
A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

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The dissertation of Ana María Varela-Lago is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm:

Chair

University of California, San Diego

2008
For Estrella and James
Pure Spaniards are totally apart from other races and very little understood, and to have this heritage and at the same time to have been born in the United States is in itself a cause for psychological contradictions and “complexes.”

Mercedes de Acosta, *Here Lies the Heart*

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No obstante su españolidad, John, Luis y Maximino son auténticos norteamericanos; autenticidad que brinda este originalísimo país y continente del mestizo; mestizaje no sólo de raza o color epidérmico, sino que de culturas e idiosincrasias.

*España Libre*, 1963
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<td>ACLU</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACLURB</td>
<td>American Civil Liberties Union Papers. ACLU Archives: the Roger Baldwin years, 1917-1950</td>
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<td>AFSD</td>
<td>American Friends of Spanish Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGA-MAE</td>
<td>Archivo General de la Administración (Alcalá de Henares), Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Embajada Washington</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGA-PG-SGM-DNSE</td>
<td>Archivo General de la Administración, Presidencia del Gobierno, Secretaría General del Movimiento, Delegación Nacional del Servicio Exterior de Falange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGP</td>
<td>Archivo General del Palacio Real (Madrid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCSE</td>
<td>Boletín del Consejo Superior de Emigración</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAE</td>
<td>Comité Antifascista Español</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFU</td>
<td>Comités Femeninos Unidos</td>
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<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>Daily Worker (New York)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>España Republicana (New York)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Frente Popular (New York)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAEAB</td>
<td>Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (Madrid), Archivo de Burgos</td>
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<td>MAEAH</td>
<td>Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (Madrid), Archivo Histórico</td>
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<td>MAEAR</td>
<td>Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (Madrid), Archivo Renovado</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBASD</td>
<td>Medical Bureau to Aid Spanish Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Archives, Washington, D. C.</td>
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

NACASD North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy

NYT New York Times

SCWOHP Spanish Civil War Oral History Project. University of South Florida Library (Tampa). Special Collections

SHC Sociedades Hispanas Confederadas

TDT Tampa Daily Times

TMT Tampa Morning Tribune

USFLSC University of South Florida Library (Tampa), Special Collections
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Conquerors, Immigrants, Exiles:
The Spanish Diaspora in the United States (1848-1948)

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in History

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Professor Pamela B. Radcliff, Chair

This dissertation studies the modern migration of Spaniards to the United States and the process of identity formation among the Spanish immigrant communities in America from the U.S.-Mexican War to the aftermath of World War II. The starting point underscores one of its main arguments: the impetus for the development of a Spanish ethnic identity among Spaniards in nineteenth-century America was U.S. expansionism in Mexico and the Caribbean. Confronted with American and Cuban nationalism, Spanish immigrant elites in some cases “invented” national traditions even before they were embraced in the homeland. Using a transnational framework that foregrounds the complex historical relationships between Spain, Latin America, and the United States the thesis highlights the singularity of the Spanish immigrant experience in America, rooted in the legacy of the Spanish “discovery” and colonization of the Americas. This legacy offered Spanish immigrant elites the symbolic tools they needed to forge a Spanish ethnic identity in the United States.
The idea of Spain and Spanish identity favored by these nineteenth-century elites, however, held less appeal for the increasing numbers of immigrants from Spain arriving at American shores in the twentieth century. Sub-national and supra-national loyalties defined many of these newcomers, some of whom espoused anarchism or supported separatist movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Their anticlericalism and their repudiation of Spain’s colonial wars in Morocco countered the elite’s imperial image of monarchic, Catholic Spain. This analysis helps us understand the diaspora’s enthusiasm for the proclamation of the Spanish Republic in 1931, as well as the immigrants’ overwhelming response when the Republic was attacked by General Franco’s military uprising in 1936. The unprecedented mobilization of the Spanish diaspora during the Spanish Civil War charted a singular path to Americanization. Most immigrant narratives point to World War II as one of the key moments in this process, but I argue that, in the Spanish case, the war in Spain played the crucial role. The circumstances of the war, however, complicated this process. For many Spaniards “becoming American” was not a voluntary choice, but one born of their transformation, after Franco’s victory, from emigrants into exiles
Introduction

The invisible Spanish immigrant

In 1948, Felipe Alfau closed his novel about Spaniards in New York with the narrator pondering “whether my ancestors were but immigrants disguised as conquerors, or whether all other aliens are but conquerors disguised as immigrants.”1 The remark sums up an essential tension in the Spanish diasporic experience in the Americas, a tension born of the contrast between the glories of Spain’s imperial past and her inglorious national present. The experience of decline and decadence was not unique to Spain. A character in Alfau’s novel pointed to the plight of immigrants from Greece and China, once the sites of splendid ancient civilizations, but the narrator felt compelled to reflect upon the historical associations that made the Spaniards’ case “especially sad and poignant.” “After all,” he explained, “they were the discoverers of this new world.”2 By 1948, a new wave of Spanish expatriates, exiles and refugees from the Spanish Civil War, had added another element to Alfau’s initial dichotomy, albeit one intimately connected with it. The war itself had been framed by the military leaders who rose against the Republic in 1936 as a “crusade” to restore the country to the grandeur of the Spain of the Catholic Kings, the patrons of Columbus’s voyages.3

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1 Felipe Alfau, Chromos (Elmwood Park, Ill: Dalkey Archives Press, 1990), 348. Born in Barcelona in 1902, Felipe Alfau emigrated with his family to the United States at the age of 14. His first novel, Locos, appeared in 1936. He finished Chromos in 1948, but having failed to find a publisher, he decided to stop writing. The novel was finally published in 1990, becoming one of that year’s finalists for the National Book Award. Alfau died in New York in 1999. For a discussion of Alfau’s life and writings, see the special issue of The Review of Contemporary Fiction 13 (Spring 1993).
2 Ibid., 16.
3 The word “crusade” was first used in a pastoral letter by the Bishop of Salamanca in September 1936. Paul Preston, Franco (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 184-185.
This dissertation studies the migration of Spaniards to the United States and explores how the memory of the conquest shaped the Spanish diasporic imagination in nineteenth- and twentieth-century America. The research is framed within a period that defined the changing relationship between the two countries: from the rivalry created by American expansionism in the 1840s, which would culminate in the Spanish-American war of 1898, to the beginning of the cooperation that would mark Spain as a key ally in American Cold War politics in the late 1940s. While the study of the Spanish diaspora reproduces, to some degree, a familiar story of the European immigrant experience in America, I will argue that the legacy of Spain’s imperial past, her turbulent modern national history, and the peculiar relationship of the Spanish immigrants to Spain, the United States, and Latin America make this a case-study of special significance.

Like the English and Scottish migrants studied by Charlotte Erickson, Spaniards too may be regarded as invisible immigrants, if for different reasons. Lost between the histories of early conquistadores and padres and the recent wave of Spanish cultural exports from Julio Iglesias to Antonio Banderas and Penélope Cruz, the Spanish immigrant experience in the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is practically unknown. Statistically, Spanish migration represented only a

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small portion of the total of European migration to the United States in this period. Yet, despite its small numbers, the Spanish immigrant experience is particularly relevant to current debates on transnational and post-colonial studies. Specifically, this dissertation seeks to contribute to three interrelated areas: migration/diaspora studies, ethnic/Latino(a) studies, and American/Spanish cultural studies.

My study of the Spanish diaspora in the United States uses a transnational approach rooted in the seminal work of Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc. These authors proposed the term transnationalism to describe “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement.” Transmigrants, they explained, are persons who “take actions, make decisions, and develop subjectivities and identities embedded in networks of relationships that connect them simultaneously to two or more nation-states.”6 A number of scholars have called attention to the term’s emphasis on the nation-state and national borders to the detriment of other frameworks...
(like colonies vis-a-vis metropolis or internal migrations within a state). Following this critique, I have used “transnational” broadly to include networks across nation-states as well as within a state (i.e. peninsular Spain and her colonies).

The research on transnationalism, in turn, has led to the reconceptualization of diaspora studies. Once a term referring almost exclusively to the traumatic loss of homeland, exodus and exile of Jews and Armenians, in the 1990s its meaning expanded to encompass a wide variety of migratory experiences. In the inaugural issue of the journal Diaspora, in 1991, Khachig Tölöyan explains that the noun “now shares meanings with a larger semantic domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guestworker, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community.” As with transnationalism, scholars continue to debate the most accurate definition and categorization of “diaspora.” Some, like William Safran and Robin Cohen, propose a number of descriptive typologies. Others, like James Clifford, argue that such an effort may bind, and, to some degree, denaturalize the very fluid and dynamic nature of the diasporic experience. Clifford also questions the emphasis

placed on binary relationships between diaspora and homeland and diaspora and host society. He calls instead for a shift in focus to “the lateral axes of diaspora,” that is, the networks that connect the same diasporic community across different territories. Similarly, he points to the importance of the creation of “new solidarities” as different diasporas may join to develop a common identity with respect to a shared experience in the host country.  

The Spanish case illustrates the fluidity of the diaspora described by Clifford. From the 1840s to the 1940s, Spaniards traveled the transnational landscape between Europe and the Americas as colonial officials, soldiers, merchants, workers, artists, intellectuals, and political exiles, among others. Through it all, as the concluding remark in Alfau’s novel suggested, the memory of the original diaspora of the conquistadores would serve to establish the basis upon which later diasporas could be imagined. During the period of mass migration, for example, it was a common trope of Spanish public discourse that, unlike other Europeans, Spaniards did not leave their land due to economic hardship, but were only fulfilling the “sense of adventure” instilled in their “race” by the conquistadores. In 1939, as General Franco celebrated his victory over the Republic in the Spanish Civil War, the editor of the New York pro-Republican Spanish daily La Voz reminded its readers, “the path opened by the Discovery and the Conquest has been followed many times by the emigrants.” This path, he continued, referring to the Spanish republican refugees, was now open to the “Spanish patriots penned in concentration camps in France.”

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11 “España en América,” La Voz, 1 April 1939, 7. (Unless otherwise stated, all translations are by the author).
Emigration and exile have been two defining experiences of the history of modern Spain, but the trend in Spanish historiography has been to study them as separate phenomena. Chronologically, research on Spanish emigration to the Americas has focused on the period of “mass migration,” beginning in 1880 and ending with the onset of the economic depression in 1930, while studies of the Spanish exile are framed within the establishment of the Francoist dictatorship (1939-1975). This chronological structure creates a significant gap in our understanding of the diaspora. Moreover, Spanish exile studies have concentrated on the political and cultural elites. Less is known about how the masses of “regular people” experienced this exile, or how political and economic circumstances predating the war may have sown the seeds of an exile mentality in the diaspora.

Within the literature of this exodus little has been said about the war’s impact on the lives of the more than two million Spaniards already living abroad when it broke out. Yet, I would argue, the outcome of the conflict made exiles not only of the Spaniards who had fought General Franco in the peninsula, but also of a sizable majority of the Spanish residents in the United States, who had wholeheartedly supported the Republic during the three years of fighting. Gustavo Jiménez’s remarks on the Spanish community of Tampa, Florida, could be applied to most of the immigrant communities across the country: “a lot of Spaniards came over with the

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12 For a recent study that argues that the “culture of exile” is a defining trait of modern Spanish culture, see Henry Kamen, The Dishinherited: The Exiles Who Created Spanish Culture (London: Allen Lane, 2007).
idea of going back . . . and when they saw Franco take over, they figured: ‘We’re not
getting back.’”

For many, Franco’s victory represented the final push towards acquiring American citizenship. Jiménez, the grandson of the last consul of the Spanish Republic in Tampa, remembered “people getting information for citizenship papers almost constantly.” Determined not to recognize Franco’s regime, the members of the Spanish mutual aid societies in Tampa changed their bylaws, and declared the stars and stripes their only official flag. Anticipating Franco’s naming of a new consul, members of the Centro Español voted to strike from its statutes the article that conferred honorary membership on the Spanish official representative. This was a remarkable decision for an institution that had been founded in 1892, the emblematic year of the Columbian Centennial, to defend Spaniards and Spanishness in the heart of one of the most active strongholds of Cuban insurgency in the United States. In the late 1800s, Spaniards in the United States were among the staunchest defenders of Spain’s colonial rule in the Americas; by the 1930s, they overwhelmingly rejected the imperial aspirations of General Franco and the Falange party. How did this transformation take place? To understand this process we need to examine the changing nature of the Spanish diaspora and of the relationship between the diaspora and the Spanish state.

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13 Dr. Gustavo R. Jiménez, interview by author, 3 February 1997, Tampa, Florida, tape recording, SCWOHP, Tampa.
14 Ibid.
15 Centro Asturiano de Tampa, Junta General, 24 April 1939, Centro Asturiano Papers, USFLSC; “El Centro Español acordó eliminar los privilegios que a los cónsules se concedían,” La Gaceta, 20 May 1939, 1.
Like the nation, the diaspora also constitutes an imagined community.

Benedict Anderson’s groundbreaking study on the cultural origins of nationalism examined the role that the printing press, particularly through the production of the novel and the newspaper, played in this process of imagination.\textsuperscript{16} My dissertation uses the immigrant press and immigrant literary production to analyze this complex process of identity formation within the Spanish diaspora. In fact, among the immigrant press in the late nineteenth-century United States there were, together with Spanish-language publications, two Basque newspapers (the Escualdun Gazeta and California’ko Eskual Herria) and a monthly Catalan magazine (La Llumanera de Nova York).\textsuperscript{17} These examples illustrate the relevance of Clifford’s “lateral axes of diaspora,” as these groups imagined themselves as belonging to regional diasporas that extended from the peninsula to Basque and Catalan communities in other parts of the Americas.

The absence of a strong national identity may be considered an additional factor—together with their relatively small numbers—in helping to explain the invisibility of Spaniards among studies of migration to the United States. For most of the period studied in this dissertation, the region and the locality, not the nation, constituted the main source of identity among Spaniards—a reality captured in the

\textsuperscript{17} La Llumanera, published in New York from 1874 to 1881, has been hailed as the first Catalan magazine in the Americas. The short-lived Escualdun Gazeta began publication in California in 1885 disappearing after the third issue. Its owner claimed it to be the first ever Basque newspaper. California’ko Eskual Herria was published from 1893 to 1898. Javier Díaz Noci, “Historia del periodismo en lengua vasca de los Estados Unidos: dos semanarios de Los Angeles en el siglo XIX,” \textit{Zer: Revista de Estudios de Comunicación} 10 (May 2001). Available at http://www.ehu.es/zer/zer10/diaznoci.html.
expression *patria chica* (little fatherland). Other European immigrants, most notably Italians, maintained a strong sense of regional and village loyalty (*campanilismo*) while living abroad.\(^{18}\) But, unlike Italy, which did not become a nation until 1870, Spain was one of the oldest nation-states in Europe. Yet, paraphrasing Eugen Weber, the modern Spanish state did not succeed in transforming “peasants into Spaniards.”\(^{19}\) The strength of these sub-national identities among Spanish immigrants made for an intriguing entry in the *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, which declared that “immigrants from Spain [had] not functioned as a traditional ethnic group.” The *Encyclopedia* remarked that “the expression of ethnic heritage takes the form established in Spain—the expression of one of Spain’s several, not always harmonious, constituent cultures.”\(^{20}\)

While it is true that immigrants from Spain often thought of themselves as Asturians, Basques, Galicians or Catalans, this dissertation focuses also on their efforts to create a “Spanish” identity by looking at their promotion of *hispanismo*. From Fredrick Pike’s classic work *Hispanismo* in 1971 to Isidro Sepulveda’s *El sueño de la Madre Patria* (*The Dream of the Fatherland*) in 2005, *hispanismo* has been portrayed as an extension of Spanish nationalism developed in contraposition to

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American imperialism in the wake of 1898. More recently, Christopher Schmidt-Nowara has shifted the emphasis, from “the loss of the colonies” to “the colonies themselves,” and has maintained that nationalism and colonialism were intimately related, and that “the persistence of colonial rule in the Caribbean and Pacific brought together the disparate regions of metropolitan Spain.” This dissertation argues that colonialism also contributed to bringing together the disparate elements of the Spanish diaspora in America. In response to growing Cuban and American national sentiment in the late nineteenth century, Spaniards in the United States sought to fashion a Spanish national ethnic identity that would balance their stronger regional and local identities. In the process, they developed their own set of “invented traditions,” such as the commemoration of Miguel de Cervantes, even before these became part of the national vocabulary of the homeland.

The outcome of the Spanish-Cuban-American war of 1898 and the emergence of the United States as an imperial power contributed to a more positive portrayal of the legacy of Spanish colonialism in the Americas. Defined by Fredrick Pike as a movement which propounds “the existence of a transatlantic Hispanic family,

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24 I borrow the term from Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). The authors define said invention as “a process of formalization and ritualization, characterized by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition.” p. 4.
community, or raza (race),” 25 hispanismo was embraced not only by Spanish
intellectuals, but by many of their Latin American counterparts, as well. 26 Perhaps
more important for the purposes of this dissertation is a parallel development taking
place in the United States at the time: the evolution of Hispanism or Hispanic Studies
as an academic discipline. Scholars from a variety of fields have written on the
historiography of American Hispanism and have examined its particular relevance to
the study of the Southwest and the development of the “Spanish fantasy past” in the
1910s and 1920s. 27 Building upon this literature, I analyze the role played in these
processes by the Spanish diaspora in America. I argue that the immigrant elite
embraced Hispanism as a tool to forge a Spanish ethnic identity in the United States.

Spaniards fit uncomfortably under the labels “Hispanic” or “Latino,” the ones
most commonly used in the United States to refer to Spanish-speaking populations. Of
course, they are not the only group to take issue with those labels for conflating
significant differences among distinct national and ethnic groups. 28 But, these
categories are more blurred when they are applied to peninsular Spaniards. A couple

25 Pike, Hispanismo, 1. Pike’s concept of hispanismo encompasses also movements known as
hispanoamericanismo and panhispanismo.
26 Perhaps the best known among them is the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó, whose 1900 influential
essay Ariel praised the idealism of Hispanic culture (Ariel) against the materialism of Anglo-Saxon
culture (Calibán).
States (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002) provide an excellent analysis of the history of North
American Hispanism. On how Hispanic contributed to the historiography of the American West see,
for example, Benjamin Keen, “Main Currents in United States Writings on Colonial Spanish America,
Spanish Legacy in North America and the Historical Imagination,” The Western Historical Quarterly
23, 1 (February 1992): 4-24. The literature on the “Spanish fantasy past” is too vast to mention here.
For a recent and comprehensive study of how it has shaped the culture and memory of Southern
California see, Phoebe S. Kropp, California Vieja. Culture and Memory in a Modern American Place
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).
28 For an analysis of the problematic nature of these ethnic labels see, Suzanne Oboler, Ethnic Labels,
Latino Lives. Identity and the Politics of (Re)Presentation in the United States (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1995).
of recent works illustrate this conceptual ambiguity. In *The Hispanic 100: A Ranking of the Latino Men and Women Who Have most Influenced American Thought and Culture*, Himilce Novas uses the terms Latino and Hispanic interchangeably. Under those labels are included about a dozen people either born in Spain or born in the United States of Spanish parents. Novas refers to this subgroup as “Iberians, or people of direct Spanish descent.” But a few lines later, explaining the meaning of the term “Anglo,” Novas states: “originally, Anglo meant an American of English descent. However, today the term refers to any American of European descent” (my emphasis). U.S.-born children of Spanish parents might therefore be considered, according to this definition, “Anglos.”

Another book, *The Latino Reader*, illustrates the invisibility of the contemporary Spanish immigrant presence in the United States. This work, which highlights Latino literary production in the United States from 1542 to the present, includes among its precursors the writings of Spanish conquistadores and padres like Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca and Francisco Palóu. Yet, its pages grow silent on the literary work of first- and second-generation Spanish-Americans like Mercedes de Acosta, Felipe Alfau, Prudencio de Pereda, or José Yglesias. Of the three, perhaps

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Yglesias (of mixed Cuban-Spanish parentage) might have felt most comfortable with the label Latino. “Latin” was the self-described term used by the tight-knit immigrant community in his native Tampa to differentiate Italians, Cubans, and Spaniards, from the “Americanos.” Felipe Alfau, who arrived in the United States from Spain at the age of fourteen, coined a new term to refer to Spanish immigrants in the United States. Combining the roots of the two words (American and Spaniard), he dubbed them Americaniards.31

Despite these conceptual difficulties, Latino scholarship provides a useful context in which to situate the Spanish diaspora in the United States. Building on the groundbreaking work of borderland studies, the “transnational turn” in American and Literary Studies has contributed to opening the door to a broader and fuller understanding of the American experience and the role of Spanish-speaking communities in shaping it.32 Most of the research in the New American Studies is Trans/InterAmerican and hemispheric in nature, but the study of the Spanish diaspora in the United States can also contribute to these discussions. Kristen Silva Gruesz’s influential book on nineteenth-century Latino cultural production in the United States is a model of analysis of these rich transamerican connections. Discussing the Hispanophone press in New Orleans, she describes an anti-imperialist discourse against the Mexican war and Cuban annexation which echoes similar sentiments expressed by the Spanish-speaking press of New York studied in this dissertation.

31 The Spanish rendition of the term would be “Americañoles.” Alfau, Chromos, 13-14.
While peninsular Spaniards were ambivalent about their “Hispanic” identity, they did share with Latin Americans a concern about the imperial designs of the United States, and, much like Hispanics elsewhere, they were also the target of North American prejudices and stereotyping, often cast in racial terms.33

Race is a necessary complement to the study of Spanish ethnicity in the United States. Españoles may have been at the top of the totem pole of the “pigmentocracy” described by Omar Santiago Valerio-Jiménez in the American southwest, but as far as the Anglo-Saxon elite was concerned, their whiteness was “of a different color” as Matthew Frye Jacobson’s insightful study proclaims.34 Jacobson’s argument that the process of Americanization of the immigrants required them also to “become Caucasian” applies to a number of European groups. For its part, María de Guzmán’s study on “the uses of representations of Spain in the creation of an Anglo-American identity” claims that the racialization of the Spaniard was crucial to the development of an Anglo-American ethnic (and imperial) identity. De Guzmán presents the figure of the Spaniard in Anglo-American literature as “the not-right-white, or the off-white.” She argues that “the drama of the repulsion of and attraction to figures of Spain has evolved to include Latinas/os and the Spanish language itself,” and calls on scholars to explore the links between Spanish and Latino identity. These, she explains, are “largely unexamined because of the lingering effects of the Black Legend against

Spain in both Anglo-American and Latina/o criticism.” This dissertation seeks to contribute to bridging this gap by exploring these connections.

In fact, the mobilization in support of the Republic during the Spanish Civil War contributed to forging a stronger bond between Spanish immigrants and the larger Hispanic/Latino community, and it helps to explain why Spaniards were not receptive to the imperial message emanating from Franco’s nationalist discourse. As one of the Spanish Republican leaders wrote about his visit to the Cuban Club in Tampa in 1937, “the Cuban Club brought me memories of the Cuban war for independence, where Martí found his death at the hands of Spaniards of the same ilk as those who launched the war against this Spain of 1936, which, like the Cuba of 1898, wants to be free.”

This dissertation explores how the legacy of Spanish colonialism in America contributed to shaping the Spanish diaspora in the United States. The study begins in the mid-nineteenth century, when Spain was still an imperial power. Spaniards in the United States, laborers as well as commercial and professional elites, were part of a broader colonial diaspora whose networks reached from the peninsula to the United States.


States and the Caribbean. Chapter one shows that this diaspora was not monolithic, however. It was divided by class and political ideology, as well as along regional lines. In this chapter I use the heretofore untapped nineteenth-century Spanish immigrant press as a window through which to analyze these internal divisions. I argue that what helped to forge a sense of Spanishness among these diverse groups at the end of the nineteenth century was a defensive response to American expansionism and the growing nationalist claims of Cuban expatriates residing in the United States.

In chapter two, I examine the efforts of the community’s leaders to develop an ethnic identity that would compare favorably to other ethnic immigrant communities taking shape at the time. Specifically, I analyze the celebration of two commemorations intimately linked with the Spanish conquest and Spanish heritage in the Americas: Cervantes Day, in the 1870s, and Columbus Day, in the 1890s. The Columbian Centennial in particular offered Spanish immigrants an opportunity to integrate themselves into the narrative of American history while defending Spanish rule in the Caribbean. Yet, the celebrations also highlighted some important differences between the two countries which would end up at war in 1898.

Chapter three explores the transformation of the Spanish diaspora in the aftermath of the Spanish-Cuban-American war. The renewed efforts of the immigrant elite to forge a Spanish ethnic identity in the United States following the war met with more success, in part because of the surprising American embrace of the country’s Spanish heritage. In this chapter I analyze the contribution of the Spanish immigrant elite to the development of Hispanic Studies in the United States. I also explore how the elite and the Spanish state used America’s fascination with the “Spanish past” to
promote a conservative/imperial brand of Spanish nationalism and national identity in
the peninsula, particularly during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera.

There were limits, however, to the usefulness of this brand of hispanism in defining a Spanish-American identity. In its portrayal of Spain as a land populated by sultry black-eyed señoritas and swashbuckling caballeros, the “Spanish fantasy past” promoted the orientalization of the country, to use Edward Said’s term.\(^{37}\) It presented Spanish society as bound in tradition, and it overstated the popularity of certain institutions, above all the monarchy. At the same time, this view of Spain downplayed the dynamism and complexity of Spanish society which would lead to the establishment of the Republic in the 1930s. In a similar fashion, this discourse also papered over the divisions and complexity within the diaspora itself, as described in the second half of the dissertation.

Chapter four examines the changes brought about in the diaspora as Spanish immigration to the United States grew in numbers and diversity in the aftermath of the war. While the colonial geography that had determined occupation and patterns of settlement in the nineteenth century was still relevant in the twentieth, the arrival of growing numbers of Spanish immigrants to fulfill the labor needs of the expanding American economy offered new challenges to the development of a united Spanish diaspora. Chapter five analyzes these challenges in more detail. It argues that the imperial undercurrent of the conquistador discourse with its traditional and conservative version of Spanish national identity did not go unchallenged. It proved a

weak contender against the local, regional and internationalist loyalties of the diaspora.

This analysis helps us understand why the Republic held so much appeal for Spaniards in America. Over the course of several decades, they had struggled against the discourses that represented Spain as the “other.” The Republic, with its emphasis in uniting with the Americas “through the bonds of republicanism to march together on the path of progress and civilization,” as its first president proclaimed in a speech aimed at the diaspora, offered an opportunity for migrants to reconcile the two halves of their ethnic identity, which for a long time had appeared to be at odds. The change of regime entailed a reexamination of civic rights and duties, as it undertook the transformation of Spaniards from subjects into citizens. This chapter provides the framework through which to understand the migrants' response to the military rising in 1936 and their support of the Republic not only during the war but also after its defeat in 1939.

The Spanish Civil War deeply transformed the experience of Spanish immigrants in the United States. Of course, the international dimensions of the conflict made the struggle relevant not only to Spaniards. As Allen Guttmann indicates, “no public event of the years between 1919 and 1939--excepting the Great Depression itself--moved Americans as did this Spanish conflict.” In fact, I would argue that the very relevance of this conflict for Americans contributed to creating an unprecedented

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38 “Discurso de Alcalá Zamora por radio,” *ER* (May 1931), 3.  
public space in which Spaniards joined groups and institutions outside their own communities in a common effort to support their homeland.

The war in Spain shaped the process of identity formation for the second generation, encouraging pride in their heritage as it helped ease the transition into American society. For the first generation, however, the war and its outcome presented a more complex set of meanings. Their activism in the 1930s did help to pave the way, after Franco’s victory, for their eventual, if reluctant in some cases, integration into American society, but many also struggled with their transformation from emigrants into exiles. In November 1939, *Frente Popular*, the organ of the *Sociedades Hispanas Confederadas* (Confederation of Spanish Societies) which had supported the Republican cause, changed its name to *España Libre*, pledging to keep up the struggle for the restoration of a free and democratic Spain. Relying on the unpaid volunteer work of its editors and on contributions from Republican exiles and sympathizers in the United States and Latin America the newspaper continued publication for the next four decades, outliving the dictatorship, which ended with Franco’s death in November 1975.
Defending *Cuba española*:
The “Cuban question” and the Spanish diaspora in nineteenth-century America

In the early morning of October 12, 1866, a crowd gathered around the Brooklyn jailhouse to witness the execution of two Spaniards found guilty of murdering a Cuban man. Despite the inclement weather, the *New York Times* reported, “for an hour or two the Myrtle-avenue cars were crowded with passengers whose curiosity led them to the scene.” Four hundred people squeezed in the yard where the gallows stood. Outside, two or three hundred more “stood and shivered in their wet clothes, gazing at the stone walls.” The expectant crowd had followed the story of the murder and the trial of the criminals in the local press for almost a year.¹ There, the gruesome details of the stabbing of the victim added to the outrage at the cowardly nature of the crime--the Spaniards had befriended the newly-arrived Cuban seeking to steal his money. As the *Times* reporter recounted, “its entire freedom from revenge, its absolute money-making nature, rendered its atrocity more than ordinarily conspicuous, and its details more than ordinarily revolting.” He concluded, somewhat hyperbolically, “probably no murder more atrocious in its every aspect than this . . . assassination was ever committed.”²

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¹ “The Double Execution,” *NYT*, 13 October 1866, 8. The Spaniards were José González Fernández, from Madrid, and Francisco Gener Salvador (aka Pellicier), from Barcelona. The victim was José García Otero, from Cárdenas. Details of the case can be found in the *New York Times* from November 24, 1865 onward.

² “Local Intelligence. The Otero Murder,” *NYT*, 28 January 1866, 8 (first quote); “The Double Execution,” *NYT*, 13 October 1868, 8 (second quote).
That the criminals were foreigners who had thus “abused . . . the hospitality of the country and . . . shocked the sense of security of . . . its people,” added to the sense of public indignation, as the judge manifested in his sentencing. But what made the crime particularly heinous, in the eyes of the district attorney seeking the death penalty for José González, was “the fact that the prisoner and his victim were in a strange land . . . that they spoke the same language, and sprung from a common origin.”

Interestingly, González’s attorney used a similar reasoning to defend his client’s innocence. He argued that the cultural and national bonds between the accused and the victim were stronger than the class divisions which separated them and which, under other circumstances, might have helped explain the crime. “Notwithstanding one of them was rich and the other poor,” he declared, “community of language, of nationality and of habit bound them very closely to each other among a strange and singular people.”

Indeed, the bonds between the two groups, Cubans and peninsular Spaniards, were rooted in centuries of contact, and had survived the wars which had separated Spain and her former Latin American colonies at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But, by mid-century, the national and cultural bonds that these American officials took for granted were rapidly being eroded. It was precisely in the United States where this erosion became most evident. As Spanish colonial policies on the island caused the number of Cuban expatriates leaving for North America to swell, the

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3 “The Otero Murder Trial,” *NYT*, 17 January 1866, 2
4 “The Otero Murder Trial,” *NYT*, 18 January 1866, 2. The recent trauma of the American Civil War may help explain the resonance of this argument in a country that was trying to heal its own divisions and reestablish a stronger national bond among its members.
United States became the ground where the tensions between Cubans and Spaniards were played out.\(^5\)

This chapter examines how Spaniards in the United States responded to the threat posed to Spanish colonialism by Cuban nationalism. Several factors set the Spanish diaspora apart from other European immigrant groups. First and foremost was Spain’s (past and present) imperial presence in the Americas. Many of the Spanish communities in nineteenth-century America were still intimately linked to the colonial enterprise in the Caribbean. In fact, most of the Spaniards arriving at American shores at that time came to work for Spanish-owned firms.\(^6\) For these immigrants, the United States was not the end point of a migratory journey, but one step in a broader transnational network that encompassed Spain and her colonial possessions, as well as the Spanish-speaking American republics.

A second important characteristic of the Spanish diaspora was the absence of a strong national identity and vocabulary emanating from the peninsula, which would serve as a point of reference for Spaniards overseas. As David Ringrose has argued in his study of the Spanish economy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Spain

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5 Historians and literary scholars have examined the role played by the émigré communities in the United States in shaping an emergent Cuban national identity in the mid-nineteenth century. The transnational body of literature produced by these exiles (pamphlets, books, and newspapers) was instrumental in creating a Cuban imagined community. See for example, Gerald E. Poyo, “With All, and for the Good of All.” The Emergence of Popular Nationalism in the Cuban Communities of the United States, 1848-1898 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989); Louis A. Pérez Jr., On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture (New York: Harper Collins, 1999); Rodrigo Lazo, Writing to Cuba. Filibustering and Cuban Exiles in the United States (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

6 Such was the case in the Spanish-owned cigar factories in New York, Florida, and Louisiana, but it applied to other firms as well. For example, in 1897, the Catalan firm L. Mundet & Son, manufacturers of cork products and bottle caps, opened a branch in New York. By 1920, it employed around 700 workers, most of them Spaniards, in three factories in Brooklyn, Ossining, and Claremont (New Jersey). “Don José Mundet ha fundado en los Estados Unidos muy grandes casas comerciales,” La Prensa, 2 April 1920, 1.
was “a collection of distinct, autonomous, and overlapping networks of regionally oriented activity, many of which extended beyond the political confines of the Spanish ‘nation.’” Spaniards in the United States were connected to communities stretching along the northern fringe of the peninsula, from Galicia to Catalonia. What prompted these regional networks to fashion themselves into a national diaspora was the combined effect of Cuban and American nationalisms.

In this chapter I analyze the Spanish press in late nineteenth-century New York to ascertain how Spanish immigrants in the United States tried to develop a “Spanish voice” in response to these movements. The impetus in newspaper production reflects a strengthening of the links between the homeland and the diaspora, which overwhelmingly supported Spanish rule in Cuba. While this support of Spanish colonialism provided a common ground among this diverse group, it was not enough to create a common identity. The range of publications produced by Spaniards in the following decades shows that the community was not monolithic in its analysis of the situation in Cuba and its possible solutions. In fact, the study of the Spanish press at this time brings to light the acrimony of the debates over who could claim the ownership of the “Spanish voice” in the United States. These debates are also

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7 David R. Ringrose, *Spain, Europe, and the “Spanish miracle,”* 1700-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10. The survival of the nation was a recurrent preoccupation of the turbulent nineteenth century in Spain, ominously bracketed between the Napoleonic invasion (1808) and the loss of the colonial empire ninety years later. In the intervening years, Spaniards experienced three civil wars between supporters of Ferdinand VII’s daughter, Isabella (Isabelinos) and those of his brother Carlos (Carlists) (1833-39, 1846-49, 1872-76), the dethronement of Isabella (1868), the abdication of her successor, Amadeo of Savoy (r. 1871-1873), a short-lived Republic (1873-1874) and the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy (1875). Spaniards also fought three wars in Cuba: the Ten Years’ War (1868-78), the Guerra Chiquita (Little War) (1878-79), and the Cuban War of Independence (1895-98).

8 My analysis focuses on the conservative newspapers *La Crónica* and *El Cronista*, the moderate *Las Novedades*, the progressive *El Progreso*, and the Catalan monthly *La Llumanera de Nova York*. I have not included here the Spanish anarchist press because anarchists opposed both Spanish and Cuban
illuminating in what they reveal about discussions over the very definition of Spanishness, what constituted a “good Spaniard,” and what role Spaniards should play in the diaspora.

**Spanish immigrants in nineteenth-century America**

In 1848, in the aftermath of American annexation of half of Mexico following the Mexican-American war, the Spanish newspaper *La Crónica* began publication in New York. The paper was printed twice-weekly in Manhattan, just a few blocks away from the offices of *La Verdad*, a newspaper established by the Cuban Junta of New York in January of that year which espoused Cuban annexation to the United States. Recalling the conditions that led to its founding, José Ferrer de Couto, a former editor of *La Crónica*, would later write that the paper had been financed with $25,000 offered by “fifty wealthy Spaniards from Havana” at a time “when circumstances of public notoriety made it indispensable to have here a newspaper which would watch for the security of the Antilles.”

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10 José Ferrer de Couto, *La verdad* (Nueva York: El Cronista, 1876), 5. *La Crónica*’s first issue appeared on November 1, 1848. Its editor was Antonio Javier San Martín. In 1855, San Martín left for Havana to work for the Spanish daily *Diario de la Marina*. Manuel Peña Cagigao edited *La Crónica*.
Before the 1840s, there had been neither the critical mass nor the need for Spaniards to justify the production of a specifically “Spanish” press. Although the Spanish presence in the United States dates back to the sixteenth century, Spanish immigrant communities of some size did not begin to take shape until the middle of the nineteenth century.\(^{11}\) In his study of immigrant New York, Robert Ernst states that “the few Hispanic peoples and Italians were too scattered in the 1820’s to form distinct communities.” By 1850, however, Spaniards, together with immigrants from Central and South America, were establishing enclaves in four wards of Lower Manhattan, and New York had the second highest number of Spanish residents in the country.\(^{12}\) Primacy of place belonged to Louisiana, which had seen its Spanish population increase significantly in the 1820s and 1830s due to the settlement in New Orleans of the *peninsulares* expelled from Mexico during the wars of independence.\(^{13}\)

Between 1850 and 1900, the number of Spaniards registered in the United States census doubled. Although these figures remained small, it is interesting to note that Spaniards were represented in all states of the Union except North Dakota. By

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\(^{11}\) Spanish migration prior to the nineteenth century includes the organized migration of Minorcans to Florida in 1768 and Canary Islanders to Louisiana in 1778. On these experiences see, Philip D. Rasico, *The Minorcans of Florida: Their History, Language and Culture* (New Smyrna Beach: Luthers, 1990), and Gilbert C. Din, *The Canary Islanders of Louisiana* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988).


\(^{13}\) Harold Dana Sims estimates that three quarters of Mexico’s Spaniards left the country between 1827 and 1834. Most went to New Orleans “since federal aid was authorized for the closest foreign port” and departing for a “port under Spanish domination prejudiced … the possibility of return to Mexico in the future.” Harold Dana Sims, *The Expulsion of Mexico’s Spaniards, 1821-1836* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 207.
1900, New York’s Spanish population was almost three times that of Louisiana, and Florida and California had overtaken the gulf state (see Table 1).

**Table 1**: Spanish population in the United States, 1850-1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1850</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>1,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3,113</td>
<td>5,121</td>
<td>6,185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike other European immigrant groups arriving at American shores at the time, the majority of Spaniards did not come to the United States directly from the Iberian peninsula, but were part of transnational networks that extended to Spain’s former American colonies and her possessions in the Caribbean. Many entered the country through the Gulf of Mexico, escaping anti-Spanish sentiment in Mexico and colonial unrest in Cuba. In fact, some began their journey as conscripts in the Spanish army serving in Spain’s overseas provinces. Once there, it became evident that the economic, if not the political, point of reference of those provinces was not the metropolis, but the United States. America thus became the ground where these two diasporas—Cubans and *peninsulares*—intersected, and often clashed.

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14 These figures must be read as signs of a trend rather than factual data. Censuses are notorious for undercounting population, particularly the highly mobile immigrant population considered here. Other sources’ estimates indicate a larger Spanish immigrant presence. *La Crónica*, for example, estimated the Spanish population in Louisiana in 1849 at between 9,000 and 10,000. *La Crónica*, 20 June 1849.
The background to the Otero murder trial offers a window into the beginnings of a Spanish immigrant community in the second half of nineteenth-century New York. José García Otero’s ill-fated odyssey began when he won a $25,000 prize in the Havana Lottery and decided to use part of the award to build a theater in his native Cárdenas. In 1865, Otero traveled to the United States to purchase the furnishings for the theater. It was on the steamer from Havana to New York that he met one of his alleged murderers, José González, a 35-year-old madrileño who had left Spain as a member of the military band of one of the army battalions sent to Cuba. When his bandmaster decided to start a distillery in Havana, González joined him, but when the business burned down in a fire, he decided to leave Cuba and go to the United States.

Neither man spoke a word of English, but that did not discourage them, as the social networks between Cuba and the fledgling Spanish-speaking community in New York provided adequate support for newcomers. Otero’s friends in Cárdenas had provided letters of introduction for a Spanish merchant in Lower Manhattan, and he took a room at the Barcelona, a hotel near Washington Square owned by Antonio Cuyás, a native of that Spanish city. The other alleged murderer of Otero, Francisco Gener Salvador, a 22-year-old cook, had also been born near Barcelona and had worked as a waiter in Cuyás’s establishment. He lodged at the more modest Hotel de Cuba, a few blocks away, and shared a room with Francisco Vila, a childhood friend from Barcelona. Like González, Vila had gone to Cuba as a soldier, but after serving in Havana for three years, he deserted and moved to New York where he worked as a cook in a French hotel.
Continuing a trend already evidenced at mid-century, Cuban and Spanish visitors to New York stayed “at an increasing number of hotels and inns run by their countrymen.”\(^{15}\) There, too, lodged a growing number of clerical workers. According to Robert Ernst, Cubans and Spaniards were among the immigrant groups with the highest proportion of clerical workers, “many of them undoubtedly employed by companies involved in the Caribbean and Mediterranean trade.”\(^{16}\) Catalonia, the most developed region in Spain, was also the most commercially active in this trade. These commercial networks extended to the United States, and their profits helped finance the publication of the first Catalan journal in the Americas, *La Llumanera de Nova York*. Its editor, Arturo Cuyás, was the son of the owner of the Barcelona Hotel.

Spaniards from other regions also participated in this emergent transnational community. Following a well-trodden path, these fledgling entrepreneurs left Spain as teenagers to join relatives in Cuba at whose side they learned the skills and established the contacts that allowed them to expand their businesses and move to the United States. Perhaps one of the wealthiest among these immigrants was the Basque José Francisco Navarro. Born in San Sebastián in 1823, Navarro left for Cuba in 1838 to work in his uncle’s mechanic workshop. A few years later, having taken courses in Engineering and English at the University of Havana, Navarro moved to New York, where he would live most of his life. The financial and commercial achievements in his long business career included, according to his biographers, the creation of “six of

\(^{15}\) Ernst, *Immigrant Life*, 52.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 108. The percentage of clerical workers ranged from 11 to 17 percent, p. 258.
the most important companies in the United States.”¹⁷ Navarro was particularly proud of his role in building two emblematic New York landmarks: the Sixth Avenue El in 1878, and one of the first co-op apartment buildings in Manhattan in 1883. The eight-story Navarro apartment complex was known as “Spanish Flats” because of its architectural style and the fact that the buildings were named after cities in the Iberian peninsula.¹⁸

Like Navarro, Manuel Rionda left his Asturian village as a teenager to join his elder brothers and uncle in Cuba in 1870. The family owned several sugar plantations. As part of his training, young Rionda was sent to a boarding school in Maine, where he learned English and socialized with the American elite. In 1874, he joined his brother in New York and started to build the family’s sugar empire. Twenty-two years later, after an association with fellow Spanish magnate Juan Ceballos, Rionda became a partner in the Czarnikow-Rionda company, the preeminent sugar broker corporation in the United States. By 1915, he presided over the Cuban Cane Sugar Corporation, considered “the single greatest sugar company on the island, perhaps in the world.”¹⁹

While Rionda made his fortune in sugar, many of his compatriots tried their luck at the second most important crop on the island: tobacco. Vicente Martínez Ybor and Ignacio Haya were two of the most prominent cigar manufacturers of Clear

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¹⁸ The Spanish Flats were demolished in the 1920s. The Sixth Avenue El was razed in 1939.

Havana cigars in nineteenth-century America. Born in Valencia in 1818, Martínez Ybor left for Cuba at the age of fourteen to avoid military service in Spain. He learned the tobacco trade and soon started his own firm. At the beginning of the Ten Years’ War, because of his Cuban sympathies, Spanish officials ordered his arrest and he fled to Key West. In 1875, he moved to New York. Eighteen-year-old Ignacio Haya left Santander for Cuba in 1860. Seven years later, he had opened one of the first Clear Havana cigar factories in New York. In the 1880s, as Haya and Ybor looked to expand their business and escape the labor unrest that prevailed among cigarmakers in New York and Key West, they followed the suggestion of fellow Spaniard, Gavino Gutiérrez, and traveled to Tampa. Tampa’s civic leaders were eager to attract the industry and offered generous incentives to lure the Spanish entrepreneurs. In 1885, Ybor purchased the land that would become “Ybor City.” His dream of avoiding labor strife proved elusive, however. To Ignacio Haya fell the honor of producing the first Havana cigar in Tampa, as Ybor’s Cuban workers called a strike over the appointment of a peninsular Spaniard as foreman in his factory.  

As the previous anecdote illustrates, the “Cuban question” increasingly divided peninsulares and Cubans, on the one hand, and created the first elements of a common Spanish identity for what had been a diverse peninsular community, on the other. The Cuban question was inescapable for Spaniards living in the United States. As

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conditions on the island deteriorated, the number of Cuban exiles mounted. Moreover, Cubans and *peninsulares* frequently shared the same enclaves in the United States. Clashes between the two groups often played out on the shop floor, but as American sympathies for the Cuban cause grew, ethnicity also became a contested battleground. The Spanish industrial and commercial elite led the organizational life that began to take shape in these incipient Spanish communities in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Their names appeared on the boards of the New York Spanish Chamber of Commerce and the Spanish Benevolent Society *La Nacional*, in societies of instruction and recreation like *La Armonía*, and in masonic lodges like *La Universal*. Similar organizations were also established in other areas of Spanish immigration like Chicago, Key West, Mobile, New Orleans, San Francisco, Savannah, and Tampa.

The Spanish-language press was also crucial in forging a sense of community among these groups. The libraries of many of these Spanish clubs subscribed to newspapers published in Spain and the Americas, but they also received Spanish periodicals published in the United States. The New York Spanish press offers a window into this transnational print culture, and helps us understand the complexities of a diverse diaspora that came together when confronted with the threat to Spanish sovereignty in the Caribbean by the Cuban exiles and the sympathies of their hosts in the United States.  

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Defending *Cuba española* in the United States.

The Cuban question achieved particular relevance in the aftermath of the filibustering expeditions of Narciso López in the mid-nineteenth century. The capture and execution of López and fifty of his American followers in Havana in 1851 closed a chapter in a series of ill-conceived expeditions led from Louisiana to annex the island to the United States. For Spaniards in America, however, the immediate consequence of López’s failed adventure became a watershed, as they experienced what may have been the first instance of ethnic violence directed against their nationality in the United States. The Spanish colony of New Orleans was the hardest hit. News of the executions combined with rumors of mutilations and other transgressions by Spaniards in Cuba to create a volatile environment. The editorials of *La Unión* defending Spain’s action against American pirates fueled the fire and provoked the wrath of an angry mob. The offices of the Spanish newspaper were completely destroyed. Spanish-owned cigar stores and coffee-houses followed the

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same fate. The violence reached also the offices of the Spanish consulate. The seriousness of the aggression was pointedly described to the Department of State by the Spanish Minister in Washington:

Her Majesty’s Consul has been assaulted, his place of business forcibly entered, the effects belonging to him destroyed, his life threatened, and the sign of his office torn down and carried away in triumph to Lafayette Square where, in the midst of rude jests, it was publicly burned together with the Spanish flag; and as if such disorderly acts had not been sufficient, they have taken away the official papers of the Consulate and it is credibly rumored that the same will be published.  

The failure of the López expedition marked also a change in the Cuban diaspora in America. As annexation to the United States became unfeasible, the idea of a Cuban-led movement for independence began to take shape. The Ten Years’ War (1868-1878) strengthened the nationalist resolve of the Cuban expatriates, particularly the cigarmakers in Florida and New York. It would be from these communities that Jose Martí would gain the political base and financial support to launch the Partido Revolucionario Cubano and the Cuban war for independence in the 1890s.  
The articulation of Cuban émigré nationalism in the United States would also bring into sharp relief what was originally a diffuse national identity in the Spanish diaspora. It was in response to this Cuban nationalism that Spaniards felt compelled to come together under their own national banner.

The diffuseness of the Spanish national identity in America in the late nineteenth century can be illustrated by the vignette that adorned the front page of the
first issue of La Llumanera de Nova York, a Catalan monthly that began publication in New York in 1874 (see Figure 1). In this sketch, the Catalan regional (and imperial) identity prevails. As a puzzled Uncle Sam asks señor Ambrós, a reader of La Llumanera dressed in traditional Catalan peasant garb, “What language is that?,” the peasant responds that it is Catalan. When the American replies dismissively, “Catalan? What’s that?” señor Ambrós chides him, “What do you mean ‘that’? Show more respect,” and he explains to his American interlocutor that Catalan is “the universal language.” How does señor Ambrós prove to Uncle Sam that Catalan, not English, is the universal language? It is not a matter of the number of countries in which the language is spoken (as the American believes). It is a matter of linguistic and cultural penetration. “Are there any English-language newspapers published in Spain?” asks the Catalan. “No sir,” replies the American. “But, here you have a Catalan newspaper published in New York.”

La Llumanera’s masthead described the monthly as a “Catalan Magazine of News and Fun.” The magazine also stated that it would shun discussions of a political, personal or religious nature. Despite these protestations, however, politics crept into

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26 Published with the financial support of Emilio Puig, a prominent Catalan businessman in New York, La Llumanera (the oil-lamp, or leading light) was lavishly illustrated by Felip Cusachs, a Louisiana-born Catalan artist who worked for the Daily Graphic and other American newspapers. Its editor, Arturo Cuyás was born in Barcelona in 1845, and moved to New York in the early 1860s with his mother and siblings to join his father, the owner of the Hotel Barcelona. Cuyás started his journalistic career in La Crónica and El Cronista and later contributed to a number of newspapers both in Spain and Latin America. An accomplished linguist, in 1876 he published a very successful English-Spanish dictionary whose sales brought him a small fortune. In the 1880s, he also tried his luck as a playwright. Biographical information on Cuyás can be found in Regina Opisso, “Arturo Cuyás, catalán de Norteamérica,” Destino 12 (17 May 1952): 7-10; Lluís Urpinell, “Artur Cuyás: Un polifacètic incansable,” IV Jornades d’Estudis Catalano-americans (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 1992): 453-465.

27 “Everything fits in the columns of La Llumanera, everything except political, religious or personal discussions.” La Llumanera, June 1876, 2.
its pages from the very beginning. As the voice of the Catalan bourgeoisie in America, 

*La Llumanera* had a complex relationship with Madrid politicians. From the start, one of the main goals of the magazine had been to publicize in Catalonia the celebration of the 1876 Philadelphia Centennial Exposition, and to encourage Catalan businesses to participate in it. Cuyás lamented that American ignorance about Spain diminished the chances of Catalan enterprises succeeding in the United States. “They think Spain is a country of bullfighters and bandits,” he wrote to his Catalan readers, “and they will not take the trouble to find out if some province of Spain has a developed industry, if we do not tell it to them and show them the products of our factories.” As each monthly issue displayed stunning illustrations of the pavilions being erected in Fairmount Park, the fears that Catalonia would miss this chance because of the ineptitude of Spanish politicians seemed to grow. In December 1874, addressing inquiries about the Exposition by the Catalan Society for the Promotion of National Production (*Societat pera lo Foment de la Producció Nacional*), Cuyás stated that while many European countries were already choosing spots on the fairgrounds for their exhibits, Spain had not yet even named a comission which would represent her at the Fair.

In January 1875, the magazine published the names of the members of the committee which had finally been appointed in Madrid to represent Spain at the Centennial. Cuyás was particularly pleased that the famed Republican orator and politician Emilio Castelar headed the committee, as he believed Castelar to be “among all the public men in Spain the better known and best regarded in the United States.” A month later, however, the short-lived Spanish Republic now defunct, *La Llumanera*
reported that Castelar had renounced his post.\textsuperscript{28} The political instability that followed the Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy only added to Cuyás's anxiety. When continuing delays, and lack of funds threatened even the shipment of a small Spanish exhibit to Philadelphia in 1875, a frustrated Cuyás declared that a Spanish pavilion might as well display: “piles of unresolved claims . . . titles of nobility . . . political newspapers . . . and the corpses of those who died in the civil war . . . under a plaque on which it would be written: ‘These are the principal products of Spanish politics.’”\textsuperscript{29}

The Bourbon Restoration received a lukewarm endorsement by \textit{La Llumanera} which stated, in general terms, that Spain needed peace and that Spaniards should support the procurer of that peace: “Blessed be Alfonso XII if he does it, blessed be whoever is able to do it.”\textsuperscript{30} This initial tepidity continued through the years. In 1878, at the time of Alfonso’s marriage, the magazine did not report on the royal wedding itself, but rather on the attention it had received in the American press and among the political and diplomatic elite. Without expressing his own opinion, Cuyás declared simply: “It is highly satisfactory for the sons of Spain who reside here to see that the press, as well as the government and the notable men of the country see today our fatherland with more respect and more sympathy than they had a few years ago.”\textsuperscript{31} When Cuyás did write a piece on that “memorable date,” the King’s wedding took second place to an event that, Cuyás claimed, would “change the physiognomy of Europe.” Taking an ironic aim at the French contention that Africa started south of the

\textsuperscript{28} “La Exposició de Filadelfia,” \textit{La Llumanera}, January 1875, 2.
\textsuperscript{29} “La Exposició de Filadelfia,” \textit{La Llumanera}, August 1875, 2. See also “Espanya y la Exposició de Filadelfia,” October 1875, 2, and “¡Vergonya!” July 1875, 1.
\textsuperscript{30} “Alfonso XII,” \textit{La Llumanera}, February 1875, 2.
\textsuperscript{31} “Lo Casament del Rey,” \textit{La Llumanera}, February 1878, 3
Pyrenees, Cuyás explained that what made the date memorable was not the marriage of the monarch, but the inauguration of the last segment of the railway connecting Barcelona to France. The railroad, the epitome of nineteenth-century progress, had thus, in one sweep, done away with the Pyrenees and moved Spain decisively from Africa into Europe.  

Despite his criticisms of Madrid-centered politics, Cuyás was a staunch defender of Spanish colonial rule in Cuba, a position that reflected the importance of the Caribbean colonies for the Catalan market. The very existence of La Llumanera led members of the non-Catalan diaspora to call into question this profession of (Spanish) patriotism. In the second issue of the magazine Cuyás felt it necessary to defend himself against the criticism of “Spaniards who are not Catalan and who accuse us of wanting to be Catalans, but not Spaniards.” This was, in his view, a mere “game of words.” He explained to his fellow countrymen that “despite having a very independent character [Catalans] are, deep down, Spaniards, and they have done more in Spain and for Spain than many of the other peoples of the Peninsula.” Articles and poems in La Llumanera memorialized Catalans’ fight against Napoleon, and extolled the role of Catalan volunteers in the 1860 campaign in Africa. Above all, the paper praised the patriotism of Catalan volunteers presently

34 “Catalans, però Espanyols,” La Llumanera, December 1874, 2.
35 See, for example, “Cansoneta d’un Miquelet del any 1808,” La Llumanera, June 1875, 3, and “Barcelona en lo dia 3 de maig de 1860,” La Llumanera, May 1877, 2. The fact that these events were commemorated on the same month (May) as the Jochs Florals, the annual Catalan literary competition, helped to connect the histories of Catalonia and Spain. A similar phenomenon, with the Dos de Mayo
fighting in Cuba. Its fourth issue included a letter from five Catalans, self-declared “plain soldiers [who] fight to preserve the national integrity on this Island . . . good Catalans who will die defending their patria and shouting: Long live Catalonia!”

Cuyás’s arguments in La Llumanera expressed what historian Josep M. Fradera has called the “dual patriotism” of the Catalan bourgeoisie. Catalans were good Spaniards, La Llumanera claimed, while Cubans and their peninsular sympathizers were malos españoles. Cuyás’s zealous militancy drew on a repertory of patriotic images going back to the Crusades and the Reconquest. In May 1875, he called on Catalan soldiers in Cuba to “Do in the West what your forefathers did in the East!” and he admonished them: “as long as one insurgent remains standing, we won’t be able to say that we are the descendants of Pelayo and El Cid.” Even the advertisements in the magazine sported an imperial tone, announcing the sale of hams with brand names such as “Cuba Española” and “¡Viva España!”

