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“No Farther West”: the Mobilization of Collective Ethnic Violence against Indigenous Peoples in California, ca. 1850-1865

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,  
IRVINE

“No Farther West”: the Mobilization of Collective Ethnic Violence against Indigenous Peoples in California, ca. 1850-1865

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements  
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
in Sociology

by

Peter Brouhard Owens

Dissertation Committee:  
Professor David A. Snow, Chair  
Professor Judy Stepan-Norris  
Associate Professor Yang Su  
Associate Professor Geoff Ward

2015
DEDICATION

To

My family,
for their unending support and encouragement.

David Snow,
who always helped convince me that my ideas had merit.

David Cunningham and Geoff Ward,
for their invaluable assistance and support.

and

Stefani Baldivia,
for her valuable research assistance, and reams of inspiration
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2013


Works In Progress

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Research Presentations and Invited Talks

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| 2013 | “Threat, Competition, and Mobilizing Structures: Motivational and Organizational Contingencies of the Civil Rights-Era Ku Klux Klan.” Presented at the American Sociological Association annual meeting, session on Race and Social Movements; New York. August. |

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

“No Farther West”: the Mobilization of Collective Ethnic Violence Against Indigenous Peoples in California, ca. 1850-1865

By

Peter Brouhard Owens

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

University of California, Irvine, 2015

Professor David A. Snow, Chair

This dissertation uses theories of ethno-racial competition, boundary work, and collective action to explain the variable mobilization of collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples in early American California, ca. 1850-1865. To do so, the dissertation proceeds through three chapters. The first chapter, “American Settler Colonialism, Racial Formation, and Competition Theory,” provides a theoretical framework that supports the empirical inquiries in the subsequent two chapters. To develop this framework, I draw from the American settler colonialism, collective action, ethnic competition, and mass violence and atrocities literatures to suggest new directions for the study of settler-colonial (i.e. inter-polity) intergroup competition and conflict. The second chapter provides a regional analysis of the dynamics of collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples in central and northern California, ca. 1850-1865. This chapter focuses on the role of frame disputes as a mediating mechanism in intergroup conflicts. The central theoretical claim, which finds strong support, is that frame disputes among settlers in different California regions influenced the dynamics of collective violence by attributing different levels of
collective out-group “threats” to proximate indigenous groups. As in contemporary cases, this ethno-racial polarization and subsequent violence was produced by the explicit attempts of local political actors to durably politicize ethno-racial group membership. The third empirical chapter looks more closely at the mechanisms supporting varying annual levels of collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples in the Humboldt Bay region of California, ca. 1853-1865. This chapter continues my emphasis on framing and boundary work mechanisms as mediators of collective conflicts, while focusing my theoretical attention more squarely on issues of threat assessment, or the ways in which group-based threats are collectively appraised by nominal power-holding group members. Drawing from theories of mediated competition, I demonstrate the specific necessity of organizational resources for extremist mobilization, and that elite framing and boundary work were required to link aggrieved individuals with these mobilizing resources. These findings confirm the role of framing and associated boundary work mechanisms in the politics of collective threat assessment. To conclude, I discuss the implications of these threat assessment issues for future historical and contemporary study of reactive mobilization.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This is a historical study of American interethnic contention and violence, and seeks to explain the variable mobilization of settler violence against indigenous peoples central and northern California, ca. 1850-1865. Its goals are both historical and theoretical. Historically, the study seeks to contribute to increased sociological understanding of a significant political and demographic event: the Gold Rush-era American invasion and settlement of California. The overwhelming violence and mistreatment of the state’s indigenous peoples, which was concomitant with this invasion and settlement, has largely been portrayed in historical studies as motivated by racist ideologies and material self-interest (e.g., Madley 2009). These explanations, while certainly accounting for potential sources of individual and collective motivation, are insufficient on an explanatory basis. This is because, as noted by many sociologists, dominant ideologies constrain available repertoires of social behavior (e.g., Bourdieu 1994) but do not strictly predict individual or collective action (e.g., Benford and Snow 2000; DiMaggio 1997; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Swidler 2001).

In contrast to extant historical perspectives that emphasize explicit beliefs, I approach anti-indigenous violence in California from a collective action perspective. This perspective disaggregates this violence as the product of various meso-level social orders, which Fligstein and McAdam (2012) refer to as collective action fields. Within different regions of the state, potential participants in violence may have been variably influenced towards more or less extreme forms of action by proximate collective mechanisms (e.g., Karstedt 2013; Owens 2014; Owens et al. 2013; Tilly 2003). This collective action perspective is also rooted in the micro-level assumption that acts of violence, on an
interpersonal level, are quite difficult to perform even in generally conducive social environments (Collins 2008), and thus require specific political escalation and triggering mechanisms to become mobilized on a significant collective scale.

This collective action perspective leads directly to the study’s theoretical goals. Theoretically, I seek to better understand the role of framing and boundary work mechanisms in reactive ethnic contention, which is defined here as any collective (i.e. group-based) effort by nominal power-holding group members to protect valued social resources or privileges from perceived out-group challenges (see also Tilly 1978; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Frames are often portrayed in studies of such contention as a necessary micro-mobilizing linkage between potential participants and mobilizing resources, organizations, and interpersonal networks (e.g., McVeigh 2009; Snow et al. 1986), but not as a mediating mechanism that is deeply embedded in the politics of collective threat assessment and subsequent action (Einwohner and Maher 2011). Because of their involvement in these politics, a focus on the role of framing mechanisms in attributing “threats” to out-groups during ethno-racial conflicts may help to better predict more extreme forms of contention. Specifically, I argue that when extreme threat frames become more politically influential and salient than other, less extreme ones within a shared meso-level action field, extremist actions will be more likely to occur. However, I also argue that these frames will only become sufficient to mobilize extremist action (i.e., violence) in areas where structural conditions are conducive to extremist framings of interethnic collective relations and events (e.g., McVeigh 2004). My findings, which support these arguments, also challenge the relatively straightforward relationship between structural threats and
their perception as such by collective actors, and suggest the need to further explore the threat-framing nexus.

As will be shown, extremist settler violence against indigenous peoples in California between 1850 and 1865 was widespread during the early invasion and rapid settlement of the state, largely due to settler encroachments on indigenous territories and resulting material and territorial disputes, as well as the highly dislocated social profile of most early settlers. However, as economic and political conditions in settlements increasingly stabilized, and relative to the state’s increasing population, levels of anti-indigenous violence tended to decrease across much of the state. This finding underlines the importance of structurally-conducive economic and political conditions in mobilizing threat-based collective action.

The only region in which this relative decrease did not occur was Northwest California, and in particular the Humboldt Bay region. Between 1856 and 1865, this region exhibited consistently high levels of collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples, much of which occurred during large collective massacres. As I will show, violence in this region was not rooted exclusively in extremist sentiments, but also in an elite-led, right-wing collective movement. This movement sought to promote extremist understandings of indigenous out-group difference and incentivize lines of action consistent with these interpretations, and thus to resolve perceptual tensions regarding the “threats” that indigenous peoples presented to the area’s settler population.

**WHY CALIFORNIA?**
Central and northern California, ca. 1850-1865, provide a natural laboratory in which to examine these questions, not only because of the variety of dominative practices used by settlers to socially control indigenous peoples, but also because of the ways in which these varying practices were likely to have reflected competing settler understandings of indigenous ethno-racial “difference.” These tensions, in turn, reflect relevant theoretical dimensions of interest to scholars of racial formation, collective action, and intergroup conflict.

In the decade and a half following the discovery of gold (1848) and the incorporation of California as a state (1850), thousands of Anglo-American settlers poured into the state and came into contact with the roughly 60 distinct tribal groups inhabiting the region. The outcomes of their encounters with Anglo-American settlers were generally marked by a high degree of violence and conflict, ranging from state-sponsored military campaigns and collective settler violence against indigenous peoples (Heizer 1993; Mann 2005:90-98; Madley 2008, 2009), to removal and confinement on reservations (Heizer 1993:101-174; Findlay 1992; Phillips 1997), to their kidnapping to be sold into slavery (Heizer 1993:219-242; Hurtado 1988; Almaguer 2009:138-41). However, in some cases indigenous peoples were able to attain a degree of social integration, albeit often marked by economic exploitation and coercive discrimination; in other areas, indigenous peoples were commonly incorporated into settler households, both as laborers and as marriage partners (Rawls 1976; Hurtado 1988).

Collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples in California took two primary forms: first, militia expeditions paid for and sanctioned by the state of California to remove indigenous peoples as a “threat” to white settlement; second, massacres perpetrated
collectively by settlers against indigenous groups (Almaguer 2009:122-130; Johnston-Dodds 2002:15-22). Mass violence against indigenous peoples in California was sometimes an intentional outcome of state policy, sanctioned at the highest official levels, and at other times was a collective outcome that occurred with the state playing an indirect role. There was also federal military violence against indigenous peoples during this period, but much of this violence occurred during the Civil War period (roughly 1861-1865) and in specific regions of the state.

Non-murderous methods of social control, which are not the focus of this study but are relevant to the varying use of non-lethal violence as a means of social control, took several distinct forms. Slave raiding was one such outcome that occurred collectively in many areas, whereby indigenous people were kidnapped from their communities by white settlers and sold into bondage in an informal slave economy (Almaguer 2009:138-41). Though less violent than outright killing, it was no less destructive or traumatic to indigenous communities, contributing to massive gender imbalances among indigenous populations and leading to further demographic decline (Hurtado 1988). Although the creation of an informal slave economy was never officially sanctioned, it was enabled by an 1850 state law that allowed for the legal indenture of Indians found to be “loitering,” effectively turning the state courts into an instrument for coercing indigenous labor (Johnston-Dodds 2002:5-10).

Territorial relocation and spatial confinement were additional repressive strategies that were generally destructive and violent, but some more so than others. California was the institutional “birthplace” of the federal reservation system, yet it was guided by often incoherent and contradictory policies that changed in response to varying local conditions
(Findlay 1992; Phillips 1997). Rather than being a uniform institution, the reservation played different roles in different areas and times. More violent forms of relocation might have involved violence undertaken to coerce indigenous peoples to relocate them off of land desired by settlers, or involve relocation onto marginal land that could not support the indigenous population, leading to systemic starvation and want – these outcomes would qualify as genocidal. In other areas, such as the Tejon Reserve (established in 1853 near present day Lebec, CA), reservations were set up for indigenous protection but indigenous peoples were not forcibly relocated; relocation was thus a nominally “voluntary” measure open to indigenous peoples, although it occurred in an environment that was undoubtedly coercive. In yet other areas, there was no apparent distinct official policy, and indigenous peoples were sometimes incorporated into settler society as laborers, albeit in a highly asymmetrical and discriminatory fashion. Historical evidence suggests that indigenous peoples, while generally viewed as alien outsiders, nevertheless played an important economic role in early American California, both as laborers in mines, farms, and ranches, but also sometimes as landowners and claimholders in their own right, who were often drawn into close, albeit exploitative, economic relations with neighboring settler communities (Rawls 1976; Phillips 1997:11).

Relations between settlers and indigenous peoples were also structured by ineffective, but nonetheless strident, state and federal policies that attempted to remove and spatially confine California’s indigenous persons within specified federal reserves. This was done in order to remove the indigenous territorial bases for sovereignty, while also “instructing” them in the tools of “civilization” on the path to eventual ethnic supersession. Previous to the Louisiana Purchase, federal policy towards indigenous peoples had largely
been characterized by removal into “Indian Territory” west of the Mississippi. The Louisiana Purchase, and later the acquisition of Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican Cession, not only hugely increased the territorial base of the United States; it also brought previously “removed” tribal groups back under the dominion of the state. Westward “removal” was thus no longer a viable option as the previously vast frontier quickly became part of the nation (Phillips 1997:5-6). At this time a tension arose among many policymakers between two potential solutions to the “indigenous problem” in the American West: extermination or domestication. Proposed policies of extermination reflected a view of indigenous peoples as inherently inassimilable and perpetually savage and dangerous; policies of domestication reflected a view of the indigenous as having the potential for assimilation, but only after cultural suppression and conversion to the more “industrious” practice of settled agriculture. The reservation system thus emerged in California as a potential middle course between these two options, meant to not only separate “savage” and potentially violent indigenous peoples from Anglo-settler society and forestall potentially expensive wars, but also as a possible “civilizing” mechanism aimed at eventual assimilation. However, California remained largely a frontier area during this period (Phillips 1997), and the reach of state and federal institutions remained relatively limited. Thus, even where relatively coherent policies took shape, their enactment was heavily mediated by changing local conditions, collective actions taken by local officials, settlers, and indigenous peoples, and different material and social constraints that developed in different areas.

Relations were also importantly structured by shifting boundaries of race and civilization. As West (2003) notes, the territorial expansion of the United States ignited a
flurry of debate over the nature of race and political inclusion that occurred alongside the scientific legitimation of racial hierarchies. California is exemplary of these tensions: while state policymakers and Anglo-settlers opposed the introduction of California as a slave state, they also tried to prevent free blacks from settling in the state, and pursued varied policies of legal discrimination, forced relocation, and intimidatory violence against Spanish Californios and Chinese immigrants, among other groups. The treatment of California’s indigenous population thus evolved in a complex multiracial social field defined by the consolidation of white supremacist exclusion against multiple groups (Almaguer 2009).

While California was a hostile environment for many non-white groups, indigenous peoples undoubtedly fell to the bottom of California’s racial hierarchy, since they were seen as both racially and civilizationally inferior (Almaguer 2009). During the 19th century, views towards indigenous peoples were primarily defined along two axes of inclusion and exclusion: Christian-heathen, and civilized-savage (Fredrickson 1982:8-9). However much these two dichotomies overlapped, they were not identical: a group could be quite civilized while remaining non-Christian, as in the ancient Greeks or Islamic empires, whereas conversion to Christianity did not necessarily remove a group from its avowed status as socially-undeveloped “savages.” The determinants of civilization, as opposed to savagery, were defined on an Anglocentric, Lockean basis: land had been given to humans to “improve,” either through farming or the creation of extractive industries. Thus, all “civilized” peoples engaged in agriculture and industry. Because their semi-nomadic and hunter-gatherer lifestyles did not regularly feature agriculture, many of California’s tribes were therefore seen as civilizationally inferior, and often referred to as “diggers” as a slur.
against many groups’ habit of gathering acorns and other foods. For social reformers, California’s early reservation system promised (in theory) a means of “civilizing” indigenous peoples by engaging them in agricultural tutelage, as well as a means of protecting them from settler violence; in reality, the system was never sufficiently funded, further official graft and corruption made it utterly dysfunctional in its “civilizing” mission, and Anglo-American settlers often perceived reservations as embedded threats to the primacy of their racial-territorial entitlements, making them frequent objects of terroristic violence.

This sense of territorial entitlement reflected, in part, one of the most dominant ideologies of the period, Manifest Destiny (Horsman 1981), which generally equated white (i.e. Anglo-American) racial dominance with the legitimacy of territorial expansion in the service of expanding Anglo-American civilization. As a broadly elaborated ideological system that was supported by contentious action by both state and non-state actors in seeking to remove indigenous peoples from their lands, Manifest Destiny fundamentally sought to resolve the racial-classificatory tension between paternalistic Enlightenment understandings of indigenous peoples as innately equal and improvable, and the dominative and racialist view of indigenous peoples as innately inferior and thus collectively expendable (Horsman 1981:190). The state and non-state institutions whose policies variously reflected this spectrum of settler out-group racial understandings, such as the federal Office of Indian Affairs, various state militias, and the federal military, can thus be thought of as “race-making” institutions (Bailey 2008), to the extent that they attempted to politically and culturally enshrine particular understandings of indigenous out-group differences. Federal policies of indigenous removal and/or physical elimination,
such as those used to remove the Cherokee and other tribes from their lands in the 1830s, thus “represented a major victory for... those who believed the Indian to be inferior, who did not wish them to be accepted as equals within American society, and who ultimately expected them to disappear” (Horsman 1981:190).

The fear of the potentially inassimilable “savage” was thus a dominant political idiom in California during this time, but was by no means the only one. As Rawls (1986) demonstrates, while most Anglo settlers generally viewed indigenous peoples as an alien and inferior race, views regarding the proper place of indigenous peoples in California constituted a shifting multidimensional field, defined by a colonial tension between the potential for indigenous assimilation and the danger of inassimilable savagery, leading to purportedly “inevitable” conflict and extinction (Hixson 2013). Exploring this multidimensional ethno-racial field in California therefore enables me to account for the role that these collective “contrast conceptions” (Shibutani 1973; see also Hunt et al. 1994) of indigenous peoples played in the overall assessment of indigenous “threats” by settlers in different areas of the state, and thus in the subsequent mobilization or demobilization of violent interethnic contention.

**DATA AND METHODOLOGY**

This study utilizes an original historical dataset that draws from a variety of primary and secondary historical data sources. Event data on 780 distinct incidences of anti-indigenous violence between 1850 and 1865, accounting for an estimated 8,329 indigenous deaths, were identified using local and state-level newspaper event data, as well as available primary and secondary sources¹. The limitations of available historical sources, as
well as noted biases in newspaper event reporting (Earl et al. 2004), ensure that even the most careful cataloging efforts will not produce a “complete” set of incidents; this is especially true for more remote areas, where it is likely that many incidents were never reported. The 780 events identified thus likely represent an undercount of total victimization episodes. However, because of the variety of primary and secondary sources utilized, it is likely that the dataset minimally incorporates the vast majority of large violent events (i.e. those with 5 or more indigenous persons killed), which seem to have rarely escaped mention in local newspapers and account for roughly 36% of overall violence in the dataset.

After initial compilation, all individual events were cross-checked by date and location to control for over-counting, and were not selected for inclusion in the analytic sample if source materials: 1) did not provide a specific number or range of indigenous persons killed; 2) did not specify, at minimum, the month and year in which the killings occurred; and 3) did not provide a specific county-level location in which the killings occurred. For sources that provided multiple victimization estimates, which generally constituted either boastful over-counts or dissembling under-counts of total victimization, I use the mean of all available estimates for each event’s total mortality. All events were also coded for the participation of three distinct perpetrator groups: 1) vigilante groups or other civic formations; 2) paramilitary state militias; and 3) federal military personnel. This coding was not mutually exclusive: while most violence events featured only one category of actor, events where multiple perpetrator groups were present were coded as representing the presence of each group.

All event data were next aggregated to the county level. Selecting counties as the
units of analysis is suitable, not only because it allows for economic and population data to be used in tandem with meso-level data on local conditions and events, but also because it provides the degree of regional specificity necessary to understand how anti-indigenous violence was differentially mobilized across different regions. I identified 15 California counties in which significant levels of violence against indigenous peoples (i.e. more than 10 deaths per 1000 population in any given five-year period) occurred during the study period. In order to include negative cases for comparison, I also include all counties that border these initial 15 counties. I exclude from analysis counties in which significant settlement occurred during Spanish and Mexican rule. This previous settlement is relevant for two reasons: first, because these areas generally did not exhibit high levels of violence during the study period; and second, because these areas likely feature various exogenous legacies of Spanish and Mexican rule that predate American settlement, such as the deleterious impact of the Catholic missions on indigenous populations (Cook 1976). Naturally, some impacts of previous rule, such as communicable disease transmission, may transcend local spatial boundaries and thus be difficult to reliably gauge, but I expect these impacts to be relatively evenly distributed across the remaining regions of the state. Application of these criteria yields an initial sample of 25 counties

To account for the creation of new counties and changes in existing county boundaries during this time, I utilize a spatial clustering technique that aggregates together counties in which significant boundary changes occurred, as well as new counties that were created out of the territory of a pre-existing county (Messner et al. 2005; McVeigh and Cunningham 2012). This yields a final sample of 7 county clusters and 5 individual counties — 12 total units of analysis.
For all analyses in the study, I utilize fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin 2008; Ragin, Drass, and Davey 2009). In fsQCA, variables become reconfigured as “sets” that possess continuous levels of membership between 0 and 1, with 0 representing full non-membership in a condition, 1 representing full membership in condition, and 0.5 representing the point of “maximum ambiguity.” Cases (i.e. counties) exhibit varying levels of membership in different sets: for instance, if we were to use colleges as our cases, Harvard would likely have a high level of membership in the set “prestigious universities,” but would also have low membership in the set “universities that accept low SAT scores.” Set membership depends on how a set is both qualitatively defined and quantitatively calibrated (see below) by the analyst. Once set membership has been defined, fuzzy set QCA proceeds by comparing the levels of set membership that cases possess for all predictive conditions, and empirically linking these combinations of conditions to the presence (>0.5 set membership) or absence (<0.5) of an outcome. After identifying one or more constitutive combinations, fsQCA then logically reduces them using its "truth table" algorithm (Ragin et al. 2009), in order to identify more parsimonious solutions. Fuzzy set methods are well suited to analyses with small- or medium-N sizes (Ragin 1987: 10-16). For this study, fsQCA offers unique analytic advantages because of its abilities to assess causal complexity: the combinatorial means through which recurrent social mechanisms combine variously to create different collective outcomes (Owens 2014; Tilly 2003). Fuzzy-set QCA methods also provide an optimal means of analysis for analyzing the mediation of competitive processes by various collective mechanisms, since they are able to specify the relative necessity and sufficiency of structural and meso-level factors for an outcome.

There are two measures of set-theoretic connection in fsQCA: consistency and
coverage. As proportions, both scores fall between 0 and 1. Consistency is associated with set-theoretic sufficiency, and assesses the degree to which values in single or INUS (i.e. $A \cap B$) conditions comprise a consistent subset of the outcome. The formula for consistency is:

$$\sum \frac{\min(x_i, y_i)}{x_i}$$

Generally, scores above 0.8 demonstrate a strong set-theoretic connection between a causal solution and an outcome (Ragin 2008). A similar consistency calculation may be used to test for set-theoretic necessity, which assesses the degree to which singular or unified sets of causal conditions comprise a superset of the outcome.

$$\sum \frac{\min(x_i, y_i)}{y_i}$$

Here all $y_i$ values are substituted for $x_i$ values in the denominator:

$$\sum \frac{\min(x_i, y_i)}{x_i}$$

Coverage is also associated with set-theoretic necessity, and assesses the degree to which sufficient or INUS conditions are present relative to the total presence of an outcome. Coverage is calculated using the formula:

$$\sum \frac{\min(x_i, y_i)}{y_i}$$

This formula expresses the relation of the sum of those $x$-values that are consistent with the statement that $x$ is sufficient for $y$ and the sum of $y$ values. Coverage demonstrates the empirical triviality or importance of a sufficient solution. High coverage is not required to establish a set-theoretic connection, but is an important consideration in overall explanation. In fsQCA (Ragin et al. 2009), once causal solutions (i.e. combinations of conditions) that exhibit strong (i.e. above 0.8) consistency with an outcome are identified, the solutions are then logically reduced into more parsimonious solutions where redundancy between similar solutions is eliminated.
**Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of QCA vs. Regression Methods**

Given the quantitative nature of the study dataset and the study’s historical context, there are benefits and drawbacks for any choice of analytic method for the current study. The most important question is: does the method effectively address the study's research questions? Time-sensitive regression methods, such as time series analysis, are an obvious consideration, since they would be able to effectively address the temporal dimension of variation in violent events, and assess whether variation in specific indicators over time is associated with similar variation in violence.

While this type of regression-based analysis would be useful for a variety of purposes, it is inappropriate for the research goals of my study for several reasons. First, regression analyses are analyses of general trends in data, and generally consider outlying or deviant cases as errors. Constitutive and case-based methods, in contrast, consider these deviant cases to be useful opportunities for the extension and refinement of relevant causal theories (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). Because different regions of California are likely to have had quite distinct patterns of interaction between indigenous peoples and Anglo-American settlers, given the rapid social and economic changes that occurred during the early settlement of the state (Mann 1982), identification of these divergent patterns is empirically and theoretically relevant. Second, regression-based methods are unable to identify the relative necessity and sufficiency of factors for an outcome within a specified model. This inability is theoretically relevant, given the mediated competition approach utilized by the study (see also Cunningham 2012, 2013; Owens et al. Forthcoming), which specifically argues that structural economic and political sources of threat should be relatively necessary but insufficient for contentious mobilization, and should therefore
require collectively-mobilizing mechanisms to enable perceived threats to translate into action. Third, given the fact that the violent events in question have been previously painted with a somewhat broad historical brush, the most appropriate analysis should be able to take account of causal complexity and equifinality (i.e., the possibility that multiple combinations of interacting factors may lead to a shared outcome; see Goertz and Mahoney 2012), in order to develop a more grounded historical understanding of the similarities and differences between different regions of the state.

