UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

A Biopolitical Methodology for Examining Legitimation
In Academic Music Circles

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in

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by

Caroline Louise Miller

Committee in Charge:

Professor Katharina Rosenberger, Chair
Professor Lei Liang
Professor Amy Cimini

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

A Biopolitical Methodology for Examining Legitimation in Academic Music Circles

by

Caroline Louise Miller

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Professor Katharina Rosenberger, Chair

The focus of music history is not evenly distributed. Why is it that we seem to learn about and hear the music of the same groups of composers for the duration of our university educations? How is it that many innovative and groundbreaking
musical experiments conducted by women and other groups have gone largely unnoticed by mainstream scholarship?

Enlisting the help of Michel Foucault, who provides a framework for conceptualizing the distribution and production of power, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who pinpoint the operation of power within the modern individual, and Judith Butler, who discusses the social and co-constitutive nature of reality and identity, I use the analytic of the grain (a flexible and metaphorical tool for tracing flows of power and normativity) to expose the effects of social behaviors on aesthetic validation and visibility. As corporeal sites for this research, I use three case studies of creative pairs (Fredric Chopin/George Sand, John Cage/Morton Feldman, Pauline Oliveros/Annea Lockwood) to trace how my grains of normative and deviant behavior, formulated from a cultural standpoint, feed a view of reality and history that is more homogenous than empirical observation reveals on a day-to-day basis.
A Biopolitical Methodology for Examining Legitimation in Academic Music Circles

Part I
Methodology

Backpacking around Europe as a bright-eyed 19-year-old composer, I came to a point of contention with my companion at the time, an equally bright-eyed 19-year-old pianist, who asserted that there had been no great female musicians except Clara Schumann. If there had been others, why did we never hear about them? A few years later, at a professional electronic music conference where one of my works had been accepted, several impromptu introductions had fellow composers overriding my attempts to self-introduce by guessing first that I was another composers’ spouse, second that I might be a singer. Then there were (and are) the countless classes, seminars and concerts where the mention of a female composer is a rare event. While I had the privilege in one listening lab of being introduced to the work of Kaija Saariaho and Björk, another “comprehensive” electronic music survey course failed to mention the contributions of Laurie Spiegel, Pauline Oliveros, Maryanne Amacher, Eliane Radigue, and other interesting and innovative figures.

The agglomeration of these experiences provides a strong personal basis for an investigation of the underlying circumstances. My travel companion, in his naïveté, unwittingly made a compelling inquiry. To rephrase his question; “Why do we never hear about these people?” becomes “Why are these people largely unobserved in the realm of mainstream scholarship?” A great number of hypotheses
concerning the question of women’s historical visibility have circulated. Carl E. Seashore argued in his 1940 article “Why no great women composers?” that the “eternal feminine and the persistent masculine” are responsible for differential life goals of men and women; the resultant inequalities in historical remembrance are a byproduct of a fundamental, natural reality.¹ A 2012 analysis of the situation by Kerry Andrew, writer for the guardian, attributes inequality in prestige to statistics, stating, “...you’ll consistently see more eager male teenage composers than female; there’s a real dropping-off in confidence in teenage girls to compose. At Junior Trinity—a Saturday school for talented young musicians where I teach—there are more female students than male, but only a third of students studying composition are girls.”² Andrews goes on to hypothesize that the real problem is a lack of female role models in the traditional canon—which spirals back to the original question. There are many more speculations and analyses of various eras and depths that explore the issue of women’s prominence in the classical music world. I use these explorations as a starting point. Rather than dealing specifically with portrayal of women in music, my aim is a contextualized exploration of human relationships, specifically creative pair-relationships, that I hope will partially illustrate some of the mechanisms feeding into and reinforcing established structures that contribute to the low visibility of particular sub-communities in the field of academic, avant-garde, and contemporary classical music.

To get to the pith of these structures, there is a rich conversation to be
developed about the relationships between our learned realities (conditioned through depiction and role-modeling), and more comprehensive actualities, some aspects of which are more elusive than others. These actualities, in my definition, form a conglomerate “big picture” within a certain topic, many details of which we can never know due to massive holes left in the wake of historical depiction and the lack of alternate evidence. These actualities are also ongoing, however, in the form of nuanced daily experiences that slip through the cracks of social memory. This is the difference between learned reality and comprehensive actuality; while learned reality deals with codified human experiences that have evidence (in social memory, historical depiction, or artifact) of their validity, comprehensive actuality deals with the in-between, the forgotten, the feminized, the evidence-less, the complex, and the suppressed.

Many of us learn early on that history is subjective; but the lack of mainstream frameworks and tools available for examining this subjectivity makes it a slippery pursuit, one that often requires extreme dedication and a willingness to step into uncharted territory. As I move forward with an examination of conflicting, harmonious, complex, and simplified learned realities and the depictions feeding them, I will be enlisting the help of Michel Foucault, who provides a framework for conceptualizing the distribution and production of power, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who pinpoint the operation of power within the modern individual, and Judith Butler, who discusses the social and co-constitutive nature of reality and identity.
With these collaborators, I aim to develop modes and specific applications (the analysis of the creative pair) for my explorations of power, knowledge, validation, and visibility.

In his 1978 lecture “Security, Territory, Population,” Michel Foucault provides a methodology for researching power:

If we accept that power is not substance, a fluid, or something that derives from a particular source, than this analysis could and would only be at most a beginning of a theory, not of a theory of what power is, but simply of power in terms of the set of mechanisms and procedures that have the role or function and theme, even when they are unsuccessful, of securing power. It is a set of procedures, and it is such, and only as such, that the analysis of mechanisms of power could be understood as the beginnings of something like the theory of power.³

This “set of procedures” is scientific in the sense that it aims to understand the complex phenomena of power through the examination of its observable, embodied manifestations (this is comparable to the theory of evolution, which also relies on bodies for both existence and evidence of its existence). Foucault goes on to describe the inextricability of bodies and power:

Power is not founded on itself or generated by itself. Or we could say, more simply, that there are not first of all relations of production and then...mechanisms of power that modify or disturb them...There are not family type relationships and then, over and above them, mechanisms of power... Mechanisms of power are an intrinsic part of all these relations, and, in a circular way, are both their effect and cause.⁴

It is Foucault’s scientifically spirited “set of procedures”, his requirement of power’s embodiment, and his “circular way” of effect and cause that prove to be
useful models for my investigation. Through this lens, structures of power simultaneously emerge from interactions between bodies and reside in those bodies. Here I will do what Foucault does not—make power site-specifically corporeal. That is, I will exemplify relationships between specific human beings in my study of historical subjectivity, depiction, and broader actuality. Through this exposition on the circulation of power within my field, I hope to produce reconsiderations of “the way things are,” leading to potentials for empowerment of values and logics heretofore trivialized by current structures of thought.