If the war in Cuba and its resonance in the United States contributed to uniting the Spanish diaspora, the question remained as to what this patriotism entailed, and what “Spanish identity” it was supposed to embrace. As we will see, while they agreed on the defense of Spain’s American empire, conservative, liberal, and progressive

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36 The soldiers, apparently, could not afford the subscription to the newspaper, which was paid by a non-Catalan gentleman. La Llumanera, February 1875, 6.


38 “¡A n’ells!” La Llumanera, May 1875, 2
Spaniards held different views on what “Spain” meant. Cuyás’s imperial stance fell closer to that of the editor of El Cronista, the sucesor of La Crónica, José Ferrer de Couto. Born into a military family in 1820, young José joined the army at fifteen, earning honors for his actions in the Carlist wars. In 1844, he left the military to pursue a career in letters. Ferrer de Couto’s writings exemplify what historian Christopher Schmidt-Nowara has called “the imperial origins of [Spain’s] national historiography.” His staunch vindication of Spain’s imperial past illustrates Schmidt-Nowara’s assertion that “Spain’s colonial history […] was the discursive space where Spanish patriots could most effectively defend not only the empire but also the nation.”

Ferrer de Couto’s main publications in the 1840s were military histories of the Spanish army and navy. In the 1850s, America beckoned. The Mexican-American War and the filibustering expeditions of the late 1840s stirred his interest in Spanish America. He first traveled to Cuba in 1852, in the wake of Narciso López’s ill-fated adventure. To defend Spain against the resurgence of the “black legend” that the executions of López and his followers provoked, Ferrer de Couto wrote an encomiastic history of the Spanish administration in the New World, in which Fray Bartolomé de las Casas (considered to be the originator of the legend) was singled out

40 José Ferrer, *Album del ejército español. Historia militar desde los primitivos tiempos hasta nuestros días* (Madrid: Imprenta de B. Hortelano, 1846-1847); José Ferrer de Couto and José March y Labores, *Historia de la marina real española desde el descubrimiento de las Américas hasta el combate de Trafalgar* (Madrid: Imprenta de José María Ducazcal, 1849-1851); José Ferrer de Couto, *Historia del combate naval de Trafalgar, precedida de la del renacimiento de la marina española durante el siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Imprenta de W. Ayguals de Izco, 1851).
for particular criticism.\textsuperscript{41} This text was later included in a book on Spain’s “national
glories,” a shorter version of which was printed for use in Spanish primary schools.\textsuperscript{42}

Ferrer de Couto made five more trips to the Americas in the next twenty years, eventu ally settling in New York, where he became the editor of \textit{La Crónica} (1865), and later \textit{El Cronista} (1866). In subsequent books and articles he called for the strengthening of the bonds between the peoples of the Spanish “\textit{raza}” against the threat of American expansionism.\textsuperscript{43} He was also a steadfast defender of slavery. The first book he published in the United States, at the end of the American Civil War, dealt with this issue. In it, he proposed an international treaty to preserve slavery, which he considered to be a Christian and civilizing institution.\textsuperscript{44} His second book in the United States, printed in the offices of \textit{El Cronista} in 1872, dealt with the war in Cuba. Conceived as a response to the question posed by the Cuban newspaper \textit{El Emigrado}, “can Cuba become independent?” Ferrer de Couto surprisingly answered in the positive. He argued, however, that it would take another fifty years for the island to reach the level of development that would allow her to become truly independent, not only from Spain but from the influence of the United States as well.\textsuperscript{45} This

\textsuperscript{41}José Ferrer de Couto, \textit{Programa de una vindicación general sobre los hechos y administración de los españoles en el nuevo mundo} (Madrid: Imprenta Española de Nieto y Compañía, 1857).

\textsuperscript{42}José Ferrer de Couto, \textit{Crisol histórico español y restauración de glorias nacionales}: obra extractada para el uso de las escuelas de instrucción primaria superior y de instrucción primaria elemental (Habana: Imprenta y librería militar, 1864).

\textsuperscript{43}José Ferrer de Couto, \textit{América y España consideradas en sus intereses de raza, ante la república de los Estados Unidos del Norte} (Cádiz: Imprenta de la Revista Médica, 1859); José Ferrer de Couto, \textit{Cuestiones de Méjico, Venezuela y América en general...} (Madrid: A. Santa Coloma, 1861).

\textsuperscript{44}José Ferrer de Couto, \textit{Los negros en sus diversos estados y condiciones; tales como son, como se supone que son, y como deben ser} (Nueva York: Imprenta de Hallet 1864), 5-10. An English version appeared under the title: \textit{Enough of war!: The question of slavery conclusively and satisfactorily solved, as regards humanity at large and the permanent interests of present owners}.

\textsuperscript{45}José Ferrer de Couto, \textit{Cuba puede ser independiente. Folleto político de actualidad} (Nueva York: El Cronista, 1872) 121. An English version appeared under the title: \textit{Cuba May Become Independent}. 
reasoning helps explain Ferrer de Couto’s adamant opposition to the war then raging in Cuba, which he described not as a war between Cuba and Spain, but as the uprising of “an insignificant and thoughtless minority … against the majority that surrounds it, and against their country.”46 He battled the insurgents and their supporters, not only from the pages of El Cronista, but on the island itself, where he joined the ranks of the Spanish voluntarios. He also fought Cuban patriots in a number of highly publicized duels.47

Ferrer de Couto’s patriotism earned him the praise of conservative circles in Spain. Following a duel in Belgium, where he was wounded, he was received warmly in Madrid. His picture and biography graced the pages of the prominent magazine La Ilustración Española y Americana, and he was rewarded with banquets, titles and medals.48 In one such banquet, a circular was issued by the “public writers of Madrid” extending their congratulations to Ferrer de Couto. Headed by Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, the artificer of the Bourbon Restoration which would end the Spanish Republic two months later, the circular’s message –“any other cause can be a matter of partisan politics, but the cause we defend in America is the cause of law and of national honor”– was underscored by the significance of the date of its publication, October 12, 1874, marking the anniversary of the “discovery.”49

47 In 1869, Ferrer de Couto traveled to Canada to duel Cuban Francisco Porto. In 1874, he went to Belgium to duel Colonel Pío Rosado, representing Juan Bellido de Luna, the editor of La Independencia, a Cuban newspaper published in New York.
48 Eusebio Martínez de Velasco, “Don José Ferrer de Couto,” La Ilustración Española y Americana, 13 October 1874, 595, 605; Manuel Juan Diana, “Don José Ferrer de Couto,” La Ilustración Española y Americana, 22 October 1874, 618-622.
49 Ferrer de Couto, La verdad, 80.
Despite this call for unity from Madrid, Ferrer de Couto’s conservative views and patriotic antics increasingly alienated members of the Spanish community in New York. These divisions had already become public in November of 1873 when the short-lived Spanish Republic and the United States sought a peaceful solution to the crisis brought about by Spain’s summary execution of American citizens seized in the *Virginius*, a ship carrying arms and volunteers to fight in Cuba. *El Cronista* attacked the measured reports of the *New York Times* on the case and encouraged its compatriots to write to the Spanish government denouncing the diplomatic protocol signed between the two countries. A few days later, however, the *Times* reported that “many leading Spaniards” repudiated Ferrer de Couto’s action and that, were he to send such a protest to the Cabinet, they would respond by sending one of their own, “tendering the thanks of the liberal-minded Spaniards resident in this city to Admiral Polo and President Castelar for the wise course they have . . . pursued.”

Liberal-minded Spaniards challenged *El Cronista*’s idea of Spain and of Spanish patriotism, as well as its claim that it represented the opinion of the entire Spanish community, not only before its government but also before the American public.

The clash between liberals and conservatives came to the fore again three years later when the supremacy of *El Cronista* among the Spanish press in the United States was challenged by the launching of a new publication, *Las Novedades*, by two former employees of Ferrer de Couto, Enrique Muñíz and José G. García. Ferrer de Couto considered the advent of *Las Novedades* in 1876 a conspiracy against his person and a

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treason to Spain. The “pamphlet war” that ensued between the editors of the two newspapers sheds light into the nature of this polemic, and it highlights how Spain’s imperial policies in the Caribbean complicated the relations between the Spanish homeland and its diaspora in the United States.\(^{51}\)

At the heart of the debate between *Las Novedades* and *El Cronista* was the very definition of Spanishness and the more appropriate role for the Spanish diaspora to play in the United States. Unlike Ferrer de Couto, who supported a militant defense of Spanish rule in Cuba much like that espoused by the infamous *voluntarios* on the island, *Las Novedades* and its readers defended a less strident version of patriotism. Keenly aware of the differences between the two environments (they were not part of a colonial elite in Cuba, but residents in a foreign country increasingly sympathetic to the colonized), the Spanish commercial elites in New York saw their main role as counterbalancing the activities of the Cuban diaspora and winning the hearts and minds of the Americans to the Spanish position. *Las Novedades* started publication in April 1876 to serve Spanish-speaking visitors to the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibit. Its stated goal was to defend Hispanic interests in the Americas. Thus, it presented itself not only as a Spanish but as a Hispanic-American newspaper.\(^{52}\)

The conflict between the two publications began, according to Muñíz, when *El Cronista* started publishing attacks against him which questioned “[his] patriotism as a

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\(^{51}\) In June 1876, Muñíz and García published a 26-page pamphlet entitled, *Nuestra defensa. Contestación a los alevosos y embozados ataques que Don José Ferrer de Couto ha dirigido en “El Cronista” contra D. Enrique Muñíz y D. José G. García* (Nueva York, 1876). In September of that year, Ferrer de Couto responded with a 100-page booklet entitled *La verdad."

\(^{52}\) “Reforma indispensable,” *Las Novedades*, 28 November 1877, 1. As with *La Crónica*, the masthead reflected this Pan-Hispanism. The paper’s subtitle was “España y los pueblos Hispano-americanos.”
Spaniard . . . [his] loyalty and . . . [his] honesty.” As a veteran of the Cuban war and recipient of several commendations from the Spanish government, Muñíz was especially sensitive to these charges, but he also took issue with Ferrer de Couto’s association of liberalism with anti-patriotism. Muñíz explained that *Las Novedades* was a newspaper “of Spanish character, but of a more liberal and pragmatic brand of politics than the one espoused by *El Cronista*, and more in harmony with the opinions of our compatriots here, as well as those in Cuba and the peninsula.”

Responding to *El Cronista*’s claim that *Las Novedades* was supported by Cuban insurgents, Muñíz defended its independence and claimed to be the true voice of the Spanish community, as he stated that Ferrer de Couto could not conceive of the existence of a Spanish newspaper in New York, “unless it be supported by the Spanish government, or the merchants and landowners in Cuba, or the Cuban insurgents.” In fact, Muñíz argued that far from defending Spanish interests, as its masthead proclaimed, *El Cronista* had harmed them. He compared the paper unfavorably to a similar publication in México, *La Iberia*, which, under equally trying circumstances, “had contributed to earn for Spain and the Spaniards the affection of the Mexicans.” In contrast, he stated, *El Cronista* “has not only made Spain lose the affection of the Cuban rebels, but it has contributed to maintaining, and even exacerbating, their hatred for the metropolis.”

53 *Nuestra defensa*, 3, 11.
54 Ibid., 5.
55 Ibid.
Muñíz declared that Ferrer de Couto’s attitude toward his adopted country, “insulting without impunity the American government and its people,” was also dangerous. As evidence of El Cronista’s rabid anti-Americanism, he presented letters in which Ferrer de Couto admonished Muñíz for praising the Americans. Muñíz stated, for example, that upon the publication of an article in which he had remarked on the success of the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition, Ferrer de Couto had rebuked him, telling him that he “had been very loose with the pen in praising the character of these barbarians, and this cannot agree with the political views of our newspaper.” A staunch monarchist, Ferrer de Couto feared that a positive portrayal of the United States might play in the hands of those who supported the Republic in his homeland. He warned Muñíz: “You should not forget that in Spain there are many fools infatuated with the institutions of this country, to which they attribute the greatest marvels, and that we should not encourage this monster with our praise.”

The outbursts of El Cronista against the United States did not go unnoticed in the American press. In a letter published in the New York Herald, the Madrid correspondent remarked that El Cronista “please[d] itself in painting this country [the United States] to the Spaniards in very dark colors,” and hinted that this misinformation might endanger the relations between the two countries. Muñíz was more explicit in his criticism. He closed his pamphlet asserting that “El Cronista in the hands of Ferrer de Couto has always been an inflammatory libel, not only against the

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57 Nuestra defensa, 18.
58 Ibid.
59 Cited in Ferrer de Couto, La verdad, 85.
Spanish governments and authorities which had not served its interests . . . but also against all Spaniards who have not allowed themselves to be dominated by it."  

Ferrer de Couto responded to Muñíz with a 100-page rebuttal. He acknowledged El Cronista’s “conservative and anti-revolutionary” politics, but he justified them because, in his view, “any newspaper in this country whose goal is to defend . . . Spain’s rule over the two Caribbean islands we have left must be resolutely anti-revolutionary and conservative.” He proudly recognized that his conservative views and his attacks on Spanish liberal governments and policies had earned him criticism, withdrawal of the paper’s subsidy, and even a jail sentence. But, he felt that he had no other choice but to pursue this path. “I had here a debt of honor with Spain, not to abandon EL CRONISTA until the war in Cuba had ended,” he explained.

Ferrer de Couto died in New York, on July 2, 1877, before seeing the end of the war in Cuba. His body was taken to Marble Cemetery awaiting his eventual return and burial in Spain. Ironically, as the obituary pointed out, his remains were placed in a vault “at the side of General Vicente Aguilera, ex-President of the Cuban Insurrectionary Government, whom he opposed so bitterly during his lifetime.”

Equally ironic was the fact that, a few months after his death, El Cronista ceased

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60 Nuestra defensa, 25.
61 La verdad, 49. Even acknowledging that there might be room in New York for a liberal Spanish newspaper Ferrer de Couto did not think Muñíz was the man for the task. His book attempts to show that, in fact, many of the conservative articles that appeared in El Cronista were written by Muñíz during Ferrer de Couto’s absences. This would make Muñíz at best a false liberal; at worst, a liar.
62 Ibid., 91.
63 “Funeral of Ferrer de Couto,” NYT, 6 July 1877, 8. In February 1878, only a few days after the signing of the treaty of Zanjón ending the war in Cuba, Ferrer de Couto’s remains were taken to Spain and buried in Madrid with full military honors. “To be buried in his native land,” NYT, 22 February 1878, 5; “Señor de Couto’s Estate,” NYT, 31 August 1877, 8.
publication and was purchased by Las Novedades. Yet, like El Cronista before, Las Novedades too would face the challenge of a publication situated further to the left in the political spectrum. In 1884, Ramón Verea started publishing the monthly (later biweekly) magazine El Progreso.

Born in 1833, Ramón Verea studied Philosophy and Theology in his native Galicia. In 1855, he emigrated to Cuba where he worked as a teacher, published two novels and became the editor of El Progreso, the first of several publications under that name that he would edit throughout his life. After a stay in Puerto Rico, in 1865 he moved to New York. There, he taught Spanish and worked as a translator. He also pursued his interest in mechanics and inventions. In 1878, Verea devised an innovative calculating machine, according to the New York Herald, not “to sell the patent or to put it to use, but simply to show that . . . a Spaniard can invent as well as an American.” The point having been made, Verea turned again to his literary interests. In 1880, he established the printing press El Polígolo and four years later he started publishing El Progreso.

Verea believed that engineers and inventors were bound to become the new conquerors of the world, brandishing patents instead of swords, and he decried the

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64 “A nuestros lectores,” 25 November 1877, 1. Following the purchase of El Cronista, and reflecting its expansion from a local to a transnational readership, Las Novedades went from a 4-page daily to an 8-page semiweekly. “Reforma Indispensable,” 28 November 1877, 1. In 1878, José G. García became the sole editor of Las Novedades when Muñíz left for México City to serve as editor-in-chief of the Spanish newspaper La Colonia Española and, in 1879, of La Voz de España. Muñíz died in Madrid in 1890. Steward, “Spanish Journalism in Mexico,” 431-432.

65 Besides Colón (Cuba) and New York, Verea edited El Progreso in Buenos Aires from 1898 until his death in 1899.

backwardness of his own country in these scientific endeavors. He claimed that Spain needed more engineers and scientists and fewer lawyers, artists and politicians. The purpose of his magazine, as stated in its first issue, was to contribute to this task by informing the Spanish-speaking public of what was being produced in other countries in the fields of “mechanics, industry, and the arts.”\textsuperscript{67} \textit{El Progreso} also included articles on politics, philosophy, and religion. A self-declared freethinker, Verea translated into Spanish the writings of Thomas Paine, Robert Ingersoll, and H. W. Beecher, and he recommended that his readers subscribe to similar newspapers printed in Spain (\textit{Las Dominicales del Libre Pensamiento}), México (\textit{El Pensamiento}), and Cuba (\textit{La Razón}).

Verea was proud of his political and economic independence. In an obvious reference to the trajectories of \textit{El Cronista} and \textit{Las Novedades}, an advertisement for his magazine stated that \textit{El Progreso} was “the only Castilian [Spanish] newspaper in New York which has survived without advertisements, without subsidies and without resorting to the degrading flattery towards those in power and in government.”\textsuperscript{68} Verea was openly critical of the Spanish monarchy and of the policies of the conservative party led by Cánovas del Castillo, whom he dubbed “little Bismarck.”\textsuperscript{69} He also denounced the ineptitude of Spanish diplomats and consuls in the United States who could not prevent the violence inflicted against Spaniards by Cuban émigrés in Key West, or the outfitting of filibustering expeditions from the United States to the

\textsuperscript{67} “Al público,” \textit{El Progreso}, January 1884, 1.

\textsuperscript{68} Reproduced in Arca Caldas, \textit{Emigrantes Sobranceiros}, 42.

island. He accused the Spanish Ministers of spending their “reserved funds” hobnobbing with high society in Washington instead of using them to pay informers to spy on the activities of the Cuban exiles. He was especially critical of the flamboyant new Minister, Spanish author Juan Valera, whom he referred to as “his most Serene Automaton,” for his alleged passivity in not pressing the prosecution of a policeman who had killed a Spanish sailor in 1884, and for not leading the colony in its efforts to collect funds to aid victims of the cholera epidemic raging in Spain in 1885. Valera did organize several funeral masses in Washington and elsewhere when king Alfonso XII died of consumption later that year, but Verea considered these “sacrilegious farces” to be “an immense waste of money.” To prove his point, he offered statistics of how much money it cost Spaniards to maintain the church and the monarchy (around 40 million pesetas), and reminded his readers that the United States, a much wealthier country, paid its president only $50,000 a year.

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70 “La extradición de Agüero,” El Progreso, February 1884, 33.
71 “Doña Inocencia,” El Progreso, April 1884, 71. In letters to his wife, Juan Valera, the Spanish Minister in Washington at the time, acknowledged this mismanagement of funds by his predecessor, Francisco de Barca, who ended up committing suicide, in 1883. Valera’s own relationship with Catherine Lee Bayard, the daughter of Cleveland’s Secretary of State, and thirty years his junior, would cause her to commit suicide in 1886, following his appointment to Brussels. On Valera’s mission to Washington see, Carlos Sáenz de Tejada, “La misión diplomática de Don Juan Valera en Washington y la problemática americana, 1884-1886” (Ph.D. diss., Universidad de Madrid, 1970).
72 “Crueldad y asesinato,” El Progreso, September 1884, 169; “Impunidad,” October 1884, 177-179. The policeman was tried and acquitted. Verea felt that the Spanish diplomats had not been forceful enough in pursuing the case and calling for an appeal of the verdict. When, a few months later, an American citizen got life in prison for killing a Chinese immigrant, Verea congratulated the Chinese consul for his work on the case and exclaimed: “Oh, to be a Chinaman!” (not without a tint of racism underlining how low Spain had fallen). “¡Quién fuera Chino!,” El Progreso, June 1885, 359.
Verea’s opinions, expressed in *El Progreso* and in several books, represented another pole of the Spanish diaspora: republican, secular and progressive. But, his unremitting indictment of the policies of the Spanish government and its colonial administration earned him enemies. In 1888, *El Progreso’s* accusations of rampant corruption and contraband by the Spanish colonial administration in Cuba ignited a virulent campaign by *Las Novedades* to discredit the editor. Verea’s charges, at a time of relative political stability on the island and of relative silence among the Cuban press in the United States, were characterized by *Las Novedades*’s editor José G. García as particularly heinous and provocative. One could expect anything from the Cuban insurgents, he argued, but for a Spaniard to criticize the motherland was not only treacherous but unnatural, even monstrous. In a language pregnant with the imagery of maternal-filial relationships, García underlined Verea’s alleged aberrant behavior by claiming that he was a lonely voice, whose message would not be echoed by the Spaniards in the diaspora. In a patriotic style reminiscent of that of his former adversary, Ferrer de Couto, García declared confidently, “there is not, there cannot be, a son of Spain, except for . . . the monstrous abortion against whom we are lashing our whip [Verea], who will act in such a way against his own family and will side with him who, calling himself a journalist, proclaims his mother’s disgrace among her own enemies.” Verea defended his independence and responded to these attacks by

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74 Verea’s publications include the following: *Contra el altar y el trono; La razón, la fe y la religión universal; Artículos Filosóficos; Catecismo librepensador o cartas a un campesino*, and *La religión al alcance de todos.*

appealing to “the public,” stating that his only crime had been “to defend the right of the citizen against the abuse of power [and to defend] reason against fanaticism.”\textsuperscript{76}

In fact, despite his criticism of official Spain, Verea supported Spain’s rule in Cuba, “a province,” he declared, “to whose possession Spain has as much right as to that of New Castile or any other.”\textsuperscript{77} His contention was that the bad administration of the island by corrupt and inept politicians was creating a burden for Cubans and Spaniards alike and benefiting only the politicians and their cronies in the colonial administration. He, therefore, advocated the sale of Cuba to the United States. Verea acknowledged that this would be an embarrassment for Spain, but to those, like the editor of \textit{Las Novedades}, who dubbed him a \textit{mal español}, he replied prophetically: “would it not be more embarrassing to have to abandon this province because of annihilation caused by our own ill-administration?”\textsuperscript{78}

In 1895, as a new war for independence was launched in Cuba, and after thirty years of residence in New York, Verea left the United States and settled in Guatemala. There he published a series of letters defending Spain against the “black legend” and warning, much in the same vein as Cuban patriot José Martí, against the dangers of United States imperialism over Cuba and the Americas. In 1897 Verea moved to Argentina where he continued publishing \textit{El Progreso} until his death in 1899.

\textsuperscript{77} “La restauración de la monarquía en España,” \textit{El Progreso}, January 1884, 8.
\textsuperscript{78} “La venta de Cuba,” \textit{El Progreso}, June 1884, 102.
Conclusion

The Spanish diaspora in nineteenth-century America was part of a broader transnational network encompassing peninsular Spain and her current and former colonies in the Americas. While small in size, it was not monolithic, nor clearly delineated. It included commercial and professional elites as well as laborers from different regions, and it ranged in views from ultraconservatives to free-thinkers. Yet, American expansionism, the chaos of nineteenth-century peninsular politics, and the mobilization of the Cuban émigré communities in the United States, contributed to creating a sense of vulnerability and victimization that prompted the leadership of this originally diffuse community to come together in defense of Spain and its colonial empire. Strikingly, despite the different viewpoints represented in the wide range of publications analyzed in this chapter, the defense of the Spanish empire was a common theme in all.

This chapter has described some of the internal debates aired in the Spanish immigrant press as this process of self-definition took place. If the duration and predominance of Las Novedades among the publications discussed here are indications of the popularity of its approach, then the Spanish diaspora sought to strike a balance between chastising the Cubans and supporting Spain without alienating the Americans.\(^79\) To offset the potency of the Cuba Libre message, Spaniards in the United States needed also to engage more actively the vocabulary of civic loyalty and public memory prevalent at the time, and use it to reinforce the historical narrative that

\(^79\)Las Novedades outlasted all the other publications and remained in print until 1918.
justified the Spanish presence in the Americas. Their attempts to do this through the figures of Cervantes and Columbus are explored in the following chapter.
Forging a Spanish-American identity in the United States:

Cervantes Day and the 1892 Columbian Centennial

“No statue other than one of Cervantes could symbolize in Latin America that Spain whose past we share . . . [T]he sense of race, of historical filiation could never be better represented for Spanish-speaking America than by the figure of Cervantes.”¹

This is how the Uruguayan essayist José Enrique Rodó expressed the significance of the Spanish author as the embodiment of a transatlantic Hispanic race. Rodó wrote his article in anticipation of the centennial of the death of Cervantes in 1916. A decade earlier, in 1905, Spain had celebrated the tercentenary of the publication of Cervantes’ masterpiece, *Don Quixote*. Yet, the first country, outside of Spain, where the idea of building a statue to the Spanish genius took hold was not in Latin America. It was the United States. This chapter explains why, and uses Cervantes as a starting point for exploring how Spanish immigrant elites attempted to forge a Spanish ethnic identity in nineteenth-century America.

In his penetrating study of the culture of the diaspora among nineteenth-century European immigrants to America, Matthew Frye Jacobson shows how the cry of *Cuba Libre* captured the imagination of Irish, Polish and Jewish immigrants, both as a model to emulate in their own struggles for national independence and also,

once the Spanish-American war broke out, as an opportunity to show their loyalty to their adopted country. For Spanish immigrants, however, the wars in Cuba elicited a different type of diasporic imagination, one based on their country’s imperial past and its role as the “discoverer” and “civilizer” of the New World. As Cubans sought independence from Spain, Spaniards in the United States worked to forge a Spanish-American ethnic identity that would justify Spain’s continued presence in the Caribbean.

Christopher Schmidt-Nowara has argued convincingly that colonialism was a key element in the forging of a national identity in nineteenth-century Spain. “Historians from across the political spectrum,” he explains, “tacitly agreed that the remaining colonies were a part of the national territory because Spain had recreated itself overseas.” Historical scholarship, however, did not necessarily translate into the realm of national public memory and commemorations in Spain. By contrast, the historical pageants and civic festivals that became part of America’s invented tradition in the late nineteenth century provided the context and vocabulary which made also possible the “invention of ethnicity.” Like other immigrant groups, Spaniards sought to participate in this national culture. But, unlike other groups, such as the Germans, Spaniards lacked “a repertoire of festive forms that consciously and unconsciously

spoke in the accents of nationalism.” While Spaniards in the United States embraced the concept of an “ultramarine” imagined community, the lack of a national vocabulary emanating from the metropolis impressed on them the need to develop their own set of invented traditions.

Following the steps of other immigrant groups, Spaniards looked to their history in search of figures that would best capture the Spanish national character. Miguel de Cervantes and Christopher Columbus were the chosen candidates. These men were already part of the pantheon of Spanish glories. But, in this chapter I argue that, because of the specific challenges Spaniards faced in the United States, they were especially receptive to the iconic power of Cervantes and Columbus as representatives of the Spanish colonial enterprise in the Americas. The theme that runs through the chapter is the Spanish immigrants’ attempt to offset the nationalism of the Cuban émigré communities in the United States and the appeal that their struggle for independence had among American audiences. My study begins with an analysis of Cervantes Day, a tradition “invented” by Spaniards in New York in the 1870s, in the midst of the Ten Years’ War in Cuba. I then turn to the figure of Columbus. I trace the origin of the celebrations of the 1892 Columbian centenary to the activities of the Unión Iberoamericana, an association promoting relations between Spain and the Spanish-American republics, and discuss the connections between the Unión and Spanish communities in the United States, and the immigrants’ participation in the Columbian celebrations in America.

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5 Kathleen Neils Conzen, “Ethnicity as Festive Culture: Nineteenth-Century German America on Parade,” in Invention of Ethnicity, 51. While such a repertoire was being produced in the so-called peripheral nationalism (Galicia, Catalonia, Basque Country), it was lacking at the national (i.e. Spanish) level.
Unlike Cervantes, who was recognized universally as the best of Spanish genius, Columbus proved to be a more problematic symbol of Spanish identity. For one thing, Spaniards had to contend with other ethnic groups (Italians, but also Irish Catholics) for the legacy of the navigator. Moreover, the celebration of Columbus’s achievements was often cast against the perceived ill-treatment he had received from the Spanish monarchs. This narrative complemented and reinforced the “black legend” that presented Spain as the cruel murderer and plunderer of the Americas. These issues overshadowed the efforts of the Spanish immigrant elites to promote Columbus as their national hero, and lurked behind the visit of the Spanish royal delegation to the Columbian Centennial Exposition in Chicago in 1893. The ensuing war for independence in Cuba which culminated in the Spanish-American war in 1898, only highlighted the challenges faced by the Spanish immigrant elite in trying to forge an ethnic identity that would bridge the gap between Spain and the United States.

Cervantes Day: Creating a national symbol in the diaspora

The tercentenary of the publication of Don Quixote in 1905 marked the height of the national celebration of Cervantes in Spain after centuries of quiet oblivion. In his insightful critique of Quixotism, Christopher Britt-Arredondo links the memorialization of Quixote to the loss of the Spanish empire in 1898. Spanish intellectuals, he argues, used quixotism “as a formula for negating the historical ephemeral reality of Spain’s decline as an empire and affirming the essential, everlasting reality of the Spanish nation’s imperial identity.” Yet, the roots of the intimate

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6 Christopher Britt Arredondo, Quixotism. The Imaginative Denial of Spain’s Loss of Empire (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), 6. Britt Arredondo’s broader argument is that
connections between what Britt-Arredondo calls “monumentalizing Quixote” and the imperial Spanish project predate the “disaster” of 1898. They are exemplified in the commemoration of Cervantes organized by the Spanish immigrant elites in late nineteenth-century New York.

The famed author had slowly begun to receive recognition in Spain during the nineteenth century, as a result of cultural as well as political trends. Literary scholar Leonardo Romero Tobar underlines the importance of Romanticism and literary criticism in the development of “Cervantism.” Historians Carlos Serrano and José Alvarez Junco highlight Cervantes’s appeal to a wide spectrum of political views. As Serrano reminds us, Cervantes was one of the first figures chosen by Spanish liberals to lead the nation’s “secular calendar” in the 1830s. In 1835 a street was named after him in Madrid and his statue, “the first of its kind in the Spanish capital,” was unveiled right across from the Cortes (Spanish parliament). These authors focus on peninsular Spain, but Cervantes’s flexibility also made him a particularly attractive national symbol in the diaspora. Leopoldo Rius’s bibliography on Cervantes shows that the commemoration of his death (April 23) began in Madrid in 1861, and that, by

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Alvarez Junco argued that Cervantes was a perfect political symbol because his work allowed for a variety of readings “desde la nacional-católica de Alejandro Pidal a la nietzscheana de Navarro Tomás, pasando por la racionalista de Ramón y Cajal, la antiburguesa de Azorín o la meramente ‘entretenida’ de Valera.” José Alvarez Junco, Mater Dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX (Madrid: Taurus, 2001), 590.

1875, it had extended to sixty-six Spanish towns and eleven countries, six of them in the Americas, including the United States.\textsuperscript{10}

Cervantes’s iconic power was not lost to Spaniards in America. Not surprisingly, the commemoration of his death in New York began during the Ten Years’ War, when Spain’s rule in the Caribbean was being challenged by Cuban patriots. The figure of Cervantes, both an author \textit{and} a soldier, was especially appealing to José Ferrer de Couto, the editor of \textit{El Cronista}, an author and soldier himself. The first Cervantes Day, an informal and spontaneous literary soirée, was celebrated at Ferrer de Couto’s home in 1872, but the first full-fledged tribute to the Spanish author in New York occurred in 1875. It was so successful that \textit{El Cronista} printed a 62-page account of the ceremonies, as the title page announced, “in order to perpetuate the memory of this event, responding to the request of many Hispanic-American and Spanish gentlemen.”\textsuperscript{11}

The committee that met at the offices of \textit{El Cronista} on April 17, 1875 to design the program comprised the commercial Spanish elite in the city as well as members of the diplomatic corps. The group agreed to have a funeral mass in the morning and a literary soirée in the evening. Invitations would be sent to the Spanish Minister in Washington and the representatives of the Hispanic-American republics. Invitations to attend the funeral mass would also be extended to the American public, through the American press. The program was soon endorsed by more than a hundred members of New York’s commercial Spanish houses, who contributed financially to

\textsuperscript{10} Leopoldo Rius, \textit{Bibliografía crítica de las obras de Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra} (Villanueva y Geltrú: Oliva Impresor, 1904), vol. III, 472, 484.
\textsuperscript{11} José Ferrer de Couto, Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra. \textit{Relación de los Primeros Festejos Religiosos y Literarios que se hicieron en la ciudad de Nueva York el día 23 de Abril de 1875 para commemorar el aniversario de la muerte de CERVANTES} (Nueva York: El Cronista, 1875), 9.
its success. In contrast to the men’s public role in the ceremonies, their wives were assigned “a delicate and poetic role,” and were put in charge of the floral arrangements. The national significance of the celebration was highlighted in the booklet, which stated that, “on few occasions, perhaps none to-date, had so many names of Spaniards in this city been joined into a common national project.”

The imperial nature of this national project pervaded the festivities. Cervantes was praised as much for his military zeal as for his literary genius. Everything exuded this imperial rhetoric. The church where the exequies took place was dedicated to St. Francis Xavier, the Spanish Jesuit famous for his missionary work in East Asia. The leader of the order, Ignatius of Loyola, was compared, as a soldier and a Christian, to Cervantes himself, who had been maimed fighting the infidels at the battle of Lepanto in 1571. The floral arrangements by the Spanish ladies reinforced Cervantes’s dual identity. Near the catafalque lay a cross, a wreath, and a book made of white roses and lilies, adorned with legends made of violets and pansies, and inscribed: Lepanto, Cervantes, and Don Quijote respectively. The colors symbolized those of the Spanish flag at the time of the battle. The funeral mass was officiated by a Spanish-speaking priest. In tune with the imperialist overtones of the event, the booklet proudly proclaimed that this had been “the first mass in Spanish ever heard in a Catholic church in Anglo-Saxon America.”

The celebration continued in the evening at the Hoffman House hotel, where the Spanish Minister presided over a banquet for three hundred guests. There, Ferrer de Couto delivered a speech imbued with Quixotism. He underlined the effect that the

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12 Ibid., 13.
13 Ibid., 23.
commemoration would have “in the regeneration of our race” and, in the spirit of Renan’s maxim that forgetting is crucial to the creation of the nation, he appealed to his listeners to continue this new tradition “so that the people of our race in both worlds would forget the dangerous memories of ill-fated years, and remember instead their shared glory.”\(^\text{14}\) Ferrer de Couto’s appeal to build a shared usable Hispanic-American past was pregnant with meaning at a time when Spain was still trying to quell a seven-year war of independence in Cuba. The presence of representatives of the Spanish American republics at the ceremony only added to the legitimacy of the cause. The unity of the “mother country” and her former colonies highlighted the strength of their attachment, fruit of a common language and a common heritage. It also helped to downplay the military and violent aspects of the conquest and empire and cast them instead within a framework that underscored the golden age of Spanish culture and her generosity in providing these civilizing gifts to her subjects.

But, the commemoration of Cervantes had another dimension. It was also meant to put the Spanish immigrant community on the ethnic map of the city, so to speak. One of its outcomes was an initiative to build a statue of Cervantes in Central Park.\(^\text{15}\) Carlos Serrano points out that the erection of monuments honoring great artists was becoming common in Europe at that time. This “monumentalist fever” was transplanted to the United States by European immigrants who donated the monuments to the cities as a way of honoring their heritage while at the same time contributing to the beautification and cultural life of their adopted country.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^\text{14}\) Ibid., 27. “Forgetting … is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation.” Ernest Renan, “What is a nation?” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (New York: Routledge, 1990), 11.
\(^\text{15}\) Ferrer de Couto, Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, 58; “Cervantes,” La Llumanera, May 1875, 6.
\(^\text{16}\) Serrano, El nacimiento de Carmen, chapter 7.
York’s Central Park reflected this ethnic monumentalism, displaying sculptures of Shakespeare, Schiller, Walter Scott, and Humboldt. Thus, in a context where different ethnic groups were beginning to adopt and create their own national heroes, Cervantes not only served as a unifying force within the Hispanic family; he represented a towering figure, comparable to those being honored by other European immigrant groups. He was, moreover, a figure whose genius was universally acknowledged, even by North Americans. As a *New York Times* editorial stated in 1878, “We Americans share the admiration of the Spanish for Cervantes, as they share ours for Washington and Lincoln.” This was a telling comparison that appeared to highlight the complementarity of both countries—one lacking “cultural” pedigree, the other one lacking able modern statesmen.\(^\text{17}\)

The death of Ferrer de Couto, who had been in charge of the event since its inception, may explain the different nature of the celebration in 1878, which was more festive in tone and also more public. A generational change had taken place, as the organizers, Arturo Cuyás and Felip Cusachs, who had lived most of their lives in the United States, designed a program that was Spanish in content but American in style. To begin with, there was no solemn mass. Nor were there private readings or banquets attended only by the Spanish “men of letters.” The main event of the day took place at the Union League Theater, which was filled to capacity. The audience was entertained by a program of humorous and artistic musical pieces and plays in which, unlike in 1875, young Spanish women had a more prominent, if still secondary role. For example, at the closing of the program, the bust of Cervantes was crowned by nine young Spanish ladies representing the nine muses, an act which, according to the

\(^{17}\) “Cervantes,” *NYT*, 23 April 1878, 4.
The sale of the theater tickets yielded enough money to cover the expenses and to start the subscription to build the statue of Cervantes in Central Park.19

In May 1878, a committee was set up to carry out the project.20 Its first resolution was to approve the design proposed by Spanish sculptor Fernando Miranda, a bronze statue of Cervantes over a granite pedestal with four bas-reliefs representing the “arms and letters” theme.21 The stone for the monument would come from Cervantes’s hometown in Alcalá de Henares and Spanish cannons from the battle of Lepanto would be used as a guard to the memorial.22 The cost of the thirty-foot monument was estimated at $18,000. Collection of funds began in earnest, and in September, the Spanish society La Nacional donated the proceeds of its summer festival, which drew more than 500 guests, to the monument fund.23 But, in the following months the initial enthusiasm must have waned. When a new Spanish Minister arrived in Washington in January, 1879, Arturo Cuyás could only hope that

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20 The committee was presided by the Spanish Minister in Washington. The Spanish Consul in New York and Arturo Cuyás were vice-presidents. Honorary vice-presidents included the consuls of all the Hispanic American republics as well as two prominent American Hispanists: William Cullen Bryant and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. “Monument á Cervantes,” La Llumanera, June 1878, 7.
21 Two of the bas-reliefs depicted Cervantes’s tools as a writer, and his famous characters: Don Quijote and Sancho. The other two depicted the battle of Lepanto and Cervantes’s imprisonment in Algiers. Drawings of the projected monument were published in La Llumanera and La Ilustración Española y Americana. “Monument á Cervantes,” La Llumanera, June 1878, 7; Alfredo Escobar, “Monumento a Cervantes en Nueva York,” La Ilustración Española y Americana, 8 January 1879, 11, 13.
22 “Cervantes. A Monument to be erected in Central Park to the memory of the famed Spanish Writer.” New York Herald, 18 May 1878. In an ironic twist of imperial politics, the committee sought to request those cannons from West Point, where they had been placed after being taken in the Mexican War.
23 “City and Suburban news,” NYT, 1 September 1878, 12.
his presence would serve “to push the project of the Cervantes monument, delayed for a number of reasons.”

Although Cuyás did not elaborate on the reasons, it seems logical to assume that the end of the war in Cuba must have contributed to diminishing the patriotic fervor which had led to the undertaking of such a monumental project. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the figure of Cervantes reappeared in 1891, when the Spanish colony in New York, responding to the call of the consul to contribute to the Columbian centennial celebrations, organized the Círculo Colón-Cervantes. As in the 1870s, the resurgence of Cuban nationalism (José Martí would found the Cuban Revolutionary Party at the end of 1891) spurred the Spaniards’ support for this celebration of españolismo. The choice of the name suggests that the Círculo was built upon the remnants of the Cervantes Society of the 1870s, but the pairing of Cervantes and Columbus was significant in the context of ethnic America, where Spaniards competed with other ethnic groups and with American elites over the proper commemoration of the Centennial. While Italians and Americans, for example, extolled Columbus’s individual initiative, New York Spaniards sought to downplay the relevance of the discoverer and highlight instead the long-term civilizing mission that followed the discovery, a legacy intimately tied to the spread of Spanish language and culture so aptly represented by Cervantes. But, to better understand why the joining of Cervantes and Columbus appealed to Spaniards in America in the 1890s, we need to look at the broader Columbian celebrations in Spain and the United States.

The Unión Iberoamericana and the Columbian Celebrations in Spain

The embrace of Columbus and the Columbian Centennial in 1892 can be traced back to the Paris Universal Exhibition in 1878, where the idea of cementing the bonds between Spain and the Spanish-American republics led to the creation of the Unión Hispanoamericana in Paris in 1879. The Americanist sentiment caught on in Spain too, and in 1885, a Unión Iberoamericana was established in Madrid. In 1890, as the United States pursued its own vision of American unity with the organization of the Panamerican Union, the Unión Hispanoamericana and the Unión Iberoamericana merged. The specter of American imperialism was never far from the minds of Spaniards, particularly those living in the United States, and it was there that the Unión Iberoamericana took a leading role in promoting Hispanoamericanismo and celebrating the Columbian heritage, as an antidote to the claims of both imperialist Americans and nationalist Cubans.

One of the main points in the Unión’s program was the establishment of Ibero-American centers in Spain and the Americas. Mexico has often been considered the pioneer, but primacy of place should go to the United States. Arturo Baldasano, the new Spanish consul in New Orleans and a founding member of the Unión, proved the right man for the job. As he settled down to work in one of the most notorious centers of Cuban filibusterism in the United States, he approached his task of spreading the new hispanist creed with almost missionary zeal.

25 Jesús Pando y Valle offers a brief history of the development of the Unión Iberoamericana in his book, El Centenario del Descubrimiento de América (Madrid: Imprenta de Ricardo Rojas, 1892). Pando y Valle, the force behind the creation of the society, was Consul of San Salvador in Madrid, and the editor of the magazine Los Dos Mundos. Information on the society can be found in its monthly journal, Unión Iberoamericana, which began publication in 1887. On relations between Spain and Latin America during the nineteenth century see Carlos M. Rama, Historia de las relaciones culturales entre España y América Latina. Siglo XIX (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1982).
To carry out this project, Baldasano sought the support of the Spanish community in New Orleans. On November 15, 1884, he reported to Madrid the inauguration of the Centro Español e Hispanoamericano. Among its goals were to “contribute to the perpetuation of the Spanish language in Louisiana, and . . . to counter the powerful influence that this country exercises over Spanish America.” Baldasano also saw the Centro as a positive counterweight to the growing nationalism of the Cuban émigré community of New Orleans, and he applauded the election of a prominent pro-Spanish Cuban as its first president.

The Cotton Centennial Exposition in New Orleans offered the perfect opportunity to showcase this Hispanic unity to Americans. Baldasano made sure that the exposition grounds reflected the harmony of the Hispanic family by placing the Spanish exhibit together with those of her former colonies. Moreover, taking advantage of the presence in New Orleans of fellow unionista and Spanish ex-deputy Arturo de Marcoartú, he arranged for the Centro Español e Hispano Americano to host the first meeting in the United States to plan the 1892 centennial of Columbus’s “discovery” of America. This was in keeping with Baldasano’s belief that Spain should take the initiative in the celebration.

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27 The meeting took place on February 15, 1885. There, Marcoartú proposed to name honorary president of the committee the Duke of Veragua, direct descendant of Columbus. The presidency fell jointly on the governor of Louisiana, Ministers of Spain and Italy in Washington, and the American Hispanist George Bancroft. The committee also included the consuls of Spain, Italy, Mexico, and the Low Countries; the Viceconsuls of Spain, Portugal and Costa Rica; Monsignor Gillow, representing Mexico; Miss Julia Ward; and representatives of the local press. To these were also added the Spanish Consul in New York and the editor of Las Noticias. Arturo Baldasano to Estado, 5 March 1885, MAEAH, Legajo H-1982. In May 1885, Marcoartú participated in a similar gathering at Tammany Hall to establish a centennial committee in New York. The meeting, called by the Consul General, drew close to 200 people, including members of the Spanish press in New York and Madrid. “America’s Fourth Centennial,” NYT, 28 May 1885, 5.
The inauspicious death of King Alfonso XII in 1885 threatened plans for the
Columbian celebrations. Alfonso is said to have expressed his desire to go to the
United States himself to unveil a replica of Madrid’s Columbus statue in New York’s
Central Park, as he believed that “Columbus should ever be an enduring bond between
Spain and the United States.” The widowed Queen Regent reiterated those feelings
in July 1887, when the American Minister in Madrid informed her of the growing
interest in the United States in commemorating the centennial. In February 1888, a
decree established the Royal Commission of the Centennial. By then, both the United
States and Italy were well on their way to developing their own programs of
festivities. The Spanish government, however, stalled for two more years. Faced with
this official paralysis, the Unión Iberoamericana took the initiative and, in May 1890,
requested from the Cabinet the creation of a Junta Nacional Central to organize the
program of celebrations. It took another seven months for the government to draft the
decree creating the Junta Directiva del Centenario. As the Queen signed the
document, the American government was already preparing to mail out the invitations
to attend the Chicago Columbian World’s Fair in 1893.

The stark contrast between the two nations was not lost on the official
organizers of the centennial in Spain. The articles in El Centenario, the Junta’s official
organ, highlighted this disparity. In its inaugural issue, the editor and former Spanish
Minister to Washington, Juan Valera, sadly acknowledged: “when one thinks of the

28 General Wilson, president of the New York Genealogical and Biographical Society, was the initiator
of the project to place a replica of the Madrid Columbus statue in Central Park. Wilson reminisced on
this earlier meeting with the Spanish king at its unveiling by U.S. Vice-President Adlai Stevenson in
1894, Presentation of Suñol’s Bronze Statue of Christopher Columbus (New York: De Vinne Press,
1894). The original statue had been commissioned by the Spanish nobility as a gift to Alfonso XII on
the occasion of his wedding to his cousin María de las Mercedes in 1879. Néstor Ponce de León, The
Columbus Gallery (New York: N. Ponce de León, 1893), 92-95.
29 The text of the decree, dated 8 January 1891, can be found in Pando y Valle, Centenario, 204-210.
great splendor with which the United States prepares to celebrate the fourth centennial of the Discovery of America, the spirit shrinks when it is compared to the small quantity Spain has to spend on the pageantry and pomp with which it should be commemorated.”

But the lackluster response of the government was not just the product of lack of resources. It revealed the weakness of the national project in Restoration Spain. The modesty of the official centennial program was also a product of the elitism of a Restoration system that was not invested in popular mobilization. Premier Cánovas del Castillo, a historian and the leader of the conservative party, helped design a program anchored by a number of historical exhibits and symposia. As president of the Madrid Ateneo, he also organized there a series of lectures on the history of the Americas. These initiatives gave the Spanish celebrations an elitist tone that contrasted markedly with the popular tenor of the festivities in the United States.

As the Unión Iberoamericana recognized, “the people . . . will not get much out of the congresses, literary competitions, expositions and banquets which very few of them will attend.”

The leaders of the Unión, many of whom had either been born or had lived in the American republics, had a clearer sense of the didactic and patriotic potential of these events. To integrate the popular classes in the centennial commemorations they

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31 Satirical renditions of the centennial in the press often underscored this elitism. Thus, the magazine Blanco y Negro published an account of the celebrations in a fictitious village, Valdepitores, where the only popular participation in a program filled with statues, hymns, literary competitions, and artistic exhibits, was a municipal banquet which “the entire village will be able to watch from the fences of the pen where it will take place, and they will be able to lick their lips for free all they want.” Cited in Salvador Bernabeu Albert, 1892: El IV Centenario del Descubrimiento de América en España: Coyuntura y Conmemoraciones (Madrid: CSIC, 1987), 166-167. On the contrasts between the Spanish and American celebrations see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Good Day, Columbus,” in Silencing the Past. Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 124-136.

32 Pando y Valle, Centenario, 228-229.
suggested the organization of a National Parade “where, in beautiful consortium, all the elements of the Nation, from the Monarch to the most humble laborer, would be joined.” Such a popular demonstration would not only counter the exclusive tone of the other events, but it would also help to construct a national historical narrative. The parade, they argued, “would revive in people’s souls the idea of a very honorable past and the envisioning of a venturous future.”

**Spanish immigrants and the Columbian centennial in the United States**

While in Spain the idea of organizing a national parade was a novel concept, in the United States historical pageants were in their apogee. The connection between the past and the future was a defining trait of this modality of celebration, which historian David Glassberg assigns to the progressive reform movements of late nineteenth-century America. Progressives “sought a sense of continuity as a psychological keel amid recent social changes.” A massive influx of European immigrants was high on the list of the social changes facing American reformers. Civic commemorations and historical pageants provided both a sense of order at a time of rapid change, and also a venue for immigrants to become part of that order by showcasing their ethnicity and patriotism.

Like other immigrant groups, Spaniards sought to take part in the great American pageant, but their attempts to claim Columbus as an ethnic symbol did not go unchallenged. For one thing, Columbianism became a contested terrain where

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33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 233.
different groups sought to appropriate the image of the navigator and the significance of his “discoveries” to fit their own goals. Thus, Italian immigrants depicted Columbus as a national hero, a symbol of their newly-unified nation, while Irish immigrants claimed the navigator as a Catholic hero in their own struggles against the ascendancy of Anglo-Saxon Protestants. More important than having to share Columbus with other constituencies was the fact that the celebration of his feats often involved the denunciation of Spain. What some nineteenth-century Spanish scholars dubbed “the Columbian Legend,” the ill-treatment suffered by Columbus at the hands of the Spanish, underscored the black legend’s portrayal of Spain as quintessentially non-American.

A report from the Spanish Consul in Savannah to the Minister in Madrid illustrates how this battle for the Columbian heritage played out in the United States. The consul described “a most reprehensible incident” which took place at a mass in the Catholic Cathedral during the Columbian celebrations. The organizing committee had assigned the Spanish official a place of honor, but the ceremony soon turned into a diplomatic fiasco when the bishop reminded the congregants of the ill treatment that the Native Americans, and Columbus himself, had suffered at the hands of the Spaniards, and pointed out that Spain was now paying for her cruelty. “She has fallen from her position as ruler over all Europe to be helplessly insignificant in a political

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37 On the Columbian Legend see Schmidt-Nowara, The Conquest of History, 75-86.
point of view,” the bishop proclaimed, and, citing Ecclesiastes, he highlighted the justice of divine retribution which had punished Spain by giving her “a child for a king.”

In Mobile, the Columbian celebrations, which included a Catholic procession of more than 2,000 people and a number of civic organizations, were dampened by the last minute withdrawal of the Italian societies, in protest for the preeminence given to the Spanish flag and the Spanish community in the parade. Even in New Orleans, where Baldasano had pioneered the creation of committees to celebrate the Columbian centennial, the Spanish presence in the civic parade was not as prominent as he had envisioned it. By then, many Spaniards had left Louisiana for the booming cigar centers of Tampa and Key West.

In Florida, the resurgence of Cuban émigré activities after the Peace of Zanjón in 1878 imbued the Columbian celebrations with a new meaning. Between 1890 and 1900, the Spanish population in the state tripled. As the militant nationalism of the Cubans increased, tensions between the two groups flared up. In Key West, for example, Cuban cigarworkers established unions that banned Spaniards from

38 “Columbus Day in Church,” The Morning News, 17 October 1892, 8. The reference is to Ecclesiastes 10:16: “Woe to you, O land, when your king is a child, and your princes feast in the morning!” The child-king referred to was Alfonso XIII, the posthumous son of Alfonso XII and María Cristina, born in 1886. Ironically, this sharp criticism escaped the Spanish Consul, whose English was so poor, as he later admitted to the Spanish Minister, that he did not understand the insulting remarks. Instead of walking out in protest, as he claimed he would have done, he sat through the entire mass, one must imagine, quite content with the ceremony. Narciso Pérez Petinto to Estado, 17 October 1892, MAEAH, Legajo H-2062.


40 “Quatrième Centenaire de Christophe Colomb,” L’Abeille de Nouvelle Orleans, 21, 22, October 1892; 17 February 1885. The Italian participation was also affected by the events of the previous year when eleven Italians were lynched by a mob for their alleged involvement in the assassination of New Orleans’s Chief of Police.

41 Gerald E. Poyo states that the Cuban communities there “became the most important constituency for a popular, militant nationalist movement.” Poyo, “With All, and for the Good of All,” 55.
membership, and in 1890, they set up a vigilante organization that patrolled the harbor to bar Spaniards from entering the island.\footnote{Ibid., 107.}

Cubans also skillfully exploited the rivalries between Americans and Spaniards. The late nineteenth century saw the development of American Nativism, a movement which was at its core anti-foreign, anti-Catholic, and anti-radical.\footnote{The classic study of American Nativism is John Higham, \textit{Strangers in the Land. Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925}, 3d ed. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992). Nativism was part of the “transformation of nationalism,” described by E. J. Hobsbawm as “mutat[ing] from a concept associated with liberalism and the left, into a chauvinist, imperialist and xenophobic movement of the right.” E. J. Hobsbawm, \textit{Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 121.} By these criteria, Spain struck out. While Cuban and American nationalisms were secular and republican, Spanish patriotism, particularly as it related to the Spanish presence in America, was still wedded to the Crown and the Catholic Church. If Americans distrusted royalist and Catholic Spain, they disliked her radical streak even more. Cubans were well aware of those sentiments, and, in the wake of the Haymarket riot, they exploited the \textit{peninsular} anarchist presence to highlight this radicalism and pit Americans against Spaniards.

In May, 1891, Cubans in Tampa responded to a Spanish May Day parade with a patriotic civic procession, ostensibly to celebrate the fourth anniversary of their arrival in the city. Reports in the American press pointed out that while the Spaniards “had paraded the [streets] of Tampa with their red flag, marching to the beat of the drum in regular anarchist style,” the Cubans had marched “with the American flag prominent all through the procession with … banners … inscribed ‘long live America and freedom.’” Moreover, the Cuban procession included “a float drawn by two horses in which were two beautiful girls, one representing Columbia and the other
Cuba.” The *Tampa Tribune* remarked that “the people of Tampa ... had nothing to fear from such loyal population as our Cuban friends show themselves to be,” but it warned Spanish anarchists that “it will not do well for them to do it again.”

The increasing tension, and even physical violence, against Spaniards in Tampa at the time led to the organization, in September 1891, of the *Centro Español*. Although established as a Society of Instruction and Recreation, the tenor of its bylaws underscored the political conflicts facing the immigrant community. Article one stated that the goals of the society were “to provide instruction and honest recreation to its members, and to protect them against any contingency they may face *due to their national origin.*” Article seven declared that “to become a member of this club the candidate must be Spanish by *race and sentiment, or a loyal supporter of Spain and her prestige in America.*” (my emphasis).