**Structure of the Dissertation**

This dissertation proceeds through three chapters. The first chapter, “American Settler Colonialism, Racial Formation, and Competition Theory,” provides a theoretical framework that supports the empirical inquiries in the subsequent two chapters. This chapter argues that the empirical study of ethno-racial conflict and competition in the social sciences has developed a robust framework for the study of domestic intergroup contention, but has largely ignored the significant collective competition and conflict between Anglo-American settlers and indigenous peoples that was attendant with America’s westward territorial expansion, and that continues under paternalistic colonial rule. This oversight is theoretically relevant, given the fundamentally distinct territorial and sovereign bases of this competition. I therefore conceptually extend theories of intergroup competition and threat to account for their distinct domestic and inter-polity modes. To justify this extension, I broadly survey the racial formation regimes that indigenous peoples and African Americans have been subjected to over the past two centuries, and contrast their central goals, strategies, and institutions of socio-spatial
control. To do so, I draw from recent studies of American settler colonialism. In contrast to the categorical strategies of perpetuation and containment used against African-Americans throughout American history, American racial formation has historically attempted to redefine indigenous ethnic plurality as a potentially assimilable and monolithic racial category, in order to facilitate white ethnic and territorial supersession. I end this chapter by synthesizing recent empirical and analytic insights from collective action, ethnic competition, and mass violence and atrocities literature, to suggest new directions for the study of settler-colonial (inter-polity) competition and conflict.

The second chapter provides a regional analysis of the dynamics of collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples in central and northern California, ca. 1850-1865. This chapter focuses on the role of frame disputes as a mediating collective mechanism in intergroup conflicts. The central theoretical claim here is that frame disputes among settlers in different California regions influenced the dynamics of collective violence by attributing different levels of collective out-group “threats” to proximate indigenous groups. This mobilization and demobilization was centrally organized around two opposed, colonial frames of indigenous ethnic “threat” (or lack thereof): one in which indigenous peoples were seen as pitiable and tractable victims who deserved to be “civilized” and eventually incorporated into the American polity as subservient laborers; and another in which indigenous peoples were seen as inherently treacherous and violent, justifying violent and exclusionary social control strategies. Alongside widespread demographic and economic changes to Californian communities, these opposed frames mediated the collective dynamics of settler-indigenous conflicts when they found sustained material and discursive support from influential state-level actors. Where these imputations of
indigenous “threats” were durably sanctioned through state material and discursive support, ethnic violence tended to endure as a normative form of political claims making that sought to maintain “thick” interethnic boundaries. As in contemporary cases, this ethno-racial polarization and subsequent violence was not strictly a product of underlying intergroup hatreds or prejudices, but rather was produced by the explicit attempts of local political actors to durably politicize ethno-racial group membership.

The third empirical chapter looks more closely at the mechanisms supporting varying annual levels of collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples in the Humboldt Bay region of California, ca. 1853-1865. This chapter draws from the findings of the previous chapter by looking at this region as a theoretically and historically significant extreme case study, which may display social mechanisms that are relevant to the more general dynamics of intergroup contention in the state. I continue my emphasis on framing and boundary work mechanisms as mediators of collective conflicts, while focusing my theoretical attention more squarely to issues of threat assessment, or the ways in which group-based threats or challenges are collectively appraised by nominal power-holding group members. These mechanisms have been identified in recent empirical study, but have not yet been substantively integrated into reactive mobilization studies or the ethnic competition literature. Drawing from theories of mediated competition, I demonstrate the specific necessity of organizational resources for extremist mobilization, and that elite framing and boundary work were required to link aggrieved individuals with these mobilizing resources. These findings confirm the role of framing and associated boundary work mechanisms in the politics of threat assessment, while also problematizing the
relationship between “objectively” threatening circumstances and the appraisal of these conditions as more or less threatening to nominal power-holding groups.

In the concluding chapter, I discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of the study's findings, both for the sociological study of interethnic contention and violence, and for how we understand California history more generally.

Together, I believe that these chapters provide important theoretical insights that will be of general interest to scholars of right-wing social movements, collective violence, and American racial formation. I also believe that the proposed dataset and its analysis deepens the existing literature on nineteenth-century Western American expansion and settlement by increasing attention to, and thus potentially stimulating, additional research on anti-indigenous violence, and examining the contextual characteristics and implications of these social control efforts. Scholars working in comparative political science can consider modifying and adopting the study model’s conceptualization, measurement, and causal theories for use in studies of other democratizing multiethnic polities (e.g. Mann 2005). The study also facilitates comparative-international research on the roles of governmental and civic authorities in exacerbating or limiting racial and ethnic conflict, violence and inequality, in the context of social movements or transitional justice.

I also anticipate the study having ongoing utility to legal, legislative and public interests. As historian Benjamin Madley (2008: 331) has recently argued: “The question of genocide in United States history remains an important subject, given that the stakes include the nature of white settlement in America, triumphal and exceptionalist interpretations of United States history, and questions of apology, reparations, and national character.” However, contemporary scholarly efforts to develop an evidentiary basis for
historical accountability and potential remediation are hindered by “blanket assessments” of atrocity crimes that are criticized as “imprecise and inadequately substantiated by evidence recognizing the variety of American Indian experiences under United States rule” (ibid). By focusing on variation in the constitution of collective violence against indigenous peoples within various meso-level contexts, this study aims to correct for this shortcoming in previous evidentiary initiatives.

While the comparative nature of the study means that it cannot pay equal attention to the specificities of every case of indigenous-settler conflict in California, the development of the project’s event-level database is intended to facilitate other evidentiary efforts in this direction. Upon completion and publication of this research, I will make the quantitative dataset and relevant qualitative data accessible to teachers, educators, and the public through the Historical Violence Database, a publicly accessible website hosted by the Ohio State University’s Criminal Justice Research Center. Research findings and data will be disseminated in a manner to support research, education, public policy and community organizing related to historical indigenous justice topics and contemporary remedial efforts.
Chapter Two: American Settler Colonialism, Racial Formation, and Ethnic Competition Theory

Introduction

"The Negro is placed at the ultimate bounds of servitude; the Indian at the extreme limits of freedom. Slavery scarcely produces more fatal effects in the first than does independence in the second."

- Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America

In the above excerpt, De Tocqueville (2000:305) identifies two separate but inextricably linked exclusionary tendencies that framed the symbolic locations of indigenous and black peoples in contemporaneous American political discourse. To many Anglo-American whites during the nineteenth century (Wolfe 2001), it seemed that it would be extremely difficult for blacks, if freed from slavery, to ever become fully equal members of American society due to the conditions of their exploitation by whites, which would mark them as second class citizens in a society politically and culturally premised on individual (i.e. Anglo male) “freedom” (De Tocqueville 2000:302-307; Rana 2010; Roediger 2007; Wacquant 2002). The symbolic position of indigenous peoples in this evolving racial caste system was, of course, also markedly inferior, but importantly distinct from that of blacks and other intra-polity minorities. As Alexander Hixson (2013) notes, Anglo-American perceptions of indigenous racial "difference" in the nineteenth century were fraught with an attributed tension between their potential to adopt “civilization” or to forever remain in “savagery.” Despite the consistent invocation of indigenous peoples as a monolithic and exogenous “other” in federal and state laws (Almaguer 2009; Bobo and Tuan 2006; Hixson 2013; Rana 2010), many whites saw them as (at least nominally) having the option of becoming “civilized” and incorporated into American society. But because this
“inclusion” was absolutely conditional upon the dual surrender of their cultural practices and political sovereignty, their entire ways of life, De Tocqueville and others felt they would tend to become caught up in the “pretended nobility of their origins,” and thus would ultimately tend to reject membership in a “civilized” society. Summarizing these tensions, De Tocqueville (2000:306) argued that while “The Negro would like to intermingle with the European, and... cannot[,] The Indian could up to a certain point succeed at it, but he disdains the attempt, and the pride of the other to death.”

Taken together, these perceptions of the collective threats that indigenous peoples, as exogenous ethno-political “others,” and free blacks and other nonwhites, as intra-polity “others,” presented to American racial democracy can be conceptualized as two distinct but interconnected exclusionary frameworks in American racial formation (Glenn 2015; Omi and Winant 1992): Blacks supposedly could not become full members of Anglo-American society, while indigenous persons would supposedly opt out. These imputed distinctions between indigenous and black collective (i.e., ethno-racial) characteristics and motives, and the corollary attributions of the threats that they presented to Anglo-American racial supremacy, would lead to two distinct trajectories of racialized social control. Whites would seek to perpetuate and socially contain Black categorical “otherness” in the face of manumission and subsequent rights- and liberation-based struggles, relying centrally on legal-political principles such as the one-drop rule (Davis 2010), in tandem with preferential economic and political practices (e.g., Conley 1999; Cunningham 2004; Massey and Denton 1993; Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Wacquant 2002) and often, terroristic violence (e.g. Cunningham 2013; Ellsworth 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995). For the social control of indigenous peoples, whites largely utilized legal and political strategies intended to subvert
the cultural and political bases for indigenous sovereignty (Hixson 2013; Steinman 2012), and ultimately to make them disappear as politically and culturally distinct entities (Churchill 2002; Wolfe 2001).

Why should these groups have been located by Anglo-American whites in such distinct ways within the evolving nation’s racial caste system? And why did whites collectively attempt to socially control these groups in distinct ways? In this essay, I link these historical tensions of race and national inclusion and exclusion (West 2003) with a critical discussion and extension of theories of ethnic competition and racial group threat (Bergeson and Herman 1998; Blalock 1967; Olzak 1989, 1990, 1992; Olzak and Shanahan 2014; Tolnay and Beck 1995; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). These theories provide robust explanations for the variable occurrence of intergroup contention and competition within a variety of social and historical contexts. Surprisingly, however, they have consistently overlooked the historical (and ongoing – see Bobo and Tuan 2006; Steinman 2012) territorial and political struggles between Anglo-European whites and indigenous peoples in the context of European, and later American, settler colonialism (Hixson 2013). As a result, group-based competition and threat theories robustly account for the dynamics of intra-polity competition and conflict, (e.g., Olzak 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995), but not the dynamics of inter-polity, colonial conflicts between Euro-American settlers and North American indigenous nations. This oversight is especially notable, given how directly these various conflicts reflect on “the nature of white settlement in America, triumphal and exceptionalist interpretations of United States history, and questions of apology, reparations, and national character” (Madley 2008:331).
To address these empirical oversights, this essay seeks to theoretically extend ethnic competition and group threat theories to account for the settler-colonial contexts of American territorial invasion and conflict with indigenous peoples (Hixson 2013; Veracini 2010; Wolfe 2001, 2006). This theoretical extension requires several conceptual steps. First, to understand how different perceived sources of out-group threat may lead to distinct strategies of ethno-racialized social control, I conceptualize the two exclusionary trajectories noted above as distinct racial projects involved in larger racial formation processes. Omi and Winant (1992:55) define racial formation as “the sociohistorical process[es] by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.” Because racial formation processes, in practice, are made up of numerous racial projects, or collective attempts to reorganize social conditions along the lines of particular racial interpretations and meanings (Omi and Winant 1992:56), this conceptualization thus directs attention to the ways in which different interpretations of racial meanings and differences will influence the strategies of social control Anglo-American whites, as an evolving and normative ethno-racial collective category (Jacobson 1999; Roediger 2006; Waters 1990), have historically used against African Americans and indigenous peoples.

I next leverage insights from recent settler-colonial studies (Glenn 2015; Hixson 2013; Steinman 2012; Veracini 2010; Wolfe 2001) to develop a typology of domestic (intrapolity) versus settler-colonial (inter-polity) ethnic competition and threat. I use this comparative framework, which contrasts these two competitive processes in terms of their central institutions, practices, and symbolic tensions, to demonstrate that the strategies of political cleansing and social control used by Anglo-American whites against indigenous peoples (e.g. Mann 2005) were (and are) a direct result of their specific perceived threat to
Anglo-American *sovereignty*. The perceived ability of whites to seize and control territory was contemporaneously linked not only with white racial and class identity and economic opportunity (Almaguer 2009; Roediger 2007; West 2003), but also with the perceived sovereign ability of the state and federal governments to enforce these racial entitlements. The distinctive nature of perceived indigenous threats to white social control thus arose from their inherent challenge to Manifest Destiny (Horsman 1981), an extremely salient racial-political “master frame” (Snow and Benford 1992). The ensuing legal and territorial struggles over the sovereign status of indigenous nations in the nineteenth century, which were contemporaneously recognized as such by federal officials (Deloria and Lytle 1984; Prucha 2000: 57-59, 85-86), were empirically and conceptually distinct from the domestic struggles for valued resources and entitlements within domestic political and economic arenas, as addressed by existing competition and threat models (e.g. Bergeson and Herman 1998; Olzak 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995).

**DISTINGUISHING SETTLER COLONIALISM WITHIN TRADITIONAL COMPETITION THEORY**

Traditional competition theories have sought to understand the economic and political forces that move social groups towards or away from contentious social relations. According to competition theorists, most intergroup conflicts are rooted in competition over valued and scarce resources, such as economic rewards and political power and status. Studies have identified a number of robust empirical indicators of these conflicts, such as increasing ethnic overlap within competitive labor markets (Bonacich 1972;
Cunningham and Phillips 2007), or shifts in the economic valuation or perceived rewards of valuable social resources (Olzak 1992; McVeigh 2009).

Settler colonialism, in contrast, is centrally premised on the ready “availability” of land and land-based resources for the colonizing population, which is essential for the establishment of settlement, consolidation of industry, and the eventual reconstitution of these areas as “domestic” locales (Veracini 2010; Wolfe 2006). Land has (and is) often claimed through doctrines that defined territorial sovereignty on a Lockean basis: one had to “improve” land economically to claim title over it (Wolfe 2001, 2006). This was used to “legally” remove indigenous title because of the real (or conveniently, attributed; see Berkhofer 1978) nomadic lifestyles of many North American indigenous peoples. The other distinctive premise of settler-colonial racialization processes is that indigenous peoples should, ideally, be made to disappear as territorially sovereign groups. This “ethnic cleansing” (Mann 2005), however, did not always necessitate the use of extreme violence; what was most important was removing sovereign indigenous claims over territory. American legal scholars in particular noted the importance of accomplishing this cleansing through legally consistent and defensible means (e.g. Prucha 2000: 57-59, 85-86).

The settler focus on the availability of and control over land and land-based resources in the areas within which they seek to extend their collective sovereignty is due to the expansionist and colonial contexts in which it occurs. Control over territory was not only essential for establishing emergent settler industries in recently-invaded areas, as well as for generating the sense of economic uplift that such expansion entailed for many underprivileged whites at the time (Roediger 2007), but was also a powerful symbolic marker of Anglo-American ethno-racial dominance (Horsman 1981). In early American
California, for instance, access to land was commonly equated with the need to protect “free white labor” against encroachment from exogenous racial and ethnic “others” (Almaguer 2009; Roediger 2007). The establishment of reservations by the federal Office of Indian Affairs (OIA), which was intended to “civilize” and protect indigenous persons while erasing their sovereignty to allow for settler access, in effect often accelerated territorial conflicts. Despite the fact that reservations granted no form of land title to indigenous peoples, California settlers commonly perceived reservations as affronts to their sovereign rights (Anderson et al. 1978). The editor of the Los Angeles Star undoubtedly echoed such Anglo-American feelings when he argued on March 13, 1852 that

To place upon our most fertile soil the most degraded race of aborigines upon the North American continent, to *invest them with the rights of sovereignty, and to teach them that they are to be treated as powerful and independent nations*, is planting the seeds of future disaster and ruin... (quoted in Almaguer 2009:145; my emphasis)

Such perceptions of these sovereign indigenous threats to white Californians were surely also at work in the decision of the California State Senate to encourage California’s Congressional representatives to “oppose the confirmation of any and all treaties with the Indians of the State of California, granting to Indians an exclusive right to occupy public lands in the state” (quoted in Almaguer 2009:145).

As Patrick Wolfe (2001) argues, the racialization (i.e., racial formation) of indigenous Americans was fundamentally premised on such white desire to acquire indigenous land. In addition to removal and confinement on reservations, this fundamentally territorial basis of interracial conflict would eventually lead to the imposition of “blood quanta” restrictions on indigenous racial-political categorization, which *restricted* political membership in indigenous nations once one became too “mixed”
(Garroute 2003; Hamill 2003; Thornton 1997). By the end of the 19th century, combined and ongoing policies of indigenous territorial dispersal, confinement, and cultural diminution, as well as ongoing settler and military violence, had brought American indigenous peoples to a demographic nadir (Thornton 1987). In contrast, the racial formation of, for instance, African Americans, has generally been premised upon their perpetuation as a stigmatized social category (Davis 2010; Wolfe 2001), attendant with the collective efforts to exclude them from various normative entitlements, privileges, and resources (e.g. Andrews 2002; Cunningham 2013; Massey and Denton 1993; Oliver and Shapiro 1995). The product of these racial formation efforts has been the historical perpetuation of an institutionally adaptive racial caste system (Alexander 2013; Wacquant 2002), as well as persisting perceptions of essentialized racial differences (Davis 2010).

Despite the important distinctions noted above, scholars of interracial conflict and violence have traditionally focused only on the domestic arena of American ethno-racial politics. Empirically, these studies have produced important historical insights into the collective mechanisms that perpetuate group-based inequality and disadvantage; theoretically, these studies have provided a robust framework for explaining why nominal power-holding groups will mobilize to prevent economic and political gains by nonwhite minorities. However, relevant theories have become premised upon the (nominal) inclusion of these embattled groups as members of a racially- or ethnically-stratified polity, creating the competitive tensions that help explain conflict in domestic arenas. Thus, identified ethno-racial competition and threat dynamics commonly focus on such factors as the presence of out-group members in shared labor niches (e.g. Bonacich 1972; Cunningham and Phillips 2007), or on the collective mobilization of rights- or liberation-
based political challenges, which are commonly perceived as threatening to dominant group interests.

Indigenous peoples, however, were generally denied inclusion in the American national polity unless they relinquished their ethnic and political alterity. Thus, indigenous peoples, at least formally, ceased to be a political source of ethno-racial threat (i.e., a “them” that might never become an “us”) once they gained nominal membership in these domestic arenas (Veracini 2010), since this “incorporation” was intended to facilitate their territorial dispossession and ethnic supersession. The distinct dimensions of settler-colonial competition clearly reflect theoretical dimensions of interest to scholars of interracial conflict and violence, and thus require an extension of these theories to account for associated conflicts. I provide an outline of this proposed extension below.

**Ethnic Competition, Racial Group Threat, and Indigenous Peoples**

Theories of ethnic competition and conflict emphasize the motivating role of threat in producing collective action intended to preserve in-group resources and status-quo power relations (Blalock 1957, 1967). Such approaches have been compellingly applied to a wide variety of contentious outcomes – including ethnic identification and the hardening of divisive attitudes (Coenders and Scheepers 2008), exclusionary criminal justice policies (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 2003), riots and other forms of violent unrest (Bergeson and Herman 1998; Olzak 1989, 1990, 1992), and sustained social movement activity (Cunningham and Phillips 2007; Luders 2010; McVeigh 2009; Owens et al. Forthcoming; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Grounded in theoretical perspectives that argue that the salience of intragroup ties will generally increase during intergroup competition for valued
resources (Barth 1969; Blalock 1967) and the politicization of ethnic identities and intergroup boundaries (Nielsen 1985), ethnic competition theory generally conceptualizes ethno-racial contention as rooted in conflicts over access to valued resources such as jobs, social status, and politically-organized rights and privileges. This literature has identified a robust set of economic, political, and demographic indicators that broadly account for this historical variability, including racial overlap in competitive labor markets (Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1992), perceived educational inequalities (Cunningham 2012), and organized challenges to existing political privileges for nominal power-holding groups (Andrews 2002; Cunningham 2013; Cunningham and Phillips 2007; Van Dyke and Soule 2002).

This theoretical approach overlaps significantly with theories that examine the mobilizing influence of perceived threat to status quo arrangements, especially as these relate to racial or ethnic stratification (Blalock 1967; Einwohner and Maher 2011; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Maher 2010; Reese, Giedraitis, and Vega 2005; Tolnay and Beck 1995; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Blalock’s power-threat thesis holds that as minority groups grow and accumulate resources, they threaten majority control, creating “a fear of political power [shifting to] the minority,” thus encouraging the majority to intensify efforts to maintain dominance (Blalock 1967:147). Because the collective ability to maintain majority group dominance is highly conditional on the availability of resources, frames, and other determinants of collective mobilization, recent advances in the study of group threat and reactive mobilization have included an increasing focus on collective framing and meaning-making (McVeigh 2009), the role of organizational strength and propinquity (Andrews 2002; Cunningham and Phillips 2007; Owens et al. Forthcoming), the interrelation of social control efforts directed against multiple social groups (Olzak and
Shanahan 2014), and a more general tendency to introduce insights from collective action theory into ethnic competition studies (e.g. Cunningham 2012, 2013; McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink 2004; McVeigh 2009; Owens et al. Forthcoming; Nielson 1985).

Despite these considerable innovations, one aspect of this theory that has so far remained unchallenged, however, is its focus on explaining the dynamics of *intra-polity* competition and threat. Due to this focus, we know significantly more about the dynamics and determinants of conflicts between majority and minority domestic groups than of *inter-polity* conflicts between Anglo-Europeans and indigenous peoples in countries such as Canada, Australia, and the United States. This inattention is both empirically and theoretically significant because of the central role that indigenous-settler competition (and violence) played in the development of America and many other modern states (Giddens 1981; Mann 2005; see also Mahoney 2010). As Omi and Winant (1992:62) note, “the ‘conquest of America’ was not simply an epochal historical event,” but also represented “the advent of a consolidated social structure of exploitation, appropriation and domination” that “initiated modern racial awareness.” This epochal social structure, in practice, manifested in a variety of dominative anti-indigenous and anti-black social control strategies in the Anglo-American colonization, settlement, and economic development of North America (Glenn 2015). As Wolfe (2001:894) argues,

In the context of capitalist property relations, there is no tension between the antithetical discourses of race to which blacks and Indians have been subject. This is because the simple undifferentiated product of the encounter between African labor and Indian land was European property…. As slaves, blacks were chattels or instruments comparable to plows or horses, whose application to vacant land realized its value and converted it from wilderness into property. Chattel slavery, one’s appropriation of another’s body, presupposed a prior alienation. One was appropriated, the other expropriated. The twin dimensions of this Janus-faced procedure cannot be appreciated separately.
In order to extend competition theories to account for the mechanisms and processes supporting indigenous territorial appropriation and ethnic supersession within larger racial formation processes, below I will present a conceptual typology that compares the relevant social control practices, institutions, and symbolic tensions that motivate anti-black and anti-indigenous social control efforts.

*Sources of Competition and Threat, Institutions, and Collective Responses*

In order to demonstrate the distinct strategies of white racialization used against blacks and indigenous peoples, in this section I will contrast the social, institutional, and strategic aspects of respective racial projects. In the typology presented in Table 1.1, I contrast domestic (intra-polity) and settler-colonial (inter-polity) competition in terms of their perceived sources of threat to nominal power-holding groups (i.e., Anglo-Americans) and corresponding social control goals, the varying institutions of spatial-social constraint that best represent these goals, and the modal practices used to attain them. This typology draws widely from recent advances in settler-colonial theory, which seeks to account for the historically variable circumstances that indigenous peoples around the world have confronted when their territories are invaded and permanently settled by members of an exogenous national or political entity (Hixson 2013; Steinmetz 2014; Veracini 2010). These aspects help to illustrate the differences between dominant group strategies intended to coercively control minorities in domestic settings and those intended to control and subvert rival (i.e., indigenous) polities in settler-colonial settings. This typology is ideal-typical, and naturally does not include the wide range of practices and institutions that developed over the course of America’s territorial invasions and expansion; while
representative, they are not intended to be exhaustive.

