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Discourse Coalitions in Land Use Politics: Building Managed Growth and Laissez-faire Policy Regimes in California Counties

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Discourse Coalitions in Land Use Politics: BuildingManaged Growth and Laissez-faire Policy Regimes in California Counties

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Sociology

by

Christopher R. Drue

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2015
The Dissertation of Christopher R. Drue is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2015
Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to the beat reporters who covered local California politics between 1980 and 2015. The histories told in this manuscript were assembled from news stories written by reporters who faithfully endured the tedium of weekly board meeting and decade-long political struggles. While digging through the archives of California newspapers, I watched as journalists were initiated with their first assignments, developed extensive local knowledge about their communities, and sometimes became vocal leaders on the opinion pages. I learned their names, their colleagues, and their politics. Perhaps because my parents are journalists and my father covered rural land use politics for three decades, I experienced a sense of comradeship with these reporters. At the least, I owe them this dedication.
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Abstract of the Dissertation

Discourse Coalitions in Land Use Politics: Building Managed Growth and Laissez-faire Policy Regimes in California Counties

by

Christopher R. Drue

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

University of California, San Diego, 2015

Professor Isaac Martin, Chair

A significant body of literature addresses the question of why environmentalists and residents in some places oust the growth machine to pursue managed growth policies and preserve rural land and open space. In this literature, scholars disagree about the proper measurement of growth policy, the conditions that lead to the adoption of growth policy, and the process through which those conditions are channeled into political action. My dissertation addresses these three questions using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and discourse analysis to investigate California county growth policy.

Which outcomes are worthy of study? Land use policies are particularly susceptible to symbolic or ineffective policy regulation, and yet most studies of land use
ignore this problem by treating land use policies as count-level data, obscuring meaningful differences among policies. I resolve the problem by constructing the dependent variable as a “land use policy regime,” better reflecting both the target of managed growth advocates in California and the possibility of significant preservation through local regulation. **Which conditions favor coalitions capable of implementing managed growth policies?** By using QCA to analyze the conditions that cause land use policy regimes, I demonstrate that managed growth policy regimes can be parsed to three causal pathways. The important conditions involve membership in the set of urban counties, affluent counties, educated counties, and the counties with majority preference for environmental regulation. I present seven case studies to support this claim. **How are the conditions for conservation translated into actionable politics?** To answer this question, I used discourse analysis to study policy contests in three counties, each which struggled to implement what urban planners call “smart growth” when they updated their general plans. I argue that the place character (or the cultural characteristics) of a community generates a discursive opportunity structure which privileges certain categories of discourse, allowing either pro-growth or managed growth coalitions to frame their claims in ways that successfully mobilize the largest coalitions. Pro-growth coalitions win political struggles when developer groups are able to draw farmers, foresters, and property owners into their coalition using economic discourse. Managed growth coalitions win these political struggles when environmental organizations draw these same constituencies into a managed growth coalition using ecological discourse. This discourse coalition model provides the mechanism that links the conditions for conservation (including community character) to the political outcomes of concern.
Chapter 1 – Introducing Land Use Politics

Halting the Growth Machine in Bolinas Lagoon

What leads some places to implement managed growth policy regimes while other places are paved over by free-market forces? The question is simple, and I begin with a deceptively simple answer which I tell in the form of an anecdote from Marin County, one of the earliest and most storied managed growth victories in California history. The tale begins late one night in January, 1967, when Martin Griffin was woken by an urgent phone call from Greg Hewlett, who had been eavesdropping on the Harbor District’s planning meeting at Smiley’s Saloon in Bolinas. Hewlett revealed that the Harbor District was moving to seize Bolinas Lagoon at fair market value to develop it with a marina, hotels, a shopping center, more residents, and even a helipad. Hewlett feared his rural neighborhood would soon change forever. He called Griffin because Griffin was the president of the Audubon Society, which leased a parcel in the estuary where the common egret roosted. (Griffin, 1998)

Bolinas Lagoon is less than twenty miles from the Golden Gate Bridge and the overheated San Francisco housing market, and was primed for development by the mid twentieth-century. But the Lagoon was especially dear to Griffin; as a boy scout he had camped in the canyons along its inland edge and learned to appreciate the lush and rugged coastline. Fortunately, he was a doctor of good standing in the community and had a many resources at his disposal. One such resource was his friendship to high society woman Caroline Livermore, who had established the Marin Conservation League
a decade earlier. Under her advice, Griffin “flashed the cash.” He arranged in secret to immediately purchase tiny Kent Island in the middle of the condemned estuary, with a small down-payment and a promise for $85,000 more, which he assumed he could raise from his connections. (Griffin, 1998)

Bolinas Lagoon and Kent Island, however, was still just days away from being condemned, and the Audubon Society could raise a commotion, but they could not stop the Harbor District from seizing the land without extraordinary measures. With the title to the property at hand, Griffin conferred with other Audubon Society board members and made a clever and ultimately fortuitous decision. He arranged an urgent personal meeting with County Board of Supervisor Chair Kettenhofen at his house. He told him he wanted to deed the island to the county as a park. Kettenhofen knew of the Harbor District’s plan, and he and the Board favored growth. But he was running for reelection, and knew the park would double the county holdings and boost his resume. The next day he convinced the rest of the Supervisors to accept the gift. When the Harbor District Board and their allied developers learned of the maneuver, they were furious. The San Francisco Chronicle breathlessly reported that the Audubon Society had not yet paid for the property that they had given away. Yet the paperwork had been signed and the deal locked-in. A grand jury investigation against Griffin was initiated but ultimately abandoned. By the time the matter was settled, it was evident that an audacious coup had thwarted powerful pro-growth interests. Decades later, Griffin wrote in his memoir, “Today, when I look at the birds […] in their tideflats around pristine Kent Island, a chill goes through me and tears come to my eyes. We came so close to losing it all” (Griffin, 1998, 66).
Marin County is the paradigmatic case of successful land preservation in California. Most of the state grew rapidly through the twentieth century, filling in lagoons, building over hilltops, and clearing forests. The urbanization of southern California famously inspired Molotch (1976) to proclaim that cities were just “growth machines,” organized such that they are inevitably dominated by the landed elite. By contrast, Marty Griffin and many others who followed him would go on to lead Marin County to adopt the strongest conservation policies in the state. In 1972, newly elected environmentalist county supervisors adopted a progressive plan that dramatically slowed growth outside of urban areas. As an example, between 1994 and 2010, just 480 residential housing units were permitted per year, compared to the statewide county average of 3,925. They also protected significant environmental resources. Nearly 10% of locally controlled land is zoned open space and significant conservations measures govern tree removal and development adjacent to streams and bays. (Average residential units permitted compiled from the California Statistical Abstract, available from the California Department of Finance. Table I-6: “Total New Housing Units Authorized by Building Units: 1994-2010.” Open space acreage compiled from Press, 2002, and author’s calculations). While Marin was the first county to implement major protections, Alameda, Santa Cruz, Ventura, and others eventually followed.

The case of Marin County provides plentiful material to illustrate the theories about land use politics that many sociologists take for granted. Why is it that some places consume the landscape as well-tuned growth machines, while other places slow growth and erect protective laws? Scholars in the conflict tradition of the urban growth machine (Molotch, 1976; Logan and Molotch, 1987) have explored several hypotheses. They
argue that pro-growth forces can only be defeated when residents trying to protect their use value are of high socio-economic status (Logan and Molotch, 1987), when environmental organization is strong (Clark and Goetz, 1994), or when or when people care deeply about the environment and develop cultural appreciation for preserving their landscapes (O’Neill, Rudel, and McDermott, 2011).

In the story of Bolinas Lagoon, we see all three of these theoretical processes. The affluent residents of Marin and San Francisco gave Griffin access to the cash that made the deal possible. Griffin himself had the resources to work without compensation for the Audubon Society, and to make personal down-payments on properties when opportunities appeared. More importantly, he raised capital from his affluent patients, as when he instructed his secretary to type “hundreds of fundraising letters” to request their donations (Griffin, 1998, 42). If the county was affluent, it was also well organized. By 1967, several environmental organizations existed, and the local chapter of the Audubon Society had over one thousand paid members. Griffin boasted that their donor list was a “‘Who’s Who’ of San Francisco and Marin County” (42). Griffin was so well-connected he was able to meet in private with the Chair of the Marin County Board of Supervisors. Even the informant in Smiley’s Saloon knew that the Audubon Society existed and that the doctor might take his late night call. Equally present was the cultural support of Marin residents. Griffin had a sense in the early 1960s that the public was coming around to support conservationist policies. The community was forthcoming and supportive. Acquaintances called him with tips, and landowners agreed in secret to sell him property before it reached the market. The Chair of the board of supervisors agreed to accept the park because he knew the public wanted it and he needed the public for reelection. The
Audubon Society was deliberate and strategic in capitalizing on this support as they sought to preserve the coast. They “took the liberty of changing the name ‘common egret’ to the more appropriate Great American Egret” (Griffin, 1998, 44) to make their press releases more appropriately reverential. Not only did environmentalists initially succeed with help from residents who cared about the environment, they fostered this culture thereafter by encouraging residents to speak about local problems using ecological language. The Audubon Society hired a naturalist who spent a career educating the public about interconnected ecological regions. Several training programs were put in place, and Griffin estimated that 20,000 people visited each year. Generations have been raised by classes like “Concept of an Ecosystem,” complete with tours of the San Francisco Bay (Griffin, 1998). These educational efforts have been effective in generating a sense of communal environmental concern, such that as Griffin explained, “a candidate who can’t identify a pickleweed marsh might have trouble getting elected” (1998, 109).

The story of Marin County is telling, but Marin County is exceptional. There is a danger from drawing conclusions from a single case, as I illustrate with the following puzzle.

**What makes Managed Growth Regimes Possible?**

Let us begin with a puzzle about two urban southern Californian counties: San Diego County and Ventura County. San Diego County is at the southernmost portion of the state, contains the city of San Diego, and is a center for military and biotech industries, although it also has a significant agricultural industry. Ventura County has
long been an oil-producing county which contains several cities that are now bedroom communities for Los Angeles County as well as a booming agricultural industry. In the 1980s, both of these counties faced similar policy issues. Each had antiquated laissez-faire zoning throughout the county where rural lands were at high risk of urbanization through expansion, particularly faced with California’s significant and sustained postwar growth boom that had been rapidly transforming rural areas into suburbs. As farmland disappeared, costs rose, and residents angered.

By the 1980s, environmentalists had mounted substantial protests in each county. Yet the outcomes were very different. In San Diego, the most significant victory was a temporary voter restriction on city expansion in a small area, which happened in 1985. All efforts to build a strong managed growth policy regime through the ballot box failed. Significant urbanization has been encouraged throughout the backcountry for decades. Even the recent adoption of a smart growth general plan which was designed to direct growth into urban hubs while preserving open space allowed more than one-half million new residents in rural areas. Ventura County, in the meantime, adopted a sweeping set of growth control policies, the strongest of which were adopted during a 10 year period in the 1990s. Under a series of ballot initiatives which were quite similar to those rejected in San Diego, Ventura’s voters approved urban growth boundaries, one of the strongest forms of growth management in which a boundary is used to demarcate rural and urban lands, for nearly every city and for the county itself, and they reinforced these urban growth boundaries with voter requirements for zoning changes, effectively stripping county supervisors of the power to zone.
Change in farmland, especially in places where soil and climate is exceptional, is an excellent indicator of how that region has done in managing growth. With high property value, farmers hold on to multi-million dollar parcels. In times of need, they sell these parcels to developers when allowed. The figure below considers San Diego and Ventura County farmland as a percentage of the total number of acres in the county. In 1982, both counties were quite similar, with just over 20% in agricultural production. Ventura County held steady through the 1980s and 1990s as the county and cities adopted their protective policies, dipping a little in 2007 to rest at 18%. San Diego County farmland, on the other hand, steadily declined within the same period.

![Graph - Farmland per Acre in San Diego and Ventura County](image)

**Figure 1: Graph - Farmland per Acre in San Diego and Ventura County**

Unfortunately, the lessons from Bolinas Lagoon in Marin County cannot fully explain why these counties took the paths they did. San Diego County and Ventura County have similar socioeconomic status profiles. They both have above average property value and income. San Diego County may have higher average education, but
Ventura County has slightly higher property value. They both have more than the average number of environmental organizations, and, in fact, San Diego’s environmental organizations are much more extensive and better funded than Ventura County’s environmental organizations by all measures. And, finally, the majority of voters in both counties have historically supported the environment when they voted on statewide measures. How can we explain the eventual policy outcomes?

The extant literature does not resolve the issue, identifying at least a dozen variables that may or may not reliably predict managed growth policy. Even the most astute observers have had difficulty making sense of this puzzle. Fulton (2011) once wrote,

> In all the years that former editor Paul Shigley and I tracked ballot-box zoning on these pages, the conclusion we most often came to was mixed bag. It was always hard to know what political events would trigger the nuclear explosion of a ballot measure and harder still to know the effects. Indeed, John Landis, formerly a planning professor at UC Berkeley (now at Penn), once conducted a major research project and came to the conclusion that both the political forces and the policy outcomes were not that different in communities that had imposed growth control via initiative and those that had done so through conventional processes.

Three reasons contribute to our uncertainty about the conditions under which managed growth is likely and the process through which it is achieved. First, even though Warner and Molotch (1995) argue that most land use policies are symbolic, episodic and largely circumvented, scholars have generally analyzed the number of environmental policies (Clark & Goetz, 1994; Glickfeld & Levine, 1992; Opp, Osgood, & Rugeley, 2013), a procedure that conflates symbolic policies with substantial policies. Additionally, scholars often mix cities with counties, or mix jurisdictions from different states (Clark &
Goetz, 1994; Glickfeld & Levine, 1992). Second, when analyzing their samples, scholars have used statistical models that are best suited to discovering probabilistic relationships, and have found modest statistical correlations at best (Clark & Goetz, 1994; Glickfeld & Levine, 1992; Press, 2002). Third, not enough is known about the process through which the conditions for managed growth are translated into managed growth policy, as previous scholarship has offered interesting leads but not yet resolved inconsistencies in the theoretical accounts.

This study addresses these concerns, beginning with the tendencies to conflate effective and symbolic policy and to mix unlike cases. Scholars have long noted that land use policies are particularly susceptible to symbolic policy regulation, where pro-growth advocates construct and implement ineffective regulatory tools, yet most studies of land use ignore this problem by treating land use policies as count data, obscuring meaningful differences. However, not all policies are unsuccessful, as GIS data from Northern California confirms, showing that urban growth boundaries in the region successfully contained development (Nguyen, 2007). I resolve this problem by constructing the dependent variable as a “land use policy regime,” which better reflects both the target sought after by managed growth advocates in California and the possibility of significant preservation through local regulation.

As a consequence of seeing land use policy as policy regimes, this study examines a census of like jurisdictions: the counties of California. While the state has planning guidelines that are among the most progressive in the US (Pallagst, 2007; Zinn, 2004), decisions about development and preservation remain the purview of cities and counties. The data is limited to county-level policy because decisions made at this level control the
fate of most of California’s remaining undeveloped private land. While cities make environmental decisions, their sphere of influence is limited and choices neighboring municipal governments may undermine city choices. Cities in California have fixed boundaries that generally include very little open space. While cities expand by annexing neighboring parcels, they do not generally expand by annexing significant undeveloped acreage, nor do they expand indefinitely. Counties have the greatest capacity to prevent sprawl because they regulate development on most of California’s remaining undeveloped private land. Urban density and quality are certainly important, but more important in the long run is the emergence of new cities and the preservation of intact habitats, and that depends on the policies of the county. For example, the rapid development of Orange County took place through the establishment of twenty new cities in the unincorporated area since 1950 (Olin, 1991), while county policies in similarly-sized Marin County permitted just two new cities during the same time period. The future of California rests in the hands of its counties, not its cities. Restricting the study to California holds state policy constant while allowing me to leverage local differences to test hypotheses about the conditions for conservation policy regimes.

Second, this study employs qualitative comparative analysis, or QCA, to explore whether modest statistical correlations in the extant literature indicate that there are multiple causal pathways to growth and managed growth, which can be obfuscated by probabilistic statistics such as linear regression (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). QCA uses set-theoretic logic that identifies combinations of causal conditions rather than average effects (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012; Ragin, 2008). Set-theoretic logic in the social sciences refers to a procedure of dividing creating a group of categories, or “sets,” identifying a
threshold for membership, and then assuming that we can look at the cross-cutting combinations of membership to better understand the conditions that lead to certain outcomes. While it is possible that just one condition leads to conservation, scholars typically write of the combinatorial effects of multiple conditions, as when preferences, ideology, character, and history come together in a political outcome (Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen, 2000; O’Neill, Rudel, and McDermott, 2011; Walker and Fortmann, 2003). QCA is appropriate to determine whether any of these combinations are necessary or sufficient for a protective policy outcome. Using this method, I demonstrate that managed growth policy regimes can be ascribed to three causal pathways. The important conditions involve membership in the set of urban counties, affluent counties, educated counties, and the counties with majority preference for environmental regulation.

Third, this study investigates the process through which the relevant conditions lead to laissez-fare or managed growth policy regimes. The existing literature gives us a place to begin, but does not resolve the question. Molotch, Freudenburg and Paulsen (2000) compared Ventura County and Santa Barbara County and argued that cultural tradition and the character of a place contribute to land use outcomes. The notion of “place character” stands in for the more intangible collection of individuals who, for the most part, see the world through a collective lens and act accordingly. To say that a place has tradition and character is to say that the people in the community are the sort who see the land around them in a certain way (as productive economic resource or as wildlife sanctuary), and make decisions that reflect these shared cognitions. Molotch and coauthors argue that character is created from the historical legacy of political economy,
while others have added that “ideocultural” migration also contributes to place character formation (Kaufman and Kaliner, 2011). Despite these interesting works, scholars have not yet fully elaborated on how place character leads to political processes. Molotch, Freudenburg and Paulsen suggested that the process was one of “lash-up,” where a series of conditions come together in a sort of lashing to produce a land use result. However, leaving our explanation at “lash-up” fails to fully explain how the growth machine/character model is different from pluralist visions of local politics. In this view, local leaders do what they think people want or ballot measures pass when they have popular support (see Dahl, 1961). Urban growth machine scholars would not agree with the pluralist perspective, and therefore the theory needs a way to articulate the relationship connecting local character (culture), resources and outcomes, and which links these abstract concepts to the actual people who do the work of reproducing social order.

To better connect place character to political outcomes, I turn to another promising but undeveloped lead in the field: an approach in which land use outcomes are the result of coalitions of actors, and coalitions are created by framing arguments to mobilize potentially sympathetic actors. Following Hayer (1989; 2003), I call this the discourse coalition model, because scholars have examined how people talk about land use politics in order to explain why they were successful. To understand how these causal conditions come together in a political process, I use discourse analysis of text from California newspapers. The content of this material was 1) read for historical content and reproduced in case studies which tell the history of California Counties from the participants perspective, and 2) was analyzed using discourse analysis to see how frames
were used over time and in different places. This is the first California study to look systematically at counties and to examine the discursive level of action.

I argue that the preferences of citizens and their socioeconomic conditions provide opportunity or constraint to the primary actors who seek to create laissez-faire or managed growth policy regimes. Under certain conditions, when environmentalists frame their arguments by talking about fragile and interconnected ecosystems, they are able draw together a wide coalition of homeowners, business leaders, and even farmers. Under other conditions, developers, realtors and other growth advocates frame any attempt to regulate the land as an assault on the economic profitability of the community, and on the individual economic rights of the landowning class, building a coalition from these constituencies.

The Stakes of the Contest

Power in local urban contexts is incredibly important because unrestricted rural and urban uses of land has already dramatically altered the natural environment to the point where further actions could have significant consequences for the ecosystem and human health and well-being. If you want to understand local politics, land is a good place to start, because our decisions about land manifest as tactile events in which irrevocable changes are made on a public stage. People can observe the destruction or preservation of land with the naked eye, unlike other environmental problems. Only the densest smog or the thickest oil spills are experienced as viscerally as the coming of the bulldozer. Carbon emissions are important, but we do not see the carbon filling the atmosphere. Land that is lost to urban growth is experienced as lost forever, because the
buildings literally come to replace the open space. Because of the “eventfulness” of land use politics, it inspires political drama, which makes for good opportunities to observe the levers of power.

Historical laissez-faire land use regulation in a capitalist economic system encouraged humans to dramatically transform California. From the establishment of the first seventeenth century Missions in San Diego and Monterey, a small contingent of white Catholics and soldiers joined an estimated 130,000 Native Americans from 60 tribes who had hitherto created a sustainable environment by living on the nuts, seeds, and wildlife that was abundant in the area (Dasmann, 1966). The Spanish colonists quickly impacted the ecology of the region. Life on the frontier was hard, and colonists had powerful incentives to exploit the tallow and timber for sale on global shipping markets. Westerners brought cattle, mules and horses which grazed on lush California plains and ate the same grains and seeds that once fed the native population (Walton, 2001). Native Americans were conscripted for labor and sickened with disease. Their population was decimated by the disruption of the ecological environment which they had cultivated. By the time the Spanish crown had given way to the brief period of Mexican control in the early nineteenth century, dramatic changes had been wrought on the land, but California was still a rural colonial frontier.

With statehood in 1850, came the gold rush, the railroad, and urbanization. In this period, Americans openly advocated for “manifest destiny,” and argued that man had a duty to conquer nature through westward expansion of the American frontier (Brulle, 2000). The California Gold Rush (1848-1855) was deeply profitable for the state, and terribly damaging to the environment. Miners used water to wash away the soil and
reveal the gold within, diverting rivers to blast the mountainsides. Sediment oozed into the valleys below. Perhaps the most lasting consequence of the gold rush was that it attracted 300,000 immigrants, many of whom stayed when the gold ran out. A new state and a new population needed a new railroad, and the first Transcontinental Railroad was finished in 1869, terminating in San Francisco (Dreyfus, 2008). Urbanization swiftly followed, taxing local resources.

The first efforts at preservation in California consisted of top-down directives from elite policy makers acting at the state level (Dreyfus, 2008). The greatest achievement of the era was the creation of the system of state and national parks and forests (Press, 2002) which protected vast regions from urban development. This conservation movement is notable because California elites played a central role in what was a national saga and because they founded the organizational models, the environmental organizations, which play a critical role in contemporary politics. One of the great progressive achievements of the century was the establishment of the US National Forests during Teddy Roosevelt’s presidency. Perhaps the best example of early conservationism is the protection of Yosemite National Park in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. The park is renowned for Yosemite Valley, where sheer batholiths form silver walls and domes that rise more than 4,000 vertical feet over the valley floor. The valley floor itself was legally protected by Abraham Lincoln, who signed the Yosemite Land Grant in 1864. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, a traveler named John Muir arrived. In 1890, a National Park bill was passed by congress, creating Yosemite and Sequoia National Parks. In 1892, Muir, buoyed by this success, created the Sierra Club. Thus, a record of environmental interventions in land was established.
Despite these acts of preservation, city and state organizations were allowed and encouraged to make dramatic changes to the natural landscape in the construction of a water infrastructure to support new urban centers. The construction of the O’Shaughnessy Dam in Hetch Hetchy Valley in northern California (completed in 1923) altered the landscape from Yosemite through the central valley to San Francisco. Similarly, construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct connected a pipeline to the once wet Owens Valley, permanently altering the ecological landscape for hundreds of miles through several counties (Walton, 1993). As Dreyfus (2008) reminds us, both Los Angeles and San Francisco were not sited on abundant resources. These cities were “created by active human intervention and environmental rearrangement” (p. 120)

Since the Second World War, California grew rapidly into the most populous US State. In 2013, more than 38 million people lived in the state, more people than the entire nation of Canada. Yet the urbanization of California has come at a great cost. The most significant consequences include the decline of plant and animal diversity, the loss of prime agricultural land, contribution to global warming, and loss of ecosystem services that support human activities.

California has four completely distinct ecoregions: the Sonoran and Mojave deserts, the coastal Mediterranean scrub and grassland, the forested mountains, and the coastal forests. All of these ecosystems have been dramatically changed by human activity. In the Mediterranean region, native grasses and plant cover form less than one percent of what is found now (Olson and Cox, 2014). In the coastal forest, the *Sequoia sempervirens*, or coast redwood, is a towering species of tree that grows for thousands of years, but only on a narrow strip of the California Coast (Dasmann, 1966, p. 75-80).
Scholars have estimated that approximately 95% of California’s old growth Redwood forests have been logged (Kelly and Braasch, 1990). Of what remains in these ecosystems, many species are found only in California. In fact, the state has more rare plant or animal species than any other U.S. state (California Department of Fish and Game, 2005). California exemplifies a broader pattern whereby urbanization and climate change threaten biodiversity around the world as habitats are erased from the earth (Seto, Güneralp, and Hutyra, 2012).

In addition to the loss of diversity, urbanization has come at the expense of some the highest quality farmland in the world. Since records have been kept, there has been a steady decline of farmland in the state. Even as total acreage has declined, farmers have shifted to less productive soils, permanently ceding high quality land to development. According to the California director of American Farmland Trust, the state lost 400,000 acres of farmland to urbanization between 1990 and 2010. Much of it was the highest quality agricultural land: “Even more troubling, only about nine new residents were accommodated for each acre of California farmland permanently taken out of food production. This is a tragic and unnecessary waste of a resource that is irreplaceable. Unless we do things differently, California will lose at least another million acres of farmland by mid-century” (Thompson Jr., 2013). Figure 1 shows a visual representation of the areas that have sustained the greatest loss of farmland between 1969 and 2007.

Finally, the form of urbanization has not just permanently affected the land, but the atmosphere and weather itself. In the last sixty years Californians filled many of the spaces between cities with interconnected low-density suburbs. This diffuse development prevented the economies of scale necessary for efficient mass transportation, and
consequently automobile traffic pollutes the atmosphere as residents travel between the suburbs where they socialize and work. While the energy uses of urban sprawl account for only a portion of global warming, that portion is significant and extent of the problem warrants serious investigation on all fronts.

Loss of diversity, farmland, and contributions to climate change are among the most well-known and immediate consequences of California’s rapid urbanization, but contemporary ecological science now considers the risk much greater and more diffuse. Scientists are now concerned for the health of the ecological system that maintains life on planet earth, from the gaseous exchanges that maintain our atmosphere, to the watersheds that supply our cities, to the bees that pollinate our crops (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Scholars have mapped the various benefits that the system provides and have begun to make calculations about how much the consequences of continued urbanization will cost humans in lost “ecosystem services” (Costanza, d'Arge, de Groot, Farber, et al., 1997).

It is for all of these reasons that the conflict between laissez-faire land use and environmental action is so intense in California. Readers may know of the Rachel Carson’s “Silent Spring” (1962) which described how the pesticide DDT, a chemical used to kill insects that carry disease, was killing off songbirds and profoundly affecting the food chain. The book became a bestseller, a national icon for environmental awareness, and a model for an environmental literature that would emerge to track human environmental damage. Raymond Dasmann’s “The Destruction of California” (1966) was the icon for California land use. Dasmann was a San Francisco-born field biologist from the University of California Berkeley, who taught at Humboldt State University, and later
at the University of California Berkeley (Woo, 2002). His book lucidly described the transformations of California and the dangers of completely stripping the land of its ecosystems. He wrote,

What is the threat to California, and from whom does it stem? […] The enemies are those who have looked so long into the blast furnaces of civilization that they can no longer appreciate a sunset—those to whom growth is progress and progress is good, regardless of its direction—those to whom money is the single standard against which all else must be measured. California has been hacked and battered by the forces of ignorance and greed, and is today being forced in a direction that few would want to travel if they could see what lay ahead. (Dasmann, 1966, 27-28)

The book was covered favorably in the California press and was widely read. Dasmann and others would inspire generations of environmental activists, but they have not been able to save all of California from the blast furnaces of civilization and progress.

Investigating Managed Growth in California’s Counties

This project contributes an updated study of comparable and relevant cases: county level land use politics within California. California is the most populous US state, and the third most extensive in land area. (San Francisco, which is both a city and a county under California law, is excluded from the present study because it includes no unincorporated territory). Within the state, there are 492 cities and 58 counties (see Figure 2). Previous studies of California counties have been limited in scope either by a small number of counties (Dyble, 2007; Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen, 2000; Walker and Fortmann, 2003; Warner and Molotch, 1995), or a limited types of policy outcomes (Press, 2002), while the county-level studies that do exist are outdated (Glickfeld and Levine, 1992).
The dissertation is anchored by a theoretical chapter followed by four empirical chapters. The empirical chapters each apply a unique method to explore a different aspect of the research questions.

Chapter 2 explains the relevant theoretical literature and then describes my argument in detail. While I situate the project in the growth machine literature that is most familiar to urban sociologists, I make the assumptions of this perspective explicit while contrasting these assumptions with other land use positions. In particular, scholars have proposed three processes through which a series of conditions are translated into managed growth land use policy. The first is the public sentiment model, which assumes
that environmental concern and organizational capacity are central to land use politics. The second is the cultural landscape model, which assumes that people develop shared conceptions about the nature of their communities based on geography or economic character. I argue, however, in favor of the discourse coalition model in which organizations vie to create the largest coalitions by framing their side of the issue in ways that resonate with residents. This model assumes that affluence and education are as important as environmental concern.

In Chapter 3, I show that much of the California land use literature has conflated symbolic and effective managed growth policies, leading to serious confusion about the object of study. To resolve this problem, I summarize the history of managed growth activism in California and isolate the set of effective policies, which, when configured appropriately, have the greatest capacity to preserve open space and force growth into cities and urban hubs. The most protective configuration, and the ultimate goal of local environmental organizations campaigning for managed growth, is county-level political control (such as an urban growth boundary) that is reinforced so as to prevent piecemeal expansion at the urban fringe. I call this a managed growth land use policy regime, and contrast it to the laissez-faire land use policy regimes that dominate much of California. Finally, I map the spread of land use policy regimes across the state and summarize this political landscape.

Chapter 4 leads the primary investigation into the causal conditions that produced managed growth policy regimes in California’s 58 counties. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis, I demonstrate that it is possible to create a perfectly consistent explanation with four conditions: environmental concern, affluence, education, and
membership in the urban set. While environmental concern is a necessary condition for conservation, it is not sufficient in urban counties where affluence and education are also important. The chapter concludes with a qualitative assessment of a case representing each pathway (Alameda, Ventura, Solano, Orange, Los Angeles, Yolo, and Santa Barbara Counties) to show that the configuration of conditions allowed managed growth coalitions to be successful in some counties and not in others.

Chapter 5 provides a deep exploration of the mechanism through which the conditions identified above are translated into policy. In order to evaluate the public sentiment model, the cultural landscape model, and the discourse coalition model, I isolate a single type of policy, the implementation of smart growth in general plans, and following it historically across Marin, San Diego, and Humboldt Counties. To determine how actors framed these disputes, I coded opinion articles using discourse analysis. The primary argument of this chapter is that the discourse coalition model is the primary means through which social conditions are harnessed into the land use coalitions that create land use policy regimes.

In Chapter 6, I step back and critically evaluate the general statements scholars have made about land use discourse in California. Is there geographically patterned variation in dominant discourse use, or is variation in language random and localized? In particular, I test three hypotheses from the literature: that southern California is dominated by anthropic discourse; that the Bay Area is dominated by ecological discourse, and that rural counties are dominated by economic discourse. To explore this question, I use computer searches of more than twenty million full text news articles from across the state, and generate the frequencies with which certain unique land use terms
appeared. My findings show that while there is some truth to the three hypotheses, reality is more complex. Anthropic and economic discourse is fairly common throughout the state, while nature discourse is far more concentrated in the Bay Area and the northern rural counties.

Chapter 7 offers a brief conclusion. I begin with a brief anecdote that explains why growth has caused such anxiety among Californians. Next I summarize my argument and discuss the implications for policy interventions. In short, this research supports scholars who argue that regional government will better manage growth and limit sprawl, but only under the condition that that government is democratic and allows for what critics call “ballot box planning.” The research provides evidence about which framing strategies work and which do not. When the conditions are right, growth advocates win the most policies when they use economic discourse, and the more rural the area, the more effective the private property frame is likely to be. In the right conditions, managed growth advocates win because they use ecological discourse. Anthropic discourse was a wash, rarely producing a coalition capable of implementing a strong policy, let alone a managed growth policy regime. I conclude by discussing the importance of maintaining a sociological account of land use politics.
Chapter 2 – Theory for Land Use Decision Making

Theories of Urban Politics

Nearly four decades ago, Molotch (1976) provided an explanation for the tendencies for cities to relentless pursue urban growth by observing that cities are “urban growth machines” such that the political infrastructure of governance is structurally dominated by businesspeople, lawyers, large landowners, and others with an economic interest in urban expansion. In their quest to accumulate wealth, these elites push for development and urbanization (Jonas and Wilson, 1999; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976) and become involved with politics in order to promote growth, courting workers with the promise of jobs and property owners with the promise of wealth through development (Calavita, 1992). In this way, a coalition of elites invested—literally and metaphorically—in urban development to ensure constant economic expansion, even if that expansion reduced the quality of life of current residents.

The predictable determinism of the urban growth machine theory held up well in accounting for the history of American cities which experienced significant growth prior to Molotch’s original article. For example, Los Angeles in the early twentieth century is the prime growth machine example. The local economy was fueled by speculation, acquisition and land development that produced a sprawling metropolis beset with social, environmental, and fiscal problems (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Indeed, California cities of the earliest twentieth centuries have all been described as dominated by openly pro-growth politicians (Fulton, 2001).
However, the growth machine theory has struggled to explain why some cities reject growth. In more recent decades, as environmental measures, like the 900 local growth control measures in California cities and counties by the end of the 1980s, proliferated in some places (Glickfeld and Levine, 1992). Writing in 1987, Logan and Molotch (1987) were no longer sure that growth machines were inevitable. They noted that changing economic landscapes had made growth less profitable, while resistance from those seeking to protect “use value” (enjoyment of their homes and communities) had increased. Moreover, it emerged that most growth control did not significantly slow growth (Logan and Zhou, 1989), because it was symbolic, short-term, and sporadically applied (Warner and Molotch, 1995).

Enter urban regime theory, which sought to resolve the gaps in the growth machine’s monolithic explanation. Regime theory has been embraced as being less deterministic than the growth machine theory (Lewis, 1996, p. 44). The theory posits that city officials have a strong incentive to partner with private interests of various sorts because cash strapped local governments lack the resources to govern effectively (DeLeon, 1992; Peterson, 1981). These public-private partnerships coalesce into “urban regimes” or ruling coalitions which govern the city (Stone, 1989; Stone, 1993; Stone, 2006). As a result, localities are often ruled by elected officials in relatively stable alliances with pro-growth private actors. The political process therefore only matters when it changes the composition of governing coalitions, as, once elected, politicians become largely unaccountable to voters.

While regimes are classically pro-growth and dominated by business interests, slow-growth regimes with homeowner and environmental groups at the center are
possible (DeLeon, 1992; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1991). DeLeon (1992) argued that progressive interests forged ruling coalitions that adopted progressive policies, including environmental protection in the leftist cities near the San Francisco Bay.

Both the “growth machine” and the “urban regime” serve as useful metaphors because they frame the land use political process as a coercive, irrational, and organizational-level social process. The theory of order assumes that political groups engage in political struggle with limited resources, and that the winner imposes their will on the loser. Order is maintained not by popular consensus, but through the coercive power of the state. The theory of action assumes that people are irrational actors who do not always behave as calculated rational profit-maximizing individuals, but are forged into coalitions or lulled into acquiescence through deliberate politicking. Finally, the level of analysis is organizational, which is to say that the groups that people form and the structure within which these groups and people are embedded leads to effective political action, rather than disaggregated political preferences.

The growth machine theory contrasts with Lewis and Neiman’s (2009) “contingent trusteeship” theory, a variation of pluralist theory. Their work theorizes electorally-beholden local officials who run government as a “contingent trusteeship” in order to guide the city our county and best fill existing needs. Using survey data from California cities, argue that cities make choices about pursuing particular types of growth, not because of political pressure from business or interest groups, but as “reasoned response[s from elected officials] to community conditions” (p. 163), in order to balance the needs of the city or to achieve a common “vision.” In this way, politicians steer cities toward becoming business development centers, residential enclaves, or tourism and
recreation centers. Interest groups can “influence and set bounds for city growth choices” (p. 168), but government typically tries to balance the wishes of different groups. The contingent trusteeship theory holds a consensual theory of order, in that the political process is considered relatively fair, with order maintained through general agreement. The theory of action assumes that politicians and voters are self-interested individuals who make logic-driven choices based on available information and incentives. Finally, the level of analysis is individual, in that various organizational level pressures are disaggregated into individual voter behavior.

This perspective meets difficulty when Lewis and Neiman apply it to land use. Rather than suggesting that local officials always guide their community in the ways they deem best, their data shows that the most significant predictor of growth management is how the planning director rates the “degree of citizen opposition to growth” (p. 144). They say that part of the reason is that citizens regularly circumvent their officials through the ballot box. But they also note,

…the contingent trusteeship perspective suggests that local policymakers may try to hold themselves at some distance from popular opinion if they feel that it is in the long-run best interests of the community to pursue policies that residents may not currently support. However, the ability of local official to evade such popular control is contingent on the degree of controversy over the policy matter and whether their stance on the policy might hinder their quest for reelection (p. 144).

That is, Lewis and Neiman argue that elected officials lead contingent trusteeships, except when they fear that residents would not vote for them, in which case, they might go along with a crowd of angry residents. I suggest that these instances prove the coalitional nature of land use politics.
The growth machine perspective firmly rejects assumptions about the contingent trusteeship. However, other theoretical work remains consistent with the growth machine assumptions. For example, Lebell, Feiock, and Ramirez de la Cruz (2009; 2005) argue that political opportunity depends on the structure of political institutions, and thus the structure of local governance biases cities against creating redistributive policies (Peterson, 1981). In this view, Denver had greater political fragmentation and therefore less growth management than Portland at the end of the twentieth century (Lewis, 1996). National and international comparisons similarly draw on political opportunity to explain a wide variety of urban outcomes (Wolman and Goldsmith, 1992; Pallagst, 2007; Zinn, 2004). Political opportunity is important but cannot account for all differences, especially those within places where fields are officially structured alike, such as the counties within a single state.

Actors and their Interests

Local land use politics is different from many other types of politics because all residents of a place belong to constituencies, based on their living situation and their economic activities, and have interests in certain land use actions. Recognition of these interests is a legacy that we take from the Chicago School of Human Ecology, the dominant urban studies paradigm in the mid-twentieth century (Hawley, 1950; Park, 1952; Park and Burgess, 1921). In this view, the hidden hand of the free market is a central organizing principle for urban development. Individuals compete in a Darwinist struggle to obtain the land they are “best suited” to occupy. The price system for land serves as a regulatory feature to signal the relative desirability of parcels, and to
optimally distribute resources based on the amount of good that any individual could get out of that land. Hence, the homeowner, the farmer, the forester, the miner, the businessman, and the developer have differentiated interests via their potential uses of the land.

Scholars have long assumed that land-based interests cut through abstract political preferences and national-scale identities. In *Urban Fortunes*, Logan and Molotch describe these interests with great detail, departing radically from the human ecology perspective. While Marxists argue that broad economic forces explain urban land use patterns (Harvey, 1976; Harvey, 1989), Logan and Molotch’s pay due attention to the parochial and local actors involved in creating policy (1987, p. 10-12). The primary distinction between local actors is between those who seek *exchange value* from the land and those who seek *use value*. Use value and exchange value are inherent in the nature of the place commodity in a capitalist market. Place is both a commodity that is bought and sold for profit (exchange value), and a physical location where people necessarily live, play, commute, shop and work (use value).

Use value is central to the resident or homeowner. Non-property owning residents, or renters, are the classic example of actors who are expected to see only use value in the land. The renter has no direct financial stake in expansion and instead enjoys use value from living on the property. Their economic interest is in getting the most value for the rent they pay. For the renter, tranquil traffic, open views, and places to walk or hike improve this value. For their part, homeowners are likely to develop lasting personal commitments and emotional attachments to the land. They share the economic fate of
their community with their neighbors. They will often seek to protect this use value from threats.

For this reason, homeowners and residents are likely to join or form organizations that seek to protect the use value of the land. While some of these organizations have been single-issue neighborhood groups, environmental organizations play a central role in fighting to preserve use value (Logan and Molotch, 1987). The Sierra Club, founded by the naturalist John Muir in 1892, is the largest and most storied example of such an environmental organization in California (Dreyfus, 2008). The organization uses its membership to encourage political engagement from people who value the environment for both recreational and ecological reasons. One way they do this is through the “Wilderness Basics Courses” which they operate throughout the state. These courses vary by location, but they are generally year-long commitments for participants who pay a small fee and go on multiple outings, and attend lectures, while learning about the land. For example, in San Diego the 2014 yearlong course agenda included bi-monthly hiking trips, ten lectures, four overnight camping trips, and a graduation ceremony. Less committed members could join one of dozens of single hikes, bike trips, ski trips, family outings, photography outings, or even try to meet single hikers in the “Sierra Singles” group. The San Diego Sierra Club operates a small cabin in Laguna Mountain where members can stay for a small fee or volunteer to maintain the cabin (San Diego Sierra Club, 2015). Finally, the Sierra Club is actively involved in promoting their cause through widely circulated member newsletters. The Sierra Club’s activities are even more extensive in the Bay Area, where they have partnered with other scientific organizations.
and organized conferences to educate the public (Aquirre and Nax, 1997) in an effort to help mobilize residents who seek to protect their use value.

If residents and homeowners prioritize use value, exchange value is prioritized by “place entrepreneurs” (1987, p. 29), the developers, real estate agents, builders, and all others who collect rent from the land (“rent” refers to both the modern notion of payment to a landlord and speculative profit on the sale of land). Capitalists engaged in this activity are interested primarily in profit, they have greater freedom to relocate based on local conditions, and they generally do not need to preserve use value in order to make money from land: “capitalists’ use of place is less fragile than that of residents” (1987, p. 22). Many are active entrepreneurs or structural speculators who stand to gain significant fortunes through urban growth. Other rentiers come to hold valuable property serendipitously, as when farmers, ranchers and foresters find that productive land is now worth a value if sold for development (p. 29). Similarly, property owners might pursue exchange value by purchasing and selling their property as an investment or by subdividing a large property.

Those who seek exchange value are also politically organized. Real estate agents, builders, developers and others participate in pro-growth political organizations to fight for laissez-faire land use regulation. These organizations sponsor “grassroots” groups and issue reports in which they diagnose the problems of a region and prescribe a favorable policy option. For example, in the peak of the housing bubble in 2004, as San Diego prepared to update its general plan, pro-growth groups issued a report which decried limited housing stock and then resulting high prices of property as a serious problem. The newspaper quoted realtors, developers, and economists who argued that housing supply
must rapidly increase to meet demand and thereby lower prices (Pierce, 2004a). Other industry groups in San Diego have attempted to control public dialogue in order to avoid opposition to urban growth and development. At the Pacific Coast Builders Conference, builders listen to speakers who recommend various strategies for defeating not-in-my-back-yard protests against development. One company suggested “direct[ing] their messages to decision makers and avoid[ing] holding meetings that might give opponents a chance to rally.” Others offered the “teach and preach” approach and counseled open dialogue and proper body language while speaking with residents (Pierce, 2004b). Such organizational activities give specific strategies to developers and provide a setting in which land developers and builders can agree upon framing strategies and tactics to maximize the exchange value of the land they possess.

Constituencies including retailers and manufacturers, local media, universities, community organizations and government officials, have more complex relationships with the land. Retailers and producers, as Logan and Molotch (1987) put it, “do not, in principle, depend on intensification of adjacent land for the success of their own operations,” although they sometimes benefit from this increased development (p. 21). In their account, the interests of these groups are indeterminate, and depend on the nature of the particular business. For example, local media have an interest in growth insofar as a greater population means an increase in circulation and revenue. As a result, many of the largest newspapers have provided pro-growth coverage to land use issues (p. 70). The authors note that pro-growth forces can mobilize neighborhoods to form community organizations just as progressive forces might mobilize such groups to stop them (p. 37-
Governments often have interests in competing with other governments to attract business growth and tax revenue (p. 34-37).

However, there are good reasons to suspect that the actors that matter in local land use interests are not particularly limited by either use value or exchange value, and that we should reject the possibility of making *a priori* assumptions about the preferences of land use actors. If all of the available actors have interests of one sort or the other, and the political system is democratic, it should be possible tally the number of different kinds of participants in each constituency to predict the winner? Empirically, however, such a calculation is not possible. Sometimes land use actors follow their predicted interests, while at other times they reject those predicted interests. As a result, farmers, residents, and businesses are often divided over the fate of a community, rendering questionable our *a priori* assumptions about their interests. The existing literature addresses this issue, of course. Consider this example that illustrates the complexity of actors and interests in California county politics.

Nevada County, California, is a rural county in the northern mountains not far from Sacramento County. It had long been governed by pro-growth gold miners, farmers, and foresters (Walker and Fortmann, 2003). In the 1970s, however, landowners discovered a lucrative market for rural residential development. Migrants from urban northern California were attracted by the natural beauty of the landscape, and came with incomes that did not rely on resource extraction or land development. Against this backdrop, in 1992, pro-growth county supervisors established a steering committee to gather citizen input for a new general plan that would determine how future growth would be regulated. Five hundred residents volunteered and requested managed growth.
Alarmed county supervisors shrugged off this recommendation and went ahead with their own plans for laissez-faire urban development. (Walker and Fortmann, 2003)

In response, angry residents formed an alliance with local businesses in order to challenge the county supervisors. Called the Rural Quality Coalition, it included realty and tech companies that catered to recent migrants from the bigger cities. In 1994, the Coalition won a seat on the board of supervisors, and in 1998 they won a majority of seats. The coalition then went about finding a way to implement a plan for open space and growth management in the existing planning framework. They began as their predecessors had, by organizing a series of public meetings for citizen input (Walker and Fortmann, 2003). At the same time, a counter-movement brought together property owners, property rights groups, and the timber harvesting Sierra Pacific Industries into a coalition that supported unregulated growth. This coalition successfully framed the new plan as a struggle between recently migrated and environmentalists (some of whom were derisively labeled “hobby farmers” rather than “real farmers”) and the poor and deserving farmers and landowners. After years of struggle, in the early 2000s, the plan was crushed by popular vote (Walker and Fortmann, 2003) and the growth regime regained its grip on local politics (Shigley, 2002).