Besides providing a gathering place for Spanish immigrants, the *Centro* was also meant to foster social intercourse between Spaniards and Americans. Spaniards believed that American sympathies toward the Cuban exiles were the result of their ignorance about conditions on the island. In October 1891, the presence of the Mayor of Tampa at a Cuban parade commemorating the *Grito de Yara* (the beginning of the Ten Years’ War) prompted a Spaniard to write to the local newspaper requesting an explanation from the official. The letter also anticipated the new visibility of a “very quiet, peaceable and law-abiding portion of the community” [the Spaniards]. The writer informed the American public that “a Spanish Casino is going to be built here

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45 José C. Otero, *Acción Española en Tampa: Sus instituciones, sus hombres, su industria, su comercio, etc.* (Ybor City: Imprenta la Políglota, 1912), 8, 10. On the origins and evolution of the Centro Español see Ana M. Varela-Lago, “From Patriotism to Mutualism: The Early Years of the Centro Español de Tampa, 1891-1903,” *Tampa Bay History* 15, 2 (Fall/Winter 1993): 5-23.
which will prove extremely useful to the Spanish residents, an ornament to the city of Tampa and a useful institution where American visitors can be received, and where they will probably learn to appreciate the Spanish character and their citizenship.\footnote{Patriotic Protest,” TMT, 26 November 1891; “Carta de Madrid,” Las Novedades, 26 November 1891, 1; “Carta de Cayo Hueso,” Las Novedades, 10 December 1891, 2.}

The letter was printed on the same day that José Martí, the leader of the movement for Cuban independence, delivered his first speech in Tampa, at the Liceo Cubano. His memorable and successful three-day fund-raising tour in Ybor City was a testament to the enthusiasm and hopes of the émigré community, and resulted in the proclamation of the Tampa Resolutions and the establishment of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in January of 1892.\footnote{On Martí’s visit to Tampa see José Rivero Muñiz, “Los cubanos en Tampa,” Revista Bimestre Cubana 74 (January-June, 1958): 47-65. For a short but comprehensive biographical account of Martí see Philip S. Foner’s introduction to José Martí, Our America: Writings on Latin America and the Struggle for Cuban Independence (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 11-68.} Not surprisingly, when the members of the Centro Español decided to build their clubhouse, they chose a prime space on Ybor City’s main thoroughfare, to rival the preeminence of the Liceo Cubano located just a few blocks away. At its official dedication, in June 1892, the references to the Columbian centennial abounded. In the wake of Martí’s visit, an event that, according to a witness, was seen by the Cuban émigrés as “the prelude of the struggle destined to expel Spain from the New World,” the emblematic date provided an opportunity for Spaniards to show their national pride and to defend their presence in Florida, as well as in Cuba.\footnote{Rivero, “Cubanos en Tampa,” 53.}

The articles published in New York’s Las Novedades on the inauguration of the Centro’s clubhouse praised it as a monument to the unity and patriotism of the Spaniards in Tampa, whose goal was “to increase our social and political prestige...
among the natives of the country, and to counteract the negative propaganda of those who want to see us hated by the North Americans.” The success of this enterprise was set up against the backdrop of the Columbian celebrations. The Tampa correspondent waxed poetic as he stated proudly, “in this year of glorious commemorations for our beloved fatherland, it seems as if her children stand up like giants to show that the descendants of those heroes, that after four hundred years remain the admiration of the world, have not degenerated.”49 The enthusiastic and almost heroic tone of these messages from the besieged Spanish community of Tampa must have raised the spirits of Las Novedades’s readers in New York, who were facing their own set of challenges to carry out their version of the proper way to commemorate the Columbian centennial.

The Círculo Colón-Cervantes and the Columbian centennial in New York.

The Columbian celebrations in New York offer an interesting contrast to the circumstances surrounding the Spanish communities in the South. Although small, the Spanish community in New York was comparatively the largest and the wealthiest in the country. Moreover, New York itself embraced the Columbian festival as a monumental civic pageant and, together with Chicago, held a prominent role in the centennial commemorations. It is this community that perhaps best illustrates the possibilities and the limitations of Columbus as a national/ethnic symbol for Spaniards in late nineteenth-century America.

49 “El Centro Español de Tampa,”Las Novedades, June 23, 1892; “Carta de Tampa,” Las Novedades, July 7, 1892.
Since Arturo de Marcoartú’s speech at Tammany Hall in 1885 not much had happened regarding the centennial celebrations in New York. But, with the appointment of Baldasano as Consul General there in 1890, things began to change. As he had done in New Orleans, Baldasano set out to organize a *Centro Español e Hispano Americano* which would serve as a tool to “increase our importance in this city, to achieve the influence we deserve among the children of the Ibero-american race, and to contribute to the splendor of the Columbian centennial in America.” In February 1891, his efforts came to fruition with the establishment of the *Círculo Colón-Cervantes*. The change in the name reflects the Spaniards’ desire to establish a direct link between the Italian explorer and the Spanish author. The universality of both figures certainly fitted the nature of the commemoration, but the reference to Cervantes also highlighted the importance of what came after Columbus, the legacy of the discovery being intimately tied to the spread of Spanish language and culture and the “civilizing” mission of Spain in the Americas.

The inauguration of the *Círculo* was the culmination of the frantic activity of Baldasano and the New York Spanish elite in the months leading up to the October celebrations. In April, the consul reported to Madrid that the Mayor of New York had endorsed the club’s initiatives for the Centennial and had supported them before the State Legislature. These included: to make October 12, 1892 an official holiday; to nominate a Committee of One Hundred to design a program of city-wide celebrations; and to allocate $50,000 from the municipal budget to cover the expenditures.

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50 Arturo Baldasano to Estado, 28 November 1890; 16 December 1890, MAEAH, Legajo H-1986.
Baldasano also enclosed a booklet with a project for a historical pageant meant to honor Columbus’s life and achievements. The idea had originated at the Círculo, which had then approached one of the best-known organizers of pageants and processions at the time, Imre Kiralfy. Kiralfy had already researched the pageant in Spain for his show “Columbus and the Discovery of America,” which was touring the United States. When he heard of the Círculo’s plans, the booklet explained, Kiralfy “accepted the task of planning and directing the pageant, for free, resolving to make it the greatest civic demonstration the world has ever seen.” The Círculo then sought the support of a number of Italian, German, and Catholic societies and presented its project to the Committee of One Hundred.  

The civic-historic pageant, called “The Triumph of America,” took place on the evening of October 12. The float of the Círculo, placed between those representing “Prehistoric America” and “A Puritan Wedding,” was part of a joint effort with the Italian societies to recreate “The New World.” It included the Catholic Kings and several hundred knights and ladies at the Spanish royal court, as well as a reproduction of the Santa María. Behind them stood a monumental statue of Columbus, and a motley group of Spanish and European explorers following in his steps. The Times declared the event to be “the crowning glory of the Columbus celebration.”  

For Spaniards, too, it was a big success. The pageant offered them the opportunity to participate in America’s ethnic festive culture. Moreover, it was intended to integrate

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52 Arturo Baldasano to Estado, 1 April 1892, MAEAH, Legajo H-1986. Kiralfy produced a stage version of “The Life of Columbus” that ran for almost two years in Chicago during the World’s Fair. “Imre Kiralfy Dead in England,” NYT, 29 April 1919, 15.  
53 “The Triumph of America,” NYT, 13 October 1892, 1.
Spain into the narrative of American history and progress, and also to legitimize her
continued imperial presence in the Caribbean.

The dramatic effect of the historical pageant and the exuberance of the week-
long Columbian celebrations had a profound impact on Spanish observers. José Alcalá
Galiano, reporting for Madrid’s *El Centenario*, spoke in extolling terms of the
unifying effect of the festivities. “Everybody was at the same time actor and
spectator,” he explained to his readers, “and they melted, as metals coalescing in a
melting pot, into that enormous unity that is the multitude, and they sang the majestic
Columbian chorus in its apotheosis.” In language pregnant with imperial metaphors,
Alcalá Galiano remarked on the fusion between the two nations, “our Spanish flag . . .
became almost the national flag of the Americans . . . as if, for a few hours, they had
offered us, by filial submission and courtesy, America’s scepter.”54 *Las Novedades* too
highlighted the prominent display of the Spanish flag on New York’s buildings. This
landscape provoked such intense feelings of national pride, its editor wrote, that “one
feels moved to shout: ‘I am Spanish!’, so that the entire world can hear it.”55

The *Círculo*’s success with the pageant, however, was tempered by the failure
of another project dear to its members, a fountain representing Columbus and the
Pinzón brothers, a gift from the Spanish colony to the city of New York. As with the
name of the club, here too, the figure of the Genoese navigator was balanced with
those of Spain’s native sons, in this case, the Spanish brothers who accompanied
Columbus in his first voyage. Honoring the captains of the three caravels underscored
the fact that the “discovery” had been a team effort, and that without Spanish

(first quote), 312 (second quote).
55 “La semana colombina,” *Las Novedades*, 13 October 1892, 8
resources and know-how Columbus might not have succeeded. The idea of the fountain started with Fernando Miranda, the Spanish sculptor who had been involved with the Cervantes monument in the 1870s, but when the Park Commission denied the Círculo’s request to place the fountain at the entrance of Central Park, the club withdrew its offer.

The failure of the Spanish fountain project came on the heels of the unveiling of the Columbus statue at Columbus Circle, a monument financed by New York’s Italian community. The inscription at the base of the statue repeated the familiar claims of the Columbian Legend. The text, in English and Italian, read in part: “scoffed at before; during the voyage menaced; after it chained; as generous as oppressed, to the world he gave a world.” Leaflets, signed by an anonymous Spaniard, offered a “Vindication for an outrage committed by the Italian residents in New York against the eternal glory of Spain about the true facts of the discovery of America.” While its author recognized the honor due to Columbus, he decried the absence of any mention of the support he received from the Spanish crown and Spanish mariners. As

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56 Martín Alonso Pinzón commanded the *Pinta*, and Vicente Yañez Pinzón the *Niña*. Despite the statue’s emphasis on the Pinzón brothers, the *Progresso Italo-Americano*, which had led the subscription for the Columbus monument funded by the Italian-American community, presented the project to its readers as yet another monument in honor of Columbus. “La gigantesca fontana che gli Spagnuoli di New York e d’America intendono elevare in onore di Cristoforo Colombo,” *Supplemento al Progresso Italo-Americano*, New York, 17 April 1892, 1. “In honor of Columbus,” (n.p., n.d). AGA-MAE, Caja 1283. On the debate in Spain over whether to memorialize Columbus or the Pinzón brothers see Schmidt-Nowara, *The Conquest of History*, 80-83.

57 “La fuente monumental colombiana,” *Las Novedades*, 29 December 1892; “The Columbus Fountain,” *NYT*, 20 December 1892, 2; 22 December 1892, 8. The Commission offered two alternative locations, Battery Park at the tip of Manhattan, and Mount Morris, in Harlem. Internal documents of the Círculo also indicate that the club did not have the resources necessary to fund the project within the calendar of the Columbian celebrations. “Informe de la Junta Directiva del Círculo Colón-Cervantes” (1892-1893), 9-10. MAEAH, Legajo H-3488.
for the legacy of the discovery, he added, “Italy cannot claim any credit for culture and progress in America, because it has never done anything whatsoever there.”

Like the bishop of Savannah, Italians honored the discoverer, but presented him as a visionary underdog fighting against the system (i.e. the cruel Spanish monarchy), an appealing image to immigrants and Americans alike. Spaniards, on the other hand, emphasized the positive consequences of the discovery: civilization, culture and progress. Thus, they sought to defend an honorable imperial past and, more importantly, the right to continue to rule over their remaining Caribbean colonies.

The Spanish Royal Delegation at the Chicago Columbian Exposition

The difficulty of using Columbus and the Spanish monarchy as elements of an ethnic Spanish identity in the United States was perhaps best illustrated by the events surrounding the visit of the Spanish royal delegation at the Columbian ceremonies. Instead of helping to forge a common bond between Spain and the United States, the delegation, which included the late King’s sister, Infanta Eulalia, and the Duke of Veragua, seemed to have magnified the differences between the two countries.

An important factor that conferred legitimacy on the Spaniards’ claim to Columbus was that his lineage had stayed in the peninsula. It was only fitting that the Duke of Veragua, the direct descendant of the Admiral, would represent Spain at the Chicago Columbian Exposition. His arrival in New York in April, 1893 was much

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58 Un Español, “VINDICACION de un ultraje cometido por los italianos residentes en Nueva York contra la gloria inmarcesible de España acerca de los hechos verídicos en el descubrimiento de America,” New York, October 1892. MAEAH, Legajo H-2062. See also, “Injusticia Italiana,” Las Novedades, 17 November 1892.
anticipated, and during this period several articles appeared in popular journals on the history of his family.\textsuperscript{59} Much was made of the Duke’s liberal leanings and of his popular and democratic ways as he attended innumerable ceremonies and received many honors. There were even rumors that the Spanish government was considering elevating its diplomatic representation to the rank of Embassy and naming Veragua its first ambassador to the United States.\textsuperscript{60} The Spanish colony, too, honored the distinguished visitor. The \textit{Círculo Colón-Cervantes} hosted a reception for the Duke and his brother and it named Veragua honorary president of the club.\textsuperscript{61}

As had happened in 1892, however, the legacy of the discovery remained a contested one. In the midst of the debate over the “American Sunday,” a Baptist minister who advocated closing the Chicago Exhibit on Sundays used Spain as an example of the decadence that befalls a country when “Romanism is dominant [and] the observance of Sunday . . . disregarded.” Reverend MacArthur was appalled to see Americans “going wild over the Infanta and . . . the Duke of Veragua, and . . . extolling Spain . . . the poorest and most ignorant country in Europe.”\textsuperscript{62} A few days later, MacArthur apparently received an anonymous letter, “purporting to come from the \textit{Círculo Colon-Cervantes},” addressing some of those charges. The anonymous author bluntly told the Reverend, “when your ancestors were semi-savages in England there was at Salamanca an (sic) university with men of great learning.” The letter also

\textsuperscript{60} “An Ambassador from Spain,” \textit{NYT}, 10 May 1893, 4.
\textsuperscript{62} “National Honor at Stake,” \textit{NYT}, 26 May 1893, 9.
called into question MacArthur’s character and ministry. The Círculo, however, disclaimed any responsibility for the document. MacArthur, who had visited Spain and claimed to have some knowledge of the history of Columbus, portrayed him as a “bully and tyrant, unscrupulous and cruel.” Challenging the Columbian myth head-on, he asserted: “Columbus may have discovered us in 1492, but we have discovered him in 1892,” and he concluded, “it is a matter of rejoicing that he discovered South America and not our own country.” Catholics, of course, disagreed with that statement. A few days later, before Veragua’s departure for Spain, the Knights of Columbus conferred upon him the order’s highest degree.

Something else was to prove more mortifying for Spaniards in America than MacArthur’s remarks. In July, the Times reported on the Duke of Veragua’s “quiet departure” and pointed to the apparent absence of a letter to the Mayor “formally acknowledging the courtesies extended to him by the city.” An explanation of sorts was published a few days later, when Veragua was said to have lost most of his fortune and to be “almost penniless.” The article went on to explain that some of the American friends he had met during his visit wanted to help him, and that the President of the Chicago Exposition, Thomas W. Palmer, had “decided to start a subscription,” calling on the people of the Americas “for contributions to a fund to be

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63 Club officials explained that its bylaws banned “religion and politics as subjects of discussion within the club or by members in the club’s name.” “Columbus finds a defender,” NYT, 13 June 1893, 1.
64 “Columbus Was a Bad Man,” NYT, 14 June 1893, 1; “Duke of Veragua Decorated,” NYT, 30 June 1893, 1. The Duke did manage to disappoint Archbishop Corrigan and some prominent Catholics when he failed to attend a scheduled ceremony at the Catholic Protectory. According to the newspaper report, some believed that his absence was due to his having taken “offense at some imaginary breach of etiquette or unintentional laxity of customary ceremony.” These types of “misunderstandings” were often mentioned during the visit of the Royal delegation to New York and Chicago. “Disappointed by the Duke,” NYT, 14 June 1893, 9.
invested in United States bonds, which shall be put in trust for the benefit of the Duke and his children.”

The officers of the Círculo interviewed by the Times claimed to have no knowledge of this project, but intimated that, even if such a project existed, the Duke, a true Spanish gentleman, would consider it an insult. Palmer thought otherwise. “I don’t believe there is a man in America or Europe who would refuse to be pulled out of a hole,” he said to the press. He added that “while the Duke is not begging, he and his family will receive any assistance from the American people as a grateful tribute.”

Things only got worse for Spaniards still clinging to the old concept of hidalguía (nobility) when Veragua’s brother, the Marqués de Barboles, chimed in. De Barboles “regretted that the subscription was intended only for the benefit of the Duke,” and claimed his right to receive part of the funds.

Behind the scenes, the subscription was also being discussed by Spanish diplomats in America. In October, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to the Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington, Emilio de Muruaga, encouraging him to support the initiative, within his own sense of what was “prudent,” and warning that its failure “would destroy in great part the outcome of the

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67 “De Barboles Asks For Aid,” NYT, 24 July 1893, 9. As if to emphasize the differences between the Spanish and the American branches of the family, the Times included in that column a reference to Alexius Columbus, a ninety-six year old man who had traveled from Buffalo, NY, to Chicago to see the Columbian Exhibit and visit his three daughters. He was described as “active in body and mind” and having a “striking resemblance” to the portrait of Columbus, of whom he claimed to be a collateral descendant, through Luis, the elder brother of Christopher.
Centennial.”

Muruaga replied that he had written to Palmer and to Juan Ceballos, a prominent Spanish banker and shipping tycoon based in New York, suggesting the creation of a lottery, backed by the state of Illinois, whose tickets could be distributed by Ceballos in South America. Muruaga indicated, however, that he did not believe this idea would succeed, as he had learned that some of the initial supporters of the subscription were “discouraged by the tenacious opposition of the press.”

Indeed, Palmer’s solution to Veragua’s plight provoked blistering comments from the press. *Life* ran a cartoon of Veragua passing the hat. *The New York Times* proposed the creation of an “Indigent Nobility Promotion Company, Limited,” and nominated Veragua and his brother as “the foundation stones for a privileged class in this country.” *The Brooklyn Eagle*, reporting the opinion of State Department officials, declared that they “consider[ed] it an outrage to further impose upon the good nature of the American people by expecting them to start this broken down relic of an effete nobility on his feet again.” The fact that Veragua bred bulls and had lost most of his money in a failed scheme to run a bullfighting ring at the Paris Exhibition only added to the acrimony of the editorial comments.

The American press and American public opinion were not the only ones opposed to the idea of a subscription for Veragua. In November 1893, Palmer wrote to Muruaga that he had “telegraphed . . . all the Presidents of the South and Central

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68 Estado to Emilio de Muruaga, 21 October 1893, AGA-MAE, Caja 1284.
69 Emilio de Muruaga to Estado, 20 November 1893, AGA-MAE, Caja 1284.
American States . . . asking for their cooperation,” but had received no answers. The responses from the Spanish Ministers in the Latin American republics, who had been sent a circular calling on them to start a subscription to establish a *mayorazgo* for the Duke and his descendants, were not encouraging either. Most of the dispatches noted that these countries were too poor to contribute. The diplomats also expressed their opinion that any such contribution should be spontaneous, and not channeled by Spain’s official representatives.

Spanish immigrant communities in Latin America also declined to participate in the Veragua subscription. Some prominent Spanish immigrant leaders, such as Telesforo García, the president of the Spanish Casino in Mexico, openly repudiated the initiative. García stated that “Veragua’s begging . . . mortified the Spanish colony.” The immigrants had hoped that the Duke would decline the offer; instead, “to the shame that this did not happen will be added the shame of the project’s failure.” He wrote that, while Spaniards in Mexico had never boasted of wealth, they could at least boast of honor, and that they felt ashamed that the so-called leaders of the fatherland came to America to beg. Moreover, he believed that Spain had already paid enough to Columbus’s heirs and that the situation Veragua found himself in had been brought about by his own incompetence.

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71 Thomas Palmer to Emilio de Muruaga, 28 November 1893. Muruaga attached a copy of the letter to his dispatch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 1 December 1893. AGA-MAE, Caja 1284.
72 Correspondence from several Latin American countries is located in AGA-MAE, Caja 1284.
73 Telesforo García to Duke of Almodóvar del Valle, 11 November 1893. Del Valle attached a copy of the letter to his dispatch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14 November 1893. AGA-MAE, Caja 1284.
The visit of the official representative of Spain to the Columbian Exposition, the Infanta Eulalia, was also marred with tensions. She had been chosen over her eldest sister, Isabel, because of her youth and modern outlook, which Premier Cánovas thought would be more amenable to the American character and to the subjects she was to meet abroad. Before setting out for the United States, the Infanta visited Cuba and Puerto Rico. The letters that Eulalia wrote to her mother, the deposed Queen Isabella II, in France, show that she was keenly aware of her responsibilities as the first Spanish royal to set foot on the land Columbus had discovered.74

The Infanta reached New York on May 20, 1893, graciously stating to American reporters covering her arrival that “it has been the dream of my life to visit your country.” Taken by her command of the language, the press praised her “good English.” Americans were also surprised by her physical appearance: a slender blonde blue-eyed twenty-nine-year-old Princess was not what most Americans had in mind when they thought of a Spanish Infanta.75 Eulalia’s personal modern style, however, was contained within the rigid parameters of royal etiquette. This caused its share of conflicts, even before her arrival in the United States. In fact, there were fears that her visit might be cancelled altogether, unless President Cleveland yielded to the demands of the Spanish royal house in matters of protocol.76

74 Eulalia de Borbón, Cartas a Isabel II (Mi viaje a Cuba y a Estados Unidos) (Barcelona: Editorial Juventud, 1949). See also Eulalia de Borbón, Memorias (Barcelona: Editorial Juventud, 1935), chapter 7. An English translation was published in 1937, The Infanta Eulalia, Memoirs of a Spanish Princess (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1937).
76 “May be no Infanta Ball,” NYT, 16 May 1893, 8. It was reported that President Cleveland would not “break a time-honored rule of the Executive and . . . return the Infanta’s call.” As this would be considered an insult, there was talk that Eulalia might have been ordered to return to Madrid. Details of this diplomatic crisis can be found in MAEAH, Protocolo, Legajo H-3488.
Eulalia’s aristocratic demeanor and the strict rules of protocol she had to follow in public situations prevented her from mingling with the people and only underscored the differences between the two countries: the modern, democratic, American republic and the traditional, aristocratic Spanish monarchy. During her stay in New York, the press commented on the exclusive nature of the grand ball given in her honor at Madison Square Garden, and pointed out that the Infanta would not mix with the guests. Internal squabbles within New York high society forced the officers of the Círculo Colón-Cervantes to step in and organize a semi-official event. The diplomacy of the Círculo’s committee saved the day.

In his analysis of the Infanta’s visit to the Fair, historian Robert E. Wilson is critical of Eulalia’s “frivolous” and “arrogant” behavior, which he believed alienated many Americans. He concludes that her more formal and dignified sister, Isabel, might have played a better role in developing a close relationship with the United States. While Wilson may be right, the tensions between the two countries cannot be reduced to the personality traits of the infantas alone. They were rooted in the countries’ different conceptions of the world and of their own role in it, and they pervaded the Columbian celebration.

A conflict that arose at the unveiling in Central Park of the replica of the Columbus statue in Madrid illustrates the cultural divide between the two countries. The ceremony was held by the New York Genealogical and Biographical Society. Its president, General James Grant Wilson, had conceived the idea when he visited Spain in 1884, and had hoped that Alfonso XII himself would unveil the statue during the

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Columbian celebrations. After the King’s death, the offer was made to the Duke of Veragua, but delays in the statue’s arrival made that impossible too. Instead, the unveiling took place on May 12, 1894, with the Vice President of the United States, Adlai Stevenson, doing the honors. The *Times* printed a detailed account of the ceremony, and, on the same page, included a critical article on the statue itself: “No Excuse for the Statue. An Affront to Art as Well as to the Artists of America.”

The article repeated some of the charges made by city leaders against public art funded by immigrant communities, which had been voiced in the discussion over the *Círculo’s* fountain project. “Foreign colonies in this city present the city with wretched specimens of sculpture,” read the blunt evaluation. But the situation was aggravated in this case by the fact that a self-described “American” genealogical society had been so “unpatriotic” as to contract the services of a foreign sculptor, Jerónimo Suñol, and, in the view of the article’s author, not even a good foreign sculptor at that. “Suñol’s statue,” the article stated, “may do well enough for Madrid, a city marvelously lacking in good monuments, but it is not fit for New York.” The author suggested that the Columbus built for the Chicago Fair by American architect Augustus Saint Gaudens would have been a better choice.

The artistry of the sculpture was not the only criteria for this judgment. The key to this criticism was the artist’s rendering of his subject, whether an intrepid discoverer or a mere tool of Spanish tyranny and Catholic fanaticism. “The cross and the Spanish banner,” the article explained, “are just the traits to banish from statues of Columbus, whose other attributes of sagacity, firmness, and indomitable will are enough in themselves to warrant all the honors he gets.” Saint Gaudens’s portrayal of

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78 “No Excuse for the Statue,” NYT, 13 May 1894, 9.
Columbus put the navigator on a par with other intrepid discoverers like Hudson, who had worked for the Dutch in New York. The contrast between Spain and the United States, represented in the two sculptural renditions, was paramount. As the article declared, “Suñol’s Columbus forces on us the memory of the vilest tyranny the world can find, that tyranny of the Inquisition against which brave little Holland fought so long and well, and because she fought, gave America precedents that serve to this day.”

No amount of royal charm by a Spanish infanta would have altered those sentiments. They reflected the deep-rooted negative stereotypes of Spain encapsulated in the centuries-old black legend.

**From Friend to Foe: The Spanish-Cuban-American War of 1898**

The checkered efforts of the Spanish diaspora in the United States to build a Spanish-American identity based on the symbols of Spain’s imperial past were dealt another blow when a new war for independence began in Cuba in 1895. The deeply-ingrained images of the black legend again helped to articulate a growing anti-Spanish sentiment. For example, when General Martínez Campos was recalled to Spain in 1896, the Times asked a Cuban leader about the character of the two candidates likely to succeed him, Generals Weyler and Polavieja. The Cuban replied: “There is only one thing that shows a parallel to the cruelties inflicted under these two men. That was the sacking of Rome by the Spaniards under Philip II (sic). The horrors of that action have

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79 Ibid.
lived for ages, the same crimes, in a lesser degree, have been witnessed in Cuba under the Spanish leaders.\textsuperscript{80}

Similar statements were delivered by leaders of other immigrants groups, sympathetic to the Cubans’ plight.\textsuperscript{81} The Russian-American Hebrew Association described Spanish rule in Cuba as “degrading, tyrannous, and corrupt.” Citing their own experiences suffering the “hardships and cruelties of persecutions . . . under the despotic rule of Russia” they requested that the United States grant Cubans belligerent rights. At a meeting commemorating the first anniversary of the war, a Polish leader compared the Cubans to the Armenians, and “characterized Spain as a vampire, which retained a colony simply in order to suck its life blood.”\textsuperscript{82}

As Americans and immigrants alike rallied to the cry of \textit{Cuba Libre}, Spaniards, feeling isolated and under siege, went on the defensive. When the U. S. Senate passed a bill calling for the recognition of Cuban belligerence and independence, \textit{Las Novedades} declared that a war between Spain and the United States would be “immense, frightful, persistent and interminable.” In order to win it, the editor stated, the United States would have to “wipe off the map and the world of the living an entire nation, whose history records the most sublime chapters of heroism.”\textsuperscript{83}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{80} “Cruelties for Cubans,” \textit{NYT}, 19 January 1896, 16. The Sack of Rome (1527) took place during the reign of Philip’s father, Charles V.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} On the appeal that the movement for Cuban independence had for other immigrant groups in America see Jacobson, \textit{Special Sorrows}, chapter 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{82} “Look for Recognition,” \textit{NYT}, 21 January 1896, 10; “Cuban Heroes Remembered,” \textit{NYT}, 25 February 1896, 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} “Cubans Feel Elated,” \textit{NYT}, 1 March 1896, 5.
\end{itemize}
A few weeks later, under the leadership of Arturo Baldasano, a *Junta Patriótica Española* was established in New York to collect funds for the Spanish Navy.84

A harsher blow hit the Spanish community in 1897 when Cánovas del Castillo was assassinated by an Italian anarchist. As anarchists in New York prepared a mass meeting to “celebrate the death of the leading despot of Spain,” the *Junta Patriótica* of New York arranged a funeral mass for the late premier.85 Cánovas’s successor, liberal party leader, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, granted autonomy to the Cubans, but it was too late. As unrest grew in Cuba, news reached the United States that the Spanish Minister in Washington had written disparaging remarks about President McKinley in a private letter to a friend. Its publication in the press fueled the prevailing anti-Spanish sentiment and forced the Minister to resign.86 A few days later, the American battleship *Maine* exploded in Havana harbor killing hundreds of American sailors. Claims that Spaniards had blown up the *Maine* continued to inflame popular protest. The situation deteriorated rapidly.

On April 17, as American troops encamped in Tampa, the Spanish Minister chartered a steamer to carry over 400 Spaniards to Havana. Some, the *Times* reported, were young men who would enlist in the Spanish army. But women and children also left, the paper said, because “the hostility to Spanish residents in that locality has become marked of late.” Similar arrangements were made for the transportation of

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84 These Juntas, which were being created throughout Europe and the Americas, organized monthly collections among Spanish immigrant communities and used the funds to revamp old warships or purchase new ones. The original plan was to maintain those collections for a period of ten years, hoping that each year would draw “at least a million dollars” from Spaniards overseas. “Money for Spain’s Navy,” *NYT*, 25 March 1896, 5.

85 “In Honor of Canovas,” *NYT*, 15 August 1897, 5. Memorial services were also held by Spaniards in other cities.

colonies of Spanish immigrants elsewhere in the United States. On April 21, war having been declared between the two countries, Baldasano closed the consulate in New York. He left the country soon thereafter, refusing to make any declarations to the press. “The press of [this] country has been so unfair to Spain that the dignity of my position makes it impossible for me to make any statement,” he said.

In smaller communities some Spaniards faced isolated acts of violence. In Georgia, two Spaniards were run out of town, and in Columbus, a Spaniard was killed by a German after an argument over the war. In Brooklyn, a reader warned the editor of the *Brooklyn Eagle* to “watch the Spaniards,” and the Spanish society “La Nacional” was denied the permit to celebrate its annual summer festival at Ulmer Park. In fact, in 1898 the park showcased a new ball game, the *Eagle* explained, “the figure of a Spaniard occupying a prominent place among those that visitors are expected to aim at.” Attempts were also made to persecute alleged Spanish spies, among them Arturo Cuyás and his brother Antonio. They were believed to be part of a espionage ring directed from Canada.

In August, following the naval debacles at Santiago de Cuba and Manila Bay, Spain surrendered to the United States. Imre

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89 “Spaniards Driven from Jonesville, Va.” (Sic), *NYT*, 27 April 1898, 3; “Spaniard killed in Columbus,” *NYT*, 28 April 1898, 3.


91 The Spanish spy system must not have been very efficient, if we are to believe reports that a letter containing a list with the name of all the spies working for Spain had been stolen by detectives in Montreal and sent to the United States, where it was printed in the press. “Spanish Spies in Danger,” *NYT*, 30 May 1898, 3; “Señor Carranza’s Letter,” *NYT*, 5 June 1898, 4. Ramón Carranza was Naval Attaché to the Spanish Legation in Washington. The letter made reference to two spies caught by the American authorities, one of them committing suicide while in jail.
Kiralfy, the master of the *Círculo’s* Columbian pageant in 1892, now reenacted the naval battles in a new pageant to the delight of audiences at Madison Square Garden.92

As the war ended, “a Spaniard” writing in the *Fortnightly Review* painted a grim picture of what Spain would be like without her colonies. He presaged that the loss of the colonial market would cause the collapse of the Spanish economy and that the streets would be filled with hungry people, joined by thousands of returned soldiers and military officers with meager salaries or no jobs at all. He anticipated the “tocsin of the revolution,” and the fall of the Restoration regime, warning that the army would decide “whether Carlists or Republicans shall triumph.”93 In her analysis of the situation in Cuba in 1893, the Infanta Eulalia had presented a more positive, and, as it turned out, a more accurate outlook. She wrote, “everywhere I have found a state of mind that seems to foresee that the day that Cuba separates herself from the kingdom would bring a general sense of relief to all concerned.”94 While the war was by no means a positive experience, paradoxically, the loss of the colonies appeared to have a reinvigorating effect in the former metropolis. Similarly, the American victory over Spain was to have some unanticipated positive consequences for the Spanish diaspora as well.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored how the attempts of Spanish immigrants to respond to American expansionism and Cuban nationalism by creating a Spanish-American

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94 Infanta Eulalia, *Cartas*, 49.
identity based on Spain’s imperial past were fraught with problems. Chief among them was the contested nature of the very symbol that came to embody the Spanish-American connection during the Columbian centennial. Not only was Columbus appropriated by a number of different ethnic groups, but the emphasis on his achievements as an individual was cast against the backdrop of the purported cruelty he had experienced at the hands of Spain and the Spanish crown. The political unrest in Cuba and the actions of the Spanish royal commission to the festivities reinforced the images of the black legend, which set a stagnant Spanish monarchy against the dynamic American republic. The war of 1898 sealed Spain’s fate as an imperial power, when it lost her remaining colonies to the United States.

Yet, it was precisely this victory which contributed to a new appreciation of Spain in America. As the United States became an imperial power in its own right, American elites appropriated the Spanish past as a symbolic tool to pursue a variety of agendas, examples of which will be examined in the next chapter. This American fascination with Spain, manifested in the development of Hispanism and the growth of Hispanic Studies in the United States, provided, in turn, the tools for the leaders of the Spanish diaspora to try to forge a Spanish-American ethnic identity in a more favorable setting than the one they had experienced in the late 1800s.
Despite Spain’s humiliating defeat at the hands of the United States in 1898 relations between the former enemies were soon reestablished. On April 11, 1899, the two governments signed a peace treaty in Paris.¹ Four days later Spain appointed José de Brunetti y Gayoso, Duke of Arcos, Spanish Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington. Although the country was still grappling with the consequences of “the disaster,” as the military defeat came to be known in Spain, the loss of the colonies produced a sense of relief.² The Duke of Arcos, an experienced diplomat who had served in Washington in the 1870s and 1880s, reflected this outlook on his arrival in New York in May 1899. Asked about Cuba by a reporter, he replied, “our interest in Cuba is ended, Spain is thinking of other things.” As for the outcome of the war, he stated, “That is past, and Spain looks only to the future.”³ Spain, of course, could not look to the future without reflecting on her past, a task that the regeneracionista movement was beginning to undertake. Interestingly, however, in the aftermath of the war, Americans too, began to look at the Spanish past in a new light, and even to claim it as their own.

¹ The armistice protocol by which Spain relinquished sovereignty over Cuba, Puerto Rico and other islands in the West Indies had been signed on August 12, 1898. The 1899 peace treaty determined the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States.
² “The disaster” was the catalyst for an intellectual movement of cultural regeneration that has been referred to in literary terms as the “generation of 1898,” or, more broadly defined, regeneracionismo. For a critique of this movement and of its scholarship see Britt-Arredondo, Quixotism.
As the Spanish immigrants who had left before the war returned from their exodus, and as thousands more joined their ranks in the following decades, the efforts of the immigrant elite to forge a Spanish ethnic identity in the United States met with more success. The loss of the colonies made the defense of the España ultramarina no longer possible, but Spaniards in the United States did not have to give up the imperial narrative altogether. Ironically, it was the end of the Spanish empire that allowed for a more positive view of Spain’s imperial past, one that could be embraced by Americans and Spaniards alike.

Historians have looked at America’s discovery of Spain and her appropriation of the Spanish past as part of a broader project of national refashioning as an imperial power.4 Through architecture, fiestas, and pageants, Anglo elites cast themselves as old-time dons and señoritas, the heirs of Spanish grandees, symbolically expressing their power over the native, non-white population. I share this interest in the symbolic power of such performances. This chapter, however, offers a different but complementary perspective, by looking at the protagonism of Spanish immigrant elites in this process. Specifically, it examines the activities of a group of leading Spanish residents in California and Florida who were instrumental in promoting American Hispanism. I argue that these elites used hispanism both as a tool to forge a Spanish ethnic identity in the diaspora, but also to shape Spanish national identity in the

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4 For an illuminating analysis of this process see Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, “Spanish Origins of American Empire: Hispanism, History, and Commemoration, 1898-1915,” International History Review 30 (March 2008) forthcoming. I thank Professor Schmidt-Nowara for providing me with a copy of the manuscript before publication.
peninsula. This nationalist project was particularly dear to official Spain during the
dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera (1923-1930).\(^5\)

There were drawbacks, however, to this recasting of Spain and the Spanish
diaspora as a new version of the sixteenth-century *conquistadores*. For one thing, even
if portrayed in a more positive light, this Romanticized reading of Spanish history
continued to present Spain as a foil to the United States. In doing so, it emphasized the
weight of tradition and continuity in Spanish society and it downplayed the dynamism
of the social forces that would lead to the downfall of the monarchy and the
dictatorship, and the proclamation of the Republic in 1931. In the diaspora too, not
everyone felt represented by the imperialist and conservative tenor of the *hispanista*
discourse. The *conquistador* rhetoric tended to gloss over cleavages and divisions
within the immigrant community, as we will see in the second half of the dissertation.

**America “discovers” Spain. Spanish-American relations, 1898-1930**

The end of Spain’s imperial presence in 1898 led, in the following decades, to
a renewed appreciation of the Spanish heritage of the United States. This shift in
American perceptions of Spain was supported by a revisionist history that was gaining
prominence in the country at the turn of the twentieth century, and it opened the space
for Spanish immigrant elites to reclaim this positive image of Spain’s imperial past
and use it as the core around which to construct a Spanish ethnic and national identity.

Writing about the causes that had led to the Spanish-American war, F. E.

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\(^5\) For a parallel process of reshaping in independent Cuba see John Marshall Klein, “Spaniards and the
Politics of Memory in Cuba, 1898-1934” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, Austin, 2004).
Chadwick presented the conflict as essentially a “racial strife.” Americans had long been puzzled by the Spanish character, Chadwick argued, because they had thought of Spaniards as Europeans, instead of “Moro-Iberian.” These racial characteristics defined the country’s “incapacity for government, its regionalism, its chronic state of revolution, its religiosity, its fatalism and procrastination, its sloth in material development,” and, Chadwick claimed, “made the Spanish nation an enigma to the northern mind.”

Chadwick’s negative portrayal of the “Spanish race” was consistent with narratives of the black legend. However, well before the war started in 1898, some American scholars had begun to reexamine this view of Spain and her past. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hispanists like Washington Irving, William H. Prescott, George Ticknor and Henry W. Longfellow had offered a more sympathetic version of Spanish history and culture. Yet, as Richard Kagan has argued in his discussion of “Prescott’s paradigm,” these works reproduced an essentialist view of the Spanish national character which presented Spain as the antithesis of the United States: “Spain was everything that the United States was not.”

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6 French Ensor Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1909), 6. A rear-admiral in the U.S. Navy, Chadwick had been in charge of a commission to investigate the blowing up of the *Maine* at the port of Havana in 1898.
A somewhat different trend developed among scholars in the West Coast where the focus of study shifted from peninsular Spain to her legacy in the Americas. Historians like Hubert H. Bancroft or Bernard Moses, who had been trained in the scientific school in Germany and taught Latin American History at Berkeley, were more interested in the study of Spanish political and economic institutions, particularly as they pertained to her rule in colonial Spanish America. Anthropologists like Lewis Morgan and Adolph Bandelier contributed to disseminating a more positive view of Spain’s imperial past. But it would be Bandelier’s disciple, Charles Lummis, whose work was to receive more attention in Spain.

While these trends had begun in the academic world in the nineteenth-century, this Spanish-American rapprochement flourished in the first decades of the twentieth century. In 1903, the International Institute, a school for women established in Santander in 1871, and one of the oldest American institutions in Spain, reopened in Madrid. In 1904, American Hispanist and philanthropist Archer Huntington founded

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For a summary of this historiography see, Keen, “Main Currents,” and Weber, “Spanish Legacy.” It is important to note that this embrace of America’s Spanish legacy was a contested arena. In California, as Glen Gendzel explains, there were competing foundational myths emanating from Los Angeles and San Francisco. This “intrastate sectionalism,” reflected tensions not only between Anglos and Hispanics, but within the White Anglo elite as well. Glen Gendzel, “Pioneers and Padres: Competing Mythologies in Northern and Southern California, 1850-1930,” Western Historical Quarterly 32, 1 (Spring 2001): 55-82.

The institute had moved to Biarritz during the Spanish-American war, and remained in France until 1903. On the legacy of the Institute in the education of Spanish women see Carmen de Zulueta, Cien años de educación de la mujer española: historia del Instituto Internacional (Madrid: Castalia, 1992).
the Hispanic Society of America in New York City. In 1907, the Spanish government created the Junta para la ampliación de estudios to foster academic exchanges with Europe and the Americas. In 1912, cultural exchanges received new momentum with the establishment of summer courses for foreigners in which a number of American students and teachers participated.

Diplomatically, too, relations between the two countries grew close. In November 1913, the United States elevated the rank of its representation in Madrid from Diplomatic Mission to Embassy, a move that was reciprocated by Spain a month later. The changing relationship between Spain and the United States was perhaps best symbolized in the visit of Theodore Roosevelt to Spain in 1914 to attend the wedding of his son Kermit to Belle Willard, the daughter of the American Ambassador in Madrid. The royal family entertained Roosevelt at the summer palace at La Granja. The former president and Rough Rider wrote to his wife, “I like the Queen, and genuinely admire and respect the King.” Except for a few negative comments in the press, Roosevelt was well received in Spain, a fact that led the New

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14 Although Juan Riaño, the Spanish Minister Plenipotentiary, received his credentials as Ambassador in 1913, due to lack of funding, the Spanish Mission in Washington did not become officially an Embassy until 1915. It is worth noting, however, that this was the first and only Spanish Embassy outside of Europe, where Spain had eight.
York Times to proclaim gleefully, “Colonel conquers the Spanish again.”

He visited El Escorial, Toledo and the Prado Museum and made it a point to receive Spanish journalists and to express his admiration for Spanish history and culture. In one of those meetings, Roosevelt remarked, “the Spanish tongue, on account of the great development of South America, would soon supplant French, and maybe English, as the universal language.”

Roosevelt may not have anticipated another factor that was to prove crucial in the universalization of the Spanish language: the war that broke out only a few weeks after his departure from Madrid.

The war in Europe and the ensuing ban on the teaching of German in American higher education was to have a great impact on the cultural relations between Spain and the United States, as Spanish came to fill the linguistic gap left by German. Americans also responded to pragmatic considerations resulting from an increase in commerce with the Spanish-American republics once European markets became inaccessible.

The academic shift met with detractors among supporters of other Romance languages (French and Italian) as well as Latin, but Hispanists and teachers of Spanish were ready to face the new challenges. Spanish immigrant elites were also to play a decisive role.

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16 “Colonel Conquers the Spanish Again,” NYT, 10 June 1914, 1.
17 “Roosevelt has a ‘bully time’ with the Spanish King,” NYT, 10 June 1914, 1.
18 The trend continued after the war. American exports to Latin America more than trebled between 1913 and 1927 (from 300 million to over 900 million dollars), making the United States “the first supplier of goods to every republic in Latin America except Paraguay.” O. K. Davies, “What Price Spanish?,” Hispania 11, 3 (May 1928): 254.
19 James D. Fernández has argued that this interest in things Spanish was a manifestation of what he has dubbed “Longfellow’s law,” which states that “U.S. interest in Spain is and always has been largely mediated by U.S. interest in Latin America.” James D. Fernández, “‘Longfellow’s Law’: The Place of Latin America and Spain in U. S. Hispanism, circa 1915,” in Spain in America, 124.
The Spanish diaspora and American Hispanism: Juan C. Cebrián

Spanish immigrant elites embraced American fascination with things Spanish. In fact, they became active promoters of Hispanism, which they used as a tool to forge a Spanish-American identity in the United States. Among the most prominent Spaniards involved in this process was Juan C. Cebrián. Cebrián, a *madrileño*, and his close friend and compatriot, Catalan Eusebio Molera, embodied the image of the *immigrant-conquistador* propounded by the Hispanist discourse. They both came from military families, and they met at the Military Academy of Engineers in Guadalajara in 1863. In the revolutionary turmoil that dethroned Isabella II in 1868, they decided to leave the army and to pursue a career in Engineering in the United States. After brief and unsuccessful stays in Paris and New York, they headed west, settling in San Francisco in 1870. In the bustling city they soon found work as assistant engineers, working on the construction of lighthouses and on the railroad. By 1875, they had established their own engineering firm. In 1879, they developed a system that improved Edison’s work on electricity, an achievement that graced the front pages of *La Llumanera*.²⁰

Cebrián and Molera married into two prominent families in the state. Cebrián wedded Josefina Laveaga, from a wealthy Mexican family of Spanish ancestry; Molera married Francisca Amelia Cooper, the daughter of Captain John B. R. Cooper,

who had settled in the area in the 1820s. These alliances brought them social recognition as well as landed wealth. The two Spanish friends had definitely “made America,” but they were also determined to “make Spain in America,” as they turned their talents to reproducing their homeland in their adopted fatherland. In tackling these projects, Cebrián and Molera were influenced as much by their own españolismo as by the growing interest in the United States about Spain. As a municipal architect in Santa Barbara, Cebrián built the first Spanish church in the city. A friend and biographer credited him with being “the initiator of the Spanish architectural Renaissance in California.” Cebrián and Molera also built Our Lady of Guadalupe in San Francisco. The church, destroyed in the 1906 earthquake, was rebuilt by Cebrián years later.

Despite his prolonged residence in San Francisco, Molera had remained thoroughly Spanish, and even more thoroughly Catalan. His activities sought to underscore this ancestry. He was one of the leading organizers of the 1909 Portolá festival, which celebrated the discovery of San Francisco Bay by Gaspar de Portolá in 1769, as well as the reconstruction of the city after the devastating 1906 earthquake. Molera also translated the log of the San Carlos, the first ship to enter San Francisco Bay, and participated in the erection of a statue of Fray Junípero Serra in Golden Gate

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21 Amelia, too, had Spanish ancestry, through her mother, Isabel Vallejo. Isabel’s grandfather had moved from New Spain to California in the mid-eighteenth century, and had accompanied Fray Junípero Serra to San Francisco in 1776.
23 His obituary mentioned that Molera “was proud of his ancestry and spoke the Catalan language even more fluently than Spanish.” D. Q. Troy, “In Memoriam. Eusebius Joseph Molera,” California Historical Society Quarterly 11, 1 (March 1932): 95. Molera had also been President of the Academy of Sciences in California, and of the Pacific Astronomical Society.
Park. In turn, when visiting Catalonia, Molera would lecture on the California Missions. He remained close to his childhood friends and, throughout his life, he contributed to a number of cultural initiatives and subscribed to a variety of publications produced in his native Vic.

In 1916, the centennial of the death of Cervantes, Molera and Cebrián donated to the city a monument to *El Quijote* that stands in Golden Gate Park. A bust of Cervantes was also donated by Cebrián to the library at the University of California at Berkeley, where he had also made extensive donations of books dealing with Spain and Spanish America. 1916 also marked the publication of the first Spanish edition of Charles Lummis’s *Spanish Pioneers* in Barcelona. The story of the translation of Lummis’s book into Spanish offers a window into the intimate connections between Hispanism, nationalism, and the Spanish diaspora in the United States.

**The Spanish Pioneers and Spanish national identity.**

Charles Lummis first published the *Spanish Pioneers* in Chicago in 1893, the year of the World’s Columbian Exposition, when Frederick Jackson Turner proposed before the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association his original and

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24 Although Serra had been born in the island of Majorca, in the Balearic islands, he was often honored as a son of Catalonia.
25 On Molera’s links to Catalonia see Ponce i Vivet, “Eusebi Molera;” and Ylla-Català, “Un vigatà a Califòrnia.”
26 In 1925, Cebrián shared with the University of California the expense of compiling and publishing a catalogue of such collections, *Spain and Spanish America in the Libraries of the University of California. A Catalogue of Books* (Berkeley: California University, 1928-30; reprint, New York: Burt Franklin, 1969).
controversial “frontier thesis.” While Turner called on historians to turn their eyes to the conquest of the West as the defining experience shaping American national character, Lummis reminded his readers that the western trail that American pioneers were so eagerly following had been opened by the Spanish explorers in the sixteenth century.

In the introduction, Lummis described his book as an heir to the “New School of American History” represented by his mentor Adolph F. Bandelier. Following Bandelier, Lummis proposed to “tell the truth” about the Spanish pioneers, a truth he believed “every manly American will be glad to know.” As Bandelier indicated in the prologue, these ideas were already becoming established within academic circles, but the relevance of Lummis’s work lay in their dissemination to a broader reading public. Lummis claimed that Americans had been “misled” in their understanding of the national past because the textbooks used in schools did not give credit to the Spaniards’ “unparalleled record.” He called on Anglo-Americans to overcome “race prejudice,” and to “respect manhood more than nationality.” “We love manhood,” he asserted, “and the Spanish pioneering of the Americas was the largest and longest and most marvelous feat of manhood in all history.”

Spaniards in the Americas were particularly receptive to this message. In fact, Lummis’s work was not the first one to receive accolades from the Spanish diaspora for its positive portrayal of the Spanish colonization of America. In 1906, the prominent Casino Español of Havana had underwritten the translation into Spanish of

Edward Gaylord Bourne’s *Spain in America*.\(^{29}\) Arturo Cuyás, the former editor of *La Llumanera de Nova York*, was to undertake the translation of Lummis’s book in 1916. Cuyás was familiar with the text and had quoted from it extensively in a booklet he had put out in 1897 defending Spanish rule in Cuba.\(^{30}\) This time, however, the goal was not just to defend Spanish rule in America, but to make the *Spanish Pioneers* the cornerstone of a new definition of Spanish history and of the Spanish national character. As had happened before, the weakness of the national project in Restoration Spain, accentuated even more by the strength of the nationalism Spaniards experienced in the American republics, prompted the immigrant elites to become promoters of Hispanism as both a source of ethnic identity in the diaspora and of national identity in the peninsula.

The title of Lummis’s book encapsulated the synthesis of Spanish and American history that Spanish immigrants found so appealing. Its translation was undertaken in the context of these renewed contacts between Spain and the United States. Eusebio Molera had brought a copy of *The Spanish Pioneers* as a gift to Alfonso XIII when he visited Spain in 1915 as an emissary of the San Francisco committee trying to persuade the Spanish government to send a delegation to the Panama-Pacific International Exposition. It was most likely during his visit that arrangements were made with Arturo Cuyás, who now lived in Madrid, to publish a

\(^{29}\) Edward Gaylord Bourne, *España en América, 1450-1580* (Habana: La Moderna Poesía, 1906). The minutes of the Casino Español for 24 March 1905—when the decision was taken to translate Bourne’s book—praised it for offering an “unqualified justification of the Spanish colonial regime in the Americas” p. [xix]. On that same date, he was granted Honorary Membership in the Spanish club. Bourne was professor of History at Yale. His *Spain in America* was part of the “American Nation” series edited by Albert Bushnell Hart from 1903 to 1918.

Spanish translation of the book. Juan Cebrián paid for the printing of 50,000 copies. *Los exploradores españoles del siglo XVI*, as the volume was titled, included some relevant additions to Lummis’s original. The subtitle, *Vindicación de la acción colonizadora española en América*, highlighted the relevance of the text in combating the black legend. The book also included an erudite 38-page prologue by the renowned Spanish historian, educator, and *americanista*, Rafael Altamira. Altamira, who held the Chair of the History of American Institutions at the University of Madrid, had met Lummis in California when he had attended the conference of the American Historical Association in San Francisco in conjunction with the Panama-Pacific International Exposition.

In his prologue, Altamira situated Lummis’s work in the context of a growing *literatura hispanófila* dating back to the nineteenth-century founding fathers of North American Hispanism (Ticknor, Prescott, Longfellow). Yet, he pointed out, this literature was barely known in Spain. Altamira reiterated an idea that he had also expressed in his lecture at the Pacific Historical Congress in San Francisco: the similarities between the Spanish exploration and colonization of America and the conquest of the Far West by North Americans. “A common fund of moral qualities . . . endurance in suffering, serenity in danger, energy in strife, force in struggle, and valor in difficulties,” he explained to his American audience, “made possible among you the epic of the West . . . and shone with remarkable luster among our discoverers and conquerors.” Moreover, he added, the history of Spain in America “will always remain

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31 Charles Lummis, *Los exploradores españoles del siglo XVI. Vindicación de la acción colonizadora en América* (Barcelona: Araluce, 1916). Lummis was awarded the cross of the order of Isabel la Católica for this book and for his work preserving the Spanish heritage in the United States.
an inexhaustible source of those ‘professors of energy’ from whom modern decadent nations, lacking confidence in their own powers, seek regenerative contacts.”

What most concerned Altamira was the recognition that the Spanish raza had degenerated in the past few centuries. In order to renew the race’s strength, Spain needed to educate the new generations through the examples provided by these “professors of energy.” That was precisely one of the main virtues of Lummis’s book. It made accessible to the Spanish youth, and particularly to Spanish young men, the extraordinary feats of the Spanish explorers. Altamira called on editors to publish more of these types of books. He offered as an example the British series “English Men of Action,” which included the biographies of Cook, Drake, and Raleigh. What Spain needed was the exaltation of her national identity, her españolismo. In the throes of the colonial disaster of 1898 many had passively accepted the black legend, the negative portrayal of Spain’s role in America, and in the world. Altamira did not defend a patriotic chauvinism, but he was concerned about the lack of a “patriotic literature” that could be taught to the new generations.

The example given by Spanish emigrants in the Americas, successfully competing with elements of other nationalities, served as clear evidence that the traits that had defined the sixteenth-century explorers were still present in the Spanish race. They just needed to be “revitalized.” America also offered a model of nationalism for

33 Altamira decried the fact that while Spanish textbooks mentioned, albeit in a “dry and disjointed” fashion, the feats of Numancia or Sagunto (against the Roman invasion) or the war of independence (against the Napoleonic armies), nothing, or very little, was taught about the Spanish exploration of America, Africa and Asia. Lummis, Exploradores españoles, 35.
Spaniards to emulate. It can be argued that, in order for Spanish immigrant elites to be able to forge a Spanish ethnic identity in America, they needed to bolster Spanish nationalism in the peninsula as well.

Indeed, part of the appeal of *Spanish Pioneers* was that its style fit within the growing literature of self-improvement for young men begun in mid-nineteenth-century America and popular in Europe in the pre-war years.³⁴ Arturo Cuyás was one of the first Spanish authors to embrace this genre of *literatura estimulante*, as it was called in Spain. In 1913, he published a “book of orientation in life for adolescents” titled *Hace falta un muchacho* (Boy wanted). Cuyás bemoaned the fact that young Spaniards read these books in translation about other nations’ heroes. He sought to produce a book “thought out and written in our language, inspired and felt by a Spanish soul; a book whose goal is to revive in [the Spanish youth] the feeling of the Fatherland.”³⁵ “Do you want your Fatherland to be strong, great and prosperous?” Cuyás asked his young readers, “then start with yourself. Strengthen your body and your spirit, aspire to be great.”³⁶

Cuyás admiringly told Spanish youngsters about Americans’ love of their fatherland, and about the daily pledge of allegiance that started the day in the public schools of New York. Since Spain lacked that tradition, and even a written national

³⁴ Samuel Smiles’ *Self Help* (London: John Murray, 1859) is considered one of the pioneer books in this genre. Frenchman Jules Payot, Italian Silvano Roudes, and Americans Ralph Waldo Trine, Orison Swett Marden, and Nixon Waterman, were some of its more representative authors.
³⁵ Arturo Cuyás Armengol, *Hace falta un muchacho. Libro de orientación en la vida, para los adolescentes* (Madrid: Julián Palacios, 1913). Cuyás mentions in the introduction that the title and the idea for the book were inspired by Nixon Waterman’s *Boy Wanted*. The author’s painful experience in the United States in 1898 resonated fifteen years later in his self-introduction to the reader, where he spoke of his “deep love for the Fatherland, demonstrated with actions as well as with words, in defense of her interests, in enemy country, and under critical circumstances.” xii.
³⁶ Ibid., 87.
anthem that children could memorize, he suggested that they memorize instead a “greeting to the flag” of his own authorship. It was in this book that Cuyás first introduced Lummis’s book to young Spanish readers before it was translated into Spanish. He copied long excerpts in which Lummis praised the feats of the Spanish discoverers, to remind his readers that they were “descendants of a race of strong, valiant, intrepid, suffering and tenacious men who never feared any obstacle.” And he called on the Spanish youth to continue this legacy in a variety of areas (science, industry, art). “By pursuing these ideals, you can, like the heroes of our golden age, bequeath to posterity an illustrious name and conquer new glories for your Fatherland.”

