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*Mare Nostrum? The Sources, Logic, and Dilemmas of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*

by

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**Abstract**

Etel Solingen and Saba Senses Ozyurt emphasize institutions and socialization within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The paper begins with an analysis of the theoretical foundations of the institutional theory that underlies the "triple logic" of the EMP, that is, economic reforms, democratization, and regional multilateralism, and elaborates on specific arguments on which each pillar of the "triple logic" rests. Subsequently they use Turkey as a case study in order to analyze the "triple logic" at work, paying attention to both the role of institutions and the effects of socialization. By exploring the difficulties of the triple logic in the case of Turkey, a state that might be expected to provide an "easy case" for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, Solingen and Senses Ozyurt point out a number of intrinsic dilemmas within the "triple logic" on which the future of Euro-Mediterranean region building will hinge.
International relations is the least expected area for effective organizations, binding rules, and shared norms to emerge in an anarchical environment, according to the neorealist paradigm. Other schools of thought, including neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism, have stressed the relevance of international organizations such as NATO and the EU to international cooperation. In particular, the EU is moving toward a more integrated Europe by consolidating supranational institutions and by accepting new members--especially from Central and Eastern Europe--through accession agreements. The Union is also reevaluating and redefining its relations with other neighboring countries through bilateral and multilateral agreements. Prominent among these is the “Barcelona Mediterranean Initiative” or the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (EMP) launched in 1995.

The main objective behind this Mediterranean strategy is to strengthen political, economic, and socio-cultural ties between the EU and the 12 southern Mediterranean states (Bulletin of the European Union, 1995). The nurturing of three main institutions--markets, democracy, and regional multilateralism respectively--provide the “triple logic” or foundational rationale for the EMP enterprise. Each of these logics endows both state and non-state actors with important roles as agents of regionalization. However, the inherent wisdom, effectiveness, desirability, and motivations behind each of these logics are heavily contested by actors in North and South. There are differences in expectations and divergences in political, economic and cultural incentives between--and often within--the EU and the southern Mediterranean states. In the absence of a common understanding of what the problems are, agreement on solutions becomes even more difficult.
The Mediterranean Basin has long been afflicted with at least two important cleavages: the rich/poor or North/South division on the one hand, and alleged civilizational tensions between Islam and the West, brandished even more forcefully after the events of 9/11. Both classical security issues (the drive toward non-conventional weapons in the Middle East, terrorism, oil and natural gas dependencies) and “new” security issues (migration, drugs, human rights violations, environmental degradation) bear on EU concerns with the political fate of the Mediterranean basin (Joffe, 1998). EU partners perceive economic stagnation, absence of democracy, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism to be the sources of security threats to Europe emanating from the southern Mediterranean states. Arab partners, on the other hand, insist on the distinction between terrorism and Islam, are divided internally and externally over the merits of economic integration into the global economy and over democratic reforms. Without a single democratic regime in place, most resist changes in their political and social structures, although there is significant variation among them in their readiness to liberalize.  

Furthermore, whereas Europe is said to converge on democratic and market-oriented interests and identities, the southern Mediterranean states lack such coherence of purpose and interests. Finally, despite continuous internal disagreements along the way, the EU has developed the deepest and most comprehensive form of regional institutionalized multilateral cooperation while such efforts have largely failed among southern Mediterranean states, even within the Arab world itself, as evidenced by the Arab League. Most of these differences must be overcome for stable and long-term regional cooperation between the EU and the southern Mediterranean states to emerge.

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1 Aspects of this chapter benefited from a United States Institute of Peace grant. The authors are also grateful for comments on earlier versions from participants at the Conference on “The Convergence of Civilizations? Constructing a Mediterranean Region,” co-sponsored by the Institute for European Studies and the European Union Center of the University of California Berkeley, under the auspices of the Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (Lisbon, June 6-9, 2002) and, especially, to Metin Heper. Etel Solingen acknowledges International Politics for permission to reprint segments appearing in an earlier version entitled “The Triple Logic of the European-Mediterranean Partnership: Hindsight and Foresight” (Vol.40, No.2, 2004:179-194)
This chapter addresses the sources and effects of these cleavages in institutions, identities, and interests, and their consequences for the development of a meaningful and stable Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). In section I we begin by analyzing the broad theoretical foundations in institutional theory that underlie the triple logic of the Barcelona process. Section II elaborates the specific arguments on which each pillar of the triple logic rests. Next, we examine the triple logic at work, through the prism of a case study: Turkey. Our purpose is not to suggest that Turkey provides a prototype of the southern Mediterranean states; indeed, it might be argued that it differs quite significantly from all others in its progress toward markets, democracy, and multilateralism (the latter on account of its NATO membership and special relationship with the EU). Precisely because of this progress, Turkey might be expected to provide an “easy case” for EU-southern Mediterranean states cooperation. Yet, the fact that important dilemmas remain even in this case makes it an especially critical and interesting category for exploring the dilemmas of the triple logic. Section IV discusses whether and how the Barcelona Initiative has operated as a source of socialization into the triple logic and the possible effects of such socialization on the continuity of the Initiative. We end with a discussion of dilemmas and hurdles embedded in the triple logic of the Barcelona process.

I. Theoretical Underpinnings of the EMP

Institutional theory has been marshaled to explain cooperation among states. Some institutionalist perspectives treat institutions as dependent variables that emerge and change as a result of acts, expectations, power, and preferences of agents. Others treat institutions as independent variables that have constraining and, in some cases, constitutive effects on state perceptions and behavior. Neorealism, a brand of rational choice, emphasizes the power of states as agents and their purposeful decisions in explaining institutional outcomes. Neoliberal institutionalism sees states as agents designing institutions to advance their joint interests.

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3 On the methodological advantages of this kind of analysis, see Eckstein (1975).
According to these models, institutions are endogenous whereas individual preferences are exogenous, that is, institutions are explained on the basis of preferences that are defined outside of the institutional context (Keohane, 1989; Jupille and Caporaso, 1999). Thus, institutions emerge and survive because they serve to maximize those exogenously determined interests and preferences of their members, especially those founding members who designed the institution. Neorealism focuses on the extent to which powerful states dominate institutions whereas latecomers or less powerful members have less control over institutional decisions and outcomes, hence benefiting least from their creation (Sened, 1991; Gruber, 2000). Neoliberal institutionalists, instead, argue that the ‘shadow of the future’--the possibility to attain gains in the future--provides a strong incentive for all states to cooperate and create institutions that benefit all parties.

