What Is The Field Of Social Justice About?

Social psychologists have a long history of interest in the basis of people's cognitions, attitudes and behaviors in social interactions. Why does a concern about people's feelings and actions in social settings lead social psychologists to study social justice? Studies show that judgments about what is "just", "fair", "deserved", or something one is "entitled" to receive are a central social judgment which lies at the heart of people's feelings, attitudes, and behaviors in their interactions with others. Perceptions of injustice are closely related to feelings of anger (Montada, 1994; Shaver et al, 1989) and envy (Smith, Parolt, Ozer and Moniz, 1994), to psychological depression (Hafer and Olson, 1992; Walker and Mann, 1987) and to moral outrage (Montada, 1994). Further, judgments of fairness are significantly related to people's interpersonal perceptions (Lerner, 1981), political attitudes (Tyler, 1990; Tyler, Rasinski and McGraw, 1985) and prejudice toward outgroups (Lipkus and Siegler, 1993; Pettigrew and Meertons, 1994).

People's actual behavior is also strongly linked to views about justice and injustice. A wide variety of studies link justice judgments to positive behaviors such as willingness to accept third-party decisions (Tyler, 1990); willingness to help the group (Moorman, 1991; Organ and Moorman, 1993); and willingness to empower group authorities (Tyler and Degoe, 1994). Conversely, other studies link the lack of justice to sabotage, theft, and on a collective level, to the willingness to rebel or protest (Greenberg, 1990; Moore, 1978; Muller and Jukam, 1983). In other words, how people feel and behave in social settings is strongly shaped by judgments about justice and injustice. Such justice judgments are of special interest to social psychologists because justice standards are a socially created reality. They have no external referent of the type associated with physical objects. Instead, they are created and maintained by individuals, groups, organizations, and societies.

In addition to being important because it addresses central social psychological questions, social justice is important because its predictions are counterintuitive, and contrary to the prevailing self-interest models which dominate the social sciences. Since the "rational" view of the person that currently informs and influences much of social science and public policy assumes that people are motivated by self interest, not by concerns about justice, departures from this rationality are both theoretically and socially important.

Social justice research shows that people's feelings and beliefs are not consistent with the feelings that would be predicted by self-interest theories. A self-interest model predicts that those who receive more compensation for their work will be more satisfied. However, this prediction is not borne out by the data. Instead, people's satisfaction is linked to whether or not they feel that they are receiving fair compensation. Those receiving fair compensation indicate greater satisfaction than those receiving higher, but unfair, levels of compensation (Walster, Walster, and Berscheid, 1978).

Social justice research on behavior also reflects departures from a self-interest or rational choice model. For example, people are willing to punish others who act unfairly even at a personal cost to themselves. Further, in situations of unequal power, social exchange theory predicts that people with greater power will use their power to achieve unequal gains. Research suggests that they do, but that their behavior does not fully exploit their power advantages (Guth, Schmitberger, Schwarze, 1982; Ochs and Roth, 1989). Instead, their behavior seems to reflect a concern for fairness. The failure of advantaged people not to fully press their resource and power advantages is consistent with the suggestion that people care about justice (Smith and Tyler, in press).

The Field Of Social Justice

Research on social justice generally addresses itself to six questions. The first is whether judgments about justice and injustice shape people's feelings and attitudes. The most clear cut evidence for the importance of justice concerns comes from investigations of what people think and feel. When people are asked to indicate their subjective reactions to their outcomes, for example satisfaction or
people are asked to indicate their subjective reactions to their outcomes, for example satisfaction or dissatisfaction, those reactions are found to be linked to judgments about whether the norms of justice have been violated, rather than personal or group interests.

The second question is which criteria people use to determine whether or not justice has occurred. If people react to injustice, it is important to understand how they decide that it has or has not occurred. Justice research generally suggests that people are seldom at a loss when asked to make judgments about injustice—"they know it when they see it!". But, how do they know it?

The third question is how people respond behaviorally to justice or injustice once they decide it has occurred. Will people acquiesce to injustice, will they choose individual remedies or will they challenge the injustice collectively? The distinction between collective and individual reactions to injustice is particularly important for researchers interested in social movements. The recognition of collective injustice is proposed to motivate participation in social movements, collective protests and political rebellions (Gurr, 1970; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994).

The fourth question is why people care about justice. Social psychologists discuss the social justice motive from two broad theoretical perspectives. The first is the theory of social exchange. That theory suggests that people are self-interested in their judgments and choices. Their concern about justice develops from a desire to maximize their own gains in interactions with others. The second theoretical perspective is based on social identification models. It argues that people use their social experiences to define and evaluate their social selves. Hence, justice is connected to people's feelings about the status of their group and within that group their social standing, their self-worth, and their self-concepts.

The fifth question is when people care about justice. Some theories suggest that justice is a basic human motivation and will be present in all social interactions. Others argue that there is a range outside of which people do not care about issues of justice—that there is a limit to social justice concerns, or at least that the strength of social justice concerns varies depending on situational factors. Researchers consider three situational factors: culture, social roles, and scarcity.

The sixth question is how justice concerns originate. Three perspectives are compared. The first argues that justice judgments represent a basic innate or unfolding human concern. A second is that justice concerns develop out of personal experiences with others. Finally, the third perspective argues that justice concerns which develop through cultural socialization.


Most social justice research deals with issues of allocation. As Leventhal notes "all groups, organizations and societies deal with the question of allocating rewards, punishments and resources" (1980:27). However, different theories approach this core issue from varying perspectives. Early research on relative deprivation focuses on the negative consequences that follow from the absence of justice. In the United States, this research was inspired by concerns about economic inequality, political instability and collective unrest that marked the 1940's and 1960s. Related research examines sabotage at work, criminal behavior and self-destructive actions such as alcoholism and drug use. The focus of this research is on what society can lose when people feel unfairly treated. More recent justice theories, in particular those underlying the study of procedural justice, focus on what can be gained when people feel fairly treated. This work develops out of concern over the circumstances under which disputants willingly accept the decisions of third parties. It also explores the willingness to obey rules, and the antecedents of loyalty and commitment to groups and organizations.

I. Do People Care About Justice?: Feelings And Attitudes

Four bodies of justice theory seek to examine the importance of judgments about justice and injustice on feelings and attitudes: relative deprivation, equity, retributive justice, and procedural justice. This review outlines the basic features of each body of theory.
Relative deprivation

One of the major contributions of the social science research on American soldiers conducted during the second world war is the development of the theory of relative deprivation (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star and Williams, 1949). In perhaps the most famous example of this theory, it is argued that feelings of relative deprivation explain the greater dissatisfaction with the promotion system among the highly promoted airmen compared to the less often promoted military policemen. It is hypothesized that airmen compared their situation to the situation for other rapidly promoted air corp peers and felt dissatisfied, since they were likely to know other people who were moving ahead of them, while military policemen compared their situation to the situation of their slowly promoted military police peers and felt satisfied, since they were moving forward as rapidly as any of their colleagues. Their research suggests that subjective satisfaction is not a simple reaction to the objective quality of a person’s outcomes when dealing with others (Merton and Kitt, 1950). Instead, people evaluate the quality of their outcomes by comparing them to the outcomes received by others. Implicit in such comparisons is a model of what they "deserve" relative to others that people use to decide how their outcomes ought to compare to those received by others.

Relative deprivation theory is important within the social sciences because the concept of relative deprivation offered social scientists an elegant way for explaining numerous paradoxes. First, it explains why the objectively disadvantaged are often satisfied with receiving very low levels of social resources, and why the objectively advantaged are often dissatisfied with very high levels of social resources. For example, studies show very little relationship between objective standard of living and satisfaction with one’s income (Strumpel, 1976). In particular, studies do not suggest that increasing objective income or raising the standard of living further increases satisfaction with income or living standards. Not only can money not buy love, more money cannot guarantee happiness.

Second, relative deprivation theory can explain when riots occur and who is motivated to participate in collective protest and rebellion. For example, empirical research shows that it is often the more advantaged members of disadvantaged groups who engage in collective action, not the most disadvantaged (Caplan and Paige, 1968; Gurin and Epps, 1975). Although these people are not the most objectively deprived members of their group, they are the most likely members of their group to make subjective social comparisons with members of more advantaged groups (Pettigrew, 1972; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). Similarly, the era of urban riots which occurred in the United States during the 1960s followed a period of economic and political gain for the disadvantaged (the "civil rights" era), not a period of stable or decreased economic justice. Relative deprivation theorists argue that the experience of increased advantages provides the disadvantaged with new standards for comparisons and expectations that make them more sensitive to potential violations of those standards (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). Following a period of improvement, people expect continued improvement. Riots occur when the rate of improvements slows, creating a discrepancy between expectations and reality.

The meaning of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is a judgment of deprivation linked to feelings of anger and resentment. This description reflects the distinction relative deprivation theorists have made between the magnitude of the differential that people see between themselves and comparison others or standards and their emotional reactions to these differences (Crosby, 1976, 1984; Gurr, 1970; Runciman, 1966). Some researchers argue that relative deprivation is better represented by people’s affective reactions to negative comparisons than by cognitive judgments. One reason for this suggestion is that affective measures of relative deprivation appear more closely related to collective action than cognitive measures (Dube and Guimond, 1986; Olson and Hafer, 1994). Others argue that justice-related affect (e.g., guilt and anger) cause cognitive judgments of fairness (Scher and Heise, 1993). However, empirical research shows that affective and cognitive measures of relative deprivation tend to be highly correlated, suggesting that they can be considered as two components of the same concept, rather than as independent constructs (Petta and Walker, 1992). More importantly, it is the comparative nature of the cognitive judgment, rather than the existence of feelings of anger and resentment, that distinguishes models of relative deprivation from the earlier frustration-aggression hypothesis.

Choice of comparison referents. Central to models of relative deprivation is the choice of comparison referent. People with the same objective outcome can potentially feel very happy or very
angry, depending upon their comparison choice. Comparison choices can explain the unexpected
tolerance of injustice by the unfairly disadvantaged (Major, 1994; Martin, 1986a, 1994; Moore, 1991).
Members of disadvantaged groups are more likely to make comparisons to other disadvantaged group
members such as their family and friends or to their personal experience and expectations than to
advantaged group members (Major and Forcey, 1985; Major and Testa, 1988). Therefore, they may not
think of themselves as disadvantaged.

The choice of a comparison target is more accurately described as a series of choices (Berger,
(1) chooses the dimension on which to compare; (2) chooses to compare oneself to others as opposed to
oneself at other points in time; (3) if comparing to oneself, chooses the points in time with which to
compare; (4) if comparing to others, chooses those others; (5) chooses to compare oneself as an
individual to other individuals or chooses to think of oneself as a group member and compare one's
group to other groups; (6) chooses groups with which to identify; and (7) chooses groups with which to
compare one's own group(s). Although theoretical models outline the complexities of comparison
choices, the majority of empirical research has been limited to a single source of comparison
information.

One tradition of relative deprivation research is focused almost exclusively on people's
comparisons with themselves at different points in time (Davies, 1962; Feierabend, Feierabend and
Nesvold, 1969; Gurr, 1970; Taylor, 1982). For example, Gurr (1970) distinguishes three different
patterns of relative deprivation, each of which can create the necessary conditions for riots and
rebellion. The first pattern, decremental deprivation, describes the discrepancy that occurs when
people's expectations remain constant but their capabilities to meet those expectations begins to fall.
The second pattern, aspirational deprivation, describes the discrepancy that occurs when people's
capabilities remain constant but their expectations increase. The third pattern, progressive
depression, describes the discrepancy that occurs when both expectations and capabilities increase,
but capabilities cannot keep pace with rising expectations. The J-Curve theory proposed by Davies
(1962) shares Gurr's emphasis on aggregate economic changes that can influence the outcomes of
intrapersonal comparisons. He argues that civil strife, revolutions and political violence are more
likely to occur if a prolonged period of economic growth is followed by a short term economic reversal.

The assumption supporting this research is that people compare their current situation with
either their past experiences or their future expectations. However, these experiences and expectations
are not measured directly. Instead, feelings of relative deprivation are inferred from aggregate
objective indices (e.g., the number of newspapers available in a particular nation-state or the literacy
rate). However, recent social psychological research directly tests the influence of discrepancies
between current conditions and both future expectations and past experiences on people's emotional
reactions to their current circumstances (Markus and Nurius, 1986). This research shows that people may
not react negatively to unfavorable objective conditions because they compare their present self to a
past self that was destitute or a future self that is in an even worse situation. Alternatively, when
information from the environment challenges the probability of realizing a cherished possible self,
people will react with anger and frustration.

In contrast to the political science emphasis on intrapersonal comparison information, most
social psychological research focuses on comparisons to other people, beginning with Festinger's (1954)
social comparison theory. That theory proposes that people prefer upward similar comparisons,
evaluating their own situation by comparing it to the situation of people who are like them, but in
slightly better situations (Martin, 1981). This emphasis on other people and groups as sources of
comparison information links relative deprivation models to a family of self-evaluation theories, all
of which build on similar premises about the social nature of the comparison process (Pettigrew, 1967).
Although research on social comparison (Suls and Wills, 1991), reference group theory (Hyman and
Singer, 1968), expectation-states theory (Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Wagner, 1983) and aspiration
levels (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger and Sears, 1944) are not explicitly linked to justice, they share a
common emphasis with relative deprivation models on the use of comparison information to evaluate
one's current situation.

Research supports the preference for upward similar comparisons when people are seeking to
evaluate their outcomes (Major, 1994; Suls and Wills, 1991), but suggests that people do not always
limit themselves to comparisons with similar others (Martin, 1981). In fact, social networks and contexts can prevent or force particular comparison choices (Gartrell, 1987; Masters and Smith, 1987; Olson, Herman and Zanna, 1986, Suls and Wills, 1991). For example, the bias toward similar others in wage comparison choices may reflect the segregation of the work environment (Major, 1987, 1994) and the tendency toward similarity in friendship networks (Gartrell, 1987).

Ironically, the role of interpersonal context in shaping social comparisons also can explain why in some situations, proximal, but socially dissimilar others, particularly if they are in the majority, are preferred as comparison choices over more distant, but more socially similar others (Martin, 1981; Moore, 1991; Singer, 1981). For example, a single minority employee working with majority co-workers is much more likely to select majority members as relevant comparisons. When members of a unfairly disadvantaged group work or live primarily with advantaged group members, they are more likely to identify with their particular disadvantaged group (Lau, 1989) and they are more likely to choose an advantaged group member as a social comparison (Major, 1994; Zanna, Crosby and Lowenstein, 1987).

While the social context influences the salience of different comparison choices, personal motivations influence their attractiveness (Levine and Moreland, 1987). For example, people prefer to make downward comparisons in order to enhance or protect their feelings of self-worth rather than the upward comparisons that can lead to feelings of deprivation (Taylor and Lobel, 1989; Wills, 1991; Wood, 1989). Members of disadvantaged groups who enjoy personal advantages may prefer to compare downward to other less fortunate members of their group rather than comparing their group's less fortunate situation to the situation for a more privileged group (Moore, 1991; Smith, Spears and Oyen, 1994). Research on married couples shows that married women prefer "referential" comparisons to other married women that support feelings of relative advantage rather than "relational" comparisons to their male partner that provide evidence of relative disadvantage (VanYperen and Buunk, 1994).

Although most empirical research has focused on a single source of comparison information, a variety of possible sources of comparison information have been identified, and it is likely that people use more than one source of comparison information. For example, people's satisfaction and sense of injustice reflects both the difference between their current outcomes and their past or expected future outcomes (an intrapersonal comparison) and the difference between their current outcome and other people's outcomes (an interpersonal comparison, Lowenstein, Thompson and Bazerman, 1989; Messe and Watts, 1983; Messick and Sentis, 1985; O'Malley, 1983). Research also suggests that the degree to which people use various types of comparison information depends on the social context. For example, judgments that one is receiving less than others are especially unsettling when one's personal outcomes already violate expectations of what is fair (Messe and Watts, 1983). Other research suggests that people pay more attention to other people's outcomes when their personal outcomes are framed as a gain rather than as a loss (De Dreu, Lualhati and McCusker, 1994).

The comparison literature also suggests the importance of distinguishing between satisfaction and fairness. For example, social comparison information appears more closely related to perceptions of fairness than to satisfaction (Austin, McGuinn and Sumilch, 1978; Messe and Watts, 1983). Satisfaction, on the other hand, appears more closely related to absolute levels of rewards (Messe and Watts, 1983) and prior expectancies (determined by previous personal experience, Austin, McGuinn and Sumilch, 1978). This finding supports the argument that fairness is a socially constructed judgment, while satisfaction is more personally grounded. Satisfaction is the product of general affect or disposition while fairness is a cognitive appraisal (Organ and Moorman, 1993).

Individual versus Group Relative Deprivation. One of the most important conceptual distinctions in relative deprivation theory, originally introduced by Runciman (1966), is between individual egoistic deprivation, produced by interpersonal comparisons, and group-based fraternal deprivation, produced by intergroup comparisons. A person might decide, for example, that they were personally deprived and/or that a social group to which they belong was deprived due to their gender, racial/ethnic background, age. Subsequent research suggests that it is feelings of group relative deprivation that promote political protest and active attempts to change the social system (Pettigrew, 1964, 1967; Vanneman and Pettigrew, 1972, Walker and Mann, 1987).

Unfortunately, researchers often ignore or overlook this distinction (Walker and Pettigrew, 1984). For example, many researchers interested in cross-national patterns of collective behavior use objective indices to infer subjective feelings of relative deprivation, or if they directly measure feelings
of deprivation, they assess individual rather than group relative deprivation (e.g., Muller, 1980; Herring, 1985; Issac, Mutran and Stryker, 1980). This neglect of Runciman's original distinction leads some reviewers to dismiss relative deprivation as an explanation of collective behavior (Finkel and Rule, 1975; Gurney and Tierney, 1982; Snyder and Tilly, 1980). In fact, however, collective (e.g. fraternal) judgments are found to predict collective behavior while individual level judgments predict individual level behavior (Smith, Pettigrew and Vega, 1995).

Still to be addressed, however, is the issue of how people determine whether they should evaluate their outcomes in individual or group terms. One solution is suggested by social identity theory (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). According to social identity theory, two types of identity contribute to the self-concept: 1) personal identity or the unique or idiosyncratic aspects of the individual and 2) social identity or the membership groups and social categories with which individuals identify. Presumably, such judgments, in turn, lead to personal and group-level comparisons. If personal identity is salient, people are more likely to make the interpersonal comparisons between themselves and others that lead to feelings of individual relative deprivation. If a relevant social identity or group membership is salient, people are more likely to make intergroup comparisons between their membership group and outgroups, leading to feelings of group relative deprivation.

Social identity theory helps us to understand Runciman's model by discussing how people decide when to think of themselves as individuals and when to think of themselves as members of groups (Abrams, 1990; Ellemers, 1993; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Kawakami and Dion, 1992; Smith, Spears and Oyen, 1994; Walker and Pettigrew, 1984). A social identity framework suggests that the most important distinction between group and individual relative deprivation is not the comparison target, but whether comparers think of themselves as group members or as isolated individuals. Members of disadvantaged groups who report identifying more closely with their disadvantaged groups report greater frustration and resentment with group level inequities than members who identified less closely with their disadvantaged groups (Abrams, 1990; Gurin and Townsend, 1986; Tougas and Veileux, 1988).

Still, studies of relative deprivation remain hampered by an inability to specify in advance with whom people will compare themselves (Pettigrew, 1978; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). Some researchers suggest that the number of potential group comparisons is more limited than the number of interpersonal comparisons (e.g., reciprocal comparison groups, Pettigrew, 1978), but Taylor, Moghaddam and Bellerose (1984) show that people shift their choice of comparison group for the same variety of reasons that people shift their choice of a comparison person. Unfortunately, the introduction of social identities as an antecedent for experiencing group deprivation does not reduce the number of group comparison choices and raises a second question - when will particular social identities become salient or important. To avoid these difficulties, researchers often select particular comparison choices to present to research participants before measuring attitudes and behavior, rather than allowing people to choose their comparisons freely. Another alternative has been to measure feelings of deprivation and comparison choices after people have already behaved.

An important, but sometimes overlooked, implication of relative deprivation models is that feelings of relative deprivation are not limited to members of objectively disadvantaged groups. Advantaged group members can feel threatened by up and coming disadvantaged groups (Vanneman and Pettigrew, 1972; Veileux and Tougas, 1989; Walker and Pettigrew, 1984). For example, the feeling that one's own group is being unfairly surpassed and ignored is significantly related to white voters' opposition to minority political candidates (Pettigrew, 1985; Vanneman and Pettigrew, 1972). Opposition to affirmative action policies and participation in socially conservative or reactionary movements also are linked closely to similar feelings of group deprivation (Lea, Smith and Tyler, 1994; Klandermans, 1989; Veileux and Tougas, 1990). In fact, Williams (1975) proposes that the narrowing of a gap between oneself or one's group and a lower status other will have a greater impact on behaviors and attitudes than a widening gap between oneself or one's group and a higher status other. This difference may reflect the greater psychological impact of a loss compared to a missed opportunity for gain (Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Crosby, 1984; Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). Alternatively, people tend to know more information about lower and equal status others than they do about higher status
others (Gartrell, 1987). Therefore, they are more likely to know about changes in the situation for lower and equal status others than changes for higher status others.

Cognitive antecedents of relative deprivation. Besides comparison choices, researchers have investigated a variety of other psychological antecedents to feelings of deprivation or resentment and anger. For example, Olson and his colleagues have investigated the influence of people's perceptions of their own qualifications, their beliefs in a just world and their self-presentation motives on feelings of resentment (Hafer and Olson, 1989; Olson, 1986; Olson, Hafer, Couzens, Kramins and Taylor, 1994). The most complex model of individual relative deprivation (Crosby, 1976) proposes that relative deprivation should be interpreted as an emotional psychological state produced by five factors. To feel deprived, people who lack some object or opportunity must (1) want it, (2) feel entitled to it, (3) perceive that someone else has it, (4) think that it is feasible to attain it and (5) refuse personal responsibility for their lack of it. More recent research supports a more parsimonious model of relative deprivation that includes three antecedents of feelings of deprivation; (1) wanting a particular goal, (2) not having it and (3) feeling entitled to the goal (Crosby, 1982; 1984; Olson, Roese, Meen and Robertson, 1994). In turn, social comparison choices, feasibility and personal responsibility are assumed to shape desire and entitlement (Crosby, Muehrer and Lowenstein, 1986).

One undeveloped implication of the three factor model outlined above is the suggestion that two sets of cognitions are important for understanding relative deprivation. The first set of cognitions; attributions of intentionality, feasibility and responsibility are important antecedents for feeling deprived. The second set of cognitions; analysis of costs and benefits, feasibility and feelings of shared support, moderates whether feelings of deprivation motivate behavioral responses. In other words, people are first influenced by their judgments about an event. For example, they may not feel dissatisfied with deprivations if they feel personally responsible for their fate. Second, if people feel dissatisfied, whether they will react behaviorally, and what form that reaction will take, is influenced by judgments about the situation. People are less likely to act on their feelings if they think their actions are personally dangerous and/or will not lead to favorable change. Similarly, self-presentation concerns encourage people to express or hide their feelings of resentment or frustration depending upon the audience (Olson, et al, 1994).

The focus on the psychological antecedents to feelings of deprivation is shared by Folger's referent cognitions model (1986; 1987). The premise of that model is that feelings of deprivation are the product of the stories people tell themselves about what might have been, i.e., by imagined possibilities (Folger, 1987). Folger argues that imagining a more satisfying alternative can create feelings of resentment if people believe that (1) current outcomes are not clearly justified and (2) the likelihood that the situation will change is relatively low.

Results from laboratory studies in which the likelihood of winning a prize, the justification for changing the rules for winning the prize and the likelihood of winning the prize under the previous set of rules are independently manipulated provide evidence for the referent cognitions model (Ambrose, Kulik and Harland, 1991; Folger, 1986; Folger, 1987; Folger, Rosenfeld and Robinson, 1983; Folger, Rosenfeld, Rheame, Martin, 1983).

The concept of relative deprivation is an important development within social psychology because it reflects a change in the image of the social perceiver which makes theories about the origins of social feelings and behaviors more consistent with emerging cognitive models of cognition, judgment and decision-making. The concept of relative deprivation suggests that subjective feelings will not necessarily mirror objective conditions. On the contrary, people can potentially be very satisfied with objectively poor, unfavorable, conditions, or they can be dissatisfied with more favorable outcomes. What is important is how people interpret their experiences. The recognition of the importance of interpreting experience moves social psychology away from models of human feeling that link subjective feelings closely to objective conditions (see, for example, Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears, 1939). It anticipates the more complex cognitive models of subjective judgments about social interaction which developed later in the context of theories of social cognition (Fiske and Taylor, 1991).

