The mass migrations of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were a global phenomenon. From the North Atlantic to the South Pacific, hardly any corner of the earth was untouched by migration. These migrations similar in quantity and organization, and all linked through the processes of globalization: the peopling of frontiers, new transportation technologies, the production and processing of material for modern industry, the shipment and marketing of finished goods, and the production of food, shelter and clothing for people who worked in those industrial and distribution networks.

It was a truly global process. Yet, the processes and cycles of migration grew increasingly integrated across the globe, the actual patterns and directions of migration grew more regionally segregated. These segregated regions experienced different patterns
of development and growth associated with migration. Moreover, this segregation helped to erase many of the non-Atlantic migrations from the historical memory, thus helping to obscure inequalities that were created as part of historical globalization by depicting certain parts of the world as having been outside of globalization.

Most histories have recounted the age of mass migration as a transatlantic age. When migrations beyond the Atlantic are remembered at all, it is usually as a limited number of indentured laborers pressed into the service of Europeans. This historical memory is not random. It is the foundation of the broadest of global identities: East and West, North and South, First and Third Worlds, and the liberal and illiberal regions of the modern international system. It corresponds with depictions of European migrants as pioneering settlers who opened frontiers and constructed new nations, bearing individual initiative and progress to the cutting edge of world history. Asians, in contrast, are remembered as backwards and earth-bound peasants unable to participate in the sweep of modern history except as impoverished sojourners compelled by external dynamism and coercive intervention.¹

In fact, Asian migrations were as numerous as the Atlantic migrations, and organized through similar networks. In the middle of the nineteenth century, trends of Asian migration to the Americas and Australasia had the potential to create densely integrated patterns of global migration that linked the eastern and western hemispheres. By the end of the century, however, Asian migration was largely cut off from the Americas and white settler colonies. State interventions and redirected shipping routes had divided global migration into distinct regional systems by establishing barriers across the Pacific Ocean and Eastern Mediterranean. The great publicity surrounding indenture,
and increasingly racialized stereotypes about a backwards Asia helped entrench a narrative of globalization as a dynamic center that expands to engulf the world rather than divide and segregate it. The isolation of the rest of the world is seen as a natural consequence of distance and cultural differences rather that the product of interaction and state intervention. In fact, however, the segmentation of the world into unequal regions has been an inseparable from the processes of integration.

Memories of Migration

It is easy to find assertions in state of the field volumes on migration history that privilege the uniqueness of the transatlantic system. Many of these are simply statements of quantity, such as the assertion that “By chance or choice, almost half of these world-travelers settled in the United States.” Some go further and assert that transatlantic migration was also different in quality, such as the claim that,

It is North and South America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that provide the great stage for the migration drama, where migration assumes extraordinary dimensions. While for the other continents migration was a means of relieving demographic pressure by moving surplus population to regions of lower density, in North and South America the problem was one of providing a labor force to work the vast areas of open land waiting to be brought under cultivation.
Other statements of transatlantic uniqueness are intended to highlight the increasingly global quality of contemporary migration, such as the assertion that “Although international migrants were not exclusively European, the overwhelming majority came from that continent. . . . Before 1925, 85 percent of all international migrants originated in Europe, but since 1960 Europe has contributed an increasingly small fraction of emigrants to world migration flows.”

In *The Age of Mass Migration*, Hatton and Williamson justify their exclusive focus on the North Atlantic with an argument that the inherent qualities of the “present Third World” led to its isolation from the historical processes of globalization until recently. These regions “were segmented by discrimination, language, and custom. They were segmented by long distance and high migration cost. They were segmented by the poverty of the Third World labor-surplus areas, areas so poor that potential emigrants would have found it impossible to finance the move to the booming OECD labor markets anyway.”

By placing migrations beyond the Atlantic outside of globalization their argument that globalization leads to economic convergence becomes a tautology: globalization causes economic convergence because only places that converged are considered to be sites of globalization.

These citations could be dismissed as grounded in a lack of information. But the entrenchment of these assumptions only perpetuates this lack of knowledge, and few of these volumes give much attention to areas beyond the Atlantic except in ways that confirm those basic assumptions, down to the very frameworks for collecting data. This can be seen in Pieter Emmer’s comparative work which categorizes long distance migration as being intercontinental or not. He includes Russians who crossed the Ural Mountains and French to Algeria as intercontinental, but not Chinese to Singapore or
Hadhrami to Java. After counting 5 to 6 million intercontinental African and Asian migrants from 1800 to 1960, he concludes that “The study of migration as part of the process of European expansion and contraction clearly shows that Europeans have participated much more extensively in intercontinental migrations than Africans and Asians.” This distinction then becomes the basis for qualitative judgments. In his essay, “Was Migration Beneficial?” he divides global migration into temperate and tropical plantation systems, the latter made up almost entirely of indentured Asians and Africans. He then suggests that it does not make much sense to ask if Asian migration was beneficial “given the relatively small volume of both internal and external migration,” thus dismissing the relevance of much of the world in understanding global processes.

Emmer’s distinctions may seem crude, but the general assumption that Asians did not migrate and that those who did consisted almost entirely of indentured labor dominated by Europeans pervades much of the literature. This assumption is somewhat understandable for Indian migration given its relatively tight organization within the British Empire and the relatively high level of assisted migration to European owned plantations. Much more perplexing is the characterization of Chinese overseas migration as indentured and the consistently low estimations of Chinese migration in Western language scholarship, ranging from 2 to 8 million (which, as we shall see, accounts for less than half of all Chinese emigration). Most of these numbers were ultimately drawn from three studies by Chen Ta, Chen Zexuan and Arnold Meagher, all of which were counting only contract labor migration. But even the incomplete Chinese numbers in Ferenczi and Willcox’s *International Migrations*, still the most widely used source of migration statistics, count 5.5 million immigrants to the Straits Settlements from 1881 to
1915, 3.7 million departing Chinese ports from 1876 to 1901, and 2.4 million leaving Hong Kong from 1900-1924. This already accounts for up to 8 million Chinese within a limited period, not including the indentures (mostly before 1874) that make up other estimates. Extrapolation from these numbers could easily have provided a much larger figure for Chinese migration, if not for assumptions that Chinese did not migrate.

One recent history of global migration explains the causes of Chinese migration overseas and to Manchuria as, “Imperial Chinese maladministration and revolts, overpopulation and natural disasters as well as colonial penetration.” Research on European migrations (as the author demonstrates elsewhere) has consistently argued that the first three causes rarely, if ever, explain the establishment of steady migration patterns from Europe. And “colonial penetration” is, of course, irrelevant for Europe. This explanation leaves the impression that Chinese did not migrate according to the same kinds of processes that produced European migration. Without European intervention, Asians would have remained tradition-bound, immobile peasants, subject only to Asian despotisms and crude Malthusian pressures. In other words, the overall effect is to render them categorically different from the trans-Atlantic migrations that were a crucible of the modern world.

Forgetting also happens in other parts of the world. For example, Chinese scholars generally consider the Manchurian migrations to be a form of domestic movement that is irrelevant to global comparison. But the current Manchurian population of over 100 million suggests a demographic transition similar to those of European settler colonies in the Americas. Without these migrations, Manchuria might not be a part of China today, but part of Russia, Japan, or an independent nation like Mongolia. National borders have
reinforced the understandings of world migration framed by the division of the world into macroregions.

