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Where Power Projection Ends: Constraints and Restraints on Japanese Militarism

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Where Power Projection Ends: Constraints and Restraints on Japanese Militarism

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Political Science

by

Tom Phuong Le

Dissertation Committee:
Associate Professor Robert Uriu, Chair
Professor Patrick Morgan
Professor Cecelia Lynch

2015
DEDICATION

To

my darling, Erika

together, every step of the way.
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Where Power Projection Ends: Constraints and Restraints on Japanese Militarism

By

Tom Phuong Le

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Irvine, 2015

Associate Professor Robert Uriu, Chair

Over the last 15 years, Japan’s security policy has undergone significant qualitative and quantitative changes. Prime Minister Abe’s strained relationship with China, and subsequent promotion of collective self-defense and increased power projection capabilities has renewed alarmism of Japanese remilitarization. Realists contend the changing international security environment and increased nationalism have led to the erosion of antimilitarism norms and the emergence of “normalizing” security policy. This scholarship stands in stark contrast to the commonly accepted narrative proposed by political scientist Thomas Berger and historian John Dower that post-war Japan is defined by a culture of pacifism. Scholars have provided reasons for why Japan should militarize without consideration of how the government and public conceptualize militarization. Military capabilities might not be directly linked to threat.

This dissertation addresses the question, what determines the direction and content of Japanese security policy? First, I argue social-structural, technical, political, and normative factors constrain and restrain the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Path-dependent factors such as an aging and declining population, weak military-industrial-complex (MIC), sensitivity
to East Asian states, and a culture of antimilitarism create an environment that makes it difficult for the government to pursue greater power projection capabilities. Moreover, several of these material and ideational constraints and restraints are constitutive, further reinforcing the antimilitarism environment. Second, I contend “normal” security behavior – i.e. power balancing, self-help, and general acceptance of military force – is subjective, reflecting the prevailing assumptions of realism more so than the logic of many states. Japan has adopted a new normal that internalizes an emerging international human security norm, creating a unique security posture that contributes to the international community through peacekeeping operation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief while adhering to the domestic antimilitarism environment. This security posture is one of a myriad of possibilities, to which I refer to as “multiple militarisms.”
Chapter One: Introduction

International and domestic conditions may force Japan to finally abandon 70 years of restrained militarism. Policymakers are increasingly concerned with the dangers of terrorism, piracy, and Japan’s irrelevance in international affairs if they cannot address these threats. In East Asia, a “rising” China, nuclear North Korea, and assertive Russia are potential threats to Japan’s security in the near future. Domestically, conservatives led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have exploited feelings of insecurity caused by two decades of economic stagnation and fierce competition from Japan’s neighbors to push an aggressive security agenda. If Japan were ever to remilitarize, now seems most likely.

If the notion of a remilitarized Japan sounds familiar, it is because it has been argued before. For decades, scholars and the media believed it was only a matter of time before its booming economy, swelling national pride, and foreboding claims of “Japanese uniqueness” would lead to Japan’s reemergence as a world power. As a world power, Japan would increase its power projection capabilities, balance against potential threats, and be more militarily involved in international security issues, or in other words, “normal” security behavior. Such bold predictions never came to fruition. Due to factors such as the collapse of its “miracle economy” and increased economic interdependence among East Asian states, Japan did not want, and was not capable of, aggressive remilitarization.

Constructivists and historians offered a different explanation for Japan’s unwillingness to remilitarize, contending a unique culture of antimilitarism generated from the devastating loss of

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1 For more on the reemergence of Japan’s “world power status,” see Huntington 1993; Betts 1994; Green 2001; and Kliman 2006.
2 Prominent Japanese politician, Ichiro Ozawa argued that a “normal country” must be willing to shoulder the responsibilities of the international community and cooperate fully with other nations to “build prosperous stable lives for their people” (Ozawa 1993, 94-95). The responsibilities to the international community were solely military related. In Chapter Two, I explore the variable meaning of “normalization” to illustrate states pursue diverse security behaviors that they would consider “normal.”
WWII constrained security policy.\(^3\) This culture of antimilitarism produced institutions, laws, norms, and a “security identity” that made it difficult for conservative politicians to pursue “normal” security policy.\(^4\) Since WWII, Article 9 of the “Peace Constitution” has served as a unifying symbol for antimilitarists in Japan and around the world.

Although few would still maintain that Japan is “number one,” realists interpreted its lack of ascendance as only a setback. Waltz (2000) argued Japan could not survive as an anomaly of the international system and would eventually normalize, even acquire indigenous nuclear weapons capabilities. Other scholars believed Japan was biding its time, and would normalize at a moment’s notice if required. Undeniably, since 1991 several bright-lines have been crossed, such as the dispatch of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) overseas for peacekeeping operations (PKO), upgrade of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to the more powerful Ministry of Defense (MOD), creation of the National Security Council (NSC), and modification of the longstanding Three Principles of Arms Exports that heavily stunted growth in the arms industry.

There are limitations to the explanatory power of the dominant theories describing Japanese security policy. Realists have difficulty explaining why Japan has not militarized to a greater degree given the many reasons to do so. North Korea regularly lobes bellicose threats towards Japan while violating its very sovereignty and dignity by kidnapping its citizens. China routinely pushes the boundaries of international law via incursions into its territorial waters and South Korea views it with critical suspicion and sometimes, outright animosity. Japan’s response has been more than tempered. Its defense budget is capped at 1% of the GDP and the

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\(^3\) For more on the development of Japanese peace culture and post-war pacifism, see Berger (1993), Dower (1999), and Momose 2010. It is important to recognize Berger’s argument that Japan’s antimilitarism could not exist if there was a legitimate threat to Japanese security or assurance of the durability of the Japan-US Alliance. Berger also contends that if Japan were to continue to not contribute to international security, its ability to abide by the antimilitarism norm would diminish. Constructivists are well aware that the conditions of the international environment impact the durability of norms.

\(^4\) See Katzenstein 1996; Oros 2008.
“Peace Constitution” is unlikely to be amended to allow the JSDF greater capabilities. Realism is unable to explain why powerful hawkish politicians are unsuccessful in taking advantage of rising nationalism, the changing security environment, and US pressure to break free of the constraints of Article 9. Conversely, constructivists have difficulty accounting for the major changes in security policy without compromising the strength of the initial claim, that antimilitarism constrains the JSDF. This weakness stems from a lack of analysis of the conditions that strengthen, weaken, and change the antimilitarism norm.

The difficulty in explaining Japanese security policy is because it appears to be consistently inconsistent. For each major change enacted by the MOD, there has been apprehension within the government and vocal protests in the public. Violations of the antimilitarism norm have reaffirmed the appeal of the institutional and cultural hadome (brakes) on militarism. Yet, given the strength of the antimilitarism norm, why has the JSDF adopted new capabilities and missions? How have Japanese justified the use of force for self-defense and in PKO when they extol the values of pacifism? How does participation in PKO and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions address conventional security threats? And when scholars discuss “remilitarization” and power projection capabilities, what do these terms exactly entail and to what degree has Japan pursued these objectives? These subjects of inquiry among others are explored in this dissertation.

This dissertation seeks to answer the following question, what determines the content and direction of Japanese security policy? I examine security policy and JSDF capabilities from three angles. First, I analyze militarism utilizing a new theoretical framework to more accurately access the relationship between JSDF capabilities and the government’s and public’s objectives. Second, I examine how the government and public conceptualize, debate, and justify their
security objectives. Third, I analyze Japan’s relations with its neighbors and its impact on security policy.

**Argument in Brief**

There is a strong demand for scholars to simplify the complex interactions in international relations due to the dominant ethos within political science; theories must be parsimonious and generalizable.\(^5\) These objectives are driven by the pressure to generate analysis that is digestible and “useful” to policymakers and the public, who many times fund our research. Research questions are commonly presented as “puzzles,” where the researcher must find the right pieces and put them in the correct order to establish the “truth.” In other words, what independent variables cause change in the dependent variable?

Utilizing this conventional research design, the dependent variable in this dissertation is Japanese security policy and the independent variables are population age and size, culture of antimilitarism, international humanitarian intervention norms, and international threats. Although I examine the influence of these variables on security policy, the focus of this dissertation is how the interaction among various institutions, actors, and ideas shape security policy. The conclusion will lack the finality many hope for, but this is because the content and direction of Japanese security policy is forever debated, challenged, and changed.

My argument consists of two primary contentions. First, I contend all states operate within interrelated international and domestic environments that shape their security policies.\(^6\) In Japan’s environment, material and ideational factors such as regional power balance, feelings of insecurity, and desire for prestige lead to remilitarization. Simultaneously, social-structural, technical, political, and normative factors direct security policy away from conventional

\(^5\) See King, Keohane, and Verba 1994.

\(^6\) One can conceptually treat the international and domestic levels as one environment.
militarism. These constraints and restraints prevent the government from investing in the JSDF’s power projection capabilities and promote the adoption of less militaristic security objectives, such as human security and development. The use of the JSDF for only self-defense and human security has become commonsensical.

Japan’s antimilitarism environment is comprised of social-structural, technical, political, and normative constraints and restraints [see Table 1.1], all of which shape the content and direction of security policy. Constraints are material factors that limit the JSDF’s power projection capabilities. Restraints are self-imposed restrictions on security behavior, which are influenced by ideational factors. Several constraints are path-dependent, making it increasingly costly and difficult for the government to enact significant policy change over an extended period of time. Moreover, several of the material and ideational factors are constitutive, further reinforcing the durability of the antimilitarism environment and promoting certain kinds of security behavior.

Table 1.1: Constraints and Restraints on Japanese Militarism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength of Constraint</th>
<th>Type of Constraint</th>
<th>Social-structural</th>
<th>Technical-Infrastructure</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Normative</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Aging/declining population</td>
<td></td>
<td>Underdeveloped military-industrial complex</td>
<td>U.S.-Japan Alliance Reassurance policy</td>
<td>Peace Constitution (Article 9) and related laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Lack of conscription</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of field experience</td>
<td>U.S.-Japan Alliance Reassurance policy</td>
<td>Non-nuclear principles</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak recruitment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Outdated infrastructure</td>
<td>Japanese neutrality outside of East Asia</td>
<td>Anti-nuclear/anti-militarism lobby [public, media, academia, science communities]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Defensively-oriented technologies</td>
<td>German apology history and international stigma</td>
<td>1% of GDP spending Limit</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Arms export ban</td>
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Second, I contend antimilitarism institutions are reified through time and experience. For 70 years, a culture of antimilitarism (most notably in Hiroshima and Nagasaki), history, laws, 

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7 For more on process-tracing and path dependence, see Pierson 2004.
and institutions have made the avoidance of conflict the starting point in security policy discussions. The historical momentum of antimilitarism forces the government and public into intense debate about the character and direction of the country. Moreover, material factors such as the declining population and technical limits of the JSDF create conditions in which the antimilitarism norm is not challenged. Because the government has been unable to strengthen the capabilities of the JSDF through recruitment or capacity building, it has not offered a credible alternative to the restrained security posture that has benefited the public. According to Chistoph Meyer and Eva Strickmann (2011), material and ideational factors are “co-constituted,” in which material structures can “reinforce or undermine existing norms and beliefs” and ideational factors can shape preferences and guide behavior (68). Following the constructivist logic that material and ideational factors can be mutually constituted, I contend material constraints such as a weak military industrial complex strengthens Japan’s culture of antimilitarism. The absence Japanese weapons at home and abroad has cultivated non-militaristic sensibilities. Equally, ideational restraints such as the culture of antimilitarism influences how Japanese interpret material factors such as the nation’s poor demographics, many believing it is not as a significant security threat that must be rectified above other national objectives. The combination of the material and ideational factors have led to security behavior that traditionally would not be considered “normalization.”

Thus, before Japan can determine what force the JSDF will use to ensure its security, it must determine what kind of country it wants to be – is it a “peace-loving nation” that finds non-militaristic ways to settling disputes and contributing to the international community, or is it a

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8 Many conventional constructivists, perhaps due to pressure from realists and liberals, have, over time, attempted to separate the ideational from the material, focusing exclusively on the causal force that can be attributed to the ideational. Following original constructivist insights (e.g. Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Wendt 1987) as well as ongoing debates, however (Klotz and Lynch 2007), I argue in favor of viewing these factors as mutually constituted, or constitutive of each other.
“normal nation” that will do whatever is necessary to ensure its survival? For most of the public, the preference is for the former. Japanese antimilitarism is uncritical and simplified, a general feeling that war is bad and should be avoided. This instinctive feeling, what Japanese Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) Senior Fellow Tetsuo Kotani refers to as “ambiguous pacifism,” is difficult for the government to overcome because it is so basic (Author’s Interview, August 2015, Tokyo, Japan). Abe hopes that open discussion on the security bills increasing the capabilities of the JSDF in the Diet can convince the public of their necessity, but cold hard facts and figures have little impact on a public distrustful of any attempts to normalize. Increasing the possibility, even slightly, of going to war again in a non-starter.

Though Japanese security policy is influenced by the regional power balance and commitments to the Japan-US Alliance, its content and direction are defined by the domestic antimilitaristic environment. Japan is not normalizing as scholars have predicted because in many ways it cannot and in some ways, it will not. As a result, it has avoided the aggressive militarization that defined the Cold War. In the post-Cold War Era, instead of “remilitarization,” it has adopted “minimal-use militarism,” allowing for limited use of force for domestic security and the promotion of human security internationally. Hence, although change is occurring in Japanese security policy, the direction of change does not reflect the conventional understanding of “normal” security behavior. This new type of militarism reflects a general change in the use of force in international relations, where armed forces will be expected to do more than just defend state sovereignty.

**Constraints and Restraints**

Japanese security policy is constrained in four areas with varying degrees of strength. Strong constraints are almost impossible for policymakers to overcome. Medium constraints greatly
influence security policy, but can be overcome by adept policymakers working in a deliberate and sustained manner. Weak constraints operate more like restraints in that they exist as long as policymakers believe they are to the benefit of the nation. These restraints can be overturned by a shock to the system, such as invasion or total alliance collapse. Strong restraints, such as the antimilitarism norm can be as enduring as a strong constraint. For example, legally Article 9 can be amended at any time, but this is unlikely because antimilitarism has become so interwoven with national identity, hawkish politicians would be unable to obtain the support necessary for an amendment.

Social-structural constraints are the limitations on the human resources of the JSDF. Specifically, poor demographics and tepid interest in the public to join the JSDF limit Japan’s power projection capabilities. Although modern warfare has placed a premium on technology, the importance of raw manpower cannot go understated. Latent power and military effectiveness will always be partly tied to “boots on the ground.” These constraints prevent the government from developing a military that is large enough to possess credible operations-level deterrence. The upper limit of a nation’s military strength is intrinsically linked to the population’s willingness to fight and support a war effort.9

The JSDF is significantly constrained by the aging and declining population. The government has aggressively tried to address the population and workforce crises, most recently under the “third arrow” of Abenomics, but has largely been unsuccessful due to social, economic, and normative factors. The public is unenthusiastic about joining the JSDF because

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9 Although technology decreases the need for a large military, having a large pool of available conscripts increases the flexibility and quality of a country’s armed forces. This is especially true for Japan who relies on highly skilled personnel to make up for its lack of manpower. The MOD can be more discerning with personnel if there were larger forces to draw from. Moreover, having a large military force diminishes the need to make strategic sacrifices. All militaries must make sacrifices due to economic and personnel constraints, Japan more so than others. For example, due to Japan’s limited military size, the MOD has had to shift troops from the northern islands to defend the Senkaku Islands in the south. Ideally, Japan would be able to patrol both areas simultaneously.
many hold an antagonistic view of the military due to early childhood education blaming the military for hijacking the nation and leading it down a destructive path in WWII. As a result, the JSDF is understaffed and this weakness has limited the strategic options of the MOD. These social-structural constraints are enduring because mitigating them requires significant social engineering that is beyond the power of the government.

The MOD has pursued a strategy of capacity building to overcome its human resource problems. Capacity building can be achieved through conscription, improving technology (quality and costs), high-level training, and increasing the amount of bases and outposts. However, due to 70 years of constrained militarism, Japan has not invested the necessary financial and political resources for rapid expansion of the JSDF. This “infrastructure lag” is technical constraints, manifested as outdated infrastructure, defense-oriented technology, and a weak military-industrial-complex (MIC). In the immediate future, the strength of the JSDF is limited by its reliance on defense-oriented technologies and severely outdated infrastructure. Japan has not built any new bases in the postwar era, making it difficult for the MOD to introduce new technologies and rearrange force structure. These limitations are further augmented by normative restraints, such as the 1% of GDP spending cap, Three Principles of Arms Exports (recently lifted but still heavily regulated), and Article 9. Normative restraints on militarism have led to suboptimal development of the MIC. For decades, defense contractors relied on a small domestic arms market because they had no access to the international market. This not only prevented the defense sector from growing, it also severed access to valuable data, joint-development projects, networking, and goodwill that is necessary for a company to survive in the ultra competitive industry.

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10 For more on post-war education and views of the military, see Dower 1999; Fruhstuck 2007.
Political constraints are the regulating behavior that prevents rapid militarization. Since WWII, Japan has adopted a reassurance strategy to signal to its neighbors that it does not intend to remilitarize. Moreover, its history has been used by East Asia and the public to pressure the government to forgo normalization policies. Historically, the government has been aware of the “security dilemma” and therefore has been careful not to take actions that disrupt regional stability. Alone, political restraints are weak because a change in leadership and self-interests can undo decades of positive relations. However, the political restraints have allowed the social-structural and technical constraints to solidify and the normative restraints to germinate – creating an antimilitarism environment that makes the political restraints stronger.

Normative constraints are self-imposed restraints on the JSDF. Peace activists, academics, and the media cultivate antimilitarism attitudes in the public and protect Article 9, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and related laws in the government. The antimilitarism norm is pervasive and enduring, but not hegemonic. Peace education and culture make antiwar feelings commonsensical, but due to weaknesses in the peace movement, security policy is not completely shaped by the antimilitarism norm.

Multiple Militarisms
“Militarism,” “remilitarization,” and “normalization” are often vaguely defined by academics and media. They regularly cite the various indicators of remilitarization, such as disputes over islands, historical revisionism, military build-up, and insensitive politicians, but do not define what militarism is.11 Is contemporary security policy mimicking WWII-style militarism or is it mimicking present-day US foreign policy? Since the motivations behind militarization are varied, there is not one type of militarism.

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11 For more on the rise of nationalism in Japan, see Matthews 2003; McCormack 2004; Park 2008.
Moreover, militarism is conceptualized as a dichotomous and ordinal variable, with pacifism on one side and militarism on the other [see Figure 1.1]. In practice, security policies rarely fit neatly in either category. To measure militarism, scholars rely on data such as military spending and military equipment acquisition. Although this data is useful at understanding some dimensions of security policy, it does not take into account the debates, double-talk, rationalizations, and political relationships that are also defining elements a state’s militarism.

![Figure 1.1: Conventional Understanding of Militarism](image)

For example, if a state increases its defense budget to improve its disaster relief capabilities, is it more or less militaristic? If the head of state pursues military expansion, but fails because of strong opposition forces, was the country militarizing? How does one compare the level of militarization among states? Is China, with the largest defense budget in East Asia more militaristic than North Korea and its military, the largest (force size) in the world? These questions reveal the fruitless exercise of “measuring” militarism.

This dissertation compares power projection capabilities, but focuses on the motivations, justifications, and orientation of security policy. In other words, there are “multiple militarisms.”

*Intellectual Merit and Contribution*
It is an important time to be studying Japanese security policy and East Asia regionalism. Within the last three years, every pacific nation has had an election, many having undergone a change in leadership. The changing domestic political environment, coupled with the US’s “pivot” to Asia and the recent 70th anniversary of the end of WWII and atomic bomb, create the opportunity for significant change in regional relations.
This dissertation is written with academics, policymakers, and the general public in mind. First, this study contributes to the growing literature on Japanese security culture. Utilizing original interview data, I explain how the security culture has evolved, paying particular attention to the changing international and domestic peace movements. Second, this dissertation achieves sharper analytical differentiation among militarisms. The “multiple militarisms” framework can be utilized in comparative analysis of cross-nation and temporal case studies. Third, the dissertation contributes to our understanding of how the government and public negotiate militarism in the context of international norms. By analyzing how Japan manages competing motivations, this paper addresses larger questions of how violence as a tool of statecraft is accepted and how states localize dominant international norms.

Last, this dissertation has important implications for policymakers and NGOs. The findings in this study will help policymakers identify weaknesses in security forces and NGOs will benefit from analysis illustrating how civil society impacts policy, and why they sometimes fail to reach their objectives.

**Cases, Data, and Methodology**

The rest of the dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter Two identifies the strengths and weaknesses of alternative theories explaining Japanese security policy. The chapter then proceeds to compare different types of militarism since the Meiji Era. Chapter Three examines the material, i.e. social-structural and technical constraints on the JSDF. Chapter Four analyzes the ideational, i.e. political and normative restraints on the JSDF. Chapter Five discusses the direction of Japanese security policy, examining the developments in the Japan-US Alliance and Japan’s contributions to human security.
This dissertation carefully examines seven decades of the content and direction of Japanese security policy. This longitudinal approach is useful because it avoids exaggerating the effects of changes in policy that are not enduring, and helps differentiate between true watershed moments or “critical junctures” and anomalous events. Scholars have argued that significant debates over security policy takes place in roughly 10-year intervals. The 10-year estimate is a bit inaccurate, but correctly illustrates that it takes years to understand the implications of policy. The government releases white papers annually, mid-term reports every five years, and major policy change approximately every 10 to 15 years. Lieutenant General Noboru Yamaguchi contends, in order to understand security policy now, one should not look at what is being spent today, but what has been spent over the last twenty years.

The public’s discussion of security policy and identity is also complex. Peace activists plan their activities to coincide with major events, such as war anniversaries, NPT meetings, and government press releases. Between these events, activists host and attend numerous academic and public events to promote their message. Understanding Japanese security policy requires more than analysis of major events, but also the day-to-day activities leading up to those decisions.

To analyze change over time, I utilize process-tracing. Process-tracing “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005, 206). Process-tracing is useful in detangling complex phenomena that take place over long periods of time. Sequencing and long-term processes are important to illustrating that

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14 For more on process-tracing, see Checkel 2005.
“casual analysis is fundamentally historical – the order of events or processes is likely to have a crucial impact on outcomes (Pierson 2005, 55). For example, had the LDP been in power during the 3/11 Triple Disaster, it would have been unlikely that Prime Minister Abe would have the opportunity to pursue his Proactive Contribution to Peace agenda. Abe also benefitted from his failures in 2007. His departure served as an important learning moment and he has returned better prepared to deal with the obstacles to his security agenda. Context, unrelated to power balancing, has a significant impact on security policy.

The primary case examined in this dissertation is post-war Japan (1945-present). However, within this single-nation case study, I compare three other temporal cases – the Meiji Era, Interwar Period, and WWII. Additionally, I utilize context-driven analysis by comparing Japanese security policy and power projection capabilities with China, North Korea, and South Korea. Lastly, I analyze issue area cases, the Japan-US Alliance, PKO, and HA/DR to illustrate the direction and content of Japanese security policy.

To determine the content and direction of Japanese security policy, I examine how the government and public conceptualize and pursue their security goals. How elites conceptualize security is fruitful in investigating “Japan’s” foreign policy because dominant interpretations “are construed and reproduced most frequently by those in power” (Lynch 2006, 294).

To ascertain elite opinion, I analyzed over 800 prime minister and minister of foreign affairs speeches, policy statements, and press releases. I also conducted over 50 semi-structured interviews with politicians, bureaucrats, JSDF personnel, academics, members of the media, museum directors, and peace activists and NGO leaders over 15 months in Japan. I also attended Track II workshops and government press conferences. Last, I examined government white papers and reports, laws, company financial reports, and political advertisements.
To understand public opinion and expressions of peace and militarism, I analyzed newspaper articles and editorials, physical monuments, polls and surveys, museum signage and exhibits, textbooks, films, videogames, and comics. I also attended peace events, protests, and working groups. By utilizing diverse “high” and “low” data, I triangulate Japan’s shared conception of security policy.\(^{15}\)

To assess the meaning behind visual and textual data, I utilize discourse analysis.\(^{16}\) Discourse analysis is useful because it reveals how often certain themes and terminologies appear in policy statements, speeches, and interviews and illustrates how security conceptions are constructed, justified, and propagated. Discourses are not just expressions of policy preferences, they are also signs of power that can impact social practices and how security is understood and pursued. According to Price (1997) “discourses produce and legitimize certain behaviors and conditions of life as ‘normal’ and serve to politicize some phenomena over others” (9). In the case of Japan, the antimilitarism norm frames how security is debated and negotiated between the public and government. The Japanese government has justified normalizing the JSDF in a fashion unlike any other government in the world, a reflection of the influence of antimilitarism. When unpopular security policies are adopted, government approval ratings drop and the public becomes more adamant at maintaining the status quo. In other words, counterfactual occurrences do not necessarily indicate norms go away; norms change, are contested, and are expressed in different ways at different times.\(^{17}\)

*Alternative Explanations*

\(^{15}\) See Weldes 2006 for detailed analysis on the value of “low” data.

\(^{16}\) For more on discourse analysis, see Milliken 2009. For an example of discourse analysis used in Japanese security studies, see Catalinac 2007. Catalinac utilizes discourse analysis to analyze politicians’ responses to the First and Second Gulf Wars.

\(^{17}\) For more on norms, see Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 and Klotz and Lynch 2007.
Security policy “normalization” literature can be categorized into three broad categories, international-level, domestic-level, and ideational-based explanations, discussed in detail in Chapter Two.

International-level explanations contend regional threats, such as China and North Korea cause security policy change. Moreover, the anarchic nature of the international system and the state’s concern over its survival causes the government to constantly seek power. Realism, therefore, predicts Japan will constantly seek to increase its power projection capabilities, especially in times of vulnerability. Though realism illustrates potential motivations for normalization, the theory is unclear on exactly how, when, and what security policy is adopted. Moreover, realism has had difficulty determining why Japanese security policy has not changed more quickly, especially in regards to the durability of Article 9 and the 1% of the GDP cap on the defense budget. Some scholars have modified realism to explain Japan’s atypical security behavior. For example, its limited defense budget has been attributed to a strategy of buck-passing, contending it will increase when necessitated. Another variant contends Japan maintains its limited defense posture when the US security guarantee is strong, but will not when the security guarantee is weak. Others argue gaiatsu (foreign pressure) leads to changes in security policy. In these explanations, Japan’s security is significantly tied to the US and other parties, betraying a core assumption of realism that states rely on self-help to ensure their security. Moreover, these theories cannot account for the influence of non-state and non-government actors on security policy.

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18 For more on international level explanations of Japanese militarization, see Cooney 2002 and Pyle 2007.  
19 For more on variants of realism applied to Japan, see Lind 2004 and Miyashita 2007.  
20 Legro and Moravcsik (1999) provide an exhaustive criticism of more recent realist scholarship’s inability to stay logically coherent and distinct.
Domestic-level explanations call attention to the conditions that allow remilitarization over the causes of remilitarization. For example, several scholars have noted the influence of nationalism on defense policy (Arase 2007; Hughes and Krauss 2007; Sasada 2006). These theories assume the public has little influence on government decisions and nationalistic elites determine the content and direction of Japanese security policy. The weakness of these explanations is that they ignore a lot of data concerning non-elite actors, who influence the government in multiple ways. Kazuhiko Togo (2010) contends the most aggressive nationalists, the “assertive conservative right,” have lost influence since the end of the Abe administration (first term) and the rise of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Domestic level explanations also have difficulty explaining inconsistencies between goals and outcomes. For example, although the “assertive conservative right” came to the forefront during the Koizumi administration, their beliefs did not align with Koizumi’s “clearly apologist view,” resulting in very little change in security policy (Togo 2010, 84). Additionally, one can question the importance of nationalism altogether. Mariko Tsujita (2009) contends that even though nationalistic education and patriotism have increased in recent years, “there is no mass feeling to support nationalism” and the various groups that may utilize nationalistic symbols such as waving flags at sports games and visiting the Yasukuni Shrine do so without “being chauvinistic nationalists” (198).

An Old Logic and the New “Normal”
Given the myriad of security threats, how long can the “peace-loving nation” last? Japan is at a crossroads and many believe it will “militarize,” “remilitarize,” and “normalize.” However, this crossroads presents a false dichotomy. Japan has more than two choices. The content and direction of Japanese security policy is not determined by a single force, whether it is the
international security environment or the domestic antimilitarism norm. It is the combination of constitutive material and ideational factors that shapes security behavior.

Security policy is a reflection of the environment in which it is debated and reconciled. Japan’s security environment is comprised of several social-structural, technical, political, and normative constraints that determine the upper limits of the nation’s power projection capabilities. Security threats allow for change, but the antimilitarism environment ensures the changes will be at the margins. Japanese security policy is akin to walking in quicksand, where movement leads to resistance. The remainder of the dissertation will examine how Japan balances between adopting a new “normal” of the international security environment and the old logic of antimilitarism that has provided 70 years of peace and prosperity.
Chapter Two: What is “Normal”? A New Approach to Militarism

Scholars, policymakers, and anxious East Asia leaders have long predicted Japan’s eventual return to “normal” security behavior. Within academic literature and policy circles, East Asia specialists have debated whether international threats or domestic forces would undo Japanese pacifistic attitudes and institutions. This chapter examines explanations of Japanese security behavior, elucidates complementary elements among the various schools of thought, and addresses the limitations to the explanatory power of the orthodox views of Japanese security policy. Furthermore, this chapter analyzes fundamental assumptions within the literature regarding what constitutes “normal” security behavior and militarism. I seek to denaturalize the terms “normal,” “nationalism,” and “militarism.” I examine how nationalism and militarism influenced Japan in different time periods to determine what constituted “normal” in a given context and how these concepts acquired different meaning over time.

When academics, East Asia leaders, and Japanese policymakers discuss normal security behavior, what exactly do they mean and according to what standards? Are normal and abnormal security policy descriptions sufficient to explaining thousands of cases of state security behavior? I contend the current analytical framework examining militarism is insufficient to understanding Japanese security policy. The accepted discourse oversimplifies complex security practices, which leads to misinterpretation of Japanese security motives. For example, although scholars readily acknowledge that present-day security policy is not akin to 1930s-style militarism, they do not articulate what exactly Japanese remilitarization entails. This lack of specificity forgoes important critical analysis of why Japan would not return to its more aggressive colonial past, necessary to curtailing open-ended alarmist predictions. Since the focus centers on independent variables (external threats) and not on the content of security policy
(practices and justifications), concepts such as “militarization,” “normalization,” and “remilitarization” are vague. By expanding conceptions of militarism, one can begin to understand how the international environment, domestic politics, and norms interact to produce security policy. I contend Japan’s decision not to return to more aggressive forms of militarism is not only due to a lack of desire, but also because the present context lacks many of the institutions and socioeconomic variables that allowed for imperialistic militarism to arise in the 19th century.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I analyze competing hypotheses concerning Japanese security policy. Second, I examine historical cases of Japanese militarism and elucidate consistent and divergent themes among various time periods. Third, I reexamine the meaning of militarism and discuss the content and utility of a “multiple militarisms” analytical framework.

Competing Explanations of Japanese Security Policy

Literature concerning Japanese security policy change, or lack of change, can be organized into three levels of analysis: 1) international-level explanations emphasizing balance of power, 2) domestic-level explanations emphasizing political interests, and 3) ideational explanations emphasizing norms and culture.

Many scholars acknowledge that to some degree, each level of analysis explain elements of security policy. However, discussion of Japanese security policy remains incomplete because scholars avoid engaging fundamental assumptions of competing schools of thought, particularly realism’s dismissal of constructivist analyses regarding the significance of norms and identity in shaping how the public and government conceptualize security. This is problematic for several reasons. First, constructivist analyses of antimilitarism are oversimplified and misconstrued by
realists. Within the literature terms such as “pacifism” and “antimilitarism” are used interchangeably - critiques of the former are equivalent to disproving the latter.

Pacifism is the ontological rejection of war and violence as justifiable tools to achieve political ends. Although there have been prominent pacifists in Japanese postwar history, mainstream attitudes reflect antimilitarism, the understanding that military force is often not the best method to achieve stability and peace. Antimilitarists believe the use of force is justifiable when protecting vulnerable populations or in self-defense. Pacifism and antimilitarism have had vastly different effects on Japanese security policy since WWII.

Second, realists overlook constructivist disclaimers about the limits of the antimilitarism norm while understating the impact of norms on security policy. Constructivists contend norms can change over time - norms can erode and be replaced with competing norms. Thus, constructivists can account for security policy change, the antimilitarism norm has eroded and a competing norm has become the dominant force in security thinking. Norms can also change how Japanese interpret threats and the legitimacy of the use of military force. Norms are not just a variable that is taken into consideration by leaders and public when dealing with external threats, they shape how threats are assessed, limit policy options, and produce novel ways of addressing security concerns.

Third, within realism, there are no analytical or linguistic tools to discuss norms without sacrificing the integrity of fundamental realist claims. According to a strict interpretation of realist tenets, norms do not exist or they are epiphenomenal to the political process. Yet, when realists seek to disprove the antimilitarism norm, they argue Japanese pacifism and antimilitarism have eroded, indicating these ideational factors have influenced security policy previously. Fourth, the centrality of states and elites in policy analysis neglects the importance
of non-state actors and grassroots movements. Since WWII, Japan has been a vibrant democracy with an active civil society.

Fifth, analysis of Japanese security policy has focused on what causes change in security policy while overlooking variables that make change difficult, i.e. demographic and technical factors. Security policy change can be conceptualized as a three-step process. First, leaders recognize threats and respond accordingly. In some cases, leaders expand the purpose and capabilities of the armed forces to justify military expansion. Second, politicians overcome political, normative, and institutional obstacles to convert their policy goals into law. Third, these policy initiatives are implemented. The third step has been under analyzed within security studies literature. Due to 70 years of constrained security policy, among other factors, implementing policy measures is difficult. Overcoming path-dependent obstacles requires not only political and normative change, but technical and social change as well. Moreover, infrastructure deficiencies hinder implementing new policy measures effectively. This process of converting security policies into practice warrants further investigation.

This dissertation builds upon the important contributions of realists and constructivists while offering a new analytical framework for studying Japanese security policy and militarism.

*International-level and Structural-based Explanations*

Realism contends the anarchic international system compels states, most importantly “great powers,” to constantly seek power to ensure their survival. Since states are rational actors and uncertain of the intentions of others, they pursue security via internal and external balancing.\(^{21}\) Realists contend Japan, as a historical economic, political, and military great power, is likely to

\(^{21}\) For more on the core tenets of structural realism, see Waltz 1979; Walt 1987; and Mearsheimer 2001. For more on Japanese security normalization, see Betts 1994 and Green 2001. Although not normally associated with realism, Huntington (1993) argues that Japan will eventually seek international primacy due to its economic strength. Furthermore, Huntington contends that US hegemony would be threatened when Japan converts its economic strength into military power.
increase its power projection capabilities when threats arise and the power balance in the international system shifts.

Christopher Layne (1993) argues, “Notwithstanding legal and historical inhibitions, Japan is beginning to seek strategic autonomy” and possibly develop nuclear capabilities eventually (38). Historian Kenneth Pyle (2007) contends due to a “more insecure regional politics and the specter of terrorism, the government steadily abandoned many prohibitions on a proactive military” and the “ability to project power abroad has been broached” (17). Specifically, rising China, nuclearizing North Korea, strengthening South Korea, and new stateless threats such as terrorism have legitimized more aggressive security policy. Accordingly, “Japan is on the verge of another sea change in its international orientation” and “over more than half a century of national pacifism and isolationism, the nation is preparing to become a major player in the strategic struggles of the twenty-first century” (Pyle 2007, 2). Daniel Kliman (2006) echoes these sentiments and argues, “Tokyo has experienced a destiny turning point in its security strategy, as the erosion of normative restraints has markedly accelerated (2).

Undeniably policymakers have been vigilant at identifying threats to Japanese security and responded accordingly. However, as Waltz (1996) reminds us, structural realism is insufficient to understanding foreign policy because it is not interested in explaining the internal dynamics of a state. Due to structural realism’s emphasis of theoretical parsimony and focus on the international system, it has difficulty explaining domestic and normative variables that shape Japanese security policy. It has been over twenty years since Layne predicted Japan would become a normal nation, yet it is unclear if this has been the case. Recent research also claims Japan is normalizing without any indication of when the process of normalization would be
completed, or what the end product would entail. Another limitation of realist analyses is it does not address the constructivist contentions that norms influence Japanese security behavior and thus, Japan is less likely to normalize over time. Layne treats “legal and historical inhibitions” as afterthoughts even though Japan’s “Peace Constitution” and postwar history are what makes its security policy uniquely Japanese.

Recently, some scholars directly have challenged norm-based arguments. Akitoshi Miyashita (2007) raised the important question, where do norms come from? While acknowledging norms can influence security policy, Miyashita concludes the strength of Japanese antimilitarism is tied to the security environment, and absent an American security guarantee, one should expect an erosion of pacifism. A weakness of this argument is it deflects the fundamental contribution that constructivists make, antimilitarism norms have constrained Japanese security behavior. Miyashita utilizes the neorealist strategy of disproving the existence of the norm by arguing that it can go away. However, this argument requires significant concessions in realist claims - norms exist and are influential. Jennifer Lind (2004) challenges the significance of the antimilitarism norm altogether. Lind contends antimilitarism norms do not adequately explain limited defense spending and a strategy of buck-passing is more in accordance with Japanese security policy. Similar to Miyashita, Lind posits that when the Japan-US Alliance weakens, Japan will seek more autonomous security policies (Lind 2004, 93).

Lind’s research is a significant contribution to Japanese security studies. As Lind demonstrates, there are multiple ways to analyzing military spending and the type of technology

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22 It is important to note that Thomas Berger (1993), who is the most cited antimilitarism norm proponent, argues that Japan might not be able to maintain the anti-militarism norm if it does not make a larger contribution to the international community. The idea that the international environment is important to security policy is not foreign to constructivists. Constructivists argue that various actors can influence the international environment, interests can change, and states are not forever trapped in a vicious game of balancing.
a state adopts can shed light on its military orientation. Moreover, Lind disproves the myth that Japan is militarily inconsequential. Nevertheless, Lind’s reexamination of Japanese military power, claims of dramatic transformation in security policy, and evidence of buck-passing merit reconsideration.

First, though Lind makes a strong case for why Japan is a maritime power, there is limited discussion of why Japan has not pursued significant power projection capabilities more aggressively. Lind contends the normative 1% of GDP spending cap on defense spending is inconsequential given the quality of JSDF technology and training. However, this deflects from the question, why has the 1% cap endured when buck-passing threatens the Japan-US Alliance and Japan can afford to spend more (up to 4% according to some estimates) to increase its independent capabilities? Buck-passing is an inexact strategy that can lead to imprecise conclusions about how and when certain technologies are adopted.

Second, in comparing Japan with traditional European military powers, Lind draws attention away from a more telling indicator of the direction of Japanese security policy – limited growth in comparison to East Asian militaries. If Japan were to adopt a balancing strategy, it would correspond with China, North Korea, Russia, and to a lesser extent South Korea and Taiwan. Buck-passing is only as viable as alliances and threats are manageable. As discussed in Chapter Four, Japan’s absolute and relative military spending has decreased over the last 15 years, allegedly a period where the antimilitarism norm eroded. With the US’ attention drawn to the Middle East since 2001 and the rapid increase in quantity and quality of East Asia military forces, one should expect Japan to significantly increase its military spending and modernization efforts.

Third, dramatic change in security policy, even when in response to external threats, does
not necessary indicate norms do not have long-term constraining effects on security policy. The very nature of norms is that they are contested. However, while stable, norms create enduring institutions that promote certain policies while removing others. Fourth, Lind provides no rubric for what constitutes “dramatic” change. Qualitative and quantitative military strength is difficult to measure, especially in regards to states that do not fight wars. Hagstrom and Williamsson (2009) contend the Ministry of Defense (MOD) has implemented incremental changes to the capabilities of the JSDF over the last few decades. While Japanese power projection capabilities have improved due to advances in technology, the JSDF has not gained game-changing war capabilities in decades.

Fifth, it is questionable if Japan has buck-passed given the high cost of its current security strategy. To offset the costs of a more independent security posture, $40 billion annually, Japan liberally provides Official Development Aid (ODA) throughout the world and takes on the economic and social burdens of hosting US bases. Moreover, linking its security doctrine to the US, Japan has jeopardized its neutral position in international relations, created tension in East Asia, and sacrificed autonomy in security matters. Finally, Lind’s assessment of antimilitarism is oversimplified. As demonstrated in the dissertation, Japanese antimilitarism is not a hegemonic force that dominates security policy. It is an enduring and pervasive force that influences, suggests, and hinders. It creates pause among policymakers and fuels dissatisfaction in the public during periods of militarization. Antimilitarism gives the content and direction of Japanese security policy its unique character.

Although structural-based arguments provide insight on some security behaviors, they

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24 Coincidentally, although Lind’s article is titled “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?: Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” the term “pacifism” is not used once throughout the article.
have difficulty assessing how modern threats such as terrorism, piracy, and cybercrime shape security policy. Structural realism explains some kinds of international relations, such as state conflict and cooperation related to managing conflict. Occasionally, neorealists analyse is policy prescriptions more so than analysis of the content and configuration MOD security policy and JSDF practices. Incorporating other theories is necessary to explaining the primary activities of the JSDF, peacekeeping operations and disaster relief.

Some scholars have turned to neoclassical realism to account for idiosyncrasies in Japanese security policy. Paul Midford (2002) argues Japan’s limited security policy is not derived from a domestic pacifism, but a rational response to the anarchical system. Japan balances against threat and, therefore, maintains a low profile to reassure its neighbors - avoiding a “security dilemma.” Midford (2011) contends the Japanese public accepts this security strategy, citing public opinion polls showing support for the defensive use of the JSDF and lack of support for offensive activities. Similarly, Tsuyoshi Kawasaki (2001) contends, “Japan’s overall strategic goal is to reduce the intensity of the security dilemma in Northeast Asia. To achieve this goal, Japan maintains its alliance with the United States and its modest and defensive military capabilities” (224).

This dissertation builds upon conclusions drawn by neoclassical realists (Chapter Four). However, as neoclassical realists such as Kawasaki claim constructivists underestimate the influence of the “security dilemma” in security calculations, neoclassical realists underestimated the importance of norms in shaping security behavior and discourse. Leaders are less likely to utilize military force to mitigate threats not only because it may send the wrong signals, but also because they may find military buildup an affront to their beliefs and national identity. Many Japanese believe imperialism was costly and immoral. And notwithstanding die-hard
revisionists, many believe Japan’s monumental defeat in WWII was not due to counterbalancing, but because of poor elite decision-making that dragged the nation into an unwinnable war. Moreover, neoclassical realists ignore international norms such as the responsibility to protect (R2P), democracy promotion, and human rights, that influence security policy.

Kawasaki (2001) claims constructivists gloss over the security dilemma (225). However, if states conceptualize threat and cooperation contrary to neoclassical realist predictions, the security dilemma never comes to fruition. The security dilemma cannot explain why Japan actively participates in PKO and aggressively pursues a seat on the UN Security Council, alarming behavior to distrustful neighbors. Japan’s zealous reassuring statements are not empty references to the “Peace Constitution,” they lead to enduring policies and institutions that handcuff its ability to independently defend itself from real threats. This lack of self-reliance, immense trust in the Japan-US Alliance, and hope that suspicious East Asian states will find its signaling reassuring does not reflect assumptions in neoclassical realism.

Domestic-level Explanations
Domestic-level explanations focus on how the government and the Japan-US Alliance shape security policy. Richard Samuels’ (2007) detailed investigation of the relationship between regional threats and shifts in domestic politics provides valuable insight concerning how and why Japanese leaders responded to regional threats such as a rising China, nuclear North Korea, and possible abandonment by the US. International threats are filtered through domestic debates resulting in four distinct groups (pacifists, neoautonomists, normal nation-alists, and middle power internationalists) vying for control of security policy (Samuels 2007, p. 5). Samuels concludes the external environment and political failures of socialists marginalized pacifism. As a result, Japanese grand strategy follows a “goldilocks consensus” - Japan hedges between China
and the US and its security posture in the region will be neither too big nor too small (Samuels 2007, 132). Keiko Hirata (2008) argues different groups vie for the national consciousness, pacifists, mercantilists, normalists, and nationalists. Up to the end of the Cold War, mercantilists were the dominant force, but have since been overtaken by normalists, led by Prime Minister Abe.

Although elites have significant influence on security policy, ignoring public opinion, NGOs, and grassroots movements fails to fully explain the domestic and international environments in which elites operate. Since Japan is a vibrant democracy with a risk averse culture, normalists are constrained when pursuing aggressive security policy. Additionally, Samuels and Hirata too quickly dismiss the influence of pacifism in Japanese politics. The failures of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP) are well documented and illustrate why pacifists are marginalized in Japanese politics. However, the lingering influences of pacifism are considerable. For example, the New Komeito Party (NKP), which routinely utilizes antimilitaristic rhetoric and is closely associated with the Buddhist peace organization Soka Gakkai, regularly checks the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) efforts to change security policy. Moreover, the pervasive pacifist discourse in newspapers, radio, symposiums and conferences, music concerts, textbooks, manga (comics), and museum exhibits influences the public’s views of the legitimacy of violence as a tool of statecraft.

Some link the domestic- and international-levels. David Arase (2007) argues, “Aside from the generational change, a new alignment of factors at the levels of international structure, domestic institutions, and national identity after 9/11 has encouraged Japan to change its security posture; it has done so with unprecedented scope and speed (561). Domestic reforms led to more dynamic policymaking in the 1990s, allowing for popular leaders such as Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi to respond to post-9/11 threats with “unprecedented change with unprecedented speed” (Arase 2007, 571-572). Arase expects these trends to continue as leaders “cast off the weakness and deference that characterized Japan after World War II in order to claim the rights and respect that Japan’s accomplishments have earned” (Arase 2007, 574). Moreover, Arase contends, “with no deep ideological conflict to divide this generation, a reviving nationalist sentiment to bind them together, and a common perception of security problems, the ruling LDP and its main opposition, the DPJ, are often in agreement on the biggest security issues, especially North Korea (Arase 2007, p. 574). Kevin Cooney (2002) also finds agreement among leaders. Cooney contends elites use the myth of gaiatsu (foreign pressure) from the international level to pursue an agenda of a “normal nation” domestically (144).

There are several shortcomings to attributing policy change solely to leadership and politics. First, leadership stability since WWII has been erratic. From 1947 to 2014, only seven of thirty-one prime ministers remained in office for more than 1000 days. This is particularly remarkable since Japanese prime ministers can call elections when their party is popular, increasing the likelihood they can extend their time in office. Of the seven prime ministers to hold office more than 1000 days, only Yasuhiro Nakasone and Koizumi sought to normalize the JSDF, the latter more successfully than the former. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi cemented the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America as the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy, but was forced to resign due to significant public backlash. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reached the 1000-day milestone on September 18, 2014 (combining both terms) and has been moderately successful in enacting policy change. Strong leaders can be very influential in determining the direction of security policy, but rarely has Japan had a prime minister who had the time and support to implement new security policies.