Foucault’s bottom-up model of power, applied in this context, necessitates a loose stratification (but not a hierarchy) of various arenas of social activity. My examination of learned reality, in conjunction with historical depiction, does not start with a specialized, professional pool of people engaged in a particular discipline—it begins on a more foundational level of environmental conditioning that centers on the intake of media depictions from the time we are children. For the sake of this study, I will say that the fundamental pool I will be scrutinizing is an amorphous “Western society” derived from a metaphorical averaging of western values. (It is important to note, however, that my methodology could be applied to any society where this form of conditioning is present.) These values are both derived from and contribute to a biopolitical “norm-line,” and are produced within us at a young age—we are surrounded, both in our social and physical environments, by depictions of
what an average human life looks like.

The way we model our behaviors, bodies, and conceptions of self are physical attestation of these forces. Triangulating between Foucault’s theories, this form of conditioning stretches at least back to the nineteenth century, when the propagation of media and technologies combined with an increase in statistical data to produce new modes of self-definition. Foucault describes the norm-line, which influences the formation these self-definitions, as a product of “biopower,” or “the mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species become the object of political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species.” The premise that humans could be understood as a species, something to study and gather data upon, impelled the replacement of “right” and “wrong” as mandated by a higher authority with “normal” and “deviant” as measurable by scientific and cultural data.

In *The history of sexuality*, Foucault describes a 19th century obsession with the classification of sexual deviances:

These fine names for heresies referred to a nature that was overlooked by the law, but not so neglectful of itself that it did not go on producing more species, even where there was no order to fit them into. The machinery of power that focused on this whole alien strain did not aim to suppress it, but rather to give it an analytical, visible, and permanent reality: it was implanted in bodies, slipped in beneath modes of conduct, made into a principle of classification and intelligibility, established as a *raison d’être* and a natural order of disorder. Not the exclusion of these thousand aberrant sexualities, but the specification, the regional solidification of each one of them. The
strategy behind this dissemination was to strew reality with them and incorporate them into the individual.⁶

This “regional solidification” of “aberrant sexualities” provides a useful model for thinking about the codification of behavior—if Foucault’s “minor perverts” can speciate into iconic representatives of deviant classes, likewise can “average individuals” speciate into iconic representatives of normative classes. Extrapolating, this classification paradigm could produce hybridized species via interpersonal relationships at the level of a pair, a trio, or a larger group of individuals. It is the politics of identity classification at the level of the pair that I trace here as a unique mechanism of power.

As a mode of comprehending how these “normative and deviant” relationships might be pictorially presented, I conducted a deep-background thought experiment focused on typical roles within interpersonal relationships in fictional or semi-fictional narrative structures in Western culture. Mediums examined included movies, books, plays, and mythologies. Dr. Richard Johnson receives credit for helping me brainstorm, triangulate, exemplify, and refine. Our brainstorming experiment furnishes my investigation with a fairly comprehensive list of the most common ways that man-to-man, man-to-woman, and woman-to-woman relationships are depicted in these narrative forms. Examples range from the ultra-classical portrayal of competitive brothers (Cain and Abel, Hamlet) to the mythologized mother-as-divine (the veneration of Mary in Catholicism, the inexhaustible “grace” provided by the mother in Terrence Malick’s Tree of Life) to the
girl-as-muse who, through her inspirational spirit, brings a man to a creative epiphany or self-realization (Harriet Smithson as impetus for Berlioz’s *Symphonie Fantastique*, the relationship depicted in the film *Garden State*) to competitive “catty” sister figures (*Heathers, Mean Girls*.)

These commonly portrayed and often mythologized relationships seem to neglect the actuality of a richly heterogeneous and recombinant pool of relationship types that transcend these categorizations. Not all plotlines are formulaic, and many narrative depictions complicate the idea of identity in order to avoid the pitfall of the “stock character”; however, bound by the limitations of narrative mediums and the goal of communicability, complications of inter-character relations seem to gather as embellishments upon larger stereotypical roles. When these depicted roles are recalled via human memory, it is the emphasized dynamic that emerges as our primary impression of possible modes of interaction between two humans. These primary impressions are processed through everyday forums of interaction and become solidified in our ongoing social discourse.

While Foucault offers the model of “solidification” and “incorporation” of these depictions into the individual, Hardt and Negri’s *Empire*, published in 2000, offers additional context for thinking about the role of the depiction-memory-discourse process. While Foucault seems to offer up classification as a social discipline (we classify others), Hardt and Negri build upon Foucault’s biopower by theorizing that we are a society of self-disciplining individuals who internalize and
reproduce normative (or deviant) behaviors as matters of both personal and social identity. Hardt and Negri describe this process:

We should understand the society of control, in contrast, as that society (which develops at the far edge of modernity and opens toward the postmodern) in which mechanisms of command become ever more “democratic,” ever more immanent to the social field, distributed throughout the brains and bodies of the citizens. The behaviors of social integration and exclusion proper to rule are thus increasingly interiorized within the subjects themselves...The society of control might thus be characterized by an intensification and generalization of the normalizing apparatuses of disciplinarity that internally animate our common and daily practices, but in contrast to discipline, this control extends well outside the structured sites of social institutions through flexible and fluctuating networks.7

According to Hardt and Negri, these networks take cultural precedence over official disciplinary institutions (the school, the psychiatric ward, the church), which contributes to a process they label “singularization.” As we singularize, management of normal and deviant behaviors is increasingly in the hands of freely networking individuals. In tandem with this singularization, my term granularization describes the breaking of depicted identities into “grains” of normative or deviant behavior.

Behaviors, of course, exist in actuality on an infinitely complex and continuous spectrum—“grains,” in my methodology, are discrete, graspable pieces of this spectrum that circulate through culture, become incorporated into our interactions with others, and assimilate into our conceptions of self. Though grains can vary in degree of complexity, combine to form hybrid-grains, exhibit diverse and numerous functions, and manifest themselves in a spectrum of ways according to circumstance; they still represent a breaking-up of the continuous, mimicking actuality while failing
to capture actuality’s intricacies. Grains can be thought of as having fluidity or resistance to circulation, propensities to change or stay the same, densities and weights, volition, or a variety of other properties as might assist in describing behavioral phenomena. In short, the grain is a metaphorical, analytical tool for conceptualizing the movements of norms and power. As I will discuss later, some grains manifest themselves rigidly, foreclosing alternate behavioral possibilities (Judith Butler, in *Undoing Gender*, cites the masculine/feminine binary, which I would call a grain) while others promote the growth of more grains, and more possibilities. These grains provide a flexible and versatile framework for considering the aforementioned Foucauldian “solidification” and “incorporation” of classifiable identities into the individual.

