Pacifically Possessed: Scientific Production and Native Hawaiian Critique of the "Almost White" Polynesian Race

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Pacifically Possessed:
Scientific Production and Native Hawaiian Critique of the "Almost White" Polynesian Race

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by

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The Dissertation of Maile Renee Arvin is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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DEDICATION

For Kalani Awo:

He ʻōpū hālau.

A heart as big as a house.

And for the entire Awo ʻohana:

Me ke aloha pau'ole.
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This dissertation analyzes how scientific knowledge has represented the Polynesian race as an essentially mixed, "almost white" race. Nineteenth and twentieth century scientific literature—spanning the disciplines of ethnology, physical anthropology, sociology and genetics—positioned Polynesians as the biological relatives of Caucasians. Scientific proof of this relationship allowed scientists, policymakers, and popular media to posit European and American settler colonialism in the Pacific as a peaceful and natural fulfillment of a biological destiny. Understanding knowledge as an important agent of settler colonial possession—in the political as well as supernatural, haunting connotations of that word—this project seeks to understand how Polynesians
(with a particular focus on Native Hawaiians) have been bodily "possessed," along with the political and economic possession of their lands. Thus, the project traces a logic of "possession through whiteness" in which Polynesians were once, and under the salutary influence of settler colonialism, will again be white.

The project’s analysis coheres around four figures of the "almost white" Polynesian race: the ancestrally white Polynesian of ethnology and Aryanism (1830s-1870s), the Part-Hawaiian of physical anthropology and eugenics (1910s-1920s), the mixed-race "Hawaiian girl" of sociology (1930s-1940s), and the mixed-race, soon-to-be white (again) Polynesian of genetics, whose full acceptance in Hawai‘i seemed to provide a model of racial harmony to the world (1950s). Rather than attempting to uncover "racist" scientific practices, the project reveals how historical scientific literature produced knowledge about the Polynesian race that remains important in how Native Hawaiians are recognized (and misrecognized) in contemporary scientific, legal and cultural spheres.

In addition to the historical analysis, the project also examines contemporary Native Hawaiian responses to the logic of possession through whiteness. These include regenerative actions that radically displace whiteness, such as contemporary relationship building between Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders. At the same time, other regenerative actions attempt to reproduce Native Hawaiian-ness with a standard of racial purity modeled on whiteness, including legal fights waged over blood quantum legislation. Overall, the project provides a scientific genealogy as to how Polynesians have been recognized as "almost white," and questions under what conditions this possessive recognition can be refused.
INTRODUCTION

I will be a different person when I live in England and different things will happen to me…. They say frost makes flower patterns on the window panes. I must know more than I know already. For I know that house where I will be cold and not belonging, the bed I shall lie in has red curtains and I have slept there many times before, long ago…

‘England,’ said Christophine, who was watching me. ‘You think there is such a place?’

‘How can you ask that? You know there is.’

‘I never see the damn place, how I know?’

‘You do not believe that there is a country called England?’

She blinked and answered quickly, ‘I don’t say I don’t believe, I say I don’t know, I know what I see with my eyes and I never see it. Besides I ask myself is this place like they tell us? Some say one thing, some different, I hear it cold to freeze your bones and they thief your money, clever like the devil. You have money in your pocket, you look again and bam! No money. Why you want to go to this cold thief place? If there is this place at all, I never see it, that is one thing sure.’

(Jean Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea)

This dissertation analyzes how colonial difference is often reproduced through a logic that I term “possession through whiteness,” which is developed in scientific knowledge and deployed variously in juridical, economic, and cultural fields of colonialism.¹ Specifically, I analyze how scientific knowledge production has positioned the Polynesian race as an essentially mixed, “almost white” race. Late nineteenth and

¹ This project focuses on indigeneity as a particular articulation of colonial difference in settler colonial contexts. My use of “colonial difference” here is borrowed from Walter Mignolo, who defines it as the simultaneously “physical as well as imaginary” space where both “coloniality of power is enacted” and the “restitution of subaltern knowledge is taking place….,” Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), ix.
early twentieth century scientific literature—spanning the disciplines of ethnology, physical anthropology, sociology, and genetics—positioned Polynesians as the biological relatives of Caucasians. Scientific proof of this relationship, established through such methods as Aryan linguistics and the rigorous bodily measurements of anthropometry, allowed scientists, policymakers, and popular media to posit European and American settler colonialism in the Pacific as a peaceful and natural fulfillment of a biological destiny. In this logic, Polynesians were once, and, under the salutary influence of settler colonialism, will again be white. By writing Polynesia's past and future as intimately dependent on the white race, the presence of settlers in the Pacific, and their dispossession of Indigenous Pacific Islanders from their lands was naturalized. This dissertation grapples with both the history and the still rippling effects of this logic, paying particular attention to the ways it has transfixed and transformed Native Hawaiians.²

This project understands knowledge as an important agent of possession—a word with which I purposefully invoke its haunting, supernatural connotation—under colonial conditions. Demons and spirits, rather than (and anathema to) the logic of science—that hallmark of Western modernity—are often identified as the agents of bodily possession. Yet, many have noted that modernity and science is in fact haunted; obsessed with the eradication of the pre-modern, with the exorcism of ghosts.³ Similarly, this project,

² Throughout this dissertation, I use "Native Hawaiian" to refer to the Indigenous peoples of Hawai‘i. Many people, including some of the sources I refer to prefer to use "Kanaka Maoli," "Kanaka ʻŌiwi," or "ʻŌiwi Maoli": all Hawaiian-language terms which also refer to the original peoples of Hawai‘i. I have largely used "Native Hawaiian" in my own writing in this project, not in opposition to these other terms, but simply because it is the identification commonly used in my own (Native Hawaiian) family.

³ Denise Ferreira da Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007); Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis:
following the critical interventions of Denise Ferreira da Silva, asks that we take the transcendent human Spirit theorized by G.W.F. Hegel, which provided the conditions of possibility for the development of racial power, rather literally. Silva's text *Toward a Global Idea of Race* intervenes into conventional understandings of race as used in the U.S. as descriptive of particular forms of oppression by recuperating "scientific signification to introduce a conception of political subjects as an effect of symbolic, productive violence." What Silva finds in the field of science is not simply the production of race as part of the "symbolics of blood," or physical characteristics, but "raciality" that operates "via the production of minds." Thus, for Silva, raciality is enabled by the scientific production of self-consciousness (which, after Hegel, is able to be understood as an interior quality that allowed Man productive power over exterior things) as Man's distinguishing attribute. Europe's Others would not be able to achieve transcendence in the same way, remaining "doubly affectable," because they would be subject to both exteriority (bodies and nature) and the European Man who had more successfully realized his own self-perfection (Hegel's Spirit).

My own project uses Silva's interventions as a model from which to begin constructing an account of how racial power operates specifically under settler


6 Silva notes that Foucault largely understood race as a mode of power that depended on the “symbolics of blood,” in contrast to her own approach. I discuss this further later in the Introduction. Ibid., 24.

colonialism. As I elaborate on later, I view settler colonialism as a process whereby Indigenous peoples, in addition to having their lands possessed, are themselves "possessed," or as Silva describes, "engulfed," and produced through the analytics of raciality as subjects who are formed in contrast to the image of the self-determined, and self-perfecting, post-European Enlightenment Man. Viewing possession through whiteness as a particular kind of deployment of engulfment specific to the settler colonial context, this project tracks some specific ways in which scientific knowledge ontologically transforms the colonized, also highlighting along the way some specific acts of decolonial, regenerative, exorcism.

How does knowledge act as an agent of possession? We often talk of possessing knowledge, but under what conditions does knowledge possess us? Jean Rhys’ novel *Wide Sargasso Sea* (1966), as noted in the epigraph, provides a particularly evocative example. It is a masterful tale of how Bertha Rochester, the madwoman of Charlotte Bronte’s *Jane Eyre*, came to be a monster locked in an English attic. Set in the colonial context of Jamaica, shortly after emancipation, the novel follows Antoinette, a “white Creole” girl whose declining family forces her first into a convent and then into a marriage with the English Mr. Rochester (who, without explanation, renames her Bertha).¹ Not incidentally, this marriage makes Rochester rich, as Antoinette’s inherited lands and money pass into his hands through the English laws of coverture. Antoinette knows that “I will be a different person when I live in England” (indeed, England has

¹ Antoinette's family is described in contrast to “Real white people” as “Old time white people nothing but white nigger now…” *Wide Sargasso Sea* takes place a year after the 1838 emancipation of slaves in Jamaica. As noted by Judith Raskin, “Rhys has changed the time period of Jane Eyre to coincide with emancipation. *Jane Eyre* is narrated in 1818 or 1819 and describes events taking place between 1798 and 1808.” Jean Rhys, *Wide Sargasso Sea*, ed. Judith L. Raskin (W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 14, 31.
already made her a different person in Jamaica, legally dispossessing her of her own inheritance). She knows her new English difference through a rather mystical, innate understanding, a false memory: “I must know more than I know already,” “I have slept there many times before, long ago.” Her childhood nanny, Christophine, a black woman from Martinique, reminds Antoinette that such knowledge of England is unnatural and potentially dangerous. How do they know England is a place at all? It is not that Christophine doubts England’s existence; she is troubled by the existence of knowledge about England in Jamaica. The knowledge is infectious, engulfing (as Silva's analytics describe) their senses despite such knowledge being at odds with their immediate reality. How can Antoinette remember England without ever having been there? How does she know she will become a different person? Can she, as Christophine seems to suggest she should, unknow these things?

Antoinette is possessed by the knowledge of England, and this knowledge dispossesses her of her lands, her money, and (to some extent) her very self. This describes very well the logic of possession that this dissertation traces. If we similarly approach colonialism as an otherworldly possession of colonized peoples by something unseen and thus unknown (as Christophine puts it) which nonetheless manifests a terrifying material reality, we realize that responses to this possession are necessarily much more varied than categories such as “resistance” or “complicity” might allow. For what is the “right” way to resist or respond to being possessed, when colonialism makes you “a different person”? Exorcism, perhaps. But what is the best method of exorcism? How can you know when you’re truly possessed of yourself again? Is it possible to

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9 Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race.
exorcise one’s self without total self-destruction? For Antoinette, it is not. Like Bertha in
*Jane Eyre*, she sets fire to Rochester’s house and jumps, ablaze, from the roof. Yet *Wide
Sargasso Sea* interprets this not as the inexplicable actions of a mad woman, but as a
series of dreams in which Antoinette escapes. She finds a way to annihilate “sad and cold
and empty” England, spreading her white room with the “lovely colour” of flame and
using it to “light me along the dark passage” out of her attic prison.

This retelling of Antoinette’s self-immolation grants the lifeless character of
Bertha in *Jane Eyre* what Avery Gordon would term “complex personhood.” Gordon
asks us to remember “that even those who live in the most dire circumstances possess a
complex and oftentimes contradictory humanity and subjectivity that is never adequately
glimpsed by viewing them as victims, or, on the other hand, as superhuman agents.”

Thus, to her, complex personhood means "that all people (albeit in specific forms whose
specificity is sometimes everything) remember and forget, are beset by contradiction, and
recognize and misrecognize themselves and others…. Complex personhood means that
even those who haunt our dominant institutions and their systems of value are haunted
too by things they sometimes have names for and sometimes do not.”

Antoinette’s actions are not easily classified as good, bad, resistant, or tragic. Though we see
Antoinette’s transformation into a ghost (and as readers of *Jane Eyre* we even know this
to be her fate ahead of time), she is neither victim nor superhuman (nor supernatural) in
Rhys’ retelling. After Gordon, we might say that sometimes Antoinette misrecognizes
herself, for she is “haunted too” by England, even as she haunts England.

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11 Ibid.
Aiming for a similar complex understanding of colonized peoples, this dissertation eschews discourses of “agency” or “resistance” in understanding responses to the logic of possession. Instead, I place responses to possession within a framework of regeneration. Regeneration attempts to recognize complex personhood in the actions of those who are colonially possessed. Regeneration can involve exorcism—a violent repulsion or unequivocal refusal to be possessed; repossession—the sanctioned or unsanctioned reclamation of a body, a culture, or a piece of land; or reproduction—the creation of new things, cultures, and peoples. Regeneration understands actions such as Antoinette’s jump from Rochester’s roof as a logical, meaningful response to her transformation into “a different person,” which is indeed a terrible new personhood that feels like being a ghost.

Regeneration in my framing also encompasses the ugliness that often accompanies responses to colonial possession. Like the Western hysteria over degeneration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that culminated in eugenics, regeneration can also urge the renewal of purity. For example, in Chapter 2, I analyze the Day v. Apoliona case, in which five Native Hawaiian men attempt to harness stringent blood quantum laws (laws that require certain racial percentages for legal recognition) to their own advantage. While I find the politics of the Day plaintiffs deeply problematic, reinforcing the very racial and heteropatriarchal hierarchies that comprise their own colonization, their actions nonetheless betray a strong anti-colonial critique and an interest in re-possessing a Native Hawaiian future of their own making. In this way, I find it oriented by a politics of regeneration that I cannot wholly condemn or separate.
from the other Native Hawaiian activist projects I examine. This dissertation endeavors to pay attention to, even when it cannot endorse, a wide variety of regenerative actions.

Overall, settler colonialism in Hawai‘i is the particular colonial formation under analysis in this project. There is much more to say about the theorizing of settler colonialism in relation to other types of colonialism, imperialism, and racial capitalism, and I further reflect on this later in this introduction. Yet, from the outset I want to note that I have purposefully chosen to designate the ideological configurations under analysis in this work as within the framework of settler colonialism in the hopes that we can take seriously the often overlooked but fundamental condition of the United States as a settler colonial nation-state. The ways that the United States' fundamental constitution through settler colonialism (as Patrick Wolfe reminds us, settler colonial "invasion is a structure, not an event") has also been a condition of possibility for the U.S.' global "war on terror," the latest of a long and also nationally constitutive history of wars, requires further attention. Indeed, this focus on settler colonialism, specifically as it has been configured in Hawai‘i, is not meant to confer a special, isolated status on either settler colonialism or Hawai‘i. Rather, like many other contemporary Indigenous and critical ethnic studies scholars, I see the logics of settler colonialism operating in tight connection with other

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12 Hawai‘i (with the diacritical mark, the ‘okina) is the proper Hawaiian language spelling of the lands and nation of the Native Hawaiian people. As Aotearoa, the Māori homeland, is different (if not always spatially distinct) from the New Zealand nation-state, Hawai‘i is not the same as Hawaii, the U.S. state. Though I use "Hawai‘i," often my sources use "Hawaii," and I have reprinted their original usage.


national and global forms of violence. Settler colonial studies has work yet to do in connecting its important theoretical frameworks to many places including the Caribbean and Latin America, which traditionally lie outside settler colonialism's application to the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. But as I have hoped to indicate above, in the introduction of my concepts of possession through whiteness and regeneration with the *Wide Sargasso Sea*'s Caribbean example, conceptually, my framings of possession and regeneration are meant to be relevant to, and in production conversation with, scholars both within and beyond my little corners of ethnic, indigenous and Pacific Islands studies. In what follows, I further explain how the logic of possession through whiteness functions as a concept. Next, I describe this project’s methodological approach and framework of regeneration. Finally, I sketch how my formulation of the logic of possession through whiteness and my framework of regeneration is applied to the context of the Pacific and Hawai‘i in each chapter.

**Outlining The Logic of Possession Through Whiteness**

Settler colonialism, as a structure of dominance, is particularly set on the domination and exploitation of land. Its power usually operates through the economic (the turning of land and natural resources into profit), juridical (the imposition of the legal-political apparatus of a settler nation-state, rather than an Indigenous form of governance), and ideological or symbolic means (culturally and morally defined ways of being and knowing resulting from European post-Enlightenment thought). These various  

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forms of power often accompany one another but do not operate simply as multiple
expressions of the same thing in different fields. For example, in the Hawaiian context,
economic and ideological components of settler colonialism preceded its legal-political
expression, as Christian missionaries and plantation owners and operators (often
missionary descendants) worked within the existing legal-political structures of the
Hawaiian monarchy until it no longer adequately suited their needs. Further, Hawai‘i
only officially became one of the United States' "new possessions" (along with the
Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico) in 1898, when annexed by the U.S. Congress who
sought to secure a re-coaling station for the U.S. Navy on their way to fight the Spanish-
American War in the Philippines. After the decline of Hawai‘i's plantation economy,
what was made valuable and extractable (the object of possession), as Adria Imada points
out, by the 1930s, had shifted: from agricultural commodities to the commodification of
Native Hawaiian bodies and culture under tourism. This commodification continues
today, and is one reason that I find the investigation of the power/knowledge deployed
under settler colonialism about Native Hawaiian bodies and culture urgent.

This project therefore focuses on one strategy deployed within the ideological
power of settler colonialism—what I call possession through whiteness—that is in
articulation with, but irreducible to, the economic and juridical forms of governance

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17 John Roy Musick, *Hawaii, Our New Possessions: An Account of Travels and Adventure, with Sketches of the Scenery ... an Appendix Containing the Treaty of Annexation to the United States* (Funk & Wagnalls, 1898).
which also constitute settler colonialism. As a logic, possession through whiteness expresses one mechanism of the "ideology and practice of governance" that Elizabeth Povinelli in the Australian context has termed "liberal settler multiculturalism." For Povinelli, the problematics of Australian settler colonialism are concerned with multiculturalism rather than postcolonialism as articulated by Frantz Fanon and the Subaltern Studies scholars. Povinelli distinguishes between the workings of colonial domination which inspires "colonized subjects to identify with their colonizers" and multicultural domination which inspires "subaltern and minority subjects to identify with the impossible object of an authentic self-identity; in the case of Indigenous Australians, a domesticated nonconflictual "traditional" form of sociality and (inter)subjectivity." Povinelli also expresses this liberal settler multicultural sentiment as "just be yourself."

However, at least in the case of Polynesia, I see these distinctions as substantially informing each other, rather than being opposed. Thus, in my use of Povinelli's "liberal settler multiculturalism," colonialism and multiculturalism are not in contrast, but accompany each other in important ways. In the scientific texts this dissertation examines, Polynesians are produced as, in a sense, "traditionally" (ancestrally and racially) white. I argue that these texts articulate a logic that proposed that Polynesians,
and Native Hawaiians specifically, could (and indeed should) become (almost) white again, through racial intermixture with white, and to a lesser extent, Asian, settlers. This racial intermixture in Hawai‘i would allow settler colonialism to operate through, as in Australia’s case, a "nonconflictual"—indeed a *pacific*, in the senses of nonviolent, conciliatory, placid—liberal, multicultural form of possession.

Thus, the sentiment expressed in the case of Pacific settler colonialism seems to be not simply Povinelli's "just be yourself," but, "you could truly be yourself if you just weren't you," to borrow a phrase geography and disability studies scholar Matthew Sothern uses to describe the (neo)liberal politics of self-help. In other words, in the Pacific, scientific knowledge produced the Polynesian race as a people who had the power to become white (because they were once white) but would fail to actually engender whiteness without the productive force of white settler men. They could truly be themselves (i.e. almost white) if they just submitted to, and allowed themselves to be possessed by, progress. In Povinelli's formulation, the "authentic self-identity" required of Polynesians under liberal settler multiculturalism is not only an often impossible, static, cultural authenticity (although that is often at play too) but also a racial authenticity that is perversely realized as the reclamation of ancestral whiteness. This logic and spirit of pacific possession through whiteness, as produced in science, would be articulated in powerful ways alongside the juridical and economic practices of pacific possession under European and American settler colonialism.

The logic of possession through whiteness thus echoes in important, if distinct, ways in a number of other colonial contexts. For example, Homi Bhabha has famously formulated colonial mimicry as a mode of colonial discourse that functions as "the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite." Similarly, in my formulation, possession through whiteness is the production (often styled as pacific despite its violence) of an Indigenous subject that is "almost the same, but not quite." In the Polynesian case, whiteness is always deferred—it is a once and future whiteness, not quite ever fully realized in the present. The difference that the "not quite" makes is thus important, both within a liberal structure of dominance that requires the preservation of hierarchy despite its universal values, and for the colonized, for whom the recognition of the "not quite" can be an awakening of anti-colonial consciousness and leveraged in the process of decolonization.

Indeed, Fanon importantly understood Algerian (and other anti-colonial) consciousness as necessarily developed in the violence of struggle, not as something natural or given but gradually and purposefully 'awakened' by the conditions of colonialism. Indigenous Studies scholar Glen Coulthard finds that Fanon's anti-colonial writing crucially "stretches" the Marxist paradigm by situating "colonial-capitalist

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24 Again, there are good reasons for articulating the specific formations of settler colonialism (which have often been naturalized and overlooked) but it is also important, in my view, to keep settler colonialism in conversation with other colonial formations in order to better understand how coloniality and raciality work everywhere.
26 Bhabha thus characterizes the "ambivalence of mimicry (almost the same, but not quite)" as "an uncertainty which fixes the colonial subject as a 'partial' presence. By 'partial' I mean both 'incomplete' and 'virtual'. It is as if the very emergence of the 'colonial' is dependent for its representation upon some strategic limitation or prohibition within the authoritative discourse itself. The success of colonial appropriation depends on a proliferation of inappropriate objects that ensure its strategic failure, so that mimicry is at once resemblance and menace." (Ibid.)
27 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth (with Commentary by Jean-Paul Sartre and Homi K. Bhabha)* (New York: Grove Press, 2004).
exploitation and domination alongside misrecognition and alienation as foundational sources of colonial injustice."\textsuperscript{28} Situated in the context of the First Nations of Canada, Coulthard further argues, "the reproduction of a colonial structure of dominance like Canada's rests on its ability to entice Indigenous peoples to come to identify, either implicitly or explicitly, with the profoundly asymmetrical and non-reciprocal forms of recognition either imposed on or granted to them by the colonial-state and society."\textsuperscript{29} Agreeing with Fanon and Coulthard, this project questions how "misrecognition and alienation" operates in settler colonial context of the Pacific, even when juridical, economic, and social formations there have disavowed such alienation with practices of recognition and inclusion. Thus, the two major questions of this dissertation, following from the excavation of the scientific knowledge production of the (almost) white Polynesian, are, first, in what ways and under what conditions have Polynesians been recognized, and at times come to identify themselves, as (almost) white? Secondly, in what ways and under what conditions can this possessive recognition be refused, and Indigenous identity regenerated? In other words, as I noted in my reading of \textit{Wide Sargasso Sea} above: how does knowledge act as an agent of possession? And can possessive knowledge be refused, un-thought—and if so, how?

**Possession Through Whiteness as a Strategy of the Analytics of Settler Coloniality**

In order to pursue the above questions, my project understands possession through whiteness as an important political-symbolic strategy of what, after Silva's formulation of


\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 439.
"the analytics of raciality," might be termed the analytics of settler coloniality. For Silva, the analytics of raciality refers to the "apparatus of knowledge manufactured by the sciences of man and society," under which "the racial" and "the cultural" became key signifiers and tools that operate to ensure "that the transparent I [the transcendent subject of post-Enlightenment Europe] would not become an affectable thing."³⁰ The analytics of raciality, in Silva's account, develop first through the nineteenth century science of man, when the "human body finally becomes an object of the tools of scientific reason," and thus "transforms race (a term previously employed to describe collectivities in terms of blood relationship) into the racial (a scientific concept)."³¹ This science of man produces "two kinds of minds"—"the transparent I" and "the affectable I"—arranged by "the racial" into the new ontoepistemological context of globality. Under globality, human beings are understood as determined by exteriority (time and space), and Europeans (and their descendants in the U.S. and other locations) are the only ones whose particular time and space allow them to achieve transparency, to inhabit "the transparent I." The analytics of raciality are further developed through the twentieth century sciences of the social (anthropology and sociology), which presuppose globality as the ontoepistemological context of the human, thus maintaining an account of human difference as "unsublatable and irreducible" under the signifier of "the cultural," despite these fields' moral objection to and explicit rejection of "the racial."³²

Silva's analytics of raciality are quite significant in my own project, but I also strive to use her model to describe the specific power/knowledge (Foucault's term, as I

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³¹ Ibid., 104, 116.
³² Ibid., 117.
explain more below) that is produced specifically in articulation with the ideologies of settler colonialism. Where Silva's project lays out the development of the analytics of raciality and then uses this to describe the working of racial power in the "national texts" of the United States and Brazil, examples she describes in the last two chapters of her book, my own project is centered squarely on the working of racial power in the settler colonial texts of Polynesia (writ broadly under European and American settler colonialism) and Hawai‘i (writ more specifically in relation to the U.S. national text).

Although my project does not offer a full exploration of an analytics of settler coloniality, I see this as a possible future development, in which I will test the applicability of my designation of the strategy of possession through whiteness in other settler colonial contexts. For now, it is important to further explain how possession through whiteness can be considered a strategy of the analytics of settler coloniality and how my concept of this strategy borrows from Silva's notion of engulfment as well as Foucault's biopolitics.

Silva describes engulfment, a strategy enabled by Hegel's philosophy and deployed in the analytics of raciality, as the "scientific concepts that explain other human conditions as variations of those found in post-Enlightenment Europe."33 For Silva, engulfment is a useful description of one effect of the tools of raciality because it offers an alternative account of power than the "sociologic of exclusion" so often used to explain racial injustice. Engulfment thus "brackets the phallocentric narrative—informing conceptions of power as domination, penetration, and oppression—that writes post-Enlightenment Europe as the last act of the play of universal reason that resolves, hides,

33 Ibid., xvi.
or dissipates everything else in the self-unfolding transcendental I. n34 Because engulfment "swallows, (trans)forms, without destroying," I also find it an apt description for the "symbolic, productive violence" of settler colonialism as particularly realized in the Pacific, where power has so often been understood as benign (literally pacific), to a point where settler colonialism is often rendered invisible amid idyllic scenes of tranquil paradise.35

However, engulfment is, in Silva's account, undeniably violent. She explains that through twentieth century sociological accounts of "race relations," engulfment is rewritten as "an eschatological narrative, thus deploying the logic of obliteration, which stipulates, as do the strategies of the science of man and anthropology, that the racial (physical) difference (via "miscegenation") and cultural (moral/social) difference (via assimilation) of the other of Europe will necessarily disappear."36 In other words, modernity assumes that the others of Europe will lose their distinct physical characteristics and cultural traditions as they attain "freedom" because the condition of "freedom," as enabled by Hegel's philosophy, is premised on "transparency," which the analytics of raciality ensured would only be available to "European minds." Silva sees sociology as only accounting for the "logic of exclusion" (of affectable minds from transparency and self-determination) but not challenging and in fact remaining "subordinated" to the "logic of obliteration," "which writes the trajectories of the others of Europe as a movement toward annihilation, the necessary destiny of affectable

34 Ibid., 33.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 157.
consciousness because it is necessary that *transcendental*ity return as the sole guiding principle of the modern social configurations they inhabit."

To further situate Silva's interventions, and my own, it is useful to show how Silva's analytics of raciality both relate and depart from Foucault's biopolitics. Foucault defined biopolitics as "the attempt, starting from the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, race…"38 Thus, for Foucault, the biopolitical was an extra-legal, liberal form of governance, a type of power/knowledge, that focused on society, and the management of society through technologies (such as statistics) that produced and capitalized human life.39 Through biopolitics as a form of knowledge production that accompanies capitalism and liberalism, the idea of "human capital" becomes important. Foucault defines human capital as "the ability-machine" whose allocated income "cannot be separated from the human individual who is its bearer."40 Human capital, in its neo-liberal formulation is "made up of innate elements and other, acquired elements."41

Of the innate elements, Foucault noted that: "modern genetics clearly shows that many more elements than was previously thought are conditioned by the genetic make-up we receive from our ancestors. In particular, genetics makes it possible to establish for any given individual the probabilities of their contracting this or that type of disease at a

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37 Ibid., 154–55.
39 For Foucault, "The realm of liberalism begins not in the state but in "society, which exists in a complex relation of exteriority and interiority vis-à-vis the state." (Ibid., 319).
41 Ibid., 227.
given age, during a given period of life, or in any way at any moment of life.\textsuperscript{42} He elaborated on the consequences of the modern potential to assess genetic probabilities:

Putting it in clear terms, this will mean that given my own genetic make-up, if I wish to have a child whose genetic make-up will be at least as good as mine, or as far as possible better than mine, then I will have to find someone who also has a good genetic make-up. And if you want a child whose human capital, understood simply in terms of innate and hereditary elements, is high, you can see that you will have to make an investment, that is to say, you will have to have worked enough, to have sufficient income, and to have a social status such that it will enable you to take for a spouse or co-producer of this future human capital, someone who has significant human capital themselves. I am not saying this as a joke; it is simply a form of thought or a form of problematic that is currently being elaborated.\textsuperscript{43}

Thus, in the form of a genetic problematic, biopolitics is exerted in the desire (necissitated by intimate genetic knowledge of one's "innate" risk of disease, etc.) to reproduce and invest in the best human capital available to oneself. Foucault (a few decades before the explosion of genomics and genetic ancestry testing, sites I explore further in Chapter 1) therefore anticipated that a future form of biopolitical governance would depend on the optimization of genetic human capital.

Foucault's account of biopolitics as a kind of power/knowledge that exerted governance over society through extra-legal modes is largely an account of life as positive knowledge, made most plain in statistics. However, in following Silva, my logic of possession through whiteness relies on a different account of life—namely, Hegel's, which produced the human as Spirit. Silva notes that, though she follows Foucault's methodology (tracking the analytics of raciality where Foucault tracks the analytics of sexuality) and "suggestion that attention to scientific signification can situate historicity

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 228.
(interiority-temporality)," that "Foucault's excavations do not reach the place where
European particularity is but an effect of the strategies of the productive ruler."\textsuperscript{44} Silva
thus argues that "Had he relinquished interiority, Foucault would have contributed to our
understanding of how the productive force of the racial ensues from the haunting
spatiality he spots at the core of modern thought, but would never fully explore."\textsuperscript{45}

To return to the logic of possession through whiteness, we can now describe this
logic, like biopolitics, as an extra-legal, liberal, social form of governance. Unlike
biopolitics, however, possession through whiteness forces a spiritual and racial
investment of human capital within the colonized, which cannot be fully produced
through statistics alone. Rather, the logic of possession through whiteness, as Silva
describes, works through engulfing the colonized within the global arrangement of two
kinds of human minds: the transparent and the affectable. Through the production of the
colonized as almost (but not quite) white, the possibility of attaining transcendence is
held out but deferred as impossible— indeed, attaining transcendence and whiteness
would "obliterate" the colonized as such. Again following the model of Silva's
engulfment, I use the term "logic of possession" in contrast to other, similar articulations
of influential ideologies under settler colonialism, such as Patrick Wolfe's "logic of
elimination" (which encompasses Indigenous genocide and amalgamation, through which
the settler is the one who replaces the eliminated), because I find it important to articulate
the ways in which settler colonial practices of elimination and replacement are

\textsuperscript{44} Silva, \textit{Toward a Global Idea of Race}, 23–25.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 25.
continuously deferred—they are not, and cannot ever be, complete. Though Wolfe also acknowledges this incompleteness (noting settler invasion is a structure not an event), I see possession as expressing more precisely the permanent partial state of the Indigenous subject being inhabited (being known and produced) by a settler society. There is, as Indigenous Studies scholar Scott Morgensen notes, a promised consanguinity between settler and native that is often eclipsed in formulations that focus only on settler colonial "vanishing" and "extinction." This consanguinity enables constant (sexual, economic, juridical) exploitation, by producing the image of a future universal "raceless" race just over the settler colonial horizon.

Following from Silva and Foucault's methodologies, in conceptualizing the strategy of possession through whiteness as a tool of the analytics of settler coloniality, it is important to note that the agent of possession is not simply the white/haole settler (or white settler scientist) but knowledge itself—particularly scientific and social scientific knowledge constructed about racial (physical, moral and intellectual) difference. Whiteness in my usage is not reducible to a set of phenotypes or group identity label. I see whiteness as a key ideological formation in all conventional settler colonial contexts (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States)—indeed, the national investment in whiteness may be one of the most important features distinguishing settler colonialism from other forms of colonialism where "other" national subjects cannot be

47 Morgensen, “The Biopolitics of Settler Colonialism: Right Here, Right Now.”
fully represented as white (for example, the mestizo subject of Mexico and other parts of Latin America). Whiteness, as many scholars remind us, must be understood as a historically and geographically specific concept. Yet, it is nonetheless possible to track in the many variations and transformations of whiteness what Cheryl Harris calls a "conceptual nucleus." In settler colonial contexts, after Rey Chow’s description, whiteness is an “ascendant” ideology, folding (or engulfing, in Silva's terms) peoples into it, encouraging peoples to identify with the power/knowledge of whiteness even when they are individually excluded from identifying as white. As with the example of *Wide Sargasso Sea* above, it is the possessive work done by knowledge, especially the knowledge (which is also the production) of one's self, that is the most haunting, that is demanding our attention precisely because it often, as Avery Gordon notes of power, "can speak the language of your thoughts and desires."

Gordon's formulations of haunting which inform my own methodologies in this work are also apt because the genealogies of the scientific knowledge I examine in this project have, as settler colonial studies scholar Patrick Wolfe elegantly puts it, "ideological half-lives" that "continue into the present." I do not assume that the political and economic ends of settler colonialism in the Pacific have always been perfectly served by Western scientific knowledge, or that scientific knowledge is

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50 Harris, “Whiteness As Property.”
predetermined by settler colonialism. Rather, my project actually seeks to illuminate the specific conditions under which scientific theories have been appropriated for political ends. As Wolfe writes, through such an approach, "we need not detain ourselves with talk of colonial handmaidens or with trying to decide whether particular anthropologists were good guys or bad guys." Similarly, my work attempts not to identify key "racist" scientists, but move towards a better understanding of how various scientific theories have come to be important to how Indigenous Pacific Islanders, focusing most often on Native Hawaiians, are recognized today including science, popular culture, and U.S. and international law.

In the specific cases examined in this dissertation, the possession through whiteness of the Polynesian race as produced in scientific knowledge emphasized that the ancestral and coming (white) racial mixture of Polynesians (and Native Hawaiians in particular) would render Polynesians better equipped to be part of modern civilization (that is, settler society). Thus, possession through whiteness is an expression of the moral and economic imperative to better one's human capital. In this dissertation, I show how possession through whiteness is both constructed (in nineteenth century ethnology, early twentieth century physical anthropology, early to mid twentieth century sociology, and post-WWII genetic explanations of race) and deployed (in juridical and social spheres, both historically and in the contemporary moment) in ways that naturalize settler colonialism as a structure of dominance in Hawai‘i and the Pacific.

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54 Ibid., 5.
Pacific Possession: Racial Mixture as a "Tender" Form of Colonialism

A final aspect of the logic of possession through whiteness that must be addressed is the importance of heteropatriarchy to its operation. Heteropatriarchy can be defined as "the social systems in which heterosexuality and patriarchy are perceived as normal and natural, and in which other configurations are perceived as abnormal, aberrant, and abhorrent."\(^{55}\) As in the English legal principle of coverture, whereby a woman’s property and rights are passed on to her husband upon marriage (as described in my opening discussion of Wide Sargasso Sea), through the logic of possession, an intimate relationship is forged which binds settler and native, aiming to nullify Indigenous peoples’ distinct “sense of being a people.”\(^{56}\) Settlers thus also come to possess indigeneity (making their presence and exploitation of land natural and non-violent) through "racial mixture," enabled by sexual relationships with Indigenous women.

Too few scholars have recognized that policies encouraging "racial mixture" in and of themselves have never seriously threatened existing racial and colonial hierarchies, but can in fact be strategies of racial/colonial subjection.\(^{57}\) In fact, as Black Studies scholar Jared Sexton argues, miscegenation provided structure to “the fiction of race purity.”\(^{58}\) Further, in settler colonial contexts, racial mixture (in the ideology of the settler colonial state) provides a method for settlers to become native, thus possessing the

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\(^{57}\) See: Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race, on Brazil.

\(^{58}\) Jared Sexton, Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 20.
“native” category in terms of both land and identity. Pacific Studies scholar Damon Salesa demonstrates this point in his rich analysis of “racial amalgamation” in New Zealand as a British settler colonial policy.\footnote{Damon Ieremia Salesa, \textit{Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the Victorian British Empire} (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).} Racial amalgamation was promoted as a more “tender” form of colonialism because it did not depend (only) on killing off the natives, but rather encouraged intermarriage, especially between British settler men and land-owning Tangata Whenu women (because under British colonial law, men automatically assumed their wives land titles).\footnote{Tangata Whenu is the Māori language term Salesa prefers to use in reference to the Indigenous peoples of New Zealand.} The children of such marriages were understood as “half-caste”: not quite British, but on their way to becoming British. Thus, Salesa argues, “It was not just land that was being transferred from the ‘native’ to the ‘European’ categories, but people too.”\footnote{Salesa, \textit{Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the Victorian British Empire}, 205.}

As with what Silva notes was termed "mild slavery" in social scientific accounts of Brazil, in the Pacific, this “tender” form of settler colonialism was no less violent, as it was often profoundly effective in dispossessing Indigenous peoples.\footnote{Silva, \textit{Toward a Global Idea of Race}, 163.} Placing importance on analyses of heteropatriarchy demonstrates that the places where settler colonialism appears to be “tender” are just as deserving of critical analysis as the more striking (because more “masculine”) forms of violence such as war. Heteropatriarchy’s relationship to settler colonialism is far too under-theorized, in conventional formulations of Ethnic Studies, Women and Gender Studies, and even in the recent growth of interdisciplinary literature focused on critical theories of global settler colonialism.\footnote{Arvin, Tuck, and Morrill, “Decolonizing Feminism.”} For
example, scholar Lorenzo Veracini, editor of the recently founded *settler colonial studies* journal, offers productive analyses about the differences between colonialism and settler colonialism, and the strong need for scholarship to better attend to the specificities of settler colonialism.\(^{64}\) However, Veracini has little to say about the place of gender or heteropatriarchy in either of these structures, and his theoretical framings of settler colonialism are less robust because of it. Veracini characterizes colonialism as “a demand for labour,” whereas settler colonialism is “a demand to go away.”\(^{65}\) But settler colonialism is more complicated than a demand for Indigenous peoples to “go away.” As Salesa points out, the “tender” side of settler colonialism does not demand Indigenous peoples to “go away,” but rather assumes the natural demise of the Indigenous “race,” and the ultimate unification of settlers and Indigenous peoples in one nation. The “demand” is more a liberal statement of commensurability: “We are you. We are (almost) the same.”\(^{66}\) This requires labor of a different kind—primarily the sexual and reproductive labor of Indigenous women, who are expected to birth the new, successively less “raced” generations, through coupling with white, settler men.

Other scholars have provided better models for acknowledging this sexualized labor. For example, centering the work of Native Hawaiian female hula performers, Adria Imada has usefully theorized the U.S.-Hawai‘i relationship as one of "imagined intimacy."\(^{67}\) She argues, "In this imagined relationship, the colonization of the islands is a natural, inevitable series of encounters, the joining of Hawai‘i and America allegorized as


\(^{65}\) Ibid., 4.


\(^{67}\) Imada, *Aloha America*. 
Native women beckoning non-Native outsiders to the islands. Yet this imagined intimacy, precisely because it was imagined, did not end or prevent the violence of settler colonialism; it accompanied it. "Hawaiians who could be reviled as undesirable 'primitives' in social and political discourse off-stage came to be imagined as largely assimilable and desirable through hula performances and the gendered bodies associated with hula." My framing of the logic of possession through whiteness similarly attempts to understand the importance of gender and sexuality to the ideological claims made by the U.S. to Hawai‘i and Native Hawaiian bodies and identities.

**Pacific Possession in Relation to Blackness and Settler Colonialism in the United States**

Finally, I want to situate my formulation of possession through whiteness in the Pacific context alongside other articulations of settler colonialism and white supremacy in the United States. A productive model for this situating comes from Indigenous Studies scholar Andrea Smith. Like Silva, Smith is dissatisfied with the usual articulations of race in the U.S., and suggests that U.S. formulations of race conventionally assume that all "people of color" are oppressed in distinct ways that nonetheless allow them to form coalitions "based on shared victimhood." Smith argues that this conceptualization of oppression fails to account for the ways in which "victims of white supremacy" are also "complicit in it as well." For example, she notes, "all non-

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68 Ibid., 67.  
69 Ibid.  
70 For another useful model figuring white supremacy alongside settler colonialism, see: Tuck and Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor.”  
72 Ibid., 70.
Native peoples are promised the ability to join in the colonial project of settling Indigenous lands. All Non-Black peoples are promised that if they comply, they will not be at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. And Black and Native peoples are promised that they will advance economically and politically if they join U.S. wars to spread 'democracy.'

Smith suggests that "we may wish to rearticulate our understanding of white supremacy by not assuming that it is enacted in a singular fashion; rather white supremacy is constituted by separate and distinct, but still interrelated logics." She defines the three primary logics of white supremacy as "(1) slaveability/anti-Black racism, which anchors capitalism; (2) genocide, which anchors colonialism; and (3) orientalism, which anchors war." The refocusing on logics helps denaturalize the conventional categories of race because "the people that may be entangled in these logics may shift through time and space," thereby allowing us to account for different impacts of these logics among racial groups traditionally viewed as monolithic (such as "Asian American" or "Latino"). Further, Smith notes that the shift to logics may help illuminate how "Peoples may be implicated in more than one logic simultaneously, such as people who are Black and Indigenous."

Smith's "logics of white supremacy" help her explain the complexities of race and colonialism especially in relation to peoples who are placed in proximity to whiteness. She notes, for example: "Andrew Jackson justified the removal of Cherokee peoples from

73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., 67.
75 Ibid., 68.
76 Ibid., 70.
77 Ibid.
their lands on the basis that they were now really “white,” and hence not entitled to their lands." Thus, "in the case of indigenous peoples, it is the proximity to whiteness that allows them to disappear into white society." This does not negate the force of the Black-White binary that also characterizes white supremacy. Rather, Smith's formulation allows us to see "that in addition to the Black-white binary, there are other binaries that intersect with this one, such as the indigenous-settler binary, that are distinct but mutually reinforcing. These logics position peoples in multiple and sometimes contradictory positions within the larger settler colonial/racial state."

Like Smith, I see possession through whiteness as characteristic of the ways Indigenous peoples are represented in settler colonial contexts. Though I focus on possession through whiteness in the Pacific context, other scholars have noted the complex production of Indigenous and Aboriginal people in proximity to whiteness in social scientific knowledge production in Australia, New Zealand, and the continental United States. Conventional understandings of race in these contexts have often failed to comprehend how proximity to whiteness can produce violence in societies structured by "the color line." For example, Smith points out that in the U.S. context, though important works about whiteness as property (by Cheryl Harris) and the possessive investment in whiteness (by George Lipsitz) have deepened our understandings of how whiteness is protected juridically and economically, "these characterizations of whiteness

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as property generally fail to account for the intersecting logics of white supremacy and settler colonialism as they apply to Native peoples. In this intersection, whiteness may operate as a weapon of genocide used against Native peoples in which white people demonstrate their possessive investment not only in whiteness but also in Nativeness."

Indeed, it is important to see settler possession of indigeneity through whiteness as an oft-overlooked foundation of the legal protection of "whiteness as property," as formulated by Cheryl Harris. Harris elegantly argues that the privileges of whiteness have historically been constructed as a kind of privilege-laden property that white people own and that the law acts to defend. Harris points out that white people are able to control whiteness as property but Indigenous peoples or Black people who can at times “pass” as white have no equivalent control over their own identity. Describing her grandmother’s work in an all-white office environment, Harris illustrates that certain Black people at certain times can perform whiteness, through passing or more accurately, “trespassing,” but that they cannot own it permanently. Performing whiteness requires sacrifice and, indeed, accepting the daily “risk of self-annihilation.” There is no guaranteed future in performing whiteness this way because those who pass do not have “continued control” over whiteness as an object. Indigenous peoples also at times “trespass” on the property of whiteness in similarly damaging ways. But because indigeneity, as a natural claim to a place, is desirable within a settler colonial context (in contrast to Blackness), white

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80 Harris, “Whiteness As Property.”

81 Harris, “Whiteness As Property,” 1711.
people also routinely attempt to “pass” as Indigenous. Within the structure of settler colonialism, this type of passing is far from risky—rather than “self-annihilation,” possessing indigeneity is in fact a form of self-actualization for white settlers.

This possession of indigeneity allows settlers to, seemingly naturally, possess Indigenous land. Settlers possessing indigeneity requires that Indigenous peoples, in turn, be possessed through whiteness. This possession, in my view, takes place in the production of knowledge first, before it is coopted by the law. Thus, my project analyzes the production of the logic of possession through whiteness in scientific literature, though I also at times connect this logic to its deployment in law (specifically in Chapter 2, where I discuss a contemporary lawsuit over blood quantum definitions for Native Hawaiians, and Chapter 4, where I discuss national and international recognition of Indigenous peoples).

Overall, then, we can view the possession through whiteness of Indigenous peoples as a central strategy of power/knowledge within settler colonial societies, though it is often accompanied by and reinforces a strategy of the enslavement and commodification of Black/other bodies. Though related to similar forms of engulfment (such as the Brazilian context as analyzed by Silva, discussed further in Chapter 4), in the specific context that I examine, Hawai‘i (and to a certain extent, Polynesia more broadly), possession through whiteness is a strategy deployed within the cultural, juridical and economic structures of settler colonialism, in order to both naturalize and actualize a settler society to replace the pre-existing Indigenous one. Though I focus on possession through whiteness and its impact on Indigenous peoples in this project, I see it as importantly in operation with (rather than more important than or in contrast to) the logic
of slaveability (often most visible in the Black-White binary) that settler colonialism also deploys.

**Methods: Tracing the Logic of Possession Within a Framework of Regeneration**

This project relies on two main methodologies: Foucauldian discourse analysis (particularly as modeled after Denise Ferreira da Silva's use of Foucault's methods in her own excavation of her "analytics of raciality"), which I use in tracing the logic of possession through whiteness, and Native feminist critique (especially Eve Tuck's formulation of "desire-based research"), which anchors my framing of regeneration. I apply these methodologies to scientific literature (from the late nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century) as well as related fields in which the logic of possession through whiteness recurs, including the contemporary science of genomics, legal definitions of Native Hawaiian membership through blood quantum standards, the mixed-race identity Hapa, and various political forms of recognition of Indigenous peoples at national and international levels. I have chosen to ground my analysis in readings of historical scientific literature because like Foucault, I find knowledge production important to the operation of biopower. In completing such an analysis, my conclusions differ from much contemporary literature on the history of science, which often disavow the continuation of racial/racist science after World War II. Such literature relies heavily on the conventional accounts of race in the U.S. context, which as I have argued above, cannot account for the ways in which raciality and settler

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colonialism are productive and inclusive rather than strictly exclusionary. In contrast, I attempt to explain how the greater acceptance of the discourse that "we are all human" has not effectively overturned raciality and settler colonialism; rather, it has been their foundation.

I am specifically guided by Foucault's methodology in The History of Sexuality. Where the "central issue" for Foucault was, in brief, "the over-all 'discursive fact,' the way in which sex is 'put into discourse,'" the central issue here is how the Polynesian and the Native Hawaiian are put into discourse in close proximity to whiteness. Like Foucault, my task is to locate the "polymorphous techniques of power" that putting the "not quite/not white" Polynesian into discourse creates. The aim is not to determine the ultimate truth of the "discursive productions and… effects of power" of the Polynesian and Native Hawaiian but rather to "bring out the 'will to knowledge' that serves as both their support and their instrument."84

Foucault shows that the apparent repression of sexuality is actually part of a regime of power/knowledge in which institutions require us to speak more and more about sex and to "cause it to speak through explicit articulation and endlessly accumulated detail."85 Yet, in Foucault's account, power is not just something that institutions like the church and the law have. The "polymorphous techniques of power" must be located in the various "channels it takes, and the discourses it permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and individual modes of behavior, the paths that give it access

84 Ibid., 11–12.
85 Ibid., 18.
to the rare or scarcely perceivable forms of desire, [and in] how it penetrates and controls everyday pleasure."\(^86\)

For Foucault, four figures help highlight the various ways sex as discourse was consolidated. These figures—"the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult"—are all "privileged objects of knowledge, which were also targets and anchorage points for the ventures of knowledge."\(^87\) In my own study, the "privileged objects of knowledge" are all variations on the "almost white" Polynesian: the ancestrally white Polynesian (1830s-1870s), the Part-Hawaiian (1910s-1920s), the mixed-race "Hawaiian girl" (1930s-1940s), and the mixed-race, soon-to-be white (again) Polynesian (1950s). Each of these figures was produced prior to Hawai‘i’s statehood in 1959, and I show how the Part-Hawaiian and the mixed-race "Hawaiian girl" were particularly important in securing statehood. Though created in specific, and in some cases quite distant times, these figures have ideological half-lives that continue into the present. Thus, I look at specific examples of their figuration in both the period of their creation/consolidation and in recent times. By doing so, I trace these figures and the logic of possession that produces them through Aryanism and genomics, eugenics and current battles over the legal definition of what it means to be Native Hawaiian, sociology and the adoption of the identity Hapa by mixed race Asian Americans, and post WWII genetic explanations of racial difference and the relationships Native Hawaiians have established to human rights, other Polynesians and the Indigenous peoples of the Pacific more broadly, and Native American and the First Nations Indigenous movement, Idle No

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\(^{86}\) Ibid., 11.
\(^{87}\) Ibid., 105.
More. I further explain the contexts of these central figures in the chapter outline of the next section.

Conceptualizing the possession of Indigenous peoples through whiteness as a key logic of settler colonialism also allows for a complex theorization of how Indigenous peoples respond to, critique, challenge, and co-opt the ideologies deployed by settler colonialism. I do so in this project through a framework of regeneration. As noted above, regeneration attempts to recognize complex personhood in the actions of those who are colonially possessed. Regeneration can involve actions we might classify as exorcism, repossession, or reproduction. As with Antoinette in *Wide Sargasso Sea*, regeneration reminds us that even as colonized peoples are possessed by power/knowledge, they are never completely erased, but also sometimes haunt and unsettle the very institutions that have turned them into ghosts. Certainly the regenerative power of the colonized is not commensurable with or equivalent to the colonial powers that possess them. Thus, regeneration should be understood not as the straightforward opposite of Western knowledge production or the specific logic of possession through whiteness. Rather, we can follow the model of Colin Dayan's understanding of the "alternative understanding[s] of law" resorted to by "persons judged outside the law's protection": "Degraded and socially excluded, they interpret legal precepts and proscriptions for themselves and reconceive the rules: not the opposite of law but its haunting." Regeneration in its own way is not power/knowledge's opposite but its haunting.