Although the outcome in rural Nevada County may not be surprising, it raises an interesting theoretical question: what leads some property owners to act to promote use value and others to act to promote exchange value? In Nevada County, property owners may have had a theoretical interest in the use value of their land, but a plurality formed around private property rights organizations alongside extractive industries and advocated for laissez-faire policy, which suggests that they instead exchange value was a
central motivation. In the next section I describe the three major approaches that land use scholars have proposed to resolve this question.

Three Theoretical Models

As the foregoing discussion illustrated, we cannot simply assume that homeowners always act in search of exchange value and that businesses always act in support of growth. Use and exchange value may have something to do with how people act, but we need a better explanation to understand the processes through which residents and individuals come to recognize their interests and use these interests in effective political action. In the following section, I describe three types of explanations for this mechanism: the public sentiment model, the cultural landscape model, and the discourse coalition model. Each model is best understood as a social process, and each process contains different assumptions about the conditions under which a place might manage growth. The conditions are the empirical traces which will help differentiate between these theories.

Public Sentiment Model

In the public sentiment model, the normative values or preferences of community members matter because decision makers seek re-election, are relatively shielded from interest group pressure, and are inclined to respect majority preferences (Baldassare and Wilson, 1996; DeLeon and Naff, 2004; Kline and Wichelns, 1998; Schumacher, 2013; Sharp, 2007). This perspective assumes that people have stable preferences regarding the environment. Moreover, that these preferences are broadly consistent, such that those who are concerned for the environment are concerned for all managed growth policies
(see Layzer, 2006; Sharp, 2007; Campbell, 2004). This perspective is similar to early human ecology explanations for urbanization (Firey, 1945) and to pluralist accounts of local policy-making (Dahl, 1961). Two conditions are especially relevant to the public sentiment model: Environmental concern and environmental organizational capacity. Layzer’s (2006) analysis of the creation of multi-species habitat programs in San Diego County is a good example of the public sentiment model at work. Layzer argues that “environmental policy disputes are, at heart, contests over values” (p. 1). Some people hold environmental values, meaning that they care about environmental systems (either for human “quality of life” reasons or because of concern for nature), while others hold “cornucopian” values, meaning that they care about economic growth and see nature as limitless (p. 2-5). Faced with this intractable divide between values, the political work of approving the San Diego habitat program involved portraying the problem in a way that aligned with majority community values. Accordingly, San Diego County acquired private land for habitat conservation because advocates successfully linked the new habitat to the voter’s environmental values.

If the public sentiment model is accurate, we would expect that environmental concern is a condition for adopting managed growth policies. Environmental concern refers to an indicator developed from census data, surveys, or voting patterns that purports to capture the degree to which people care about environmental issues. The term is widely used in comparative national and international environmental scholarship, where survey data is used to debate the reasons some people care about the environment and others do not (Dunlap and Mertig, 1997; Dunlap and York, 2008; Givens and Jorgenson, 2013; Pampel and Hunter, 2012). Land use scholars have found an important
relationship between environmental concern and other indicators of political or social preferences (Baldassare and Wilson, 1996; DeLeon and Naff, 2004; Kline and Wichelns, 1998; Press, 2002; Rosdil, 2010).

A second condition relevant to the public sentiment model is the network of environmental organizations that, when extensive and well-funded, constitute environmental organizational capacity. While a strict pluralist might argue that interest groups have no undue influence on politics, neopluralist public sentiment scholars argue that environmental organizations play an important role in the political process by bringing up environmental issues to officials, publicizing potential threats, and providing the resources to support environmental planning. Press (1998; 2002) argued this capacity is needed to negotiate and purchase land trusts, and developed an index of organizational capacity based on factors including “revenue, civic environmentalism, and policy entrepreneurship” (2002: p. 123). Others found a connection between perceived organizational conflict and growth management policies (Donovan, 1993); between Sierra Club membership and managed growth policy (Clark and Goetz, 1994); and between the number of local environmental activist groups and smart growth policies (O’Connell, 2008).

Cultural Landscape Model

A second model is a collective ideational process through which a shared understanding about the landscape determines the path for development or preservation. I call this model the “cultural landscape” model, following O’Neill, Rudel, and McDermott (2011), who argue that some places develop shared community consensus about “the land
as used, envisioned, and physically remade by a particular group of people at a particular time” (p. 13). Their chief example is a rural community where residents understood the land as part of a “farming-oriented community” (p. 125) and enacted managed growth policies to preserve that character. Many other scholars, though not necessarily embracing the cultural landscape model, nonetheless argue that landscapes matter.

The cultural landscape model connects scholarship on the theory of “place” to the land use literature. Gieryn (2000) defined place as consisting of “location, material form, and meaningfulness” (p. 466) and reminds us that “places are endlessly made,” (p. 471) in their physical construction and also in the sense of meaning that the community experiences. Place matters because it “sustains difference and hierarchy both by routinizing daily rounds in ways that exclude and segregate categories of people, and by embodying in visible and tangible ways the cultural meanings variously ascribed by them” (p. 474). In this tradition, scholars argue that neighborhoods develop such place-specific characters (Firey, 1945; Miller, 2012) which can contribute to neighborhood preservation when developers must respect the prevailing cultural landscape, or the “expectations about how their communities […] are defined, projected, and understood” (Douglas, 2012, p. 216). Similarly, Kaufman and Kaliner (2011) argue that “places” are created in a “…process whereby both in-state and out-state residents come to identify a specific place with specific values, resources, and behaviors…” (121). They characterize the primary mechanism of this process as ideo-cultural migration, or the spatial congregation of like-minded people, “based on place-specific cultural preferences” (p. 122). Other scholars have contributed to our understanding of the conditions of such
migration by exploring the connection between socioeconomic status and migration to exurban or rural areas (Osgood, 2011).

Based on this insight, some land use scholars consider physical geography a condition for adopting managed growth policies. Logan and Molotch (1987) argued that the presence of desirable geographic features such as rich wildlife habitats or productive family farms; or undesirable geographic features such as overdrawn water resources or thick smog, make citizen mobilization most probable. Press posited that only some places have “landscapes that inspire communities to protect them” (2002, p. 123). Sokolow (1998) argued that the San Francisco Bay Area adopted conservation policies because residents perceived their rugged coastal geography as beautiful, while agricultural Central Valley counties allowed urbanizations because the pastoral landscape was not perceived as valuable. Others have argued that population growth itself is a geographically-bound demographic condition which triggers residents to take action to protect the environment when available open space diminishes and natural landscapes are lost (Baldassare and Wilson, 1996; Dunlap and York, 2008; Knight and Messer, 2012; Lubell, Feiock, and Handy, 2009). These examples all invoke widely shared community understandings of the physical landscape.

Another version of this argument posits that what matters most is not the landscape itself but the historical legacy of land use and the economic character engendered by that use. Molotch and Logan, for example, note that public sentiment is “bound up” with economic structures. Molotch, Freudenberg and Paulsen (2000) likewise argue that places have character and tradition, based on both the social and cultural conditions that give a place its sense of history (p. 791-792). They caution against
viewing economic and cultural resources as separate, instead arguing that “physical and social elements” come together in a path-dependent “lash-up” which creates the “character” of a place (p. 793). They describe how Ventura and Santa Barbara Counties, at one time both dominated by oil jobs, diverged in the wake of early laissez-faire development. The place character of Santa Barbara shifted as a new industrial base bolstered the local economy, lessened reliance on oil, and attracted residents with social, economic, and cultural capital. These residents further contributed to the “consumption milieu” by serving as a customer base for cultural businesses such as architectural services, bicycle shops, book stores, commercial art and graphic design, counseling services, and museums and art galleries (p. 815). I disagree with their characterization of the two counties (See Chapter 4). However, their model contributes a fourth empirical condition which: that economic character is manifest in local economic activity.

Discourse Coalition Model

The final model, the discourse coalition model, asserts that discourses, or the categories of ideas people use to talk about policy issues in a community, are used by actors in deliberate processes to build coalitions (Lee, 2009; Hajer, 1989; Hajer, 2003; Singer, 1990). The discourse coalition approach is similar to an approach taken by sociologists who argue that the way people talk about social problems reveal “discursive opportunity structures” that enable or constrain political actors (Ferree, 2002; Ferree, 2003; Padamsee, 2009; Steensland, 2006). Social movement scholars argue that the use of highly resonant frames can contribute to successful mobilization (Benford and Snow, 2000; Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; Snow and Benford, 1988). Participants demonstrate
concern for discursive opportunity structure when they seek advantage by using dominant discourse, focus attention through repetition, avoid public debate, or internalize oppositional discourses (Bröer and Duyvendak, 2012).

In this model, land use organizations are able to build strong coalitions only under certain conditions and using the right frames (the term “frame” is used here to connote a specific idea, or a subset of a discourse). This approach is also similar to a branch of the growth machine literature that explores the power of ideology or ideas in the land use process (Cox, 1999; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Logan, Whaley, and Crowder, 1999; Short, 1999). Ideas can become fixed in communities as “territorial ideologies” (Cox, 1999), which can help or hinder land use mobilization (Lee, 2009; Nevarez, 1996; Troutman, 2004; Walker and Fortmann, 2003). The discourse coalition concept extends the notion of the territorial ideology by focusing on the “clash of strategic conduct” (Hajer, 1989, p. 31) through which actors build political alliances. Hajer describes this mechanism as a “discourse coalition,” or a “group of actors that, in the context of an identifiable set of practices, shares the usage of a particular set of story lines over a particular period of time” (Hajer, 2003, p. 302). Hajer’s (2003) best example is the politics of acid rain in Britain. Using discourse analysis, he examines how actors developed storylines that relied on either “ecological modernization” discourse or “traditional pragmatist” discourses, and that these decisions contributed to the formation coalitions. According to Di Gregario (2012), discourse coalitions can form around “relatively broad discursive frames” (p. 2) even in conditions when participants do not share the same values. Once in power, coalitions can work to institutionalize discourses in the policy domain, attempting to produce a dominant local discourse, a condition
where the majority of local actors accept a way of talking about a problem, and act accordingly (Hajer, 2003, p. 205). Another example is Lee’s (2009) explanation for the development of a conservation coalition in South Carolina. Lee found that environmentalists were successful because they used dominant discourse to mobilize a large coalition, specifically by using discourses which resonated with the territorial ideology in the community. The slow-growth coalition depicted “conservation as local property owners’ civic duty” and development as taking “profits to faraway places with little consideration for local self-determination” (p. 314).

According to the discourse coalition model, greater **wealth** and **education** are conditions that favor managed growth coalitions because the people are likely to join a managed growth coalition are those with high economic, cultural, and social capital. Many scholars have found evidence showing that affluence is important as both a condition of environmental concern (Abramson and Inglehart, 1994; Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart, 1997; Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Kidd and Lee, 1997; Manfredo, Teel, and Henry, 2009) and as a condition for progressive land use outcomes (Donovan, 1993; Opp, Osgood, and Rugeley, 2013; Lubell, Feiock, and Handy, 2009; Stone, 1989). Moreover, according to Laidley (2013), beliefs about the environment function as symbolic boundaries or fences between classes. Those with low economic and cultural capital cared least about the environment, which they tended to think about as a rich person’s concern. Those with low economic capital and high cultural capital tended to care about the environment and see structural forces as being important. Those with high economic capital and low cultural capital cared about the environment, preferred market solutions, and were skeptical about our ability to resolve environmental issues. Those with high
economic capital and high cultural capital also cared about the environment and preferred market solutions (p. 167). Another explanation for the relationship between wealth and managed growth policy is that building a managed growth coalition requires a lot of resources, and affluence provides a source of resources. Logan and Molotch write, “particularly effective are instances in which coalitions include […] rich and powerful residential neighborhood groups…” (1987: p. 223). Stone likewise observed that progressive regimes were only likely in cities that had a “resource-rich but non-corporate middle class” (Stone, 1989, p. 228).

Another relevant aspect of socioeconomic status for the discourse coalition model is education. It both produces a collective awareness of environmental problems as people confront the stark reality of environmental destruction with scientifically informed viewpoints (Milbrath, 1984; Skrentny, 1993), and familiarizes people with environmental discourse. In a comparative cross-national study using data collected from 19 countries in the ISSP 2000, Marquart-Pyatt (2008) found that education was the best predictor of environmental values. Duch and Taylor (1993) found that education and current economic conditions explain postmaterialist values. In individual level results, Givens and Jorgenson (2013) confirmed these results.

The Contributions of this Study

Although the public sentiment model easily connects with the vast existing framework of environmental concern research, there are good reasons to question the mechanism through which public sentiment supposedly has its effect. One difficulty is that many land use policy issues are understood by only a small portion of the electorate,
and therefore these issues are not particularly salient to the community. Burstein (2003) argues that public opinion often correlates with outcomes of concern, but that many claims about the importance of public sentiment are unrealistic, as few issues are salient to the public (Burstein, 2006). This lack of community connection is particularly problematic in land use because while the issues are salient to everyone in one way or another, the policy considerations are complex, and relatively few people know about the local planning process. As a result, decision makers are not induced to respond to community environmental concerns. Some political contests become highly salient, but at most this means they involve a fraction of the larger community.

A further difficulty is that the public sentiment model does not tell us how officials know anything about public sentiment. Especially at the local level, there are few regular and reliable opinion polls. Even if officials are aware of their constituents’ voting preferences (perhaps from reading a study such as this one), the disconnect between actors’ assumed *a priori* land use preferences and their actual preferences make it hard to predict how the community would respond to different policy options depending on the interests at stake and the way the issues are perceived locally. Officials instead rely on representatives from constituents and interest groups when they consider policies. That opens the opportunity for discourse to shape officials’ behavior by shaping their perceptions of what constituents and interest groups want.

There are also good reasons to question the cultural landscape model based on the abstraction between how a landscape or character matters to actual political processes. For example, Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen say little about the political process and the way that “lash-up” is said to work. At times, they indicate that residents contribute to
an actual political process, as when they declare that residents in Santa Barbara were “eminent experts” who provided pro bono testimony (see p. 810); however, this process is not fully described. The notion of “lash-up” implies that character comes to pervade the unconscious actions of actors, leading them to pursue managed growth or laissez-faire policy without reflection. The great risk of this perspective is that without a mechanism through which character matters, it is possible to misconstrue the theory as focused on cultural consensus. Yet in many instances, landscapes are highly contested sources of meaning. A farm-oriented community to some is a future world city to others. It is difficult to know whose assessment counts when consensus is unavailable. To provide a better alternative to the public sentiment model, we need to better link place character to strategic action.

The theoretical argument of this dissertation consists of two parts. First, using qualitative comparative analysis and other techniques, I demonstrate that membership in a particular set of socio-economic and cultural conditions provide causal recipes that help us understand the relevant political process. Second, the case studies examined in Chapter 5 show that the most plausible explanation for how these conditions come together in policy is the discourse coalition model. That is, the conditions under which slow-growth coalitions are likely to form are those in which the discourse used to frame a managed growth policy successfully mobilized residents to believe that their interests were in obtaining use value through preserving the land. My primary argument is as follows:

(a) Pro-growth and slow growth organizations vie to build coalitions. The largest coalition wins and implements their preferred policy regime. The conditions for successful managed growth coalitions involve high
environmental concern, education, affluence, and having an urban character.

(b) Residents do not act on *a priori* interests in land use. Rather, they are recruited into land use coalitions. Organizations build coalitions by framing policy contests using discourses likely to convince residents to advocate and vote on their side.

This argument contributes to substantial open questions about land use. Claim (a) provides a systematic means with which to answer the puzzle that Molotch (1976) first initiated when he asserted that all cities are growth machines. Why, then, are there managed growth regimes? None of the answers to this question have been satisfactory thus far. This explanation provides an empirically consistent account of a large number of cases, while maintaining the assumptions central to a conflict perspective. Claim (b) deals with the mechanism through which these organizations build their coalitions. I argue that it is not just that people have fixed sentiments, or that there is a consensus on the environmental value of a particular place. Successful coalitions require local actors to frame a policy contest in a way that resonates with the particular discursive opportunity structure associated with the particular configuration of the conditions for managed growth. That is, I argue that the discourse coalition model best accounts for what has happened in counties across California, while rejecting the public sentiment model and the cultural landscape model. Both of those models work in some cases, but fail to fully account for the diversity of cases in California.
Conclusion

This dissertation advances our understanding of how land use works by showing that the discourse coalition model best explains the persistence of managed growth land use policy regimes in some counties. The public sentiment model and the place character model may provide acceptable explanations in some cases, but they carry unrealistic assumptions about the mechanism for their political efficacy, and these assumptions limit their usefulness. Perhaps most importantly, both the public sentiment model and the place character model rely on consensual understandings of the local world, where culture is cast as mere public preference or as a shared and monolithic notion about the value of a particular sort of landscape. The discourse coalition model, by contrast, revives some classical conflict theorists’ understanding of how culture contributes to social domination.

As Hajer (1989) notes, the discourse coalition resembles Gramsci’s cultural structures of coercive power. While Marx maintained in 1845 that social science should be grounded in real people as we conceptually “ascend from earth to heaven,” and that ideas were purely secondary to material processes (Marx and Engels, 1972, p. 154), Gramsci observed that hegemony is not just the ideas of the ruling class; it also includes a set of compromises aimed to placate the subaltern (or subordinate) classes (p. 161). Using the concept of cultural hegemony, he wrote that beliefs and values are dominated by the ruling class as an extension of their power, such that they could control civil society and delay the formation of class consciousness (Gramsci, 1971). Similarly, Weber’s theory of legitimate authority holds that to subordinate the residents to an “orderly domination,”
the ruling minority needs the lubrication of legitimacy which allows them to sustain the preponderance of resources for rule (1978).

Despite its local emphasis, the discourse coalition model is similar to studies of national differences in cultural practices. Cultural differences in categories of thought are encoded in social practices, as in cultural differences in the valuation of labor between Germany and Britain (Biernacki, 1995), or between the economic value of nature in the United States and France (Fourcade, 2011). This is what Steensland (2006), writing on national welfare policy, would call culture’s “constitutive contribution to collective schemas” (p. 1274), or the way that widely shared ideas form cognitive structures which act as templates for thinking about social policies.

This dissertation demonstrates similar processes. Residents, developers, farmers, and environmentalists, all with different cultural, discursive, and economic priorities for land use policy, encounter each other in civil society. Local ruling coalitions form, stabilize, or break based on local cultural conditions which support certain legitimate regimes. As a result, local land use politics contain a battle over the hegemony of ideas between capitalist forces and those with other interests.
Chapter 3 – Land Use Policy Regimes in California Counties

Introduction

What land use policies matter, and how should we study them? Understanding land use politics requires a clearly defined dependent variable which captures meaningful differences between land use choices. Yet land use policies come in all shapes and sizes, and there is no adequate scholarly convention on appropriately weighting these policies. Most scholars have avoided the task by treating all policies as equal units and summing the total number of a selected group (see Glickfeld and Levine, 1992). However, this procedure fails to address a classic critique of land use policy: that many policies are best understood as providing only “symbolic” regulation which conceals and protects a pro-growth agenda (Clare, 2014; Linkous, 2012; Logan and Zhou, 1989; Warner and Molotch, 1995). In this chapter I argue that we can screen out symbolic land use policies by adopting a policy regime concept. Land use policy regimes represent a configuration of policies which have been used effectively to either promote or prohibit outward urban development. In particular, I describe two such regimes which account for California politics: a growth regime and a managed growth policy regime.

To support this argument, I describe the history of land use regulation, where local governments across the United States have transformed land use policy from unregulated expansion to mediated expansion or conservation. I explain how California’s current configuration of policies has been accomplished through the periodic layering of environmental policies selected from an evolving palette of fashionable choices. Next, is
a theoretical exegesis of how past scholars have treated these policies and how my proposed dependent variable is different. In particular, I identify specific policies (e.g., county-level urban growth boundaries, voter control of zoning, and locally funded open space acquisition programs) which have been the primary target for environmentalists, and have the greatest capacity for limiting sprawl and preserving open spaces. I label this configuration a “land use policy regime.” Lastly, I present findings on California land use policy to argue that conservation policy regimes have exhibited slower average population growth, slower loss of farm acreage data, and greater density of development during the time period of 1990-2010.

**Symbolic and Effective Land Use Policies**

Beginning in the late 1960s, growth management policies proliferated across California, sweeping through cities and counties alike. While environmentalists celebrated the dawn of the ballot box era, growth machine scholars are highly skeptical of the intent and effect of these measures. By comparing growth under slow-growth policies to overall trends during the period from 1970 to 1980, Logan and Zhou (1989) argue that growth control has been largely ineffective. Growth advocates were able to successfully resist constraints by finding loopholes or other opportunities, and adopted policies were not always fully implemented. As a result, growth control failed to slow growth and actually had negative consequences, slightly increasing average rent while reducing minority populations. In a similar study, Warner and Molotch (1995) evaluated growth in Santa Barbara, Santa Monica, and Riverside County, and found that many policies had little practical effect. Growth control policies were sporadically applied, short-term, or
balanced by countervailing policies. Glickfeld and Levine (1992) looked at a wide variety of growth control measures in California Counties and found that many policies had no effect on the rate of non-residential construction in all but two counties. More recently, Clare (2014) described the proliferation of such symbolic policies in wetland protection in Alberta, while Linkous (2012) described the “transfer of development rights” program being developed in Florida as offering only symbolic regulation. In short, critics have contended that many land use policies are written in ways that make them impossible to enforce, riddled with exemptions, or improperly calibrated, even if other policies offer substantive protections.

Scholarship on California land use has not resolved this concern. Because count variables can be analyzed statistically, scholars have generally analyzed the number of environmental policies without differentiating between policies (Clark & Goetz, 1994; Glickfeld & Levine, 1992; Opp, Osgood, & Rugeley, 2013). Lewis and Neiman’s (2009) study of California government serves as a good example. They evaluate California by looking at all cities and counties and developing a scale of sixteen possible policy options, from “design review standards” (83% of localities had accomplished this) to “encourage growth in built-up areas only” (28% of localities had this), along with various stronger types of political control, from caps to moratoriums (p. 141). (Strangely, urban growth boundaries and agricultural voting restrictions are not listed). When all cities or counties are aggregated in this way, the results are somewhat limited. In a bivariate regression, the authors found that “Bay Area location alone accounted for 7 percent of the variation in cities’ total number of policies” (p. 142). The Bay Area was “distinctive,” but the difference was small. The Bay Area averaged just over 3 policies per locality while
Southern and Central California averaged just over 2 policies (p. 142). These studies have not addressed one of the most serious problems in the literature. Though there are many growth management and conservation policies available, it is likely that many of them are symbolic and incapable of having a significant impact on future development.

The problem with conflating symbolic and effective policy, or of lumping together policies of different scope, is that it leads us to draw incomplete conclusions about desirable land use outcomes. Critics of managed growth abound and have focused on the perceived claims that growth management policies bring unintended economic and social consequences. Some say that growth control results in lower homeownership rates and higher housing costs, especially in places with fixed boundaries (see Luger and Temkin, 2000). In Sonoma County, Schwartz, Hansen, and Green (1986) found that growth controls during the 1970s led to the elimination of affordable, low-priced housing.

In Frieden’s (1979) classic account of the first attempt to slow growth around the San Francisco Bay Area, he argued that efforts had only increased the value of housing while keeping out nonwhite residents. Frieden suggested that “environmentalism” was just a hustle, giving wealthy residents a convenient cover under which to act in their perceived self-interest. This hypothesis is commonly cited in the literature, often by scholars pursuing economic models to explain residential policy adoption (Lewis and Neiman, 2009, p. 136-137). And in fact, a few cities have used the growth management policies quite in ways that seem intentionally designed as exclusionary tools. In Escondido, residents approved Proposition S in 1998 which required a vote to increase density anywhere in the city. Fulton (2000) derided the Escondido effort as backward – allowing growth outside of the city but requiring a popular vote to increase density within.
As a result, many critics see all forms of managed growth activism as Not-In-My-Back-Yard ("NIMBY") politics in which people reject local change because of self-centered concern with quality of life. As Oreskes (2014) notes, environmental projects of all sorts have been often criticized as "merely" NIMBY politics. The term is used pejoratively to stereotype environmentalists. As Stephens (2014) notes, when individual urban neighborhoods carry on sustained local NIMBY protests, they can block low income housing and mass transportation links, and externalize the pressure for growth, often sending it to less privileged neighborhoods that are less capable of mounting resistance. The classic NIMBY scenario aggravates social injustice; elite neighborhoods reject any project that will bring change, while open space elsewhere is converted for housing and poor neighborhoods are required to take the polluting infrastructure of the city.

We are in a better situation to address these problems if we conceptually distinguish between symbolic and effective policies. As data on California growth management policy have accumulated and have been analyzed with more advanced techniques, it is increasingly evident that some local environmental policies are effective. Nguyen (2007) studies over 400 local ballot measures from the late 1980s to 1999 and found that they are effective tools to slow growth, as measured by fewer new housing starts, although Nguyen also argues that this has had unintended exclusionary effects. Newburn and Berck (2011) find that the urban growth boundary used by cities in Sonoma County was effective at preventing high density suburban growth outside of the boundary. However, it did not prevent low-density exurban development which relied on wells and septic systems rather than city services. This was because an urban growth
boundary was superseded by development rights provided for by earlier plans. Newburn and Berck argue that specific zoning requirements for agricultural and resource-rich land were better choices to prevent rural and exurban development. We also see this in Levine (1999), who collected and analyzed survey data from 490 California cities and counties. They found that, when citizens use the initiative and referenda process, they can significantly slow growth: 404 fewer units per policy. Other scholars have argued that some growth management policies are mostly effective because they lengthen the bureaucratic process and slow down developers, leading to uncertainty and greater expenses (Mayer and Somerville, 2000). Wu and Cho (2007) use aggregate data from 5 western states (including California) to show that land use controls decreased available land supply by 10%.

In this chapter, I identify a specific configuration of policies that permanently preserve significant amounts of open space and lock growth into urban areas. These configurations should not be characterized as NIMBYism. For the majority of residents, these policies ensure that future growth would require the transformation of their community through densifying development. This is in line with an argument made by Oreskes:

Most supposedly NIMBY arguments are not NIMBYist at all – they are NIABYist: not in anyone’s backyard. They are about preserving beauty, safety and integrity of communities. They are about solving problems (like climate change) without creating serious new ones (like nuclear waste and proliferation). They are about finding technologies that enrich our lives, support our health, and increase our prosperity, and not ones that threaten our safety, harm our health, and destroy our natural beauty. (Oreskes, 2014, para 20-21)
Her argument pertained to siting renewable resources, but the point is applicable here. Sure, there are versions of growth management policy that are ineffective, symbolic, or NIMBYist; but there are also versions of the policy that effectively manage growth. I turn next to reviewing these policies.

Growth Management Policies in California

Contemporary Californians inherit a slew of growth management policy options with varying potential to regulate growth. These policies were invented in the twentieth century to manage the rapidly urbanizing California landscape. The very first attempts to intervene in the land use market were carried out by well-to-do neighborhoods who sought to erect boundaries against undesirable urban elements. The restrictive covenant was born to legally separate wealthy neighborhoods from factories or religious and ethnic minorities. Eventually communities imposed height restrictions and residential zones over certain areas of the most developed cities. In the series of legal challenges that followed these early attempts, the courts recognized the right for land use authorities to zone property (Taylor, 2009).

Restrictive covenants were eventually replaced with city and regional planning. City planning was instituted in the largest cities in the early 1900s, while the first comprehensive regional plans were developed in the late 1960s. In California, regional plans were presaged by a 1937 law requiring that all counties and cities adopt a “master plan,” later retitled a “general plan,” which would explain how the community would handle growth and development. Following this law, the first planning department in the country was established in 1950 in Monterey County (Walton, 2001). With the
emergence of planning departments, most places in California applied a zoning map to
direct future growth between 1950 and 1975. Nearly all of these first-generation planning
documents were oriented toward growth. As a national leader in the fledgling planning
movement noted, these plans were rapidly developed across the country, but with the
primary goal of segregating communities (Williams, 1956) rather than managing growth
and preserving open space. These early plans had another effect. They established
precedent for future planning struggles by zoning most rural parcels at urban or suburban
levels of density. The adoption of this first plan created a group of property owners who
would forever have an economic interest in preserving their right to build at high density.

By mid-century, the nation was rapidly urbanizing. This shift began in the 1930s
and accelerated in the 1950s, which Abbott calls the “pivotal decade in the suburban
transformation of metropolitan America” (1987, p. 61). In the mid-century, the federal
government actively encouraged the creation of low density suburbs through public
works projects including the 1956 Highway Revenue Act which earmarked federal
money for the creation of interstate routes. State and federal dollars began to flow to
road-builders tasked with creating a huge network of freeways across the nation.
Elsewhere, the Army Corps of Engineers were busy working with developers on dredge
and fill projects in wetlands and low-lying areas, and channelizing waterways to make
them more predictable and exploitable. Significant urbanization followed. In 1970, for
the first time, more Americans lived in suburbs than central cities (37.2% compared to
31.4%). Many Californians, in particular, found this change alarming.
Observers have typically applied a periodization to the waves of activity through which managed growth policies were swept into parts of California (Fulton, 2001; Press, 2002), as illustrated in the table below.

Table 1: Periodization of Growth Management Policy Adoption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Historical Period of Growth Management</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-1980</td>
<td>Slow Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-2000</td>
<td>Ballot Box</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-Present</td>
<td>Smart Growth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first wave extends from 1960 to 1980, and captures the historical period where most Californian localities first wrote their general plans. This wave is characterized by top-down land use implementation, and is dubbed “slow-growth” for the reactive nature of managed growth goals, where environmentalists were primarily concerned with reigning in the rapid post-war boom that had radically changed the California landscape (Press, 2002). The era was initiated by a growing national awareness of environmental problems, and the creation of a series of new environmental institutions. On January 1 of 1970, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act, which required that the federal government perform an environmental assessment for agency actions. On December 2, 1970, Nixon signed an executive order creating the United States Environmental Protection Agency, chartered to enforce a series of federal laws such as the Clean Water Act in 1972 and the Endangered Species Act in 1973. In California, the California Environmental Quality Act was created in 1970 to ensure that the state would meet the new federal guidelines. The Act requires local governments to publicly evaluate the environmental ramifications of development, prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement which details alternative options, and prevent “significant avoidable” degradation (Fulton and Shigley, 2012). While this regulatory framework does not itself ensure sound development, it acts as a tool for legal challenges against projects (Olshansky, 1996). At the same time, the creation of the California Land Conservation Act (known as the Williamson Act) in 1965 and its expansion in 1977 provided state money to rent development rights from farmers, providing a valuable environmental tool which lasted until 2010 when funding was cut. How the state of California dealt with tidelands and marshlands also changed in the 1970s. In 1971 Marks v. Whitney afforded permanent protection to these resources in California although the decision is often interpreted as “no-net-loss,” meaning that developers must mitigate any wetland damage through establishment of new protected areas.

Californians responded to the changing geographical and political landscape by establishing several statewide nonprofit organizations, including the San Francisco Bay Area Greenbelt Alliance, the Trust for Public Land, and the Planning and Conservation League. These organizations quickly busied themselves with acquiring land. At the same time, local communities began to organize for the first time and respond to growth in their community. The strongest managed growth victories in this period involved the bluntest of policy instruments: from rejecting freeways to down-zoning properties without compensation (see DeLeon, 1992; Dyble, 2007). The successes of the first wave can be attributed to the emergence of a national bipartisan environmental consensus in the early 1970s, combined with unorganized growth advocates who had not yet formed the organizational networks to resist environmentalists and well-funded local governments who could afford to cut ties with developers.
The first wave came to an end in the early 1980s, when a severe economic recession rocked the nation. The recession followed on the heel of California’s Proposition 13, which hamstrung local governments by limiting property taxes and requiring a 2/3 voter majority to raise taxes. By 1982, an era of national and statewide austerity had commenced. Without reliable funding, environmentalists in all but the richest places had greater difficulty finding allies willing to turn down developers or raise taxes for conservation. In response, new trends in environmental policy emerged. Communities began to use ballot measures. In 1986, there were fully 45 local growth control measures on California ballots (Shigley, 2008). Glickfeld and Levine (1992) identified 907 total managed growth policies in California cities and counties and found that 13.4% had been adopted by ballot measure (p. 33). The biggest ballot box contests, however, were fought in 1990s. 1990 marked the first time that a ballot measure stripped zoning control from county supervisors in Napa County. Despite the protests of property rights advocates, the State Supreme Court upheld the measure (Shigley, 2008). In the years that followed, a dozens of cities and counties approved sweeping urban growth boundaries and voter control of zoning. Alameda, Santa Clara, Contra Costa, Sonoma and Solano Counties, all in the Bay Area, adopted or strengthened policies at this time, as did Ventura County in southern California.

Fulton and coauthors (2000) published one of the most detailed reports on California ballot box initiatives. They built a dataset of 671 measures and initiatives during the period from 1986 to 2000 using data collected for the California Planning & Development Report. They found that slow-growth initiatives maintained a slight edge over pro-growth initiatives, although the success rate declined slightly from 60% to 54%
over the study period. Los Angeles and San Diego had the greatest number of ballot measures, primarily because southern Californian counties made extensive use of pro-growth ballot initiatives, which competed with slow-growth initiatives. Not all policies were successful. Between 1998 and 2000, significant growth measures in Contra Costa County, San Diego County, San Luis Obisbo County, and Sonoma County had failed (DelVecchio, 2000). Yet California remains unique in that citizens have used the ballot box far more extensively than have residents of other states. According to Fulton, “almost everywhere in the nation, ‘ballot-box zoning’ is non-existent, but in California it is common. This divergence occurred over a period of many decades and several milestone court cases. The result is that even in places where land use initiatives are rare, the threat of the ballot changes the political equation for development” (2011).

Although ballot box planning continues, a new era is upon us. Beginning in the late 1990s, and at least partially in response to the threat of losing zoning control to angry voters, planning officials around the state began to actively promote “smart growth planning.” They called for a focus on infill development in urban hubs, where they would fill the remaining open spaces in urban environments rather than building on greenfield land at the urban margin. They argued that these new high density hubs could be efficiently connected to job centers via mass transit because they would achieve economies of scale. Critics appeared on both sides: from residents who opposed infill development, fearing for their quality of life, and from those who opposed downzoning of rural properties.

Local adoption of smart growth came along with several statewide developments in which external pressures influenced conservation. The federal Endangered Species Act
of 1973 mattered little to Californian developers until the 1990s, when several Californian species were listed as endangered. State officials and developers negotiated a new policy apparatus which acted as a compromise between the competing interests. Called “Habitat Conservation Programs,” these plans called for the creation of reserve habitats through easements or purchase of land trusts, in exchange for the destruction of endangered species in other areas (Fulton and Shigley, 2012; Layzer, 2006). A good example of how Habitat Conservation Programs have been used is the city of Coalinga in Fresno County. In the late 1980s, the Department of Fish and Game charged that the city’s growth was killing off the endangered kit fox. Faced with the risk of a court-ordered moratorium, the city spent $350,000 to prepare a plan which would require new development mitigate environmental damages by purchasing land for conservation. Meanwhile, residents and farmers were bitterly opposed (McClatchy, 1994). The plan was finally approved in 2005 and covered some 50 acres. In exchange for these acres, local builders were free to carry on with building. Habitat Conservation Plans have been implemented in many places. In September 2000, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service proposed that 5.4 million acres across the state be designated as critical habitat for the red-legged frog. This came on the heels of a new slate of habitat proposals and listings of unprecedented scope (Krist, 2000).

A second source of external pressure to pursue managed growth more rigorously came from the adoption of two important state laws. In 2006, Assembly Bill 32 required the state to meet greenhouse gas reduction goals to roll back emissions to 1990 levels. In 2008, California State Legislature adopted Senate Bill 375 which required that local jurisdictions promote infill development when possible. At the same time, the State
adopted the Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008. When these laws were finally implemented at the local level, the result has been the creation of regional land use players who have developed non-binding plans, which they have promoted with local communities. While this series of state measures was lauded by city planners, they were seen as controversial by others. In 2011, Tea Party activists across the state began to attend regional and statewide meetings, which they disrupted by challenging the very premise of organized planning. According to Stephens, activists “criticized the plan for forcing residents into dense housing and impinging on suburban lifestyles. Speakers questioned the notion of regional planning, claiming that top-down planning would usurp local control” (2011a). In fact, the most recent wave of popular resistance to smart growth was spurred by these relatively toothless statewide policies rather than by the powerful local measures.

These periods have been described and summarized differently by insiders. Some speakers have emphasized the differences between periods. At an American Planning Association meeting in Los Angeles, the keynote speaker described these periods as follows:

In the growth control era, growth was viewed as a problem – a cancer to be restricted and boxed in. In the growth management era, growth was considered a fiscal problem – permissible so long as it paid for itself. In the smart growth era, growth has been viewed as “an opportunity for achieving desirable development patterns (Fulton, 2012).

Others, however, have been more cautious in their appraisal and rejected the notion that smart growth was a novel phenomenon. Landis noted,

…smart growth is simply the newest adaptation of growth management (which is itself an adaptation of growth control), albeit with a greater
emphasis on regional coordination and promoting housing and transportation choice. Controlling sprawl has long been growth management’s principal spatial objective” (Landis, 2008, p. 411)

The changing eras made a substantial difference in another way. The ballot box era gave all of the power to citizens, while the local county supervisors retain that power in the Smart Growth era.

In short, changes to the structure of the planning field have led to changing political opportunities for pro-growth and slow-growth forces in local communities around the state of California. Yet the constituencies and the basic balances of force remain the same across periods. In the four decades since major reorganization, some cities and counties have adopted strong sets of environmental policies, while others have not. Urbanizing counties are increasingly charged with the task of doing something to preserve dwindling biological resources. At the present time, counties in California are stratified by their growth management and conservation policies. At one end of the spectrum are counties which have adopted some of the most sweeping programs in the nation in both conservation and growth management. At the other end of the spectrum are counties which have none of these policies. In between are a set of counties which have adopted some policies, but which do not have the full range capable of enabling serious conservation. The challenge, however, is to distinguish between symbolic and effective policies.

Land Use Policy Regimes

Faced with the significant problems associated with conflating symbolic and effective policy, the solution is to construct the concept of the land use policy regime.
This concept is closely related to the urban regime school of land use politics. A strand of literature that emerged a decade after the growth machine, regime theory holds that city and local government is relatively weak and must form coalitions or “regimes” with nongovernmental actors (Stone, 1989; Stone, 1993). A regime is “an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions” (Stone 1989, p. 4). An urban regime creates this collaboration through formal institutional networks or informal networks between actors. Within regimes, there is a tendency to adopt the same goals and come to consensus on a distinctive policy direction. Classically, urban regimes bring together politicians and businesspeople with an interest in laissez-faire land use policy. However, under the right conditions, regime theory allows for managed growth policy regimes with homeowner and environmental groups at the center (Stone, 1993).

Scholars have fruitfully used regime theory to study the development of progressive land use. The most well-known example is DeLeon’s (1992) examination of the shift in San Francisco politics between 1960 and 1980 from a regime oriented toward growth to an “antiregime,” which had yet to be consolidated into a progressive regime. He argued that a political culture characterized by three overlapping but distinct progressive communities (liberalism, environmentalism and populism), was able to defeat the pro-growth coalition and thwart plans for growth. However, the consolidation of a progressive regime required yet unforged linkages to certain sectors of the business world including the labor movement and small business. Others elaborated on the regime typology through comparative research (De Socio, 2007; Kilburn, 2004; Turner, 1992). For example, Digaetano and Klemanski describe four variations in regimes depending on
the particular actors involved: exclusionary, growth management, pro-growth, and caretaker regimes (1991). Urban regimes have mainly been applied to cities or metropolitan regions, and not to county government, but there is little reason to think that the concept is limited to the classical urban city government. California Counties are governed by five county supervisors who are comparable to City Council Members. Organizations from across the political spectrum court these politicians, and structurally Counties are just as dependent on outside resources to effectively govern. There are however, some obvious differences, foremost being the unavoidable fact that counties are not all urban and county policy is as much about rural policy as it is about managing the city.

Urban regime theory is a popular metaphor with which to describe the operation of power in local governments because it requires less commitment about the underlying mechanism of political power than does Molotch’s “machine.” Stone originally conceived of regime theory as a theoretical middle ground that combined pluralist and elitist theories. Yet growth machine scholars also embrace the concept. Logan, Whaley and Crowder (1999, 76) argue that urban regime theory is complementary to the urban growth machine theory. Both share a conflict perspective in which those with resources dominate government over the interests of others, and both find that pro-growth conditions tend to dominate even when it undermines the interests of residents.

A challenge for using the urban regime as a theoretical apparatus is that it is hard to empirically identify a regime. Politicians do not admit that they belong to such an entity, nor do their actions always convey clear affiliations. Sometimes there is regular political change which obscures regime connections, sometimes it is difficult to interpret
policies, and some governments make contradictory policies. In response to this critique, I prefer the concept of a “land use policy regime,” which bypasses the need to characterize the relationship between elected officials and outside groups, and instead focuses on the resultant configuration of policies. By choosing to study a policy regime rather than assuming that there is an underlying urban regime, I avoid a number of judgment calls about whether people belong to regimes and how to characterize that regime. Instead, a policy regime is indicative of a configuration of effective policies.

In order to operationalize and calibrate land use policy regimes, it is necessary to make decisions about which policies are most desirable. Based on detailed exploratory casework, I interpret local land use history in the California context as a sequence of stages in which policies are layered to form an interlocking policy regime capable of regulating the land market. By describing growth management as a sequence of stages, I mean to recognize the shared starting point from which all local governments begin. For all counties, the sequence of adopting (or thwarting) a managed growth policy regime begins in the mid twentieth century with the emergence of local planning and regulation. At that time, the rural land that was about to be beset with postwar economic boom was generously zoned for development. Property owners could build and subdivide with little difficulty. All records indicate that there were no managed growth policy regimes in 1950.

The first stage in the sequence for controlling growth is the establishment of political control over the speed or location of future urban development through an urban growth boundary, an urban service boundary, an urban limit line, or a cap on housing permits. Urban growth boundaries are the strongest type of policy and are commonly
found in the San Francisco Bay and Central Valley areas (Gerber and Phillips, 2004). Typically, they are created first in central cities first and later for the county as a whole, such that reinforcing policies protect the entirety of the county. Caps on the issuance of annual development permits were first used in California in the Sonoma County city of Petaluma in 1970. The Construction Industry Association filed suit against Sonoma County and the city of Petaluma, but policy was upheld by the court. A number of cities and counties across the state have experimented with the cap, some in conjunction with other policies (Fulton, 2001b).

The weakness of policies in this stage is that they are susceptible to circumvention by county supervisors, who may change boundaries or issue conditional use permits for construction outside of boundaries. The policy itself must be calibrated properly to slow market growth in order for it to be effective, and many are not (Landis, 2008). Some boundaries are set generously to limit growth only in the most exuberant of housing booms. For example, consider Sutter County, California, an agricultural county just north of Sacramento. The county has an urban growth boundary in place, which demarcates the areas within which urban growth is allowed. However, this line may prohibit indiscriminate suburbanization, but it has not been used to slow growth; the boundaries are generous and county supervisors have regularly approved outside development. As these policies are susceptible to manipulation, secondary protective policies are required to reinforce the boundary or cap.

The second stage of the managed growth sequence is to lock the desired boundary or cap into position through stripping supervisors of zoning control and requiring a popular vote. Sometimes a vote is required to rezone agricultural land, and sometimes the
vote is required for moving the urban growth boundary. This second stage is nearly always achieved through the ballot box, as local governments typically would not voluntarily surrender zoning control.

Achieving stage one and stage two of the managed growth policy sequence substantially mitigates the risk of sprawl, but environmentalists typically seek a third stage: the permanent legal preservation of remaining private parcels through the acquisition of land trusts, greenbelts, or conservation easements. Specific parcels can be preserved through the market purchase of land and the creation of one of several types of land trusts. The definitive study of California open space was conducted by Press who counted locally purchased land trusts (1998; 2002). Adding together purchases by cities, counties, special districts, deals brokered by local governments to give land to the State Park system and land trusts, 1.2 million acres of land were acquired between 1920 and 2000 (Press, 2002, p. 15). Establishment of land trusts is the only non-policy element of growth management in that land trusts can bypass the political process. Initiative to create land trusts can be taken by local government, grassroots environmentalist support, or elite entrepreneurs, with or without cooperation. This accounts for significant portions of our preservation efforts, and is an ongoing process (Press, 2002). Press’ research contributes the tally of open space acreage used in this study although I analyze the data differently. Instead of creating an index of acreage and population, I calculate the open space as a percentage of total acres and set the threshold at 5%. A second type of stage 3 policy is the creation of an open space taxation program. Some communities have adopted measures raising taxes to fund open space districts. For example, in 2000, Placer County residents approved a plan that would raise the sales tax by a quarter-cent in order to raise
$8.3 million to fund the Placer Legacy Open Space and Agricultural Conservation Program (Shigley, 2000).

To summarize, growth management was historically implemented in three stages, each with a specific set of policy options for enforcement. See the table below.

