personal courage is paraded in Josephus’ detailed narration of the siege of Saba (*Ant.* 2.249–252).

**Audience**

It is Josephus’ concern to meticulously record the primary audiences’ observations of and reactions to Moses’ martial actions that most clearly suggests the historian’s appropriation of a specifically Roman narrative approach. In this episode, the

305 *Ant.* 2.238. Polybius describes elite Roman funerals—including their displays of *imagines* and the laudationes—as advertising ancestors likewise renowned for such martially proven aretē; see his *Hist.* 6.53.10.

306 Specifically, Moses chooses a shorter, albeit snake-ridden, route for his troops. He protects the Egyptians from deadly bites by releasing ibises (2.248).

307 Josephus further footnotes that, under Moses’ leadership, “...the Egyptian army showed such indefatigable energy that the Ethiopians were menaced with servitude and complete extirpation” (2.248).
primary audiences evaluating Moses’ martial prowess include 1) the Egyptians, 2) the Hebrews, and 3) Tharbis, an Ethiopian princess. While the Egyptians grow increasingly envious and the Hebrews increasingly hopeful it is the fascinating description of Tharbis’ emotional evaluation that proves the most colorful:

Tharbis, the daughter of the king of the Ethiopians, watching Moses bringing his troops close beneath the ramparts and fighting valiantly (μαχόμενον γειναίως), marveled (θαυμάζουσα) at the ingenuity of his manoeuvres (τῆς ἔπνοιας τῶν ἐγχειρήσεων) and, understanding that it was to him that the Egyptians, who but now despaired of their independence, owed all their success, and through him that the Ethiopians, so boastful of their feats against them, were reduced to the last straits, fell madly in love with him (Ant. 2.252).

Viewing Moses’ martial performance from Tharbis’ admiring vantage point encourages Josephus’ readers to similarly marvel at Moses’ courageous leadership.

Commemoration

As will be the case for every episode I will analyze, the primary extant “monument” commemorating the Josephan Moses’ value-laden actions is the text of Antiquities itself. Describing his own presuppositions with respect to the commemorative purpose of biblical histories, Seth Schwartz summarizes that for Josephus,

they are to serve as monuments to the benefactions (euergesiai) and great deeds (aretai) of the founders of our nation...So far, then, Josephus appears to have embraced the idea of memorialization: benefactors and saviors can reasonably expect to have their deeds remembered and their memories perpetuated. Here those doing the remembering are the general

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308 Regarding the Egyptians, Josephus narrates how in the sight of Moses’ feats, the Egyptian priests “who, after having spoken of putting him to death as an enemy, were now not ashamed to crave his succour” (Ant. 2.242). More significantly, we are told how “...the Egyptians, thus saved by Moses, conceived from their very deliverance a hatred for him...suspecting that he would take advantage of his success to revolutionize Egypt and suggesting to the king that he should be put to death...he [the king]...alike from envy (φθόνοι) of Moses’ generalship (στρατηγίας) and from fear of seeing himself abased (πατεινομένως)...was prepared to lend a hand in the murder of Moses” (2.255). Thus, rather than Moses’ murder of an Egyptian prompting the Pharaoh’s dislike (Ex. 2:11–15), in Antiquities, it was the Egyptians malevolent observation of Moses’ superlative military assistance. The “Hebrew hierarchy”, unlike the Egyptians, esteemed Moses’ performance foreseeing in it, “...the possibility of escape from the Egyptians with Moses as their general (διὰ τοῦ Μωυσῆν αὐτοῖς στρατηγεῖν)” (2.243).
membership of the community of Israel, and such commemoration takes
two forms, which in Josephus’s account are scarcely distinguished from
one another: oral recitation and inscription in text (2010: 96).  

As I summarized in the first chapter, moreover, according to Roller the commemoration
of a deed, its communal effects, and its primary spectator evaluation can often appear
exclusively in the form of a narrative.

Beyond Josephus’ own narrative commemoration of Mosaic martial prowess, we
can also observe two commemorative events within the story itself. Moses’ courageous
action, for example, was crowned with his marriage to Tharbis and Moses, secondly,
commemorates God’s hand in his success by rendering thanks (Ant. 2.252–253).

Imitation

Finally, as is the case for the balance of the Josephan exemplary discourse in
Antiquities, though the historian does not explicitly enjoin his readers to follow Moses’
courageous disposition or to share Tharbis’ or the Hebrews’ glowing perspective of his
actions, such imitation is implied throughout the account. The praise for the hero
elsewhere in Ant. 2–4 in conjunction with the snapshots of Moses equipping Joshua for
military leadership carry strong mimetic implications. Furthermore, in her study of
Roman exemplary discourse in Josephus’ portrayal of Abraham, Annette Reed points out
that the absence of explicit calls to follow an exemplum “...is consistent with the genre
conventions of narrative prose history in Roman literary culture of the time.” Citing the

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309 Commenting further on the important role of story-telling among Josephus’ Jewish contemporaries,
Schwartz later concludes, “...the Jews did indeed not reciprocate their benefactors with statues and temples
and honorary decrees but with memorialization, apparently in mainly oral form” (2010: 106).


311 For passages explicitly celebrating Moses’ exemplary leadership, see Ant. 2.205, 216; 4.312–331. On
Moses’ training Joshua, see Ant. 3.49–51.
example of Livy’s History of Rome, she comments, “...explicit appeals to exempla are only sometimes found in the narrative accounts of historical events” (2009: 195–196). Thus, Josephus’ reluctance to directly exhort his hearers toward imitation does not preclude his robust participation in the mimetic aspects of the Roman discourse of exemplarity as it was commonly instantiated in ancient historiography.

In sum, compared with his discussion of Moses’ lineage, Josephus places much greater stress on his hero’s battle-proven courage and martial skill. As he certainly did not miss during his long tenure in Rome, such enthusiasm for an ancestral hero’s military distinction was ubiquitous among both his elite and non-elite neighbors. Josephus, moreover, celebrates this typically Italic core value in a narrative frequently constructed around the common elements of the Roman discourse of exemplarity. In short, whatever else he aimed to achieve, Josephus strove to create secondary audiences which could confess with him that Moses “[a]s a general had few to equal him” (Ant. 4.329).

II.A.3. Education and Eloquence

Similarly aligning with Roman leadership priorities, Josephus frequently highlights Moses’ eloquent and efficacious speech. In addition to his legacy of “inspiring faith” preserved in “…all his utterances” (Ant. 3.318), the Josephan Moses is a leader

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312 It is in this category, in my estimation, that Josephus’ exemplum seems to most clearly reflect the influence of Roman discourse on noble leadership. In a recent article, Finn Damgaard has proposed that Josephus’ emphasis on Moses’ martial qualities was not necessarily driven by a desire to impress his Roman audience, nor was it a product of his Jewish heritage, but it was meant to reflect Josephus’ own career as a general. He summarizes, “Josephus’ picture of Moses and the Jewish people that is given in the Antiquities is governed by his own self-portrait in the Jewish War, and…the many significant similarities between the rewritten portrait of Moses and the self-portrait in the Jewish War were meant to direct the readers to recognize the parallels” (2008: 220). Given Josephus’ apparently significant appropriation of the narrative elements of the Roman discourse of exemplarity, one could argue that Josephus’ desire to highlight his own Mosaic-like military credentials is due to his—consciously or otherwise—adoption of Roman leadership values. Annette Reed, for example, observes how Josephus’ appeal to the military prowess of Moses’ predecessor Abraham “…fits well with the use of exempla in Roman historiography of roughly the same time, wherein the focus often fell on military cunning and courage in battle” (2008: 202).
“…who, with all his other talents, was so gifted in moving a crowd” (*Ant.* 4.25). Most clearly, in his final encomium to Moses, our historian recalls how Moses “…surpassed in understanding all men that ever lived and put to noblest use the fruit of his reflections. In speech and in addresses to a crowd he found favor in every way” (*Ant.* 4.328). Such statements are proven in *Ant.* 2–4 as, on a number of occasions, Moses verbally moves the Hebrews to either piety (*Ant.* 2.330–333; 3.9–22, 302; 4.142–144) or courage (for example, *Ant.* 3.39–62; 4.87–88). Finally, throughout the work, Josephus minimizes biblical details which point to Moses’ rhetorical handicap. He, for example, replaces the biblical Moses’ direct, and embarrassing, confession of ineloquence (Ex. 4:10) with the hero’s more dignified hesitation in light of the size of the exodus project (*Ant.* 2.271). Furthermore, Josephus leaves out completely God’s provision of Aaron as the mouthpiece for the inarticulate Moses (Ex. 4:14–16). Like his emplotment of Moses’ military exploits, in his presentation of Moses’ eloquence in action, Josephus incorporates (to varying degrees) the standard elements distinguishing Roman exemplary discourse. For the sake of time I will, again, limit my analysis to one such exemplary episode—Moses’ speech preceding the battle with the Amalekites (*Ant.* 3.39–62).

Following his description of the provision of water at Elim (*Ant.* 3.9–22)—an episode also featuring Moses exercising “…that winning presence of his and that extraordinary influence in addressing a crowd” (*Ant.* 3.13)—we are told that the Hebrews began to attract the hostile attention of the Amalekites.

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313 Josephus further enhances his hero’s eloquence by describing how Moses composed a number of poems in hexameter verse (*Ant.* 2.346; 4.303). Here, Feldman notes that with such references, Josephus wished to highlight that such poems were “…in the same epic meter as the great poems of Homer” (1992b: 12). While Josephus very well may have had Homeric verse in mind, Virgil’s Roman epic the *Aeneid*—itself seeking to eclipse Homer—is also composed in hexameter and could have equally been the target of Josephus’ cultural competition.
**Action**

As the Hebrews begin to lose heart in the face of their physically superior enemies, Josephus’ Moses springs into action and begins a moving speech—a speech which is completely absent from the much shorter LXX version (Ex. 17:8–16).\(^{314}\) Josephus explains the goal of Moses’ speech: “Moses accordingly proceeded to console (παραμυθίας) them. He bade them take courage (θαρρείν), trusting in God’s decree, through which they had been promoted to liberty” (*Ant.* 3.45). Furthermore, initiating his sagacious preparation for war,\(^{315}\) Moses calls upon the formerly trembling Hebrews “to show the keenest ardour” (*Ant.* 3.46), before exhorting “...the most notable (ἀξιολογώτατος ἰδίᾳ παρεκάλει) of the Hebrews one by one”, and finally addressing “stirring words to the whole host assembled in arms” (*Ant.* 3.52).

**Audience**

Josephus details the positive response of the Hebrew audience, noting “[w]ith such words did Moses embolden (παρεθρόσυνε) the multitude...with hearts elated at the peril...they urged Moses to lead them instantly and without procrastination against the

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\(^{314}\) The Biblical account simply contains the following: “Then Amalek came and fought with Israel at Rephidim. Moses said to Joshua, ‘Choose some men for us and go out, fight with Amalek. Tomorrow I will stand on the top of the hill with the staff of God in my hand.’ So Joshua did as Moses told him, and fought with Amalek, while Moses, Aaron, and Hur went up to the top of the hill. Whenever Moses held up his hand, Israel prevailed; and whenever he lowered his hand, Amalek prevailed. But Moses' hands grew weary; so they took a stone and put it under him, and he sat on it. Aaron and Hur held up his hands, one on one side, and the other on the other side; so his hands were steady until the sun set. And Joshua defeated Amalek and his people with the sword. Then the LORD said to Moses, ‘Write this as a reminder in a book and recite it in the hearing of Joshua: I will utterly blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven.’ And Moses built an altar and called it, The LORD is my banner. He said, ‘A hand upon the banner of the LORD The LORD will have war with Amalek from generation to generation’” (New Revised Standard Version).

\(^{315}\) *Ant.* 3.47–52. These battle preparations include 1) his personal selection of the best warriors (not Joshua’s selection as the LXX tells us), 2) a reorganizing of the camp to protect women and children, and 3) passing a “wakeful night instructing Joshua how to marshal his forces” and to “prove himself in action no whit inferior to the hopes that were built upon him and to win through his command a reputation with his troops for his achievements” (3.45–51).
enemy, since delay might damp their ardour (προθυμίαν)” (Ant. 3.48). Later he again portrays the formerly fearful Hebrew audience as “...animated...by his words (παραστησάμενος τὸν στρατὸν τοῖς τε λόγοις)” (Ant. 3.52).

Commemoration

In addition to Josephus’ narrative forming the primary form of commemoration, within the episode we observe several examples of memorializing the eventual victory to which Moses’ speech contributed. First, we are told, “Moses...presented rewards to the valiant and eulogized (ἐνεκωμίας) their general Joshua, whose exploits were attested (μαρτυροῦμεν) by the whole army” (Ant. 3.59). Secondly, Moses is said to have piously marked the victory by offering “...sacrifices of thanksgiving” and erecting “an altar, calling God by the name of ‘Giver of victory’” (Ant. 3.60). Finally, the Hebrew general “...regaled the troops with festivity” (Ant. 3.60).

Imitation

As I noted in my analysis of the narrative describing Moses’ martial prowess in action against the Ethiopians (Ant. 2.238–257), the fact that Josephus desires leaders to imitate Moses’ efficacious exercise of oratory is, in step with the mimetic aspects of Roman prose history, largely implied. The scene does, however, introduce Joshua as a leader who reflects many of the leadership attributes celebrated in Moses and who is personally trained to assume the latter’s military leadership—presumably including the effective utilization of eloquence.318

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316 To be sure, these commemorations are not specifically focused on Moses’ rhetorical capabilities. They do, however, demonstrate Josephus’ penchant for memorializing.

317 The construction of an alter is the only form of commemoration mentioned in the LXX (Ex. 17:15).

318 Regarding Joshua’s Mosaic-like leadership characteristics, Josephus carefully recounts that Joshua was, “son of Nauekos, of the tribe of Ephriam, a man of extreme courage (ἀνδρευστῶν), valiant in endurance of
This all to say, in the category of eloquence, Josephus once again—consciously or otherwise—embellishes the LXX account tailoring both the narrative elements as well as the Mosaic leadership attributes to fit a much more Roman form.319

II.A.4. Generous Patronage

Compared with his characteristically Roman fascination with and elaboration of Moses’ military accomplishments and rhetorical power, Josephus rarely discusses the Hebrew hero’s personal means or use of wealth for the sake of those in his charge.320 In his narration of the Korah revolt, Josephus does acknowledge the general attractiveness of wealth as it relates to a leader’s honor (Ant. 4.26), and in a few passages he mentions Moses’ personal frugality. The Josephan Moses, for example,

\[\text{toil (πόνους ὑποστήμας γενναίων), highly gifted in intellect and speech (ῥησαί τε καὶ έπείσ ἤκανωσας), and withal one who worshipped God with a singular piety (εὐσεβείας) which he had learnt from Moses, and who was held in esteem (τιμωμένων) by the Hebrews' (Ant. 3.49). In terms of Joshua’s training, as I cited earlier, Josephus tells us that preceding the battle, Moses “...passed a wakeful night instructing Joshua” (Ant. 3.51).}

While his eloquence is certainly celebrated, Josephus does not heavily stress the importance of Moses’ formal education. Whereas, as we will see, Philo’s Moses receives a first-rate, cosmopolitan education (Mos. 1.21–24), Josephus’ account only indicates that he was nourished/brought-up (ἐφέρετο) “...with the utmost care” (Ant. 2.236), with no mention of the substance of such an up-bringing. In fact, nowhere in Ant. 2–4 does our Historian discuss the formal education of Moses. Feldman hypothesizes that Josephus may have remained silent about Moses’ education because “...he may have found it embarrassing to state that Moses, who insisted on a monotheism with no representation of the divine, had been taught hieroglyphics and the details of the Egyptian worship of animals” (1992a: 307). Similar to Damgaard’s view of Josephus’ emphasis on Moses’ martial ability—namely, that since Josephus was a general he portrayed his hero as a general—Koskenniemi hypothesizes that just as Philo’s Moses “...was well educated, as Philo himself was”, so “...Josephus forgets to lead Moses to a Greek gymnasium, as he himself had forgotten to go” (2008: 293). Thus, Josephus’ omission of Moses’ formal education comes not from his Judean background as such, but from his own personal journey. Koskenniemi concludes his examination of the educational ideal in early Judaism as personified in the Moses of six different second Temple Jewish texts (including Ant.) with a similar observation: “It is enough to say here that Moses’ education, even later, interestingly reveals the view the writers have on classical education. To paraphrase: a good way is our own way, and because Moses was one and the best of us, he also received an education similar to ours” (2008:294). To be sure, Josephus is careful to remind his audience that his Moses developed more quickly in understanding and ability than his contemporaries (Ant. 2.230 and 4.328).

Feldman provides one possible explanation for Josephus’ silence on this front: “We may assume that Josephus chose not to stress Moses’ wealth because the philosopher-king in Plato’s ideal state has no private wealth” (1992a: 291).
...having declined every honor which he saw that the people were ready to confer on him...dressed like any ordinary person, in all else he bore himself as a simple commoner, who desired in nothing to appear different from the crowd, save only in being seen to have their interests at heart (Ant. 3.212–213).

Josephus, furthermore, notes Moses’ just use and distribution of wealth (Ant. 4.46, 164) as well as his distain for avarice (Ant. 4.189). Rather than using money and other resources for his own purposes and those of his immediate family, the sole motivation of the Josephan Moses was the welfare of those he led (Ant. 3.13, 297; 4.42, 194, 321).

Thus, though he is less concerned to discourse on the use of material goods than were many of his Roman contemporaries, Josephus was careful to include at least a few snapshots of his Moses demonstrating personal frugality and exercising effective patronage.

Much more than painting Moses as a patron distributing precious resources from his own coffers, the historian prefers to parade the heroic leader as a pious broker mediating between God—the ultimately honorable patron—and the Hebrew community. Josephus’ re-written biblical account of the miraculous provision of quail and manna for the wandering Israelites illustrates well Moses’ role in this regard (Ant. 3.22–32). As I will presently demonstrate, moreover, the extended account is also narrated in conformity with Roller’s four-fold schema.

*Action*

In step with the biblical sequence of the wilderness wandering, this episode recounts one of the early events following God’s deliverance of the Hebrews from Egypt. As the Hebrews being to grumble against Moses in their hunger, he delivers an ameliorating speech (Ant. 3.9–22) and then, whereas in the LXX God simply tells Moses
what he will do about the situation (Ex. 16:4), Josephus’ version features Moses putting aside the Hebrews’ insulting grumbling and taking the initiative to broker God’s miraculous patronage. Following his prayerful intercession, Moses publically announces that, “...he had come to bring them from God deliverance from their present straits” (Ant. 3.23), just before the Hebrews are inundated with quail (3.35) and blessed with manna (3.27). All along the way, Josephus is careful to closely connect the miraculous provision with the interceding actions of Moses. He comments on the manna, for example that

... while Moses raised his hands in prayer, a dew descended, and, as this congealed about his hands, Moses surmising that this too was a nutriment come to them from God, tasted it and was delighted; and, whereas the multitude in their ignorance took this for snow and attributed the phenomenon to the season of the year, he instructed (ἐδιδάσκει) them that this heaven-descending dew was not as they supposed, but was sent for their salvation (ἐπί σωτηρίᾳ τὴν αὐτῶν) and sustenance (Ant. 3.27).

Again different from the limited Mosaic role in the biblical account, here Moses’ prayerful gesture directly commences the nourishment and his instruction and, as we will see in a moment, his example are required for its proper enjoyment.

Audience

The Hebrew community occupies the role of the primary judging audience in Josephus’ account. As in other passages throughout Ant. 2–4, Josephus meticulously details their responses. Following Moses’ descent from the high place of his intercession,

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321 Josephus details Moses’ selfless intercession: “But, holding those feelings of theirs induced by stress to be not unreasonable, he concluded that he ought to approach God with supplication and entreaty; and, mounting a certain eminence, he besought Him to grant some succour to His people and relief from their distress...” (Ant. 3.22).

322 To be sure, the biblical account does have Moses answering the Israelites’ questions regarding the identity and proper collection of the substance (Ex. 16:15–16). Nevertheless, Ant. places much more stress on Moses’ step-by-step initiation of the blessing and instruction and example in its consumption (Ant. 3.27).
Josephus records that the Hebrews, “...on seeing him all radiant at the divine promises, passed from dejection into a gayer mood” (Ant. 3.24). Josephus also describes the audience’s experience of delight in the product of Moses’ intercession (Ant. 3.28). In short, through such detailed audience descriptions, Josephus invites his readers to experience Moses’ unique patronage through the eyes of the hungry Hebrews.

**Commemoration**

In addition to the main Josephan narrative commemoration of Moses’ brokering divine patronage, the account itself includes at least two commemorative responses to the results of this leadership activity. The first, only indirectly remembering Moses’ role, includes the hero’s own prayerful thanksgiving for God’s provision (Ant. 3.25). The second, commissioned and sustained by God himself, more directly commemorates Moses’ role in providing for the Hebrews: Josephus remarks, “...to this very day all that region is watered by a rain like to that which then, as a favour to Moses (καθάπερ καὶ τότε Μωσεί χαριζόμενον), the Diety send down for men’s sustenance” (Ant. 3.31). Though the LXX narrates God’s command to commemorate the manna provision by keeping an omer of the substance for generations to come (Ex. 16:32–34), Josephus’ unique account is careful to note that the original provision came about “as a favour to Moses” (Ant. 3.31), and thus centers more closely around the hero rather than just the Divine.

**Imitation**

Beyond the underlying implications toward Mosaic imitation in Ant. 2–4, this episode portrays the Hebrews following Moses’ own trust in the goodness of God’s

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323 Josephus, moreover, is meticulous in describing Moses’ proximate position to the Hebrew audience (Ant. 3.23–24).
material provision. Following Moses’ tutorial on manna consumption, he leads by example and is the first to consume the divine gift. Following this, Josephus records how the Hebrews, “imitating their leader (οἱ δὲ μιμοῦμενοι τὸν στρατηγὸν), were delighted with what they ate” (3.28). Thus, while Josephus indirectly suggests that good leaders, like Moses, broker divine blessings for their community, he more directly calls his readers/hearers to follow Moses’ example in trusting in God’s provision.

In sum, though in the category of patronage his portrait of Moses does not conform as closely to traditional Roman preferences as the leadership characteristics surveyed earlier, Josephus’ hero does correspond well with the ideals of Italian austerity outlined in my second chapter. Also, he is a leader who faithfully provides for the needs of his community—albeit by interceding with the ultimate patron, God.

II.A.5. The Josephan Favorite: “Piety”

Of the leadership virtues celebrated in Ant. 2–4, Josephus above all portrays Moses a paragon of piety (εὐσέβεια). Steve Mason’s summary of the role of piety in the

324 In the LXX, rather than imitating Moses’ manna consumption, the Israelites simply do as Moses tells them (Ex. 16:15–17).

325 Seth Schwartz explains this Josephan trend preferring divine over directly human patronage: “For Josephus, God is patron and euergetes (AJ 4.213; 4.317; 6.211; 7.206) more than he is lord. Indeed, Josephus almost never uses the terms despotes (master; AJ 1.272; 4.40) or kyrios (lord) for God, and, unlike many of his Christian and rabbinic near contemporaries, avoids characterizing Israel’s relationship to God as one of douleia—’avdut—that is, slavery or vassalage” (2010: 94). Noting a related trend, Martin Goodman comments on the contrast between Roman and Jewish views of the social utility of money: “Among Jews, by contrast, the possession and expenditure of wealth were almost irrelevant to social status....The public display of wealth on behalf of the community did not in itself bring social status in Judean society” (2007: 342).

326 Other classical virtues celebrated in Josephus’ Moses (though they are eclipsed by his piety) include justice (Ant. 3.66–67; 4.46, 50, 214) and temperance (Ant. 2.290; 4.143, 322, 328–329). While Feldman deals with the Josephan Moses’ virtues systematically according to the cardinal virtues (Feldman: 1992b), I have folded a discussion of Mosaic wisdom (φρόνησις) and courage (ἀνορεία) into my larger categories of “rhetoric/education” and “martial ability” respectively.
larger Josephan corpus provides a good point of departure for our look at pious Moses in

_Antiquities:_

For Josephus, then, εὐσέβεια is a one-word summary of the whole Jewish system of religion, instigated by God, articulated by Moses, administered by the priests, and shared by the whole nation. Moses’ success, he allows, lay in his making all of the virtues elements of εὐσέβεια rather than making εὐσέβεια count for only one virtue among many (Ag. Ap. 2:170).

‘Εὐσέβεια’, he says, ‘governs all our actions (πράξεις) and occupations (διατριβαί) and speech (λόγοι)’ (Ag. Ap. 2:171). 327

Consistent with Mason’s observations, at the outset of _Antiquities_, Josephus reminds his audience that it was Moses, “the great lawgiver under whom they [οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι] were trained in piety (εὐσέβειαν) and the exercise of the other virtues” (Ant. 1.6). More than just a teacher of piety, however, Josephus paints Moses as an _exemplum_ of service to God. 328 Unlike Philo’s portrayal of Moses (Mos. 1 and 2), as we will see, Josephus is

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327 Mason: 1991: 86. Earlier, Mason argues that “[ε]ὐσέβεια and its cognate verb and adjective occur 144 times in Josephus. Although he occasionally speaks of ‘filial’ piety, he uses the εὐσέβεια word-group almost always to denote piety toward God. Every nation has its own traditional form of εὐσέβεια, but Josephus wants to show (especially in Ant. and Ag. Ap.) that Jewish εὐσέβεια is particularly worthy [quotes Ag. Ap. 2.188]” (Mason: 1991: 85). Mason further observes the connection between justice and piety in Josephus: “He [Josephus] can also restrict εὐσέβεια to action that is directed toward God, in which sense it is complemented by δικαιοσύνη, which refers to human relationships” (1991: 88–89). See also Feldman: 1992b: 47.

328 As S. Scott Bartchy has insightfully emphasized, the proper point of departure in any analysis of an individual or group’s religious expression or service to God (i.e. piety) is to first define what that individual or group means when they use the term “God” (2002: 89–104). Thus, as we seek to understand Josephus’ portrayal of Moses’ piety, we must first explore his understanding of divine power in _Antiquities_. Unfortunately for our present theological purposes, Josephus says relatively little about God in this work. Consistent with this, Louis Feldman concludes: “…that the _Antiquities_ is a historical book rather than a book of theology is clear from Josephus’ repeated statements (1.25, 192, 3.143, 4.198, 20.268) that he intends elsewhere, presumably in a separate work which he never lived to write, to discuss such theological matters” (Feldman: 1993: 301). Nevertheless, we will quickly sketch out several aspects of God as they are described in Ant. 2–4: 1) God is sovereign over human history (Ant. 2.209, 222, 225; 4.47), 2) God is a community-forming Power and has a people, Israel, who he helps and protects (Ant. 2.332, 336; 4.185), teaches (Ant. 3.14–15), disciplines (Ant. 4.51–56), and fight for (Ant. 2.268; 3.309; 4.87–88, 316), 3) God is concerned with order expressed in ritual performance (Ant. 3.100, 107, 202), and finally, 4) God desires justice in human relationships (Ant. 4.214) and he distributes it based upon good and bad works (Ant. 1.14; 4.180, 313). Consequently, as we analyze Moses’ piety we will likely see a high degree of correspondence between these aspects of divine power and the Mosaic expressions of service to God.
careful not to elevate Moses to a divinity/quasi-divinity. Nevertheless, the Josephan Moses exudes unparalleled thankfulness for God’s help (Ant. 2.253, 329; 3.25, 3.60–61), he shows a virtually unwavering trust in God’s provision and protection (Ant. 2.329, 333, 336; 3.13), and he, not Aaron, functions as the paradigmatic priest in both his prayers (Ant. 3.22–26, 33, 212–213) and ritual performance on behalf of the people (2.349; 3.107, 204). Josephus’ version of the parting sea narrative illustrates Moses’ pious leadership well and, unsurprisingly in light of the episodes dissected above, conforms well to Roller’s framework for exemplary Roman discourse (Ant. 2.334–348).

**Action**

In this account, the exemplary actions of Moses include his intercessory prayer (Ant. 2.335–337), his exhortations to trust God’s military advocacy as well as his taking the first steps through the parted sea (Ant. 2.339). While the LXX depicts Moses urging the people to “Fear not, stand firm, and see the salvation of the LORD, which he will work for you today” (Ex. 14:13–14), it does not include the elaborate Mosaic prayer or his leadership in physically walking through the parted sea first and beckoning the Hebrews to imitate such trust. Thus, though Moses’ piety is certainly not a complete

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329 On Moses as a divine figure in Philo, see Mack (1995:18) and Satlow (2008: 506). Feldman maintains that Josephus’ reserve in this regard was “…particularly necessary in view of the frequency among the Greeks of the apotheosis of heroes, such as Dionysus, Heracles (cf. Diodorus 4.38.3–5, 39.1–2), and Asclepius” (1992a: 322).

330 Feldman has correctly observed that, as a rule, Josephus removes biblical details and episodes depicting Moses’ distrust in Divine Power (1992b: 47–48).

331 Moses’ priestly function fits with Mason’s contention that “[a]ccording to Josephus, this εὐοεῖα finds its centre in the Temple cult. It requires the offering of prescribed sacrifices and the celebration of feasts” (1991: 85).

332 Once pinned between the sea and the Egyptian army, rather than mustering troops, “Moses took his staff and made supplication to God,” admitting, “…if there be any means of salvation at all for this host which at thy will has left Egypt, thine it is to provide it” (Ant. 2.335).
Josephan addition to the LXX (as, for example, Moses’ martial prowess seems to be) the historian significantly elaborates the piety of his paradigmatic leader.

**Audience**

While the LXX does mention the Egyptians as well as the Israelites as viewing audiences, Josephus is careful to detail their presence and responses. First, the historian is careful to note that Josephus, following an exhortation, let the Hebrews “...towards the sea under the eyes of the Egyptians (τῶν Ἄγνωπίων ὄρων)” (*Ant.* 2.334). Equally concerned to give a play-by-play of the Egyptian viewing, Josephus continues, “the Egyptians at first deemed them mad...but when they saw them far advanced unscathed...they made speed to pursue them” (*Ant.* 2.340). Seeing the Hebrews’ safe crossing further “...stimulated the ardour of the Egyptians for the pursuit” and soon led to their perishing “...without a single one remaining to return with tidings of the disaster” (*Ant.* 2.344). In the LXX, the Egyptians’ doomed following is stimulated by God’s hardening of their hearts (Ex. 14:17), not their viewing the results of Moses’ pious leadership. Finally, as I will discuss further in my treatment of the pericope’s mimetic aspects, the Hebrews’ perspective of Moses’ successful intersession on their behalf is equally detailed by Josephus while only mentioned in passing in the LXX.\(^{333}\)

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\(^{333}\) Regarding their crossing, the biblical account simply narrates, “[t]he Israelites went into the sea on dry ground, the waters forming a wall for them on their right and on their left” (Ex. 14:22). To be sure, describing the aftermath of God’s deliverance, the LXX does pay some attention to the Hebrew spectators: “Thus the LORD saved Israel that day from the hand of the Egyptians, and Israel saw (εἶδον Ἰσραήλ) the Egyptians dead on the seashore. Israel saw (εἶδον δὲ Ἰσραήλ) the great power that the LORD used against the Egyptians, so the people feared (ἐφοβήθη) the LORD, and they believed in the LORD and in his servant Moses” (Ex. 14: 30–31). Nevertheless, while the totality of audience descriptions in *Ant.* 2.334–348 should not be attributed exclusively to participation in Roman discourse or Josephus’ desire to highlight Moses’ leadership, the historian spends far more time describing judging spectators than does the LXX.
Commemoration

While, Josephus’ Antiquities itself provides the primary monument to Moses’ pious leadership, commemorative activities also saturate this episode. In addition to the Hebrews’ enthusiastic celebration of God’s Mosaic-sponsored deliverance (Ant. 2.345), we are told that “...they passed that whole night in melody and mirth, Moses himself composing in hexameter verse (ἐξαμετρητον νῷ) a song to God to enshrine His praises” (Ant. 2.346). Again, while the biblical account—which Josephus is careful to credit (Ant. 2.347)—is not without mention of similar memorializing action, including a congregational song and a women’s chorus,334 the Josephan Moses’ commemorative composition seems to, in very Roman fashion (i.e. Virgil’s Aeneid), compete with the culturally hegemonic Homeric epics written in hexameter.

Imitation

Finally, the call to follow the Josephan Moses’ pious leadership is not only implicitly present throughout Antiquities, but is explicitly depicted in this scene. Once the sea parts, we are told, Moses “…set the first foot upon it and bade the Hebrews follow him and pursue their way by this God-sent road” (Ant. 2.339).335 Their leader’s trust in God’s deliverance provokes them to, “without more ado, [speed] forth with zest, assured of God’s attendant presence” (Ant. 2.340). Just as the Hebrews were rewarded by imitating Moses’ pious trust, the narrative seems to suggest, so Josephus’ contemporaries will be as they seek after and follow faith-filled leaders.

335 Again, this exhortation to imitation is completely absent from the LXX account.
Beyond this episode and the previously mentioned snapshots, Moses’ reliance on God undergirds almost every leadership category reviewed above (lineage, martial prowess, eloquence, and patronage). It is God’s selection of Moses—not simply his proper bloodline—that secures his leadership, his military roles and victories are inseparably linked to his relationship with God, Moses’ speeches are almost exclusively calls to reliance on God, and as I reviewed above, his primary role is not as patron per se, but as a mediator of God’s patronage. In short, if as Steve Mason argues, “Josephus sets up εὐεργετής as the crucial test for the competence of Jewish (and other) public figures” (1991: 86), the Moses of Antiquities passes with flying colors.

Having examined the Josephan deployment of Moses as an exemplum in light of both the form and content of the Roman discourse on leadership, I will continue this section by briefly considering Philo’s Moses in De Vita Mosis 1–2 before closing with a

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336 In Josephus’ account of Korah’s rebellion (Ant. 4.14–58), for example, Korah, a negative leadership exemplum, “...thought that he had a greater right to enjoy all this glory himself, as being richer than Moses without being his inferior in birth” (Ant. 4.14). In the end, while acknowledging Korah’s superiority in wealth and equality in birth, Moses underscores that only God’s choice is sufficient to establish Moses (and Aaron) in a position of leadership (Ant. 4.29).

337 On the topic of martial ability, Josephus tells us that Moses’ selection as a general in Egypt’s battle with the Egyptians was not based upon his prior demonstration of skill, but due to God’s advice that the Egyptians “take the Hebrew for their ally” (Ant. 2.241). Additionally, while his courage and martial prowess certainly contribute to the Hebrews’ various victories, it is Moses’ pious reliance on God that ultimately wins the day every time. When the Hebrews are trapped by the Egyptians at the sea, for example, rather than martial troops for battle, “Moses took his staff and made supplication to God”, admitting, “…if there be any means of salvation at all for this host which at thy will has left Egypt, thine it is to provide it” (2.335). Their battle with the Amalekites, to take another example, is ultimately won thanks to Moses’ reliance on God (Ant. 3.52–62).

338 Moses’ speech to the grumbling Hebrews at Elim centers around several reminders of God’s past provision (Ant. 3.14–21) and his eloquent charge in the face of the Amalekites concludes with an unmistakable call to piety as he urges them to “…regard their own army as great and lacking in nought—arms, money, provisions, all those things on the possession of which men rely in going to war-deeming that in having God as their ally they possessed them all; while that of their adversaries should appear as puny, unarmed, weak...” (Ant. 3.45).
comparison of the traditional Roman discursive elements and leadership values in both authors’ accounts.

**II.B. Philo’s Portrayal of Moses’ Exemplary Leadership in Mos. 1–2**

Like Josephus, Philo of Alexandria was driven by a robust pedagogical agenda as he re-wrote the lives of famous Hebrew ancestors. He commences his *De Abrahalomo*, for example, with the following explanation:

> Since it is necessary, to carry out our examination of the Law in regular sequence, let us postpone consideration of particular laws, which are, so to speak, “images” (εἰκόνων), and examine first those which are more general and may be called the “archetypes” (ἀρχετύπων). These are such men as lived good and blameless lives, whose virtues (ἀρετῶν) stand permanently recorded in the most holy scriptures, not merely to sound their praises, but as an instruction to the reader and as an inducement to him to aspire to the same (καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔνσιν ἀγαθήν).\(^{339}\)

On the Alexandrian’s re-writing of such patriarchal accounts, Annette Reed concludes that regardless of Philo’s use or neglect of specific Greek or Roman technical rhetorical tools, his approach is nonetheless “…predicated on a view of the past that he shares both with his Hellenistic predecessors and with his Roman contemporaries.”\(^{340}\) Throughout his narrative presentation of Moses’ life (*De Vita Moses* 1–2), Philo affirms this exact literary and pedagogical project, clarifying that he intends to write the “story [βίον] of this greatest and most perfect of men” (*Mos*. 1.1), who

> ...in himself and his life displayed for all to see, he has set before us, like some well-wrought picture, a piece of work beautiful and godlike, a model (παράδειγμα) for those who are willing to copy it (μιμεῖσθαι). Happy are

\(^{339}\) *Abr.* 3–4. All English translations in this paper will rely on F.H. Colson (*LCL*). See also Reed (2009: 192–193).

\(^{340}\) See Reed (2009: 194).
those who imprint, or strive to imprint, that image (τὸν τύπον) on their souls.\textsuperscript{341}

In short, for Philo, Moses was not simply the giver of the Law, but “the reasonable and living impersonation of law” (\textit{Mos.} 1.162).

The style of Philo’s biography of Moses (\textit{Mos.} 1–2) stands apart from the rest of the Philonic corpus in that in these works he rarely employs allegory, preferring largely strait-forward narrative.\textsuperscript{342} Though establishing the intended audience of \textit{Mos.} 1–2 has not been without debate, Peder Borgen seems to best account for the evidence in concluding that, “the \textit{Life of Moses} … was written to tell Gentile readers about the supreme law-giver whose laws they are to accept and honour. It was also [written] to strengthen the Jews” (1984: 235).\textsuperscript{343}

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{341} \textit{Mos.} 1.158. In a recent article, Michael Satlow takes a different approach than Reed and contends that Philo never intended for his Moses to become a blueprint for leadership. Rather, Satlow argues, in Philo’s works Moses is so idealized that he “cannot be emulated; no mortal can ever hope to reach his state of perfection” (2008: 507–508). Later in his article, Satlow calls Moses’ life a “theoretical model” never intended to provide “paths to perfection” for ordinary human beings (2008: 511). In addition to the passage just quoted (\textit{Mos.} 1.158), Philo’s introduction to \textit{Mos.} 1 brings Satlow’s claim into question. Commencing his own native account, Philo criticizes his Greek contemporaries for not fully benefiting from the biographies of their own heroes: they do not, he laments, use “…their natural gifts to the full on the lessons taught by good men and their lives” (\textit{Mos.} 1.3). If Philo expects others to learn from the lives of their ancestral heroes, one could argue that he expected no less for his own βιογραφία on Moses.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{342} In terms of genre, P.L. Shuler argues that Philo’s \textit{De vita Mosis} is an example of an encomium biography (βιογραφία): “The narrative is replete with embellishment and amplification associated with encomium biographies” (1990: 94). Louis Feldman agrees with Shuler’s assessment: “If we are looking for a single term to classify \textit{De Vita Mosis}, that term would be ‘encomium’” (2007: 18). Feldman, however, rightly cautions against positing an overly reified distinction between encomium, biography, and history. He summarizes, “[d]uring the Hellenistic period the gap between historical encomium, biography, and history had narrowed, so that, in effect, it became impossible to separate them” (2007: 21). Finally, and more significant for the present study exploring Roman influences in Philo’s work, Feldman suggests that, stylistically, \textit{Mos.} 1 reflects more closely a “Plutarchian” history while \textit{Mos.} 2 resembles a “Suetonian” biography (2007: 22).

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{343} Similarly, Hywel Clifford notes that Philo’s work was responding to “[t]he pressure to present an ideal Moses who represents everything that intellectual Greeks and Romans, as well as cultured Jews, could ever wish for” (2007:165–166). Regarding the complex internal evidence, on the one hand, several elements in Philo’s work suggest that it was meant for the encouragement and edification of a Jewish (Judean) audience. The Alexandrian’s censures to those who would “subvert the ancestral customs…by adopting different modes of life” and “lose all memory of the past” seem to have potential “apostate” Jews in mind (\textit{Mos.} 1.31). A similar audience would fit nicely with Philo’s detailed accounts of the Levites slaughtering idolaters (\textit{Mos.} 2.170–173) and Phinehas slaying the fornicating Hebrew (\textit{Mos.} 1.301–304). Portions of
As we will see when compared with Josephus’ *Ant.* 2–4, though Philo’s presentation of Moses includes a number of characteristics traditionally celebrated in Roman conversations on leadership, it demonstrates far less concern with the hero’s martial ability—which, again, was a supremely cherished attribute in Rome—and, reflecting Philo’s own Platonic presuppositions, celebrates philosophical education over eloquence. Moreover, though Philo clearly shares many Hellenistic and Roman assumptions about the exemplary use of history, compared with Josephus’, his narrative episodes by and large do not appear to be structured around the elements of Roman exemplary discourse. In terms of my approach, like the above treatment of *Ant.* 2–4, I will review the salient aspects of leadership in *Mos.* 1–2 in dialogue with my heuristic model of Roman leadership (developed in chapter 2). Again, where an extended action sequence celebrates a particular attribute I will analyze it in light of Roller’s four-fold schema before concluding this section by noting any additional Mosaic leadership attributes featured in *Mos.* 1–2. I will commence this study with the subject that Philo sees as “…necessarily the right place to begin” (*Mos.* 1.5), namely, with Moses’ lineage.

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*Mos.* 1 and 2, on the other hand, seem to be directed at a gentile audience. In several places, for example, Philo showcases the popularity of Jewish customs and laws among the gentiles (*Mos.* 2.17, 27–43) and in his account of the exodus, he makes clear that the Hebrews did not treat the Egyptians unjustly while collecting valuables from them (*Mos.* 1.141). In his case for a predominately gentile audience, Louis Feldman contends that the work was “…intended for the non-Jewish world in hope, if not of actually winning it to convert to Judaism, at least of explaining [the Pentateuch] to an intelligent and scientifically sophisticated audience” (2007: 13). To be sure, later in his monograph, Feldman qualifies his position as he argues that Philo “is directing his essay not only to non-Jews but also to those Jews who sought assimilation with Gentiles” (2007: 208). Jenny Morris contends that *Mos.* 1 and 2 was intended primarily for a gentile audience (1987: 855). If my present project offers any insight into the question of authorship, Philo’s deployment of Moses as an *exemplum* of leadership could equally be provided for the instruction of a Jewish audience as well as for apologetic and identity-clarification purposes in a Greek or Roman context.
II.B.1. Noble Lineage

Like Josephus, and in step with Roman leadership preferences, Philo is careful to note Moses’ noble birth. To begin with, in several passages Philo highlights Moses’ honorable birth. As he introduces his hero, Philo discloses that “Moses was by race (γένος) a Chaldean, but was born and reared in Egypt” (Mos. 1.5). Though at first glance this ascription may not appear to enhance Moses’ bloodline credentials, Feldman argues that by considering Moses a Chaldean,

Philo is accomplishing two purposes: in the first place, he is ascribing further antiquity to Moses, since the Chaldeans were more ancient than the Hebrews; and, in the second place, he is associating Moses with Chaldean astronomy, the greatest achievement of the Chaldeans (Migr. 178; Somn. 1.53; Abr. 69), in which the youthful Moses is said by Philo to have been instructed (Mos. 1.23).³⁴⁴

Further ornamenting Moses’ high birth, Philo notes that “[h]e had for his father and mother the best of their contemporaries, members of the same tribe” (Mos. 1.7). Moreover, Philo chooses his favorite number, seven,³⁴⁵ to anchor Moses’ praiseworthy ancestry: “He was seventh in descent from the first settler, who became the founder of the whole Jewish nation (ἐθνοῦς)” (Mos. 1.7).³⁴⁶

Not only does Moses possess these ascribed credentials, but the Philonic hero maintains the proper balance between possessing high birth and avoiding nepotism. Philo, for example, emphasizes that Moses bypassed his own children for leadership

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³⁴⁵ For Philo’s detailed account of the perfection of the number seven, see Spec. Leg. 2.56–58.

³⁴⁶ In addition to Moses’ noble birth, Philo also highlights the hero’s good and noble appearance—something one could consider ascribed honor in that Moses does not earn it but simply has it via birth—(Mos. 1.9, 15, 19, 1.59). Feldman provides helpful background on the connection between appearance and honor: “Plato asserts (R.7.535A) that the ideal ruler should be, as far as possible, very good-looking (εὔωδόστατος, ‘well-shaped,’ ‘comely,’ ‘beautiful’), since the Greeks apparently assumed that good looks were a reflection of inner worth” (2007: 55).
offices, “[f]or in all things great and small he followed a pure and guileless policy, and, like a good judge, allowed the incorruptibility of reason to subdue his natural affection for his children” (Mos. 1.150). Similarly, Philo explains that in endowing his brother’s line with the priesthood, Moses “…was not giving precedence to his own family but to the piety and holiness which he observed in their characters” (Mos. 2.142). In short, as this presentation reflects, for Philo, while a leader should not put family loyalty above the reasonable recognition of virtue, “[it is]…for humane natures to pay some tribute of goodwill to the name of kinship” (Mos. 1.241).

More than his treatment of individual family credentials, Philo is eager to present Moses and his people as, above all, champions of a more broadly Hebrew tradition. Concerning Moses, the Alexandrian narrates how the hero was “…zealous for the discipline and culture of his kinsmen and ancestors” over the prosperity and honor as “…the son of the [Egyptian] king’s daughter, and in general expectation almost the successor to his grandfather’s sovereignty” (Mos. 1.32). In a separate episode, Moses further displays his deep respect for bloodline. While the Edomites—not specifically named in Philo’s account—did’t respect kinship ties with Hebrews, “Moses, though an attack might have won him an uncontested victory, did not feel justified in taking this course because of the above-mentioned kinship (συγγένεια)” (Mos. 1.243).

The Hebrews (Ἑβραῖοι), for their part, are also praised by Philo for their bloodline concerns. Our biographer describes that after the Egyptians finally release them, though “…hunted as outcasts from the land”, the Hebrews were “…conscious of

347 See also Mos. 2.170–176. Along these lines, Philo provides the reason behind the Levites’ unique possession of the priesthood. It was not merely an entitlement based on blood, but the result of their pious slaughter of the idolatrous Hebrews involved in the golden bull incident. Philo summarizes: “But Moses, in approval of this heroism, devised and confirmed a reward for the victors well suited to the deed. For it was right that those who had voluntarily taken up arms for the honour of God, and so quickly achieved success, should receive the priesthood, and thus be worthily promoted to be His ministers” (Mos. 2.173).
their own high lineage (ἐυγενεῖας),...emboldened to act as was natural to them, as freemen” (Mos. 1.140–141). Later, we are told that in forming the golden bull, the Hebrews “built altars and brought victims for sacrifice in forgetfulness of the true God and to the ruin of the high-born (εὐγενείαν) qualities inherited from their forefathers and fostered by piety and holiness” (Mos. 2.270).

Such celebration of shared lineage and cultural allegiance in Moses and his people, moreover, further confirms Annette Reed’s suggestion that part of Philo’s historiographical project was, like his Roman contemporaries, to appropriate an originally Hellenistic exemplary discourse to celebrate his distinct “native” tradition.348 That is, Moses is not simply an exemplum of ideal leadership; he is an exemplum of Hebrew leadership.

II.B.2. Bravery and Martial Prowess

Compared with Josephus’ supremely martial Moses, Philo de-emphasizes his hero’s military career, neglecting to include any extended narrative sections describing Moses’ bravery.349 Philo does mention Moses’ skill as a general, describing him as one with “good sense, and at the same time good feeling” as he “guarded against the

348 See Reed (2009: 192–193). As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, Philo’s appropriation of Roman presuppositions regarding lineage and honor can additionally be noted in his Roman-influenced preference for matrilineal descent. See Niehoff (2001: 17–31).

349 Comparing both author’s embellishments of the biblical account, Feldman remarks: “…Josephus’ additions, as one might expect from one who himself had served as a general, are concerned with presenting a background for Moses’ political and military career…Philo, on the other hand, emphasizes Moses’ training in the liberal arts, as one would expect from one who developed a deep interest in philosophy” (2007: 50). In both Mos. 1 and 2, furthermore, Philo remains virtually silent about his hero’s personal ability to physically dominate challengers and he only ever attributes these martial qualities to the Hebrew warriors in general (1.259). The only exception may be Moses’ killing of the abusive Egyptian (1.44); but here, Philo amends the biblical account to demonstrate that Moses did not act out of rage or unrestrained emotion, but out of justice. Thus, the episode seems to be an embarrassment to Philo and it scarcely showcases Moses’ ability to physically dominate other men.
possi[bility of [military] disaster” (Mos. 1.249). He, furthermore, deployments effective
defensive strategies (Mos. 1.257), a shrewd offensive against Balak’s Moabites (Mos.
1.306–308), and he—not God—proposes the idea to spy out the Canaan so as to gain
“…solid knowledge of the conditions” and to “…calculate the proper course of action
(2.220–221). Thus, while noted as a cunning military strategist, the Philonic Moses
was a far cry from the courageous ancestors monumentalized in Roman exemplary
discourse or modeled in Josephus’ lawgiver.

II.B.3. Moses’ Education and Eloquence

If Moses was anything for Philo, he was an educated and rhetorically powerful
philosopher-king. To begin with, one of the chief attributes of Moses advertised in Mos.
1–2 is his outstanding education and philosophic acumen. Whereas the biblical account
of Moses’ upbringing mentions precious little (Ex. 2:10), Philo fills in the lacuna with
extended details of the remarkable education and character of young Moses. As a youth
in Egypt, rather than exploring the sensual pleasures of the kingdom, Moses “…with a
modest and serious bearing…applied himself to hearing and seeing what was sure to
profit the soul” (Mos. 1.20). Moreover, Philo tells us,

Teachers at once arrived from different parts, some unbidden from the
neighbouring countries and the provinces of Egypt, others summoned
from Greece under promise of high reward. But in a short time he
advanced beyond their capacities; his gifted nature forestalled their

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350 Reflecting on Philo’s attribution of the latter idea to Moses rather than God, Feldman explains, “…ever
seeking to build up the stature of Moses as a military planner, [Philo] attributes the plan to Moses” (2007:
163).