Rational choice institutionalism is highly relevant in explaining the motivations of EMP partners. First of all, the preferences of member states seem to be determined largely outside the context of EMP. EU partners have their own national, subnational, and regional goals and concerns. Similarly, the southern Mediterranean states’ expectations from the Barcelona Initiative differ not only from their EU partners but also from each other. Seen in this light, the Initiative is the product of exogenously defined preferences of agents (states, politicians, or different domestic groups). EU governments and publics consider political and economic instability in the southern Mediterranean states /Middle East region as the main security threat to the EU leading them to promote a more secure, peaceful, and stable foundation for democracy and economic reform in that region. In a wide-ranging survey on the security aspects of European integration in 1991, Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, identified the need for Europe's 'Southern flank' (the Maghreb, the Mashreq and the Middle East) to develop economically as a pre-requisite for achieving peace and stability in
In February 1995, Willy Claes, then NATO Secretary General, launched a new NATO initiative for the Mediterranean, identifying Islamic fundamentalism as a threat to European security comparable to communism. Many have also identified poor economic performance, control of key energy supplies, demographic change and population movements, Islamic fundamentalism and cultural incompatibilities, terrorism, drugs trafficking, depletion of natural resources, and conventional and unconventional weapons proliferation as sources of instability affecting EU security. Yet others, reflecting more neorealist tendencies, see the need for the EU, as a rational actor, to commit to EU-Mediterranean cooperation and Middle East stabilization if it is to emerge as a genuine world power. As the former Director General for North-South Relations of the European Commission Juan Prat (1997) suggests, “the US is interested in the region because it is a global power. The region is important for the EU because it is our geopolitical region, it is our business to talk about the business of the countries of this region.” Since the EMP is seen as an extension of the EU political and economic influence in the region, there is also a perceived imbalance among partners in their decision-making power. Neorealists take for granted the zero-sum quality of an institution whereas neoliberal institutionalists tend to focus on absolute gains for all. In the latter’s view, southern Mediterranean states choose to participate in the Initiative because they expect economic growth and related benefits.

Central to neoliberal institutionalism is the notion of ‘transaction costs’. “The costliness of information is the key to the costs of transacting, which consists of the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements” (North, 1990, p.27). Thus, institutions are desirable, despite the constraints they impose on nation states, because they reduce transaction costs associated with rule making, negotiating, implementing/enforcing, information gathering and conflict resolution. In the initial stages of the Initiative, some (domestic) transitional costs for southern

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4 This section builds on Whiteman (2001)
Mediterranean states were expected to be higher than the adjustment costs for EU members. Trade liberalization with the EU will affect protected industries in the region, which will need to adjust to the increasing competition by reducing labor costs through cutting employees (Nsouli, et al. 1996). Increased unemployment in the short term is regarded as a main challenge as well. In the longer term, however, the Initiative is considered to facilitate future growth and stability. For EU partners, financial contributions were considered a temporary burden that would, in the long term, reduce transaction costs with the southern Mediterranean states. For instance, the costs of gathering information on security issues of great concern to the EU--weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug-trafficking, and organized crime--would decrease as a result of increased institutional cooperation with southern Mediterranean states.

*Constructivist institutionalism* conceptualizes institutions as a collection of norms, rules and routines, rather than a formal structure. In contrast to rational choice theories, institutions cannot simply change the preferences of actors, but can also shape their identity (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Klotz and Lynch, 2004). Constructivism focuses on the central role of ideology, rules, and norms that institutions diffuse to constitute agents. Against a “logic of instrumentality” or “logic of consequences” of rational choice institutionalism, it posits a “logic of appropriateness”, arguing that individuals’ actions are guided by social expectations rather than utility maximization calculations (March and Olsen, 1989; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Rules, routines, and procedures can be imposed or enforced by a political authority, or they can be part of a code of appropriate behavior that is internalized through socialization. Institutional routines are followed even when there is no obvious self-interest involved. The internalization of shared norms through socialization is instrumental in this understanding of institutions, as is learning and adaptation to the social environment. According to this framework, agents are socialized into institutional routines drawing greater attention to cognitive processes, schemas, scripts,

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5 We subsume rather diverse approaches, including sociological institutionalism, under the category of constructivism.
social categories and classifications. Constructivism emphasizes the relation between social structure and inter-subjective understandings (collective meaning-making), which is the byproduct of cognitive processes, interpretation of norms, dominant ideology, and dominant discourse. Institutional practices reinforce individuals' thinking and organize knowledge. In return, internalized norms, knowledge and dominant discourse reproduce the institutions. Institutions are capable of change; yet they also carry elements of stability (Klotz and Lynch, 2004). One of the ways in which institutions reproduce themselves is by engaging individuals in a dialogue of specialized (dominant) language that transforms individuals' thinking patterns. The socialization process is critical in producing cooperative behavior. States (especially newcomers) are socialized into international institutions through two microprocesses: persuasion and social influence (Johnston, 2001). We discuss the effects of socialization on the future of EMP below.

Constructivism draws our attention to the possible drawbacks of the absence of shared norms and common culture among Euro-Med partners. At the same time, the framework can be useful for exploring how to overcome cultural and ideological differences between EU and southern Mediterranean states, and amongst them. The logic of appropriateness seems less salient in the EMP's rather brief history than the logic of consequences. However, in tandem with the material objectives that may accrue over time, the viability of the Initiative will require proper attention to socialization and transformative efforts toward common purpose.

The fourth and final approach to the origin and functioning of institutions is more sensitive to domestic politics and disaggregates among groups that are more likely to benefit from the institution than others (Moravcsik 1998, Solingen 2004). Accordingly, the assumption that all economic sectors in each southern Mediterranean state will respond equally to the opportunities and constraints of market reform, or that all societal forces approach the process of democratization with the same strategies and objectives in mind, seems misleading. The same is, of course, the case for EU members, whose specific sectoral interests shape their view
of what should be done or avoided in the context of the EMP (agriculture is a good example). The next section applies a perspective rooted in domestic responses to explain the behavior of both EU and Southern Mediterranean actors vis-à-vis the EMP.