The goal of framing my analysis of the historical scientific literature through regeneration is, therefore, not to document "damage" (in order for the state or scientific

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disciplines to redress such damage) but to better understand how settler colonialism persists in order to better understand what strategies have been and might be effective in unsettling such logics. Native feminist scholar Eve Tuck reminds us that it is important to examine the underlying theories of change in the research we do.89 She describes damage-centered research as "research that operates, even benevolently, from a theory of change that establishes harm or injury in order to achieve reparation."90 She eloquently argues that when such research is framed "without the context of racism and colonization, all we’re left with is the damage, and this makes our stories vulnerable to pathologizing analyses."91 Thus, such research has contributed to Indigenous and other colonized peoples "thinking of ourselves as broken," rather than actually transforming social and political relations.92

With Tuck's important critique in mind, I understand my discursive analysis of the scientific production of the "almost white" Polynesian race as purposefully intent on fleshing out the operative logics of historical and present-day settler colonialism; not as proof of irreparable or totalizing harm. As I attempt to highlight throughout the dissertation, the racial designations imposed on Native Hawaiians and other Indigenous peoples have never been wholly or blindly accepted. In many Native Hawaiian contexts, historically and in the present, being “Part” or “x percent” Native Hawaiian is entirely nonsensical. Native Hawaiians have long been inclusive about their genealogical

90 Ibid., 413.
91 Ibid., 415.
92 Ibid., 409.
definitions of community and nation. This inclusion has rarely made sense to scientists who, for example, in the early twentieth century often doubted and disregarded the self-identifications their Native Hawaiian subjects made, marking many of those who claimed to be “Pure Hawaiian” as likely “Part Hawaiian” instead. That Native Hawaiians would want to hold on to their Hawaiian-ness, when they were being offered nominal entry into whiteness, was often baffling to scientists and a larger American public. Salesa similarly writes of the continual self-identification of “half-castes” as Māori, as a development that was “fascinating to scholars, who wondered why, if given access not just to the colonial polity but the white race, literally thousands of people apparently refused, and not just day after day but (by the 1930s and 1940s) generation after generation.”

Yet, the history and present of Native Hawaiian identity is deeply entangled with the logic of possession through whiteness, despite the alternative understandings that have long existed. My framework of regeneration attempts to acknowledge the entanglements rather than focus on the colonial and the colonized ideas as entirely separate. Thus, regeneration is similar to what Adria Imada, after Vince Diaz, terms "counter-colonial tactics and desires," which are "practices and desires that are not easily categorized as anticolonial but nevertheless contain latent critiques of imperial influence." Regeneration is also in affinity with what Eve Tuck offers as "desire-based research," what she frames as an epistemological shift that can help re-frame "damage-based research" without engaging in "denial" of racist and colonial contexts. She notes:

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94 Salesa does an impressive job of documenting the historical responses to Western knowledge production in Aotearoa by Māori. Though I largely analyze contemporary regenerative actions in this dissertation, this is not to say that regenerative actions on the part of Native Hawaiians were not present in the past.
95 Imada, *Aloha America*, 64.
As a theoretical concept, desire interrupts the binary of reproduction versus resistance. In social science, it is often believed that people are bound to reproduce or replicate social inequity or, on the flip side, that they can resist unequal social conditions. Critics on both sides accuse the other of oversimplifying, of underestimating the immense and totalizing power of systematic oppression on the one hand and the radical power of the human spirit and human agency on the other. It seems that the positions are irreconcilable.96

Desire is more complex, as indeed Tuck articulates it in conjunction with Avery Gordon's complex personhood. "Desire, because it is an assemblage of experiences, ideas, and ideologies, both subversive and dominant, necessarily complicates our understanding of human agency, complicity, and resistance."97 Similarly, I approach regeneration not as a framework that suggests “best practices” for decolonizing Indigenous actions, but rather as a framework with which to conceptualize the complications of Indigenous responses to settler colonialism; responses that deserve much more from academia and the public than simple endorsements or condemnations.98 Thus, even in cases where Indigenous actions are, on their face, complicit with settler colonialism, I attempt to take seriously the desire behind such actions, in order to uncover not simply assimilation or oppression but a complex response to deeply possessive forms of power/knowledge.

I find that my own theory of change is in line with the sentiment expressed by Avery Gordon: "We need to know where we live in order to imagine living elsewhere.

97 Ibid., 420.
98 Many other Indigenous Studies scholars have also significantly developed theories of regeneration, including Taiaiake Alfred and Andrea Smith, who have named regeneration or generative performance (respectively), as important characteristics of modern Native communities. However, as Alfred’s formulation in particular promotes regeneration as a particular kind of political action/orientation, my own formulation of regeneration is distinct in that it is not necessarily or straightforwardly one type of political “resistance.” See: Taiaiake Alfred, Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2005); Andrea Smith, Native Americans and the Christian Right: The Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).
We need to imagine living elsewhere before we can live there."99 In its critical analysis, this dissertation is without a doubt caught up more in the act of discovering "where we live" now, rather than imagining "living elsewhere." Indeed, I find the work of knowing "where we live" overwhelming at times, especially when raciality and settler colonialism are so often naturalized, and when science has produced raciality and the logics deployed in settler colonialism as the uncontested truth. However, like Gordon, my purpose in excavating the knowledge of "where we live" is oriented by the need "to imagine living elsewhere." My framework of regeneration attempts to reveal glimpses of possible "elsewheres" through a thorough investigation of how Native Hawaiians respond to "where we live" now. As a Native Hawaiian woman, I find these tasks urgent. Yet, while I am of the Native Hawaiian people, I do not seek to speak for all of them, or even part of them. Rather, through regeneration, I analyze several different Native Hawaiian actions that I see as connected through similar goals of decolonization, even when their strategies may be at odds. In other words, all of the regenerative actions I analyze are involved with both knowing where we live, and imagining an elsewhere.

**Chapter Outline**

Each chapter of my dissertation pairs a set of historical scientific literature with a set of contemporary problems in which the logics of that older literature are still intact or re-emergent. While my dissertation covers a wide temporal range, a kind of time travel even, the chapters are designed to support a cumulative analysis and critique. The historical literature of each chapter, therefore, follows a rough chronological order,

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developing a sense of how scientific knowledge produced the fundamentally mixed, "almost white" Polynesian race over time. The contemporary texts are largely sited within the last decade and do not follow any chronology, though my analysis attempts to put them in context with each other. I describe each chapter in further detail below.

Chapter One, “The Polynesian Problem, and its Genomic Solutions,” analyzes the origins of Native Hawaiians’ scientific possession through whiteness in the abundant scientific literature speculating on the racial origins of Pacific Islanders. This topic fascinated many late nineteenth century and early twentieth century social scientists who referred to it as “the Polynesian problem.” Through linguistic, archaeological and mythological comparisons, scientists attempted to prove that Polynesians were descended from ancient Grecians or Romans, or, after the popularization of Max Müller’s scholarship, the original Aryan race. I trace how the logics of these studies established Polynesians and Native Hawaiians as holding an ancient, biological connection to whiteness, though contemporary Native Hawaiian people had “degenerated” from their former civilizational heights. I trace this logic to the contemporary genomics field, in both the popular narratives that circulate based on population genomics’ findings that we are all “African,” and a proposed genebank that would isolate and study the “Hawaiian genome.” I examine how Native Hawaiians have responded in complex ways to genomics studies, specifically through analyzing the declaration of the Native Hawaiian Intellectual Property Rights Conference, issued in 2003. This declaration envisions Native Hawaiian indigeneity as an agent in unsettling Man itself, by drawing on radically different epistemologies about property, land and the human.
Chapter Two, “‘Still in the Blood’: Past and Present Configurations of the ‘Part-Hawaiian’” considers how whiteness was, in a sense, “bred” in Native Hawaiians through the development and contemporary exercise of blood quantum policies for Native Hawaiians. The legal history of the 50% blood quantum requirement created with the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act in 1920 is already well documented. Yet, this chapter further explores how the concept of “50% Hawaiian blood” was constructed in the scientific literature of the time, and how such blood percentages figure in Native Hawaiian political actions today. Eugenics scholarship dominated the scientific literature in Hawai‘i at the time blood quantum legislation was passed, and played a key role in constructing Hawaiian “blood” as a literal and figurative measure of the Native Hawaiian race. For example, educational manuals produced for Native Hawaiian high school students disseminated the principles of eugenics, suggesting how to choose spouses to best produce children with the “honorable qualities” of their “old time Hawaiian” ancestors. Tracing concerns with the authenticity of Hawaiian “blood” to the present day, I focus on a notorious attempt by five Native Hawaiian men to institute more stringent blood quantum policies in state programs benefiting the Native Hawaiian community. This attempt was brought to court as Day v. Apoliona (2006-2009), and the plaintiffs ultimately lost at the Federal Appeals level. Yet, the case epitomizes the continuing salience of institutionalizing “Hawaiian blood.” The court denied the plaintiffs the power to change the blood quantum policies, yet also stopped short of throwing out

100 Kauanui, Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity.
101 Uldrick Thompson, Eugenics for Young People: Twelve Short Articles on a Vital Subject (Honolulu, 1913).
those policies altogether—thereby upholding the state as final arbiter of who “counts” as Native Hawaiian.

Chapter Three, “Re-envisioning 'Hybrid' and 'Hapa': Race, Gender and Indigeneity in Hawai‘i as Racial Laboratory,” focuses on the management of perceived threats to the possession of Hawai‘i and Native Hawaiians through whiteness in the designation of Hawai‘i as a “racial laboratory” in social scientific texts from the late 1920s to the 1950s. In these studies, anthropologists and sociologists repeatedly proclaim that Native Hawaiians are dying out; a tragic occurrence that nonetheless heralds an exciting “neo-Hawaiian American race.” I show how popular media also drew on these scientific studies in portraying “hybrid Hawaiian girls” as a key symbol (and racial intermarriage as a key method) of Hawai‘i becoming American. I connect these discourses of racial mixing to the contemporary use of racial identity “Hapa.” A Hawaiian word meaning "portion, fragment, part," “Hapa” is now widely used to refer to mixed race Asian Americans, without critical understanding of the key role categorizing certain people as “Part-Hawaiian” played in disenfranchising Native Hawaiians from being a self-determined people. I argue that for mixed race Asian Americans, Hapa becomes a circuitous mode of accessing whiteness. I contrast the Hapa movement with the efforts of Native Hawaiian and allied scholars to theorize the concept of Asian settler colonialism, which has been a significant response to such uncritical slippages between Asian, Hawaiian, and American in Hawai‘i.

102 Sidney Gulick, Mixing the Races in Hawaii: A Study of the Coming Neo-Hawaiian American Race (Honolulu, HI: The Hawaiian Board Book Rooms, 1937).
103 Kip Fulbeck, Part Asian, 100% Hapa (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2006).
My last chapter, “Beyond Recognition: Native Hawaiians, Human Rights, and Global Indigenous Identities” examines the difficulties of recognizing Native Hawaiian indigeneity within both national and international contexts due to the persistence of the image of Hawai‘i as a happy place of racial mixture. I examine UNESCO publications on race from the 1950s that reference Hawai‘i as an international model, alongside Brazil, of racial harmony. These studies were important foundations for the development of human rights law, and were authored by many of the same social scientists that developed the notion of Hawai‘i as a racial laboratory, as analyzed in the previous chapter. My analysis of these documents argues that the erasure of Native Hawaiian indigeneity remains a troubling and ultimately unacceptable precondition for racial harmony and liberal concepts of “humanity” itself. Various groups of Native Hawaiian activists, often well aware of the problems inherent in trying to be recognized by the U.S. or the international community, nonetheless continue to seek redress from both the U.S. Congress and the United Nations. I analyze the efforts of those arguing for recognition under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as the non-state forms of recognition Native Hawaiians seek or refuse in the relationships they build with other Indigenous Pacific Islanders, Native Americans, and the Idle No More movement. In each case, I seek a better understanding of how these activists in pursuing a different Native Hawaiian future, variously challenge and displace, or simply valorize and seek better inclusion within, scientific understandings of race, indigeneity and humanity.

Thus, while the entire dissertation is grounded in the Hawaiian context, the first and fourth chapters of this project are more broadly focused on questions of Polynesia, while the middle chapters are more squarely engaged with scientific knowledge produced and disseminated in Hawai‘i—particularly at the Honolulu institutions of Bishop Museum, Kamehameha Schools, and the University of Hawai‘i. Overall, each chapter attempts to answer, as described above, my guiding questions: "How does knowledge act as an agent of possession?" and "Can possessive knowledge be refused, un-thought—and if so, how?" Within the context of Hawai‘i, I am also asking more particularly, first, in what ways and under what conditions have Polynesians/Native Hawaiians been recognized, and come to identify themselves, as (almost) white? And second, in what ways and under what conditions can this possessive recognition be refused, and Indigenous identity regenerated? My aim in pursuing these questions is to unsettle representations of the exceptionally pacific (calm, peaceful and non-confrontational) nature of Pacific settler colonialism, in order to reveal not simply colonial damage but the complex personhood that the construction of the almost white Polynesian race has so long erased.
CHAPTER 1:

The Polynesian Problem and its Genomic Solutions

In what consists the ever constant interest in the handful of people that comprises the Polynesian race? … The answer is, no doubt, the mystery that surrounds their origin, their intelligence, their charming personality, and—one likes to think—their common source with ourselves from the Caucasian branch of humanity, which induces in us a feeling of sympathy and affection above that felt toward any other colored race.

(S. Percy Smith, “Polynesian Wanderings,” 1911)

Today visitors to Maui land on a runway just downwind from the shore where Captain Cook battled the surf eleven generations ago. Once out of the airport, they encounter what is probably the most genetically mixed population in the world. To the genes of Captain Cook’s sailors and the native Polynesians has been added the DNA of European missionaries, Mexican cowboys, African-American soldiers, and plantation workers from throughout Asia and Europe. This intense mixing of DNA has produced a population of strikingly beautiful people.

(Steve Olson, Mapping Human History: Discovering the Past Through Our Genes, 2002)

Visitors to Oceania have long seen themselves (selectively) reflected in the Indigenous peoples they have encountered there. This “ever constant interest” in “the Polynesian race,” as put in 1911 by S. Percy Smith, then president of the Polynesian Society (a New Zealand-based “learned society” focused on the study of Māori and other Pacific Island peoples), has fueled tourism in Hawai‘i and elsewhere in the Pacific from the turn of the twentieth century. While this abiding interest is often naturalized and depoliticized, it is actually an articulation of colonial power, what this dissertation terms

“possession through whiteness.” The effects of such power continue to have significant, and often damaging, material effects for Indigenous peoples in the Pacific.

Ideals of human progress and modernity are central to the comparisons Western settlers and scientists have long made between themselves and Indigenous Pacific Islanders. The Pacific Islands have long been imagined as an idyllic picture of (Western-defined) humanity’s past and future. Early European explorers saw in Pacific Indigenous peoples the reflection of ancient European civilizations, while late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century scientists argued passionately for a prehistoric genealogical relationship between Polynesians and Aryans. Today, Indigenous Pacific Islanders continue to represent a rather mythical version of humanity itself, as they simultaneously seem to recall a classical European antiquity—a treasured civilization now tragically disappeared from the earth—and herald a multicultural, global future in which everyone is “genetically mixed.” As science journalist Steve Olson describes in the quote above, Hawai‘i in particular has come to represent for many the epitome of this “strikingly beautiful” multicultural face of the future. Olson’s sexualization of Hawai‘i's population is barely subtler than that of Percy Smith’s “sympathy” for the “charming” Polynesian “personality.”

This chapter maps the history and legacy of the “ever constant interest” of Western science in Indigenous Pacific Islanders from nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century writing about the “Polynesian Problem”—that interesting “mystery” of Polynesian origin, intelligence, and charm, as S. Percy Smith puts it—to understandings of Polynesian race in contemporary genetics/genomics literature. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the question of Polynesian origins troubled scientists, settlers
and missionaries for a number of reasons. For one, how had such seemingly “primitive”
native peoples navigated the immense expanses of ocean between the Pacific Islands to
populate some of the most isolated pieces of land on Earth? Why, if clear affinities
existed between various native Oceanic languages, did the various natives of the Pacific
Islands look so different— with some Polynesians seeming to have classical Grecian,
“white,” or at most “brown,” features in stark contrast to the “black” Melanesians, for
instance? Where did they fit into existing racial hierarchies of Man? Though
contemporary scientific questions about Indigenous Pacific Islanders differ in significant
ways, by tracing the logic of possession through whiteness across various historical
transformations, this dissertation argues that scientific interest in the Pacific and its native
peoples’ diversity has never been entirely divorced from the historic Polynesian Problem.
In fact, the Polynesian Problem remains an important theme throughout my dissertation.
This chapter begins to critically assess the Problem’s underlying logics, practical and
potential applications, and overall staying power. At its most basic level, the problem of
Polynesian origins has been “solved” more or less definitively through archaeological,
anthropological and linguistic data, with recent augmentation from genomic population
histories: the ancient ancestors of Indigenous Pacific Islanders migrated to Oceania from
Asia. Yet questions probing various cultural and historical details of ancient
migrations, as well as the bioanthropological relationships between different Oceanic,

106 Patrick V. Kirch, “Peopling of the Pacific: A Holistic Anthropological Perspective,” *Annual Review of
Asian, and South American populations continue to animate scholarship in a number of fields.\textsuperscript{107}

Beyond pursuing ever more precise solutions to the Polynesian problem, I argue that a significant part of the interest in “Polynesian” origins, lands, and cultures is structured by a strong desire to better know and define Man. As argued in the Introduction, I follow Denise Ferreira da Silva in using “Man” to denote not simply an apolitical notion of humans as a global collective, but the Western, scientific concept of humanity which is oft presented as universal, yet actually remains tied to biological, racial, and cultural hierarchies that privilege European/white men.\textsuperscript{108} Scientifically articulated desires to better know Man have both justified and helped realize the possession of the Indigenous Pacific through whiteness. Both historical and contemporary scholarship emphasizes definitions of race and humanity in such a way that Western whiteness is the natural past and/or future of the Pacific islands. Within such discourses, the distinct bodies, lands, cultures, and politics of Polynesians and Native Hawaiians are "engulfed" (in Silva's terms) and possessed (in my own terms) through an insistence on past, present and future, white “racial mixture.” As Pacific Islander “racial mixture” is glossed into a universal (and in Hawai‘i’s case, noticeably American) humanity, Polynesia and the Polynesian “race” become emblematic of, and possessed by, a global future where any remaining differences between the Western world and Oceania


\textsuperscript{108} Silva, \textit{Toward a Global Idea of Race}. 
will finally only serve to highlight their similarities as (apparently equal) members of the human race.

Part 1 of this chapter provides historical context and analysis of key texts about the Polynesian Problem, focusing on the influential discourses of degeneration and Aryanism in writing Indigenous Pacific Islanders as a kind of European prehistory. Part 2 uses that analysis as a basis for understanding and critiquing the logic of contemporary genomics, particularly tracing a similar version of this logic of possession through whiteness within the proposed Hawaiian Genome Project. This study drew significant protests from the Native Hawaiian community, some of whom resisted not only the sequencing of a “Hawaiian genome” but also the genomic definition of Man itself. I examine how the protests are regenerative for Native Hawaiians, despite liberal scientists’ surprise and confusion at the refusal to participate in potentially medically and financially beneficial studies. Ultimately, this chapter’s analysis demonstrates that short of substantial decolonization of Western scientific epistemologies, knowledge used to prove the universality of Man tend to entrench rather than eradicate the underlying colonial logics of the Polynesian Problem.

**Part 1: Defining The Polynesian Problem**

Before analyzing the Polynesian Problem, it is necessary to know something of the origins of the designation Polynesian itself. The French writer Charles des Brosses has been credited with the first use of the term in 1756 (in French, “Polynésie”), having
derived it from the Greek “polloi,” meaning “many.” For des Brosses, “many” signified the many islands across that vast geographical scope of what was commonly known as “the South Seas.” Today, the term “Polynesian” holds a debatable value to scholars and Indigenous Pacific Islanders themselves, especially as it has been used alongside the labels Micronesian and Melanesian to mark what are now understood to be rather spurious ethnic/racial divisions between Indigenous Pacific Islanders. While Micronesia marked a geographic contrast to Polynesia (signifying in Greek, “the area of small islands”), and was at times understood linguistically and ethnologically as a related subset of Polynesia, the division between Polynesians and Melanesians was explicitly racial. Polynesians were “brown” and Melanesians were “black.” Indeed, the label Melanesian derived from “melas,” meaning “black” in Greek: an overt reference to skin color.

Scholarship has tended to focus on the Polynesian/Melanesian divide (generally overlooking Micronesia altogether). Nicholas Thomas notes that “distinctions between the darker race in the west and the peoples related to the Tahitians and Tongans were sustained and elaborated upon in publications associated with other voyages… but the ethnological distinctions as understood in the 20th century were not clearly defined until the 1830s.” Thomas credits the navigator Jules-Sebastien-Cesar Dumont d'Urville with effectively solidifying the divisions between Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia in an

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article published in 1832. d'Urville also revealed the meaning the West would long attribute to these divisions, which was, as Thomas describes it, that:

unlike the hospitable Polynesians, the savage Melanesians always met Europeans with defiance and hostility; for the Western writers there was thus a happy correspondence between the advancement of the different peoples and their sense of appropriate behaviour towards foreigners. As [Horatio] Hale [of the U.S. Exploring Expedition in 1846] added, "the difference of character in the three Oceanic races is most clearly displayed in the reception which they have given to their earliest civilized visitors."\(^{114}\)

Later anthropologists did not adhere to the divisions in exactly the same ways, and some scholars have cautioned tracing an unbroken line of similarities between older labels and contemporary divisions because, as Bronwen Douglas argues, “the binary construction of Pacific humanity was never homogeneous or uncontested… it has recurred, retreated, and mutated.”\(^{115}\) Indeed, ethnologist S. J. Whitmee would express dissatisfaction with the “confusion in the use of Geographic and Ethnographic names in the Pacific” as early as 1879.\(^{116}\) Whitmee argued that Polynesia should be applied as a strictly geographic term to the entire Pacific islands east of Australia, the Philippines and New Guinea. Nonetheless, he maintained that there were ethnological divisions to be made between the “dark races” and the “brown stock,” insisting only on further specifying this divide with designations such as “Negrito-Polynesian” and “Malayo-

Polynesian.” Significantly, the perceived social position of women was a key barometer of the differences between the black and brown races for Whitmee:

Among the black Polynesians (Negrito-Polynesians), as among other savages, her position is worse than that of the dog, whose food—the leavings of the lords of creation—she shares. But among the brown race, throughout the whole of Polynesia, woman maintains a position of importance, perhaps only a little inferior to the relative position held by our “better-halves” in our own homes.

Clearly, heteropatriarchy was thus an important part of solidifying the racial divide between Melanesians and Polynesians, as Western onlookers identified more closely with “position of importance” they perceived in Polynesian societies. Imagining Polynesian women as “only a little inferior” to “our ‘better-halves’” indicates the possibility of Polynesian women as “graduating” to the position of wives of white men; whereas the women of the “Negrito-Polynesians” remain tied to their status as “worse than that of the dog,” despite Whitmee’s critique of their treatment as such.

Undeniably, later studies have tended to reify these “two types” in different ways. Marshall Sahlins’ noted essay, “Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief,” published in 1963, is a particularly influential example, in which Sahlins characterized Melanesians as having largely egalitarian societies in contrast to Polynesians’ more structured hierarchical societies. In contemporary anthropology, there remains critical debate less about the usefulness of the terms as ethnology markers (which has largely been debunked) but about the usefulness of area studies more broadly and the development of

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117 Ibid., 360-369.
language across the Pacific, which has given rise to other sets of labels, such as: “Near Oceania” and “Remote Oceania”; and “Papuan” and “Austronesian.”

I further examine an ideological echo of this characterization of Polynesians and Melanesians as “two types” in Chapter 2. For now, it is important to note the historical Polynesian Problem literature I focus on in this chapter were very much shaped by an obsession with the relative similarity between Polynesians and white settlers, in contrast to the relative dissimilarity between white settlers and other Indigenous peoples (including Melanesians, but also, at times, Native Americans, Aborigines of Australia, and other Indigenous peoples). While my own dissertation’s focus on Polynesians (and largely, not Melanesians or Micronesians) risks reifying such labels, I do so because my dissertation overall is interested in the violence done through what I have termed possession through whiteness. The Polynesian Problem literature struggles with precisely the terms of whiteness, and the conditions under which Indigenous Pacific Islanders can be included in the making of white settler nations.


With “Polynesian” briefly historicized, I now turn to a closer examination of the Polynesian Problem. A host of scholars and writers since the nineteenth-century have referred to the Polynesian Problem—what archaeologist Patrick Kirch characterizes as

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120 Kirch, “Peopling of the Pacific,” 133; Terrell, Kelly, and Rainbird, “Foregone Conclusions?”.
121 “Indigenous Pacific Islanders” is the term I prefer to use in reference to all Indigenous peoples of Oceania, though this term is also imperfect and derived largely from the U.S. political context, rather than Oceania itself. See, for example: Vicente M. Diaz, “‘To “P” or Not to “P”’?: Marking the Territory Between Pacific Islander and Asian American Studies.” *Journal of Asian American Studies* 7, no. 3 (2004): 183–208.
“the long-standing questions of when and how people entered the Pacific and managed to discover and colonize virtually every one of its thousands of islands.”122 Yet, the specific questions that constitute the “Problem” have varied.123 K.R. Howe’s text *The Quest for Origins* provides a thorough overview of the various debates and questions that scientists and others have asked about Pacific Islanders.124 Yet even his text betrays an important slippage in formulations of the Polynesian Problem. In the first chapter, Howe defines the mystery so many scientists and others pursued thus: “Where did Islanders come from?”125 Yet the book’s subtitle demonstrates a different slant: “Who First Discovered and Settled the Pacific Islands?” The difference between these two formulas of the Polynesian Problem may seem slight at first. The first question, however, takes Indigenous Pacific Islanders as a given (as a natural or at least historical category), while the second suggests the possibility that Indigenous Pacific Islanders were not really the first “discoverers” and “settlers” (culturally, and colonially, loaded terms) of the Pacific at all.

While both questions evince wonder at who Pacific Islanders really are and where they came from, encompassed within the second question is a suggested need for the reconstruction of the category of Pacific Islander itself. As “Who First Discovered and Settled the Islands?” is the very subtitle of the book, it is this second question that is arguably the more significant point for Howe. It is precisely this slippage between *origins* and *identity*, between *where from?* and *who?*— and implicitly, regarding the ownership of

122 Kirch, “Peopling of the Pacific,” 132.
123 Another iteration of the Polynesian Problem—namely the production of the Polynesian race as one of the lost tribes of Israel, and therefore a “chosen people” within the Mormon church—which is not covered by Howe has recently been addressed by Hokulani Aikau in her book *A Chosen People, A Promised Land: Mormonism and Race in Hawai‘i* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).
125 Ibid., 27.
the Pacific Islands, whose?—that is the focus of my analysis of historical and
contemporary scientific writing about the Polynesian Problem, for it is this slippage that
presents such a recognizable threat to Indigenous peoples today. Given the histories of
blood quantum and other colonial laws about Indigenous membership, it is not
unreasonable to understand genomic reconstructions of Indigenous identity as posing
significant threats to Indigenous sovereignty.\textsuperscript{126}

In short, this slippage relies on the replacement of indigeneity (\textit{where from?}) with
racial typing (\textit{who?}). Indigenous Pacific Islanders are established in a racial hierarchy of
“Polynesian,” “Micronesian,” and “Melanesian,”—distinctly different from each other
but all of which fall behind white, civilized settlers. Through this racial hierarchy, white
settlers become the obvious answer as to who is really deserving of owning and
governing these islands. Melanesians were characterized by a savage indigeneity, while
Polynesians were “only a little inferior” to white settlers. Thus, white settlers easily
possessed Polynesian indigeneity. Polynesians can always display a more savage side that
divorces their affinity with whiteness, placing them closer to the Melanesian savage, and
thus allowing whiteness to assume the mantel of Polynesian indigeneity. Such slippages
between these competing indigeneities are fundamental to all literature on the Polynesian
Problem. For while Polynesian Problem literature always begins with a stated intent of
uncovering the origins of Pacific Islanders, the real interest and answers to the “Problem”
are inevitably about possessing the origins and identity of Man itself.

\textsuperscript{126} Kim Tallbear and Deborah Bolnick, “\textit{Native American DNA}” Tests: What Are the Risks to Tribes?,
2004; Debra Harry and Le’a Malia Kanehe, “Asserting Tribal Sovereignty over Cultural Property: Moving
Towards Protection of Genetic Material and Indigenous Knowledge,” \textit{Seattle Journal for Social Justice} 5,
My critique here, of how the Polynesian Problem was less an issue concerned with Pacific Islanders themselves, and more with white European and American concepts of humanity, is in fact largely shared by Howe. He similarly argues:

The opening to the Western gaze of the Americas in the 1750s and the Pacific in the 1770s greatly stimulated the idea of early or natural man…. Only humans were encountered [as opposed to “monsters,” the previously speculated inhabitants of the Pacific Islands], but they were still regarded as fundamentally different, largely on the basis of time and location. These people and regions were soon regarded as living archives wherein Europeans might see examples of their early selves, and also gain evidence for a range of more philosophical speculations.127

Howe expresses concern with how such colonial understandings of Indigenous peoples as “living archives” of early European Man are recurring today in discourses that he terms “new learning”—referring largely to new age spiritualism which idolizes Native peoples as having natural, mystical connections with the Earth.128

While our critiques on such points are shared, my analysis differs from Howe’s in a key way. Namely, Howe maintains an overall positivistic belief in the necessity and possibility of scientifically solving the “Polynesian Problem,” even as he acknowledges the damaging Eurocentrism embedded in past scientific studies of the issue. In general, he views the “interpretative underlay” of modern science as drastically improved, since:

we are now more open to the idea that peoples long ago had abilities and capacities to explore, discover, settle, adapt, modify, colonize and generally control their own destinies in the regions of the world that we might regard as ‘remote’ and ‘difficult.’ The post-imperial study of indigenous cultures, plus the recent emphasis on considering communities in relation to their natural environment, has meant that there is now much more focus on the achievements and adaptive progress of indigenous peoples rather than their assumed inherent mental and technological

127 Howe, The Quest for Origins, 20.
128 Ibid., 140.
Howe’s use of “we,” as well as “post-imperial,” are troubling here. Though he clearly positions himself as a non-Pacific Islander researcher, and thus never claims to speak for Pacific Islanders, his position as part of this “we”—which apparently alludes to both “Western” science and humanity itself—goes unmarked and unquestioned. It is not just that Howe is able to speak for Western science qua humanity, but also that his use of “we” assumes that his audience and readers are also equally part of and able to claim Western science and Western ideals of humanity as their own. His use of “post-imperial” is similarly problematic—as imperialism and colonialism are very much alive in many parts of the Pacific, including New Zealand, his country of residence, even if those systems look different today than they did historically. By declining to better contextualize his use of “post-imperial,” and limiting his critique of contemporary expressions of Pacific Islanders as “early man” to “new learning,” he betrays a lack of complex consideration of contemporary political issues in the Pacific related to imperialism, colonialism, and science. In doing so, he fails to further reflect on how his own study participates in reifying the Polynesian Problem rather than substantially dismantling it.

My analysis remains skeptical of such belief in the positive progression of Western science in fully correcting its colonial “interpretative underlay.” Overall, I am not interested in determining the “real” answer to where Polynesians came from. John Terrell, Kevin Kelly, and Paul Rainbird point out: “as the archaeologist Les Groube

129 Ibid., 62.
wrote years ago [in 1971], we now know that the Polynesians did not ‘come from’ anywhere: they became Polynesians after their ancestors settled Fiji and western Polynesia some 3,000 years ago.”¹³⁰ Most Indigenous Pacific Islanders also understand themselves as originating in, and genealogically related to, the Pacific.¹³¹ My interest instead lies in understanding how and why the Polynesian Problem was constructed and what its legacy is today—especially, how and why seeking knowledge related to the Polynesian Problem seems to continually trump the self-defined concerns of Indigenous Pacific Islanders. In the sections that follow, I establish what has historically shaped the particular scientific and colonial contours of the “Polynesian Problem,” through analyzing Pacific discourses about degeneration (in 1.1.2) and Aryanism (in 1.1.3).

1.1.2: Polynesia Through the Christian Lens of Degeneration

The claiming of Pacific Islanders and the Pacific Islands for Man is abundantly clear in the writing of John Dunmore Lang, whose View of the Origin and Migrations of the Polynesian Nation in 1834 insisted that inquiry into the Polynesian Problem “promised in some measure to open up the darkest and the most mysterious portion of the ancient history of man.”¹³² Lang was a Scottish missionary who settled in Australia. Beyond the work of the church, Lang became a passionate advocate for Australian nationalism, which encompassed for him complete independence from Great Britain, and an Australian empire that would spread across the Pacific, starting with New Guinea,

¹³¹ See, for example, Noenoe Silva’s discussion of the Hawaiian genealogical chant, the Kumulipo in Aloha Betrayed, 97-104.
Tahiti, New Caledonia, Fiji, and the New Hebrides. While various forms of the Polynesian Problem had circulated since Captain Cook’s first voyage into the Pacific to track the transit of Venus in 1768, Lang’s writing encapsulates several commonly accepted scientific theories of the time that would shape how the world understood the “Polynesian race” through to our present time. This section examines Lang’s View of the Origin and Migrations of the Polynesian Nation as exemplifying a formative discourse in Polynesian Problem literature: namely, degeneration, a Christian tenet that would later meld with more secular knowledge about human evolution.

In 1834, Lang was writing with the assumption that all humans were derived from a single, original pair: the Biblical Adam and Eve. He quickly dismisses the idea “that the South Sea Islanders are indigenous, or coeval with the islands they severally inhabit,” due to his Christian theology. “God made of one blood all the nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth,” he wrote—therefore, no men could have originated in the Pacific independently. From medieval times, Christian ideas of monogenesis promoted the view that Europe’s Others were effectively failed or sub-humans, but human nonetheless. These sub-humans had sunk so low due to sin, and rejecting the Word of God—but through missionary efforts, they were at least partially redeemable. Yet even if Indigenous Pacific Islanders were obviously redeemably human to Lang, as Western explorers from the earliest encounters in the late eighteenth century also viewed them, he was nonetheless eager to slot Indigenous Pacific Islanders’ into Man’s Great

135 Lang, View of the Origin and Migrations of the Polynesian Nation, 3.
Chain of Being. The Chain of Being was linear, and progression along it was possible for all, since eighteenth-century philosophers understood “mankind as capable of indefinite improvement.”

As Howe explains, this meant that “societies that maintained the ‘principles of education’, that increased and passed on knowledge, improved, while others degenerated.” But that improvement was neither guaranteed, nor would stasis or progression be the only options. Societies could also fall down the chain. Yet the heights that those degenerated societies had once reached were the heritage of all humanity—namely, the Greeks, Romans, and Egyptians became viewed and even beloved as the prehistory of all Western civilization.

As J.R. Forster, the natural scientist who accompanied James Cook on his second voyage to the Pacific, put it, “all the improvements of mankind… ought to be considered as the sum total of the efforts of mankind ever since its existence.”

The touchstones of ancient Greece, Rome, and Egypt were important throughout the nineteenth-century literature on the Pacific. Lang was one among many to create lyrical lists of the many supposed similarities between ancient European civilizations and the ancient Pacific. The very label “Polynesia” reflected a Greco-Roman comparison (given the Greek etymology of "Polynesia") and a kind of wonder at the apparent “unity” of Indigenous cultures across wide stretches of the Pacific, which recalled to Western thinkers an ancient empire. Indeed, Lang’s fascination with the Pacific seems to have

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137 Howe, The Quest for Origins, 31.
138 Indeed, the eighteenth century formulation of the Great Chain of Being itself was derived from Aristotle and Plato.
139 Howe, The Quest for Origins, 31.
started with his wonder at how the “same primitive language is spoken, the same singular customs prevail, the same semibarbarous nation inhabits the multitude of the isles” from Hawai‘i to New Zealand, and the Indian Archipelago to Easter Island: an expanse “exactly twice the extent of the ancient Roman empire in its greatest glory.”¹⁴¹

Ultimately, these comparisons provided acceptable answers to where “Polynesians” came from, who “really” first settled the Pacific Islands, and (implicitly) whose islands they were really were. Lang argued that Polynesians were from the West—and likely even ancient Rome or Greece itself—and they had travelled across Asia to get where they were today. Who Polynesians really were, then, were descendants of ancient Romans and Grecians, through a line that was distinct from, but ultimately traceable to, modern Europeans. In this logic, the Pacific belonged to—and was destined to be repossessed by—modern Europeans; this justified Lang’s push to gain British settlers for Australia and the other parts of the Pacific he viewed as intimately connected. By bringing civilization to the Pacific “wilderness,” European settlers could reverse the degeneration that Polynesians had apparently suffered. In his words:

> It is an easy and natural process for man to degenerate in the scale of civilization, as the Asiatics have evidently done in traveling to the northward and eastward. He has only to move forward a few hundred miles into the wilderness, and settle himself at a distance from all civilized men, and the process will advance with almost incredible celerity. For, whether he comes in contact with actual savages or not, in the dark recesses of the forest, his offspring will speedily arrive at a state of complete barbarism.¹⁴²

As is clear in Lang’s description, degeneration was intimately related to the notion of a white, civilized person “going native”: of losing the material, mental, and

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¹⁴¹ Lang, *View of the Origin and Migrations of the Polynesian Nation*, 1.
¹⁴² Ibid., 89.
physical/inherited trappings of civilized Man. Thus, in this narrative, Indigenous Pacific Islanders had not always been savage. Rather than something that was in their very nature, degeneration was caused by their migratory history, and their residence in isolated environments, which had sparked their fall from the heights they had known as “an ancient and primitive civilization, of which both the memory and the evidences have almost passed away.”

From this lower state, Lang believed that Indigenous Pacific Islanders could potentially be saved, but only through outside (and in his case, missionary) influence. “No nation,” he argued, “has ever yet risen from a state of savage barbarism to a state of comparative civilization, unless some lever, powerful enough to raise the nation from its lower level has been worked from without.”

Though Lang acknowledged that the West had not yet uncovered a truly effective mode of redeeming the “savage,” either in the “Indo-American” or the “South Sea Islander,” he maintained that such work was both possible and desirable. Lang’s theory of change here operated within the ideology of what would come to be known as diffusionism. Within diffusionism, change was understood as occurring only through the influence of people or technologies newly introduced from elsewhere. In the context of the “Polynesian Problem,” diffusionism emphasizes the dissemination of an “original” culture from a few, limited points of origin—usually, older civilizations that had been long established in India, Malaysia, or

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143 Ibid., 115. He later noted that: “the forefathers of the Polynesian and Indo-American nations must have separated from the rest of mankind when the system of religious worship, that required the construction of pyramidal edifices, was generally prevalent—before the introduction of those more debasing systems of idolatry that characterized a later age, and in all probability within a few centuries of the deluge.” (Lang, _View of the Origin and Migrations of the Polynesian Nation_, 224-225.)

144 Ibid., 89.

145 Ibid., 240-241.
Papua New Guinea. In imagining Indigenous Pacific Islanders as off-shoots of Asian (and later in the nineteenth century Aryan) civilizations, this logic allowed European settlers to understand their own presence in the Pacific as fitting almost naturally into the next stage of the Pacific’s development. As Howe points out, the ideology of diffusionism was part and parcel of imperial and missionary ideology, since it advocated the importance of the transference of superior cultures to inferior ones.146

Lang, however, would take the diffusionist strain of thought one step further than most. Lang argued that ancient Indigenous Pacific Islanders did not stop in the Pacific, after their migration from the West, but continued on to found the Americas. Lang dismissed the Bering Strait theory because he could not reconcile the peoples of the Arctic with the “civilizations” of the Aztec. He reasoned: “The savage Esquimaux of the Arctic regions of America may have sprung from the equally savage hordes of Kamtschatka and Oonalaschka; but other blood must have circled in the veins of the comparatively civilized inhabitant of Mexico and Peru.”147 Though attributing the achievements of the Indigenous Pacific Islanders mainly to their apparent brash and “thoughtless… spirit of adventure,” Lang once again emphasized their similarities to Western civilizations and Western explorers:

We are therefore warranted to conclude that the same adventurous spirit, which had ascertained the existence of these distant regions, and rendered them available for the purposes of mercantile speculation, would not only lead enterprising individuals of the Malayan nation to the successive discovery and settlement of all the islands of the Indian Archipelago, at a comparatively early period in the history of the world, but induce them to launch out, like Columbus, in quest of unknown lands into the boundless Pacific.148

146 Howe, The Quest for Origins, 53.
147 Lang, View of the Origin and Migrations of the Polynesian Nation, 89.
148 Ibid., 56.
Other authors writing about the Pacific at this time tended to view Lang’s conclusions about the Pacific peopling of the Americas as fanciful but many applied the discourse of degeneration to their own purposes. ¹⁴⁹ Some even used degeneration to critique, rather than validate, Christian missionaries’ presence in the Pacific. Such writers placed the primary source of Indigenous Pacific Islanders’ degeneration on the missionaries or broader Western influence. In 1848, for example, Elizabeth Elkins Sanders wrote a critique of the popular missionary account “Tour Around Hawaii,”¹⁵⁰ which noted the “degenerating effects of Christianity as preached by Calvinists.”¹⁵¹

Mrs. E.M. Willis Parker, in her scathing missive, The Sandwich Islands, As They Are, Not As They Should Be, would further indict the missionaries for effectively enslaving rather than civilizing the Native Hawaiians. After visiting the islands, she came away thoroughly scandalized by both the missionary and the native:

Would that some of the pious poor who, in a far-off land, have joyously contributed their hard-earned mite to the support of the “poor missionaries,” could see their luxurious houses, filled with native slaves, for they are nothing more, and witness the idle luxury of their lives…. After the immense amount of money expended, and the wonderful accounts of revivals and reformations which have reached them, but which only exist in the brains of the inventors, they would have a right to expect, at least, an ordinary degree of morality and decorum; while, I will venture to say, that there is not another so corrupt and debased a people on the face of the earth, as the natives of the Sandwich Islands at this moment! Accomplished thieves and servile liars … Their licentiousness is incredible; and the child of eleven years is as deeply corrupted as the courtesan of twenty!¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Howe, The Quest for Origins, 125.
¹⁵² Elizabeth Maria Bonney Wills Parker, The Sandwich Islands as They Are, Not as They Should Be. (San Francisco: Burgess, 1852), 8.
Indeed, especially by the 1860s, many missionary families would have relinquished their religious duties entirely in favor of pursuing economic enterprise in the growing plantation economy in Hawai‘i. Yet, the discourse of degeneration—paired with the image of Indigenous Pacific women’s “licentiousness” as Parker puts it—and the potential for Western redemption of the native Pacific would prove remarkably long-lasting. Parker’s insistence on the absence of innocence even in “the child of eleven years” betrays a disgust at not only what she found to be the unfeminine and sacrilegious characteristics of Native Hawaiian women—but also the failure of missionaries to truly instill a structure of proper heteropatriarchy amongst the natives.

1.1.3: Heirlooms of the Aryan Race

The Pacific’s supposed Mediterranean heritage would take on added significance in the late nineteenth-century, as the influence of new developments in biology, archaeology, and linguistics, among other fields, would give new significance to the study of ancient proto-European civilizations. Here, I focus on these developments as evident in the work of Abraham Fornander. In his 1878 three-volume work, *An Account of the Polynesian Race: Its Origin and Migrations and the Ancient History of the Hawaiian People to the Times of Kamehameha I*, Fornander made detailed observations, some similar to Lang’s, about the provenance and character of Indigenous Pacific Islanders. A key difference was that Fornander’s argument was couched in the language of Aryanism. As a respected judge and “Knight of the Royal Order of Kalākaua,”

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153 Howe marks a shift from a prevalence of missionary accounts to professional scientific accounts in the 1860s. Howe, *The Quest for Origins*, 41.
Fornander thought his well-known reputation in Hawai‘i allowed him “to speak on behalf of the Polynesian people, to unravel the past of their national life.” It was Fornander’s goal in *An Account of the Polynesian Race* to use the “folklore” of the Native Hawaiian people themselves to prove that Polynesians were “fundamentally Arian of a pre-Vedic type.”

Today, popular understandings of Aryanism are deeply entwined with the histories of the Holocaust, Nazism and neo-Nazism, and eugenics. While Aryanism informed the Holocaust in particular ways, it was applied in distinctly different ways in the Pacific. In order to understand the different histories and legacies, a brief contextualization of the history of Aryanism as an intellectual discipline is necessary.

Aryanism first arose as a matter of linguistics. Sir William Jones is credited with the earliest Western study of Sanskritic tradition in India, and for first establishing a common linguistic and cultural heritage between northern India and Europe, in the 1780s (incidentally at nearly the very same time that the West would begin to explore and colonize the Pacific). Tony Ballantyne notes that the concept of an Aryan people was not originally European, but Indian: “it was deeply embedded in Vedic tradition. The *Rig Veda*, composed around 1500 BCE, recorded the incursion of tribes of pastoralists who identified themselves as ‘Arya’ (lit. noble) into India.” Thus, Aryanism was fundamentally an Orientalist appropriation, born particularly in knowledge requisitioned...

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by the British East India Company—what Ballantyne refers to as “Company Orientalism.”

From Jones’ work, the “Aryan concept” would become influential across many fields of European thought. Lang, for example, acknowledged Jones’ scholarship but disagreed with Jones that the Polynesian language and “Polynesian nation” had Sanskrit origins. Where Jones understood Sanskrit as the “common parent” of both “Malay” and “Polynesian” languages, Lang argued that these two languages had originated in “Chinese Tartary,” an outdated term for the area around present-day Mongolia. By the time of Fornander’s writing, the publication of the work of Max Müller had further developed the discourse of Aryanism into a popular subject in Europe, and Fornander would draw heavily from Müller’s work. Another key difference in the works published by Lang in 1834 and Fornander in 1878 was the impact of the scholarship of biologist Charles Darwin, who published his *On the Origin of Species* in 1859.

While the reception of Darwin’s *Origin of the Species* spurred the notion of positive, human evolution, degeneration maintained an important place within ideas of progress in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Except now, degeneration was thought of as being a potential *biological*, as opposed to being a primarily historical, social or individual moral, fate. Historian Gregory Moore describes the fears of degeneration in Europe as more than social paranoia or pessimism. Rather it was understood as an “empirically demonstrable medical fact, as symptomatic of a more

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157 Ibid., 19.
158 Lang, *View of the origin and migrations of the Polynesian nation*, 29; also Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race*, 6-7.
159 Lang, *View of the origin and migrations of the Polynesian nation*, 34.
fundamental degenerative process within the European races.”¹⁶⁰ Fears about “biological collapse” and “social pathologies” were enabled by Darwin’s theories of evolution and natural selection (and his cousin Francis Galton’s extrapolations of Social Darwinism) as well as a renewed passion for studying antiquity, brought about by other timely revolutions in geology and archaeology.¹⁶¹ Geology had revealed that the Earth was much older than previous Biblical understandings had held, and archaeology flourished as scientists attempted to piece together a better understanding of the various epochs of antiquity.¹⁶²

The popularity of new ideas about human antiquity would come to shape more than just archaeology, however. For example, practitioners of anthropology also understood their task as “a sort of living archaeology.”¹⁶³ Science studies scholar Cathy Gere evocatively describes this epistemology of science at the turn of the century as one of, in Thomas Huxley’s terms, “retrospective prophecy.”¹⁶⁴ For Huxley, this meant, “that while the ‘foreteller’ informs the listener about the future and the ‘clairvoyant’ informs the listener about events at a distance, the retrospective prophet bears witness to events in the deep past. What unites them all is ‘the seeing of that which, to the natural sense of the seer, is invisible.’” Gere notes that while the “effect was magical… the method was

¹⁶¹ Ibid.
¹⁶² Cathy Gere, Knossos and the Prophets of Modernism (University of Chicago Press, 2009), 7; See also: Lewis Henry Morgan, Ancient Society; or, Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery, Through Barbarism to Civilization (H. Holt and Company, 1877), vii. This text opens with a dramatic announcement of the radical potential of new scientific proof of mankind’s underlying unity. He goes on to praise the study of the American Indian because, “Forming a part of the human record, their institutions, arts, inventions and practical experience possess a high and special value reaching far beyond the Indian race.”
¹⁶³ Gere, Knossos and the Prophets of Modernism, 11.
¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 8.
eminently rational.”¹⁶⁵ This retrospective prophecy could also be described as deductive reasoning, in the mode made most classic by that Victorian fictional hero (and still popular) Sherlock Holmes. Yet, this technique would also characterize innovations in fields such as criminology— in Francis Galton’s invention of fingerprinting, for example—and psychoanalysis— such as Freud’s insistence on recovering and coming to terms with one’s past, pre-Oedipal layers.¹⁶⁶

The scholarship of Max Müller should also be understood within the context of this turn towards “retrospective prophecy.” Müller’s views on the significance of studying ancient India within a liberal education is particularly clear in a series of lectures he delivered in 1883 to Cambridge University students about to enter the British Indian Civil Service. He argued that such study had “not only widened our views of man, and taught us to embrace millions of strangers and barbarians as members of one family, but it has imparted to the whole ancient history of man a reality which it never possessed before.”¹⁶⁷ Though he maintained a strict differentiation between the ancient Aryan race who produced the Vedas and contemporary Indians, he asked the young men about to travel to India to consider their work as part of determining "a history of the human mind”:

Is there not an inward and intellectual world also which has to be studied in its historical development, from the first appearance of predicative and demonstrative roots, their combination and differentiation, leading up to the beginning of rational thought in its steady progress from the lowest to the highest stages? And in that study of the history of the human mind, in

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.
¹⁶⁶ Ibid.
¹⁶⁷ Friedrich Max Müller, *India: What Can It Teach Us?: A Course of Lectures Delivered Before the University of Cambridge.* (Funk & Wagnalls, 1883), 47-48.
that study of ourselves, of our true selves, India occupies a place second to no other country.\textsuperscript{168}

It is clear that Müller was interested in what Silva would term transcendence— in how Europeans as the epitome of Man had progressed inwardly, how they had realized their “true selves” from a long development over time.\textsuperscript{169} While this kind of thinking may seem blatantly racist by today’s standards, Müller clearly understood his work as both worldly and liberal. Gere notes that Müller attempted to distant himself and his scholarship on Sanskrit and Aryanism from more explicitly political attempts to shore up the purity of the white race.\textsuperscript{170} Yet, understanding the Vedas as primarily the heritage of Europeans, rather than the heritage of contemporary Indians, was a colonial logic that persists in the Western study of other peoples and their “cultures” and resources. Here I return to how this logic played out in the work of Fornander, who was deeply influenced by Müller.

As an ethnologist, Fornander precisely understood his work as a kind of “living archaeology.” He described his research as an intrepid, pioneering effort to tame and interpret the “almost impenetrable jungle of traditions, legends, genealogies, and chants” of Native Hawaiians. What he found in that “jungle” convinced him of their fundamental descent from the “Arian” race, for “their own undoubted folklore, their legends and chants, gave no warrant for stopping there [in Malaysia]. They spoke of continents, and not of islands, as their birthplace.”\textsuperscript{171} Like the contemporary Indians in Müller’s account, for Fornander, the Polynesian race would almost certainly never retain their former place

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 32-33.
\textsuperscript{169} Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race.
\textsuperscript{170} Gere, Knossos and the Prophets of Modernism.
\textsuperscript{171} Fornander, An Account of the Polynesian Race, Vol. 2, vii.
within the Aryan family. Nevertheless, contemporary Native Hawaiians were important repositories of Aryan knowledge and culture:

Throughout the grosser idolatry and the cruel practices springing from it in subsequent ages, these shreds of a purer culte [sic] were still preserved, soiled in appearance and obscured in sense by the contact, it may be, yet standing on the traditional records as heirlooms of the past, as witnesses of a better creed, and as specimens of the archaic simplicity of the language, hardly intelligible to the present Hawaiians.\(^\text{172}\)

In this description, “the present Hawaiians” are “hardly intelligible” of the “heirlooms of the past” they hold within their “Polynesian race.” Aryan-ness was something that was biologically part of Hawaiians, but microscopic and presently inaccessible to them (anticipating, in an important sense, modern understandings of DNA). Their Aryan heritage was thus “soiled” and “obscured” but capable of being rescued by and for Man. Fornander understood his own task in writing his three volumes on Native Hawaiian “antiquities” and “folklore” in exactly these terms.