351 Feldman observes the Hellenistic literary tradition undergirding Philo’s presentation: “[o]ne of the
subjects with which an encomium was to deal was the celebrated person’s nurture and training” (2007: 47).
He further explains, “[o]ne of the typical motifs of the biography of a hero…was the hero’s exceptional
physical development, beauty, self-control, and precocious intellectual development as a child” (2007: 47).
instruction, so that his seemed a case rather of recollection than of learning, and indeed he himself devised and propounded problems which they could not easily solve (Mos. 1.21).

Moses, this “gifted soul” (Mos. 1.22), received an elite Egyptian education in arithmetic, geometry, meter, rhythm and harmony, music, philosophy conveyed in symbols/Egyptian religion); a Greek education; an Assyrian education in letters; and finally a Chaldean education in astronomy/astrology (Mos. 1.23–24). In addition to Philo’s platonic portrayal of Moses’ learning in terms of recollection, Feldman observes, “…it is surely striking that these are the very subjects, indeed in the very order, that Plato (R.7.521C–31C) prescribes for the higher education of his philosopher-king” (2007: 51). Without question, in Philo’s opinion, Moses’ training as a youth had a great deal to do with his eventual success as a leader.353

Later, when Moses is in exile in Midian, our biographer ensures the reader that Moses’ exile was by no means a break from his academic and philosophical development. Rather, “Moses was carrying out the exercises of virtue with an admirable trainer, the reason within him (ἐν ἐαυτῷ λογισμὸν), under whose discipline he laboured to fit himself for life in its highest forms, the theoretical and the practical” (Mos. 1.48). We further learn that “[h]e was ever opening the scroll of philosophical doctrines, digested them inwardly with quick understanding, [and] committed them to memory never to be

352 Philo’s suggestion in Mos. 2.2 confirms Feldman’s observation: “It has been said, not without good reason, that states can only make progress in well-being if either kings are philosophers or philosophers are kings.”

353 Later in Mos. 1 we are told that young Moses was “…so utterly unlike…the majority, soaring above them and exalted to a grander height” (1.27). Philo is also careful to note Moses’ training was not solely in gentile arts, but he “…was zealous for the discipline and culture of his kinsmen and ancestors” (1.32).
forgotten” (*Mos.* 1.48). Philo even presents Moses’ shepherding as a first-rate education in kingship:

for the chase of wild animals is a drilling ground for the general in fighting the enemy, and the care and supervision of tame animals is a schooling for the king in dealing with his subjects, and therefore kings are called “shepherds of their people,” not as a term of reproach but as the highest honour.\(^{355}\)

In sum, whether taught by world-class scholars or a herd of sheep, Philo’s Moses was well educated.

Not only did Moses receive superlative training, but he was a powerful communicator. In *Mos.* 1 and 2, Philo repeatedly portrays Moses consoling, encouraging, warning, and inspiring his Hebrew flock. When his people are first brought under more weighty oppression, because the hero had no political authority to stop the Pharaoh’s cruelty, “[w]hat he could he did. He assisted with his words” (*Mos.* 1.40). Philo describes further, “[w]ith such soothing words, like a good physician, he thought to relieve the sickness of their plight, terrible as it was” (*Mos.* 1.42).\(^{356}\) Moses’ verbal might is further underscored by his pre-battle speeches. Following one such speech, the wandering Hebrews, “[s]o, braced by these exhortations, with the native gallantry of their souls kindled to a flame…went forth to the contest as to certain victory with indomitable

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\(^{354}\) Commenting on this passage Hywel Clifford observes, “Philo primarily wants his audience to realize that Moses’ regular, disciplined reading of philosophy, coupled with his natural gifts, enabled him very quickly to live a life of virtue led by reason. In this way, reason successfully trained Moses for life with a fruitfulness that thrived in the soil of a natural brilliance” (2007: 153–154).

\(^{355}\) *Mos.* 1.61. Feldman also concludes: “His [Moses’] years in Midian were not interludes of seclusion but were spent in mastering philosophy for his late career as a philosopher-king” (2007: 75).

\(^{356}\) Feldman draws a helpful comparison between Philo’s Moses and Virgil’s Aeneas: “In so encouraging his people he reminds us of Aeneas’ consoling words to his men when, after they land on the coast of Africa, he recalls to them that they have endured more grievous obstacles and bids them to persevere (*Virgil, Aen.* 1.198–207)” (2007: 61).
resolution” (*Mos*. 1.309). Additionally, Philo calls Moses a “good teacher” (*Mos*. 2.153, see also 2.141), and he underscores the persuasiveness of Moses’ exhortations in that, following the Red Sea deliverance, Moses is able to persuade the “myriads” (μυριάδως) of Hebrews to “sing with hearts in accord the same song, telling of those mighty and marvelous works” (*Mos*. 2.257). Two scenes in *Mos*. 1 and 2 especially highlight Moses’ rhetorical ability.

First, the episode in Midian in which Moses rescues the women at the well from the abusive shepherds (*Mos*. 1.54 – 57) puts into sharp relief Philo’s preference for rhetorical might over and against military strength. While the LXX only tells us that Moses “rescued” the women (Μωυσῆς ἐρμόσατο εὐτάς), Philo’s elaboration underscores that Moses employed words—not arms—to rescue the women. This account, moreover, is one of the few episodes in *Mos*. 1–2 with narrative elements comparable to those outlined by Roller.

*Action*

Philo introduces this scene by informing his readers that he will be describing “...an action (πραξθεν) of his at this time, which, though it may seem a petty matter, argues a spirit of no petty kind” (*Mos*. 1.51). Rather than using physical violence, Moses deploys a well-crafted verbal assault:

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357 See also *Mos*. 2.250–252.

358 Noting possible Greek parallels, Feldman adds, “[o]ne of the key attributes of a leader, as we may see in Thucydides’ (2.60) portrait of the ideal statesman, Pericles, is the ability to persuade the people” (2007: 121).

359 See Ex. 2:17. Like the LXX, Josephus’ account of the incident fails to include any mention of a speech, but simply reports that Moses “beat off the arrogant intruders (τοῖς μὲν ἐφρέ θλονταῖς), and afforded the others opportune aid (βοήθειαν)” (*Ant*. 2.260).
‘Stop this injustice...You are masses of long hair and lumps of flesh, not men...by the heavenly eye of justice, you shall not take it [the water]; for that eye sees even what is done in the greatest solitude. In me at least it has appointed a champion whom you did not expect, for I fight to succour these injured maidens, allied to a mighty arm which the rapacious may not see, but you shall feel its invisible power to wound if you do not change your ways” (Mos. 1.54–56).

Audience

The audiences to Moses’ speech-act include God—the “…heavenly eye of justice” (Mos. 1.55); the shepherds who upon hearing the speech Philo describes as consequently being “…seized with fear (φοβηθεὼντες) that they were listening to some oracular utterance,” before becoming “submissive (καταπέσαντες) to Moses’ demands (Mos. 1.57); and the rescued maidens who, so impressed by the rescue, “…went home in high glee (γηγονήθησαν), and told the story of the unexpected event to their father” (Mos. 1.58).³⁶⁰

Commemoration

In addition to Moses’ eloquent action being memorialized in Philo’s narrative, within the narrative itself it is further commemorated in the father’s hospitality. In response to the account of their rescue, he commands his daughters, “[r]un back with all speed, and invite him to receive from me first the entertainment due to him as a stranger, secondly some requital of the favour which we owe to him” (Mos. 1.58). Though not directly related to Moses’ verbal heroism, upon seeing Moses, the father is “at once struck with admiration of his face (ὄψιν), and soon afterwards of his disposition

³⁶⁰ Their father, who becomes a secondary audience to the Mosaic action, “thence conceived a strong desire to see the stranger, which he showed by censuring them [his daughters] for their ingratitude” (Mos. 1.58).
(βούλημα),” and “[a]ccordingly, he gave him the fairest of his daughters in marriage, and, by that one action, attested all his noble qualities (καλοκαγαθία)” (Mos. 1.59).³⁶¹

*Imitation*

Like the episodes analyzed in *Ant.* 2–4, this scene does not include an explicit call to imitate Moses’ eloquent assistance. As I have already mentioned above, elsewhere in the biography Philo showcases Moses as a “…well-wrought picture, a piece of work beautiful and godlike, a model (παράδειγμα) for those who are willing to copy it (μιμεῖσθαι)” (Mos. 1.158). Thus, if any segment in Mos. 1–2 aligns with Roman exemplarity, it is Moses’ eloquent intervention at the well in Midian.

Given Philo’s evident enthusiasm for Moses’ eloquence, how did the Alexandrian deal with the passages in the LXX in which Moses admits his inability to communicate effectively (Ex. 4:10; 6:12)? In short, Philo simply omits Exodus 6:12 altogether, and he apologetically reinterprets Moses’ confession of ineloquence during the burning bush event (Ex. 4:10). Regarding the latter, Philo first claims that Moses’ statement stemmed from the hero having just heard God’s speech and consequently recognizing that “human eloquence compared with God’s was dumbness” (Mos. 1.83). Secondly, he attributes Moses’ confession to his great modesty: “he shrank from things sublime and judged that matters of such magnitude were not for him” (Mos. 1.83).

Further adapting the LXX version, Moses’ reluctance—described as “modesty” (αἰδώς) by Philo—rather than arousing God’s anger (Ex. 4:14), inspired God’s praise (Mos. 1.84). Feldman rightly notes that Philo had to either adapt or drop these biblical

³⁶¹ In the LXX, the daughters do not volunteer the account of their rescue, but have to be asked about their tardiness, and their father’s emotional response is not mentioned at all (Ex. 2.18–19). Also, Moses’ betrothal to Jethro’s (or Raguel’s; Ex. 2:18) daughter is not explained as a result of any Mosaic action (Ex. 2:21).
admissions since they “…called attention to Moses’ lack of ability as an orator in a society where eloquence in a leader was a *sine qua non*” (2007: 88).

**II.B.4. Personal Frugality and Generous Patronage**

Similar to Josephus’s depiction and consistent with Roman preferences, Philo describes his Moses as being personally frugal while remaining a generous patron. To begin with, though Philo was himself a member of one of the richest families in Alexandria, he proudly displays his hero’s disdain for luxury in _Mos._ 1–2. Our biographer articulates that because Moses “…desire[ed] to live to the soul alone and not to the body, he made a special practice of frugal contentment, and had an unparalleled scorn for a life of luxury” (_Mos._ 1.29). Again, rather than make an “arrogant parade” of his wealth and honor, Philo applauds the way in which his hero “…practiced the economy and unassuming ways of a private citizen” (_Mos._ 1.153). But why was the leader’s scorn for luxury so important? Philo explains:

…meaner men emulate men of distinction, and set their inclinations in the direction of what they deem to desire. Thus, when a ruler begins to shew profligacy and turn to a life of luxury, the whole body...of his subjects gives full vent to the appetites of belly and sex beyond their actual needs."

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362 On the disparity between Philo’s social position and his seeming distain for wealth, David Mealand sees a unique similarity in the life and writings of Seneca the Philosopher, and he further claims that Philo’s perspective developed from two sources: his eclectic philosophy (Platonic disparaging of the body, Stoic celebration of poverty, and Cynic excoriation of wealth) and his cultural position as an Alexandrian Jew: “Though rich, Philo belonged to a people who had suffered humiliation. That fact may be a significant factor behind his disagragement of wealth” (1978: 259–263). T. Ewald Schmidt, on the other hand, dismisses Mealand’s thesis that Philo’s articulated contempt for wealth was an unexpected position for such a wealthy individual, and that such contempt came in part from the thinker’s social position as an Alexandrian Jew. Instead, Schmidt claims that Philo’s example was very common in the ancient world, and that his motivation to critique wealth did not come largely from philosophical sources. Rather, Schmidt argues that “Philo’s affinities to Greek thought, especially to that of the Cynics, are limited in scope to those that he perceives to be consistent with Jewish tradition [i.e. the Hebrew scriptures]” (1983: 93).

363 _Mos._ 1.160.
In short, for Philo, on a community’s road to opulent indulgence, the profligate leader charts the path.\footnote{In response to Moses’ eschewing luxury, Philo further explains, “God rewarded (γεραιρέω) him by giving him instead the greatest and most perfect wealth (τελεωτάτων ἄντικδος πλοῦτων). That is the wealth of the whole earth and sea and rivers, and of all the other elements and the combinations which they form. For, since God judged him worthy to appear as a partner of His own possessions, He gave into his hands the whole world as a portion well fitted for His heir” (Mos. 1.155).}

Beyond frugality, on several occasions Philo depicts his exemplum with the disposition of a generous patron. The biographer states, “…he [Moses] had set before him one essential aim, to benefit his subjects; and, in all that he said or did, to further their interests and neglect no opportunity which would forward the common well-being” (Mos. 1.151).\footnote{To this end, Philo further elaborates Moses’ refusal to amass wealth for his own enjoyment: “For In solitary contrast to those who had hitherto held the same authority, he did not treasure up gold and silver, did not levy tributes, did not possess houses or chattels or livestock or a staff of slaves or revenues or any other accompaniment of costly and opulent living, though he might have had all in abundance” (Mos. 1.152).} Rather than valuable materials, however, Philo chiefly underscores his hero’s generosity with respect to “…those treasures which the ruler may well desire to have in abundance”, namely,

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\text{...the repeated exhibition of self-restraint, continence, temperance, shrewdness, good sense, knowledge, endurance of toil and hardships, contempt of pleasures, justice, advocacy of excellence, censure and chastisement according to law for wrongdoers, praise and honour for well-doers, again as the law directs (Mos. 1.153–154).}
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Where Moses’ provision of material resources is concerned, moreover, he is not depicted distributing goods from his own coffers but, like his Josephan counterpart, he is shown securing provisions as a mediator between his people and their ultimate patron—God.\footnote{For example, in Mos. 1.191–202, when Moses intercedes for the wandering (and grumbling) Hebrews, Philo recounts that “God, moved partly by the clemency and benevolence to man which belongs to His nature, partly too by His wish to honour the ruler (ἡγομόν τιμήσαν) whom He had appointed, and still more to bring home to them the greatness of that ruler’s piety (εὐσεβίας and holiness (οἰκοτήτιος) as shewn in matters both clear and obscure, took pity on them and healed their sufferings” (Mos. 1.198).}
In the end, as Philo argues, Moses’ appointment as a leader (ἡγεμών) and his possession of this office (ἀρχή) and kingship (βασιλεία) was not secured like some of those who thrust themselves into positions of power by means of arms and engines of war and strength of infantry, cavalry and navy, but on account of his goodness (ἀρετή) and his nobility of conduct (καλοκαγαθίας) and the universal benevolence (πρὸς ἀπάντας εὐνοίας) which he never failed to shew (χρώμενος άει διετέλει).  

II.B.5. The Philonic Favorite: Piety

As important as generosity was, however, in Philo’s conceptual universe a singular virtue is given pride of place—namely, piety (εὐσεβεία). In his Life of Abraham, for example, Philo calls piety the “highest and greatest of virtues” (Abr. 60) and John Dillon concludes, “Philo, however, makes Piety…or Holiness… the queen of the virtues (Spec. Leg. 135), rather supplanting Wisdom which he only ranks second to this” (1977: 150). Consistent with Dillon’s insight, Philo’s biography of Moses underscores the unparalleled importance of piety. After the Hebrews had witnessed the plagues wrought upon Egypt, Philo comments, “I think that everyone who witnessed the events of that time could not but have thought of the Hebrews as spectators of the sufferings of others, and not merely spectators in safety, but learners thereby of the finest and most profitable of lessons – piety” (Mos. 1.146).

Not only does Philo present piety as key virtue, but he exhibits it as a prerequisite for successful leadership:

But a king and lawgiver ought to have under his purview not only human but divine things; for, without god’s directing care, the affairs of kings and subjects cannot go aright. And therefore such as he needs the chief priest-

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367 Mos. 1.148. Philo’ concluding paragraph to his encomium of Moses sums up again his understanding of Moses’ intentions as a leader: Moses was known for “…his vast benevolence and watchful care for each one of them and for all” (Mos. 2.291).
hood, so that, fortified with perfect rites and the perfect knowledge of the
service of God, he may ask that he and those whom he rules may receive
prevention of evil and participation in good from the gracious Being Who
assents to prayers. For surely that Being will grant fulfillment to prayers,
seeing that He is kindly by nature and deems worthy of His special favour
those who give Him genuine service (2.5, italics mine). 368

This last statement, however, begs the question, what exactly did Philo mean by “genuine
service” to God? That is, what was Philo’s understanding of piety? 369 As was the case
with Josephus, to better understand Philo’s portrayal of Moses’ piety, we must first
explore his understanding of divine power. Unlike Josephus, however, Philo spills a great
deal of ink on theological discussions.

II.B.5.a. Philo’s General View of God

In his classic introduction to Philo of Alexandria, Samuel Sandmel mentions one
of the difficulties in reconstructing a coherent picture of Philo’s metaphysics: “Philo,
unhappily, abstains from providing his system; there is a risk that is necessary to run in
our making his system possibly too neat” (1979: 89). 370 Despite this obstacle, several
scholars have combed through Philo’s vast library and have reconstructed a basic

368 Later in his second book on Moses, Philo claims that the leader in the service of God is of the highest
rank: “he who is consecrated to God is superior when he acts as a priest to all others, not only the ordinary
laymen, but even kings” (2.131).

369 The Stoic definition of εὐσεβεία generally meant “the science of the service of the Gods” (Dillon 1977:
150).

370 Jenny Morris comes to the same conclusion: “It is significant that Philo nowhere provides a systematic
presentation of his thought” (1987:875). She comments further, “…philosophically speaking, there are
inconsistencies and repetitions in his works which make the formulation of any coherent Philonic theories
difficult. This is principally because of the character of his literary enterprise: in the majority of his
treatises he does not set out to outline a philosophical position, but rather takes a scriptural text as his point
of departure…Nevertheless, it is possible to discern individual notions pursued with some consistency
Philonic theological framework. Before surveying Philo’s depiction of God/divine power in *Mos.* 1–2, I will briefly consult a number of these scholarly summaries.

To begin, many scholars have noted Philo’s indebtedness to (and contribution to) Middle Platonism. While much debate still surrounds the issue,371 John Dillon summarizes the consensus well: “Above all, however, he is steeped in Plato.”372 In terms of Philo’s theology proper, Jenny Morris affirms, “Philo does allow some positive affirmations about the nature of God,” summarizing,

> All determining attributes appropriate to the finite beings are therefore to be denied to God. He is eternal, unchangeable, simple, free, self-sufficient. He is not only free from human errors, but also exalted above all human virtues, and better than the Good and Beautiful…his nature, then, is beyond definition. It can only be said that he is, not what he is (1987: 881).

Although Philo’s understanding of a “wholly other” God (τὸ ὄν) differs in some aspects from that proposed by the Platonists,373 in general he holds to the extreme transcendence of that Being. Sandmel explains further: “…the domain of *To On* is not only beyond our senses, it is even beyond and outside our reason” (1979: 93). Consequently, because of the understanding of divine power undergirding his LXX and his Jewish (Judean) heritage in general, namely, that God interacts in history and cares deeply about human community, the Alexandrian thinker had to bridge the gap between the transcendent τὸ ὄν and human beings. To do this, Philo seems to have mined Stoic theology as well as

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371 On the degree to which one may call Philo of Alexandria a Middle Platonist, see the opposing arguments of Sterling (1993: 96–111) and Ruina (1993: 112–140).

372 Dillon: 1977: 140.

373 Unlike Plato, for example, Philo views Ideas as created by God, and thus affirms creation. See Sandmel: 1979: 97.
Judean personifications of wisdom (for example, Prov. 8) and from it postulated an intermediary divinity/emanation of the τὸ ὄν itself, namely, the λόγος.

Again, Sandmel exposes the difficulty in reconstructing an overly restrictive definition of Philo’s λόγος:

At no time does Philo, in the abundance of what he has to say about the Logos, ever define Logos for us. What we can do…is assemble some of what Philo tells us, and out of that material hope to present some sense of what Philo intends by the term (1979: 94).

Following this word of caution, Sandmel attempts a summary: “Logos can be explained as the substance of what we can know about God and about his functions. Accordingly, whatever Scripture tells us that God or the Lord said or did, Philo ordinarily ascribes to the Logos” (1979: 94). Amir and Niehoff similarly describe the λόγος as God’s “…rational part as well as His speech.”374 Finally, Morris describes the λόγος as the main intermediary figure between an utterly transcendent God and the material world:

The Logos is the active divine reason, described as the Idea which embraces all other ideas, the Power which includes all other powers. It is neither uncreated, nor created as finite things are. It is the representative and emissary of God, the angel or archangel who transmits the revelations of God, the instrument by which God created the world. So it is also identified with the creative Word of God (1987: 884).375

Keeping in mind Sandmel’s assessment, namely, that “whatever Scripture tells us that God or the Lord said or did, Philo ordinarily ascribes to the Logos” (1979: 94), and thus,

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374 See Amir and Niehoff: 2007: 62–63. Sandmel further explains that “[t]he Logos never descends from the intelligible world into the sensible world; man must move into the intelligible world to encounter the Logos” (1979:95).

375 On the metaphysical status of the Logos, Morris explains: “The Logos as mediator must be both distinct from both parties, and yet also be in some way like both parties, and this contradiction is unresolved” (1987: 884). Also, Morris correctly notes that “The inspiration for this doctrine comes from Jewish theology as well as from Greek philosophy” (1987:884).
that all of the divine actions in Philo’s βίος on Moses should be attributed to the λόγος, we will now explore the descriptions of “God” and his characteristics in Moses 1–2.

**II.B.5.b. Philo’s View of God in Mos. 1–2**

In terms of behavior, Mos. 1–2 portrays God punishing or at least threatening to punish the disobedient and faithless with physical hardships (Mos. 1.6, 96, 111, 236; 2.61, 2.147), we observe God speaking to Moses (Mos. 1.71), God exercises providence over certain human affairs (Mos. 1.12, 17, 20, 85), and finally, God is described as an orderly creator (Mos. 2.48, 99–100).

Philo also attributes several virtues to God. He is described as “…the God of liberty and hospitality and of justice to guests and suppliants, Who watches over such as these” (Mos. 1.33; 2.241), one who takes “…pity on the perishing” (Mos. 1.101), and one who shows moderation in punishment” (Mos. 1.110, 134; 2.61). More than this, God is portrayed as a good giver of gifts (Mos. 1.204), and the reason (τὸ λογεῖον) holding all things together (2.133). Finally, God is one who honors valor in battle (Mos. 2.242). In sum, using these limited descriptions we can tentatively construct a picture of a God (i.e. the λόγος) who maintains a degree of concern for justice, the capacity for violent action, and above all preference for order, rationality, and interaction with human minds. With this sketch of Philo’s complex understanding of the Divine, I will conclude this section with a brief examination of Moses’ pious leadership.

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376 On different occasions God is ascribed a “…kindly nature and gracious to true suppliants” (Mos. 1.72; 2.5, 238).

377 Using the masculine pronoun to describe God fits well with Philo’s general androcentric perspective on reality. See, for example, Mos. 2.238–2.243.
II.B.5.c. Manifestations of Piety in Mos. 1 and 2

To begin with, consistent with Philo’s conception of an orderly Creator, his Moses maintains a fastidious concern for proper ritual performance.\(^{378}\) To be sure, Philo declares that, “if the worshiper is without kindly feeling or justice, the sacrifices are no sacrifices” (Mos. 2.107). Nevertheless, in Mos. 1–2, Philo never views virtue without proper cultic ritual as sufficient. Further reflecting a concern for order, reverence for sacred time is displayed throughout Mos. 1–2.\(^{379}\) Like sacrifice, however, Philo anchors such observance into some sort of philosophical development. He describes, for example, that the ultimate aim of Moses’ institution of the Sabbath was to facilitate “…the study of wisdom with the ruler expounding and instructing the people what they should say and do, while they received edification and betterment, in moral principles and conduct” (Mos. 2.215). Specifically, he clarifies, the curriculum of such Sabbath study included reflection on the Platonic virtues.\(^{380}\) Philo’s biography, furthermore,

\(^{378}\) Moses, for example, tells the unyielding Pharaoh of the Hebrews’ need to perform their ancestral sacrifices (τὰς πατρίδως θυσίας; see Mos. 1.87), he receives detailed instructions for the construction of the tabernacle and the performance of the cultic ritual (Mos. 2.67–152), and Philo enthusiastically celebrates the Hebrew’s piety via sacrifices (Mos. 2.159; cf. 1.317; 2.67 and 153). Negatively, Philo regularly describes misdirected ritual performance (idolatry) as great impiety. Commenting on the Hebrew’s construction of the Golden bull, for example, Philo describes their errant ritual action as a product of “…forgetfulness of the true God and to the ruin of the high-born (ὕψηλα) qualities inherited from their forefathers and fostered by piety and holiness” (Mos. 2.270). On such impiety, see also Mos. 1.298–299.

\(^{379}\) These times include the Sabbath (Mos. 1.205; 2.21–22, 263), the Day of Atonement (Mos. 2.23), and of course, the Passover (Mos. 2.224).

\(^{380}\) Mos. 2.216. These virtues, according to Philo, include wisdom (φρόνησις), courage (άνδρεία), temperance (σωφροσύνη), justice (δικαιοσύνη), and piety (έυσεβεία).
repeatedly highlights Moses’ trusting God as a core element of his piety, and celebrates Moses’ faithful communication of the oracles of God.

In terms of pious care for justice, though (as I reviewed above) Philo understands God as maintaining some level of concern for His people on these issues, his Moses is far from preoccupied with them. To be sure, Philo does praise the hero’s unequaled display of virtue as a legislator:

The legislative faculty has for its brothers and close kinsfolk these four in particular: love of humanity, of justice, of goodness, and hatred of evil. It is no small thing if it is given to anyone to acquire even one of these—a marvel surely that he should be able to grasp them all together. And to this Moses alone appears to have attained, who shews distinctly these aforesaid virtues in his ordinances (Mos. 2.9–10).

Philo’s larger framework for reality, however, undercuts any serious philosophical energy driving such a social agenda. His articulated understanding of the solution to the human problem, in fact, has nothing to do with bettering the plight of human communities on earth. Rather, the truly holy mind “…has learned to gaze and soar upwards, and, as it ever ranges the heights and searches into divine beauties, it makes a mock of earthly things, counting them to be but child’s-play, and those to be truly matters for earnest

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381 See Mos. 1.225. Such faithful reliance on God is manifested elsewhere in Mos. 1–2. To take a few examples, Moses urges the panicking Hebrews to remember that God is trustworthy (Mos. 1.174), and those who doubt are accused of being men of “feeble piety” (Mos. 1.183) who “neither know God nor [have] ever sought to know Him” (Mos. 1.212). See also Mos. 1.47, 236–237; 2.169.

382 See for example, Mos. 1.173. Philo explains the practical utility of such oracular communication: “Moses necessarily obtained prophesy also, in order that through the providence of God he might discover what by reasoning he could not grasp” (Mos. 2.6). Negatively, one of the worst forms of impiety Philo caricatures involves the rejection of God’s prophecy (Mos. 1.90 and 294).

383 In Mos. 1.36, for example, Philo describes Pharaoh’s great impiety in that “…he showed no shame or fear of the God of liberty and hospitality and of justice to guests and suppliants, Who watches over such as these” (Mos. 1.36).
This qualification notwithstanding, in every area of divine–human interaction that significantly mattered to Philo, Moses excelled.\(^{385}\)

Finally, and similar to Josephus’ elevation of the virtue, in Mos. 1–2 every category of noble leadership reviewed above is inextricably related to piety. The Mosaic military strategy described in Mos. 1–2, for example, is founded upon the hero’s reliance on God.\(^{386}\) Moses’ philosophical acumen, moreover, is explicitly connected to the Lawgiver’s priestly piety.\(^{387}\) Furthermore, as I touched on earlier, Moses’ eloquence is consistently exercised to stoke the Hebrews’ feeble trust in God, and his patronage is perhaps better understood as mediation between the Hebrews and their divine patron. In short, more than a brave general, educated orator, or virtuous patron, Moses was above all a paragon of piety.

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384 John Dillon notes, “[t]he ideal of likeness to God takes on a different meaning from the Stoic ideal of conformity to Nature, if one believes in a transcendent God and holds that escape from the toils of this world and from the prison of the body to a better life is both desirable and possible” (1977: 148).

385 For more instances of God’s appreciation of Moses’ great piety see Mos. 1.47, 84, 198.

386 In addition to the miraculous deliverance from the Egyptian army (Mos. 2. 246–257), for example, Moses reminds the Hebrews that “[o]ur arms and engines and all our power consist solely in faith in God” (Mos. 1.225). Balaam, furthermore, admits that the military might bestowed upon the Hebrews was given by virtue of their trust: “[t]herefore, they care nothing for omens and all the lore of the soothsayer, because they trust in One Who is the ruler of the world” (Mos. 1.284).

387 Philo summarizes, “The chief and most essential quality required by a priest is piety and this he [Moses] practiced in a very high degree, and at the same time made use of his great natural gifts. In these, philosophy found a good soil, which she improved still further by the admirable truths which she brought before his eyes, nor did she cease until the fruits of virtue shewn in word and deed were brought to perfection. Thus he came to love God and be loved by Him as have been few others” (Mos. 2.66 – 67). Here, Moses’ fastidious performance of Hebrew rituals, his fecund philosophical mind, and his consequent virtuousness merged to produce an unparalleled divine love. Hywel Clifford comments, “[w]hy was this [connection] so obvious to Philo? It must be rooted in Philo’s conviction that the Law, which guides behavior, is also by nature philosophical…[i]n other words, the Mosaic Law is philosophy” (2007: 155). Thus, Moses’ piety and philosophy were organically connected in the biographer’s mind.
II.B.6. Moses Balancing Reason and Emotions

In Mos. 1–2, Philo does not present the individual virtues of his hero in any systematic way, and unsurprisingly, his conversation features virtues not emphasized in the categories comprising my heuristic model of Roman leadership (i.e. martial prowess, education and eloquence, generous patronage, and piety).\(^{388}\) Though, as I have already reviewed, the foremost Mosaic leadership preferences in Mos. 1–2 include education and eloquence and the all-encompassing Philonic preference for piety, one additional—and closely related—leadership disposition warrants a brief discussion, namely, Moses’ maintenance of a proper balance between reason and emotion.

As a Middle Platonist imbued with Stoic ethics,\(^{389}\) Philo unsurprisingly portrays his young Moses heroically overcoming the sensual opportunities afforded by the Egyptian royal court:

> He did not, as some, allow the lusts of adolescence to go unbridled...[b]ut he kept a tight hold on them with the reins, as it were, of temperance (σωφροσύνη) and self-control (καρπερία), and forcibly pulled them back from their forward course. And each of the other passions, which rage so furiously if left to themselves, he tamed and assuaged and reduced to mildness (Mos. 1.25–26).

Philo attributes Moses’ moral success in this regard to his reliance on reason (λόγος):

> “...in general he watched the first directions and impulses of the soul as one would a restive horse, in fear lest they should run away with the reason which ought to rein them in, and thus cause universal chaos.”\(^{390}\) Rather than slaughtering the Egyptian out of base

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\(^{388}\) While he does explicitly mention the Platonic cardinal virtues on a few occasions (particularly in Mos. 2.216 in relation to Sabbath observance; cf. Mos. 2.185), his portrayal of the virtuous Moses is in no way bound by or organized around them.

\(^{389}\) For a detailed account of Philo’s philosophical influences, see Dillon (1977: 139–183).

\(^{390}\) Mos. 1.26. As he tells the story of Moses’ adolescence, moreover, Philo notes that the only good sexual impulse is that which is intended for the begetting of children (Mos. 1.28).
emotion or in a shameful way (which the biblical account seems to suggest), Philo’s elaboration describes Moses’ attack as a carefully considered and morally evaluated “righteous action” (Mos. 1.44). Though, in the end he denies that Philo’s Moses was ever intended as a model to follow, Michael Satlow rightly notes, “[t]rue human perfection for Philo, then, entails both excising the seat of anger and rage and standing up to and fighting the inevitable passions. Moses himself would seem to offer a model worthy of emulation” (2008: 506).

Despite such emphasis on reason, there were a handful of emotions that Philo, and many Stoics with him, approved. John Dillon summarizes these “eupatheiai” as joy, will, and caution. Philo, Dillon claims, includes “pricking of conscience” as a fourth acceptable emotion. As we survey Mos. 1 and 2, we see the protagonist at times moved by these emotions and their cognates. Corresponding to “pricking of conscience,” Moses becomes angry at the Pharaoh’s oppression (Mos. 1.40) and at other times we see him

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391 Ex. 2:11–12.

392 For more examples of Moses restraining emotion with his reason and general praise of such a disposition, see Mos. 1.50, 173, 175, 197; 2.140, 185, 211, 214.

393 In contrast to Moses’ restraint, Philo describes the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah (without explicitly naming the villages) and the reason for their destruction: “…they turned aside to licentious living and fed every pleasure and every lust with lavish supplies of fuel like a flame when the brushwood is piled upon it” (Mos. 2.58). See Mos. 2.139 for a summary of similar forbidden vices. In opposition to such ἀοιδεῖα, our biographer describes the pious mind: “Such, too, is the nature of the mind of those who have tasted of holiness (ἁγιότητος). Such a mind has learned to gaze and soar upwards, and, as it ever ranges the heights and searches into divine beauties, it makes a mock of earthly things, counting them to be but child’s-play, and those to be truly matters for earnest care” (1.190). Finally, the description of Moses’ final transition into pure spirit further illustrates the disparity, in Philo’s opinion, between the weak, impassioned elements of the material world, and the perfect realm of the spiritual (Mos. 2.288). Maren Niehoff summarizes the nexus between Philo’s self-controlled Moses and Roman morality: “Philo stresses the high quality and rigidity of Jewish principles which he defines in terms congruent with Roman culture. He constructs a hierarchy ranging from ‘barbarian’ to civilized nations. The Jews are placed at the top. They represent the elite of the Western world which promotes the value of virile self-restraint. Philo argues that enkrateia informs all of Mosaic legislation and distinguishes the Jews in virtually every aspect of daily life” (2001: 94).

394 Dillon 1977: 151.
“…spurred to righteous anger by his passionate hatred of evil.”

On a few occasions Moses also demonstrates great joy. In sum, the Alexandrian’s Moses regularly restrained his emotions with reason; where his emotions did manifest, however, they did so perfectly.

Having reviewed each author’s exposure to Roman politics and culture as well as their respective portrayals of Moses’ leadership, I will conclude this chapter by first reviewing Josephus and Philo’s supreme elevation of their exemplum in light of a similar trend in Valerius Maximus’ Facta et Dicta Memorabilia, before briefly comparing their relative appropriation of the form and content of Roman discourse on exemplary leadership. Lastly, I will make a few observations regarding Josephus and Philo’s participation in this cross-cultural conversation in their efforts to advertize and inculcate their respective “native” notions of “Jewish” leadership.

II.C. Josephus and Philo’s Elevating the Figure of Moses in light of Roman Discourse

II.C.1. Josephus and Philo’s Shared Exaltation of Moses

Despite their many differences, Josephus and Philo’s projects align in more than just choice of protagonist, core storyline, or a few overlapping leadership virtues. To begin with, both accounts significantly elevate the character and position of the Hebrew hero from his description in the biblical account. While the LXX only includes two explicit commendations of Moses (Deut. 34:10–12 and Num. 12:3), as I reviewed earlier,

395 Mos. 2.279; cf. 1.196; 2.167, and 2.280.

396 A pronounced example is described in Mos. 2 as the Hebrews are delivered from the parting of the Sea: “[a]nd the prophet, rejoicing at this, seeing the people also overjoyed, and himself no longer able to contain his delight, led off the song, and his hearers massed in two choirs sang with him the story of these same deeds” (Mos. 2.257). See also, Mos. 1.177.
both authors unabashedly lavish superlatives on the leader. Josephus’ encomium, for example, extols Moses for

...having surpassed in understanding all men that ever lived and put to noblest use the fruit of his reflections. In speech and in addresses to a crowd he found favour in every way...As a general he had few to equal him, and as prophet none, insomuch that in all his utterances one seemed to hear the speech of God Himself (Ant. 4.328–329).

Philo recognized Moses as the “greatest and most perfect of men” (Mos. 1:1) and “the holiest of men ever yet born” (Mos. 2.192), who “…has set before us, like some well-wrought picture, a piece of work beautiful and godlike, a model for those who are willing to copy it” (Mos. 1.158–159). Evidently, both first-century Jewish authors maintained a higher view of Moses than the biblical authors did.

Beyond multiplying praises, Philo and Josephus carefully adapt the canonical account, excising or reinterpreting any signs of Mosaic weakness. The first blemish recounted in the LXX is Moses’ killing of an Egyptian (Ex. 2:11–15). In Ant. 2.238–257, Josephus never mentions the murder and he paints Moses’ flight as provoked by Egyptian envy of his martial prowess. Philo’s account, though not avoiding the incident, creatively reinterprets the killing as a carefully considered “righteous action” (Mos. 1.44).\footnote{Niehoff describes the Philonic Moses as having “killed the Egyptian out of primarily humanitarian considerations” (2001: 71).}

Regarding the leader’s biblical confession of ineloquence (Ex. 4:10–17),\footnote{Moses shamefully admits similar weakness in Ex. 6:12 and 6:30.} and the resulting “anger of the LORD...kindled against Moses (θυμωθείς ὁ ρήγη κύριος ἐπὶ Μωσῆν),” Josephus transforms the biblical Moses’ virtual refusal to lead into a more dignified hesitation in light of the scale of the exodus project. He, furthermore, fails to
mentions Aaron’s appointment as a mouthpiece for Moses.\textsuperscript{399} Philo simply omits Ex. 6:12 and attributes Moses’ hesitation in Ex. 4:10 to his admiration of God’s eloquence—an admiration that provokes God’s praise rather than censure.\textsuperscript{400}

Finally, both biographies recast Moses’ inability to enter the Promised Land, portraying the potentially embarrassing biblical detail in a positive light.\textsuperscript{401} In \textit{Ant.} 2–4, Josephus deletes Moses’ disobedience in the Desert of Zin and only allows Moses to make mention of the fact that, “...having completed a span of one hundred and twenty years, I must quit this life, and that in those coming actions beyond the Jordan I am not to be your helper and fellow combatant, being prohibited by God (κωλυόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ).”\textsuperscript{402} No explanation for such prohibition is attached to Moses’ statement. Like Josephus, Philo eliminates Moses’ incident in the Zin Desert and instead of any deathbed comments on his “being prohibited by God,” the Alexandrian includes the following glowing account:


during the coming actions beyond the Jordan I am not to be your helper and fellow combatant, being prohibited by God (κωλυόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ).”\textsuperscript{402} No explanation for such prohibition is attached to Moses’ statement. Like Josephus, Philo eliminates Moses’ incident in the Zin Desert and instead of any deathbed comments on his “being prohibited by God,” the Alexandrian includes the following glowing account:

\begin{quote}
the time came when he had to make his pilgrimage from earth to heaven, and leave this mortal life for immortality, summoned thither by the Father Who resolved his twofold nature of soul and body into a single unity, transforming his whole being into mind (εἰς νοῦν), pure as sunlight (\textit{Mos.} 2.288).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{399} \textit{Ant.} 2.271.

\textsuperscript{400} \textit{Mos.} 1.83–84.

\textsuperscript{401} In the LXX, Moses’ disobedience in the Desert of Zin (striking the rock rather than verbally commanding it to bring forth water) leads to God’s punishment: “Because you did not believe in me, to sanctify me in the eyes of the people of Israel, therefore you shall not bring this assembly into the land which I have given them” (Num. 20:12). Preceding his death, God again reminds Moses that he will not be able to enter the land because, God explains, “you rebelled against my word in the wilderness of Zin when the congregation quarreled with me” (Num. 27:14).

\textsuperscript{402} \textit{Ant.} 4.177.
Without question, demonstrated in both their lavish praise as well as creative redaction of the biblical account, Josephus and Philo were equally eager to paint Moses as a flawless exemplum of effective leadership.

II.C.2. Consolidation of Virtue in Valerius Maximus

Their preference to give such focused moral weight to an individual leader or particular vein of ancestral tradition was not unique to the two Jewish authors. Such consolidation of leadership virtue into and significant excision of flaws from an author’s favored ancestral leader or gens can be identified elsewhere in traditional Roman exemplary discourse. Valerius Maximus’ portrayal of the Scipio family in his Facta et Dicta Memorabilia illustrates this well. To be sure, Valerius’ literary project differs from Josephus and Philo’s as the former work is ostensibly a categorized collection of episodes and the latter works are largely prose history. Nevertheless, in almost every preferred aspect of traditional Roman leadership (outlined in chapter 2), in Facta et Dicta the Scipios are deployed as positive exempla.403

II.C.2.a. Noble Lineage

To begin with, Valerius takes for granted that leaders connected with this Roman family inherited a distinguished ancestry.404 His collection is littered with members of the prominent family for, as Valerius reminds us, “[t]he Scipios keep handing us their distinctions (ornamenta) to be commemorated (commemoranda)” (8.15.4). In a

403 To my knowledge no other leader or family described in Valerius’ work enjoys such comprehensive consolidation of virtue.

404 For a detailed family tree of the Scipio clan, see Hölkeskamp (2004: 120).
particularly telling account Valerius describes how Cornelius Scipio Serapio, “[a] young man of outstanding noble birth (nobilitatis)”, could not avoid the surname “Serapio” due to his physical likeness to a sacrificial assistant of the same name. Valerius laments, “[n]either the respectability of his character nor regard for so many ancestral masks (imaginum) saved him from this insulting aspersion” (9.14.3).

II.C.2.b. Courage and Martial Prowess

More than any other leadership trait, the members of Valerius’ Scipios are deployed as martial exempla. P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, by far Valerius’ favorite, is ubiquitously showcased for his military distinction. Valerius tells us, for example, that Scipio’s name was “like an everlasting triumph” and, with Marcellus, was one of the “...most illustrious representatives of true, sterling virtue (clarissimos solidae veraeque virtutis auctores), bearing [his] country’s welfare on [his] shoulders” (2.8.5). While still a boy, Valerius later includes, he rescued his father militarily “...with a man’s vigour” (5.4.2). In extreme old age, we discover the retired general bravely marshaling his private staff to defend his country house from pirates.

405 He was consul in 138 B.C.E.

406 Scipio Africanus was first consul in 205B.C.E. and is most revered in Roman memory for defeating Hannibal at the Battle of Zama and thus ending the Second Punic War.

407 Valerius continues, “[b]y his intervention he saved his father’s life when he, the Consul, was gravely wounded fighting Hannibal under adverse auspices at the river Ticinus. Neither the weakness of his age nor his lack of military experience nor the outcome of an unlucky battle apt to make even a veteran warrior afraid could deter him from earning a crown by snatching father and commander at the same time from the jaws of death, conspicuous with a twofold glory” (5.4.2).

408 Val. Max. 2.10.2b. In this account, Valerius underscores Africanus’ acceptance—even among pirates—as a paragon of Roman virtus: “...the pirates...after dismissing their troops and laying down their weapons they went up to the door and loudly announced that they had come to Scipio not as enemies to his life but as admirers of his prowess (virtutis admiratores), seeking to see and meet so great a man as a gift from the gods; so let him not grudge to show himself to strangers without fear for them to gaze upon.”
The Elder Africanus, furthermore, is showcased as a sagacious military planner (7.2.2), a statesman bravely commanding state-loyalty (5.6.7), a general respected even among his enemies (2.10.2a), and a thoroughly commemorated Roman ancestor (8.15.1). According to Valerius, moreover, these episodes are but a sample of the paradigmatic general’s lore since, “[t]he distinctions accorded to him in life would take too long to mention, because they are many.”

Second only to the Elder Africanus, Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (Africanus the Younger) is given pride of place in Valerius’ collection of military exempla. This adoptive grandson of the Elder Africanus is adorned with distinction during his career in Spain under Lucullus as he was “the first to climb the walls of Intercatia, a very strong town then under siege” (3.2.6b). Physically, Valerius enthusiastically describes how the Younger Africanus “…had wearied his shoulders and limbs much and long and made them prove their robustness in martial exertions” (3.6.1). Finally, in addition to overseeing the destruction of Carthage, we learn how as a consul he brought discipline to unruly Spain.

II.C.2.c. Education and Eloquence

Of the core elements comprising my heuristic model of ideal Roman leadership in chapter 2, Valerius’ Scipiones are rarely deployed as exemplifying wisdom

409 Regarding the latter, Valerius notes: “He has his statue placed in the sanctuary of Jupiter Best and Greatest, and whenever a funeral is to be celebrated in the Cornelian clan, the statue is sought there, and to it alone the Capitol is like an entrance hall” (8.15.1). In short, if the Scipiones comprised the foremost exemplary family, the Elder Africanus was the premier Scipio.

410 Val. Max. 8.15.1.

411 Val. Max. 2.7.1. For more episodes of the Scipiones’ valor, see Val. Max. 2.2.6a and 5.3.2e.
or eloquence. The only mention of wisdom—that I could identify—is related to the Elder Africanus’ “cunning” military strategy. Martial concerns seem to all but engulf the family’s legacy in Facta et Dicta.

II.C.2.d. Personal Frugality and Generous Patronage

While the balance of Valerius’ use of the Scipios with respect to generous patronage does not involve their material wealth but their use of military skill in “...bearing their country’s welfare on their shoulders” (2.8.5), members of the family are consistently deployed as exempla of traditional Roman austerity. Valerius details the defense of L. Scipio who, when called before the senate regarding four million sesterces acquired from Antiochus, defends himself with a powerful reminder of his family’s reputation for honest frugality:

...For when I subjected all Africa to your power, I brought nothing back to be called mine except a surname. So I was not made greedy by Punic treasures nor my brother by those of Asia, but each of us is richer by envy than by money (3.7.1e).

Finally, including the Scipios in a short-list of prominent families to whom his readers are directed to imitate, Valerius concludes that “...no riches can be preferred to the poverty of men like these” (4.4.11).

412 Val. Max. 7.3.3.

413 The Younger Africanus, for example, understands his martial distinction to obviate his need for traditional comportment—though not audible, a significant aspect of one’s overall eloquence (Val. Max. 3.6.1). On the traditional importance of one’s appearance, Maud Gleason summarizes, “[t]he language that a man’s body spoke through its deportment was a language that his contemporaries could read, even against his will. (1995: xiii).

414 Valerius describes the audience reaction: “The entire senate approved Scipio’s resolute defense.”

415 Valerius also describes Scipio Africanus the Younger’s wise critique of various leadership candidates relationship with wealth; see Val. Max. 4.4.2a.
II.C.2.e. Piety toward the Divine

Beyond his description of the Scipios’ filial piety, Valerius singles out the Elder Africanus as a paragon of piety to the Gods. He recounts the latter’s hours spent in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline, and in his account of Africanus’ gracious return of a prisoner of war to his kin, Valerius narrates, “[h]e thought that the greatest rewards of victory lay in returning temple ornaments to the gods and their kith and kin to men” (5.1.7). In sum, similar to Josephus and Philo’s deployment of Moses, Valerius Maximus portrays a singular ancestral source as invested with a unique abundance of ideal leadership qualities. Though his Facta et Dicta employs numerous members from various gentes, Valerius nevertheless has to admit, “[t]o whatever quarter of memorable examples I turn (in quacumque memorabilium partem exemplorum convertor), like it or not, I must stick fast in the surname of the Scipios” (3.7.3).

As the above summary demonstrates, Philo and Josephus’ consolidation of leadership virtues into a singular exemplary source was not unprecedented in Roman literary practices surrounding the deployment of exempla. That is, the preference for and ethical utility of one superlative individual or family over others was not necessarily unique to communities with sacred written traditions or liberator figures (e.g. Moses or Christ), but may have been something of a pedagogical trend in the Roman Mediterranean. This observation will provide a more robust context when I consider the centrality of Christ in 1 Clement and Lyons (below).

416 For example, the Elder Africanus’ youthful rescue of his father described earlier (Val. Max. 5.4.2).

417 Val. Max. 1.2.2.
Having reviewed these correspondences and Josephus and Philo’s similar elevation of Moses, I will conclude by briefly comparing their relative appropriation and re-deployment of the content and form of Roman discourse on exemplary leadership before making a few observations on their efforts to articulate their respective notions of ancestral leadership.

II.C.3. Traditional Roman Leadership Preferences in Josephus and Philo

Judging from his literary display of Moses in Ant. 2–4, Josephus, as we have seen, seems to share the Roman penchant for, above all, martial distinction. Though he shows less concern for formal education, the historian celebrates his Moses as a powerful orator, as well as a personally frugal while piously generous patron (I will discuss his piety more below). Philo, on the other hand, seems to be significantly less influenced by Roman leadership values. In terms of traditional Roman preferences, he mentions conspicuously little about Moses’ courage or martial ability preferring to elaborate his hero’s cosmopolitan education and philosophical acumen. Philo does, to be sure, share Roman priorities regarding eloquence, and he—like Josephus—showcases Moses personal frugality balanced by generous patronage.

In one leadership category in particular, however, both historians place similar stress above and beyond that warranted by traditional Roman expectations; both, as we have seen, give pride of place to Moses’ piety. The reason for their converging penchant for piety is likely due to, among other causes, their shared reliance on a sacred tradition. The LXX, though sparingly celebrating the personal leadership attributes of Moses, does emphasize his special proximity to the Hebrew God (Deut. 34:10–12) and portrays him as
the quintessential mediator of God’s life-organizing legislation for Israel.\(^{418}\) It is thus in this attribute, if anywhere, that we can arguably begin to circumscribe an emergent “Jewish” moral orientation to leadership in both writers’ exemplary discourse.

**II.C.4. Form: Traditional Roman Discourse of Exemplarity in Josephus and Philo**

In the realm of the narrative elements characterizing Roman discourse on exemplary leadership, as we have seen in *Ant.* 1–2, Josephus’ narrative suggests a robust appropriation of the Roman discourse—making careful mention of actions, audiences, commemoration, and imitation. In contrast, while Philo clearly shares Hellenistic and Roman historiographical presuppositions about exemplarity, where Matthew Roller’s four-fold framework is concerned, only one scene arguably contains the interacting narrative complex—namely, Moses’ rhetorical rescue at the Midianite well (*Mos.* 1.54–57). In short, while both authors appropriate foreign discursive tools to celebrate their native hero, and both similarly re-inscribe a leadership tradition structured around the virtue of piety, it is Josephus more than Philo who could have said with conviction, “when in Rome, write as the Romans write.”