**Long Distance Migration**

Rather than start with assumptions about the distinctness of different systems, let us start with migration data. Port and customs statistics from around the world support an estimate of at least 150 million long distance voyages from 1840 to 1940, spread over much of the world (table 1). This number mostly counts ship passengers who traveled in third class or steerage, people categorized as “immigrants”, “emigrants” or “laborers,” and migrants who registered under officially sponsored colonization schemes like those from Russia to Siberia and Central Asia. Data for return voyages is less readily available, so (as with most migration statistics) this estimate includes multiple trips by single individuals. It does not count people who traveled overland or in first class, or the other migrants who avoided inspection and enumeration. The prevalence of these evasions is apparent in comparing numbers from emigration and immigration ports that sometimes vary by 20 percent or more. Thus, estimates like this can only describe general trends but are still useful as a basis for broad comparisons.

**Table 1: Global Long Distance Migration, 1840-1940**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Origins</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Auxiliary origins</th>
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The bulk of these long distance migrations can be classified according to three systems that were similar in quantity and connected major sending and receiving regions: transatlantic migration from Europe to the Americas; from India and South China to a region centered on Southeast Asia but extending across the rims of the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific; and from Russia, north China and Korea into the broad expanse of North Asia stretching from the Russian steppes to Siberia and Manchuria. The three destinations were the great frontier settlement regions of the modern world. Smaller
auxiliary flows moved across these systems, but accounted for less than five percent of the total movement.

*Transatlantic.* The migration of Europeans to the Americas is the best known of these migrations. Nearly 65 percent went to the United States, with the bulk of the remainder divided between Argentina (which had the largest proportion of foreign born residents), Canada, Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Cuba and Uruguay. Over half of the emigration before the 1870s was from the British Isles, with much of the remainder from Northwest Europe. As migration increased along with new transportation technologies in the 1880s, regions of intensive emigration spread south and east as far as Portugal, Russia, and Syria. Up to 2.5 million migrants from South and East Asia also traveled to the Americas, mostly to the frontiers of western North America or the plantations of the Caribbean, Peru and Brazil. Half of the Asian migration took place from 1850 to 1885, after which the decline of indentured labor recruitment and the rise of anti-Asian immigration laws took effect.

*Southeast Asia-Indian Ocean.* Migration to Southeast Asia and lands around the Indian Ocean and South Pacific consisted of over 29 million Indians, at least 19 million Chinese, and about 4.5 million Europeans, mostly to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Most migration from India was to colonies throughout the British Empire. Nearly 4 million Indians traveled to Malaysia, over 8 million to Ceylon, over 15 million to Burma, and about a million to Africa, other parts of Southeast Asia and islands throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Despite the notoriety and extensive debates over Indian indenture, less than 8 percent of total migration from India was indentured at the time of departure, mostly to distant places in the Americas, Africa and Fiji. The
Proportion declined over time, accounting for about a quarter of Indian emigration from 1840 to 1860 and quickly decreasing to an average of 5 percent a year until imposition of restrictions on indenture contracts after 1908 and the abolishment of indenture in 1920 brought it down to nothing. A majority of Indian migration to Southeast Asia was still undertaken with under some form of assistance or debt obligation through native kangani and maistry labor recruitment systems. Up to two million migrated as merchants or travelers not intending to work as laborers.16

The vast majority of Chinese migrants came from the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. Up to 11 million traveled from China to Singapore and Penang, from where more than a third of these transshipped to the Dutch Indies, Borneo, Burma and places further west. Nearly 4 million traveled directly from China to Thailand, between 2 and 3 million to French Indochina, over a million directly to the Dutch Indies (for a total of over 4 million if transshipments from Singapore are included), less than a million to the Philippines, and about half a million to Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii and other islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.17 Given the wide variety of labor recruitment and financing schemes and the fact that many migrants were trained to tell inspectors that they had not signed a contract, it is difficult to determine the number of migrants who migrated with labor contracts. Less than three quarters of a million Chinese migrants signed indenture contracts with European employers, including a quarter million to Latin America and the Caribbean before 1874, a quarter million to Sumatra from the 1880s to the 1910s, and a smaller number to mines, plantations and islands scattered throughout Malaya and the Pacific and Indian Oceans. From 1881 to 1913, 776,457 labor contracts (about 12 percent of all immigrants) were signed in front of the Protector of
Chinese in Singapore by migrants who had not paid their own passage. These ranged from indentures to Chinese and European planters in Malaya and Sumatra to agreements for cooperative profit sharing in Malayan tin mines. Many, if not most Chinese paid for their own passage or borrowed money from relatives and friends. Others had their original passage paid by wealthy Chinese under the “credit-ticket” system, although the terms of repayment varied and the migrants were not necessarily bound to work for their creditors. In all cases, the organization of migration was largely independent of European regulation, but deeply linked to the expansion of a Europe-centered global economy.

*Northern Asia.* Migrants had trickled into Central Asia, Siberia and Manchuria for hundreds of years before the Qing government’s gradual relaxation of restrictions against movement into Manchuria after the 1850s and the emancipation of serfs and opening of Siberia by Russia in 1861. Both governments actively encouraged settlement with homesteading policies in the 1880s, each attempting to counter territorial encroachment by the other. Railroad construction in the 1890s further strengthened the migrant flows. At least 13 million Russians moved into Central Asia and Siberia. This briefly reversed in the 1920s as local policies were erected against Russian settlers, but resumed familiar eastward patterns by the mid-1920s when central directives overrode local policies. Between 28 and 33 million Chinese migrated into Manchuria and Siberia, along with nearly 2 million Koreans. Another two and a half million Koreans migrated to Japan, especially in the 1930s, and over two million Japanese also moved in to Korea and Manchuria. In addition, up to a million north Chinese, Koreans and Japanese migrated to a diverse range of destinations, including much of the Americas, Hawaii, Southeast Asia, South Africa and Europe.
These migrations caused a significant redistribution of the world’s population. All three destination regions experienced massive population growth, with their populations increasing by factors of 4 to 5.5 from 1850 to 1950 (table 2 and figure A). Growth rates in these areas were over twice that for world population as a whole. In comparison, growth rates in the sending regions were lower than world population growth and less than half of those in the receiving regions. Taken together, the three main destination regions accounted for 10 percent of the world’s population in 1850 and 24 percent in 1950. The Americas and northern Asia grew more quickly than Southeast Asia with its smaller area, tropical environment and more entrenched native population. Nonetheless, from 1870 to 1930 approximately 35 million migrants moved into the 4.1 million square kilometers of Southeast Asia, compared to the 39 million migrants that moved into the 9.8 million square kilometers of the United States.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 2: World Population Growth, 1850-1950 (Millions)</th>
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<td>1850</td>
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<td>Population</td>
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<td>World</td>
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[Insert Figure A]

Emigration was uneven from specific localities within broader regions. Some villages or counties sent numerous migrants while others sent hardly any at all. But average emigration rates from the sending regions are broadly comparable. At first glance, 19 million overseas emigrants from China or 29 million from India seems like a drop in the bucket compared to the several millions from much smaller countries like Italy, Norway, Ireland and England. But if we adjust the focus to regions of comparable size and population, the rates are very similar. Some peak rates of overseas emigration from Europe in the 1910s are 10.8 emigrants per 1,000 population in Italy, 8.3 from Norway, and 7 from Ireland. In comparison, the annual average overseas emigration rate from Guangdong province in south China, which had a slightly larger geographic area and slightly smaller population than Italy, was at least 9.6 per 1,000 in the peak years of the 1920s. Hebei and Shandong provinces (sources of migration to Manchuria) had an even
higher rate of 10 during that same decade. In terms of broader regional population, emigration from Europe from 1846 to 1940 amounted to 15.4 percent of the European population in 1900, compared to 11.3 in China and 10.4 in South Asia. This latter difference is not insignificant (and only tentative, given our lack of knowledge of internal and overland migration), but certainly does not justify a categorical distinction between quantity and quality of migration in the different regions.