The importance of the interpretation of experience also highlights the potential importance of social influences on the individual. Since people's reactions to their experiences are not rooted in the objective quality of those experiences, people can be influenced by the social context within which they
That world influences people's choices of comparison others, their definition of their personal
identity as individual or group-based, and their evaluations of the importance to place on having
various types of material or nonmaterial resources. Through social institutions, such as mass
communication, as well as through the cultural socialization process, society can encourage people to
structure and interpret their experiences in particular ways. Those interpretations can, for example,
lead individuals to accept objective deprivations without dissatisfaction, or to feel dissatisfied amid
abundance. The social construction of reality has an important social influence on the cognitive
processing of outcomes.

*Distributive justice*

While important, theories of relative deprivation are incomplete as justice theories in two
ways. Although relative deprivation models recognize that people are concerned about deprivation
relative to some standard, they do not demonstrate that such deprivation is necessarily linked to issues
of injustice. A variety of other psychological theories make the point that people's hedonic reactions
to their experiences do not occur in the abstract. Instead, those reactions occur through the comparison
of experiences to reference points (e.g., anchoring and adjustment, Kahneman and Tversky, 1982,
prospect theory, Kahneman, 1992, norm theory, Kahneman and Miller, 1986). However, judgments of
justice or injustice are not assumed to mediate those reactions.

Helson's adaptation-level theory (Helson, 1964) links dissatisfaction to discrepancies between
obtained and desired states without including mediating judgments of fairness. In other words, people
react to current events based on the level of satisfaction to which they are accustomed because of their
prior history. Interviews with lottery winners and accident victims reveal that everyday events are
evaluated as less satisfying when compared to the extremely positive event of winning the lottery and
more satisfying when compared to the extremely negative event of having a terrible accident
(Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bulman, 1978). The "hedonic treadmill" described by Brickman and
Campbell (1971) is based on a similar principle. They argue that people adjust to the status quo, and no
longer find it fulfilling (see also Lane, 1993). According to these authors, intrapersonal comparisons
suffer from a pernicious "ratcheting" effect, with ever greater levels of outcomes required to maintain a
constant level of satisfaction. While these models suggest that people evaluate their experiences using
a reference point of some type, these reference points can, but not need not, involve consideration of
issues of fairness.

Because these models fail to identify judgments about justice as mediators of reactions to
experience, they are not justice theories. In contrast, most versions of relative deprivation theory
regard judgments of "entitlement or deservedness" as central mediators (Crosby, 1984). These theories
are justice theories. However, relative deprivation theories are incomplete for a second reason; they do
not explain how people know if something is deserved. An important advance in theories of social
justice is the development of models of distributive justice. These models seek to show both that justice
matters and to identify the principles underlying people's judgments that their outcomes are or are not
fair (Walster, Berscheid and Walster, 1973; Walster and Walster, 1975; Walster, Walster and
Berscheid, 1978).

*Equity theory.* The first model of distributive justice is equity theory (Adams, 1965). It
originally developed in the context of work organizations to explain workers' reactions to their wages,
and subsequently developed into a general theory of justice (see Walster, Walster, and Berscheid,
1976). Equity theory is important for two reasons. First, it hypothesizes that both satisfaction and
behavior are linked not to objective outcome levels, but to outcomes received relative to those judged to
be equitable. Second, it articulates a criterion against which individuals are suggested to judge the
fairness of their wages. The basic justice principle underlying equity theory is a balance
between contributions and rewards. For example, if there are several workers in a company, their
salaries are fair if they are in proportion to their relative contributions to the company. As studied by
psychologists, equity is a psychological assessment which people make about their own work rewards
and contributions relative to others. Hence, equity or inequity is in the eye of the beholder. The many
equity studies showing that people's feelings and behaviors in work settings are affected in ways that
can be predicted in advance by equity theory are an important demonstration of the power of social justice judgments (Greenberg, 1982; 1990b; Walster, Walster, and Berscheid, 1978).

Equity theory identifies two groups of people who should feel upset: those who are underpaid and those who are overpaid. Of these two groups, the overpaid group is especially interesting. Equity theory suggests that those who receive too much, relative to norms of equity, should feel less satisfied than those who receive a lesser, but fair, level of rewards. It is not surprising that underpaid people feel angry, since this is predicted by both justice theories and theories of self-interest. However, overpaid people are predicted to be dissatisfied by justice theories, but predicted to be highly satisfied by self-interest theories. Those people whose rewards and contributions are not consistent are predicted to feel psychological distress, either guilt if they have too much or anger if they have too little. They are also predicted to engage in behaviors designed to restore equity.

A number of studies have supported equity theory by showing that people become upset if they are over or underpaid. Studies typically present workers with a wage for some type of work, which they are told is overpayment, underpayment, or fair payment. The results show that fairly paid people are the more satisfied with their wages than either under or over paid people (see Walster, Walster, and Berscheid, 1978). More importantly, unfairly paid workers in these studies adjust their level of effort and productivity to restore equity (e.g., Greenberg, 1988). Interestingly, they do so even when productivity is private, and what they produce cannot be connected to individual workers. Further, workers leave organizations characterized by inequity to join organizations in which wages were more fairly distributed, even if such a move leads them to be less highly paid (Schmitt and Marwell, 1972).

Equity theorists have argued that equity principles apply broadly. For example, the general principles of equity theory have been used as a framework for investigating the giving and accepting of resources in close, intimate, ongoing social relationships including close friendships, romantic relationships and marriages (see Hatfield and Traupmann, 1981; Hatfield, Utne, and Traupmann, 1979). Satisfaction in relationships has been predicted using global equity measures based on inputs and outcomes (Davidson, 1984; Hatfield, Traupmann, Sprecher, Utne, and Hay, 1985; Rachlin, 1987; Snell and Belk, 1985), specific measures of self-disclosure (Davidson, Balswick and Halverson, 1983), physical attractiveness (McKillip and Riedel, 1983), the division of household chores (Steil and Turetsky, 1987), and relative power in the relationship (Mirowsky, 1985). People who report more equitable romantic relationships report feeling more confident that they will stay together, feeling more content, and also are less likely to report extra-marital affairs.

Equity theory also can be used as a framework for explaining public opposition to redistributive policies such as affirmative action (Nacoste, 1980; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). Taylor and Moghaddam (1994) argue that public conceptions of appropriate inputs into equity judgments focus on individual effort and skills, not group memberships. By bringing such group membership judgments (e.g., race, gender) into the equity equation, principles of fairness are violated. They argue that a different conceptualization of the issue of redistribution is necessary for promoting support for affirmative action policies - for example, considering as an input the effort a person has made to overcome hardships in their life. This conceptualization is more consistent with views about equity, and might, consequently, be more publicly acceptable.

There are a number of problems which arise when issues of equity are studied. First, as suggested above, how inputs and outcomes are defined is subjective and often, controversial. People involved in particular social interactions may not agree in their judgments about what constitutes a contribution or a reward. They also may disagree about how much of a contribution each person is making and/or what level of rewards they are receiving. More importantly, people tend to exaggerate their personal contributions to collective efforts, leading to inevitable and widespread conflicts (Lerner, Somers, Reid, Chiriboga, and Tierney, 1991; Schlenker and Miller, 1977). In other words, if members of work groups are asked to estimate the percentage of their contribution to a successful project, or husbands and wives are asked to estimate the percentage of their contribution to housework, the sum of those estimates will be over one hundred percent. A second empirical difficulty for equity research was the discovery that other measures besides equity were more closely related to feelings of satisfaction with close relationships (e.g., the absolute level of rewards, Hays, 1985; Steil, 1994).
In studies of equity the problems outlined above are usually avoided by creating artificial situations in which: 1) there are only limited types of contributions to be considered; 2) there are clear and generally accepted rules about appropriate rewards; and 3) rewards and contributions are easily quantifiable, as is true when exchanges are dominated by piece work and money. In addition, researchers sometimes tell people that their rewards are fair or unfair, as opposed to hoping that they will make this judgment naturally when presented with objectively "unfair" distributions.

Much of the initial excitement about the promise of equity theory stemmed from the possibility of dealing with widespread dissatisfaction over compensation found in work settings. It was believed that people would accept compensation more willingly if it were clear that it was the result of fair allocations (e.g., the use of equity). Ironically, more recent research on social judgments suggests that this hope did not take into account people's tendencies to exaggerate both their competence and their contributions to group efforts (Taylor and Brown, 1988; Tyler and Hastie, 1991).

**The domain of distributive injustice concerns.** Because of the extensive body of research developed under the rubric of equity theory, discussions about distributive justice often focus on questions of pay and promotion in work settings. As has been noted, such settings are ideal from a research perspective, since rewards and contributions are easier to identify and quantify in work settings than in more complex settings. However, distributive justice researchers question whether this choice of arenas captures all of people's typical distributive justice concerns. For example, Foa and Foa (1976) describe six different types of resources that can be exchanged: love, status, information, goods, services and money.

More importantly, when people are asked to describe their personal experiences with injustice, they do not describe issues of unfair payment or unfair distributions of material goods (Mikula, 1986). For example, Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, and Samuelson (1985) asked subjects to think about fair and unfair acts in dealings with other people. They found that respondents "do not think of allocative behaviors of the sort that are common in social psychology experiments. None of the eighty behaviors that we sampled had to do with payments for work accomplished, the prototypical task used to study equity and fairness. The majority of acts had to do with interpersonal considerations and politeness (p. 499)". Even a study of managers suggested that only about half of the work conflicts they dealt with involved issues of pay and performance (Lissak and Sheppard, 1983; Sheppard and Lewicki, 1987). These studies suggest that many of the concerns about distributive justice mentioned are not about questions of pay. Hence, the focus on pay issues has missed many other aspects of distributive injustice. More importantly, many of the examples people describe concern questions of procedure. These authors suggest that a broader justice focus is needed which also includes attention to how decisions are made.

**Procedural justice**

Awareness that questions of justice involve issues of how decisions are made, as well as what those decisions are, underlies several important theoretical statements about social justice. Leventhal (1980; Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry, 1980) elaborates a justice framework which incorporates both distributive and procedural criteria in an effort to expand the justice framework provided by equity theory. Thibaut and Walker (1975) similarly differentiate feelings of distributive and procedural justice concerns, drawing on the legal literature—which distinguishes between substantive and procedural justice, and seeks objective criteria for identifying each type of justice. The original Thibaut and Walker model of procedural justice is also rooted in equity theory. Thibaut and Walker (1978) suggest that people viewed fair procedures as a mechanism through which to obtain equitable outcomes—which is the goal in cases of "conflict of interest". 

These procedural justice theories recognize that people are concerned with the way outcomes are distributed in groups. In addition to evaluating the fairness of outcomes, people evaluate the fairness of the procedures by which those outcomes are determined. Such fairness judgments have been labelled judgments of procedural justice. This empirical finding confirmed the importance which Thibaut and Walker (1975) found that legal scholars attach to evaluating trials by procedural criteria, in addition to evaluations of their outcomes. Subsequent writers in management similarly identify procedural influences on performance appraisal (Folger, Konovsky, and Cropanzano, 1992; Greenberg, 1986); pay decisions (Miceli, 1993); employee selection (Guilland, 1993), workplace grievance
procedures (Feuille and Delaney, 1992; Gordon and Fryxell, 1993; Pavlak, Clark, and Gallagher, 1992), and corporate acquisitions (Citera and Rentsch, 1993). Hence, the empirical findings of procedural justice research confirm the insights of legal and management scholars—procedural issues have an independent importance.

Although many justice researchers have noted the importance of procedural issues (see Leventhal, 1976, 1980), Thibaut and Walker (1975) developed the first systematic psychological research program on the idea of "procedural" justice as a distinct social justice concern. They hypothesized that people's evaluations of the fairness of decision-making procedures have an influence on their reactions to the outcomes of those procedures which is distinct from their reactions to outcomes themselves. They demonstrated the occurrence of such procedural justice effects in a series of studies comparing the adversarial and the inquisitorial procedures for dispute resolution.

Thibaut and Walker's research addresses three psychological issues in the context of third party efforts at dispute resolution. The first issue includes: 1) when people are willing to go to third parties and 2) how people choose the type of third-party procedure (e.g. mediation, arbitration, trial) they prefer to use in resolving their dispute. Their work demonstrates: 1) that people are reluctant to take disputes to third-party authorities and do so primarily when they are unable to resolve those disputes through negotiation and 2) that procedural fairness judgments have an important influence on procedural choices. The second issue is the objective fairness of different dispute resolution procedures. Their work concludes that the adversary legal procedures are more objectively fair than the inquisitorial system on several dimensions, including favoring the disadvantaged party in evidence collection (seeking and transmitting facts) and eliminating pretrial bias (combating external bias). The third issue is the subjective reactions of people who have experienced various types of procedures. Their work suggests that these reactions are influenced by procedural fairness judgments (Walker, LaTour, Lind, Thibaut, 1974).

The work of Thibaut and Walker is focused on comparing the adversary and the inquisitorial legal systems. This framing of the study of procedural justice had several important influences on the issues addressed in their own, and subsequent, research on procedural justice. First, they focus on formal characteristics of procedures, as opposed to informal aspects of the procedure (Tyler and Bies, 1990). The adversary system of legal procedure specifies a formal structure for a procedure (people have their own lawyers, etc), but is implemented differently by particular judges and lawyers. Further, their work focuses heavily on people who were personally involved in disputes (although some studies had observers), and on particular disputes. People are not asked abstract questions about justice (e.g., who should have a kidney?). Third, people are asked about the fairness of procedures in ways that discourage them from making judgments about the fundamental fairness of institutionalized procedures. In the context of a jury trial, for example, asking people to evaluate the fairness of their trial leads them to consider whether the trial procedures were enacted justly. However, people might also be asked whether it is fair to make decisions about innocence or guilt using a jury trial. The way Thibaut and Walker framed procedural justice research enabled researchers to conduct a number of procedural justice studies but it also constrained the types of questions they considered.

Since the publication of Thibaut and Walker's book Procedural justice (Thibaut and Walker, 1975), a substantial body of research has been conducted on the subjective consequences of experiencing procedures of varying fairness. Studies demonstrate that people react to the fairness of procedures in a wide variety of settings, including legal trial procedures (LaTour, 1978; Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, and Thibaut, 1980), plea bargaining and mediation (Adler, Hensler, and Nelson, 1983; Casper, Tyler, and Fisher, 1988; Houlden, 1980; Lind, MacCoun, Ebener, Felstiner, Hensler, Resnik, and Tyler, 1989; MacCoun, Lind, Hensler, Bryant, and Ebener, 1988), administrative hearings (Brisbin and Hunter, 1992), and police-citizen interactions (Tyler, 1988, 1990; Tyler and Folger, 1980). Procedural justice effects have also been found in organizational (Greenberg, 1987a, 1987b, 1990a; Greenberg and Folger, 1983; Folger and Greenberg, 1985; Sheppard, Lewicki, and Minton, 1992), interpersonal (Barrett-Howard and Tyler, 1986; Senchak and Reis, 1988), political (Tyler, Rasinski, and McGraw, 1985), and educational (Tyler and Caine, 1981) settings (see Lind and Tyler, 1988, for a review).

This research shows that both distributive and procedural justice are significantly related to personal satisfaction with outcomes received from third-parties. However, the evaluation of group authorities, institutions, and rules has been found to be primarily influenced by procedural justice.
judgments. This is found in studies of legal (Tyler, 1984, 1990), political (Tyler and Caine, 1981; Tyler, Rasinski, and McGraw, 1985), and managerial (Alexander and Ruderman, 1987; Folger and Konovsky, 1989) authorities. Further, procedural justice enhances organizational commitment (Konovsky and Cropanzano, 1991; McFarlin and Sweeney, 1992; Sweeney and McFarlin, 1993).

The findings outlined suggest that procedural concerns are especially important when people's interactions have implications for their connections to organizational authorities. This suggestion is supported by other studies which differentiate among different types of reactions to experiences. Personal judgments, such as satisfaction with job or pay or turnover intention, have a strong distributive justice component, while organizational judgments, such as commitment, are more strongly procedural in nature (Alexander and Ruderman, 1987; McFarlin and Sweeney, 1992; Sweeney and McFarlin, 1993). Similarly, decisions about whether to return an unsatisfactory purchase (Clemmer, 1993) or how to deal with a parking ticket (Conlon, 1993) are evaluated in more strongly distributive terms. Further, evaluations of commitment or reactions to overall organizational rules are more procedurally based than decisions about whether to accept a particular decision (Tyler, Degoey, and Smith, 1994). Hence, procedural issues seem especially important when interactions have larger social significance.

Although most procedural justice studies explore hierarchical settings, a direct comparison between hierarchical and equal status third parties suggests that procedural justice is equally important in both (Barrett-Howard and Tyler, 1986; ironically, the importance of distributive justice increases as the setting becomes more hierarchical). Procedural justice judgments also have been demonstrated to have an important influence on people's reactions to social policies. In fact, research suggests that when deciding whether to support social policies people focus more strongly on their evaluations of the procedural justice of social policies than they do on the degree of the distributive injustices which those policies are designed to correct (Lea, Smith, and Tyler, 1994). This suggests that policy makers can shape reactions to public policies by framing those policies in ways which will be viewed as procedurally fair or unfair (Nacoste, 1990). For both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of affirmative action policies, perceptions of policy fairness influence emotional reactions, expectations about how one's performance will be evaluated and feelings of personal confidence (Nacoste, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993).

The procedural justice effect is important because it suggests a way in which the potential harm that resolving disputes can do to social relationships within a group or society can be avoided. Poorly resolved disputes can threaten enduring relationships. The use of procedures regarded by all parties as fair facilitates the maintenance of positive relations among group members and preserves the fabric of society, even in the face of the conflict of interests that exists in any group whose members want different things.

Why is procedural justice so central to the evaluation of authorities? The reason for the preeminence of procedural justice concerns in judgments of the legitimacy of authority is found in a later analysis by Thibaut and Walker (1978). In many social situations, it is not at all clear what decision or action is correct in an objective sense. Indeed, it could be argued that most group's decisions concern questions for which there is no way of knowing what course of action is right or will work out best. In a trial, for example, jurors typically lack any completely clear evidence of guilt or innocence. They can never be certain whether their verdict is actually "just" in an objective sense.

Thibaut and Walker argue that what is critical to good decision-making in outcome-ambiguous situations is adherence to norms of fairness, and fairness is most evident when procedures that are accepted as just are used to generate the decision. In other words, absent objective indicators of the correctness of a decision, the best guarantee of decision quality is the use of good—which is to say fair—procedures. Evaluations of the fairness of procedures serve as a heuristic which allows people to quickly evaluate the correctness of actions without really weighing all the benefits and costs associated with the action (Lind, Kulik, Ambrose and Vera-Park, 1993). In social settings, such cost-benefit calculations are complex, and a simpler solution is to assume that fair outcomes result from fair procedures. Subsequent studies show that people also evaluate the motives of the decision-maker who is implementing the procedure (Tyler and Lind, 1992).

Objective fairness: The study of the subjective consequences of experiencing fair or unfair procedures develops from the similar subjective focus of relative deprivation and equity theories. However, the work of Thibaut and Walker also identifies the objective characteristics of procedures as
an important justice issue. This concern with objective justice builds on the group dynamics tradition
(Cartwright and Zander, 1986), which examines the influence of group structure on group functioning
and group outcomes (see, for example, Lewin, Lippitt, and White, 1939). One example of such research
is the extensive literature on the influence of variations in jury size and decision rules on jury decisions
(Davis, 1980). This literature is objective in character and is not concerned with the feelings of those
involved in jury deliberations. While subsequent studies recognize the importance of objective
procedural issues, subjective reactions to procedures are the focus of the most extensive study.

The distinction between objective and subjective concerns is also found in Leventhal's discussion
of procedural justice. Leventhal distinguishes between structural components of a procedure, for
example what type of appeals mechanisms it contains (an objective issue), and the justice rules which
are used to evaluate whether a procedure is fair (a subjective issue). The structural elements of the
procedure include: allocation of the responsibility for the selection of agents, allocation of the
responsibility for setting ground rules, processes for gathering information, processes for using
information to make decisions, processes for handling appeals, safeguards, and mechanisms for
considering and implementing changes. Still, it is the subjective issue of justice rules which receives the
greatest attention in subsequent studies (Barrett-Howard and Tyler, 1986; Tyler, 1988).

The emphasis on justice rules, and not structural components, also reflects the individualistic
focus of procedural justice research. Research has been concerned with how people experience existing
procedures, rather than with the structural issues which must be considered when designing procedural
systems. In this respect, procedural justice research has been generally reactive, rather than proactive,
in character (Greenberg, 1987b). This reactive framing follows the framing of equity theory research,
which has been generally concerned with how people deal with experiencing fair or unfair outcome
distributions.

Retributive justice

Concerns with the fairness of procedures often develop in the context of efforts to manage
interpersonal or social conflicts (Thibaut and Walker, 1975). Groups, organizations, and societies
respond to conflicts by creating authorities and institutions to make decisions about the allocation of
scarce or disputed resources (Messick, Brewer, Kramer, Zemke, and Lui, 1983). These decisions,
together with social norms and rules which regulate behavior provide a basis of shared understandings
and expectations which allow social life to occur. Social norms indicate appropriate principles for
exchange and for interpersonal conduct. They indicate the appropriate balance of rights and
obligations in various settings. In cases of dispute, the meaning of those norms is interpreted and
applied by legitimate authorities, who make decisions which specify the appropriate interpretation
of norms and rules. However, the existence of these norms, rules, and of the decisions and
interpretations of legitimate authorities leads to a new justice concern: retributive justice. Rules and
norms, once specified, can be broken, and the decisions of legitimate authorities can be disobeyed. In
fact, studies of managerial, legal and political authorities suggest that rules are often disobeyed, and
the decisions of authorities are also often ignored (Tyler and Lind, 1992). Hence, the question of how to
respond to rule-breaking is central to the viability of organized groups.

What is retribution? Equity theory suggests that victims feel the need to try to restore equity
after they have been victimized. While such needs are contained within discussions of retributive
justice (Austin, Walster, and Utne, 1976; Brickmann, 1977), the nature of retributive concerns is much
broader. People often feel that the restoration of equity is inadequate as a response to rule-breaking.
They feel that, in addition to restoring equity, those who have broken rules should be punished in some
way. For example, when someone hits a person, that person not only hits them back, but hits them
harder. This additional response cannot be viewed in the context of equity theory, since it again creates
a situation of inequity (with the victim becoming a harmdoer). It can be better viewed as an
additional punishment for rule-breaking.

In other cases, such as murder, rape, or bank robbery, people reject the idea that restoring equity
is a just response to rule-breaking. They regard it as an inappropriate response to being arrested for
bank robbery to offer to give the money back. This response may be linked to the instrumental judgment
that such an equity-based response will encourage further rule breaking or it may reflect the view that
material resources have symbolic, e.g. moral, significance and compensation is an inadequate response. For example, people often prefer that burglars take televisions, instead of personal pictures or jewelry, and that they be robbed on the street, rather than in their home. These more troubling crimes do not simply lead to economic losses, they also inflict symbolic harm, by threatening people's faith in their own safety by showing that others lack a commitment to following social rules that dictate respect for everyone's dignity and emotional well-being. Similarly, displaying contempt for others by vandalizing their homes is considered an especially heinous crime, far worse than simply stealing property.

The psychology of retribution is additionally interesting because of the widely noted affective character of retributive feelings (Hogan and Emler; Miller and Vidmar, 1981; Vidmar and Miller, 1980). In fact, this "primitive", affective character has been contrasted to the more cognitive conceptualizations of distributive and procedural justice. Hogan and Emler (1981) suggest that retributive feelings, which are highly "affective", have been viewed by psychologists as important in children and in primitive cultures, but as less central to the reactions of civilized adults. More recently, social psychologists have emphasized the importance of considering both affective and cognitive elements in all social responses (Clore, Schwarz, and Conway, 1994), suggesting that retributive justice is an important and unique area of justice research.