Beyond these conceptual approaches to international institutions in international relations, historical institutionalism as a brand of institutionalist theory in the social sciences provides an important perspective for understanding crucial founding moments of institutional formation that shape future paths. Institutions evolve in response to changing environmental conditions in ways constrained by past trajectories (Thelen, 1999 p.387). This framework provides two very useful concepts for the analysis of institutional persistence and change. The first is “path dependency”, the idea that once a policy choice has been made it will tend to persist throughout the institution’s development. However, path dependency (being “locked into” a given path) does not preclude institutions from changing over time and takes account of evolutionary processes, although the initial path frames the range of possibilities for institutional change. A second important concept in historical institutionalism is “critical junctures” or “punctuated equilibrium,” the idea that equilibrium (stability) is not permanent and that there will be bursts of institutional change followed by long periods of stasis (Peters, 2001, p.68) Various institutional configurations emerge at different times and out of different historical contexts, sustained by broader political and social issues. Similarly, institutional change cannot be analyzed in isolation from the political and social setting in which it is embedded (Thelen, p.16)

Historical institutionalism draws our attention to the economic, social and political context within which the EMP emerged in the mid-1990s. The post-Cold War era created greater convergence toward an international community committed to political stability, increased democratic participation, economic development, integration in the global economy, and improvements in human rights. At the same time, the 1990s found most southern Mediterranean states rather lagging in economic reform, democratic transformation, and regional and international cooperation, not merely relative to the EU but relatively to other industrializing
regions as well. The initial conditions for embarking on the institutional path underlying the Euro-Med Initiative foreshadowed considerable difficulties in the implementation of the triple logic. At the same time, the launching of the EMP provided a critical juncture for a much hoped transformative process. By locking in certain commitments with the EU, southern Mediterranean states’ leaders could justify domestic reforms as part of a regional cooperative enterprise (Nsouli, et al. 1996). The expectation was that greater political participation and economic stability would encourage domestic and foreign investment, chartering a new path-dependency that would make it hard to reverse it once it got under way.

These different approaches, relying on alternative emphases on power, interests, norms, and evolutionary processes provide complementary windows into the broad institutional contours of the EMP. We now turn to more specific arguments sustaining the “triple logic.”

II. The Three Pillars of the EMP

As argued, the Barcelona process brings to relief three institutional pillars on which a peaceful Mediterranean region would presumably rest: economic reform, democracy and regional multilateralism. These pillars reflect three interrelated logics rooted in more general perspectives on the sources of regional conflict and cooperation.6

a) The logic of economic reform

Economic proposals in the Barcelona Declaration included the establishment of a Free Trade Area between the Union and southern Mediterranean states by 2010 and the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers by southern Mediterranean states. Economic aid and loans (European Investment Bank) were to benefit the southern Mediterranean states’ private sector and to encourage structural reform and privatization. MEDA II (1999) expected the “structural adjustment facility” financed under MEDA I to target more specifically the reforms necessary for

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6 This section, as well as section VI, builds on Solingen (2003b). This author acknowledges International Politics for permission to reprint segments of the original version.
free trade with the EU on the one hand, and to streamline EU decision making on the other.\textsuperscript{7} The underlying objective was to help adapt southern Mediterranean states to an increasingly freer and globalized economy in the belief that such transformation would also help resolve the many socio-political problems in the region.

By the early 1990s the Middle East had become the least self-sufficient area in the world in food, with among the highest rates of infant mortality and illiteracy (particularly female), high levels of unemployment and underemployment rates, enormous income disparities, high inflation, overvalued real exchange rates, and uncompetitive goods.\textsuperscript{8} For instance, Egypt’s GNP grew from $260 in 1972 to $640 in 1992, its budget deficit quintupled from 1975 to 1989, and its external debt increased from $2 billion in 1972 to $40 billion in 1990. According to a UN human development index (HDI) combining indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment, and income worldwide, Egypt and Morocco—non-oil economies—ranked 112\textsuperscript{th} and 125\textsuperscript{th} respectively by the mid-1990s (Tunisia was 83\textsuperscript{rd}).\textsuperscript{9} For comparative purposes, Pakistan and India ranked 138\textsuperscript{th} and 139\textsuperscript{th} whereas South Korea ranked 30\textsuperscript{th}, Thailand 59\textsuperscript{th}, and Malaysia 60\textsuperscript{th}. Average adult literacy remains as low as 56% in the Arab world (98 % in East Asia, excluding China) and much worse for women (Egypt’s is 36%). Radical Islamist movements have shown little proclivity to support female education, known to be a critical factor in reversing birth rates and improving economic conditions.

Such statistics are frequently cited in efforts to induce further economic reform in the southern Mediterranean states. But what is the underlying logic presumably connecting economic reform with regional cooperation? On this, there is far less agreement than meets the

\textsuperscript{7} The MEDA Regulation was adopted in 1996 and the beneficiaries are Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Malta, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Up to 1998 the MEDA Programme has committed 2,325 billion euro and disbursed 600 million euro for economic reform, social cohesion and regional cooperation.


\textsuperscript{9} UNDP HDR 1994-1998.
eye. The relationship between interdependence and conflict/cooperation is not a simple one (Mansfield and Pollins 2003). One effort to link the process of economic reform to the nature of regional relations focuses on the nature of political coalitions that emerge as a consequence of internationalization and economic reform.10 According to this argument, politicians worldwide rely on material and ideal aspects of internationalization to broker political coalitions across constituencies that respond differently to the opportunities and constraints of internationalization. Three ideal-typical coalitions tend to form: internationalizing and backlash (of which pure forms are hard to find in the real world) and hybrid. Driven by their varying socio-political composition and incentives, these coalitions also embrace different approaches (grand strategies) to both the domestic and global political economy and institutions.

Both qualitative and quantitative studies found internationalizing ruling coalitions to be more prone to intensify their country’s trade openness (imports plus exports/GDP) and expand exports, to attract foreign investments and curb wasteful military-industrial complexes, to shun weapons of mass destruction, defer to international economic and security regimes, and strive for regional cooperative orders that reinforce those objectives. Instead, backlash ruling coalitions were found to restrict and reduce trade openness, exports, and foreign investment, while building expansive military-industrial complexes and weapons of mass destruction, challenging international security and economic regimes, and exacerbating civic, religious, and ethnic-nationalist differentiation within their region through an emphasis on territoriality, sovereignty, and self-reliance. Coherent coalitional grand strategies are hard to find in the real world but the links between a commitment to internationalization and regional cooperation and stability are evident (the latter two are extremely important for the kind of macroeconomic and investment policies pursued by internationalizing coalitions).