The intimate connection between Lummis’s translation and this motivational literature was also evident in Cuyás’s choice of the word *exploradores* (explorers) as a translation for *pioneers*. In the prologue, Altamira took issue with Lummis’s use of the general term “pioneers” to refer to a diverse diaspora that encompassed discoverers, conquerors, and even missionaries. Altamira himself barely used the word *exploradores*, preferring instead *descubridores* (discoverers) or *viajeros* (travelers). In some cases, he kept the English word “pioneers.” In his own rendering of the text, Altamira translated “pioneer” for *conquistador*. In his effort to avoid any negativity

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37 The lengthy five-verse greeting to the flag highlighted Spain’s imperial past and its relevance to twentieth-century Spanish youngsters. One of the verses read: “Tu paseaste triunfante el orbe entero / ... / y a tu sombra creció el germen fecundo / de la vida española en medio mundo.” The concluding verse read: “A ti volvemos con afán los ojos / buscando el faro que señala el puerto, / pues mientras luzcan tus destellos rojos, / no perderá la nave el rumbo cierto / que nos conduce a un porvenir de gloria / más grande que el pasado en nuestra historia.” Ibid., 91.

38 Ibid., 213.

39 Contrast for example, Altamira’s translation on p. 22 and Cuyás’s translation of the same text on p. 302, where one translates pioneer for *conquistador* and the other one for *explorador*. Most Spanish
associated with the term “conquest,” the Spanish translation also eliminated the title of Lummis’s third part “The greatest conquest,” where the conquest of Peru by Pizarro was narrated, using instead the more politically correct heading “Exploradores ejemplares” (exemplary explorers).

This suppression of the conquest for the benefit of exploration may have been Cuyás’s own contribution to combating the black legend. But the emphasis on “pioneers” and “explorers” were not simply the literary choices of an accomplished translator and linguist. They also fit squarely within Cuyás’s own projects for the regeneration of the Spanish race and the education of the Spanish youth. Indeed, besides writing books for adolescents, he was among the pioneers in the establishment of the “Boy Scouts” in Spain, a movement known in Spanish as “Los exploradores españoles,” the very same title of Lummis’s Spanish translation. In his introduction to the provisional bylaws of the Spanish Boy Scouts, Teodoro de Iradier, a captain in the Spanish army, reiterated the arguments put forth by Altamira and Cuyás– the Spanish race was degenerating. The scout movement was presented as an enterprise for Spain’s “national betterment.” “Today’s explorador will be tomorrow’s practical man,” claimed Iradier, and “he will proudly bear the title of transformer of our Fatherland.” Charles Lummis’s work was seen as contributing to the same end.

editions maintained the title, Los exploradores españoles, except two: Los conquistadores españoles (Chile: Difusión, 1942) and Los descubridores españoles (Madrid: Grech, D. L., 1987).

Cuyás had met the founder of the Boy Scouts, General Baden-Powell in England, where he lived after leaving the United States in 1898.

Teodoro de Iradier y Herrero, Los exploradores de España (Boy Scouts españoles). Estatutos y Reglamento Provisionales (Madrid: Talleres del depósito de la guerra, 1912), 13.
While Altamira praised the work of the hispanófilos who were now looking at Spain’s historical record in a more “scientific” way, he regretted that most of these scholars were foreigners. Spaniards did not engage in that research, he argued, because they did not know their own history. Without that knowledge, they could not respond to the stereotypes spread by the black legend. This lack of historical knowledge was another sign of Spain’s national weakness and dependence. Altamira called on Spaniards to “conquer their [cultural] independence,” to write their own history, and to make it accessible to the new generations. This proved to be a slow process. A decade later, when Altamira wrote a manual for Spanish teachers of history and suggested bibliography for their own preparations, the chapter on the Spanish conquest and exploration of America was still limited primarily to studies of the American southwest by American authors, Lummis holding a prominent place among them.

Lummis’s work enjoyed considerable success in Spain. Ten editions were published between 1916 and his death in 1928. Juan Cebrián contributed to this accomplishment by financing the publication and distribution of Los exploradores españoles. Cebrián also underwrote the reedition of the book by Julián Juderías on the

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42 Lummis, Exploradores españoles, 45.
44 Based on a search of WorldCat records (www.worldcat.org), the latest Spanish edition appears to have been published in 1989. Besides the United States, other editions were produced in Mexico, Argentina, and Chile. Cebrián also distributed more than 40,000 copies of the English version in the United States, Canada, and England. “Biografía leída por don M. López Otero en la Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando con motivo del homenaje a D. Juan C. Cebrián,” Arquitectura 15, 168 (April 1933): 100.
history of the black legend (25,000 copies).\textsuperscript{45} To underscore the relevance of these works for the regeneration of the Spanish youth, Cebrián offered 500 copies of each, free of charge, to the first Spanish-speaking government that would establish them as textbooks in their country’s schools.\textsuperscript{46} He also offered free copies of Lummis’s work to all students of Madrid’s School of Architecture upon graduation. The books included an autographed photograph of Lummis signed “¡Viva España, madre de America!” that Cebrián and other enthusiasts of hispanism were fond of quoting.\textsuperscript{47}

In 1928, already on his deathbed, Lummis worked on a new edition of the \textit{Spanish Pioneers} to which he added a section on the California Missions. A special edition for free distribution was published by Cebrián.\textsuperscript{48} News of Lummis’s death reached Spain as the Spanish government frantically finalized preparations for the opening of the Ibero-American Expositions of Seville and Barcelona. They resonated in the Spanish National Assembly, where Blanca de los Ríos, one of the representatives, and the editor of the \textit{americanista} magazine \textit{Raza Española}, proposed that the government pay homage to Lummis, awarding him the title of “\textit{benemérito} of the Fatherland,” and that it underwrite a new edition of his book in Spain. A “National

\textsuperscript{45} Julián Juderías, \textit{La leyenda negra: estudios acerca del concepto de España en el extranjero} (Barcelona: Editorial Araluce, 1917).

\textsuperscript{46} “A los gobiernos hispanoparlantes,” \textit{La Prensa}, 27 January 1917, 1.

\textsuperscript{47} “Adhesión del Colegio de Arquitectos de Madrid, representado por D. M. Martínez Angel.” \textit{Arquitectura} 15, 168 (April 1933): 101. Cebrián had a long-standing association with the School of Architecture to whose library he had donated more than 10,000 volumes, making it one of the best architectural libraries in Europe. He had also helped fund the publication of the classic \textit{Historia de la arquitectura Cristiana española} by Vicente Lampérez y Romeá, a noted Spanish architect who had served as director of the School. In 1933, the Spanish Minister of Education awarded Cebrián the title of “Arquitecto Honoris Causa.”

\textsuperscript{48} Charles F. Lummis, \textit{The Spanish Pioneers and the California Missions} (Chicago: A. C. McClurg, 1929). The dedication page read: “Special Edition (for gratuitous distribution) in MEMORY of that radiant soul, CHARLES F. LUMMIS, great among men, for his unswerving loyalty to the highest ideals of humanity, and the unsurpassed beauty of his portentous WILL. From his friend and cordial admirer John C. Cebrian (San Francisco, California).”
“Edition” of *Los exploradores españoles*, with a prologue by General Primo de Rivera, was issued in 1930. The title page read: “homage of a thankful Spain to the memory of Carlos F. Lummis, the generous and dauntless writer who, since 1890, dared to proclaim the highly civilizing work of Spain in America, against the centuries-old calumnies piled upon the Hispanic race.”

Both Lummis and Cebrián had sought to make the *Spanish pioneers* obligatory reading in the schools of their respective countries. They believed that if Spain could not be understood without America, the United States, or at least the American southwest, could not be understood without Spain. Their collaboration in making this work accessible to a wider readership contributed to the increasing relevance of hispanism on both sides of the Atlantic. The stress on the shared history of Spain and the United States allowed both Spaniards and Americans to claim the figure of the intrepid and benevolent *conquistador*. Turning the black legend of the Spanish conquest into the white legend of Hispanism and the “Spanish fantasy past” allowed both *Yankee conquistadores* and Spanish *immigrant-conquistadores* not only to reconcile their history, but also to assert their ascendancy over the native, non-white population.

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50 This process was complex and with diverse outcomes. John Nieto-Phillips argues that in New Mexico the biracial setting (Europeans vs. Indians) created by the Spanish fantasy past contributed to the integration into the American body politic of Mexican citizens, now considered full-blown “white Spanish Americans.” William Deverell’s study of Los Angeles shows that there the Spanish fantasy past served not as a tool to integrate but rather to create ethnic boundaries between Anglos and Mexicans. John Nieto-Phillips, “When Tourists Came, The Mestizos Went Away. Hispanophilia and the Racial Whitening of New Mexico, 1880s-1940s,” in *Interpreting Spanish Colonialism*, 187-212;
The American Association of Teachers of Spanish.

Language, together with history, was another key element of Hispanism, and here too, Juan Cebrián wielded his influence to promote the teaching of Spanish in American schools. Together with Hispanist Archer Huntington, Cebrián was instrumental in the creation of the American Association of Teachers of Spanish in October 1916. A year later, in November 1917, the association published the first issue of its journal, *Hispania*, whose editor was the renowned folklorist and Stanford professor Aurelio M. Espinosa. Cebrián also contributed to the foundation, in 1918, of the *Hispanic American Historical Review*. The idea for such a journal had been suggested by Rafael Altamira when he attended the Pacific Historical Congress in San Francisco.

Cebrián not only provided much-needed financial support for these fledgling enterprises, but he was also the force behind the naming of both journals, whose appellations reflect his staunch defense of the term “Hispanic” America over its alternatives, “Latin” America and “Ibero” America. Latin, he claimed, encompassed countries which had little to do with the discovery and colonization of America (such as France and Italy). Iberia was not entirely accurate either, since it covered not only Spain and Portugal but also parts of France. The correct designation, he argued, was

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51 The AATS was the pioneer organization. Similar associations for other modern European languages soon followed (The American Association of Teachers of Italian in 1923, The American Association of Teachers of German, and the American Association of Teachers of French in 1927). In 1944, the name was changed to the American Association of Teachers of Spanish and Portuguese. See also Fernández, “‘Longfellows’ Law,’” 125-134.

“Hispanic,” as Hispania was “from the beginning, and always have been, the name of the whole peninsula.”

This was not a mere game of words. As he had done with Lummis’s book, and as Spaniards in the United States had done in the 1870s and 1890s, Cebrían’s actions illustrate how Spanish national identity (particularly as it related to its imperial past in America) was being constructed in the diaspora. The original letter Cebrían wrote on this topic appeared in New York’s Las Noticias in 1916, and it was reprinted in Hispania in 1918, as part of an article written by Aurelio Espinosa. This article, in turn, was translated into Spanish and published in Madrid under the auspices of the Comisión Regia de Turismo (Royal Commission on Tourism). Cebrían’s arguments also appeared in the inaugural issue of the Spanish monthly magazine Raza Española which included an article about him written by Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín, a celebrated Spanish academic who had met Cebrían in California where he had been a guest lecturer in the summer of 1915. The campaign over the proper name of Spanish former imperial possessions resonated in the peninsula. Cebrían’s protest led Spanish intellectuals Ramón Menéndez Pidal and Mariano de Cavia to write similar articles in Madrid’s El Sol. Shortly thereafter, the editors of the Spanish daily “banished from its columns the term Latin America.”

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53 Aurelio Espinosa, “The Term Latin America,” Hispania 1, 3 (September 1918): 135-143.
54 Ibid.
57 Espinosa, “The Term Latin America,” 141. The letters to El Sol by Menéndez Pidal and Mariano de Cavia appeared on January 4 and 5, 1918, respectively. On January 6, El Sol renamed his Latin-America section, “Ibero-América.”
In 1921, *Hispania* reported that the Second Spanish-American Congress of History and Geography, held in Seville, had also repudiated the term Latin America, proposing instead Spanish America or Hispanic America. Yet, these successes did not assuage Cebrián’s disappointment when, in 1925, the Spanish government decided to change the name of the *Exposición Hispanoamericana* in Seville to *Exposición Iberoamericana*, in order to secure the participation of Portugal and Brazil. A new pamphlet, with articles by Cebrián, Bonilla, Espinosa, and Blanca de los Ríos, was printed to press their case and change the name back. Cebrián’s calls of: “down with Iberoamericanismo, Long live Spain and Hispanoamericanismo” were to no avail. In 1930, when he wrote to the *Real Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid* proposing that the name Iberian Peninsula be changed to Hispanic Peninsula, he still remembered the “crime of high treason,” of the Seville Exposition.

Despite these setbacks, Cebrián must have been pleased with the growth of the AATS and its journal. During the war years, the demand for the teaching of Spanish in the United States grew enormously. In 1918, the *New York Times* announced that the number of students of Spanish since 1915 had increased 1,000 percent, and that 400

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60 *Proposición que a la Real Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid presentó en sesión del 15 de Diciembre de 1930 el Vocal de su Junta Directiva Excmo. Sr. D. Juan C. Cebrián en solicitud de que se cambie el nombre de Península Ibérica por el de Península Hispánica* (Madrid: Publicaciones de la Real Sociedad Geográfica, 1931), 7. In 1940, Aurelio M. Espinosa was still reclaiming the use of the term Hispanidad, now in a pro-Francoist monthly published in New York. Aurelio M. Espinosa, “Ni Iberismo, Ni Latinidad, Sino Hispanidad,” *Época* (September 1940): 6-7, 30. The regime created the *Consejo de la Hispanidad* in November 1940. Franco and the Falange will give the term a more militant meaning than the one ascribed to Hispanic, emphasizing ideas of race, empire and Christianity. See, Eduardo González Calleja and Fredes Limón Nevado, *La Hispanidad como instrumento de combate. Raza e Imperio en la Prensa franquista durante la Guerra Civil española* (Madrid: CSIC, 1988), 47-80.
out of 505 secondary schools had substituted Spanish for German. When the AATS was founded in 1917 there were 400 members, by the end of its first year it had almost doubled (725 members), and by 1921 it had grown almost four-fold (1,400 members), sustaining fifteen local chapters across the United States. *Hispania* expanded from four to six issues a year. Its collaborators included the most prestigious names in Spanish literary scholarship: Ramón Menéndez Pidal, Américo Castro, Tomás Navarro Tomás and Federico de Onís, among others. The latter, a professor at the University of Salamanca, had been hired by Columbia University in 1916 to teach Spanish Literature and Philology, and in 1920 he established the Hispanic Institute (*Instituto de las Españas*) there.61

The pages of *Hispania* shed light on the strain that this “Spanish boom” put on the educational system. Not only was the development of new teaching materials necessary, but there were simply not enough teachers to meet the demand. This proved to be a bonus for many Spanish immigrants who were able to supplement their incomes with Spanish classes or translations.62 The New York Spanish daily *La Prensa* ran advertisements for Spanish academies and private tutors as well as for self-teaching courses like the Galeno method. In 1920, *La Prensa* itself started publishing


62 In his novel on Spanish life in New York, Luis de Oteyza dramatizes this situation when a destitute Asturian immigrant was saved from deportation by the sudden demand of Spanish-speakers to teach in American high schools and colleges. “Don Antonio, aunque sólo conociera al autor del ‘Quijote’ de oídas y de su lengua sabía únicamente hablarla . . . con acento asturiano, fué nombrado profesor de Lengua y Literatura Españolas,” Luis de Oteyza, *Anticípolis* (Madrid: Renacimiento, 1931), 33.
an educational page, “El Eco de las Aulas,” for students of Spanish, and it established a set of prizes for the best Spanish compositions by high school and college students.

In 1919, the Junta para la ampliación de estudios in Madrid sent its secretary, José Castillejo, to study the American university system and develop a program of exchanges between academic institutions in both countries. Teachers and students of Spanish availed themselves of the popular cursos de verano para extranjeros organized by the Junta with the prestigious Centro de Estudios Históricos and the Residencia de Estudiantes in Madrid. In turn, Spanish intellectuals like Isabel de Palencia, María de Maeztu, and her brother Ramiro de Maeztu lectured about Spanish language and culture in American institutions.63 In the 1920s, even American school textbooks, the traditional repository of anti-Spanish rhetoric, offered a more positive portrayal of Spain and the Spanish character.64

**Angel L. Cuesta and Hispanism in Florida.**

If California had Lummis and Cebrián to promote Spain’s history and the state’s Spanish colonial heritage, Florida could boast of John Stetson (the founder of the Florida Historical Society in 1921) and Angel L. Cuesta (a prominent Tampa cigar manufacturer from Asturias). One of the first actions taken by the newly-founded

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63 Ramiro de Maeztu wrote about his experiences in the United States for *El Sol* (Madrid), *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires) and *El País* (Havana). His articles, collected in a volume, were published in 1957. Ramiro de Maeztu, *Norteamérica desde dentro* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1957). He had been invited to lecture by Julián Moreno-Lacalle, a former instructor of Spanish at West Point, who at that time ran the Spanish Department at Middlebury College in Vermont.

Florida Historical Society, following on the steps of California’s Society of Sons of the Golden West, was to send delegates to the *Archivo de Indias* in Seville and make copies of all the documents pertaining to Spanish Florida. The state also held annual celebrations in honor of its discoverer, Ponce de León, while cities did the same at the local level (Tampa, for example, honored Hernando de Soto; Saint Augustine, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés). To illustrate the enthusiasm of Anglo elites and their Spanish immigrant counterparts in fostering this common heritage, we can examine the role they played in transforming an initially local ceremony into a transnational event.

In 1924, the city council of Avilés, in Asturias, decided to pay respects to its most illustrious son, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, by transferring his remains from a humble niche where they had lain since 1591 to a sumptuous funeral monument in a more accessible part of the church of San Nicolás. As late as June 19, 1924, in response to a request by a Florida Senator to have Stetson represent the state at the ceremony, the American consul in Madrid reported to the State Department that “no official action had been taken by the city government of Avilés” regarding the ceremony. But, through the intervention of Angel L. Cuesta and Miguel de Zárraga, the editor of *La Tribuna*, a Spanish weekly published in New York, a month later a nine-member delegation from St. Augustine was heading for Spain. On August 7, they arrived in Avilés to witness the transfer and re-interment of Menéndez’s remains.

The visit of the American delegation received extensive coverage in the Spanish press, particularly in the monarchist *ABC*, in which Zárraga collaborated. In

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65 American Consul to State Department, 19 June 1924, NA RG 59, M1369, File 852.415/67.
one of his articles on the ceremonies, Zárraga proclaimed America to be “a prolongation of Spain” and the American delegation “the direct and legitimate descendants of the glorious Spanish explorers of the sixteenth century.” In *La Correspondencia de España*, Beatriz Galíndo praised the Florida Historical Society’s edition of the chronicle of Menéndez’s expedition, which, she explained, dispelled notions that the *adelantado* had been a cruel man. King Alfonso himself sent a telegram to Avilés expressing his pleasure with the ceremonies and extending an invitation to the American delegates to visit him at the summer palace in Santander.

The American delegation did not leave Avilés empty-handed. Angel L. Cuesta secured the old coffin where Menéndez’s remains had lain for more than three centuries and donated it to the city of Saint Augustine. The city, in turn, named D. P. Davis, a prominent Florida real estate developer, its official custodian. The donation illustrates the commercialization of the Spanish past in Florida. An advertisement for Davis’s company, Davis Shores, declared that he would “preserve for posterity the most ancient relic that has any connection with St. Augustine, the white race or the Christian religion in America.” The ad showed a model for a chapel D. P. Davis would

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67 Beatriz Galíndo was the penname of Isabel de Palencia. Galíndo herself had been a towering intellectual figure in fifteenth-century Spain, and the tutor of Queen Isabella and her children.
68 “Spain Hails Americans at Avilés Celebration,” *NYT*, 11 August 1924, 3; “New Tie with Spain is Made at Tomb,” *NYT*, 31 August 1924, 5. The unity between the two countries was further memorialized in a commemorative bronze plaque made to accompany the restored coffin of Menéndez in Saint Augustine. A copy of the plaque was sent to Avilés in 1928 to be placed near Menéndez’s remains in the church of San Nicolás. The tablet again acknowledged, “the debt owed by the New World to Spain, for the Civilization, Culture and Progress contributed to Florida and to the Republic of the United States of America.” “Es honrado el fundador de St. Augustine, Florida,” *La Prensa*, 13 September 1928, 7.
deed to the city and where Menéndez’s wooden coffin would be displayed to the public (see Figure 2).

Tourism and post-war wealth fueled the Spanish craze in Florida. By the 1910s and 20s the state was fast becoming, architecturally speaking, “Spanish.” For one thing, the history of its discovery by the Spanish conquistadores exuded the kind of romance that developers and resort managers used to lure buyers and guests. As one writer put it, “with his names: ‘Land of Flowers’ and ‘Fountain of Youth’ old Ponce [de León] remains to-day the champion booster of them all.” But, besides tourists, Florida leaders also sought to attract year-round settlers. Here too, the “Spanish fantasy past” proved useful. One of the problems facing Florida’s image was the criticism that its wealth and growth were an ephemeral boom in an otherwise backward and undeveloped economy. Florida elites deployed the Spanish past to counteract these claims and provide a sense of tradition, permanence, and strength. An advertisement for Daytona Highlands in The Bankers Magazine illustrates this (see Figure 3). A photograph of the medieval fortress-looking entrance to the subdivision reinforces its motto, “Sound, Safe, Conservative, and therefore Permanent.” Another ad, for Davis Shores, underscores the message (see Figure 4). Although Florida’s development might appear to rest on thin air, it was in fact built on a solid foundation, having been more than 400 years in the making. The problem had been, as an ad for the Mizner Development Corporation indicated, that although the Spanish conquistadores had exhibited courage in discovering the land, they had lacked

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69 The restored wooden coffin is now on display in the gift shop of the Shrine of Our Lady of la Leche at the Mission Nombre de Dios.
foresight in colonizing it and developing it (see Figure 5). But, as John Taylor Boyd Jr. stated, “in the twentieth century the Yankee conquistadores [were following] in the footsteps of Ponce de León.” And they came armed with both, courage and vision.

Addison Mizner, the head of the Mizner Corporation, was a good example of the Yankee conquistador. The developer, among other projects, of the Spanish-looking city of Coral Gables, near Miami, he was proud to make this aristocratic style accessible to the middle classes, advertising his homes as “Everyman’s Spanish castle.” Articles in Florida magazines extolled Mizner’s “thoroughness . . . in producing the true foreign atmosphere.” Interior decoration was key to this process of “inventing antiquity.” In fact, Mizner developed an industry dedicated exclusively to the reproduction of a variety of Mediterranean-style ornaments, ranging from iron works to pottery, from stained-glass windows to period furniture.

Homeowners unfamiliar with the Spanish style could leaf through magazines, like Suniland, to find advice on how to decorate their new “castle.” One such article mentioned a “charming accessory that most lovers of the Spanish home not only crave but demand.” This was “a reproduction of the Santa Maria or one of the other vessels which brought Columbus to the New World.” The author assured her readers that “these little vessels set on the mantel or on an especially decorated shelf are irresistible.” In fact, by the mid 1920s historic ship models were being mass produced and sold as a hot item in department stores. One could buy a replica of the

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71 Ibid., 37.
72 S. M. Shelton, “As a boy, he dreamed of ‘Castles in Spain,’” Suniland 1, 2 (November 1924): 47.
Santa Maria at Spear’s for $12.95 (see Figure 6). Those who could not afford the steep price, or preferred to indulge in the pleasure of do-it-yourself, could follow the detailed instructions printed in magazines like *The Ladies’ Home Journal.* “A ship model is more than a decoration,” an article explained, “it is a breath of romance. To see one is to forget the drudgery of everyday existence and to set forth upon a mental voyage of adventure into uncharted seas.”

In the 1920s, an unprecedented number of Americans set forth upon a sea voyage seeking a breath of romance in Spain. Ambassador Alexander Moore was especially praised for his efforts at publicizing Spain in America, which resulted in an increase of American visitors to Spain from 3,000 in 1923, to 40,000 in 1925. But apparently, Americans did more than sightseeing. That same year, the Royal Commissioner of Tourism, the Marquis de la Vega Inclán, wrote a frantic note to the Royal Palace informing Alfonso XIII that “through [the] port [of Barcelona] carts upon carts of stone and wood pieces leave the country” and that in Seville, “more than 80 boxes” of similar materials had been sent “either through the American consulate or through persons associated with it.” The Marquis called on the King to do something to prevent this plundering. He warned that, if nothing were to be done, “in a few years . . . the tourist agencies abroad will invite us to see our own antiquities

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76 “Americans visit Spain,” *NYT*, 5 November 1925, 25.
which they will dress up to give themselves the appearance of countries of history and art in New Jersey or Cincinnati.”

In a similar vein, the *New York Times* reported the following year that “doors, windows, whole ceilings and fireplace mantels of wood or stone are now shipped from Spain to become part of the Spanish homes that Americans are building from Santa Barbara to Long Island and from Santa Fe to Miami.” Americans were appropriating the Spanish style with such gusto that, the article said, “it is now being referred to by architects as ‘Southern’ architecture rather than Spanish.” The cross-pollination of styles was further complicated by the fact that Spaniards were, in turn, emulating the American “Spanish” style, in what architects dubbed “estilo de ida y vuelta,” two-way style.

Despite the Tourism Commissioner’s fears that wealthy Americans would carry away the country’s monuments, Spanish officials were delighted with the American “discovery” of its Spanish roots. For Primo de Rivera, who had justified his 1923 military coup as a needed measure to cleanse the country of corrupt politicians and restore it to its imperial greatness, this outburst of Spanishness on the part of the North Americans was a welcomed bonus. The warm relationships between the two countries were reflected in the prominent place held by the United States in the 1929 Ibero-American Exposition in Seville. The events that followed the exhibit, however,

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77 Benigno Varela (Marquis de la Vega Inclán) to Emilio de Torres, 16 August 1925, AGP, Caja 15592/1.
highlighted the deep discrepancy between the image of immobility promoted by the “Spanish fantasy past” paradigm and the dynamism and complexity of Spanish society.

Spain as a “vast museum”: The pitfalls of the Spanish fantasy past

Writing in *Hispania*, seeking support to create a museum in the home of Spanish author Benito Pérez Galdós, J. Warshaw stated that “the proudest ambition of Spain with regard to the Spanish-speaking or Spanish-loving world, should, in fact, be that of playing the part of a vast museum of splendid memories.”

Although probably meant as an accolade, the statement vividly encapsulated the tension that characterized the relationship between Spain and America. Spain belonged to the past, the repository of “splendid memories” for the up-and-coming modern nations, to which the future belonged.

Around the same time, American writer John Dos Passos deplored the tendency of his compatriots to focus too much on Spain’s past and neglect her present. In a biting review, he critiqued *Virgin Spain*, the work of fellow American Waldo Frank, for its academicism and its lack of life. Dos Passos wondered whether Frank had written his book in the library of Madrid’s *Ateneo*, that “museum of extinct scholastic monsters.” As the title of the book suggests, Frank reproduced an American tendency to emphasize a picturesque and primitive Spain, not the vibrant Spanish society of his day. Dos Passos wrote:

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I can’t understand how Frank came to leave out all the confused and confusing tragedy of the Spain of our day, the gradual collapse of the bullfights before football, the influence of the Rio Tinto British-owned mines, the bloody farce of the Moroccan war, the Jesuit control of the railroads, the breakdown of Catalan syndicalism, of the agrarian movement in Andalusia. These things are as much Spain as Philip IV and the Old Cathedral at Salamanca and much more important to us at the present moment.  

Dos Passos himself had been impressed by the weight of the past when he first visited Spain in 1916 at the age of twenty. “Life still conducted according to the ritual of the seventeenth century gave to every day a quality of theater,” he would write years later. Yet, unlike other American hispanophiles, Dos Passos immersed himself fully within the culture, learning Spanish with Tomás Navarro Tomás at the Centro de Estudios Históricos and enjoying long walks and conversations with other members of the progressive Institución Libre de Enseñanza, like José Giner and José Castillejo. This experience, and his keen eye, soon opened to him a more sophisticated view of the complex Spanish landscape. “The villages of Spain were living in the seventeenth century, the towns and cities were in the full heyday of the nineteenth,” he declared.

The Spanish towns and cities were indeed alive. Before the official closing of the Ibero-American Exposition on June 30, 1930, the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera had begun to fall apart. The General resigned at the end of January, and died in exile in France shortly thereafter. A year later, the King himself left the country following municipal elections that brought about the proclamation of a Spanish Republic on April 14, 1931. Among the tasks faced by the fledgling regime would be to forge a

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new relationship with the Americas. This would require the transformation of the
discourse of Hispanism, from the traditional hierarchical relationship between the
motherland and her “daughters” to the more leveled one among sister republics.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the Spanish-American war, Spain and the United States
enjoyed surprisingly friendly relationships. The Spanish boom that followed reflected
America’s newfound appreciation of its Spanish heritage. Historians have argued that
the American discovery of Spain was part of a wider process of national reimagination
as an imperial power. Thus, Anglo elites appropriated the Spanish past and recast
themselves as heirs of old-time *dons* ruling over the native population. I have focused
on the role played by Spanish immigrant elites on this process. I have argued that they
embraced Americans’ fascination with things Spanish, and were active promoters of
Hispanism, which they used as a tool to boost Spanish nationalism as well as to define
a Spanish ethnic identity in the United States. While offering a positive counterpart to
the black legend, the idea of Spain fostered by the myth of the Spanish fantasy past,
reproduced stereotypical images of Spain as a picturesque land moored to the past.
This emphasis on tradition and continuity downplayed the fractures and changes
brought about by the industrialization and modernization of the country. Much in the
same way, the *hispanista* discourse of the immigrant elites glossed over the
differences that marked the increasingly larger and diverse immigrant community. As
we will see, the imperial narrative espoused by this discourse did not go unchallenged.
The new Conquistadores: Spanish migration to the United States after 1898

“This is a sad country to live in forever, [but] it’s good for earning a little money for a few years to return to Spain, to be rich and look for a girlfriend.”

Thus did a young Basque immigrant living in Idaho at the turn of the twentieth century write to a friend in the old country. The statement captures the outlook shared by a majority of Spaniards who migrated to the United States at that time. Many of them did manage to “hacer la América,” and return to the homeland to enjoy their fortune (usually after a longer sojourn than originally anticipated). But, for many others, this life project never materialized. In their perception of opportunities in America, Spaniards were not unlike the millions of European migrants who crossed the Atlantic from the 1880s to the 1930s with a similar plan in mind, but there were also some relevant differences between them, including the chronological, geographical, and economic patterns of this migration.

The first three chapters of this dissertation have focused on a relatively small group of Spaniards who arrived in the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century and who experienced the momentous transformation of the two countries they felt allegiance to, as Spain lost its centuries-old colonial empire at the hands of the imperialist American newcomer. The following chapters will examine the

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development of the Spanish diaspora in the United States in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War from a relatively small and well-off colonial and commercial diaspora, to a more regionally and economically diverse community of immigrant workers. They will highlight similarities and contrasts with other immigrant groups, and provide an overview of the transnational networks and institutions that contributed to the articulation of a Spanish identity in the United States after 1898. I will show that the conservative version of Spanish national identity championed by the *hispanista* discourse of the elites did not go unchallenged. And I will discuss the enthusiastic response of the diaspora to the proclamation of the Spanish Republic in 1931 and their overwhelming support when it was attacked by General Franco’s military rising in 1936.

This chapter analyzes the chronological and geographical patterns that characterized Spanish migration to the United States and set it apart from the general trends of European migration to America. It shows that the colonial geography that shaped the Spanish presence in the nineteenth century continued to influence the occupations and settlement patterns of Spanish migrants during the first decades of the twentieth century. Despite these continuities, however, I argue that this migration presented a challenge to both governments, one that appears to have been disproportionate to the actual number of migrants involved, and which needs to be interpreted in the context of U.S.-Spanish relations and perceptions in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War.

The imperialist nativism that followed America’s victory over Spain in 1898 spurred a racial nationalism that favored Anglo-Saxons, and the so-called old
European migration, over all other “races.” This racism, as Mathew Frye Jacobson has argued, was linked to American definitions of republican citizenship. Whiteness, thus, was not a category based solely on phenotypic features, but it encompassed also the immigrants’ “fitness for self-government.” Nativism, which Jacobson defines as “a kind of race vigilance,” worked together with antiradicalism, “a kind of class vigilance,” to keep “unfit” migrants out.

Despite the hispanophilia of selected groups of the American elite discussed in the previous chapter, most Spaniards wishing to migrate to the United States in the twentieth century faced these Nativist prejudices, even before they left their homeland. American consuls in Spain sought to limit the arrival of swarthy and often uneducated Spaniards to American shores. Their assessment, no doubt, was colored by the racial rhetoric of the time and by their perceptions of the emigrants’ low potential for republican citizenship given Spain’s political tradition. Upon arrival at Ellis Island, Spaniards were also victims of abuse by immigration officials, so much so that, in 1913, the Spanish Ambassador suggested that the Spanish government issue a temporary ban on emigration to the United States.

Ambassador Riaño based his appeal on a recent circular by the Ministry informing that the Consejo Superior de Emigración (High Council on Emigration)

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2 Jacobson, Whiteness, 42. A powerful illustration of this connection can be seen in the statements of Texas Congressman Martin Dies before a House Committee considering further restrictions on immigration in 1911: “I would quarantine this Nation against people of any government in Europe incapable of self-government for any reason, as I would against the bubonic plague...I will admit the old immigration of the English, Irish, Germans, Scandinavians and Swedes, the light-haired, blue-eyed Anglo-Saxons, or Celts.” “Pure Caucasians?” asked the chairman of the committee. “Yes,” replied Dies, “they were great in their own country and great in our country.” Cited in Higham, Strangers in the Land, 180.

3 Jacobson, Whiteness, 72.
contemplated such a measure in countries “whose governments prevent [Spanish] consuls from exercising the inspection functions attributed to them by the [Spanish 1907] emigration Act.” While the list of indignities Spanish migrants experienced was real enough, this definition of the problem understated another important factor, the lack of resources on the part of the Spanish government to deal with this exodus. As the Spanish consul in New York recognized, most European nations had consular agents at Ellis Island to assist their countrymen and prevent some of these abuses. Not so Spain. The consul did not have the means to hire such an agent, and he was not hopeful that his request for funding to do so would be granted by Madrid. The penury and indifference of the Spanish state often put Spanish immigrants at a disadvantage as they faced the challenges of living and working in America.\footnote{The circular, dated 31 March 1913, and Riaño’s correspondence can be found in AGA-MAE, Caja 8125, Expediente: “Emigración a EE.UU.”}

**Spanish hands for the American head**

On December 21, 1907, King Alfonso XIII signed a landmark piece of legislation, a comprehensive *Ley de emigración* (Emigration Act) that would set the emigration policies of the country for the next two decades.\footnote{Until 1907 Spain lacked a comprehensive emigration law. Different aspects of migration were legislated through a complex mass of decrees and royal orders. The 1907 law was superseded by migration laws enacted in 1924 and 1959, during the dictatorships of Primo de Rivera and Francisco Franco respectively.} The law was a response to the rising number of emigrants leaving Spanish shores. To some degree, it reflected also the growing influence of the United States in that exodus and the trepidation of the Spanish officials to see the “decadence” of the homeland, painfully made clear in 1898, confirmed with the abuse of her citizens by the American colossus. Article one
of the new law “recognize[d] the freedom of all Spaniards to emigrate,” limited only by the self-proclaimed tutelary role of the state. It was no coincidence that two of the areas where Spanish tutelage was sought in the years surrounding the promulgation of the Act corresponded to regions that marked the economic and political expansion of the United States: Hawaii and the Panama Canal.

The contrast between Spain’s weakness and America’s strength was captured bluntly in a 1905 newspaper headline: “Spaniards for Canal Work. Attempt to Attract Immigrants from Famine-Stricken Region.” When an agent from the Department of Labor traveled to Spain to recruit workers for the Panama Canal, the Spanish Prime Minister, Segismundo Moret, is said to have responded acrimoniously: “Why should Spain allow her people to do America’s labor?” In a telling organic metaphor that encapsulated the power relations between the two countries, Moret declared, “The American is too proud to work with his hands! He must work with his head, and Spain must be his hands! Spain refuses to be hands for the American head.” The peasants of Galicia disagreed with the Prime Minister. Between 1904 and 1908 around 8,200 of them signed up to work in the canal. During those years, American companies

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7 “Spaniards for Canal Work,” NYT, 23 September 1905, 5.
similarly recruited thousands of Castilians and Andalusians to work in the sugar plantations in Hawaii.⁹

Despite Spain’s historical links with the Americas, Spaniards were latecomers to the process of capital and labor globalization that resulted in the mass migration of Europeans to the continent between 1880 and 1930.¹⁰ Spanish mass migration did not start in earnest until the twentieth century. Unlike most European migration at that time, it was oriented not towards the United States, but to Spanish-speaking America, particularly Argentina and Cuba.¹¹ Thus, in 1890, when the U. S. census began to register an increase in immigration from Southern Europe, the number of Spanish residents in the country remained low (6,185). Even Portugal, Spain’s peninsular neighbor, had more people residing in the United States than did Spain (see Table 2).

Spanish immigration grew in the first decade of the twentieth century, and it peaked in the years following World War I, precisely at the time when the United States began to consider closing its doors. In 1924, as immigration quotas for different national groups were finally established, Spain’s low representation in the 1890 U.S.

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census came back to haunt her (see Table 3).\textsuperscript{12} Her allotted annual quota was set at 131—a figure that caused dismay among the immigrant community. “131 immigrants for the country that discovered America” clamored the headline in the New York Spanish newspaper \textit{La Prensa}.\textsuperscript{13} By the 1920s, however, Spanish immigrant communities had been established in a number of states.

\textbf{Table 2:} Origin of the foreign-born population of the United States, 1880-1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>5,751,823</td>
<td>8,030,347</td>
<td>8,881,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>3,212,431</td>
<td>4,056,160</td>
<td>3,917,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>2,287,458</td>
<td>3,232,757</td>
<td>3,286,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>128,371</td>
<td>512,464</td>
<td>1,134,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>66,249</td>
<td>216,387</td>
<td>539,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>1,887</td>
<td>8,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>44,230</td>
<td>182,580</td>
<td>484,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>8,138</td>
<td>15,996</td>
<td>30,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azores archipelago</td>
<td>7,512</td>
<td>9,739</td>
<td>9,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5,121</td>
<td>6,185</td>
<td>7,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{12} The Immigration Act of 1921 set the annual national quotas for immigrants of the Eastern Hemisphere at 3 percent of the foreign-born population of each nationality residing in the United States in 1910. The Immigration Act of 1924 set the quotas at 2 percent of each nationality residing in the country in 1890. The Spanish quota went from 912 in 1921 to 131 in 1924. In 1929, the total quota for all countries was set at 150,000. National quotas were based on the proportion of the population of each nationality (both native-born and foreign-born) residing in the country in 1920. This raised the Spanish quota to 252.

\textsuperscript{13} “La cuota fijada al país descubridor de la América es de 131 inmigrantes,” \textit{La Prensa}, 13 August 1924, 1.
Table 3: Emigration from Spain to the United States, 1881-1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>1881-90</th>
<th>1891-1900</th>
<th>1901-10</th>
<th>1911-20</th>
<th>1921-30</th>
<th>1931-40</th>
<th>1941-50</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,419</td>
<td>8,731</td>
<td>27,935</td>
<td>68,611</td>
<td>28,958</td>
<td>3,258</td>
<td>2,898</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not only chronology, but geography too, set Spanish migration apart from the trends of European migration to the United States. For most of the nineteenth century, New York and the Gulf of Mexico remained the chosen destination of Spaniards in America, a choice shaped by the Spanish colonial economy in the Caribbean. In the west, only California showed similar figures. News of the gold rush there had led a contingent of Basques to try their luck in mining. Here, too, the imperial connection was relevant, if less direct, as these settlers came not from the peninsula, but from Basque communities dispersed across Spanish-speaking America, particularly in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina.\(^{14}\)

Patterns of settlement after the Spanish-American war did not change significantly. During the 1900s, only a small number of Spaniards migrated to the industrial centers in the Midwest and the northeast corridor of the United States. Most turned instead to rural areas or small urbanized centers in the west and south. According to the 1911 report by the Dillingham Commission, New York, Florida, and California accounted for 55% of this migration, with another 23% distributed among

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Texas and the western states (see Table 4).\textsuperscript{15} Except for New York, which was also the leading destination for the country as a whole, the Spanish pattern deviated from the general trends of European migration. States like Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Massachusetts, which followed New York in national rankings, had a relatively small Spanish presence, while Florida, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada and Louisiana, where the bulk of Spaniards resided, received a small European immigrant contingent.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Table 4:} States with the highest population of Spaniards (1900, 1910)

![Chart showing population of Spaniards in different states](chart.png)

This settlement pattern would change in the following decade, especially during World War I, when, as subjects of a neutral country, Spaniards were actively recruited to man the war industries. The war opened the door for many Spanish

\textsuperscript{15} Named after senator William P. Dillingham, the commission produced a 41-volume report which sought to stop the immigration of Eastern and Southern Europeans, considered to be less easily assimilated than the “old stock” Europeans from Northern and Western Europe.

immigrants to join the industrial workforce. By the 1920s and 1930s, Spanish enclaves could be found in New Jersey, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Ohio (see Table 5). This geographic expansion of the Spanish immigrant presence across the country reflected also their entry into new areas of the economy. The following pages offer a brief overview of the main economic activities Spanish immigrants in America engaged in.

Table 5: States with the highest population of Spaniards (1920, 1930)

The traveling fraternity. Cigarworkers and the Clear Havana cigar industry.

“I thought when I was young that you worked according to your nationality,” wrote Prudencio de Pereda in his novel about the Spanish community in Brooklyn. “We were Spanish, and my father, grandfather and uncles were all in the cigar business. There was a definite rule about this, I believed—a law.” Labor segregation is

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17 I have borrowed this expression from Patricia A. Cooper, Once a Cigarmaker. Men, Women, and Work Culture in American Factories, 1900-1919 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 75.
arguably one of the most visible outcomes of economic migration. Yet, for the most part it reflects conditions in the receiving economy and the strength of migrant networks, rather than a particular skill of the emigrant prior to leaving the homeland. Before leaving for America, prospective Biscayan sheepherders and Asturian cigarmakers often shared a similar rural background in the northern fringe of the Iberian Peninsula. What determined whether they would end up herding sheep in Idaho or rolling cigars in Florida were the transnational networks established between relatives, neighbors, and countrymen who had previously followed this path. In the Spanish case, these transnational networks were shaped by the particular geography of imperial Spain that linked the peninsula to her former colonies. The Clear Havana Cigar industry in the United States is a prime example of the survival of these transnational colonial networks in the post-colonial world.18

According to the Dillingham Commission, 2,116 Spanish tobacco workers entered the United States between 1889 and 1910. They represented the second highest category among the skilled occupations within the Spanish immigrant group, sandwiched between “clerks and accountants” and “mariners.” It is highly likely that many of the Spanish clerks and accountants also exercised their trade in the cigar factories of Louisiana, Florida, and New York. This statistic reflects a conservative count, however. The same commission, in the volume dedicated to the cigar industry, revealed that the city of Tampa alone was home to 2,001 Spanish cigarworkers. The roots of this migration went back to the nineteenth century--452 (22.58%) of these

workers had been in the country more than ten years, but immigration intensified after the Spanish-American war. 874 (43.68%) of the Spanish cigarworkers living in Tampa in 1910 had been in the United States between 5 and 9 years, and 675 (33.73%) had arrived in the previous four years.\textsuperscript{19}

For most of the original Spanish cigarworkers, Cuba was a stepping stone and training ground prior to moving to the United States. The life story of one such pioneer, Fermín Souto, recorded in Tampa in 1935, illustrates this journey. Born in the Galician town of Ferrol in 1858, the son of a stone-cutter, Souto was taken to Cuba at age 12 by a family friend. He worked in a hat factory in Havana, and later moved to Santiago de las Vegas to work as a clerk in a variety store. There he met a cigarmaker who had worked in New York for many years. Souto took his advice and learned the trade. After two years of apprenticeship, he traveled to New York and started working as a cigar maker. In 1891, Souto moved to Tampa, to work in the factory of another compatriot, Asturian Enrique Pendás.\textsuperscript{20}

The American occupation of Cuba consolidated a trend towards the monopolization of the tobacco industry. In the summer of 1899, cigar manufacturers from Tampa, Key West, New Orleans and Havana created a trust, the Havana-American Company. Tampa became the seat of the organization. It was estimated that 90% of the Clear Havana cigar production consumed in the U.S. would be produced


there, and that this output would require almost doubling the cigar-making population, from 6,000 to 11,000.\textsuperscript{21}

Immigrant transnational networks supplied thousands of Asturian and Galician workers for this expansion. Among them was 14-year-old José González, who left Asturias for Tampa in 1905, with an older cousin who had settled in the city a few years earlier. Upon arrival, José started as an apprentice in the same factory where his cousin worked, and which was owned by a fellow Asturian. He would later arrange for the migration to Tampa of two siblings, Luisa in 1913 and Víctor in 1916. José may not have appeared in the official emigration statistics, however, as he traveled first class (only those traveling in third class were considered “emigrants”). Nor did he share the humble origins described by Souto to his interviewer. José’s father was an army officer from a relatively well-off family of landholders in Castile.\textsuperscript{22}

These types of social and labor networks are not new to historians of migration. The peculiarity of the Spanish case lies in the nature of the industry the immigrants came to work for. Although they arrived at American shores, the majority of Spanish cigarworkers were employed by Spanish-owned firms. Cubans and Spaniards monopolized the Havana cigar industry booming in Gilded Age America. In cities like New York and Brooklyn, Spanish entrepreneurs found a niche in an already thriving industrial and commercial metropolis. In Florida, however, the establishment of their factories marked the beginnings of industrialization in an overwhelmingly

\textsuperscript{21} “Importante transacción,” \textit{Las Novedades}, 17 August 1899; “Sobre Tabaco,” \textit{Las Novedades}, 21 September 1899. In 1901, the Havana-American Company was purchased by the American Cigar Company, a subsidiary of the American Tobacco Company led by tobacco magnate James Duke.

\textsuperscript{22} José González Fernández Papers, USFLSC, Box 3.
rural and unpopulated state. In his characteristically blunt style, cigar manufacturer Enrique Pendás reminded the WPA interviewer recording his life history in 1935,

> When the manufacturers and cigar-makers arrived in Tampa, they found nothing but a stinking hole with swamps and pestilence everywhere. When we first arrived here, what little we found, in what was called Tampa, could not even be called a village. We made not only what Tampa is today, but the whole state of Florida . . . We gave it life and placed it on the map of the United States. This State owes everything to us. 23

Spanish immigrants, in this case, cast themselves as the new *conquistadores*, like their ancestors, bringing “civilization” to an untamed and undeveloped land.

When Vicente Martínez Ybor and Ignacio Haya first visited the area in 1885, Tampa had fewer than a thousand residents, its population declining steadily since the Civil War. With the establishment of the cigar industry, the population boomed. By 1900, it had increased almost seven-fold, to over 5,000 residents. Twenty years later, it had grown to over 50,000. 20% of the city’s inhabitants were foreign-born, another 22% had at least one foreign-born parent. Spaniards represented one quarter of the foreign-born population. Cigar production developed accordingly. The original two factories established in 1886 had a decade later expanded to 120. By 1908, over ten thousand workers manufactured cigars valued at $17 million, receiving “an average weekly wage of $200,000 or 75 per cent of the total payroll of the city.” In 1910, Tampa became the world’s leading producer of cigars, with an output of 250 million. By 1919, it had peaked at 410 million cigars. 24

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24 *Immigrants in industries*, 187.
In the 1920s, however, the mechanization of the cigar industry and the popularity of cigarettes began to erode an industry whose main product had been high-quality hand-made Havana cigars. At the same time, Florida’s real estate boom and the state’s transformation into a tourist mecca opened up new sources of income and contributed to diminishing the economic relevance of the tobacco industry. A 1926 headline in the leading trade journal, Tobacco Leaf, summarized this bleak state of affairs, “Cigar manufacturers feel slighted,” the journal reported; “Tampa ‘Inventory Congress’ relegates leading industry to minor position, arousing indignation of cigar men.”

The Great Depression was the nail in the coffin for the cigar industry. In the decade following the crash of 1929, the payroll of Tampa cigar factories was cut almost by half (from $13 million to $7 million), while the workforce decreased by almost 40 per cent (from 13,500 to fewer than 8,000).

As the Ybor City Chamber of Commerce organized pageants and banquets to celebrate the Golden Jubilee of the cigar industry in 1935, many of the cigarmakers who had come to Tampa in the 1880s faced desperate conditions. Eighty-year-old José García, who declined the invitation to attend a banquet honoring the founders of the city, summed up their plight. “Almost all of the old pioneer cigarmakers are now wandering the street in rags, and would welcome the cost of their place at the banquet in order to purchase some groceries,” García explained to a WPA interviewer. The predicament of these unemployed workers worsened when, in 1939, the WPA began

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27 “History of Ybor City as narrated by Mr. José García,” Social-Ethnic Study of Ybor City, Tampa, Florida Federal Writer’s Project, vol. 2, 1936, USFLSC.
dropping aliens from its rolls. Despite years of residency in the United States, many Cuban and Spanish cigarmakers had not become citizens. Some decided then to take naturalization papers. For many others, however, lack of proficiency in English made this an impossible proposition. A significant number decided to look for better opportunities elsewhere, and through a familiar pattern of migration networks, followed friends and relatives who had moved up north, particularly to New York.

**Sheepherding: Basques in the American West.**

Basque sheepherding offers another example of the relevance of the Spanish colonial geography in the shaping of transnational networks between Spain, the United States and Latin America. The lure of the gold rush attracted a pioneering group of Basques from Chile and the Rio de la Plata to California in the 1840s. When the gold rush abated in the 1850s, many of these immigrants left the mines and turned instead to cattle ranching and sheep-raising to meet the demand for foodstuff from the booming population of the state. Enterprising Basques joined Anglos and Mexicans in transforming the remnants of old Californio society. With skills learned in the expanding economies of South America, Basques helped launch the sheep-raising industry in California on a grand scale. Once established, they used kin and village networks to encourage relatives and countrymen to migrate directly from the Basque country.\(^{28}\) When the transcontinental railroad was completed in 1860, Basques would arrive in New York and board the trains heading west.

\(^{28}\) Douglass, *Amerikanuak*, 231ff.
As California’s economy shifted to agriculture at the turn of the twentieth century, many Basques who had invested in land either sold it to farmers, or began to farm it themselves. Those still engaged in sheep and cattle herding moved their business to other western states where grazing was easier. Here too, migrant networks shaped settlement patterns, with French Basques and Navarrese choosing California, Arizona and western Nevada, and Biscayans becoming more prominent in northern Nevada, southern Idaho and eastern Oregon. In fact, most Biscayans came from a handful of villages near the coast in the north-east corner of the province. Accurate statistics of Basque immigration to the United States are hard to come by because they were registered according to their nationality either as French or Spanish. Yet, naming patterns indicate that a majority of the Spaniards listed in the U.S. Census in the western states originated in the Spanish Basque provinces. The census, notorious for undercounting immigrants, may have seriously misrepresented the Basque presence given the highly mobile nature of this population made up of itinerant herders of sheep and cattle.

Unlike the Havana cigar industry where Spanish immigrants worked within a “Latin” labor market and did not compete with native workers for jobs, this itinerancy, and the practice of hiring relatives from the Basque country, became a source of tension between the Basque and native sheepherders. In 1909, for example, an article in an Idaho newspaper reported that the “Bascos are coming in great numbers and are driving the other sheepmen from the range.” While acknowledging that the Basques

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29 Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon as well as Montana and Wyoming. Ibid., 245.
30 Ibid., 302, 331, 335.
were hard-workers, the article stated that they were “clannish and undesirable.” In an explicitly racial comment that challenged the “whiteness” of the immigrants, the article warned that “unless something is done [the Basques] will make life impossible for the white man.”

A decade later, a Nevada publication decried the unorthodox grazing practices of Basque sheepmen on the national forests, again highlighting the threat they posed to the established white social order: “like the pirates of old, [they] cruise upon the public domain, setting aside without the slightest regard moral rights and customs which in the olden days made at least some provision for what was right and just.” In 1934, the Taylor Grazing Act was enacted to address these concerns, effectively putting an end to itinerant grazing. This legislation, in the evocative phrase of William Douglass, marked “a kind of Old and New Testament” for the Basque sheepmen in the West.

The success of the Taylor Grazing Act, combined with the reduction of Spanish immigration by the national origins quota acts of the 1920s eventually backfired. As World War II increased the demand for sheep products, the industry faced a perilous labor shortage. Leaders of Sheep Owners’ Associations in several western states pressured their representatives in Congress to allow the importation of Basque shepherds. Starting in 1943, a set of bills, dubbed the “Sheepherder Laws,” were passed. They offered labor permits for Basque shepherds to work temporarily in the United States. For the next twenty years, these private laws and temporary labor contracts helped maintain a precarious balance in the industry. But, in the 1960s, as

32 *The Nevada Stockgrower*, 1 October 1919, cited in Ibid., 277.
Spain began to experience her own economic recovery, and European countries offered competitive salaries and opportunities closer to home, the appeal of shepherding contracts in the American west began to wane. This, together with negative reports in the Spanish press (some of them voiced by a Catholic priest who had tried to unionize the sheepmen) about the low wages, poor living conditions and other abuses experienced by the immigrants, jeopardized the continuation of the program and contributed to its eventual demise.34

Andalusian farmers in Hawaii and California.

Contract labor was not unique to the migration of Basques in the post-World War II period. It had been used much earlier, with mixed results, to encourage the migration of Spaniards from other areas of the peninsula. As early as 1873, American companies had recruited Galician peasants to work in Louisiana’s sugar plantations.35 In 1906, Andalusian peasants were recruited to work on the sugar plantations in Hawaii. If the ranks of sheepmen and cigarmakers had been filled overwhelmingly by young single males, the Andalusian emigration to Hawaii was composed primarily of families.

Sugar companies in Hawaii had been recruiting immigrant labor since the 1850s. Beginning with Chinese coolies, the bulk of this immigration by the turn of the century came from Japan. Labor unrest among the Japanese workers, and the growing

34 Ibid., 306-325.
35 Recruitment continued throughout the 1880s, to the chagrin of the Spanish Consul who sounded the alarm among the Spanish authorities in Madrid. According to consular reports, many of these immigrants died of exhaustion and disease, and others asked to be repatriated to Cuba. See, for example, Arturo Baldasano to Estado, 30 August 1884 and 22 September 1884, MAEAH, Legajo H-1982.
anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States that led to their exclusion in the so-called “gentlemen’s agreement” of 1907, prompted the companies to turn to Europe as an alternative source of labor. Since Spaniards had proven to be good cane workers in Cuba, Hawaiian planters looked to “Latin peasants” (Spaniards and Portuguese primarily) as a valuable alternative.

The recruitment of Spaniards for Hawaii began in 1906. Prospective emigrants were offered a three-year labor contract which included free passage to Hawaii (for those under 45 years of age), free lodging and free medical care. The monthly salary was $20 for men (up to $22 by the third year), $12 for women, $15 for boys and $10 for girls over 15. For those under 15, the company also provided free and compulsory schooling. Considering conditions in rural Spain at the time, these inducements looked extremely attractive. On March 10, 1907 the first ship sailed to Hawaii from Malaga, with 2,269 men, women, and children. From 1907 to 1913 six other ships made the journey, transporting approximately 8,000 Spaniards to the islands. The beginning of World War I put an end to this migration, but by then, many of those who had migrated to Hawaii had left the island and relocated to farming communities in the San Francisco and Sacramento areas (Vacaville, Stockton, Sunnyvale, Fairfield). In fact, by 1916, a report from the Spanish consul in Honolulu estimated that only 3,500 Spaniards remained in Hawaii, and that 500 left every year for California.\(^{36}\)

In the 1930s, George Schnack used oral histories among Spanish families who had left Hawaii for California to attempt to explain this exodus. He concluded that this

migration was not a response to objective factors (poor conditions in Hawaii or better conditions in California), but to subjective ones. Spaniards, he claimed, were “fickle, flighty, curious as to the unknown, and always anxious to find out what was on the other side of the fence.” “The Spanish are sheep that follow the leader,” Schnack asserted, “and the reasons they think they had for leaving Hawaii are mostly a means of satisfying themselves that there was some valid logical reason why they should follow their friends.”