A second reason retributive justice is interesting is that people believe that it is important to respond actively to rule-breaking through acts of vengeance or retribution. These acts are carried out both personally and by friends and families of victims, and often by only vaguely self-interested people such as neighbors. It is to forestall acts of personal vengeance that society has created social institutions such as the police and courts to respond to rule breaking. These agencies represent the collective interest of society in enforcing social rules. Interestingly, recent research on public views about law suggests that the public has increasingly lost faith that legal authorities can enforce rules. The consequence is greater public support, in the form of lenient jury verdicts, for those citizens who take the law into their own hands through self-defense or retaliation (Robinson and Darley, 1995).

When does the need for retributive justice occur? Retributive justice behavior is seen in responses to both informal norms and formal norms that have been codified into law. Generally enforcement of informal norms is achieved through informal social mechanisms such as ostracism or alienation whereas enforcement of formal norms is undertaken by appointed authorities such as police.

The nature of the response to rule violation is also a function of the type of rule that has been broken. People use information about the type of violation and the outcome of the violation to decide whether and how to respond. People who evaluate a negative outcome are likely to ask: what rule has been violated or what has been damaged? Violations that lead to material harms are evaluated less severely than violations that lead to psychological or social harms (Alicke, 1990; Pontell, Granite, Keenan, and Geis, 1985; Rossi, Waite, Bose, and Berk, 1974). Not only is the intensity of the motive for retribution linked to the nature of the social rules broken, but the nature of the rules also influences decisions about how to react. For example, retribution is a more appropriate response to the violation of some types of rules. This is consistent with arguments made by Foa and his colleagues (Donnenwerth and Foa, 1974; Foa, Turner, and Foa, 1972). Their data suggest that people are sensitive to the type of the resources underlying violated rules and feel justice is best restored by responding in kind.

The rules that regulate the activities of members of social groups can be classified into four categories: rules that regulate personal material resources transactions, rules that regulate personal status resource transactions, rules that regulate the use of collective material resources, and rules that support fundamental collective values. The character of retributive responses can be determined by specifying the relationship between these categories and the goals of the particular responses. It is acknowledged that offenses are often multifaceted containing many characteristics and evoking many connotations. The proposed offence typology categorizes offenses along the most salient dimensions of an offense.

Violations of rules governing personal material resource transactions can be seen in departures from equity, breaking contracts, violating the property of others, or failing to reciprocate. A large body of research discusses the efforts people make in response to violations of equity (Walster, Walster, and Berscheid, 1978). Other examples of responses exchange type violations include equity based punishments in sports (Brickman, 1977) and tort law which specifies punishment in the form of restoring
the wronged party's material status. In these instances the goal of retributive justice is to restore the material balance between involved parties. Restitution or compensation of those who have suffered some material or financial loss at the hands of another is likely to be expected by both the affected party and by observers.

A second category of rules are those rules that support the social order by specifying how equal and unequal status people are to behave towards each other. Such norms can specify appropriate principles of distributive justice (high status people get more) or of procedural justice (everyone is entitled to equally polite treatment from the police). Violations of this type of rule involves injury to status positions and often evoke strong motives for a retributive response. Such injuries may occur through insults or inappropriate behavior (i.e. actions which are "rude", "demeaning") that threatens status relationships. For example, Bies and Tripp (1995) find that employees who have been the subject of insults from managers express a sense of injustice and feel that some response is necessary to restore justice.

Breaches of status rules concern social psychological resources that are difficult to specify or quantify. As such, equity based responses are not as easily generated and status based adjustments are expected. The goal of retributive justice in this instance is to restore the former status quo (Heider, 1958; Miller and Vidmar, 1981). To achieve this a demand for an apology is made. If no apology is forthcoming, retaliation or vengeance is likely (Ohbuchi, Kameda, and Agarie, 1989) and insult is traded for insult (Hogan and Emler, 1981). These responses are directed at the involved parties and others in the social group and serve to restore social standing to the victim.

Rules that regulate the use of collective material resources form the third category. Collective material resources can take many forms including material goods such as public funds, improved public property, and natural resources and more general public goods such as a safe environment, clean air, etc. People's reactions to rule-breaking can be linked to the threat posed to collective resources. For example, Heider (1958) notes that juries sometimes give more severe sentences to rule-breakers when they believe that there is a "crime-wave" in their community. Those increased sentences are linked to the desire to protect the community resource of safety, rather than to a model of individual "deserving".

Responses to threats to collective material resources are also found in other areas. For example, people are outraged when public funds are embezzled or public property is vandalized, even in unimproved collective resources such as parks and natural resources. This concern is seen in environmental regulation aimed at preventing the spoilage of collective resources (Heberlein, 1972). The literature on social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980) suggests that these concerns about protecting collective resources develop from the persistent difficulty which organized groups have in effectively managing collective resources. Recent studies suggest that attitudes toward environmental laws are better predicted by concern for society than by self interest concerns (Montada and Kals, 1995) and that justice considerations are important for the effective implementation of these solutions (DiMento, 1989; Tyler and Dawes, 1994; Tyler and Degoey, 1994). The character of responses to violations of this type of rule is suggested in recent research that indicates people are concerned with restitution and amelioration in response to environmental degradation (Baron, Gowda, and Kunreuther, 1993).

Rules that support the basic cultural and social values of a society form the fourth category. Examples of such basic values might include: the sanctity of human life, the rights of individuals to not be physically violated, the rights of children to a stable and nurturing environment. Violation of these types of norms or moral values may involve victims but can also include victimless crimes. Such crimes have a social meaning that extends beyond the preferences and desires of individual citizens. For example, people are not allowed to pay for sex, or buy a baby or a kidney, irrespective of whether or not the parties to these transactions consent. Such behaviors violate social values and create injustice despite the equitable balance between interaction partners. The goal of retributive justice in these types of instances is to restore the validity of the violated norms or values and to ensure that they are not violated further (Miller and Vidmar, 1981). These goals require that the symbolism of punishment be communicated to society at large as well as the offender. Responses to violation of these types of rules have a moral base.

This last category of responses to rule violation is frequently the subject of surveys of public opinion. Research indicates that people are often concerned with punishment of violations of this
category of rules for symbolic reasons (Tyler and Weber, 1983; Vidmar, 1974) and are very angry at transgressors who break this type of rule (Alicke, 1990). In contrast to equity based punishments, retributive responses may exceed the extent of suffering caused by violation. On the other hand, if the offender is sufficiently remorseful and contrite the punishment may be more lenient (Felson and Ribner, 1981; Pepitone, 1978; Schwartz, Kane, Joseph, and Tedeschi, 1978).

Research on justice has not generally examined how the response to rule-breaking is linked to the nature of the broken rules. For example, people often see punishing the offender as more important than compensating the victim (Hogan and Emler, 1981). This may be more or less true for different types of rules. The typology suggested here indicates that punishment is a more important goal for status and value offenses. Similarly, "just deserts" may be a more important punishment principle than deterrence effectiveness with some types of rules, but not others (Vidmar, 1974).

II. The Criteria Used To Evaluate Justice

Relative deprivation theory frames the issue addressed by all subsequent theories of justice. People compare their situation to another possibility using some principle describing what "ought to be". This judgment about what is fair, just, or deserved is the core of social justice theories. It is important subjectively and shapes people's feelings and actions. Unfortunately, relative deprivation models lack an explanation for how people pick among various justice principles which indicate what they are entitled to receive when they make comparisons. For example, do they deserve the same as others, and, if not, what justifies discrepancies among people? In other words, relative deprivation theory does not provide a model of justice which people can use when comparing their own outcomes to the outcomes of others. Do people believe that everyone should receive equal outcomes, for example, or that discrepancies are justified by differences in effort, ability, or need? The models do not answer this question. Instead, they make the entitlement a precondition for the occurrence of relative deprivation. In contrast, determining which principle(s) of justice people utilize is a central concern for the distributive, procedural, and retributive justice literatures.

Distributive Justice criteria.

Equity theory emphasizes both the centrality of judgments about justice or deservingness to people's reactions to the outcomes they receive from others and the evaluation of relative contributions as the criteria for determining entitlement. While equity theory is an important advance beyond relative deprivation, since it specifies a justice rule, it confounds two issues: whether justice matters and the criteria which people use to define justice.

In an important qualification of equity theory, Deutsch (1975) distinguishes these two questions. He suggests that people might evaluate their outcomes using judgments of justice or deservingness, but might use a variety of different principles beside equity to define deservingness. Deutsch emphasizes two additional principles—equality and need. Subsequent research has suggested that under different circumstances people utilize a wide variety of principles of distributive justice, including equity, equality, need, and many others (Leventhal, 1980a; Reis, 1986, 1987; Schwinger, 1986).

The identification of multiple distributive justice principles raises the question of how people choose among different justice principles. Deutsch (1982) proposes a typology of relationships varying along four dimensions: cooperative vs. competitive; equal vs. unequal power; task vs. socioemotional, and formal vs. informal. He hypothesizes that variations along these dimensions shape the cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations of the people within them. The type of relationship between people determines the extent to which both need and merit will be important to the allocation of rewards (Lamm and Keyser, 1978). Similarly, in their research, Clark and Mills (Clark, 1984; Clark, Mills and Powell, 1986) distinguish between two different types of interpersonal relationships. In exchange relationships, benefits are
given with the expectation of immediate repayment in kind while in communal relationships, benefits are given based on the other person's needs.

Fiske (1991; 1992) also makes the argument that social relationships influence justice concerns. Fiske differentiates among four elementary forms of social relationships: communal sharing; authority ranking; equality matching; and market pricing. He argues that each form of sociality has a characteristic model of distributive justice. In communal sharing relationships, individuals use resources as needed. In authority ranking relationships, equity governs resource distributions, with hierarchal position defining inputs. In equality matching relationships, equality governs resource distributions. And, in market pricing relationships, equity again governs resource distributions, with productivity or market value defining inputs.

Deutsch (1975) also argues that the nature of the social justice judgments is influenced by the goals of the parties involved. For example, "in cooperative relations in which economic productivity is the goal, equity rather than equality or need will be the dominant principle of distributive justice". Related research suggests that circumstances which increase the importance of productivity as a goal increase the importance of equity as a social allocation principle, while circumstances which enhance the importance of positive interpersonal relations as a goal heighten the importance of equality and need. For example, principles of equity and merit are important determinants of deserving in the workplace but principles of need are important determinants of deserving in the home (Prentice and Crosby, 1987).

Deutsch's "crude hypothesis of social relations" asserts that a reciprocal causal connection exists between the type of relationship, the relevant goals, and the relevant justice principle (Deutsch, 1975: 147). In other words, people use allocation principles as cues to the nature of social relationship, and vice-versa. If two people use an equality rule to divide costs or rewards, observers evaluate the relationship as closer than two people who use an equity rule (Greenberg, 1983). In a direct test of Deutsch's hypotheses about the influence of the situation on the importance people give to distributive and procedural justice issues, it is found that both interaction goals and the importance of fairness vary across types of relationships (Barrett-Howard and Tyler, 1985).

Perhaps the most interesting idea to emerge from this literature is the possibility of tradeoffs among different justice principles (Bowie, 1971; McConnell, 1987; Okun, 1975). For example, it is argued that there is a tradeoff between the use of equity and equality. The assumption is that equity promotes productivity, but harms social harmony. The use of equality, on the other hand, is suggested to promote social harmony at the expense of productivity. Consequently, a balance among these objectives, leading to a balance among principles of justice, must be settled upon.

Three methods of balancing tradeoffs have been identified. One is to use a hybrid rule which mixes the use of equity and equality in allocating a resource such as money. So, for example, a company gives all employees a 3% raise, then adds an additional 2% for the most productive employees. A second method of balancing is to distribute some resources and rewards based upon principles of merit and equity and other resources and rewards based upon principles of need and equality. Pay and monetary benefits in organizations is determined by merit (or tenure), while socio-emotional benefits are determined by need or equality (Martin and Harder, 1994). For example, employees all receive the same size office or are invited to the Christmas party, while higher productivity employees are paid more. Combining justice principles within the same context but for different rewards offers another reason why large pay inequities may be tolerated (Martin and Harder, 1994). A third method is to focus on procedural concerns when seeking to enhance harmony, leaving distributive justice norms free to be shaped in ways that enhance productivity (Tyler, 1991; Tyler and Belliveau, 1995).

Deutsch (1985, 1987) addresses the issue of tradeoffs in a different way. He questions the assumption that tradeoffs occur by examining whether the use of equity is especially likely to promote productivity. He presents experimental data suggesting that equality as effective as equity in promoting productivity. If so, then there is no necessary tradeoff between the goal of productivity and the use of equality as a reward principle.

One reason that equity may not always be linked to heightened productivity is that equity can be defined in various ways, with organizations often adopting equity-based approaches that are less effective in promoting productivity. Deutsch (1975) suggests that equity might enhance productivity if it is defined as giving resources to those most able to use them in the future. However, equity is often
defined as a reward for past achievements. Hence, older workers command high salaries because they were once productive, and formerly productive scientists receive large grants. Hence, there may be more or less productive ways to allocate compensation within the general framework of equity. On a societal level, retiring workers receive rewards for work they have already performed via pensions and social security, while investments in education (which is linked to future productivity) are low.

Micro vs. macro distributive justice

One issue which influences the criteria used to define justice is the level at which the judgment is being made. This subtle but important distinction was first outlined by Brickman and his colleagues (1981). It distinguishes between microjustice judgments of the fairness of rewards for single individuals (or groups) and macrojustice judgments of the fairness of entire societies. Judgments of macrojustice reflect assessments about the overall distribution of rewards or the overall procedures of a society.

The idea of macrojustice is important from a social policy perspective. Many social policies which are judged to be unfair in microjustice terms are fair when evaluated from the perspective of macrojustice. For example, comparable worth, affirmative action, and universal health care are all policies which are fair from the perspective of at least some principles of macrojustice. The observation that many real-world social policies are seen as unfair in microjustice terms, but not in terms of macrojustice, suggests that macrojustice has an important societal role. If these policies were simply evaluated in microlevel terms, there would be no reason to enact them. Similarly, many procedures, ranging from jury trials, the use of lotteries to impose social burdens, and Presidential elections, can also be evaluated from a societal macrojustice perspective.

What are principles of macrojustice? Brickman and his colleagues give three examples of macrojustice principles in the arena of distributive justice. The minimum principle suggests that the range between the least well off and the most well off in society should be small. The average principle suggests that there should be a balance between the proportion of social resources used in different ways. Finally, the subgroup principle suggests that there should be a balance between the resources/opportunities given to different groups in society.

Interestingly, the macrojustice examples given by Brickman and his colleagues do not specify any clear justice principle, beyond balance. They do not indicate how balance is judged to be fair or unfair. This lack of specification suggests that an important area for future research is the specification of macrojustice rules.

The one empirical finding in this area is that there is a tension between microjustice and macrojustice principles of distributive justice. When people are asked about microjustice principles for distributing economic outcomes, they typically support differences based on differences in ability and effort (i.e. equity). However, when people are shown aggregate distributions of outcomes for societies functioning on these micro principles, they often judge those aggregate distributions to be unfair. Studies suggest that people typically modify such distributions by increasing resources to those least well off, and decreasing resources to those best off (Hermkens and van Kreveld, 1991; Ordonez and Mellers, 1993; Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, and Ordonez, 1993).

The degree of tension between micro and macro justice varies depending on the situation. Some policies appear fair from both perspectives. For example, the use of a lottery to allocate the risk of being drafted. Other policies, such as affirmative action, appear unfair from a microlevel, but not from a macrolevel. Still other policies, such as giving people the right to decide for themselves whether or not to own handguns, or how much to drink at a bar, appear fair on a microlevel, but have aspects of unfairness from a macrolevel (e.g. a very high violent death rate with many random victims).

Several explanations might potentially underlie observed micro/macro tensions. One type of explanation is cognitive. People may have different information or consider different issues when making justice judgments on the two levels. For example, people may consider aggregate or base-rate data on the macro level, while they often minimize attention to base-rates when making micro judgments. Conversely, people may minimize attention to individuating information when making macro level judgments. For example, people may not consider the long hours of work and years in school that lead to the high levels of income represented in aggregate distributions. Further, people may have incorrect assumptions about the objective relationship between micro and macro distributions.
misunderstanding the true role of ability, effort, etc., in creating aggregate distributions of income. Finally, people may have greater personal experience making microlevel judgments, such as dividing resources among friends than with making macrolevel policy decisions. Hence, they may rely more on personal experience in one case than the other.

There are also motivational explanations for micro/macro differences. In making microlevel judgments, people are motivated to do what is fair for particular people. In making macrolevel judgments, people are concerned with what a just society should look like. Similarly, on the micro level, people are motivated by the goal of interpersonal harmony, while macro level motivations are directed at aggregate social harmony.

Finally, self-interest may differ on the micro and macro levels. On the micro level, people are concerned about maximizing their personal self-interest, and their exchange relations with particular others. Their preferences may be strongly affected by the desire to be free to pursue personal gain. On the macro level, people are concerned about larger societal constraints on freedom of action. For example, the minimum difference principle restricts the ability of the wealthy to amass large sums of wealth. Within organizations individuals typically strive to maximize their personal compensation, while organizations have to worry about the macro-level implications of large differences between the salaries of workers and CEO's (Sheppard, Lewicki and Minton, 1992).

It is also important to consider which situational factors influence the balance between the attention given to micro and macro level justice issues when making overall justice judgments. Several factors have been suggested to encourage people to focus on macro level issues. First, people are more likely to focus on the macrolevel when they identify closely with particular groups. If people think of themselves in group terms, they are more likely to focus on macro issues. Such group identification is encouraged by ideologies which emphasize group identification and a group orientation toward issues. For example, a person may not feel able to protest low wages as an individual, but they can as a member of a group which argues that wage differences are due to discrimination against a class of people.

Second, people are more likely to make macro level judgments about issues which they believe are beyond a single individual's control. When a person is viewed as able to control, and hence is seen as responsible for a problem, they are judged in micro level terms. When a problem is beyond personal responsibility, it is judged in macro terms. For example, welfare is viewed as appropriate for those who are not responsible for their plight (e.g. not lazy) and not appropriate for those who are responsible (a microjustice judgment), while allocating support for the elderly or handicapped, who are generally not viewed as responsible for their situation, is generally framed in macrojustice terms. A macro justice perspective is more likely to occur when the problems involved are universal within the society. Universal aspects of life, like getting old, typically are not evaluated in terms of a person's "responsibility".

Third, the social context influences the relative importance of macrojustice. People think in macro terms when rules are being formulated and societies created or changed. The centrality of macro level issues promotes consideration of macro justice. Further, people may find themselves placed within roles that encourage macro thinking, such as an allocator of resources or leader. Such people are accountable to society for their actions and must consider justice principles that legitimize their actions. This may explain the allocator/recipient differences in justice which will be discussed later.

Fourth, allocators of resources may emphasize macro level judgments during periods of scarcity. If resources are sufficiently abundant, little effort is made to distinguish between recipients (Greenberg, 1981) and equality principles may be used to allocate the resource (Skitka and Tetlock, 1992). However, society often faces the difficult situation of allocating scarce resources. In such instances allocators may utilize a variety of principles to allocate resources. However, the efficiency principle often emerges as an important principle for allocating scarce resources (Greenberg, 1981; Skitka and Tetlock, 1992). While evaluations of efficiency require reference to individual characteristics the use of this principle is aimed at maximizing the aggregate or macro justice of the distribution (Elster, 1992).

**Procedural Justice criteria.**

As was the case in studying distributive justice, it is important to distinguish between two questions in studying procedural justice: whether procedural justice matters and the criteria which
people use to evaluate the fairness of procedures. Thibaut and Walker (1975) argue that the key procedural characteristic shaping people's views about the fairness of procedures is the distribution of control between disputants and the third-party decision-maker. Thibaut and Walker distinguish between two types of control: process control and decision control. Process control refers to the extent and nature of a disputant's control over the presentation of evidence. Decision control refers to the extent and nature of a disputant's control over the actual decisions made.

Thibaut and Walker assume that disputants are primarily concerned with the problem or dispute that brings them to a third party authority. Judgments of the fairness of various dispute resolution procedures are based on instrumental concerns in the sense that disputants are thought to view procedures as means to the end of improving their own outcomes. Thibaut and Walker do not devote much attention to disputants' concerns about their long-term relationship with authorities. Implicit in their model is the assumption that by and large disputants view their experience with the judge and the court system as a one-shot encounter.

These assumptions lead to the view that disputants are concerned about control in the immediate situation when they evaluate procedures. They want control because they see control as a means of attaining the outcomes they desire. This model links procedural desirability to previously outlined ideas about equity. Because equity models link what people receive to what they contribute, procedures need to provide disputants with opportunities to present information about their contributions. Process control is important because it assures people that the third party receives their information on contributions and preferred outcomes, and this in turn allows the third party to use equity rules to resolve the dispute fairly (Thibaut and Walker, 1978).

Much of the research conducted on procedural justice focuses on the effects of procedural variations in opportunities for process control on people's feelings about their control within those procedures (their sense of having a "voice"; Folger, 1977). A large number of studies support the suggestion that the distribution of control influences assessments of procedural justice, with procedures with greater process control judged to be fairer (Folger, 1977; Kanfer, Sawyer, Earley, and Lind, 1987; LaTour, 1978; Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, and Thibaut, 1980; Lind, Lissak, and Conlon, 1983; Tyler, 1987; Tyler, Rasinski, and Spodick, 1985; Walker, LaTour, Lind and Thibaut, 1974). For example, Kanfer, et al (1987) had subjects in a laboratory experiment perform a task that involved generating a list of innovative names for some common household products, names which were evaluated by a supervisor who dispensed rewards. In the high process control condition, subjects gave not only names but also explanations. This resulted in higher procedural justice ratings and higher ratings of the supervisor.

Although the Thibaut and Walker control model has been important in generating research, it has had the restrictive consequence of focusing discussions about the criteria of procedural justice on only control issues. Leventhal (1980a) suggests a broader framework for evaluating the justice of procedures. His framework distinguishes six justice rules. Consistency refers to consistency across people and over time. So, for example, the same issues should be considered when making promotion decisions for different employees. Bias suppression involves avoiding self-interest or ideological preconceptions (i.e. personal biases). So, for example, a judge should withdraw from cases that influence their personal financial well-being. Accuracy involves using good, accurate, information and informed opinions. Correctability involves providing opportunities to have other authorities modify or reverse decisions (i.e. appeals mechanisms). Representativeness involves having one's concerns, values, and outlook considered at all phases of the process. This criteria is similar to Thibaut and Walker's conception of control. Finally, ethicality involves compatibility with fundamental moral and ethical values. So, for example, torture is not used in trials irrespective of whether it produces reliable information.

Several studies find experimental support for the importance of the six justice rules in the Leventhal model (Fry and Leventhal, 1979; Fry and Cheney, 1981). In a broader test Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) present undergraduates with scenarios describing allocation situations. The situations vary following a 2x2x2x2 factorial design to correspond to four basic dimensions of interpersonal relationships (see Deutsch, 1982; Wish, Deutsch, and Kaplan, 1976; Wish and Kaplan, 1977). They find, after averaging across situational variations, that four criteria are especially important in shaping procedural justice judgments: consistency across people, ethicality, bias suppression, and
accuracy. Interestingly, all four of these criteria are more important than representativeness (ranked fifth), which includes the control judgments central to Thibaut and Walker's theory.\textsuperscript{10}

Tyler (1988) examines the influence of Leventhal's criteria, and some other factors, on people's evaluations of legal procedures in a natural setting—people's experiences with legal authorities. He finds that people have complex procedural models. Seven aspects of procedures make independent contributions to people's judgments about the fairness of procedures including five of Leventhal's rules (ethicality, opportunities for representation, bias/honesty, decision accuracy, and consistency of decisions) plus the trustworthiness of the authority. A replication of this study in a managerial setting finds that six aspects of procedures make independent contributions to employee's procedural fairness judgments when dealing with their supervisors including four of Leventhal's rules (ethicality, representativeness, bias/honesty, and consistency) and trustworthiness (Tyler, 1994; Tyler and Lind, 1992). Other studies also find that people distinguish and consider a number of procedural dimensions (Lissak and Sheppard, 1983; Sheppard and Lewicki, 1987). These findings validate Leventhal's argument that procedural justice judgments are multifaceted. Interestingly, people's ratings of the importance of differing criteria are found to vary depending on the nature of the situation (see Barrett-Howard and Tyler, 1986; Rasinski, 1992; Tyler, 1988).