10 Solingen (1998) and on how different coalitions emerge, see (2001). Internationalization involves increased openness to international markets, capital, investments, and technology but also to an array of political and security regimes, institutions, and values.
Different coalitional combinations in different regions create regional orders, “identities,” and shared expectations about conflict and cooperation and, conversely, are affected by them. Inter-regional comparisons suggest that where internationalizing coalitions gathered strength in a given region, there was a better chance that zones of stable peace might develop. In these cases ruling coalitions relied more on concerts, collective security, and multilateralism (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991; Ruggie, 1993) avoiding aggressive steps towards each other and mutually adjusting to resolve outstanding disputes. For instance, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian States) produced relatively peaceful stability on the ashes of earlier wars and internationalizing coalitions in the Southern Cone of Latin American made MERCOSUR and denuclearization a reality. Even in the Middle East, proto-internationalizers made strides in a cooperative direction in the early 1990s (Oslo and Multilateral Middle East Peace Process) although recalcitrant backlash rivals throughout the region ended this brief cooperative spurt.\textsuperscript{11} War Zones are more likely to emerge in regional contexts where backlash coalitions have a dominant presence. Given the logic of their grand strategy--particularly militarization and nationalist brinkmanship--stronger backlash neighbors tend to produce and reproduce backlash strategies. Nasser’s encroachment in Yemen and quarantine of Israel in 1967, Sadat’s 1973 October War, Begin/Sharon’s invasion of Lebanon, Asad’s threats to Israel and invasion of Lebanon, Arafat’s threats to Jordan and Lebanon, Galtieri’s Malvinas debacle, repeated Indo-Pakistani military encounters and nuclear swaggering, Iran’s Islamic Republic threats to Saddam Hussein and Saddam’s own invasions of Iran and Kuwait, are all instances of this pattern. Finally, zones of restrained conflict reflect coalitional competition among internationalizing, backlash, and hybrid leaders at the regional level. Under these conditions, no pure coalitional type dominates across states within a region. In hybrid orders, regionally hegemonic coalitions (Nasserism in the

\textsuperscript{11} For further elaboration of ASEAN, the Southern Cone, and the Multilateral Middle East Process along coalitional lines, see Solingen (1999, 2000, and 2001a).
1960s) influence the fate of domestic--and eventually regional--coalitional balances, frequently shifting them towards their own type.

In some ways, the EU conceives of itself as a zone of stable peace and of the Mediterranean as a hybrid or mixed region at best, with at least some ruling coalitions in southern Mediterranean states falling under the category of backlash or latent backlash. Israel, (Greek) Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey are regarded as closest to the EU's internationalizing expectations. Beyond that, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia are estimated to have made more progress in the process toward internationalization than the rest of the region. The last two promoted exports through preferential trade agreements with the EU and have stimulated private sector and foreign investment for over a decade. In both cases, states employed about one-fourth of the non-agricultural workforce, far less than under most regimes elsewhere in the region. Tunisia’s President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali deepened liberalization in financial markets and foreign investment, promoted tourism, and reduced maximum tariff rates from 220 percent to 43 percent in the early 1990s (Rodrik, 1994:62). Jordan implemented liberalizing reforms to improve foreign investment throughout the 1990s and embraced FTAs with the EU and the US. Under Sadat's *infitah* ('opening up') initiative in the mid-1970s Egypt began its slow process of liberalizing economic sectors, although it has often provided a paradigm for little structural adjustment, regulatory reform, privatization, or trade liberalization (Cassandra, 1995).

Unsurprisingly from the perspective of the coalitional argument outlined above, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia were also strong supporters of the Oslo and multilateral peace processes, which were regarded as a *sine qua non* for creating stable regional conditions propitious for economic development. The connections are made clear in the analysis of Riad Al Khouri (1994:110, 111, and 115):

"Jordan's economic hopes are riding on the peace process...A resolution of the conflict with Israel would also allow reduction of the country's defense budget (which accounts for more than 30 percent of government spending)... Against the background of the lingering Arab-Israeli
conflict, it remains almost impossible to attract [foreign] investors. But if the peace process flourishes...Jordan will assume its rightful economic role. However, the vociferous fundamentalism unleashed by democratization is belligerent and xenophobic--opposed to both peace and foreign investment."\(^{12}\)

The last remark alludes to a problem afflicting many a southern Mediterranean state, with Algeria representing the worst debacle thus far. However, Islamist movements opposed to internationalization are not the only source of backlash forms in the region.\(^{13}\) No less resistant to internationalization and to its domestic political and economic implications is Syria’s ruling coalition. The vast national security apparatus created by the Assad regime is a prime example of sectors that would lose their *raison de'être* if regional peace came about (Hinnebusch, 1995:74).\(^{14}\) The entrenched, oversized, Ba’ath-run state has largely resisted economic liberalization despite some incipient steps in the 1980s that essentially “carefully preserved the privileged position of ‘national’ economic sectors.”\(^{15}\) Public sector managers (as well as military and security) bureaus have countered the nascent power of private commercial and industrial groups. Repression of the Islamist opposition has been harshest in Syria. As expected, the backlash interests driving Syria’s ruling coalition have also kept Syria (and Lebanon, which it controls) self-isolated from most peace initiatives, including the multilateral Middle East process of the 1990s. Beyond these cases lies the “outer ring” of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean arch in the Euro-Med region, including Iraq and Iran. The former is undergoing a major political, economic, and social transformation in the aftermath of the 2003 war to depose Saddam Hussein. The latter has developed political forces pushing for

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\(^{12}\) On the affinity between nationalism and Islamist fundamentalism, see also Rouleau (1993).

\(^{13}\) On populism as a common characteristic of both Arab nationalists and Islamist radicals, see Leca (1994:79)

\(^{14}\) On support among Syrian private entrepreneurs for a peace settlement with Israel, see Lawson (1994:63). On regional conflict and (domestic) military gains throughout the Arab world, see Waterbury (1994).

\(^{15}\) Heydemann (1992:94). See also Hinnebusch (1993); Rabinovich (1993), and Lawson (1994).
democratization and greater international openness although reformists have, thus far, been overcome by resistance from the conservative clerics and their political allies in the judiciary, military, and state enterprises. Unlike Southeast Asia, there is no critical mass of internationalizers within this arch, let alone in its periphery. On the whole, economic reform has proceeded at a much slower pace in the Middle East than virtually everywhere else (including some areas in Africa) and political resistance to economic openness remains quite strong in most cases.

b) The Logic of Democracy

The Barcelona process also aimed at encouraging “good governance,” namely democracy and human rights, and advanced the development of confidence-building measures to enhance regional security. In the European experience, stable and mature democracies are considered to be better suited to deal with ethnic and religious fragmentation than non-democracies. Differences can be channeled through established political parties and legal institutions able to adjudicate along more or less neutral (civic) lines. In this view, only democracy can be expected to guarantee human rights and personal freedoms. “Good governance” cannot emanate from regimes that are not accountable. Furthermore, the 1990s diffused the idea (developed by Kant) that democracies tend to safeguard peace in their interactions with each other. Despite contradictory logics of democratization in the Middle East (see below), the commitment of European publics to these principles makes it hard to envisage a EU Mediterranean policy that does not rely on these norms. From the EU perspective, democracy appears a win-win: it is expected to deliver human rights to the southern Mediterranean states and peaceful interactions between the Mediterranean north and south. Yet, the progression toward democracy in the southern Mediterranean states has been rather slow in contrast to democratization in Latin America, Eastern Europe, East Asia, and sub-