This understanding of obscure, ancient, civilized “specimens” trapped within Hawaiian language and Hawaiians themselves also endowed an extra significance on the understanding of Polynesians as a “mixed race.” While Polynesians had long been spoken of as an essentially hybrid race of Asian and/or Malay mixture, Aryanism gave this mixture a significant hint of whiteness. Fornander argued that in Polynesian myth, “the body of the first man was made of red earth and the head of white clay” which indicated to him “a lingering reminiscence of a mixed origin, in which the white element occupied a superior position.”\(^\text{173}\) Note that marking the head as “white,” whereas the “body” is red, played directly into notions of the distinction of white men as having

\(^{172}\) Fornander, \textit{An Account of the Polynesian Race}, Vol. 1, 59.

\(^{173}\) Ibid., 71, 98.
“reason” and “self-determination.” Thus, in Fornander’s reading, Polynesians were originally mentally capable of being white, despite how they appeared as colored bodies. Not incidentally, Fornander was also one of many scholars who argued that Polynesians had not “mixed” or significantly “intermarried” with Papuans; thus preserving a distinction between the “brown” Polynesian, not destined to be permanently “colored,” and the indelibly Black Papuan or Melanesian.

Despite Fornander’s apparent eagerness to slot Polynesians into the white race, Aryanism in the Pacific is best understood, as Tony Ballantyne argues, not simply as a “whitening” discourse. Rather, Aryanism as applied to Polynesians was an extension of “long-established Orientalist and ethnological traditions that developed out of the British encounter with South Asia.” For Ballantyne, historians who assume that Aryanism “naturally legitimized colonization” neglect the ways that:

Aryan theories could just as easily subvert colonial authority and racial hierarchies as reinforce them. Tregear [author of *Aryan Maori*, 1885] himself argued that any European or settler who considered themselves superior to Maori had ‘travelled little’ and no European should ‘blush’ to recognize their affinity with the ‘Bengalee’ or the Maori ‘heroes of Orakau.’

Ballantyne points out here that the discourse of Aryanism in the Pacific was not overtly racist, and at times those who wrote about Aryanism understood their actions as disrupting rather than reinforcing commonly accepted Western racial hierarchies. Similarly, Fornander cannot easily be dismissed as an anti-Native Hawaiian racist—indeed, he was a longtime editor of the *Polynesian*, a pro-Hawaiian government

174 Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race*, 76.
175 Ibid.
newspaper, and was therefore viewed as an ally to Kanaka Maoli. Nonetheless, Noenoe Silva notes that “Kanaka Maoli share with other Pacific Islanders theories about the migrations around the Pacific that are significantly different from those proposed by scholars such as Abraham Fornander.” I argue that although the discourse of Aryanism as used by Fornander did not legitimize the colonial domination of white settlers over Polynesians per se, it did legitimize the presence of white settlers in Polynesia and their vision of a white future for Polynesia. It was not whitening of actual Indigenous Polynesians that really mattered, but rather the possession of Polynesian indigeneities that would justify various settler projects of nation/empire building.

Ballantyne goes on to explain this in terms of the work of Edward Tregear, a writer whose analysis mirrored Fornander’s in many ways, though his focus was on New Zealand instead of Hawai‘i. By (selectively) writing Māori and South Asians alongside the British into one Aryan family, Tregear was able, in Ballantyne’s words, to:

erase the conflict and violence of colonialism to imagine British imperialism in India and Pakeha power in New Zealand as reunions of long-lost Aryan siblings. Such an argument was neither ‘whitening’ nor ‘assimilationist’ for Tregear believed that, as fellow Aryans, Maori (or South Asians) were part of the same racial stock as Britons. Thus, rather than using assimilationist arguments to legitimate colonialism, Tregear instead naturalized the settler presence by denying racial difference and viewing the British empire not as a series of highly unequal power relations but as the product of a new wave of Aryan migration.

In other words, Polynesians were not white, but their ancestry made them potentially compatible subjects of the British empire or, in the case of Hawai‘i, citizens of the United States. In my own framework, this exemplifies the deployment of the logic of possession

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177 Ibid., 97.
through whiteness— whereby Polynesians are supposedly extended partial access to whiteness, but have no power to exercise whiteness. Instead, they and the lands of Polynesia are transferred to the latest “wave of Aryan migration”: the British and American colonists.

Overall, then, the Polynesian Problem literature after Darwin and Müller did not always display an overt shift in terminology or even colonial and racial hierarchies that understood “Polynesians” as more or less barbaric, but with the potential to progress from Western tutelage. Yet as the idea of Man itself changed after Darwin, the idea solidified that as a race, “Polynesians” would never be able to escape their biology, and their existence within Nature. No longer would it be enough to become civilized in Western terms— terms that Native Hawaiians, for example, quickly became fluent in, most obviously through the adoption of a Western-styled monarchy.179 For after the creation of the post-European Enlightenment Man, this cultural adoption of civilized traits was no longer enough. Now, to truly become part of Western civilization’s definition of humanity, they would need to biologically cease “being” Polynesian; ideally through gradual intermarriage with white settlers, which would theoretically allow Polynesians to reclaim their original Aryan qualities.

In conclusion, Part 1 of this chapter has argued that glorified ideas about the prehistory of humanity profoundly shaped the West’s encounter with the Pacific in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While missionaries drew on Christian ideals of Man’s degeneration and salvation in justifying their colonial work, turn of the century

social scientists would develop degeneration into a more recognizably modern racial framework through which Indigenous Pacific Islanders would only be able to progress from their barbaric state through racial mixture. Part 2 finds current echoes of these formulations of the Polynesian race and humanity itself in genomics.

**Part 2: (Un)Mapping Humanity: Genetic Sameness and Mixture in the Pacific**

A common claim made by geneticists today—and echoed in various kinds of political rhetoric, but especially in liberal rhetoric—is that humans are all genetically mixed. This discovery and the continuing investigations of the human genome are at times accompanied by rosy announcements that the “end of race”—signaling the destruction of racism itself—is nigh. In these accounts, science has finally proven that there is no biological racial purity and that all modern humans share common ancestors stretching back to the very origins of humanity in eastern Africa. The popular text *Mapping Human History* by Steve Olson cites Himla Soodyall, an Indian South African geneticist with firsthand experience in overcoming the damaging effects of apartheid, as one voice of this “common refrain.” Soodyall sees in her work on mitochondrial DNA that, “These data have the potential to abolish racism…. Race is purely circumstantial. It establishes a social hierarchy that people can use to exploit others. But that hierarchy has no basis in biology.”

The narratives that genomics has helped popularize about human history (including “we all come from Africa,” and “we are all genetically the same”), find a special kind of fulfillment in the Pacific. According to genomic mapping of ancient

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human migrations, the Pacific was the last place on Earth to be populated by humans—with New Zealand possibly having been first populated as recently as 1300 A.D.\textsuperscript{181} This distinction is often combined with a celebration of contemporary residents of Oceania as among the most “diverse” and “mixed-race” peoples of the entire world—at the genetic and racial/ethnic levels. Olson’s concluding chapter in \textit{Mapping Human History} is in fact entitled, “The End of Race: Hawaii and the Mixing of Peoples.” In section 1.2.1 below, I show how heteropatriarchy significantly informs Olson’s perspective on Hawai‘i, allowing for a softening of racial conflict he sees in Hawai‘i, as well as genomic science more generally. In section 1.2.2, I examine how Native Hawaiian responses to the proposed Hawaiian Genome Project open up possibilities for anti-colonial and anti-racist critique that does not depend on a narrative of our common humanity, but instead reroutes dominant ideas of race and indigeneity towards a more just definition of humanity itself. In short, the following sections map the contemporary perpetuation of and resistance to the logics of the Polynesian Problem. In face of some of the threats that genomics newly poses, Indigenous peoples have acted in important, regenerative ways to protect their rights to self-determination, and in doing so, demonstrate creative methods towards un-mapping the colonial, scientific foundations of Man.

\textbf{1.2.1: Genetically “Solving” the Polynesian Problem}

Olson begins his chapter “The End of Race: Hawaii and the Mixing of Peoples” with the classic mark of Western history about Hawai‘i: Captain Cook. In Olson’s telling, for the “Polynesian inhabitants” of Hawai‘i, the arrival of Cook’s ship \textit{Resolution} in

\textsuperscript{181} Howe, \textit{The Quest For Origins}, 70.
November 1778 “must have looked as strange to them as a spaceship from another planet. Yet they responded without hesitation. They boarded canoes and paddled to the ship. From atop the rolling swells they offered the sailors food, water, and, in the case of the women, themselves.”

In this breezy account of first contact, reminiscent of the American myth of the first Thanksgiving between Native Americans and the Pilgrims, the subsequent violence of Hawaiʻi’s colonial history is barely gestured to, focusing instead on Native Hawaiians’ innocence, openness, friendship, and sexual promiscuity. Olson argues that the “nineteenth-century stereotype of the South Pacific as a sexual paradise owes as much to the feverish imaginations of repressed Europeans as to the actions of the Polynesians.”

For in his account, “lower-class” Polynesian women seeking a “rise in status” routinely traded “sexual favors for a tool, a piece of cloth, or an iron nail.”

Beyond failing to substantially acknowledge the heteropatriarchal and colonial framework (and attendant power differentials) through which “nineteenth-century stereotypes” represented Polynesian women as natural and always willing sexual objects to European men, Olson entirely misses how his own critique reproduces these “stereotypes.” Indeed, the idea that Polynesian women would sexually welcome European visitors was never neatly confined to the nineteenth century nor as superficial as his designation of “stereotypes” suggests. As Haunani-Kay Trask has argued, the actual and metaphorical prostitution of Native Hawaiian women has been key in

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182 Olson, Mapping Human History, 223.
183 Ibid., 224.
184 Ibid.
Hawai‘i’s incorporation into the United States and global “modernity.” Olson’s primary examples of Hawai‘i’s “strikingly beautiful people” (as noted in the epigraph to this chapter) are telling. “Miss Universe of 1997 and Miss America of 2001 were both from Hawaii,” he writes. “The former, Brook Mahealani Lee, is a classic Hawaiian blend. Her ancestors are Korean and Hawaiian, Chinese and European.” Thus, the praise that Olson lavishes on Hawai‘i both whitewashes the colonial history of genocide that in part produced Hawai‘i’s unusual “genetic mix” and perpetuates that colonial, heteropatriarchal violence in continuing to represent Hawai‘i as a young, beautiful, sexually available woman.

For Olson, the ancient populations that scientists have identified through certain mutations roughly correspond to today’s major races. Yet, the ways that discourses of race overlay population genomics depends in large part on a common collapsing of popular understandings of race and population. Weiss reminds us that a strict differentiation must be made between race and the geographically based populations that genomics divines: “Nothing in genetic data suggests categorical “race” divisions. It is obvious that individuals from the same geographic area are far from identical.” Writing with Jeffrey Long, Weiss has further argued for revising the assumptions of commonly used analytical software that abstract “distinct and independently evolved populations” (“pure” parental populations) out of which all of the people living today are

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185 Haunani-Kay Trask, From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai‘i (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999).
186 Olson, Mapping Human History, 224.
187 David E. Stannard, Before the Horror: the Population of Hawai‘i on the Eve of Western Contact (Honolulu, HI: Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawaii, 1989).
admixtures.\(^{189}\) Weiss and Long note that this admixture is often connoted to “mate exchange” (an interesting alternative to the phrasing of “interrmarriage,” which nonetheless implies an equality of “exchange” rather than including rape and other forced sexual encounters) during “colonial era migrations”; as if no admixture occurred previously.\(^{190}\) Expressing special concern about “‘recreational’ genetic ancestry analysis,” which are always “approximate at best,” they caution: “Genotypic affinity is related to, but not identical with, genetic or demographic ancestry. Genotypes may predict an individual’s broad geographic ancestral homeland(s), but the homeland does not predict his genotype. Above all, a present-day population is not a literal ancestor!”\(^{191}\)

Olson gestures towards the concerns Weiss and Long raise while bringing up the question of what genomics might enable in identifying genetic markers for Native Hawaiians. Yet not only does Olson fail to maintain a complex approach to genetic ancestry, he further seems to blame the problems of interpretation and use of such new biotechnology on Native Hawaiians themselves. He interviews Rebecca Cann, a genetics professor at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, who was involved as a graduate student in identifying “mitochondrial Eve” and has more recently focused her work on identifying genetic lineages in Polynesians and Micronesians.\(^{192}\) Cann tells Olson: “I get people coming up to me all the time and saying, ‘Can you prove that I’m a

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\(^{190}\) Ibid., 705.

\(^{191}\) Ibid., 707, 709.

Hawaiian?” Cann seems to find the question both unsettling and ridiculous, concluding, “I get nervous when people start talking about using genetic markers to prove ethnicity…. I don’t believe that biology is destiny. Allowing yourself to be defined personally by whatever your DNA sequence is, that’s insane. But that’s exactly what some people are going to be tempted to do.”

While Olson briefly explains some of the political issues behind why someone might be so interested in proving their biological Native Hawaiian-ness, he and his quotes from Cann make the verification of indigeneity a seemingly personal problem— one that ‘some insane people’ might pursue—rather than an institutional problem of state and federal governance as well as corporations (an issue I take up further in Chapter 2). In doing so, he largely glosses over the complicated issues of race and indigeneity, effectively defining Native Hawaiian indigeneity as a tragically threatened commodity, and a lack of any other homeland: “Other cultures have roots elsewhere; people of Japanese, German, or Samoan ancestry can draw from the traditions of an ancestral homeland to sustain an ethnic heritage. If the culture of the Native Hawaiians disappears, it will be gone forever.” He further simplifies the various forms of racial “prejudice” he admits do exist in Hawai‘i by effectively equating “prejudice” towards “haoles” (white residents of Hawai‘i) with the “similarly rough treatment” and “stereotypes” which treat Japanese “as clannish and power-hungry,” Filipinos “as ignorant and underhanded,” and Native Hawaiians “as fat, lazy, and fun-loving.” Olson’s explanations thus flatten the realities of race in Hawai‘i by failing to engage in an analysis of colonialism. Racism is

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193 Olson, Mapping Human History, 234.
194 Ibid., 235-236.
195 Ibid., 232.
196 Ibid., 231.
more than “prejudice,” it has material effects. Equating the dispossession of Native Hawaiians from their lands and other resources with occasional expressions of backlash against haole privilege is not simply irresponsible journalism; it actually participates in at once solidifying and downplaying the extent of the racial and colonial divides between Native Hawaiians, haoles, and other residents of Hawai‘i. In other words, it re-deploys a logic of possession through whiteness.

When it comes to further explaining the promise of Hawai‘i’s genetic mixture, beyond its sexualized beauty and the individual worries Native Hawaiians seem to have about proving themselves, Olson’s argument begins to run in contradictory directions. On the one hand, he insists on the near-magical effects of Hawai‘i’s high rates of racial intermarriage, arguing that while most human populations have separated enough to have recognizably distinct characteristics despite their genetic mixtures, in Hawai‘i: “this process is occurring in reverse. It’s as if a videotape of our species’ history were being played backward at a fantastically rapid speed. Physical distinctions that took thousands of generations to produce are being wiped clean with a few generations of intermarriage.” On the other hand, he later tempers the rapidity of this “clean slate” of human physical difference, noting that,

Of course, ethnic and even ‘racial’ groups still exist in Hawaii, and they will for a long time. Despite the rapid growth of intermarriage in Hawaii and elsewhere, the mixing of peoples takes generations, not a few years or even decades…. Five hundred years from now, unless human societies undergo drastic changes, Asians, Africans, and Europeans still will be physically distinguishable.

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197 Ibid., 226.
198 Ibid., 236.
So, which is it: are “physical distinctions” (the distinguishing mark of “race” in Olson’s account) disappearing in Hawai‘i (and soon, in the rest of the world), or not? In arguing both sides of this question, that “physical distinctions” will be on the one hand, “wiped clean with a few generations of intermarriage” but on the other, that “the mixing of peoples” will not be complete even in the next “five hundred years,” Olson has effectively contradicted himself. Yet, this contradiction allows a romantic image of Hawai‘i’s “strikingly beautiful” genetically-mixed people to stand as an isolated case that he believes the world should aspire to.

Even if the indelible physical distinctions of race must continue to exist (a point Olson seems only begrudgingly to admit), what Olson very badly wants his audience to glimpse in Hawai‘i is a potential for a greater freedom of ethnicity. For him, this means that one’s “community of descent” is “more like a professional or religious affiliation, a connection over which a person has some measure of control.” For Olson, Hawai‘i’s real uniqueness is precisely that: “Ethnicity in Hawaii… seems far less stark and categorical than it does in the rest of the United States…. Expressions of social prejudice in Hawaii are more like a form of social banter, like a husband and wife picking at each other’s faults.” Not only does characterizing racial and Indigenous conflict in Hawai‘i as “a husband and wife picking at each other’s faults” assume an heteropatriarchal model that allows Olson to represent the relationships between various peoples in Hawai‘i as more or less equal and innocent, it also allows him to characterize any type of conflict that falls outside of this model as aberrant, queer, and not authentically Hawaiian.

199 Ibid., 236.
200 Ibid., 237.
Olson concludes his chapter with a final meditation on Hawai‘i’s example for humanity’s future:

The logical endpoint of this perspective is a world in which people are free to choose their ethnicity regardless of their ancestry. Ethnicity is not yet entirely voluntary in Hawaii, but in many respects the islands are headed in that direction. State law, for example, is gradually coming to define a Native Hawaiian as anyone with a single Hawaiian ancestor. But at that point ethnicity becomes untethered from biology—it is instead a cultural, political, or historical distinction. People are no longer who they say they are because of some mysterious biological essence. They have chosen the group with which they want to affiliate.

Genetically, this view of ethnicity makes perfect sense. Our DNA is too tightly interconnected to use biology to justify what are essentially social distinctions. Our preferences, character, and abilities are not determined by the biological history of our ancestors. They depend on our individual attributes, experiences, and choices. As this inescapable conclusion becomes more widely held, our genetic histories inevitably will become less and less important. When we look at another person, we won’t think Asian, black, or white. We’ll just think: person.201

Through such a reading of genetic history, Olson’s spin on the Polynesian Problem is effectively to declare race not dead but complexly related to one’s microscopic genetic material, which science is destined to decode. Thus, while the mapping of human history through genomics has confirmed that Micronesians and Polynesians are of “Island Southeast Asian origin,” and followed “a colonization route along the north coast of New Guinea,”202 the question of who Polynesians really are both biologically and politically—i.e., should a Polynesian identity really be biologically determined or, as Olson wishes, should everyone be free to choose—is still just indeterminate enough to justify both continuing the study of Polynesian genes and validating non-Indigenous claims to ownership of Polynesian lands and resources. In the end, Olson is convinced that while

201 Ibid.
202 Koji Lum and Cann, “mtDNA Lineage Analyses,” 151.
biological race may, unfortunately, always exist (at least in the sense that human populations can be differentiated by distinct haplotypes), the ways that societies interpret a person’s “ethnicity” are beginning to be divorced from their biology. Indeed, this divorce seems to define the difference between “race”—a biological, and usually visible marker—and “ethnicity”—the social and cultural distinctions between human populations, which he believes should not require any biological component.

For all his excitement about Hawai‘i’s genetic mixture, Olson envisions Hawai‘i as a global model not of the end of race, but the end of race-based ethnicity. In the particular case of Native Hawaiians, he sees this as particularly desirable: for a Native Hawaiian to be defined in state law not by biology but as “instead a cultural, political, or historical distinction.” In a way, this is what many (though not all) Native Hawaiians advocate themselves—as Native Hawaiians have long understood themselves as members of an overthrown independent nation, or at least as a historically (and contemporary) colonized people. Yet for Native Hawaiians, these distinctions are not about ethnicity; they are about indigeneity. Because Olson fails to engage in any type of complicated analysis of how Native Hawaiians experience race and indigeneity, and how they have so problematically been written into global humanity as the possessions of whiteness (as Part 1 of this chapter argued), he fails to see how thinking just “person” instead of “Asian, black, or white,” is just as problematic as the state requiring Native Hawaiians to prove they have 50% Native Hawaiian blood in order to qualify as Native Hawaiian at all.
1.2.2: The Hawaiian Genome Project

While the previous section focused on journalistic accounts of genomics in terms of ancestry testing and mapping human history, this section turns to another, related application of genomics, namely medical genomics. These applications of genomics also have particular impacts on Indigenous peoples, and this section focuses on the proposed Hawaiian Genome Project (HGP) and the response it elicited from Native Hawaiians. An increasing number of scholars have written productive critiques which suggest a variety of ways to ethically engage Indigenous communities in genomic research—from rigorous standards of free, prior, informed consent and approvals by both university and Indigenous nations’ institutional review boards to innovating new methodologies to incorporate cultural protocols, or understanding Indigenous DNA samples as “on loan” and to be returned to the Indigenous community along with the results of the study after its completion.203 Such critical work is undeniably essential to protecting Indigenous peoples’ rights as genomic scientists will continue to express particular interest in genetically “isolated” and “homogenous” groups. Though indebted to such productive scholarship, the point I wish to make about the HGP and the Native Hawaiian response to it is somewhat different from practically mapping out what went wrong in order that the next project may be conducted more competently. Instead, I wish to further interrogate the impact of the protests of the HGP on those researchers who proposed it; an impact

203 Health and Social Services Committee of the Navajo Nation Council, Approving a Moratorium on Genetic Research Studies Conducted Within the Jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation Until Such Time That a Navajo Nation Human Research Code Has Been Amended by the Navajo Nation Council (Montezuma Creek, Navajo Nation (Utah), April 2, 2002); John Bohannon, “A Home for Maori Science,” Science 318, News Focus (November 9, 2007): 907; Laura Arbour and Doris Cook, “DNA on Loan: Issues to Consider When Carrying Out Genetic Research with Aboriginal Families and Communities,” Community Genetics 9, no. 3 (2006): 153–160, doi:10.1159/000092651.
which is generally characterized as “surprise,” which has accompanied many such studies when met with resistance and outcry from global Indigenous communities. I believe that “surprise” reveals something not only about the seeming incommensurability between Western science and Indigenous peoples’ lives (even when Western science is in so many ways dependent on Indigenous peoples’ resources and knowledge), but also what Indigenous peoples and their allies might do to effectively decolonize this relation beyond only making science more culturally competent and palatable. Below, I offer first the context of the HGP before focusing on this moment of liberal surprise and its implications.

Charles Boyd, a professor at the Pacific Biomedical Research Center at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, proposed the Hawaiian Genome Project in 2003. The HGP was proposed as a type of genebank, which can be defined as: “a stored collection of genetic samples in the form of blood or tissue, that can be linked with medical and genealogical or lifestyle information from a specific population, gathered using a process of generalized consent.” The most famous genebank is the deCODE project, run by a U.S.-based company but located in Iceland. deCODE was authorized by the Icelandic Parliament in 1998, and heralded the potential to map the genome of the Icelandic people, in the interest of discovering possible genetic causes (and remedies) of diseases. This was conducted through analysis of the health records of all Icelandic people, which Iceland’s government licensed to deCODE, along with blood samples volunteered from

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about 50% of the country’s citizens from which DNA information was extracted.

deCODE was interested in the Icelandic population because it was relatively homogeneous, given its isolated island location as well as having experienced several historic catastrophes (the Bubonic Plague in the 1440s, and smallpox as well as a devastating volcanic eruption in the 1700s). These catastrophes resulted in “genetic bottlenecks”: in other words, the deaths of large percentages of the population reduced the population’s available genetic material. Those who survived these catastrophes in isolated locations become a relatively small group of “founders” for the following generations, resulting in a significant narrowing of the population’s genetic diversity.

The genetic homogeneity of Iceland and the overall importance of genetic studies focused on populations shaped by “founder effects” are both contested. Yet the common reasoning given for why genetic homogeneity is important is that genomics studies on disease depend on uncovering genetic causes (different genetic mutations) in a population with a certain disease by comparing that population’s genetic data to a “healthy” population. A genetically heterogeneous population presents a less reliable data set for this purpose because greater genetic diversity overall makes the differences between healthy and unhealthy populations less apparent. Somewhat ironically, given Hawai‘i’s constant praise today as a diverse, melting pot, it was precisely the Native Hawaiian population’s perceived genetic homogeneity that interested Boyd et. al. in sequencing a “Hawaiian genome.” As Lindsey Singeo describes it:

> Already an isolated society, the Hawaiian population became even more homogenous as a result of massive epidemics and population reduction during the mid-1880s. During this time, foreigners introduced previously

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206 Ibid., 42.
unknown diseases to Native Hawaiians, including measles, whooping cough, mumps, and smallpox. Unlike the foreigners, Native Hawaiians lacked the immune system resistance and suffered significantly high mortality rates.\textsuperscript{207}

Thus, in a strange (or perhaps, only fitting) way, it was precisely the effects of colonialism— depoliticized in the rhetoric of the project’s proposers as the natural if tragic impact of measles, whooping cough, mumps and smallpox— that made the Native Hawaiian population genetically homogeneous and particularly attractive to genomics researchers. Yet, the project obliquely proposed to compensate for the contemporary legacies of colonialism— namely, health disparities faced by the Native Hawaiian community—by potentially providing genetic information to explain Native Hawaiians’ higher risk for diseases including diabetes, hypertension and renal disease.\textsuperscript{208}

If the “Hawaiian Genome” proved fruitful, it could also potentially be licensed to the UH researchers by the Native Hawaiian community (after the Icelandic model), for a certain monetary amount. A magazine article accordingly announced the project by advertising its potential for providing medical and financial benefits to the Native Hawaiian community, claiming, “It’s a potentially lucrative market—Roche pharmaceutical company paid $200 million outright for rights to the Icelandic genome, which underwent a similar bottleneck.”\textsuperscript{209} In any case, how much commercialization the Hawaiian Genome project might involve was quite unclear at the time the magazine article was published. There are other models that the HGP could have drawn from that would not have any corporate involvement or would limit such involvement instead of

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{209} “Licensing Hawaiian Genes for Medical Research,” \textit{Mālamalama, the Magazine of the University of Hawai’i System}, July 2003, 16.
granting companies exclusive rights.\textsuperscript{210} Yet, there had also recently been a genebank project proposed in Tonga in 2000 by Autogen, an Australian biotechnology company, which did closely follow the Icelandic model. The Tongan project was never carried out due to local opposition, especially from church groups, who as Austin et. al. report, “objected to the ‘conversion of God created life-forms, their molecules or parts into corporate property through patent monopolies.’”\textsuperscript{211}

The Native Hawaiian community also strongly objected to the proposed HGP. As with the Tongan project, licensing a “Hawaiian genome” to the university violated a number of cultural and religious beliefs. Further, the HGP seemed to many Native Hawaiians to be both an obvious extension of historic and ongoing colonial expropriation of Native Hawaiian lands and resources, and a potential replication of other seemingly exploitative genetic studies such as the patenting of a cell line of an Indigenous Hagahai man from Papua New Guinea by the U.S. National Institutes of Health.\textsuperscript{212} In November 2003, the Association of Hawaiian Civic Clubs issued a resolution, “Urging the University of Hawai‘i to Cease Development of the Hawaiian Genome Project or Other Patenting or Licensing of Native Hawaiian Genetic Material Until Such Time as the Native Hawaiian People Have Been Consulted and Given Their Full, Prior and Informed Consent to Such Project.”\textsuperscript{213} This resolution made explicit reference to the modeling of the HGP after Icelandic deCODE project, and asserted that such licensing of Native

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{213} Association of Hawaiian Civic Clubs, “A Resolution Urging the University of Hawai‘i to Cease Development of the Hawaiian Genome Project or Other Patenting or Licensing of Native Hawaiian People Have Been Consulted and Given Their Full, Prior and Informed Consent to Such Project,” (Nukoli‘i, Kaua‘i, Hawai‘i: Association of Hawaiian Civic Clubs, November 15, 2003).
Hawaiian genetic material and the mapping of a Hawaiian genome would require the prior, informed consent of all Native Hawaiian people since “the Hawaiian genome represents the genetic heritage of our ancestors and is the collective property of the Native Hawaiian people.” The resolution further drew comparisons to the activism of other global Indigenous people, arguing that “other Indigenous peoples globally and regionally have declared a moratorium on any further commercialization of Indigenous human genetic materials until Indigenous communities have developed appropriate protection mechanisms.” Another declaration was also issued after a Native Hawaiian Intellectual Property Rights Conference was held in October 2003 which further condemned the theft of “the biogenetic materials of our peoples, taken for medical research for breast cancer and other diseases attributable to western impact” as acts of “biocolonialism.”

In the end, these protests led the HGP to be discontinued. The strong response from the community surprised the project’s founders, who seem to have genuinely believed that the “self-evident” medical and financial benefits to Native Hawaiians would accord them a willing participatory population. This response was thus very similar to a more famous example of genomic researchers’ surprise: namely, in regards to the case protesters brought against the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) shortly after its proposal in 1994. Given the HGDP’s sincere efforts to respond to the critiques ethically, scholar Jenny Reardon argues:

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214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.
217 The HGDP responded to such critiques by implementing a feasibility and ethics study led by a
These were not self-seeking researchers who sought to extract the blood of indigenous peoples for the sake of financial and political gain. They were scientists who sincerely hoped to create a project that would deepen the stores of human knowledge while fighting racism and countering Eurocentrism. It would be historically inaccurate, and morally insensitive, to understand the Diversity Project as an extension of older racist practices by labeling the initiative the product of white scientists wielding the power of science to objectify and exploit marginalized groups. The story of the Project is more complicated. It raises questions that cannot be resolved so easily.\footnote{Jenny Reardon, \textit{Race to the Finish: Identity and Governance in the Age of Genomics} (Princeton University Press, 2005), 2.}

I doubt neither the sincerity of Cavalli-Sforza et. al.’s desire to conduct anti-racist work, nor the functional difference Reardon is pointing out between “research for research’s sake” (or, “research for humanity’s good”) and research to fuel a business’s profits. Certainly both types of research exist within the genomics field— from rather questionable DNA ancestry tests offered by biogenetic companies on one end of the spectrum to federally funded top-tier genomics research on the other. The wide variety of genomic scientists and entrepreneurs cannot all be branded the same. Yet, the problems attending the projects of those scientists who are surprised at the apparent failure of their liberal purpose seems to me the most urgently needed. For it is precisely this liberalism that was so formative of the Polynesian Problem literature of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Decolonizing the science of race and indigeneity in Hawai‘i will continue to require a wrestling with not only problems of what Reardon terms “older racist practices” but also the more fundamental colonial practices that are compatible with and constitutive of contemporary liberalism and capitalism.

To begin with, the very invention of something that can be recognized as “the” Hawaiian genome, much less that thing’s total sequencing and potential licensing/ownership, is something that deserves more reflection. For in the manifestation of a genome, concerns of possession and property reveal themselves in particularly complicated ways. A genome denotes an organism’s complete set of genes, and thus genomics denotes the study of the interactions between those sets of genes, whereas genetics more specifically refers to the study of singular genes, in relative isolation. A genome is at once a living part of a human being, and an abstraction based on relative genetic similarities in a defined population; in this case, the population being “Native Hawaiians.” Thus, a genome is a kind of organic “thing” that nonetheless can only be materialized and studied in the “captivity” of a laboratory. Science studies scholars Cathy Gere and Bronwyn Parry point out that the amount of “corporeality” genomic and other biological artefacts retain after their collection from a person greatly varies: “Some, such as cryogenically stored tissues, retain a degree of corporeality, others, such as digital scans and DNA sequences, offer more purely informational renderings of the human form.”

Thus, even if the most “corporeal” of the materials that constitute genomic studies, such as tissue samples or cheek swabs, are repatriated according to proper Indigenous protocols, there can often remain many other types of own-able “things”—such as the abstracted and digitized sequences, as well as the overall intellectual property of the resulting study. In the particular genebank model that the Hawaiian Genome Project proposed, the DNA samples collected from Native Hawaiians likely would have

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been subject to “immortalization” in Lymphoblastoid cell lines (LCLs), as the samples collected in the Human Genome Diversity Project were.\footnote{Cavalli-Sforza, “The Human Genome Diversity Project.”} This immortalization allows the DNA sequences to be preserved and replicated, shared and sold, among scientists according to the specific types of consent and ethical protocols under which the samples were collected.

As pitched to Native Hawaiians, we can understand the HGP as having offered Native Hawaiians a share in the ownership of a “Hawaiian Genome.” This genome was a newly conceptualized kind of privatized property potentially to be held in common by Native Hawaiians as a group. The subtle, motivating logic of the HGP in exhorting Native Hawaiians participation was classically liberal: since, theoretically, every Native Hawaiian would have access to the materials necessary to creating this genome in their own body, Native Hawaiians had a moral, national, civilizational duty to exploit those resources for their own and the common good. By refusing to license or lend their genome to the university, or even to acknowledge that such an entity exists that is perfectly described by Western science, Native Hawaiians risked seeming not only “stingy”—denying the common good of science—but also self-destructive, refusing a desperately needed opportunity that would potentially offer medical answers and treatments, as well as money.

Such subtly implied self-destruction uncannily recalls turn of the century discourse on the reasons for the degeneration of the Polynesian race that I detailed in Part 1 of this chapter. For Native Hawaiians, degeneration was an especially influential discourse at the time of Hawai‘i’s annexation to the United States in 1898. Alexander
Twombly, author of *The Native Hawaiian of Yesterday and To-day*, published in 1901, put it this way:

There is no recuperative power in the native such as most white races possess. Advance in civilization enables the Anglo-Saxon to overcome even hereditary tendency to disease. Hawaiians die when the white man lives. The latter exercises a measure of self-control for selfish ends. The former shows little or no self-control for any ends.

To sum up, the native Hawaiian of to-day is an anomaly in civilization. He cannot understand its significance or adjust himself to its requirements. Citizenship is only a condition to him, not an inspiration. The half-caste has not the same obstacles to contend with, and assimilates in greater degree with modern progress.221

Twombly demonstrates here his belief in the “half-caste” as the only possible future of the Hawaiian race because it is necessary to physically infuse the Hawaiian race with “a measure of self-control for selfish ends”—a critically apt description of the requirements of U.S. citizenship, for Twombly particularly glimpsed Hawaiian degeneration in their failure to grasp the importance of owning land. He wryly noted: “It is a sign of the tendency to degenerate when men care little for the possession of land.”222 The apparently extreme depths of this degeneration, though described as moral, behavioral, or cultural failings, were ultimately blamed on the biological. Twombly, like many others, believed that nothing would be able to be done for Native Hawaiians until they had received a substantial racial infusion of whiteness. Ultimately the Hawaiian race would disappear, but be replaced by the growing numbers of “half-castes” more biologically disposed to become part of the white settler society.

221 Alexander Twombly, *The Native Hawaiian of Yesterday and To-day* (1901), 10.
222 Ibid., 8.
In the context of genomics, Native Hawaiian refusal to participate in the development of biotechnology which might produce innovative new medical treatments for diseases that Native Hawaiians are susceptible to can still be read as a failure to exercise “a measure of self-control for selfish ends,” and thus to give into degeneration even when it is not environmentally inevitable. This situation also illustrates the point that whiteness is understood as kind of property that one must carefully manage, protect, and control—because as Margaret Radin and Cheryl Harris remind us, controlling one’s whiteness is a mode of controlling one’s expectations for the future, and one’s very personhood depends on the realization of these expectations. Seen this way, controlling, decoding, objectifying, and commercializing one’s genome has developed as a new form of whiteness as property.

Science studies scholars have offered relevant analyses to this situation, though often without substantial concern for the particulars of Indigenous cultures and politics. Melinda Cooper, for example, in *Life as Surplus*, makes an important connection between the nineteenth century revolution in biological science and accompanying revolutions in economics. Drawing on Foucault’s formulation of biopower, she argues that after Darwin, there was a “relocation of wealth” from the “fruits of the land” (as in the philosophy of Adam Smith) to “the creative forces of human biological life.” Cooper quotes Foucault in describing this change as one in which the “organic becomes the living and the living is that which produces, grows and reproduces; the inorganic is the non-living, that which neither develops nor reproduces; it lies at the frontiers of life, the

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223 Harris, “Whiteness As Property,” 1730.
225 Ibid., 6.
inert, the unfruitful—death.” Neither Cooper nor Foucault extend this analysis to the structure of settler colonialism, yet Foucault’s use of the phrase “frontiers of life” is particularly evocative here: white settlers in the United States having long understood manifest destiny throughout the U.S. West and even to Hawai‘i as spreading the inherent and common good of civilization and capitalism. In my analysis, Foucault’s description aptly explains the difference that settler colonialism institutes between settlers and Indigenous peoples. The settler “produces, grows and reproduces,” while the native “lies at the frontiers of life,” vanishing and destined only to die out.

Thus, the push for studying, decoding, and in fact, producing something called a “Hawaiian Genome” is deeply shaped by this Western scientific/economic epistemology of organic life: that which produces, grows, and reproduces. While the “Hawaiian Genome” will be realized and produced largely by Western scientists, with the donation of genetic material from Native Hawaiians, liberal, anti-racist scientists imagine that they are also helping to produce, grow, and reproduce Native Hawaiian-ness or Native Hawaiian personhood itself. Choosing to opt out of the HGP seems almost nonsensical to Western scientists because that would mean Native Hawaiians are choosing to align themselves with the inorganic—“that which neither develops nor reproduces… the inert, the unfruitful—death.” Native Hawaiians refusing the “organic” process implied in the HGP registers within this settler colonial framework as a refusal of development, reproduction, and life itself—a choice that scientists find difficult to parse especially after they prove themselves eager to combat the valid problems of racism and colonialism. An

226 Ibid., 6-7.
analogous situation also arose with between the Native Hawaiian community and the University of Hawai‘i when researchers there proposed to genetically modify kalo, the Hawaiian name for the taro plant, a traditional staple starch in the Hawaiian diet. While Native Hawaiians argued that taro was sacred and it would be reprehensible to genetically modify it, researchers promoted the genetic modification as a biotechnological improvement that was “necessary to increase crop yields, improve pest and disease resistance and advance scientific research.” Though a provisional five-year moratorium on genetically modifying taro was passed in the State legislature in 2008, the Native Hawaiian case was often represented as simply a “cultural” one, whereas biotechnology proponents represented “progress”—delayed for now, but destined to win out, through more “culturally competent” means if necessary.

Yet, on closer examination, the Native Hawaiian protests against the HGP and the genetic modification of kalo were significantly more complicated than their gloss as “cultural difference” implies. This is clear in a closer examination of the two statements issued in response to the HGP in 2003 by the association of Hawaiian Civic Clubs and the Native Hawaiian Intellectual Property Rights Conference. For the Hawaiian Civic Clubs, there is not a strict critique of capitalism or the notion of isolating a Hawaiian genome. Their resolution in fact takes both the existence of a Hawaiian genome, and the classification as this genome as property, as a given, stating: “The Hawaiian genome represents the genetic heritage of our ancestors and is the collective property of the

228 I discuss Native Hawaiian protests against the genetic modification of kalo further in Chapter 4, as related to recent Idle No More protests in Hawai‘i.
Native Hawaiian people.” Thus, the Civic Clubs object less to the science of the HGP than the assumption that a genebank could commercialize “the Hawaiian genome.” In their account, the HGP is not viable until there are better protections in place for Native Hawaiians to properly be informed and benefit or “equitably share” the results from such a project.

The Paoakalani Declaration issued by the Native Hawaiian Intellectual Property Rights Conference (NHIPRC) goes farther in its critique, which it does not limit to the HGP. Nor does the declaration make reference to anything called a “Hawaiian genome.” Rather, it forcefully problematizes “bioprospecting and biotechnology institutions and industries” which are “imposing western intellectual property rights over our traditional, cultural land-based resources. This activity converts our collective cultural property into individualized property for purchase, sale, and development.” Further, the NHIPRC group insists on a complete moratorium on any kind of genebank project: “Kanaka Maoli human genetic material is sacred and inalienable. Therefore, we support a moratorium on patenting, licensing, sale or transfer of our human genetic material.” For the Paoakalani Declaration, it is not only the University of Hawai‘i that is the subject of critique but also “the pharmaceutical, agricultural and chemical industries, the United States military, academic institutions and associated research corporations,” all of which are implicated in biocolonialism in Hawai‘i.

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231 Association of Hawaiian Civic Clubs, A Resolution Urging the University of Hawai‘i to Cease Development of the Hawaiian Genome Project or Other Patenting or Licensing of Native Hawaiian People Have Been Consulted and Given Their Full, Prior and Informed Consent to Such Project.
232 Ibid.
233 Paoakalani Declaration, 2.
234 Ibid., 6.
235 Ibid.
While this Declaration draws on the notion of human rights and references other resolutions supporting Indigenous rights, as the Civic Clubs resolution also does, it also calls for a more fundamental unsettling of what humanity is. The NHIPRC authors reformulate the place of humanity within Hawaiian epistemology rather than accepting wholeheartedly the purportedly “universal” Western notion of humanity, writing that:

According to the Kumulipo, a genealogical chant of creation, Po gave birth to the world. From this female potency was born Kumulipo and Po’ele. And from these two, the rest of the world unfolded in genealogical order. That genealogy teaches us the land is the elder sibling and the people are the younger sibling meant to care for each other in a reciprocal, interdependent relationship. Humanity is reminded of his place with the order of genealogical descent. The foundational principle of the Kumulipo is that all facets of the world are related by birth. And thus, the Hawaiian concept of the world descends from one ancestral genealogy.236

Thus, this Declaration repositions humanity as the apex of all organic life, putting humans as the “younger siblings” of the “elder sibling,” land. In Hawaiian epistemology, then, land is not property but a form of genealogy and knowledge. This knowledge is actively formed and participated in, rather than simply accessed, shaped by a “reciprocal, interdependent relationship” between family members, humans and the land. This unsettles completely the Western scientific and economic differentiation between the “organic” and “inorganic,” as discussed by Cooper and Foucault. Rather than valuing “the creative forces of human biological life” over the simple “fruits of nature,” the declaration reminds its readers that human life is interdependent with the life of the land; and land is indeed a living, knowing thing to which all humans look up to as to a wiser elder sibling. The ways that this epistemology subverts popular heteropatriarchal notions of land as “virgin” or “mother” is also significant. The creator of the world was a “female

236 Ibid., 3.
potency,” not necessarily a maternal figure. Land is not “Mother Earth,” nor a sexualized thing to conquer and make reproduce, but humanity’s sibling, someone with whom humans might have a complex, mutually sharing relationship.

Overall, what the Paoakalani Declaration envisions then is a form of Native Hawaiian indigeneity that is not property as whiteness is; something that is not possessable by whiteness at all, since it is premised on entirely different conceptualizations of land and the human. Compared to the Hawaiian Civic Clubs resolution, the Paoakalani Declaration intends to have a broader impact. For the Declaration recognizes, similarly to the Hawaiian Civic Clubs resolution, that Native Hawaiians need protections within laws that privilege the Western concept of Man, but refuses that they should only understand themselves, their “genetic material,” and other “collective cultural property” within such colonial frameworks. Both approaches of the Hawaiian Civic Clubs and the NHIPRC are regenerative, in my analysis—both seek to avert new forms of colonialism and thus promote a different kind of future for Native Hawaiians. But where the Hawaiian Civic Clubs responded within the existing Western frameworks of institutional review boards and principles such as “reciprocity” and “equitable sharing,” the NHIPRC challenged the very foundations of such principles. Thus, NHIPRC points out how making genomic science more culturally competent and alert to Indigenous peoples’ rights to free, prior, informed consent will not necessarily overturn the colonial basis of such science.

The Paoakalani Declaration and similar frameworks developed by other Indigenous peoples can have broad significance for all genomic studies, not only those involving Indigenous peoples. Gere and Parry make a critique similar to the Paoakalani Declaration in questioning the appropriateness of extending “formal property rights
regime to aspects of the self, including body parts, biological samples, or even genetic information extracted from one’s own body,” as proposed by legal theorist Graeme Laurie.\textsuperscript{237} Gere and Parry argue that a such a “property-in-self” model as Laurie suggests is ultimately inadequate, in part because genetic artefacts are less “‘thing’ like” than “an embodiment of all the intricate Gordian relations—between donors, technologies, research scientists, funding bodies, technicians, institutions and charities that allow them to be in the world as they are now—and indeed as they might be.”\textsuperscript{238} So too, donors are often less interested in financial benefits from genomic studies, than in “securing is a means of being formally recognized as part of the collective that will oversee the stewardship of these artefacts as they (the artefacts) progress through their social life course.”\textsuperscript{239} Gere and Parry therefore argue instead for a model of ‘collective custodianship’ over the genetic materials and knowledge involved in genomic studies—a model they acknowledge is drawn at least in part from Indigenous contexts such as “indigenous folkloric traditions, for example, that are progressively worked up and passed down from one generation to the next in much the way that these new biotechnological artefacts will surely be.”\textsuperscript{240} Indeed, if genomic scientists and research institutions could further utilize models in closer affinity with Indigenous “collective custodianship,” than invoking Western incentives of commercialized property-in-self or the good of all “humanity,” this might go a long way towards decolonizing science and overturning scientific, liberal “surprise” at Indigenous protests.

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\textsuperscript{237} Gere and Parry, “The Flesh Made Word,” 140.
\textsuperscript{238} Ibid., 153.
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid., 156.
\textsuperscript{240} Ibid.
In conclusion, this chapter has argued for the importance of understanding the scientific discourses of degeneration and Aryanism, as part of the Polynesian Problem literature of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as histories that continue to inform and naturalize the process of settler colonialism in Hawai‘i. While contemporary science insists that biological racism has long been debunked and imagines genomic population histories as a method of permanently eradicating racism and even the boundaries of ethnicity, I have argued that such eagerness to move beyond “race” and the liberal “surprise” of scientists who find their “savior” efforts rebuffed by Indigenous protests really demonstrate the many ways that contemporary science remains rooted to Western, colonial and racist definitions of Man. The genetic mixture of humanity lauded by those like Olson echoes the liberal belief in the future of Hawai‘i as a new and distinctly American racial mixture—and this is troubling because such mixtures have depended on the eradication of other modes of being Native Hawaiian and/or human. Despite these colonial echoes in genomic science, Native Hawaiians are among global Indigenous peoples leading efforts to effectively decolonize science and Western notions of humanity altogether, particularly through pointing out the false distinctions between organic and inorganic, or Man and nature. The next chapter continues to trace the history of the Polynesian Problem into the early twentieth century, when eugenics became a dominant force in biological science. The responses of Native Hawaiians to contemporary problems caused by the legacies of eugenics demonstrate different set of regenerative politics, one more pointedly interested in emulating rather than transforming the possessive power of whiteness.
CHAPTER 2:

"Still in the Blood":
Past and Present Configurations of the "Part-Hawaiian"

The Hawaiian-whites are looked upon as the negroes are in this country. The vital statistics show that the part-Hawaiian is an improvement on the Hawaiian stock although the birth rate is considerably less. I think it is fair to say that at the present time the part-Hawaiian is biologically a better individual than the full Hawaiian,— more capable of coping with modern conditions of life and civilization.

(Louis Robert Sullivan, "Discussions" at the Second International Congress of Eugenics, New York City, 1921)

... Article XII, Section 6 clearly states that the income and proceeds from the §5(f) trust must be used solely for native Hawaiians not native Hawaiians and Hawaiians.


In the early twentieth century, discourses about degeneration and Aryanism reached new heights as eugenics developed into a popular science in Europe and the United States. Noting eugenics’ incredibly varied scope, historians have nonetheless generally agreed that “eugenic thinking” revolved around “fitness and betterment—especially racial betterment.” Historians tend to characterize eugenics in two distinct modes. The first, positive eugenics, focused on improving and maintaining the superiority of the white race. Positive eugenics largely focused on modifying the behaviors of white, middle and upper class families. Positive eugenic projects included providing incentives to the upper classes to have more children and the development of educational tracks for

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“gifted” children, for example.\textsuperscript{242} Negative eugenics, on the other hand, focused on reducing or eliminating altogether the ‘diseased,’ lower class white, non-white and otherwise "other-ed" populations. Negative eugenics includes the Holocaust in Nazi Germany and the forced sterilization of Indigenous, Black, and "mentally unfit" people in the U.S. through to the 1970s.\textsuperscript{243}

While differences between positive and negative eugenics for their respective target populations are important, these two forms of eugenics were always mutually reinforcing and often directly connected. This is especially clear in the history of eugenics as practiced in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{244} While eugenicists in the Pacific were often students and advocates of British and American forms of eugenics (both positive and negative), the ways that they sought to apply these lessons to Hawai‘i and Native Hawaiians in particular was far from predetermined.\textsuperscript{245} Following from the history of the Polynesian Problem literature, eugenics approached Polynesians as “nearly Caucasian”—and thus racial intermarriage with whites was understood as a desirable route to “whiten” and Americanize Native Hawaiians. At the same time, eugenic practices were mobilized to salvage the unique and good “old-time” qualities of the Native Hawaiians of “good character,” who were understood as “dying out.” While both of these forms of eugenic thinking about Native Hawaiians could generally be characterized as positive eugenics—encouraging various forms of reproduction rather than prohibiting it—it is clear that

\textsuperscript{242} Wendy Kline, \textit{Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of the Century to the Baby Boom} (University of California Press, 2001).
\textsuperscript{243} On Indigenous sterilization, see, for example, Andrea Smith, \textit{Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide} (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2005).
\textsuperscript{245} Bashford and Levine, \textit{The Oxford Handbook of the History of Eugenics}. 
negative eugenics was always still a part of the equation. In the first scenario, racial intermarriage is encouraged in order to prevent the birth of darker, “purer” Native Hawaiians, while in the second scenario only “purer” Native Hawaiians were valued. This chapter looks at how the figure of the “Part Hawaiian” figures in both of these types of eugenic thinking—whether the “Part Hawaiian” was viewed as the shining face of the distinctly American future, or as the lesser descendants of a once glorious race.\(^{246}\) I also look at how these histories continue to influence thinking about the Part-Hawaiian and the Native Hawaiian race today.