25 For more on the leadership’s influence on security policy, see McCormack 2004.
On the other hand, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato were very successful in establishing many antimilitaristic principles and institutions. Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda eschewed controversial security initiatives in favor of improving the economy.

Second, many bureaucrats oppose normalization and believe they are the final check on overzealous politicians, obstructing unwanted policy platforms via loosely interpreting policy platforms and creative legal drafting. Third, the impact of the Japan-US Alliance on elite decision-making is much more complex than unwanted foreign pressure. Abe, for example, believes the Japan-US Alliance creates the opportunity for Japan to “Proactively Contribute to Peace”, while others, contend it is a questionable cornerstone to Japanese security because it can lead to regional isolation and being drawn into US conflicts. Given the US’ declining influence, costly wars in the Middle East, and increasing importance of China, some leaders are reconsidering the prudence of relenting to US pressure. In September 2014, Japan suffered a major setback in negotiations over the Kuril Islands because the Abe administration yielded to pressure to enact sanctions against Russia. Notwithstanding East Asia, Japan is well respected internationally, and the benefits that it reaps from its reputation are at risk if it follows the US too closely.

Ideational-based Explanations
Ideational-based explanations examine how non-material factors such as ideas, norms, culture, and identity influence on security policy. In the literature, the most commonly cited ideational forces are nationalism, antimilitarism, pacifism, and prestige.

Nationalism is frequently cited by realists and popular press as the impetus for security normalization. Growing nationalism is attributed to conservatives’ pride of Japan’s culture and economic success, insecure feelings brought on by the rise of China, lack of war guilt, need for
prestige, and racism. Hironori Sasada (2006) argues, “as the antipathy toward Japan has intensified in China and Korea, the Japanese have countered with their own nationalistic turn, marked by increasing support for more assertive national defense policies and an uncompromising stance toward its hostile neighbors” (109). Conservative politicians exploit feelings of insecurity and hostility to achieve security policy normalization. Sasada concludes, “Today Japanese people, including the young population who used to advocate pacifism enthusiastically, favor nationalistic policies more than ever before, and the public is leading Japan away from its post-World War II pacifist tradition” (109).

Antipathy towards China and South Korea has fueled nationalistic discourse. Due to two decades of economic decline and increased academic and economic competition, feelings of insecurity have magnified in Japan. Sasada (2006) contends the “changing global context, the decline of leftist parties, the increasing influence of media and conservative intellectuals, the growing popularity of nationalist manga, increased Internet use, and international sporting events” comprise the environment that has fueled tensions in East Asia (112). Other examples of growing nationalism are the Yasukuni Shrine and history textbooks controversies. East Asia is convinced Japan is “whitewashing” its colonial history and has not properly atoned for its actions in WWII.

Linking nationalism to increased militarism is problematic. First, the majority of the security measures pursued in recent years are defense-oriented. Since it is generally accepted, even in East Asia, that Japan has the right to self-defense, policies increasing its ability to protect its territories are a far cry from aggressive nationalism. Second, Japan participates in Track I and Track II bilateral and multilateral negotiations concerning disputed territories and security matters, hardly an uncompromising stance toward hostile neighbors. Third, nationalistic forces

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26 For popular media on the rise of Japanese nationalism, see McCormac (2014); Richards (2014); Takahashi (2014).
primarily focus on reinterpreting Japan’s colonial past, rarely proposing specific policy recommendations. Nationalists support strengthening the JSDF to prevent Chinese encroachment. Scholars have not shown that general improvement and modernization initiatives in the JSDF are a response to pressure from nationalistic groups.

It is difficult to determine whether nationalism leads to militarism because nationalism is as elusive a concept as militarism. Historian Kevin Doak (1997) contends there are several types of competing nationalisms originating from different segments of society. Doak contends scholars have followed the “time-honored means of explaining both Japan's economic successes and political crimes over the course of the twentieth century” by underscoring “the role of the state in historical accounts of national identity in modern Japan” (285). This approach treats nationalism as a single hegemonic force when, in practice, ethnic-centered and state-centered nationalisms propagated and challenged militaristic policies. The tensions among nationalisms is relevant in the postwar period because some intellectuals hailed ethnic nationalism as “a critical ingredient in anti-imperialism and decolonization movements in ways that reconnected to the post-Meiji popular disenchantment with the modern capitalist state” (Doak 1997, 300). Ethnic nationalism, which can complement conservative movements, is one of several nationalisms that vie for the soul of modern Japan. During the Allied occupation, elites promoted a specific brand of nationalism, which espoused:

a “liberal democratic nationalism that would support the liberal, capitalist Japanese state. This democratic nationalism rested on a concept of the Japanese people as a sovereign kokumin, the key concept of postwar national citizenship that would now include women and that was explicitly joined to the civic values of the new constitution. This belief in the values of a liberal, civic nation was not merely a rejection of class as more fundamental to social life than the nation but a clear alternative to the pervasive concept in wartime Japan of the Japanese as a distinct ethnic nation (minzoku) among its fellow members of the Asian race (jinshu)” (Doak 2007, 301).

Nationalism, and the militarism that may stem from it, is diverse and continues to be negotiated in society. When political scientists predict the rise of Japanese militarism, it is unclear if it is
due to patriotism, jingoism, or nationalism. “Nationalism” and “militarism” have become catch-all terms for dangerous and treacherous. Because Japan was a defeated enemy nation in WWII, its history has served as a scarlet letter in international relations and academic debates. This has prevented critical analysis of the complex nationalisms that influence Japan.

Many constructivists on the other hand, call attention to the role of norms, culture, and identity in constraining militarism. Thomas Berger (1993) argues that the physical and emotional devastation of WWII led to the belief that “the military is a dangerous institution that must be constantly restrained and monitored lest it threaten Japan's postwar democratic order and undermine the peace and prosperity that the nation has enjoyed since 1945” (120). According to some estimates, “2.7 million servicemen and civilians died as a result of the war, roughly 3 to 4% of the country’s 1941 population” (Dower 1999, 45). Hundreds of cities were destroyed, Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered the only use of atomic bombs on humans in history, the state and empire completely collapsed, and the mythical status of the emperor was completely discredited. In other words, the war was not just the destruction of physical Japan, it also unraveled a century-long elaborately constructed national identity. The shock of this monumental defeat laid the foundation for enduring institutions and ideologies that constrain militarism. Berger (1993) concludes, “the primary reason for Japan's reluctance to do so [normalize] is not to be found in any structural factor, such as a high degree of dependence on trade or the absence of any potential security threats, but rather is attributable to Japan's postwar culture of anti-militarism” (120).

The antimilitarism norm is much more complex than realists have depicted in their

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27 Japan has long sought to have Article 53 and Article 107, also known as the “enemy clauses” removed from the United Nations Charter. Some believe the articles are an embarrassing reminder of Japan’s WWII history and an obstacle to obtaining a seat on the UN Security Council.

28 It is important to recognize that the constructivist approach is not limited to analysis of “good norms.” One of the goals of this dissertation is to investigate norms that legitimize militarism and violence in settling international affairs.
rebuttal of constructivism. Andrew Oros (2008) contends Japan’s security policy is constrained by a domestic antimilitarism security identity emphasizing three central tenets: 1) no traditional armed forces, 2) no use of force by Japan except in self-defense, and 3) no Japanese participation in foreign wars. A security identity is “a set of collectively held principles that have attracted broad political support regarding the approached role of state action in the security arena and are institutionalized in the policy making process” (Oros 2008, 9). Oros argues a hegemonic domestic antimilitarism security identity influences organizational design and provides the boundaries to which security policy is debated and establishes limits to what policy options are available. Yasuhiro Izumikawa (2010) further complicates the antimilitarism norm in his contention that the “Japanese antimilitarism is not a monolithic concept. Rather, it consists of three elements: pacifism, anti-traditionalism, and the fear of entrapment” (125). Additionally, Izumikawa calls attention to a critical component of norm development – other ideational forces augment the endurance of norms. Izumikawa contends Japan’s anti-traditionalists seeking to “protect and deepen Japanese democracy” and a fear of entrapment restrain politicians seeking more active security policies (Izumikawa 2010, 131).

Constructivists have captured many elements of Japanese security. This dissertation builds upon their contributions and addresses several shortcomings. First, much of the constructivist literature explains restraints in security policy decision-making, neglecting constraints. Security policy is restrained and constrained by material and technical factors (discussed in Chapter Three). To understand why norms are enduring, analysis of material, institutional, and normative environments is necessary. Second, constructivist literature examining Japanese security policy prioritizes elites over other equally relevant actors and

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29 Izumikawa’s analysis is problematic because pacifism and antimilitarism are treated as the same. As this chapter demonstrates, maintaining a clear division between the two concepts is important to understanding the development and impact of the antimilitarism norm.
forces, i.e. grassroots movements, academia, education, and NGOs. In Chapter Four, I analyze peace discourse to determine how antimilitaristic messages are propagated throughout society. Pacifist elites are simultaneously norm entrepreneurs and products of the antimilitarism norm.

Third, constructivists have not adequately accounted for major shifts in security policy. Within the last three years, Japan has eased the arms-export ban, increased the role of JSDF officers in security decision-making, and adopted collective self-defense. These policy shifts suggest that other norms also influence security policy. Fourth, the antimilitarism norm has not been scrutinized. Norms are often renegotiated when the public and government deal face changing security and ideological environments. An under-analyzed dimension of the evolution of the antimilitarism norm has been the increasing importance of human rights and humanitarian intervention norms. I contend these international norms are localized and reshape Japanese conceptions concerning the appropriate use of force in international relations.

Fifth, constructivists have not addressed the weaknesses of the antimilitarism norm proponents. In Chapter Four, I examine bureaucratic, strategic, and cultural weaknesses of peace groups and address why the antimilitarism norm is not a hegemonic force. Lastly, constructivists have focused on the 1960s and 1970s to explain the peak of the antimilitarism norm and developments in the 1990s to explain its moderate decline. However, several developments in the past five years are likely to significantly impact security policy. The 70th anniversary of WWII, declining hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors) population, and 2014 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), and National Security Strategy (NSS), among other topics are worthy of investigation.
Japan’s Multiple Militarisms
Within political science, there has been a dearth of analysis on what militarism actually entails. This weakness is due to the lack of an analytical framework that differentiates security doctrines. Consequently, vastly divergent cases are categorized as examples of “nationalism,” “militarization,” and “remilitarization.” The current analytical framework is overly reliant on basic indicators of militarization, such as defense spending and technology acquisition, reifying limited conceptions of security that dominate international relations scholarship. The orthodox view assumes security policy begins and ends with the state, ignoring actors utilizing innovative methods and tools to achieving human security and peace.

Given the significance of Japan’s militaristic past and anxiety over its current security policy, it is surprising that the concept of militarism has not been critically examined. Sociologist Martin Shaw (2012) contends within international studies, the term “militarism” is not often used because it denotes a political opposition to military force and therefore not scientific. One can attribute hesitation to use the term because many scholars reside in a country that often serves as the reference point in security studies, the US. Criticisms of militarism, and therefore the US, could be interpreted as politically charged and controversial. However, the US’ primacy in international relations explains much about the weaknesses of the current literature concerning Japanese security policy.

Since the US is militarily active and responds to a myriad of threats, the starting assumption regarding change to security policy is that it must be related to threat. When scholars contend Japan is “normalizing,” “militarizing,” or “remilitarizing,” they emphasize motivations over content and direction. Yet, not all motivations are acted on or converted to corresponding security measures. Inaction can reveal more about security doctrine than action. Furthermore, analysis of security behavior assumes it is bidirectional – states are either increasing power
projection capabilities or decreasing/losing. Several security-related activities do not fit neatly in either category, i.e. disaster relief and PKO. Since the US is often criticized for what is perceived to be a politically motivated nation-building agenda, the assumption that security measures must have ulterior motives is prevalent in international relations scholarship. The language utilized by Western scholars is tinged with an inherent assumption and prejudice that “normal” security behavior is militarization. But there is no standard to how much militarization a state should pursue or what militarization should require.

Coincidentally, realism tacitly acknowledges not all militarisms are the same. For example, realists draw differences among offensive, defensive, and buck-passing strategies. As war technologies become more advanced and accessible, the differences (in utility, not quality) are negligible among states. Most modern countries possess an air force, navy, and standing army. Yet, few scholars would suggest all major warring countries practice the same kind of militarism. Since WWII, the US has spent more on defense than any other country, has bases on foreign territories, and has fought several wars - sometimes unilaterally. However, US militarism is clearly different from militarisms of the British Empire, Nazi Germany, Mongol Empire, and other hegemons. Though scholars acknowledge Japan is not returning to 1930s-style militarism, they are unclear regarding what kind of remilitarization it occurring.

Several indicators illustrate degree of militarization and type of militarism. The power dynamic between civilian and military forces in government reveal direction of security policy. If military officers have disproportionate influence, states are more likely to utilize force to settle international disputes. Another indicator is the prevalence of militarism symbols. In many communist countries, statues and murals throughout the city propagate state narratives about history and identity. In Vietnam and Russia, statues of war heroes are often displayed in
roundabouts and political murals blanket major cities. These discourses are public, unabashed, and uncritical of the military. Another indicator of militarism is how history is portrayed in textbooks, museums, and monuments. In East Asia, the Yasukuni Shrine is commonly associated with Japanese militarism. An investigation of not just the content of museums, but also their popularity and relationship with the government can be informative. The portrayal of military, whether positive or negative, in novels, movies, comics, and television illustrate how the public’s opinion on the JSDF is influenced. How comfortable is the public with military symbols? Are there certain taboos the public and media avoid? Are JSDF personnel respected in society? The varied pervasiveness (and kinds) of symbolic and physical manifestations of militarism among states can illustrate different militarism types.

In the following section I examine several time periods of Japanese history to explain different types of militarisms. In doing so, I develop an analytic framework for achieving sharper analytical differentiation among militarisms.

A Brief History of Japanese Militarisms
During the Edo period (1603-1868), the Tokugawa bakufu ruled Japan from Tokyo. Ieyasu Tokugawa consolidated power through war, but what followed was 250 years of peace and stability. The Edo Period steadily declined due to the intrusion of Western powers, most notably by Commodore Matthew Perry who sailed into Yokohama Bay in 1853 with his infamous black ships. A series of unequal treaties were ratified and Japan’s sovereignty slowly eroded. Its weakness in the international community was a rude awakening and the bitter lesson informed Japanese leaders since then. Isolationism, inability to respond to a rapidly changing world, and strict social order defined the Edo Era. Though Japan’s most iconic symbol of militarism, the samurai, is often associated with this time period, in reality, they were a minority group. Many
of the elite warrior class, most notably from Satsuma and Choshu, would be foundational to the development of the succeeding Meiji Government, however, they were valued more for their bureaucratic skills than their ability to wield a sword.

*The Meiji Era (1868-1912)*

Capturing all of the significant changes in society during the Meiji Restoration is a herculean, if not impossible endeavor. Here, I will focus on four issue areas that relate to militarism: 1) legitimacy of the state, 2) state religion 3) armed forces, and 4) and foreign policy.

The Meiji Restoration is regarded as the beginning of modern Japan. After successfully overthrowing the Tokugawa bakufu, Meiji leaders had to quickly address international and domestic problems. In international affairs, the government sought to renegotiate the “unequal treaties” signed with Western powers in the mid-19th century. China, for centuries the center of East Asia, was a shadow of its former self after just a few decades of Western semi-colonialism. The balance of power in international relations had a significant impact on domestic and foreign policy. Simultaneously, domestic debates over cultural identity, race theory, and direction of the state shaped foreign policy. Japan sought to be recognized as a modern nation and equal to the Western powers. This motivation was not only due to strategic power balancing, but also a desire for prestige and respect. To avoid China’s fate and regain its sovereignty, the government adopted the philosophy “rich nation, strong army.” Japan had internalized the “rules of the game” in international relations, and in many ways, was overcome by modernity (Harootunian 2000). To ensure Japan’s survival, the government worked towards legitimizing its rule, modernizing economic policies and legal codes, and building a cohesive national identity.

Though the imperial line dated back to antiquity, the emperor was rarely the center of Japanese economic and political affairs. During the Edo Era, daimyo (feudal lords) governed
autonomous domains and held allegiance most strongly to the Tokugawa shogunate. Based in Kyoto, the emperor was the final authority in political affairs, yet essentially remained isolated from state affairs, delegating such matters to the government in Tokyo. While the legitimate ruler of Japan, rarely did the emperor serve as an active uniting symbol for the public. Government leaders understood that in order to legitimatize their newfound authority and effectively exercise power, the emperor had to be restored as the ultimate authority. Historians have referred to the elaborate and, at times, forceful policy of restoring imperial rule as “internal colonization” (Doak 1997). The young Meiji emperor toured the four main islands to unite the public under a single powerful symbol. Before the Meiji Restoration, the emperor rarely made public appearances. By having a physical presence across the countryside, yet remaining physically separated by an imposing entourage, the emperor established a visceral link to the common person and maintained an aura of divinity. The locations the emperor visited became public spaces where Japanese congregated and celebrated the nation. Historian Takashi Fujitani (1996) has carefully detailed these “mnemonic sites,” or “material vehicles of meaning that either helped construct a memory of an emperor-centered national past that, ironically, had never been known or served as symbolic markers for commemorations of present national accomplishments and the possibilities of the future” (11). These sites later served as locations for celebrating military victories in the Interwar Period.

Establishing a state religion was also critical to legitimizing the government and creating a national identity. The emperor had long been considered a “living deity with magical powers,” and according to some accounts, during imperial processions villagers gathered dirt-covered pebbles kicked up by imperial horses believing that it would bring good luck and a plentiful harvest (Fujitani 1996, 51). The government aggressively promoted Shinto as the state religion
and foundation of the educational system. Prior to the Restoration, Shinto and Buddhism were intimately connected, sharing places of worship across a highly decentralized network of shrines and temples. The government established the *jingikan* (Department of Shinto) to separate the two religions, solidifying Shinto as a unifying force of Japanese cultural identity. What followed was a “frenzied move to suppress Buddhism, and consequently many Buddhist artifacts were damaged, or destroyed” (Hane 1992, 108). The violence instigated by the government under the guise of religion is telling of how militarism developed over the following five decades. Japan’s colonial expeditions were supported by the divinity of the emperor, and thus, righteousness of the mission.

Establishing a modern military was a priority for the government concerned with encroaching Western powers and domestic instability. In April 1871, three years into the Meiji Era, “the government created an imperial army of just under ten thousand samurai recruited from restoration forces” (Gordon 2003, 88). By 1873, Japan had instituted universal conscription.  

Conscription is important to understanding militarism in modern Japan. Though Japanese soldiers are often portrayed as zealot practitioners of *bushido* (way of the samurai) up to WWII (Berger 1993, 145), conscription was a highly unpopular and contested policy. To former samurai elites, conscription represented the end of the class system that privileged their abilities and afforded them numerous rights not provided to the majority of the population. Non-elites rejected what they believed was a “blood tax” and numerous protests against the new government policy broke out throughout the country (Hane 1992, 97). Thus, “the strong discipline and fierce loyalty shown by Japanese soldiers in the later decades were by no means timeless traditional elements of Japan’s ‘national character’” (Gordon 2003, 66-67). The

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30 Three years of active service and four years of reserve service were required of all males of age (Gordon 2003, 66).
majority of the population did not come from the warrior samurai class. Over time, the establishment of several elite military schools and war professionalized and normalized the military.

The government aggressively spent and distributed technologies to remake the private sector into an independent and sustainable military-industrial-complex (MIC). Kozo Yamamura (1977) contends “the ‘strong army’ policy, combined with the wars, was the principal motivation behind creating and expanding the arsenals and other publicly-financed shipyards and modern factories which acted as highly effective centers or the absorption and dissemination of Western technologies and skills” (113). Participation in foreign wars generated demand, helping the struggling private shipbuilding, machinery, and machine tools industry (Yamamura 1977, 113). The sheer speed of Japan’s economic growth was astounding. Within a dozen years of the Meiji Restoration, the government had developed four major arsenals with satellite plants and three government shipyards that were “fully engaged in supplying the needs of a modern military force” (Yamamura 1977, 114). The strong links between government and industry were critical to the growth of militarism. Through the Ministry of Construction, the government ensured the private sector closely complemented security policy. For example, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, government supported arsenals went into “a twenty-four-hour production schedule to increase the output of ships, guns, shells, and other military needs, and the largest private shipyards, such as Ishikawajima and Kawasaki, were also called upon to upgrade their technological competence and increase production” (Yamamura 1977, 120).

The international environment also influenced the Meiji Government. The government was preoccupied with two main issues, establishing a greater presence in Korea and

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31 Scholars and popular media have grossly exaggerated military aspects of samurai and influence of bushido in Japanese society. By the end of the Tokugawa Era, most samurai spent their time governing and handling bureaucratic matters.
renegotiating the “unequal treaties.” Japan’s first major victory on the Korean peninsula was the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876. It gave Japan access to key trading ports and more importantly, a footprint on the continent to challenge Chinese and Russian influence in Korea. For Meiji leaders such as Yamagata Aritomo, Korea was critical to the security strategy of establishing a buffer zone (“zone of advantage”), designed to protect Japan (“zone of sovereignty”) (Gordon 2003, 116). Over the next few decades, the government and public intellectuals grappled with the ethics and ideologies of who and what comprised the nation. By the early 1920s, colonial possessions became inherent components of the empire, thus expanding Japan’s “zone of sovereignty.” This fueled the government’s anxiety over its security and fueled aggressive security policies seeking to establish more “zones of sovereignty.” Consequently, the independence, prestige, and boldness of the military increased. These issues would arise a few decades later in the Manchurian Incident, when the Kwantung Army manufactured an excuse to invade Northeastern China. In the 1880s and early 1890s however, military officials were “relatively cautious” and resisted popular jingoistic attitudes” (Gordon 2003, 117). It was not until the euphoria of later military successes did Japan dedicate its resources to full-scale imperialism.

The next major victory for Japan was in the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War, culminating in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. After achieving an unexpected lopsided victory, Japan gained territorial concessions (Taiwan, which was pacified militarily), development rights, sizable war reparations, and most importantly the respect of the international community. Japan’s rising status within the international community fueled an enormous outpouring of domestic support and national pride. Japan’s incursions in Korea and China established a pattern of the press and political opponents of the government propagating Korean independence from China under the
guise of pan-Asianism followed by the government limiting but not sanctioning such movements as “it moved cautiously in a similar direction” (Gordon 2003, 117). Similar to the strategy of establishing the divinity of the emperor, pan-Asianism was an elaborate tool utilized by nationalist and military forces to justify aggressive militarism. Japan’s military successes during the Meiji Era reached its zenith in its remarkable victory over a Western power in the Russo-Japanese War. Securing victory in September 1905, Japan gained some territorial possessions, but most importantly, dominion over Korea, later formally colonized in 1910.

Its aggressive policies in East Asia provided the leverage the government needed to renegotiate the “unequal treaties.” During the Iwakura missions of the early 1870s, Japan was a voracious student looking to mimic Western political, military, economic, and cultural institutions. Japan was operating from a position of weakness and was unable to undo the “unequal treaties.” Over the next few decades, the government slowly regained rights over tariffs, territories, and trade. Eventually Japan created unequal treaties with Asian countries. Japan’s annexation of Korea was unchallenged by the West. The fact that its early military successes allowed the government to renegotiate treaties and gain a prominent position in world affairs certified its belief that what it was doing was right.

The Meiji Era provides several important insights concerning Japanese militarism. First, colonialism did not begin with Korea—it started at home. The first territories the Meiji Government gained were Ezo (Hokkaido) and the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa). Additionally, the imperial processionals allowed the emperor to establish sovereignty over the main Japanese islands, with each step analogous to placing a flag in the ground in unclaimed territories. Early Meiji leaders sought to remake society, one obedient and loyal to the “divine” emperor, and hardworking to build a “rich nation and strong army.” This brand of militarism was not initially
expansionist. The government and public intellectuals were in the process of constructing fundamental characteristics of Japanese identity, and had not yet developed a colonial doctrine of empire and race. Militarism during the early Meiji Era was defensive and inward looking. This “survival militarism” was defined by the government’s creation and control of the military to fulfill the goals of a vulnerable developing nation. Even with several military successes, the public was not ready to support empire. The public suffered from war fatigue as often as it was overtaken by the deliria of victory. Government coffers were pushed to the limit by questionable international activities and Japan endured significant losses in the Russo-Japanese War. Up to the Meiji Era, the common person did not pay the costs of war so directly.

Second, it was not just the distribution of power that fueled the “rich nation, strong army” ideology, but also the feeling Japan was un-modern and backwards. These sentiments would eventually be overtaken by feelings of pride in Japanese uniqueness and anti-Western attitudes. Nationalism in the Meiji Era sought to mimic the West. Japan’s evolving ideologies led a different time of militarism during the Interwar and WWII periods, one defined by racism, military control of the state, and arrogance – highlighting the differences between Japan, the West, and East Asian countries. Many Meiji institutions and ideologies allowed for the creation of the imperial war machine, the war machine did not create Meiji institutions and ideologies. They are intrinsically linked, yet fundamentally different.

Interwar Japan (1918-1939)
By the end of the Meiji Era, Japan had fully converted from a developing state to a full empire, possessing colonies (Korea, Taiwan, and the southern half of the Sakhalin Islands), a strong military, a modern economy, relatively equal treaties with the West, and unequal treaties with East Asia. Yet, the path towards empire and confrontation with the West was not a
foregone conclusion. In the Interwar Period, Japan was divided between democratic internationalism and fascist isolationism, the latter eventually winning the day.

The Taisho Era (1912-1926), sometimes referred to as the “Taisho Democracy,” was the model for democracy and modernity in the non-Western world. Simultaneously, militarism reached its zenith during the Taisho Era. This period demonstrates the extreme sides of Japan, a nation torn between cooperating with status-quo powers and placing faith in its ability to independently grow through power. The militarists were able to wrest away the nation from internationalist forces because of weak democratic institutions, subterfuge, and eventually popular support. Interwar Period militarism is defined by two beliefs, 1) Japan could carve out a space for itself among the Western powers and 2) it could not be accepted, and thus had to prepare for an inevitable war. Neither a defensive nor offensive realist account of the Taisho completely captures this internal struggle. Japan went to war with the West and one could argue that the threat of the West never changed, it was Japan’s conceptions of the West that changed.

During the Taisho Era, Japan had an emperor-centered democracy, a hybrid form of government filled with compromise and contradictions. It is important to recognize difficulties faced by a developing democracy. For most of world history, the majority of people were not free citizens who possessed rights. In the 1920s and 30s most people were either slaves, imperial subjects, or citizens. The Meiji Constitution was just 22 years old at the beginning of the Taisho Era and Japan was in the process of remaking a population of previously non-political peasants into modern citizens, albeit imperial subjects. Prior to the Meiji Era, society was divided into a four-class system consisting of samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants. Only samurai had substantive rights; the rest of the population was trapped in hereditary positions (Gordon 2003). However, half a century after the end of the Tokugawa Era, it was possible for a farmer born in
the countryside to commute to a factory owned by foreigners in the city and work alongside members of all social classes. The Meiji and Taisho governments not only established rights, but also completely remade Japan’s economy, technology, and society. However, democracy was ultimately disrupted by a combination of shocks, namely “economic depression, intense social conflict, military expansions, and the assassination of prime ministers and leading capitalists” (Gordon 2003, 182). The Depression provided opportunity for military leaders to seize the nation.

The strength of democracy was inversely related to the strength of the military. During the Taisho Era, military officials were deeply involved in the policymaking process. Militarists took advantage of public discontent over rising rice prices, inflation, and weak economy to justify their expansionist agenda and marginalize government officials. Militarists argued, “Japan’s economic difficulties could be resolved by moving into Manchuria and other parts of China where supposedly unlimited reservoirs could be tapped” (Hane 1992, 246). With each military success, militarists grew bolder and sought to extend their reach even further. After the Russo-Japanese War, they aggressively pushed the government to increase its size (Hane 1992, 193). The increasing size and prestige of the military allowed Japan to expand the scope of its colonial aspirations. For example, in WWI under the pretense of supporting the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902), it entered the war with intentions of increasing its international prestige and taking hold of German possessions in China (Hane 1992, 195). In 1918, Japan inserted itself in the Siberian Intervention with far more troops than requested by its allies and stayed two years after the other powers had abandoned the mission (Gordon 2003, 175). The government and military were mostly aligned in these early expeditions. The government utilized the military to increase its colonial possessions, international prestige, and maintain domestic stability.
Over time, the military became increasingly uncontrollable. In 1931, two Kwantung Army officers plotted to take Manchuria from Chinese Nationalists in the name of the Japanese Empire. They reasoned that taking Manchuria was vital to protecting Japan from Russia, provided valuable resources for the economy, and ultimately good for the Mongolians (Hane 1992, 254). On September 18, 1931, a small group within the Kwantung Army blew up a small section of the South Manchurian Railroad and used this opportunity to blame Chinese and increase hostilities. Following the attack, the Kwantung Army occupied all of South Manchuria in a highly independent and illegal military campaign.

The government in Tokyo was powerless during this entire fiasco. Prior to the Manchurian Incident, the emperor expressed his concern about the rogue military leaders, resulting in the Minister of War Minami dispatching General Tatekawa to rein in the Kwantung Army (Hane 1992, 254). The army acted before Tatekawa arrived. During the Kwantung Army’s incursions into Southern Manchuria, Foreign Minister Shidehara desperately tried to settle the dispute with China. The army rebuffed Shidehara’s efforts, claiming that their actions were protected by the “independence of the supreme command.” Moreover, the army received enthusiastic public support, further limiting the power of the government. Even the emperor could do little to control the army. Prime Minister Inukai contemplated asking the emperor for assistance in stopping the rebels, but ultimately did not out of fear that the army’s independence would reveal the throne’s weakness (Hane 1992, 256). The Inukai cabinet ultimately yielded to the military’s demands, sending two army divisions into Shanghai to quell anti-Japanese demonstrations against the illegal activities. On March 9, 1932, the army formally created the state of Manchukuo. This episode demonstrates that the military was beginning to make independent political and strategic decisions on behalf of the government, not on its orders. This
was a new kind of militarism because they were *manufacturing* opportunity instead of responding to threats.

The boldness of the military is apparent in attempted coups and assassination of opposition forces, sometimes referred to as “government by assassination.” The military coups in 1932 and 1936 resulted in the murder of several prime ministers and prominent politicians and opposition military leaders. Although both coups were suppressed, the light punishment of the rebels and boldness of the military signaled the strength of nationalists and dangers they posed to civilian opposition.

Japan’s relationship with the West deteriorated significantly during the Interwar Period. Following the Allies’ victory in WWI, Japan pressed China with the infamous Twenty-One Demands. Up to this point, the West was relatively accepting of Japan’s incursions in China’s affairs. However, Japan suffered an embarrassing blow to its status when the British and Americans sided with the Chinese on some demands, resulting in significant modifications to the original proposal. Though Japan gained control of German possessions in China, plus railway rights, this event signaled that the West was the ultimate adjudicator of its foreign affairs.

Another conflict between Japan and the West arose during negotiations in Versailles following the end of WWI. Japanese leaders desperately wanted a racial equality clause in the founding charter of the League of Nations, but were denied. This defeat drudged up memories of the humiliating Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907. The Immigration Act of 1924 would expand on these limits of the Gentlemen’s Agreement and banned Japanese immigration altogether.

In 1922, several Japanese leaders denounced the 5:5:3 tonnage ratios for the UK, US, and Japan that was established at the Five Power Naval Treaty of Washington. Though the agreement was favorable to Japan in that it artificially limited the US’ arms production and
provided relief to a Japanese economy stretched thin by war, nationalists saw the conference as a clear sign of Japan’s secondary status in the international community. These militarists argued the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was equally insulting. Following the Manchuria Incident, the League of Nations responded with the Lytton Commission report criticizing Japanese aggression. The report outlined a plan that would result in limited control of the new state, to which Japan responded by leaving the League of Nations altogether (Hane 1992, 257). These series of conflicts led many to believe that coexistence with the West was impossible and war was inevitable.

The Interwar Period highlights the difficulty the literature has in analyzing militarism. In one sense, the period is an example of Japanese democracy at its zenith prior to WWII. Increased enfranchisement, improved standard of living, and cooperation with the West according to the “rules of the game” indicated Japan was becoming a more peaceful nation. On the other hand, it was increasingly reckless and antagonistic. Was Japan more or less militaristic than in previous eras? The conventional indicators of militarism, such as military expenditures, reveal little. In the 1920s, the government cut force size, weapons, and defense spending (Gordon 2003, 175). Yet, Japan was not less militaristic even though it had fewer arms and spent less on the military. As the government cut defense spending, it fostered military education curriculums in middle and high schools and refined its increasingly racist worldview. War capabilities retracted while the logic of war expanded.

**WWII Japan (1937-1945)**

Japan’s aggressive imperialism during WWII provides valuable insight on the complexities of militarism. At first glance, it seems that colonial expansion, end of cooperation with the West, and attack on Pearl Harbor are natural progressions of Japanese militarization of the previous
five decades. A realist analysis of Japan’s security behavior would conclude that the international system compelled it to engage in balancing behavior. Indeed, foreign policy prior to WWII was decidedly realpolitik. On September 27, 1940 Japan became one-third of the Tripartite Pact and proceeded to sign the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941. It was clearly preparing for an upcoming war.

Yet, Japanese security policy did not follow a direct trajectory nor was it ideologically coherent. As demonstrated in the Meiji and Taisho periods, the government desperately sought ways to cooperate with the West and rein in the military. Had it possessed the ability to control the military and cooperate with the West, militarism would have been very different. WWII militarism was markedly different than preceding types. Japan’s actions were hyper aggressive, risky, and excessively cruel. A simple rubric describing war expenditures and listing body counts provides little insight on motivations and practices. Realism has difficulty explaining security behavior leading up to WWII because the international distribution of power was becoming increasingly favorable to Japan as it became stronger. Realism can account for the West’s response to Japanese expansion, but cannot explain why Japan was so willing to put itself at odds with clearly militarily superior nations who for the most part accepted its rapid growth. Japan’s changing perceptions of the West and its increasingly racist ideology compelled the government to remake the “rules of the game.”

Following the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan dedicated its resources to total war. The Sino-Japanese War was followed by the colonization of several regions in China, French Indochina, the Philippines, and many other territories in Asia. The expansion of territory alone does not provide much insight on security policy however; it was its behavior within the colonies
that define WWII militarism. “Total war militarism” was the extreme manifestation of ideologies and strategies of the previous eras.

Japan believed it was the center of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Kyoto School of Philosophy developed the foundations of this belief in the 1920s. Leading intellectuals such as Tanabe Hajime propagated a theory of the “Logic of Species,” arguing for a multi-ethnic nation under a single Japanese identity (Sakai 2000). According to Naoki Sakai (2000), “Tanabe’s Logic of Species was a response to such needs of Japanese Imperialism and it represented a philosophical attempt to undermine ethnic nationalism” (463). This philosophy was very appealing to empire proponents in government. One government document, titled “An Investigation of the Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus,” outlines the racial hierarchy in East Asia. This report guided policymakers and propagated “the subordination of other Asians in the Co-Prosperity Sphere,” an “unfortunate consequence of wartime exigencies, but the very essence of official policy” (Dower 1986, 263-264). Japan’s hierarchical view of the world reflect a lack of confidence in its security and cultural strength, which it tried to rectify via comparison with the poorer and weaker East Asia countries. Robert Eskildsen (2002) contends:

“Japanese colonialism happened concurrently with and contributed much to Japan's modernizing process. The discourse on civilization and savagery that gained popularity at the time of the Taiwan Expedition points to a similar pattern. Even before Japan established a formal colonial empire, debates about using Japanese military power overseas drew heavily on the imagery and rhetoric of Japan's own efforts at modernizing. Despite being shot through with contradictions and ambivalence, the idea of exporting the Western civilizing impulse to the indigenous population of Taiwan helped justify, naturalize, and explain the concurrent effort to modernize Japan. Mimesis of Western imperialism, in other words, went hand in hand with mimesis of Western civilization” (389)

Colonialism was modern and natural. Military leaders such as Colonel Ishiwhara Kanji developed “an apocalyptic view of the international science through his idiosyncratic studies of Buddhism and world history,” predicting that a “cataclysmic ‘final war’ loomed inevitably between Japan and the United States” (Gordon 2003, 188). The public was “indoctrinated to see the conflict in
Asia and the Pacific as an act which would purify the self, the nation, Asia, and ultimately the whole world” (Dower 1986, 215). Japanese security policy was not just a strategic rebalancing of power in the international system, but the practice of establishing a racial hierarchy based on ideology. Remaking the world would require transformation at home.

Takao Ito (2009) argues that the militarization of education became “particularly extreme after 1941, when Japanese elementary schools were reorganized as National People’s Schools (kokumin gakko), where they implemented a form of highly regimented and militarized education that took both its name (a direct translation of Volksschule) and inspiration from Nazi Germany (137). Students were rebranded as “little nationals” and provided war related training – boys were taught martial arts and girls were trained to use naginata (traditional Japanese pole weapon used by samurai) and nursing (National Showa Memorial Museum 2014). The Ministry of Education implemented curriculum that ensured “selfless dedication” to the emperor and country. For example, one elementary school textbook included a flowery narrative about the honor of dying for one’s country and being enshrined at Yasukuni (Ito 2009, 143). Students were bombarded with propaganda describing enemy combatants as “beasts” and “devils” and the homeland as pure (Dower 1986, 248). The indoctrination of youth was best symbolized by “rising sun lunch boxes” (hinomaru bento), comprised of rice and a red plum arranged to resemble the Japanese flag (Cwiertka 2006). The boxes instilled loyalty to the nation, built solidarity with the military, and fostered unity. The pervasiveness of militarization extended to the playground, where students played war games instead of tag and children’s magazines glorified war (National Showa Memorial Museum 2014). Students were completely mobilized for the war effort. All middle school students spent one year doing munitions work at factories and regularly worked in the most dangerous air raid areas digging firebreaks. When students
came of age and entered the war, their mothers sewed 1000 stitches in the shape of tigers into their clothing for their safe return and success for the empire (National Showa Memorial Museum 2014). The parallels with Spartan mothers sending their sons to war expecting them to return with their shields or on them are more than apparent.

The full mobilization of the public, young and old, led to the most extreme violations of acceptable war conduct. Although realism can account for the scope of Japanese militarism during WWII, it has difficulty outlining the logic of its scale and character. The wanton violence did little to secure the homeland and only invigorated opposition forces. Its actions were many times irrational and not strategic. Japanese “prejudices affected their war conduct: the way they evaluated, and frequently misjudged, Allied capabilities; the attitudes and policies they adopted toward other Asians within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and how they fought and died” (Dower 1986, 203).

Under the doctrine of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, many believed they were freeing Asia from the “many years of tyranny under white rule” (Dower 1986, 208). There was a genuine belief that they were on a divine mission creating regional solidarity. This thinking was an amalgamation of warped religious and modernity philosophies and self-serving economic interests. Japan was simply replacing one colonizer with another. Japanese dehumanized their colonial subjects and their enemies. The list of Japan’s war crimes is lengthy. From 1937 to 1945, the it colonized several countries, killed hundreds of thousands of non-combatants (Nanjing Massacre, Manila Massacre, and Bataan Death March) and killed millions indirectly (Vietnam Famine). Many of those who survived the initial fighting became forced laborers. Japan violated dozens of warfare norms, such as torturing and executing prisoners, conducting human experimentation (Unit 731), and using chemical and biological weapons. The
government operated a vast network of “comfort stations,” in total forcing “approximately 200,000 girls and women (most of them Korean) to provide sex for its soldiers” (Lind 2008, 28). In total, approximately 15 million Chinese, four million Indonesians, one million Vietnamese, and several hundred thousand Malaysians and Filipinos were killed (Dower 1986, 296-297).

Japanese paid for their extremism as well. Thousands of soldiers died fighting in unwinnable battles and one-way kamikaze attacks. Civilians were coerced into believing that they had to fight to the death, and many did. The fighting on Iwo Jima and Okinawa was particularly intense and tragic. Almost, every major city was leveled from firebombing and Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered the only use of nuclear weapons on a human population in history, resulting in 140,000 and 70,000 deaths, respectively. In total, approximately 2.1 million soldiers and civilians died, about 3% of the total population (Dower 1986, 298). The six million soldiers who returned home had to face the stark reality that they had fought an unjust war that led to end of an imperial line that dated back millennia.

Its conduct in WWII cannot be completely explained by the orientation of the international system, external threats, or internal politics. Ideology shaped how Japan treated its colonial subjects and operated in the wider world. Thus, when scholars discuss Japanese remilitarization, what kind of militarization do they mean? Militarism in the Tokugawa Era and first half of the Meiji Era sought to create internal security. The Meiji Government’s chief goal was creating modern citizens. During the second half of the Meiji Era to the end of WWII, Japanese militarism sought not only to increase its security from outside forces, but also to remake the international order. Hence, the Showa Government produced zealous soldiers. In the postwar period, the government adopted antimilitarism to increase external security. More recently, the government has pursued the concept of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,”
contending the JSDF can contribute to world peace. In the span of 150 years, the role of the military, the public’s view of violence in international affairs, and Japan’s place in the international community have undergone remarkable changes. To treat all militarisms as the same would sacrifice the important lessons that can be drawn from Japan’s many mistakes and successes, and do a disservice to the countless individuals who stood in the way of tyranny.

*Postwar Japan (1945-Present)*
The remaining chapters in this dissertation investigate the content and direction of Japanese security policy after WWII. Therefore, the following section is limited to analysis of the connections and cleavages of militarism elements before and after WWII.

One of the most unique features of various militarisms from the Meiji Era onward was the primacy of religion. The government prior and during the war years utilized state Shinto to legitimize its claim to power, justify colonial expansion, construct ethnic and culture-based nationalisms, and garner fanatical devotion to the state. Today, religion is no longer closely linked to politics, removing a critical element of the militarisms of the past. Japan would have difficulty returning to older forms of militarism and any new type of militarism would have to derive its strength from another source of unity.

The removal of religion from politics was a purposeful attack on militarism. State Shinto was abolished by the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) in 1945. Soon after, the Shinto Directive abolished Shinto as the official state religion, the war shrine Yasukuni was “demobilized, Shinto altars (*kamidana*) and the Imperial Portrait were removed from all schools, the worship of the Imperial Palace from afar, imposed upon pupils in Japan and its overseas territories was banned and visits to Shinto shrines was prohibited” (Shibata 2008, 355). Whatever remaining links between the state and Shinto have led to “vigorous protests and civil
rights litigation” (Freedom House 2014). Currently, many local and former national shrines are independently affiliated with the Association of Shinto Shrines (Kisala 2002, p. 138).

Religion is unlikely to have a major role in politics again. According to Masako Shibata (2008), education of State Shinto “has never been revived in publicly funded schools since World War II” and “even some hardline nationalist cabinets, which attempted to restore the old notions of national identity and national traditions in education, have been hesitant to stir up the old memory of State Shinto (pp. 357-358). Japanese are quite distrustful of religion. In one survey, when asked about their confidence in seventeen social institutions, “only 13 per cent of the respondents in Japan indicated some level of trust in religious groups, putting religious institutions at the bottom of the list. This result reflects a high level of distrust towards religious groups across the board” (Kisala 2002, 144). The distrust is placed on old and new religions. For example, “Shinto suffers for its identification with militaristic state; and new religions are seen as often dangerous frauds” (Kisala 2002, 144). The freedom of religion also ensures the government cannot monopolize religion for its own political purposes.

Nevertheless, many in East Asia contend Japan is “whitewashing” history and remilitarizing. According to Shibata (2008), the current government use of Shinto in politics has been to highlight Japan’s victimhood during WWII, specifically using the Yasukuni Shrine as a national symbol. This approach minimizes Japan’s aggressive actions when it sought to colonize East Asia in the mid-19th and early-20th century. Moreover, several nationalistic groups have adopted a skewed interpretation of Japan’s actions in WWII that justifies colonial expansion. Nationalists have used the shrine to “bolster anti-foreign sentiments among the otherwise disinterested members of the Japanese public” (Akaha 2008, 165). These groups seek to restore Japan’s former glory and instill pride among youths. Several prominent politicians, such Prime
Minister Koizumi and Prime Minister Abe have visited the shrine in official and unofficial capacity. Indeed, the Yasukuni Shrine controversy since the 1980s has created tension in East Asia and increased the chance conflict. However, outsiders usually misunderstand the place of the Yasukuni Shrine in Japanese politics and society. Much of the controversial discourse associated with the Yasukuni Shrine is not actually located in the shrine, but at the museum (Yushukan) in the same area.\(^{32}\) When politicians visit the shrine to pray, they rarely go into the Yushukan that propagates a whitewashed version of war history. Furthermore, since Japan is a free country with freedom of speech, there is little the government can do to change the message propagated by the Yushukan. The National Showa Memorial Museum (Showakan), official museum of the Showa emperor and a ten-minute walk from the Yushukan, has a much more critical interpretation of WWII. Many Japanese visit the Yasukuni Shrine to pray for those who died fighting for the nation. According to Woodard (1972), Japanese “feel guilty about enjoying post-war prosperity by surviving the war and by receiving a state stipendiary for the sacrifice of the death of their sons. They are normally regarded as pacifist and even anti-nationalist, but they also want a healing sanctuary in the shrine supported by the state for which their sons died” (as cited in Shibata 2008, 357).

The “emperor system” has also changed significantly since WWII. During the war eras, the emperor was the symbolic force behind colonialism. Historians have debated the centrality of the Showa emperor in WWII, but the role of the emperor in contemporary politics is absolutely clear – he does not have influence. Under the Postwar Constitution, the Emperor of Japan is “the symbol of the State and the unity of the People, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power” (The Constitution of Japan, Chapter 1). The

\(^{32}\) The Yushukan is maintained by the shrine, but has no religious significance. Since 1946, the shrine has been privately funded and operated.
end of WWII demystified the emperor’s status as a living god, and as a result, proponents of reviving WWII-style militarism can no longer use him to further their agenda.

Takashi Fujitani (1992) contends the “emperor system” had significantly changed since the end of WWII,” highlighting the importance of recognizing the “radical transformations” and “historical discontinuities” within the “emperor system” that may reveal “which operations of power change over time” (827). Understanding the changing role of the emperor in modern Japan helps differentiate militarisms in the past 100 years. During the Prewar Era, “Tokyo underwent massive physical transformations as political elites within the new national and Tokyo governments as well as the Imperial Household Ministry reconstructed it to become a central and open theater for performance of spectacular national pageants. In that age of rising mass nationalism, the masses and the emperor were brought together to Tokyo’s new public spaces, the most important being the Imperial Plaza, for enormous ritualized celebrations for themselves and their communion” (Fujitani 1992, 830). In the past, the public was an active participant in constructing the divine status of the emperor and the exceptionality of the Japanese state (Fujitani 1996). Today, the constitution separates the emperor from public affairs.