16 For aggregate evidence on the relative immunity of democratic states to violent ethnic upheaval, see Hill and Rotschild (1993) and Espy et al (1997).
Saharan Africa. In the 1990s there was some movement towards selected democratic procedures and political liberalization characterized by incipient, tentative and piecemeal steps, and marked by significant reversals (Solingen 2003a). Morocco, a pioneer in its tolerance for freedom of the press and association with a relatively strong (in regional terms) civil society, has seen some barriers placed on the monarchy. By the late 1990s there was a government led by the traditional opposition (although appointed by late King Hassan) and further improvements were detected with the inception of King Mohammed to the throne in 1999. Jordan has experienced competitive parliamentary elections since 1989 and a lively press debate over domestic and foreign policy. Liberalization has both suffered some setbacks after 9/11 but also nudged some rulers in a liberalizing--albeit tentative--direction, particularly in some of the Gulf states. Egypt has restricted political participation through electoral laws and procedures that favor the ruling National Democratic Party (Harik, 1994; Korany, Brynen, and Noble, 1998). Its record with respect to human rights and pro-democracy organizations has deteriorated, as evidenced by the conviction of noted scholar and activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim on trumped-up charges of defaming Egypt’s reputation and receiving foreign funding without governmental permission. In tune with modal southern Mediterranean states politics, Tunisia’s President Ben Ali won a third 5-year term with nearly 100 percent of the vote in the October 1999 elections, replicating President’s Mubarak 1999 performance in Egypt. Palestinians elected their president and Legislative Council in their first free, internationally supervised, elections in January 1996 but no elections have taken place since, and Arafat has precluded genuine political participation or any effective power sharing with a Prime Minister. Syria remains a highly personalistic authoritarian state that also places stiff boundaries on Lebanese liberalizing efforts. Turkey, with strong incentives from the EU, is arguably furthest along in the process of democratization and political liberalization but is also under the constant vigilant critique of European publics resisting Turkey’s inclusion as a full-fledge democracy.
To the extent that some democratization-from-above has taken place throughout the region--launched by state elites with varying degrees of support from powerful societal actors--these have been efforts at coopting influential elites while placing strict controls on the expansion of political rights. These barriers to democratization make initiatives in the third area of the Barcelona Process--society and culture--harder to sustain. These initiatives include the development of networks of human rights organizations and economic and defense institutes (EuroMeSCo is a network of strategic studies institutes, and FEMISE is a network of economic Institutes). The promotion of private organizations and NGOs through the EMP is expected to reinforce democratization, economic reform, and multilateral cooperation but the record has, thus far, fallen short of expectations.

**c) The Logic of Regional Multilateral Institutions**

The merits of regional multilateral institutions in the eyes of EU officials and publics are quite clear: “if it worked in Europe, why not everywhere?” The EU experience has had a profound influence in international relations regarding the role of regional institutions in cooperation. However, it is important to recognize that cooperation can come about even where there is either little integration or institutions, whereas conflict is possible in the presence of both.\(^{17}\) This is supported by findings from coalitional analysis and regional conflict and cooperation in other regions, beyond the EU (Solingen 1998, 2001). In the Arab Middle East the institutional record of the Arab League and other institutions in promoting cooperation has been rather dismal and despite the rhetoric of integration, economic barriers among Arab states have never receded. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an exception, in some respects. Incipient cooperation in the Korean peninsula cannot be traced to institutions. Rather, the establishment of institutions such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

\(^{17}\) Cooperation involves the willingness to forsake, in repeated instances, the unilateral pursuit of one’s own interests and to undertake commitments on a basis of diffuse reciprocity (Keohane 1986). Behavior oriented to resolve disputes and to avoid armed confrontations--with or without institutions--is considered cooperative.
(KEDO) lagged after the emergence of cooperation in response to domestic political changes. A dense institutional framework in Latin America failed to advance cooperation between Argentina and Brazil, over decades of guarded regional relations, limited economic exchange, and risky nuclear competition. Only a dramatic domestic coalitional reversal in the 1990s instilled new life into old institutions and created novel, effective ones. Internationalizing coalitions, not institutions, sperheaded MERCOSUR and a denuclearized Southern Cone.

In accordance with its own strong belief in the role of institutions in inducing cooperation, the EU became active in the Multilateral Middle East Peace Process between 1993-1995, and underwrote much of the emergent Palestinian political-economy. Between 1994 and 1996 the Middle East/North Africa Economic Conferences became an instrumental venue for regional reconciliation through economic development, global openness, and foreign investment. According to the World Economic Forum conference’ organizers, there was considerable expectation in the region that investment would grow in tandem with deepening privatization, new stock exchanges and capital markets, protocols on trade and regional agreements in sectors such as transport, energy and tourism, solid GDP growth, and rapid industrialization. The rise of Palestinian Islamic terror and the election of Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel in 1996 stalled the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian track, and helped derail these multilateral efforts.

Clearly, regional institutions have had a hard time emerging among southern Mediterranean states, either in the inter-Arab or broader (including Arab-Israeli) plane. However, as argued earlier, regional institutions are perhaps neither necessary nor sufficient for cooperation. What about the relationship between economic integration and cooperation? The EMP process can be seen as a “hub and spoke” model that potentially competes with MENA integration processes. But does it really? First of all, MENA’s repeated attempts have never taken off. Second, integration with the rest of the world does not necessarily imply that regional integration is hindered (as evidenced by East Asia and the Mercosur region). Third, integration with extra-regional countries is expected to create domestic changes in the political economy of
MENA countries, perhaps ameliorating internal tensions; this could result in improved intra-
MENA political and economic relations, as new socio-economic and political forces change the
domestic coalitional landscape and the resulting strategy towards neighboring states. In sum,
the EMP initiatives might be considered complementary to further regional integration, and
perhaps a catalytic factor in bringing integration about.