**Conclusion and Implications**

The foregoing chapter holds a number of implications for the remainder of my dissertation focusing on two letters written in highly Romanized areas of the Mediterranean and prominently featuring “Christ” and other biblical and “Christ-like”

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\(^{418}\) “Since that time no prophet has risen in Israel like Moses, whom the LORD knew face to face, for all the signs and wonders which the LORD sent him to perform in the land of Egypt against Pharaoh, all his servants, and all his land, and for all the mighty power and for all the great terror which Moses performed in the sight of all Israel” (*Deut.* 34:10–12). The only additional compliment in the LXX characterizes Moses as, “very humble (*πρεπόσις φόδοφρα*), more so than anyone else on the face of the earth” (*Num.* 12:3).
figures as leadership *exempla* in antiquity. 1) First of all, my study illustrates well the complex cultural dynamics involved in effectively articulating an individual or community’s notion(s) of exemplary leadership in the crowded Roman Mediterranean marketplace of ideas. Like many of their Roman counterparts, Josephus and Philo here imaginatively appropriate originally Greek historiographical approaches, pedagogical presuppositions, and rhetorical strategies, in the service of outlining their respective ideas about an ethnically specific ancestral leadership tradition. Josephus, for his part, appears to largely reflect this originally Hellenistic discourse as it was redeployed in Roman cultural conversations on leadership. Philo, as we have seen, largely lacks this Roman discursive stamp. Both, however, preserve a similar moral approach wherein their chief leadership *exemplum* above all maintains a close relationship with the God described in the LXX and worshipped (or previously worshipped) in the Jerusalem Temple.⁴¹⁹

2) Secondly, the above study again illustrates the general usefulness of my polythetic model of honorable leadership presented in the last chapter. As I discussed there, the general leadership categories comprising this heuristic taxonomy, though certainly not equally prioritized by every participant—and, in fact, actively debated in the marketplace of ideas—frequently formed common points of discussion in conversations on leadership in the Roman Mediterranean. Similar to traditional Roman texts like Cicero’s *De Officiis* or Valerius Maximus’ *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia*, Josephus and Philo’s respective projects, though generally assuming the importance of these

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⁴¹⁹ This chapter in part confirms Wayne Meeks’ observation: “Yet the theocentrism of the Jewish moralizing historians, however widely their accounts differ from one another, distinguishes them from the pagan authors who treat such themes. Of course the pagan histories are not infrequently punctuated by the intervention of the gods, and not a few orators assured the leaders of Rome that they could not have gained such power without the gods’ favor. What was special to the historical conception held by many Jews was the notion that there is but one God with power to determine finally all human affairs, judging all by transcendent standards and showing no partiality” (1986: 92).
characteristics, freely re-prioritize them and debate (or virtually ignore) individual attributes. Considering where these authors similarly or differently emphasize, adapt, or eschew individual leadership characteristics helps us better situate those thinkers in their discursive context.

3) Finally, this chapter provided examples of at least three prominent first century authors (Josephus, Philo, and Valerius Maximus) whose works consolidate into one exemplary figure or family the aggregate of their preferred leadership characteristics and sanitize most (or often any) negative elements in the tradition. Tracing this discursive phenomenon will provide a more robust context for my subsequent study of the deployment of Christ and other biblical or Christ-following figures as exempla of leadership in 1 Clement and The Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons.
Chapter 4: Exempla and Roman Exemplarity in 1 Clement

Having outlined the way in which Josephus and Philo articulate what they understand to be their community’s time-honored values of leadership, in the following chapters I explore two letters celebrating Christ (among other exempla) and written by communities in highly Romanized portions of the Empire—namely, The Letter of the Romans to the Corinthians (1 Clement) and the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons (Lyons). I argue that both texts actively participate in the Roman discourse of exemplarity in order to communicate and re-inscribe their respective notions of Christian leadership. Both texts, to differing degrees, appropriate many characteristically Roman ancestral virtues (especially courage and endurance) while emphasizing the Pauline virtues of love (ἀγάπη) and especially humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη).

The primary goal of the present chapter is to explore how 1 Clement, a letter ostensibly composed by “the church…sojourning in Rome” (ἡ ἐκκλησία...ἡ παροικοῦσα Ἐλλάδα, 1 Clem. praef.), appears to appropriate, adapt, or eschew these Roman discursive practices and moral priorities as it articulates and inculcates a native tradition of exemplary leadership “in Christ.” Related to this, my chapter reevaluates the purpose of 1 Clement. Whereas many scholars assume that the achievement of concord is the singular aim and organizing principle of the letter, I contend that 1 Clement equally sets out to re-inscribe an inherited tradition of ancestral leadership; a tradition personified in the letter by Moses’ love and Christ’s humility.

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420 Next to the canonical texts of the New Testament, Adolf von Harnack called this Roman letter, “die wichtigst Urkunde, die wir aus der ältesten Kirchengeschichte empfangen haben” (1929: 1). William Lane agrees, placing 1 Clement alongside Paul’s letter to the Romans as one of “…the two primary Christian sources for ascertaining the character of Roman Christianity during this formative period (1998: 196). Gerhard Schneider likewise emphasizes the value of the document calling it an “important link” (Zwischenglied) between apostolic and non-apostolic times (1994: 9).
To make these arguments, following a brief discussion of several introductory issues (i.e. the date, authorship, genre, and occasion of the letter) as well as a review of scholarship, I will turn to the heart of my study by first introducing the letter’s general penchant for using examples. My chapter will continue by exploring the author’s selection of “ancestral” exempla before moving to an examination of the particular leadership characteristics advocated in the work (in light of the traditional Roman preferences outlined in chapter 2). In the latter exploration, I will both pay special attention to those attributes fortified with the most numerous and/or prominent exempla, and I will analyze the extended exempla according to Roller’s outline of the Roman discourse of exemplarity. Finally, following an excursus on “humility” in ancient Mediterranean literature, I will conclude by summarizing my findings and briefly mentioning a number of implications with respect to my larger project.

I. Overview of 1 Clement

I.A. Preservation and Date of Composition

1 Clement is best preserved in two Greek codices. In the earliest Greek witness, Codex Alexandrinus (5th century), the letter appears immediately following Revelation and is missing the last leaf, presumably containing (1 Clem. 57.7–63.4). Codex Hierosolymitanus, though much later (11th century), preserves the entire letter. Most scholars date its original composition to the last years of Domitian or to the beginning of Nerva’s reign (ca. 96–97 C.E.) based on the assumption that the “sudden and repeated misfortunes and calamities” endured by the Roman church (1 Clem. 1.1) refer to a

421 For a full discussion, see Gregory (2007: 22). For more on Codex Alexandrinus, see Metzger and Ehrman (2005: 67).
persecution under Domitian. Despite its popularity, this date range has not been unanimous. Perhaps the most significant critique of the consensus has come from L.L Welborn. Welborn first notes the “vague” language of *1 Clem*. 1.1 noting that, “…one may doubt whether it refers to persecution at all” (2004: 202), and then effectively demonstrates the problematic nature of any evidence for a supposed persecution of Christians under Domitian. Based on what little reliable evidence we do possess, he conservatively dates the composition of *1 Clement* between 80–140 C.E.

Other scholars, often influenced by Welborn’s arguments, have similarly suggested a flexible date range. Based on the admittedly slim external and internal evidence, I am inclined to agree with Welborn’s cautious proposal, though in light of possible references to the letter in Ignatius’ epistle to the Romans (*Rom. 3.1*) and

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422 For recent studies reviewing the evidence and maintaining this date range, see Holmes (1999: 23–23); Lane (1998: 226–227); Schneider (1994: 20); Jeffers (1991: 90). Odd Bakke provides a robust review of earlier scholars who largely agree with a late first century date (2001: 9 fn. 45).


424 He later makes the following accusation: “convinced that the Roman church suffered under Domitian, scholars have colored up the dull prose of *1 Clement*” (2004: 204). Bakke follows Welborn and further diminishes the likelihood that such references to “misfortunes and calamities” (συμφορά καὶ περίπτωσις) describe Imperial persecution or even external factors. Rather, he demonstrates that the terms were common *topoi* used to describe dissention and intra-communal conflict in Greco-Roman concord speeches (2001: 100–105); cf. Welborn (2004: 216).

425 Welborn underlines the lack of references to such a persecution in the works of Suetonius and Cassius Dio as well as the quite late date and biases of our earliest sources for this persecution (Tertullian and Eusebius); see 2004: 205–207.

426 See Welborn (2004: 201). He lists the factors suggesting a *terminus post quem* after 80 C.E.: “The presbyters installed by the apostles have died (44:2) and a second ecclesiastical generation has also passed (44:3). The church at Corinth is called ‘ancient’ (47:6); and the emissaries from Rome are said to have lived ‘blamelessly’ as Christians ‘from youth to old age’ (63:3)” (2004: 200). In terms of the letter’s *terminus ante quem*, Welborn notes the clear mention of the letter by Dionysius of Corinth (*H.E.* 4.23.10).

427 Following Welborn, Barbara Bowe proposes a date range between 80–120 (1988: 1). Bakke tentatively hypothesizes “…one has good reason to conclude that all this internal evidence suggests that the letter had been written during the first decade of the second century” (2001: 11). Andrew Gregory, likewise questioning the external referent of *1 Clem*. 1.1 and the evidence for Domitian’s persecution, he goes to far as suggest that the letter could have been written as early as the 70’s (2007: 29).
Polycarp’s to the Philippians (*Phil. 2.3*) I recognize that a date in the upper limits of the range is less likely.

**I.B. Authorship**

The letter itself nowhere identifies an individual author, preferring instead to be understood as a communal letter (*1 Clem. praef*). The unity and style, however, suggest that a singular author likely composed the work on behalf of the community. The letter soon came to be associated with a figure named “Clement” beginning at least by the time of Dionysus of Corinth (late second century) and continuing with Irenaeus (*Haer. 3.3.3.*) and Clement of Alexandria (*Strom. 1.38.8; 4.105.1; 111.1; 6.65.3*). Such connections are doubtful, among other reasons, in light of the fact that the name was quite common in antiquity.

Regarding the possibility of a connection between the author of the Roman letter and the consul of 95 C.E., T. Flavius Clemens, who according to Cassius Dio was executed by Domitian in 96 on charges of “atheism” (*a游戏操作*; 67.14.1f.), Lampe meticulously sorts through the evidence and sensibly concludes: “There is no basis at all to think of identifying Clement with the above-named consul” (2003: 206). In short, though for convenience and out of scholarly convention I will frequently refer to the

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428 See Bakke (2001: 4). Regarding its communal nature, Gerhard Schneider concludes that with *1 Clement*, we can speak of an “…echten Brief von Ortsgemeinde zu Ortsgemeinde sprechen” (1994: 14).

429 See Bakke (2001: 5). Moreover, no solid evidence exists linking the author of the Roman letter with the Clement mentioned in Phil. 4:3 or in *Hermas Vis. 2.4.3.*

430 For Lampe’s entire discussion, see 2003: 198–206. Suetonius also mentions his execution but does not specify the charges (*Dom. 15.1*). Welborn elaborates, “There is nothing in the non-Christian historians whose writings are extant which connects Flavius Clemens or Domitilla with the Christians. Suetonius was resident in Rome during the last years of Domitian’s reign and had every opportunity to observe its legal proceedings. His report of the execution of Flavius Clemens follows the account of Domitian’s fear of conspiracy and the extraordinary measures he took against it” (2004: 208–209).
work as “I Clement” and the author as Clement, I everywhere assume an anonymous composer of a communal letter.

**I.C. Genre and Structure**

Though these issues will be further discussed in the review of scholarship below, I will say a few words about the genre and composition of the Roman letter. Today, most scholars agree that I Clement was written as a deliberative, “symbouleutic” letter. This widely discussed category of ancient rhetoric aimed largely at persuading, not commanding, an audience toward a particular course (or particular courses) of action. As we will see, Clement’s desired response was the Corinthian community’s reinstatement of recently displaced leaders and the consequent peace and concord that such action would produce in the community.

While I share this assessment regarding the general rhetorical genre of the letter, my study will challenge the current consensus with respect to Clement’s major rhetorical/compositional influences as well as his strict adherence to only the moral topoi employed in formal Greek symbouleutic addresses. Without denying the formative role of rhetorical genre on the compositional choices Clement makes, my study will suggest that his rhetorical presentation was as much colored by popular Roman discursive

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431 Andrew Gregory provides a succinct explanation of the broad genre: “…a συμβουλευτικόν, [is] a form of deliberative rhetoric that is attempted to persuade rather than compel…[the writer] hopes to persuade because he cannot compel or command, and he knows that he cannot take it for granted that those whom he addresses will welcome and act on the counsel that he gives. He avoids the use of the imperative, and speaks instead in the second person plural…[h]is purpose is to give advice to those who deliberate on a certain matter” (2007: 26). See also van Unnik (2004: 180); Holmes (1999: 24); and Bowe (1988: 73).

432 As I will review later in the chapter in my discussion of the leadership characteristics emphasized in I Clement, Odd Bakke’s excellent and influential monograph, in particular, envisions the formal rhetorical genre as the major organizing principle of the letter, dictating the topics covered, examples employed, and maintaining the work’s focus on a more or less singular goal (achieving concord and peace).
practices and particular Pauline traditions as it was by the strictures and *topoi* of formal Greek rhetorical theory.

In terms of structure, most scholars agree that *1 Clement* consists of at least two major sections in addition to an introduction and conclusion.⁴³³ In this broad-stroked division, the first portion lays out what it understands to be the theological and ethical undergirding for the more concrete treatment of the Corinthian problem in the second major section. Devoting a substantial portion of his monograph to a fresh compositional analysis of the Roman letter, Bakke further divides the work in accordance with ancient rhetorical rules for structuring a discourse—especially those rules associated with the second stage of composition known as the *dispositio*).⁴³⁴

Using this lens, Bakke proposes that the letter consisted of an *exordium* preparing the audience for deliberation (1.1–2.8), a *narratio* instructing the audience as to the nature of the dispute (3.1–4), a *probatio* containing the body of the letter’s argument (4.1–61.3)—further divided into theoretical elements (*quaestio infinitia/θέσις*, 4.1–39.9) and concrete treatments of the crisis (*quaestio finita/ὑπόθεσις*, 40.1–61.3)—a *peroratio* summarizing the major topics and goals of the work (62.1–64.1), and finally the conclusion (65.1–2).⁴³⁵ Though my study will not necessarily assume the same level of fidelity to formal rhetorical rules in *1 Clement* as Bakke’s does, his outline will provide a helpful heuristic.

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⁴³³ Von Harnack (1929: 52, fn. 1), Bowe (1988: 126), and Schneider (1994: 11), for example, argue that the second major section begins at 37:1, while Bakke (2001: 205–279) and H.E. Lona, *Der erste Clemensbrief* (1998)—along with the balance of scholarship—contend that the major break takes place in 40:1. See Bakke (2001: 205–207) for an extended list of scholarship on this structural issue.

⁴³⁴ For Bakke’s methodology in this endeavor, see 2001: 207–216.

I.D. Occasion

The main concerns addressed in the Roman letter are not primarily “theological” or “liturgical,” but “ecclesiological.” Specifically, *1 Clement* claims to be written in response to a *stasis* (rebellion, discord) resulting from the deposition of older, established leaders of the Corinthian congregations by a group of younger aspiring leaders (*1 Clem.* 1:1; 47:6; 44:3–6). For my purposes—as my primary goal in this chapter is the study of the letter’s discourse rather than the historical *realia* underlying it—it seems sufficient to simply affirm that *1 Clement* ostensibly seeks to reestablish “peace and concord” (εἰρήνη καὶ ὀμόνοια, 65.1) in a community facing significant troubles related to leadership and authority.

I.E. Previous Scholarship on Leadership and Rhetoric in *1 Clement*

Since I will interact with many additional scholars on various issues throughout the chapter, I will first briefly review the most influential works related to my project’s chief interest in leadership and discursive practice. With respect to issues of authority, *1 Clement* features prominently in a number of the classic historical studies investigating the nature and development of church office and hierarchical leadership structures in

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437 Bowe, rightly in my view, takes a minimalist approach to the occasion, making the following observations: “Two facts are known: on the one hand, some presbyters had been removed from their duties (*1 Clem.* 44.6); and on the other, disputes had arisen causing ‘strife and sedition’ among Christians in Corinth (*1 Clem.* 3.2; 46.5.9)” (1988: 16). To be sure, she cautions against reading the references to the “young” (νεωτά, *1 Clem.* 3.3) as necessarily referring to the literal youth in the Corinthian congregations (1988: 18–19).

438 For a detailed review of scholarship on *1 Clement* until 1975, see Fuellenbach (1977).
Rome. More recently, scholars have approached 1 Clement with similar curiosities regarding polity in the Roman (or Corinthian) congregations, but have done so with new methodological tools and thus fresh results. Harry Maier (1991) fruitfully explores 1 Clement in light of modern scholarship in the sociology of religion (e.g. Weber, Wilson, Geertz, Berger and Luckmann). Not only does Maier provide a plausible social context for leadership in the Roman and Corinthian communities, but he also postulates an attractive reconstruction of the Corinthian crisis 1 Clement addresses.

439 In the preface to his final great work, *Einführung in die alte Kirchengeschichte*, Adolf von Harnack famously celebrates 1 Clement’s central position in his historical reconstructions, “da es keine zweite Urkunde gibt, die mit ihm in Hinsicht der geschichtlichen Bedeutung zu rivalisieren vermag” (1929: 5–6). More specifically, for Harnack, 1 Clement served as clear evidence for the increasing influence of Hellenistic, and largely non-charismatic, “non-Christian” approaches to leadership and authority. The ridged and authoritative approach to leadership advocated by the letter, he argues, paved the way for the ecclesiastical authority structures of the fourth century and beyond (1929: 72). In Walter Bauer’s watershed project, *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity* (originally, *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum* [1934]), 1 Clement is the first, and perhaps most important, source for Bauer as he constructs his theory of the rise of both “orthodoxy” and the increasingly stratified and powerful offices in the Roman Church (1972: 95–110). The letter, Bauer argues, is most precious as a source revealing the rhetorical tactics and polemics of an increasing minority of currently empowered “Jewish Christians” against the swelling number of “gnostic” believers in both Corinth and Rome. In short, for Bauer, 1 Clement is not about affirming a leadership ethic, but part of “…a contest for the extension of [the Roman Church’s] own influence” (1972: 111). Hans von Campenhausen’s equally influential *Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual Power in the Church of the First Three Centuries* (originally, *Kirchliches Amt und geistliche Vollmacht in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* [1953]) included 1 Clement as a centerpiece representing an intermediate stage in the ecclesiological trajectory of the western church from purely charismatic Pauline communities to the “unbalanced ascendency of office” flourishing in the time of Cyprian (1969: 299). In the Roman letter, Campenhausen contends, the largely Pauline—and thus more informal—episcopal system has merged with “…the patriarchal system of elders, which formed the load-bearing framework of the ‘catholic’ church organization” (1969: 120; cf. 84). For more recent—though equally positivistic—investigations using the Roman letter as a major source for reconstructing the nature of the Christian communities and their leaders in Rome, see Jeffers (1991), Lane (1998), and Lampe (2003). Peter Lampe’s diachronic monograph additionally includes a substantial prosopographic study of the Roman Church network (2003: 153–355).

440 “We shall argue that the typical leaders of the communities here analyzed were *patresfamilias* with houses large enough to accommodate meeting in their homes. They were the wealthier members of the church, and their social position is an important factor to be taken into account in any attempt to understand the problems to which these selected documents testify and the efforts of their writers to solve them” (1991: 4).

441 Maier concludes, “…the dispute over the title of bishop is occasioned by a division within one or two of the Corinthian house churches; the dissidents have formed an alternative meeting place” (1991: 93). Summarizing the implications of his approach, Maier contends that community life and leadership in the communities of Hermas, Clement, and Ignatius “…can be adequately understood only if one takes account of 1) the power wielded by relatively wealthy household owners who hosted the church in their homes, and
David Horrell (1996) applies the sociological insights of Anthony Giddens to both of Paul’s Corinthian correspondences as well as *1 Clement*—a letter he situates within a socially conservative trajectory of Pauline Christianity.\(^{442}\) Horrell’s careful and thorough study concludes that though Paul’s approach to leadership should not be considered “love patriarchalism,” in so far as the Apostle “…did not seek to affirm the position of the socially strong, nor to demand from the weak ‘subordination, fidelity and esteem’”, the approach of *1 Clement*, “though drawing upon some of the rules and resources used by Paul in 1 Corinthians” instead urges harmony via “the maintenance of established hierarchical roles” (1996: 263–265).

Finally, though the balance of his monograph addresses the rhetorical composition of *1 Clement*, Odd Bakke devotes a chapter to reconstructing the social-historical situation addressed by the letter (2001: 281–317). Here, in addition to providing an extensive review of modern scholarship on the issue (2001: 283–289), Bakke—standing on the shoulders of New Testament scholars utilizing tools from cultural anthropology (Malina, Moxnes, et al.)—proposes that the social situation underlying the letter involves a significant struggle for honor, not just a grasp for authority and power or

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2) the fact that the authors formulated Christian belief in a way that maintained the household setting” (1991: 199–200).

\(^{442}\) “The trajectory is one in which the rules and resources offered within Pauline Christianity are taken up in a way which is increasingly socially conservative, which supports the interests of the socially dominant, and which ideologically legitimates the established social, domestic and ecclesiastical order. The socially weak are urged to fulfill the responsibilities of leadership” (1996: 287). Horrell later proposes two possible social situations encouraging such conservatism in *1 Clem.* (as opposed to other “Pauline Trajectories” such as *The Acts of Paul* or various “gnostic” conceptualizations of the Apostle’s Christianity): 1) the external social and cultural pressures created by both the “might of Rome” experienced in the capital city and fading belief in the imminent return of Christ (1996: 289) and 2) the possibility that after the disappearance of Paul “prominent and powerful” resident members of these Roman congregations may have “…used their positions of power to formulate teaching which reflected and sustained their [conservative patriarchal] social interests” (1996: 290). Compare this with Campenhausen, who attributes the conservative development with respect to church structure and authority in the new generation of Roman Christianity to numerical growth, heretical deviations, and the “flagging zeal” in the congregations (1969: 79).
a conflict between “spirit” and “office.” The abovementioned studies all seek to understand or reconstruct the historical or socio-historical situation behind the Roman letter’s treatment of leadership and authority.

Beyond these socio-historical investigations, a handful of noteworthy monographs engage in a line of inquiry more closely related to the focus of my project—namely, exploring the rhetorical and, more broadly, discursive practices evinced in the Roman letter to Corinth. W.C. van Unnik was the first to address the formerly neglected issue of the letter’s literary genre concluding, “1 Clement belongs…to the sumbouleutikon genos, as recognized by ancient rhetoric” (2004: 180). Building on van Unnik’s work, Barbara Bowe (1988) devotes a portion of her study to further identify 1 Clement’s literary form. Finally, Odd Bakke (2001) agrees with the general genre identification of the latter two scholars, but engages in an exhaustive compositional study of the letter emphasizing rhetorical analysis. He argues that 1 Clement should be specifically characterized as deliberative rhetoric urging concord. As such, Bakke attempts to demonstrate that even the virtues advocated in the letter are occasioned largely by this

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443 Bakke summarizes: “Therefore, in light of the great value of honour, it is a reasonable suggestion that the removal of some of the presbyters not only ought to be seen as a quest for power and influence in itself, but that to hold an office in the Church was regarded as honourable in a way that was analogous to holding a public office in a city” (2001: 316).

444 His original 1970 essay has recently been translated into English by L.L. Welborn (2004).

445 Bowe concludes that 1 Clement is best interpreted against the rhetorical background of the sumbouleutikos genos, especially those examples of the subgenre peri eirhias kai omonias represented, in particular, in the speeches of Chrysostom and Aristides” (1988: 73). See 1988: 61–74 for Bowe’s full discussion of the literary genre.

446 Bakke summarizes, “…the main thesis of this investigation includes the following points: (1) that Clement, in his response to what he considers to be a dangerous situation for the Corinthian Church, applies the primary features of deliberative rhetoric; (2) that throughout the letter he applies terms and topoi commonly used in discourses, letters and other types of literature that deal with the political problem of factionalism; and (3) that the sub-texts on different levels in one way or another have also been integrated into Clement’s appeal for concord. Hence, 1 Clement ought to be classified as deliberative rhetoric, or more precisely, deliberative rhetoric urging concord” (2001: 15).
Hellenistic rhetorical genre. As mentioned above, I will challenge such conclusions, suggesting that, at least with respect to love and humility, the letter is not simply reproducing the Hellenistic or Roman language of concord; instead, 1 Clement is advancing elements of a Pauline leadership tradition.

Additionally, while the latter studies examine 1 Clement almost exclusively in light of Hellenistic literary and formal rhetorical influences, my study will consider the role that popular Roman moral and discursive practices play in the composition of the letter. Put differently, this chapter seeks to give more weight to the fact that Clement is not constructing this letter in a vacuum of Greek rhetorical tradition, but in the Imperial Capital saturated with storied statuary, echoing with exempla-laden orations and entertainments, and very publically and proudly featuring the “paradigmatic” leadership of the princeps. In short, in the following pages I will seek to better understand 1 Clement as it both champions a self-consciously native leadership tradition while at the same time fits neatly within its Roman pedagogical and political context.

I.F. Advocating a “Native” Morality of Leadership on the Way to Restoring Harmony

With respect to my first anticipated contribution, a few preliminary comments are in order. First, I do not dispute the scholarly consensus viewing the achievement of peace and concord as the overarching goal of the Roman letter. That is, I agree that 1 Clement was not written primarily as a treatise on proper leadership, but instead addresses the leadership crisis in Corinth as the means to a greater end, namely, the restoration of

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harmony among all members of the community. Nevertheless, though a secondary concern, both discussions of and moralizing exempla related to leadership abound in the text and invite a systematic investigation of the letter’s moral project on the topic.

Second, neither my focus on leadership in the letter nor my contention that Clement views his letter as a moral pedagogical project are altogether novel. As the scholarly attention outlined above suggests, the significance of 1 Clement as a source for understanding church leadership in Rome has not been missed. It has, however, tended to focus almost exclusively on issues of structure and polity to the neglect of any systematic analysis of the letter’s construction and pedagogical articulation of a moral leadership tradition.

Finally, in terms of the letter’s moral content, the broader ethical agenda of 1 Clement has also already been noted. As Barbara Bowe rightly emphasizes, the letter first and foremost aimed “…to reinforce certain values in its audience, values which will impel concrete actions and alter the historical realities of Corinthian church life” (1988: 24). My project, however, will move beyond Bowe’s more general treatment of

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448 Barbara Bowe rightly notes, “…the letter speaks both of deposed presbyters and of a general state of factiousness among Christians in Corinth. However, it can be demonstrated that Clement places far more emphasis on the latter than on the former. From the Roman viewpoint at least, the discord within the church was by far the more serious problem” (1988: 22).

449 She later underscores, “Clement’s letter appears to redefine the conflict in Corinth not in terms of individual disputes but in terms of a communal ethic” (1988: 74). Lane further highlights this moral agenda: “A positive result of the social conflict in Corinth was the identification of the values and historical events (or the interpretation of those events) that were normative for the proper functioning of shared communal life” (1998: 240). Though he fits more comfortably in the tradition of scholars exploring ecclesiastical structures in the Roman letter, Lane correctly appreciates the moral project of 1 Clement as well as the relationship between this moral project and church leadership. Lane summarizes: “His strategy was to make explicit the ground of the authority of the deposed presbyters in divinely established community structures, and so to strengthen the normative character of the structures of leadership within the church. By identifying the values and historical events that were normative for the proper functioning of ordered church life, Clement underscored that the church was committed to support the deposed elders…to provide a formal legitimation of certain leadership structures that prevailed at Roman and in Corinth at the end of the first century” (1998: 244).
“morality” in *1 Clement* and will focus closely on the specific virtues and characteristics the author both advocates for leaders and celebrates in his leadership *exempla*. My study will additionally provide a more robust context for this moral material as it seeks to understand both the form and content of Clement’s discussion in light of the Roman moral discourse on the topic (outlined in chapter 2). Having made these clarifications I will now turn to the major focus of my chapter, beginning with a consideration of Clement’s didactic preference for example.

II. *Exempla in 1 Clement*

II.A. Ubiquity of Exempla

Even a cursory read reveals that *1 Clement* aligns well with the traditional Roman preference for “native” examples. Second only to the quotation of what it calls the sacred Scriptures (τὰ ἱερὰ γραφάς) (*1 Clem.* 53.1), the letter supports the vast majority of its exhortations with positive and negative *exempla* (ὑποδειγμάτα in this letter). In addition to several individual examples (*1 Clem.* 14.3; 20.1–12; 33.1–8; 34.5–6; 37.1–4; 43.1–6; 52.1–4; and 53.1–5), the epistle supports the balance of its prescriptions for the Corinthian crisis with nine *exempla* lists (*1 Clem.* 4.1–13; 5.1–7; 6.1–2; 7.4–7; 9.2–12.8; 16.1–18.17; 31.1–4; 45.1–7a; and 55.1–6).

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450 *1 Clement* provides approximately 75 quotations—likely from the LXX—and many allusions; see Hagner (1973). Andrew Gregory notes Clement’s apparent familiarity with and reliance on the LXX, “…the fact that the author uses so much Septuagintal language and draws on it both extensively and coherently to support the point he wishes to make suggests that he knew the Greek Jewish scriptures very well” (2007: 29). Gregory continues, “Clement appeals also to a number of Christian writings that were later included in the New Testament, as well as the words of Jesus” (2007: 30). To be sure, there is no consensus as to the extent or specificity of the letter’s reliance on the texts of the canonical New Testament. See Gerhard Schneider’s summary of the scholarly discussion concerning Clement’s use of the New Testament (1994: 24–34); cf. Harnack (1929: 37–39).
The *exempla* lists all occur in the *probatio*, with the first seven bolstering Clement’s theoretical argumentation (*quaestio infinitia*/*θέως*, 4.1–39.9) while the latter two anchor the author’s concrete treatment of the Corinthian crisis (*quaestio finita*/*ὑπόθεσις*, 40.1–61.3). As many of these clusters will be examined in more detail later in the chapter, here I will simply introduce the context and specific paradigmatic figures. The *first* list (*1 Clem.* 4.1–13) illustrates the damaging effects of jealousy and envy (ζῆλος καὶ φθόνος) by pairing a number of “ancient examples” (*ἀρχαῖοι* ὑποδειγμάτων, 5.1) with their jealous persecutors (Cain/Able, Jacob/Esau, Joseph/unidentified persecutors, Moses/fellow countrymen, Aaron and Miriam/fellow countrymen, Moses/Dathan and Abiram, David/foreigners and Saul).

The *second* cluster (*1 Clem.* 5.1–7) furnishes “noble examples” (*ἀρξαῖοι* ὑποδειγμάτων) who likewise bravely endured hardship (Peter and Paul). The *third* (*1 Clem.* 6.1–2) compliments the earlier two by including “a great multitude of the elect” (πολύ πληθὸς ἐκλεκτῶν) who suffered for the same reasons. The *fourth* (*1 Clem.* 7.4–7) follows a string of hortatory subjunctives enjoining author and reader to look both to the blood of Christ leading to repentance as well as all generations (τὰς γενεὰς πάσας) whose acts of repentance were rewarded with acceptance and salvation (i.e. Noah and Jonah’s respective repentant audiences).

After both the repentant *exempla* as well as a number of scriptures urging repentance (*1 Clem.* 8.1–5), the *fifth* list (*1 Clem.* 9.2–12.8) recounts those paragons who have “perfectly served his magnificent glory” (τελείως λειτουργῆσαντας τῇ μεγαλοπρεπεί δόξῃ αὐτοῦ), including Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Lot, and Rahab. Enoch is especially distinguished for his obedience (ὑπακοή), Noah and Abraham for their faithfulness...
(πιστοὶ), Lot for his hospitality and piety (φιλοξενίαν καὶ εὔσεβείαν), and finally Rahab for her faith and hospitality (διὰ πίστιν φιλοξενίαν).

Following a number of calls to humility (ταπεινοφροσύνης), the sixth list (1 Clem. 16.1–18.17) features Christ (1 Clem. 16.1–17) as well as “those who went about in goatskins and sheepskins, preaching the coming of Christ” (1 Clem. 17.1), including Elijah, Elisha, Ezekiel, Abraham, Job, Moses, and David. The seventh (1 Clem. 31.1–4) appears after a long section urging peace and concord in light of God’s peaceful and orderly creation (1 Clem. 20.1–12), resurrection and eschatological judgment (1 Clem. 22.1–28.4), and our shared inheritance as the people of God (1 Clem. 29.1–30.8). This list investigates “the ways of blessing” (αἱ ὁδοὶ τῆς εὐλογίας) and enumerates three significant leaders in Israel’s history, including “our father” (ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν) Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob who were blessed through their faith (διὰ πίστεως), confidence (πεποιθήσεως), and humility (ταπεινοφροσύνης) respectively.

The final clusters appear in the quaestio finita/διάθεσις portion of the probatio, after Clement urges the Corinthians to respect God’s “appointed times” (καιροὺς τεταγμένους, 40.1) and “offices” (τὰ ὀνόματα, 44.1). The eighth list (1 Clem. 45.1–7a) showcases both the abominable men (οἱ συγγενεῖς) who persecuted the righteous as well as the righteous who endured nobly (εὐκλεῶς ἠμερίκαν)—the latter being Daniel, Ananias, Azarias, and Mischael. The ninth and final exempla list (1 Clem. 55.1–6) is aimed at the usurping Corinthian leaders, urging them to voluntarily remove themselves from the community and so follow the example of “those who live as citizens of the commonwealth of God” (οἱ πολιτευόμενοι τὴν ἀμεταμέλητον πολιτείαν τοῦ θεοῦ, 54.4). Such “citizens” include unnamed kings and rulers, “many among us,” and women.
empowered by God to perform “many manly deeds” (πολλὰ ἄνδρείᾳ). The latter include Judith and Esther.

II.B. Selection of Exempla

In line with traditional Roman exemplary discourse, the exempla (individual examples as well as those in a list) both are conceived of as “native” to the Roman and Corinthian communities and are deployed primarily as moral models.451 That these models are envisioned as “native” to both the author and audience is suggested 1) by their frequent connection with the first person plural genitive pronoun (ἡμῶν), and 2) by the ancestral language employed throughout the letter.452 Regarding the latter, for example, Clement introduces Jacob, Adam, and Abraham individually as “our father” (ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν)453 and, among other ancestral references, he explicitly exhorts the Corinthians,

451 To be sure, as I reviewed in chapter 1 and as Bakke describes in his review of the standard components of deliberative rhetoric (2001: 54–57), the use of examples was not exclusive to Roman persuasion. Furthermore, appealing to native or ancestral examples in the course of a deliberative speech has precedents in traditional Greek rhetoric. As Bakke rightly notes, Isocrates appeals to “the forefathers” in his deliberative orations (Or. 6.82; 7.84; 8.36–37; cf. Bakke [2001: 56–57]). The nuanced distinction between Isocrates’ reliance on family tradition and typical Roman appeals to the ancestors, however, seems to be one of frequency, specificity, and moral emphasis. Roman speeches, for example, were positively littered with native exempla while Isocrates’ ancestral appeals are comparatively sparing. Regarding specificity, while Isocrates almost always appeals to the ancestors as a group, as Valerius’ Facta et Dicta illustrates (among other texts), Romans tended to showcase individual exempla. Finally, though Isocrates at times points to the decisions and actions of ancestral antiquity, for the most part his appeals are to military or political decisions (with the exception of Or. 6.94–100, where the emphasis is on both military strategy and valorous conduct). Typical Roman deployment of the ancestors, on the other hand, was more intimately connected with moral instruction. To say it all, while Greek rhetoric did not ignore the fathers as didactic resources, the Romans treasured them as moral and pedagogical essentials.

452 For the use of ἡμῶν in connection with the exempla, see 1 Clem. 4.8, 6.3, 30.7, 31.2, 37.1, 44.1. The figure of Christ is almost everywhere referred to as “our Lord” (ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν). See 1 Clem. 49.6, 20.11, 42.3, 44.1, and 50.7. To be sure, some textual witnesses omit ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν in 1 Clem. 16.2; see Holmes: 1999: 44 fn. 65.

453 See 1 Clem. 4.8, 6.3, and 31.2.
“Let the testimony to our good deeds be given by others, as it was given to our fathers (τοῖς πατρᾶσιν ἴμων) who were righteous” (*I Clem.* 30.7). ⁴⁵⁴

Unlike traditional Roman exemplary discourse, however, these examples (with a few exceptions) are not taken from the stock heroes celebrated for their defense of the *res publica*, but from the “great multitude of the elect (ἐκλεκτῶν)” (*I Clem.* 6.1) who are either recounted in the Septuagint or cherished as more recent heroes of the Roman and Corinthian communities. ⁴⁵⁵ While he references roughly 32 figures or groups from the LXX, ⁴⁵⁶ his most frequently deployed heroes include Moses (*I Clem.* 4.10; 17.5–6; 43.1–6; 53.1–5), Abraham (*I Clem.* 10.1–7; 17.2; 31.2), and David (*I Clem.* 4.13; 18.1–17; 52.1–4). Prominent paradigms from Clement’s more recent memory feature above all the figure of Christ (*I Clem.* 7.4; 16.1–17; 49.6) and the “good apostles” (ἄγαθοι ἀπόστολοι) Peter and Paul (*I Clem.* 5.4–7). ⁴⁵⁷ Finally, *I Clement* appeals to creation

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⁴⁵⁴ Along these lines, in 29.1 the letter also links his community with the heritage of God’s people “Israel” who became God’s “chosen portion” (ἐκλογὴς μέρους). For more on the use of familial language in *I Clement*, see Hellerman (2001: 130–131).

⁴⁵⁵ Gregory provides a helpful analysis of the letter’s sources: “Clement also draws on other sources in addition to the Jewish scriptures and Christian writings and traditions. These include the legend of the phoenix (25.1–5), possibly Stoic images of harmony (20.1–12; 37.1–3, but cf. Paul and Jesus), and various examples drawn not only from Jewish but also from Gentile (i.e. Graeco-Roman) history (6.2, 4; 55.1). These appeals have sometimes been used as evidence of the extent to which he has been influenced by non-Jewish and Christian traditions, but it is probably more important to note how few, rather than how many, such examples he notes. By far the majority of his examples and appeals to other sources of authority are drawn from Jewish scripture or from Christian tradition” (2007: 30). Schneider similarly circumscribes the vein of tradition Clement draws upon, summarizing, “die Gemeinde beruft sich auf gemeinsame christliche Überlieferung (7,2), auf die Bibel des Alten Testaments und auf die Worte Jesu” (1994: 8). For a more detailed analysis of the specific sources Clement uses, see Schneider (1994: 20–22).

⁴⁵⁶ These include God (14.3; 33.1–8), the angelic host (34.5–6), Moses (4.10; 17.5–6; 43.1–6; 53.1–5), Abraham (10.1–7; 17.2; 31.2), David (4.13; 18.1–17; 52.1–4), Jacob (4.8–9 [Jacob/Esau]; 31.4), Cain and Able (4.3–7), Joseph (4.9), Aaron and Mariam (4.11), Dathan and Abiram (4.12), Noah’s generation (7.6), Noah (9.4), Jonah’s generation (7.7), Enoch (9.3), Lot and his wife (11.1–2), Rahab “the harlot” (ἡ πόρνη, 12.1–8), Elijah and Elisha (17.1), Job (17.3–4), Isaac (31.3), Daniel (45.6), Ananias, Azarias, and Mishael (45.7), Judith (55.4), and Esther (55.6).

⁴⁵⁷ The letter also includes general references to “a great multitude of the elect” (πολὺ πλήθος ἐκλεκτῶν, *I Clem.* 6.1–4) and “many among us” (*I Clem.* 55.2).
itself (20.1–2) as well as ὑποδείγματα ἑθνῶν, including “soldiers who serve under our commanders” (τοὺς στρατευομένους τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἴμων, 37.1–4) and “many kings and rulers” (πολλοὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ ἡγούμενοι, 55.1). Having introduced the general situation, character, and selection of exempla in 1 Clement, I will now consider in more detail their application to issues of leadership and, for the longer exemplary accounts, their constituent discursive elements. Consistent with the foregoing chapters and given Clement’s arguably significant exposure to Roman moral and political discourse, 458 I will organize my investigation according to the heuristic categories of “traditional Roman leadership” outlined in chapter 2.

III. Leadership Ideals

Andrew Gregory’s remarks on the use of ancestral tradition in 1 Clement provides a helpful transition into our investigation of the letter’s moral discourse. The examples, he notes, “…not only function as illustrations and proofs of the opinions that Clement expresses, but also give form to the ideal of Christian life. Those in Corinth should respect these examples and imitate them in their lives” (2007: 27). Though the overarching moral intent of 1 Clement is the restoration of peace and concord in the Corinthian community (leaders and “laity” alike), as Gregory suggests, the Roman letter

458 Several factors suggest the letter’s original proximity and likely openness to Roman leadership mores. First of all, the text explicitly identifies itself as having been written by a community “sojourning in Rome” (ἡ παρακολούθησις Ρώμης, 1 Clem. praef.). Secondly, as a number of passages reflect, it seems to maintain a generally positive outlook on the Roman state (1 Clem. 37.2–3; 21.1, 6; 60.2; 61.1–2; cf. Wellborn: 2004: 198). More than this, James Jeffers has persuasively argued that the letter reflects Roman political and social ideals with respect to leadership structure and domestic life. He summarizes, “Clement and his congregation came to accept social distinctions among themselves on a basis for ordering their relationships. That is, through the influence of Roman ideology, they came to accept hierarchy as natural to Christianity” (1991: 131). Finally, the fact that the letter is written in Greek should not be taken as an indication of its insulation from Roman culture and politics. Rather, as Lampe points out, the presence of Greek-speaking communities was “typical of the entire city” (2003: 144).
stretches for a more ambitious goal, namely, the pedagogically effective review of a distinctive value system. Due to the nature of the Corinthian crisis, moreover, it is not surprising that part of this project involves both the validation of the recently-deposed leaders’ credentials, and the re-inscription of what Clement understands to be an ancestral leadership ethos. But what were the characteristic elements of such a value system and how did they measure up to traditional Roman expectations? To answer these questions, beginning with the topic of noble birth I will first explore the letter’s discourse in light of the key “Roman” leadership attributes outlined in chapter 2, before considering two moral emphases (ἀγάπη and ταπεινοφροσύνη) wherein 1 Clement deviates from traditional Roman mores, fitting better within Pauline tradition. Along the way, I will seek to demonstrate that Clement showcases his Christian ancestral leadership priorities by employing very Roman pedagogical practices.

**III.A. Noble Lineage**

On the subject of honorable lineage, though this authority-inscribing cultural convention was energetically celebrated in Roman literature and ambitiously advertized throughout the Roman capital, Clement largely ignores the attribute. To begin with, the letter makes no explicit appeal to bloodline as an important factor in either the leadership tensions in Corinth or their possible resolution. Consequently, *exempla* are never deployed to this specific end. Secondly, in its plea for the restoration of the displaced leaders, the text does not (or perhaps cannot) refer to the Corinthian leadership’s honorable bloodline as a source of credibility. The only clear reference to the ascribed honor of significant figures in either community appears in 65.1, where Clement refers to
two of the letter’s accompanying “witnesses” (μάρτυρες) by their Roman gentes (i.e., Claudius Ephebus and Valerius Bito). While these references show that Clement does not seek to thoroughly subvert ascribed titles and honors, his overall approach to them in the letter seems to be one of de-emphasis.

This does not mean, however, that the letter altogether abandons all forms of ascribed honor. 1 Clement begins its concrete treatment of the Corinthian situation (quaestio finita/ὑπόθεσις 40.1–61.3) with a call for the re-installation of the former leadership based on the noble origins and order of the offices themselves:

So then Christ is from God, and the apostles are from Christ. Both, therefore, came of the will of God in good order (ἐντάκτως)...So [the apostles], preaching both in the country and in the towns, they appointed their firstfruits...to be bishops and deacons (ἐπισκόπους καὶ διακόνους) for the future believers (1 Clem. 42.2, 4).

This apostolic appointment is then likened to the “blessed” (ὁ μακάριος) Moses’ wise and public deference to God’s vindication of the Aaronic priesthood (43.1–6), before continuing:

Our apostles likewise knew, through our Lord Jesus Christ, that there would be strife over the bishop’s office (τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς). For this reason, therefore, having received complete foreknowledge, they appointed the officials mentioned earlier and afterwards they gave the offices a permanent character; that is, if they should die, other approved men should succeed to their ministry. Those, therefore, who were appointed by them or, later on, by other reputable men (ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν) with the consent of the whole church (συνευδοκησάσης τῆς ἐκκλησίας πάσης), and who have ministered (λειτουργήσαντας) to the

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459 In the course of his prosopographic study of the Roman Christian network, Peter Lampe elaborates on these names: “Their Greek cognomens betray a slave background…which is made precise through the Latin gentilicia, indicating that they were freedmen of the Claudian and Valerian families” (2003: 184).

460 The dual aim of Moses’ actions in this regard, according to 1 Clement, is the maintenance of order and divine honor. Clement concludes: “What do you think, dear friends? Did not Moses know beforehand that this would happen? Of course he knew. But in order that disorder (ἀκαταστάσις) might not arise in Israel, he did it anyway, so that the name of the true and only God might be glorified, to whom be the glory for ever and ever. Amen” (1 Clem. 43.6).
flock of Christ blamelessly (ἀμέμπτως), humbly (μετὰ ταπεινοφροσύνης), peaceably (ησύχως), and unselfishly (ἀβαναίνως), and for a long time have been well spoken of by all (μεμαρτυρημένους τε πολλοῖς χρόνοις ὑπὸ πάντων)—these men we consider to be unjustly removed from their ministry (1 Clem. 44.1–3).

Thus, in one sense proper descent and noble association (with the apostles) is an authority-imparting component of Clement’s overall vision for proper leadership. But, as Barbara Bowe has rightly noted, it is the honorable and divinely-ordered origin of the offices (ὁνόματα) themselves—not the individuals occupying those offices—that is highlighted in this passage.461 She contends, “[t]he absence of any mention of individual apostles and their specific connection with individual churches argues against interpreting these chapters as a statement of ‘apostolic succession’” (1988: 148).462

As 1 Clem. 44.3 further suggests, simply having occupied an apostolically approved office was not enough to ensure the former leaders’ continued tenure; they were also to be considered worthy based on their behavior while in office. In sum, whether intentionally ignoring bloodline or simply unable to identify any Corinthian leaders distinguished by it, 1 Clement by and large deemphasizes the otherwise valued Roman leadership priority.

**III.B. Courage, Martial Prowess, and Endurance in 1 Clement**

Similar to his treatment of bloodline, Clement never showcases military accomplishment as an important leadership characteristic. Likewise, his exempla are never deployed as brave warriors or skilled generals. Nonetheless, the letter is peppered

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461 For her extended discussion on this matter, see Bowe (1988: 147–157). She follows Koester’s conclusion that “Clement is not interested in the doctrine of apostolic succession but wants to speak generally about the continuance and stability of offices in the Christian churches” (1988: 148).

with martial imagery—even, arguably, drawing upon the Roman military as a positive model—and it does feature several leaders positively exemplifying the agonistic virtue of endurance (ἡ ὑπομονή).\textsuperscript{463} Several of these paragons are, moreover, deployed in a manner according well with Roller’s fourfold pattern. I will briefly review the general martial and agonistic images in 1 Clement before providing a more detailed analysis of the latter exempla.

\textbf{III.B.1. Martial images}

In his diachronic exploration of military imagery in selected “Christian” texts until the 3rd century, Adolf von Harnack identifies “the Roman Clement” as a thinker who “regarded all Christians as warriors of God” (1981: 40). The specific military images he mentions, it should be noted, never directly advocate physical or spiritual violence or battlefield bravery, preferring instead to celebrate the cohesion and organization of the military. Regarding cohesion, for example, Clement depicts the participants in the Corinthian faction as “deserters.”\textsuperscript{464} Concerning organization, von Harnack joins a large scholarly tradition in observing the letter’s apparent high view of the Roman army in 37.1–3.

The latter passage falls in a section of 1 Clement highlighting the importance of order and proper submission to authorities (1 Clem. 36.1–38.4). Beginning with the hortatory command, “Let us, therefore, serve as soldiers (στρατευομένη), brothers with all earnestness under his faultless orders,” Clement directs his audience’s attention

\textsuperscript{463} To be sure, this virtue is never explicitly advocated as a leadership virtue. Nevertheless, as we will see, the virtue is celebrated in several key leadership figures, including Peter and Paul.

\textsuperscript{464} 1 Clem. 21.4 and 28.2.
toward a group he refers to as “the soldiers (τοὺς στρατευομένους) who serve under our commanders (τοὺς ἡγούμενους ἡμῶν).” 465 He urges,

Let us consider the soldiers who serve under our commanders, how precisely (πῶς εὐτάκτως), how readily (πῶς εἰκτικῶς), how obediently (πῶς ὑποταγμένως) they execute orders. Not all are prefects (ἐπαρχοί) or tribunes (ξιλαρχοί) or centurions (ἐκατόνταρχοι) or captains of fifty (πεντηκόνταρχοι) and so forth, but each in his own rank executes the orders given by the emperor and the commanders (1 Clem. 37.1–3). 466

While the military tenor of this passage has never been in question, scholars have spilled a great deal of ink debating whether or not Clement has the Roman army in mind. In a noteworthy article, A. Jaubert questioned the prior scholarly consensus that generally considered Clement’s primary source in chapter 37 to be the Roman army. Jaubert instead suggests, “on doit désormais tenir compte de nouveaux éclairages sur le judaïsme des environs de l’ére chrétienne” (1964: 83). She rightly notes that Clement’s final military division (πεντηκόνταρχοι) has no equivalent in the Imperial Roman army, but “…est typique de la répartition des fonctions dans le people de Dieu d’après la Bible et certains écrits juifs” (1964: 81). 467 Bowe agrees, concluding that the primary source and meaning of Clement’s military image is located not in the Roman army, but “…in the sacred and priestly conception of the desert wanderings of Israel” (1988: 134).

More recently, however, James Jeffers has persuasively reestablished the position holding that Clement’s main referent in chapter 37 is the Roman army. If Clement wished to describe the armies of the House of Israel, Jeffers reasons, we would expect him to mention a position that is ubiquitously connected to those other “Jewish” martial

465 1 Clem. 37.1–2a.
466 1 Clem. 37.1–3.
467 Her study explores, in particular, Job, 1–4 Maccabees and 1QS to establish the Jewish context of Clement’s military analogy.
configurations, namely, the commander “in charge of ten soldiers” (δεκάδαρχος).\textsuperscript{468}

Jeffers then concludes,

[p]resumably Clement never served in the Roman army, but he had an extensive knowledge of the Old Testament. It appears most likely that he had in mind the Roman army, but he erred in his reference to those ‘in charge of fifty’ because of his knowledge of the Old Testament (1991: 140).\textsuperscript{469}

The fact that Clement later refers to “our rulers and governors on earth” (ἀρχοντας και ἡγουμένων ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, 1 Clem. 60.4) in the same way that he identifies soldiers who serve “our” commanders (1 Clem. 37.1) further suggests that his army illustration primarily draws upon Roman traditions. Whatever the ultimate source (or combination of sources), in light of their relative infrequency and the lack of robust emphasis put on such allusions, it seems reasonable to conclude with Bowe that the “…image of the army should not, therefore, be inordinately stressed within the ecclesiology of 1 Clement” (1988: 134).