Table 2: Three Stages of the Managed Growth Sequence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1</th>
<th>Stage 2</th>
<th>Stage 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban Limit Line</td>
<td>Voter Control over Agricultural Zoning</td>
<td>&gt;5% locally acquired Land Trusts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Service Boundary</td>
<td>Voter Control over all Zoning</td>
<td>Open Space Taxation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Cap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Growth Boundary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Much of the existing scholarship documenting the adoption of such policies in California has relied primarily on surveys (Glickfeld and Levine, 1992; Clark and Goetz, 1994; Lewis and Neiman, 2009), which, while useful, are prone to error. In addition to scholarly surveys, the State of California Governor’s Office of Planning and Research conducts an annual survey of California cities and counties (2010). However, vaguely worded survey questions and poorly informed respondents have produced contradictions and inconsistencies in our record of these land use outcomes. San Diego County is a good example. According to Glickfeld and Levine’s (1992) survey, the County of San Diego answered “yes” to the question of whether the “city established an urban limit line or greenbelt, other than the boundaries of your city, beyond which residential, commercial and/or industrial development is not currently permitted” (p. 97 and p. 141). However, the 2006 California Book of Lists identifies a list of “jurisdictions with a formal urban
growth boundary (urban limit line, urban service boundary, etc)” and San Diego County is not represented (p. 131-137). The 2008 California Book of Lists did not ask the same question, but did ask whether the general plan dealt with urban boundaries, and again, San Diego County was not included.

Based on the weakness of our existing data, a better approach is to study actual policy documents to confirm the existence of effective policies. For this reason, information about county policy was constructed from investigation of three publicly available sources, the municipal code, the general plan, and local land use measures. These documents govern local jurisdiction and they present the most accurate account of which policies a locality may have accepted. The municipal codes are extensive documents and are maintained online on most county websites or sometimes in one of several online databases. These codes were extensive and made browsing prohibitive, and thus my method was to search using keywords that corresponded to the categories of reference. General plans require the county to explain how it handles conservation and growth management, therefore listing the policies in place. The most recent general plan documents were obtained for nearly every county. State law requires that general plans consist of several elements which much address the local approach to planning, development, and conservation. These elements include the land use element, the natural resources and open space element, and the housing element. In practice, the housing element of the general plan provided one of the best sources of information about these policies because California State law requires the housing element to “address and, where appropriate and legally possible, remove governmental constraints to the maintenance, improvement, and development of housing” (Government Code Section 65583c3). It
must also be updated more often than other elements and therefore is more readily available.

I concluded that a policy was present when I found textual evidence of a policy which applied to the entire county, excluding, for instance, community plans or suggestive language. There were some rural counties for which either the general plans or the municipal codes were unavailable (though there were no instances which lacked both). In these cases, I compared existing survey data with available local documents and reports in local newspapers to confirm the selection of policies. The “land trusts” category is a measure based on data from Press (2002), which tallied the amount of land held in trust at the county level. Open space measures were collected based on primary research into county politics and from the Trust for Public Land (2014), which maintains a database of California land policies which have involved the purchase of land or easements for preservation. This research is current as of December 2014. Based on this definition and method, the list of counties using growth management is somewhat different in this research than the lists created in statewide surveys such as the California Book of Lists since 1990. For example, no matter what survey respondents said, the documentation shows that San Diego County has an urban service boundary.

Assuming that these policy elements are part of a sequence, it follows that places can adopt some or all of these measures. Furthermore, it is possible that there are different reasons for adopting different steps within this sequence. Probably most significant for this argument, there is more than one type of political process where these politics are resolved. The first, as I have already mentioned, is through the local initiative process. Groups that believe they have a chance in a local referendum may use this
system to initiate a measure. Thus the political process for this type of policy requires a campaign and a constituency with the capacity and willingness to pursue such politics. The other way that these types of policies are adopted is through the adoption of local ordinances. These ordinances are approved through by local elected officials, often through the general plan process, under public scrutiny, and with pressure from private interest groups who may campaign, mobilize supporters, or initiate legal action.

In the figure below, the sequence of policies has been mapped for each county, showing interesting geographical variation. Primarily, stage two and stage three policies are clustered around the San Francisco Bay Area. Stage one policies are more widely dispersed, though mostly concentrated in Southern California.
The next step is to create a threshold that separates counties with weak, unsupported boundaries from those which have layered additional supporting policies. Based on the assumptions described above and extensive case study research, I divided all counties into two sets: those with both growth management and more than one reinforcing policy of either stage two or three, and those without. Setting the threshold at one revealed ten managed growth policy regimes. See the table below.
Table 3: Land Use Policy Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Laissez-faire Policy Regime</th>
<th>Managed Growth Policy Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpine, Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, El Dorado, Del Norte, Fresno, Glenn, Humboldt,</td>
<td>Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Mateo, Santa Clara,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Kings, Lake, Lassen, Los Angeles, Madera, Mariposa, Mendocino, Merced,</td>
<td>Santa Cruz, Sonoma, Solano, Ventura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modoc, Mono, Nevada, Orange, Placer, Plumas, Riverside, Sacramento, San Benito, San</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardino, San Diego, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Shasta, Sierra,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siskiyou, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, Tulare, Tuolumne, Yolo, Yuba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Though I have set the threshold at stage two, there are two other possible thresholds to be considered. It could be set at stage one, whereby any growth management policy counts, regardless of supporting stages. Or we could set the threshold at stage three, whereby only the most protective and reinforced policies would be considered. See the figure below for an illustration of the geospatial variation of alternative configurations.

Figure 4: Map - Managed Growth Policy Regimes
In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that only by setting the threshold at stage two can we exclude all cases known to have done a poor job of protecting the environment, while including all cases known to have implemented strong environmental protection.

Managed Growth Policy Regime

The managed growth policy regime includes all counties with stage two or three policies. Primarily, it includes the eight counties which touch the San Francisco Bay: Marin, Sonoma, Napa, Solano, Contra Costa, Alameda, Santa Clara and San Mateo; a ninth Bay Area County which does not directly touch the Bay: Santa Cruz; and one Southern California County: Ventura County. In this section, I argue that setting the threshold at Stage two is ideal because a) one of the most protected counties in America
(Marin County) achieved only Stage two managed growth, and b) stage three policies do not appear to be significantly more effective than Stage two on the whole.

The San Francisco Bay Area is the birthplace of managed growth politics. Although the city of San Francisco is its own city-county, and its politicians are not responsible for the growth or conservation that happens in the neighboring nine counties, San Franciscans nurture the environmental organizations that contribute to land use battles across the state. These organizations date back to the turn of the twentieth centuries when San Franciscans joined John Muir’s newly-founded Sierra Club in an attempt to block the Hetch Hetchy River dam project in the Sierra Nevada Mountains (see Dreyfus, 2008). In the more recent past, San Francisco-based groups provided the tradition, the finances, and the science that were exported to other Bay Area frontiers including the Save the Bay Campaign, People for Open Space, and the Greenbelt Congress (Gilliam, 1985). Although it did not always come in time to save major green spaces, and sprawl has escaped into the central valley, all of the counties surrounding the Bay Area eventually adopted managed growth policy regimes. Marin County was the first to adopt strong environmental policies, which protected prime open space throughout the booming 1970s and 1980s. But, by the late 1980s, numerous edge cities had sprung up in the south and east bay, environmental movements had success in those counties as well. Now, all eight of the Bay Area counties have managed growth policy regimes to preserve what remains.

Marin County is a useful case with which to check the assumptions of the managed growth regime threshold. Marin environmentalists seized control of local government earlier than anywhere else in the state, setting up a system of stringent land
use corridors that effectively functioned as an urban growth boundary (stage one) in the early 1970s (Dyble, 2007; Griffin, 1998). Marin residents would go on to support their plan through the creation of land trusts and the purchase of conservation easements. Today, Marin’s environmentalists boast that some 80% of the land in the county is preserved forever; a remarkable feat for any county, much less one with the highest average property value in the state. What is remarkable about Marin County is that the managed growth coalition never buttressed their corridor system by instituting voter control. They never stripped their county supervisors of zoning control because, after 1972, their coalition controlled the board of supervisors. Because they implemented their managed growth regime in the slow growth era, their actions predated the invention of voter control. Marin County has clearly done all that is necessary to protect the land. In the absence of voter control, aggressive spending on land trusts and easements accomplished the same thing.

It may not seem remarkable that the wealthiest residential counties in the Bay Area slowed the growth machine. But perhaps more remarkably, the rural farming counties of Sonoma, Napa and Solano adopted similar growth policies. In Napa County, there is no official urban growth boundary, but instead voters approved a series of sweeping growth control measures that accomplish the same goals. In 1975, Napa County passed its first general plan. They put the measure to a popular vote and residents selected the slowest growth option. In 1980, Measure A was passed, capping unincorporated growth at 1% per year (Nissen and Eisele, 2009). In 1990, Measure J was proposed (before the proliferation of urban growth boundaries in the late 1990s). A vintner named Volker Eisele, one of the initial architects of Measure J, would go on to sit on the
Greenbelt Alliance Board of Directors (Greenbelt Alliance, 2012). Measure J stripped county supervisors of control of 85% of the unincorporated territory, requiring a popular vote to change the zoning or the general plan (Ingram, 1990). Property owners filed a suit, but the California Supreme Court upheld the measure in 1995. It turned out to be a particularly effective tool. Between 1990 and 2008, there were 14 votes to rezone agricultural land and only six were approved. Measure J was renewed in 2008 as Measure P (Jensen, 2012). In 2006, more than 54% of voters approved the creation of the Napa County Regional Park and Open Space District (California Planning & Development Report, 2006). In 2008, Measure P was approved, extending the Measure J protections for fifty years (Greenbelt Alliance, 2012).

A final interesting case is Sonoma County. In 1972, environmentalists tried to take control of Sonoma County, as they had in neighboring Marin County, and won some seats on the board of supervisors. By the mid-1970s, they had a slim majority and began crafting a general plan that would preserve open space and concentrate growth in cities. They called for a moratorium on rezoning until the plan was completed, but it backfired. In 1976, the Sonoma County Taxpayer Association initiated a massive recall drive. Environmentalist Supervisors William Kortum and Charles Hinkle were recalled by voters and replaced with pro-development supervisors (Mason, 2014). As a result, Sonoma grew more rapidly than its neighbors, with the city of Santa Rosa developing from a small redwood town into a thriving San Francisco suburb city with an active downtown (Walters, 1986). Growth advocates and farmers who feared regulation worked together to defeat Measure C in 1984 (Gilliam, 1985). By the late 1980s, environmentalists tried again as, county supervisors were working to update the general
plan. The planning department reported that several areas around Petaluma and Sebastapol were at or near buildout (Brewer, 1986b). They were working on developing what they called “greenbelt zoning,” which would take farmland that had been designated urban reserve and rezone it as 1 unit per 20 acres. Farmers were furious and led by Henry Matteri, they formed the Committee to Save Agriculture to preserve their property value (Brewer, 1986a). However, in the next decade, growth advocates were firmly defeated.

Between 1990 and 2010, all of the cities in Sonoma County adopted urban growth boundaries. It began in 1990 with Measure D in Cotati and Measure G in Santa Rosa. Both won by large margins (San Francisco Chronicle, 1990). In 1994, Windsor voters elected new Councilmen who favored an urban growth boundary, and candidates interpreted the results as a referendum in favor of slow-growth (Hart, 1994). In 1996 and 1999, Santa Rosa voters strengthened the urban growth boundary, eventually requiring voter approval for change. Eventually, even growth advocates embraced the use of urban growth boundaries. By 1998, pro-growth advocates in Rohnert Park slated a 20-year urban growth boundary (Measure A) that passed despite opposition from environmentalists who would have preferred a more restrictive policy. Vice-Mayor Vidak-Martinez supported the policy and argued that it was just as strict as other urban growth boundaries (Vidak-Martinez, 1998). Similarly, in 2002, Windsor residents considered Measure X which would limit residential units to 75 per year on top of the urban growth boundary that already existed. However, representatives from the Greenbelt Alliance and the Sonoma County Conservation Action were opposed to the cap, which they argued would not do enough to limit sprawl inside the urban growth boundary line (Brown and Kortum, 2002). In 2010, the city of Petaluma strengthened their urban
growth boundary, with more than 65% of voters extending the boundary to 2025 (Stephens, 2010a). In 2010, Cloverdale was the final city to adopt an urban growth boundary in Sonoma County, with 56% approving Measure Q (Stephens, 2010a).

The managed growth coalition that had secured many city-level victories was led by the Sonoma County Conservation Action group. The group was well organized, with canvassers who regularly promoted growth management throughout the community (Fraga, 2005). The group clearly enjoyed popular support. In 1998, 22 out of 30 of their endorsements for office won throughout the county. In a letter calling for the resignation of the Director of the California Department of Fish and Game, they assessed their own position: “we enjoy the support of thousands of member households and exert leverage on a political process which would otherwise be dominated by economic interests and political insiders” (Kortum, 1999). These activists, however, lost a significant battle in 2000 when they tried to implement a countywide policy with an initiative called the Rural Heritage Initiative. The policy would require a vote to rezone unincorporated parcels for 30 years. The Greenbelt Alliance supported the policy, arguing the local supervisors could undo slow-growth efforts with just a 3 to 2 vote to change the general plan. Yet others were opposed, including county supervisors who thought they had done a fine job of complementing city growth boundaries with county growth boundaries (Shigley, 2000). Farmers were even more opposed and spent more than environmentalists in the run-up to the election (Fulton 2000). In November of 2000, the plan failed at the ballots. Fulton argued that because most of the cities already had boundaries, “voters could not easily make the connection between growth boundaries in their cities and the countywide […] measure” (2000).
Sonoma County managed growth activists reinforced their managed growth policy regime in 2006 when they approved Measure F, with 76% of voters in support. The measure extended a sales tax which was used to purchase open space for the Sonoma County Agricultural Preservation and Open Space District (Martin, 2006). Despite these significant policies, the Greenbelt Alliance considers Sonoma’s protection to be weak compared to other counties in the Bay Area. They categorize 49% of the county as “low protection” (Greenbelt Alliance, 2012). Sonoma lacks a county level urban growth boundary that is supported by voter control. Instead, the county has committed to what amounts to an urban service boundary in its general plan. In the Land Use Element, LU-5a, the county promises to “neither approve extension of urban services into any Community Separator nor approve connection of any lot in a Community Separator to existing urban services…” But at the same time, LU-2.1 promised to accommodate nearly 20,000 residents in the unincorporated area (beginning in 2000).

Laissez-Faire Policy Regime

Laissez-faire policy regimes are those that are characterized by a pattern of rapid growth led by market pressures with no fixed boundaries to constrain the pattern. As described above, they may be places that have experimented with some forms of conservation policy (i.e., stage one policy). It is possible to see small-scale experimentation, as in the case of the habitat conservation programs described earlier in this chapter. However, in the laissez-faire growth policy regime, the policy combination is permissive, even if it is not absolutely laissez-faire.
While the San Francisco Bay Area has generally adopted similar strong growth control measures, Southern California has embraced laissez-faire land use policy regimes. Officially, the region is demarcated by the northern Border of San Luis Obispo, Kern and San Bernardino Counties, a horizontal line that splits the state just below the thirty-sixth standard parallel. The ten southernmost counties include the three mentioned above and Santa Barbara, Ventura, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Diego and Imperial Counties. While there are some managed growth policies in the region (Ventura County, and to some extent Santa Barbara county exhibit the strongest policies), most counties have no firm boundaries, voter control, or strong land preservation programs.

The San Joaquin Valley, a vast, fertile, and rapidly urbanizing region, has also pursued laissez-faire land use policy. Along with the Sacramento Valley to the North, it forms what Californians call the “Central Valley,” a region so agriculturally rich it produces one-third of all of the produce grown in the United States. Combined, the San Joaquin Valley and the Sacramento Valley contain the largest amount of Class one soil in the world, with ideal temperatures and 300 days of sunshine per year (Bittman, 2012). The San Joaquin in particular connects eight counties: Fresno, Kern, Kings, Madera, Merced, San Joaquin, Stanislaus and Tulare Counties. While they all have substantial agriculture, urbanization is also present, with several large urban cities developing amid the farmland.

A good example of the type of growth-oriented policy found in this region is Kern County. Just North of Los Angeles, in the southernmost part of the Central Valley, the county’s northern border, along with San Luis Obispo and San Bernardino, align to form the horizontal and largely symbolic boundary which divides northern and southern
California. Its population was just over 850,000 in 2012, with almost half of that number living in the Bakersfield, the county seat. This county has very little successful growth management policy (Shigley, 2009a) and resembles its southern neighbors. Not only has the county avoided making hard choices, but the county seat of Bakersfield has aggressively courted development. During the housing boom, the city grew rapidly. In 2005, despite having ample undeveloped land within the city’s sphere of influence, the city bid to expand the sphere of influence by 112 square miles (nearly doubling the footprint of the city). The Bakersfield City Council approved the expansion in October. They were planning to grow by 280,000 people within twenty years. There were reports that the local Sierra Club had an arrangement whereby they would not file a lawsuit if developers paid $1,200 per unit for air pollution mitigation. Developers happily paid (Shigley, 2005).

Environmentalists tried to make inroads in the central valley, but their work has been largely futile. For example, the Sierra Club is active in San Joaquin County, and consequently several San Joaquin cities have experimented with growth control. In 2004, a series of competing proposals went before Stockton residents. A slim majority of Stockton residents approved a Sierra Club-backed urban growth boundary that solidified their existing urban service boundary (50.4%) and required voter approval for changes to the boundary. Yet at the same time, a developer initiative, Measure X, ensured that 1,000 acres of land slated for construction remained within the boundary. (California Planning & Development Report, 2004). In the city of Tracy, a measure that would have implemented a 750 unit-per-year housing cap failed by a narrow margin in 2000 (California Planning & Development Report, 2000). However, a less restrictive measure
passed. In 2004, two developer initiatives to overturn the measure both failed (California Planning & Development Report, 2004). In short, despite some victories, the county maintains a laissez-faire land use policy regime.

South of San Joaquin County is Merced County, where slow growth supporters have not been as successful. Merced County has an urban growth boundary of sorts. It is called the “Specific Urban Development Plan” and includes a boundary where the county has approved urban growth. It is not particularly tightly drawn around urban places, nor is it tightly maintained. In 2010, slow-growth supporters sought to strengthen the urban growth boundary by creating voter control over agricultural rezoning. They collected the required signatures for Measure C, “Voter Confirmation of Zoning Changes.” It was originally called the “Save Farmland Initiative” and would require a vote to rezone agricultural parcels or open space of ten or more acres. County supervisors put their own measure on the ballot at the same time, Measure D, which they called “The Right to Vote on Residential Expansion.” It copied Measure C but exempted several thousand acres. Both proposals failed. Measure C won only 43% of the vote. (Stephens, 2010a)

Stanislaus County long looked similar to the rest of the Central Valley, with laissez-faire government dominated by farmers. However, some cities adopted modest growth protections. For example, residents of Modesto passed growth management ordinances in 1979 and again in 1997. These measures were at least somewhat successful; in 2008, the California Department of Conservation reported that Stanislaus cities had achieved the highest density of all the San Joaquin Valley counties (8.2 persons per acres). However, developers balked at mandates for increased density, and county officials were reluctant to deploy them (Stapley, 2011b).
The county adopted political control over agriculture in 2008 through Measure E. This measure required voters to approve rezoning of agricultural land to residential land for a period of 30 years. Despite running without much formal opposition, proponents raised $40,000 to campaign for the measure (Hoang, 2011). Later, in 2011, there was a great deal of discussion about creating urban growth boundaries throughout the county. Nine area city mayors attended a conference and agreed to each draw up plans for urban growth boundaries (Stapley 2011). However, even with the support of a councilman, they couldn’t get an urban limit line in 2011 (Stapley, 2011a). Instead, the Local Agency Formation Committee (LAFCO), which governs annexation for city expansion, put in place a policy requiring that cities which desire to annex farmland for residential construction provide agricultural mitigation at a one-to-one ratio. If a city adopted an urban growth boundary, LAFCO would drop the mitigation requirement. The chairman of the Farmland working group thought the policy would make things “better for everyone” (Stapley, 2012).

Further north in the central valley, Sacramento County has both an “urban service area” and an urban service boundary. Sacramento County also has an urban service boundary, a rare victory for environmentalists during the 1993 general plan update. In fact, the language of the policy itself seems clear enough:

The urban service boundary […] indicated the ultimate boundary of the urban area in the unincorporated county. The boundary is based upon jurisdictional, natural, and environmental constraints to growth. It is intended to be a permanent growth boundary not subject to modification except under extraordinary circumstances (Sacramento County Land Use Element, p. 19; amended 2011).
In this case, the county’s urban service boundary was treated like an urban growth boundary, and by 2005, reporters had taken to calling it an urban growth boundary. Although there was no law requiring it, major expansion efforts were regularly put up to a vote. However, the boundary was initially set extremely generously and included 95,000 acres of open land, with huge parcels voted in at the last minute to appease developers (Vellinga, 1999b).

Developers were not concerned about the boundary, suggesting that they were convinced it was merely symbolic. In fact, it actually may have benefitted land speculators. When the urban service boundary was approved, an investor name Angelo Tsakapoulis acquired nearly 5,000 acres of land just outside the boundary. He confidently offered this to a newspaper reporter: “It will be opened up for this reason: It is not prime farmland. It does not have vernal pools. And it is attractive for people to live in and for industry to go to, because it is rolling, and it has some trees” (Vellinga, 1999a).

Tsakapoulis kept his word. In 2005, he was working to prepare a pair of initiatives for voters. Move the urban service line to include what had grown to 9000 acres, and he would use 20% of the profits to provide 275 million dollars in private money to build a new stadium in the city (Vellinga, 2005). However, the project fell through when some property owners balked. But he doggedly fought on, offering to build anywhere the City would offer to extend the urban growth boundary (Vellinga, Hardy and Graswich, 2005).

There were several similar pro-growth campaigns. In 2000, Sacramento voters faced an organized campaign to extend the boundary to encompass a proposed gated senior community. The developer spent $2 million on the project, but almost three-quarters of voters rejected it (Philp, 2000). In 2005, former US Representative, Doug Ose
requested to build on 2000 acres. Ose and several other landowners wrote their measure to change the USB to a UGB (after enlarging it to include their property). They named it the “The Farmland Protection and Planning Initiative of 2005.” However, the plan would shrink the already lenient buffer zones adopted by county supervisors (Vellinga, 2005). The county has also allowed significant urban expansion. In 2000, the city of Elk Grove was formed in the south of Sacramento, with 54,000 people (California Planning & Development Report, 2000). By 2011, the county had allowed significant urban expansion, and showed little sign of slowing. County officials settled on a general plan update that did a little to implement managed growth while potentially opening up 20,000 additional acres to expansion (Stephens, 2011b). Stephens (2011) estimated that 550,000 out of 1.4 million residents lived in unincorporated Sacramento.

The remainder of California includes all of the relatively rural counties in northern California excluding the San Francisco Bay Area and the Central Valley. These areas are characterized by significant holdings of state and federal property, significant forestry industries, low populations, and less population growth pressure. Most of these counties have stage zero growth management policy. However, counties along the coast (Del Norte, Humboldt and Mendocino Counties) and some counties in the Sierra Nevada Mountains (El Dorado, Nevada, and Placer Counties), have experienced growth pressure. In these counties, growth interests usually win out even when battles are protracted (see the account of Nevada County in Chapter 2).

A good example is El Dorado County. El Dorado County nominally has an urban limit line, but the county has been described as “aggressively approving development” during the 1990s (Vellinga, 1999). In fact, the strongest form of growth management in El
Dorado County was Measure Y in 1998. This policy prevented construction of any project with five or more homes which would contribute to traffic gridlock, at least unless developers were willing to pay for infrastructure improvements (Philp, 2000). In 2008, voters extended the measure. In 2014, developers tried to circumvent the effects of Measure Y by proposing a new measure (Measure N), which would repair and widen roads, opening the door for greater growth. Environmentalists responded by pushing two measures. In the spirit of Measure Y, Measure M also tied growth to traffic and supported by the same County supervisor who wrote Measure Y. It would “prevent the county from rezoning rural residential properties for higher-density housing construction” (Hecht, 2014), but only in places where the California Department of Transportation showed gridlocked traffic. The county also sought to prevent several specific projects through initiative with Measure O. Voters rejected both of the slow growth policies, but they also rejected the developer policy (California Planning & Development Report, 2014)

Analysis

What evidence is there that the sequence is a legitimate way to understand policy pursuit? Why not atomize these policies into a series of equivalent choices? One reason is that the environmentalists who have organized these political campaigns envision the desirable outcome as the adoption of a series of interrelated policies. The Greenbelt Alliance (2012) describes in some detail the risks they see facing a region that already has an array of policy protection measures:

The Bay Area has had tremendous success in protecting our agricultural and wild lands. But our work is not yet complete. Over 322,000 acres remain at risk of development. Some of these places lack protection
measures. Others may have strong protections in place but experience repeated attempts to loosen or remove those protections due to high development pressure. And policies expire; most protection measures are put in place for a set amount of time, perhaps 20 years, and must then be renewed. (Greenbelt Alliance, 2012, p. 4)

In their system for generating maps of the risk faced by local counties, the progression of policy options that they see as essential to successful preservation is evident. They categorize protection as low, medium, high, or permanent. Medium protection is land which has policies that protect it from development, but for which exceptions can be made through “special permit.” High protection is land through which those policies firmly prohibit development. Permanent protection, though, is the category of land for which development potential has been stripped through conservation easements or land trusts (Greenbelt Alliance, 2012).

This categorization scheme recognizes the difference between urban growth boundaries which have been shored up through voter control or other means and urban growth boundaries which have not and are amenable to change through a specific request. For example, agricultural Merced County has an urban growth boundary. However, in 2010, slow-growth activists sought to strengthen the boundary through Measure C, “Voter Confirmation of Zoning Changes” (Stephens, 2010). The measure failed and the urban growth boundary is more permeable in Merced than in places that have successfully shored up initial policy victories. Similarly, the County of San Luis Obispo adopted a 3% growth limit in 1989, following the city of San Luis Obispo in 1980. Of course, 3% is an extraordinarily high number, especially in rural San Luis Obispo. This does a good job of illustrating the importance of adding additional protections to a single growth cap. In November of 2000, activists from “Go SLO,” proposed a ballot measure
that promised strong urban growth boundary (Fulton, 1999c). Measures were slated in Paso Robles and the county which required an election to rezone agricultural, open space or rural land (Shigley, 2000); however, they failed. Stage one managed growth is a first step, but alone it is weak.

This point is underscored by managed growth opponents. The Reason Foundation, a libertarian think tank in Los Angeles produced a deeply critical report in 1999 during the height of the new urban growth boundary period. The report was a national study, but most of their evidence came from California. In a 66-page policy report, the foundation noted with concern that,

In Boulder and Napa Counties, city-based growth boundaries or service areas were supplemented by highly restrictive county land-use regulation that complemented the urban-containment policies of individual cities to create an urban-growth boundary. Boulder and Napa Counties are thus hybrids. Even though the boundaries were not regional in scope and implemented by one agency, they became effective regional-limit lines when complemented by county-level policies.

A single growth policy was bad enough, but the combination of interlocking policies could create regional level protection for those places where environmentalists were coordinated enough to win the required battles.

Similarly, the California Association of Realtors issued an alarmed report in 1997 in opposition to urban growth boundaries. The report was released just as ballot box growth control measures were peaking in the state. It provided a language for realtors to use when they opposed the growth boundaries. It cast the Greenbelt Alliance as a villain, and emphasized “inflexibility,” “overcrowding” and “leapfrogging and hobby farms” as
risks associated with urban growth boundaries. How can a realtor deal with the local threat? The policy report had some helpful suggestions:

Be Proactive—The alternatives to UGB’s take more time and consideration than UGB’s. (Remember, simplicity is one of the most attractive things about UGB’s.) If activists begin to circulate petitions for a UGB in your community, you may have already lost the battle. […] Stay Involved--This is the best way to be proactive. REALTORS® who sit on planning commissions, city councils or other bodies, or who just have a visible presence in the halls of their local government, are much more effective in conveying the concerns of the REALTOR® community than those who show up at the eleventh hour. But what do I do if an urban growth boundary proposal catches on in my community? The response to a UGB is very much the same as to any other issue that REALTORS® oppose but which becomes popular locally. The first thing to do is organize the local REALTOR® community and reach out to other constituent groups to form a coalition. For example, local building industry associations, labor organizations, chambers of commerce and property owner groups should be approached. You will also want to communicate your position to the elected officials and the voters in your community. Finally, your response will depend on the circumstances in your community that allowed the UGB to become popular. For example, if traffic congestion is the problem, REALTORS® may argue that leapfrogging to other communities will further exacerbate the situation. (California Association of Realtors, 1997)

These reports suggest that pro-growth organizations are also aware of the importance of growth boundaries and supporting boundaries, and deeply concerned with their potential for managing urban growth.

The concept of the land use regime is useful because, for land use, it is the long game that matters most: creating stable policies requires not just occasional or temporary victories but permanent victories with consequent enforcement. In land use, local governments do far more than just sign off on the big ordinances that matter most. They draw the boundaries for their policies, they permit individual projects, and they make myriad smaller decisions that affect residents. The concept of urban regime is a simple
way for a scholar who has read through so many details about a government to make a qualitative generalization about the thrust of policy direction and the underlying relationship between outside interests groups and political incumbents. If we focus on every individual policy, we may miss the long game in urban politics which is the slow shaping of the landscape.

Critics might complain that this land use policy regime concept misses some classes of policy that are more difficult to measure. The most straight-forward way to slow growth is to rezone parcels. Though the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires “just compensation” for those whose property is “taken,” rezoning without providing compensation has been deemed legal when conducted through a community planning process that treats similar properties consistently. Despite its legality, zoning is rarely done in large scale because of the political expense of alienating voters by stripping perceived property value. At the same time, it is extremely difficult to systematically compare zoning control, and thus it is omitted from this study. I also omit the small role that the Local Agency Formation Committee (LAFCO) can play in growth management. Each county has its own LAFCO which governs the annexation of land by urban cities. In some instances, the LAFCO’s have been used to regulate growth, such as by prohibiting the annexation of farmland by urban centers (Handel and Sokolow, 1995). While LAFCO is effectively used in the Bay Area, it is only rarely used as the sole regulatory body and therefore is not included.

However, an exhaustive comparison of land use policy invites many technical difficulties. A complete analysis of environmental policy in counties would triangulate written land use policies within each plan and sub-plan, their implementation in various
processes, and the complete historical record of zoning and development decisions. It is impossible to accurately measure these outputs as information at this level is not available. As GIS data improves, future scholars might tackle the construction of a long term historical record of yearly zoning changes in order to create a more precise land use policy regime. In the absence of complete data, the challenge is to construct an appropriate series of indicators that predicts how local governments respond to other environmental policies. For this reason, it is useful to theorize a land use policy regime as an ideal type (Weber, 1949); a category that captures the orientation a county might have when it approaches land use. I use the indicators available to suggest membership in a broader regime of policies, and assume that unobserved policies follow the same pattern.

In the next section of this chapter, I estimate the effectiveness of land use policy regimes versus traditional means of quantitative analysis. Data on population growth, change in farmland, and density measurements, confirms the utility of the slow-growth policy regime. I show that by using the policy regime concept, scholars can isolate effective polices from symbolic policies in land use debates.

First, measuring the success of local environmental policies presents a challenge. One good measure is the amount of population growth. However, we are not interested in the absolute measure of urbanization, because urbanization that happens within cities by creating denser hubs is not as concerning as the sprawling low-density suburbs that have historically spread across California. For the purpose of this analysis, I selected population change between 1992 and 2010. Population data was acquired from the California Department of Finance, Demographic Research Unit.
To show how this population growth was accommodated, I first examine the rate of farmland loss. I examine changes in acres of farmland during that happened concurrently with the population growth noted above. Based on the available data, I selected change in acres of farmland between 1987 and 2007. The farmland statistic ignores loss of farmland for reasons related to the economics of farming. That is, different counties have different agricultural compositions, and the various costs
associated with these different products might play a role in the loss of farmland. For example, when water supplies are restricted, farmers may sell off land that they can no longer cultivate. However, these problems are the price of large scale comparison.

Market pressure may have led farmers to sell land, but, at a large scale, we can assume that the transformation of this land to low-density development depends on the policies of the locality which may pursue growth or conservation.
Discussion

One of the consequences of adopting the concept of the land use policy regime is that the unit of analysis becomes broader than the individual city. Individual cities matter, but one city means little if the rest of the county goes on building around them. Using the county level brings us closer to a regional perspective, which urban planners and environmentalists have identified as necessary for grappling with development issues. Lewis wrote about the “scant literature on county governments” (p. 37) and suggests that counties are likely to act more like regional cities than fragmented bedroom communities.
This is especially true of strong counties that retain land use control over significant amounts of land. Lewis argues that counties like those in California, where there are many small incorporated cities, the county becomes the "residual" government (p. 37). He writes, "...The county does not closely enough approximate monopoly control of land to serve as a proactive regulator of development." Yet this critique misses the boat by ignoring the ever crucial points of seeding new cities and conserving large scale ecosystems. The battle over private land is conducted at the county level.

Scholars have extensively studied city policy in California (Lewis and Neiman, 2009). However, county policy plays an important role in the patchwork system of land use governance, because counties govern the unincorporated areas of a region. As in the rest of the United States, California is fragmented into numerous cities, counties, and special agencies that make independent decisions about land use without planning for regional consequences (Pallagst, 2007). Counties are important to the ecological health of a region because they govern nearly all of the undeveloped private land in a region. When the conditions are right, California counties have urbanized rapidly by seeding new towns through lax policies and zoning (Olin, 1991).

At the same time, counties are not cities in another form, as has been assumed in studies which combine city and county policy. One of the most important reasons is that the stakes are different. Cities can reach a stage of buildout (meaning that they have filled the footprint of their territory, and have no potential for significant future outward growth) which effectively removes issues of conservation from the policy agenda and renders urban growth as a question of renewal, revitalization and redistribution within the city. Others cities which do not reach this stage of buildout nonetheless experience a
stage where developers have built so much housing that as migrants from other urban areas move in to exurban regions, they flood local communities and can easily adopt NIMBY growth measures. Yet counties are the locations of rural politics, where large landowners are often farmers and ranchers, or other extractive industries. Many of California’s counties host billion-dollar agricultural industries. If small-parcel homeowners are normal for suburban cities, property owners in unincorporated areas often hold larger parcels and are involved in extractive industries. The wide-open spaces of California’s counties make them formidable challenges for homeowners, who must win support from a majority of county supervisors or muster a majority of unincorporated voters in order to influence policy, a difficult thing to do when even a small property owner with ten acres could see millions in revenues if urbanization is allowed.

At the same time, focusing on a county level land use policy regime leads us to see California through a new lens. Using the existing characterization, leading expert Paul Shigley, surveyed the field in 2009 and argued that there are two Californias; the coastal California where infill and containment policies dominate, and inland California, where greenfields are turned into suburbs, and containment policies are scarce or ineffective. Shigley’s central examples consist of coastal Ventura, with a tight urban growth boundary, and inland Bakersfield, where growth prevails. Shigley’s conception splits geography into coastal and inland rather than urban versus rural. Inland San Bernardino, Riverside, and Sacramento have vast populations and pursue growth. While many of the coastal counties which have adopted what Shigley sees as smart, organized planning, retain relatively low density. (Shigley, 2009a)
But when we see use the lens of a county-level land use policy regime, the central example remains applicable, but the story is different. The city of Ventura is now seen as a small piece of a region that has embraced growth management. Bakersfield is subsumed in the Kern County region, which has a laissez-faire policy regime. This is where the similarities end. The rest of the southern California coast of Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego County more closely resemble Sacramento, San Bernardino and Riverside than the Bay Area. Meanwhile, the northern California coast is divided between the Bay Area where managed growth is dominant, and the rural coastal counties where it is not.
Chapter 4 – QCA: The Conditions for Building Land Use Coalitions in California Counties

Introduction

In small and often sparsely attended board rooms across the country, elected officials make conservation and growth management decisions that codify the fate of private land. Although many places maintain laissez-faire land use policy regimes, other local governments have managed to build managed growth land use policy regimes. To explain this divergence, in California and elsewhere, urban scholars have developed six hypotheses: environmental concern, organizational capacity, physical geography, economic character, affluence, and education. Although each of these hypotheses has some support in the literature, it is not clear whether or how these conditions combine to produce environmentally preservationist outcomes. As I argued in Chapter 2, the three theoretical models in the land use literature each point to at least two of the hypotheses as central to their mechanism of political action. Therefore, by better understanding which combinations of conditions lead to managed growth regimes, we can begin to discern which theoretical model is most adequate.

This chapter uses Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin, 2008) to investigate the causal conditions that led to the adoption of managed growth policies in California counties. With this method, I recast the hypotheses of previous scholarship into conditions, or membership in a set that is relevant to the outcome of interest. I argue that there are three causal recipes or pathways that consistently account for managed growth policy regimes. Within these causal recipes, this study points to environmental concern,
physical geography, affluence, and education as important for adopting managing growth, while it finds no evidence supporting organizational capacity or economic character. Therefore, while these results are not incompatible with the public sentiment model, the cultural landscape model, or the discourse coalition model, identifying the theoretical memberships of concern brings us closer to resolving the theoretical question at the heart of this dissertation.

Method

For the purpose of this analysis, policies have been divided into types based on the analysis explained in Chapter 3. As a reminder, I argued that the goal of environmental organizations has been to adopt a sequence of land use policies which create boundaries or limits and then reinforce those limits through additional policies. I found that there were some significant average effects associated with adopting those policies. Based on this evidence, I identified two types of land use policy regimes: a laissez-faire policy regime and a managed growth policy regime. Critically, ten counties have adopted managed growth policy regimes: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Sonoma, Solano, and Ventura.

These outcomes are analyzed with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) which uses set-theoretic mathematical principles to identify combinations of causal conditions rather than average effects (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012; Ragin, 2008). While it is possible that conditions matter as average effects, scholars typically write of the reciprocal, combinatorial effects of multiple conditions (O’Neill, Rudel, & McDermott, 2011; Walker & Fortmann, 2003), and furthermore, they usually write about these
conditions as if they were logical sets. QCA uses Boolean minimization to find the minimum number of causal variables that are necessary and sufficient to produce the observed outcomes. In an iterative process, the researcher returns to cases to recalibrate conditions or outcomes until a theoretically consistent solution is found (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009). I use “crisp-set” QCA in which conditions and outcomes are coded into dichotomous true or false statements to indicate membership in a theoretically relevant set. While some researchers follow Ragin’s lead in using “fuzzy-set” QCA which allows users to assign thresholds for a range of partial to full membership in a category, most practitioners use the standard crisp-set variant, because the use of crisp-set QCA allows for the most simple, most direct, and most parsimonious application of the conceptual framework to the theory at hand (Rihoux and Marx, 2013). In all models, unobserved variables were set to 0 following the conservative approach used by Redding and Viterna (1999).

I test the following six hypotheses regarding the conditions for creating a managed growth policy regime:

1. Strong environmental concern is a condition for managing growth.
2. Extensive environmental organization is a condition for managing growth.
3. Certain physical geographic features are conditions for managing growth.
4. Economic character is a condition for managing growth.
5. Affluence is a condition for managing growth.
6. High education is a condition for managing growth.

I operationalized the majority of these conditions using continuous level indicators from publicly available datasets.
I operationalize environmental concern by assuming that cultural attitudes extend from local political contestation to statewide environmental policies, an assumption for which there is a good comparative record. This operationalization was adopted and updated from Press (2002). I used the average percent of residents in each county that voted in favor of environmental protection from all statewide measures between 1990 and 2012 as a measure of environmental concern. California Secretary of State records provide information on 35 measures related to land use, pollution and water, of which 26 offered meaningful choices. Land use measures involve purchasing or funding parks and open space, regulating timber harvest or land use, and the regulation of wildlife and animals; they include Propositions 17 (1990), 130 (1990), 132 (1990), 149 (1990), 180 (1994), 197 (1996), 4 (1998), 12 (2000), 90 (2006), 2 (2008), and 21 (2010). Propositions related to pollution involve funding a rail transit system, other transit-related pollution policies, or pesticides, and toxic pollution and include Propositions 108 (1990), 116 (1990), 125 (1990), 156 (1992), 1B (2006), 878 (2006), 1A (2008), and 23 (2010). Propositions related to water include bonds to improve water infrastructure for both conservation and quality, including Propositions 141 (1990), 178 (1994), 204 (1996), 13 (2000), 40 (2002), 50 (2002), and 84 (2006).
Organizational capacity is operationalized as the number of nonprofit land conservancies, land trusts, global warming groups, and wildlife or habitat groups in each county, as well as the total annual revenue reported by environmental organizations for each county. A list of over 3,000 environmental-related non-profit organizations located in California and their income was drawn from the Guidestar online directory (research conducted in 2012). This approach is more inclusive than Clark and Goetz’s (1994) use of Sierra Club membership as an indicator of organizational capacity, which missed the
prolific network of small local organizations that have been a part of environmental struggle in California (Dyble, 2007; Walker & Fortmann, 2003).

Figure 9: Map – The number of Nonprofit Environmental Organizations in California Counties

I considered discrete geographic variables including whether a county is urban (based on membership in the Urban Counties Caucus of California), population and population density, acres of farmland, annual timber production, and whether the county was along the Pacific Coast or San Francisco Bay (data drawn from the 2011 California Statistical Abstract and the USDA Census of Agriculture).
Figure 10: Map – Population in California Counties
Figure 11: Map – Farm Acres as a Percentage of Total Acres in California Counties
Figure 12: Map – Annual Timber Production in California Counties

Economic character was operationalized as the distribution of several types of extractive and cultural jobs. I developed measures of the ratio of arts and entertainment jobs or hotel and food jobs, real estate and construction jobs, and timber jobs compared to the overall economic employment.

Affluence is operationalized as average property value. The financial resources available to residents can be measured two ways. I gathered data on individual income from the US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis. However, people
do not always work where they live, nor are all people who earn an income invested in land use politics. Another measure of economic resources is property value, based on the average value of occupied housing units in the 2000 census, as reported in the 2011 California Statistical Abstract published by the California Department of Finance. See the figure below.

![Map - Average Property Value in California Counties](image)

Figure 13: Map – Average Property Value in California Counties

For this study, I obtained educational data from the 2008-2012 American Community Survey of Educational Attainment. The survey reports estimates of the
percentage of bachelor’s degrees and graduate degrees out of the population of people over 25 years of age.

Figure 14: Map – Frequency of Bachelor's Degrees in California Counties

I then transformed these six indicators into dichotomous variables for use in crisp-set QCA by assigning thresholds. This chapter uses two criteria to set thresholds: 1) that a reasonable person would find the threshold appropriate, and 2) that the threshold produces the most charitable results for the individual hypotheses. That is, I primarily
report the thresholds that produce the greatest consistency in the truth tables, although I also report the sensitivity of the analysis to alternative thresholds when applicable.

**QCA Results**

Using QCA software developed by Ragin, I modeled several combinations of the six causal conditions in order to find the optimal solution set. The optimal solution set included four conditions: “Urban,” operationalized as membership in the Urban Caucus; “Environmental Concern,” operationalized as the set of counties with average majority support for statewide ballot measures; “Affluent,” operationalized as counties with housing value greater than $230,000; and “Educated,” operationalized as counties with more than 20% of residents over the age of 25 holding a bachelor’s degree. The first step in crisp-set QCA is the creation of a truth table which plots the observed pathways. Table 7 presents four conditions with leading to the outcome of concern, with zero indicating a laissez-faire policy regime, and one indicating a managed growth policy regime. This truth table is perfectly consistent. The final three rows of the truth table represent configurations with no observations.
Table 4: QCA – Truth Table for Managed Growth Policy Regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Concern</th>
<th>Affluent</th>
<th>Educated</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Cases within each pathway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Alpine, Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Del Norte, Fresno, Glenn, Humboldt, Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Kings, Lake, Lassen, Madera, Mariposa, Mendocino, Merced, Modoc, Plumas, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, Shasta, Sierra, Siskiyou, Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, Tulare, Tuolumne, Yuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>El Dorado, Mono, Nevada, Placer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marin, Napa, Santa Cruz, Sonoma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alameda, Contra Costa, San Mateo, Santa Clara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Monterey, Santa Barbara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>San Bernardino, Riverside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Los Angeles, Sacramento</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>San Benito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Solano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yolo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ventura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QCA software removed logically redundant conditions, resulting in the reduction of one causal pathway that led to managed growth and four causal pathways that led to laissez-faire policy. The next table illustrates the causal pathways for managed growth policy regimes and the converse causal pathways for growth policy regimes. In the table, “raw” and “unique” refer to the coverage, with raw coverage being the proportion of cases that fit each pathway, and unique coverage being the number of cases that are explained only by the pathway in question. “Consistency” refers to the proportion of true
positives and true negatives (Ragin, 2008). Following the conventions of QCA, all capital letters indicate the presence of a condition, while all lowercase letters indicate its absence. Asterisks denote set intersection.

Table 5: Optimal Solutions for Managed Growth and Laissez-faire Policy Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Causal Pathway</th>
<th>Raw</th>
<th>Unique</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managed Growth</td>
<td>ENV. CONCERN<em>AFFLUENT</em>EDUCATED</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENV. CONCERN<em>URBAN</em>AFFLUENT</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENV.CONCERN<em>urban</em>affluent*educated</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
<td>Env. concern</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>URBAN*affluent</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EDUCATED*affluent</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AFFLUENT<em>urban</em>educated</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Solution coverage and solution consistency were both 100%.