**Other Migrations**

Trans-oceanic migration within these three systems was only the tip of the iceberg of global migration. Other migration moved in and out of places such as Africa and the Middle East that were at the interstices of the main long-distance systems. Overland and domestic migration, much of it within the main sending and receiving regions, also generally escaped the web of enumerators and inspectors. Perhaps the great majority of global migration was seasonal, temporary and permanent movement to nearby cities, towns, factories, mines, agricultural regions and unused lands.

The transatlantic migrations could be extended to include over 13 million people who moved to the Western frontiers of North America, first primarily across the United States and then into the western plains of Canada. This process also included the relocation of great numbers of Native Americans and the migration of over 2.5 million Mexicans to the agricultural areas of the southwest in the early twentieth century. The industrial centers of the northeastern United States also attracted over 2.5 million Canadians, and then over a million African Americans and Mexicans in the early twentieth century. In other parts of the Americas, great numbers of Andean and other
peoples moved to coastal plantations and cities, and over 300,000 Caribbean peoples migrated to plantations in Central America and Cuba, to the Panama Canal Zone, and the United States. Migrants also moved within Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. These included up to 500,000 Javanese traveling to plantations in Sumatra and the Southeast Asian mainland, and, in what may have been some of the densest outmigrations ever, over 300,000 Melanesians and Micronesians who worked on plantations and as seamen throughout the region.

Massive internal migration also took place within the major sending regions of long distance migration. In Europe, migrants from Ireland traveled to England for work, and from eastern and southern Europe and Belgium to the industrial areas of northwestern Europe, especially France and Germany. Within Russia, migrants moved into the growing cities and southern agricultural areas. Within India they moved to tea plantations in the south and northeast, to the mines and textile producing regions of Bengal, and to newly irrigated lands and urban areas throughout the subcontinent. In China, they migrated to growing coastal cities, to areas of the Yangtze basin left underpopulated by the Taiping rebellion, and to borderland areas of the northwest and southwest, including overland migration to Burma. Each of these regions hosted at least 20 million journeys.

Africa experienced net trans-oceanic immigration but at much smaller numbers than other main destinations and from a wider variety of origins. The immigrants included over three million French and Italians into north Africa and up to a million other Europeans, Syrians, Lebanese, Arabs, Indians and Chinese throughout the continent. The end of the transatlantic slave trade led to increased movement of slaves into the
Western Sudan, Middle East and areas bordering the Indian Ocean in the late 19th century. Labor migration to plantations and mines in southern and central Africa increased through the late 19th and twentieth centuries, as did movement to agricultural areas and coastal cities in western and eastern Africa. Millions of people took part in these movements, some of whom were coerced or otherwise went to work for European enterprises, but many of whom also found independent occupations.31

The Middle East and ex-Ottoman lands were also at the interstices of the main long-distance flows described above. Projects such as the Suez Canal and development of an infrastructure for cotton cultivation in Egypt attracted large amounts of local migration, while Lebanon and Syria experienced some of the highest overseas emigration rates in the world. Conflicts surrounding the dissolution of the Ottoman empire also generated refugee and state fostered migrations that were a foretaste of processes that would become increasingly common over the twentieth century. By the 1920s, 4 to 6 million people were dislocated in population exchanges between Turkey on the one hand, and Balkans, Greece and Russia on the other, with Christians moving north and Muslims moving south. Around a million Armenians were expelled from Turkey to points around the world, and nearly 400,000 Jews moved to Palestine in the early twentieth century.32 Mass movement of refugees would extend to other parts of Europe in the wake of World War One and the Russian revolution, including the movement of three million Russians, Poles and Germans out of the Soviet Union. In a different kind of movement, millions of people also took part in the hajj to Mecca, including nearly 700,000 from the Dutch Indies after the 1870s, a predecessor of the twentieth century explosion of long distance tourism.33
In addition to the migration of settlers and workers, some long established merchant diasporas continued to flourish. For centuries before the 1800s these ethnic networks were some of the most prominent exemplars of long distance migration. Their importance was diminished or transformed under the economic changes and new labor migrations wrought by industrialization. Jewish merchant networks were subsumed into the operations of European capital, while Armenian merchant networks were decimated by the traumas of genocide. But other old and new diasporas flourished and expanded, often at the frontiers of globally expanding credit and trading networks where they adapted long-standing forms of commercial organization for the needs of the new economy. They often developed reputations as “middlemen,” but more than just fitting into pre-existing social gaps, their activities created the relationships created market and social relationships that had not existed before. For example, Chinese merchant networks were often at the cutting edge of an expanding world economy. They channeled labor throughout Southeast Asia and pioneered dense networks of shops and services in places as distant as the Amazon rubber groves, South Pacific atolls and upriver Borneo. They also provided services to other migrants and workers in plantations and urban neighborhoods throughout the world. Merchants from India similarly expanded trade networks into Central Asia, Africa and Southeast Asia. Chettiar from South India expanded along with the British into Burma, and Parsis facilitated the India-China trade using some of the capital they earned to establish textile mills in India. Sindworkies from the town of Hyderabad in what is now Pakistan spread around the globe from Japan to the Panama Canal and Tierra del Fuego, establishing upscale “curio” shops for international tourists and becoming prominent carriers of Japanese trade in the Dutch Indies. Other
merchant diasporas such as the Hadhramis from Yemen, Hausa in western Africa, and Lebanese Christians also joined this interface between expanding industrial enterprises and dispersed individual producers and consumers around the world.\textsuperscript{34}

**Historical Trends**

The concurrent rise of migration around the world was not coincidental (figures one and two). The rise of rapid, inexpensive transportation, the growth of global markets and industrialization, the loosening of controls over internal migration and the expansion into frontiers around the world, all reinforced each other in a snowball effect. It was a world on the move, flowing into factories, construction projects, mines, plantations, agricultural frontiers, and commercial networks across the globe. Rice planters in Burma, tin miners in Malaya, rubber tappers in Borneo and the Amazon, and wheat farmers in Manchuria were as much a part of this global economy as steel factories in Pittsburgh, sugar plantations in Cuba, merchants in Calcutta and Singapore, and ranchers in the plains of North America and Argentina. Foodstuffs and resources from frontiers near and far supplied growing immigrant populations in industrial centers, trade entrepots and mining frontiers. This, in turn, attracted more immigrants, who produced more goods that generated more trade, more movement, and more commercialization of agricultural areas around the world that generated more migration. Inexpensive steamships crossed the oceans of the world after the 1850s, as railways crossed North America and North Asia. Where mass transport did not extend, its agents did, supplying information and access. All were linked through the world-wide processes of economic globalization.
These migrations increased more quickly than world population. It amounted to 0.36 percent of the world’s population in the 1850s, rising to 0.96 percent in the 1880s, 1.67 percent in the 1900s, and then declining to 1.58 percent in the 1920s. The overall growth in long distance migration was punctuated by short-term regional ebbs and flows that corresponded with business cycles and job opportunities. After a North American depression of the late 1870s, transatlantic migration boomed and clearly surpassed migration from and within Asia for the first time. This boom corresponded with a greater concentration of migrants in industrial and trading occupations in towns and cities, a pattern that would be followed in North Asia at a fifteen to twenty year delay. Migration from south China expanded at the same time as the transatlantic (figure 3) although the long term growth Indian migration remained relatively stagnant from the 1870s to 1910s, despite some temporary fluctuations. In Southeast Asia, rural populations continued to grow more rapidly than urban ones, but Asian migrants increasingly took up work as independent traders, smallholders and craftsmen rather than laborers.