Schnack’s observations on the Spanish temperament may tell us more about the state of ethnographic research on migration at the time of his writing than about the actual reasons of the Spaniards’ move to California. Other sources indicate that better economic prospects as well as important structural differences between Hawaii and California may help explain this second migration from the islands to the continent. In the Hawaiian plantations, impersonal relationships were prevalent and workers were supervised by foremen hired by the companies. Beverly Lozano argues convincingly that Andalusians must have decided to move to California because the personal contact between ranchers and laborers replicated the patron-client relationships they were used to in the Andalusian latifundios. California also offered the opportunity of stability, which was difficult to obtain in Hawaii where workers could be relocated from plantation to plantation according to the needs of the owners. Moreover, in California workers could settle in towns similar in size to those they had

37 George F. Schnack, “Subjective Factors in the Migration of Spanish from Hawaii to California” (M.A. Thesis, Stanford University, 1940), 65 (first quote), 62 (second quote). Schnack’s work is based on twenty-three interviews carried out with Spaniards living in Mountain View.
left in Spain, a welcome change from the isolation they had experienced in the plantations.\(^3\)

Spanish Consular reports from Hawaii indicate that low wages, the high cost of living, and poor working conditions led the immigrants to seek better opportunities in California.\(^3\) The importance of this chain migration was acknowledged by the Spanish Consul in San Francisco, who, in 1915, wrote that the Spanish colony “increases prodigiously day by day, between those who come from Hawaii and those who emigrate directly from Spain.” The consul estimated that there were over 20,000 Spaniards in California dispersed throughout more than 125 small towns.\(^4\) In fact, despite the limitations imposed on transoceanic travel during World War I, these years saw an increase in Spanish migration to the United States. In 1916, for example, an article in the Bulletin of the Consejo Superior de Emigración stated that in the month of April alone 200 emigrants had left the province of Almería to work picking fruit in the orchards of California. These farmers, who according to the reports were relatively well-off, came from a handful of villages, and their goal was to “return two or three years later with good savings.”\(^5\) Similar reports in 1918 indicated that this migration from Almería to California was “well organized towards San Francisco, Los Angeles

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39 See, for example, consular reports from Honolulu in AGA-MAE Cajas 8121 and 8143.
and other places in the same region, where they get good wages and they live together in the ranches in groups of 10 or 12, which allows them to save enough money.  

While the Spanish statistics showed an increase in the number of emigrants leaving for the United States, the actual numbers defy an accurate count, since many emigrants sought to elude the obstacles anticipated in New York by entering the country through Cuba, Mexico, and Canada. As an emigration inspector reported in 1918 of a contingent of Andalusians going to Veracruz, “their goal is to enter the United States through El Paso, Texas. Once in the United States, they’ll join the Spanish colony in San Francisco.”

Miners, stone-cutters and sailors.

While the Spanish immigrant groups mentioned so far deviated from the pattern of most European migration to the United States, Andalusian and Asturian miners, Cantabrian stone-cutters, and Galician sailors came closer to that pattern in that they followed a more direct path from Spain to the United States and became more directly involved in American industries and American unions. This emigration, which began in the first decade of the twentieth century, also included a higher number of skilled workers.

According to state records cited by historian Thomas Hidalgo, Spaniards began entering the mines of West Virginia in 1908, their numbers growing steadily from 7 in 1908 to 2,212 in 1921. In the south of the state, in towns like Beckley, Spaniards

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43 Ibid.
worked in coal mines. The majority, like Hidalgo’s own grandparents, came from coal mining areas in the province of Córdoba and other parts of Andalusia as well as the northern region of Galicia. In the north, however, the mining population was composed mostly of Asturians who worked in zinc smelting plants around the city of Clarksburg.

Interestingly, the opening of one of these major plants, the Grasselli Chemical Company, in 1904, coincided with the aftermath of a long mining strike in Asturias the previous year, where the *Real Compañía Asturiana de Minas* retaliated by firing many of its workers. A number of these unemployed workers migrated to West Virginia. In the following years, the migratory networks brought hundreds of Asturians to the area. One scholar has stated that “entire families from the town of Salinas . . . in Asturias . . . migrated to Harrison County to work in the metal and glass industries there.” Among these families was that of Gavín W. González. His uncles had migrated to the United States at the turn of the century. Unhappy with working conditions at the smelter furnaces (the only jobs to be had by Spaniards), they decided to open businesses to cater to the Spanish communities in the smelter towns. Around the Grasselli Company there were, according to González, 1,200 people, two-thirds of them from Spain. It was there that Gavín’s father and uncles moved in 1905, each opening a different business: a grocery, a fish market and a beer garden.

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44 Thomas G. Hidalgo, “Reconstructing a History of Spanish Immigrants in West Virginia: Implications for Multicultural Education” (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1999), 75-76.
A similar pattern can be found among the Spanish stonecutters who migrated to Vermont in the first quarter of the twentieth century. By 1920, there were 661 Spaniards in the state, most of them (573) in Washington County. There, they worked in the granite and marble industry in Barre and Montpelier. As one of those immigrants recalled to a WPA worker in the mid-1930s, “ninety percent in Barre, and in all of Vermont, come from one province in Spain . . . Santander.” “There is granite in that province,” he explained, “but not all who came to Barre learned the trade over there. Maybe half of them.” Once the initial migration of skilled workers had established a foothold, less skilled migrants followed. Farmers would then leave Santander to learn the stone-cutting trade in Vermont. Some of them became quite successful. In the mid-1930s it was estimated that there were 20 Spanish-owned granite sheds in Barre.47

Sailors and stokers in the American merchant marine and stevedores in American harbors represented another important occupation among Spanish immigrants, particularly those from the coastal region of Galicia, where most of the ships to America sailed from. When Joaquín Solá, the editor of a magazine directed to the Galician diaspora, visited New York in 1914, he described the colony as composed mainly of “humble and hard-working stokers” living in the vicinity of the docks on the Hudson.48 Accurate statistics of this migration are hard to come by given the high mobility of the trade, but it was significant enough that, by the first decade of the twentieth century, the newly established Marine Firemen’s, Oilers’ and Water-

47 “Memorandum to Dr. Botkin,” American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1949. Available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/wpaintro/wpahome.html
Tenders’ Association (affiliated to the International Seamen’s Union) had a Spanish-speaking section. According to historian Bieito Alonso, in 1911 this section had over 10,000 members, most of them Spaniards. ⁴⁹

These figures must have increased considerably in the following years, when the demands of World War I and the shortage of labor in the United States prompted American shipping companies to recruit workers overseas. Sailors from neutral Spain responded eagerly to the offer. As early as January 1916, the Bulletin of the CSE denounced a company based in New York for recruiting workers in Galicia and neighboring León, and warned future emigrants that they would face “tough work at sea or in naval factories.” The warning went unheed; the next month close to 200 Spanish sailors left for the United States. ⁵⁰ This emigration continued in the following years. In 1918, the inspector of emigration from La Coruña harbor reported that those who left for the United States were almost exclusively sailors and stokers from the Galician coast, lured by the high wages offered in America. Similar reports came from the port of Vigo in southern Galicia, where the inspector anticipated that those leaving would write to their relatives, thereby increasing the migratory wave. ⁵¹

In fact, this continuing emigration proved very profitable for Galicians. Almost a decade later, when the CSE Bulletin reported that Galicia had experienced “a considerable reduction in the amount of remittances” from the Americas, it singled out the coastal areas as an exception. There, the article stated, the wages earned as sailors

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and stokers in the American merchant marine allowed the emigrants to maintain “the periodical remittance of copious savings.”52 This statement bore out not only the strength of the American economy, but also the strength of the ties that kept the emigrants connected to the homeland.

Despite their contributions to the economies of Spain and the United States, Spaniards abroad often felt discriminated against in both countries. As Juan Rabassa, a prominent member of New York’s Spanish community, declared to the New York Spanish daily La Prensa, “We Spaniards have all the obligations and none of the rights in the United States, and when we go to Spain, we experience the same thing.”53 This prejudice, acutely felt by leaders of the well-established Spanish immigrant commercial elite, like Rabassa, was experienced even more deeply by the mass of peasants and workers leaving Spain for America in the first decades of the twentieth century. American and Spanish consular records indicate that these emigrants’ movements caused anxiety among the authorities of both countries.

The Spanish migrant and the American state

One of the first arguments between Spain and the United States over the issue of emigration was, as already mentioned, the American hiring of Spanish workers to work in the Panama Canal. The new Spanish Emigration Act, which banned labor recruiting agencies in Spanish soil, sought to put an end to this practice. In November 1908, the American Chargé d’Affaires reported to Washington the reasons given by

52 “Vigo,” BCSE (1927): 501
53 “Los españoles de los E.U. laboran por su patria como no se sabe en España,” La Prensa, 2 August 1924, 1.
the Spanish government for such action: “the unhealthiness of the Isthmus; the non-
existence of any employers’ liability for accidents; the dismissal of workmen who fall
ill, and the misunderstandings which arise from the use of a foreign language.” The
American official, however, claimed that the main unspoken reason was “the strong
desire to check emigration by every available means.” He also hinted at a loophole in
the law, which applied only to Spanish ports, and therefore left open the possibility of
Spanish workers leaving from French ports. American recruiters availed themselves of
that option.  

Spanish efforts to check the recruitment of Spaniards by the American
sugar companies in Hawaii after an initial contingent had sailed from Malaga in April
1907, met with a similar fate. Spaniards continued to emigrate, but the ships left from
the neighboring British port of Gibraltar.

These were special circumstances however, as immigrant contract labor was
banned in the United States.  

While Spaniards were eagerly courted to work in
Hawaii, in West Virginia they were being deported for the same reason. In 1907, for
example, the Bureau of Immigration investigated claims that the Graselli Chemical
company had for several years been importing Spaniards to replace American
workers. The reports of the Bureau’s agents, based on interviews with some of the

54 American Chargé d’Affaires to Secretary of State, 12 November 1908. NA, RG 85, Box 136, File
51648/5. In fact, the recruitment continued in France. Spaniards also emigrated to third countries, such
as Costa Rica, whence they traveled to Panama.
55 The Alien Contract Labor Law prohibited aliens from entering the United States to work under
contracts made prior to their arrival, but Federal immigration laws allowed exemptions for territories.
56 The alleged importation had begun around 1905. By 1907, Spaniards were apparently becoming too
strong. A witness interviewed in the case claimed that the manager of the plant had once told him “We
must get in some more Polanders, for there are too many Spaniards.” The Bureau agent explained: “The
idea was to keep a lot of different foreigners so that they would be divided all the time and in a fight
among themselves.” Fred G. R. Gordon to Commissioner-General of Immigration, 15 December 1907,
NA, RG 85, Box 156, File 51681/44, p. 9.
displaced American workers, offer a glimpse into their perception of this migration, beyond the illegality of the company’s action. The following quote illustrates the unfitness of the Spanish immigrant to be a part of the American polity:

That these Spaniards are an undesirable lot there can be no doubt. They get drunk and shoot holes in peaceable folks windows, they are hard drinkers, they are nearly all armed with a murderous knife and they have two societies who are in a constant factional war with each other . . . I don’t believe there is an honest Spaniard in Clarksburg.\(^{57}\)

Part of this unfitness was due to the Spaniards’ sojourner status. The litany of charges that made this immigration undesirable and subject to deportation included the fact that “ninety per cent of them are here only temporarily and intend to go back to their native land.”\(^ {58}\)

The predicament of Spaniards seeking work in the United States was nicely summarized in a confidential report on Spanish migration sent to the Department of State by the Office of Naval Intelligence. The document called attention to the conflict in regulations emanating from both countries. Spaniards applying for passports to emigrate were required to submit a contract, certified by the respective consul, proving that they had a job in the country of destination. Yet, the presentation of such contract before an American consul would ipso facto make them ineligible to migrate to the United States, as they would be in violation of the Alien Contract Labor Law. That is why, a Spanish official explained to its American counterpart, “you will never see a Spanish passport giving ‘work’ as the reason for emigration. They all go to visit a

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 10.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 11.
The testimony of fourteen Spaniards facing deportation from Clarksburg in 1908 bears that out. All except one claimed that they had come to the United States to visit friends or relatives.60

Likelihood to become a public charge, another category that would exclude an immigrant from entering the United States, presented similar problems for Spaniards, as it was open to interpretation. In May, 1914, for example, thirty-two Spanish immigrants arriving in Providence, R. I. were detained and half of them were eventually deported under that charge. The shipping company which had brought them alerted the Spanish consul in Boston of the situation, affirming that the Spaniards “are plentifully supplied with money,” and that “their rights seem to be denied them.”61 In his report to Ambassador Riaño, the vice consul in Boston reiterated that these men had enough funds ($45-$50 each) to hold them over until they could find employment, and he openly stated his belief that they were being targets of discrimination.

“Hundreds of immigrants from other nationalities, in much worse physical, moral, and economic conditions, land not only in this port but in ports throughout America,” he wrote, “it is an injustice not to allow these Spanish citizens to land.”62 Riaño’s letter to the American Secretary of State upon learning that the immigrants’ appeal had not

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59 “Issuance of Passports, Pontevedra, Spain.” Office of Naval Intelligence to Dept. of State, 5 October 1917, NA, RG. 85, Box 537, File 52408/59.
60 Commissioner-General of Immigration to the Bureau of Immigration, 30 March 1908, NA, RG 85, Box 156, File 51681/44. The situation in Clarksburg, however, seems to have been particularly flagrant. Similar investigations by the Bureau of Immigration prompted by the increase of Spanish immigration to the mines of Morenci, Arizona, via Mexico, failed to find evidence of the activities of recruiting agencies. Rather, it was explained as a natural migratory movement fostered by letters from kinsmen as to the opportunities in America, as was also the case with Spaniards migrating to Tampa, via Cuba. NA, RG 85, Box 537, File 52408/59. Mexican political instability was also offered as a possible explanation of this movement of Spaniards from Mexico to the United States.
61 James Elwell to Spanish Consul, 7 May 1914, AGA-MAE, Caja 8125. “Emigración a EE.UU”
62 Pedro Mackay de Almeida to Juan Riaño, 16 May 1914, AGA-MAE, Caja 8215. “Emigración a EE.UU.”
been granted, expressed his protest for this “unjustified discrimination” against Spanish nationals. At the same time, Riaño again suggested to his government that it discourage the emigration of Spaniards to the United States, “where the endless number of abuses, inflictions, and inconveniences [they experience] make their lives a living hell.”

Despite these problems, Spanish migration to the United States grew during World War I, as the country faced a shortage of manpower caused by the return to Europe of migrants from belligerent countries, and later, America’s own entry into the War. Galician sailors and stokers left Spain lured by the wages offered in the American merchant marine, and Valencian peasants worked as farm laborers or in munition plants. New York’s Spanish paper La Prensa ran ads from labor agencies specifically catering to Spaniards to work in a variety of industries, mines, and public works. Spanish women were also sought for “patriotic labor,” making chocolate candy for American servicemen in Europe. In 1919, an article in The Literary Digest estimated that during the war, “30 to 40 percent of the unskilled workers in munition plants, shipyards, mines, and other industries were Spaniards.” And it estimated the population of Spaniards in the country to be at 80,000. By 1920, the United States

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63 The Secretary of State, for his part, denied the charge. Juan Riaño to W. J. Bryan, 12 June 1914; W. J. Bryan to Juan Riaño, 29 August 1914, AGA-MAE, Caja 8215. “Emigración a EE.UU.”
64 Juan Riaño to Estado, 12 June 1914, AGA-MAE, Caja 8215. “Emigración a EE.UU.”
65 “Muchachas y Señoras, Trabajo patriótico y esencial,” La Prensa, 23 October 1918. See, for example, La Prensa, 23 June 1917, 8. Most of these jobs offered $3 a day. According to an emigration inspector in Valencia, these wages allowed landless farmers to save enough money in a short time to pay the loans that financed their migration, and buy their own land, so that they would not have to hire out to others for the miserly wages paid in Spain. “Emigración por puertos. Valencia,” BCSE (1918): 467.
ranked third in the Spanish emigration statistics, following Cuba and Argentina, an average of 4,000 Spaniards leaving for the United States every month.  

Although this migration was small when compared to that of other European countries, the trend worried American authorities. Already in 1917, when Spanish migration to America had not reached 4,000 for the year, but the shift towards the United States had become significant, American officials were looking for ways to curtail it. In August of that year, the Office of Naval Intelligence forwarded to the State Department a communication from Coruña which clearly stated that concern. The dispatch indicated that, in 1916, 14,000 emigrants had left from Spain to Cuba from that port alone. Pointing out that this was an open door for “undesirables” to enter the United States, it suggested that “a request be made that Cuba adopt somewhat similar visa regulations as to those at present required for persons leaving for the United States.” That meant that Spaniards would not be allowed to enter the United States from Cuba without the visa of an American consul.

The report’s gloomy predictions did not materialize. Although Spanish migration to the United States did increase during those years, the post-war economic depression and the enactment of the first National Origins Quota Act in 1921 curtailed this increment. In fact, in 1921, the Spanish government budgeted the unprecedented sum of half a million pesetas to repatriate unemployed Spaniards from the United

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68 Office of Naval Intelligence to Department of State, 14 August 1917, NA, RG 85, Box 537, File 52408/59.
States. Yet, fears of an invasion of illegal Spaniards remained. In the summer of 1922, the American Consul in Vigo reported to the State Department that his British counterpart in the city had informed him that nineteen emigrants had applied for visas to Canada with the intention to go to the United States. The Consul stated that “hundreds perhaps thousands of Spaniards in this district desire to go to the United States,” and expressed concern that this would start a smuggling ring through Canada.\(^{70}\) The American Consul in Coruña, however, reassured the Department of State that the situation was under control. Having met with the British Vice Consul there, he was confident that no visas had been either requested or granted, and that the British official would “visa no passports for Canada without communicating to this office the names of the emigrants.”\(^{71}\)

In fact, as Thomas Kirk, the Director of Immigration in Jacksonville, Florida, reported to the Department of Labor of his inspection trip to Cuba in April, 1924, most migration to the United States from Cuba was orderly and legal. He wrote, “I find that quite a number of aliens now in Cuba are not making any effort to smuggle in, but are waiting, confidently believing that on July 1\(^{st}\) they will be able to enter regularly and legally.” “Of course,” Kirk continued, “there is a great disappointment in store for them, and, when this is learned, the majority of them will no longer wait, thinking to get in legitimately, but will make every effort to smuggle in.”\(^{72}\) Kirk was referring to the enactment of the Second National Origins Quota Act which, besides further

\(^{70}\) Henry Wilcox to Secretary of State, 24 June 1922, NA, RG 85, Box 332, File 55079/286.
\(^{71}\) Ralph C. Busser to Secretary of State, 30 June 1922, NA, RG 85, Box 332, File 55079/286.
\(^{72}\) Thomas Kirk to Commissioner General of Immigration, 14 April 1924, NA, RG 85, Box 369, File 55396/17.
limiting the entry of foreign nationals to a portion of those admitted under the Quota Act of 1921, abolished the quota exemption that foreigners living in American countries had enjoyed.73 As Kirk shrewdly anticipated, the publication of the law swelled the ranks of illegal immigrants, as thousands of foreigners waiting in Cuba to enter legally into the United States fell prey to unscrupulous smugglers. In 1928, the immigration commissioner in New Orleans estimated that some aliens were paying from $1000 to $1500 to enter the United States.74 In 1933 the New York Herald Tribune reported that in the past ten years 40,000 “undesirables” had been smuggled in the United States from Cuba alone, at a profit of 20 million dollars.75

While a number of Spaniards may have entered the country illegally, the 1924 National Quota Act drastically reduced their presence in the United States (see Table 3).76 At the same time, in the mid-1920s, the newly-established dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera began to use the Hispanista discourse to promote stronger ties between Spain and its American diaspora. Soon after Primo’s coup in September 1923, a new emigration law was passed. Perhaps more important for Spaniards abroad were two other pieces of legislation promoted by the regime, one regulating the

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73 The 1921 Quota Law exempted from the quota foreigners who had lived at least one year in other American countries. In 1922, this residence requirement was extended from one to five years. In 1924 it was abolished altogether.
74 Commissioner of Immigration, New Orleans to Commissioner General of Immigration, 11 August 1928, NA, RG 85, Box 436, File 55607/457.
75 “Smuggler Ring In Cuba Swells U.S. Alien Tide,” New York Herald-Tribune, 3 February 1933. The overwhelming majority of these immigrants came from Eastern Europe and Asia.
76 While specific figures are hard to find, the repeated calls on the pages of the Spanish publication La Emigración Española warning Spaniards of the dangers they faced if they tried to be smuggled through Cuba or Mexico, give an indication of their participation in this clandestine traffic. See, for example, “No dejarse engañar. La emigración clandestina a Norteamérica,” La Emigración Española 17 (1927): 822.
military obligations of Spaniards abroad; the other one revamping the consular and diplomatic career.\textsuperscript{77}

The Spanish migrant and the Spanish State

In the 1930s, Mr. Navarro, one of George Schnack’s informants on the emigration of Spaniards to Hawaii, stated that the offer of the sugar plantations to recruit Spanish laborers had been a godsend for a Spain struggling with high rates of unemployment. Speaking of one of those shipments, in 1913, Navarro explained that “The [Spanish] government was ready to send people to Hawaii, ‘just like they were sold to America.’”\textsuperscript{78} The powerful image of enslavement that this remark conjures up was elaborated in Navarro’s account of his own “forced” migration. The son of a prosperous Málaga farmer, the family’s luck turned when a neighboring marquis schemed to take the land away from them. The Navarros’ attempt to seek redress at the courts failed and the marquis prevailed, forcing the destitute family to leave their land to work in the pineapple plantations of Hawaii.

Whether or not the specific details of this migration are historically accurate, they reflect a sense of frustration and acrimony against Spanish policies that were common among many Spaniards in the diaspora.\textsuperscript{79} In his poignant memoir of Spanish migration to West Virginia, Gavín González discusses these sentiments openly.

“‘There is no viable reason why the descendants of the Asturian smelter workers

\textsuperscript{77} In 1924, the Madrid daily \textit{El Sol} estimated that 5 million Spaniards, nearly a quarter of the total population of Spain, lived abroad. \textit{El Sol}, 15 November 1924.

\textsuperscript{78} Schnack, “Subjective factors,” 103. Schnack states that Navarro was not the only one among his informants to express this idea.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 102. Schnack relates two versions of Navarro’s departure from Spain, this one being “probably more exact as to the actual conditions.”
should keep saying they are proud of being Spanish,” González wrote, “Spain never
did a thing for them.” “In fact,” he continued, “if their ancestors had stayed in Spain
they never would have existed. Their ancestors would have starved to death before
they could have been conceived.”

Sympathy for the plight of peasants and workers forced to emigrate was not
always forthcoming from the Spanish political elite. Prime Minister Segismundo
Moret, for example, thought of emigration as a social ill that needed to be penalized.
During the parliamentary debate on the 1907 emigration law, he had famously stated
that those who left Spain had no right to request the government’s protection. Other
political leaders, like Rafael Gasset, the editor of Madrid’s daily El Imparcial, saw the
role of the state differently. Gasset blamed emigration on the underdevelopment of the
Spanish economy. As Minister of Public Works, in 1911, Gasset published
impassioned articles in his newspaper about the wretched condition of Spanish
laborers, many of whom earned less than 1,50 pesetas (27 cents) a day. He also
proposed a comprehensive plan of public works that would provide employment for
the poor and contribute to the development of the country.

The 1907 Emigration Act had been part of this broader effort to tackle the
“social question” in Spain. The impulse for the law emanated from the Instituto de
Reformas Sociales (Institution for Social Reform), established in 1903, which
promoted a number of social and legislative initiatives to temper the structural

80 González, Pinnick Kinnick Hill, 243.
81 On the contemporary debate on emigration in Spain see Sánchez Alonso, Causas, 62-93.
82 The articles, some of them with stirring titles such as “A Country That Vanishes,” made an
impression on the American Minister to Spain, Henry C. Ide, who forwarded them to the Secretary of
State. See, for example, Henry Ide to Secretary of State, 1 February 1911, and 15 February 1911, NA,
RG 59, M1369, Files 852.56/10 and 852.56/11.
problems of modernization in fin-de-siècle Spain. Emigration, and particularly the
increase of female emigration, was high on the agenda. The new law called for the
establishment of a Consejo Superior de Emigración whose many tasks included: “the
study of the causes and effects of Spanish emigration . . . the compilation of migration
statistics, and the publication of all necessary data in order to understand and to solve
this problem, including the edition of guides and books directed to the general
public.”

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The tutelage of the state over the emigrant was to be exercised through a
network of officials, but the bulk of it fell to the consuls in the country of destination.
Consuls were charged with “processing and addressing all petitions by the emigrants”
and “fomenting the constitution of societies in their district whose goal would be the
defense, tutelage or mutual aid among Spaniards.” They were also required to send to
the Consejo tri-monthly reports about the situation of their respective countries
regarding “labor need, wages, and anything else that might be of interest to the
Spanish emigrant.”

84 The lofty goals of the legislation soon stumbled against the harsh
economic reality of the Spanish state, as funding to carry out its mandate was meager
or nonexistent.

The deficiencies of the Spanish consular system in the Americas contributed to
making this a daunting task. In 1907, when the Emigration Act was passed, there were
no Spanish embassies in the Americas. Tellingly, the first Spanish embassy in the
continent was opened in Washington in 1915, two years before the one in Buenos

83 Article 10, in Vincenti, Estudio sobre emigración, 339.
84 Articles 16, 18, in Ibid., 340-341.
Aires where a quarter of the Spanish migrants lived. New York housed the only Spanish Consulate General outside of Europe. Despite this somewhat privileged position, the consular system in the United States was ill-prepared to fulfill the tasks required by the Emigration Act, in part because of the unusual geographic dispersion of the Spanish diaspora. Many of the locations where Spaniards emigrated to had no Spanish consulates to begin with.\textsuperscript{85} Even in places where consulates had long been established the new demands were hard to meet. The archives of consular correspondence in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expose an appalling dearth of resources. Consulates lacked tools that were becoming essential in any American commercial house, such as typewriters or telephones. Some even lacked the Spanish flag and seal that indicated its official character. Consuls routinely requested to be sent up-to-date legislative codes and relevant official information. Meager salaries and appropriations, they argued, forced them to rent offices in less than desirable areas, and prevented them from hiring staff to help with the demands of the job. This lack of resources, in turn, contributed to the often rocky relationship between consular officials and the people they purportedly represented.

The story of the long drawn-out process to establish a Spanish consulate in Tampa, one of the wealthiest and more populous Spanish communities in the United States, illustrates the schism between the Spanish state and its diaspora. The original consular agency, established in 1885, had been upgraded to a consulate during the Cuban war for independence. But, once the war was over, and precisely when Spanish migration to Tampa began to increase, the office was downgraded to honorary vice-

\textsuperscript{85} Such was the case in Hawaii, which did not have a Spanish consulate until 1911.
consulate. Requests from the immigrant community to get a consulate were supported in 1913 by the Spanish Minister in Washington, who wrote to the personal secretary of Alfonso XIII, expressing a “very deep and personal interest” in the matter.

Juan Riaño’s carefully crafted letters reveal his keen understanding of the need for the Spanish state to promote and benefit from the patriotism of Spaniards abroad, and to strike a balance of rights and obligations in the relationship between the state and its subjects. Highlighting the transnational links that kept diaspora communities connected to the homeland, Riaño reminded his superiors of the remittances sent by Tampa Spaniards to their families, as well as their contributions to subscriptions to support a variety of causes in the peninsula. He called attention to the fact that, despite the advantages offered by naturalization, only five per cent of the Tampa Spanish residents had sought American citizenship, and even those had remained “morally and materially bound to the Motherland.” Riaño’s attempts “to do everything in my power to tighten the links between the Government and the colony” were also shaped by the growing appeal of anarchism among the Tampa community. He warned that socialists and anarchists had used as part of their rhetoric to separate the workers from the fatherland “the abandonment in which they are left without a consular representative in tune with the importance of its size and of the wealth produced by their work.”

Juan Riaño to Estado, 7 April 1913; Juan Riaño to Emilio M. Torres, 8 April 1913, AGA-MAE, Caja 8121. See also Caja 8165. Riaño had visited Tampa in 1913 as a guest of honor to attend the inauguration of two clubhouses of the Centro Español.
Riaño’s impassioned calls went unattended. Three years later, the Tampa Spanish colony again asked him for help in pressing their petition for a consulate. This time they even offered to pay the consul’s salary. The Ambassador relayed this request to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but he also brought it to the attention of the Spanish Prime minister. Still dealing with the consequences of the Mexican revolution which had forced hundreds of Spaniards out of the country, a frustrated Riaño reminded Romanones that “much of what happened in Mexico was due to the neglect in which we have the consular service.”

This neglect extended to most of the Americas, and was reflected in the training and aptitude of the officials assigned to the consulates. Protestations of *hispanismo* notwithstanding, Spain remained culturally, politically, and diplomatically oriented towards Europe. Many consular officials saw posts in the far-flung American continent only as a necessary step in the path to the coveted positions in the European capitals. Within the Americas, the Spanish-speaking republics offered linguistic and cultural advantages that tended to make them more appealing to Spanish officials than the United States. In fact, many of these officials did not speak English.

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87 Not only were these requests unheeded, but by 1920 the Minister, apparently without consulting Riaño, created new consulates in Chicago, Philadelphia, and St. Louis, cities which, according to the General Consul in New York, were well served by honorary agents. In turn, the Ministry failed to create consulates in Norfolk and Tampa where they were needed. A year later, the consulate in St. Louis was transferred to Norfolk, but the repeated calls from Tampa Spaniards to get a consulate remained unanswered. Alejandro Berea to Juan Riaño, 10 August 1920; Estado to Juan Riaño, 11 September 1920; Juan Riaño to Estado, 24 January 1922, AGA-MAE, Caja 8255.


89 When Andrés Iglesias Velayos was first assigned to the newly-created consulate at Galveston, he wrote to his superior: “my services will be useless there, since I have no knowledge of English.” Andrés
la Escosura provides perhaps the most egregious case of this linguistic inability. Assigned to head the new Spanish consulate in Philadelphia in 1920, but unable to speak English, he claimed his right to follow European diplomatic practice, and insisted on carrying on his correspondence with American authorities in French.\footnote{In a letter to Riaño defending his behavior, De la Escosura stated that in the European posts where he had served, interpreters were paid to translate the consular correspondence into French, the language of diplomacy. Juan Riaño to Estado, 20 December 1920; 26 December 1920, MAEAH, Expediente Personal, Manuel de la Escosura y Fuertes, P-291/21865.}

De la Escosura’s contempt for Americans did not bode well for the protection of the interests of the growing Spanish community in his consular jurisdiction.\footnote{In 1923, the Spanish consul in Philadelphia calculated the number of Spaniards in his jurisdiction at 15,000. This figure was based on the number of those registered in the consulate (7,500), estimated as half of the total population, a conservative estimate as the consul himself acknowledged. Emilio de Motta to Juan Riaño, 30 May 1923, AGA-MAE, Caja 8227.} In fact, his disdain soon spilled over to the Spanish subjects under his care. In 1921, the New York Spanish society \textit{Unión Benéfica Española} requested the Consul’s support as they helped a Spanish immigrant injured while working at the University of Pennsylvania to claim an indemnity. De la Escosura’s terse response underscored his understanding of the proper relationship between the Spanish immigrants and the consular representative:

\begin{quote}
I reply to your letter with the only goal of letting you know that from now on you should not address this or any other Spanish consulate, ordering what the consul should or should not do, as this is the height of insolence. You should also know that whenever you need anything from any representative of the nation, you should request it in the form of a respectful request and through the mediation of the Consul General in New York.\footnote{Manuel de la Escosura to Unión Benéfica Española, 1 February 1921, MAEAH, Expediente Personal, Manuel de la Escosura y Fuertes, Legajo P-291/21865. This and other incidents brought the consul disciplinary action and a transfer to Brazil. His personal file indicates that he continued to have problems with the Spanish community in other posts as well.}
\end{quote}
While this may have been an extreme case, complaints by Spanish migrants about the inattention of the Spanish state and its consuls were common. In 1919, a Tampa Spanish newspaper called *Renovación* (Renewal) published an open letter to the Spanish Parliament calling on legislators to change the constitution so as to allow immigrant representation in Congress. In a letter forwarding the paper to the Spanish Ambassador, a Tampa resident, Regino García, asked Riaño if he could send him a manual on the rights of the Spanish emigrants abroad. A few months earlier, García had written to Riaño protesting that the Spanish vice-consul in Tampa did not defend the interests of Spanish citizens. The letter echoed the denunciation of the viceconsul by two Spanish sailors from New York who claimed they had been tricked by a ship Commissioner who had offered them a job on a ship heading to Barcelona. When the job did not materialize, the sailors asked the viceconsul for help in getting the money owed to them for the work done and the expenses incurred, but, apparently, he sided with the company. In a leaflet distributed in Tampa’s Latin quarter, the sailors asked their compatriots: “Is Spain well represented by a man who represents only the capitalist?”

Workers, particularly those facing violence because of real or alleged participation in strikes, sought the protection of the Spanish representatives,

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93 Dr. Argüelles, “Carta abierta al Congreso Español,” *Renovación. Periódico Obrero de Propaganda y Combate*, 31 October 1919, 2. A copy of the paper was attached to Riaño’s dispatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Juan Riaño to Estado, 5 November 1919, MAEAH, Política Exterior, Legajo H-2445.

94 Riaño suggested that the Spanish viceconsul in Tampa could write to the Consejo Superior de Emigración requesting, if such publication existed, a manual on the rights and duties of Spanish emigrants. Juan Riaño to Regino García, 5 November 1919, AGA-MAE, Caja 8182, Legajo 1226.

95 Críspulo Sáez and Juan Toda, “A la Colonia Española de Tampa en particular y la opinión pública en general,” 1 August 1919. Both the leaflet and Regino García’s letter (dated 5 August 1919) are in AGA-MAE, Caja 8181.
without much success. At the height of a bitter mining conflict in West Virginia in 1921, a dozen Spanish strikers claiming to represent 150 Spanish families employed by the Graselli Chemical Co., called on the Ambassador to intercede as the company threatened to evict them. The petitioners asked Riaño to act “as a Spaniard, and as a representative of our Sovereign.” Having received no help, a month later, they wrote again. This time, they described some of the abuses they were subjected to, and asked Riaño to visit or to send someone to assist them. “There’s no law for us in this state,” they cried, “every minute of the day we are trampled on by the police; we suffer persecution by the representatives of the Justice, and are treated worse than animals.”

A newspaper clipping attached to the letters spoke of a Spanish labor leader receiving a threatening note from a group called “American citizens for the preservation of American ideals.” Addressed to “Spanish Aliens,” the note told Spaniards to “either settle down and become American citizens or leave Harrison county.” “If you disregard this warning,” the menacing message continued, “you will be burnt out of your houses and run out of the country.”

While Riaño kept abreast of developments through the vice-consul in Clarksburg and the Consul General in New York, he did not intervene, as he considered this to be a matter better left to the local courts and the local police.

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96 Celestino Alvarez et al. to Juan Riaño, 23 February 1921, AGA-MAE, Caja 8226.
98 The Spanish viceconsul in Clarksburg, an Italian lawyer who was also consul of Italy, explained to the Consul General in New York that the company was within its rights to evict the strikers. As for the
Similarly, when Ramón Sánchez, accused of “criminal syndicalism” in San Francisco in 1921, and his American lawyer, wrote to the embassy asking Riaño to intervene on his behalf, he declined, explaining that the Embassy “can only take the matter up with the Department of State if the protests can be based upon evident denial of justice.”

This standard of evidence, however, left most Spaniards accused of crimes to fend for themselves in a system often stacked against poor, uneducated, immigrants. In a case filed in the Embassy archives under the telling title, “Inhuman and barbaric attack against three Spaniards on the American steamship Brunswick,” the only apparent role of the embassy in the defense of the Spanish sailors accused of mutiny in Tampa was to contribute $150 to hire a lawyer. Behind the scenes, Riaño prodded the elites to find an amenable solution, with a veiled threat to decline an invitation to represent Spain at an upcoming ceremony marking the inauguration of the two new clubhouses of the Centro Español. In this case, the sailors benefited from the relative influence of the Spanish community in Tampa and the good relations between the embassy and the community’s leaders. Despite the merits of the case, it is doubtful that had the trial happened in another place, they would have been able to count on

treathe, he believed the matter should be left in the hands of the local police. B. Merendino to Alejandro Berea, 6 March 1921, AGA-MAE, Caja 8226, Legajo 1295, Carpeta 5.
99 Juan Riaño to J. G. Lawlor, 5 January 1922, AGA-MAE, Caja 8226, Legajo 1296, Carpeta 27. Sánchez was accused of being a member of the International Workers of the World. In his letters to Riaño, he asked to be set free or at least deported to Spain, but the District attorney would not consent to a repatriation. Reluctance by consular and diplomatic officials to intervene on behalf of Spaniards accused of radical activities in the United States also reflects the Spanish state’s own apprehension about the politicization of its emigrants in America.
100 The telegram sent by the Embassy to the Minister requesting authorization for that expense is indicative of the official understanding of the duties and obligations between the Spanish state and its subjects abroad. The text pointed to the need to address the “constant impunity of crimes against Spaniards,” but it also highlighted the deserving nature of the Spanish community in Tampa, who had just recently contributed $500 for a subscription to Spanish victims in Melilla. Walls to Estado, telegram, 11 October 1912. AGA-MAE, Caja 8120.
Spanish official support. In New York, where there were a number of cases of
Spaniards wrongly accused of crimes, their advocates, instead of writing letters to the
Spanish representatives, turned to the Spanish press and the Spanish community to
raise funds to pay the services of the best lawyers they could afford.

In 1925, on the occasion of the arrival in Cuba of a Special Spanish envoy to
attend the investiture of Gerardo Machado, the Diario Español published a series of
articles as an open letter to the envoy on “what the action of Spain in America is and
what it should be.” The scathing indictment declared that “diplomacy . . . might be
considered one of the most pernicious factors that Spain has in America.” Primo de
Rivera began to address some of these problems, but there was much to be done.

In 1931, in the first-ever radio broadcast from Spain to both Americas, the
President of the newly-proclaimed Spanish Republic, Niceto Alcalá Zamora, set out
the Republic’s approach to its diaspora communities. For those seeking to return, he
announced a series of measures which included an amnesty for exiles who had left
Spain for political and military reasons, and the repatriation of unemployed
immigrants without means to return. For those remaining in the Americas, the
Republic proposed the possibility of dual citizenship. Alcalá Zamora also promised a
reorganization of the consular service so that the new envoys to the continent would
be “men completely capable.” Further, he anticipated a reorientation of Spanish
diplomacy, to make sure that “Spain’s representation in America would be equal if not

101 A. de Lardo [Adelardo Novo], “Lo que es y lo que debe ser la acción de España en América,” Diario Español, reprinted in La emigración española, 15 July 1925, 197-202. The special envoy sent by Primo de Rivera was the renowned Hispanist and professor at the Universidad Central in Madrid, Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín.
better to that in Europe." The priorities set forth in this speech underscored some of the difficulties that had plagued the relationship between Spanish migrants and the Spanish state for decades. They also illustrated the appeal that the offers of the new Republic had for those immigrants.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed the changes in the Spanish diaspora in the United States in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Spain’s colonial geography continued to influence patterns of labor and settlement in the first decades of the century, but labor recruitment (as in the case of Hawaii and the war industries during World War I) resulted in an increase of Spanish migration directly from the peninsula and a broader presence of Spaniards in a variety of states and occupations. Still, even at its peak, the Spanish immigrant population of the country remained relatively low.

The small size of this immigrant population makes the degree of unease surrounding this migration in both countries all the more remarkable. How can we explain this response? For Spain, large scale Spanish migration to Latin America was more comfortably integrated within a narrative of Spanish colonization and empire. The ease with which Spaniards moved about the two continents in a pattern of “swallow” migration, only reinforced the emblematic unity of the Hispanic world, with Spain at its center. Emigration to the United States, however, elicited a different

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set of images. The increase of this migration, even if small in numbers, highlighted America’s economic dominance and, therefore, the weakness of Spain, an ever-present reminder of its defeat in 1898. The American state, for its part, acknowledged the value of the Spanish workers, but seemed less convinced about their potential for citizenship. The ease of travel between Spain and her former colonies conjured up images of masses of Spaniards entering the United States through the “back door.” When the 1920s quota laws restricted this migration further, the fears turned to a possible avalanche of Spanish illegal aliens.

During the first decades of the twentieth century, Spanish immigrant communities in America remained relatively small and isolated. As Caroline Ware wrote of the Spaniards in Greenwich Village in the 1930s, they “kept very strictly to themselves.” This was due, in part, to the lack of command of the English language. (Ware states that although most of the people she met had lived in America for more than ten years, few could speak English.). But the Spanish ethnic press reveals that divisions and isolation were also part of the internal dynamics of the community, and that they often frustrated the attempts by the leaders of the colony to create a united ethnic presence and to make their voices heard not only before the American institutions but before their own government as well. At the same time, as we will see in the following chapter, these decades saw the flourishing of a number of institutions which helped fostered local and regional as well as international identities among this diverse immigrant population. In fact, part of the sense of division and

isolation often bemoaned in the Spanish press may reflect the elites’ uneasiness with a vibrant and varied community not easily molded into their pattern of what a Spanish ethnic identity in the United States should entail.
The making of transnational communities

“Agapito was a Spaniard and he lived in Spain. America was the place he worked in.” Written about a fictional character in Prudencio de Pereda’s novel, these sentences describe an experience shared by many Spaniards in the United States.¹ Agapito had been born “in a little pueblo in Galicia,” we are told, and “ever since he could remember he was determined to leave Spain.” The tales of the Americanos (wealthy returnees from America) drew him, like many others, to try his luck in America. After two years working as a cigar salesman in New York, he saved enough money to return to his village and marry his sweetheart. During the following years, he returned periodically, to visit his wife and attend the birth of his children, five in total. An enterprising man, Agapito managed to survive the ravages of the depression, but his dream of retiring with his family in Galicia was shattered by the Spanish Civil War. When the war started, he brought his wife and children to the United States, never to return to Spain.

The sojourner nature of most of the Spanish migration to America, made up overwhelmingly of young males, contributed to the strength of these transnational networks. It also explains the important role played by two immigrant institutions which catered to this highly mobile population: boarding houses and mutual aid societies. They, in turn, reinforced not only the transnational connections with the

¹ De Pereda, *Windmills in Brooklyn*, 49.
homeland but also the bonds between regional and local diasporas across the Americas.

This chapter examines how Spanish migrants grappled with the definition of an ethnic identity in twentieth-century America. In chapter three, I argued that the American rediscovery of the Spanish past after the Spanish-American war had aided the efforts of the Spanish immigrant elites to create an identity based on the discourse of *hispanismo*. The following pages will show that this conservative version of Spanish national identity was not universally accepted by the diaspora. In fact, it proved a weak contender against the local, regional and internationalist loyalties of many of the immigrants arriving at American shores in the 1910s and 1920s. Sub-national and supra-national loyalties defined many of these migrants, who espoused anarchism or supported separatist movements in Catalonia and the Basque country. Their anticlericalism and their repudiation of Spain’s colonial wars in Morocco countered the imperial image of monarchic, Catholic Spain. The continued calls by the immigrant elites to create a Hispanic unity in America only highlighted the difficulty of the task.

**Home away from home: Boardinghouses in the Spanish immigrant enclaves**

One of the first things Agapito did upon arriving in New York was to find a Spanish boarding house. Boarding houses were a vital element of the immigrant enclave. They offered affordable living quarters for frugal young men seeking to increase their savings. Furthermore, they provided a warm and safe environment that protected the newly-arrived Spaniard, supplied information about job possibilities, and
helped ease the transition to American society. Advertisements for Spanish hotels and restaurants appeared in the Spanish immigrant press as early as the 1870s.\(^2\) By the 1920s, a growing number of Spanish boardinghouses, restaurants, and grocery stores offered immigrants a “home away from home.” Mirroring the geographic diversity of the community, these establishments catered to different regional tastes. Grocery stores would sell Spanish olive oil and cheese, but also “Galician sardines,” while restaurants’ weekly menus would lure customers which such regional specialties as paella valenciana, bacalao a la Vizcaína, patas de ternera a la Andaluza, and olla a la Catalana. Among the most successful entrepreneurs catering to this regional public in 1920s New York was the Basque Valentín Aguirre, whose restaurant Jai-Alai, decorated with murals of pelota players, advertised “platos típicos regionales” (typical regional dishes).

Born in Biscay, Aguirre migrated to the United States in 1895. After a stint working in the dockyards of New York, he and his wife opened a boardinghouse, Casa Vizcaína (Biscayan House), in the Spanish section of Manhattan. In 1910, they moved to bigger quarters in Greenwich Village and established the Santa Lucía Hotel as well as a travel agency. For most of the Basques arriving in New York in the first decades of the last century, Aguirre’s hotel was a necessary and welcome stop in their journey west. The entire family participated in the enterprise, and their competency in getting the immigrants safely to their destination was legendary.

\(^2\) See Las Novedades and La Llumanera, for example. Among the best-known of these establishments were the “Restaurant Español,” the “Hotel Español,” and the “Hotel del Recreo” which advertised itself as a “Casa Española” where meals were served “Spanish style.”
Aguirre’s children would greet passengers at the docks and would ask (in Basque) “Are there any Basques here?” The new arrivals were taken to the Hotel, where they enjoyed the best of Basque hospitality and cuisine. Aguirre’s travel agency would then come into play. He not only purchased the train tickets and selected the best itineraries, but he made sure that the non-English-speaking immigrants would not get lost in transit. As one such immigrant recalled years later, “the Aguirre boys arranged my train tickets. It was a long stub pinned . . . to my front jacket lapel, and at each station, the conductor came by and tore another section from the bottom. The shorter the ticket stub got, I knew I was closer to seeing my father in Boise.”

Aguirre’s wife made sure that those who lacked the language skills or the cash necessary to buy food during the long journey arrived at their destination well nourished. “Benita made a huge basket of food for me,” remembered an immigrant as he reflected, “I don’t know if I’d have made it without those people in New York helping me.”

Aguirre’s business was part of an extensive network of so-called Basque hotels throughout the American west. Most of them were located near train stations, making them easy to find by newly-arrived immigrants. In her comprehensive study of these establishments, Jerónima Echevarria has painstakingly gathered information on close to 300 Basque hotels functioning between 1856 and 1939 in twelve states.

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4 Ibid.
functions. They served as employment recruitment centers, and offered welcome
solace for herders after long stretches of isolation. Couples often met and wed at the
hotels. They also doubled as rest homes when workers fell sick. Expecting mothers
living in remote ranches would go to the hotel when childbirth approached and stayed
there to recover after the babies had been born. Hotelkeepers would wear many hats,
as they became their patrons’ confidants, translators, nurses, bankers, or witnesses in
official documents. Above all, they provided the material and emotional support that
made the immigrants’ lives in America a bit easier.

Boarding houses were also the primary living arrangement among Spanish
immigrants in Tampa, where some of these establishments lodged over 150 people.⁶
There, they were often part of a network of ancillary businesses connected with
particular cigar factories. It was not uncommon for a relative of the owner or of the
manager of a cigar factory to run a boardinghouse or a restaurant nearby.
Opportunities for employment then were sometimes contingent on whether a
prospective cigar worker was willing to lodge in the boarding house or take his meals
at the restaurant. Boarders were also found in private homes, as a way for housewives
to supplement the family income. Among Tampa’s immigrant groups, Spaniards
accounted for the highest percentage of boarders. It has been estimated that, in 1900,
33 per cent of Tampa Spaniards lived in boarding houses. By 1910 there were 810
Spanish boarders, compared to 352 Cubans and 45 Italians. These figures correlated

⁶ In 1912, for example, a Spanish paper reporting on an excursion organized by the Centro Español
noted that the owner of a well-known boardinghouse, and his boarders, numbering over 150, would join
the outing. “El Centro Español,” Tampa Ilustrado, 21 September 1912, 28.
with those on marital status. Spaniards in Tampa had the lowest rate of marriage among males over twenty.  

Social clubs and mutual aid societies

Social clubs and mutual aid societies were a necessary complement to the boarding houses in the immigrant community. As the report of the Dillingham Commission stated of Tampa Spaniards, “to avoid the monotony of their boardinghouses [they] must have clubs. In case of sickness they must have sanatoria.” These organizations, in fact, had been imported from Cuba, where Spanish immigrants had established them in order to preserve their identity as well as their health during their expatriation. Reflecting the geography of emigration, these clubs or centros were organized along regional lines. The pioneers in Havana were the Centro Gallego in 1878 and the Centro Asturiano in 1886. Similar centros regionales were also established in other Latin American countries of heavy Spanish immigration, like Argentina and Uruguay. From their humble beginnings, in the following decades the centros grew to become complex and hugely successful institutions, their membership (reaching the tens of thousands) surpassing in size the population of most of the cities in the immigrants’ provinces of origin.

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7 Less than 50 percent of Spanish immigrants were married, as opposed to 66 percent of Cubans and 72 percent of Italians. Gary R. Mormino and George E. Pozzetta, *The Immigrant World of Ybor City. Italians and Their Latin Neighbors in Tampa, 1885-1985* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 75.
8 *The Immigration Commission*, 228.
9 The Centro Gallego of Buenos Aires, for example, was founded in May 1879, and the Centro Gallego of Montevideo a few months later.
What appealed most to their members was the institutions’ cradle-to-grave coverage. Their magnificent buildings (tellingly called *palacios* and usually placed in a prominent location in the center of town) included classrooms, well-stocked libraries, and *cantinas*, where the immigrants could attend night classes, or relax reading the Spanish press or playing cards or dominoes with their friends. The cultural and social needs of the members were complemented with two of the clubs’ most valued prizes: the theater and the ballroom. The *centros* also provided much-needed medical care, first in small clinics, and later, as they grew in size, in splendid sanatoria (*quintas*). Their large membership allowed these organizations to offer their services for a moderate monthly fee of $1.50, which remained constant for most of this period. This fee also covered burial in the *centros’* cementeries.¹⁰

Sickness and death in a foreign country were among the most dreaded experiences for immigrants and their families. In the United States, sickness and death benefit societies were particularly prevalent among the foreign born.¹¹ In New Orleans, two such Spanish societies were already functioning in the mid-nineteenth century.¹² In 1868, they united into the *Sociedad Unión Española de Beneficencia*

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¹⁰ Other services offered by the *centros* included saving banks and gymnasiums. They also sponsored a variety of sporting events. For a study of these regional *centros* in Cuba see Elwood Warren Shomo, Jr., “The Centros Regionales de Havana, Cuba, with Special Emphasis on the History and Services of the Centro Asturiano” (M.A. Thesis, University of Miami, 1959).

¹¹ As Michael Davis, Jr. wrote in his 1921 contribution to the Carnegie-sponsored Americanization Studies Series, “Frequently in small communities wherein native Americans must depend upon their individual resources in times of sickness, and wherein publicly organized facilities are inadequate or nonexistent, the foreign born will have well-defined organizations for sickness and death insurance and for medical care.” Michael M. Davis, Jr., *Immigrant Health and the Community* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1921; reprint, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, 1971), 92.

¹² The *Sociedad Ibera de Beneficencia Mutua* was established in 1846; the *Sociedad Española de Beneficencia Mutua* in 1851.
Mutua. That same year, Spaniards in Brooklyn established the mutual aid society La Nacional, and in 1884, founded the Sociedad Española de Beneficencia. These, in turn, served as the model for El Porvenir, a pioneer Spanish mutual aid society in Tampa in 1887. Similar societies, offering some type of medical and burial insurance, appeared in Mobile (1871), San Francisco (1880), Chicago (1891), and Los Angeles (1893). As Spanish immigration increased at the beginning of the twentieth century, these societies proliferated. In 1908, a Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos was founded in Boise, and similar associations were organized in the mining towns of Morenci and Metcalf (Arizona). In 1914, the Unión Benéfica Española was created in New York. By 1920, it had opened delegations in several cities in New York, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.

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13 This society offered a comprehensive health plan, which included medical assistance for the member and his dependents, as well as hospitalization and drugs, and even repatriation to Spain for those with chronic conditions. Constitución y Reglamento de la Sociedad Unión Española de Beneficencia Mútua de Nueva Orleans, La. (Nueva Orleans: Imprenta de M. Capo, 1885) in MAEH, Legajo H-1982.
15 Some of these societies were established under the auspices of consular officials, such as the ones in Morenci and Honolulu. Their names, honoring the Spanish monarchs, bear witness to this official patronage. Morenci had a “Sociedad Española de Beneficencia de Alfonso XIII,” and Honolulu a “Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos Victoria-Alfonso.” Luis Guillén Gil, “Nuestra emigración en las islas Hawai,” BCSE (1917): 158-174.
16 The cities included Albany and Niagara Falls in New York; Canton, Cleveland and Lorain in Ohio; Philadelphia; and Westfield, Massachusetts. Openings were anticipated in Lackawanna or Buffalo, New York; Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio. “Sucursal de la Unión Benéfica en Filadelfia,” La Prensa, 27 March 1920, 4. On the origins of the Unión Benéfica see Jesús Tato, “Cómo se originó la idea y para qué es el Sanatorio Español,” La Prensa, 29 September 1919, 4. See also “Una gran sociedad que trabaja con ahínco…,” La Prensa, 24 August 1920, 1.
The efforts to create strong mutual aid societies were often hindered by internal divisions within the community, often across regional and/or class lines. In Tampa, for example, the Centro Español was founded in 1891 as a social club in response to growing anti-Spanish sentiment among Cubans and their American supporters. Requests to transform the Centro into a mutual aid society were deferred during the 1890s, but once the hostilities were over, the calls were renewed. The foot dragging of the Español leadership in addressing them led to the secession of a number of its members to open a branch of the Centro Asturiano of Havana in 1902. The success of the Asturiano moved the leadership of the Español to action. In 1903, it too became a mutual aid society, but attempts to join the two societies in subsequent years failed.\(^\text{17}\)

While the Centro Asturiano and the Centro Español were the most prominent Spanish mutual aid societies in Tampa, the immigrant community also maintained a number of smaller regional organizations such as the Galician Acción Gallega or the Agrupación Canaria, a society of natives of the Canary Islands. In New York, there existed a Casa Galicia, Centro Andaluz, Centro Aragonés, Centro Asturiano, Centro Balear, Centre Nacionalista Catalá, Centro Vasco Americano, and Círculo

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\(^{17}\) The competition benefited the thriving Spanish immigrant community, which, in a matter of months, attended the inauguration of two hospitals: the Asturiano in April 1905, and the Español in February 1906. The steady growth of Spanish immigration to Tampa in the first decades of the twentieth century allowed the Centros to embark on a massive building campaign. In May 1909, the Asturiano inaugurated its $75,000-clubhouse. When the building burned down in 1912, its membership, now surpassing 3,000, voted to build a bigger and better building. The $110,000 clubhouse was inaugurated in 1914. By 1908, the 2,500 members of the Español were also considering building a new clubhouse to replace the 1892 original wooden structure. Because many of its members lived in neighboring West Tampa and the Centro received incentives from the city to build there, the decision was made to build not one, but two clubhouses, with a combined value of over $150,000. The new buildings were inaugurated in 1912. These years also saw the purchase and expansion of the original cemeteries of both institutions.
Valenciano. Besides these region-based societies, Spanish immigrants, particularly Galicians and Asturians, participated in a network of micro-territorial associations as well. Similar to the Jewish landsmanschaften, the membership of these organizations was composed of natives of a particular village or municipality. The sociedades de instrucción (societies of instruction) were the most popular and successful among these. They collected funds to finance the construction of primary schools in the homeland. Some of these societies, of which there were close to four hundred in the Americas, had branches in several countries, thus adding a translocal dimension to this transnational diaspora. In Tampa, for example there existed several delegations of such societies based in Havana. In New York too, Galician immigrants from the coastal communities of Coruña maintained a number of these societies. Among the goals of these organizations, as one member explained to readers of La Prensa, was to contribute to “the regeneration of the Spanish people,” following the path of regeneracionista leader Joaquín Costa whose motto, “school and pantry,” summarized

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18 They are just one example of the many ways in which these transnational connections were maintained. Other examples include ad hoc collections, such as the one organized by the natives of Sada to aid the victims of severe storms in their village, or the one by the natives of Pego, Alicante, to help the village’s charity hospital. “La colecta por las víctimas de Sada aumenta,” La Prensa, 23 April 1924, 1; “Colectan los de Pego para su hospital,” La Prensa, 2 May 1924, 2.