In dialogue with Foucault, Judith Butler provides an extra dimension to my “grain” idea in her discussion of knowledge-power: “The question of who and what is considered real and true is apparently a question of knowledge. But it is also, as Michel Foucault makes plain, a question of power. Having or bearing ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ is an enormously powerful prerogative within the social world, one way that power dissimulates as ontology.”⁸ My grains, bearing “truth” status through their social visibility, can additionally be thought of as mechanisms of knowledge-power, assisting in the circumscription of reality and social being.

Zooming out to observe this circumscription in culture-at-large, these grains form a coarse and falsely homogenous big picture, leaving vacuums to be filled with
deviant and alternative depictions of cultural phenomena. While this helps explain the budding of countercultures, these initially marginalized depictions often become mainstreamed at a certain threshold, entering the pool of normalized and deviant grains; and there remains an observable area in the realm of the continuous that seems to elude these vacuums. This continuousness is part of the aforementioned “actuality” that is observable but so complex it is difficult to describe. Thus, grains are produced (via depiction and perception), allowing culture to spread faster than more complicated depictions of actuality generally allow. While some depicters (authors, film directors, biographers etc.) find ways to illustrate these complex actualities by implicating the continuous, the vast majority of material depicting human behavior and interaction relies on already-known grains to weave a narrative.

The granularity/continuity problem is especially salient regarding sex and gender in narrative depictions of pair-relationships. Since sex and gender are more fluid than commonly depicted, any combination of relationship roles are not only possible but also fairly prevalent; furthermore, these combinations are infinitely modifiable and synthesizable. However, the natures of these relationships may not be as readily articulated because they lack cultural grains to validate them.

This point is supported by Judith Butler, who provides a robust description of gendered sociality in *Undoing Gender*. Butler takes the view that modes, levels and treatments of humanness are articulated socially (contrary to purely individualistic and autonomous views of identity), and that socially knowable identities (similar to
my grains) constitute the norm while “illegible” identities fail to enter our shared reality—remaining firmly in the zone of the unreal. Exemplifying sexual relationships as an intensive site of this identity trouble, Butler says: “...those who live outside the conjugal frame or maintain modes of social organization for sexuality that are neither monogamous nor quasi-marital are more and more considered unreal, and their loves and losses less than ‘true’ loves and ‘true’ losses. The derealization of this domain of human intimacy and sociality works by denying reality and truth to the relations at issue.”

Bringing identity onto the level of a pair (or more) of people, Butler implies that complex interpersonal emotions such as love become subject to the same normalizing social measures that shape and produce the behaviors of individuals. It follows that the nuanced social behaviors that enrich our lives and minds are sometimes found to be unreal, lacking in truth. If assigned truth, they are gendered, stratified, and weighted. Accordingly, relationships that are culturally unsupported by granularized or “truthful” depictions are, in the lives of the subjects in question, often perceptually adjusted and rationalized within one or more known categories. Though empirical actuality contains infinitely complex possibilities of gendered creative partnerships, those complexities may not register as legitimate according to the way we interpret the field of actuality. Our learned reality represents the way we filter actuality, and is largely conditioned through these granularized depictions.

I supplement this by wondering if the power and knowledge-producing
mechanisms that are activated by socialization create, through instability, more potent policing of interacting bodies. We have seen that hybrid and emergent behaviors at the level of a pair (or more) of humans must, through their dynamism, be more difficult to predict and to regulate, to classify, understand, and consensually assimilate into social reality. It is understandable, then, that the proliferation of possible identities and characteristics generated by pairs of humans undergoes such impoverished (compared to what is possible) representation in our social discourse.

Love (and jealousy, possession, lust), intellectual competition, role-modeling, and artistic collaboration are just several examples of emergent behaviors produced by pair sociality; the profile and form of these “macro-behaviors” is determined by unknown and fluctuating quantities of “micro-behaviors” (expressions of sex and gender, modes of communication, navigations of conflict, body language). Both macro and micro are subject to the forces of granularization, normalization, and discipline. Thinking through this model, one way that learned reality might present a complex concept like love is through grain-recipes: if x, y, and z micro-behaviors come together in a particular way, the emergent macro-behavior takes this form. Observable actuality provides an endless stream of falsifications of these types of “equations”, making pair-sociality(s) an especially important site(s) for detecting movements of power.

The picture that arises from these models of depiction, discourse, and granularization is a circular flow of power amongst networks of bodies that deals
specifically with my “grains” and the ensuing cultural rationalization of said grains. As culture defines itself with these grains, depictions are proliferated that further enforce classifiable relationship identities, looping back upon culture by shaping our modes of being. While countercultures can arise from the negative space left in the wake of granularized areas, they often represent part of the same discourse, producing their own depictions and grains that reinforce, by virtue of their comparative deviance, that which is established. This fluidity between culture and depiction leaves us with a more homogenous image of reality than we might experience otherwise.

These models and methodologies become useful when applied to the smaller and more clearly delineated society of academic composers (this term will hereafter encompass the avant-garde, experimental, and contemporary classical idioms.) Digging again at the question posed in the introduction, (“why are these people largely unobserved in the realm of mainstream scholarship?”) it is possible that the aforementioned grains can be reconstituted as grain-threads that stretch from a broader culture basis, feeding into the social community of academic composers and informing its special mediums of depiction.

Looking at historical depictions of three composer relationships, questions to consider include: What and how much historical documentation is available for each case? What kind of knowledge is this (which depictional medium), how is this type of evidence typically weighed, what authority is given to it, and why? Where does this
evidence meet and where does it deviate from normative broad-culture depictions? What is the relationship between how a depiction-type registers from a broad-culture standpoint and how it registers from a subculture standpoint?

These questions are important to my analysis of power in their attempt to pinpoint areas where granular thinking influences what and who is historically legitimized and reinforced, versus what and who falls to the wayside. By contemplating these questions in the context of historical case studies, I hope to discover areas where popular depictions and tropes overlap with scholarly depictions of creative pairs, how such popular depictions contribute to the availability, quality, and type of material available for scholars, and how the result of this granularized thinking (both in larger society and in the academic composer community) works to perpetuate lower visibility for women in the field of music composition.