One key adherent of the view that the (Part White) Part Hawaiian represented true racial betterment for Native Hawaiians was Louis Robert Sullivan, a respected social scientist, trained in physical anthropology by the eminent scholars Charles Davenport and Franz Boas. As noted in the epigraph, Sullivan ruefully acknowledged that, "Hawaiian-whites are looked upon as the negroes are in this country," but urged fellow eugenicists against such a view, insisting that "the part-Hawaiian is biologically a better individual than the full Hawaiian." In parsing this quote, we should note that Sullivan neither sought to dispel the perceived inferiority of "negroes," nor placed much value on either the "full Hawaiian" or any alternative views there might have existed about “Hawaiian-whites” in Hawai‘i as opposed to the wider American public. Rather, he argues that the "part-Hawaiian" is an improvement, rather as he might remark upon a special hybrid cross of a tree or flower. On first glance, Sullivan’s approach confounds conventional categorizations of positive or negative eugenics. For rather than focusing singly on either

\(^{246}\) While hereafter I drop the scare quotes around Part Hawaiian, I maintain a critical stance towards this label throughout.
bettering the white race or eliminating the Polynesian race, he opted for a mix: bettering the Polynesian race. That Native Hawaiians might qualify for “racial betterment,” on selectively similar terms to the larger eugenic project of bettering the white race, may at first appear to be a curious twist. Yet, this improvement hinges on the introduction of whiteness. The Part Hawaiian in Sullivan’s account, as in most, refers to a Native Hawaiian with white ancestry, as opposed to Asian ancestry. Thus, on closer examination, Sullivan’s brand of eugenics fits my framework as another colonial form of establishing whiteness in Hawai‘i, and using whiteness to possess both Hawai‘i’s people and lands.

This chapter traces the complexities of such knowledge production about the Part-Hawaiian through the Pacific eugenics literature of the 1900s-1930s as well as the historical formation and contemporary impact of blood quantum laws for Native Hawaiians. The 1920 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act enshrined in law a distinction between "part-Hawaiians" and "full Hawaiians." "native Hawaiians"— with a lower case "n," were those “of no less than one half part”— while "Native Hawaiians," with an upper case "N," were those who could not prove that their ancestry met this 50% blood requirement. Only native Hawaiians would be eligible to receive a homestead, because Native Hawaiians were assumed to be already better versed in American ways, as they could likely "pass" as white. Kēhaulani Kauanui's text Hawaiian Blood has significantly illuminated the legal and political history of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, persuasively arguing that blood quantum policies in Hawai‘i were drawn from similar
policies of land allotment such as the Dawes Act in the Native American context. My work attempts to show another side of how blood quantum was formed in Hawai'i by illuminating how the Part Hawaiian was created in scientific literature, formed in between the racial categories of Polynesian and white, and objectively measureable in percentages of blood. At stake in this chapter is the question: why, when other forms of eugenic thinking have been disavowed for decades now, have eugenic ideas about Hawaiian ‘blood’ and the Part Hawaiian had such a long life?

The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act exists today largely unchanged from 1920, though many Native Hawaiians find the blood quantum restrictions outrageous and entirely divorced from their own forms of membership. In tracing the logics embedded in eugenics literature to the present-day, this chapter analyzes the lawsuit *Day v. Apoliona* (2006-2009) as one example of how Native Hawaiians have responded to blood quantum policies. The five plaintiffs in the Day case, who identify as native Hawaiian, brought suit against the Office of Hawaiian Affairs in order to extend the reach of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act's 50% blood quantum policy (and the related definition outlined in Hawai‘i's 1959 State Admission Act), arguing that the resources OHA-funded programs offered were being "diluted" by the use of state funds to support Native Hawaiians without reference to blood quantum.

As noted in the epigraph above, the plaintiffs based their claims on the §5(f) clause of the Admission Act (a legal foundation of Hawai‘i's statehood), which, they argued, restricted the use of state monies given to OHA from the revenue of "ceded lands" (formerly belonging to the sovereign Hawaiian Kingdom) for "native Hawaiians

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not native Hawaiians and Hawaiians." Such a phrase manages to make head-scratching jargon out of Native Hawaiian identity—"native Hawaiian" and "Native Hawaiian" are distinctions only possible in written language, necessitating at times the deployment of just "Hawaiians," to refer to Native Hawaiians without 50% blood, dropping the native prefix altogether. This process is recognizably part and parcel of the multiplication of indigeneities under settler colonialism, wherein a variety of competing claims to native-ness are created in order to unsettle sovereign Indigenous claims and replace them with settler ones. The Day plaintiffs define "native Hawaiian" against "Hawaiian" in order to emphasize their possession of the most urgent and authentic claims to Hawai`i's lands and resources.

Noticeably, the Day plaintiffs share a patriarchal system of determining Native Hawaiian racial identity with the eugenic scientists of the early twentieth century. In both forms of thinking, Native Hawaiian women are subsumed in discussions about blood purity—erased as actual participating subjects in the formation of Native Hawaiian identity but necessarily predicated as the “vessels” of birthing both the Part Hawaiians that Sullivan viewed as a “superior” being, as well as the Part Hawaiian’s foil, the authentic “native Hawaiian,” valorized by the Day plaintiffs. This chapter analyzes such heteropatriarchal norms and questions how and why they are embedded in both eugenics and Native Hawaiian articulations of identity. Approaching the Day case with Indigenous feminist frameworks allows me to critique the use of heteropatriarchal, Western norms on the part of the Day plaintiffs, while at the same time, forwarding a critically empathetic reading of this case. For my close reading of the Day case shows that a major stake for the plaintiffs was challenging the very authority of the state to define Native Hawaiian
identity, something they chose to do by ‘calling the law on the law.’ Yet, using the master's tools—in this case, blood quantum—to dismantle the master's house also resulted in ‘calling the law on themselves.’ It resulted in a definition of "native Hawaiian" created in the juridical image and structure of whiteness, in which native Hawaiian-ness (and, relatedly, Native Hawaiian female, reproductive sexuality) is a property to be guarded and properly bestowed on only the most deserving.

Overall, this chapter is interested in the legacy of scientific and political measures that make various claims on and about Native Hawaiian "blood." Part 1 begins by contextualizing the discourses and practices of eugenics in the Pacific. I attempt to understand the continuation of the Polynesian Problem in Louis Robert Sullivan's studies, as well as the dissemination of eugenics as a pedagogical subject to Native Hawaiian children, who were instructed in methods to preserve the ancient integrity of their race that was "still in the blood." Part 2 analyzes the complicated claims that "more blood" enables in the Day v. Apoliona case. Throughout, the Part Hawaiian acts as a particularly important cipher in claims about Native Hawaiian racial betterment, alternately indexing the desirability of American whiteness and the betrayal of Native Hawaiian racial purity and authenticity.

Part 1: Eugenic Thinking About Native Hawaiian Betterment

2.1.1: Eugenics Pedagogy in Hawai‘i: Uldrick Thompson's Hopes for the Hawaiian "Remnant"

The field of eugenics in the early to mid twentieth century can be broadly understood as a scientific desire and program for combating degeneration (as also
discussed in Chapter 1), in which the biggest fear was Westerners and the West itself regressing or "going native." Gregory Moore, for example, describes the fears of degeneration in Europe as something more significant than simple social paranoia or pessimism. Rather, Moore writes: "This putative deterioration of Western civilisation—manifested in the epidemics of "social pathologies" such as alcoholism, sexual perversion, crime, insanity, and anarchism... [was] an empirically demonstrable medical fact, as symptomatic of a more fundamental degenerative process within the European races; it eventually gave rise to the eugenics movement."248 As anthropologist Jonathan Marks has noted, “the extent to which eugenics was actually a mainstream movement among professional biologists and geneticists” from 1910 to 1930 … “cannot be overemphasized.”249 In fact, eugenics was a key component of Progressivism.250 Educational programs for “gifted children” and birth control, for example, both trace their histories back to eugenic science.251

The very terminology of eugenics was slowly popularized as it replaced other discourses that were more obviously tied to long-standing discourses about degeneration. For example, a 1911 collection published in Britain titled "The Methods of Race-Regeneration," began by using the language of "race regeneration"—thereby directly referencing and seeming to offer concrete solutions as to how to combat fears about

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251 Ibid.
degeneration. Yet it quickly proposed that its audience replace "race regeneration" with eugenics as a more scientific term: "to describe those who seek the regeneration of the race by the application of the laws of life." The authors in this collection argued, referencing the expertise of Francis Galton, that social improvements must be biological and preventative rather than focus only on responding to the environmental causes of social problems.

This promotion of eugenics as a scientific solution to degeneration—and one more comprehensive than social reforms that focused on environmental conditions—is echoed in the eugenic thinking that occurred in Hawai'i as well. Through eugenics, various concerns about Native Hawaiian "blood" took on more weight as both a metaphor for racial ancestry and a literal, genetic measure of that ancestry. Native Hawaiian youth at Kamehameha Schools—particularly boys—were often at the heart of eugenic pedagogy and research in Hawai'i. Kamehameha Schools for Boys, opened in 1887 (with a Girls campus opening in 1894), was a school for Native Hawaiian children set up by the will of a member of the royal Hawaiian family, Bernice Pauahi Bishop. Two years after the opening of Kamehameha Schools for Boys, the Bishop Museum was founded, and would become a home to a large collection of Native Hawaiian cultural and ethnological artifacts. The Bishop Museum shared a campus with the Kamehameha Schools for Boys from 1889 to 1940, making it particularly easy to pull Native Hawaiian boys into the studies of researchers, like Louis Robert Sullivan, who were based at the Museum.

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252 Caleb Williams Saleeby, *The Methods of Race-regeneration* (Cassell, 1911).
253 Ibid.
Eugenics was also a key topic of instruction at Kamehameha Schools for Boys, as illustrated in two manuals that were used there in the 1910s. Uldrick Thompson, a teacher at, and later the principal of, Kamehameha Schools, published two manuals on eugenics, one in 1913 and one in 1915, for use in his courses on "sex hygiene." Although he was not a scientist, he kept up with all contemporary eugenics literature, as his manuals demonstrate through recommending texts by well-known eugenicists Charles Davenport and David Starr Jordan for his students’ further reading. Originally from New York State, Thompson’s long career at Kamehameha Schools allows him to be remembered today as a storied advocate of Native Hawaiians. For example, in 2002, staff and advocates of Kamehameha Schools repeatedly invoked a 1904 address of Thompson's while the Schools faced its first legal battle over the constitutionality of its Native Hawaiians-first admission policy. Yet the eugenics context of Thompson's advocacy deserves closer examination.

His "Eugenics For Young People" manual, published in 1913, opens up the subject by explaining:

If you tell a chemist what materials you are going to mix together, and what the conditions are, he will tell you, before you mix the materials, just what will happen.... When men have worked out the laws on any subject, and can tell beforehand just what will happen, we say that subject has become a Science.... Sociology is coming to be a Science because men know what will happen if certain people live under certain conditions.... Sociology is also a study of how to improve human beings in every way...

255 Szego, “The Sound of Rocks Aquiver?”.
But I shall not call it Sociology because Sociology is too big a subject. I shall call it Eugenics.\(^\text{256}\)

Thompson goes on to stress that understanding and abiding by the rules of inheritance is of the utmost importance in improving the human race. He tells his students that "our ancestors" are "not entirely to blame" for the combination of "good" and "bad" qualities "they gave us, because they did not understand these laws of heredity."\(^\text{257}\) Yet, for his students, a "Revolution" has begun:

In six states laws have been passed to regulate heredity. These laws say that certain criminals (murderers, thieves and others) shall not have children. People are getting tired of taking care of such creatures.... In time, only the finest men and women will have children. And the weak, the cowardly, the dishonest, the foolish, the lazy and the diseased will die and disappear.\(^\text{258}\)

Thompson's exhortation to his students at Kamehameha Schools is that they can, and indeed must, consciously form reproductive, sexual relationships that will result in children of the finest stock. They were to avoid any unions with biologically and psychologically inferior women who might cause their offspring to fall into that category of "the weak, the cowardly, the dishonest, the foolish, the lazy, and the diseased." Outside of the classroom, Thompson also worked to pass a policy of medical sterilization in Hawaiʻi's Territorial legislature— his proposed bill would "make it lawful for the people of these Islands to refuse parenthood to those who are plainly unfit to reproduce humans."\(^\text{259}\)

On one hand, Thompson's eugenics lesson would have been commonplace at the time. Historian Robert Osgood, for example, demonstrates that the public education

\(^{256}\) Thompson, Eugenics for Young People: Twelve Short Articles on a Vital Subject, 3.
\(^{257}\) Ibid., 5.
\(^{258}\) Ibid., 5–6.
\(^{259}\) I have not found any evidence that this bill passed. Szego, “The Sound of Rocks Aquiver?,” 46–47.
system in Indiana routinely taught eugenics principles, and structured a variety of public
policy on eugenics, including the development of both “special education,” for students
with special needs, and education for so-called "gifted" students. A state leader in Indiana
at the time noted, without controversy, that: "as each [state] agency takes up the work
with boys or girls, or men and women, it recognizes that feeble-mindedness is one of the
great causes of pauperism, vice, immorality, crime, degeneracy..." 260

On the other hand, Thompson's eugenics pedagogy at Kamehameha Schools also differed in significant ways
from continental U.S. concerns, which Osgood argues was largely focused on managing
the reproduction of working class white immigrants. Though Thompson often uses the
same language of degeneracy and immorality in his manuals, the Hawaiian case also held
its own specific concerns. In his 1913 manual, Thompson focuses on the particular case
of Hawaiians in a special section titled, "To a Remnant." 261

Characterizing "old time Hawaiians" as "gigantic in stature and great in strength," "patient and persevering,"
"honest and hospitable," and "intelligent," Thompson questions how many of these good
qualities were passed on to the contemporary generation of Native Hawaiians, whom he
deems "a small remnant." 262

He suggests:

> the qualities which made the old-time Hawaiians great, in their time and
> under their conditions, have been transmitted and are still in the blood.
> Latent, if you will; but present; and capable of development.... It remains
> for this remnant of a great people to learn how best to keep and how best
> to transmit, to their children, the qualities that they are proud to say their
> ancestors possessed. And they must learn these things and act upon this
> knowledge before it is everlastingly too late. 263

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260 Osgood, “Education in the Name of ‘Improvement’,” 282.
261 Thompson, Eugenics for Young People: Twelve Short Articles on a Vital Subject, 9–10.
262 Ibid., 9.
263 Ibid.
While Thompson represents the Hawaiian race with the common eugenics language of degeneration, and also uses the popular images of Hawaiians as dying out and disappearing, he argues overall that eugenics can help reverse such decay and foster a stronger Hawaiian race for the future. This use of eugenics as applied to improving the Native Hawaiian race is a rather surprising re-purposing of common eugenics discourses about bettering the white race. Eugenics pedagogy in the U.S., as noted by Osgood, generally focused on preventing reproduction among those considered members of a lower class and inferior race, not encouraging it. Even other eugenicists writing about Hawai‘i in the early twentieth century tended to view Native Hawaiians as irreversibly doomed to extinction, and were primarily interested in how the physical and moral characteristics of "pure" Hawaiians would be transmitted into the larger, racially mixed population of Hawai‘i. Thus, Thompson's plan for biologically bettering the Hawaiian race, through a careful cultivation of the "qualities which made the old-time Hawaiians great," displayed a unique belief in the reversibility of Native Hawaiians' supposed extinction. He encouraged his Native Hawaiian students to imagine a future in which they could also confidently wield the "the qualities that they are proud to say their ancestors possessed."

The advocacy and power Thompson granted in encouraging his students' belief in a Native Hawaiian future should not be easily dismissed. Yet, we also cannot ignore that Thompson agreed with other eugenicists that it was the "pure," "old time Hawaiians,"

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264 L.C. Dunn, for example, wrote, “The decrease in numbers of the native Hawaiians, and the increase in the number of hybrids indicate that the Hawaiian type will eventually exist only in hybrids between Hawaiians and other races.” Dunn in Charles Benedict Davenport, Scientific Papers of the Second International Congress of Eugenics Held at American Museum of Natural History, New York, September 22-28, 1921. Committee on Publication (Williams & Williams, 1923).
who were the ideal and most valuable Native Hawaiians (prefiguring in some ways the valuing of the native Hawaiian of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1921, further discussed in Part 2 of this chapter). Thompson simply applies the positive eugenics lessons that eugenicists meant for well-off white populations to his students, the relatively privileged (because they were being privately educated) Native Hawaiian boys at Kamehameha Schools. While this application may seem surprising, as my analysis in Chapter 1 has shown, Thompson would have had ample literature to draw on that would have tied Native Hawaiians ancestrally to the white race. Indeed, as Szego, who explores Thompson's "racial ambivalence" towards Native Hawaiians through an analysis of a song Thompson composed, has noted: "A great deal, though certainly not all, of Thompson's appreciation for his contemporaries seems to have stemmed from the ways that Hawaiians fulfilled European American standards and desires, rather than an intrinsic valuation of their indigenous practices."265 Thus, Thompson envisioned Native Hawaiians as close enough to "European American standards" and the white race to be capable of undergoing a similar positive eugenic project of racial betterment within their own communities.

However, negative eugenics were also implicit in Thompson's eugenics teaching and advocacy. Though he held hope for the best of Native Hawaiian youth, he also clearly felt that some Native Hawaiians were "unfit" and should have been subject to the medical sterilization policies he advocated. Szego remarks on this point: "In short, many haole elite regarded a great many Hawaiians as 'unfit,' though Thompson never said as

265 Szego, “The Sound of Rocks Aquiver?,” 32.
much. He did not have to. In his manuals, Thompson gives few explicit instructions about what kinds of unions or women would be 'unfit' for his male students. Yet, his repeated mentions of disease and learning the laws of inheritance touch on two taboos that Western observers perceived Native Hawaiians transgressing—namely, incest and leprosy. Some Native Hawaiians (especially the royal family) had a tradition of marriage between siblings, for example. Additionally, after the outbreak of leprosy in Hawai‘i in the late nineteenth century, Native Hawaiians did not initially follow Western standards of quarantining those with Hansen’s disease. These things shocked and mobilized Western missionaries, and similar concerns were translated into scientific literature through eugenics, where breaking such taboos became the cause of Native Hawaiian racial degeneration. Sexual relationships between Native Hawaiians with and without leprosy, and relationships deemed incestuous by Western standards, were both capable of producing children whose "bad qualities" were not immediately, physically apparent, but seemed to Western observers to always lay just below the surface.

Western fears and fascination about Hawai‘i in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in fact pivoted on the fact that both leprosy and racial ancestry were not always immediately, physically apparent. At least in the early stages of Hansen's disease, those infected often appeared perfectly healthy. For example, in Jack London's stories about Hawai‘i, a repeated theme is of a white person coming to terms with the discovery that the beautiful and sexually desirable appearance of a Native Hawaiian man or woman masked both their diseased nature and their true racial identity— because they appeared

266 Ibid., 47.
to the white viewer to also be white, or at least very nearly white. Like Thompson, London was fascinated by what was latent, "still in the blood" of Native Hawaiians.

These fears about disease and race in Hawai'i were important to an American public for whom many were just being introduced to the idea of Hawai'i becoming part of the U.S. For in 1893, formal U.S. claims to Hawai'i began to made, along with the dismantling of Native Hawaiian sovereign power. The Hawaiian monarchy was overthrown by a cadre of American plantation owners in 1893, and Hawai'i was formally annexed as a territory by the U.S. in 1898. Scientific and popular interest in Hawai'i burgeoned after the Hawaiian monarchy's overthrow and Hawai'i's annexation; yet many balked at the idea of adding a "brown" race to the U.S. populous. The association of leprosy with Native Hawaiians was a particular cause of concern. American writer Prince Morrow, for example, argued that considering "more than ten per cent of the Hawaiian race are affected with leprosy it becomes a serious question as to what will be the effect of the absorption of this tainted population upon the health interests of this country." Morrow went on to detail what was not responsible for the leprosy epidemic among Native Hawaiians:

No unfavorable influence of soil or climate or hardship can be invoked in explanation of the decay and death of the native race. It is not the outcome of a contest between a savage and a civilized race in which the weaker succumbs to the stronger, as exemplified in the case of the North American Indian. It is not the result of a struggle for existence, since there

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can be no competition for subsistence in a land where nature is kindly and bountiful, and furnishes a supply of easily procured food sufficient for the needs of all. Under the same conditions which have led to the depletion of the Hawaiian race, and which threaten its ultimate extinction, the foreign races that have settled here have flourished and multiplied.\textsuperscript{271}

While Morrow does not explicitly explain what was responsible for leprosy among Native Hawaiians, it is clear that he places the blame on Native Hawaiians themselves. Another commentator during this period stated more explicitly: "The exceeding immorality of the people [of "the Hawaiian race"] has done more toward perpetuating this disease than any other cause."\textsuperscript{272}

Thompson also believed that Native Hawaiians had certainly suffered at least partially at their own hands, but the largest sin in his eyes is that most of the "old time Hawaiians" "died without having reproduced their kind. And humanity is just that much poorer."\textsuperscript{273} By this, Thompson meant not that "old time Hawaiians" had had no children at all, but that they had had children with non-Hawaiians, therefore producing Part Hawaiians without the same admirable qualities. Thompson approached the male Native Hawaiian students he taught as the elite, future leaders of their communities, and believed that under his tutelage, these students could "rehabilitate" their race. It is the "young men and young women of Hawaiian blood who are meeting the new conditions and holding their own in the struggle for existence and advancement" in whom Thompson believes the good qualities of old time Hawaiians are "still in the blood."\textsuperscript{274}

\textsuperscript{272} Ibid., 559.
\textsuperscript{273} Thompson, \textit{Eugenics for Young People: Twelve Short Articles on a Vital Subject}, 9.
\textsuperscript{274} Ibid., 10.
Yet, it is significant that Thompson's plan for re-invigorating the Hawaiian race was premised on "purer" unions between Native Hawaiians only, and was implicitly staged against children born of inter-racial relationships, who were common at the time. For Thompson, modern Part-Hawaiians (many of his students included) were clearly distinguishable from (and lesser than) the "old-time Hawaiian," of whom he talks completely in the past tense. In a memoir Thompson later published in 1941, he would state even more pessimistically and adamantly:

I do not believe in this MIXING THE RACES. It has been going on since Cain migrated to the land of Nod. And the present population of this earth is the result,—a conglomerate of human beings, degenerates, liars, thieves, parasites, murderers, kidnappers, dope fiends, swindlers. If this mixing of the races could be confined to the mating of the finer women and men of each race, the results would be entirely different.275

Interestingly, Thompson was not bothered by the idea of racial mixing as a practice as much as he was concerned about the pedigree of those who were mixing. Thompson believed Native Hawaiians' best qualities were their similarities to European Americans; thus, keeping their pedigrees within those of a "finer" nature was the only viable future for Native Hawaiians.276 Thus, though Thompson's stance was markedly different than other eugenics literature that lauded the benefits of racial intermixture for assimilating Native Hawaiians into proper Americans, it was actually structured by the same tenets of whiteness. Though similar ideologies continue to influence Native Hawaiian racial and gender norms today (as I will elaborate on later), I now turn to a different eugenic view of the Part Hawaiian, which fills out a more complete picture of the ways eugenics constructed Native Hawaiian blood.

275 Szego, “The Sound of Rocks Aquiver?,” 49.
276 Ibid.
2.1.2: Sullivan's "Two Types" of Polynesians

Louis Robert Sullivan, as mentioned in this chapter's introduction, was a physical anthropologist who worked for the American Museum of Natural History in New York City. Visitors to the Bishop Museum Archives today may readily recognize his name from a bountiful resource that he left behind after his visiting affiliation with the Bishop Museum from 1921-1925: the Sullivan collection of photographs. These images—over 1,300 photographs total, though this is only a fraction of the nearly 11,000 residents of Hawai'i whom Sullivan measured—portray a variety of Hawai'i's residents from the 1920s and are frequently used today for visitors conducting genealogical research. Yet, few visitors may understand the original purpose of these photographs. In a joint appointment between the American Museum of Natural History and Bishop Museum, Sullivan was hired to "undertake a definite investigation of the Polynesian elements in the Hawaiian population." In the words of Clark Wissler, curator in the department of Anthropology at the American Museum, Sullivan, "a highclass [sic] museum man," would provide research desired by Bishop Museum and in the process also direct the production of a "collection of photographs and plaster casts of living subjects to be used in our exhibition halls." 277

Even before Sullivan arrived in Honolulu, the photographs and plaster casts the American Museum expected him to produce were seen as vitally important data for the eugenics field. Henry Fairfield Osborn, then president of the American Museum, Clark Wissler, Louis Sullivan, and Herbert Gregory, then director of Bishop Museum and also

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affiliated with Yale University, were all members of the Galton Society, the premiere professional eugenics organization of the time. As Warwick Anderson notes:

Collecting 'primitive' types was compelling because [Henry Fairfield] Osborn planned a Polynesian hall at the American Museum; the United States boasted a "historic connection" with Hawai‘i and the evaluation of a racially mixed peoples might offer insight into contemporary social problems on the mainland, including New York.  

Thus, the eugenic interest in Hawai‘i was a distanced curiosity by academics located on the East Coast, fueled less by a genuine interest in the populations of Hawai‘i than in what the lessons Hawai‘i's racial mix might imply for the changing demographics of the mainland United States. Scholar Anne Maxwell has suggested that American audiences would have viewed "racial type" photographs such as Sullivan's as a way "to predict what would happen if other racial groups were allowed to mix with Americans, and if reversing the sex of the parents for each racial combination made any difference." This is what American visitors would have had in mind while viewing the photographs and casts Sullivan directed as they were displayed at both the American Museum and the 1921 Second International Eugenics Congress in New York City. Each photo and facial cast, made from live subjects, was carefully notated with that person's race. Some were labeled simply "Chinese man," while the Native Hawaiian subjects had much more detailed fractions, allowing viewers to imagine the effects of racial combinations, as Maxwell has noted. Captions inked across the chests of the 54 facial casts included, for example: "Hawaiian 6/8 American 2/8," "Hawaiian 3/4, Chinese 1/4," or "Hawaiian 1/4, White 1/4, Chinese 1/2."

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Upon his arrival, Sullivan used anthropometric methods to obtain physical measurements and other data from Native Hawaiians in Hawai'i. These methods included measuring the stature (height), span, head length and width, anatomical face height, nasal height and width, physiognomic ear length, height and breadth. Qualitative characteristics were also observed, including classifications of eye color, presence of epicanthic eyefold, ear lobe shape, nasal bridge height, slope of the forehead, shape of the lips, hair color and form ("straight, low waved, deep waved, curly, frizzly, wooly"), and skin color (both "exposed and unexposed"— Sullivan required his subjects to be measured nude). In anthropology—a discipline for which Sullivan even wrote a manual specifying a standardized set of practices—all of these features were compared to the average or common features of other races and used to construct ideal racial types. Sullivan was both fascinated and frustrated by the large variety of physical characteristics Polynesians exhibited—as Warwick Anderson notes, he wrote of his work: "I'm trying to work out a method for isolating race types in a badly mixed population." Despite finding it harder to isolate "race types," as an anthropometrist, he soldiered on, meticulously cataloging and constructing a large collection of photographs and plaster casts of Hawai'i's Polynesian and non-Polynesian populations.

In addition to producing items for the American Museum's Polynesian Hall, Sullivan also understood his work as pursuing a more refined, complex answer to the classic Polynesian Problem. Warwick Anderson has shown that Sullivan's research interests stemmed from his somewhat uneasy mentorship under two famous, and

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famously opposed, anthropologists: the staunch eugenicist Charles Davenport and one of the first anthropologists to speak against eugenics, Franz Boas.²⁸² Sullivan had completed his Ph.D. fieldwork on the Sioux Indians under Boas, but he was also influenced by, and corresponded with, Davenport because of Davenport's long established interest in the Polynesian Problem.²⁸³ While Davenport and the American Museum president Henry Osborn wanted Sullivan to procure evidence of Hawai‘i's various, "pure racial types," Sullivan's training under Boas had also made him "skeptical of racial typologies and fixities," and interested in the physical effects of race mixing.²⁸⁴ In correspondence with Davenport and Boas, Sullivan emphasized different results; speaking more openly to Boas about his interest in the racially mixed population, while seeming to pursue only "pure" populations in correspondence with Davenport.²⁸⁵ Anderson goes so far as to argue that Sullivan's health suffered from being pulled between Davenport and Boas.²⁸⁶

The tensions of discovering "pure" racial types as well as accepting and studying racially mixed people in Hawai‘i are certainly clear in Sullivan's research and correspondence. For example, in response to a 1921 request from a Dr. R.E. Bevan Brown of New Zealand for blood samples from Native Hawaiians "of pure Island stock and without European admixture," Sullivan had to explain:

> It is perhaps not necessary to tell you that there are no recognizable tribal or island differences in the Hawaiian groups. It is impossible to assure you that the blood in these tubes is pure Hawaiian blood. The 41 subjects were selected from 350 students [at Kamehameha Schools]. Many besides these who claimed to be full Hawaiian were rejected. According to the census

²⁸³ Ibid.
²⁸⁴ Ibid., S95.
²⁸⁵ Ibid., S99–100.
²⁸⁶ Ibid., S100.
count there are nearly as many Part-Hawaiians as full Hawaiians in the islands at present. In addition there is an enormous amount of unadmitted but obvious Chinese and White blood.  

This quote reveals Sullivan's skepticism of the existence of "pure Hawaiian blood," especially when he only had the individual's word to go by. Yet this correspondence also reveals a slight impatience at the assumption that only "pure" Hawaiian blood would be of interest (as "it is impossible" to be sure of such purity). Nonetheless, the "pure" Hawaiian remained important to his own work. In his own (unfinished and posthumously published) study, "Hawaiian Somatology," grouped his subjects into three categories: "1. Hawaiian, 20-59 years old; 2. Hawaiian, 60 years and over; 3. Hawaiians of doubtful purity (20-59)." He believed himself to be a judicious arbiter of "purity" and kept a short list of names of students at Kamehameha Schools whom he accepted as likely being "pure."  

In his own work, Sullivan was moving towards an understanding of the Polynesian race as, even at its prehistoric base, the conglomeration of two or more distinct racial types. That is, Sullivan believed that the contemporary Polynesian race was a combination of several other races, reflecting the migration of ancient Polynesians from Asia through Malaysia, Indonesia and Micronesia to Polynesia. A Bishop Museum annual report from 1921 describes Sullivan's interests thus:

During his investigations Dr. Sullivan became intensely interested in the study of the problem, were there originally only one or several types of physical Hawaiian? And measurements were made of many school-children for the purpose of comparing local and foreign-born Hawaiians,

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289 Untitled document, Sullivan Staff File, Bishop Museum, Honolulu, HI.
in order to find out what changes, if any, had taken place as a result of environment. Boas had completed similar studies interested in the effects of environment on the physical types of European immigrants to New York City. In applying a similar methodology to the population of Hawai'i, Sullivan was thus working with a model of local-born and foreign-born that centered immigrant experiences: the "local and foreign-born Hawaiians" the report refers to denotes recent Asian and European immigrants to Hawai'i as "foreign-born" and "locals" as anyone who was born in Hawai'i, not only Native Hawaiians. Yet Sullivan would also move away from this model as he became more and more fascinated with the Polynesian race itself— the "one or several types of physical Hawaiian" mentioned in the report more straightforwardly denoting Sullivan's specific interest in Native Hawaiians.

In answer to that question, "were there originally only one or several types of physical Hawaiian?," by 1922, Sullivan seemed to have concluded that there were at least two original Polynesian racial types. He described his preliminary thesis in a professional correspondence with Herbert Gregory:

There are two types in Polynesia aside from any Negroid or Mongoloid elements that may occur. The first and primitive type (judging from its distribution) is a short, long-headed, wavy-haired, brown skinned type.... This type is a primitive Mongoloid type related to the Aino [sic, likely Ainu], Indonesian, Micronesian, and the primitive American Indians (Fuegians, Eastern Indians etc). A second type not so wide-spread is a tall, short-headed, straight-haired type with lower, broader faces. Both types are present in Hawaii. I believe the second type is nearer some Malay types than anything else I know of at present. I don't for a minute believe that this solves the Polynesian problem. It does however give us something tangible and definite to start with. Physically that's what we are

Sullivan based these conclusions on comparisons he made between different subjects in his detailed anthropometric measurements of Native Hawaiians, as well as from his analysis of the field work of other ethnologists and anthropologists working elsewhere in the Pacific, such as E.S. Craighill Handy and Willowdean Handy's studies of the peoples of the Marquesas. In fact, Sullivan likely saw his task as proving these ethnological and linguistic claims with physical anthropological evidence. All of his writings about the two types posit his claims as preliminary to further research "and close cooperation on the part of museums [sic] and scientists" which he was certain would be able to give "a more definite answer to the question, 'Who are the peoples that inhabit Polynesia?'"

Most of the remaining research Sullivan would conduct and publish would be centered on his thesis about the "two types" of the Polynesian race. Later, Sullivan would describe his two types as the "Polynesians of Polynesia" and the "Indonesians of Polynesia." The "Indonesian" type corresponded to the first type he describes above—a "brown skinned type," "a primitive Mongoloid." The "Polynesian" type corresponded to the "tall, short-headed, straight-haired type" he mentions above. In a study published by the Bishop Museum in 1923, titled "Marquesan Somatology With Comparative Notes on Samoa and Tonga," Sullivan argued for the continued importance of solving the Polynesian Problem, noting, "All agree that the Polynesian is tall and has wavy hair. Beyond that there is little agreement in their characteristics." He went on to conclude:

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292 Sullivan, Handy, and Handy, *Marquesan Somatology with Comparative Notes on Samoa and Tonga.*
294 Ibid.
If then the Polynesian is not to be regarded as a true Caucasian, he is to be regarded as at least a decided step in that direction. The Polynesian, Aino [sic, Ainu], and certain American Indians may egotistically be looked upon as unsuccessful attempts of nature to make a Caucasian. If they are not true Caucasians, they branched off near the stem of the Caucasian type. It was some type closely related and resembling the Polynesian that gave rise to the Caucasoid types. If they are not true Caucasians, there are undoubtedly descendants of this or closely related types in Europe who pass for Caucasians.  

Writing for a more popular audience in 1923, in an article titled "New Light on the Races of Polynesia," Sullivan would declare the true Polynesian type to be a Caucasoid type. He argued that naming this type Polynesian (of his two acknowledged Polynesian types), though somewhat arbitrary, was fitting because "most of the skeletal material described as Polynesian has been of this type and since the Caucasoid element has been almost exclusively described to the public by London, Stevenson, O'Brien and other writers of South Sea romances." This points to an interesting reliance on popular ideas of Polynesians as well as the linguistic methods and findings of Aryanism, like the earlier Polynesian Problem literature of Lang and Fornander I examined in Chapter 1. His argument that Polynesians "branched off near the stem of the Caucasian type" is quite similar to Fornander's argument that Polynesians were "fundamentally Arian of a pre-Vedic type."  

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295 Ibid.  
296 Ibid.  
To illustrate his points, Sullivan included several photographs with the 1923 article, contrasting, for example (see Figure 2.1 above), two Polynesian men, both dressed in suit and tie. One photo is marked as the "Indonesian Type" who "Represents the Mongoloid Element with Negroid Characters" and the other shows the "Polynesian Type" in whom "Nature Seems Just to Have Missed Producing a Caucasian."298 (In between he shows a photograph of a “Hawaiian Fisherman”—whom he notes is of interest to “specialists in language, ethnology and folk-lore,” as distinct from his own interests in physical anthropology.) Sullivan's creation of one "browner" type and one

298 Sullivan, New Light on the Races of Polynesia.
"whiter" type also echoed previous arguments about the black and brown races of Oceania. While earlier ethnologists had drawn colored distinctions between "black" Melanesians and "brown" Polynesians, Sullivan was acknowledging that similar distinctions existed within the Polynesian race itself. This acknowledgement, however, did not make such categories irrelevant but conveniently allowed for the diversity of physical characteristics within the Polynesian race while also seeming to objectively prove the existence of the storied, 'white' Polynesian of "South Sea romances." This was a revision of Fornander and others' arguments that Polynesians had never mixed with Black races—Sullivan was at once acknowledging Polynesian racial diversity and declaring, with visual and physical evidence, that popular views of the Polynesian as a morally pure, nearly white, noble savage type were still valid.

Ultimately, Sullivan died before he was able to adequately (in his mind) solve the Polynesian Problem. He passed away at a young age, in 1925, from pleurisy or complications of tuberculosis. After his death, the American Museum eventually replaced Sullivan's visiting position at the Bishop Museum with Harry Shapiro—a researcher whose work I examine further in Chapter 4. Here, I would like to conclude with a few final points about the significance of Sullivan's work in my own analysis. It is particularly useful to note the difference in my analysis of Sullivan's work from that of historian of science Warwick Anderson.

As referenced in my own analysis of Sullivan above, Anderson's recent scholarship provides an important examination of the careers of many of the social

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scientists who worked in Hawai‘i and elsewhere in the Pacific in the early twentieth
century, including Sullivan, Shapiro, Kenneth Emory, and Frank Stimson.\textsuperscript{300} Anderson
distinguishes the work of these scientists, as mentioned in reference to Sullivan's tense
situation between Davenport and Boas, from older, more conservative anthropologists
who were still invested in "older classificatory physical anthropology," noting that:

Most of these rising anthropologists arrived in Hawai‘i already
discontented with the complicated and contradictory typologicalenterprise, and experiences there propelled their drift toward racial
recusancy. The vast sea of islands, with Hawai‘i in the middle, proved an
exemplary site where physical anthropology could be refashioned and a
new human biology might emerge.\textsuperscript{301}

Though Anderson usefully points out the budding changes in physical anthropology and
the influence of scientists' experiences in the Pacific as key to the development of a
"more-dynamic biological anthropology," there are gaps in Anderson's analysis. First,
Anderson spends very little time on the differences between Sullivan's analysis of Native
Hawaiians (and the Polynesian race more broadly) and other populations in Hawai‘i. For
example, Sullivan's thesis about the two types is not mentioned in Anderson's work. This
is a major oversight because, as I have argued above, Sullivan was fascinated precisely
by the specific racial makeup of the Polynesian race, as distinct from the Asian and
European immigrants to the Pacific. Not every element of Hawai‘i's racial mix held the
same interest for Sullivan, or for other eugenicists and social scientists. An
acknowledgment of Sullivan's arguments about the Indonesian and Polynesian types of
Polynesians significantly complicates Anderson's argument that young rising

\textsuperscript{300} Anderson, “Racial Hybridity, Physical Anthropology, and Human Biology in the Colonial Laboratories
of the United States”; Warwick Anderson, “Hybridity, Race, and Science: The Voyage of the Zaca, 1934–

\textsuperscript{301} Anderson, “Racial Hybridity, Physical Anthropology, and Human Biology in the Colonial Laboratories
of the United States,” S95–96.
anthropologists in the Pacific were really breaking away from the "typological enterprise." Though Sullivan's work did differ from previous work insisting on uncovering pure types, his discovery of the two types actually allowed him to shore up older ideologies about the ancestral Polynesian ties to the Aryan race.

Examining Sullivan's work more closely also complicates Anderson's broader conclusion that studies of racial hybridity in the Pacific helped phase out the more biologically grounded aspects of physical anthropology and promote more liberal views about race in science. While Anderson acknowledges that blood quantum policies have limited Native Hawaiian self-determination, he holds that Sullivan and Shapiro's era of science in the Pacific was an exceptional, liberal moment, concluding:

While scientists were praising human hybridity, enjoying their modernist biological moment, mainland typologies and classifications gained a foothold on the islands. By the 1970s, when Barack Obama was growing up in Honolulu, the tension between these contrasting racial evaluations would be keenly felt.302

This argument curiously denies the participation of eugenicists like Thompson and Sullivan in the perpetuation of racial typologies that allowed blood quantum policies to develop in Hawai'i. At the very same time that the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act established blood quantum laws for Native Hawaiians in 1921, science was encouraging both academic and layperson to view Native Hawaiians as Thompson's "remnants," in whom the good qualities of old time Hawaiians were "still in the blood," and to measure Native Hawaiians (exclusively) in fractions such as those notated on Sullivan's photographs and facial casts. What Anderson calls "praising human hybridity," in other

302 Ibid., S105.
words, was not contrary to the establishment of "mainland typologies and classifications" in Hawai'i, but essential to them.

Anderson lauds Sullivan's work as a worthy, if unsuccessful, attempt to "Hawaiianize racial thought"—meaning, in his words, the efforts of Sullivan and others to "stabilize and sanction mixed-race identities." However, by viewing Sullivan's work in relation to Thompson's earlier views on Native Hawaiians and eugenics, other conclusions about Sullivan's work can emerge. Sullivan championed the Part Hawaiian (because he was also Part White, just as the true Polynesian type had been), whereas Thompson championed the pure Hawaiian (because he mirrored white standards of racial purity). Though they took opposite sides on the value of the Part Hawaiian, we can see that both forms of eugenic thinking girded settler colonialism in Hawai'i. Both definitions of the Part Hawaiian wrested the label of Hawaiian away from Native Hawaiian forms of identification and allowed standards of whiteness to dominate Hawai'i instead. The key point is that whether Native Hawaiians were judged by the standards of white purity or they were simply judged as *almost* white, through eugenics white, American authority over Hawaiʻi became not just a fact, but an innate, biological fact. As the next part of this chapter explores, by formulating blood measurements as an objective measure of Native Hawaiian identity, this work helped profoundly disempower Native Hawaiians.

**Part 2: Leveraging Blood And Whiteness**

Part Two of this chapter examines contemporary negotiations over Native Hawaiian identity in a legal challenge to the state and federal enforcement of blood
quantum definitions of the "native Hawaiian." As Kēhaulani Kauanui has examined in
detail, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1921 (hereafter abbreviated as the
HHCA) instituted a system whereby "any descendant of not less than one-half part of the
blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778" would be able to
lease small homesteads from the state government. 303 The lease stipulation (as distinct
from than ownership of land in fee simple) and the "not less than one-half part" blood
definition were arrived at only after a series of compromises between the government, the
Native Hawaiian advocates of the bill, and the Big Five, a consortium of plantation
owners operating in the islands since the early 1800s. 304 Native Hawaiian leaders, with
respected Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalanianaʻole at the helm, argued that Native Hawaiians of
even the 32nd degree deserved land under the HHCA, but the powerful Big Five sought to
limit the definition of Native Hawaiian in order to allow themselves access to as much
land as possible. 305

The HHCA is in force today with few changes since its establishment in 1921.
Though minor provisions for the passing on of homesteads to descendants who are "at
least one-quarter Hawaiian" were added in 1997, "one-half part" remains the requirement
for original leaseholders of Hawaiian Homelands. 306 While "one-half part" native
Hawaiian "blood," is officially tallied by verification of the race listed on birth
certificates and other genealogical documents, such documents are notoriously
incomplete or incorrect. Any characteristics that do not fit popular images of the average

303 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1921, http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/vol01_ch0001-
0042f/06-Hhca/HHCA_.htm; Kauanui, Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and
Indigeneity.
304 Kauanui, Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity.
305 Ibid.
306 Ibid., 5; Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, §208(5) and §209.
"Polynesian" or "Hawaiian type"—whether it is skin or hair color, birthplace, cultural knowledge and practices—can always call "blood" amounts into question, as we saw in Louis Robert Sullivan's constant questioning of his subjects' purity and pedigree. Below in Part Two, I first briefly contextualize the ways that scientific understandings of the Polynesian race were translated into law in one pre-requisite case that ruled on whiteness and indigeneity in Hawai'i in the early twentieth century. Then, I examine the arguments of Day v. Apoliona in an attempt to understand how and why five native Hawaiian men leveraged the 50% blood quantum definition in suing the Office of Hawaiian Affairs for failing to "better the condition of native Hawaiians."

2.2.1: Polynesian Blood and the Pre-requisite of Whiteness

Kēhaulani Kauanui's legal history of the HHCA draws on Claire Jean Kim's formulation of racial triangulation to explain how the legal institution of blood quantum for Native Hawaiian recognition further fueled a "haole-Hawaiian-Asian" divide. In this triangle, Native Hawaiian blood was understood as "dilutable" whereas Asians were permanently unassimilable and haoles were the face of Hawaiʻi's future. Though I am indebted to the strength of Kauanui's findings, my approach to the history of "Hawaiian blood" also differs in key ways. My project has sought to demonstrate that racial ideas about Native Hawaiians cannot be understood without situating the history of blood quantum for Native Hawaiians within the longer history of racial ideas about Polynesians, as evident in the Polynesian Problem literature. Kauanui makes important

308 Kauanui, Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity, 75.
connections between the legal histories of the HHCA and the Dawes Act of 1877, which instituted allotment and checkerboarding of Native American lands. Yet she largely does not examine any broader Pacific context in *Hawaiian Blood*, tying her analysis chiefly to comparative U.S. laws. This is fitting for her project as it is centered primarily a textual history of state and federal law. However, my work seeks to build off Kauanui's findings by contextualizing them within the longer history of scientific knowledge production about the Polynesian race. Before moving on to a discussion of *Day v. Apoliona*, I want to highlight the differences between Kauanui's and my own approach in the critique and study of "Hawaiian blood," by commenting on an essay Kauanui published in 2004, about a racial prerequisite citizenship case for a Polynesian person in 1928.  

In that article, Kauanui examines a court case in which Alfred Milner Stephen, a man identified as "three-quarters English and one-quarter Polynesian," challenged the 1790 Congressional prerequisite which stipulated that naturalization for U.S. citizenship was only open to "free white persons." Stephen was not Native Hawaiian; he had migrated to Hawai'i from "Neuru Island" (likely Nauru Island in the Marshall Islands). As Ian Haney López's seminal book *White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race* examines, U.S. federal courts ruled on a total of 52 so-called 'prerequisite cases,' from 1878 (after the clause was amended to include "aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent" in 1870) to 1952 (when racial restrictions on naturalization were  

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311 Ibid., 36.
formally ended). Kauanui follows Haney López's argument that in determining a plaintiff's relative "whiteness" and readiness for U.S. citizenships, the courts gradually shifted from using social scientific racial classifications to common knowledge rationales. In the specific 1928 case of Alfred Milner Stephen, the courts decided that Stephen was sufficiently white enough to naturalize. Kauanui argues that this was due partly to the "predominance" of Stephen's white "blood" but also because of "pervasive notions about the potential for Hawaiians to assimilate and to fulfill the requirements of American citizenship." 

By adhering to the rubric of López's work, which starkly distinguishes between scientific evidence and common knowledge as the basis of ruling on one's whiteness, Kauanui accepts that the Stephen case was decided largely on common knowledge and not scientific evidence. For example, she notes: "in Stephen's case, had the judge relied on scientific evidence instead, he might have ruled in favor of him because Polynesians were at that time categorized as an 'Oceanic branch of the Caucasian division.'" Instead, Kauanui argues, the presiding judge relied on common knowledge in which "Polynesians and mixed race Hawaiians were racialized as assimilable. The judge told the court that it was important to 'consider the fact that the racial admixture which characterizes this applicant is of a very desirable character [,] as the history of Hawaii and the South Seas has clearly proven." However, as Part One of this chapter has demonstrated, scientific thought and popular thought were never entirely divorced or

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313 Kauanui, “‘A Blood Mixture Which Experience Has Shown Furnishes the Very Highest Grade of Citizen-material’: Selective Assimilation in a Polynesian Case of Naturalization to U.S. Citizenship,” 35.
314 Ibid., 38.
315 Ibid.
without mutual influence, especially in the context of the Pacific Islands. Popular views of Native Hawaiian’s “assimilable” nature were in part based on a long history of scientific racial classifications of Polynesians as white. Further, many American scientists came to the Pacific Islands with romantic notions about living in paradise, and this view inevitably colored the ways that they produced knowledge about Indigenous Pacific Islanders. López's examination of scientific classification is largely applied to racial type classifications (after Charles Davenport's models) that were becoming out of mode by the 1920s; but scientific rationales continued to articulate the boundaries and character of race within science and popular culture even when the racial type categories became less important. Indeed, as Sullivan's work shows, the idea that "racial admixture" between Polynesians and whites produced individuals "of a very desirable character" was both a scientific and popular notion.

Noting the ways that science continued to inform popular notions of race even after racial types went out of mode in physical anthropology is important. Science, in Western societies, authorizes ideas in a way that other knowledges have never had the power to. For even the most liberal scientific ideas about race continue to negatively impact the ways that the law and the public recognize Indigenous Pacific Islanders. In noting 'the fact that the racial admixture which characterizes this applicant is of a very desirable character," the judge in the Stephen case could have been quoting from one of Sullivan's studies. The judge's language emphasizes "fact," and the scientific phrase, "racial admixture." By dismissing science as an important background to the Stephen

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316 Anderson, “Hybridity, Race, and Science.”
317 Sullivan, "New Light on the Races of Polynesia."
decision, Kauanui misreads the extent to which the Native Hawaiian "race" was scientifically formed in relation to whiteness. It is not only the case that Polynesians and Native Hawaiians were at times classified as (nearly) Caucasian; but that this scientific literature fed off of and in turn refueled popular notions about Polynesian women as suitable sexual partners for white, settler men and Polynesia as a whole as suitable for settlement by white people.

Though whiteness is also important to Kauanui's analysis of the Stephen case, she understands it mainly as a "solvent"— noting that in popular perceptions of mixed-race Indigenous Pacific Islanders, "Whiteness was always selectively figured as the critical solvent," wherein "white blood" dissolved any negative characteristics associated with "Polynesian blood." However, my formulation of whiteness as a mode of bodily possession—as opposed to a solvent— makes clearer that the racial difference between whites and Polynesians was never meant to actually disappear. Rather, the proximity to whiteness, that science played a leading role in establishing between whites and Polynesians, allowed whites to become the natural inhabitants of Hawai'i and Polynesia. Whiteness thereby dissolved Indigenous Pacific Islanders' sovereign claims to their lands, but always allowed a significant amount of racial hierarchy to remain intact. While the differences between my analysis and Kauanui's may seem slight — between my emphasis on the scientific history of the Polynesian race as opposed to her legal comparisons to U.S. prerequisite cases, and between my seeing whiteness as possession or her view of whiteness as solvent— but I believe it leads to significantly different

318 Kauanui, “‘A Blood Mixture Which Experience Has Shown Furnishes the Very Highest Grade of Citizen-material’: Selective Assimilation in a Polynesian Case of Naturalization to U.S. Citizenship,” 41.
conclusions in the study of Native Hawaiian issues regarding blood quantum, as the next section makes clear.

### 2.2.2: Calling the Law on "Native Hawaiians with a Capital N"

*Day v. Apoliona* was a lawsuit first filed in Hawai‘i in 2005 by five Native Hawaiian men suing the trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (hereafter referred to as OHA) for failing to use state trust monies for the sole benefit of "native Hawaiians"—that is, native Hawaiians "of not less than one-half part blood," as defined by state and federal law. This definition exists as state and federal law because the state Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1921 is explicitly referenced and reinforced in the federal Hawai‘i State Admission Act of 1959. The plaintiffs based their claims on the §5(f) clause of the Admission Act, which, they argued, restricted the use of state monies given to OHA from the revenue of "ceded lands" (amounting to approximately 20% of OHA's total funds) to the "betterment of the condition of native Hawaiians." Ceded lands refer to the lands formerly belonging to the Hawaiian Kingdom, which were seized first by the American businessmen who overthrew Queen Lili‘uokalani in 1893, and were later ceded to the U.S. government, to be held after statehood in "public trust." The Day plaintiffs alleged that OHA failed to follow this mandate for the use of ceded lands money specifically in their funding of four items: first, lobbying for the Akaka Bill (which refers to federal legislation intending to formally recognize and create a so-called "Native Hawaiians")

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319 *An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawai‘i into the Union, 1959*, [http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/vol01_ch0001-0042f04-adm/adm-.htm](http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/vol01_ch0001-0042f04-adm/adm-.htm).