19 According to historian Vicente Peña, these societies of instruction built 225 primary schools in Galicia alone. The majority of them were built in rural areas, and many are still extant and in use today. Vicente Peña Saavedra, Exodo, organización comunitaria e intervención escolar. La impronta educativa de la emigración transoceánica en Galicia (A Coruña: Xunta de Galicia, 1991), 2 vols.


21 The oldest and most successful one was the “Sociedad de Naturales de Sada,” with branches in Havana and Buenos Aires. Others included “El Anzuelo” (from the municipality of Mugardos); “Socorros Mutuos de Muros y sus Contornos”; “Bueu, Beluso y sus contornos”; and “Hijos de Palmeira.”
the two poles of his modernization project for Spain: economic development and fight against illiteracy.\textsuperscript{22}

The Centro Aragonés of New York (whose members hailed from Costa’s native region) contributed to the erection of a monument to Costa in his hometown. Its members also sought to keep his memory alive by establishing a Prize for the best biography of Costa written by school children in Aragón.\textsuperscript{23} The statue was unveiled, in 1929, by general Miguel Primo de Rivera, Spanish dictator and one of the reformer’s admirers. Primo thought of himself as the cirujano de hierro (iron surgeon) whom Costa had called for to dismantle the corrupt caciquismo system of the Restoration regime, which, in his view, prevented the full participation of the people in Spain’s political life and contributed to the country’s social, economic, and political stagnation.\textsuperscript{24} Primo de Rivera also was, in historian Richard Herr’s words, “one of the first active prophets of Hispanidad.”\textsuperscript{25} His vision to strengthen the cultural and


\textsuperscript{24} The cacique (a Carib word meaning “chief”) was the local political boss who, by rigging the elections, ensured the success of the turno system, the peaceful alternation of liberals and conservatives in Spanish politics. Costa claimed that, while theoretically a parliamentary democracy, Spain was ruled by caciques and oligarchs. Caciquismo became a byword for everything that was wrong with Restoration politics. Kern, \textit{Liberals}; Joaquín Costa, \textit{Oligarquía y caciquismo como la forma actual de Gobierno en España y modo de cambiarla}. (Madrid: Fortanet, 1901).

\textsuperscript{25} Richard Herr, \textit{An Historical Essay on Modern Spain} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 147. While Spanish essayist Angel Ganivet had used the term in 1897, the concept of Hispanidad acquired relevance in 1926 when Zacarías de Vizcarrà, a Spanish bishop in Argentina, used it as a substitute for the word “Raza” to refer to the Hispanic community. The word is often associated with Ramiro de Maeztu, who served as Spanish Ambassador to Argentina during the dictatorship (1928-
diplomatic links between Spain and Hispanic America would endear him to the leadership of the immigrant community in the United States, which sought to use *hispanismo* as a tool to overcome the community’s internal divisions and to help fashion a united Hispanic identity in America.

**The elusive Hispanic Union**

Calls for unity abounded in the pages of the Spanish immigrant press, as the immigrants faced an upsurge of American Nativism during what John Higham has dubbed, the “Tribal Twenties.”26 One letter writer explained the low rates of naturalization among Spaniards saying that while other races were respected, Spaniards in the United States were “insulted without consideration” through the reiteration of the stereotypes of the black legend. Another correspondent reported a conversation where two men were talking about a third one. “What is he, Spanish?” asked the first one. “No, he is a white man,” replied the other. The writer called on Spaniards and Hispanic Americans to unite against “a common enemy.”27 These remarks indicate that Spaniards often felt discriminated against. However, they seem to have failed to present a united front against such discrimination.

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1930), and wrote his *Defensa de la Hispanidad* in 1934. This militant Catholic and ultraconservative version of the more secular and liberal *Hispanismo* of previous decades would be later embraced by General Francisco Franco and promoted by his regime through the *Consejo de la Hispanidad* and the *Instituto de Cultura Hispánica*. Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria*, 160-166; María A. Escudero, “Hispanist Democratic Thought versus Hispanic Thought of the Franco Era: A Comparative Analysis,” in *Bridging the Atlantic. Toward a Reassessment of Iberian and Latin American Cultural Ties*, ed. Marina Pérez de Mendiola (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 169-186.

26 Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 264-299.

One of the most ardent supporters of Spanish unity in America was José Camprubí, the editor of *La Prensa*. Camprubí’s biography illuminates the lasting connections between Spain, the Hispanic Caribbean and the United States. Born in Puerto Rico in 1879, in a prestigious family linked to American wealth, Camprubí grew up in Barcelona where his Catalan father worked as a civil engineer. In 1896, he returned to the United States to attend Harvard University, where he received a degree in Engineering in 1902. Camprubí’s transnational connections served him well as his work entailed the development of commercial relations between Spain, Latin America, and the United States. His involvement with the Spanish immigrant community began during World War I, when he tried to help his compatriots negotiate the complexities of the American military bureaucracy.

In 1917, the Selective Service Act had established the draft of all males of military age except enemy aliens and those who had not taken out citizenship papers. As subjects of a neutral country and one whose treaty of friendship with the United States explicitly exempted its subjects from compulsory military service, Spaniards should have been safe. The burden of proof, however, fell on them to establish their alien status. Ignorance of the law, limited knowledge of the language, lack of documents, prejudice and, in some cases, plain intimidation, resulted in hundreds of

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28 Although born in Pamplona, Camprubí’s father, Raimundo Camprubí Escudero, belonged to a military family rooted in Catalonia. Raimundo met his future wife in Puerto Rico in the 1870s, when he worked on the island building the road system. José was the eldest brother of Zenobia Camprubí, the wife of Spanish poet and Nobel laureate Juan Ramón Jiménez. For a fuller biography see, Graciela Palau de Nemes, *Inicios de Zenobia y Juan Ramón Jiménez en América* (Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1982), 82-93.

29 Camprubí represented General Electric in Buenos Aires (1912-1914) and worked as purchasing agent and representative in the United States for a number of Spanish companies (1918-1921). “Jose A. Camprubi, Newspaper Owner,” *NYT*, 13 March 1942, 19.
Spaniards being unwillingly and unlawfully conscripted in the American army. The plight of these immigrants moved Camprubí, now president of the Unión Benéfica Española, to help them. The Benéfica supported the establishment of a Spanish Local Law Board, and hired a team of lawyers to assist Spaniards dealing with the draft. In 1919, a report on the activities of the board stated that “hundreds had been taken out of jail and concentration camps; many obtained the documents which allow them to work and to walk freely on the street.”

In June, 1918, Camprubí also purchased the ailing weekly La Prensa. As he would later write to Ambassador Riaño, he did this “hoping that [Spaniards in America] would stop being a dispersed mass and would become an organized mass, with some representation, some personality.” The weekly soon turned into a daily and, by 1921, Camprubí was working full-time in the paper and planning to send representatives throughout the United States and Latin America. The demands of the war effort contributed to creating the sense of community that Camprubí had hoped

30 “Treaty Between the United States and Spain. Friendship and General Relations,” (July 3, 1902) in Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), 723-730. The article in question is article V. Spain was one of a number of neutral countries experiencing similar problems. For a detailed discussion of these draft policies see Thomas A. Bailey, The Policy of the United States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), 435-492.

31 “Filantropía, Justicia y Fraternidad Hispanoamericana es el sagrado lema de la Unión Benéfica Española,” La Prensa, 17 March 1919, 5. Among those Spaniards who had taken their first citizenship papers, the release from the draft came at a price as they were barred from American citizenship in the future. Shirley Fulton Jackson, “The United States and Spain, 1898-1918” (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1967), 244-251.

32 Spaniard Rafael Viera began publishing the weekly La Prensa on the emblematic date of October 12, 1913. In 1918 it became a daily. The paper remained in the Camprubí family until 1960, when his daughters sold it to the Pope Brothers. In 1963, La Prensa merged with El Diario de Nueva York to form El Diario/La Prensa which is still published today.

for, and to ease the integration of the Hispanic community into the broader American family. Thus, while *La Prensa* carried information from the Spanish Law Board to help immigrants avoid the draft, it also published ads calling on its readership to contribute to the Liberty Loan. Similarly, the banquet to celebrate the *Día de la Raza*, commemorating the discovery of America, acquired a new dimension when President Wilson proclaimed October 12, 1918, “Liberty Day.” The signing of the Armistice a month later was celebrated by the immigrant leadership with an impromptu banquet in the America Hotel, described by *La Prensa* as “one of the most beautiful acts that the Spanish community had celebrated in this metropolis.”

The ravages of the influenza epidemic (regrettably called, as *La Prensa*’s readers pointed out, the Spanish flu) also contributed to this effort to unite the immigrant community. The goal was to collect funds to build a Spanish Hospital, which, like the ones in Tampa, could provide medical care to its members. This initiative was part of a broader attempt to consolidate the myriad Hispanic societies in New York into one strong federation. This had been the basis of the reorganization, in 1914, of the *Unión Benéfica Española*. From 250 members in 1914, the *Benéfica* grew to 2,200 in 1920. That year it purchased a five-story brownstone on Sixteenth Street, the first Spanish society in New York to own a clubhouse. *La Prensa* hoped that the building would become the home of all *hispanos*. Quoting Hamlet, an

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34 “Banquete Hispano celebrado en el Hotel America con motivo de firmarse el armisticio,” *La Prensa*, 12 November 1928, 1.
36 “Fundada el 5 de abril de 1914....” *La Prensa*, 7 June 1920, 1.
editorial explained that the Hispanic colony faced a similar dilemma, “to be or not to
be,” and that contributing to the Benéfica’s clubhouse would represent the resounding
determination of the Hispanic race “to be.”

The unity hoped for in La Prensa, however, was not to be. In 1924, the
Benéfica sold its building on Sixteenth Street and bought another one in the heart of
the Spanish enclave, Fourteenth Street. At the inauguration of the new clubhouse,
celebrating the tenth anniversary of the society, the Spanish consul called again on
Spaniards to unite into one great association. By then, the effects of the Quota
legislation, curtailing Spanish immigration to the United States, were beginning to be
felt. The main argument for the union was to pull the resources of the numerous
societies and to build the much-needed Hospital Hispano. As one reader indicated,
almost 90% of Spanish immigrants did not speak English and could not easily
communicate with non-Spanish speaking doctors. Yet, the union remained elusive.
In 1929, the Unión Benéfica Española and the Centro Hispano Americano
(established in 1903) did take the first steps to merge, but the other important
immigrant societies (Casa Galicia, Centro Vasco Americano, and Centro Asturiano
together with La Nacional and La Cosmopolita in Brooklyn) declined to join.

38 “Nuestra Casa,” La Prensa, 3 June 1920, 4.
39 “Un distrito pierde la nota de animación hispana con la casa de la Benéfica,” La Prensa, 12 March
1924, 1.
40 “Vibrante, patriótica y cordial fiesta inauguró la casa de la Unión Benéfica,” La Prensa, 15
September 1924, 1.
41 “De nuestros lectores,” La Prensa, 9 January 1929, 6.
42 The union of the Peruvian Social and Sporting Club and the Centro Social Venezolano was an
43 “La Unión Benéfica Española y el Centro Hispano Americano…,” La Prensa, 25 January 1929, 1;
“El Centro Hispano Americano aprueba fusion…,” La Prensa, 4 July 1929, 1. The two Brooklyn
societies, La Cosmopolita and La Nacional, joined in November, 1929. “De nuestros lectores,” La
Prensa, 29 November 1929, 6.
Regionalism was often signaled as the culprit of this state of affairs in the debate on the matter held on the pages of *La Prensa*. As one reader put it, “We [Spaniards] can’t tolerate each other for a long time. There is as much difference between the character of an Asturian and an Andalusian as there is between that of a Latin and an Anglo Saxon.” In fact, during these years a number of new regional organizations were created, and others embarked on ambitious expansion programs. In a letter to “all Galicians in the United States,” for example, the *Casa de Galicia* encouraged Galicians in America to join the society. “Let’s do ‘our’ work in the United States,” the flyer said, “and let the sons of other regions do ‘theirs’. That way, we will continue to be very ‘Galician,’ but not less ‘Spanish.’” *Casa de Galicia*’s goal was not so much to unite with other Spanish societies, but rather to join with Galician clubs in other states.

The strength of these regional and local identities came into sharper focus because of the absence of relevant national symbols. In the 1890s, Spaniards in the United States had been moved to overcome their differences and embrace a national Spanish identity as a response to the nationalism of the Cuban émigrés and their calls for independence. In the 1910s and 1920s, however, no similar threats existed. Immigrant celebrations in America remained rooted primarily in regional and local

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45 Among them were the *Centro Aragonés* and the society of instruction *Beluso y sus Contornos*, both established in 1928.
46 “A los Gallegos de los Estados Unidos,” *La Prensa*, 13 May 1929, 3. The New York *Casa de Galicia* had a number of delegations in other states. In 1929, these included delegates in Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey. “Sociedades Hispánicas,” *La Prensa*, 1 January 1929, 6. The same was the case with the *Centro Asturiano*, itself a branch of the *Centro Asturiano* in Cuba, “Sociedades Hispánicas,” *La Prensa*, 10 January 1929, 6.
47 In 1930, the Galician centers of New York and Newark were finalizing their union. “Por la Unión,” *Plus Ultra* (February-May 1930), 6.
customs derived from Spain’s rich repository of popular traditions. Gavín W. González’s memoirs of life in West Virginia opens with a gathering of Spanish immigrants at the Romería de San Juan (an open air picnic in honor of Saint John), where people “sang and danced to the music of bagpipes or an accordion . . . the men snapped their fingers and the ladies clickity-clacked the castanets as they danced ‘La Jota Aragonesa’ with reckless abandon.”48 In the fall, Spaniards in West Virginia, would gather, as they did in Spain, to make wine and butcher pigs (matanza) to make sausages (chorizos and morcillas) and filloas (a Galician dessert made with pig’s blood).49 Wine-making and matanza were also popular among Spaniards in California.50 In Tampa and New York, the celebrations of the Spanish mutual aid societies combined these traditional customs with American popular culture and an American festive calendar. Thus, they organized romerías, fiestas, and bailes for Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving or Halloween, where the sounds of the gaita and the dance of the jota rivaled with those of the American fox trot.

Sporting events offered another important venue for the manifestation of ethnic identity. Pelota and jai alai were played in the many frontones (ball courts) dotting the western states where Basque immigrants settled. In New York, and the east coast, however, soccer was the most popular sport within the Spanish community. In 1929, around five thousand people attended the game of the Galicia Sporting Club. Buses were provided by the club to drive Spanish immigrants from all over New York and

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48 González, Pin Nick Kinnick Hill, 3.
49 Hidalgo, “Reconstructing a History,” 144-149.
50 See, for example, Anne Aguilar Santucci, Memories of Spain (Rocklin, CA: Club Español, 1994), 230-236; Anne Aguilar Santucci, “Spanish Settlers Changed Rocklin,” The Placer Herald, 1 November 2006, A11; Manuela Rodríguez, Memories of a Spaniard, 56-57 (typescript in author’s possession). I thank Aaron Olivas for bringing these sources to my attention.
New Jersey. Although soccer crossed regional as well as national boundaries (as membership was open to non-Spaniards), the names of the clubs attest to the importance of local and regional identities within the immigrant community.\footnote{The oldest team was the Calpe American, established in 1920 by immigrants from Calpe, Alicante. Other teams included the Vasco Football Club, Galicia F.C., Barcelona F.C., and Centro Asturiano F.C.}

Boxing was perhaps the sport that allowed for the display of a more inclusive ethnic identity. In 1923, when Argentinian heavyweight Luis Angel Firpo faced Jess Willard in Jersey City, the promoter estimated that twenty per cent of the crowd cheering at the stands would be of Spanish and Italian descent.\footnote{“South Americans to Be at Ringside,” NYT, 11 July 1923, 15.} After Firpo’s victory over Willard, the Unión Benéfica Española organized a reception attended by the consuls of the Spanish-American nations. There Firpo was presented with a gold medal and the gloves he would use to fight against heavyweight champion Jack Dempsey the following day.\footnote{“Spanish Society Will Give Gold Medal to Firpo Today,” NYT, 13 September 1923, 17.} This “Pan-American” fight, as the New York Times dubbed it, had broader implications outside the ring. “By tomorrow morning we shall know whether the balance of power in the New World has shifted from North to South America,” began the Times editorial. After a hopeful beginning where Firpo knocked Dempsey out of the ring, the Argentinian lost by knockout on the second round. “He was willing and courageous, but plainly outclassed,” declared the Times.\footnote{“A Pan-American Fight,” NYT, 14 September 1923, 18 (first quote); “Dempsey Still Champion,” NYT, 15 September 1923, 14 (second quote). Despite his loss, Firpo remained a hugely popular boxer, particularly in Latin America. Manuela Rodríguez explains that her uncle, an amateur boxer, was nicknamed Firpo after the Argentine “Wild bull of the Pampas.” Rodríguez, Memories, 60.} The balance of power remained in the North. Firpo’s feat did more for Hispanic unity than all the attempts by the Spanish immigrant leadership to resuscitate the Día de la Raza. But this, like the triumphal transatlantic flight of Ramón Franco and his crew in 1926,
was a fleeting moment of unity in an otherwise divided community. These divisions would come to the fore more openly during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera.

**The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera**

The news of Firpo’s defeat, September 14, 1923, shared headlines with those of a military coup in Spain led by General Miguel Primo de Rivera. Primo’s takeover had roots in the tradition of military *pronunciamientos* popular in Spain during the nineteenth century (the last one, in 1875, had brought about the Restoration regime that he was now destroying), but it was also informed by the post-1898 *regeneracionista* movement of Joaquín Costa. As mentioned above, Primo saw himself as the iron surgeon who would rid Spain of *caciquismo* and restore order to Spanish national life.

Primo’s program of political reform and national renewal, promising to do away with the *caciques* and end the unpopular war in Morocco, appealed to Spanish migrants, many of whom had left Spain to escape both. They responded with enthusiasm to Primo’s initiatives, in part because he presented himself as a temporary ruler who would turn the government back to civilians once he had finished cleaning house. “Living as we do in a democracy, we are democrats and enemies of autocracy.”

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55 In a reenactment of sorts of Columbus’s famous voyage, Ramón Franco piloted the *Plus Ultra* in the first ever flight from Europe to South America, leaving from the town of Palos (Huelva) on January 22, 1926, and arriving in Buenos Aires four days later to wild popular acclaim. Military historian Emilio Herrera has argued that, in showing Spain’s awakening and strength, this flight represented the “closure of the crisis opened by the Disaster of 1898.” Cited in Ricardo Fernández de Latorre, *Desde las otras orillas. Evocación Americana y Filipina de dos Grandes Vuelos españoles. El “Plus Ultra” y el Madrid-Manila* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2001), 104.

read a document drafted by leaders of the Spanish colony of Tampa three months after the coup. Yet, the immigrant community praised Primo’s “strong, honest, and decisive” government style bent on “eradicating abuses” and “fomenting the agrarian and industrial wealth” of the nation. Primo’s actions became more relevant to them than the form his government took. The endorsement of the Spanish community was not entirely disinterested. The document also asked the dictator to end the tobacco monopoly in Spain, and it offered the expertise of Tampa Spanish cigarmakers to help develop the cigar industry in the peninsula. Reflecting on their personal experiences, they hoped that Spain’s good administration and economic prosperity would put an end to emigration and allow those living abroad to return.\(^{57}\)

Primo and his cabinet were aware that one of the main reasons preventing the return of migrants to Spain was the fear of the law, as many had left Spain to avoid the draft and were considered fugitives and subject to military service if caught while in Spain. Among the many proposals sent to Primo by Spaniards abroad, the issue of military service was high on the agenda. One of the first measures of the regime was to decree an amnesty that allowed deserters to return in exchange for payment of fees. In 1926, another decree exempted Spaniards abroad from military service in the peninsula through the establishment of yearly payments. These decrees translated into revenues for the Spanish economy, not only in the way of fees paid by the emigrants, but also in the increase in the number of emigrants who visited the country and spent

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\(^{57}\) “Los tabaqueros hispanos de Tampa piden al Directorio el libre cultivo del tabaco,” *La Prensa*, 8 January 1924. In an editorial on the subject, *La Prensa* highlighted the dynamism that the new government had brought to Spanish society and to the Spanish diaspora in America. “Los españoles y sus gobiernos,” *La Prensa*, 9 January 1924, 4.
money there.\textsuperscript{58} Interestingly, the 1926 decree extended to part of the United States the ethnic characterization of “American country of Iberian race.” Originally drafted for deserters living in Latin America and the Philippines, Spaniards in the United States fought to have this designation apply to them. Thus, the areas of “Iberian race” included Latin America and the consular districts of New Orleans, San Francisco, and Tampa.\textsuperscript{59} A few months after the decree had been issued, the Spanish consul in Tampa requested from Madrid “from 800 to 1000 military cards” to cover the demand of emigrants availing themselves of this opportunity to travel to Spain.\textsuperscript{60}

The connection between the regime and Spaniards in America was also reinforced through the press. From the beginning of its publication as the organ of Primo’s party, \textit{La Unión Patriótica}, the Madrid daily \textit{La Nación} had a correspondent in New York.\textsuperscript{61} \textit{La Prensa}, too, was an ardent supporter of the regime. In 1928, its subdirector, José Torres Perona, flew with Primo de Rivera from Madrid to Seville as they visited the installations of the IberoAmerican Exhibit there.\textsuperscript{62} The relations between the Spanish immigrant leadership and the regime grew closer when Spain opened an office of the \textit{Patronato Regio de Turismo} (Royal Tourist Board) in New York, and appointed as its head one of Primo de Rivera’s sons, Miguel.\textsuperscript{63} His arrival in New York in September coincided with the anniversary of his father’s coup, and he

\textsuperscript{58} The decrees were published in the official bulletin, \textit{La Gaceta}, on 13 April 1924 and 26 August 1926 respectively.

\textsuperscript{59} Spanish residents in the remaining consular districts in the United States and Canada would benefit from the decree if they could prove that they were residing in Spanish America a year prior to the date of their enlistment. F. W. Manley, Military Attaché, 31 August 1926, NA, RG 165, M1445, File 2041-205/12.

\textsuperscript{60} Javier Meruénano to Secretaría General, 1 October 1926, MAEAH, Legajo H-2074.

\textsuperscript{61} Marcial Rossell published his articles under the title “Crónicas Neoyorkinas” (New York chronicles).

\textsuperscript{62} “Torres Perona…viajará con Primo de Rivera…” \textit{La Prensa}, 10 February 1928, 1.

\textsuperscript{63} The offices of the Spanish Tourism Board opened on Fifth Avenue on 28 May 1929.
was invited, together with the son of General Martínez Anido, the Minister of the
Interior, to a banquet celebrating the occasion. At the Plaza Hotel, one hundred guests
listened to speeches praising the achievements of the regime as the orchestra played a
composition in honor of the dictator titled “September 13.” La Prensa also reported
proudly on the reception given the following day by the mayor of New York to Primo
de Rivera’s son.

The regime’s Hispanista discourse contributed to the revitalization of the
fiesta de la raza, which had had a checkered past since the Unión Benéfica Española
began celebrating it in 1917. In 1924, La Prensa described the fiesta somewhat
hyperbolically as “the most brilliant foreign celebration held in New York in many
many years.” The day-long elite festivities included a banquet, a concert, and a ball.
Two years later, the fiesta acquired a more popular dimension when, under the
auspices of the Spanish Chamber of Commerce, it integrated also a “civic parade.”
The procession represented a connection with the Columbian celebrations of the 1890s
as well as the appropriation by the Spanish community of Jerónimo Suñol’s statue of
Columbus in Central Park. The ceremony concluded with speeches praising Hispanic
unity and the laying of a wreath at the statue, which was now adorned with a placard
declaring, “we know not where he was born, but we honor a Spanish citizen.” The
fiesta de la raza continued to be celebrated during the following years with different

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64 “New York celebra con entusiasmo el 5to aniversario del gobierno de Primo de Rivera,” La Prensa, 14 September 1928, 1.
65 “El alcalde Walker dirige un saludo al presidente español,” La Prensa, 15 September 1928, 1.
66 “La Fiesta de la Raza se celebró con un esplendor sin precedentes en el gran Banquete del Commodore,” La Prensa, 13 October 1924, 1.
degrees of success. The annual celebration of Hispanidad did not help assuage Hispanic sensibilities over Spain’s imperialist tendencies, even if they were now almost circumscribed within the cultural realm. An interesting illustration of such tensions in the late 1920s can be seen in the controversy between Spaniards and Latin Americans over the “proper” version of Spanish to use in the talkies, with peninsulares steadfastly defending the purity of Castilian Spanish against the variations of the language spoken in Spanish America.

Hispanic Americans were not the only ones at odds with the conservative imperialist refashioning of Spanish history emanating from Primo de Rivera’s regime. Many Spaniards in the United States, too, expressed similar concerns and voiced their criticism. In January 1924, a representative of the Grupo Cultura of Detroit accused La Prensa of partiality in publishing reports by writer F. Britten Austin that defended the regime and criticized Spanish workers, and asked La Prensa to allow for an alternative presentation of the Spanish reality in its pages. In Tampa, a Christmas collection for the Spanish soldiers fighting in Morocco sparked a debate over the political implications of such an act. “Do not contribute for patriotism,” wrote the editor of La Gaceta, “but to help, to show your love for the young who fight and die.”

In 1928, for example, the diplomatic representation was limited to the consuls of Spain, Portugal, and Peru. In 1929, on the other other hand, there was a more solid diplomatic representation, as well as representatives of the Spanish Tourist Board and New York City Hall. There were also reports that the placard honoring Columbus as a Spanish citizen had been vandalized.

An analysis of this controversy can be seen in the booklet by noted Spanish linguist Tomás Navarro Tomás, El idioma español en el Cine Parlante ¿Español o Hispanoamericano? (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Históricos, 1930). On the broader context for these linguistic disputes within the Hispanic world see José del Valle and Luis Gabriel-Sheehan, eds. The Battle over Spanish between 1800 and 2000. Language ideologies and Hispanic intellectuals (New York: Routledge, 2002).

“Vida obrera,” La Prensa, 21 January 1924, 4. The author argued that Britten Austin’s analysis was based on erroneous information, as he did not know the reality of the working class in Spain and wrote about it based on reports given to him by the police and the employers (patronal).
Republican supporters in Tampa protested this contribution, and some undermined the collection of cigars in the factories to be sent to the front by inserting in them “revolutionary proclamations.” Juan González, a merchant from Asturias, took a different tack. For several years he wrote letters to Calvin Coolidge requesting American support and protection to establish a Republic in Spain.

By 1929, the calls to end the dictatorship grew louder. While many praised Primo’s attack on caciquismo, they argued that it was time for him to turn the reins of government to a new class of civilian leaders, untainted by the old politics of the Restoration regime. “Is Primo de Rivera in power as a result of the popular will?” asked a Spaniard from West Virginia, “No,” he replied, “We need a bit of freedom, we are surrounded by bayonets.” The lack of individual freedoms and the strict censorship of the press were the main focus of criticism by Spaniards in America, but equally important for many Spanish migrants was Primo de Rivera’s hostility towards regional nationalists and anarchists. The regime’s national-Catholic crusade was part of a strategy of “negative integration,” which, as historian Alejandro Quiroga argues, sought “the assimilation of the lower and middle classes through nationalist ideas that emphasized foreign and domestic foes.”

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70 “Chungas y no chungas,” La Gaceta, 24 October 1925, 3 and 24 November 1925, 1.
71 Juan González to President of the United States, 3 December 1926, NA, RG 59, M1369, File 852.01/13.
72 “De nuestros lectores,” La Prensa, 2 March 1929, 6. The debates over the regime spilled over to disputes on the immigrants’ organizational life. Following the overhaul of one of the mutual aid societies, its critics called the new leaders “Primos de Rivera.” Using an argument prevalent among supporters of the dictatorship, José Camprubí defended them in his editorial. In his view, those who had allowed the society to get to the point that made the reorganization necessary were the ones deserving the criticism. “Reorganización de sociedades,” La Prensa, 11 November 1929, 4.
was particularly resented by the purported representatives of the “anti-España” in America: Spanish anarchists, and Catalan and Basque nationalists. Therefore, it further contributed to fostering the internal divisions of the immigrant community and to alienating significant elements of the Spanish diaspora in America.

**Sub-national and supra-national political activism: Ethnonationalism and anarchism**

The national-Catholic *hispanista* discourse embraced by the Spanish immigrant elite in America in the 1920s had been challenged by nationalists and anarchists in the diaspora already in the nineteenth century. Secundino Delgado, the “father of Canarian nationalism,” embodied this singular combination of anti-colonial, ethnonationalist, and anarchist thought. Born in 1869 in Tenerife, Delgado emigrated to America as a young man. He lived first in New York, where he married an American woman, and later in Tampa. There, together with fellow Spaniard Luis Barcia, he started editing the anarchist weekly *El Esclavo* (The Slave) in 1894. After a short stay in Tenerife in 1896, he left for Venezuela, where he began publishing the Canarian nationalist paper, *El Guanche*, in 1897. As the war of independence raged in Cuba, Delgado, who believed that his homeland was also subject to peninsular colonialism, called for Canarian independence. Expelled from Venezuela under diplomatic pressure from Spain, he went to Cuba, returning to Tenerife in 1900. There, he worked with the *Asociación Obrera Canaria* (Canarian Workers’ Association) and contributed to its organ *El Obrero* (The Worker). A year later, he founded the *Partido Popular Autonomista* seeking autonomy for the archipelago, and edited the newspaper
Vacaguare. Charged with participating in an attack against the General Captains' of Havana in 1897, he was imprisoned in Madrid by General Weyler in 1902. In 1904, he wrote the autobiographic *Vacaguare! (Via Crucis)* which was published in Mexico while he was traveling once again in the Americas. He returned to Tenerife in 1910, where he died two years later. Although he did not see his dream come true, Delgado’s activities would set the stage for the foundation, in 1924 in Havana, of the Partido Nacionalista Canario during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Primo’s regime, which forced into exile a number of nationalist leaders and intellectuals opposed to it, spurred also the establishment of Catalan and Basque ethnonationalist groups in the United States in support of those movements in the peninsula.

**Catalan and Basque nationalism in America**

From its foundation in January 1920, the Centre Nacionalista Catalá (Catalan Nationalist Center) in New York faced the blistering criticism of the Spanish immigrant elites. The weekly *La Tribuna* (co-owned by Castilian Miguel de Zárraga and Galician Joaquín Lago) took issue with the use of the adjective “nationalist.” Holding the United States as a model, Zárraga explained that he supported regional autonomy or something akin to a federal state in the peninsula (the United States of Spain, or of Iberia), but one where all regions would contribute to the unity of the nation, the “greater Spain.” He was adamantly opposed, therefore, to Catalan

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separatism. “The seed of separatismo must be stamped out” he wrote. And in a language that anticipated the nationalist discourse of the dictatorship, he divided the community between “Spanish” and “anti-Spanish.” One was “either with Spain or against it.”

Juan Cebrián, the ardent hispanista, dubbed Catalan nationalism “an obfuscation,” particularly at a time when things Spanish were becoming so popular in America. Anti-nationalist Catalans like Antonio Cuyás were also among the critical voices. Cuyás repeated the phrase uttered by Alfonso XIII in a recent visit to Barcelona, “Spain, one and indivisible.” And he reminded Catalans that even the American immigrant commission considered the Spanish race one of the most remarkably homogeneous ethnic groups in Europe. There were also indications that some in the community had asked for the list of members of the Catalan Center and planned to boycott their businesses, but there is no evidence that this, in fact, happened.

The activities of the Catalan Center were also closely monitored by the Spanish diplomats. Soon after its creation, Ambassador Riaño wrote to the Spanish Consul in New York and asked him to determine whether the club “pursued political ends contrary to the established institutions.” Riaño suggested that the consul use his influence in the colony to “prevent and thwart the pursuit of goals against legality.”

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76 “Separatistas?” La Tribuna, 20 March 1920, 3.
77 Juan Cebrián, “Ante el separatismo,” La Tribuna, 10 April 1920, 7.
78 Antonio Cuyás, “Una frase de Alfonso XIII,” La Tribuna, 31 July 1920, 3. Cuyás was the brother of Arturo, the editor of the Catalan monthly La Llumanera in the late nineteenth century.
79 Juan Riaño to Alejandro Berea, 12 April 1920, AGA-MAE, Caja 8208.
Consul Alejandro Berea assured the Ambassador that the club’s focus was cultural and recreational, but Riaño confronted him with the center’s publication, *Catalonia*, and its defense of “Catalonia’s national freedom.” He urged Berea to inform him of “the best means to counter this campaign.”

The confrontation between the leaders of the Spanish colony and the Catalan nationalists came to a head in September 1920, when the battleship *Alfonso XIII* visited New York. As representatives of the community entertained the naval officers and sang the praises of the Spanish navy, they were met by a flyer signed by three Catalan Separatist groups. Titled, “From Catalonia to the people of the United States,” the leaflet was an indictment of Spain’s history, particularly its imperial history, and a denunciation of her colonial wars in Morocco. To add insult to injury, it called on the United States to do for Catalonia what they had done for Cuba in 1898.

Zárraga declared the Catalanist manifesto a “shameful insult to Spain,” and asked that its authors renounce Spanish citizenship or that they go to Africa to fight for Morocco. Riaño, on his part, wrote the Department of State and requested that they carry out an investigation on the matter. The Bureau’s agents, however, did not find any information on the Separatist Clubs. Consul Berea reported to Riaño that the New York Catalan Center had nothing to do with the manifesto, and that its members

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80 Juan Riaño to Alejandro Berea, 15 July 1920, AGA-MAE, Caja 8208.
81 The manifesto, dated 7 September 1920, was signed by the Separatist Catalan Clubs (Club Separatista Catalá) of New Orleans, New York, and Washington D. C., AGA-MAE, Caja 8208.
believed it had been printed precisely to damage their reputation before the Spanish colony.  

Whether or not that was the case in 1920, a year later an article published in New York’s *Globe* by the vice-president of the Catalan Center resonated in the Spanish Senate. The article, which dealt with the Spanish military defeat at Annual, declared the “total and definitive failure of the Spanish army” and called for the “restoration of the Iberian nationalities” to counter the “fatal artificial unity imposed by the Spanish influence,” while blaming the Madrid government for the social violence then rampant in Catalonia.  

Senator Antonio Royo Vilanova asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs whether there was any juridical or political weapon to punish such declarations. Royo stated that, as a liberal, he did not have a problem with Spaniards being critical of their government, but he believed that they “should wash their dirty linen at home,” and not use the foreign press to do so.  

The Minister, who had discussed the matter with Riaño, understood that any action on the part of the Spanish government on this matter would fail against American laws on freedom of the press. In fact, a lawyer consulted by the Embassy argued that there was nothing punishable in the article.

Things only got worse in 1923 when Primo de Rivera came to power. Through the pages of *Catalonia*, the Catalan Center denounced the new regime, and even

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83 The correspondence on this matter is located in AGA-MAE, Caja 8208. See also José Canals Ginesta, “Separatismo catalán en Nueva York,” *La Prensa*, 29 April 1924, 3.
84 *Diario de Sesiones*. Senado, n. 95, p. 1941. The senate session took place on 18 November 1921.
85 This argument was used within the Spanish immigrant elite as well. In a letter to the Catalan Center, A. B. Caragol, a Catalan businessman, wrote that as far as politics was concerned, Spaniards abroad should show absolute support for the Government, whatever its form. It was for those in the peninsula to debate internal political matters. A. B. Caragol to Centre Nacionalista Catalá, 7 April 1920, AGA-MAE, Caja 8208.
encouraged Spaniards to take citizenship papers in the United States. Riaño’s efforts to stop this “anti-Spanish” campaign by appealing to the State Department were unsuccessful. This criticism of the dictatorship was not confined to leaflets or the Catalan press, however. In an unprecedented move within the Spanish colony in New York, supporters of Catalan independence brought the “dirty laundry” into the open on the pages of the *New York Times*. There, a “Catalonian” denounced Primo for the restrictions on the use of the Catalan flag and language and “the imprisonment and banishment of Catalanian patriots,” while an “Asturian” praised the regime for its pacification of Catalonia and the fact that the “‘patriots’ of Deputy Francisco Macia’s pattern (sic) are no longer free to cry even in the Cortes, ‘Death to Spain!’”

Francesc Maciá, the founder of the independentist party *Estat Català*, was then living in exile in France, but his party was supported by the Catalan diaspora in the Americas, which had established a network of Catalan Separatist Clubs in Argentina, Chile, Cuba, and the United States. Following the example of *Sinn Fein* in Ireland, *Estat Catalá* sought to train armed groups to rise against the Spanish state in Catalonia. In June 1925, a group associated with the party planned an unsuccessful assassination attempt against Alfonso XIII. In 1926, the party raised a small army to invade Catalonia from France, but the plan was discovered and aborted by the French *gendarmerie*. According to Josep Carner-Ribalta, a veteran of these struggles, the resources for these actions came from Catalans abroad. A call from Maciá to the

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86 As he wrote to his superiors in Spain, his work was hindered by “the absolute freedom of propaganda that exists in this country, where the press attacks with all impunity the highest representation of the State.” Juan Riaño to President of the Directorio Militar, 9 June 1924, AGA-MAE, Caja 8208.

Catalan Clubs in America in 1926 produced close to one million francs. 164,000 of these came from the New York Club, a significant amount considering the size of the community, only surpassed by the funds collected in Cuba, but ahead of those collected in Buenos Aires.\textsuperscript{88} The failed invasion of Catalonia led to Maciá’s departure from France to Belgium, and later to a tour of the Americas where the party was reorganized.

It was in Havana in 1928 that the leaders of the movement decided on the creation of the \textit{Partit Separatista Revolucionari de Catalunya} (Revolutionary Separatist Party of Catalonia) inspired by the Cuban Revolutionary Party created by Jose Martí in the 1890s. The independentist Cuban-Catalan connection was also manifested in the flag adopted by the party to represent the Catalan Republic, which combined the yellow and red bars of the Catalan flag with the lone star (white over blue) of the Cuban flag. After Cuba, Maciá stopped in New York where he met with Catalan supporters before heading back to Europe.

The activities of the Catalan Nationalist Center exemplify the transnationalism of the Catalan diaspora in the United States. One of the Center’s members, Josep Gibernau, a Catalan author who came to the United States in his teens, remembered his excitement at his upcoming graduation from college in 1929.

\begin{quote}
We were becoming great admirers of America and its institutions, and it in turn, reinforced our Catalan Nationalism. Our rebellion against the militaristic Centralism of Madrid was enhanced when we saw
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{88} Josep Carner-Ribalta, \textit{De Balaguer a Nova York passant per Moscou I Prats de Molló} (Paris: Edicions Catalanes de París, 1972), 94.
American freedom and respect for the rights of its citizens and the efforts toward establishing a truly democratic society.\textsuperscript{89} Gibernau and its fellow catalanists would actively support the Republic during the Spanish Civil War, and, in 1939, they helped create the \textit{Casal Catalá}. This organization collaborated with the National Council of Catalonia, established in London in 1940, and published the magazine \textit{Free Catalonia} from 1942 to 1944.\textsuperscript{90}

The Basque nationalist community in New York followed a similar trajectory. Basques had a long tradition of political organization in the diaspora, as many had fled to America in the aftermath of the nineteenth-century Carlist wars. In 1877, Basques in Buenos Aires organized the \textit{Laurac Bat} to protest the abolition of the historic Basque \textit{fueros} (rights) by the Spanish liberal government.\textsuperscript{91} Several Basque nationalist newspapers were published in Latin America. In 1907, the editors of one such publication, \textit{Euzkotarra}, were expelled from Mexico upon pressure from the Spanish Embassy. They moved to the United States and continued to publish the paper, in New Orleans, until 1909. It was also through Mexico that the Basque nationalist movement developed in New York in the 1920s.

As had happened in Catalonia, the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera forced some leaders of Basque nationalism into exile. Elías Gallastegui was one of them. Gallastegui had split with the traditional line of Basque nationalism and espoused a more radical view, supporting independence. In Mexico, he helped organize

\textsuperscript{91} Gloria P. Totoricagueña, \textit{Identity, Culture, and Politics in the Basque Diaspora} (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2004), 68.
supporters of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party). Attempts to do the same in New York with the members of the Centro Vasco Americano failed, but a group of its supporters broke away from the Centro to create a nationalist club called Aberria (Homeland).\textsuperscript{92} The club also published a newspaper, Aberi.\textsuperscript{93} Aberi praised the work of the Irish in America who had created patriotic clubs to support independence in the homeland, and it encouraged Basque immigrants to do the same.\textsuperscript{94} The diaspora-homeland connection was also expressed in the paper’s advice to its readers to mail the publication to their friends and relatives in Euzkadi once they had finished reading it.\textsuperscript{95} As was the case with Catalan nationalists, the Basques of Aberi, actively supported the Basque Government during the Spanish Civil War and the Government-in-exile after Franco’s victory.\textsuperscript{96}

Together with Basque and Catalan nationalism, anarchism posed a third challenge to the Hispanista discourse and aspirations of the regime and its supporters in the diaspora. Unlike the other two, however, the anarchist critique of the Spanish state went beyond national borders. It extended to the broader political and economic system underpinning the development of modern capitalist societies. Because of this, the Spanish government and Ambassador Riaño had more success in eliciting the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{92} Koldo San Sebastián, \textit{The Basque Archives. Vascos en Estados Unidos (1938-1943)} (Donostia: Editorial Txertoa, 1991), 15-16.
\item \textsuperscript{93} According to an anonymous “patriot” who denounced the paper to the Spanish Consul in New York, Aberi portrayed Spain “as an illiterate, semi-savage nation, ruled by a bunch of hangmen and murderers,” “Un patriota” to Alejandro Berea, 24 April 1926, AGA-MAE, Caja 8266.
\item \textsuperscript{94} See, for example, the article “Nuestra Labor,” Aberi, 9 May 1926, AGA-MAE, Caja 8266.
\item \textsuperscript{95} “No romped este periódico, ni usarlo como envoltura. Después de leerlo, remítidlo a vuestros familiares y amigos que dejásteis en Euzkadi.” Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{96} Koldo San Sebastián, \textit{The Basque Archives}, 16.
\end{itemize}
support of American authorities to monitor and punish anarchist activities than they had had in persecuting the publications of Catalan and Basque nationalists.

The Spanish anarchist diaspora in America

Anarchism represented the most militant of the transnational networks established by Spaniards in the United States. As historian Carlos Serrano has pointed out, anarchists were less sedentary than socialists. This mobility was partly the result of state repression, but it also reflected the anarchists’ prominence in areas of emigration with easy access to ports, such as Catalonia and Galicia. In the summer of 1901, in the midst of violent strikes by anarchist-led unions in Spain, manifestos of solidarity published by anarchists in Tampa singled out the violence in Barcelona and Coruña, and called on Tampa cigarworkers to protest against the “mass shootings and cruel and systematic persecution of our brothers by the barbarous Spanish government.” The signatories hoped that Spanish workers could soon “get rid of the tyranny of the government, the priests, and the bourgeoisie!”

The solidarity of the Spanish anarchists in the Americas contributed to the survival of the movement in Spain. Besides contributing money for strikers, Spaniards in the United States donated funds to Spanish anarchist publications when these faced financial difficulties. Perhaps more important, as Serrano observed, was the practice of “relay” (relevo): when censorship or outright closure threatened anarchist publications

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in the peninsula, these used the Spanish anarchist press in the United States to express their views. \(^{98}\)

Tampa was one of the centers of anarchism in America. Pedro Esteve, the most prominent Spanish anarchist in the United States at the time, was instrumental in developing this radical environment. In 1892, Esteve left Spain for New York, where he became the editor of the Spanish anarchist newspaper *El Despertar* (The Awakening). He would later move to Paterson, New Jersey, to publish *La Questione Sociale* with Italian anarchist Enrico Malatesta. In 1905, Esteve participated in the foundational convention of the Industrial Workers of the World Union in Chicago. Escaping police persecution, he moved to Tampa in 1906 invited by anarchist groups who pooled their money to provide him with a printing press, *La Políglota*. \(^{99}\) Despite high illiteracy rates among immigrant workers, anarchist newspapers and literature reached a wide audience as they were discussed in anarchist cultural centers and read by the *lectores* (readers) in the cigar factories while cigarmakers worked at their tables. Maximiliano Olay, a prominent Spanish anarchist, claimed that he turned to anarchism after hearing a *lector* read the anarchist newspaper *Tierra y Libertad* (Land and Liberty) in a Tampa cigar factory. \(^{100}\)

When Francisco Ferrer, the founder of the *Escuela moderna* (modern school) was executed in 1909, accused of inciting the events of the *Semana Trágica* (Tragic

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Week) in Barcelona, Pedro Esteve called a meeting in Tampa to protest the “infamous assassination” and vowed to continue Ferrer’s legacy by building several modern schools in the city. According to the official bulletin of the *Institución Francisco Ferrer*, which started publication in March 1910, the Tampa society had 250 members and had collected over $200 in funds. There is no evidence that these schools came to fruition, but we know that at least one of the members of the *Institución* did decide to avenge Ferrer’s death. In 1912, Manuel Pardiñas traveled to Spain and assassinated Spanish Premier José Canalejas. By then, Esteve had moved to New York, where he published the weekly *Cultura Obrera* and worked with the I.W.W. to unionize Spanish maritime workers on the east coast. Maximiliano Olay would follow shortly, working as a *lector* in the factories, and attending the *Centro Ferrer* in Harlem and the Modern School at Stelton, in New Jersey. In 1919, Olay moved to Chicago, where he got a job as a translator and continued to organize anarchist groups such as the Free Society and to contribute to the anarchist press in Cuba, Spain and the United States.

Spanish anarchists in the United States remained a concern for both governments in the coming years. In 1913, after the failed attempt to capture Pardiñas before his deed, Ambassador Riaño requested the aid of the State Department to investigate an alleged anarchist plot to kill Alfonso XIII. In 1919, it was President Woodrow Wilson who was feared to be the possible target of anarchist violence. In

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102 Alonso, *Obreiros alén mar*, 113
104 Alfonso suffered an attempt against his life in April 1913, by José Sánchez Alegre, a Catalan anarchist.
February of that year, acting on tips that Spanish anarchists were planning to assassinate Wilson upon his return from Europe, the police raided the offices of two Spanish radical clubs. Fourteen Spaniards were arrested in New York and ten more in Philadelphia. Among them was the organizer of the Spanish Branch of the I.W.W and editor of the Spanish anarchist weekly *El Corsario*. Charged with violating Wilson’s proclamation against the publication of seditious literature, they faced deportation.  

The exclusion of immigrant anarchists and their deportation had been a policy advocated by the United States since the turn of the century, following the assassination of President McKinley. In 1903 and 1907 anarchists were added to the list of undesirables banned from entering the country. After World War I, fears of Bolshevism led to the deportation of thousands of foreign “radicals” in the notorious Palmer raids. At the same time, congress discussed measures to drastically cut the immigration from “radical” countries. Spain was singled out as a particular culprit by the Republican congressman from Minnesota, Harold Knutson. “Before the war, immigration from Spain was practically unknown,” the congressman stated, as he explained that in a recent visit to Ellis Island in December 1920, he had found that two thousand immigrants from Spain had arrived in one day. Knutson believed that this increase responded to Spanish government policies. “Spain is a seething mass of anarchy,” he declared, “and the [Spanish] Government is gathering these anarchists up and dumping them on us.”

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105 “Bomb Planned for Wilson,” *NYT*, 24 February 1919, 1. According to the press account, *El Corsario* had a circulation of 1,400. Almost all of the accused were finally released and deported.

106 “House Cuts to Year Bar on Immigration,” *NYT*, 11 December 1920, 1.
The deportations and the ensuing legislation that resulted in the National Origins Quota Acts of the 1920s did cut the Spanish immigrant presence in the United States considerably, but it did not completely eliminate anarchist activities. In 1923, news of the bombing of the Spanish and Italian consulates in Philadelphia set off a search for Spanish radicals presumed to have set the bombs to protest the recent alliance between Mussolini and Primo de Rivera. The “relay” practices of the 1890s would resurface again in the 1930s. Following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, two anarchist newspapers from Barcelona, Solidaridad Obrera and Cultura Proletaria were printed in New York and mailed back to Spain.

Ironically for a country which had spread the Catholic faith in the Americas, the Catholic Church was one of the institutions whose transnational links were the weakest among the diaspora. While not as inherently political as the factors discussed above, the immigrants’ overwhelming anticlericalism was another important element that shaped their response to the Hispanista version of Spanish national identity.

The Catholic Church and the Spanish diaspora

When Juan G. Pumariéga, a Spanish resident in Cuba, travelled to Tampa in 1909 for the inauguration of the Centro Asturiano clubhouse, he remarked, on visiting the Sacred Heart Catholic Church in downtown Tampa,

With some surprise I realized that almost all those attending the mass were North Americans, Latins being very far and between, even though

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108 “Anarchist Papers Published Here,” NYT, 21 August 1936, 3.
in Tampa their number exceeds that of the Americans. Why would that be? Could it be that the Anglo-Saxons are more religious than us?\textsuperscript{109}

Unlike other Catholic immigrant groups in the United States, few Spaniards considered religion a mark of their identity. The roots of this sentiment lay in the role the Catholic Church played in Spain. In fact, in some cases the church may have been even considered a “push” factor, as some immigrants mentioned it as one of the causes of their emigration and of their entrenched anticlericalism. Recalling his mother and grandmother’s trip to Tampa from Asturias before the onset of World War I, Joe C. Maldonado stated:

the reason they left Spain was because in Asturias . . . if they didn't attend certain masses, their family was fined . . . So, my grandmother decided that she just wanted to migrate . . . As a matter of fact, they were so upset with the Catholic religion, back then, that when they came to Tampa they never set foot in a Catholic church.\textsuperscript{110}

Even among the Basque immigrants, who hailed from what was considered the most Catholic region in the country, church attendance suffered once they moved to America, where they were free from the compulsion and peer pressure exerted in their villages. Many men abandoned the church altogether. Women were generally more involved. In 1914, for example, Basque immigrants joined Irish families in building a church in Jordan Valley, Oregon. Basques were also successful in obtaining priests from their provinces to minister to them. In 1911, Father Bernardo Arregui was sent to serve the growing Basque communities in Idaho, and in 1919 he became the pastor of the first all-Basque church in the United States, the Church of the Good Shepherd, in

\textsuperscript{109} Juan G. Pumariega, \textit{Impresiones de un viaje a Tampa} (Habana: s.n., 1909), 46.
\textsuperscript{110} Joe C. Maldonado, interview by author, 11 April 1997, Tampa, Florida, tape recording, SCWOHP, Tampa.
Boise. A decade later, however, services at the church were discontinued. A number of factors contributed to this outcome: the virtual end of new immigration from Spain following the Quota laws, the progressive Americanization of the Basques already in the United States, and the movement within the American Catholic church to encourage Americanization and do away with national ethnic parishes.

As had happened in Spain, Catholicism in the diaspora was more often associated with material wealth. A number of well-to-do Spanish immigrants contributed to the construction of Catholic churches in the United States in the late nineteenth-century. Juan Cebrián was credited with building the first Spanish church in Santa Barbara and, together with Eusebio Molera, he built the church of Our Lady of Guadalupe in San Francisco. Susana Domínguez and her husband Gregorio del Amo, offered the parlor of their home in Redondo Beach as an impromptu chapel where Catholics would gather for Sunday mass in the 1890s. As the number of celebrants grew, the couple and other relatives funded the construction of St. James Church in 1892. The Del Amos also underwrote the construction of a Seminary for the Claretian Missionary Fathers in 1927, and offered generous gifts to the Plaza Church in Los Angeles. In Tampa, Vicente Martínez Ybor funded the building of the first Catholic Church in Ybor City, Our Lady of Mercy, named after his wife’s name saint (Mercedes).

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111 Bieter, An Enduring Legacy, 63.
Well-to-do Spanish Catholics also patronized non-Spanish Catholic churches. Spanish tycoon José de Navarro helped finance the construction of St. Patrick’s Cathedral and, in 1879, paid $2,100 in a bid for first choice in the cathedral’s pew auction. Mrs. Micaela H. de Alba, the devout and aristocratic Spanish mother of New York socialites Rita Lydig and Mercedes de Acosta, was also a pew owner at St. Patrick’s where she attended daily mass until her death in 1921. By then, Manhattan had an “official” Spanish church, Nuestra Señora de la Esperanza. At the blessing ceremony on July 21, 1912, Our Lady of Hope was hailed as “the only Spanish Catholic church in this city.” Ironically, it was funded almost entirely by Protestant wealth. The church was the brainchild of Mrs. Manuela de Barril, who sought the support of the wealthy (non-Catholic) Hispanist Archer Huntington. Huntington had built the Hispanic Society of America at Audubon Terrace in Upper Manhattan, in 1904, and he liked the idea of adding a Spanish church to the Hispanic museum. He offered the land and $50,000 to Cardinal Farley, who embraced the project wholeheartedly. Manuela’s relative, María de Barril, once described as “the most famous social secretary in the United States, if not in the world,” used her social skills to raise another $50,000 from influential friends among New York high society to furnish the interior of the church.

De Barril was also instrumental in obtaining a royal gift from the Spanish king.

114 The pews, which seated from 5 to 10 people, were sold in perpetuity, provided the owner and heirs paid a yearly rent. “The Cathedral auction,” NYT, 30 May 1879, 5. See also Burman and Beerman, Un Vasco en America, 53-57.
115 Mercedes de Acosta, Here Lies the Heart (New York: Arno Press, 1975), 2-3. Mrs. de Alba was a descendant of the family of the Dukes of Alba in Spain, 7-10.
116 “Cardinal Blesses New Spanish Church,” NYT, 22 July 1912, 16.
Alfonso XIII sent a magnificent lamp, a replica of the eighteenth-century original held in the emblematic chapel of San Antonio de la Florida in Madrid, a former royal chapel whose dome was graced with frescoes by Francisco de Goya. In his speech, Cardinal Farley reminded the congregants how Alfonso’s ancestor, Charles IV, had also contributed generously to the first Catholic Church erected in New York, and how Ferdinand and Isabella had helped bring Catholicism to America. Yet, despite this paean to *Hispanismo*, the church was put under the care of the Augustinians of the Assumption, an order originating in France. In 1924, at the onset of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, an anonymous report sent by a Spaniard in New York to the Royal Palace remarked on the “fall of Spain’s prestige” in the United States using this church as an example, “a so-called Spanish church governed by non-Spanish priests.”

