Title
Psychoanalysis & Rhetoric: Metaphors in the Work of Melanie Klein & J.-B. Pontalis

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by

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Abstract

PSYCHOANALYSIS & RHETORIC: METAPHORS IN THE WORK OF MELANIE KLEIN & J.-B. PONTALIS

This dissertation project examines the role of rhetoric and figurative language in the formation of psychoanalytic theory. I begin with the premise that psychoanalysis is not only a clinical practice and a theory of mind, but that it is also a writing practice that must be considered rhetorically. Founded as it is on paying close attention to the speech of the patient, psychoanalytic discourse has always been concerned with the form of its own expression. Because of this, psychoanalytic writing opens itself to the kind of analysis that pays attention to and highlights the rhetoric of its written form.

In focusing on psychoanalysis as a discourse, I wish to raise the question of form, and thus of rhetoric in its relation to psychoanalysis as a whole. The underlying surmise of this project is that the rhetorical form by which psychoanalytic theory and practice is inscribed structures both theory and practice.

In this project I am concerned with the description and analysis of the rhetorical foundations by which the psychoanalytic works of Melanie Klein and J.-B. Pontalis are made possible. By doing so I hope to broaden and advance an understanding of the psychoanalytic tradition as a development of rhetorical form. I also sketch out a critical approach that makes possible a similar investigation of other psychoanalytic texts.
This dissertation seeks to contribute to a critical approach that would make it possible to develop a comparative analysis of psychoanalytic theories and an understanding of the differences between the many diverse theoretical approaches that constitute the field of psychoanalysis. The dissertation’s focus on the role of rhetoric and figurative language would also contribute to a fuller understanding of psychoanalysis and its relationship to the humanities. Such a focus seeks to exemplify a literary analytical approach to psychoanalysis that derives its mode of investigation from a close attention to the rhetorical construction of psychoanalysis and the underlying themes that animate it. This approach puts psychoanalysis in conversation with larger questions within the humanities about the structure and construction of discourses and the epistemological status of theory in relation to its object of inquiry.
Chapter 1

Psychoanalysis and Rhetoric

Introduction

Psychoanalysis is a discourse that discovers a need to describe the clinical encounter and the conceptual edifice that arises from it in written form. Since it is a tradition that has always been more or less concerned with the form of its expression, psychoanalytic discourse opens itself to the kind of analysis that pays attention to and highlights the rhetoricity of its written form. The underlying surmise of this project is that the rhetorical form of psychoanalytic theory and practice is inscribed structures both its theory and practice.

Psychoanalysis is also a reading practice. It consists in reading and rereading prior texts (both psychoanalytic and otherwise). For psychoanalyst-writers/readers, this means reading and rereading Freud’s texts. Many psychoanalytic writer/readers have engaged with Freud’s texts to develop or expand upon the ideas presented and the form in which those ideas are presented in writing. Psychoanalysis has arisen as a discursive tradition through its production of Freud’s texts as its own pre-text, as the source of the specific presuppositions that it assumes. Each psychoanalytic text constructs this pre-text anew, (re)defining the function of Freud’s texts for the current text. It is the manner of rereading of Freud’s texts in relation to the existent discursive norms that makes a given psychoanalytic reading
unique and identifiable. This can apply to an individual theorist or to a whole a sub-tradition (or “school”).

I am interested in considering the rhetorical presuppositions by which psychoanalytic theory establishes itself and its objects. I begin by considering the discourse of psychoanalysis not as a singular and uniform entity, but as a multiple and differing set of distinct, if related, writing traditions that have arisen at historically, geographically, and linguistically different and diverse sites over the last 110 years or so. It is a discourse that has developed at various times and in various places throughout the world and at each site it has remained psychoanalytic (if not always unquestionably so), while also taking on and developing idiosyncratic tropological aspects that have, at times, led to drastically different conceptions of psychoanalytic objects, theory and practice. The work of Melanie Klein, for example, represents one branch of the development of psychoanalytic discourse; her writing enacts a tropical “move” by which the language and the objects of psychoanalytic discourse change and result in a particular and unique constellation of objects, theory, and practice.

Once established, discourses have a tendency to settle into a routine in which the questions of figures and tropes come to seem self-evident or even invisible. Hayden White claims that discourse is “intended to constitute the ground whereon to decide what shall count as a fact in the matters under consideration [in the case of psychoanalysis, psychic functioning] and to determine what mode of comprehension is best suited to the understanding of
the facts thus constituted,” indicating a conservative tendency once the terms of a discourse are in place. On the other hand, White also describes discourse as involving a shuttling “between ways of encoding reality” (3-4, italics in original). In the psychoanalytic discursive tradition, certain psychoanalytic texts (and/or authors) deliberately unsettle established tropes of the discursive regime and revitalize the shuttling of discourse by introducing new tropes or reorienting the established regime in a new direction. As a result of such retroping, a new sub-tradition comes into being. In the case of the psychoanalytic discursive tradition, the texts of Freud function as the touchstone, a prediscursive reserve for any such operation. A focus on retroping as rhetorical innovation can be useful in considering the different psychoanalytic schools, in that it provides a means of understanding the conceptual innovations that a given school develops.

Psychoanalytic schools can be considered a collection of texts that develops according to a shared reading that retropes a portion of Freud’s texts. For example, I will argue in chapter two that, in the case of Klein, the retroping consists of a rearticulation of the metaphor of psychic structure according to a cartographical paradigm. This metaphorical paradigm differs drastically from the “depth psychology” that structures Freud’s texts. Klein’s writing figures different constellations of psychic organization as “positions” between which the mind shuttles, occupying at different times one position or another, which is in marked distinction to Freud’s idea of psychic “stages.”
And although Klein never fully abandons Freud’s organization of the psyche according to the “stages,” it is eventually superseded by her “positions.”

Much has been written on the rhetoric of Freud, but less has been written (and less systematically) about the rhetoric of psychoanalysts or psychoanalytic traditions since Freud. There is, it seems, a sense that while it is undeniable that Freud can and should be thought of as a writer—as Patrick Mahony’s book title, *Freud as a Writer*, so clearly indicates—a similar critical lens has not been so readily applied to other psychoanalysts. The most notable exception is perhaps the figure of Jacques Lacan, although there is an extent to which Lacan is considered less as part of a tradition and more as another Freud, another master, another singular genius. A literary consideration of other analysts such as Melanie Klein is less common. While her concepts and themes have certainly been catalogued and studied, less attention has been devoted to a rhetorical study of her tropes. I don’t at all wish to adopt the “great man” model of literary production, but to focus on the rhetorical strategies of the texts of other psychoanalytic writers and their reading and retroping of psychoanalytic discourse. It is, for example, through the rhetorical techniques and strategies of Klein’s written works that what could be called a Kleinian psychoanalysis is created. Thus I consider the texts of Melanie Klein in their rhetoricity, the ways that they constitute

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1 For work on the rhetoric of Freud, see Culler, Gasché, Mahony, Meisel, Meisel, ed., Møller, Weber.
themselves through a rhetorical play of transformations and dissimulations—
of the tropes, figures and metaphors of other texts, especially Freud’s.²

The form of a discourse directly and thoroughly affects its contents. As White writes, “discourse itself must establish the adequacy of the language used in analyzing the field to the objects that appear to occupy it. And discourse effects this adequation by a prefigurative move that is more tropical than logical” (1, italics in original). White’s use of italics to emphasize the prefix in “prefigurative” is potentially confusing. He is not claiming that the move is somehow before figuration. After all, it is hard to

²I take my understanding of rhetoric, rhetoricity and figure from Bender and Wellbery’s essay, “Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of Rhetoric.” The authors argue that a contemporary form of rhetoric emerges in the wake of modernism that differs from its classical predecessor. Taking their cue from Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense,” and focusing on “the essential rhetoricity of language and on the human ‘drive to form metaphors’ as the basis of our rendering of the world,’ they argue that

The inherited concept of figures…are no longer devices of an elocutio that adorns and presents the invented thoughts of the speaker, but mobile, shifting categories that are always at work in every encounter with the world....Rhetoric returns...not as a procedure to be employed within specific situations toward determinable ends, but rather as a kind of immemorial process—an a priori that thought can never bring under its control precisely because thought itself is one of the effects of that process. (26-7)
conceive how a move that he claims is “tropical” could fail to be figurative. Instead, his use of italics highlights the antecedent quality of the move. The prefigurative move figures, ahead of time, the rhetorical form that establishes the adequacy of any claim regarding the objects that a discourse may present.

A psychoanalytic example can be found in Freud’s “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” where he discusses what he calls the “presuppositions” necessary to any metapsychological discourse. Freud claims that a discourse begins with neither “clear and sharply defined concepts” nor with simple observation and description of phenomena, but rather an amalgamation of the two:

Even at the stage of description it is not possible to avoid applying certain abstract ideas to the material in hand, ideas derived from

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3 White defines tropes as “deviations from literal, conventional, or ‘proper’ language use, swerves in locution sanctioned neither by custom nor logic” (2). It is worth citing White’s discussion of this topic at length:

Tropes generate figures of speech or thought by their variation from what is “normally” expected, and by the associations they establish between concepts normally felt not to be related or to be related in ways different from that suggested in the trope used....[a trope] is always not only a deviation from one possible, proper meaning, but also a deviation towards another meaning, conception, or ideal of what is right and proper and true “in reality.” Thus considered, troping is both a movement from one notion of the way things are related to another notion, and a connection between things so that they can be expressed in a language that takes account of the possibility of their being expressed otherwise. (2)
somewhere or other but certainly not from the new observations alone. Such ideas—which will later become the basic concepts of the science—are still more indispensable as the material is further worked over (SE 14:117)\(^4\)

The beginning of discourse (in this case psychoanalytic theory) does not have a clear and autochthonous beginning in Freud’s formulation. It has a prehistory, as it were, which is somewhat unspecific in relation to the resulting discourse (“certain abstract ideas,” “from somewhere or other”).

It also has the peculiar quality of being neither part of the discourse (“the basic concepts of the science”), nor entirely separate from it. These are the “presuppositions” that prefigure any discourse. Freud continues:

> In order to guide us in dealing with the field of psychological phenomena, we do not merely apply certain conventions to our empirical material as basic concepts; we also make use of a number of complicated presuppositions. (SE 14:119-20)

The example that Freud gives at this point, “the most important of these presuppositions,” comes from the domain of biology and makes use of the concept of “purpose” (or perhaps of expediency) and runs as follows: the nervous system is an apparatus which has the

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\(^4\) Admittedly, Freud uses the word “idea” (Idee in German) rather than “trope.” However, as will be seen below, the ideas Freud has in mind (such as biological purpose) have a prefigural ground which determines them and establishes the adequacy of their use or importance, and are in that way tropical.
function of getting rid of the stimuli that reach it, or of reducing them to the lowest possible level; or which, if it were feasible, would maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition. Let us for the present not take exception to the indefiniteness of this idea. (SE 14: 120)

The concept of purpose that Freud refers to is immediately illustrated by reference to a Helmholtzian electro-mechanical model of neuronal functioning. This model, of course, was one of the earliest and most persistent metaphorical paradigms that Freud employed throughout his texts. The concept of purpose that serves as a presupposition is here supported by a metaphorical paradigm that is no less presuppositional than the concept, and is in fact coextensive with it. Such presuppositions “regulate the movements” of Freud’s “metapsychological discourse” and structure it from an earlier time to the time proper of its discursive elaboration, from a time neither logical nor spatio-temporal in the sense in which this presupposition would have already obviously existed in another discourse. Or again, the presupposition in question that structures the metapsychological quest is a before that is constituted only in the elaboration of the metapsychological and speculative “science,” for which it provides a place, a time and a “logic.” (Gasché 183)

Freud’s presuppositions come from a variety of domains, including biology, chemistry, physiology, popular opinion, and archaeology. Each of these
presuppositions import into psychoanalytic discourse a rhetorical force made manifest by the metaphorical paradigms they contain, and they have an effect due to “a quality of antecedence, of being before this place and its discourse” (176). Such presuppositions operate as a “metaphorical reserve” (177) that is not strictly part of the conceptual edifice of the discourse, but which nonetheless exerts a certain kind of rhetorical force on it. The concepts that constitute a discourse, and which develop out of the ideas from antecedent domains, maintain a trace of the rhetorical form of those ideas.

What is also of great importance is that the “quality of antecedence” is “neither logical nor spatio-temporal,” but structural and nachträglich. The “prefigurative” (White) is not simply antecedent. It does not consist of an initial phase which then fades into the background, nor does it exist as a pre-history that is unwritten (if exhumeable) but which is in all instances dead. It does not preexist “in another discourse,” as Gasché points out. Its antecedence is entirely nachträglich. In addition, I argue, the rhetorical aspect of analytic theory and discourse does not disappear or fade, but continues to exist and shape analytic discourse. It, too, continues to change and develop along with the discourse.

In this chapter I introduce a way of thinking about psychoanalytic discourse and psychoanalytic theory along the axis of its rhetoric, arguing that the rhetorical does not fade after the establishment of analytic discourse but continues to develop and shape the discourse. What follows consists of three movements. In the first, I continue to argue for the existence and
independence of the rhetorical dimension in analytic discourse, putting to use
the work of Nicolas Abraham in thinking through the independence of the
rhetorical axis of analytic theory from its referential axis. In the second part, I
focus on the disruptive potential of rhetoric in analytic theory. In this I rely
on Paul Ricoeur’s narrative of the history of rhetoric in relationship to
philosophy and the question of truth. In the third part, I consider the history
of the development of rhetoric as it is taken up by Paul de Man. Putting to
work de Man’s concept of “literariness,” I attempt to establish the generative
possibility of psychoanalytic rhetoric understood as independent and
separate from the referential function of language. In doing so, I will raise
epistemological questions about what, if anything, psychoanalysis speaks.
Given that psychoanalytic discourse arises as a way of attending to the
discourse of the analysand, I argue that psychoanalysis is fundamentally a
discourse about language. As a discourse in language and about language,
the rhetorical axis of psychoanalysis is not only one of many aspects of its
discourse, but its central aspect. Such an approach helps to make visible the
generative possibility of the rhetorical dimension of psychoanalytic discourse.

On the concept of “anasemia” and the loosening of reference

Nicolas Abraham introduces the notion of “anasemia” in his 1968
review of The Language of Psychoanalysis, by Laplanche and Pontalis, the
lexicon of psychoanalytic terms and concepts. In this article, Abraham picks
up the thread originally laid down by Freud in his introduction to “Instincts
Abraham notes that when psychoanalytic theory imports words and concepts from other discourses, be they technical and specialized (biology, mechanics, fluid dynamics), or commonly used words such as love, pleasure, pain, desire, etc., “[s]uch ideas” not only “become the basic concepts of the science,” as Freud has it, but also undergo a curious transformation in the process of their incorporation (SE 14:117). Abraham thus gives an additional twist to Freud’s statement that the ideas “are still more indispensable as the material is further worked over,” arguing that the imported elements are themselves altered in the process (SE 14:117).

Abraham’s article addresses what he calls “the radical semantic change psychoanalysis has brought to language,” for which change he coins the term “anasemia” (83). This phrase occurs in the section of his essay titled “The Ploy of Capitalization,” which addresses the convention, adopted by Freud’s French translators, of capitalizing common but key words such as Plaisir and Décharge, which introduces an immediately visible and graphical difference between these common words and their incorporation into psychoanalytic discourse. This is of course a notable departure from the original. In German all nouns are always capitalized, and Freud makes no graphical distinction that might mark different senses of words like the ones just mentioned. It is indeed unclear to what degree such a distinction exists for Freud, and to what degree “the ploy of capitalization” is an interpretation and intervention on
the part of his translators. Abraham does note that Freud himself occasionally utilizes graphical markers of difference in his use of abbreviations such as UBw and WBw, or the use of Greek letters in the early, unpublished *Project for a Scientific Psychology*. For Abraham, such graphical interventions (a phrase I borrow from Derrida’s essay on *différance*), which are “esoteric in appearance, reveal—but do not yet define—the semantic originality of the plane on which, from the very start, psychoanalytic discourse unfolds” (Derrida, “Différance” 3, Abraham 83).

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5 It is by no means an uncommon “ploy,” as graphical distinctions exist in the English *Standard Edition*, such as the use of the alternative and selectively-applied spelling of “phantasy” for the original German *Fantasie* when it is used by the translators to distinguish it from a mere whim or fancy or when it is deemed to be describing a “technical psychological phenomenon” (*SE* 1:xxiv). The *Standard Edition* also makes liberal use of Latin as a graphical marker of specific technical jargon, such as in the translation of the more or less everyday words *das Es, das Ich*, and *das Überich* (literally “it,” “I,” and “over-I”) into *Id, Ego* and *Superego*, which are themselves everyday Latin pronouns. There is also the straight-out invention of the quasi-Greek word “cathexis.” This word is coined as a translation for *Besetzung*, which is more commonly translated as, among others, “occupation,” “allocation,” “investment” or “sitting-in.” Remarkably, Strachey’s stated reason for introducing this neologism, (constructed out of the Greek word *catachein*, meaning “to occupy”) is “the supposed interests of clarity” (*SE* 3:63 fn. 2). The polysemy of the original term is thus emptied out and an anasemic substitute, empty of all connotations due to its novelty, is introduced in its stead. It is interesting to note that Strachey mentions that Freud, “who disliked unnecessary technical terms, was unhappy” with this tactic (*SE* 3:63 fn. 2).
Abraham’s argument adds to our understanding of Freud and Gayché’s argument, as outlined above. When Freud describes the presence of “presuppositions” in the construction of analytic theory, which are “derived from somewhere or other,” he is highlighting the fact that analytic theory is not constructed from whole cloth, but begins with and consists of a number of borrowings from other discourses, both technical and common (SE 14:117). In adding that these presuppositions come “from somewhere or other but certainly not from the new observations alone,” Freud insists that the clinical observations of the analyst are not sufficient to construct the discourse that would describe what will be called psychoanalysis, and that the borrowing of concepts and other elements of other discourses is not only unavoidable, but necessary (SE 14:117, italics mine). Gayché then amplifies Freud’s claim that these borrowings “will later become the basic concepts of the science” by describing the nachträglich quality of such antecedence by which the “metaphorical reserve” that the borrowings constitute are only understandable as such in retrospect (Freud, SE 14:117, Gayché 177).

To this argument that psychoanalytic theory is constructed from conceptual and metaphorical borrowings that can only be understood retroactively, I add Abraham’s claim that there is a semantic transformation that occurs in such borrowings. In coining the neologism “anasemia” (and its adjectival form, “anasemic”) to describe this transformation, Abraham highlights a certain moment of “designification” of all borrowings that “precedes the very possibility of the collision of meanings” (84, italics in
Anasemia names the transformation of borrowed terms that occurs in the process of their importation. In being transported from their prior contexts a borrowed word loses, if temporarily, its meaning. Anasemic incorporation opposes “semantic actualization,” where pleasure in its analytic sense would mean the same as pleasure in its common sense. This helps us understand how it is that terms that originally belonged to other discourses and that appear in analytic theory often signify in ways that are opposite or otherwise unrecognizable in their “original” contexts. With the term anasemia, Abraham gives us a way of thinking more clearly about what Freud himself had indicated, namely that there exists a designifying operation that occurs when terms are imported into psychoanalysis from elsewhere. Abraham argues that

the anasemic structure, proper to psychoanalytic theorizing…proceeds from Freud’s discovery. Before it, one could not say Pleasure or Anxiety without designating the experience which founded its meaning. Symmetrically, with Freud we can speak of a pleasure experienced as such that would nevertheless not be designated as Pleasure with a capital, of a pain that would be Pleasure, and even of a Pleasure that would be suffering. Most of the misconceptions about psychoanalytic concepts come from the constantly tempting confusion

There is a nachträglich operation as well, in that the resignification of the terms can also bleed back out of analytic theory and complicates the “original” ideas.

This refers to the “graphical ploy,” of capitalization in French translation.
between the subjective (introspective) or objective (for example, neurological) plane, on the one hand, and the anasemic plane, on the other. (85-86)⁸

These three instances will benefit from a brief gloss. By a pleasure “that would nevertheless not be designated as Pleasure with a capital,” Abraham is referring to the choice, made by Freud’s French translators, to capitalize certain common words such as pleasure in order to mark their use in a specific psychoanalytic context. Pleasure not designated with a capital, then, would be an instance of “mere” pleasure, as it were, outside of its technical and specific theoretical context. A “pain that would be Pleasure” refers to the fundamental analytic insight that the conscious experience of an event is not the only nor even the most important aspect of our psychical experience, and that something that might be consciously experienced with displeasure, or not even noticed at all, can be pleasurable to a different, unconscious agency.

⁸ The issue which will take us to a more general discussion of rhetoric is how to think about what analytic theory does with "designified" concepts, a question that Abraham does not take up. His argument takes a different turn near the end, turning to an analysis of the concept of the “somatic,” which he argues is not related to the body and is in fact the "depth" and not the "surface," turning on its head the traditional soma/psyche, surface/depth dichotomy. In this he is reading Freud carefully and points out that in fact both terms are inventions, as it were, of the psychic itself, or at least that they come from a discourse concerned with the psychic. And he makes clear that the soma is a projection and peeling off of the psychic, but which works as (or is the name for) a kind of kernel of the unknown and immediately inaccessible to thought.
or element. A “Pleasure that would be suffering” is the opposite experience, then—a conscious pleasure that functions nonetheless as a suffering in the unconscious. This is an illustration of the de- and resignifying aspect of a common word that occurs in psychoanalytic borrowing of a common word such as pleasure. The preexisting signification is emptied out and replaced with at least two other significations (pleasure that would not be pleasure, pleasure that would be pain) that are illogical by the standard of common usage. The referential aspect of signification is loosened and made strange by the anasemic operation of designification.

The anasemic aspect of psychoanalytic discourse “allud[es] to the untouched nucleus of nonpresence—Pleasure, Discharge, the Unconscious (as well as Consciousness and Ego, in their relation to them), [and does] not strictly speaking signify anything, except the founding silence of any act of signification” (84). Abraham argues that there is a "scandalous antisemantics of concepts designified by the action of the psychoanalytic context," and which is revealed by the use of capitals in French, wherein

instead of resignifying them [i.e. concepts], [the uses of capital letters] strip words of their signification, they designify them, so to speak....Their rigor resides in the always singular way in which they oppose semantic actualization—that Pleasure should mean pleasure—all the while referring precisely to the nonpresence from which 'pleasure' emerges and which at the same time manages to be represented in pleasure. (84-5)
“What then,” Abraham writes, “is the principle of coherence of a discourse in which Pleasure no longer means what one feels, in which Discharge refers to something other than what one sees?” (83). Anasemia operates in a way that highlights an underlying nonmeaning in language. Abraham argues that anasemic action empties terms of their everyday associations and contexts and loosens the frame of semantic reference, of paradigmatic relations (e.g. that pleasure is the opposite of pain). The referential function of language in relation to the phenomenal world is already itself at best a presumption rather than a fact, and Abraham emphasizes the loosening of conventional referentialities that is the property of psychoanalytic rhetoricity. Psychoanalytic concepts are neither strictly empirical, nor phenomenological, nor mere parts of a preexisting semantic system: “The language of psychoanalysis no longer follows the twists and turns (topoi) of customary speech and writing” (85). Rather, psychoanalytic theory figures a relationship between the empirical, the phenomenological and the preexisting semantic system. Anasemia names an operation or structure fundamental to psychoanalytic theorizing that leads to or produces metaphoric relationships in analytic theory.

The theoretical aspect of psychoanalysis is unthinkable without also considering the clinical aspect from which it derives and to which it is ultimately directed. The “nonpresence, the kernel and ultimate ground of all discourse” with which psychoanalysis concerns itself in analytic theory has a clinical analogue in “the subject-less, acephalic knowledge that goes by the
name of the unconscious” (Abraham 84, Nobus and Quinn 23). Dany Nobus and Malcolm Quinn define psychoanalytic clinical practice as separate from and even opposed to the search for “a state of full knowledge,” writing that such a state is not an item on the psychoanalytic menu. If anything, the first principle of psychoanalytic research defines clinical practice in a negative way: however much an analysand may be engaged in a search for knowledge [about himself, his symptoms, etc.], the analyst needs to avoid assisting him in the realization of this task.” (22)

Instead, when it comes to clinical practice, “rather than facilitating the accumulation of knowledge, the analytic position is geared towards the ‘fall of knowledge,’ which implies that the search for (better, truthful) knowledge is turned against itself, in the direction of non-knowledge,” which they define not as a Bataille-like self dissolution, but as “an inwardly divided reason….moments of rational inversion, when thought suddenly runs into its unthought and unthinkable Other, when thought loses its meaningful, communicative function and strands into nonsensicality and meaningless” (22, 211).