The first recipe resulting in a managed growth policy regime requires membership in three sets: environmental concern, affluence, and education. If this recipe was obtained, it did not matter if the county was urban or rural. The raw consistency of 0.800 indicates that 80% of managed growth cases are accounted for by this pathway, making it the most common pathway to a managed growth policy regime. The second recipe includes the set of counties that voted for environmental measures, were urban, and were affluent. Fifty percent of the cases can be explained by this configuration. The third recipe consists of counties that voted for environmental measures, and did not fit the other categories. That is, the vote was sufficient in the absence of urbanity, affluence, and education. This pathway covered only one managed growth policy regime: Solano County. As Ragin (2008, p. 55) notes, because we are limited to this single case, we should cautiously assess the empirical importance of this causal recipe.
Four causal recipes led to laissez-faire policy regimes. Eighty-seven percent of these outcomes can be explained by belonging in the set of counties that did not vote for environmental measures, again with perfect consistency. In addition, there were several combinations through which the presence of environmental concern and the absence of affluence, education, or an urban population led to growth policy.

Taken together, this QCA solution suggests that voting in support of environmental measures is necessary for a managed growth policy sequence. All of the managed growth counties had environmental concern, while 87% of laissez-faire counties did not. Yet as the discrepancy reveals, environmental concern is not a sufficient condition for a managed growth land use regime. Affluence, education, and urbanness seem to act as triggering conditions that create sufficient pathways when combined with the average vote.

Following the steps outlined in Skaaning (2011), I tested robustness by changing calibration thresholds for causal conditions, changing frequency thresholds, and changing consistency thresholds. Table 9 shows the results of several tests in which I substitute different thresholds and indicators for the optimal conditions. The table is divided into groupings of indicators based on relevance to the hypothesis of interest, with the first line of each group showing the optimal solution reported above. This is not an exhaustive list of conditions and tested combinations, as the full analysis involved more than 20 conditions which were analyzed iteratively at multiple thresholds. In fact, for each of the six categories of conditions I report only the best fitting solutions that I could find. This list demonstrates that without the conditions identified in the optimal solution, the solution coverage is seriously reduced. Solution coverage of less than 1.000 indicates that
even though all of the cases in an observed recipe may be fully consistent, all of the pathways taken together do not fully account for the outcome. Because I was able to create an optimal solution with full consistency and coverage using four conditions, I limited the number of conditions in these tests to four conditions per iteration.
Table 6: Solution Coverage and Consistency for Various Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Conditions Evaluated</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>a. <em>Environmental Concern</em> (threshold set greater than 50% average support for statewide measures), Urban, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. <em>Environmental Concern</em> (threshold set at majority support for more than 14 statewide measures) Urban, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. <em>Democrats and Greens</em> (threshold set at more democrat and green voters than republican and libertarian voters), Urban, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>a. <em>Environmental Organizations</em> (threshold set at 5 organizations), Environmental Concern, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. <em>Environmental Organizations</em> (threshold set at 3 organizations), Environmental Concern, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. <em>Environmental Organizations</em> (threshold set at 5 organizations), Urban, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. <em>Environmental Organizations</em> (threshold set at 5 organizations), Environmental Concern, Urban, Affluence</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. <em>Environmental Organizational Income</em> (threshold set at $2 million), Urban, Environmental Concern, Education</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>a. <em>Urban</em> (Defined by membership in Urban Caucus), Environmental Concern, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. <em>Population</em> (threshold set at greater than 200,000 persons), Environmental Concern, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. <em>Population Density</em> (threshold set at 200 persons per acre), Environmental Concern, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. <em>Coast</em> (defined by location adjacent to coastline, including bays), Environmental Concern, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. <em>Forests</em> (threshold set at greater than 1 million board feet annual timber production), Environmental Concern, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f. <em>Farms</em> (threshold set at more than 50% acres of active farmland), Environmental Concern, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>a. <em>Arts and Entertainment Jobs</em> (threshold set at 20% of countywide jobs), Environmental Concern, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. <em>Resource Extraction Jobs</em> (threshold set at 5% of countywide jobs), Urban, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. <em>Real Estate and Construction Jobs</em> (threshold set at 10% of countywide jobs), Environmental Concern, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. <em>Arts and Entertainment Jobs</em> (threshold set at 20% of countywide jobs), Environmental Concern, Affluence, Education</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. <em>Arts and Entertainment Jobs</em> (threshold set at 20% of countywide jobs), Environmental Concern, Urban, Education</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>a. <em>Affluence</em> (threshold set at average home cost of $230,000), Education, Urban, Environmental Concern</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. <em>Affluence</em> (threshold set at mean, average home cost of $159,592), Environmental Concern, Urban, Education</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>0.800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. <em>Income</em> (threshold set at $40,000), Urban, Environmental Concern, Education</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>a. <em>Education</em> (threshold set at 20% of residents over the age of 25 holding a bachelor’s degree), Environmental Concern, Urban, Affluence</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. <em>Education</em> (threshold set 15%), Environmental Concern, Urban, Affluence</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. <em>Graduate Degrees</em> (threshold set at 10%), Environmental Concern, Urban, Affluence</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first grouping, 1a through 1c, relates to environmental concern. Iteration 1a shows that the optimal solution involves environmental concern. In the second iteration, I recalculated environmental vote as the number of measures approved, and set the threshold at the 14 or more approved measures. The result of 1b demonstrates that changing the threshold rules for environmental concern does not reduce the solution coverage, indicating robust support for environmental concern as a condition for a managed growth regime. In 1c, I substituted a measure of political preference for environmental concern, calculated by adding the number of registered Democrat and Green voters and calculating their percentage of the sum of registered Republican, Libertarian, Democrat, and Green Voters (California Secretary of State). I found that a plurality of democrat and green registered voters versus republican and libertarian voters reduced the solution coverage. Environmental concern appears to be a robust condition, and is not reducible to political preference.

Grouping 2a through 2e relates to the hypothesis that organizational capacity is a condition for creating managed growth regimes. The first four iterations show that substituting environmental organizations at any threshold reduced solution coverage, while 2e demonstrates that coverage is substantially reduced when environmental organizational income is substituted for affluence. To make environmental organization formally necessary the threshold must be set at one organization (not shown), which is so inclusive as to render the hypothesis trivial, as all but a handful of counties have one environmental organization, and which similarly does not improve solution coverage.
The third grouping relates to physical geography, and demonstrates that only membership in the urban set produces a perfectly consistent solution. Line 3a shows that membership in the urban caucus was part of the optimal solution, perfectly covering all of the cases with perfect consistency. However, none of the other geography variables produced optimal solutions. Neither a large population (3b), a dense population (3c), presence of the coastline (3d), presence of forests (3e), nor presence of farms (3f) were able to match this perfect solution coverage. Of all the landscape variables, population density had the greatest coverage (0.900), which supports the robustness of membership in the urban set as a condition for managed growth.

Similarly, iterations 4a through 4e demonstrate that economic character does not improve solution coverage. In this group of tests, I aggregated jobs into categories and divide by the total number of jobs to create a percentage. Using multiple thresholds, I was unable to find perfect solution coverages for arts and entertainment jobs (4a), resource extraction jobs (4b), or real estate and construction jobs (4c). 4d and 4e show that substituting arts and entertainment for other conditions does not improve the coverage.

The fifth grouping relates to affluence, and demonstrates that affluence is important, although it is sensitive to the threshold at which it is set. In the first line, the affluence threshold is set at the best-case scenario for the theory, which is a $230,000 average housing cost, producing optimal coverage and consistency. The second iteration, 5b, shows that when affluence is set at the median, this solution coverage and consistency decline. The third iteration, 5c, demonstrates that a different operationalization (greater than $40,000 in annual income) does not improve solution coverage either. These tests
indicate that the importance of affluence is highly dependent on the chosen threshold and should be interpreted with caution.

The final grouping, 6a through 6c, relates to education. 6a shows that education, when operationalized as greater than 20% of residents with bachelor’s degrees, improves creates optimal solution coverage. However, in 6b and 6c, education operationalized in other ways fails to produce optimal solution coverage. Once again, education may be important but only at the threshold defined in the optimal solution.

Exploring Causal Pathways with Case Studies

The next step in QCA is to qualitatively analyze the observed pathways to make sure that the configurations make sense in their contexts. I selected a case to represent each of the causal recipes, and evaluated whether the observed configuration of conditions provide a plausible account of the outcome in concern, that is, I determine whether the pathway has surface validity. Because I had seven pathways, I selected seven cases: three pathways that led to a managed growth policy regime, represented by Alameda, Ventura and Solano Counties; and four pathways that led to a laissez-faire policy regime, represented by Orange, Los Angeles, Yolo, and Santa Barbara Counties. While many of these pathways cover multiple cases, these specific cases were chosen because they challenged my intuitions about what sort of place might adopt a managed growth policy regime (several other important cases are discussed elsewhere in this dissertation).
Table 7: Causal Pathways and Selected Cases for Comparative Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Causal Pathway</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managed Growth</td>
<td>VOTE<em>AFFLUENT</em>EDUCATED</td>
<td>Alameda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VOTE<em>URBAN</em>AFFLUENT</td>
<td>Ventura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VOTE<em>urban</em>affluent*educated</td>
<td>Solano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laissez-Faire</td>
<td>vote</td>
<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>URBAN*affluent</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EDUCATED*affluent</td>
<td>Yolo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AFFLUENT<em>urban</em>educated</td>
<td>Santa Barbara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 1950s, all seven counties began with a laissez-faire policy regime, built on generous underlying zoning maps. Since then, these regimes have been episodically tested at historical junctions as population growth and new statewide policies from Sacramento create political opportunities where the adopted policy regimes were negotiated anew. As explained in Chapter 3, there have been three historical periods through which local cities and counties have grappled with growth in California. These periods act as junctions in which new political opportunities have emerged, opening up the existing policy regime to challenge from opponents.

The first historical junction extends from roughly 1960 to 1979, when environmental organizations in some places, supported by a national wave of positive media attention, were able to create slow-growth policy regimes and implement top-down slow-growth policies in what Press describes as “the first slow-growth era” (2002). Political opportunity in this historical junction reached an apogee in the year 1970, when the State of California passed the California Environmental Quality Act. Among its many requirements, the lasting influence of the new statute was its establishment of public forums to discuss the environmental impacts of each local development project. Where they were organized, environmentalists and homeowners found a new stage on which to
work. However, they were rarely successful at sweeping county-wide regulation. The second historical junction began following the 1979 passage of California’s Proposition 13, which changed the fiscal landscape by limiting property tax revenues available to local government, making local government more reliant on urban growth for revenue (Fulton, 2001). In the two decades that followed, this incentivized many local governments to grow rapidly in order to fund existing fiscal commitments. In response, environmentalists relied more heavily on ballot box measures to create preservationist policies. This historical junction witnessed the most significant activity aimed at creating managed growth policy regimes in California. The third historical junction began in the year 2000 when statewide regulation requiring “smart growth” once again shifted the terrain on which growth politics are played (Press, 2002). “Smart growth” is a policy phrase used in urban planning that entails that growth is concentrated in urban hubs that provide access to mass transportation, while rural and agricultural areas are spared from development (Fulton and Shigley, 2012). Through the smart growth era, counties slowly were forced to take up the issue as they updated their general plan documents. In this critical moment, environmentalists and growth advocates worked to disseminate and implement a definition of smart growth that would be favorable to their causes.

Figure 16 presents a schematic for how the cases discussed in this chapter passed through these historical junctions (labeled T1, T2, and T3). Much like a subway map, a series of stations (historical junctions) link separate pathways by providing opportunities to switch lines and adopt laissez-faire policy regimes or managed growth policy regimes.
Figure 15: Historical Junctions T1-T3 for Land Use Policy Regimes

The figure shows that in the case of these counties, as in the case of most counties, the critical era was T2, the ballot box era. This is not an error of measurement or selection; most of the important managed growth policies adopted at the county level have been adopted during the ballot box era, when citizens around the state first invented this form of land use control, and saw the potential to circumvent local authorities with managed growth measures. One of the few exceptions of a county that adopted managed growth in the first historical junction (the slow growth era) is Marin County, treated in the next chapter. Similarly, no counties have yet pursued a managed growth policy regime in the smart growth era though some counties have continued to buttress their managed growth policy regimes during the smart growth era.
Alameda County

The first case is Alameda County, which follows the pathway VOTE*AFFLUENT*EDUCATED. Although several counties follow this pathway, including affluent Marin and Sonoma Counties, Alameda County is a challenging case because as regional environmentalists won extended political battles in the 1970s, Alameda County grew without much growth control. The western portion of the county along San Francisco Bay was completely urbanized with the construction of Berkeley, Oakland, Hayward and Fremont. For a long time, the Diablo Range, the series of low hills that hem the coastal cities, isolated the eastern Livermore Valley. Developers, however, followed interstate 580 and began urbanizing the eastern portion of the county. Despite the significant commute from San Francisco, the cities of Dublin, Pleasanton, and Livermore grew into mid-sized suburbs, while the county reached 1.5 million people. However, by the end of the 1990s, environmentalists used the ballot box process to create the managed growth land use policy regime necessary to preserve the open space that remained.

Land use tensions in Alameda County were brewing through the 1980s and 1990s over the development of large-scale projects. In Eastern Alameda County in 1993, a foreign Taiwanese investor named Jennifer Lin had become a large landowner, and was planning to build several large projects. Residents in the cities of Dublin and Pleasanton were alarmed over the rapid growth. In Dublin, they proposed Measure B, which would reject the new general plan that the city council had approved and that would allow annexation of more than a thousand acres of Lin’s property. In Pleasanton, they proposed measure D, which would prevent 85 homes from being built. Through a San Francisco
consulting firm, Lin bankrolled a half million dollar campaign in opposition to the two measures. A representative from the Greenbelt Alliance called for an urban growth boundary (Witt and Slonaker, 1993), and, in 1996, the city of Pleasanton adopted an urban growth boundary. While the battles in Dublin and Pleasanton were important, each victory was costly and easily circumvented by county decisions.

In 1999, two dozen or so Alameda County Sierra Club activists began meeting to plan a county-level urban growth boundary initiative which would increase control over local land. They crafted Measure D, the “Save Agriculture and Open Space Lands Initiative,” which restricted development and protected ridgelines through urban growth boundaries which would be locked in through voter control (DelVecchio, 2000). It took just seven weeks to gather 63,000 signatures. At the same time, another organization, the Citizen’s Alliance for Public Planning, began campaigning for an even stronger measure that would require a vote for any changes to local general plans which would cause the construction of ten or more homes (Fulton, 1999c). Alarmed by the proliferation of growth control ballot measures, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors submitted a competing measure, Measure C, in order to retain control of the political process. They called it “Vision 2010” and drew a boundary such that all planned development could continue (Shigley, 2000).

The Sierra Club garnered endorsements from major political institutions across the Bay Area, including then mayor of Oakland, Jerry Brown (Schneider, 2011). At the same time, the Sierra Club handily outspent political opponents (Fulton, 2000). Most importantly, their message connected with voters who were both affluent and educated. In 2000, voters approved Measure D with more than 56% of the vote, locking in a
managed growth policy regime. In the aftermath, developers immediately sued the County. Environmental organizations including the Golden Gate Audubon Society, Preserve Area Ridgelands Committee, the Greenbelt Alliance, and the Sierra Club joined together to defend the initiative (Schneider, 2011). In addition to the urban growth boundaries and voter control brought by Measure D, Alameda County has since set up the institutions and raised the funds to preserve a large amount of open space. In 2008, voters approved $500 million to raise money for open space in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties (Rogers, 2014). As of 2012, the East Bay Regional Parks District has over 112,000 acres of land in 65 parks (Greenbelt Alliance, 2012).

In the urban setting of Alameda County, land use politics is a high-stakes political game where local homeowners vie with huge development corporations to influence local decisions. However, given the right conditions, Alameda County formed a managed growth policy regime when they approved Measure D at the end of the ballot box era. The adoption of this measure is best understood as a coalitional victory where the slow-growth side achieved what they wanted at the expense of pro-growth interests. Because the action was approved by vote, it circumvented county supervisors, stripping them of land use control. Because the major policies in Alameda County came through the ballot box, there is a clear link to the environmental vote condition. But it is also clear that the managed growth coalition had ample resources due to the socioeconomic status of most residents, which they used to effectively advocate for their policies. The local Sierra Club, Greenbelt Alliance, and Audubon Society outspent opponents in their battles. The wealth of local residents was also important in supporting a well-funded East Bay Regional Parks District that has been extremely active in buttressing the managed growth
policy regime by taking key parcels out of the private market to ensure that the current build-out plan is enforced.

In addition to the organizational benefits of affluence, managed growth actors found it easy to connect their environmental message with educated voters. The Greenbelt Alliance and the Sierra Club were the most important local organizations in supporting Alameda’s land use victory. Their primary method for mobilizing residents was to hold class-specific events with that relied on residents’ ability to appreciate the environment. For example, the Greenbelt Alliance held an annual fundraising event called “Savor the Greenbelt” where members were treated to a “Grammy Award-winning bluegrass artists” and a “farm-to-table dinner” from local greenbelt farms, paired with local wines. This event and others were held in private homes, and used as a means to frame local land use elections and urge members to vote or become involved (Pal, 2014a). Organizers used environmental discourse that drew on ecology science to make their claims, and convinced residents to see the land debate as an environmental problem rather than as a private property rights struggle. Uneducated residents would be unlikely to respond to such organizational tactics, nor would environmentalists by likely to invite uneducated neighbors to listen to any such event. Nor are poor and uneducated voters likely to respond to such framing, given limited exposure to scientific ecology. That is, the success of the managed growth coalition building tactic depends on both wealthy and educated residents.
Ventura County

Ventura County followed the second pathway to the managed growth policy regime: VOTE*URBAN*AFFLUENT. This pathway illustrates that in urban, wealthy counties with environmental concern, education is no longer necessary. Of the counties that fit this causal recipe, Alameda, Contra Costa, San Mateo and Santa Clara are all in the Bay Area, and are all educated. Ventura County is the lone example which is not a member of the educated set. The county adopted a managed growth policy regime in the ballot box era, when farmers felt threatened by the rapidly urbanization of the region, and joined ranks with a wealthy, if not educated, managed growth coalition.

Oil entrepreneurs dominated the local economy from the early twentieth century (Adamson, 2002). Under their lax policies the county was rapidly developed. Developers, land speculators, and builders became a powerful political force, while, at the same time, farmers became increasingly successful, with their lemon groves and strawberry fields among the most productive and lucrative in the nation (Krist, 2007). An alliance of farming landowners, oilmen and developers dominated local government and encouraged rapid growth (Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen, 2000). They immediately set out to build the infrastructure that would allow substantial growth. To create a reliable water supply, cities in the urban portion of the county were connected to the main water pipeline from northern California in 1953 (Krist, 2007). In 1959 the Casitas dam provide a reliable local water supply. Los Angeles was booming, demand was high, and the stage was set for rapid urbanization. As Molotch, Freudenburn and Paulsen note (2000), Ventura County residents described growth in the 1960s as unplanned leap-frogging
expansion toward the periphery and bemoaned the expansion of a freeway system that split its cities into strips of privatized coastline.

However, as the County urbanized, farmers, oilmen, and land speculators were outnumbered by residents who sought to regulate the land use market. The County adopted the “Guidelines for Orderly Development” in 1969 which placed greenbelts between the cities meant to contain their growth (Krist, 2005). However, lacking support from the county, and without fixed boundaries, developers easily circumvented the symbolic restrictions of the greenbelts. Pressure grew during the 1980s, though it failed to unseat the pro-growth county regime. In the 1980s, a statewide drought had left farmers and residents worrying about new water restrictions (Knight, 1988). A few individual cities created urban growth boundaries. But the largest cities of Ventura, Oxnard and Camarillo along the 101 Freeway continued expanding through commercial development, creating what Fulton describes as “Sales Tax Canyon” (Fulton, 2001, p. 255). In a competitive spirit, the three cities switched focus from the old downtown to transforming the farmland along freeway into a new commercial center of auto dealers, big box retailers, and shopping malls.

Ventura County’s pro-growth orientation finally crumbled in the late 1990s, when environmentalists successfully marketed a series of managed growth initiatives called SOAR, or “Save Our Agricultural Resources” (Ryan, Wilson, and Fulton, 2003). The first phase of this managed growth movement began in 1995 when the city of Ventura adopted the first SOAR-style growth boundary. Following the success in Ventura, a forum was held in Oxnard in early 1997 to discuss extending greenbelts throughout the county (Sprengelmeyer, 1997). A representative from the San Francisco-based Greenbelt
Alliance assured the group that urban growth boundaries were common and successful in the Bay Area. She argued that the boundary would help farmers. The Ventura County Farm Bureau and the Building Industry Association were both present, and neither were completely opposed (Lehr, 1997). In September, planners in the city of Oxnard had written up a report suggesting that an urban growth boundary was an option to consider (Ventura County Star, 1997). Later that month, Oxnard Councilman Tom Holden, with support from a majority of his colleagues, officially proposed the UGB (Sprengelmeyer, 1997). By December, citizens in Oxnard formed a local SOAR group and were calling for a ballot measure to protect agricultural land (Smith, 1997). A working group was formed. In late 1997, the group had completed their work recommending that urban growth boundaries be drawn around each of the cities in Ventura County. The plan had tentative buy-in from representatives of the agricultural industry. Among the strongest agricultural supporters were the wineries (Herdt, 1997). A county-level urban growth boundary was drawn up by attorney Richard Francis.

In early 1998, SOAR groups City Councils around the county began competing to control a process they felt was inevitable. When the Oxnard City Council planned to include 567 acres of farmland within a proposed boundary (Sprengelmeyer, 1998a), SOAR disputed the boundary at several points (Sprengelmeyer, 1998b). At a public hearing in March, a majority of residents pleaded for a strong growth boundary to protect quality of life, while a few, including a real estate appraiser, challenged the project. Francis threatened to circumvent the council by gathering signatures to place the matter on the November ballot (Hough, 1998a). A compromise was eventually reached in the
form of Measure K, which would strip supervisors of their zoning control. SOAR initiated a campaign of phone calls, fliers, and neighborhood canvassing (Hough, 1998b).

Similarly in Moorpark, SOAR supporters seized on local ambivalence toward a large scale development project (Fulton, 1999b) and gathered the signatures to slate the Moorpark Save Open Space and Agricultural Resources initiative (a 10-year urban growth boundary rather than a 20-year boundary). Councilwoman Teasley supported the measure, saying that her residents “don’t want Ventura County to turn out to be the San Fernando Valley” (Coit, 1998a). Just as the signatures were ready, the Libertarian Party of Ventura County, represented by attorney William Weibacher Jr., filed suit on the ground that they had found an error in the wording of the Moorpark petition. SOAR supporters scrambled to correct the error (Greenberg and Oliande, 1998), but they were unable to meet the deadline, delaying their ballot. In the meantime, City Council put their own more generous urban growth boundary on the agenda, and for good measure added a proposal to increase taxes by $79 per home to fund open space acquisition (Coit, 1998b).

In June of 1998, the Ventura County Board of Supervisors voted to put SOAR on the agenda (Giordani, 1998). In the runup to the big election, the SOAR Board of Directors, under Steve Bennett, ran an editorial which called on farmers to join ranks, as they had in the city of Ventura. They suggested working with farmers to implement a right-to-farm bill to further shield the fields from encroaching development (Bennett, 1998). That election marked the turning point. SOAR measures passed in Oxnard, Simi Valley, Thousand Oaks, and Camarillo, and most importantly of all, Ventura County (Ventura County Star, 1999). In Moorpark, the City Council’s urban growth boundary passed by a narrow margin in lieu of a SOAR proposal. Urban growth boundaries were
now locked in by the vote of the people for 20 years. In the wake of this historic series of
managed growth victories in southern California, in Ventura County of all places, Fulton
speculated that similar policies might spread to the nearby counties. He wrote, in the
Ventura County star that “the SOAR proponents here will continue to be the Johnny
Appleseeds of land-use politics throughout California for the foreseeable future” (Fulton,
1999a). Just as Greenbelt Alliance activists brought their message from San Francisco to
Ventura, Ventura activists now sought to sell their newly repackaged message to San
Luis Obisbo residents in the North. Bennett and Thousand Oaks Mayor Linda Parks both
traveled to the farming county in 1999 (Fulton, 1999a). The San Luis Obisbo policy
would fail in 2000 (Fulton, 2000a).

By 2001, all of the cities and the county had adopted urban growth boundaries.
Between 1996 and October of 2000, Fulton reported that slow growth forces won 12 out
of 15 battles in the county, or 80%; well above the state average during that time of just
over 50% (Fulton, 2000b). That growth management passed in Ventura County at the
same time as it stalled in other counties seemed remarkable to observers. In Fulton’s take:

In retrospect these results all reveal how remarkable the 1998 Ventura
County SOAR campaign was -- and in particular what a shrewd political
move it was to place the countywide SOAR measure on the same ballots
as the city SOARs. People are more likely to vote for -- indeed to work for
-- a growth restriction in their city than in their county. By tethering the
county measure to the city measures the SOAR proponents didn’t just try
to create an airtight system in which urbanization of new land could not
occur without a vote. They also removed the biggest political obstacle to
passage of the countywide measure -- the perception that it is not pertinent
to local residents. (For a variety of complicated reasons the Ventura
SOAR forces also were not badly outspent by their opponents.) (Fulton,
2000a)
Yet by 2002, slow-growth successes in Ventura County were slowing. There were four measures on the ballot and the results split between growth and slow-growth supporters: Managed growth measures won in Ventura and Santa Paula, and lost in Ojai and Simi Valley (Shigley, 2002).

However, these victories are not permanent, as the policies were in most places designed to sunset in 20 years. Slow-growth advocates next sought to lock in some of these victories. In 2001, the chairwoman of the Conejo Open Space Conservation Agency made the case in support of a county-level open space district that would buoy the SOAR initiatives. With an open space district that has the power to purchase conservation easements, the county could ensure that land continues to contribute to property taxes. (Skei, 2001). In 2004, local Measure A would have raised the sales tax to create an Open Space District which would have the power to purchase agricultural easements and other properties, and was expected to raise 250 million dollars in ten years (Ratcliff, 2004a). The measure failed everywhere but the cities of Ojai and Ventura (Ratcliff, 2004b)

The relationship between environmentalists and farmers was critical to the political process and was greatly contested. Some farmers and most realtors bitterly opposed these growth management laws, but they had underestimated the power of environmentalists and the support from residents (Krist, 2007). However, in the years to come, farmers and slow-growth advocates formed an increasingly close relationship. Some farmers defended S.O.A.R. in the newspaper, arguing that it was saving agriculture, not threatening it (Ag Futures Alliance Stewardship Committee, 2006; Pidduck, 2005). Environmentalists laid claim to farmers and defended their turf, as in
how the Chair of the Friends of the Santa Clara River responded to a farmer who had written in opposition to the growth boundaries:

Having served three years with Ventura County’s Ag Futures Alliance, and having met and discussed numerous issues with all types of county farmers over the years, I am convinced that Caldwell, who is not from Ventura County, does not speak for the majority of our farmers. I believe that most members of our farming and ranching community are not only good stewards of their land, but that most, by nature, wish to look after the well-being of the wildlife that may use or temporarily cross it. (Bottorf, 2010)

It seems that voters’ approval of the urban growth boundary system changed the dynamic between parties.

By 2006, the urban growth boundaries were still hot political topics. Many local boundaries had been tested by large projects and individual votes. In 2000, county residents voted to allow a nursing home to expand on farmland near Ojai (California Planning & Development Report, 2000). But bigger projects were rejected. In 2006, Moorepark voted on Measure A6, which would have extended the boundary to allow construction of more than 1600 houses. The group Save Open Space – Santa Susana Mountains campaigned against the project, and voters upheld the urban growth boundary by a three to one margin (Valencia-Martinez, 2006). There have also been controversies about annexing land into the city of Ventura (Hines, 2011).

The intense nature of the controversy in Ventura County reveals a fragile managed growth policy regime. On one hand, environmentalists have not been able to shore up the policy through a large local tax program to purchase easements, the boundaries they chose were not drawn extremely conservatively to begin with, and their policies must be renewed as they sunset this decade. As a consequence, the data shows
that the SOAR program has had mixed results. Maida and Maida (2007) argue that significant urbanization and loss of farmland happened despite the urban growth boundaries and voter requirements. Much of this development, however, is not reflected in the total size of the county agricultural area. As the county lost prime agricultural land near cities, farmers shifted to use less productive land more intensively, maintaining the billion dollar per year industry even as it lost prime soils. Even relatively neutral community voices have complained about the SOAR restrictions. After watching voters reject expansion of the urban growth boundaries, Joe Howry, Editor of the Ventura Starr, noted in an editorial that, “if the voters won't accept a proposal as well-planned and laden with amenities as North Park, what will they accept? The answer […] seems obvious: Nothing” (Howry, 2006). On the other hand, the managed growth coalition retains powerful allies throughout the community. The Ojai Valley Chamber of Commerce vocally supported growth control, arguing that it would benefit the economy, improve quality of life, and preserve the ecosystem (Ojai Valley Chamber of Commerce Environmental Affairs Committee. 2007).

The Ventura managed growth coalition swept in their preferred policy regime by creating a coalition of voters and political supporters. The support of farmers was central to this coalition. Because Ventura County is already urban there is not a lot of remaining high-quality farmland for an industry that depends on an economy of scale. At the same time, twentieth century farmers, rural property owners, oilmen, and developers were vastly outnumbered by residents (unlike Santa Barbara County, where a vast rural portion of the county is populated by typical pro-growth allies and environmentalists are geographically isolated and their power diminished). Farmers responded to the ecological
discourse of proponents. The Ag Futures Alliance published a report which illustrates this point as well. They began by quoting famous environmentalist Aldo Leopold:

All ethics […] rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. […] The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively, the land (Ag Futures Alliance Stewardship Committee, 2006)

Environmentalists pushed hard to distribute this message. The Ojai Valley Defense Fund sponsored an art contest in which locals were asked to create scenes of how Ojai Valley would change if it “underwent a degrading impact: a landfill, uranium mining, a freeway, or urban sprawl” (Broesamle, 2010). Students from the local high school and area artists were given cash awards for their entries.

Solano County

The final pathway that led to managed growth is VOTE*urban*affluent*educated. In all of the other pathways, urban, affluent, and educated acted as triggers that allowed for effective political resistance. But in Solano County the absence of all three triggering conditions combined with the presence of environmental support (VOTE) led to adoption of a managed growth policy regime. That this configuration was so rare (Solano County was the only instance), itself indicates part of the reason for this counterintuitive result. In most cases, environmental support correlates with the socioeconomic status indicators. Solano County was long an agricultural county with little other economic strengths and consequently a lot of rural farmers in control of a great deal of land. Property value and income remain lowest in the Bay Area. But even though Solano County is the least affluent of the Bay Area, the resources of the Bay Area are easily at hand. As the San
Francisco Bay Area grew, the county has attracted biotech, logistics, and healthcare development (Ammann, 2011). Environmentalists from neighboring counties have also had a large influence in pushing through a managed growth agenda. Most compelling, however, farmers and environmentalists have largely worked together in the managed growth coalition. This partnership, at times rocky, has left pro-growth advocates with few allies.

Solano County adopted a managed growth policy regime in the early part of the ballot box era. Faced with proposals to build large-scale developments on agricultural land, Solano County voters approved Proposition A, the “Orderly Growth Initiative” in June of 1984. It gave voters control over development in unincorporated Solano County, while capping development on farmland (Batson, 2008; Handel and Sokolow, 1995). The measure would have to be reapproved every ten years. Unlike in other counties, it was farmers who led the action to support the initiative. They had seen how rampant development had increased taxes to the point that it was hurting their operations. In the run-up to the election, county supervisors approved one last project, Rancho Solano, leading farmers to sue (Gilliam, 1985).

In the aftermath of Measure A, the city of Fairfield rushed to annex additional lands, and the slow growth coalition filed suit again. They settled the suit in 1986, requiring Fairfield to fund the Solano County Farmlands and Open Space District. By 1995, the organization had preserved 2,800 acres (Handel and Sokolow, 1995). In 1987, a right-to-farm ordinance was written in to the county code. It forbids agricultural production from being deemed “a nuisance.” In 1992, the Tri-Cities and County Regional Park and Open Space Authority was created to preserve additional acreage (Handel and
Sokolow, 1995). The Orderly Growth Initiative was extended in 1995 by the board of supervisors, this time until 2010. In 2005, the Orderly Growth Committee campaigned to extend the Orderly Growth Initiative for thirty years. This time, farmers rebelled, arguing that it stifled their business. Farmers launched a campaign called “Save our Farms – No on Measure J.” The initiative was narrowly defeated, sending managed growth advocates back to the drawing board (Pursell, 2006).

In 2006, the County began to work on updating the general plan. County planners offered several carrots to the agricultural community. The proposed plan would place 200,000 acres into “resource conservation areas.” At the same time, residents disputed the amount of development it would allow. Many claimed that by changing classification of 33,000 acres, the general plan was ceding ground. However, others argued that most of the reclassification merely cleaned up existing incorrect zoning, and that the real urbanization would account for just over 1000 acres of urbanization, much in industrial farmland operations (Greenwood-Meinert, 2008). Farmers supported this measure, arguing that it would allow them to remain profitable without major development (Fadhl, 2008), even as environmentalists decried it for giving so much ground (Kromm, 2008). Because of the growth initiative, voters would have to approve the general plan. The general plan was put to the vote in 2008 as Measure T. The Solano County Farm Bureau joined forces with the Greenbelt Alliance and the Chamber of Commerce to advocate for the measure (Brown, 2008). Even the president of the Northern Solano County Association of Realtors supported the measure, arguing that it would be fine to keep growth in the cities (King, 2008). When the plan was being debated, more than 70 tractors paraded to the County Government Center, and more than 100 farmers spoke in
support. On Election Day, Measure T passed with backing from 72% of voters (Martinez and Lum, 2009).

Solano County adopted a managed growth policy regime because even though it was not extremely educated, did not have extremely high property value, and was not urban, it was very close to a region that had these qualities: thus, it was unique: it had environmental support, even from farmers. As a rural county, local wealth was not as important for financing a managed growth coalition, especially, with such close proximity to the deep coffers of the San Francisco environmental organizational hub. Thus, even though there is continued hostility by some in the county toward managing growth (realtors continue to show up to local ABAG meetings and criticize what they view as unwarranted government intervention [Murphy, 2013]), the managed growth policy regime seems firmly in place. The tractor parade is evidence that pro-growth advocates would need to significantly shake up existing allies in order to retake the county.

Orange County

I have so far covered the three pathways which lead to managed growth policy regimes. Now I turn to the first of four pathways that lead to laissez-faire policy regimes: the absence of environmental support. This is the most self-evident of conclusions to be drawn from this work: if residents have not historically come out in favor of environmental measures when they vote on statewide ballots, there will be no local slow-growth victory. This explanation covers a plurality of California counties, but the most interesting case is Orange County. Unlike most counties where residents did not support
environmental measures, Orange County is urban, affluent, and educated. Right from the beginning of the slow-growth era, resourceful developers in Orange County won the majority of political contests over the objections of environmentalists and built a political and cultural infrastructure that ensured continual development into the twenty-first century. The county’s population grew to three million persons, making it one of the densest suburban counties in California.

Orange County developers had a great advantage. The industry migrated south from Los Angeles - fully capitalized, fully organized, and with a proven model for development. Parcels of agricultural land were consolidated at an early time, and were large enough to allow entire cities to be planned and built. Environmental activists and organizations were not absent in Orange County. In fact, they took similar actions as environmentalists elsewhere. But they were late to the game and rarely able to use the market to block future developer plans. They put managed growth measures to a vote, but were outmaneuvered. They brought thousands of Earth First protesters to Laguna Canyon and were ignored.

Powerful developers in Orange County seized control early in the twentieth century, and exercised their power by establishing new cities. During the 1950s, the county tripled in population (Schiesl, 1991) with the formation of eight new cities (Olin, 1991). The growth coalition effectively presided over the orderly large-scale transformation of the county throughout the remaining half of the century, following up on their work in the 1950s with four more cities in the 1960s and a handful after that. The county grew by millions of residents in a short time, most of whom moved in to homogenous, decentralized, interconnected, mixed-use suburbs that scholars have dubbed
“Postsuburbia,” with the working classes who ran the service industry building communities settling in shoddier development in the interstice between cities (Kling, Olin, and Poster, 1991).

The story of Irvine’s construction is a good example of the tactics that were used throughout the county during this time. The Irvine Corporation was a well-funded development corporation that cut its teeth building the suburbs of LA. They began their project in Irvine by quietly consolidating vast swaths of agricultural property, which they then leased back to the farmers to maintain income on the property as they waited. The city was carefully planned to include a variety of housing types with limited remaining open space. Though they incorporated more mixed-use development and more sidewalks than Los Angeles suburbs, automobiles were a requirement for navigating the low density cities of Orange County. Developers successfully brought in information technology industries and service-oriented consumerism to attract an affluent population (Schiesl, 1991). By 1988, Orange County had broken into the “top 10 manufacturing centers in the United States. 23% of the local population worked in manufacturing in 1988, surpassing Los Angeles (Hawk, 1989).

The first environmental protests originated in Laguna Beach where the Laguna Greenbelt advocated for open space (Fulton, 2001, 205). There were also groups like Irvine Tomorrow that agitated for slow growth, but, as Schiesl argued, their concerns were focused on “quality-of-life-liberalism” issues such as providing adequate amenities and services to residents (1991, 72). For both of these groups, victories were rare and circumscribed. County-wide growth control measures were proposed in 1988 by Laguna environmentalists, initially with support from county elites and residents. However,
growth industries spent two million dollars to defeat it, hiring workers to canvas neighborhoods to raise alarm about loss of jobs. Environmentalists spent only fifty thousand dollars. The proposal was handily defeated, largely due to the organized and well-funded politicking of entrenched developers (Fulton, 2001). In the early 1990s, environmentalists were able to gain some small victories against the Irvine Company, preserving portions of Laguna Canyon, and defeating the Irvine Corporation on a housing project (Schiesl, 1991). But environmentalists were hindered by general apathy toward conservation. This is evident in the 1988 attempt to pass a slow-growth measure, where environmentalists framed their concerns as traffic issues, seeking to restrict growth when roads were overcrowded. This is the weakest slow-growth proposition, since the provision of adequate infrastructure is generally within the means of deep-pocketed businesspeople. Without environmental support, the affluent residents of the County were uninterested in funneling that money to alter development patterns.

By 1992, sprawl in southern California had devoured the majority of coastal habitat of the now threatened California Gnatcatcher, a small bird that made its home in the sage scrub that grew on the bluffs along the Pacific Coast. State and federal officials were considering listing the bird as an endangered species. The Laguna Canyon in Orange County was squarely in the middle of Gnatcatcher habitat, but local officials were working with developers to build through the valley and were planning the San Joaquin Toll Road, a new route west of the 405 Freeway that would be built with taxpayer dollars. The road was of particular strategic importance because it would open up some of the last remaining undeveloped large properties to traffic and the possibility of further suburbanization. Ten-thousand Earth First protesters gathered in opposition at Laguna
Canyon, but they ultimately failed. The road was built and the canyon mostly filled. (Fulton, 2001)

The uniqueness of the Orange County political-corporate marriage in the land use field cannot be overstated. Consider how complete corporate entities managed the total erasure of farmland from the landscape. In a news account from Aliso Viejo in 2005, the town’s “last cowboy” was being evicted in order to build a community center. It was the last open space in town. In the news article, the imagery was intensely nostalgic. The Farmer, Don Barnes, was described as a man with “well-worn boots and a good horse.” He was quoted as saying, “I’m not sad. […] I’ve done well and I enjoy what I’m doing. […] I’ll just be caretaker here until they decide what to do” (Vardon, 2003). Who is they? Barnes was not the land-owning farmer, he was a company employee of the Mission Viejo Corporation and Shea Homes, which purchased the company in 1997. These development companies paid Barnes to keep the ranch alive.

The land was originally held by the Moulton family, a long-time ranching family who held 19,000 acres. The land was split up and sold to the Mission Viejo Corporation in 1976. At the time, the company was owned by Philip Morris. He held lavish corporate parties in the barn, which he adorned with a neon sign that read “Park Avenue West,” named as counterpart to his offices in New York City. They built not just Aliso Viejo but Leisure World, Laguna Hills and Laguna Niguel. (Vardon, 2003)

Development has taken its toll on the ecosystem. Aliso Creek was so polluted in 1994 that a report stated,

…in summer this is waste water, awash with a mix of fertilizers, pesticides, battery acid, motor oil and pet droppings. After winter rains, when the creek can carry 30 million gallons to the sea in a day, the runoff
includes copper, lead and zinc from auto brakes, exhaust and tires. By the
time it mixes with the surf at south Laguna Beach, water flows so fast and
deep it cuts a channel 20 feet across the sand and carries so much bacteria
it is a permanent danger zone. The water here was clean enough to qualify
as "good" in only 14 of the past 31 months; it was "unhealthy" seven
months, county records show. (Horan, 1994).

Despite this pollution, residents regularly surf in the contaminated zone where the
polluted water meets the beach.

Developers in Orange County outspent their opponents at nearly every turn, but
there were critical moments environmentalists could have thwarted the growth machine,
had residents shown environmental concern. The growth control measure of 1988 was
such a moment. Despite having been outspent by developers, environmentalists tapped
into a real sense of residential unease. Environmentalists were, however, unable to
transform this unease into environmental concern, because they perceived residents as
primarily interested in quality of life, and they were unable to mobilize the residents for
effective long-term struggle.

In Orange County, growth supporters elaborated economic discourse to an
unparalleled degree. Consider the opinion pieces by Greenhut (2009), which appeared in
the Orange County Register. In it, he argued that the housing bubble and subsequent bust
was a direct result of growth control policies, inspired by “global warming hysteria”:

The bubble was inflated mainly in those metropolitan areas – i.e., San
Francisco, San Jose, Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle, etc. – that embrace
Smart Growth, the trendy and widely implemented idea that government
should limit suburban growth (sprawl, as it is pejoratively called) and
insist that new growth be crammed into urban growth boundaries.

In this (quite selective) reading of history, environmental policies not only hamstrung a
local economy that depends on urban growth, but these policies created the economic
crisis in the first place. Elsewhere, Greenhut (2006) argues that “…communities are either growing or atrophying. To use Draconian rules to strangle natural growth and change will end up with odd, unintended consequences.”

The Orange County Register (2002) was also eager to explain the beliefs of residents regarding their quality of life: “Californians, overall, are very happy with their current lifestyle. They like suburban living, prefer to commute by car on freeways rather than on public transit. They tend to support transit, but that's for other people to ride. They like big homes, and nearly half the public will still opt for a big home with a long commute rather than a small home closer to work.” Elsewhere they add, “we are dubious of so-called wars on social issues and the battle against urban sprawl is just as wrong as the war on drugs” (Orange County Register, 1999). They argue that any attempt to slow growth will result in violations in property rights. Urban sprawl is just “economic growth that will better mankind in the long run” (1999). Even slow growth supporters were defensive and hedged their political claims to appease what they perceived as the dominant perspective. Hall (1987) wrote that he wasn’t concerned about “every falling leaf or rock in the riverbed,” he just wanted “sanity” to protect the collective quality of life.

Los Angeles County

The second of four pathways to the laissez-faire policy regime is URBAN*affluent. In this pathway, environmental concern alone was not enough to lead to a managed growth policy regime in the absence of high property value and education. While places like San Bernardino and Riverside qualify under this pathway, they are also
explained by the lack of environmental support, and therefore may not seem exceptional. But Los Angeles, Sacramento, and San Diego Counties are interesting examples of this pathway because while majority of voters favor statewide environmental measures, environmentalists in all three counties have been unable to adopt managed growth policy regimes. In these expansive urban counties, the missing ingredient is the affluent and educated residents who might join an insurgency against deeply entrenched pro-growth coalitions, as I will illustrate with the best-known laissez-faire policy regime: Los Angeles County.

In 1970, passage of California’s Open Space Lands Act required all cities and counties to designate open space and have plans for how to deal with it. The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, famously pro-growth, responded in the 1973 General Plan by simply declaring most undeveloped land open space until otherwise developed. In 1975, the Sierra Club with the Center for Law in the Public Interest sued the county and won an injunction against development until a new general plan was completed (Brown, 2012). The County responded by hiring the consulting firm England and Nelson to rewrite the general plan. The county proposed a new type of regulatory framework they called “Significant Ecological Areas.” In 1976, with Sierra Club guidance, they selected 62 significant ecological areas which would require conditional use permits to develop. The permitting process would do nothing to prevent the board from approving development, but it would at least delay approval until opinions on environmental damage were aired. Eventually, the general plan update of 1980 officially codified the policy framework, and promised to use SEA’s to regulate growth (Wohlgemuth,
The Sierra Club found immediately that the SEAs did little to slow approval of new projects (Brown, 2012).

By 1991, the Los Angeles Times reported that the SEA program had been extremely ineffective. Half of the significant ecological areas no longer existed because the areas had been completely developed through conditional use permits. A nature conservancy biologist said that “despite the best intentions of people in decision-making positions, the areas were being managed and developed in a manner that certainly was not conducive to their long-term survival.” Supervisor Edelman urged the board to hire a biologist and spend more money on advertising. Developers grumbled that it would just pile on paperwork (Pyle, 1991).

In response, the Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment filed a lawsuit against a county-approved project in 1993 (which the county’s committee of biologists and most environmentalists opposed). They hoped to set a precedent that would force the County to honor the SEA as written into the general plan. The county attorney argued that the law stated that county supervisors could do whatever they wanted to in a SEA as long as they thought the project was “compatible with the area.” Developers included their new golf course in their measure of the “open space” which would be preserved (Gaw, 1993a). However, a Superior Court judge rejected the environmentalist bid, and environmentalist lawyers were late to file an appeal (Gaw, 1993b). In 1994, the conservation chairman of the Audubon Society wrote a piece in the Los Angeles Times expressing his disappointment with what the significant ecological areas had become: “It sounded wonderful, containing a commitment ‘to preserve the county’s ecological resources and habitat areas in as viable a natural condition as
possible.’ Those of us with affection for canyons, wetlands and woodlands took heart. Alas, we were soon disenchanted” (Wohlgemuth, 1994). He went on to describe the failings of the SEA. The advisory committee of biologists (SEATAC) had no authority to make decisions. Pro-growth supervisors simply approved parcels one at a time until nothing remained to be protected. They failed to spend money on a study of the SEAs to monitor their quality. Nor had they made any attempt to preserve SEAs through acquisition (Wohlgemuth, 1994).