Migration around the world boomed at the turn of the century, more than doubling in the decade after 1900 to over 3 million a year. Transatlantic migration reached a spectacular peak of over 2.1 million in 1913, and migration to Southeast and North Asia also reached unprecedented peaks of nearly 1.1 million a year from 1911 to 1913. World War One caused a global decline in migration, hitting the Atlantic the hardest. But global
migration once again reached peaks of over 3 million a year in the late 1920s, with Asian migration reaching new peaks of 1.25 million migrants to Southeast Asia in 1927 and 1.5 million to North Asia in 1929. Transatlantic migration recovered to 1.2 million migrants in 1924, after which immigration quotas in the United States severely curtailed migration from southern and eastern Europe. The Great Depression put a stop to much migration, with the exception of the command economies of Japan and the Soviet Union where coercion and government promotion produced rates of up to 1.8 million migrants a year.

Coercion and freedom were both important aspects of the entwined processes of expanding capitalism and frontier settlement. For every lawless frontier town, independent small holder and gold rush adventurer there was a gridded corporate or government mining town, plantation laborer, or rancher intent on removing native peoples and erecting fences. In many regions, the rise of migration in the nineteenth century followed the demise of more coercive regimes of migration control. The rise of mass migration into Siberia was accompanied by a decrease in exiles and prisoners from 75 percent of total emigration in the 1870s, to nearly nothing by the 1890s. The transatlantic African slave trade, European indentured migration and convict transportation all decreased significantly after the 1820s and, with some exceptions, nearly disappeared by the end of the century. In their place indentured laborers from India, China and the South Pacific were taken to plantations in all corners of the world, from Peru and the Caribbean to South Africa, Australia and Hawaii. This practice reached its zenith in the 1880s, and declined gradually over the next three decades. The slightly more than two million indentured accounted for less than five percent of all migration from Asia. As with the transatlantic migrations the decline in indenture
corresponded with an increase in independent migration, both self-financed and through informal credit and job networks.

**Regionalizing World Migration**

Even as migrants covered the world along with economic globalization, they were also increasingly divided into separate regions. In the middle of the nineteenth century, global migration patterns pointed towards the creation of a single global system. By the end of the century they were increasingly segregated into the distinct systems mentioned above. Globalization generated difference even as it brought the world together.

This increasing segmentation is especially clear in the distribution of Asian migration. At least 227,000 migrants from south China traveled to the Americas and Australia in the 1850s. Numbers for Southeast Asia in this period are speculative, but migration to non-Asian destinations amounted to at least 40 percent of all emigration from South China. Indentured migrants, mostly to Cuba and Peru, accounted for about 90,000 of these migrants. The remaining 135,000 went mostly to the gold fields of California and Australia, with nearly 50,000 Chinese traveling to California in just the period from 1851 to 1855. These gold rush migrants were funded and organized by Chinese capital and depended on Chinese mining skills. But as Chinese migration continued to expand movement beyond Asia remained stagnant. It declined to 6 percent of total emigration in the late 1880s and remained at that level over the next five decades (figure 3). The subsequent stagnation was not a consequence of inadequate resources, earth-bound peasant mentalities or any other distinction that made Chinese migrants categorically different from European emigrants. It was a result of exclusionary laws and
the scarcity of inexpensive direct transportation to Latin America after the end of indenture.

[Insert Figure 3]

[Insert Figure 4]

Shifts in the proportions of Indian migration beyond Asia are not so dramatic, but their exclusion from non-Asian destinations was much more complete (figure 4). About a quarter of all Indian overseas migration in the 1840s and 50s was to non-Asian destinations, most of it under indenture contracts. Migration beyond Asia then retained a steady average of about 16 thousand migrants a year until the decline of indenture after the turn of the century. But by the 1880s the proportion of migration beyond Asia had already declined to about 5 percent of total migration. Unlike the Chinese, even the absolute number of Indians beyond Asia declined to an insignificant trickle by the 1910s. Most indentured Indians had traveled to islands with few economic opportunities beyond the plantations, reducing the attraction for new migrants and making it difficult to build migration networks. The few that traveled to North America after the turn of the century were unable to establish strong migration networks before the imposition of exclusionary measures, implemented with great efficiency by local governments that had learned from their experiences in regulating Chinese and Japanese immigrants. South Africa and colonies in eastern Africa were the only non-Asian destinations with established Indian communities and economic opportunities to attract new migrants in the early twentieth
century. But by the 1900s, South Africa was also cordoned off behind exclusionary legislation.

Regulation and the consolidation of borders not only blocked migration, but also encouraged and directed it. Nearly all Indian migration took place within the British Empire despite the resistance of white settler colonies. In response, white colonists and officials often promoted white migration to settlement throughout the empire, although with limited success due to the competing allure of the United States. French and Italians were encouraged to migrate to North Africa in the name of imperial interests, as were the Japanese to Korea and Manchuria. Indeed, the north Asian migration system was largely shaped by the Russian, Chinese and Japanese policies that encouraged migration as a way to claim, fortify and develop territory, making the north Asian system the most insular of the three major systems. The fact that the Russian and Chinese projects are so often forgotten is perhaps the greatest mark of their success. Both Siberia and Manchuria are now considered integral parts of the home nations of the immigrants who populated them, and the movement have been subsumed under national rather than international histories.

**Regional Dynamics**

A global comparative perspective can show that the formation of migration networks and diasporic spaces are broadly similar around the world. Little evidence supports a broad distinctions between a progressive Atlantic world and a earth-bound Asia. Each specific flow existed at a specific nexus of multiple global forces, that came together to produce particular yet broadly shared experiences of mobility. Rates of
female and return migration are good ways to quantify differences in the structure of particular flows. By the 1890s, absolute and cyclical return grew converged around the world. This happened even as migration was increasingly segmented into different regions with divergent economic development. Low rates of female migration and high rates of return migration in Asia are often presented as evidence that Asians were sojourners unlike the pioneering families who crossed the Atlantic and assimilated into the emerging new nations. Quantitative evidence does not support this distinction. It does, however, suggest that transatlantic migrations were more dynamic than those elsewhere, with greater shifts in sending regions and more long term variability in rates of return and female migration. The Atlantic world was clearly an area in transformation, whereas Asian migration systems were much more static. Globalization generated divergence as well as convergence.

In Europe, the main migrant homelands shifted broadly from northwestern to southeastern Europe between 1840 and 1940. No similar shift can be found in Asia. In south China, despite local shifts between counties and villages, the main migrants sending regions of the 1850s were still the main migrant sending regions of the 1930s. The proportion of migrants departing from different ports remained almost constant from the 1870s to the early 1920s, after which Hong Kong started to increase slightly. Overall proportions of women migrants were much lower to Southeast Asia than to the United States. But they also fluctuated much less, exhibiting steady growth rather than shifts. Annual proportions of women migrating to the United States were as low as 20 percent in the early nineteenth century. They rose to 40 percent in 1860s, where they remained until a sudden drop to 30 percent in 1900. They remained at this level until 1914, after which
they gradually increased to 54 percent by the late 1930s. In contrast, the proportion of women leaving Hong Kong grew steadily from 6 percent in the 1860s to 18 percent in the late 1920s, then doubling to 36 percent by the late 1930 in an early twentieth century increase that mirrored that from Europe, if at a lower proportion.\textsuperscript{41} Data on the migration of Indian women is less readily available, but rarely rose above 20 percent before the 1930s.