In addition, unlike the tradeoffs found within the distributive justice literature, Tyler (1988) finds very little evidence of tradeoffs among criteria of procedural justice. Procedures rated high on one dimension were also generally rated high on others. However, there are tradeoffs between fairness and nonfairness criteria. In particular, representation and efficiency clash. Procedures which provide more opportunities for process control are more time consuming. As a consequence, allocators often resist providing "fair" procedures. Judges, for example, typically have very little time to handle cases and are resistant to expanding the opportunities of litigants to "tell their side of the story".

Other studies have also suggested that greater procedural justice may have costs. MacCoun and Tyler (1988) found, for example, that 12-person unanimous verdict juries are viewed as more representative and thorough in their deliberations, but more costly. Therefore, people are more likely to prefer such juries for serious cases than trivial cases. People's evaluations of the desirability of these procedures shows a trade off between decision quality and cost. Similarly, Kerr (1978) demonstrates that people use a higher threshold of guilt when the penalties for rule breaking are more severe and Erber (1990) demonstrates that procedural preferences shift toward more elaborate adversarial procedures when the penalties for rule breaking are more severe.

\textit{Micro vs. macro procedural justice}

Brickman, et al (1981) discusses macro justice in terms of distributive issues, but macrojustice is also a procedural justice concern. Just as people evaluate the overall distribution of outcomes within a society, they also consider the overall form of social procedures. In fact, the macro level may be a natural level for considering many procedural issues. For example, people consider whether the jury is a fair procedure for determining guilt and innocence; whether elections are a fair procedure for determining leadership; and/or whether there should be limits on campaign spending. In each case, the procedural issues are considered independent of individual problems, disputes, or interests.

Several studies of macrojustice include attention to issues of procedural justice (Azzi, 1992; Azzi, 1993; Azzi and Jost, 1992). They consider the particular issue of subgroup balance, a concern identified by Brickman, et al (1981). The subgroup principle recognizes that the balance of control between majorities and minorities is a macro level justice concern. Azzi explores this issue, using two possible principles of macro justice. One is proportionality—one person, one vote. Another is group equality—one group, one vote. He finds that minority group members judge group equality to be fairer while majority group members judge proportionality to be fairer.

One way that the majority and minority could resolve their conflict among differing macrojustice principles is to reach some form of consensus, in which both groups agree about a common principle of macrojustice. Azzi suggests that instead the groups he studied compromise between the two principles through a procedure in which each has mutual control. Under mutual control, all groups have veto power over the actions of the overall group—as is true of individuals in a unanimous jury.
Hence, each group can apply its own justice standards. Such a solution, while viewed as mutually fair, may make it difficult to arrive at social decisions.

Underlying the Azzi approach to macrojustice is the assumption that people want control over outcomes. In other words, Azzi extends the micropsychology of the Thibaut and Walker (1975) instrumental view of justice to the macrolevel. In so doing, he does not consider the possibility that groups can develop a superordinate identity with the larger group which would compete with or supersede their loyalty to their own subgroups. Studies which include attention to superordinate identification suggests that it changes the way group members conceptualize the meaning of justice. In particular, it leads to a de-emphasis on group control over outcomes (Huo, Smith, Tyler, Lind, 1994; Smith and Tyler, in press). Heightened superordinate identification could lead to a greater ability to reach consensus, to a lesser concern about personal or group gain, and/or to a greater willingness to defer to superordinate authorities.

The work of Azzi is also interesting because of its suggestions about the degree to which people are able to step "behind the veil" of ignorance (Rawls, 1971). In studies which ask people to indicate how rewards should be allocated across all of society, the concern is with general principles of justice divorced from one's personal situation. However, people's responses may be influenced by their knowledge of how those rules affect them. For example, if we ask people if slavery is just, their responses may be influenced by whether or not they are a slave. Hopefully people can put aside personal concerns and make idealized judgments.

The Azzi research on procedural justice suggests that self-interest influences fairness judgments. Members of minority factions are more likely to favor equal representation or veto power, while members of majority factions are more likely to favor proportional representation (Azzi, 1992). Further, empirical research on macro judgments about distributive justice suggests that the situation in which people find themselves shapes both their perceptions of the fairest shape of aggregate distributions (Hermkens and Krevold, 1992) and their reactions to such distributions when they see them (Taylor, Watson and Wong-Reiger, 1983). In contrast, research by both Thibaut and Walker (1975) and Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1990) suggests that people's fairness judgments are not primarily influenced by their assessments of their own self-interest.

Retributive justice criteria

It is important to distinguish the abundant evidence that people care about justice issues in the context of rule-breaking from concerns about the criteria used to evaluate justice or injustice in this context. There is widespread agreement that people strongly favor some type of reaction to rule-breaking. However there is disagreement about the criteria that people use to decide that breaking a particular rule deserves sanctioning. The majority of research and theory development in the psychology of retribution focuses on how people assign moral responsibility or blame to others for violations that lead to socially undesirable outcomes. This focus informs the question: on what basis do people evaluate whether people should be punished for rule-breaking? This question is distinct from efforts to deal with several questions which follow from deciding that someone should be punished: "What form should the punishment take?"; and, "How severe should the punishment be?". These latter questions are concerned with establishing the form of sanctioning which will restore justice in the wake of recognizing rule-breaking.

The process of criteria evaluation illuminates the basic principles of retributive justice. Behavioral responses to rule violation are intended to encourage people to uphold rules that facilitate social living and to avoid significant future harms. These responses flow from moral judgments of responsibility and blameworthiness. Specifically, people making these types of judgments and responses search for features of behavior that communicate information about the actor's orientation vis a vis the rules as they evaluate the seriousness of the consequences of violation behavior.

Much of the research on the attribution of responsibility and blame is based on the pioneering discussion of responsibility in Heider (1958). Heider distinguishes between causing an event to occur and being held morally responsible for that event. He argues that sanctioning behavior (e.g. punishment) flows from moral responsibility, not causality. Heider outlines five possible relationships between causing an event and being held responsible for it. Global association links actors to events to
which they are connected in any way. **Extended commission** holds people responsible for the consequences of events for which their behavior was necessary to cause the consequence, irrespective of whether those consequences could have been foreseen or were intended. **Careless commission** holds people responsible for foreseeable events. **Purposive commission** holds people responsible for the things they intend to do. **Justified commission** holds people responsible for things they intend to do, but also takes account of environmental forces which influence intentions.

As predicted by Heider, one of the most important offender criteria in assessments of moral responsibility is intent. Intention is reliably associated with assessment of blame (Miller and Vidmar, 1981; Shultz, Schleifer, and Altman 1981, Shultz and Wright, 1985) and to the severity of punishment responses (Darley and Huff, 1990; Horai and Barteck, 1978; Horan and Kaplan, 1983; Schwartz, Kane, Joseph, and Tedeschi, 1978). The violator's character and behavior prior to and after the violation provide evidence about intent and are utilized in deciding whether responsibility should be assigned and a retributive justice response is appropriate (Landy and Aronson, 1969; Miller and Vidmar, 1981; Schwartz et al, 1978). For example, Schwartz and his colleagues find that if an offender expresses pleasure after committing an offence observers attribute greater intention to the actor and assign more severe punishment.

Perceived freedom of action is also related to assessments of intention. Both lay judgment and legal codes demonstrate sensitivity to the general principle that a person must be able to freely and rationally choose the correct path of action to be held morally accountable for a failure to do so. When an actor is incapacitated in some manner for reasons beyond his or her control responsibility is generally attenuated (Alicke, 1990; Fincham and Roberts, 1985). However, the definition of control is socially constructed. For example, incapacitation due to voluntary intoxication either enhances punishment responses (Alicke, 1990) or provides no attenuation of punishment (Taylor and Kleinke, 1992). These effects occur because people expect a reasonable and responsible person to avoid becoming intoxicated prior to engaging in behaviors that require sound judgment or to have the integrity to disobey an immoral command.

Actors can also be incapacitated for social reasons. For example, Kelman and Hamilton (1989) explore the ability of legitimate authorities to authorize subordinates to abandon their justice concerns and "just follow orders". Their study of observer's reactions to "crimes of obedience" suggests that there is considerable variability in the extent to which observers consider the authoritative or coercive directives of superiors to be an acceptable excuse for crimes of obedience (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989).

Why is intent a critical factor? Miller and Vidmar (1981) argue that intentional wrongdoing is seen as diagnostic of contempt for group rules and is therefore more threatening to social order. Hence, intentional acts are responded to with more certainty and intensity. On the other hand, offender behavior that indicates some level of respect or acknowledgment of the principles of the broken rule, such as remorse, is less threatening. In the latter situation, the offender acknowledges the validity of the rules they have violated, satisfying to some extent the goals of retributive justice. For example, "sincere" expressions of remorse or contrition are seen to attenuate punishment reactions (Felson and Ribner, 1981; Kleine, Wallis, and Stalder, 1992; Miller and Vidmar, 1981; Pepitone, 1975; Rumsey, 1976; Schwartz et al, 1978). This effect may be considered both from the perspective of society and from the perspective of the parties directly involved in the violation.

Remorse may also be interpreted as an indicator of regret and suffering on the part of the offender. An equity theory perspective predicts that such suffering will attenuate punishment responses (Austin, Walster, and Utne, 1976). Apology also attenuates the retributive counteraggression of victims (Ohbuchi, et al 1989). However, strategic and insincere expressions of remorse (Pepitone, 1975) can enhance punishment responses.

Remorse may also be interpreted as an indicator of regret and suffering on the part of the offender. An equity theory perspective predicts that such suffering will attenuate punishment responses (Austin, Walster, and Utne, 1976). Austin and colleagues review experimental and anecdotal evidence suggesting that consideration of an offender's suffering is related to punishment decisions. The amount of restitution paid by the offender to his or her victim is also proposed to attenuate punishment reactions (Brickman, 1977; Darley and Shultz, 1990). The Shultz and Darley model discussed in the next section explicitly incorporates suffering and restitution as moderating influences on the final punishment assignment.
Ohbuchi et al's (Ohbuchi, Kameda, and Agarie, 1989) analysis of the functions of apologies suggest apology and remorse expressions have meaning for the broader social context. These expressions communicate information about the offender's present and future orientation towards status relations and group rules (cf. Heider, 1958). Miller and Vidmar (1981) argue that such expressions mitigate responses precisely because they acknowledge the validity of the rule that was broken.

Intentional acts are not the only behaviors that people feel compelled to sanction. Abundant evidence suggests that people are also motivated to attribute blame to people whose behavior leads to accidents (i.e. "unintended" events) with negative consequences (Burger, 1981; Shaver, 1985; Walster, 1966). Assessment of blame for accidents leads to punishment responses as described in Heider's extended and careless commission levels. One criteria that is particularly important in these contexts is outcome severity. Generally the motivation to blame and punish bears a positive linear relationship to outcome severity. For example, Taylor and Kleinke (1992) observe that attributions of blame and punishment for drunk driving accidents vary as a function of outcome severity despite the fact that all drunk drivers break the same rule. Karlovac and Darley (1988) find that people who fail to avoid a foreseeable and serious accident are seen as more morally blameworthy than those who cause less serious accidents. Punishment responses for former type of accident typically go beyond simple compensation for damages (Karlovac and Darley, 1988).

The research on the attribution of blame suggests that features of the situation are used in evaluating the event. If an accident is foreseeable, and there are means of taking precautions, people are expected to utilize these features to avoid harm. Observers have the expectation that, if possible, people should anticipate the consequences of their actions or inaction and respond appropriately or be held morally accountable - especially when consequences are or could be severe.

Theoretical Models of Criteria Utilization. Heider's analysis of responsibility (Heider, 1958) informs more recent presentations of models of the attribution of blame (Shultz and Darley, 1991; Schultz, Schleifer and Altman, 1981; Shaver, 1985). These models also draw inspiration from moral philosophy and law. Their primary focus is on specifying how people combine information to arrive at the judgment that a retributive response is appropriate.

Shaver's (1985) conceptual model of the attribution of blame specifies the sequential causal relationship between a number of variables that intervene between simple causation of an act and moral accountability for that act. In this model all acts with negative consequences are subject to an attributional analysis that begins with an assessment of the number of possible causes for the event. Multiple causes can lead to a diffusion of responsibility either to other actors or mitigating factors in the situation and may lead to judgments of negligence. Identification of a single cause leads to an attributional analysis that includes whether the actor could have foreseen the negative consequences of his or her act, which may also lead to attributions of negligence. Alternatively, a single actor may be seen as acting with intent. If this assessment is made a decision as to whether the person freely chose to engage in the behavior is made. If an actor is seen as being coerced they will be seen as responsible, but not blameworthy.

When an actor is judged to have voluntarily acted to intentionally bring about a negative consequence the assessment of blame is engaged. At this point an observer assesses whether the actor had the capacity to appreciate the moral status of his or her action. If the person is judged to have the capacity to understand that his or her action was wrong (mens rea) an evaluation of accounts are made. If a person's account (justification or excuse) is accepted, then the person may be seen as responsible but not blameworthy. If accounts are not accepted the person is seen as blameworthy or morally accountable for his or her actions. While the assignment of blame generally makes an actor the target of some retributive response, Shaver does not discuss sanctions at length.

The Shultz, Schleifer, and Altman model (1981) also considers the interrelationship between the same factors mentioned above and subsequent punishment responses. Consistent with the Shaver model, the Shultz et al information processing model specifies that moral judgements proceed in a fixed sequence with each judgment presupposing the previous one. To empirically evaluate the model, Shultz and colleagues present subjects with scenarios that vary factors shaping judgments of causality (necessity and sufficiency) and responsibility (intervening causes, foreseeability, and voluntariness). Subsequently, subjects respond to the target person's behavior by making ratings of causality, responsibility, and appropriate severity of punishment. Results indicate that when an agent's actions
are seen as necessary to produce the negative outcome they are seen as more the cause of the outcome, more culpable for the outcome, and deserving of more severe punishment. While sufficiency information has been argued to be important from a legal perspective the impact of sufficiency information in these empirical studies is relatively small.

Analysis of factors thought to affect responsibility judgments (intervening causes, foreseeability, and voluntariness) reveal that voluntariness or intention of an offender's actions have the greatest impact on judgments of causality, responsibility, and punishment. The more voluntary the behavior that leads to the negative outcome the more certain the judgments of causality, moral responsibility and the more severe the recommended punishment. Intervening causation and foreseeability did not affect causation and severity ratings. However, the actor's foreknowledge of the consequences of behavior leads subjects to assign greater responsibility.

Shultz and colleagues use cause, responsibility, and punishment data to conduct a path analyses to test their sequential judgement model. The results indicate a strong relationship between judgments of causation and responsibility and between judgements of responsibility and punishment. Consistent with the sequential model predictions, there was no direct path from causation to punishment. As predicted by Heider, reactions to rule-breaking flow through a justice-based interpretation of responsibility for those events, and are not direct.

While the conceptual analysis provided by Shaver (1985) and the empirical tests of the Shultz et al model are important contributions to understanding behavior related to retributive justice, there are important limitations to be considered. Both the Shaver analysis and the Shultz et al studies generally emphasize the evaluation of behaviors that lead to accidental harms. They do not thoroughly consider behaviors that intentionally violate social rules and are intended to harm others physically, socially, psychologically, or that are violations that offend social or cultural values. Given the centrality of intent to most retributive justice theories, it is striking that most studies in this area focus on accidents. The judgment processes used to explain and respond to accidents may be quite different than those used with deliberate actions. The models discussed tell us about the former type of violation but may not generalize to the latter.

In addition, affect is not considered in these models of the evaluation and response to norm violation and harm doing. There is widespread anecdotal and empirical evidence that people are enraged by the misdeeds of others and anguished when wrongdoers are not punished to their satisfaction. This is the case even when the offender's behavior has no direct bearing on the interests of the evaluator. Evidence suggests that such affect can influence both attributional processes (Alicke, 1990; Clore, Schwarz, and Conway, 1994) and behavioral responses (Schmidt and Weiner, 1988).

Another limitation of these information processing models is that the motives and goals of the observers are not considered. The models tell us how people utilize and combine information but do not discuss why they combine the information in the fashion that they do or what their goals may be in applying a sanction.

Micro/Macro retributive justice

Just as people can evaluate the fairness of the overall procedures and distributions in society, they can also evaluate the overall fairness of retributive systems. People may judge the treatment of offenders by the criminal justice system to be too lenient, or indicate that the appropriate punishment for murder is too severe, for example capital punishment. Studies suggest that there is an inconsistency between these general attitudes and judgments of particular offenders and court cases (Zamble and Kahn, 1990; Cumberland and Zamble, 1992). When asked to make global evaluations of the criminal justice system and the treatment of criminals, people evaluate the current system to be too lenient, suggesting that they want more severe punishment, but when asked to make sentencing decisions after reading scenarios that contain specific information describing the crime and the offender, their decisions were remarkably close to the sentencing decisions made by judges and other participants in the criminal justice system (Zamble and Kalm, 1990). Ellsworth (1978) similarly showed that people supported the death penalty for particular crimes on the macrolevel, but were much less willing to vote to give the death penalty to a particular person who commits the same crimes.

Why are there differences between macro and micro level support for punishment?
Doob and Roberts (1984) propose a cognitive explanation—that the nature of the information underlying public opinion affects leniency judgements. To test this idea, subjects are presented with information in one of two ways: media treatment and extended description. Subjects who evaluate information about the treatment of offenders that is presented in media fashion (brief, dramatic, and occasionally biased) support severe punishment. In contrast, subjects who evaluate information presented in a more comprehensive and objective fashion like that utilized by legal professionals indicate they believe that the courts are treating offenders appropriately and in some cases too harshly. Hence, abstract justice judgments may be based on different information than more personalized judgments.

Another possibility is that there are differences in the motivational bases for macro and micro judgments. It may be the case that people have different goals in retributive justice judgments when considering the macro or micro perspective. When considering a particular case an observer may attend to the justice needs of the victim and offender. This focus leads to the consideration of mitigating factors in the attribution of blame and assignment of punishment. People may, for example, respond to intention and remorse. These factors influence victim’s judgments about whether the status quo has been restored. They may also feel compassion for the victim, or the offender, or both. In contrast, when observers consider the incidence of crime and the treatment of criminals in general they are likely to attend to the concerns of society as a whole. This focus may lead to an emphasis on behavioral control and a desire for more severe punishment for the sake of general deterrence. It also may lead to a focus on the symbolic or expressive role of punishment. When considering the problem of criminal deviance from a societal perspective, people may wish to punish severely with the goal of symbolically reasserting the status of the violated rules.

III. Behavioral Reactions To Justice And Injustice

Behavioral vs. psychological reactions to injustice

The discussion of people’s justice judgments is based on the implicit assumption that these judgments reflect people’s efforts to make sense of their social experience following “rational” processes. This assumption suggests that people want to know the truth and, knowing the truth, want to behave justly. However, social psychologists also recognize that people can distort their judgments about their experiences to enhance their attainment of other social objectives, such as bolstering their feelings of competence or security, as well as to keep resources and opportunities for themselves.

A central contribution of the equity literature is the distinction between two types of responses which can occur in response to harmdoing. These responses are the restoration of actual equity and the restoration of psychological equity by distorting the situation. According to equity theory, the recognition of injustice produces an uncomfortable and distressing emotional state (Adams, 1965; Austin and Walster, 1980). Therefore, people are motivated to restore justice. For example, when workers are confronted with unfair overpayment, they can restore actual equity by working harder to justify the higher pay, or they can restore equity psychologically by deciding that their work is of greater value, justifying higher pay. Studies over time show that workers who are unfairly overpaid first restore equity by changing their actual behavior (increasing their effort). However, over time, they increasingly restore equity psychologically (Lawler, 1968). As a consequence, their work effort drops back to their original level of effort. The distinction between the restoration of actual and psychological equity leads to a consideration of two perspectives: the advantaged (“the harmdoer”) and the disadvantaged (“the victim”).

The advantaged. One group with an obvious reason to distort their evaluations of justice is the unfairly advantaged. If people are receiving or have received too much, they can restore fairness if they work harder, lower their rewards, or redistribute resources to others. These actions will restore actual equity, but at the cost of self-interest. In contrast, the advantaged might reevaluate the situation and decide that their work is of greater value (e.g., that they deserve more) or that other’s contributions are of less value (e.g., that they deserve less). These cognitive changes justify their “unfair” level of rewards, restoring psychological justice without costs to self-interest. Such justifications avoid the need for compensation or restitution (Lerner, 1981; Mikula, 1986). For these
reasons, it has been suggested that the advantaged are "more likely" to engage in psychological strategies (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994).

A second motive for distorting unfair advantages is to protect a positive self-image. It may be difficult to reconcile unjust actions with perceptions of oneself or one's society as moral and fair (Deutsch and Steil, 1988). Often when people use their power to take resources or to behave in ways that hurt others, those actions are accompanied by cognitive justifications of harm. For example, those who commit acts of cruelty or injury during wars justify their actions by viewing their victims as deserving their fate. This process of cognitive distortion makes acts of injustice and inhumanity seem more acceptable to those who commit them. Equity theorists outline several ways in which the advantaged can cognitively distort an unfair situation. They can blame the victim, minimize the victim's suffering, deny any personal responsibility or deny or minimize the inappropriateness of their behavior (Mikula, 1994; Walster, Walster and Berscheid, 1978).

On a societal level, those who are advantaged may try to justify their advantages by distorting norms of distributive justice. Relative power and position shapes people's distributive orientations (Kabinoff, 1991) and their reactions to distributive inequities (Cook and Hegtvedt, 1986; Steil, 1983). For example, those with more resources and power prefer equity based distributions, those with less resources prefer principles of equality and need (Kabinoff, 1991). Similarly, those who benefit from distributive inequities are more likely to view the distribution (and the procedures that produced the distribution) as more fair than those who do not benefit (Azzi, 1992; Cook and Hegtvedt, 1986). The advantaged may add insult to injury by first gaining material advantages and then justifying those advantages by enhancing their evaluations of their own virtues and/or derogating the characteristics of those receiving lesser outcomes.

Although the advantaged may be inclined toward psychological distortion, studies make clear that the advantaged do not always simply justify their advantage, evaluating whatever is in their interest as fair. If they did so, this would render "justice" an ephiphenomenal construct, which contributes nothing unique to the understanding of social behavior. In fact, one of the most impressive findings of equity inspired research is the demonstration that both the feelings and the actual behaviors of the advantaged are shaped by justice concerns. Empirical research shows, for example, that German citizens who reacted to differences between their own favorable situation and the unfavorable situation faced by disadvantaged others with feelings of guilt or outrage were also more likely to support political action and personal sacrifice to help the disadvantaged (Montada and Schneider, 1989; Montada, 1991). Further, the sympathetic recognition of unfair disadvantages is significantly related to support for redistributive policies (Smith and Tyler, in press; Tougas and Veilleux, 1989) and redistributive behavior (Berscheid and Walster, 1967). Hence, the actual restoration of equity does occur, even when it involves giving up advantages.

The disadvantaged. The situation for the unfairly disadvantaged is more complex. For reasons of self-interest, their preference should be for the restoration of actual equity via individual compensation or retaliation (Walster, Walster, and Berscheid, 1978) or via collective political and social actions such as ballot initiatives, riots, and strikes (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). However, the unfairly disadvantaged are widely observed not to act in the face of injustice (Major, 1994; Martin, 1986; Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam, 1990a). This lack of action can simply represent powerlessness. People may judge that injustice is occurring, and may feel angry, but they may not act for fear of losing their jobs, being shot in the street by the police or other reasons. Contrary to this image, social scientists have noted widespread evidence that differences in objective conditions do not lead to subjective experiences of injustice. Typically, personal experiences with objective inequality are not translated into feelings of outrage and resentment by the disadvantaged (Martin, 1986).

One explanation for the finding that the unfairly disadvantaged do not feel that injustice exists is cognitive. The comparison processes through which experience is interpreted may lead to the acceptance of objective disadvantages. Major (1994) argues that natural patterns of social comparison prevent the awareness of objective disadvantage. She suggests that people compare themselves to others who are proximal and similar to themselves—others who most likely share the same disadvantages. Further, they compare themselves to themselves at other points in time, so that their previous disadvantages become the standard of comparison. These comparison tendencies blunt the development of feelings of injustice. Other researchers have argued that people see themselves as
well off because they make comparisons to the extremely deprived examples presented in the mass media (Taylor, Wright, and Porter, 1994).

In addition, the interpretation of experience occurs through a filter of beliefs about legitimacy. Theorists generally recognize the central role of legitimacy judgments in mediating behavioral reactions to experiencing individual or group "injustice" (Azzi, 1994; Major, 1994; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). For example, social identity theory proposes that how people respond behaviorally to experiences of low status depends upon whether those status evaluations are seen as legitimate (Ellemers, 1993; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). This important mediating role of legitimacy is noteworthy since justice judgments are the central antecedent of beliefs about legitimacy (Tyler, 1990; 1994).