The criticism was not entirely merited. Despite their French origins, the Assumptionists had a long tradition of ministering to the Spanish-speaking community. The first members of the order had arrived in New York in 1891, and in 1901 they had approached Cardinal Corrigan offering to do missionary work among the Hispanic population. The following year, they founded the parish of Our Lady of Guadalupe in the heart of the Spanish community, 229 West Fourteenth Street, in Manhattan. Father Adrian Buisson, who became the pastor of the church in 1903, was well fit to the task. Born in France in 1863, he trained with the Augustinians in Spain, where he was ordained in 1887. In 1890, he was sent to Chile, where he did

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118 “Cardinal Blesses New Spanish Church,” *NYT*, 22 July 1912, 16. The church also received paintings by Spanish artists Joaquín Sorolla and Ignacio Zuloaga.
119 “De interés nacional,” AGP, Caja 15592, Expediente 2. Date of document extrapolated from internal references to attached newspaper clipping published in 1924.
missionary work for thirteen years, until his arrival in New York. Buisson became the first pastor of Our Lady of Esperanza in 1912, a position he held for more than forty years, until his retirement in 1953. The Assumptionists were not usurpers; rather, they came to fill a void left open by the Spanish church.

The Spanish Catholic church was slow in responding to the pastoral needs of Spanish emigrants. It was in 1913 that its leaders began to turn their eyes towards the ever growing mass of Spaniards leaving the country. That year marked the foundation of the *Asociación Española de San Rafael*, an institution for the “Protection of the Emigrant” which had among its stated goals “to avoid, if possible, unjustified emigration; to prevent, remedy or lessen the ill religious, moral, social and economic effects of migration; and to protect the emigrant, regardless of age and gender, in the different phases of emigration.” The San Rafael Association was modeled after similar institutions in Germany and Italy, whose foundation had been spurred by Pope Pius X’s concern with the plight of the emigrants. The year of its foundation is significant because it represented the highest peak of emigration to the Americas in that decade. Perhaps more important, 1913 marked the beginning of a trend of increasing Spanish emigration to non-Catholic United States.

The apprehension that this emigration caused among Catholic quarters is illustrated by the commentary on the “pernicious consequences of emigration”

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121 “Resumen de los Estatutos de la Asociación Española de San Rafael,” *NE* 1, 1 (January 1917).

122 Among them, the German *St. Raphaelverein*, and the Italian *Italica Gens* (Federazione per l’Assistenza degli Emigranti Transoceanici).
published in the society’s official bulletin, *Nuestra Emigración* (Our Emigration), in 1918. “The parish priests can attest how badly devotion suffers in the soul of many emigrants,” stated the article. The priests “cry when they see how, upon their return, [the emigrants] do not practice [their religion]; even worse, they ridicule and persecute their neighbors [who do].” This behavior, the publication argued, was the result of the life the emigrants led abroad, in countries inimical to Catholicism, or where several religions are practiced, or . . . where it is fashionable to profess no religion, where the impious press predominates, and sectarian gatherings are frequent, where there is scarcity of priests in populous centers and, if living in the countryside, the great distances between the different farms make it necessary to travel several miles to reach a temple.123

Strengthening the links between the emigrant and the homeland (and the Catholic religion) was thus a crucial goal of the San Rafael Society. In the United States, they benefited from the assistance of the French orders which had been ministering to Hispanic Catholics since the turn of the century. In 1917, *Nuestra Emigración* reported that the Salesians in New York had organized a Secretariat for Spanish immigrants “to help them establish contacts among themselves, so that they do not forget their nationality and they maintain their connection to the fatherland.”124 A few months later, a delegate of San Rafael toured Cuba and the United States and confirmed the collaboration with the Salesians as well as with the Augustinians of Our Lady of Guadalupe.125 The following year, the priest of that parish offered to open a

123 “Perniciosos resultados de la emigración,” *NE* 1, 5 (May 1918): 72.
124 “Países de inmigración,” *NE* 1, 3 (March 1917): 40.
125 “Estados Unidos,” *NE* 1, 10 (October 1917): 158.
new branch of the San Rafael Association. He also sought the collaboration of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul in assisting needy Spanish families, and tried to contract a number of beds for needy Spaniards in a Catholic hospital run by nuns.\textsuperscript{126}

By February 1919, the priest reported that he had signed a contract with a Mexican couple to run a boarding house for Spanish and Hispanic-American immigrants, the San Rafael Hotel. The couple would be in charge of the house, and the parish would provide the spiritual aid. This would include a catholic library, as well as conferences by the Augustinian fathers, and a professor paid by the society to teach English to new arrivals. The hotel had room for twenty-one immigrants, and the priest anticipated that, if everything went well, within the year they could move to bigger quarters.\textsuperscript{127}

News from New York in \textit{Nuestra Emigración} faded away in the following years. In 1925, it reported on the inauguration of a ward for needy Spaniards and Hispanic-Americans in St. Vincent’s Hospital. The “Navarro-Moncada” ward had been funded by the will of two anonymous female donors, and was administered by Cardinal Hayes. It was serviced by the Sisters of Charity, and had room for seventeen beds, attended by a doctor and a nurse, both of whom spoke Spanish. Two years later, the magazine reported on the foundation of a new Spanish church, Our Lady of the Miraculous Medal (\textit{La Milagrosa}), under the care of Vincentian priests. The article highlighted that the retable of the main altar was to be purchased in Spain, and that it

\textsuperscript{126}“New York,” \textit{NE} 2, 6 (June 1918): 93.
\textsuperscript{127}“New York,” \textit{NE} 3, 29 (May 1919): 75.
would represent “the most brilliant demonstration of Spanish religious art ever seen in New York.”

The impact of these religious institutions on the bulk of the immigrant community remained limited. As the last quotation indicates, the Spanish Catholic church continued to see its role primarily as the repository of artistic riches symbolizing the splendor of Spain’s imperial past. Its traditionalism and its association with the wealthy elites did not appeal to many emigrants who, by their own accounts, had left Spain in part to flee the culturally and economically oppressive environment that the church and its allies had contributed to creating. Moreover, their limited charitable efforts could not compete with the services offered by the well-established transnational mutual aid societies. As early as 1917, a report from the San Rafael delegation in Asturias had hinted at this institutional competition. Searching for a reason as to why so few Asturians emigrating to Cuba availed themselves of the services offered by the religious society, the “explanation of the enigma” was found in the efficient tutelage provided by the Centro Asturiano of Havana.

Conclusion

This chapter has traced the development of a variety of transnational networks among Spanish immigrants in the United States in the initial decades of the twentieth

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129 Even Alfonso XIII was concerned about the ultraconservative tenor of the Spanish Church. When he first met Theodore Roosevelt in 1911, at a time when Alfonso’s relations with the Vatican were strained over his support of liberalism in Spain, the King remarked: “much though I object to the anarchists, I do not regard them as more dangerous to my country than the ultraclericals; of the two, I mind the extreme right even more than I mind the extreme left.” Theodore Roosevelt to David Gray, 5 October 1911, in Morison, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, 411.
130 “Asturias,” *NE* 1, 8 (August 1917): 127.
century. It has shown how these networks maintained the connection between the migrants and their places of origin. While some institutions, such as boarding houses and mutual aid societies brought members of the community together, there were also important forces that divided them across regional and political lines. The attempts by the immigrant elite to forge a united Hispanic identity based on the tenets of *hispanismo* met with little success, particularly when *hispanismo* gained official status during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Local, regional, and class identities remained strong among immigrants in America, and the centralist national politics of the regime in the peninsula only contributed to the radicalization of important sectors of the diaspora. The appeal of regional nationalisms and international anarchism, the immigrants’ anticlericalism and their rejection of the colonial enterprise in Morocco ran against the *hispanista* version of Spain, which emphasized the imperial tradition, the monarchy and the church. Within this context, we can better understand the enthusiasm in the Spanish diaspora for the proclamation of the Spanish Republic in 1931, as well as the immigrants’ overwhelming support when the Republic was attacked by General Franco’s military uprising in 1936.
The Spanish civil war
and the Americanization of the Spanish immigrant

News of the proclamation of the Spanish Republic in April 1931 was received with enthusiasm among the Spanish communities of America. The Tampa press captured this transnational exhilaration as it reported on King Alfonso’s departure from Spain. “Frenzied ‘Vivas!’ for the new republic were heard from Madrid to Main street, West Tampa,” read an article in the *Tampa Times*.\(^1\) “Latin Colony Here Jubilant as King Quits,” proclaimed the headlines of the *Tampa Tribune*.\(^2\) New York’s *La Prensa* described events in Spain using the language of “tradition” and “modernity.” In his editorial, Camprubí stated that republicanism was a system of government more in harmony with the social and economic structure of the modern world.\(^3\)

This chapter examines the response of the Spanish immigrant communities in the United States to the establishment of the Republic in the peninsula and their support of the Republic when it came under attack during the Spanish Civil War. It argues that an important aspect of what made the Republic appealing to Spaniards in the United States was that the new regime allowed them to reconcile two parts of their identity that until then had appeared to be at odds. Many within the immigrant

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\(^1\) “King Alfonso is Nominated as President,” *TDT*, 15 April 1931, 1. The article reported an “aftermath of sympathy and approval for Alfonso the man,” following his decision to step down, abiding by the popular will of his subjects.

\(^2\) “Latin Colony Here Jubilant as King Quits,” *TMT*, 15 April 1931, 1. Cuban exiles were also among the jubilant crowds, because, as the article stated, “the day seemed to bring closer the fall of Machado of Cuba.” The authoritarian regime of General Gerardo Machado was toppled in the summer of 1933.

\(^3\) “La tradición cede a la realidad,” *La Prensa*, 15 April 1931, 4.
community shared President Alcalá Zamora’s wish to unite Spain with the Americas “through the bonds of republicanism to march together on the path of progress and civilization.” Regardless of their particular political allegiances, Spaniards in America embraced the entrance of their homeland into the “modern world,” and hoped that it would open new possibilities for the relationships between Spain and the United States. These hopes were dashed when General Franco rose against the Republic in 1936. The coup and subsequent civil war sparked an unprecedented mobilization of the Spanish immigrant community in America.

I explore this mobilization as an example of both continuity and change within the diaspora. On the one hand, the response of the immigrant communities illustrates the strength of the transnational networks that had kept the diaspora connected to the homeland through the period covered by this dissertation. At the same time, the nature of the conflict and its international dimension created a novel scenario, and made this a particularly transformative experience in the life of the community. Unlike the nineteenth-century civil wars in the peninsula and the colonial wars in Cuba (often cast by Spaniards in America as civil wars), the 1936 conflict soon called into question such a definition. Franco’s Nationalist forces encompassed troops from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, as well as Moroccan volunteers. The Loyalists, for their part, were aided by the Soviet Union. The Communist Party also helped organize the International Brigades, bringing around 40,000 volunteers to fight on the side of the

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4 “Discurso de Alcalá Zamora por radio,” ER (May 1931), 3.
Republic. The characterization of the conflict in Spain, not as a civil war, but as a war of national independence against foreign invaders conjured up images of the national response to the Napoleonic forces in 1808 and helped rallied the immigrant community around the Republic. This was particularly the case after the attacks on the Basque towns of Durango and Guernica by the German Condor Legion in April 1937.

The indiscriminate attack upon civilians and America’s neutrality policy, which allowed only humanitarian aid to be delivered to Spain, heightened the sense of unity among the immigrant community now described as an extension of the Republican homefront. The homefront quality of this mobilization also resulted in greater immigrant visibility, particularly of Spanish women and children, who played a key role in these activities. This visibility, in turn, reflected the iconography of the Popular Front which presented women as “icons of militant motherhood.” In 1935, Caroline F. Ware had written of Spaniards in Greenwich Village that “the isolation of

5 German and Italian aid to Franco was greater than Soviet aid to the Republic. For specific figures on international aid to both sides of the conflict see Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War*, 4th ed. (New York: Touchstone, 1986), 974-984. Besides the foreign troops mentioned, Franco also received the support of a small group of international volunteers, estimated at 1200 by historian Judith Keene. Judith Keene, *Fighting for Franco: International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain During the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39* (London: Leicester University Press, 2001).

6 A week after the uprising, the daily *ABC*, referred to the war in Spain as a “second war of independence.” The Nationalists, on their part, justified the rebellion as a crusade against the forces of international Communism. For an analysis of the Spanish Civil War as a war against foreign invaders, see Xosé M. Nuñez Seixas, *¡Fuera el invasor! Nacionalismos y movilización bélica durante la guerra civil española (1936-1939)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006).

7 Elizabeth Faue, *Community of Suffering & Struggle. Women, Men, and the Labor Movement in Minneapolis, 1915-1945* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 83. For the most part, however, women remained relegated to an auxiliary role. This was also the case in Spain, where, after the initial months of the conflict, the brave *milicianas* were transformed into “homefront heroines.” Historian Mary Nash indicates that “the overall activities of the different women’s groups tended toward supportive and complementary antifascist activities.” Mary Nash, *Defying Male Civilization: Women in the Spanish Civil War* (Denver: Arden Press, 1995), 101.
the group from the rest of the community was practically complete." This would be less so in the second half of the decade. Besides forging a closer sense of community, the war in Spain also contributed to fostering contacts between the Spanish diaspora and other communities.

In fact, I would argue that the unprecedented mobilization of the Spanish immigrant community was as much an expression of the immigrants’ Americanism as it was of their Spanishness. Their activities were shaped not only by the ties that bound them to their homeland, but by the Popular Front culture that emerged in the United States in the 1930s; a new civic culture where working-class immigrants began to move outside their ethnic enclaves and to establish alliances with like-minded Americans regardless of ethnicity, race, gender, or creed. Spanish immigrants were actively participating in what Michael Denning, in his cultural history of the Great Depression, has dubbed “the laboring of American culture.”

The response of the Spanish diaspora to the Spanish Civil War reveals a singular path to Americanization. While most studies of immigration point to World War II as one of the key moments in this process, in the Spanish case, the conflict in Spain, overshadowing the world conflagration, played the crucial role. The war inspired in the second generation a thirst for knowledge about their parents’ homeland and a rekindled pride in their heritage at the same time that it helped ease the transition into American society. For the first generation, however, the struggle and its outcome

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8 Ware, *Greenwich Village*, 228.
9 Michael Denning, *The Cultural Front. The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century*, 2d ed. (New York: Verso, 2000), xvi. Denning defines this cultural front, as “the result of the encounter between a powerful democratic social movement—the Popular Front—and the modern cultural apparatuses of mass entertainment and education,” xviii.
were more problematic. For many of these Spaniards “becoming American” was not a voluntary choice, but one born of their transformation, after Franco’s victory, from emigrants into exiles.

“At Last! Spain is a Republic”¹⁰

The advent of the Republic in 1931 may have seemed to its Spanish supporters in the United States the culmination of a cycle started in 1873. That year, in New York, an earlier generation of Spanish immigrants had celebrated the establishment of the First Spanish Republic with a banquet. The guests had responded “with enthusiastic applause” to a toast to George Washington, “the founder of a Republic . . . whose example may well be imitated by the young Republic of Spain.”¹¹ A few months later, however, the fledgling Republic foundered. The efforts of New York’s Centro Español Republicano Federal to raise funds to aid the government in Spain were to no avail.¹² Marred by internal divisions and conservative reaction, the Republic vanished in 1874 when a military coup brought about the Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. The New York Times expressed disappointment at this turn of

¹⁰ “¡Por fin!...Por fin España es una República,” La Prensa, 5 April 1931, 4.
¹¹ “Declaration of Spanish Republic,” NYT, 23 February 1873, 8. The proclamation of the Republic inspired Walt Whitman’s poem “Spain,” whose last stanza had a sense of foreboding: “Nor think we forget thee, Maternal:/ Lagg’st thou so long? Shall the clouds close again upon thee? /Ah, but thou hast Thyself now appear’d to us—we know thee; /Thou hast given us a sure proof, the glimpse of Thyself;/ Thou waitest there, as everywhere, thy time.” Published originally in the New York Daily Graphic (22 March 1873), it would be retitled “Spain, 1873-74” after the fall of the Republic.
¹² The officers of the Centro included Serafín Sánchez (president) and Ignacio Haya (secretary), the owners of the cigar manufacturing firm of Sánchez & Haya. AGA-MAE, Caja 7872.
events, as it stated sharply, “we must conclude that the people are not wise enough for a Republican form of Government.”

In 1931, in his first radio broadcast to the Americas, the President of the Second Spanish Republic addressed Spain’s “former daughters . . . now our sisters.” As in 1873, Spanish republicans pointed to the United States as an example of democracy and efficiency, goals towards which the Spanish Republic also strove. The *Times*, praising the peaceful transition that brought about the new regime, and remembering the failed republic sixty years earlier, conceded that “possibly the Spanish people are riper for it today.”

This “coming of age” was welcomed by many Spaniards in America, who, as the advertisement of the New York Cervantes bookstore declared, were happy to see Spain at last become a Republic (see Figure 7). The Cervantes advertisement reveals an interesting approach to developments in Spain, and it illustrates how the tools of mass culture and mass marketing, while contributing to the Americanization of the immigrant, could be also used to reinforce the links between homeland and diaspora and to help preserve ethnic identities in America. Presenting the republican victory as the culmination of a long process of civic learning and sacrifices by the Spanish people, the ad encouraged its audience to learn about that process through a republican

17 For a broader discussion of mass culture and immigrant America in the interwar period see, for example, Lizbeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal. Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), especially chapter 3.
library of sorts. The selected books, written by “distinguished citizens,” the ad stated, had contributed to creating “the civic spirit so fully conveyed” in the recent elections. The books offered Spaniards abroad the opportunity to learn more about those events and to participate vicariously in the Republican success. Records were also used to similar effect. Offering a wider context in which to situate the republican struggle, the Castellanos-Molina Corporation advertised a phonograph record on the trial and execution of Francisco Ferrer in 1910, perhaps the most infamous miscarriage of justice in Restoration Spain (see Figure 8). Another record advertised by the same company focused on the life of King Alfonso and the “good fortune” which had allowed him to rule Spain for forty-five years. Like the books advertised by Cervantes, the record provided a narrative of the events that had led to the proclamation of the Republic.

The history of recent developments in the peninsula was not unknown to Spaniards in America, who had read about their unfolding in the American and the Spanish immigrant press. In places like Tampa, these readings were also complemented by lectures offered by Spanish republicans touring Latin America. In 1929, for example, Spanish writer Eugenio Noel lectured at the Centro Español and the Centro Asturiano.18 The following year, the newly-created Asociación hispano-cubana de conferencias hosted distinguished Catalan republican Pedro Corominas.19

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19 “Pedro Corominas,” La Gaceta, 26 November 1930, 1. During the Republic, Corominas would serve in the Catalan government (Generalitat Catalana), and as deputy to the Spanish Parliament.
Two weeks after Corominas’s lecture, news arrived in Tampa of the failed attempt by republican army officers to proclaim a Republic in Jaca in December 1930. The summary execution of two of the conspirators, and the exile and imprisonment of republican supporters mobilized the diaspora. Tampa’s *Frente Unico de Acción Republicana* answered the call from the *Centro Republicano Español* in Buenos Aires to collect funds to aid republicans in Spain. At the same time, *La Gaceta* started publishing the *Manifiesto por la República* signed by the republican leaders who had constituted themselves into a provisional government.²⁰

Thus, when municipal elections brought about the proclamation of the Republic in April 1931, Spaniards in America were ready for the change. The first step was the removal of the symbols of the monarchy. In Los Angeles, Josep Carner-Ribalta, a Catalan nationalist who worked in Hollywood’s film industry, joined Spanish playwright Gregorio Martínez Sierra, and went to the Spanish consulate to “dismiss the monarchic consul” and to fly the new republican flag from the consulate’s balcony.²¹ In Tampa, the *Centro Español* took down the portrait of the king and raised the tricolor republican flag at the tune of the *Himno de Riego*, the republican national anthem.²² At the same time, the Republican *Frente Unico* organized a signature campaign requesting that the new government discharge the 

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²⁰ Founded in 1904, the *Centro Republicano Español* was part of a thriving network of Spanish Republican centers established in Argentina at the beginning of the twentieth century. For an excellent analysis of this largely unknown chapter of the political mobilization of the Spanish diaspora in the Americas see Ángel Duarte, *La república del emigrante. La cultura política de los españoles en Argentina (1875-1910)* (Lleida: Editorial Milenio, 1998).


²² “La bandera de la república española fue izada ayer en los dos palacios del Centro Español,” *La Gaceta*, 4 May 1931, 1. The Centro Asturiano would follow a few days later.
Spanish consul. In New York, the *Alianza Republicana Española* started publishing the monthly *España Republicana*.

Support for the new Republic was also expressed in the return of Spaniards to the peninsula. Carner-Ribalta, for example, left Hollywood for Barcelona, where the leader of his party, Francesc Maciá, was now the president of the newly-established Catalan government, the *Generalitat*. Carner-Ribalta would be instrumental in establishing the Catalan film industry in the 1930s. Many of the leading members of the *Alianza Republicana Española* in New York also left for Spain in the months that followed the proclamation of the Republic. In Tampa, the Spanish cigarmakers renewed their calls (as they had done with Primo de Rivera) to end the government monopoly on tobacco production, and offered their expertise to help develop the free tobacco industry in the peninsula.

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23 Among a long list of offenses, the signatories mentioned the Consul’s inappropriate behavior towards Republican Pedro Corominas during his visit to Tampa in 1930. “La protesta de la colonia española en contra de la actuación del cónsul Iglesias,” *La Gaceta*, 10 May 1931, 1. The Consul, Andrés Iglesias Velayos, had served as the first Spanish consul in Tampa from 1923 to 1925, and again from 1929 to 1932. Although removed from Tampa, he was not expelled from the diplomatic corps as the petition requested. The Republican government dismissed him in 1936, when evidence showed he supported the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War. Andrés Iglesias Velayos, MAEH, Expediente Personal, Legajo P-469. Expediente 33764.

24 The *Alianza* was founded in August, 1930, as a branch of the homonymous association based in Madrid. It supported a Socialist-leaning Republic in Spain. One of the first activities of the group was to open a subscription for the orphaned daughter of Captain García Hernández, one of the two officers executed for declaring the Republic in December 1930. “Suscripción,” *ER* (April 1931), 4.


26 “Los Españoles de America emprenden una activa campaña contra el monopolio español del tabaco…” *España Nueva*, December 1932, 6. The proposal of the “*Agrupación Pro-Industria Libre del Tabaco en España*,” received the support of the Socialist Trade Union (UGT) in Spain. When the Republican Minister of Justice, a former head of the UGT, visited Tampa in 1938, he explained that a Tampa cigarmaker was helping to organize the tobacco industry in Asturias before its fall to the Franco
The Republican government encouraged this contact with the diaspora. The first broadcast of Republican President Alcalá Zamora to the Americas offered an amnesty to those who had left Spain for political or military reasons, as well as the repatriation of those left unemployed by the onset of the Great Depression. The Republican leader also mentioned the possibility of granting parliamentary representation to Spaniards living in America.\(^{27}\) The Republican constitution was the first Spanish constitution to mention the Spanish emigrant, and the first one to consider the establishment of dual nationality legislation with the Latin American countries.\(^{28}\)

In his speech, Alcalá Zamora had also promised the reorganization of the consular service, and the reorientation of Spain’s diplomacy towards the American continent. The Republic seemed to have improved relationships between the consuls and the immigrant communities. In August, 1931, the Consul in San Francisco wrote to Madrid that he had been invited repeatedly by the Spanish colonies in his jurisdiction to visit them, especially after the proclamation of the Republic. In 1932, reporting on the celebration of the Fiesta de la Raza, a new consul highlighted the “republican spirit” of the festivities and the colony’s enthusiasm as they met the first


\(^{28}\) Article 46 stated that the Republic’s social legislation would regulate the conditions of the Spanish workers, including emigrants. Article 24 allowed for the naturalization of Latin American citizens in Spain without having to renounce their nationality, and applied the same principle to Spaniards who had become naturalized in Latin America. In 1932, the Spanish consul in San Francisco suggested to the government that Spanish residents in the United States also be included. Alvaro de Aguilar to Estado, 27 July 1932. AGA-MAE, Caja 12120.
official representative of the Republic in the city.” 29 In Tampa, the first Consul assigned by the Republic was received with a banquet organized by the leaders of the Spanish community and attended by two hundred guests. A year later, a new consul informed Madrid that the visits to the Consulate had continued to increase since the proclamation of the Republic. This, he explained, was due both to the Republican sympathies of the colony but also to the efforts of Consulate officials to establish better relations with the colony and the general public.30

Despite these improvements, the republican record concerning its representation abroad was a mixed one. The republican governments elevated to embassies the Spanish representation in Mexico and Brazil, but they did not alter substantially the number and structure of legations and consulates that had been established during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship.31 The Republic did try to modernize the diplomatic career, adapting it to the needs of the new regime. In 1932, a new program of studies was designed. Its goals were to professionalize the diplomatic career and to open it to members of all social classes, as a way to counter the nepotism so prevalent in it.32 While successful, the new curriculum had a limited scope, since only one class of students graduated from the program. The failure to republicanize

29 Sebastián Romero to Estado, 31 August 1931, AGA-MAE, Caja 12120; Alvaro de Aguilar to Estado, 11 October 1932, AGA-MAE, Caja 12120.
30 “El banquete homenaje al Sr. A. de Maldonado...” newspaper clipping (n.d.) in Alvaro de Maldonado y Liñán, MAEAH, Expediente Personal, Legajo P-514, Expediente 34768; Pablo de Ubarri to Estado, 18 May 1933, MAEAR, Legajo R-179, Exp. 30-33.
the diplomatic corps was to prove crucial when the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936.

**From Republic to Civil War**

While the July military coup caught Spaniards by surprise, it was not entirely unexpected. Since 1931, the Republic had grown increasingly weak in the face of the polarization between the right and the left. The profound economic, social, and political challenges facing Spain tested the fledgling regime. In the first two years, a left-republican administration dealt with some of the most intractable issues in Spanish history, including the separation of Church and State, a Law of Agrarian Reform, and regional autonomy for Catalonia. Not surprisingly, these initiatives alienated the more conservative elements within Spanish society. In 1932, General Sanjurjo led a failed military uprising against the Republic in Seville. At the same time, peasants and workers, frustrated by what they saw as the slow pace of reform, turned to Communism and Anarchism. The divisions within the Left, and the strengthening of the coalition of conservative forces, contributed to the victory of the Right in the November 1933 elections. In the following years, the new administration dismantled most of the legislation approved by its predecessor. In 1934, the entrance in the cabinet of members of the right-wing CEDA party resulted in a workers’ uprising led by the Socialist party (PSOE). The Asturian Revolution, named for the northern mining region where the uprising was most successful, was ruthlessly suppressed by

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33 CEDA is the acronym of the *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* (Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rights), a loose confederation of conservatives, monarchists, and right-wing groups, founded in March 1933.
the government with the help of the colonial forces from Morocco led by General Franco, in what has been dubbed “the first battle of the Civil War.”

The aftermath of the revolution and a series of political scandals brought down the government. This time, following the anti-fascist policy of the Soviet Union, the left-wing parties organized a Spanish Popular Front. The Frente Popular narrowly won the elections in February 1936. The situation deteriorated rapidly in the following months as the Popular Front coalition began to disintegrate and the Right started to conspire against the government. The violence that ensued culminated in July when the leader of the opposition monarchist party, José Calvo Sotelo, was murdered by policemen in retaliation for the assassination the day before of a Republican police officer by members of the pro-Fascist Falange party. The military coup began a few days later, on July 17, 1936. Its leaders had expected to capture Madrid in a swift campaign, but the overwhelming response in support of the Republic, both in Spain and abroad, prolonged the struggle for three years.

The speed of events in the weeks following the coup added confusion to an already volatile situation. As soon as news arrived in the United States of the military uprising, Spanish consulates were flooded with telegrams from Spaniards and others volunteering to go to Spain to fight. At the same time, ad hoc committees were being

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35 On 22 July 1936, Ramón Pi wrote to the Consul in New York asking for transportation to Spain for himself and fifty-eight others, including Puerto Rican, Cuban and Venezuelan volunteers. The Club Español also reported to the Consul that hundreds of Spaniards wanted to go to Spain to fight for the
created to raise funds to support the Republic. These loosely organized coalitions included not only Spaniards, but other groups sympathetic to the Spanish government, particularly among workers and militants of the left. In New York, a demonstration organized by the United Committee in Support of the Struggle against Spanish Fascism at Union Square drew over four thousand unionists, Socialists and Communists, among others. In Chicago, the Committee for the Defense of Spanish Liberties, chaired by Spanish anarchist Maximiliano Olay, joined Communist and Socialist leaders in a mass meeting that raised $1,100 for the Republic. In Tampa, the foundational meeting of the Comité Popular de Defensa del Frente Popular Español, included representatives of labor unions, the International Labor Defense, the Labor Alliance, the Communist Party, and the Italian Antifascist Group. The Comité would also receive the support of protestant ministers. From the beginning of the war, protestant ministers were instrumental in establishing and leading the most important American organizations in support of the Republic: the American Friends of Spanish Democracy (AFSD), the Medical Bureau to Aid Spanish Democracy (MBASD), and the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy (NACASD). The Catholic hierarchy, for its part, sided with Franco’s nationalist forces.

Republic. AGA-MAE, Caja 4380. A week after the uprising, La Gaceta stated that over 150 Tampans had offered themselves to the Republic. “Chungas y no Chungas,” La Gaceta, 28 July 1936, 1. 36 “Spanish Fascists Assailed,” NYT, 1 August 1936; “3,500 Meet Here; Give War Funds to Spain’s Labor,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 12 August 1936, 2. 37 “La adhesión de la asamblea de anoche a la república española,” La Gaceta, 4 August 1936, 1. Among the protestant leaders who supported Republican Spain were Rev. E. C. Nance; Rev. A. J. Phillips, a Methodist minister who chaired the local chapter of the American Friends of Spanish Democracy, and Rev. Walter Metcalf, a Congregationalist minister who headed the Tampa Committee for the Defense of Civil Liberties. 38 The Quakers, through the American Friends Service Committee, and the American Red Cross, also provided much needed aid to Spain. For a description of these and other American organizations.
The Popular Front culture that emerged in America in the 1930s contributed to this solidarity with the Spanish diaspora in support of Republican Spain. At the same time, tensions often flared up between two increasingly polarized views of events in Spain. Pro-Loyalists claimed that they were defending democracy against the attacks of Fascism, while Franco’s supporters argued that the General was saving Spain from the claws of international Communism. The debates as to the nature of the conflict in Spain were part of a broader debate on America’s own identity, in the turmoil of the Great Depression and the New Deal, as both sides presented their position as the essence of true Americanism. John L. Lewis, the head of the new Congress of Industrial Organizations, would justify the CIO’s challenge to the established American Federation of Labor as fulfilling for workers “the promise of 1776.” Earl Browder, the leader of the Communist Party, proclaimed Communism to be “twentieth-century Americanism.” John E. Kelly, a Franco-lobbyist, compared the General’s forces to “the Rebels of Valley Forge,” and Catholic leader Edward Lodge Curran saw in the military uprising a replica of America’s war of independence.

These ideological conflicts on Americanism and the Spanish Civil War played out in communities across America. Pro-loyalist groups often faced censorship and intimidation by opposing groups and American authorities. In Springfield, Illinois, supporting both sides in the war see Marta Rey García, *Stars for Spain. La guerra civil española en los Estados Unidos* (A Coruña: Edicións do Castro, 1997).

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39 Michael Denning defines the Popular Front in the United States as “a radical social-democratic movement forged around anti-fascism, anti-lynching, and the industrial unionism of the CIO,” and he argues that it was during the Spanish Civil War that the term Popular Front became the name of the movement. Denning, *Cultural Front*, xviii: 23.

those attending the viewing of *Heart of Spain* (a pro-Loyalist documentary sponsored by the NACASD) at an Episcopal church, were confronted by Catholic picketers with banners that read “Don’t Buy Tickets To Support Spanish Communism.” In the days prior to the showing, Catholic officials had also called a bookstore where tickets for the event were sold and threatened a Catholic boycott against the owner.\(^{41}\) In Detroit, the Police Commissioner banned the exhibit of *Heart of Spain* unless “uncomplimentary references to Mussolini, Hitler, and fascist dictators in general” were deleted from the film.\(^{42}\) In Vacaville, California, the mayor and the chief of police stormed the hall of the Spanish society where the film *Spain in Flames* was to be shown, and arrested four members of the organizing committee, claiming that the meeting and the club were “communist.”\(^{43}\)

Since many of these organizations had legally registered with the Department of State, they called on it to act against these attacks, in most cases, to no avail.\(^{44}\)

\(^{41}\) Springfield Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, “Memorandum of Certain Events at Christ Church Parish…,” 11 November 1937, ACLURB Papers [microfilm], reel 141. Churches were sometimes preferred for these events to other venues, since private owners or city officials were more likely to cede to pressure. In Rock Island, Iowa, for example, the NACASD had to cancel an event three times due to pressures by religious groups and others on the venues (two hotels and the local Labor Temple). The meeting finally took place at an abandoned church. However, the Spanish delegation that was scheduled to speak “declined to attend, declaring that they would not make a public appearance in any community exhibiting such organized antagonism to the government they represented.” “Meeting for Spain Faces Organized Opposition in Iowa,” ACLU, “Weekly Bulletin,” 26 December 1936, ACLU Papers [microfilm], reel 6.

\(^{42}\) The MBASD sought an injunction, and a judge ruled against the Police Commissioner, lifting the ban. “Detroit Censorship of Two Films Lifted,” 24 September 1937, ACLURB Papers, reel 141.

\(^{43}\) The Spanish consul, who visited the town to inquire about the attacks, reported on this event to the Ambassador in Washington. In the end, the meeting, sponsored by the Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Battalion, took place without interference. The film, however, was not shown, as the Committee had not secured a municipal permit. Miguel Pizarro to Fernando De los Ríos, 16 June 1937, AGA-MAE, Caja 12120.

\(^{44}\) Registration of relief organizations with the State Department was a requisite of the Neutrality law enacted on 1 May 1937. The law allowed for the solicitation and collection of funds to be used for humanitarian aid to Spain, provided the soliciting organizations were not acting on behalf of any governmental agency on either side of the conflict.
When the secretary of the Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Batallion, the group which had organized the Vacaville event, asked Cordell Hull to grant the release of those arrested and to reprimand the mayor, the Secretary of State responded that “local activities such as gatherings and meetings must be carried out in accordance with the police of the respective states and communities.” “It does not fall within the purview of the Department to interfere in matters of this nature,” Hull explained.45

Local conditions illustrated the polarization of the country, which was experiencing a mini-civil war of sorts. In Tampa, for example, only a few months before the war started in Spain, the city had made national headlines for the brutal flogging death of Joseph Shoemaker, a socialist organizer, by members of the Ku Klux Klan with the connivance of the police. In October 1936, violence erupted again when local police and Klansmen charged against a rally where Earl Browder, the presidential candidate of the Communist Party, was scheduled to speak.46 Spanish republicans and their sympathizers used these events to counter stereotypical explanations of the war in Spain as the outcome of the so-called “Spanish character.” Thus, when the editor of the Tampa Tribune remarked on the cruelty of the war, and attributed it to the “traits of the Spanish people . . . [who] are courageous, cruel, and proud,” a reader replied that she had “yet to read anything in Spain to equal the

45 Phil Bard to Cordell Hull, 8 June 1937; Cordell Hull to Phil Bard, 9 June 1937, NA, RG 59, LM74, 852.48/14 and 852.48/16. The American “Abraham Lincoln Brigade” was part of the foreign volunteer force that fought for the Republic in the International Brigades. Around 3,000 Americans joined the ALB; close to a third of them died in Spain.
46 Shoemaker was the last victim in a long tradition of vigilante violence by Tampa elites dating back to the nineteenth century. Robert P. Ingalls, Urban Vigilantes in the New South: Tampa, 1882-1936. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988).
brutality of the Shoemaker murder.” 47 Similarly, after the attacks on the Earl Browder rally, the editor of La Gaceta asked the Tribune’s editor, “would the enlightened Mr. Lambright … care to tell us whether yesterday’s aggression … falls also within the Spanish ‘savagery’ and ‘cruelty’?” 48

Part of the task of Republican officials and Loyalist supporters in the United States was to contest simplistic interpretations of the conflict and, perhaps more important, to fight against perceptions that the war in Spain was foreign to Americans. This proved a difficult undertaking, even among supposedly sympathetic audiences such as the labor movement. In November 1936, as Franco’s forces surrounded Madrid, Fernando de los Ríos, the Spanish Ambassador in Washington travelled to Tampa hoping to address the AFL convention meeting there. The Ambassador, however, was not allowed to address the labor assembly. 49 Neither was Isabel de Palencia, a Spanish congresswoman who had been designated as a fraternal delegate by the Spanish unions. 50 The two Spanish officials did speak to large crowds in events organized by the AFSD and the Spanish Comité Popular. De Palencia, a prominent Socialist feminist who had represented Spain at the League of Nations and was involved in the League of Women Against War and Fascism, also spoke at a luncheon

47 “Savagery in Spain,” TMT, 21 October 1936; “Spain, Russia, Tampa,” TMT, 22 November 1936.
48 “Chungas y no chungas,” La Gaceta, 26 October 1936, 1.
49 “Spanish Ambassador Due Here Today; Labor Deaf to His Plea for Support,” TMT, 19 November 1936, 6.
50 De Palencia had also served as fraternal delegate to the British Labour Party conference in Edinburgh in October, 1936. Half-Scottish herself, she addressed the conference in fluent English and so persuasively that the Party shifted its position and called for the abandonment of British Non-Intervention. According to Tom Buchanan, De Palencia’s powerful oratory led some in the audience to believe that they had listened to La Pasionaria, the famous Spanish Communist leader. Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 80. Isabel de Palencia, I Must Have Liberty (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940), 245-248.
organized in her honor by the women delegates to the AFL convention. Before leaving the United States for her new appointment as Ambassador to Sweden, she met Eleanor Roosevelt at the White House.\textsuperscript{51}

De Palencia had come to the United States as part of a delegation sent by the Republican government to garner support for the Republic in America. Beginning in Toronto, the delegation criss-crossed Canada and the United States for close to two months, under the auspices of the NACASD, raising over $100,000 for the Republic.\textsuperscript{52} The “wonderful enveloping feeling of universal brotherhood” that De Palencia and her companions experienced in their encounters with the American people, however, did not translate in a change of the governmental policy towards Spain.\textsuperscript{53} Despite the Roosevelts’ sympathies with the Loyalist cause, the administration maintained a policy of neutrality, born of domestic as well as international concerns.

Domestically, Roosevelt was careful not to alienate the Catholic vote and the powerful Pro-Franco Catholic hierarchy that defended the war as a Christian crusade against Communism.\textsuperscript{54} Catholics, however, were not a monolithic group. While the Catholic hierarchy was overwhelmingly on Franco’s side, Gallup polls conducted during the war indicated that 39% of Catholics were pro-Franco, 30% supported the

\textsuperscript{51} De Palencia, \textit{Liberty}, 250-259.
\textsuperscript{52} The delegation included Ex-minister Marcelino Domingo and Father Luis Sarasola, a Catholic priest. "$100,000 Raised in the U.S. and Canada for Spain,” \textit{NYT}, 30 December 1936, 13. Similar Republican delegations would visit the United States in the course of the war.
\textsuperscript{53} De Palencia, \textit{Liberty}, 258.
\textsuperscript{54} American Catholics were the strongest group among Franco apologists, a fact that the Republic tried to counter by including Catholic priests in the delegations they sent on speaking tours to the United States. Among these were Friar Luis Sarasola (1936), priests Michael O’Flannagan (1937) and Leocadio Lobo (1939), and Catholic writer and journalist José Bergamín (1938). These tours were sponsored by the NACASD. José M. Sánchez, “Suspended Priests and Suspect Catholics: Visitors from Loyalist Spain to America,” \textit{The Catholic Historical Review} 78, 2 (April 1992): 207-216.
Loyalists, and the remainder were neutral. Divisions existed even among the predominantly Francoist American Catholic hierarchy. Cardinal Mundelein, the archbishop of Chicago, was a particular thorn on the side of Franco’s supporters in America for his alleged sympathies for the Spanish “reds,” as well as his anti-Nazi stance.

Internationally, the Roosevelt administration followed the policies set up by Great Britain and France, which, in their desire to contain the war within Spanish borders, had set up a Non-Intervention committee to enforce an arms embargo on both sides. The embargo went against the basic tenets of international law which entitled a legitimate government to purchase arms to defend itself against aggression. Moreover, because Franco did receive massive military support from Italy and Germany, the policy only served to condemn the Republic by forcing her to seek the aid of the Soviet Union, and by further emboldening the Fascist powers. In an illuminating account of FDR’s response to the Spanish Civil War, Dominic Tierney documents how, in the aftermath of the Anschluss and the Munich Agreement, Roosevelt tried to shift American policy towards the Republic. The president even considered covert action (illegally sending planes to France for transport across the border). By then,

55 Guttmann, Wound in the Heart, 65.
56 Juan F. de Cárdenas denounced Mundelein’s anti-Franco behavior to Spanish Cardinal Gomá and suggested that Gomá bring it to the attention of the Holy See. Juan F. de Cárdenas to Cardenal Gomá, 8 February 1938, MAEAB, Legajo R-1004, Exp. 1. The Marques de Guisa, an Spanish aristocrat with ties to the Spanish church and who lived in the United States, also denounced Mundelein, and the New World, the official organ of the diocesis, on similar grounds to the Catholic hierarchy in the United States and Pope Pius XII. Correspondence in MAEAB, Legajo R-1004, Exp. 3.
57 On the NIC and foreign intervention in Spain see George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, Spain at War. The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939 (London: Logman, 1995), 188-207. FDR was also concerned about how the war in Spain would play out in Latin America. Richard P. Traina, American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), 144-157.
however, the Republic was in its last throes, and the situation not only in Spain, but in Europe as a whole, was rapidly deteriorating.\(^{58}\)

**The Spanish Civil War and the Spanish Diaspora in America**

Three days after the military coup, the *Tampa Tribune* commented that its effect on Tampa Spaniards would be minimal. “There are few Tampans in Spain now and those who are there went to the northern provinces, far from the scene of the revolt,” the paper stated.\(^{59}\) Developments would soon prove the newspaper wrong, as Tampa Spaniards, like those elsewhere in the country, were to organize in an unprecedented mobilization to support the Republic. The *Tribune*’s remark was based on an understandable misperception of events in the peninsula, but it also reflected a misunderstanding of the nature of the relationship between the immigrants and their homeland.

Local papers often recorded the summer travels of Tampa Spaniards to Europe. Many of these had become residents, in many cases citizens, of the United States, but their connections to the homeland remained strong as they still had relatives there. Some had even contemplated the possibility of returning to Spain, after working and saving some money in America. Emilio Viñas, for example, who had migrated to the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, returned to Spain in his mid-fifties in 1934. The civil war cut short his retirement in his native Galicia, one of the first regions to fall to Franco’s forces. Although Viñas was not affiliated to any political


party, he felt at risk because he was a freemason. He burned incriminating freemasonry documents fearing for his life, as “houses were searched daily,” he explained to *La Gaceta* once safely in Tampa.\(^{60}\) Lino Prida was not as fortunate. Like Viñas, Prida had emigrated to Tampa at the turn of the century. In the following years, he became a prosperous restaurant owner, but when Prohibition was passed, he decided to leave the United States with his bride and return to Spain. A Republican sympathizer, in 1932 he became the first republican mayor of his town in Asturias. When Franco’s forces were closing in on Asturias in 1937, Prida sent his wife and youngest daughter to France, hoping to join them with the rest of the family soon. His wife never made it to France, and ended up in a refugee camp in southern Spain. It was there that she learned that Prida had been killed in Asturias. The news came in a letter sent by her relatives in Tampa. The difficulties of communication between the two sides of the civil war made letters from America one of the few channels available for the family to keep abreast of what happened to the others.\(^{61}\) Cases like these illustrate why it was difficult for Spaniards abroad to remain “neutral” in the Spanish conflict.

Spanish immigrants were not the only ones following events in Spain, however. In fact, the wave of pro-Loyalist support expressed by American groups and

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60 “Emilio Viñas nos relata las atrocidades de la Falange Española y los militares en Pontevedra,” *La Gaceta*, 8 October 1936, 1. Franco’s hatred of freemasonry was only matched by his rabid anti-Communism. According to his most eminent biographer, the General “attributed the loss of empire in general and the 1898 disaster in particular to the collaboration of Spanish and North American freemasons.” Paul Preston, *Franco* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 323. The regime’s Law of Political Responsibilities considered membership in a masonic lodge or a left-wing political party a crime.

61 Mrs. Aida P. González (Lino Prida’s daughter), interview by author, 12 May 1997, Tampa, Florida, tape recording, SCWOHP, Tampa.
organizations contributed greatly to the mobilization of the immigrant community. As historian Lizabeth Cohen has indicated, the CIO labor movement emphasized commonalities among workers. It strove to “create a culture of unity that brought workers of different sexes, races, nationalities, and locales together.”

The war in Spain, therefore, allowed Spanish immigrants to forge new connections and new identities, not only as Spaniards, but also as Spanish-American workers.

A manifesto of the Comité Antifascista Español, a New York Pro-Loyalist organization, written in response to a letter published in La Prensa, illustrates this transformation. The letter disapproved of CAE’s militancy and accused it of dividing the Spanish community on the issue of the war. The CAE, for its part, claimed that whatever differences existed within the community reflected standing social divisions within the colony, between “the exploited, and the exploiter, the privileged and the slave, the reactionary and the free man.” The CAE also challenged La Prensa’s understanding of the role of the diaspora. The paper had argued that, as foreigners, Spaniards should not bring the political problems of their country to the United States. The CAE, on the other hand, asserted that being a resident alien did not mean “being a meek pariah without the right to think and to feel.” The CAE also reminded La Prensa that it had opened its columns to the discussion of political problems in other countries. Against the limited political role of the diaspora espoused by the newspaper, the CAE embraced a transnational identity both as Spaniards, and as workers. “As workers who wish to be free, where we had been born and wherever we reside,”

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62 Cohen, Making a New Deal, 333.
CAE stated, “we must join those who, being workers like ourselves, feel the same desire for liberation.”  

What happened in New York was being reproduced elsewhere in the United States where there were Spanish communities. In Tampa, too, the Spanish mutual aid societies, whose bylaws forbade discussion of political matters, were at first reluctant to take sides in the conflict. Initially, they cancelled their summer festivals as a sign of mourning for those killed in the war, but, by September, the Centro Español had decided instead to celebrate its annual festival and send the proceeds to the Spanish Red Cross. Its leaders were careful to point out that this was not a political act but just an extension of the society’s humanitarian work. As evidence of foreign intervention in the war mounted, however, the Centros became more open in their support for the Republic. The bombing of Guernica by the German Condor Legion was a turning point. Following the bombing, the Centro Asturiano declared that the conflict in Spain was a “war of national independence” and that the Loyalists were defending a Constitution “analogous in its democratic principles” to the American one. The Centro Español voted on a five-point declaration which condemned “the rebellion of the [Spanish] Fascist military” and “the invasion of Spain by International Fascism.”

A long tradition of labor mobilization in the cigar industry combined with the antifascism of the Italian and Cuban colonies to create an upswell of support for the Republic within the immigrant community. As soon as the Comité Popular was

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63 “De nuestros lectores,” La Prensa, 28, 29, July 1936, 6; Comité Antifascista Español, Manifiesto a todas las sociedades, grupos e individuos de la colonia Española e Hispanoamericana, AGA-MAE, Caja 4380.

64 “Se declaró antifascista la sociedad Centro Español,” La Gaceta, 6 May 1937, 1; “La Sociedad Centro Asturiano se declaró antifascista,” La Gaceta, 11 May 1937, 1.
established at the beginning of August, 1936, collections in the cigar factories and fundraising rallies and festivals began. A week after its founding, the Comité had sent $5,400 to Spain. Weekly collections in the factories continued throughout the war, and were complemented with collections at commercial establishments as well. Nickel-and-dime cash donations, which reached close to $200,000 dollars in Tampa alone by the end of the war, were just one of the aspects of this Republican support. Equally important were medical aid, food and clothing. In the course of the war, the Tampa Comité sent to Spain four ambulances as well as medical equipment and medicines. It also mailed thousands of cans of food and over twenty tons of clothing, as well as thousands of cigars for soldiers at the front.65

While the Tampa Committee may have been one of the most successful organizations, similar groups sprung up throughout the country. In San Francisco, Spaniards organized the Acción Demócrata Española, with branches in surrounding communities, where most Spaniards worked in agriculture. The Spanish Consul, pointed out the connection between the foundation of this group and the New Deal movement. He explained that its name, Democratic Action, was an “unconscious influence of the campaign to reelect President Roosevelt, contemporaneous with its establishment [in 1936].” In Los Angeles, an “antifascist” group with anarchist leanings published the newspaper El Antifascista.66

65 For a discussion of the activities of the Tampa Popular Comitee see Ana Varela-Lago, “¡No Pasarán! The Spanish Civil War’s Impact on Tampa’s Latin Community, 1936-1939,” Tampa Bay History 19, 2 (1997): 5-35.
66 Miguel Pizarro to Estado, 14 August 1938, AGA-MAE, Caja 12120.
In New York, too, the Spanish war led to the creation of new organs of communication within the community. *Frente Popular*, the organ of the *Sociedades Hispánicas Confederadas*, began publication on May 1, 1937. Its first issue had served a commemorative purpose, as shown in the masthead’s ambiguous reference to its periodicity, “sale cuando es necesario” (it will be published as needed). In fact, the next issue did not come out until more than a month later. But, from then on, the 12 page-newspaper appeared regularly every ten to fifteen days, eventually becoming a 16-page weekly, filled with news of Spain and the Hispanic Societies in the United States. Beginning on July 19, 1937, the activities of the colony were also showcased on the pages of a new Spanish daily, *La Voz*, whose reports extended to the broader Hispanic community, and the Iberian world. Its Portuguese-language section featured news from Portugal, Brazil and Madeira as well as Portuguese-Americans in the New York metropolitan area. The founding of this self-proclaimed “diario democrático avanzado” was a response to the alleged lukewarm support for the Spanish Republic by the erstwhile organ of the colony, the daily *La Prensa*.

The pages of *Frente Popular* offer a window into the structure of the *Sociedades Hispánicas Confederadas*, a federation of Spanish societies that channeled support for the Republic, and unveil a vibrant associational life within the community. SHC’s affiliates ran the whole gamut of organizations, from the traditional social clubs and mutual aid societies to political groups and workers’ associations. In the past, this type of segmentation would have been stigmatized as fostering divisions and draining immigrant resources. Yet, the federated nature of the SHC proved effective to the task at hand. In fact, in 1937, the Hispanic Societies celebrated an unprecedented event in
the history of the community: a national congress where delegates from Spanish societies throughout the country met to discuss problems and decide on future courses of action. This is not to say that internal divisions had disappeared. But, as one of the organizers of the congress explained, in the process of working together for the Republic “a true revolution has taken place . . . The unity of the [Hispanic] colony.” The records of the national conference also illustrate another “revolution” of sorts, the presence of women among the delegates. More than ever before, the unity of the colony came to signify too a gender and generational unity that encompassed not only men, but women and children as well.67

“Mothers and Women of the World!”

In her study of 1920s Greenwich Village, Caroline F. Ware painted a grim picture of the Spanish immigrant community, and particularly of the small group of women within it. “The completely subordinate position of the women, the fact that their only sphere of activity was the home, and their subjection to the authority of the men was very generally accepted,” Ware wrote. As to Spanish women’s relations with American society, Ware explained,

No outside agencies had touched these Spanish women in the way that they had reached the Italian women to upset their traditional status and traditional attitudes . . . As far as the women were concerned, the American community might almost as well not exist.68

The war in Spain was to challenge this image of female isolation.

68 Ware, Greenwich Village, 230, 231.
In the summer of 1936, Dolores Ibarruri, the communist leader known as “Pasionaria” for her fiery oratory, appealed to women in America and the world to help feed and clothe the children of Spain, left behind while “often one or both parents are at the front.” These were the days of the heroic defense of Madrid that captured the imagination of the Left everywhere. Militia units from the unions and working class parties helped Republican forces to hold the capital. Spanish women donned dungarees and joined the militiamen in the trenches. ¡No pasarán! (They shall not pass!) was the watchword (see Figure 9). By November 1936, as the situation grew from a military rebellion into a full-fledged war, women were relegated to the rearguard. Yet, the image of the miliciana continued to have a powerful hold on the popular imagination, and it was recreated many times at events organized by the Spanish diaspora in America. At pro-Loyalist picnics, Tampa Spanish children in their miliciano outfits paraded under a banner honoring Francisca Solana, a miliciana killed in Spain (see Figure 10). Choruses of milicianas, such as New York’s Juventud Libertaria Hijas de España (Daughters of Spain’s Libertarian Youth) organized and participated in festivals for the Republic, singing revolutionary songs of the war.70

Historian Elizabeth Faue has stated that in the ideology of the Popular Front these “icons of militant motherhood coexisted with images of female victimization.”71 In Spain, too, women were portrayed as both innocent victims protecting their suckling babies from Fascist bombers and brave Republican citizens taking arms to

69 “U.S. Women Urged to Aid Victims of Spanish Civil War,” TMT, 9 September 1936, 2.
70 Many of these songs were composed by local musicians, such as the hugely popular “No Pasarán!” a sort of Hymn of the Spanish Popular Front in the United States, written by Leopoldo González, a Spanish cigar-worker from Tampa who had moved to New York in the 1930s.
71 Faue, Community of Suffering & Struggle, 83.
defend their country against foreign invaders. Spanish women were both mothers and soldiers. In fact, they were soldiers because they were mothers. They appealed to this sense of motherhood to seek aid from “mothers and women of the world,” because motherhood knew no boundaries, motherhood was above politics. In November 1938, as Spaniards entered the third winter of the war, the mothers of Loyalist Spain pleaded, “No matter what your point of view may be, no matter whether you believe our fight is right or wrong -before everything, be mothers. . . Don’t let our children perish of hunger and cold.”  

Spanish women in the United States responded to these calls enthusiastically, creating Comités Femeninos to collect money, food and clothing for the children of Loyalist Spain, and achieving a visibility they had never had before. “We are poor, working class women, from Spain and Latin America,” read the flyer of the Bronx Agrupación de Mujeres Antifascistas (AMA) which advertised its upcoming festival to benefit Spanish children.  

AMA was one of the many committees affiliated with Comités Femeninos Unidos, an organization established by Ernestina González, a prominent Spanish leader whose American husband had been killed in Spain. Young women, too, dressed in white nurse outfits with sashes with the Republican colors, helped the women of the Comités Femeninos.

Pro-Loyalist women led boycott campaigns against products from Germany, Italy, Japan and the areas of Spain held by Franco. They also organized

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73 Agrupación de Mujeres Antifascistas, Circular attached to letter from AMA to Antonio de la Cruz Marín, Spanish Consul General in New York, 26 November 1938. AGA-MAE, Caja 4380.
74 “Spanish Heroine in U.S. Asks Aid for Defenders,” DW, 13 April 1937, 7; “U.S. Engineer Dies in Spain,” DW, 19 October 1936, 1.
demonstrations in support of the Republic. In 1938, eight hundred Spanish-American women, representing the CFU, marched to Washington to request that the State Department lift the arms embargo on Spain. In Tampa, following the bombing of Guernica, a group of female cigar workers led five thousand demonstrators to City Hall and asked the mayor to protest the bombing of open cities and to request that president Roosevelt lift the arms embargo against the Republic.

As mothers, Spanish women also played a key role in educating their children, future American citizens, into the values of democracy. Spanish-American children were prominent in public demonstrations of support for the Republic, whether carrying banners in parades, or singing the Republican Anthem and militant songs at pro-Republic events. Their mothers, no doubt, sewed the *miliciano* uniforms they wore at those gatherings. In Tampa, in 1938, a children’s group participated in the Labor Day parade, carrying American flags and placards that read: “Stop Hitler and Mussolini,” and “Help Democracy Defeat Fascism.” Latin mothers also removed their children from Catholic schools to protest the Church’s support of Franco.75

The intense activism of Spanish immigrants in support of the Spanish Republic troubled some of their neighbors, who accused them of disloyalty to their adopted country. “It seems to me the time has come to teach some of our citizens of Spanish descent that both charity and patriotism should begin at home,” read a letter to the *Tampa Tribune*. Indeed, many Tampans were shocked at the sums that, in the midst of the Depression, unemployed Latin cigarmakers were sending to Spain. By 1938, the

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Tampa Committee had collected over $100,000. This, according to the reader, was
“more than the city can raise in a Community chest campaign.”