Return migration, closely linked to business cycles and employment opportunities also changed more dynamically in transatlantic migration. Return migration from Southeast Asia remained a fairly steady 63 to 75 percent of all arrivals from 1871 to 1930, with Chinese averaging 64 percent and Indian migration averaging 78 percent. Return migration from the United States, on the other hand, declined from 32 percent in the depression years of the late 1870s to 13 percent in the early 1880s, then gradually growing to over 50 percent in the 1910s. Returns jumped to nearly 70 percent during World War One and receded to 40 percent in the years preceding the immigration quota of 1924. Despite very different trajectories over much of the nineteenth century, return rates of all three flows began to converge in the 1890s, not only in absolute rates but also in short term swings (figure 5). Migration flows grew more synchronous even as they were increasingly constrained into divergent economic spheres.

[Insert figure 5 here]

Shifts in female and return migration to Europe may be partly explained by greater emigration from regions with larger stem families, as argued by Donna
Nuclear families predominated in northwestern Europe, the source of most mid-century transatlantic migrants. Husband and wife depended on each other for subsistence, and many women had experience in market activities. In comparison, migrants from southern and eastern Europe, as well as China and India, tended towards multigenerational patrilineal families. The migration and wages of individual members were an investment in the maintenance of this larger structure. Women often remained with their husbands’ families to continue contributing to this larger economic unit a rather than just the nuclear family. The men journeyed abroad as a kind of investment, expected to send much of their earnings back to this larger unit and eventually returning home themselves. Return rates to southeastern Europe were similar to those of Chinese and Indians, ranging from a high of 90 percent Bulgarians and Serbs, and 50 to 60 percent for Southern Italians, Greeks and Slovaks.

But differences in family form still draw attention to the dynamic shift in emigration sources within Europe, where migration from northeastern Europe eventually declined. Migration in Asia continued to be a multigenerational strategy that endured and expanded among the same villages and towns for over a century. One reason for the decline in migration flows from certain parts of Europe was the convergence in wages across the Atlantic. In Asia, however, wages did not converge, and may even have diverged in places. Rural conditions in China and India, although highly commercialized, remained static as did occupational structure in Southeast Asia. In contrast, shifting European emigration sources corresponded with the spread of industrialization and urbanization across the continent.

On the receiving end, shifting proportions of female and return migration from the
Americas corresponded with changing conditions of frontier settlement, urbanization and shifting industrial occupations that increasingly preferred male over female workers. Even northern Europeans who made up the bulk of mid-nineteenth century settlers had larger rates of return and male migration by the end of the century. In contrast, females predominated in short distance migration to the cities of Western Europe in the late nineteenth century where, like Irish women to the Americas in the mid-nineteenth century, they found ready employment in service occupations. Return rates from Canada and especially Brazil, with their somewhat more constricted economic opportunities, also tended to be somewhat higher than from the United States. Returns from Australia also changed dramatically, declining from 60 percent in the 1890s to 20 in the 1910s, as the British and Australian governments encouraged family relocation. In comparison, Southeast Asia underwent minimal urbanization and economic development in this period. The new colonial trade entrepots like Singapore and Rangoon were built and populated largely by Asian migrants, but offered a relatively consistent collection of artisanal, mercantile and transportation-related jobs. Many migrants continued to work as rural proletariats, both independently and on large plantations. None of these were occupations that employed high numbers of women. Only with the rise of small Chinese family retailers after the turn of the century did the proportion of Chinese women grow.

Migration to industrializing North Asia developed more along the lines of migration to the Americas. Anecdotal evidence suggests that early years of migration to the temperate agricultural frontiers north Asia included relatively high proportions of women. Russian officials encouraged family migration to Siberia and observers often commented on the sight of entire families on their way to Manchuria, especially during
the north China famine of 1876-1879. By the 1920s, as the frontier was settled and industrial and mining jobs more common, Chinese migration to Manchuria was 80 to 90 percent male with return rates of over 65 percent, with volatile swings reminiscent of the transatlantic migration.49

Differences in settlement rates are often attributed to differences in return and female migration. But return rates to Manchuria were the same as to south China, and female migration even lower. Yet Manchuria is now even more dominated by descendants of Chinese than North America is by descendants of European immigrants. A more significant cause behind the ability to leave descendants is that of migration to tropical areas with complex native societies and plantation economies versus temperate frontiers and urban areas. Nearly all southern Chinese and Indians migrated to tropical areas within or near well-established native states. But still their descendants have made up over 30 percent of the population in Malaya, Sri Lanka and scattered islands around the world—and calculations that account for intermarriage and assimilation with natives could make the numbers much higher in other regions. By comparison, European migrants have fared much worse in tropical areas. Only Costa Rica, Cuba, Venezuela and Colombia are tropical areas with populations of European descent at all comparable to the populations of Asian and African descent in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean. In short, the settlement and economic and economic impact of migrants everywhere depended on specific local circumstances, circumstances that were embedded in broader global patterns.
This segmentation of migration patterns corresponded with a segmentation of economic patterns. In the Americas, migration was associated with economic development and transformation. In Asia and Africa, migration was at best associated with survival, increased consumption, raw material production and a few successful fortunes built on trade. Patterns of economic growth were very different. The relationship of migration to economic change must always be situated in a particular context of specific local and global processes.

In the Americas, migration helped shift the political and economic momentum away from the old centers like Mexico, Lima and the Caribbean to areas that such as Argentina, southern Brazil and North America that had once been underpopulated frontiers. By 1900, relative economic and political power was inverted, as these later places became the most economically developed areas of the region. Migration was an important part of this growth, embedded in mutually reinforcing flows of goods and money between Europe and the Americas. Agricultural, commercial and industrial revolutions generated dislocations and unemployment in Europe. Many people found opportunity in the Americas, where labor was scarce and wages were high. Most migrants brought their labor, but others brought capital and together they built the transportation infrastructure and produced the raw materials that further fed the factories of Europe even as in created more need for labor in the Americas. Over time, American profits facilitated industrialization in some of the Americas as well, especially in the United States which remained the most attractive destination for many migrants. Urbanization was an important part of this growth. By 1900, nine out of the ten largest cities in the world were in Europe and the immigrant states of the Americas (Tokyo being
the only exception). Over time, wages and prices converged across the Atlantic, and migration itself began to slow.\textsuperscript{50}

Asian migration did not follow a similarly virtuous and mutually productive circuits. Locally, the effects of dense immigration were similar to the Americas inasmuch as regions with small native populations and high proportions of immigrants, such as Singapore, Malaya, Taiwan and Manchuria, tended to become some of the most economically advanced localities of the region (although Burma and Sri Lanka and the sugar islands are exceptions to this generalization). But in comparison to the Atlantic system, Asian migration was neither so dynamic nor so deeply linked to general economic growth as in the Atlantic. Wages were higher in the destination than in the sending zones, but remained so until the 1930s without much significant convergence. A large portion of migrants also traveled from rural areas to rural areas. Industrial centers like Shanghai, Calcutta and Bombay experienced immigration and growth rates comparable to the Atlantic world—as did trade entrepots like Singapore and Rangoon.\textsuperscript{51} But only in Japan, and to a lesser extent in Manchuria, could one begin to speak of a broader industrial and transportation infrastructure of the type that emerged in the immigrant states of the Americas. As in Europe, emigrant regions tended to be highly commercialized, but they did not experience anything like an industrial revolution. Given the lack of a favorable investment environment, most remittances went towards the purchase of land, houses, consumer goods and other institutions for the benefit of home regions such as schools, ancestral halls and village walls. This is not to say that the global economy did not penetrate the interior of India and China. The Indian countryside was decisively transformed by colonialism and integration into global markets—albeit with
policies that often made Indians less rather than more mobile. And in China by the
1910s, few Chinese could be found who did not use Swedish or Japanese matches to light
cigarettes sold by the British American Tobacco company and lamps filled with Standard
Oil kerosene so that they could see more clearly while using their Singer sewing
machines. But the arrival of global consumer goods and markets did not necessarily bring
a modern transportation and industrial infrastructure beyond the coast.