III.B.2. Agonistic Endurance (ὑπομονή)

In contrast to the more moderate use of distinctly military imagery, the letter ambitiously celebrates the agonistic ideal of endurance (ὑπομονή). To be sure, this trait is never explicitly offered as a leadership essential and it is not prescribed as a solution to the Corinthian leadership crisis. Nevertheless, Clement’s discussion of endurance is everywhere fortified by carefully deployed leadership exempla. The two main clusters celebrating such paradigmatic endurance occur in opposite ends of the letter (1 Clem.

\textsuperscript{468} Jeffers 1991: 140.

\textsuperscript{469} Bakke agrees with Jeffers (2001: 174–175).
5.1–64 and 45.1–46.1) and both contrast the suffering heroes with their unrighteous persecutors.

The first list undergirds Clement’s rebuke of the schismatic Corinthian leaders’ jealously and envy (ζῆλος καὶ φόνος). Here, the author features the exemplary behavior of Peter and Paul, “...the greatest and most righteous pillars (στῦλοι) [who] were persecuted, and fought to the death (ἐως θανάτου ἠθλήσαν)” (1 Clem. 5.2). Formally, the description of these “pillars” fits Roller’s schema, describing 1) action, 2) audience, 3) commemoration, and 4) imitation.

1 Clement first deploys Peter as an exemplum of endurance. In terms of action, we are simply told that Peter, “...endured (ὑπῆρεγκεν) not one or two but many trials” (5.4a). While the communities in Rome and Corinth are made secondary audiences as hearers of Peter’s actions, the primary audience to Peter’s endurance is implied by the fact that he is described as “...having given his testimony (μαρτυρήσας ἐπορεύθη)” (1 Clem. 5.4b). Peter’s endurance is further commemorated by both the Roman letter itself, and more significantly, by 1 Clement’s comment that following Peter’s spectacle of endurance he “...went to his appointed place of glory (τῆς δόξης)” (1 Clem. 5.4c). Finally, albeit less explicitly, 1 Clement seems to call for the imitation of Peter’s endurance as it charges its hearers: “Let us set before our eyes the good apostles (ἀγαθοὺς ἀποστόλους)” (1 Clem. 5.3). The promise of glory, one could further argue, suggests the exemplum’s mimetic aim.

Further indicating his generally positive view of the Empire, Clement fails to identify the Romans or even a specific emperor related to Peter or Paul’s persecution. Jeffers articulates the letter’s unspoken perspective, “[t]he Neronian persecution was the result of ‘jealousy and envy’ by unnamed persons rather than the conscious opposition of the state” (1991: 140).
Turning to Paul, Clement equally underscores his “patient endurance” (ὑπομονής, 1 Clem. 5.5). More specifically, the letter recounts that Paul “...had been seven times in chains, had been driven into exile, had been stoned, and had preached in the East and in the West” (1 Clem. 5.6). The main judging audience is God, who clearly approves of Paul’s noble suffering and awards him “genuine glory” (1 Clem. 5.6). Though their evaluation of Paul’s actions are not disclosed, “the rulers (ἡγουμένων)” before whom “he had given his testimony (μαρτυρίας)” form an additional audience (1 Clem. 5.7). The readers of 1 Clement who were charged to “...set before [their] eyes the good apostles (ἀγαθῶς ἀποστόλους)” (1 Clem. 5.3), comprise the newly-created secondary audience of these Pauline feats. The Apostle’s brave endurance is commemorated in both the letter of 1 Clement itself and by God as Paul is, again, said to have attained “genuine glory” in 5.6, and to have “departed from the world” and gone “to the holy place” in 5.7. Lastly, the call for imitating Paul’s endurance can be seen in 5.5 when the author states that Paul “pointed out the way to the prize for patient endurance.”

Moving from his extended narration of Peter and Paul, Clement provides several quick snapshots of individuals in the “vast multitude of the elect who, having suffered (παθόντες) many torments and tortures because of jealousy (διὰ ζῆλος), set an illustrious example (ὑπόδειγμα κάλλιστον) among us” (1 Clem. 6.1–4). He follows this cluster up by casting his own leadership project as an athletic endeavor: “We write these things, dear friends, not only to admonish you, but also to remind ourselves. For we are in the same arena (τῷ σκάμματι), and the same contest awaits us (ὅ αὐτός ἡμῖν ἀγων ἐπίκειται)”

471 Clement further notes the honored position of the apostle as in 47.1 he exhorts the Corinthians to “take up the epistle of the blessed Paul (μακαρίου Παύλου).”
Clement finishes the persecution list with both an exhortation to repentance (1 Clem. 7.2–3) and the soteriological basis of such repentance—describing the latter in agonistic terms: “Let us fix our eyes on the blood of Christ and understand how precious it is to his Father, because, being poured out for our salvation, it won for the whole world the grace of repentance” (1 Clem. 7.4).

The second showcase of exemplary endurance appears as the letter reviews both the destructive nature of the Corinthian schism as well as the steps for its resolution (1 Clem. 44.3–48.6). To underline the deleterious nature of the leadership disruption, Clement deploys a series of *exempla* from the scriptures, reviewing the “abominable” (οἱ στυγητοί) persecutors who “who were stirred up to such a pitch of wrath that they tortured cruelly (εἰς αἰκίαν περιβάλειν)” Daniel, Ananias, Azarias, and Mishael. Along the way he contrasts the “lawless” persecutors with the nobly enduring righteous.

Clement summarizes the praiseworthy action of these heroes, simply stating that “[d]espite suffering these things, they endured nobly (εὐκλέω τὴν)”. The primary *audience* includes both “…the Most High” who “is the champion and protector of those who with a pure conscience worship his excellent name” (1 Clem. 45.7b), and the persecutors themselves (1 Clem. 45.7a). In addition to the secondary audiences created by the Roman letter, the heroes are *commemorated* both in “the Scriptures…given by the

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472 As Wellborn explains, this passage should not necessarily be seen as evidence for the community’s persecution in a literal Roman arena, “…but the oral trench where the Christian athlete strives; and the ‘struggle’ (ἀγωνία) is not against wild beasts and gladiators, but against the moral foes of ‘jealousy and strife’” (2004: 215). Regardless of the historical underpinnings of the statement, the discursive context fits well with Roman martial values.

473 1 Clem. 45.6–7. Prior to this, Clement clarifies the contrast, “You have searched the Scriptures, which are true, which were given by the Holy Spirit; you know that nothing unrighteous or counterfeit is written in them. You will not find that righteous people have ever been thrust out by holy men. The righteous (δικαίοι) were persecuted, but it was by the lawless (ὑπὸ ἄνόμων)” (1 Clem. 45.4).

474 1 Clem. 45.5.
Holy Spirit” (*1 Clem.* 45.2) and in the fact that “those who patiently endured (ὑπομένοντες ἐν πεποθῆσε) with confidence were exalted (ἐπήρθησαν), and had their names recorded by God as their memorial (ἐν τῷ μνημοσύνῳ) for ever and ever” (*1 Clem.* 45.8). Finally, Clement calls for their *imitation*: “Therefore we too, brothers, must follow examples such as these (Τοιούτως οὖν ὑποδείγμασιν κολληθῆναι καὶ ἡμᾶς δεῖ, ἀδελφοῖ)” (*1 Clem.* 46.1).

In sum, though not the central leadership characteristic on which *1 Clement* focuses, the letter celebrates this cherished Greco-Roman athletic virtue in a characteristically Roman discursive manner. Combining this with the military imagery surveyed above, it is safe to suggest that in contrast with its virtual neglect of bloodline concerns, in the category of agonistic virtues, the Roman letter more clearly reflects Roman leadership priorities.

**III.C. Eloquence**

Clement’s contemporary (or near-contemporary) and fellow inhabitant of the capital, Quintilian, reflects well traditional Roman sensibilities regarding the vital connection between influential leadership and eloquence:

> Was not the divine eloquence of Cicero, in opposition to the agrarian laws, even popular? Did it not quell the daring of Catiline and gain, in the toga, the honor of thanksgivings, the highest that is given to generals victorious in the field? Does not oratory often free the alarmed minds of soldiers from fear and persuade them, when they are going to face so many perils in battle, that glory is better than life? Nor indeed would the Lacedaemonians and Athenians influence me more than the people of Rome, among whom the highest respect (*summa dignitas*) has always been paid to orators (*Inst.* 2.16.7–8).

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475 Trans. John Shelby Watson.

476 *1 Clem.* 46.1.
As my foregoing chapters demonstrate, Quintilian was not alone in his high view of oratory; Mediterranean authors from Plutarch and Valerius Maximus to Philo and Josephus all shared a penchant for well-spoken leaders. As we turn to 1 Clement on the issue, we will discover that while eloquence is certainly not ignored—as the letter itself is a rhetorically elaborate composition—the skill is never mentioned as a desired leadership trait, no exempla of eloquence are showcased, and persuasive speech is frequently viewed as a source of division.

While they may debate its level of sophistication, scholars have long noted the rhetorical skill and at least moderate educational background required to write 1 Clement. Nevertheless, the letter frequently downplays—and at times sharply criticizes—ornate speech. In one of the few places where the letter does mention “words” (οἱ λόγοι), for example, they are subordinated to actions: “Let the wise man (ὁ σοφός) display his wisdom (τὴν σοφίαν), not by words (μὴ ἐν λόγοις), but through good deeds (ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς)” (1 Clem. 38.2).

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477 Scholarly opinion on the rhetorical proficiency of Clement ranges all the way from Werner Jaeger, who likens the Roman author to “a second Demosthenes” (1961: 13), to Peter Lampe who after his recent and thorough survey of the evidence concludes that the education of Clement “…remains remarkably in darkness, in spite of the abundance of material” (2003: 217). For a review of the scholarship and evidence relevant to Clement’s education and rhetorical sophistication, see Lampe (2003: 209–217).

478 Prior to this passage, Clement equally downplays “wisdom” (ἡ σοφία) and “understanding” (σοφίας) as valid routes to divine favor: “we, having been called through his will in Christ Jesus, are not justified through ourselves or through our own wisdom (σοφίας) or understanding (σοφίας)…but through faith” (1 Clem. 32.4). In a succinct and helpful lexical study, Bakke suggests the broader rhetorical understanding of the Greek term λόγος: “it may designate “word” in general; in other words, the everyday meaning of λόγος as, “speech”, “the subject under discussion, matter, thing” [Bauer: 477]. We should note, however, that logos was commonly used as a technical term for a “speech” and that it was used in particular to mean a “speech, delivered in the court, assembly, etc” [Liddell and Scott: 1058]. That is to say, it is the product of rhetoric” (2001: 133).
Such “words,” moreover, are frequently connected with the factious and “arrogant” Corinthian leadership, perhaps indicating that rhetorical display contributed to the Corinthian crisis. In a paraenetic section following the letter’s portrayal of God’s peaceful and orderly character, creation, and His ever-watching eye (1 Clem. 19.2b–20.12), Clement excoriates the “foolish and senseless men who boast in the arrogance of their words (ἐγκαυχώμενοις ἐν ἀλαζονείᾳ τοῦ λόγου αὐτῶν), rather than God” (1 Clem. 21.5). Also, toward the end of the probatio, in the quaestio finitia (40.1–61.3), Clement explicitly links such arrogant speech to those who “laid the foundation of the revolt.” He urges them, “…learn how to subordinate yourselves, laying aside the arrogant and proud stubbornness of your tongue (ἀλαζόνα καὶ ὑπερήφανον τῆς γλῶσσης)” (1 Clem. 57.2).

Finally, similar to his treatment of noble birth, Clement never deploys exempla in favor of the trait and he never advocates for the old Corinthian leadership based on their eloquence or teaching ability. While this may, in part, be due to their comparative incompetence in this area, it more likely has to do with the fact that the usurping leaders relied on this form of traditional credibility. Furthermore, as I will argue later, the letter attempts to promote an altogether different virtue as quintessential to God-honoring, Christ-like leadership. In sum, while composed in a rhetorically effective manner the letter does not feature eloquence as an invaluable leadership characteristic.

Commenting on the charge to “be wise in the interpretation of discourses (ἡττο οἶκος ἐν διακρίσει λόγων, 1 Clem. 48.5), Bakke further identifies rhetorical display as a key component in the Corinthian crisis. He explains, “[b]ecause the opponents argue for their view by means of rhetoric, Clement exhorts the audience, the Corinthian Church, to distinguish between the arguments, and to make wise judgments. This implies that Clement views rhetoric as a seditious element” (2001: 134).
III.D. Generous Patronage

Celebrating the ideals once exemplified by the Corinthians, among other virtues listed in the *exordium*, Clement boasts that they “…were more willing to give than to receive” (*1 Clem.* 2.1). Clearly, the Roman letter is not unconcerned with leaders and their use of money. Perhaps because the crisis it addresses did not primarily deal with wealth, however, its comments on the topic are few and are generally made in the service of broader moral and ecclesiological agendas.\(^{480}\) Consistent with this, the letter includes no real interaction with personal frugality and no *exempla* exclusively celebrating generous patronage.

Clement directly deals with socio-economic issues only once, in a segment of a larger passage focused on the need for order and peace in the community: “Let the rich man (ὁ πλούσιος) provide for the wants of the poor (τῷ πτωχῷ); and let the poor man bless God, because He has given him one by whom his need may be supplied” (*1 Clem.* 38.2). Here, in what limited attention he does pay specifically to patronage, Clement re-inscribes traditional Roman expectations with one noteworthy variance—rather than the patron providing for the material needs of his clients and the clients returning with praise for the patron, the praise is to be given primarily to God.\(^{481}\) The centrality of God in such...
financial symbiosis is similar to that celebrated in Philo and Josephus’ respective accounts of Moses’ pious patronage (see chapter 3). Beyond this passage, whether the issue is simply not a factor in the crisis or whether traditional expectations were so universally presupposed by the Roman and Corinthian communities so as to forestall articulation, the letter says almost nothing more about patronage.

**III.E. Piety**

In stark contrast to its virtual silence on patronage, *1 Clement* is thoroughly preoccupied with piety. As I will review in turn below, while the actual term εὐσεβία is only used three times in the letter—and one of those occurrences devalues the attribute—concern for divine-human relations permeates every chapter and both the Corinthian leadership crisis as well as its solution are inextricably linked to the community’s relationship to God. Also, though only a couple short exempla are deployed exclusively illustrating fidelity to God, the category of piety subsumes every lauded leadership virtue in the letter.

Benefactor (ἐυρήτης) of spirits and the God of all flesh” after acknowledging, “you make rich and make poor” (*1 Clem.* 59.3). Without commenting on the theocentric nature of the clients’ praise, Jeffers identifies an adapted Roman conceptual framework as fundamental to the letter’s exhortation in *1 Clem.* 38.2: “Clement appears to accept social distinctions among Christians as a basis for ordering relationships within the community on the model of Roman patronage. He makes only one significant change: unlike Roman aristocrats, rich Christians are not to use their retinue of needy clients for ostentatious display. Rather, they are to care for those with legitimate needs” (1991: 133).

As I outlined in chapter 2, my study will focus on the “vertical” aspect of piety more broadly conceived, namely, right relations with the divine.
III.E.1. Ἐὐσέβεια

To begin with, Clement’s use of Ἐὐσέβεια is quite limited and somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, he demonstrates a high view of piety, commencing the *exordium* by complimenting Corinth’s reputation for, among other attributes, “piety in Christ” (ἐὐσέβειαν ἐν Χριστῷ). His praise of the specific virtue continues as, well into the *quaestio infinitia/θέσις* portion of the *probatio*, Clement follows an exhortation to “be obedient to his magnificent and glorious will” (*1 Clem. 9.1*) with his fifth *exempla* list which includes the biblical character of Lot, who is celebrated for his hospitality and piety (ἐὐσέβειαν). His piety, here manifested in Lot’s hope (ἐλπίς) in God, is contrasted with the negative example of “his wife” who became a pillar of salt because she joined the “double-minded” (ὅι ὀξυτοροι) who question the power of God (*1 Clem. 11.2*).

Somewhat contradicting the above understanding, on the other hand, without explaining their exact difference, Clement seems to pit “piety” and “faith” against each other, concluding, “we…are not justified through ourselves or through our own wisdom or understanding or piety (ἐὐσεβείας)…but through faith (διὰ τῆς πίστεως)” (*1 Clem. 32.4*).

III.E.2 General Emphasis on the Divine

While Clement’s specific use of Ἐὐσέβεια remains unelaborated and equivocal, the emphasis he places on right relations between humans and God is ubiquitous and unmistakable. First of all, in all but three of the letter’s sixty-five chapters, Clement

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483 *1 Clem. 1.2*. In the same verse, Clement also lists the Corinthians’ πίστιν, σωφρονία, ἐπιευγή, φιλοξενίας, and ἀσφαλὴ γνώσιν.

484 *1 Clem. 11.1*.
directly mentions God. In fact, God is twice featured as an exemplum. The text not only discusses God, but also actively engages with him, concluding the probatio with a lengthy prayer. The avenues for properly relating to God, furthermore, are everywhere connected to the figure of Christ. Christ, for example, is portrayed as the primary mediator of God’s blessings to man, a community gathered to worship God is referred to as “the flock of Christ” (τὸ ποίμνιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ), and the lifestyle prescribed in the letter is that maintained “in Christ” (ἐν Χριστῷ).

Secondly, both the crisis addressed in 1 Clement—introduced as an “unholy schism (ἀνοσίαν στάσεως)…so alien and strange to those chosen by God (ἐκλεκτοὺς τοῦ θεοῦ, 1 Clem. 1.1)—and its resolution are everywhere inextricably linked to the

483 The exceptions include chapter 25, 37, and 63. In chapter 25, Clement describes the death and resurrection of the Phoenix without mention of the Divine. Similarly, no direct mention of God is made is chapter 37 as the author deploys the exempla of the army and body. Finally, in chapter 63, Clement refers to his letter as “written through the Holy Spirit” (γραμμένος διὰ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος), but nowhere directly mentions “God” (ὁ θεός), “the Lord” (ὁ κύριος), “the Master” (ὁ διοικητής), or any of his typical titles for the Divine.

486 God is deployed as an exemplum of a peaceful and orderly creator forming and guiding a peaceful and orderly creation (1 Clem. 19.2–20.10), and he is later touted as a paragon of one producing and delighting in good works (1 Clem. 33.1–7).

487 1 Clem. 59.3–61.3. This prayer includes, among other things, intersession on behalf of “our rulers and governors (ἄρχοντα καὶ ἡγουμένων ἡμῶν) on earth”, as God has “given them the power of sovereignty (τὴν εξουσίαν τῆς βασιλείας)” (1 Clem. 60.4–61.1).

488 The ekklesia of Corinth, for example, is introduced as “sanctified by the will of God through our Lord Jesus Christ (διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ)” with God’s “grace and peace” additionally coming “through Jesus Christ” (1 Clem. praf.). The probatio ends, to take another example, with a prayer mediated “through the high priest and guardian of our souls (διὰ τοῦ ἀρχερέως καὶ προστάτου τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν), Jesus Christ” (1 Clem. 61.3; cf. 36.1–2, 64.1 and 65.2). Also, the letter makes clear that it is only those “in Christ” who enjoy special proximity to the blessings of the Creator (1 Clem. 20.11–12).

489 1 Clem. 16.1, 44.3, 54.2, and 57.2.

490 Morally, Clement makes clear that it is “faith in Christ” (ἡ ἐν Χριστῷ πίστις) which ultimately finds his moral exhortations (1 Clem. 22.1). Likewise, Clement praises the Corinthians’ former piety “in Christ” (εἰσέθεσαν ἐν Χριστῷ) in 1.2. Negatively, the schismatic Corinthians are critiqued for their failure to live “in accordance with [their] duty toward Christ” (μονός πολιτεύοντα κατὰ τὸ καθήκον τῶν Χριστῷ, 1 Clem. 3.4). Finally, though examples could be multiplied, parents are urged to train their children in “instruction which is in Christ” (τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ παιδείας, 1 Clem. 21.8). For more “Christocentric” references, see 1 Clem. 21.6; 32.4; 42.1; and 48.2–4.
Corinthians’ relationship with God. For example, the pre-*stasis* Corinthians are praised as having “received an abundant outpouring of the Holy Spirit (πνεύματος ἄγιον, *I Clem. 2.2*), and that they, “with excellent zeal (ἀγαθὴ προθυμίᾳ), and a devout confidence (εὐσεβοῖς πεποιθήσεως)…stretched out [their] hands to almighty God (παντοκράτορα θεόν, *I Clem. 2.3*).”⁴⁹¹ In the face of their current leadership crisis, the Corinthians are not described first and foremost as politically unstable but spiritually bankrupt. Clement elaborates, “…each one has abandoned the fear of God (φόβον τοῦ θεοῦ) and become nearly blind with respect to their faith in Him, neither walking according to his commandments nor living in accordance with his duty toward Christ (μηδὲ πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸ καθήκον τῷ Χριστῷ, *I Clem. 3.4*).” Furthermore, whereas before the conflict the Corinthians “stretched their hands out” to God (*I Clem. 2.3*), in their present state they “heap blasphemies (blasphημίας) upon the name of the Lord” (*I Clem. 47.7*).⁴⁹²

The various solutions to the communal dysfunction, though eventually fleshed out with more specific moral prescriptions, all involve first and foremost the Corinthians’ disposition before their God. The Corinthians, for example, are not asked simply to choose their former leaders over the new regime, but to “…be obedient to God rather than follow those who in arrogance and unruliness have set themselves up as leaders in abominable jealousy” (*I Clem. 14.1*). Realigning themselves with the older leadership, moreover, is not simply choosing the more effective overseers, but joining “with the innocent and righteous (δικαίως), for these are the elect of God.” (*I Clem. 46.4*).⁴⁹³

⁴⁹¹ In *I Clem. 2.8*, Clement further boasts, “[b]eing adorned with a virtuous and honorable (σεβασμῷ) manner of life, you performed all your duties in the fear of him (τῷ φόβῳ αὐτοῦ). The commandments and the ordinances of the Lord were written on the tablets of your hearts.”

⁴⁹² The crisis is elsewhere described as failing to “live worthily” of God (*I Clem. 21.1*).

⁴⁹³ For more such exhortations to piety, see *I Clem.* 9.1, 27.1, 30.1–2, 45.2, 48.1, 56.1, and 58.1.
Finally, one of the more popular fixtures in Clement’s paraenesis is his plea that the Corinthians return to a “fear (φόβος) of the Lord.”\textsuperscript{494} In short, the community’s major moral task is everywhere framed not merely as a decision to recalibrate their leadership praxis, but also as a choice to reconcile with their God.

**III.E.3. Piety and Orderly Ritual**

In addition to these general, albeit pervasive, exhortations to piety, in 36.1–44.2 Clement makes his case for the protection of Corinth’s long-standing leadership by recounting the care for order and proper personnel in both the ritual performance of the House of Israel as well as the divinely ordained and carefully transmitted ecclesiastical offices. Clement commences this section by identifying Christ’s foremost ritual position as the “High Priest of our offerings (τὸν ἐφραίμερα τῶν προσφορῶν ἡμῶν), the Guardian and Helper of our weaknesses” (1 Clem. 36.1).\textsuperscript{495} He continues the cultic topos, emphasizing order and sacred time: “we ought to do, in order (τὰ ξεί), everything that the Master has commanded us to perform at the appointed times (κατὰ καιροὺς τεταγμένους)” (1 Clem. 40.1). These commands are then explained in terms of orderly “offerings and services (τὰς τε προσφορὰς καὶ λειτουργίας)” performed at designated “times and seasons (ὡρισμένως καιροῖς καὶ ὠραῖς). Both where and by whom he wants them to be performed.”\textsuperscript{496} Clement extends his discussion of the latter officials, lauding them as

\textsuperscript{494} See 1 Clem. 21.6, 8; 23.1; and 28.1.

\textsuperscript{495} Along these lines, possibly employing cultic language from Hebrews 1, he elaborates both Christ’s mediation on behalf of the communities to God (1 Clem. 36.1–2a) and Christ’s elevated position with the Father (1 Clem. 36.2b–6).

\textsuperscript{496} 1 Clem. 40.2–3.
acceptable and blessed: for those who follow the instructions of the Master cannot go wrong. For the high priest (ἐφαρμοσάμενος) the proper services (ὑπὲρ εὐεργεσίας) have been given, and to the priests (εὐεργείου) the proper office has been assigned, and upon the Levites the proper ministries (διακονίας) have been imposed. The layman (ὁ λαῖκος ἀνθρωπός) is bound by the layman’s rules (1 Clem. 40.4–5).

In light of this priestly tradition, Clement urges each of the Corinthians to “give thanks to God, maintaining a good conscience, not overstepping the designated rule of his ministry, but acting with reverence” (1 Clem. 41.1).

Chapter 41 proceeds with the analogy of Israel’s temple cult, noting the proper ritual site and personnel for the “continual daily sacrifices, freewill offerings, …[and] the offerings for sin and trespasses,” as well as underscoring the divine retribution awaiting those who violate such sacred order. Respect for ritual order and proper personnel, Clement continues, is all the more important in the present ecclesiological situation, as “we have been considered worthy of greater knowledge, so much the more are we exposed to danger” (1 Clem. 41.4). In the following chapters he recounts the transmission of this “greater knowledge” (πλείονος γνώσεως), narrating how “the apostles received the gospel (εὐγελίσθησαν) for us from the Lord Jesus Christ; Jesus the Christ was sent forth from God” (1 Clem. 42.1), and progressing through his description of the divinely-ordered origin of and biblical precedent for the current “offices” (οἰκομενα) of communities “in Christ.”

497 1 Clem. 41.2. Such sacrifice can occur, Clement explains, “…only in Jerusalem…in front of the sanctuary at the altar” after having been inspected by the high priest and other ministers (1 Clem. 41.2).

498 1 Clem. 41.3.

499 1 Clem. 42.2–44.2. I treat “succession” in more detail above in my discussion of “noble lineage”.

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As one quickly notes, these passages focus on pious leadership *structures* rather than the ideal characteristics of individual leaders. The leadership attributes of those who would be attractive for such positions and would likely win both the appointment by “reputable men” as well as the “consent of the whole church” (*1 Clem.* 44.3) are spelled out elsewhere (especially in the attributes I will review below). Here, the most we could say related to the attributes of honorable leaders, is that according to Clement, previously-established leaders (such as the old regime of the Corinthian congregations) should be able to point to their authoritative appointment and their overall pious relationship to a sacred structure. According to such logic, in other words, only after being approved could church leaders—or those who desire to protect them—appeal to this avenue of pious precedent as an authority-imparting attribute.

**III.E.4. Piety as Encompassing All Virtue**

Finally, as I mentioned above, though only a couple short *exempla* are ever deployed exclusively illustrating fidelity to God, the category of piety subsumes almost every lauded leadership virtue in the letter. For instance, Clement prefaces his seventh *exempla* list, not with an exhortation to any of the particular virtues featured in the list,

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500 William Lane correctly concludes, “Clement grounds the formal structures of leadership in the creative will of God which stands behind all order. Consequently, submission to constituted leaders is ultimately subjection to God” (1998: 224). A few pages earlier, Lane explicates Clement’s big innovation with respect to Pauline notions of divinely ordained leadership structures: “What is distinctive of Clement is the grounding of the structures of leadership in the creative will of God. Like Paul, Clement believed that all secular authority is instituted by God (61.1; cf. Rom. 13:1–7). He felt obligated to pray for its representatives (60.4). The hierarchical secular order is a response to the creative action of God (60.1; 61.1–2). For Clement, God’s action in establishing the secular order is also responsible for the structures of church order (37.1–38.3). This is a motif that is only germinally present in the letters of Paul, but in Clement it has become a fundamental framework for the ordered Christian life” (1998: 237).

501 These short *exempla* include pious and hospitable Lot (*1 Clem.* 11.1), faithful Abraham (*1 Clem.* 31.2), and confident, sacrificial Isaac (*1 Clem.* 31.3).
but with the hortatory subjunctive, “[l]et us therefore cling to his blessing, and let us
investigate what are the ways of blessing (αὐ дор[τής] εὐλογίας). Later he exclaims,
“How blessed (μακάρια) and marvelous are the gifts of God, dear friends”, before listing
these “gifts” largely in moral terms (1 Clem. 35.1-2).

The most celebrated disposition in the letter, humility (πατερνοφροσύνη), is
portrayed as a preeminently God-honoring, “Christ-like” attribute (1 Clem. 16.1) and one
exemplified by David as a leader after God’s own heart (1 Clem. 18.1). Likewise,
Clement’s extended discourse on another of his favorite virtues, love (ἀγάπη), is
introduced as an investigation into the “open gate of righteousness (πύλη δικαιοσύνης)
leading to life” (1 Clem. 48.2). He later describes this “love” as fulfilling the
“commandments of Christ (τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παραγγέλματα”). To take a final
noteworthy example, in the peroratio Clement summarizes the letter’s major didactic
goal, namely, that the Corinthians would “reverently please almighty God.” Such
pleasure, he continues, is secured

…in righteousness and truth and steadfastness, living in harmony without
bearing malice, in love and peace with constant gentleness, just as our
fathers, of whom we spoke earlier, pleased him, by being humble toward
the Father and God and Creator and toward all men (1 Clem. 62.2).

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502 1 Clem. 31.1.

503 Following this cluster, Clement claims, we are blessed “if our mind is fixed on God through faith (διὰ πίστεως)”, only to flesh this “faith” out in terms of moral and relational ideals (1 Clem. 35.5–6).

504 1 Clem. 49.1. From there, Clementembarks on a protracted review of love (49.1–53.5) and a renewed
call for the usurpers to admit guilt and take whatever steps are required to rectify the situation, including saying, “I retire; I will go wherever you wish, and will do whatever is ordered by the people. Only let the flock of Christ (τὸ ποίμνον τοῦ Χριστοῦ) be at peace with its duly appointed presbyters” (1 Clem. 54.2). This advice is followed by a final exempla list illustrating such self-less behavior (1 Clem. 55.1–6).
Clement’s God does not first and foremost prioritize liturgy or priestly deportment; rather, this God is deeply concerned about upholding a host of relational (and, in Clement’s presentation, ancestral) mores.\(^{505}\)

To sum up, though Clement’s treatment of the specific virtue of εὐσεβεία is limited, his letter is everywhere shaped by a robust concern for man’s proper relationship to the divine. With respect to traditional Roman expectations, insofar as the letter stresses divinely sanctioned personnel and elements of ritual order, it aligns well with Italic mores. Where piety undergirds morality, however, 1 Clement diverges from traditional Roman religio, which as I reviewed in chapter 2, generally did not provide substantial ethical foundations. Rather, in its morally catalytic and generally all-encompassing nature, the letter’s notion of piety seems to fit better within the Jewish ethical discourse reflected in Philo and Josephus’ works as well as the Jewish–Christian paraenesis promulgated in Paul’s letters.\(^{506}\)

Having investigated 1 Clement in light of my heuristic model of ideal Roman leadership, I will conclude this chapter exploring two moral areas wherein Clement deploys significant and elaborated exempla which, though narrated using characteristically “Roman” discursive practices, seem to preserve largely foreign and, as I will argue, characteristically Pauline leadership priorities.

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\(^{505}\) I will analyze love and humility in more detail below.

\(^{506}\) Clement’s treatment of divine-human relations further aligns with both Philo and Josephus’ high view of Israel’s sacrificial and priestly traditions and, as we will see in the exploration of “love” below, the latter authors’ high view of Moses. The primary difference between the general picture of piety in the Roman letter and that exemplified in the Philonic and Josephan Moses can be seen in Clement’s insistence that proper relations with God must be “in Christ.”
III.F. Love (ἀγάπη)

The virtue of “love” (ἀγάπη; φιλαλελφεία) is primarily advocated toward the end of the letter (1 Clem. 47.1-55.6). This virtue, praised as “great” and “wonderful” with “perfection...beyond description” (1 Clem. 50.1) is showcased as both a prescription for the problems in the Corinthian community as well as a key ingredient ensuring effective leadership. After situating Clement’s focused discourse on love within the logical and thematic sequence of the letter, I will explore both his high praise as well as the exempla he deploys to inculcate the priority.

Clement’s primary discussion of “love” occurs in his concrete treatment of the Corinthian crisis in the quaestio finitia. He begins this latter half of the probatio by crowning his review of divinely-ordered succession (1 Clem. 40.1–44.2) with a series of exhortations directly addressing the Corinthian leadership crisis. Here, Clement complains, “[t]hose, therefore, who were appointed by them or, later on, by other reputable men with the consent of the whole church...these men we consider to be unjustly removed from their ministry” (1 Clem. 44.3), and warns, “[f]or it will be no small sin for us, if we depose from the bishop’s office those who have offered the gifts blamelessly and in holiness (ὅσίως προσενεκκόντας τὰ δῶρα τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς)” (1 Clem. 44.4).

Clement proceeds to ask the Corinthians to redirect their contentiousness and zeal (φιλόνεικος ἐστε ἡλωτά) toward those things that relate to salvation (σωτηρίαν, 1 Clem. 45.1), before detailing an exempla list (reviewed above) of those who “nobly endured” at the hands of misguided zeal (1 Clem. 45.3–8). Then, leading into his robust treatment of love, he explicitly brings Pauline tradition to bear on their schism—a schism which he
laments has “perverted many; it has brought many to despair, plunged many into doubt, and caused all of us to sorrow” (I Clem. 46.9). Clement opens in 47.1 urging the Corinthians to “[t]ake up the epistle of the blessed Paul the apostle (τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τοῦ μακαρίου Παύλου τοῦ ἀποστόλου).”507 He then compares the current—and far more “shameful” (λίαν αἰσχρὰ)—Corinthian rebellion with the conflicts described in 1 Corinthians.508

Finally Clement transitions to the ultimate solution for their leadership dysfunction:

Let us therefore root this out quickly, and let us fall down before the Master and pray to him with tears, that he may…restore to us the honorable and pure conduct which characterizes our love for the brotherhood (τῇς φιλαδελφίᾳ ἡμῶν). 509

Such sibling love (φιλαδέλφεια), Clement continues, is more than a communal quick fix, but “an open gate of righteousness leading to life…the Christian Gate (αὕτη ἐστίν ἡ ἐν Χριστῷ).”510 An image which he immediately follows with the exhortation, “Let the one who has love in Christ (ἀγαπᾷν ἐν Χριστῷ) fulfill the commandments of Christ” (τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παραγγέλματα, I Clem. 49.1) and a brief encomium to love which echoes Paul’s praise of the virtue in 1 Corinthians 13.511 This portion of the tribute culminates in

507 Regarding this epistle, Margaret Mitchell underscores, “the term ἀγάπη undeniably plays a crucial role throughout the argument of 1 Corinthians” footnoting, 1 Cor. 4:21; 8:1; 12:31b–14:1a; 16:14, and 24. See Mitchell (1991: 165).

508 See I Clem. 47.2–7. Cf. 1 Cor. 1:11–12. I will examine the influence of Pauline traditions in I Clement in greater detail below.

509 I Clem. 48.1.

510 I Clem. 48.2–4.

Clement’s summary of the ancestral tradition of love, showcasing Christ’s personification of the virtue:

In love all the elect of God were made perfect; without love nothing is pleasing to God. In love (ἐν ἀγάπῃ) the Master received us. Because of the love (διὰ τὴν ἀγάπην) he had for us, Jesus Christ our Lord, in accordance with God’s will, gave his blood for us, and his flesh for our flesh, and his life for our lives (1 Clem. 49.6).

In light of the paradigmatic love of Christ, Clement urges the Corinthians to “be found blameless in love (ἐν ἀγάπῃ), standing apart from the factiousness of men” (1 Clem. 50.2). As such factious individuals, the leaders of rebellion and dissension (ἀρχηγοὶ στάσεως καὶ διώστασιάς ἐγενήθησαν, 1 Clem. 51.1) do not emulate Christ, but the negative examples of those “...who rebelled against Moses the servant of God” (1 Clem. 51.3), and consequently, “went down to Hades alive.” With the moral deficiency of these Korah-like Corinthian leaders established, Clement proceeds to a rhetorically elaborate depiction of Moses—one of his most referenced heroes and, as we saw with Josephus and Philo, a preeminent leadership exemplum among first century Jewish authors.

Moses, who in the logic of 1 Clement corresponds to the recently deposed Corinthian leaders, is first and foremost deployed as a paragon of loving leadership in 53.1–5. This description of Moses is by far the lengthiest exemplary account of loving

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512 Building on the example of Christ’s love, Clement further praises the virtue in chapter 50, affirming, “...those who, through the grace of God, have been made perfect in love (ἐν ἀγάπῃ τελειωθείσης), now possess a place among the godly, and shall be made manifest at the revelation of the kingdom of Christ” (1 Clem. 50.3). Similarly, the letter confirms: “Blessed are we, dear friends (ἀγαπητοί), if we continue to keep God’s commandments in the harmony of love (ὁμονοία ἀγάπης), that our sins may be forgiven us through love (δι’ ἀγάπης)” (1 Clem. 50.5).

513 1 Clem. 51.4. Cf. Num. 16:33ff. The letter then recounts the watery grave of another group of Mosaic enemies, namely, Pharaoh, his army, and all the rulers of Egypt (1 Clem. 51.5).
leadership and features the biblical hero’s selfless intersession on behalf of his people. As I will quickly review, moreover, the exemplum fits Roller’s schema well.

The featured action recalls Moses’ bold response to God’s intention to destroy the stubborn Israelites and make a great people out of Moses’ offspring.\(^{514}\) To this proposal, Moses selflessly pleads: “May it not be so, Lord. Forgive this people their sin, or else wipe me also out of the book of the living” (I Clem. 53.4). The primary audience is God himself, while secondary audiences include the readers/hearers of the sacred scriptures (τὰς ἱερὰς γραφὰς; I Clem. 53.1). Moses’ exemplary love is likewise approved and commemorated in the latter text as well as in the Roman letter itself. The final verse of the account, in fact, includes a commemorative hymn extolling: “What mighty love (ὁ μεγάλης ἀγάπης)! What unsurpassable perfection! The servant speaks boldly with his Master: he asks forgiveness for the multitude, or demands that he himself also be wiped out with them” (I Clem. 53.5). Finally, the following chapter contains the explicit call for imitation, imploring any leader claiming to be “noble-minded” (γενναῖος), compassionate (ἐυσπλαγχνός) or “full of love” (πεπληροφορημένος ἀγάπης) to seek the peace of the flock of Christ. Like Moses, such a demonstration of selfless leadership is sure to merit “great fame in Christ (μέγα κλέος ἐν Χριστῷ).”\(^{515}\)

To close out his extended discourse on love, Clement follows up this carefully deployed biblical exemplum of selfless love with his ninth and final exempla list, showcasing those who similarly gave themselves up or endangered themselves for the sake of others—including, gentile kings and leaders (ὑποδείγματα ἐθνῶν), “many among

\(^{514}\) I Clem. 53.3. Cf. Ex. 32 and Deut. 9:12–14.

\(^{515}\) I Clem. 54.1–2.
us” (πολλοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν—i.e. the Roman Christ-following community), and two female examples from the LXX, Judith and Esther.\footnote{1 Clem. 55.1–6.}

To be sure, in the immediate context, this treatise on love is commenced to first and foremost coax the “leaders of rebellion and dissen
tion” (1 Clem. 51.1) into admitting: “If it is my fault that there are rebellion and strife and schisms, I retire” (1 Clem. 54.2). Additionally, as Bakke and others have noted, cognates for the term ἀγάπη (though not the Greek term itself) can be found in several Greco-Roman deliberative speeches urging concord.\footnote{Bakke understands Clement’s decision to use the term, though influenced by the terminology in Paul’s letters on the issue, as motivated above all else simply by the requirements of his chosen rhetorical genre: “Indeed ἀγάπη is an important term in the New Testament and Clement’s use of it must, of course, be viewed against this background. However, his application of this term, i.e. the explicit linking of this term to concord, must be primarily understood in the light of Graeco-Roman and Hellenistic-Jewish literature. We should in particular pay attention to Greco-Roman literature in as much as in this literature throughout the time from Plato to Dio Chrysostom we will find that love is associated with concord.” (2001: 192–193). Bakke largely follows Margaret Mitchell’s study of the term in the rhetoric of 1 Corinthians (1991: 165–171). While Paul’s selection of the term, Mitchell argues, reflects its valence in the writings of “Hellenistic Judaism,” his application of the term to the factionalism among the Corinthians is “natural within the Greco-Roman world and Hellenistic Judaism, from which Paul probably made the connection” (1991: 167–168).}

Nevertheless, Clement does not view love merely as an \textit{ad hoc} remedy for a unique contingency, but as both a moral catalyst for deeds by which a true leader “…will win for himself great fame in Chirst (μέγα κλέος ἐν Χριστῷ)” and a critical component of “the things that those who live as citizens (οἱ πολιτευόμενοι) of the commonwealth of God (πολιτείαν τοῦ θεοῦ)...have done and will continue to do” (1 Clem. 54.3–4).

Furthermore, the fact that his most elaborate narration of one of his favorite heroes (Moses) is reserved for “love” further suggests the robust role of the virtue in his moral discourse. Finally, further indicating the enduring importance of the virtue beyond simply resolving a temporary leadership emergency, based on the Roman letter’s high
view of Paul coupled with the fact that the noun ἀγάπη is multiplied in 1 Corinthians (though completely absent from other extant examples of Greco-Roman deliberative rhetoric), one could argue that in so far as Clement seeks to preserve Pauline tradition, he would consequently favor the Pauline preference for ἀγάπη.519

To sum up, as the foregoing analysis seeks to establish, through the calculated deployment of cherished “ancestral” exempla, 1 Clement prescribes a more or less distinctively “Pauline” leadership tradition using largely “Roman” cultural tools and pedagogical instincts. We will discover a similar moral and discursive phenomenon as this chapter concludes considering 1 Clement’s rhetorically powerful insistence on the humility (ταπείνωφροσύνη) of those in authority.

III.G. Humility (ταπείνωφροσύνη)

III.G.1: Unelaborated Exhortations to Humility

While Clement clusters his plea for loving leadership toward the end of the probatio, his exhortations regarding humility are ubiquitous. My study of this predominant moral feature of the letter’s leadership discourse will first review several of the calls to humility that lack exempla. Secondly, I will explore in detail two passages that, like the exemplum of Moses analyzed above, seem to reflect the structural elements of the Roman discourse of exemplarity—namely, the extended exemplum of Christ’s


humble leadership (*I Clem.* 16.1–17) as well as Clement’s sixth *exempla* list featuring the humility of authoritative figures ranging from Elijah and Elisha, to Abraham, Job, Moses, and David. (*I Clem.* 17.1–18.17). Thirdly, I will seek to demonstrate that for Clement humility was far more than an attribute appealed to in an *ad hoc* manner to quell the Corinthian crisis; rather, it functioned as a central and authority-bestowing trait among the early Christ-confessing communities in Rome and Corinth. Fourthly, since “humility” occupies such a significant position in the letter, I will continue my analysis with an *excursus* on the ταπεινωμον-word group before concluding my study of the Roman letter with a few words on “love” and “humility” as Pauline preservations in *I Clement*.

The Roman letter’s advocacy for humility begins as early as the *exordium*, where the author praises the Corinthians’ prior paradigmatic communal disposition: “Moreover, you were all distinguished by humility (ἐταπεινωμένοι), and were in no respect puffed up with pride (ἁλαζόνεις)” (*I Clem.* 2.1). In the *probatio*, Clement’s first focused exhortations toward humility occur after his exposition of the toxic effects of misplaced zeal (ζήλος) as well as his recollection of those innocent heroes who nobly endured its consequences (*I Clem.* 4.1–6.4). Similar to the letter’s promotion of love, its injunctions to humility are not introduced as *ad hoc* behavioral adaptations, but as significant components of the “glorious and holy rule of our tradition (εὐκλεία καὶ σεμνόν τῆς παραδόσεως ἡμῶν κανόνα)” (*I Clem.* 7.2).

After briefly recounting *exempla* of “faith” (πιστός), obedience (ὑπακοή), hospitality (φιλοξενία), and piety (εὐσεβείαν),⁵²⁰ Clement crowns his review of this ancestral tradition (παραδόσεως) with an exhortation to humility:

⁵²⁰ See *I Clem.* 7.1–12.8.
Let us therefore be humble (ταπεινοφρονήσωμεν), brothers, laying aside all arrogance and conceit (ἀλάσνειαν καὶ τύφος) and foolishness and anger, and let us do what is written. For the Holy Spirit says: “Let not the wise man boast about his wisdom, nor the strong about his strength, nor the rich about his wealth; but let him who boasts boast in the Lord” (1 Clem. 13.1a).

This call to humility, maintained with reference to a collage of scriptures, is then fortified “most of all” (μᾶλλον) with a preeminently authoritative source, namely, “…the words of the Lord Jesus” (1 Clem. 13.1b). Clement continues by offering the paradoxical hortation: “let us strengthen ourselves (στηρίζομεν ἐαυτοῦ)…[with this commandment and these precepts]…that we may humbly walk (ταπεινοφρονοῦντες) in obedience to his words” (1 Clem. 13.3). In the following chapter, he contrasts this disposition with that demonstrated by “those who in arrogance (ἀλάζονεία) set themselves up as leaders (ἀρχηγοί)” (I Clem. 14.1).

The second set of exhortations lacking extended exemplary elaboration occurs in chapters 30–31. Here, Clement fleshes out his exhortation, “let us do all the things that pertain to holiness (τὰ τοῦ ἁγιοῦ πάντα)”, with a list of virtues in which “humility” is underscored. Then, prior to illustrating these “things that pertain to holiness” with the abbreviated exempla of Abraham’s faith and Jacob’s departing from his land with humility (μετὰ ταπεινοφροσύνης, I Clem. 31.1–4), Clement explicitly connects a humble disposition with both ancestral tradition and God’s blessing:

Let our praise be with God, and not from ourselves, for God hates those who praise themselves. Let the testimony to our good deeds be given by others, as it was given to our fathers who were righteous (τοῖς πατράσιν

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521 Holmes suggests Jer. 9:23–24, 1 Sam. 2:10, 1 Cor. 1:31 and 2 Cor. 10:17 (1999: 43 fn. 27).

522 Clement begins the list by contrasting God’s favor for the humble (ταπεινοῖς) with His resistance to the proud (ὑπερφάνοις), before urging, “Let us clothe ourselves with concord, being humble (ταπεινοφρονοῦντες) and self-controlled, keeping ourselves far from all backbiting and slander, being justified by works and not by words” (1 Clem. 30.1–3a).
Later, just prior to his prolonged discourse on love, Clement articulates a number of moral and relational injunctions, including his suggestion that “…the greater [an individual] seems to be, the more he ought to be humble (ταπεινοφρονεῖν), and the more he ought to seek the common advantage of all” (1 Clem. 48.5–6). Finally, in terms of unembellished appeals to humility, towards the end of the quaestio finita, he directs his attention unequivocally at the Corinthian usurpers, praying for their “humility” (ταπεινοφροσύνη, 1 Clem. 56.1) and reminding them of God’s honor-reversal with respect to their arrogance.524

III.G.2. Extended Exempla of Humility

In addition to these unadorned calls for such renunciation of status, in chapter 16 the Roman letter conspicuously includes an extended exemplum of Christ’s humble leadership, and in 17–18 it showcases a lengthy exempla list recalling the humility of authoritative figures ranging from Elijah and Elisha, to Abraham, Job, Moses, and David.

523 Clement follows up Moses’ example of selfless love on behalf of the people with his ninth and final exempla list, showcasing those who gave themselves up/endangered themselves for sake of others—including, gentile kings and leaders, those among us (i.e. the Roman Christ-following community), women: Judith, Esther. Regarding Esther, he says, “Esther…through her fasting and her humiliation (τῆς ταπεινώσεως αὐτῆς) she entreated the all-seeing Master, the God of the ages, and he, seeing the humility of her soul (τὸ ταπεινῶν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς), rescued the people for whose sake she had faced the danger.” See 1 Clem. 55.1–6.

524 For the latter appeals, see 1 Clem. 57.2; 58.2; and 59.3–4.
Like the *exemplum* of Moses analyzed above, the descriptions of these paragons reflect the structural elements of the Roman discourse of exemplarity. I will analyze the narrative approach of each in turn.

Clement prefaces his first extended *exemplum* of leadership by establishing a clear contrast between two types of leaders: “...Christ is with those who are humble (ταπεινοφρονώτων), not with those who exalt themselves over his flock (οὐκ ἐπαιρομένων ἐπὶ τὸ πόλιμνον αὐτοῦ, *1 Clem.* 16.1).” He quickly elaborates this point with the paradigmatic leadership disposition of Christ—significantly, other than the short example of Christ’s sacrificial love in 49.6, this is the only instance of an extended exemplary deployment of the figure of Christ in *1 Clement*. Clement recalls, “[t]he majestic scepter (σκηντρον) of God, our Lord Christ Jesus, did not come with the pomp of arrogance or pride (though he could have done so), but in humility (ταπεινοφρονῶν).” His exemplary application of authority is further elaborated with quotations from Isaiah 53 and Psalm 22, before the closing reminder underscoring that the “...Lord...humbled himself (ἐταπεινοφόρησεν)” (*1 Clem.* 16.17).

In terms of Roller’s categories, the primary *audience* to Christ’s humble action consists of the first person plurals “observing” Christ’s actions in the Isaiah 53 quotation (*1 Clem.* 16.3). The readers of *1 Clement*, of course, become secondary audiences to this honorable activity and this epistolary preservation also functions as the main form of *commemoration*. Finally, the call to *imitation* offered by this *exemplum* is unmistakable in the closing verse of chapter 16: “You see, dear friends, the kind of pattern (ὁ

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525 *1 Clem.* 16.2. Bowe also notices the special nature of this *exemplum*: “in the center of this unit, 13.1–19.1, the author presents the example of the Lord Jesus (*1 Clem.* 16), the only instance of such an appeal in the letter” (1988: 119).
that has been given to us; for if the Lord so humbled himself (ἐταπεινωφρόνησεν), what should we do...?” (1 Clem. 16.17).