III. Turkey: The EU, the EMP, and the triple logic in action

Turkey is one of the few countries regarded as closest to the EU’s internationalizing
expectations. However, a strong commitment to the EMP is fused with many dilemmas for
Turkey, which has been a rather reluctant partner to the EMP process at the outset. On the one
hand, Turkish governments have always strongly supported regional organizations and
initiatives aimed at creating a more peaceful and stable Mediterranean basin, given Turkish
concerns with its territorial integrity and national interests. On the other hand, Turkey regards
the EMP as a pale initiative relative to its own more ambitious expectations from EU
membership (Yilmaz, 2002). Turkish leaders frequently stress that the EMP can never be an
alternative to the kind of relationship Turkey wants with the EU. They also emphasize more
realistic and modest goals than those proclaimed in the EMP process. For instance, while
supporting confidence-building measures, Turkish officials regard trade and investment issues
more feasible and attainable than progress in the political and security arena (Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Report, 2000).

The EU Mediterranean policy, as framed in the Barcelona Declaration, does not assume
the eventual accession of the majority of southern Mediterranean states into the EU. In that
respect Turkey is an exception, along with Malta and Cyprus. At the same time, Turkey has had
a long and challenging relationship with the EU for over four decades since it signed the
Association Agreement (AA) in 1963. The AA was much more ambitious from an integration
point of view than the bilateral free trade agreements signed by the partners to the EMP, as it
contemplated the gradual establishment of a customs union (CU) between Turkey and the EC. The agreement implementing the final phase of the CU became effective in December 1995. Accordingly, both parties have eliminated customs duties on industrial and processed goods (Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman, 1999). Since the CU agreement, Turkey has demonstrated the ability to cope with the competitive challenge of free trade. However, Turkey has been denied full membership in the EU on political and social grounds, including its human rights records, hostile relations with Greece over Cyprus, demographic characteristics and high population rate, and concerns over her “European” status (Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman, 1999).

Notwithstanding a profound Turkish frustration with the EU's rejection of full membership, some regard the EMP as providing certain political and economic benefits to Turkey and increasing its chances of eventual full accession. Furthermore, if the EMP could render the Mediterranean a more stable region (a big if) it would also open new foreign policy options for Turkey. Yet Turkey has significant reservations regarding the effectiveness of the EMP, especially in the political, security, and cultural areas. We now turn to a more specific treatment of Turkish perceptions of the EMP’s triple logic.

a) Economic Reform

Turkey is considered one of the front-runners in the economic reform aspects of the EMP. The overall objective of MEDA financing in Turkey was to support economic development and transition in accordance to the Customs Union Agreement (CUA) signed between Turkey and the EU (European Commission, 2000). As a result, Turkey liberalized its trade policies, eliminating trade barriers and customs on industrial and processed goods. Capital liberalization during the 1980s and 1990s took place as part of Turkey’s obligations as an OECD member and EC associate member (Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman, 1999). According to a 1997 IMF report, Turkey ranked higher in an overall index of capital liberalization than most Central and Eastern European, and Mediterranean countries that had signed associate membership agreements with the EU (IMF, 1997). Turkey is one of the few southern Mediterranean states
where EU foreign direct investment continues to grow consistently. As a result of the CU Agreement, Turkey signed bilateral trade agreements with Israel, Tunisia, and Egypt, and is negotiating one with Morocco. Turkey and Israel are--thus far--the only Mediterranean countries linked by free trade agreements, boosting their economic cooperation (Rhein, 2001). With a large young population, and a per capita GDP (in purchasing power parity) of about $7,000 (OECD, 2001), Turkey is an attractive market for the EU. During 1999, its trade deficit with the EU declined significantly (EUR 8.9 billion in 1998 as compared to EUR 5.7 billion for the period of January to November 1999). The EU, with a customs union in force since January 1996, and accounting for 54% of Turkish trade activity, remains Turkey’s most important trading partner.

Capital goods, raw materials and semi-finished products account for 90% of Turkish imports from the Union (European Union, 2003).

The human development index (HDI) provides evidence for other promising developments. Adult literacy rates went up from 53 to 84 percent between 1965 and 1997 (UNDP Report, 2001). Turkey also increased its compulsory primary school education from 5 to 8 years in compliance with EU practices. GDP per capita increased from $791 to $2,792 in the same time frame. Although the 2001 UNDP HDR report classifies Turkey among the fastest progressing countries it has not yet reached the high human development category. It climbed from ranking 54 in 1990 to 51 in 1998 in the HDI, and is projected to achieve the high HDI in 10 years, provided it can sustain economic growth, public services, and the political support of its population.

Summing up thus far, Turkey’s economic reforms are considered to be the successful result of policies instituted by successive ruling coalitions committed to internationalization. Its current Islamic leadership has continued to implement this strategy, a behavior that can be traced to a combination of path dependency, the creation of domestic constituencies vested in this trajectory, and the socialization of other Turkish constituencies into EU norms. These advances notwithstanding, significant problems remain, including regional disparities in HDI. In
1975, one third of Turkey’s eastern and southern provinces were in the low HDI category whereas its western provinces were at the medium-level category. In 1999, all eastern and southern provinces—except one—reached the medium category and its western provinces climbed up to the high HDI level (ibid). The eradication of this inequality will be one of the main challenges in the years to come. The EU provided funds and loans to support education projects, including EUR 182 million allocated to six projects in the most disadvantaged provinces (European Commission, 2000). As part of the Euro-Med initiative, in 2002 Turkey also received EUR 50 million from the European Investment Bank to support information technology education (European Report, 2002).

Notwithstanding this support, Turkish leaders would have preferred direct EU funding, as agreed upon in the CU Agreement rather than through MEDA channels. Furthermore, MEDA funds have often been delayed and not much has materialized. New conditions were added by the European Parliament in September 1996 for Turkey’s projects, including the requirement to spend funds in Southeast Turkey and on human rights projects. Even Commissioner Patten confessed to distributing only 25% of the envisaged assistance to Turkey through MEDA and criticized this situation at the Lisbon “think tank” Ministerial Meeting in May 2000 (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report, 2000). The Greek veto power influenced these conditions. Turkey rejected them on the grounds that no conditionality should be attached to MEDA funds (Tayfur, 2001). Finally, especially before the Helsinki and Copenhagen summits, Turkey hoped its status within the EMP would derive from its association and CU with the EU, placing it on the European side of the negotiations. Instead, Turkey was confined to the non-EU category. Since Helsinki the Turkish vision of the EMP as an economic project has changed considerably and it now considers itself closer to the EU, taking the EMP initiative more seriously.

b) Democracy and Human Rights

Turkey has had a long and promising experience with democracy in comparison to other Muslim countries in the region. After the foundation of the Turkish Republic at the end of World
War I, Turkey adopted Western values, including Western political and legal systems, under Kemal Atatürk. Although Turkey’s initial experience with democracy was an elite driven, “revolution from above” experience, democratic values became internalized both at the popular and regime level. There were three instances when parliamentary democracy was suspended as a result of military coups, but in each case the brief military takeover was followed by democratic elections. This is no perfect democracy, however, particularly regarding the treatment of minority populations.