Table 1.1: Traditional and Settler-Colonial Dimensions of Ethnic Competition and Racial Group Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Source of Competition/Threat</th>
<th>Collective Goals</th>
<th>Institutions of Socio-Spatial Control</th>
<th>Focal Practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic (Intra-Polity)</td>
<td>Perceived challenges to ethno-racial dominance in economic and political markets</td>
<td>Maintenance of exclusive access to economic and political privileges and resources</td>
<td>Urban Ghetto Prison</td>
<td>Containment/Perpetuation Stigmatization Economic Exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settler-Colonial (Inter-Polity)</td>
<td>Perceived challenges to ethno-racial territorial sovereignty and access</td>
<td>Removal of indigenous alterity and political-territorial sovereignty</td>
<td>Reservation</td>
<td>Dispersal/Assimilation Supersession</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source of Threat and Corresponding Social Control Goals**: The sources of threat that domestic and settler-colonial forms of competition are responsive to are both fundamentally rooted in normative principles of Anglo-American in-group honor and socio-political entitlement and privilege (Fredrickson 1982, 2002; Roediger 2007). However, the perceived threats presented by internal minorities and extra-national indigenous peoples widely differed in their appraisal by whites. Domestic (i.e. domestic or intra-polity) competition and threat theories generally focus on perceived out-group challenges to valued domestic economic, political, and status-based privileges and resources, which dominant groups have inordinate access to. Perceived challenges to these arrangements of privileges and resources commonly include relative economic gains for minority groups (e.g. Cunningham 2012), economic contraction for dominant groups (McVeigh 2009; Tolnay and Beck 1995), organized rights-based political challenges
(Cunningham and Phillips 2007), or the increasing presence of minorities in competitive labor markets (Bonacich 1972; Cunningham and Phillips 2007; Olzak 1992). These structural challenges to the political and economic “buying power” of one’s imputed or avowed group membership, to use McVeigh’s (2009) market idiom, will thus tend to produce counter-efforts to reassert and protect in-group political and economic dominance (Blalock 1967; Olzak 1992; Olzak and Shanahan 2014).

In American history, perceived threats to dominant white resource and entitlement regimes have been most virulently attributed to African Americans, and have served to justify a flexible and ongoing system of economic exploitation, political disempowerment, symbolic denigration, and frequent violence (Wacquant 2002). Similar threats to white economic and political entitlements were attributed, albeit to a much less extreme extent, to various “nonwhite” European ethnic migrants (e.g., Jacobson 1999), but their perceived threats were much more likely to be seen as conditional rather than immutable. As Olzak and Shanahan (2014) demonstrate, while European ethnics initially faced significant economic and political disempowerment and significant collective violence, they were slowly able to “become white” as their collective economic statuses improved (see also Roediger 2006).

Settler-colonial competition, in contrast, seeks to erase, rather than perpetuate, ethno-racial alterity in order to remove perceived threats to in-group sovereignty and territorial access, and ultimately to recreate the settler polity in a novel geographic context (Hixson 2013; Veracini 2010; Wolfe 2006). Unrestrained Anglo-American access to land and resources was central to the political doctrine of Manifest Destiny, and was seen as evidence of the dominance of Anglo-Saxon civilization over inferior “races” (Horsman
1981). As Patricia Limerick (1987:55) notes, “If Hollywood wanted to capture the emotional center of Western history, its movies would be about real estate.” Political control over territory and the potential economic resources contained within it define the axis of settler-colonial competition and threat, in contrast to the perceived economic exploitation and the maintenance of exclusive domestic rights and privileges concurrent with intra-polity competition theories. As a result, while systematic labor exploitation and discriminatory lawmaking were sometimes used to socially control indigenous peoples, these practices were fully incidental to the more central goals of territorial dispossession and ethno-racial supersession (Veracini 2010).

Evidence from the early American invasion and settlement of California during the mid-19th century illustrates the links between land, racial entitlement, and perceived indigenous threats. In California, as well as many other “frontier” states, any check on the ability of Anglo settlers to freely access “unused” land (see below for further discussion) and resources was seen as not only impeding commerce and individual enterprise, as these had become increasingly linked to contemporaneous anxieties of class and race (Almaguer 2009; Roediger 2007), but also as fundamental threats to state and federal sovereignty (Anderson, Ellison, and Heizer 1978:26). California state governors and legislators, who saw themselves as safeguarding the interests of settlers against indigenous challenges and federal policy reformers, generally supported these popular appropriative sentiments. For example, in an 1852 letter to an Office of Indian Affairs (OIA) official, Governor John Bigler argued that “The treaties negotiated by [the OIA], so far as they assigned fixed and determinate boundaries to valuable lands reserved for the permanent use and occupation of the Indians, are opposed to the wishes and interests of this state...” (quoted in Anderson
et al. 1978:27). Bigler would go on to create and develop a state “militia system for self-defense” in 1852, which he felt would restore rightful sovereignty over the use of state lands back to the settlers: “We have but one other alternative – to fight our own battles – to maintain our independence as a sovereign but isolated state” (California State Legislature 1852: 705).

Just as the existence of chattel slavery in a nominal democracy required a justificatory racial project (Rana 2010; Wacquant 2002; Wolfe 2001), unlimited territorial access for Anglo-American settlers also required the creation of political and cultural justifications for the subversion of indigenous sovereignty. In large part, this subversion was justified through the racial doctrine of Manifest Destiny, which was centrally premised upon the notion that Anglo-American whites were destined to project their sovereignty across the North American continent (Horsman 1981; Stephanson 1996). Legally, American invasion and expansion was legitimated through the doctrine of *terra nullius*, which was used to transform indigenous nations into “domestic dependent nations” whose sovereignty was secondary to Anglo-American territorial entitlement. As Wolfe (2001:869) notes, “In distinctively Lockean fashion, the doctrine held that property in land resulted from the mixing of one’s labor with it to render it a more efficient provider of wealth than it would have been if left in its ‘natural’ state.” Anglo-Americans legal scholars thus argued their title to the land trumped that of indigenous peoples since, in their minds, indigenous peoples did nothing to “improve” the land they lived on (Hixson 2013; Glenn 2015; Prucha 2000: 29).

The anomalous status of indigenous “domestic dependent nations” in American foreign policy was and is “exceptional,” in the sense theorized by Carl Schmitt (1985):
American officials simultaneously recognized indigenous political sovereignty, which had been necessary to enter into international treaties with them, while also systematically circumscribing their ability to exercise it (e.g. Prucha 2000: 57-59, 85-86). This relegated indigenous peoples to a highly vulnerable and interstitial social status (e.g. Somers 2008), since they were now neither American citizens nor foreign nationals. In the nineteenth century, this anomalous status was used to “legally” justify continued American territorial invasion, indigenous removal, and settlement, and thus contributed to the demographic and political collapse of many North American indigenous nations.

These fundamentally colonial structures of invasion are not readily intelligible within domestic minority politics frameworks (e.g. Bobo and Tuan 2006; Nagel 1995), which necessarily include a host of incorporative assumptions that, in fact, facilitate continued indigenous political and cultural erasure. Indigenous decolonization efforts have accordingly rejected their “domestic dependent” political status as wards of the U.S. government, and continue to assert their national sovereignty in the face of ongoing American colonial control (Steinman 2012).

**Distinct Institutions and Collective Practices:** Although a variety of undoubtedly “peculiar” institutions have contributed to the racialization and social control of blacks and indigenous peoples in American history (e.g. Alexander 2013; Wacquant 2002), there are certain identifiable social institutions that conceptually represent the starkly different socio-spatial strategies of social control that have been imposed upon these groups. These strategies, as described below, should be regarded as exemplars that, while certainly not historically definitive or exhaustive, are representative of key differences between the intra- and inter-polity modes of ethno-racial conflict.
The institutions of socio-spatial control that perhaps best represent the ethno-racial strategies of categorical perpetuation, containment, and stigmatization imposed on African-Americans in the post-Reconstruction era are the urban ghetto and, later, the prison. Together, the ghetto and prison arguably exist as parallel institutions (Wacquant 2001) that combine hugely disproportionate rates of black incarceration with ongoing mass political disenfranchisement, cultural and legal stigmatization, and economic abandonment (Alexander 2013; Hutchinson and Haynes 2014; Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1987). As Wacquant (2002) suggests, these loosely coordinated and adaptive institutions represent, in part, the historical accretion of ongoing collective efforts by whites to perpetuate the stigmatization, disempowerment, and dislocation of American blacks in the face of successive rights- and liberation-based challenges.

Here I wish to focus on Wacquant’s (2013:2; cf. Small 2008) definition of a ghetto as “a socio-spatial institution geared to the twin mission of isolating and exploiting a dishonored [social] category.” In utilizing this somewhat functionalist definition, I do not argue that these and other institutions of socio-spatial control are always fully intentional products of political policies and/or collective action strategies; they may also represent institutional accretions that arise from a variety of discriminatory and dominative practices, both formal and informal, intentional and “coded,” and that occur at multiple levels of social action. These practices include residential and educational segregation and retrenchment (Andrews 2002; Massey and Denton 1993), systematic discrimination in finance and housing markets (Conley 1999; Oliver and Shapiro 1995), deindustrialization (Wilson 1987), and normative equations of racial meanings and social contexts (Anderson 2015), among others.
The utility of Wacquant’s conceptualization of ghettos is that it introduces a broader institutional and political framework of socio-spatial politics that can apply to a variety of scenarios where power and space become embodied with strong racial and political meanings (e.g. Wacquant 2010, 2012). Reservations, I suggest, can be thought of as a sort of rural variant of urban ghettos since they also represent the institutional outcomes of various exclusionary and dominative political and collective actions, both formal and informal, and are intended to isolate and confine a stigmatized social category (i.e., sovereign indigenous peoples), in order to allow settlers to pre-emptively gain territorial entitlement:

The major factor differentiating modalities of spatial [control strategies] is whether the subordinate population must *move to supply labor* or be *removed to release land* they occupy. In cases where the dominant group does not wish to, or cannot, extract labor out of subalterns, but seeks to appropriate their territory, as in colonial encounters aimed at settlement, we often witness the emergence of a *reservation*, that is, a bounded and reserved tract, typically located in a remote and economically fallow area, governed through special legal and customary rules designed to regroup and immobilize that population (Wacquant 2010:168; original emphasis).

This conceptualization, while useful, remains incomplete for two reasons. First, Wacquant focuses on land primarily as an economic resource used to further agrarian expansion, and not as a potent cultural and political signifier of racial identity and entitlement (Horsman 1981; Roediger 2007). These cultural and political dimensions are central to understanding the overall "threat" that indigenous territorial sovereignty appeared to pose to Anglo-American territorial ambitions, because land and its productive capacity was contemporaneously entwined with racialized and normative ideals of economic and political “freedom” (e.g. Almaguer 2009; Roediger 2007; West 2003). Second, Wacquant (2012:23) argues that the economic utility of stigmatized populations exists in a fundamental tension with their physical elimination. This is not always accurate because,
contra the situation of blacks and other groups inside domestic political arenas, the ability to coerce indigenous labor has been largely incidental to the settler colonial goal of territorial supersession. The specific role of the reservation as a staging ground for this supersession, guided by a fundamental “logic of elimination” that seeks to erase indigenous sovereignty, is therefore obscured in Wacquant’s (2010, 2012) focus on tensions between labor, land, and physical elimination.

Debates regarding the early federal reservation system in California during the 1850s illustrate these tensions. As Findlay (1992) notes, because the reservation system was generally so ill administered, it provided a “blank slate” for different actors to map their racial anxieties and interpretations onto. For OIA agents and federal policymakers seeking indigenous “domestication,” the reservation system represented an institutional intervention into the annihilation of a people and a staging ground for their eventual societal incorporation; this paternalistic viewpoint was largely based on a view of indigenous peoples as “extremely ignorant, lazy, and degraded, [but] at the same time generally harmless and peaceable in their habits, indisposed to controversy or war with whites” (quoted in Almaguer 2009:143). For Anglo-American settlers and many in the California state government, as discussed previously, reservations ultimately represented threats to the sovereign ability of the state to control its own territorial affairs. Thus, in areas where many reservations were present, such as the state’s Northwestern frontier, settlers tended to perceive indigenous reservations as threatening sources of criminality and potential violence, and frequently petitioned the state government to have them removed entirely, as well as engaging in frequent violence against their inhabitants. In California, reservations thus represented the fundamental tensions between violence and
consociation that is inherent to settler colonial competition.

The confluence of factors encountered by indigenous persons on rural Californian reservations (i.e., spatial dislocation, political erasure, and terroristic violence) thus overlaps with, but remains collectively distinct from, those faced by many African Americans in the post-Reconstruction era. Like systemically underprivileged urban areas, reservations were (and are) loosely coordinated spatial institutions that serve to “contain” an exploited and dishonored social category. Their existence represents an institutional accretion of multiple and intersecting forms of marginalization and disadvantage, ranging from direct effects of state policies to everyday acts of discrimination and exclusion (Omi and Winant 1992). The fundamental distinction between the two is in their ostensible political purposes: ghettos institutionally perpetuate the exploitation and exclusion of a domestic racial category from various normatively-organized entitlements and resources, while reservations served as an extra-national staging ground for the dismantling of foreign territorial sovereignty. As American “race-making” institutions (Bailey 2008) that are both deeply involved in the creation and consolidation of American capital (i.e., through the unjust appropriation of land and labor), both institutions have served interconnected but distinct political functions throughout the nation’s political and social history.

**New Directions in the Study of Settler-Colonial Competition and Conflict**

In the discussion below, I use the contrasting racialization strategies leveraged against African Americans and indigenous peoples noted above, and the distinct category-based strategies that undergird them (i.e. categorical perpetuation and containment, versus dispersal and supersession), to suggest distinct indicators of settler-colonial competition
that can be assessed empirically in subsequent studies, as well as providing a general analytic structure for future empirical and historical inquiries.

**Empirical Indicators of Settler-Colonial Threat and Competition**

In terms of empirical indicators, I argue here that settler-colonial competition and conflict is likely to have analogous economic and political dimensions of competition and threat that are distinct from, but interconnected with, indicators of collective political or economic threat from domestic challengers. Settler colonialism, though parallel to normal colonialism in some respects, is a distinct social and political formation with unique demographic, economic, and political goals. Politically, settler colonialism seeks to erase indigenous alterity and sovereignty; economically, it seeks the acquisition of territory and the proliferation of extractive industries; and demographically, it seeks the reproduction of the settler polity in a novel geographic context (Veracini 2010). American settler colonialism symbolically located indigenous peoples as distinct ethnic groups, legally and culturally, as both outside of and antithetical to the boundaries of nineteenth century American civil society (Fredrickson 1981; Hixson 2013).

Thus, while the overall logic of the ethnic competition and threat perspective is likely to be consistent in this case (i.e. that social contexts perceived as threatening or competitive by white ethnic majority members will increase the occurrence and intensity of CEV against indigenous peoples), the specific factors that gave rise to competitive or threatening contexts are likely to be somewhat different than in previous studies. Here I offer the following expectations regarding the structural and demographic factors conducive to increased CEV against indigenous peoples in the context of the American
colonization of California, as I focus on the underpinning structural and meso-level mechanisms that facilitated or disenabled violent conflict in different areas of central and northern California.

**Political Threats and Perceived Territorial Sovereignty:** Because the acquisition of territory is central to the settler-colonial goals of territorial conquest and ethnic supersession, political threats to dominant ethnic groups are more likely to focus around perceived restrictions on settler access to land. It is probable, then, that areas where indigenous groups are granted exclusive access to a specific area of land, either through treaty stipulations or the creation of a bounded reservation, may become seen as viable sources of political threats to settler territorial entitlements. The territorial bases of conflicts are likely to shift in contemporary settler-colonial periods, but remain centrally concerned with the perceived degree of control that either indigenous or settler societies possess over valued territorial resources (e.g., Steinman’s 2012:1106-1107). Charges of environmental injustice, in terms of indigenous nations not receiving fair compensation for federally appropriated resources (Churchill 2002), the proper use of land-based resources (e.g., Bobo and Tuan 2006), and in terms of indigenous peoples shouldering a heavily disproportionate burden of contemporary environmental risks (e.g., Churchill 2002; National Wildlife Federation 2011®), illustrate potential tensions that may motivate different forms and intensities of collective action.

**Land-Extractive Industries and Perceived Economic Entitlement:** Indigenous peoples who participated in the colonial labor market rarely became demographically large enough to come into direct competition with dominant ethnic groups. However, the viability and prosperity of settler economic practices in areas such as California, where
mining, lumber milling, and farming were directly tied to resource bases made available by the acquisition of territory, may be likely to affect the perceived collective “buying power” of nominal power-holding groups, making them more cognitively receptive to right-wing collective action frames (e.g., McVeigh 2004, 2009). Consistent with these theoretical expectations, I would therefore expect that declines in the economic fortunes of dominant ethnic groups (particularly those tied to land-based extractive enterprises) would increase the likelihood of contentious collective action, including collective ethnic violence, against indigenous peoples.

Analytic Considerations: Mediating Mechanisms and Relational Approaches to Intergroup Contention

Just as the study of mass violence, atrocities, and associated political violence has increasingly focused on meso- and micro-levels of analysis (Collins 2008; Kalyvas 2003; Karstedt 2013; King 2004; Owens et al. 2013), revealing complex relational mechanisms that mobilize or demobilize different forms of contentious collective action, I argue that studies of settler-colonial conflicts and contentious dynamics in other regions of the Americas could similarly focus on the differential presences and intensities of such relational mechanisms, especially as they relate to the empirical indicators noted above. Mediated competition approaches to the study of ethno-racial contention (Cunningham 2012, 2013; McVeigh et al. 2004; Owens et al. Forthcoming; see also Nielsen 1985) provide an important analytic foundation for understanding the role of relational collective mechanisms, vis a vis structural incentives and forces, in differentially mobilizing contention across different meso-level environments.
Historians, and particularly those associated with the “New Western History,” have done significant work in addressing the dynamic and relational nature of settler-colonial relations, and especially the role of indigenous collective agency, as these relations evolved across a variety of historical and national contexts (e.g., Blackhawk 2006; Brooks 2002; Cronon, Miles, and Gitlin 1992; Hämäläinen 2008; Limerick 1987; White 1991). This conceptual framework proposed in this study thus advocates for a similar sense of agency among colonizing groups, who are collectively involved not only in the maintenance and defense of ethno-racial boundaries and associated colonial arrangements of political and economic power, but also in the construction and negotiation of different ethno-racial boundary systems (e.g., Go 2004; Steinmetz 2007; Wilson 2011).

More generally, the analytic framework proposed here should help to inform new understandings of the interconnections of race, place, and the politics of exclusion in the American West (West 2003). Historical documentation of numerous acts of ethno-racial exclusion, targeting not only African Americans but also indigenous groups, Chinese, South American migrants, and Californios (Almaguer 2009; Bottoms 2013; Carrigan and Webb 2013; Pfaelzer 2007; Saxton 1976), suggests a more dynamic and complex set of relations between different targets of reactive social control strategies. This observed dynamism is consistent with mediated competition approaches to the study of intergroup contention (Cunningham 2012, 2013; Owens et al. Forthcoming), as well as recent applications of settler-colonial theory to the dynamics of American racial and gender formation (Glenn 2015) and contentious political action (Steinman 2012). More thorough integration of these insights into testable empirical propositions, alongside continued utilization of the robust and evolving theoretical framework of intergroup competition and group threat,
should thus help scholars of intergroup conflict and violence to account for different modes of reactive ethno-racial contention. The following two chapters are intended to provide an illustration of the utility of such an analytic framework, not only for better understanding the dynamics of settler-colonial competition and conflict, but also for understanding the specific social forces underpinning violence in the early history of the state of California.
Chapter Two: Frame Disputes, Ethnic Competition, and the Mobilization of Collective Ethnic Violence in California, 1850-1865

Introduction

American territorial expansion and political consolidation in the nineteenth century was generally concomitant with foundational practices of terroristic state and civic violence against North American indigenous peoples. Such violence, and its enduring political, cultural, and demographic legacies, has been well documented by historians and demographers (Anderson 2005; Blackhawk 2006; Delay 2008; Hixson 2013; Thornton 1987), with nineteenth century California as an especially violent case (Cook 1976; Heizer 1993; Lindsay 2012; Madley 2008, 2009). Due to the pervasive and well-documented nature of this violence, it is often depicted in historical studies as the product of a relatively monolithic ideological and institutional structure of racist expansionism (e.g. Churchill 1997; Stannard 1992). Notwithstanding the deep ideological and political roots of this violence, such “blanket assessments” of atrocity crimes are often “imprecise and inadequately substantiated by evidence recognizing the variety of American Indian experiences under United States rule” (Madley 2008: 331; emphasis mine). Although ethno-racial conflict and contention are major topics within several social-scientific disciplines, researchers have yet to produce a systematic and theoretically-informed analysis of this significant variation in indigenous-settler encounters, and how this variation reflects relevant theoretical dimensions of interest to scholars of ethno-racial collective action and conflict. Such an account should ideally hinge on a comparative analysis of specific regional contexts, within which varying collective mechanisms will impel actors towards more or less extreme forms of group-based collective action intended to police ethno-racial
boundaries (Karstedt 2013; Owens, Su, and Snow 2013; Tilly 2003).

This study addresses these outstanding analytic issues by developing a frame mediation model of collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples in nineteenth-century California. Here, collective ethnic violence\(^9\) refers to lethal physical violence perpetrated by any non-indigenous government or civic actor against at least one indigenous person; in this context, violence encompasses killings resulting from federal military and California state militia operations, as well as those committed by civilian lynch mobs, vigilante parties, and individual homicides. The model focuses on the varying collective influences of two competing frames of ethnic out-group “threat,” which were differentially advanced by local actors and sanctioned by political leaders in different regional contexts. The outcomes of these regional frame disputes contributed to the incentivization of divergent forms of ethnically organized collective action. In central mining districts, California’s indigenous peoples were more likely to be framed as pitiable and tractable victims of American colonization, as commonly expressed through the epithet “digger,” and were thus viewed as deserving of “civilizing” practices intended to erase their indigenous ethnic and political alterity. In contrast to this “soft” ethnic cleansing, northern settler perceptions of indigenous out-group threats centered on the imputation of an inherent tendency for criminality, treachery and violence, and the resulting appropriateness of collective practices that would maintain “thick” interethnic boundaries: territorial relocation and confinement, and/or extermination. Using an original historical dataset and employing comparative configurational analysis (Ragin 2008; Ragin, Drass, and Davey 2009), I constitutively link these competing frames with distinct trajectories of settler violence in central and Northern California. To conclude, I discuss the implications
of these findings for understanding the relationship between collective violence, collective action framing, and ethnic and racial conflict more broadly.