It is important to note that the academic composer community has its own set of social values and grains that have been informed by years of subculture and depictions through its own unique mediums. These mediums include scholarly articles, tributes, reviews, essays, poems, books, documentaries, interviews, fictional takes on the community, and many others. As I move forward with my case studies in part II, I will refer back to my methodology of normative and deviant grains, Foucauldian circular power, Hardt & Negri-style models of singularization, and Judith Butler’s conceptions of gendered social identity in exploratory and flexible ways, discovering new avenues that are opened up by my framework. Through the study of
these creative interpersonal relationships and application of my conceptualization of power flow, I will discover how threads, produced from a broader societal base, permeate our scholarly and artistic communities and contribute to strata of more-homogeneous surface realities and more-heterogeneous submerged actualities.

Part II: Three Case Studies

Frederic Chopin and George Sand
John Cage and Morton Feldman
Pauline Oliveros and Annea Lockwood

In dialogue with Foucault’s “biopower” arising in the 19th century, the much-sensationalized creative partnership between Frederic Chopin and George Sand seems an elucidating place to start.

In February 1880, an anonymous review (by “an Oxonian”) of M. Karasowski’s “Life and Letters of Chopin” appeared in the British publication The Musical Times (then appended with “and singing class circular”). The review centers almost exclusively on Karasowski’s misrepresentation of George Sand:

M. Karasowski hates George Sand, and his account of the part she played in Chopin’s life seems to us at variance with all the facts in our possession. Opinions on so delicate a matter as personal relationship are of little value save when founded on a just estimate of personal character. Failing to form any such estimate, M. Karasowski has drawn a picture which is unworthy of George Sand and unworthy of Chopin. A cloud of misrepresentation darkens a noble friendship. It will be our purpose to dispel the cloud that the light may shine.10

Here, an immediate battle of depiction has been established. Our author later
objects to Karasowski’s “general conception of the intimacy between Chopin and George Sand”; where Karasowski paints Sand as a woman with no scruples, whom Chopin was ashamed to be with, the author rushes to Sand’s defense: “We must love with our whole being, she maintained, or live, come what may, in virgin purity. Union on any other terms is a mortal sin. And, with her, to preach and to practise were the same thing.”\(^{11}\)

Both authors appear hung up Sand’s sexual purity or lack thereof, unsurprising in a time when sexual conduct was perceived as a major aspect of a woman’s social identity. The reviewer fuels the sensationalizing of Chopin and Sand through this battle for Sand’s dignity, rejecting Karasowski’s claim that Sand “empoisoned” Chopin in his later years.\(^{12}\) The aftertaste is one of juicy controversy and mystery; we get the impression of an impassioned yet pure romance laden with tragedy. Did Sand destroy Chopin, or did she inflame his artistic spirit? Our Oxonian says, “Chopin is grand in his despair.”\(^{13}\)

It is interesting, in the case of Chopin and Sand, to observe how depictions of their partnership change over time. An article about Chopin, “Chopin: his Wit and Humor” appeared in the *Musical Times* 48 years later. When Mrs. Frank Leibich gets around to Sand’s impact on Chopin, strong language is used: “The law of contrasts sometimes brings about strange matings...Chopin, according to Liszt, dreaded becoming acquainted with the chatelaine of Nohant...the novelist, however, had determined to track him down. By sheer force of will she succeeded.”\(^{14}\) Discussing
Chopin’s reaction to the surroundings during their getaways, the trope of Sand as an empoisoning force is developed; “...the coarse-natured Sand woman was incapable of understanding his hatred of the uncivilized places to which she had dragged him. His sense of humor, of fun, failed him utterly in Valdemosa.”\(^{15}\)

A more scholarly 1929 article quotes Chopin’s biographer, Emile Vuillermoz lamenting upon the classic depictions of Sand: “...according to their personal aesthetics, George Sand is represented either as an abominable ogress abducting and putting away a guileless individual, or as the most motherly and attentive of lovers and nurses.”\(^{16}\) Through ongoing dramatization of both Sand herself and the ways in which she has been/should be depicted, these articles place the obsession with her identity in the foreground of the creative pairing. In this sense, Sand’s identity determines the relationship’s identity. We all know the image of Chopin as a dreamy, fragile genius; his identity has been firmly granularized—but the ongoing sensationalizing of Sand’s role gives their relationship, in popular thought, a dualistic identity.

To grasp at the actuality of Chopin and Sand’s relationship, one must sift, sleuth-like, through private letters, trying to piece together what is missing. Gastone Belloti writes about the availability and perceived importance of such evidence in “Three unpublished letters by George Sand and their contribution to Chopin scholarship,” asserting that Chopin biographers often disregard the bulk of available letter documentation in favor a few well-known letters, or Sand’s accounts of the
liaison in *Histoire de ma vie*, which is laced with intentional inaccuracies; in Belloti’s words, “that edifice of lies in which she thought herself secure.”¹⁷

There are many more depictions available, varying in their level of dramatization. A huge amount of material has abounded around Chopin and Sand’s famous relationship, giving extra context to both artists’ work. Notions of Chopin’s genius are partially produced through this proliferation of content, while Sand garners extra scholarly attention from the romanticized frustration of her identity.

This kind of value production, made possible through the social avenue of personal relationships, yields rich possibilities for tracing power and discussing historical subjectivity. In the case of Chopin and Sand, reviewers, admirers, biographers, and scholars are left with a trail of evidence that, if followed on the path of least resistance, feeds into a social mindset already primed to expect dramatic accounts of strange or deviant love affairs from the 19th century; the Victorian obsession with sexuality both *fueled* and *was fueled by* the image of passionate artists engaged in a tumultuous, pure or poisonous liaison. The details of daily life, the nuances of interaction, and the complexity that inevitably marked Chopin and Sand’s relations are superseded, in our memory, by the strongest impressions—those that are particularly consonant with pre-established grains of normative and deviant behavior (as understood for artists.) This kind of “fitting in (or not fitting in, provocatively)” serves as a legitimizing force, generating interest around the artists as depictions of their relationship get solidified in social discourse. As I will discuss in
a bit, artist pairs themselves are often the first generators of this interest—
documenting their thought processes, recording conversations with each other, and
creating tributes to one another in remembrance. This body of work surrounding the
creative pairing of individuals (or on a larger scale, “schools,” such as the Second
Viennese School) forms a mythology, perpetuating inspiring images, stimulating
scholarly interest, fueling debates, and increasing historical visibility of the individuals
in question.