In December 1999 the Helsinki European Council included Turkey in the enlargement process on the same basis as the other candidates and confirmed Turkey as a candidate for EU accession. It agreed to a pre-accession strategy to include enhanced political dialogue (including on human rights), an Accession Partnership (to set out priorities for Turkey on meeting EU membership criteria), preparation for ‘screening’ (comparing Turkey’s legislation with EU legislation), and Turkish participation in Community programs and agencies (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). The EU formally adopted the text of Turkey’s first Accession Partnership in March 2001. The same year the Turkish Parliament passed a series of Constitutional amendments, which included lifting the ban on publishing or broadcasting in languages other than Turkish and limiting restrictions on freedom of thought or expression. The Parliament passed another package of EU-related reforms in August 2002, which included the abolition of the death penalty except in wartime, the further lifting of limitations on freedom of speech, and the legalization of broadcasting and education in the Kurdish language.

In sum, the EMP has had a significant impact in enhancing Turkey’s commitment to democracy, even if Turkey’s democratic traditions preceded the EMP, unlike most other southern Mediterranean states. The EU provided EUR 8 million under MEDA for a project aimed at developing civil society and EUR 1.3 million for a community empowerment project. Turkey received a total of EUR 14 million to support 29 projects related to community empowerment, child protection, human rights, women rights and development, and civil society building.
between 1995 and 2000 (European Commission, 2000). As a result of these efforts, Turkey may be in far better position to reach full EU membership.

c) Regional Multilateralism

Turkey has been an active participant in international organizations in general and in regional organizations in particular. It has been a NATO member since 1952 and an EU associate member since 1963. It has also been actively involved in the OSCE process since its inception in 1975 and supported regional organizations with its neighbors with the hope of promoting peace, stability and economic development in the region (including the Multilateral Middle East Peace Process of the mid-1990s). It is a founding member of the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) created in 1992, which currently includes 11 members. Turkey also initiated the Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO) among Turkey, the Central Asian Republics, Iran, and Pakistan. Turkey is also an active member of the Council of Europe and the OECD. Despite its support for regional multilateralism, Turkish officials’ vision of the EMP and its role in promoting security in the region differ from that of EU members. As a NATO member, Turkey prefers security arrangements that include NATO, where Turkey has more decision-making power than in any other venues (Yilmaz, 2002). Turkey also prefers a security dialogue through the OSCE, of which Turkey has been a full member since its inception, rather than through the EU, where Turkish power is limited as an associate member.

This overview captures both Turkey’s progress and dilemmas over the triple logic of the EMP. Despite its limited effects thus far, the EMP seems instrumental for Turkey in a number of ways. First, it can help consolidate Turkey’s commitment to democracy and its human rights records, bringing it further along toward full accession to the EU. Second, and no less critically, the EMP can help Turkey promote cooperation not only between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, but also among the latter. Third, Turkey can provide a meaningful role model for the rest of the Islamic world struggling to adapt to Western values of democracy, equality, and
market economies. It can help socialize other Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries and bridge the cultural gap between the Islamic and Western worlds. This would be no easy task but given the enormous gaps among other southern Mediterranean states, Turkey is perhaps uniquely positioned to help bridge them. This brings us to a discussion of the concrete mechanisms through which socialization works to change values and interests.

IV. The Barcelona Process as an Instrument of Socialization

Perhaps the main challenge to the EMP is the absence of a strong commitment to the process on both sides, and a lack of identification on the part of the southern Mediterranean states with many of the norms, rules, interests, and worldviews embedded in the triple logic. Southern Mediterranean states have achieved little economic cooperation amongst themselves and lag significantly in political and economic reform, let alone in developing collective security schemes. Efforts to develop a Euro-Mediterranean collective identity, build confidence, and consolidate trust can be helped by improving the ability to arrive at common understandings. To that effect, a proper understanding of mechanisms of socialization in multilateral institutions is required. The work of Johnston (2001) provides a particularly useful foundation in that regard. Johnston recognizes material rewards and punishments as key sources of cooperation leading states to join some international organizations and to shun activities punished by the international community. However, rational calculations are, in his view, insufficient to explain states’ actions or institutional outcomes, which not always reflect rational states nor capture differences in the quality of participation and in the level of commitment states make to different international institutions. The degree and quality of cooperation can best be understood through the process and degree of socialization that takes place among partners. Communication, interaction, and influence within an institutional context can generate common understandings that go beyond material gains and losses.
Socialization is the process by which the newcomer internalizes norms and values of a group and is incorporated into organized patterns of interaction (Stryker and Statham, 1985). The literature on socialization suggests that in the absence of material incentives, identification with or affective attachment to a valued group provides the motivation to act in accordance with the group norms. Identification with the group leads the newcomer to perceive the authority (the sponsor of the norms) as legitimate, to mimic the valued group’s behavior, and to perceive defecting from the group norms as costly to one’s self-esteem (Axelrod, 1997). One of the effective microprocesses of socialization involves the cognitive process of persuasion and aims at changing opinions and attitudes. The process of successful persuasion can lead to the creation of a common knowledge and homogenization of interests among actors by eliminating differences between actors’ initial perceptions and cognitions (Johnston, 2001:234). A key element in successful persuasion is the persuadee’s perceived knowledge and trustworthiness of the persuader. Shared ideology, identity, and other cultural cues affect the ways in which the persuadee determines the trustworthiness of the persuader (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Johnston, 2001:236). Social influence through dominant discourse is another effective mechanism of socialization that distributes social rewards and punishments among actors. Language structures institutional behaviors and shapes identity formation processes by creating a unique discourse shared by all members of a community (Klotz and Lynch, 2004). Institutions, norms and practices are reproduced through dominant discourse both by dominant actors (persuaders) and by newcomers who are socialized into institutional practices. The newcomer’s ultimate motivation is to fit in initially and maximize status and prestige over time while avoiding social exclusion, shaming, and dissonance arising from inconsistencies between institutional norms/expectations and their own actions. Certain institutional designs and interaction styles are more conducive to successful socialization. The authority structure, its distribution among members, decision-making rules, and initial preferences and values all play a significant role on the outcome of socialization.
No systematic study of socialization within the EMP along these lines is yet available. Clearly, some southern Mediterranean states perceive the distribution of influence within the EMP as skewed towards the EU. After all, the EU conceived and launched this process, pivoting it on the "triple logic" that is shared by some but not all southern Mediterranean states’ represented in the EMP. Yet, internal differences among both southern Mediterranean and EU states caution against a simple categorization of the EU as persuader, and southern Mediterranean states as persuadees.\textsuperscript{18} Domestic actors in each case can influence when and whether state representatives stand at one or the other side of the persuasion process. For instance, different economic groups within the same country may push for competing positions regarding what persuasion should be all about. Even actors sharing the merits of a particular logic (economic liberalization, for instance) may resist socializing others into a position that could weaken their own interests (Morocco and Turkey had concerns that the EMP process could have adverse consequences for their own bilateral relations with the EU). These observations suggest that studies of socialization in international institutions may benefit from closer attention to domestic distributional perspectives.