Several panel studies test the hypothesis that prior views about authorities condition people's interpretations of their experience. Tyler (1990) demonstrates that prior views about the legitimacy of legal authorities influenced evaluations of the distributive justice, but not the procedural justice of personal experiences with those authorities. Also, Tyler, Casper, and Fisher (1989) find that prior evaluations of the legitimacy of legal authorities influenced evaluations of the procedural justice, but not the distributive justice, of case disposition procedures (e.g. trials, plea bargaining) among people charged with felonies. Takenishi and Takenishi (1992) similarly found that prior commitment to government authorities influenced the fairness criteria used to judge government actions.

There is a tendency for people to legitimize the status quo, seeing "what is" as "what ought to be" regardless of the fairness of their objective position (Hochschild, 1981; Kluegal and Smith, 1986; Major, 1994). One striking example of this occurs in the case of attributions of causality and responsibility for success and for failure. Studies of economic achievement in the United States show that people take personal responsibility for their own success and/or failure in life (Kluegal and Smith, 1986). In other words, the distribution of resources is assumed to generally reflect people's relative worth (Della Fave, 1980; Sheplak, 1987). Furthermore, people who view themselves and others as personally responsible for their success or failure are more likely to assume that societal inequities are legitimate (Martin, 1986b). Hence, people view justice in individual terms, focusing on personal characteristics (e.g., one's personal identity) and issues of personal relative deprivation in contrast to focusing on shared group membership characteristics (e.g., one's social identity) and issues of group relative deprivation. It is advantageous to society if people emphasize individualized rather than group-based conceptualizations of justice (Azzi, 1994), while those seeking social change try to encourage the disadvantaged to view their disadvantage in group terms. Brockner, Tyler, and Cooper-Schneider (1992) find that, when those who view authorities as legitimate have experiences which they do interpret as unfair, their views about legitimacy decline more sharply than any other group. These findings suggest that those who believe that authorities are legitimate are more likely to interpret their experiences as fair. However, the effects of legitimacy are not completely positive.

A second explanation for the failure of the disadvantaged to see their disadvantage as an instance of injustice is motivational. Crosby (1984) argues that the disadvantaged are motivated to deny that they are the personal victims of injustice. She infers denial from the finding that disadvantaged people, in particular working women, recognize wage injustice on a collective level, but do not report personal injustice, even though the objective data show evidence for both individual and collective discrimination. This pattern has been widely replicated in studies of other disadvantaged groups (Taylor, et al. 1994).

The denial of injustice can reflect several different motives. To acknowledge disadvantage means accepting one's victimized position. This is potentially damaging to one's self-esteem and sense of control over the world (Bulman and Wortman, 1977; Mikula, 1993). According to the just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1981), people get what they deserve in life, and consequently, deserve what they get. Hence, victims of discrimination may feel that accepting such status suggests a flaw in their own character, or at least that others will view them in that way. Experimental research shows that subjects who expressed a stronger belief in a just world were more likely to view personal failure under disadvantageous circumstances as fair (Hafer and Olson, 1989). Furthermore, the recognition of injustice often requires victims to identify a particular perpetrator or to act in some way to correct the injustice (Crosby and Gonzalez-Intl, 1984; Montada, 1991). In many situations, these actions may prove costly (e.g., losing one's job, the expense of litigation).
This research suggests that the disadvantaged are in a difficult position. On the one hand, they have a strong motive to acknowledge injustice and seek compensation for current and past harms. However, such acknowledgement brings the disadvantaged into confrontation with the advantaged who control jobs, wealth, as well as agencies of social control (e.g., the police). Those who seek to restore actual justice must contend with the objective realities of powerlessness. Hence, the disadvantaged have a strong motive to deny injustice or disadvantage. However, such denial is psychologically damaging, as people turn to drugs, alcohol or other acts of self-destruction in frustration. It also prevents potentially constructive social change.

The psychological denial of personal injustice is illustrated by comparisons between people’s assessments of their personal experience of injustice and the injustice their respective group experiences. When evaluations of personal and collective injustice are compared, members of disadvantaged groups are less likely to deny collective disadvantages than personal disadvantages (Crosby, 1982; Crosby, Pufall, Snyder, O'Connell, and Whalen, 1989; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam and LaLonde, 1990; Taylor, Wright, and Porter, 1994). Most explanations for the discrepancy between personal and group evaluations share an emphasis on the benefits of denying personal disadvantages or injustices. However, more recent research suggests the emphasis on the denial of personal injustice by the disadvantaged is misplaced. Taylor, Wright and Porter (1994) argue that the focus on the denial of personal injustice hinges on the assumption that people are motivated to deny any personal discrimination, since as long as people recognize some personal discrimination, the psychological benefits of denial are lost. Once some personal injustice is acknowledged, a perpetrator must be identified, some action undertaken and the threat of stigma is possible. Yet, empirical research suggests that people minimize rather than deny personal injustice (Taylor, et al, 1990; 1994). Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider the possibility that members of disadvantaged groups might exaggerate the amount of collective injustice (Taylor, et al, 1994).

Taylor, Wright, and Porter (1994) directly compare models based on the idea of an individual need for denial, which suggest that people will be unable to acknowledge personal deprivation, and group exaggeration models, which argue that the discrepancies outlined develop from the tendency to exaggerate the collective disadvantage of their group, not to deny individual differences. They find that, while both models receive some support, most of their evidence supports the group exaggeration model. There are two reasons why people might be motivated to exaggerate or emphasize the amount of collective injustice. First, collective injustice can provide an external attribution for personal failure (or make personal success even more impressive, Crocker and Major, 1989). Second, it can help establish collective claims for obtaining valued resources (Bourhis and Hill, 1982; Patchen, 1958; Taylor et al, 1990; van Knippenberg and van Oers, 1984).

When will people acknowledge injustice? The discrepancy between evaluations of personal injustice and collective assessments of injustice reflect the tension for targets of injustice between the risks and benefits of acknowledging it. While there are costs to being identified as a victim, there are also the potential benefits of compensation and restitution (Montada, 1994). Whether people prefer to restore equity psychologically or behaviorally may depend upon: 1) practical concerns, such as the likelihood of success and/or retaliation, 2) the ambiguity of the situation, e.g. the ease with which reality can be distorted, 3) whether the procedures or situation producing the injustice are perceived as legitimate and 4) the relationship of both the victim and the perpetrator to the larger collective.

If a person has real power disadvantages in actual situations of injustice, the restoration of justice can be costly or impossible. For example, Mikula's (1966) interviews with the victims of injustice found that confrontations with higher power individuals seldom resulted in the redistribution of resources. Hence, estimates of likelihood of success are likely to be central to decisions about how to respond to injustice. If the likelihood of compensation or retaliation is low and the costs are high, the disadvantaged will be more likely to psychologically distort the situation. Similarly, resource mobilization models of collective action propose that people's willingness to protest collectively is a direct reflection of their estimates of success or efficacy (Klandermans, 1993; Martin, Brickman and Murray, 1984).

One interesting argument made within the equity literature is that the disadvantaged may gain by challenging injustice, even if they do not gain the redistribution of resources. By challenging the injustice, the disadvantaged can avoid being victimized twice: once by the initial injustice and a
second time, by the justifying distortion that they deserved their unfair fate. If a harmdoer is challenged by the victim of injustice, and deals successfully with that challenge, they will not subsequently feel the need to derogate the victim. Elsewhere, Hogan and Emler (1981) argue that seeking redress is important for saving face in social groups. Failure to seek redress may result in low status and communicates to others that one is weak and invites further injustice (Hogan and Emler, 1981).

Whether or not there is a clear perceived cost of the harm which can be restored via compensation also influences whether perpetrators will try to rectify the injustice or cognitively justify the situation. Harmdoers are more likely to attempt to restore actual equity if they can do so completely (Walster, Walster and Berscheid, 1978). The disadvantaged can increase the likelihood that harmdoers will move toward restoring actual equity by indicating to the advantaged exactly what type and amount of compensation will restore equity.

Second, psychological distortions to achieve equity are less likely to occur if distorting reality is extremely difficult, regardless of one's advantages or disadvantages (Deci, Reis, Johnston and Smith, 1977; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). Unless there is clear evidence to the contrary, people assume that a correspondence between outcomes and inputs exists (Cook and Hegtvedt, 1986). Therefore, clarifying an ambiguous injustice, and the actions necessary to correct the injustice, makes the actual restoration of justice more likely. The unfairly advantaged also are less likely to distort unfair situations cognitively when they expect future contact, and/or to see themselves as similar or share a close relationship with the victim (Mikula, 1994; Walster, Walster and Berscheid, 1978).

Third, whether people acknowledge distributive inequities may depend on their perceptions as to how those inequities are produced. For example, defendants who believe that judges were neutral and non-biased evaluated their verdicts to be fair regardless of whether they are judged innocent or guilty (Tyler, 1990). In other words, procedural justice (or injustice) can act as a heuristic for determining whether the outcomes one receives are fair (Lind, et al, 1993).

Finally, the balance between the tendency to restore actual and psychological equity can also be influenced by rules and authorities created by the social group. Equity theory suggests that the unjustly advantaged are in conflict with society, as well as with their victims. That conflict occurs because society values the restoration of actual equity. If those who commit harm restore equity through psychological means, that benefits them in the short-term, but creates heightened social tension. Over time, society is undermined. Hence, social institutions and authorities, such as the Courts, are responsible for pressuring harmdoers to make actual restitution. One way in which they do so is to undermine psychological justifications for harmdoing.

Of course, in other situations, the perpetrator may be seen as a representative of the larger social group, and the victim as a deviant. In such cases, the norms of the larger society may prevent the restoration of actual equity and encourage the restoration of psychological equity. When a low status or morally decrepit person is victimized, the event may be seen as justified (Pepitone, 1975) or the offense may not be evaluated as severely (Landy and Aronson, 1969). In dealing with legal and political authorities people often make demands for rights and/or restitution based on moral claims. Social authorities are typically reluctant to grant such claims, recognizing that using the authorities and institutions of society to redistribute societal resources opens the door for further claims of injustice. Hence, both individuals and groups often engage in lengthy struggles before their claims to redress are acknowledged. Typical is the struggle for school desegregation which culminated in the Brown v. board of education decision in 1954. A similar struggle has occurred over monetary compensation for Japanese-Americans and their families who were interned in relocation camps during World War II (Nagata, 1992).

Behavioral reactions to injustice

Although there may be pressures for people to distort situations cognitively in ways that justify the status quo, not all members of advantaged groups deny inequities between their situation and the situation for the disadvantaged (Montada and Schneider, 1989), nor do all members of disadvantaged groups appear to deny or minimize personal discrimination or injustice (e.g., Crosby, 1982; Taylor, et al, 1994). The recognition of injustice and the resulting feelings of anger or guilt should motivate people to act in a variety of ways (Crosby, 1976; Mark and Folger, 1985). Research has
generally addressed two issues: First, what are the various types of behavior in which people can engage? Second, what judgments about the situation (e.g. feasibility, costs and benefits) lead people to engage in one form of behavior as opposed to another?

A closer look at the types of behavioral responses to deprivation and discrimination proposed by researchers suggests three dimensions that distinguish people's reactions to injustice (Ellemers, 1993; LaLonde and Cameron, 1994; Kawakami and Dion, 1992; Mark and Folger, 1985; Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam, 1990b). The first distinction is between normative behaviors; reactions that conform to the standards of the larger social system, and non-normative behaviors; reactions that are outside the confines of existing social rules (Kawakami and Dion, 1992). The second distinction is between behaviors directed toward a specific individual and behaviors directed toward the larger system or other collective. The third and most heavily researched distinction is between individual behaviors; reactions designed to improve or rectify one's personal situation and collective behaviors; reactions designed to improve or rectify the situation for one's larger reference group. The distinction between individual and collective behavior is not based on the number of people who participate but rather on people's intentions. For example, people can riot for individual reasons (now is my chance to get the color TV that I deserve) or for collective reasons (now is our chance to protest how the "system" treats our group).

Personal level responses to injustice. The first possible response to perceived injustice is not to react even though the situation is recognized as unfair. People may simply accept the current situation (Mikula, 1986). In descriptions of dissatisfying close relationships or economic exchanges, acceptance of the situation is often described as loyalty or resignation (Hirschman, 1969; Mikula, 1986; Rusbult, 1987). However, acceptance of injustice is not without costs. For example, feelings of personal relative deprivation are associated with greater psychological depression and reports of symptoms indicating physical stress (Abrams, 1990; Hafer and Olson, 1992; Keith and Schafer, 1985; Parker and Kleiner, 1965; Walker and Mann, 1987). More dramatically, people may direct their frustration toward themselves by suicide, drug use, or alcoholism.

The most likely active personal response to injustice is to seek to restore fairness from the person perceived to be responsible. For example, victims may ask the harmdoer to compensate them. One relatively unexplored area of research are victims' reactions to compensation once it is offered (deCarufel, 1986). When initially unfairly paid subjects later received fair pay plus compensation, they reported as much dissatisfaction as did unfairly paid subjects who continued to receive unfair pay, suggesting that the offered compensation served to legitimate the injustice, but did not adequately compensate for it (deCarufel and Schloper, 1979).

If people are unable to achieve adequate compensation directly, they may turn to third party mediators or decision-makers as a way to redress personal grievances. However, as might be expected given people's general reluctance to turn to third parties, the unfairly disadvantaged do not find compensation given by a third party to be as satisfying as the same amount given by the actual harmdoer (deCarufel, 1981). Together, the research on compensation from either the original harmdoer or a third party suggest that restoring equity following injustice may not be so easy.

Other personal level responses are non-normative, and violate social rules. For example, most people agree that blowing up the building of one's former employer or other acts of vengeance designed to harm the wrongdoer violate shared norms. Walster, Walster, and Berscheid (1978) suggest that people move in sequence. They first try to gain compensation and then, if this fails, they try retribution. In close relationships, people may use the "silent treatment" or ostracism as a method of punishment (Somer and Williams, 1994). Similarly, employees are more likely to steal from their employers when they feel they have been treated unfairly (Greenberg, 1990b; 1993).

In contrast to restoring justice by direct retaliation against a specific harmdoer, the offended party may make a retaliatory gesture towards a more general audience. People can engage in individual acts of violence toward others. For example, a person brings gun(s) to work and kills coworkers, or a person kills people on the street, at a school, in a train or bus. These cases frequently are associated with perceptions that management or social leaders more generally have treated the violent worker unfairly. Interestingly, the effort to identify and find the actual harmdoer often seems minimal, so the harmdoer often escapes punishment and others are victimized. Perhaps the specific harmdoer is only important as a representative of a larger organization or group and seemingly
unfocussed attempts simply reflect the interchangability of group members. For oppressed minorities to kill any member of the disliked White society may, for example, have similar psychological meaning.

A final reaction to personal injustice is to leave the unjust relationship or group (Hirschman, 1969; Mikula, 1986; Rusblut, 1987; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). In a six week field study, clerks hired at one pay scale returned the second day to learn that a new pay structure would be used instead. Under the new pay scale, clerks who were equitably or overpaid continued to participate, but 27% of the clerks who were underpaid under the new pay scale quit the study (Valenzi and Andrews, 1971). Neglect of particular close relationships may represent a more passive form of exit (Rusbult, 1987).

**Group level responses to injustice.** When someone breaks a rule and, for example, murders someone else, society is offended, as a group. Even those who are not victims, or did not even know the victim, want to see justice restored. The goal is to protect the status quo, the rules and values that make social living possible by meting out retribution and symbolically reasserting the broken rule (Miller and Vidmar, 1981). Collective responses to rule-breaking can occur formally (e.g., via a legal system) or informally (e.g., insults, practical pranks). In most societies that have central governing bodies, severe sanctions are administered through a legal and penal system.

It is likely that collective sanctions are achieved both formally and informally for serious moral affronts. For example, communities often isolate or discriminate against released or paroled offenders who have served formal sentences and lawyers refuse to deal with other lawyers who violate informal norms (Ross, 1980). Furthermore, if people are unsatisfied with formal retribution or punishment or doubt the ability of formal institutions to punish offenders adequately, they might respond collectively (Shotland, 1976). For example, victim's rights groups often form in response to what the members perceive as punishment that is too lenient. Alternatively, lynch mobs or vigilante groups may pursue retribution outside of the formal system of punishment. Such actions can be viewed as prosocial behavior designed to defend group rules.

Both these examples involve a collective response to the individual violation of shared norms. However, people may also feel that the groups of which they are a member are treated unjustly by other groups or the larger society. When confronted with collective mistreatment, disadvantaged group members may seek to restore justice in two ways. On the one hand, they may pursue collective change in ways that do not directly challenge the status quo (e.g., voting as a block, political lobbying, labor negotiations). They may even turn to third parties to intervene (e.g., class action suits, referring decisions to the International Court). Alternatively, disadvantaged group members may pursue change in ways that directly challenge the current system (e.g., riots, rebellion, terrorism). In this case, the collective reaction to injustice is not considered normative by the larger society's standards. A final reaction of subordinate groups to the perceived unjust treatment by a superordinate category is to exit or disengage from the larger society (Azzi, 1993; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). Separatist movements and civil wars reflect a collective desire to exit or disengage from the larger society.

**When will people act collectively?** Which features of the situation determine when people will engage in one form of behavior rather than another? In particular, empirical research has examined when people will act collectively rather than individually. A variety of research investigations suggest that it is disadvantageous intergroup comparisons and associated feelings of group relative deprivation that promote support or participation in collective behavior (Dube and Guimond, 1986; Hafer and Olson, 1992; Dion, 1986; Olson, 1994; Tougas and Veilleux, 1988; Walker and Mann, 1987). According to this research, individuals can act as a representative for the entire group and feel deprived and respond on the entire group’s behalf.

Identification with particular social groups or categories suggests a psychological mechanism for explaining how individual perceptions of deprivation form the shared discontent that prompts collective protest (Abrams, 1990; Dube and Guimond, 1986; Kawakami and Dion, 1993). Different people who share the same group membership will be sensitive to the same justice norms, and more importantly, to violations of those norms (Turner, 1991; Reicher, 1987). For example, participants in one collective action, the St. Paul’s riots in Bristol, identified strongly with the local community and interpreted a police raid on a local community tavern as a violation of the community’s rights while non-participants, not identified with the community, did not share the same interpretation of the event (Reicher, 1987; Potter and Reicher, 1987). Recent experimental evidence shows that people are more likely to behave collectively when a shared group membership is made salient (LaLonde and...
Silverman, 1994). Similarly, identification with a shared community and unambiguous beliefs that the target had violated community safety and local social norms marks examples of spontaneous vigilant behavior (Shotland, 1976).

However, feelings of group deprivation assume prior assessments of entitlement at the group level, just as feelings of personal deprivation assume prior assessments of entitlement at the personal level (cf. Crosby, 1976; Major, 1994). One important antecedent to feelings of group deprivation are beliefs about the legitimacy of the intergroup situation (Ellemers, 1993; Major, 1994; Tajfel, 1982). If status relations between groups are perceived to be legitimate, high status and low status groups will not be considered comparable and objective inequalities will be considered irrelevant (Ellemers, 1993; Major, 1994). In contrast, the belief that the intergroup status relations are illegitimate should promote social comparisons across group boundaries. Furthermore, the belief that the position for the entire group is illegitimate (as opposed to one’s personal inclusion in the group) promotes increased identification with the group, making it more likely that people will experience feelings of group rather than individual relative deprivation (Ellemers, 1993). Finally, if intergroup relations are perceived to be illegitimate, people may be more likely to consider alternative arrangements (and similarly, if people can imagine alternative arrangements, they will be more likely to view the current situation as illegitimate).

Relative deprivation research often assumes that the key judgment for feelings of group deprivation is the judgment of distributive injustice between groups. However, judgments about discrimination, or differences in how group members are treated - a procedural issue, are more strongly related to group resentment and support for collective action then judgments about outcomes (Dion, 1992). For example, ethnic conflicts generally focus on the degree of ethnic group political participation and representation, recognition of the group’s distinct culture or the elimination of discriminatory institutions and practices - all procedural rather than distributive concerns (Azzi, 1993, 1994).

Other research suggests that collective action is motivated by a combination of procedural and distributive injustice. People are most likely to challenge a situation collectively if they believe that the procedures are unfair and they personally suffered because of the injustice (Dibble, 1981; Taylor, Wright and Moghaddam, 1987). In a study of work tasks, students are found to be most likely to complain to a third-party authority (a campus "ethics committee") when they are treated unfairly and receive unfavorable outcomes (Greenberg, 1987a). The potent combination of unfair (collective) treatment and unfair personal outcomes is reminiscent of earlier descriptions of 'double deprivation' (Folger, 1987; Runciman, 1966; Vanneman and Pettigrew, 1972). The same study of work tasks also shows that students are most likely to take action when the procedural injustice they experience reflects institutional policy than when it reflects the actions of a single authority (Greenberg, 1987a).

Interestingly, fair procedures appear to mitigate dissatisfaction with unfavorable or unfair outcomes, but it is less clear that they increase satisfaction when outcomes are favorable (see Brockner and Weisenfeld, 1994 for a review). The typical pattern found in studies of procedural justice suggests that people are less upset and angry after receiving a negative or unfair outcome if that outcome is generated by a fair procedure. On the other hand, people seem equally satisfied after receiving a fair outcome via a fair or an unfair procedure. Hence, outcome favorability and procedural justice do not impact additively on satisfaction.

Intervening cognitions between perceptions of injustice and behavior. While feelings of anger and frustration might prime or motivate people for particular behaviors, they might not necessarily produce direct engagement in collective action (Ellemers, 1993; Petta and Walker, 1992; Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam, 1990b). Just as a variety of cognitions determine whether people will recognize injustice, a second set of cognitions help determine how people will react to injustice once they recognize it (Crosby, 1976). Researchers have explored the influence of three types of factors on the choice to support or participate in collective behavior: 1) people’s optimism or pessimism that the situation might change (Cook, Crosby and Hennigen, 1977; Folger, 1986, 1987), 2) people’s beliefs about the permeability, stability and legitimacy of the intergroup situation (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel, 1982) and 3) the pragmatic costs and benefits of collective behavior (Martin, 1986).

The first set of factors that can promote a collective reaction to group injustice is people’s beliefs about the possibility of change. The possibility of future change has been identified by both Folger (1986;1987) and Crosby (1976; 1984) as a pre-condition for feelings of deprivation. Cook, Crosby and
Hennigan (1977) distinguish between future and past expectations. They argue that resentment is most likely to occur when past expectations are high, but future feasibility is low (see also Gurr, 1970). Similarly, Folger (1987) argues that although past expectations can serve as referent outcomes, feelings of resentment are unlikely unless future change is unlikely. However, without any hope for change, participation in collective action appears unlikely (LaLonde and Cameron, 1993; Kelly and Kelly, 1993). In fact, several authors have proposed feelings of collective efficacy: the belief that as a group, people can accomplish change, as an important determinant of collective behavior (Azzi, 1992; Dion, 1986; Klandermans, 1989).

Together, this research suggests that the relationship between future feasibility and participation in collective behavior is likely to be curvilinear. If people believe that without any action, a rotten situation will improve, feeling resentful is unlikely and active reactions to the bad situation perhaps are even more unlikely (Crosby, 1976; Folger, 1987). But if people believe that they or their group can not make a difference, it is equally unlikely that they will react collectively (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Martin, 1986; Tajfel, 1982).

In contrast to relative deprivation researchers' focus on people's general feelings of optimism or pessimism, social identity researchers have focused on a second set of variables that might influence whether people will act collectively or individually - their beliefs about the relevant intergroup situation (Ellemers, 1993; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1982). According to social identity theory, there are three important variables that influence beliefs about the intergroup situation. One important variable is whether deprived or disadvantaged group members believe the boundaries between groups are permeable. If they believe the boundaries are permeable, they may try to pass or assimilate into a higher status group (Taylor and McKirnan, 1984; Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam, 1990a). In fact, experimental research illustrates that as long as a few token members of disadvantaged groups are able to assimilate into a higher status group (thereby demonstrating permeability), most people will continue to prefer individual over collective strategies of action even if they believe the collective situation is unjust (Wright, et al, 1990a). However, if group members believe the boundaries between groups are impermeable and "passing" is a psychological impossibility, they are more likely to focus on collective strategies.