“Psychoanalysis,” writes Abraham, “stakes out its domain precisely on this unthought ground of phenomenology,” which he refers to as “the opaque indeterminacy of the distance that separates the reflecting subjects from themselves” (84, italics in original). What is a clinical experience and goal for Nobus & Quinn is a theoretical one for Abraham. The nonmeaning
in the analytic situation is a product of the unconscious, and Abraham is here making a move from analytic practice to analytic discourse. The antisemantic aspect of analytic theory (whether notated by capitalization or not) functions as a “ploy” or strategy to maintain the “unthought” and the acephalia of the unconscious in analytic discourse itself. What does it mean to maintain something that is outside of discourse (and perhaps outside of representation, without, however raising it to the level of being "the unrepresentable") in a discourse? For Abraham, this is achieved through "the vigor with which [analytic terms] literally rip themselves away from the dictionary and ordinary language. The allusion to the nonreflexive and the unnamed in fact induces this unprecedented and strange semantic phenomenon" (85). The anasemic dissonance between analytic terms and their everyday counterparts introduces the unthought into discourse through allusion.

For Abraham, psychoanalytic discourse does not fundamentally function through a process of reference, but through allusion. It describes neither the objective world, nor subjective experience, nor even the discursive realm of "ordinary language." And yet

The very fact that, running counter to the known laws of discursive ratiocination, such a discourse [i.e. psychoanalysis] actually occurs—that it evidences genuine impact and fruitfulness—amply confirms that its allusion meets a resonance in us capable of founding the discourse and allowing it to reveal, by its advance toward this
nonpresence in us, the place from which all meaning ultimately
springs. (85)

The dissonance created between analytic terms and their
homophonic/homographic counterparts in everyday language does not
describe, in language, the nonpresence that psychoanalysis encounters in the
clinic. Analytic theory does not name this presence so much as it alludes to it,
Abraham argues, through the designification an curious resignificaiton that
words undergo in the process of being taken up by psychoanalytic discourse.
The power of Abraham’s argument lies in clearly highlighting the anti-
referential character of psychoanalytic terminology, insisting that that the
semiotic aspect of analytic terms is to be found in the relationship between the
signifiers within analytic discourse, the purely internally significant terms or
pairs of terminological relationships that arise in psychoanalytic discourse.
He gives as an example soma and psyche, the concepts whose relationship in
analytic theory take the form of the “anasemic couple, the Nucleo-
Peripheral.” This leads, for Abraham, to a discussion of the paired couple
that he and Maria Torok coin, the “shell” (or “envelope”) and the “kernel,”
which function as an “anasemic compliment” to each other (88, 90). These
terms are anasemic to the degree that they signify primarily in relation to
each other and their place in analytic discourse.

Later in the development of his argument (by which time the envelope
and the kernel is the dominant anasemic pair he employs) Abraham discusses
explicitly the purpose and function of metapsychology in analytic discourse. The “vocation of metapsychology,” he writes, is to translate the phenomena of consciousness—auto- or hetero-perceptions, representations or affects, acts, reasoning or value judgments—into the rigorous symbolic language which reveals the concrete underlying relations that, in each particular case, join the two anasemic poles: the kernel and the envelope. (93-4)

Again, he describes the “ultimate metapsychological meaning” of such formations as the Oedipus complex as lying in “its symbolic value in relation to the two anasemic poles” (95). Abraham gives us the terms anasemia and anasemic as ways of marking a kind of relationship between signifiers that exists outside of a referential operation, while also marking the mode of allusiveness by which these terms operate in relation to nonpresence. If they do not refer to something external, nor to something hidden (as in a hermeneutics), they signify (by allusion) the fall of knowledge that is the clinical experience and theoretical subject par excellence of psychoanalysis.

**On the disruptive potential of rhetoric**

In the first chapter of *The Rule of Metaphor*, which grew out of a seminar given in Toronto in 1971, Paul Ricoeur describes the early history of rhetoric in respect to its relationship with philosophy. I am interested in how the story of this early division, invoked at the behest of philosophy in the form of
a defense, is also a story of the covering over of the relationship between language and reference and of the non-referential elements in language itself. 

Ricoeur notes that rhetoric preexists the discourse of philosophy and has its origin in the praxis of public speaking as oratory, which constitutes a techne “that made persuasion a distinct goal to be achieved by means of specific strategy” (10). Rhetoric represented an epistemological danger to Greek philosophers because “it is always possible for the art of ‘saying it well’ to lay aside concern for ‘speaking the truth’” (10). Persuasion and the interest of the speaker (or the interest(s) he represented) are opposed to the desire of philosophers to speak the truth. Rhetoric is thus condemned by philosophers such as Plato as “belonging to the world of the lie, of the ‘pseudo’” (11). The relationship is thus posed by philosophy as a difference between an interested and a disinterested discourse, but which I prefer to reframe as a difference between two differing interests or desires. As Ricoeur points out, “philosophical discourse is itself just one discourse among others, and its claim to truth excludes it from the sphere of power” (11). From the beginning, then, philosophy is caught up in a struggle for dominance with rhetoric, a dominance that it can only achieve through a project of containment and rationalization in order “to delimit the legitimate uses of forceful speech, to draw the line between use and abuse, and to establish philosophically the connections between the sphere of validity of rhetoric and that of philosophy” (11). Thus philosophy reacts to rhetoric by trying to bring rhetoric under its aegis, to legislate its proper and improper uses.
Ricoeur argues that Aristotle forges the most lasting connection between philosophy and rhetoric under the sign of logic when Aristotle identifies the logical mode of rhetoric as belonging to the probable, which brings persuasion under the rule of logic. The result is thus a “deep-seated conflict between reason and violence” in the history of the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy that contains “two opposed movements, one that inclines rhetoric to break away from philosophy, if not to replace it, and one that disposes philosophy to reinvent rhetoric as a system of second-order proofs” (12).

Rhetoric existed as a part of ancient Greek oratory and predated both philosophy and Aristotle’s philosophical appropriation of it. Indeed, Ricoeur argues that Aristotle’s writing on rhetoric was an attempt to contain and rationalize the disruptive potential of rhetoric. “Because there was oratory, public oratory, there was rhetoric,” he writes. “Originally, speech was a weapon, intended to influence people … called upon to gain victory in battles where the decision hung on the spoken word….Rhetoric was this techne that made discourse conscious of itself and made persuasion a distinct goal to be achieved by means of a special energy” (10). To Ricoeur, rhetoric as techne represents a first domestication of this “undisciplined common speech [l’usage sauvage de la parole] and the wish to harness its dangerous power by means of a special technique. Aristotle’s rhetoric is already a domesticated discipline, solidly bound to philosophy by the theory of argumentation” (10). Ricoeur thus provides a developmental narrative of rhetoric as having a
savage beginning that is progressively domesticated into philosophy. He also argues, as will de Man, that this domestication and limitation continued progressively into the 19th century, where rhetoric was limited to “playing with distinctions and classifications” (12).

For Ricoeur, the relationship between rhetoric and “savage speech” on one hand, and philosophy on the other, is where rhetoric “derived all the ambiguities of its position” (10). Rhetoric is thus characterized as a disrupting and disruptive force that can never quite be eradicated and is therefore in need of containment. “Rhetoric is philosophy’s oldest enemy and its oldest ally,” writes Ricoeur,

“Its oldest enemy” because it is always possible for the art of “saying it well” to lay aside the concern for “speaking the truth.” The technique founded on knowledge of the factors that help to effect persuasion puts formidable power in the hands of anyone who masters it

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9 Ricoeur’s trope of the savage is illustrative to the degree that it characterizes the disruptiveness and dangerousness that philosophy (and perhaps he himself, still) feels toward rhetoric. The metaphor of the savage is a lasting one in the consideration of rhetoric. For example, during the Controversial Discussions in London in the 1940s, the fear of a psychoanalytic theory too in thrall to rhetoric lead Marjorie Brierley to argue that such a mode of reasoning must be avoided lest “we forfeit our claim to be scientists and revert to the primitive state of the Chinese peasant who interprets an eclipse as the sun being swallowed by a dragon. His subjective logic may be unanswerable but his explanation of the event is erroneous” (535).
perfectly—the power to manipulate words apart from things, and to manipulate men by manipulating words. (10-11)

Yet the two goals of “saying it well” and “speaking the truth” need not be as divergent as the classical tradition demands. Such a distinction can be located in the second half of each edict, namely in saying it well and speaking the truth, in which the quality of an utterance, the art and artifice put into its construction, has the power to persuade and lead its listener away from the truth. (Yet it need not be so if we consider the possibility that the rhetor might from time to time have as his client someone in whose interest speaking the truth might be necessary and even desirable.) In any case, the first half of each formulation highlights a similarity rather than a difference—that the goal of both philosophy and rhetoric lie in the pursuit of their respective desires through an articulation in language (saying it well and speaking the truth). In both instances there is a desire and there is language. There is desire in both cases because both have an aim and an object (to borrow two of the three aspects of Freud’s formulation of the drive). The philosopher desires to represent the truth (object) in language (aim), at least ostensibly, and the rhetor desires to serve the interests (object) of those on whose behalf he speaks (aim). In either case, the aim of the desire lies in a field different from language, and language is conceived as a means to an end. The main difference, seen this way, is whether language is considered to
be transparent or opaque. Rhetoric disrupts the idea that the truth is the ultimate goal while also putting into question the very division between “saying it well” and “speaking the truth.” It might be even more radical than Ricoeur’s narrative has it.

In foregrounding the rhetorical, psychoanalysis finds itself in a place where the truth and that which is well said coincide. The truth is that which is well said. Formulating the issue in the register of desire leads us to the desire of the psychoanalyst, who resembles both philosopher and rhetor but is not either one. Strictly speaking, the analyst serves neither the analysand (who is not called the “client,” as in some mental health discourses, for this very reason) nor the truth. He is engaged by the analysand, who pays him, but the analyst does not serve the “interests” of the analysand if those interests are understood to lie at the level of conscious demand. It is most

10 I’m working here at the level of the division proposed by philosophy and popular understanding between philosophy and rhetoric. As I mention above, the more fundamental desire of the philosopher is one of power and domination. In this case, the truth is both the obfuscation and the tool of this desire. In a similar vein, what would be the fundamental desire of the rhetor? Self- or mercenary interest? To play with language—a ludic desire? Or is it a question of his knowledge: that the rhetor knows that language does not serve the truth? In this case we might argue that the philosopher knows this as well, and that the difference between the two lies in how they put such knowledge to use. This is a knowledge that the psychoanalyst also has. Could we say that what distinguishes him from both philosopher and rhetor lies in the use he makes of it?
likely that the conscious demands of the analysand are themselves symptomatic and the analyst must find himself working in opposition to, or at least indifferently to, those demands. Yet neither does the analyst serve the truth understood as an independent universal. Psychoanalysis differs in this way from all kinds of scientism that conceive of the truth (of something) as a mineral buried in a mountain that must be extracted and refined. The desire of the analyst is a desire for the unconscious, and this is achieved by having the analysand speak. In “Constructions in Analysis,” Freud formulates the analyst’s desire as a desire for the analysand to say more, and insists that the confirmation of an interpretation or a construction lies in neither an analysand’s “yes” or “no,” but in the production of associations that result from the interpretation (SE 23:262-7). In saying more, the analysand’s truth manifests itself in language. For Jacques Lacan, who devoted more time than most to a consideration of the analyst’s desire, “the analyst desires that the analysand’s own unique truth emerge in the treatment, a truth that is absolutely different to [sic] that of the analyst; the analyst’s desire is thus ‘a desire to obtain absolute difference’” (S11, 276, in Evans 39).

For the psychoanalyst, a construction is no longer an end, but “only a preliminary labour” (Freud, in Nobus and Quinn 196), and “the task of the psychoanalyst is almost exactly the opposite; that is to employ construction in order to expose the lack of a cognitive destination and an intersubjective dimension for unconscious knowledge” (Nobus and Quinn 196). Freud argues that the analyst’s construction is judged neither by its truth or falsity
with reference to the past or even to the analysand’s psyche. The goal of a construction is to produce more material from the analysand (SE 23:262-7). For Freud, it is neither here nor there if the analyst is “on the money” in his construction, and it does not matter whether the analysand agrees or not. An analytic construction does not seek to contain and represent all there is to say about the psyche, but to allow its saying.

The contingent and open nature of an analytic construction resonates with something in the category of the probable and its relationship to truth that Ricoeur introduces. An analytic construction is neither true nor false (or at the very least it does not have its utility there), but is rather something that might facilitate the emergence of a truth. In this way, a construction can only be judged to have been effective retroactively. Importantly, it is a matter of its being effective, not true—a truth uttered by the analyst at an inopportune moment might lead to a resistance and a stop to the work of the analysand, whereas a construction that isn’t true, or is true only provisionally, might lead to more work.

De Man, rhetoric and “literariness”

In “The Resistance to Theory,” Paul de Man picks up the history of rhetoric at the time of its inclusion into the classical trivium along with grammar and logic as the three sciences of language. De Man claims that this grouping, which is further coupled to the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music), contains and covers over “a set of unresolved
tensions” that continues to play out into the present day (13). The link between the *trivium* and *quadrivium*, he writes, is traditionally “accomplished by way of logic, the area where the rigor of the linguistic discourse about itself matches up with the rigor of the mathematical discourse about the world” and represents

a clear instance of the interconnection between a science of the phenomenal world and a science of language conceived as definitional logic, the pre-condition for a correct axiomatic-deductive, synthetic reasoning….this articulation of the sciences of language with the mathematical sciences represents a continuity between a theory of language, as logic, and the knowledge of the phenomenal world to which mathematics gives access. (13)

It is the ability of a discourse to have access to the phenomenal world and to be able to speak about it—and to speak truths about it—that defines the epistemological project connecting the *trivium* and *quadrivium*.

De Man argues that there exists, within the *trivium*, a continuity that is established according to the above epistemological project, namely the connection between logic and grammar. Grammar functions here as the science of language which would be (in a proposed future) “applicable to the generation of all texts” and would allow for a universal intelligibility and translatability of language (14). “Grammar stands in the service of logic which, in turn, allows for the passage to the knowledge of the world” because “grammar is by definition capable of extra-linguistic generalization” and
serves a program dedicated “towards the mastering and the clarification of meaning” (14, 15). Grammar serves as the techne that allows the formation of a link between language and the world. It allows itself to perform an adequation between language and the world. As it was in the Greek philosophical tradition, rhetoric is once again reduced to a description of the tropes and techniques by which language might be manipulated as part of “the semantic agent of the specific function (or effect) that rhetoric performs as persuasion as well as meaning” (15). The focus on grammar, de Man argues, “is part of an explicit program, a program that is entirely admirable in its intent since it tends towards the mastering and the clarification of meaning” (15). That is to say, it is admirable to the extent that it is a “replacement of a hermeneutic with a semiotic model, of interpretation by decoding,” but it also sidesteps the question of figuration and of the realm of rhetoric altogether: “There are elements in all texts that are by no means ungrammatical, but whose semantic function is not grammatically definable” (15-16). De Man argues that the “tension” present in the group that makes up the trivium consists precisely in the containment of the threatening qualities of rhetoric, were they to be considered properly. In particular, he writes, “[r]hetoric, by its actively negative relationship to grammar and to logic, certainly undoes the claims of the trivium (and by extension, of language) to be an epistemologically stable construct. . . . The model of the trivium contains within itself the pseudo-dialectic of its own undoing” (17).
The rhetorical “operates on the level of the signifier and contains no responsible pronouncement on the nature of the world.” De Man gives a name to “this autonomous potential of language” by calling it “literariness” (10). In his essay, de Man characterizes the realm of literature as that domain in which literariness is of primary concern and is most apparent. De Man defines literature as fiction “because it is not a priori certain that language functions according to principles which are those, or which are like those, of the phenomenal world. It is not therefore a priori certain that literature is a reliable source of information about anything but its own language” (11). Yet if the definition of literature as fiction involves a claim about language in general (he does not write “this language,” or “literary language,” or some other qualifier), then the notion of literariness can and must be extended to other discourses even if they do not explicitly thematize or be entirely about this function of language. Literature, for de Man, is an exemplary case of the general nonreferentiality of language.

While elaborating his theory of “literariness,” de Man insists on its distinctness from aesthetics and identifies it with the field of rhetoric. Using Proust as an example, he argues that the literariness of Proust’s text is a rhetorical rather than an aesthetic function of language, an identifiable trope (paronomasis) that operates on the level of the signifier and contains no responsible pronouncement on the nature of the world—despite its powerful potential to create the opposite illusion. The phenomenality of the signifier, as sound, is
unquestionably involved in the correspondence between the name and
the thing named, but the link, the relationship between word and
thing, is not phenomenal but conventional…”

to which he adds, a few sentences later, that literariness “is also not primarily
mimetic” (10). Instead however, “[T]his gives the language considerable
freedom from referential restraint, but it makes it epistemologically highly
suspect and volatile, since its use can no longer be said to be determined by
considerations of truth and falsehood, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, or
pleasure or pain” (10). Whereas de Man identifies poetics with aesthetics
and the study of tropes as such (which is placed in opposition to
hermeneutics as the study of meaning and of the adequation between
language and the world), rhetoric is conceived as a field that is concerned
with “a system of tropes that would be productive of meaning” but which is
also always already unreliable (“The Task of the Translator” 91). It is the
epistemological instability of the relationship between language and meaning
that constitutes the rhetorical dimension for de Man. For this reason, I choose
to utilize the term rhetoric in this study, since I am interested in the unstable
area between language and the world that makes up the psychoanalytic
clinical situation and that is at play in the psychoanalytic theorizations as
expressed in writing.

De Man discusses language’s referential function by questioning the
assumption that language is like the world and can thus represent it. And
while he uses literature as his example here, it is the “literariness” of
literature that makes such a questioning possible. The discourse of psychoanalysis possesses this quality of literariness and may thus be considered in the manner de Man discusses since it is a discourse in which the referential function is very much in question and in which the role of rhetoric in the construction of meaning is paramount. For psychoanalysis, which dwells within the disconnect between language and the world and the construction of the latter by the former, it is very much a question of determining the operative principles of language and the principles by which language functions in the world.

Yet the question arises: isn’t psychoanalysis a discourse that purports to describe and address the phenomenal world? Or at least, doesn’t it claim to describe something that exists outside it (outside its discourse): symptoms, inhibitions, dreams—in other words, the mind? But psychoanalysis is not primarily the study of the brain (neurology) or of actions and behaviors out of which the existence of a mind is postulated (psychology). Psychoanalysis is a discourse on a discourse, specifically the discourse of the analysand (or perhaps of the unconscious). The clinical specificity of analysis is based on the existence of an analysand who speaks. Psychoanalytic practice operates from, on, and through speech and language. Psychoanalytic theory as a discourse arises out of this encounter with the speech of the analysand and is a discourse on that discourse. The “reality” to which psychoanalysis is addressed is thus not the phenomenal world, but the reality of the analysand’s language. We might playfully recall de Man’s description of
Proust’s text, and claim that like literature, psychoanalysis “operates on the level of the signifier and contains no responsible pronouncement on the nature of the world—despite its powerful potential to create the opposite illusion” (“Resistance to Theory” 10).

If the value and epistemological role of analytic theory is not referential, is it analogical or metaphorical? I don’t wish to argue that there is no referential aspect at all in analytic theory, merely that the epistemological model is not one of constructing a theoretical edifice that only speaks about the psyche or the analytic situation. Removed from its referential function—or understood at least to be acting independently and in excess of it—the figurative language of a given analytic theorist develops on its own. It develops out of itself and, like a good (analytic) construction, leads not to a referential truth—it is neither true nor false—but rather to more work. As in the analytic setting, the work takes the form of saying more. A study of the rhetorical aspect of psychoanalytic theoretical language makes visible the interdependence of the theoretical work and its figural coordinates.

Rhetoric, as I understand it in this study, is not a supplement to reference. It is not also merely a list of techniques and tactics. Rhetoric is the field where language works on itself and where a certain kind of creation is made possible. It is the realm of literariness that is not outside of, but elsewhere than, the “frame” of reference. It is to be evaluated, if at all, by what it makes possible. As de Man shows, rhetoric introduces logical incoherences into language, but at the same time it can allow for new figures
to emerge. Like a construction in analysis it is not a question of whether literariness in analytic theory is true or false, since being true (but in the wrong place) may lead to resistance and halt and close off the discourse of the unconscious.¹¹

Methodologically, I follow through the strands of figural language to see where they go—or how far they go. This is done not to reach a goal, but to determine, nachträglich, what has happened and what has been being expressed all along. Stupidity is a non-relational knowledge for Nobus and Quinn. How might we to trace out the stupidity—in its maddening non-referentiality—in psychoanalytic discourse?

**Conclusion**

In the following chapters I analyze two related aspects of psychoanalytic discourse that I have sketched out above. First, I analyze the emergence of a specific instance of psychoanalytic discourse inaugurated by Melanie Klein. I argue that in reorienting the coordinates of the interrelations between elements in psychoanalytic discourse, Klein produces a transformation in psychoanalytic theory. A shift in the prefigurative ground of analytic discourse, specifically with reference to dominant spatial

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¹¹ Or it may simply lead to agreement, at which point nothing more may seem need to be said. The construction will have veered into the territory of reference and correspondence, and both parties will be satisfied (if only briefly) in having “said it.” And in being false it may lead to more speech. This is Freud’s lesson.
metaphors, effects a shift in the form and content of the theory. In addition, I show that Klein’s transformation of analytic theory has a history in two senses: In the one sense, Klein’s theory is the result of a practice of reading prior psychoanalytic texts. It is an intertextual history of a reading practice. In the other sense, Klein’s theory is embedded in a history of clinical encounters with analysands at the margins of then-contemporary analytic theory, primarily children and psychotics, and represents a response to such encounters. I argue that it is only through an analysis of the figural coordinates of psychoanalytic theory and their shifts that the development of psychoanalytic theory can be properly understood and submitted to any further scrutiny or evaluation. Such a mode of analysis is applied to the specific case of Melanie Klein, but is designed to be applicable to any instance of rhetorical transformation in psychoanalytic theory.

In my third chapter I take up the question raised in the second part of this introductory chapter, namely the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and the clinic, focusing specifically on how psychoanalytic theory theorizes the relationship between the clinical and the theoretical. I have chosen a text by J.-B. Pontalis, titled Windows, which approaches this topic from an oblique angle. I argue that Windows situates itself in response to two questions: the question of the drive towards systematization in and of psychoanalytic theory, and the question of how to represent the experience of clinic in writing in the face of its seeming impossibility.
Pontalis’ work is an appeal for a kind of writing of psychoanalysis—of writing about psychoanalysis—that pays attention to elements shared by literary language and psychoanalysis. Pontalis’ texts, I argue, thematize and enact a stylistics of evocation, rupture, resistance, and dream that seeks to, as he puts it, “transpose the movement and the rhythm of the word.” Being attentive to this movement and rhythm contributes to thinking about how psychoanalysis writes itself—for example, as theory, as case history, as memoir—while it struggles with the question of what is elusive in the representation of the analytic situation.