**Framing Processes and Ethno-Racial Conflict**

Social scientists have long recognized that intergroup violence and warfare have played major roles in the political formation and territorial consolidation of modern states (Giddens 1982; Steinmetz 2014; Tilly 1992). In exploring this linkage, scholars of contention argue that these collective conflicts are most likely to be ethnic in nature when rival claims to sovereignty are made along ethnic group lines (Mann 2005; Wimmer 2002). These works are important because they implicitly argue that interethnic conflicts are often a reaction to various efforts to *politicize* existing understandings of interethnic difference, or install new ones, by reorganizing the boundaries of legitimate political and social inclusion and exclusion around imputed interethnic boundaries (Brubaker and Laitin 2000; Gagnon 2006). Because political signification processes are central to the elevation of ethnic group membership as a salient social marker of political inclusion and exclusion (Wimmer 2013; see also Omi and Winant 1994:55-56), the variable political sanctioning of more extreme understandings of ethno-racial out-group "threats" should be a key indicator of potential interethnic conflicts. In tandem with the findings above, recent theoretical work suggests that intergroup boundaries, and their attendant collective identity imputations, are products of intentional and sustained “boundary work” undertaken by collective actors at various levels of social action (Hunt et al. 1994; Lamont and Molnar 2002; Wimmer 2013). Because intergroup boundaries are, in part, products of collective meaning-making processes, the boundaries dividing conflictive groups may often seem
unsettled, or open for debate. Such basic disagreements over the proper problem orientations of actors toward a shared object of concern are a common feature of most meso-level social environments (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Snow et al. 1986: 470). Salient collective action frames help to resolve such action-object ambiguity by providing a coherent and consistent narrative that identifies a social problem’s existence, proposes potential solutions to the problem, and provides a motivational rationale to de-incentivize inaction (Snow and Benford 1988).

However, it is not uncommon that distinct interpretive frames of social reality will compete for salience with each other within a common collective action field, even those defined by polarized ethnic boundaries. Benford (1993) calls such competition “frame disputes.” We should expect frame disputes to have important effects on the meso-level functioning of ethnically-stratified social orders by shaping the interpretive mechanisms through which particular collective threat attributions, and their corresponding lines of remedial action, come to be consistently understood in ethnic group-based terms. In making this claim, I draw from Gould’s (1995) empirical linkage between successful appeals to group-based collective action and an individual re-prioritization of particular identities and boundaries vis a vis other, less salient aspects of one’s social environment (see also Snow et al. 1986). In this way, framing attributions of in-group and out-group identities “undergird normative commitments to social protest, but are at the same time the product of the very social relations that are both affirmed and forged in the course of protest” (Gould 1995: 15; see also Hunt et al. 1994).

*Frame Disputes and the Mobilization of Interethnic Contention*
The insights from the collective action framing literature have been slow in making their way into studies of collective ethno-racial conflict (e.g. Bergeson and Herman 1998; Nielsen 1985; Olzak 1992; Olzak and Shanahan 2014; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Such approaches posit that the salience of ethnic group bonds generally increases in the presence of observable competition for scarce or valued resources (Barth 1969), especially in contexts where ethnic identification and mobilization are more likely to occur (Medrano 1994). In explaining variable occurrences of interethnic contention, most researchers focus on structural transformations that are likely to contribute to the formation of ethnically-organized grievances, such as competition for jobs in a shared labor market, or declines in the economic and political power of dominant groups (e.g. Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995; for further discussion, see Cunningham 2012). While structural conditions undoubtedly influence subsequent collective action, the ways in which such changes come to be collectively understood by knowledgeable actors as more or less threatening to their interests should be equally important. Accordingly, McVeigh’s (2009) recent status devaluation theory of right-wing social movement emergence unites the importance of macro-structural shifts and collective meaning-making processes by emphasizing how salient collective action frames link structurally-derived individual grievances with existing movement resources and political opportunities (see also McVeigh 2004; McVeigh et al. 2004).

In diagnosing the existence of a group-based social problem and suggesting lines of corrective action to address it through their “diagnostic” and “prognostic” functions (Snow and Benford 1988), collective action frames also develop in-group and out-group “identity fields” by attributing goals, motives, and characteristics to relevant sets of actors (Hunt,
Benford, and Snow 1994; see also Lamont and Molnar 2002). This suggests that, in the context of significant frame disputes over the content of salient interethnic boundaries, the outcomes of such disputes can potentially alter the trajectory of subsequent collective action by suggesting more or less extreme forms of ethnic collective action as appropriate, given how ethnic out-groups are perceived as more or less threatening to dominant group interests. Despite the more or less necessary role that frames play in mobilizing interethnic contention, scholars have not yet focused on how frame disputes over the nature of ethnic out-group “threats” may influence the collective dynamics of interethnic conflicts.

In this study, I focus on the role of such frame disputes in the meso-level mobilization and demobilization of collective ethnic violence. Specifically, I argue that more extreme frames of ethnic out-group “threats” should impel nominal power-holding groups toward more extreme (i.e., violent) social control strategies. This should be especially true when threatening characteristics are framed as inhering along ethno-racial lines, rather than arising from conflictive social conditions and group interests.

*Frames and Political Legitimation*

The relative political power and standing of the actors who advance different ethnic collective action frames are good indicators of those frames’ relative influences on the dynamics of contention in a shared collective action field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). My focus here is not the bureaucratic or administrative capacities of these actors per se, but rather that central state actors often function as powerful sources of symbolic legitimation for normative political practices and dispositions, which Bourdieu (1994) refers to as “symbolic violence.” Local collective actors, in turn, can influence these political
signification processes through sustained communication of their desired problem orientations to these officials, as well as through gaining increased political standing relative to their framing opponents and third parties. In other words, communications between local- and central state-level actors introduces the potential for strong “frame bridging,” whereby emergent local frames become incorporated into central state political discourse, and the “amplification” of a frame’s potential audience (Benford and Snow 2000). In areas where central state actors systematically endorse or sanction extreme collective imputations of “threat” onto an ethnic out-group, especially through the use of material and social incentives, collective violence should be much more likely to occur than in areas where such understandings are not strongly endorsed by central state institutions.

**Violence and Colonialism in Early American California: Historical Background**

The American territorial invasion and settlement of central and northern California provides a natural venue for probing these theoretical issues because of the deeply contested nature of indigenous ethno-racial “difference” in contemporaneous American culture. Indigenous peoples in general have served as an essential “other” in American law and politics (Bobo and Tuan 2006: 65-73; Rana 2010). In nineteenth century American politics, indigenous social control policies were often determined by competing stereotypes of “the white man’s Indian” (Berkhofer 1978), and increasing social contact often served to reinforce, rather than challenge, these stereotypical frameworks. Many Anglo-Americans saw indigenous-white difference as a relatively unbridgeable gap, and looked to contemporaneous conflicts in the northwestern and plains territories as evidence of the impossibility of their societal incorporation. In contrast, many social reformers believed
that indigenous peoples could eventually be incorporated into American society, but only if they relinquished their sovereign political claims and gave up their ethnically distinct social and political practices (e.g. De Tocqueville 2002: 307-325; Prucha 2000: 57-59, 85-86). In other words, it was seen as generally necessary to ethnically “cleanse” the continent’s indigenous nations, but this cleansing did not always necessitate the use of physical violence (Mann 2005).

Todorov (1984) notes that divergent views of indigenous peoples as essentially either good or wicked, and the resultant social tensions towards or away from violent means of social control, are axial to any colonial encounter with an “other.” He in particular notes that colonial political leaders and administrators are important symbolic agents (e.g., Steinmetz 2008; Wilson 2011) who interpret interethnic differences in ways that support two distinct lines of strategic action: 1) the recognition of the shared humanity of the other, which facilitates interethnic rapprochement but can also lead to indigenous cultural “leveling” and diminution (what Todorov [1984] calls “the understanding that kills”; see also Ward Forthcoming), which supports assimilative practices such as segmented incorporation or labor exploitation; and 2) the rejection of the shared humanity of the other, which leads directly to strong superiority/inferiority formulations that support dominative practices such as enslavement and systematic violence (Todorov 1984).

Importantly, he notes that neither of these axial approaches to encounters with an ethno-racial “other,” nor their attendant practices, are in any way hostile to colonialism; they merely advocate that a colonial project should use either domination or consociation as the operative principle of ethnic supersession.

The possibility that settler ethnic supersession could be achieved without
widespread conflict and violence was accordingly a matter of great public debate in mid-nineteenth century America. In California, as in many other areas, this debate centered around two disputed frames of indigenous out-group “threat,” or lack thereof, and the lines of appropriate strategic action they suggested: 1) indigenous peoples were the degraded and pitiable victims of American invasion and colonization (commonly identified using the epithet “diggers”), who nevertheless had the potential to be “civilized,” and were thus deserving of “protective” policies that would lead to their eventual societal incorporation; or 2) as irredeemably criminal, treacherous, and violent “wild Indians” who were thus socially acceptable targets of territorial relocation, spatial confinement, and collective violence. These divergent frameworks in effect framed contemporaneous American indigenous policies in California as a choice between indigenous “extermination or domestication10.”

For their part, the California state government strongly endorsed the extreme political and social marginalization of indigenous peoples by denying them legal and political representation, and by passing several acts “for the governance and protection of Indians,” which effectively legalized indentured servitude (Johnston-Dodds 2002; Madley 2009). This extreme marginality “primed” indigenous peoples across the state, in terms of the informal social and legal sanctioning of mistreatment that it created, as easy targets of civic and formal state efforts to maintain white social dominance. Such extreme and generalized social marginalization might predict relatively consistent levels of anti-indigenous settler violence in different areas of the state between 1850 and 1865, relative to its steadily increasing settler population. As Figure 2.1 and 2.2 show, however, empirical event data demonstrate that population-standardized levels of collective ethnic violence
varied significantly across different regions of the state and over time. Two patterns are notable: first, Figure 2.1 shows that anti-indigenous violence, while initially widespread, generally \textit{declined} over time relative to the state’s growing settler population; second, Figure 2.2 shows that collective ethnic violence in later periods (1856-1865) became increasingly \textit{clustered} inside northwestern counties such as Mendocino, Del Norte, Humboldt, Klamath, and Trinity (the latter four of which constitute the NW regional cluster). Why did frequent state and civic violence endure in this northwestern region, but not in others? In the analysis below, I will demonstrate how this divergent regional trend was produced, in part, by the mediation of conflict dynamics through disputes between two opposed frames of ethno-racial out-group threat, which were differentially advanced and sanctioned by local and state-level political actors in different regional contexts.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2_1.png}
\caption{Settler Homicides of Indigenous Persons in Central and Northern California Counties, ca. 1850-1870}
\end{figure}
A Frame Mediation Model of Collective Ethnic Violence

The analytic model I develop below takes the interplay between structural shifts in meso-level political and economic fields, and the resulting collective signification processes that actors use to render these shifts meaningful, as critical to explaining variation in ethnic mobilization-based outcomes (Cress and Snow 2000; McVeigh 2004, 2009). While extant studies of interethic conflict generally look to contentious labor market relations and increasing political challenges made by minority groups as robust indicators of potential conflict, these intra-polity perspectives are inappropriate for American indigenous peoples. This is primarily because indigenous peoples were contemporaneously recognized by settlers as distinct and sovereign nations in their own right, and thus represented rival polities to be devalued and ultimately erased\(^1\). Accordingly, settler formulations of indigenous threats centered on their perceived political access to and control over land and
land-based resources. While indigenous labor exploitation was common in many Californian communities, such practices were incidental to the more central settler-colonial goals of territorial domination and ethnic supersession.

It is also important to note that this model is essentially constitutive and conjunctural in its causal claims: rather than focusing on the discrete effects of individual factors, I focus on how facilitative structural conditions will interact with collective meaning-making processes to together become causally sufficient to mobilize interethnic violence (see Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Ragin 2008).

Insights from the study of ethnic competition, group threat, and social movement mobilization, in tandem with the historical considerations noted above, inform my selection of predictive factors. First, collective ethnic violence should be more likely to occur in local areas that exhibit *proximate perceived threats to the political power (i.e., territorial dominance) of dominant ethnic groups*, which may signal a shift in entitlements or privileges away from them and toward subordinated groups (Mann 2005: 73; McVeigh 2009; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Second, collective ethnic violence should be more likely to occur in areas that possess *existing organizational resources for violent mobilization*. These resources, such as meeting spaces, available weapons caches, and other material infrastructures, provide important support for mobilizing disparate individuals into collective events (Andrews 2002; Cress and Snow 1996; McVeigh 2009; Owens et al. 2014). Third, because anti-indigenous violence took place alongside various social control efforts targeting nonwhite and immigrant groups within California (Almaguer 2009; Pfaelzer 2008), areas where non-indigenous, non-white and foreign ethnic groups did not make up a significant minority of the population (i.e. <10%) will tend to deflect the locus of interethnic
competition away from nonwhite and foreign groups within the settler polity. In addition, *areas where the domestic indigenous population constituted a significant minority of the population* (i.e. >10%) should increase the likelihood of conflictive social contact between indigenous persons and settlers (Bergeson and Herman 1998; Blalock 1967; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Fourth, because of the tenuous nature of settler economic prosperity in California (e.g. Clay and Jones 2008), and the Anglo-American view of California as a refuge for “free white labor” (Almaguer 2009), *areas of particular economic centrality for settler industries should become focal points for competition over land and land-based resources*, wherein nominal power holders may view an indigenous presence as threatening to their economic interests (Cunningham and Phillips 2007; McVeigh 2009). Fifth, the changing composition of local settler populations, specifically *the availability of socially dislocated individuals for violent mobilization*, should make violent mobilization more likely to occur. Socially marginal individuals will often seize on the political opportunities created by emergent meso-level social orders, especially when participation offers potential economic and status rewards (e.g. Straus 2006; Su 2011; see also Tilly 2003). This measure is also informed by community-level studies of interracial and violent crime, which demonstrate that socially disorganized communities with weaker social controls and interpersonal links between individuals tend to encourage greater rates of interpersonal violence (e.g. Bursik 1988; Sampson and Groves 1989; cf. Lyons 2007). In California at this time, local populations that were overwhelmingly itinerant and male, relative to the total number of families, should indicate a low level of community social and political cohesion, potentially decreasing the salience of restraint and conciliation relative to the emergent opportunities offered by participation in collective violence (Courtwright 1996; McVeigh and
This constitutive model hinges on how such baseline social factors are together mediated by the political legitimation of frames of ethnic out-group “threat,” as advanced through the coordinated claims-making activities of local and state-level actors. For a frame to become politically legitimate, two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions must occur: first, the consistent invocation of extreme understandings of out-group difference in local officials’ communications with central state (i.e., California) political figures; and second, the state provision of financial, material, and often discursive support to these local actors through sustained policy actions. Social movement research has identified the important interplay between political opportunities and framing processes, noting in particular that politically-influential framing efforts can sometimes create their own opportunities for subsequent mobilization by more closely aligning the problem-action orientations of influential political actors with those of a social movement (Benford and Snow 2000; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). It therefore seems likely that this more general dynamic should hold in cases of interethnic contention and conflict when local civic actors’ preferred frameworks of ethnic out-group threats are durably incentivized through sustained state material (and often discursive) support. The role of both local and state-level leaders as ethnic “boundary entrepreneurs,” who work together to incentivize collective action that was consistent with their preferred ethnic boundary formulations, is central to this process.

Data Operationalization and Calibration

In order to prepare the study’s county-level dataset (discussed in Chapter 1) for
analysis, I utilize the “direct” method of fuzzy set calibration (Ragin 2008: 89-94). This procedure requires the researcher to specify three quantitative “benchmarks” for each indicator that correspond to 0.05 (threshold for full non-membership), 0.5 (point of maximum ambiguity), and 0.95 (threshold for full membership) levels of set membership. These benchmarks are used to calculate the log-odds of membership for each case in each set; these log odds are then transformed into fuzzy sets. The details of these calibration procedures are shown in Table 2.1. All factors and outcomes use counties and county clusters as their unit of analysis. In order to capture temporal changes in the mobilization of violence, I periodize the analysis into three separate five-year blocks: 1850-55, 1856-60, and 1861-65.

The outcome measure for all analyses in all periods is the number of indigenous deaths per capita (x 1000) of the contemporaneous settler population. In order to account for differences between state and civic violence, I use three separate outcomes for each period for violence caused by vigilante groups and other civilian formations, paramilitary state militias, and federal army operations. For 1856-60 and 1861-65, I set the threshold for full membership somewhat lower, at 50 deaths per 1000, due to empirical evidence (see Figure 2.1) that violence declined in all counties during later periods.

To capture proximate political threats to settler territorial dominance, I use data on OIA land cessions to indigenous peoples in California (Royce 1900: 780-949). Loss of exclusive settler access to land is an appropriate indicator of political threat because of its perceived diminution of state sovereignty and settler economic prosperity. For 1850-55, I
Table 2.1: Calibration of Set Membership Levels for California Counties and County Clusters (N=12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Calibration Thresholds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full Membership (0.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence (per capita x1000)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851 Treaties (crisp)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prox. Political Threats (# land cessions)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Org Capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigilante (50-65)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia (50-60)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military (61-65)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Foreign Pop (%)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Ind. Pop (%)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Centrality ($)</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male-Family Ratio</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong State Support ($)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

use a “crisp” 1-0 coding, analogous to a dummy variable, to indicate the presence or non-presence of a proposed federal reservation territory in a given region; for 1856-65, I use count data on the number of federal land cessions made with the purpose of establishing a reservation.

The existence of organizational resources for violent mobilization is measured through archival count data on the number of vigilance committees, militia organizations, and military posts in each county or county cluster (Brown 1975; California Inventory of the War Department’s Militia Company Records for 1849-1880; Ainsworth and Kirkley 1902). Since militia organizations were generally more common than vigilance committees, I calibrate the full membership threshold for “counties with strong militia organizational
capacity” somewhat higher than the vigilante set. In addition, because my event data do not show significant per capita levels of military violence before 1860, with the exception of Napa and Sonoma Counties in early 1850\textsuperscript{12}, I only analyze military violence outcomes for 1861-65.

The presence of nonwhite, non-indigenous foreign and ethnic populations, and the “domestic” indigenous population, are measured using Census data for 1850 and 1860. For total industrial capital invested in a region, I use the per capita (x 1000) level of investment in mining activity from the 1850 and 1860 Census of Manufactures. Because mining regions had generally transformed into increasingly technical, industrial wage-labor economies by 1860 (Mann 1982), I use average monthly labor wages from the 1860 Census of Manufactures instead of industrial capital invested for to indicate economic centrality for 1861-1865.

To assess the presence of socially-marginal individuals for violent mobilization, I use data from the Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Datafiles for California for 1850 and 1860 (Haines and ICPSR 2010) to calculate each county and cluster’s ratio of total male population to total number of families.

To measure the extremity of ethnic “threat” frames invoked by local actors, I directly coded all available petitions and communications between local actors and the state government between 1850 and 1865 in the California Indian War Papers\textsuperscript{13}. This is the only measure that is not directly calibrated from qualitative data. All petitions were aggregated for each county and regional cluster for each five-year time period, and were individually coded using a four point fuzzy-set scale (0, 0.33, 0.66, 1). I use the modal set membership score for each county/cluster for analysis. For an overview of coding guidelines and
examples, see Appendix Table 1. The level of direct state support for settler violence is measured using the dollar amount of state expenditures given to local civic actors in these regions.\(^{14}\)

This calibration produces a total of six predictive measures for the fuzzy set model. This model is used to test for violent outcomes across three different perpetrator groups: civic (vigilante) groups, state (militia) organizations, and federal (military) personnel. For civic violence, I look at all three time periods; for state violence, I look at the period between 1850 and 1860, after which militia organizations were demobilized by the state government; for federal military violence, I look at 1861-65 only, since earlier military violence occurred primarily in Napa and Sonoma counties in 1850-1 (see endnote 9). For all analyses, I incorporate “easy” counterfactual assumptions (i.e. that the absence of a causal condition does not make the outcome more likely to occur) to produce more parsimonious and interpretable sets of “intermediate” solutions (Ragin 2008: 163-167). Further incorporation of all logically possibly counterfactuals identifies particularly central explanatory conditions within these solutions (Ragin 2008: 169-172).

**Results**

*Civic Vigilante Violence*

The fsQCA results for civic violence for all three periods are shown in Table 2.2. Between 1850 and 1855, there were three different pathways toward widespread civic (i.e., vigilante) collective ethnic violence. Solution 1 shows that areas with a combination of large indigenous domestic minorities, small non-indigenous nonwhite and foreign populations, and very high concentrations of itinerant men were together sufficient to yield
high levels of vigilante violence, with the presence of a large indigenous domestic minority being particularly central. Solution 2 demonstrates that increased social contact with indigenous domestic minorities was not needed to mobilize violence in areas that exhibited relatively small nonwhite and foreign populations, proximate political threats to settler territorial dominance, had extreme concentrations of itinerant men, and that were focal to the settler frontier economy. In these areas proximate political threat-based grievances may have developed their mobilizing potential through a specific economic-demographic-political “recipe”: the combination of threats to settler territorial dominance, the economic centrality of local land-based industries, and an absence of strong labor market competition with Blacks, Chinese, and other intra-polity nonwhite and foreign groups. These two solutions are generally inclusive of counties in the agrarian and mining areas of the western Sierra Nevada range, such as Butte, Nevada, and Mariposa counties.

Solution 3 demonstrates the central importance of extreme imputations of out-group threat in mobilizing civic violence among the northwestern cluster of Del Norte, Humboldt, Klamath, and Trinity counties. In this region, where settler economic activity revolved around highly profitable mining and logging industries, collective ethnic violence was premised upon a facilitative demographic environment in which foreigners and non-indigenous nonwhites were likely to be less socially visible, and thus less likely to be perceived as threats to dominant whites. In addition, these areas required either a significant domestic indigenous minority, increasing possibilities for conflictive social contact, or the presence of proximate political threats to settler territorial dominance in the form of allocated reservation territories.

Between 1855 and 1865, civic anti-indigenous violence decreased everywhere
across central and Northern California, relative to its growing settler population, increasing ethnic diversity, and economic-industrial consolidation. However, as shown above, particularly high levels of civic anti-indigenous violence endured in the northwestern region. The single sufficient combination for civic violence between 1856 and 1860, which is again specific to the northwest cluster, shows that sources of political threat, through the continued creation of OIA military reserves in the area, in combination with extreme frame attributions of indigenous out-group “threat,” largely itinerant male populations, and the economic centrality of settler land-based industries had strong mobilizing effects upon local civic populations in this area. Previous pathways for civic violence in the central mining districts, which relied upon facilitative demographic conditions where indigenous peoples were more socially visible and other nonwhite and foreign groups were less visible, had now largely disappeared. In northern regions, the continued political sanctioning of extreme frames of ethno-racial threat over ten years by local and state-level officials had likely produced an environment where collective ethnic violence was now a regular feature of social life, and where such violence was commonly tolerated, or even celebrated, by state representatives.

The solution for civic violence between 1861 and 1865 in Table 2.2, although not highly consistent with high violence outcomes, nevertheless demonstrates the central importance of major demographic shifts in northwestern counties toward increasing diversity in their indigenous, foreign, and nonwhite populations, in the context of continued strong economic investment in local mining and timber industries. The fact that continued civic collective ethnic violence in northwestern California no longer relied upon extreme attributions of indigenous out-group threats suggests the likelihood of a
“poisoning” of interethnic relations of these areas, similar to the effects of persistent lynching violence in the Reconstruction-era south (Tolnay and Beck 1995). In these areas, collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples was likely to have become a durably-sanctioned form of political claims making, drawing the boundaries of legitimate communal inclusion and exclusion along extreme ethno-racial lines. In doing so, previous waves of settler collective ethnic violence may have functioned similarly to other instances of ethno-racial vigilantism in the U.S., which can have enduring effects on meso-level social orders by sowing collective distrust in the ability of mainstream political institutions to safeguard dominant group interests (McVeigh and Cunningham 2012). In the context of an increasingly diverse nonwhite and foreign population, and the continued centrality of settler industrial activity in the northwest, it therefore seems likely that previous waves of collective ethnic violence in this region may have supported the durable institutionalization of violent social relations between settlers and indigenous peoples.
Because of the relatively inconsistent set-theoretic connection between this solution and high violence outcomes, I support this assertion with additional qualitative analysis below, after discussing the results for state militia and federal military violence.