An explanation of these differences ultimately depends on how one chooses to
explain inequalities in the global economy. But the patterns of global migration should
make clear that such an explanation does not lie in the fact that Asia and Africa lay
outside of global capitalism but that they were differentially inserted into it. In the
Atlantic, migrants were intimately associated with the centers of the industrial revolution,
causing goods, money and people to move in mutually reinforcing circuits. In Asia,
goods, money and people traveled crosscutting circuits. Capital did not follow migrants
abroad, but came from different origins in Europe and Japan. And then much of the
profits followed the raw materials back to the place the capital came from rather than the
place where the migrants came from. An outward pointing transportation infrastructure
was built to facilitate this. Manchurian patterns conformed a bit more closely to Atlantic
patterns, with capital traveling in with Russians and Japanese. But the overwhelming
majority of migrants still came from China, and despite being a relatively open frontier
like in the Americas Mancuria still remained a colonial state torn between competing
elites rather than a self-governing migrant polity.

Appendix 1: Comparison with Late-20c. Migration
International migration has grown steadily around the world since 1950. Looser migration controls in many favored destination countries since the 1960s, the end of the Cold War and emigration restrictions in socialist and other countries, continuing refugee flows and the expansion of the global economy have all contributed to this trend. Especially since the 1970s, the new wave of economic liberalization (the first was in the 1850s-80s) has created the kinds of disruptions, opportunities and commercialization that have always produced emigrants without necessarily erasing the international wage gaps that are an important stimulus of immigration at the other end.

It is actually more difficult to get an accurate counts of migration for the second half of the twentieth century than for the first half. This is due largely to the spread of laws and institutions to regulate migrants. These have created new incentives for migrants to avoid official who might count them. They have also generated a plethora of new categories for admissible migrants that can be unclear in their meaning and incomparable across nations for the purpose of statistical measurement. The United Nations prefers to define migrants as those who plan to stay for a year or more. But counting such people at the border is often impossible as many migrants often change their status after arrival or overstay their visas illegally. For example, the United States experienced a near doubling of immigrants in the single year 1993 because of its amnesty
law, in which migrants who may have been residing illegally for decades were finally counted as “immigrants.”

Thus, international organizations have resorted to counting “migrant stock” rather than migration itself, basing their numbers on foreign born peoples counted in national censuses. This, too, is an imperfect form of measurement, because some censuses count foreign birth, while others only count foreign residents who have not become citizens, and others merely note racial or ethnic distinctions. This measurement may also count people who have never moved all their lives while international borders have moved around them, such as the many people who became foreigners without ever having left their homes as new nations were created around them during the break-up of the Soviet Union. Other events could have a disproportionately large effect on these numbers, such as the partition of South Asia in 1947 that created over 20 million refugees. These people accounted for nearly 15 to 25 percent of the world “migrant stock” through the 1970s, even though South Asia is more important as a migrant producing than receiving region.

Table 3: Migrant Stock as Portion of World Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign-born Population (mil.)</th>
<th>Percentage of World Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Value 1</td>
<td>Value 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>105.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>119.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We can also attempt a crude estimate of annual migration flows in the 1990s.\(^5\) As in the previous wave, the United States is still the largest single country of immigration, averaging 860,000 legal migrants a year, and over 300,000 (some say up to a million) illegals. Annual migration to the European Union amounted to 1.2 million legal migrants and 400 to 500,000 illegals. Migration into Canada, Australia and New Zealand accounts for another 300,000 each. Over a million migrants have gone each year to the Persian Gulf states and Israel—indeed, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Jordan and Israel were the four countries with the highest proportion of immigrants in the world in 2000. Other major destinations include Argentina, Venezuela, South Africa, Singapore, Malaysia and Japan, as well as large flows between countries in Africa, Southeast Asia and the ex-
Soviet republics. A generous estimate of 3-4 million migrants seems likely for these other destinations. Over half a million asylum applications were also made each year around the world, often not counted in migration statistics. Added up, this produces an annual migration of 8-9 million a year. A return rate of about 40 percent could account for the difference of 55 million migrants found in migrant stock estimates from 1990 to 2000.

Any attempt to compare this to earlier numbers is fraught with more difficulties. Pre-WWII migrants stock numbers were based on fragmentary data beyond the Atlantic, and migrants to Manchuria, Siberia and Burma would not even have been counted as international migrant stock. Also, most migrants who crossed land borders within Africa, Europe and the Americas before the 1940s remained uncounted in migration statistics.

But if we put these caveats aside and compare the long distance migration numbers offered in the first section to these contemporary estimates, it appears that per capita global migration has approached levels roughly similar to earlier rates. Peak long distance migration rates around 1912 and again in the late 1920s reached over 3.3 million a year. Contemporary migration is double to triple that number, but a total of 85 million migrants in the 1990s would only account for 1.4 percent of the world population of 2000 as compared to the 1.7 percent of world population in the decade before 1915, or 1.5 percent of world population in the 1920s.

Contemporary migrations can also be compared to earlier migrations in several other ways, all of which help understand the changing aspects of global migration:

*Sources and Destinations.* During the first great wave, migrants spread out to fill much of the globe. The bulk went to the three great frontier zones, but significant portions also traveled to northern Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Japan. The only...
places that did not receive significant immigration were the main sending centers in southeastern Europe, India and China. In contrast, recent migrations originate in many more parts of the world but the bulk of them converge on a more limited number of destinations. Only the main migrant destinations in North America, Western Europe, Australia and the oil kingdoms do not produce significant numbers of emigrants. Main contemporary destinations also tend not to be frontiers, as in the past, but economically developed countries or regions in possession of excess wealth, such as the oil kingdoms. These are also places with steady or declining populations. That decline may be slowed as a result of migration, but the places of greatest demographic expansion also happen to be the places that send emigrants. Rather than the global population redistribution of the past migrations, the current migrations seem only to be mitigating the effects of much higher growth rates in the poorer parts of the world.

These shifting migration patterns can also be seen in shifting rates of urbanization. Only two of the 10 most populous cities of 1900, New York and Tokyo, are still in the top 10 of 2000. The rest of are located in some of the major migrant sending regions of the world such India, Mexico, Brazil, China and Indonesia. International migration is clearly only part of the story of global migration since the 1950s. Massive waves of domestic migration have accompanied the population growth of the undeveloped world. Without the relatively liberal migration regimes and sparsely populated frontier destinations of the earlier waves, the effects of this new urbanization and population growth may be much different than a hundred years ago.

Refugees. Mass movement of refugees spread across Europe in the wake of World War One and the Russian revolution, including the movement of three million Russians,
Poles and Germans out of the Soviet Union, and of over a million Armenians. This kind of mobility has spread across the world over the course of the twentieth century.