This dissertation seeks to contribute to a critical approach that would make it possible to develop a comparative analysis of psychoanalytic theories and an understanding of the differences between the many diverse theoretical approaches that constitute the field of psychoanalysis. In offering a focus on the role of rhetoric and figurative language in the construction and dissemination of psychoanalytic theory, I hope to contribute to a fuller understanding of psychoanalysis and its relationship to literature. Such a focus seeks to exemplify a literary analytical approach to psychoanalysis that derives its mode of investigation from a close attention to the rhetorical construction of psychoanalysis and the underlying themes that animate it, putting psychoanalysis in conversation with larger questions within the humanities about the structure and construction of discourses and the epistemological status of theory in relation to its object of inquiry.
Chapter 2
Melanie Klein and the Transformation of Spatial Metaphors in Psychoanalytic Theory

Introduction

In this chapter I consider the function of rhetoric in the construction of Melanie Klein’s theories of early psychic functioning. I begin by situating her historically as part of a new wave of psychoanalytic thinking that began in the late 1920s and that took hold most notably in England, which became Klein’s adopted home in 1926. This wave of thinking took up the question of child analysis and a theorization of early psychic functioning. Initially on the fringe of a psychoanalytic movement whose intellectual, geographical and German-language speaking center was in Vienna and Berlin, the psychoanalytic scene in Britain initially provided an atmosphere of clinical and theoretical experimentation in which Klein was able to develop her theory. I then consider Klein’s status as a writer and how Klein’s writing has been received and considered by psychoanalysts and other critics and how it has led to certain blindnesses and misreadings of Klein’s texts. What follows is a reconsideration of her work that focuses on her reworking of spatial metaphors in the rhetorical construction of analytic theory.

I argue that Klein intervenes in psychoanalytic theory at the places where it had, until then, come up short and remained undertheorized—in this case early childhood and psychosis. Klein’s interventions here are as
much rhetorical as they are theoretical, and this chapter examines the moments in Klein’s theory where the theoretical and rhetorical become difficult prise apart. It is in these moments that a rhetorical shift enacts a theoretical one, sometimes vice versa, and allows for more work. In particular, Klein develops a series of shifts in the theorization of psychic structure, which are accompanied by a shift in the metaphorical ground by which that structure is imagined. Klein enacts a shift from a surface/depth metaphoric binarism to one of outside/inside, which arises in response to and allows for the theorization of her clinical work with children. I also argue that this shift occurs in tandem with her theorization of psychosis and of what she will come to call “schizoid mechanisms.”12 For this I introduce a Lacanian perspective on psychosis as a way of making sense of Klein’s move both theoretically and rhetorically. I end the chapter by demonstrating how the development of Klein’s theories of early mental functioning represents an addition to and reorientation of Freud’s theory of the drives and primary and secondary processes, for which Karl Abraham’s elaboration of pre-oedipal drive theory provides a bridge.

**Klein as a Nomad**

Julia Kristeva has characterized Klein’s life as nomadic, figuring Klein’s life as part of a topography that spans Europe as a set of places,

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12 This term is introduced by Klein in her 1946 paper, “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms” (Envy and Gratitude 1-24).
languages and psychoanalytic schools. Kristeva lists the itinerary of Klein’s life, the itinerary of a “nomad of sorts: Vienna, Rosenberg, Krappitz, Budapest, Berlin and London, with several addresses in Berlin and five different houses in London. Her son Eric claimed never to have had a home of his own” (196). The first city in the list marks the town of Klein’s birth and upbringing, the second and third her residences during her marriage to Arthur Klein. The next two are the cities of her analytic training (with Sandor Ferenczi in Budapest and Karl Abraham in Berlin), and the last two are the cities where Klein developed her psychoanalytic theory. Kristeva’s metaphor of nomadism highlights the fundamental lack of grounding in a homeland and a language that characterizes Klein’s biography.

Although she was a native German speaker, Klein chose to write in English after her move to London in 1926. A few years before the move, she began learning English with Alix Strachey in Berlin, who eventually referred Klein to a more formal tutor. Klein did not take very easily to English and despite writing in English (as well as the necessity of thinking and speaking in English in order to work with her English analysands) she always “relied on her anglophone friends” when it came to her writing, a practice of collaboration that continued throughout Klein’s lifetime (Kristeva 193). The reverse is also true, as Klein was not infrequently active in the production of

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13 Kristeva neglects to include Klein’s brief but important move to Pitlochry, Scotland during the war, where she treated Richard, the account of which would later be published as a book-length case study, **Narrative of a Child Analysis**.
texts by those who would become her followers or allies. For example, “On the Nature and Function of Phantasy,” Susan Isaacs’ seminal paper presented during the Controversial Discussions, was written “under the constant guidance of Melanie Klein” (Steiner 42).14

Klein’s nomadic status has also been suggested as one of the reasons for her mode of reworking Freud’s texts. At the time she began writing, the center of the psychoanalytic movement was German-speaking and continental: Freud’s Vienna and the Psychoanalytic Clinic in Berlin, plus other important nodes in Switzerland, Germany and Hungary. The “fringe location” (Judith Hughes, in Sanchez-Pardo 197) of England was therefore a linguistic and geographical one, but it was also a cultural one. Many of the British analysts such as Fairbairn, Winnicott, Bion, and Klein were not personally analyzed by Freud. This lack of a personal analytical link to Freud marked Klein as different from the earlier generation of psychoanalysts, including some of the earlier and more “institutional” British analysts such as

14 The question, for psychoanalysis, of what might be called the “patrimony” of a given text, that is, who wrote it and also whose ideas it represents, has always been a part of the psychoanalytic tradition. Take, for example, the fate of Sabina Spielrein’s paper “Die Destructions als Ursache des Werdens,” which was ignored by the psychoanalytic establishment for eight years because Freud suspected it of representing not her own ideas but the views of her former teacher, analyst and lover Carl Jung (see de Lauretis 93-5) The anxiety of patrimony runs through and at times structures Freud’s own texts as well (see, for example, Meisel 58).
Ernest Jones, James and Alix Strachey, or Joan Riviere. Hughes has suggested that Britain’s multiply fringe location “may have lessened [the British analysts’] commitment to Freudian solutions and prompted a readiness to entertain alternatives” such as the work of Klein (in Sanchez-Pardo 197). The fringe aspect of British Psychoanalysis allowed Klein to develop her theory amid significant local idiosyncrasies, among them a strong proportion of female analysts, of lay analysts (of both genders), and an openness to clinical and theoretical experimentation in less established fields, most notably child analysis.

Kristeva helps us frame the question: is it possible to consider Klein as a writer as we do Freud? Specifically, Kristeva asks if it is possible “to speak of Klein’s text like we do Freud’s, as a body of work” (197). Kristeva calls attention to Klein’s problematic relation to her two major languages, German and English: “We read Freud like a body of work that is rooted, as hers is, in the very flesh of language. But Melanie did not partake of the memory of the German language; rather she was a member of a different class of thinkers who worked in an international laboratory and expressed themselves in a

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15 “Institutional” in the sense that they represented the psychoanalytic institution in England. Jones was a close confidante of Freud and would become an early President of the BPS and the IPA, as well as the motive force behind the Standard Edition. James Strachey was the General Editor of the Standard Edition of Freud in English, and he and Alex were also major translators for it. Riviere, who would quickly become a strong supporter of Klein, was also an early translator of Freud’s works.
universal code” (197). Unlike Freud, who wrote as a member of the Austro-German literary and rhetorical tradition and who established psychoanalytic discourse, Klein was writing in what was already, in the mid-1920s, an international and multilingual community of analysts and interested readers that in effect constituted a new writing/literary tradition.

At the same time, Kristeva’s reference to universality seems overstated, even if it was a goal of the international psychoanalytic institution as a part of the Eurocentric universalist tradition. Psychoanalysis has often maintained a regional character (as Elizabeth Roudinesco has suggested) tied to the inherent regionality of its analysands and to the literary and linguistic traditions of the country in which it is experienced and written.16 True, the internationality of the psychoanalytic community was immensely beneficial to Klein and the development of her thought. It allowed her to migrate from

16 In her preface to Jacques Lacan & Co., Roudinesco writes “The terms French, American, Viennese, or Jewish psychoanalysis is incorrect. I have used them only ‘metaphorically,’ or in order to relate them to authors who have defined them in a specific ideological context. There is no French psychoanalysis, but a French situation of psychoanalysis, as idiosyncratic as that of other countries. Theory, like thought itself, knows neither national boundaries nor homelands, but the conditions under which it is pursued are always national and language-bound” (xvii). For the purposes of this study I would add “British” to her list of “metaphorical” psychoanalyses. More significantly I would also add to Roudinesco’s understanding of “situation” not only the ideological one, but also a rhetorical one. It is the contention of this study that the “situations” of psychoanalysis cannot be thought of adequately without considering their rhetorical inflections.
the analytic association in Budapest to Berlin and ultimately to London, where her thinking found its greatest and most immediate acceptance. But Kristeva’s claim that there was “a universal code” of expression seems off the mark. Rather, as Kristeva herself describes it, the rootlessness that allowed Klein to move around Europe also contributed to a “linguistic estrangement” that placed Klein outside the writing traditions of her adopted cities and that contributed to a nomadic sensibility and existence “which had estrangement at its very core” (197).

Klein was part of neither a local language tradition nor a universal “international laboratory,” but established her body of work in a place of nomadic estrangement that finds its clinical corollary in her experiences working with young children, where the analyst places herself in a space that is unfamiliar and foreign, namely the phantasies of her child patients:

every language was a foreign language as if it were a dream, as Freud taught her....It is because the mother tongue, from the perspective of the place where Melanie situated herself—from the nonplace where she situated herself—is from the outset a foreign language. There is a foreign aspect to what is familiar, a maternal uncanniness that lurks beneath. (Kristeva 198, italics in original)

Kristeva suggests that Klein’s experience of nomadism—of finding herself so often on the move, always in different houses, countries, languages, psychoanalytic communities—made her more open and receptive to exploring the unfamiliar territory of childhood phantasy. Klein the nomad
was most at home in “the nonplace where she situated herself” (198).

Kristeva writes of the estrangement that characterized Klein’s existence:

The foreign language was its visible side—English obviously, but, even more fundamentally, psychoanalysis itself as a system with the idiolect of “Kleinian theory” its crowning glory. We see Melanie the clinician who descended “over there,” by way of her phantasy, to the wordless place of inhibited, psychotic, and autistic childhood, and we also see Klein the head of a school of thought who spoke, schematized, and supervised her underlings. (197, italics in original).

This “idiolect” reflects the topographical (or cartographical) metaphor of nomadic rootlessness and estrangement and points to a major theme of Kleinian metapsychology--the reorientation of the surface/depth model into one of different regions (and/or languages), an inside and an outside constructed contingently and on the fly, continually renewed and renegotiated.

**Klein’s Style**

The question of Klein as a writer also means to think of Klein’s status as a writer, to think of how Klein’s writing has been received and considered by psychoanalysts and other critics. On the one hand, Klein’s contributions to psychoanalytic theory and technique are understood, even by those who disagree, to be considerable and vastly influential. Her development of the play technique with children was revolutionary for child analysis, and
concepts that she introduced or reformulated, such as projective identification and part objects, have informed much of analytic theory. And yet on the other hand, her status as a writer, even among her strongest supporters, is less surely established. Often, Klein’s thinking and her conceptual and technical contributions are praised while her actual writing is denigrated such that in all but her most perceptive critical commentators, Klein’s writing is perceived as a stumbling block or barrier to the expression as well as understanding of her thinking. The quick dismissal of Klein’s writing ability acts as a kind of involuntary tic.

This tendency is expressed in two related ways. On the one hand, Klein’s writing style itself is considered poor or problematic. Meira Likierman, in Melanie Klein: Her Work in Context, refers to the strong objections and hostility that Klein’s ideas engendered and ties it directly to her writing, claiming that

Such reactions can partly be traced to difficulties which were of Klein’s own making, and this included the poor presentation of her ideas and what it appeared to indicate about her mode of approach to constructing a theory of mind. This approach was closely bound up with a personality which was teeming with enthusiasm, intuitions and insights, but which was correspondingly impatient to communicate findings and careless in formulating and expressing them. (3) Even Kristeva, one of Klein’s deepest admirers and subtlest readers, has referred to the “cumbersome quality of her writings” (198-9). On the other
hand, Klein was considered by her critics to be unscientific in her method of reasoning, evidence of which was to be found in her writing style (a claim Likierman also reflects). Edward Glover has criticized Klein by claiming that she “cannot tell a developmental story straight” (in Rose 146), and complains that “unless one is at pains to correct this ‘hop, skip and jump’ method, disciplined argumentation is impossible” (558). Pearl King characterizes the objections to Klein’s writing in her discussion of the Controversial Discussions, which were very much animated by concern over Klein’s theories, in this way: “because she [Klein] often formulated her ideas in descriptive rather than conceptual terms her theories were easy to apply to a quick understanding of a patient’s material and could easily be shared with colleagues without the hard work that would have been involved in conceptualizing them in terms of the metapsychology of classical theory” (22).¹⁷ King then goes on to quote Marjorie Brierley, who claimed that in

¹⁷ The Controversial Discussions, have they have come to be called, were a series of meetings held by members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society between 1942 and 1945. The meetings, and the papers presented in the course of these meetings, were concerned with questions of psychoanalytic theory and the training of analysts, particularly the role of Klein’s ideas and whether they were to be considered orthodox or not. In the end, it was resolved by a sort of agreement to disagree. The three strains of analytic theory that emerged from the meetings were each represented by three different training groups, Kleinians, Freudians (a more conservative group represented by Anna Freud), and the Middle group. The Controversial Discussions represented the first real theoretical crisis in analytic discourse where Freud’s
Klein, “Generalizations tended to be expressed in perceptual rather than conceptual terms” (in King 22).

Phyllis Grosskurth, Klein’s biographer, has characterized Klein’s taking up of the “challenge posed by Freud” in the following terms:

Lacking a biological background, she interpreted the death instinct strictly in psychological terms; she had no conception of behavior that was not purposeful. She was talking about constellations of mental impulses, the destruction of the object by incorporation or some other means. In the infant, the death instinct operates as a projection of aggression in fear of annihilation. Whereas for Freud the infant is unaware of death as such. She always believed that she was following a lead suggested by Freud, but, unlike Freud, she was not the product of a mechanistic nineteenth-century biology, and had no real understanding of instinct in the sense Freud meant. What Klein saw was that the children she was treating were engaged in destructive activity, and she termed this the operation of the death instinct. For her a drive was not a directionless, tension-producing stimulus only unassailable fiat of communion or excommunication was absent, and where the members of the analytic community had to come to a decision on their own. It was in many ways a matter of Klein and her followers, engaged in a remetaphorization and re-invigoration of analytic thinking, coming up against a post-Freudian drive to normalize, regulate and render psychoanalytic discourse “scientific,” now that its inventor and master rhetor was dead. The full record of these meetings have been collected by Pearl King and Ricardo Steiner as The Freud-Klein Controversies 1941-45.
secondarily attached to an object. Both libido and aggression she viewed as inherently directional longings, and the drives were in effect relationships. (108)

The language used in the above passages to describe Klein’s thinking and writing is of particular interest. Klein’s formulation of her ideas, as Brierley puts it, “in descriptive rather than conceptual terms” leads those ideas to be criticized for the ease with which they can be applied and shared, and the “quick understanding” of clinical material that they allow for. Klein is reprimanded for not having performed the “hard work” of “conceptualizing” her ideas according to orthodox metapsychological theory. The distinction between Klein’s descriptive, easy path and the proper, conceptual, difficult path is reproduced in Likierman’s characterization of Klein’s writing as being motivated by “personality teeming with enthusiasm, intuitions and insights,” faint praise when this is considered to be responsible for the impatience and carelessness in “formulating and expressing” her ideas (Likierman 3). For Grosskurth, though speaking more specifically of the way Klein was working through Freud’s ideas, Klein’s ideas are based ultimately on an intuitive perception (“what she saw was”)—a perception that failed to formalize itself in the mechanistic biological framework that she was incapable of grasping, conceiving of, or understanding, though Grosskurth does point to a more substantive understanding of Klein’s work when she identifies the psychological, subjective orientation of Klein’s theory. That Klein’s conceptual system does not follow Freud’s closely enough is also problematic
for her detractors. As Jacqueline Rose has pointed out, in failing to follow the already established categories and conceptual framework, “Klein, in the eyes of her critics, theoretically disinherits herself” (146).\textsuperscript{18}

The persistent misogynistic cast of such characterizations of Klein’s writing (by friends and foes alike), in which Klein’s inherent feminine intuition is praised while her inability to think conceptually is criticized, is as problematic as it is misleading. Indeed, it is necessary to point out that Klein didn’t (or didn’t simply) fail to conceive of the mind biologically, for to do so imagines Klein in a place of non-conception and, also, non-understanding. Klein’s differences from Freud do not result in a conceptionless and therefore merely intuitive and discursive theory, but rather they result in a rearticulation of psychoanalytic theory according to a different set of tropes, along a different rhetorical axis. In fact, it is the case that Freud’s polysemous texts contain within them a multiplicity of rhetorical frameworks that overdetermine his writing to the degree that most quick summaries of Freud (as, for example, Freud as mechanist biologist) perpetrate such violence on Freud’s text as to be valuable only as a polemic.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} This last issue will become less of a problem after the war as the Kleinian conceptual apparatus comes to be organized and formalized into a system by Klein’s supporters and followers.

\textsuperscript{19} For example, Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, which was so influential on Klein, is a text where object relations and the mechanistic libido theory exist, if somewhat uncomfortably, side by side.
The general understanding or characterization of Klein’s writing as problematic or poor is misleading because it has led to a comparative lack of focus on the particularities of Klein’s writing and her use of language, including such elements as her use of concrete language in describing unconscious mental functioning and her use of a metaphorics of inside and outside to formulate her conception of the mind. In addition, it is beside the point whether Klein’s language is a case of “bad” or “poor” writing. It very well may be, but such aesthetic claims are only of interest to the degree that such claims mislead or waylay a critical approach to her use of language.

I suggest that Kristeva’s phrase, “a maternal uncanniness that lurks beneath,” can be used to think about the fundamental source of the reemphasis that the Kleinian reading makes in the direction of orality, namely the pre-Oedipal psychic life of young children (198). In refocusing her clinical and theoretical lens on early psychic functioning, Klein finds it necessary—or at the very least useful—to reorient the Freudian rhetoric, to change its emphasis. In doing so, Klein picks up on certain less developed, neglected or less-integrated elements of Freud’s rhetorical field (orality, the maternal, the inside/outside paradigm, the language of subjective experience, etc.). The change in emphasis also means that certain other Freudian elements atrophy or become reduced, which is one way of understanding Grosskurth’s claim that Klein misunderstood Freud’s concept of drive because, “unlike Freud,

20 An exception to this is Ester Sanchez-Pardo in *Cultures of the Death Drive: Melanie Klein and Modernist Melancholia.*
she was not the product of a mechanistic nineteenth-century biology, and had no real understanding of instinct in the sense Freud meant” (108). The “non-place,” to use Kristeva’s term again, from which Klein approaches Freud—Klein’s lack of mechanistic biological understanding, for example—seems to Grosskurth to be an empty place. This can only be the case if Freud’s texts are reduced to one of their modes, mechanistic biology, as Grosskurth does here. Klein comes at Freud, indeed, from a different angle, but that angle is no less Freudian than Grosskurth’s characterization of Freud.

Conspicuously absent in the above discussions of Klein’s theory is the clinical aspect of Klein’s work. Klein’s clinical experiences with her child analysands is so fundamental to her theory and her writing that it is nonsensical to discuss one without the other. Klein’s theory, and the language that she employs to elaborate it, arise as a direct consequence of the clinical technique that she developed to work with young children, whose modes of expression was previously inaccessible to the traditional “talking cure.” Klein’s theory and the play technique that she invented cannot be easily separated. They create and inform each other.

Klein’s Retroping of the Metaphorics of the “Child-mind”

Psychoanalysis has been faced with the question of the origins of mental functioning since its own origin in Freud’s theory. For Freud, psychoanalysis was unable to speculate theoretically about the earliest era of psychic development, especially up to roughly the first year or two after
birth. “Most of the repressions with which we have to deal in our therapeutic work are cases of after-pressure,” he writes at the beginning of Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. “They presuppose the operation of earlier, primal repressions which exert an attraction on the more recent situation. Far too little is known as yet about the background and the preliminary stages of repression” (SE 20:94, italics in original). For Klein, it becomes a question of how psychoanalysis can both imagine early psychic functioning and treat patients who still inhabit this early era, namely children. The result of this on the clinical level was that the psychoanalysis of young children was not pursued in depth until the early 1920s, when both Anna Freud and Melanie Klein began to publish accounts of their work with children.21 Klein’s clinical play technique quickly drew interest. In addition, Klein’s early papers began very clearly to exhibit theoretical characteristics that would come to define the Kleinian approach. In between the theory and the technique, we can see in her use of language a desire begin to be realized—not simply the ability to work with young children in a way that Freud did not, nor to theoretically develop the makeup of the early stages of psychic development introduced by Abraham, but to be present at such an early stage and to experience it directly—something structurally impossible for adults in analytic theory.

A remarkable passage from Klein’s 1926 paper, “Psychological Principles of Infant Analysis,” is quite instructive here:

Another early pioneer in the field of child psychoanalysis was Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth.
In the *History of an Infantile Neurosis*, Freud says: “An analysis which is conducted upon a neurotic child itself must, as a matter of course, appear to be more trustworthy, but it cannot be very rich in material; too many words and thoughts have to be lent to the child, and even so the deepest strata may turn out to be impenetrable to consciousness.”\(^{22}\)

If we approach children with the technique appropriate to the analysis of adults we shall assuredly not succeed in penetrating to the deepest layers of the child’s mental life. But it is precisely these layers which are of moment for the value and success of an analysis.\(^{23}\) If, however, we take into account the psychological differences between children and adults and bear in mind the fact that in children we find *Ucs* [the system unconscious] still in operation side by side with *Cs* [the system consciousness], the most primitive tendencies side by side with those most complicated developments known to us, such as the super-ego—if, that is to say, we rightly understand the child’s mode of expression, all these doubtful points and unfavorable factors vanish.

For we find that, as regards the depth and scope of the analysis, we

\(^{22}\)Klein is referring here to Freud’s only published case history of a child analysis in 1910, referred to as the case of “Little Hans”. It should be noted that Freud did not treat the child directly, but through consultations with Hans’ father.

\(^{23}\)It will be noted that this passage retains a sense of Freud’s metaphor of layering (surface/depth). Klein’s early work, of which this is an example, represents a transition from one metaphorical paradigm to another. This is addressed in more detail below.
may expect as much from children as from adults. And more still, in the analysis of children we can go back to experiences and fixations which in analysing adults we can only reconstruct, while in children they are directly represented. (Love, Guilt and Reparation 65, italics in original)

For Klein, understanding “rightly” consists of two different yet connected elements, an understanding of the structure of the psyche (especially how it differs in children and adults) and an understanding of “the child’s mode of expression.” She is clear that the former is only possible by way of the latter. An understanding of the structure of the psyche is founded on an understanding and analysis of another structure, the child’s mode of expression. Knowledge and understanding begins from the analyst’s being attentive to the child’s “mode of expression.” Like Freud, Klein begins from a kind of text. While behaviors and actions and (less so with children) speech are the material the analyst is provided with, it is necessary to attend to the mode, to the relations between and within a given expression. The guarantee for the possibility of this understanding is Klein’s claim that “we can go back” to early experiences and that they are not merely “reconstructions” but are “directly represented” and witnessed, as Kristeva might have it, by the analyst.

Klein’s text addresses origins and the issue of rhetoricity, and her early writing embodies the attempt to address the question both clinically (in child analysis) and theoretically. For her, the analyst can “see” the workings of the
earliest phantasies directly. As noted above, the translation in the original 1926 paper includes the phrase, “while in children they are *directly* represented.” The revised translation of chapter 1 of *The Psychoanalysis of Children* reads “whereas the child shows them to us as immediate representations” (9). The phrase used in Klein’s German edition of that book is “*während sie uns das Kind unmittelbar darstellt*” (*Psychanalyse des Kindes* 21, italics in original).24 *The Psychoanalysis of Children* also includes a footnote to this passage:

> Early analysis offers one of the most fruitful fields for psycho-analytic therapy precisely because the child has *the ability to represent its unconscious in a direct way*, and is thus not only able to experience a far-reaching emotional abreaction but actually to live through the original situation in its analysis, so that with the help of interpretation its fixations can to a considerable extent be resolved. (9, italics mine)25

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24 This essay/chapter has a complicated and translinguististic history. It was first read by Klein as a paper to the BPS in English, from a translation by Alix Strachey of Klein’s original German notes. It was then published in 1926 as the first of Klein’s essays to appear originally in an English-language journal. The essay was then revised by Klein and included as the first chapter in her German-language book, *Die Psychoanalyse des Kindes*, published in 1932, simultaneously with Alix Strachey’s English translation. The book’s English translation was then revised in 1975 by H. A. Thorner and published as volume two of *The Writings of Melanie Klein*.