State Militia Violence

While multiple pathways existed for the mobilization of civic violence between 1850 and 1855, the mobilization of significant state-sponsored militia violence relied upon a more specific combination of conditions that remained relatively consistent between 1850 and 1860, as shown in Table 2.3. It should be noted, however that the solution for 1850-55 is only 63% consistent with significant militia violence in this period, meaning that roughly 37% of included cases did not exhibit high levels of collective ethnic violence. Where significant militia violence did occur in the northwest regional cluster, mobilization relied centrally upon the political sanctioning of extreme frames of indigenous out-group threat. In northwestern counties, influential local leaders and officials not only consistently invoked frames of extreme ethnic threat in their political communications with state officials. These frames suggested that northwestern indigenous peoples were inherently untrustworthy and violent in nature, necessitating the provision of state resources to curb these threats. As a result of this frame bridging between local and central state officials, California state officials rendered $545,000 (equivalent to $13M today) in financial and material aid to Northern Californian civic leaders to support the prosecution of anti-indigenous militia campaigns (Johnston-Dodds 2002).

This overwhelming financial support resulted in the creation of robust organizational resources for militia mobilization in these areas that supported continued
violence. As shown in solution 1 for 1856-1860, these organizational resources were of central importance to continued militia mobilization, in tandem with the continued political threats of nearby reservation territories. The consistent political sanctioning of extreme imputations of indigenous out-group threats were still constitutive of violent collective outcomes, but was less central than the existence of political threats and organizational resources.

Table 2.3: Intermediate Solutions for High State (Militia) Violence in California Counties, 1850-1860

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal Conditions</th>
<th>1850-55</th>
<th>1856-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Militia Org. Capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Foreign &amp; Nonwhite Pop.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Indig. Pop.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Centrality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itinerant Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist Ethnic Framing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Consistency                        | 0.639   | 0.985   | 0.940   |
| Raw Coverage                       | 0.326   | 0.256   | 0.384   |
| Unique Coverage                    |         | 0.283   | 0.181   |

Note: ● = core constitutive condition (presence); ○ = contributing constitutive condition (presence); □ = core constitutive condition (absence); ▲ = contributing constitutive condition (absence)

This is particularly true for Mendocino county (the one case represented by Solution 2), where extreme imputations of indigenous out-group threats, made by local civic leaders and officials, did not lead to extensive financial and material support. This deviant finding can likely be explained by two factors: 1) much of the extreme violence in this area was perpetrated by a small, 17-person militia company during only four months in 1859, and 2) this company, while discursively supported by Mendocino county officials, governor John
B. Weller, and much of the state legislature, was collectively organized and funded by Mendocino settlers, and so needed only $9,300 in remuneration (Madley 2008: 320-322).

When comparing the state militia and civic vigilante violence solutions for the northwest region between 1856 and 1860, it is significant that both display highly similar combinations of conditions: specifically, the intersection of proximate political threats, the centrality of settler economic activities, the widespread availability of socially-marginal men for violent participation, and extreme, politically-sanctioned attributions of out-group threats. In these counties such attributions of threat, which were central to the mobilization of initial vigilante violence, likely contributed to the formation of durable, politically-incentivized perceptions of local indigenous peoples as inherently dangerous and violent.

Military Violence

Although punitive military campaigns against indigenous peoples did occur earlier in counties such as Napa, Sonoma (see endnote 9), Humboldt, and El Dorado, federal military violence against indigenous peoples in California was most concentrated during the Civil War period, between 1861 and 1865. It is therefore understandable that significant federal violence should have occurred at this time, since the primary threats to Washington’s territorial sovereignty in California (besides isolated secessionist movements) were the frequent and violent conflicts between settlers and indigenous peoples in the state’s northwest region. It is significant, then, that Solution 1 in Table 2.4 includes conditions linked with strong militia violence in the northwest during the previous five year period: proximate political threats, strong military organizational
capacity, and the relative availability of socially-marginal men for violent mobilization. Despite this overlap in constitutive conditions, military violence was also largely confined to areas where relatively large indigenous minorities remained present, despite the overall demographic diminution of indigenous populations: the OIA military reserves in northwest California.

While the federal military’s enforcement capacity was initially quite weak in northwest California, with only two military forts in Eureka and Reading in 1855, its presence had ballooned by 1861 to include 14 separate forts across Colusa, Del Norte, Humboldt, Klamath, Mendocino, and Shasta counties. This explosive militarization was largely a response to continued settler violence and encroachments on reservation territories. In attempting to police indigenous-settler conflicts, however, the military became the primary agent of indigenous social control in Northern California, and would inherit the durable socio-political incentives created by previous state sanctioning of collective ethnic violence. This consistent sanctioning, as I will show below, likely led to the reconstitution of meso-level social orders such that collective ethnic violence became the preferred means of maintaining white socio-political dominance. It is instructive to note, for example, that the northwest was the only region that displayed high levels of combined federal (military) and civic (vigilante) collective ethnic violence between 1861 and 1865, suggesting the potential synergy between distinct forms of collective ethnic violence. In the next section, I leverage additional qualitative and historical evidence to detail the processes that lead different perpetrator groups towards or away from sustained collective ethnic violence, and in particular the durable institutionalization of violence in the state’s northwestern counties.
Table 2.4: Intermediate Solutions for High Federal (Military) Violence in California Counties, 1861-1865

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1861-1865</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal Conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Threat</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Military Capacity</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Foreign &amp; Nonwhite Population</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Indig Pop</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Centrality</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itinerant Men</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extremist Ethnic Framing

Consistency  0.867  0.831
Raw Coverage  0.599  0.574
Unique Coverage  0.320  0.294

Note: ● = core constitutive condition (presence); ● = contributing constitutive condition (presence); ○ = core constitutive condition (absence); ○ = contributing constitutive condition (absence)

Qualitative Analysis: Central Mining Regions and the Decline of Collective Violence

The initial waves of collective ethnic violence in this region began with the massive Gold Rush settler invasions of the Sierra Nevada range, extending roughly from Butte and Plumas counties in the state’s northeast to Mariposa in the southeast. The invasions of indigenous lands and the deleterious ecological impacts of mining operations and agriculture thoroughly upended local ecological and social conditions, and forced indigenous groups into direct territorial competition with the settler population for control of land and resources. Despite this competition, local settlers were often sympathetic to the plight of local indigenous peoples, and recognized (if somewhat implicitly) that many conflicts with settlers emanated from malleable social conditions and group interests, rather than from an essential indigenous “character.” For instance, in an 1858 letter to the Sacramento Daily Union, a Nevada county resident frames conflicts as a primarily a result of indigenous struggles for survival and the collective punishments committed by settlers:
Hunger renders men, *whether white, black, or red*, desperate. The Indian is no exception to this rule, and hence he steals to save the lives of his women and children as well as his own, rather than sit down and wait quietly the approach of death by starvation. But he pays dearly for preferring stealing stock to starving. It is missed by the owners, who pursue and shoot down the innocent and the guilty wherever they find them. Indeed, it not infrequently happens that the innocent suffer and the guilty escape\(^{15}\).

Some indigenous individuals adapted to this violent social order by incorporating themselves into frontier economies and households, in particular indigenous women (Hurtado 1988: 154-168); many others were forced into indentured white servitude through the state’s “protection” laws (Johnston-Dodds 2002), or were kidnapped into an informal slave trade. In some areas, however, local settler allowed indigenous peoples to maintain or develop their own mining claims, farms, and ranches (Rawls 1976). Indigenous children even attended schools alongside whites in some locales\(^{16}\). Many settlers in Nevada County openly opposed forced indigenous relocation to northern reservations, and suggested that the Chinese be removed instead, who they saw as very threatening to their economic interests\(^{17}\). Although the racist and colonial contexts of these practices make them essentially coercive in nature, it is nonetheless significant that many indigenous peoples were able to find a place in these settler communities, and thus to survive.

Alongside these changing settler practices, powerful economic and demographic forces were quickly transforming many central Californian mining settlements into more stable political and economic communities by 1860. In large settlements such as Grass Valley and Nevada City in Nevada county, the overwhelming prevalence of itinerant men eventually gave way to increasing numbers of women, children, and families, and a middle class economy of merchants, artisans, and small tradesmen began to emerge (Mann 1982). As central mining areas also became increasingly ethnically diverse, white social control
efforts increasingly sought to curb labor access for blacks, Chinese, Californios, and other nonwhite groups (Almaguer 2009; Carrigan and Webb 2013; Pfaelzer 2008). Interracial homicide remained a common feature of life in California (McKanna 2002), and isolated violence against indigenous peoples continued to occur in these regions, but this violence had lost its overwhelmingly massive collective character.

These developments also corresponded with increasingly popular views of indigenous peoples in the region as relatively tractable and non-threatening. This view was captured through the racial epithet “digger,” as an editorial in the Yuba County National Democrat demonstrates:

The Diggers are a quiet, docile race, and easily domesticated, if you but give them a certain and permanent home, and know how to manage them.... We may be mistaken, but we do confidently believe that if men were put over these reservations who understood the Digger character, ...the system would not be a failure” (emphasis mine).

As indigenous policing and spatial confinement policies became increasingly prominent, anti-indigenous social control efforts in central California became oriented around the “slow violence” of the assimilation and cultural leveling practices advocated by OIA policy reformers (Ward Forthcoming; see also Todorov 1984). However, the violent exclusion of indigenous peoples was becoming an increasingly quotidian feature of social life in California’s northern frontier.

Qualitative Analysis: the Institutionalization of Collective Ethnic Violence in Northwestern California

Early collective ethnic violence in California’s northern frontier, as in the central mines, was also directly caused by the economic and social conditions of the Gold Rush:
after the discovery of gold near Yreka in 1851 initiated a “second” rush in the north, boom towns and scattered diggings quickly sprang up across Trinity, Humboldt, Shasta, Del Norte, Tehama, and Siskiyou counties; many settlers also found employment in the area’s thriving timber industry. While these constitutive conditions overlap with conditions in the central mining districts, qualitative data suggest that collective ethnic violence in the northwest may have also arisen from more basic practices of ethno-racial domestic exclusion. Although Census data indicate that indigenous-settler cohabitation in other areas was relatively common, northern counties were unique in that “there was no place for Indian households within white society” (Hurtado 1988: 208-209). The general exclusion of indigenous women, in particular, from the domestic sphere is indicated by population data on the ratio of indigenous men to women of childbearing age (15-39) for California counties in 1860, shown in Table 2.5. In contrast with other regions where domestic indigenous populations were overwhelmingly male, indicating the ethnic subsumption of indigenous women through intermarriage or other forms of domestic incorporation, indigenous women actually outnumbered indigenous men in northern counties (Hurtado 1988: 196). Though an indirect indicator, this female gender imbalance suggests 1) that indigenous women were not ethnically subsumed into settler households as frequently as in other regions, and 2) that indigenous men were generally less present in northern communities, likely due to being frequent targets of violence. These demographic trends suggest the heightened salience of ethno-racial exclusion at a very basic social level. Event data also suggest that violations of these domestic boundaries met with severe responses: a Nevada Democrat article in 1857 describes the killing of fifteen Indians in a small settlement in Trinity County, simply for having accidentally entered the tent of a local
woman\textsuperscript{18}; in another incident, residents of Antelope Creek in Tehama County drove out all indigenous persons “at the risk of extermination, and also those white men who were living with squaws\textsuperscript{19}.”

Table 2.5: Percentage Male/Female and Sex Ratios for Indigenous Persons (Aged 15-39) in California regions, 1860

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Southern Coast</th>
<th>Central Valley</th>
<th>Sacramento Valley</th>
<th>San Joaquin Valley</th>
<th>Northern Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male (%)</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (%)</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-F Sex Ratio</td>
<td>1.137</td>
<td>1.829</td>
<td>1.900</td>
<td>2.316</td>
<td>0.785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hurtado (1988: 196)

In tandem with pre-existing practices of domestic exclusion, collective conflict in these regions also arose as a result of collective boundary work by local civic actors: the strategic reconstitution and polarization of indigenous-settler boundaries around an imputed indigenous tendency for treachery and violence, making them worthy targets of dominative social control efforts. In requesting state aid to pursue and prosecute supposed indigenous threats, civic actors tended to frame these threats in extreme terms. In contrast to central Californian views of indigenous peoples as generally tractable and docile “diggers”, northern settler boundary work focused upon the uniquely hostile nature of northern tribes. In an 1850 petition to Governor Peter B. Burnett, civic leaders in Trinity County argued that:

The savage tribes in this neighborhood... have at length acquired sufficient boldness and confidence in their strength, and the impunity with which they have committed their atrocities, \textit{to declare open and general hostility upon all white men}.... They have become so bold and daring in their crimes that it is now \textit{impossible to live peaceably among them}.... They regard all friendly advances with disdain, or if they seem to reciprocate them, it is only for the purpose of lulling us into security \textit{until the favorable moment arrives for more surely effecting their treacherous designs}\textsuperscript{20} (emphasis mine).
Similarly, the Yreka Union Extra argued that “there was never before known to exist such a universal spirit of hatred and hostility towards the whites on the part of the Indians of Northern California.” As a result of these ethnic imputations, which were supported by the continued ethnic violence in the region, even moderate central Californian papers such as the Sacramento Daily Union would warn their readers that “unless the [OIA] ‘Indian Commissioner’ or the state government adopt some measure for the eradication of this evil, the northern country will be most lamentably and disastrously retarded, if not utterly ruined.”

The California state government responded to the extreme imputations of northern indigenous threats, most commonly made in civic petitions for aid, with strong financial and discursive support. In response to a joint 1852 petition from the senators and representatives of Trinity, Klamath, Shasta, and Siskiyou counties, which alleged that indigenous violence against settlers “emanates from the known character of the Indians: a mischievous disposition and a desire for plunder,” Governor John Bigler echoed previous settler frames of extreme indigenous threats in requesting aid from the state legislature:

> These savages... seem to cherish an inveterate hatred toward the white race; and this is a principle of their nature that cannot be obliterated by time or vicissitude.... The character and conduct of these Indians present an additional illustration of the accuracy of observations repeatedly made, that whites and Indians cannot live in close proximity in peace, and it seems to confirm... that an ultimate evacuation of the northern counties by either the whites or the Indians, will be unavoidable (emphasis mine). (California State Legislature 1852: 705-706)

Bigler went on to argue that if the federal military would not aid the state in such a course of action, “we have but one other alternative – to fight our own battles – to maintain our independence as a sovereign but isolated state.... Adequate protection has not been extended from the government at Washington to American citizens residing in California”
(California State Legislature 1852: 706). The solution to these assaults on California’s prosperity and sovereignty, Bigler felt, was the consolidation of a militia system for settler self-defense: "it is believed that every possible encouragement, by legislation, should be extended to independent and volunteer companies, and a Militia system matured, sufficiently comprehensive in its details to combine the whole available force of the State" (ibid: 28). The consistent support of governors Bigler, J. Neely Johnson, and John B. Weller, as well as a majority of the state legislature, for the use of militias to combat indigenous threats would be crucial in securing sustained state support for Northern Californian settler violence between 1850 and 1860.

Using these funds, settlers in central and northern California established over 42 different militia companies between 1850 and 1860. While militias were mobilized in many regions of central and northern California at this time, the particular willingness of northwestern settlers to engage in sustained campaigns of violence and terror against indigenous peoples is attested to by the per capita militia membership rates shown in Table 2.6. It is especially notable that over a quarter of the northern California settler population was enlisted in a militia between 1850 and 1855, and enlistment remained consistently higher than elsewhere in the state relative to regional populations. This regional particularity suggests that collective ethnic violence had become a relatively central feature of social life in many areas of northwest California by 1860. For example, The Humboldt Times reported on August 7, 1858, that “white men in this district are in the habit of firing upon and killing the Indians... whenever they fall in with them. In fact, they make up regular parties to hunt Indians.” Major Edward Johnson of the Army’s Pacific Division made similar remarks to his Army superiors in 1859 regarding settlers in
Mendocino county: “I believe it to be the Settled (sic) determination of many of the inhabitants to exterminate the Indians” (quoted in Madley 2008: 319)

Table 2.6: Militia Organization and Membership in Central and Northern California, 1850-1860

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New Militia Orgs Formed</th>
<th>Total Membership</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1850-55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Frontier</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento Valley</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Joaquin Valley</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856-60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Frontier</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento Valley</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Joaquin Valley</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1647</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Johnston-Dodds 2009; 1850 and 1860 Population Census

State support for anti-indigenous militia campaigns would wane by the end of the decade, largely as a result of militia violence in Mendocino County (Carranco and Beard 1981; Madley 2008), which attracted national newspaper attention and led to a state congressional investigation of the militia (a largely symbolic affair since indigenous persons could not testify in state courts). Despite the official end of the militia system, indigenous-settler relations in northern California had perhaps become so durably polarized that local settlers began to engage in their own collective efforts to incentivize continued ethnic violence in the absence of direct state support. Although systematic data on these efforts are not available, at least two practices are sporadically documented in event data for the northwest: 1) public bounties for indigenous scalps in settlements proximate to reservations\(^{22}\); and 2) settler formation of subscription-based militias that would be supported using public donations\(^{23}\). There is no documentation of similar practices being used in central California counties.
When the federal military formed its Humboldt Military District (including Sonoma, Napa, Mendocino, Humboldt, Trinity, Klamath, and Del Norte counties) in December 1861, its mission was ostensibly distinct from the terroristic violence of civic vigilantes and the state militias. Assistant Adjutant-General John Hanna, who administered the Military District, described this mission in a March 1862 letter to a fellow officer:

The purpose for which the military force in this district is to be employed is not to make war on the Indians or to punish them for any murders or depredations hitherto committed, but to bring them in and place them permanently on some reservation where they can be protected from all outrages from hostile whites. (Ainsworth and Kirkley 1902 1:50:1: 924-925).

However, federal efforts to police settler-indigenous violence in the region met with frequent resistance from local settlers, who argued that the military lacked an appropriate understanding of the local indigenous character. As one Humboldt Times correspondent argued, “we have seen enough of Indian troubles in this section to convince us that neither [federal] troops nor Indian agents can catch Indians [guilty of committing crimes].... Our mode of warfare with Indians is to pay them off with their own coin. If they murder a white man without cause, kill ten Indians for it24.” The results of this (by now well-established) mode of conflict resolution were readily apparent to Colonel Francis Lippit of the Humboldt District, who wrote a concerned letter to Hanna in 1862 that stated that

No Indian can show his head [in this area] without being shot down like a wild beast. The women and children, even, are considered good game, not only in the mountains but here all around us, where families who have brought up Indian children have to exercise constant watchfulness to prevent their being murdered. (Ainsworth and Kirkley 1902 1:50:1: 906-910).

In light of the military’s perceived misapprehension of the northern indigenous character, some evidence suggests that northern settlers provided false accounts of indigenous attacks on settlers that would ostensibly provoke military retribution. Rather than relying
explicitly on settler accounts, army officials generally required evidence of indigenous attacks before a punitive campaign would be undertaken. Very often they found none: In a letter to Colonel Lippit, Captain J.B. Moore noted that upon investigating reports of indigenous cattle thefts in the Shelter Cove region of Humboldt County, “the stories of Indian ‘depredations’ in this vicinity are all bosh…. There seems to be a number of men in this vicinity who desire to make an impression on the government by false reports, &c., that the Indians should be immediately and severely punished. We have the power to successfully prevent or punish these acts of white men, yet we are constantly importuned to punish Indians” (Ainsworth and Kirkley 1902 1:50:1: 834-835; emphasis mine).

Moore’s observations are germane: because the military focused exclusively on the policing and spatial confinement of indigenous peoples, rather than on addressing the readily apparent poisoning of interethnic relations and collective efforts to incentivize further violence (Lippit notes to Hanna in 1862 that citizens in the area made “a business of killing the bucks wherever they can find them and selling the women and children into slavery”; see Ainsworth and Kirkley 1902 1:50:1: 982), its peacekeeping mission was essentially toothless. In light of the seeming irrepressibility of hostilities, as well as manpower shortages and inconsistent communications with regional commanders, Adjutant-General Hanna adopted a reactive policing strategy that failed to curb provocative settler violence, but frequently punished indigenous peoples for their “depredations” against whites. By the late spring of 1862, Adjutant-General Hanna had chosen to abandon his earlier “pacific” policies, and directed his commanders to “give no quarter to Indians in the field, sparing and protecting only those Indians who shall voluntarily come in and surrender themselves.” Despite substantial evidence of settler malfeasances against the
region’s indigenous inhabitants, the federal Army had inserted itself into, and ultimately became subordinate to, a deep-rooted cycle of violence created and sustained by settler collective action. In effect, the federal responsibility to maintain socio-political order in the region, through its supposed monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, had become subordinate to the collective settler need to violently protect exclusionary ethno-racial boundaries.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

This paper has sought to leverage central insights from the study of ethnic collective action and right-wing social movement emergence to account for the variable mobilization of state and civic violence against indigenous peoples in different regions of California. In doing so, I have focused particularly on the role of frames of ethnic out-group “threat”, as advanced by local actors, in influencing the regional mobilization or demobilization of collective ethnic violence among various perpetrator subgroups. This mobilization and demobilization was centrally organized around two opposed, colonial frames of indigenous ethnic “threat” (or lack thereof): one in which indigenous peoples were seen as pitiable and tractable victims who deserved to be “civilized” and eventually incorporated into the American polity as subservient laborers; and another in which indigenous peoples were seen as inherently treacherous and violent, justifying violent and exclusionary social control strategies. Alongside widespread demographic and economic changes to Californian communities, these opposed frames mediated the collective dynamics of settler-indigenous conflicts when they found sustained material and discursive support from influential state-level actors. Where these imputations of indigenous “threats” were
durably sanctioned through state material and discursive support, ethnic violence tended to endure as a normative form of political claims making that sought to maintain “thick” interethnic boundaries. As in contemporary cases, this ethno-racial polarization and subsequent violence was not strictly a product of underlying intergroup hatreds or prejudices, but rather was produced by the explicit attempts of local political actors to durably politicize ethno-racial group membership.

While these frames of ethnic out-group threat were a central constitutive condition, they nevertheless required conducive political, economic, and demographic environments to become broadly salient and influence proximate settler collective action. By incorporating robust structural indicators of threat and competition alongside emergent political signification processes, I hope to extend recent models of ethnic competition and right-wing social movement mobilization. In addition, I identify a critical political mechanism through which an ethnic threat frame can become politically legitimated and subsequently influence collective conflict dynamics: sustained, state-level material and discursive support. In areas where these local frames found sustained support from the state government, it created durable incentives for continued collective participation in ethnic violence, and powerfully reorganized social space around principles of ethno-racial inclusion and exclusion. This regionally-specific set of practices ultimately contributed to a “poisoning” of interethnic relations, fuelling continued violence and ruling out any form of indigenous incorporation or consociation as not only unrealistic and misguided, but inherently dangerous.

Other historical studies of race and colonialism suggest that the ethno-racial frameworks of colonial administrators determine, to a large extent, the formation of either
sympathetic or hostile colonial policies, (Go 2004; Steinmetz 2007; Wilson 2011). In revealing the subtlety of administrative perceptions of ethno-racial difference, these studies also tend to ignore the situated meso-level contexts in which collective actors negotiate and understand ethno-racial boundaries. Because the perceived content and salience of ethnic boundaries are theorized to be central to the mobilization of interethnic contention (Barth 1970; Hannan 1979; Olzak 1992), the ways in which these boundary orientations gain or lose salience within variable meso-level environments should be central to understanding variation in contentious outcomes. Intergroup boundaries, rather than arising mechanistically from ideology or macro-social change, are also the products of sustained efforts by resourceful actors who seek to advance their own collective worldviews and interests vis a vis challengers and third parties (Lamont and Molnar 2002). Future studies of interethnic contention and conflict should thus address the ways in which racial, ethnic, religious, and even political boundaries become linked with group-based threat attributions by influential political actors, and the effects that such political sanctioning can have on collective conflict dynamics. Such an approach is also consistent with the scholarly movement towards a meso- and micro-level of engagement with intergroup violence and conflict across a number of social science fields, in which the variable constitution of emergent, meso-level social orders may have important influences on broader conflict dynamics (Collins 2008; Karstedt 2013; King 2004; Owens et al. 2013).