The Christ exemplum in ch. 16 is then followed up with an exhortation to “become imitators” (μυμηταὶ γενώμεθα, 1 Clem. 17.1) of the figures deployed in Clement’s sixth exempla list (1 Clem. 17.1–18.17). These exempla are taken from Israel’s ancestral heroes (including Abraham, Moses, and David—three archetypical biblical leaders), and are deployed as individuals with great honor and rank who don’t just refrain from boasting, but actively “humble” themselves. As we will see, furthermore, their portrayal fits Roller’s schema nicely.

After quickly mentioning “those who went about in goatskins and sheepskins preaching the coming of Christ”—namely, Elijah, Elisha, Ezekiel and the prophets—Clement turns to several “ancient men of renown (τοὺς μεμαρτυρημένους).”

“Abraham”, he showcases, “was greatly renowned (ἐμαρτυρήθη μεγάλως)” and was called the ‘Friend of God’; yet when he looked intently at the glory of God, he said humbly (ταπεινώθην), ‘I am only dust and ashes’ (1 Clem. 17.2). Here, the action consists of Abraham’s humble admission, while the aorist passive indicative verb ἐμαρτυρήθη presents the leader as carefully observed—thus implying a primary audience. The dual commemoration of the Patriarch’s humility includes both his honorific title “Friend of God (φίλος...τοῦ θεοῦ)” and the Roman letter itself. Finally, the call to imitate the leader occurs in 19.1–2 and refers equally to Moses and David. After my outline of the latter exempla I will discuss this mimetic injunction in more detail.

526 1 Clem. 17.1.
527 1 Clem. 17.2. The humble admission is quoted from the Gen. 18:27.
Regarding Moses, Clement celebrates his exemplary humility as demonstrated in his response to God in the burning bush encounter (Ex. 3:11; 4:10). The “greatly glorified (δοξασθεὶς μεγάλως)” Moses, the letter recounts, though “…called ‘faithful in all his house,’ and through his ministry God judged Egypt…did not boast (οὐκ ἐμεγαλορημόνησέν) but said, ‘Who am I, that you should send me? I have a feeble voice and a slow tongue’” (1 Clem. 17.5). This humble verbal action is made with God as the primary audience and, secondarily, it is displayed to all those reading the scriptures. The latter source—in addition to 1 Clement—doubles as a significant means of commemoration. Finally, like Abraham, imitation is enjoined in 1 Clem. 19.1–2.

Such idealizing treatment of Moses reflects in many ways the moral and pedagogical projects of Philo and Josephus. Like these two, what is portrayed as negative behavior in the biblical account is adjusted to fit the author’s broader moral aims. Whereas Philo, as we reviewed earlier, sanitizes the account by simply deleting it from his narrative and Josephus treats it as reasonable modesty—eliminating altogether the role of Aaron as Moses’ mouthpiece (Ant. 2.271), Clement actively celebrates the confession as honorable humility.

The cluster of humble heroes concludes with David. Clement identifies his contrite confession in Ps. 50:1–19 (LXX) as the noteworthy action of the “illustrious” (μεμαρτυρημένω) leader. God and the readers/hearers of scripture form the primary audiences. Like the Mosaic exemplum, the scriptures, 1 Clement itself, and the honorific

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528 Then, in 17.6, Clement includes another humble Mosaic admission from an unknown source: “And again he says, ‘I am only steam from a pot.’” See Holmes (1999: 49).
titles mentioned *commemorate* the deed.\textsuperscript{529} Lastly, “seeing, then, that we have a share in many great and glorious deeds (πολλών οὖν καὶ μεγάλων καὶ ἐνδόξων...πράξεων),” the Roman letter underlines the necessity to act in accordance with the “humility and subordination” (ταπεινόφρον καὶ τατεπεινωμένη) of “so many and such great men of renown.”\textsuperscript{530}

**III.G.3. Humility as an Enduring, Honorable Attribute in 1 Clement**

In line with the occasion of *I Clement*, the humility of these ancestral *exempla* is frequently linked to obedience. With respect to the immediate goal of the letter, moreover, the desired instantiation of this virtue is primarily envisioned as the usurping leaders’ submission to the recently deposed.\textsuperscript{531} This fact has led some scholars to suggest that humility in *I Clement* is a disposition exclusively suggested for those under the authority of church officers or simply used in an *ad hoc* manner to ensure the submission of the usurping Corinthian leaders. In his study of humility in what he calls “Greco-Roman, Old Testament-Jewish, and early Christian tradition,” for example, Klaus Wengst

\textsuperscript{529} These titles include David’s being a “man after [God’s] own heart” and his having been testified about (μεμαρτυρημένω, *I Clem.* 18.1. In addition, all of the exemplary acts in the heroic cluster are commemorated as being “great and glorious deeds (μεγάλων καὶ ἐνδόξων...πράξεων) in 19.2.

\textsuperscript{530} *I Clem.* 19.1–2.

\textsuperscript{531} Regarding the link to obedience, see *I Clem.* 19.1. *I Clem.* 14.1 likewise urges, “therefore it is right and holy, brothers, that we should be obedient to God rather than follow those who in arrogance and unruliness have set themselves up as leaders in abominable jealousy (ζήλους).” Summarizing a major aim of the letter, furthermore, Clement articulates in the *peroratio*: “Therefore it is right for us, having studied so many and such great examples (ὑποδείγματα), to bow the neck and, adopting the attitude of obedience, to submit to those who are the leaders of our souls, so that by ceasing from this futile dissension we may attain the goal that is truly set before us, free from all blame” (*I Clem.* 63.1). In light of such passages, Bakke points out, “[t]he tapeino-word group is especially prevalent through the letter and is presented as a means of solving the present crisis in the Church” (2001: 126). Bowe more forcefully notes, “Clement’s choice of *ταπεινόφροσύνη* as the cardinal virtue, therefore, is wholly conditioned by how he perceives and characterizes the cause of the crisis in Corinth” (1988: 118).
concludes, “‘Humility’ [in *1 Clement*] is obediently taking one’s place in the hierarchical order of the community determined by the ministers” (1988: 54). More than this, Wengst contends that, for Clement, the virtue “becomes specific for those who bear it in recognition of and in obedience towards the authority of those who govern the community and who cannot be deposed” (1988: 55).

Nevertheless, a number of important passages suggest that “humility”—as it operated in Clement’s community and is framed in the letter—was far more than a disposition for those below church officers or an *ad hoc* virtue employed to control the aspirations of the young leaders. These passages, instead, demonstrate that humility actually functioned as an enduring, honor-ascribing attribute that was to be exemplified by leaders and laity alike just as it was by their “glorious” ancestral heroes.

To begin with, Clement identifies the virtue as central to *every* child’s education and socialization “in Christ” (τὴς ἐν Χριστῷ παιδείας): “Let our children receive the instruction which is in Christ: let them learn how strong humility is before God (μαθέτωσαν, τί ταπεινοφροσύνη παρὰ θεῷ ἱσχύει)” (*1 Clem.* 21.8). Not only is this suggested moral curriculum extended to the children of *all* social segments in the Corinthian population, but the pedagogical prescription indicates Clement’s desire that

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532 In his study of morality in *1 Clement*, Runar Thorsteinsson similarly notes, “While this is certainly possible, one has to take into account the fact that the virtues ταπεινοφροσύνη, ὑποταγή, and ὑπακοή are all closely tied to the local situation addressed in the letter, and therefore not necessarily applicable as ‘cardinal’ virtues in all Christ-believing communities” (2013: 122). Bowe rightly attenuates this position: “The emphasis on order and submission, however, appears less central in the author’s argument than exhortations to ταπεινοφροσύνη and communal harmony. These appeals stress in a positive sense a voluntary subordination of self-interests to the corporate goals of the community based, above all, on the example of the Lord Jesus” (1988: 121).

533 Horrell provides what, in my view, a more balanced analysis of humility’s application in the letter: “The theology of *1 Clement*, with its emphasis upon order and appropriate submission, is at least potentially one which legitimates and sustains a dominant social order; it affirms that everything is ordered just as the master intended” (1996: 257).
humility play a robust and enduring role in the life of the community—well beyond the present crisis.\footnote{Regarding this passage, Bowe notes, “It appears that here Clement undertakes a conscious reinterpretation of the traditional παιδεία in terms of a Christian emphasis on ταπεινοφροσύνη, φόβος τοῦ θεοῦ” (1988: 115).} Later, in a paraenetic section following his description of the orderly priesthood, army, and human body (\textit{1 Clem.} 36.1–37.5), Clement includes a command that speaks volumes to the honor-evoking nature of humility in the Roman and Corinthian communities: “Let the wise man display his wisdom, not by [mere] words, but through good deeds. Let the humble (ὄ ταπεινοφροσύνη) not bear testimony to himself, but leave witness to be borne to him by another” (\textit{1 Clem.} 38.2). As this injunction indicates, far from a trait reserved for “laity” or a disposition recently introduced to solve a crisis, along with wisdom humility was a socially valuable virtue about which individuals could plausibly boast.

Furthermore, when concretely addressing the Corinthian schism, Clement clearly underscores the virtue as a key measure of honorable leadership distinguishing those recently displaced from authority:

Those, therefore, who were appointed by them or, later on, by other reputable men with the consent of the whole church, and who have ministered to the flock of Christ blamelessly, humbly (μετὰ ταπεινοφροσύνης), peaceably, and unselfishly, and for a long time have been well spoken of by all (μεμαρτυρημένους τε πολλοὺς χρόνους ύπο πάντων)—these men we consider to be unjustly removed from their ministry (\textit{1 Clem.} 44.3, italics mine).\footnote{Though not specifically mentioning humility, Bowe rightly critiques Harnack: “Harnack argued that the call for submission to the presbyters is so strongly expressed in \textit{1 Clement} that the presbyters are to be seen as standing ‘above’ and ‘over-against’ the community. On the contrary, the distinctions in the OT cultic ‘order’ praised in \textit{1 Clem.} 40.5 do not reappear in the discussion of Christian office. Instead, Clement repeatedly describes the ‘blameless service’ that the presbyters have performed on behalf of the community” (1988: 152).}
Thus, much more than an attribute simply deployed to impugn the usurpers’ imprudent ambition, humility, in Clement’s discourse, is a virtue distinguishing healthy leaders.\(^{536}\) Finally, in addition to the fame of the *exempla* of humble leadership discussed earlier (including figures as important to the author as Christ, Abraham, Moses, and David), as Clement summarizes his argumentation in the *peroratio*, he again underscores that, for the Roman and Corinthian communities in Christ, humility toward both God and man is a cherished ancestral tradition. The Corinthians, he concludes, should please God “…just as our fathers (πατέρες ἡμῶν), of whom we spoke earlier, pleased him, by being humble (ταπεινοφρονώντες) toward the Father and God and Creator and toward all men” (*1 Clem.* 62.2). In sum, though this virtue is certainly deployed to deal with the initial Corinthian crisis, for Clement, humility was an enduring and honor-inscribing leadership trait.\(^{537}\)

As the above survey demonstrates, humility is one of the foremost virtues cherished in *1 Clement*. As we have seen, not only is the disposition exemplified by the loftiest ancestral *exempla*—including Christ, Abraham, and Moses—but *tapeino*-cognates are mentioned well over twenty times in the text and are closely connected with the processes of education and leadership approval.\(^{538}\) But would this trait be particularly

\(^{536}\) Commenting on this passage, Horrell correctly concludes: “…*ταπεινοφροσύνη* is clearly intended to be a characteristic of all within the community, including the leaders” (1996: 254).

\(^{537}\) These passages challenge Thorsteinsson’s conclusion, “There is little doubt that the virtue *ταπεινοφροσύνη* (together with ὑποταγή and ὑπακοή) is of cardinal significance for the argument of the letter as a whole. But it need not tell us much more than that. It does not have to imply that, according to the letter’s author, this is the cardinal virtue that in general and in all circumstances ‘lies at the heart of Christian life and community’” (2010: 123).

\(^{538}\) Bakke traces the presence of these terms throughout the letter and lists their appearances: *ταπεινοφροσύνη* 6 times (*1 Clem.* 21.8; 30.8; 31.4; 44.3; 56.1; 58.2), *ταπεινοφρονώ* 12 times (*1 Clem.* 2.1; 13.1, 3; 16.1, 2, 17; 17.2; 19.1; 30.3; 38.2; 48.6; 62.2) and *ταπεινός* 4 times (*1 Clem.* 30.2; 55.6; 59.3, 4); see Bakke (2001: 126).
well received in a traditional Roman (or Greco-Roman) context? If not, from what vein of tradition might Clement have acquired such appreciation for ἀπειλοφόρος and its cognates? In an effort to answer such questions, I will dedicate a substantial excursus to understanding the ἀπειλο- word group in its broader lexical and historical context, before concluding this chapter with a summary and a few observations and implications.539

III.G.4. Excursus: The ἀπειλο- Word Group in Ancient Mediterranean Literature

In the following excursus, I will first look at non-Jewish Greek and Roman authors before considering the terms in the LXX and in non-biblical Jewish texts. I will conclude by reviewing ἀπειλο- usage in the texts of the canonical New Testament, focusing on the Pauline tradition. Though much of the excursus will be informed by my own lexical searches (especially with respect to ἀπειλο-words in Epictetus, Plutarch, the LXX, and the New Testament), the present examination will refer reqently to Grundmann’s lengthy article (1999).

III.G.4.a. Traditional “Greco-Roman” Usage540

Beginning with non-Jewish Greek and Roman authors, even a cursory review reveals that the ἀπειλο- word group is almost exclusively used negatively. Grundmann’s assessment of humility in authors ranging from Homer to Plutarch underscores this point. In most occurrences, ἀπειλος and its cognates refer to something or someone “lowly,”

539 I will also, albeit more briefly, consider its Latin counterpart, humilis. This excursus will additionally benefit my final chapter as the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons likewise showcases ἀπειλο-words to describe a cherished ancestral leadership disposition.

540 As I consider the word group in its Greek and Roman context, I will begin with authors separated from 1 Clement by several centuries, before focusing in on two chronologically proximate authors writing in Greek and frequently employing the term, namely, Epictetus and Plutarch.
“mean,” “insignificant,” “weak,” or “poor.” Related to one’s moral state, it negatively connotes a slave-like disposition or generally sycophantic behavior. Arguably a “positive” situation in certain circumstances—though certainly not celebrated in Greek and Roman antiquity—ταπεινός was frequently used to describe the diminutive position of a human before a deity. Similarly, noting the political contexts in which this word-group is typically employed, Klaus Wengst correctly observes that the “…decisive factor in understanding the terms is that those in high social positions use them to speak ‘from above’ about those in low social positions” (1988: 4). Grundmann further identifies these social uses of ταπεινός, noting that the term often indicated “obediently to fit into a given order” or reflected a submissive disposition before a ruler. This understanding of the term, Grundmann continues, “was exacerbated in Roman society with its fixed social order and class distinctions” (1999: 4 fn. 8).

541 Due to the sheer amount of negative occurrences of the term, I will not cite them here. For the specific references, see Grundmann (1999: 1–5). In terms of Greek authors, he mostly looks at Homer, Aeschylus, Herodotus, Euripides, Plato, Xenophon, Demosthenes, Aristotle, Epictetus, Plutarch, and Dio Chrysostom. For my exploration of “humility” in Epictetus and Plutarch, however, I will include many of the specific citations. Rehrl lists many of these passages in his review of the semantic field “bei den Griechen” (1961: 26–78). Cf. Wengst: 1988: 4–14.


543 In this regard, Grundmann, particularly highlights Isocrates Or. 3.56 and Xenophon Lac. 8.2. Bakke follows Rehrl in taking the former use of “humility” (Isocrates Or. 3.56) as a virtue. He explains: “The obedience, i.e. to be ταπεινός, of subjects to governments is a precondition for safety not only for rulers, but for citizens as well. In other words, in this passage to be ταπεινός is viewed as a virtue.” (Bakke 2001: 130). Cf. Rehrl (1961: 38). Nevertheless, even if Bakke is correct, this would not be a virtue distinguishing honorable leaders; only obedient followers.

544 The Latin equivalent, humilis, with few exceptions, refers to those individuals or things that are low, small, or slight in size or, with respect to rank, birth, mind or character, are base mean, poor, or insignificant. See, “humilis” in Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879).
Turning to the “positive” uses of ῥεομος cognates in Greek and Roman authors, it is immediately apparent that very few can be identified with any clarity.\(^545\) I will quickly review the handful of more or less straightforward passages wherein the term indicates a virtuous or desirable attribute or attitude, before focusing in detail on the use of ῥεομος in Epictetus and Plutarch—two thinkers who were contemporaries (or near contemporaries) with Clement.

The earliest preservation of such positive use occurs in Plato. In his Laws, those who “cleave to Justice (δίκη)...[the] avenger of them that fall short of the divine law (τοῦ θείου νόμου)” with “lowly and orderly (ῥεομος καὶ κεκοσμήμενος) behavior” are contrasted with those boasting in “vainglory” (μεγαλαυχίας) and “inflamed with hubris” (μεθ’ ὄβρεως).\(^546\) Though the positive evaluation of ῥεομος here is a step beyond simply a subservient disposition before a deity, in light of the “divine” nature of these laws and the semi-divine personification of Justice, the disposition is not altogether different.

Xenophon, another disciple of Socrates, offers an additional example of ῥεομος as a praiseworthy disposition. In his Agesilaus, Xenophon praises the virtues of the Spartan king, noting:

To moderation (σωφρονεῖν) in times of prosperity he added confidence in the midst of danger. His urbanity found its habitual expression not in jokes but in his manner; and when on his dignity, he was never arrogant (ὑβρίς), but always reasonable (γνώμη); at least, if he showed his contempt for the haughty (ὑπεραυχων), he was humbler than the average man (τῶν μετρίων ῥεομοτερος).\(^547\)

\(^545\) Though, Stefan Rehrl envisions his main contribution being the identification of a more robust—albeit germinal—notion of “Demut in der profan-griechischen Literatur,” regarding the ῥεομος word group itself, he admits, “Sagen wir gleich im voraus, daß es nur einige solche Stellen im profane-griechischen Schriftum gibt” (1961: 25–26).


\(^547\) *Ag.* 11.11. Transl. E.C. Marchant (1925).
Here, perhaps more than anywhere else, we see a clear and unambiguous example of “humility” distinguishing a leader. Noting this clarity, as well as the fact that the passage is the most cited example of positive “humility” among modern scholars of the disposition, Rehrl rightly concludes: “Dass tap. hier im Sinne einer ethisch vertvollen Haltung gebräucht wird, steht außer Zweifel” (1961: 40).

Additional examples in classical Greek literature include Demonsthenes’ connecting the term to “measured/moderate” (μετριος) in his oration against Meidias (Or. 21.186), and Isocrates also using the term, in its adverbial form (ταπεινως), with reference to (μετριως). The latter use, however, seems to be something of a hyperbole, hardly suggesting that speaking ταπεινως was a familiar rhetorical practice among orators. Finally, in his oration on envy (περι φθόνου) Dio Chrysostom describes the “noble, thoughtful, and moderate man” who, instead of striving for riches and praise, will “…go through life as simply as possible and without conceit, modest (ταπεινός) and moderate in himself.” Dio’s description, though at first glance appearing to...

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548 See Liddell et al. (1940: 1122).

549 Isocrates exclaims, “[if]or I thought that it was so well known that I was waging war against the false pretenders to wisdom and that I had spoken so moderately (μετριως), nay so modestly (ταπεινως)” (Or. 12.20); transl. George Norlin (1980). I will revisit the relationship of the latter two terms as I conclude my analysis of I Clement below.

550 Or. 77/78. 26; transl. Cohoon and Crosby 1932 (LCL). With respect to this passage, Wengst concludes, “‘humility’ is used in a positive sense when it is meant to describe the deliberate modesty of a life-style free from conceit and the quest for fame” (1988: 15). Individuals of this temperament, Dio elaborates a few paragraphs later, will never be stimulated toward envy. Rather, such modest individuals will appear “more inglorious than the beggars (δοξότερος μὲν τῶν πτωχῶν), more destitute than the wretches who lie prostrate in the streets, held worthy of no consideration at all by anybody (μηδενός δὲ ἐξομένος παρὰ μηδενί λόγου)”. Consequently, he will never “be warped through want or dishonor or change his own character, becoming a toady and cheat instead of noble and truthful” (Or. 77/78. 33). Thus, such self-deprecation is a strategy employed by the true philosopher to avoid envy and foster a radical individuality and self-sufficiency.
straightforwardly value ταπεινός as an honor-inscribing virtue in the same way that *I Clement* does, arrives at the assessment from an entirely different set of presuppositions.

The high-minded, perfect man (ὁ γεννάως καὶ τέλεως ἀνήρ) Dio is describing here adopts the ταπεινός disposition not as an ancestral tradition or as a well-recognized and cherished virtue, but in light of his distain for the masses, who Dio describes as “unintelligent” (τῶν οὐκ εἰδότων).551 In the next paragraph, Dio illustrates the problem with what he views as the all-too-common route to glory in his age. He sarcastically asks, “Well then, do you believe that a good flautist takes pleasure in his skill and is proud when praised by unmusical and unskilled persons, and that, if youthful swineherds and shepherds crowding around him express their admiration and applaud him?”552 As this passage suggests, Dio’s advice is ironically founded upon his own status-conscious distain for the “lowly.”

His praise of humility is not only rare and largely unique to his discourse, but it is quickly reversed as, a few paragraphs later, he reverts back to a purely negative sense of the term as he describes “toadies and cheats” seeking praise (in this context, philosophers courting the favor of the wealthy) as “humble and dishonored” (ταπεινοῦς καὶ ἀχίμους).553 In short, *Or. 77/78.26* fails to clearly demonstrate either the popularity of “humility” in Greek and Roman antiquity or even a stable moral emphasis in the orations of Dio of Prusa. The balance of the remaining “positive” uses of humility in Greek literature occurs in Plutarch—an author I will consider separately below.

551 *Or. 77/78. 17.*

552 *Or. 77/78. 18.*

553 *Or. 77/78. 34.*
Finally, with respect to general positive uses of “humility” in Latin literature, Wengst reviews the “very few” positive occurrences of *humilis*. Noting single occurrences in Statius, Virgil, and Propertius, Wengst concludes, “‘Humility’ is used positively in only a very few passages of ancient literature. Its context here is a man’s attitude towards the gods” (1988: 14–15). In short, these relatively scarce passages notwithstanding, the ταπεινο- word group and its Latin counterparts almost always carry morally and socially negative connotations. I will conclude my survey of the terms in Greek and Roman literature with a closer look at the extant works of Epictetus and Plutarch, both near-contemporaries with the authors/texts I consider in my dissertation.

*Epictetus (55–135 CE)*

John Reumann summarizes Epictetus’ use of the term well, noting that famous freedman “…had nothing good to say about being tapeinos; the Cynic does not engage in ‘self-disparagement’” (2008: 310). Reumann’s analysis is confirmed on page after page of the *Discourses*. The philosopher uses the term to describe an individual crushed by life circumstances (*Diss.* 1.6.40), someone “lowly” or without glory (*Diss.* 1.3.8, 1.4.25; 2.6.2, 6, 8; 2.6.25; 3.24.36; 3.24.75; 4.1.54; and 4.4.1), or the morally base individual (*Diss.* 2.16.18; 2.24.58; 3.2.14; 3.22.104; 3.24.43; 3.24.53, 56; 4.1.2; and 4.7.11). Finally, the

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554 Specifically, Statius mentions “humble” (*humilis*) petition as a means of manipulating the gods’ will (*Ach.* 1.144), Virgil refers to Turnus’ disposition as “humble (*humilis*) and weeping” while raising his right hand in petition (*Aen.* 12.930), and Propertius calls his quaff of wine, bowing “humbly” (*humiles*) before Bacchus’ altar (*Prop.* 3.7.1).

555 Ταπεινο- is explicitly connected with αδοξον in *Diss.* 1.4.25, and slavery in *Diss.* 4.1.54 and 4.4.1. In 2.6.25, Epictetus contrasts the tribunal (βημα), which is “high” (ὑψηλός), with a prison (φυλακή), which is “low” (ταπεινός).

556 In *Diss.* 3.22.104 and 3.24.43, ταπεινο- is listed along with φθόνος as a vice, and in 2.1.11, Epictetus contrasts caution and “modesty” (αδήμων) with “cowardice and meanness” (δειλόν καὶ ταπεινόν). Also, “humility” is linked with impiety in *Diss.* 4.7.11.
verbal form refers to the act of debasing someone (*Diss.* 2.8.15 and 3.24.75), and as a noun (\(\tau\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\nu\phi\rho\sigma\omicron\upsilon\eta\)), it describes a debased, petty disposition (*Diss.* 3.24.56).

**Plutarch (46–120 CE)**

Like Epictetus, most of the occurrences of the lexeme in Plutarch describe something bad or undesirable. Unlike Epictetus, however, modern scholars have credited Plutarch with a handful of positive uses. I will briefly summarize the negative before examining one general usage and two specific passages that seem to understand the term more positively. First, throughout his extant works, Plutarch uses the term to indicate something or someone of a lowly, poor condition (*Rom.* 6, 13; *Cat. Min.* 12, 61; *PUBL.* 4; *Cato Maior* 1, 26; *Sulla* 7; *Tiberius Grac.* 10; *Gaius Grac.* 12). The lexeme also describes emotional dejection or social humiliation (*Fab.* 10, 18; *Coriolanus* 18; *Flam.* 21; *Luc.* 29; *Sert.* 22; *Pomp.* 73, 80; *Caes.* 6; *Gaius Grac.* 1, 18; *Cic.* 32; *Ant.* 53, 83; *Galb.* 23; *Praec. Coniug.* 8; *De Aristide* 27; *Sept. Sap. Conv.* 9). Citing a representative passage, Grundmann summarizes this well, “[according] to Plut. *Aud. Poet.*, 9 (11, 28a)

557 In the next passage, \(\tau\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\nu\phi\rho\sigma\omicron\upsilon\eta\) is a vice said to belong exclusively to the ignoble \(\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu\mu\omega\zeta\)—a term which Epictetus elsewhere links to the \(\tau\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\nu\)-word group (*Diss.* 1.3.1, 4). For some of the above references see also Grundmann (1999: 2–5).

558 In what follows, I will rely on Rehrl and Grundmann for the survey of tapeino- cognates in Plutarch’s *Morals* and with respect to his biographies of Greek leaders in his *Parallel Lives*. The lexical study in his biographies of Roman leaders is my own research. Many of the categories of usage I point out significantly overlap with one another.

559 To be sure, Plutarch sometimes uses the term in a morally or socially neutral fashion to describe someone or something in a low position geographically or spatially (*Cam.* 3, 28; *Luc.* 3; *Ant.* 54).

560 Describing the origins of patronage in his biography of Romulus, for example, Plutarch suggests, “Romulus thought it the duty of the foremost and most influential citizens to watch over the more lowly (\(\tau\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\nu\sigma\epsilon\rho\omicron\omega\))” (*Rom.* 13).
the right attitude is to withstand fate and hold one’s head high καὶ ποιεῖν ύψηλὸν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀταπείνωτον, i.e., not to surrender one’s honour.  

Beyond these uses, ταπεινός regularly describes someone of inferior rank or status (Num. 2; Cat. Min. 61; Aem. 9; Flam. 19; Sulla 1, 3; Pomp. 24; Ant. 33), or explains submissive behavior before a superior (Dion. 33; Adulat. 19). Not to be understood in complete distinction from the foregoing categories, Plutarch frequently deploys the word group to describe a morally inferior disposition (Cor. 21; Pomp. 23; Cic. 10; De Nicia 26; Alex. Fort. Virt. 4; Tranq. An. 17). Finally, with respect to negative applications, in its verbal form the term generally means to lower or humble someone (Cat. Min. 17; Aem. 36; Gaius Grac. 9; Luc. 21), and when used reflexively, it means to lower one’s own status (Aud. Poet. 13; De exilio 1). In the latter passage, Plutarch provides advice should the reader find himself in exile:

The language addressed to us by friends and real helpers should mitigate, not vindicate, what distresses us; it is not partners in tears and lamentation, like tragic choruses, that we need in unwished-for circumstances, but men who speak frankly and instruct us that grief and self-abasement (ὅτι τὸ λυπεῖται καὶ τὸ ταπεινοῦ ἑαυτὸν) are everywhere futile, that to indulge in them is unwarranted and unwise.

As the above collection of passages indicates, in Plutarch ταπεινός and its cognates were almost universally employed to describe socio-economic inferiority or undesirable circumstances in general. In a handful of instances, however, he does seem to foster an

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561 Grundmann (1999: 3).

562 Regarding the latter, Grundmann captures Plutarch’s use, rightly concluding “such submission should not be compliant self-surrender, however” (Grundmann 4). Along the lines of inferiority in status, the term could also indicate someone manifesting in a manner below the standards one would expect. For example, Plutarch tells us that in her political manoeuvring during a difficult season, Cleopatra would celebrate her birthday in a lowly manner ταπεινῷ while giving Antony lavish parties (Ant. 73).

563 It is explicitly connected with “ignoble” (ἄγεννῶς) in Pomp. 23 and Cic. 10. Cf. Aem. 9.

arguably “positive” view of the disposition. I will quickly examine these before moving to the ταπεινο- word-group in the LXX.

**Positive Usage in Plutarch**

First, similar to the few Greek and Latin uses surveyed earlier, in a limited number of passages, Plutarch employs the terms to describe the properly (or resultant) low, humble, or submissive state of mortals before the power and potential wrath of the gods (*Num. 8; Aem. 27; Ser. Num. Vind. 3*). While these passages describe a proper position of humans before the gods, the process of humbling (on the human side) is not seen as pleasant, and the disposition is normally presented as the product of a painful and often involuntarily debasing ordeal. With respect to *Ser. Num. Vind. 3*, for example, Grundmann expounds, “[Plutarch] speaks of the κακία which as an evil human mind can be brought by divine chastisement to understanding (σύννοις), humility (ταπεινή) and fear of God (κατάφοβος πρός τὸν θεόν). Here abasement, as the abasing of man’s wickedness, can have positive significance even though it is not a positive good” (1999: 3). Thus, despite such negative coloring, these applications of the term are not altogether distinct from some of the instances I highlighted in *1 Clement*, they simply occur far more infrequently and without the same clarity.

In his study of “Demut” in classical literature, Stefan Rehrl cites two passages with particular enthusiasm in his efforts to identify a positive appraisal of the term in Plutarch—namely, *Quaest. Rom.* 10 and 49. The former passage asks and proposes

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565 In fact, Plutarch figures prominently in Rehrl’s argument for the growing “positive” sense of “humility” in classical literature. For his extended treatment of Plutarch, see Rehrl (1961: 123–136).

566 Wengst likewise comments on this passage, “That this does not amount to a positive evaluation of humility emerges when it is said rather earlier in the text that an absence of retribution ‘weakens the cheated victim in his hopes and breaks his spirit’ (ἀθετήσθη...ταῖς ἐλπίσεωι πολεί καὶ ταπεινόν τῶν ἀδικουμένων [Moralia, 548e])” (1988: 15).
answers to the question, “why is it when [Romans] worship the gods, they cover their heads…?” One of Plutarch’s proposed solutions to this question relates to Roman efforts at maintaining the *pax deorum* through deference. He explains,

> For they uncover their heads in the presence of men more influential than they: it is not to invest these men with additional honour, but rather to avert from them the jealousy of the gods, that these men may not seem to demand the same honours as the gods, nor to tolerate an attention like that bestowed on the gods, nor to rejoice therein. But they thus worshipped the gods, either humbling themselves (ταπεινώντες ἑαυτούς) by concealing the head (*Quaest. Rom.* 10).

Such a reading in Plutarch certainly aligns with the notion of human “humility” in relation to the divine surveyed above. Nevertheless, it must be observed that this quotation, which for Rehrl represents an important proof-text for “virtuous” humility in Greco-Roman antiquity, is only but one of the possible answers Plutarch provides—and according to Grundmann’s analysis, it is not even Plutarch’s preferred answer.568

The second passage, addresses the question “Why was it the custom for those canvassing for office to do so in the toga without the tunic…?” In answer to this question, Plutarch supposes:

> Was it in order that they might not carry money in the folds of their tunic and give bribes? Or was it rather because they used to judge candidates worthy of office, not by their family nor their wealth nor their repute, but by their wounds and scars? Accordingly that these might be visible to those that encountered them, they used to go down to their canvassing without tunics. Or were they trying to commend themselves to popular favour by thus humiliating themselves by their scanty attire (τη γυμνότητι

567 *Quaest. Rom.* 10; trans. F.C. Babbit 1936 (*LCL*).

568 Rehrl (1961: 43). Regarding this “positive” use, Grundmann concludes, “Plut…reckons with the possibility that concealing the head in sacrifice and prayer achieves the end of humbling oneself before the gods. Here ταπεινών ἑαυτόν has a positive sense, but for Plut. this is only one way of explaining the practice, and he seems to prefer others” (1999: 5). In the same passage, Plutarch gives at least equal weight to the option that, perhaps “by pulling the toga over their ears as a precaution lest any ill-omened and baleful sound from without should reach them while they were praying”; as well as the possibility that such deportment was meant to symbolize the soul’s being covered by the body.
ταπεινοῦντες ἑαυτοὺς), even as they do by hand-shaking, personal appeals, and fawning behavior.

Here, the last of three plausible options, envisions such self-effacing behavior as a political strategy endearing the candidate to his constituents. While this certainly indicates that such “humbling” behavior could potentially win voters, a similar political ploy described in Plutarch’s *Publicola* sheds more light on the above passage. In this biography, Plutarch describes a number of measures taken by the statesman to render himself and his government “agreeable to the multitude”, including the removal of axes from the lictors’ rods and lowering the rods to the people when entering an assembly—thus “emphasizing the majesty of the democracy.” Plutarch then clarifies that Publicola’s goal was “not humbling himself” (οὐχ ἑαυτὸν πολὺν ταπεινὸν), but “checking and removing their envious feelings (φθόνον) through moderation (τῇ μετριότητι ταύτη).” For this, Plutarch concludes, he added to his real influence over them just as much as he had seemed to take away from his authority, and the people submitted to him with pleasure and bore his yoke willingly. They therefore called him Publicola, a name which signifies *people-cherisher.*

Thus, even if Plutarch’s preferred answer to *Quaest. Rom.* 49 is the third option he mentions—a fact we are not told and is not necessarily even likely—his presentation of Publicola’s political stratagem at least indicates that such “humbling” (or in Publicola’s case, moderation—not “humbling”) functioned primarily as a precaution against envy in

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569 *Quaest. Rom.* 49.

570 *Pub.* 10; trans. Bernadotte Perrin 1921 (LCL). In his biography of Tiberius Gracchus, Plutarch portrays the tribune similarly canvassing the crowd “in a humble manner and with tears in his eyes (ταπεινός καὶ δεδακρυμένος)” in a desperate attempt to gain support. Tiberius’ behavior is followed up with another ploy that displays his desperation as well as the anomalous nature of and perhaps one of the motivations for such debasing political efforts: “he declared he was afraid that his enemies would break into his house by night and kill him” (*TG* 16); trans. Bernadotte Perrin (1921).
the citizen body rather than as an honor-imparting virtue. Regardless, it cannot be denied
that in the cases of *Quaest. Rom.* 10 and 49, the ταπεινο-lexeme is viewed in at least a
neutral, if not positive, light. As the vast majority of the term’s appearances indicate,
however, in Plutarch such “positive” connotations were far and away the exception.
Having reviewed the non-Jewish Greek and Roman lexical panorama, I will turn to a
consideration of the term as it was used in Jewish literature around the time of *1 Clement.*

**III.G.4.b. The ταπεινο-Word Group in the LXX and Jewish Literature**

**III.G.4.b.1. Usage in the LXX**

Though much could be said about “humility” in the Hebrew Bible, since the texts
I am considering in this and the next chapter are written in Greek and in light of the
importance of the LXX (not the Hebrew Bible) for *1 Clement*, this excursus will not
explore in any detail the Hebrew cognates for the ταπεινο-word group (הֵן, יָנוּ, שְׁרֶ, מְ),—
which have been comprehensively studied elsewhere.

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571 Finding very few positive uses of actual ταπεινο-words in Plutarch, Rehrl searches instead for the
broader concept of “Demut” in the literature (1961: 134–136). In this endeavor, Rehrl finds this German
concept to a large extent in Plutarch’s use of “moderation” (μέτριος), “Mäßigung wobei Mäßigung hier
wieder den umfassenden Sinn der weisen Selbstbescheidung hat, steht sie der Demut doch einen Schritt
näher (1961: 128). Among other methodological pitfalls, this approach abandoning emic language in search
of an anachronistic German concept fails to appreciate the widely attested distinction between μέτριος—
which everywhere means “moderate”, “medium,” and “average” (see the entry for μέτριος in Liddell, Scott,
Jones: 1122)—and ταπεινο, which, as we have seen with very few exceptions means “low”, “lowly,” and
“debased.” Further criticizing Rehrl’s conceptual approach to “Demut” in Plutarch (and other Greek and
Roman authors), Grundmann complains, “Rehrl misunderstands this ref. in acc. with his dogmatic
presuppositions, cf. Dihle, 742. Rehrl, 134–6 builds from Plut. a picture of the humble man which the term
ταπεινο itself does not support. *Ibid.*, 140 he speaks of respect, esteem, awe, humility, wonder, subjection,
and he concludes that ‘humility is thus sustained by these religious virtues.’ The impossibility of deducing
all this from ταπεινο itself raises the basic question whether Rehrl does not put humility in this total picture
in order to find there what he is looking for, esp. as he has a presupposed view of it on scholastic premises”
(1999: 3 fn. 4).

572 Unless otherwise noted, all of my English translations of the LXX or N.T. scriptures follow the NRSV.

573 In the canonical texts of the Hebrew Bible, the terms, וְהָנָ, יְנוּ, שְׁרֶ, מְ generally describe either a poor,
afflicted, or lowly state or fasting and debasement before God. Following George Mendenhall, Reumann
deal with the Septuagint, concluding with a consideration of a few additional literary sources.

The adjective ταπεινός and the more infrequent noun forms (ταπεινότης, ταπεινωσίς, and ταπεινωφρον—interestingly, ταπεινωφροσύνη is altogether absent in the LXX—carry a range of uses. The balance of these mean either “poor,” “dishonored,” or “afflicted,” (“affliction” as a noun), or “weak,” “oppressed,” or “depressed.” The word group could refer to something morally bad (2 Sam. 16:12; Is. 58:4) or simply a morally neutral spatial position.

Ταπεινώω, the verbal form, covers similar semantic territory. It is used to describe humans “oppressing,” “dishonoring,” or “subduing,” other humans or, in the passive

summarizes this application well, noting that “OT ‘lowliness’” describes both “the poor or afflicted” and is also “…a way of acting toward God; rejection of ‘pride, arrogance, and violence’ [and] is part of Israel’s rejection of ‘aristocratic stratification’ in society. The Exodus taught that Yahweh ‘delivers the humble, but brings down the haughty’” (2008: 211–212); see also Grundmann 6. While the notion of humility before God is certainly prevalent in the Hebrew Bible (and thus in the LXX), “humility” (ταπεινότης) as a “horizontal” social virtue between humans is only advocated in later post-biblical Jewish traditions. In this regard, John Dickson and Brian Rosner definitively, in my opinion, challenge S.B. Dawes’ contention that the concept of humility as “regarding others as better than yourselves” finds its roots in the Hebrew Bible (1991b: 38–48). Critiquing the latter’s problematic methodology bringing later Jewish traditions (especially those in Sirach and in the Dead Sea Scrolls) to bear on key texts in the Hebrew Bible, Dickson and Rosner conclude, “‘humility’, understood as the virtue of lowering oneself before an equal, is simply not present in the scriptures of Israel. Related notions certainly exist: God’s people are often described as ‘humiliated’ or ‘afflicted’; God’s love and favour is often said to extend (especially?) to such as these; the notion of ‘theological humility’, or submission to God, is very frequent…[n]one of these related notions, however, satisfies the definition of ‘social humility’…so common in early Christianity: lowering oneself before an equal or lesser.” Klaus Wengst likewise concludes that the humility language of the Hebrew Bible arises in the context of social inequity and violence and does not yet refer to a social virtue (1988: 20–22). For Dawes’ full argument, see “Humility: Whence this Strange Notion?” (1991a) and “ANAWA in translation and tradition” (1991b).

574 Gen 16:11; 29:32; 31:42; 41:52 Lev. 27:8; Deut. 26:7; 1 Sam. 1:11; 9:16; 18:23; 2 Kings 14:26; Neh. 9:9; Esth. 4:8; Judith 7:32; 13:20; 1 Mac. 3:51; 14:14; 3 Macc. 2:12; Ps. 9:14; 31; 21:22; 24:18; 30:8; 89:3; 118:50; 118, 92, 153; 135:23; Prov. 30:14; Eccl. 10:6; Sir. 13:22; 29:8; Sol. 5:12; Amos 2:7; 8:6; Is. 25:4; 26:6; 32:7; 49:13; 53:8; Jer. 2:24; 22:16; Ezek. 21:26; Lam. 1:3, 7, 9.

575 Judg. 6:15; Ps. 9:39; Ps. 17:28; 33:19; 81:3; 33:19; 101:18; Sir. 25:23; Is. 54:11; Dan. 3:37.

576 Lev. 13:3–4, 21, 25–26; Josh. 10:16; Judg. 1:15; 1 Macc. 14:14; Ps. 112:6. The remainder of the adjective and noun forms of the lexeme will be considered below in my survey of “virtuous” humility in the LXX.
voice, “becoming impoverished,” “oppressed,” or “dishonored.” Along these lines—and illustrative of its negative range—the verb often signifies “rape.” Furthermore, divine chastisement is regularly indicated using a form of ταπεινόω, and socially, it can mean “to submit to a superior” (Gen. 16:9; Sir. 4:7; Sir. 29:5; Is. 60:14). Finally, before I consider potential uses of the lexeme as a virtue in the LXX, it often describes self-chastisement and self-denial (especially that brought on by fasting), and can innocuously indicate downward movement.

Like the non-Jewish Greek and Roman literature surveyed above, though the most frequent usages of ταπεινό- cognates indicate negative or undesirable states or situations, some of the texts comprising the LXX also maintain positive traditions with respect to the lexeme—especially related to “humility” before the divine. Distinct from the non-Jewish Greek and Roman material, however, in the LXX this “positive” tradition is more robust. First of all, throughout the Greek scriptures, God is depicted as one who gives assistance

577 Gen. 15:13; Gen. 31:50; Ex. 1:12; Lev. 25:39; Deut. 21:14; 26:6; Judg. 12:2; Judg. 16:5–6, 19; 1 Sam. 7:13; 12:8; 26:9; 2 Sam. 7:10; 1 Chr. 17:9–10; 20:4; 2 Chr. 13:18; Esth. 6:13; 5:11; 1 Macc. 12:15; 2 Mac. 8:35; Ps. 37:9; 38:3; 39:2; 43:26; 73:21; 87:16; 93:5; 104:18; 105:42; 106:12; 115:1; 141:7; 142:3; Prov. 10:4; 13:7; 16:19; 27:5; Eccl. 12:4; Job 22:12; Job 24:9; 31:10; Sir. 2:4, 5; 6:12; 11:12; 12:11; 13:8; 20:11; 40:3; Sol. 11:4; Is. 3:8; 51:23; Is. 58:10; Jer. 13:18; Lam. 1:8; Dan. 7:24.

578 Gen. 34:2; Deut. 22:24; 29; Judg. 19:24; 20:5; 2 Sam. 13:12, 14, 22, 32; Lam. 5:11; Ezek. 22:10, 11.

579 Judg. 4:23; Ruth 1:21; 1 Kings 8:35; 1 Chr. 4:10; 2 Chr. 6:26; 2 Chr. 28:19; Tob. 4:19; Ps. 43:20; 54:20; 71:4; 74:8; 88:11; 89:15; 105:43; 106:17; 118:67, 71, 75, 107; Job 22:29; 34:25; Sir. 33:12; Mal. 2:12; Is. 3:17, 26; 51:21; 64:11; Lam. 1:5, 12; 2:5; 3:32, 33, 34. In Is. 40:2, the verbal idea is communicated in noun form.

580 Lev. 16:29, 31; 23:27, 29, 32; Ezra 8:21; Ps. 34:13–14; Sir. 34:26; Is. 58:3, 5. A similar idea is communicated in noun form (ταπεινωματις) in Ezra 9:5 and Sol. 3:8. Regarding such self-chastisement in the LXX, Grundmann makes an observation that anticipates our discussion (below) of the word-group’s “positive” connotations. He comments, fasting is “not just the observance in which self-humbling finds visible expression but more particularly the subjection of the mind to God’s Will and judgment, which alone gives to the outward exercise any value before God” (1999: 7).

581 Judg. 5:13; Eccl. 10:18; Is. 40:4; 57:9; Jer. 38:35.
to and/or exalts the lowly while opposing and/or humiliating the proud. In most of these texts, to be sure, the “humble” are the socially and economically poor and oppressed, while the proud (ὑπερηφανοι; μετέωροι; or those with ὑβρις) temporarily occupy the opposite position. Nevertheless, in a handful of instances, the ταπεινο-word group stretches beyond simple socio-economic antitheses, instead emphasizing what we might understand as moral dispositions before God.

To begin with, on several occasions the adjective, ταπεινός, positively describes one’s contrite disposition before God. In Prov. 16:2 and Sir. 12:5, for example, it is framed as the opposite of ἀσεβής (“ungodly”, “impious”). More than this, God’s work in “humiliating/humbling” his people is explained as preparing their hearts for obedience to Him. Along these lines, the psalmist declares, “[b]efore I was humbled (ταπεινωθηκαί) I went astray, but now I keep your word” (Ps. 118:67), and later, “[i]t is good for me that I was humbled (ἔταπεινωσάμενοι) me), so that I might learn your statues” (Ps. 118:71). Here, though God’s humbling is understood as a form of punishment or discipline—not an immediate imputation of virtue or something of that sort—the relationship between humility and piety is bolstered. Prov. 18:12 makes similar connections, advising, “[b]efore destruction one’s heart is haughty, but humility (ταπεινούται) goes before honor.” Prov. 29:23 likewise attests, “[a] person’s pride (ὑβρις) will bring humiliation

582 Ps. 17:28; 18:27; 137:6; Prov. 3:34; 29:23; 1 Sam. 2:7; 2 Sam. 22:28; Job 12:21; Sir. 10:15 (Sir. 13:20, the noun form, ταπεινότης, is contrasted with the proud); Is. 1:25; 2:9, 11–12, 17; 5:15; 10:33; 11:4; 13:11; 25:11–12; 26:5; 29:4; 49:13; 54:11; Ezek. 17:24; 21:26, 31; 114:6; 146:6; Job 40:11; Sir. 7:11; Judith 16:11; Sol. 2:35; Hos. 5:5; 7:10.

583 Judith 6:19; Sir. 11:1; 29:8; Zeph. 2:3; 3:12; Is. 66:2; Dan. 3:87.

584 For similar examples of the verbal form (ταπεινώ), see 2 Chr. 32:26; 33:12, 23; 34:27; Esth. 14:1; Judith 4:9; Ps. 50:19; Job 22:23; Sir. 2:17; 7:17; 18:21; Hos. 2:17; Dan. 3:39; and Dan. 10:12.
(ταπεινοί), but one who is lowly in spirit (ταπεινόφρονας) will obtain honor (ἐρείόει δόξη κύριος; literally, “…the Lord supplies glory”)."

While the above appearances of the lexeme almost exclusively underscore man’s contrition before God, in Sir. 3:17–20 the term seems to take on a social dimension, describing a non-compelled, virtuous disposition toward one’s fellow man.\(^{585}\) Though this passage still maintains a strong emphasis on “theological humility” (esp. Sir. 3:20), here the child (τέκνον) is instructed to perform his filial obligations knowing that, “the greater you are, the more you must humble yourself (ταπεινον σεαυτόν, Sir. 3:18). Such humility is not just owed to God, but also to the father, for “the Lord honors (ἐδόξασεν) a father above his children” (Sir. 3:1). In Sir. 3:21–31, furthermore, the child is instructed to “not meddle in matters that are beyond you” as such behavior is the product of “conceit” (ἡ ὑπόλογμας). As this passage indicates, though the book additionally uses the word group with almost every “negative” meaning outlined above, in Ben Sira (Sirach), ταπεινός has the ability to connote what we might call a social virtue. In sum, while most of the manifestations of the lexeme in the Greek scriptures describe unwelcomed physical, social, or emotional conditions, ταπεινο-ognates in the LXX are associated with a correct demeanor before the divine with more frequency than we observed with the non-Jewish literature above.

\(^{585}\) If he indeed utilizes the book at all, Clement may refer to Sir. 16 (among a host of other possible texts) in his prayer in 1 Clem. 59.4; cf. Holmes (1999: 97).
III.G.4.b.2. Other uses in Jewish Literature

Turning to “humility” in Jewish literature (written in Greek) both outside the LXX and chronologically proximate with 1 Clement, a similar trend is evident. Like Sirach, the Epistle of Ariseas (2nd century B.C.E.) both re-inscribes God’s exaltation of the humility and debasement of pride and additionally suggests humility as a social virtue. A telling passage occurs in the context of “King Ptolemy” asking one of the Jewish scribes how “he could meet with recognition when traveling abroad?” The scribe’s response links the traditional biblical notion of God’s opposition to the proud and exaltation of the humble with a virtuous recognition of human solidarity: “When a man pays heed to equality and remembers on every occasion that as a man he rules over those like him καὶ ὁ θεὸς τοὺς ύπερηφάνους καθαρεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐπεικεῖς καὶ ταπεινοὺς ύψοι” (Ep. Ar. 257). Though the social utility of humility is only germinally suggested in Sir., in Ep. Ar. the marriage of “theological” and “social” humility is much more conspicuous.

Though silent on the positive “social” implications of humility, Philo of Alexandria, for his part, preserves the biblical tradition regarding the proper human disposition of humility before the divine. To be sure, the vast majority of the term’s occurrences in his substantial extant literary corpus describe something negative,

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586 While the above survey of the ταπεινο- lexeme the LXX is driven by my own lexical searches, for this section, I will rely more heavily on secondary sources—especially Grundmann (1999).