25 In German, “the ability to represent its unconscious in a direct way” appears as “*diese unmittelbare Darstellung*,” which repeats the exact wording of
It is worth examining both “directly” and “represented” (unmittelbar and darstellt) closely. Unmittelbar’s translation as “immediate” is useful, if one keeps in mind the negative sense of “without mediation” that it carries. Direct(ly) and immediate(ly), the child’s play makes present what in the adult is only reconstructed. It appears in the present whereas for the adult it is lost to the past—or to the unconscious, which is timeless, but also never directly accessible, a temporal unavailability transformed into a structural one. For the young child, Klein writes, this transformation has not yet finished taking place. What appears has not ceased to happen, but is still happening. From an orthodox Freudian standpoint this seemingly makes no sense. What defines repression is that it has already happened. And while a continual after-pressure might be necessary to maintain the repression, what is repressed has already been repressed—in the past. For Klein, however, the repressed material (experiences, thoughts) has not finished happening, it is in the process of happening (the first time around).

the prior adverbial phrase while transforming the verb (darstellen) into a noun (Darstellung), an economy of terms that gets somewhat diffused in the English versions. The wording and syntax of the German and English versions of the footnote differ somewhat. This is the complete German version: “Diese unmittelbaren Darstellungen, die neben der weitgehenden Abreaktion der Affekte das vollkommenste Durchleben der ursprünglichen Situation in der Analyse und damit eine weitgehende Auflösung der Fixierung mit Hilfe der Deutungen ermöglicht, macht die Frühanalyse zu einem besonders erfolgreichen Zweig der psychoanalytischen Therapie” (21).
In addition, the other term in the pair, *Darstellung/darstellen* can be translated as either “representation” or as “presentation.”

*Darstellung/darstellen* is representation in the sense of depicting, portraying, displaying and demonstrating. It contains among its many senses a reference to the theater and to acting (an actor is sometimes called a *Darsteller*). This is the sense expressed in the version of the translation that reads “the child *shows* them to us as immediate representations.” What is (re)presented and the act and form of its (re)presentation are incompletely separated.

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26 There is a related term, *Vorstellung/vorstellen*, which also means to represent, though primarily in the intellectual/visual sense of imagining, picturing, thinking, envisioning, or figuring.

27 In *Archive Fever* Derrida argues that there is a continuous tension in Freud between the archive (which is irreducible to simple recollection) and archaeology, which comes to a head in relation to the question of origins. On the one hand, psychoanalysis treats the psychic apparatus as an archive, as a kind of prosthesis, “hypomnesic” and slippery, and as what preserves the past, but only ever as effaced. On the other hand, Freud “invariably maintains a primacy of live memory and of anamnesis in their originary temporalization. From which we have the archaeological outbidding by which psychoanalysis, in its archive fever, always attempts to return to the live origin of what the archive loses” (92). The archive and archaeology are, Derrida argues, “co-implicat[ed], and yet radically incompatible, heterogeneous, that is to say, different with regard to the origin” insofar as the archive perpetually defers access to the past while the archaeological embodies the fantasy of being able to be present at the origin. As Derrida writes,
sense of a portrayal or performance also carries with it the idea of a spectator, of someone or something to or at whom the performance is directed. This spectator need only be a structural position. When Klein writes that the analyst’s task is to “rightly understand the child’s mode of expression,” she is implying that the work of the analyst involves learning to occupy the peculiar position of spectator to the child’s play. Yet despite the fact that they are unmittelbar darstellt, the analyst must learn to understand a child’s “experiences and fixations” by being attentive to their mode of expression.

The scene of excavation, the theater of archaeological digs are the preferred places of this brother to Hanold. Each time he wants to teach the topology of archives, that is to say, of what ought to exclude or forbid the return of the origin, this lover of stone figurines proposes archaeological parables….It is the nearly ecstatic instant Freud dreams of, when the very success of the dig must sign the effacement of the archivist [the effacement of effacement?]: the origin then speaks by itself. The arkhe appears in the nude, without the archive. It presents itself and comments on itself by itself. “Stones talk!” In the present. Anamnesis without hypomnesis! The archaeologist has succeeded in making the archive no longer serve any function. It comes to efface itself, it becomes transparent or unessential so as to let the origin present itself in person. Live, without mediation and without delay. (92-3)

Klein’s shift to the era of early childhood in some ways participates in and perpetuates this impossible desire that animates psychoanalysis. At the same time, her rhetorical shifts serve to reinscribe the place of the origin in a different register which reorients both the questions and the (im)possible answers.
Klein’s writing touches the heart of the psychoanalytic enterprise, both reflecting it and enacting a shift. This shift in the theory regarding the structure of the mind and the analyst’s mode of access to it is made clear when compared to Freud’s earlier theory. For Freud, psychic structure is organized along a conceptual binary axis of the hidden and the visible, which Lionell Trilling has argued has its roots in romanticism (96). Lis Møller has argued, similarly, that Freud’s psychoanalysis possesses a “surface/depth paradigm” that originates in nineteenth-century epistemology, and that “Freud situates his own enterprise” in this paradigm, especially in his utilization of archaeological metaphors (35). Møller locates numerous instances of this throughout Freud’s work, focusing mainly on Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s Gradiva. Other examples Møller identifies include Freud’s analogy of analytic technique with archaeology in Studies on Hysteria. There Freud writes that “This procedure was one of clearing away the pathogenic psychical material layer by layer, and we liked to compare it with the technique of excavating a buried city” (in Møller 41). Møller also points to the analogy, in “The Aetiology of Hysteria,” between the psychoanalyst and the archaeologist who “may start upon the ruins, clear away the rubbish, and, beginning from the visible remains, uncover what is buried” (in Møller 35). “The analogy with archaeology,” writes Møller, “reads time as (stratified) space; it provides Freud with a spatiotemporal model that is, by the same token, a model of ‘preservation in the sphere of the mind’” (42). As an illustration, he cites a passage from the Rat Man case history, where Freud
uses an archaeological metaphor to describe “the psychological differences between the conscious and the unconscious, and upon the fact that everything conscious was subject to a process of wearing-away, while what was unconscious was relatively unchangeable” (in Møller 42, italics Freud’s).

In contrast, Klein argues that in the case of children, psychical elements are not hidden by being lost to time and memory. Keeping in mind that Freud himself considered the era of early childhood difficult to understand (“far too little is known as yet about the background and the preliminary stages of repression”), Klein’s work repeatedly inhabits such undertheorized spaces in psychoanalytic theory (SE 20:94). In this instance, in order to dwell in the space of early psychic functioning, Klein must reorganize analytic theory, specifically the theory of repression and of primary/secondary processes. She thus introduces to the theory a new metapsychology of early psychic functioning dominated by what she will later come to call “schizoid mechanisms.”

This theoretical shift is accompanied by a rhetorical shift involving a new spatial metaphors. Addressing the clinical and theoretical issue of early psychic functioning and the questions of origins that it raises, Klein’s metaphoric language differs markedly from Freud’s. If Freud’s archaeological-topographical model of the adult mind imagined early psychic

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28 Although, like the repressed, they do seem to be hidden in plain sight. The analyst’s interpretation is still required, however the underlying metaphor of psychic structure has changed.

29 See Envy and Gratitude 1-24.
life as lying at a deeper psychical level, in a manner reminiscent of ancient archaeological ruins that needed to be reconstructed by the analysis, Klein’s topographical model could well be described as *cartographical*, where psychical elements exist in relative proximity from each other on a two-dimensional plane, side by side, nearer or farther away, as with countries or geographical features. And like countries or geographical regions, modes of psychic functioning are *positions* that can be occupied.

“Psychological Principles of Infant Analysis” is noteworthy for its transitional quality. It is a fairly early work and represents Klein working within the Freudian theoretical and rhetorical edifice, while at the same time refashioning it. Freud’s archaeological depth metaphors exist alongside Klein’s own cartographic ones. This is most evident in her metapsychological discussion of the psychic makeup of children (in which she distinguishes between “little children,” “older children,” and adults), which comes at the end of the paper (*LGR* 134). In the context of explaining why children’s reaction to psychoanalysis “is different in early childhood from what it is later,” Klein attributes the ease with which children accept the analyst’s interpretation, as well as the ease with which interpretations can be made by the analyst, to the claim that “in certain strata of the child-mind there is a much easier communication between Cs and Ucs (the system conscious and the system unconscious)” (134). Here Klein adopts the standard Freudian geological/archaeological metaphor of *strata* to describe the different systems of the psyche (unconscious, preconscious and conscious) as part of a
surface/depth model, which also applies to psychic functioning in which earlier experiences or psychic actions are located deeper, along a vertical axis.\textsuperscript{30} Klein uses the term again later in her paragraph when she argues that her play technique allows children’s play to deepen, and that such play “expands and expresses deeper strata of the mind” (135). Her third use of the term is in fact a quote from Freud, cited above, in which Freud worries that, even in the analysis of children, “the deepest strata may turn out to be impenetrable to consciousness” (in Klein 135). Additionally, in her next paragraph (also already cited above), Klein refers twice to the “layers” that make up “the child’s mental life” (135).

Yet after having employed terms such as “strata” and “layers” repeatedly, situating herself within a familiar Freudian topography, Klein warns that “[i]f we approach children with the technique appropriate to the analysis of adults we shall assuredly not succeed in penetrating to the deepest layers of the child’s mental life” (135, italics mine). A different approach is now required, and the crucial sentence follows, which is worth revisiting in full:

If, however, we take into account the psychological differences between children and adults and tear in mind the fact that in children we find Ucs still in operation side by side with Cs, the most primitive

\textsuperscript{30} Freud’s diagrams of the agencies of the psyche, comprised of id, ego, superego, also work along a vertical axis where one agency is stacked on top of the other (\textit{SE} 19:24, 22:78).
tendencies side by side with those most complicated developments known to us, such as the super-ego — if, that is to say, we rightly understand the child’s mode of expression, all these doubtful points and unfavorable factors vanish. (135)

Klein’s use of the term unmittelbar [“immediately”] introduces a spatial connotation of proximity, of being near or next to, as in one’s immediate neighbors or of something being within the immediate vicinity, within spitting distance. This is compounded by Klein’s repeated use of neben when describing the difference between adults and children, writing that “in children, we find Ucs still in operation side by side [neben] with Cs, the most primitive tendencies side by side [neben] with those most complicated developments known to us.” Klein is here developing a spatial model of proximity that is primarily flat. In this essay, she stretches Freud’s model of mental strata to the breaking point, and this paragraph represents the pivot from Freud’s archaeological metaphor to Klein’s cartographic one. After her “If, however,” Klein abandons the use of the terms “strata” and “layers” entirely. A few paragraphs earlier, Klein would write that “in certain start of the child-mind there is a much easier communication between Cs and Ucs” (134). In the paragraph currently under consideration, she begins by making reference to the importance of “penetrating to the deepest layers” of the child’s mind. This “penetration,” also part of the surface/depth metaphorics, is presented as what is most necessary, but also what is made most difficult because the free-association technique does not work well with children.
Klein’s play technique is the linchpin here, but it is coeval with the introduction of the notion of “side by side” and the proximal metaphorics that she develops. Klein works by following Freud’s metaphor of mental strata to the point where it falls apart and becomes an obstacle to thought. Her introduction of a different spatial metaphorics allows what was previously “impenetrable to consciousness” to become newly thinkable (Freud, in Klein 135). Freud’s layers and strata are subsumed and even “vanish” (like Freud’s doubts) when Klein introduces the phrase “side by side.” Unlike adults, children’s psychic agencies, phantasies and experiences are arranged by Klein as if on a flat plane (Juliet Mitchell calls it “the flat earth of infancy”) that can be observed without the need for penetration (28). In this paper Klein’s cartographic metaphor refers only to the psychic functioning of children. As her work develops, however, it will expand to overtake first the territory of psychosis and eventually the entirety of psychic life, with the development of the concept of “positions.”

Juliet Mitchell has pointed out the prevalence in the paper of some other Freudian elements that would become less central later on, such as primary narcissism, the centrality of the Oedipus complex, and castration anxiety. Mitchell also identifies the already-present Kleinian elements such as an early Oedipus complex, early guilt, phantasies in games, and the centrality of identification (foreshadowing projective identification). She identifies the difference that emerges between Klein and Freud, based on Klein’s “emphasis on the relative lack of separation between the unconscious
and the conscious life in a small child; the fact that what is happening takes place in the present and does not need to be reconstructed” (57-58).

In small children, Klein writes, the “experiences and fixations which in analysing adults we can only reconstruct,” are in children “directly represented.” For adults, the reason why early fixations and experiences require reconstruction is not simply because they occurred long ago and have been forgotten, but because they have been repressed. Here Klein is discussing a state of early childhood in which repression has either not occurred or is in the process of occurring. This helps us better understand her claim that the connection or communication between conscious and unconscious in children is different in children than in (neurotic) adults. She repeats herself nearly identically in 1926 and 1955. In 1926 she writes, “in certain strata of the child-mind there is a much easier communication between Cs and Ucs, and therefore it is much simpler to retrace the steps from the one to the other” (LGR 134). In 1955 she writes, “…the connections between conscious and unconscious are closer in young children than in adults, and…infantile repressions are less powerful” (Envy and Gratitude 132). It is not simply the precocity of the “child-mind” that is in question here, as the latter quote illustrates. It is a question of the status and strength of repression. This is due to the fact that, for Klein, the era of early childhood is an era that is fundamentally schizoid and dominated by what she will come to call schizoid mechanisms.
Mitchell has highlighted the temporal shift that Klein introduces in her work with children—“what is happening is taking place in the present and does not need to be reconstructed”—and she discusses and develops this in more detail in her general introduction to The Selected Melanie Klein. “Where in Freud repression is a defence that creates a past and a symptom is a return of that past,” she writes, “Klein is appropriately more interested in the defences which have no such dimension of time past and with atemporal inhibitions of the ego, not with symptoms” (28). Klein’s cartographical topography, in other words, is also an atemporal one because her patients do not have a repressed past, as Mitchell demonstrates. “By definition, the pre-Oedipal child…has not negotiated the Oedipus complex, has not acquired a history” (28). Mitchell also makes a link between the “spatial” element and Klein’s new psychic temporality, writing that “Klein’s contribution is to chart an area where present and past are one and time is spatial, not historical….Klein’s crucial concept of a ‘position’ speaks to this different, earlier, prehistorical sense of time—a position is a mental space in which one is sometimes lodged” (28). This points to the difference between Freud’s “tunnel[ing] back to…beginnings” and Klein’s “looking at the flat earth of infancy” to study “lateral, horizontal, not vertical, relationships” (28). These retroped “relationships” lead to a re theorization of repression that is coextensive with her development of a theory of psychosis and the schizoid mechanisms that are closely related to it.
A Brief Consideration of Psychosis From a Lacanian Perspective

Bruce Fink has elaborated a useful Lacanian approach to the role of the unconscious and repression in psychosis. For Lacan, the mechanism of negation that operates in psychosis is foreclosure, which differs radically from the mechanism of repression in neurosis. In neurosis the operation of repression establishes the unconscious and the central role that it plays in all neurotic mental functioning. Lacan writes that Freud’s notion of the unconscious involves not only just repression, but also an original acceptance of what will become repressed. It must be first let in, as it were, before it can be hidden. “[W]hat is unconscious not only is everything repressed, that is, misrecognized by the subject after having been verbalized, but that behind the process of verbalization there must be admitted a primordial Bejahung, an admission in the sense of the symbolic” (Lacan, S3 12). What is repressed must first be admitted, and “[w]hat comes under the effect of repression returns, for repression and the return of the repressed are just two sides of the same coin....By contrast, what falls under the effect of Verwerfung [foreclosure] has a completely different destiny” (12).31 This destiny is a form of negation or “exclusion” that differs drastically from repression such that the subject is said to want “to know nothing about it,” which is a “very special knowing nothing of the thing, even in the sense of the repressed...—what is

31 In the word “destiny” we can hear a reference to Freud’s essay “Triebe und Triebschicksale.” The Standard Edition translates Schicksal in its characteristic way as “vicissitude,” but a more colloquial translation is “destiny.”
refused in the symbolic order re-emerges in the real” in the form of hallucination (12-13, italics in original). Unlike the repressed, which is first admitted into the subject only to be hidden, what is foreclosed is never allowed admission in the first place. Rather than become hidden, it remains ever present and visible, though not as part of the subject or his inner world, but outside, as it were, in the real. In Klein’s theory of schizoid mechanisms, she notes that with splitting, “[i]t is in phantasy that the infant splits the object and the self, but the effect of this phantasy is a very real one, because it leads to feelings and relations (and later on, thought-processes) being in fact cut off from one another” (EG 6). This emphasizes the way that splitting leads to an exclusion or “knowing nothing about” by a process of being “cut off from one another.” And this being “cut off” is never understood as a being hidden, but always as a being separated, expelled.

Lacan adds that repression and foreclosure also differ in their developmental temporality, stating that “The origin of the neurotic repressed is not situated at the same level of history in the symbolic as that of the repressed involved in psychosis” (13). Immediately preceding this passage, Lacan states that his developmental schema is only provisional and he is not certain that he will retain it. I believe it is useful in emphasizing that foreclosure operates prior to repression. Lacan’s use of the term “repressed” to describe the products of both neurosis and psychosis is a bit confusing, however, especially since Lacan earlier described the unconscious as “everything repressed,” repression only possible after a
“primordial…admission,” which is denied to what is foreclosed (12). The operation of foreclosure in psychosis operates very differently indeed, and Fink will be able to write that “there is no repression, and thus strictly speaking no unconscious, in psychosis” (Fink, *Fundamentals* 232).32

There is a difference between psychosis as a structural category in Lacanian theory and the question of schizoid mechanisms in Kleinian theory. Both involve a developmental narrative, but they occupy a different place within each narrative. Lacanian theory understands psychosis as a particular structural result of the child’s navigation of the Oedipus complex. Foreclosure is the mechanism by which the threat of castration, posed by the figure of the father, is negated (in the form of the expulsion of the Name of the Father). Psychosis is then the structural result of this particular mechanism of negation, of this particular navigation of a path through Oedipus. In Lacanian psychosis, the only thing that has no place within the otherwise paranoid fullness of the psychic world is the Name of the Father. In Klein’s theory, which is far less concerned with the role of castration, and which models itself predominantly on pre-Oedipal relations, schizoid mechanisms are understood to be at work in the earlier eras prior to the introduction of the Oedipus complex (which arises much earlier than in Freud’s theory, of course). It is possible to think of psychosis (as a structure)

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32 In this context, Fink adopts a narrow definition of the unconscious as “a chain of signifiers—largely equivalent…to what [Lacan] calls the ‘symbolic order’” (233).
as a rejection of castration and an attempt to return to pre-Oedipal psychic functioning. I simply wish to note the difference that for Klein, schizoid mechanisms are characterized developmentally as pre-Oedipal, while structural psychosis in Lacan is characterized as post-Oedipal. Yet despite this difference, the ways in which psychosis is characterized in Lacanian theory can be helpful in understanding the operation of schizoid mechanisms and the paranoid-schizoid position in Klein’s theory, particularly the status of the unconscious and repression in the construction of schizoid psychic spatiality.

Fink’s discussion of the different place of the unconscious in psychosis is accompanied by a footnote that refers to a brief remark by Freud in his *Autobiographical Study*:

Freud…commented on the nonexistence or nonfunctionality of the unconscious in psychosis in a slightly different way when he said that “so many things that in the neuroses have to be laboriously fetched up from the depths are found in the psychoses on the surface, visible to every eye”; this is, no doubt, the origin of Lacan’s well-known expression à ciel ouvert, meaning right out in the open, there for all the world to see. (*Fundamentals* 233)

Fink utilizes this reference as a way to think about the different clinical experiences of working with neurotics and psychotics, the latter of whom, as early as the first session, “may come right out” and say kinds things that neurotics might only say “after a great deal of analytic work designed to get
at the repressed” (233). Fink’s context is, after all, a clinical one specifically concerned with the technique of working analytically with psychotic patients, work which Freud argued was quite difficult, bemoaning that “it is true that in this sphere all our knowledge is not yet converted into therapeutic power; but the mere theoretical gain is not to be despised, and we may be content to wait for its practical application” (SE 20:61). Lacan’s use of the phrase à ciel ouvert that Fink cites occurs in the context of a comment on “the supposed perversion at the crux of neurosis,” where Lacan writes that “Perversion is in the neurotic’s unconscious in the guise of the Other’s fantasy. But this does not mean that the pervert’s unconscious is right out in the open. He, too, defends himself in his desire in his own way” (Ecrits 699, italics mine).

Outside of the immediate therapeutic context, what is significant about the juxtaposition that Fink has enacted with two citations is the emphasis on the figure of being “right out,” of being “visible to every eye” (Freud) and “right out in the open” (Lacan). For Freud the situation of psychosis and of psychotic mental functioning is very explicitly figured as a “surface.” Lacan’s à ciel ouvert could more literally be translated as “under an open sky,” a metaphor that carries with it the implication of a flat or at least unobscured ground below such an open sky. In both Lacan and Freud, too, the openness of psychosis is figured in direct contrast to the hiddenness that is characteristic of neurotic structure. In the case of Freud, it is a question of something hidden in “the depths” which must be “laboriously fetched up.”
In Lacan, it is a question of something defended, and defended from being out in the open.

In writing and organizing her clinical and theoretical work along the lines of a flat spatiality, Klein provided a means to work with patients, understand psychosis and write it (as theory). Psychosis becomes clinically and theoretically thinkable through a particular spatial metaphor. The “world” of the young child or psychotic is so nameable because of Klein’s fundamental metaphor. The too-much-ness, the all-there-ness that characterizes psychosis is translated spatially. The metaphor metaphorizes the unbearable presence as a flat spatiality.

**Karl Abraham and the Reorientation of Drive Theory**

As a major step toward locating Melanie Klein’s relationship to and retroping of Freud’s rhetoric, it is necessary to examine the work of Karl Abraham, which acts as a moment of transition between the work of Freud and Klein. Klein’s refocusing and reinvigorating of psychoanalytic rhetoric required a change in emphasis, and this change in emphasis has a genealogy that can be traced through the work of Abraham. Abraham is at the root of Klein’s reorientation of analytic theory, its concepts and its rhetoric, toward a more object-oriented position. It is significant that the theoretical and rhetorical shifts that Abraham and Klein introduce into psychoanalysis occur as a way of making sense of psychosis. The neuroses are formulated through a metaphoric of surface and depth, of hidden and revealed, dominated as
they are by repression and the hiddenness and subterfuge that accompany
the expression of the libido. The psychoses, in Klein’s thinking (borrowing as
she does from Abraham), come do be formulated along a flat-plane metaphor
of side-by-sideness, where objects move horizontally.

Abraham’s influence on Klein can be properly situated by looking at
his 1924 article, “A Short Study of the Development of the Libido, Viewed in
the Light of Mental Disorders.” I consider four aspects of Abraham’s work:
his development and reorientation of Freud’s theory of drives towards a
theory of the object; his focus on incorporation phantasies and the language
of subjective experience; his rhetoric of spatiality; and his development of the
theory of part-objects.

i. Reorientation of drive theory towards the object

Karl Abraham was an early psychoanalyst whose analytic practice was
located in Berlin. He was Klein’s second and final analyst, beginning in 1921
and lasting until his sudden death in 1926. (Klein’s first analysis was with
Sandor Ferenczi in Budapest.) Abraham’s relationship to Freud was that of

33 While I focus here on the role Abraham played, Darian Leader has argued
that the influence of Ferenczi and the Hungarian school on Klein is also
indispensable for understanding the development of her theory. Leader
argues that Klein’s “debt” is primarily evident in light of the Hungarian
school’s “central research problem…the construction of reality through
projective-introjective mechanisms,” which allowed Klein to develop “a
paranoiac construction of reality” (Freud’s Footnotes 67).
an acolyte who respected and deferred to Freud as master and inventor of psychoanalysis. As such, his contributions to the theoretical and clinical development of psychoanalysis were achieved in consultation with and in deference to Freud, and therefore never took on a radical tone in relation to the Freudian corpus.\textsuperscript{34}

Abraham introduced major developments in the psychoanalytic theory of drives. In particular, Abraham added to Freud’s focus on the source and aim of the drive by shifting his theoretical attention towards the question of the object of the drive. To help situate this shift, it is useful to turn to Laplanche and Pontalis’ gloss on this change in the psychoanalytic understanding of the theory of the drive (translated in the following passage as “instinct”) in their entry for “Object-Relation(ship)” from \textit{The Language of Psychoanalysis}:

\begin{quote}
We know that in seeking to analyse the concept of instinct Freud distinguished between instinctual source, object, and aim. The source of the instinct is that zone or somatic apparatus which is the seat of the sexual excitation; its importance in Freud’s eyes is attested to by the fact that he names each stage of libidinal development after the corresponding predominant erotogenic zone. As to the aim and object,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{34} This is most clearly evinced in the Freud/Abraham correspondence and in its critical analysis by scholars. For example, see Hinshelwood and Sanchez-Pardo, both of whom discuss the relationship in detail.
Freud preserved the distinction between them throughout his work.