In developing such a perspective, this study reinforces the importance of synthesizing central causal insights from the ethnic competition and social movement literatures. Social movement scholarship has consistently sought to explain how the dynamics of collective action are mediated by various institutional and meso-level forces
(Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Cress and Snow 2000; Cunningham 2012; McVeigh 2009; Nielsen 1985). These studies argue that the mobilizing effects of changing economic, demographic, and political contexts are likely to be conditional on their linkage with mechanisms that allow individually-felt grievances to become collectively mobilizing. For instance, underlying structural conditions should only lead to collective change efforts when potential adherents saliently perceive existing arrangements as unjust or unfair, have some sense of a collective solution to the problem, and possess a motivational rationale to overcome inaction. Greater attention to how meso-level actors perceive and diagnose ethnically-attributed social problems, share these problem orientations with potential allies and third parties, and gather resources to collectively pursue solutions to them should improve theoretical understanding of the meso-level constitution of other episodes of interethnic contention. Incorporating these insights alongside the robust political, economic, and demographic indicators identified in traditional competition models should also improve the generalizability of findings across different substantive areas of inquiry.
Chapter Three: Threat Assessment, Collective Boundary Framing, and Violence against Indigenous Peoples in California’s Humboldt Bay Region, 1853-1865

Introduction

The study of reactive and repressive contention has increasingly focused on theoretical intersections between four distinct but overlapping explanatory perspectives. The ethnic competition and group threat perspectives emphasize the roles of perceived challenges to valued resources and entitlements in increasing the likelihood of group-based contentious action (Bergeson and Herman 1998; Blalock 1967; Olzak 1989, 1990, 1992; Olzak and Shanahan 2014; Tolnay and Beck 1995; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). In contrast, the social movement and boundary work perspectives more strongly emphasize the role of collectively-mobilizing mechanisms, resources, and symbolic contests in harnessing extant collective grievances (Andrews 2002; Blee 2002; Cunningham 2012, 2013; Cunningham and Phillips 2007; McVeigh 2009; McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink 2004; Owens, Cunningham, and Ward Forthcoming; Simi and Futrell 2010).

One product of the increasing intersection between these perspectives has been an emphasis on collective action framing and associated relational mechanisms in reactive and repressive movements (Berbrier 1998; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; McVeigh 2004, 2009; McVeigh et al. 2004; Simi and Futrell 2010; Snow and Owens 2014; see also previous chapter). Reactive mobilization, understood here as group-based collective action intended to protect existing arrangements of scarce or valued resources and entitlements from perceived collective challenges (Owens et al. Forthcoming; Tilly 1978; Van Dyke and Soule 2002), can arguably depend as much on structural conditions as it does on the collective appraisals of these arrangements as more or less threatening to avowed group interests. Put simply, because reactive contention is generally mobilized to defend existing
procedural, distributional, and interactional arrangements, from which their members often disproportionately benefit relative to other social groups, it is often necessary for participants to either discursively relocate themselves as a “minority” facing unjust discrimination (e.g., Berbrier 1998), or as an inherently or “naturally” dominant and entitled social group (e.g., Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). The integral role of claim-making strategies in mobilizing reactive contention therefore challenges relatively straightforward theorized relationships between empirically “threatening” conditions, collective grievance formation, and reactive mobilization (see also McVeigh 2004; McVeigh et al. 2004), and directs attention toward mechanisms of collective threat assessment (Einwohner and Maher 2011) and the defense of hierarchical collective status systems from perceived challenges (Lyons 2007; Olzak and Shanahan 2014; Tolnay and Beck 1995).

Despite the importance of both relational and structural bases for reactive mobilization, the relative constitutive importance (i.e. necessity and sufficiency) of these distinct bases remains underspecified.

To address this issue, this study draws constitutive theoretical insights from studies of ethno-racial competition, collective action, and ethnic boundary work to explain the varying mobilization of Anglo-American settler collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples in the Humboldt Bay region of northwestern California, ca. 1853-1865. Here, collective ethnic violence refers to lethal physical violence perpetrated by any non-indigenous civic or state-level actor against at least one indigenous person; in this context, violence encompasses killings by California state militia organizations (i.e. paramilitaries), as well as those committed by civilian lynch mobs and vigilante parties. Using an original historical dataset that draws from and combines data from historical settler accounts,
indigenous oral histories, state government records, and local newspaper coverage, I use qualitative-comparative analysis (Ragin 2000, 2008) to specify the intersecting structural and meso-level mechanisms that explain the variable intensity of settler collective violence over time. Consistent with theories of mediated competition, results indicate that perceived political threats to settler territorial sovereignty were almost always a necessary mobilizing factor, and required elite framing and boundary work mechanisms to become sufficient for high levels of violence. This identified relationship fundamentally problematizes the linkage between empirical structural contexts and collective appraisals of these contexts as more or less threatening to group-based interests. Micro-level oral history data reinforce this issue by illustrating the uneven local topography of ethno-racial grievances. The implications of these findings for future studies of reactive and repressive contention are discussed.

**Anti-Indigenous Violence in the Humboldt Bay Region: Historical Background**

Located roughly 230 miles north of San Francisco on the California coastline, the Humboldt Bay is one of two naturally-formed bays in the state (the other being San Francisco Bay, and is encircled by the rugged Trinity and Klamath mountain ranges to the east and north. Prior to American colonization, the Wiyot, Wailaki, Karuk, Yurok, Whilkut, Nongatl, Chilula, Mattole, Wintu, and Hupa indigenous peoples densely populated the area, utilized abundant food resources from the area's rivers, coasts, and forests, and established major settlements in both coastal areas and inland valleys; the combined pre-contact population of these ethno-national groups was perhaps as high as 70,000 (Cook 1976:42; Heizer 1971:69). Outside of mercantile encounters with American and Russian fur trappers
in the early nineteenth century, they had had very little contact with Americans prior to the 1850 onslaught.

American invasion and settlement of the area began with the founding of Trinidad, about 14 miles north of Humboldt Bay, on April 8, 1850. By late April, three American trading companies had established themselves on Humboldt Bay, and began selling mining provisions (or “mining the miners” as it was often known) to prospectors heading to and from the Trinity gold fields. The posts established by these companies on Humboldt Bay would quickly grow into the towns of Eureka, Uniontown (later Arcata), and Bucksport, all of which were incorporated between 1850 and 1851. Due to having become a population center, Humboldt County was created from western Trinity County on May 12, 1853, and its first newspaper, the *Humboldt Times*, began publication in September 1854 (Coy 1929:60-61). Unlike many other regions in Northern California, Humboldt's early attraction to settlers did not hinge on mining, but rather on logging and agriculture: in a May 2, 1851 piece in the *Sacramento Daily Transcript*, the correspondent noted that Humboldt Bay “is said to be delightful, abounding in game, while the soils are very fertile. The farmers there are planting...extensively²⁶.” Perhaps as a result of these more modest offerings, in comparison to the gold fields of the lower Cascade and Sierra Nevada ranges, as well as Humboldt’s relative isolation, the county never experienced the explosive population growth of most California counties during the 1850s. For example, only 2,694 settlers are recorded for Humboldt in the 1860 census – roughly half the population of Trinity County to the East, the nearest gold hotspot, and 12% of the population of gold-rich Nevada County.

Despite this isolation and relatively small scale of settlement, the Humboldt Bay
area nevertheless grew into a substantial settler community. By 1854, nine saw mills provided jobs for roughly 400 workers, and produced lumber in quantities sufficient to directly compete with other coastal producers in San Francisco lumber markets (Cox 1974). Although lumbering was a highly profitable industry, Humboldt County exhibited notable inequalities in settler wealth distribution: in Eureka in 1860, 15% of the population (17 people) owned 71.8% of the town’s wealth, while in neighboring Arcata, 15% (21 individuals) owned almost 89% of the town’s wealth (Cornford 1983:38). Farming in Humboldt, despite the generally high quality of local soils, was not as financially productive as in other areas: the 1860 census records that the value of all agricultural products in Humboldt, per acre of developed farming land, was only $3.42, compared to $15.65 and $10.50, respectively, for neighboring Klamath and Trinity counties that same year.

Naturally, this expanding settlement also brought varying degrees of contact and conflict with the area’s indigenous inhabitants. Jerry James, a Wiyot who was living on Humboldt Bay as a young boy, remembers the arrival of the first “sailing ships” in the bay. Although initial interactions seemed peaceable, on the day after their arrival the whites captured and executed five Wiyot men who were found taking ropes off of a wrecked ship. The men were first made to wade out into the bay up to their necks, and the whites then shot them (WHP). These early experiences of violence at the hands of American settlers were likely to have left a strong impression on the area’s indigenous populations.

Other early interactions with whites, although still invasive in nature, were relatively peaceful, as in the case of Reddick McKee, an agent from the federal Office of Indian Affairs who travelled to Northern California in 1851 to “negotiate” federal treaties with the area’s indigenous groups (Gibbs et al. 1972). More typically, however, encounters
between indigenous groups and land-hungry whites were much more tense, and frequently involved violence. McKee would later attest, in letters to the OIA’s California superintendent, that much if not all of this violence was instigated by settlers: in a November 15, 1851 letter to the acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, McKee argues:

“Now that I have been through the whole Indian country, I am convinced in the opinion that in almost every instance of difficulty the whites have been the aggressors, and some cases have come to my knowledge of wilful (sic), brutal, and outrageous disregard of all the claims of humanity and civilized life. Until some examples are made in the punishment of such demons in human shape, perfect tranquillity (sic) can hardly be expected.”

Most settlers in the area, however, used frequent allegations of indigenous murder and theft as evidence of the need for indigenous removal and/or extermination, and frequently sought state support for attempted dispossession and ethnic supersession. However, there is evidence in local newspaper commentaries that McKee’s sense of white responsibility for these conflicts was at least comprehensible, if not compelling, to some local residents, suggesting that such extremist ethno-racial sentiments were by no means unanimous among local whites.

Rather than attempting to understand indigenous peoples on their own terms, many whites quickly formed their own ethno-racial contrast conceptions (Berkhofer 1978; Rawls 1986). Some groups (such as the Chilula) were seen as being “wild,” implying to fellow whites that such groups could be potentially violent or untrustworthy, and were thus seen as imminent threats to whites when encountered (Rawls 1986). Other indigenous groups were seen as comparatively peaceful and amicable, but were nonetheless racially stigmatized by whites as “diggers”: lazy and un-industrious individuals who were prone to
vice, and thus shorn of ethnic honor\textsuperscript{29}. While these competing “contrast conceptions” (Shibutani 1973) undoubtedly worked together to encourage settler violence and mistreatment, they may have done so by providing distinct threat- or boundary-based incentives for violent collective action. These distinct incentives reflect the theoretical dimensions of intergroup threat and competition that this paper seeks to explore.

As shown in the previous chapter, statewide event data clearly demonstrate that civic actors in the Humboldt Bay region engaged in unusually sustained levels of collective ethnic violence against local indigenous peoples during the study period, and also actively sought support from state-level allies for continued violence in the region. Newspaper data further indicate the general support of the local *Humboldt Times* for these extremist strategies, as well as the provision of various private, civic economic incentivizes for further violence, such as scalp bounties and subscription militias. County political and business elites, as the only community members likely to have had the resources necessary to furnish such ventures, thus may have played a major role in radicalizing local residents into violent collective action. However, the constitutive importance of these elite activities, relative to popular settler grievances arising from perceived devaluations of economic and political entitlements, is unclear. As an extreme region of inter-communal violence and atrocity situated within the more general dynamics of collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples in California, my focus on the Humboldt Bay area thus seeks to extend and refine central insights from theories of ethnic competition, collective action, and boundary work by assessing their relative constitutive importance in a historically significant meso-level context.
Movement-Based Collective Exclusion and Violence

In order to address the causal intersection of structural incentives, organizational resources, and framing and boundary work in the mobilization of collective ethnic violence in the Humboldt Bay region, it is first necessary to conceptualize this violence as the outcome of a series of loosely-coordinated, reactive, and supremacist collective actions engaged in by differently-resourced groups of civic actors. The smallest but best resourced group of participants - county elites and political officials - used their inordinate wealth and influence to organize and consolidate local settler support for extremist indigenous policies and actions, to provide various economic and political incentives for violence (often created using state funds), and to garner sympathetic relations with potential allies in the state government, who generally relied on local accounts for developing regional intelligence (often in preference to conflicting federal intelligence, e.g., California State Legislature 1852:712-716). The second and more diffuse layer comprised local whites who may have formed collective grievances against indigenous persons, due to the aforementioned political and economic conditions, but who lacked the requisite resources and participatory rationales for these potential grievances to become collectively mobilizing.

Despite its regionally specific scale, the mobilization of collective ethnic violence in Humboldt County is eminently comparable to other racial vigilantist movements in American history (e.g. Cunningham 2013; McVeigh 2009; Simi and Futrell 2010; Van Dyke and Soule 2002), in that it sought to defend nominal power-holding group entitlements and privileges from perceived out-group challenges. Furthermore, the mechanisms and structures supporting this violent mobilization are readily intelligible within current
collective action theories (Benford and Snow 2000; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; McCarthy and Zald 1977). First, local insurgent settlers were able to create a considerable degree of organizational viability by creating local volunteer militias and dedicated meeting spaces. These militias also provided a dedicated movement infrastructure that could be used to support subsequent mobilization (Andrews 2002; Owens et al. Forthcoming). Second, civic elites organized sporadic town meetings in Eureka, Arcata, Hydesville, and other local areas as popular micro-mobilization and recruitment mechanisms, during which these elites attempted to promote their preferred extremist orientations and strategic solutions with local actors (i.e., the necessity of indigenous removal or elimination), while also gathering ostensible “evidence” of popular support for extremism by having local residents sign petitions demanding state financial and military aid for these ventures. In this way, these meetings also served as collective vehicles for elite frame bridging and amplification with both state officials and local residents (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986). Beyond this theoretical congruence, conceptualizing these violent and exclusionary efforts as a form of reactive contention helps to contextualize such efforts within the broader social fields of white supremacy and racial formation in California at this time (Almaguer 2009; Bottoms 2013; Carrigan and Webb 2013; Pfahlzer 2012; Saxton 1971).

In the analysis below, I will show how various efforts by local whites transformed the Humboldt Bay region into an emergent meso-level social order in which participation in violence became linked with potential status and economic rewards (e.g., Straus 2006; Su 2011), and in which popular grievances were commonly framed in dominative and exclusive ethno-racial terms (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Gagnon 2004;
Oberschall 2000). Contemporaneous white settler understandings of the “thick” ethno-racial boundaries between settlers and indigenous peoples were products, in part, of collective boundary work by local civic actors (Hunt et al. 1994; Lamont and Molnar 2002; Wimmer 2013). This boundary work, alongside repressive settler collective actions, sought to resolve perceived tensions with local indigenous peoples by incentivizing collective action in-line with extremist interpretations of supposed indigenous “threats.” In the section below, I outline the theoretical typology that structures my analysis of the structural, organizational, and meso-level bases of these events.

**Competition, Framing, Boundary Work, and Mediated Competition**

In adjudicating between structural competition and threat, collective framing, and boundary work theories to explain the relational bases of collective ethnic violence, I draw from identified empirical intersections between these perspectives (e.g., McVeigh 2009; Nielsen 1985; Olzak and Shanahan 2014). My theoretical understanding of ethno-racial intergroup boundaries, and the mechanisms of their creation, defense, and transformation, draws strongly from the framing and boundary work literatures, which both strongly suggest the dynamic and relational determinants of collective action organized around these boundaries (Hunt et al. 1994; Gamson 1992, 1995; Lamont 2000; Lamont and Molnar 2002; Tilly 2005; Wimmer 2013). Wimmer (2013:9) notes that

A boundary displays both a categorical and a social or behavioral dimension. The former refers to acts of social classification and collective representation, the latter to everyday networks of relationships that result from individual acts of connecting and distancing. On the individual level, the categorical and behavioral aspects appear as two cognitive schemes. One divides the social world into social groups – into “us” and “them” – and the other offers scripts of action – how to relate to individuals classified as “us” and “them” under given circumstances.
Wimmer’s insights are highly consistent with insights from the collective framing literature (Benford and Snow 1988, 2000; Snow et al. 1986), which focuses on the necessary role of collective-cognitive scripts for interpersonal action and categorization in micro-mobilization processes. Hunt et al. (1994:192), for instance, use the parallel concept of “identity fields” to explain how “the avowal or imputation of characteristics to relevant sets of actors within a movement’s orbit of operations” is a necessary micro-mobilization mechanism, “inasmuch as [it] situate[s] and place[s] other categories of actors as targets of strategic action” (see also Gamson 1992, 1995). While these group-based avowals and attributions are of course influenced by broader structural and ideological factors, they do not strictly determine the collective meanings that actors draw from these circumstances. Rather, ideological and structural factors should be conceptualized as raw materials, whose creative use is inevitably constrained by dominant modes of knowledge and interaction (Bourdieu 1994; Vaisey 2009), but can nevertheless be reinterpreted to articulate new and emergent understandings of social reality (Sewell 1992; Snow, Owens, and Tan 2014).

Frame theory thus directs attention to the ways in which existing ethno-racial boundaries, understood as having both relational and categorical dimensions, can be influenced by processes of collective representation and meaning-making at the meso- and micro-level. As Omi and Winant (1992:84-88) note, any overarching social system of racial formation and stratification is always offset by collective challenges and transformations at more detailed levels of analysis, indicating the potential role of relational mechanisms in influencing larger processes of ethno-racial categorization and social control.

Just as the intergroup boundaries that frame conflicts are open to collective contestation, so are the perceived dimensions of intergroup competition and threat, which
are generally theorized to create the base of individual grievances that are necessary, but insufficient, for collective mobilization (Blalock 1967; Olzak 1989, 1990, 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995). Einwohner and Maher (2011) focus on several dimensions of threat appraisal, and demonstrate how these perceptual dimensions can influence subsequent strategic mobilization. For instance, threats that are perceived as more severe (e.g., those that present an imminent danger to group survival) will be more likely to mobilize collective action than threats seen as relatively minor; likewise, threats that are seen as changeable or avoidable are less likely to foster corrective action than those seen as inevitable or pre-determined (Einwohner and Maher 2011:137). Importantly, they find that “while objective levels of threat” may remain constant, “subjective assessments of the precise nature of that threat” can vary across different social contexts. McVeigh (2009) similarly finds that individual actors who have become aggrieved by structural devaluations of economic and political power nevertheless require salient problem orientations and understandings for micro-mobilization to occur.

Taken together, the above findings strongly suggest that intergroup boundaries, and the various attributional and perceptual mechanisms that constitute them at the meso and micro-level, are often susceptible to the creative meaning-making activities of knowledgeable collective actors. These insights pose particular challenges for structural studies of intergroup competition and conflict, which assume a relatively direct relationship between structural circumstances, perceived threats, and collective grievance formation. My focus here, on the ways in which collective meaning-making mechanisms mediate intergroup competition, thus seeks to problematize the relationship between structural circumstances and intergroup boundaries and their collective attribution as
more or less threatening to nominal power-holding group interests.

Drawing from the above insights, the ethno-racial threat/competition and framing/boundary work perspectives can be presented as empirically overlapping explanations for reactive mobilization that lead to constitutively distinct forms of reactive mobilization, as shown in Table 3.1. Specifically, reactive mobilization that is influenced more consistently by perceived devaluations of dominant-group resources and entitlements, in the relative absence of ethno-racial framing and boundary work by local civic actors, can be conceptualized as competition/threat-based mobilization that is predominantly intended to defend in-group economic and political resources and entitlements (e.g., Olzak 1992). In contrast, mobilization based more consistently on available symbolic or ideological incentives, such as the need to protect a valued in-group status or intergroup boundary from perceived out-group threats, in the relative absence of salient economic or political devaluation, can be thought of as boundary-based mobilization (e.g., Lyons 2007). The intersection of competition/threat and framing/boundary incentives, consistent with mediated competition theories of interethnic contention (Cunningham 2012, 2013; Owens et al. Forthcoming), should thus produce frame-mediated mobilization: the co-presence of empirically threatening circumstances with relational framing / boundary incentives for mobilization. Finally, where both structural and ideological incentives are absent, I expect no mobilization of mass collective violence to occur; this, of course, does not preclude the use of less-violent social control techniques (e.g. Mann 2005), as this study is focused on explaining extreme events.
Empirical Indicators

The theoretical framework of the study, as discussed above, guides my selection of mechanisms that help to explain varying annual patterns of reactive contention in the Humboldt Bay region. First, perceptible economic gains by members of minority groups, and/or significant diminutions in the collective economic “buying power” of nominal power-holding groups, are generally robust indicators of ethno-racial intergroup contention (Blalock 1967; Cunningham and Phillips 2007; McVeigh 1999, 2009; Olzak 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). In the Humboldt Bay area at this time, because of the central role of logging employment for the local settler population (Cornford 1983, 1987; Cox 1974), and given the highly unequal distribution of wealth in the county noted above, severe changes in the price of redwood lumber in San Francisco (the primary Pacific lumber market at this time) may indicate a collectively-perceptible diminution in the economic “buying power” of local settlers, making individuals more cognitively available to reactive framing strategies and other micro-mobilization efforts (McVeigh et al. 2004; McVeigh 2009; Owens et al. Forthcoming; Tolnay and Beck 1995).

Second, political sources of intergroup threat most commonly involve perceived changes to the rights and social entitlements enjoyed by nominal power-holding group
members, as well as perceived collective challenges to these arrangements by minority group members (Cunningham and Phillips 2007; McVeigh 2009; McVeigh et al. 2004; Olzak 1990, 1992). Given the settler-colonial contexts of Humboldt county at this time (see Chapter 1), political threats to white territorial dominance were most likely to occur through perceived challenges to unrestricted settler acquisition of territory, which largely took the form of (real or threatened) federal cessions of state lands to establish reservations. Although federal reservation policies did not grant Californian indigenous peoples any form of title or sovereignty over these lands, many California settlers and state officials nevertheless perceived these actions as assaults on the state’s territorial sovereignty and economic “freedom” (e.g., California State Senate 1852:705-706; Marshall 1974; see also Anderson et al. 1978). This resistance was most commonly justified through the labor theory of value: because indigenous peoples supposedly did not farm or mine the land as settlers did, they did nothing to “improve” it, and thus collective white entitlement supposedly pre-empted indigenous sovereignty (Almaguer 2009).

Third, documented acts of indigenous violence against settlers, although vastly infrequent compared to pervasive settler violence, were also quite likely to incur subsequent collective reprisals from local whites. Attacks on whites were also likely to be framed by officials as salient evidence of indigenous threats to white safety and territorial dominance. In this way, these events can be conceptualized as “quotidian disruptions” (Snow et al. 1998) that acted as “precipitating events” (Owens 2013) by generating ruptures in the fabric of local, racially-stratified social life and creating sudden new grievances for reactive mobilization. As one Humboldt Times correspondent argued in June 1858, “Our mode of warfare with Indians is to pay them off with their own coin: If they
murder a white man without cause, kill ten Indians for it.\textsuperscript{30}

Social movement theories of reactive and repressive mobilization argue for a necessary linkage of framing/boundary work processes and organizational resources in mobilizing sustained reactive contention (e.g. McVeigh 2009). I assess the framing and boundary work of local civic officials and elites by using data on the frequency and content of local civic meetings organized by town officials to address the area’s ongoing “Indian problem,” which served as a means for promoting extremist intergroup interpretations and actions such as ethnic cleansing or violence. For example, an October 12, 1861 civic meeting in Hydesville was convened "to make some arrangement in relation to the Indians in our county, both tame... as well as... wild," and “unanimously adopted” the following resolutions:

1. Resolved, That it is of paramount importance to the citizens of Humboldt County that \textit{all} the Indians of our county, who have homes with citizens, or living in the settlements as “\textit{tame} Indians,” should be removed to the Klamath Reservation... 2. Resolved, that the citizens of the county, having Humboldt county Indians bound [i.e., indentured] to them, are requested to call on the County Judge and reclaim their papers of indenture within twenty days of the date of this publication, of all Indians so bound, who come within the purview of this first resolution.... 6. Resolved, That all citizens of the county are earnestly requested to co-operate with us in ridding our county of all “\textit{tame or pet} diggers”... (Humboldt County Indian Affairs, B-CHS; emphasis in original)

Notably, after effectively calling for the ethnic cleansing of the local indigenous population, the committee also decided that a copy of the meeting’s resolutions should be sent to S.G. Whipple, editor of the \textit{Humboldt Times}, and printed in the paper for wider circulation.