It is quite likely that negotiations within the EMP reflect, in a general sense, the EU’s internal order, layers of authority, and institutional mechanisms, more than a mutually negotiated structure (Smith, 2000). It is possible that some amount of socialization into the triple logic has taken place, and it is also possible that some progress in socialization has not improved cooperative practices.\textsuperscript{19} It may also be the case that the EMP process has not directed enough attention to the social interaction environment or that initial values and preferences were so far apart that any efforts at socialization are extremely difficult if not doomed. Even a

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\textsuperscript{18} A Jordanian diplomat expressed the lack of a common position on the part of Southern Mediterranean partners quite succinctly when he said: “Barcelona will be the European Union facing 12 countries, each with its own agenda and not listening to the others” (Whiteman, 2001).
\textsuperscript{19} Many have argued, for instance, that the EU has not been as committed to socialization into democratic institutions.
\end{flushleft}
common cultural background would not have guaranteed successful socialization into common purposes, as the case of the Arab League over 60 years suggests. All these caveats notwithstanding, the tragic events of 9/11 and the 2003 war with Iraq compel increased efforts to build trust and strengthen dialogue among EMP partners.

V. Conclusions

Our overview of institutional theory provides different windows into the EMP’s conception and process. At a very fundamental level, the EU approach reflects the triumph of internationalizing coalitions in member states. From this perspective, the core interests of most important constituencies are reflected in the elaboration of the EMP’s "triple logic." At the same time, EU states retain different mixes of backlash constituencies that hinder the "triple logic" itself. Agricultural protectionism, prominent in French politics albeit not uniquely so, lie at one extreme. Cultural and ethnic purists in many EU states help deepen mistrust and dilute commitment to the EMP as well. On the southern Mediterranean states side, internationalizing coalitions are generally feeble and frequently threatened by extensive backlash forces with political, economic, and religious agendas that reject the "triple logic." However, there are significant differences in the degree of economic and political reform between members like Turkey or Jordan on the one hand, and Syria on the other. Furthermore, internationalizing constituencies in the southern Mediterranean states are sometimes weakened by the EU no less than by their own backlash oppositions. MEDA support pales relative to the significant economic relief that might result from removing EU agricultural protectionist barriers. At the same time, making the process of economic reform in the southern Mediterranean states contingent on EU policies may doom internationalizing efforts in the SM, whereas other opportunities exist. Integration into a global trading and investment regime has inherent advantages, particularly if accompanied with sensible and equitable privatization procedures and social safety nets. The energies of southern Mediterranean states, NGOs, and economic
entrepreneurs should retain a focus on internationalization and global multilateral institutions. Southern Mediterranean states constituencies can find numerous allies in their effort to socialize EU members into the recognition that the EU's agricultural policies may well constitute the greatest threat to Mediterranean security.

Democracy, economic reform, and multilateral cooperation do not obtain automatically, linearly, or inevitably, as was expected at the inception of the post Cold-War order. They can only result from concerted activities of political leaders, in government and in opposition, and of the societal forces that back them up. Socialization into the value of democratic institutions is intrinsic to this process. Leaders of southern Mediterranean states confront a dilemma: they either phase this multifaceted process of change in or run the risk of being themselves phased out by it. Which will take place is hard to foresee. The first option has a second-order dilemma folded unto it: leaders seem deadlocked between “democratic efficiency” arguments (democratization can facilitate economic reform and help build new political coalitions to overcome opponents of economic reform) and "authoritarian advantage" models, illustrated by China and the East Asian tigers (Pool, 1993; Harik, 1994; Norton, 1995). Predictions about which model might prevail are hindered by what Kuran (1991) labelled “the predictability of unpredictability” or the imperfect observability of real private preferences under authoritarian rule, a phenomenon that foiled predictions of Eastern European democratization and economic reform as well.

A related dilemma for southern Mediterranean states’ leaders (and some secular oppositional constituencies as well) is the perceived "theocracy trap," fueled by the fear--evident in the Algerian case--that democratization may not lead to democracy but to Islamic theocracies. This fear may be exaggerated, considering that political inclusion of Islamist groups (where practiced, as in Jordan) appears to have led to diminishing political returns for Islamist movements, in the form of stable--and at times even declining--electoral gains. Iran, although in the "outer ring," may also constitute a promising path to more democratic institutions, although
the latter are still forcefully resisted by powerful backlash forces among clerics, military, and state enterprises. The challenge to avoid the Algerian debacle remains: strong institutional arrangements must be designed to protect the integrity of the democratic system so that even a small plurality of votes cannot undermine democratic continuity. The EMP may have thus far underplayed socialization into Western models of church-state separation, for obvious reasons. In any event, dialogue and persuasion within southern Mediterranean societies seem far more important in bringing about an accommodation that also protects individual (prominently gender) rights. This "battle for the minds" is more compelling after 9/11 than anytime before.

As if the EMP did not face enough difficulties since its inception, the war with Iraq and the presence of US forces in the heart of the Arab world add new complexities and uncertainties. It is far too early to tell what will be the implications for Iraq of the operation of the "triple logic," let alone their second and third order effects within the region. In particular, the effects of the rift between the US and some European leaders during the war have continued to undermine the development of a common purpose on the reconstruction of Iraq. This will require enhanced efforts within EMP structures to strengthen mechanisms likely to enhance the prospects of successful economic, political, and social reform in Iraq.

Finally, the EU has played a central role in the so-called "quartet" process to help nudge the Israel/Palestine conflict towards some accommodation. On the one hand, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an important variable—although clearly not the only barrier—to advancing the Barcelona process. On the other hand, all the dilemmas involving coalitions and the "triple logic" identified above cast their shadow on this conflict, turning it into a microcosm of the broader themes raised in this chapter. As of late 2003, whether or not this microcosm can be nested in the "triple logic" that underlies the macro Mediterranean framework remains uncertain. The viability of the EMP may partially hang on this balance.
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