One of the most mythologized relationships of the latter half of the 20th
century is that between John Cage and Morton Feldman. A Google search alone
reveals numerous blogs, discussions, and websites devoted to their famous
friendship. James Pritchett, music blogger, describes the pair as “two composers
walking through the night in lower Manhattan, looking for the truth in music,”18
while Alex Ross, music critic for the New Yorker, humorously paints them as “The odd
couple of the musical avant-garde.”19 The obsession with Cage and Feldman’s pair
identity is partially generated by a firmly established grain in social consciousness,
filtered through the lens of “artist”: the image of camaraderie between great men
that produces something profound.

Similar to the sensationalizing of Chopin and Sand’s affair (though eroticism, if
present at all, is buried), the use of language and storytelling provide romanticized
frameworks in which we are induced to think about these mythologized artistic
bonds. In “American Sublime,” a tribute essay to Morton Feldman, Alex Ross
describes a quintessential scene of 20th century modernism-greatness: “John Adams told me that he once attended a new-music festival in Valencia California, and stayed at a tacky motel...when he came down for breakfast, he found various leading personalities of late-twentieth-century music, including Steve Reich, Iannis Xenakis, and Milton Babbitt, sitting with Feldman, who proceeded to talk through the entire meal. ‘A lovable solipsist,’ Adams called him.” The fond nicknaming of Feldman by esteemed peers, combined with the image of “leading personalities” in a casual setting is arguably exciting. It smacks of legacy, of exclusivity, and also somehow of intimacy, as if we are momentarily being invited to share in greatness (made wonderfully mundane at the setting of a motel breakfast table.) Even the nature of how this story is told (“John Adams told me...”) suggests that a connection to (even removed by a degree) this circle of modernist greats is something significant.

The romanticized language prevalent in such depictions highlights the Cage-Feldman identity; depictions that are well-established in our social conditioning (we fully expect that intellectual men consort with one another, based on historical knowledge, mythologies, classic novels, and a slew of other mediums) combine with personal desire for or fascination with this special, larger-than-life kind of friendship, generating interest around the duo. But in the case of Cage and Feldman particularly, third-party depiction is indebted to a rich body of commentary on art by Cage and Feldman themselves, both in regard to each other and to a larger “vision”—an artistic front created from the intersection of, conversation about, and tensions between
Cage’s and Feldman’s positions on art and life. Nearly a scholarly article gets away with discussing Cage and Feldman without referencing, often reverently, this primary source material. The mass of information available resides in interviews with Cage, Feldman or both; lengthy recordings of conversations that were broadcasted on public radio; the numerous writings of both Cage and Feldman, and musical or artistic tributes borne out their friendship. To what degree legacy was of concern to either composer is debatable, but the trail of evidence left in the wake of their relationship inarguably assisted in the solidification of their position in the 20th century canon. It is the public performance of this pair-sociality that I wish to investigate as a unique site for the building of legitimacy and visibility.

The legendary relationship narrative begins with a classic kindred spirit tale.

Feldman writes of the encounter:

My first meeting with John Cage was at Carnegie Hall when Mitropoulos conducted the Webern Symphony. I believe that was the winter of 1949–50, and I was about twenty-four years old. The audience reaction to the piece was so antagonistic and disturbing that I left immediately afterwards. I was more or less catching my breath in the empty lobby when John came out. I recognized him, though we had never met, walked over, and as though I had known him all my life said, “Wasn’t that beautiful?” A moment later we were talking animatedly about how beautiful the piece sounded in so large a hall. We immediately made arrangements for me to visit him.21

Alex Ross has a different take on the scene, noting that both men left to “avoid having their modernist spell disrupted by Rachmaninoff’s romanticism.”22

Both accounts—of leaving because of the audience’s reaction or possibly to avoid Rachmaninoff—sugest a certain sensitivity or idealism. We are well acclimated both
to the image of the male sensitive artist (with Romantics like Schubert, Schumann, and Chopin) and to the image of Modernist idealism associated with the second Viennese school. Arnold Schoenberg exemplifies this idealism in a message to the National Academy of Arts and Letters:

I had fallen into an ocean...of overheated water, and it burned not only my skin, it burned also internally.
And I could not swim.
At least I could not swim with the tide. All I could do was swim against the tide—whether it saved me or not!23

This image, of the artist swimming against the trend in pursuit of a possibly unattainable aesthetic salvation, represents a crucial grain of artist identity. Though it may have been a deviant grain in the mid-20th century, academic music culture has subsumed this idealism since as normative, if not necessarily dominant. Feldman’s public representation of his initial encounter with Cage is saturated with what we expect Feldman expected for his own identity based on this available, deviant “modernist” grain. “Liner Notes” was written in 1962, more than ten years after that evening. Feldman’s writing is saturated with sweeping statements about art and state of mind, and it does not seem strange that a 12-year retrospective (filled with formative artistic experiences) produces such a romanticized, love-at-first-sight depiction of the encounter.

The visible, public bond between Feldman and Cage flourishes as they write about each other. Cage, a prolific writer and articulate speaker, strengthens the ties with his “Lecture on Nothing,”(on his own music) and “Lecture on Something”(on
Feldman’s music), situated adjacently in Silence. “I am here, and there is nothing to say.”24 begins Cage on himself; on Feldman he starts, “This is a talk about something and naturally also a talk about nothing. About how something and nothing are not opposed to each other but need each other to keep on going.”25 This juxtaposition establishes a deep connection between Cage and Feldman in the musical discourse. Cage’s public endowment of Feldman with “something” for his “nothing,” grants to the younger composer a serious status; Cage (already established) seems to be stating, thinly veiled by metaphor, that his music does not exist without Feldman’s. Contrary to Cage’s thought in that moment, historical perspective strongly suggests that Cage’s recognition as a composer would stand without Feldman. Yet Cage furnishes Feldman with a distinct musical role: “Feldman speaks of no sounds, and takes within broad limits the first ones that come along. He has changed the responsibility of the composer from making to accepting.”26 The removed lens of 50-some years later reveals that that Feldman is largely legitimized through Cage’s advocacy of his work.