In 2001, the process began anew. The Regional Planning Commission decided to review the SEAs. They hired a consultant, Steven Nelson of the PCR Services Corporation to do the work. Nelson argued that the existing SEAs were too fragmented to be of any use, and that they must expand to include 577,000 acres by consolidating what remained in twelve larger SEAs. Not incidentally, review would also allow the board of supervisors to wipe away the remnants of former SEAs, clearing the way for infill (Kondo, 2001). In 2003, the County first broached the subject of increasing the number of SEAs in a general plan update. They planned to put them in the eastern part of the Antelope Valley. Real estate and business representatives joined property owners in challenging the approach, which would, among other things, restrict development to one unit per ten acres (Bostwick, 2002; 2003). By 2004, business groups and property owners throughout the County had protested, leading to the removal of 22,000 acres from the plan (Skeen, 2004).

At present, Los Angeles County is updating its general plan, and officials hope to increase the acreage of significant ecological areas by four-fold, to nearly 650,000 acres (Brown, 2012). Most of the new SEAs are proposed for the Antelope Valley area, which
encompasses the dry northern portion of the county on the far side of the San Gabriel Mountains. Despite a lack of water and a long commute to Los Angeles, portions of the area have been built into the bedroom cities of Lancaster and Palmdale. At the same time, many of the rules governing the SEA are under revision, including eliminating the buffer zones that used to surround each SEA and potentially grandfathering-in existing uses (Bridegam, 2014). Environmentalists complain that expanding the SEA program would do little to protect the land, which, considering the thirty-five year record of SEAs, adequately describes the program. Property owners, ranchers, and oilmen complained that it increases uncertainty and risk. As both parties recognize, the problem with the SEA is that it neither forbids development nor encourages it. Growth is possible for those who gain the favor of county supervisors and are allowed to negotiate the complex system of rules and conditions that govern development in the SEA (Bridegam, 2014).

Environmentalists were never able to elect a majority of sympathetic Los Angeles County Supervisors. Los Angelites show a general environmental concern, but in local matters they preferred growth oriented leaders who kept the city growing. It is unlikely that this failure is the result of a lack of organization and money, since Los Angeles County is home to many environmental organizations and many wealthy enclaves with generous donors. In fact, environmentalists successfully funded legal battles that forced the meager compromises that were obtained. And, as reported above, environmentalists are well aware of the weakness of significant ecological areas. However, managed growth activists did not raise a popular coalition of angry residents to confront the county. Instead, many residents joined with business leaders in supporting growth. The
socioeconomic characteristics of the majority of county residents both hindered managed
growth organizational efforts and assisted pro-growth mobilizations tactics.

Yolo County

The third of four laissez-faire pathways is EDUCATED*affluent, represented by Yolo County. Yolo County is a rural farming county that sits between the Bay Area and Sacramento County. The urban city of Davis holds the campus of the University of California, Davis, which tends to attract environmentally-oriented students and faculty, making the city more liberal than the surrounding rural farmers of conservative central valley stock. Nearly all of the land in the county is rated as prime agricultural soil, and there is very little unfarmed land to which farmers can move operations if urbanization occurs (see Krist, 2001).

Environmentalists have long sought to create strong protections for Yolo County, but these protections have been limited to the city of Davis. In early 2000, Davis voters swept in a majority of managed growth politicians, while at the same time adopting measures which increased protection (Turner, 2000b). In March, a 54% majority of voters approved Measure J, the Citizens Right to Vote on Future Use of Open Space and Agricultural Lands initiative. The policy required that any City Council-supported project on agricultural or open space lands be vetted by voters (California Planning & Development Report, 2000; Turner, 2000a). Opponents threatened a lawsuit that never went anywhere (Turner, 2000a). Later that year, 70% of voters approved Measure O, a $24 per home fee that would go toward preserving farmland (Philp, 2000). Davis voters held the line through the smart growth era, including in 2009 when three-quarters of
voters rejected a developer proposal that would have rezoned 26 acres of agricultural land for development (Shigley, 2009b). In 2010, Measure J was up for renewal as Measure R (which would extend the measure by ten years). The Sierra Club campaigned in support, even organizing a forum for city council candidates to debate the environmental measure (Lee, 2010a). Measure R passed in 2010 with nearly 77% of the vote (Lee, 2010b).

The county, meanwhile, has not created a managed growth policy regime, precisely because the type of residents who support such a measure were highly concentrated in Davis, where they could wield little influence on the broader County. Despite taking some significant steps to preserve open space, County official have avoided building a managed growth regime. A prime example is the creation of a Habitat Conservation Program (HCP). In 1993, The Yolo County Board of Supervisors negotiated a “memorandum of understanding” with the four cities in the county, such that any urban growth would be within their sphere of influence (Thompson, 2005). The memorandum would form the basis of a HCP that would be negotiated with the federal government. The Yolo County Board of Supervisors hired a consulting company, EIP Associates, to design a Habitat Conservation Program to protect endangered species. However, the plan went nowhere. In 1997, a Davis biologist who had been working for EIP quit the project and denounced the plan as ineffective (Lacy, 2000). Yet the county continued to work on the plan. By 2001, they planned to put more than 400,000 acres of the county (70%) into a habitat conservation program, allowing incidental takings of endangered species in exchange for the preservation of most of the farmland. Cities would be allowed to urbanize 11,672 acres of farmland (Krist, 2001). Yolo County also requires agricultural mitigation at a one-to-one rate, meaning that developers who wish to
build on farms must provide permanent protection for an equal number of agricultural acres as they destroy (except for low income housing or public projects). However, the loss of Williamson Act tax credits for agricultural easements and growth in the Sacramento area have created strong market pressures for development on farmland (Ternus-Bellamy, 2012).

Faced with this pressure, Yolo County updated its general plan in 2010. While it was controversial, the new general plan did little to strengthen environmental protection. The new plan relied on a new “clustered housing” ordinance for agricultural land, which allows small scale development in a corner of a parcel, while placing a conservation easement on the remainder (Cary, 2010). The plan was awarded by the Sacramento Valley American Planning Association, and even secured a small state grant to implement the required rezoning (Daily Enterprise, 2010).

Yolo County demonstrates that in rural counties, the absence of wealth leads to a laissez-faire policy regime. The average cost of housing in Yolo County is just $164,400, which is below the state average. Effectively, this means that a lot of the people in the rural areas of the county are working class, or at least are not wealthy in land. In fact, one of the few countywide environmental successes, the acquisition of 10,000 acres of land and easements, was financed with outside money (Ternus-Bellamy, 2012). In 2000, the Yolo County Land Trust was awarded a grant from the Great Valley Center, a nonprofit in Modesto County that was itself set up by the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, in Santa Clara County. The grant provided $5 million in matching funds to purchase conservation easements, which would be split between Yolo, Stanislaus and Merced

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1 See the 2009 Yolo County General Plan Housing Element HO-60.
Counties (Mukherji, 2000). There are a lot of academics in the city of Davis, and a countywide majority demonstrates environmental concern. However, that has not yet been enough to build a managed growth coalition.

Santa Barbara County

The final pathway to a laissez-faire policy regime, AFFLUENT*urban*educated, is illustrated by Santa Barbara County, which demonstrates that the lack of education in a rural county prevents environmentalists from establishing a managed growth policy regime (Monterey County also fits this causal pathway). Santa Barbara is carved out of 100 miles of southern California coastline, just north of Ventura County. If Los Angeles has long been known as prone to growth domination, San Barbara County is the liberal counterpart of the region. However, Santa Barbara County environmentalists have not yet been able to adopt the strongest protections, despite a long history of environmental mobilization and environmental concern. The county has an urban growth boundary but there is no voter control and no significant open space acquisition program. As in Yolo County, the city of Santa Barbara and its neighboring seaside cities are isolated, urban retreats in a vast, rural county. The county as a whole is not urban, and the population in the unincorporated region is not highly educated. Affluence alone can do little in a rural county where a coalition must be built from farmers and rural residents.

Santa Barbara’s reputation for environmentally conscientiousness began in the 1960’s, when improvements in the transportation network made the city of Santa Barbara a practical bedroom community to which many educated and wealthy Los Angeles resident fled. These residents forged an uneasy relationship with the oilmen who had long
run the local economy (Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen, 2000). When oil drilling was proposed off the coast, citizens rose up in protest. Following an oil spill, over 110,000 citizens signed a petition to Nixon supported by “virtually every local, civic and government body” (Molotch, 1969). City and county governments filed legal claims to prevent oil companies from drilling. Molotch argued that this struggle mobilized citizens and created a number of lasting environmentalist institutions. While they were unable to keep out oil companies, these institutions helped guide local development for decades to come. Indeed, in the 1970s Santa Barbara residents challenged growth and occasionally implemented a number of growth control policies. For example, city of Santa Barbara has downzoned parcels and also capped population growth. The suburb Goleta implemented a water service hookup moratorium in 1972. However, as Warner and Molotch note (1995), these growth control policies failed to slow regional growth in the long-term because vested development rights, countervailing growth policies, and lawsuits and initiatives from developers (p. 389-393) ensured that overall growth numbers remained strong.

For a time, the only countywide growth control measure implemented by Santa Barbara County was a statute that limited unincorporated development to available local water supplies. In 1979, county voters rejected measures to connect the county water supply to the state water system, a move which would increase the volatile local supply and also allow further growth. For a while, it was seen as an interesting attempt to manage growth using infrastructure restrictions. However, the late 1980s brought a multi-year drought that taxed residential supplies. In 1990, voters reversed their position and cleared the way to connect Santa Barbara to the statewide water supply. As Nevarez
(1996) argues, this reversal was due not to major changes in public opinion but rather institutional changes that decentralized power to several individual local water boards, combined with a strategic campaign to create and compelling frame a drought “crisis.” By transferring control over state water entitlements to local water boards, officials were able to frame the issue in the technical jargon of water experts rather than in terms of growth, as had been the case in front of the board of supervisors. When the drought happened, the water community framed it as a crisis that could only be supplied through increasing supply rather than through conservation and continued management (p. 247).

Environmentalists have been more successful in the cities like Santa Barbara. Even the tiny city of Buellton in the northern part of the county approved an urban growth boundary in 2008. Local residents recruited Ventura County activist Steve Bennett to speak about urban growth boundaries at a local town hall meeting (Canelon, 2008). Petitioners put Measure E on the November ballot, which set a voter-controlled urban growth boundary around the city at the current city boundary, effective until 2025. An alarmed pro-growth City Council put a competing measure on the ballot, which drew the same boundary but shortened the sunset period to six years (Sadler, 2008). Residents chose the stricter SOAR style measure, and created the first urban growth boundary in the county (Santa Maria Times, 2008). In 2012, Goleta residents in south Santa Barbara County were inspired by Buellton’s victory, and, with the help of the Environmental Defense Center, activists proposed Measure G, the Goleta Agricultural Land Protection Initiative. It required voter approval to rezone agricultural land (in parcels greater than ten acres). The measure passed with more than 70% of the vote (Wignot, 2012). Still, despite these municipal policies, no countywide managed growth regime exists.
Although often considered an environmental exemplar, Santa Barbara County demonstrates the challenges of building a managed growth coalition in a rural county without a highly educated rural population. Because the majority of the county is rural, Santa Barbara is politically split in a way that marginalizes urban environmentalists. The northern portion of the county is working class and agricultural, and is more characteristic of adjoining San Luis Obispo County than progressive environmental leaning Santa Barbara and Goleta. These split is so pronounced that northern residents filed a petition to secede from Santa Barbara County in 2003, creating a new northern county to be called “Mission County” (Shigley, 2003). When the initiative came to a vote in 2006, it failed by a margin of four-to-one (Walters, 2006), probably because political interests in county government already favors those northern interests, with three northern county supervisors compared to two southern supervisors. The rural supervisors tend to side with farmers and growth advocates when it comes to rural land use issues. A good example is the community plan for the Santa Ynez Valley. When the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors began working on the plan in 2004, they hoped to include 231,000 acres. However, in early 2005, farmers pressured supervisors to reduce the plan to fewer than 50,000 acres (Carlyle, 2005). In 2009, county supervisors gutted the plan of its affordable housing mandate, under pressure from farmers and homeowners who attended local meetings and decried the loss of property value (Womack, 2009c). When the plan was finally approved, it favored growth.

This same laissez-faire approach can be seen in negotiations over the now defunct Williamson Act, which provided a tax credit in exchange for temporary development rights. At its peak implementation, this policy covered three-quarters of private
agricultural land in Santa Barbara County. During 2006, a coalition of local farmers, a former county supervisor, and the Coalition for Labor, Agriculture and Business (COLAB) were pushing to update the local Williamson Act’s Uniform Rules such that significant portions of farmland could be developed without penalty, while including a number of incentives for increased construction activity on protected land, such as allowing “guest ranches” and second houses. The farming community was split between those who felt that farmers should control the land and those who thought that losing agricultural land would harm the industry. Though the Farm Bureau stayed out of the matter, several prominent pro-growth farmers with a great deal of land at stake supported the measure, and were likely to be supported by county supervisors. Environmentalists and skeptical opponents feared that the results would be too generous and so they filed a lawsuit in 2007 to require an environmental impact study (Stewart, 2007). However, in 2009, Sacramento defunded the Williamson Act, leaving farmers to build as they wanted.

Managed growth activists in Santa Barbara County were not successful because they were never influential in the rural northern part of the county, which is revealed by the relatively low education rate of the county. Far from the academics clustered at the University of California Santa Barbara are the less educated and less wealthy rural folk who have not been willing to embrace a sweeping program. Because of the rural nature of the county, farmers have played an important role in county politics and have been able to command a veto point against a broad county-level managed growth regime.
Discussion

This study of managed growth policy regimes helps to resolve a debate among urban scholars about the conditions under which residents can curb growth and preserve the environment (Clark & Goetz, 1994; H. L. Molotch, 1976). I investigate counties rather than cities, employ the concept of a slow-growth policy regime, and use QCA to analyze the results. Of the six conditions identified, I have found evidence for four: environmental concern, geography (insofar as “urban” is geographic), affluence, and education. By contrast, I have found no reason to believe that environmental organizational capacity or economic character, as I have been able to measure them, are conditions for managed growth land use policy regimes. This finding has mixed implications regarding our efforts to understand the three theoretical models discussed in Chapter 2. While identifying these conditions for managed growth is crucial to understanding the process, in this instance such knowledge does not allow us to adjudicate between the relevant theories.

At first pass, the public sentiment model seems strongly supported by the finding that environmental concern is a necessary condition for managed growth. Those who follow this perspective might have preferred to find that socioeconomic status had no role in the process, but they could also explain this through a capacity argument. Perhaps environmental concern matters when you have the resources and knowledge to effectively organize. However, the number of environmental organizations does not seem to be an important condition within California. Environmental organizations proliferate in counties that have not adopted strict policies, such as Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego; while some counties that do adopt policies such as Solano County have relatively
few environmental nonprofits. All of the urban and urbanizing counties had at least a local Sierra Club Chapter, suggesting that the organizational capacity requirements to create a managed growth policy regime may, in fact, have been met in all of the crucial cases. At the same time, environmental organizations are not geographically limited to the county of their origin. San Francisco hosts many of the best funded environmental organizations in California, and they contribute to political causes throughout the state, as when the Greenbelt Alliance supported managed growth efforts in Ventura County and Santa Barbara County. This suggests that the organizational capacity to mount an effective resistance is not one of the limiting factors, at least among these cases.

The cultural landscape model is the least supported by these results, even though urbanization played a role in one of the causal recipes. As I described in my account of Ventura County, farmers may have indeed acted as they did because they felt besieged by rapid loss of prime agricultural land to encroaching subdivisions. This is consistent with scholarship showing that population correlates with more environmental policies (Lubell, Feiock, & Handy, 2009; Opp, Osgood, & Rugeley, 2013), but it is not clear that the mechanism for this process refers to the landscape rather than something about the social organization of urban and rural places. The evidence does not support the hypothesis that other physical characteristics in the environment are required to inspire preservation. Residents doubtlessly develop collective narratives to account for their relationship to the land, and they doubtlessly weave certain elements from the landscape into these narratives. Comparatively, though, neither the beauty of the coast, nor the presence of farms or forests was necessary for managed growth policy regimes.
Lastly, these results support the discourse coalition model. As expected, environmental concern mattered. Moreover, wealth and education played an independent role in the causal recipes, and in every case I examined, the victorious party became victorious only by mobilizing a dense following of supporters who either bent local leader to their will or instituted desired policies at the ballot box. The cases illustrated two main reasons that it would be easier to build a managed growth coalition with the support of a wealthy and educated population. Wealth is important for financing political campaigns, from electing county supervisors to promoting local land use initiatives. It is especially important in urban counties where there is a lot of people and industry vying to influence that land use sector. Additionally, wealthy and educated people may be independently more inclined to participate in land use politics vis-à-vis their perceived investment in the land. These residents may feel greater resonance to the ecological discourse that is necessary to sustain a managed growth coalition.

Unfortunately, knowing the conditions under which managed growth regimes are adopted does not provide definitive evidence to rule out any of the theories. The causal recipe borrowed elements that point to all three theoretical approaches. To determine whether the public sentiment model, the cultural landscape model, or the discourse coalition model best describes how these conditions are translated into policy regimes, further analysis is required. The next chapter isolates a single policy question and uses discourse analysis to examine each of the three hypotheses at length.
Chapter 5 – Building Discourse Coalitions in the Smart Growth Era

Introduction

Why is it that places where many people have high socioeconomic status and preferences for environmental policy actually adopt managed growth policy regimes? Scholars have advanced three models which might explain why the pathways identified in the previous chapter produce land use policy outcomes. According to the public sentiment model, the values of the mass public affect policy insofar as policy makers want to be re-elected and are beholden to voters (Layzer, 2006; Rosdil, 2010; Schumacher, 2013). A second model is the cultural landscape model, which posits that because physical landscapes are sociologically constructed, communities develop shared interpretive frameworks about how the land is to be used (O’Neill, Rudel, and McDermott, 2011). A third answer is the discourse coalition model which asserts that discourses, or the categories of ideas people use to talk about policy issues in a community, are used by actors in deliberate processes to build coalitions (Lee, 2009; Hajer, 1989; Hajer, 2003; Singer, 1990). Earlier in this dissertation, I hinted at my answer to this question when I suggested that winning a land use policy contest involves constructing a coalition capable of dominating the political field. In this chapter, I use case studies to formally argue that the discourse coalition model best accounts for the process through which political decisions are reached. In particular, land use decisions are made when pro-growth or environmental activists use discourse to frame an argument that is resonant with a plurality of property owners, farmers, and businesspeople.
To make this argument, I compared three important political contests of the same type: county-level general plan updates in the smart growth era in Marin, San Diego, and Humboldt County. General plans are the comprehensive land use documents which specify a regulatory framework for future growth and conservation, and therefore a general plan update provides opportunities to implement new policy measures. While much of local California planning occurs through the ballot box, general plans are significant processes through which other growth management measures can be reinforced or circumvented. Unlike ballot box initiatives, general plans usually do not require approval by popular vote. However, contemporary plans often require a decade of work, and intensive public input. While the ultimate decision is made by county supervisors, there is significant risk of retribution for defying a coalition capable of unseating a county supervisor. This study focused on the period between 2000 and 2014, when many general plans were being updated and when the smart growth planning challenge was a dominant concern. Since previous plans were written, smart growth had become widely accepted by planning professionals, who sought to preserve open spaces in exchange for increased allowable density in urban hubs. The new rules that planners were suggesting, however, stepped on the toes of farmers, property owners, residents of urban areas who opposed increased density, and even some environmentalists.

Isolating the general plan process in the smart growth era allowed me to look at a single planning challenge: how counties handled the emergence of the smart growth era. Smart growth was a potential threat to both pro-growth activists and managed growth activists. Because the concept of smart growth combined elements of both growth and conservation, pro-growth activists and environmentalists vied to influence how the
program would be implemented. When these counties began to update their general plans, county planners in in all three places began by developing “smart growth” proposals that restricted growth to central urban hubs while preserving open space, but the ensuing politics pulled these plans in different directions. After a decade of political wrangling, Humboldt and San Diego Counties took a growth-oriented approach that retained a laissez-faire policy regime under the banner of smart growth, while Marin County strengthened environmental protection. From the beginning to the end, the process took approximately a decade in each county. Marin County approved new general plans in 2007, while San Diego County followed in 2011. In Humboldt County, after 15 years, the process is ongoing but probably nearing conclusion.

The primary finding is that neither the public sentiment model nor the cultural landscape model can account for all of the cases. Instead, Marin County shows that environmentalists were able to use ecological discourse to mobilize a coalition that was capable of overcoming backlash against the smart growth densification plan. Meanwhile, in Humboldt and San Diego Counties, growth advocates were able to build winning coalitions using economic discourse, making particularly good use of private property rights. By analyzing the frames used in public testimony about these plans, I show that local participants used different discourses to talk about similar problems and that discourse mattered to the policy outcomes because it facilitated coalition building. The environmental concern, affluence, and educational profile of a community give it a discursive opportunity structure which empowers or constrains actors to mobilize a majority coalition and make demands of the local government. Pro-growth and slow-growth organizations successfully mobilized developers, property owners, farmers, and
environmentalists into organized claim-makers when they faced openings in the discursive opportunity structure. County supervisors responded to the most mobilized and vocal constituents by creating policies that were favored by the largest coalition. Furthermore, the discourse coalition model provides a better account for these three cases than does either of the other theoretical models.

Case Selection and Method

I compared general plan updates in the beginning of the twenty-first century in three coastal Californian counties: Marin, San Diego, and Humboldt Counties. These cases follow different causal pathways via their membership in the sets of interest (as discussed in Chapter 4).

Marin County follows the same causal pathway as Alameda County. Environmentalists in Marin County held power since the early slow growth era, and their general plan was already devoted to preserving open space prior to the smart growth era. However, the Marin coalition drew support from many small town residents who were now being asked to accommodate denser neighborhoods. Environmentalists were in the difficult position of having to convince their own base that what was needed was dense urban hubs and public transportation. At the same time, a social justice movement in favor of housing for needy populations threatened to undermine the existing plan by demanding more housing. After a decade of work, the Marin County managed growth coalition eeked out a victory and strengthened environmental protection while allowing growth in urban hubs.
By contrast, Humboldt County follows the same causal pathway as Orange County while San Diego County has conditions similar to Los Angeles County. In both counties, environmentalists who may have wished that the smart growth era would strengthen their position were outmaneuvered by the pro-growth coalition. It was not easy; it took decades and an entire repertoire of clever political tricks to build the coalitions that would maintain the laissez-faire policy regimes. The outcome in Humboldt County should make sense given our theoretical apparatus: the county lacks all of the conditions that should favor managed growth coalitions. Most importantly, a majority of voting residents do not favor environmental protection, a necessary condition. However, in San Diego County, the pathway is less theoretically straightforward. Even though the county has majority environmental concern, it lacks high average property value.

Table 8: Cases and Causal Pathways

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Managed Growth Regime?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marin</td>
<td>VOTE<em>AFFLUENT</em>EDUCATED</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humboldt</td>
<td>vote</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>EDUCATED*affluent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table below provides several indicators with which to compare the counties. Humboldt County is the least populated and the least dense, while San Diego County is the most populated, the densest, and the only member of the Urban Counties Caucus. The homeownership rate is quite similar in these counties, but the median value of occupied housing units confirms that the landed wealth on which Marin’s homeowners reside is much higher than the other counties, especially compared to Humboldt County, which is far cheaper than the state average. Marin County is also the most educated, with almost
one out of every three residents over the age of 25 holding a bachelor’s degree. Those same Marin residents also have the highest average support for statewide environmental measures; San Diego County also has majority support for the environment.

Table 9: Relevant Statistics Comparing Marin, San Diego, and Humboldt Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Marin</th>
<th>San Diego</th>
<th>Humboldt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>256,069</td>
<td>3,177,063</td>
<td>134,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons/Acre</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Urban Counties Caucus</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unincorporated Population</td>
<td>69,806</td>
<td>491,764</td>
<td>71,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership Rate</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Value Occupied Housing Units</td>
<td>$493,300</td>
<td>$212,000</td>
<td>$128,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons with Bachelor’s degrees</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average support for State</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate and Construction Jobs</td>
<td>22,412</td>
<td>187,587</td>
<td>7,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate/Construction % of Workforce</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Organizations</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Organization Income</td>
<td>$25,376,003</td>
<td>$61,592,817</td>
<td>$5,426,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Income/Person</td>
<td>$101</td>
<td>$20</td>
<td>$40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>5,732</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


I selected these instances of comparable political events in order to demonstrate the claim that discourse coalitions explain the outcome better than the public sentiment model or the place character model. When we look at the political successes of growth management in the smart growth era, it is very difficult to discern between the three models. In Marin County, a reasonable argument can be made on behalf of public sentiment, place character, or discourse coalitions. However, when we look at the places
where growth-oriented plans were pursued, the public sentiment model and the place character model fail to explain all of the cases. In San Diego County, the public sentiment model fails to account for the observed outcome, supporting the QCA finding that having environmental concern is a necessary but not sufficient condition for managed growth. Similarly, in San Diego County, the place character model might work, but, in Humboldt County, the place character model cannot account for the growth-oriented outcome. See the table below.

Table 10: Applicability of Theoretical Models to Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Public Sentiment Model</th>
<th>Place Character Model</th>
<th>Discourse coalition model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marin</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>MAYBE</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humboldt</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>MAYBE</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I used the following evaluative criteria to assess each model. For the public sentiment model, the majority of residents had to have voted on statewide ballot measures in the same direction as the eventual policy outcome, or there had to be a consensus about what to do. For example, if residents agree that the environment is important but there is no controversy about local growth, such a case would be consistent with the public sentiment model. For the place character model, I had to be able to make an argument linking a common shared idea about the land or character of the place and the eventual policy outcome. I was specifically looking for statements where speakers or writers indicated that “everyone agrees” that the land is either a valuable resource or a place for development, along with a plausible argument whereby this effect shaped policy. Alternatively, I was looking for the historical conditions which would give rise to a sense
of tradition or character that might engender certain behavior. Finally, for the discourse coalition model, I would predict that the construction of a mobilized coalition is central to each policy contest and that there are no instances in which a large coalition of detractors is ignored. Furthermore, the model suggests that different framing strategies or different uses of discourse are the proximate method through which coalitions are organized. Therefore, I would expect to find different uses of discourse to frame policy contests corresponding to each type of mobilized coalition.

To assess these conditions, I conducted qualitative case studies which relied on several sources. I gathered a record of all documentation about land use in each county, drawing from materials including county planning documents, archived video and audio recordings of local government meetings, news articles, state and local government reports, private sector organizational memos and documentation, newspaper articles, and books. I also spoke informally with key informants who provided their assessments of the events of importance, and I spoke with planning officials when information was unclear.

I analyzed a portion of this data using discourse analysis, and specifically employ a method in which text or speech is parsed into frames which are tracked across a sample (see Taylor, 2001). Discourse analysis allows estimation of the rate at which frames or categories of frames (referred to as discourses) are used by individuals and groups during the general plan update. I created a sample for discourse analysis using the centralized Access World News database to locate all opinion articles related to growth in the three counties between 1999 and 014. This produced several hundred opinion articles containing discussion on a wide variety of land use policy matters, ranging from ballot box initiatives to county ordinances and general plans. Much of it was directly related to
smart growth and the general plan. Three types of material were gathered: editorials, op-eds, and letters to the editor. Relevant articles were those whose topic was a pertinent land use issue. Issues that I do not consider relevant include, for example, clean water and sewage, and environmental pollution not directly related to the use of land. I include transportation issues when they specifically involve a local project to construct additional transportation options, which was then directly relevant to whether places could grow. I do not include requests for a new homeless shelter, while related to housing and development, as I do not consider it specifically a land use issue. I do not include complaints about poor construction on a county construction project because they were not about the issue of development. Lastly, I do not include discussions of energy sources.

I coded the sample based on principled arguments, or statements about a proper course of action, such as, “we should do X because of reason Y.” I recorded procedural claims, or claims without principled reasons, but did not categorize them. To facilitate comparison, my coding scheme is divided into three broad categories of discourse: economic discourse, anthropic discourse, or ecology discourse. *Economic discourse* considers the fiscal impacts of environmental regulation and the appropriate relationship between private citizens and government. Economic discourse contains statements concerning either individual or collective fiscal consequences of growth. One of the most potent economic frames is “private property rights,” which is a persistent frame in contemporary American land use settings (Niedt and Weir, 2010). *Anthropic discourse* invokes the anthropocentric (human-centered) effects of land regulation on traffic, infrastructure, or housing. One particularly common anthropic frame is “quality of life,”
which has been central in many land use disputes (Layzer, 2006), and is used to support both laissez-faire policy and managed growth policy. *Ecology discourse* focuses on the importance of natural landscapes, species or systems, and their interconnections. These categories cut across the orientation of speakers: versions of each discourse were used by pro-growth and slow-growth speakers alike. That the same types of arguments were used in both counties suggests that despite several hundred miles of separation, participants drew ideas from a common toolbox to address land use challenges. Table 16 lists the specific frames in each category.
Table 11: Categorization of Land Use Frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Discourse</th>
<th>Anthropic discourse</th>
<th>Ecological discourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>More Growth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) MG-Econ2. Growth saves taxpayer money.</td>
<td>2) MG-Anth2. Growth benefits farmers.</td>
<td>2) MG-Ecol2. Some land is unfit for preservation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) MG-Econ4. Private property rights are absolute.</td>
<td>4) MG-Anth4. Resources are plentiful.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) MG-Econ5. Markets should be free.</td>
<td>5) MG-Anth5. Good stewards should control land.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Less Growth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) LG-Econ2. Growth increases taxpayer costs.</td>
<td>2) LG-Anth2. Growth hurts farmers.</td>
<td>2) LG-Ecol2. Growth contributes to global warming or pollution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) LG-Econ4. Markets need regulation.</td>
<td>4) LG-Anth4. Resources are scarce.</td>
<td>4) LG-Ecol4. Nature has intrinsic value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the following, I provide a narrative explanation for how participants in each of the three counties dealt with the challenge of the smart growth era. I then assess the consistency of the three theoretical models with each observed process. I present comparative results of the discourse analysis to support my interpretations in the discussion section.

Marin County

In Marin County, the public sentiment model and the cultural landscape model both provide plausible explanations for Marin’s ecological interpretation of smart growth;
however, the discourse coalition model provides the best explanation. Marin County lies on the Northern California coast, hemmed between the Pacific Ocean and San Francisco Bay. Despite its extremely valuable location, county residents and officials long ago built a managed growth regime, and Marin’s population leveled off at one quarter million persons. Marin County’s land use history is the most fabled environmental tale in all of California, but even Marin struggled to implement smart growth during the general plan update process conducted from 2000 to 2007. While I favor the discourse coalition model, I argue that Marin County alone can tell us little about the process through which environmentalists dominated the political agenda. The public sentiment model, the place character model, and the discourse coalition model all provide reasonable accounts of this particular policy contest.

When the Golden Gate Bridge was first opened on May 27, 1937, Marin County was opened for urban development. The bridge was simultaneously a monument of architecture and a great business venture for Marin County boosters who had funded the bridge to create new commuter communities for the relatively small prewar San Francisco (Dyble, 2009). By the end of the Second World War, however, one bridge was no longer sufficient. By 1956, growth advocates had secured funds to build a second bridge to Marin. They enjoyed support from most residents and even state politicians. Yet a cadre of wealthy residents at both ends of the proposed route delayed its expansion, and gained the support of San Francisco County Supervisors in 1959. A decade-long standoff ensued as subsequent alterations of the bridge were proposed and protested. The bridge was never built (Dyble, 2007). Despite the setback, Marin County government was dominated by pro-growth elites who were busy planning the infrastructure that would
accommodate a rapidly growing region. In 1964, Marin County released the West Marin Master Plan, which would parcel out much of agricultural west Marin at one unit per acre, and establish two east-west freeways and an improved oceanfront highway. This plan was adopted in 1969.

Chapter One recounted the story of the Audubon Society’s actions in the 1960s when they stopped development in Bolinas Lagoon. The lagoon would prove to be preamble to a much larger contest over the master plan. Between 1968 and 1970, environmentalists rallied against the West Marin Master Plan and successfully unseated a majority of county supervisors, replacing them with managed growth sympathizers. In 1971, the new Board repealed the West Marin Master Plan and convinced the state to stop working on any new coastal highways. They also pulled their support from a project that would dam Sonoma County’s Russian River and bring water via aqueduct to Marin County. They brought in a new chief planner who installed a planning team and wrote the 1973 Countywide Plan. It created the corridor system used today, which designated the entire western portion of the county as rural and agricultural, and limited growth to the urban corridor (functionally equivalent to an urban growth boundary). At the same time, county supervisors created an open space district which was to acquire more than twenty-thousand acres as buffers between towns (Dyble, 2007; Griffin, 1998; Hart, 1991). Marin County is the only county to have adopted a managed growth policy regime during the slow growth era.

Despite these victories, managed growth advocates were wary of farmers who controlled much of the private land in the west. Even with a general plan that would restrict growth, individual farmers still could legally break their farms into smaller
properties for sale. With only a few hundred small farms in the region, it was likely that market pressures would drive many to sell and undermine the general plan. Those counties that grappled with this policy issue decades later, during the ballot box era, would all use the combination of urban growth boundaries and voter control over zoning to implement the change in one fell swoop. Marin County’s policy regime predated the invention of this policy model, and so they chose to rezone the land. County supervisors downzoned the farmers of western Marin County by creating a sixty-acre minimum for parcel divisions on agricultural land. This single change reduced the developable capacity of the western part to 3,200 housing units, stripping almost 50,000 potential units from farmers. The Marin Property Owners Association and most of the farming community were bitterly opposed. But there was division; Farm President Al Poncia supported the rezoning, which passed in 1972. One of the county supervisors who pushed through the measure described just how drastic the change had been: “In some cases, the poor ranchers thought they would be developing 2,000 units, and suddenly the zoning we created allowed for six. Not 600, not 60, but six units” (Rogers, 2007: para 16).

Marin County added a further layer of protection when the managed growth coalition set up a conservation easement purchase program that paid farmers in exchange for giving up development rights. In 1980, the Marin Agricultural Land Trust (MALT) was formed to purchase development rights. Government money was initially in short supply due to the statewide property tax limits imposed by Proposition 13, and so the program was funded by local environmental organizations including the San Francisco Foundation, the Marin Community Foundation, and the Coastal Conservancy. By 1989, they had purchased development rights on 11,500 acres, at a going rate of between one-
quarter and one-half of the value of the land (Hart, 1991). By 2012, MALT had acquired more than 44,000 acres of easements on 68 farms (Greenbelt Alliance, 2012).

In the decades since this basic framework was built, environmentalists have held the board of supervisors. Most political effort involved shoring up various loopholes that would permit growth in the greenbelt areas around cities, notably involving in the 1990s when the cities of San Rafael and Novato considered urban growth boundaries (Lapin, 1990; San Jose Mercury News, 1990). Novato eventually approved an urban growth boundary as Measure G in 1997 with 70% of resident voting in favor (Lee, 1997; San Francisco Chronicle, 1997). By the turn of the century, Marin County had successfully thrown out a pro-growth coalition, invented managed growth, and governed for generations. Yet for all of these victories, the land use battle was fought again when smart growth opened up a political opportunity for a new compromise.

Table 12: Timeline of Major Land Use Events in Marin County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>West Marin Master Plan Repealed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Countywide Master Plan Adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>County General Plan Update Process Began</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>County General Plan Update Approved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1997, Marin County planners were given the order to begin working on a new general plan which would bring smart growth to the state’s oldest managed growth land use policy regime. Environmentalists interpreted the smart growth mandate to preserve open space and concentrate housing as a call for the preservation of open space, while growth advocates interpreted the same message as a call for the creation of dense urban hubs. Marin County supervisors and planners supported smart growth in principle, so
long as the beneficial aspects of smart growth would not undermine their managed
growth policy regime. When a draft plan was released in 2004, environmental
organizations advocated for additional regulations beyond those suggested in the draft
plan. These regulations included expansion of the corridor system to include a new
“Baylands Corridor” which would increase restrictions for building on properties near the
San Francisco and San Pablo Bay (Brenner, 2004; Halstead 2004a). The plan avoided
creating new urban hubs in the greenbelts between cities, while at the same time it called
for mixed-use and mixed income development in a few limited places. Neither business
groups nor environmentalists were initially pleased by the plan (Halstead, 2004b). When
the Baylands Corridor was first proposed, residents who lived in the area protested and
argued that it would unduly restrict their activities (Brenner, 2004) and that the county’s
ecological science was not accurate (Rogers, 2006). Some business groups, including the
San Rafael Chamber of Commerce, argued that it would harm the economy (Halstead,
2004b).

However, the greatest controversy related to the Baylands Corridor centered on a
single project proposed for 1230 acres of greenbelt land along highway 101 (Halstead,
2007). The deal was known as the St. Vincent’s-Silveira project for the well-respected
landowners at the center of the project. The Archdiocese of San Francisco had long
operated the St. Vincent’s School for Boys on one property, and the Silveira family had
farmed the other parcel for over a century. Now the church, the farmers, and their
developer were hoping to build a mixed-use subdivision. Initially, in 2002, project
developers asked for 766 units. The county, citing their new bayside corridor and smart
growth principles, was willing to allow 220 units of mixed senior and market-rate
housing (Halstead, 2004a). In fact, in District One Supervisor Adams actually upset her opponent and won her seat on the Marin County Board of Supervisors following a campaign to reject large scale growth on the property (Rogers, 2007).

Under the lead of the developer, the pro-growth group focused attention on how quality of life could be improved by new mixed-use development. They mobilized dozens of senior citizens and other members of the community to testify about a countywide lack of senior housing. That the St. Vincent’s School for Boys also stood to gain magnified the human needs available for fulfillment. A progression of community supporters and former students implored county supervisors for extra units as due reward for Christian work. The developer’s comments on the project illustrate their argument:

What can be more sustainable than providing the possibility [for] our seniors to age gracefully in the county they now occupy and love and wish to serve out their time living in? What’s more sustainable than that? […] That isolation of being shipped off to Solano or Vallejo or anywhere else, can you imagine the disruption if that happens to your friends or family?²

This shows how “sustainability,” a term from ecology discourse, can be combined with anthropic discourse about seniors. Marin’s progressive League of Women Voters, some editorial staff at the Marin Independent Journal, and even former environmentally oriented County Supervisor Giacomini were swayed to support the project. However, these mobilized pro-growth advocates were unable to gain concessions from the Marin County Supervisors, as they were countered by even greater number of slow-growth supporters. The supervisors unanimously approved the planning commission’s recommendation for 221 units.

² Marin Board of Supervisors, 9-10-07 at 01:43:45.
In opposition to pro-growth supporters, environmental organizations successfully mobilized environmentalists and sympathetic residents. Nearly all local environmental groups including Marin Baylands Advocates, Marin Audubon Society, Campaign for Marin, Tomorrow’s Bay Association, Marin Conservation League, Save the Bay, Friends of Corte Madera Watershed, Sierra Club, and the Environmental Action Committee of West Marin participated in the campaign to oppose the St. Vincent’s-Silveira project. One of the leaders of the movement was Marjorie Macris, an environmentalist who had once served as planning director and had been involved in county politics since the 1970s. (Rogers, 2007) In a 2007 news article, Macris defended the baylands corridor: “These are lands that everyone in the county values. […] They represent the history of California, with the church, the mission, agriculture, the ranches. In Marin County, it's a treasure.” (Rogers 2007)

Some Marin environmentalists were not satisfied with the new corridor alone and proposed additional layers of regulation, including a streamside conservation ordinance which would prevent ecological disturbance within 100 feet of a stream. Marin Environmentalists mainly used ecology discourse when they made these proposals. A Marin County Sierra Club representative said,

We do have an enforcement problem […] in Stinson Beach where someone was red-tagged for trying to put in a 90-foot wall [along the] Creek, which is salmon habitat. And he put it in anyway! This is something where we should not only throw the book at the guy; we should throw the entire 90-foot wall at him! […] All of these creeks are part of a system, and all of the Coho [salmon] in Lagunitas have the potential to be restored. We need to treat these as a system.3

3 Marin Board of Supervisors, 9-11-07 at 02:06:04.
The speaker illustrated how nature frames about valuable habitat and interconnected natural systems provide justification for extensive management of private land.

Seniors and the developer were unable to win further concessions with their claims about existing needs. The supervisors unanimously approved the planning commission’s recommendation for 221 units. Supervisor McGlashan argued that the staff plan was already a compromise between environment and people:

“I’m very angry about the fact that people have been manipulated into believing that we’re taking away the value for the boys, or that we’re cold hearted when it comes to our seniors. It’s just not true. We are potentially offering 48 million dollars of value and 120 market rate units in the middle of nowhere.”

As of 2015, the St. Vincent and Silveira property has not been developed. The county continues to work with environmentalists and farmers to implement a streamside conservation program.

The discourse coalition model provides a good explanation for why environmentalists were successful. Affluent and educated Marin County, residents, businesses, and even farmers often side with those who use ecological and anthropic discourse rather than economic discourse. Pro-growth advocates tried to use economic discourse, but they failed to mobilize residents with these messages. Private property rights messages were largely ignored by residents. Though there were many property owners in the county, they did not side with developers. Only the St. Vincent’s and Silveira project drew a crowd of supporters, and only because the properties tied together so many vulnerable groups – the underprivileged boys of the St. Vincent’s School, the

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&MBS9-25-07 [c01:17:41]
family farmers, and the seniors who needed affordable housing – making it an easy target for a quality of life campaign. Even so, it was not enough.

The empowerment of environmental science discourse was evident early in the proceedings when board President Kinsey set the stage for public testimony by directing attention to a bucket of ice next to the podium. He explained,

…next to the timer’s table you will see a bucket of ice, and that’s just one theatrical way of acknowledging that this plan and this planet are really being considered in a climate change perspective. [...] It is intended to be a quiet reminder that this plan and this planet are being considered today by this board with a very serious view toward affecting the future.\(^5\)

This was perhaps for the benefit of a visiting observer, because abundant, concordant responses made it clear that arguments about global warming and connections within the natural world were of great concern. Marin residents combined discussion of the value of specific plants and animals with ecological frames about connections within natural systems. Residents used this natural systems talk in support of greater managed growth by invoking the flow of water and the migration of animals under changing climate conditions. The popularity of this type of frame in Marin County is demonstrated by the use of environmental science frames even to justify claims for greater development, such as by residents who argued that sprawl would yield a net reduction in carbon emissions by reducing in-commuting for local workers.

A second controversy, focused on Marin County farmers, further illustrates the strength of the discourse coalition model. When faced with an aggregate cap on the square footage of houses on agricultural properties and a series of new trails that would cut through the edges of some farms, farmers bargained with anthropic and ecological

\(^5\) MBS9-25-07 [00:01:00]
discourse, and when their arguments coincided with the discursive logic of the dominant managed growth coalition, they were successful. Farmers tried to stop the aggregate cap on square footage with anthropic discourse, and they lost. The housing cap would limit residential square footage on agricultural land to 7,000 square feet, and was meant to discourage wealthy hobby-farmers from replacing working farms with large and inefficient houses. A representative from the Marin Agricultural Land Trust described opposition to square footage limits as an issue of quality of life, by arguing that large houses were needed “to accommodate extended and multi-generational landowners.”

Marin County farmers almost never used economic discourse. In one of three instances when a speaker mentioned the potential loss of land value, that speaker described himself as a rebel against powerful and complacent farming interests. Supervisors were unconvinced by the quality of life arguments of farmers, and adopted the square foot limit.

Those same farmers used ecology discourse to oppose trail expansion along the boundaries of their farms, and they won. Like development, trails increase consumption of the natural world while decreasing the available reserve. Yet trails also strengthen local environmental concern by creating a public zone through natural spaces and a constituency of users. Farmers and others capitalized on this reversal of environmentalist logic by speaking about contamination of natural springs and potential damage to habitat from human disruption. Trails, they argued, would be bad for the environment. These arguments prompted support from the local chapters of the Sierra Club and the Audubon

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6 Marin Board of Supervisors, 9-11-07 at 02:58:53.
7 Marin Board of Supervisors, 9-11-07 at 01:46:38.
8 See Marin Board of Supervisors, 9-11-07 at 00:39:25 after the continuance.
Society, and county supervisors reversed course and eliminated offending trails.

Supervisors crossed farmers on more important issues such as the aggregate cap because there were no empowered arguments to be made. It seems that they respected their trails request, not because farmers were a powerful interest group, but because this particular request was justifiable under a discursive opportunity structure that privileged environmental arguments.