(279)
The drive has three separate components, of which the question of the source occupied much of Freud’s early theory of sexuality. The erotogenic zones to which Laplanche and Pontalis refer above are defined by Freud as the oral, anal, and genital zones. As the authors indicate, the stages of libidinal development (oral, anal, genital—and phallic, which is introduced later) are understood to be defined by the erotogenic region that is the “seat of the sexual excitation” and that also organizes and structures the libidinal character of a given stage. In accordance with this focus on the source of the drive, the aim is understood as the means by which satisfaction is achieved, and the object as simply the thing that “procure[s] satisfaction” (218).

Around 1913, Abraham’s work began developing in more detail the role that the object plays in the structure of the drives. What this would ultimately lead to, in the psychoanalytic discourse of the 1960s when Laplanche and Pontalis are writing, is a “conception of object-relationship [that], while it does not strictly speaking imply a revision of Freud’s instinct theory, does involve a shift in emphasis.” They continue:

The source of the instinct, as organic substrate, is definitively assigned a secondary role; its status as mere prototype, already recognized by Freud, is stressed.35 Consequently the aim is considered less as the

35 This is, for example, an instance where Freud’s more difficult and complex idea of the relationship between psyche and soma is reduced in the Kleinian
sexual satisfaction of a particular erotogenic zone: the very concept of aim tends to fade and give way to that of relationship. In the case of the ‘oral object-relationship’, for example, what now become the centre of interest are the various guises of incorporation and the way this [i.e. the object-relationship] is to be found as the meaning and the dominant phantasy at the kernel of all the subject’s relations with the world….We may note in this connection that the term “[libidinal] stage” is tending to be replaced by “object-relationship”. The advantage of such a change of emphasis is that it helps clarify the fact that several types of object-relationship may be combined, or may alternate, in the same subject. To talk of the coexistence of different stages, by contrast, amounts to a contradiction in terms. (280)

Abraham’s contribution to the “shift in emphasis” toward object relationships is most evident in “A Short Study of the Development of the Libido, Viewed in the Light of Mental Disorders.” In this long article, Abraham deals with what he calls the “circular insanities,” melancholia (or manic-depression) and the obsessional neuroses, which are marked by a circular pattern in which the appearance of acute depressive or manic symptoms is followed by a period of seeming quiescence, and which are characterized by a regression of libido to the oral stage and a high degree of ambivalence (418-422). He is also concerned with what were then called the “narcissistic neuroses,” which were

system to a simpler concept. See, for example, Susan Isaacs’ “On the Nature and Function of Phantasy,” especially, pp. 159-162 (footnote mine).
distinguished from “transference neuroses” such as hysteria because the displacement of libido has not been transferred onto a different object, but is withdrawn from the world and directed upon the ego (480). The phrase “narcissistic neuroses” belongs to a somewhat early stage of psychoanalytic terminology and would later come to fall out of use and be subsumed under the category of the psychoses (Laplanche and Pontalis 258).

The article takes a two-fold approach to the question of the object and the pre-genital stages. On the one hand, Abraham approaches melancholia and the obsessional neuroses from the more traditional point of view of the libidinal stages. He introduces a refinement to the pre-genital elements of libido theory by proposing “early” and “late” subdivisions to each of the oral, anal and genital stages, which Freud would subsequently incorporate more or less intact into the 1924 edition of his *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. On the other hand, Abraham argues that the theoretical focus on the libidinal stages concerns itself too much with sexual *aims* and not enough with the sexual *object*, thus failing to allow for a full consideration of the neuroses in which he is interested. He argues that the psychoanalytic theory of “the pregenital levels of the libido...deals with the transformations which the individual undergoes in regard to his sexual *aim*” (480, italics mine). Yet transformations of aim and object are different matters, and “since Freud’s classical work on the subject [*Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*] we are accustomed to distinguish the sexual *aims* of the individual from those processes which concern his relations to his sexual *object*. What we have so
far said about the ontogenesis of object-love does not sufficiently cover the field of facts” (480, italics in original). Abraham argues that the “development of the relation of the individual to his object-love” must therefore be “trac[ed] separately” from the development of the sexual aim (480). As a means of addressing more fully the clinical picture presented by his work with the narcissistic and circular neuroses, Abraham builds on Freud’s distinction between auto-erotic, narcissistic, and object-love.

Abraham thus proposes to consider the circular neuroses “from another angle” (419). This other angle, he claims, originates in Freud’s work itself. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud raised the question of the object, object-loss and the mechanisms by which the psyche relates to the object, making this central to the theory of melancholia (419). For Abraham, this other “angle” does not represent a complete break with Freud’s theory of libidinal stages, as the libidinal stages will remain the underlying frame for his inquiry into the question of object-relations. Rather it represents a shift towards—and a further elaboration of—the question of the object in analytic theory. For example, Abraham begins his elaboration of early object-relations by examining the different kinds of object relations that are characteristic of a given libidinal stage:

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36 In truth however, this angle was originally proposed to Freud by Abraham himself and was incorporated without full attribution by Freud in that very article (Sanchez-Pardo 25).
Now, in spite of their common relation to the anal-sadistic organization of the libido, melancholia and obsessional neurosis exhibit certain fundamental differences not only in respect of the phase to which the libido regresses at the onset of the illness [i.e. either “early” or “late”], but also in respect of the attitude of the individual to his object, since the melancholiac gives it up, while the obsessional patient retains it. (424, italics mine)

He reiterates Freud’s argument that every given libidinal stage corresponds to a specific erogenous zone, but adds that that this correspondence also indicates a specific, embodied relationship to objects that is personified in a kind of phantasy organizing the object-relation. For example, in the anal-sadistic stage, “the individual regards the person who is the object of his desire as something over which he has ownership” (427). This is a form analogous to his anal relation to his own feces, which is marked by retention and expulsion. Such a relationship to objects works by analogy and it comprises a “habit of thought”—in this case one of anal possession, but other modes are also possible, such as destruction, control and conservation. Abraham argues that such a “habit of thought” is unconscious and operates despite the fact that “[t]his primitive idea that removing an object or losing it

37 Here a subjective stance is correlated to a specific set of mechanisms, which produces a two-fold elaboration: on the one hand, a subjective attitude (i.e. phantasy), on the other, a set of mechanisms (retention and expulsion).
is equivalent to defæcation has become remote to us grown-up people” (427-8).

In part, Abraham turns to the object when the question of stages leads to difficulties (especially in relation to the drive’s aim). By following the changes in relation to the love object, Abraham is able to better discern the transformations in the stages of regression.38 Here he considers introjection and the challenge it poses to being understood simply in relation to the libidinal stages:

When melancholic persons suffer an unbearable disappointment from their love-object they tend to expel that object as though it were fæces and to destroy it. They thereupon accomplish the act of introjecting and devouring it—an act which is a specifically melancholic form of narcissistic identification. Their sadistic thirst for vengeance now finds its satisfaction in tormenting the ego—and activity that is in part pleasurable. (463-4)39

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38 Neurosis was considered at the time to be a matter of the regression of the libido to an earlier developmental stage (or the fixation of the libido at an early stage which should have been overcome, but was not).
39 Sandor Ferenczi introduced the term “introjection” in 1909 as a companion to the concept of “projection,” the mechanism by which a subject “projects on to the outer world the interest that has become a burden to him” (“Introjection and Transference” 47). Ferenczi coins “introjection” to describe the mechanism of “taking into the ego as large as possible a part of the outer world, making it the object of unconscious phantasies” (47). (It is worth noting that Ferenczi introduces this distinction as a way of making a
nosographical distinction between paranoia and neurosis—projection, in this case, being the primary mechanism of paranoia and introjection of neurosis.) Ferenczi adds that “The neurotic is constantly seeking for objects with whom he can identify himself, to whom he can transfer feelings, whom he can thus draw into his circle of interest, i.e. to introject” (47-8). Although he does not develop introjection much further in this paper, we can see at the beginning the mixture of identification and a spatial “taking into” that will come to characterize the concept. Freud first uses the term in 1915 in “Instincts and their Vicissitudes,” where he uses it to describe a “development” in the ego’s relationship to objects: “In so far as the objects which are presented to it are sources of pleasure, it [the ego] takes them into itself, ‘introjects’ them” (SE 14:136). Ferenczi does not always strictly identify introjection with the introjection of objects, for example, using the term to describe any “extension of his [i.e. the neurotic’s] circle of interest. In addition, Laplanche and Pontalis argue that at times in his paper, Ferenczi uses the term to describe behavior “that might equally be described as projection” (230). By the time Freud takes up the term, the centrality of introjection as a kind of relation to objects is cemented.

While Freud uses the term only rarely in subsequent works, he uses it most in “Mourning and Melancholia,” written at roughly the same time as “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” but published two years later. In this paper, the mechanism of introjection, in which the lost object (typically a dead loved one) is unconsciously restored and set up within the psyche is central to Freud’s theory of melancholia. In melancholia, the incorporated object is subjected to unconscious excoriation for having left (i.e. died), but having been incorporated into and identified with the ego, the effects of such violence toward the lost object are experienced consciously by the ego, resulting in intense depression. The incorporation phantasy is what lies behind Freud’s famous statement that in melancholia, “the shadow of the object fell upon the ego” (SE 14:249). Freud writes that the libido that had
Abraham points out that this transformation of the melancholic’s sexual aim takes a very convoluted path of regression. In this phantasy scenario, the melancholic shits out his lost love-object in an anal-sadistic act of expulsion only to then eat it up again in an act of oral cannibalistic incorporation. Following this, the ambivalent feelings of both love and hate in each of these operations do not manage to reduce anxiety but instead amplify it, resulting in a further regression to an even earlier oral relationship of sucking (which he considers pre-ambivalent) (481). In this phantasy, the question of early or late stages of development seems somewhat beside the point since there is previously been invested in the lost object is “withdrawn into the ego” and “serve[s] to establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object,” but also that “the ego wants to incorporate this object into itself” (SE 14:249, italics in original). Here Freud indicates the double-articulation that characterizes introjection, a combination of an identification with the object and a quasi-literal incorporation of the object. Introjection is thus as a specific mechanism that combines the ego function of identification (the ego identifies with the object, fuses its identity with the object and takes on the object’s characteristics) and the phantasy of incorporation where the object is brought inside the envelope of the body. At the level of identity, the ego and the object are fused; at the level of the body, the object is swallowed whole. Abraham’s 1924 paper on the development of the libido makes extensive use of the concept of introjection, and he develops it in great detail through his description and analysis of mourning and melancholia, which constitutes the bulk of his paper. However, his developing theory of object relations, especially in the paper’s final section, leads him to eventually emphasize the role of the incorporation phantasy over that of identification.
such a shuttling back and forth. It is also unclear whether the regression(s) happen sequentially in time (either psychic or real) or constitute a constellation of transformations happening and re-happening over and over, or even overlapping, which leads Laplanche and Pontalis to object that “[t]o talk of the coexistence of different stages, by contrast, amounts to a contradiction in terms” (281, italics mine). Such careful tracing of the complex movement of the libidinal stages of the melancholic, Abraham argues, only indicates more strongly the comparative lack of development in the theory of object-love and the need for its further elaboration.

ii. Incorporation phantasies and subjective experience

Abraham’s development of his theory of the object and its relation to the drive also leads him to elaborate a new rhetorical register that corresponds to the consideration of Freud’s theory “from another angle.” This rhetorical development relies on Abraham’s characterization and description of “the attitude of the individual to his object” (Abraham 424).

Abraham’s theoretical focus on the question of the object arises out of an acknowledgement of the complexity of early (pre-Oedipal) psychosexual functioning and the challenge that it poses to a libidinal theory that emphasizes the vicissitudes of the drive’s aim. The theorization of the aim, which is inherently an issue of direction (of the flow of libidinal energy), utilizes a terminology appropriate to the elaboration of direction and its transformations. The theorization of the object of the drive, however, is an
issue of a relation to the object and the different ways that it is made use of for the satisfaction of the drive. Abraham finds that a terminology that focuses on the subjective experience of a relationship to the object allows him to more fully elaborate the transformations of that relationship in all of its complexity. The shift in rhetorical style is thus reflective of a shift in theoretical focus and coextensive with it.

What Sanchez-Pardo calls the “metaphor of dramatic action” has always been a part of psychoanalytic writing, of course (38). Freud famously remarked that his earliest case histories read like short stories, and his second topology of id/ego/super-ego refigured the psyche as a struggle between three semi-personified agencies. Abraham (and Klein) enhance the metapsychological emphasis on dramatization such that dramatization becomes a primary rhetorical feature. As an extreme example, prominent Kleinian Paula Heimann describes Love and Hate (capitalized as if they were characters) as characters in a kind of psychomachia, “urging the subject to strive for sublimation” (in Sanchez-Pardo 38). Klein describes part-objects as persecuting, attacking or healing the ego, operating through a metaphorical logic of dramatic action that organizes the death drive and early oral sadism.40

Abraham and Klein’s emphasis on dramatic action serves to de-emphasize the theory of libidinal stages, which is oriented temporally along a

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40 Lindsey Stonebridge has referred to “the great theoretical edifice of the Kleinian theatre of object relations” whose construction she considers as “an effort to check anxiety, to once more put it in its place” (198, italics mine).
developmental axis and spatially around the primacy of certain bodily organs or orifices. While they do not abandon the stage theory altogether, it is significantly altered. The focus on object relations and the emphasis on dramatic action lead Abraham and Klein to reconsider the libidinal stages in light of the stages’ differing orientation towards objects such that they “go hand in hand with stages in the development of object love” (Sanchez-Pardo 29). The stages of libidinal development are thus considered less in terms of the kind of organ pleasure involved, but in terms of the transitive aspect of the libido, what mode or kind of object love it represents. For example, Abraham subdivides the anal phase into primitive and late phases. Both phases are still within the general mode of anal satisfaction (i.e. the aim remains unaltered), yet the shift from the early to late anal phase is marked by an event that indicates a shift in the relation to the external world and its objects: “For at the dividing line between those two [anal] phases there takes place a decisive change in the attitude of the individual to the external world. Indeed, we may say that this dividing line is where ‘object love’ in the narrower sense, begins, for it is at this point that the tendency to preserve the object begins to predominate” (423, in Sanchez-Pardo 39, italics mine). In general, Abraham’s stress is

on the complex to-and-fro motion of the object in and out of the body; the very explicit experience of the concrete internal objects…; the relation of these phantasies to oral and anal instincts (sucking and excreting); and thus a clear link between bodily instincts and active
relations with objects....Love, loss and restitution are expressed as phantasies of bodily activities that are a considerable amplification of Freud’s theories. (Hinshelwood 23-4)

In this particular example, Abraham’s difference from Freud thus lies in his stress on the shift in the infant’s attitude towards objects (in this case from aggression towards preservation and care).

By emphasizing a vocabulary derived from subjective experience, the relationship of the psychic subject to its objects becomes literalized.\(^41\) This literalization in the form of a phantasied movement of the object to the inside the body (Freud: “literally, to the inside”) becomes a way of describing the theoretical relationship between subject and object that places the subject at the center of that relation and defines such a subject as the totality of its object-relations. Abraham focuses on “the patient’s concern with the object; it is this kind of subjective description of loss which he was beginning to discover” (Hinshelwood 22, italics mine). Freud is concerned with articulating the libido and drive theories through a terminology that describes psychic functioning separately from the subjective experiences of his patients’ illnesses (even if his practice was founded on paying careful attention to their utterances). In contrast Abraham, and later Klein, develops a theory of object relations that takes its cues from patients’ subjective descriptions, writing in a style that dramatized the subject’s relationship to

\(^{41}\) It is a psychical literalization, to be sure, in that it is concerned with phantasies—and thus psychic relations—rather than empirical states or facts.
objects. It is a style that “describe[s] the psyche and its mental processes in terms of interactions among various objects” (Sanchez-Pardo 31).

iii. Development of a rhetoric of spatiality

In concert with the new focus on a subjective and quasi-literal vocabulary of object relations, Abraham introduces a new emphasis on spatiality, developing a concern with the borders of the body and the inherent instability of those borders. Concepts such as incorporation, introjection and projection (which had always been on the tropological periphery of analytic theory) come together to form a new rhetorical field that focuses on a literalized description of psychic functioning. This description privileges the themes of movement across a border (understood as the envelope of the body) and of the absorption or expulsion of discreet entities, be they objects or emotions. As Esther Sanchez-Pardo notes, “in the rhetoric of Abraham’s papers there is an emphasis on spatiality, spatial metaphors, and spatial phantasies. His repeated allusions to ‘taking in, ‘being outside,’ ‘evacuating,’ and ‘expelling’ are obvious tropes for figuring the oral and anal components in the infant’s relation to the external world” (31).

Abraham’s utilization and development of a rhetoric characterized by spatial metaphors can be seen, for example, in the quotation cited above, where he describes the melancholic’s tendency to “expel” the lost object “as
though it were faeces and to destroy it…introjecting and devouring it.”

Abraham’s spatialized and subjectivized rhetoric is evident in his presentation of cases, such as this example of a patient who had a history of melancholia, the most recent attack of which resulted in his rejection of his fiancée, followed by their rapprochement, leading to another relapse, which he describes here:

His resistance to his fiancée re-appeared quite clearly during his relapse, and one of the forms it took was the following transitory symptom: During the time when his state of depression was worse than usual, he had a compulsion to contract his sphincter ani….What is of most interest here is its significance as a convulsive holding fast to the contents of the bowels. As we know, such a retention symbolizes possession, and is its prototype in the unconscious. Thus the patient’s transitory symptom stood for a retention, in the physical sense, of the object which he was once more in danger of losing….A few days later he told me…that he had a fresh symptom which had, as it were, stepped into the shoes of the first one. As he was walking along the street he had a compulsive phantasy of eating the excrements that were lying about. This phantasy turned out to be the expression of a desire to take back into his body the love-object which he had expelled from it in the form of excrement. We have here, therefore, a literal

42 Note here that the action is described both as a metapsychological operation (introjection) and as a subjective one (devouring).
confirmation of our theory that the unconscious regards the loss of an object as an anal process, and its introjection as an oral one. (443-44)

Abraham describes a bodily translation of the patient’s fear of losing his fiancée. As R. D. Hinshelwood explains, “The loved object is lost, or felt to be lost, because she has turned suddenly into a hated one. Freud’s theory expresses this in objective terms, the ‘direction of the libido.’ But Abraham now emphasizes the patient’s concern with the object” and the nature and form of the concern takes explanatory precedence over the aim of the libido (22). “[I]t is this kind of subjective description of loss which [Abraham] was beginning to discover” and using to structure his own theorizing. Abraham takes what would classically be considered a vicissitude of the libido’s direction and describes it instead as a dramatized reorientation of the libido’s relation to the object (22).

Freud’s original focus was on strictly intrapsychic functioning and his tropes developed accordingly (economic, topographic, and dynamic). With the development of the second topology, however, incorporation phantasies and the language of introjection become indispensable to Freud’s concepts. For example, the ego is described as a “precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes” (Freud SE 19:29) and, as a result, “the superego becomes an internal object” (Hinshelwood 20). This spatial topology is composed of “allusions” to taking in, being outside, evacuating and expelling that operate as “tropes for figuring the oral and anal components of the infant’s relation to the external world.” This “pervasive rhetoric of spatiality will later be prominent
in Melanie Klein’s writings, in which all interactions between psychic space and external reality are *figured* in terms of introjection and projection” (Sanchez-Pardo 31, italics mine). Or, alternately, Abraham and Klein’s “pervasive rhetoric of spatiality” figures the metapsychological operations of introjection and projection in terms of interactions between internal psychic space and external reality. Moreover, the literalization of object relations and the use of the “metaphor of dramatic action,” as described in the previous section, transforms internal psychic space into a literal, bodily space that is traversed by literal objects (Sanchez-Pardo 38). Such a traversal of objects across and through the body occurs continually, alternating between erogenous zones, especially the oral and anal zones, which are the literal areas of bodily ingress and egress.

In subdividing of the stages of libidinal organization, and distinguishing between stages of libidinal organization and stages of object love, Abraham is able to focus on different modes of object relations that occur within the same “stage” of libidinal development. In fact, the subdivision of libidinal stages works to open up the possibility of thinking different modes of object relations, linking them to different kinds of diagnostic categories, such as obsessional neurosis and melancholia. The focus on the drive’s object allows him to better theorize and distinguish the differences between these different clinical diagnostic categories. This is made possible by decoupling the libidinal phases of the drive’s aim (its egorogenic zone) from the phases of the relationship to the object. In
developing the theory of such a relationship, Abraham utilizes a more subjective vocabulary and a different rhetoric of spatiality that allows him to articulate the coordinates and movements of these newly-theorized object-relationships. Having introduced a new level of granularity by splitting the stages of libidinal organization, Abraham then goes one step further by splitting object love into partial object love, and the object into part-objects. This has a significant influence on Klein, which we will look at in the next section.

iv. Development of a theory of part-objects and the spatialization of time

Abraham proposes that Freud’s elaboration of the three stages of object-love—auto-erotic, narcissistic, and true object-love—should be developed further and introduces the concept of partial object-love, or a “partial incorporation of the object” which lies “somewhere between narcissism and object-love” to account for the ambivalences characteristic of pre-oedipal object-relationships (482-487). The introduction of partial object-love allows Abraham to better distinguish between melancholia and paranoia, as the early and late libidinal stages allowed him to distinguish between melancholia and obsessive neurosis. In this case, the melancholic introjects his entire love object, whereas the paranoid introjects only a part of it (489). Abraham describes the stage of partial object-love as filled with ambivalence and aggression, composed of phantasies of “depriv[ing] his object of a part of its body, i.e. to attack its integrity without destroying its existence. We are
put in mind of a child which catches a fly and, having pulled off a leg, lets it go again” (486-7). He gives the example of a patient who “once said that he would like to ‘eat up’ the young girl in question...‘mouthful by mouthful’” and whose mind was “greatly occupied...in this stage of analysis with the idea of biting off things” (487). While the three stages of object-love correspond roughly to the three libidinal stages, they are not entirely or necessarily linked to the libidinal stages. For example, Abraham discusses instances of regression in obsessional patients, writing that “[i]n this stage the individual is not yet able to love anyone in the full sense of the word. His libido is still attached to a part of its object. But he has given up his tendency to incorporate that part. Instead he desires to rule and possess it” (491). While incorporation is usually considered a mechanism of the oral stage (or for Abraham, the late oral stage), the desire to rule and possess an object is

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43 To help the reader visualize his system, I include Abraham’s chart here (496):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages of Libidinal Organization.</th>
<th>Stages of Object Love.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VI. Final Genital Stage</td>
<td>Object-love (Post-ambivalent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Earlier Genital Stage (phallic)</td>
<td>Object-love with exclusion of genitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Later Anal-sadistic Stage</td>
<td>Partial Love (Ambivalent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Earlier Anal-sadistic Stage</td>
<td>Partial love with incorporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Later Oral Stage (cannibalistic)</td>
<td>Narcissism (total incorporation of object)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Earlier Oral Stage (sucking)</td>
<td>Auto-erotism (without object) (Pre-ambivalent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
more characteristic of the anal stage. Yet despite the change in regression from the anal to oral stage of libido-organization, from the point of view of object-love, this merely represents a change in the mode of object-relation to a partial object, which remains unchanged in its status of being a part-object.