320 Ibid.
Hawaiian governing entity"), and, support of three social welfare-type programs: the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, Na Pua No'eau Education Program, and Alu Like.\textsuperscript{321}

In Hawai'i District Court, OHA trustees, as the defendants, repeatedly filed for summary judgment (i.e. a ruling in their favor without a full trial), arguing that their expenditures from the §5(f) trust funds were not legally limited to solely "the betterment of native Hawaiians," as stipulated in the Admission Act, but instead could be extended to the more broadly defined Native Hawaiian public. District Court granted summary judgment in 2008.\textsuperscript{322} Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Federal Appeals Court. In 2009, the Ninth Circuit definitively ruled that federal law does not require OHA to use the §5(f) trust funds solely for native Hawaiians.\textsuperscript{323} Though the suit was ultimately unsuccessful for the plaintiffs, and thus did not legally change any laws or policies regarding the use of blood quantum for Native Hawaiians, this case showcases well the "ideological half-life" of eugenic thinking about "blood" and "racial betterment," as well as the difficulties Native Hawaiians face in asserting any kind of self-determination over their racial recognition.\textsuperscript{324} For the five plaintiffs of this case, "native Hawaiians," those "of not less than one-half part blood quantum," are a distinct group, clearly separate from, and, indeed, ‘more oppressed’ and thus ‘more entitled’ to state money than Native Hawaiians. Their claims against OHA are in fact described as "dilution interest" claims,

\textsuperscript{321} Walter Schoettle, \textit{Day v. Apoliona Appellants' Opening Brief} (United States Court of Appeals For the Ninth Circuit, November 19, 2008).
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{323} Raymond Fisher, \textit{Day v. Apoliona}, 10687 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Court 2009).
\textsuperscript{324} Wolfe, \textit{Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: the Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event}, 3.
"referring to their assertion of an interest in preventing the dilution of benefits to Native Hawaiians by limiting eligibility to native Hawaiians only."325

My critical entry into this case is through a focus on how law and science are activated by the Native Hawaiian plaintiffs as well as by the Ninth Circuit judges in the final hearing of *Day v. Apoliona* in the Ninth Circuit Court, an audio recording of which I was able to obtain, and the resulting decision. As is evident in the audio recording, there is much confusion and contention in how boundaries can be drawn and maintained between native Hawaiians and other Native Hawaiians. Most significantly, I question the motivations and tactics of the Day plaintiffs. How do the Day plaintiffs, in valorizing blood quantum policies and insisting on the 50% definition of native Hawaiian, participate in what could be read as both 'calling the law on the law'— in insisting that OHA (a quasi-state agency) is neglecting state blood quantum laws— and 'calling the law on themselves'— in insisting that legal and scientific distinctions must be drawn in their own communities between native Hawaiians and Native Hawaiians?

These questions about 'calling the law' stem from a conference on law, violence and the state that I attended at the University of Southern California in September 2010, specifically two talks given by scholars Sora Han and Fred Moten. Sora Han's talk addressed the *Lawrence v. Texas* case of 2003, famous for striking down Texan sodomy laws, by examining the initiation of the case as an account of racist profiling perpetuated by Robert Eubanks, a white man who had been sexually involved with Tyron Garner, a black man who was arrested for sodomy along with another sexual partner, John.

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325 See Defendant-Appellees Apoliona et. al. Answering Brief (No. 08-16704, 01/05/2009, p. 3-4).
Lawrence, because Eubanks called the police on him. Han, as well as Moten in his own talk "On (Non)Violence," both asked what it meant that Eubanks essentially called the law on himself—by asking for homosexual sex (and his own former sexual partner) to be violently policed—and theorized that law was so effectively galvanized here precisely because Eubanks had framed the relationship between Garner and Lawrence as an injury to (his) whiteness. Moten further questioned how we could escape this and other uses of law to policing our own selves and communities, through reinforcing the legal sovereignty of whiteness, by provoking the audience to think about "how not to want this shit." "This shit," being, in my reading, the same status or recognition as enjoyed by whiteness in law.

Incited by Han and Moten, I argue that the Native Hawaiian plaintiffs of Day v. Apoliona also 'called the law on themselves' in order to have Native Hawaiian indigeneity formally recognized in law with a similar, if never quite the same, weight of whiteness. While I heartily agree with many Indigenous Studies scholars that such efforts towards recognition and formal, legal equality are misguided and incomplete at best, as it often strengthens the sovereignty of the colonial nation-state at the expense of native nations, I remain haunted by Moten's words: in practical terms, how exactly do we (and our diverse communities, with many for whom legal recognition is not so easily dismissed) go about not wanting this shit? For indeed, in the face of scarce and endangered resources and rights, how can Native Hawaiian not desire stronger protections under the law? In

326 These presentations by Sora Han and Fred Moten, as far I know, have not yet been published.
raised by the case is not "how could they?!" (as in "how could these Native Hawaiian
men defend and actually seek to extend the reach of the 50% blood quantum
definition?!"). Rather: why did they choose to use blood quantum to gain greater resources
and recognition, blood quantum being a technology "not of our own making" but
nonetheless one that has become an undeniable part of Native nations? Why did they
think this suit could be successful, and what did they hope to actually have 'recognized'?
In denying their claim, what was the motivation of the state and federal governments, and
why did they stop short of striking down blood quantum policies for Native Hawaiian
altogether? To be clear, framing my questions in this manner is not meant to sanction the
Day plaintiffs' actions but rather to more deeply understand them and their part in
shaping dominant forms of Native Hawaiian recognition, especially this clearly
heteropatriarchal and colonial, but nonetheless persistent, desire to have "no less than
one-half parts blood," a desire circulated both by the state and amongst Native
Hawaiians. Below I consider these questions in regards to the opening statement of the
final Day hearing, an exchange between one justice and the plaintiff's attorney about the
importance of blood quantum in the case, and a final exchange between the justices and
plaintiff's attorney about the harms of the Akaka Bill to native Hawaiians.

Overall, the plaintiffs framed their claims as a problem of neglect, of OHA's
failure to "better the condition of native Hawaiians," as the plaintiffs argued was their
duty according to the Admission Act. Yet, the plaintiffs also constantly challenge the
legal authority of the state and federal government. They gesture towards the view of

328 Scott Richard Lyons, X-Marks: Native Signatures of Assent (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2010).
native Hawaiians as a dispossessed and colonized people, even while they carefully insist that their argument is solely about enforcing the blood quantum definition enshrined in state and federal law. For example, in his opening address, Walter Schoettle, the plaintiffs' attorney, attempts to demonstrate for the court what he calls "the big picture." He states that the "Kingdom of Hawaii" dispossessed native Hawaiians from their lands (referring, he clarifies in his opening brief, to the division and privatization of lands in the Great Māhele of 1848, prior to even the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom by American citizens) just as the Native Americans were dispossessed by the United States. To this claim, a justice interrupts to say, "Now that we're a statehood, and it went to a popular vote of the people, I take it that it's part of the union.... Let's take it as is." Even though it is the Kingdom of Hawaii that Schoettle identifies as the dispossessor, not the United States, the justice is eager to foreclose any further discussion that Schoettle may be setting up—such as Native Hawaiians' inherent sovereignty over the whole of Hawai'i—which he sees as far outside the scope of his court and long settled. Schoettle responds, "I'm not... [laugh] I'm not challenging annexation. I'm just stating the fact..." The justice intervenes again: "Let's take it like it is. And in the course of becoming a state, certain agreements were entered into between the Kingdom and the United States government, approved by the Senate. That's what we're looking at isn't it?" Schoettle responds, "That's what I'm getting to, your honor, and I'd like to see

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330 The Justice speaking is not identified in the audio recording; it is either Justice Robert Beezer or Justice Raymond Fisher. Ibid.
331 Ibid.
332 Ibid.
those agreements enforced." Thus, Schoettle quickly abandons the language of dispossession—not even challenging the judge’s erasure of the history of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s illegal overthrow and annexation. He returns to the language of neglect, insisting on the duty of the state to "better" native Hawaiians:

My point is... that even though this court has indicated on several occasions that 5(f) [section of the Admission Act] by itself doesn't require the state to do anything in particular for native Hawaiians...if you look at 5(f) in connection with 5(b) and section 4 ... The state has to do something to better the ... condition of native Hawaiians... and that is to implement the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. That is what Congress said in 1959.

The justices respond to Schoettle's claims with two main lines of inquiry— the blood quantum definition and accounting in accordance with the §5(f) trust. Justice Graber brings up blood quantum twice in the hearing. As Schoettle explains the details of the foundation of the OHA and its negligence in serving native Hawaiians, Graber interrupts to ask, "So your complaint has to do with the definition of Native Hawaiian, at bottom?" Schoettle empathetically responds, "My complaint has to do with the fact that OHA has been ignoring the definition of native Hawaiians." This again emphasizes the fact that it is the state and federal definition of native Hawaiian that Schoettle and his plaintiffs are attempting to enforce, simply as a matter of law. Graber brings up blood quantum later in the hearing as well, however, as Schoettle emphasizes that his plaintiffs' challenges are grounded in the fact that the use of §5(f) trust funds for the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, Na Pua, and Alu Like, all programs who provide

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333 Ibid.
334 Ibid.
335 Ibid.
336 Ibid.
services without reference to blood quantum, is illegal. They have a heated exchange about blood quantum:

Graber: That's what caused me to ask you the question I asked you much earlier. Isn't this an argument about blood quantum and the definition of who's sufficiently Hawaiian to receive this money?

WS: Yes, that's what the whole case is all about, is the blood quantum.

Graber: But anyone who can... anyone who meets the definition that you want also meets the definition for these entities, do they not?

WS: No... all these entities provide services to Hawaiians without regard to blood quantum.

Graber: Right, so people with more blood quantum by definition...

WS: With less, less... I represent Hawaiians that have the blood quantum... that are not less than one half part...

Graber: If there is a .001 bottom, that people who are fifty percent or above by definition are within that group, are they not?

WS: Yes.

Graber: Okay.\footnote{Ibid.}

At this point another justice redirects the discussion by questioning if the case is primarily a problem of accounting— of OHA failing to properly record how their funds impact specifically native Hawaiians (as distinct from Native Hawaiians more broadly). Schoettle agrees that this is a central part of the plaintiffs' claims— "That's the objection we're making. There is no accounting."\footnote{Ibid.} The justice goes on:

Justice: Have they received any benefit?

WS: Who?
Justice: native Hawaiians. Are you saying no native Hawaiian has received any money from the trust?

WS: I don't know. All I know is, from this record, that they have given trust money to three entities that provide benefits to non-beneficiaries as well as beneficiaries... and what the entities have done with it... they could have spent all the money on native Hawaiians, they could have spent the money on non-native I mean Hawaiians with less than one half part... they could have spent some of it on one and some of it on the other... we do not know... I am saying that by giving the money to an entity that is not restricted to the blood quantum, they have breached the trust because there is no accounting.

The confusion about which type of Native Hawaiians the attorneys and justices are referring to is as palpable in this section as it is in the more heated exchange between Schoettle and Graber about the blood quantum definition. Though Schoettle's argument is that native Hawaiians (of no less than one-half part blood) such as his plaintiffs are the authentic native Hawaiian population that is in most need of "betterment," even he hesitates and stumbles over his words in his explanations. He starts to refer to the broader Native Hawaiian population as "non-native" before clarifying, "I mean Hawaiians with less than one half part." He also begins to rely on the language of accounting in describing his clients and native Hawaiians as "beneficiaries," in contrast to the Native Hawaiian "non-beneficiaries."

As the justices move towards the particular challenge to OHA's support for the Akaka Bill, in contrast to the challenges of funding for the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, Na Pua, and Alu Like, Schoettle creates an even stronger divide between native Hawaiians and Native Hawaiians. He repeatedly refers to the Akaka Bill as a project of "Native Hawaiians with a capital N," explaining:

339 “native Hawaiian” is my own interpretation of the judge’s words here, based on context.
They are trying to establish a government for Native Hawaiians without regard to blood quantum. This is not a benefit to the small number of actual beneficiaries... This is a benefit that goes to all Hawaiians. There are 400,000 Hawaiians. There are only at most 80,000 native Hawaiians.\(^{341}\)

Schoettle goes on to proclaim that "without blood quantum, everyone will be Native Hawaiian," as the Akaka Bill legislation as drafted had no blood quantum requirement.\(^{342}\)

For these reasons, Schoettle claims that the Akaka Bill is "of no benefit" to native Hawaiians as it is basically a way to "deprive" them of their lands. Schoettle further asserts that the Akaka Bill will be held unconstitutional in any case because "without a blood quantum," it will be a violation of the 14\(^{th}\) Amendment of the U.S. Constitution—specifically the equal protection clause. "Racial classification without blood quantum is unconstitutional," Schoettle insists. He goes on to paraphrase the opinion of Justice Breyer in the *Rice v. Cayetano* case, that he had "never heard of an Indian tribe without a blood quantum." This 2000 Supreme Court case *Rice v. Cayetano* held that it was unconstitutional to limit voting for OHA trustees to Native Hawaiians, as limiting the vote according to "Hawaiian as a racial classification" violated the 15th amendment.

Justice Breyer in his *Rice* opinion further wrote:

> Of course a Native American tribe has broad authority to define its membership... There must, however, be some limit on what is reasonable... And to define that membership in terms of 1 possible ancestor out of 500, thereby creating a vast and unknowable body of potential members... goes well beyond any reasonable limit.\(^{343}\)

Using Breyer's argument, Schoettle insists that his clients' native Hawaiian-ness is not reducible to a racial classification and is instead a properly, "reasonably," defined

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341 Ibid.
342 Ibid.
Indigenous classification—that is, one that is based on a native Hawaiian sovereign right to decide its own membership, but that does not exceed, or even approach, that specter of the "vast and unknowable body of potential members" that so threatens Justice Breyer's sense of order in the Rice case. "We would have no objection to governance similar to a Native American tribe," Schoettle explains. The point of contention for the Day plaintiffs is that the "governing entity" that the Akaka Bill would establish starts with the full Native Hawaiian population as a base, instead of the smaller and more "in need" native Hawaiian population. He concludes:

It's up to the tribes to determine the blood quantum... on their own. And what they [Native Hawaiians with a capital N] want to do is to have this entity establish a blood quantum... which they won't... if you start out with no blood quantum, there won't be a blood quantum...

This bill is trying to deprive native Hawaiians of their lands... it is of no benefit to native Hawaiians.

In a generous reading, the plaintiffs are trying to mark n/Native Hawaiians as a sovereign, Indigenous people—a people "deprived" of "their lands", not just a race. Yet the only way this can be "reasoned" in the law is through the enforcement of a restrictive blood quantum, which is, in practice, undeniably racial and thus must be limited to native Hawaiians only. Their arguments ultimately rest, then, with what can be characterized as 'calling the law on the law'—on an insistence that the state and federal governments are failing to follow their own laws and agreements with native Hawaiians. Yet this also requires 'calling the law on themselves'—on dividing communities and families into native Hawaiians as opposed to Native Hawaiians. Like Justice Breyer's remark that an

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344 Day v. Apoliona, No. 08-16704, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Hearing.
345 Ibid.
Indigenous population with "a vast and unknowable body of potential members" is "well beyond any reasonable limit," the Day plaintiffs are accepting that their potential status as the "real" native Hawaiians, and thus any sovereignty associated with that status, is entirely dependent on state and federal limits.

As for the OHA trustees, the defendants in the case, their claims are limited as well. They do not explicitly contest the formal definition of native Hawaiian as referring only to those of "no less than one half part." In part, this reluctance to explicitly challenge the blood quantum is a careful stance—OHA had previously supported a referendum to assess and potentially change the blood quantum requirement, and this referendum was also legally challenged by some of the very same plaintiffs of the Day case.\(^\text{346}\) OHA's defense in the final Day hearing simply argued that their programs do benefit both native Hawaiians and Native Hawaiians more broadly, and that the §5(f) clause did not stipulate any strict accounting measures that required proof that their programs would primarily benefit native Hawaiians only.\(^\text{347}\)

In the end, the published decision from the Ninth Circuit’s hearing of *Day v. Apoliona* found that OHA had not breached the §5(f) in their use of funds for any of the challenged programs. The justices ultimately decided that Congress had given the State of Hawai‘i wide latitude in deciding how to manage the §5(f) funds and that OHA was not limited to spending their money solely on “the better of native Hawaiians.”\(^\text{348}\) The decision concludes:

> We hold that, although §5(f) permits Hawaii to impose further rules and restrictions on management of the §5(f) trust, it does not require the state

\(^{346}\) Mentioned by Robert Klein, the defendants’ attorney, in ibid.

\(^{347}\) Ibid.

and its agents to abide by those rules and restrictions as a matter of federal law. Those alleged violations are actionable under state law, if at all. The trustees have established as a matter of law that each of the challenged expenditures constitutes a “use” “for one or more of the [§5(f)] purposes” and that is sufficient to defeat plaintiffs’ §1983 claim under federal law for breach of the §5(f) trust. 349

My reading of Day v. Apoliona has shown that the answer to Fred Moten's beautiful provocation "how do we not want this shit?"— how do we stop "calling the law on ourselves"— in the case of Native Hawaiian recognition is far from clear. As the Day case demonstrates, the reasons for using blood quantum are complicated; the plaintiffs clearly see blood quantum laws as a way towards exerting native Hawaiian sovereignty, no matter how limited. An essential first step towards ending ‘calling the law on ourselves' may be to remember that Native Hawaiian (and native Hawaiian) identity is a site of conflict that is deeply structured by colonialism—and not, as some would (perhaps understandably) like to see it, as a pure site of culture, resistance, or revitalization. Native scholar Scott Lyons reminds us that, "on top of blood, enrollment, and behavior... another material used for the intersubjective construction of Indian identity [is]: the historical fact of American participation." 350 My analysis has shown that blood itself is also an idea and material object that is constructed through American participation. Keeping our fingers on precisely this pulse—"the historical fact of American participation" in the construction of Indigenous identity generally and the perpetuation of blood quantum in particular—is important because it is necessary to remember that it is not the Day plaintiffs who created the blood quantum laws. Blood quantum laws are a state and federal creation and it will require further efforts in and beyond the courts in order to change them.

349 Ibid.
350 Lyons, X-Marks: Native Signatures of Assent, 47.
Yet, as Moten also recognizes, it is never as easy as simply recognizing and then discarding "the historical fact of American participation" in Black and Indigenous identities. This fact is never easily discarded or excised; it is too deeply embedded in individual and community ideals. Native Hawaiian scholar Brandon Ledward addresses some of these complications in his ethnographic approach towards issues of identity and authenticity among Native Hawaiians. He notes, "For some po'e ha'awina [a Hawaiian language phrase denoting Native Hawaiians], being mistaken for a haole is commonplace"— himself included. He cites an interviewee, a woman who works at a Hawaiian organization, who analyzes an instance of her own experience of how Native Hawaiian communities can be divided by racial authenticity:

I actually had a coworker tell me— and I think she was joking. But you know when you joke there's always an element of truth in there, right? I guess she's frustrated. She goes, "You know, when you watch Kamehameha [Schools] song contest on TV? You don't see any Hawaiian faces." [Pause] I always thought that every single face up there was Hawaiian. But she thought they should make it part of the admission procedure that you should look Hawaiian to get into Kamehameha. And she's someone I respect and is a friend of mine. I just looked at her like [expression of puzzlement]. I thought to myself, "So I don't have the right to go there? 'Cause I don't have dark skin and ūpepe [broad] nose?" I wanted to say something, but I just blew it off.... It's like now we're back in the South in the '50s. We're discriminating on the basis of what skin color you have.\(^{351}\)

In this quote, the speaker expresses both pain and empathy at her coworker's 'joke' about the students of Kamehameha not looking Hawaiian. "I guess she's frustrated," she notes, before she goes on to explain her problems with her coworker's reasoning and limited recognition of who looks Native Hawaiian. Similar to Lyons' insistence on remembering

the "historical fact of American participation" in constructions of Native identity, Ledward goes on to conclude that "Hawaiians need to recognize that 20th-century American racialization causes both personal and collective fragmentation among our people. We must actively challenge these discourses whenever we encounter them."  

Yet, obvious in Ledward's nuanced readings of his interviews, is also a sense that Native Hawaiians are already— and have long been— living with racial discourses and challenges within their own communities, and that their responses (even when unvoiced) are important and complicated. The interviewee quoted above did not feel the need to engage her coworker, in part because she recognized that racial discourses or other aspects of being Native Hawaiian must also "frustrate" that coworker. In that sense, perhaps Ledward's interviewee has shown one mode of how not to call the law on ourselves; she chose not to further solidify the divide her coworker had set up between those who look Hawaiian and those who don't by simply blowing it off. Yet she did not give up her own vision of who Native Hawaiians are or what they can look like.  

Ledward's nuanced approach shares much with Indigenous feminist perspectives, which note that the refusal to accept racism and heteropatriarchy within Indigenous nationalisms is not about posing Native women against Native men, or native Hawaiians against Native Hawaiians, but about building a radically different future for all of us. Lisa Kahaleole Hall, for example, notes that combating heteropatriarchy is important because it has been key to colonialism for Native Hawaiian men and women alike: "The

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352 Ibid., 137.
353 Ledward also opens his article with an anecdote about his own mistaken identity when a Native Hawaiian woman assumes he is white. Rather than explicitly correct her, Ledward offers to chant an oli, signaling to the woman that he is part of the Native Hawaiian community, and the woman later becomes a strong ally and friend. Ledward, “On Being Hawaiian Enough.”
deliberate destruction of non-heteronormative and monogamous social relationships, the indigenous languages that could conceptualize these relationships, and the cultural practices that celebrated them has been inextricable from the simultaneous colonial expropriation of land and natural resources.\textsuperscript{355} As with eugenics discourses, heteropatriarchy is an important but unvoiced part of blood quantum and its use in the Day case. In the case of eugenics, Alexandra Minna Stern has noted that: "As androcentric eugenics highlighted male desire and bodies in pursuit of perfection it frequently demoted or symbolically— and literally— erased women."\textsuperscript{356} The claims of the Day plaintiffs can also be characterized as androcentric— that the five plaintiffs are native Hawaiian men is not coincidental. The distinctions Schoettle is eager to create and maintain a strict difference between 'Native Hawaiians with a capital N' and 'native Hawaiians of not less than one half part,' are dependent on biological, heteropatriarchal definitions of native Hawaiians. Native Hawaiian women (and native Hawaiian women) are required to biologically reproduce and maintain communities of native Hawaiians of not less than one half part— crucially with native Hawaiian men who are also of not less than one half part. That none of the plaintiffs, the defendants, or the justices ever mention the difficulties in maintaining a distinct native Hawaiian population seems shocking— and yet, it is also fitting because the blood quantum law (which is not being contested in itself— only its proper application) is entirely dependent on heteropatriarchal definitions. If the court is loath to even hear that the Kingdom of Hawaii, not even the United States, dispossessed native Hawaiians of their lands, they would certainly be dismissive of


attempts to change the basis of native Hawaiian recognition altogether. As Schoettle points out, the government "has never heard of a tribe without a blood quantum." We might also add, or an Indigenous people who are not a tribe.

Through a generous reading of the Day case, we can understand their actions as, in part, regenerative— and regenerative in an almost literal, eugenic mode, as a way to stave off the encroachment of the broader (Part) Native Hawaiian population on the rights and privileges of native Hawaiians. Yet, from the perspective of Indigenous feminisms, it is clear that a more substantially regenerative response to blood quantum laws is also possible and would involve more fundamentally exorcising ourselves of forms of recognition based on science, heteropatriarchy and whiteness. As Ledward suggests, it is possible for Native Hawaiians to recognize other Native Hawaiians even when they may not "look" like a "pure Hawaiian type." He argues, "Precisely because a Hawaiian framework of identity is based on bilateral kinship and genealogical ties, there is room for diversity and multiplicity to thrive in our community."357 Similarly, it should not be expected that a native Hawaiian woman is required to birth a Native Hawaiian person— there are other culturally appropriate modes of recognition, such as hanai or adoption, that Native Hawaiians still depend on to enlarge and grow our communities. Overall, drawing on these older modes of constituting Native Hawaiian community could be important not because they are more authentic or traditional but because they threaten to destabilize whiteness and heteropatriarchy— to cut the possessive stronghold whiteness has held over Native Hawaiians and Polynesians since the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER 3:

Re-envisioning ‘Hybrid’ and ‘Hapa’:
Race, Gender and Indigeneity in Hawai‘i as Racial Laboratory

Almost all immigrants were men, who perforce married Hawaiian girls.

("Hawaiian Medley," Collier's, Dec. 11, 1943)

ha•pa (hä’pä) adj. 1. Slang. of mixed racial heritage with partial roots in Asian and/or Pacific Islander ancestry. n. 2. Slang. A person of such ancestry. [der./ Hawaiian: Hapa Haole (half white)]

(Epigraph to part asian * 100% hapa, Kip Fulbeck, 2006)

Beginning in the late 1920s, sociology solidified ideas about Hawai‘i as a place of racial mixture in new, profound ways. Sociological and popular interest in Hawai‘i grew as the U.S. strengthened its investments there— as a key base for the Pacific War of the 1940s, and later, as Hawai‘i’s political status shifted from a U.S. territory to the 50th state in 1959. Sociology in fact played a direct role in statehood, as sociologists from the University of Hawai‘i submitted testimony to statehood hearings, and more broadly encouraged their students and the public to view statehood as a natural progression of Hawai‘i’s exceptional racial harmony.358 The noted Chicago school of sociology at this time was particularly interested in Hawai‘i as its many different races seemed to provide a perfect site for modeling their theories about immigration and assimilation. This literature perpetuated viewing Native Hawaiians as largely a race of the past, and routinely slotted Native Hawaiians as only a minor segment of Hawai‘i’s many races.

Sociologists were interested in Native Hawaiians only insofar as they made up a piece of

Hawai‘i’s racially patch-worked population and the heralded “neo-Hawaiian” which would be a new, uniquely American, ‘raceless’ race. This chapter looks at Hawai‘i’s social scientific construction as a “racial laboratory” during the late 1920s through the 1950s—in which the U.S. closely watched, measured and fetishized the racial “hybridity” of its new territory’s population. In doing so, the logic of possession through whiteness was deployed once again, specifically creating a "neo-Hawaiian" race that would be uniquely American and physically look "almost" white.

Though the sociology of this period largely portrayed Hawai‘i as an exceptionally racially harmonious place, there is ample evidence that many people (Native Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian, white and non-white, residents of Hawai‘i and residents of the continental U.S., academic and laymen) found Hawai‘i anything but. For example, historian Christine Manganaro has demonstrated in her analysis of the sociological interviews of Hawai‘i residents produced by graduate student researcher Margaret Lam in the early 1930s that many Hawai‘i residents, even or especially those who were themselves in interracial marriages, found Hawai‘i to have a great deal of “race prejudice” and generally disapproved of racial mixing. In the popular media of the U.S. in the early 1930s, images of Hawai‘i as a “racial nightmare” were in fact being splashed over countless newspapers and magazines in response to the so-called “Massie affair.” The Massie affair involved a series of highly publicized court cases originating from the claims of Thalia Massie, the white wife of a naval officer stationed at Pearl Harbor, that she had been assaulted and raped by a group of Native Hawaiian and Asian American men in 1931. When these men failed to be convicted due to lack of evidence, enraged

white Navy men engaged in vigilantism. One Japanese American man, Horace Ida, was severely beaten. Further, Massie’s husband and mother along with two other Naval officers kidnapped, shot, and killed Joseph Kahahawai—a Native Hawaiian man identified as the “darkest” of the accused. Stopped on their way to dump Kahahawai’s body in the ocean, they were caught and arrested. Massie’s mother and husband were subsequently convicted of killing Kahahawai, but ultimately, under great pressure from the Navy and the yellow journalism of the U.S. mainland, the governor of Hawai‘i commuted their sentences and they served only an hour under arrest—and not in jail but at tea in the governor’s office.  

The Massie case was widely reported on throughout the U.S. and the world, shocking readers with depictions of Hawai‘i as a terrifying place where “roads go through jungles, and in those remote places bands of degenerate natives lie in wait for white women driving by.” Some have argued that the furor over the Massie case and the racial fears brought on by the widespread media coverage of it were even responsible for delaying Hawai‘i’s entry into the U.S. as a state. This new image of Hawai‘i as a “racial nightmare” was completely at odds with the idyllic, carefree image that local government officials of the Territory of Hawai‘i wished to promote. It also flew in the face of social scientists’ existing views (including Louis Sullivan and his mentor Franz Boas) of the Pacific as a benign and controlled “racial laboratory” for human biology.

361 Stannard, Honor Killing, 267.
362 Rosa, “Local Story,” 102; Imada, Aloha America, 175.
However, instead of destroying the racial laboratory ideal, after the Massie Affair such sociological accounts only seemed to gain further importance.

Part 1 of this chapter examines how this ideal was particularly symbolized in popular accounts in the image of the hybrid “Hawaiian girl.” Analyzing the work of the influential Chicago-trained sociologist Romanzo Adams as well as popular photograph collections of mixed race women from Hawai‘i, I argue that the logic of possession through whiteness was deployed in popular illustrations of racial intermarriage after the Massie Affair, allowing colonial powers in Hawai‘i to maintain the image of racial mixture in Hawai‘i as benign, rather than a potential threat to white women. As pitched to a white American male audience, popular “racial type” photographs of “Hawaiian girls,” depicting Hawai‘i’s women as near-uniformly young, carefree, exotic and inviting, constructed “part-Hawaiian” women as both the product and promise of Hawai‘i’s racial mixture and a future “neo-Hawaiian American race.” Thus white American men were invited to continue the tradition of racial mixing in Hawai‘i that began, as the epigraph notes, with the earliest European immigration to Hawai‘i, when, “Almost all immigrants were men, who perforce married Hawaiian girls.”

Adria Imada has similarly articulated the labor of Native Hawaiian hula performers traveling the continental U.S. at this time as key to producing an "imagined intimacy" between the U.S. and Hawai‘i.  

Live performances were intimate encounters between Hawaiian performers and American audiences, although the intimacy I refer to was not literal but imagined. Consuming these shows, Americans came to possess Hawai‘i in their dreams, imagining Hawai‘i and the United States as inseparable and mutually dependent. The vast majority of Americans

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would never visit the islands directly, yet a fervent vision of Hawai‘i—as America's exquisite escape and untouched playground—came into being through these intimate encounters. This Hawai‘i was not so much an antithesis of America, but a better version of it—a respite from the harshness of urban life and industrial capitalism, yet not too foreign and different. By association with their tropical colony, Americans could believe they belonged to an optimistic, playful, and tolerant nation.\(^\text{364}\)

Imada's insight that the 1930s-40s era image of Hawai‘i in the U.S. was "not so much an antithesis of America, but a better version of it" resonates deeply with the knowledge production of Romanzo Adams I examine in Part 1 of this chapter. Imada goes on to persuasively argue that the floor shows of New York City's "Hawaiian Rooms" produced a particular kind of intimacy, as the hula performers "delivered an affect that radio programs, news photographs, or even movies could not produce, though this media complemented the visceral associations produced in the live shows."\(^\text{365}\) Where Imada's work provides an important consideration of the lives and desires of the women who did this affective work, I consider representations of mixed race Native Hawaiian women in news illustrations and photographs, Navy pin-up drawings, and coffee-table art books as further deployments of the logic of possession through whiteness.

Part 2 of this chapter traces the legacy of discourses about Hawai‘i as a place of racial mixture, and part-Hawaiian women as that mixture’s product and promise, within the contemporary articulation of hapa/Hapa identity.\(^\text{366}\) Hapa was originally used in the phrase “hapa haole” to denote Native Hawaiian individuals who also had white ancestry.

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\(^{\text{364}}\) Ibid., 180.
\(^{\text{365}}\) Ibid., 180–181.
\(^{\text{366}}\) Some mixed race Asian American activists purposefully distinguish “Hapa” from “hapa,” with the capitalized word referring only to mixed race Asian American people, whereas the lower case word remains tied to mixed race Native Hawaiian people. I attempt to use the upper case word when it is used by the sources I analyze, though some overlap in the two senses is inevitable and indeed intended on the part of Hapa activists.
Since at least the 1990s, “Hapa” has become a contemporary identity used by many mixed race people who are not Native Hawaiians. Particularly used by mixed race Asian Americans to promote the positive embracing of a mixed race identity, many Native Hawaiian activists and scholars have challenged this use of Hapa as an appropriation that replays so many other colonial appropriations. In Part 2, I critically examine the contemporary use of Hapa by mixed race Asian Americans in light of the history of 1920s-1950s sociological discourses about racial intermarriage in Hawai‘i. Specifically, I analyze the ways that artist Kip Fulbeck’s book part asian * 100% hapa (whose definition of Hapa is the second epigraph above, emphasizing the Hawaiian origins but contemporary usage of the term by "Asian American and/or Pacific Islanders") problematically recreates many of these older sociological ideals about the desirability and inevitability of racial hybridity. I turn to other examples of Native Hawaiians acknowledging multiple racial backgrounds in understanding how we might think about hapa and recent intellectual articulations of Asian settler colonialism in productive ways.

Part 1: Hybrid Hawaiian Types: Native Hawaiian Women in Hawai‘i’s Racial Laboratory

The front pages of Sidney Gulick's book, *Mixing the Races in Hawaii: A Study of the Coming Neo-Hawaiian American Race*, include a number of seemingly innocuous yearbook photos of Native Hawaiian young women and men who attended the Kamehameha Schools in the 1930s. In many ways, these are unremarkable, conventional photographs—students are dressed up and eager to look their best. When I look at them, I am touched by the glimpses of familiar yearbook messages I can make out on some of
the photos: “aloha nui” (much love) one of them says.

And yet the full photographic object tells a different story. The caption to these photographs does not mark these women’s names, but only the fractions of their racial
make-up. The young woman numbered 1 in this series is identified as “8/8ths Hawaiian,” providing a base of comparison for the variety of racial mixtures displayed by
the other women. Number 7, for example, is identified as “2/8ths Hawaiian, 6/8ths Scotch” while Number 3 has the most elaborate description—she is “6/8ths Hawaiian, 1/16th French, 1/16th Hindu, 1/16th Negro, and 1/16th Arabian.” The use of “sixteenths”
and “eighths” even when more easily understood fractions like ½ or ¼ (or even no
fraction, in the case of 8/8ths) would have sufficed highlights both the scientific effort to
create the most precise taxonomies and the incredible absurdity of measuring people in
this way.

Similar to Sullivan’s careful racial fraction notations as analyzed in Chapter 2,
Gulick saw these students as the forerunners of an exciting “neo-American race.” As a
Hawai‘i-based teacher and missionary best known for promoting Japanese-American
relations, Gulick held great hope for this new race because he thought racial and cultural
differences would come to an end as physical characteristics melded. He wrote: “The
physiological characteristics of the new race will be a mixture of Hawaiian, Caucasian
and Asiatic, while its psychological, social, political and moral characteristics will be
distinctly American.” The foreword of his book further demonstrates the impact of this
ideology on Native Hawaiian and Polynesian women, concluding with this dedication:

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Ibid., v.
To Louisa Clark, my niece, I am indebted for the cover design—a symbolic representation of the Polynesian mother-race, holding aloft with yearning aspiration the racial mixing bowl, which is Hawaii. Into this poi-bowl pour racial ingredients from the East and from the West, and out of the bowl is coming forth a new human type—The Neo-Hawaiian-American Race.\(^{369}\)

This description is quite clear in its feminization and sexualization of Hawai‘i and Native Hawaiians, referring to a Polynesian “mother-race” which would be replaced by a more masculine, robust “neo-Hawaiian race.” The Polynesian woman is also symbolically represented as a “poi-bowl” into which “racial ingredients” from East and West “pour.”

Unfortunately, this image of Native Hawaiian women as empty, welcoming vessels for both the “East and West” is almost commonplace today—in the figure of the hula girl, it graces ad after ad promoting tourism in Hawai‘i. Part 1 of this chapter examines the construction of Hawai‘i as a racial laboratory, paying particular attention to the ways that the racial laboratory came to be represented in popular accounts as the mixed race “Hawaiian girl.” Many scholars, notably including Native Hawaiian scholar-activist Haunani-Kay Trask, have importantly critiqued the sexualized image of the Pacific Islands in general and Hawai‘i in particular as a young, welcoming Native woman.\(^{370}\) The focus of my own critique is the scientific and popular interest in, and construction of, Native Hawaiian women as mixed race “hybrids.”

I will first examine the representation of Hawai‘i as a racial laboratory in sociological studies beginning in the 1920-30s. This scientific literature built on eugenics findings about the qualities of the so-called “Part Hawaiian” and projected the coming of what Gulick called the “neo-Hawaiian American race.” As such representations

\(^{369}\) Ibid., vi.
\(^{370}\) Trask, *From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai‘i*; Imada, *Aloha America*. 
encouraged scientists and a larger public to understand the category of “Hawaiian” as a universal one, not a category belonging only to Native Hawaiians anymore, they did important ideological work for the overall structure of settler colonialism in Hawai‘i. Transforming Indigenous nations into settler nations required an instillation of heteropatriarchal binaries whereby Indigenous peoples' complex forms of governance and kinship were largely overthrown by Western norms of race, gender and sexuality. As seen with Gulick’s captions to the Kamehameha Girls yearbook photographs, despite the fact that Native Hawaiian identity had long been determined by genealogy (broadly inclusive of both patrilineal and matrilineal descent), Native Hawaiian-ness was becoming confined to diminishing racial fractions. This made it easy for the logic of possession through whiteness to be deployed in ways that made settler colonialism in Hawai‘i seem natural and pacific, rather than haunted by ongoing colonial (dis)possession.

3.1.1: The Racial Laboratory of Romanzo Adams and the Chicago School of Sociology

Sociological representations of Hawai‘i differed in some respects from eugenics literature, but also demonstrated key ideological alignments. As Christine Manganaro has noted, "Just as scientists working in Hawai‘i in the 1920s established it as a perfect laboratory for studying the biological consequences of race mixing, social scientists such as University of Hawai‘i sociologist Romanzo C. Adams framed it as the perfect location to study race relations." Manganaro points out that race relations, as formulated first by

Booker T. Washington and later used by Robert Park and the Chicago School of Sociology, was a project about improving "how black and white people feel about each other." Eliminating bad feelings between black and white people, rather than structurally changing white supremacy, was understood as the solution to "race prejudice." Denise Ferreira da Silva has further shown that the "race relations cycle" (through which immigrants to the U.S. could achieve assimilation) articulated by Chicago sociologist Robert Park (Romanzo Adams' mentor) rewrote "the play of engulfment as an eschatological narrative, thus deploying the logic of obliteration— which stipulates that the other of Europe will necessarily disappear." In other words, eliminating racial prejudice ("bad feelings") would ultimately require eliminating racial difference altogether, through assimilation.

Romanzo Adams was specifically hired by Hawaii Territorial officials to head the University of Hawai‘i’s studies of race relations, officially titled a "Station for Racial Research," which, beginning in May 1926, was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. Accordingly, unlike eugenics studies that focused on the Pure and Part Hawaiian almost exclusively, Adams looked to Hawai‘i’s population as a whole as a model of race relations that had the potential to provide insights to racial problems on the U.S. mainland. Adams' research would focus on what he defined as two central aspects of race relations in Hawai‘i: first, the so-called "Japanese Problem," (his focus in the late 1920s)

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374 Initially the grant was for $20,000, and total funding from 1926-1937 reached nearly $250,000. Manganaro, “Assimilating Hawai‘i: Racial Science in a Colonial ‘Laboratory,’ 1919-1939,” 91, 101.
and second, interracial marriage (his focus in the 1930s).\textsuperscript{375}

Where sociologists on the U.S. mainland were eager to solve the "Negro Problem," i.e. prevalent anti-black attitudes and the failure of black Americans to be integrated into mainstream society, the "Oriental Problem," or more specifically, the "Japanese Problem," in Hawai‘i was defined as anti-Japanese attitudes (those who, before during and after WWII viewed Japanese as potential spies and traitors to the U.S.) and the Japanese's inability or unwillingness to assimilate to American norms.\textsuperscript{376} Adams' writing sought to answer the Japanese problem by illustrating that Hawai‘i's Japanese population was not in fact a barrier to Hawai‘i's Americanization. Through analyses of demographic shifts, he emphasized that though Japanese residents of Hawai‘i were by far the least likely to intermarry with other races, that they would likely follow the example of other Asian groups like the Chinese and eventually intermarry with whites and Native Hawaiians.\textsuperscript{377} Thus, Adams' scientific view backed up other non-academic of Hawai‘i at this time as, in Honolulu minister Albert Palmer's words, "a bridge between Japan and America." Palmer concluded his 1924 book \textit{The Human Side of Hawaii} thus: "After all that is just what Hawaii means—a human bridge of international good will and understanding between East and West!"\textsuperscript{378}

Given the Chicago School's understanding of race relations as primarily about attitudes and feelings, rather than structures, interracial marriage between "East and

\textsuperscript{375} Ibid., 139–140.
\textsuperscript{377} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{378} Albert W. Palmer, \textit{The Human Side of Hawaii; Race Problems in the mid-Pacific} (Boston, Chicago,: The Pilgrim press, 1924), 144.
West" was seen as a key bellwether of lessening racial prejudice. For Adams, Hawai‘i’s rates of racial intermarriage were exceptionally high relative to the mainland United States, and thus, race problems seemed to him practically non-existent there. Hawai‘i’s high rates of racial intermarriage also seemed to uniquely prove the achievement of assimilation (according to the Chicago race relations cycle) into American society. Manganaro argues: "Notably, Chicago sociologists saw interracial sex and marriage as both symbols of closing distance as well as the most efficient actual pathways to assimilation if they produced children. In other words, they were both the cause and effect of assimilation."

Thus, though Hawai‘i was exceptional, like the broader ideology of American exceptionalism, Adams thought Hawai‘i should be used as racial laboratory because it promised a universal model for race relations everywhere. In his influential 1937 book *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii*, Adams argued “Hawaii presents an exceptional opportunity for the observation and study of a type of social process [namely, racial amalgamation] that has been going on in many parts of the world for a long time…. Since Europeans and Asiatics began to come to Hawaii there has been sufficient time to permit of many interesting changes." This understanding of Hawai‘i as a universal model for race relations would have a much longer legacy, including in the development of international human rights after World War II, as I examine further in Chapter 4.

Ethnic Studies scholar Jonathan Okamura credits Adams as the first to advance

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380 Manganaro notes amalgamation in Hawai‘i, in Adams’ view, “suggested a degree of assimilation so far unrealized by any other society.” ibid., 144–145.
the view of Hawaiʻi as having an "unorthodox race doctrine" where racial tolerance and harmony reigned. Okamura questions Adams' apparent inability or unwillingness to acknowledge racial conflict in Hawaiʻi, noting: "I have long wondered how Adams, who had lived in Hawaiʻi since 1919 and thus presumably was aware of the highly unequal social status held by the different 'races,' nevertheless maintained that political, economic, and educational status was not allocated according to race."\textsuperscript{382} Manganaro suggests that Adams' insistence on racial harmony in Hawaiʻi was not because he lacked data to the contrary. She argues that Adams exaggerated the actual rates of interracial marriage in Hawaiʻi and largely avoided discussing blatant examples of racial conflict such as the Massie affair.\textsuperscript{383} The data that Adams and other social scientists relied upon were largely demographic statistics about race and marriage. Even when other researchers, such as his graduate student Margaret Lam, presented ethnographic evidence to refute the notion that Hawaiʻi had no racial problems, such data was downplayed as unimportant.\textsuperscript{384}

Adams was interested in Native Hawaiians only insofar as they made up a piece of Hawaiʻi’s racially mixed population. He took for granted the findings of eugenics literature that Native Hawaiians were quickly dying out, and that all residents of Hawaiʻi were therefore becoming part of a new mixed race of “Hawaiians” (non-Native, but unmarked as such). In this way, we might say that he could not think beyond the logic of possession through whiteness that had been formulated in the Polynesian Problem and eugenics literature that came before him. This stance was abundantly evident in a 1926 address Adams gave to the Pan-Pacific Research Institution, titled “Hawaii as a Racial

\textsuperscript{382} Jonathan Y. Okamura, \textit{Ethnicity and Inequality in Hawaiʻi} (Temple University Press, 2008), 8.
\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 191–237.
Melting Pot.” Subsequently published in the *Mid-Pacific Magazine*, Adams’ address explained the import of racial intermarriage in Hawai‘i by describing a hypothetical demographic equation:

Take the 13 Japanese women who married other Caucasians, and if in the next 50 years they have 30 children, it will be more natural for them to marry out than for their parents, and finally you get ¼ and 1/8 strains and finally the racial boundaries are obscured and within 3 or 4 hundred years people will not know what blood they have in their veins. In fact nearly everyone here will be entitled to go to Kamehameha Schools.

In my own case, I hardly know what combinations I have represented in my ancestry. I found out on a trip to Ohio that I had German, Irish, English, Scotch and Dutch, and many of you are probably the same.385

In this quote, we can see that although the racial and ethnic groups that Adams mentions do not include Native Hawaiians, he nonetheless sees all of these races (and his Pan-Pacific Research Institution audience) as eventually being “entitled to go to Kamehameha Schools.” As noted before, Kamehameha Schools was set up for Native Hawaiian children (as determined by genealogy not by blood quantum fractions) and has retained a Native Hawaiian first admission policy. By projecting that in “3 or 4 hundred years people will not know what blood they have in their veins,” Adams assumes that everyone will be fairly counted as Native Hawaiian, making Kamehameha Schools open to all. Adams therefore assumed that specific Native Hawaiian Indigenous ties to culture, land, ocean, and sovereignty in Hawai‘i would naturally transfer to all settlers of Hawai‘i. Although this transfer was ostensibly to be universal, including to Asian immigrants to Hawai‘i, Adams’ final emphasis of his “German, Irish, English, Scotch and Dutch” roots as a commonality with the audience (his quip that “many of you are probably the same”),

highlights the fact that white men would hold a particularly important kind of entitlement to Native Hawaiian-ness. In this way, the logic of possession through whiteness is also quite baldly a logic of commensurability—an understanding that everyone would eventually be the same, and racial or ethnic distinctions would cease to matter.

Yet this desired commensurability would benefit white settlers and dispossess Native Hawaiians of their own identities, along with their lands. The process is illustrated well in a diagram from an article about Hawai‘i published in the *Oakland Tribune* in 1930. In this diagram, deeply exoticized and racially typed images of an “Asiatic” and “Polynesian” are symbolically added to the “European,” befitting the sociological image of the racial laboratory. Where the Asiatic and Polynesian figures are dressed in stereotypical “primitive” garb, the European is dressed plainly in a possibly military uniform, as would have fit the large presence of the U.S. Navy in Hawai‘i at this time. The magical result is a “Hawaiian”: a dark-haired, mustachioed man in a shirt and tie, his dress also subtly suggesting a military uniform. Particularly significant here is the erasure of women from this biological equation. A plus sign stands in for the reproductive work. Each figure here is a man, obscuring but taking for granted that the reproductive work of producing a "new race" of Hawaiians would be eagerly taken up by Native Hawaiian women. Though it is possible in the logic of this diagram that other women (white or Asian) would also be involved in this reproduction, the disappearance of representations of Native Hawaiian men (especially after the Massie affair in 1931, as I will discuss further below) and the repeated common knowledge that immigrants to Hawai‘i were

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386 Shelley Sang-Hee Lee and Rick Baldoz, “‘A Fascinating Interracial Experiment Station’: Remapping the Orient-Occident Divide in Hawai‘i,” *American Studies* 49, no. 3/4 (Fall/Winter 2008): 96.
almost entirely men "who perforce married Hawaiian girls" (as noted in this chapter's epigraph, also discussed further below), hinted that the reproductive labor would fall squarely on Native Hawaiian women.

Also notable is the way that the Oakland Tribune illustration adds up the various racial components to result in “Hawaiian” rather than simply the multicultural catchall category of “American” (which is also the underlying suggestion). This is a stark illustration of how settler colonialism required not only the assimilation of Native Hawaiians into the U.S. but also relied upon changing the category of "Hawaiian" into something that white Americans who had settled or aspired to settle in Hawai‘i would be able to inhabit, perform and possess. This illustration shows that European American men held the true authority to determine what Hawaiians are made of and made for, not only because they were clearly superior to “pure” Asiatics or Polynesians, but also because they were (or could be) Part Hawaiian. Thus, the "Hawaiian" was implicitly or explicitly redefined as always, at base, a "Part Hawaiian"; someone who was always part something else too. And though that part something else could be Asian, it was the being part white that really mattered. Because, as the illustration shows, though this image uses Hawai‘i to show a unique fulfillment of America's foundational ideals of racial equality and democracy, it also shows that its ideal of multiculturalism was premised on the assimilation of 'other' races into the white race. This end product "Hawaiian" is not a true mix of the other three races but simply a slightly darker version of this European. Indeed, the discourses about racial mixture in Hawai‘i were never fixed on the result of an even mix of racial, physical and moral characteristics. Rather, as Pacific Islands Studies
scholar Damon Salesa puts it in the context of racial amalgamation policies in colonial New Zealand:

A proper amalgamation did not combine two races into a ‘new’ race that was substantially mixed or intermediate; rather the process of amalgamation projected, very baldly, the disappearing of one race into another. … Yet, although the other race would then no longer exist as a race, race itself would still pertain, still visible in individuals.  

Thus, if individuals in Hawai‘i still demonstrated “threatening” racial characteristics or an affinity for identifying as “Native Hawaiian,” this was not sufficient evidence to deny that the category of "Hawaiian" was becoming universal and that Hawai‘i overall was becoming truly American. It also allowed a racial hierarchy to implicitly remain even as such multicultural equations seemed to gesture towards the end of racial distinctions altogether.

Articles such as this one from the Oakland Tribune played an important role in disseminating Adams' vision of Hawai‘i as a racial laboratory and model of race relations. Adams encouraged a public image of Hawai‘i as a racially harmonious place, actively publishing in popular journals and teaching classes not just for university students but the public (especially businessmen) in Honolulu.

Even his most academic work, his text *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii*, he understood as important to non-academic audiences. Manganaro notes that he planned:

> to send *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii* to all plantation managers first; then to principles of all schools, public and private, that had four or more teachers including language schools; territorial officers; members of the University of Hawai‘i faculty; members of the Institute of Pacific Relations; universities on the department exchange list; pastors of

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churches; directors of sugar and pineapple companies; and members of the Hawaii Sugar Planters Association.\footnote{Ibid., 162–163.}

Adams' advocacy of Hawaiʻi as a model of race relations undeniably took on significance beyond academia, then—he saw his research as directly relevant to the economy, projecting that Hawaiʻi's lack of racial conflict would maintain social stability and encourage the growth of business.