588 Though focusing on 2nd Temple texts written in Hebrew, Grundmann underscores the robust presence of such “social” humility in the literature of the Qumran Community. He summarizes, “In the Rule παρίσταται. Its meaning corresponds to ταπεινοφροσύνη in the later NT writings (21, 32ff.) and some post-apost. fathers (⇒ 25, 7 ff.). For this humility is a disposition which members of the union should observe toward one another and which is essential to unity” (1999: 12). Dickson and Rosner likewise cite 1QS II.24; IV.3; IV.25; and XI.1–2 (2004: 479 fn. 57).
undesirable, or morally inferior.\textsuperscript{589} Josephus, on the other hand, \textit{exclusively} uses the word group negatively. To take one example, far from the positive leadership virtue lauded in \textit{1 Clement}, \textit{ταπεινοφροσύνη} in Josephus is the deleterious accusation leveled against Galba by his soldiers. This insult is so grievous that it eventually leads to his public murder in the streets of Rome (\textit{BJ.} 4.9.2).\textsuperscript{590} As the above sample suggests, like the LXX, the \textit{ταπεινο}-lexeme in Jewish literature written in Greek by and large refers to debasement, poverty, moral ill, or lowliness. Diverging slightly from the LXX, however, at least in the case of the \textit{Epistle of Aristeas}, we find a more robust notion of virtuous humility toward one’s fellow human being.


\textit{Tapeino}-words occur a total of 34 times in the canonical texts of the New Testament.\textsuperscript{591} Of the 34 uses, about half (16) connote unambiguously negative social, economic or emotional circumstances. Consistent with the vast majority of Mediterranean usage, the lexeme frequently describes something “lowly”, “weak”, “poor”, or “debased” (as well as their verbal counterparts).\textsuperscript{592} In Phil. 3:21, for example,

\textsuperscript{589} Positively, for example, summarizing Philo’s argument in \textit{Rev. Div. Her.} 29, Grundmann explains, “[m]easuring his own vanity, which is grounded in mortality, in his constitution of dust and ashes, and in the contemplation of the all-surpassing height of the divine blessings, man, \textit{ταπεινὸς γεγονὼς, καταβεβλημένος εἰς χοῦν, gains confidence and courage to draw near to God…This abasement is the essential transition to proximity to God}” (1999: 15). With respect to the predominant negative employment of the word group in Philo, see Grundman 14–15.

\textsuperscript{590} \textit{Γάλλας ἀποδειχθεὶς αὐτοκράτωρ εἰς Ρώμην ἐπανήλθεν ἐκ τῆς Ἰσπανίας, καὶ…ἄπο τῶν στρατιωτῶν αἰτιθεὶς ἐπὶ ταπεινοφροσύνῃ (B.J. 4.9.2). For more on Josephus’ employment of the lexeme, see Grundmann (1999: 15).

\textsuperscript{591} The lexeme never occurs in Johannine writings, Mk., 1Cor., Gal., Hb., Jude, 2Pet., or in the Pastorals.

\textsuperscript{592} Rom. 12:16; 2 Cor. 7:6; 10:1; 11:7; Phil. 3:21; 4:12; Col. 2:18; 23; James 1:9, 10; Acts 8:33; 20:19. In Acts 20:19, in the context of Paul’s speech to the Ephesian elders, “humility” is connected to tears and trials and, thus, lowliness and debasement. Though his endurance of such hardship is paraded before the
Paul looks forward to the eschatological transformation of his “body of humiliation” (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως), and later in Phil. 4:12, he recounts his familiarity with financial prosperity as well as poverty (ταπεινοῦσθαι). The book of James situates the term as the opposite of “rich” (πλοῦσιος; 1:9–10), and in Col. 2:23 it is aligned with “severe treatment of the body” (cf. Col. 2:18). 

Moreover, tapeinoω is used to describe God’s debasing, chastising, or “humiliating” certain individuals or groups. Finally, the verb is used once to simply describe downward movement (Lk. 3:5).

Barbara Bowe correctly identifies another dimension of the word-group’s usage in this literature: “The New Testament texts repeat and intensify the prophetic promises concerning humbling and exaltation” (1988: 113–114). This phenomenon is prevalent particularly in Luke and James, though it also appears in 2 Cor. 7:6 (where Paul refers to God “who consoles the downcast [ταπεινωθήσεα]”), 1 Pet. 5:5–6, and in Matthew (18:4 and 23:12). In Luke 14:11, for example, Jesus echoes Prov. 29:23 reminding his hearers that, “all who exalt themselves will be humbled (ταπεινωθήσεται), and those who humble themselves (ὁ ταπεινὸς ἐαυτὸν) will be exalted.” Following his parable regarding the prayers of the Pharisee and the sinner (Lk.18:9–14), Jesus repeats the same aphorism. Luke includes a more thoroughly social dimension to the latter exhortation, explaining that the parable was directed at “some who trusted in themselves that they were righteous and regarded others with contempt” (Lk. 18:9). Thus, while the primary “humility”

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593 2 Cor. 12:21; Lk. 14:11; 18:14; Matt. 23:12.

594 Passages deploying the term in this way include Lk. 1:48, 52; 14:11; 18:14; 2 Cor. 7:6; James 1:9–10; 4:6, 10; 1 Pet. 5:5–6; Matt. 18:4 and 23:12.
exemplified in the parable was of a “theological” nature, the parable itself also serves a social end.

While ταπεινός in one’s estimation of God and his or her fellow humans is suggested in the above Lukan material (L), in the canonical Pauline tradition this social dimension finds its clearest articulation. In Phil. 2:1–4, Paul underscores,

If then there is any encouragement in Christ, any consolation from love, any sharing in the Spirit, any compassion and sympathy, make my joy complete: be of the same mind, having the same love, being in full accord and of one mind. Do nothing from selfish ambition or conceit, but in humility (τῇ ταπεινόφροσύνη) regard others as better than yourselves. Let each of you look not to your own interests, but to the interests of others.

In the following verses, the apostle undergirds this exhortation with Christ’s own paradigmatic renunciation of status (ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν) for the benefit of others (Phil. 2:5–11). Here, the resurrection is portrayed as God’s ultimate vindication of Christ’s humility and the manifestation of God’s characteristic “exaltation” (ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερψωσεν) of the humble. In short, Paul fits well into the to the biblical tradition of humbling and exaltation while also demonstrating remarkable innovation in terms of the unambiguous direction of one’s “humility”—namely, not just (or primarily) before God, but in “the interests of others” (Phil. 2:4). In short, Paul sums up the ideal disposition of God-honoring life, leadership, and even death, in a noun which elsewhere only connotes depravity or moral inferiority—namely, ταπεινόφροσύνη. Thinking principally of

595 Perhaps along these lines, though we are not given specifics regarding the “theological” or “social” (or both) direction of his “humility”, in Matt. 11:29 (M material) Jesus entreats his hearers, “Take my yoke upon you, and learn from me; for I am gentle and humble in heart (ταπεινός τῇ καρδίᾳ), and you will find rest for your souls.”

596 For an analysis of this passage in the social context of Roman Philippi, see Hellerman (2005).

Paul’s letter to the Philippians, Brent Shaw underscores the significant nature of this innovation in the context of ancient Mediterranean moral discourse:

To be *tapeinos* was to be weak, poor, submissive, slavish, womanish, and therefore had an indelible connection with shame, humiliation, degradation and, inexorably, with that which was morally bad…It is the Christian writings of the New Testament that revolutionize these values wholly by their total inversion (1995: 303).

**III.G.5. “Humility” in 1 Clement as a Pauline Preservation**

In light of foregoing excursus, a few final words on “humility” in *1 Clement* are in order. In terms of Clement’s appropriation of especially the social dimension of *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, though one could point out a small handful of arguably “positive” uses of the lexeme in non-Jewish Greek and Roman literature (especially with respect to one’s lowly disposition before the divine), to claim, as Bakke does, that Clement’s use of the *ταπεινο*-word group would “…sound appropriate in Greek ears which were familiar with the positive use of *ταπεινός*”, in my estimation, simply does not follow from our evidence (2001: 131).\(^{598}\) Rather than being attracted to “humility” as a *topos* of Hellenistic rhetoric, as Barbara Bowe suggests, the “Pauline text (Phil. 2:3–4) seems surely to have

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The lexeme indicates this positive social disposition elsewhere in the canonical Pauline tradition (Col. 3:12 and Eph. 4:2) as well as in 1 Pet. 3:8 and 5:5. For a discussion of the possible dependence of 1 Peter on Pauline tradition as well as the scholarly discussion on the topic, see Achtemeier: 1996: 15–19. Aside from perhaps language, Achtemeier doubts any substantive literary dependence (1996: 19).

\(^{598}\) Bakke does confess: “Admittedly, we have not observed any example of *ταπεινός* used as a virtue in contexts where one dealt with the question of unity and sedition in a political body. It is, however, interesting to note that *ταπεινός* is both associated with virtues (*σωφρονία* *μέτριο*ο) which were related to sedition” (2001: 131). His focus on (*σωφρονία* *μέτριο*)—in the absence of *ταπεινός* in deliberative speeches urging concord—largely follows Rehrl and thus is subject to my critiques of the latter above.
influenced the meaning and the choice of ταπεινόφροσύνη in 1 Clement, with Paul’s particular emphasis of putting the common good before one’s own” (1988: 114). 599

Thus, while it certainly highlights values that would be well received in traditional Mediterranean moral discourse (especially “endurance” and “piety”), 1 Clement does not deploy exclusively popular rhetorical topoi or stock Roman values to bring about concord in and shape the leadership ethos of the Corinthian community. Instead, with respect to “love” and especially “humility”, the Roman letter is re-inscribing what it understands to be distinctively native traditions “in Christ” with respect to leadership and communal morality.

Furthermore, using Hellenistic and, as I have been arguing in this chapter, largely Roman rhetorical and pedagogical strategies, 1 Clement seeks to transmit a self-consciously “unique” ancestral tradition. And it is the letter’s enthusiastic celebration of the virtue of “humility”—especially exemplified in the figure of Christ and other weighty ancestors—that most significantly distinguishes its developing leadership ethic from those traditionally advocated in Roman and even many Jewish discourses. Moreover, the language and formulation of much of Clement’s presentation of ‘love’ and ‘humility’, as I have suggested, are influenced by the moral priorities in Paul’s letters—especially 1 Corinthians and Philippians. In other words, the centrality of these leadership ideals was not a Clementine innovation or standard rhetorical stock; to a significant degree, it was a Pauline preservation. Regardless of how these “virtues” may have operated in the day to

599 David Horrell likewise concludes, “[Clement’s] understanding of the term may owe a good deal to Paul, for whom imitating Christ meant humbling oneself (Phil 2.5ff; 2 Cor 11.7; cf. 1 Clem 16.1f, 17), although Paul uses ταπεινόγος in a negative sense (2 Cor 10.1; Phil 3.21). Indeed, for Paul the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ senses of the word can hardly be separated neatly, since following Christ (a positive thing!) involves the humiliations of suffering and hardship” (1996: 254). Further suggesting the influence of Paul’s letter to the Philippians (or at least Pauline traditions along these lines), 1 Clem. already references Philippians elsewhere in the letter (1 Clem. 47.1–2, citing Phil. 4:15).
day context of the Roman congregation(s) producing this letter, to say it all, they
nevertheless maintained a substantial position in Clement’s discourse as a valuable
dispositions exemplified his community’s cherished native leadership exempla.

Conclusion

In sum, moving beyond most modern studies examining 1 Clement almost
exclusively in the context of Hellenistic literary and formal rhetorical influences, my
examination of the letter’s appropriation of both the form and content of the Roman
discourse on exemplary leadership yielded a number of illuminating results. Most
significantly, my examination demonstrates that while clearly reflecting the robust
influence of popular Roman moral and discursive practices—for example, Clement’s
characteristically Roman approach to moral instruction via ancestral exempla or the
narration of longer exempla according to specific narrative elements—the letter uses
these didactic tools to articulate what it understands to be a distinct ancestral tradition.
Rather than stock Roman paragons, for example, Clement prefers 1) heroes from Israel’s
sacred tradition (here consistent with Philo and Josephus), 2) apostles, and 3) the figure
of Christ.

The letter’s moral content on leaders and leadership, furthermore, reflects a
robust Roman influence at the same time as the letter recalibrates traditionally Roman
virtues and preserves largely non-Roman Pauline priorities. First, while 1 Clement
promulgates the notion of proper descent with respect to leadership structures and offices,
whether intentionally ignoring bloodline or simply unable to identify well-born
Corinthian leaders, the letter by and large deemphasizes the otherwise valued Roman
emphasis. Second, unlike Josephus’ portrayal of Moses and in contrast to most Roman
sources surveyed in this dissertation, 1 Clement never showcases military accomplishment as an important leadership characteristic nor are his exempla ever deployed as brave warriors or skilled generals. The letter is, however, imbued with martial imagery and ambitiously celebrates the Greek and Roman agonistic ideal of endurance (ὑπομονή).

Third, Eloquence, is largely viewed with suspicion and consequently is never mentioned as a desired leadership trait or showcased in exempla. Fourth, generous patronage is rarely discussed; where it does come up Clement re-inscribes traditional Roman expectations but urges the clients to praise God, not exclusively their patron. Fifth, in step with Philo and Josephus and in contrast to his near silence on eloquence and patronage, Clement everywhere showcases and presupposes the importance of piety.

Clement most deviates from traditional Roman moral emphases as he uses his favorite and loftiest exempla (especially Moses and Christ) to underscore the communal and leadership virtues of “love” (ἀγάπη) and “humility” (ταπεινοφροσύνη)—the latter largely considered a negative attribute according to most Roman and more generally Mediterranean moral presuppositions. In love and humility, I argued, Clement seems to preserve largely Pauline traditions. In sum, as presented in this chapter, 1 Clement provides yet another example of individuals and groups in the Romanized Mediterranean using Roman discursive practices to articulate native ancestral traditions.

Beyond these findings, my chapter contributes to scholarship in a final significant area. Whereas most studies on 1 Clement focus on a singular aim in the letter, namely, the achievement of concord, I examine a secondary (albeit complementary) agenda—communicating a distinctive ancestral morality of leadership. As Van Unnik, Bowe, and
more recently Bakke (among other scholars) have rightly demonstrated, the chief goal of 1 Clement is the restoration of peace and concord in the Corinthian community. Nevertheless, consistent with the centrality of leadership and authority in the Corinthian stasis, the Roman letter seeks to not only restore order and peace, but to (re)inculcate an native morality of leadership. This, in turn, perhaps explains why both ἀγάπη / ἀγαπάω and ταπείνο-cognates figure so prominently in 1 Clement while absent in what Bakke calls traditional Greek or Roman literature associated with concord. In short, for Clement these terms were not stock virtues to be mentioned in a concord speech; they were core values distinguishing those individuals rightly appointed as “leaders of our souls” (ἀρχηγοί τῶν ψυχῶν, 1 Clem. 63.1).

In the following chapter I will conclude my dissertation with a study of the discursive practices and leadership ideals in the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons, a text ostensibly written on behalf of communities in highly Romanized portions of Gaul.
Chapter 5: The Martyrs of Vienne and Lyons as Exempla of Christian Leadership

In a sermon delivered on the feast day of St. Agnes the martyr, Augustine strongly dissuades his readers from attending the local games. Instead, he offers an alternative sanguine spectacle: “[B]y the blood of Agnes/the lamb the lion is vanquished. Ecce spectacula christianorum.” Augustine’s pastoral proposal, though penned centuries after the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons, illustrates the enduring popularity of spectacle violence among both Christian and non-Christian audiences. In second-century Gaul, as in Augustine’s North Africa, the Christian ἐκκλησία and Roman munera functioned in close (and at times, no doubt, uncomfortable) geographic and cultural proximities. More than simply entertainments, the latter gladiatorial games winsomely acclaimed virtuous Imperial leadership and powerfully re-inscribed Roman social and cultural values. In the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons (Lyons), the amphitheater remains a preferred site for such moral and political advertisement, but the focus is different; rather than celebrating Roman mores and imperium, the arena showcases the exemplary leadership and moral superiority of Christ-imitating martyrs.

In this final chapter, after a brief overview of this Gallic-Christian letter, its preservation in Eusebius, and Roman culture in second-century Gaul, I will examine the way in which Lyons interacts with both the form and characteristic moral content of the Roman discourse of exemplarity. I argue that—like Josephus in Ant. 2–4 and 1 Clement—Lyons actively participates in the Roman discourse of exemplarity. As I will demonstrate, the letter thoroughly reflects the narrative approach characterizing Roman

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601 In addition to the longer treatments of social and political communication in the munera by Alison Futrell (1997) and Thomas Wiedemann (1992), see Cobb (2008: 34–35).
exemplarity and, in several key aspects, aligns with Clement’s navigation of the Roman idiom of moral leadership. First, while 1 Clement passively ignores bloodline as a source of honor (contrary to Josephus and Philo), Lyons aggressively eschews its importance. Instead, the martyrlogy insists exclusively on the leaders’ Christian identity. Again, where Roman military priorities are concerned, though both letters never advocate a leaders’ violent physical action against other humans, they do contain martial imagery and celebrate agonistic values. In Lyons, however, the protagonists’ physical dominance and cosmic military exploits greatly eclipse Clement’s measured discourse on violence and leadership. Additionally, both letters underscore piety before God as a fundamental and invaluable leadership necessity.

Lyons, furthermore, differs slightly with 1 Clement on the Roman leadership priorities of eloquence and generous patronage. Regarding eloquence, which 1 Clement depicts as, if anything, potentially divisive, Lyons deploys a handful of exempla recognized for powerful speech. Also, while both letters discuss the issue of patronage, 1 Clement interacts primarily with its material expression. Lyons, on the other hand, envisions its patronal paragons as (akin to the Philonic and Josephan Moses) mediating divine favor.

Finally, this chapter will draw attention to two significant moral parallels between Lyons and 1 Clement. First, Lyons shares 1 Clement’s prioritization of love and specifically lovingly employing one’s authority to benefit the weaker members of the community. Secondly, the Gallic correspondence shares 1 Clement’s insistence on the
rather un-Roman leadership disposition of Christ-emulating humility. In both texts, furthermore, the latter virtue appears to be a distinctively Pauline preservation.  

I. Overview of the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons

I.A Date and Contents

The Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons is partially preserved in the first two (perhaps three) chapters of Book five of Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History (H.E. 5.1.1–2.8). Like 1 Clement, Lyons is ostensibly a corporate correspondence—a rather unusual form given Greek and Roman epistolary conventions—and abounds with moral and martyrological exempla. Ostensibly, Lyons claims to describe for the Churches of Asia and Phrygia a series of events which took place in the seventeenth year of Marcus Aurelius (177 C.E.) and which exhibit “the intensity of our afflictions here, the deep hatred of the pagans for the saints, and the magnitude of the blessed martyrs’ sufferings

602 Whereas I noted the Pauline formulation of “love” in 1 Clement, Lyons nowhere signals that Pauline tradition informed this virtue in the Gallic churches. Though Paul’s letters certainly may have influenced the preference for the virtue, Candida Moss—one of the few scholars seeking its origin in the correspondence—has suggested the more robust role of Johannine “love” in Lyons; see Moss (2010: 50).

603 Candida Moss notes, “[t]he letter is preserved exclusively and only partially by the fourth-century church historian Eusebius in his Ecclesiastical History (5.1.1–5.3.4) and is otherwise untested as a separate document until the medieval period (2012: 103). For a helpful introduction to the work, see Moss (2010: 189).

604 Largely on the grounds of thematic similarities, Nautin has proposed Irenaeus as the author, though this suggestion has gained little acceptance among scholars (1961: 54–61). For an argument against Irenaeus’ authorship, see Moss (2012: 105). Dehandschutter, while recognizing the similarities between Irenaeus and Lyons, reflects the scholarly consensus noting the apparent editorial unity of the collective epistle (2005: 9). On the group correspondence, Candida Moss notes the more or less exceptional nature of such corporate letters: “Correspondence in the name of groups is itself unusual. Although there are letters addressed to and received from voluntary associations—Greco-Roman social groups frequently compared to early Christian churches—this correspondence is normally composed by the founders or patrons of the group” (2012: 190 endnote 14; cf. Dehandschutter 2005: 8). On both letters’ shared preoccupation with “martyrological exemplars”, see Moss (2012: 103). This chapter will use Hurbert Musurillo’s translation unless otherwise specified (1972: 62–85).

605 See H.E. 5.1.1.
(ὅσα ὑπέμειναν οἱ μακάριοι μάρτυρες)” (Lyons 5.1.4). Scholars have generally accepted the letter’s late second century date and Gallic provenance, though as I will treat in more detail below in my examination of the preservation and “authenticity” of the letter, some have contended for a third century redactor and/or Eusebius’ own editorial hand.

In terms of content, following a brief introduction by Eusebius (Lyons 1.3–4a), the letter proceeds in a somewhat convoluted sequence recounting the virtuous suffering of unspecified groups of Gallic Christians interlaced with episodes portraying the confession, suffering, and death of nine named martyrs—Vettius Epagathus, Sanctus, Maturus, Attalus, Blandina, Biblis, Pothinus, Alexander, and Ponticus (Lyons 1.4b–63). Eusebius closes with four segments of the letter recounting the martyrs’ loving and humble behavior while among their fellow Christians (Lyons 2.1–4, 5, 6–8) as well

606 Many (most) scholarly works consult Lyons without interacting in any detail with the status of the Eusebian preservation—for example, Boyarin (1999: 120), Castelli (2004: 45); and Cobb (2008: 78ff). A handful of prominent scholars do address the issue and accept (with few qualifications) the letter’s authenticity and second century date; see Frend (1965: 1–5); Musurillo (1972: xx–xxii); Nautin (1961: 54–61; and Dehandschutter (2005: 3–22). As I will defend below, I tend to agree with Dehandschutter’s position: “we may hold that the events to which MLugd refers can be dated only about 177, without further precision. And the Letter might be situated quite near to the events it relates, although here too some caution is recommended” (2005: 7–8). My argument in this chapter does not rely on such a precise date, though it does necessitate that I establish the authenticity and general unity of the portions quoted in H.E. 5.1–2, as well as the Gallic provenance of the original letter (regardless of any third century redaction).

607 This “body” of the letter begins with a general introduction to the persecution (1.4b–8), followed by the exemplum of Vettius Epagathus (Lyons 1.9–10), and a general description the confessors, deniers, and unbelieving slaves (Lyons 1.11–15). The letter then debuts Sanctus, Maturus, Attalus, and Blandina (Lyons 1.16–17) before detailing the (for many, first round of) torture and sustained confession of Blandina, Sanctus, and Biblis (Lyons 1.18–26). When the tormentors note their failure to break their subjects, the martyrologist narrates, they attempt new tactics (Lyons 1.27–28), which lead to the abuse and resulting death of the aged Pothinus (Lyons 1.29–31). This transitions into another contrast between the noble deportment of the confessors and the ignoble disposition of those denying their Christian identity (Lyons 1.32–36). At this point Eusebius indicates his skipping over a short portion of his source, only to resume with the letter’s description of Maturus, Sanctus, Blandina, and Attalus’ paradigmatic behavior as participants in the “day of gladiatorial games” arranged for their sake (Lyons 1.37–44). During an intervening period awaiting the Emperor’s decision regarding confessing Roman citizens the letter recalls the multiple conversion of many previously non-confessing prisoners (Lyons 1.45–46) and the subsequent executions of such individuals (Lyons 1.47–48). Finally, in terms of the public endurance of the martyrs, the “body” of extant letter includes the confession of Alexander (Lyons 1.49–50a), his martyrdom along with Attalus (Lyons 1.50b–52), and the final contest of Blandina paired with young Ponticus (Lyons 1.53–56), before describing the shameful treatment of the martyrs’ corpses by the “pagan” (ιδινων) mob (Lyons 1.57–63).
as an account of Attalus correcting the imprisoned Alcibiades with respect to the latter’s extreme austerity (*H.E.* 5.3.1–3). My project will focus on the first two main sections of the letter, namely, the exemplary portrayals of the confessors/martyrs in *Lyons* 5.1–2.

*I.B. Review of Scholarship on Lyons*

As a relatively early example of martyrological literature, *Lyons* has not been overlooked by scholarship. For most of the 19th and 20th centuries, it figured prominently as a source in many studies on Christian persecution and martyrdom. These investigations were primarily interested in the historical and political realia attested to by the letter. In the last few decades, however, scholars have moved away from more positivistic questions regarding the historical circumstances referred to in *Lyons* in favor of examining the correspondence itself as a cultural artifact. Candida Moss’ approach in her recent monograph (2012) characterizes well the presuppositions and methodology underlying many of these works: “This book treats martyrdom as a set of discursive practices that shaped early Christian identities, mediated ecclesiastical and dogmatic

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608 As I will review below, however, many scholars view *H.E.* 5.3 as largely a Eusebian addition.

609 José Ruysschaert argues for the interchangeability of the terms “confessor” and “martyr” in *Lyons*. He contends that “martyr” had not yet taken on its technical meaning—as it would in Cyprian or Eusebius, for instance—referring to one who died confessing one’s faith, with “confessor” specifically referring to one who testified to being a Christian but was not killed (1978: 158).

610 The standard work along these lines is W.H.C. Frend’s *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church* (1965). For another frequently cited investigation along these lines, see De Ste Croix (1963) as well as many of the contributions in Rougeé and Turcan’s volume (1978). For substantial reviews of scholarship on ancient “Christian Martyrdom”, see Moss (2012: 12–17) and Cobb (2008: 3–4).

611 See Perkins (1995); van Henten (1995); Boyarin (1999); Castelli (2004); Shaw (1996); Lieu (2002); Kelly (2006); Cobb (2008); and Candida Moss (2010).
claims, and provided meaning to the experience described by early Christians as persecution, and in doing so produced a new economy of action” (2012: 17).

While all of these studies footnoted examine the text (normally as one in a group of the pre-Decian martyr acta) with respect to its role in the identity formation and moral universe of the authorial community responsible for Lyons, several works share my more specific interest in exemplary discourse. Though I will be in conversation with many of these scholars throughout my chapter, in light of this overlap as well as their influence on my project, an extended discussion of a few of the contributions is warranted at the outset.

In a seminal article (1995), Jan Willem van Henten studies Jewish and Christian accounts of martyrdom, including Lyons, in light of (largely) Greek exemplary discourse. Investigating one of the many possible functions of these heroic accounts, Van Henten contends that, not unlike Athenian funeral orations, many Jewish and Christian martyr accounts function politically, modeling for their audience(s) the shared virtues and identity characterizing the martyrs’ respective communities as a political bodies. In his own words, “[a] comparison with texts about the Jewish martyrs and pagan heroic figures

612 Cf. Moss: 2010: 17. Boyarin explicates a similar line of inquiry: “It is generally accepted among church historians today that such texts as, at least, the Martyrium Polycarpi, the Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs (of 180), and the Letter of the Churches of Lyons and Vienne were produced very close to the time of the events in question, if not by actual eyewitnesses. It is important for me to emphasize that the question that I am raising is not one of historical ‘authenticity,’ but of the histories of discourses. Another way of putting this question would be: In the second century, when Jews such as Akiva and Christians such as Polycarp were both being killed by the Romans (in this case, within approximately two decades of each other), what were the stories that Rabbis were telling of Akiva’s death and that Christians were telling of Polycarp’s” (1999: 120). Finally, Stephanie Cobb notes, “…the martyr accounts inform us not only about the martyrs themselves but also—and perhaps more importantly—about those who told their stories” (2008: 5).

613 The starting point of van Henten’s exploration into the manifold utility of the martyrological accounts is his observation that, at least in the case of Asia Minor (his proposal for the likely provenance of 4 Maccabees), “the overall picture of the Jewish communities…in this period is one of a peaceful coexistence of pagans and Jews, with a sometimes astonishing amount of Jewish interaction. This implies that we may consider another function of this literature than the obvious one of comfort and encouragement of an oppressed community” (1995: 317).
suggests that the Christian martyrs functioned analogously as the heroes of a ‘nation’ which was considered as unique” (1995: 304). While I certainly share van Henten’s interest in the function of Lyons in light of popular political discourse and my project will investigate the martyrs as paragons of virtue, my chapter will focus on the letter’s appropriation of more specifically Roman discursive habits as well as the intra-communal educational potential of Lyons.

Another scholar whose works play a significant role in my chapter is Candida Moss. As I will converse with her throughout, I will only briefly introduce two of her most recent projects, before outlining where I stand on her shoulders and where we part ways. To begin with, in her revised dissertation, The Other Christs (2010), Moss explores a phenomenon often taken for granted in scholarship, but seldom carefully dissected—

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614 Van Henten underscores the importance of the Jewish and Christian appropriation of the Hellenistic tradition of utilizing παραδείγματα to articulate group/political identity. In 2 Maccabees, for example, van Henten argues that the martyrs model the virtue of the newly independent Hasmonean temple-state (1995: 314–315), and in 1 Clement, van Henten notes the importance of Peter and Paul functioning as paragons “…of perseverance (ὑπομονή) until death” and thus demonstrating “…the special character of the Christian stock” (1995: 319). Thus, rather than simply concluding that Christian traditions regarding “martyrdom” developed linearly out of similar Jewish martyr accounts, van Henten proposes that both kinds of accounts celebrating noble death similarly looked to pagan (largely Greek) topoi of patriotism (1995: 303–304).

615 In a more recent article (2006), Nicole Kelly, like van Henten, acknowledges the multifunctional potential of martyrological literature and consults Greek discursive models to better understand one such function: “In the pages that follow I will explore how the reading and hearing of narratives about martyrdom constituted an exercise derived from Greek philosophy, adapted to inspire a largely nonliterate audience. This exercise not only trained early Christians to be ready for death and the world to come, but also worked to shape their perceptions of the Christian way of life in this world” (2006: 723–724). Though her focus in terms of both discursive influence as well as function is different than mine, her observation is nonetheless applicable to this study: “The martyr acts functioned not just as scripts or templates, but also as vehicles for the inculcation of a particular set of values…they also allowed a much larger group of Christians, who were never in any real danger of martyrdom, to internalize the religious principles exemplified by the martyrs” (2006: 729). Again summarizing well the approach I will take to Lyons, Kelly observes that such martyr acts “…are not just historical documents that reflect the practice of martyrdom, but texts that worked rhetorically to shape their readers' way of being in the world” (2006: 734). For another project examining the martyr acts as instruction for the minority of Christians facing persecution and death, see Thompson (2002). Thompson concludes, “…the martyrlogies themselves became recipes for exemplary behavior at the trials and executions, for example, how to respond to questions, what gestures to make and what facial expressions to wear, and how to display suffering as normative, not abnormal” (2002: 41).
namely, the fact that martyr acts frequently portray their protagonists as imitating Christ. After carefully reviewing scholarly trends with respect to *imitatio Christi* (2010: 3–11), and exploring such mimetic phenomena in the documents comprising the New Testament as well as *1 Clement* and Ignatius’ epistles (2010: 19–44), in four chapters Moss explores the disparate ways in which the protagonists enshrined in the martyr acts imitate, are possessed by, and even *become* Christ primarily by means of suffering.616

Along the way, and frequently aligning with my own inquiries, Moss also examines the manifold functions of these texts as well as the implications that the cultural capital inherent in Christ-like suffering held for the ancient communities producing and digesting martyrological literature.617 Regarding the latter, Moss concludes,

*Imitatio* as ritual and literary performance was a strategic practice. It amplified the authority of the already powerful martyr. It endowed those who shaped the martyr’s memory with the authority to adjudicate in ecclesiastical matters, to promote particular values, ethics, and doctrines, and to elevate the standing of particular churches against their competitors. Rhetorically, then, resurrecting Christ in the martyrs was a

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616 Moss contends, “It is in the earliest formulations of what it meant to follow Jesus—the writings of the Jesus movement—that the premise of imitating Christ through suffering was first established.” (2010: 18). Following her review of *imitatio* in the New Testament, Moss similarly concludes, “[t]he preponderance of this theme in the literature of the early church created an environment in which the suffering, persecution, and death of an individual were understood Christologically, in terms of the sufferings of the savior…[t]he prevalence of this idea formed part of the intellectual climate out of which the practices, literature, and theologies of martyrdom emerged” (2010: 44). Her observations with respect to this high view of suffering resonates with Paul Middleton’s monograph, *Radical Martyrdom and Cosmic Conflict in Early Christianity*, wherein Middleton argues, “radical martyrdom, at least as an ideal, was a significant, rather than marginal, strand of second-century Christian thinking. A great many early Christians up to, and indeed beyond, the end of the second century were altogether more enthusiastic about death than is generally acknowledged” (2006: 5–6). Finally, in one of Moss’ most innovative contributions, she assesses the implications of such *imitatio* for historical theology, exploring how, “[i]n some respects…the *acta* provide a clearer picture of some of the interpretations of the passion narratives” (2010: 53).

617 In step with her contention that “…martyrdom texts…were used in a variety of settings and in a number of different ways” (2010: 17), Moss notes, for example, the liturgical or catechetical life of the *acta* (2010: 14–15), their utility as part of “a program of intra-ecclesial dialogue” (2010: 15), their apologetic and boundary-marking usefulness (2010: 15–16), as well as their application to issues of church polity (2010: 104). With respect to the “cultural capital” mentioned above, Moss argues “[w]ithin the ‘mimetic economy’ of the early church, suffering like Christ was ‘cultural capital’” (2010: 28).
powerful move that invoked the unassailable character of the Savior to promote a particular agenda (2010: 175).

My chapter is primarily interested in those “particular values” and “ethics” promoted by the martyrs deployed in Lyons.

Moss follows *The Other Christs*, with a monograph exploring ancient Christian martyrdom in general. In this work, which I will also draw upon throughout my study, Moss devotes an entire chapter to martyrological discourse in Gaul. In addition to her preoccupation with the mimetic aspects in Lyons in this chapter and in *The Other Christs*, her thoughtful discussion in *Ancient Christian Martyrdom* with respect to the preservation of Lyons in Eusebius’ *Ecclesiastical History* as well as her critical analysis of the major themes, characters, and mimetic discourse of Lyons will figure prominently in the pages that follow. In short, her fresh exploration of *imitatio Christi* in martyrrological literature significantly intersects with many of the aims of my project.

Without fundamentally challenging her insightful contribution—and in many areas standing on her shoulders—my project diverges and/or significantly supplements her work in several respects. First, while she is careful to note the diversity among the extant pre-Decian martyr *acta*, in *The Other Christs*, the *Letter of the Churches of Lyons* and Vienne specifically related to imitation in Lyons, Moss insightfully observes, “...the exchange of martyrdoms accomplished other things, serving to propagate a particular image of an individual church as especially virtuous, persecuted, and enduring. The persecuted church in Gaul, for example, appears successful, brave, and exemplary, and this presentation sets up an implicit hierarchy among the churches. When the Letter of the Churches of Lyons and Vienne is read aloud in Asia Minor, the congregants and the church in Asia minor are implicitly encouraged to behave like the churches of Gaul” (2010: 15).

While the mere act of writing this book appears to bind them together, the martyr acts are not a homogeneous group. What emerges out of this study is the considerable diversity of opinions, scriptural interpretations, and views of martyrdom they represent” (2010: 176).

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619 See Moss (2012: 100–121).

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Vienne and Lyons is but one of several texts Moss explores as examples of martyrological literature. In the monograph, moreover, while mentioned (virtually) throughout, Lyons only factors in significantly to her third chapter. In my study, on the other hand, I give pride of place to the letter, examining it as a discrete text.

Secondly, though acknowledging the broader pedagogical potential of the literature, Moss focuses almost exclusively on suffering as the primary means of imitating Christ in the acta. Certainly not overlooking such culturally valuable action, I explore the virtues exemplified by the martyrs emulating Christ in both hostile external conflicts as well as—perhaps more importantly for my study—more mundane intracommunal (ecclesiological) settings.

Finally, in this chapter I will attempt to situate Lyons in the broader context of popular pedagogical, exemplary discourse in the Roman west. Moss, on the other hand, almost exclusively conducts her examination of the mimetic aspects of the letter in the vacuum of theological and ecclesiological “Christian” traditions related to imitatio Christi. For example, in The Other Christs, she frames her project as revisiting a concept

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622 In the third chapter (“The Martyr as Alter Christus” [pp. 45–74]), in fact, wherein Moss explores the reception history of the gospel narratives in the acta, Lyons only contains two of six passion narrative elements she mentions, namely, the crucifixion (2010: 62) and water from Christ’s side (2010: 68). In the fourth chapter focusing on the martyr’s function after death (“The Martyr’s Heaven” [pp. 113–148]), Moss rarely mentions the text, only citing Lyons 2.7 to illustrate the fact that in the acta “the moment of martyrdom is consistently described as the moment of “departure to God” (2010: 126). Finally, in chapter five (“The Martyr as Divine Heir” [pp. 149–172]), examining the status of the martyr in their post-mortem existence, Moss never deals with Lyons.

623 Moss’ Early Christian Martyrdom aligns better with my project, providing a focused treatment of the text as an example of Gallic martyrological tradition; see Moss (2012: 100–121).

624 Though she only devotes a few pages fleshing out the observation, Moss rightly notes, “[w]hile death alone qualified a martyr as a model, martyrs also served as embodiments of Christian virtues. Indeed, their status as exemplar is not secured merely by dying but is contingent upon the manner of their death...It is tempting to reduce the moral example of the martyrs to a single virtue—endurance or obedience—but in truth the picture is more complicated. Martyrs are not one-dimensional ethical characters. They embody a plethora of sometimes surprising virtues: obedience, endurance, piety, love, humility, forgiveness, and fearlessness” (2010: 105).
largely avoided for theological reasons by protestant scholarship.\textsuperscript{625} In setting the context for such \textit{imitatio}, furthermore, Moss almost completely ignores Roman—or even Hellenistic—discursive practices related to imitation. Instead, she provides a lengthy survey of the exhortations toward imitating Christ in the canonical New Testament, \textit{1 Clement}, and Ignatius’ letters.\textsuperscript{626} Without question, her work in this regard is quite fruitful and intersects with my own concern for Pauline moral traditions. Nevertheless, while not fundamentally challenging Moss’ innovative research, my examination of \textit{Lyons} will address this lacuna by consulting very similar Roman exemplary discourse and, I believe, better situating the imitation of Christ into a broader cultural context.\textsuperscript{627}

Finally, of any project I have come across, Stephanie Cobb’s \textit{Dying to be Men} (2008) comes the closest to my line of inquiry regarding \textit{Lyons}. As opposed to Moss’ virtual neglect of exemplary discourse outside the Christian tradition, Cobb underscores the importance of the broader cultural context in which the martyr acts were written.

\textsuperscript{625}Moss complains, “New Testament scholars have exhibited an astonishing and often unjustified reluctance to speak of the imitation of Christ as a theme in the earliest Christian literature. \textit{Imitatio} anxiety among scholars is grounded in one of three underlying motivations: the almost proprietorial hold that Roman Catholicism has over the term, the Christological convictions threatened by the concept, and the inescapable but repugnant conclusion that dying for Christ may be a central, rather than peripheral, part of the Christian experience” (2010: 21). She continues, “…anachronistic and inappropriate to use the term \textit{imitatio Christi} in its expanded medieval sense. At the same time, it is inappropriate to discard the notion of imitating Christ completely, merely because it conjures up bad memories in the Protestant collective unconscious. In its basic meaning, \textit{imitatio Christi} refers to actions or words that imitate those of Christ, not complicated ethical and spiritual systems of thought. For the purposes of this work, I will employ the term to describe the idea that Jesus’ followers should seek to imitate him” (2010: 23). In sum, for better or worse, similar to the works she surveys as background for \textit{imitatio} in the \textit{acta} (i.e. the canonical New Testament, \textit{1 Clement}, and Ignatius’ letters) Moss’ study is largely concerned with what is presented as an internal Christian discourse. That is, Moss’ study of imitation in the \textit{acta} primarily situates it in a developing historical, theological and ecclesiological context, rather than viewing the \textit{acta} in their broader Mediterranean cultural context.

\textsuperscript{626}2010: 19–44. To be sure, on pp. 20–21, Moss devotes two paragraphs to the “Greco-Roman” background of mimesis and on pp. 82–83, she discusses Roman Sacrifice. Nevertheless, these brief considerations pale in comparison to the multiple pages Moss reserves for the theme in Christian tradition.

\textsuperscript{627}Along these lines, I will not consider \textit{Lyons} as a potential source for tracing the development of Christian theology. For her conclusions on this, see Moss (2010: 175).
Distinct from both Moss and van Henten, furthermore, Cobb focuses on *Roman* rhetorical, pedagogical, and moral influences in the text. Seeking to “contribute to a large and ever-growing conversation about the construction of Christian identities and the nature and function of martyrological literature” (2008: 8), Cobb devotes her monograph to mostly pre-Decian martyr acts arguing, “…the martyr acts functioned in the Christian community as identity-forming texts and, more specifically, that the authors of these texts appropriated Greco-Roman constructions of gender and sex to formulate a set of acceptable Christian identities” (2008: 5). Furthermore, Cobb argues, these martyrologies “…illustrate Christian behavior and establish boundaries between Christianity and other social groups” (2008: 5).

To make her case, following an introduction to identity theory and sex and gender in antiquity (2008: 18–32), Cobb surveys Roman notions of the masculine, especially as they were broadly advertised in gladiatorial exhibitions and athletic discourse (2008: 33–59). With these contexts in place, she explores the ubiquity of Roman formulations of *virtus* they appeared in the martyr *acta* (2008: 60–91). Finally, Cobb examines the intracommunal function of the accounts, noting the way in which female martyrs (including Blandina) are deployed to re-inscribe traditional female cultural values (2008: 92–123). In short, Cobb contends, rather than subverting traditional Roman constructions of gender, the *acta*—their professed opposition to all things Roman notwithstanding—wholly re-inscribe Roman presuppositions regarding ideal manhood and womanhood.

628 Here, Cobb shares a similar concern for Roman spectacle entertainment and literary culture as that of Christopher Frilingos in his *Spectacles of Empire* (2004).
My project follows Cobb in two particularly important areas (among others).\textsuperscript{629} First, I share her starting point approaching martyrlogical texts as first and foremost pedagogical tools: “[t]he martyr acts are better understood as educational propaganda than objective history” (2008: 5). Secondly, and related to the first point, in studying \textit{Lyons} I am profoundly interested in the intracommunal functions of the letter—especially as they relate to constructing or re-inscribing a value system. In my case, I will focus on the way in which \textit{Lyons} deploys martyrs as \textit{exempla} of leadership, both as representatives of the community to hostile “outsiders” (εθνικοί) as well as when functioning within the Christian community.\textsuperscript{630}

My project differs from Cobb’s as mine focuses exclusively on \textit{Lyons} and is not primarily concerned with discourse on gender in the text. Furthermore, my study does not stop with a consideration of the Roman \textit{moral influence}, but considers the characteristically Roman narrative delivery of these accounts. Finally, Cobb concludes that the martyrologies completely “…embraced, rather than replaced, Roman definitions of honor, strength, and reason” (2008: 2). My study, on the other hand, while certainly illustrating the robust appropriation of many Roman moral priorities in \textit{Lyons}, nevertheless explores the way in which the letter utilizes Roman discursive habits to also preserve and celebrate largely un-Roman leadership dispositions—love (ἀγάπη) and especially humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη).

\textsuperscript{629} Of course, like Cobb and many of the abovementioned authors, I examine \textit{Lyons} as a cultural artifact in the study of the moral priorities and discursive approach of the author/authorial community.

\textsuperscript{630} Thus, I share Cobb’s presuppositions: Thus, rather than providing historical data, these texts may more readily supply information about the ways Christians portrayed themselves and how they constructed appealing and persuasive group identities through the stories they told” (2008: 5).
Before considering exemplary discourse on leadership in the *Letter of the Churches in Vienne and Lyons*, I will first discuss the likelihood that *Lyons*, as it is preserved in Eusebius, represents an authentic Gallic correspondence, and then consider the presence and nature of Roman cultural forms and political realities in Gaul during the Imperial period.

**II. Preservation of The *Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons***

Though most scholars have accepted at least *H.E.* 5.1–2 as more or less an intact preservation of a letter from Gallic churches to those in Asia Minor and Phrygia, such acceptance has not been unanimous.631 Motivated in part by a desire to exonerate what he calls “the tradition of the church” maintaining that Marcus Aurelius was not a persecutor, James Westfall Thompson was the first (of the still relatively few) to challenge the authenticity of *Lyons* as a second century correspondence more or less faithfully preserved in *H.E.* 5.1–2.632 Without suggesting a particular provenance or author, Thompson concludes that the letter was “…written as a pious forgery to encourage those recanting during Decian persecution that such behavior will not rescue them from punishment” (1912: 380–381).633 The balance of his critiques, however, may call into

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631 Many (most) scholarly works consult *Lyons* without interacting in any detail with the status of the Eusebian preservation—for example, von Harnack (1908: 1.191–192); Mommsen (1899: 238); and more recently, Boyarin (1999: 120); Castelli (2004: 45); and Cobb (2008: 78ff). A handful of prominent scholars do address the issue and accept (with few qualifications) the letter’s authenticity and second century date; see Frend (1965: 1–5); Musurillo (1972: xx–xxii); Nautin (1961: 54–61); and Dehandschutter (2005: 3–22).

632 For his motivations with respect to the reputation of Marcus Aurelius, see Thompson (1912: 360–361). In the introduction, Thompson recognizes his novel position: “So far as I am aware modern historical research had not yet impeached the veracity of Eusebius’ account of this persecution” (1912: 360).

633 Thompson further claims, “Eusebius, apparently arbitrarily or by a method of his own, ascribed it as he did. The genuineness of many of the documents in Eusebius is open to question” (1912: 384). Though, as we will see, Moss does not think *Lyons* has remained untouched by redaction, she certainly does not share
question the historical accuracy of the events described in Lyons, but they do not directly (or necessarily) call into question the date of composition, provenance, or unity of the supposed letter recounted in H.E. 5.1–2.\textsuperscript{634}

Modern scholarship, moreover, has not followed his doubt with respect to the existence of Christian communities in second century Gaul.\textsuperscript{635} The robust connections and communications between Rome and southern Gaul (which I will review below), in fact, increase the likelihood that Christ-confessing communities were able to fairly easily spread from Rome.\textsuperscript{636} Finally, Thompson’s argument from the “intrinsic psychological evidence” (1912: 378) and “miraculous elements” in the Eusebian account (1912: 378–379) mistakenly presupposes a uniformity and linear development in pre-Decian martyrological literature—literature that, as Moss demonstrates, was heterogeneous.\textsuperscript{637} In short, while Thompson rightly refuses to simply take for granted the authenticity of H.E. 5.1–2, the evidence simply does not warrant such extreme skepticism.

\textsuperscript{634} For example, he questions the historical accuracy of the supposed persecution, noting the lack of evidence in other “pagan” or Christian writers (1912: 361–365). Additionally, Thompson impugns the letter for misunderstanding the operation of “police power” in the separate provincial locations of Lyons and Vienne (Lyons was in an imperial province, \textit{provincia Lugdunensis}, and Vienne was a senatorial province, \textit{provincia Narbonnensis}). He concludes, “[t]he spectacle of a Roman governor so transcending his prerogative as to invade the jurisdiction of another governor would certainly be extraordinary…[a]ll evidence is in favor of a strict limitation of the governor’s authority to his own territory” (1912: 368–369).

Regarding the latter critique, while Thompson’s observations are astute, they do not necessitate abandoning the general Gallic origin of the letter. Furthermore, relying on a reified understanding of pre-Decian Imperial policy and proceedings with respect to Christians (policy which was far from uniform), he questions the date of the account as it contradicts Trajan’s policy regarding seeking out Christians (1912: 370).

\textsuperscript{635} In my reading for this chapter, only Thompson has doubted a Christian presence in second century Gaul.

\textsuperscript{636} For Thompson’s argument regarding the dearth of Christian remains in second century Gaul, see 1912: 365–366.

\textsuperscript{637} See Moss (2010: 176).
In a more nuanced study of the preservation of Lyons, Winrich Löhr argues for a handful of possible redactions in the letter (in particular, he doubts the authenticity of *H.E.* 5.3). Nevertheless, none of these perceived additions jeopardize the major segments of the letter on which my argument rests.638 He argues, “Bildet der in V, 1–2 von Eusebius exzerpierte Teil des Dossiers eine inhaltliche und formale Einheit, so ist deutlich, daß die von Euseb anschließend zitierten Stücke sekundäre Zusätze sind” (1989: 139).

Most recently, in terms of scholars proposing redactional layers, Candida Moss has directed scholarly attention toward the issue of Lyons’ preservation. To be sure, in *The Other Christs*, aside from a brief discussion in the appendix,639 she leaves the issue of the letter’s preservation largely unaddressed. Nevertheless, in *Ancient Christian Martyrdom*, Moss calls into question the authenticity of larger elements of Lyons. Introducing her look at Lyons with the suggestion that “the authenticity of the Letter…is far from certain” (2012: 102), Moss initially makes a distinction between the relatively stable narrative in 5.1 and the more heavily redacted portions of the preservation in 5.2–3.640 Nevertheless, as I will demonstrate below, throughout her study of Lyons, she


639 There, Moss notes that “…it may have been reworked by a third-century redactor or Eusebius himself (cf. the cruelty of the soldiers and the mention of the beast in 1.5, 42, 47; 2.6; the term ‘virgin mother’ used of the church in 1.45 parallels the late third-century Methodius of Olympus, *Symposium* 3.8)” (2010: 189). Thus, in *The Other Christs*, Moss sees the potential for an editorial hand mainly with respect to selected terms and narrative details—none of which concern major aspects of the text upon which my argument rests. Moreover, she never suggests that extended portions of the letter, for example 5.2, are Eusebian interpolations.

640 Here Moss concludes (though never systematically specifying or unpacking the layers of redaction), “Segments of the Letter are unlikely to have been composed by Irenaeus. In 5.2–3, the authors specifically mention visiting the martyrs in prison and showing them their compositions. The imprisoned martyrs apparently berated their visitors for calling them martyrs when the title should be applied exclusively to Christ. The account presumes a formal distinction between “martyr” and “confessor” that emerges out of the Confessors Controversy in Carthage in the mid-third century. This portion, and presumably the sections
frequently notes thematic unity between 5.1 and 5.2, and then, in apparent conflict with her skeptical forecast, eventually argues that many of the shared themes likely provide evidence for a Gallic Christianity and martyrological discourse.\footnote{Compare her earlier skepticism, “neither Irenaeus nor the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons can be as securely tied to Gaul as scholars have claimed” (2012: 19), with her conclusion, “[t]here are also thematic similarities between Irenaeus and the Letter…[w]e might choose to view these common features as evidence of a particularly Gallic form of Christianity, rather than as the product of a single author or as evidence of Eusebius imitating his sources” (2012: 104). More than this, Moss argues persuasively that at least some individuals in the Gallic Christian communities would have been sufficiently educated to compose the letter (2012: 104–105).}

Having introduced and evaluated, albeit summarily, several leading critical voices with respect to the preservation of Lyons, in the following paragraphs I will offer my own contribution to the scholarly conversation. At the most, I will seek to establish the high likelihood that, without excluding the possibility of some third century redaction, H.E. 5.1–2 represents a more or less faithfully transmitted late 2nd century (but more importantly) Gallic correspondence.\footnote{With Moss, for example, I do not insist that the letter be an authentic collaboration between the churches of Lyons and Vienne: “Historically, Lyons and Vienne were feuding towns (Tacitus, Hist. 1.65), so there is something suggestive about their literary collaboration” (2012: 103). Nevertheless, as I will defend below, I tend to agree with Dehandschutter’s position: “we may hold that the events to which MLugd refers can be dated only about 177, without further precision. And the Letter might be situated quite near to the events it relates, although here too some caution is recommended” (2005: 7–8). Again, my argument in this chapter does not rely on such a precise date, though it does necessitate that I establish the authenticity and general unity of the balance of the portions quoted in H.E. 5.1–2, as well as the general Gallic provenance of the original letter (regardless of minor third century redaction in 5.1–2).} At the least, I will show that, on the whole, scholars dealing with the letter have not seriously called into question the Gallic origin of the major aspects of Lyons undergirding my argument.