A second key variable is whether people believe the relationships between different groups are stable or unstable (e.g., whether the group's position as a whole can change or switch with another group's position). Deprived or disadvantaged group members who view the relationship as unstable are more likely to view the relationship as illegitimate and to compete directly and collectively with the higher status group (Ellemers, 1993; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Major, 1994). The third key variable is whether people believe the relationships between groups are legitimate or not legitimate. Illegitimate intergroup relationships also should encourage collective reactions to injustice. Further, it is the combination of these three variables that form people's beliefs and reactions to a particular intergroup situation. For example, disadvantaged group members will prefer to compete with an advantaged group directly through political lobbying, terrorism, revolution, war or civil rights activity if they perceive the relationships between the groups to be illegitimate and unstable and the boundaries between groups to be impermeable (Hogg and Abrams, 1988).

The third set of factors that might influence whether people react collectively or individually involves assessments of personal costs and benefits. For example, research indicates that potential participants show a greater willingness to engage in collective behavior when there are more mobilization resources present, independent of their feelings of resentment (Martin, 1986). This research suggests that collective behavior may be determined more by potential costs of the behavior than by previous psychological comparisons (Klandermans, 1989; Martin, 1986, Van Knippenberg, 1989). In other words, people begin with the least costly strategy. For example, the acceptance of an unfair situation or the attempt to "pass" rather than to challenge the status quo directly may not reflect differences in feelings of group-oriented deprivation, but rather differences in the anticipated costs and benefits of different behaviors.

One limitation of traditional analyses of costs and benefits is the neglect the psychological consequences for different behavioral choices. For example, "passing" or assimilating to another group is not without its psychological costs. Disadvantaged group members often are faced with a choice between being a low status member of a high status group, or a high status member of a low status group.
(Tyler, Degoe and Smith, 1994). Passing upward to a higher status group improves a person's group status but often at a cost to one's personal status within the group. In fact, one's personal position in a group is more closely related to feelings of self-worth than the group's position in the larger society, suggesting one reason why moving from a low status to higher status group is not always attractive (Tyler, Degoe and Smith, 1994). Furthermore, fellow members of disadvantaged groups or categories can hold people accountable to the group by making assimilation to other groups difficult as well as by providing social support and emotional resources for dealing with potential difficulties and threats from outside the group (Abrams, 1989; Hyman and Singer, 1968).

A second difficulty with the current emphasis on the costs and benefits of participation in collective action is that it provides a better explanation of who does not participate than who does (Klandermans, 1993). In fact, recent research suggests people often participate in social movements even when the chance of success is slight. For example, both participants and non-participants in the Dutch Peace Demonstrations in the early 1980s believed that they could not control the nuclear arms race. However, participants in the demonstrations were significantly more likely to have friends and relatives who also demonstrated and they valued the general goal of nuclear weapons reduction more highly than did non-participants (Klandermans and Oegam, 1987). This research suggests that interpersonal connections and ideological commitments are as important to determining participation in collective action as an analysis of potential costs and benefits. Furthermore, the resource mobilization perspective does not recognize that people vary in the strength of their feelings. On the contrary, those with greater feelings of injustice will be motivated to overcome higher barriers to participation, to seek resources that are not easily available and to be more receptive to ideological alternatives to the status quo.

An important issue for future research will be a more sophisticated understanding of the motivations for collective action requires a more complex examination of what collective action and social movements are. In some cases, collective behavior represents long term rational and purposeful behaviors elicited and coordinated by a relative small group of individuals who define the goals and interests of the larger group (Azzi, 1994; Klandermans, 1993). In other cases, collective action reflects expressive spontaneous reactions to violated shared norms (Reicher, 1987). It is plausible that the psychological model of participation is different for the two different types of reactions. For example, non-organized collective action ("riots") may be more affectively motivated than organized collective action, and more likely the consequence of a "triggering" event such as the Rodney King trial in Los Angeles (Azzi, 1994).

Rule breaking vs. rule following. The important role of legitimacy in shaping both people's recognition of injustice and subsequent behavioral reactions suggests the importance of understanding the psychology of legitimacy. Concern about the legitimacy of authority, in turn, leads to a recognition of the importance of supplementing the study of the occurrence of rule-breaking behavior, which has been the dominant focus of the previous research with a focus on the antecedents of rule acceptance and rule following. Such a shift again leads to increased attention to procedural issues, since studies suggest that people who experience procedural justice when they deal with authorities are more likely to view those authorities as legitimate, to accept their decisions and to obey social rules (Early and Lind, 1987; Friedland, Thibaut, Walker, 1973; Lind, Kanfer, and Earley, 1990; Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, and Park, 1991; MacCoun, et al, 1988; McEwen and Maiman, 1984; Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, Welton, and Castrianno, 1990; Rasinski, 1988; Rasinski and Tyler, 1987; Thibaut, Friedland, and Walker, 1974; Tyler, 1990, 1994; Tyler and Lind, 1992).

Within political psychology, political science and policy studies, procedural justice is widely hypothesized to be an antecedent of legitimacy and acceptance for political, legal, and managerial authorities (Easton, 1965, 1975; Kelman, 1969). Theoretical discussions of authority distinguish between support for the policies and decisions of incumbent authorities and for the procedures and institutions of government. This latter, "diffuse" form of support, is viewed as key to the willingness to accept decisions and rules. This "diffuse support" hypothesis is supported empirically in studies of both national level legal authorities, such as the Supreme Court (Murphy and Tanenhaus, 1969; Tyler and Mitchell, 1994) and of national level political authorities, such as Congress (Tyler, 1994b; Tyler, Rasinski, and McGraw, 1985).
More generally, procedural justice is found to promote a positive climate within organizations. For example, it encourages commitment to the organization and to the acceptance of organizational rules and authorities (Tyler, 1990). It also leads to the willingness to accept third-party decisions (Greenberg, 1987a; Lind, 1990; MacCoun, et al, 1988); to follow group rules (Friedland, Thibaut, and Walker, 1973; Greenberg, 1994; Thibaut, Friedland, and Walker, 1974; Tyler, 1990); and to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors (Moorman, 1991; Moorman, Niehoff, and Organ, 1993; Niehoff and Moorman, 1993; Organ and Moorman, 1993). Procedural justice also diminishes the intention to leave the organization (Dailey and Kirk, 1992; Kononsky and Cropanzano, 1991; Schaubraeck, May, and Brown, 1994), the intention to sue in court (Bies and Tyler, 1993); and the willingness to support strikes and sit-ins (Leung, Chiu, and Au, 1993).

IV. Why Do People Care About Justice?

The nature of the justice motive: Two theories

The literatures outlined demonstrate that concerns about justice shape people's feelings, attitudes and behaviors. But it is not enough to show that justice is important, it is also important to examine why justice matters. The dominant psychological model of the justice motive begins with the assumption that people are basically motivated by self interest when they interact with others (Walster, Walster and Berscheid, 1978; Thibaut and Walker, 1975). This utilitarian framework develops from the theory of social exchange (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959).

The social exchange model of justice begins with the assumption that people want to regularize their interactions with others. To do so in social interactions, people collectively develop mutually accepted systems for allocating resources, systems whose rules are codified in terms of fairness. People expect others to follow these rules, and expect to follow the same rules themselves (Walster, Walster, and Berscheid, 1978). Hence, justice concerns arise out of the motivation to gain long-term benefits from social interactions. People follow justice rules as long as it is in their interest to do so. Similarly, they enforce those rules because it is in their own interest to do so. While people are concerned about issues of justice, that concern is in the service of their efforts to maximize their own gains in interaction by preserving mutually beneficial exchange relationships (Deutsch, 1985).

An alternative theoretical perspective is based on social identity models (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Social identity theory has been applied to the justice arena in the group-value model of procedural justice (Lind and Tyler, 1988). Based on social identification models of the person, group-value theory argues that people use evidence that they are receiving distributive, procedural, and retributive justice as an indicator of the quality of their social relationship to the group and its authorities (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Lind, 1992). If people receive unfairly low outcomes, are subjected to rude or insensitive treatment, or fail to have wrongs against them avenged, these experiences communicate information indicating marginal social status. Conversely, if people receive fair outcomes from others, are listened to, and have wrongs against them corrected by society by retribution, compensation, or other mechanisms, they feel respected and valued by their group.

A key difference between the group value model and social exchange models is the assumption that people do not evaluate their social relationships solely in terms of the number of resources they receive from others. People use their outcomes and treatment by authorities as a source of information about their position within their group. In other words, people use their status within a group to determine whether they are valuable people or not. High status has positive implications for self-esteem and feelings of self-worth (Tyler, Degoeijy and Smith, 1994). According to group value theory, justice is connected to people's feelings about their group membership, social status, self-worth, and self-concepts (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Lind, 1992).

The centrality of relational concerns to procedural justice explains the important role of procedural justice in shaping judgments about authorities and institutions. Authorities and institutions
embody the cultural and social values of the group. Their actions speak for the group. Political theorists (Lane, 1988; Rawls, 1971) recognize that "self-respect" is impacted by assessments about how others judge you. Such assessments are especially strongly affected by treatment by political, legal, and managerial authorities, since authorities represent the group.

High status is not only an issue of self-esteem and self-worth. High status group members also believe that the authorities involved will treat them fairly, so they will not be disadvantaged by group membership. In other words, people care about the quality of their outcomes over time. In this regard, social exchange and identity models of the justice motive are similar. Both argue that people have a concern about their long-term outcomes in social interactions. The key distinction lies in the broader focus of identity models on inter and intra group social status and the quality of connections individuals have with the social group.

A social identity model is one alternative model to the instrumental or social exchange model. However, it is important to recognize the possibility that other, as yet undeveloped, models exist. People may care about non-instrumental issues besides social identity and group status. Other models could be based on the types of affective relationships people have with others. Studies of children's willingness to help their aging parents find that liking is an important mediator of willingness to help (Pratt, Schmall, and Wright, 1987). Such interpersonal connections or caring relationships have also been distinguished from justice concerns (Blum, 1980; Gilligan, 1977, 1982; Gilligan and Wiggins, 1988).

Another possibility is that people are motivated by interpersonal responsibilities, i.e. obligations to be responsive to another's wants and needs that arise from shared group membership (Miller and Bersoff, 1992).

Investigations of the justice motive.

Disagreement about the role of resource-based social exchange and social identity motives in generating concerns about justice are found within the literatures on all three of the aspects of justice which have been outlined—distributive, procedural, and retributive. However, an alternative social identity based justice motive is most clearly articulated and tested within procedural justice research.

Procedural justice research. Thibaut and Walker's control theory of procedural justice is based on the suggestion that social interactions are driven by instrumental motives (Thibaut and Walker, 1975). Thibaut and Walker argue that people normally prefer to control decisions which influence their own outcomes when they are in negotiation with others (i.e. to maximize decision control). Hence, they resist third-party intervention into conflicts with others. However, people sometimes feel that they cannot resolve conflicts in bilateral negotiation, so they reluctantly give some amount of the control over decisions that influence their lives to a third-party. When they do so, people try to keep indirect control over outcomes by maintaining their opportunities to influence the third-party through evidence presentation (i.e. through process control or voice). Hence, people view third party procedures as fair if those procedures allow them to control the presentation of evidence to third parties. In other words, as with distributive justice, people's justice judgments are linked to considerations of self-interest. People think that their best opportunities for gain lie in seeking to persuade a third-party of the value of their case.14

The control model of Thibaut and Walker (1975) has been widely studied in the context of people's evaluations of their experiences with third-parties. The findings of the research support the Thibaut and Walker model, in that people judge procedures to be fairer when those procedures give them control over outcomes (Lind and Tyler, 1988). However, findings of studies of control do not simply follow the instrumental model suggested by Thibaut and Walker, which links the value of process control to its influence on decision control.

Contrary to the instrumental predictions of control theory, studies suggest that process control is often more important than decision control (Lind, et al, 1983; Tyler, 1987; Tyler, Rasinski, and Spodick, 1985). Further, studies suggest that people value process control even when it does not influence decision control (Lind, et al, 1990; Musante, Gilbert, and Thibaut, 1983; Tyler, Rasinski, and Spodick, 1985). In fact, the only precondition for the occurrence of the process control effect seems to be that people feel their views are being considered by the decision-maker (Tyler, Rasinski, Spodick, 1985).
The importance of having evidence that one's arguments are considered by the decision maker explains the widespread finding that decisions are more acceptable if they are explained, justified, or otherwise accounted for (Bies, 1987; Bies and Shapiro, 1988; Bies, Shapiro, and Cummings, 1988; Brockner, DeWitt, Grover, and Reed, 1990; Schaubroeck, May and Brown, 1994; Shapiro, 1991). Greenberg (1990c) has extended this finding to a more general argument that justice findings suggest the basis for an "impression management" strategy by authorities.

Control studies typically find that both decision control and process control have independent influences on procedural justice (Shapiro and Brett, 1993; Tyler, 1987; Tyler, Rasinski, and Spodick, 1985), that is, process control effects are partially, but not completely explainable in terms of indirect decision control. To at least some extent, process control effects are non-instrumental in character. Such effects have been labelled "value-expressive".

Other findings also suggest that an instrumental perspective on justice is inadequate to account for procedural justice findings. Mikula, Petri, and Tanzer (1990) coded everyday instances of injustice and find that "a considerable proportion of the injustices which are reported do not concern distributive or procedural issues in the narrow sense but refer to the manner in which people are treated in interpersonal interactions and encounters (p. 133)".

Studies have supported the relational perspective by showing that people care about justice even when the outcomes involved are very important. One way to do this is to study situations in which a great deal of money is at stake. Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, and de Vera Park (1993) examine the role of procedural judgments in decisions to accept mediation awards in civil suits. The amount of money at issue ranged up to $800,000. The findings indicate that the primary judgments shaping decisions about whether to accept mediation decisions are assessments of the procedural qualities of the mediation session, not its outcome. A similar test in the criminal justice arena suggests that people faced with substantial deprivations in liberty (up to 20 years in prison) also evaluate their experience with the law—in this case the felony disposition process—primarily in procedural terms (Casper, Tyler and Fisher, 1988; Tyler, Casper and Fisher, 1989).

While these findings suggest the incompleteness of a control model, they do not thereby demonstrate the correctness of other models. Several efforts have been made to test a relational conception of justice. One type of test involves an examination of the role of relational indicators in shaping procedural justice judgments. Tyler (1988, 1989, 1990, 1994; Tyler and Lind, 1992) examine the influence of relational criteria (e.g., the trustworthiness of decision makers) on procedural justice in studies of citizen experiences with police officers and judges and employee experiences with managers. In both settings, each relational aspect of experience independently influence procedural justice judgments, and the combined relational criteria are more central to such definitions of procedural justice than were instrumental evaluations of outcome favorability and/or control. The findings suggest that people are concerned about their long-term social relationships with the group and group authorities.

People are affected by three relational issues. One is their evaluation of the neutrality of decision-making procedures—the degree to which they are unbiased, honest, and make decisions based on evidence (Tyler, 1988). A second relational issue involves the assessment of the trustworthiness of others in the relationship, in particular authorities (Lind and Lissak, 1985; Pruitt, et al, 1990; Tyler, 1988, 1990). People place great weight on their inferences about the motives and intentions of the authorities with whom they deal. Finally, the third relational dimension—status recognition—reflects the degree to which people's social status and standing in the community is respected through: 1) the dignity of a procedure; 2) the respect and politeness of their treatment; and 3) the respect shown for their rights (Bies and Moag, 1986; Lind, et al, 1989, 1990; MacCoun, et al, 1988; Tyler, 1988, 1990). When a person is treated politely and with dignity, their feelings of positive standing within the group or relationship are enhanced, with positive implications for feelings of self-esteem. Conversely, undignified, disrespectful, or impolite treatment carries the implication that a person is not a full member of the group. Segregated schools, for example, not only caused material harm to African-Americans, they also communicated an important, and negative, message about their status within American society. It is for this reason that separate is inherently unequal, because it denotes the inferiority of one social group, a problem which cannot be rectified by equalizing spending across schools.
The three relational issues outlined are not the same in conceptual terms. Neutrality in behavior and in procedures reflects something that an authority or an institution does. Features of neutrality are often built into the framework of procedures. For example, trial procedures create a "level playing field" by giving both parties the opportunity to have an attorney, and by giving those attorneys equal opportunities to present arguments, question witnesses, etc. Status recognition also reflects the behavior of authorities, however, politeness and treatment with dignity are more strongly linked to the implementation of procedures by particular authorities. Finally, motive inferences about trustworthiness reflect inferences made by people based on behaviors they experience.

While all three relational issues have an important influence on people's reactions to their experiences, comparisons among the three issues find that trustworthiness is typically the most important relational factor shaping evaluations of authorities (Tyler and Lind, 1992). The importance of motive inferences reflects the suggestion of Heider (1958) that people believe that understanding the motives underlying volitional behavior provides the most effective basis for predicting future behavior. It may also be true that the motives of others in an interaction provide the most direct evidence of social standing.

The centrality of trust to reactions to authorities explains two paradoxical findings in procedural justice studies. First, when people encounter treatment that has surface features of unfairness (e.g. bias, poor quality decision making, etc.) they sometimes do not interpret that behavior as unfair (Tyler, 1990). This finding is explained by including motive attributions into the analysis. If people believe that an authority has "their heart in the right place", they focus less strongly on their actual behavior in making fairness judgments. Conversely, people do not rate procedures with surface features of fairness to be fair if they feel that those creating or implementing those procedures are not motivated to act fairly. As has already been noted, for example, people do not value having the structural opportunity to speak unless they think what they say is being "considered" by the decision maker.

Further support for the relational perspective comes from studies demonstrating that procedural justice influences self-esteem (Koper, Von Knippenberg, Bouhujs, Vermunt, and Wilke, 1993; Tyler, Degoey, and Smith, 1994) and self-efficacy (Gilliland, 1994). According to Group Value theory, fair treatment indicates that the person is a valuable group member while unfair treatment indicates marginality. The knowledge that one is valuable should increase self-esteem while the knowledge of marginality should decrease it. Studies demonstrate that people place more weight on procedural justice when they identify more strongly with their group (Huo, Smith, Tyler, and Lind, 1994; Smith and Tyler, in press; Tyler and Degoey, 1994). Since those who identify more strongly with groups draw more of their identity from their interactions with others in those groups, this finding suggests that procedural justice more strongly influences those who are drawing more identity-relevant information from their interactions with group members.

These findings strongly support the suggestion that procedural justice judgments are relational in character. However, that does not show that all justice judgments are relational. Tyler (1994) examines the psychological antecedents of procedural and distributive justice in legal and managerial settings. He finds that procedural justice has strong relational antecedents, and is not influenced by instrumental judgments. On the other hand, distributive justice is influenced by both instrumental and relational motives. Hence, the psychological antecedents of each form of justice need to be independently considered.

Distributive justice research. In contrast to the literature on procedural justice, instrumental perspectives dominate the distributive justice literature. For example, the merit principle of equity theory assumes that justice is the consequence of an analysis of relevant contributions and rewards. The utilitarian nature of assumed distributive justice motivations is also illustrated by the types of research conducted. One set of studies show that people are more concerned with distributive justice in allocating pay when their behavior will be public than when they believe their behavior will be private. This suggests that people act fairly at least in part out of fear of the social consequences of self-interested behavior. People are also found to prefer principles of distributive equity that favor their personal situation. For example, older workers favor pay systems based on seniority while younger workers prefer pay systems based on productivity (Karsh and Cole, 1968).
However, not all evidence supports an instrumental orientation on distributive justice. Sometimes people are found to act in ways contrary to their self-interest to achieve distributive justice goals (Montada, 1991; Smith and Tyler, in press), finding it difficult to explain from a self-interest or instrumental perspective. Further, relationships influence people's interpretation of fairness in ways that are not related to instrumental costs and benefits. Even in the economic marketplace, an area where people might not expect to give justice to others (e.g., let the buyer beware), people are concerned with relational forms of justice (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986). For example, people believe that employers have an obligation to their existing employees, but not to new employees (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986). Landlords have an obligation to current tenants, but not to new tenants (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986). Further, people have an obligation to maintain ongoing levels of exchange in existing relationships, even when shortages develop. So, a store should not exploit shortages to charge its regular customers more, nor should a team raise prices for playoff tickets, and exploit loyal fans. Again, however, these obligations are to ongoing relationships. A person can fairly solicit bids from strangers on their own house, unlike a playoff ticket, which should not be auctioned off, but should be sold in some way respecting the entitlement of ongoing fans. People feel there is a psychological contract which develops in ongoing social relationships which specifies justice norms and entitlement (Rousseau and Aquino, 1993; Rousseau and Anton, 1988; Rousseau and Parks, 1993). The multiple distributive justice principles and related social relationships discussed earlier also illustrate the influence of social relationships on distributive justice concerns.

Social identification influences on distributive justice concerns suggest other evidence for a relational perspective. In minimal group studies, subjects are categorized arbitrarily into different groups (through the estimation of dots or the flip of a coin) and then asked to allocate rewards between anonymous members of their group and an outgroup. A self-interest or instrumental model predicts that subjects will prefer allocation strategies that maximize the profit for their group. Instead, subjects display a tendency toward fairness. More surprisingly, a preference for strategies that insure the outgroup will lose more, even if it means that their group will gain less (see Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Messick and Mackie, 1989; Tajfel and Turner, 1986 for reviews). In other words, subjects allocated rewards in ways that positively accentuated the differences between groups even when there were no positive personal benefits and even potential personal costs (e.g., their allocations were not directly related to their personal rewards). Social identity theorists argue that subjects' behavior in these studies reflect a desire for a positive social identity - a relational motive. According to social identity theory, people want to belong to positive valued groups, suggesting that issues of collective respect can be as important as personal respect.

Other research shows that the advantaged are more willing to support the redistribution of their advantages to the disadvantaged if they value or identify with a shared superordinate category (Smith and Tyler, in press). This research suggests that advantaged group members are interested in the fair treatment of both disadvantaged and advantaged group members for two reasons. The treatment of any category member communicates information about individual group member's value to the group and further, it communicates information about the groups' norms, or the group's value (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Lind, 1990). This analysis implies that the discovery that an important group behaves unjustly should be particularly upsetting for those who identify most closely with the group, even if they continue to benefit instrumentally from their membership. For example, survivors of lay-offs were more upset with unfair organization policies when they were more identified with the organization before the lay-off began (Brockner, Tyler and Cooper-Schneider, 1993).

The importance of relational issues also appears to be recognized by leaders. An analysis of revolutionary leaders' speeches shows that leaders seeking to motivate their followers to fight for change do not focus on differences in material resources and well-being, but rather on differences in emotional well-being and ideological resources (such as moral righteousness, Martin, Scully and Levitt, 1990). Interestingly, leaders also direct attention away from procedural justice, toward distributive inequities.

Retributive justice research. An instrumental understanding of retributive justice is linked to seeking punishment out of a desire to control the future behavior of the rule-breaker, as well as other potential rule breakers (Miller and Vidmar, 1981; Vidmar and Miller, 1981). People value rule-
following, and seek to punish rule-breakers to prevent them from further rule breaking and to serve as an example to others.

Several different areas of research support an instrumental or behavioral control model of retribution. The behavior control model hypothesizes that people should be especially punitive toward those criminals that they think are likely to commit future crimes, since punishment is intended to deter future crime (specific deterrence). Behavior control models also suggest support for making an example of an offender to deter similar crimes by others. Empirical research supports the suggestion that people are motivated by the desire to deter future crimes. For example, Vidmar (1974) found that 63% of those he interviewed gave behavior control as their primary reason for supporting the death penalty, while only 37% gave deservedness.

In other research, respondents learn information that indicates that deterrence does not lower crime. This information should negate the instrumental reason for supporting punishment (Ellsworth, 1978; Ellsworth and Ross, 1983; Sarat and Vidmar, 1976). These studies provide intermediate levels of support for an instrumental model—some respondents report less support, but others do not. A behavioral control model also suggests that people should be more troubled when rule-breaking is personally threatening. In other words, those potentially affected by a crime should be more punitive than those less affected. For example, women should be especially likely to punish rapists. Further, people should be more punitive when they feel that crime rates are too high.

Although studies of punitiveness provide some support for an instrumental perspective on punishment, that support is not strong. Studies do not find that fear of personal harm through victimization (fear of crime), judgments that rule-breaking is widespread (evaluations of the crime rate), or having been a victim of rule-breaking behavior are strong predictors of punitiveness.