The housing cap was divisive even among the farming community. The Farm Bureau president spoke on record in opposition to the cap, but his spouse campaigned in support. She argued:

I feel strongly that allowing large houses in our community will be the end of our community and that it will end up with people who are interested in living inside their large houses and going off on their trips and riding their horses around their arenas and take away from those of us who are willing to go out and milk the cow, feed the chickens, jump on the tractor and take care of our ranches [...] I do encourage and welcome people with means into our community. I would like to welcome them by making it easier for them to engage in productive agriculture [...] so that we traditional ranchers can continue to have a critical mass of serious agriculturalists, not just wealthy people in big houses who want a huge backyard to enjoy.\footnote{MBS9-11-07 [c00:06:58]}

This was an unpopular position among many farmers, and the Farm Bureau president resigned in the ensuing internal debate. His spouse’s position, which alienated their family from some members in the farming community, makes sense when we acknowledge a local discursive opportunity structure where environmentalist values resonate strongly. This resonance meant that their family had many allies in the larger community, and the moral high ground of having a strongly resonant argument.
It is difficult to unravel the independent effects of environmental support, resources, and education for making the managed growth regime possible. Most Marin County residents voted for environmental measures, but at the same time, most of these residents are deeply exposed to the ecological discourse that underlies statewide and local policy contests. For example, a pair of Marin filmmakers, working with local KRCB North Bay Public Media in Sonoma County produced a documentary about Marin County’s environmental victories. It was called, “Rebel with a Cause” and was a theatrical telling of Marin’s local politics. It aired at film festivals across the nation. Documentaries, however, require resources to produce, and they work best with an educated audience. For these reasons, Marin County has become the kind of place where environmentalism is deeply entrenched in the local way of life for many. Consider a letter published in the Marin Independent Journal: Judy Shils (2012), founder of “Teens Turning Green,” recounted waiting in a line of cars to park at Phoenix Lake. She noticed that the cars were idling as they waited, and so she exited her own car, and approached the waiting cars. “I would tap on each window and asked them to spare the air. Some looked at me like I was crazy, rolled their eyes and turned away. Others did the right thing.” Why the big deal? Shils went on to argue that, Phoenix Lake is a one of the most biodiverse and magnificent ecosystems in our community. It's habitat to hundreds of species and in my mind, one of the most beautiful places on earth. [...] The responsibility for the loss of habitat and species at Phoenix Lake is all of ours. Urbanization and pollution contribute to the direct loss of habitat, harm to streams and lakes, degrading water quality and altered ecosystems for the birds, fish, flora and fauna that need to flourish in places like Phoenix Lake, or Corte Madera Creek or Stafford Lake. (Shils, 2012)
Shils’ action demonstrates the degree to which residents were exposed to ecological discourse in Marin County. Even in the private space of their own automobiles residents are faced with intrepid environmental activists who demand that they modulate their behavior for environmental health.

However, as Marin County approaches its planned buildout, the fight has shifted to urban infill. Many residents reject densification of smart growth hubs, especially in their own back yards. In these cases, residents do not have easy access to ecology discourse. No one in Marin is proposing to build an apartment complex outside of the urban growth boundary. They want to put them in small cities where the residents that built those very boundaries live. This type of growth is a much more difficult sell.

Consider how one resident responded to a proposal to build in Novato:

Novato does not want to be an urban town. We do not want to be the next Sunnyvale or San Jose. The people of Novato are not agreeing with the Greenbelt Alliance and Smart Growth. Smart Growth isn't smart. We don't want high-density units to be the wave of the future. (Drucker, 2010)

Even so, Marin County environmentalists have already won, especially given generous local funding for land trust and easement purchases. This funding shows no sign of abatement. In 2012, as parks around the state were facing cuts, Marin residents voted on Measure A, which would increase sales taxes by one-quarter of a cent in order to raise 90 million dollars in nine years for the purchase of open space and fund parks (Marin Independent Journal, 2012). The measure passed, raising 10 million dollars per year, half of which would go to park budgets. The grateful County Parks offered free admission for the month of December following the victory (Johnson, 2012).
San Diego County

The way that San Diego County dealt with smart growth best demonstrates the inadequacies of the public sentiment model, especially in comparison to the discourse coalition model. San Diego County is a large coastal county in Southern California, bordering Mexico and encompassing the separately governed city of San Diego among other cities. It is an urban region with majority environmental support and a dense network of well-funded environmental organizations, and, at times in its history, it seemed like victory was within the grasp of managed growth advocates. However, each time that environmentalists sought to challenge the laissez-faire land use policy regime, growth advocates rallied a coalition of vocal property owners and business people to dispose of the threat. As a result, those environmental organizations that remain at the land use table are sometimes described as resigned to the status quo and too willing to approve development and growth in exchange for a few concessions (Hogan, 2003). As I will argue, San Diego growth advocates created this situation by winning the majority of policy contests from 1970 through 1998 and then by fending off attempts to make radical changes in the smart growth era.

In the middle of the twentieth century, a pro-growth coalition presided over the complete urbanization of Mission Valley and Mission Bay. The coastal estuary at the end of the San Diego River was dredged and filled with man-made islands and ringed with sculpted shorelines that held recreational facilities, hotels, expensive homes, and Sea World. Next, they chipped away at restrictions against building in Mission Valley, where a flood-prone, nine-mile stretch of the San Diego River had long supported indigenous populations and wildfowl between steep valley walls. Despite opposition from
environmentalists and existing business communities threatened by expansion elsewhere, developers had the support of Mayor Dail and the resources to make a fight of it. They hired a university professor to conduct a survey showing favorable public support for the project (Davis, 2003). Today, an unbroken line of big box retail stores and malls, condos, and concrete extend from the San Diego Chargers football stadium to the beach.

By the 1970s, San Diego County environmentalists and homeowners were better organized against the persistent and mostly orderly expansion, but they failed to create a managed growth regime. In 1972, Republican Pete Wilson was elected Mayor of San Diego. He had campaigned on an environmental plank, and his first act was a moratorium on building in Mira Mesa. However, the moratorium proved temporary. Despite Wilson’s support from environmentalists, he did not favor a managed growth regime more broadly, nor was he in a position to influence the all-important county government. City efforts at this time focused on accommodating growth, “in a manner sensitive to the particular needs of San Diego – with special reference the matters of timing and phasing” (Stepner, 1986, p. 65). Elsewhere in the county, homeowners in the rugged Cuyamaca Mountains and rural backcountry had mixed results stalling the growth machine during the slow growth era. Three proposed roads that would have increased San Diego tourist traffic to the heart of the mountain region were abandoned due to local pressure, and residents thwarted several proposed suburbs and campsite projects. In Julian, residents petitioned the county to allow the creation of the Julian Historical District, which helped block commercial incursion and the development of new suburbs. At the same time, for each environmental victory, developers won in other places across the region, slowly building infrastructure into the hilly interior (Fetzer, 2009).
In 1974, two scholars, Donald Appleyard and Kevin Lynch, prepared a report in which they identified San Diego’s landscape as the central reason to reject the county’s laissez-faire policy. Their now iconic report was called “Temporary Paradise? A Look at the Special Landscape of the San Diego Region” and it was the first comprehensive attempt to frame the problems of land growth (Appleyard and Lynch, 1974). It declared that the San Diego landscape was special. They write: “This bold site, its openness, its sun, its mild climate, the sea, the landscape contrasting within brief space are (along with its people) the wealth of San Diego. They are what has attracted settlers to the place and still attracts them. They must not be destroyed” (Appleyard and Lynch, 1974: p. 4). They went on to threaten San Diegans with the specter of a landscape completely paved over, which might resemble Los Angeles. The report was financed by the well-known San Diego Marston family, and 30,000 copies were distributed throughout the region (Stepner, 1986, p. 63-72). The document is still considered the defining moment in the local environmental movement.

The report was complemented with a Sierra Club effort to bring a drastic growth management plan to the ballot, but the ballot drive failed to garner the required signatures (Calavita, 1992). Their plan would have limited growth to the national average rate. Some thought that the plan failed because “the formula it used to calculate growth was too complicated” (Stepner, 1986, p. 65). In response to mounting pressure from managed growth activists, the San Diego County Board of Supervisors felt compelled to at least discuss managed growth. In 1976, an interim growth management ordinance was proposed in order to limit growth to pre-built urban and suburban areas. It was highly contested and ultimately dropped in favor of advisory language. By 1979, San Diego
County approved its first general plan. In that plan, the county adopted an urban limit line which was set to match the County Water Authority boundary and which divided the county into a rural, unserviced eastern side and an urban, serviced, western side (Walbert, 1988). This line, however, was both exceedingly generous to development and never strengthened with provisions that would ensure that outlying areas remained rural.

Table 13: Timeline of Major Land Use Events in San Diego County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Sierra Club Growth Management Plan, Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>San Diego County General Plan Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Proposition A “Managed Growth Initiative” Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Proposition D and J, Failed (County Prop B, Counter-proposal, also failed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Proposition C “Forest Conservation Initiative” Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Proposition B “Rural Heritage and Watershed Initiative” Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>County General Plan Update Process Started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Proposition A “Clean Water and Forest Rural Lands Initiative” Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>San Diego County General Plan Update Approved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the 1980s, San Diegan environmentalists joined those across the state in embracing the ballot box era, and crafted a measure that they hoped would gain popular support. They were fortunate in that the city of San Diego had blundered its rapid northward expansion, creating the neighborhood of Mira Mesa some ten miles from the city center and completely lacking in local services and adequate roads (Calavita, 1992; Davis, 2003). The “San Diegans for Managed Growth” and the Sierra Club made Mira Mesa’s epic traffic woes emblematic of the pitfalls of laissez-faire land use. Their first effort was a citywide growth management policy in 1985, Proposition A. The measure was modest in scope and required voter approval for the city of San Diego to urbanize the “urban reserve” within a 10 year period. They were supported by San Diego Mayor
Hedgecock (Colburn, 1986). Environmentalists were outspent, and pro-growth supporters tried to confuse voters. Opponents organized as a group called “Citizens for Community Planning” and argued that the proposal was necessary to maintain a high quality of life. The Chamber of Commerce allegedly lobbied residents by calling them and asking them “survey questions” about how they would handle expected increases in cost of living if they voted for Proposition A. On election night in 1985, San Diego Sierra Club Conservation Coordinator Jay Powell described the effort as a “full-scale mobilization” and recounted a corps of volunteers calling themselves the “Sprawl Busters” who victoriously chanted “A, A, A, Yes on A!, No L.A., Yes on A” (Powell, 1985a; Powell, 1985b).

In 1988, environmentalists reached out beyond the city boundaries with measures that focused on the unincorporated county. Under a new organization called “Citizens for Limited Growth,” environmentalists crafted two propositions, D and J. The goal of the measures was to slowly cut growth in the unincorporated region down from the 4% observed between 1986 and 1987 to a maximum of 1.6% (Weisberg, 1988). By March of 1988, they delivered 85,000 signatures to qualify both measures. However, residents were ambivalent. In a letter to the editor of the Sierra Club newsletter, the High Sierran, in May of 1988, a resident expressed sarcastic concern over Sierra Club support for the proposal. She advised the Sierra Club to “discourage tourists from discovering San Diego.” She went on, “…We must also ask our research and development employers not to be so innovative; we may have to accept lower wages. Our children might have to find jobs elsewhere” (High Sierran, 1988). The Sierra Club ran a rebuttal in the same issue, arguing growth management was effective in many places across the county and was
necessary to keep San Diego from being “Los Angelized” (Mullaney, 1988). They argued that growth would reduce quality of life and increase the cost for services. For two months, 100 members distributed 40,000 pamphlets to voters in San Diego.

County supervisors advanced a counter-proposal, Proposition B. Pro-growth forces joined together to form the “San Diegans for Regional Traffic Solutions.” They argued that job loss, economic harm, and too much red tape bureaucracy were all reasons to reject the environmental proposal (Powell, 1988). Developers joined in the attack by creating pamphlets that lamented “Poor baby Carol,” a fictional child whose parents would never be able to add on another room to their house under the new growth management guidelines (Ristine, 1988). All four measures—the two that supported the environment and the two that did not—failed in the end.

Five years later, tensions in San Diego’s backcountry remained high. In the city of Alpine, an unincorporated region of 11,000 persons in the low Cuyamaca Mountains, 2,000 residents signed a petition to block a project to build a golf course and over 130 homes. The project was called “Stagecoach Ranch,” and was funded by Golf Ventures USA. Residents had signed on to a deal in which the company would provide a sewage treatment plant that would increase the town’s capacity to reclaim water for the golf course and service residents who now relied on septic systems. It was later revealed that the developer would not fund the sewage treatment plant, and that the plant itself would open up capacity to develop another 1,667 homes. As one letter writer stated, “an exclusive golf and country club community with restaurant and motel will offer nothing to Alpine residents and will destroy the flavor of our small, western town, where horses and cattle abound” (Kent, 1993).
In 1993, the organization Save Our Forests and Rangelands (SOFAR), led by Duncan McFetridge, sought to limit the degree to which mountain property could be subdivided and developed through a combination of legal cases and land use propositions. McFetridge was a San Diego County activist who pushed perhaps the most important growth management policies in the county in 1998. McFetridge was a cabinet maker who lived in a two-room cabin in rural Descanso. He wanted to make sure the San Diego backcountry did not end up looking like Los Angeles, “one big asphalt-covered suburb” (Associated Press, 1998). However, McFetridge also used ecological discourse, as when he said, “these things I fight against are hurting our watershed, habitat and the self-sustaining life that inhabit the forest. Without forest and farmlands, the earth will be irreparably harmed” (Penny, 2014). McFetridge spearheaded efforts for a new land initiative in the form of Proposition C, the “Forest Conservation Initiative” which would limit parcel size to 40 acres (Fetzer, 2009, p. 273-276). It passed without much opposition and almost 65% of the vote.10

A judge then passed an order in 1994 which set a minimum parcel size for farmland, stripped the city of zoning power, and led to a moratorium on development. This was a significant environmental victory, but it did not last long. SOFAR filed a second lawsuit in 1998, arguing that the county had not done enough to study the environmental impacts of zoning changes. In response, the Association of Realtors raised money for a new campaign which they called “SOAR” or “Save Our Agricultural Ranchlands,” with the message that only by liberalizing land use could the county make

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10 See the County of San Diego Registrar of Voters, Special Consolidated Statewide Election.
its lands safe for farmers and property owners. It took nearly four years for the county to complete a new environmental report. When it was finally released in 2002, SOFAR brokered a deal to settle the suit in exchange for legal fees. (Monteagudo Jr, 2002)

McFetridge and SOFAR tried again in 1998 with Proposition B, which would reduce the permitted density on agricultural properties. A farmer from San Marcos accused McFetridge of dreaming “up a demon that doesn't exist” (Associated Press, 1998). The local newspaper did not frame the issue in a sympathetic light. A San Diego Union-Tribune article described the rush to implement urban growth boundaries in the state as “a fashion trend that periodically goes in and out of style” and quoted an expert who compared it to NIMBYism: “I’m here, now pull up the drawbridge” (Weisburg, 1998). Proposition B lost resoundingly.

The biggest political struggle in San Diego County in recent memory was the general plan update. The original plan was written in 1979, and therefore was legally outdated and offered few consistent policies for planners to control rampant growth in the backcountry. The county initiated the update in 1998, and held a slew of planning meetings throughout the county in which they broached the subject of smart growth. In an early inventory of land, county planners reported that the existing regulatory program would allow 855,000 units in the unincorporated county at buildout. Planners hoped to reduce that number to 660,000 and channel much of it toward existing urbanized areas where services were available. The process involved rezoning property, which would cost many landowners in potential market value, while providing a windfall to those properties located in unincorporated smart growth hubs. One land appraiser estimated profits of $3 billion (Piro, 2003).
They county’s general plan was not the region’s only introduction to smart growth. The City of San Diego concurrently produced its own smart growth general plan. Supported by Mayor Dick Murphy, the “City of Villages” plan would allow 150,000 new homes in 20 years by opening up new areas for dense mixed-use development (Showley, 2002). According to the 2002 City of San Diego General Plan, smart growth would bring walkable neighborhoods where people could conveniently “work, shop, and recreate” (“Executive Summary” City of San Diego General Plan, 2008, p. 12). The wider planning community celebrated various aspects of the planning projects as impressive monuments to rational thinking and conservation, buoyed by the redevelopment of San Diego’s East Village (Weisberg, 2004). In 2010, the American Planning Association awarded the city plan the Daniel Burhnam Award for a Comprehensive Plan, noting that the plan “reaffirms the city’s long history of protecting open space lands” (American Planning Association, 2010). However, while the plan did a lot to encourage greater density, it did not strengthen environmental protections. At most, it provided a desirable outlet for developers to focus growth resources.

However, many county residents and developers did not embrace the concept of smart growth. Disgruntled property owners formed a group called “Save Our Land Values” or SOLVE. A 2000 news article reported that they had a membership of 150, had raised $20,000, and had hired a political consultant. Initially, environmentalist organizations SOFAR and the San Diego Sierra Club also opposed the plan (Monteagudo Jr, 2000a). Realtors complained that not enough property owners had been heard, and county supervisors delayed their hearings until January of 2001, just as conservative Supervisor Bill Horn assumed the chair (Monteagudo Jr, 2000b). In addition to serving as
a local voice for property rights discourse, Horn owned three parcels in Valley Center which would be affected by the planning process (Monteagudo Jr, 2003b).

In 2001, Sierra Club activists suggested a moratorium on development in the backcountry. Citizens in Alpine and Ramona were frustrated with the growth that they had absorbed while the plan was in underway (Monteagudo Jr, 2001a). While the plan stalled, developers were rushing to build controversial projects that might be impossible after a plan was complete. The San Diego Planning Commission agreed to hear the request, but it declined to act on it (Monteagudo Jr, 2001b).

In 2002, SANDAG, the regional association of governments, gathered city and county leaders and attempted to convince them to take direct steps to implement smart growth. However, efforts were largely focused on changing policies to allow rapid growth in urban hubs rather than to prevent further suburban growth. Developers pointed to the success of San Diego (city) and Chula Vista in creating higher densities. SANDAG experts argued that without increasing allowable density, developable land might be built out by 2020. (Weisberg, 2002)

By 2003, San Diego County Supervisors were still hashing out the details of their general plan update. In a series of public hearings, some lasting more than six hours, both environmentalists and growth advocates were unhappy. Property owners threatened to sue if the plan was approved (Monteagudo Jr, 2003a). Farmers were hoping for a much-discussed transfer of development rights program, whereby developers in urban cores would pay a fee of $25,000 per unit which would be transferred directly to a farmer in exchange for selling the right to development one unit on farmland (Piro, 2003). In June, after hearing from hundreds of residents, supervisors voted to approve the direction of the
land use element. In the chosen plan, they would allow for growth to 678,500 persons in the unincorporated area. At the same time, Supervisor Horn ordered staff to continue reviewing 210 specific requests from property owners, all of which would be heard before the supervisors. Developers celebrated the news (Monteagudo Jr, 2003c). At the same time, county staff indicated that any projects that were underway and that could be approved under the old guidelines prior to the plan implementation would be allowed to go forward despite the pending policies (San Diego Union-Tribune, 2003). At the end of September, supervisors were stalled as they listened to a backlog of 183 property owners who appealed the planner recommendations (Monteagudo Jr, 2003d).

In late 2003, McFetridge and supporters interrupted the general plan update when they began gathering signatures for a new land use measure (Weisburg, 2003a). Proposition A, “Clean Water and Forest Rural Lands Initiative,” would have capped the population in the unincorporated area to just under 700,000 residents, while establishing 80 and 160-acre minimum lot sizes for parcels in areas far from urban centers. Over 100,000 signatures were collected to qualify the measure, at a cost of $100,000 (Weisburg, 2003b). A supporter from the Surfrider foundation (an environmental organization normally devoted to beaches but which occasionally participates in land use issues) optimistically noted, “last time this was brought forward, no one was talking about smart growth, but now people are beginning to make the link between planning and their quality of life” (Weisburg, 2003).

The initiative was divisive. Proponents were outspent by opponents including land developers and the Farm Bureau of San Diego (Conlan, 1998). None of the local farming groups supported the plan, which was aimed at protecting farms. The Farm
Bureau supported the general plan process and accused environmentalists of hijacking the democratic process (Weisburg, 2003a). The Endangered Habitat League didn’t take a position (Gao, 2004). An opinion piece from the Urban Futures Program in Los Angeles argued that the measure was “simply ballot box planning at its worst” that appealed only to emotion (Fiscelli, 2003). This proposition failed at the ballot box.

In 2006, SANDAG released another report, this time increasing its estimate of growth. The report suggested that, in 25 years, the county would grow by one million residents. The county was slotting 38 percent of that growth in the urban core while the remaining 62% would be low density build-out (Weisburg, 2006).

By 2010, San Diego county residents were finalizing a new general plan to replace the 1978 plan which had liberally zoned the backcountry. Planners, environmental organizations, and most county supervisors were initially eager to pursue smart growth, which included generous development forecasts for hubs across the county. However, a loose coalition of developers, property owners, and farmers protested smart growth and environmental restrictions. Planners and many residents were concerned that the current zoning pattern would allow the seeding of new urban areas throughout the rural and mountainous eastern San Diego County. A new general plan was drafted which would allow for more than 180,000 new residents in the unincorporated backcountry. At the same time, it would downzone parcels where lack of services and natural hazards would make development costly (20% of parcels) while increasing allowable density in some previously urbanized areas (10% of parcels). It was a tough sell, and county planners had been working to garner support from residents for more than a decade, hosting some 500 stakeholder meetings. Residents who would see
increased growth in small unincorporated areas were furious as were property owners who would face density cuts. (Stephens, 2010b)

Close observation of the general plan hearings revealed that even though the public sentiment model would predict that more people support managed growth than laissez-faire policy, in actuality, more participants favored laissez-faire policy. While rural property owners had long enjoyed favorable zoning, new smart growth boundaries drawn up by planning groups would have dramatically limited options for future growth. County planners vocally advocated for smart growth as a compromise that would allow fiscally solvent growth. Developers and real estate agents had an interest in altering the plan to retain as much growth potential as possible. To do this, they mobilized a coalition of property owners, farmers, and those who worked in the development industry. In August of 2010, a pro-growth “stakeholders group” published a white paper titled “Fixing the Fatal Flaws.” The document was endorsed by several local Association of Realtor groups, business and development organizations, the grassroots organization “Save Our Rural Economy,” and the San Diego Farm Bureau.11 The primary argument was that the proposed plan would constitute “severe downzoning” which would financially ruin rural property owners. The document went on to model a series of economic arguments with which anyone who owned property might criticize the plan and request an exemption.

There were a total of 273 speakers during public testimony in San Diego County and, though not all speakers took clear positions, the majority supported growth in San

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11 Additional groups include the Building Industry Association of San Diego County, the San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce, the San Diego North Economic Development Council, the San Diego Regional Economic Development Corporation, and the Alliance for Habitat Conservation (a developer-funded organization that works to set up easements in exchange for growth).
Diego County. (By my estimation, 158 favored growth while 97 favored managed growth.) Economic discourse was most common in San Diego, and it was most frequently used by those who wanted more growth. Speakers argued that growth would help the economic health of the region, pay for county services, and protect land prices. Economic arguments were so popular that they were also regularly used by those who desired less growth. These speakers disputed the fiscal benefits of rural development and the possibility of economy of scale outside of urban hubs. Combining both more growth and less growth discourse, almost half of all coded frames engaged with the economic costs and benefits of implementing smart growth. The second most frequent category was anthropic discourse, which was the predominant category used by those seeking less growth.

Pro-growth organizations in San Diego County succeeded because they made claims on behalf of the rights of property owners that resonated with the local discursive opportunity structure. During public testimony, fifty-three property owners, developers, and attorneys spoke to request greater density on a specific property (over 100 more submitted requests in writing). Property owners primarily used economic discourse to justify their requests. They argued that property value would be lost by down-zoning, that the economy would suffer, or that growth was needed to finance local services such as schools. Speakers sometimes added to their economic claims by challenging the appropriate use of government. Many speakers used private property rights frames, emotionally arguing that ownership conferred an absolute right to dispose of private land as they wished. The influence of the stakeholders group can be seen especially where
pleas for exemption drew from the language circulated in the white paper, as in frequent use of the phrase “severe downzoning” to describe reductions to allowable density. Most farmers followed the Farm Bureau’s lead and joined the pro-growth coalition. They argued that they needed to be able to mortgage or liquidate property to keep their farms financially viable. The potential economic loss for downzoned farms was frequently and compellingly put to use by San Diego farmers.

In response to this pressure, county supervisors authorized the drafting of a “referral map” in which interested parties created a maximal growth plan which would be scrutinized alongside the smart growth plan. This maximal growth map gave homeowners the chance to argue that a compromise was needed to bridge the smart growth map and the referral map.

Environmental organizations and community groups defended smart growth, but they failed because the discursive opportunity structure, predicated on the socioeconomic status of the region, advantaged their opponents. Despite the extensive environmental organization network in San Diego County, only 18 speakers identified as environmentalists during testimony for the general plan update (just over 6% of the 273 total participants). The San Diego Sierra Club, which had taken a leadership role in fighting for growth management policies during the 1980s, was hardly involved in the final years of the plan process. The San Diego Chapter Newsletter failed to run a single story on the general plan between 2009 and 2011. Other environmental organizations seemed to actually acquiesce to growth-oriented programs. For example, a transfer of development rights program in San Diego in which property owners would be permitted
to sell “development rights” to interested builders had support from representatives from
the Endangered Habitats League and Citizens Coordinate for Century 3.\textsuperscript{12}

Though the San Diego Sierra Club did not campaign on the general plan, members occasionally spoke during public testimony. When they did, they primarily used quality of life and economic discourse. For example, one representative approved of environmental and economic compromise while fretting about natural hazards and cost:

\begin{quote}
The true challenge is what provides for the best sustainability for agriculture, taxpayers, and the environment. [We should shift] development west toward existing highways and into towns and villages, strengthening these economic centers and creating local jobs. A smarter pattern of growth increases public safety by decreasing high fire zones and reducing taxpayer burdens related to infrastructure and environmental damage.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

This speaker and other environmentalists made claims which primarily invoked the economic advantages of growth management rather than global warming, valuable habitats, or natural systems.

The public sentiment model cannot explain the actions of San Diego environmentalists. The San Diego Sierra Club should have been highly engaged in mobilizing supporters to defend the environment in a place where more than half of all voters care about the environment. However, environmentalists were underrepresented during general plan testimony and many environmental groups did not effectively campaign. The discursive opportunity structure better accounts for the actions of San Diego environmentalists. Economic discourse is a poor choice for protecting land, because the development of land is a powerful economic engine. For every person who

\textsuperscript{12} See San Diego Board of Supervisors, 10-20-10 and 12-8-10.
\textsuperscript{13} San Diego Board of Supervisors, 11-10-10 at 01:16:43.
argues that a solution for limited economic resources is small community footprints, others have a discursive opportunity to argue that growth would increase economic resources for all. San Diego environmentalists did their best with the empowered economic and anthropic discourses, but it was an ineffective organizational strategy.

Developers joined homeowners in making arguments which dovetailed with dominant economic concerns, such as this example from a representative of the Rodney Corporation, which had plans for the Guejito Ranch, the largest private undeveloped property in unincorporated San Diego:

…You will note that I say private landowner. The fact is that 64% of the unincorporated area is already in public hands […]. San Diego County or some other entity already controls 64% of the unincorporated area. And through this general plan update, through unjust downzoning and imposition of countless regulations the county wants to control even more. That’s just not right […]. People will fight. There will be lawsuits and ballot measures and new candidates, and whatever the people can do to protect the value of their land.¹⁴

San Diego farmers outside of planned urban growth areas had long been zoned for rural residential development. This de facto regulation allowed farmers to sell parcels of property for development if times were tough or opportunities lucrative. To implement smart growth and preserve agriculture, the county planned to downzone farms. The majority of farmers rallied under the Farm Bureau in a partnership with property owners and developers to resist smart growth. In particular, they advocated to compensate farmers for the loss of equity in their land through a farmer specific transfer of development program. They commonly invoked “people needs,” such as the need to preserve agriculture, and protect farmers and their families. Farmers linked these

¹⁴ SDBS10-20-10AM [02:10:37]
arguments with concern about the potential economic loss to downzoned farms, the most frequent category used by San Diego farmers (See Figure 12). They argued that they needed to be able to mortgage or liquidate property to keep farms financially viable. For example, a farmer explained how land equity kept his family farm afloat in the 1980s:

We kept cutting and cutting and it was heartbreaking. [...] How did we survive? We survived by splitting off pieces of land and selling it. It was the only way we could keep ahold of the farm.\textsuperscript{15}

Numerous farmers and representatives from the Farm Bureau reiterated the theme, often holding that farmers need not actually sell the property to developers but merely have high property value as collateral for high lines of credit.

Farmers were only partially successful. The Board offered lip-service support for the agricultural TDR despite periodic staff reports showing a lack of funding sources. They were not willing to publicly shrug off the concerns of the agricultural community and supporters. Even relatively environmentalist Supervisor Jacobs supported the program at the end of public testimony:

My intent is to have another tool in the tool box as we progress. [...] Rather than have a third party own open space, [the] private landowner could maintain that property, have it in certain uses like [agriculture], and the property owner would get some kinds of benefits for doing that.\textsuperscript{16}

Farmers were able to appeal their particular zoning density on an individual basis, or apply for a general plan amendment at a later point in time.

To summarize, San Diego farmers mobilized against downzoning using dominant economic frames. They were partially successful in disrupting the proposed smart growth

\textsuperscript{15} SDBS10-20-10PM [00:48:40]
\textsuperscript{16} SDBS 12-8-10PM [00:03:00]
implementation, and some were given opportunities to exempt their properties. This success was due to the local discursive opportunity structure that made these frames seem compelling. Neither the supervisors nor environmental groups were willing to challenge the farming community even though it would have been easy to use natural systems or value in nature frames in their arguments. This silence can be accounted for by a discursive opportunity structure that empowers only economic and anthropocentric reasons for slow growth, while ignoring systemic and value in nature frames. That the TDRs were ultimately successful and yet so popular further weakened the general plan that was eventually passed. (The agricultural specific “PACE” program was established as a pilot program in November of 2011 and a brochure is available on the county website indicating that farmers may apply and the program will begin distributing funds in 2012. However, inquiries on whether funds have been distributed have gone unanswered.) The empowered logic of land value explains why county supervisors have been willing to revisit their 2011 general plan decisions in 2012 to carve out further amendments and exceptions that increase allowable density.

There were also residents in San Diego who mounted challenges against increased growth in places slated to be new urban hubs of smart growth. This reactionary mobilization, the smart growth equivalent of “not in my backyard” local activism, was most densely organized in Valley Center, a rapidly suburbanizing community along the I-15 corridor. For the most part, these participants were concerned about the personal effects of growth.

After more than a decade of preparation, San Diego County approved an updated general plan in 2011. Eventually, county supervisors weakened the general plan update
by allowing multiple appeals from individual property owners. Though early drafts of the plan proposed down-zoning as much as 60% of parcels, only 20% of land was eventually downzoned, while 80% was increased in allowable density or remained the same. Most of the remaining 20%, as planners repeatedly explained, was a “paper” down-zoning as other ordinances prohibited greater density in these areas. The final plan that was approved allowed for a million more residents, nearly half of whom would be located outside of the county’s urban service line. After approving the plan, Supervisors Roberts, Horn, and Cox voted for a meeting in which they scheduled review of up to 230 individual projects requests (Schmidt, 2011). Immediately following the new plan, the supervisors offered a further carrot to developers by significantly cutting development fees throughout the county, arguing that the new plan would require less revenue. They reduced fees for commercial projects by 79% and residential unit fees by 46% (Nichols, 2012).

Environmentalists in San Diego were never successful using ecological discourse, and so they eventually turned to anthropic and economic discourse. In the city of San Diego, Mayors Wilson and Hedgecock both allied with environmentalists “managed growth” efforts in the 1970s and 1980s. However, their support was rarely justified through ecology discourse. According to Colburn, during the run-up to the 1985 Proposition A vote, “Hedgecock couched his position in economic terms, so as not to unduly alarm Republican backers” (1986, p. 78). He argued that the problem was overburdened services that was increasing taxpayer costs and lowering quality of life.
Consider how well-known environmentalist Duncan McFetridge advocated for Proposition B in 2006. His comments in a long Op-Ed focused entirely on quality of life and cost savings:

Proposition B will be a catalyst for smart growth by directing growth to areas within or adjacent to existing urban areas. [...] Proposition B would have numerous beneficial impacts including a massive reduction in traffic, preservation of local water supplies and the decrease of air and water pollution, resulting in a savings of millions of dollars for reinvestment in our needful communities. These are documented meaningful benefits for San Diego.

As this quote illustrates, McFetridge frames the argument entirely using quality of life and economic discourse. This was, in fact, the only mention of pollution or environmental issues in the entire opinion piece.

It is striking how little involvement environmentalists had with the general plan update. Some groups failed to campaign at all. In the run-up to the final public hearings, the Sierra Club newsletter barely mentioned the general plan update. They did not run notices about the public hearings that were going on in the county. But others were pleased that the county was doing something and made no additional demands even as the plan was weakened. The director of the Endangered Habitats League supported the plan for its cost-saving potentials. Stephens noted, “Unlike in many California land use battles, stakeholders are not arguing over environmental protection” (Stephens, 2010b). In fact, by 2010, interest in the San Diego Chapter of the Sierra Club had been dwindling for over a decade. In 1999, the San Diego chapter sponsored over 1000 recreational activities, but, by 2008, there were just half as many (High Sierran, 2011). Membership in the San Diego chapter dropped by 1100 members during a year and a half period
between 2008 and 2009 (Zechman, 2009). One of two local Sierra Club office workers was sacked in the spring of 2010 (Chase, 2010). In 2014 the local Sierra Club executive board was dissolved by the national office in San Francisco (Sullivan, 2014).

What can we say about the cultural landscape model in San Diego? On the other hand, San Diego is neither forest nor is it a particularly pastoral farming county. While there are some forested mountains and lush river valleys, most of the county is blanketed with dense shrubs where wildfires periodically scorch the earth. This land is beautiful to some people but not to all people. Yet even in the shrubs and chaparral there are some places where a shady grove of oak trees protects a small patch of grass where San Diego appears downright idyllic and picturesque. The environmentalists with whom I have spoken seem to love the landscape just as fiercely as any other. I reject the claim that something about the landscape is lacking in San Diego.

In many ways, the architects of San Diego’s failed managed growth movement did their best to frame the struggle as a great battle to protect a beautiful landscape. They invoked Los Angeles to remind San Diegans that San Diego was different. It had not yet broken into the backcountry and still had the potential to save much of it. Environmentalists won when they used this tactic in 1985, although it was a limited and temporary victory. This victory seemed to offer a clear sign that the slogan “No on LA” resonated strongly among many. The Los Angeles slogan persisted, with the formation of Prevent Los Angelization Now! (PLAN) in the early 1990s (Navarro, 1991). Even beleaguered Los Angeles environmentalists felt obliged to form a loose coalition they called “Not Yet New York” which was successful at passing Proposition U in 1986 which reined in commercial development (Martin, 1988).
However, the cultural landscape model did not work for environmentalists, and not because it was not widely shared. San Diego managed-growth advocates failed because even though residents did not want San Diego to turn into the Los Angeles landscape, many residents were more persuaded by economic discourse. In the years form the 1985 victory, environmentalists have turned away from managed growth politics, probably as a response to the perceived futility of further action. By the turn of the century, local frustration over the politics of growth had reduced the environmentalist movement to desperate symbolism. An Earth Liberation Front saboteur burned a two-hundred unit apartment building under construction in University City near the campus of the University of California, San Diego. The arson remains unsolved and stands as a futile gesture against the corporate-driven development that brought three million residents in the twentieth century, and continues to plan for more (Hettena, 2003).

Humboldt County

While San Diego County provides clear evidence of a process that seems to violate the public sentiment model, Humboldt County provides a process that seems contrary to the cultural landscape model. Humboldt County has many environmentalists, but they are relatively concentrated in the city of Arcata, home to Humboldt State University, and the first city in America to come under Green Party control, in 1996 (Bailey, 1996). However, the green politics of Humboldt’s cities competes against the laissez-faire liberalism of Humboldt’s rural census designated places, where foresters and marijuana growers tend to bitterly oppose regulation. While some cultivation is legal under the auspices of medical marijuana, illegal grow sites and decades of Drug
Enforcement Agency helicopter assaults foster paranoid independence. In the small town of Redway, residents are so distrustful of local government that they protested all plans for government intervention, even a plan to narrow a main street to create a more vibrant downtown community (Tressler, 2004e). A majority of residents do not demonstrate environmental concern based on statewide ballot measures (42.7% average voting record). The county does have an active group of environmentalists concerned over the health of forests and rivers in the area (Tressler, 2002b), however it is difficult to imagine how this relatively dense and well-funded environmental organization could overcome such a significant lack of concern. And in fact, when it comes to land use planning, rural Humboldt County had a firmly entrenched Laissez-faire policy regime by the dawn of the smart growth era.

Humboldt County provides the best evidence to reject the cultural landscape model. Unlike cases with competing geographical and economic traditions, Humboldt County residents agreed that the trees and plants that feed local industry were critically important. The lucrative marijuana industry brings in an estimated 400 million dollars in largely untaxed income (Greenson, 2011c) and is a huge component of the local character of the county. However, the rural forested landscape of Humboldt County is central to shielding the clandestine grow industry. Humboldt County produces more timber than any other county in California (Kalt, 2009). The state and federal government own a combined 550,000 acres of timberland in Humboldt county, more than one-eighth of the total land in the county (Driscoll, 2001a). The county is part of the redwood triangle and has born extensive political controversy between loggers and environmentalists over the cultivation of forests. The result is a working forest landscape with a patchwork of old
growth parcels in conservancy status. I will demonstrate that even though everyone on both sides embraced this cultural landscape, the pro-growth coalition nonetheless ignored this cultural landscape when they built a coalition to trash the smart growth plan and produce a rapid growth alternative plan.

At the same time, the general plan update in Humboldt County supports the discourse coalition model. By the year 2000, the first update of the general plan in twenty years began under a moderate board of supervisors. Planners and most participants seemed to favor a conservative smart growth approach. Environmentalists sought to usher in this result by building a managed growth coalition using the cultural landscape as a rallying point. They were crushed by a pro-growth who used economic discourse, and specifically the private property rights frame to build a 4,000-member coalition.

Davidson (2007), in a study of Humboldt County in the 1990s, prior to the smart growth age, finds that private property rights discourse is a “hegemonic ideology,” which is a widely used and rarely questioned economic frame that grounds political discussion. Indeed, it seems that this particular form of economic discourse remains an effective organizing tool today.

Table 14: Timeline of Major Land Use Events in Humboldt County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>League of Women Voters Lawsuit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Humboldt County General Plan Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>County General Plan Update Process Began</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Humboldt County General Plan Process Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Humboldt County faced significant hurdles to update the general plan. The existing general plan was the result of the settlement from a League of Women Voters
lawsuit in 1980 which forced the county to stop dragging its feet and produce a timeline to completion (Faulk, 2005i). In 1984, county supervisors adopted a first plan (Sims, 2012b), codifying a laissez-faire policy regime. By the turn of the century, the plan was badly outdated and the changing economic character of the community brought new risks. Housing was beginning to encroach on land used by extractive industries, and new residents were making demands that required principled guidance. For example, resident living near the Klamath River protested against ongoing aggregate mining operation in 2004 (Tressler, 2004b). Humboldt was growing at just 0.25% annually, with strong demand for affordable housing and rapidly increasing costs. The housing boom had more than doubled the median cost of housing in Humboldt County in a decade, vastly increasing profits from development (Tressler, 2004c). The California Department of Housing and Community Development and the Humboldt County Association of Governments initially encouraged the board of supervisors to pursue a plan allowing 1% growth per year, to be distributed between the various local governments. While some environmentalists were upset that growth would be planned at a greater density than the annual rate, meeting the state’s preferred growth rate could help accommodate affordable housing goals while ensuring that Humboldt County would be eligible for community block grants and other state funding (Tressler, 2002a).

Environmentalists were optimistic as the work started, but this optimism was short-lived. In 2002, longtime conservative 5th District Supervisor Paul Kirk led the way by adopting a community plan for McKinleyville, a census designated place which had become a bedroom community for nearby Eureka. The plan erected a town plaza for the growing community, and was ushered through with little controversy (Tressler, 2002d).
Supervisor Kirk promptly retired. In the heated election that followed, relative newcomer and environmental analyst Jill Geist was elected. She was seen by observers as the voice of a progressive and younger district (Tressler 2002c), and seemed to mark a shift in community demographics. She was committed to redirecting more water to the Klamath and Trinity Rivers (Tressler, 2003a) and seemed like a prime candidate to back a smart growth general plan update. In 2003, county planners began gathering feedback (Times-Standard, 2003a), and, by August, they had scheduled a series of official public workshops and optimistically promised a completed draft by the end of the year (Time-Standard, 2003b). However, no one had figured out a strategy to accommodate the projected growth. At stake was the question of how to handle agricultural and timber land, which was slowly disappearing while local farmers and foresters struggled to remain profitable. To make matters worse, county supervisors faced a $9 million budget shortage in 2004 (Tressler, 2004a).

At the end of 2003, the Northern California Association of Homebuilders complained that the process was moving too quickly and organized an effort to boycott a planning meeting (Tressler, 2003b). When they returned to the table in 2004, developers and realtors had organized. They charged that loss of productive lands was inevitable, and that the county should facilitate much more rapid growth by paying to extend infrastructure including roads, water, and sewer (Driscoll, 2004b; Tressler 2004c). Next, they hired consultants to write their own general plan in (Tressler, 2004c). They formed an organization called the Humboldt Economic and Land Plan Group (HELP), which included notable growth advocates, such as the Mayor of Fortuna, Tom Cooke and commissioner for the Humboldt Bay Harbor Commission, Ronnie Pellegrini, and Mike
Harvey, the Chairman of the Humboldt County Republican Party (Bird, 2004b). The most well-known person associated with the group was Robin Arkley, though he stated publicly that he was not a member. He was a businessman and financier who had spent millions of dollars on various conservative political issues (Conners, 2006). In fact, Arkley bought his own newspaper in 2003, the *Eureka Reporter*, which competed with the local daily, the *Times-Standard*. Arkley turned the newspaper into a free daily paper and used its editorial pages to back the pro-growth battle that he was waging between 2003 and 2008. However, the paper never made money, and was sued by the parent company of the Times-Standard. Arkley closed the paper in 2008, having found no willing buyers, but managed to secure a legal agreement with the *Times-Standard* to run Arkley’s editorials in their newspaper following the dissolution of the *Eureka Reporter* (Greenson, 2008b).

HELP first presented their version of the plan, “Plan H,” to the Humboldt County Board of Supervisors in June of 2004. Whereas the county had called for just 16,000 total units in 20 years, most of which would not be placed in unincorporated areas, Plan H requested a 2% increase per year, which would amount to 80,000 new homes in the same period (Lovelace, 2004). They recommended that the Board stick to the 1984 plan as closely as possible while adding an “economic development” element, eliminating red tape, and opening up more areas for growth to increase supply. They scheduled regular meetings to spread their message concurrently with countywide planning outreach (Tressler, 2004d). The director of the Greater Eureka Area Chamber of Commerce wrote a piece in the *Times-Standard* described Plan H as “a realistic, common sense plan that rests somewhere between the perspectives of unfettered growth and no growth at all”
(Hockaday, 2004). In late July, the Fortuna City Council signed on to the plan (Bird, 2004a) as did local realtors and other growth advocates (Vogel, 2004a).

In response, environmentalists formed a competing group, the Healthy Humboldt Coalition, to promote managed growth (Lovelace, 2004). The group allied the Northcoast Environmental Center, the Sierra Club, and the Humboldt Watershed Council (Tressler, 2004g). They attended local meetings in Arcata, Fortuna, and Eureka in late summer of 2004, and challenged the HELP plan (Vogel, 2004b). At a Eureka City Council meeting, County Supervisor Lovelace spoke on behalf of Healthy Humboldt to argue that HELP was only masquerading as a reasoned development plan for the future: “This is the absolute blueprint of sprawl. […] This is leaving the future to chance and the vision of a few people” (Vogel, 2004c). The Healthy Humboldt coalition advocated a version of smart growth that they called “city-centered growth” which prescribed dense development in urban areas with provisions for affordable housing units and little development in open space (Tressler, 2004g). An affiliated group, the Alliance for Ethical Business, criticized developer arguments that increasing development would alleviate rising housing cost (Salzman, 2004).

By August, popular opinion seemed to favor growth and HELP, even though Healthy Humboldt had received support from the predictably green Arcata City Council (Vogel, 2004d) and from local professors (Times-Standard, 2004). HELP had managed to secure letters of support from the city of Fortuna, the Humboldt Bay Harbor Commission, the Eureka Chamber of Commerce, and the McKinleyville Community Services District (Bird, 2004b). As the board of supervisors prepared to choose between four “sketch
plans,” growth advocates urged them to reject all of the drafts. Bob Higgins, of the Northern California Association of Homebuilders, suggested that supervisors start over:

Unduly limiting land designated for new housing in the updated General Plan will do nothing but exacerbate this. There is an imbalance between supply and demand. As long as this remains the case, there will be constant pressure on prices. (Higgins, 2004)

The HELP group received regular coverage in local newspapers, including prominent feature stories where leading developers were quizzed about their vision for the future. They bemoaned the economic fate of Humboldt County (one writer compared it to Cuba), and argued that their children would be forced to leave, perhaps to Mississippi where houses could be purchased for $55,000 (Tressler, 2004f). Farmers and foresters joined with the pro-growth coalition and argued for laissez-faire land use which would increase the value of their holdings (Tressler, 2004g).

When the board of supervisors took up the general plan in August of 2004, there was standing room only in the board room. County supervisors and community planners responded to the public debate by considering three options: 6,000, 12,000 and 18,000 new homes in twenty years, respectively (Tressler, 2004h). In September, the planning commission and county supervisors voted to move forward with the middle plan (Tressler, 2004i). By the end of the year they produced an updated housing element that roughly sketched their vision for modest growth. HELP briefly threatened to sue (Tressler, 2004j), and then responded by sending a strongly worded letter of concern to board chairwoman Geist (Bird, 2004c). They then appealed to the state Department of Housing and Community Development, but the appeal was rejected. The housing element
secured a $4.1 million of state funds which would go toward a large affordable housing project in Willow Creek. (Faulk, 2005b).