On Cage’s influence in his life, Feldman writes “Quite frankly, I sometimes wonder how my music would have turned out if John had not given me those early permissions to have confidence in my instincts.”27 While attributing a large part of his artist-hood to Cage’s influence, Feldman consistently complicates the situation through various social presentations of himself. In a 1972 interview, prompted to discuss Cage’s influence, Feldman claims “I was on my way before I met Cage—my
music didn’t change when I met Cage, in fact it’s the opposite: his music changed when he met me.”28 Feldman’s need to make such public claims further reveals Cage’s validating influence; the public perception of their relationship (Cage as formative, Feldman as receptive) that Feldman is attempting to subvert suggests (at the time) that Feldman is primarily conceptualized in terms of this pair-relationship.

This question about Cage appears first in the interview. I compare this to a 1987 interview with Cage that is more than 20 pages long, where nearly every question prompts Cage to reveal his individual position on topics such as experimentalism, the avant-garde, and chance; no question specifically asks about Feldman.29

Yet when it comes to describing what happened to the American arts scene in the 50’s and 60’s, we latch onto Feldman’s language. It excites us. Speaking of those times, Feldman says, “It was a sort of frontier atmosphere in which an extraordinary laissez faire prevailed. Men worked and talked with the recklessness of the forty-niners, and a vote of confidence was given to all. This excitement, this social phenomenon, has had an influence extending to much of the painting and music being created today.”30 In contrast, Cage’s writings on the situation remain measured, enigmatic, and personal. Speaking of the situation, he focuses on mundane details, non-happenings. His language is the opposite of Feldman’s bombastic romanticism. “Now, on the other hand,” he writes, “times have changed; music has changed; and I no longer object to the word ‘experimental.’ I use it in fact to describe all the music that especially interests me and to which I am devoted,
whether someone else wrote it or I myself did.\textsuperscript{31}

The difference in historical telling from the perspectives of Cage and Feldman (as well as how they have each been filtered through third-party retrospective) is elucidating. If it is Cage who legitimizes Feldman, it is Feldman who legitimizes the artistic trends of the times, helps along the idealization of both the relationship and the era. A 2001 headline from the \textit{Jewish Daily Forward} reads “The Tale of a Chance Meeting that Set the World on Its Ear: Carnegie Hall Restages the Epic Encounter Between John Cage and Morton Feldman in a 3-day Festival Called “When Morty met John.”\textsuperscript{32} Meanwhile, there is an irony of depiction in an \textit{Art in Limbo} blog post; the author writes, “Cage set the stage for a fundamental 1960s attitude toward what might or might not be represented in art, that a political justice could be served in representing what had previously been excluded- in this case, the ordinary.” She exposes Cage’s interest in the “ordinary”, but rather than adopting his method of history telling, she sticks to more sensational language; “It is impossible to imagine a contemporary art world that has not been touched by his legacy.”\textsuperscript{33}

The way we discuss art in reference to Cage and Feldman exemplifies a dominant grain of history-telling behavior—through connections to the extraordinary rather the ordinary. In other words, we talk about Cage, who represented himself complexly, enigmatically (rejecting the epic mode of depiction that Feldman so readily utilizes) in Feldman’s terms. This dominant grain of historical depiction stretches far back, and persists today in our early schooling; we hear much about
major crises, revolutions, wars, heroic deeds, powerful individuals; little about the
details of daily life, all the ordinary things that form the environment in which crises,
revolutions, wars, and deeds occur (relevantly, the branch of history dealing with
these daily details comes about in the late 19th century, circa the time women are
accepted as viable writers of non-fiction, coinciding also with the emergence of
Foucault’s bio-power.) This parallels aspects of the Cage-Feldman relationship that
we hear most about: material abounds around their famous conversations and
debates, fraternal tensions; things we have learned to associate with major events.
Yet Kyle Gann, describing a Wesleyan symposium, notes: “someone rose to comment
that though everyone was calling Cage a father figure, his horoscope has Cancer
rising: he’s actually a mother figure. The panel agreed that Cage is a nurturing
presence.” The subversion of Cage’s nurturing or “motherly” social attributes in the
presence of the more accessible grains of fraternity or mentorship suggests a
subversion of Cage’s own view of the world (a relatively feminized view) by those
who interpret his history. This, ultimately, is how Feldman contributes to the
affirmation of Cage’s importance: by making him historically intelligible to broader
culture through modes of storytelling.

I have now examined two ways in which social depiction greatly enhances the
historical visibility of creative pairs of people. How do we account for creative
relationships of arguably prominent people that don’t produce the same type of
legitimacy; a threshold of visibility that multiplies and propels an artist (and the
artist’s work) again and again through forums of academic musical knowledge such as the classroom, the concert hall, and the conference paper session?

It could be a personal failing of mine, or merely a testament to my conditioning (probably both) that I could not think of an “important” female collaboration in the academic music world—somehow 4 years of undergraduate study at a conservatory, a semester in a master’s program at Ithaca College, and 3 semesters at UC San Diego left me impoverished on this front. With research and recommendation, I found a modest amount of material on Pauline Oliveros and Annea Lockwood, two well-known composers that are female.

Martha Mockus’s 2008 book Sounding Out: Pauline Oliveros and Lesbian Musicality stands out as the most visible source of documentation for Oliveros’ and Lockwood’s relationship (including large amounts of excerpts from personal letters), while other works like Pink Noises (by Tara Rodgers) and a radio interview on Ode to Gravity involving Lockwood and Oliveros provide extra context. Much of this material is extremely focused on the intense musical sociality of women, which makes it yet more perplexing that these artistic female to female relationships stay largely within the confines of feminist musicology, resisting broader generalization, circulation, and granularization.

Hearkening all the way back to my Foucauldian methodology; it is possible that this circulation of power having to do with women’s visibility in music is due in part to the phenomena of grains; cultural truths or discrete manifestations of
knowledge-power, via behaviors, that we are prompted to rationalize and conceptualize relationships with. In my study of Chopin and George Sand I tried to show that Sand’s visibility is enhanced through “fitting” with these grains in sensationalized and controversial ways—the task of understanding her in these terms is simplified by the sheer mass of different ways (or grains) we have at our disposal to conceptualize male/female relationships with. In the case of female/female relationships, we have less to work with. This initially seems strange, since women are often depicted as intensely social—their sociality, however, is frequently regarded as mysterious, inconsequential (because it occurs in the undervalued domain of the domestic), or destructive. Women organize socially, in narrative, through the fundraiser, the potluck, the book club—we are familiarized with their operations at the local level in community projects such as aesthetic upkeep and charitable acts; on the more destructive front, tropes such as “petty drama” and “town gossip” prevail. Another depicted area of female-to-female interaction, “feminine mystery,” is often regarded as a sanctified and possibly frightening domain, unfit for critical analysis (this directly relates to Oliveros, Lockwood, and the nature of mainstream academic music and scholarship in ways I will discuss shortly.)