The “de-auratization” of the emperor system is a result of technology, but also “comes long after the Showa emperor’s self-proclaimed renunciation of divinity in 1946 and the formal, legal/ideological repositioning of political sovereignty from the monarch to the people” (Fujitani 1992, 841). In other words, the locus of power no longer sits with the emperor; the public uses the emperor system for their secular purposes. For example, Fujitani’s (1992) analysis of the Showa Emperor’s funeral and ascension of the Heisei Emperor finds that the emperor system highlights the progressive changes in the postwar period and convenient forgetting of the past. During the enthronement of Akihito, the Heisei emperor emphasized his status as a symbol and
an upholder of Japan’s “Peace Constitution.” Fujitani (1992) argues, “despite the charges from the left that the mystery surrounding the daijosai [enthronement of the Japanese emperor] threatened a return to the divine emperor of prewar days, media coverage accomplished quite the opposite. Rather than enhancing the monarch’s cult value, mystery coupled with titillation and these snatched glimpses completely deauratized him. No longer, as in imperial Japan, did the emperor’s panoptic gaze discipline the masses” (Fujitani 1992, 847). The emperor’s increased presence in society has led to the opposite effect that it had during the Meiji Era.

Another important development regarding the emperor and politics is the Showa and Heisei emperors have made it difficult for conservative to utilize the throne for their cause. After the enshrinement of the 14 Class A War criminals at the Yasukuni Shrine, the Showa emperor stopped visiting the shine. The Heisei emperor has not visited the shrine since his enthronement. The Heisei emperor is also quite the non-traditionalist – acknowledging the imperial family’s Korean ancestry, speaking in plain language, apologizing for Japan’s colonial history, and marrying a commoner (Portman 2011). Nationalists have clung to a de-historicized mystical notion of the emperor. Modern nationalism, and the militarism that can derive from it, is a construction of an imaginary past. In a sense, these groups are marginalized by the symbols that they rally behind.

Japan is also a long-established and robust democracy with strong civilian control of the military. Democracy was not introduced to Japan by General Headquarters (GHQ). The Meiji Era and early Taisho Era showed signs of a healthy party system and expanded the franchise to millions. Japan was not a complete democracy because the emperor was the source of political power and the military sabotaged the democratic process but, within 150 years, it had evolved from an extremely stratified class system where the vast majority of the population were peasant
subjects to a country with full suffrage, free and fair elections, religious freedom, academic freedom, and freedom of press (Hane 1992; Freedom House 2014). According to the 2014 Freedom House rankings, Japan is ranked 1 in civil liberties and political rights – it is a completely free society.

The strength of democracy goes hand-in-hand with strong civilian control of the military. Croissant et al. (2010, 2011) argue civilian control is the “distribution of decision-making power in which civilians have exclusive authority to decide on national politics and their implementation.” Moreover, it is “civilians alone who determine which particular policies, or aspects of policies, the military implements, and the civilians alone define the boundaries between policy-making and policy implementation” (Croissant et al. 2010, 955). Croissant (2011) contends Japan enjoys the highest amount of civilian control in East Asia in the areas of elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization, what is referred to as “civilian supremacy.”

Regarding military practices Croissant states, “while a certain degree of autonomy is necessary for the military to fulfill its missions and roles, civilian control requires the ability of civilians to define its range and boundaries” (Croissant 2011, 5). This is best exemplified in the current debates regarding reinterpreting Article 9. Critics of the Abe administration argue reinterpreting Article 9 is tantamount to remilitarization. However, this effort to expand the role of the JSDF is not coming from the military, but from a civilian prime minister. Moreover, the reinterpretation is a significant concession; Abe sought a constitutional amendment in his first term. Abe extended deliberation in the Diet hoping to clarify to the public the legal limitations of collective self-defense, and provide adequate time to consider the merits of his policy recommendations.

33 According to JSDF personnel I interviewed, some are not in favor of reinterpreting Article 9.
The separation between the military and the government is clearly outlined in Ministry of Defense Guidelines and White Papers. The Prime Minister of Japan is the commander-in-chief of the JSDF. Military authority then proceeds to the Minister of Defense (civilian) of the MOD. The prime minister and minister of defense are advised by the Chief of Staff (military) of the Joint Staff Council and the National Security Council (civilian officials from MOFA and MOD), which was established in December 2012. Military officers do not have a direct link to the prime minister and would have to go through the normal channels of communication – the system is designed to have several layers between the prime minister and the military. This is vastly different than the 1920s when high-ranking army and navy officers had direct access to the emperor via the mechanism of the “independence of the supreme command” (Hane 1992, 248).

Militarism with Adjectives
From the Tokugawa Era to the present, Japan has pursued a myriad of militaristic policies and ideologies with significant consequences domestically and internationally. The diverse security motivations, practices, and justifications of the government and public suggest militarism is much more complex than currently depicted in the literature. The conventional pacifism-militarism analytical framework fails to provide deeper insight on the creation and consequences of policies reflective of unique individuals, relationships, and historical contexts. Comparative analysis of militarism across temporal and geographic cases would be a fruitful exercise in determining the content and direction of contemporary Japanese security policy. Therefore, I propose a “multiple militarisms” analytical framework to achieve sharper analytical differentiation among militarisms.

Civilian control is not discussed in the constitution because the Renunciation of War Clause makes it a moot point. The preamble reads, Japan “never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people” (Constitution of Japan). Strictly speaking, the existence of the JSDF is a violation of the constitution. However, Japan and the international community has long accepted the legitimacy of the JSDF as long as it remains defense-oriented.
This framework denaturalizes the common assumptions about militarism and provides some basic guidelines to analyzing security policy. Historian Ingo Trauschweizer (2012) argues it is problematic to rely on normative definitions based on the most extreme historical examples (512). The term militarism is commonly associated with Interwar Japan, Nazi Germany, and present-day North Korea. Though these three cases exemplify militarism, further scrutiny reveals diverse motivations and practices. Additionally, the US has fought in more wars and acquired much more destructive weapons than these cases, but one would be hard-pressed to conclude that it is similarly militaristic. The US’ democratic values, civilian control of government, and general acceptance in the international community legitimatize its security behavior.

The first guideline in the “multiple militarisms” framework is to not assume militarism is aggressive, bad, or singular. Sanitizing the term allows researchers to examine security policy according to the case’s unique context and circumvents normative biases. Second, the “multiple militarisms” analytical framework encourages analysis of how force is used. Is the military used for defensive or offensive purposes? Does it represent a single state, or is it involved in multilateral missions? Does it participate in non-security missions, such as reconstruction, disaster relief, or election monitoring? Addressing these questions illustrates what kind of militarism a state practices. Third, empirical data should drive analysis, not theory. Realism assumes states, as rational actors, engage in balancing behavior because of tangible and perceived threats. This assumption is built on normative prescriptions of what theorists believe states should do. Analysis of weaponry, defense budgets, and elite rhetoric should focus on actual practices and less on predicted outcomes or unsaid motivations. Fourth, an eclectic approach utilizing only the complementary elements of international relations theory is desirable.
Both material and ideational variables shape militarism. However, researchers should avoid cherry-picking hypotheses from competing schools of thought to fill in gaps in theory. For example, one cannot assume a culture of antimilitarism explains constrained security policy and international anarchy compels states to always balance against threat. The assumptions regarding the permanence of the international system and the lack of actor agency are ontologically incompatible with arguments highlighting the malleability of interests and impact of ideational variables on state behavior. In other words, theories of absolutes are not compatible with theories of change. Fifth, beyond examination of data related to security, such as the military industrial complex and defense budgets, careful attention should be paid to the general environment that cultivates or represses militarism. Demographic, economic, political, and ideational variables significantly impact on a state’s willingness and ability to pursue certain kinds of militarism.

These general guidelines are not a definitive list of what can comprise a “multiple militarisms” analytical framework. Depending on the case, a scholar may need to examine other dimensions of security policy. This framework is designed to reverse the orthodox logic. Instead of the question, “has material and/or ideational environment caused militarism?” the researcher will investigate, “what kind of militarism has a state adopted, if at all, given the material and ideational environment”? Both these questions assume a state is militaristic, therefore, before types of militarism can be determined, a baseline understanding of the core elements of militarism must be established.

Although a common topic in international relations, political scientists have not critically examined militarism. Historian Alfred Vagts (as cited in Trauschweizer 2012) contends militarism “presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought associated
with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purposes…Its influence is unlimited in scope. It may permeate all society and become dominant over all industry and arts” (509). In this classic definition, the commonly understood dimension of militarism is emphasized, the encroachment of military forces into the civilian world. Yet, as demonstrated in the Meiji Era, militarism draws much of its strength from discourse and motivations not entirely related to matters of war. In addition, this definition suggests the causal arrow is unidirectional; militarism reshapes the non-military world and not the other way around. The public can be as culpable as military elites in shaping and propagating militaristic ideologies and practices.

Ingo Trauschweizer (2012) contends militarism “may best be understood as the connection of militarization of the state and of society. It requires a strong military ethos, a social system threatened with rupture, a mythical reading of the nation’s past, and a sense of fear – of one’s neighbors or of ideological foes – that subsumes political culture (542). Additionally, Trauschweizer suggests the concept of militarism is not static and the meaning can evolve depending on the strategic and political needs of those who brandish the term. For example, one reason why Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan are typically considered ideal types of militarism is because these countries lost WWII. If the Axis Powers had won the war, one could assume British and American war conduct would be severely criticized in the present day. How states understand the relationship between military force and state formation has changed over time. In the late 19th century, many Europeans measured national greatness in military strength and in colonial possessions (Trauschweizer 2012, 525). In the Cold War, militarism took on a different connotation depending on the ideological orientation of the concept holder. Marxists believed militarism was a result of capitalistic societies and the West argued it was about the failure of civilian control (Trauschweizer 2012, 527). By the end of the Cold War, states were rapidly
decolonizing and the worth of a nation was measured by how much it could protect democracy. The use of the military and the concept of militarism had rapidly changed within a 100-year span. Trauschweizer (2012) concludes militarism “comes from different forms and requires careful distinctions (542). This definition begs comparative analyses of temporal and geographic cases.

Sociologist Martin Shaw (2012) contends militarism should be specified not in terms of “how military practices are regarded, but how they influence social relations in general” (p. 20). A second component of Shaw’s militarism definition is “militarism denotes the penetration of social relations in general by military relations; in militarization, militarism is extended, in demilitarization, it contracts” (p. 20). Richard Kohn (as cited in Trauschweizer 2012) proposes utilizing the term “militarization” instead of militarism to avoid the political connotations of the latter. Militarization is “the degree to which a society’s institutions, politics, behaviors, thought, and values are devoted to military power and shaped by war” (as cited in Trauschweizer 2012, 508). However, analysis focusing on degree instead of type leads to “counting” instances of militarism and an overreliance on the indicator, military expenditures. Determining the degree of militarization is crucial to understanding the strength of a militarism type, but the concepts are distinct. Additionally, this definition’s focus on evidence of militarism neglects scenarios where militarism was rejected or modified. Which tenets of militarism are accepted and denied can illustrate what kind of militarism a state has constructed.

I define militarism as the following: 1) the acceptance of the use of violence as a legitimate tool of the state in settling disputes, 2) the merging of government, military, and public ideologies of war, and 3) the spread of militaristic discourse throughout the physical and ideational dimensions of a civilization, i.e. art, monuments, and public education. This broad
definition salvages much of the literature identifying militarism in states, while requiring the researcher to provide additional analysis clarifying type. Moreover, this definition is decidedly non-normative, emphasizing descriptive analysis and empirical evidence over rational-actor-based prescriptions. I acknowledge complete objectivity in language and concepts is difficult to obtain – the terms “violence” and “legitimate” have normative dimensions. In employing this definition, the researcher must be reflexive of position, mindful of potential biases, and transparent in data coding and argument support.

From this baseline definition, scholars can begin to identity militarism type, but how is this to be accomplished? Due to the dearth of analysis within international relations on the subject, I rely on other fields of research, namely democracy studies, to construct the “multiple militarisms” framework. In identifying democracy subtypes, Collier and Levitsky (1997) call attention to the challenge that researchers face in constructing typologies, the tension between increasing analytical differentiation and maintaining conceptual validity. One method of creating subtypes is to utilize Sartori’s ladder of generality. As one moves up the ladder of generality, one finds more cases of the root concept, and as one moves down, fewer cases exist (Collier and Levitsky 1997). This approach can be useful to identifying cases of militarism, but requires an additional step to determine type. Collier and Levitsky also propose the use of diminished subtypes, accomplished by removing attributes from the baseline concept to explain each case. This approach is not desirable because it assumes the degree of militarism is the existence of an ideal type. Moreover, in the concept of democracy, procedures are an easily identifiable indicator of the existence/non-existence of democracy. Militarism is a broader concept that lacks similar indicators. The researcher can create a minimum list of militarism indicators to establish a root concept, but should be transparent on how the list was determined.
and acknowledge that subtypes of this root concept reflect a normative bias. Another method is “precising” the definition by adding defining attributes to the root concept (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 442). Precising allows for finer analytical differentiation because the additional attributes illustrate the uniqueness of each case. However, this method risks overly modifying the root concept and creating types far removed from the original concept. Elman (2005) has shown the usefulness of explanatory typologies in qualitative research; explanatory typologies are “multidimensional classifications based on an explicitly stated theory” (296). Explanatory typologies “invoke both the descriptive and classificatory roles of typologies,” defining compound concepts and assigning case type (296-297).

In determining militarism type, I propose the method of utilizing the ladder of generality (abstraction) to determine the existence of militarism, precising type by identifying defining attributes, and utilizing explanatory typological analysis to confirm the content and direction of that militarism type. The researcher starts with a case that demonstrates the baseline definition of militarism and proceeds to add identifying descriptors to illustrate type. In other words, militarism with adjectives.

There are several strands of research within political science, sociology, and history literature that can help identify militarism types. Daisuke Akimoto (2013) utilizes Andrew Oros’ security identity framework to classify four kinds of security identity; a pacifist state, a UN peacekeeper, a normal state, and a US ally. Oros (2008) contends Japan is shaped by a domestic antimilitarism security identity. Neorealists have debated the existence of offensive and defensive security postures. Martin Shaw (2012) identifies at least two forms of militarism, classical modern militarism (industrialized total warfare) and contemporary militarism (global surveillance warfare). Andrew J. Bacevich (as cited in Trauschweizer 2012) argues “misleading
and dangerous conceptions of war, soldiers, and military institutions that have come to pervade the American consciousness and that have perverted present-day U.S. national security policy” comprises modern American militarism (509). Michael Mann (as cited in Shaw 2012) contends US militarism is the “excessive reliance on military power, out of kilter with its more limited economic, political, and ideological capabilities. Adrian Lewis (as cited in Trauschweizer 2012) argues the increased professionalization of the military and end of conscription has led to a “conception of citizenship free of obligations in which public support for the troops has become a substitute for service,” what I would call “bystander militarism” (508). And Pierre Hassner (2001) warns of a growing modern militarism where the indirectness of conflicts sanitizes violence and dehumanizes the enemy, thus blurring the “normal” and the “extreme.”

Another type of militarism is “protectionist militarism” in present-day Turkey and Thailand, where the military believes it is a check on government corruption. In addition, the Revolution in Military Affairs has propagated a new militarism that places a premium on technology and surveillance. Some terrorist groups are examples of “religious militarism.” And some states have begun to explore “privatized militarism,” relying on mercenaries and private security contractors. Antimilitarism is another form of militarism that emphasizes reconciliation over the use of force, yet finds the use of force legitimate in some cases. These types of militarisms are constructed differently and have far reaching and diverse consequences.

Conclusion
Predictions of a foreboding return of Japanese militarism and nationalism by academics, policymakers, government leaders, and public are built on assumptions of what states should do. This approach to analyzing security policy is incomplete at best and alarmist at worst. As this chapter demonstrates, militarism has held different connotations for different people at different
times. Impressive growth, fear of the West, and feelings of superiority in Asia were the main forces behind the intense nationalism and militarism of the Meiji Era and Interwar Period. In WWII, militarism was defined by fanaticism and gross violence. Over the last 20 years, nationalism is fueled by insecurity caused by economic decline and an aging population. One should not expect the militarism of the current era to be similar to the past when the conditions are vastly different. Contemporary militarism is not a return to militarisms past, but a reflection of the present day conditions. The following three chapters examine movements and counter-movements, justifications and practices, and material variables that shape Japanese security policy.
Chapter Three: Social-structural and Technical Constraints

Conventional wisdom would have one believe that the United States should have won the Vietnam War. The US was superior to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in firepower, technology, air and naval capabilities, and potential size. And the US was not afraid to use its raw strength; “By the end of the war, 7 million tons of bombs had been dropped on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia - more than twice the amount of bombs dropped on Europe and Asia in World War II” (Zinn 1980). To this day, leftover bombs and ordnance kill hundreds of Vietnamese every year (Brummitt 2014). Yet the North Vietnamese refused to surrender and the US was forced to leave by the end of 1973. According to James William Gibson, the US fell victim to the false logic of “techno-war;” the assumption that technology would ultimately win the day (as cited in Moller 2002, 30).

The US pulled out of Vietnam because “neither Congress nor the general public was prepared to accept thousands of body-bags for what appeared to be a lost cause” (Moller 2002, 30). The lack of will to continue was tied to the US inability to win the war quickly. For every soldier sent to Vietnam, there were scores of native Vietnamese who knew every inch of their homeland and were willing to give their lives to defend it. The US simply lacked the “boots on the ground” to establish a long-term presence, firmly hold onto territory, or completely eliminate the enemy with its raw manpower. Moreover, superior US technology proved ineffective against enemy combatants utilizing guerilla-style tactics. Due to the North Vietnamese lack of symmetrical technological capabilities and their unwillingness to engage the Americans directly in combat, the US was unable to fully utilize equipment designed to challenge superpowers.

Political scientists, like government leaders, can fall in love with the techno-war narrative. From afar, warfare may seem like a solvable problem as long as one has the right
tools. Consequently, when scholars discuss Japanese remilitarization, power projection capabilities, and ability to balance against regional threats, the lens narrows in on the strengths of the JSDF, such as technology and training. Although important, technology is but one of many important variables determining the power of a military. Analyses of Japanese security policy have remained fixated on disproving the significance of normative constraints on Japan’s power projection capabilities, mistakenly ignoring the difficulties of jumpstarting militaristic security politics and practices once the norms erode. The underlining logic of realists is if Japan’s security was truly threatened, the government would be able to overcome the normative and political restraints imposed on the JSDF by the general public and pursue more “normalized” security policies, i.e., Japan’s weaknesses are a matter of choice. However, in war and politics, as in life, the easy things are difficult and the difficult things can be next to impossible. And the capabilities of the JSDF may not meet the ambitions of eager politicians.

The existence of a will to normalize, if it exists in Japan, does not necessarily mean there is a way. There are significant constraints on Japanese power projection capabilities, especially in terms of demographics and capacity. In this chapter, I investigate these two areas and argue that Japanese power is much more stunted than currently depicted in the literature. Even if the government can overcome the high political, normative, and economic hurdles, the JSDF’s power projection capabilities would still be limited by force size and capacity. As a result, the MOD constantly makes compromises in its security policy and the JSDF routinely operates under suboptimal conditions.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I compare force size and recruitment practices among military forces in East Asia. Since Japan’s primary security concerns are Chinese incursions into its territorial waters, conflict with North Korea, and terrorism, the size and youth
of the armed forces are critical to Japan’s security and ability to project power. Second, I discuss the impact of Japan’s aging and declining population on Japanese security. Third, I analyze Japan’s attempts to overcome its demographic problems by examining the MOD capacity building efforts. In this section, I contend that 70 years of institutional lag have led to an underdeveloped infrastructure, limited offensive technology, and a weak military industrial complex – all of which make it difficult for the material dimensions of Japanese power projection to meet the political and strategic goals of government leaders. Understanding these limitations on the JSDF sheds light on Japan’s limited militarization and begins to reveal the environment in which the antimilitarism norm has been cultivated. The social-demographic and technical constraints on the JSDF are path dependent and are reinforced by normative, cultural, political, and economic variables.

As will be demonstrated in this chapter, Japan is significantly constrained in these two areas and there is very little it can do to overcome these limitations. Thus, even if Japan were to pursue a normalized security policy, it would have great difficulty in doing so.

_A Comparative Analysis of East Asian Military Forces_

A military is only as strong as the individuals that comprise it. Although military forces have increasingly relied on technology to turn the tides of war, the importance of “boots on the ground” cannot be overstated. This is particularly evident when discussing power projection, which implies force strength available beyond defense capabilities. Power projection is “the ability to apply all or some of its elements of national power - political, economic, informational, or military - by rapidly and effectively deploying and sustaining forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional, [even global] stability” (Globalsecurity.org). In warfare, it is preferable to have a preponderance
of power over having just enough, and absolutely preferable to have enough power over not enough. Additionally, the effectiveness of technology in the battlefield is heavily influenced by how it is implemented and operated by the combatants. Military power can be measured in a variety of ways, such as defense budgets, manpower, military infrastructure, combat RDT&E institutions, defense industrial base, and inventory and support resources (Tellis, Bially, Layne, and McPherson 2000, 137). Many of these measures filter down to those who implement these forms of power. With all else being equal, a state would want the largest military possible because it would provide more raw power and flexibility on the battlefield, i.e. more operations can be conducted simultaneously and fewer compromises need to be made. In the theater of war, “boots on the ground” are important for holding onto territories that are gained, protecting assets, and limiting enemy combatants’ mobility. Simply put, manpower matters.

From the Meiji Era to the end of WWII, the Empire of Japan was not just built on impressive technological advancements, but on a large and growing population, with government policies promoting Japanese emigration into colonized territories throughout Asia, and effective mobilization of the public for warfare. From 1920 to 1945, the population of Japan grew from 55,963,053 to 71,998,104 at a rate of 5.6% to 7.9% per year (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2015). Japan’s power projection was synonymous with the extension of its “zone of advantage” in order to protect its “zone of sovereignty.” Japan was eventually defeated

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35 “The rapid transformations in both technology and the military arts have resulted in a need for increasingly specialized institutions that focus on research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities relating to combat. These institutions could be: academic institutions, which specialize in training soldiers in the history of war or the higher requirements of command; specialized establishments, which focus on honing certain specific warfighting skills; technical centers, which either develop, test, and evaluate new equipment for various combat elements or advance new concepts of operations for military technologies developed by other institutions; or research organizations which focus on studying foreign military forces and their organization, equipment, patterns of training, and doctrine” (Tellis, Bially, Layne, and McPherson 2000, 139-140).

36 Between 1940 and 1945, the Japanese population declined by 541,625, or -.07 percent. This decline can be attributed to WWII. Following the war, Japan, like many other industrialized countries underwent massive economic growth partly due to a rapid increase in population.
in WWII for a multitude of reasons, one being it was stretched too thin and had to make sacrifices in terms of which territories it could protect. The US was able to exploit Japan’s force size limitations by utilizing a strategy of island hopping, sometimes referred to as “leapfrogging,” to avoid pockets of Japanese military power. Although Japan possessed the largest battleships in WWII, its strengths in technology and willpower could not mitigate this significant weakness.

In the present day, the size of the JSDF is still very important for Japan’s defense and power projection capabilities. Japan is comprised of 2,456 islands spanning 380,000 km sq. The JSDF is responsible for protecting 29,751 km of coastline and patrolling 4,470,000 km sq. of territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) waters, which is roughly twelve times the size of Japan’s land area. As an island nation, Japan enjoys natural defense advantages, but also endures several vulnerabilities. During war, and sometimes in peacetime, blockades can sever Japan’s access to outside resources, which is especially problematic because Japan is resource-poor. The JSDF employs significant manpower to protect the main islands, strategic islets, airspace, and surrounding waters. Yet, over the past few decades, kidnappings conducted by North Korea, Chinese fishing in Japanese territorial waters, and Chinese and Russian fighters intruding into Japanese air space have made it abundantly clear that the JSDF lacks the capabilities it needs to protect the integrity of Japanese territories. Japan’s weaknesses have become even more glaring as Chinese strength and boldness grows. According to the MOD, between March 2014 and December 2014, “Japanese fighters scrambled 744 times, 32 percent more than the same period the previous year” and “encounters with Chinese aircraft, which accounted for half of the nine month total, jumped to 164 in the final quarter of 2014, the most since 1958, when records began” (Kelly 2015; Ministry of Defense 2015, February). In November 2013, the Chinese
government declared the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” which includes airspace over the Senkaku Islands. This significantly increases Japan’s need to monitor its distant islands. Since Japan “nationalized” the Senkaku Islands on September 11th, 2012, Chinese ships have intruded into Japanese territorial waters 101 times (329 vessels). Japan has territorial disputes with countries to its north, east, and south, forcing the MOD to be vigilant across diverse areas and against capable militaries.

Moreover, since the end of the First Gulf War, and especially since 2001, prominent Japanese politicians have sought to increase Japan’s security roles abroad, increase its international political clout, play a greater role in the Japan-US Alliance, address new threats such as terrorism and piracy, develop credible defense capabilities, and adopt “collective defense.” In several of these areas, Japan has unequivocally expanded its security roles. Since 1991, approximately 9,300 JSDF personnel have been sent to 13 UN PKO missions (MOFA pamphlet). Moreover, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has pushed for a more assertive Japan under the doctrine of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” in his second term. Japan will likely increase its activities abroad in non-combat, but labor-intensive operations. However, changes in the JSDF have confronted compromise and difficulty. A large chasm remains between security goals and security capabilities. Currently, Japan has relatively minimal commitments abroad, yet the JSDF is stretched thin. In threats relatively unfamiliar to Japan, such as terrorism, “there is no reliable substitute for large numbers of boots on the ground” (Waldman 2013, 151). On the tactical level, battlefield decisions still need “boots on the ground,” for which air and naval power play supporting roles. One can expect the limits of Japan’s capabilities will be stretched to the breaking point and the weaknesses of the JSDF to be exacerbated as Japan adopts more proactive and unfamiliar security policies.
The JSDF also has unique responsibilities at home that require significant manpower. Authorized by General Douglas MacArthur, the JSDF began as a National Police Reserve on September 8th, 1950 and has slowly adopted more traditional security roles over time. Currently, its primary function, not the original intent of the Japanese or American government, is disaster relief (similar to the National Guard). Between 1951 and 2011, “including periods when there was a National Police Reserve and the National Safety Force, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) was deployed to disasters on approximately 20,000 occasions and approximately 14 million personnel were dispatched” (Yoshizaki 2011, 76). In 2011, the JSDF was deployed for a domestic mission in the Tohoku region of Japan after the 3.11 “triple disaster,” which was its biggest disaster relief effort ever. More than 100,000 JSDF personnel were dispatched to deal with the aftermath of the Great Tohoku Earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima nuclear disaster (Yoshizaki 2011, 71). In 2014, JSDF personnel were deployed to Hiroshima after devastating mudslides and to Mount Ontake after a volcanic eruption (Japan Times 2014, August; Japan Times, September). The JSDF’s admirable work in disaster relief has significantly increased its reputation in Japan and abroad and serves as a reminder of just how active the forces have been in non-military activities in the last 20 years (discussed in Chapter 5). The JSDF’s experience and stellar work in disaster relief operations has led to joint Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) exercises in Southeast Asia (JICA 2005; JMSDF 2015). The JSDF has many diverse responsibilities and its effectiveness requires many people, but with major changes in the

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37 According to Article 3 of the SDF Law, the JSDF Major Primary Mission is the defense of Japan. This is followed by its Primary Mission, which is the Maintenance of Public Order. The Primary Mission includes disaster relief, earthquake prevention dispatch, minesweeping, and several other traditional and non-traditional security activities. However, in practice, the JSDF is deployed far more often and in greater scale to non-traditional security missions. The SDF also has an additional Primary Mission based on legislation other than the SDF Law, which includes international disaster relief and international peace cooperation activities. However, this Primary Mission cannot interfere with the other two primary missions. The JSDF’s Secondary Mission includes engineering, education and training, cooperation for major athletic games, cooperation for Antarctic observation, transport of national guests, and bomb disposal (MOD Bureau of Operation Policy, Defense Operations Division, 2015, January 7). “Missions and Operations of the SDF.” Tokyo, Japan.
regional balance of power, the emergence of new threats, a weakening domestic economy, and unhealthy demographics, the JSDF is having to do more with less.

Numerically, the JSDF is rather large. With active personnel of 247,150 (151,050 GSDF, 45,550 MSDF, 47,100 ASDF), Japan ranks 22\textsuperscript{nd} in the world in force size. Reserves consist of 56,100 and 12,650 paramilitary. Japan now has 43,930,753 men and women fit for service and 1,214,618 reaching military age annually (globalfirepower.com). However, the overall size of the JSDF will decrease over the next few years. Due to cost cutting measures and a de-emphasis on ground troops, the MOD has been cutting GSDF personnel (Yomiuri Shimbun 2010, October).

When considering its power projection capabilities, it is important to recognize the size of the potential enemies. In comparison with its historical rivals, Japan’s forces are much smaller.

Table 3.1: Military Forces Size in East Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Paramilitary</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
<th>Active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>666,000</td>
<td>510,000</td>
<td>2,333,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>12,650</td>
<td>56,100</td>
<td>247,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>189,000</td>
<td>5,700,000</td>
<td>1,190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>449,000</td>
<td>2,035,000</td>
<td>766,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
<td>655,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>290,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IISS. Table created with data from The Military Balance (2014)

China has the world’s largest standing military with 2.33 million active personnel. With a much larger population, Japan’s forces are smaller than North Korea’s and those of Russia, South Korea, and Taiwan. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Japan has the 2\textsuperscript{nd} lowest ratio of military personnel per 1000 civilians in Asia (1.88:1000). China ranks
lower with a 1.71:1000 ratio, due to its large population (1.3 billion). Japan’s reserve forces are also meager. China (0.5 million), North Korea (5.7 million), South Korea (4.5 million), Taiwan (1.65 million), and Russia (2 million) have reserve forces larger than the entire JSDF (The Military Balance, 2014). In even the direst circumstances, Japan only has 56,100 in reserve forces ready to join the active army (forces that train approximately five days a year). In other words, for JSDF power projection, what you see is what you get. The latent potential is not there, or at least not comparable to other countries who have the raw power, regular training, resources, and popular support to fully exploit their capabilities.

Due to the small size of the JSDF, Japan would have a difficult time maintaining extended operations in East Asia and beyond. Highly advanced technology may be useful in defending the nation or fighting enemy combatants, but does very little to suppress the reemergence of threats, prevent continued assault, or secure far off territories such as the Senkaku Islands. A defense of the mainland would also be highly taxing due to the overwhelming numbers of troops possessed by Japan’s neighbors. In a war of attrition, Japan might do well if the government can mobilize the entire population to support the war effort. Yet, the public has been unwilling to join or fully support the JSDF. According to the World Values Survey (1981, 1990, 1995, 1999, and 2010), Japanese respondents ranked last in East Asia in “willingness to fight for country.” Since the 1980’s, only about 20% of Japanese have been willing to fight for their country. Although showing less enthusiasm than in the past, as of 2010 approximately 60% of Chinese and 70% of South Koreans say they are still willing to fight for their countries.
For decades, the MOD has had trouble recruiting. In the late 1980’s the GSDF was able to recruit only 85.2% of its 180,000 target (Maeda, 1986, 260). JSDF personnel were also failing to finish military training, while officers witnessed a drop in the quality of training. The military academies endured severe faculty shortages because soldiers quit their posts for jobs in the economy (Maeda, 1986, p. 260). The MOD has never reach its maximum recruitment quotas, usually achieving approximately 90% of desired levels (Author’s Interview, Tetsuo Kotani, August 2015, Tokyo, Japan). In the past, private companies have headhunted engineers and other highly skilled workers of the JSDF once their training has been completed. They wait for the JSDF to bear the costs of the training, then offer a paycheck the MOD cannot match. The JSDF has often asked the government for measures preventing the poaching, but with the workers free to leave as they wish, little can be done. The JSDF also has high turnover because soldiers are normally tied on short-term contracts of only 2-3 years. Although JSDF requirements are stringent, with not all applicants hired by the MOD, the forces are understrength because the MOD draws from a small population with limited talent.
There are several reasons why this general situation exists. First, the general Japanese economy is an attractive alternative to military service. Due to the declining population and historically strong economy, private companies pay much better than the JSDF. Japan is mostly middle class, decreasing the likelihood a person would join the armed forces for financial reasons. Accordingly, the MOD has “aggressively promoted the SDF as a career choice for high school graduates, particularly in Japan’s underdeveloped countryside” (Kawasaki 2010). Of all the prefectures in Japan, only the northern island of Hokkaido has more than one JSDF recruitment office. Job prospects there are not as strong as elsewhere in Japan, thus it produces higher rates of potential recruits in that area. The stigma of the JSDF is also hard to overcome. According to Katsuya Tsukamoto, a research fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), the MOD weak recruiting the top graduates is because the defense sector is not seen as a growth industry and the military is not seen as suitable for “smart” people (Author’s Interview, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan). Tsukamoto concludes that even with better salaries and benefits, the MOD would still have difficulty recruiting good students.

Second, Japan has enjoyed seven decades of peace. Joining the military is not a normal part of the Japanese experience and visual landscape, JSDF members are rarely seen in public, military service is not a career path promoted in school, few people have friends or relatives in the armed forces, and service is not usually praised openly. Japanese are unlikely to consider joining the JSDF because of perceived dangers and lack of support within society for it. Third, many Japanese consider conventional military responses to conflict are not be in Japan’s interest. Japan has relied on Official Development Aid (ODA) and diplomacy as its main tools in international relations with great success. Fourth, being in the armed services, although sometimes perceived as providing a decent job with good benefits, is still believed to be a
difficult and dirty job that does not instill any particular sense of pride. Military service can actually be quite devastating, which has resulted in further reductions in force size. Many who join the JSDF, display low morale and high rate of suicide. Many potential recruits do not make it past the initial stages of enlistment because they do not meet the physical/intellectual standards, or are scared away when they realize the difficulty of being in the armed forces. The JSDF is likely to have greater problems with recruiting and retention when the full implications of Prime Minister Abe’s “proactive peace” become clear. Moreover, with the kidnappings and executions of Japanese citizens Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa by ISIL terrorists in January 2015, and the Japanese government’s absolute inability to save them, the public is less likely to join or support increased JSDF missions abroad. At the prospects of doing more than disaster relief, one JSDF member lamented, “I do not want to go to war” and “if (the SDF) were a military, I might not have joined it” (Shimoyachi 2004).

The dangers of military service are not just hypothetical. Though the JSDF does not engage in combat missions, since its establishment 1,851 (as of October 24, 2014) have died in the service, most commonly from accidents and suicides (Ministry of Defense 2014, October). Suicide may be the most difficult problem. In FY2004, a record 94 JSDF Regular Personnel committed suicide. The JSDF suffered 83 suicides in FY2007, 76 suicides in FY2008, and 80 suicides in FY2009 (Defense of Japan Annual White Paper, 404). The suicide problem became particularly pronounced after Japan participated, albeit in non-combat roles, in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. Between November 2001 and January 2010, 1 in 562 JSDF members committed suicide. For GSDF personnel sent to Iraq, 1 in 280 committed suicide and 1 in 453 ASDF members committed suicide (Japan Press Weekly 2014). The US Army, which is very

38 The most undeniable jobs in Japan are commonly referred to as “3K, or “3D” in English - kitani, kiken, kitsui (dirty, dangerous, and demanding) jobs.
active in live wars, has a 1 in 3,333 suicide ratio. In other words, JSDF members are six times more likely to commit suicide than a US soldier even though their current duties are much safer (and potentially less stressful) (RT.com 2015).

Although military service is not universally popular in the rest of East Asia simply due to the dangers of the job, China and South Korea lack the normative aversion to military service that currently exists in Japan. The lesson Japanese drew from WWII was that militarism led to Japan’s monumental defeat. For East Asians, their own lack of military might was why Japan was able to conquer their lands. Countries in East Asia still locked conflicts that stem from WWII. The threat of existential danger over the horizon has led to conscription throughout East Asia, except in Japan. Conscription has made militarism more acceptable in China, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan because everyone has family involved, whether oneself, a brother, husband, son, or relative. On the other hand, conscription in Japan is a constitutional and political impossibility. The JSDF is an all-volunteer force, a feature the MOD emphasizes to disassociate the current security forces with the militaristic forces of pre-1945. For 70 years military service has not been an expected responsibility of a Japanese citizen; for the rest of East Asia, sacrificing several years in military service of the country has become an intrinsic part of national identity.

Consequently, East Asia states draw their military strength from conscription and strong support of the military by the general public. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, all countries in East Asia practice conscription, with North Korea requiring the longest commitment at 60 months.

39 Women can voluntarily serve in the armed forces, but are not conscripted.
China’s conscription situation is unique. Due to the large enlistments, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) does not enforce conscription. However, military service is expected when needed. The Chinese constitution (Article 55) says, “It is the sacred obligation of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to defend the motherland and resist aggression. It is the honorable

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40 China: 18-24 years of age for selective compulsory military service, with a 2-year service obligation; no minimum age for voluntary service (all officers are volunteers); 18-19 years of age for women high school graduates who meet requirements for specific military jobs; a recent military decision allows women in combat roles; the first class of women warship commanders was in 2011 (2012)

41 Japan: 18 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription; mandatory retirement at age 53 for senior enlisted personnel and at 62 years for senior service officers (2012)

42 North Korea: 18 is presumed to be the legal minimum age for compulsory military service; 16-17 is the presumed legal minimum age for voluntary service (2012)

43 Russia: 18-27 years of age for compulsory or voluntary military service; males are registered for the draft at 17 years of age; service obligation is 1 year (conscripts can only be sent to combat zones after 6 months of training); reserve obligation for non-officers to age 50; enrollment in military schools from the age of 16, cadets classified as members of the armed forces note: the chief of the General Staff Mobilization Directorate announced in May 2013 that for health reasons, only 65% of draftees called up during the spring 2013 draft campaign were fit for military service, and over 12% of these were sent for an additional medical examination (by way of comparison, 69.9% in 2012 and 57.7% in 2011 were deemed fit for military service); approximately 50% of draft-age Russian males receive some type of legal deferment each draft cycle (2014)

44 South Korea: 20-30 years of age for compulsory military service, with middle school education required; conscript service obligation - 21 months (Army, Marines), 23 months (Navy), 24 months (Air Force); 18-26 years of age for voluntary military service; women, in service since 1950, admitted to 7 service branches, including infantry, but excluded from artillery, armor, anti-air, and chaplaincy corps; HIV-positive individuals are exempt from military service (2012)

45 Taiwan: 18-35 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service; service obligation is 2 years; women may enlist; women in Air Force service are restricted to noncombat roles; reserve obligation to age 30 (Army); the Ministry of Defense is in the process of implementing a voluntary enlistment system over the period 2010-2015, although non-volunteers will still be required to perform alternative service or go through 4 months of military training (2012)
duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to perform military service and join the militia in accordance with the law.” In practice, many Chinese receive some form of military training, usually at universities where students must complete one to four weeks before graduation.

The general training that all conscripted males receive is important to military strength, power projection, and defense for several reasons. First, militaristic behavior is not normal human behavior. Where there is danger, people tend to flee and are highly disorganized. The military trains individuals to act strategically and calmly in times of crises. Although the training that soldiers receive during mandatory conscription is not the same as permanent members of a military, it can still contribute to a nation’s security. Moreover, death is inevitable in combat. Military drills trains civilians who are not interested in taking life to be able to kill an enemy and to cope with witnessing death. Even if Japan was able to simply mobilize the public through implausible fiat power, it would still take time to indoctrinate the recruits in this dimension of military service. Military training also includes handling of weapons, operation of advanced technology, and following orders. All the other militaries in East Asia have been training in these areas for decades, whereas Japan has not.

Lastly, conscription activates the entirety of society for a war effort. Military activities abroad greatly benefit from a supportive public at home. Since everyone pays the “blood tax,” whether directly or indirectly, in China, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan, their governments do not face the same public resistance on security matters that one routinely sees in Japan. Conscription does not just increase the military capabilities of a state because it creates a ready supply of military forces, it also builds a military culture where citizens are remolded into soldiers who can perform the mental and physically strenuous duties absolutely necessary in warfare. Simultaneously, conscription indoctrinates the public into believing the use of force is a
legitimate and normalized behavior. Even though repealing conscription would be to the benefit to most South Koreans, there is still strong resistance to get rid of it completely because everyone should serve their country. Whereas Japan’s rivals have a steady supply of well-trained soldiers who are ready for duty at a moment’s notice, Japan has struggled with reaching desired military personnel quotas or securing the public’s support, even for completely legitimate concerns regarding international security. Simply put, virtually every male in Asia, ages 18-35 has at least 18 months of military training, except Japanese men.

Because conscription is not an option, the MOD has aggressively tried to increase recruitment, with some successful, through innovative media campaigns. In recruitment posters, popular idols and cartoon images extol the JSDF’s virtues of “peace,” “love,” and improving one’s self. In 2014, Haruka Shimazaki of the popular idol group, AKB48, fronted an MOD’s recruitment campaign. The beautiful and non-threatening idol informs potential recruits that “there is a job that you can only do here” (ここでしかできない仕事があります). In the Shimazaki commercial the job consists of disaster relief, hugging little children, and using “cool” technology (Ministry of Defense 2014, June). Not once does the viewer see any use of force, handling of weapons, or potential threats the JSDF would have to address. Anthropologist Sabrine Fruhstuck’s (2007) exhaustive study of JSDF recruitment literature finds the MOD has “symbolically ‘disarmed’ the Self-Defense Forces; normalized and domesticated the military to look like other (formerly) state-run service organizations such as the railways and postal systems” (117).

These sanitized depictions of the JSDF have made military service more palatable, but has not necessarily increased the quality of the forces. Since many Japanese see the JSDF as akin to a regular government job, they are not prepared for the difficulties of military service.
Many quit soon after joining. This media campaign has also attracted many who are interested in *anime* (Japanese animation) and videogames, not warfare. In several conversations with JSDF personnel, I learned the commercials were a sore spot because they felt that the ads were embarrassing and were attracting the “wrong” kind of person. The MOD’s recruitment campaign is the result of the historical baggage the Japanese military carries; the MOD would utilize more traditional recruitment strategies if it could. In the US, each military branch has a targeted recruitment strategy that seeks out individuals that best fit its function. Generally speaking, the air force seeks those interested in technology, the army seeks people who wish to pursue college upon the end of their service, and the marines seek out tough, hardened individuals interested in the most difficult jobs. Tailored recruitment provides recruits less likely to be quit once training begins (Author’s Interview, Colonel Christopher Goff, USMC, August 2014, Tokyo, Japan). The MOD does not have that luxury. Due to the declining population and antimilitarism attitudes, the MOD takes whoever it can get. As US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld forebodingly observed, “you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”

The MOD has also begun implementing policies to increase the recruitment of women to bolster force size. The MOD has also tried to make service more appealing by assisting JSDF members in transitioning back into the economy, such as work skills training and offering tax breaks to companies who hire reserve JSDF members (Japan Times 2014, November). In another initiative, the MOD works closely with local governments and relevant organizations to help reemploy retired JSDF members (National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond, 26). The MOD has proposed that companies be allowed to deduct 100,000 yen (~$800) from their corporate tax payments for each reserve member they hire. This incentive is designed
to help reserve members fulfill their required five days of training a year requirement, a duty they find difficult to meet because they usually have to utilize vacation time.

Yet, though the MOD has aggressively recruited, and implemented various steps to make the JSDF more attractive occupation for a force smaller than a quarter million it still cannot fulfill its quotas. The reserve force is supposed to have 47,900, but its only 70% of that number (Japan Times 2014, November). As of 2009, JSDF recruitment is still 96% of desired levels (Hughes 2009). Boots on the ground are precious and hard to come by.

A Population Crisis
Japan’s small force size and the MOD’s difficulty in addressing the problem reflect a convergence of demographic and normative forces. The government must pursue two interrelated objectives, 1) package the JSDF as non-militaristic and admirable entity to gain popular support, and 2) institute measures to increase the population and therefore the supply of potential recruits. The normative public aversion to militarism ebbs and flows depending on the strength of activist movements, the effectiveness of government propaganda, and perceptions of regional threats. However, the rapidly aging and declining population is a constraining force that is difficult to overcome because of economic and cultural realities that have developed over decades.

According to the Japanese National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (PSSR), based on medium fertility rate projections Japan is entering a long period of population decline. It is expected to decrease to approximately 116.62 million by 2030, to 99.13 million in 2048, and 86.74 million by 2060. The projections for 2060 vary widely - from 94.6 million in optimistic estimates to 79.97 million; this more pessimistic scenario would mean a 38% decrease in population since 2012.
Japan has long been passed the population replenishment rate due to its dangerously low fertility rate, which in 1974 fell below 2.1, where births slightly outnumber deaths. Though the precipitous drop was momentarily halted in 2005, and increased to 1.41 in 2012, the cause is unclear and few officials believe that the rate will increase to suitable levels to sustain population equilibrium. In 2014, slightly more than 1 million babies were born, the lowest figure on record (Riley 2015). This amounts to less than half the annual births of 1973, when signs of population decline began to emerge. The full impact of this will be even more obvious in a few decades, when today’s children are adults. Children under 15 have decreased from 27 million in the early 1980s to 16.84 million today. The most recent PSSR report projects that the population of young-age Japanese will be only 7.91 million by 2060.
More problematic for the JSDF is the rapid aging of the population. Japan is the world’s first “hyper-aged society.” Figure 3.4 illustrates its increasingly “constrictive” population pyramid. Compared to more desirable “expansive” population pyramid where the majority of the population is of working and under-working age, a “constrictive” pyramid has fewer individuals contributing to the economy and more individuals drawing social welfare benefits. By 2020, 35.12 million Japanese will be of retirement age and by 2060, 40% of the total population will be over the age of 65. As a result, the increasingly small working-age population will be burdened with upholding the economy and large retirement-aged population. By 2060, the age dependency ratio, which measures the level of support burden on the working-age population, will be 1.3 workers for each senior (PSSR 2012). Somewhat fittingly, Japan’s population “pyramid” resembles an urn.
These trends will not only significantly strain already undermanned and labor-intensive industries such as healthcare, but the financial stress will likely have negative effects on the broader economy. For example, banks will lose valuable investment capital as the elderly dip into their savings for professional care and medical services. This is due, in part, to the decreasing capacity of families and government to support the elderly. In addition, an ongoing population decline will see fewer consumers spending and place acute pressure on Japan’s GDP growth and wages. The increased competitiveness in industries that Japan used to dominate, such as automobiles and consumer electronics, from China and South Korea will further squeeze the Japanese economy, which is being stifled internally and externally, making it less attractive to foreign investors, removing yet another valuable tool for economic recovery (Dekle 2012, 5).

The impact of the declining and aging population on the potency of JSDF forces power is substantial. First, the declining population makes it difficult for the MOD to replenish personnel. According to the MOD (2014), “due to the declining birthrate and increasing university enrollments the recruitable population has been decreasing in size, and the general recruitment climate for SDF personnel has been becoming increasingly severe” (Defense of Japan White Paper, Chapter 2, Section 1). Specifically, the JSDF draws much of its membership from the nation’s countryside. However, due to declining population and decades of movement away from the country, the MOD has fewer people to draw from. The distribution of population is so affected that hundreds of villages have simply become extinct – with one village even resorting to using dolls to replace long lost residents (Souppouris 2014). The MOD may seek to recruit more individuals from the city, but major cities offer attractive competing opportunities for would-be recruits. And contrary to expectations, two decades of a stalled economy has not led to increased enlistment in the armed services. One reason is that the declining population has
curtailed excess labor. The unemployment rate has remained below 6% since the economic asset bubble burst in 1991 and dropped to as low as 3.5% in 2015 (the lowest since 1997). These figures do not tell the whole story about how unattractive employment in the JSDF. Although the unemployment rate is low, 20,300,000 Japanese (38% of the working population age 15 or older) are underemployed as part-time or temporary workers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Communications 2015). Part-time employment, or arubaito, is in low-pay non-benefit jobs that offer little long-term stability. Nonetheless, despite the JSDF’s respectable pay and great benefits, the MOD continues to struggle with recruitment.