In contrast to the behavioral control model, theoretical statements on retributive justice (Hogan and Emler, 1981; Miller and Vidmar, 1981) suggest relational dynamics similar to the group value model of justice. These arguments flow from the same types of concerns that dominate the identity based relational model of justice. Rule-breaking is viewed as a threat to the status of victims and to the status of social rules (Hogan and Emler, 1981; Miller and Vidmar, 1981). An offense "has symbolic consequences for the individual" and the social group, since rule-breaking is "an affront to [the victim's] values and status" (Miller and Vidmar, 1981 p. 155)(cf, Heider, 1958). In addition to physical and material harm, victims suffer the psychosocial harm of humiliation and degradation. To restore the victim's status requires the rule-breaker be punished.

Rule breaking also threatens the status of group rules and underlying values. From this perspective, the harm of wrong-doing is to the social fabric of the group and its members. Hogan and Emler call such breaches failures of the moral values that are the "enabling conditions for social life (p.138)". Healing these breaches has important implications for the maintenance of group norms, cohesiveness, and quality of social relations in the group (Miller and Vidmar, 1981). This perspective stresses the importance of punishment as a symbol to restore the structure of society and the positive social characteristics of the group.15

A moral or retributive based model of punishment assumes that people will be more punitive when they feel that rule breaking shows a lack of moral character, e.g. a disrespect for social rules. For example, it has already been noted that defendants are more harshly punished when they seem to feel no remorse after they have broken rules (Felson and Ribner, 1981; Rumsey, 1976).

The "deservedness" model, which links punishment to the degree of disrespect for social rules, is supported by research on public attitudes about rule-breaking. First, punitiveness is typically strongly related to social and political values. A number of studies, for example, link authoritarianism (Narby, Cutler, and Moran, 1993; Tyler and Weber, 1983), conservatism (Tyler and Weber, 1983), and the belief in a just world to punitiveness (Lerner, 1980). Second, retributive motives are also more strongly aroused when people break social rules which are more central to the maintenance of the social and moral order (Pepitone, 1975). Finally, those who feel closely connected to the group punish ingroup perpetrators more severely than outgroup perpetrators (Boeckmann, 1994).

The distinction between instrumental and moral reactions to rule following is not simply an academic one. There is a fundamental tension between these two perspectives on reactions to rule violation which is highlighted by current debates about criminal justice policy. With its forward
looking perspective, the instrumental model focuses on those conditions which lead to future rule following. In contrast, punitiveness is directed at punishment for past crimes.

The utilitarian focus of the instrumental model suggests a focus on the conditions which will lessen rule-breaking in the future. Two punishment goals are important: deterrence and rehabilitation. Deterrence is achieved through making punishment sufficiently aversive that behavior is not repeated, either by the criminal or by others. Unfortunately, psychological research suggests that punishment is not particularly effective in altering long-term behavior unless there can be effective behavior control in future situations. Hence, there is a need to rehabilitate rule-breakers by encouraging them to internalize group values. Ironically, however, the conditions which enhance internalization involve: 1) the development of values of individual responsibility through freely making value choices; 2) taking responsibility for choices and obligations in situations without supervision and 3) the development of occupational skills which make nonrule-breaking a viable career option. When efforts have been made to create programs which provide such a rehabilitative environment in criminal justice settings, e.g. work release programs or training and education programs in prisons, there has been public opposition. This opposition is based on the belief that people who commit crimes should be punished by living in an aversive environment—that they deserve to suffer because they have broken social rules.

The incomparability of instrumental and moral reactions to rule-breaking also arises on the macro level during times of social change. Following a revolution, or other changes in power, new leaders must decide whether to integrate past officials into their new society, or to have investigations and trials in an effort to punish former officials for their past crimes. While new leaders often follow the path of ignoring or pardoning past crimes, there are strong pressures from the families of victims and the members of injured groups to uncover the truth about past crimes and bring the guilty to justice.

The relationship of procedural and retributive justice. A relational model suggests insights for understanding the connection between procedural and retributive justice. Normally procedural and retributive justice work in conjunction. Procedures for dealing with rule-breaking function to reinforce social structure and group identity. Through procedures, commitment to the group is developed and emphasized. For example, those accused of crimes must show deference to social authorities, e.g. rising when the judge enters the courtroom, which indicate respect for social rules. In fact, the failure to respect social procedures ("contempt for the court") is a separate crime for which a defendant can be punished. Hence, the procedures of a trial, in which rule-breaking is determined, and punishment established, reinforce the symbolic structure of society and symbols of justice, such as a blindfolded woman holding a scale, are often found in court buildings. Procedures complement punishment, and both reassert the status of the victim and of social rules. The punishing of wrongdoers reasserts social status. Procedures also reinforce commitment to society because they allow the rights of the individual to be demonstrated. By according those accused of crimes rights and due process of law, society also reasserts that the status of people within the group is protected. Interestingly, while Boeckmann (1993) found that ingroup members are more severely punished for violating rules, the same study also indicates that ingroup members are accorded more procedural protections while their guilt is being determined.

On the other hand, rule-breaking can also provoke a conflict between procedural and retributive justice. People may react to heinous or shocking crimes, like the sexual abuse of children, by denying that the offender shares the values of the group. For example, discussions of mass murderers or child molesters often emphasize how such people were "loners" and never fit into society. In other words, they were never group members, who held the values of the group. Such distancing is important, since the actions of less identified individuals are less threatening to group values. Those individuals are also less likely to be accorded procedural protections. Further, they may be subject to spontaneous community actions, such as lynching, being "railroaded" through a cursory investigation and trial, or other efforts to violently reassert the groups' rules and status. As Kelman and Hamilton (1989) note, "dehumanizing" others is a prelude to abandoning justice and morality in dealing with them.

V. When Does Justice Matter?

Deutsch (1985) argues that there is a scope or limited range to those social relationships in which justice principles are applied. He argues that: "...unless one shares Albert Schweitzer's
reverence for all living creatures, one would not feel it to be unjust if one killed an annoying mosquito or caught a fish to eat for dinner. Similarly, justice is not involved in relations with others—such as heathens, "inferior races", "heretics", "perverts"—who are perceived to be outside one's potential moral community (Deutsch, 1985, p 36)."

Research supports Deutsch's suggestion that there are limitations to the applicability of justice. For example, Nagata (1990) describes how Japanese-Americans were excluded from normal justice considerations in the United States during the second world war; Cook (1990) describes the historical exclusion of African-Americans from equality in the distribution of social resources; Kelman and Hamilton (1989) describe how people's human rights are denied in times of war; and Huo (1994) shows that people exclude members of "disliked" groups from access to resources, procedural rights, and fair treatment. Further, political psychologists find that groups are more likely to be denied the right to speak when they question fundamental social values (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, 1982).

Deutsch further argues that the scope of justice is defined by the boundaries of productive exchange relationships (Deutsch, 1985). This instrumental view can be contrasted with a moral or symbolic perspective, which suggests that the scope of justice is shaped by the group or social categories with whom a person identifies and/or by identification with cultural values. This latter model suggests that people exclude others because they are not like them, do not behave as they do, and do not share their cultural and social values.

The study by Nagata (1990) illustrates the contrast between instrumental and identity based explanations for the scope of justice. The internment of the Japanese-Americans can be explained via instrumental factors—the threat they posed and the feasibility of such a policy (due to their distinctive appearance; their small number; their geographic concentration; and their lack of political power). Similarly, Opotow (1993) demonstrates that people's inclusion of the beetle within their scope of justice is linked negatively to the threat the beetle is seen as posing and positively to its utility to humans.

The internment of Japanese-Americans also can be explained in identification/relational terms. At the time, there were racial stereotypes that Japanese-American's values were different from Americans. There was also an assumption that Japanese Americans were "Japanese", an outgroup, and not "American", an ingroup. Further, moral feelings of retribution were involved, with many people feeling that the Japanese should be punished for the Pearl Harbor attack on the United States. These arguments build on social identity research, which links intergroup conflict to competition over positive, favorable, identities. From this perspective, it is threats to symbolic/cultural values which are the basis of excluding others who are dissimilar, different, or who dress or behave differently. While this example relies on stereotypes of an ethnic group to identify "difference", individuals can also be viewed as different, and outside the group, because they "don't fit in".

Other studies also provide support for an identification based model of the scope of justice. For example, people react more strongly to injustice to others if they identify with those others (Brockner, 1990) and are less concerned with extending justice to disliked or excluded others (Huo, 1994). Further, studies of support for giving civil liberties to others suggest that identification with community norms of tolerance increases the willingness to allow disliked groups to exercise rights such as free speech (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, 1982). On the other hand Opotow (1993) does not find that feelings of similarity to the beetle shape the extension of justice to the beetle.

The findings of Huo (1994) also provide a different type of support for an identification based, relational, view of moral exclusion. Huo explores the willingness of people to exclude their "most disliked group" from access to resources, procedural rights, and fair treatment. She finds that the threshold for exclusion from access to resources is low. People are most willing to deny other people and groups access to community resources. The threshold for denying others procedural rights is moderately high. The highest threshold is for denying people fair treatment as people. Hence, denying people respect as people is regarded as the most fundamental denial, and only occurs in relations with extremely disliked groups.

Discussions of the scope of justice focus on those circumstances under which people exclude others from their scope of justice concerns (i.e. on "exclusion"). However, there is also a less studied process of inclusion, with people of varying centrality (subjective feelings of inclusion) differing in their justice concerns (Tyler and Lind, 1990). Tyler and Lind argue that people of intermediate centrality are the
most concerned about procedural and relational issues, since they are concerned about their status within their group. People with high status, who feel secure about their status, and those in marginal positions, who recognize their marginal position, focus relatively more on instrumental concerns.

Social context

The argument that there is a scope of justice can be more generally stated as the suggestion that justice concerns are shaped by the social context. For example, Leventhal (1980) argues that people are not always concerned with justice issues. He suggests that justice rules are often routine or invariant aspects of interactions and fade into the background. Only under some circumstances are justice concerns activated.

Recent descriptions of the role of justice in close relationships (Lerner and Mikula, 1994) present a similar argument. When relationships are going well, justice concerns are proposed to be largely irrelevant. None of the parties to the relationship are actively considering whether they are being fairly or unfairly treated in the relationship. However, when relationships start to deteriorate, people become more concerned with the injustice of their situation (Attridge and Berschied, 1994; Brehm, 1992). However, not all researchers agree that justice concerns are not present in satisfying close relationships (Lerner and Mikula, 1994). For example, justice may be defined differently in satisfactory close relationships (e.g., as need) than in deteriorating close relationships (e.g., as equity). This argument is consistent with the previously outlined literature on the influence of the character of relationships on the distributive justice principles used within them.

The two different descriptions of the role of justice in close relationships illustrate the two questions examined in research on contextual influences: Does social context determine the relative important of justice, or does social context shape the criteria used to define justice. Current research suggests that justice issues remain important across a variety of situations but that the criteria and meaning of justice vary. Several types of contextual influences have been examined, including: cultural effects, structural and role influences, and influences of scarcity.

Cross-cultural research. Many studies suggest that justice concerns are important across cultures. For example, judgments of procedural fairness are the most important criteria for choosing a procedure across ethnic groups and nationalities (Lind, Huo and Tyler, 1994; LaTour, Houlden, Walker and Thibaut, 1976). Similarly, cross-cultural research demonstrates that the desire to punish rule-breaking is widespread (Hamilton and Saunders, 1992). On the other hand, the relationship between experiencing injustice and feeling anger varies across European societies (Babad and Wallboth, 1986; Walbott and Scherer, 1986). Possible cross-cultural differences in the centrality of justice concerns is illustrated by research comparing Indian and American resolutions for a conflict that required a choice between a solution favoring justice considerations (e.g., individual rights, claims and the prevention of harm) or a solution favoring role related interpersonal responsibilities. Subjects were asked, for example, to consider a situation in which they go on a trip and lose their money. Their return is required to be present at a relative's wedding. Subjects are asked whether it is better to steal money to return for the wedding (meeting interpersonal obligations) or to follow justice principles and miss the wedding. Indian adults and children preferred solutions that favored interpersonal responsibilities, suggesting less concern about issues of justice (Miller and Bersoff, 1992).

The analysis of Miller and Bersoff (1992) illustrates the difficulties of interpreting cross-cultural findings. It may not be that people in some cultures value justice less, but rather that they define it differently. First, the interpersonal responsibilities of importance to Indian subjects may also represent justice judgments. It may be that Indian subjects, for example, give preference to the principle of need, feeling that their relative needs their presence at the wedding more than the victim needs the stolen money. If so, then it is the meaning of justice which changes, not its existence.

It is also possible that the level at which justice considerations are conceptualized is different in different cultures. The group should be more important to the self-concept of Indian subjects as members of a more collectivist culture, than for American subjects, as members of a more individualist culture. Microjustice principles of individual rights and responsibility may not represent the best level at which to capture collectivist justice concerns. Justice for collectivist cultures is better defined at the

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macrojustice level (Azzi, 1994; Brickman, et al). Again, the key issue may be not whether justice matters, but how it is conceptualized.

Although most studies support the suggestion that justice is important across cultural settings, this research suggests that people do not necessarily place the same weight on justice concerns or think about justice in the same way. This research differentiates procedural, distributive, and retributive justice concerns. In the case of procedural justice only minor variations in the meaning of justice, or in procedural preferences, have been found across cultures. Studies in Japan (Sugawara and Huo, 1994), Europe (Thibaut and Walker, 1975), Hong Kong (Leung, 1987; Leung and Lind, 1986) and among differing subgroups of American society find both great similarity in the criteria used to define procedural justice and some clear differences. For example, the Japanese concern for clarity in procedures may be greater than that found among Americans (Sugawara and Huo, 1994). Similarly, cross-cultural investigations of procedural preferences show that Chinese students in Hong Kong and Kurdish and Lebanese immigrants in Germany prefer conciliatory procedures more strongly than do American students (Leung, 1987; Leung and Lind, 1986; Bierbauer, 1990).

In the case of distributive justice criteria, great cultural differences are found. It has been widely suggested that collectivistic cultures focus more strongly on equality and need, while individualistic cultures focus on equity (Deutsch, 1975; Hasegawa, 1986; James, 1993; Triandis, 1972, 1989), a hypothesis supported by several studies (Berman, Murphy-Burman, and Singh, 1985; Bond, Leung, and Wan, 1982; Leung and Bond, 1982, 1984; Kashima, Siegal, Tanaka, and Isaka, 1988; Mahler, Greenberg, and Hayashi, 1981; Marin, 1981, Meindl, Hunt, and Cheng, 1994; Murphy-Berman, Berman, Singh, Pachauri, and Kumar, 1984; Siegal and Shwalb, 1985; Tornblom and Foa, 1983).

Finally, cross-cultural research on retributive justice shows that there is considerable agreement between cultures on which offenses warrant punishment and the seriousness of offenses (Evans and Scott, 1984). However, cultures differ in the goals of the punishment response. For example, citizens in the United States are more interested in retribution, incapacitation, and general deterrence, while Japanese citizens emphasize rehabilitation and social labelling (Hamilton and Sanders, 1988, 1992). In Japan the emphasis is on the need to bring the individual back into society, through restitution, apology, or some other similar means. In the United States, people who break rules are isolated to punish them for their crimes. Interestingly, both societies equally strongly favor punishment, but they differ in their beliefs about the goals of punishment.

Cross-cultural differences in justice criteria can be understood in several ways. Most explanations emphasize differences in people's values concerning their social relations with others. One commonly suggested value difference is individualism or collectivism. In collectivist societies, macrojustice, and consequently, individual-level equality in the allocation of resources is emphasized. This occurs because societal goals dominate over individual goals. In individualist societies, individual differences and microjustice are valued and consequently, equity in the allocation of resources is emphasized, individual goals dominate over societal goals. Further, members of collectivist societies value interpersonal harmony and the avoidance of animosity so they prefer more conciliatory procedures, in contrast to members of individualistic societies. Finally, in collectivist societies, rule breaking is viewed as a failure of society to socialize and guide the person properly (Hamilton and Sander, 1988). Therefore, rehabilitation and reintegration into society is emphasized. In individualist societies, rule breaking is viewed as a personal failure for which society is not responsible. Therefore, punishment and separation from society is most important. The distinction between collectivist and individualist cultures is linked to the nature of the social relations within a group, as predicted by the relational view of justice. For example, social groups in Japan are much more closely knit and homogeneous than similar groups are in the United States. Therefore, shaming a rule-breaker is a much more effective punishment in Japan than it is in the United States (Braithwaite, 1989). Further, feelings about obligation and responsibility to other people differ across these two societies (Hagiwara, 1992; Hamilton and Hagiwara, 1992; Hamilton and Sanders, 1983; Kurosawa, 1992).

Judgments about justice are also influenced by other cultural values. For example, differences in power-distance (e.g., egalitarianism-hierarchy) influence both the importance and meaning of justice in shaping reactions to authorities (Tyler, Lind and Huo, 1994). Power distance reflects beliefs about the naturalness and permeability of power differences.
Gundykunst and Ting-Toomey (1988) demonstrate that these variations are strongly related to cultural values (the correlation to power-distance was \( r = -0.86 \)). Power distance has also been linked to the willingness to tolerate inequality (Scase, 1977; Stern and Keller, 1953). In those societies with high power distance, anger is less related to injustice, since "cultures that inculcate an acceptance of power differences lead individuals to expect, take for granted and, therefore, not get angry about, injustices (James, 1993, p. 23)."

Other explanations for cross-cultural differences in how justice is defined are instrumentally based. For example, the differences in allocation preferences between Indian and American subjects have been argued to reflect the different levels of resources available in each society (Murphy-Berman, et al, 1984). When resources are scarce, allocation based on need is seen as more just than when resources are plentiful. Similarly, when resources are scarce, people are less likely to view the world as just (Furnham, 1993). Finally, Meindl, Hunt and Cheng (1994) explain the shift among Chinese managers from more egalitarian to more meritocratic principles of justice as a reflection of the shift from a more collectivist centralized economy to a more market-oriented one. Other researchers link differences in definitions of justice to different beliefs about the consequences of using different conflict resolution procedures (Bond, Leung and Schwartz, 1992; Leung and Lind, 1986).

Social structural/role effects.

A second set of contextual factors that influence considerations of justice are role or social structural differences. Leventhal (1980) suggests that the degree to which justice concerns are activated depends, in part, on the nature of the social structure. For example, justice concerns are more salient in pluralistic systems, which lack a single set of justice principles, and less central in monolithic systems. Similarly, justice issues are more prominent when organizations are being created and rules developed (Azzi and Jost, 1992).

In contrast, in established hierarchical organizations, justice concerns may recede into the background. Subordinates often defer their moral obligations and evaluations to their supervisors and leaders, acting as "agents" for the collective will, rather than as autonomous individuals (Milgram, 1974). Kelman and Hamilton (1989) provide numerous examples of people's willingness to abandon moral principles to support the actions of legitimate authorities. As Darley (1992) comments: "organizations are required to produce evil actions (p. 204)", since they provide the social forces which alter individuals by encouraging them to abandon their justice concerns. Similarly, Kelman and Hamilton (1989) suggest that people "authorize" legitimate others to make moral judgments for them.

One structural factor which determines the extent and degree to which justice concerns are activated is the social role being played by the person studied. A first and perhaps, obvious role difference is between victim and victimizer (Mikula, 1994). The difference in causal attributions between observers and actors is a well-documented social psychological principle (Jones and Davis, 1972). A similar divergence in perspectives is found between victims' and victimizers' perceptions of the same events (Mikula, 1994). Victims perceived unfair events as more serious, more undeserved, more unjust and attributed more responsibility and blame to the victimizers than did victimizers (Mikula, 1994:195). Interestingly, the less satisfied partners were with the relationship, the greater divergence in their explanations for unjust events.

Not only do perceptions of unjust events diverge between victims and victimizers, so do their understandings of retributive behavior. For example, when romantic partners use the silent treatment as punishment, they assume the violator knows the offense and is unwilling to apologize. In contrast, when they are the target, they report that they have no idea what their offense was. More importantly when people are the target of the silent treatment, they report feeling extremely angry and aggressive, but when they use the silent treatment themselves, they minimize the target's emotional reactions and focus, instead, on its effectiveness (Somer and Williams, 1994). In other words, these divergent perspectives also reflect an egocentric bias in which one's behavior, or one's reaction to another's behavior is seen as more reasonable and good (e.g., deRidder and Tripathi, 1992; Mummmendey and Osten, 1993).

A second important role difference is between allocators and recipients of resources. Those who are allocators must consider issues of macrojustice, examining the various tradeoffs involved in enacting
fair procedures and finding fair solutions (Elster, 1992; Leventhal, 1980; Skitka and Tetlock, 1992). Allocators must make proactive social justice judgments (Greenberg, 1987), while recipients make reactive judgments. Further, the trade-offs important to those who allocate resources are very different from the trade-offs important to the recipients (Elster, 1993). Certainly, the dependent variables; e.g., decision acceptability, organizational commitment, important to people in positions of authority or responsibility are different from the dependent variables important to the recipients; e.g., costs and benefits, status recognition. The influence of role on views about justice is demonstrated by studies of work supervisors and police officers (Lissak and Sheppard, 1983; Sheppard and Lewicki, 1987). These studies find that allocators place a greater emphasis on instrumental issues than relational issues vis-a-vis subordinates and citizens. This accords with the suggestion of Hogan, Curphy, and Hogan (1994) that subordinates' evaluations of authorities are more strongly affected by relational issues than are authorities' evaluations of subordinates.

The influence of role and structural effects on social justice concerns can be understood from either an instrumental or a relational perspective. An instrumental perspective suggests that it is in the self-interest of those who may have caused an injustice to minimize their responsibility or the seriousness of an unjust event and it is in the self-interest of those who feel they are victims to emphasize the seriousness and injustice of the same event. Similarly, it is in the self-interest of those who punish to emphasize the effectiveness and reasonableness of the punishment and those who are the targets to emphasize their confusion. The same reasoning can be extended to allocator/recipient differences. For example, allocators are motivated to be efficient, but this efficiency is tempered by feelings of accountability to recipients because they know that recipients will react to the allocations they receive (Skitka and Tetlock, 1993). Recipients, according to an instrumental perspective, will endorse any distribution that benefits them as fair.

An instrumental perspective suggests that roles and social structure can be understood as a series of instrumentally beneficial exchange relationships. In contrast, a relational perspective suggests that roles and social structure can be understood as a web of social relationships and responsibilities. A relational understanding of role and structural differences can explain why some couples' explanations of unfair events converge and other couples' explanations do not. After all, it is not in the perpetrator's self-interest to acknowledge his or her role in creating an injustice. Therefore, it is difficult to account for this variability from a pure instrumental perspective. A relational perspective suggests other goals (e.g., mutual responsiveness, Clark and Mills, 1993) might be important in some relationships and not in others, independent of any instrumental costs and benefits. Similarly, allocators and recipient differences may reflect differences in their social responsibilities. For example, allocators' structural role in the group makes authorities responsible for considering the moral implications of their actions (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989), while subordinates react based on their feelings of obligation to authorities and the group. However, studies to date have not provided a clear differentiation of the motives underlying role effects on social justice judgments.

Scarcity and Abundance.

A third set of contextual factors is the scarcity or abundance of social resources or opportunities. Some argue that justice concerns are a curvilinear function of resource availability. Hogan and Emler (1981) suggest that justice concerns are limited or absent in times of abundance and arise when there are conflicts of interest. When there are moderate resources, scarcity conflicts will arise and people will be concerned with justice and the implications injustice may have for immediate and long term outcomes. As the severity of resource scarcity increases, justice becomes limited again and will only apply to those with whom one has significant exchange or social relationships. Finally, self interest may be the terminal form of "justice" when scarcity imposes threats on the basic necessities of life (Booth, 1983; de Carufel, 1981). This argument is an extension of the general argument of Thibaut and Faucheux (1965) that justice concerns are likely to arise in 'profitable, but unstable' social relations (see Barrett-Howard and Tyler, 1986, for evidence supporting this proposition).

Evidence suggests that justice concerns remain important when resources are scarce but justice rules and the extent to which they are applied varies. For example, need and efficiency are viewed as
more appropriate distributive justice principles than equity when the particular resource is scarce (Greenberg, 1981). According to the contingency model of distributive justice (Skitka and Tetlock, 1992), the influence of scarcity is to promote cognitive effort on the part of the allocator in the evaluation of claimants for the scarce resource. Under conditions of low scarcity, only those personally responsible claimants with low priority (low need and efficiency) are denied resources. Under conditions of high scarcity, only claimants with high priority (high need and efficiency) are given resources.