Even women, I believe, sometimes find themselves unable to describe or contextualize their own empirical interactions. I have often heard young, intelligent women in my field (including myself, at some juncture) disavow the deep and fruitful
female relationship; citing other women as “hard to understand,” “vapid,” or “catty,”
while making claims that friendships with men can be deeper, more fulfilling, or more
intellectual. That this dialogue is so common amongst younger artistic or self-
proclaimed intellectual females speaks volumes. We reject the limited grains we have
at our disposal for contextualizing female-female relations because they don’t fit our
individual conceptions of self. This, combined with the isolation of being one of few
females in a male-dominated field, means opportunities to falsify our social
preconceptions can be few and far between. Recalling my granularity/continuity
problem, I theorize that because of the lack of deep cultural and narrative
exploration of female/female relationships, the apprehension of these relationships
requires us to delve into continuous, empirical actuality.

Another way to think about this is provided by Alice Jardine, who, according
to Timothy D. Taylor in “The Gendered Construction of Musical Self: The Music of
Pauline Oliveros”, uses the term “gynesis” to describe what has been “‘left out,’ de-
emphasized, hidden, or denied articulation within Western Systems of Knowledge.”
We know that females bond, but we don’t know how. The how is my reading of the
“articulation” that Jardine describes.

A glance at the two Wikipedia articles “Female Bonding” and “Male bonding”
provides overwhelming support for this point. I choose Wikipedia because it is the
quick, accessible go-to source for the person who is cursorily curious, and a well-
known institution of knowledge in our era. On the topic of male bonding, Wikipedia
states:

In the context of human relationships, male bonding is used to describe friendship between men...The expression is sometimes used synonymously with the word camaraderie. Friendships among men are...based on shared activities and ambitions, instead of emotional sharing (which is common of women’s friendships.) This can include playing musical instruments, video games, business ventures, creative endeavors, journeys, quests, sporting activities, fishing, hunting, camping, gambling, social drinking, or working with tools.\(^{36}\)

The article on female bonding is significantly more vague:

Female bonding is the formation of a close personal relationship between women.\(^{[1]}\) Female bonding is a term that is used in ethology, social science, and in general usage to describe patterns of friendship, attachment, and cooperation in women; or in the case of ethology, associations between females of various species. The exact meaning of the term differs across contexts.\(^{37}\)

We can observe these articles as sites where grains are available for consumption, and thus possible disseminators or articulators of “truth.” The respective specificity/vagueness of the two articles reflects Foucault’s knowledge-power insofar as it puts on vivid display, through relative levels of detail, our collective focus on “what should be known” and circulated.

I reiterate the complex productivity of norms (facilitated by grains) as they concern gendered constructions of sociality. Judith Butler illuminates the paradox of autonomy as an illustration of this productivity.

When we assert our ‘right,’ as we do and we must, we are not carving out a place for our autonomy—if by autonomy we mean a state of individuation, taken as self-persisting prior to and apart from any relations of dependency on the world of others. We do not negotiate with norms or with Others subsequent to our coming into the world. We come into the world on the condition that the social world is
already there, laying the groundwork for us. This implies that I cannot persist without norms of recognition that support my persistence: the sense of possibility pertaining to me must first be imagined from somewhere else before I can begin to imagine myself. My reflexivity is not only socially mediated, but socially constituted. I cannot be who I am without drawing upon the sociality of norms that precede and exceed me. In this sense, I am outside myself from the outset, and must be, in order to survive, and in order to enter into the realm of the possible.38

Though norms constrict, foreclose, and circumscribe reality; they simultaneously form the foundations of our ability to comprehend each other, as well as providing for the emergence of alternate possibilities. Specific knowledge (once again, how) can be a tool for departure: more grains provide more points of flight, possibilities for hybridization, points of comparison and falsification, and conceptualization of new or alternate identities.

This problem of “what tools do we have to talk about female bonds?” is of utmost importance when considering Pauline Oliveros and Annea Lockwood as a creative duo. One facet of this issue relates to the dominant modes of storytelling I exposed with my study of Cage and Feldman; many of the ways Oliveros and Lockwood discuss their artistic bonds, interest, and processes fall into feminized modes of historical relation. Annea Lockwood says of her first contact with Oliveros:

...we made contact towards the end of the ‘60’s. We started writing letters to each other; I think we recognized kindred spirits. She got me involved in the Sonic Meditations when she wanted to organize them at a distance. And I was sending her stuff that I was doing, and so on, responding to each other. That was an invaluable friendship. And then little by little I began to reach more Americans.39
The informality of this statement, the ordinariness of it does not immediately

cue us to recognize Oliveros’ and Lockwood’s friendship as something distinctly
worth noting. Language like “little by little” and “and so on” suggests process,
building, or patience; but modern music scholarship, with its frequent examination of
major artistic upheavals, passionate affairs, famous disagreements, and other overtly
potent factors is not primed to take notice of this type of conversation, though it is
happening everywhere all the time. Additional difficulties arise from the
experimental nature of what Oliveros and Lockwood were doing together. I will
examine various mechanisms behind this claim, including musical content, context,
gendering, and staging.

The setting of modernism, in which Oliveros’ and Lockwood’s musical
collaborations unfold, provides its own set of quandaries. In Gendering Musical
Modernism, Ellie Hisama takes issue with the assertion that because Ives used
masculine language to describe modernism, it is an unfriendly musical arena for
women. She enlists the Marion Bauer on this point; Bauer says of Modernism, “We
might successfully sum up the new music as an attempt to escape the obvious, to
avoid time-worn combinations, to elide the unnecessary, to allow the mind to supply
implied detail and to break down established boundaries...”

Bauer’s take on modernism suggests it is an unusually friendly place for
women, providing the opportunity for new, preliminarily undervalued modes of art
and thought to emerge. At this point of possibility, where structures, hierarchies and
value systems are still nascent, we can imagine that gendered grains liquefy, singularize, become somewhat detached from former structures and thus open themselves to revision and hybridization. Judith Butler cites the importance of possibility as a normative aspiration; in my methodology, possibility as a norm operates as a grain with the specific function of opening-up rather than foreclosing. In this regard, the ideals behind modernism potentially supply the field of gender with new windows for recognition and legitimation.