Adams' views may have even influenced Hawaiʻi's eventual incorporation into the U.S. as a state. He submitted expert testimony to the first hearing on Hawaiʻi's statehood in 1935, where he pointedly deflected fears about the "Japanese problem," noting that the Japanese population in Hawaiʻi was declining.\footnote{Ibid., 171; Adams, \textit{The Japanese in Hawaii: a Statistical Study Bearing on the Future Number and Voting Strength and on the Economic and Social Character of the Hawaiian Japanese}.} Okamura further notes the legacy of Adams' ideas in the persistent image the "Hawaiʻi multicultural model," which first emerged in popular and academic literature of 1980s, and continues to exert an influence today. The repetition of tropes about Hawaiʻi as "the 'ethnic rainbow, 'positive example,' and 'melting pot'' in the news media, Okamura argues, has influenced a "countless" audience of people around the world to understand Hawaiʻi in such simplistic, and erroneous, terms.\footnote{Okamura, \textit{Ethnicity and Inequality in Hawaiiʻi}, 10–11.} The next section considers another popular trope about Hawaiʻi that developed concurrent with Adams' research, and continues to be used today: that of the welcoming, young, mixed race Hawaiian woman.
3.1.2: Hybrid Hawaiian Girls

Unlike the 1930 Oakland Tribune illustration's concentration on men, later popular scientific articles focused entirely on Native Hawaiian women. I understand this shift from the erasure to the hypervisibility of (certain) Native Hawaiian women, as a clear response to, and concerted move away from, a more threatening image of Hawai‘i and Native Hawaiians that had become dominant in the U.S. imagination later in the 1930s. For fears about Native Hawaiian men raping white women were sensationalized across the U.S. in response to the “Massie affair” in 1931 (as mentioned in this chapter’s introduction). These racial and gendered fears were not entirely new, but can also be found in public debates about the annexation of Hawai‘i to the United States after a cadre of American plantation owners overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893. Many Americans balked at the idea of adding a "brown" race to the U.S. populous, before and after its formal annexation in 1898, and newspaper cartoons mocked the deposed and imprisoned Queen Lili‘uokalani as a barbarian queen.392 After the Massie case, the U.S. government was anxious to dispel such fears. The U.S. Department of the Interior published a booklet called Hawaii and Its Race Problem in 1932, which sought to reassure the public that “race antagonisms” in the islands were “practically non-existent.” This booklet concluded:

There is much apprehension lest groups in Hawaii based on race should come into political dominance…. It is a part of the beautiful experiment, here in the mid-Pacific, that self-government is to be tried out under conditions and with human material that is new. There is nothing so far to indicate that the experiment will not turn out to be as successful as it is interesting.393

392 Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues : the United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917; Silva, Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism.
The rhetoric of Hawaiʻi as a racial laboratory or experiment station, closely mirrored the sociological work of those like Romanzo Adams, and is deployed in this government document to underline the fact that the U.S. was in charge of all “experimenting” and that the white population of Hawaiʻi had the racial masses under control.

Such rhetoric also provided a similar ideological backbone for a photo essay, titled “Hawaiian Medley,” published in 1943 in the popular magazine Collier’s. Festooned with Hawaiian prints and flowers, the photographs clearly draw on developing tourism industry tropes about Hawaiʻi’s “hula girls,” though it claimed to depict simply a number of typical “Hawaiian girls.” The captions of the photographs identify these women primarily by listing their individual racial mixtures, with these lists declared in all capital letters before their names are even mentioned. The captions accompanying the two leading photographs, for example, read: “HAWAIIAN-CHINESE-AMERICAN—Jackie Tatum, 18, is the leading dancer in Hawaii’s USO troupe of Flanderettes…” and “HAWAIIAN-PORTUGUESE-ENGLISH—Bernice Keala Gomez, 16, is a secretary, a model, and an amateur photographer. Like all island girls, she’s a fine swimmer…”

Along with such careful notations of racial mixture, and lists of the women’s typical “island girl” interests, the Collier’s article provides a popularized reading of social scientific studies of Hawaiʻi. In a short, breezy history of Hawaiʻi, the author explains that the men who immigrated to Hawaiʻi as part of the plantation economy had no choice but to marry women of other races:

Almost all immigrants were men, who perforce married Hawaiian girls.


Ibid., 16.
In the beginning, the change spelled trouble. Pure Hawaiians had no immunity to European diseases. Measles was for them a death-dealing plague. Tuberculosis, alcoholism and venereal disease decimated the population. In the 100 years following Captain Cook’s arrival, the number of pure Hawaiians dropped from 300,000 to 150,000.

But the new part-Hawaiian population showed great vigor, with the children of mixed marriages holding their own socially and economically, and maintaining a very high birth rate, which, even now, is the greatest among the races. 396

Focusing on the newness and “vigor” of the “part-Hawaiian population,” and representing this population so enticingly as glamorous young women in bathing suits, encourages the presumed white, male, American reader to desire both exotically mixed race women and the Hawaiʻi that they symbolize.

If any lingering doubts about the prospects of interracial marriage remain, the article concludes:

Anthropologists decline to say whether racial intermarriage is good or bad, but they do state that a crossing of strains—in dogs, cattle, horses, or people—often results in heterosis or “hybrid vigor.” That is, the offspring will be bigger, stronger and more fertile than the parents. Hawaii seems to be proving the point. 397

Thus the article drives home the desirability of coming to Hawaiʻi and racially intermarrying, by arguing that it is scientifically proven that white American men in creating a “Hawaiian medley” family would ultimately strengthen the human race itself. Not so subtly equating “part-Hawaiian” women to dogs, cattle or horses to be bred, the article smooths over any latent defects in their Asian or Native Hawaiian backgrounds by assuring the reader that their children will be “bigger, stronger and more fertile.” In this

396 Ibid., 17.
397 Ibid.
way, the “girls” are presented as evidence of the success of Hawai‘i’s (past) colonization, and its fated future as culturally and racially American.

Notably, the emphasis on Jackie Tatum as a U.S.O. entertainer also encourages and naturalizes the militarization of Hawai‘i and the Pacific arena of World War II, for which the U.S. used Hawai‘i as a key staging ground. Ty Kāwika Tengan has proposed viewing the U.S. military in Hawai‘i as a primary site for the defining of gendered citizenship.\(^{398}\) The Collier’s photos were in fact inspired by the illustrations of several of the same women originally created by McClelland Barclay. A “combat artist” for the U.S. navy, Barclay was well known for his depictions of glamorous pin-up girls and U.S. military recruitment posters. Barclay’s captions to his pin-up girl illustration also noted his subjects’ racial make-up along with other tidbits about their physical measurements and interests. For example, along with Jackie Tatum’s portrait was noted:

- Height 5’ 7 1/2” - Weight 115
- Father - English, Irish, French
- Mother - Hawaiian, Chinese, Spanish
- Born Hawaii - age 18 - Likes dancing (first), swimming\(^ {399}\)

In Barclay’s extensive collection of drawings for the Navy, many of his portraits note his subjects’ hobbies and hometowns, alongside their contributions to the war effort. Yet, his sketches of the U.S.O. performers in Hawaiʻi are the only ones to note their parents’ races. Note that in the transition of Jackie Tatum’s portrait to the photograph in Collier’s, her “English, Irish, French” and “Spanish” background is glossed as “American.”

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My point is that the carefully notated mixed racial backgrounds were actually key to the sexualization (and the attendant construction of race and indigeneity) for these “Hawaiian girls.” Having “AMERICAN” or other presumably white European races like “ENGLISH” appended to the racial identities of these women managed to downplay any potential off-putting darkness or foreignness in their display as tropical, exotic women by assuring the reader that their foreignness was quickly dwindling along with the “Pure Hawaiian race.” Native Hawaiian men were conveniently displaced from the picture altogether, subtly associating the men with the Native Hawaiian race that was disappearing, dying, and vanishing; which meant that Native Hawaiian men were weak, not threatening. Adria Imada similarly notes a purposeful erasure of male hula performers in early twentieth century hula circuits:

Euro-American promoters made a deliberate choice to cast young women rather than older male and female dancers. The hoʻopā’a, men expert at the aural aspects of hula (chanted poetry and instrumentation), nearly disappear in the coverage of hula performances at the turn of the century. The men were eclipsed by the bodies of the female dancers, whose movements intrigued Euro-American observers.  

This displacement left space for white men to imagine claiming their own Hawaiian girl. In promoting the mixed race woman as “Hawaiian girl,” the racial fears spurred by the Massie affair were thus turned into sexual fetish and desirability. The pervasive image of victimized Thalia Massie gradually transformed over the 1930 and 40s into the “white enough” women of the “Hawaiian Medley”—figures that echo the "almost white" figures of the ancestrally white Polynesian and the Part Hawaiian examined in Chapters 1 and 2.

400 Imada, *Aloha America*, 68.
This tempering with whiteness occurred with women who were Native Hawaiian as well as those who were Asian. Yet the racial categories attributed to Native Hawaiians and Asians also importantly tempered each other. Indigenous Studies scholar Jodi Byrd has noted that Orientalism in the Americas has been key to the “construction of ‘native’ otherness as foreign to and excluded from the United States.” Referring to the Bering Strait theory (and its attendant attribution of the origins of Native Americans to Asia), Byrd argues that “such assemblages suggest that not only were ‘Indians’ not indigenous to the Americas, but that they were ultimately the first wave of a ‘yellow peril’ invasion that infested the lands already (or destined to be) inhabited by Europeans.” Byrd’s application of Orientalism to the context of Indigenous peoples of the Americas, or what she also terms “Indianness in Asianness,” is also relevant to Hawai‘i. By insisting on a mixed race woman as the symbol of Hawai‘i in the midst of World War II, Native Hawaiians and Asians became mutually associated even as they were differently incorporated into U.S. racial hierarchies. Asian women were made more familiar and less threatening through the representation of them as “Hawaiian girls,” decorated with appropriated and fetishized tropes of Native Hawaiians. At the same time, Native Hawaiian women—as primarily Native Hawaiian, as an Indigenous people rather than a race—are fixed on a vanishing horizon where their unique cultural and political attributes have been diluted as Native Hawaiian culture and women are portioned out to the entire settler population of Hawai‘i.

By incorporating Byrd’s approach towards Orientalism in the Native American

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402 Ibid.
404 Silva, *Toward a Global Idea of Race*. 
context, Indigenous Studies research in the future might reveal further implications for historical and contemporary configurations of race under settler colonialism. For example, I suspect that the popular tendency to suggest today that Asian Americans no longer experience racism is connected to the fact that racism against Native Hawaiians and Native Americans is and has long been accepted and even explained as “honoring.” For example, we might think more about popular music star Gwen Stefani’s recent video "Looking Hot" in which she "played Indian," by wearing a headdress, in conjunction with her previous and ongoing exploitation of Japanese women in her appropriative (symbolic and literal) use of "Harajuku girls." In short, Asian Americans are selectively nativized just as Native Hawaiians and Native Americans are Orientalized.

This process is even clearer in a coffee table book published in 1945 by Henry Inn. Inn was the photographer for Collier’s “Hawaiian Medley,” and he included some of the same photographs and many more styled similarly, under the new title “Hawaiian Types.” The cover portrays a smiling Native Hawaiian woman, standing out against, if somewhat haunted by, the specter of a stoic-faced, dark-skinned Native Hawaiian man, who seems to be part of a background the woman stands in front of. Symbolically, he is shown as her past, not her future. Inside “Hawaiian Types,” the captions to the photographs become entirely limited to their racial mixes. Their names, or any other individual information, are no longer included at all. The book includes 47 photographs in all, each taking up a full page, with the facing page remaining blank except for

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captions such as “Hawaiian-Japanese-Chinese-Norwegian.” Inn does include some women who are monoracially identified (e.g. Hawaiian, Chinese, Filipino, and a portrait of two women identified as Korean), yet these women are photographed in the most culturally traditional clothes and poses, which make them seem quite old-fashioned or anachronistic amidst the other women who are seen smiling and relaxing in tropical scenes with Hawaiian shirts, bathing suits, hibiscus in their hair, lei around their necks. The more European “types” are the only ones represented in professional settings (as nurses, for example), while all others are in generic tropical or exotic settings. This is despite the fact that all of the women who modeled for this photo shoot were college students at the University of Hawai‘i—and thus all relatively educated and upwardly mobile.407

Andrew Lind, a sociologist who was also trained at the University of Chicago, wrote the introduction to Hawaiian Types. Lind conducted his dissertation research in Hawai‘i and became a permanent faculty member at the University of Hawai‘i in 1931, comprising with Romanzo Adams the sociology department, a department of two.408 In the Hawaiian Types introduction, Lind affirms the U.S. racial laboratory image of Hawai‘i, noting: “Certain it is that Hawaii of 1944 offers America’s most impressive large scale demonstration of racial democracy at work.”409 He goes on to describe the objective of the book as: “To capture in permanent and visible form something of the human charm derived from the free meeting and mingling of many cultural and racial

409 Inn, Hawaiian Types (pages unnumbered).
strains in Hawaii…” Lind emphasizes that such cultural mixing was evidently accompanied by physical mixing, making “an increasing proportion of Hawaii’s entire population” baffling to even “the most experienced student of physical anthropology.”

The physical changes he describes thus:

It is as though the racial and ancestral masks were becoming slowly transparent and a new character, thoroughly Hawaiian and American in spirit, were forcing itself through to dominant expression. Nor is it merely the superficial transformation of a Hollywood coiffure or a Hawaiian aloha shirt. Facial muscles have become relaxed and an expressiveness of countenance, born of long experience in Hawaii’s free and democratic atmosphere, has supplanted the inflexible facial cast of the Oriental and European immigrant pioneers. The faces in this book, whatever else they may be because of their varied racial uniforms are also typically American. With an accuracy of its own, the camera has helped to document the fact that by various routes the many and varied races of the world are becoming in Hawaii “one people.”

Lind therefore equated physical changes in racial types with moral and behavioral changes. The new mixed race populations of Hawai‘i were different from their predecessors even in the utilization of their “facial muscles”— which Lind argued had become more relaxed and expressive, in contrast to “inflexible facial cast of the Oriental and European immigrant pioneers.” This characterization worked not only to minimize the trope of the “inscrutable,” “sneaky” Asian, but also put Asian immigrants on par with European immigrants, drawing them both into the category of “typically American” despite the very different histories of immigration.

Lind fails to note that all of the photographs in Hawaiian Types are of women. Lind seems to gesture towards this point when he mentions the difference between his realm of science and Inn’s realm of art: “The author, with the artist’s subtle sense for

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410 Ibid.
411 Ibid.
412 Ibid.
what is expressive of the kaleidoscopic life of the Islands and with the studied skill of a seasoned professional, has performed a service of which the scientist, with his calipers and slide rules, may well be envious.\textsuperscript{413} It is possible to read this as a sly hint that Lind wished his own work on racial types in Hawai‘i would allow him to so carefully study the young women of Inn’s collection. Yet, by noting Inn’s “studied skill of a seasoned professional,” and as noted in the quote above, the camera’s “accuracy,” Lind maintains the scientific value of \textit{Hawaiian Types}. Despite its obvious ties to the pin-up girl genre, the inclusion of Lind’s introduction allowed Inn’s book to maintain a high-art distinction, as it also allowed a presumed American male audience to understand their gaze as “scientific” rather than purely sexual.

The very gendered and sexualized logic of possession through whiteness that is deployed in \textit{Hawaiian Types} certainly has had a long ideological half-life. In an interview Henry Inn would later give in 1979, he still characterized his models as “girls,” even as he also noted their reproductive function: “Some of them became grandmother already.”\textsuperscript{414} The interviewer, Katherine Allen, responds, “Well, I hope they put out another edition… because I think this would really, especially now, be of value because of the racial disturbances we’ve been having lately. This shows all these different kinds of people—types—[that are the people of Hawaii].”\textsuperscript{415} The interviewer, situated in the late 1970s during the Native Hawaiian renaissance in which Native Hawaiians were successfully fighting to reclaim land rights and revitalize Hawaiian language and culture, demonstrates how close to the surface fears regarding Hawai‘i as a racial nightmare

\textsuperscript{413} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{414} Inn and Allen, \textit{Henry Inn}.
\textsuperscript{415} Inn and Allen, \textit{Henry Inn}.
continued to be, even long after the Massie case, and even while looking at the most idyllic representations of mixed race Hawaiian girls. The racial laboratory image thus played an important role in managing those fears and assuring the public that the U.S. had everything under control in Hawaiʻi.

Part 2: Hapa and Whole

The second part of this chapter looks at how the history of Hawaiʻi as a racial laboratory, heralding a new mixed race, has a legacy in contemporary discourse about “hapa” identity. Hapa is a Hawaiian word meaning "portion, fragment, part, fraction, installment; to be partial, less," and "of mixed blood." Hapa was used in the term “hapa haole” to denote Native Hawaiians who also had white ancestry, usually individuals who had light skin color and could at times pass as white. In the 1990s, “Hapa” (dropping the “haole”) became a popular identity for mixed race Asian Americans—primarily Asian Americans without Native Hawaiian ancestry and often for Asian Americans who have no connection to Hawaiʻi at all. As such, hapa is a particularly salient example of how discourses about racial mixture continue to shape indigeneity, race, and gender in significant ways today in Hawaiʻi and the United States. I first examine the work of self-identified Hapa artist Kip Fulbeck, whose photographs of “Hapa” (capitalized in his words) individuals attempts to subvert the histories of race and science. Yet, Fulbeck’s work problematically recalls many of the same discourses as used in early twentieth century sociological studies about Hawaiʻi. I turn to other visions of contemporary Native

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416 Pukui and Elbert 58
417 Ibid.
Hawaiian identity that provide an important contrast to the project of better including hapa people within humanity. This analysis allows for a critique of one way in which Hawai‘i continues to be tied to a vision of racial mixture which, through the logic of possession through whiteness, heralds a new, uniquely American race, while Native Hawaiian lands, resources and identities continue to be the expropriated materials that allow this vision to stand.

The use of Hapa as an identity for mixed race Asian Americans has been the subject of critique from Native Hawaiians since the growth of its popularity in the 1990s. Asian American Hapa activists and artists have defended their use of Hapa largely through arguing that they are performing an empowering re-appropriation of the word. One Hapa activist, Tammy Conard-Salvo, “contends that if Kanaka Maoli want our word back, then she wants the word ‘kimchi’ back.” Similarly, in the afterword to Kip Fulbeck’s 2006 book *Part Asian *100% Hapa, historian and ethnic studies scholar Paul Spickard writes:

I sympathize with resentments some Hawaiians may have at their word being appropriated by Asian Americans. But that is the nature of language. It morphs and moves. It is not anyone’s property. Continental Americans might just as well complain about Hawaiians using “TV and cell phone.”

The Hawaiian origins of the word Hapa are worthy of respect. The people in this book use the term respectfully. That is all anyone can ask.

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419 ho‘omanawanui, “From Captain Cook to Captain Kirk, or, From Colonial Exploration to Indigenous Exploitation: Issues of Hawaiian Land, Identity, and Nationhood in a ‘Postethnic’ World,” 255 [note that ho‘omanawanui prefers her name be printed in all lower case letters].

420 Fulbeck, *Part Asian, 100% Hapa*, 262.
The parallels Conard-Salvo and Spickard attempt to draw between the use of hapa and the use of kimchi, TV and cell phone, are perhaps purposefully outrageous. These examples are meant to highlight things that cannot be exclusively owned. Making hapa a matter of language use (implicitly suggesting other communities’ practices of reclaiming denigrating language and the democratic right to free speech) makes it easy to both acknowledge and dismiss Native Hawaiian critiques of Asian Americans’ use of Hapa. This simultaneous acknowledgment and dismissal, enabled by an Asian American version of the possessive logic of whiteness, can also be termed a "settler move to innocence," defined by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang as:

those strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much at all. In fact, settler scholars may gain professional kudos or a boost in their reputations for being so sensitive or self-aware. Yet settler moves to innocence are hollow, they only serve the settler.\(^{421}\)

Indeed, Asian American use of Hapa identity is not innocent, but is purposeful. It asserts an Asian American right to possession of Hawai‘i and Native Hawaiians, using a Native Hawaiian identity to make mixed race Asian Americans less foreign to the U.S., more "at home." The resistance these Asian Americans have to Native Hawaiian critiques is then a defense of their rights to be settlers. As Yang and Tuck also note, "For many people of color, becoming a subordinate settler is an option even when becoming white is not."\(^{422}\)

While ownership of language is a significant point of concern to Native Hawaiians, for whom the Hawaiian language was systematically banned and denigrated for generations, understanding these critiques as only about language use is disingenuous.

\(^{421}\) Tuck and Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” 10.
\(^{422}\) Ibid., 18.
As hoʻomanawanui writes, Native Hawaiian critiques of Hapa intend to highlight the more fundamental dispossession of Native Hawaiians of which Hapa is symbolic. In response to Conrad-Salvo, hoʻomanawanui writes:

Kanaka Maoli did not steal kimchi from Koreans; it was imported to our shores with Korean laborers on the plantation, a situation beyond Kanaka Maoli control. These Korean laborers, like all others imported to work on the sugar plantations, lived, worked, and died on lands that had previously been occupied by Kanaka Maoli, lands Kanaka Maoli were dispossessed of by settler colonialism. There is a huge difference between that situation, where kimchi was one food item incorporated into the multicultural “plate lunch,” and the purposeful theft of a Hawaiian word to misrepresent an identity that is suggestively Hawaiian. Moreover the two are not analogous, as “hapa” is being applied to something it wasn’t meant to be, while kimchi—one on every plate lunch and restaurant menu in Hawai‘i—is, well kimchi (or kimchee, depending on the lunch wagon or restaurant).423

hoʻomanawanui unequivocally states that Kanaka Maoli have been “dispossessed… by settler colonialism” and that this situation cannot be easily equated with the circulation of Korean foods like kimchi. The (dis)possession of land and identity are linked in hoʻomanawanui’s account, as she describes the Asian American use of hapa as “the purposeful theft of a Hawaiian word to misrepresent an identity that is suggestively Hawaiian.” This is similar to the critique I advanced earlier in this chapter regarding the social scientific transformation of Hawaiian into a category that is seemingly universal and yet especially reserved for white settlers. As hoʻomanawanui points out, Hapa is yet another transformation of a specific Hawaiian identity into a more universal mixed race identity (which is nonetheless bound to mixed race Asian Americans).

This analysis allows us to re-evaluate critical debates about Asian settler colonialism. Candace Fujikane has defined Asian settler colonialism as: “a constellation

of the colonial ideologies and practices of Asian settlers who currently support theroader structure of the U.S. settler state."\footnote{Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura, *Asian Settler Colonialism: from Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 6.} Other scholars have critiqued the articulation of Asian settlers in stark contrast to Native Hawaiians given Hawai‘i’s “history of mixing."\footnote{Manganaro, “Assimilating Hawai‘i: Racial Science in a Colonial ‘Laboratory,’” 1919-1939,” 32.} While I agree that the distinction between settler and Native should also take into account the complicated ways that some Native Hawaiians also sometimes identify with Asian ancestry, I reflect on the usefulness of Asian settler colonialism alongside (rather than opposed to) a critical view of Hawai‘i as a place of racial mixture.

In what follows, I argue that the use of Hapa by mixed race Asian Americans is an attempt to create and possess a race that can deploy the same cultural and social power and recognition as the logic of possession through whiteness. I use Kip Fulbeck’s 2006 book *part asian * 100% hapa as an important illustration of the use of Hapa by mixed race Asian Americans. While I agree with ho‘omanawanui that the use of Hapa by non-Native Hawaiians is objectionable because it re-enacts (while simultaneously erasing) colonial dispossession of Native Hawaiians, I also attempt to sketch a regenerative response to Native Hawaiian critiques of hapa; one that does not depend on the “return” of the word hapa, but rather points to the history of scientific discourses about mixed race to illustrate that the invent of “a new American mixed race” has long been the object of the ideology of settler colonialism, not a challenge to it. I turn to the continued uses of hapa by Native Hawaiians to understand how mixed race might be framed in more liberatory ways for both Native Hawaiians and Asian Americans.
3.2.1: Kip Fulbeck's Vision of Hapa as a "Whole" New Race

*part asian* *100% hapa* strongly echoes Henry Inn’s *Hawaiian Types*, previously discussed in this chapter, in a number of ways. To begin with, like *Hawaiian Types*, *part asian* *100% hapa* is conceived as a coffee-table art book, composed chiefly of photographic portraits of individual mixed race people. Whereas *Hawaiian Types* included photographs only of young women, *part asian* *100% hapa* includes both men and women, with a range of ages, including children and elderly. Names are not included alongside the photographs in either book— the main identification for each photo being a list of the person’s races or ethnicities, though in Fulbeck’s text, each photograph is also faced by a page where the subject has written a response to the question: “What are you?” Fulbeck explains this question as one that Hapās are continually asked: “Hapās know the question inside and out. *What are you?* And we can’t answer it any more than we can choose one body part over another. We love the question. We hate the question. And we know many times people aren’t satisfied with our answers.”

It is precisely in response to the lack of courtesy and recognition (as illustrated in how often strangers feel entitled to ask Hapās what they are and the implication that Hapās are abnormal) that Fulbeck’s text seeks to make Hapās more visible and more proud of themselves. Like the Chicago school of sociology's race relations, the Hapa project is about the eradication of "bad feelings" and "race prejudice."

Like Andrew Lind’s introduction in *Hawaiian Types*, *part asian* *100% hapa* also includes a brief endorsement of both the book and the unique qualities of mixed race

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426 Inn, *Hawaiian Types*; Fulbeck, *Part Asian, 100% Hapa*.
people from a social scientist—in this case, Paul Spickard, a historian and ethnic studies scholar from the University of California, Santa Barbara. Where symbolic references to Hawaiian culture such as flowers tucked behind ears, Hawaiian prints, and props including pineapples and lauhala mats, provided a common stylistic frame to *Hawaiian Types, part asian * 100% hapa* frames each of its subjects largely devoid of any cultural markers. Yet this absence of cultural markers allows for a universalism, an aesthetic and assumed cultural harmony, between all of the subjects in the book, just as the presence of Hawaiian symbols allows in *Hawaiian Types.* Fulbeck’s subjects are photographed against a white background such that only their shoulders and heads are visible within the frame, which is roughly square—the book itself is not a standard size, but a small square shape that makes it easy to quickly flip through its pages. Fulbeck describes his choice to photograph his subjects in this way in the introduction to the book: "I photographed every participant similarly—unclothed from the collar-bone up, and without glasses, jewelry, excess makeup, or purposeful expression. Basically, I wanted us to look like us, as close to our natural selves as possible." The idea that photographing subjects in such a way that they effectively appear nude (if only from the “collar-bone up”) allows them to be portrayed “as close to our natural selves as possible,” is problematic in a number of ways. For one, publicly presenting themselves without clothes, “glasses, jewelry, excess makeup, or purposeful expression” must have been profoundly un-natural for most of Fulbeck’s subjects. Clothes and accessories are certainly important features of a person’s self-presentation, and to have even dictated that subjects should refrain from “purposeful expression” seems even more restrictive.

428 Ibid., 16.
In framing his subjects as (partial) nudes Fulbeck also re-enacts the racial type photography of early twentieth century social scientists, such as Sullivan (discussed in Chapter 2) and Adams (discussed earlier in this chapter). In completing exacting measurements of physical anthropometry, Sullivan required that his subjects be measured both clothed and nude; it was important to him to record skin color in areas that were not normally exposed. In the Afterword to *part asian * 100% hapa, Paul Spickard both anticipates and dismisses critiques which point to the similarities between Fulbeck’s work and racial type photography. Under the bold heading “Misinterpretation 1” (of 2, the second responding to Native Hawaiian critiques of the appropriation of Hapa by asking if Hawaiians should stop using the words “TV and cell phones,” as mentioned above), Spickard writes:

Some readers might think that framing the subjects of the photographs this way is making more or less the same move that racist so-called scientists made half a century ago, when they put pictures like that and racial fractions like that in their books. They tried to measure the mixture of race in each person by measuring their noses and eye folds and skin tones. They thought they could measure who people were by their shapes and colors.

For those “scientists,” people of color did not have individual identities or stories, and they did not get to speak for themselves. They were just racial equations like “half-Chinese, one quarter Polynesian, one-quarter European.” Those books treated racially mixed people as if they were exhibits in human zoos.

That was racist nonsense, but this book is doing something quite different. Kip Fulbeck is using the pictures to provoke and encourage his readers. He is using the old form, but with exactly opposite content. Every one of his subjects has an identity and a story. Every one gets to speak for him or

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herself, and gets to define him or herself however he or she wants to. That is taking the old racist trope and turning it on its head.\textsuperscript{430}

Spickard argues that though Fulbeck’s photographs use the same form as those that “racist so-called scientists made half a century ago,” he is turning old racist tropes on their heads. Spickard thus ignores the fact that many physical anthropologists like Sullivan who produced racial type images were understood in their time as liberal and anti-racist. Further, because Fulbeck is himself mixed race (white and Chinese), and identifies as Hapa, in Spickard’s account, he is incapable of portraying Hapa people in a racist way. Spickard claims that Fulbeck is “using the old form, but with exactly the opposite content.” However, the difference actually resides not in the content of the photographs (which in their tight attention to the physical features of mixed race people are in fact exactly the same content as older racial type photographs), but in the fact that “every one of his subjects has an identity and a story. Every one gets to speak for him or herself, and gets to define him or herself however he or she wants to.” This is a key difference between \textit{Hawaiian Types} and \textit{part asian * 100\% hapa}, but it is arguable whether or not the inclusion of self-identifications along with the photographs effectively turns the genre of racial type photographs on its head. The book still encourages the reader to scrutinize the physical features of each subject, and to compare them with the other mixed race subjects of the book, as well as with the list of races and the readers’ ideas of what those races should look like.

Moreover, Spickard’s point that previous “books treated racially mixed people as if they were exhibits in human zoos” requires qualification. Spickard makes it seem as if

\textsuperscript{430} Fulbeck, \textit{Part Asian, 100\% Hapa}, 260–261.
mixed race people were all discriminated against in a similar way, and in a way that was absolutely distinct from non-mixed people, whereas social science actually reveled in the relative worth of different types of mixed race peoples (white-Hawaiian being better than Chinese-Hawaiian, which was better than white-Filipino, for example).\textsuperscript{431} As my analysis of \textit{Hawaiian Types} has attempted to show, mixed race Native Hawaiian and Asian American women in particular were not the distanced objects of “human zoos,” but the desired ideal of Hawai‘i as a welcoming, sexually fulfilling place for white American men.

This points to another issue in Fulbeck’s presentation of his subjects as partially nude. Both Fulbeck and Spickard seem oblivious to the history of photographs portraying mixed race women as sexual (as well as scientific) objects, and the fact that presenting themselves “nude from the collar-bone up” may be more invasive, and undesirable, for female subjects, especially if they are interested in creating un-exoticized representations of Hapa identity. Though Fulbeck states that the subjects all volunteered to be photographed, the self-written statements intimate that they may not have known beforehand that they would be photographed partially nude and that they were not entirely comfortable with it. One subject writes as his answer to “What are you?”: “I’m a grown man who just exposed my breasts to a complete stranger. :)”\textsuperscript{432}

Many other subjects use their answers to “What are you” to also address the sexualized nature of the photo-shoot or of being Hapa itself, at times rejecting and challenging this sexualization and at other times acknowledging the exoticification only

\textsuperscript{431} Adams, \textit{Interracial Marriage in Hawaii : a Study of the Mutually Conditioned Processes of Acculturation and Amalgamation}. \\
\textsuperscript{432} Fulbeck, \textit{Part Asian, 100% Hapa}, 86.
to revel in it: “My last boyfriend told me he liked me because of my race. So I dumped him,”433 “Why? ... Are you coming on to me?”434 “I am whatever you want when you want it,”435 and “Many of my ex-girlfriends were habitual half-asian daters. These women considered half-asian men ‘exotic,’ ‘sexy,’ and ‘just-like-Keanu Reeves-in-the-Matrix. I consider these stereotypes appropriate because I got laid.”436 Another subject’s answer to “What are you?” simply proclaims in all capital letters: “QUEER EURASIAN,”437 anxious to write himself out of a presumed heteropatriarchal gaze and to highlight that perhaps his identity is more importantly formed in relation to both his race and sexuality, not his race alone. While these subjects’ narratives point to the sexualization of mixed race people both historically and in their personal experiences, the book seems to at once encourage this fetishizing and disavow that it does so. In Kip Fulbeck’s introduction, the foreword by Sean Lennon (John Lennon and Yoko Ono’s son), and the afterword by Spickard, no mention is made of sex or gender at all. The subjects are presented partially nude but only because “I wanted us to look like us.” The inclusion of children and elderly people as subjects seems to be important precisely because it ostensibly helps to distance this project from any sexual overtones.

The way that Fulbeck constructs Hapa in fact presumes that all Hapas face racial power in similar ways. The problem with such an assumption is that it covers how policies promoting or forcing the mixing of races have long been an important tactic of settler colonialism, in which Indigenous peoples, and in particular Native Hawaiians from

433 Ibid., 158.
434 Ibid., 206.
435 Ibid., 228.
436 Ibid., 160.
437 Ibid., 182.
whom he takes the very identity of Hapa, are projected to cease to exist. Being Part Hawaiian has a very different history and present than being Part Asian, though Fulbeck attempts to conflate the two, and includes many people who identify as Hawaiian in the book. He envisions uniting as Hapa as a self-evident positive project that provides a comfortable identity for mixed race people. However, the self-descriptions of his subjects reveal that Hapa is neither the primary identification of many included in the book nor is it always comfortable even for those who do identity as Hapa. Several of those included in the book actually identify mono-racially, including one subject who is shown with a tattoo across his neck reading “100% Filipino”— his self-description explains that he views all Filipinos as mixed race because of the history of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines. Another subject’s self-description notes: “Happy to be Hawaiian. There’s not many of us left.” This self-description seems to point out how the Hapa identity can act as simply another universalizing race that threatens to cover and replace Native Hawaiian indigeneity. Even as this description perhaps participates in the colonial myth of the vanishing native, it also haunts the book’s desire to construct Hapa as a coherent new race, a race that is in fact beyond race. This subject insists that identifying as Hawaiian is more important than identifying as Hapa.

Media studies scholar Nicole Rabin notes that these self-descriptions are important not because they represent the space where the subjects reveal their truly “natural” selves, but rather because they actually show that “not all the participants seem

438. Ibid., 140.
439. Ibid., 172.
to be ‘at ease’ with liminality.”

Indeed, in many self-descriptions the subject highlights the absence of their own voice. Instead, they note the voice of someone (perhaps someone like the reader) confronting their physical appearance and racial identity. For example: “Really? You don’t look Thai. Well let me look again. Yeah now I can see it around your eyes. You know Thai food is my favorite. Were you born in Thailand? Do you speak, what is it, Thai-wanese? Do you dream in English or Thai-wanese? You really don’t have an accent at all.” This self-description thus challenges the reader, seeming to propose: “I know what you are thinking. I have been asked these things countless times before.” Yet what does such a challenge really accomplish beyond admonishing a reader to be more courteous to mixed race people?

Rabin writes: “mixed race bodies have been co-opted in the field of visual culture to serve in the maintenance and production of a multicultural pluralist ideology that positions the US as a society beyond race, and detaches the multiracial body from access to its own identity and/or critiques of its racialization.” In *part asian* *100% hapa*, Rabin sees detachment occurring through the boundedness of how Hapa is constructed as an imagined community. Though Fulbeck argues that the Hapa project exists in order “to expand the definition of multiracial beyond the black/white paradigm,” Rabin critiques the fact that in limiting the definition of Hapa to those “with partial roots in Asian and/or Pacific Islander ancestry,” he does little to reconfigure the black/white

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441 Fulbeck, *Part Asian, 100% Hapa*.
442 Rabin, “Picturing the Mix,” 3.
paradigm. In fact, Rabin argues, in Fulbeck’s vision, “this Hapa ‘nation’ delineates its own boundaries, and works to contain the very multiplicity it seeks to convey, because even as the project may require a limited multiraciality in order to make hapaness visible, it re-imagines boundaries around a multiplicity it seeks to explore and expand.”

Indeed, Fulbeck’s vision of Hapa is quite self-important, by his introduction’s conclusion, citing celebrities like Keanu Reeves and Tiger Woods: “The new face of the millennium is part Asian/Pacific Islander.”

Overall, the problem is not (only) that Hapa is an appropriation of a language that was historically denied and suppressed among Native Hawaiians, but more broadly that Hapa enacts very similar ideologies to the early twentieth century social science that painted Hawai‘i as a racial laboratory and Native Hawaiians as the basis of a new, universal American race. Hapa allows Asian Americans to become less foreign by associating themselves with a word that is more “native” to the United States: Hapa. Yet, Asian American Hapa activists necessarily ignore the fact that this is not an American word, and that Hapa as used by Native Hawaiians still upholds a Native Hawaiian rather than American identity. The goal of Hapa as envisioned by Fulbeck is to gain recognition within the U.S., not to be radically separate from it. Sean Lennon’s foreword makes this desire for recognition plain and painful when he ends by inviting readers to make up racist jokes about Hapas: “There are about a million Hapas living in the United States. Doesn’t that make us eligible for our own radio station? … At the very least I propose someone writes a how-many-Hapas-does-it-take-to-screw-in-a-lightbulb joke. Think

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444 Rabin, “Picturing the Mix,” 8.
445 Ibid.
446 Fulbeck, Part Asian, 100% Hapa, 17.
about it.” This seems a particularly tone-deaf comment for the many “Hapas” included in the book whose self-descriptions clearly point out how many racist jokes they have been subject to. Yet it makes sense for a vision of Hapa that understands mixed race people as absolutely outside existing racial norms, rather than deeply constituted by them.

3.2.2: Re-constellations of Asian Settlers, Hāole Settlers and Native Hawaiians

What models are there for understanding mixed race people as products of, rather than exceptions to, racial hierarchies and settler colonialism? This chapter's final section considers the ways that hapa is used by Native Hawaiians today in order to counter Fulbeck’s vision of Hapa, and assess how discourses about mixed race people and racial mixing more broadly might be decolonized in regenerative ways.

Though Fulbeck’s vision of Hapa makes it seem as if hapa identity is no longer important to Native Hawaiians — that Native Hawaiians in effect were not using hapa anymore so it was okay to appropriate that language for the purposes of mixed race Asian Americans — Native Hawaiian scholars including kuʻualoha hoʻomanawanui and Brandon Ledward point out that hapa continues to be a meaningful, if not always comfortable or widely appreciated, identity to many Native Hawaiians. hoʻomanawanui historicizes the term hapa, noting that:

Initially it meant one who was half-Hawaiian and half-haole, hence the term ‘hapa haole.’ As Kanaka Maoli continued having children with people of multiple ethnicities, the word took on the larger meaning of one with mixed blood, heritage or ancestry, one who is bi- or multi-racial. But because the term originated in a Kanaka Maoli cultural context, it has always been understood that part of that ancestry is Kanaka Maoli.  

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447 Ibid., 21.
She further explains that the word was used in Hawaiian-language newspapers beginning in the 1830s, and the first definitions of “hapa haole” appeared in Hawaiian dictionaries in the 1860s.\footnote{449} She notes that hapa haole was used in this period to describe “Kanaka Maoli with significant social status,” though this did not imply that the status of hapa Hawaiians was uncontested— in 1882, for example, Kalakaua was elected king over Emma because he cast doubt on her mixed lineage.\footnote{450} However, the word was not inherently or even primarily derogatory; and hoʻomanawanui emphasizes thus, “the term does not need rescuing by Asian Americans, as it is a dynamic descriptor of ethnic heritage that is alive and evolving within the Hawaiian community.”\footnote{451} With this argument and history, hoʻomanawanui directly challenges the notion that Hapa artists like Fulbeck are actually positively reclaiming Hapa (as others have done for derogatory terms).

hoʻomanawanui's analysis thus places the Asian American use of Hapa within a longer history and broader present of non-Hawaiians claiming Hawaiian-ness. Such re-appropriations of Hawaiian identity are as old as—for indeed they constitute and gird—settler colonialism itself in Hawai‘i. Queen Liliʻuokalani noted this practice among those who overthrew her in 1893. In her memoir \textit{Hawaii's Story by Hawaii's Queen}, which she published in 1898 in hopes of swaying American public opinion against annexation, she distinguished between the Hawaiian people as "the children of the soil— the native inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands and their descendants" and those "aliens" who "have called themselves Hawaiians" in Washington, D.C. "They are not and never were

\footnote{449} Ibid.
\footnote{450} Ibid.
\footnote{451} Ibid., 244.
Hawaiians," Lili'uokalani wrote, exposing this practice of naming as a strategy the missionary party used to portray Hawai'i's annexation by the U.S. natural and inevitable, a strategy that my project has understood as the logic of possession through whiteness.  

The concluding challenge ho'omanawanui issues is for settlers, having now been educated about the history and present use of hapa by Native Hawaiians, to “adopt a form of kuleana consciousness.” She defines kuleana as “a Hawaiian term that means both one’s rights and one’s responsibilities,” and kuleana consciousness as “a specific recognition of responsibility and a call to act” which “extends to all” (not just Native Hawaiians). She elaborates:

What is settlers’ kuleana to Hawai‘i? What is settlers’ kuleana to Kanaka Maoli? One aspect of settler kuleana is to embrace the truth of history and place and stop stealing Kanaka Maoli identity and claiming a false indigeneity. Settlers should speak up against other settlers, such as the continental-based mixed-blood Asians who insist on their right to be identity thieves.

Therefore, ho'omanawanui urges settlers of Hawai‘i to recognize a responsibility to educate other settlers— particularly critiquing here the role Asian Americans who live in Hawai‘i may have in allowing the use of the identity Hapa among Asian Americans not residing in Hawai‘i, arguing that Asian settlers in Hawai‘i can recognize their own kuleana by correcting such misappropriations. This point is closely tied to recent scholarship about Asian settler colonialism, a theory developed from Haunani-Kay Trask’s work that critiques Asian Americans in Hawai‘i for participating in the

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452 Lili‘uokalani (Queen of Hawaii), Hawaii‘s Story by Hawaii‘s Queen, Liliuokalani (Lee and Shepard, 1898), 325: See also Lydia Kualapa, “The Queen Writes Back: Lili‘uokalani’s Hawaii‘s Story by Hawaii‘s Queen,” Studies in American Indian Literatures 17, no. 2, Series 2 (July 1, 2005): 57.
dispossession of Native Hawaiians from their lands. Asian settler colonialism deserves further analysis as a mode of decolonization and regeneration for Native Hawaiians.

While Asian settler colonialism has existed as a concept since at least the 1990s, stemming from Haunani-Kay Trask's insistence that Asian Americans in Hawai`i are settlers not immigrants, the project has more recently coalesced with the publication of the volume *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai`i*, edited by University of Hawai`i professors Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Okamura.\(^454\) The contributors to the volume identify themselves as Asian settler scholars who are committed to respectfully confronting the ways that Asian Americans living in Hawai`i have long erased Native Hawaiian claims to land and sovereignty. In contrast to histories that laud the first generations of Japanese and Chinese plantation workers as the foundation for the contemporary Asian American middle class in Hawai`i,\(^455\) these scholars seek to re-position themselves and their communities outside of U.S. national frames and within a squarely settler colonial one:

> The early Asian settlers were both active agents in the making of their own histories and unwitting recruits swept into the service of empire.

The status of Asians as settlers, however, is not a question about whether they were the initial colonizers or about their relationship with white settlers. The identification of Asians as settlers focuses on their obligations to the indigenous peoples of Hawai`i and the responsibilities that Asian settlers have in supporting Native peoples in their struggles for self-determination.\(^456\)

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\(^454\) Fujikane and Okamura, *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai`i*.


Thus, other contributors to the volume emphasize that they can no longer pretend innocence about Hawai‘i's status as a settler colony. Recalling Yang and Tuck's critique of "settler moves to innocence," as mentioned with the analysis of Fulbeck above, for example, Karen Kosasa argues, "Settler acts of erasure are denials of wrongdoing. They are an intrinsic and necessary part of settler life—sanctioning colonialism by avoiding references to it or disavowing knowledge of it."\(^{457}\) As a visual artist, Kosasa works to call attention to "settler acts of erasure" by highlighting how these acts "produce an American imaginary where concepts and images of 'blankness' and blank spaces proliferate."\(^{458}\) In one piece, Kosasa and co-artist Stan Tomita depict a postcard picture of the Kilauea volcano crater on Hawai‘i Island, showing a tourist photographer aiming his camera not at the beauty of the landscape but at a (fictional, depicted through collage) row of hotels in the distance. White dotted lines traverse the image, dissecting the landscape between the photographer and the hotels. As a "settler image," Kosasa argues it "makes the land available and vulnerable to the settler imaginary as a resource, as raw material to incorporate into settler visions and desires."\(^{459}\) Thus, Kosasa's art symbolizes her willingness to expose and critique the ways that Asian settlers have allowed what she terms the "production of whiteness" and "white American culture" in Hawai‘i, out of Native Hawaiian lands.\(^{460}\)

Other scholars have critiqued the concept of Asian settler colonialism for imposing a strict line between Asian settlers and Native Hawaiians. This objection often


\(^{458}\) Ibid.

\(^{459}\) Ibid.

\(^{460}\) Ibid., 198.
relies on the sense that such a line cannot be drawn through much of Hawai‘i’s mixed race population. Manganaro, for example, notes:

> Part of the colonial apparatus in Hawai‘i has been producing a population of American-identified settlers instead of more Native-identified people. Yet the literature on settler colonialism does not currently attempt to address how to square the Native-settler dichotomy with Hawai‘i’s history of mixing.

This is an important question, yet it seems to assume that the "Native-settler dichotomy" in formulations of Asian settler colonialism and settler colonialism more broadly is one that is evidently based only on biological, racial terms. It also seems to assume that most of Hawai‘i's population is mixed race—a view which, as Manganaro's work itself points out, has long been inflated from the demographic facts. Objecting to the idea that Native-settler dichotomies can effectively be drawn in Hawai‘i, because Hawai‘i is a place of racial mixture, can be another "settler move to innocence." Manganaro seems to assume that settler is an identity that is opposite but analogous to Native. Although Asian settler scholars do seem to wrestle with their personal histories as settlers in Hawai‘i, "settler" perhaps better understood as, in Yang and Tuck's words, "a set of behaviors, as well as a structural location." Where Native Hawaiian exists as an identity both outside of and within settler colonialism (i.e. it existed before settler colonialism and it seeks decolonization of present-day Hawai‘i as a settler colony), a settler is an agent and beneficiary of settler colonialism and does not exist outside of that structure. That some mixed race Native Hawaiian families have Asian and/or haole ancestry does not automatically re-position them as settlers within the structure of settler colonialism.

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Though racial mixing was often used to deny that significant differences or racial prejudice existed between settlers and natives in Hawai‘i, this was not the case. The aim of Asian settler colonialism should therefore be understood less as a matter of separating Native Hawaiians from Asian Americans than as a matter of non-white, predominantly Asian American Hawai‘i residents who have benefited from settler colonialism attempting to highlight and refuse such benefits.

Though not formulated in conjunction with Asian settler colonialism, anthropologist Brandon Ledward's 2007 dissertation gets at similar conflicts between settler and native in regards to Native Hawaiians and haole. Ledward defines his dissertation as being about the “‘lived experience’ of being hapa for Hawaiians today.” For Ledward, it is important to understand “hapahaole” as “originally a Hawaiian term that reflects a native worldview where genealogy, connections to people and place, are stressed above any kind of racial conceptualization.” That is, Native Hawaiians historically understood hapahaole as denoting a person who had ancestral ties to both Hawai‘i and another place; which, depending on the context, could be a positive thing, as it made that person part of the world beyond Hawai‘i even as it grounded them there.

Ledward articulates in his dissertation a different problem regarding hapa identity—namely that Native Hawaiians today are reluctant to claim a mixed identity given fears about not being Hawaiian enough. Ledward sees this as part of the problem in the rise of non-Hawaiians adopting hapa identity, explaining: “Whereas the vast majority of Hawaiians are ethnically mixed to some degree, a strong tendency exists for us to

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464 Ibid., 37.
privilege our Hawaiian-ness at the expensive [sic] of other ancestral ties. It is not surprising then, that nowadays you often find more non-Hawaiians claiming to be hapa than Hawaiians.\(^{465}\) Ledward’s project thus “reveals that an alarming number of Hawaiian respondents do not feel ‘Hawaiian enough’ due to a perceived lack of racial phenotypes, the inability to speak their native language or their birthplace and residence… Not being socially recognized as a Hawaiian by one’s desired community and the implications this has for individual and collective wellbeing is a key focus of my research.”\(^{466}\)

Identifying as hapa haole himself, Ledward narrates his coming to political consciousness about his Hawaiian identity during college, but also notes that “While I felt pain about past injustices and anger towards lasting inequalities I stopped short of doing one crucial thing; I did not reject my haole ancestry.”\(^{467}\) Therefore, for Ledward, hapa haole identity is a way to acknowledge both Native Hawaiian and haole ancestry, without shame or erasure of his haole ancestors. We can read this move as a regenerative one in the sense that Ledward's project attempts to allow for more expansive definitions of Native Hawaiian identity and redress and eliminate the pain that some Native Hawaiians cause others by intimating that "they don't look Hawaiian enough."

As Ledward is well aware, many Native Hawaiians are understandably reluctant to present themselves as part haole because of the social and legal implications of not being Hawaiian enough (as discussed with the Day v. Apoliona case in Chapter 2). Because of scientific ideas and blood quantum legislation, being Part Hawaiian has

\(^{465}\) Ibid., 17–18.
\(^{466}\) Ibid., 40.
\(^{467}\) Ibid., 55.
always mattered in a way that is distinct from other "racial mixes" in Hawai‘i. This is part of why adopting hapa as an identity for mixed race Asian Americans is so outrageously tone-deaf to many Native Hawaiians—Asian American mixedness means something very different to Asian American communities than it does to Native Hawaiians whose "part" members are still used as evidence of their race's pending extinction. Similarly, in encouraging Native Hawaiians to not reject their haole ancestry, Ledward places what may be an unattainable and undesirable expectation on hapa haole identity: namely, that it can be a source of "whole" wellbeing or an always comfortable position. Haole and Native Hawaiian ancestries are not equivalent, nor equally important, for Native Hawaiians. As Yang and Tuck write, "Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone." This includes Native Hawaiians. Though many Native Hawaiians have non-Hawaiian ancestors, they also recognize that the positions their various ancestors have held under the establishment of settler colonialism in Hawai‘i were not easily collapsed or confused. Yang and Tuck write that realizing "an ethic of incommensurability" is necessary for decolonization. They explain:

To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas's, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone—these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.469

Therefore, even though some Native Hawaiians may also have ancestors who were settlers, Yang and Tuck point out that the positions of settler and Native are not

469 Ibid., 36.
commensurable (even though this is the hope and aim of settler colonialism). Indeed, if we understand the logic of possession through whiteness as a strategy of producing settler colonial commensurability, we might understand regeneration as a haunting of that commensurability; a reminder that incommensurabilities continue to exist and are asking to be attended to. Decolonization must attend to these incommensurabilities even when they break unevenly across individual Native Hawaiian and Asian American families in Hawai‘i. Many Native Hawaiians who have mixed ancestry have been subjected to dispossession and violence under settler colonialism, rather than benefiting from it. Being hapa haole did not and does not exempt one from this, and neither can hapa haoles be simply disaggregated from other Native Hawaiians. On the other hand, some residents of Hawai‘i claim a Native Hawaiian ancestor in the same mode in which many residents of the continental U.S. claim a Cherokee princess as their grandmother. The people who make such claims have often benefited from settler colonialism, and use this claim to long-lost ancestry as a way of naturalizing their presence in Hawai‘i (this is another type of Yang and Tuck's settler moves to innocence). The important thing is that Native Hawaiians and Asian Americans ("mixed" or "pure"—both being flawed designations anyway), in order to achieve decolonization, must imagine "the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone."