*Service Jobs.* While many international migrants still work in agricultural and industrial jobs, a growing proportion is destined for construction and service jobs such as maintenance, food service, gardening, nursing, domestic work, sex work and professional employment. This has accompanied the deindustrialization of most destination countries and the mechanization of agriculture. Some sociologists and economists also argue that it is indicative of a dual labor market in which the highly educated workers of developed countries are increasingly dependent on immigrant service labor—not to mention the manufactured goods produced by domestic migrant labor in other countries.

The increase in service jobs includes educated professionals, who have made up to 20 percent of migrants to North America and Europe since the 1960s, as well as significant streams of professionals from the developed countries into the oil kingdoms. Immigration law preferences for the wealthy and educated play an important role in this stream, as does the lack of intellectually and financially attractive jobs in many poorer countries. Over time however, migrant flows once dominated by educated professionals open the door for a rise in less skilled migrants taking advantage of family reunification opportunities, and the proportions turn towards less skilled migrants.

*Women.* Whereas women rarely made up more than 40% of earlier long distance migrant flows, and often much less, they now often make up more than half. Some of this may be due to the growth of refugees and the prevalence of family reunification preferences in migration laws. Much of it is related to the growth of service jobs. Women increasingly leave their own children and elderly parents at home so that they may travel
abroad to clean the homes and take care of the children and elderly parents of wealthier families—the so-called “care drain.”

*Short Term Mobility.* Over 700 million tourist entries were counted in 2000, up from 480 million in 1990 and 300 million in 1980. This kind of short term movement is several magnitudes of order larger than in the previous migration waves. Many of these tourists overstay their visas and become migrants, contributing the difficulty of counting contemporary migration. But perhaps of more significance is the growth in short term mobility, for which there is no direct counterpart in the earlier waves of migration. Indeed the line between migration and travel is increasingly blurred, as in the case of Hong Kong residents in the 1990s who established households abroad but still commuted regularly back to Hong Kong for work. More than any changes in the nature or patterns of labor migration, this short term mobility can best justify claims for an unprecedented new era of transnational interactions and mobility.

New migration patterns also pose potential questions:

*Difficulty of Assimilation.* Are recent migrants less likely to assimilate than previous waves? Arguments in favor of this perspective point to the rise in transnational connections and ease of return travel, the expansion of dual citizenship, the prevalence of home language media, stronger ethnic and racial differences, the emergence of dual labor markets that will block advancement into professional jobs, and the temporary and illegal status of many migrants as evidence that new waves of migration will not assimilate like earlier waves. Most of arguments are very similar to those made in the 1920s, 1890s, 1850s, and even the 1770s.
Most of these argument rest on weak historical foundations. In nations where assimilation is the norm, integration has generally taken two to three generations. The recent waves of migration are still too new to say anything definite based on the situations of existing migrant communities. Transnational networks, a vibrant home language print media and involvement with home politics were also the norm in earlier migrations, as well as causes for great concern by observers worried about incorporation. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that political participation is not an either-or choice. Migrants involved in homeland politics are more likely to be politically active in their new nation and look beyond their migrant networks. Much the same was true historically. The Japanese government was strongly involved in the affairs of emigrant communities, but often used its influence encourage migrants to build a positive image of Japan by assimilating to local norms. From a different perspective, Chinese migrants also made the link between strong home government and assimilation. With good reason, they often explained their poor treatment abroad as at least partly due to the weakness of the Chinese government and the bad international images of China as a consequence of the uncouth behavior of Chinese while abroad. The strengthening of homeland and diasporic loyalties in the early twentieth century did not mean the weakening of assimilationist tendencies but their strengthening, as particularistic loyalties were replaced by national loyalties which were more likely to be multiple than exclusive.

The idea of an unprecedented difference in race and culture also has weak historical foundations. In the past, Irish, catholics, Asians, Jews, Italians and other southeastern Europeans were thought to be distinct and unassimilable races. None have proved to be so. Skin color may still mark out certain groups such as Asian-Americans
for discriminatory treatment, but has its roots in assumptions of the broader society more than in the cultural behavior of Asian Americans themselves. Nonetheless, broader racial attitudes may ultimately be an obstacle to integration, as is certainly the case with Africans in many parts of the Americas.

Concerns related to the economic impact and integration of migrants are a bit more difficult to address. One fear common to past and present migrations is that the new migrants could create an poorly-paid caste that would bring down wages, take away jobs, undermine the dignity of the working classes and the possibility of participatory democracy. . . . . (Econometric measurements are highly contentious). . . . . There, however, are some historical discontinuities with the past. The spread of migration controls is the most obvious. Many migrants increasingly reside as illegals, temporary workers or other kinds of status that do not allow for citizenship and political integration. This may hinder integration in the long run and create a subordinate laboring caste even more than the presence of a dual labor market.

But most discussions of assimilation assume the existence of a mainstream national culture that is attractive and powerful enough to make incorporation desirable. This is perhaps not an unreasonable assumption in North America and Europe. But given the wide variety of global destinations, we should hesitate before generalizing the North Atlantic examples. The maintenance of communal language, culture and identities over many generations in many countries of Southeast Asia is one alternative. The overwhelming of local peoples, as in colonial North America Manchuria and Singapore is another. And some form of hybridity or creolization is present in almost all situations.
The attractiveness of assimilation may also change as a function of time as well as place. In the middle of the twentieth century, in the context of declining international migration, decolonization, Cold War suspicions and strong nationalisms, the pressure to integrate and assimilate was strong around the world. Since the 1970s ethnic and multicultural identities have grown more attractive alongside more liberal regimes of mobility.

For example, in Southeast Asia after World War Two, emergent nationalisms and Cold War suspicions encouraged many Chinese to identify entirely as local nationals of Chinese descent, and social scientists predicted imminent assimilation. Since the 1970s, however, individuals of Chinese descent who now identify linguistically and culturally as Thai, Filipino or some other nationality have increasingly emphasized their Chinese identity, joined Chinese cultural associations and started to teach their children Mandarin. This has emerged as part of the expansion of regional Chinese business networks and the identification of Chineseness with power and modernity. Many people of Chinese descent, especially those from relatively wealthy countries such as North America or Australia, resent attempts to pull them into an essentialized Chinese “diaspora.” But this only emphasizes that the attractiveness and meaning of assimilation must always be put in historical context. In this case it is a global historical context, in which the opening of China, the rise of neoliberal trade regimes, the ability to revitalize dormant networks, and the creation of global hometown and surname associations has created a possibility to create Chinese identities that float free from nation and place. Power and wealth often determine the attractiveness of assimilation, but they may reside somewhere other than the mainstream national community.
Economic Development and Convergence. Does migration play a role in economic development and convergence like it once did in the Atlantic world? As with assimilation, it is again too early to tell. Cycles of migration and wage convergence in the North Atlantic were about 80 years long, much longer than the waves of contemporary migration. But the strongest evidence for such historical convergence is only available for migrants from northwest Europe. It is far from clear if this model can be generalized across space and time.

There are many reasons to think that the current migrations will not lead to convergence. The rise of migration controls also means that labor does not flow as freely as in the previous wave, making it difficult for wage levels to reach equilibrium. Existing migration controls also give preferences to the wealthy and well educated, potentially contributing to a “brain drain” in favor of the already developed countries. Many nations also have developed guest and temporary worker policies that perpetuate dual economies while insulating migrants from the broader society and retarding the broader development of skills and wealth that might have a positive development on economic development at home.

The directionality of migration in relation to flows of goods and money is also different than in the past. In the earlier Atlantic migrations, capital followed the migrants to developing frontier areas. Now most migrants move to places with wealthier and more developed economies, entering into the lower echelons of the job market. Capital then moves the opposite direction from the migrants, often channeling much of the profits back home. Migrant remittances are sent home, often amounting to substantial proportions of the national economy. But without a broader climate favorable to
investment, these remittances often just make the home areas more deeply dependent on migrant labor.