Apart from serving important strategic framing functions in spreading extremist sentiments, these events also provided an organizational base for frame bridging and amplification through the collection of signatures for petitions for state aid, as noted above.
The language of the petitions, in communicating the “threats” posed by local indigenous groups to both state-level officials and to other settlers in the region, tended to advocate for extremist understandings of indigenous groups. I thus include a measure of the annual number of these petitions sent to the state government, in order to capture the influences of this downward (local) and upward (state-level) frame bridging mechanism.

To capture the relative availability of mobilizing resources and infrastructure for violent collective action, I use yearly counts of the number of active state militia and volunteer organizations in the county. These counts are drawn from state militia records (MCR), and are supplemented by local newspaper (NCIH) and federal army accounts of local volunteer activities (Ainsworth and Kirkley 1902). Many Humboldt volunteer organizations in the area were never entered into state militia rolls, and so triangulating between generally supportive local accounts and often-critical army accounts helps in identifying the presence of unaccounted for organizations.

**Data and Methods**

Using the study’s event-level dataset discussed in Chapter 1, I aggregate all violent event data for Humboldt County by year for 1853-1865, and match these data with additional annual county-level indicators. I do not analyze the years 1850-2 because of the lack of detailed local accounts from the period, partly because the local Humboldt Times had not yet been established, and also because the area was technically part of Trinity County until late 1852, making Humboldt-specific indicators difficult to identify. The annual per-capita (x 1000) lethality of collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples in the region is shown in Figure 3.1. It is notable that this violence shows significant temporal
variation, and also spikes significantly in two years: 1855 and 1861. 1857 and 1865 are the only years with relatively little or no reported anti-indigenous violence.

Figure 3.1: Annual Per Capita (*1000) Indigenous Homicides in Humboldt County, 1853-1865

I combine these event-level data with proximate indicator data from annual manufacturing statistics, state (1852) and national (1850-1860) population censuses, state-level militia records, events and community meetings reported in the local Humboldt Times newspaper (identified using an online event database; see Johnston-Dodds 2009), Army records and communications, firsthand settler and indigenous accounts, and available secondary sources. Most notable and unique among these data are the Wiyot History Papers (WHP31), which include oral histories collected in 1920 from five Wiyot women who lived in Humboldt Bay during the study period. These accounts, which were given to a Humboldt County journalist by a private citizen and are currently held at the Humboldt State University archives, provide potentially-important new insights into white-
indigenous conflicts in the study area.

The units of analysis are the thirteen Humboldt County-years between 1853 and 1865. The empirical operationalization of indicators from the above data sources, and their calibration into fuzzy sets for analysis, are detailed below.

Operationalization of Indicators

To capture the influence of economic devaluation for majority groups, I use yearly data on Humboldt County lumber prices in San Francisco markets between 1853 and 1865, obtained from Cox (1974: 297-304); for each year, I use the annual average of biannual prices for January and July to calculate the annual percent change in prices. To capture perceived political challenges to white territorial acquisition through the granting of indigenous “title” to reservation land, I use count data on the number of OIA land cessions to indigenous peoples in Northwest California (Royce 1900: 780-949) to indicate how many reservations were present in the county or in neighboring counties each year. To capture contemporaneous instances of indigenous violence against whites, I use available primary newspaper event data (Johnston-Dodds 2009) and secondary source materials (Madley 2009) on county-level incidences in which one or more non-indigenous person was killed by at least one indigenous person. These events are then aggregated by year. Data on elite-sponsored recruitment and framing efforts use count data on the number of civic meetings addressing the county’s “Indian situation” that held in the county during a given year; these data are gathered using available event databases and newspaper accounts (Johnston-Dodds 2009) and aggregated by year. To assess whether or not such meetings also supported elite-state frame bridging through the transmission of signed
public petitions to the state government, I use annual counts of Humboldt County petitions submitted to the state government in the California State Archives’s Indian War Papers (CIWP). To capture the role of the changing availability of organizational infrastructures and resources for mobilizing mass violence, I use monthly data on the establishing and disbanding of state militias (MCR 1849-1880), and triangulate these data with *Humboldt Times* accounts of informal volunteer companies formed between 1861 and 1865 (Johnston-Dodds 2009), which are not reflected in state militia records.

*Calibration Procedures*

In order to transform the study dataset’s interval-ratio indicators into fuzzy sets for analysis, I utilize the “direct” method of fuzzy set calibration (Ragin 2008: 89-94). For the indicator set “Humboldt County-years with significant settler economic devaluation,” I use the observed distribution of annual lumber price changes (Cox 1974: Appendix 1). Prices fluctuations for redwood lumber in San Francisco, the primary market for Humboldt producers, varied between a high of $100 per MBF (1000 board-feet) in 1853 and a low of $16 per MBF in 1865; the greatest decrease in these prices occurred between 1853 and 1854, when prices fell by roughly 48%, followed by 1854-1855, in which prices dropped a further 46%. Lumber prices never fully recovered from this steep drop, and stabilized at levels ranging between $16 and $25/MBF for the remainder of the study period (1856-1865). Considering this distribution of price changes, which is shown in Figure 3.2, I use
For the indicator set “Humboldt County-years with strong perceived indigenous threats to settler land acquisitiveness,” I substantively calibrate the contemporaneous absence of a proposed reservation territory as the 0.05 threshold, whereas the 0.5 threshold is set as just below the presence of one such territory (0.95;), in order for any county with at least one territory to receive a “more in than out” level of set membership. The 0.95 threshold is set at 2 territories, since there were never more than 3 real or proposed reservations at any one time in the study area between 1850 and 1865.
The indicator set “Humboldt County-years with organizational infrastructures that supported violence” is similarly calibrated using the contemporaneous absence of any militia organization in the county as the 0.05 threshold, and with just below one organization (0.95) as the 0.5 threshold; since there were never more than six militias operating in the area at any one time during the study period, I use the presence of five militias as the 0.95 threshold.

For the indicator set “Humboldt County-years in which a significant number of whites were reportedly killed by indigenous violence,” I use the observed distribution of homicides in annual data, as well as noting that in California at this time, only one or two white deaths could often be enough to spark collective reprisals. The highest number of deaths in any one county-year was 15, in 1862, followed by 14 in 1861 and 11 in 1858; I therefore use 11 deaths as the 0.95 threshold. I use 3 white deaths as the 0.5 threshold, since roughly half the cases (i.e. county-years) fall below this threshold; the 0.05 threshold is zero deaths.

For the indicator set “Humboldt County-years with frequent civic meetings addressing the local ‘Indian’ problem,” I use the observed distribution of data. Because there were never more than three such meetings organized in any one year, I use two meetings as the 0.95 threshold. Similar to the organizational and white homicide calibrations above, I use zero meetings as the 0.05 threshold.

For the indicator set “Humboldt County-years with signed aid petitions sent to the California state government,” I calibrate event count data similarly to the meeting measure above, with one change: because there was never more than 4 petitions sent per year, I use 3 petitions sent as the 0.95 threshold.
The outcome set of “Humboldt County-years exhibiting sustained collective ethnic violence against indigenous peoples” is calibrated using the observed distribution of annual per capita collective ethnic violence levels. The most violent year, 1860, featured 167 killings (per capita * 1000); the second-most violent year, 1861, featured 149 killings (pc*1000); and the third most violent year, 1855, had 92 killings (pc*1000). I therefore use 100 deaths as the 0.95 threshold. I use 16 as the 0.5 threshold since it represents a natural break point in the distribution between the sixth and seventh most violent years (17.31 and 14.48 deaths/pc for 1856 and 1863, respectively). I use 5 deaths/pc as the 0.05 threshold since only two years (1865 and 1857) fall below it.

**Results: Necessity and Sufficiency of Conditions for Collective Ethnic Violence**

*Identifying Necessary Conditions*

Before assessing the individual and joint sufficiency of the constitutive causal factors using fsQCA, I first conduct consistency tests to identify necessary conditions. This step is important, not only because necessary conditions form an integral part of causal explanation in comparative research (Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Goertz and Starr 2003), but also because fsQCA’s truth table analysis is oriented towards identification of sufficient and INUS conditions. Tests for necessity are thus an important preliminary step in fuzzy set analysis, and aid the interpretation of results (Ragin 2000:212). The mediated competition perspective (Cunningham 2012, 2013; Owens et al. Forthcoming) holds that individual sources of threat and competition are necessary but perhaps insufficient bases for actual reactive or reactive mobilization to occur. Tests for necessary conditions allow us to assess the degree to which this statement is true: the degree to which structural and symbolic
mechanisms, as well as the mediating organizational and critical event factors, comprise consistent supersets of the outcome set. Conditions found to be “almost always necessary” can be thought of as INUS conditions whose relationship to the outcome is strongly consistent (> 0.8) with necessity (Ragin 2003, 2008:53). Likewise, more empirically relevant necessary conditions will be those that also possess a higher proportion of coverage, meaning that their presence is more likely when the outcome is present rather than absent (Mahoney et al. 2009:119).

The results of this analysis, shown in Table 3.2 below, indicate that the only condition that is strongly consistent (i.e. 0.841) with a set-theoretical statement of the necessity of perceived political threats to settler territorial sovereignty for collective violence. The results of probabilistic verification tests for a significant difference between 0.841 set consistency and a 0.8 threshold, using the Stata “Fuzzy” command line (Longest and Vaisey 2008), demonstrate that this difference is significant at the 0.1 level. Together, these constitutive and probabilistic results show that perceived political threats were an “almost always” necessary and insufficient condition for high collective violence to occur.

Assessing Causal Sufficiency using Fuzzy Sets

Having found organizational capacity to be almost always necessary for high annual levels of collective ethnic violence, I now turn to an assessment of causal sufficiency using fsQCA’s truth table algorithm (Ragin et al. 2006). FsQCA analysis produces three sets of results. The initial cross-case logical comparison and reduction, performed on solutions possessing at least 0.8 consistency and at least one empirical instantiation, yields a first set of “complex” solutions. Depending on the number of causal factors included and the
Table 3.2: Necessity of Conditions for Mass Violence Against Indigenous Peoples in the Humboldt Bay Area, 1853-1865

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Mass Violence Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>F (Consistency &gt; 0.8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Devaluation (annual lumber price change)</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Threats (reservation territories in area)</td>
<td>0.841</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>3.95†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Capacity (# of militia orgs established)</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Events (# of whites killed)</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Elite Framing / Boundary Work (# of civic meetings organized)</td>
<td>0.609</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Frame Bridging (# of state aid petitions sent to state gov’t)</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1

complexity of the data, these solutions can often be difficult to interpret. In the next step, fsQCA incorporates counterfactual assumptions to produce a second, more parsimonious and interpretable set of “intermediate” solutions. Incorporation of counterfactuals addresses important issues of limited diversity in observational data (Ragin 2008:147-153). Because the theoretical foundations of the model’s causal conditions lead me to expect that the presence of each condition would only make violent outcome more rather than less likely to occur, I incorporate only “easy” counterfactuals in this intermediate analysis (Ragin 2008:163-167). In addition to the intermediate set, further incorporation of
all logically possibly counterfactuals produces a third set of most parsimonious solutions (Ragin 2008:169-172). While this third step is useful at identifying particularly central INUS conditions within fsQCA solutions (identified in the results below), the extreme parsimony of these results can make useful explanation difficult. The “intermediate” solution thus represents the optimal set of results for causal explanation since it balances empirical complexity and explanatory parsimony.

The results of the fuzzy set analysis are presented in Table 3.3. The two solutions identified display two quite distinct dynamics in the varying mobilization of collective ethnic violence in this area. The first solution, which is highly consistent (0.974) and accounts for roughly 42% of high violence years in the county, shows that the mobilizing effects of political threats, as represented by the proximate cession of territory for OIA reservations, were made sufficient to mobilize mass collective ethnic violence through the collective boundary and framing work of local town officials, business elites, and state representatives. Specifically, the combined organization of mass public meetings by town officials and elites, and the subsequent collective creation and transmission of petitions to the state government asking for help in dealing with local “Indian problems,” were central INUS conditions in mobilizing perceived political grievances into collective ethnic violence; this is demonstrated by the fact that the intersection (i.e., ∩) of both conditions were identified as central INUS conditions through counterfactual analysis (see Table A2). Although less central, the availability of organizational resources for violent mobilization, through the establishment of militia organizations, was a contributing INUS condition for violent mobilization.
The second solution displays a starkly different picture of mobilization in the earliest study year, where high levels of collective violence were mobilized without any of the model indicators being present. It is important to note, however, that this second solution's set-theoretic connection with high violence outcomes is notably weaker than the first: only 70% of the cases with this second solution displayed high violence outcomes. It is also important to note that the county-year that possesses the highest membership (0.95) in this solution was also identified above as representing the strongest empirical violation of the necessity of political threat for collective ethnic violence: 1853.
Because of the potential asymmetry of fsQCA results, it is also necessary to verify that each solution is constitutively linked with positive outcomes and not also with negative outcomes. To do so, I perform probabilistic verifications using Wald’s F-tests in Stata’s “Fuzzy” command line (Longest and Vaisey 2008). The results of these tests, displayed as F coefficients, are shown in Table 3.4. As shown, the first solution's membership in the positive outcome set is both significantly greater than its membership in the negative (or, stated in set-theoretical terms, 1-Y) outcome set, and significantly greater than a baseline 0.8 threshold. The second solution, however, is not significant at the 0.05 level for either test; put simply, this means that the constitutive links between the second solution and high violence outcomes are not significantly stronger than its constitutive links with low violence outcomes.
Table 3.3: Intermediate Solutions for Mass Collective Ethnic Violence in Humboldt County, 1853-1865

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal Conditions</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Devaluation</td>
<td>○</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Threats</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Capacity</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Events</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Framing / Boundary Work</td>
<td>● ○</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Frame Bridging</td>
<td>● ○</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0.974</th>
<th>0.706</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Coverage</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique Coverage</td>
<td>0.355</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Model Consistency</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Model Coverage</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ● = core constitutive condition (presence); ○ = contributing constitutive condition (presence); = core constitutive condition (absence); □ = contributing constitutive condition (absence)

To elaborate on the findings of this fuzzy set analysis, I will now move to a detailed qualitative analysis of events surrounding collective ethnic violence that occurred in 1860, a year that is highly significant to Humboldt County's history due to the extremity of events that occurred. As I will demonstrate below, this year also represents the strongest empirical instance of the model's combined findings: that perceived political threats were generally necessary, but insufficient, to mobilize violent reactive contention, and constitutively required collective framing, boundary work, and access to organizational
Table 3.4: Results of Wald’s F-tests for Intermediate Solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution</th>
<th>Y Consistency</th>
<th>1-Y Consistency</th>
<th>$1 (Y &gt; (1-Y))^a$</th>
<th>$2 (Y &gt; 0.8)^a$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$resfz \cap militiafz \cap meetingfz \cap petitionfz$</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>21.95**</td>
<td>61.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sim lumberfz \cap \sim meetingfz \cap \sim petitionfz$</td>
<td>0.706</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < 0.05; $\cap$ logical “AND”; $\sim$ logical “NOT.”

$a$ Wald’s F tests performed using Stata Fuzzy 10.1 (Longest and Vaisey 2008; YvN and YvV tests for 1 and 2 above, respectively).

resources and networks to become sufficiently collectively mobilizing for violent reactive contention to occur.

Qualitative Analysis: Humboldt County ca. 1860 and the Mobilization of Mass Collective Violence

1860 is an important year for exploring the dynamics of violence against indigenous peoples in the Humboldt Bay region. Collective ethnic violence during this year was especially intense, and featured numerous large-scale acts: Of the twelve recorded incidents of collective ethnic violence, half included more than 5 indigenous victims. Much of this year’s violence is concentrated within only three days: February 26 - 28, 1860; this three-day period is discussed further below. The remaining acts of settler violence were on a much smaller scale, and occurred sporadically throughout the rest of the year. The monthly per capita ($*1000$) distribution of collective ethnic violence in Humboldt County for 1860 is shown in Figure 3.3.
The year opened with an air of apparent exasperation among many Humboldt settlers over the supposed inability of state and federal forces to curb reported indigenous "depredations" against settler property. This unrest was in spite of the apparent success of a recent punitive campaign against the Wintun in northeast Humboldt and Klamath counties: those who had survived this armed onslaught had been deported from their territories and subsequently confined on the Mendocino reservation, about 78 miles southwest of Eureka. These campaigns and subsequent deportations seem to have done little to placate settler grievances against local indigenous tribes: A January 24 Humbold Times article argued that "the bloody catalogue of the Indians of Humboldt county for two years is fresh in the minds of all, and as it is a subject deeply [illegible] to the people of this county, we hope an effectual end will be put to their proceedings." Further "outrages" against settler property were also reported on the Mad River, just north of Humboldt Bay, on February 11, and on the Van Duzen fork of the Eel River in southern Humboldt on
February 25. As Rohde (2010) notes, these “outrages” generally involved the loss of only one or two animals, which did not preclude extreme reactions by settlers. Many were also likely angered by the circulating rumor, as reported in the *Humboldt Times*\(^{32}\), that those responsible were likely intransigent Wintuns who had “escaped” from confinement on the Mendocino reservation.

In response to these minor and alleged offenses, settlers across the Humboldt Bay region began to prepare for an unprecedented mobilization of violence against the region’s indigenous inhabitants. On or around February 3, 1860, extremists in Hydesville (a smaller settlement about 18 miles south of Eureka in the lower Eel River valley) called a civic meeting to discuss their situation vis-à-vis local native peoples, and by the meeting’s end had passed resolutions that formed the Humboldt Volunteers. Local merchant and former state assemblyman E.L. Davis, who presided over the meeting, appointed Seman Wright as the leader of the company. This paramilitary unit of 25 to 30 men was ostensibly similar to the state-funded militias that had previously been active in the region, but the Volunteers were never formally inducted into state service; rather, settlers organized the company collectively in response to, and in defiance of, perceived state inattention to local settler grievances against indigenous peoples. At the resolution of this meeting, citizens also signed a petition that would be sent to Governor Downey, asking that he formally support the company by inducting it into state service, and that it be kept “in the field until the redskins are driven from our country” (*Humboldt Times* 1860\(^{33}\)). In a February 4 letter to the *Humboldt Times* (1860), a Hydesville correspondent further noted that “under the extreme [popular] demand that exists for [the company’s] immediate action, they will take the field at once, trusting to the justice of their cause, and the wants of the people for a
recognition of their acts, and recompense for their services at the hands of the State authorities.” By mid-February, it was reported that this paramilitary unit had killed some 40 indigenous persons on the Eel River’s south fork, but had not yet crossed the river into the region directly south of Eureka (Humboldt Times 1860; Rohde 2010). It would do so soon.

Between February 26 and 28, 1860, a group of settlers carried out coordinated and terroristic attacks on indigenous villages throughout the Humboldt Bay area. These attacks are estimated to have killed between 200 and 700 indigenous persons over the course of three days. The best documented of these actions was the February 26 attack on the Wiyot village of Dulawat, located on an island in Humboldt Bay roughly a half-mile from downtown Eureka (the largest settlement in the region at the time). In the early dawn hours, a small group of settlers stealthily crept onto the island and methodically killed between 80 and 200 indigenous persons, predominantly women and children, while they slept. Jane Sam, a 27 year Wiyot woman who survived the massacre by hiding in a trash pile, later recounted that, after the killings, “two boats full of men” departed across the Bay directly to Eureka (WHP). While this specific incident, which would become known as the “Indian Island” massacre, gained significant statewide news coverage due to the dedicated efforts of a local journalist (e.g., Harte 1860), at least eleven other attacks were also carried out over the next three days on villages on the lower Eel River, at Table and Eagle Bluffs, along the Elk River, and on a village just outside Fort Humboldt, among others.

The scale and rapidity of this violence suggests a great deal of collective coordination among local settlers; additionally, local data strongly suggest the involvement of well-resourced and influential civic actors. For instance, Sheriff Van Nest of Eureka,
rather than investigating the murders that had occurred just outside of town, spent the following weeks collecting 26 petitions attesting to settler losses of property at indigenous hands; in his letter to Governor Downey that accompanied the petitions, Van Nest complained of the lack of state protection in the area, and the resulting necessity of local settlers “fighting their own battles... in their own way” (quoted in Rohde 2010). E.L. Davis, the aforementioned leader of the Humboldt Volunteers and presider of the fateful Hydesville meeting, later wrote to Governor Downey that “the little mess at Indian Island near Eureka is only a beginning if we can’t get our just protection from [the] state or [federal] government.” This thinly veiled threat of further indigenous massacres, which almost certainly would occur at the hands of the Hydesville Volunteers and associated collaborators, did not influence Downey, who denied Davis’ request (Rohde 2010). Major Rains, the military commander of Fort Humboldt, later wrote to the commissioner of Indian Affairs that, after Downey’s denial of state support for local paramilitaries, “a portion of Capt. Wright’s Company held a meeting at Eel River... and resolved to kill every peaceable Indian—man, woman, and child in this part of the county.” Major Rains also notes the involvement of the company in the attacks on Dulawat, Eagle Prairie, and Humboldt Point (Rohde 2010). Meanwhile, the Humboldt Times doubled-down on its support for local extremists on March 3: “it is a fact beyond dispute that the ranches [once] considered friendly have become lurking places for the mountain Indians, who have always been the common foe of the whites, and are treated as such at this time.”

The unprecedented mobilization of settler violence in the region, while extreme in its scale, relied centrally on the structural and collective mechanisms identified in the fsQCA results above. Local settlers seem to have been deeply aggrieved by the presence of
nearby reservations, and associated claims of escaped persons committing crimes against settler life and property. For example, a January 18, 1860 *Sacramento Union* reprint of a Trinity County news item noted that “the Indians [i.e. Wintun] sent to the [Mendocino] Reservation last winter are back to their old haunts again, and [are] more fiendish and daring in their depredations. Unless immediate steps are taken to check them, we shall again... have to record acts of murder and plunder.” Violence was also mobilized through the creation of a supportive organizational structure, the Humboldt Volunteers, which provided local extremists with a network of like-minded individuals and afforded them with important infrastructural, discursive (i.e. through favorable newspaper coverage), and financial support from influential civic actors. Elite framing and boundary work strategies, as evidenced through the importance of the civic meeting in Hydesville, presided over by a prominent local businessman and former state representative, and the gathering of official petitions (both at this meeting and by Sheriff Van Nest after the massacre) to demonstrate ostensible community support for extremism, sought to both radicalize the local populace into violent action and to garner supportive relations with state officials (albeit un成功fourly).