In contrast to Fulbeck's vision of hapa as a new, globally ascendant mixed race and Ledward's eagerness to imbue hapa haole identity with a sense of pride, Native Hawaiian artist Adrienne Pao offers one example of how mixed race identity might be engaged as a product of settler colonialism rather than its solution. Born in Oakland,

California and based in San Francisco, Pao's work addresses the dislocations of being mixed race and "off-island." In her *Hawaiian Cover-ups* series, for example, she presents images of herself amidst the Hawaiian landscape, using her body to juxtapose, as art historian Margo Machida writes, "the perspectives of its actual inhabitants with the seductive notions of an unspoiled paradise so favored by tourist transients, for whom the realities of local life and history are characteristically hidden or willfully occluded."\(^{471}\)

*Lei Stand Protest / Lei Pua Kapa* (2004) is part of this series, and in it, Pao is photographed lying prostrate before the lei stands at the Honolulu International Airport, her body covered with orchid flowers. In an interview, she notes that the protest is not about the lei stands themselves, a site where, in addition to tourists, many local people stop to buy lei before picking up family members at the airports: "I'm not 'anti-lei stand.' Leis are incorporated into our family— we use them, we love them. I feel like that's a protest about the commodification of culture."\(^{472}\) In a way, Pao is asserting a haunting presence; reminding viewers of the continued existence and belonging of Native Hawaiians even in spaces constructed with tourists in mind. Pao further points out that this photograph is purposefully humorous as well, as in the scene, her "protest" is evidently gathering no attention as the lei stand business goes on as usual.\(^{473}\) Thus, Pao uses humor to leaven but not deny the routine painfulness of the commodification of Native Hawaiian culture and Native Hawaiian women's bodies.


\(^{473}\) Ibid.
In sum, this chapter has argued that Hawai‘i’s enduring image as a place of racial mixture and racial harmony was constructed in the work of sociologists, trained in the Chicago School of Sociology and based at the University of Hawai‘i from the late 1920s through the 1960s, who understood Hawai‘i as a racial laboratory. Popular media translated the sociological discourse of Hawai‘i as racial laboratory into sexualized representations of beautiful and welcoming mixed race Native Hawaiian and Asian American women. While such accounts sought to prove Hawai‘i’s suitability, even destiny, to be American (offering mixed race women as a special encouragement to white American settler men in contrast to other racial fears about Hawai‘i's unassimilability and the barbaric nature of Native Hawaiian men), discourses proclaiming the virtues of the coming "neo-Hawaiian-American race" were used to cover the continued existence of Native Hawaiian people and claims to sovereignty. Contemporary discourses such as the use of Hapa to refer to mixed race Asian Americans (as illustrated by artist Kip Fulbeck's book) fail to acknowledge that discourses about mixed race have long been used to erase Native Hawaiians' presence in Hawai‘i. In contrast to Fulbeck's assumption that Hapa is free to be appropriated because Native Hawaiians are no longer using it, hapa continues to be a meaningful identity for some Native Hawaiians today. Overall, I find expressions of mixed race Native Hawaiian identity hold the most regenerative potential when they acknowledge race and "mixed race" as in Hawai‘i as part of settler colonialism rather than assume, like Romanzo Adams, that it is its remedy.
CHAPTER 4:

Beyond Recognition:
Native Hawaiians, Human Rights, and Global Indigenous Identities

Whether the mixture was remote or recent, the result is that all human beings are hybrids or mongrels containing genes from a wide variety of different ancestors.


We sweat and cry salt water, so we know that the ocean is really in our blood.

(Teresia Teaiwa, epigraph to Epeli Hau‘ofa’s “The Ocean in Us,” *We are the Ocean*, 2008)

While Romanzo Adams popularized the ideal of Hawai‘i as a model of race relations for the mainland United States in the 1930s, similar ideas about race in Hawai‘i would soon filter onto an international stage. Changes in the trends of social science in Hawai‘i as well as political urgencies after World War II expanded the place of Hawai‘i from an exclusively American racial laboratory to a global, universal example of race relations and modernization. University of Hawai‘i-based sociologist Andrew Lind’s influential 1938 book, *An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawaii*, for example, articulated Hawaii as an ideal site for the study of “human ecology.” Key to this ecological methodology would be the comparison of Hawai‘i with other colonies or former colonies with high rates of racial mixing such as Brazil and Jamaica. As Manganaro notes, Lind's *An Island Community* “documented Hawai‘i’s “natural history” of human migration, contact, settlement, and so on as it also situated these processes as part of a global process of modernizing underdeveloped societies and incorporating them

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into the global capitalist system. As with praise of Hawai‘i as a model for the solution of American "race relations," Hawai‘i would be a shining example of global racial mixing in the post-war period.

Hawai‘i made an ideal model for this more global framework in large part because of its perception (as encouraged by Romanzo Adams) as a place of racial mixture and good race relations. For racial mixture would become a central part of discussions about the place of biological race in the contemporary world after WWII. As articulated by L.C. Dunn, a geneticist who also conducted research in Hawai‘i, the sense that “all human beings are hybrids or mongrels” became an important way of explaining biological racial difference at this time. This insistence on the existence of genetic racial mixture in every human being emphasized that social hierarchies based on physical, racial differences were invalid—since at a genetic level, no one could claim to be of a “pure” race. However, the idea of universal racial mixture at the genetic level would ensure that race remained a valid biological concept, within the proper purview of experts—namely, geneticists and physical or biological anthropologists—rather than the layman. In defending the biological nature of race, physical anthropologists were defending their turf. As historian Perrin Selcer has noted: “Their expertise was discriminating between races; if racial differences were of trivial social significance, so were they.”

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This idea of genetic mixture was not new—it stemmed from Mendelian genetics first articulated in 1865. Yet, it took on new importance to explanations of biological race after WWII, as is especially evident in UNESCO educational documents about race published in the early 1950s, which Part One of this chapter examines. Indeed, the identification of all humanity as “hybrid” and “mongrel” seems a somewhat startling assertion by a researcher of Hawai‘i, where (as explored in the previous chapters) such special scrutiny had long been placed on the unique ancestral racial mix of the Polynesian type(s), the exceptional qualities of the Part-Hawaiian, and the exotic desirability of the mixed race Hawaiian girl. However, as argued in Chapter 3, the universalizing of racial mixture would be important to assuring that non-Hawaiians could become Hawaiian. Given that everyone was genetically racially mixed, the burden of proof of Native Hawaiian ancestry would continue to fall heavily and exclusively on Native Hawaiians.

This chapter argues that the use of Hawai‘i as a universal model of racial mixture in the foundational anti-racist documents of UNESCO naturalized and even valorized settler colonialism as a process of “racial mixing” with global significance. Claiming that “isolation” has been the greatest race-maker, scientists writing for UNESCO would endorse racial mixing and settler colonialism for integrating isolated populations into the contemporary world. Such understandings continue to shape contemporary genetics and genomics. As discussed in Chapter 1, genebanks like the deCode project in Iceland, which the proposed Hawaiian Genome Project was modeled after, is based on (contested) understandings of Icelandic, Native Hawaiian and many other Indigenous populations as having gone through “genetic bottlenecks” that have resulted in genetic homogeneity and
make them “isolates of historic interest.”

Thus, this chapter returns to some of the threads of Chapter 1, including the Polynesian Problem, but within the context of applying scientific definitions of race and indigeneity in international law and human rights. Beyond the historical documents of UNESCO, I further examine contemporary articulations of race and indigeneity in international Indigenous rights including the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. At stake is furthering an understanding of how Native Hawaiians are required to negotiate science, law, and global comparisons and connections as they pursue recognition of their historically erased and overthrown status as sovereign, Indigenous peoples.

Accordingly, Part One of this chapter examines how Hawai‘i as a place of “race mixture,” and Native Hawaiians (and, more broadly, Polynesians) as a mixed race, are portrayed in the UNESCO pamphlets. At the time of their publication, in the early 1950s, Hawai‘i was not yet a state, and as a territory of the U.S., the UN had placed Hawai‘i onto the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories in 1946. However, the UNESCO documents portray Hawai‘i as a place largely free of racial prejudice and in some ways even more democratic and American than the continental U.S. itself.

Hawai‘i was removed from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories when Hawai‘i became a state, despite the fact that independence was not included as an option on the statehood ballot measure. This point continues to be a source of activism for Native Hawaiians who look to the UN, rather than the U.S., as the most appropriate

authority to appeal to in decolonization efforts. Part Two of this chapter examines that international activism more closely. In particular, I analyze the impact that such ideas about biological race have had in the application of international human rights discourses to Indigenous peoples. I consider some of the ways that Native Hawaiians have called on international human rights and other global models of indigeneity, including Idle No More and the articulation of a larger Indigenous Polynesia or Pacific, in their actions towards decolonization.

Indeed, one important avenue of recognition for Native Hawaiians has been through the building of connections with other Indigenous peoples of the Pacific, all of whom, as Micronesian scholar and poet Teresia Teaiwa notes in the epigraph above, are constituted in important ways by their relationship to the ocean. She argues lyrically, in a flagrantly un-scientific way, that Indigenous Pacific Islanders “know that the ocean is in our blood” because humans cry and sweat salt water. Notably, Teaiwa's words encompass all Indigenous Pacific Islanders— not just Polynesians, but Micronesians and Melanesians as well. I use her quote to guide this chapter’s ultimate questioning of how Native Hawaiians might achieve regenerative forms of recognition that are oriented by Indigenous epistemologies and relationships rather than depending on recognition from settler colonial nation-states.

Part 1: Polynesia and Hawai‘i in the Science of Race after World War II

4.1.1: The Polynesian Problem as Anti-Racist Example

Soon after the United Nations passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, scientists were called on to clarify for the world the scientific basis for race.
Social scientists who had studied race and race mixture in Hawai‘i would play an important role in this task. The ambitious, and perhaps naive, hope was that by proving that there is no scientific basis to any assessments of racial superiority and inferiority, racism could be educated out of existence. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) officially resolved: “1. To collect scientific materials concerning problems of race; 2. To give wide diffusion to the scientific information collected; 3. To prepare an educational campaign based on this information.” Accordingly, a group of social scientists convened in 1949 to draft an official Statement on Race. The setting heightened their sense of purpose: they met in Paris in the UNESCO House, formerly the German military headquarters during the French occupation. One attendee, Ashley Montagu, an anthropologist from Rutgers, wrote of the settings’ significance: “Only if our deliberations had taken place at Auschwitz or Dachau could there have been a more fitting environment to impress upon the Committee members the immense significance of their work.”

The resulting Statement on Race, published in 1950, stated: “For all practical purposes, ‘race’ is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth.”

However familiar this argument that race is a social construction may be to us today, the statement’s strong dismissal of biological foundations of race sparked a firestorm among scientists, especially physical anthropologists, who ultimately pressured

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480 Ibid., 4.
481 Ibid., 10.
UNESCO to convene another meeting and issue another Statement on Race.\textsuperscript{482}

Eventually, UNESCO would publish four separate Statements on Race, in 1950, 1951, 1964, and 1967.\textsuperscript{483} In addition to these statements, in 1952-53, UNESCO created and disseminated pamphlets for their educational campaign to further explain the links (or lack thereof) between race and biology. Some pamphlets, such as one titled, “What is Race?” were aimed at a high school audience and included an appendix of discussion questions for teachers.\textsuperscript{484} Others, most notably including a series titled, “The Race Question in Modern Science,” were more academic, and included a variety of experts summarizing contemporary scientific opinions about topics such as “Race and Society,” “Race and Culture,” “Race and Biology,” and “Race and Psychology,” and “Race Mixture.”\textsuperscript{485} In many of these pamphlets, Hawai‘i is repeatedly called on as a model of harmonious race relations, despite high rates of racial diversity. Two of the scientists at the second UNESCO convention, geneticist L.C. Dunn and physical anthropologist Harry Shapiro, had in fact researched race mixing in Hawai‘i. In the course of heralding Hawai‘i’s model race relations, Dunn and Shapiro’s UNESCO essays also emphasize that, despite most problems of race relations being social in origin, racial difference nonetheless had a biological component.\textsuperscript{486} In other words, these scientists used Hawai‘i

\textsuperscript{482} Michelle Brattain, “Race, Racism, and Antiracism: UNESCO and the Politics of Presenting Science to the Postwar Public,” \textit{The American Historical Review} 112, no. 5 (December 1, 2007): 1386–1413; Selcer, “Beyond the Cephalic Index”; Montagu, \textit{Statement on Race}.

\textsuperscript{483} Montagu, \textit{Statement on Race}.


to argue that biological race did exist, but that “it was not ‘race’ but racism that was the problem.”

Though some UNESCO pamphlets about race and science encouraged readers to think of race as primarily socially constructed, the literature is also anxious to assert and clarify the biological aspects of race. In part, this reflects the debate among scientists over the official UNESCO statements on race, and the protests about the first statement downplaying the importance of biology to too great an extent. The educational pamphlets were all published after the second statement was published in 1951. One of the main things the UNESCO pamphlets seek to educate readers about is Mendelian genetics. The pamphlets consistently encourage the public to stop thinking about race as a matter of “blood,” and to instead understand observable, physical, racial difference as a matter of genes. For example, the educational booklet “What is race?” explains:

Previously, people thought that children had a blend of the traits of each parent as the result of the mingling of the blood. According to this theory a father with kinky or woolly hair and a mother with straight hair, for example, would have a curly-haired child, that is, a child whose hair was intermediate between woolly and straight. Mendel showed that, in fact, inheritance is not passed on through the blood but by unchanging and unblending minute particules which were later called genes.

The booklet goes on to diagram cell and gene structures, explaining the process by which dominant and recessive genes determine traits such as eye color, hair texture, and blood type. L.C. Dunn’s essay, “Race and Biology,” from which the “What is race?” booklet is drawn, further explains the wrongheadedness of blood metaphors, noting in previous understandings of heredity:

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487 Brattain, “Race, Racism, and Antiracism,” 1395.
Each person was supposed to have inherited half of his nature from each parent, hence one quarter from each grandparent and so on in decreasing fractions from remoter ancestors. If the parents differed in race or type the children were ‘half-bloods’, the grandchildren ‘quarter-bloods’, etc.\footnote{Dunn, “Race and Biology,” in UNESCO, \textit{The Race Question in Modern Science; Race and Science}, 265.}

However, Dunn argues, “Genes are stable living units, perhaps the smallest units in which living matter can perpetuate itself; their peculiarity is precisely that they do not blend or lose their individuality in whatever combinations they take part.”\footnote{Ibid.}

What creates physical racial difference, such as skin color, then, is not one’s percentage of white or black or Native “blood,” but the expression of genes, which follow certain rules when combined from parents into a child. Dunn explains, “Racial differences… are compounded of many individual differences”— and thus, there can be as much diversity in physical characteristics amongst one race as there is between races. “This means,” he continues:

that races are distinguished from each other, as \textit{groups}, by the relative commonness within them of certain inherited characters…. Woolly hair is very common in negroid peoples but uncommon in Europeans or Mongolians. It is more accurate to describe the difference in this way than to say of any one trait that it is present in all of one group and completely absent in the other.\footnote{Ibid., 272.}

Thus, Dunn encouraged his readers to understand physical racial differences as dynamic rather than static. Common, distinguishable physical traits could be attributed to different racial groups only because of “geographical or social” isolation.\footnote{Ibid., 284.} Indeed, he argued, “isolation is the great race-maker.”\footnote{Ibid.} He concluded: “A race, in short, is a group of
related intermarrying individuals, a population, which differs from other populations in the relative commonness of certain hereditary traits.”

Using a similar definition of race, the “What is race?” booklet takes pains to explain that there is no “single objective list of races.” This is because “there are many border-line races and border-line individuals.” To illustrate this, the booklet includes a diagram of racial classifications as determined by anthropologist A. L. Kroeber. In this diagram, three adjoining circles are represented: one for the “Caucasoid” races, one for the “Mongoloid” races, and one for the “Negroid” races. In the Caucasoid circle are dots representing, “Nordics,” “Alpines,” “Mediterranean” and “Indians.” The Mongoloid circle includes “American Indians,” “Asiatic Mongoloids,” and “Oceanic Mongoloids,” while the Negroid circle shows dots for “Oceanic Negroes,” “Negritos,” and “African Negroes.” Certain dots are on the outside of these circles or on the cusp of two circles—for example, “Australian aborigines” are outside of all the circles, because, the booklet explains, some scientists prefer to classify Australian aborigines as their own separate race.

In the dead center of the three circles is a dot labeled, “Polynesians.” While this seems to suggest that Polynesians are a mix of the three racial groups, the booklet is actually using “Polynesians” as an assignment: “Referring to the list of racial characteristics on page 45, you might try to decide into what group you think the

494 Ibid., 273.
496 Ibid.
499 Ibid., 37.
Polynesians should go and then compare the results with the work of Dr. Harry Shapiro.\textsuperscript{500} The referenced list on page 45, titled “Physical Characteristics of the Three Main Races of Mankind,” supplements the three circles diagram by describing the skin colour, stature, head form, face, hair, eye colour and eye-fold shape, nose, and body build of the Caucasoid, Mongoloid and Negroid.

It is interesting to speculate about what kind of pictures “Polynesian” generated for audiences in the U.S., Europe, South America, Africa, and Asia (as this booklet was widely distributed internationally) in 1952. For many, it was likely the image of the “hybrid Hawaiian girl” disseminated in popular media in the 1930s and 1940s, as analyzed in Chapter 3. However, readers were encouraged to “check their results” by a footnote directing them to “See Up from the Ape by E.A. Hooton, (1946).”\textsuperscript{501} Earnest Albert Hooton, an eminent Harvard anthropologist, was in fact L.C. Dunn’s adviser. Hooton had done anthropometric research in Hawai‘i and it was at his urging that Dunn took over this research.\textsuperscript{502} Hooton’s Up from the Ape is a large tome first published in 1931, with a second edition in 1947, which he intended to be a popular, non-technical text about human evolution, though he notes in the second edition’s preface that “it has principally been read by students.”\textsuperscript{503} In it, he explains Man’s relationship to primates, through narrating first the “primate life cycle,” and then the “advent of Homo sapiens,” before describing Man’s “racial history.”

It is in this section on racial history that Hooton analyzes Polynesians. He begins by deeming them a “COMPOSITE RACE (Predominately White),” and listing their

\begin{footnotes}
\item[500] Ibid.
\item[501] Earnest Albert Hooton, Up from the Ape (The Macmillan Company, 1947).
\item[503] Hooton, Up from the Ape, viii.
\end{footnotes}
physical characteristics, including: “Skin color: yellow brown,” “Lips: integumental and membranous lips rather full, but not Negroid,” and “Body build: usually broad, muscular, mesomorphic, with tendency to corpulence.”

His narrative, beginning after this list of physical characteristics, is titled “The Comely Polynesians,” and describes them as “one of the tallest and finest-looking races of the world.”

Hooton explains their “composite” racial nature thus:

Examining any considerable number of individual Polynesians, one notices some who show Mongoloid features, others in whom Negroid traits are apparent, others who approximate an European type, and a majority in whom all of these racial characteristics are blended into a harmonious and pleasing whole, distinct from the type of any of these three primary races….

However, a careful consideration of Polynesian features in the light of what is known of the behavior of Negroid and Mongoloid characters in racial crosses suggests that the White strain in this composite race must be much stronger than either of the other two elements….

Further, Hooton argues, Polynesian “crosses” with Europeans, “such as the mutineers of the Bounty and Tahitian women, studied by Shapiro, are much more European in their physical characters than would be possible if the cross did not involve an already predominant White strain on the Polynesian side.”

Kroeber’s 1948 textbook *Anthropology* (from which the “What is race?” booklet copied their three circle diagram) similarly argued of Polynesians: “There is almost certainly a definite Caucasoid strain in them…. Most of the more recent world-wide race classifications tend to emphasize the Caucasoid resemblances of the Polynesians.”

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504 Ibid., 616.
505 Ibid., 616–617.
506 Ibid., 617.
507 Ibid., 617–618.
In other words, in the discourse of Mendelian genetics, so encouraged in the UNESCO explanations of race, though many common physical traits of the white race have been proven to be recessive traits (e.g., blue eyes, blonde hair), their presence with some frequency in Polynesians proved that there was the infusion of these traits was not only in recent racial mixture but in ancient human history as well. Thus, whiteness was effectively the dominant trait of Polynesians, despite, or even pointedly because, white traits were characteristically recessive. This is yet another configuration of Polynesians being possessed through whiteness. For Hooton, Polynesian genes preserved their whiteness even in recent mixtures with Chinese in Hawai‘i and Melanesians in Fiji. He noted that such crosses produced people who “seem to preserve an essentially White type of body build and features” rather than becoming more pronouncedly “Mongoloid” or “Negroid” in their features.509

In effect, Hooton and his use of Shapiro’s research was simply the latest answer to the classic Polynesian Problem, the ethnological and physical anthropological literature speculating on Polynesians’ true “racial type,” as analyzed in Chapter 1 and in Louis Sullivan’s work in Chapter 2. Though worded and argued differently than the earlier Polynesian Problem literature, Hooton comes to a similar conclusion: that Polynesians are a racial mixture (both in ancient and recent racial crossings—he notes the popular hypothesis that Polynesians “arrived” in Polynesia “a ready-made composite race”) that is nonetheless “predominately white.”510 Like the illustration from the *Oakland Tribune* in 1930 analyzed in Chapter 3, though seemingly contradictory,

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509 Hooton, *Up from the Ape*, 618.
510 Ibid., 616–618.616-618
Polynesians’ simultaneous ‘mixture’ and ‘predominant whiteness’ were actually complementary. It allowed for Polynesians’ difference while at the same time emphasized their desirable, “comely” nature, and their seeming destiny to become “more European” looking as they mixed with white settlers in Tahiti, New Zealand, Hawai‘i and elsewhere.

To return to the three circles diagram in “What is race?”, then, the answer Hooton’s text provided was that rather than being squarely in the center of the Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid races, Polynesians were more properly edged into the Caucasoid circle. This raises the question: why was the Polynesian Problem important enough to be included in a booklet seeking to explain biological race to the world? Why was it the ideal case for a scientific and lay audience to contemplate the biological aspects of race? In part, the answer seems to be because of the ways that Polynesians represented in these accounts the promise and desirability of racial mixture in both the ancient history of Man and the future of Man. Polynesians, and their seeming unclassifiable (but also white) nature, thus represented a fundamental human unity and universality that UNESCO was eager to impress on their readers.

From some of the most isolated islands in the world, Polynesians seemed to symbolize an important proof: that the geographic isolation that caused biological racial difference could be overcome; that racial mixture could thrive and be socially accepted.

511 Although, lest readers confuse all Indigenous Pacific Islanders as Polynesian, the diagram also includes a separate dot for “Oceanic Mongoloids” and “Oceanic Negroids.” Though unexplained in the “What is race?” booklet, Kroeber’s text notes that Oceanic Negroids are “Papuo-Melanesian,” who “are clearly close relatives” to Negroes—“A trained observer can distinguish them at sight, but a novice would take a Papuan from New Guinea or a Melanesian from the Solomon or Bismarck islands to be an African.” Kroeber does not elaborate on the Oceanic Mongolid type. Kroeber, Anthropology: Race, Language, Culture, Psychology, Prehistory, 137, 140.
In this vein, Dunn argued about understanding racial differences as being “of degree” (i.e. “caused by geographical or social isolation” rather than “of kind,” (i.e. older scientific ideas that said humans were of different species) that:

This change in biological outlook has tended to restore that view of the unity of man which we find in ancient religions and mythologies, and which was lost in the period of geographical, cultural and political isolation from which we are now emerging.⁵¹²

In referencing the “isolation from which we are now emerging,” Dunn was referencing his and the larger UNESCO project’s hopes for greater international and interracial cooperation after World War II. However, he was also implying, along with many other UNESCO authors, that a population’s “isolation” was often the result of resisting “civilization” (i.e. settler colonialism, neo-colonialism, etc.). Such isolation was, in this view, immoral: it caused the destruction of the “unity of man.” Thus, even as the social scientists argued against racism, they maintained and shored up a belief in colonialism. Conquest and civilization had been and would continue to improve the “unity of man.” Resistant colonized peoples would wreck this unity. As Kenneth Little wrote in the UNESCO pamphlet, “Racial Myths”:

In all the regions in which an advanced culture is found there has been conquest of one people or peoples by others. The claim that crossbreeds are degenerate is refuted by the actual fact that the whole population of the world is hybrid and is becoming increasingly so. Isolated human groups have had little or no influence on the cultural progress of humanity, whereas the conditions which allow of any group playing an important role in civilization are promoted by crossing with other races.⁵¹³

Thus, racial mixture (through the spread of civilization) was not only no longer negative, but it was a primary mode of progress. Social scientific representations of Polynesians,

the “predominately” Caucasoid peoples who were only getting whiter through more recent mixtures enabled by settler colonialism, could be used as a perfect example of such progress.

Denise Ferreira da Silva reminds us that:

Most contemporary analyses celebrate this transformation [of race as a matter of blood to race as a matter of geographical isolation] as the substitution of "historical" for "biological" constructions of cultural difference. What usually escapes these analyses is that, though arguing the particularity of the primitive mind as a product of (temporal-spatial) isolation, the anthropological text would establish that cultural difference derives from temporal processes always already mapped by the categories of racial difference it uses to distinguish between the civilized and the primitive man.\(^{514}\)

Thus, Silva sees the turn to geographical isolation as the maker of race as a key moment in which globality comes to rule modern representation. Globality, as mentioned in the introduction, is the onto-epistemological context created by post-European Enlightenment philosophy in which human beings are understood as determined by exteriority (time and space), and Europeans (and their descendants in the U.S. and other locations) are the only ones whose particular time and space allow them to achieve transparency and self-determination. Silva's argument is important in remembering that such turns away from notions of race that relied on blood (which had already occurred through the science of life and science of man in the nineteenth century) did not actually displace the importance of the scientific text to the analytics of raciality. The next section further explores the ways that UNESCO representations of Hawai‘i's geographically isolated location and racial paradise further deployed the logic of possession through whiteness, now on an international scale.

\(^{514}\) Silva, *Toward a Global Idea of Race*, 143.
4.1.2: “Tropical Democracy” and the Science of Stabilizing Mixed Race

“Race mixture has had a field day in Hawaii,” argued Harry Shapiro in “Race Mixture,” one of two UNESCO pamphlets in the Race and Science series he authored (his other was titled “The Jewish People: A Biological History”). He continued:

Polynesians, all kinds and degrees of Europeans and Americans, Puerto Ricans, Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Filipinos, not to mention smaller contingents of other populations, have met here and produced a bewildering array of hybrids. The extraordinary fact about all this—extraordinary in the light of conditions in many other areas of race mixture—is the relative absence here of friction, prejudice or social rejection. There is no colour bar in Hawaii and no legal disability based on race, although contact between the same races elsewhere has given rise to them. Why, one might ask, has Hawaii become the seat of such an amicable arrangement?\(^\text{515}\)

Shapiro’s emphasis on the “extraordinary” acceptance of all races and race mixtures in Hawaii is echoed in many of the UNESCO pamphlets. For instance, Dunn’s “Race and Biology” notes: “New races are forming in the Hawaiian Islands, for example, by the mingling of Chinese and European immigrants with the native people.”\(^\text{516}\) In another example, psychologist Otto Klineberg’s “Race and Psychology” uses a comparison of “Chinese-white crosses in Shanghai and Hawaii” to argue against the notion of racially mixed people as naturally less intelligent.\(^\text{517}\) Where such crosses in Shanghai are “maladjusted,” their “healthy integration” in Hawaii suggested to Klineberg: “It is clearly the attitude towards the hybrids, not any special hybrid biology, which determines their place in the community.”\(^\text{518}\)

\(^{515}\) Shapiro, “Race Mixture,” in UNESCO, The Race Question in Modern Science; Race and Science, 383.

\(^{516}\) Dunn, “Race and Biology,” in ibid., 284.

\(^{517}\) Otto Klineberg, “Race and Psychology,” in ibid., 444.

\(^{518}\) Ibid.
In addition to the frequent invocation of Hawai‘i as an example throughout UNESCO's *The Race Question in Modern Science* series, two essays dedicate special sections to Hawai‘i: social anthropologist Kenneth Little’s “Race and Society” and Shapiro’s “Race Mixture,” as noted above. Little’s “Race and Society” compares and contrasts the history of race relations in South Africa, Brazil, Hawai‘i and Great Britain. For him, South Africa represented the most “intense” place of “racial consciousness and feeling” in the world, while Brazil and Hawai‘i were the opposite, and Great Britain somewhere in the middle. Through such contrasts, Little hoped to show that there was “a direct relationship between racial attitudes and society— *that race relations are, in effect, a function of a certain type of social and economic system*” (italics in original).\(^{519}\)

The absence of “racial consciousness and feeling” in Brazil is explained in this account by both Portuguese custom and the style of slavery they imported to Brazil. Early Portuguese settlers married Indian women because of a lack of white women, but also, “The Portuguese had already had a prolonged history of contact and marriage with the Moors” and were thus “accustomed to mixed unions and their offspring.”\(^{520}\) Plantation slavery in Brazil was characterized by what Little describes as “a type of close intimate association” in which the “master recognized a common religious bond with his slaves. They were regularly instructed in Roman Catholic ritual and, in the eyes of God, were treated as equals.”\(^{521}\) Thus, “mulatto children of the plantation owner were frequently taken into his family.”\(^{522}\)

\(^{519}\) Little, “Race and Society,” ibid., 67.
\(^{520}\) Ibid., 76.
\(^{521}\) Ibid., 77.
\(^{522}\) Ibid.
Accordingly, Little argues, “the Brazilian population claims that it is undergoing a ‘lightening’ process. However, the discovery of ancestral Negro blood does not alter the social standing of the individual.”523 Thus, he continues, “A popular slogan is, ‘We Brazilians are rapidly becoming one people. Some day, not far distant, there will be only one race in our country.’”524 Though he acknowledges “Colour prejudice is probably felt among many Brazilians and in certain social circles,” he finds it more important that this prejudice is “generally not overt, and public opinion is opposed to any forms of open discrimination on racial grounds.”525

Moving on to Hawai‘i, Little similarly notes the absence of any laws or public opinion against intermarriage.526 He explains this as, in part, a matter of good political and business sense:

The reason for this racial freedom in Hawaii lies largely in the very heterogeneity of the population which is racially so distributed that no politician, business man, or newspaper proprietor could afford to affront any of the more important groups of his followers or customers with race prejudice.527

This good business sense was not only contemporary but historical, as he notes that intermarriage between white settlers and Native Hawaiian women “of high rank” could accrue the settlers with status and land.528 Though, as with Brazil, the early absence of white women left white settler men with little choice but to marry Native Hawaiian women, Little notes, “A good many [settler men] found the native women attractive,
married them and had families.” After the importation of Asian and European (chiefly Portuguese) plantation labor, the pattern of settler men without other choices was repeated and they married Native Hawaiian women.

For Little, the mixed-race Part Hawaiian had already been established as the norm. His essay cites Romanzo Adams’ *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii* in arguing “Today, the part-Hawaiians greatly outnumber the ‘pure’ Hawaiians, and the trend of marriage suggests that individuals of mixed blood will constitute a majority of the population by the end of the century.” Like Adams, Little also understood this trend as intimately tied to Hawai‘i’s Americanization. However, in comparison to Adams, Little was situated somewhat at a remove from the project of Americanization—he was based at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. Thus, he argued that Hawai‘i’s racial mixture is not only being improved by American settler colonialism, but also that America is being improved by Hawai‘i’s racial mixture:

> Closer contact with the United States and the making of Honolulu into a great naval and military base has affected the cultural development of the Hawaiian. It is making him more and more of an American. It is also tending to diffuse the traditional American attitude towards race relations into the islands.

By mentioning the transformation of Honolulu into “a great naval and military base,” and the diffusing of “traditional American attitude towards race relations,” Little recalls the shock of the Massie Affair in 1931, and officials’ eagerness to re-establish the image of Hawai‘i as a racial paradise, as discussed in Chapter 3. Thus, Little seems to imply that Hawai‘i is helping to change “traditional” racism in the United States. He highlights this

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529 Ibid.
530 Ibid., 82.
531 Ibid., 83.
532 Ibid.
by concluding the Hawai‘i section: “Although there is far from a ‘complete absence of Negrophobia in Hawaii’, Negroes find there ‘the closest approach to real democracy available under the Stars and Stripes’.”533 While Little thus admits that a small amount of racism (as defined by continental U.S. black-white race relations) exists in Hawai‘i, overall, Hawai‘i is still the most racially progressive place in the United States.

Denise Ferreira da Silva has described the writing of the Brazilian national subject precisely along the lines Little expresses in relation to Brazil and Hawai‘i.534 Yet, in her account, Silva makes plain that the “whitening” thesis and the insistence upon Brazil’s supposedly unique “racial democracy” (i.e., the sociological theory that due to Brazil’s racial mix of Indians, blacks, and Portuguese was inherently democratic in contrast to the more strictly observed racial hierarchies of Europe) were really invested in the production of a “tropical civilization,” under the domain of a “slightly tanned” but fundamentally European male, national subject.535 She writes:

In racial democracy, racial difference plays no role in the juridical, economic, and moral configuration of colonial Brazil. Instead, it is resolved in the interiority of the always already slightly tanned subject of patriarchy. From this results a mode of racial subjection the sociohistorical logic of exclusion cannot capture precisely because both assume that miscegenation, as a process and index of the obliteration of racial difference, institutes social configurations where the racial does not operate as a strategy of power.536

Silva points out here that Brazil is not understood as a place where racism (configured in social science as racial exclusion) exists because in the “juridical, economic, and moral configuration” racial difference is officially accepted (even, selectively, appropriated and

534 Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race, 221–252.
535 Ibid., 231.
536 Ibid., 241.
celebrated). Racial difference is accepted because it has already been resolved in the “interiority” of the mixed race Brazilian subject, the product of miscegenation. Miscegenation in the Brazilian national account has been recuperated as a “process and index of the obliteration of racial difference,” rather than evidence of racial difference (as in the “one drop rule” regarding blackness in the United States).

Silva emphasizes the patriarchy of the national subject because it is through patriarchy that racial difference is obliterated and recuperated as cultural difference. She explains, citing the logic of anthropologist Gilberto Freyre’s reading of Brazilian miscegenation as the creation of a “colonial family”:

Regarding the articulation of the presence of the others of Europe, this rewriting of the predicament of the Brazilian culture… enables Freyre to all but ignore the violent aspects of colonization and slavery, to privilege their influence on the colonial family. With this he rewrites the affectability of the Indians and Africans by enveloping them in the culinary, affective, and pathological aspect of the patriarchal family life. 537

Though the “affectability of the Indians and Africans” lent Brazil a distinctive culture, through the emphasis of a “patriarchal family life,” this distinctive culture is ultimately seen as the product of Portuguese male desire (not of Indians and Africans). For Freyre “Africans’ only relevant contribution was the body of the female slave,” (who cannot have any desire of her own, as she is written as doubly affectable), whereas the “productive power, the ‘inner force,’ belongs to the Portuguese because their ‘inclination’ to sexual intimacy produces the slightly tanned Brazilian subject.” 538 This is similar to what I have argued in Chapter 3, regarding the importance of the mixed race “Hawaiian girl” as the representation of Hawai‘i within a U.S. national frame. Though Native

537 Ibid., 242.
538 Ibid., 244.
Hawaiians lent a special cultural aspect to the latest iteration of U.S. democracy, it would be the white American military male (as representative of the U.S. itself), rather than the Native Hawaiian women who birthed the newly American race, who would be credited with the success of Hawai‘i’s unique “racial democracy.”

Silva’s analysis points out that the “successful version of the Brazilian subject had a price”:

> Because the ‘spirit’ of the nation encapsulated both African culture and physical traits, in this version of the Brazilian text blackness cannot signify a self-determined and productive, even if subaltern, subject. Nevertheless, precisely because the appropriation of the black female body was also premised on the idea that only whiteness signifies the transparent I, the blackness and Africanness the woman’s offspring inherit from her remain as dangerous signifiers of a subject of affectability who cannot but signify Brazil’s unstable placing at the outskirts of the modern global configuration. 539

In other words, because the Brazilian national subject has successfully been constructed as fundamentally white, those Brazilians who fail to signify whiteness are seen as dangerous to the nation. This explains for Silva why violence against contemporary “generations of black and brown Brazilians” causes no moral outrage—because it is “but the latest manifestation of the national desire to obliterate the Brazilian people who, regardless of its elites’ desire for whiteness, insist on signifying otherwise.” 540

Silva’s analysis provides a useful vantage point from which to examine the second in-depth treatment of Hawai‘i in the UNESCO documents—that of Harry Shapiro in his essay “Race Mixture.” A major theme of Shapiro’s essay, which is also echoed throughout the UNESCO pamphlets, is of the especially unjust mistreatment of mixed

539 Ibid., 246.
540 Ibid., 248.
race people. He noted: “The great injustice, after all, that has been placed on the mixed-blood is that he is judged, not as an individual, an elementary right to which he is entitled, but as a member of a group about which there is much prejudice and little understanding.”

Thus, Shapiro was interested in championing mixed race people because he felt they were especially unfairly classified (in contrast to the still reprehensible but understandable ‘prejudice’ against ‘purer’ racial types). As a long established researcher of Indigenous Pacific Islanders, Shapiro implies that mixed race people of the Pacific were especially undeserving of racial discrimination because, despite the physical or cultural traits which might in Silva’s words “insist on signifying otherwise,” they were fundamentally (part) white.

Shapiro compares Pitcairn Island, Jamaica and Hawai‘i in his UNESCO essay on “Race Mixture.” Shapiro, who would replace Louis Sullivan at the Bishop Museum after Sullivan’s death, had been an anthropology Ph.D. student of Earnest Hooton at Harvard and conducted his dissertation research on the Pitcairn Islanders (finished in 1926 using data he did not collect himself; he apparently did not actually go to Pitcairn until the mid-1930s).

In the early twentieth century, the Pitcairn Islanders signified a particularly famous and romanticized story of racial mixture. The inhabitants of Pitcairn were the descendants of Tahitian women and British mutineers from the British Navy’s H.M.S. Bounty. In fear of retribution from the Navy, the mutineers had escaped to uninhabited Pitcairn (“some 2,500 miles south-east of Tahiti”) in 1790 with the help of 12 Tahitian

\[541\] Shapiro, “Race Mixture,” in UNESCO, The Race Question in Modern Science; Race and Science, 388.


\[543\] Ibid., 233.
women and 6 Tahitian men. They were then “virtually lost to the world” until 1808, when another British ship encountered the island. On their re-discovery, it came to light that the mutineers had killed the Tahitian men shortly after their arrival, as well as fought among themselves, leaving only one British man alive. However, nine Tahitian women and twenty-five children were present in 1808.

Shapiro has no difficulty in brushing over the murder of six Tahitian men at the founding of Pitcairn Island, and heralding it as a site of racial freedom. In “Race Mixture,” Shapiro notes that he found Pitcairn Islanders to be ideal subjects of study because their isolation from “their parent races” allowed them freedom from the usual prejudice integrated societies held towards mixed race people. He argued: “the visitor is invariably impressed by the pleasant, friendly manners of the islanders, their charm, their hospitality and self-confidence. There is no trace here of a people conscious of inferiority.” He also noted their high fertility rates— by the time of his study in the 1920s, over 1,000 Pitcairn Islanders existed. Thus, “the Pitcairn experiment lends no support for the thesis that race mixture merely leads to degeneration or at best produces a breed inferior to the superior parental race. In fact, we see in this colony some support for heightened vigour….”

In choosing the Pitcairn Islanders as subjects, Warwick Anderson notes that Shapiro demonstrated that he “was especially adept at attaching his scientific research to
broader cultural enthusiasms, in particular the fate of the Bounty mutineers, thus giving race mixing a white human face. He combined the Polynesian craze and incipient South Seas tourism with liberal doses of science.” Indeed, giving “race mixing a white human face” was to be Shapiro’s mode of operation in more ways than one. Anderson also notes that in 1934-35, Shapiro traveled for the first time to Pitcairn with fellow researchers anthropologist Kenneth Emory and linguist J. Frank Stimson. Encountering difficulties in getting Pitcairn Islanders to submit to his anthropometric measurements, Shapiro noted: “It requires almost a flirtation to get the women to be measured.” Anderson explains the potential solution to these difficulties as proposed to Shapiro by his fellow researchers:

Emory and the older, pushy Stimson—Keneti and Ua—encouraged him to sleep with the local girls, as they did, thereby “normalizing” their presence, so it seemed. Once sexual relations were established, the research process might go more smoothly, or so Shapiro speculated. But mostly the “boys” simply relied on Keneti’s guitar and Ua’s fluent Tahitian to break the ice.

Apparently, the time-honored, anthropological “solution” to creating more pliable, female research subjects was to have sex with them. This is a remarkable illustration of Silva’s analysis about the importance of patriarchy in obliterating the presence of affectable others while appropriating their cultural difference in producing a national subject with a European consciousness. In Brazil this process occurred through the sexual exploitation of the black female slave body and the powerful “inner force” of the Portuguese man. In the case of the Pacific Islands, it was Indigenous women’s bodies that were exploited as simultaneously sexual and scientific objects in order for white American scientists to

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551 Ibid., 237.
552 Ibid.
produce accounts of racial mixture “with white human face.” Emory and Stimson, having taken on the Polynesian nicknames “Keneti” and “Ua,” advance their research through not only sex with the local women (of whose motivations or consent little is said beyond the sense that they were “asking for it”—i.e., Shapiro’s lament that flirtation was required to obtain measurements), but also through the display of Tahitian cultural skills—music and language. Again, though these skills may have been taught to them by Tahitian or other Polynesian women, or could otherwise be attributed to the feminine aspects of Tahitian culture, it was the white male, through a mastery of these skills, who was able to produce something more important for the world: in this case, an account of racial mixture that would scientifically prove that there were no “bad effects” from racial mixture.

Ultimately, to return to the Hawaiian case, this arrangement of white males as productive colonial force helps explain why it was so important for social scientific texts to first emphasize that white settler men in Hawai‘i initially “had no choice” but to marry Native Hawaiian women, and secondly, present contemporary “racial intermarriage” between white American men and mixed race “Hawaiian girls” as natural and desirable. Indeed, Shapiro reiterates this logic in his UNESCO essay’s section on Hawai‘i, writing that early American and European settlers initially had no choice but to respect Native Hawaiians as “they were legally foreigners whose advancement and prosperity depended on the goodwill of the Hawaiians.”

Shapiro explains thus:

> Since the potential and actual wealth of the islands—the land—remained in the hands of the native families, intermarriage was frequently an economic advantage that brought a social position to the white man which

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he might not otherwise easily achieve. His children, therefore, would acquire status and prestige in the beginning not so much from their white ancestry as from the status and land they inherited from their native mothers.  

Thus racial discrimination (“exclusion” in Silva’s terms) against Native Hawaiians was unthinkable in this social scientific logic even as Shapiro describes at the very same time the settler colonial process by which Native Hawaiians were dispossessed of their lands: through marriage to white men (and the transformation of land tenure law to a Western system).  

He goes on to explain that the acceptance of racial mixture generally continued even after the importation of Chinese and Japanese plantation labor because: “Social prejudice and economic resentment against these newcomers did develop and at times became quite acute, but it could not degenerate into a crude, open, racial form since that would have involved the Hawaiians and the part-Hawaiians.”  

Acknowledging that some racial mixture occurred in Hawai‘i between Native Hawaiians and Chinese, Shapiro nonetheless largely defines mixed race in Hawai‘i as a mix of white and Native Hawaiian (perhaps with some Chinese thrown in). Thus, though mixed race children in Hawai‘i would initially benefit from the “status and land they inherited from their native mothers,” Shapiro implies that it is their whiteness (and Hawai‘i’s inclusion into the U.S.) that will benefit them the most in the end. He reiterates the idea that the future of Hawai‘i, like that of the world, is decidedly mixed race and “whitening.” For Part Hawaiians, like the Pitcairn Islanders, showed “hybrid vigor”: “The mixed Hawaiians,

554 Ibid., 384.
555 Kame‘elehiwa, Native Land and Foreign Desires = Ko Hawai‘i ʻĀina a Me Nā Koi Pu‘umake a Ka Po‘e Haole: A History of Land Tenure Change in Hawai‘i from Traditional Times Until the 1848 Māhele, Including an Analysis of Hawaiian Ali‘i and American Calvinists.
thus, by a steady growth through primary crosses, by intermarriage with ‘pure’ racial
groups and by their own high natural increase, are expanding at a more rapid rate than
any other major contingent of the population.”

Warwick Anderson narrates the history of Shapiro’s encounters with the Pitcairn
Islanders and other Indigenous Pacific Islanders as a progressive achievement for science.
He stages his historical account of Shapiro as demonstrating key transformations in racial
science—namely the “disintegration of racial classification or typology in the 1930s and
1940s” through “the complex process of cross-cultural interaction and exchange” in
Pacific social science:

The engagement of seafaring scientists and islanders inevitably was
difficult, trying, and bewildering for everyone involved; often it was
inflected with condescension and paternalism; occasionally it would lead
all parties into moral peril; but sometimes it created intimacy and
understanding, even a new sense of identity and what it means to be
human. It is this modulation of the perception of human difference—this
oceanic vision—that I seek to recapture here.

Again, as mentioned with Anderson’s analysis of Sullivan in Chapter 2, I part ways with
Anderson in his insistence on reading the history of social science in the Pacific as
contributing the universal good of a new understanding of “what it means to be human.”
This new understanding refers both to Shapiro’s championing of mixed race people but
also his later advocacy against eugenics. However, as Silva points out, formally
conferring humanity on Europe’s others would not allow them to become transparent,
self-determining subjects. Instead, it predicated their humanity on their own
obliteration—on becoming white, or at least possessed through whiteness. Anderson’s

557 Ibid., 386.
559 Ibid., 251.
gloss of Shapiro et. al.’s encounters with Polynesians and Polynesian women in particular as relationships with some “condescension and paternalism” but also with “intimacy and understanding” ultimately re-enacts the logic of possession through whiteness. Anderson appropriates cultural elements of Indigenous Pacific Islanders into what he deems Shapiro’s revolutionary new “oceanic vision” of human difference, and like Shapiro, he fails to substantially acknowledge the colonial, un-consenting and violent use of Indigenous Pacific Islander’s bodies in making such claims.

As Silva so eloquently argues, formulations of “tropical democracy” have a price. Those bodies that fail to signify whiteness must pay this price. Despite the repeated claims of Polynesians’ fundamental whiteness, and mixed race Polynesians’ even more ascendant whiteness, such claims were never incompatible with the Polynesian race’s obliteration or extinction. Indeed, the contemporary expression of their latent whiteness required such an obliteration. Thus, though measuring people by designations such as “half-bloods” was ostensibly invalidated by Mendelian genetics, as the UNESCO documents go to great pains to explain, Native Hawaiians would still be subject to blood quantum measurements which set their racial membership at 50%. Though seemingly counter to the rules of dominant and recessive genes in which white traits were usually recessive, both science and law dictated that white “superiority,” or European consciousness, would nonetheless win out in mixed race Native Hawaiians. This analysis suggests that contemporary uses of discourses proclaiming "we are all mixed race," though formulated in a post-WWII articulation of anti-racism, are embedded in a definition of the human that is tied to the Man of the European Enlightenment. We must be attentive to this history when considering the use of human rights today. Indeed, the
next part of this chapter looks at the possibilities and pitfalls in the use of international human rights discourses, and other global Indigenous rights discourses, by Native Hawaiians in recent years.

**Part 2: Reframing Recognition: Indigenous Rights and Relationships in Oceania and Beyond**

Whereas the previous half of this chapter examined how Polynesia and Hawai‘i, as a model examples of mixed race, racially harmonious populations, were used in foundational notions of human rights, the second half of this chapter considers how Native Hawaiians have used international human rights and other global Indigenous movements to stake their claims to recognition and sovereignty. As the previous half of the chapter was particularly concerned with the ways that race was defined in the 1950s UNESCO documents, this half further considers how colonization and indigeneity has been defined in more recent UN documents such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. How have Native Hawaiians drawn on other international models in working towards decolonization, and how might such practices change or continue problematic definitions of race, indigeneity and the human itself?

Native Hawaiians, since at least the 1970s, have pursued a variety of means of decolonization, from efforts to gain federal recognition within the U.S. Congress (in the legislation popularly known as the Akaka Bill) to more separatist sovereignty movements, which I will not attempt to summarize in full here. Precisely because the

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U.S. is Hawai‘i’s colonizer, some Native Hawaiians view U.S. national courts and legislation as an improper realm within which to seek justice. Accordingly, the UN has been one important site of Native Hawaiian political action. In this half of the chapter, I position UN organizing within a framework of multiple regenerative connections that Native Hawaiians have and continue to make among other Indigenous peoples. I am interested in both how Native Hawaiians articulate their identities in relation to broader identities including Polynesian, Pacific Islander, and Native American, as well as how other Indigenous peoples recognize Native Hawaiians within or outside of these identities. This part of the chapter is thus important in considering a different aspect of the Polynesian Problem that this dissertation has yet to consider fully: how those who may fit the label Polynesian use or challenge this designation, and what Indigenous and racial connections they make within and beyond the Pacific Ocean.

In framing activism at the UN as only one type of regenerative action pursued by Native Hawaiians, I am following other Pacific Islander scholars in shifting the focus of Indigenous rights and recognition efforts away from the frames used and imposed by nation-states (and international organizations which rely on nation-state actors) and towards the productive possibilities in connections among the world’s Indigenous peoples themselves. For Native Hawaiians, a particularly important regionally based form of connection has been among the Indigenous peoples of Oceania. The relationships between Native Hawaiians, Māori, and others are continuously regenerated in the sense that many Indigenous Pacific Islanders have epistemologies that view other Pacific Island

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peoples as ancestral relatives, making cultivation of these ties in the present important. Alice Te Punga Somerville’s recent text *Once Were Pacific: Māori Connections to Oceania* provides an exemplary critical assessment of relationships between Indigenous Pacific Islanders. With specific reference to Māori who both live in Aotearoa and abroad as well as Pasifika (non-Māori Indigenous Pacific peoples, including Tongans, Samoans, and many more) communities who live in New Zealand, Somerville questions the substance of Pacific Indigenous identities when they are mobile and migrant. Wondering when and why Māori have become divorced from a broader Pacific identity in New Zealand, Somerville argues that there is a pressing need in contemporary Pacific Islands scholarship to trouble the actually existing forms of connection between Māori and other Indigenous Pacific peoples. This is a critical uptake of foundational Pacific Islands Studies literature such as Epeli Hau’ofa’s “Our Sea of Islands,” which emphasizes a wide-reaching solidarity between all Pacific Islanders. She writes thus:

Māori-Pasifika connections are marked by discourses of relationship and reconnection but also of disjuncture. For example, we might consider familial prohibitions on marriages or partnerships with the other, informal prejudice, ethnically drawn rivalries between youth gangs, and so on. Compounding this, Pakeha racism has tended to lump Māori and Pasifika together in a way that flattens out differences and further marginalizes all communities involved. Surely a focus on Māori-Pasifika connections should also attend to the rather embarrassing genealogies of suspicion, derision, and competition between our communities. They certainly provide a counterpoint to the Pacific-centered discourses that echo and sometimes explicitly draw on Albert Wendt’s and Epeli Hau’ofa’s visionary framings of an Oceania whose insistently regional focus allows little room to problematize the relationships between Indigenous and immigrant Pacific peoples in particular spaces.