The significance of such barriers depends on context. Until the 1980s, migrants and migrant remittances to East and South Asia seemed to have little role in development. Remittances tended to be used for conspicuous consumption or as charity, and few emigrants saw a serious future in these parts of the world. As these areas have developed, however, many educated and successful migrants have taken a much greater interest in investment and return residence. What was once seen as brain drain has become the accumulation of new skills and wealth abroad that could be profitably utilized at home. But it is far from clear if similar conditions will emerge in Latin America, Africa or Russia. The role of migration in economic development is contingent on a broader economic context.

Appendix 2: Sources for Historical Migration Statistics

Most of the statistics used in the tables and charts, except for overseas migration from south China, are from published sources, which are mostly based on port and immigration statistics. The availability of statistics does not mean the numbers are necessarily reliable. J. D. Gould, “European Inter-Continental Emigration 1815-1914: Patterns and Causes,” European Journal of Economic History 8 (1979): 598-605, and several articles in Imre Ferenczi and Walter Willcox, eds., International Migrations, v. 2, Interpretations (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1931), discuss the sometimes serious discrepancies between departure and arrival statistics in the transatlantic migrations. I have encountered similar problems with Chinese and Southeast
Asian sources. The difficulties of accounting for return and repeat migration further complicate the significance and reliability of any quantitative estimate.


Nearly 25 million Chinese to Manchuria after 1891 are counted in Thomas Gottschang and Diana Lary, *Swallows and Settlers: The Great Migration from North
China to Manchuria (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, 2000), p. 171, but much overland migration may have passed uncounted. Gottschang and Lary, p. 64, also suggests that up to half a million Chinese moved into Siberia before 1917. Numbers for migration to Manchuria before 1891 are highly uncertain. Migration controls were loosened in 1876-79 during a famine in North China and 900,000 migrant were estimated in 1876 alone (Gottschang and Lary, p. 47). Anecdotal accounts also mention constant streams of new settlers after 1860. Ge Jianxiong, Cao Shuji, and Wu Songdi, Jianming Zhongguo yimin (Concise history of Chinese migration) (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), p. 478, estimates that 14 million migrants moved to Manchuria from 1860 to 1907, based on population growth. This same method gives them a serious underestimate of 4 million migrants from 1912 to 1930. Migration before the turn of the century likely contained a larger proportion of families and settlers, and a smaller flow could have produced higher population growth. I have used a rather low estimate of about 3.5 million migrants before 1891 for the charts. The actual number could have been as high as 6 to 7 million.


Figures for Indian migration are from Kingsley Davis, The Population of India and Pakistan (New York: Russell and Russell, 1951), pp. 99-100. To estimate
distribution between countries, I used Nalini Ranjan Chakravartty, *The Indian Minority in Burma* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 21, 188, Ferenczi and Willcox, *International Migrations*, v. 1, pp. 900-7 and 915, and Kernial Singh Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of Their Immigration and Settlement (1786-1957)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 373-80. Davis counted only those Indians who left as labor emigrants. In years for which I could assemble fairly complete estimates based on immigration statistics from different countries the numbers were 15 to 30 percent higher than Davis’ estimates. Claude Markovits, “Indian Merchant Networks Outside India in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A Preliminary Survey,” *Modern Asian Studies* 33 (1999): 895, suggests that at least 1.5 million commercial migrants could be added to Davis’ numbers. I have adhered to Davis’ estimates in preparing the charts because they offer the most complete and consistent data set, and because so much of the migration to Ceylon and Burma was repeat migration that I thought a low estimate of gross emigration would make the net significance of Indian migration more comparable to the other migration flows.


I used Chinese customs reports as the basis for preparing charts 1 and 2 because they offer the most complete statistical series. They are generally considered to be an undercount because they often did not count emigrants who traveled in Chinese junks, and many Chinese tried to avoid medical exams given by Customs officers, and I have
made additions based on colonial statistics. The reports of the Protector of Chinese in Singapore for 1881 to 1939 generally corroborate quite well with Chinese emigration statistics, with the exception of migration from Hainan in the years up to 1902. Skinner’s *Chinese Society in Thailand*, pp. 61 and 173, gives estimates based on Thai customs reports after 1882 that are up to 30 percent higher than emigration reports. Immigration statistics in the *Annual Report of the Philippine Commission*, and the *Annual Report of the Bureau of Customs* for Manila from 1899 to 1939 are also up to 30 percent higher than emigration numbers.

Statistics for the Dutch Indies from 1900 to 1938 in *Statistisch Jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch Indië* (Batavia), and Departement van Economische Zaken, *Volkstelling 1930*, v. 7, *Chineezen en Andere Vreemde Oosterlingen in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Batavia, 1935), are divided according to a variety of shifting and unexplained administrative categories. I have found it impossible to make them correspond with each other or with migration statistics from China and Singapore. I have thus assumed that most migration to the Dutch Indies has been accounted for by figures from China and Singapore. I have made the same assumption for seaborne migration to Burma.

University Press, 1944): “The rich and well-to-do Chinese travel on big liners like Europeans; but most of the immigrants are crammed together in picturesque, ill-smelling groups on the decks of small boats.” Assuming that many migrants to French Indochina were not counted as emigrants by Chinese customs, I have made estimates of Chinese migration to French Indochina based on available immigration statistics, population estimates, and anecdotal evidence that migration rates decreased temporarily after the imposition of immigration restrictions in 1906. See Wang Wen-Yuan, *Les relations entre l’Indochine Française et la Chine* (Paris: Éditions Pierre Bossuet, 1937), pp. 16-7.

The trends of Chinese migration recorded in charts 1 and 2 account for 18.9 million Chinese emigrants to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. I think this estimate is conservative, especially before 1881 and after 1928, and the actual number could be as high as 22 million.


1 Sucheta Mazumdar, “Chinese and Indian Migration: A Prospectus for Comparative Research,” in *Chinese and Indian Diasporas: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Wong Siu-lun (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2004), 139-67.


9 Chen Ta, *Chinese Migrations, with Special Reference to Labor Conditions* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923); Chen Zexuan, “Shijiu shiji cheng xing de tiaoyue huagong zhi” (The nineteenth century Chinese contract labor system),


11 Hoerder, Cultures in Contact, 12.

12 See the division of topics in Ge, Cao and Wu, Jianming Zhongguo Yimin. Also personal communication with Qiu Liben, December, 2001.


22 Nugent, Crossings, 43.

23 Population data for China is from Gottschang and Lary, Swallows and Settlers, 172-3; Robert Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), 280.


27 Burds, *Peasant Dreams*; Moon, “Peasant Migration.”


33 Statistisch Jaaroverzicht (Batavia: Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek in Nederlandsch Indie, 1938), 140.


36 Hoerder, Cultures in Contact, 322.


Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*.


Sources for these and subsequent calculations in notes 13 and 15-17.


McKeown, “From Opium Farmer.”


Figure 1. Global Migration 1846-1940

Figure 2: Regional Trends in Global Migration, 1846-1940 (Five Year Averages)

Source: McKeown, "Global Migration," 165.
Figure 3: Chinese Migration, 1850-1940

Southeast Asia

Americas, Australia, Africa, etc.

Sources: See McKeown, "Global Migration," 188-9.
Figure 4: Indian Migration, 1842-1937

Figure 5: Return Migrants as Proportion of Emigrants, 1870-1937