It is in this soup where we find Oliveros the innovator, challenging, in ways quite distinct from personages like John Cage, the foundations on which modern academic music is constructed. The unique aspects of Oliveros’ body of work provide insight into the politics and power circulating in the sphere of academic music. While Oliveros maintains relatively high visibility, both she and Lockwood are regularly outstripped in classic measures of scholarly interest by people like Boulez, Xenakis, and Feldman, to name a few.

Oliveros herself argues that Western Culture has emphasized analytical modes of thought over intuitive modes, linking analytical to “masculinity” and intuitive to “femininity.”\(^{42}\) Synthesizing, Oliveros’ point about feminized (though not necessary female) logics suggests that although the ideals behind modernism are inherently friendly to women, older grains and structures of thought in place continue(d) to delay a rich integration and expansion of undervalued, gendered logics in scholarly research. (It is interesting to note that Feldman and Cage, who both used
a distinctly feminized musical logic and yet still garner much scholarly interest, fall
under my point about novel variations on old grains. When “great men” use
feminized logic it is an original way of thinking; when women use feminized logic it is
inseparable from their culturally unverifiable natures, and we do not know how to
talk about it.)

So what does this use of feminized logics by females produce, in the case of
Lockwood and Oliveros? One answer is that is produces an intensely social music—
breaking with more classic academic structures of artistic community and
individualism (some of which I’ve explored) that make up the surface view of the
academic music world. This “breaking with tradition” is characterized by
collaborations and socialities that happen outside of the authority of the concert hall.
Even before meeting each other in person, Lockwood and Oliveros communicated
about potential common goals. Oliveros writes to Lockwood, “Your work is lovely and
I’m all the more convinced that meeting you would be very interesting as I think we
are dealing with some similar problems. Time span—occult phenomena—ritual—
thater.”43 In 1971, she sent scores of her Sonic Meditations to her friend, who
gathered people together in the Epping Forest in Essex to perform them. Almost 40
years later, Martha Mockus describes Lockwood’s observations about the experience
as “the most sophisticated contemporary analyses of the Sonic Meditations.”44

The friendship between Oliveros and Lockwood, though it produces
documentation, fails to generate legitimacy in the same way as the Cage/Feldman or
Chopin/Sand relationships. Instead, an alternative form of legitimacy—submerged from our conditioned view of reality, arises from these feminized experiences, collaborations, and analyses. This legitimacy remains “alternate” because it embodies a near-complete rejection of normative ways to conceptualize academic music. When Lockwood analyzes the meditations, she describes bodily, kinesthetic experiences; language of analysis holistically interwoven with sensuality: “...a rhythmic pattern on “Allah”—gradually shifts emphasis onto the “—lah—,” which becomes breathier and heavier until one’s chest is subjected to great weight-feelings, the words gone and it’s a pumping of the whole body.”

Not only is the social experience of music making outside the validating arena of the concert hall (as a primary goal, not just in rehearsal or informal settings) a feminized mode of conceptualizing music in the academic music sphere, but the analysis of this social experience through the tactile subjectivity of a female body remains a form of knowledge that isn’t given much weight.

To expand on this point, I will not argue that the body is repressed in Academic Music; instead I will argue that there are granularized norms that produce expectations of how the body will be presented. This brings up the aforementioned issue of staging; for a woman’s music, (music largely dealing with women’s bodies and sociality) to exist outside normal forums of evaluation simultaneously challenges and reinforces the mysterious otherness of women’s sociality. On one hand, the evoked grain of “feminine mystery,” something sacrosanct, may play a preventive
role concerning more traditional (and more accepted) forms of academic analysis for this kind of “social music.” In this sense, the grain of feminine mystery operates as an inhibitor for the development of more specific, fluid, or proliferative grains. On the other hand, by distilling both the grain of women’s “mysterious” sociality and all of the un-described in-between into an aesthetic action; a depiction is formed, sparking possibilities for eventual grain-production and increasing the chance for strong social legibility.

The ways in which Oliveros and Lockwood present themselves and describe their friendship, the availability and type of documentation for this friendship, and the content and setting of projects they worked on together all provide a lens for examining the influence of women’s sociality on legitimacy. It can be surmised that the lack of available grains for contextualizing women’s relations with each other (in deep and resonant ways) is a partial contributor to our lack of knowledge about creative female partnerships. Oliveros and Lockwood, through collaborations and documentation, have provided a rich view of the possible outcomes we have at our disposal to examine, learn, and write about women’s musical sociality, as well as any musical sociality that lies largely submerged from our granularized view of reality.

I circle back to my young experiences, to my friend citing Clara Schumann as the only great female musician; to the assumptions I encountered about my presence at the electro-acoustic conference, to the classes and seminars where the same people are cited again and again as worthy of our attention, while others fall to the
wayside. Sex and gender, which have been long subjected to deep cultural dualisms, are potent areas for the investigation of knowledge and power flows; but my concern runs deeper. It is not useful to state, simply, that I may be subjected to different treatment, in various arenas, because I am female. That is an empty statement of a surface condition. It is more useful to look beneath the surface; to consider how the structures of knowledge and power in which we are all socially conditioned and continuously acclimated preempt our impressions before we have the empirical evidence to test against these conditioned realities.

I connect the dots with my early compositional training and social influences, at the conjunction of knowledge-power that formed the basis from which I would develop, and later learn to question, as a composer. These pools of grains in which I was socialized and subsequent interrogations (arising from observed discrepancies) are what led me to this analysis of historical subjectivity and validation. My three case studies, through their investigation of social influences on the visibility of creative people, provide a launching point for further research; specifically the exploration of how the social production of knowledge in academic music spheres produces legitimized grains for aesthetic trends, creative processes, and modes of discussing these processes and trends. Through a more specialized analysis of musical outcomes, I hope to trace how dominant logics emerge in our sphere of Academic Music, forming falsely homogeneous sets of ideals for how art should look and sound, how it should be conceived, and how it should be received. Lastly, I
question how these dominant logics and trends circulate back into and affect academic music culture, informing how we perceive and shape our art and ourselves.
20 Ross, “American Sublime.”
22 Ross, “American Sublime.”
27 Feldman, Give my Regards, 5.
30 Feldman, Give my Regards, 15.
31 Cage, Silence, 7.
34 Kyle Gann, Music Downtown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 185–186.
38 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender, 32.
41 Marion Bauer, quoted in Gendering Musical Modernism, 122.
44 Martha Mockus, Pauline Oliveros, 59.
45 Martha Mockus, Pauline Oliveros, 59.
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