Abraham never uses the term “part-object” explicitly, although it is implicit in his description of the way the libido can be “attached to a part of its object.” It is Klein who eventually coins this term (LGR 271). The rhetorical foundations of the part-object is clearly evident in Abraham’s descriptions of the vicissitudes of object-relations, such as this example: “what was at first a part grows into a whole, and what was at first a whole, shrinks into a part and finally loses all value or continues its existence as a mere rudiment” (498, italics in original). Klein retains and develops the rhetorical model of synecdoche that Abraham elaborates. Whereas the transformations of the libido’s aim are frequently considered as occurring along the lines of metaphor and metonymy, Abraham suggests that the relationship to the object follows a synecdochic logic. What is retained in the synecdoche is the concreteness of the object. The shift from part to whole maintains the specificity of the figure that is the object, and therefore its concreteness. In this way, for example, Klein can theorize that the breast is split into a good and a bad breast, yet it nevertheless retains the concrete

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44 We can see here the combination of a kind of organ pleasure (oral, anal) with a phantasied relation (incorporation, ruling, possessing) to an object (whole or in pieces).
specificity of being a breast, and the relationship between the mother and the breast—the rhetorical transformation from one to the other—remains concrete.

Klein upholds the general psychoanalytic trend of imagining early childhood development in terms of the achievement of greater ego-development. However, this development will be based, more or less, on Abraham’s scheme of object-relations instead of on the more classical scheme of libidinal stages. For example, Klein writes in “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms” that “I hold that the introjected good breast forms a vital part of the ego, exerts from the beginning a fundamental influence on the process of ego-development and affects both ego-structure and object-relations,” and she describes the “early oral-sadistic impulses” along lines “stressed by Abraham”:

[i]n states of frustration and anxiety the oral-sadistic and cannibalistic desires are reinforced, and then the infant feels that he has taken in the nipple and the breast in bits. Therefore, in addition to the divorce between a good and bad breast in the young infant’s phantasy, the frustrating breast—attacked in oral-sadistic phantasies—is felt to be in fragments; the gratifying breast, taken in under the dominance of the sucking libido, is felt to be complete. (EG 4-6, italics in original)

Here Klein elaborates on Abraham’s object-relations model by introducing multiple splittings of the object—an initial split into good and bad breast, followed by the good breast remaining whole and the bad breast further split
into fragments. Thus within an earlier ambivalent relationship to the breast, Klein introduces a non-ambivalent relationship to the good breast and an ambivalent relationship to the bad breast. In this example we can see that Abraham’s concepts are retained while his scheme is made more fluid and complex.

Klein will not maintain Abraham’s correlation between stages of object-love and libidinal stages and the unidirectional model of development that it implies. She focuses rather on the constant shifting of relations and objects, their movements back and forth, building on Abraham’s work with melancholics. Abraham’s example of the patient who expelled his lost object as feces only to subsequently eat it up again as a form of oral cannibalism points to the circulation of different object-relations and the shift from a temporal to spatial organization of the drive in concert with a shift from aim to object. Abraham’s example describes a neurotic regression, not to a specific stage of pre-genital object relations, but rather a regression that encompasses a constellation of pre-genital oral and anal characteristics, which calls into question the usefulness of the term “regression” in a case such as this.

Yet Abraham continued to use the term stages to describe the different modes of object love that he identified, a practice which Klein would abandon in favor of a different, less temporalized, terminology. This is most clearly evidenced in her coining of the term “position” to replace any reference to the idea of developmental stages. In her 1939 essay “A Contribution to the
Genesis of Manic-Depressive States,” Klein first uses the term in her elaboration of what she calls the Depressive Position. Explaining her choice of the term in a footnote, she writes:

In my former work I have described the psychotic anxieties and mechanisms of the child in terms of phases of development. The genetic connection between them, it is true, is given full justice by this description, and so is the fluctuation which goes on between them under the pressure of anxiety until more stability is reached; but since in normal development the psychotic anxieties and mechanisms never solely predominate (a fact which, of course, I have emphasized) the term psychotic phases is not really satisfactory. I am now using the term ‘position’ in relation to the child’s early developmental psychotic anxieties and defenses. It seems to me easier to associate with this term, than with the words ‘mechanisms’ or ‘phases’, the differences between the developmental psychotic anxieties of the child and the anxiety or depressed feeling to a normal attitude—a change-over that is so characteristic for the child. (LGR 275-6)

Here we can see Klein’s explicit de-emphasis of the “genetic connection” that undergirds the teleology of developmental achievement in libidinal stages or object-relations.

The fluidity and complexity that Abraham and Klein introduce into the functioning of early, pre-oedipal psychic life has more far-reaching implications. Following on Abraham’s decoupling of early object relations
from a strict homology with early libidinal stages, Klein, as we see, further radicalizes Abraham’s work by de-emphasizing the genetic connection altogether. This is achieved rhetorically by the term *position*, which emphasizes a non-teleological movement, a movement that is characterized by shuttling back and forth, or the “change-over that is so characteristic for the child.” In addition to the alteration in the spatial makeup of the mind, Klein introduces a temporal one as well. As she will write later in 1952, “My study of the infant’s mind has made me more and more aware of the bewildering complexity of the processes which operate, to a large extent simultaneously, in the early stages of development” (*EG* 61, italics mine). The move from a temporally-oriented genetic theory of libidinal stages to a spatially-oriented theory of object-relations effectively spatializes time. The introduction of the metaphor of the *position* in favor of *phase* reorients her theory of psychic functioning that subsumes all question of time under the question of space. The question is no longer *when?* (i.e. which stage of development is the patient at?) but *where?* (i.e. which position does the patient occupy and how?).

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45 It is also notable here that, unlike Abraham, whose work was primarily with adults, Klein’s work is influenced by her clinical experience working with children. This clinical focus was to be the source of much of her experience.
Klein’s Theory of Schizoid Mechanisms

Freud’s theory of primary and secondary processes is based metaphorically on the idea of a hydraulic or electrical flow and circulation. In this way of thinking, the difference between the two processes is a difference between “free” and “bound” energy. As we have seen, Klein’s shift in emphasis in her reading of Freud’s drive theory involves a shift from an emphasis on the aim of the drive to its object. Freud’s circulation metaphor (in both its hydraulic and energetic expression) fits with a focus on the drive’s aim, understood as the means by which the drive achieves satisfaction, with the aim functioning as the specific channel by which the drive’s pressure is transmitted. In shifting focus from the aim to the object and its relations, Klein is enacting a shift in the metaphorical register towards a spatial metaphor derived anaclitically from an originary orality, of a movement in or out across a border which is here based on the mucus membrane of the mouth and lips.

This shift allows Klein to introduce a different set of primary processes than the ones that are immediately familiar from Freud (condensation, displacement, satisfactory hallucination). These new primary processes are introjection and projection, both of which are characteristic of the function of splitting. In “The Development of Mental Functioning” Klein writes

The young infant would be in danger of being flooded by his self-destructive impulses if the mechanism of projection could not operate.

It is partly in order to perform this function that the ego is called into
action at birth by the life instinct. The primal process of projection is the means of deflecting the death instinct outwards. Projection also imbues the first object with libido. The other primal process is introjection, again largely in the service of the life instinct; it combats the death instinct because it leads to the ego taking in something life-giving (first of all food) and thus binding the death instinct working within.

From the beginning of life the two instincts attach themselves to objects, first of all the mother’s breast. I believe, therefore, that some light may be thrown on the development of the ego in connection with the functioning of the two instincts by my hypothesis that the introjection of the mother’s feeding breast lays the foundation for all internalization processes. (EG 238).

Despite being written in a decisively Kleinian register, we can observe that Klein retains a certain amount of Freud’s original energetics in her description of the infant “being flooded” by his impulses, in this case the death drive (or “instinct,” following the translation that was fashionable at the time). Projection and introjection are characterized as “primal” processes whose aim is the “deflection” and/or “binding” of the death instinct understood as a pressure or flow. The mention of “binding” in this context will prick the ears of the astute reader, since in Freud’s formulation of the primary and secondary processes, it is the secondary processes which are
responsible for the binding of energy and are in part defined by that operation.⁴⁶

Klein’s thinking continually returns to the un- or undertheorized elements of Freud’s texts. As such it functions best when taken as an intervention in Freudian theory, and as something that does not fit well, but which, in doing so, points towards another scene. It is the intermediate scene of splitting and object relations to which this passage points. In the above passage, Klein’s text attempts to think aim and object at the same time. Each formulation of the operation on the aim in the function of splitting, namely

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⁴⁶ This is perhaps a place where the charge that Klein is a poor and confused reader of Freud is applicable. On the other hand, perhaps in using the word “primal” and not “primary,” Klein is merely referring to the primal, originary nature of both primary and secondary processes, both of which are fundamental to any understanding of more developed or complex mental functioning. Perhaps, and it is certainly true. But it is difficult to determine whether projection and introjection are primary/secondary processes, respectively, or whether “deflection” and “binding” are both simply additions to the list of secondary processes. Deflection is a particularly slippery term in such a context.

It is worth keeping in mind that while the terms “primary” and “secondary” imply a temporal and even developmental scheme, such a scheme is always ultimately a heuristic one in Freud. Like much of Freud’s thinking, the two processes are only thinkable as two equal parts of a totality, and they never function on their own, as it were, but in relation to each other. Klein’s shift from aim to object and her accompanying spatial metaphor ultimately deemphasizes Freud’s binary totality in favor of her own totality of projection and introjection.
deflection and binding, is accompanied by a formulation on the operation in the relation to the object: “Projection also imbues the first object with libido,” and introjection “leads to the ego taking in something life-giving” (italics mine).

The schizoid mechanisms, splitting, introjection and projection are to be understood as mechanisms of mental functioning. Klein is attempting to add to the Freudian catalog of mechanisms of mental functioning based on her work with schizophrenics and young children. In Freud, the primary

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47 Klein is quite consistent throughout her writing that the schizoid mechanisms that constitute the process of splitting are different from the mechanisms of repression, even if they are functionally similar. In 1930, which predates her theory of schizoid mechanisms, we can still find Klein writing, in reference to early phantasies of sadism,

According to what I have found in analysis, the earliest defense set up by the ego has reference to two sources of danger: the subject’s own sadism and the object which is attacked, this defence, in conformity with the degree of the sadism, is of a violent character and differs fundamentally from the later mechanism of repression. In relation to the subject’s own sadism the defence implies expulsion, whereas in relation to the object it implies destruction. (LGR 220, italics mine)

In 1946, in her paper on schizoid mechanisms, she will say much the same, writing

In passing I would mention that in this early phase splitting, denial and omnipotence play a role similar to that of repression at a later stage of ego-development. In considering the importance of the processes of denial and omnipotence at a stage which is characterized by persecutory fear and schizoid mechanisms, we may remember the
processes are mechanisms of immediate dispersal of energy (a satisfaction achieved either through motor action or hallucinatory satisfaction).

Secondary processes are based on delay and prospection, which introduce a sense of time which has a “now” and a “later.” Yet Klein’s schizoid world is one without time. It is a perpetual present without a past or future. Phantasy functions—which is to say, schiziod mechanisms operate—in a semi-hallucinatory way. Psychotics seem to suffer, as it were, from an acute absence of reminiscences. They suffer instead from an overwhelming presence of the present—a present that exists outside of linear time. There is no gap, no forgetting, and thus no time, only a perpetual recurrence of the same. If the reality principle has a regulating function, it is to create or allow for the possibility of periodicity in the psychic apparatus. Language and memory and space are all tied up in Freud and Klein, and a different mode of language, memory and time brings along with it a different spatial metaphorics.

The acts of splitting, introjection and projection and the envelope of in/out is a way of managing libido. Yet this is done not in terms of time, since delusions of both grandeur and of persecution in schizophrenia. (EG 7)

While this stance may at first glance appear more reserved and conciliatory than the earlier one, it is important to note that in the first quote, she is distinguishing between the mechanisms of splitting and repression, whereas in the second she notes a similarity in the role they each play in their respective realms.
it is a timeless world, but in terms of space. It is of course not a real space, corresponding to any sense of reality. The real world has no reality in the paranoid-schizoid position. Klein writes early on that “[we] see then that the child’s earliest reality is wholly phantastic” and that there are uncontrollable elements and they come equally from endo- and extra-psychic sources (drive, frustration, absence, etc.): “he is surrounded with objects of anxiety, and in this respect excrement, organs, objects, things animate and inmate are to begin with equivalent to each other” (EG 221). It is above all a paranoid world that does not know absence. There are no gaps, nothing can go missing, everything is equivalent and all is always accounted for. Such a world has a place for everything and those places are constantly shuffled around (introjected, projected) as a way of managing the inability to actually (in “reality”) control things. A secondary process of a kind is at work, since there is an organization of need and demand that allows for a kind of relief through structure. But it has nothing to do with an awareness of the reality of the external world or with time. It is thus also a kind of primary process in that the satisfaction is hallucinated, or rather it has a hallucinatory quality (paranoid) that hallucinates not the satisfaction of a need, but the management of the impossibility of its complete satisfaction.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has taken up the question (outlined in the first part of chapter one) of how psychoanalytic theory reads itself and is transformed by
the shift in rhetorical foundations. Klein’s retooling of psychoanalytic discourse does not arise, as Grosskurth and others have claimed, from a lack of understanding or from some kind of individual whim. As we have seen, Klein’s reworking of analytic theory has a history and is part of a continuum that stretches back to Freud himself. The development of her theory also occurred in response to specific clinical experiences with children and psychotics. These clinical instances were resistant to psychoanalytic treatment in part because they interacted with analytic theory in places that remained undertheorized. Klein developed her new spatial metaphorics as a way of addressing these undertheorized elements in an attempt to expand the clinical possibilities of psychoanalytic treatment.

The analysis in this chapter does not wish to take sides or to pass judgment. I am not concerned here with whether Klein is correct or incorrect, whether her theory is on the mark or misses the mark. Instead, I have been interested in analyzing the history and development of the rhetorical foundations of her theory. I believe it is only after such an investigation and analysis has been made would it even be possible to begin to hazard a judgment of the theory. Such a judgment is well beyond the remit of this analysis, but I believe it would be impossible without such an analysis.

In the following chapter, I will look at a drastically different analytic response to the interaction of clinical practice and psychoanalytic theory. Moving from a focus on the metaphorical foundations of analytic theory and their vicissitudes, I will focus on the question of the theorization and
representation of clinical practice in analytic theory itself, as it is posed by J.-B. Pontalis in his book, *Windows*. As drastically different as Klein and Pontalis are, they are both illustrative instances of the inescapability and generative power of rhetoricity in psychoanalytic theory.
Chapter 3

“The Movement and Rhythm of the Word”: Representing Psychoanalysis in J.-B. Pontalis’ *Windows*

**Introduction**

As I argued in my first chapter, psychoanalysis is fundamentally a discourse on a discourse, namely the discourse of the analysand who speaks in analysis. Psychoanalytic practice operates from, on and through speech and language, while psychoanalytic theory arises out of this encounter with the speech of the analysand and is a discourse on it. In this chapter I consider more fully how psychoanalytic theory addresses the relationship between the analytic experience and its representation in writing. This question is of major concern to J.-B. Pontalis in his book *Windows*, and this chapter is a sustained consideration of Pontalis’ book and the approach he adopts in his struggle with what is elusive in the representation of analytic experience.

Beginning with Freud, psychoanalysts have claimed that there is something difficult about the representation of the psychoanalytic situation in writing. Although this claim has not in the least prevented analysts from writing about analysis, nonetheless, it could be said that the difficulty of representing the analytic situation is in one way or another a central question of all psychoanalytic writing. The French analyst and writer J.-B. Pontalis is probably best known for his 1967 work with Jean Laplanche on the *Vocabulaire de la Psychanalyse*, translated as *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, a
definitive lexicon of psychoanalytic concepts. More recently, Pontalis has revisited the format of the lexicon while drastically reimagining its possibilities. In a short volume titled *Windows*, Pontalis has created what he calls "a lexicon 'for personal use,'" a memoir comprised of 58 short meditations on words or phrases that hold a certain significance to his psychoanalytic life (xxiii). Pontalis utilizes a hybrid genre of lexicon and memoir that is fragmentary and idiosyncratic to represent the analytic situation in a way that would do justice to what he refers to as "the intense, moving, incredible reality that the analyst confronts" in analysis (75).

This chapter is an exploration of Pontalis' style, of the poetics of *Windows* and how it reimagines the role of theory in psychoanalysis, and how that theory might be written. It is a study of the text's form and how it works. This chapter also examines how Pontalis' text, in its poetics, speaks to the questions of rhetoric raised in the first chapter: questions of literariness, of what the object of psychoanalytic theory is and how it is constructed, of the referential aspects of language and how rhetoric, specifically, is concerned with questions otherwise from that. Pontalis, like Klein, is at heart a theorist. Yet Pontalis' position is defined by its uneasy fascination with theory and its possibilities. Whereas Klein's intervention is located at the place of undertheorized aspects of psychoanalytic discourse, Pontalis' intervention can be said to be located in the overlap between the clinical and the

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48 “un petit lexique à usage personnel” (*Fenêtres* 13).
49 “l'intense, mouvante, incroyable réalité à quoi l'analyse confronte” (116).
theoretical. He is concerned with how that transition operates, if it does at all, and what dangers it might contain.

Despite his role in the production of the *Language of Psychoanalysis* (and, as we shall see, because of it), Pontalis is resistant to and doubtful of the received wisdom of analytic theory. It is the very receivedness of the theory that he suspects, meaning that for most analysts it is a theory given to them, something found in the world, already fashioned in the form of psychoanalytic discourse. Analytic theory, in this way, can act as an aid to thinking and practice, but for Pontalis, a too-rigid theory can become an impediment to that very same thinking and practice; it can become a crutch and has the potential to produce blocks and blindness. For Pontalis, theory must be discovered anew for each analyst and in each session for it to have any usefulness.

But if theory is to be perpetually discovered anew, what is the purpose of writing psychoanalysis? Pontalis hardly shies away from the written word. As a writer and editor throughout his life, the writing of psychoanalysis is a driving force. In Pontalis' text, always present but never fully articulated, is an appeal for a kind of writing of psychoanalysis that pays attention to and perhaps even reproduces (in its own way) the rhythm and movement that Pontalis identifies in language. It is this appeal that I will explore in this chapter, along with one of the questions that animate it: how to represent the analytic situation and the role of experience in that reproduction. Pontalis' text thematizes and enacts a stylistics of evocation,
rupture, resistance and dream that acts, as he says, to "transpos[e] the movement and the rhythm of the word" (76). Being attentive to this movement and rhythm in Windows contributes to thinking about how psychoanalysis writes itself—for example, as theory, case history, or memoir—while it struggles with the question of what is elusive in the representation of the analytic situation.

I examine these topics by considering Windows in relation to Pontalis’ earlier text, *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse in French). The Vocabulaire is a reference point for Windows, which continually situates itself in conversation with and invokes the memory of the Vocabulaire. I argue that, far from a repudiation, Windows represents a rethinking and working through of the possibilities implicit in the Vocabulaire.

*The Language of Psychoanalysis and the role of a reference work in psychoanalytic theory*

Written in 2000, Windows is a sustained meditation on what the writing of psychoanalysis is, what it is for, and what it can do. It is, for example, a narration of the continual discovery that characterizes Pontalis’ understanding of analysis. Its tone mimics the perpetual tentativeness of analytic attention. It also invites the reader to read it closely and carefully—not to discern its "meaning," since its meaning is not hidden and does not

50 “transposer le mouvement et le rythme de la phrase” (117).
51 Preferring the more limited connotations of the original title, and the relative ease of transforming it into a noun (the Vocabulaire), I will refer to the text by its French title in what follows.
consist in its hiddenness. Rather, the text rewards the reader who reenacts
the floating attention of the analyst. It is a text that repeats and echoes itself.
Each chapter is more or less self-contained and can be read on its own. But
when the chapters are read together, or better, in relation to one another, a
logic that is neither narrative or linear emerges. It is also a text in which the
context carries an effect. A given motif raised in one context repeats many
pages later in an entirely different one, and changes its tone, reorients itself,
and reorients retroactively its previous occurrence.

In the foreword, Pontalis refers to Windows as "a small lexicon for
personal use" (xxiii), which recalls his earlier Vocabulaire, while also
drastically revising it, since what is referenced here is not Freud's corpus of
terms and concepts, but "a certain number of words...images, traces of
sessions with patients, meetings with friends, and readings that had left their
mark on me" (xxiii).52 The book is arranged like a reference work, since it
contains 58 "entries," or chapters consisting of a word or a phrase at the head
of the page in italics that is then followed by a short piece of text of roughly
one to three pages. However, these passages of text are written in a casual,
aphoristic style, like a series of vignettes. They do not progress in a linear
fashion or mount an argument (much less provide what might be easily
recognized as a clarification). Rather, they follow a more poetic or dreamlike
logic of shifts, jumps and displacements: many of the sentences are written as
fragments and relate to each other paratactically. Paragraphs are quite short

52 “un certain nombre de mots...des images, des traces que des rencontres avec des
patients, des amis, des lectures avaient laissés en moi” (13-14).
and the chapters are interwoven with many quotations from texts or overheard speech. Many more questions are posed than are answered.

The *Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse* is itself no simple reference work. Each entry begins with a definition, which “seeks to sum up the concept’s accepted meaning as it emerges from its strict usage in psycho-analytic theory” (*Language* xii). These definitions are relatively succinct and are not more than a few lines long. The bulk of each entry is devoted to a lengthy critical commentary that traces the history of the term in Freud’s work, noting the term’s first appearance and subsequent developments, as well as the different contexts in which the term appears. There is also sometimes an additional section that considers “ambiguities [*ambiguités*]” and “contradictory aspects [*les contradictions*]” of a term in its history and usage (*Language* xii-xiii, *Vocabulaire* xi). In offering what its authors describe as “an interpretation [*une interprétation*],” the *Vocabulaire* is a text that reads Freud carefully and closely (*Language* xii, *Vocabulaire* xi, italics in original). Its form enacts a process of thinking with and through Freud’s texts and the concepts that arise from those texts, which are always in transition and always tied to and arise from their particular textual and intertextual contexts. Laplanche and Pontalis make clear in their foreword that their method, especially in their detailed commentary, is alternately "historical, structural and problematic [*histoire, structure et problématique*]" and that

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53 “ramasser l’acception de la notion, telle qu’elle ressort de son usage rigoureux dans la théorie psychanalytique” (*Vocabulaire* x).
on est frappé de voir les concepts fondamentaux s’éclairer, retrouver leurs arêtes vives, leurs contours, leurs articulations réciproques, lorsqu’on les confronte à nouveau aux expériences qui leur ont donné naissance, aux problèmes qui ont jalonné et infléchi leur évolution. (x).

it is striking to see how the basic concepts are illuminated, how they regain their living contours, their definition, and how the links between them become clear, once they are shown in relation to the experiences which originally brought them into being, and to the problems that have punctuated and shaped their development (xii).

The stated aim is thus not to pin down the meaning of an analytic term or concept, but, through the enactment of a mode of reading, to demonstrate the vicissitudes that characterize the Freudian text.

The mode of reading that the authors envisaged for the *Vocabulaire* is most fully outlined elsewhere. In two articles written by Pontalis around the time of the *Vocabulaire*’s publication, "*Du vocabulaire de la psychanalyse au langage du psychanalyste*" and "*Questions de mots.*" Pontalis defines his and Laplanche's approach to Freud's "œuvre" as "pay[ing] attention to to his own discourse and to stay[ing] in his language" ("*Du vocabulaire*" 136, translation mine).  

He writes that their "terminological survey" is concerned

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54 "*Du vocabulaire*" was published just prior to the publication of the *Vocabulaire* and "*Question de mots*" just after. They represent a remarkable and
avec l’hypothèse…que le champ psychanalytique reste structuré par le champ sémantique qui fut celui de Freud, le sens de l’expérience subordonné au texte freudien, et avec le présupposé que c’est en se replaçant dans ce champ sémantique que la psychanalyse trouve ses meilleures chances de rejoindre le mouvement moderne du savoir… (136, italics in original)

with the hypothesis…that the psychoanalytic field is structured by the semantic field which was that of Freud, that the meaning of the [psychoanalytic] experience is subject to Freudian text, and with the assumption that it is by placing psychoanalysis in this semantic field that it has its best chance to join the modern movement of knowledge… (Translation mine)

Pontalis defines this "placing" as being in part historical, by detailing the origins and development of a particular analytic concept. He also describes their method as one of "decompos[ing] Freudian theory to thereby discover its arrangement" ("Question de mots" 174, translation mine). The arrangement that Pontalis has in mind refers to the "interrelations" that are always shifting between elements in the semantic field (169). Such elements may consist of specific terms, but they may also be particular themes and contexts. Pontalis gives as an example the idea [notion] of "incorporation," which has its origins complex meditation on the question of psychoanalytic language and its relation to analytic experience and praxis.