Second, a smaller pool of potential-recruits means the overall quality of the JSDF declines as well. As discussed earlier, in countries such as the US, military recruitment is extremely targeted in order to extract the full potential of available recruits, East Asian militaries have access to every single able-bodied male, providing maximum flexibility in how security forces are designed and organized. Conversely, the MOD relies on a very generic message of “peace” to capture the widest population possible. Instead of receiving enlistees with specific interests and skills, or having access to all individuals in a country, the MOD must mold a small pool of talent into something functional.

The aging population exacerbates the troop quality problem. War is a young person’s game. Even with the increased reliance on technology, combat is still physically and mentally strenuous. Soldiers have to carry heavy equipment, engage in hours of tiring training and combat in severe environments, memorize countless tactics, and learn to operate increasingly sophisticated weapons technology. The average age of a member of the JSDF is 35, about 10 years older than a soldier in the rest of East Asia. This is especially surprising because the MOD retires personnel much earlier than the general workforce, many retiring in their mid-50s to keep
forces at peak performance (Defense of Japan Annual White Paper, 2010, 406). Whereas East Asian militaries have limitless potential because they enlist young healthy men in their prime, the JSDF is scraping together whoever it can get and hoping technology masks its weaknesses.

Third, Japan’s population demographics significantly weaken the economy, making it difficult for the government to increase the defense budget. Japan’s post-war economic growth was built on a baby-boom generation. Lacking foresight, the government developed a pension and healthcare system under the assumption that there would always be a ready supply of labor to support the retirement-age group (Oshio 2008). When the economic bubble burst in the early 90s, several structural problems in the Japanese economy became apparent. Although Japanese are known for their work ethic - some literally die from work (karoushi) - there is a limit to how productive a person can be. Moreover, the aging population means the economy will become increasingly less productive. Because the elderly retire or work fewer hours, from “1995 to 2010, the total number of workers in the workforce declined by 3%, while hours worked fell by 12% (Dekle, 7). Increasing the retirement age would stem some of the production loss, but would be politically difficult and would result in a host of new problems. The elderly lack the contemporary skillsets and productiveness of younger workers (while being paid more) necessary for Japan to compete with the rapidly modernizing and competitive international economy. Mid-career training might increase the usefulness of older workers, but this would be expensive and require significant changes to work hours and practices. Moreover, if older workers remain in the workforce, it makes it difficult for younger workers to move up Japan’s notoriously regimented seniority-based corporate structures. Therefore, the changes in demographics and work conditions require incredibly difficult social engineering and the reversal of long embedded work culture trends. As a result of the decline in labor output,
Japan’s GDP growth has dropped by an average of 0.8% annually since 1995. As Dekle (2012) makes starkly clear, “had Japanese labor grown at 1% annually (about the same rate as in the US) instead, annual GDP growth in Japan would have averaged 2.5%, instead of 0.7%” (7). In other words, Japan has been remarkably productive since the price asset bubble burst; its just the consequences of population decline are so severe the nation’s productivity has been all but erased. A less productive people would be drowning now instead of treading water. It is questionable how long Japan can starve of the most severe consequences of population decline.

The weak economy has tied the hands of government leaders. Japan’s debt is 238% of its GDP, the highest among advanced industrialized countries. And Japan’s deficit will continue to grow as the population turns grey. Just within 12 years (2000-2012), “social welfare expenditures grew from 20% of all government outlays in 2000 to 30% in 2012” (Dekle 2012, 4).

The pressures on the Japanese economy are not just from forces that are predictable. Random events such as the “3.11 triple disaster” not only cost several hundred billion dollars in reconstruction, but led to the shutdown or decommission of the country’s nuclear reactors. As a result, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry estimates that increased fuel imports cost Japan $35.2 billion in 2013 alone (Japan’s Energy White Paper 2014). The increased energy imports increased Japan’s trade deficit to a record $112 billion, up 65% from 2012. These losses significantly hinder whatever economic recovery Japan musters through prudent fiscal policy. The much-touted “Abenomics” has done little for economic recovery. After an initial bump in the economy, which can be attributed to increased consumer spending before a 3% increase in sales tax was implemented in 2014, the Japanese economy sank into recession in the second half of 2015.
The lesson from Japan’s economic woes is that there are many negative forces that leave the government almost completely hamstrung when it comes to new spending. For controversial issues like security, significant budget increases are political poison. For decades the government has kept defense expenditures under 1% of the GDP. This normative cap has remained steadfast even with the rise of China. Under the hawkish Abe regime, the defense budget increased for three consecutive years (2012-2015) after 16 years of continuous decline. Nevertheless, under the current 10-year plan, the defense budget will be fixed at under 1% of the GDP. If one were to take into account the weakening yen during that time period, then the increase in spending is negligible. According to prominent Diet members from Japan’s three largest parties, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), and New Komeito (NKP) that I interviewed, it would be a political impossibility to significantly increase the defense budget (Author’s Interview, May – September 2014, Tokyo, Japan). The limited budget forces the MOD to choose among system upgrades and maintenance, weapons acquisition, salary increases and benefits, and recruitment. According to Colonel Craig Agena, Japan’s budget is big in scale, but is not spent well and much of it goes into administrative costs (Author’s Interview, April 2014, Tokyo, Japan). In fact, the US intelligence budget is greater than the entirety of Japan’s defense budget. Agena contends that much of the equipment is outdated and needs to be replaced. Solutions to these problems not only require eager politicians to jumpstart investment in Japan’s security, but also money, popular support, and time – all of which are lacking.
Solutions to Japan's Population Crisis?

Overcoming the population crisis and its impact on Japanese security requires fundamental structural changes in government policies and cultural practices, two areas in which the Japanese government has proven inept, or at least naively optimistic.

There are many reasons Japan’s demographic problems are so severe and difficult to remedy. The decline in the birthrate is fueled by strongly embedded cultural practices in both public and private spheres. Some cite declining marriage rates, a corporate culture not conducive to a sound work-life balance, and Japan’s stubborn aversion to immigration (Riley 2015). Although bureaucrats predicted the decline in fertility rate early on, it was not until the “1.57 shock” of 1989 that created a sense of urgency about stemming the oncoming crisis. This precipitous drop has been attributed to the “conspicuous rise in the proportion of never-married among women aged 20s and early 30s” and a decline in marital fertility rates (as cited in Atoh 2000, 2). Later marriages decrease the chances of having multiple children because the window of opportunity for childbirth is smaller as women age. In response to the low fertility rate, government leaders and bureaucrats (mostly middle-aged men) scrambled to institute policies to get women to have more children. In 1994, the government adopted the Angel Plan, which created more childcare spaces with longer hours and established consultation centers to help new mothers (Schoppa 2008, 8). Since the initial Angel Plan, various new programs have been implemented, which include modest subsidies for childbirth and childrearing, couples counseling, and measures to assist women labor force participation after childbirth. However, these policies have had little impact and have been somewhat misguided. First and foremost, seducing women with monetary incentives to have more children to support the economy, and ultimately Japan’s security, is really not within the purview of government – particularly when

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46 The “1.57 shock” occurred in 1989 when Japan’s fertility rate reached a record low. The fertility rate would continue to drop for another 21 years.
men design these “family planning” programs. Women make up less than 15% of policymakers in the Diet, and when they speak up about the population crises they have occasionally been met with sexist derision (Japan Times 2014, July).

Second, the government has little influence in the workplace or home. In 2002, the Plus One Plan was introduced to alleviate some of the household work burden on women. It called for employers to offer paternal leave immediately after a baby was born. The objective was to have fathers bond with their newborns and establish a commitment to raising the children over the succeeding months and years. The policy was adopted, but few firms promoted the “daddy week” and only about 10 percent of fathers are taking it (Schoppa 2008, 10). The reluctance of fathers to utilize the plan and to do more housework reveals deeply embedded gender roles in Japanese society. Men are expected to beサラリーメン(salarymen), or the breadwinners, and it is taken for granted that women are responsible for work at home—regardless of their commitments to the public workforce. For women to maintain a healthy balance between work and private life remains difficult, where 70% of working women quit their job either at marriage or at their first birth (Atoh 2000, 8). According to Naohiro Yashiro (2001), a councilor for the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy during the Abe and Fukuda Cabinets, it would be culturally difficult for Japan to change its economic structure because of “fixed social roles for men and women, both at work and at home” (Yashiro, 2001, 297). As a result, Japan’s poor demographics is due to “market failure” where the “asymmetry in the consequences of marriage by gender has brought about a trade-off for women between work and marriage” (Yashiro 2001, 299).

These policies do not tackle the core problem; people are getting married much later than before. According to the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, “the average age of women on
first marriage was 27.8 years in 2004, up 2.4 years from the average age 20 years earlier, while
the average age of birth of the first child was 28.9 years, up by 2.3 years” (Oshio 2008, 2). The
reasons for later marriages are varied. Some individuals simply prefer to remain single and
avoid marrying “undesirable men” (Oshio 2008, 4). Others would like to get married, but only
once they are financially stable, a status increasingly hard to reach in Japan’s stagnant economy.
As for why some women choose not to have children, some worry that having children is too
expensive while others just do not want children. Some analysts believe that increasing women
in the workplace would further suppress the fertility rate. Yashiro (2001) contends, “Because the
labor force is declining, the labor force participation of women should be further stimulated,
which is likely to lower the fertility trend still more. This “vicious circle” between an increasing
number of women working and a declining fertility rate is what demographers have missed for a
long time” (300). Ultimately, “judging from this record, we cannot confidently proclaim that
getting more women into the labor force will result in more children” (Oshio 2008, 1).

Third, government policies to increase the population size have been rather roundabout.
Ultimately, government leaders are simply trying to increase the labor pool. The mobilization of
women is not built on principle, but necessity. Women, and the elderly, are seen as “domestic
immigrants” who have labor to offer. The government seeks to extract their labor by offering
them various incentives. Yet, women and the elderly choosing not to work or have children
remains a matter of personal choice.

Another potential solution to the population crisis is immigration. The world offers a
ready supply of young workers who can help the economy and possibly join the JSDF (although
this would be unlikely given the citizenship requirements of the JSDF and Japan’s strict
citizenship laws). Currently “1.7% of people in Japan are immigrants, compared to 13.5% in the
US, 13.1% percent in Germany, and 21.3% percent in Canada” (Dekle 2012, 9). There is clearly room for growth in Japan’s immigrant population. However, government leaders have been reluctant to aggressively pursue immigration reform because it is a highly controversial public issue. If Prime Minister Abe advocated a stronger position on immigration, he “would likely face stiff political resistance, especially in Japan’s rural provinces” (Riley 2015). Some Japanese are so against immigration reform that they are moving in the opposite direction. In 2014, jisedai no to (Party for Future Generations), proposed a bill that would exclude non-Japanese residents, many born in Japan or who have lived there for most of their lives, from receiving welfare benefits (Japan Times 2014, August). In the 80s and 90s, Japan instituted programs to repatriate Brazilian-Japanese to fulfill labor shortages in the manufacturing sector. However, Brazilian-Japanese were unable to integrate smoothly into mainstream Japanese society and faced discrimination. Many Japanese held prejudices and believed the immigrants were lazy and troublesome. As a result, Japan became wearier of immigrants because if Japanese could not assimilate, how could non-Japanese? As the economy slowed, the government sought ways to send the Brazilian-Japanese back home, even offering large sums for immigrants to pack up and leave (Tabuchi 2009). All this reveals deeply embedded cultural biases are difficult to overcome. For most of its history, Japan has been unwilling to pay the high costs of assimilating foreigners.

Moreover, for it to have an impact, immigration must be adopted wholesale, in large quantities. According to former director of the Tokyo Immigration Bureau, Hidenori Sakanaka (2014), Japan can pursue two policy options; a Small Option that restricts immigration and pursues a “compact society,” or a Big Option that welcomes immigrations and a restructuring of Japanese society to its core. The Big Option would require 20 million immigrants over 50 years,
or 400,000 a year, and Hidenori is pessimistic about Japan’s ability to take in such a large number so suddenly. This would be more than four times the current rate and with immigration to be that high, immigrants would constitute about 20% of the total population of Japan by 2030 (Dekle 2012, 9). This would require Japan to “transform itself into a land of opportunity, building an open, fair society which guaranteed equal opportunity, judged people on their merits, and allowed everyone to improve their social status regardless of origin or ethnicity” (Hidenori 2005). And this change would be extremely expensive. To help assimilate immigrants, it will have to provide language training, welfare, and other programs. Japanese nationals would also need some culture education.

Thus, immigration reform would require sweeping changes, which Japanese have simply been unwilling to pursue, to the extent that it seems like sabotage. For those who come, there are many barriers to gaining the citizenship required to be a long-term contributor to Japanese society. For example, in the critical area of nursing, immigrants must take a Japanese language test so difficult that only 3 of 600 nurses have been able to pass since 2007 (Tabuchi 2011). In 2007, only 11,000 of the 130,000 foreign students studying in Japan found jobs (Tabuchi 2011). Though they are needed more than ever, there seems no way to weave foreigners into the tapestry of Japanese society.

Even if Japan can implement immigration reform, it would provide indirect economic benefits to the JSDF at best. Immigrants are unlikely to join the JSDF if they are the highly skilled laborers Japan desires. Moreover, those who most likely to immigrate to Japan, Chinese and Koreans, come from countries the government considers possible threats to the nation. If Japan is to increase its capabilities to balance against regional powers, it must rely on people from those states to shore up its economy and stabilize its population. Moreover, if Japan cannot
right this ship soon, it runs the risk of no longer being an attractive destination for immigrants. Given its poor relations in Asia, a shrinking economy, and improving living conditions in China and South Korea, Japan may eventually no longer attract the best and brightest, let alone open its doors for them to come and make it easier for them to stay. Signs of the decline in Japan’s attractiveness have begun to appear. In 2009, foreigners who applied for resident status slumped 49% to just 8,905 people (Tabuchi 2011).

Japan’s force size problems are difficult to solve because they do not relate only to security. Recruitment will always be controversial and difficult because it calls upon society to pay the highest tax to the state. Path-dependent norms and policies have made Japan’s recruitment situation especially onerous. Japan’s population crisis cuts across historical, economic, normative, and gender issue areas, making it very difficult for policymakers to find a suitable a panacea for problems Japan faces.

Figure 3.5: The Impact of Demographics on Japanese Security

As illustrated in Figure 3.5 and this chapter, these constraints form a vicious cycle that is hard to break. Whereas Japan is on the decline, its neighbors are undergoing impressive growth. Therefore, the question “is Japan normalizing?” does not capture the central puzzle in Japanese
security. A more pressing question is, “can Japan normalize”? It is increasingly clear that Japan cannot.

_Japan’s Limited Technical Capabilities and Constraints on Capacity-building_
In order to offset the social-structural limitations of the JSDF and increase Japan’s contribution to global security, over the past 20 years the MOD has pursued a policy of capacity building, in what has routinely been described as militarization. The MOD has improved surveillance capabilities, modernized equipment, and increased combined training exercises with the US and other states. However, when scholars analyze these changes they typically make three fundamental mistakes.

First, scholars assumed these upgrades are significant. Determining the significance of weapons upgrades and policy changes is difficult, especially if states upgrade their equipment and policies. Moreover, if we consider the normative, political, and regional power balance contexts, the degree of change is debatable. For example, China commissioned its first aircraft carrier _Liaoning_ into the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) on September 25, 2012 and Japan simultaneously sought to upgrade its _Atago_ class destroyers with improved BMD technology. If this was a response to China’s acquisition of a new type of ship in the region, was it significant? Given that China increased its defense budget from under $5 billion in 1989 to over $105 billion in 2012 while Japan’s defense spending remained at roughly $40 billion, it is difficult to conclude that some systems upgrades are significant. China’s aircraft carrier also signals a fundamental shift from a green-water into a blue-water navy. Japan’s response was a continuation of existing policies. Additionally, even if China had not acquired the aircraft, Japan would have still sought to upgrade aging fleets. According to Hagstrom and Williamsson (2009) the post-war period witnessed incremental changes to the JSDF – nothing significant or game
changing in the regional power balance. Since BMD is defense-oriented technology, upgrading MSDF did not fundamentally change Japanese security doctrine or capabilities.

Second, realists have used capability change as “an analytical shortcut to understanding foreign policy change” (Hagstrom and Williamsson 2009, 246). Alarmists cite rising threat in East Asia to Japanese militarization without careful analysis of why certain technologies are adopted and others not by MOD. There is little consideration of the political and strategic justifications for these policy changes. According to Jun Nishida, Deputy Director of National Security Policy Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japanese leaders have sought changes to the JSDF for Japan to contribute even more to humanitarian and disaster relief, plus streamline the forces due to unnecessary complexities in legal codes and improve its efficiency (Author’s Interview, February 2014, Tokyo, Japan). These justifications pertain more to domestic issues than regional power balancing. Japan has been well aware of China’s rise and North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, but has not responded proportionally. The changes in Japanese capabilities are more reflective of a new kind of militarism that aims to stabilize failing states, engage in counter terrorism, and rebuild after environmental disasters.

Third, projections of JSDF capabilities assume growth is indefinite and linear, when it has been more piecemeal and patchwork. Scholars have assumed that once political and normative hurdles are over come, the MOD can continuously and significantly increase the country’s capabilities unhindered. However, JSDF’s capabilities are significantly constrained by 70 years of antimilitarism norms, inefficient security practices, and infrastructural “lag.” Normalization” for Japan is not simply acquiring new capabilities, but also making up for lost time and undoing deeply embedded weaknesses in its defense infrastructure. For the foreseeable future, Japan’s outdated military bases, lack of field experience, defense oriented technology and
security doctrine, and an underdeveloped military-industrial-complex (MIC) will limit its power projection. Increases in the JSDF capabilities may be in spurts and fits and can stall if there are political or economic problems.

Towards a Modern Force for Contemporary Problems
The Japanese government has made incremental changes to the JSDF since its inception. However, each “upgrade” to the defense forces has to meet the spirit of Article 9 and the 100s of increasingly convoluted legal codes that came with it. As a result, modifications to security policies can be time consuming and inefficient. In order to address modern threats, increase Japan’s contributions to international peacekeeping efforts, and increase its cost efficiency while maintaining Japan’s defense-oriented security doctrine, Japanese leaders have sought to streamline the JSDF and adopt more “seamless” and “logical” policies.

With the rise of China and relative decline of the Russia, Japan has adjusted its security strategy to focus on defending remote islands over Cold War-style land fighting. Until recently, Japan has not been training for the problems that they would face in today’s security environment, such as invasions of its remote islands. During the Cold War, “47 percent of SDF’s total training area was concentrated in Hokkaido to protect sea lands and prevent attacks from the former Soviet Union” (Mie and Aoki 2013). Now in order to address Japan’s weakness in the South, JSDF forces have been moved across the country. With Japan’s outdated and limited infrastructure this is not a smooth process. Specifically, Japan has not built any new domestic bases in the post-war period and the existing bases need upgrading. For example, several JASDF bases are over 70 years old, with runways that are not well suited for jet fighters. In many, such as the Miho Air Base and Chitose Air Base, the runway is shared between the JSDF and civilian flights. Furthermore, according to Colonel Jonathan Goff, the US’s first
marine attaché to Japan, the JSDF needs additional training grounds (Author’s Interview, August 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Japan’s most substantial former imperial bases are currently controlled and operated by the US. Such a limited footprint constrains MOD ability to rapidly increase its size, quickly move troops to new areas, mount new and large-scale exercises, and incorporate new equipment and technology. It would take years and billions to upgrade its bases – something unlikely given the move towards lower spending. The unpopularity of bases due to concerns about crime and pollution also make building new bases unlikely.

One development of note is the construction of Japan’s only post-war base in Djibouti. Announced in 2010 and opened in July 2011, the $40 million base is meant to allow the JMSDF to conduct patrols in the Indian Ocean and augment its anti-piracy capabilities. There are about 200 JSDF personnel dispatched to the base. The base is important for indicating a clear line has been crossed on the permanence of Japanese troops abroad. However, the impact on Japan’s overall strength is likely to be minimal. The defense forces are still hamstrung by strict rules of engagement and the footprint is still very small. The base may allow Japan to contribute more to anti-piracy efforts, but does little to balance against regional neighbors. It is questionable if this represents any true power projection capability increases for Japan.

Japan’s outdated bases are a symptom of a more crippling limitation on Japanese militarization - he JSDF’s dearth of field experience. For decades, there was little impetus to upgrade bases and many other elements because Japan was not engaged in international peacekeeping efforts, let alone wars. Not until the early 1990s did Japan engage in limited peacekeeping operations (PKO), and not until the early 2000s that it had to seriously consider adjusting its force structure. Only in the past few years, under the Abe regime, has the government considered significant changes to the nation’s security doctrine.
It is not that Japanese troops are absolutely ill prepared. Scholars routinely highlight JSDF professionalism and training to illustrate Japan’s military strength. The JSDF is a capable force, but simulations and training exercises are no substitute for combat experience. Technology helps augment its strength, but does not replace combat experience. Training, preparedness, and practice are all important to understanding how technology applies to security. Stephen Biddle (2007) contends “skill interacts with technology and numerical preponderance in a powerful, non-linear way” (208). Each branch of the JSDF benefits from different kinds of training environments. For example, the MSDF can rely on computer simulations because they closely reflect its live combat scenarios. On the other hand, the GSDF, the largest branch of the JSDF, requires outdoor training exercises to mimic true battlefields. Pilots in the ASDF can replicate some operations from simulations, but actual flight time prepares them for extreme stresses and strains. Regardless of the type of training simulations cannot replicate the stress and high stakes of combat. For example, US drone pilots, thousands of miles from the battlefield, can suffer from depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress (Dao 2013). Field experience is absolutely essential to preparing for the randomness and ugliness of war.

In general, East Asia has been peaceful and most counties in the region have not fought in major conflicts for decades. However, Japanese have not fired a live round in combat for 70 years. Since the end of World War II, China has seen combat in the Invasion of Xinjian (1949), the Invasion of Tibet (1950-1951), the Korean War (1950-1952), the Chola Incident (1967), the Zhenbao Island Incident (1969), the Vietnam War (1969-1975), the Battle of the Paracel Islands (1974), and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979). Over the last five decades, Russia has engaged in several conflicts, most notably in the 1975 Afghan War. In 2008, Russia defeated Georgia in

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47 The third Indo-China War lasted only one month, and China did not fair too well. However, losing experience is better than no experience at all.
a dispute over South Ossetia. In 2014, Russian forces were likely involved in the annexation of Crimea and civil war in Ukraine. North Korea and South Korea ended conventional warfare in 1952, but have continued war games, intensive training drills, and random skirmishes for various reasons. In November 2010, North Korea fired approximately 170 artillery shells on Yeonpyeong Island, killing four South Koreans and injuring 19. The key difference between Japan and its neighbors is that the other countries still have officers with combat experience to train the next generation. Higher ranked military officers in East Asia have cut their teeth in war, whereas no one in the JSDF fought in Japan’s last war. In the US military, the completion of tours is a major factor in officer promotion. Spending time in the field is important for understanding every level of a security force.

The most field experience JSDF personnel have overseas has been through HA/DR and PKO operations. However, these activities did not begin until 1989, over 30 years after the establishment of the JSDF. Such operations are useful in improving logistics, organization, and Command and Control (C2), and improving Japan’s image abroad. However, combat applicability of Japan’s international contributions has been grossly exaggerated.

As of 2014, Japan has sent 9300 personnel to participate in 13 PKO overseas operations. Many of their duties included election monitoring, human resource development and intellectual contributions. Many personnel were not combat forces, but engineering units and staff officers. They operated under restrictive rules of engagement, requiring constant protection from other states. Even under these strict conditions, the government faced strong public pressure to withdraw the troops.
That strong aversion to troop deployment has more to do with principle than actual scale because Japan has contributed very few SDF personnel to UN missions, typically 30 troops per year over the past two decades.

Figures 3.6: UN and Japan PKO Mission Totals 1990-2014

As illustrated in Figure 3.6, since the mid-90s, the UN has engaged in between 11 to 22 missions. Of those, Japan has participated in at most five missions at a time, and then only for a total of four months over the past 24 years. Japan rarely participates in more than two missions and, when it does, makes a very small troop contribution. Its greatest troop contribution was in May 1993: 729 (out of 77,310). This quickly dropped to 53 by September 1993. The average amount of JSDF members per month has hovered around 169 out of an average of 62,877 UN troops. As such, Japan’s rank in all country donations is quite low.
Figure 3.7: UN PKO Contributions: Country Rank 1990-2014

![Chart showing UN PKO Contributions: Country Rank 1990-2014](chart)


Figure 3.7 illustrates that Japan routinely ranks in the bottom half of contributors to UN missions. At its peak, Japan ranked 16 out of 89 countries between December 2002 and February 2003, when it contributed was 680 JSDF personnel. Since then, Japan’s contribution has declined and currently sits at 52 out of 121 countries. As of January 2015, a total of 272 of 104,496 UN troops are JSDF and Japan is engaged in only one mission out of 18. For all of Prime Minister Abe’s appeals for a “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” Japan has done very little. In his first term from September 2006 to September 2007, Japan contributed 35 to 38 troops split between two and three missions (out of 21 and 22 total UN missions). In this second term beginning December 2012, Japan has contributed between 196 to 278 troops to one UN PKO mission. Right before Prime Minister Abe came into power in November 2012, Japan was contributing 529 troops over the missions. Of course, many of these decisions were made before Abe came to power. However, in the entire time Abe has been in office, Japan has made no increases in its UN forces commitments.
The JSDF has been much more active in disaster relief operations. Between 2004 and 2013, over 120 teams of civilian medical experts from the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, National Policy Agency, National Police Agency, Japan Coast Guard, JSDF, and JICA, among other organizations have been dispatched between 520 to 892 times per year (not including the Great East Japan Earthquake).

Highly constrained PKO operations and disaster relief missions have a limited contribution to make in preparing for combat. Additionally, extended time abroad could condition the public to accept a more “proactive” JSDF. The longer Japan avoids legitimate combat theatres, the more politically costly it could be to engage in warfare. A single combat death could be a deathblow to militarization efforts since the public has shown little support for JSDF operations abroad. For its entire existence, the JSDF has been a reactive force and the MOD has relied on unforeseen UN missions and disasters to increase the training of Japan’s security forces at the margins.

*Japan’s Defense Industry*

Japan’s lack of overseas field experience can be attributed to its defense-oriented security doctrine stemming from Article 9 of the “Peace Constitution.” The constitution forbids Japan a right to make war, which has been interpreted as prohibiting sending troops abroad, selling arms, and being involved in international conflicts. According to Andrew Oros (2008), Japan’s security identity, which forgoes participation in conflict abroad, brings into question the need to develop its arms industry. Since Japan seeks to avoid foreign conflicts, “providing weapons into conflict areas might draw Japan into military conflict” and “undermines any principled pacifist stance held by Japanese” (90). Not until 1991, 45 years after WWII did Japan authorize sending JSDF troops abroad, at least for highly constrained UN-authorized PKO and HA/DR missions.
The spirit of the constitution is pacifistic because Japan is actively avoiding conflict in its various forms, but in practice, the constitution is antimilitaristic because Japan is not above the use of force in circumstance. Government leaders and the public have accepted the notion that the use of force for defense does not violate the intent of the constitution and is the guiding principle behind Japan’s security technology acquisitions.

For close to seven decades Japan’s power projection has been limited because the government can only acquire and develop defense-oriented technology. Even with the recent Abe administration efforts to increase Japan’s capabilities, the 2013 NDPG, Japan’s first fully fledged security doctrine, established five defense-oriented goals: 1) study and research the compatibility of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with MSDF vessels; 2) study for the introduction of airborne early-warning (and control) aircraft, 3) improve the capability of the Airborne Warning And Control System, 4) implement a project for the conversion of central computing devices and installation of electronic warfare support measures to improve the warning and control capability of the existing E-767, and 5) research the introduction of UAV (Defense Programs and Budget of Japan 2014). These technologies help defend the Japanese mainland without overtly disrupting the power balance of East Asia.

Nevertheless, scholars have argued that Japan’s advanced technology and changes in the regional power balance have compelled government leaders to pursue security normalization policies, including jumpstarting Japan’s indigenous arms production capabilities. However, the defense-oriented nature of the JSDF and the “Peace Constitution” curtailed the growth of Japan’s defense production and technological base, making it much more difficult to reactivate as analysts had predicted. Much of the arms manufacturing base was destroyed in WWII and the industry has never recovered. Recovering R&D necessary for a strong military-industrial-
complex, once lost, would require a long time and great cost (Ministry of Defense 2014, June).

Over time, Japan’s defense production and technological base developed the following unique characteristics: 1) Japan does not have state-owned armament production facilities, 2) small to medium size companies are a major part of the market, and 3) domestic demand drives it; there is no foreign market.

As a consequence, the Japanese military-industrial-complex is defined by a tight knit relationship between the government and corporations. Since the government cannot import arms freely and Japanese arms producers cannot sell in the global market, there is predictable but limited domestic arms market, which is unlikely to see any growth for the foreseeable future. Historically, close to half of the defense budget was allocated to personnel and provision expenses, such as salary, retirement allowances, meals, and boarding. In the much ballyhooed 2015 budget, 2.1 billion yen was allocated for personnel expenses while 1.7 billion yen was set aside for procurement, repair and maintenance of equipment, purchase of fuel, education and training, facility construction and maintenance, utilities, R&D, base maintenance, and hosting the USFJ (Defense Programs and Budget of Japan Overview of FY2015 Budget). Since Japan’s defense budget is routinely ranks in the top ten in the world, there is still a substantial amount that could be spent on defense equipment. However, only 2.29 billion yen, spread over five years, was allocated for procurement of major defense equipment in the 2015 defense budget. This is even less substantial considering Japan’s high cost of procurement and the weakening yen. Therefore, Japanese arms manufacturers should expect a continuation of the historical trend of limited MOD demand. Since the government rarely makes bulk purchases, Japanese

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48 The top 20 Japanese military suppliers by percentage defense budget allocation are as follows: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (20.8%), Mitsubishi Electric (14.5%), Kawasaki Heavy Industries (8.3%), NEC (5.7%), Fujitsu (3.9%), Komatsu (2.7%), Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding (2.4%), Hitachi (1.6%), Toshiba (1.3%), Mitsubishi Corporation (1.3%), Nakagawa Co. (1.2%), The Japan Steel Works (1.2%), Nippon Oil Corporation (1.2%), IHI (1.1%), COSMO (1.1%), DAIKIN (1.1%), ISUZU (1.0%), OKI (0.9%), IHI AEROSPACE Co. (0.9%), Fuji Heavy Industries (0.8%) (MOD Press Release, 2010)
corporations take an initial loss, hoping the government will consistently buy and thus
development costs will be recouped. This pattern has been maintained for decades, and thus the
JSDF has regularly modernized but Japan’s military-industrial-complex remained
underdeveloped, lagging behind other states.

With recent cutbacks due to the economy, this relationship has become increasingly
unsustainable. In December 2009, Fuji Heavy Industries (FHI) filed a civil case against the
government because the MOD cancelled a contract for 62 AH-64D attack helicopters (Apache
Longbows) after just 10 units due to high costs (Kubota 2010). In 2010, the MOD cancelled a
contract with Toshiba to remodel jet fighters due to production delays, when Toshiba was not
able to procure parts from abroad (Japan Today 2010). Since 2003, roughly 20 companies have
left the defense industry sector altogether because, as Sumitomo Electric believes, "given that
defense-related businesses have little promise of future growth while requiring highly advanced
technology, limited human resources and production facilities should be allocated to civilian
purposes" (Kubota 2010). Japanese companies have tried to remain competitive through the
backdoor approach of expansion via developing dual-use technology (Samuels 2007, 163), but
this is a cumbersome way to build a robust arms market. As the Japanese population declines, it
will be increasingly difficult for Japanese companies to dedicate precious resources to a market
with limited growth.
Table 3.2: Percentage of Income from 2010 Military Contracts (top 20)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Company</th>
<th>Percentage of Income</th>
<th>Name of Company</th>
<th>Percentage of Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, ltd.</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11) Nakagawa Co., ltd.</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Mitsubishi Electric</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12) The Japan Steel Works, ltd.</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Kawasaki Heavy Industries</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13) Nippon Oil Corporation</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) NEC</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14) IHI</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Fujitsu</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>15) COSMOS</td>
<td>.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Komatsu</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>16) DAIKIN</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Mitsui Engineering &amp; Shipbuilding</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>17) Isuzu</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Hitachi</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>18) OKI</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Toshiba</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>19) IHI Aerospace</td>
<td>.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Mitsubishi Corporation</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>20) Fuji Heavy Industries</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by editing data from 2010 Company Annual Financial Reports and 2010 MOD Contractors Report

Japanese defense contractors are mostly dual-use consumer goods companies that are subsidiaries of a limited group of corporations. As illustrated in Table 3.2, in 2010, the largest military contractors, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, generated 8% of their income from military sales. For Kawasaki Heavy Industries, aerospace remained the only profitable sector because of strong appreciation of the yen and a decline in North American and European business (Kawasaki Heavy Industries Financial Review 2010). Five of the top 20 contractors generated less than 5% of their income from MOD contracts and another five generated less than 1%. Among the world’s top arms manufacturers, Japanese manufactures are hard to find. Of the top 100 producers, just four (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries – 27; Mitsubishi Electric – 68; Kawasaki Heavy Industries – 75; NEC – 93) are Japanese (SIPRI 2014). Of them, only Mitsubishi Heavy Industries rose in rank from the year before (up five spots) while the others dropped between 18 to 43 spots. If Chinese companies were included in the rankings,

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49 Nakagawa Co., Ltd annual financial reports were not available. Nakagawa Co., Ltd is a small oil company in Nagoya.
50 Become JX-Nippon Oil & Energy in July 2011. JX-Group generates even less than .2% of its income from MOD contracts.
51 IHI is a subsidiary of IHI Group. IHI’s Group’s percentage of income from military contracts is 1%.
52 IHI aerospace is a subsidiary of IHI Group and does not release an independent annual financial report. However, the income from military contracts is likely to be miniscule because IHI Group’s military contract income is 1%.
53 Mitsubishi and IHI engage in many different industries. NEC, Fujitsu, Toshiba, and OKI primarily sell telecommunications, printers, and consumer electronics. Nakagawa (oil), Japan Steel, Nippon Oil focus is on natural resources, not military technology.
Japanese manufacturers rankings would likely drop even further.\textsuperscript{54} Moreover, all four are part of only 11 companies in the top 100 that generate less than 10\% of their revenue from arms production (9\%, 3\%, 7\%, and 3\% respectively). They produce defense-oriented equipment and small components of larger weapons systems. Clearly Japanese companies have not dedicated the resources or energy to compete with the major arms manufacturers in the global market. As a result, the defense industry currently makes up only half a percent of Japan’s GDP.

As a consequence of Japan’s limited production, it has become “dependent on US deliveries and leases of defense equipment (Ministry of Defense 2014, June). This is difficult to sustain because of the weak economy, high per unit cost, and changes in the industry that necessitates multinational defense equipment development. According to some estimates, the unit costs of Japanese vehicles are three to ten times as high as US vehicles (globalsecurity.org). Japan is also reliant other states to provide arms that Japan cannot independently develop. For example, the US was reluctant to sell F-22 fighters to Japan and the government had to slowly come to terms with the fact that Japan would not be able to procure the most advanced weaponry if it did not contribute to its development (Mainichi Shimbun 2009; Kubuta 2010). Ultimately, Japan settled on the F-35, a formidable aircraft, but one that provides a hard cap on the upper capabilities of the ASDF for the foreseeable future. The technologies Japan has developed independently well, such as sea-based IFF technology (identify friend or foe), sound navigation and sonar, and antisubmarine periscopes, are primarily defense-oriented (Kubota 2008, 12).

One major development that could reverse decades the limited growth is the recent softening of the “arms export ban.” In the 1950s, Japan produced equipment for the US for the Korean War as part of the US strategy to reignite the Japanese economy. Not until the 60s and 70s did Japan commit to limiting its indirect role in international conflicts. First issued as a

\textsuperscript{54} SIPRI excludes Chinese companies because reliable data cannot be found on China’s military-industrial-complex.
partial arms export ban by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1967, the Three Principles on Arms Exports (the Three P’s) has slowly acquired additional regulations. Prime Minister Takeo Miki extended the reach of the arms ban in 1976 by further limiting exports to all countries. Table 3.4 outlines the Three P’s, which have been interpreted in slightly different ways over the past few decades. For example, Japan has engaged in limited joint-development projects with the US. However, this was to maintain their alliance more than to balance against rising threats or to gain a backdoor approach to development an indigenous MIC. The exception illustrates that the arms export ban is not firm as the name of the principles suggests. Nevertheless, the refusal to export arms to conflict areas (most countries) and inability to join multinational weapons development projects has significantly curtailed Japan’s MIC growth.
### Table 3.3: Japan’s Non-Export Principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three Principles on Arms Exports</th>
<th>&quot;Arms&quot; exports to the following countries or regions shall not be permitted:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1) communist bloc countries,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) countries subject to &quot;arms&quot; exports embargo under the United Nations Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council's resolutions, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1976 Principles                  | "Arms" exports to other areas not included in the Three Principles will be also restrained in conformity with Japan's position as a peace-loving nation. |
|                                  | 1) In other words, the collateral policy guideline declared that the Government of Japan shall not promote "arms" exports, regardless of the destinations.55 |
|                                  | 2) So-called dual-use items do not fall under such "arms."                      |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Principle laws</th>
<th>Based on other relevant laws, the Government of Japan also deals with in a strict manner:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1) direct overseas investment for the purpose of manufacturing &quot;arms&quot; abroad, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) participation in the overseas construction projects of military facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) The export of military technologies is treated in the same manner as the export of &quot;arms.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) However, in order to ensure the effective operation of the Japan-United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>security arrangements, the Government of Japan paved the way for the transfer of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>military technologies to the United States as an exception to the Three Principles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Such transfer of military technologies to the United States is to be implemented in accordance with the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (the MDA Agreement) and the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies concluded in 1983 under the MDA Agreement (the 1983 Exchange of Notes).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2014 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (in development)</th>
<th>Intent of New Principles: Clarify the original three principles with consideration to the new security environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Japan will be more proactive in international affairs under the principle of international cooperation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world commensurate with its national capabilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded,</td>
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<td>ii) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or</td>
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<td>iii) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack).</td>
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In 2013, the DPJ relaxed the arms export ban, signifying the most significant change in Japanese weapons development since the end of WWII. Where the pressure for change comes

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55 “The term ‘arms’ as referred to in the Three Principles is defined as "goods that are listed in Item 1 of Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order of Japan (see http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/annex1.html), and which are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat." Such "arms" include specially designed parts and accessories as well as finished products. The question of whether each item falls under such "arms" or not will be judged objectively based on its shape, feature and other technical aspects, and regardless of its end-use” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
from is unclear because politicians, businesses, MOD, and Ministry of Trade, Economy, and Industry (METI) would all benefit. According to Colonel Craig Agena, when former Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura announced on December 29, 2011 the intent to relax the self-imposed restrictions, it was linked to the decision to purchase the F-35 Lighting II announced a week earlier (Author’s Interview via E-mail, August 2015, Tokyo, Japan). Agena goes on to say, “the F-35 acquisition decision was viewed as a venue for the change and senior Japanese officials made it clear to me [him] and in public that they wanted to produce F-35 parts and sell them to consortium nations. At the time, they were not fully aware of the complexities of the 8-nation consortium and the global parts distribution system. It was the first time that they made a decision to purchase a platform that was still under development aka concurrency. The problem was that there was no mechanism for implementing the 3P relaxation. It was still a case-by-case approach. Some people assumed that the initial announcement would open the floodgates for Japan to sell weapons around the world; nothing could be further from the truth. Understanding the political sensitivities, Japan wanted to ease into implementing change by first concentrating on non-lethal equipment, i.e. chemical detection & protection, boats, engineer equipment and the like” (Author’s Interview via E-mail, August 2015, Tokyo, Japan).

Even if the long-term viability of Japan’s MIC were questionable, in the short term, manufacturing defense equipment would create hundreds of new jobs. Representative Akihisa Nagashima (DPJ) contends the change was mainly designed to help the struggling defense industry. (Author’s Interview, June 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Nagashima indicated that Japan “must not go into conflict areas” or remove all the limitations on the arms exports, and the government must strike a balance between loosening restrictions and promoting the industry’s development (Author’s Interview, June 2014, Tokyo, Japan). This “balance” is at the heart of Japan’s current
struggle between shoring up its security in a world of new threats and maintaining its antimilitaristic sentiments. According to one high-ranking LDP parliamentarian, the easing of the Three P’s is a small, but meaningful change that can lead to growth in Japan’s defense industry (Author’s Interview, September 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Historically, the Three P’s was the functional equivalent to a blanket ban that allowed for few exceptions. Each sale needed prior vetting by METI. However, the 2014 principles allow Japan to export arms as long as it meets the following goals: 1) defense of the nation, 2) development of a domestic defense industry, and 3) contributing to world peace. The policy now emphasizes what cannot be exported as opposed to what can. According to Colonel Craig Agena (US Army Japan), Japan will benefit most from data exchange agreements, which will be easier to the new principles (Author’s Interview, April 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Although Japan has done some co-development with the US, there is a lot of room for growth, particularly on large multinational projects for complex weapons systems. However, Agena believes that for at least the immediate future, Japan’s focus will be on defensive technologies. Jun Nishida contends that Japan’s security will benefit because the MOD will no longer be hamstrung by “illogical” complexity in the legal code and rules that have prevented the export even of clearly defensive technologies in the past, such as helmets and bullet-proof vests (Author’s Interview, August 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Nishida’s concerns reflect a general trend that has created the abundance of complex legal codes and rules. Andrew Oros (2008) argues that Japan has practiced a policy of “reach, reconcile, reassure,” where the government makes a significant change to security policy and backtracks a bit. According to Tomohiko Satake, research fellow at NIDS, the change in the Three P’s is not necessarily major. It is to an extent simply codifying what Japan has done previously regarding exports (Author’s Interview, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan). One landmark change is the
disbanding of the Bureau of Finance and Equipment and the establishment the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency in its stead. According to Colonel Craig Agena, the intent is “better synergy, eliminate duplication of effort, save money, and streamline acquisition” (Author’s Interview via E-mail, August 2015, Tokyo, Japan). Agena contends, “this is difficult and new so it will most likely take them to figure out how to make the new organization as effective as possible. Up until now everything has been purchased in a piecemeal fashion. It made systematic upgrades very difficult to manage.”

For decades, the MOD has introduced laws to address new threats, then performed creative mental gymnastics to justify the change to a wary public. Moreover, government leaders and bureaucrats have tried to maintain at least the spirit of the pacifistic constitution. As a result of this hesitant approach to policy change, there are dozens of contradictory laws and many may not even meet the original intent of the government when a modification to an existing law was introduced. Prime Minister Abe’s expansive reinterpretation and restructuring of Japan’s security doctrine has sought to clarify the meaning of current legal codes, streamline laws, and make it easier to amend laws in crises (discussed in Chapter Five). Peace activists have seen this as an attempt to gut the “Peace Constitution” and pursue militaristic security behavior, but many in government, see it finally clarifying the pacifistic tenets of the legal code while creating room for implementing necessary security measures.

Yet, the full impact of this may not be noticeable for decades, if it has a real impact at all. According to Ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki, the easing of the Three P’s is not a game-changer, but can be good if Japan can develop some improved capabilities (Author’s Interview, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan). Fujisaki is hesitant to conclude that Japan can significantly improve its domestic arms industry because the process of modernizing will be very costly. Unlike the
consumer electronics industry where manufacturing can be outsourced, defense R&D and manufacturing is highly sensitive and the government prefers indigenous development. However, the domestic industry is such that the cost to performance ratio would be less than ideal. Additionally, at least a few dozen laws must be rewritten to clarify how the new principles are to be put into practice and to ensure they will not violate the constitution. Given the ambiguity in all this companies may be reluctant to commit significant resources to the arms industry.

The more problematic issues for Japan’s MIC are the companies themselves. First, Japanese companies will need to compete with international arms manufacturers with a wealth of experience and resources. Of the top 100 arms producers, 43 generate over 50% of their revenue from arms sales, and none of those are Japanese. Japanese companies will enter the global market at a disadvantage because they have no tactical experience (no market data) and Japanese-made weapons have not been tested in combat (Kubota 2008, 5). According to Colonel Christopher Goff, the quality of Japanese equipment is high, but not designed with the live battlefield in mind (Author’s Interview, Tokyo, Japan, August 2014). In one case cited by Colonel Goff, tanks designed by Mitsubishi had amazing tread and were built to last, but lacked space for the wounded because the engineers did not consider the possibility of injured soldiers. Japan’s MIC lacks the important understanding that weapons fail in live combat; it is inevitable. Instead, Japanese companies have the logic of *jyasuto* (just enough): equipment is designed to work as intended and not much more. For consumer goods this works, but in warfare this weakness can be critical. According to Colonel Goff, militaries need arms overkill because equipment will fail and lives depends on having more than “just enough.” Second, Japanese companies may have trouble growing quickly because Japan’s manufacturing base is not as
strong as in the past, with much of it outsourced to China. Japan’s population crisis has further put pressure on domestic productivity. Third, Japanese companies have adopted sub-optimal practices that can disadvantage them in the international market. Many companies generate most of their revenue from consumer goods, so they fear the stigma of being a “merchant of death” (Oros 2008). Tetsuo Kotani contends the “defense industry is not ready” and “company culture is still very reluctant” to commit to an industry (Author’s Interview, August 2015, Tokyo, Japan). Few companies dedicate key human resources to their arms division. The best engineers are assigned to the larger, less political, divisions of the company. Kotani believes long-term change is possible, but will be difficult until there is significant change in the Japanese university-level education system, which has not provided the training for arms sales and development.

In one arms category, submarines, Japan may find itself competitive internationally. But Japan has always had a strong navy, thus an increase in submarine exports would not fundamentally change its power projection capabilities nor fix the ailing MIC. Katsuya Tsukamoto also sees potential for growth in exporting submarines, but does not see this as a “game-changer” because Japan lacks experience in this field and has not developed strong relations with foreign customers or effective negotiation strategies (Author’s Interview, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan).