“A Tampa Latin” reminded his Anglo neighbors of the philanthropic work of the Spanish immigrants in
the community, and asked: “if as a peace and liberty-loving people, at a time when the
land of their fathers is being invaded by war-mad dictators, they rally and make
sacrifices for its support, are they to be censored?” Rather than a reflection of the
immigrants’ alleged un-Americanism, the work of the Popular Committee fit squarely
within the tradition of American patriotism. As “A Loyalist” put it, “The same echoes
that resounded from Bunker Hill during the American Revolution are now heard in the
Spanish Pyrenees.”

The remark illustrates how the Spanish Civil War, and the
Popular Front culture of which it was a part, contributed to the Americanization of the
Spanish immigrants.

The Spanish Civil War and the Americanization of the second generation

As historian Maurice Isserman has indicated, the culture of the Popular Front
“provided a bridge by which the children of immigrants could adapt themselves to the
culture of the New World without renouncing the ideals that had sustained their
parents in the move from the Old.”

This was particularly the case among Spanish-
Americans, as children were an integral part of the activities of the Pro-Loyalist
organizations. For many of these American-born children, the events of solidarity with

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78 Maurice Isserman, *Which Side Were You On? The American Communist Party During the Second
the Spanish Republic marked their first contact with the traditions of the land of their parents as well as their first involvement with American politics. “I became involved in something outside of here, the United States,” recalls Joaquín de La Llana, “and something that I put my heart into—the Spanish Republic, and it made me a little closer to Spain.” “The war in Spain . . . was something that you almost lived with every day,” remembered Amalia Owens, a young woman at the time, “and it colored a lot of the things that you did.”

The Spanish Civil War contributed to shaping a new sense of identity among the Spanish-American youth. For seventeen-year-old José Yglesias, a recent transplant from Tampa, the multitudinous inter-ethnic pro-Loyalist meetings at Madison Square Garden were a revelation. “I thought the top of my head would come off,” the author recalled decades later in one of his writings, “to see that enormous gathering come to its feet during the playing of the Himno de Riego [the Republican anthem] and again when Fernando de los Ríos, the Republic’s ambassador in Washington, got up to speak. Incredible!” Yglesias, who was struggling with his Spanish-Cuban heritage and had just considered changing his name to the more American-sounding “Moran” in order to get a dishwasher’s job at a local restaurant, experienced a newfound pride that


80 One such meeting, a festival co-sponsored by SHC and the NACASD to commemorate the first year of the war, illustrates this diversity. Presided over by Congressman Jerry J. O’Connell, the speakers included the Spanish Minister Plenipotentiary, Enrique Carlos de la Casa; Norman Thomas (American Socialist Party); Earl Browder (American Communist Party); Congressman Vito Marcantonio; African-American communist leader Angelo Herndon; and anti-fascist representatives from Germany, Italy and Portugal. In between speeches, ensembles of singing choirs, dancers and performers treated the audience of twenty-two thousand to a sample of Spanish folk dances and “revolutionary” hymns, including the memorable “No Pasarán!” “22,000 Here Mark Spanish War Date,” *NYT*, 20 July 1937, 12; “El Monumental Mitin celebrado el 19 de julio…” *FP*, 1 August 1937, 1.
gave him the strength to face the pressures of assimilation. In 1937, he realized, “Spaniards were heroes . . . and that made me take pride in whatever Spanish heritage I could claim.”

Michael Denning, borrowing a term from Raymond Williams, describes the Popular Front as a “structure of feeling,” “a political and cultural charter for a generation.” This was perhaps even more so for second generation Spanish-Americans. It was at this time that Yglesias began to read Spanish, “a language [he] had refused to study in high school,” and to study the history of Spain. He also became interested in American writers, especially those who supported the Loyalists. “It was through Spain that I, like many of my generation, began to know and judge the world,” he wrote. While Yglesias was becoming acquainted with the readings of Ernest Hemingway, another second-generation Spanish-American writer, Brooklynite Prudencio de Pereda, was working with Hemingway in the production of *Spain in Flames*, one of several documentaries and films produced on the war in Spain.

Brooklyn was also the home of *Juventudes Españolas* (Spanish Youth Association), an organization founded in 1937 by a group of American-born children of Hispanic parents. Among the activities offered by *Juventudes* to the Spanish colony were English classes, lectures, and theater plays. *Juventudes* also published a homemade mimeographed monthly called *Luz* (Light). The only extant issue of *Luz*

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83 Yglesias, “Bittersweet.” On José Yglesias’s life and work, see the special issue of *Tampa Bay History* 18, 1 (1996).
84 De Pereda’s writing career would be marked by the war in Spain. See, for example, his powerful *Fiesta. A novel of Modern Spain* (New York: A. A. Wyn, Inc., 1953).
85 “Spanish Youth Association,” *FP*, 30 September 1937, 9. The organization was linked to the Spanish society *Ateneo Hispano*. 
underlined the novelty of their organization. “The members and friends of JUVENTUDES ESPAÑOLAS and of its modest bulletin must realize that our organization is sailing upon uncharted seas,” they wrote in the English supplement to the bulletin. “We are in the process of creating something new, something unprecedented . . . a bilingual magazine of interest to both Spanish and English readers.” While I have found no evidence as to whether this project came to fruition, its mere conception illuminates how the Spanish Civil War and the 1930s Popular Front culture shaped the experience of young Spanish-Americans in the United States.

In particular, Luz’s issue illustrates how second-generation Spaniards struggled with the divisions that were renting the country of their parents and that were manifesting themselves in the diaspora as well. An article titled, “For the Antifascist Union,” reproduced the text of a speech delivered by a delegate of the Juventudes to the SHC assembly, where he called on Anarchists and Communists to set aside their differences and to continue working together for Loyalist Spain. In “Building Democracy,” a regretful member of the Juventudes apologized for his “improper behavior” at a recent meeting, and wrote about the need to “practice democratic principles” in the society, rather than “dictatorial methods.” “Try sometime to force yourself to relinquish a point . . . that you are ‘dead set on,’” he suggested, “and feel the tremendous satisfaction of being able to ‘take it’ at the expense of your own ego.” The emphasis of young Spanish-Americans on maintaining unity and pursuing democratic methods within the colony was also complemented by their opening to

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87 “Por la unión antifascista,” Luz, February 1938, [8]; “Building Democracy,” Luz, February 1938, [16].
other antifascist struggles and the community at large. Thus, in “Life goes onward,” a member of the Juventudes reported on his participation in a meeting organized by the American League for Peace and Democracy to discuss whether a boycott of Japanese products would help China. The article reveals how ill at ease the young Spaniard felt in that forum,

The hall, situated in the aristocratic Brooklyn Heights section, was filled with ‘stuffed shirts’ of the Sunday Church Parish variety. Upon entering these noble portals, I wondered if it were possible that humble ‘I’ could tell these noble people anything that they did not already know. 88

Despite this uneasiness, the Juventud delegate was able to express his opinion (in favor of the boycott), and to offer his readers a summary of the positions taken by the main speakers at the event.

The calls for unity emanating from Luz and other Pro-Loyalist publications reveal that these organizations were fraught with internal division. Yet, despite their differences, they managed to maintain a united front throughout the war. What accounts for this overwhelming support for the Republic? While the Spanish Civil war, as seen from abroad, was often portrayed as the battleground of the struggle between two international and “modern” movements, Fascism and Communism, the Republican discourse directed to Spaniards in America emphasized the long-lasting internal strife between the so-called “two Spains ” and played into the personal experiences of the immigrants. A flyer printed by the Círculo Republicano Español in Cuba seeking contributions for war victims and milicianos illustrates this argument (see Figure 11). The center of the page shows a teen-age Spanish peasant, a black

88 “Life goes onward,” Luz, February 1938, [15].
beret on his head and hempen sandals (*alpargatas*) covering his feet, standing on a harbor, a small suitcase by his side, waiting the arrival of an approaching transatlantic ship which, we assume, will take him to America. Above the figure, in bold letters, a question and a reminder: “¿Te acuerdas? ¡Este eras tú!” (Do you remember? This was you!). The text then recounts the causes that forced the young man to leave Spain: the back-breaking toiling in the fields, the stark poverty, the prospect of being drafted and killed fighting in Morocco, and, above all, the sense of oppression and alienation felt before the “drunken señoritos, Spaniards like you, who never conceived of you as a Spaniard like them.” “You left your homeland,” the flyer continued, “seeking in the democratic nations of America what you were denied by the priest and the cacique (political boss): the condition and the opportunities of a free man.”

In the graphic summary of Spanish history described in the flyer, Franco and his supporters represented “the old Spain of the fascist military, rotten with conventionalism, annihilated by the carrion of her stultified clergy and her idle and vicious nobility.” The Loyalists, in turn, defended a new Spain “vigorous, free and sovereign, offering opportunity and equality to all her children.” Included among all her children were the emigrants themselves, who in this narrative had been forced into exile, expelled by a Spain where wealthy señoritos, priests and caciques reigned supreme. These were the same forces now confronting the Loyalists, the flyer explained, as it exhorted the emigrants to “reread the blurred pages of the sad book of

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89 “¿Te acuerdas? ¡Este eras tú!” Círculo Republicano Español (Habana), Centro Español Papers, USFLSC.
your life as an expatriate and help them.”

Franco’s supporters, of course, held a more positive view of what they stood for. Like the pro-Loyalists, they, too, tried to appeal to American public opinion, often drawing from the same sets of symbols.

**Nationalist Spain and the Spanish diaspora in the United States**

Spanish support for Franco in the United States was organized around Juan Francisco de Cárdenas, who had served as Spanish Ambassador to Washington during the Republic. Following the military uprising, Cárdenas resigned his Ambassadorship in France and moved to the United States. In New York, he led the *Junta de Defensa Nacional*, an organization founded by Franco’s supporters to collect money for Nationalist Spain and to counteract pro-Loyalist propaganda. When Cárdenas was appointed official representative of the Francoist Nationalist Government in the United States, the group dissolved, and a new organization, the *Casa de España*, was established. The *Casa* began operations in May 1937, with thirty-five members. From it sprang also the National Spanish Relief Association, which raised funds for civilians in Franco’s Spain through the *Auxilio Social* (Social Aid).

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90 Ibid.

91 The polarization of the immigrant community mirrored the experience of Spanish immigrants in other American countries. Its manifestation, however, varied with the local conditions of the particular country. For an overview of the continent’s response to the Spanish Civil war see Mark Falcoff and Fredrick B. Pike, eds. *The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39. American Hemispheric Perspectives* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). For specific studies of Latin American countries see, for example, the illuminating works by Consuelo Naranjo (Cuba), Mónica Quijada (Argentina), and Mario Ojeda (Mexico). Consuelo Naranjo Orovio, *Cuba: Otro escenario de lucha. La guerra civil y el exilio republicano español* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1988); Mónica Quijada, *Aires de República, Aires de Cruzada: La Guerra civil española en Argentina* (Barcelona: Sendai, 1991); Mario Ojeda Revah, *México y la Guerra civil española* (Madrid: Turner, 2004).

92 As happened in other countries, Franco’s supporters were among the wealthiest members of the Spanish immigrant community. Emilio González, the head of an export company in New York and
Although a year after its foundation the *Casa de España* membership had increased tenfold, its numbers remained low. A letter written by the head of the society, Ramón Castroviejo, to a Falangist friend, reveals the difficulties faced by Franco’s supporters in America. “I am absolutely convinced that the United States is the worst country in the world for the Spanish National cause,” Castroviejo wrote. He offered a laundry list of reasons to back his assertion. These included: the enmity of the Roosevelt administration; Jewish support for the Loyalists and Jewish influence on American politics and media; the power of Communist, Socialist, and Liberal propaganda; the reluctance (even cowardice) of American conservatives to support the Nationalist cause for fear of reprisals; and the strong anti-Catholic sentiment prevalent in the United States. The latter, one might add, represented a legacy of the Protestant-inspired black legend.

To counter these trends, the Nationalist government established an Office of Press and Propaganda in New York and edited several pro-Nationalist publications (*Cara al Sol*, *Epoca*, and *Spain*). It also produced leaflets and other printed materials that presented Spain’s National Movement in a positive light appealing to Americans. In fact, in these publications Franco was often portrayed as a defender of American values. In 1938, for example, the weekly *Cara al Sol* decried that the American volunteers of the International Brigades had chosen the names of Abraham Lincoln and George Washington for their battalions. According to the paper’s editor, president of the National Spanish Relief Association, donated over $40,000 to Franco Spain. Juan F. de Cárdenas to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 14 February 1939, AGA-MAE, Caja 8896.

93 Ramón Castroviejo to Val (Valentín de Mollinedo), 3 September 1927, AGA-PG, SGM, DNSE, EE.UU. Castroviejo was a renowned Spanish ophthalmologist. He had moved to the United States in 1928.

the volunteers represented “everything that was contrary to what these great American patriots stood for.” In Cara al Sol’s rewriting of history, it was the Spanish General who embodied the values of these two iconic American presidents. Like Washington, Franco was “a ‘rebel’ against a tyrannical, despotic and oppressive government.” Like Lincoln, who had fought a civil war to preserve the Union against Southern secession, Franco was fighting “against the dismembering of the Fatherland” by Basque and Catalan separatism.95

Despite these efforts to place Franco squarely within the tradition of American democracy, the Nationalist discourse suffered from its reactionary slant and its traditionalist rhetoric. It was easier to know what Franco was against than it was to know what he was for. As Allen Guttmann pointed out, his supporters often failed to make the case for “the positive achievements of General Franco’s rule.”96 Despite the Movimiento’s discourse on the Nueva España, what prevailed in the Nationalist narrative was an emphasis on a return to the past, a past that many Americans associated with images of economic backwardness and cultural and religious intolerance.

Loyalists, such as Ambassador Fernando de los Ríos, played deftly with the rich imagery of the black legend to reinforce such sentiment and to denounce the regime before the American public. “What does the assault of the Spanish rebels

95 Cara al Sol, 12 February 1938, 1. Cara al Sol (Facing the sun) was the title of the anthem of the Falange, the Spanish Fascist Party.
96 Guttmann, Wound in the Heart, 25. The difficulty of the Francoist publications in the United States to make the regime appealing to Americans reflected also the absence of clear guidelines emanating from the Franco government as well as internal divisions within the movement. For the case of Spain, see Marta Rey García, “La creación de la imagen de Franco y su nuevo Estado en Norteamérica: Spain,” Anuario del Departamento de Historia 5 (1993): 57-69.
against the Spanish people signify?” De los Ríos asked. “Nothing new in Spain,” he replied, “but rather a return to the directing forces of the political life of Spain in the Sixteenth century: intolerance, absolute control over the speech, thought and conscience of the people; and the restoration of a feudal social-economic structure by means of an absolutist regime imposing itself through terror.”

Franco’s traditionalism, however, did help to protect him to some degree from the accusations that he was just a puppet of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. In 1938, for example, Life printed a photograph of Franco seated on a medieval throne. The caption explained that Spain’s totalitarian state would differ from those of Germany and Italy because “Franco’s agrarian Spain is deeply traditionalist, deeply Catholic.” Commenting on the photograph in a dispatch to the government in Barcelona, the Spanish consul in San Francisco stated that this was the most effective argument being used by Franco’s supporters in America. The Movimiento was not Fascism; rather, it was a peculiarly and historically Spanish movement. These perceptions of Spain’s Catholicism and traditionalism, the consul explained, were “very dear to the aristocratizing fantasies of the [United States].”

Indeed, this seemed particularly applicable to California, whose “fantasy past” heritage had been built on those premises. After New York, California was the state with the most active pro-Franco Spanish organization. In May 1937, a Nationalist “Spanish Relief Committee” was established in San Francisco. Among its members

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98 “Franco Enthroned,” Life, 23 May 1938, 34.
99 Miguel Pizarro to Estado (Barcelona), 3 June 1938, AGA-MAE, Caja 12120.
were Antonio Rodríguez Martín, a retired Spanish Captain, who had served as viceconsul before the coup, and Aurelio M. Espinosa, a prominent Hispanist and professor at Stanford. Espinosa had authored one of the propaganda booklets of the Committee. His son, José Manuel, translated to English the biography of Francisco Franco by Joaquín Arrarás. The SRC, whose President was the Dean of San Francisco Cathedral, counted among its members a number of Spanish and American Catholic priests.

Los Angeles, too, had a Casa de España and a colorful aristocratic leader, the Marqués de Guisa. Unhappy with the perceived diplomatic tepidity of Cárdenas, the Marqués tried, unsuccessfully, to use his connections in the State Department to establish a Francoist consular system in America, even thought the United States had not recognized the rebels. Later, claiming to be acting on behalf of the Spaniards left unprotected by the closure of the Republican consulates, he appointed himself Spanish consul in Los Angeles. Among the many ideas he had for his “administration” was to blacklist all those in Hollywood who had supported the Republic, so that their films would not be shown in the New Spain.

The tension between Cárdenas and the Marquis was not unique. The records of the correspondence of these Francoists groups reveal that besides the difficulties pointed out by Castroviejo in his letter, the internal divisions within the Nationalist camp also posed a challenge to their efforts to garner support for Franco in the United

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101 A report on the activities of the SRC is attached to a letter from Juan F. de Cárdenas to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 18 May 1939, MAEAB, Legajo R-1004, Exp. 5.
102 Correspondence related to the Maqués de Guisa can be found in MAEAB, Legajo R-1004, Exp. 3.
States. These conflicts came to a head in 1937, when the *Falange Exterior* Service began an aggressive campaign to establish Falange branches in the Americas. The head of the FE in Spain, José del Castaño, was aware of the particularities of the American setting. He anticipated, for example, that they would not be able to operate openly as a pro-Fascist organization in the United States. He asked Cárdenas for information on how Italians and Germans were dealing with the anti-Fascist sentiment in America, so that Falangists could learn from their experience.\footnote{José Del Castaño to Juan F. de Cárdenas, 20 January 1938. AGA-MAE, Caja 8663. On the expansion of the Falange in the American continent see Allan Chase, *Falange: The Axis Secret Army in the Americas* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1943). On the Spanish Falange in the United States see Francisco A. Blanco Moral, “Proyección de la Falange en Estados Unidos (1936-1939), in *Revisión de la guerra civil española,* eds. Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza and Luis Eugenio Togores (Madrid: Actas Editorial, 2002), 973-983.}

Del Castaño also suggested to the appointed *jefe* of the Falange in New York, José Perignat, that he register the association under a more palatable name, such as “Spanish Workers’ Aid Society.” He also admitted that they would not use the same paraphernalia (uniform, salutes, etc.) that they used in Spain or in other countries.\footnote{José del Castaño to José Perignat, 30 September 1938, AGA-PG, SGM, DNSE, EE.UU. In San Francisco, too, the ex-vice-consul, Marcos Gracia, organized a Falange group called *Renovación Española* (Spanish Renewal). In other places, they received the names of historical figures associated with the time of the conquest of America, such as Club Hernando de Soto (Tampa), or Club Isabel y Fernando (Washington).}

Even with all these precautions, the Falange faced important challenges in America. Some had to do with the clash of personalities. Thus, the person appointed to head the Falange in New York, José Perignat, was a young and inexperienced man, apparently unable to rally the community behind him, unlike the better-known and well-liked Castroviejo. Behind those conflicts, however, lay different conceptions of Spain and Spanish identity. Many supporters of Franco, in fact, had hoped that he
would reestablish the monarchy, and become, perhaps, a second Primo de Rivera. They were not prepared for a Fascist regime. As Castroviejo acknowledged in a letter to Castaño, many of his coreligionists supported Franco but had not yet “digested the doctrine of the Falange.” In his own correspondence with Perignat, Castaño stated that Spaniards abroad did not appreciate the authoritarian methods of the Falange because they had not experienced the war and the National Movement. Spaniards in the United States were also influenced by an environment of “false democracy.”

Del Castaño’s calls to Perignat to establish delegations in other states met with limited results. By 1938, even Castroviejo broke with the Falange, blaming Perignat for the divisions of the colony. Del Castaño conceded that he had failed in New York.

Despite American recognition of the Franco regime, things did not improve with the end of the war in Spain, as Del Castaño had hoped. If anything, the beginning of World War II only made matters worse. In February 1940, Cárdenas advised Spanish Falange officials to lay low, fearing that Falange activities would only create problems with American authorities and further divide the pro-Franco Spanish community. A year later, in November 1941, Cárdenas wrote to Serrano Suñer, Franco’s brother-in-law and Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the same vein. Ironically, the success of the Falange in Latin America had made the situation in the United States even more precarious for these Spaniards, as the administration now suspected Falangists of wanting to introduce totalitarianism into the continent. In the summer of 1941, a concerned American consul in Vigo reported to the State Department

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105 José del Castaño to José Perignat, 10 November 1938, AGA-PG, SGM, DNSE, EE.UU.
106 Ramón Castroviejo to José Perignat, 21 September 1938; Ramón Castroviejo to José Del Castaño, 30 September, 1938, AGA-PG, SGM, DNSE, EE.UU.
newspaper accounts that a Galician resident of New York had sent to the *Casa de España* five roses taken from the tomb of Falangist leader, José Antonio Primo de Rivera.\(^{107}\) The local Falangist press explained that the roses symbolized Falange’s call for the “resurrection of a so-called ‘Empire of Hispanicism.’” Given the immigrant’s connection to Falange, the Consul suggested that a renewal of his reentry permit to the United States be examined with care.\(^{108}\)

The entrance of the United States in the War was the nail in the coffin for Falangism in the United States. The *Casa de España* was quietly dismantled after the resignation of its president, Marcelino García. The last meeting took place in the aftermath of Pearl Harbour. In it, the speaker reminded the small gathering that the institution had been created to help establish in Spain “something similar, if not identical to what the fighters for American independence and the Bill of Rights had fought for, the basis of civil liberties.”\(^{109}\) He explained that the members had decided to suspend the club’s activities in order to show their loyalty to their adopted country. It is telling that one of the last decisions of the *Casa de España*’s decimated assembly

\(^{107}\) José Antonio, the eldest son of General Miguel Primo de Rivera, founded the Falange party in 1933. He was executed by the Popular Front on November 20, 1936. Upon Franco’s victory, his remains were taken to the monastery of El Escorial. They would later be transferred to the Valley of the Fallen, Franco’s monument to the Fallen in the Civil War. On November 19, 1939, the *Casa de España* offered a funeral mass for the Falangist leader in the church of the Santa Agonía in New York. Francisco Larcegui to Juan F. de Cárdenas, 14 November 1939, AGA-MAE, Caja 8835.

\(^{108}\) George J. Haering to the Secretary of State, 8 July 1941, NA, RG 84, Vigo Consulate, Box 2. The State Department did not have a clear policy in the granting of visas to members of the Falange. Internal documentation indicates that they tried to distinguish between those whose membership was “of a perfunctory character” and those who appeared to be prominent in the movement. Their main goal was to guarantee that their admission in the country would not be “prejudicial to the public interest.” In 1946, a confidential circular letter from the American Embassy in Madrid to its consulates in Spain explained that “the mere fact of Falange membership is not in itself sufficient justification for refusal of a visa.” Circular Letter No. 138, 4 October 1946, NA, RG 84, Consulate Vigo, Box 9.

\(^{109}\) Francisco Larcegui, 20 December 1941, AGA-MAE, Caja 8835.
was to offer its remaining funds not to Spain but to the United States.¹¹⁰ They too, if perhaps for reasons different than those affecting pro-Loyalists, had become Americanized in the process of helping the Homeland.¹¹¹

Conclusion

In 1933, Juan Cueto, a Spanish military officer who had taught Spanish at Columbia in the 1920s, wrote that one of the main characteristics of the Spaniard was “a paradoxical mixture of localism and universalism.” Cueto described his compatriots as “innately antinationalists.”¹¹² Spanish immigrants in the late 1930s proved to be antinacionalistas in more ways than Cueto had anticipated, as the term nacionalista was appropriated by General Franco and its supporters to define their view of Spain. Moreover, the structure and organization of the Sociedades Hispanas Confederadas, the loose confederation of a myriad of small local organizations joined in a common effort to destroy international Fascism, illustrates nicely Cueto’s assertion.

At the same time, the war in Spain created an unprecedented national mobilization in the diaspora. This was due, in part, to the portrayal of the conflict, by Loyalists as well as Nationalists, as a war of national independence against foreign invaders (Fascists and Communists). The creation of Sociedades Hispanas

¹¹⁰ Larcegui, 20 December 1941, Espinós (same date), AGA-MAE, Caja 8835. $200 to the American Red Cross, $1,500 to purchase American war bonds. $100 left to reestablish the Casa when circumstances would change.

¹¹¹ Already in 1937, some members of the Nationalist community, like Marcelino García and Manuel Díaz, denounced as Franco spies by Senator Nye, had decided to become American citizens. Cárdenas reported to Spain that this was their “only means to defend their interests in this country.” García and Díaz had lived in the United States for 35 and 30 years respectively. Cárdenas to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 October 1938, MAE R-1004. Exp. 3.

¹¹² Juan Cueto, Cuentos al nuncio. Sobre derivaciones republicanas de los sucesos de Vera (Madrid: Impresora de Galo Saez, 1933), 59.
Confederadas and the establishment of annual national congresses to decide on common paths of action also fostered this sentiment. Furthermore, these activities in support of the homeland contributed to the process of integration of the Spanish diaspora within the American nation as well. Republican supporters felt more at ease in the Popular Front culture of 1930s America, but even those inclined to support Franco, were reluctant to embrace the tenets of the Falange. As the United States entered World War II, both sides of the political spectrum in the diaspora, and their American-born children, decided to support their adopted country.
Epilogue

From migrants to exiles

On April 1, 1939, a victorious General Franco declared the end of the war in Spain. That same day, awaiting American recognition of Franco’s government, all consular Spanish offices in the United States were transferred to Cuban diplomats. A few days later, Juan F. de Cárdenas became Franco’s ambassador, the red and gold flag replacing the republican tricolor on top of the embassy building. Fernando de los Ríos, the former Republican ambassador, remained in the United States where he joined the ranks of European intellectuals teaching at the newly created “university in exile” at the New School for Social Research.

As the State Department negotiated the release of the remaining American volunteers from the Abraham Lincoln Brigade held in Franco’s jails, De los Ríos thanked the American people, “in the name of democratic Spain, of the liberal Spain—which has gone down many times in the past, only to rise again, more vigorously than before.” Cárdenas, too, expressed his gratitude to those who had supported Franco’s side, and hoped that “the high ideals of the new Spain [would] be fully understood.” A statement by José de Gregorio, the Spanish Consul in New York, hinted that Franco’s

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1 The embassy in Washington was transferred to the Ambassador of Colombia. “De Los Ríos Quits as Envoy to U.S.,” NYT, 1 April 1939, 2.
3 “De Los Ríos Quits as Envoy to U.S.,” NYT, 1 April 1939, 2.
“new” Spain looked back to a more distant past. The General’s victory, the consul declared, was that of “the true great Spain with her traditions and glories.”

Republicans had no place in this new Spain. President Roosevelt’s desire that Franco take a page from the American Civil War and show clemency did not materialize. After the General’s victory, repression only intensified. While specific figures are still debated, the number of executions in the aftermath of the war has been estimated to range from a low of 23,000 to a high of 200,000. In addition, 400,000 people were imprisoned in Franco’s jails from 1939 to 1945 alone. A similar number crossed the border into France, where they were crowded into concentration camps with almost no services and little food. When France itself fell to the Nazis in 1940, the situation of the Spanish refugees was made even more precarious.

Republican supporters in the United States turned their activities to helping the exiles leave Europe and resettle in the Americas. The United States allowed refugees to enter its borders while in transit to other countries, but the bulk of this displaced

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4 “New Spain’s Envoys Appeals to U.S.,” NYT, 5 April 1939, 12.
5 Cárdenas to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 1939, MAEB, Legajo R-1004, Exp. 5. Roosevelt expressed this desire to Cárdenas when the Ambassador presented his credentials. Cárdenas reminded FDR of the differences between the two conflicts. In their Civil War, Americans had fought each other, In Spain, however, “true Spaniards” [i.e. Nationalists] had “defended their homeland against bandits and criminals, joined by anarchists and foreign communists.” Yet, Cárdenas assured Roosevelt that Franco would be fair and benevolent and that the new regime would only punish those guilty of non-political crimes (delitos comunes).
6 In February 1939, Franco had issued a retroactive Law of Political Responsibilities, which criminalized all those who had supported the Republic since October 1934 (the Asturian revolution). “Support” was a very flexible concept. Even those not involved in Republican politics were subject to punishment. Anybody who had not actively embraced the nationalist cause could be considered a supporter of the Republic. This repression was further reinforced with the 1940 Law for the Suppression of Freemasonry and Communism.
population settled in Mexico, the closest ally of the Republic during the war.\(^8\) The presence of the refugees south of the border, however, again raised the specter of masses of Spaniards entering the United States through Mexico. In fact, as the Immigration and Naturalization Service concluded after a thorough investigation of the case, the chances of that happening were small.\(^9\)

While the plight of the Spanish refugees received justified attention, Franco’s victory also had a profound effect on Spaniards already living in the United States. Many immigrants felt themselves suddenly transformed into exiles. This sentiment was evident when George Schnack interviewed his subjects in California at the end of the war. “Had the Loyalist won the war he might have returned,” Schnack wrote of one of his interviewees, “but now that Franco is in power he would not set foot to the ground for anything.”\(^10\) Franco’s “new Spain” did not hold any appeal for these immigrants. “In the Franco government they see the same sort of regime that was partly the cause of their being forced to leave Spain,” Schnack explained, “and they

\(^8\) Instrumental in the transportation of refugees to the Americas in the early years of the Second World War were two Spanish organizations based in Paris: the SERE (Servicio de Emigración de los Refugiados Españoles) and the JARE (Junta de Auxilio a los Refugiados Españoles). While most of this migration went to Mexico, other Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela among them) also received Spanish refugees. Among the aid organizations in the United States were the Spanish Refugee Relief Campaign, established in April 1939 (in 1940, the SRRC dissolved and the North American Spanish Aid Committee was established), and Spanish Refugee Aid, which operated from 1953 to 2006.

\(^9\) In 1940, New Mexico’s Congressman John Dempsey urged the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization to investigate alleged illegal border crossing of European refugees through Southern California. The investigation showed no evidence of such traffic through the Mexican border. The Chief of the Visa Division of the Department of State, sent to Mexico to survey the Spanish refugee situation, reported that at that time there were 8,000 Spanish refugees in the country. Most of them had settled around Mexico City, except for a small colony of 500 in Chihuahua, south of El Paso. Correspondence on this investigation can be found in NA, RG 85, Box 1759, File 56034-694.

don’t care to return to the Old Country while Franco is in power.” A similar sentiment was expressed in other locales.

If the mobilization in support of the Republic during the Spanish Civil War had contributed to the Americanization of the Spanish immigrant community, Franco’s victory secured it through the naturalization of many immigrants-turned-exiles who now faced the prospect of never returning to their homeland. The process was complicated by the fact that a good number of Spaniards had entered the country illegally and lacked proper documentation. In fact, *Frente Popular* accused Francoists of reporting such immigrants to the American authorities, so that they would be deported. Thus, soon after the war ended, the *Sociedades Hispánicas Confederadas* established an “immigration section” to help not only refugees leaving Spain but also the Spanish immigrants who feared deportation to Franco’s Spain.

The task of assisting this group to legalize their situation was made more difficult by the fact that they could not count on the aid of Spanish consular officials.

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11 Ibid., 98.
12 In Tampa, Joaquín de la Llana remembered: “I think my father would have gone back to Spain if the Republic would have won, but with [Franco’s victory] he lost complete interest of ever going back to Spain.” Joaquín de la Llana, interview by author, 13 April 1997, Tampa, Florida, tape recording, SCWOHP, Tampa.
13 In some cases, American citizenship was sought in part to facilitate a return to Spain. Javier Benedet, for example, applied for citizenship after the war, and got his papers in 1950. A labor leader who had supported the Republic during the war, he decided for naturalization “when I realized that if I were to return to Spain, I could only do it with an American passport.” Cited in Rueda, *La emigración*, 227.
14 “Ralea Fascista,” *FP*, 12 May 1939. Similarly, during World War II, the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau also received anonymous letters denouncing alleged Franco supporters and members of the *Casa de España* as Francoist and Nazi spies and demanding their deportation. See, for example, NA, RG 85, Box 2458, File 56126-170.
15 “Nuestro Departamento de Inmigración,” *España Libre*, 26 January 1940, 5; “Campaña Contra Deportaciones por el C.P.D.E.” *La Voz*, 6 May 1939. In this task they were also helped by the American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born.
16 Things got more complicated when, in 1940, the Alien Registration Act required all foreigners to register and state their status. Unlike other European refugees whose countries were occupied by combatants in the war, Spaniards were citizens of a neutral country whose government was recognized.
The consulates echoed the new ideology of citizenship emanating from Francoist Spain. An announcement by the General Consul in Puerto Rico summarized this philosophy. The notice declared that consular services would be offered to all Spanish citizens “except those who, due to their recent conduct towards our glorious national movement, have lost the right to be attended and protected by the New Spain.”

Fear of reprisals may explain why documents related to the war period had been removed from the Embassy’s archives.

The entrance of the United States in World War II accelerated this process of Americanization, as many of these migrants, and their American-born children, joined in the war effort to defend the same values they had defended in Spain against a common threat. The day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Centro Asturiano in Tampa declared its fidelity to the United States. Calling the Club, a “100 percent American organization,” the pledge stated that the great majority of its members were “American either by birth or by choice and all faithful to our ideals of democratic government.” The Centro Español, celebrating the 50 years of its foundation, similarly pledged its loyalty and the society’s holdings, valued at $500,000, to President

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The notice was reproduced in Frente Popular, which claimed that, while not so brazenly stated, most Spanish consulates in practice would conduct themselves in the same fashion. “Como actúan los Fascistas,” FP, 13 October 1939.

In a letter to the Minister in Madrid Cárdenas stated that the archives of the Embassy in Washington were missing all documents covering the dates of the Civil War. Juan F. de Cárdenas to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 6 April 1939, MAEAB, Legajo R-1004, Exp. 4.
Roosevelt. A year later, a similar resolution condemned Franco’s alleged support for an Axis victory and reaffirmed the Spaniards’ loyalty to the United States.

The war raised hopes that Franco would still be overthrown, and this fueled Spaniards’ support for the United States. ACERE, a Spanish Republican association in New York suggested that Spanish exiles and immigrants in America be allowed to form a special unit, instead of being drafted into the regular army. They argued that, in this way, they would more effectively help the allies in key positions such as the Canary Islands or the North African campaign. The Catalan Casal Catalá offered Americans a “blueprint for invasion” of Franco’s Spain. Through the pages of its bilingual publication, Free Catalonia, the Casal showcased the history of Catalonia, her links with the United States, and the Catalans’ desire to defeat Franco and establish in the peninsula an Iberian confederacy of Free States, encompassing Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque country. The Bulletin of the Basque Delegation in the United States, Basques, followed a similar model. Seeking to establish a close connection with the United States, an editorial observed that travelers to the Basque Country unanimously compared the Basques with the Anglo-Saxons “if only for the

19 “Centro Asturiano Members Pledge Fidelity to U.S.,” TMT, 8 December 1941, 11; “Español Club Gives Pledge to President,” TDT, 18 December 1941, 3.
21 “ACERE y el Draft,” Ibérica, March-April 1942, 23. ACERE was the acronym of the Agrupación de Combatientes y Exiliados de la República Española (Association of Combatants and Exiles of the Spanish Republic). Ibérica was the association’s monthly publication.
22 “Blueprint for invasion,” Free Catalonia (February-March 1943), 4-5.
23 In its first issue, June 1942, Free Catalonia announced that a delegation of the London-based Catalan National Council (Catalan Government in Exile) had been established in New York. The magazine highlighted the work of Catalan exiles in the United States such as Josep Lluís Sert (architect), Alexandre Vilalta (musician), Urbici Soler and Joseph de Creeft (sculptors). It also underscored the historical links between Greater Catalonia and America through the figures of Admiral David Farragut, the celebrated Union leader of the American Civil War, whose Spanish father had also fought in the American War of Independence, and Esteban Miro, the governor of Louisiana in the late 1770s.
fact that we are not a Latin people,” and explained that Basques were known in the peninsula as “the Yankees of Spain.”

Unlike the Catalans, whose president, Lluís Companys, had been executed by Franco after his capture by the Gestapo in France, the Basque diaspora had its lehendakari, José Antonio de Aguirre. Aguirre managed to escape Europe in 1941 settling in New York where he combined his political activities with a position as lecturer at Columbia University. The Basques’ anti-communism made them appealing allies to the American government during World War II and beyond. A number of the leaders of the Basque government-in-exile in New York served as FBI informants against communist activities in the United States and Latin America.

Ironically, this concern with the expansion of Communism in the post-war era was to become the death knell for the aspirations of Basque nationalists and the Spanish Republican exiles in America.

While President Truman was not fond of Franco (he later referred to the General in private correspondence as “that lousy totalitarian”), the onset of the cold war was soon to dictate a change in American policies towards Spain. In 1945, Spanish republicans had been heartened by the declarations emanating from

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24 “Basque Democracy,” Basques (August 1944). Written entirely in English, the publication lasted from March 1943 to August 1944. San Sebastián, Basque Archives, 57-58.
international conferences in San Francisco and Postdam banning Spain from membership in the newly created United Nations. A year later, the isolation of the regime was increased by the decision of most of the members of the UN to withdraw their ambassadors from Spain. Truman further punished the Franco regime by barring Spain from receiving aid from the Marshall Plan. At the same time, the Truman Doctrine and the Cold War were rapidly improving the dictator’s prospects, as Spain was now considered a valuable ally in the defense of the West. In 1950, a Gallup poll showed that 48% of Americans favored Spain’s entry in NATO and 57% supported Spain receiving economic and military aid from the United States. In 1951, Truman restored diplomatic relations with Spain. Two years later the two countries signed the Pact of Madrid. The treaty offered American economic and military aid to Spain in exchange for the use of its territory for military bases.

American geopolitical interests did not alter Republican supporters’ perception of the Franco regime. *Sociedades Hispanas Confederadas* and kindred organizations continued their work, albeit with dwindling resources as attested by the declining regularity of SHC’s organ, *España Libre*. The newspaper publicized the plight of...

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28 Reporting on these poll results to Madrid, the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires in Washington stated: “in their recent votes, so favorably to us, the Senate and Congress have answered to the pressure of public opinion, which at this time of danger for the Western world, has made common sentiment and logic prevail over partisan prejudices and ideological obfuscations.” Eduardo Propper de Callejón to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 13 September 1950, MAEAR, Legajo R-2442, Exp. 12.  
30 In its task, *España Libre* was supported by a number of Spanish intellectual exiles. SHC had at times a rocky relationship with some of them. This was the case with Victoria Kent, a prominent lawyer and Republican leader. Kent edited the exile-oriented monthly *Ibérica* in New York from 1953 to 1974. María Angeles Ordaz, “El exilio español en Estados Unidos. Los intelectuales de España Libre,” in *La oposición al régimen de Franco. Estados de la Cuestión y Metodología de la Investigación*, eds. Javier Tusell, Alicia Alted, and Abdón Mateos (Madrid: UNED, 1990): 73-83; Zenaida Gutiérrez Vega,
political prisoners and striking workers within Spain and condemned the “shameful collaboration of the American democracy with the Francoist dictatorship.”

Throughout the forty years of the regime, *España Libre* readers continued to help needy Spanish exiles, the “legion of the forgotten,” as Spanish Refugee Aid founder Nancy Macdonald called them.

Keeping the memory of Republican Spain alive was an equally important mission of *Sociedades Hispanas Confederadas*. Through dinners, speeches, and other celebratory events, they maintained the festive calendar forged during the war to commemorate the heroic feats of the Loyalists. The key dates in this calendar were April 14 (the proclamation of the Republic), July 19 (the popular response against the military coup), and November 7 (the defense of Madrid). The emblematic *Día de la Raza* remained a source of contention between Republicans and Francoists in the diaspora. In 1959, *España Libre* denounced the celebration of the date by the Falange and the imperialist tone of the *Hispanidad* discourse emanating from Franco’s *Instituto de Cultura Hispánica*. Not surprisingly, for *España Libre* the relevance of the “discovery” lay in it having offered Spaniards the opportunity to enjoy the freedom they lacked in the peninsula. Spaniards had gone to America not to enrich themselves

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31 “S.H.C. El 14 de Abril en Nueva York,” *España Libre*, 6 April 1963, 1. For years, the paper carried the banner “Visit Sunny Spain, Land of Orange Groves and Jails” in its English-language section.


33 Occasionally, the 1934 Asturian October Revolution and the proclamation of the First Spanish Republic in 1873 were also celebrated.
but to flee the oppression of the “dominant castes.” The Francoist commemoration, the article claimed, celebrated the violence and exploitation heaped upon the Indians by the imperial system; the same violence, it argued, now being heaped upon the Spanish people by a “putrefact and jail-like Falangist Spain.”

The presence in the United States of an illustrious group of Spanish exiles contributed to the maintenance of the Republican sentiment in the diaspora and among the new generations. A number of these figures began their exile in New York teaching in schools associated with the Spanish immigrant organizations. Thus, in 1939, the Comité Pro Democracia Española established an Education Section. Its main goal was to teach the history of Spain to the Spanish youth born in the United States. This knowledge, it was claimed, “was needed in order to reconquer the Iberian Peninsula.” The task was assigned to Father Leocadio Lobo, a Catholic priest exiled from Franco’s Spain. Similarly, the Frente Popular Antifascista Gallego offered Emilio González López, a Galician ex-congressman, and Daniel Alfonso Castelao, an artist and the preeminent leader of Galician nationalism, the opportunity to teach Spanish history and drawing respectively. Emilio González López would stay in

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34 “La Falange Exterior en New York y el 12 de Octubre,” España Libre, 2 October 1959. Similar debates occurred in successive years. On the concept of Hispanidad see Sepúlveda, El sueño de la Madre Patria, 155-175.

35 This arrangement also provided the refugees gainful employment and protected them from being deported for being public charges.

36 “Comité Pro D. Española,” La Voz, 8 August 1939, 12. From May 1939, Father Leocadio Lobo was also the editor of New York’s La Voz. He died in New York in 1959.

37 “Iniciativa Plausible del Frente Popular Antifascista Gallego,” La Voz, 6 November 1939, 6; González López also taught classes for the children of Spanish immigrants belonging to the Agrupación Socialista Española. “Agrupación Socialista Española,” España Libre, 12 April 1940, 14.
New York, where he remained involved in the activities of the Spanish community. In 1971, for example, Gónzalez López addressed the gathering commemorating the 40th anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic, a meeting where España Libre highlighted the presence of young people, and announced the incorporation of the new generations in the fight against the dictatorship.

Relations between the regime and the Spanish diaspora in the United States remained strained. In January 1951, for example, the consul in New York reported negatively to the Ambassador on a lecture given by Federico de Onís at the Casa de Galicia. The lecture, on poet Antonio Machado, who died in exile in France at the close of the Civil War, was perceived as a critique of the Franco regime. The Consul lamented that Onís was still head of the Instituto de las Españas at Columbia. He also acknowledged that the Casa de Galicia, like most of the Spanish societies in its consular jurisdiction remained “under the influence of the Spanish reds and their sympathizers” and that the Consulate had not been able “to have any intervention” in it. His predecessor had had a similar experience. In a clear reversal of what had been the trend before the Spanish Civil War, he stated that the majority of Spaniards in New York became naturalized shortly after arriving and that they shunned the Spanish official representation.

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38 González López had a prolific career as Professor of Spanish language and literature and Director of the Graduate program at the City University of New York. Castelao left for Argentina in 1940, where he died ten years later.
39 “Nuevas generaciones de españoles se suman a la lucha contra la dictadura,” España Libre (May-June, 1971), 3.
40 Pelayo G. Olay to Ambassador, 29 January 1951, AGA-MAE, Caja 8835. Interestingly, Onís had been Olay’s professor at the University of Oviedo.
41 Bernardo Rolland to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 1947, MAEAR, Legajo R-1941, Exp. 1.
In California, too, the regime’s cultural initiatives appeared to be undermined by subversive intellectuals. Soon after the end of the war, the Del Amo Foundation had approached the embassy to reestablish its program of fellowships for Spaniards to study in California’s universities and Americans to study in Spain. The regime welcomed this opportunity to foster friendly relationships between the two countries. However, the Spanish consul in Los Angeles soon discovered to his chagrin that some of the American students who had received the fellowships had become, upon returning to the United States, “tenacious detractors of our Fatherland.” The Consul blamed this faulty selection of fellows on the influence in the Foundation of César Barja, a renowned professor of Spanish at UCLA, “openly and declared enemy” of Franco during the civil war. The presence of “Anti-Spanish” academics in American universities remained a matter of concern in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and consuls were instructed to provide a list of instructors of Spanish within their jurisdiction and report their attitude towards the regime. This information would be used in determining whether or not to issue visas for them to travel to Spain.

The Spanish diaspora in the United States also challenged the legitimacy of Franco’s representatives, and protested honors bestowed upon them by American

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42 The Foundation had been established in 1927 by Gregorio del Amo, a wealthy Spaniard residing in Los Angeles. Del Amo donated his alma mater close to $400,000 to build a residence hall in Madrid’s University City to house American students. The building was inaugurated in 1929, but it was completely destroyed in the Spanish Civil War. In the 1950s, the Spanish government tried to secure the help of the Foundation to rebuild the structure. Gillingham, Rancho San Pedro, 315-316; MAEAR, Legajo R-11061, Exp. 2.

43 José Pérez del Arco to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4 December 1951, MAEAR, Legajo R-11061, Exp. 2. In his letter, the consul proposed a solution to this situation: fellowships would be given to the best student essays on relations between Spain and California. This, he thought, “might counter part of the negative influence exercised by some actively anti-Spanish elements in Spanish Departments in California Universities where they found refuge at the end of our Civil War.”

officials. In 1958, for example, an invitation by Tampa cigar manufacturers to the Spanish Ambassador to attend the annual Verbena del Tabaco Festival provoked the response of the local Spanish newspaper whose editor reminded the organizers of the event that the Latin community remained as antifascist as it had been in 1936.\footnote{“El Pueblo de Tampa Protesta de una Invitación al Embajador de Franco, Conde de Motrico,” España Libre, 21 November 1958, 1.} The visit of the Spanish Ambassador to San Francisco in 1962 was also boycotted by members of the community.\footnote{“Californianas. Que le B. la M.” España Libre, 2 February 1962, 5.} In 1964, \textit{Sociedades Hispanas Confederadas} protested to the Mayor of New York for receiving Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Franco’s Minister of Information and Tourism, who was there to visit the Spanish Pavillion at the New York’s World Fair and to inaugurate the new Spanish National Tourism Office in Manhattan.\footnote{“Mayor Presents a Plaque To Spanish Tourism Aide,” NYT, 14 October 1964, 53; “Telegrama al alcalde,” España Libre, 6 November 1964, 2.} The protests extended to the visit of King Juan Carlos to the United States in 1976. While a banquet in honor of the King was being held at the Waldorf, members of SHC and other Spanish and American organizations picketed outside the hotel shouting “Amnistía-Libertad,” the same chant heard in the streets of Spain asking for amnesty for her political prisoners, and freedom.\footnote{“Spanish King was Picketed at Waldorf,” España Libre, May-June, 1976, 4. Placards read: “King Juan Carlos-restore democracy, or abdicate!” and “Franco is dead-his Fascism must die too!”} While the American mainstream press hailed Juan Carlos as the leader of a “new Spain,” the Spanish diaspora in the United States saw in Franco’s anointed successor the continuity of the regime.\footnote{“The New Spain,” Washington Post, 4 June 1976, A24.}

The tension between continuity and change pervaded the royal visit, as the monarchy, like previous regimes, sought to redefine the nature of Spanish national
identity through her relationship with the Americas. Like his great-grandfather in 1875, Juan Carlos faced a difficult Restoration trying to heal the wounds of the deep national divisions manifested in the civil war. In both cases, the United States was an important point of reference. While Alfonso XII could not visit America for the 1876 Philadelphia Centennial, Juan Carlos arrived just in time for the Bicentennial celebrations, the trip to the United States being the first official trip abroad of his six-month-old reign.

Following on the steps of Eulalia de Borbón in 1893, Juan Carlos became the first Spanish monarch to visit the Americas. Like Eulalia, the king prefaced his visit to the United States with a stop in Spanish America, in this case the Dominican Republic, the location of the first Spanish settlement in the continent. In flawless English, Juan Carlos addressed a joint session of the House and Senate. He opened his speech with a retelling of Spain’s past in America that would have made Charles Lummis proud. Queen Isabella and Christopher Columbus took pride of place, but the King also paid tribute to the sixteenth-century Spanish pioneers who explored most of the continent. He reminded his audience of Spain’s role in helping the United States gain its independence from the British in the eighteenth century, and he embraced Spain’s imperial legacy in the Americas by referring to the links between the American republics and the Madre Patria. The ceremonies surrounding the monarch’s

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50 Although this was his first visit as a reigning monarch, Juan Carlos had visited the United States before, in 1958 as a Navy cadet on the training ship Juan Sebastian Elcano, and with his wife, Princess Sofia, in 1967 and 1971.
visit reinforced the themes highlighted in the speech.\textsuperscript{51} While in Washington, the King and Queen inaugurated an exhibition on Columbus at the Smithsonian and unveiled statues to Bernardo de Galvez and to Don Quixote. Juan Carlos also gave to the city of Philadelphia a statue of Diego de Gardoqui, the first Spanish envoy to the United States.\textsuperscript{52}

The royal agenda also reflected the monarch’s desire to come to grips with some darker aspects of the nation’s past. Thus, Juan Carlos met with a delegation of American Jews, headed by former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg. Goldberg stated that this was “the first meeting between a Spanish head of state and a Jewish delegation of any nationality since before 1492 when Jews were expelled from Spain.”\textsuperscript{53} While obviously not an outsider in the traditional sense of the term, Juan Carlos may have been particularly sensitive to the experience of the diaspora, having spent most of his childhood in exile.\textsuperscript{54} In his first trip to Mexico, in 1978, the King would again reach out to the diaspora, this time the Republican exiles. Meeting the

\textsuperscript{51} In some cases, the King’s words were physically inscribed in the monuments. This happened with the speech he delivered at the dedication of the statue of Bernardo de Galvez, near the State Department, and which were engraved in its pedestal. It read: “Bernardo de Galvez, the great Spanish soldier, carried out a courageous campaign in lands bordering the lower Mississippi. This masterpiece of military strategy lightened the pressure of the English in the war against the American settlers who were fighting for their independence. May the statue of Bernardo de Galvez serve as a reminder that Spain offered the blood of her soldiers for the cause of American independence. Excerpt of a speech given on this location on June 3, 1976 by his majesty Don Juan Carlos I. King of Spain.”

\textsuperscript{52}“Juan Carlos Opens Bicentennial Displays,” \textit{NYT}, 4 June 1976, 4.


\textsuperscript{54} Born in Rome in 1938, he lived in Italy, Switzerland, and Portugal before setting foot on Spain in 1948 to be groomed as a successor to Franco. Juan Carlos’s biographer, Paul Preston, equates the negotiations between the General and Juan Carlos’s father, Don Juan, that led to this outcome to being “sold into slavery.” Paul Preston, \textit{Juan Carlos. A People’s King} (London: HarperCollins, 2004), 1.
widow of Manuel Azaña, the last president of the Spanish Republic, Juan Carlos said, “Your husband, and you yourself are as much part of the history of Spain as I am.”

In a recent book, historian Henry Kamen argues that Spanish culture has been marked by the imprint of exile. Kamen claims that Spain is the only European country whose national consolidation was based upon exclusion (Jews, Muslims, Protestants, Liberals) rather than inclusion, and he sets out to illustrate how much of Spanish culture was created in the diaspora by the “disinherited” expatriates as a response to this exile. Kamen’s emphasis on Spanish exceptionalism has been rightly criticized by his reviewers, but his work presents an illuminating analysis of the history of Spain through the lens of the different waves of her diasporas.

Kamen’s study focuses primarily on the rich cultural production of the intellectual elites. Yet, as I have shown in this dissertation, this project of cultural construction was not limited to a particular social group. The institutions, publications, monuments, ceremonies, and festivals analyzed in the previous chapters illustrate how the diverse Spanish diaspora in the United States contributed to this process. Through the activities of the Círculo Colón-Cervantes and the Sociedades Hispánicas Confederadas; through the denunciation of the black legend and the promotion of Hispanism; through the support for anarchism and nationalist movements; through the ethnic press and the myriad mutual aid societies that created the networks that kept the

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55 Ibid., 442. Mexico, the home of the Spanish Republic in Exile, had never recognized the Franco regime. Spain and Mexico reestablished diplomatic relations in March, 1977.
diasporas connected to one another and to the homeland, Spaniards in the United States participated actively in the formation of Spanish culture and Spanish identity.
Figure 1: La Llumanera de Nova York
Figure 2: “In Memory of Menéndez” (advertisement, Davis Shores).
Source: Tampa Morning Tribune, 16 January 1926.
Figure 3: “Sound-Safe-Conservative” (advertisement, Daytona Highlands).
Source: Bankers Magazine, 1925.
Figure 4: “It Took 400 Years” (advertisement, Davis Shores).
Source: *Tampa Morning Tribune*, 4 January 1926.
Figure 5: “They Had Courage…” (advertisement, Mizner Development Co.)
Source: *Tampa Daily Times*, 11 July 1925.
Figure 6: “Sale of Historic Ship Models” (advertisement, Spear’s)
¡POR FIN!....

Por fin España es una República

Para obtener la gran victoria democrática del domingo, el pueblo español tuvo que pasar por un largo y difícil aprendizaje que le costó horas de inmensas, amargas, y no pocas sacrificios de muchos de sus hijos. Los algunos de los libros que, escritos por ciudadanos, ingenuamente contribuyen poderosamente a crear el espíritu cívico tan plenamente puesto de manifiesto.

“La Sublevación de Jaca”
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Por Rafael Sánchez Guerra
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“Los Desiertos de la Dictadura”
Por Francisco Madrid
$1.00

“De los Sucesos de Ciudad Real al Proceso Sánchez Guerra”
Por Raúl Solís
$1.00

“El Cauce de un Régimen”
Por Luis Araquistán
$1.00

“La Dictadura a Traves de sus Notas Oficiales”
Por Dionisio Phalé
$1.00

“El Pan de la Emigración”
Por Don José Sánchez Guerra
$1.20

“La Dictadura”
Por Francisco Cambo
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“En la Calle y en la Cárcel”
Por Marcelino Domingo
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“Alas y Garras”
Por Marcelino Domingo
80 cts.

“Páginas Turbias de la Historia de España”
Por Gonzalo de Reparaz
$2.00

“Las Responsabilidades del Antiguo Régimen”
Por el Conde de Romanones
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“Por la Concordia”
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Figure 7: ¡Por fin! . . . (advertisement, Librería Cervantes).
Source: La Prensa (New York), 15 April 1931.
Figure 8: “¡Viva España!...” (advertisement, Castellanos-Molina Corporation).
Source: La Prensa (New York), 15 April 1931.
Figure 9: “¡No Pasarán!” (Spanish Civil War Republican poster).
Figure 10: “Columna Francisca Solana” (Tampa Spanish girls in *miliciano* outfit). Photograph courtesy of Mrs. Grace L. Peláez.
Figure 11: “¿Te acuerdas?” (flyer of the Círculo Republicano Español of Havana).
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