55 “rendre attentifs à son propre discours et de séjourner dans son langage.”
56 “…à décomposer la théorie freudienne et, par là, à découvrir l’agencement...”
in bodily prototypes such as the mouth and the womb, and also with other
"ideas," such as identification. Yet, he argues, if one insists too singularly on
the bodily aspect of incorporation,

one risks unduly valorizing an organ (the mouth), a function (ingestion
of food), a stage (oral), while other erogenous zones (the skin for
example), and other functions (like vision) also provide support for
incorporation, and whereas orality constitutes the model, it is not
limited to the oral stage. Furthermore, one risks equating it with an
"objective" process and ignoring the essential, namely its fantasmatic
dimension and the significations to which it is attached (both the
destruction of the object and its conservation inside the self, assimilation of its qualities, etc.). But conversely, to define incorporation as a "purely" fantasmatic processes would be to see it as the mere imaginary correlate of internalization and understood as the imaginary correlate of the "mental" register. (translation mine)

In this example Pontalis elaborates the richness of the "interrelations" that govern, determine and branch out from a single given term that functions less as an independent concept than a nodal point in a matrix of relations. Organs (literal and fantasmatic), functions (bodily and psychical), stages (oral, anal, etc.), object relations, interiority, and other concepts (such as internalization) are all woven together, surround and pass through a single concept, “incorporation.” As Pontalis points out, the interrelations are sometimes contradictory or require different levels of emphasis. These interconnections, which are discovered through decomposition [décomposer] and analysis, and the "articulation of the ideas relevant to the same field of operations," are the object of Laplanche and Pontalis' project in the Vocabulaire (169).\footnote{articulation avec des notions relevant du même champ d’opérations”}

In addition to their method of reading Freud, Laplanche and Pontalis also designed a specific formal structure for their own text. As a supplement to its alphabetical arrangement, there exists a system of cross-references signified by the use of either a q.v. or an asterisk that indicates the connections between different concepts (Language xi).\footnote{marquer les relations existant entre les différentes notions” (x).} While this apparatus
is not, in itself, an uncommon feature in a reference work, the authors imagine this system of cross-references as a kind of invitation to the reader: "The reader is thus encouraged to identify for himself the significant links between concepts, and to find his own bearings in the associative networks of the language of psycho-analysis" (xii). Thus the text is imagined as being a double instance of reading. First, it represents a demonstration of the authors' reading of the Freudian text. Second, a cross-referential system has been built into the text in order to create and recreate the very interrelationality that is, for the authors, so central to the Freudian text as they understand it, and which invites the reader to perform a similar action on the *Vocabulaire* itself. The text serves at least three functions, first as a summary and explication of the contextuality of Freudian concepts, second, as an illustration and reenactment of a mode of reading that would produce a careful understanding of Freud, and third, as a text that invites the reader to produce his or her own reading of the *Vocabulaire* itself.

Anne Quinney points out that, despite its authors' stated intentions, the *Vocabulaire*’s publication had a paradoxical effect, "pav[ing] the way for the institutionalization of Freudian psychoanalysis in France" (vi). In her

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59 “Nous aimerions ainsi inviter le lecteur à établir lui-même des relations significatives entre les notions et à s’orienter dans les réseaux d’associations de la langue psychanalytique” (x).

60 Quinney is the only English-language critic thus far to critically engage with Pontalis' work. *Windows* has received little attention from English-language readers. The handful of book reviews that accompanied the book's 2003 translation were as overwhelmingly positive as they are brief (see Boesky, Eckardt, Meissner, Perro). The general tone of the cursory reviews is one of untroubled delight, describing the
translator's introduction to *Windows*, Quinney contextualizes the publication of the *Vocabulaire* in 1967 in its historical situation, which was marked by an increasing French interest in Freud and psychoanalysis at a time when "interest in Freud outweighed knowledge of Freud" due to poor and incomplete French translations of his work (vi). In tandem with new translations of Freud, also organized by Laplanche and Pontalis, the *Vocabulaire* "created the first point of entry into psychoanalysis for many whom it would otherwise have remained a closed door" (vi). Despite the formal strategies of the text, the *Vocabulaire* also "represented the first concerted effort to crystallize Freud's thought for a new generation of analysts and theorists" (vi-vii). Even if it explicitly invited the reader to engage in the same kind of careful reading that produced the text, the clarity and ease of reference that the *Vocabulaire* provided meant that, in France, "for the first time in the then-young history of psychoanalysis, anyone could have access to the main principles on which Freudian psychoanalysis was based text as "a delightful treasure" or "this wonderful book" (Eckhardt 575, Perro 151). A more sustained consideration of Pontalis’ work exists in French. See, for example, André, Duparc, and Pontalis et al.

61 The French situation was quite different from that of the English-speaking world of Britain and the United States, where the heyday of psychoanalysis occurred much earlier, due in great part to the efforts of translators and editors such as A.A. Brill in America and Earnes Jones, Joan Riviere, James and Alix Strachey, and others in Britain, as well as the foundation of the New York Psychoanalytic Society in 1911, and the British Psychoanalytic Society in 1913.

The French interest in Freud in the 1960s is, of course, greatly a product of Jacques Lacan’s sustained and long-lasting championing of Freud through his seminars at the École Normale Supérieure, which Laplanche and Pontalis attended and participated in, and the publication of his *Écrits* in 1966, one year before the *Vocabulaire*.
and in language not necessarily reserved to specialists in the field” (vii). Partly facilitated by the *Vocabulaire*, "an industry of psychoanalytic theory began to grow with tremendous speed...with immense enthusiasm" (vii).

Quinney writes, “Written as a coda to *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, [Windows] is a response to the very problem that has occupied Pontalis’s theoretical writings of the last three decades,” namely the problem of institutionalization, crystallization and industrialization that were in part fostered by the publication of the *Vocabulaire*, and which Pontalis has considered one of the foremost difficulties facing psychoanalytic discourse and theory (ix). In referring, as we have seen, to *Windows* as a "lexicon for personal use," and as a survey of “a number of words belonging to my private Vocabulary” Pontalis also appears to make a distinction between, on one hand, the Freudian vocabulary and its institutionalization, and the individual analyst’s "private" vocabulary on the other (xxiii). Yet the use of capitalization and italics serves to re-tie the author's "private Vocabulary" to the *Vocabulaire* by marking "Vocabulary" as a title, as the title of a text. Though the text is titled *Windows*, we are invited at the very start to compare the *Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse* to this *Vocabulaire d’un psychanalyste*.

What kind of "response" and what kind of "coda" is *Windows* to its predecessor? Quinney argues that *Windows* positions itself in relation to the *Vocabulaire* as a repudiation and "a critique of the very institutionalisation that he inaugurated, however unwittingly, with the *Vocabulaire***

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62 In the French, *Vocabulaire* is both capitalized and italicized, suggesting a direct reference to the *Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse*.
"Psychoanalysis is on the Couch" 121). Windows' "more strident position," she claims, consists of a call
for a complete re-evaluation of the place of psychoanalytic concepts in the analytic setting, decrying the danger both of the concretization of psychoanalytic theory into its own idées fixes and the theoretical indoctrination of contemporary psychoanalysts who approach psychoanalytic theory more as a source of power than as a method. ("Translator's Introduction" ix)

This call for re-evaluation is indeed an undeniable theme in the text. It is most clearly articulated in the text's second chapter, titled "They Stole My Concept!"63 In this chapter Pontalis quite forcefully refers to the "tyranny of the concept" and lampoons a young Jacques-Alain Miller, whose frustrated shout gives the chapter its title (Windows 3-4).64 In contrast with such "tyranny," Pontalis argues that language and words have a degree of mobility and flexibility that allow us to "stay open to the inconceivable" (4).65 This chapter, however, stands as a rare example in this text of a pitched battle or of a clear argument. While an opposition to institutionalization and standardization constitutes a "strident position" within the text, such a position is rarely accompanied by explicit argumentation. It is a position that mostly acts as an animating energy or impetus. Pontalis claims in his foreword that in writing his text "my intentions were opposed to any kind of

63 "On m'a volé mon concept!"
64 "la tyrannie du concept" (18). This incident is ambiguously identified by Pontalis as an "invented or real anecdote" ("anecdote inventée ou reel") (3, 17).
65 "s'ouvrir à l'inconcevable" (19).
closure as they were to all discourse presented as argument” and that he “hoped rather to open for myself, perhaps thereby opening for the reader, a few windows” (xxiii). The question then becomes, what kind of form does opening a few windows take?

There is a danger in too stridently opposing Windows to the Vocabulaire, as Quinney does. Whereas Quinney writes in one sentence that Windows is written “as a coda” to the Vocabulaire, and that it constitutes “a response to the very problem” of the codification of analytic theory into concepts, I would like to pry apart these two related elements. As Quinney has argued, the “problem” of the institutionalization of psychoanalysis is related to the Vocabulaire’s publication and reception, and is the background against which Pontalis “invents…a counterdiscourse” in the form of Windows (ix). No doubt. But it is also necessary to distinguish between the text of the Vocabulaire and its enmeshment in a historical conjuncture in order to allow a second look at the possibilities that the text embodies—possibilities that it in fact shares with Windows. In this way, it is possible to consider the “problem” of the Vocabulaire’s reception without necessarily considering the Vocabulaire to be a problem text that must be stridently repudiated.

By distinguishing the text of the Vocabulaire from its reception, we can rehistoricize it in terms of its milieu of origin, namely the careful French

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66 “mon propos était opposé à toute clôture comme à tout discours argumenté…Je souhaitais plutôt m’ouvrir et éventuellement ouvrir pour le lecteur quelques fenêtres” (14).

67 It is worth noting that Pontalis also never makes this opposition in Windows.
reengagement with Freud's texts, among which Lacan's "return to Freud" was a driving engine, and which was characterized by a particular mode of reading. As I have argued above, the *Vocabulaire* is the product of and an attempt to enact a mode of reading Freud that pays attention to the rhythm and movement of his texts. While *Windows* also functions as a "response" to the "problem" of concretization in analytic theory, this response involves neither a repudiation of the form of the *Vocabulaire* nor a distancing from the mode of reading that the *Vocabulaire* sought to enact, but a reinvigoration of its form and mode. Quinney's choice of the word "coda" to describe the text is quite apt in this context. A musical coda is a short piece at the end of a score which restates and looks back on the themes and motifs of the longer piece that preceded it. Separated by time and space from its source text, *Windows* functions as a reworking and heightening of certain aspects of the *Vocabulaire* that have perhaps been overlooked due to the history of its reception.

Part of Pontalis' strong reaction against the idea of the "concept" in *Windows* appears to spring from the very paradox that a text such as the *Vocabulaire* produces, namely that a text that reveals and revels in the richness and mobility of Freud’s language and thought nonetheless contains a fixity that results from having been written down in the first place. It is perhaps unavoidable that the very format of the reference work, which Laplanche and Pontalis sought to make a living and subtle text, contains within it a resistance to the very mobility of the concept that the authors celebrated. As
we have seen, there is a strong degree to which the very ossified or stale psychoanalytic “concepts” that Pontalis takes issue with in *Windows* are a product of his own early scholarship. The format of *Windows*, which both is and is not a lexicon like the *Vocabulaire*, reflects a resistance to the fixity of concepts and embraces the mobility of language.

For example, in *Windows*, the table of contents (in the original French edition) lists all 58 chapter titles sequentially, but inserts occasional blank lines between them, producing 20 groupings (including the first and last chapters, each of which stand alone). The irregular spacing turns the list into a sequence, suggesting a syntagmatic organization, but the groups (if that is indeed what they are) are not named or labeled in such a way that would reveal or even intimate their underlying logic. The format raises the expectation of an order which is subverted by being insufficiently articulated. The effect of this seeming organization without sense can be compared to being confronted with a parapraxis, dream or symptom—an ordered disorder that implies the possibility of an organizing principle or logic in a place where none would initially seem to exist. One gets the sense that the text is not merely feigning an organization where it has none, but rather that it is organized otherwise. Such an organization might arise from the experience of reading the text, meaning that the act of reading the text might be a self-organizing process. This process would not be simple, since the time of reading (like “the time of analysis”) is not instantaneous and takes place *over*
time (Windows 44). Thus the organization is reworked in each moment as the reading progresses, in a manner that inscribes multiple and differing interpretations. As each line of text is encountered it refashions understanding, as it were, nachträglich, or through deferred action.

This process continues its work each time the text is encountered, read and reread. This line of thinking to a degree assumes that the text of Windows would be read sequentially, from beginning to end. It is also certainly possible to read the text out of sequence, which might even be more in keeping with its status

68 “le temps de l’analyse” (74).
69 Pontalis has elsewhere commented on his fragmentary form and its nachträglich logic, referring to

"mon attirance pour des livres constitués de fragments comme Fenêtres ou En marge des jours, fragments qui dans un second temps après coup, revêtiront un forme, une ébauche de forme. La composition des fragments, leur ordonnancement ne sont pas prévus au départ. L’intelligible n’est pas premier, il surgit du sensible tout comme la forme en vient à attirer vers elle les fragments. Disloquer, disséminer avant de composer. ("Réponse à Hélène Parat” 148)

my fascination for books consisting of fragments, such as Windows or En marge des jours [published two years later], fragments which assume a form, a skeleton of a form, the second time around, after the fact [après coup: nachträglich]. The composition of the fragments and their sequence is not foreseen at the outset. The intelligible is not primary, it arises from what is sensible just as the form comes from the attraction of the fragments. Scattered, disseminated before being composed.

(translation mine)
as a reference work—which isn’t regularly designed to be read from beginning to end. However this would not change the experience of reading that I have been outlining. It would simply be another means by which the text might be encountered and which would add to the multiplicity of interpretation.

*Windows* situates itself in a format that, like the *Vocabulaire* traffics in concepts. Yet when the reader encounters the occasional chapter in *Windows* that bears a potentially conceptual inflection (chapters with titles such as “Nostalgia,” “Memory,” “Childhood,” and “Erasure”), the body of that chapter does not define the concept (though the chapter on “Nostalgia” does begin with a definition, but from another source). Instead, the chapter engages in the same characteristic aphoristic musing that we find throughout the text. The reference work format sets up the potential for a definition (for a whole text of definitions) while problematizing it by substituting an elusive and aphoristic reflection. It is not that Pontalis wants to remove the

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*Nostalgie, Mémoires, Enfance, Effacement*

*In this, Windows shares a formal affinity with texts such as Montaigne’s essays or Roland Barthes’ fragmentary* *A Lover’s Discourse.*

Perhaps, also, it is too limited to think about a reference work such as a dictionary only as something to which one turns to seeking an authoritative statement. It is undeniable that a dictionary is often used by its readers to determine a word’s meaning and to fix it. Such an approach seeks to escape the movement of language, to get out of it. Yet any good scholarly dictionary will also include some form of etymology and/or usage history that makes evident the shifting movement of a word’s journey through language. On one hand, a dictionary can appear to answer our appeal to fix a word and its meaning and take us out of the play of language, on the other, we find
question of meaning or abolish the idea of accuracy (“Accuracies” is another chapter title) in favor of a personal or private solipsism. Pontalis is interested, rather, in highlighting the incessant movement of a term highlighting the connections that exist between ideas and keeping open the possibility that one thought can lead to an entirely different one, a movement that doesn’t stop with a definition, and isn’t arrested by it.

In opposing the idea of the concept, Pontalis is working in a Nietzschean vein that opposes the concretization and the lifelessness that can occur when one forgets that the concept is a placeholder, as Pontalis makes clear by quoting “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense”: “Concepts are formed by forgetting what distinguishes one object from the next” (in Pontalis 3). Pontalis also, though less strenuously, opposes the form of the story, for which his aphoristic form is an alternative. This opposition reflects the second “genre” that Windows references, the memoir, insofar as the traditional memoir form follows to some degree the form of the conversion narrative: it is chronological, and has a linear narrative structure.

ourselves thrown back into language, into its messiness, its developments, its contradictions, its multiplicity. In addition, I’m sure that most people have had the experience of turning to a reference work such as a dictionary or encyclopedia at some time or another and found their attention drawn, not to what they were looking for, but instead to other neighboring entries. It is possible to get “lost” for some time in this way.
Theorizing clinical experience in *Windows*

Published in 2000, *Windows* came out on the centenary of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. *The Interpretation of Dreams* founded a discourse and a movement and continues to be a touchstone for psychoanalytic discourse. For all its complexity, and the concepts and models that it introduces, Freud’s dream book remains fundamentally a guide to a mode of reading—a reading of the text of the dream as reported by the dreamer, of the dream as rebus, of the connections between elements in a dream, and the means by which those connections are disguised and distorted. In this spirit, Pontalis writes that

*Les barrières du refoulement se situent entre les représentations. Elles ont pour fonction d’empêcher les liens entre elles. Le règle de la libre association vise à en établir d’autres, à multiplier les réseaux. Elle défait le souvenir, elle en crève l’écran. Elle détisse l’image dans le tapis.* (Fenêtres 110, italics in original).

The barriers of repression are situated between representations. They function to prevent the links between them. The rule of free association aims at establishing other links, to multiply the networks. It undoes the memory, it breaks through the *screen*. It unravels the figure in the carpet. (*Windows* 70-71, italics in original)

As a text published on the centenary of Freud’s dream book, *Windows* may be read as a book of connections, a text that creates internal networks, and that asks to be read as a kind of dream. Such an invitation does not abandon or
reject the question of concepts and theory, as Quinney argues, but attempts to
do it differently, in the spirit of the dream book.

Both *The Interpretation of Dreams* and *Windows* “draw on the author’s
experience as an analyst and thus are both highly personal,” and both rely on
the author’s self-analysis “as the primary relationship whose description is an
attempt to understand the strange confrontation that the analytic setting
constitutes” (Quinney, “Psychoanalysis is on the Couch” 121). Like the pre-
Freudian dream books that promised a pre-established code by which to read
and translate dreams, a psychoanalytic practice that relies on and begins from
an external source of understanding is what Pontalis warns against. After all,
it is the text of the dream itself that Freud reads, not a dream book.72 For
Pontalis, each clinical experience is not something to which understanding
may be brought, but from which an understanding may emerge. The means
by which that understanding may be achieved (though it is never guaranteed
ahead of time) arise from within the experience itself, rather than being
brought to bear from outside.

It is the very question of analytic experience that Pontalis is theorizing.
Yet for Pontalis, the idea of analytic experience is far from simple or self-
evident:73

72 It is also a reading that results in the writing of a new book, Freud’s
*Traumbuch*. It is a mode of reading texts that produces new texts.
73 In her reading of Pontalis, Quinney is sometimes less reflective in her
understanding of what she means by “experience,” such as when she lionizes
the “raw material of lived reality” and a “more authentic and exact personal
L’analyse: l’expérience la plus intime, la plus insolite, la plus difficile à transmettre et même à dire, bien qu’elle soit à l’opposé de l’ineffable et de son flou, la plus réticente à tour savoir, à tout discours maîtrisé. Une expérience qui demeure souvent opaque à ceux-là mêmes qui s’y soumettent, analyste et patient. (Fenêtres 22).

Analysis is the most intimate, the most unusual experience and the most difficult to impart or speak about, even though it is opposed to the vagueness of the ineffable. The experience is the most reticent in the face of all forms of knowledge, of all mastered discourse. It is an experience that often remains impenetrable even to those who are involved, analyst and patient. (Windows 6)

Analytic experience is resistant to those whose experience it is (analyst and patient) and equally resistant to being imparted or spoken about. In the same chapter as the above quotation, Pontalis provides a vignette that describes what he calls the “rare exception” of someone speaking from her analytic experience at a psychoanalytic conference:

Exception rarissime: ce fut de l’analyse. Même quand la femme qui parlait se risquait à la théorie, tentant ainsi de donner une plus large portée à ce qui lui était apparu dans son expérience singulièr, incertaine, tout son propos

vocabulary, one that is rooted in personal reflection” (“Psychoanalysis is on the Couch” 122). The rawness or authenticity—if it is ever that—of experience is, for Pontalis, always something that must always be read.
émanait de ce qu’elle avait rencontré, découvert au cours de ses cures. Elle n’avait pas besoin d’y faire directement référence, il suffisait que ce qu’elle avançait, éventuellement “théorisait,” trouve là, tout au long, sa source. (22-23)

Rare exception: her talk was truly analysis. Even when the woman who was speaking advanced a theoretical claim, trying thus to expand on what had appeared uncertain and singular in her experience, her whole argument flowed from what she had encountered and discovered in the course of her analytic treatment. She didn't need to refer to it directly; it was enough for her to put forward, perhaps even to “theorize,” what had all along been the source, that is, her experience. In other words, what was discovered in the process of analysis. (6-7)

Pontalis characterizes what it means to speak from the analytic experience in terms of how it is expressed. He provides no specific content, doesn't describe what she says. Instead he describes the mode of its presentation. Her presentation “flowed from what she had encountered and discovered in the course” of her analyses.74

Like the analyst in the conference, Windows seeks to “put forward, perhaps even to 'theorize'” analytic experience. In attempting a new way of representing the analytic experience, “what had all along been the source,”

74 “émanait de ce qu’elle avait rencontré, découvert au cours”
Pontalis is also attempting a new kind of theorizing. The mode of putting forward becomes the means of theorizing the very experience that is represented. *Windows* is not an escape from theory into the “raw material of lived reality,” as Quinney argues, but an effort to theorize the clinical encounter through a different form (“Psychoanalysis is on the Couch” 122). In contrast to the “tyranny of the concept” and to “all discourse presented as an argument—anything that expects to ‘hold itself together’ at the risk of holding us captive within it,” Pontalis employs indirectness as a mode of expression that highlights what Quinney refers to in her preface as the “litteralité, the literariness, of the psychoanalytic situation” (*Windows* 4, xxiii, xi).75 But what is the experience of analysis that is so central to Pontalis’ writing? As it is for Freud, experience is the strangeness with which the analyst (and analysand) is confronted.

While Quinney is correct to emphasize the fact that “Pontalis's work in recent years spells out a new direction in psychoanalysis with its emphasis on a return to clinical practice,” she misreads Pontalis' stance on the question of reading, which she argues gets in the way of an attentiveness to clinical experience (“Psychoanalysis is on the Couch” 123). Quinney claims that Pontalis’ work represents a return to what she calls “a pre-Lacanian Freud,” writing,

> In his recent memoir, *En marge des jours*, Pontalis reframes the importance of Freud's example, ‘I fear the sacralisation of the

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75 “tyrannie du concept,” “tout discours argumenté censé ‘se tenir’ au risque de nous tenir enfermés en lui” (*Fenêtres*, 18, 14).
‘Freudian text’ . . . will put experience aside, this other source of our thoughts, the more immediate, more troubling, more worrisome; for with experience, it is no longer a question of reading and commenting.” Pontalis vindicates Freud’s original concerns dating back to 1937 regarding the analytic situation with its emphasis on the singularity rather than the universality of individual experience in analysis. This appeal to returning to a “pure practice” honours Freud's own respect for experimentation in analysis while it challenges the theoretical indoctrination of contemporary psychoanalysts who approach psychoanalytic theory as so much more a source of power than a method. (123)

It is difficult to understand what Quinney means by a “pre-Lacanian Freud” in this context, especially when Pontalis writes, at the beginning of the same paragraph that Quinney quotes,

*Ce qui me gêne dans les meilleurs travaux psychanalytiques que j’ai pu lire ces derniers temps, ce n’est pas tant qu’ils se réfèrent à Freud presque à chaque paragraphe dans une lecture toujours plus attentive aux mots de sa langue, une lecture initiée par Lacan, poursuivie, prolongée par Laplanche, Granoff, quelques autres. Non, ce qui me gêne, c’est l’aveu implicite qu’un psychanalyste ne pourrait penser qu’à partir de ce qui a déjà été pensé (par Freud). (En marge 71-2)*
What bothers me in the best psychoanalytic work I’ve read lately is not so much that they refer to Freud in almost every paragraph in an ever more careful reading of the words of his language, a reading initiated by Lacan and continued, extended by Laplanche, Granoff, and others. No, what bothers me is the implicit admission that a psychoanalyst is able to think only what has already been thought of (by Freud).