Beginning with the latter, other than James Thompson’s sweeping contention that the entire letter is a third century “forgery” dripping with Eusebian redaction, those areas in H.E. 5.1–2 where scholars have suggested later development never call into question that follow, must be later commentary on the martyrs” (2012: 105). With Löhr, however, Moss never fundamentally questions the unity of 5.1–2, though she proposes a more significant Eusebian hand “shaping later portions of the account (Lyons 5.2–3)” (2012: 105–106).
the thematic and narrative elements of *Lyons* upon which my argument is based. To consider one noteworthy example, no scholar (to my knowledge) proposes a non-Gallic source for the “humility” exemplified by the martyrs in 5.2—a disposition which, as we have seen in *1 Clement*, was no stranger to Christ-imitating constructions of leadership in the Roman west. Though this observation, of course, does not prove the Gallic origins of *Lyons*, it assures the reader that my arguments below are not out of step with scholarship in the field.

Secondly, two virtues that I will later argue play significant roles in the martyrrology—namely, love and humility—are both disproportionately focused in *H.E.* 5.1–2. For example, of all the appearances of the noun, ἀγάπη, in the ten books of Eusebius’ *Ecclesiastical History*, over half (!) occur in *H.E.* 5.1–2 (*H.E.* 5.1.9, 10, 17, 23, 34, 49; 2.6, 7). Of the remaining seven occurrences three cite scripture (*H.E.* 7.25.21 [2 occurrences]; 8.10.3), and two appear in quotations of other documents (*H.E.* 4.15.3; 7.22.7). To be sure, only one of the fourteen verbal occurrences comes from *Lyons* (*H.E.* 5.2.7). Nevertheless, almost all of the remaining uses appear in direct quotations of other sources.⁶⁴³ In short, in those portions of *Ecclesiastical History* explicitly representing his own literary production, Eusebius all but foregoes employing ἀγάπη and its cognates.

Positive uses of ταπεινο- words are likewise disproportionately represented in *H.E.* 5.1–2. Of the six positive uses, two come from *Lyons* (*H.E.* 5.2.3, 5) and are

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⁶⁴³ Most are scriptural references (*H.E.* 1.3.14; 3.23.1; 7.25.12; 10.4.7, 33, 70) while others originate in other documents (*H.E.* 1.11.8; 3.36.13; 4.15.42; 6.41.18; 7.24.4). In terms of the remaining two verbal forms, Eusebius begins his first book (using the 1st person plural) expressing how, “[w]e shall endeavour to give [the scattered memoirs] unity by historical treatment, rejoicing (ἀγαπῶντες) to rescue the successions, if not of all, at least of the most distinguished of the apostles of our Savior” (*H.E.* 1.1.4). Later, in the context of his discussion of John, Eusebius employs the term several times, claiming “I hold that there have been many persons of the same name as John the apostle, who for the love they bore him, and because they admired and esteemed him and wished to be loved (ἀγαπηθῶντες), as he was, of the lord, were glad to take also the same name after him” (*H.E.* 7.25.14).
associated with the martyrs. Three of the remaining occurrences appear in quotations of other church fathers as they described Jesus’ own renunciation of status according to the pattern outlined in Philippians 2:3–11 (H.E. 1.13.20; 8.10.2), and the final use comes from Apollinarius of Hierapolis (a mid to late 2nd century Phrygian) and does not make reference to Christ (H.E. 5.18.5). More than this, when celebrating virtues in his own words, Eusebius never uses the term. For example in the litany of compliments Eusebius doles out in reference to the leadership of his praiseworthy contemporaries (or recently departed), “humility” is never included. When applying ταπεινο­- words outside direct quotations, instead, Eusebius always employs the term negatively. In fact, even when introducing an excerpt of the Gallic letter which itself features the “humility” (described in ταπεινο­- words) and “love” (ἀγάπη) of the martyrs, Eusebius does not employ these terms: “It might be worth while to add to this some other passages from the same document, in which the gentleness (ἐπιευκείς) and love (φιλάνθρωπον) of these martyrs is described.” Thus, at least as far as the clustering of word-groups in H.E. 5.1–2 is

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644 Two are included in Eusebius’ epitome of Thaddaeus’ preaching the “word of life” (τὸν λόγον τῆς ζωῆς) to Abgar. There, apparently modeled on Philippians 2:3–11, Thaddaeus includes the description of Jesus “…new preaching…lowliness and humiliation (μικρότητος καὶ ταπεινώσεως), and how he humbled himself (ἐταπεινώσεν ἑαυτὸν), and put aside and made little his divinity, and was crucified” (H.E. 1.13.20). Finally, in H.E. 8.10.1–10, Eusebius ostensibly preserves a letter from a distinguished statesman-turned-bishop, Phileas, on the matter of martyrdom. In this alleged excerpt entitled, “From the Writings of Phileas to Thmuites”, Phileas quotes Phil. 2:6–8—recounting Jesus’ self humiliation (ἐαυτὸν ἐταπεινώσεν)—almost exactly (H.E. 8.10.2).

645 For example, the word group never occurs in his praise of Dorotheus and Gorgonius (H.E. 8.1.4–5), the martyrs in Palestine (H.E. 8.7), Phileas (H.E. 8.9.7–10.1), or in his extended panegyric addressed to Paulinus (H.E. 10.2.1–72).

646 For example, he castigates the Ebionites’ demonic (διαβολικής) view of Christ as “poor and mean” (πτωχὸς καὶ ταπεινός; H.E. 3.27.1), he similarly characterizes Paul of Samosata’s Christology as “low and mean” (ταπεινός καὶ καμαραπτή; H.E. 7.27.2), and explains how God “…humbled (ταπεινόσωσα) and cast down” Simon the sorcerer for his wickedness (H.E. 2.14.2).

647 Lyons 2.1.
concerned, the *Letter of the Churches in Vienne and Lyons* does not suggest heavy
Eusebian redaction, and certainly does not appear to be the latter’s invention.

Third, in terms of establishing the unity of *H.E.* 5.1–2, a number of themes appear
equally in both chapters. To take one example, in a recent article contending for the unity
of the letter, Boudewijn Dehandschutter correctly notes, “…the editorial unity is achieved
by the hints to important themes: the general theme of the struggle against the devil, and
the special one of the winning back of the apostates” (2005: 9). Despite her skepticism
noted above, Moss likewise notes the pervasive theme coloring *H.E.* 5.1–2. Including
references to 5.1 and 5.2, she notes, “[i]magery of cosmic conflict persists to the end of
the work. The devil is a voracious and gluttonous beast who eagerly seeks to consume the
Christians” (2012: 115).

Love represents another theme equally distributed between *H.E.* 5.1 and 5.2.
More significantly, Moss points out, it not only saturates the letter and accounts for one
of the “thematic similarities between Irenaeus and the Letter” (2012: 104), but in her
words, “the prominent role played by love as analgesic and reciprocal relationship
between Christ and the martyrs is a distinctive feature of these Gallic texts” (2012: 121,
italics mine). Though not exclusive to Gaul, the ubiquity of “endurance” in both portions
of the preservation further suggests such their unity.

Finally the focus on Stephen’s exemplary behavior in *H.E.* 5.2.5, though not
referenced in 5.1, also represents a largely Gallic tradition. Moss observes, “[s]omewhat
unexpectedly, early Christians were not that interested in Stephen the martyr. The

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648 In *The Other Christs*, Moss quotes *H.E.* 1.23 and 2.2, stating, “[a]s we already noted, the *Letter of the Churches of Lyon and Vienne* presents the deaths of the martyrs in terms of victory over Satan” (2010: 107).
exception to this rule is Irenaeus’s use of the martyrdom of Stephen (Acts 7) in *Against the Heresies*” (2012: 117). Moss’ conclusion assumes the Gallic provenance of *H.E.* 5.2: “…it would not be an overstatement to say that his [Stephen’s] death takes on exegetical significance only in Gaul” (2012: 117). In sum, on the basis the foregoing historiographic, lexical, and thematic arguments, not excluding the possibility of some 3rd century redaction, my study will cautiously assume that at least *H.E.* 5.1–2 preserves a unified Gallic correspondence. 

III. The Presence and Nature of Roman Power and Culture in Gaul

Having defended the Gallic provenance and unity of *Lyons* 1–2, I will begin my exploration of the letter’s appropriation and creative application of Roman exemplary discourse by investigating the presence and nature of Roman cultural forms and political realities in Gaul during the first centuries of the Imperial period. My review will first discuss 1) the general imposition of Roman power and influence in the region, before assessing “Romanization” in Gaul more specifically in terms of 2) patronage, 3) laws and administration, 4) material culture (especially monumental architecture, inscriptions and statuary), and most important for my chapter, 5) those vehicles for the advertisement and dissemination of traditional Roman leadership values and exemplary discourse. Along the

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649 There, Moss notes the absence of Stephen traditions in the Apostolic Fathers, apologists, Nag Hammadi texts and extant early Christian apocryphal texts.

650 Moss concludes: “Regardless of how we might choose to interpret the similarities between Irenaeus and the *Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons*—as evidence of Gallic Christianity or as the literary product of Irenaeus—it is clear that there is a distinctive theology of martyrdom in Gaul” (2012: 120).

651 The following survey will primarily rely two of the most thorough and recent treatments of “Romanization” in Gaul, namely, Woolf (1998) and MacMullen (2000).
way, I will note the importance of Lyons and Vienne, without assuming *Lyons* 5.1–2 was necessarily composed in one of those prominent cities.

**III.A. General Roman Power in the Region**

Though the pacification and imposition of Roman power, patronage, and cultural influence in Gaul was a long and uneven process beginning in the second century B.C.E., the most drastic Roman-induced disruption took place during the first century B.C.E., as Julius Caesar and later Augustus settled scores of triumviral veterans in major cities in southern Gaul. A century later, Woolf observes, “…Gallic violence only escaped Roman control in exceptional circumstances” (1998: 33). By the period *Lyons* was likely written (late 2nd century C.E.), at least in the urban centers, Roman power and patronage networks had so taken hold in the region, Woolf concludes that “an individual’s place in the Roman social order was indistinguishable from his or her place in the social order in general,” and the “…cultural boundary between Gaul and Roman was no longer so clear cut” (1998: 78).  

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653 Woolf recounts, “in the course of just one generation, veterans were settled at Narbonne, Arles, Béziers, Orange, Fréjus, probably Nyon, Augst and Lyon, and possibly Valence and Vienne” (1998: 38); cf. Woolf 1998: 43.

654 Noting the uneven process of such conquest, Woolf observes, “the establishment of a Roman order (*pax*) in Gaul was a longer process than Romans liked to admit, and one punctuated by reversals – breakdowns in relations followed by the temporary return of the legions” (1998: 32).

655 Though I will not discuss the phenomena at length here, Woolf further notes that, by this time, new patterns of production and consumption—especially as indicated in the popularity of *terra sigillata* pottery—had taken a firm hold in Gaul; see Woolf (1998: 169–205). MacMullen, similarly, notes the urban Gauls’ transformation with respect to their palate, soon preferring Roman staples in food and drink over their native menu (2000: 123); cf. Woolf (1998: 241–242).
III.B. Roman Patronage Networks in Gaul

Roman influence in Gaul was not simply a matter of unwanted imposition, but significantly appealed to and enfranchised a new aristocracy, which would “take the lead in building Roman Gaul.” Evolving from those relationships initiated as Julius Caesar received scores of Gallic nobles into his fides, and conspicuously attested to in Claudius’ speech before the Senate regarding the admission of Gauls into their ranks, well before Lyons was ever penned, Roman patronage networks had become a significant (and in many ways welcomed) social, economic, and cultural fixture in the Gallic provinces.

III.C. Roman Law and Administration in Gaul

Beyond patronage, by the end of Augustus’ reign, Roman administration was a fixture in the urban centers of Roman Gaul. MacMullen concludes,

…it seems safe to assume that the majority of the civitas-capitals and all but a few of the [urban centers in Gaul] were…governed by elected officials in pairs with titles matching what Augustus might have found in Italy: ordinarily duumviri with aediles, sometimes quattuorviri…(2000: 96).

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656 Woolf: 1998: 47. MacMullen similarly emphasizes the “pull” rather than “push” of Roman power and influence in Gaul—that is, the relationship between “Gauls” and “Romans” was not always (or even often) adversarial. See MacMullen: 2000: 113. Woolf identifies some of these new aristocrats as they represented themselves in Lyons: “At Lyon and in their communities they competed to patronize the new collegia and to build monuments. Acts of euergetism and honorific statues displayed their personal wealth and achievements. We can identify some members of the first generation of Gallo-Roman aristocrats (Woolf: 1998: 40). MacMullen also notes the “Italic” approach to patronage appropriated by Gallic elites (2000: 87, 98).


658 Tacitus Ann. 11.23–24; ILS 212.

659 For more on the Gauls’ willing participation in and benefit from these networks, see Woolf (1998: 68) and MacMullen (2000: 98).
Similarly, MacMullen suspects that *Latinitas* (Latin Right), which conveyed a number of benefits including Roman citizenship for local magistrates, was likely granted to *civitas*-capitals by this time. On this, Woolf observes, “…censuses, taxation and the Roman law that came with Roman citizenship taught new Gauls new ways of behaving” (1998: 40). Thus, though the imposition Roman law and its practice would have scarcely been noticed by the majority of families dispersed across the Gallic countryside, for those living in cities, it represented a marked change.

### III.D. Roman Material Culture in Gaul

Perhaps more noticeable than these administrative adaptations, however, would have been the visual transformation of the urban landscape. By the time *Lyons* is penned, the average person walking the streets of most Gallic cities would have been regularly confronted with Roman-styled architecture, inscriptions, and statuary modeled

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660 Summarizing the implications of *Latinitas* for Gallic capitals, Woolf elaborates, “*Latinitas* was no doubt valued for the prestige it conferred on provincial communities, but it also offered a series of more tangible benefits. Members of Latin communities were bound by their own laws and had their own political institutions, modeled in practice on those of Rome. But one of the most important privileges incorporated in the Latin right was that the magistrates, or more rarely all the town councilors, of Latin communities acquired Roman citizenship. Latin communities thus operated ‘automatically’ to disseminate Roman citizenship among provincial elites. Latins also had the right of *commercium*, the ability to enter into contracts with Roman citizens, a valuable privilege for traders. In this, and in other respects, Latins had access to Roman law, even if Roman law was in practice probably often interpreted in the light of local traditions. Practically and in symbolic terms, then, Latins were privileged among Rome’s subjects” (1998: 67).

661 Regarding the agrarian majority, Woolf suggests, “[f]ew Gauls lived in the cities or even near them, and as a result few can have had much contact with them. Roman cities in Gaul were thus islands of civilization scattered over a world of villages that in its operation, although not in its appearance, strongly resembled the iron age world it had replaced” (1998: 136).

662 Woolf suggests, “[t]he first indication of a new conception of urban space emerges in most cases not with the imposition of a grid, but with the construction of the first civic monuments” (1998: 117).
on Roman archetypes and communicating Roman imperium and mores. Woolf discusses, for example, the importance and prominence of monumental arches, which were “set up in the coloniae and major cities of Narbonensis and neighbouring regions during the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius” (1998: 75). These arches peppering the urban landscape, for example, regularly communicated messages touting the martial prowess of Rome and her leadership and frequently featured noble imperial ancestors. Woolf describes these conspicuous structures as, “[c]elebrations of the pax Romana…decorated in representations of Roman troops and subject barbarians, images of emperors and deities, and symbols of the peace achieved by Roman arms” (1998: 75). More than this, he continues, the arches were “…visual counterparts of the classical school texts through which Gauls learned the new history of civilization” (1998: 75). In short, these proliferated structures were far from simply aesthetic embellishments.

Epigraphy evinces another Roman habit that, according to MacMullen, significantly took hold in Rome and Italy during the latter decades of Augustus’ rule and very quickly spread to Gaul. In contrast to the arches, which were largely erected by

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663 This is to say nothing about Roman coinage, which regularly advertized the virtues of great Roman commanders (and eventually emperors); see MacMullen (2000: 87–88). Regarding the political motivations underlying many of these changes, MacMullen argues, “Augustus built and decorated in the Province; Agrippa built and decorated; no doubt other magnates of Augustan times did so as well. Their intent was not, however, to communicate a message of any sort that could be called ideological. They wanted only to advertise their personal greatness, their maestas” (2000: 113).

664 He footnotes such structures in Narbonne, Vienne, and other cities near the supposed site of our martyrrology; see Woolf (1998: 75 fn. 107).

665 Later, he mentions that “[t]he earliest monuments often celebrated the imperial house” (1998: 121). Along these lines, MacMullen observes, “[a]rches commonly did bear sculpted figures on top. Stone portraits of Augustus’ line were of course political statements.” He further notes: “Their message was simple: that the person or persons signallized was or had done something wonderful, most often martial” (2000: 119).

wealthy, powerful, and eventually almost exclusively imperial leaders, the inscribing classes included individuals from a broad range of the social strata. Moreover, though Gaul affords proportionately less extant inscriptions than other provinces, they abound in its major cities—including Lyons and Vienne. In a recent article, Werner Eck provides a diachronic look at the evolving function of these increasingly popular public advertisements of honor. In the republican era, Eck explains, such inscriptions almost exclusively reviewed a deceased magistrate’s cursus honorum and were in that way adaptations of the laudatio funebris in epigraphic form. In the Augustan age and beyond, these epigraphic formulas began to increasingly appear hand-in-hand with statuary. That is, where these inscriptions occurred, Eck argues, they by-and-large functioned as explanations of statues. He summarizes the impact (both in Rome and beyond) of this conjunction:

The power of the images created by Augustus was complemented and enhanced by that of the words, of the epigraphic formulas. Statues and epigraphic formulas were powerful elements in the Augustan culture, which shaped world history for hundreds of years to come, not only in Rome and its fora, but also in the provinces (2009: 92).

667 Woolf explains, “The inscribing classes included many more than simply the decuriones and seviri Augustales of the cities, but many fewer than the total population and so indicate how Roman power and Roman culture operated well beyond whatever narrow group we might designate as ‘the provincial elite.’…The extend of the epigraphic habit in Gaul demonstrates that cultural change was not confined to a narrow section of society” (1998: 81).

668 Woolf summarizes, “the order in which the towns [with a large number of inscriptions] appear seems to correspond fairly well with their political, military and economic pre-eminence in the early empire, insofar as it can be assessed by other criteria. The ‘top ten’ are, in order of precedence, Narbonne, Nimes, Lyon, Mainz, Trier, Bordeaux, Arles, Cologne, Vienne and Langres, all of them large cities located on one or more major routes, most of them heavily monumentalized, and several of them centres of provincial administration” (1998: 86–87).

669 See Eck (2009: 88).
In short, if Eck is correct, residents of and visitors to Gallic cities like Lyons and Vienne would have regularly encountered scores of storied statuary not unlike those populating the Forum Augustum.670

Beyond inscriptions and statuary, the provinces in Gaul abounded with theaters, amphitheaters, and fora.671 Theaters, in Woolf’s words, “were regarded as an indispensable adjunct of a Roman style city and the entertainments that took place within them were an indispensable part of civic life” (1998: 122). Amphitheaters, though more costly and thus less numerous, figured prominently in the major Gallic cities, including Lyons.672 Stephanie Cobb underscores one of the functions of these structures in a province: “The amphitheater, then, stood as a grand reminder of Rome’s centrality and power, and the funeral-ceremonies-turned-political-events became one way for Rome to impose its will on other cities” (2008: 44). She later notes, “the presence of an amphitheater claimed a Roman identity for the city. The building itself became a symbol of Rome’s far-reaching influence and authority” (2008: 45).673 Though more examples of

670 See chapter 1 for my discussion of this architectural and exemplary complex. MacMullen also notes the Roman style mausolea clustered outside Gallic cities (2000: 110–112). MacMullen discusses, for example, an excavated mausoleum in Glanum (south of Lyon and Vienne), which is modeled on elite Roman mausolea, complete with statuary and elaborate Roman architectural features (2000: 111). Significantly for my study, this provides evidence for the existence of funerary practices in Gaul which resembled those lavish displays of elite death in Rome.

671 On theaters, Woolf notes: “Well over a hundred examples are known from all over Gaul, the vast majority built in the second half of the first century and the first half of the second century AD. Theatres were common in all categories of towns (as at rural sanctuaries) in central and northern Gaul, while in Narbonensis and Aquitaine south of the Garronne they were rare outside of the civitas capitals” (1998: 122).

672 For a review of the locations and significance of these structures in Gaul, see Woolf (1998: 97, 216–217); and MacMullen (2000: 102–104).

673 Cobb also notes the martyrological community’s familiarity with such Roman games: “The authors of the martyrologies did not need to describe beast hunts, gladiatorial fights, executions, or athletic contests because they could rely on their audiences’ experiences in—or, at the very least, aware of—the amphitheater to provide a fuller contextual meaning for their narratives” (2008: 34).
Roman architecture and civic planning in Gaul could be mentioned, both MacMullen and Woolf note Gaul’s increasing transition from hilltop residences (oppida) to communities organized around fora. These broad changes to the civic landscape of first and second century Gaul, again, should not be though of simply as Roman “impositions”; rather, as Woolf suggests,

it may also be that the first generation of truly Gallo-Roman aristocrats embraced the urbanizing project for reasons that were not wholly pragmatic or strategic, but rather because the city was so central to the vision of civilization they had embraced (1998: 125).

Whatever the explanation, the Gallic community(ies) or individual responsible for the *Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons* would have regularly encountered—and no doubt been influenced by—the increasingly Romanized urban landscape.

### III.E. Instilling and Broadcasting Roman Mores

More than the foregoing value-laden material culture several other venues offered, especially Gallic elite, robust exposure to Roman values and exemplary discourse. To begin with, the well-born youth of the new aristocracy in Gaul could anticipate receiving a proper Roman education. Woolf outlines the standard course of study:

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674 For example, Roman baths, fountains, and aqueducts; see Woolf (1998: 122).

675 See MacMullen (2000: 86, 104–107); and Woolf (1998: 124). Commenting on the impact such Roman organization likely had, Woolf suggests, “[c]ivic space, roads, walls, the forum and its monuments might all be made to conform to a perfect order, itself an expression of religious and political ideology” (1998: 116).

676 Indeed, the text itself assumes these standard Roman institutions: “…we were…shut out of our houses, the baths (βαλανίων), and the public square (άγορᾶς)” (*Lyons* 1.5).
education in Gaul, as generally in the West, followed the pattern outlined in the works of Quintilian and the Elder Seneca, beginning with the study of language and proceeding to that of rhetoric...Language was taught through intense reading of the Latin classics, among them Virgil, Cicero and Livy, and the same texts also contributed to the teaching of rhetoric, along with practice speeches on themes drawn partly from Roman history (1998: 73).

Consistent with Roman education in the capital, such curriculum resulted in mental and, more importantly, moral growth: “These exercises exposed students to Roman conceptions of their exemplary past and their glorious future, and to implicit definitions of virtue and civilization, in short they provided a guide to the imperial and humane vocation of the Roman elite” (1998: 73).

Though formal Roman education was almost exclusively reserved for elite youth, in light of the educational emphasis placed on oratory—and the great potential for honor in its effective public performance—the Roman exempla populating elite curriculum would have undoubtedly reached the ears of a far broader audience. In fact, Gaul became known throughout the empire as a source for fine orators, and their exciting narration of the exemplary exploits of the Roman maiores no doubt echoed throughout the ever-emerging Gallic fora.

Another important Roman value which could not have been missed by the urban Gaul was that of pietas towards the divine:

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677 Woolf further observes the social and moral impact of such sustained exposure to the “Roman cultural myths acquired in the course of this education” (1998: 74): “Their education too, would have contributed to their socialization...Learning to be Roman, for this group, meant learning the virtues and mores appropriate to their place in the empire of cities and the empire of friends” (1998: 104).
Bowersock likewise highlights the dissemination of this exemplary ancestral tradition in the provinces: “the spread of the Roman imperium brought with it the glorification of Lucretia and Scaevola in legend and the heroic stories of Stoic philosophers in recent memory” (1995: 73).

678 “The region is occasionally mentioned (like Africa and Spain) as a source of orators, the most famous being Favorinus of Arles, Gallic oratory is alluded to by Juvenal, and all but one of the speakers in Tacitus’ Dialogus de Oratoribus are Gauls, as Tacitus himself may have been” (Woolf 1998: 73).
At the federal sanctuary, in schoolrooms like those in Autun and from the speeches of Roman governors and commanders, Gallic leaders will have acquired an understanding of the Roman conception of a divine mandate for the empire, of Roman success on earth depending on the maintenance of proper relations with the gods (1998: 231).

Again reflecting the “pull” (not “push”) of so much of the spread of Roman culture and mores in the provinces, many changes taking place with respect to worship in Gaul were initiated and instantiated by the new aristocracy—not mandated by Roman magistrates. Furthermore, aligning with the complexity of the appropriation of Roman cultural forms evinced in the Letter of the Churches in Vienne and Lyons (as I demonstrate below), Gallic deities were frequently portrayed according to Roman conventions while retaining native variety. That is, material remains from the region frequently depict Gallic deities presented in traditional Roman fashion. In sum, whether the ancestral honor and generous patronage advertised in ever-multiplying monuments, the martial values performed before packed amphitheaters, the exempla-imbued orations tickling Gallic ears, or the new pietas towards old deities, the urban inhabitants of second century Gaul drank deeply of the mos maiorum.

III.F. Lyons and Vienne

Finally, though my study does not require the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons to have actually been composed by residents from these communities, since the evidence certainly does not preclude such a provenance I will quickly review the likely exposure to Roman culture and political discourse in these communities. Founded

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as a Roman colony in 43 B.C.E. and the jewel of the province of Lugdunensis, Lyons was the fulcrum of a road network leading from Rome and connecting the cities across Aquitania, Lugdunensis, and Narbonensis. With an estimated population of approximately 30,000 and as “the largest Roman administrative establishment north of the Alps,” Lyons was particularly endowed with the urban amenities and cultural exposure noted above.

Less than twenty miles away in the province of Narbonensis, Vienne stood as a Gallic city of note (though less prominent than Lyons). A rare and magnificent wall surrounded the city, which may have had up to 25,000 inhabitants. As a rich site for viticulture and well-connected in terms of trade, Vienne attracted scores of Italian businessmen and likely resembled an Italian municipia. Woolf summarizes well the political and cultural implications of Gallic centers like Lyons and Vienne: “At these privileged points in the new imperial order new habits were most easily learnt and displays of cultural expertise were most effective” (1998: 104). In short, if the author(s)

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681 Further underscoring the Gallic capital’s importance, MacMullen explains, “Lyon, however, serving as the imperial mint-center for the gold of all the west and as the place of meeting of delegates from all the civitates annually, clearly stood out; and it was the starting point, historically, of the Gallic road system, too” (2000: 93). Moss argues for the close connection of Lyons and Rome, noting inscriptions (CIL 13.1942; 13.1945) identifying the military road running from Rome to Lyons. See Moss (2012: 190). On the road system, see also Woolf (1998: 89); cf. MacMullen (2000: 93).

682 Woolf (1998: 103). For his discussion of population, see 1998: 137. MacMullen describes the drastic transformation of the city during the reign of Augustus: “…its streets were drawn on the familiar grid–plan. In connection with Augustus’ presence in 27 B.C. to hold a general census, it was made the point of deposit of all resulting records. It received from the emperor one or both of its early aqueducts, a walled circuit…, a new forum to replace the one laid out by Plancus, a theater, and an amphitheater, or at least the beginnings of one…having been nothing more than the site of a modest Roman encampment, the Gallic capital had burst into full Roman flower in little more than a generation” (2000: 95–96).


of Lyons frequented either city, he (they) would have been significantly exposed to Roman political ideals and exemplary discourse.

**IV. Exemplary Discourse on Leadership in the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons**

Turning to the *Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons*, the remainder of this chapter will explore the way in which the text reflects participation in the Roman discourse of exemplarity as it deploys the martyrs as paragons of Christian leadership. My approach here will be somewhat different from the prior two chapters. Rather than organizing the study around the heuristic model of ideal Roman leadership outlined in chapter two, after initially establishing the role of martyrs as leadership (or generally authoritative) *exempla*, I will analyze the narrative portrayal of several individual martyrs and groups of martyrs as they are introduced in *Lyons*. In my analysis of each episode or series of episodes featuring these specific characters and groups I will take careful inventory of the primary leadership virtues and characteristics showcased or eschewed. Finally, I will devote special attention to the ideal intracommunal behavior of the martyrs narrated in *Lyons* 5.2, before concluding with a brief synthesis of the letter’s general appropriation, adaptation, and redeployment of the form and content characterizing Roman discourse on exemplary leadership.

**IV.A. The Martyrs of Lyons and Vienne as Paragons of Leadership**

To begin with, the readers/hearers of Lyons are left with little doubt that the figures celebrated in the letter were authoritative figures in the communities of Lyons and
Vienne. Describing the general company of the μακάριοι μάρτυρες (Lyons 1.4), the martyrrologist boasts that “...God’s grace...protected the weak, and raised up sturdy pillars (στύλος ἑδραίος) that could by their endurance (διὰ τῆς υπομονῆς) take on themselves all the attacks of the Evil One” (Lyons 1.6). A few lines later, the writer describes both the quality and the former role of the group taken from the Christian community, “the arrests continued, and every day the finest (οἱ ἅξιοι) were taken to fill up the number of the martyrs. The result was that they collected all the most zealous Christians of the two communities and those on whom everything most depended (ἀν μᾶλστα συνειστήκει τὰ ἐνθάδε)” (Lyons 1.13).

Several of the specifically named martyrs seem to be known leaders in the community or highly honored figures in general. The first named martyr, Vettius Epagathus, is described as having reached “…a peak of perfection” (Lyons 1.9). The “blessed” (μακάριος) Pothinus, furthermore, is specifically referenced as being “entrusted with the care of (ἐπισκοπῆς) the province of Lyons” (Lyons 1.29), Attalus is called “famous” (γὰρ ἦν ὁνομαστός, 1.43), and Alexander “was known practically to everyone because of his love of God and his outspokenness in preaching the word” (Lyons 1.49). In light of their imitation of Christ, as we will see, even socially disadvantaged martyrs (like Blandina, for example) are presented in Lyons as leaders and ideal paradigms for individuals of all social stripes in the reading/hearing audience—including those in recognized leadership positions.\(^{685}\) While such examples could be multiplied, the above sample confirms Dehandshutter’s conclusion articulating the “interpretational character

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\(^{685}\) Moss summarizes: “Assimilating the martyr to Christ affected more than the literary imagination; it fundamentally altered the status of the martyrs in the eyes of the audience. It endowed them with Christly authority, authority that could be manipulated by those controlling the memory, legacy, and cults of the saints, but an authority that could never quite be harnessed” (2010: 46).
of the editor’s endeavour: his martyrs are models for the Christian communities” (2005: 10).

**IV.B. The First Depiction of the Martyrs as a Group (Lyons 1.4–8)**

After expressing the letter’s inability to adequately articulate “[t]he intensity of our afflictions here, the deep hatred of the pagans for the saints, and the magnitude of the blessed martyrs’ sufferings (ὅσα ὑπέμειναν οἱ μακάριοι μάρτυρες)” (*Lyons* 1.4), the martyrology opens with a depiction of the conflict as well as the martyrs as a group (*Lyons* 1.4–8). This summary forecasts much of the letter’s moral agenda and rhetorical approach, portraying the martyrs as exemplary leaders in a fierce (and ultimately heavenly) battle and carefully commemorating their exemplary actions and describing the viewing audience(s)—though not yet including the mimetic elements which prevail in the narrative elsewhere.

Here, the chief exemplary action celebrated is the martyrs’ agonistic endurance (ὑπομονή), which serves as the primary weapon deployed against their true cosmic enemies—“the Adversary” (ὁ ἄντικείμενος) and his well-trained (προγυμνάζων) minions.Continuing the account in these martial terms, the passage describes how the protagonists “…charged into battle, holding up under every sort of abuse and torment; indeed, they made light of their great burden as they sped on to Christ” (*Lyons* 1.6). Again, far from submissive suffering or ignoble inaction, the letter underscores: “They heroically endured (γενναίως ὑπέμεινον) all that the people *en masse* heaped on them:

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686 The letter sets the battle scene as follows: “The Adversary swooped down with full force, in this way anticipating his final coming which is sure to come. He went to all lengths to train and prepare his minions against God’s servants (προγυμνάζων κατά τῶν δούλων τοῦ θεοῦ)” (*Lyons* 1.5). As Moss explains, “[t]he martyrs’ bodies become locations for a cosmic battle between Satan and Christ” (2012: 108).
abuse, blows, dragging, despoiling, stoning, imprisonment” (Lyons 1.7). Through their noble endurance, in fact, the martyrs function as “sturdy pillars” (στύλος ἔδραίος) who protect the weak (ἀσθενείας) and so broker God’s grace to the community. Thus, in the throes of violent interrogation, the martyrs function as significant patrons to the Gallic Christians. Finally, their conquering fortitude and valuable patronage culminates with another praiseworthy action—and one that will be multiplied throughout Lyons—namely, their confession.

These actions take place not only before the eyes of the Christian community—especially those “weaker” brethren—but the passage specifically mentions additional audiences comprised of the “enraged mob” (ήγερσαμένως πλήθει; 1.7) and those participating in their tremendously public trial: “They were dragged into the forum (τὴν ἁγοράν) and interrogated before the entire populace by the tribune and the city authorities”( Lyons 1.8). In terms of commemoration, as will of course apply to all of the exempla reviewed below, the martyrlogist quite consciously understands his letter’s function as attempting to memorialize these heroic actions (Lyons 1.4), and in the present passage he crowns the protagonists with the honorific title “blessed” (μακάριοι). Finally, though this introduction lacks clear mimetic injunctions or behaviors (imitation), the latter will permeate the rest of the letter.

In sum, already in this first passage, we can identify several narrative features of the Roman discourse of exemplarity as well as a general martial hue; a hue which would have been quite culturally intelligible to inhabitants of the major cities of Roman Gaul.

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687 Lyons 1.6.

688 “When they confessed (ὁµολογήσαντες), they were locked up in prison to await the arrival of the governor” (Lyons 1.8).
With all of these very “Roman” aspects, however, two characteristics betray a more culturally specific “Christian” influence in the passage. First of all, as will be the case throughout Lyons, the passage ascribes a major role to the figure of Christ. Secondly, and again ubiquitous in the letter, the entire account is framed as an apocalyptic battle between the devil and God.

**IV.C. Vettius Epagathus (Lyons 1.9–10)**

Following this introduction, the author recounts in detail the first individual martyr, Vettius Epagathus. Though we soon discover that he was a “distinguished person” (ἡ ἐπίσημος) in the broader Roman Gallic community, and thus presumably from a prominent family, he is exclusively identified according to his “Christian” kinship as “one out of the brethren” (τῶν ἀδελφῶν). Clearly showcasing him as an exemplary leader in this fictive kin group, the text describes his lifestyle (ἡ πολιτεία) as having “reached...a peak of perfection” (Lyons 1.9). The chief attribute distinguishing this perfect lifestyle, moreover, is his “love (ἀγάπης) of God and of his neighbour”, proven in his blameless walk according to the commandments and precepts (ταῖς ἐντολαῖς καὶ δικαιώμασι) of the Lord, “untiring” service to his neighbor (ἡ πρός τὸν πλησίον λειτουργία), and great devotion to God (ἡλιον θεοῦ πολίν).

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689 Lyons 1.6.

690 Lyons 1.10.

691 Lyons 1.9. Here, Musurillo simply translates the introduction as “one of our number”, unfortunately missing the kinship nuance (1972: 65).

692 Regarding such exemplary deployment, Dehandschutter observes: “The passage about Vettius...summarises the main issues of the author...he shows a perfect Christian ‘life-style’” (2005: 17).

693 Lyons 1.9.
The culminating action showcasing this “love” is Vettius’ noble death: “he demonstrated…the fullness of his love (ἀγάπη πετειάς), consenting as he did to lay down his life in defense of his fellow Christians (ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν).” Describing his secondary action, the author describes his desired (and patronal) political and legal advocacy on behalf of the Christian community: “he could not endure the unreasonable (ἀλόγως) judgment that was passed against us and he became highly indignant; indeed, he requested a hearing in order to speak in defense (ἀπολογούμενος) of the Christians (ἀδελφῶν).” Finally, instead of this rhetorical contest, the prefect pushes Vettius to perform a different—and in the context of our letter a far more important—feat, namely, his confession:

The prefect dismissed the just request that he had put forward and merely asked him if he too were a Christian (εἶχε Χριστιανός). When he admitted he was in the clearest tones (λαμπροφόρη φωνῇ ὁμολογήσαντος), he too was accepted into the ranks of the martyrs (Lyons 1.10).

Fitting Roller’s schema well, Lyons carefully includes two main judging audiences: 1) the Christian community and 2) the cruel Roman prefect influenced by the increasingly irrational mob. The latter mainly function as a foil for Vettius’ composure.

Lyons 1.10.

Lyons 1.9. The primary aim of his defense was to defend the exemplary piety of the Christians: “he requested a hearing in order to speak in defense of the Christians, to the effect that they were innocent of atheism or impiety (ὅτι μηδὲν ἄθεων μηδὲ ἄσκοβος).”

Judith Lieu expands on both the importance and multiplication of audience participation in these accounts: “There are in fact multiple audiences for the martyr’s confession: first, within the narrative world, the governor and the mob who watch without perception…they often become caricatures, the governor generalized as ὁ ἄρχων, but labeled ‘accursed’ or ‘wicked’, the crowd engaging in unbridled violence, hostile and yet also moved to wonder. Next are those who tell the story, who have privileged access…and yet also, as those who watch with impunity, free from the harassment which befalls other bystanders such as Alexander and Vettius Epagathos; seeing and yet not seen, omniscient and yet implicated. Then, outside that narrative world, the recipients of the letter, the church at Philomelium, or the brethren in Asia and Phrygia – believers, for these accounts are clearly not meant for an outside audience. They watch those who watch, provided by the text with the key to the true meaning of what lies before them; although ostensibly they are invited to affirm or to deny, to choose the latter would be to choose meaninglessness. Then, beyond them other readers, for these texts are self-consciously catholic…For those in the outermost circle
and pious virtue, while the “brethren” celebrate his loving service on behalf of the community. Furthermore, within the narrative Vettius is *commemorated*, being “called the Christians’ advocate” (παράκλητος Χριστιανῶν), and the text eulogizes him as a “true disciple of Christ” (γνήσιος Χριστοῦ μαθητής) who “was accepted into the ranks of the martyrs (εἰς τὸν κλήρον τῶν μαρτύρων).”

The passage, furthermore frames Vettius’ loving activities as forms of ancestral imitation. First, young Vettius’ behavior is twice described as following in the footsteps of “the old man Zachary,” and inspired by the “Spirit that filled Zachary, which he demonstrated by the fullness of his love (αὐγάπης), consenting as he did to lay down his life in defense of his fellow Christians (ἀδελφῶν)” (*Lyons* 1.10). Secondly, as we will see frequently in *Lyons*, Vettius’ exemplary behavior emulates that of Christ: “He was and is a true disciple of Christ, following the Lamb wherever he goes.” As Moss rightly observes, “[t]he idea of discipleship is more nuanced than merely imitating what Jesus did;…Vettius imitates the ethic of love that underlies the act of laying down one’s life” (2010: 50).

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697 *Lyons* 1.10.

698 *Lyons* 1.10.

699 “Young though he was, his life had reached such a peak of perfection that the same could be said of him as was said of the old man Zachary” (*Lyons* 1.9).

700 Moss understands this “Zachary” (Zacharias) as a reference the father of John the Baptist (2012: 111). Dehandshchutter, paints a slightly more complicated picture: “The comparison with Zacharias is possible due to a confusion of traditions about two persons, the one being the Old Testament prophet about whom traditions of his ‘martyr’ death existed, the other Zacharias, the father of John the Baptist, about whom also a violent death is narrated” (2005: 17 fn. 47). For my purposes, it only matters that whoever the referent, Vettius’ leadership is understood as ancestral imitation.

701 *Lyons* 1.10.
To review, through the exemplum of Vettius, deployed in a rhetorically specific “Roman” manner, the martyrologist seeks to advertise a distinctive “native” Christian tradition of leadership. In this episode, while Vettius’ endurance is not paraded, his exclusively “Christian” identity—and thus refusal of the privileges of high birth—as well as his loving “Christ-following” advocacy for his true kin prevail. To be sure, Vettius’ love, in so far as it is manifested in his leveraging his notable social position in Gaul to provide a verbal defense on behalf of the brethren, shares traditional Roman expectations with respect to a leader’s eloquence as well as patronage. In short, while the author (or authorial community) behind Lyons no doubt intended to portray the episode as a stark contrast between Roman mores and Christian leadership, the letter itself—with its complex narratological, political, and moral interactions—ironically reflects the multifaceted interplay between the cultural spheres.

IV.D. Two General Groups: Martyrs vs. the Stillborn, (Lyons 1.11–13)

Before introducing another batch of named protagonists, the letter again includes a general description of the martyrs, this time contrasting them with a weaker population of incarcerated individuals (Lyons 1.11–13). Though I will not treat every synopsis and transition in Lyons in my study, this description of the two groups is fairly representative of many such summary passages. Like the opening report (Lyons 1.4–8), here the letter celebrates its distinctive “Christian” ethos by liberally appropriating characteristically Roman discursive tools and mores.

The first group commemorated as ἐτοιμοὶ, οἱ ἁξιοὶ, and πρωτομάρτυρες, earn these titular prizes by first and foremost “…making a full confession of their faith with the greatest

702 See, for example, Lyons 1.32–33; 36; and 1.45–48.
enthusiasm (προθυμίας ἀνεπλήρουν τὴν ὀμολογίαν τῆς μαρτυρίας)" (Lyons 1.11). The second group functions as both a foil for the first and a general negative *exemplum* of those “…shown to be still untrained (οἱ ἄνετομοι), unprepared (ἀγήμναστοι), and weak (ἀσθενεῖς); unable to bear the strain of a great conflict.” Rightly noticing the masculine and martial flavor of this archetypical contrast, Stephanie Cobb notes “…as opposed to the manly martyrs (ἀνδρεία), these Christians are described as unmanly (ἄνανδρος) or cowardly (δειλός)” (2008: 87). In this passage, the ignoble *action* of these “stillborn” is performed before a primarily Christian audience, which consequently suffers “great grief and measureless distress” (Lyons 1.11). Beyond emotional pain, the denial of the “weak” encourages deleterious *imitation*, “blunting, indeed, the eagerness of those who had not yet been arrested” (Lyons 1.11). In short, further underscored by such contrast, in Lyons 1.11–13 (and replicated through the letter) the martyrs are proudly paraded as epitomes of courage and agonistic preparedness.

Following this snapshot, the letter continues by indicating the martyrs’ renewed ordeal and reminding the readers of the overarching cosmic conflict: “from then on the blessed martyrs (οἱ ἄγιοι μάρτυρες) underwent (ὑπέμενον) torments beyond all description; and Satan strove to have some word of blasphemy escape their lips” (Lyons 1.16). In the next line, the martyrrologist lists four key protagonists—Blandina, Sanctus, Maturus, and Attalus—introducing them, for the most part, according to their

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703 Lyons 1.11. Later, these weak deniers visually wear their shame as Lyons describes them as “dejected, downcast, ill-favored, and devoid of all comeliness” (Lyons 1.35). Naturally, their ignoble, ugly deportment is contrasted with the beautiful appearance of the confessing community. For the full contrast, see Lyons 1.32–35.

704 This negative emulation is counterbalanced with the positive confession of many previously “stillborn” brethren when the latter finally follow the positive *exempla* of the courageous martyrs. See Lyons 1.45–46.

705 This image is further enhanced as, in the following passage, the martyrrologist describes the arrest of “some of our servants who were pagans (ἐθνικοὶ)” who are both “ensnared by Satan” and “terrified (φοβηθέντες) of the torturers” and thus falsely accuse the Christians. See Lyons 1.14–15.
traditionally formulated social identities. During the course of the narrative these former identities are, of course, subordinated to (or obliterated by) the courageous confession, “I am a Christian (Χριστιανός/Χριστιανή εἰμι)”.

While Lyons generally breaks these heroes’ individual exemplary accounts into two or more segments and distributes them throughout the letter, each martyr’s respective pedagogical function and moral flavor tends to remain more or less consistent throughout the account. In light of this thematic stability and for the sake of clarity, where I treat individual martyrs, I will consider their confession, suffering, and noble death as a whole rather than dealing with each narrative segment as they appear in the, at times very complex, sequence of the letter. Due to the thematic similarities in many (most) of these accounts, I will only provide an extended analysis of Blandina and Sanctus, though I will include my relevant findings for each named martyr in this chapter’s concluding synthesis.

IV.E. Blandina (Lyons 1.18–19, 37, 41–42, 53–56)

As I will review, the presentation of Blandian’s torture and confession (Lyons 1.18–19), her first encounter with the beasts (Lyons 1.41–42), and her eventual death ad bestias (Lyons 1.53–56) above all celebrates her superlative love (ἀγάπη) for God demonstrated in acts of victorious agonistic endurance (ὑπομονή). Consistent with the other episodes in Lyons, moreover,

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706 For example, the letter introduces “…the deacon Sanctus of Vienne”, “Attalus whose family came from Pergamum” and—though as we will see the narrative quickly reverses these expectations—Blandina the sort of individual who “men think cheap, ugly, and contemptuous” (Lyons 1.17).

707 Where significant, of course, I will note the setting of each segment within the structure of the extant letter.
the heroine’s narrative portrayal manifests the letter’s thorough appropriation of the schematic forms of Roman exemplary discourse.

From the martyr’s first mention, the letter makes no mistake with respect to both Blandina’s defining disposition as well as the virtue compelling her brave actions, namely, “her love (ἀγάπη) for him [God] which was not merely vaunted in appearance but demonstrated in achievement (ἐν δυνάμει δεικνυμένης)” (Lyons 1.17). The interrupted sequence of three episodes that follows, furthermore, proves the power of this love to both deconstruct her prior low social position as “cheap, ugly, and contemptuous” and instead to present her as “worthy of glory before God” (Lyons 1.17). The primary, and ever interconnected, noble actions celebrated in her story include her gladiatorial endurance (1.18, 53–56), Christian confession (1.19), and her Christ-like encouragement of the other martyrs (1.41, 55).

Blandina’s noble endurance, furthermore, is showcased before a number of carefully described audiences. In the first scene (Lyons 1.18–19), Blandina performs bravely before both the “terrified” (δειδότων) Christian community, including her “earthly mistress” (της οἰκίας δεσποίνης αὐτῆς), and the torturers.708 While her mistress is “in agony lest because of her bodily weakness (διὰ τό ἀσθενεῖς τοῦ σώματος) she would not be able to make a bold confession of her faith” (1.18), Blandina upsets all social expectations, and as a female slave, is “filled with such power (δυνάμεως) that even those who were taking turns to torture her in every way from dawn to dusk were weary and exhausted.”709 The latter audience, moreover, outlasted by this “noble athlete”

708 Additionally, God functions as a viewing audience, awarding both the miraculous insensitivity to pain in 1.19 as well as the “glory” described in 1.17.

709 Lyons 1.18.
(γενναῖος ἅθλητής), find themselves confessing (ὁμολογοῦντας) that they had been beaten. Further detailing this audience response (and thus guiding secondary audiences to respond similarly), the martyrrologist recounts, “they were surprised (θαυμάζειν) that she was still breathing, for her entire body was broken and torn”, and they themselves “testify” (μαρτυρεῖν) that “even one kind of torture was enough to release her soul, let alone the many they applied with such intensity” (Lyons 1.18). Here, Blandina’s remarkable endurance culminating in her confession, “I am a Christian” (Χριστιανὴ εἶμι), moreover, is commemorated both with the textually ascribed title “blessed” (μακαρία), as well as, her miraculous “refreshment, rest, and insensibility to her present pain.”

In her second episode, Blandina is brought out (again with the three aforementioned martyrs) “…to be exposed to the beasts and to give a public spectacle of the pagans’ (ἐθνῶν) inhumanity, for a day of gladiatorial games (θηριομαχών) was expressly arranged for our sake.”

In this supremely agonistic context, Blandina’s two featured actions include 1) her conscious prayer and encouragement of those suffering and, connected with this, 2) her role in the cosmic conquest of the “Adversary” (ἀντικείμενον). These feats, performed primarily before the judging audiences of both God and the those suffering (τοῖς ἀγωνιζόμενοις), receive a divine form of commemoration whereby God himself

710 Lyons 1.19. Of course, the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons, as is true with every episode I survey, continues to function as a form of commemoration.

711 Lyons 1.37. Cobb rightly notes the depiction of the willing martyrs here as auctorati—volunteer gladiators who “revealed their bravery was by taking an oath, the sacramentum gladiatorium, to die the good death” (2008: 54). Despite the perceived social inferiority of gladiators in elite Roman culture, Cobb adds, “…they were also heralded as the embodiment of Roman strength and virtue, characteristics traditionally accorded the greatest of men and military heroes” (2008: 51).

712 Lyons 1.41.
monumentalizes Blandina’s actions with “…the crown of immortality (τὸν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας στεφαμένη στέφανον).”⁷¹³ Through her cruciform encouragement (surveyed below), in fact, Blandina’s audience is reminded of the glorious celebration awaiting their successful endurance: “…all who suffer for Christ’s glory will have eternal fellowship in the living God.”⁷¹⁴

In this narrative segment, moreover, *imitation* is given pride of place. Not only does Blandina’s unswerving endurance and timely encouragement effect the emulation of the primary Christian audience,⁷¹⁵ but her own behavior takes place in conscious imitation of Christ. For example, while exposed on a post before the beasts,

[s]he seemed to hang there in the form of a cross, and by her fervent prayer she aroused intense enthusiasm in those who were undergoing their ordeal, for in their torment with their physical eyes they saw in the person of their sister him who was crucified for them (Lyons 1.41).