Other research suggests that scarcity may affect the scope of justice concerns in addition to affecting the principles of justice used. Sociological theories of responses to scarcity based on field observation (Booth, 1983) suggest that distributive justice norms may have an increasingly restricted range of applicability in times of scarcity. Towson, Lerner, and de Carufel (1981) have demonstrated a shift to in-group favoritism from equitable allocations in response to high competition in laboratory. Elster (1993) argues that scarcity prompts people to limit the scope of justice to members of the same social or ethnic group in the distribution of scarce and valuable resources. Examples of this phenomenon include efforts to introduce legislation that would bar foreign nationals from utilizing organ pools in the United States and the preference African American kidney donors express that their kidneys not be provided to Caucasian patients.

Studies also suggest that how people respond to scarcity depends on their political/social ideology. When resources are scarce, political conservatives tend to focus on an assessment of personal responsibility, withholding resources from claimants, who are personally responsible for their plight (Skitka and Tetlock, 1993). The basis of their reactions is not changed by level of scarcity. In contrast, political liberals' allocation behavior appears more responsive to the extent of resource scarcity. Under conditions of no scarcity, liberals tend to allocate resources to all claimants. However, under conditions of scarcity, egalitarian values are not practical and painful discriminations must be made. In this event, the behavior of liberals begins to resemble that of conservatives and personally responsible claimants are denied resources. Some research has suggested that the experience of allocating under conditions of scarcity may have enduring effects (Ross and Ellard, 1986). Skitka (in press) has found that liberals who have allocated resources under conditions of scarcity are less likely to allocate resources to all claimants when scarcity constraints are relaxed. It is reasoned that to reduce the painful and socially awkward trade-offs associated with making allocation decisions under scarcity, liberals accentuate the deservingness of chosen and/or the undeservingness of the rejected. These justifications then outlive the period of scarcity affecting future allocations.

In addition to influencing distributive justice, there is research to suggest that scarcity may have an effect on retributive justice as well, since scarcity is expected to increase social conflict. Analysis of archival data (Sales, 1973) suggests that punitiveness towards violators of ingroup rules increases when society faces economic threats. This is indexed at the collective level by a relative increase in expenditures for police, law and order themes in political speeches, and attitudes in favor of the death penalty. A number of studies similarly suggest that fear of crime, judgments that crime is a serious social problem, and many other similar indices of heightened conflict lead to greater punitiveness (although, as previously noted, these effects are not strong).

The influence of scarcity on the choice of justice principles can also be understood as the product of relational or symbolic issues or in instrumental terms. An instrumental analysis suggests that increased scarcity of resources means that justice principles are chosen in ways that will serve self-interest. If a person is more likely to benefit from criteria that emphasize the efficient distribution of resources, he or she will support that principle. If a person is more likely to benefit from criteria that emphasize a distribution of resources based on need, he or she will support that principle (Greenberg, 1981). Similarly, increased scarcity should mean that people will limit their scope of justice to those people with whom they have a productive exchange relationship.

In contrast, a relational analysis emphasizes value and relational influences on justice considerations during times of scarcity rather than direct individual costs and benefits. One type of evidence which supports a relational analysis is evidence that, when resources are scarce, societies and individuals think about justice in macro terms. One macroconcern is efficiency—what is good for the overall society. Just as in Eskimo society, the elderly voluntarily wander off to die when they can no longer contribute to the group, and in wartime doctors conduct triage to determine who will receive medical treatment, during times of scarcity individuals focus on what is good for the group, rather than
what is good for themselves or for other individuals. Greenberg (1981) provides evidence that under conditions of scarcity, overall efficiency becomes a more central justice principle.

The issue of scarcity provides an excellent arena within which to compare the instrumental and relational models of the justice motive. If the instrumental model of the justice motive is correct, then people should increasingly abandon their justice concerns for self-interested behavior as resources become scarce. In extreme situations people should simply care about themselves, their family, and perhaps their immediate social group. These feelings should be especially strong when people are losing accustomed resources, since prospect theory indicates that losses loom larger than gains in subjective calculations (Kahneman, 1979). In contrast, from an instrumental perspective, abundance should be a time when there are an absence of resource conflicts (Hogan and Emler, 1981).

The relational model suggests that people should be concerned about status and identity issues. Ironically, scarcity should not necessarily create problems of status or identity. Consider the military police officers studied in the original research on relative deprivation. Those officers faced a scarcity of promotion opportunities with apparent equanimity. In contrast, the pilots faced an abundance of promotion opportunities with unhappiness and dissatisfaction. A relational perspective suggests that the changes in status, and consequent identity, which occur during times of abundance may be more troubling than the problems encountered during scarcity.

The argument that abundance may be difficult for individuals and societies to deal with is also suggested by Greenberg (1981). Both Brickman and Campbell (1971) and Greenberg (1981) argue that people rapidly increase their expectations as resources increase, with the consequence that it is difficult to create the psychological feeling of "abundance". Instead, resources increasingly take on a symbolic role, reflecting relational issues of status and self-worth. As a consequence, high levels of objective abundance do not lead to positive feelings. While there is very little research comparing the instrumental and relational models in this area, it seems like a promising arena for future studies.

The origin of justice criteria: How do justice concerns develop?

Our discussion of the criteria of justice suggests a broad consensus about the criteria for judging justice within a particular setting, as least within American society (Tyler, 1985; Lane, 1986). This consensus has two aspects. First, within a particular situation, people who differ in their demographic characteristics—age, education, sex, race, etc.—seem to have similar views about the criteria for defining justice (Tyler, 1988; Tyler, in press). Further, public opinion polls also show that the public agrees about what constitutes a punishable crime (Miller, Rossi, and Simpson, 1986) and about the appropriate level for sanctioning particular crimes. Second, people have situational templates that identify situational characteristics that activate particular justice principles. People do not apply the same justice principles in all situations. For example, there is a broad consensus that equity applies to business/work settings; equality to legal/political settings; and need to the family (Tyler, 1985).

How can this striking consensus be explained? One model of the psychology of the person suggests that concern for justice is a universal human characteristic. Lerner has argued that people are intrinsically motivated to behave fairly. Lerner (1980, 1981, 1982) suggests that people have a basic desire to behave fairly and to believe that justice exists in the world (the just world phenomenon). If justice concerns arise from basic human characteristics, it makes sense to find common justice concerns across people, groups, and societies.

One type of support for Lerner is the previously outlined evidence that fairness generally shapes how people feel and what they do. Another is evidence that justice beliefs are found among fairly young children (Gold, Darley, Hilton, and Zanna, 1984). Lerner also points out that people engage in cognitive distortions to maintain the belief that the world is a "just place". If people see someone else suffer, for example, they distort their judgments to decide that they deserved to suffer, even if given evidence that the suffering is actually randomly determined. This suggests that people are motivated to distort their judgments to support the belief that people get what they "deserve" in life.

Lerner's argument is supported by other findings demonstrating that, even when people have power over others and can do to them whatever they desire, as in wars, they typically engage in considerable cognitive effort to justify their actions and make them seem "just" (Kelman and Hamilton,
One manner in which the universality of justice motives can be tested is by examining whether a justice motive appears in cultures which do not socialize people to value that concern. For example, Thibaut and Walker (1965) demonstrate that Americans in their studies prefer the adversary method of dispute resolution. Since Americans are socialized into a legal system which defines the adversary system as just, this is not surprising, and it could reflect either socialization or an inherent preference for that procedure. Thibaut and Walker, however, replicated this finding in France and Germany, countries with the inquisitorial legal system. Respondents in France and Germany also preferred the adversary system. A key difference between the two legal systems is the opportunity to shape the presentation of one's own evidence. The preference for an adversarial legal system suggests that people view "voice" as inherently fair, since it goes against socialization. Lind and Barley (1992) refer to such justice judgments as intrinsic because they develop from basic human needs. They argue that the concern for positive status within groups is a universal human characteristic. As a consequence, across cultures, people value procedures which provide such evidence, through neutral treatment, evidence that authorities are trustworthy and through treatment with dignity and respect.

A second argument is that people learn what is just through the process of cultural socialization. If so, this would explain why there is widespread consensus about what is just within a particular culture and differences across cultures. Lind and Earley refer to these socialized standards as extrinsic to the individual. In contrast to the findings of Thibaut and Walker that concerns for voice and positive status are invariant across cultures, extrinsic standards should vary with cultural context. For example, Miller and Bersoff (1992) show that Indian and American subjects differ in their conceptions of the importance of behaving justly in trying to resolve a social conflict. One difficulty with a cultural socialization explanation is that it does not take account of people's individual experiences, nor does it suggest whether and how people might change their views across their lives.

Darley and Schultz (1990) present a more individualized approach to socialization which emphasizes the interpersonal aspects of the socialization process. It focuses on both peer interactions and children's interactions with adults. Adults play a particularly central role in moral socialization, with children constructing their sense of justice through interaction with parents and teachers. This social constructionist model argues that principles of justice evolve as acceptable explanations for behavior. These explanations are learned through negotiation with adults. Still, cultural scripts will limit the influence of personal experiences in the development of views about society (Tyler and McGraw, 1986). For example, the disadvantaged may have objective experiences that their basic feelings about justice say are unfair, but may interpret those experiences as "deserved" and "just" because of cultural socialization. Slaves, for example, often believed that slavery was just, just as the authors of the declaration of independence could proclaim "all men created equal" without meaning to include slaves or women in the arena of basic human rights. Hence, each individual's justice rules will reflect both general consistency with overall cultural rules and idiosyncratic elements developed through negotiations with particular authorities.

If people learn what is just through cultural socialization or through negotiation with particular adult authorities, this raises the question of how such justice rules arise on the societal level, to be socialized into individuals through education. How, for example, do parents determine which moral rules they should be seeking to enforce when dealing with their children. How do they know what is right? Presumably justice rules arise because they have some functional value to societies seeking to deal with the problems of maintaining social order and cohesiveness, while dealing with problems of productivity and the allocation of rewards (Campbell, 1975). If the problems faced by various societies are similar, then justice rules should be similar across different societies.

Socialization, whether at a cultural level or via personal experiences with others, may interact with the unfolding of basic human needs and cognitive frameworks. In their treatment of moral development, Piaget and Kohlberg focus on the unfolding evolution of feelings about right and wrong as the sophistication of people's reasoning develops over time, as a consequence of cognitive maturity and social experience. Development involves changes in the way people think about justice. This perspective is especially interesting to the extent that it suggests basic conceptions of justice which are intrinsic to individuals and, hence, likely to be universal across societies.
Conclusion

When the field of social justice initially developed during the immediate post-war period, justice findings played an important role in the cognitive revolution within social psychology. Research on the dynamics of relative deprivation, in conjunction with the study of social comparison, make clear that people construct their social worlds. As a consequence, subjective satisfaction and feelings about experience are substantially independent of the objective quality of experiences. This fundamental insight is one of the central contributions of social psychology. However, this early work, while framed in justice terms, does little to substantiate directly that people are concerned about issues of social justice.

Subsequent developments within the field of social justice have more effectively substantiated the argument that people care about justice. They have also widened this basic claim. Currently research on distributive, procedural, and retributive justice all demonstrate that people's feelings and behaviors are strongly affected by their judgments about the justice or injustice of social experiences.

Justice findings provide important information about the antecedents of two key social behaviors. The first is behavior designed to change social rules and institutions. Studies of distributive justice suggest that judgments of group-based deprivation are important antecedents of both collective political action and collective unrest. Distributive injustice leads to rule-breaking and rule-changing behavior. The second is behavior which conforms to social rules. Studies of procedural justice suggest that judgments about the fairness of decision-making procedures are the primary antecedent of people's willingness to voluntarily accept decisions and obey rules.

While there are supportive research findings in all of these areas, the area of retributive justice is currently the least developed theoretically. This is ironic given the importance which issues of retributive justice are assuming in recent public debates about social policy. While it might seem strange to link the development of social justice concerns to current events, throughout its evolution the field of social justice has been shaped by social concerns. During the 1940s and 1960s, collective unrest spurred the study of relative deprivation. During the 1960s, dissatisfaction among workers over pay and promotion opportunities led to important work on equity theory. During the 1970s, the concern of the legal system over the management of disputes led to research on procedural justice. Hence, it seems likely that current concerns over defining and maintaining social order will lead to greater attention to issues involving the psychology of retribution.

Of course, the evolution of justice research is not only linked to emerging social issues. It is also linked to the intellectual development of social justice research. While relative deprivation theory establishes the important point that subjectivity matters, its failure to identify the rules underlying social comparisons leads it to have a post hoc quality. Equity theory addresses this concern directly by providing a justice model through which justice-based predictions can be made and tested. However, equity theory proved limited in its ability to explain feelings and behaviors in groups. Open-ended studies suggest that the narrow range of questions examined by equity theory fail to touch on many of the justice concerns which arise in social interaction. In efforts to broaden the scope of justice concerns to capture these issues, procedural concerns were added to the justice equation. Subsequent studies show that, in fact, procedural concerns dominate justice concerns in groups and organizations. Studies of procedural justice also highlight the tremendous difficulties which authorities of all types have in securing compliance with rules. This concern with rules, in turn, leads inevitably to the question of how people respond to rule-breaking. The procedural justice literature focuses on the positive question of how to heighten obedience, while the retributive justice literature discusses how to deal with those who do not obey.

There are three emerging social issues in the United States that suggest important directions for future social justice research. First, there is a decline in the legitimacy of social authorities, both within the United States and Europe. Previous research indicates that the dominance of procedural concerns in groups and organizations reflects the stability and legitimacy of existing institutions and authorities. As the forms of authorities and organizations established during the last fifty years are questioned and revised, there will be increased attention to questions obscured by the procedural evaluations of existing legitimate authorities. As legitimacy declines, people may be increasingly unwilling to view the enactment of procedural justice as the attainment of justice. In fact, those seeking
to create social change attempt to focus attention away from procedural issues, toward questions of what is desirable and right (Martin, Scully and Levitt, 1990), recognizing that "fair" procedures can obscure unfair outcomes (Fox, 1993; Haney, 1991). Alternatively, the loss of legitimacy may mean that procedural justice will remain important but be defined more relationally. Cross-cultural research, for example, indicates that members of cultures marked by more egalitarian and less hierarchical social relationships are more likely to define justice in relational terms.

This decline in traditional sources of legitimacy may also lead to increased attention to macro justice as the framework of social institutions is reshaped. Already, issues of distributive justice are emerging on the macro level in the form of discussions about how to handle intergenerational conflicts (e.g., social security vs. education), disagreements about entitlement to social support (e.g., welfare and health benefits), as well as about the obligation of the well-off to redistribute resources to the disadvantaged. Similarly, concerns about retributive justice are leading to renewed debate about how to maintain social order through the punishment of rule breakers. For example, people’s declining faith in the legal system has led to an increase in the public willingness to condone extraprocedural acts of self-protection and vengeance (Robinson and Darley, 1995).

The importance of macrojustice issues is a reminder that the majority of social justice research has investigated people’s subjective experiences of justice, rather than the often more difficult issues of objective social justice (i.e., what sorts of procedures, rules or goals society ought to be trying to achieve, see Lane, 1981). Because people accept the legitimacy of existing authorities, they focus on whether existing procedures are fairly enacted, rather than more difficult distributive or retributive issues of right and wrong. However, as traditional institutions decline in legitimacy, these issues will become more salient and important to solve.

A second social trend in the United States is the shift from traditional hierarchical authority relations to an increased use of decentralized authority structures. Businesses are seeking to breakup hierarchical, bureaucratic, organizations to create smaller more malleable work units (Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin, 1992), while the public is pressuring for declines in the role of national government, with increases in local autonomy. Since such authority structures place more responsibility in smaller groups, which have stronger social ties, this social change is likely to heighten the influence of relational concerns in defining justice.

Finally, as the nation state declines as a focus of identification, and ethnic and group identifications increase, societies are becoming increasingly diverse and multicultural. This will have several effects on justice concerns. First, distributive and procedural concerns will be increasingly framed in group, rather than individual terms. In order to maintain social stability, society has an interest in encouraging citizens to frame their outcome judgments in individual terms, rather than on a group level (Azzi, 1994; Major, 1994). Deprivations interpreted in group terms, after all, are more likely to lead to collective unrest. Hence, social instability seems a likely prediction for the future.

The development of stronger subgroup identification also suggests that there will be an increasing attention to justice issues involved in balancing among differing justice values. Past justice research has focused primarily on people who share common social, cultural, and justice values, as well as a common superordinate identification. In such settings conflicts of interest occur within a framework of shared values. Increasingly, with the development of diverse, multicultural, societies, the issue in social interaction will be that of bridging across differences in values. Such bridging could occur through discussion and consensus building, it could involve systems of authority in which each group has power to veto justice judgments to which it objects (Azzi, 1994), or it could involve coercion, with one group imposing its values on others. One consequence of increasing ethnic and cultural diversity has been stronger subgroup identification. Such subgroup identification can make bridging across differences in values and interests even more difficult (Huo, Smith, Tyler, Lind, 1994).

The distinction between individual and group justice concerns highlights an important contribution of social justice to the field of social psychology. Reflecting the individualistic nature of American culture, early work on social justice has been strongly individual in character. However, the important early distinction between egoistic and fraternal deprivation (by a European author) foreshadowed an important emerging issue within the field of justice. Theories of justice must accommodate group-based justice models, since the development of multilevel justice models appears inevitable as America moves toward becoming a multicultural society.
In fact, despite the limits of the current literature, justice theories and research have been infused with the social identity perspective on the individual more than most areas of social psychology (Ellemers, 1993; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). That perspective emphasizes that people’s identities are shaped by both unique individual qualities and memberships in important groups and social categories (social identities). The justice literature demonstrates that social identities have important social implications. If people define themselves in group terms, they are more likely to interpret their experiences in group terms, more likely to feel group deprivation, and more likely to engage in collective actions.

The psychology of justice

Recognition of the importance of judgments about justice and injustice leads to a series of further issues exploring the nature of these justice concerns. Early justice theories suffer from a instrumental quality born of their social exchange backgrounds (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). While demonstrating widespread concerns about justice, theorists then explain these concerns as examples of the pursuit of self-interest in social life. Hence, in contrast to Lerner (1982), who regards the social justice motive as a basic human characteristic, these models suggest that justice concerns are simply a strategy in the service of self-interest. As justice research has proliferated a number of research findings inconsistent with this image have emerged. This has led to renewed attention to the nature of the psychological motives underlying justice concerns.

Non-instrumental models have not been extensively developed. At this time the primary non-instrumental model is the identity based group value model. That model accounts for many of the discrepancies from instrumental predictions which are found in the research findings on justice. Recent findings make clear that, as predicted by the group value model, people use the justice they experience in interactions with others as an indicator of their status within groups. That inferred status, in turn, shapes feelings about the self, as well as satisfaction and social behavior.

It is also clear that further investigation of the nature of the justice motive is needed. Of particular importance is an understanding of the psychological processes underlying each form of justice, since recent studies suggest that these processes may differ (Tyler, 1994). There may very well be other, neglected, aspects of justice to be explored. One suggestion flowing from both general social psychology and the specific literature on retributive justice is that affective models need to receive greater attention.

Recent research findings also suggest that there is a scope of justice concerns. People do not extend their justice framework to all people or all living organisms. More broadly, a number of situational factors influence both the importance and meaning of justice. Such effects are found in investigations of cultural influences, role influences, and examinations of the effects of scarcity and abundance on the nature of people’s justice concerns. However, it is not clear why these effects occur. Do these situational variations influence instrumental evaluations of the situation such as evaluations of the effectiveness of varying principles of justice, or to they influence people’s social relations, and/or the social and cultural values which frame actions? Social justice research clearly demonstrates the importance of fairness judgments to people’s feelings, attitudes and behaviors in social interactions. The goal for future research will be a better understanding of when and why social justice is so important.
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Justice is not only central to the thoughts, feelings and behavior of people within organized groups, it also dominates the efforts of philosophers to explain and justify societies. Discussions of justice are key aspects of the philosophical writings of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Marx, Rawls, and many others.

More advantaged members of low status groups also are more likely to have access to the resources necessary for collective action (Klandermans, 1991).

This choice of comparison others does not only involve issues of feeling. People's actual effectiveness in dealing with others is also linked to their social comparison choices. For example, studies show that achievement is linked to effective use of social comparisons, while dysfunctional people make poor social comparison choices.

An alternative argument is that because America is a highly individuals-focused society, people tend to think of inputs and outcomes in individual terms. Perhaps what is needed is a "fraternal" version of equity theory, in which people think about inputs and outcomes on the group level. Affirmative action policies can be interpreted as achieving equity at the collective or group level. The application of equity theory to policy support highlights the important role of societal and/or cultural rules in specifying appropriate or inappropriate inputs. For example, in Indian society a person's caste (e.g. the status of their group memberships) would be considered an input into their value at work.

Thibaut and Walker (1978) distinguish conflicts of interest from truth conflicts. If, for example, a group of people are lost in the woods, they have a common interest in finding their way out (finding truth). In such a situation, they argue the psychology of procedural preference is different.

Their work is also concerned with the justice of various dispute resolution procedures when judged against objective criteria. This concern will not be addressed within this review.

It is also possible to give cognitive explanations for the reliance on heuristics. Langer's work on mindlessness (Langer, 1992), for example, indicates that people are likely to defer to an explanation, even if it is cognitively meaningless ("I need to use the xerox machine because I need to use the xerox machine."). It may be that people develop rules for central and peripheral processing (the ELM model) in which many issues are reacted to without thought. Only some events trigger the type of cognitive effort what would invalidate the enactment of accustomed forms of interaction. One such event may be an experience of injustice. Hence, people may be slow to recognize the violation of forms reflecting justice norms in social interaction, but quick to take offense when they do recognize such violations.

An additional issue is which principles ought to govern distributions. Deutsch (1975) raises this more normative question in his discussion of various possible principles of justice. Political philosophers, such as Lane (1981) have addressed it in more detail.

Mahoney (1987) points out that, while the idea of defining a person's "worth" in equity equations in terms of their market value seems self-evident to most Americans, there are actually several different ways of thinking about "worth". For example, theories of comparable worth define "worth" in terms of the value of what someone produces, rather than in terms of the offers they can receive elsewhere. Interestingly, both of these conceptions of worth are contained within the classic writings of Adam Smith (see Mahoney).

They also found that the importance of procedural and distributive justice, while generally high, varied in importance across situations, both in absolute terms and relative to the influence of nonfairness factors. This finding was replicated in a natural setting by Lissak and Sheppard (1983) who found that procedural justice was the primary criteria for evaluating procedures in a legal setting, but not in a managerial setting.

Azzi (1992) suggests three types of efficacy beliefs that are important to determining whether people will participate in collective action: 1) individual efficacy (I can make a difference), 2) collective efficacy (the group can make a difference) and participatory efficacy (successful collective action requires my participation). Dion (1986) suggests two similar dimensions; perceived control and the chance of modifying the system as important mediators. People with feelings of high personal control will be the more likely to participate politically if they feel they have high system control and endorse militancy and violence if they feel they have low system control. People with low personal
control will be more likely to support the political system indirectly if they feel they have high system control, and express political apathy if they feel they have low system control.

12 In contrast to the curvilinear idea, Martin (1982) distinguishes between two types of deprivation - optimistic (group) relative deprivation which reflects unexpected violations and should be related to constructive attempts to change the system and pessimistic (group relative) deprivation which reflects expected violations and should be related to violence against the system.

13 A similar distinction can also be made between risky or non-conventional and non-risky or conventional collective behavior (Azzi, 1994; Klandermans, 1989; Walker and Wong, 1994).

14 It is difficult to understand how both parties can simultaneously have this view. However, studies show that people exaggerate their competence. In fact, both parties to an impending mediation session simultaneously believe that the case strongly favors their side.

15 Deviance within a group has implications for the status of the group. Miller and Vidmar (1981) argue punishment may be motivated in part by an effort to avoid having a few bad apples tarnish the overall evaluation of the group.

16 This conflict is also linked to differences of opinion about whether or not people can be changed. In the past the rehabilitation ideal dominated corrections policy. More recently people have become much more pessimistic about the possibilities of character change. This has led to declining support for rehabilitative programs. Instead, the public increasingly supports programs to warehouse criminals for their remaining lives.

17 Other authors argue that people's general orientations, either toward exchange or communal relationships, predicts whether justice will be an important concern for their close relationships or not (Clark and Mills, 1993; VanYperen and Buunk, 1994).