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Somerville’s willingness to engage the “disjunctures” and “rather embarrassing genealogies of suspicion, derision, and competition between our communities” is important and ground-breaking in viewing Indigenous Pacific Islanders as having complicated relationships between themselves, which are also structured by racism and colonialism. As she notes herself, “Whereas the verticality of Indigenous relationships with non-Indigenous communities is widely explored, horizontal modes of Indigenous-Indigenous connection have enjoyed far less critical consideration.” 564 This is a key oversight especially because the kinds of recognition (or lack thereof) that take place between Indigenous Pacific Islanders as well as between Indigenous Pacific Islanders and other Indigenous peoples can be just as or more important than recognition conferred by nation-states or international bodies like the UN (even as these various types of recognition often influence one another). A major argument of Once Were Pacific is in fact: “that Māori and Pasifika communities are drawn into the logic of New Zealand-specific prejudices as long as they insist that their primary relationship is with the New Zealand nation-state.” 565 Thus Somerville asks that Māori and Pasifika communities be reframed in such a way that we can better pinpoint how “the European gaze” is reproduced by Māori and Pasifika peoples in how they talk about each other, thus producing “spaces where its power is decentered.” 566

Following Somerville’s example, I find it crucial to examine how Native Hawaiians relate to the many other identities that often encompass them—in order not only to show the spaces in which Native Hawaiians have been recognized and defined in

564 Ibid., xxvii.
565 Ibid., xxiii.
566 Ibid., xxviii.
ways that erase their indigeneity and specificity but also to consider in what spaces of Indigenous connection might the American and European gaze be productively decentered, and the logic of possession through whiteness disrupted, for Native Hawaiians as well as other Indigenous peoples. The main types of connections and identities relevant to Native Hawaiians I explore below are: first, Polynesian and Pacific Islander; second, Indigenous and Non-Self-Governing (terms used in international Indigenous human rights); and finally, Native American and the contemporary First Nations-led Indigenous movement Idle No More. Possible in each relationship is the regeneration of Indigenous-Indigenous recognition and, thereby, new understandings of self-recognition. Native Hawaiians, for example, through forging relationships with Māori and others affirm their identities as Polynesians and Indigenous Pacific Islanders. Each of these complex relationships deserve much more critical attention, yet for the scope of this project, I focus on the tensions and possibilities in using these relationships to break out of the settler colonial frame and its long-enduring possession of Native Hawaiian identity and recognition through whiteness. Overall, I point towards the need for greater critical engagement of these relationships, rather than presuming that strong connections and similarities inherently exist among any of these identities and movements.

4.2.1: Polynesian / Pacific / Pacific Islander

As historically articulated, the divisions between Polynesians, Melanesians and Micronesians have had a lasting impact. As I have argued in Chapter 1, the Polynesian Problem literature contributed to these divisions by insisting on Polynesians’ inherent,
ancestral whiteness in stark contrast to the darkness of Melanesians and to a lesser extent Micronesians. *Once Were Pacific* examines these divisions as evident in a variety of historical and contemporary sources. Noting, for example, the tendency of some Polynesians to disdain Indigenous people from Papua New Guinea as cannibals, and as more primitive and savage, Somerville argues that “For Māori to be Pacific, then, we first need to rethink our exposure to, and participation in, years of racism that has been directed towards Indigenous people from around the Pacific.” However, she also points to many ways that Māori and Pasifika alliances have attempted to overcome this racism and develop identities that transgress and reshape the traditional Polynesian, Melanesian, and Micronesian boundaries. For example, she examines the creation of the “neologism *Nesian*” by the New Zealand band Nesian Mystik. She argues “Nesian” identity “extricates the “island” (-nesian) root from the Western-imposed cartographic and anthropological prefixes (poly-, micro-, and mela-), echoing Hau‘ofa’s reframing of the (colonially imagined) Pacific as the (Indigenously imagined) Oceania.” Thus, “Nesian people are situated within the boundaries of one nation-state or city or neighborhood, yes, but they participate in the complexity, border crossing, linguistic differences, political positionings, and cultural nuances of the wider Pacific region.” She acknowledges too that these connections can be awkward and vulnerable, at times existing in a “space between anxiety and confidence,” given the multiple colonial histories and positionings

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567 Ibid., 66.  
568 Ibid., 112.  
569 Ibid.
of “Nesians,” but that they are nonetheless productive, especially in providing forms of recognition beyond the nation-state.\textsuperscript{570}

Similar to the position of Māori relative to Pasifika communities, Native Hawaiians also are at times considered (and consider themselves) separate from other Indigenous Pacific Islanders, given the status of Hawaiʻi as a formal part of the United States and given the history of viewing Native Hawaiian culture and identity as particularly devastated by U.S. settler colonialism. Thus Native Hawaiians have occasionally been viewed particularly negatively—as a people who have been culturally bankrupt by their forced inclusion and assimilation into the U.S.—by other Indigenous Pacific Islanders, as Somerville notes, for example, in the case of a famous Māori anthropologist, Te Rangihiroa (Peter Buck), who resided in Hawaiʻi and directed the Bishop Museum for many years.\textsuperscript{571} However, such views can be changed, Somerville argues, through “lived, negotiated, ongoing, and specific interaction between Māori and the Pacific,” as:

Te Rangihiroa’s ideas about the Pacific changed over his lifetime. When he first went to Hawaiʻi, he was disparaging toward the Hawaiian people, whom he considered to be extremely compromised and whose cultural legacy he believed to have already passed. After two decades living on Oʻahu, he had shifted in his thinking so that his last book, a mammoth undertaking, was about Hawaiian arts and crafts.\ldots\ [This] points to the possibility of genuine negotiation in the relationship between Māori and the Pacific.\textsuperscript{572}

To date, very few Native Hawaiian scholars or activists have centrally addressed these tensions and negotiations between Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders.

What might it open up for Native Hawaiian activism and scholarship if the relationships

\textsuperscript{570} Ibid., 120.
\textsuperscript{571} Ibid., 12–18.
\textsuperscript{572} Ibid., 34–35.
between Native Hawaiians and other Indigenous Pacific Islanders in Hawai‘i and elsewhere were foregrounded, instead of or in addition to relationships with Asian and haole settlers? Should Indigenous Pacific Islanders living in Hawai‘i be considered settlers, or migrants who are genealogically tied to Native Hawaiians and Hawai‘i as an island in the Pacific? So too, are Native Hawaiians who live in other parts of the Pacific settlers or migrants, or is another vocabulary needed to explain these complex positions in a responsible way? Certainly other Indigenous Pacific Islander communities in Hawai‘i receive almost no recognition in discussions of Hawai‘i’s famously diverse “racially mixed” population. This lack of recognition is at times embarrassingly perpetuated by Native Hawaiians themselves. For example, Native Hawaiian scholar Kealani Cook has written about the tendency of some Native Hawaiians to understand the Micronesian navigator Mau Pialug, whose knowledge informed and inspired the revitalization of Kanaka Maoli voyaging, as not Micronesian but as an ancestral Hawaiian. Cook writes: “Hawaiians revere Mau, but unfortunately many do so because they see him not so much as what a modern Islander can be, but what ancient Hawaiians were. It is not that far a conceptual leap between praising Mau as a cherished remnant of the Hawaiian past and denigrating Marshallese immigrants as primitive and ignorant.”573 As Somerville points out, however, this does not mean for Cook that “genuine Pacific-Pacific engagement is impossible or foreclosed,” but that, as Cook elaborates, “in these contemporary efforts to reconnect, we must be aware of how the discourses we are

engaging in have been shaped by history, and make conscious choices about how we use and reshape them.”

One other exception to the tendency of Native Hawaiians to erase or foreclose genuine connections with other Pacific Islanders is found in the scholarship of Ty Kāwika Tengan. Tengan writes about the importance of Native Hawaiian-Māori interaction in solidifying Native Hawaiians’ self-recognition as Indigenous peoples of the Pacific. Perhaps precisely because Native Hawaiian cultural traditions have at times been seen as devastated and lost beyond repair, Tengan’s work shows how meaningful and productive connecting with Māori people and practices can be for Native Hawaiians. As with the example given by Cook regarding the Native Hawaiian emulation of Micronesian navigator Mau Piailug above, such trans-Pacific connections seem especially regenerative for Native Hawaiian masculinities (suggesting at the very least that more scholarship on female Pacific connections is needed). Describing his participation in a Native Hawaiian men’s organization, Hale Mua, Tengan notes “the direct influence of Māori modes of resistance and aggressive cultural assertion on the ways that Kānaka Maoli have launched anticolonial projects.” This Māori influence is especially true of what Tengan calls the “remasculinization of culture” and the adoption of “warrior” masculinity in the face of the feminization of Hawai‘i.

Thus, an important event for Hale Mua was a cultural exchange trip to Aotearoa, in which the men performed Hawaiian chants and dance while connecting with Māori communities. To Tengan, the trip recognized “our shared Oceanic genealogies” as in

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574 Ibid.
576 Ibid.
Native Hawaiian epistemologies, “ʻōiwi Maoli are considered the elder brothers to the Māori.” In this configuration, there is a possibility that viewing Māori as younger brothers could be patronizing and hierarchical relationship, replaying some of the problems with viewing Mau Piailug as an ancient Hawaiian rather than modern Micronesian. However, Tengan’s ethnography examines the careful and in-depth preparation the Hale Mua men underwent before their trip—studying and practicing performances for a year before traveling to Aotearoa—and it is clear that the substance of their connections, if awkward at times, were not structured in such a way that Native Hawaiians looked down on Māori. In fact, Native Hawaiians looked up to, sought and received validation from Māori. As Peter Vanderpoel, one of the Hale Mua participants told Tengan: “That's what we went there for. Go see our kūpuna. And the way that it turned out was, the validation that we had on virtually everything we did was unbelievable. The feedback that we got was that we were the most solid Hawaiian group that's gone down there, especially a Hawaiian masculine group that's gone down there. So, wow, I mean mission accomplished I guess.” Tengan thus views the “Māori feedback” to Hale Mua’s performances as one important “discursive practice” through which “we come to know who we are and claim some semblance of (co)authorship in our lives as Hawaiian men.” Tengan thus concludes:

Whatever the trajectories of individuals, our communities clearly had affirmed ancient connections and established new ones that would serve as the basis for future communion. Despite the efforts of nation-states to take them away, our shores will continue to be sites in which we welcome our kin and fight our invaders.

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577 Ibid., 203.
578 Ibid., 216.
579 Ibid.
580 Ibid., 213.
All of this discussion about the relationships that have been built, and the relationships that may still need to be regenerated, amongst Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders further suggests a productive reframing of the label Pacific Islander within the U.S. context. So often, Native Hawaiians are identified within the Pacific Islander category in U.S. demographic data, and this category is often lumped together with Asian and Asian Americans. While recent activism has focused on disaggregating Pacific Islander from the Asian Pacific Islander category, given the significant differences between Indigenous peoples of the Pacific and Asian immigrants to the U.S., Somerville, Cook, and Tengan’s work suggests that more thought might need to be given to the substance and diversity of the Pacific Islander category in its own right. In other words, what are the connections Pacific Islanders have made and might make between themselves when not framed solely by the U.S. demographic landscape?

4.2.2: Indigenous / Non-Self-Governing Territory

Indigenous Pacific Islanders do importantly connect to other global Indigenous peoples, and the activism of Indigenous peoples at the United Nations has been one site of these connections. The UN General Assembly adopted the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereafter DRIP or the Declaration) in September of 2007. It is the product of decades of work and advocacy by Indigenous leaders from around the world—notably including Native Hawaiian leader and lawyer Mililani Trask. Significantly, at the date of its adoption, four settler colonial countries voted against the

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581 See, for example: Vicente M. Diaz, “‘To “P” or Not to “P”?’: Marking the Territory Between Pacific Islander and Asian American Studies,” *Journal of Asian American Studies* 7, no. 3 (2004): 183–208.
declaration, namely: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. Since then, however, each of these countries have reversed their decisions and officially endorsed the Declaration. The substance of their endorsements largely remains to be seen. Yet, the official endorsement of DRIP by the U.S. noted that President Obama would support the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act (popularly known as the Akaka Bill) as “a process for forming a Native Hawaiian governing entity that would be recognized by, and have a government-to-government relationship with, the United States.”

Unfortunately, this Act is not supported by a large segment of the Native Hawaiian population, who view the legislation as a top-down measure and an extinguishment of rights (especially regarding land) rather than a productive form of legal recognition. I discuss this Act further in the next section, but it is crucial to note from the outset that the Declaration is entangled with the policies of settler nation-states even as it simultaneously attempts to leverage international pressure to make change within nation-states. A good deal of scholarship has begun to grapple with the implications of the Declaration’s passage and what it has and will mean to various indigenous peoples around the world.

I am interested in reviewing here how the UN engages the categories of Indigenous (as used in the DRIP) and Non-Self-Governing (as used in their list of Non-Self-Governing Territories). I question both what kinds of connections are opened or foreclosed amongst

these two identities as well as how these categories reinforce or transform the ideas embedded in foundational texts about human rights as reviewed in Part 1 of this chapter.

One major, and rather remarkable, feature of the Declaration is in fact its refusal to define “Indigenous.” Nowhere in the document is a set of criteria or list of recognized Indigenous peoples listed. This feature was insisted on by Indigenous advocates themselves, who recognized the power of colonial definitions of indigeneity, arguing “that definitions and categorizations have determined indigenous peoples’ lives since first contact with European settlement or other colonizing powers.”585 For some, this lack of definition is viewed with skepticism because of the ability of some nation-states to deny that any Indigenous peoples exist within their borders (this was a discourse repeatedly employed by several African nation-states, Namibia chief among them, for example, during the Declaration’s drafting).586 Yet, the ability of Indigenous peoples themselves to decide the terms of their own identity and indigeneity is undoubtedly necessary to Indigenous self-determination.

Also rather remarkable for a human rights document, the Declaration asserts not only the rights of Indigenous peoples to be treated equally relative to other people, but also their rights to be treated distinctly. The Preamble states the UN General Assembly’s affirmation “that all indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be respected as such.”587 Article 8 further affirms that “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture”

585 Pulitano, Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration, 11.
and that “States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
(A) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities….”588 This recognition of difference rather than universality (e.g., the idea that “we are all Indigenous”) is potentially radical for a human rights document. Indeed, in the Native Hawaiian context, if the U.S. addressed Article 8 alone, this would embody a huge step forward in decolonizing the deep settler colonial history of folding Native Hawaiians into whiteness, and thus into America (and vice versa). For example, recognizing Native Hawaiians’ right to “integrity as distinct peoples” could possibly invalidate lawsuits charging Native Hawaiian institutions like Kamehameha Schools with reverse discrimination against white and Asian American people.

Native Hawaiian scholar kuʻualoha hoʻomanawanui views the Declaration as potentially “just one more piece of paper,” but also a regenerative site within which Native Hawaiian efforts towards decolonization can be amplified.589 Her discussion foregrounds the fact that “Kanaka Maoli have not sat idle waiting for the UN or any other entity to right the injustices done to us on our behalf.”590 Yet, she also characterizes the Declaration as allowing, “for the hopeful imagining of what is possible to further positive political and social transformation for Kanaka ʻŌiwi…. Kanaka Maoli are skeptical but hopeful that our concerns and actions since the overthrow of our nation in 1893 will garner support and recognition at every level.”591

588 Ibid., 4.
589 kuʻualoha hoʻomanawanui, “Contested ground: ʻāina, identity and nationhood in Hawaii,” in Pulitano, Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration, 287.
590 Ibid., 285.
591 Ibid., 287.
Interestingly, hoʻomanawanui notes that there is some dissention about the use of the identity Indigenous among Native Hawaiians. She analyzes Native Hawaiian scholar and activist David Keanu Sai, who acts as Regent of the Hawaiian Kingdom government. Sai has attempted to advocate for Native Hawaiian sovereignty and independence from the U.S. at the World Court of Arbitration (though the Court refused to rule on the case). However, hoʻomanawanui notes:

Sai himself does not see the Declaration as having any impact on the status of Hawaiian rights in the international arena, as he argues that Kanaka Maoli are not indigenous people, rendering the Declaration irrelevant to our political situation. Sai’s position stands apart from other pro-sovereignty advocates, who view Hawaiian claims for sovereignty as originating with, if not exclusively based on, our status as indigenous people. Sai does not view Native Hawaiians as Indigenous because he views the U.S. as illegally occupying Hawaiʻi, and having precipitated the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893. Thus, in this logic, Hawaiʻi was and continues to be a foreign, independent country. By accepting the label of Indigenous, Sai feels Native Hawaiians risk accepting U.S. territorial claims to Hawaiʻi, as well as capitulating that Native Hawaiians are simply a racial and ethnic minority rather than an overthrown nation.

Sai’s cautious approach to Indigenous identity is unusual among Native Hawaiians who have generally embraced the language of indigeneity as it has helped them to distinguish their claims among Hawaiʻi’s so-called “racial mix.” However, his concerns may deserve further consideration, especially given the potentially problematic uses of universality that pervade the DRIP. For example, the Preamble acknowledges that, “all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilizations and cultures,

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592 Ibid.
which constitute the common heritage of humankind.” This language of “common heritage of humankind” risks viewing Indigenous peoples, resources, and lands as a kind of universal possession of all humans, rather than respecting that Indigenous peoples must be recognized as the specific owners or maintainers of Indigenous identities, traditions and lands. Indeed, the discourses of “civilizations and cultures” and “common heritage” overlap with the discourses used in the UNESCO documents examined earlier in this chapter. For example, the scientists writing for UNESCO in the 1950s agreed, as Claude Lévi-Strauss put it in his “Race and History,” pamphlet, that European civilizations were not biologically superior to any other human beings, but that their history was simply more “cumulative,” rather than “stationary.”\textsuperscript{593} Lévi-Strauss thus argued that European civilization simply “improved” on more primitive cultures, writing: “We are still dependent upon the tremendous discoveries which marked the phase we describe, without the slightest exaggeration, as the neolithic revolution: agriculture, stock-rearing, pottery, weaving. In the last eight or ten thousand years, all we have done is to improve all these ‘arts of civilization’.”\textsuperscript{594} The “we” of his writing stands in for universal humanity itself (all of whom have developed from “neolithic” man), yet it is also clearly wedded to the “we” of modern, white Europe.

This is the logic of possession through whiteness, written into the very foundational discourses of human rights, and continuing to haunt human rights even in the 2007 DRIP. And it raises the question: is recognition of Indigenous human rights the same as or divorced from support of Indigenous decolonization? In other words, do

\textsuperscript{593} Claude Lévi-Strauss, “Race and History,” in UNESCO, \textit{The Race Question in Modern Science; Race and Science}, 235.
\textsuperscript{594} Ibid., 243.
Indigenous human rights recognize Indigenous peoples as having a right to be included within a European definition of Man or does the Declaration potentially transform the definition of Man itself? Does the Declaration challenge the very existence of settler colonial nation-states, or does it sanction them?

At this point, it is helpful to consider another site of UN discourse about Indigenous peoples—namely the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, created in 1946. Though the UNESCO documents that praise Hawai‘i’s model of race relations do not mention it, at the time they were written, Hawai‘i was in fact included on this list. As Ka Pakaukau, a coalition of Native Hawaiian sovereignty groups, has noted, the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories was meant to “bring the Colonial world generally within the sphere of international responsibility.”\(^{595}\) Ka Pakaukau suggests that Hawai‘i’s inscription onto the UN list may have been a partial motivation for advocates of Hawai‘i statehood to push statehood legislation through the U.S. Congress, before any further requirements of decolonization could be achieved.\(^{596}\) Thus, in March 1959, the Hawaii Statehood Bill passed in the U.S. Congress. Yet, the U.S. was required, in compliance with the UN Charter, to obtain the approval of the “people of Hawaii” through a plebiscite in order to allow this status change.

This plebiscite, conducted on June 27, 1959, was riddled with problems. The UN did not supervise the plebiscite. The U.S. assumed that the “people of Hawaii” referred to anyone who had been living in Hawai‘i for at least one year. This meant that Native Hawaiians were vastly outnumbered in the vote by white and Asian settlers. Further, the


\(^{596}\) Ibid., 307.
options presented on the plebiscite were limited to the approval of statehood (versus remaining a U.S. territory); independence was not an option. Ka Pakaukau demonstrates that the vote on statehood was thus in flagrant disregard of UN standards, and yet when the U.S. reported to the UN that through becoming a state Hawai‘i had obtained self-governance, the UN accepted this without question, and removed Hawai‘i from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Comparing Hawai‘i to other colonial contexts including Algeria (colonized by France), Angola and Mozambique (both colonized by Portugal)—each of which were inscribed on the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories in the 1950s-70s over their colonizers’ objections—Ka Pakaukau argues:

It is obviously a juridical contradiction of the first order that, even as French and Portuguese colonies were being inscribed on the list of non-self-governing territories over the most vociferous objections of the colonizers, America’s Hawaiian colony should have been removed from it. At the very least, it must be said that the UN defaulted on its responsibility as guarantor of adherence to international standards insofar as it failed to ascertain the relative degree of truth or falsity attending U.S. claims that its plebiscite process in Hawai‘i was an authentic exercise in self-determination. Had it done so, there can be no serious question but that the islands would have remained on the list until such time as a United Nations-supervised procedure was conducted and genuine decolonization achieved.597

Accordingly, Ka Pakaukau argues that reinscription on the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories (which currently includes three U.S. territories: American Samoa, Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands) is the most important first step in achieving decolonization for Native Hawaiians.598

Indeed, the reinscription of Hawai‘i onto the UN’s list was an important motivation for many who participated in the Kaho‘okololo Nui Kanaka Maoli (the

597 Ibid., 308.
598 Ibid., 314–15.
People’s International Tribunal Hawai‘i) convened in 1993, a watershed year for Native Hawaiian activism which commemorated the illegal overthrow of Queen Liliu‘okalani in 1893. This Tribunal, staged in the tradition of People’s Tribunals established by philosopher Bertrand Russell, charged the U.S. with nine serious crimes including “Na Kaomi Ku‘ako‘a,” translated as the “impermissible interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation and people,” and “Ka Pepehi a Ke Ku‘e Na Mea Pono Kanaka Maoli,” or “Acts of genocide and ethnocide against the Kanaka Maoli.” Testimony in demonstration of these crimes was given by Native Hawaiian scholars, activists, and community members on five of Hawai‘i’s main islands, including O‘ahu, Maui, Moloka‘i, Kaua‘i, and Hawai‘i. The judges of the Tribunal were a variety of lawyers and international legal scholars, including Ward Churchill, Sharon Venne, Milner Ball, Hyun Kyung Chung, Richard Falk, Lennox Hinds, Moana Jackson, Asma Khader, and Makoto Oda. In an edited volume that documents the Tribunal, Churchill and Venne note that the tribunal’s findings were not a foregone conclusion:

At the outset, several of those who had agreed to serve as tribunal members were skeptical of at least one of the allegations advanced by the Kānaka Maoli and its able team of volunteer prosecutor/advocates. Prior to the initiation of proceedings, there was even serious discussion—on grounds that such claims might be “frivolous, exaggerated and inflammatory”—of an a priori dismissal of allegations that the United States had visited genocide upon the indigenous Hawaiians. Fortunately, no such course was followed…. Indeed, those jurists who had initially been most opposed to consideration of the genocide charge ended up being among its strongest proponents.

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600 Ibid., 341–356.
601 Ibid., 333.
Thus, the Tribunal did much to contradict “the Big Lie” taught about Indigenous peoples and Native Hawaiians in particular, as prosecutor Glenn Morris (of the Shawnee nation) put it: “We’d all been taught you were all dead too.”

The judges convicted the U.S. on all nine counts. In combination with other high profile protests that year, this Native Hawaiian activism was important in securing the passage through the U.S. Congress of the Apology Resolution, signed by President Clinton in November 1993. This resolution apologized for the U.S.-backed overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893. The findings of the International Tribunal were also submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1996, in hopes of regaining a place for Hawai‘i on the UN’s list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. However, perhaps the most lasting impact of the Tribunal was its continuing power to bolster Native Hawaiian self-recognition and strengthen internal community ties. Haunani-Kay Trask’s account of Tribunal in an interview in the academic journal *Biography* notes that although “informing audiences is not the same as changing the political power imbalance,” the Tribunal produced a significant archive and record for Native Hawaiians themselves:

> It's important that we have a written and filmed record of the Tribunal. Historical memory and retrieval depend on it. I think of my nephew, who is seven. As he grows up, he will see that tape on public access TV, and hear about it from me. And he will know, almost without thinking, that we are a nation occupied by the United States. Unlike my generation, he will not have to rediscover we were once an internationally recognized nation. He is learning that right now! 

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602 Ibid., 671.
Thus, while the Tribunal had a relatively small audience, it was and remains important for Native Hawaiians for the purposes of perpetuating the life of the nation among younger generations (and generations to come). It is an important site of self-recognition, as suggested by Trask’s conviction that the Tribunal footage will instill a strong sense of the Native Hawaiian nation and people for her young nephew. Similarly, her sister Mililani Trask has noted, “The best outcome of the Tribunal was to see the involvement and the impact on our people.”

While Hawai‘i is not, by any means, the only nation unjustly left off of the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, we can see that this category is not equal in UN discourse to the category of Indigenous. The Declaration does not state the right of Indigenous peoples to be completely decolonized and independent from their colonizers. This stems in part from the multiple needs and visions of Indigenous rights among the global Indigenous peoples who were involved in crafting the Declaration. For example, many Indigenous peoples including the Maasai from Africa supported the Declaration in order to gain further rights within their nations rather than separate from them.

Among Native Hawaiians too there are many differing articulations of the proper paths to justice. The organization Ka Lahui Hawai‘i supports a “nation-within-a-nation” model of sovereignty for Native Hawaiians, analogous in many ways to Native American tribal sovereignty (and yet still markedly different from the Akaka Bill for which

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605 Hodgson, “Becoming Indigenous in Africa.”
President Obama has promised support). In contrast, Ka Pakaukau, the primary organizers of the People’s Tribunal, sees complete succession from the U.S. as the main goal. Indeed, the People’s Tribunal asked for nothing less than the indictment of the U.S. for devastating crimes against Native Hawaiians, and framed Kanaka Maoli sovereignty as something to be decided on Kanaka Maoli terms. In fact, the Tribunal listed Kanaka Maoli Law, defined as “embracing sets of convictions about right action and righteousness on political, economic and social relations,” as the first and ultimately most important legal framework within which the U.S. should be tried. Calling the Tribunal “almost prophetic in charting the journey that states will have to make in order to implement the provisions of the Declaration,” Elvira Pulitano suggests that DRIP should uphold that notions of justice must originate “within an indigenous epistemology rather than from Eurocentric concepts of jurisprudence.” However, it remains to be seen whether and how DRIP will function in support of Indigenous decolonization; as a non-binding convention, the UN cannot forcefully sanction violations of DRIP. Thus, it is possible that the Declaration, despite its radical possibilities, could amount to little more than lip service to Indigenous peoples as a kind of “minority rights.” Nonetheless, Indigenous peoples will continue to forge alliances among Indigenous peoples around the world, and I find these connections to be among the most productive results of the DRIP.

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607 Other, secondary, legal frameworks used included international law (and the then Draft Statement on Indigenous Rights), U.S. law, the “law of nations and peoples” (i.e. the tradition of people’s tribunals), and “The Inherent Law of Humanity,” explained as “a higher law based on the search for justice in the relations among persons and peoples and their nations… drawing on the ideas of stewardship… that are especially embodied in the cultures of indigenous peoples.” Ibid., 683–685.
In the next section I consider further Native Hawaiian connections to Native Americans and First Nations peoples of Canada, particularly through the contemporary global Indigenous movement Idle No More.

4.2.3: Native American / Alaska Native / Idle No More

In contrast to Ka Pakaukau's goal of getting Hawai‘i back on the UN's list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, other segments of the Native Hawaiian community advocate the U.S. as the most important sphere within which activism should take place. Organizations like the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement (CNHA) have long advocated for federal recognition of Native Hawaiians, in an analogous manner to the recognition of many Native American tribes. This federal legislation introduced to the U.S. Congress in various forms since 2000 is officially titled the "Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act," but is more popularly known as the Akaka Bill, after the bill's main sponsor, U.S. Senator Daniel Akaka. As Indigenous Studies scholar Jodi Byrd has noted, though originally titled with language referring to recognition, the Akaka Bill's shift towards "reorganization" in 2001 makes explicit that this legislation is designed to better include Native Hawaiians under similar U.S. government structures as Native Americans. However, there are significant differences to what the Akaka Bill would grant Native Hawaiians from the rights of some Native American tribes. Byrd argues that the Akaka Bill "draws upon the policies of the 1930s and not the post-termination policy era of the late twentieth century to incorporate Native Hawaiians further into the structures already established to maintain power over Indian lands and
peoples under the rubric of 'reorganization.' Many Native Hawaiians, including Haunani-Kay Trask, staunchly oppose the Akaka Bill precisely because it does not provide similar land rights as given to certain Native American tribes.

In fact, though not included within the text of the Akaka Bill itself, from the positions of its main Native Hawaiian advocates, CNHA, it is likely that the Bill would reorganize Native Hawaiians in a manner similar to that of Alaska Natives. Many Alaska Native tribes were officially reorganized into corporations, with ownership over oil resources, after the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act in 1971. My Master's thesis critically examined how CNHA would model the results of the Akaka Bill after the Alaska Native case, so that Native Hawaiians (even if not officially reorganized as corporations) would gain a greater share of Hawai‘i's tourism and military economies.

Of course, for many Native Hawaiians, the goal of decolonization is the liberation of Hawai‘i from its dependence on tourism and its occupation by the U.S. military.

While Native Hawaiians have made important connections to Native American and Alaska Native communities, the Akaka Bill illustrates one of the ways in which tension exists between Native Hawaiians, Alaska Natives, and Native Americans, given their various legal positions and histories under U.S. settler colonialism. Byrd is attentive to the ways in which Native Hawaiian opponents of the Akaka Bill have at times espoused both exceptionalism and anti-Indian rhetoric in the course of their critiques.

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610 Haunani-Kay Trask, Pro, Con Articles on Akaka Bill Fail to Address Land Issues, 2004.
Noting the tendency of Native Hawaiian activists to emphasize the "unnatural" inclusion of Hawai‘i within the territory of the U.S. considering its distance of over two thousand miles away from the U.S. continent, she writes:

Sometimes, and understandably, attempts to contextualize U.S. colonization of Hawai‘i through American Indian histories are criticized as yet another form of U.S. hegemonic imperialism that seeks to transform subjects of an independent Hawaiian kingdom into “Native Americans.” Many Hawaiian activists, and especially kingdom sovereignty nationalists, focus on understanding the Hawaiian archipelago as the site of exceptionalism within the trajectory of U.S. empire-building. Hawai‘i is in this view a militarily occupied territory outside the bounds of American control, while American Indian nations are naturalized as wholly belonging to and within the colonizing logics of the United States.  

Byrd thereby points out that basing Native Hawaiian claims to sovereignty on its "exceptional" distance and foreignness to the U.S. (such as "kingdom sovereignty nationalists," presumably including David Keanu Sai as discussed earlier) risks erasing the foundation of the U.S. (continental and otherwise) in settler colonialism. The "continental U.S." occupies Native American territories just as unnaturally as the U.S. occupies Hawai‘i.

Byrd further demonstrates how this naturalizing of Native American colonization allows Native Hawaiians to internalize and perpetuate colonial representations of Native Americans. For example, she analyzes the testimony of Native Hawaiian Anna Reeves in opposition to the Akaka Bill, who characterized the legislation as an attempt to literally replace her Hawaiian blood with Indian blood. Reeves testified, “… I am 100 percent Hawaiian, kanaka maoli. I do not have any other blood, not even Indian. I want the committee to know you are not going to inject Indian in my blood.” Byrd argues:

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612 Byrd, The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism, 149.
Reeves’s resistances to being injected with “Indian blood” diagnoses U.S. imperialism as depending upon a catchable “Indianness” to justify continued colonial occupation of and control over others’ lands and bodies. But what is troublesome to me is that such constructions of Indianness as infection depend upon a series of misrecognitions about federal Indian law and the diverse histories of American Indian nations that in these discussions are both feared and contaminating. 613

Indeed, "Indianness as infection" is a somewhat startling notion as expressed by another Indigenous person, who might be expected to be critical of all forms of settler colonialism. However, Reeves' comment fits with my earlier discussion of the Day v. Apoliona case and the adoption of blood quantum standards by some Native Hawaiians who hope to have Native Hawaianness recognized with the same force of whiteness in law. Like the Day plaintiffs, Reeves also insists on her pure blood quantum: "I am 100 percent Hawaiian... I do not have any other blood." Reeves' reading of the Akaka Bill as a simultaneously legal and biological transformation—injecting "Indian in my blood"—is on the one hand a prescient critique of the ways that the U.S. has long determined the racial categorization of Indigenous peoples according to their own desires to possess Indigenous lands and identities. On the other hand, as Byrd points out, Reeves is interested in preserving Native Hawaiian exceptionalism and racial purity which she sees as clearly superior to Indian contexts, thereby denigrating Indians in such a way that U.S. settler colonial white supremacy is ultimately preserved.

A different and potentially more hopeful example of regenerative Native Hawaiian connections to other Indigenous contexts comes from the ongoing Idle No More movement. Idle No More is a viral Indigenous decolonization movement begun in late 2012 by four (Indigenous and non-Indigenous) women: Sheelah McLean, Nina

613 Ibid., 157.
Wilson, Sylvia McAdam and Jessica Gordon. Originally organized against the C-45 Bill in Canadian Parliament which proposed lowering the threshold of consent by First Nations peoples in regards to the exploitation of natural resources on Indian Reserve Lands, since December 2012, hundreds of protests, teach-ins, round dances, marches, and hunger strikes aligned with Idle No More have been undertaken around the world.

Leeann Simpson, a First Nations writer and scholar, has described Idle No More as resistance to "extractivism”— the colonial "extraction of indigenous knowledge, indigenous women, indigenous peoples," along with natural resources. For her, Indigenous struggles started "at the moment the colonizers stopped seeing us as sovereign nations and started seeing us as an obstacle to lands and resources, obstacles they could legislate out of existence." Thus, Simpson notes:

My hope is that #idlenomore is the first step in building a mass movement of Indigenous nations that will both re-establish our political cultures and reset the relationship we have with Canada. We need to strengthen and in some cases re-create the political cultures that enabled us to negotiate strong international agreements based on our own traditions of treaty making and our own traditions of diplomacy. There are many, many people in Indigenous nations that have been working very hard their whole lives to plant these seeds and nurture these young seedlings.

Articulated in solidarity with First Nations, many other Idle No More events have also sought to highlight local Indigenous struggles. In Hawai‘i, a protest held at the State Capital on January 16, 2013—the opening day of the Hawai‘i State Legislature and a day

617 Ibid.
before the 120th anniversary of the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom—was organized by a group called "Idle No More Hawaii‘i" with the title: "We the People Rally." The protest was focused foremost on the issue of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), in specific reference to the corporation Monsanto, who has large land holdings in Hawai‘i, as well as researchers at the University of Hawai‘i who had proposed patenting genetically modified forms of kalo/taro. While the coverage of the event was limited (there seems to have been no newspaper coverage of the event at all), a public television station, ‘Ōiwi, reported on the protest and interviewed several of the participants.

People are shown marching in downtown Honolulu, holding signs with slogans such as "Evict Monsanto" and "#IdleNoMore Hawai‘i," pounding poi inside the State Capital, chanting "No GMO," and singing. One attendee, Ānuenue Tui of the charter school Hālau Kū Māna, explains the significance of the event in ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i (Hawaiian language): "If we remain idle, we will have no nation. But if we continue to stand up and be strong, our nation will be held tightly together as a rope" [as translated by ‘Ōiwi].

Given the lack of news coverage of the event, it is hard to determine how much connection the protest in Hawai‘i actually had to the First Nations Idle No More events in Canada. However, it is clear that use of the #IdleNoMore name and its rhetoric were significant to the event organizers and attendees. Idle No More activist Leanne Simpson has also spoken about the importance of food sovereignty to First Nations peoples, posing that, "The alternative to extractivism is deep reciprocity. It’s respect, it’s relationship, it’s

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618 See also: Imada, Aloha America, 262.
620 Ibid.
responsibility, and it’s local.” Like the Native Hawaiian activists at the Idle No More event in Hawai‘i who were reclaiming kalo as sacred and a part of their daily lives rather than a neutral, non-culturally-specific food free to be genetically modified, patented or extracted, Simpson emphasizes a shift from consumption to local production of food. She notes, "my ancestors, they weren’t consumers. They were producers and they made everything…. When you have really localized food systems and localized political systems, people have to be engaged in a higher level— not just consuming it, but producing it and making it.” Thus, Idle No More Hawai‘i’s focus on GMO issues are potentially amplifying similar issues that concern First Nations peoples, and could be the basis of further collaboration between them in the future.

Simpson further explains that her vision of Idle No More and decolonization is a process of regeneration of life and relationships:

Winona [LaDuke] took a concept that’s very fundamental to Anishinaabeg society, called *mino bimaadiziwin*. It often gets translated as “the good life,” but the deeper kind of cultural, conceptual meaning is something that she really brought into my mind, and she translated it as “continuous rebirth.” So, the purpose of life then is this continuous rebirth, it’s to promote more life.

It was the quality of their relationships— not how much they had, not how much they consumed— that was the basis of my ancestors’ happiness.

So in Anishinaabeg philosophy, if you have a dream, if you have a vision, you share that with your community, and then you have a responsibility for bringing that dream forth, or that vision forth into a reality. That’s the process of regeneration. That’s the process of bringing forth more life— getting the seed and planting and nurturing it. It can be a physical seed, it can be a child, or it can be an idea. But if you’re not continually engaged in that process then it doesn’t happen.  

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621 Klein, “Dancing the World into Being.”
622 Ibid.
623 Ibid.
Simpson's vision is thus in close affinity with my own framework of regeneration, as well as Somerville's insistence on the need to attend to relationships amongst Indigenous peoples rather than depend on relationships with nation-states.

Overall, this chapter has argued that the use of Hawai‘i as an international model for race relations, as formulated in 1950s human rights scientific discourse, consolidated an anti-racist rhetoric that at the same time naturalized and even valorized settler colonialism, through the deployment of the logic of possession through whiteness. This was particularly clear in positive social scientific assessments of mixed race populations, and the eagerness with which scientists included mixed race individuals as (at least potentially) white and assimilable. Though characteristically white physical traits are genetically recessive, social scientists argued that Polynesians and Native Hawaiians were literally turning white through racial mixture, building on ancestral whiteness that was latent in their genes. Such assessments of racial mixture attributed productivity to white settler men, often entirely erasing the presence of Native Hawaiian and other Polynesian women. In light of this history, I have argued that human rights and international Indigenous rights discourses must be critically assessed, as even the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples does not guarantee decolonization. Thus, pursuing human rights at the UN level should perhaps be understood as only one important site of relationship building among Indigenous peoples, rather than a forum through which Native Hawaiians will achieve national or international recognition of their sovereignty. Similarly, Native Hawaiian connections to other Polynesians, Pacific Islanders, Native Americans, and activists in the Idle No More movement, hold much potential for collaborative forms of regeneration if they can be grounded not only in
utopic trans-Indigenous visions but also in deep engagements with the ways our own communities can buy into the logic of possession through whiteness in ways that simply push settler colonialism off into someone else's backyard.
CONCLUSION

He was writing a book about them, with the ink she made….

Of course, he missed everything. Everything that might have made him notice that she was alive and would stop making the ink and run away, even kill her children, probably kill him too. Even with his professional method (1. Defining what counts as evidence. 2. Collecting evidence. 3. Generalizing from specifics. 4. Drawing conclusions.), even with all his documentation and will to find the errors… he misread all the signs and could only count as evidence what occurred within his very limited field of vision. *Number my teeth. I thought he was a fool. And the questions he asked was the biggest foolishness of all.* A problem of perspective, he thought, and so he returned to claim his data, his story, his property. But it was too late, she ran out of his book (and his clutches) and landed in a different one—more caring, more careful, more able to understand that it was inevitable that she would stop making the ink and run away, even kill her children, probably kill him too.

(Avery Gordon on Toni Morrison's *Beloved*, in *Ghostly Matters*)

This dissertation began with the question: how does knowledge act as an agent of possession? Each chapter has offered provisional, by no means definitive, answers to these questions in relation to specific forms of possession—the figures of the ancestrally white Polynesian, the Part Hawaiian (a "biologically superior" specimen to the pure Hawaiian), the hybrid Hawaiian girl, and the genetically mixed Polynesian, whose full acceptance in Hawai‘i seemed to provide a model of racial harmony to the world. Each of these figures, created in specific periods and in different scientific disciplines, are intimately related iterations of the "almost white" Polynesian race. This ideal of the almost white Polynesian race as continually deployed in the juridical and ideological apparatuses of settler colonialism in the Pacific has produced Native Hawaiians and others as the natural relatives (or, perhaps more specifically, the potential wives) of
European and American men. Filtered into tricky realms as diverse as blood quantum legislation defining "native Hawaiians" against "Native Hawaiians" and contemporary identity politics of the mixed race designations "hapa" and "Hapa," the logic of possession through whiteness has thus profoundly disfigured how Polynesians are recognized and, indeed, how we (including myself as a Native Hawaiian) come to recognize ourselves and each other.

Tracing the "ideological half-lives" of the logic of possession through whiteness as created in science, this dissertation has argued, following Denise Ferreira da Silva, that we should not too quickly dismiss the ways that racial power continues to operate through the productive and engulfing strategies of scientific knowledge. Past "racial science," as it is often described, cannot so easily be bracketed out of the history of science or the history of race. Though "racial type" is a term usually limited to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century "racial sciences," we can see that the "almost white" Polynesian racial type has long exceeded the boundaries (and, in some cases, such as Aryanism and eugenics, even survived the demise) of the disciplines it was created within. As Silva argues, the "racial type" was an effective strategy of engulfment—that power/knowledge which "swallows, (trans)forms, without destroying"—not despite the fact that "racial type" described an abstract ideal rather than an actually existing "race," but precisely because of it. 624

In other words, few if any Native Hawaiians or Polynesians would actually be able to secure the privileges of whiteness through embodying the almost white Polynesian type. Even those who were interpellated as almost white, such as the models...

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of the *Hawaiian Types* art book, would become exotic possessions of whiteness rather than gaining a secure power to identify as white themselves. Indeed, it was precisely the slight slip of representation—the "almost white," but not quite—that the apparatuses of settler colonialism would point to explain its apparently beneficent task: to help Polynesians realize their latent, deferred (but on the cusp), future whiteness.

Though the social sciences of anthropology and sociology since the mid-twentieth century have encouraged us to replace the ruling signifier of "the racial" with "the cultural," Silva's work urges us to see how the analytics of raciality remain embedded in modern onto-epistemology. Thus, it should not surprise us that the ancestrally white Polynesian of nineteenth century ethnology reappears in contemporary genomic mappings of the human race and the "Hawaiian genome." The Part Hawaiian, set on a different trajectory into modernity by the likes of Louis Sullivan, is excised again by contemporary "native Hawaiian" men in *Day v. Apoliona*, who defend blood quantum legislation in the interest of stemming the "dilution" of their social and political claims. The hybrid Hawaiian girl pin-up hung on the wall of a Navyman's room haunts the stark, white margins of contemporary visions of mixed-race, "Hapa" Asian Americans. And the socially accepted, mixed-race Polynesian, one of the great hopes of UNESCO-affiliated social scientists after World War II, writes a teleology along which some indigenous Pacific Islanders misrecognize other indigenous Pacific Islanders as their more primitive ancestors. "Racial science" haunts us. As William Faulkner reminds us, the past it isn’t dead; it’s not even past. Instead of dismissing the haunting as a specter of anachronistic racism, we had better, as Avery Gordon suggests, reckon with the ghost, who is announcing that there is something to be done in the here and now.
This leads us to the second question this dissertation has posed: can possessive knowledge be refused, un-thought—and if so, how? Each of my chapters has offered tangled, provisional answers to this question, culminating, perhaps, only in more questions. I have surveyed a wide variety of what I framed as regenerative Native Hawaiian responses to the logic of possession through whiteness. Overall, my examples of regeneration have shown that our own desires for decolonization cannot be easily disentangled from the possessive and ascendant logic of whiteness constantly deployed under settler colonialism. Indeed, in my analyses of regeneration, I have swept my readers across a vast terrain, perhaps without giving them time to carefully examine and climb each mountain. The Hawaiian Civic Clubs, the Native Hawaiian Intellectual Property Rights Conference, the Day plaintiffs, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs defendants, those who identify as "Hapa," those who identify as "hapa," the Native Hawaiians connecting to Māori in Aotearoa as relatives, the Native Hawaiians denigrating Micronesian and Melanesian migrants to Hawai‘i, the Akaka Bill protestors refusing to be injected with "Native American blood" and those marching for Hawai‘i Idle No More: each of these actors and actions deserve much more analytical attention and care than I have been able to give them here. None of these actors or actions are commensurable, and, either individually or taken as a whole, these cannot stand as comprehensively representative of all Native Hawaiians, much less all Polynesians.

What I have hoped to show in surveying these regenerative actions is simply what Avery Gordon describes as complex personhood. Thus, this has been about "conferring the respect on others that comes from presuming that life and people's lives are
simultaneously straightforward and full of enormously subtle meaning. Following Gordon in attempting to find ways to refuse and un-think possessive knowledge has led me to, as she suggests, "move within and between furniture without memories and Racism and Capitalism" as legitimate answers to "why dreams die" because "everything of significance happens there among the inert furniture and the monumental social architecture." Similarly, this dissertation has attempted to move between things like the "dilution claim" of the Day plaintiffs or the terrible, funny familiarity of the Honolulu Airport's lei stand (after artist Adrienne Pao's example discussed in Chapter 3) and the overarching theories of Settler Colonialism and Raciality. In engaging in this movement, perhaps only one thing is for sure: there is no "right" way to respond to being possessed by the social architecture of settler colonial whiteness. Nor is there anyone to call. We must be our own ghost busters, and innovate complex techniques of reckoning, precisely because we are often at once both the ghosts and the haunted.

Regeneration, to recall my definition of it in the introduction, is not power/knowledge's opposite but its haunting. It is a refusal to let the invisible lines undergirding the order of things established by scientific texts go unnoticed. Thus, regeneration is evident as much in the Paoakalani Declaration's insistence (counter to genomic mappings of humanity) that human beings are the younger siblings of the land as it is in the Day plaintiffs picking up the mantle of the (scientifically created) almost white Polynesian and, in their (legally established) Native Hawaiian purity, claiming a kind of equivalence to whiteness. Regenerative responses to the logic of possession

626 Ibid., 3-4.
through whiteness therefore allow us to reveal that both science and whiteness (including but not reducible to white people) are inextricable parts of the story of settler colonialism in the Pacific, even or especially when science and whiteness (such as in the Hawaiian Genome Project's projected financial and medical benefits or the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' denial of the Day plaintiffs' "exclusionary" claims) present themselves as settler colonialism's solution.

Can those of us working within the academy really regenerate or haunt power/knowledge, even as we work to produce it? At the very least, we must remember that we are part of the stories we research and tell. As noted in the epigraph above, in Toni Morrison's *Beloved*, a slave master is writing a scientific study about his slaves, using, as Avery Gordon reminds us, the ink his slave Sethe made. As Gordon points out, "Of course, he missed everything. Everything that might have made him notice that she was alive and would stop making the ink and run away, even kill her children, probably kill him too."627 The master, for all his scientific methods, could not anticipate that his scientific object could run away—indeed, that in being tasked with making the ink for the scientific obliteration of her own humanity (in addition to the already-achieved legal obliteration of her humanity), that running away, killing her children, killing him would all be logical, urgent, necessary choices. As Gordon notes, Toni Morrison's feat in *Beloved* (like Jean Rhys' feat of rewriting in *Wide Sargasso Sea* the character of Bertha from *Jane Eyre*) is not only anticipating Sethe's actions but providing them a home in a "more caring, more careful" book than the master's, a book that understood her actions as inevitable. In other words, Morrison rewrites Sethe's story as one in which we are all

627 Ibid., 186.
accountable to the real-life story of Margaret Garner, a woman who escaped slavery and then chose to kill her child rather than have her re-captured into slavery. Morrison does not let us turn away from or blame or change Margaret Garner's actions because, as Gordon puts it, "we are in this story, even if we do not want to be there."  

Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang provide another way of recognizing that we are all in the story of settler colonialism, even if we do not want to be there. They write that decolonization requires not reconciliation, which is "about rescuing settler normalcy" and "rescuing a settler future," but an "ethic of incommensurability" in which we are "accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity." Thus, "Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an 'and'. It is an elsewhere." Their arguments resonate with the theory of change I have based this project on—that, as stated by Avery Gordon and discussed in the introduction, "We need to know where we live in order to imagine living elsewhere. We need to imagine living elsewhere before we can live there."

This dissertation has found that where we live, though often seemingly pacific on the surface, is profoundly chaotic and pained. When I began this project, I may have imagined that my work would provide specific critiques of damaging scientific practices that have impacted Native Hawaiians, and generate suggestions for correcting such practices, especially in contemporary scientific disciplines like genomics. Yet along the way, the power/knowledge I tracked revealed violence that may have originated in

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628 Ibid., 188.
629 Tuck and Yang, "Decolonization is not a metaphor," 35.
630 Ibid., 36.
631 Gordon, Ghostly Matters, 5.
historical scientific laboratories but reverberate far beyond the time and place of its creation. The logics created by taxonomies of racial types, from a historical "racial science" so easily dismissed today, are still alive in the ways Native Hawaiians and Polynesians are (legally, scientifically, popularly) recognized and recognize themselves and each other today. Thus, I have reached no answer as to how damaging scientific practices might be reconciled or reformed. Yet I believe it matters that we know such reconciliation might not be possible or desirable. Rather than viewing this inability to reconcile as hopeless, we might follow Tuck and Yang in setting aside such questions, at least at times. For whatever we decide to do about this possessive haunting, in science, law, culture, and critical scholarship, we must not only anticipate being unsettled, but understand, like Toni Morrison, caringly and carefully, that this unsettling is inevitable.
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