Even if these industry weaknesses can be rectified, are all these costly changes worth it. Representative Isamu Ueda (New Komeito) argues that there will still be national-level control on which arms can be exported and to whom. Ueda contends, “The law requires every export of defense equipment to be approved by METI. Japanese regulation is unique in that it requires government approval on respective transfers, while such regulation does not exist in most
countries. Therefore, Japan’s regulation is far stricter than international treaties” (Author’s Interview, October 2014, Tokyo, Japan). The restrictions, outlined in Table 4, eliminate many potential buyers. However, the new laws create a more predictable market, making it easier for arms producers to seek business deals. Nevertheless, Japan’s newly minted National Security Council (NSC) would still need to consider substantial cases and the information would be made available in accordance with the Act on Access to Information by Administrative Organs (law No. 42 of 1999). The NSC would need to ensure that proper controls are put into place to guarantee that the technology is not transferred to third parties, which would violate the principle of not exporting to conflict areas. Dual-use technologies will also be limited to ensure that the exports do not violate any international treaties. Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimaru has stressed that sales will be “subject to government approval on a case-by-case basis,” and companies are “still prevented from selling equipment that might end up being used in anger” (Moss 2011). In order to prevent arms from reaching terrorists or strife-torn countries, Japan will establish safeguards to control the movement of its arms. Moreover, since the JSDF is primarily focused on disaster relief and peace-building, the government does not expect large exports of guns and weapons. Instead the primary exports will be “patrol boats, bullet-proof vests, and heavy machinery that are used by Self-Defense Forces abroad” (Ito, 2011).

This extreme sensitivity on which countries Japan can export arms to is why easing the ban may not lead to significant change. According to Representative Taro Kono (LDP), Japan might jeopardize its favorable neutral position in world politics if it is directly, or indirectly, involved in international conflicts through arms exports, especially to the Middle East (Author’s Interview, May 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Japan has long been a peaceful, non-religions, pro trade, and pro development nation, giving it a favorable reputation throughout the world. A major
change in its security practice may make it seem too close to the US, putting it in a less favorable position. Japan experienced this recently with the murder of two Japanese nationals by ISIL because Prime Minister Abe was supposedly assisting the US in its War on Terror. Thus, the costs to normalizing the MIC might be not just financial but political and in blood as well. Japan must also be mindful of its East Asia neighbors. For decades, the government has advocated the kibanteki boeiryoku koso (basic defense force concept), which is to not create instability by gaining too much power (Kubota 2008, 6). The Chinese and Korean governments have already begun to express their concerns about Japanese remilitarization under the Abe government. If Abe truly wants Japan to match China’s blistering military growth, he must convince the nation to dedicate the human and financial resources for what may be an impossible mission. Not many democratic countries can stomach the high costs of militarism.

Conclusion
This chapter explored the hardware and software limitations of JSDF power projection capabilities. The MOD has sought to increase the flexibility and efficiency of the JSDF but will struggle to overcome severe demographic and infrastructure constraints. Many of the constraints are path-dependent and reinforced by deeply embedded cultural practices.

The MOD has increased the JSDF’s capabilities and updated its security doctrine in the past few decades, but the extent of these changes has been exaggerated. This may largely be due to the symbolic nature of Japan’s actions. Sending troops abroad and bluntly addressing China’s rise are dramatic actions that attract attention. However, the tangible changes to Japan’s security forces have been limited. Some of the limits are self-imposed, but many are not. The aging population and the many consequences that stem from it have significantly hindered Japanese security and economic growth. 70 years of antimilitarism has also constrained Japan’s security
infrastructure and reinforced habits not conducive to security “normalization.” As a result, the MOD is finding itself having to do more with less. For the next few years, Japan will pursue a greater role in international relations, but this is unchartered territory and the process will be slow and clumsy. Historically, Japan has shown a remarkable ability to overcome great disaster and strengthen itself through growth. However, the challenge today is not just lack of growth, but decline. Overcoming regional threats in the 21st century may not require linear growth in power projection capabilities (if that is possible at all), but a new approach to security. For Japan, political and normative forces will considerably shape this new approach. Chapter Four will explore the impact of regional and domestic political dynamics and its impact on security policy. Moreover, an analysis of Japan’s complex culture of antimilitarism will elucidate the nexus between the physical constraints and normative restraints. The interaction among these forces creates new limitations on the SDF and directs Japanese security policy in a unique direction that is the subject of Chapter Five.
Chapter Four: Political and Normative Restraints

In the previous chapter, we investigated the material constraints on the JSDF; constraints, such as the aging population and weak military-industrial-complex (MIC) that limit Japan’s power projection capabilities. This chapter contends that these material constraints are symptomatic of political and normative forces that further hamstring government attempts to significantly change Japanese security policy. Whereas the material factors operate as constraints because there is little the government can do to overcome these limitations, ideational factors operate as restraints because they lead to self-regulating behavior among policymakers and general public. The political and normative restraints operate in two ways. First, these factors make it costly for government leaders to pursue significant policy change. Politicians must expend significant political capital to inform the Japanese public and East Asia community about potential policy changes for what are often limited gains. Second, Japan’s “peace identity” shapes how the public and government approach security issues, ultimately leading to policy decisions that are reflective of an antimilitaristic environment. For many Japanese, antimilitarism, or the avoidance of conflict has become the commonsensical reaction to potential threats. This attitude has become so ingrained in the public that it serves as the starting point for policymakers when they discuss security policy, including policymakers who have not internalized the antimilitarism norm. Consequently, due to 70 years of cultivation, the antimilitarism norm has for all intents and purposes become a constraint on Japanese military activities.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, I examine the various political factors that have limited efforts to pursue a normalized security policy. Although not a strong restraint on the JSDF, Japan’s sensitivity to how its neighbors and the international community perceives it has impacted the speed in which normalization has progressed. Second, I elaborate on the
various normative restraints on the JSDF. Peace activists, the media, the public, and government leaders propagate Japan’s antimilitarism norm. Over the past 70 years, scores of institutions, laws, monuments, museums, and literature have not only displayed the pervasiveness and endurance of antiwar attitudes, but have further reinforced the antimilitarism identity of present-day Japan.

Under the Microscope: Japan’s Security Behavior Since the End of WWII
Due to the atrocities Japan committed during World War II, its history serves as the beginning and end point for analyzing contemporary Japanese security policy and identity. For many East Asians, and scholars, a perceived lack of contrition among government leaders over the past decade signals that Japan is on a path towards normalization and possibly even imperialism. However, as problematized in chapter two, the concepts of “militarism” and “normalization” as conventionally used reveal very little about contemporary Japanese security policy. If nationalism is truly growing in Japan, and this dissertation disagrees with that sentiment, scholars have failed to demonstrate a strong link between security policies that promote international peacekeeping plus a conservative whitewashing of history with the desire to increase Japan’s clout in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Conversely, Japan routinely highlights its post-war “peace culture” to signify that it is a new country dedicated to peace, democracy, and human rights. Since the end of WWII, it has sought to reassure neighbors that it will never pursue militarism again. However, Japan’s motivations are not pacifist, or at least not solely motivated by an ontological denial of violence. This compulsion to reassure is a political restraint motivated by many factors, some of which are self-serving. Reassurance efforts have limited change in the JSDF in four ways: 1) Japan’s apology record binds government leaders, 2) Japan reassures its neighbors by highlighting its
“peace culture,” thus creating a discourse that can be used to criticize government leaders when they violate previous pacifist statements, 3) Japanese feel legitimate remorse for the nation’s history and seek to have good relations with its neighbors, 4) Japan does not want to jeopardize its favorable reputation in the international community, and 5) Japan desires to craft a positive identity in the international community.

Japan’s reassurance strategy is consistent with neoclassical realist arguments contending that states seek to avoid conflict via positive signaling in reaction to potential threats. Neoclassical realists contend that states respond to “probable, not possible conflicts” (Kawasaki, 2001, 227). Thus, a nation can be willing to limit its militarization if surrounding states (potential threats) seem likely to respond in kind. According to Tsuyoshi Kawasaki (2001), “Japan’s overall strategic goal is to reduce the intensity of the security dilemma in Northeast Asia” (223). Kawasaki posits that Japan maintains a limited military so there is no power vacuum, but only just enough capabilities to maintain its defense. Paul Midford (2010) contends, “Japan’s grand strategy, rather than reflecting an inward-looking pacifist culture, is in fact a rational response to the anarchical environment it faces” (2). Instead of a culture of antimilitarism that limits Japanese power projection, Midford concludes, “Japan has recognized that ‘normal’ great power behavior could fan a spiral of suspicion by its neighbors, producing counterbalancing and an arms race. Japan has engaged in an iterated series of unilateral and noncontingent conciliatory measures that significantly limit Japan’s offensive capabilities, entail risk for Japanese security, and benefit others” (33). Non-neoclassical realist scholars have arrived at similar conclusions. Louis Hayes (2001) argues that Japan’s livelihood is heavily contingent on the stability of its neighbors and it is unlikely to disrupt the current equilibrium (p. 183). And David Kang (2007) has shown that “Japan has no desire or capacity to lead Asia.
When China was strong, Japan did not challenge China” (154). Japan’s Ministry of Defense is also well aware of the nation’s precarious situation in East Asia. As stated in the Basic Policy of National Defense (1957), Japan “will not become a military power that might pose a threat to other countries,” thus “Japan will not possess and maintain a military capability strong enough to pose a threat to other countries” (Defense of Japan Annual White Paper 2009).

For decades, Japan has cultivated favor in East Asia through Official Development Aid (ODA), formal apologies, trade, and cultural exchanges. Moreover, although at times political elites in Japan and its neighbors seem to have weak relations, there are dozens of annual track II and III meetings designed to serve as confidence-building measures. These various reassurance meetings have at least tempered distrust on the civilian and military sides of the government. There is, indeed, a strategic logic to Japan’s reassurance policies. Good relations within East Asia will be critical for the region’s security for the foreseeable future as energy, food, environmental, North Korean nuclear weapons acquisition, and terrorist threats continue to increase. According to Yasuyoshi Komizo, Chairperson of the Peace Culture Foundation in Hiroshima, Japan needs to work closely with its neighbors or its security cannot increase (Author’s Interview, April 2014, Hiroshima, Japan). Ambassador Komizo’s sentiments can be found within policy and military circles in East Asia, where one is likely to find more cooperation and understanding than among elected officials.

However, gaining the trust of its neighbors has been difficult for Japan and has required constant positive signaling from the Japanese government. According to Jun Nishida, Deputy Director of National Security Policy Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), it is important to the Japanese government to explain its position and provide justifications to countries abroad when it pursues security policy change (Author’s Interview, August 2014,
Tokyo, Japan). For example, when Japan created the 2014 National Program Defense guidelines, amended its arms exports principles, and created the National Security Council (NSC), it explained its rationale to neighboring countries including South Korea and China through diplomatic routes, press conferences, and new literature. MOFA produces dozens of easy-to-digest documents clearly outlining changes in Japan’s security policy that are disseminated to elites abroad and at home. In recent years, Japan has sought ways to improve relations with South Korea while positively engaging with China. According to one Japanese parliamentarian who chose to remain anonymous, “Japan welcomes China’s development and they [Japan and China] are economically interdependent…but there is concern about them” (Author’s Interview, September 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Realpolitik concerns of regional balance inform current Japanese reassurance strategy. Japanese Defense White Papers plainly state that China’s rise can be problematic if not managed properly and Japan must be vigilant with its defense capabilities. Yet, it should be no surprise to China that Japan is mindful of its rise and it is accepted among leaders that states are always concerned with their security. But the central tenets of Japanese foreign policy are not intended to pursue regional balancing, a fact the government has gone to great lengths to clarify with its neighbors. According to Defense White Papers and various government literature, the recent changes to security policy are to address new threats in the 21st century and for Japan to play a greater role in the international community. This doctrine is consistent with the spirit of Japan’s “peace constitution” which states, “We [the Japanese people] desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth” (Constitution of Japan).

Japan’s engagement with its neighbors has surely been strategic, but also with the
understanding that Japan owes its neighbors an explanation when it makes significant changes to its security policy. According to Jun Nishida, Japan is not required to explain its position, but does so partly due to its history (Author’s Interview, August 2014, Tokyo, Japan). For any other country, the creation of a national security strategy and amendments to arms export policies is considered solely sovereign a domestic matter beyond the purview of other states as long as they do not violate international law. Japan is often criticized by its neighbors for what they interpret as potentially aggressive security policies. However, China and South Korea usually ignore legalistic critiques, replying instead on normative arguments about Japan’s obligation to atone for its actions in World War II. Nevertheless, according to the Genron 10th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll (2014), 59.6% believe Japan failed to issue a proper apology for its history and its invasion of China. In the same poll, 52.2% of Japanese surveyed believed that deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations are due to China’s criticism over historical issues. The history problem may be the most difficult issue to navigate in East Asia. Although most Japanese are not revisionist and are sorry for their colonial history, it is not a topic they wish to revisit, especially after decades of ODA and over 50 official apologies. Additionally, Japanese are frustrated with what they see as excessive criticism and a current campaign to embarrass Japan internationally (Le 2014). One consequence of China’s and Korea’s persistent criticisms has been “apology fatigue” in the government and public. Scholars and the media have picked up on this and have argued that it is evidence of an erosion of Japanese pacifism. To accurately understand Japan’s reassurance strategy, it is important to recognize that apology fatigue and whitewashing are not the same and apology fatigue has not led to demands for militarization. In spite of the increased public frustration, government leaders are cognizant they have to at least address the history issue when engaging with East Asia and have relied on informal meetings at the ministerial level
to address historical grievances.

Even oft-criticized Prime Minister Abe has made a concerted effort to alleviate concerns about Japanese remilitarization. During a 2014 trip to Southeast Asia, he stated, “I will explain Japan's position carefully to avoid misunderstandings in other countries in the region. Throughout this trip, I have explained these matters to the leaders of the countries I visited” (Abe 2013, July). In response to a question from a Tokyo Shimbun reporter at a 2014 Press Conference regarding constitutional reinterpretation, Abe affirmed that that Japan’s new policy would not lead to more conventional security operations. Specifically, Abe stated, “On no account will we participate in the future in conflicts like the Iraq War or the Gulf War, which had the exercise of force as their objective. We will continue to fully uphold the pacifism advanced in the Constitution. Since the end of World War II, Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation. There will be no change in this path in the future” (Abe 2014, June).

Furthermore, Abe declared, “As for revising the Constitution, we are currently deepening the discussions on what a Constitution suitable for modern Japan should be, naturally premised on pacifism, popular sovereignty, and fundamental human rights (Abe 2013 July). Here, one can see the key elements of Abe’s foreign policy. Abe’s reference to “modern Japan” is highlighting a need to adjust to changing power dynamics in East Asia. There is no doubt that Japan’s security policy is concerned with traditional conceptions of security and state sovereignty. However, it cannot simply acquire the tools necessary to balance against China and address new threats because the world has changed. Beyond difficulties in reigniting Japan’s war capabilities, as discussed in Chapter Three, Japan must also temper military growth and reaffirm its peace identity to neighbors and the public. Hence, Abe’s affirmation of pacifism, popular sovereignty,
and fundamental human rights are not just goals in his “proactive peace,” but reminders of what has and will continue to motivate Japanese security policy.

The strategy of reaffirming Japan’s peace identity to pacify domestic and regional concerns is nothing new. In his first term (9/2006 – 9/2007), Abe mentioned pacifism three times in 21 speeches. In 2015 alone, Abe has referred to pacifism over a dozen times. And Abe is not the first in doing this. Since the Koizumi Era of the early 2000s, every prime minister has reiterated either antimilitarism or pacifism as central components of Japanese foreign policy. Many prime minister speeches and press statements are translated into Chinese and English, readily available on the Government of Japan website.

Realists would contend that Japan’s proclamations of its peace identity do not reflect a genuine pacifistic attitude, just a strategic decision to avoid conflict, a diplomatic way of saying Abe is lying. The true intentions of government leaders will always be unknown. The veracity of Japan’s apologies is important for victims of WWII, but for security practitioners, the focus should be on Japan’s policy record and how it impacts regional security. Even if the reassurance strategy is apologetic in name only, its practice has been the functional equivalent of a normative restraint. Because the Government of Japan makes the discursive actions of reassuring and apologizing, or “puts the ideas out there,” it is beholden to them as policy promises, and when institutionalized, as law. The peace discourse becomes a common part of the conversation on security policy and the public ensures that its leaders are beholden to the statements they make. As discussed later, the antimilitarism identity is strong among social movements and they routinely use that identifier as the reason for their existence, among other motivations.

Politicians are also sensitive to public attitudes. As a strong democracy, dissatisfied voters can punish politicians, the most spectacular example being the ousting of the ruling LDP
in 2009. However, Japanese prime ministers have been adept at responding to angry voters before elections, usually deciding to step down from a position to ensure their party maintains control of the Diet, as can be seen over the last decade. In regard to Japanese foreign policy, Paul Midford (2011) has argued that hawkish elites have been constrained by public opinion on policies beyond the “indifference slope” of the public (27). Specifically, Midford contends, “Japanese cabinets tailor policies that avoid provoking the emergence of stable opposing opinion majorities (26). Thus, reassurance strategy preempts concerns abroad and at home. For example, after the government suggested the biggest change to Japanese security policy since the implementation of the JSDF - exercising the right to limited collective self-defense - Abe stated Japan “will continue to fully uphold the pacifism set forth in the Constitution. The course Japan has taken as a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II will for its own interests including the military aspect” (Matake 2014; Abe 2014, July). Moreover, in his aggressive bid for reinterpretation of Article 9, Abe was forced to delay the change too, instead opt for a full Diet session to discuss the new policy. Keep in mind that the reinterpretation was already a concession because Abe had failed at achieving a related constitutional amendment in his first time in office. In fact, he was never close to achieving his original goal.

China and South Korea also utilize Japan’s reassurance strategy to censure its normalization efforts. When Japan does take action, they routinely cite past statements to question the sincerity of changes in its security policy. For example, China and South Korea routinely pressure Japan to reaffirm previous apology statements, such as the Kono Statement on comfort women, the 50th anniversary apology statement, and the 60th anniversary apology statement. Additionally, prior to Abe’s speech before Congress in 2015, China and South Korea were very vocal about the need for Japan to be mindful of its war history. South Korea’s Foreign
Ministry spokesman commented, “it [Japan] should reflect carefully, looking squarely at history how the international community and its neighboring countries will react if it takes key parts from statements by Murayama on the 50th anniversary and Koizumi on the 60th” (Shino 2015). Japanese politicians have called upon previous apology statements to censure the Abe government. As Abe prepared his 70th anniversary statement, former Chief Cabinet Yohei Kono and former Prime Minister Tomichi Murayama urged the Abe administration to uphold previous statements, withdraw security related bills from the Diet, and just avoid the constant efforts to diminish the value of previous apologies (Yoshida 2015, June). After some resistance, Abe conceded that he will apologize in some form in the 70th Anniversary Statement.

More aggressively, East Asia states have compared Japan’s record to Germany’s and engaged in an aggressive shaming campaign, including erecting comfort women statues around the world to gain international support against Japan’s militarization. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman remarked, “Will it [Japan] play down the history of aggression and continue to carry that negative asset? Or will it show profound and sincere remorse over its history of invasions and travel lightly forward? The international community waits and sees” (Yoshida 2015, January). Moreover, when discussing a potential amendment to Japan’s constitution, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson commented, “people can’t help questioning, whether the path of peaceful development which Japan has upheld for a long time after the war will not change” (McDonell 2014). On the same issue, China’s Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua stated Japan should “take the correct attitude, stick to its previous correct positions and statements, including the Murayama Statement, we also expect Japan will remain the pathway of peace” (RT.com 2015). At the idea of amending the constitution, China’s official news agency referred to it as “brutal violation” of the spirit of Japan’s peace constitution” (King 2014). If
China does not believe the Japan’s peace constitution to be genuine, it surely hopes it would be. Although these strategies have backfired and led to apology fatigue and counter movements in Japan, the constant regional and international pressure on Japan makes it difficult for government leaders to act without incredible scrutiny and the need to justify their actions. Journalists and academics have also contributed to the reassurance political restraint on Japanese security policy. Japan’s “poor” apology record and related apology fatigue has also become the go to argument for critics of the Japanese government (Jee 2015; 東京歴史科学研究会 2015). Besides being the losers of WWII, the different contexts, histories, cultures, languages of Germany and Japan really do not warrant a comparison. Yet, the comparisons exist and have added an additional layer to the many discourses that shape Japanese security policy.

There are limits to the explanatory power of neoclassical realism arguments concerning Japan’s limited militarization. First, the theory is not consistent with its theoretical underpinnings in classical realism. Neoclassical realism assumes Japan adopts a reassurance posture to prevent a security dilemma, contingent on the notion that it can rely on its rivals to respond positively to reassurance signals. This is a risky strategy that seems a failure since China continues provoking Japan and building up its military strength, and South Korean-Japanese relations have remained cold. It is not clear if Japan can reassure its neighbors. In a 2013 Pew Research Center survey, 98% of South Koreans and 78% of Chinese believe Japan has insufficiently apologized for its military actions in the 1930s and 1940s (Stokes 2014). Chinese and Koreans are also not very receptive to Japanese leaders. In a Spring 2014 Global Attitudes survey, of 12 pacific nations (including Japan), China and South Korea showed the least confidence in Abe, at 15% and 5% respectively. Moreover, according to a GENRON poll, most Chinese expect to go to war eventually with Japan (Genron NPO 2014). Reassurance as a
strategy to deflate China’s rise does not seem to appease most Japanese either. According to a 2014 Pew Poll, 68% of the respondents see China as the greatest threat to Japanese security (Pew Research Center 2014). Given reassurance has failed, there must be another variable that is limiting the Japanese buildup.

Second, Japan’s reliance on ideational and identity explanations and its current discursive strategy reflect norms not captured in the theory. Japan can simply limit its arms, increase transparency, and pursue more direct confidence building measures if it wants to reassure. Instead, Japan uses specific language to do so. Government leaders emphasize Japan’s peace culture, its support of democracy, and its remorse for its past actions. These discursive strategies reveal a normative dimension to reassurance and policymaking.

Third, reassurance should not be able to work as a long-term strategy. Although Japan’s militarism has been constrained throughout the post-war period, the region has been far from predictable. China and South Korea have had drastic regime changes that increase the costs of a reassurance strategy. Japan has had to negotiate with authoritarian regimes, only to have those agreements ignored when new regimes came into power. Moreover, a random accident, miscalculation, shift in balance of power, or simple government carelessness can negate years of positive signaling. Given the randomness of politics, reassurance as a strategy does not follow realist principles of prudence and self-help.

Fourth, Japan has been incredibly inconsistent when it comes to reassurance. Coupled with the dozens of apologies have been actions that have led to distrust between Japan and its neighbors, such as visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, insensitive comments, acquisition of some dual-use technologies, and decline in Track I meetings between heads of state. Fifth, Japanese reassurance is an illusion when China and South Korea believe the US dominates Japanese
security policy. Whatever unilateral security action Japan takes, whether genuine or strategic, can be negated by a US security policy statement or interpreted as a part of US grand strategy.

Thus, reassurance may have limited the Japanese security buildup, but the utility and effectiveness alone cannot explain the durability of Japan’s militarism allergy. Japan is sensitive to its image in East Asia, but also cognizant of the importance of maintaining its positive image outside the region, a reputation around the world as an industrious, democratic, free, and helpful nation (BBC 2014; Pipa.org 2005 and 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). Since Japan has not fought a war since 1945, is one of the largest donors in ODA, participates in most of the important global financial and political institutions, contributes in peacekeeping operations, and is largely non-religious, it enjoys a valuable neutral position in its bilateral relations. According to former Ambassador to Kuwait Yasuyoshi Komizo, Japan has a good reputation in the Middle East and its missions in Iraq are seen favorably (Author’s Interview, April 2014, Hiroshima, Japan). Representative Taro Kono warns that if Japan were to begin to take actions that lead others to question its neutrality, such as exporting weapons, its diplomacy and security would be negatively impacted (Author’s Interview, May 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Peace activists share this sentiment. Under the Global Article 9 Campaign, Japanese peace activists have pushed for Article 9 to be adopted in constitutions worldwide and selected for the Nobel Peace Prize. Its proponents contend that Japan’s peace identity and neutrality have been advantageous to its people. To change paths would lead Japan down an unknown and likely dangerous road. This kind of reputation is valuable and militarization will destroy decades of hard earned good will. Jun Nishida argues that Japan for example has enjoyed a “free hand” in middle-east diplomacy (Author’s Interview, August 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Japan can act unhindered by historical baggage in other parts of the world – a freedom it does not enjoy in East Asia. Abe’s recent
decision to engage in Mideast politics by promising $200 million in aid to states fighting ISIL quickly resulted in a $200 million ransom, the execution of two Japanese civilians, and the promise of more violence. This tragedy was a dreadful reminder for Japanese of what awaits them if they were to veer too far from neutral and antimilitarist ways.

Political restraint draws much of its strength from the antimilitarism norm. The decisions of politicians may be political and strategic, but the attitudes of the public are decidedly less so. And it is those attitudes that have cultivated an antimilitarism environment, which has directed Japanese security policy toward a unique path in international relations.

A Nation of Peace?
As discussed in Chapter Two, scholars have argued that a culture of antimilitarism has stunted the growth of Japanese militarism. This antimilitarism has been discussed in several: as a culture (Berger 1993), a security identity (Oros 2008), and a norm (Katzenstein 1996). Most commonly, it is analyzed by focusing on elite politics and government policies. Hence, the norm is seen as strong when antimilitarism institutions and laws are put into place and can erode when norm advocates lose out to their conservative counterparts.

Opponents of the durability of the norm have argued that it does not exist or has eroded over time. For example, Miyashita (2007) argues that Japanese pacifism attitudes wane when the perception of threat increases and that “pacifism has been possible in large part because peace was relatively abundant in postwar Japan and many feel that the alliance with the United States has contributed to that effect” (116). Miyashita concludes that with no US guarantee, pacifism would not be so enduring. Moreover, when the balance of power in East Asia shifts, for example with the rise of China, the durability of the norm is eroded. Scholars have highlighted opinion polls that indicate that the Japanese public is open to Article 9 revision (Arase 2007; Hughes
Christopher Hughes (2008) has argued that erosion of negative attitudes on the JSDF, a weakening taboo on the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and moves toward reinterpreting Article 9 demonstrate a weakening of the antimilitarism norm (Hughes 2008, 99).

Jennifer Lind (2004) is less convinced that an antimilitarism norm exits and contends a strategy of buck-passing accounts for Japan’s limited militarism. Lind is correct that change in Japanese security policy is tied to threats, she does not show that the current changes are significant nor take into account the dozens of times where antimilitarism has inhibited the government. Paul Midford (2011) argues that what seems like pacifism is in fact fear of entrapment and an inability to control the military masquerading as pacifism. Midford’s analysis clearly outlines the strategic logic of Japan’s non-militarization, but he fails to consider how pacifism shaped reassurance strategy and fueled other peace movements. It is plausible that the antimilitarism norm is not a significant inhibition on Japanese militarism, but incorrect to conclude it doesn’t influence security policy whatsoever.

There have been several flaws in the norms debate. First, the norm has been viewed as static and concrete. To “see” its impact on Japanese security policy, it has to be treated as an independent variable affecting the dependent one (Japanese security policy). However, demonstrated in the following section, the antimilitarism norm has evolved over time and has influenced security policy in different ways. Second the antimilitarism norm has been treated as a dichotomous variable, either existing or not. It is important to analyze how the norm has been cultivated, evolved, and expressed. The original norm may have faded, but remnants have taken on other dimensions that make antimilitarism attitudes enduring and pervasive. More accurate descriptions would contend that the norm is an ordinal variable, that gets stronger or weaker, or as I argue, a categorical variable that can take on qualitatively different characteristics.
Third, the impact of time on the norm has been oversimplified. Woven into the discussion of time is the realist logic that the longer there is peace, the closer a state is to war. For antimilitarism norm skeptics, Japanese antiwar feelings fade as experiences of WWII morph into historical memory. Moreover, with each passing moment, the perceived opportunity for conflict increases. This realist contention is un-falsifiable because the chance for conflict always exists and as one adds up time, the chances can seem to increase. However, T1 of the antimilitarism norm is not August 15, 1945. Antimilitarism attitudes existed before, during, and long after WWII. Many victims of the war became teachers, politicians, activists, and parents and spent decades cultivating the norm for the younger generations. Other major events, such as the Vietnam War and First Gulf War jumpstarted complementary antimilitarism movements that eventually merged with the original norm. Therefore, Japanese antimilitarism has different branches and multiple T1s, each worthy of investigation.

Fourth, study of the antimilitarism norm has focused too much on elites and its history, ignoring other actors and contemporary peace movements. When discussing changes in security policy today, scholars point to the past failures of the Left (Samuels 2008) without taking into consideration how movements today impact security policies in different ways. I agree that the movements have weakened in some ways. Thus, I conclude that the antimilitarism norm is not hegemonic; security concerns do have a significant impact on security policy. However, the norm is enduring and pervasive and cannot be dismissed as a relic of the past. Antimilitarism is very much present and will help shape Japanese understanding of security for the foreseeable future. Finally, as discussed in Chapter Two, scholars have treated pacifism and antimilitarism as interchangeable concepts. This is not the case. Each influences how Japanese understand the use of violence in international relations, but in different ways and degree.
Thus, misconceptions of antimilitarism have plagued the literature. I seek to avoid these problems by analyzing the several strands of antimilitarism, some critical junctures, and the many actors. Antimilitarism is much more complex than an identity or culture. It is an antimilitarism environment that shapes how Japanese understand their history before and after the war and their place in the wider world.

Just as militarism is an institution that requires a complex set of support systems to operate effectively, antimilitarism is buttressed by various outlets in society that has made it culturally commonsensical. For example, in the US, not only are there holidays celebrating veterans but a general “support our troops” culture. There are discounts for military personnel at movie theatres, city buses, and amusement parks. At sports games there are moments of silence in honor of the troops. Soldiers receive priority boarding on airplanes and veterans receive priority class enrollment at universities and colleges across the country. On those campuses the armed forces have a noticeable footprint through ROTC programs, job fairs, or recruitment offices. Across the nation we see many “support our troops” bumper stickers, plus official state monuments celebrating US military might and commemorating the sacrifices of the men and women in the armed services. Military members can wear their uniforms with pride in public, and in the right bar in the right part of the country they can expect a free drink from a grateful civilian. Most notable about this overt militarism is not that it not its acceptance in the US, but all over the world. Of course the US has the right to celebrate its military, for all states have the right to self-defense. One rarely sees Russia, China, or the US’ other rivals criticize its domestic patriotism. This militarism culture does not exist in Japan. There are few monuments commemorating soldiers lost. The ones that exist are rife with controversy in and out of Japan. JSDF members are adamant that they are jieitai (self-defense force member) and not guntai (a
military force), for the latter has a negative connotation. There are no discounts, or holidays, or a general sense of pride for the military. The Japanese public has grown more supportive of the JSDF, but only when it relates to humanitarian missions, a product of the MOD current advertising campaign.

A culture of antimilitarism is consequential because “shared worldviews or beliefs within a state or society shape how a military organization prepares for and executes war (Brooks and Stanley 2007, 16). Supplanting militarism discourse are peace museums, peace monuments, and peace education. These antimilitarism institutions propagate the message that war is bad and therefore should be avoided. This simple, and sometimes uncritical view is commonsensical among members of the public. To understand how this environment restrains Japanese security policy, one must investigate what Japanese mean when they refer to their nation as a “peace-loving country,” or heiwa kokka. The short answer is, many things. Even for Japanese, pacifism and antimilitarism are obtuse and undefined – as concepts to serve as a general guide for how Japan approaches security problems. I contend that the antimilitarism norm, cultivated by an antimilitarism environment, has six primary characteristics: 1) Japanese antimilitarism is influenced by, but is not the same as pacifism, 2) is not self-critical, 3) is motivated by the suffering of WWII, reconstruction, and fear of future conflict, 4) is staunchly antimilitary, 5) is reinvigorated at different times for different reasons and 6) is commonsensical.
Japanese antimilitarism is not a single hegemonic force dominating security policy. Government leaders are always concerned with state security and pursue policies consistent with realist and neoclassical realist predictions. However, they must operate in an enduring and pervasive antimilitarism environment. These politicians went to schools that taught a specific version of WWII history, have learned of the horrors of war from the elderly, and most importantly have friends, family, and voters who make it difficult to “normalize” Japan.

**Key Elements of Japanese Anti-militarism**

1) Japanese antimilitarism is not pacifism

Pacifism is the ontological rejection of violence as a means of settling disputes. Most commonly attributed to Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. in popular discourse, this philosophy requires profound commitment from its practitioners; a commitment many have not been able to bear. The avoidance of violence has both deontological and pragmatic underpinnings. Pacifists believe violence is morally objectionable and ineffective at settling disputes. Instead of using violence, a pacifist will rely on tools such as on dialogue, peaceful protests, civil disobedience, and even surrender. For Japan, the practice of pacifism would mean that even when invaded Japan could not defend itself. Although there are true pacifists, the vast majority supports Japan’s right to self-defense as defined by Article 51 in the United Nations Charter.

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<th>Characteristics of Japanese Antimilitarism</th>
<th>Expression in the Antimilitarism Environment</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) Different from Pacifism</td>
<td>Acceptance of self-defense; support for HA/DR missions</td>
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<td>2) Uncritical</td>
<td>Emphasis on Japan’s suffering as a result of war over its colonial history; broad conceptualization of peace</td>
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<td>3) Motivated by fear of conflict</td>
<td>Peace movements against amending Article 9; prioritization of dialogue over military intervention; lack of gun culture</td>
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<td>4) Antimilitary</td>
<td>Civilian control of military; anti-traditional security</td>
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<td>5) Reinvigorated at different times and for different reasons; evolving; supported by diverse actors</td>
<td>Diverse peace movements (anti-base, anti-nuclear weapons, pro-Article 9, anti-nuclear energy); connected to global peace movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Commonsensical</td>
<td>Peace education; strong poll numbers against militarization</td>
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Nevertheless, pacifism does inform Japanese antimilitarism. Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan states:

Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. (Constitution of Japan)

In the strictest interpretation of Article 9, there is no doubt that the existence of the JSDF violates the constitution. Japan has willfully given up its sovereign right to war in settling disputes. However, the international community has not held Japan to this standard. Although Japan does not follow the constitution strictly, the government has implemented several significant policies to sever Japan’s ties to militarism, such as the arms exports ban, anti-nuclear principles, and dozens of laws that make it difficult to strengthen the JSDF. Only after pressure from the US did Japan create a national police force that eventually evolved into a self-defense force. Not until the 90s did Japan being sending troops abroad for purely humanitarian missions, again due to outside pressure. The Japanese public has also been very accepting of the JSDF on humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions (discussed in detail in chapter 5).

Pacifism was influential in the early post-war period, informing key antinuclear activists such as Moritaki Ichiro and Josei Toda. For many, the rejection of violence would ensure that Japan would not be subject to another deadly war that ultimately led to two atomic bombs. Additionally, pacifism could allow Japan to erase its shameful history and honor the millions lost in the war. Lastly, pacifism could be used to deflect US pressure for remilitarization. Ultimately, pragmatic politicians dominated Japan’s security agenda by appeasing pacifists and meeting some US demands under what was dubbed the Yoshida Doctrine by Western scholars. As long as the US occupied Japan and the Russia threat loomed large, absolute disarmament was
unlikely. The Yoshida Doctrine prioritized economic development and a small international footprint. The antimilitarist characteristics of Japanese foreign policy really took shape under the Fukuda Doctrine in the late 70s, which emphasized ODA, Japan’s peace-loving nature, and democracy. The language of pacifism was dominant in Japanese foreign policy, even enshrined as law in the constitution, even though Japan practiced a form of militarism by having a defense force and allying with the US. Yet ultimately, Japanese could not claim to be true pacifists because the Japan-US Alliance meant that the Americans could use violence on their behalf if Japan was attacked.

Scholars have routinely conflated pacifism and antimilitarism and have highlighted security policies that boost Japan’s defense capabilities, such as increases in defense spending and acquisition of military technologies. This has obscured the justifications Japanese leaders have made when policy change has been implemented. For example, in defense white papers, changes in security policy has been justified in terms of the need to increase Japan’s defense capabilities, addressing non-state threats such as terrorism, and streamlining the forces (Defense of Japan Annual White Paper 2014; The Ministry of Defense Reorganized 2007; National Security Strategy of Japan 2013). The rise of China has led to a military buildup, but not on a scale indicating antimilitarism has no effect on security policy. Moreover, although all forms of militarization violate pacifistic principles, some forms of militarization are consistent with antimilitarism as long as it is defensive. According to a SAGE poll, 78.1 percent of Japanese believe going to war when attacked is legitimate and 50.7 percent believe going to war to prevent genocide in another country is legitimate (Midford 2011, 32). The other two options, preventing human rights abuses and tracking down terrorists got less than 50% support. Japanese have also supported the use of very limited force for peacekeeping purposes. In UN peacekeeping
missions, SDF members follow strict guidelines on the use of force, so much so they are escorted by less constrained military forces when in the field. PKOs are consistent with the values that Japanese associate with pacifism, namely democracy and human rights. However, the ethics of pacifism make it difficult for Japanese to wholeheartedly accept the use of force in most circumstances.

2) Japanese antimilitarism is not self-critical Professor of Asian Studies Roni Sarig (2009) contends that following WWII the Japanese government and public constructed a victim’s discourse to deflect attention from the atrocities committed during WWII. Specifically, Japan highlighted the suffering from the atomic bombs, which served as an impetus for a Japanese movement against nuclear weapons and provided legitimacy for a universal peace movement (Sarig 2009, 167). Japan’s peace culture can at times be very generic in simply extolling the values of “peace” without critically examining Japan’s colonial history or the difficulties of implementing peace today. This approach to peace allows Japan to avoid its embarrassing past, deflect blame on militarists, and highlight its miraculous postwar recovery and significant contributions to development around the world. As a result of the peace movement’s simple position of “no war, no armaments and neutrality,” there is room for different interpretations of the constitution (Kurino 1987, 167). This not only creates many different branches of the peace movement, but also a space for revisionists to stretch the constitution thin.

However, lack of self-criticism does not mean the broad message can’t convert into specific antiwar attitudes. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum is the prime example of an anti-nuclear institution that heavily utilizes generic platitudes to promote the values of peace. Although some sections of the museum mention Japan’s imperial history, the chief focus on the
destructiveness of the atomic bomb and the suffering of the Hiroshima residents. The museum is careful not to be too critical of the US, hoping to project a sanitized account of Japan-US WWII history. Displays promoting nuclear disarmament are limited to one floor, roughly 1/10th of the museum’s exhibits. The lack of a political agenda in the museum allows visitors to focus on the suffering of victims and contemplate peace in a nonthreatening setting. However, despite the lack of antiwar messaging, patrons leave the museum with strong attitudes against war, not just nuclear weapons. When departing from the museum, journals allow guests to write their thoughts. Many museum patrons write statements such as “No war! No nukes!” and “war is a curse on all mankind.” Although the museum does not overtly promote an antiwar message, preferring to emphasize peace and Hiroshima’s reconstruction, the impact is clear.

Japan’s emphasis on its victimhood does not mean antimilitarism is eroding. Despite this central part of Japanese understanding of the war since 1945 antimilitarism was still able to proliferate. Moreover, an emphasis on victimhood has not prevented contrition. Since the end of WWII, Japan has offered over 50 formal apologies for its wartime aggression. One can question the quality of the apologies, but revisionism is difficult to sustain when the country has apologized so many times. Ultimately, Japan’s antiwar attitudes are not contingent on an awareness of the atrocities it has committed; it is built upon the idea that peace is valuable and desirable. However, a consequence is that it is difficult for peace activists to propose clear policy initiatives for the government. Many people believe in the value of peace, but have no clear action plan or timeline for achieving it. Therefore, for many Japanese antimilitarism and pacifism are more ways of living than a policy platform.

3) Japanese antimilitarism is motivated by a fear of conflict
The most famous image of the atomic bomb is the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima on August 6,
1945 taken by the crew of the Enola Gay as it flew away from the fiery explosion. From a distance, the sheer size and force of the bomb can be interpreted as signs of brilliant human engineering and the awesome power of nature unveiled. But for the 330,000 residents in Hiroshima and 250,000 residents in Nagasaki on August 9, 1945 no description can capture the sound, the fury, the heat, pain, and fear during and after the atomic bomb (Children of the Atomic Bomb). They did not see the cloud; they were engulfed and burned by it. The best victims could do to provide a sense of the atomic bomb was to refer to it as *pikadon, pika* in describing the blinding flash and *don* in describing the thunderous noise that followed. Those fateful days would drive the antiwar ethic of many survivors for the remainder of their lives.

Many would become parents, teachers, and leaders dedicated to educating those who did not experience the atomic bomb first hand about the absurdity of what war can bring. However, it was not just the *hibakusha* that suffered greatly. Between 1941 and 1945, over 2.5 million died and hundreds of cities were demolished in firebombing and air raids. According to some estimates, US air raids destroyed 20 percent of all houses, 30 percent of Japan’s industrial capacity, and 80 percent of Japan’s shipping (Hane 1992, 341). They left nine million homeless (Gordon 2003, 225). For every survivor, there were countless friends and family who died in combat, Soviet detention camps, disease, and starvation. Reconstruction was slow, painful, and humiliating. There were significant shortages in supplies, and infrastructure was neglected during the war or completely destroyed. Japanese were convinced they were fighting a holy war against a demonic enemy only to lose, be occupied by the enemy, and discover that the Americans were nothing like that (Dower 1986; Dower 1999). Many early writings of war survivors emphasized the destructiveness of war and the tragic waste of life (Dower 1999, 199). What Japanese also learned soon after was the many benefits of avoiding conflict. Under the
Yoshida Doctrine Japan’s standard of living increased significantly and the nation quickly reclaimed a position of respected world power through economic might. By 1955, the economy had returned to prewar levels and the government officially declared the postwar period over (Allison 2006, 41). Instead of sending young men to die abroad and sacrificing comfort at home to support a war effort, Japanese spoiled themselves (some would say “too much” after the economic bubble burst in the mid-80s - early 90s) with luxuries gained through hard work. The centrality of antimilitarism to the Yoshida Doctrine has been debated, but the benefits of avoiding conflicts were absolutely clear to the public; immense growth and prosperity. These lessons are a common part of the Japanese postwar narrative. For example, according to peace activist Akira Kawasaki (Peace Boat), storytelling about the war was routine in his youth and people gained a general feeling that war is bad (Author’s Interview, May 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Kawasaki contends that though Japanese do not know basic facts about the war today, they draw the same general lessons and develop a dislike of conflict.

Moreover, many Japanese believe that the using force does not achieve desirable ends. The roots of Japanese aversion to offensive power stem from its “disastrous use of offensive military power to promote foreign policy goals in China and elsewhere in East Asia in the 1930s and 1940s” (Midford, 2011, 30). Midford emphasizes utility to explain how Japanese determine the legitimacy of the use of force, assuming that if a certain utility threshold is met, it is considered to be legitimate. However, legitimacy is a normative idea that can exist without any utility. For Japanese, not only is the use of force illegitimate because it does not achieve policy goals, it is illegitimate because it brings suffering to Japanese and others, and for pacifists it is even more fundamentally wrong. In the current debates about collective defense, there is concern that Japan can be pulled into foreign conflicts (Kawasaki and Nahory 2014, October;
Gupta 2014). This is a very general concern not tied to utility, because the costs and benefits of lending support to the US in hypothetical conflict are not clear yet. Japanese are worried about what may happen if the country begins to normalize. In 2015, shortly after Abe announced Japan’s non-military commitment to fighting terrorism, the Japanese public received a violent preview of what may await if it gets involved in international conflicts. Terrorists from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) kidnapped and beheaded two Japanese civilians, Haruna Yukawa and Kenji Goto, for what they perceived as Japan’s involvement on the war on terror. The government had absolutely no means of saving the hostages and proposes no credible way of avoiding a similar crisis in the future. The dangers Japanese face abroad became the dominant story in the media for months and further solidified opposition to Abe’s efforts to expand the role of the SDF.

The suffering from surviving an atomic bomb, fighting a total war, and rebuilding a broken nation does not fade with time as some scholars expected. We can begin to understand how Japan’s monumental defeat has left an imprint on the nation’s psyche that continues to shape how Japanese engage the topic of violence today. Antimilitarism does not need to be critical when images of burnt bodies, crying orphans, and beheaded civilians are the lasting images of war. Japan’s antimilitarism is more visceral than intellectual and, most importantly, commonsensical. Who needs an elaborate explanation of why war is bad when the results speak so clearly?

4) Japanese antimilitarism is staunchly antimilitary
In explaining why Japanese developed a distain for the military, historian John Dower (1986) argued that, “The militarists and super patriotic ideologues were now portrayed – by the Japanese civilian elites and their American conquerors alike – as corrupt influences who had
distorted the pure essence of the Imperial Way. They were outsiders who had somehow muscled their way into close proximity to the throne” (307). This antimilitary elite attitude shaped many early peace movements. For example, a memorial service held in 1946 by Shigeru Nanbara, a Christian educator and Professor at Tokyo Imperial University, was “meant to evoke the memory of dead countrymen – and the problems of guilt, repentance, and atonement” (Dower 1999, 489). Nanbara told the dead “bluntly that Japan had been led into war by ignorant, reckless militarists and ultranationalists” (Dower 1999, 489). Under closer scrutiny, this narrative seems a bit overly simplistic as the public was supportive of the war efforts and the early successes of Imperial Japan (Eskildsen 2002; Caprio 2009; Christy 1993). By blaming the military, however Japanese could minimize their complicit and explicit support of militarism and highlight their victimhood. Japan’s former colonial victims have strongly objected to this narrative. According to a-bomb survivor Terumi Tanaka, Japan never really apologized for the war. Many Japanese were mad that those responsible for the war came back to power (Author’s Interview, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan), and this anger was a major driving force of the early peace movements even though it could not be voiced openly because of the US occupation.

Nevertheless, this self-serving interpretation of the war helped cultivate Japanese antimilitarism and it cannot be denied that Japanese militarists did shameful acts of violence that led to suffering throughout the empire. According to Ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki, after the war, people were dismayed with the military because they had been led to believe that they were “the best and brightest, especially the navy” (Author’s Interview, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan). Fujisaki also contends that, with the war ending, the army fled its colonial possessions, such as in Manchuria, leaving civilians to defend for themselves. Actions like these were “burned into the Japanese psyche,” entrenching a deep mistrust in the military (Author’s Interview, Ichiro
Fujisaki, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan). Moreover, “the Japanese militarists took over through a far more insidious [than the Nazis, who were elected] and protracted process of political assassinations, attempted coups d'etat, and engineered military emergencies abroad. The independent position of the army under the Meiji constitution allowed it to evade civilian control and stage military incidents abroad to expand Japanese control over North China” (Berger 1993, 174). The public also had easy targets to blame in, the class-A war criminals. Many Japanese regarded them as hateful persons who had given heavy pains to ordinary people by sending them to the fronts, or making them suffer terrible air raids” (Momose 2010, 115). After monumental defeats in Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the militarists pushed the country to continue the war. Hiroshima and Nagasaki would pay the ultimate price for their zealotry, in the only use of nuclear weapons on a human population in history. Emperor Hirohito, against the wishes of his military advisors, decided to end the war because “he could no longer allow his people to suffer death and destruction” and asked his officers to “endure the endurable, that is to accept the Allied terms and end the war” (Hane 1992, 338). Apparently even the Emperor’s decision could not convince the most hardcore ultranationalists, who attempted a coup d’état on hearing news of the imminent surrender. The coup failed due to lack of support from key generals (Hane 1992, 338)

The destructiveness of the atomic bombs and bloodlust of the military were symptomatic of a war completely out of control. Much of the postwar anger was directed at the government for its inability to control the militarists and utilize force effectively and legitimately (Midford 2011, 51). This lack of faith in the government to control the sword made Japanese “extraordinarily reluctant to allow their armed forces to engage in military planning for fear that, as in the 1930s, the military might try to engineer an international incident that could drag Japan
into a war in Asia” (Berger 1993, 136). Thus, until 2007, the military arm of Japan was relegated to a defense agency, far weaker than a ministry. And after the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was upgraded to ministry status, civilian control remained. Within Japan’s chain of command, no military officer has direct access to the Prime Minister and bureaucrats have significant control in how security policies are implemented.