In the next verse, the potency of her example—as well as its agonistic nature—is further explained: “…tiny, weak, and insignificant as she was she would give inspiration to her brothers, for she had put on Christ, that mighty and invincible athlete (μέγαν καὶ ἀκαταγώνιστον ἀθλητήν Χριστοῦ).”⁷¹⁶ Thus, Blandina’s own example is founded on and

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⁷¹³ *Lyons* 1.42. Again, *Lyons* itself represents an act of commemoration.

⁷¹⁴ *Lyons* 1.41.

⁷¹⁵ “She aroused intense enthusiasm in those who were undergoing their ordeal (τοῖς ἐγὼν ὑμὸν ἀσημένοις)” (Lyons 1.41). Additionally, imitating the noble examples of Blandina and the other martyrs, in the intervening period as the governor is awaiting word from the Emperor with respect to confessing Roman citizens, “…those who had denied the faith…were conceived and quickened again in the womb and learned to confess Christ” (Lyons 1.45–46).

⁷¹⁶ *Lyons* 1.42. This athletic terminology, moreover, fits the context of the Roman arena well. In light of Louis Robert’s study of gladiatorial epitaphs written in Greek (1940: 22–23), David Potter points out “…how pubic combatants appropriated the language connected with Greek athletics in their self-presentation. This sort of self-presentation may have influenced Christian appropriation of the same language to describe martyrdom—another activity explicitly connected with the amphitheater” (1999b: 323).
strengthened by the archetypical leader (and in this context, gladiator) himself, namely, Christ. Later in the letter we discover more of the mimetic implications connected with Blandina’s (among other martyrs’) Christological reproduction. In Lyons 1.45–46, for example, we are told that, imitating the noble examples of Blandina and the other martyrs, “…those who had denied the faith…were conceived and quickened again in the womb and learned to confess Christ.”

In the third episode, set on the “last day of the gladiatorial games (τῶν μονομαχών)”, Blandina is paired with Ponticus, a fifteen-year-old boy. In this scene, Blandina’s exemplary leadership manifests in her own exquisite endurance as well as her maternal encouragement to the youth (Lyons 1.53–56). Regarding endurance, her first feat is shared with Ponticus as both martyrs remain courageously resolute though daily forced to watch the torture of others. Because they, in this way, “persevered and contemned (ἐξουθενεῖν) their persecutors,” the crowd (τῷ πλῆθος) “grew angry with them” (Lyons 1.53), and consequently subjected the pair to “…every atrocity and…every torture, but to no avail.”718 The final mention of Blandina’s brave endurance celebrates, after duplicating in her own body all her children’s sufferings, she hastened to rejoin them, rejoicing and glorying in her death as though she had been invited to a bridal banquet instead of being a victim of the beasts. After the scourges, the animals, and the hot griddle, she was at last tossed into a net and exposed to a bull (Lyons 1.55).

717 Candida Moss further emphasizes the drastic nature of Blandina’s mimesis: “The transformative quality of her imitation of the crucifixion is so strong that the martyr herself vanishes; her identity is transformed into and is subsumed by that of Christ” (2010: 62).

718 Lyons 1.54.
In terms of audience reactions, in addition to Ponticus’ mimetic response (reviewed below), the hostile spectators, amazed at her endurance, are forced to “confess (ἀμολογούντων) that no woman had ever suffered so much in their experience.”

Similar to Lyons 1.19, Blandina’s bravery and Christological mimesis is divinely commemorated as, “[a]fter being tossed a good deal by the animal, she no longer perceived what was happening” (Lyons 1.56). Additionally, Lyons eulogistically reinterprets her death as a sacrifice. Finally, at least two levels of imitation are in play with respect to her endurance: Blandina’s ordeal is, again, depicted as taking place under the influence of—and in intimacy with—Christ, and young Ponticus emulates her exemplary endurance, facing a fatal round of tortures.

Turning to Blandina’s second featured action, her support for Ponticus, the youth is so encouraged (παρωρμημένος) by “his sister in Christ”, that the even the hostile audience (τὰ ἔθον) reacts as they “realized that she was urging him on (προτερομένη) and strengthening him (στηρίζονα άυτόν)” (Lyons 1.54). Partly as a result of her inspiration, furthermore, the youth, “after nobly enduring (γενναίως ὑπομείνας) every torment, gave up his spirit.” The primary commemorative elements of the narrative can

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719 See Lyons 1.56. Again, like the scores of exempla analyzed by Roller, here the record of the observation and evaluation of the primary audience is a fundamental narrative ingredient.

720 “Thus she too was offered in sacrifice (ετύθη)” (Lyons 1.56). As Castelli notes, such ritual language additionally signals the martyrological mimesis of Christ’s death: “In the Christian view, sacrifice had been definitively brought to an end by the death of Jesus; continued sacrifice after this history-shattering event could only signal idolatry and demon worship…Christians simultaneously appropriated the language of sacrifice to describe their experience of persecution at the hands of the Romans, seeing their own deaths as parallel imitations of the death of Jesus” (2004: 51).

721 Lyons 1.56.

722 Lyons 1.54.

723 Lyons 1.54.
be seen in 1) Blandina’s titles, “blessed” (μακαρία) and “noble mother” (μητέρα εὐγενής), and 2) her action being described as sending her children “before her in triumph (μυκηφόρους) to the King” (Lyons 1.55).724

Finally, the formulaic depiction of Blandina as a “noble mother” encouraging her children to endure understands her actions in light of (perhaps in imitation of) the Maccabean mother with her sons.725 Moss, strongly underlining this point, argues that in all three episodes the “…characterization of Blandina is a tapestry of biblical reenactments: she is the Maccabean mother encouraging her children, the biblical Daniel turned courageous Thecla whom animals do not dare approach…and an imitator of Christ” (2012: 113). As the three foregoing episodes illustrate, in terms of emplotment, Blandina’s leadership in the context of suffering beautifully reflects the characteristically Roman “cyclical dimension [of] exemplary discourse: deeds generate other deeds, spawning ever more audiences and monuments, in an endless loop of social reproduction” (2004: 6).

Since the remaining depictions of individual martyrs showcase very similar, often identical, virtues and are deployed according to the same formal narrative patterns

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724 Highlighting the specifically martial context for Blandina’s triumph, Moss comments: “Throughout the narrative, the deaths of the martyrs are interpreted as both exemplary and inspirational and as victories over Satan…[t]he death of Blandina, in particular, serves a dual function as example and triumph” (2010: 91–92). While not overlooking the additional athletic flavoring in the martyrology (2006: 74), Middleton likewise suggests that martyrs’ ultimate role was ultimately cosmic military triumph: “I will argue that Christians believed they were participants in an apocalyptic ‘holy war’ between God and Satan. However, not only did they believe themselves to be participants in this war, they actually saw their deaths as contributing to the final outcome. Martyrs were, in effect, Gods foot soldiers on the front line of cosmic conflict; death through martyrdom was their most potent weapon in bringing about victory in that war” (2006: 6).

725 See 2 Macc. 7. Moss observes, for example, “…Blandina is styled as the Maccabean mother, a ‘noble mother’ who encourages and dispatches her spiritual ‘children’ to God before finally being executed herself” (2012: 112). Further confirming this allusion, Cobb notes: “The connection between the Maccabean mother and Blandina is made stronger by the use of the plural noun, ‘children,’ in the Letter...” (1.53); cf. Musurillo (1972: 79 fn. 27).
(methodically making note of actions, audiences, commemoration, and imitation), I will only explore in detail one last individual martyr, namely, Sanctus. Following this I will turn to Lyons 2.1–8—an episode in which, I will argue, the martyrs exemplify a set of more specifically intracommunal leadership virtues.

**IV.F. Sanctus (Lyons 1.20–24, 38–40)**

Introduced as “the deacon Sanctus of Vienne”, this martyr’s story is mainly told in two episodes (Lyons 1.20–24 and 1.38–40). Like the *exempla* surveyed above, Lyons frames his protracted martyrdom as both an act of agonistic endurance and participation in victorious cosmic conquest. Following Blandina’s first exposure, we are told, “Sanctus, too, withstood (γενναίως ὑπομένων) all the indignities that men heaped on him with extraordinary, superhuman strength (ὑπὲρ πάντα ἀνθρωπόν)” (Lyons 1.20). A few lines later, the military power of this endurance is showcased. Summing up Sanctus and the other martyrs’ collective martial accomplishment, the author boasts: “The tyrant’s instruments of torture had been utterly overcome by Christ through the perseverance of the saints (διὰ τῆς τῶν μακαρίων ὑπομονῆς); and so the Devil turned his mind to other devices” (Lyons 1.27). Finally, keeping with the theme of conquest through endurance, when Sanctus is tortured with Maturus, they suffer “…as though they had never experienced it at all before—or rather as though they had defeated their opponent in many contests and were now fighting for the victor’s crown” (Lyons 1.38). Without

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726 Lyons 1.17.  
727 Moss comments, “Sanctus appears to feel no pain: he is ‘unyielding,’ ‘unbending,’ and ‘firm in his confession.’ He is a model of Roman masculinity” (2012: 109).  
728 Lyons 1.27.
question, in Cobb’s words, “[a]s gladiators and athletes, the martyrs were not passive victims of Roman power but active participants in a fight for honor” (2008: 33).

In a speech act closely connected to this virile endurance, and again mirroring the *exempla* throughout *Lyons*, Sanctus not only bravely withstands the most despicable torments, but contrary to the traditional Roman preoccupation bloodline he actively eschews any source of ascribed honor outside of his Christian identity:

...he would not even tell them his own name, his race (ἐθνος), or the city he was from, whether he was a slave or freedman. To all of their questions he answered in Latin: ‘I am a Christian’ (Χριστιανός εἰμι)! He kept repeating this again and again instead of giving his name, birthplace, nationality, or anything else (*Lyons* 1.20).

Holding to his confession—and thus rejection of bloodline—through a series of torments, Sanctus further provokes the increasingly enraged mob. Despite their “desire to break down the martyrs’ resistance (ὑπομονή)”, however, all they would hear from Sanctus “was what he had repeated from the beginning, his confession of faith” (*Lyons* 1.39).729

Unsurprisingly, given the portraits in *Lyons* reviewed above, these noble actions are all performed before deliberately described judging *audiences*. The three most explicit spectator groups include 1) the hostile mob and torturers, 2) the Christian community, and 3) Christ himself. With respect to the first group, the enemies respond to Sanctus with alternating frustration and amazement. Each of his victories and declarations “aroused the obstinacy (φιλονεκία) of the governor and the torturers (ἡγεμόνος καὶ τῶν βασανιστῶν)”, leading them to seek alternate methods to conquer the

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729 Noting the agonistic flavor of both featured actions (endurance and statement of identity), Brent Shaw concludes: “The purpose of the torture was defeated not only by the corporeal action of the body, but also in verbal enunciation. Sanctus would pronounce none of the identifications of self required by the authorities—no words escaped his lips other than “I am a Christian” (1996: 308).
warrior. More than this, they react to his endurance and miraculous healing with “complete amazement” (παρὰ πᾶσαν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων). Most explicitly highlighting both the public and martial nature of their contest, the second account insists that Sanctus and Marcus were “…being made all the day long a spectacle to the world to replace the varied entertainment of the gladiatorial combat (τοῖς μονομαχίοις)” (Lyons 1.40).

Within the narrative, Sanctus suffers before the eyes of those remaining (τῶν λοιπῶν)—in this context clearly a reference to the Christian community. The satanically inspired tormentors also operate in recognition of this vulnerable audience. As the letter describes, the opponents “…thought…that if [Sanctus] died under the torture this would terrify the others (τοῖς λοιποῖς)” (Lyons 1.24). Finally, the account is littered with references to Christ’s presence during—and even participation in—Sanctus’ suffering.

Both featured actions are commemorated in the letter itself as well as within the narrative. With respect to the latter, while being burnt with the hot plates, Sanctus’ suffering is ameliorated because he remains “firm in his confession of faith (τὴν ὀμολογίαν)”; this comfort, moreover, is awarded by Christ himself via “…the heavenly fountain of the water of life that flows from the side of Christ” (Lyons 1.22). Sanctus’ second bout with the torturers, in fact, served to miraculously heal his “swollen and inflamed” body. The martyrlogist explains: “Indeed, the second trial by the grace of

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730 See Lyons 1.20–21. Other descriptions of the increasingly maddening mob (μανόμενος ὁ δῆμος), see Lyons 1.38.

731 Lyons 1.24.

732 Lyons 1.23.

733 I will deal with most of these instances as I treat commemoration and imitation below.
Christ proved to be not a torture but rather a cure” (*Lyons* 1.24).734 Beyond these miraculous prizes, Sanctus’ noble endurance—and Christ’s suffering in him—is said to have “achieved great glory (δόξα), overwhelming the Adversary.”735 Beyond this martial honor, like Blandina, Sanctus and his partner’s death are not understood as the shameful execution of noxii, but as sacrifices to God.736 In short, the secondary audiences created by *Lyons* clearly understand the glories connected with boldly facing one’s external opponents and exclusively maintaining a Christian identity. Likewise, the readers/hearers are not in doubt with respect to the honor and authority-imparting nature of such endurance.

Finally, Sanctus’ exemplary suffering both occurs in imitation of Christ and provides a model for others. Both of these mimetic components are featured in a single passage. In spite of the fact that “…his body bore witness (μάρτυς ἡν) to his sufferings, being all one bruise and one wound,” *Lyons* explains that such suffering took place in imitation of (even possession by) Christ: “but Christ suffering in him achieved great glory, overwhelming the Adversary” (*Lyons* 1.23). This Christ-inspired suffering, the same verse explains, efficaciously provides an example (ὑποτευπῶσον ὑποδεικνύμων) “to all the others (τῶν λοιπῶν) that nothing is to be feared where the Father’s love is, nothing

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734 Such commemoration does more than simply promise honor to the audience; Moss rightly adds: “Within the context of audience reception, the narrative eradication of pain serves both consolatory and exhortatory purposes…The presentation of pain as healing reassures those who otherwise would be inclined to avoid suffering for Christ that suffering can be painless…bodily suffering is rendered impotent by Chirstly analgesic and the administration of pain solidifies the martyr’s body” (2012: 109). Later, Moss comments on the geographically exclusive nature of *Lyons*’ emphasis on such Christ-mediated healings: “The prominent role played by love as analgesic and reciprocal relationship between Christ and the martyrs is a distinctive feature of these Gallic texts” (2012: 121).

735 *Lyons* 1.23.

736 *Lyons* 1.40.
painful where we find Christ’s glory” (*Lyons* 1.23). Lastly, though already mentioned in the case of Blandina, the mass of confessions taking place in *Lyons* 1.45–46 is depicted as being prompted by the martyrs’ (including Sanctus’) courageous examples. In short, Sanctus’ bold confession of absolute identity and his courageous Christ-following endurance were themselves to be followed.

**IV.G. Lyons 2.1–8**

In the second chapter of his fifth book, Eusebius promises to present, “some other passages from the same document, in which the gentleness (ἐπιευκές) and love (φιλάνθρωπον) of these martyrs is described” (*Lyons* 2.1). Whereas the first chapter of *Lyons* primarily features the martyrs’ Christ-emulating heroic endurance, courage, and confession, this second chapter describes the martyrs’ Christ-emulating behavior when in the Christian community and highlights—above all—their humility and love. But what accounts for this shift in moral emphasis?

In her study of gender and identity in the martyr acts, Stephanie Cobb identifies and attempts to sort out a similar distinction between the martyrs’ behavior when facing external threats and the martyrs’ moral disposition when among the Christian community. Cobb observes that several of the female martyrs are not only portrayed as paragons of masculine virtue in the *acta*, but that these same women also are, in specific situations, showcased as bastions of feminine virtue. *Cobb’s solution to their paradoxical*

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737 Moss elaborates on Sanctus’ being called a “pattern” (ὑποτύπωσις): “The same term is used in 1 Tim. 1:16 and 2 Tim. 1:13. Here pseudo-Paul uses the term of the person and words of the apostle, which are a pattern for those seeking eternal life. In this instance, however, the virtues that serves as the ὑποτύπωσις are patience, faith, and love” (2010: 249 fn. 88).

“masculinization” and “feminization” posits a situation-specific morality: “while Christian women were expected to display masculinity in the face of external opposition, they were to maintain traditional women’s virtues within the Christian community” (2008: 15). Thus, Cobb argues, since modeling proper “action-in-crisis” was not the only didactic function of these narratives (2008: 93), the martyrologists simultaneously portray the women’s exemplary—and thus traditionally feminine—deportment among the Christian community.

Her observation of context-specific modeling in the martyr acts sheds light on my study. If chapter one of Lyons portrays the moral exemplarity of the martyrs in the face of external threats, chapter two seems to showcase the martyrs as exempla of leadership within the Christian community. Thus, in the latter section we learn how, according to the martyrrologist, one should use his or her authority and influence among the brothers and sisters in Christ. While the moral focus is different, as we will see, the exemplary framework remains consistent—noting actions, audiences, commemoration, and imitation. I will review the latter elements as they relate to the protagonists’ exemplary “humility” and “love” in turn.739

IV.G.1. Humility

The section begins by showcasing the humility-inspired actions of the martyrs. To amplify their humility, the letter first recounts the martyrs’ recently proven valor as well

739 Löhrr comments on the letter’s praise of both the martyrs’ endurance in hostile situations and their humility and love among the brethren: “Gegenstand des Lobes ist zunächst ihre Standhaftigkeit auf der Folter und in der Arena, ihre Demut und Gottessfurcht, mit der sie Christus nachreißen, ihre Barmherzigkeit und Vergebungsbereitschaft gegenüber allen Menschen, besonders aber Folterknechten und Mitbrüdern...und darüberhinaus ihr erfolgreicher Kampf im Bitten zu Gott für die gefallenen Brüder, die sie wieder zu Bekenntnis und Martyrium brachten. Das ist auch der Kern ihres heilschaffenden Friedenswerkes, und so schließt der Brief in nahezu hymnischem Tonfall” (1989: 139).
as other honor-imparting qualities. In the first instance, we are reminded of the martyrs’ glorious endurance and confession, “having won such glory (δόξη) and having borne witness not merely once or twice but many times” (Lyons 2.2). In a second catalogue of virtues and accomplishments, the author reminds us that the martyrs had manifested the power of martyrdom in deed (δύναμιν τῆς μαρτυρίας ἔργῳ ἐπεδέκκαμεντο), speaking to the pagans with great openness (παρρησίαν), and showing forth their nobility (εὐγένειαν) by their perseverance (ὑπομονή), fearlessness (ἀφοβίας) and courage (ἀτρομίας). The items applauded in this list are, of course, not arbitrary, but mirror several of the virtues ubiquitously celebrated by Roman leaders throughout the empire (especially, proven courage, rhetorical ability, and high birth). In short, with these summaries, the letter is careful to bolster the protagonists’ honorable standing—a standing that, in Roman contexts throughout Gaul, would regularly, and eagerly, have been carefully protected and ambitiously advertised.

Rather than enjoying the honorific rewards of this cultural capital, once reunited with the brethren, “having won such glory” and “covered with burns, bruises, and wounds” (marks which, in light of the martial flavor of the letter, should be understood as praiseworthy badges), the martyrs did not exploit the rewards of this cultural capital; instead, they refuse the honor of the ascription “martyr,” for it was their joy to yield the title of martyr to Christ alone, who was the true and faithful witness…they would recall the martyrs that had already passed away saying: ‘They were indeed martyrs, whom Christ has deigned to take up in their hour of confession, putting his seal on their witness by death: but we are simple, humble (ταπεινοὶ) confessors’ (Lyons 2.2–3).741

740 Lyons 2.4.

741 Here, rather than enjoy their “glory” as martyrs, incidentally the same glory which the crowds acknowledged in the comely and courageous confessors in Lyons 1.35, they claim to be “humble”—the same status the crowds noted about the deniers in Lyons 1.35). Again, in light of Christ’s own renunciation
Later, and more emphatically, “…they begged that the name of martyr not be used of them among the Christians (τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς), filled as they were with the fear of God” (Lyons 2.4).

Finally, further reflecting the “multiple intertextual threads which combine in [the martyrs’] depiction”, the letter describes their action with a complex echo of Philippians 2:8 and 1 Peter 5:6: “They humbled themselves (ἐταπέλευσαν ἐαυτοὺς) under that mighty hand by which they have now been greatly exalted” (Lyons 2.5). Summarizing well the centrality of this virtue in Lyons, Dehandschutter, concludes: “If there is a choice for martyrdom…it implies an unusual humility” (2005: 19).

As an exemplum of intracommunal leadership, the main audiences to the martyrs’ humility include both the Christian community and their God. The former, initially referred to in the first person plural, are given a front row seat to the protagonists’ aggressive humility: “…if anyone of us would speak of them as martyrs either by word or letter, they would sharply rebuke him” (Lyons 2.2). Rather than receive accolades, in fact, the martyrs tearfully beg these siblings (τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς) for prayer and for the cessation of their “misplaced” praise. Regarding the martyrs’ divine audience, they are said to have performed such acts of humility “…filled as they were with the fear of God” and “under” his “mighty hand” (Lyons 2.5). In addition to the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons itself, and the brethren attempting to enshrine the martyrs’ noble action

of status (Phil. 2:5–11), the author clearly views this self-effacing claim positively and in the next passage, as we will see, uses the verbal form of the lexeme to describe the “virtuous” act.

742 Lieu (2002: 211).

743 See Lyons 2.3 and 2.4 respectively.

744 Lyons 2.4.
in “word or letter”, the most underlined *commemorative* activity belongs to the hand of God, “by which they [the martyrs] have been greatly exalted” (*Lyons* 2.5).

Finally, and explicit throughout the account, the martyrs’ own exemplary humility is enacted in conscious *imitation* of Christ’s. At the outset, the excerpt explicated the motivation driving their exploits of humility: “These then were intensely eager to imitate and emulate Christ (ζηλωταλ και μμηταλ Χριστου εγενοντο)” (*Lyons* 2.2). While in the first chapter, this emulation takes on the form of agonistic endurance, here the behavior is modeled on Christ’s humility (ταπεινοφροσυνη)—especially as it is narrated by Paul in Philippians 2:3–11.745 The latter Christological pattern is first signaled with a direct quote from Phil. 2:6, “[Christ] who being in the form of God did not think it robbery to be equal with God” (*Lyons* 2.2), and continues according to the same pattern of willful humiliation preceding divine exaltation. In short, *Lyons* depicts the martyrs, like Christ, entrusting themselves to a God who desires and rewards humble leaders.746

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745 Reflecting on the potency of the Christ narrative as an paradigm establishing, reinvigorating, and sustaining the nascent Christian ethic, Theissen observes, “[a]s soon as the primitive Christian ethic was firmly inscribed on this myth, no one could remove it from the basic convictions of primitive Christianity. However far the real life of the community might be removed from it, time and again it could be renewed from this basic narrative of the Christian faith” (1999: 117).

746 Commenting on *Lyons* in general, as illustrated by this passage in particular, Candida Moss views the primary mimetic agenda of the martyrs to be their imitation of Christ’s suffering and death (2010: 25–26). Moss’ reading, however, largely overlooks the moral focus of this latter portion of the letter—as well as the original Pauline deployment of Christ’s humility-exemplifying death in Philippians 2. In *Lyons* 2.1–8, the importance of a Christ-like death is certainly not absent (see *Lyons* 2.3, for example), but even the martyr’s insistence on the distinction between dead martyrs versus living confessors ultimately serves to illustrate their superlative humility. Commenting on the theme of *imitatio Christi* in *Lyons*, Judith Lieu rightly, in my opinion, notes: “The *Letter of the Churches of Lyons and Vienne* quotes Phil. 2.6, but only of the refusal by those who though much tortured were yet alive, to claim for themselves the coveted title of ‘martyr’ (Eusebius, *H.E.* V.2.2). Blandina, spread-eagled on the stake, becomes the means through which those also under torture see ‘him who was crucified for them’ (*H.E.* V.1.41), but even this hardly amounts to an *imitatio Christi*…Certainly Christ suffers in Sanctus, defeating the adversary…but there is little conscious theological development of the potential of such language” (2002: 212).
IV.G.2. Love

While their humility is uniquely celebrated in this latter section of the letter, the martyrs’ love (ἀγάπη) saturates all portions the letter.\(^{747}\) In the first chapter, the term largely describes the martyrs’ fortitude-producing love for God,\(^ {748}\) and it is twice used more broadly to additionally describe one’s love for one’s fellow human—in these cases, as we have already seen, praising Vettius’ love.\(^ {749}\) Vettius’ love, moreover, is noted as a virtue bolstering his reputation among the Christian community prior to his ordeal. Thus, this social expression of love takes place in the context of internal Christian relations. In step with this, in Lyons 2.1–8, the term (and its synonyms) exclusively characterizes the martyrs’ disposition towards the Christian community—notably including those who recanted and denied the faith:

Because of the sincerity of their love (διὰ γνήσιον τῆς ἀγάπης)…[they did not] gloat over those who had fallen; rather, they gave of their own abundance to those in need, showing to them a maternal love (μητρικὰ σπλάγχνα), shedding many tears on their behalf before the Father (2.6–7).

That same “genuine love” is depicted as the efficacious weapon turning the tide of the “…greatest of all the contests (ὁ πόλεμος) which they waged against the Demon.” Thanks to this love, furthermore, “the throttled Beast” is “forced to disgorge alive all those whom he at first thought he had devoured” (Lyons 2.6). Later, we are told that the martyrs left “…no strife or conflict for their brothers, but rather joy, peace, harmony, and love (ἀγάπη)’ (Lyons 2.7), and in the final verse, the letter underscores that their behavior and attitude towards the “fallen” was distinguished by familial love (στοργή).

\(^{747}\) As I mentioned earlier, of all the quotations and Eusebian literary products in Ecclesiastical History, over half of the occurrences of the noun form of “love” (ἀγάπη) are consolidated in Lyons.

\(^{748}\) Lyons 1.17, 23, 34, and 49.

\(^{749}\) Lyons 1.9 and 10.
Admittedly, compared with the portions celebrating the protagonists’ humility, the letter is more sparing in its detail with respect to the audience response to the martyrs’ loving actions. The main audience to their love is the brethren experiencing such care. The martyrs, to take one example, “shared with their neighbor (τοῖς πληρίων) when they went off completely victorious (κατὰ πάντων νικηφόροι) to God” (Lyons 2.7). In particular, “their brothers (τῶν ἀδελφῶν) who had fallen” attest to the martyrs’ love (Lyons 2.8). The “Beast” (θηρ) comprises a hostile—and of course conquered—audience (Lyons 2.6), and God is throughout assumed as a very interested spectator. Their love, furthermore, is commemorated via the letter itself, in the triumphal language used to describe their departure to God, and, as we have seen throughout Lyons, in their honorific designation as “blessed” (τῶν μακαρίων).

Finally, their loving prayers on behalf of their fellow brethren takes place in the paradigmatic shadow of “Stephen, the perfect martyr (ὁ τελειωτὸς μαρτύς).” Preparing the reader/hearer for the Gallic martyrs’ own loving intersession, after describing Stephen’s selfless behavior, the author asks, “If he prayed for those who were stoning him, how much more would he have done for his fellow Christians (ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν)?” Beyond their laudable imitation of the “perfect martyr,” by comparing it with the “cruel and pitiless attitude of those who later were so unsparing towards the

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750 God, for example, is the audience to their tearful prayers as well as their receiving audience as they depart the world (Lyons 2.7).

751 “…they went off completely victorious (πάντων νικηφόροι) to God” (Lyons 2.7).

752 Lyons 2.5.

753 Lyons 2.5. To be sure, the example of Stephen may underlie both the humility as well as the love of the martyrs. As Dehandschutter observes, “[t]his humility also receives its expression in the martyr’s willingness to forgive. Stephen appears here to be the perfect martyr” (2005: 19). Nevertheless, there seems to be a more or less firm thematic connection between Stephen’s intersession in 2.5 and the prayerful expression of the martyrs’ sincere love in 2.7.
members of Christ’s body”, the author indirectly encourages the imitation of their loving attitude (Lyons 2.8). In sum, the developing ethic of intracommunal leadership advocated in Lyons 2.1–8, like 1 Clement, is delivered according Roman discursive practices while giving pride of place to the more or less “un-Roman” virtues of humility and love.  

Having examined these selected passages, I will continue by synthesizing the leadership virtues exemplified by the martyrs of Vienne and Lyons in light of the heuristic model of ideal Roman leadership outlined in my second chapter. Along the way, I will put Lyons in conversation with those leadership ideals lauded in Philo’s De Vita Mosis, Josephus Ant. 2–4, and 1 Clement.

V. Lyons in Light of Traditional Roman Leadership Attributes

V.A. Noble Lineage

With respect to bloodline and other traditional elements of ascribed honor, if 1 Clement passively overlooks such attributes as distinguishing marks of leadership, Lyons aggressively eschews them. In addition to the letter’s use of sibling terminology with respect to the Christian community, the ubiquitously celebrated confession of the martyrs functions as a rejection of bloodline, hometown, and inherited status.

Regarding the latter, while Lyons is careful to note the parentage, birthplaces, or inherited status of many of the named martyrs (Lyons 1.17, 49), with their voices and

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754 Noting these moral functions of Lyons 2.1–8, Dehandschutter concludes, “[t]he Christians of Lyons and Vienne anticipate (negatively) the appropriation of martyrdom by several groups who want to confirm in that way their Christian identity: humility and willingness to forgive, that is the imitation of Christ” (2005: 22).

755 The key characteristics of exemplary Roman leadership include noble lineage, martial prowess, eloquence, generous patronage, and piety.

bodies, each protagonist in turn affirms only their Christian identity. In addition to Blandina’s rejection of her inherited dishonor (as a female slave) and Sanctus’ refusal to self-identify via traditional criteria,\textsuperscript{757} Attalus and Alexander equally insist on the exclusive validity of their Christian identity. For example, Lyons introduces Attalus’ ascribed citizenship and status in 1.17 only to display its complete (and completely public) subordination to his “Christian” identity: “He was conducted around the arena (ἀμφιθεάτρου) behind a sign on which there was written in Latin, ‘This is Attalus, the Christian’ (Lyons 1.44). Alexander, likewise, is initially located according to his hometown and profession (Lyons 1.49) prior to his defiant insistence on just one fateful factor: “The governor then…asked him who he was. When Alexander said that he was a Christian (τοῦ δὲ φήσαντος ὅτι Χριστιανός), he flew into a rage and condemned him to the beasts” (Lyons 1.50).\textsuperscript{758} In sum, more than simply ignoring bloodline and traditionally inherited status as a factor in determining one’s suitability for leadership, Lyons aggressively reconfigures its heroes’ ascribed honor around their fictive kinship in Christ. This firm rejection of bloodline not only separates Lyons from Roman moral preoccupations, but it sets it apart from Josephus and Philo’s respective configurations of exemplary Mosaic leadership.\textsuperscript{759}

\textsuperscript{757} “[H]e would not even tell them his own name, his race, or the city he was from, whether he was a slave or a freedman. To all their questions he answered in Latin: ‘I am a Christian!’” (Lyons 1.20). For Blandina’s and Pothinus’ confessions, see Lyons 1.19 and 1.31.

\textsuperscript{758} Lyons 1.50.

\textsuperscript{759} Though focusing on martyrological literature, Judith Lieu understands such a denial of ascribed identity as one of the key differences between Jewish and Christian martyrlogy: “Perhaps most significantly, it is within the Jewish accounts that the language of national and citizen identity develops…for the Christians it is perhaps both their problem and their virtue that they have no patrioi nomoi for which to doe. There is no equivalent to the claim of 4-Macc. 1.11 that ‘their native land was purified through them’” (2002: 225).
V.B. Courage and Martial Prowess

Turning to arguably the most celebrated category of ideal Roman leadership, courage and martial prowess, though never depicting the martyrs as physically harming other humans, Lyons paints its exempla in an unmistakable martial hue. In this way, the Gallic letter significantly eclipses the emphasis on martial qualities in 1 Clement. In terms of bloody imagery, Moss rightly observes, “[o]ne of the distinctive aspects of the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons is its voyeuristic focus on torture and bodily degradation” (2012: 107). Also, as evinced in the episodes examined above, the entire ordeal of the Gallic churches is framed as a series of cosmic battles. In the words of Paul Middleton, “[m]artyrs were, in effect, Gods foot soldiers on the front line of cosmic conflict; death through martyrdom was their most potent weapon in bringing about victory in that war” (2006: 6).

Congruent with the latter theme, as we have seen, Maturus and Sanctus bravely faced their second round of public torture “…as though they had defeated their opponent (ἐκβεβιωμένοι τῶν ἀντίπαλων) in many contests and were now fighting for the victor’s crown” (Lyons 1.38). Attalus, similarly, “…entered the arena as a warrior (ἀγωνιστής)…"

760 Moss views this theme as perhaps a distinctive feature of Gallic martyrlogy (2012: 119). In The Other Christs, moreover, she explains: “When it comes to the paucity of interest in the devil among early Greek acta, the Letter of the Churches of Lyons and Vienne is the exception that proves the rule. The battle between Christ and the devil motivates the action so of the characters of the piece, the demonic and divine battling it out in the bodies of the martyrs” (2010: 90). My contention that such imagery suggests Roman influence does not exclude the involvement of multiple ideological threads running through the letter. Paul Middleton, for example, directs scholarly attention to the Holy War tradition in the Hebrew Bible as the influencing narrative behind radical Christian martyr texts like Lyons (2006: 15, 131–132). Without discounting Middleton’s well-argued proposition, it may be that this Jewish tradition—if it indeed underpins the letter—was theologically attractive precisely because the Romano-Gallic martyrologist wrote in a culture giving pride of place to militarily accomplished leaders. The gladiatorial context and agonistic language permeating the letter, I would argue, suggest the latter.

761 Moss puts this even stronger, “[t]he martyrs were generals, not foot soldiers, in God’s army, their bodies serving as the battlefields upon which God and Satan contested” (2010: 110).
well prepared for the contest” (Lyons 1.43). Finally, in the second chapter the text describes the martyrs as “fearless” (ἀφοβίας) and “courageous” (ἀτρομίας). Without question, in the worldview of the martyrologist, the condemned Christians were not shameful criminals awaiting a passive death; they were courageous warriors crushing a cosmic enemy.762

Compared with 1Clement’s measured celebration of agonistic leadership virtues, Lyons ubiquitously depicts the martyrs’ actions as valorous gladiatorial exploits—feats that would no doubt be quite familiar to Gallic provincials. In addition to the value-laden amphitheatrical setting of the events, the martyrs’ actions are regularly described as victories in spectacle combat. The following summary statement, as we have seen, reflects the language used throughout the letter: “Surely it behoved these noble athletes (γενναίως ἀθλητάς), after sustaining a brilliant contest (ὑπομείναντας ἀγώνα) and a glorious victory (μεγάλως νικήσαντας), to win the great crown of immortality” (Lyons 1.36).763 Those unable to make a firm confession (ἐξαρνόντες γεννόμενοι), to take a negative example, are recognized by audiences as “…ignoble cowards (ἀγεννείς καὶ ἀνανδροί)” (Lyons 1.34). Finally, underscoring the athletic endurance of these heroes, Lyons multiplies the term ὑπομονή to describe the their praiseworthy feats.764 In sum, baptized

762 For a historical and social study of the meridiani (midday executions during the games), see Wiedemann (1995: 70–86).

763 Commenting on this framework, Stephanie Cobb states, “[a]s virile fighters, gladiators embodied ideals of Roman masculinity such as strength, courage, and volition. Like their pagan counterparts, the authors of the martyrologies (and presumably their communities) regarded a noble death, similar to that of the gladiator, as honorable” (2008: 34).

764 The term appears as a noun (ὑπομονή) five times (Lyons 1.6, 27, 39, 45, and 2.4), and in its verbal form (ὑπομενεῖ) seven times (Lyons 1.4, 7, 16, 20, 36, 51, and 54). On the appropriation of such agonistic terminology in Lyons, see also Shaw (1995: 307–308) and Lieu (2002: 222–223).
in these martial images and agonistic language, the protagonists of Lyons are, in many ways, more “Roman” than their Roman persecutors.765

V.C. Eloquence

If the courage and agonistic endurance of the martyrs prevails in Lyons, eloquence occupies, at best, a tertiary position. To be sure, the account does feature many of the martyrs’ pithy retorts. When asked by the ruler (ἡγεμόνος) about the “god of the Christians”, for example, Pothinus boldly responds, “If you are worthy, you will know” (Lyons 1.31). The nobly trained (γεγυμνασμένος) Attalus,766 additionally, while fastened to the burning seat rhetorically defends the Christian’s piety to the crowd in Latin (τὴ 'Ῥωμαϊκή).767 Alexander, most clearly approximating something akin to Roman eloquence, is said to have been “known practically to everyone because of his…outrspokenness in preaching the word (παρρησίαν τοῦ λόγου), for he did in fact possess a share in the charism of the apostles (οὐκ ἄμοιρος ἀποστολικὸν χαρίσματος)” (Lyons 1.49).” He puts this communicative power to work gesturing before the tribunal, “urging the Christians to make their confession” (Lyons 1.49). Finally, in the eulogistic review of the martyrs’ noble achievements, the letter includes their “…speaking to the pagans with great openness (παρρησίαν)” (Lyons 2.4). Thus, while it does not ignore

765 Reflecting on similar early Christian martyrological traditions, Daniel Boyarin insightfully notes: “Paradoxically…[such rejecters of Rome] seem most strongly to be representing the Roman value of honor” (1999: 64); cf. Cobb (2008: 5).

766 Lyons 1.43.

767 Lyons 1.52. On this verbal defense, Moss suggests: “That Attalus responds in Latin is a marker of his citizen status (Lyons 5.1.43) and, at the same time, a gesture to the social status of those whom he addresses, for they are Romans. In the background echoes a subtle jab at Roman civility in Gaul” (2012: 111).
rhetorical ability as a useful leadership attribute, for the most part, Lyons lets the martyrs’ unflinching bodies do the talking.

**V.D. Patronage**

“Attalus whose family came from Pergamum…had always been a pillar and ground of the community there” (Lyons 1.17). As this description indicates, the exempla in Lyons encompass leaders of all social stripes, including those previously functioning in a patronal role. Like Josephus’ Moses, however, it is the pious mediation of the martyrs that receives the clearest praise in Lyons. As we have already noticed with Vettius Epagathus, the wealth or political influence of an Attalus pales in comparison with the divine aid secured by the martyrs. Their function as brokers between God and their brethren is perhaps best illustrated in the second chapter:

> nor did they gloat (καυχμα) over those who had fallen; rather, they gave of their own abundance to those in need, showing to them a maternal love, shedding many tears on their behalf before the Father...they shared [life] with their neighbour when they went off completely victorious to God (Lyons 2.6–7).

As the example of Blandina clearly demonstrates, finally, unlike its traditional Roman counterpart, such patronage depends not on one’s social or financial standing but exclusively on his or her bold Christian confession and love for God.

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768 We later learn that Attalus was quite famous in Gaul (γαλικος ἐν οῳδοματος; 1.43) and possessed Roman citizenship (Lyons 1.44).

769 For Vettius’ account, see Lyons 1.9–10. The introduction of the letter unambiguously identifies the patronal role of the martyrs, referring to them as “study pillars” sent by God for the protection of “the weak” (Lyons 1.6).

770 In this way, the Gallic letter’s treatment of patronage is somewhat distinct from 1 Clement’s. In the latter, to recall, the only substantive treatment of patronage dealt with its material expression between the rich and the poor (1Clem. 38.2).
**V.E. Piety**

With respect to the last heuristic pillar of honorable Roman leadership, like Josephus, Philo, and *1 Clement*, *Lyons* subsumes virtually every honorable leadership trait under the category of piety to God. The cosmic context of the entire series of exposures, as we have already seen, enfranchises the condemned Christians as pious warriors fighting on God’s behalf. The love for God demonstrated in the martyrs’ suffering, is only enhanced by the increasing impiety of the Roman spectators. For example, in the ordeal of aged Pothinus, *Lyons* lampoons the misplaced piety of the hostile crowd: “…everybody acted as though it were a serious fault and impiety (ἀσεβεία) to fall short in their viciousness towards him, for they thought that in this way they could avenge their gods” (*Lyons* 1.31). In the end, whether motivating their exemplary endurance or Christ-imitating humility, the Gallic leaders displayed a profound love for and fear of God.

**V.F. Love and Humility**

Finally, and in fascinating alignment with *1 Clement*, *Lyons* celebrates its leaders’ love and emphatically advocates the distinctively Pauline disposition of theological and social “humility”. Love not only defines the intracommunal behavior of the authoritative martyrs (*Lyons* 2.6–8), but as I outlined earlier, it motivates the respective endurance of Blandina and Sanctus (*Lyons* 1.17, 23) and characterizes much of Alexander’s exemplarity among the Gallic Christians (*Lyons* 1.49). Similarly, humility is given pride

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771 See *Lyons* 1.5, 16, 25, 27, 42, and 2.6.

772 For the divine love of Vettius, Blandina, Sanctus, and Alexander, see *Lyons* 1.9, 17, 23, and 51 respectively.
of place as a Christ-following characteristic. In addition to the closing episode described above (*Lyons* 2.2–8), the authorial community describes the protagonists as “slaves of God (τῶν δούλων τοῦ θεοῦ)”\(^{773}\) and self-identifies as “slaves of Christ (δούλοι Χριστοῦ).”\(^{774}\) Without question, the author of *Lyons* would firmly have agreed with Clement’s insistence that children be socialized with a firm understanding of “how strong humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη) is before God, what pure love (ἀγάπη ἁγνή) is able to accomplish before God” (1Clem. 21.8).

**Conclusion**

As the foregoing analysis suggests, the articulation of Christian identity and leadership morality in *Lyons* was an intricate process. The resulting rhetorical and moral tapestry is a complex intermingling of traditionally Roman, biblical, and—especially in the case of humility—Pauline discursive threads.\(^{775}\) In terms of pedagogical approach, in almost every case, whether a depiction of the martyrs/confessors as a whole (*Lyons* 1.11–16, 27–28, 32–36, 45–48, 2.1–8), or a description of individual or paired martyrs, the key elements of Roman exemplarity are ubiquitous—namely, action, audience, commemoration, and imitation.

Like *1 Clement* and Josephus’ *Antiquities* 2–4, this Gallic correspondence confirms the robust participation of groups celebrating non-Roman ancestral *exempla* in

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\(^{773}\) *Lyons* 1.5. Even Pothinus’ role is identified in terms of service: ὁ τῆν διακονίαν τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς (*Lyons* 1.29).

\(^{774}\) *Lyons* 1.3. Dehandschutter highlights a parallel here: “The senders of the Letter style themselves as ‘servants of Christ,’” which is quite Pauline” (2005: 9).

\(^{775}\) My study certainly confirms Boyarin’s insistence on “…the enormous convolutions of cultural multicausation, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman, in the production of the multifold discourse of martyrdom” (1999: 64).
the cultural context of the Roman discourse of exemplarity. Ironically, in Lyons’ efforts to distinguish between “Romanness” and “Christianness” (clearly recommending the latter), the letter appropriates the form and much of the moral content characterizing Roman conversations on exemplary leadership.

My study, moreover, confirms Stephanie Cobb’s contention with respect to one of the original functions of martyrological literature:

> The martyr acts are better understood as educational propaganda than objective history. Thus, rather than providing historical data, these texts may more readily supply information about the ways Christians portrayed themselves and how they constructed appealing and persuasive group identities through the stories they told (2008: 5).

More specifically, this chapter suggests the utility of Lyons in constructing, defending, and in part, preserving an ethos of leadership. Departing somewhat from Cobb—though my study wholeheartedly embraces her focus on the social functions of martyrological literature—this chapter demonstrates that while the Gallic Christians responsible for Lyons certainly embraced many “…Roman definitions of honor, strength, and reason…”, in light of their denial of bloodline and insistence on a Pauline formulated notion of Christ-like humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη), it seems a step too far to categorically conclude that “…Roman cultural values were at the very core of Christian identity” (2008:2). Instead, to most Romans questing up the cursus honorum or its many provincial replications, the humility exemplified by a crucified Christ likely remained, to quote Paul of Tarsus, social “foolishness” (μωρίαν).776 At least in 1 Clement and Lyons, this counterhegemonic virtue seems to have become an invaluable component of honorable, Christ-imitating leadership.

776 1 Cor. 1:23.
Conclusion

In the foregoing dissertation I argued that Jewish and Christian authors writing, for the most part, in the Imperial west actively participated in the ubiquitous Roman discourse of exemplarity as they contended for their respective conceptualizations of paradigmatic ancestral leadership. To this end, informed by a broad swath of ancient Roman sources and in conversation with recent research in the field of Classics (especially the work of Matthew Roller), my project began with a thorough introduction to the origins, nature, and popular deployment of exemplary discourse in Roman antiquity. Having outlined this popular communicative vehicle, my second chapter identified its characteristic moral freight with respect to ideal leadership. There, I presented a heuristic model of exemplary Roman leadership featuring the attributes of noble lineage, courage/martial prowess, eloquence, generous patronage, and piety toward the divine. I also tested the model, demonstrating the presence of these categories in the work of two biographers (Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch), two extant Roman funeral eulogies, and I concluded with an extended study of this idiom of leadership in Cicero’s *De Officiis*. All along the way, while showcasing its usefulness, I denied the inviolability of my model, noting the room for adaptation, contestation, and differing emphases in individual texts celebrating praiseworthy Roman leadership.

With those important foundations in place, my project explored the various ways in which both the rhetorical form and moral content of this ancient conversation were appropriated and redeployed in Jewish and Christian texts dealing with leaders and authority. Specifically, in chapter 3, I began by examining the various deployments of Moses as a paragon of leadership in Josephus’ *Antiquities* 2–4 and Philo’s *De Vita Mosis*
1–2. There, after reviewing the writers’ respective exposure to traditionally Roman politics and culture, I argued that Josephus’ more sustained contact with Roman culture and politics significantly shaped his presentation of Moses’ exemplary leadership, while Philo’s account largely lacks such narratological and moral Roman coloring. Both authors, I contended, stress Moses’ all-encompassing paradigmatic piety.

Chapters 4–5 focus on the leadership discourse in 1 Clement and The Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons, two corporate letters deploying Christ and Christ-imitating ancestral exempla in the service of intracommunal issues of leadership. I demonstrate the robust participations of these two texts in the Roman discourse of exemplarity as well as their shared appropriation of many characteristically Roman leadership priorities (especially courage and agonistic endurance). At the same time, I argue, both texts advocate the rather un-Roman, Pauline leadership priority of “humility” (ταπεινοφροσύνη) using Roman discursive tools, thus affirming the utility of Roman exemplarity for the preservation and articulation of non-Roman ancestral traditions.

The remainder of my study focused on 1 Clement and The Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons, two corporate letters deploying Christ and Christ-imitating ancestral exempla in the service of intracommunal issues of leadership. After establishing these authors’ respective exposure to Roman cultural forms and political realities, in each chapter I studied the texts’ penchant for ancestral exempla as well as their careful narrative description of extended authoritative models using Roman discursive frameworks.

I closed my extended study of each letter with a summary of the major leadership characteristics advocated in Lyons in light of both traditional Roman leadership priorities
and in dialogue with those advocated in Josephus, Philo, and *1 Clement*. I argued that like Josephus in *Ant.* 2–4 and *1 Clement*, *Lyons* thoroughly reflects the narrative approach characterizing Roman exemplarity. In terms of its interaction with the popularly-shared categories of honorable Roman leadership, though differing in emphasis, I maintained that *Lyons* aligns with these exemplary deployments as they all highlight the courage and agonistic achievement of their ancestral leaders. Like *1 Clement*, however, *Lyons* eschews bloodline as an authority-ascribing factor. Finally, both Christ-confessing texts celebrate above all the importance of love and the rather un-Roman leadership disposition of Christ-emulating humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη).

In sum, the foregoing chapters demonstrate that, even in the midst of at times fierce cultural competition and ambitious boundary marking, the pedagogical approach and much of the language of leadership in these Jewish or Christian accounts reflect their specific historical moments and Roman cultural contexts. At the same time, especially in the cases of *1 Clement* and *Lyons*, participation in the Roman discourse of exemplarity did not discourage patently un-Roman virtues; on the contrary, the flexible and debate-welcoming conversation provided a rhetorically and narratologically intelligible means of inculcating such attributes in the context of the Roman west. In fact, the Roman preoccupation with ancestral models of leadership seems to have fueled the literary deployment of Christ and Christ-imitating authoritative paragons.

**Implications**

I will close by highlighting two major implications of my work. First, as proposed in the introduction, my project encourages those studying Roman pedagogy and moral
discourse to begin re-examining texts which are often too quickly overlooked as belonging exclusively to the fields of Jewish or Christian studies. As my dissertation demonstrates, such texts promoting competing ethnic or political identities (and at times even repudiating *Romanitas*) do not represent simple bastions of non-Roman ancestral culture, but are shaped by, actively participate in, and even contribute to the polyvocal Roman marketplace of moral and political ideas. Including texts like *Antiquities*, *1 Clement*, and *Lyons*, just to name a few, can open new horizons in our understanding of the provincial appropriation of “Romanness” as well as the textures, instabilities, and nuances of culture in the Roman west.

Second, for those interested in ancient notions of Christian leadership, my project encourages the appreciation of the similarity of developing Christ-oriented leadership traditions to Roman approaches as well as the possibility of their moral peculiarity. Regarding the latter, at least in the cases of *1 Clement* and *Lyons*, my dissertation can affirm Gerd Theissen’s contention that “[t]he ethic of primitive Christianity is governed by two basic values: love of neighbor and humility” (1999: 115). As my study of two Christian letters otherwise imbued with traditional Roman coloring seem to support, far from representing a stock Roman virtue or an ad hoc rhetorical gambit,

> It is characteristic of primitive Christianity that it makes renunciation of status the presupposition for authority within the community. ‘Humility’, elsewhere the disposition of slaves and dependents, becomes the characteristic of those who want to assume leadership roles in the community (1999: 72).

Again, this Christian difference on leadership demonstrates the flexibility of the Roman discourse of exemplarity at the same time as it affirms the latter’s utility in preserving non-Roman ancestral traditions. In the case of *1 Clement* and *Lyons*, far from altering the
morally peculiar Pauline tradition of humility, the Roman pedagogical habit actually
aided its chronological stamina. In short, even in the increasingly status-conscious
cultural landscape of Rome and Gaul, encouraged no doubt by the multiplication of
Christ-imitating exempla, Paul’s panegyric to Christological humility still echoed—albeit
in Roman tones.
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