(translated by me)

For Pontalis, it is not a problem of “reading and commenting” as such. There is a problem when an analyst is only able to read and comment on texts, and in the sacralizing stance taken toward Freud. Pontalis doesn’t fear analysts who reference Freud (even “in almost every paragraph,” as he says), but analysts who can’t think beyond what Freud hasn’t already thought. It is not a question of reading versus experience, but a matter of being capable of reading Freud, but also of reading analytic experience, which consists of encounters with what is not already represented or representable. A few lines later, Pontalis writes “When one of my young colleagues confides in me, somewhat contritely, ‘I don’t understand,’ I say to myself, ‘This is a good sign, he’s starting to become an analyst’” (72, translation mine). For Pontalis, understanding cannot exist prior to the encounter. The grappling with that non-knowledge defines the analytic experience itself (“he’s starting to become

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76 “Quand un de mes jeunes collègues me confie, un peu contrit, ‘Je n’y comprends rien,’ je me dis: ‘C’est bon signe, il commence à devenir analyste.’”

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an analyst.”)\textsuperscript{77} In an analogous manner, the form of Windows itself, separate from any particular declarative statement it contains, invites the reader to

\textsuperscript{77}Pontalis addresses this issue in Windows as well, using a first-person narration this time:

\begin{quote}
Il m’arrive pourtant, comme à tout analyste j’imagine, de penser—et, ça m’est très déplaisant—que je ne fais que m’avancer sur des chemins déjà balisés. Si je n’avais jamais entendu parler de théories sexuelles infantiles ou de scène primitive, de pulsion de mort ou d’angoisse de castration, sans doute ne pourrais-je que dériver sur un flux de paroles et d’images. Oui, mais si ce que j’ai appris m’empêchait d’entendre? Si je ne m’accrochais à du déjà-nommé-identifié que par peur de me perdre? Une interprétation qui vient de ce que je sais et non de ce qui me saisit n’est pas une interprétation. Surdité, aveuglément que suscite le savoir….Il n’existe pas de commencément premier. Freud lui-même est venu après. Les hystériques viennoises, le petit Hans, l’Homme aux rats, sa propre névrose lui ont appris la psychanalyse. En quelque domaine que ce soit, nous venons toujours après et, pourtant, indéfiniment, nous commençons. Chaque analyse, quel soit le nombre d’années de notre pratique, est la première fois. (145-146, italics in original)
\end{quote}

I happen to think, however, as do all analysts, I imagine—and that is very unpleasant for me—that I only go forward on paths already mapped out. If I have [sic] never heard of infantile sexuality theories of the primal scene, the death instinct or castration anxiety, no doubt I would have only been able to drift along on the flow of words and images. Yes, but what if I only got hooked on the already-named-identified out of fear of losing myself? An interpretation that comes from what I know and not from what strikes me is not an interpretation. A deafness, a blindness brought about by knowledge….There is no initial beginning. Freud himself came after,
approach it, not with an understanding that would be pre-made (or the expectation that there is a pre-made understanding to be received by reading the text), but to grapple with the lack of understanding that the encounter with the text presents.

Quinney mischaracterizes Pontalis' sense when she implies there is an unbridggable divide between “reading” and “pure practice” or “experience.” Pontalis makes clear that reading is necessary (including but not limited to a reading of Freud), and that experience itself must be read. If there is an unbridgable divide for Pontalis, it is that which opens up when analysts choose to read only texts (which they can control) in lieu of a reading encounter with clinical experience and the risk that it involves.  

Viennese hysterics, little Hans, the Rat Man, his own neurosis taught him psychoanalysis. In whatever matter, we always come after and yet we are perpetually starting something. Each analysis, however many years we have been in practice, is the first time. (95-6, italics in original)

As Pontalis writes in the next paragraph,

Quand certains écrits psychanalytiques deviennent-ils illisibles? Quand la pensée de l’auteur, s’enchantant d’elle-même, de ses circonvolutions, de ses prouesses en vient à se prendre pour objet au lieu d’aller vers l’objet pour en révéler la richesse latente, comme le peinture va sur le motif. (En marge 72)

When do certain psychoanalytic writings become illegible? When the thought of the author, bewitched by itself, its convolutions, its prowess, takes itself as its object instead of going to the object to reveal
not wrong when she claims that “Pontalis's work in recent years spells out a new direction in psychoanalysis with its emphasis on a return to clinical practice;” however, this is not a flight from reading into some “more authentic” notion of experience. (“Psychoanalysis is on the couch 123, 122). Pontalis' work represents a call for a renewed reading practice, and that the analytic experience also needs to be read and inform one’s readings.

**Strategies of invitation and evocation in Windows**

*Windows* takes up the question of reading and the experience of the psychoanalytic situation through strategies of invitation and evocation. As I have argued above, the *Vocabulaire* is imagined by its authors as an invitation to a kind of reading that is generative, that produces an experience rather than delivers ready-made knowledge. It is a question of the reader constituting himself in an identification with linkages by following the cross-references that the text contains, but more importantly, by “identify[ing] for himself” links between concepts, constructing the links via his own process of reading (*Language* xii).79

Pontalis also writes that “A lexicon for 'personal use' is a way of inviting each of us to come to terms with his own lexicon, beyond those

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79 “à établir lui-même” (*Vocabulaire* x).
notions that are the tools of the psychoanalytic trade” (xxiii). However, *Windows* is not without its treatment of “the associative networks of the language of psycho-analysis,” staging, in part, its own reading of canonical themes (such as, for example, narcissism, mourning and melancholia, dreams, insomnia, persecutory organs, interpretation, the analytic frame, memory, transference), though it would be fair to say that the text also stages a “com[ing] to terms with” the psychoanalytic lexicon that emphasizes the reading of the analytic lexicon as its own form of encounter. Yet the text also contains more than a reading of canonical analytic themes, inviting the reader to “find his own bearings” in these themes, as well. *Windows* does not take the form of an argument and is not presented systematically—and any intimation of systematicity, such as the order of the chapters, is merely a lure. The text appears to know what it is doing, which is to say that there is just enough of an appearance of coherence that it does not seem chaotic, yet it is difficult for the reader to decipher just what it might be that the text is doing. It has the appearance of sense, but of a sense that escapes the reader, who is invited to dwell in the encounter with uncertainty and to “find his own bearings” in it.

This formal aspect of the text is raised, if briefly, by Pontalis himself in one of his chapters. It is worth citing at length:

*Aujourd’hui mes écrits psychanalytiques sont tenus par certains pour plus littéraires que scientifiques (le Vocabulaire m’a quand même quelque

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80 “Lexique ‘à usage personnel’: façon d’inviter chacun à aller à la recontre du sien propre au-delà des notions qui sont le bien commun des psychanalystes” (13).
peu dédouané à cet égard). J'accepte cette critique. Mais, à mes yeux, elle se fonde sur une conception erronée. Tout dépend de ce qu'on entend par littérature.

Faire de la littérature pour un analyste (ou pire, “faire dans la littérature”) peut être péjoratif si cela le conduit à éviter de s’approcher de la chose à dire, à masquer, par un style qui se voudrait poétique, l’intense, mouvante, incroyable réalité à quoi l’analyse confronte. Bruit et fureur, silence et cri. Pouvons-nous alors faire autre chose qu’évoquer? Mais dans évocation, je veux entendre, faire entendre, faire appel à…, faire apparaître, rendre audible la voix de…, voix présente et lointaine tout à la fois. Transfert de voix, voix du transfert. (115-116, italics and ellipses in original)

Today my psychoanalytic writings are regarded by certain people as more literary than scientific (The Language of Psychoanalysis did, however, clear me somewhat in this respect). I accept this criticism. But, to my mind, it is based on an erroneous idea. All depends on what one means by literature.

Producing literature for an analyst (or worse, “trying to be literary”) may be derogatory if this leads him to avoid getting closer to the thing he has to say, to mask the intense, moving, incredible reality that the analyst confronts by using a style that wants to be poetic. Sound and fury, silence and scream. Can we then do anything besides evoke? But with evocation, I mean, to summon…make appear, make
audible the voice of…voice present and distant all at once.

Transference of voice, voice of the transference. (75)

The distinction between the literary and scientific (theoretical) domains is a false distinction. In “trying to be literary” or “producing literature” and using a style to mask the “reality the analyst confronts,” analysts are simply reinforcing the false distinction between a science that can clearly speak the truth about reality and an aestheticizing that covers it over. Pontalis affirms the literariness of his writing, but not according to what some mean by “literary” (i.e. that which seeks to avoid an encounter with analytic experience). He argues for evocative language and against the use of poetic rhetoric merely for aesthetic purposes.

The possibility of “scientific” observation also comes under scrutiny:

Il n’y a pas d’observation psychanalytique possible. L’analyse, par la nature même de son objet, ne saurait être une science d’observation. Pour trois motifs au moins: 1. Une analyse échappe à la description comme à la narration. 2. Son objet est invisible et construit, inventé (dans le double sens du mot invention: trouvaille de ce qui est là, un trésor, parfois caché; fabrication inédit). 3. Cette invention est lae produit de deux—faut-il dire deux pensées? deux inconscients? deux appareils psychiques? —qui etrent en résonance. Absence donc d’un objet observable.

…Le souci d’exactitude, quand c’est d’analyse qu’il est question, se déplace, exige d’autres nodalités. Il s’appelle, entre autres, souci du mot juste, venant à point nommé. Il s’emploie, avec l’écrit, à transposer le mouvement et
le rythme de la parole dans le mouvement et le rythme de la phrase, tout comme les moments de rupture. En cela, il est fidèle au rêve: un rêve n’est jamais flou dans le choix des images qu’il opère pour dire ce qui le porte, il est on ne peut plus précision extrême du poème, même s’il n’est pas de Mallarmé.

Rêve, poésie, analyse: sciences exactes. (116-117)

There is no psychoanalytic observation possible. Analysis, by the very nature of its object, could not be a science of observation. For three reasons at least: (1) An analysis escapes both description and narration; (2) Its object is invisible and constructed, invented (in the double meaning of the word invention: the discovery of what is there, a treasure, sometimes hidden; new creation); (3) This invention is the product of two—must we say two kinds of thinking? Two unconsciouses? Two psychic apparatuses?—that start resonating. Absence therefore of an observable object.

...The concern for exactitude, where analysis is concerned, is displaced, demanding other methods. It’s called, among other things, concern for the right word [mot juste], named just at the right moment. It devotes itself, in writing, to transposing the movement and the rhythm of the word [la parole] within the movement and the rhythm of the sentence [la phrase], just like the moments of rupture (in a sentence, in music). In this respect, it is faithful to dreams: a dream is never vague in the choice of images that it employs to express the message it
carries—it couldn’t be more exact, it’s its story that makes it vague.

Rigor, extreme precision of a poem, even if it isn’t one of Mallarmé’s.

Dream, poetry, analysis: exact sciences. (75-6)

The psychoanalytic object does not exist prior to its theorization and is “constructed, invented” in the course of its theorization. There is a temporality in the science/literature distinction that Pontalis argues against. “Scientific” observation, would require an object that exists prior to its observation, and “trying to be literary,” would act as an aestheticization after the fact. Pontalis “reimagine[s] what one means by literature” by refusing the distinction that would keep science and literature apart. It is also a false distinction between an exacting (scientific) representation and its literary supplement.

For Pontalis, literature—or, one might say, literariness in analytic theory—aims at an “exactitude” of another order that he calls “evocation.” Literariness in analytic theory thus involves the construction of the object in the course of its theorizing. The mode of evocation is tied to and made manifest in the figure of “movement.” In an earlier passage Pontalis writes:

*Ce mouvement — celui de la pensée, de la langue, du rêve, de la mémoire, de la parole, du désir —, ce mouvement qui nous anime ne pourra se raconter, tout au plus être évoqué (il y a voix dans ce mot-là). Transmettre le mouvement d’une analyse, est-ce possible ? Au moins cette condition : que ce soit avec ma voix propre que s’entende la voix de l’autre.* (72-3, italics in original)
This movement—of thought, of language, of dreams, of memory, of speech, of desire—this movement that moves us will not be able to be recounted, and may at best be evoked (there is the word voice in this word). Is it possible to convey the movement of an analysis? At least with this condition: that it is with my own voice that the voice of the other is heard. (43 translation altered)

The text is constructed of different voices and their interpretation or internalization: quotations from literature, from Freud, from patients and colleagues. The text is (which is to say, constructs) a memoir of a life lived, or a subject constructed through listening to and reading the language of others. The analytic object is constructed through the literariness of the text, but it is only one construction among many (and the text is more concerned with staging the construction rather than its end result). Through the strategy of invitation, the reader is invited to meet the uncertainty of the text, to “find his own bearings” through his own construction (Language of Psychoanalysis xii).

**Movement: figuring the unconscious and the analytic situation**

One of Pontalis’ overarching questions, if indirectly posed, is how one can use language to represent the unconscious and, more importantly, what is the movement and the rhythm of the unconscious in analysis, of the experience of analysis? Pontalis identifies from the beginning a fundamental difficulty in this task. *L’analyse*, he writes in an early chapter, is
l’expérience la plus intime, la plus insolite, la plus difficile à transmettre et même à dire, bien qu’elle soit à l’opposé de l’ineffable et de son flou, la plus réticente à tour savoir, à tout discours maîtrisé. Une expérience qui demeure souvent opaque à ceux-là mêmes qui s’y soumettent, analyste et patient. (22)

the most intimate, the most unusual experience and the most difficult to impart or speak about, even though it is opposed to the vagueness of the ineffable. The experience is the most reticent in the face of all forms of knowledge, of all mastered discourse. It is an experience that often remains impenetrable even to those who are involved, analyst and patient. (Windows 6)

This is not a new observation, of course, and it originates—psychoanalytically speaking—with Freud himself, who often claimed that the analytic experience resisted any attempts to describe it, or at least to describe it properly. In a letter to Jung that he wrote while writing up the Rat Man case history, Freud writes, “How botched our reproductions are, how miserably we pick apart these great art works of psychic nature!” (in Windows 43).

Pontalis echoes this claim when he discusses in a later chapter an analyst he once supervised and who was able to report, “without notes...the complete 'text' of the sessions. I never had the slightest image of his patient,” Pontalis writes, “who to me remained a dead letter” (69). The patient—and by

81 “J’ai eu en supervision un analyste qui pouvait me rapporter, sans notes, le “texte” intégral des séances. Je n’ai jamais eu la moindre représentation de son patient resté pour moi lettre morte” (107-8).
extension the analysis that concerned this patient, since the two are inseparable for Pontalis—appears to him as out of circulation, a dead letter whose addressee, origin, and destination has been effaced or lost. It is notable that in Pontalis' telling, the literal is immediately refigured as the literary. He writes that he “never had the slightest image” of the patient, which is immediately followed by the vivid image of the dead letter. In fact, the metaphors and figures seem to be endless—”art works,” “text,” “image,” “dead letter”—but they don’t exactly cohere. The literal recounting of the analytic experience, the “botched reproduction” (as Freud calls it), is for Pontalis incapable of reproducing what is proper or essential to analysis (though it is immediately reanimated in its new context through the introduction of the metaphor), and which is organized around the idea of the experience of analysis, which is Pontalis’ contribution to this question, as is made clear when he repeats this term in succession—”The experience is the most reticent in the face of all forms of knowledge…It is an experience that often remains impenetrable”—and in which experience and knowledge appear coupled (6). What is essential about the analytic experience for Pontalis is not the literal text of the analysis, but what he calls “movement,” and which is tied to his understanding of language—to the experience of language and the experience of reading and writing. In other words, what “left their mark on me” (xxiii).82

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82 “laissées en moi” (14).
What recurs in Pontalis' discussions of writing and analysis in *Windows* is his focus on this idea of “movement,” and the establishment of a mode of writing or of writing psychoanalysis that would be appropriate to this movement (3). Movement is one of the primary metaphors Pontalis employs to describe language—as well as other elements that are to him analogous: thought, dreams, memory, speech, desire, poetry and most importantly for our considerations, psychoanalysis itself (43, 76). That analysis is included in this group gives us an indication of Pontalis' thinking on the subject and of the difficulty of representing analysis. In analysis, language does not represent literally, it is not the literal message of speech (on the level of the enunciated) that is of primary interest. Speech does not reliably represent the analysand's ego, his “I” or “me.” It represents something else, the unconscious, and not in its literal meaning but in its form, in its structure as language.

The idea of the movement that is inherent to language and analytic thinking, and its relation to what he calls “the tyranny of the concept,” is inscribed by Pontalis in the early chapter entitled “They Stole My Concept!”

Pontalis writes that:

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83 These are, of course, not Pontalis' words, but are attributed to a young J.-A. Miller, who bursts into a class shouting the titular phrase. Miller is, among other things, the author of the “Index of Major Concepts” included in Lacan’s *Ecrits*, and Pontalis’ explicit reference to this in the text encourages a comparison between the two lexicographers. In addition, as mentioned above, the provenance of this utterance is immediately put into question. Pontalis remembers “this invented or real anecdote [cette anecdote inventée ou réel],” which “delights [ravit]” him, as having originally appeared in “something I read long ago [d’une lecture très ancienne]” (*Windows* 3, 145.)
Les mots sont voyageurs en tous sens (alors que le concept tend à en imposer un seul, il définit, il circonscrit son champ d’application). La langue a son souffle propre, elle est mobile; et, riche ou pauvre, elle peut tout dire; elle est rencontre avec l’inattendu. Elle décontenance le concept, se rit de lui. (18)

Words are travelers in every way (whereas the concept tends to claim just one meaning, it defines, it circumscribes its field of applications). Language breathes; it is mobile; and rich or impoverished, it can say everything; it is a meeting with the unexpected. It disconcerts the concept, mocks it. (4)

Windows is an example of a text that seeks to give voice to the movement of language, a text that appears to represent the movement of language and the experience of analysis on the level of its form. The text proceeds nonlinearly, but with a rhythm and periodicity in both its themes and its references. The text is interwoven with anecdotes, remembered speech, literary quotations: the speech of others is constantly being recalled and reworked. It ranges widely over Pontalis’ life and his work in such a way that the two are not separate. Windows is not a “case history,” of course—of Pontalis or any of his patients—since it does not follow or describe the treatment of a given case. Yet a good many chapters do reference patients. Their needs, desires,

_Fenêtres_ 17). The role of memory here is not to report accurately on what may or may not have been recorded and printed accurately by someone else in the past. Memory serves here as a form of “delight” and is itself evoked “each time I see a colleague come up with a neoconcept, _his concept [chaque fois que je vois un collègue fabriquer un néo-concept, son concept]_” (Windows 3, _Fenêtres_ 17, italics in original).
troubles, pains are very often what begins an chapter or determines its focus. There is a sense that Pontalis' patients never leave him, that they—or his experiences of them in analysis—have become part of Pontalis and a part of this text. These are only a few of the many ways in which the text moves and flows in a way that, while not a literal representation of a given analysis, or even “analysis” writ large, nonetheless reproduces an analytic life (an analytic memoir) that resembles in its form the poetics of analysis. In other words, it evokes part of the analytic experience through the effect it creates for the reader.

For Pontalis there is something in the analytic experience that demands a transmission and which he must transmit in the form of an evocation. As we saw with the “dead letter” text, the literal transcription of the “text” of an analysis, is insufficient for him in that it reproduces the literal events and even the speech but without the affective experience of the “confrontation,” which is not retained. The difficulty with the literal text is that it assumes a third person point of view from which analysis could be observed and which could be reproduced in representation. All of the positions in analysis are implicated—there is no neutral position. Pontalis' text evokes the movement of analysis through the incessant movement within and between his chapters or vignettes. “Good writing,” writes Adam Phillips, “like good conversation or interpretation in analysis, seems to free something in us” (51).
The text attempts to evoke the movement of language and the experience of analysis through its vignette-like tone. There is in the brief-chapter format something that allows him to dip into anyplace he likes, to open a window. Often the chapters begin as if in media res: the scene or the thought has already begun when a window is suddenly opened in through which the reader is afforded a glimpse (it is often sudden but it is rarely if ever jolting—it is, oddly, always a relaxed suddenness). This tone interrupts the progressive structure of the theoretical and case-history genres—as well as the traditional narrative arc of the memoir genre. It does not progress, but meanders. If we were to use another of Pontalis’ metaphors, that of the current, it would not be the current of a river, flowing in one direction, building from narrow headwaters to a wide river mouth. It would instead be the current of a tidal estuary where the currents are multiple and rhythmic. Each chapter has a flow and a direction, even if, like a stream, it has its eddies, its branchings, its dams and backwards flows. The relaxed tone allows Pontalis to build briefly toward a question without answering it. Often he will end a chapter with a question, or pepper questions throughout, as if it is enough for Pontalis to raise the question, and as if to answer it would be to miss the point (and they are usually very minor questions in the first place). The tone and the form work together here to oppose the linearity of an argument in favor of a graduated periodicity—to resist the production of a dead letter, a literal text that fails to evoke and transmit the movement and rhythm of language and of the experience of analysis that Pontalis
experiences as, among other things, a demand. It is a style which does not report, but which seduces the reader. It also makes a demand on the reader, creating an invested, active reader (or a frustrated, confused reader).

This tone is also a kind of “dreaming thought,” as one chapter is titled, that becomes evident as the chapters mount and when taking the book as a whole (18). The connections between chapters begins to become evident. Like the analyst’s floating attention, the reader must be attentive to the content and ideas of a given chapter while also attentive to the repetitions that occur over the course of many chapters, themes, figures, adjectives. Like the analysand, each chapter appears as if “it wants to be understood [il veut être compris],” while containing another scene that makes no claim to our understanding, but which exists nonetheless: dream, language, representation, thought, understanding; movement and its attendant metaphors of being “carried away [entrainée],” taking “multiple routes [des voies multiples],” convergence; the insomniac, Pontalis’ bête noir, who “worries [souci]” instead of desiring, trapped in a limbo between dreaming thought and “the rules of diurnal thought [règles e la pensée diurne]” (Windows 19, Fenêtres 39-40). And always the return to the question of representation (in this chapter also a latent theme), to what has been represented and how, to what can be, of what that might look like.

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84 “Une pensée qui serait rêvante” (38).
Conclusion

Pontalis’ text seeks to revive the writing of psychoanalysis. His text contains an appeal for a kind of writing of analysis that pays attention to the rhythm and movement of the analytic experience. In doing so, it must be able to evoke an experience of and through language. The experience of the analytic session is never pre-linguistic. As I argue in Chapter 1, the clinical specificity of analysis is based on the existence of an analyst who speaks. However the fundamental insight of psychoanalysis is that the value an the purpose of that speaking does not lie in its intelligibility or in the analysand’s intention to be understood. For Pontalis, the experience of psychoanalysis is the encounter with language not in its referential function, but in all of its referential failures, its lacunas, its lapses, its errors, its jumps, its seeming nonsensicalities. This is what Pontalis attempts to evoke with his metaphor of “movement.” It is the experience of the analyst who must face and learn to read the relationship of words with each other, of their rhythm, associations, disjuncture, slippage, etc., that Pontalis seeks to represent in *Windows*.

At the same time, Pontalis is suspicious of discourses where representation takes the form of a display of mastery. For him, a discourse that would try to say something definitive about psychoanalysis using concepts and arguments would miss its mark. *Windows* is not concerned only with the representation of the analytic experience as such, but also with the form of its articulation within a discourse. The fragmentary and disjointed form of the text is incapable of producing a kind of systematic knowledge
that the reader could incorporate and reproduce. Utilizing strategies of
invitation and evocation, Windows’ form asks the interested reader to dwell
with the text and its movements, to read and reread not in search of a
knowledge, but of an experience that is not guaranteed ahead of time. Like a
construction in analysis, Windows would be successful not when it is taken as
a work, but when it is capable of producing more work.
Works Cited


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