In the wake of the disastrous report from Humboldt State, growth advocates regrouped. In February of 2005, the Humboldt Business Council was formed. The group represented local timber and paper industries, including the powerful Pacific Lumber Company. Its founders held a press release in Eureka to declare that the business community was an “endangered species.” They simultaneously announced a new political action committee and what they called a grassroots committee, Citizens for Job Growth. Crawford stated that the group’s primary goal was to avert a “local regulatory climate -- a no-growth, anti-business agenda.” (Faulk, 2005a). Later that year, HELP hired a Sacramento-based lobbyist who sent a letter to the county threatening another lawsuit. They alleged that the county was not doing enough to provide room for growth to reach affordable housing goals (Faulk, 2005d). They were able to convince the state’s Department of Housing and Community Development to visit the county, where they staged an elaborate tour of contentious sites. Arkley joined the fray, taking on chief planner Kirk Girard on the radio, and delivering what some called “a verbal beating” (Faulk, 2005e). HELP later called for Girard to be fired (Faulk, 2005f). Supervisor Roger Rodoni noted in an October interview that Girard’s planning office had not been getting along with the customers (Faulk, 2005i).

In an effort to come up with a policy that might establish a managed growth policy without further aggravating HELP and the Humboldt Business Coalition, county planners proposed an agricultural and industrial timber zoning overlay that would rezone many farms and forests to 600 acre minimum parcels, with a withdrawal policy of 1 unit
per 160 acres, if clustered near roads. Planners noted that between 3,000 and 5,000 acres of farmland had been lost to development each year since 1964. Foresters, farmers and property owners were furious. The Pacific Lumber Company, the Green Diamond Resource Company, the Humboldt Cattlemen’s Association, all lobbied in opposition to the measure (Driscoll, 2005; Harvey, 2005).

By July of 2005, the county invited HELP to attend a public planning meeting, offering the group 45 minutes to make their case. In front of a crowd of 100 onlookers, HELP’s Sacramento consultant Kay Backer argued that the Humboldt Planning Department had shown “blatant disregard for the truth and the law,” compared to other places where Backer had consulted, such as China (Faulk, 2005f). HELP followed up by officially requesting that the state Community Development Block Grant Program reject Humboldt’s application for funds on the grounds that poor planning had resulted in a “de facto moratorium” on growth (Faulk, 2005g).

The state Department of Housing and Community Development issues a report in September in which they praised the Humboldt housing element. They did, however, require the county to provide more detailed updated information about their housing stock in an amendment that would be submitted in a month. Both sides took it as a victory. HELP’s consultant Backer said, “They have 30 days to comply with something they had apparently tried for several years and haven’t been able to accomplish. […] It’ll be interesting to see what they come up within 30 days” (Faulk, 2005h). When the county finally sent the update to the state in early November, HELP responded by filing suit, again. They plan, they said, still failed to provide enough land to meet their low income housing needs (Faulk, 2005j).
In early 2006, the state had still not decided how to respond to the Humboldt issue, and Backer was still threatening a general lawsuit (Faulk, 2006a). In late February, Arkley created a new group, “Humboldt Sunshine,” which was tasked with filing the lawsuit (Faulk, 2006b). When the state approved the housing element for the second time, the lawsuit was filed in March of 2007 (Times-Standard, 2007a). A judge threw out the case on a technicality, and the group set to work rewriting the suit (Times-Standard, 2007b).

Later that year, a new battle commenced. This time it was led by the Pacific Lumber Company, which was filing for bankruptcy in a Texas court. While the Pacific Lumber Company had long been owned and operated by a local family, it was now operated out of the Maxxam Corporation in Texas (Cobb, 2007). In a plan to raise capital, the company was hoping to build high-end residential development and a golf course on 22,000 acres of timberland in Humboldt, from which it hoped to raise $700 million. This development was in direct contradiction to the new zoning laws being proposed for the land, and so in October, county supervisors voted 4-1 to issue a 45-day moratorium on building in timber zones. Lumber companies and landowners were furious (Driscoll, 2007a; Driscoll, 2007b). The lone Supervisor opposing the moratorium was Roger Rodoni, who had long had a relationship with the company: he rented a cabin on 9,000 acres from the company for $350 per month (Cobb, 2007).

The response to the moratorium was mixed. Property owners and growth advocates around the county voiced their concerns, and used the moratorium as a springboard to attack the general plan (Driscoll, 2007c). The Times-Standard ran an editorial arguing that the policy was an unnecessary reaction since the development had
several bureaucratic hurdles to clear including the bankruptcy court, and the supervisors could always reject the proposal when it was formally brought to them (Times-Standard, 2007c). Yet environmentalists were quick to defend the supervisors and criticize Rodoni. They conducted a random sample poll of Rodoni’s second district registered voters and found that the largest group of residents favored the most protective county land use policy and that many were concerned about outside business interests dominating county policy (Times-Standard, 2007d).

As for the Pacific Lumber Company, the supervisor’s moratorium was actually successful. The bankruptcy court rejected the development proposal, citing the antagonistic relationship between the timber company and the county and stating that the development was unlikely to be allowed (Driscoll, 2007d). In the aftermath of the moratorium, county supervisors sought to shore up their decision on the timber production zoning through the general plan. The strongest regulation they sought was to require a conditional use permit for these timber areas. Yet, once again, fired up by the recent policy threat, opponents flooded the meeting (Faulkner, 2007). Critics charged that the planning staff had lied about the legal obligations for the timber production zone (Caldwell, 2007). The moratorium had done political damage to environmentalists and galvanized pro-growth advocates. In November, the moratorium was allowed to expire over the protests of staff planners, with County Supervisor Jimmy Smith changing his vote after hearing several hours of public testimony (Driscoll, 2007e).

By 2008, HELP was continuing to make strides. In February, the county, now working with consulting firm Winzler & Kelly, prepared a report detailing how it would provide for future infrastructure needs (Faulkner, 2008). Meanwhile, the HELP group
hired HDR International Engineering who critiqued the infrastructural policies being discussed by the board, quibbling with nearly every assumption made by planners. HELP called for the suspension of the update process (Times-Standard, 2008a). Later, even the city of Eureka joined the dissent, arguing that county plans to encourage development within the city’s sphere of influence were not consistent with available infrastructure capacity (Greenson, 2008a).

In an opinion piece, Cobb described HELP’s rise as “a slow-motion coup” (2008). Though planners had surveyed residents and found overwhelming support for slow-growth goals, HELP had managed to mobilize residents to show up at meetings to promote development (Cobb, 2008). HELP’s lobbyist Kay Backer (2008) responded with an op-ed in which she scolded Cobb for “inaccurate conclusions.” She included survey results that seemed to show that Humboldt residents, in contrast to the Humboldt State University survey, primarily wanted jobs, housing, safety, and growth. She also insisted that the group represented a broad constituency that extended beyond the developers and property owners with personal interests in property. She noted, “[a] group of high school students calling themselves HPA (Humboldt Property Alliance) joined in last year in an attempt to impress on county officials their concerns that landowners were being abused” (Backer, 2008).

2008 would prove a pivotal year for the county. Following an unexpected series of events, three supervisor seats were opened to significant challenge. The election was viewed as no less than a referendum on property rights versus smart growth planning policy (Comstock, 2008). In the second district, incumbent supervisor and rancher Roger Rodoni was expected to face challengers in the November election. Rodoni had suffered
criticism from environmentalists for his handling of the general plan and his support of the Pacific Lumber Company (Times-Standard, 2008b). But, in April, Roger Rodoni was killed in an automobile accident on U.S. Highway 101 (Driscoll, 2009). Rodoni’s seat was in the hands of California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who appointed Roger’s wife, Johanna Rodoni, to complete the remainder of his term. Though she was too late to post her name on the ballot, she promised to “take up where Roger left off” and campaigned as a write-in candidate (Rodoni, 2008). The election, however, was won in a close race by another farmer, Clif Clendenen. In the first district, Supervisor Jimmy Smith, a former commercial fisherman faced challenger John Vevoda, a dairy farmer (Somerville, 2008). He was considered a swing vote on the board, and his position was extremely important for the general plan (Times-Standard, 2008b). Smith survived the election. In the third district, Supervisor Woolley announced that he would not seek another term early in the year. Woolley was the most liberal Board Member and was considered well-matched to the district that included Arcata area residents. Mark Lovelace campaigned in support of General Plan Alternative A. His primary opponent was financial advisor Bryan Plumley, who campaigned for jobs and growth. Lovelace won with 53 percent of the vote, while Plumley received 34 percent. Lovelace’s win preserved a strong environmental voice on the board (Burns, 2008).

By 2009, the Humboldt Coalition for Property Rights (often abbreviated HumCPR) was boasting 2,000 members and was working to apply for nonprofit status. The group had been founded by Lee Ulansey, who owned 100 acres of timber property that he wanted to develop, and had been upset by supervisor policies aimed at preventing development (Driscoll, 2007a). With an office in Eureka, the group had a very public
presence. Estelle Fennell, who had ran for Supervisor in the second district and was beaten out by farmer Clif Clenenden, was appointed Executive Director. (Faulkner, 2009a).

The Humboldt Coalition for Property Rights framed their argument with more nuance than had their allied business groups. For example, the Humboldt Private Property Rights group argued that they represented “balance.” Executive Director Estelle Fennell even nodded to environmental discourse: “We’ve all got the same interests at heart, protecting the environment and protecting property rights” (Falkner, 2009a, para 7). However, in her private property rights discourse, the right way to preserve the environment was to let the property owner manage the free market on their own: “Why not look at encouraging good stewardship as a way to protecting our resources? Why not take the view that those who are stewards of the land are best suited to knowing what's best for it?” (Fennell, 2009). By 2011, HumCPR described its membership as “well over 4,000 members from across the political spectrum, from our urban centers to our most remote rural communities” (Sims, 2011, para 5).

By the end of 2010, the general plan was no closer to being completed. County supervisors asked the planning commission to speed things up by providing a timeline for completion. But the planning commission was politically divided, and a power struggle continued (Tam 2010a). In May, county supervisors approved a timeline of their own, which set a furious pace with the goal of completing the project by the end of the year. It would dramatically limit public testimony to less than an hour for some meetings. HumCPR and HELP seized the opportunity to criticize county supervisors for subverting democracy (Tam 2010b).
The 2010 election brought new supervisors to the fourth and fifth districts. In the fourth, Virginia Bass secured big financial contributions from developers which helped her beat out rivals. In the fifth, Ryan Sundburg also won with developer money (Hourany, 2010). They had the power to mix things up, and there were several vacancies on the planning commission, including the Chair of seventeen years. After twelve years of working on the general plan, the commissioners were worn thin (Tam, 2010c). The next year, Bass and Sundburg began working to mix up the planning commission, challenging the appointment of at-large Commissioner Bruce Emad (Tam, 2011a). Bass appointed HELP activist and real estate broker Linda Disiere (Greenson 2011a).

The county settled the court case that had been filed by Humboldt Sunshine and Housing for All back in 2007. Under the agreement, the county would expedite their efforts to increase zoning on 55 parcels to allow 1000 units of multi-family stock, half of which would go to low-income housing. Though the parcels had all been voluntarily submitted for rezoning, nearby communities were upset (Greenson, 2011b). The Humboldt Association of Realtors and Supervisor Sundberg and Bass were critical even of this project, even though the failure to approve such affordable housing could lead to devastating effects on the local housing industry. Pro-growth forces had taken an obstructionist position.

Later in 2011, pro-growth supervisors turned their attention back to Community Development Services Director Kirk Girard, who was facing a regular evaluation. There were rumors that some on the board wanted to split the department to create a separate planning team – to be helmed by someone else (Tam, 2011b). In October, in a closed session meeting, Girard’s performance was evaluated. Ten people gave testimony, seven
of whom wanted him out. They accused him of making “deliberately false and misleading statements” throughout the planning process. The Healthy Humboldt Coalition, Humboldt Baykeeper and Supervisor Lovelace were at his defense (Hansen, 2011b). In February of 2012, Chairwoman Bass and Supervisor Sundberg led the charge to split the department. It was now officially the Planning and Building Department, and the “Economic Development and Natural Resources” Department. It was initially unclear whether Girard would be allowed to stay. The split was billed as a cost-saving measure, but Girard earned a respectable six-figure salary, and now the Board would have to hire more employees. There was considerable discussion about whether it would be possible to lower Girard’s pay. (It would not be.) Even Clenenden noted that the Humboldt Taxpayer’s League might not approve of the new costs (Hansen, 2012a). Girard was eventually confirmed to a position leading the Economic Development and Natural Resources Department, billed as potentially interim, by a 3-2 vote. Supervisors Smith and Clenenden joined Lovelace on the vote (Hansen, 2012b).

County supervisors were careful to couch their critiques of Girard in terms of cost-savings and “customer dissatisfaction.” But others told a different story. Robin Arkley II published an “open letter” to the county supervisors where he blamed Girard for the housing element’s political troubles:

Six times, its author, Kirk Girard, has submitted a plan to the state. Six times he has failed. Each submission has been postured with, “This time, we got it right.” It is foolish to assume that future attempts will yield different results. It is time for management, the board of supervisors, to step in and resolve this matter, once and for all. (Arkley II, 2012, para 1)

They went on to say,
A general plan must be consistent in all ways. By not having a state-compliant and acceptable housing element, the very foundation of any general plan will be flawed. (Arkley II, 2012, para 3)

Of course, it seems reasonable to assume as well that the housing element failed not because of Girard’s incompetence but because of the political pressure that had been applied by HELP’s lobbyist for a decade, and by the obstructionist tactics of some supervisors and even landowners. But it did not matter. Girard resigned in May, and took a job in Santa Clara County, where he would be second in command (Tam, 2012). Online articles about his resignation attracted the most vitriolic of commentary. While liberals noted that his shoes would be hard to fill, others continued to hound Girard on the internet (Humboldt Mirror, 2012; Sims, 2012a)

2012 was another election year for the first, second and third districts. In the first, Smith was stepping down. Voters replaced him with Rex Bohn, an agricultural businessman who campaigned on a pro-business, pro-property rights agenda, and was endorsed by Supervisor Bass (Hansen, 2012c). On the hottest seat was Clif Clendenden who had been unwilling to sac Girard. And so, in September 2011, HumCPR’s Estelle Fennell announced her decision to once again challenge Supervisor Clenenden in the second district (Hansen, 2011a). Her victory created a four-person pro-growth majority. Only Lovelace remains.

Finally, as pro-growth supervisors had secured their hold on the office and department, the draft general plan and draft environmental impact report was released to the public. Public meetings were scheduled from June to September (Hansen, 2012d). But growth advocates were not done. Lobbyist Kay Backer and other began to write that the entire general plan, and perhaps the entire process of planning, was an assault that
forced elite ideas on the majority. She claimed that obtaining community input was farce in which options were pre-tailored to suit a United Nations agenda while dissenting citizens were ignored (Backer, 2012). When Bohn and Fennell were sworn in, they moved to delay the process once again. By September, there was even talk of scrapping the entire general plan and beginning anew with the minimum changes needed to make the 1984 plan compliant with state law. To facilitate that process, Supervisor Bohn ordered staff to create a list which would compare the two plans and given justification for every change (Hansen, 2012e).

In 2013, Humboldt County supervisors supported Property Rights leader, Lee Ulansey, to the county planning commission. Only Supervisor Lovelace rejected his appointment, calling him “divisive” (Sims, 2013). In early 2014, Supervisor Bass appointed a construction company owner to another vacant seat. Having appointed Ulansey and McKenny, the supervisors sent the entire Open Space and Biological Resource element back to the committee, which had finalized the element in 2011 (Houston, 2014a). Ulansey led the new planning commission to weaken the language in the element in February. When the existing plan had committed to a well-maintained system of parks and trails, the new plan would just “consider” such a system, and made no mention of trails. Ulansey pushed it through the committee amid public outrage. Supervisor Sundburg received angry anonymous voicemails, one of which he replayed in a Board meeting, apparently to admonish his critics (Eureka Times-Standard, 2014a).

By 2014, the board of supervisors, with Lovelace the lone dissenter, further weakened the environmental protections proposed in the draft plan. When they worked on the housing plan in April, they struck their infrastructure standards for building second
housing - explicitly changing the word “infrastructure” to “roads,” to exclude public utilities (Graziani, 2014). In August, they adopted setback standards for wetlands that were significantly weaker than those recommended by their own planning commission, and weaker than those suggested by the California Department of Fish and Game, reducing required development setback by 50 feet, and adopting their own definition of a wetland (Eureka Times-Standard, 2014b; Houston, 2014b). While they did adopt a streamside protection policy in the plan update, the policy allows for development with a special permit process. Later in September, county supervisors agreed to extend the amount of time between mining permit renewals (Houston, 2014d).

What can Humboldt County tell us about the cultural landscape model? A close reading of a decade of letters to the editor, op-eds, and news articles reveals no shared specific landscape that cut across both pro-growth and managed growth advocates and might have had an important role in the policy formation. In fact, just what the landscape was and how it deserved to be treated was particularly contentious. Participants from both sides claimed that “everyone agreed” with their interpretations of the land, but these interpretations were very different. Individuals made such statements in their letters when they claimed that “everyone agreed that the land was worth protecting” but then went on to either endorse actual protections or tremendous growth.

Perhaps it is true that the land was viewed in common as a “forestry oriented community” much in the same way that O’Neill et al argued that the communities they studied were “farm-oriented communities.” Certainly no one from either the pro-growth or the managed growth side in Humboldt County ever argued that forestry should be eliminated or reduced in the county. No one argued that Humboldt was really a suburban
county in disguise. But, even so, precisely how to best regulate this forestry oriented community was a contentious point. For pro-growth advocates, the working nature of the landscape dictated a laissez-faire policy to give foresters the leeway to keep working the landscape. For environmentalists, the same working forests needed to be protected.

At the same time, what can be said about the “character” of Humboldt County? For one thing, the character was very mixed. Environmentalists outside of Arcata were extremely different from rural farmers. And perhaps it could be argued that a majority of residents in Humboldt County had the “character” of rural folk. However, this fails to account for the deliberate way that this character was shaped into active voters. It was striking that Humboldt County’s smart growth era began with so little discussion of property rights, and so little pro-growth involvement. For a while it seemed possible that a mild smart growth agenda would take at least some steps toward regulating urban growth. There were years where the county discussion was dominated by moderates and environmentalists with little involvement from rural Humboldt and the farmers and foresters of the county. In fact, the “character” of the community may have come to matter but only under the skilled leadership of pro-growth organizations.

A better answer for what happened here can be found in the discourse coalition model. Both growth advocates and managed growth advocates sought to court rural property owners. Environmentalist proposals used anthropic and economic discourse to frame their preferred policy solution as consistent with preserving a working landscape. For example, the Northcoast Regional Land Trust reached out to property owners by putting on the North Coast Dialogues working group, claimed to have developed a shared vision about the importance of such activities (Faulkner, 2009b).
By contrast, pro-growth advocates portrayed their opponents as opposed to growth, while vilifying ecological discourse:

Note the words -- “transit-oriented development.” That's code for “no growth.” The state is going for this in a big way. There's also a section called “Sustainable Development,” which appears to be another code word for “no-growth.” The draft language says, “sustainability objectives are translated into urban development policies that direct growth into [urban] areas…” You don't have to read any further to realize that this is more state pressure to direct local land use decisions. (Hawk, 2009)

The growth coalition was increasingly effective at turning out letter writers, and the content of those letter suggest a serious movement that extends beyond the actions of a few powerful actors. By 2011 the pro-growth coalition had brought in a wide variety of individuals. They had made an alliance between developers, foresters, farmers, and rural property owners. They saw themselves as allied against the planning department and Healthy Humboldt:

It appears that [Healthy Humboldt] does not really believe in democracy. They seem to have no idea at all of what I would call "the wisdom of the redneck" and they seem to think of hillfolk as basically snaggle-toothed characters out of "Deliverance," who seem to care only about making trouble for decent folks trying to do good things. What a pity, as we are natural allies. Several of us tried to point this out to Mark Lovelace before he was elected, suggesting that the healing of this breach would be a real contribution, but so far there doesn't seem to be much in the way of a response. (Bauer, 2011)

Discussion

By examining these three cases together, we see that the discourse coalition model best explains the how smart growth was negotiated during general plan updates. All three counties were dealing with a similar problem, and all three counties faces an external policy shock via the new smart growth era and a host of new state pressures to
pursue smart growth. Strikingly, in all three counties, the general plan update that commenced around the turn of the century began in similar ways. Well intentioned planners sought to implement what they understood to be the best option: growth would be encouraged but only when the smart growth criteria of mixed-use construction and transit oriented hubs were met. The cases illustrate clearly how the coalitional nature of land use politics quickly took over. In each county it began with a relatively small rift as battle lines were drawn, and then escalated into a countywide battle. The goal was quite evident to the actors involved: persuade as many people as possible to become involved in the fight, by showing up to meetings, voting. In Humboldt County, pro-growth advocates first tried straightforward economic discourse, and mobilized many of the businesspeople in the county. What was most successful, however, was the private property rights discourse. In Marin County, pro-growth advocates tried to mobilize residents in opposition to smart growth, but they were unsuccessful.

By assessing the types of land use arguments made in a public forum, discourse analysis provides evidence that supports my interpretation. First, I assess overall preference of article writers to gain a sense of how both sides used news articles. Managed growth advocates consistently used newspaper articles more than laissez-faire activists. In my studies, I have found that laissez-faire activists in California rely less on news media and tend to concentrate their efforts on public testimony in planning meetings, mailed political brochures, and talk radio. However, as seen in the figure below, the difference is not that substantial in these counties. We have a good record from both sides of the debate, which provides a good comparative record of how discourses were used.
Figure 16: Article writers favoring laissez-faire versus managed growth policy.

In the next figure, I tally how smart growth was framed differently in the three counties within this sample. Most importantly for this analysis, there was a difference between how broad categories of ideas were used which cut across preferences for more or less growth. In Marin County, ecological discourse was the most frequently used frame while economic discourse was used least frequently. In both San Diego County and Humboldt County, anthropic discourse was most common, followed by economic discourse, with ecological discourse far behind.
From this figure, I deduce two points, both which support the narrative accounts of county politics. First, Marin County is the only case which strengthened their managed growth regime during the smart growth era, and they did it using ecological discourse. However, this discourse did not completely overwhelm those using economic and anthropic discourse, which were also invoked, if slightly less frequently. The second point is that residents in San Diego County and Humboldt County framed their land use dispute primarily using Economic and Anthropic arguments.

Conclusions

My argument elaborates on the discourse coalition model in local land use politics by applying the concept of a discursive opportunity structure. The study design isolated an instance in which the discursive pattern and dominant values did not align: A majority of San Diegans cared about the environment when presented with the non-localized
language of state ballot initiatives, but when they talked about the environment in their local community, they used mostly economic discourse. This misalignment, through comparison to the aligned Marin County, allowed me to demonstrate three points:

First, the frequency with which people use economic, quality of life, and ecology discourses, varies between places, even when they advance the same political interests on the same policy issues. Recall the contrast between the economic discourse of the San Diego Sierra Club representative and the ecology discourse of the Marin County Sierra Club representative. Second, the discursive opportunity structure paired with a mobilization process is consistent with the observed outcomes. In San Diego County, advantaged economic discourse provided an opportunity for pro-growth organizations to mobilize a large number of property owners and farmers, which coincided with the weakening of the smart growth plan. In Marin County, advantaged ecology discourse provided an opportunity for environmental organizations to mobilize numerous residents, which coincided with the approval of a plan in which land use regulation was increased. Third, in some instances, constituents made strategic choices that are unexplainable without theorizing the discursive context that limits their actions. The best evidence of this comes from San Diego environmentalists, who were ineffective during the plan update, contrary to what the public sentiment model predicts.

Though this study has explored local land use politics, the discourse coalition model can potentially explain how political outcomes are reached in other local political contests. In any setting where decision makers have incomplete knowledge of their constituency’s preferences, and where some community members openly participate in those politics, community mobilization can have a big impact. Instead of relying on
incomplete knowledge about community values, land use policy responds to organized coalitions. Discourse drives participation by providing opportunity and constraint which facilitates or hinders mobilization. It is also, in some instances, a tool with which decision makers arbitrate between the interests of participants, as when trails were removed from Marin County farms. This is not to suggest that public sentiment is unimportant. Discourse and public sentiment are surely related, and because discourse analysis is time-intensive, public sentiment is often the best available quantitative measure. However, as the case of San Diego demonstrates, the public sentiment model does not always capture the underlying cultural dynamic of a political contest.

In providing this comparative examination of three counties, I chose a qualitative examination of discourse in favor of a more generalizable study. In doing so, some questions are left over. If counties with managed growth regimes built those regimes using ecological discourse, does that mean that ecological discourse is used more frequently in those counties? And conversely, is economic or anthropic discourse used most frequently in counties that adopted laissez-faire policies? Scholars have certainly suggested as much in case studies, but modern data mining techniques allow us to test this hypothesis with rigor. If the discourse coalition model is the mechanism through which politics is accomplished throughout California, we would expect to find an association between policy outcomes and the ways people talk about land use. The null hypothesis, that there are no differences in the way Californians talk about their land use struggles, would lead us to suspect that the coalition, in fact, has little to do with discourse. The following chapter takes up this task.
Chapter 6 – Territorial Ideologies in Land Use Politics: Mapping Economic, Anthropic, and Ecological Discourses in California

Introduction

In the previous chapter, a close examination of three cases suggests just the discourse coalition model likely explains the three cases better than any other theory. Furthermore, it suggests which discourses are effective for building coalitions. Managed growth coalitions were built using ecological discourse, while laissez-faire coalitions were built using economic discourse. But is this the general pattern for all California counties? What exactly is the relationship between how people talk about land use and the coalitions that implement land use policy regimes?

Growth machine scholars using the discourse coalition model argue that ideology contributes to land use politics, suggesting that ideas become fixed as widely shared territorial ideologies which help or hinder the growth machine. In case studies, scholars have described dominant local ideologies including the claims that growth produces plentiful job opportunities, is inevitable, can damage quality of life, or can ruin natural ecosystems. If ideology can become locally dominant, as these scholars argue, we would expect to see spatial variability in how people talk about land use problems. While there is information about differing local environmental preferences, and many case studies have described local discourse, no studies have systematically mapped land use discourse. In this chapter, I examine how people talk about land use problems in different ways in different counties in the state of California, and how discursive variability between places can help us understand land use politics. Analyzing discourse from over
twenty million newspaper articles, I confirm the existence of certain discursive trends. I find that, while there is nearly universal use of anthropic, human-centered quality of life discourse, there are significant differences between the use of economic and ecological discourses. Economic discourse, including discussion of property value and private property rights, was common in southern California and many rural forestry and farming counties. Ecological discourse, including discussion of global warming and sustainability, was most common in the San Francisco Bay Area. These results provide a foundation from which to empirically test the extant literature’s claims about territorial ideologies.

The chapter describes a method for obtaining and coding the archived full text newspaper articles for quantitative analysis of discourse use, whereby computer algorithms were used to search databases for key phrases associated with qualitatively developed coding categories. In the final portions of the paper I map the discursive structuration to California counties, and discuss the implications for this research and future scholarship. There are three specific claims in the extant literature that I set out to test:

1. Southern California is dominated by economic and anthropic discourse.
2. The San Francisco Bay Area is dominated by ecological discourse.
3. Rural counties are dominated by economic discourse, and particularly by private property rights discourse.

Quantitative analysis of discourse use in newspapers indeed suggests that there are regional differences in the way that newspapers use language. This research suggests that the three hypotheses are roughly accurate, while characterizing the limits of what we can actually say about this discursive domination.
Of all the three categories of discourse, only nature discourse showed any potential for geospatial variability in the expected direction. Northern California and much of the Bay Area had greater frequencies of nature terms than did Southern California and the Central Valley; however, the differences were not extremely strong. The other categories of discourse showed little variability. Of particular interest is that property rights discourse was present across the state, even in places where we might not expect it like liberal Marin County.

Three Hypotheses

In order to provide a framework within which to explore discourse use in newspapers across California, I have selected three geographically distinguished hypotheses that have been proposed in the existing literature.

Hypothesis One: Southern California Discourse

Despite its many environmental organizations and overall environmental concern, Southern California has a reputation for a pro-growth, laissez-faire political attitude. Scholars who have looked closely at certain cases found that growth is discussed and framed using anthropic discourse, or non-economic arguments about human needs and concerns, such as quality of life or traffic congestion. Others have found that economic discourse is pervasive. Troutman’s (2004) account of San Diego is a good example. He argued that pro-growth elites in the city of San Diego in the late 1990s and early 2000s developed a series of successful ideologies which helped them secure further regional growth. These elites had long used the value-free growth ideology in which they argued that growth would be good for all. But the rising costs of low density sprawl made this
message an increasingly difficult sell. Instead, growth supporters argued that growth was inevitable, that it would improve quality of life, and that it would make space for community children to take up residence, thus downplaying controversial immigration. Layzer’s (2006) analysis of the creation of multi-species habitat programs in San Diego County makes a similar point. Layzer argued that, “environmental policy disputes are, at heart, contests over values” (p. 1). Some people hold environmental values, meaning that they care about environmental systems (either for human “quality of life” reasons or because of concern for nature), while others hold “cornucopian” values, meaning that they care about economic growth and see nature as limitless (p. 2-5). Faced with this intractable divide between values, the political work of approving the habitat program involved portraying the problem in a way that aligned with majority community values. Accordingly, San Diego acquired private land for habitat conservation because advocates successfully linked the new habitat to the environmental values of voters.

Hypothesis Two: San Francisco Bay Area Discourse

A second hypothesis is that the San Francisco Bay Area is the hotbed of environmentalism, and thus is dominated by environmental discourses. This hypothesis draws from scholarship showing that environmentalism was created in some developed urban cities such as San Francisco, before being dispersed across other institutional contexts, or the world at large. In this literature, scholars argue that an older human exceptionalism paradigm was replaced by a new environmental paradigm which continues to gradually disseminate through society (Catton and Dunlap, 1980; Milbrath, 1984; Dunlap and Mertig, 1997; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertif, and Jones, 2000).
American Journal of Sociology article, Pampel and Hunter (2012) provide a variation of this theory that pays attention to the shifting cohort effects. Working in the tradition of the World Polity Integration theory, Givens and Jorgenson (2013) used the 2005 world values survey and argued that once individual level variation is controlled for, the number of international environmental organizations best explained degree of environmental concern, suggesting an international diffusion of environmental values.

For some scholars, this environmental ethos represented the emergence of a new biocentric way of talking about life on earth, where plants and animals were believed to have intrinsic value. Earth Day was established in 1970 as a holiday focused on environmental protection. In the 1970s and 1980s, an unofficial “back to the land” movement led disenchanted suburbanites (and urbanites) across the country to reject their modern lifestyle and live primitively in a wilderness setting (Coffin and Lipsey, 1981). Several radical grass-roots environmental organizations were founded, among them Earth First!, the Earth Liberation Front, and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, which, at times, used civil disobedience and even violence against their mostly corporate enemies (Taylor, 1995). Many participants held Biocentric ecologies that attribute intrinsic value to all life-forms or even nature itself. This ecology often uses a language of animal and plant rights, and argues that we cannot violate those rights just to meet human wants. One of the core tenants of Deep Ecology is the claim that “Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.” (Duvall and Sessions, 1985, p. 70). There is mixed evidence about the abruptness of this shift. Brulle’s (2000) study of volunteer organizations in the US employed content analysis of over one hundred environmental organizations over the course of a century to show that
these organizations were predominately focused on conservation issues which were framed anthropocentrically until biocentric organizations became common in the 1960s through 1980s. However, some media studies were unable to find clear cultural shifts during the target time period. In an analysis of general audience magazine content, Podeschi (2007) found that the themes associated with modern environmentalism were present as early as 1945, and that any change was a change in emphasis or magnitude rather than a wholesale shift. In a study of the major news sources between 1890 and 1960, Knight (2010) found that environmental news shows little evidence for the thesis. Journalists reported environmental problems beginning in the late 1800s.

While the literature has often celebrated the emergence of biocentric environmentalisms in the 1970s and 1980s, there were only rare instances when people talked about growth and conservation in their county using such language. It is clear that many environmentalists extend sympathy to plants and animals, but they do not talk about it in public forums. The Earth First! extremist ecocentric politics of which California had its fair share of representatives, is rarely expressed, at least in my sample. Rather, environmentalists use more neutral and scientifically vetted language about interconnected natural systems and external threats like global warming. Scholars have seen the contemporary environmental language as forming a relatively coherent set of claims about the importance of the natural environment. For Luke (2009), “ecologism” is a consistent ideology. One of the ecological frames of interest is wrapped up in the word “sustainability.”
Hypothesis Three: Rural Discourse

The third hypothesis is that rural communities use private property discourse in order to argue about the economic principles behind land use. This perspective is supported by the history in which counter-movements emerged concurrently with the most radical and biocentric environmentalist claims in rural places. In the 1970s, there was the Sagebrush Rebellion. Then in the late 1980s the so-called “Wise Use” movement emerged with the publication of Ron Arnold’s “Wise Use Agenda.” The term is credited to the famous early twentieth century conservationist and forester Gifford Pinchot. Though Pinchot was credited with working with Teddy Roosevelt and John Muir to create the National Parks, he was always more practical than Muir the environmentalist, advocating for practical and sustainable human uses. Now, conservatives claimed the term “wise use” for a very different agenda, the preservation of property rights. In 1989, Arnold wrote an essay (which was later republished in an edited volume) in which he criticized extreme environmental groups (Brick and Cawley, 1996). Arnold depicted environmentalists as “establishment interventionists,” “eco-socialists,” and “deep ecologists,” and wolves in disguise, ready to take away private property. In 1988, a meeting was held in Reno, Nevada, bringing together “a hodgepodge of property rights groups, anti-regulation legal foundations, trade groups of large industries, motorized recreation vehicle clubs, federal land users, farmers, ranchers, fishermen, trappers, small forest holders, mineral prospectors and others who live and work in the middle landscape” (Arnold, 2008, n. pag.). They promoted “unlimited economic growth” and postured as the real pastoral people taking back the metaphorical livestock that urban
environmental “wolves” had stolen. The movement fueled a conservative resurgence in local land use politics.

Recently, there may even be further erosion of overall American political concern, due to the politicization of environmental attitudes and slowing economic recoveries in the new millennium. Using data from Gallop polls, scholars have argued that the public has become much more strongly politicized regarding the environment. Republicans who had been concerned about the environment before are less concerned now, and tend to believe that environmental issues are exaggerated (Guber, 2013). In fact, the release of the film “An Inconvenient Truth” by Al Gore might have triggered this issue by politicizing environment. The Pew Research Center found that in 2010 the impression that global warming is based on good science fell from 77% to 59% due to exodus of Republicans (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2010).

In response to smart growth, an extremely vocal group of activists emerged to challenge the popular planning concept. These actors have argued that smart growth is a conspiracy, derived from a distant United Nations agenda, and designed to violate private property and individual liberty. Consider one local incarnation of this discourse, from Santa Barbara County. In 1991, some county residents formed a group they called the Coalition of Labor, Agriculture, and Business (COLAB), which billed itself as representing farmers, the growth industry, and concerned taxpayers. One of the lead speakers was Andy Caldwell, who ran a conservative radio show. In 2011, a Caldwell argued in an op-ed that smart growth was eviscerating private property and that county leaders wanted to dictate individual lives. He suggested that smart growth would prevent
people from extracting oil, gold, and agricultural products from the land. As a result, he warned that smart growth would lead to “stupid decline” (Caldwell, 2011).

This idea is supported in a chapter by Richard White (1995) which provocatively, cleverly, and subtly penned the connections between our day to day physical activity and our environmental beliefs. White described how rural folk who worked the land develop and intimate knowledge of that land, as habitus born in physical experience and community. The beliefs they developed about that land were connected to that experience. Environmentalists however, were more often those who worked in the city at modern office jobs, and entered the natural world as a place to play. Describing the separation from the natural world of his own modern work, he writes,

> Lights flicker on a screen. I expend little energy; I don’t sweat, or ache, or grow physically tired. I produce at the end of this day no tangible product; there are only stored memories encoded when my fingers touched keys. There is no dirt or death or even consciousness of bodily labors when I am done. Trees still grow, animals still graze, fish still swim. (White, 1995, 184)

Such work suggests that rural places encourage different ways of interacting with and valuing the land. The question I ask here is whether these different experiences result in different ways of talking about the land as well.

And indeed, there was significant evidence of what might be called property rights discourse, but it came in many forms. In its most recent appearance in California land use disputes, private property rights language was wrapped up in a hostile conservative backlash against smart growth and United Nations planning. Advocates who use this discourse are critical of government capacity to intervene in land use
(reminiscent of the Tea Party), consider any regulatory agenda to be a threat to individual rights, and have argued that global warming is a hoax (for example, see Murphy, 2010).

Method

To gather evidence about the geospatial structuration of discourse use, this chapter presents a content analysis of newspaper articles from California. I developed a sample of the electronic text of newspaper articles stored in the centralized Access World News database. The research was conducted in October of 2014, at which time there were 196 California Newspapers. Thirty-seven of California’s counties had at least one newspaper accessible by the online database. There were 21 counties which did not have a local newspaper which was accessible via Access World News (Amador, Alpine, Calaveras, Colusa, Del Norte, Glenn, Inyo, Lassen, Mariposa, Modoc, Mono, Napa, Nevada, Placer, Plumas, San Benito, Santa Cruz, Sierra, Sutter, Trinity, Tuolumne).

The search procedure was as follows. The database was limited to the 196 California newspapers, and was searched in full text for the total number of articles. These newspapers were searched for key terms from a list of potential candidates chosen based on a close examination of the coding work in the qualitative study presented in the previous chapter. The final terms list was calibrated by examining the newspaper output to find terms that were producing relevant results. For example, while “traffic congestion” is extremely important to a land use argument, it is also ubiquitous in urban cities and only very few terms were found to be invoking anthropic land use discourse. Therefore, this term was dropped in favor of a more unique term that allowed comparison. Three phrases (or occasionally, words) were chosen from each of the three
discourses, for a total of 9 search terms. The results from these 196 newspapers were then aggregated by county and presented as frequencies. See the table below.

Table 15: Search Terms for Content Analysis

<table>
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<th>Discourse Type</th>
<th>Search Terms</th>
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| Economic       | E1 “property rights”  
                | E2 “property value”  
                | E3 “construction jobs” |
| Anthropic      | A1 “quality of life”  
                | A2 “future generations”  
                | A3 “steward of the land” |
| Ecological     | N1 “global warming”  
                | N2 “ecological footprint”  
                | N3 “sustainable” |

Note: All search terms used with “land” or “growth.”

Admittedly, this method of gathering discursive data is furthest from qualitative analysis. While the method was developed on concert with the other methods, there is no way to be sure that the search terms represent actual local discourses. These terms could have been invoked in any context including articles which mention land or growth but are not about local land use issues. Furthermore, there is no way to know the intended meaning of these terms in the article. It is merely a count of how many times these terms appeared. Newspapers themselves are problematic sources to some degree. Reporters seeking to provide open and fair coverage may try to represent all available views, even if those views are in a minority. Many of these articles may be op-eds written by people who may not be from the local area of concern. Other articles may not be local articles, and may represent people from distant places. Op-eds themselves may select for those people who are vocal and not necessarily the majority opinion. The newspapers
themselves may have a political bias which influences coverage. All of these reasons indicate that extreme caution should be taken in interpreting this macro level data.

Nonetheless, newspapers are written by reporters who are embedded in the community and are in many cases community experts who do have a feel for the community discursive norms. There are multiple newspapers for many regions, and each newspaper has multiple reporters. And discourse use is discourse use. People who used economic discourse, even in a disparaging way, still engaged with at least some specific frames. And by looking at the sum total of discourse in each category we can see the available language with which land and growth issues are discussed. Content analysis of news articles reveals discursive differences that are consistent with those found in case studies, and allow extrapolation of findings to the wider County-level context.

Results

The results of these searches are reported in the appendix (ordered by descending index score). What conclusions can be drawn from this data? Regarding hypothesis one, there is very little predictable variation between counties. I observed a great deal of economic discourse in both progressive and conservative locales. Furthermore, even within the search there is not a high degree of consistency. The “property rights” and “free market” are the terms that are probably most closely limited to material related to the economic discourse in question. However, these terms provided mixed results. “Property rights” discourse was common in places where case studies showed that we should expect this discourse, but, counterintuitively, it was more frequent in Marin County articles than Orange County or San Diego articles. In fact, residents throughout
the Bay Area sometimes use property rights, even when it may seem futile from an observer’s perspective. In Alameda and Contra Costa County, the Citizen Alliance for Property Rights openly frame their arguments as private property rights measures, as when they said that Measure D “…restricted thousands of acres in Alameda County belonging to private property owners. Voters thought that sounded good and approved Measure D, but most had no idea that they were voting for county control over their private property interests” (Citizen Alliance for Property Rights, 2013).

Property rights discourse pervades most places where rural property owners are prevalent. One of my favorite examples is a particularly telling commentary from a real estate agent in Sonoma County. She wrote a letter to the Sonoma Index-Tribune in 2006. It was titled, “Who owns the land?” and her first sentence was, “There are no simple answers to that question” (Bair, 2006). Her letter is posed as a celebration of participatory democracy, and a request for moderate positions and rational decision making: “The issues of private property rights versus public needs and rights are painted in hot colors wherever they appear.” By contrast, the needs of her community, “as diverse as the geography of this remarkable area,” require less emotional planning. She insisted that even in the heart of the managed growth empire, a rational person would consider private property rights a valid concern. The data can be further visualized by frequency using filled maps.
Other test phrases including “Free market,” on the other hand, conformed to the expected pattern, with Orange County scoring high. “Construction jobs” did not reveal anything particularly interesting with regard to the variation in question. “One-size-fits-all,” a keyword used by San Diego pro-growth advocates to argue against environmental policy was rare, and counter-intuitively most frequent in Marin. I interpret this as an indication that economic discourse is, in fact, present everywhere. Realtors and developers and pundits make economic arguments, and newspapers print those arguments. What can explain the common incantation of these ideas in Marin? It is possible that reporters include these ideas in an effort to provide balanced perspectives even though most constituencies are not interested in these ideas.
Figure 19: Map – Frequency of "Property Value" Frame (E2)
Figure 20: Map – Frequency of "Construction Jobs" Frame (E3)

Anthropic discourses also produced similar results. In case studies of growth issues, anthropic discourse was most frequent of all categories, on average. When we look comparatively, we find that people talk about quality of life and future generations everywhere. Take for instance the phrase “quality of life.” It was extremely frequent in nearly every county. In Los Angeles and Orange County it was relatively low, but Ventura, San Diego and Marin County all had similar frequencies.
Figure 21: Map – Frequency of “Quality of Life” Frame (A1)
Figure 22: Map – Frequency of “Future Generations” Frame (A2)
Figure 23: Map – Frequency of “Steward of the Land” Frame (A3)

Ecological Discourse showed the clearest pattern for spatial structuration. There is a good deal of internal consistency between all three search terms, indicating that these terms are capturing a single discursive category. Furthermore, the direction of the pattern is consistent with the clear pattern discerned while reading opinion articles. The index puts Marin at the top, where we would expect it, and puts Orange near the bottom, where we would also expect it. Consider the term “sustainable.” Sustainable can be used in a number of ways. Growth advocates might say that growth would make the economy sustainable, or that we need a sustainable tax break; however, the term is most commonly
invoked in ecological discourses. Ecosystems, habitats, and ecological processes are said to be sustainable.
Figure 24: Map – Frequency of "Global Warming" Frame (N1)
Figure 25: Map – Frequency of "Ecological Footprint" Frame (N2)
There is a similar level of economic discourse and quality of life discourse in most places. However, only some places complement these discourses with ecology discourse. Ecological discourse is rarest in Southern California, and most common near the San Francisco Bay and the adjoining coastal counties.

Conclusion

Hypothesis 1 is not well-supported by this evidence. Southern Californian’s are exposed to economic and anthropic discourse in newspapers, but with no greater frequency than residents in northern California. Hypothesis 2 is better supported by the data. We do see that property rights and property value appear to be more common in rural counties. However, the data is not definitive. Hypothesis 3 is also well-supported by
the data. Ecological discourse is concentrated in northern California, although there is some evidence that Santa Barbara and Ventura Counties also use a lot of ecological discourse.

These results shed light on the nature of territorial ideology by suggesting that we should not understand the differences between places as complete discursive domination. Ecological discourse competes against anthropic and economic discourse. That is, even though a resident may be exposed to newspaper articles using the terms “sustainable” and “global warming” more frequently in some places than in other places, they are also likely to be exposed to some articles containing the term “private property rights” and “quality of life.” The ideas are all swirling about in a collective milieu and the differences are limited to how frequently a resident might hear an idea. This result is particularly interesting because it suggests that discourse plays a pivotal role in politics even when it is not operating on the large-scale schemas identified elsewhere in cultural sociology.
Chapter 7 – Conclusion

The Mules in the Urban Maze

California has been optimized for the automobile; a network of freeways, some a dozen or more lanes in capacity, connects vast metropolitan regions. Despite that state’s reputation for agonizing rush hour traffic, millions of commuters successfully traverse the state in private automobiles each day. Californian drivers led the nation in 2011, accumulating some eighty-five billion miles in 2011. The portion of the fabled Interstate 5 that connects California’s metropolitan regions en route from Tijuana to Vancouver, alone accumulated more than twenty-one billion miles (Scauzillo, 2013). The freeway system is so extensive that it has facilitated the creation of a suburban state. Developers have turned entire rural counties into bedroom communities for the urban centers. In Southern California, builders transformed the western portion of Riverside County into a bedroom community, despite being between 50 to 100 miles from the major Southern California job opportunities in Los Angeles and San Diego. In the San Francisco Bay, urban development crept all of the way across the Bay Area Counties into the agricultural Central Valley in places like Stanislaus County and San Joaquin County, displacing farm activities on some of the most fertile soil in the world.