5) Japanese antimilitarism is reinvigorated at different times and for different reasons, supported by diverse actors. The lifeblood of Japanese antimilitarism are the peace activists who pressure the government on issues such as preserving Article 9, disarmament, nuclear energy, and moving the US bases on Okinawa. These groups seek to educate the general public about Japan’s militaristic past and contemporary security issues. Although the end of the war motivated many to join the peace movement, it was not the only event that activated the antiwar ethic. Before WWII, young intellectuals had formed peace movements to challenge the militarists, but due to “little public support and the 1925 Maintenance of the Public Order Act, which restrained the freedom of speech and social movements, the peace movement remained quite weak or fragile and later was shattered by the rise of the militarist regime” (Peou 2010, 145). Peace movements remained constrained soon after the war as well as many peace activists were silenced due to the American occupation (Mimose 2010). Japan’s relationship with America would shape much of the early peace movements. When the US occupation ended on April 28, 1952, pent up antiwar feelings could finally be expressed, resulting in an outpouring of writers producing peace literature (Dower 1999, 196). On March 1, 1954 Japanese were reminded of the destructiveness of nuclear disasters when the 23-member crew of the Daigo Fukuryuu Maru (Lucky Dragon 5) was exposed to the contaminated fallout from the US Castle Bravo nuclear test on the Bikini Atoll, 6 members of the crew died soon after the incident. This event jumpstarted a global antinuclear
movement that had lasting effects on nuclear policy. The Lucky Dragon 5 incident also led to
the creation of Godzilla, a pop culture phenomenon that signified the “travesty of nature brought
on by the atomic blasts of the Americans” and provided “a vehicle for reliving the terrors of the
war relieved of any guilt or responsibility” (Allison 2006, 45). The Godzilla franchise would
expand to 30 films (two produced by Hollywood), multiple television series, and countless
novels, comic books, videogames, and memorabilia. Godzilla brought antimilitarism to the
mainstream consciousness not just for Japanese, but the world.

In 1960, hundreds of thousands of protesters surrounded the Diet building every day to
express their opposition to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United
States and Japan for many “still had vivid memories of World War II, which had ended only 15
years (earlier), and believed the treaty would lead to another war” (Hirano 2010). However, the
anti-\textit{anpo} movement, as its known in Japan, ultimately failed resulting in the quick end of the
“overall-peace” movements of the early 50s (Kurino 1987, 171). Many veterans of these early
protests are still involved in peace movements, albeit with a recognition that the Japan-US
security alliance is likely to remain and self-defense is acceptable. Another critical juncture in
the peace movement was the Vietnam War. Many objected to Japan’s complicit role in the war
when the US was using Okinawa as a base of operations. The Okinawa issue was already a sore
point because the island has also been used as a US base during the Korean War and remained
under American jurisdiction until 1972. Moreover, the US had stockpiled chemical weapons and
nuclear warheads on the island in the 1950s and 60s (Mitchell 2015). For activists such as
Takeshi Nakashima, the fact that Japan was hosting US planes and soldiers that “went to
Vietnam to kill” was offensive and necessitated activism (Author’s Interview, October 2014,
Hiroshima, Japan). Although Nakashima was the son of an a-bomb survivor, it was the Vietnam
War that led him to join student peace movements. Nakashima would also participate in G8 Summit, labor unions, the US war in Syria and Iraq, collective defense, and Narita airport protests, the latter resulting in two arrests and a three-year period in jail. The Okinawa base is still a major issue for peace activists today and anti-base attitudes seem to be gaining momentum. In 2014, Susumu Inamine won the Nago, Okinawa mayoral election and Takeshi Onaga won the gubernatorial election, both staunchly anti-base (Fackler 2014, January; Fackler 2014, November). There will be peace movements as long as Okinawan residents must deal with the pollution, crime, and instability caused by the US bases.

In the 1970s, antinuclear activism continued to grow. The Joint World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in 1977 spawned grassroots peace movements that campaigned “to expose the casualties of Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (Peou 2010, 147). What was striking about this campaign was that it “brought together housewives, students, retired individuals, and workers who had no affiliations with either the socialist or communist groups in the country. They saw nuclear weapons as ‘absolute evils,’ not relative ones, and insisted on total abolition of nuclear weapons under all circumstances (Peou 2010, 147).

Non-traditional security events have also reinvigorated Japanese antimilitarism. After the “3/11 Triple Disaster,” strong opposition to nuclear energy grew in Japan. The poor handling of the crises by the government and apparent corruption of TEPCO led many to protest Abe’s efforts to restart the nuclear reactions, all 52 of which are still decommissioned (six permanently). The Fukushima nuclear disaster brought renewed attention to the nuclear weapon issue and connected several different peace groups within Japan and abroad. Many of the members in these groups also protest Abe’s efforts to reinterpret Article 9 and collective defense.
Hence, since the end of WWII, Japan’s antimilitarism attitudes have evolved and acquired several different missions. The diverse missions reflect various actors that have joined the peace movements, many involved in several peace groups simultaneously. The impact of peace activism in Japan has been marginalized by some scholars, who usually cite Japanese political apathy, activists’ historical connection to the far left, and an aging population as reasons for the decline. Additionally, antimilitarism skeptics contend that the further Japan is from the suffering of WWII, the weaker antiwar feelings become. This characterization of peace movements is deficient for several reasons. First, the peace movements are diverse; many have links to the far left. Many peace movements are focused on issues not damaged by the socialist-communist split that weakened the antinuclear movement in the 1960s and 70s. Second, although Japanese civil society differs from American civil society, the public is no less politically active. Japanese tend not to be very transparent with their political views, which have hurt the fundraising of peace groups (discussed later), but they vote in high numbers. Since WWII, no single national election has had less than a 50% voter turnout (IDEA 2011). With such high participation rates, politicians cannot afford to ignore the popular will. Third, many activists joined peace movements long after the war for reasons unrelated to personal suffering. Therefore, while some strands of antimilitarism weakened after the war, new ones emerged and drew the attention of the next generation. The peace groups force government leaders to pay attention to many issues related to antimilitarism. Paul Midford (2011) contends that public attitudes empower defensive realists in the government to “delay, curtail, and block altogether desired missions by hawks” (Midford 2011, 180). The antimilitarism norm has empowered politicians seeking to limit Japan’s militarization, but the public has a greater impact than Midford suggests. Many activists directly engage with actors in the government through letter
writing campaigns, meetings, and protests, generating peace discourse that can influence the
general public that may not be as actively engaged in cultivating the antimilitarism norm. Thus,
peace movements are a fundamental part of the environment in which government leaders
navigate.

The Japanese Trade Union Confederation, commonly referred to as RENGO, may have the
largest footprint in the antimilitarism environment. With over 6.82 million, and aspirations
to reach 10 million members, RENGO has significant pull with the government. Its primary goal
is to create jobs and protect workers’ rights, but to do so RENGO has made “play[ing] a role in
challenging and overcoming injustice in society” a core mission (JTUC-RENGO Japanese Trade
Union Confederation 2014-2015). To to achieve this mission, RENGO hosts four major peace
rallies a year: the Okinawa Peace Rally in June, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Rallies in
August, and the Nemuro (Hokkaido) Peace Rally in September. These events, headlining
important speakers, draw thousands. Additionally, RENGO produces literature, provides
information tours, and hosts events (some international) to educate the public on antimilitarism
issues. For example, in 1996, RENGO hosted the first overseas showing of Hiroshima-Nagasaki
Atomic Bomb exhibition in Paris. In 2005, it engaged in a signature-collection campaign aimed
at the 2005 Review Conference of NPT. In 2010, along with several other groups participated in
the 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York. RENGO is engaged in a 10 million-signatures
campaign to lobby at the 2015 NPT Review Conference. It is also a major supporter of smaller
NGO groups. Utilizing 108,967,530 yen (~$878,000) from membership fees, RENGO has
supported 123 NGOs (56 NGOs and 67 local NGOs), or approximately 885,915 yen (~$7,10
per
group (Author’s Interview, Anonymous high-ranking RENGO officer, August 2014, Tokyo,
Japan). Due to RENGO’s large footprint, it has strong ties within the government, especially
with the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Every two years it produces a policy issues information packet and to present to members of the government. The Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare has a special council that meets with RENGO to discuss the trade union’s demands.

Another major player in the peace movement is Soka Gakkai International (SGI). An international lay Buddhist association with over 12 million members spanning 192 countries and territories, SGI promotes public education, with a focus on peace and disarmament, sustainable development, human rights, and several other missions. Similar to many other peace organizations in Japan, SGI has several short-term and long-term goals. Immediate goals include holding exhibitions educating the public about nuclear weapons and lobbying the government on abolition of nuclear weapons at conferences such as Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). SGI is well networked and works closely with other peace groups. SGI hosts events such as the interfaith symposium on nuclear weapons in Washington DC in April 2014. At this symposium, SGI, with several other faith groups pledged increased activism on abolishing nuclear weapons, preparing a statement concerning their humanitarian impact to be presented to the chair of NPT PrepCom in April 2014 (SGI 2014). Another major SGI initiative, the “People’s Decade of Action for Nuclear Abolition,” started in 2007. In collaboration with International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and with support of like-minded individuals and organizations, SGI launched a new antinuclear exhibition titled “Everything You Treasure – For a World Free from Nuclear Weapons.” The official launch was organized on the occasion of the 20th IPPNW World Congress in Hiroshima.56 The antinuclear exhibition aimed to educate the public about the

56 Peacedecade.org Website. For more information, see http://www.peoplesdecade.org/decade/exhibition/eyt/eyt.html.
impacts of nuclear weapons and the importance of a broader concept of security, that of human
security (Kawai 2010). The exhibition has been translated in five languages and viewed in over
38 cities in 13 countries. As a Buddhist organization, SGI promotes a long-term goal of world
peace. According to Kimiaki Kawai, Program Director of Peace Affairs at SGI, Japan’s “peace
culture” after WWII can be looked at from three dimensions: religion, war history, and
geography (Author’s Interview, May 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Kawai contends Japan’s religious
ethics, combined with the sense of remorse of WWII, have helped developed unique Japanese
peace culture. Moreover, Kawai believes Japan’s island status makes the country inherently
introverted, preferring to focus on domestic over international issues, especially war. Based on
its Buddhist faith tradition, Soka Gakkai in Japan has sought to nurture a culture of peace among
the society. It is also closely connected to the New Komeito Party (NKP), historically the
pacifistic check on the LDP, which was originally founded as Komeito Party by Daisaku Ikeda,
president of Soka Gakkai, back in 1964. Although officially separate from each other, the two
groups regularly meet to discuss peace issues. Within the broader government, Soka Gakkai in
Japan has regular contact with the arms control section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Author’s Interview, Kimiaki Kawai, May 2014, Tokyo, Japan).

The heart of the peace movement may be the Japan Confederation of A-and H-Bomb
Sufferers Organization (nihon hidankyo), the biggest organization representing hibakusha.
Originally started to help survivors find missing family members, gain recognition from the
government as victims (one needs a witness to authenticate hibakusha status), and secure
medical benefits, hidankyo grew to include initiatives such as disarmament, preservation of
Article 9, hosting antinuclear conferences, and, after the 3/11 “triple disasters,” opposing nuclear
power plants. Terumi Tanaka, a-bomb survivor and current Secretary General of hidankyo,
 contends that the antinuclear movement is a major pillar of the antiwar movement. According to Tanaka, the ultimate goal for hidankyo is to abolish nuclear weapons, but this would be impossible if war is still acceptable (Author’s Interview, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan). As a result, hidankyo has worked with many different groups, usually lending their senior voices on panels and protests. Hidankyo’s current project is to set up a display at the UN’s 2015 NPT Conference. 50 members will attend the conference to pressure government leaders to meet the 2020 disarmament goals. Tanaka believes the peace movement will be “ok” even though it “relies heavily on hibakusha” because there has been a concerted effort to archive their testimonials (Author’s Interview, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan).

Some peace organizations have as strong a footprint internationally as they do in Japan. Located in the trendy ward of Shinjuku, Tokyo, Peace Boat was first established in 1983 by Japanese university students. While conducting an interview with an executive committee member of Peace Boat, I noticed a high-energy office with over 50 staff working on a myriad of peace issues. Unlike many of the peace groups I encountered, Peace Boat skews young and operates similarly to NGOs in the US. Utilizing an innovative method of providing peace education (and fundraising), Peace Boat charters a large passenger ship that over the last 30 years, has completed 81 “Peace Voyages” to more than 80 countries and 120 ports. Speaking to mostly students and retired workers, Peace Boat provides peace education, dialogue, speaker series, and many other programs during the several month trips. At each dock, Peace Boat works with the local community to spread its antimilitarism message. According to Executive Committee Member Akira Kawasaki, Peace Boat operates as a focal point for many NGOs working on issues such as nuclear disarmament, environmental production, preservation of Article 9, phase out of nuclear power, and US-Okinawa base problem (Author’s Interview, May

57 Peace Boat Website. For more information, see http://peaceboat.org/english/?menu=53
2014, Tokyo, Japan). One major Peace Boat initiative is the Global Article 9 Campaign to Abolish War. Started in conjunction with Japan’ Lawyers’ International Solidarity Associate (JALISA) in 2005, the “campaign seeks not only to locally protect Article 9, but also to educate people around the world about existing international peace mechanisms such as Japan's Constitution and encourage governments to work towards disarmament, demilitarization and a culture of peace.” In 2008, the three-day ”Global Article 9 Conference to Abolish War” hosted Nobel Peace Laureates and leaders from NGOs from over 40 countries, drawing over 33,000 participants “to discuss and have a dialogue on the role that citizens of the world can play to realize the principles of Article 9, through promoting disarmament, demilitarization and a culture of peace.” Peace Boat hosted two international follow-up events in 2009. In 2012, Peace Boat worked with several groups and held the “Nuclear Free Now” series of events in Tokyo and Fukushima, drawing thousands of attendees. Organizations such as Peace Boat operate as a strict check on government attempts to normalize Japan’s security policy. Beyond hosting events, educating the public, and writing op-eds, Peace Boat works closely with local governments to block undesirable policies (Kawasaki and Nahory 2014, May). Although Peace Boat has allies in the NKP, DPJ, and LDP, being granted regular meetings, it also targets powerful local governments that are against nuclear weapons and nuclear energy (Author’s Interview, Akira Kawasaki, May 2014, Tokyo, Japan).

Local governments can be a valuable resource for peace movements. Mayors for Peace, started by Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1982, works towards the total abolition of nuclear weapons by networking with local governments across the world to block national policies. As of June 1, 2015, Mayors for Peace had a membership of 6,706 cities (including 90% of Japanese

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58 Article 9 Website. For more information, see http://www.article-9.org/en/about/index.html
59 Article 9 Website. For more information, see http://www.article-9.org/en/about/index.html
60 Nuclear Free Now Website. For more information, see http://npfree.jp/english.html
cities) in 160 countries and regions.\textsuperscript{61} Mayors for Peace spearheads several disarmament initiatives, the most significant being the 2020 Vision, which seeks to abolish all nuclear weapons by the 2020 NPT Conference. Moreover, Mayors for Peace produces annual progress reports, collects signatures, assist in good faith negotiations (Mayors for Peace Action Plan 2013-2017), and disseminates antinuclear posters and DVDs, and other general education programs. The current Cities Are Not Targets (CANT) initiative has collected 2,065,209 signatures calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons. These initiatives fall within the organization’s “roadmap to the abolition of nuclear weapons” which aims to 1) raise public consciousness through petitions and other activities, 2) influence Japanese and other nationals, 3) commence negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention, 4) sign a nuclear weapons convention, and 5) achieve “a peaceful world free from nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{62}

Not all peace movements are as large as the ones discussed. Local NGOs such as ANT-Hiroshima are no less important because they help organize events for larger NGOs utilizing local knowledge and resources. Founded by Tomoko Watanabe a second-generation a-bomb survivor, ANT-Hiroshima seeks to educate youth regarding the dangers of nuclear weapons and on other peace issues. For Watanabe, peace is “human dignity and rights, water, food, and shelter, education, bonding, and free expression” (Author’s Interview, March 2014, Hiroshima, Japan). This broad peace message is consistent with the general trend of peace activism in Japan. And like many other peace activists, Watanabe focuses primarily on educating youths about the realities of war. According to Watanabe, 20 years ago teachers made it their mission to do this. Therefore, ANT-Hiroshima’s short-term goals are educating people about the reality of

\textsuperscript{61} Mayors for Peace Website. For more information, see http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/outlines/index.html
\textsuperscript{62} Mayors for Peace Website. For more information, see http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/campaign/projects/petition/index.html
war, peace-building activities, and growing new peace builders. The long-term goals are similar to that of SGI and Peace Boat: a nuclear free world and a global peace culture. ANT-Hiroshima works with other peace groups because they feel that they cannot achieve as much on their own. Some of the tools ANT-Hiroshima uses are networking with local groups to lobby the government, fundraising, producing a-bomb literature, letter writing campaigns, lobbying at embassies, holding lectures with nuclear experts, and getting local level politicians such as mayors to sign peace pledges.

Local grassroots movements such as Free Information Guide (FIG) and Hiroshima Interpreters for Peace (HIP) have less formal connections to the government, but can nonetheless have an impact. Kosei Mito, an in-utero a-bomb survivor, started FIG in 2006, long after his parents survived the Hiroshima bomb. Mito’s peace activism was activated after his disenchantment with high school education (he taught high school for more than 15 years) and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (he was a volunteer). Consisting of 10-15 members, FIG provides free tours to tourists and students around the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. In 9 years, Mito has turned into somewhat of a local celebrity having given tours to over 200 thousand Japanese and 44,305 foreign visitors from 164 countries (as of July 11, 2015). These tours offer FIGS’ strong anti-US and anti-Abe sentiments, and blunt criticisms of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum for not “adequately displaying the tragic nature of war and Japan’s wartime atrocities” (Author’s Interview, March 2014 and January 2015, Hiroshima, Japan). In recent years, Mito has added antinuclear power plant messages in his tour because of the 3/11 “triple disaster.” Although FIG takes a critical stance of the government and is not sponsored by a city government, they have loose connections. FIG is stationed in front of the Atomic Dome, one of the most valuable locations in Hiroshima. Every morning it sets up tables, chairs, signs,
a-bomb artifacts, and information packets (translated in seven languages) and basically loiters from 7AM to 4PM. At night, the group packs up their goods and hides them in the brush. The city government is well aware of their criticisms and personal use of public property, but allows them to stay. In turn, FIG routinely contacts city officials to inform them about problems at the park, i.e. broken lights or pollution. Mito has also requested the city to improve the park for visitors and make FIG’s stay more comfortable. Sometimes the city obliges, such as installing wooden benches to replace sitting on cold stones, and sometimes they decline, like refusing to cut trees to give the group more space. According to Motonobu Yokoyama, Director of Peace Programs of Hiroshima City, the city does not reject any independent peace activity because private groups can spread their message as they please because, all peace activists are fighting for the same goals - abolishing nuclear weapons and world peace (Author’s Interview, March 2015, Hiroshima, Japan). The city often allows peace groups to use “the city as Hiroshima” as one of their supporters for their events. Though Mito prefers the unofficial status of FIG because he believes becoming an established NPO might lead to censorship, other members such as Michiko Yamaoka work closely with the city. Along with giving tours as a FIG member on her free time, Yamaoka works as an official guide for the city and participates in other peace groups. Although she is deeply embedded in the Hiroshima peace community, her activities began less than 10 years ago. When her husband died, she went to the Peace Park to find new meaning in life, and found herself being asked questions by tourists. This motivated her to learn English and become a guide. As a nisei (second generation) hibakusha, Yamaoka is only connected to the a-bomb with knowledge mostly from second hand testimonials about how Japanese suffered during reconstruction. Relying mostly on her mother’s stories, her tours are very scripted, offer a simplified version of the war, and promote a very general idea of peace. Yamaoka’s father
survived the a-bomb, but never spoke of his experience because the trauma was too much, as is common in many survivors (Author’s Interview, November 2014, Hiroshima, Japan). For groups like FIG, there is no clear action plan, just the compulsion to tell an important story, pay respect to the dead, and educate the next generation.

Keiko Ogura, an a-bomb survivor, founded HIP 30 years ago. Like many survivors who hid their status out of fears of discrimination, Ogura was not active in the peace movement until much later in life (Author’s Interview, March 2015, Hiroshima, Japan). When her husband, a spokesperson for the city’s mayors, died 35 years ago, Ogura found purpose translating documents and providing tours for foreigners who worked with her husband and were interested in Hiroshima’s history. HIP provides information tours about the atomic bomb and currently consists of approximately 80 members, including hibakusha, teachers, and anyone else interested in atomic bomb history. Like many small NGOs, HIP did not begin as a peace movement; but a loose collection of tour guides who wanted to produce a pamphlet to help educate visitors. Because hibakusha passing away every year, Ogura is in an increasingly critical role in the peace movement. A quick glance at her schedule book reveals dozens of meetings a day; she is booked for the next eight months. Because Ogura was eight when the bomb dropped, she is one of the few left who remember the events with clarity. For the majority of survivors who are under 80, there is a risk that their testimonials are warped by their being so young at the time, distorted by the trauma, and coopted by dominant academic narratives of the atomic bomb. Unlike many survivor testimonials, Ogura’s storytelling lacks scientific details and macro explanations, instead focusing on a visceral personal experience. As a result of her work in the peace community, the Peace Memorial Museum has made her its “official story teller” in English.
These are but a few of the peace groups in Japan today. Activists such as Masahiro Watarida, founder of Global Watch Hiroshima and a second generation a-bomb victim, has occasionally joined the growing protests in front of the Diet building every Friday, pressuring the government on disarmament, nuclear power plants, Article 9, collective defense, GMOs, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement (Author’s Interview, March 2015, Hiroshima, Japan). Unaligned and unaffiliated individuals also are an important part of Japan’s antimilitarism environment. For example, the academic community has begun challenging the Abe administration’s foreign policies (Japan Times 2015, June; Penney 2011). Critics of the Abe government can be found in the highest levels of Japan’s society. Taking a rare political position and a clear jab at the current government’s normalization efforts, Crown Prince Naruhito remarked that “it is important to look back on the past humbly and correctly pass down tragic experiences and the history behind Japan to the generations who have no direct knowledge of the war, at a time memories of the war are about to fade” (Japan Times 2015, February). Crown Prince Naruhito further stated, “I hope this year will be an opportunity to take the preciousness of peace to heart and renew our determination to pursue peace,” concluding that Japan’s peace and prosperity was built on Japan’s Constitution (Japan Times 2015, February).

The less tempered critiques of the government are more rare, but nonetheless shocking. Since the Abe government has pursued changes to Japanese security, activists have been setting themselves on fire to protest possible changes to the constitution (Yoshida and Osaki 2014; Japan Times 2014, November).

The most prominent members of the peace movement are hibakusha who suffered during reconstruction and working class individuals who cut their teeth during the protests of the 60s.

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and 70s, but the peace movement has always relied on the young to provide optimism and vitality. Hiroshima’s most famous symbol for peace, the paper crane, originated with Sadako Sasaki, a sixth-grader who became ill from exposure to radiation when she was two. Believing that folding a thousand paper cranes would make her wish come true, Sadako folded over 1,300, stopping only because she passed away eighth months after being diagnosed with leukemia (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum 1999, 77-78). Sadako’s classmates responded by fundraising to build a monument in her honor three years later with the unveiling of the Children’s Peace Monument. Sadako’s story, her cranes, and the monument became enduring reminders of the dangers of nuclear weapons and ignited an international peace movement.

Students today are still very active in the peace movement. In 1998, a student group in Nagasaki Prefecture began collecting signatures for the abolition of nuclear weapons, receiving 1.04 million signatures by 2013 (Japan Times 2013, August; Watanabe 2013).

The Japanese antimilitarism environment is supported by groups large and small, old and young. Their diversity has changed antimilitarism in the past six decades. The various movements share common characteristics that explain why antimilitarism is pervasive and enduring, but not hegemonic. First, many peace groups convey a visceral feeling how Japanese suffered during and after the war. For example, Mito’s tour of the Peace Park stops by a gravesite to let visitors feel tombs damaged by the atomic bomb. One of his greatest frustrations with the Peace Memorial Park Museum is that it does not accurately convey the suffering of Japanese and East Asians caused by the government. Hiroshima City would surely disagree since the city government recently began inviting dignitaries from around the world to Hiroshima to witness the suffering caused by atomic weapons. *Hibakusha* are best in conveying
such messages, and while they decline each year, the city has been recording their testimonials to preserve their lessons.

Second, strong emphasis is placed on educating youth about the horrors of war. Many activists I interviewed do not believe nationalism is strong, but fear it nonetheless. They believe the antiwar education they received as youths helped keep Japan on a path towards peace and wish to utilize education to stem the growth of nationalism. Some are not as optimistic. Yumi Kanazaki, reporter for the Chugoku Shimbun, believes nationalism is growing, and after the 70th anniversary of the war feelings in the country may change dramatically (Author’s Interview, June 2014, Hiroshima, Japan). She laments that without war survivors passing on their stories, younger people may not appreciate the peace they have. One parliamentarian believes that nationalism is rising and it is the government’s job to “prevent unhealthy nationalism” because it “jeopardizes the security of the region” (Author’s Interview, September 2014, Tokyo, Japan).

In some ways, Japan has become complacent and pacifism is not as vigorously discussed on the national level as in the past. The Peace Memorial Ceremony is no longer aired by commercial broadcasters – not even in Hiroshima - and peace editorials have less traction now (Author’s Interview, Yumi Kanazaki, June 2014, Hiroshima, Japan). Only NHK still broadcasts the ceremony around Japan. A major exception to this trend was on the 70-year anniversary of the a-bomb, when not only NHK, but all local TV channels live broadcasted the ceremony. However, Kanazaki does note that public opinion about peace and security has begun to shift because of the current developments on the national security bills. I attended the 70-year anniversary event in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and observed loud jeering during Abe’s speech. Such sensitivity to national security policy was not as apparent in ceremonies over the past few years.
Third, peace activists have a complicated relationship with the JSDF. Many respect the JSDF’s humanitarian work and believe that self-defense is legitimate, but are worried it might become a normal military force in the future. This is why some activists object to Abe government attempts to reform Japanese security policy, even if it is not militaristic. Fourth, the diversity of peace groups has made it difficult for them to cooperate and develop clear action plans. Many activists join multiple groups, but are unable to compartmentalize different agendas. According to Steve Leeper, former Chairman of the Hiroshima Peace Foundation, the peace movement suffers “serious problems of horizontal communication because Japan is a very vertical society” (Author’s Interview, April 2014, Hiroshima, Japan). Each group has its own agenda, and though they may join other groups during protests, there is little effort to combine missions. Moreover, strong egos have led to some groups breaking up, the most famous split being the Hiroshima chapter hidankyo.

Fifth, peace groups have a very long-term view of peace. Few believe peace can be achieved soon. The aim of short-term goals, such as educating youth, getting governments to abide to disarmament agreements, and promoting peaceful dialogue is to set the stage for a new international relations ethic in the distant future. Sixth, weak fundraising and little utilization of modern mobilization tools, such as websites and social networking, has significantly hindered peace movements. For example, hidankyo, probably the most famous peace group in Japan reached less than a quarter of its fundraising target in its current major project to send a-bomb survivors to the NPT (Author’s Interview, Terumi Tanaka, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan). The 70th Anniversary of the atomic bombs was not enough to mobilize donors. The hidankyo headquarters in Tokyo is a small office operating mostly on membership fees (40 million yen per year/~$320,000) and charity; its executives are unpaid and employees have very low salaries.
Smaller groups such as FIG and HIP have almost no funds. FIG is completely voluntary and HIP collects only 300 yen (~$2.40) per meeting and 1000 yen (~$8.00) for bus fares from people on the tour. The City of Hiroshima does not fund these groups, but allows HIP to use rooms at the Peace Memorial Museum free. With limited funds, many peace groups have no websites, or ones not updated for years. Even the Peace Memorial Museum’s website has outdated scripts and is difficult to navigate. One reason for the spartan websites is because peace groups rely on donations, and want to avoid conveying the image of extravagance. But perhaps peace groups are simply too poor to hire dedicated staff for their websites. Having no presence on Facebook, Twitter, and other free social networking sites seems to confirm this human resource problem.

The Peace Memorial Museum has only a single donation box, unmarked and placed in front of the Memorial Cenotaph. Patrons are not solicited for donations and big companies must go to the museum offering a donation for either maintenance of the Atomic Dome or general peace activities, which can be turned down. Activist Masahiro Watarida contends peace groups are reluctant to fundraise due to a stigma of pushing one’s personal politics on others and therefore, rely on small membership fees to support their activities (Author’s Interview, August 2015, Hiroshima, Japan). Watarida believes Japanese peace groups are “not concerned about growth as much,” instead focusing all their energies on the most current project. Consequently, it is difficult for peace groups to retain young activists - who eventually “burn out” and quit to pursue more stable career paths - and plan for the long-term (Author’s Interview, Masahiro Watarida, August 2015, Hiroshima, Japan)

Because Japanese peace movements have easy-to-digest and noncontroversial peace platforms, actively educate the public, and do not aggressively push a political agenda, antimilitarism has endured for seven decades and is pervasive. However, the lack a clear action
plan, and the refusal to be critical and political and thus demanding of the public for money and time, has prevented antimilitarism from completely elite politics. For activists such as Steve Leeper, true peace seems a “goal really far off” and requiring “huge systemic change,” but he is hopeful because he sees progress every day (Author’s Interview, April 2014, Hiroshima, Japan). But it can be difficult to know if they really are having an impact. Antimilitarism institutions have proliferated over the years. The Yoshida Doctrine, primarily focused on non-alignment, eventually evolved into the more pacifistic Fukuda Doctrine, with non-nuclear, and non-export principles. Peace movements meet resistance from the government and my interviews reveal many activists feel that the Abe administration simply does not listen. This insecurity drives many peace activists to continue to try to keep the government in check. A recent major victory of the peace movement sums up the complex antimilitarism environment. In recent years, elites in the peace movement have utilized a strategy of emphasizing the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and have tried to get the government of Japan to sign the 2013 New Zealand Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons (Higgie 2013). Because the US nuclear umbrella protects it, Japan endorsed the Australian statement allowing for the use of nuclear weapons for security reasons, directly challenging the no nuclear weapons under “any circumstances” clause of the New Zealand Statement (ICAN 2014). Peace groups were outraged and lobbied the government, arguing that as the only country to suffer a nuclear attack, Japan should be the first to support the New Zealand Statement. Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, who hails from Hiroshima, eventually relented and Japan signed the New Zealand Statement (Asahi Shimbun 2013, October; Leeper 2013; Kanazaki 2014). Japan actually endorsed both statements, taking the impossible stance of rejecting nuclear weapons in any circumstances while agreeing that their use may be acceptable for security reasons. Japan’s
position has become clearer since 2013 and has again endorsed the statement demanding nuclear weapons not be used (its sixth rendition) at the 2015 NPT Review Conference (Tanaka, 2015).

Many groups remain dissatisfied with the pace of abolishing nuclear weapons and Japan’s inability to take leadership of the international antinuclear movement. But more critical movements have not worked well with groups that want to work more closely with the government. At the NPDI Conference in Hiroshima in 2014, several prominent peace groups were extremely critical of the government-endorsed Hiroshima Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative Statement that advocated a “world free of nuclear weapons” by the “systematic and continued reduction of all types of nuclear weapons” (NPDI 2014), because the statement did not call for abolition of all nuclear weapons immediately. Thus, the stubbornness of activists helped influence government policy, while simultaneously unable to build a strong enough coalition to dominate relevant policy decisions.

6) Japanese antimilitarism is commonsensical
According to a high-ranking LDP parliamentarian, “peace culture is always deep in our [Japanese] mind, no doubt about that” (Author’s Interview, September 2014, Tokyo, Japan). It is also prevalent among defense officials, non-elected civil servants, and elected officials (Author’s Interview, Katsuya Tsukamoto, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan). For most Japanese, Japan’s antiwar attitudes and restricted foreign policy have simply “always been that way” because the vast majority of the public has seen no conflict, and those who fought in WWII, teach that conflict was detrimental to the country. According to the RENGO officer I interviewed, his/her grandparents used to recall the suffering caused by the war and warned of the dangers of conflict (Author’s Interview, Anonymous high-ranking RENGO officer, August 2014, Tokyo, Japan.). Kimiaki Kawai became interested in peace activism from listening to his parents about their
experiences, from war survivors, and teachers (Author’s Interview, May 2014, Tokyo, Japan). His father put it simply, “War is terrible.” Millions were exposed to these ideas. Due to war, Japan lost millions of lives, its economic might, its sovereignty, and its status in the international community. The older generation was responsible. According to Dower (1999) “the impact of defeat on teachers in general was exceptionally traumatic” (249). Many teachers were “filled with grief over the deaths of their young charges, often overwhelmed with guilt for having encouraged them onto a path of destruction. Many embraced the ideals of peace and democracy with fervor” (Dower 1999, 250). Thus, the antimilitarism environment roots are in early post-war pacifistic education obligations. In Nagasaki and many other parts of Japan, peace education is included in elementary and junior high school curriculums and schools hold peace assemblies 9 to commemorate the atomic bomb (Author’s Interview via E-mail, Mayor Tomihisa Taue, July 2014, Nagasaki, Japan). Hiroshima City has developed a peace education curriculum and disseminates the materials throughout the elementary and intermediate schools in the city. Outside of Hiroshima, there are 46 Japanese universities and 17 foreign universities that have adopted the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Peace Studies Course (Author’s Interview, Motonobe Yokoyama, March 2015, Hiroshima, Japan).

Antimilitarism became a way of life in Japan. The nation has no conflict abroad or at home to face. It has some of the lowest crime rates in the world and some of the strongest antigun laws. its reputation as a “peace nation,” symbolized by its “Peace Constitution, is promoted as a unique contribution to the world. Chalmers Johnson once observed, “Most Japanese equate Article 9 of the Constitution with democracy itself; to alter one is to alter the other” (Johnson 1992, 24). Antimilitarism has been package deal that came along with stability, prosperity, status, democracy, and human rights, and through antimilitarism Japan placed itself
high in the world hierarchy. According to Dower (1999), “the text went on to introduce pacifism as the means by which Japan, as well as other countries, could best promote civilization and become a cultured nation” (249). In a poll conducted by the Cabinet Office of Japan (2004), 51.9% believed Japan should contribute to maintaining world peace (including physical support), 16.1% believed Japan should protect universal values (freedom, democracy, human rights), and 25% believed Japan should provide humanitarian support for refugees.64

Japan has pragmatic reasons for following Article 9. There is also growing feeling that the US way of politics is not working, as with US troubles in the Middle East. Steve Leeper contends that “humans can no longer resolve conflicts through disruptive power…humans need to graduate to a civilization of love, influenced by Gandhi and MLK, or people will not survive war, which is becoming controllably violent” (Author’s Interview, April 2014, Hiroshima, Japan). Yasuyoshi Komizo echoes these sentiments and has stated, “the current security framework doesn’t work and leaders need another credible security framework not built on nukes…Article 9 has worked, and its useful for Asian countries as well” (Author’s Interview, April 2014, Hiroshima, Japan). Komizo elaborates on the weaknesses of the current security framework and possible alternatives stating:

“for both nuclear and non-nuclear attack by neighbors, there is no guarantee that the USA is going to retaliate by nuclear forces that could trigger serious risk of nuclear attacks against US’ own soil. Nuclear deterrence may not prevent determined conventional attacks by its neighbors. Nor acceleration of military exchange started by a front line encounter may not be deterred by nuclear deterrence. If by accident or miscalculation nuclear weapons are used, their humanitarian consequences are too grave, widespread and longstanding - denying any possible justification of use. And by release of classified information, it is now known that risks of nuclear weapon use by accident or miscalculation are much higher than claimed in the past. Nuclear deterrence cannot work against terrorist attacks.

Security frameworks may need military elements for back up, but if security merely depend on military means, it is likely to create arms race that could enhance rather than reduce risks of military confrontations. Security arrangement that promotes wider exchange in culture,

64 19.9% (contributing to advancing a healthy world economy), 15% (cooperation to advance developing countries), 38.4% (solving global environmental issues), 5.5% (international cultural exchanges), .1% (other), 8.3% (don’t know).
For many activists, the hope is the world will eventually align with Japan and see peace as the best way to engage other states in the most commonsensical way to conduct international relations. Japanese in the present day are reflections of the survivors of WWII. They are simultaneously part of, contribute to, and shape the antimilitarism environment.

Expressions of Antimilitarism
Over the past 70 years, antimilitarism has been displayed in the education system, in policies, in law, and throughout the physical landscape. The passive expressions of antimilitarism along with its active practitioners form the environment that constrains and restrains Japanese militarism. The most unique expression is the dozens of peace museums across the country. Currently, there are some 67, far more than in any other country. They are located in 27 of the 47 prefectures and they are spread evenly across the country - no museum more than two prefectures away. The size of a prefecture is approximately equal to a county in California; the distance between one museum and the next is no more than a three-hour drive. Many museums were not constructed right after the war, but much later. Over half were constructed in the last 25 years, 20 after 2000, most established by private non-state actors [see Appendix A]. Along with peace museums, there are over 130 “peace monuments.” Few are popular destinations for tourists, but their existence is a tangible reminder of how Japan constructs its postwar identity.

In the past two decades the subject matter covered in museums has become increasingly diverse and has incrementally acknowledged more of Japan’s colonial history. For example, a medical history museum that opened in 2015 in Fukuoka recounts the history of medical
experiments conducted on US prisoners by Japanese (Japan Times 2015, April). Although it does not address Unit 731, the biological warfare unit of the Imperial Japanese Army, its subject area opens the door for discussion, and likely criticism, of Japan’s dark colonial past. The Women’s Active War Museum on War and Peace (WAM) in Tokyo is a recent addition. Established in 2005, WAM has five objectives: 1) focus on wartime violence with the objective upholding that justice free from any gender bias, 2) gather and exhibit data on victims and clarify who is to take responsibility for their victimization, 3) establish a people’s network to rid the world of violence, 4) create a network not dependent on state power, and 5) take action to enable cross-border solidarity. WAM also hosts special exhibitions about comfort women and other historical events related to women’s victimization. Until June 21, 2015 WAM hosted an Urgent Special Exhibition to bring the comfort women issue to middle school students.

Most of the peace museums focus on the earlier suffering of the Japanese people from the war. This has resulted in a peace movement that is antiwar in the most general sense - war is destructive and should be avoided. Critical inquiry into the causes of war and Japan’s violations of human rights are not as apparent in other museums as Kyushu University’s medical history museum or WAM. Instead, Japanese museums highlight specific subject areas that impacted Japan more than other states during World War II, such as nuclear weapons and firebombing.

On June 10, 1976, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government opened the No. 5 Fukuryu-maru Exhibition Hall to raise awareness on the disasters caused by nuclear weapons. At no cost, visitors see the Lucky Dragon no. 5 vessel, and read approximately twenty panels outlining the history of nuclear testing on Bikini Atoll, the impact on the fisherman, and the dangers of nuclear fallout, or “death ash.” The later half of the exhibition hall promotes current antinuclear movements and peace. In 2014, the hall held a special exhibit on Godzilla and displayed

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65 WAM Website. For more information, see http://wam-peace.org/en/aboutus/five-principles/
drawings created by Japanese elementary school students. Opened in 2002, the Center of the Tokyo Raids and War Damage provides visitors with a history of the Tokyo Air Raids. About 10,000 annual visitors pay the 300-yen admission (~$2.50) to see related letters, artifacts, and statistics. Like many Japan peace museums, the Center is small and not well advertised. However, it is well networked. It has an exhibition with paper cranes donated from the Hiroshima Peace Memoriam Museum and ties to a greater movement for world peace. In calling these “peace museums,” Japan frames how its history is interpreted, this is a self-serving laying the groundwork in society to think about security differently. Over time they have educated millions of Japanese and foreigners about the dangers of war and nuclear weapons.

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66 The Center for Tokyo Raids and War Damage Website. For more information, see http://www.tokyo-sensai.net
The most famous are the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. Both have low admission prices (50 yen/$0.40 and 200 yen/$1.60; free on August 6th and 9th) and are staffed with guides who speak several languages. Both convey the history of nuclear weapons, the suffering of the people, postwar reconstruction, and peace. Over the next few years, they will dedicate their resources to important short-term goals, the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII, fulfilling the Mayors for Peace 2020 Vision, and transitioning the peace.


Prefectures with a peace museum are highlighted in light blue.

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67 Prefectures with at least one peace museum are highlighted in light blue.
movement to a stage without *hibakusha* leading the cause. The average age of *hibakusha* is 80 as of 2015, and many fear that once they are gone the movement will lose a critical voice. Mayor of Nagasaki, Tomihisa Taue has stated, “Without a doubt the voices of atomic bomb survivors have the persuasive power on how nuclear weapons are inhumane. However, there is not much time left for us to be able to listen to their voices” (Author’s Interview, July 2014, Nagasaki, Japan). The time when *hibakusha* can contribute to peace movements is closing much sooner than many realize. If an a-bomb survivor is 80 in 2015, he was 10 when the bombs were dropped, likely the lowest age for an individual to remember the event. Survivor narratives are already notoriously unreliable because the trauma of the event and dominant historical narratives can warp how survivors tell their story. Younger *hibakusha* tend to recall memories that are much more detailed, scientific, and contextualized, narratives much more a reflection of the information gathered after the bombings because a victim would not have any idea of the temperature of the bomb or its strategic significance at the time. Hence, in the next few years, the testimonies of *hibakusha* will reflect historical information more than than their unique and visceral experience. To address this problem, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki governments have started programs to train a new generation of storytellers to convey the experience of a-bomb survivors. However, according to Kathleen Sullivan, program director of Hibakusha Stories, “the personal impact will be missing” (Anna 2015).

Mayor Kazumi Matsui of Hiroshima and Mayor Taue, like their predecessors, have responsibilities uncommon for local level political positions. Beyond leading the aforementioned Mayors for Peace, their constituents expect both to be ardent promoters of peace. Their most general responsibilities are inviting dignitaries to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to learn about the bombings and attending national and international events to promote the abolition of
nuclear weapons. For example, in April 2014, Matsui and Taue went to New York to attend the Third Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). At the conference the mayors submitted a letter of requests and signatures collected by Mayors for Peace calling for the early conclusion of the nuclear weapons convention (Author’s Interview, Mayor Taue, July 2014, Nagasaki, Japan). Each mayor is also expected to write and deliver a peace statement on the anniversary of the atomic bombings. These statements are important for conveying the suffering of hibakusha, pressuring the Japanese government on militarization, calling on the international community to abolish nuclear weapons and, at times, establish an action plan. Although the statements share similar objections, they can differ greatly. For activists such as Kosei Mito, the Nagasaki statements are “better” because they are much more critical of the government and aggressively push for abolition of nuclear weapons and demilitarization (Author’s Interview, January 2015, Hiroshima, Japan). Hiroshima is more interested in advising the government than criticizing it (Author’s Interview, Yasuyoshi Komizo, April 2014, Hiroshima, Japan).

The differences between the two cities and their peace museums highlight key elements of Japan’s antimilitarism environment. It is said, “Hiroshima rages, Nagasaki prays” (ikari no Hiroshima, inori no Nagasaki) (Treat 1995, 301). According to Terumi Tanaka, the peace movements in the two cities used to be quite different, Hiroshima being more “logical” and Nagasaki being more “emotional” (Author’s Interview, February 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Although the cities now work more closely and align together, the development of each city’s individual peace culture still can be seen today. During the First Sino-Japanese War, the Meiji government moved to Hiroshima, establishing it as Japan’s military capital. Hiroshima would remain so until leveled by the atomic bomb. Following WWII, its people had to decide to pack up and leave or
rebuild the city from scratch. Under the leadership of Mayor Shinso Hamai, Hiroshima lobbied the government for financial support to construct a “peace city” with the Peace Memorial Park and A-Bomb Dome as “a lasting stronghold for world peace” (Hamai 2010, 65). Spanning approximately 90,000 square meters in downtown Hiroshima, Peace Memorial Park is easily assessable via the city’s main street (hondori). Tourists and locals travel through the park daily to get to work, go to restaurants, or do some shopping. The wide flat terrain of the park has made it a popular destination for major cultural events, festivals, and protests such as cherry blossom viewing, concerts, and the annual Flower Festival. The Flower Festival began as a championship parade for the Hiroshima baseball team, the Hiroshima Carp. Over time, the Carp have become a symbol of the city and big promoter of Hiroshima’s peace message. In August, the Carp hosts a “peace nighter” game where fans receive a free gift commemorating the end of the war and partake in peace related activities. Hence, Peace Memorial Park is deeply intertwined with daily life in Hiroshima and defines a key part of the residents’ identity.

The “peace city” identity is also strong in Nagasaki, but is manifested differently. Nagasaki Peak Park is much smaller, divided among three areas on separate planes. This layout makes it difficult to navigate the park and hold large demonstrations. Additionally, Nagasaki’s major social centers are in different parts of city, making it unnecessary for most residents to go through the park daily. Nagasaki also draws fewer international and domestic tourists because it is much further from Tokyo and lacks a shinkansen (high-speed railway) line. As a result, Nagasaki’s peace NGOs and overall impact is smaller.

The difference in scale between the cities has resulted in different peace strategies. Hiroshima City cultivates a very general peace message in order to attract foreign dignitaries and influence the national government. Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park has easily identifiable
monuments such as the Atomic Dome, a world heritage site. The shape of the dome has made it an internationally famous symbol of peace. The Flame of Peace, lit during the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, “symbolizes hope for a nuclear free world” (HIP 2015, 26). At the center is the Memorial Monument for Hiroshima, City of Peace. Unveiled August 6, 1952, the Cenotaph contains all the names of people who died from the a-bomb. Each year at the Peace Memorial Ceremony, the city government adds the names of hibakusha who recently died. There are about 50 peace monuments in the park. However, the city clearly emphasizes the park’s major monuments in its promotional literature. Nagasaki has a peace promotion plan building strong bilateral relations with other cities and states. In 1978, Nagasaki established the “Peace Symbols Zone” and invited countries around the world to donate peace monuments. At the center of the Peace Park is the Nagasaki Peace Statue, an imposing Greek-God like figure with his right hand pointing up to symbolize the atomic bomb and left hand extended and pointing left to symbolize peace. Although this statue is the most famous, the layout of the park encourages visitors to visit the statues donated by other countries.