Importantly, local oral history testimonies indicate that these extremist sentiments were not unanimous, even in the region where this extremist violence was initially mobilized. Jane Duncan Searson, a then-18 year old Wiyot woman, was living in the Eel River region shortly before the massacres. She recalls her husband, a white man who she describes as having himself killed five Indians, threatening to lynch a local white man named Blair who would not “go and murder the Indians at [Indian Island], Eureka” with them. She also recalls that, shortly after the massacre, a white man who claimed to have
participated in killing on the island was harshly reprimanded by his father, and later committed suicide (WHP). This testimony, while fragmentary, demonstrates that many local whites resisted participating in violence or informally censored those who had, and thus suggests the *uneven local topography of ethno-racial grievances*. If true, this further emphasizes the importance of framing and boundary work mechanisms in the micromobilization of collective violence.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

The study of reactive and repressive contention has increasingly focused on the role of collective perception and meaning making mechanisms, both in terms of how different actors come to understand the categorical group boundaries that separate, to varying degrees, an “us” from a “them,” and the scripts for social action that are consistent with these categorical attributions. Following insights from the social movement literature, these micro-mobilization mechanisms are theorized to link structurally aggrieved individuals with collectively mobilizing resources and networks. However, the constitutive importance of structural (i.e. competition and threat-based) and relational (i.e. framing and boundary work-based) mechanisms for reactive mobilization remains underspecified. To address this issue, this study utilized qualitative comparative analysis to constitutively adjudicate between these distinct but overlapping bases for reactive ethno-racial contention. The results indicated that, while structural sources of political threats (and, by implication, the grievances that likely arose from them) were a generally necessary condition for high levels of collective ethnic violence, these threats also required the framing and boundary work efforts of local elites to become collectively mobilizing. These
constitutive findings confirm central insights from mediated competition theories of intergroup contention (Cunningham 2012, 2013; Owens et al. Forthcoming), and identify framing processes as an important INUS condition in the mobilization of reactive contention. Framing processes are likely to be especially important in violent ethno-racial conflicts, since such conflicts are more likely to feature extreme collective attributions of out-group characteristics, and the mobilization of corollary lines of action consistent with these extremist attributions (Shibutani 1973; see also Gagnon 2004; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Straus 2004).

Beyond these theoretical findings, the study also has implications for California history, especially regarding state and federal relations with and current obligations to the state’s indigenous peoples. In contrast to previous studies of historical violence against indigenous peoples in the state, which emphasize ideological determinants of violent settler actions (e.g., Madley 2009), this chapter’s findings indicate that much of this violence arose as a result of contentious actions taken by political and economic elites, who sought to resolve existing tensions regarding indigenous “threats” by variously supporting violent actions consistent with extremist interpretations of these threats. In effect, violence in this area was driven by a right-wing and extremist social movement, which sought to use violent collective action to leverage influence with state-level allies to support further extremism in the region. In this sense, anti-indigenous violence in California displayed mechanisms eminently comparable to those in other extremist and/or supremacist ethno-racial movements in American history, which have generally used collective action to push for greater restrictions on social rights, privileges, and entitlements (Cunningham 2013; McVeigh 2009; Tlonay and Beck 1995; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Further studies of
collective violence in the American West, and the study of interethnic competition in other settler-colonial contexts, should therefore continue to investigate the potential movement bases of this violence on the part of settler groups, and the ways in which the collective capacities of ethno-racial extremists may have variously contributed to the mobilization of intergroup violence and conflict.
Chapter Five: Conclusion

In this study, I have sought to generate theoretical contributions for the sociological study of intergroup conflict and violence, and in particular those conflicts that are organized along ethno-racial lines, while also seeking to develop a sociologically informed perspective on significant historical events in the settlement of the state of California. In the sections below, I outline these contributions, while also reflecting on their implications and potential directions for future study.

The study's contributions are naturally tentative, given that they represent the findings of initial analyses of an original historical dataset, and given the data constraints of the project. Data sources for this period of California history are fragmentary and often incomplete, and thus disallow me from incorporating potential variables of interest. For instance, there is little systematic ethnological data on indigenous tribes during this period. This precludes constructing variables on the particular land use patterns of various tribes, which were likely to have influenced overall conflict patterns, or whether certain indigenous groups were more or less militarized and thus more likely to be perceived as threatening by settlers. The primary role of newspaper reporting in developing my event data also disallows a systematic analysis of negative outcomes (i.e. instances where collective violence should have been mobilized but was not), since non-events were rarely reported on. Finally, it is important to note that my selection of sustained collective violence as an outcome does not capture the full range of social control practices used against indigenous peoples, as discussed in the introduction (see also Mann 2005). These practices, which included coercive labor extraction, slave-trading, and territorial relocation
and confinement, were also undoubtedly violent, but it is difficult to assemble more than anecdotal data on many of these outcomes and their contextual determinants, since open admissions of these activities seem to have been rarely given.

**Historical Contributions**

In terms of California history, this study provides substantive evidence that the notable levels of violence against indigenous peoples during California’s early settlement were, in part, the result of sustained repressive collective actions organized and undertaken by Anglo-American settler elites, and in particular their attempted bridging and amplification of local anti-indigenous frames in state politics. Their actions were intended, in part, to resolve categorical tensions regarding indigenous peoples’ purported potentials to either yield to American conquest or to remain forever “savage.” This attempted resolution centrally involved the invocation, and subsequent amplification and bridging, of extremist frames of ethno-racial group differences, attempts to create facilitative relationships with state political leaders, and thus to provide incentives for extremist understandings of indigenous out-group differences through the mobilization of concurrent lines of collective action. In doing so, these settler actions worked to construct emergent, meso-level social orders in which violent participation became linked with potential social status and rewards. Interestingly, the Wiyot History Papers illustrate the uneven topography of settler willingness to engage in violence, as well as attempts by pro-violence settlers to prevent defection or inaction, at least in the Hydesville area of Humboldt County. These data points further suggest the importance of boundary mechanisms in the mobilization or demobilization of violent contention, since the
testimonies also indicate that local extremists engaged in intimidating campaigns to weed out those who would not participate in collective violence.

While other studies of violence against indigenous peoples in California during this period have focused specifically on the role of racist ideologies and laws in enabling this violence and mistreatment (e.g., Madley 2009), the specific collective bases of this violence are not as well identified. As a result, the potential role of framing and other collective action mechanisms in mobilizing different levels of violence in different regions of the state has been obscured. By focusing on the role of frame disputes and the political legitimation of extremist frames in the mobilization of anti-indigenous violence, in the context of settler-colonial competition for land and resources in a freshly-annexed American territory, this study’s findings specify important mechanisms of collective threat attribution and appraisal that are constitutively related to violent outcomes. As I show in the above chapters, these collective meaning-making mechanisms are important, in that settler views of indigenous peoples were relatively unsettled and open to collective influence. The framing mechanisms that variably influenced the problem orientations of these settlers are therefore likely to have also influenced the use of different social control strategies.

In this sense, violence against indigenous peoples in California is eminently comparable to other historical episodes of mass violence and atrocity (Karstedt 2013; Owens et al. 2013), in which collective violence is rarely a straightforward product of pre-existing group divisions or underlying hatreds. Such ethnic divisions are generally more widespread and constant in most societies than actual incidences of violence. Rather, violence is generally mobilized only after group-based social distinctions are used as salient social markers of inclusion and exclusion (Barth 1969; Nielsen 1985). influential
political and economic actors often play important roles in the elevation of ethno-racial characteristics as both collectively salient and exclusionary in nature, but this role has been understudied in California during this time period. As V.P. Gagnon (2006) demonstrates, in Serbia during the 1990s, ruling political leaders politicized existing ethnic divisions as a means to demobilize their domestic political challengers. They did so by reframing political and economic grievances as inhering along ethnic lines, and supported these problem orientations and their proposed (violent) solutions with strong state material and discursive support; similar findings have been made in historical and contemporary cases of state-supported mass violence, in which official ideologies help to create emergent opportunities for extremist collective actions (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Su 2011; see also Owens et al. 2013). The key difference in the Californian case is that, rather than being advanced by prominent state-level political or economic leaders, these extremist beliefs were advanced by a loosely articulated right-wing social movement, which sought to further radicalize state policies by leveraging its collective influence over proximate citizens. In this way, prominent leaders and spokespeople for violent and right-wing movements often act as boundary entrepreneurs by seeking to embed extremist interpretations of essentialist out-group differences within state and/or local policies and rhetoric. The potential motivations for civic leaders in promoting such violence and extremism are varied and likely to be context-dependent, and cannot be fully accounted for in this study, but are likely to be influenced by both strategic and social-psychological considerations. Future studies of anti-indigenous social control and violence in California might therefore consider looking specifically at the varying roles of civic and state leaders in agitating for or against particular lines of action in other areas of the state.
Theoretical Contributions

Beyond these historical insights, the findings of the study should have ongoing utility to students of contentious politics, collective violence, and racial formation processes. First, the study identifies important differences between two ideal-typical modes of ethno-racial competition and conflict (intra- and inter-polity), which respectively seek to either contain and restrict a dishonored social category in order to facilitate continued economic exploitation, or to draw exogenous categorical “others” into the domestic arena to facilitate territorial acquisition and eventual ethnic supersession. Despite the ideal-typical nature of this conceptualization, which in reality comprises more of a spectrum of practices than two distinct and mutually exclusive sets, it nevertheless directs attention to the ways in which particular racial formation processes support specific and distinct attributions of collective out-group threats, and thus make the mobilization of retributive collective actions consistent with these attributions more likely to occur. In further studies, scholars may consider linking different forms of indigenous-migrant contact with the types of conflicts that are engendered through them; some axes of variation here may include whether settler migrations are voluntary or forced, or whether a territory is intended for eventual annexation or for simple resource extraction (as in traditional, non-settler colonialism).

Second, the study identifies political legitimation and threat framing mechanisms as important mediators in the relationship between structurally-conducive conditions and violent reactive contention, as shown in Chapter Two. Specifically, I show that the consistent political legitimation of extremist frames, alongside conducive political,
economic, and demographic conditions, contributed to consistently high levels of collective violence against indigenous peoples in Northwestern California. While violence in other areas was initially quite intense, violence generally declined as the social cohesion of settler communities increased, as settlers increasingly moved from speculating to a wage labor economy driven by new industrial development, and as most areas of the state became increasingly ethnically diverse, increasing perceived Anglo-American with non-indigenous non-white groups; in essence, violent competition decreased as these areas became increasingly consolidated as “domestic” locales. These changes also tended to correspond with sympathetic, but nevertheless paternalistic, popular frames of indigenous peoples as tractable victims of American expansion, and thus calling for less violent and incorporative strategies that would lead to their eventual disappearance as distinct territorial sovereigns.

Framing and the Politics of Threat Assessment

Beyond these extensions of mediated competition theories of intergroup contention, the findings from the third chapter also fundamentally problematizes the relationship between empirical structural circumstances and the ways in which these structural characteristics are interpreted, via collective meaning-making mechanisms, as more or less threatening to in-group interests. In this sense, framing has generally been regarded as a necessary micro-mobilization mechanism (i.e. as a necessary cognitive link between potentially-aggrieved individuals and collectively mobilizing resources and networks), but not also as a mediating relational mechanism (e.g., McVeigh et al. 2004) that is deeply enmeshed in the politics of collective threat assessment and attribution. Einwohner and Maher (2011) identify five relevant dimensions of threat assessment: 1) severity, or the
degree to which a threat affects potential group survival; 2) \textit{temporality}, or whether the threat is immediate or will occur sometime in the future; 3) \textit{applicability}, or whether the threat is group-specific or more generalized in its potential effects; 4) \textit{malleability}, or the degree to which a threat can be averted or changed by collective action; and 5) \textit{credibility}, or the degree to which the claim is collectively salient.

This framework, alongside the above results, provides a useful starting point for understanding the specific role of framing mechanisms in the politics of collective threat assessment (see also Benford 1987; Klandermans et al. 1999; McVeigh et al. 2004; Saguy 2012). For instance, the assessed malleability of a collective threat is likely to be heavily influenced by the \textit{prognostic} and \textit{motivational} dimensions of collective action frames, which respectively provide a proposed solution to an identified social problem or perceived injustice, and a rationale for overcoming potential inaction or free-riding (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; Benford and Snow 2000). Likewise, the assessment of severity, temporality, and applicability are likely to be influenced by the \textit{diagnostic} dimension of collective action frames, which involves the salient identification of a social problem, and attributions of responsibility, inaction, or other relational states onto relevant groups of actors. These diagnostic and prognostic, and motivational dimensions of frames are thus likely to be deeply enmeshed in collective assessments of threat that, in turn, are necessary for the mobilization of reactive contention.

Finally, I argue that the assessment of the credibility (i.e., salience) of a proposed threat is likely to be dependent, in part, on the \textit{discursive opportunities and constraints} presented by relevant master frames (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Snow and Benford 1992). For instance, contemporary racist movements (e.g.,
McVeigh 2004; Simi and Futrell 2010) face a cultural climate organized around multiculturalist imperatives that, in the post civil-rights era, are fundamentally opposed to overt displays of racist sentiments, but generally do not target more subtle, “euphemized” expressions of ethno-racial meaning (e.g., Lamont 2000). This has forced such organizations to fit their supremacist ideologies within the multiculturalist master frame, by describing American whites as a “minority” group that is not only equivalent to other minorities, but is also in need of greater protection and recognition (Berbrier 1998, 2002).

This cultural climate is markedly different from that of mid-nineteenth century California, which was arguably dominated by the Anglo-American master frame of Manifest Destiny (Horsman 1981; Miller 2006). This epochal frame justified the increasing territorial acquisitiveness of the United States through claims of innate Anglo-American racial and civilizational superiority, and helped to make claims of white entitlement to both land and labor highly salient to relatively underprivileged whites (e.g., Roediger 2007). Such a powerful sense of collective racial entitlement also helps us to understand how, despite the fundamentally invasive and dispossessive nature of white settlement in the Humboldt Bay region and much of the rest of the state, many area settlers would demand state protection and remuneration for indigenous “depredations” and “outrages,” even while those around them were committing extreme acts of violence.

The relational mechanisms identified in this study thus are likely to have important implications for the study of reactive contention in the contemporary era. For instance, it is an apparent irony that, despite numerous contemporary indicators of systemic inequality and under-privileging of nonwhites, and in particular African-Americans (e.g., Massey and Denton 1993; Oliver and Shapiro 1995), a small but highly militant group of whites can
saliently claim that they are in fact a besieged minority group, whose culture and values are currently under attack (Berbrier 1998; Simi and Futrell 2010). Dylan Roof, the recent perpetrator of a terrorist attack on the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, SC, described himself as defending himself from cultural tyranny and white genocide, and offered such justifications as a means to provoke others to take similar actions. Greater analytic attention to the role of framing and the politics of threat assessment should thus benefit both historical and contemporary studies of reactive contention, which demonstrate the various ways in which empirical circumstances come to be understood as more or less threatening to nominal power-holding groups, and the destructive consequences of these perceived threats for the peoples and communities they target.
### APPENDIX TABLE 1: Crisis Frame Coding Guidelines and Examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set Membership</th>
<th>Coding Guidelines</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No conflict frame used in state-level communication regarding indigenous difficulties</td>
<td>“I perceived in the <em>Marysville Herald</em> of today an account of an attack and massacre by Indians of a portion of volunteers and many of the inhabitants residing at Gold Beach near the mouth of the Rogue River, and alas, there would be a necessity for calling to their assistance a volunteer force; as commander of the militia of the sixth division, I herewith hasten to place myself under your orders, I tender my services to your Excellency [Governor J. Neely Johnson] in the event of a call upon the citizen soldiery.” F3753-273. CIWP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Conflict frame is used, but only requires aid to address general “difficulties” with local indigenous populations. Indigenous are seen as hostile and/or dangerous, but these characteristics are not imputed to be inherent. May note that difficulties are due to settler mistreatment of indigenous groups.</td>
<td>“The immediate scenes of their [Indian] hostile movements are at and in the vicinity of the Mariposa and Frizno (sic). The Indians in that portion of that state have, for some time past, exhibited disaffection and a restless feeling toward the whites. Thefts are being continually perpetrated by them, but no act of hostility has been committed on the person of any individual which indicates general enmity on the part of the Indians.” F3753-46. CIWP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>Conflicts with indigenous populations are framed as intense ones that present an imminent threat to settlement. Indigenous groups are represented as hostile and violent towards whites, but not essentially so. This implies that some negotiation or conciliation may bring an end to hostilities.</td>
<td>“We the undersigned petitioners do most respectfully urge upon your Excellency's [Governor John Bigler’s] consideration, the dangerous and alarming position many of the inhabitants of the Northern portion of the state, and more particularly those of the county of Klamath, in the vicinity of Crescent City. And for the benefit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conflicts are framed as zero sum conflicts in which either settlers or indigenous groups will be eliminated. Indigenous groups are imputed to be essentially hostile and treacherous in nature, making negotiation with them impossible. Threats pose a direct threat to economic and social stability of the region.

“The savage tribes in this neighborhood, after a long series of vexations, threats, daring robberies, and most cruel and wanton murders of our companions and countrymen, have at length acquired sufficient boldness and confidence in their strength, and the impunity with which they have committed their atrocities, to declare open and general hostility upon all white men.... They have become so bold and daring in their crimes that it is now impossible to live peaceably among them.... They regard all friendly advances with disdain, or if they seem to reciprocate them, it is only for the purpose of lulling us into security until the favorable moment arrives for more surely effecting their treacherous designs.”

“State of Indian Hostilities in Trinity County.” *Sacramento Transcript*, October 28 1850, p. 2, col. 3. (Petition was printed in local newspaper) NCIH.
APPENDIX TABLE 2: Truth Table for fsQCA

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>militiafz</th>
<th>whitefz</th>
<th>meetfz</th>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
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<td>1854</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>0.94</td>
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### APPENDIX TABLE 3: Simplifying Assumptions Table

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<th>Complex</th>
<th>Intermediate\textsuperscript{a}</th>
<th>Parsimonious\textsuperscript{b}</th>
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<tr>
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<td>(\text{petition})</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: \(\cap\) logical “AND”; \(\cup\) logical “OR”; \(~\) logical “NOT.” For further discussion of the movement between complex, intermediate, and parsimonious solutions, see Ragin (2008), chapter 9.
a Incorporates “easy” counterfactuals (simplifying assumption that the absence of a causal condition does not make the outcome more likely to occur).

b Incorporates both “easy” and “difficult” counterfactuals (all logically possible simplifying assumptions, regardless of theoretical or empirical basis).
References

Primary Source Collections

B-CHS: H.H. Bancroft Collection, County Historical Scraps; Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

CDNC: California Digital Newspaper Collection (http://cdnc.ucr.edu).

CIWP: Military Department. Adjutant General. Indian War Papers, California State Archives, Sacramento, CA.

HCIW: Ethnic Groups Collection, Indian Wars; Humboldt County Historical Society, Eureka, CA.

MCR: Inventory of the Military Department. Militia Company Records; California State Archives, Sacramento, CA.

NCIH: Northern California Indian Historiography (http://calindian.org).

WHP: Wiyot History Papers; Humboldt State University Archives, Humboldt Room, Arcata, CA.

Printed Sources


*Secondary Sources*


Original available via HCIW collections.


Small, Mario. 2008. “Four Reasons to Abandon the Idea of the ‘Ghetto.’” *City and Community*


Notes

1 Primary source materials are as follows: 1) published accounts in local California newspapers (inclusive dates: September 9, 1850 – December 31, 1865), specifically: Daily Alta California, Humboldt Times, Marysville Herald, Placer Times, Sacramento Transcript/Daily Union¹, Shasta Courier, and Yreka Union (CDNC; NCIH); 2) reports and event summaries in the State of California’s Indian War Papers and militia records (CIWP); and 4) Journals and reports of federal Army officials operating in California (Ainsworth and Kirkley 1902). Secondary data are drawn from Madley (2009: Appendix I-IV), Johnston-Dodds (NCIH), and Heizer and Almquist’s (1971) extensive cataloguing of anti-indigenous violence in California.

2 Counties included in the analysis and their years of incorporation are as follows: Amador (1854), Butte (1850), Calaveras (1850), Colusa (1850), Del Norte (1857), El Dorado (1850), Fresno (1856), Humboldt (1853); Klamath (1851); Mariposa (1850); Mendocino (1850); Napa (1850); Nevada (1851); Placer (1851); Plumas (1854); Sacramento (1850); Shasta (1850); Sierra (1852); Siskiyou (1852); Sonoma (1850); Stanislaus (1854); Tehama (1856); Trinity (1850); Tulare (1852); Tuolumne (1850); and Yuba (1850).


4 See Mackie (1965, 1980) and Goertz and Mahoney (2012) for an extended discussion of INUS conditions and their role in causal processes.

5 For instance, if the solutions $A \cap B \cap C$ (A present AND B present AND C present) and $A \cap \neg B \cap C$ (A present AND NOT B present AND C present) are found to be both highly consistent, they would then be reduced to one solution: $A \cap C$. This is because B has been found to be logically superfluous in constituting the outcome, and is thus dropped from the solution.

6 Naturally, these formally inclusive sentiments were belied by massive informal AND state-sponsored discrimination, violence, and terrorism that was perpetrated against
hundreds of indigenous nations during America’s territorial expansion during the
nineteenth century (see Thornton 1987).

7 It should not be surprising that these early American policies would eventually provide
legal precedent for the denial of habeas corpus to enemy combatants during the “War on
Terror” (Rana 2010; Wolfe 2007).

9 This term is used interchangeably with “anti-indigenous violence” and “collective
violence”; both refer to the same collective phenomenon of direct physical violence against
indigenous peoples, unless otherwise noted.

10 “Address of the Indian Agents.” Daily Alta California, Jan. 14 1851, p. 2. CDNC.

11 As Steinman (2012) notes, attempts to reconstitute the sovereign status of indigenous
peoples into being domestic dependent minorities are in fact central to settler-colonial
models of domination.

12 Much of the violence in Napa during this period is attributable to massive civic and
military reprisals precipitated by the killing of two men, Charles Stone and Andrew Kelsey,
by their indigenous servants. These two men were responsible for much abuse and
violence against the local indigenous population. For a detailed discussion of events leading
up to the killings and subsequent military reprisals, see Madley (2009: 101-165) and
Heizer Collected Documents on the Bloody Island Massacre (1973).

13 Items F3753: 195-198; 204-205; 228; 231; 267; 272; 332; 342-348; 354; 360-361; 369-
370; 386; 407-408; 413; 428; 439; 475; 487; 532; 542; 570; 575; 583-584; 586; 600; 612-
613; 615; 617-618; 621; 628; 630. CIWP.

14 Comptroller of the State of California, Expenditures for Military Expeditions Against
Indians, 1851-1859, (Sacramento: The Comptroller), Secretary of State, California State
Archives, “Roster” Comptroller No. 574, Vault, Bin 393. Tabulated in Johnston-Dodds

15 “Volunteers – Indians.” Sacramento Daily Union, December 9 1858, p. 2, col. 3. NCIH.

NCIH.

17 “Grand Indian Council.” Nevada Democrat October 4, 1854, p. 2. NCIH.

“Anti-Indians.” *Sonoma County Journal*, June 11 1858, p. 2 col. 5. *NCIH.*

“State of Indian Hostilities in Trinity County.” *Sacramento Transcript*, October 28 1850, p. 2, col. 3. *CDNC.*

“All the Indians in the northern counties...” *Sacramento Daily Union*, September 16 1851, p. 2, col. 3. *CDNC*


“No Authority.” *Weekly Humboldt Times*, September 25 1858, p. 2 col. 1. *NCIH.*

“Killing Indians.” *Weekly Humboldt Times*, June 26 1858, p. 2 col. 2. *NCIH.*

This term is used interchangeably with “anti-indigenous violence” and “collective violence”; both refer to the same collective phenomenon of direct physical violence against indigenous peoples, unless otherwise noted.


Although there is isolated mention of the role of white abuses in motivating conflict with indigenous groups in the *Humboldt Times* (e.g., “The Klamath War” 02/24/1855; “Indian Difficulties Again Threatened” 05/26/1855; “Mouth of Salmon” 05/03/1856; Accessed online at [http://calindianhistory.org](http://calindianhistory.org) on May 17, 2015), these rumors or opinions were rarely elevated beyond conjecture.

Such was the double-bind of anti-indigenous racism in California: indigenous persons who did not violently resist white colonization, or who were no longer able to mount such resistance, were seen as “degraded” and undignified; those who continued their resistance to settler colonization were more often seen as honorable and dignified, but nonetheless very dangerous, and thus in need of either removal or elimination.


These primary accounts are available at the Humboldt Room, Special Collections, Humboldt State University Library, Arcata, CA.
Appendix Table 2 shows the complete fuzzy-set truth table for the data, and Appendix Table 3 details the simplification process from complex to intermediate and parsimonious solutions.