Faced with the proliferation of so much concrete, Californians have begun to lose the expansive open landscapes they once took for granted. The density of the development and the dominance of freeway networks, along with the lack of convenient public transportation, have meant that it is no longer possible to live conveniently without
an automobile. This has inspired resistance by those who feel a deep uneasiness about the transformation.

Not long ago I was taking a trip to a grocery store in Lemon Grove, a city just five miles from San Diego and well within the metropolitan core of the county. As I pulled off the highway I came across a strange sight. A man was leading three mules down the side of the road, over the pavement, trying to find a way to travel in between the concrete obstacles that no longer permitted easy hooved travel. The man and the mules were disheveled, laden with gear, and had clearly been on the road for a long time. They looked sad and purposeful. One of the mules wore a placard that read, “3mules.com,” and so I looked it up when I returned home.

The man who leads the mules refers to himself as “Mule.” He has a website and a Facebook page with over 31,000 “likes” as of June, 2015. He has been traveling the California coast with his mules since the 1980s (Kurhi, 2013), on a mission to highlight the loss of the pastoral past and the private and inaccessible character of the present urban landscape. His online media sites post regular accounts his journeys, filled with righteous anger against the system. A polished statement on the cover of his website states,

Where are we going? Nowhere. We’re here: the outside, the web of life, the beautiful earth, a place like no other. We have come to this place, a place of golden sparkling light, a place for anybody and everybody. Give your faith, hope and energy to this place at which time you connect to it and receive the magic and endless possibility of infinity. As you walk in this place with these mules you spread the awareness that this beautiful earth, like no other, can only be protected by the way we live one day at a time. (3 Mules, 2014)

The difficulties of his journey go far beyond finding places for the mules to graze. The municipal codes of most cities contain language prohibiting hooved travel on roadways
or sidewalks. Local law enforcement officials constantly harass him as he travels. He has been arrested and ticketed so many times that for many years the journey is primarily from courthouse to courthouse to contest his fines. Once, authorities committed him to a mental hospital, under the pretense that any man who leads mules into the city must be mentally ill (Kurhi, 2013). Sometimes his mules have been temporarily confiscated. Most often he is told he cannot stop, and so he and his animals must keep walking, day and night. But through some string of persistence and luck, and now even mild fame, the man and mules continue to walk the roads of California.

Sometimes his critiques are small but trenchant glimpses into the difficulty he must face to bring pack animals into the city. He showed some photographs of the contemporary mixed-use housing unit not ubiquitous in California, with just a few strips of private lawn and xeroscaped landscapes, and wrote that they demonstrate

…the Megatropolises exclusionary practice of using space (exclusionary landscaping practices). The Megatropolis could very easily switch to inclusionary landscaping practices which would provide feed for the Mules and monks the ambassadors of the Natural World. Bringing in the energy and awareness, respect, reference and appreciation of that world to the citizens of the Megatropolis. (3 Mules, 2014, sic)

The perpetual journey of the Three Mules demonstrates the deep-seated resistance to endless growth that grows from California soil. “Mule” was born John Sears, in Mill Valley, then a small village in Marin County, epicenter of the land use environmental movement. The supporters who help run his website are from neighboring Sonoma County (3 Mules, 2014). The man and his mules are just the most provocative figureheads of an environmental undercurrent that feeds through much of California. Environmental concern, as I have shown, pierces through the north-south California
divide, uniting most of the urban coastal counties. Yet this environmental concern is not enough to create the managed growth policy regime that Mule desires.

Caring about the plight of the three mules matters, but environmentalists will not be able to build discourse coalitions without access to resources and to a widely dispersed population of educated residents who will join the coalition. Thus, we must focus on socioeconomic status and environmental concern together. Furthermore, by arguing against the cultural landscape model, I mean to suggest that it does not matter where the mules roam. Managed growth policy regimes do not require a particularly beautiful stretch of coastline, a particularly valuable natural resource, or a large amount of farms. Nor do they require a small rural population with a lot of potential for protection, as managed growth policy regimes can be installed in places as urban as Alameda and Santa Clara Counties. The ingredients for crafting such policy are purely social.

Implications for Intervention

This research leads to some predictions about future land use policy outcomes. We should pay close attention to the county level, and the coalitions formed by the available property owners, farmers, and businessmen. To build a coalition, political actors need to mobilize residents by framing the policy debate in a way that resonates with a majority of residents. Even in the largest counties, it does not take that many people to do this advocating. A few hundred involved citizens have shaped all of the land use contests described here. However, the greatest challenge is that residents have different socioeconomic statuses and preferences, and those social characteristics determine how they will respond to the available framing choices.
Two final examples will serve to illustrate the implications of this research. First is Santa Clara County, a Bay Area county that adopted growth management in the late 1990s after growing into a dense, urban metropolis. Santa Clara is interesting because it is the home to Silicon Valley, and the propertied residents of its sleepy suburbs have a tremendous wealth from thirty years of technology booms. With environmental support, affluence, and education, environmentalists built a powerful land use regime, which came to include the technology industry, and eventually even some farmers. The county demonstrates that managed growth regimes do not require picturesque landscapes, extensive forests or farms. The raw materials to build a managed growth regime can be found anywhere where the social environment is favorable. However, beyond the construction of a managed growth policy regime, the county has reached a critical point where most of the space within its urban growth boundaries is developed. In order to continue growing, cities must rezone single family housing for multifamily housing. The same environmentalist organizations that slowed growth are now in the position of having to liberalize development options in some low-density neighborhoods. Santa Clara County provides an example of this challenge and how managed growth advocates have attempted to navigate this policy issue.

Second is Monterey County, a rural but rapidly growing coastal county that sits just south of Santa Clara County. Monterey County follows the pathway of Santa Barbara, in that while it has majority environmental concern and affluent residents, education is low. During the early 2000s, Monterey County politicians fought a fierce political struggle to create a general plan update. Pro-growth advocates and rural property
owners formed a coalition and ultimately succeeded in maintaining a laissez-faire land use policy regime. However, this victory is perhaps most tenuous of all the policy regimes described in this dissertation. The longer that Monterey County grows, the more rapidly its socio-economic character changes. Because of the high price of land and the county’s desirable location, Monterey’s immigrants are likely to be wealthy and educated. My work suggests that as these demographics change, environmentalists will have better luck building a winning coalition capable of creating a managed growth land use policy regime.

Table 16: Comparison of Santa Clara and Monterey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Santa Clara</th>
<th>Monterey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1,781,642</td>
<td>415,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons/Acre</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member of Urban Counties Caucus</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unincorporated Population</td>
<td>99,122</td>
<td>107,642</td>
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<tr>
<td>Homeownership Rate</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
<td>55%</td>
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<td>Median Value Occupied Housing Units</td>
<td>$422,600</td>
<td>$254,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persons with Bachelor’s degrees</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average support for State Environmental Measures</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate and Construction Jobs</td>
<td>102,844</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate/Construction % of Workforce</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental Organizations</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>Environmental Organization Income</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Income/Person</td>
<td>$7.60</td>
<td>$11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>1,179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Santa Clara County

Santa Clara County follows the same path as Alameda County, Contra Costa and San Mateo (VOTE*AFFLUENT*EDUCATED). The largest city in the county is San Jose, which was long dominated by growth interests. The city expanded rapidly through annexation from the 1950s through the 1970s, forming highly stratified wealthy and poor neighborhoods (Logan, 1976). Political leaders watched as the inner city deteriorated and attention turned to surrounding areas (Walters, 1986). This growth continued through the establishment of Silicon Valley, the world-famous cluster of technology companies in the region.

By the late 1980s, a significant struggle over the land use future of the county had commenced, with a series of countywide planning committee discussions about managed growth (Rodebaugh, 1988). Although farmers were opposed (Rodebaugh, 1989a), most public meeting attendees favored an urban growth boundary (Rodebaugh, 1989b). Elsewhere, environmental activists were supported by the Farm Bureau and manufacturers in a bid to levy a new parcel tax to support land acquisition (Farragher, 1988). However, they were unable to gain the support of the two-thirds of residents needed to pass the measure (San Jose Mercury News, 1990). In late 1991, the Greenbelt Alliance released a dramatic report showing that the Bay Area had lost one-third of its farmland since 1949, and was likely to lose most of the remaining farmland by the turn of the century (Lapin, 1991). Even the San Jose Mercury News, supported urban growth boundaries, reporting: “Give [a developer] the sense that a boundary is not frozen and you turn them loose to find the next opportunity to put a bulge in it” (Vroman, 1991).
In 1994, Santa Clara County adopted an updated Land Use Element which strengthened the 1980 general plan (Pellow and Park, 2002). The new element was approved after a 31-person committee worked on it for four years. It had language that required most urban growth to be accommodated by individual cities, which were encouraged to set up urban growth boundaries. It was reported that “about 20 speakers” spoke in favor of the new land use element, while no one spoke in opposition. According to a news report, “some environmentalists worried the plan was too weak, and builders said it may be so strong that parts could be illegal” (Peterson, 1994). Some residents were concerned that cities could circumvent the plan through individual projects pending a strong urban growth boundary (Sayer and Moore, 1994). County supervisors unanimously approved the plan. In 1994, County Voters signaled their further support for environmental measures by approving the Santa County Open Space Authority, which was to collect $12 annually from property owners toward the purchase of open space. Although the tax was challenged in court, it was eventually upheld in 1998 (San Jose Mercury News, 1998a).

Following this county-level shift in political attitude, Santa Clara County cities began to craft urban growth boundaries. Cupertino adopted a general plan in 1993 which included an urban growth boundary. Although the plan allowed plentiful growth for local Apple Computers, Tandem Computers, and the Hewlett-Packard Company, not everyone was happy. The Roman Catholic Diocese of San Jose filed a lawsuit against the boundary which would prevent development on a hillside property owned by the church, arguing that more environmental study was needed to implement such a policy (Cronk, 1993). In 1995, the city of San Jose negotiated with the county to set an urban growth boundary. In
a congratulatory column, an editorial in the San Jose Mercury News noted that “people don’t want this to become another Los Angeles” (San Jose Mercury News, 1995a). Later that year, neighborhood organizations and environmentalists began plotting to strengthen the San Jose urban growth boundary (San Jose Mercury News, 1995b). In 1996, the San Jose City Council adopted a “Greenline Initiative” which would strengthen the urban growth boundary by requiring that changes to the boundary be approved only during general plan updates. It took years to pass the initiative, amid lawsuits and opposition from developers who owned property just outside of the boundary (San Jose Mercury News, 1998b). Business leaders bemoaned the economic loss that they predicted the new policy would bring (McCabe, 1996a). However, the Greenline Initiative was well-supported during the public meeting (McCabe, 1996a). In mid-November, the county finally approved the line on a unanimous vote, a measure that was credited to environmentalist mayor Susan Hammer (San Jose Mercury News, 1996a). In 1996, the Morgan Hill City Council joined the growth management program by adopting an urban growth boundary with nearly unanimous support (Rodebaugh, 1996). The San Jose Mercury News characterized their growth effort as a grass-root effort to contain costs (San Jose Mercury News, 1996b). Los Gatos, Monte Sereno, and Saratoga joined with the county in establishing the West Valley Hillsides community plan, which would further restrict growth. The plan established a growth boundary for the region and even inserted height and size restrictions on rural homeowners. Houses could be no taller than 35 feet and no larger than 8,000 square feet (McCabe, 1996b). Milpitas established an UGB through a ballot initiative, Measure Z, in 1998 with 55% of the vote in favor (Wolverton, 1998).
To consolidate these urban growth boundaries, Santa Clara environmentalists proposed the Santa Clara County Land Conservation Initiative in 2006, which would protect 400,000 acres in the county by rezoning farm and ranchland to 40 and 160 acre minimum lots, respectively. The initiative was supported by the Sierra Club, the Greenbelt Alliance, and the Santa Clara Audubon Society. Yet the plan faced significant opposition from realtors, the Santa Clara County Farm Bureau, builders, and property owners (Shigley, 2006). The initiative lost by a slim margin, with 49% of residents voting in favor. A Silicon Valley Association of Realtors representative argued that voters felt the measure would unduly punish farmers and ranchers (Martin, 2006). However, in 2014, the Midpeninsula Regional Open Space District approved a $300 million bond measure to purchase open space in Santa Clara and San Mateo County. The Peninsula Open Space Trust helped raise $1 million to campaign for the measure (Rogers, 2014). That same year, the Santa Clara Open Space Authority proposed Measure Q, which would provide a $24 parcel tax to purchase open space. The Friends of Santa Clara Valley Open Space, the Greenbelt Alliance, the Peninsula Open Space Trust, and the Committee for Green Foothills are campaigning in support of the measure (Hippard, 2014). In support of this position, the county commissioned a report to value the ecosystem services in the county. The report estimated that the ecosystem services provides between $1.6 billion and $3.9 billion in benefits to the region each year (Batker et al, 2014, p. 2).

Santa Clara County environmentalists have turned their attention inward and worked maintaining to political and economic viability of growing within a boundary. The biggest challenge is how to convert the same growth-cautious voters that created a
managed growth regime to residents of future urban hubs. From the 1990s, it was clear that this would be a problem. When a Joint Venture Silicon Valley report called for infill development and smart growth, an editorial in the San Jose Mercury News chided the report for assuming that growth was inevitable and necessary: “Traffic is a nightmare. Housing prices are astronomical. And the quality of our lives has deteriorated. Haven't we already reached the point where growth is dysfunctional and should be limited?” (Closson, 1998). Nearly fifteen years later, in 2014, the Greenbelt Alliance itself was the champion of increased growth and development within urban growth boundaries. To keep their boundary viable, they would need to go back to the same residents who initially chose to limit growth to keep Los Angeles out, and ask them to now embrace the new city that would be built over their quiet neighborhoods. The Greenbelt Alliance hosted an even called “Solving the Silicon Valley Growth Bomb” in which they argued for 120,000 more homes within the San Jose city boundary (Pal, 2014b).

Monterey County

In Monterey County, growth advocates have long held a slim majority, but this majority has a tenuous hold on local politics. Monterey County lies just south of San Francisco Bay, and is best-known for the dramatic and scenic Big Sur coastline. The county was the colonial capital of Spanish California due to its enticing natural harbor, which was initially easier to navigate than the rocky passage into San Francisco Bay (Walton, 2001). However, early urbanization favored its northern neighbor, and Monterey was saved for later. At the turn of the millennium, the county had more than 400,000 residents, spread out over a large geographical area. There was considerable
pressure to live along the coast so close to the South San Francisco Bay and the county had set generous precedents for accepting that growth. Despite strong growth pressure, Monterey County is a farming county, with a $3 billion dollar annual industry (the top industry in the county). And although environmentalists successfully purchased key farmland properties and easements (more than 8,000 acres between 1984 and 2002), the rate of prime farm loss was increasing even as less productive lands were converted to vineyards (Manley, 2002c).

In 1999 the Monterey County Board of Supervisors first began to plan an update for the Monterey County general plan. The last update was from 1982, and contained no guidelines for growth management. As they began, the planning commission was immediately flooded with 270 requests for zoning changes to increase allowable density. Initially, they recommended approval of only 57 requests (Monterey County Herald, 2002b). The board of supervisors was concerned about unorganized growth, and issued a moratorium on growth in the Carmel Valley (Monterey County Herald, 2002a).

In 2002, Monterey County began holding planning commission hearings to update the general plan. It was at this point that Monterey citizens were first introduced to the idea of smart growth. The Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments held a seminar early in year to tout the benefits of “new urbanism.” The first mention in the press carried none of the implications of the regulatory apparatus required to make it work: “new-urbanist ideas embrace hybrid designs that bring together our professional and personal lives — work and play — as a way to revitalize an otherwise sleepy neighborhood” (Manley, 2002a). However, smart growth would require not just urban revitalization but rural regulation. Early planning commission drafts included rezoning
agricultural farmland to 40 acre-minimum parcels, while concentrating growth in the
cities of Gonzales, Greenfield, Soledad and King City. They would allow conversion of
3,000 acres of farmland to urban uses. At the same time, the county would reduce
allowable density on some properties in the rural south, and encourage growth within city
borders (Duman, 2002b). There was some discussion of creating growth boundaries.

The main environmental organization in the county, Monterey LandWatch, along
with a group of farmers and developers called Common Ground Monterey County signed
a joint statement calling for the county to adopt smart growth (Manley, 2002b). Initially,
however, agricultural interests were split. The Farm Bureau President rallied farmers
around property rights discourse. Yet the President of the Central Coast Ag Task Force (a
local vegetable packer) argued that scattered growth would be unwise (Duman, 2002a).
By late September, the county supervisors were unsure of how to proceed. They
questioned the legality of the 40-acre minimum, and seemed unwilling to settle on clear
and fixed boundaries (Manley, 2002d). Property owners furiously lobbied supervisors all
fall. Finally, after postponing the issue on multiple occasions, county supervisors led by
Supervisor Armenta, approved the draft, after making thirteen exceptions to allow
additional development, in opposition to the planning commission and the planning
department. Environmentalists donned matching bright green t-shirts and declared that
the supervisors had hijacked the plan (Manley, 2002e).

In 2003, agricultural interests and property owners urged supervisors to drag their
feet on the general plan. Pro-growth groups proliferated including Twenty-first Century
Solutions Group and an offshoot, the Coalition for Jobs, Housing, and Respect (Monterey
County Herald, 2003b). Farmers were increasingly opposed to the general plan. The
Board also continued to drift away from managed growth. At the beginning of the year, slow-growth 3rd District Supervisor Judy Pennycook was replaced by pro-growth Butch Lindley (Monterey County Herald, 2003a). Despite having spent $4 million on the plan, Supervisor Lou Calcagno threatened to cut the funding, and no one was expecting approval until mid-2004 (Manley, 2003). Supervisors hired a pro-development lawyer to consult on the plan. Meanwhile the Monterey County Herald ran increasingly urgent editorials that urged county supervisors to move forward on the plan. They even called for the formation of a “blue-ribbon” group that would bring together environmentalists, farmers, and developers to search for a compromise (Monterey County Herald, 2003a; 2003b). County supervisors did not move forward with the plan, but they did form an ad-hoc group to work on a compromise, which environmentalists criticized as “a travesty of accountable governance” and “so blatantly overstacked with development interests, it cannot even come to a consensus on the meaning of that term” (O’Brien, 2003). By 2004, the plan was incomplete and the county had spent $5 million. In May, Supervisors Edith Johnsen, Butch Lindley and Fernando Armenta voted to once again delay the plan update (Monterey County Herald, 2004).

The land use issue in Monterey County had divided the left. The Democratic Party which dominated the county and reliably votes for democrats was split between pro-growth and slow-growth advocates. At heart was a split between green-oriented Monterey Peninsula Democrats and social justice-oriented Salinas Democrats. In October of 2004, democrats from Salinas accused LandWatch Monterey County of being “environmental racists” (Livernois, 2004). Environmental organizations did legal battle with developers around the county. The biggest battle was a petition drive to require a
vote on a 4,000 unit subdivision (Rancho San Juan) north of Salinas. Environmentalists succeeded in putting the Rancho San Juan project to a vote in 2005 as Measure C. Though it was narrowly defeated, allowing the project (now 2,500 homes) to go forward, environmentalists promised to launch another petition drive (Parsons, 2005c). There were also several lawsuits in the works and dozens of controversial development projects around the county (Parsons, 2004).

At the end of 2004, Fourth District, Supervisor Jerry Smith was up against an environmentalist challenger, Jane Parker, an executive from Planned Parenthood who had support from the Monterey County Herald. Smith received large campaign donations from developers, and businesses (Phillips, 2004). The election was extremely close, but Smith barely defeated his challenger (Livernois and Purewal, 2004). The county continued to work on its general plan draft with the new Refinement Group. Environmentalists felt there was far too much growth, farmers argued that proposed trails would violate their property rights, and even developers were not happy with a plan that added little new regulation (Parsons, 2005b).

Disenchanted with the possibility of managed growth, County Supervisor Dave Potter, and LandWatch Monterey County went to work on a petition drive to put a competing general plan on the ballot. Called the “Community General Plan,” it would limit growth to urban community areas and require a vote to change the general plan or rezone agricultural property (Parsons, 2005a). Even though the petition drive was successful, the majority of county supervisors refused to place the items on the ballot, arguing that the petitions had been circulated without being translated into Spanish. Many
suggested that the move was intended to delay the citizen general plan until supervisors would have a competing plan ready for the same ballot (Parsons, 2006a; Parsons, 2006b).

Indeed, in 2007, the measures were slated for election. Measure A was the environmental general plan. Measure B was the Supervisor’s General Plan Update, dubbed “GPU4” (Johnson, 2007). In June of 2007, all three general plans were put up to a popular vote, in the most expensive political contest in Monterey County history. They all failed, by narrow margins. The county turned to begin work on a compromise plan (Monterey County Herald, 2007). They eventually adopted a weak general plan that did not increase environmental protection.

Managed growth advocates in Monterey County lost a number of key elections and initiatives, but by a narrow margin. Supervisor Parker would go on to unseat Supervisor Smith, slowly shifting the power center in the county. And as the liberal development policy continues, residents will continue to move to Monterey County, changing the demographics of the community. My research suggests that if the county becomes urban or becomes significantly better educated, environmentalists would win future policy managed growth policy contests.

Lessons for Coalition Building

Taken together, these cases provide a set of lessons which apply to managed growth and pro-growth organizers. Managed growth activists should know that winning coalitions always required more than environmentalists and residents. Environmental organizers were successful when they partnered with technology companies, other urban businesses, and even farmers. In all of the cases I observed, these coalitions were
primarily framed with ecological discourse, while economic discourse was present but subordinate.

Politically, the managed growth coalition should try to elect managed growth supervisors, propose managed growth measures using the ballot box, and participate in general plans. These coalitions should try and write simple, easy to understand proposals. If the county is urban, spending money on these contests is essential; in most cases where environmentalists were successful they outspent their opponents. Finally, managed growth coalitions must prepare for the inevitable transition from advocating for slow growth to advocating for more growth.

Pro-growth advocates similarly must also build a coalition if they seek to maintain a laissez-faire managed policy regime. The developers and realtors who benefit most centrally from a laissez-faire policy regime will find likely allies in property rights organizations, the Chamber of Commerce, farmers, and extractive industries such as forestry and mining companies. To build a pro-growth coalition, use conservative economic discourse. Outspend environmentalists. Use the ballot box proactively, especially under intense competition from environmentalists. Purchase media and lobbyists.

Reorganizing the Land Use Policy Field

These county-level findings have broader implications about the hyper-fragmented organization of the land use field in the United States. The parochial nature of the county government has meant that a relatively small subset of the population has been involved in land use politics, and that little regional planning has been conducted. Urban
Planners have argued that a regional approach is necessary to implement better environmental policies (Pezzoli, 2006; Ravetz, 2000). This is in line with the “new regionalism” approach in urban planning where scholars have argued that urban cities have dependent relationships to the broader regional bodies because of the limited natural and economic resources available to a region (Bollman, 2002). According to Ravetz (2000), the city region has a metabolism with inputs and outputs, which needs to be coordinated with long-term goals in order to achieve sustainable development.

By aggregating together the municipalities, we can avoid the impossible task of coordinating them. We also take advantage of the dense urban residents who are likely to contribute positively to politics. In Pezzoli’s (2006) analysis, the San Diego and Tijuana regions share interconnected ecological systems. But as a result of the municipal borders that not only divide the US and Mexico but also the smaller surrounding cities, effective management toward a sustainable ecosystem is impossible. Similarly, Lidström (2012) argued that citizens in Sweden had a broad inter-municipal orientation to the region which was not translated into regional activism because of factionalized local governments.

This reorganization of the field would probably benefit managed growth activists. Urban residents tend to care about the environment, but they are not involved in rural land use politics such as county-level measures. The nature of the coalition-building process would change the inclusion of the entire region in the voting body. Development interests who contribute to the parochial politics would be present in the regional government just as they are present in rural areas. But at the same time, the number of citizens with potential use value interest in open space would vastly increase. The most
recent population estimates show that California surpassed 38 million people in 2014. However, the unincorporated population was just 6,395,263. On balance, California has long supported the environment, but the vast majority of undeveloped land is governed by just 16.7% electorate (State of California, Department of Finance, 2014). That leaves 31 million urban Californians who have never voted on a regional land use measure. In a new regional government, these voters would play a much greater role in managing rural places. As a consequence, it would be difficult for pro-development groups to capture this huge population given that most are not farmers or foresters or owners of property with development capacity. Pro-growth organizations would lose the key advantage of leveraging the self-interest of voters in their quest to build discourse coalitions.

The current challenge is that regional proposals, as they stand, do not work. Because local governments maintain the last word, they regularly avoid binding agreements. Consider the San Joaquin Valley Blueprint, an agreement between the nine agricultural counties that attempted to draw boundaries. Even though many counties drew “blueprint” urban growth boundaries, they were not enforced. It was largely considered a failure (Stapley, 2011a). Without a serious reorganization of the field requiring regional planning, and a democratic regional planning process whereby urban and rural residents both contribute to decision-making, such efforts will likely produce few strict policies.

In addition to reorganization of the field, this research is relevant to the issue of campaign finance in local contests. Increasingly since the Citizens United legal decision, untraceable big money is influencing local elections. My findings have shown that even before that legal precedent, affluence was important for waging political contests. If more money pours into local politics, it is likely that we would see a higher threshold of funds
needed to finance managed growth campaigns. Just as progressives have fought for environmental land use restrictions, Californians have been keenly aware of the potential for big money to influence local contests. Many areas have sought to limit campaign financing in local races. For example, several efforts are underway in Humboldt County (Houston, 2014c).

A Sociological Approach to Urban Politics

This dissertation has pursued a sociological approach to land use theory which rejects many of the rational choice assumptions of pluralist theory. In Monterey County and Humboldt County, we see the influence of business interests in sustaining social movements and electing candidates to get their way. Similarly, in Marin and Sonoma County, it was environmental organizations that worked closely with supervisors, vetted local policies, and dominated the political arena. County land use politics is characterized by coalitions, and county supervisors are not shielded from organizational interests. To gain the money, resources, and endorsements of the forest industry and private property rights groups in Humboldt County allowed pro-growth organizations to secure an electoral win in most districts. In Marin County, environmentalists played this role.

As a consequence, I am relatively optimistic about the capacity for change, even though I do not think this optimism represents an expression of human agency. Despite the tendency for places to become growth machines, urban land use politics involve a relatively small number of actors who work build coalitions capable of creating land use policy regimes. I find myself agreeing with Carlsson (2014) when he recounted the history of San Francisco activism, from the rejection of a third bridge out of the city, to a
height limit on waterfront properties, and to the rejection of the so-called “slum clearing” program. Residents have not always successfully fought high-rise buildings and hotels, and they certainly have not provided plentiful affordable housing, but they have been remarkably successful:

Read one way, this short history demonstrates the relentless power of money in defining who is a San Franciscan and who can stay and who must go. But read another way, this history shows that there is historic precedent for optimism that the worst consequences of today’s creative destruction of the city can be averted if we know and use our history. (Carlsson, 2014: p. 94)

This optimism for change is limited by the socioeconomic status of local residents, and consequently the ability of local elites to build coalitions with resonant discourses.

At the same time, the evidence demonstrates that this agency is constrained by the demographics of the community. I have no panacea to offer to activists. My causal explanation links successful coalition building to the character of a community, and I have found no examples where managed growth activists have swept over poor, rural, uneducated, places; or conversely where pro-growth activists have retained control in wealthy, urban, and educated places. I do not see evidence that suggests that the environmentalists of Humboldt County have a chance to frame the land use issue in a winning way, notwithstanding dramatic demographic change. Nor do I see any sign that developers in Marin County could sell a project that would urbanize the coastline. Perhaps, though, history will prove me wrong.
Appendix A – Codebook used for Discourse Analysis

More Growth: Economic Discourse

MG-Econ1. Growth improves the economy: Increasing the allowable density on a parcel will benefit the local economy in general. Sometimes writers refer to the construction activity on the parcel, or the economic uses of developed property, or the possibility of increased economic spending from new residents.

MG-Econ2. Growth saves taxpayer money: Growth is needed to bolster the local budget of the state, either by creating economies of scale or revitalizing tax base. Writers may discuss a particular local service such as schools or fire departments, and argue that growth would secure additional funding to help these services.

MG-Econ3. Growth improves property value: Down-zoning hurts land values, by preventing sale to developers or construction of additional units. Residents sometimes argue that re-zoning is “taking from us to give to them,” referring to other property owners or environmentalists. One good example of this is an account of local land use politics in the community of Rancho Penasquitos in San Diego County. Vandehey (2013) described the community as concerned about,

…the rights of every resident of their community, including the ability to live in a safe, healthy, and clean environment in which to raise children; maintenance of property value through preservation of an idealized suburban lifestyle; and the ability to control what happens within the boundaries of the community. (p. 54)

Vandehey went on the quote citizens who protested in the late 00s. One speaker, a long-time resident of the community, who Vandehey described as representing the majority of
residents, said this: “People here care about their neighborhood and property value. We moved here because of the golf course. We bought our house because of the golf course and the open space it provides. I am concerned that our property values will go down if this plan goes forward.”” (p. 57)

This was cause for “wild applause” in the public hearing.

**MG-Econ4. Private property rights are absolute:** Owning property confers rights of development and down-zoning is unconstitutional due to the Fifth Amendment. This frame includes all uses of “private property” and “taking.” Often speakers invoked this category without significant explanation, such as by merely mentioning that their property rights were violated. However, some writers elaborated on the principle of the argument. Here is an example from a libertarian commenter, writing about Monterey County:

One of the most successful methods for taking ownership of a private land is simply to make the land nearly impossible to use. With an arsenal of land use laws and county general plans, local governments across California are increasingly banning owners from reasonable use of their property. But now some no-growth land use adherents have found another way to take other people’s land: vote it away directly. […] When does a voting majority ever have the right to take away legal property from another? According to one of the most renowned U.S. Supreme Court Justices, Robert H. Jackson, the answer is never. According to Jackson, ‘One’s right to life, liberty, and property… and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no election.’ (Samuels, 2006).

This speaker makes it clear that the concept of property rights is invoked in an “absolute” sense, such that it should be prioritized when balanced against other principles.

**MG-Econ5. Markets should be free:** The market should determine rather than government. Included in this category are explicit references to the “free market” or
explicit claims that regulation is undesirable, but also, less thorough-going critiques of regulation. For example, some writers noted that exceptions should be made to environmental regulation on a case-by-case basis, due to the unique characteristics of places. Speakers often use the phrase “one-size-fits-all” to critique policy for being too constricting, and favored “flexible” policy options. A good example of this frame comes from a Research Fellow with the Urban Futures Program, commenting on a San Diego County policy:

Deciding between the county general plan and the Rural Lands Initiative is almost like choosing the lesser of two evils. The Rural Lands Initiative is simply ballot box zoning at its worst, appealing to the emotions of voters who abide more by political allegiance than what is best for San Diego. The general plan, which essentially wins by default if the Rural Lands Initiative fails, was carefully thought out, but has the failing of all general plans in that it attempts to plan a future that is unknowable and relies on policies and a political process that do not effectively implement them. San Diegans must decide which pain point to accept. If population grows as expected, we will either have less open space, higher densities, or an increasing housing shortage and affordability problem. There is no win-win-win in this scenario. But, there is a choice. We could have these scenarios play out in the political arena, dominated by activists and special interests, which is typically the case, or we could allow market forces to allocate land resources most effectively. Markets have a way of determining what people want and what they are willing to pay for. (Fiscelli, 2003)

More Growth: Anthropic Discourse

MG-Anth1. Growth improves quality of life: The personal financial or quality of life issues faced by residents are more important than the needs of plants, animals, or ecosystems. In a slight variation, existing human needs are more important than environmental considerations, and could be met with increased growth and development. One version of this argument is the claim that growth would actually improve services
such as by financing wider roads and freeways to ease existing traffic congestion or
financing newer and better schools or other public services.

**MG-Anth2. Growth benefits farmers:** Environmental restrictions threaten the
fiscal health and existence of agricultural properties. One version of this argument is that
down-zoning will strip farms of liquidity or flexibility. Another version of this argument
is that environmental actions hurt farmers while a laissez-faire policy benefits them, as in
this example from Ventura County:

> While Ventura County may never have become as paved-over as Orange
County, it now consistently ranks second only to it in terms of home
prices, mostly due to the restrictive nature of the Save Open Space and
Agricultural Resources guidelines making it virtually impossible to build
enough homes. With more and more prime developable land being lost to
"the public trust" of conservancies, development will only get harder and
what little does take place will have to be aimed at the one thing
conservancies want everyone to think they care about: agricultural land.
The resulting value of their land will only pressure farmers to sell
properties and defeat the purpose of what everyone set out to protect in the
first place. Throw in the effect the loss of property tax revenue to this
now-"public" land is going to have on the state's finances and the question
of why founders and executives of land conservancies would want
everyone to continue marching in this fools' parade arises. (Roland, 2004)

**MG-Anth3. Growth benefits families:** In the individual form of this argument,
landowners claim that they should be allowed to divide a parcel of land for distribution to
heirs. Frugal zoning can complicate inheritance or prevent the children of property
owners from constructing second and third residences on parcel. In the collective form of
this argument, more growth in general is said to allow more families to stay in a county.
For example:

> Who should care about the general plan and support the supervisors' new
direction? Business owners and wage earners, as well as people who can
ever hope that their children and grandchildren will not leave Monterey County due to housing and job concerns. (Steinbruner, 2004)

MG-Anth4. Resources are plentiful: Natural resources required to satisfy the conditions for growth are plentiful. This includes the availability of water, open space, and building materials. In this argument the speaker values the natural resources insofar as they can be consumed, and usually in order to counter claims of scarcity.

MG-Anth5. Good stewards should control land: People who have been good stewards of the land should continue to make the decisions about what to do with the land (because of their greater knowledge, involvement, our trust, or as karmic reward). Good stewards should not be punished by having value taken away from them. One really good example of this frame comes from Humboldt County:

HumCPR represents thousands of people who live on the land, who consider themselves environmentalists and engage in good land management practices every day. Some of them are from families who have been stewards of the land in Humboldt County for generations. Some of them are first or second generation homesteaders who were drawn to living in and caring for this special piece of the earth. Some of them have been and are on the cutting edge of clean energy and technological advances for rural living. They want a voice at the table when it comes to policies that are going to affect them and their families directly. Frankly, we believe that voice is invaluable to any discussion about Humboldt’s future. (Fennell and Ulansey, 2011)

This example shows how the argument can be used to appeal to long-time property owners who are likely to have family ties to the land.

More Growth: Ecological Discourse

MG-Ecol1. Growth improves the environment: Growth is said to improve environmental value by locking in desirable outcomes. The construction of a new project is sometimes said to improve the environmental value of the land. Sometimes a speaker
positions undeveloped land as a liability, in that the owner could insist on a destructive use, whereas built land locks in a potentially desirable outcome.

**MG-Ecol2. Some land is unfit for preservation:** Speakers employing this frame argue that a particular parcel in questions is either not in a natural condition (has been leveled, built on, or otherwise altered); or is of low-quality, and therefore unsuitable for preservation. Land is commonly describes as “not natural,” or “unworthy.”

**MG-Ecol3. Environmental science is inaccurate:** This is the claim that environmental science, including planning science such as smart growth, is understudied, inaccurate, or biased. Respondents either invoke other science to support their critique, or merely allege that the work is incorrect. The most extreme versions dispute the possibility of objective and accurate environmental science.

**Less-Growth: Economic Discourse**

**LG-Econ1. Growth harms the economy:** Environmental regulation will help the local economy, by shielding it from punitive state and federal regulation, or by preventing costly pollution or habitat degradation. Also included were statements arguing that environmental regulation might not benefit the economy, but at the least it would not harm the economy. One variation of this argument is that there is not enough available affordable housing, and unregulated growth is likely to lead to large and expensive houses which will drive up prices and make it hard for low-income families to afford a home. Another claim is that environmental regulation should be imposed for its beneficial effects on developers or businesses, such as by leveling market differences or simplifying business procedures.
LG-Econ2. Growth increases taxpayer costs: Though there are many versions of this argument depending on the situation at hand, they share the idea that growth activities or policies cost local government money; or the converse, that growth is costing too much taxpayer money. One version of this argument is that low density growth is expensive to service, therefore environmental protection saves the county government money eliminating the need for infrastructure, or through making state services less expensive through densification. This position directly engages and refutes the pro-growth argument that down-zoning costs local government money through cutting the property tax base. Another version of this argument is that conservation would avoid penalties imposed by the State of California. Yet another version of this argument is that pro-growth regulatory activity is designed to stall environmental progress and is wasting state money. For example, the following is a quote for an editorial which accused pro-growth forces of stalling the general plan update through creating a refinement committee:

The refinement committee already has cost taxpayers more than $64,000, according to an estimate by the county’s finance office. The biggest chunk, $50,000, was used to pay two meeting facilitators. The 527.35 hours county government staffers spent attending the group’s first seven meetings cost $6,215. Clerical time ($4,264), water and cookies ($158) and other miscellaneous expenses drove up the costs. (Monterey County Herald, 2003)

LG-Econ3. Growth reduces property value: Property is more valuable when density on the parcel or on neighboring parcels is low. Less allowable construction increases the appeal for wealthier residents looking for a secluded home. This argument
reverses the pro-growth argument that properties should be up-zoned to increase property tax value.

**LG-Econ4. Markets need regulation:** One version of this argument is employed as a response to speakers arguing in support of private property rights for development. It is the claim that the rights of private property are not legally rights to develop without regulation.

### Less-Growth: Anthropic Discourse

**LG-Anth1. Growth reduces quality of life:** Growth will reduce quality of life, through crowding local infrastructure (often as traffic congestion), or through altering community character. For example, the following statement does not use the phrase “quality of life” but it does invoke and therefore was included:

> I believe it is time before we ‘pave paradise and put up a parking lot,’ as the song goes for local residents to really imagine this area with wider freeways, more cars, crowds, crime, smog and less character. I have lived here nearly all my life and I don't like the idea. (Atkinson, 2003)

Also included were statements which indicated that current pro-growth development trends would drive out artistic people who contribute to a high quality of life:

> The invaluable people in our wonderful community are those who usually get paid the least ... an injustice in itself. I speak of the teachers, emergency response people, public service workers, etc. And what of the poets, artists, crafts people and countless others who make our area culturally rich? What they give to our unique community certainly doesn’t cheapen it; it enhances it. (Spicer, 2003)

**LG-Anth2. Growth hurts farmers:** Development restrictions should be put in place to protect agriculture in the county. Restricting zoning to disallow agricultural subdivision and development is thought to force farmers to carry on with agricultural
activities, even if these are less profitable than selling portions of land for profit. This
reverses the pro-development argument that agriculture will be protected if farmers can
sell off or develop land. One example of this discourse is the following somewhat
sarcastic comment:

"There's a new committee controlled by developers working on a revision
of the just completed general plan. Instead of four years and $4 million,
we could save money and hours of meetings if we just turned over the
writing of our general plan to developers, realtors and large property
owners who want to subdivide productive farmland to housing
subdivisions. Then we could have our incredibly rich farmland grow
houses, save $4 million, have Salinas Valley look just like San Jose and
quadruple the price of lettuce." (Leeper, 2003)

Even though this comment did not explicitly state that growth would harm agriculture, it
was clear from the context that this speaker believed that farmers should grow lettuce and
not houses. In another example, a Humboldt County speaker directly explains why she
believes farmers need protection: “Productive agricultural land is precious -- let's value it
and protect it vigorously. As the saying goes, they ain't making any more of it” (Orenelas,
2007).

LG-Anth3. Growth hurts families and future generations: The environment should
be protected for the future of the county, including for the youth, or “our grandchildren.”
It is often combined with other frames to explain the threats facing future residents.
An example of how this frame can be invoked in combination with ecology frames is the
following, from a Sonoma County letter to the editor: “I hope that as we continue to look
for ways to save the California tiger salamander, we should also look at how we take care
of our total community, including our businesses and children” (Featherstone, 2005).
**LG-Anth4. Resources are scarce:** Development should not occur because water resources required for human consumption are scarce or unavailable. This includes both the shortage of groundwater in the local water basin and the shortage of water in the state or nation. While this frame is not exclusively anthropocentric (ecosystem health requires water as much as people), it is nearly always the water that comes out of the faucet which is of concern in this type of statement. Other consumable resources include timber and aggregate for cement. For example,

If the big timber companies can sell 160-acre parcels (or even down to 40 under current zoning), their short-term profits will be enormous compared to long-term timber operations. But society can't allow this essential natural resource to be frittered away. (Harvey, 2005)

Food is coded separately in LG-Anth2.

**LG-Anth5. Growth increases exposure to natural hazards:** Land should not be developed because of the potential for natural hazards including earthquakes, floods, and fires. Often a specific parcel is specified and evidence is given for its particular risk.

**Less Growth: Ecological Discourse**

**LG-Ecol1. Growth harms ecological systems:** Ecological systems are interconnected and fragile and in need of protection. This includes claims of the importance of plants for regulating gasses and sequestering carbon, of bees for pollination, or of flood plains for filtering groundwater. It includes the claim that there are finite natural resources (excluding water which I code separately) which matter systemically, and also arguments about ecological footprints.

Perhaps the newspaper said it best, echoing a sentiment that I heard in Both Marin and Sonoma but nowhere else. In an argument that said very little about nature, Lynch of
the Sonoma Index-Tribune argued for a concept of ecological sustainability in which the health of the human economy was incorporated into the broader ecological health of the region. He was defending the newspaper against environmentalists, who didn’t understand why not every local action was supported by the newspaper. He wrote,

In fact, it is fair to characterize the Index-Tribune's editorial policy as "pro local business." It has been said, more than once, in the opinion column of this newspaper, that the local economy is a vital part of the local environment, and its health is as important to local quality of life as other elements of the environment. But it is never been the editorial policy of this paper that business interests trump all others.” (Lynch, 2000)

LG-Ecol2. Growth contributes to global warming or pollution: Global warming is a threat and must be dealt with at the local level by limiting development. As many people confuse or combine arguments about carbon emissions, greenhouse gasses, and air pollution, they have been combined here into a single frame. The primary form of argument in the contemporary period implicates laissez-faire land use decisions as a cause of global warming and climate change.

LG-Ecol3. Growth harms valuable species: We must protect a specific type of valuable non-human life-form. A common example is that since wetlands are diminishing, and wetlands hold valuable species, a moratorium on development in wetlands is required. A related argument identifies a specific biological feature in the natural environment - a specific wetland, a specific species, or another ecosystem - and argues that it is of significant value to warrant limited development. For example, in the following statement a writer accuses developers and pro-growth residents of destroying the natural world:
Enough already! There are enough fat-food franchises, enough fat-car facilities and enough big boxes on the bay. There is enough urban sprawl and strip mall, enough rapacious development, enough collusion, deforestation and futility. Enough pollution and paving over. Enough! If you haven't had enough, consider moving to Baghdad, or at least Bakersfield; move soon, and leave the remnant forests, open lands and unspoiled seascapes to those who understand and appreciate these incredible biomes. (Wiebe, 2004)

It is clear in this example that the forests, open lands, seascapes and “incredible biomes” are valued as natural phenomenon, independent from their productive human uses.

LG-Ecol4. Nature has intrinsic value: This is the argument that the natural world has intrinsic value and deserves respect. This frame included explicit statements about intrinsic value of an ecosystem or “nature,” and also spiritualist references to “Gaia” or “Mother Earth.” This category also includes those who argue that nature is sentient and in need of political voice, as when speakers claim to “speak for the trees” or “the Bay.” A statement that was also included in this category was the notion that growth is irreversible. Speakers sometimes argued that the development of land was a permanent act which irrevocably altered the landscape and destroyed biodiversity. In interpret their concern about the “permanence” of this act as evidence of a value placed on what was lost. A building can be destroyed and returned to open space; but for the speaker, this return comes at a cost. The “naturalness” of the site is gone, and it is now a garden. This discourse invokes intrinsic value.

One good example of this frame comes from a letter to the editor in Ventura County which recounted the story of a bear who had wandered out of the mountains and in to town in October of 2009, as occasionally happens in California cities that abut rugged interior mountains. The bear had climbed a tree on Aliso Street, whereupon a
standoff ensued between treed bear, neighborhood residents, and the local Warden with the California Department of Fish and Game. After 24 hours, the bear would not surrender and so the Warden shot the bear with a tranquilizer. The bear fell from the tree and died, thus ending the standoff and stirring great concern. In a letter to the editor, one person noted, “there was nothing humane about a group of armed men shining flashlights up into the tree, causing the frightened bear to climb even higher and the horrific crash to the ground that followed.” She continued to criticize the warden, who was “known for organizing adult and youth pheasant hunts” rather than being a proper “steward of the environment.” More importantly for this frame, she defended the bear, an “innocent creature that never threatened to hurt or endanger any member of the public.” She concluded by cautioning the Warden to look “closely into the eyes of the creature he killed” (Francina, 2009). Such language clearly invokes a sense of deep intrinsic value for the bear who “never threatened” anyone, and should be gazed upon by the Warden with respect.
Appendix B – List of Op-Eds used for Discourse Analysis

Humboldt County Op-Eds


Marin County Op-Eds


**San Diego County Op-Eds**


## Appendix C – Content Analysis

Table 17: Content Analysis - Economic Discourse

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Table 19: Content Analysis - Ecological Discourse

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Note. In the tables above, search term frequency has been reported first as raw frequency, and second as frequency per 1000 growth or land articles. The final row is an index, in which I have taken the average of the square root of the frequency per 1000 articles.
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