The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum also have different approaches to teaching. Entering the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, one is greeted by a solemn video narrating a brief history of the a-bomb. The video proceeds as follows:

“On August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb in the world was dropped on Hiroshima, and a vast number of her citizens perished.” [Image of a woman praying]
“IT is now about half a century since the curtain was lifted on the Nuclear Age.” [Image of Atomic Dome in rubble]
“And still today we are living through that age.” [Image of four nuclear tests]
“This is the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, an expression of our desire for world peace and the total abolition of nuclear weapons” [Image of the museum].

The video ends with birds chirping, hopeful music, and images of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony. Many exhibits use passive language when outlining Japan’s involvement in the war.
The messaging suggests that the nation was hijacked by militaristic forces and a strong government that “insisted on ‘spiritual mitigation,’ denying even freedom of thought” (Panel in Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum). Of 100+ panels in the museum, less than ten discuss Japanese militarism. Instead, the museum prioritizes education about nuclear free zones, Mayors for Peace, Hiroshima’s reconstruction, and authentic artifacts from the war. Recently, curators removed the museum’s infamous mannequins depicting a burned woman and two children walking through a nuclear apocalypse (Hiroshima Peace Media Center 2013). The decision led to many protests in the city who believed the museum needed to convey the feelings of destructiveness of nuclear weapons. However, curators believed the mannequins might be too graphic for young children.

The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum has taken the opposite approach. The museum seeks to convey the ugliness of war and the bombs; the goal is to rile emotions. After descending a long stairwell entrance, patrons walk into a full-scale replica of the city’s famous Urakami Cathedral, which was destroyed by the atomic bomb. LED lighting projects images of flames across the exhibit room’s wall while speakers pump sounds of howling winds of the post-bomb destruction. The room itself has very few artifacts. From the beginning, the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum conveys a message that nuclear weapons are evil. The museum has many more images of charred bodies and the physiological suffering of the residents. In the middle of the museum are a series of televisions showing the history Japanese imperialism. In one video about the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the narrator states “Japan said it wanted to free Asia from Western control and create a sphere of co-prosperity, but in fact it was simply an invasion by Japan.” The video also discusses comfort women, forced labor, cultural genocide, and the suffering of Japan’s colonies. In the final section there is an exhibit showing
the impact of nuclear weapons on communities around the world, such as Ronneburg, Hanford, Nevada, and New Mexico.

Although Hiroshima and Nagasaki are routinely grouped as one peace movement, their differing strategies indicate that Japanese peace culture can be cultivated in vastly different ways, sometimes for simply geographical reasons. The differences are not noticeable day-to-day, because the cities cooperate on many initiatives. However, the differences are clear every August 6th and 9th when the annual Peace Memorial Ceremonies are held. Hiroshima’s Peace Ceremony is a large expensive event that draws dignitaries from around the world. The Mayor delivers the annual peace statement, followed by a plea for peace given by two elementary school children. In the past few years, Prime Minister Abe has spoken at the ceremony as well. Hibakusha do not give a speech. The rest of the day is a mix of solemn and festive events with many booths set up by peace activists and students extolling the virtues of peace. The day ends with a beautiful lantern and candle lighting ceremony. Conversely, Nagasaki’s Peace Ceremony is a vivid reminder of the ugliness of war. During the ceremony, graphic images of atomic bomb victims are displayed throughout the park. The Mayor usually gives a speech that criticizes the government for not doing more to abolish nuclear weapons, tame compared to the speech that follows. Hibakusha present the second speech, usually an enraged criticism of the Prime Minister, sitting awkwardly just meters away. This stark contrast reveals two different elements of the Japanese antimilitarism environment. Hiroshima cultivates a peace culture through positive messaging and pacifism. This is best captured by the Peace Memorial Park’s symbol, Sadako’s paper crane. Nagasaki’s builds upon the peace culture through emotional reminders of the dangers of war and the benefits of antimilitarism. It is fitting that the motif of Nagasaki Peace Park is water, always available in fountains throughout the museum and park dedicated to
the souls of the *hibakusha* who died in great pain. Yet, even with the significant differences between the two cites, they are tied by a common goal of antimilitarism. For the cities’ residents, the peace parks are built upon giant graveyards and, as survivors, they have a responsibility to past and future generations to never repeat those “fateful days.”

Since 1955, 65,836,448 people have visited the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. Attendance peaked in 1991, following a major renovation project. In recent years there has been a slight decline, but this can be attributed to a four-year renovation project to be completed by 2017 (Kikumoto 2015). Antimilitarism norm detractors have argued that the norm has eroded because of rising nationalism and decreased interest in peace among Japanese. A close inspection of museum attendance statistics suggests that the reality is a bit more complicated.

![Figure 4.2: Annual Student and Foreign Visitors 1970-2014](source)

Source: City of Hiroshima

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The Peace Memorial Museum is an important resource for young Japanese to learn about the war. However, recent trends suggest that fewer students are going to the museum. In Figure 4.2, peak attendance was between 1985 and 1990. Since then there has been a significant drop in high school and middle school students. In 1985, 535,101 students visited the peace museum. In 2014, the total dropped to 306,395. Elementary school attendance has held steady at roughly 150,000 students a year. What accounts for this change? One possible explanation is that flights are cheaper today than 30 years ago so older students are traveling abroad more. Another possible explanation may be there are fewer students in Japan. Between 1985 and the present, Japan’s elementary school population dropped 30% (8.5 million to 5.79 million), the middle school population fell 42% (10 million to 5.79), and the high school population declined 33% (8.9 million to 6 million). Interestingly, the number of foreign visitors has increased, which may indicate that the city’s efforts to increase its presence internationally are working.

Figure 4.3: Annual School Trips 1970-2014

Source: City of Hiroshima

Total number of school trips to the Hiroshima Peace Museum seems to confirm that interest in peace education has not dropped. Between 1985 to the present, annual school trips have slightly
increased, peaking at over 4500 in 2004. A small dip in 2011 may have been due to the “3/11 Triple Disaster” leading to cancelled school trips. Although students are a smaller percentage of overall museum patrons, declining from 39.7% in 1985 to 22.8% in 2013, general interest among schools has remained stable. Overall attendance has also remained strong, suggesting that there has been no decline in interest among elders. Over the last ten years the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum has averaged between 1.1 and 1.3 million annual visitors. Over the past five years, the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum averaged approximately 680,000 general visitors and 240,000 student visitors respectively.

The antimilitarism of the peace museums has diffused to other museums. The Kure Maritime Museum, also known as the Yamato Museum, depicts the history of Japan’s greatest warship during WWII. At first glance, the museum seems like a prideful display of Japan’s former military might, especially via many models of ships and fighter planes. But according to Kazushige Todaka, Director of the Yamato Museum, the exhibits are designed to teach young people about the history of the city, advances in technology, and the possible dangers of war (Author’s Interview, July 2014, Kure, Japan). Todaka laments that “it took 70 years for Japan to become a strong country, and due to the war, Japanese lost everything in four years. It took 10 years for Japan to recover, so there is hope for Japan” (Author’s Interview, July 2014, Kure, Japan). Todaka’s interpretation of the war matches the passive language of other conveying the idea that the Japanese were overtaken by negative forces and, in this case, technology run amok. This may not be appealing to Japan’s former colonies, but it is antimilitaristic nonetheless. It follows the general idea that war is terribly destructive, especially when the state is unable to control militarism. The Yamato Museum is part of a network that shares exhibits, artifacts, and information. Although the Yamato Museum depicts Japan’s naval history, the MSDF rarely
works with it, limiting interaction to lending uniform personnel for special events. The MSDF manages the JMSDF Kure Museum. This museum has no exhibits on the Imperial Military, focusing solely on the history of the JSDF. Coincidentally, with so few missions since its inception, the majority of the exhibits are about its very recent history in underwater minesweeping, other PKO, and humanitarian operations. The Showa Museum (Showakan), the official museum of the Japanese Emperor during WWII, (and coincidentally, just a 15-minute walk from the Yasukuni Shrine) downplays the emperor’s role in colonialism and emphasizes the suffering of people during the war, the difficulty of recovery, and Japan’s rise as a global power. Its dark history is hinted at but rarely critically engaged. For many museums, and Japan’s antimilitarism in general, war is decontextualized and simplified. In doing so, Japan deflects blame from itself and cultivates an easy-to-digest and popular antimilitarism that closely resembles pacifism. These museums therefore propagate a powerful and appealing message among the youth and general population that ultimately has significant influence on policymakers.

Delving into the 1% Spending Cap
As discussed in the Chapter Three, Japan’s defense budget has been significantly constrained by the weak economy and declining population. Due to the declining population, increased competition from abroad, and two decades of limited economic growth, the government has had difficulty increasing the defense budget. Norms have also played a role in limiting the defense budget, and thus steps towards militarization. For almost the entirety of the existence of the JSDF, the government has had a self-imposed restraint of 1% of the GDP cap on the defense budget. Recently, in 2011 and 2012, the defense budget increased to over 1%, at 1.01; Japan critics call attention to a “record setting” 2014 defense budget under the hawkish Abe
administration (Panda 2015). This would be the third consecutive year of a budget increase. Colonel Craig Agena argues, the MOD Defense Budget increases led to “unrealistic expectations,” such as acquisition of the F-35, Global Hawk, Osprey, and AEGIS and F-15 upgrades, Global Hawk, Osprey, F-15 Upgrades, or in other words, “a Christmas wish-list” (Author’s Interview via E-mail, August 2015, Tokyo, Japan). However, Agena contends the MOD was “forced to prioritize, because if you want a little of everything, you end up with nothing.”

However, Japan’s defense spending is rather unspectacular. First, taking into account the weakening yen the 2014 defense budget was less than in preceding years. Second, the government requested a record overall budget, so the modest increase was in line with a general trend of increased spending to stimulate the economy. Third, it is unclear how sustainable continued increases are. Japan is paying for much of the budget increase with a recent 3% tax hike, but the economy has slowed and the second phase of the tax hike (an additional 2%) has been cancelled. Fourth, in the context of East Asia, it is clear that Japan is not increasing its spending in relation to threats, and is actually spending less.
As illustrated in Figure 4.4, compared to East Asia countries, that neorealists would cite as Japan’s primary threat, Japan spends far less as a percent of GDP. The self-imposed 1% of GDP spending limit dropped as low as .07% in 2008. What Japan spends on defense is heavily tied to the size of the economy not regional threats. As the population declines, the economy should contract, further limiting defense spending. As a percentage of the GDP, China spends double that of Japan and has a much larger and faster growing economy. Russia has dedicated more to military spending recently and is moving towards dedicating 5% of its GDP to the military.
How much a state dedicates to its military compared to other commitments can reveal what government leaders prioritize. As a share of government spending, Japanese defense expenditures took up 2.8% of the budget in the 80s, and have dropped to a historic low of 2.5% over the last five years. Compared to other states, the insignificance of Japanese defense expenditures is even more apparent. For small countries with conscription like South Korea and Taiwan, defense expenditures as a share of government spending is 10% or above, and as high as 25% for Taiwan in 1988. China, the second largest economy in the world, dedicates 7.3% of the budget to the military.
In absolute terms, Japan has traditionally spent a lot on defense, but the cost of labor in the JSDF is high because it is an all-volunteer force, Japan contributes to maintaining the US bases, and since Japan lacks a strong military-industrial-complex, its outlays are high. Moreover, half of the Japan’s defense budget is for non-military expenses: such as salaries, insurance, base maintenance, and forced early retirements. The JSDF is not very cost effective. More importantly, Japan’s spending is not directly tied to threats. China, normally cited as its biggest threat, has far outspent Japan. In 2006 and 2007, Japan’s budget continued to shrink while China’s grew. As of 2014, China spends over $150 billion, five times as much as Japan on defense. In 2007, Russia overtook Japan and is likely to double Japan’s defense spending in the next decade.
In year-to-year growth percentages, Japan’s record setting budget increases are even less impressive. Russia’s defense spending has seen the most fluctuation, due to political instability since the Cold War and its heavy reliance on oil as an economic driver. Nevertheless, Russia has maintained an average of 13% growth over the last 25 years. China has maintained the highest average in year-to-year budget increases at 14%. In the last three years, in USD, Japan’s budget decreased 1%, 19%, and 6%. Since 1988, Japan has had the second lowest year-to-year growth at 3%, behind South Korea’s 6% and ahead of Taiwan’s 2%.
Japan’s unwillingness to match its rivals in defense spending is most apparent in its share of defense spending in East Asia. In the 1970s Japan’s defense expenditures increased significantly due to the amazing growth of its “miracle economy.” Yet, between 1970-1980 Japan’s GDP increased five times over, from 200 billion to 1 trillion, while military expenditures only increased from 2 billion to 22 billion (McIntosh 1986, 121). Japan’s dominance of the region peaked between 1991 and 2001 when Japan’s share was 10% more than the next highest spender. Between 1989 and 2000, Japan possessed a 40% share of the region’s defense spending, mostly caused by the fall of the Soviet Union and not a massive increase in Japanese defense spending. Moreover, beginning in 1991 Japan adopted its first PKO missions, which can explain why defense expenditures remained stable. Beginning in 2002, Japan’s share of regional spending declined to 37% while China’s share increased to 30%. This is notable because this shift occurred during Prime Minister Koizumi’s term, an era remembered as the beginning of a rise in Japanese nationalism and increased commitment to the Japan-US Alliance. By 2005, China overtook Japan in share of regional spending and two years later, Russia followed. For 16...
straight years Japan’s share of regional spending has dropped and currently sits at 11%, 2% above South Korea and far below Russia’s 22% and China’s 55%.

For decades, Japan has had much more capital available to invest in the military, but has chosen not do so. This contradicts realist expectations that potential threats such as a belligerent North Korea, a rising China, and international terrorism would lead to militarization and balancing behavior. This should be especially surprising to realists because Japan has had a string of conservative prime ministers who dedicated much energy to increasing Japan’s security responsibilities. Due to the many constraints and restraints on Japanese militarism, Japan has consistently maintained tempered levels of military spending despite the emergence of new threats.

**Antimilitarism Laws and Principles**

Japan’s “Peace Constitution” is the most enduring symbol of Japanese antimilitarism, yet its origins were not very Japanese or antimilitarist. It was written by Americans who sought to demilitarize Japan and engrain democracy. To accomplish these goals, Article 9 waived Japan’s right to the use of force in settling international disputes and has defined Japanese foreign policy since its inception in 1947. According to one LDP parliamentarian, Article 9 “influences discussion of defense all the time and it will continue to influence all discussions” (Author’s Interview, September 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Although the US was an occupying force, the constitution’s drafters understood it was important to have Japanese input and final ratification. Some conservatives still contend that the constitution should be amended to better encompass Japan’s principles, and at least more accurately reflect the Japanese language. Despite their objections, the Constitution has withstood amendment attempts. Richard Samuels (2008) explored the politicking behind the endurance of Article 9 and argues it is preserved because
Conservatives gave the Leftist opposition periodic guarantees to protect the peace clause. This allowed pragmatic conservative to accomplish other goals, such as economic growth (38). For many early Japanese leaders, the pacifistic interpretation of the constitution had more to do with economic goals than a rejection of violence.

However, this strategy did make pacifistic ideals central to Japanese foreign policy in practice. Over time, several complementary policies, laws, and policy statements came into existence to supplement and clarify what the “Peace Constitution” entailed. The most famous of these are the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the arms export bans (discussed in Chapter Three). Ratified in 1971, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles state that Japan shall not possess, manufacture or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons in its territories. In practice, Japan has halfheartedly explored the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, but has never come close to the production of nuclear weapons or proposing legislation to do so. The Three Principles of Non-Exports (3Ps) introduced in 1967 and prevented Japan from exporting arms to countries in the Communist Bloc, countries subject to UN arms embargoes, and countries likely involved in international conflict. This ban was extended to all countries in 1976. As discussed in Chapter Three, there have been numerous exceptions to the principles including the most recent change in policy in 2014. However, the principles have always limited Japan’s arms exports to defensive purposes only, a constraint of Article 9. More constraining are the many lower level laws that prevent dual-use exports, deployment of troops, and other day-to-day activities of a “normal” state. When Japan adopts a major policy change, such as collective defense or easing of the 3Ps, the state cannot actually implement new practices until several dozen lower level laws are rewritten to ensure the constitutionality of the new measures.

To help facilitate change in Japanese security policy, conservatives have sought to amend
the constitution, but they have been met with strong resistance from fellow politicians and angry protests from the public (Hirose 2014; Japan Times 2015, June; Yoshida 2015, June). Amending the constitution is incredibly difficult, requiring two-thirds vote in the Japanese Diet and then ratification by a majority of voters in a national referendum. As a result of this onerous requirement, the Constitution of Japan is the oldest constitution in the world to not have been amended.

Some scholars have argued that changing public attitude may eventually lead to constitution revision, specifically citing an April 2004 Mainichi Shimbun poll that found 65% supported it. What they neglect is that 66% of those supporting revision did so because they felt the “Constitution did not fit the times” and because there was a “gap between the war-renouncing Article 9 and the current activities of the Self-Defense Force.” Many felt that it did not clearly outline the limits of the SDF and hoped revision would do so. Moreover, 80% of those polled believed the constitution had contributed to keeping peace and improving people’s lives since World War II (Mainichi Shimbun 2004). In the following year an April 2005 Nikkei Shimbun poll found that 29% of respondents did not support constitutional revision, and of the 29%, 47% worried that revision could change pacifism. Of the 53% that supported revision, respondents were split on the problems that needed to be fixed (civil rights issues, security, clauses on the Diet, and local autonomy concerns). In April 2010, an Asahi Shimbun poll found that only 24% of respondents wanted Article 9 amended. 67% of respondents wanted to retain the renunciation of war clause, with 70% believing Article 9 was “somewhat useful” or “useful” for the peace of Japan and stability of East Asia.

The public is also not receptive of reinterpretation to the constitution, a strategy Abe has used to bypass the amendment process and introduce collective self-defense. According to an
April 2014 Asahi Shimbun Regular Public Opinion Poll, of those surveyed, 27% supported a reinterpretation and 56% opposed. This right to collective self-defense would allow Japan to protect an ally, such as the US. Moreover, this can only be undertaken when the ally is defending Japan and caught in a crisis, for example if a US ship has been sunk by a North Korean torpedo and requires a MSDF to lend rear support. Even with these stringent conditions, Japanese are concerned they will be drawn into unnecessary and protracted conflicts. A May 2014 Asahi Shimbun Regular Opinion Poll found that 50% of those polled believed Abe’s security bills would likely increase conflict and 75% Japan would be brought into an ally’s conflict. Public apprehension has remained strong well into 2015. A May 2015 Asahi Shimbun Regular Opinion Poll revealed that although 45% of those polled support the Abe cabinet (32% oppose), only 33% support Abe’s bills permitting the use of collective self-defense (43% oppose). The public is extremely distrustful of Abe’s claims that Japan will not get caught up in a US war, with only 19% agreeing and 68% disagreeing.

The durability of the constitution has allowed peace groups to develop their own interpretation of it. Article 9 has evolved from strategy of curtailing Japanese militarism, to a supplement of economic growth, to a way of conducting “Japanese” foreign policy, to a “peace” identity, and finally an exemplar of Japanese modernity and lasting contribution to the international community. Mayor Taue argues, “The origin of the principle of peace in the Japanese Constitution that was established after the war is based on the experience of the atomic bomb that caused devastation and claiming the lives of many citizens. I believe that this principle enabled us to gain trust as a Pacifist country in the international society” (Author’s Interview, July 2014, Nagasaki, Japan). The belief is that Japan’s “Peace Constitution” is more than a convenient way to avoid conflict, but a standard for democracy, human rights, and
pacifism. Many Japanese consider the constitution “national treasure.” A 2008 Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that of the 43% of respondents who did not want a constitutional revision to the renunciation of belligerency clause, 42.7% believed it was entrenched among the people and 52.5% believed the peace constitution could be “boasted to the world” (Yomiuri Shimbun, March 2008).

Conclusion
Contemporary Japanese antimilitarism is as much as product of the early post-war period as it is a product of the present. Article 9, Yoshida Doctrine, Fukuda Doctrine, 3Ps, and the many complementary laws were originally self-imposed restraints. Over time, thousands of policymakers and activists worked to turn those restraints into constraints that bind future attempts at militarism. The various institutions that resulted form the environment that influences policymakers today and informs the Japanese of tomorrow. When the political and normative restraints are combined with the material constraints (Chapter Three), antimilitarism becomes truly path-dependent. Major shocks to Japanese security, such as a terrorist attack or North Korean missile attack on the main islands could dislodge the antimilitarism norm, but negative critical reactions due to things such as the Vietnam War, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks on civilians, in reaction to the slightest “normalization” policies, have been much more prevalent. When Japan’s security is threatened, the public does not push for militarization but the exact opposite out of fear that opportunists would highjack the country as it did in the Imperial Era. Such negative feedback cycles can reinforce antimilitarism norms. When conservatives seek to push Japan towards security normalization, the public has tended to act as a natural balance. Due to this highly constraining environment, “defense policy has been forced to develop almost surreptitiously, through a process of what is called kiseijijitsu no tsumiage, or the
accumulation of *faits-accomplis*. Whenever there is a consensus between the right idealists and the centrists that something must be done to improve national security, changes in policy are made quietly and with a minimum of public debate. Simultaneously, with every new defense initiative, new safeguards have been placed upon the armed forces (commonly referred to as *hadome*, or breaks) (Berger 1993, 142). According to Tomohiko Satake, research fellow at NIDS, Japanese security laws tend to incrementally change according to need, only to be quickly pulled back and justified under antimilitarism principles (Author’s Interview, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan). The law does not go into practice until proper policy adjustments are made and adequately justified to the public.

This dissertation has argued that Japanese militarism is constrained and restrained. However, Japanese security has surely changed in the past 20 years due to external forces. How have Japanese negotiated and justified these changes in light of its domestic antimilitarism attitudes? And what new policies have been adopted given the difficulty in changing Japanese security policy? The fifth and final chapter contends that Japan has adopted new missions to better cooperate with the US and international community to address new non-state threats of the 21st century, namely piracy, terrorism, and natural disasters.
Chapter Five: A New Mission: Militarism, Peace, and Security

Since the end of the isolationist policies of the Tokugawa Era, Japan has sought to find its rightful place in the international community (Harootunian 2000; Iriye 1992). During the Meiji Era, Japan adopted a “rich country, strong army” doctrine that utilized the military to secure its sovereignty and extend its power in East Asia. Following decades of failure to be treated as an equal power by the West, Japan embarked on a destructive mission to place itself on top of the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The many atrocities it committed during the early 20th century continue to affect its international standing today. Following its absolute destruction at the end of WWII, Japan pursued a strategy of gaining international primacy through economic strength (Huntington 1993). Although the “Peace Constitution” limited Japan’s security contributions to the international community, Japanese still desired “to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth” (Constitution of Japan). The means of gaining prestige have changed over time, but the ends have remained the same. In each of these eras, the government aimed to strike a balance among preserving Japan’s unique identity, adapting to international norms, countering threats, and making a meaningful contribution to the global community. In each period Japan stumbled before it was able to achieve a coherent and effective foreign policy.

In the post-Cold War Era, Japan again finds itself trying to find its proper place in the world – a world that prioritizes military contributions in tackling the threats of terrorism, rogue states, state collapse, and environmental catastrophe. However, as discussed in previous chapters, social-structural, technical, political, and normative constraints and restraints on the SDF make it difficult for politicians to quickly acquiesce to demands of the international
community. If the government is able to overcome the demographic, budgetary, and technical hurdles, it still must ensure that the JSDF engages only in international activities that are compatible with the ethics of Japan’s antimilitarism environment.

Norms not only constrain, they also compel - and Japan’s contributions have been influenced by an emerging humanitarian-based intervention norm. Since the early 1990s, Japan’s security contributions to the international community have primarily been in the areas of UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations (PKO) and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions. The humanitarian intervention norm has not only complemented, but augmented Japanese post-war identity. According to Bhubhindar Singh (2008), identity refers to “what a state is and what it aspires to be” (305). Japan seeks recognition as a unique state that can contribute to the international community through pacifism.

Although its security policy is fundamentally defense-oriented, Japan has gradually become more receptive to contributing JSDF personnel to UN missions to protect human security. However, the extent of Japan’s commitments is reflective of its view on the use of force in achieving its objectives. Unlike most states that are willing to use as much force that is necessary for success, Japanese antimilitarism limit the use of force to the absolute minimum. Japan is practicing a “minimal-use” type of militarism that prioritizes defense at home and human security abroad. Japanese believe that the use of force is only a short-term tool and meaningful human security can only be achieved through long-term economic development and democracy.

This concluding chapter investigates contemporary Japanese security policy and proceeds as follows. First, I examine Japan’s contribution to the rising global norm of humanitarian intervention, specifically the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Second, I discuss Japan’s PKO
and HA/DR missions. These missions have allowed Japan to utilize the JSDF beyond self-defense, contribute to international peace, and reinforce the nation’s peace identity. Moreover, I elaborate on how Japanese Official Development Aid (ODA) has become increasingly important to contemporary Japanese security policy. Within the past few years, ODA has been restructured to target specific problems that have increased instability in the international community. Third, I analyze the changing Japan-US Alliance. Japan seeks to rebalance the alliance so that the US does not take on all the risks while Japan endures the social costs. By increasing combined and joint operations, the MOD hopes to provide the JSDF more robust and independent capabilities. Fourth, I conclude the dissertation with a discussion of scope conditions and further research questions.

*Localizing a Global Norm*

Interstate relations have become increasingly complex. The interaction among states is no longer limited to solely trade and war, but now includes bilateral and multilateral cooperation to address non-state threats such as terrorism and existential threats such as natural disasters and poverty. States are as concerned with problem solving as they are with power balancing. Increased cooperation among states has also led to the erosion of traditional notions of state sovereignty. States are increasingly pressured to uphold human rights to justify their existence in the international community. The concern for human rights is the result of the expansion of the concept of security, which now includes gender rights, freedom, equality, development, and sustainability. These non-traditional security matters are also known as human security.

According to Kaoru Kurusu and Rikki Kersten (2011), Japan was “one of the first countries to take up the concept of human security” (115). Beginning in the late 1990s, Japan helped create, propagate, and disseminate the human security norm abroad while simultaneously
implementing human security via specific policy guidelines (Kurusu and Kersten 2011, 115-116). To promote human security, Japanese foreign policy has utilized ODA and multilateral and bilateral relations. Japanese security policy is also designed to promote human security via the Japan-US Alliance and regional security agreements. The concept of human security is attractive in the post-war antimilitarism environment because it allows Japan to contribute to the international community without an overreliance on the use of force. Many Japanese attribute their post-war success to the low-cost military posture of the Yoshida Doctrine. For example, in the Abe Cabinet’s decision to increase the capabilities of the JSDF, the Cabinet cited “adhering to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles” and “continuous efforts of its people” as the reasons why “Japan has flourished as an economic power” and is able to build “a stable and affluent livelihood” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, July). It was human development and economic growth that allowed Japan to rise from the ashes of war and become a major power in the international community. Thus, Japan’s human security contributions also call attention to its amazing development over the past seven decades.

However, before the concept of human security was crystalized, Japan did not have a coherent foreign policy in regard to contributing to the international community. Following WWII, its international contributions were limited to trade agreements, participation in international organizations, and ODA, all of which benefited the Japanese economy. Many believed that the nation’s economic might and participation in international non-military activities made Japan a respected member of the global community, but his belief was misplaced. According to historian Akira Iriye (1997) Japan’s foreign policy had failed to articulate clearly
“how it proposes to behave in the world, beyond pursuing its own security goals and economic interests. The nation has not made a notable contribution to the international order. Its foreign affairs have been devoid of a sense of purpose” (188). This lack of direction materialized into tangible problems for the Japanese when they faced intense criticism from the international community during the early 90s. Since 1954, Japan’s foreign policy had consisted of the strategic use of ODA (Arase 1995) and accordingly, it adopted “checkbook” diplomacy during the First Gulf War. Although Japan was the largest contributor to the war effort, totaling 13 billion dollars, many argued its efforts were “too little too late” (Cooney 2007, 36). Japan’s poor standing in the international arena was perfectly summarized when Kuwait commissioned an official mural depicting the flags of the Allied Forces as a sign of gratitude and Japan’s flag was omitted. Whereas it was nationalistic militarism that failed Japan during World War II, Japan embarrassingly discovered that it was passive “checkbook” diplomacy would not warrant the respect of the international community in the post Cold-War Era.

Criticisms of Japan for not making a human contribution to the war effort illustrate that a normative premium on conventional military support and traditional methods of obtaining security had emerged. The prized international currency was blood, not money. Although Japanese financed 20 percent of the total cost of the war, and made it transparent that they felt underappreciated for their aid, the international community argued that Japan needed to play not just a greater role, but a different role as well (Wan 2001). Japan was still not a fully accepted and embraced member of the international community because the “general complaint about Japan concern[ed] the insularity of its outlook – an outlook that tend[ed] to confine itself to narrow national concerns without taking into account the broader international perspective” (Hane 1992, 410). The Gulf War was not an expansionist campaign that required commitment
from an ally; it was an international undertaking to stop a belligerent spoiler that required help from a member. Many of the emerging threats in the world, such as environmental disasters, terrorism, and cyber attacks has made every state a responsible stakeholder and each state is expected to contribute its fair share. According to Singh (2008), “The sum effect of the Persian Gulf Crisis illustrated to Japanese policy makers that any expansion of Japan’s international contribution beyond its minimalist economic strategy will come in the area of military-strategic affairs, especially in terms of military manpower contribution to international efforts” (313).

For decades, Japanese leaders have dwelled on and sought to rectify Japan’s “failure.” In a speech presented at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy, Senior Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Yasuhsia Shiozaki (2006) confessed that Japan’s omission from the Kuwait mural was a “painful experience.” This “painful experience” also prompted influential politician Ichiro Ozawa to raise the issue that Japan was an “abnormal country” due to its inability to act when called upon by the international community. Ozawa argued that a “normal country” must be willing to shoulder the responsibilities of the international community and cooperate fully with other nations to “build prosperous stable lives for their people” (Ozawa 1993, 94-95). Moreover, Ozawa maintained that domestic politics were no excuse for Japan to recuse itself from these responsibilities and Japanese should be eager to contribute to the international community without the need for international pressure (Ozawa 1993, 94-95). This sentiment was prevalent among political elites. During Prime Minister Yashiro Nakasone’s tenure, he sought to revise the constitution in order to change Japan from a “peace nation” to a “normal nation” (Matthews 1993, 5). Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who was one of the more successful leaders in Japanese history, routinely argued that Japan “must fulfill a constructive role as a member of the global community” (Koizumi 2001, May). Koizumi sought to utilize the
“Peace Constitution” to justify Japan playing a greater role in the international community. In a General Policy Speech to the 164th Session of the Diet, Koizumi stated, “In keeping close to the heart this spirit of the Preamble of our Constitution, Japan has upheld freedom and democracy” and “we [Japanese] will continue to contribute to the peace and stability of the world, resolutely maintaining our principle of resolving all matters not by force, with the Japan-US alliance and international cooperation as the basic principles of our foreign policy” (Koizumi 2006, January). Following the logic of upholding freedom and democracy, Koizumi was one of the biggest supporters in the US War on Terror. Expending significant political capital, Koizumi dispatched the JSDF for refueling missions in Afghanistan. Following the withdrawal of JSDF from the Indian Ocean after more than nine years, Japan provided further financial contributions to Afghanistan. Minister of Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura attributed MSDF activities in the Middle East to being “a responsible member of the international community” (Machimura 2007, September). Machimura’s successor, Masahiko Koumura reiterated the need for Japan to “play a responsible role in the international community as a ‘peace fostering nation’” and to “free individuals from fear and poverty (Koumura 2008, January). During the same year, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda promised to “carry forward a diplomacy which contributes to world peace, so that Japan will realize its responsibilities commensurate with its national strength in the international community, and become a country which is relied upon internationally” (Fukuda 2008, January). Throughout Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s first term, he promoted the idea of a “beautiful Japan” where the people could be proud of the nation and Japan would be a respected member of the international community. Abe has zealously pushed for Japan to be “admired and respected” and a “country which is open to the world” (Abe 2007, January). In Abe’s second term, he has aggressively pushed for Japan to make a “proactive contribution to peace.” In a
policy speech to the 187th Session of the Diet, Abe proclaimed “Japan will make even greater contributions than ever to world peace and stability, working hand-in-hand with the United States and other countries with which we share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law” (Abe 2014, September).

After the Gulf War crisis, the government overcame significant legal, normative and political hurdles and passed the UN Peace Cooperation Bill, which allowed Japan to participate in UN-sanctioned PKOs, albeit with limitations on the use of force (Cooney 2002, 41-42; Shiozaki 2006). The PKO Law outlined five strict conditions under which the JSDF could be dispatched. In addition to the UN’s three PKO principles of “the existence of a ceasefire agreement, consent of the parties for deployment, and impartiality,” Japan added the conditions that “should any of the above three conditions not be met, the government of Japan may withdraw its contingent” and “the use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel” (Fukushima 2014, 3). These conditions were put in place in order to appease a public wary of using force abroad and to ensure that the JSDF would not violate the constitution. Regardless of the limitations, the PKO Law was legal gymnastics and a strict interpretation of the constitution would have prevented sending troops abroad under any conditions. The PKO Law crossed a clear bright-line and was a concession that loosened a 40-year self-imposed restraint on the JSDF. The Gulf Crisis began the process of Japan transitioning from a “peace state” to an “international state” (Singh 2008, 310).

The concession still preserved the underlying principles of Japanese antimilitarism, which was the bare minimum use of force and promotion of other means of settling disputes, while allowing the JSDF to be dispatched to UN missions. Since passing the PKO Law, Japan has dispatched approximately 9,300 personnel to 13 PKO missions and routinely is a top-2
contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget. Most of Japan’s human resource contributions have been noncombat personnel such as engineers, election monitors, educators, and medics. Japan’s initial remilitarization was not instigated by a new threat, but by admonishment from the international community for not being a team player.

Although Japan has adopted UN humanitarian missions, the domestic antimilitarism environment has prevented wholesale adoption of how human security is to be achieved. In some circumstances, military intervention may be necessary to protect a vulnerable community. In 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon outlined the responsibilities of humanitarian intervention in the report “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.” Although the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) had existed since the 1990s, it was not until recently that the UN issued a clear mandate.

In a general sense, Japan is a supporter of the R2P concept. According to Alex J. Bellamy and Sara E. Davies (2009), in the Asia-Pacific, Japan, along with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and South Korea are R2P advocates, whereas others in the region are either R2P engaged, fence-sitters, or opponents (551). R2P advocates are the group of states they are determined to “help translate the principle from words to deeds” (Bellamy and Davies 2009, 551). R2P consists of three main pillars. The first pillar states that, “Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means” (Moon 2009, 4). The second pillar states the international community must be committed to assisting states in meeting their responsibilities of pillar one. Specifically, these provisions suggest that assistance could take one of four forms: 1) encouraging states to meet their responsibilities under pillar one; 2) helping
states exercise this responsibility; 3) helping states to build their capacity to protect; and 4) assisting states “under stress before crises and conflicts break out” (Moon 2009, 15). The third pillar states that the international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to respond in a “timely and decisive manner, using Chapters VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace) and VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter as appropriate, when national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (Bellamy and Davies 2009, 550; Moon 2009).

However, R2P has been inconsistently implemented because the erosion of traditional sovereignty is a fluid process that has met with resistance from many states, especially authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the military dimension of R2P alarms states that desire to avoid the political use of force, being pulled into foreign conflicts, and exacerbating local conflicts. For many Japanese, there is a concern that the use of force would not be conducive to achieving long-term human security. Jun Honna (2012) argues that the divisions in Japan regarding R2P can be clustered in four main groups. Conservatives, epitomized by figures such as Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, contend the use of force is not compatible with Japan’s view of security. Revisionists on the other hand believe that R2P provides the window of opportunity for military growth (Honna 2012, 98). Revisionists do not have much support within the government or among the public due to fears that they are stretching the limits of the constitution. Liberals embrace a view that "reverberates in Japan’s vibrant security discourse” and they “wish to preserve the Peace Constitution, and rollback defense guidelines that appear to flout the letter and spirit of Article 9” (Honna 2012, 100). Honna contends that “Liberals are leery of Japan’s implementation of R2P, because they have concerns about R2P’s uncertain
status under international law and the potential for politically ‘instrumentalizing’ the doctrine to legitimize interventions not strictly within its ostensible remit. However, these concerns are presented as ‘practical’ problems that should be overcome – rather than as critical reasons for rejecting R2P” (Honna 2012, 100). Lastly, peace activists, reflecting the voice of the global anti-neoliberal network, are most resistant to the idea of R2P and argue that R2P, which highlights the ‘state failure’ to protect populations, obscures ‘international’ causes of ‘state failure’ and the resulting violent conflicts in the Global South” (Honna 2012, 100).

Japan is not fully committed to the military dimensions of R2P because its conceptions of security are more holistic, focusing on “freedom from want” as much, or even more so than “freedom from fear.” In December 1998, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi outlined Japan’s broad interpretation of human security and embraced “both freedom from fear (in such manifestations as conflict, terrorism, landmines, small arms, and human trafficking) and freedom from want (including currency crises, natural disasters, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, and poverty)” (Fukushima 2014, 4). This approach to security targets the underlying causes of insecurity, such as environmental degradation, inequality, and lack of development. Accordingly, Japan is one of the biggest contributors to and promoters of development through institutions such as the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFS), donating $390 million as of October 2013 (Fukushima 2014, 3). Moreover, while Japan was initially the sole donor, Japan has persuaded other UN member states such as Slovenia, Thailand, Greece, and Mexico to contribute to the fund – thus taking on a leadership role in ODA (Fukushima 2014, 5).

Although the Gulf War crises compelled Japan to make a human contribution to international security efforts, its prefers to utilize financial resources and diplomacy, specifically ODA to address human security issues. The MOD considers ODA and humanitarian efforts to
be “two wheels of the same shaft” in the nation’s pursuit of international security (Defense of Japan White Paper 2005, 55). ODA has served several functions: 1) it allowed Japanese companies to develop, 2) it developed other countries, which created dependable trade partners, 3) it was a form of reparations to East Asia, 4) it was humanitarian, and 5) it fulfilled Japan’s emphasis on human security and tackling problems before they became unmanageable.

ODA was not always targeted on human security issues. Between the late-1940s and 1970s, most donors were OECD countries (and Russia) and most recipients were war-torn European counties (and Japan). The second wave of ODA targeted colonial territories and developing countries. Initially, ODA was highly political and reflected the politics of the Cold War. However, as the Cold War ended in the 1980s, non-state entities such as OPEC and NGOs began to contribute ODA as well, focusing mainly on low-income countries. The purpose of post-Cold War ODA was to encourage economic development, reduce poverty, protect human rights and gender equality, nation build, prevent state collapse, mitigate conflict, eradicate disease, and manage and prevent natural and man-made disasters. Over time, the use of ODA became less political, more sophisticated, and much more surgical. The terms of ODA increasingly outlined clear performance goals in order to ensure a “return” and prevent misuse.

Japan has routinely been a top-3 donor among OECD countries since it implemented ODA in 1955 (OECD 2015). Between 1990 and 2000, Japan was the world’s number-one ODA donor and as of 2014, Japan has provided 313.4 billion dollars in assistance packages to 190 countries/regions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). In addition to financial assistance, Japan has promoted human resources development and technology transfer and has dispatched and received over 190,000 trainees, experts, research teams, and cooperation volunteers between 2000 and 2012 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2014).
In recent years, the government has sought to make the use of ODA more effective. In 2015, the ODA Charter was renamed to the Development Cooperation Charter to emphasize the new strategic logic of ODA. The philosophy of the Development Cooperation Charter states that “as peace-loving nation,” Japan must “contribute to the world through cooperation for non-military purposes” with a focus on human security, equal partnership with developing countries, and public-private partnerships with local governments and NGOs (Development Cooperation Charter). The latter two clauses in the philosophy are meant to ensure that recipients are responsible with the aid they receive. In line with Japan’s human security goals, the Development Cooperation Charter promotes “universal values” in order to achieve rule of law, good governance, human rights, democratization, peace building, capacity building of law enforcement, anti-terrorism, and promotion of women’s rights (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015, February). Moreover, the new aid charter allows Japan to provide aid to a recipient country’s military forces as long as it is not for military purposes. In order to ensure that the aid does not contribute to military conflict purposes, the government considers aid on case-by-case basis, “assessing the objectives, recipients, activities and possible impact, as well as the development needs of the country or region” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March).

The changes in the ODA Charter reflect Japan’s difficulties in meeting the needs of the international community. According to Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano (2011):

since 1998 “human security policies played an important role for successive Japanese governments to establish a distinct identity in international relations. Japan has adopted an extremely broad view of human security that ‘comprehensively covers all menaces that threaten the survival, daily life and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront these threats’. In essence, the two components of the concept, ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’, have become separated in the Japanese policy discourse, with a very clear preference for implementing aspects related to ‘the freedom from want’ rather than ‘the freedom from fear’ which is underlying R2P” (216).

The government and public are mostly in agreement on playing a larger role in the international community. This larger role involves dispatching JSDF personnel as long as the mission
promotes human security and does not contribute to military conflict. Moreover, although Japan’s reliance on ODA-diplomacy was admonished in the past, it is still an important tool for promoting human security and R2P. According to Honna (2012), “Japan’s concern about R2P focuses on how it meshes with human security, the country’s core diplomatic policy. As the second largest contributor to the UN budget, Japan is expected to play a role in implementing R2P and thus it is crucial to understand the prospects for synchronizing R2P with human security doctrine and practice” (96). Seeking to synchronize R2P and human security in practice, Japan has modified its ODA charter to better assist foreign military forces as long as the mission is humanitarian in nature. Thus, Japan is militarizing only in the sense of increasing the use of the JSDF. The use of the JSDF however is relegated to decidedly non-militaristic tasks.

How much R2P and how to implement it in Japanese foreign policy is still hotly contested, and the material and normative constraints involved will prevent rapid wholesale adoption of the global humanitarian intervention norm. Amitav Acharya (2004) has argued that global norms are better received when they are localized to better match the local domestic ethics. In the immediate future, hawkish leaders will seek to apply international pressure on Japan to play a greater role in the global community. The JSDF will gradually adopt greater responsibilities, but they will be limited to missions that promote “universal values” while upholding the “peace constitution.” However, these missions will become increasingly risky as states further commit to the R2P concept. Many of the “freedom from want” problems that Japan prioritizes, such as “economic decline, climate change, infectious diseases, poverty, to refugee assistance” have increasingly been linked to post conflict peace-building (Kurusu and Kersten 2011). Prantl and Nakano (2011) summarize the result of Japan’s internal debate on security best, concluding that “Japan’s human security policies created the political space for
gaining global influence without revising the 1947 peace constitution. Tokyo has fully embraced human security as a policy it can develop independently and as an alternative means to humanitarian intervention for cultivating influence” (217).

Abe’s Proactive Peace
The human security and R2P concepts have given Japan a sense of mission in international relations, but due to the public’s aversion to the use of force, Japanese leaders have been unable to construct a coherent security doctrine. The public supports the idea of Japan protecting universal values and vulnerable communities, but have been unsure to what degree are they willing to do so. Tetsuo Kotani refers to the public’s reluctance to support increased international responsibilities for Japan as “one-nation pacifism,” a belief that Japan is “separated from the region and the world” (Author’s Interview, August 2015, Tokyo, Japan). This uncertainty has vexed Japan’s allies and leaders in the international community. Prime Minister Abe has sought to rectify this problem and clarify the extent of Japan’s commitment to the international community.

Abe is the most traveled Prime Minister in Japanese history, having visited 49 countries on a global tour to promote his vision of a “first-rate” Japan (Panda 2014). Moreover, hoping to bring leaders together behind his vision for Japan, Abe has held over 200 summit meetings. Specifically, Abe has promoted a foreign policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace.” Scholars and the media have focused primarily on the military implications, but it is important to recognize that ODA and diplomacy are equally as significant.

Abe’s Proactive Contribution to Peace is part of a broader security doctrine comprised of six main points: 1) a systematic approach towards national security policy; 2) a National Security Strategy (NSS) with Proactive Contribution to Peace as its key concept; 3) a Dynamic Joint
Defense Force as the goal in the defense buildup; 4) a seamless response to “gray zone” events as an operational concept; 5) reconstruction of the legal basis for security; and 6) serious consideration of the trends in the regional security environment represented by the US rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region and China’s rise (Yamaguchi 2014, 1).

Each of these points aims to make Japanese security policy coherent and consistent. In doing so, Japan can more effectively communicate with its allies, reassure neighbors, and tackle human security problems. Up until the introduction of the NSS in December 2013, Japanese security policy was following the 1957 Basic Policy on National Defense. The half-page policy statement stipulated that the “objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, and thereby to safeguard the independence and peace of Japan based on democracy” (Fukushima 2014, 1). The statement cites four specific policies to achieve this objective, namely “(1) supporting the United Nations, (2) nurturing patriotism, (3) building up national defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, and (4) maintaining security relations with the United States until the UN becomes capable of maintaining international security” (Fukushima 2014, 1).

Yet, as the world became increasingly interconnected and threats complex, the Basic Policy on National Defense proved insufficient. For example, within the past few years, Japanese civilians have been kidnapped and killed in Algeria and Syria, but the Basic Policy outlines no mechanism to protect Japanese while abroad (BBC 2013; Nordland 2015). Additionally, non-traditional security threats such as hacking are difficult to attribute to an aggressor country and cannot be stopped alone. When Sony was hacked in 2014, many experts believed that the origin was North Korea (NPR 2015). The FBI was able to connect North Korea to the attack because it did not adequately mask its movement through proxy servers around the
world (Greenberg 2015). In most cases, a cyber crime will cross borders and lines of jurisdiction, thus requiring a multinational response involving public and private actors. The nature of security had evolved while Japanese security policy remained fixed. Threats such as cybercrime, terrorism, and piracy have made one’s security deeply interconnected with the security of others. No nation is an island, not even Japan. In promoting the Proactive Contribution to Peace, Abe has maintained that Japan would “never, ever change” its over 60 years “path as a peace-loving nation” and the “principle of a peace-loving nation set forth in the Constitution of Japan is something we should be proud of within the international community” (Abe 2014, October). But following the logic that Japan’s peace is connected to the world community, Abe argues that Japan’s “inward-focused ‘one-country pacifism’” cannot be regarded as “truly pursuing peace” (Abe 2014, October).

Japan’s first national security strategy outlines the underlying logic of the Proactive Contribution to Peace. The NSS is based on the principles of international cooperation to address the changing security environment. Beyond security of the state, Japan’s national interests and security objectives include improving the “global security environment and build[ing] a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal value and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions” (National Security Strategy 2013, 18).

Scholars routinely cite the rise of China and North Korea as reasons for Japan’s remilitarization. These two issues have increasingly troubled Japanese leaders and have appeared more frequently in government White Papers and the NSS. However, these issues are only two of the six security concerns of the government, which also include the threat of
international terrorism, risks to global commons, challenges to human security, and risks to the
global economy (National Security Strategy 2013, 5-6). Moreover, the rise of China is not just a
security threat. The NSS states that China is greatly affecting global governance, but China’s
rise in itself is not the problem. Japanese leaders have signaled that the peaceful rise of China
would be good for the region and Japan hopes that China will “play a more active role for
regional and global issues” (National Security Strategy 2013, 6). Moreover, the NSS has a
section dedicated to building stable relations with China, specifically seeking to construct and
enhance relations in the medium-to-long-term and establishing a framework to avert crises.
China’s actions concerning the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea have led to some
changes in the structure of the JSDF, such as reorganization of some brigades and the
repositioning of troops. However, the changes have remained defensive in nature and have not
fundamentally altered the orientation of Japanese security policy.

In the NSS, the problem of North Korea is couched in a general concern for the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other related materials. Until Japan obtains
nuclear weapons, there are few security policies that it can pursue that would give it a credible
deterrent vis-à-vis North Korea. As a result, Japan has utilized bilateral and multilateral
negotiations to try to denuclearize North Korea and address other security problems, such as the
abduction issue.

The clear policy objectives in the NSS will make it easier for the MOD to construct
consistent security policies. Colonel Noboru Yamaguchi (2014), currently a professor at the
National Defense Academy, succinctly outlines the difference between the old and new security
strategies in the following statement:

“In the past, planners working on NDPGs had to surmise what a national security strategy
would describe. While the newly developed NSS may suffer from being just the first of its
kind, it provides the defense strategy and policy with a broader context within which defense
planners along with those working on diplomatic, economic, and other aspects of national security will be able to comprehend the role of defense in national security as a whole. This change in the process of developing defense strategy and policy will ensure that they are consonant with all other aspects of Japan’s security strategy such as those on diplomacy, commerce, and trade, while fitting precisely into a broader picture of NSS” (3).

Accordingly, in 2013 the Abe administration established the National Security Council (NSC) in order to create centralized, cohesive, and efficient security planning among defense related agencies (Defense of Japan Annual White Paper 2013). Due to Japan’s limited experience in security matters abroad, it lacks established strategies in dealing with emerging threats. Beyond creating new security related positions such as National Security Advisor, the NSC holds 4-Minister Meetings (4MM) which aim to “sharpen the focus of discussions at the NSC and allow the prime minister and his top advisors to more efficiently direct foreign and defense policies regarding national security” as well as increase coordination with Japan’s allies (Miller 2014). For 70 years, Japan has operated without an apparatus to deal with “gray zone” scenarios and security crises.69 Through the NSS and NSC, the government hopes to finally professionalize its approach to security to deal with these emerging threats.

69 “Gray zone” scenarios are “situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests.” (National Security Strategy 2013).
Table 5.1: Concrete Examples of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” in the National Security Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro Goals</th>
<th>Targeted Goals</th>
<th>Specific Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles</td>
<td>Proactive Contribution to International efforts for Peace and Stability in the international Community</td>
<td>*Strengthen Diplomacy at United Nations *Strengthening the Rule of Law *Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation *Promoting International Peace Cooperation *Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the Japan-US Alliance</td>
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Source: Tabled created by editing data from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014)

As outlined in Table 5.1, Abe’s Proactive Contribution to Peace concept has three broad objectives. First, the Proactive Contribution to Peace seeks to strengthen and expand Japan’s capabilities and roles. This is the most “militaristic” objective in that the JSDF will be expected to participate more in international activities concerning peace and stability. Specifically, Japan will cooperate with other states to address the problems of terrorism and proliferation. This macro goal will likely include state and capacity building in the future. As such, the first objective is equally focused on “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” issues. Second, Japan will work closely with the US in defending the homeland and tackling security problems abroad. Due to constitutional constraints, Japan will still be unable to aid the US in foreign wars or defend the US from an attack, unless the scenario is directly related to the defense of Japan. However, by working more closely with the US and updating the JSDF, Japan will gain more
responsibilities in the alliance. Overall, this is a continuation of the defense-oriented security policy of the past seven decades. Third, Japan seeks to strengthen diplomacy and security cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace. This non-military arm of Japan’s security policy emphasizes cooperation with other states to address the underlying causes of insecurity, such as environmental degradation, poverty, lack of rule of law, and lack of human rights. Nine of the ten specific measures are fundamentally not militaristic.

Abe’s Proactive Contribution to Peace provides a consistent framework for national security. According to Tomohiko Satake, security reform of the Abe government, including the approval for the right to collective self-defense, is partly to ratify what the government has already done before. Or in other words, “reality comes first, then policies adjust” (Author’s Interview, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan). Andrew Oros (2008) has called the phenomenon of the government stretching the constitution as “reach, reconcile, reassure” (34). Oros further contends that current Japanese security policy is more akin to “reach, replace, review” where the government is more willing to introduce new legislation to replace old policies without reassuring the public (34). Although correct in highlighting the elasticity of Japan’s security policy, Oros’ less charitable interpretation of new security policies ignores the many difficulties the government has when introducing new legislation and facing the hundreds of government speeches calling support of Japan’s peace values. Moreover, new security policies do not necessary mean they are qualitatively different from old policies. Jun Nishida, Deputy Director of the National Security Policy Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that the current changes in Japanese security policy ensures JSDF operability will be “seamless” and get rid of unnecessary complexity within the laws related to security measures (Author’s Interview, August 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Because the government had to pass exceptions to standing policies to
allow the JSDF engage in international operations, numerous contradictions in Japan’s legal code began to arise – making it difficult for the public, government, and bureaucrats to discern the underlying logic of Japanese security policy. The reactive approach was cumbersome and made it difficult for Japan to respond quickly to threats. When Japan was allowed take action, it was inefficient and costly. The reactive approach also increased distrust with outsiders. Japan’s actions could be misinterpreted and provoke Japan’s neighbors when they were meant to reassure. By having a comprehensive strategy, Japan can be accountable to its allies and enemies.

In a survey of the Japanese Diet, Yongwook Ryu (2007) found that current Japanese political leaders from both the LDP and DPJ overwhelmingly support a more active and assertive foreign policy and favor a leadership role in Asia and the world (85). Abe’s Proactive Contribution to Peace lays the groundwork for Japan to take on that leadership role. And as Jun Nishida argues, if Japan is to be a “tier 1” country in the world, it must contribute a lot to the world (Author’s Interview, August 2014, Tokyo, Japan). In the areas of PKO and HA/DR, Japan has unquestionably risen to the status of “tier 1.”

Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
Since the early 1990s, Japan has found its security niche in the areas of UN-sanctioned PKO and HA/DR. Humanitarian-based missions complement Japan’s prioritization of the human security concept and allow it to contribute to global security while averting criticism from its neighbors in East Asia. From 1992 to 2015, Japan has dispatched on average 168 personnel in one to five UN PKO missions at a time (however, most missions received approximately 30 personnel). Other than 1995, Japanese forces have participated in UN missions every year for two decades.

Since the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) team law was enacted in 1987 the JSDF has
conducted 13 overseas HA/DR operations (Futori 2013).\(^7\) Including minesweeping missions, activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, and anti-piracy activities, the JSDF has participated in 33 missions as of December 2013 (Ministry of Defense). Domestically and abroad, the JSDF has been dispatched for disaster relief missions more than 30,000 times (Abe 2014, October). JSDF duties have included humanitarian relief operations in Rwanda and Indonesia, transport of supplies in Iran, disaster relief in Haiti and New Zealand, and supplying engineers to maintain roads in Sudan (Futori 2013). JSDF personnel are only dispatched to areas where there are no combat activities and only with the permission of the host state. As a result of these strict conditions, the JSDF has often had to rely on protection from other military forces when in the field and is often deployed in state building missions, as opposed to peacekeeping missions.

In addition to these operations, the JSDF has been “making full use of its knowledge and experience” by “promoting its capacity building assistance activities to help military forces of developing countries to improve their capacity” (Ministry of Defense 2014). For example, in 2015, Japan and the Philippines held their first naval drills dealing with piracy and maritime security. The purpose of the drills was also training in the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which are protocols designed to “ensure the safety of vessels meeting at sea” (Parameswaran 2015). In recent years, the JSDF has regularly worked with its counterparts, holding ministerial meetings and combined training exercises annually. In comparison, during the entire Cold War, Japan’s defense ministers visited foreign countries to meet with their non-US equivalents only five times (Author’s Interview, Tomohiko Satake, February 2015, Tokyo, Japan).

\(^7\) The law was amended in 1992 to allow JSDF members to participate in overseas PKOs.
Moreover, through multilateral security frameworks such as ASEAN, Japan has worked closely with other states in disaster relief exercises. Since 2011 the MOD “has been providing capacity building assistance to other Asian countries in nontraditional security areas, including training for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief; non-combatant evacuation operations; training of coast guards for piracy control; training in peacekeeping operations focusing on infrastructure; and defense medicine. Such training and assistance can allow countries to utilize their own resources in dealing with crisis situations and can also deepen cooperation between Japan and the recipient countries, contributing to regional stability. Japan is also collaborating with Australia and others in capacity building assistance” (Fukushima 2014, 6). From 2012, the MOD has been sharing its HA/DR expertise with other militaries in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, East Timor and Cambodia. This capacity-building support program has the potential to significantly strengthen strategic bilateral relationships between the militaries of Southeast Asia and the JSDF. Japan has also “provided funds and dispatched experts to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management which was launched in 2011 in Jakarta, Indonesia” (Futori 2015). In 2007, MOFA created the Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC) to strengthen civilian capacity for peacebuilding. In 2014, the HPC in collaboration with the United Nations Volunteers (UNC) established the Program for Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding, which is a six-week course to train 30 participants (15 Japanese and 15 from other countries) in developing a career in the field of peacebuilding. Alumni of the program have gone on to work for the UN.

Japan is also a significant financer and norm driver of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and disaster relief. Between 2001 and 2011, Japan “provided approximately $55 billion in

71 Hiroshima Peace Builders Center Website. For more information on HPBC activities, see http://www.peacebuilderscenter.jp/eng/about_e.html
overseas development assistance towards international disaster related projects including technical assistance, grant-based and loan-based aid and emergency relief projects (Futori 2015). In 1998, Japan helped established the Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) in Kobe, whose mission is to enhance disaster resilience, build safe communities, and support sustainable development. Japan has also hosted all three United Nations World Conferences on Disaster Reduction, in Yokohama (1994), Kobe (2005), and Sendai (2015) respectively. Japan chaired the Kobe Conference, which resulted in the Hyogo Framework for Action. The Hyogo Framework sought to make disaster relief reduction a priority, improve risk information and early warning, educate the public on safety and resilience, reduce underlying risk factors, and strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels (Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015). The 2015 Conference in Sendai, the region that was most impacted by the Great East Japan Earthquake, produced the Sendai Framework for Disaster Relief Reduction. The Sendai Framework adopted the “Build Back Better” philosophy of making post-disaster communities more resilient and targeting underlying disaster risk, such as the consequences of poverty and inequality, climate change and variability, unplanned and rapid urbanization, poor land management and compounding factors such as demographic change, weak institutional arrangements, non-risk-informed policies, lack of regulation and incentives for private disaster risk reduction investment, complex supply chains, limited availability of technology, unsustainable uses of natural resources, declining ecosystems, pandemics and epidemics (Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, 7). Soon after the conference, Japan was one of the biggest supporters of Nepal after the April 15 Nepal Earthquake. Japan’s assistance during the Nepal earthquake showcased the militaristic and

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72 Asian Disaster Reduction Center. For more information on the ADRC, see http://www.adrc.asia/aboutus/index.php
diplomatic dimensions of Proactive Contribution to Peace. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which is under the arm of MOFA, held seminars to share Japan’s experience and knowledge of post-earthquake while the MOD dispatched over 100 JSDF personnel (JICA 2015, June; Japan Times 2015, April).

The government has also mobilized NGOs for the purposes of human security. For example, following Operation Tomodachi, which was the biggest combined (between allies) and joint (between branches within a military) mission of the JSDF, the government created the TOMODACHI Initiative to continue the spirit of the collaboration. While Operation Tomodachi ended soon after the Great East Asia Earthquake, lasting only a few months, the TOMODACHI Initiative has been going strong for three years and is gaining momentum. The initiative is a public-private partnership between United States Embassy in Tokyo and the U.S.-Japan Council and is supported by the government of Japan. The Initiative connects local governments, private actors, businesses and donors to create peace programs, education exchanges, and disaster relief, among many other programs. In its three years of existence, the initiative has experienced year-to-year growth and has sponsored 50 programs in 25 locations in Japan and the US. In total, the imitative has had over 23,000 participants (Tomodachi Initiative 2014). Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi referred to Japan’s emphasis on humanitarianism as “peace consolidation” (Kawaguchi 2003).

The JSDF’s performance in disaster relief, and specifically during the 3/11 Triple Disaster significantly improved its reputation in Japan. Surveys conducted by the Cabinet Office prior to the 2011 Tohoku relief efforts found that a combined 75.6 percent of respondents held a "neutral" to "negative" and "relatively negative" image of the JSDF (Yeo 2012-2013, 78). After the disaster, a Cabinet Office survey found that "positive" impressions of the JSDF increased
from 19.5 percent to 37.5 percent while "neutral" to "negative" and "relatively negative" decreased to 59.5 percent (Yeo 2012-2013, 78). And, in the Tohoku region, a Yomiuri Online survey found that 82 percent of respondents rated the JSDF as "positive and survey results of the three most affected areas (Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima Prefecture) show that 72.4 percent described the activities of the JSDF as their "major source of post-disaster encouragement," compared to 27.2 percent that stated the central and/or local government as such (Yeo 2012-2013, 78). More generally, according to the World Values Survey, public confidence in the armed forces has significantly increased between 1995 and 2014. For Japanese who have “Quite a Lot” of confidence in the JSDF, there was a substantial increase from 29.3% in 1981 to 54.6% in 2010 (World Values Survey 1981; 1990; 1995; 2000; 2005; 2010-2014). Moreover, during the same time period, the number of respondents who had “a great deal” of confidence in the armed forces increased from 5.8% to 12.5%.

Between PKO and HA/DR contributions, Japanese are more receptive to the apolitical natural disaster missions. According to a 2009 Cabinet Office survey, 78.4% of respondents believed the primary objected of the JSDF should be “disaster relief activities, surpassing even “national defense.” Japan is a country prone to earthquakes and tsunamis, the most notable being 3/11 Triple Disaster in 2011. As a result, Japanese have gained expertise in disaster relief and are eager to share their experience with victims of natural disasters. Moreover, since HA/DR missions do not require the use of weapons, Japanese do not have to worry about the safety of JSDF members and violating the spirit of the constitution.

Yezzi Yeo (2012) contends “Large-scale disasters are not anticipated or premeditated publicity stunts,” so they may provide “public relations opportunities for militaries if carried out successfully. This is because humanitarian/disaster relief missions are (usually) not
depicted/perceived as military or militarist in nature” (72). As discussed in previous chapters, the MOD has highlighted the peace dimensions of the JSDF, which has allowed for increased responsibilities of the defense forces. However, the strategy of utilizing “affirmative essentialisms” typecasts the JSDF in very specific roles. This typecasting is especially strong because the post-war narrative placed all the blame for Japan’s defeat on the military elite and the government’s inability to control the armed forces. Hence, the public is supportive of HA/DR missions and accepting of PKO missions, but is vigilant against militarism creep.

Singh (2008) argues that “the international-state security identity has become a permanent feature of Japan’s security discourse and it is also increasingly accepted by the larger Japanese society. This process of change is irreversible and it will gradually gain greater momentum as a result of Japan’s domestic and external environment” (318). The international environment has been conducive to change in Japanese security, and not just in terms of power balancing. The values promoted by humanitarian intervention complement Japan’s post-war narrative that it is a first-tier modern and democratic nation. In a poll conducted by the Cabinet Office of Japan (2004), 51.9% believed Japan should contribute to maintaining world peace, 16.1% believed Japan should protect universal values, and 25% believed Japan should provide humanitarian support for refugees. In the same poll, 22.2% believed Japan should participate more in PKO, 46.8% supported the missions in Cambodia, Golan Heights, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Rwanda, and only 22.1% believed Japan should have minimum or no involvement at all (Cabinet Office of Japan 2004).

However, as Yutaka Kousai (1997) forewarns, “when wars become holy wars, when their objectives are sanctified to an extreme degree, the war ceases to be a game played according to rules – it becomes total war in which all means are to be employed, even the total destruction of
the enemy” (152). Japanese may have accepted the need to play a greater role in the international community, but the domestic environment will be much more constraining than Singh predicts. According to Shinsuke Yoshimura (1997), “the end of the Pacific War has left a deep imprint on the Japanese consciousness, and one constituent of that imprint is an acute skepticism about sacrificing one’s light for lofty objectives” (156). Many in Japan think that even with just wars, “Japan’s commitment to international peacekeeping should stop short of using military force (Yoshimura 1997, 158). Moreover, Yoshimura argues that the public’s reluctance to use force “lies a deep visceral distrust of the state and particularly, a hatred of that most stark expression of state sovereignty, namely war and the deployment of military force” (156). For activists such as Tomoko Watanabe (ANT-Hiroshima), the JSDF should be able to be dispatched to deal with piracy and natural disasters, but dealing with “terrorism is tricky because one cannot know who a real terrorist is” (Author’s Interview, March 2014, Hiroshima, Japan). Watanabe’s skepticism about the neutrality of intervention is echoed by many in Japan’s peace community. Akira Kawasaki (Peace Boat) contends that piracy and PKO are too similar to military endeavors and can be used as a “stepping stone” for further militarism (Author’s Interview, May 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Masahiro Watarida believes the moment the JSDF leaves Japanese territories, even for PKOs, it would no longer be a self-defense force (Author’s Interview, August 2015, Hiroshima, Japan).

Even if the government accepts more dangerous missions, Yoshimura is skeptical that the public is even capable of joining the JSDF. Yoshimura (1997) contends that after decades of post-war pacifism, the Japanese people have “become genuinely ‘peaceful’ and “even if they recognize in principle there can be just wars, they no longer ‘have the courage’ to take up the sword of justice against those who start wars that are unjust” (158). It would be reasonable to
surmise that most people are not enthusiastic about going to far off lands to fight unknown enemies, with the only certainty being the chance one could die. For Japanese who have not fought a war in 70 years and have utilized economic development to achieve peace, the notion that using force is necessary to achieve peace is not at all commonsensical.

Recalibrating Risks and Costs: The Japan-US Alliance

On April 29, 2015 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe became the first Japanese head of state to address a joint meeting of Congress. For approximately 45 minutes, Abe spoke in English about an “Alliance of Hope” and working together to make the world a better place. Abe pledged that Japan would provide up to 2.8 billion dollars in assistance to help improve the bases in Guam and to pass new security legislation in the upcoming summer (Abe 2015, April). Moreover, Abe promised that Japan’s support for the US “rebalancing” in East Asia would be “first, last, and throughout.” In concluding the speech, Abe proclaimed that Japan has a “new self-identity,” one that will ensure that “human security will be preserved in addition to national security” and allow Japan to proactively engage the problems of terrorism, infections diseases, natural disasters, and climate change (Abe 2015, April). It seemed that after decades of pressure, Japan was finally meeting the expectations set by the US “reverse course” decades ago and was willing to play a greater part in the Japan-US Alliance. The previous day, Abe and President Barack Obama extolled the virtues of the upgraded alliance. Obama proudly stated, “together, our forces will be more flexible and better prepared to cooperate on a range of challenges, from maritime security to disaster response. Our forces will plan, train and operate been more closely. We’ll expand our cooperation, including cyber threats and in space. And Japan will take on greater roles and responsibilities in the Asia Pacific and around the world” (Obama 2015). Abe added, “Japan and the United States are partners who share basic values, such as freedom, democracy, and basic
human rights and the rule of law” and “now, Japan wants to be a country that can respond to such calls” (Abe 2015, April).

Prime Minister Koizumi once stated, “The US is the only nation in the world which says that an attack or aggression against Japan is an aggression or attack against their own country. There is no other nation that perceives an attack or aggression against Japan as an attack against itself. If you think about this and judge for yourself, I think you will understand how important Japan-US relations are” (Koizumi 2006, January). Indeed, the alliance has never been so important. The US rebalance to Asia is equal parts defensive, political, and economic and will require more than just Japan’s support; it will require a recalibration of the Japan-US Alliance. Japan’s upgraded role in the Alliance serves three main functions: 1) it addresses changes in the regional security environment, namely the rise of China and nuclear North Korea, 2) it addresses changes in the global security environment, such as the rise in terrorism, natural disasters, and cyber crime, and 3) it creates a more equitable partnership between the US and Japan. Recalibrating the responsibilities, and therefore status of the US and Japan will shape both the content and direction of Japanese security policy in the short to mid term.

In a Joint Statement issued by Minister of Foreign Affairs Kishida, Defense Minister Onodera, Secretary of State Kerry, and Secretary of Defense Hagel, several broad references to the changing security environment and the need to manage China are made, but the bulk of the statement concerns “modernizing” the alliance. Specifically, the Ministers “affirmed that the Alliance should remain well positioned to deal with a range of persistent and emerging threats to peace and security, as well as challenges to international norms. Among these are: North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and humanitarian concerns; coercive and destabilizing behaviors in the maritime domain; disruptive activities in space and cyberspace; proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD); and man-made and natural disasters” (Kishida, Onodera, Kerry, and Hagel 2013). The statement also laid the groundwork for Japan to play a greater role in the region through cooperation with the US in order “to effectively promote peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.” In regard to bilateral relations, the Ministers cited the need for further cooperation in Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), cyberspace, space, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, joint/shared used of facilities, bilateral planning, defense equipment and technology, extended deterrence dialogue, information security, joint training exercises, and host nation support. The alliance is expected to increase regional security through regional capacity building, maritime security, HA/DR, trilateral cooperation, and multilateral cooperation. The contemporary alliance is a far cry from the defense-of-Japan-only arrangement of the previous half century.

Immediately after WWII, the US sought to make Japan “‘armless and harmless’ and played an authoritative role in getting Japan to enact the ‘Peace Constitution’ (the vast majority of Japanese people welcomed it)” (Matsuyama 1997, 163). In doing so, the US made itself responsible for ensuring the security of Japan, most clearly articulated in Article VI of the Japan-US Security Treaty (Japan-US Security Treaty). The ten article treaty ensured that the US would have a base of power in East Asia and Japan would be protected by the US. This initial arrangement basically entailed Japan paying for the US’ military might. Since the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan was signed January 19, 1960, the alliance has gradually shifted from a purely defense-oriented arrangement to a security management arrangement.

Over time, the changing security environment, high social costs of hosting the bases, and US overstretch necessitated changes in the alliance to ease the burden on the Japanese public,
specifically the Okinawans and for Japan to assist the US in maintaining regional security. These changes have been most clearly articulated in the 1978, 1997, and proposed 2015 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation.

The 1978 Guidelines were relatively vague and focused largely on defending Japan from potential Russian attacks on the northern island of Hokkaido. However, through the alliance, “Japan was playing an important role in international security during the Cold War era, particularly toward its end” because by guarding its own coastal waters and airspace, Japan could ensure that the Soviets were blocked from entering important strategic routes in the Asia-Pacific theater (Yamaguchi 2012, May). The Japan-US Alliance also ensured that Japan was “a bastion of anti-communism in Asia” (Matsuyama 1997, 163). The 1997 Guidelines were developed after the Gulf War crisis and destabilization of the Korean peninsula. These emerging threats indicated that Japan’s security may be tied to regional issues. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Gulf Crises forced Japanese leaders to consider the necessity of dispatching the JSDF beyond the defense of the mainland to ensure the viability of the alliance and the nation’s security. The most significant change between the two Guidelines is that “the 1997 revision expanded the focus of the alliance from Article V of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which is focused on the defense of Japan, to Article VI, which is focused on the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where the greatest challenges to the post–Cold War order were evolving” (Pryzstup 2015, 10). The 1997 Guidelines also outlined several dozen examples of “items of cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan,” such as relief activities, search and rescue, rear area support, and minesweeping (1997 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation). Although the defense of Japan remained the alliance’s priority, the 1997 Guidelines introduced maintaining regional stability as an important dimension of the alliance.
Much has changed in the world since 1997. Over the past decade the US has waged a global war on terror, China has emerged as a rising super power, North Korea has acquired nuclear weapons, new battlefields have emerged in space and cyberspace, and even problems of antiquity, such as piracy have resurfaced. Again, Japanese leaders are faced with pressure to adapt to new challenges to Japanese security.

However, it would be a bit of an over-simplification to conclude that the changing security environment directly leads to changes in security policy. China has been rising for years and overtook Japan in defense spending in 2005. North Korea has been a threat to Japan for decades, having kidnapped dozens of Japanese civilians, conducted several missile tests, and acquired nuclear weapons. The US War on Terror began just four years after the 1997 Guidelines were established and not until 14 years later could Japanese leaders credibly claim that they would implement meaningful changes to the security doctrine in the form of the 2015 Guidelines. Between 1997 and 2015, Japan’s economy had become stagnant, Japan’s status had declined, and the Okinawan Base issue worsened. Moreover, Japan enjoyed another 18 years of peace and the world became increasingly interconnected. These issues, along with the international security environment, have led Japanese leaders and the public to reconsider the orientation of the Japan-US Alliance.

Appendix B summarizes the major points of the 1978, 1997, and 2015 (proposed) Guidelines. The 1978 Guidelines were by far the shortest and general. It consisted of three main parts, which were 1) the posture for deterring aggression, 2) response to an armed attack against Japan, and 3) Japan-US cooperation in case of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an importance influence on security on Japan. The Guidelines did not outline specific threats and it was primarily focused on establishing the responsibilities of each side. The 1997
guidelines expanded on the 1978 guidelines significantly and was comprised of seven main parts: 1) Aim of guidelines, 2) basic premises and principles, 3) cooperation under normal circumstances, 4) actions in response to an armed attack against Japan, 5) cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security (situations in areas surrounding Japan), 6) bilateral programs for effective defense cooperation under the guidelines, and 7) timely and appropriate review of the guidelines. The 1997 guidelines were twice the length of the previous version and emphasized closer cooperation across all aspects of the alliance. The 2015 Guidelines is comprised of eight main parts: 1) defense cooperation and aims of guidelines, 2) basic principles and premises, 3) strengthened alliance coordination 4) seamlessly ensuring Japan’s peace and security, 5) cooperation for regional and global peace and security, 6) space and cyberspace cooperation, and 7) Bilateral Enterprise, and 8) Processes for Review. The Guidelines use clear language to define the proactive and “seamless” nature of the alliance, emphasizing defense, cooperation, and interoperability. The length of the guidelines is more than three times the length of the 1978 Guidelines. The added length is due to the specificity of the issues that the US and Japan plan to engage.

Unlike the 1978 Guidelines that focused on Japan’s security and the 1997 Guidelines that increased attention to regional security, the 2015 Guidelines propose a Whole-of-Government approach with a particular emphasis on interoperability at multiple levels between each state. The 2015 Guidelines still maintain Japan’s defense-oriented security policy, but expand the idea of what Japan’s security entails. Japan’s security is now linked to global threats such as cybersecurity, maritime security, terrorism, space, and maintaining a healthy alliance by working together in PKO and HA/DR. Moreover, the 2015 Guidelines seek to end the cumbersome
approach to tackling the international threats. After 9/11, at the behest of the President George W. Bush, Koizumi dispatched the JSDF to support the US armed forces in the Middle East. To allow participation in missions such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Japan passed highly controversial special measures. Each time Japan participated in these international operations, it would stretch the limits of the constitution and leaders would pay high political costs for what was evidently going to be regular occurrences. The 2015 Guidelines aim to end the need to rely on awkward interpretations of the constitution and clarify exactly what Japanese security policy entails. Although all three Guidelines do not require either side to make budgetary, legislative, or administrative changes (the Guidelines are not laws or legislation), the latter Guidelines have an implicit understanding that each side will do more to increase the viability of the alliance.

However, when analyzing the Japan-US Alliance and Japanese security policy, it is important to consider what Japan can actually accomplish. As discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, the JSDF is highly constrained by material and ideational forces, constraints that will not go away regardless of the necessity for change.

Japan will unlikely be able to contribute more personnel and equipment to US-led missions due to the small size of the JSDF, the limited defense budget, and public’s unwillingness to join the armed forces. Moreover, Abe has emphasized that under the proposed security bills concerning collective defense, Japan would not be drawn into US conflicts and the appropriate “brakes” will remain in place (Kameda 2015). Japan’s contributions to fighting terrorists are also likely to be limited as Abe has also promised that the JSDF would not be able to aid nations fighting ISIS in a logistics capability, offering instead nonmilitary aid such as goods and medical support to refugees (Kameda 2015). Abe has enough support in the Diet to
Japan is also not likely to increase its Host Nation Status support as it already pays most of the costs for maintaining the US bases and the Okinawan base issue has become a significant obstacle to Abe’s security plans. Unresolved for over a decade, the issue of the relocation of the US base on Okinawa has increased scrutiny of Abe’s overall security agenda. Due to pollution, crime, and incidents of rape related to the base, the Okinawans have moved further away from working with the government. In May 2015, Abe was met with jeers and called a “warmonger” during a visit to the southern island (Fackler 2015, July).

Collective self-defense, the linchpin of the new security arrangement between the US and Japan, is also likely to face significant resistance. In Abe’s first term, he established the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security to examine four cases regarding collective self-defense. The panel examined the JSDF’s right to defend US vessels on the high seas, intercept ballistic missiles that might be headed toward the US, use of weapons in UN PKO, and logistics support for the operations of other countries participating in UN PKO and other activities. Abe resigned before the report was submitted in June 2008. In February 2013, Abe resumed the meetings of the Advisory Panel and in addition to the four original cases, the panel examined what concrete actions Japan could take to maintain peace and security, what ideas underline the government’s interpretation of the constitution, and how the domestic legal system should be structured (Advisory Panel Report 2014). The panel argued that in order to ensure the right to life, liberty, and happiness (Article 13) of the people, Japan needed to exercise the appropriate use of force to repel outside attacks, protect its sovereignty, and proactively participate in international operations related to peace and security. Moreover, the panel
introduced a novel interpretation of pacifism. Citing pacifism as a “fundamental principle of the Constitution,” the panel argued that given the interconnectedness of security among states, pacifism could not be “self-centered” and a “passive form of pledging not to disturb the peace” – Japan needed to take “proactive actions to realize peace” (Advisory Panel Report 2014, 5).

The panel offered some concrete examples of actions the JSDF can take. For example, under the new reinterpretation of the constitution, Japan can protect US forces when they are under attack (if the US forces are protecting Japan), mine sweep in maritime areas where Japanese ships are significantly affected, participate in UN PKO to maintain international order, use weapons in UN PKO, and protect Japanese civilians and vessels from armed attack. Moreover, Japan can exercise the right to collective self-defense if the following conditions are met: 1) when a foreign country in a close relationship with Japan is under attack and if “such situation has the potential to significantly affect the security of Japan,” and 2) Japan can use limited force to the minimum extent necessary, having obtained an explicit request or consent from the country under attack.

Following the recommendations of the report, Abe has pushed for a package of security bills concerning collective self-defense and the bills passed in the Lower House in July 2015. However, there will be much resistance from the public, political opposition, and members of the LDP before the Upper House votes on the package of bills. The new security bills have also met with strong criticism from the academic community and there are daily protests outside of the Diet (Kameda 2015, July). On August 30, 2015 there was over 300 protests against the security bills across Japan, the largest drawing a crowd of over 120,000 in front of the parliament building (Takenaka 2015, August). Abe has sought to appease critics and has extended the current session of the Diet, “the longest such extension in postwar history, to give himself more
time to win over public opinion and avoid the appearance of ramming the bills through” (Fackler 2015, July). Nevertheless, collective self-defense critics claim that the bills violate the “Peace Constitution” because it would allow Japan to use force in certain scenarios (Snow 2015; Asahi Shimbun 2015, July). Anti-security bills forces have recently gained momentum as several prominent constitutional scholars, including a professor of constitutional law at Waseda University who was selected by the LDP for a commission hearing on the bills, argued that the security bills were unconstitutional (Japan Times 2015, June). Since Japan prides itself on its democracy and the impetus for playing a larger role in international relations is to promote rule of law, their arguments carry a lot of weight in Japanese society. The media have adopted this narrative and have been increasingly critical of collective self-defense. Asahi Shimbun conducted a poll of over 100 constitutional scholars and found almost unanimous agreement that the bills are unconstitutional (Asahi Shimbun 2015, July). A 2014 Asashi Shimbun poll found that more than 60% of respondents oppose lifting the self-imposed ban on collective self-defense and 63% of believe Japan should stick to its longstanding interpretation of Article 9. A June 2015 Asahi Shimbun poll found that only 39% of respondents support the Abe cabinet, compared to the 42% that oppose. The same polled revealed that 56% of respondents opposed the security bills (26% supported) and 31% believed the security bills would “contribute positively to peace, and to Japan’s safety.” 42% of respondents believed the bill would not contribute to Japan’s safety and 48% of those polled believed the security bills violate the Japanese Constitution (24% believe the bills do not violate the constitution). These results reflect a steady decline in support for the bills and Abe cabinet over the past two years.

The constraints and restraints on Japan’s contributions to the alliance and international community will be less severe in the areas of the JSDF’s force structure, professionalization,
interoperability, and combined operations with the US. Although Japan cannot contribute more, it can contribute better. One of the primarily goals of the 2015 Guidelines and security bills is to develop the JSDF into a “seamless force.” In the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), Japan adopted the “dynamic joint defense force” philosophy. Due to concerns that the “dynamic defense force” philosophy (which emphasized readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, and is reinforced by advanced technology based on the latest trends in the levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities) in previous NDPG’s could not address “gray zones” scenarios (neither peace nor conflict situations), the 2013 NDPG added mobile deployment capabilities and a wide range of logistical support systems to the JSDF. Another key development in the 2013 NDPG is the introduction of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade. This is not simply modernization of the JSDF, but the adoption of new amphibious tactics to improve the flexibility of the GSDF. By FY2018, the MOD plans to deploy 3,000 personnel in this group (Defense of Japan Annual White Paper 2014). The 2014 NDPG established the goal of allocating “limited resources in a focused and flexible way to prioritize the functions and capabilities from a comprehensive perspective, identified through joint operation-based capability assessments of the Self-Defense Force’s (SDF’s) total functions and capabilities in various situations” (NDPG 2014, 7). The MOD has also set up a Joint Staff Office in order to increase interoperability between the different branches of the JSDF.

Japan will also “strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including efforts for intelligence cooperation and information security, and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology, to build a firmer and effective alliance” (NDPG 2014, 10). Since 2005, the GSDF has conducted combined training operations with US marines, which should allow for easier transition into this new phase of the JSDF.
Interoperability is emphasized throughout Defense of Japan White Papers, NSS, and NDPG. The US and Japan have conducted joint exercises since 1985, but under the new guidelines, the MOD looks to increase the seamlessness between the two forces and “strengthen the Japan-US alliance in all its aspects, including political, economic, and security areas” (NSS 2013, 28). The Abe Cabinet has also proposed legislation that would allow the JSDF to carry out “very passive and limited ‘use of weapons’ to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the United States armed forces, if they are, in cooperation with the JSDF, currently engaged in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, July).

The Japan-US Alliance is evolving, but not so much in terms of projection and strength. It is more of a recalibration to allow Japan to play a more significant role. Japan only seems to be “militarizing” rapidly because for decades it was lagging behind the US significantly in terms of responsibilities and status. In comparison to the rest of East Asia, the changes in JSDF capabilities and responsibilities are rather subdued. Representative Akihisa Nagashima argues that Japan needs to play a greater role through collective self-defense, but with clear limits. Nagashima clarifies that Japan should be banned from entering the territorial space of other countries, but should be able to provide logistics support. Ultimately, Japan needs to be a “more reliable ally” because the US has “taken all the risks and Japan (Okinawans) pays the costs, this needs to be more balanced” (Author’s Interview, June 2014, Tokyo, Japan). Since the “reverse course,” the US and Japan have tried to determine the appropriate balance. Colonel Craig Agena contends that over the last 25 years, there has been a lot of progress in the Japan-US Alliance and Japan has finally developed a “sense of mission” (Author’s Interview, April 2014, Tokyo, Japan). The US and Japan could not be more different. The US has fought several wars whereas
Japan has not fired a single live round in combat since 1945. Yet, both nations play critical and complementary roles in the alliance.

Conclusion
This dissertation seeks to answer the question, what determines the content and direction of Japanese security policy? This is fundamentally a different inquiry from determining the causes and obstacles to Japanese “normalization.” The latter puzzle assumes that militarism either grows or recedes, when in practice, militarism can take many different paths.

Chapter Two introduced the multiple militarisms framework for analyzing security policy. Since the Meiji Era, Japan has pursued several distinct types of militarism, such as “survival militarism” (Meiji Era) and “total war militarism” (WWII). Japanese security policy has never been simply the response to potential international threats, although power balancing is part of the calculus of government decision-making. As discussed in Chapter Three, various social-structural and technical constraints have limited Japan’s ability to significantly augment the capabilities of the JSDF. In comparison to its counterparts in East Asia, the JSDF has remained stagnant in terms of size, military spending, capabilities, and potential. These constraints shape the content (policies and capabilities) and direction (objectives and justifications) of Japanese security policy.

In conjunction with the material constraints, political and normative forces have also led to restraints on normalization of the JSDF. Chapter Four argued that Japan’s concerns for its regional neighbors and antimilitarism institutions and peace movements have prevented security policy “normalization.” These material and ideational forces interact and form a path-dependent and enduring antimilitarism environment that impacts how the government and public conceptualize security. Seven decades of antimilitarism attitudes and lack of conflict have
created conditions that make it difficult for the government to change the fundamental nature of Japanese security policy.

The antimilitarism environment has solidified Japan’s reputation as a peace-loving nation dedicated to human rights, the rule of law, and democracy at home and abroad. The nexus among Japan’s antimilitarism identity, the emerging international norm of human security, and Japan’s responsibilities to the Japan-US alliance also determines the content and direction of Japanese security policy. Abe’s Proactive Contribution to Peace concept is the uneasy compromise between Japan’s commitments to human rights, disaster relief, and playing a greater role in the international community and domestic antimilitarism attitudes. A concern for human security and peaceful dialogue to solve disputes are both considered commonsensical in Japan. However, Japanese are currently grappling with the idea of having to do more, even using force, to ensure that both security and opportunities for dialogue can exist in an increasing complex world.

If playing a greater role in the international community via PKO, HA/DR, and professionalization of the JSDF is to be called “normalization,” then it is a new normal where the armed forces serve a greater purpose than just offense and defense. Japan has not militarized as realists have predicted because in many ways it cannot and in some ways it will not. Japan is embarking on its unique type of militarism, that of “minimal-use militarism” in the name of human security.

Is the case of Japan generalizable? The short answer is no, this case is not generalizable. Japan’s security policy is distinct because of its history and security environment. The hundreds of laws and institutions, Japanese culture and history, cultures, and the East Asia security environment ensures that Japan’s militarism cannot completely be replicated. The long answer is
- it depends on what dimensions of militarism are the subject of inquiry. The “multiple militarisms” framework is exportable in that one can compare different states and different militarisms. For example, investigating the differences and similarities between Japanese antimilitarism and Irish neutrality may yield valuable insight on what variables lead states to forgo “normalized” security policy. Additionally, an examination of dissimilar cases, such as the US and Japan may prove valuable in understanding the impact of militarism discourses. Region specialists can utilize the multiple militarisms framework to compare states within a security system to determine why the states react differently to the same security environment. Lastly, comparing militarisms can shed light on the impact of certain variables, such as conscription, on security policy. For example, South Korea and Israel may seem dissimilar, but both states practice conscription, are surrounded by enduring threats, and are allied with the US. Analyzing temporal and geographic cases under a multiple militarisms framework can yield valuable lessons on how the use of force is legitimized or delegitimized.

This dissertation is also an investigation of how violence is justified and delegitimized. The international community has evolved from a collection of tribes, to city-states, to empires, to states. In protecting these entities, nations and their leaders have justified the use of force. Japan utilized the sword to ensure its security and paid for its violence dearly during and after WWII. For the past 70 years, Japanese have been able to forgo the use of force to build a vibrant, democratic, and wealthy nation. Yet the world now is facing new threats, such as terrorism, natural disasters, and cyber warfare. In this new stage in history, is violence necessary in addressing these new dangers – or has 70 years of Japanese pacifism provided another path to peace and security? Japan is an important case because even Japanese are uncertain about the viability of their unique path. Regardless of the outcome of the current security debates,
Japanese militarism will be shaped by the legacies of Japan’s imperialistic past, the demands of the present, and the needs of the future.
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weapons-abolition.html.


## Appendix A: Peace Museums in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Museum Name</th>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Year Founded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima Peace Museum</td>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum</td>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maruki Gallery</td>
<td>Saitama</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daigo Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon) Exhibition Hall</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Museum for the People</td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soka Gakkai Toda Peace Memorial Hall</td>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sendai Sensai Hakkou Memorial</td>
<td>Miyagi</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobe City War Damages Exhibition Corner</td>
<td>Hyogo</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life is Treasure House</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka Human Rights Museum (Liberty Osaka)</td>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Memorial Center</td>
<td>Hokkaido</td>
<td>1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamamatsu Revival Memorial Center</td>
<td>Shizuoka</td>
<td>1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>Okunoinoima Poison Gas Museum</td>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teranaka Art Museum</td>
<td>Wakayama</td>
<td>1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grassroots House</td>
<td>Kochi</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himeyuri Peace Museum</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamba Manganese Memorial Hall</td>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nakano War Peace Exhibition Hall</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aomori Air Raid War Damages Exhibition Hall</td>
<td>Aomori</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shoukokumin Museum (Museum of Children)</td>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kochi Library and People’s Rights Museum</td>
<td>Kochi</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Osaka International Peace Center (Peace Osaka)</td>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taji-cho Ishigaki Memorial Museum</td>
<td>Wakayama</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mirasaka Peace Museum of Art</td>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suita Peace Memorial Center</td>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>Kyoto Museum for World Peace</td>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kawasaki Peace Museum</td>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>No More Hibakusha Hall</td>
<td>Hokkaido</td>
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<td>German Museum</td>
<td>Tokushima</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace Museum of Saitama</td>
<td>Saitama</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>1993</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Shizuoka</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>Human Rights and Peace Museum Fukuyama</td>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<td>Sakai City Peace and Human Rights Museum</td>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oka Masahara Memorial Nagasaki Peace Museum</td>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Takamatsu Civic Culture Centre: Peace Museum</td>
<td>Kagawa</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holocaust Education Center</td>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific War History Museum</td>
<td>Iwate</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Setagaya Peace Gallery</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Himeji Historical Peace Center</td>
<td>Hyogo</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usui Peace Memorial Center</td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>1996</td>
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Source: International Network of Museums for Peace
### Appendix B: The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (shortened)

<table>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Key Points</th>
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| 11/27/78   | **Aim of Guidelines:** These draft guidelines shall not be construed as affecting the rights and obligations of Japan and the United States under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. It is understood that the extension of facilitative assistance and support by Japan to the United States, which is described in the draft guidelines, is subject to the relevant laws and regulations of Japan.  
**Basic Premises and Principles:** Japan, as its defense policy will 1) will possess defense capability on an appropriate scale with in the scope necessary for self-defense, 2) assure, in accordance with Status of Forces Agreement the stable and effective utilization of facilities and areas in Japan by U.S. Forces and the United States will maintain a nuclear deterrent capability and the forward deployments of combat-ready forces and other forces capable of reinforcing them.  
**Cooperation Framework:** The US and Japan will 1) conduct studies on joint defense planning, 2) undertake necessary joint exercises and training when appropriate, 3) study and prepare beforehand common procedures deemed necessary for operational needs in order jointly to undertake operations smoothly. Such procedures include matters related to operations, intelligence, and logistics and 4) each nation is responsible for the logistics of its own forces.  
**The Defense of Japan:** Both nations will conduct closer liaison and will take necessary measures to ensure coordinated joint action and 1) In principle, Japan by itself will repel limited, small-scale aggression. When necessary, Japan will repel it with the cooperation of the US, 2) Japan will primarily conduct defensive operations of its territories and surrounding waters with the US as support 3) Japan and the US will work jointly and closely in operations, command and coordination, intelligence, and logistics, and 4) Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities to the US in accordance with the US-Japan Security Treaty.  
**Cooperation in Surrounding Areas that Influence Japan’s Security:** The Governments of Japan and the United States will consult together from time to whenever changes in the circumstances so require and 2) conduct studies in advance on the scope and modalities of facilitative assistance to be extended to the U.S. Forces by Japan within the Japan-US Security Treaty and related arrangements and agreements. |
| 10/23/97   | **Aim of Guidelines:** The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible U.S.-Japan cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provided a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.  
**Basic Premises and Principles:** 1) Upholds rights and obligations of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 2) Japan will conduct all actions within the limitations of its Constitution and maintain its exclusively defense-oriented policy and three non-nuclear principles, 3) all actions taken by the US and Japan will be consistent with basic international law, and 4) the guidelines do not oblige either government to take legislative, administrative, or budgetary measures. However, the US and Japan will establish an effective framework of cooperation.  
**Cooperation Framework:** The US and Japan will 1) increase information sharing and intelligence, 2) increase cooperation to promote regional and global security, and 3) both Government will conduct bilateral defense planning in case of armed attack against Japan and mutual planning in situations in areas surround Japan.  
**The Defense of Japan:** Both nations will cooperate as appropriate to ensure a coordinated response and 1) Japan will establish the basis for U.S. reinforcements, 2) Japan will have the primary responsibility for conducting operations for land, sea, and air defense 3) the US will provide appropriate support for Japan, 4) Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities to the US in accordance with the US-Japan Security Treaty.  
**Cooperation in Surrounding Areas that Influence Japan’s Security:** 1) Both Governments in intensify information sharing and 2) cooperate in relief activities, search and rescue, activities ensuring effective sanctions, 3) establish common standards for preparation, 4) establish common procedures. |
| 04/27/15   | **Aim of Guidelines:** In order to ensure Japan's peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize: 1) seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses, 2) synergy across the two governments' national security policies, 3) a whole-of-government Alliance approach, 4) cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations and 5) the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Moreover, the two governments will continuously enhance the Japan-US Alliance. Japan will possess defense capabilities according to the NSS and NDPG and the US will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full rage of capabilities, including US nuclear forces.  
**Basic Premises and Principles:** 1) Upholds rights and obligations of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 2) all actions taken by the US and Japan will be consistent with basic international law, 3) All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy and Japan will maintain its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and non-nuclear principles, and 4) the Guidelines do not oblige either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures. |
| **Cooperation Framework:** | The two governments will take advantage of all available channels to enhance information sharing and to ensure seamless and effective whole-of-government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning. The two governments will cooperate in 1) intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), 2) air and missile defense, 3) maritime security, 4) asset protection, 5) training and exercises, 6) logistic support, and 7) use of facilities. Moreover, the two governments will develop and enhance bilateral cooperation in the areas of defense equipment and technology, intelligences and information security, and educational and research exchanges. |
| **The Defense of Japan:** | The Alliance will respond to situations that influence Japan’s peace and security; such situations cannot be confined geographically. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for its support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan. Operations may include defending air space, counter ballistic missile attacks, defend maritime areas, counter ground attacks, and cross-domain operations. |
| **Actions in Response to an Armed Attack of a Third Party:** | When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism. |
| **Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security:** | Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The two governments will corporate closely and maximize interoperability in PKO, international HA/DR, maritime security, partner capability building, noncombatant evacuation operations, ISR, training and exercises, and logistic support. The governments will also promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The government will also cooperate to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space. To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. |

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs