Kütahya in the Eighteenth Century: Transformation or the Persistence of the Old Order?

By

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Abstract

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This dissertation examines the socioeconomic history of Kütahya, an inland town in western Anatolia, with a specific emphasis on the transformation that took place in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth century. However, it is not a socioeconomic history of an urban center or of a region in the traditional sense. Rather, it uses Kütahya and the surrounding region as a ground upon which it seeks to answer a series of questions about this transformation. These questions concern the impact of the administrative function of a city on its socioeconomic development; the extent to which a new financial policy implemented at the end of the seventeenth century—the malikâne system—affected power relations in the region surrounding Kütahya; and the role played by the cash requirements of the state at the end of the eighteenth century in the monetization of the economy. The dissertation also examines various aspects of credit relations, changes in consumption patterns, and the relationship between privilege and the accumulation of wealth.

The research does not subscribe to any particular perspective on the transformation that took place in the eighteenth century, nor does it focus on one particular framework of interpretation, such as center-periphery relations or the rise of the local notables. Rather, it is intended to provide as much concrete evidence as possible on these issues for a city and region for which there is literally no secondary literature.

The findings of this research show that generalizations about the transformation that took place in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth century need to be qualified with further research—especially with in-depth studies on different regions of the empire. During this period, local notables emerged, the financial and military crisis took a serious toll on the region, the economy became more and more monetized, credit relations expanded, and some sectors of society accumulated wealth. But, relations of power vis-à-vis the center did not change significantly. The notables that emerged posed no challenge to the central authority, the economy was to a great extent regional, and the accumulation of wealth remained a function of political and economic privilege.

The dissertation consists of two parts. The first three chapters are intended to provide a lengthy prelude to the eighteenth century, and draw largely on secondary sources. These chapters present a socioeconomic context for the changes that took place in the eighteenth century, and within which those changes can be assessed. The scarcity of secondary sources, and the highly descriptive nature of the few that exist also made it necessary to include an organized narrative
for the period between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries in the first three chapters. The last three chapters cover the period roughly from 1671 to 1820, and are based to a great extent on primary sources—especially on the court registers. These three chapters seek to answer the questions concerning the transformation of the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth century with the evidence provided by the primary sources.
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INTRODUCTION

The goal of this dissertation project has changed substantially over time. The research started out as a dissertation project on the impact of a specific financial policy—malîkâne (lifetime tax farm)—on property relations at the local level—Kütahya—in the eighteenth century. It has turned out to be a kind of socioeconomic history of Kütahya, with a specific emphasis on the period between 1758 and 1828. This is hardly surprising for a dissertation project. Nevertheless, it is in order to explain briefly the causes and consequences of this change.

Most scholars agree that the implementation of the malîkâne system in 1695 was a crucial factor in the transformation of Ottoman polity. From the rise of the local notables to the emergence of civil society, a whole array political, economic, and social developments are associated with the consequences of this new financial practice. There are, however, major shortcomings associated with this perspective. Scholars have not studied in detail the empirical evidence on a wide range of questions. These include how widespread the malîkâne system was, where it was most successfully implemented, exactly how this financial policy enabled larger sectors of society to participate in decision-making process, and exactly how it changed the relations among the taxpaying population, the tax farmers, and the central authority. Therefore, scholarly consensus relies on shared impressions, rather than on a wide range of empirical evidence and comparative studies. More importantly, there has been no study that investigates these questions at the level of a specific locality (especially as the socioeconomic history of an inland town rather than the coastal regions, where the socioeconomic change was more noticeable throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). The original goals of the present research were to contribute to the study of the eighteenth century, to provide empirical evidence on the impact of the malîkâne system on property relations, to draw attention to the dynamics of change in landlocked towns, and to write history from below. Other than the primary sources pertinent to the implementation of the malîkâne system, the most crucial component of this research project was arguably the court registers—which scholars of Ottoman history usually turn to in order to write the socioeconomic history of specific towns and regions. And, in the end it was the scarcity of court registers that determined the final goal of research.

There were only five extant court registers for eighteenth-century Kütahya. More than fifty years separated the first court register, which covered the years between 1698 and 1702, and the second one, which covered the years between 1757 and 1760. The scarcity of sources made it necessary to extend the time frame to the 1820s, in order to include more data from the later court registers. But the content of the court registers was also limited, in that the entries were mostly of a notarial nature rather than litigations that might have provided clues about legal issues and social and economic problems. Other primary sources such as the orders sent by the central authority to the provincial governors and kadıs on a variety of issues, and documents pertinent to the implementation of the malîkâne, did not reveal much, either. Since the aim of the research was to provide a perspective from below, it would not suffice simply to identify, say, the malîkâne holders, how many malîkânes were sold, and how much they cost. The scarcity of secondary literature was another serious limitation for the project. There was literally no book length study on eighteenth-century Kütahya—and only a couple of articles. There was almost nothing on the social, political, and cultural history of the region. The works that existed dealt mostly with the nineteenth century, and the Republican period. The situation was not much different for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; there was only one monograph (published in
the early 1970s) on the principality that was established in Kütahya and the surrounding region by the Germiyans. Given the limited primary sources, to carry on with the initial project was to risk replicating the exact same assumptions that the project sought to explore in detail, and to write a history that would be overtheoretical and lacking in substance. The absence of secondary sources made the proper contextualization of the limited data less than rigorous—even when the time period was extended to the 1820s. These shortcomings could have been overcome to some extent, if there had been more studies on the eighteenth-century socioeconomic history of other Anatolian towns. But there were few such studies, which made comparison with and comparative deduction from other cases problematic as well.

So the theoretical and comparative ground of the project shifted to an empirical and descriptive one. The lack of hard data and comparative evidence forces the historian to recognize that sometimes one’s research findings resemble a patchwork, rather than a fully integrated representation of social change. So it was in the present case. One way to minimize this ‘patchwork’ effect was to present the material with specific references to the relevant theoretical debates of Ottoman historiography on the socioeconomic transformation of the eighteenth century in general, and on the long-held assumptions about Kütahya in particular. This presentation examined a variety of topics, ranging from ascribing the importance of Kütahya to its place in the administrative structure of the Empire to the changing patterns of consumption in the eighteenth century. Another way to provide a more balanced account of the socioeconomic change that took place during the period in question was to include a long prelude to the eighteenth century. This was necessary first, because a proper contextualization of the data on the eighteenth century required frequent references to previous centuries; and second, because scattered information on Kütahya had to be presented in an organized narrative. The present research is therefore not a socioeconomic history of a city or a region in the traditional sense. It follows a chronological order, but it focuses on the eighteenth century. Nor is this a study that focuses exclusively on a specific aspect of society or of the economy—that is, it is not an exhaustive analysis of consumption patterns, or of the accumulation of wealth. It does not focus on one particular group—the artisans or the military class. Nor does it rely on a particular set of primary sources—the probate inventories, for instance. However, it has something substantial to say on each of these subjects. Whether to concentrate on a particular subject (or set of sources) and write comprehensively on that particular subject, or to cover as much as ground as the sources allow on a region for which there is hardly any secondary literature was the choice that I had to make, and I opted for the latter.

The first two chapters of this dissertation situate Kütahya (and the surrounding area) in the context of the frontier region from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. This serves two purposes. It was necessary, as I explained above, to provide a lengthy prelude to the eighteenth century. It was also necessary to discuss the frontier region in some detail because the particular characteristics of the frontier region determined to a great extent the success of the Ottoman enterprise and the failure of the Germiyans. The Ottomans and the Germiyans inhabited much the same frontier region, but while the former became an empire, the latter were reduced to a local notable family. It is therefore important to discuss the institutional similarities and differences between the two principalities in order to understand how the Ottoman central authority was able to control the region more firmly than it was able to control other regions. The emphasis in these first two chapters, then, is on the socioeconomic characteristics of the frontier
The ebb and flow of power between the Byzantine and the Seljuk states; the transition from Byzantine to Germiyan, and then to Ottoman rule are discussed with reference to the human and natural resources of the Bithynian region, which bordered Kütahya. Essential to this discussion are the major institutions (especially the vakfs and the ahi organizations) that brought diverse groups together and imposed a structural unity on to the political fragmentation and intense military competition of the frontier.

The consolidation of Ottoman power is the subject of chapter 3. The dynamics of consolidation are discussed with reference to certain scholars’ perspectives on the formation of the early-modern Ottoman state. The discussion focuses on the function of the Islamic courts and different forms of surplus appropriation, such as the malikâne-divanî system, because they offer a perspective that compares Kütahya with other regions. The malikâne-divanî system did not prevail in Kütahya and in the surrounding area. The Ottoman state was able to control most of the revenues in the region and to establish the timar system quite effectively. This control over the revenues is further suggested by Kütahya’s place in the administrative partitioning of the empire. It is therefore worth considering whether Kütahya’s position as the capital of the province of Anatolia had an impact—and if so, what impact—on the socioeconomic development of the region. Furthermore, Kütahya, along with Manisa in western Anatolia, was also a princely district (şehzâde sancaği) in the sixteenth century—where princes lived with their retinue and competed with each other for the throne. It is likewise worth considering the impact of this institutional practice on the region, because it is usually assumed that these two functions (being a capital and being a princely district) reflected Kütahya’s importance in the empire. Other major developments of the period from the fifteenth to the late seventeenth century—such as demographic change, the Celâlî uprisings, and the impact of the nomadic groups—are also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter 4 is based on the impressions of the most famous traveler of the seventeenth century, Evliyâ Çelebi, who visited Kütahya in 1671. An assessment of his accounts with reference to other sources sets the stage for an examination of eighteenth-century Kütahya. According to Evliyâ Çelebi, Kütahya was a relatively prosperous middle-sized Anatolian town—one that was still trying to recover from the destruction of the Celâlî rebellions. Artisanal production seems to have been alive and well at the end of the seventeenth century, but production and trade were to a large extent local, or regional at best. Falling outside the geography where olive and cotton were grown, and located only on auxiliary trade routes, Kütahya was much more isolated than the coastal towns that would participate in an expanding global market—a market that would create an increasing demand for such produce as raw cotton. Evliyâ Çelebi also gives the impression of a town where the control of the central authority—despite a tumultuous period at the beginning of the century—was still intact. Small-scale peasant landholding was prevalent. There were no real political contenders, and no significant social unrest.

Chapter 5 covers the years 1700-60, and chapter 6 covers the years 1760-1820. These two chapters develop in detail most of the themes set forth in chapter 4. The data in these two chapters come almost exclusively from primary sources. A brief discussion of these primary sources, especially the court registers, provides an introduction to the eighteenth century proper. Chapter 5 looks first at the neighborhoods and the fortress specifically—with the help of the
court registers. This is followed by a closer look at the socioeconomic structure of Kütahya. There is no evidence that this was a fast-changing society. The old order of the sixteenth century seems to have persisted to a great extent—especially with regard to landholding and to administrative structure. More importantly, the short-term effects of the sale of the malikânes were negligible. But another way to assess the plausibility of the arguments about the eighteenth century as a period of significant transformation is to look at credit relations. An evaluation of the credit relations is important for two reasons. First, scholars of Ottoman economy agree that the first half of the eighteenth century was period of economic recovery—a period that lasted until the 1760s. Second, the court registers are one of the main sources that historians use to investigate various aspects of credit relations. The chapter 5 explores the various dimensions of credit relations as they were reflected primarily in the court registers.

Chapter 6 consists of two different sections. While the first section continues to investigate economic relations, the focus (and narrative) of second section is political. After laying out the general context of the period 1760-1820, the first section turns to credit relations; it compares the credit relations of this period to those of the period 1700-1760. Shortage of cash, cash vakfs, the effects of new taxes, and the monetization of the economy are all discussed in the context of credit relations. An analysis of the probate inventories for this period helps to situate the dynamics of the accumulation of wealth in a broader context. Chapter 6 also assesses the relationship between consumption, wealth, and production. A brief discussion of what is today considered to be Kütahya’s specialty—the manufacture of Kütahya-ware, and more precisely, the cup makers’ guild—also situates a specific manufacturing sector on a more concrete ground.

The second section of chapter 6 examines the relationship between political privilege and wealth, and investigates whether seeking privilege in the late eighteenth century was a major (perhaps the major) means of accumulating wealth in Kütahya. The chapter closes with a closer look at the local notables of Kütahya. Since the local notables are among the main actors of the eighteenth century, and since many studies have been done on them but none on the local notables of Kütahya, it was appropriate to end the research by examining the politics of the local notables. The main figures here are the Germiyanzâdes, who reemerged in the eighteenth century after four hundred years in the shade. Along with the Germiyanzâdes—and with a wide range documents other than court registers—other notables in and around Kütahya are also discussed chapter 6.

The conclusion returns briefly to the new perspectives on the socioeconomic change that took place in the eighteenth century, and discusses how this research can be related to these perspectives. A realistic interpretation of the transformation in the eighteenth century may result in a more ambiguous interpretation of the transformation than that of the previous generations but this does not mean that it is disconnected from larger theoretical concerns. The conclusion then summarizes the major findings of the research. There is also a lengthy appendix, consisting of a survey of the literature on the local notables and trade in the eighteenth century. These two dimensions—roughly the political and the economic—are so essential to an assessment of the eighteenth century and of the data on which this research is based that a lengthy survey of the literature survey was indispensable. However, despite the importance of this survey, it was appropriate to put it in the appendix because it would otherwise interfere with the overall narrative of the research that revolved around the socioeconomic history of Kütahya.
The survey of the literature consists of two sections. The section on the local notables focuses especially on studies that examine the relationship between new fiscal policies and the consolidation of the local notables’ power. Malikâne was just one aspect—even though it was arguably the most important aspect—of the transformation of Ottoman polity. Scholars argue that the implementation of new taxes also engendered novel forms of governance. They call these new forms of governance, “government in the vernacular,” or “homegrown modernity.” The local notables also took advantage of their position as intermediaries between the local population and the central authority to represent the local population as these new forms governance enabled more people to participate in the decision-making process. It was therefore important to emphasize the transformation of the administrative structure as much as the new fiscal policies—with the caveat that these claims are mostly impressions rather than fully explored and supported with concrete evidence.

The second section of the survey reviews the literature on trade in the eighteenth century. This section may seem to be only loosely related to Kütahya, because after a general discussion of the economic conditions in the eighteenth century, the emphasis of the survey is on the implementation of capitulations, and especially on the port of Izmir. However, it is necessary to show the extent to which noneconomic factors played a role in the expansion of the economic privileges granted to foreign merchants, and how these merchants extended their economic, social, and political network inland. To compare Kütahya with other towns and regions, we must determine whether Kütahya was part of that network. In order to make this determination it is necessary to read the literature on trade in the eighteenth century in general. In the same vein, it was important to discuss Izmir as the rising regional center of western Anatolia—and as one of the principal centers of trade with Europe. When, how, and under what conditions Izmir became the most important trade center in Anatolia and how this affected the hinterland are also important comparative and contextual questions. Especially important is the extent to which the credit network and sociopolitical relations that developed around the region reached inland, and whether Kütahya was at all connected to these new and expanding monetary networks. Instead of acting as an economic stimulus to the inland regions, it may well be that, in the absence of a developed national market, regional economies created their own spheres of influence sometimes to the detriment of other regions.

Finally, a couple of remarks on the more technical aspects of the research. As the administrative boundaries changed very frequently, the term Kütahya does not designate a location with fixed boundaries. It designates both the city and the district (sancak), and whenever it was not obvious from the context, I tried to specify which one the data were referring to. For instance, data concerning taxation and timars are data for sancak; whereas data on the neighborhoods and the non-Muslims are data for the city. Throughout the dissertation, I took the liberty of moving back and forth between the sancak and the city because I wished to give them equal priority, and not to study one while neglecting the other. If there were more primary sources and if there were not big chronological gaps between the court records, it might be possible to focus either on urban history or on the socioeconomic relations at the level of sancak. As it stands, however, my goal was to discuss with concrete examples particular aspects of eighteenth-century socioeconomic history and to do so was more important to than to clearly define the boundaries of Kütahya.
For most scholars who spend much time in the archives, it goes without saying that reading the primary sources is always a humbling experience. To claim that one could read these documents without making any mistakes is at best presumptuous. Besides the usual problem of deciphering the handwritten sources (and the scribes who recorded the entries in the Kütahya court registers did not help at all), I encountered other problems in the course of this research. The reading of the place names was particularly difficult, because there are very few guides to reading the place names properly. This is especially true for the period prior to the nineteenth century. Names of the nomadic groups and of non-Muslims pose an even greater problem as there are even fewer guides to reading their names correctly. Sometimes my renditions are just a guess—hopefully an educated guess. I can only hope that the mistakes I have made are not too grave.
After the Battle of Manzikert (1071), Anatolia was open to the conquest of the Seljuks and with it, to the influx of the Turkic tribes.¹ For almost four centuries the peninsula was the ground upon which the Seljuk, Mongol and Byzantine empires struggled for domination, while one wave of migration followed another. During this long process of settlement until the Ottoman Empire finally emerged as the successor to the Byzantine Empire, there would be periods of relative stability and prosperity (from the late-twelfth to the mid-thirteenth century) and periods of uncertainty and economic downturn (from the mid-thirteenth to about the mid-fifteenth century).² The influx of the Turkic tribes created a political environment where principalities competed to gain control over their rivals while seeking to strengthen their relative autonomy vis-à-vis their suzerains – the Seljuks, Mongols or Byzantines. Even though their influence was short-lived, the Crusaders also played a role in the social and political environment of Anatolia, sometimes increasing its fragmentation and sometimes creating conditions of regional stability – just as they had done after the sack of Constantinople, when the Byzantine Empire moved further east to Bithynia and reasserted its power over a region that had been for some time in decay. The big peninsula which for centuries had been home for the Armenians, the Greeks, the Jews, had become a new home the Turks and the Kurds, a way station for the Mongols, and a last stop for the Seljuks.

¹ The Battle of Manzikert (1071) plays a considerable role in the history of Turkish nationalist discourse. Insofar as the Turkish victory against Byzantium opened the gates of Anatolia to the Turks, it marks the beginning of a history of appropriation (of the lands, the people, the institutions and the culture of the region). The victors in such cases conveniently reduce their “victory” to a single event in order to prove their own superiority. In this case, and looking at it from the Turkish perspective, their victory over Byzantium proves their military, political, and even moral superiority over an infidel empire. But this beginning also requires a justification that goes beyond the use of brutal power if Turkish historians are to claim that the Turks were also the purveyors of a better, and perhaps more just and advanced civilization – just as a Eurocentric or Hellen-centric interpretation would argue for the contrary. Suffice it then to say that I am aware of the pitfalls of beginning with Manzikert, and that my purpose in doing so is only to describe the economic and sociopolitical context of the period. For an authoritative text see Speros Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). For a discussion of the incidents that led up to Manzikert and the sociopolitical context of the period see especially pp. 69-80. Speros Vryonis has continued to write on the Manzikert from different perspectives, see for instance; Speros Vryonis, "The Greek and Arabic Sources on the Battle of Mantzikert 1071 Ad," in *Byzantine Studies: Essays on the Slavic World and the Eleventh Century* ed. Speros Vryonis (New Rochelle: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1992). Speros Vryonis, "A Personal History of the History of the Battle of Mantzikert," (Athens: National Research Foundation, Institute of Byzantine Studies, 1998). Speros Vryonis, "The Battles of Mantzikert (1071) and Myriokephalum (1176). Notes on Food, Water, Archery, and Ethnic Identity of Foe and Ally," *Mesogeion* 25-26(2005). I am greatly indebted to Prof. Vryonis for kindly sending me all the relevant material on Battle of Manzikert, as well as the other his other articles that I am using in this dissertation. For a historiographical account of the Muslim (Arap, Persian and Ottoman-Turkish) historical writing about Manzikert from the twelfth to the fifteenth century as well as some remarks on contemporary Turkish historiography about Manzikert, see Carole Hillenbrand, *The Battle of Manzikert Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).

² Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century*. p.285
Within this multiple layers of authority there existed a web of changing alliances and interests\(^3\) - a web that was frequently torn apart and recreated as the political context was continuously reconfigured. The multiplicity of competing powers (from nomads to sedentary social formations and states, from small principalities to empires), and the extent of their claims for hegemony (sometimes local and regional, sometimes more extensive) are what define Anatolia as a frontier region from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries. As the term frontier can mean many things,\(^4\) it is worth quoting Colin Heywood at length in order to clarify what it means in this context:

The [Ottoman] state came into being at the end of the thirteenth century at the interface of two distinct zones of culture and settlement in northwestern Anatolia: the zones of Islamic domination and Turkoman settlement on the one side, and of late-Byzantine rule and Greek Christian civilization on the other. In terms of microhistory we are looking at the Turkish (and possibly Ottoman) outflanking of the Byzantine frontier defences in Bithynia, on the middle course of the Sangarius river, in the later thirteenth and early thirteenth centuries. In terms of macrohistory, as is less recognized, we are looking at one of the three great political faultlines which marked the interface … between the Ilkhanate and the Golden Horde, the two westernmost and mutually hostile sub-empires of the Mongols under the imperial authority of the successors of Chinggis (Genghiz) Khan.\(^5\)

The specific features of the frontier region, and the role they play in the foundation of Ottoman polity, are more complicated than mainstream historiography would suggest. This is, first, because the term frontier usually brings to mind the modern boundaries of mutually exclusive nation-states, and second, because even when they are subject to more refined and qualified historical scrutiny, comparative approaches have not established satisfactory classifications of the social and political formations of the frontier regions.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the term frontier can nevertheless be used as an analytical tool. Defined as a zone of transition, the frontier of the premodern periods was a flexible marker of economic, political, or various other social formations.\(^6\) Even though there were realms of authority, these realms were crisscrossed by other economic, political and legal claims; in short, the regulatory power of the central authority was limited and highly diffuse. In the absence of a strong “center” to establish institutions that could exert some sort of control and unity, orthodoxy was hard to impose on the religious and cultural practices too.

In this context, even the term *heterodoxy of religious beliefs and practices* may not be totally adequate to describe the frontier. According to Cemal Kafadar, “the religious history of

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4 Daniel Power and Naomi Standen, eds., *Frontiers in Question Eurasian Borderlands, 700-1700* (London: MacMillan,1999). The major distinction is between the European (as a political barrier) and American (as a zone of settlement) variants. Since in the Anatolian, or more specifically the Bithynian, context the term frontier can easily fit either definition it seems inconvenient, at least for the sake of this essay, to define the Bithynian frontier solely in either the European or the American sense.
6 Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference the Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). For a more elaborate definition of this idea see chapter.2
Anatolian and Balkan Muslims living in the frontier areas of the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries should be conceptualized in part in terms of a “metadoxy”, a state of being beyond doxies, a combination of being doxy-naive and not being doxy-minded.” This is an important point in that there has been a tendency (still prevalent today) to conflate heterodoxy with Shi’ism. This conflation would become partially true in the second half of the fifteenth and throughout the sixteenth century, for two principal reasons. First, only at the beginning of the sixteenth century, were the main Ottoman state institutions established, and only then did Sunnism become the predominant school of interpretation within the religious establishment. Second, at about this time, the Safavids became the Ottomans’ the main rivals, and Shi’ism started to exert an influence on non-orthodox religious sects, and groups. To reduce the sociopolitical and cultural atmosphere of Anatolia to two rival political powers or religious beliefs or is therefore to misinterpret the context of the foundations of the Ottoman state. It is best to walk the thin line between inclusion and struggle, for the social and cultural history of the Anatolian peninsula is best understood by taking into account, on the one hand, the fluidity and inclusiveness (rather than exclusiveness) of its boundaries, and on the other hand, a constant struggle on the part of competing powers to govern, co-opt, and establish some sort of uniformity over the unruly elements.

Indeed, if a certain degree of generalization based on dichotomies is permitted in this context of multiplicity, one could point out the tensions between sedentary states and nomads, and more specifically between the urban centers and the rural areas. Whereas Persian culture and Sunni Islam were predominant in urban centers, the rural areas were the home ground of the nomadic Turcoman tribes and were governed by their belief systems. There was very little interaction between the two, and very little competition for hegemony. Nevertheless, the political and spiritual leaders of the nomads, the babas, with their highly unorthodox religious practices, were seen as a threat to the theologically-oriented piety and culture of the city-dwellers. The tension between the nomads and the urban polities would sometimes escalate into rebellion, as was the case during the early thirteenth century, with the Babaî revolts against the Seljuk sultans. Even though demographic pressure and the disputes arising over landholding claims

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7 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State. p.76
10 There are various ways to point out this tension between the sedentary empires and the nomads. For an attempt to evaluate this tension on a wider scale than regional confrontations (Roman vs Gallic, Chinese vs Mongol, Byzantine vs Ottomans) see Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, eds., Core/Periphery Relations in Precapitalist Worlds (Boulder San Francisco Oxford: Westview Press,1991). See specifically, chapter 7. As for Ottoman history, even though most historians agree that urban-rural, sedentary-nomadic divides could be used as analytic tools, they should be taken with grain of salt because there were institutions such as dervish lodges, and groups such as tarikats that did not always neatly fit in either category. For a critique of this divide see, Ethel Sara Volper, "Patronage and Practice in Late Seljuk and Early Beylik Society: Dervish Lodges in Sivas, Tokat, and Amasya” (Ph.D Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1994). p.40
12 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, La Révolte De Baba Resul Ou La Formation De L'hétérodoxie Musulmane En Anatolie Au Xiiie Siecle (Ankara: Conseil Suprême d'Atatürk pour Culture, Langue et Histoire, 1989). For the economic and demographic factors as primary causes, pp. 36-44
constituted the immediate political-economic context of the revolts of 1239-40, they also illustrate the limits of cultural and political inclusiveness of the frontier context.

Apart from the Babaî revolts, two major events in the thirteenth century, each related to one of the main forces in Anatolia, determined the political and economic fate of the region. By the beginning of the century, there was relative political stability due to the balance of power between the retreating yet still influential Byzantine Empire in Nicaea and the Seljuk state in Konya. Interestingly, it was the fall of Constantinople to the Latin forces, during the Fourth Crusade in 1204 that helped to create the conditions of relative stability. The empire’s hold on Anatolia had already been weakened by internal strife, and there ensued another period of political fragmentation, both in the Balkans and in western Anatolia as the Latin forces divided the Byzantine territories in Greece and the Balkans among themselves, the Greek Palaeologues gathered their forces in Nicaea to make it their seat. One of the consequences of this move was the reinforcement of Byzantine power on their eastern frontier. As Speros Vryonis puts it, “the Latin conquest of Constantinople was undoubtedly responsible for the prolonged life of Byzantine authority in Asia Minor inasmuch as it forced the Greeks to focus their energies and numbers in Nicaea.” However feeble and fragmented it may have been, the reaffirmation of the Byzantine state power in and around Bithynia halted the advance of the Turkic tribes and slowed the economic and social disintegration of the region. The counterpart of this concentration of power in Nicaea was the presence of the Seljuks in Konya. These two powers, more preoccupied with other rivals than with each other, brought stability and some prosperity to western Anatolia. However, this too proved to be a very fragile balance of power, and the relocation to Constantinople in 1261 created a power vacuum in the region, as the last remnants of military and political control over western Anatolia by the Byzantine Empire disappeared.

Another major turning point in the thirteenth century – one that increased the impact of the power vacuum caused by the retreat of the Byzantine state - was the defeat of the Seljuks at the hands of the Mongol forces. Already weakened by various attempts to control her rivals in the north and south, and unable to fully suppress the Babaî revolts, the Seljuks, after their defeat in 1243 at Kösedağ, became a vassal state to the Mongols. Mongol victory against the Seljuks had wide-ranging effects, as Vryonis argues:

The combined impact of Turkic rebellions and Mongol conquest had destroyed the political unity of the Seljuk state and removed the possibility of a more peaceful development of the land in social and economic matters. The territorial disintegration of the state was further accelerated by the degeneration of Mongol rule in Anatolia during the late thirteenth and the early fourteenth century. The great movements of commerce across Anatolia were partially disrupted, and, henceforth the caravans tended to touch on the easternmost fringes of Anatolia. The Mongol intrusion after 1277 was marked by the further settlement of Mongol and eastern Turkish tribes with their military chiefs in eastern Anatolia.

It is probable that Mongol suzerainty in eastern Anatolia had an indirect impact on the western part of the peninsula, by forcing - or more accurately, by creating - the political, economic, and even geographical context in which still more Turkic tribes and principalities moved west.

13 Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century. p.132
14 Ibid. p.135
During the following period, more than twenty principalities dominated the political landscape. It lasted until the middle of the fifteenth century, when the Ottoman principality emerged as victorious over the others.

**BITHYNIA**

If Anatolia was a seacoast washed by the great waves of migration, political fragmentation, and cultural diversity, Bithynia (roughly the northwestern edge of Asia Minor, comprising the region from Kocaeli to Zonguldak in contemporary Turkey) was its shoreline; and just as the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 was the gateway to eastern and central Anatolia for the Turkic tribes, so the Battle of Myriokephalon in 1176, would be the gateway to western Anatolia. However, the defeat of the Byzantine army did not lead to a full conquest of western Anatolia as the Seljuks preferred to establish themselves in Konya. This further consolidated a zone of transition between the Seljuks and the Byzantines. For roughly two centuries, western Anatolia, and even more specifically Bithynia would be, in this sense, the frontier of the frontier.15

And it was a double frontier not merely in the geopolitical sense; it was also a frontier for historiography and literary imagery. The fact that the transition from principality to statehood is relatively obscure creates an ideal breeding ground for nationalist discourses—both Islamic and secular—each seeking to appropriate the historical geography of the region for their own purposes. Let us note, then, in passing that Bithynia has been the ideal setting for the genesis of the Ottoman/Turkish identity in contemporary Turkish literature and popular culture.16 Most of the historical fiction that is set in this region depicts very crude dichotomies between superior “Turkish and Islamic” identities and inferior “Others.” Obviously, exclusionary and totalitarian fantasies tell more about the hegemonic ideologies of nation-states—ideologies in which historiography and literature are intertwined—than they tell about the historical conditions of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.17

The ambiguity of the context and the lack of evidence, lead some experts of the period to argue that it is futile to ask why the Ottomans succeeded in founding an empire;18 but for others,

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15 Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London: The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1963). p. 23 For Wittek, the creation of this zone is of the outmost importance, because this no-man’s-land was the political, economic, military, and sociological ground for a specific social formation—the Gazis, or maret-warriors. It is through this social formation that Wittek explains the Ottoman’s transition from principality to statehood.

16 Murat Belge, *Genesis "Büyük Ulusal Anlatı" Ve Türklerin Kökeni* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008). In this study Belge examines the extent to which history and literature influence each other, and “join forces” in the creation of a “grand narrative” about “identities”. If the discipline of history provides sources for the historical context or the personae of the novels, the imagery of the novel, in turn, helps to shape historical imagination. Some of the novels that Belge studies, even though they create their own “grand narrative” about the origins of Turkish identity, rely heavily on historical works, and their scenes are set in the Bithynia region, rather than in valleys of Central Asia. This Bithynia variant, is worth examining in detail and for its own sake, because when read against the background of academic studies, these novels address most of the problems treated in those studies concerning the transition to statehood; and because they have something to say about the principal actors of the region and the period. See also Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*. pp.19-29


this is nevertheless an important question, for it deals with the groundwork underlying a polity whose longevity, rather than its decline, needs to be explained. As Mehmet Öz and Oktay Özel have recently pointed out, there are a variety of perspectives on this question, but most scholars limit their explanatory framework to a single factor. These factors include the role of a new military body comprised of Christians and Muslims, the drive for conquest based on the ideology of gazâ, the role of population movements, and the tribal-nomadic character of frontier societies. Even though recent contributions to the literature have enlarged the scope of the debates, and shown that a comprehensive interpretation of the foundational period must take into account the inclusiveness of Ottoman policy making and the heterogeneity of cultural identities, alternative frameworks based on the political economy of the frontier region are still not taken seriously by mainstream scholars.

Furthermore, the foundational period remains isolated from the overall narrative of the Ottoman Empire. This isolation creates an imbalance in the narrative, because while the period from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century can be situated within an early-modern Eurasian context, and the nineteenth century is inescapably intertwined with European capitalist expansion, the foundational period tells its own story. And this story marginalizes the social and economic changes that took place within Bithynia, and reduces its history mainly to political history. Political history, in turn, becomes the narrative that binds together different periods and structural changes, and reinforces the idea that the Ottoman Empire has a sui generis historical trajectory.

It is necessary, then, to identify a broader structural context in which the political history can be situated. In its Marxist or Weberian forms, political economy and historical sociology offer important insights for a comparative history of the foundational period--one in which political history becomes meaningful but not omnipotent in the sense that it is narrated in relation to economic and social factors, and include a wide array of actors—not only the military actors as the founding fathers. These actors include religious figures, merchants, diplomats, peasants, as well as nomads. The most recent attempt at constructing a comparative framework from this perspective is that of Karen Barkey, who situates the formation of the Ottoman state in the sociopolitical context of the frontier zone between the Byzantine and Seljuk empires, and conceptualizes “early state formation as moments when contenders for power have minimal organizational structures at hand, but have many social relations and ties that they need to manipulate in order to influence, control, and increase their social and cultural resources.” From this perspective, the creation of specific institutions (state formation) is therefore seen first,
in terms of mobilizing horizontal ties (leadership) that existed in the frontier zone, and second, as the ability to turn these ties into a hierarchy of authority (from the leader as primus inter pares to the establishment of a dynasty). Mobilization of diverse social, economic, military, and religious forces was a matter of political brokerage, and the Ottomans proved to be better power brokers than other principalities when it came to creating a network of alliances. Gradually moving into the center of this network, they were able to use the power that emanated from it. The goal of Barkey’s study is much more ambitious than to set the stage for the birth of the early Ottoman state. It is an attempt to provide a hub-and-spoke model that can account for the longevity of the empire, and for its successive phases of transformation. Leaving aside for the moment an evaluation of Barkey’s approach to the formation of the early Ottoman state, we can use that approach as a heuristic device to situate the political and military dynamics of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in a coherent interpretive framework.

Despite the idealizations and oversimplifications of the nationalist discourse, the geopolitics of this frontier region were undeniably important for the rise of the Ottomans. In one form or another, most scholars emphasize the strategic location of the region. From the eleventh to the mid-fourteenth century, western Anatolia—and Bithynia specifically—was the area where an ambitious warlord could not only enlist fighters but also draw upon the expertise of the existing administrative and religious cadres. The raiding groups led by these warlords were mainly composed of Turkic nomads. They were located in the vicinity of Doryleanum (Eskişehir) from whence they moved into the plains of Bithynia. Byzantine emperors, in response to the raids, attempted at different times to strengthen their hold over the region by rebuilding its principal towns Dorylaeum (Eskişehir) and Cotyaeum (Kütahya), which were sacked in early in the twelfth century by the Turkic tribes. Not only does this rebuilding attest to the strategic military importance of the area, but also as Vryonis argues, it constitutes “one of the clearest chapters in long struggle between nomadism and sedentary society in Anatolia.”

After the death of the Emperor Manuel Comnenus, the region passed for good into the hands of the Turks. Throughout this period, Bithynia seems to have remained a backwater area. Yet as Kafadar points out the very fact that it was a backwater area provided an opportunity for the Ottomans (and other principalities) with opportunities for expansion, settlement, and the mobilization of human resources:

From the point of view of the Ottomans, however, this “backwater” status of Bithynia at the time turned out to be advantageous not just because of the weak defensive system they encountered but also because they could expand and build without attracting too much attention from the larger powers. In this neglected area, whose Christian inhabitants seem to have been disenchanted with their imperial government, there would also be a better chance of gaining former Byzantine subjects to the Ottoman side or at least of having them become resigned to, if not welcome, the establishment of Ottoman power.

When the Ottomans arrived in the region, there had been at least three generations of cohabitation between the Turkic population and the Christians. Any emerging power had to find a delicate balance between conquest and making use of the existing human resources (for revenue, for their know-how, and for institution building). When the Ottomans were competing

24 Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century, p.188
25 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State, pp.133-134
with other principalities in western Anatolia, they were, in a sense, the successors of previous kingdoms, and were replicating previous political divisions dictated partly by geographical conditions. The fact that Orhan was named “the ruler king of Bithynia” especially by the Greek historians, shows the extent to which old habits of mind were applied to the new facts.26

The ebb and flow between the Byzantine state and the principalities continued well into the latter part of the thirteenth century, or until the Ottomans made a name for themselves. The Battle of Bapheus (Koyunhisar) opened the way for the Ottomans to move further into the heartland of Bithynia, and gave them a reputation that attracted warriors, from disenchanted Byzantine warlords to Turcoman raiders. According to Halil İnalcık, the Bapheus campaign was neither a myth created by the Ottoman chroniclers nor the result of haphazard raiding activities. It is likely, İnalcık argues, that Osman Bey, around the years 1299 – 1301, was following a strategy to turn the power vacuum in the region to his advantage, and the Bapheus campaign was part of that strategy.27 As it turned out, not only did the Ottomans become better known from then on, but they also took the first step in state-building. “By 1337 Orhan had captured all the large Byzantine towns in Bithynia, and probably by then captured almost the entire province. An Endowment Register for Kocaeli, the Ottoman province corresponding to Byzantine Bithynia, dating from 1420, records lands which Orhan had dedicated to religious foundations as far west as the districts of Gebze and Şile.”28

Mongol invasions and the disintegration of Seljuk power had created a push toward northwestern Anatolia, and filled the region with different tribes, villagers, and political, religious, and intellectual figures. Military expeditions and raids to the Byzantine frontier offered an opportunity to prove one’s leadership qualities and to attract more followers by providing them with economic incentives to engage in military expansion. Historians seeking to explain the rise of Ottoman power have focused on the various mechanisms for mobilizing and controlling this human resource. After pointing out the importance of the demographic composition of the region, İnalcık asserts that the ideal of gazâ, holy war, was crucial to the “foundation and development of the Ottoman state,” and he goes so far as to argue that “society in the frontier principalities conformed to a particular cultural pattern, imbued with the ideal of continuous Holy War … Gazâ was a religious duty, inspiring every kind of enterprise and sacrifice. In frontier society all social virtues conformed to the ideal of gazâ.”29 It seems that this overarching ideal worked better for the Ottomans than for other principalities. In this context, the coastal principalities focused more on the sea than on expanding into new territories – that is, they focused more on trade than on conquest. This eventually worked to their disadvantage, because they were unable to gain control of the major trading ports in the Aegean islands. Nor were they able to cross to the Balkans. They seem to have relied more on the revenues to be gained from linking trade routes between Asia Minor and Europe.30 As for the landlocked principalities, the

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26 For this continuity as well as a detailed geographical study of the region, Raif Kaplanoğlu, *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Kuruluşu* (Istanbul: Avrasya Etnografya Vakfı, 2000).
27 The exact date and the details of the battle are not established with certainty. For a comprehensive account and the importance of the battle in the rise of Ottoman power in Bithynia, Halil İnalcık, “Osman Gazı’nın İzink Kuşatması Ve Bafeus Muharebesi,” in *Osmanlı Beyliği (1300-1389)*, ed. Elizabeth A. Zachariadou (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997). İnalcık dates the battle to the summer of 1301
30 Lindner, “Anatolia 1300-1451.” p.112
decisive factor seems to have been that their only opportunity for expansion was to eliminate each other. It was therefore a combination of “the political (the weakness of Byzantine defenses), economic (the agricultural wealth of the lowlands), and military (richer lands to support more soldiers)” factors, and the ability to create a network of alliances that allowed the Ottomans to establish a solid foundation for state building.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, however, the emergence of Ottoman power can be interpreted only in relative terms. As we are reminded time and again, there was nothing to indicate that the Ottomans were destined to become a world empire. They were one of the many principalities in and around Bithynia – and certainly not the most powerful. Despite all the social, political, economic, and cultural characteristics that set Bithynia apart from other areas in Anatolia, it is probably true that had the Ottomans not reached the Aegean coast, crossed the Dardanelles and moved into the Balkans, their ascendancy would have been cut short, and they might well have been one of the many principalities that vanished in the sixteenth century. Expanding from their base in Söğüt, Bithynia, the Ottomans first captured Bursa (1326) and then Nicaea (İzni) (1331) and Nikomedia (İzmit) (1337). These conquests guaranteed their hold on the Marmara basin, and brought them into even closer contact with the Byzantines. This proximity, in turn, turned the Ottomans into players, and strategic partners, in the internal struggles of the waning Byzantine Empire.

The Ottomans captured Gallipoli in 1354, suffered some setbacks in the years that followed but by 1380s had established themselves permanently in Thrace, in the European part of Marmara. The expansion toward the west was accompanied by an eastward expansion. Following various strategies, from the outright use of force to marriage alliances, the Ottomans also made gains at the expense of other principalities, and gradually incorporated these principalities into their more and more centralized polity. And by the time Murad I assumed the leadership of the Ottoman principality in 1362, the Mongol hold on Anatolia had weakened substantially. Lindner suggests that “Murad assumed the leadership of a beylik; he left behind an imperial enterprise.”

Yet Ottoman expansion in western and central Anatolia would come to a crashing halt with the defeat of the Ottomans by Timur in 1402 in Ankara. This was followed by a decade of internal strife, but the unity of the dynasty (and therefore of the state) remained intact after Mehmed I emerged victorious from the struggle. As Carter Findley suggests, “the Ottomans could not have survived defeat by Temür had they not begun to develop institutions that distanced them from the norms of Osman’s retinue. In ways great and small, the Ottomans’ awareness of Turkic and Perso-Islamic statecraft showed from the beginning.”

For most students of Ottoman history, one of the distinctive features of the Ottoman Empire was that it was able to overcome “the quintessential Khaldunian predicament,” that is,

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32 Kate Fleet, ed. The Cambridge History of Turkey, Byzantium to Turkey 1071-1453, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). See Introduction
33 Lindner, "Anatolia 1300-1451." p.129
34 Findley, The Turks in World History. p.111
the deadly tension between the egalitarian tribal spirit and the centralized court culture, which
loose this spirit as the members of the court come to see themselves as superior to, and distinct
from, the rest of the warrior leaders.35 Already in the second half of the fourteenth century, this
was the path taken by the Ottoman house, and in fact the first test of institutional stability in the
face of the centrifugal forces exerted by the other principalities came before the defeat by Timur
in 1402. As Kafadar insightfully reminds us, when the Ottomans lost control of Gallipoli in the
latter part of the fourteenth century, they were threatened with the loss of their position as primus
inter pares as other warrior leaders started to assert their independence from the Ottoman house:

Many former states in the Muslim world, as Ibn Khaldun observed, had begun a process of
disintegration at a similar stage; the nature of the challenge might differ somewhat from case to
case, but the basic problem was one of dissolving cohesiveness. The Ottomans rose to the
challenge, however, not only by eliminating the challengers after Gallipoli was recaptured ca.
1377 but also by creating an institution of artificial kinship, the Janissary standing army, that
functioned as an extension of the royal household.36

When the defeat of 1402 presented a similar, but even more important, challenge to the
Ottomans’ centralization process, the Gallipoli experience helped them to hold their emerging
state together. Their control of the Balkans was an economic asset that facilitated reunification
process. Rumelia proved to be, in this sense, the core of the political economy of the early
Ottoman state because the allocation of resources—that is, the distribution of revenues in the
form of timars—helped the Ottomans to keep patronage ties to the military cadres (Muslim as
well as Christian) relatively intact after their defeat in Anatolia. Furthermore, the “ulema steeped
in the state traditions of High Islam (who also occupied important positions in urban guild
structures, and therefore had a double vested interest in seeing peace and order together with the
trade routes restored on an Anatolian scale) … closed ranks around the Ottoman dynasty.”37
Both groups were essential to the recovery process.

From 1413 on, the Ottomans would once again pursue their expansionist policy in both
directions. There was no major contender in the Balkans after 1402, and between 1413 and 1421
Mehmed I’s base of operations would be in Anatolia, where he sometimes forged alliances, and
sometimes used force in order to reconstitute the Ottoman power. Once the major winner of the
post-1402 period, the Karaman principality was brought under control in central Anatolia, the
Ottomans could once more establish a position that was more than a primus inter pares.38 Seen
from this perspective, some scholars argue that even the fall of Byzantium and Constantinople

35 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State. pp.16-17, and Findley, The Turks in
World History. p.109. For a more general historical and sociological perspective see Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society,
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36 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State. p.17
37 Berktay, “The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography.” pp. 143-144 Berktay’s
reference to Köprüülü’s analysis is particularly important in that the main focus of the analysis is to situate Köprüülü’s
contribution in a comparative historical framework.
38 Ideological reassertion of suzerainty claims and references to the gaza took on a new form in the post-1402
period, especially after 1413. For a new and an interesting interpretation of how the gaza and gazi identity of the
Ottoman sultans came to play a role in the ideological reassertion, see Ali Anooshahr, The Ghazi Sultans and the
Frontiers of Islam a Comparative Study of the Late Medieval and Early Modern Periods, Routledge Studies in
“did not represent any sudden or dramatic departure from Turkish policy but was a continuation in the development of the Ottoman state in line with the fall of Byzantine cities before it [such as] Thessalonika in 1430.”\textsuperscript{39} The fall of Constantinople may well be situated in the continuum of an expansionist policy, but it would be decisive in the founding of a state with imperial claims. This was perhaps not so much because it represented a qualitative leap in institution building or a sudden surge of innovative ideas, but because the Ottoman state was now in able to use the opportunities of an appropriate setting for carrying the claims of suzerainty to the next level from statehood to empire building.

THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT OF BITHYNIA

Despite the availability of alternative frameworks of explanation, the history of the early Ottoman polity remains predominantly political and leaves the economic history of the period in obscurity. This is to some extent understandable; most of the relevant sources for historians, especially the chronicles of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are narratives that revolve around a dynasty—narratives that constantly shift between myth and history. But even when historians use alternative sources, such as diplomatic correspondence or merchant reports to and from the Italian city-states, to unravel the economic context of the period 1000-1300, they are far from establishing the major characteristics of that period. Claude Cahen had remarked as early as 1968 that “if the chronicles of the First Crusade convey an impression of devastation in the interior of Asia Minor, the fact remains that, on the contrary, travelers who saw it in the thirteenth century brought back a recollection of prosperity, by the standards of their time.”\textsuperscript{40} Kate Fleet makes much the same point forty years later. The main difference between these two scholars lies in the importance they assign to the agency of the Turkic tribes in bringing about this prosperity about in Anatolia. Cahen argues that “in large measure it was clearly a prosperity that had been restored: … the first Turcoman invasion must not be given the credit for the results which it possibly did not produce.”\textsuperscript{41} Fleet, however, asserts that “the Turks who arrived in Anatolia from the late eleventh century on established an economy which developed, thrived and prospered. Far from bringing economic destruction in their wake, it has been argued that their arrival was beneficial for the economy of the region.”\textsuperscript{42} Even though, scholars agree about the larger picture as concerns the economic history of Anatolia, few data are available for evaluating in detail landholding patterns, agricultural production, price fluctuation, or population movements. More importantly, we know little about the specific attributes of the different localities and the peasant and nomadic economy. Most of the information we have pertains to merchant activities, rather than to agriculture or landholding. Bearing in mind and setting aside the crucial question of whether it is (even theoretically) possible (and if so, whether it is desirable) to distinguish the political from the economic, it is nevertheless, important to examine the political-economy of this period and setting.

Located at the edge of the rather arid steppes of central Anatolia, Söğüt, the birthplace of the Ottoman principality, was a fertile land. Whereas contemporary accounts describe

\textsuperscript{39} Fleet, ed. \textit{The Cambridge History of Turkey, Byzantium to Turkey 1071-1453}. p.2
\textsuperscript{40} Claude Cahen, \textit{Pre-Ottoman Turkey}, trans. J. Jones-Williams (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1968). p.155
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Kate Fleet, “The Turkish Economy 1300 - 1453,” in \textit{The Cambridge History of Turkey, Byzantium to Turkey 1071-1453}, ed. Kate Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). p.230
Dorylaneum (Eskişehir) as a large plateau devoid of trees or vineyards, in Söğüt there were mulberry and willows trees, and adjacent areas were suitable for cultivating rice. As Rudi Lindner suggests, this was an area of transition between the higher, more arid steppes of central Anatolia, and the greener, more fertile lands of Bithynia, which indicated that prosperity for the Ottomans and their followers lay ahead, toward the north and northwest. The Ottomans would indeed make ample use of the opportunities provided by the northwestern lands. They might have started out as nomadic raiders, but the fact that they moved northwest indicates a preference for a mostly settled region over the pastoral one lying to the south. Whether this was a conscious decision made to exploit resources that would allow them to establish stronger patronage ties, or whether it was simply an attempt to stay away from their stronger, wealthier, and better-established southern neighbors, is open to speculation. Nevertheless, it can safely be argued that even though frontier regions are insecure, and more likely to be deserted, due to continuous warfare and plunder, it would be an oversimplification to treat all nomadic groups as a monolithic entity; nor can we easily assume that raiding groups and footloose soldiers would always act with no other purpose than to pillage and loot. As Cahen remarks, “the Turcomans did not act in the same way everywhere (they had no reason, for instance, to destroy plantations of trees, some of which were probably able to survive); and, once they were installed, however harsh they may have been, they had no more to gain than any other nomads from destruction of the oases of sedentary agriculture.”

It is important to reflect upon the patterns of raiding and settlement, because even though the nomadic character of the Turkish conquest of Anatolia played a major role in the dynamics of the region from the eleventh to the fifteenth century, the settlement process was also rather quick. Recent research on the Balkan regions of the Byzantine Empire during the period of transition to Ottoman rule suggests that the depopulation of the region, and the consequent settlement by the Turcoman groups, cannot be attributed solely to warfare and raiding. It is likely that the Black Death played a role in the depopulation that took place prior to the influx of the nomadic groups. The low density of the Christian population in the region must therefore have facilitated the settlement of the lands; most of the reliable data on population come from the Ottoman tax registers of the second half of the fifteenth century, and they indicate that most of the Christian inhabitants had left the region by that time.

Nevertheless, in Bithynia specifically, it seems that the depopulation process and consequent resettlement was gradual. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the region was crisscrossed with an extensive web of villages, towns, and fortresses, which we can take as

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43 Lindner, "A Tale of Three Cities Eskişehir, Kütahya, and Karacahisar." p.49. For Lindner’s account of the contemporary descriptions, see pp.69-70
44 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey. p.156
45 It is nevertheless important not to exaggerate this nomadic aspect of the Ottoman polity, and turn it into an all-purpose explanation for the economic, cultural, and political achievements—or the failures—of the Ottoman Empire (and contemporary Turkey). Some Turkish writers make this mistake. Even though their work may not be academic, they have considerable influence on Turkish popular culture. For instance, according to some of these writers, the reason why the Ottomans did not become an overseas merchant empire was that, as nomads, they preferred the land over the sea, the horse over the ship.
evidence that the economy was not in decline, and that there was no serious decline in the population. When the Byzantine Empire’s was confronted by the Turkic principalities at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century, and the Byzantine defensive system, which relied on fortresses, disintegrated, the upper class along with a small percentage of the villagers, left the region. In the fourteenth century only a small number of fortresses would be left in the hands of the Byzantine state, but many villages would remain Christian even after the Ottomans had gained total control of the region. The number of Christian villages and the percentage of Christians in the population in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, are not easy to determine; but the toponymic studies of Jacques Lefort show that there was continuity in a good number of villages, especially in the mountainous areas.47

When it comes to the peasant economy during the period of transition from Byzantine to Ottoman rule, the information is scarce. We cannot draw even qualified conclusions as to continuity in agricultural production, patterns of landholding, or characteristics of the peasant family. Most scholars agree, however that the most prevalent form of landholding was sparsely populated latifundia,48 taxed heavily by absentee landowners. As the most recent studies on the economy of the twelfth-century Byzantine Empire confirm, “the Komnenian empire was run as the estates of various Constantinopolitan landlords—a category that includes the emperor, his kinsmen, the church and those monasteries and other pious institutions known as the ‘pious houses’”.49 However, there is no consensus as to how the large estates were integrated into the Byzantine economy overall. In other words, it is not clear whether these estates were established in response to internal commercial activity and helped to sustain and even develop local production and markets; or whether they functioned as revenue-extracting enterprises more responsive to the demands of the regional and global market than those of the internal market. Whatever the case may be, the Byzantine economy of the late twelfth century was not “fulfilling its potential,” to say the least.50 Notwithstanding the adverse effects of the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204, the thirteenth century, on the other hand, seems to have been a period of prosperity. Angeliki Laiou remarks that the major effect of the conquest was to divide a more or less cohesive economic structure under the Byzantine states into small Greek and Latin states. She argues that from then on, it makes more sense to talk about regional economies in Bithynia, Macedonia, or Thessalonika. In this context of fragmentation, the Bithynian region of the thirteenth century was still “well populated and prosperous.”51 The Bithynian lands, which were rich with alluvial soil, permitted the peasantry to engage in polyculture, and to produce enough agricultural goods both to ensure self-sufficiency, and to meet the market demand. Although it is hard to know the degree to which regional or long-

48 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey. p.156
50 Ibid. p.491 Angeliki Laiou also makes it clear that although scholars have emphasized the role of the state in the economy as a distinctive feature of the Byzantine Empire, most of the crucial questions concerning the Byzantine economy have not been answered. For an extensive discussion of the Byzantine economy, see Angeliki E. Laiou, ed. The Economic History of Byzantium from the Seventh through the Fifteenth Century, 3 vols. (Washington D.C: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection,2002).
distance market demand played a role in agricultural production, grain production was significant. The region also had olive trees, as well as mulberries. It produced olive oil, although we do not know whether it produced silk (the manufacture of which is usually associated with mulberries). Other than the productivity of the soil, Laiou attributes the prosperity of the thirteenth century to two important factors: population increase, and the economic policies of the Byzantine state after the capital was relocated to Nicaea. This relatively short period of prosperity came to an end with the relocation of the empire back to Constantinople, and the concomitant increase in taxation, in turn, put a halt to the increase in agricultural production. The “last crisis” of the empire was combination of local, regional, and interregional factors: civil wars, the fall in peasant production, plague, the impact of the Mongol hegemony that further diverted trade from Constantinople, the wars between Genoa and Venice who were the main trading partners with Constantinople, and finally, the Ottoman expansion.53

Most scholars also argue that after years of uncertainty and economic hardship, the entire population were longing for peace and stability, even if that meant the rule of the “infidel.”54 The transition period was therefore a period during which two polities with different social, economic, and political structures—that is, the Byzantine and the early Ottoman polities—were merging into one another. The hegemony of the early Ottoman state was based on an alliance of the military, religious, and administrative cadres from the Balkans and Anatolia, but it also incorporated some of the institutions of revenue collection from the Byzantine state. Agricultural production55 and customs duties were the main sources of revenue for the emerging states. It can therefore be argued that once one of the competing powers succeeded in consolidating its political and military rule over the others, and managed to provide a certain degree of stability, the conditions for further settlement and state-building were already present. The ebb and flow was not only between the Byzantine Empire and the principalities, the old and the new, but also between raids and settlement, plunder and revenue extraction.

The debate about the influence of the administrative and fiscal institutions of the Seljuk and the Byzantine empires in the allocation of lands and the regulation of taxation is as old as the foundation of the Turkish Republic at the beginning of the twentieth century. It involves a range of arguments about everything from the “Turkish” and secular origins of Ottoman state power to the particulars of the empire’s historical development (and therefore the transition to the Turkish Republic).56 Leaving aside the ideological underpinnings and the ramifications of the debate, it is

52 Ibid, p.320
54 Matschke, "Research Problems Concerning the Transition to Tourkokratia: The Byzantinist Standpoint." p.82 The longing of peace argument is, of course, not specific to Matschke, Turkish historiography makes ample use of this context to advance ideas about Ottoman tolerance.
55 Vryonis argues that “the basic farming stock of Seljuk Anatolia up to the mid-thirteenth century consisted of Greek, Armenian, and Syrian peasants. After the thirteenth century, the majority of these farmers converted to Islam and these converts, with the sedentarized nomads, came to constitute the Turkish farming population of most of Anatolia”, Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century. p.475
56 Berktay, "The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography.", see also Halil Berktay, "İktisat Tarihi: Osmanlı Devletinin Yükselişine Kadar Türklern İktisadi Ve Toplumsal Tarihi," in Türkiye Tarihi, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yaynevi, 1989). Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the
clear that the fiscal and administrative institutions and practices retained a certain continuity. This holds true especially for the most important pillar of the Ottoman Empire at the height of its power, the timar system. The form as well as the content of revenue extraction through timar (that is, the conservation of the tax base in its geographical-administrative form and sometimes even the percentage of taxation levied from the peasantry) is indeed striking. Furthermore, the fact that by the mid-thirteenth century there was a web of caravanserai, and khans connecting the northern and southern, as well as the western and eastern, parts of Anatolia meant that the infrastructure for trade and the transportation of goods and resources was not completely devastated, and that it could be efficiently used once the political fragmentation gave way to Pax Ottomanaica. Fairs were also among the most important and widespread remnants of the Byzantine heritage, and these fairs promoted the development of the regional economies by connecting them to one another.57

In central and western Anatolia, a crucial element was injected into the administrative-fiscal body of the old institutions and practices. That crucial element was the nomadic population. But this population was concentrated most heavily in southwest Anatolia—in Dorylaeum (Eskişehir) and Cotyaeum (Kütahya) and the upper Meandre (Büyük Menderes) region. It is difficult to say anything with certainty about the size of the nomadic population (some contemporary sources estimate it up to 100,000).58 Whatever the case may be, the influx of nomads in the twelfth century was important enough to be both an asset and a liability for the centralizing powers. The nomadic groups needed to be handled with care by a principality with grander ambitions; while they were effective in weakening the last defenses of the Byzantine Empire, they were, at the same time, unruly, and could well be an impediment to the centralization and sedentarization processes. This tension would mark the first centuries of the Ottoman polity.59

From the twelfth century onward, the nomadic groups came to the peninsula in great numbers. As Fleet remarks, “the Turkoman nomads moved westward from Central Asia and Iran into the rolling upland pastures of the central Anatolian plateau. Ideal for large-scale ranching, the economic backbone of the obstreperous Byzantine magnates in the tenth-century, these lands provided the nomads with both winter and summer pasture for their extensive herds and flocks [especially horses and mules which were renowned for their pedigree]… the Turkomans traveled in considerable numbers of families and flocks, setting up large tent encampments, such as that

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57 Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century. pp.444-498. Of course, Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey. is indispensable.
58 Halil İnalcık, “The Yürüks: Their Origins, Expansion and Economic Role,” in The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire, Essays on Economy and Society (Bloomington Indiana University Turkish Studies and Turkish Ministry of Culture, 1993). p.98
59 This tension is not restricted to the foundational period the Ottoman state. Even after the fifteenth century, the Ottoman state always kept an attentive eye on the nomadic elements and followed policies of settlement. What I meant here is that the nomads were essential players in the balance of power during the formative years of the Ottoman polity. For a brief account of the changing relations between the nomads and the central authority see ibid. see also Reşat Kasaba, A Moveable Empire, Ottomans Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2009).
of 2,000 people described by Kinnamos around Dorylaion in 1175.\textsuperscript{60} By the second half of the sixteenth century, the nomads constitute 15 percent of the population of the province of Anatolia, and in the Balkans they would number around 50,000 households.\textsuperscript{61} They were concentrated in the greatest numbers around the sancaks (sub-provinces, or districts) of Kütahya, Ankara, Aydın, Saruhan, and Menteşe with their high mountain pastures and relatively lower plains. Even though there are little or no data concerning the fluctuation in migration patterns, there must have been periods during which population increased from 50 to 150 percent in some parts of the Anatolian province.\textsuperscript{62} Both push (the forced-settlement policies of the central authority) and pull (the new economic opportunities in western Anatolia) would determine the nature of the nomadic movements. Even though these movements would last well into the late nineteenth century, the first great influx of nomads was absorbed rather quickly. A range of policies promulgated by the central authority (or more precisely, by the centralizing authority in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), from forced settlement to relocation, from tax exemptions to cooptation into the military institutions promoted quick settlement pattern. Geographical factors also played an important in this transition to sedentary life. As Suraíya Faroqhi argues, “this process was made easier by the fact that even in the driest areas of inner Anatolia it was (and still is) possible to farm without the need for irrigation. By the second half of the fifteen century, when Ottoman tax registers gave a first overview of land use, Anatolia was again largely populated by sedentary farmers. The preponderance of the sedentary lifestyle grew markedly in the sixteenth century, although summer migrations to nearby high pastures were practiced even by many twentieth-century villagers.”\textsuperscript{63}

Another major factor that made Bithynia a strategically important place (and perhaps helped in the sedentarization process) was that main trading, pilgrimage, and military routes crossed the region. When in 292 BC, the emperor Diocletian made Nikomedia the eastern capital city of the Roman Empire, this had a major impact on the major trading routes in Anatolia; but the real and permanent change occurred when Istanbul/Constantinople became the capital of the empire in 330 AD. With that change, the main route in Anatolia was no longer on an east-west trajectory; it turned south after reaching Nicaea and went on to Tarsus passing, by the Taurus. Even though it was subject to temporary ups and downs during times of relative centralization and fragmentation (as was the case from the twelfth to the fifteenth century), this main route connecting Nikomedia (İzmit), Dorylaneum (Eskişehir), Akşehir and Konya would continue to function during the Ottoman rule.\textsuperscript{64} The pilgrims, merchants, and soldiers coming from Constantinople had to pass through the Ottoman pasturelands. Söğüt was and remained one of the major posts connecting Istanbul to Konya.\textsuperscript{65} Knowing full well the importance of these routes

As the trade and pilgrimage routes connected the fragmentary political and social worlds of the nomads and the sedentary people, the nomads, up until the late nineteenth century, kept the routes alive, and helped to form new ones. For instance, when, in the nineteenth century, western Anatolia, especially İzmir, was an ever more important role in international commerce and provided trade opportunities for the hinterland, the camel drivers proved to be the major link between the hinterland and the ports. Moreover, just as some nomadic groups specialized as camel drivers, others specialized in the lumber trade. The Tahtacı (lumberman) tribes, living mostly on the high Toros mountain range, were engaged in felling timber and transporting it further south, to be shipped to Syria and Egypt – a pursuit in trade that proved highly profitable in the second half of the fifteenth century.\footnote{İnalci, "The Yürük: Their Origins, Expansion and Economic Role." p.115}

The function of the nomadic groups in the regional economy was multifaceted. To begin with, the slave trade was a lucrative business that connected southern Russia to Egypt and western Europe. The practice of supplying the Muslim armies of the southeast Mediterranean with the slaves from the Caucasus had begun in the ninth century, and as is well known, formed the very foundation of the mamluk institution (and dynasty). As Elizabeth Zachariadou argues, “from the early fourteenth century a subsidiary trade was established from the coast of Asia Minor to Crete and thence to Western Europe, with the Turks raiding the Aegean islands and territories and carrying off the inhabitants who were then sold as slaves to the Latins.”\footnote{Elizabeth Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydın (Venice: Library of the Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies 11, 1983). p.160} Some of the sources put the estimated number of slaves traded up to 25,000 during the years 1331-1332. This shows the extent to which the slave trade could be exploited to realize short-term gains, and also the extent to which it could have altered on the economic, social, and political context by emptying the towns, and surrounding areas.\footnote{Ibid. see also Kate Fleet, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State, the Merchants of Genoa and Turkey, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). p.39} Even though most of the slaves were Greeks,\footnote{For instance, the contemporary writer Doukas emphasizes the brutality of the Turkish enterprise upon the Greek society, Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks trans. H.J. Magoulias (Detoit1975). p.72, Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydın. p.161} the raids and the subsequent enslavements of captives were not limited to the Turkic principalities; the Latins also captured and sold Muslims in the slave markets of Chios and Genoa.\footnote{Kate Fleet notes that “in the early fifteenth century the king of Cyprus seized in successive raids 1.500 subjects of the Mamluk sultan to boost his labour force in the sugar plantations on Cyprus”. Fleet, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State, the Merchants of Genoa and Turkey. pp.40-43} The slave markets were widespread all over the eastern Mediterranean, from the ports of Constantinople and Rhodes to as far west as Catalonia.
The slave trade was not merely an interregional or interreligious activity that took place between the Turks and the Latins. There were regional slave markets in the Turkic principalities, and the Turks also bought slaves. Ibn Battuta recounts that during his travels in Anatolia in 1332-1333 he bought a slave girl when he was around Ephesus, near Izmir.72 His narrative gives the impression that the slave trade in western Anatolia was quite ordinary. Almost a century later, Aşıkpaşazade, an Ottoman chronicler, would also describe how he captured Christians in the raids he participated and sold them as slaves.73 The slave trade was therefore more than a short-term source of revenue; the fact that the principalities of Aydın and Menteşe imposed export duties on slaves, and that there were laws governing the recovery of runaway slaves, shows the extent to which the slave trade was institutionalized as an economic activity.74

The stable pillars of the nomadic economy, however, were the trading of clothing, tents, carpets, and rugs for dairy products and raw materials. İnalçık, specifically mentions the manufacture and trade of carpets and rugs (halı, kilim). One of the main reasons why the manufacture of carpets proved to be profitable even within the confines of the local economy was that they were widely used by townsmen and the nomadic population alike in their everyday lives, and were put to a variety of uses as cushion covers and saddlebags.75 Rhoads Murphey points out that “in the estimation of [the Ottoman] surveyors of 1583 even the poorest herdsmen could be placed in the same category as peasant cultivating a full 60 - 100 dönüms or 15 - 25 acres of land.”76 This means that the nomadic groups were also carefully controlled by the state as taxable units. Frequently, state’s policy of settling or relocating the nomadic groups was intended not only to keep the nomads under control but also to enlarge the tax base. Recent evidence suggests that the pastoral economy did not necessarily relegate the nomads to subsistence level production or dire poverty, nor were they an unruly group, always resisting the central authority. İnalçık, for instance, remarks that there was social and economic differentiation within the pastoral groups, and some wealthy nomad leaders were even tax farmers.77

It was commerce that connected the dots of this fragmentary landscape; trade functioned as a set of institutions and practices that provided the continuity between the Byzantine past and the Ottoman future during this transition period. By the tenth century, Constantinople had already become “a great entrepot of international trade, without losing its importance as a regional and interregional center.”78 Venice and Genoa competed with one another to secure access to and control the trade routes of entrepot. Despite fluctuations in the economy, and disruptions in trade, they always managed to survive the hard times and to maintain their trade relations with the next hegemonic power, whether in eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, or the Black Sea. The role they played in the Byzantine economy (and therefore in the economy of the

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73 Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State, the Merchants of Genoa and Turkey*. p.46
74 Ibid. pp.46-58
75 İnalçık, "The Yörüks: Their Origins, Expansion and Economic Role."
76 Murphey, "Some Features of Nomadism in the Ottoman Empire: A Survey Based on Tribal Census and Judicial Appeal Documentation from Archives in Istanbul and Damascus." p.192
78 Laiou, "The Byzantine Economy: An Overview." p.1148
region) was such that they played an important role in the economic upturn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. When the Crusaders’ invasion of Constantinople in 1204 led to the political fragmentation of the Byzantine Empire, the integrative role of trade became even more apparent. For the trade carried on by the Italian city-states minimized the negative effects of political and military decentralization, and kept the economy from serious deterioration. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the Byzantine imperial power had its downside. The Italian city-states became the dominant powers in the economy of the region, and the Seljuk state emerged as Byzantine Empire’s new competitor. The reason why Laiou calls the thirteenth a “lost century” is that it was then that Constantinople lost its dominant position in the regional and “global” economy.  

The treaties between the Genoese, the Venetians, and the different Turkic principalities attest to the importance of trade; they institutionalized and regulated customs duties, as well as rules for the prevention of monopolies rules governing staple goods. The treaties were crucial for the Venetians and the Genoese for several reasons. They enabled them to get the best bargains by keeping customs duties as low as possible; they guaranteed the safety of their merchants; they helped them to operate within a predictable legal framework; and they granted them tax-farming privileges. It is from these treaties that we have learned most of what we know about the staple goods. According to Zachariadou, corn, dried vegetables, rice, saffron, sesame seed, raisins, and hemp were the main export goods from Anatolia. Horses, oxen, and hides were also bought from the nomads. As for the manufactured products, carpets and leathers were the main trading items. Compared to these goods, mainly textiles, soap and wine were imported to Anatolia.

Grain was, of course, of the utmost importance. Most of the population of medieval and early-modern societies relied on wheat and barley (along with corn and millet) for their diet. A continuous supply of these staple goods of grain was therefore a matter of life and death, not only for the masses but also for the political authorities, in order to prevent uprisings. Most sources suggest that western Anatolia supplied a large amount of the grain that was consumed for the Italian city-states. Even though Anatolia was not the only source of grain, it seems to have been important enough source that when exports of grain from Aydınoğulları were interrupted in the second half of the fourteenth century, this was one of the decisive factors that led the Genoese to want to start a crusade. On the other hand, the Genoese, as the main beneficiaries of the grain trade, sought constantly to guarantee and renew their partnership with the new principalities. On the other hand, the Ottomans, while expanding westward at the expense of the other principalities, tried to control and limit the grade trade. The prohibition against exporting grain, which Bayezid I imposed in the late fourteenth century, was a strategic tool in the economic policy of the new state, causing a considerable rise of grain prices in Italy, and provoking the complaints of the Genoese merchants.

The trade was more than an exchange relation between two different states, or between the merchants and the producers. It was an integral part of the financial policies of the principalities, and of the early Ottoman state. As Fleet says, “the Genoese merchant was an

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79 Ibid. p.1156  
81 Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State, the Merchants of Genoa and Turkey*. p.59  
integral part of the embryonic Ottoman economy, not merely as an outside factor coming, taking and leaving, but as one of the functionaries of the state, for Genoese and other Latin merchants operated as tax farmers for the Ottomans.**83** Although scholars do not know exactly when the practice was implemented, Fleet suggests that tax farming was practiced in the fourteenth century by the principalities of Menteşe and Aydın principalities. As for the Ottomans, it is likely that the Latin tax farmers were in charge of collecting certain customs duties in the ports, and “various partnerships were formed by Genoese merchants, in 1416, 1437 and 1448, to control Ottoman alum production and export [in Western Anatolia].”**84** The extent and the role of tax farming as an institution would be much more important in the overall political economy of the eighteenth century; nevertheless, its existence and close connection to the merchant capital as early as 1416 show the extent to which it formed already part of the political structure from the beginning.

As the Seljuk Empire established itself more and more firmly in Anatolia, and pushed the Byzantine Empire further to the northwest, it started to control the trade routes that connected the peninsula to the silk route. However, this connection was mainly through the Mediterranean ports, and the inland was rather less well connected. It was a major policy (and achievement) of the Seljuk Empire to establish a new network of caravanserais to connect the inland to interregional trade. It did so by creating an axis that crossed Anatolia from southwest to northeast. As Katharine Branning remarks:

> With the spread of Islam in the Middle East, the Byzantines steadily lost control over the traditional trade routes. They attempted to establish new routes using Black Sea ports, but the main thoroughfares were eventually overcome by the Muslims. Once the Seljuks established themselves in Anatolia, Byzantium completely lost control of the flow of trade through Asia Minor. This trade channel was taken over by the Seljuks, who sought to develop their inland cities such as Sivas, Tokat and Niğde to take advantage of this trade. By erecting hans along the Konya-Kayseri-Sivas route, they attracted Genoese commercial interests to Sivas, followed by merchants from Naples, Pisa, and Russia. In addition, the arrival of the Crusaders increased the volume of trade, as Europeans developed a taste for oriental goods, linking in effect Peking to Paris. Pilgrim "Holy Land" souvenirs were highly- prized items. Luxury items such as Islamic carpets, textiles, ivories, metalwork, ceramics and glass filled the stately homes and cathedrals of Europe. Many of these goods passed over the land and maritime routes of Anatolia.**85**

The construction of caravanserais was surely done partly to revive, attract, and regulate commerce, and must have contributed to the relative prosperity of the period,**86** but as I pointed out above, it was also a means of controlling the nomadic elements coming into the region by creating the infrastructure for commercial relations, rather than relying solely on forced settlement or relocation policies. As Vryonis point out, the commerce between the Greek and Muslim merchants resumed in the latter half of the twelfth century, and “this movement of merchants was greatly facilitated by the creation of an expanded network of caravansarays in the

**83** Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State, the Merchants of Genoa and Turkey*. p.134
**85** [www.theturkishan.org](http://www.theturkishan.org), see the section on trade
**86** Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*. p.167-168
Seljuk domains, which stretched out from Konya and Caesarea to the east, north, south, and west … These caravansarays were built to accommodate the growing movement of merchants and other travellers through the Byzantine-Turkish border regions and … they also reflect the thorough and integrative character of Seljuk colonization policies.”

Trade, therefore, functioned in more than one way as a nexus of power. Amidst the constant political and military tension between the nomadic and the settled social formations, trade functioned as a network that connected these seemingly opposing forces.

There were other institutions and practices closely related to commerce and artisanship that formed networks within the political, economic, cultural, and social landscapes in Anatolia. When Ibn Battuta arrived in south Anatolia in the first half of the fourteenth century and made his way to the Aegean coast, and from there to the Black Sea region, he was struck by the wealth of the principalities and the prosperity of most the towns he visited. With regard to this general prosperity, he attributes particular importance to ahi organizations. He remarks that “in all the lands inhabited by the Turcoman in Anatolia, in every district, town, and village, there are to be found members of [this] organization.”

The prosperity of the principalities may be related partly to the fact that by the 1330s, they (especially Aydınoğulları on Aegean coast) were able to rule over the Christian principalities of the nearby islands and the Balkans by subjecting them to tributes, but what struck Ibn Battuta was the hospitality and the generosity of these organizations. Ibn Battuta’s remarks on this subject are particularly interesting because the historical evolution of the early ahi, or futuwwa, organizations from simply religious confraternities to guildlike institutions with specific rules and regulations is not very clear. As Cahen puts it, “The problem is as follows … the futuwwa organizations throughout the whole Muslim world before the end of the Middle Ages, even though they included men most of whom followed some trade, were not professional organizations in the sense that the profession does not appear to have been the basis of either for their activities or for the division of their members into sub-groups. On the one side there were the trades, on the other the futuwwa, even if their members were in large measure the same. There is nothing, at least before the thirteenth century, to justify any other opinion.”

Ibn Battuta’s accounts give the impression that the trades and the futuwwa had merged in fourteenth-century Anatolia, and that the widespread existence of the ahi organizations points to a certain juxtaposition of religious orders and artisans within the nexus of trade relations, rather than to their coexistence as separate entities.

As Vryonis observes with regards to the writings of the famous Mevlevi dervish Eflâki, many craftsmen, and the merchants were affiliated with the Mevlevi order. In Menakib al-‘Arîfîn of Eflâki, “the most extensively discussed category [in relation to the crafts] is that dealing with clothing, textiles, leatherwork, and shoes. This includes the crafts of the tailor, furrier, hatmaker, tanner, and currier, all of whom produced a rich assortment of products – feredjjes (cloaks),

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88 Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa 1325 - 1354. p.125
89 Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin. p.24
90 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey. p.199
shirts, turbans, mantles, women’s veil, fur coats, shoes, boots, and the like.” Furthermore, the centrality of Konya both for the Mevlevi order, and for the caravan trade must have played an important in establishing close ties with between the order and the merchants. Especially after the fall of the Seljuk state, these connections became all the more important for the competing principalities because by forming alliances with the ahi organizations, or religious orders incorporating, these principalities could at the same extent their control over valuable financial resources.

Even though details of their internal organization are not well documented for the first centuries of their existence, the ahi organizations, specifically in Seljuk Anatolia, were shaped by a variety influences and practices. As Cahen says, “without completely ruling out the possibility that traditions brought directly by the Turks from remote Central Asia may occasionally have had some influence, it seems reasonable to admit that the life of craftsmen in the towns of Seljuk Asia Minor originally derived from the juxtaposition of, or contact between, Greek and Armenian craftsmen on the one side and Iranian immigrants on the other.” To what extent they were religious orders or simply private organizations that brought the artisans together for administrative purposes; to what extent they were autonomous or under state control—these are points of scholarly debate. It is therefore important to not to take Ibn Battuta’s impressions as proof that the futuwwa converged with the urban craftsmen. It is more productive to reflect on the probable function of the futuwwa as a marker of the historical context rather than than it is to engage in endless debates on their origins. In the post-Mongol period, the ahi organizations in Anatolia brought together a variety of traditions and practices; and at least some guilds, such as tanners, saddlers, and cobbler, were directly connected to Ahi Evren from Kırşehir in Central Anatolia—a figure who later became later the pîr of all the guilds. In this sense, it can be argued that the ahi organizations played a central role in sustaining and disseminating the syncretic views and practices of Islam in resolving the economic, political, and cultural disparities, and in reducing the tensions between the countryside and the urban centers.

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92 For the early formation of the akhi organizations, see Claude Cahen, "Futuwwa," Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd Edition. Cahen is highly doubtful about the connection between the futuwwa of the earlier Islamic periods and the Ottoman guilds.
93 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey. p.195 compare this with Neşet Çağatay who argues that the organization is a Turkish institution, Neşet Çağatay, Bir Türk Kurumu Olan Ahilik (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989).
94 Frank Taeschner, "Futuwwa (Post-Mongol Period)," Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd Edition. Pîr can be translated as the spiritual leader of a religious order, or as the founder of a zaviye, a dervish lodge. For a detailed study of Ahi Evren and the foundation of the akhi organizations in Anatolia see, Mikail Bayram, Ahi Evren Ve Ahi Teşkilatının Kuruluşu (Konya1991). Mikail Bayram offers a detailed genealogy of Ahi Evren, and argues that the organization, even though drew on the futuwwa precedent, was a distinctly Turkish organization, and also contends that Ahi Evren and the movement he started was suppressed by the Mongol overlords and their vassals in Anatolia.
95 Frank Taeschner, "Ahkî," Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd Edition. Taeschner argues that they were “an important element of cohesion in the motley conglomeration of states in Anatolia at that period. In towns where no prince resided, they exercised a sort of government and a rank of amir, sometimes they exercised judicial authority” for which Ankara is an example.
However, the function of the ahi organizations cannot be reduced solely to proselytization, nor can it be seen purely in terms of syncretic religious views.\textsuperscript{96}

The development of the dervish lodges, with close ties to the ahi organizations, can also be situated within the same post-Mongol context of political fragmentation. The Battle of Kösedâğ (1243), which put an end to Seljuk rule in Anatolia, also created the social and economic conditions that allowed the newly emerging local rulers to form patronage ties. Since these new rulers did not have access to the extensive economic resources that were available to the Seljuk rulers to finance large religious or commercial institutions, their strategy was more circumscribed. Hence their support for the dervish lodges, which were more inclusive than the medreses funded by the Seljuk state in terms of their appeal to the heterodox religious elements, and to the Christians. Furthermore, by creating social and political ties around a dervish lodge, the rulers of the new principalities also sought to control the trade routes. As Ethel Sara Volper argues in her study of the dervish lodges in north-central Anatolia, “these local rulers became patrons of architecture and built dervish lodges in important locations within major trading cities. This represented a significant break from the previous century when building activity, primarily funded by the Seljuk Sultan, did not include dervish lodges. From the mid-thirteenth century to mid-fourteenth century, at least twelve dervish lodges were built in Tokat, Sivas, and Amasya, major trading cities on two important trade routes. These cities were populated by large numbers of Christians and by immigrants who often traveled with mystic leaders.”\textsuperscript{97} Another major advantage of supporting the dervish lodges was that their legal status as pious endowments (wakfs), protected the dervish lodges (and the revenues accruing from them) from the fragmentary effects of the Islamic inheritance law, and hence secured revenues to the principalities.

The dervish lodges were not only established as an act of piety, nor were they, in this sense, only an institution that they helped the Islamization and Turkification of Anatolia. In the post-Mongol context of political and economic competition, the patrons of these institutions also had political motivations. This period was at the same time a period of state-making. The contenders that emerged after the weakening of the Seljuk state had to establish institutions that had access to revenues, mobilize human resources, and establish an ideological legitimacy. Volper claims that the dervish lodges were one of these institutions that helped the competing local rulers to build their state and establish their hegemony: “simply put, setting up a waqf foundation allowed amirs to protect and invest the land they acquired from the bankrupt Seljuk state … using a waqf foundation to support a dervish lodge was a way to set up a lucrative foundation that remained outside of state control … amirs chose to build dervish lodges because they provided various important services to the mixed populations of their cities … endowing dervish lodges in these locations transformed the hierarchy of spaces in these cities by providing new centers of activity catering to this mixed population.”\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{96} Mikail Bayram, for instance, argues that Ahi Evren was the follower of sunni Islam, and was proponent of Ibn Rusd, Bayram, \textit{Ahi Evren Ve Ahi Teşkilatının Kuruluşu}. p. 89-91

\textsuperscript{97} Volper, "Patronage and Practice in Late Seljuk and Early Beylik Society: Dervish Lodges in Sivas, Tokat, and Amasya". p.xi

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid. p.131
CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCING KÜTAHYA: POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE FRONTIER REGION

FROM BYZANTINE TO GERMIYAN RULE

What, in the mid-fifteenth century (1451), would become the capital of the province of Anatolia, Kütahya, was, from the eleventh century onward, and especially in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a town that embodied most of the characteristics of this fluid frontier region. As an old settlement, which dates from time of the Phrygians (roughly from the twelfth to the seventh BC), Cotyaeum was noted only as the birthplace of famous fabulist Aesop by the writers of Roman period in the fourth century. Later on it also became one of the principal religious centers of Christianity, and the seat of the archbishopric, during the Byzantine Empire. Situated in a fertile stretch of land, Cotyaeum was also strategically located. The fact that in the ninth century the Byzantines built one of the most impressive fortresses of central and western Anatolia overlooking the city, attests to this strategic importance. Given the relative peace and prosperity of the ninth and the tenth centuries, the Byzantine authorities probably considered it necessary to consolidate their expansion in the region. As the population increased, and as Constantinople became a huge entrepôt for a major center of international trade, it was imperative to control the both the population and the regional trade by securing the strategic locations along the trade routes. As Clive Foss, the author of a comprehensive study of the Kütahya fortress, points out;

A strategic location has been even more significant than the land for the growth of the city. Kütahya lies on natural routes which connect it easily with major centers of population, and provide relatively easy communication between the central plateau and the coast. They lead from Kütahya to Eskişehir (Doryleaum) and the cities of Bithynia or to Ankara; northwest to Bursa or Balıkesir and the Mysian plain; southeast via Aezani and Gediz to the Maecestus valley or Lydia; and south through Altıntaş and Uşak to the Maeander and Hermus valleys, or via Afyon to the main highway through Anatolia to the Near East. Such a location, a place from which large parts of western Anatolia could be reached or controlled, accounts for the long historical role Kütahya as a military and administrative center and thus for the size and importance of its great castle.

Foss’ study suggests that Byzantine state was at the same preparing the region around Kütahya as a major defensive line against the Arab incursions which had started much earlier than the migrations of the Turkic nomadic groups, and the Seljuks. Along with the Kütahya fortress, there

1 “Kütahya has always owed its prosperity to the long and narrow plain which stretches before it for some 25 km. The plain is well watered, providing sufficient vegetation and agriculture to support sizeable human and animal population. In addition, the mountains all around offer generous sources of stone and minerals.” Clive Foss, Survey of Medieval Castles of Anatolia with Plans by Robin Fursdon, vol. I: Kütahya, British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara, Monograph No.7 Bar International Series 261 (Oxford: BAR 1985). p.12
3 Foss, Survey of Medieval Castles of Anatolia with Plans by Robin Fursdon. p.12
were a dozen fortresses and castles. Their purpose and function seem to vary, but taken together they display purely military as well as civil and administrative functions. The characteristics of the Kütahya fortress show that it was undoubtedly a military base and an administrative center, and remained so until the late eleventh century.

With the influx of the Turkic nomads and the establishment of the Seljuk authority from the eleventh century onward, the northwestern plateau of central Anatolia became one of the areas where control frequently shifted from one power to another. The Seljuks preferred to channel some of the migratory pressure from eastern and central Anatolia toward the Bithynian region. It is hard to tell whether they pursued a well-thought-out plan of settlement of the nomadic elements, or whether they were proceeding in an ad-hoc manner, but it seems clear that they allocated lands to some of the powerful tribes—among them the Germiyans, the rulers of the region and one of the most important principalities during the fourteenth century.

The transition from Byzantine control of the region to Germiyan rule took place after at least two centuries of ebb and flow. The Battle of Manzikert in 1071 had opened the Anatolian peninsula to the settlement and movements of the Turkic tribes, and the Seljuks were able to conquer Kütahya in 1078, but their initial control over the whole of the Bithynia region did not last long. With the first wave of the Crusades, the Byzantine state was able to reassert its rule until the end of the twelfth century. The decisive turning point came in 1176, with the Battle of Myriokephalon and the defeat of the Byzantines forces by the Seljuk ruler Kilç Arslan II (1156-1192) – “a defeat that the [Byzantine] Emperor himself considered comparable to that of Manzikert a century earlier.” Nevertheless, it took another fifty years for the Seljuks to consolidate the control over the region. Even though the dismantling of the fortification of the last century was stipulated as part of the peace agreement, and hence facilitated the advance of the regular army as well as that of the nomadic-warriors elements, another major development had an adverse effect on the Seljuk rule, and on the advance of the nomads in the region.

With the capture of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade, the Byzantine state fragmented into three major power centers, and the seat of the empire moved to Iznik, at the westernmost edge of the Bithynian region. This move, even though it was the consequence of a major turmoil within the Byzantine Empire, led to the stabilization of the Bithynian region, with the state in exile asserting its power to control the realm under its authority. Hence, with the balance of power between the Byzantine state in Iznik and the Seljuk state in central Anatolia, the advance of the nomadic forces came to a halt for the first half of the thirteenth century. As

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4 Foss’ survey “identified the sites of thirteen [castles] in an area of 1200 square kilometres which stretches about 140 kilometres north to south and over 100 east and west” for time period that extends from seventh to the fifteenth century. Ibid. p.122
6 “[Kütahya] was clearly in a frontier zone … and clearly needed its fortress: in 1159, for example, the emperor Manuel Comnenus was attacked by Turkish forces near Cotyaeum as he returned from Cilicia. After Manuel’s defeat at Myriokephalon in 1176, the frontier region was dangerously exposed to Turkish attacks, and most of its fortresses soon fell. Among them was Cotyaeum, which became Turkish, captured by the Seljuk sultan Kilich Arslan, in 1182. The loss was definitive, four year later, when the Sultan divided his dominions among his sons, it became part of the territory og Kaikhosraw who was base in Konya; it is never again mentioned as forming part of Byzantine domains.” Foss, Survey of Medieval Castles of Anatolia with Plans by Robin Fursdon. p.13
Foss suggests, “as order was restored and a balance of power established the Seljuks of central Anatolia, succeeding emperors devoted much effort to the defense of Asia Minor and to the frontier areas in particular … the great rebuilding of Kütahya, with its close ranks of solid towers suitable for heavy artillery, probably dates from [this period along with reconstruction of smaller castles with defensive functions].” The period of relative stability that ensued lasted until the Seljuks were defeated by the Mongol forces and the Byzantine state in exile returned to Constantinople in 1261.

The settlement of the Germiyans in and around the region of Kütahya took place in the decade 1250-60. Mustafa Çetin Varlık, the author of the only monograph written on the Germiyans, argues that they first appear under the suzerainty of the Seljuks as one of the forces that the Seljuks used against the Babaî rebellions in the late 1230s. Later on, they were once again among the principal actors in one of the last struggles of Seljuk dynasty to retain their authority in central Anatolia. It appears that in the 1250s the Germiyans were living around the Malatya region, and were allocated Kütahya in 1277 as a fief in return for their role in capturing Cimri, the pretender to the Seljuk throne in Konya.

The first references to the Germiyans and to their vassalage either to the Seljuks or to the Ilkhangas are not firmly established, even though the Germiyans seem to have revolted against the Ilkhan overlords toward the end of the thirteenth century. At that time, as Lindner points out, the Germiyans “were sometimes nominally loyal to the Seljuks and sometimes acted independently; at one time they were subservient to the Ilkhangas, although just what that meant in practice is unclear.” What seems certain, however, is that by the end of the thirteenth century they had begun to act more and more autonomously, and by the beginning of the fourteenth century the Germiyans were a major force to be reckoned with. I will return briefly to the military and political relations between the Germiyans and other principalities during the fourteenth century, in chapter 6, when I discuss the Germiyans as the ayâns (notables) of the eighteenth century. Suffice it say here that the Germiyans seem to have established the conditions needed to make the leap from a small principality to an institutionalized state in a short period of time. The fact they failed to do so is no easier to explain than the reasons why the Ottomans succeeded in establishing a world-empire. We know so little about the social and economic history of the period that we cannot compare the ways in which they and their rivals accumulated wealth, built institutions, or mobilized and managed their natural and human resources. Nevertheless, it seems plausible to argue that their geopolitical location did not permit them to compete with their more resourceful rivals.

One of the main sources used by historians for early-fourteenth-century Anatolia is Ibn Battuta’s travel notes. Unfortunately this source is of very limited value for Kütahya and for the

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7 Ibid. p.124
10 Rudi Paul Lindner, "Anatolia 1300-1451," in The Cambridge History of Turkey, Byzantium to Turkey 1071-1453, ed. Kate Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). p.113
Germiyan dynasty. During his travels from the south to the north of Anatolia, which took place between 1330 and 1332, Ibn Battuta bypassed Kütahya. While he took a detour toward the western Anatolian principalities, he mentions the “Jermiyans” only as a threat to other principalities. It is interesting that while he refers to most of the leaders of the small principalities as “sultan,” he does not even mention the Germiyans as a principality, but as a band of brigands “infesting the country” and as “possessing a town called Kütahya.” While the fact that he bypassed the Kütahya region and stayed with the rival principalities of western Anatolia may explain his relative dismissal of the Germiyans, the fact that they were there, and they posed a threat, suggests the extent of their power. Ibn Battuta made these remarks from afar, more precisely from the Denizli region, west of their territory. Some thirty years later, the Germiyan principality seems to have asserted its suzerainty over that region. The inscriptions on the Ulu Camii in Denizli, a mosque that was probably constructed by the Seljuks around 1250 indicate that it was renewed by the Germiyan ruler, Süleyman Şah. Hence, far from being unruly nomads, the Germiyans were by then expanding their patronage ties, if their construction activity in Denizli is any indication.

Ibn Battuta does not give any first-hand account of Kütahya, but his descriptions, especially of the region around Kütahya, can be taken as more or less applicable to Kütahya as well. His account portrays a prosperous urban life and a relatively peaceful countryside. He is impressed by most of the towns and cities he visits, and also by the generosity of the courts he was admitted to. It may be surmised that had he traveled to the lands of the Germiyan, and to their court, he would probably have been even more impressed because there is no doubt that they were more prosperous than most of the principalities he had been to, including the nascent Ottomans, whose power and wealth he admires. He describes Bursa, the early capital of the Ottoman principality, as a “great city with fine bazaars and broad streets, surrounded by orchards and running springs.” He adds that “the Sultan of Bursa … Orkhan Bey …is the greatest of the Turkmen kings and the richest in wealth, lands, and military forces, and possesses nearly a hundred fortresses which he is continually visiting for inspection and putting them to rights. He fights with the infidels and besieges them.” Yet, for all of the praise that Ibn Battuta heaps on the Ottoman house in the 1330s, Pachymeres, another major source, albeit a little earlier than Ibn Battuta, remarks that by the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Germiyans “were more powerful and dangerous than Osman.”

For the time, at least, their construction activity in and around Kütahya was impressive, and the quality of their coinage - one of one the marks of independence and sovereignty – was “notably superior to that of many of the other beyliks.”

Even though most of what we can say about the social, economic, and cultural context of the Germiyan period in Kütahya comes from studies on art and architecture, almost no pre-
Ottoman architecture survives, and the condition of most the few remaining buildings makes it impossible to establish their architectural genealogy with any certainty. There is also considerable disagreement as to whether some of the major architectural sites were built by the Seljuks, the Germiyans, or the Ottomans. Natural disasters, economic downturn, and subsequent renovations taking place over many years all make it even more difficult to reconstruct the social and economic context of the period by studying the architecture of Kütahya. The epigraphs and inscriptions on the buildings as well as the endowment deeds sometimes allow historians to make inferences concerning this question, but the insularity of each discipline, and the descriptive nature of architectural history, limits the scope of these inferences. Nevertheless, the prosperity of the Germiyan capital is attested by the ongoing construction activity that took place during a good part of the fourteenth century. The construction of the Vacidiye Medrese in the early part of the century was followed by the construction of a series of mosques (especially Kurşunlu, Bahkli, and Kale-i Bâlâ) during the reign of Süleyman Şah (1361-87), which was at the same time the apex of the power of the Germiyan dynasty 18. Even though Adnan Sayılı argues that it might have been intended primarily as an observatory, 19 the construction of Vacidiye Medrese in 1314 by one of the emirs of the Germiyans, Mubarızeddin Umur Savcı, seems to have attracted well-known scholars to Kütahya. The construction of such medreses can be seen as evidence that the Germiyans had the resources necessary to build them, and that the Germiyan dynasty was following in the footsteps of the Seljuks in using these resources to expand their patronage ties and to promote trade. 20 Inscriptions in the Vacidiye Medrese indicate that the money for its construction (and its upkeep) came from the cizye, taxes levied on the non-Muslims of the nearby Alaşehir – another indication that the Germiyans were able to establish institutionalized forms of tax collection and were ruling over the non-Muslims too.

Patronage ties were also established in a variety of ways. Around the court, no matter how modest it was, patronage of religious men, artists, poets, and scholars was a sign of sovereignty and a statement that the dynasty had further political ambitions. Following the established traditions of court politics, the Germiyans supported the poets. Particularly noteworthy in their case, was the promotion of works written in Turkish. Whether this was a conscious effort on the part of the Germiyans to differentiate themselves from other principalities is not clear but Ahmet Yaşar Ocak notes that “Germiyan [along with Karamanoğulları and Aydınoğulları] was particularly important for the extensive use of Turkish in works composed in the areas of literature, Sufism, and learned knowledge, and in this context the reigns of Yakub Bey [1300-1340], his son Mehmed Bey (d.1363), and Süleyman Şah were productive. Süleyman

Uzunçarşılı’s work is still important because some of the architectural sites and buildings he wrote about in early 1930 have disappeared over time, or have deteriorated to such an extent that his observations are the only extant evidence for their existence, and form the basis of our knowledge about the period. See also, Ara Altun, "Kütahya'nın Türk Devri Mimarisi, "Bir Deneme"," in Kütahya - Atatürkün Doğumunun 100. Yılına Armağan (Istanbul: 1981). Altun’s book-length contribution in this volume is one of the most systematic reappraisals of the architectural history in Kütahya. Uysal who published the only major monograph on the Germiyan architecture corrected many of the assumptions made by the authors of the earlier literature. 

18 That the reign of Süleyman Şah was the apex of their power is, of course, highly questionable. Mustafa Çetin Varlık sees the apex of power as the reign of Yakub II (1300-40), Varlık, Germiyan-Oğulları Tarihi (1300-1429). pp.35 and 98. For a brief reference to the architectural history of the Germiyans, see Crane, "Art and Architecture 1300 - 1453." p.269-270. For a detailed account, see Uysal, Germiyanoğlu ve Kütahya'nın Türk Devri Eserleri.


Şah gave support and protection to scholars and poets of the era, such as Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, Ahmed-i Dai, Ahmedî and Şeyhi [all of whom came under the Ottoman protection after the Ottomans established their rule]. Marriage ties were also used to create a network of economic, political, and cultural capital. In this respect too, the Germiyans seem to have laid the foundations of a dynasty; it seems likely that the daughter of Süleyman Şah, Devlet Hatun, who later married Bayezid I, was born to Mutahhara Hatun, who was the granddaughter of Mevlânâ Celâleddin-i Rumî, the founder of the Mevlevî tarikat.

However, it is necessary to qualify conjectures about the state building process in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The political, economic, social, and cultural environment of Anatolia was highly competitive, and unstable. As I have argued above, a wide variety of alliances were formed among the actors that inhabited this highly unstable context. It is therefore important to take with a grain of salt the alliance formed between the Germiyans and the Mevlevîs. As Vryonis points out with regard to Mevlevî dervish Eflaki's famous work, Menakib al-'Arîfîn, the representation of the ethnic groups in Eflaki shows the extent to which it was difficult for the newly emerging Turkic principalities to found legitimacy and hegemony. For it seems that for Eflaki, politically and ethnically, the most predominant group in Anatolia was the Persians, not the Turks. This was the case not so much because they were most numerous, but because they were, in most cases, representatives of high culture, and bureaucratic elite. Vryonis argues that "the mere fact that Eflaki differentiates ethnically by employing the epiphet "Turk" indicates that to him religious lines were not only marks of sociocultural distinction. Ethnic demarcations were also important to him, and this further implies that Eflaki was writing in a social, cultural, and literary milieu where ethnic differences were important and has some resonance." What is even more significant other than the general remarks on the perception of ethnic identities is a specific episode in Eflaki where the Germiyan prince, most probably Yakub I, is portrayed as ignorant, and uncivilized. Eflaki’s own spiritual master Amir Arif went to visit the Germiyan prince where he had set up his tents along with a large retinue. The prince first greeted the Amir Arif with politeness and respect but later grew uninterested with their recitation from the Kur'an, upon which Amir Arif angrily left the camp. An immense storm followed that almost destroyed the whole camp, upon which the prince sent emissaries to apologize. Eflaki’s description is that "when the disciples began to recite from Koran and to utter divine insights, the said person [the Germiyan prince, Yakub I], out of extreme ignorance and sheer stupidity, paid no attention but occupied himself with his attendants. For he was a Turk and without ceremony and uninformed about the world of the Friends of God." Furthermore, when Amir Arif went to Kütahya later on, Yakub I, received him with proper manners and became his disciple.

22 Sayılı, "Vacidiyye Medresesi." See also, Varlık, Germiyan-Oğulları Tarihi (1300-1429). pp.63-64
24 Shams Al-Din Ahmad-E Aflâkî, The Feats of the Knowers of God (Manaqeb Al-Arefîn), trans. John O’Kane (Leiden Boston Köln: Brill, 2002). p.661-662 For an interpretation of this section, see Vryonis, "The Economic and Social Worlds of Anatolia in the Writings of the Mawlawî Dervish Eflaki." p.194, see also Varlık who mentions this section without any reference to Eflaki’s comments on the ignorance or the ethnic description of the Germiyans, Varlık, Germiyan-Oğulları Tarihi (1300-1429). p. 40-41
We can draw a couple of conclusions from Eflaki’s remarks. First, it seems clear that the Germiyans were reigning as overlords in and around Kütahya because other principalities, such as Aydınoğulları, which became predominant later on, were described as their vassals. Second, even though the Germiyans were militarily the suzerains in the region, their cultural and political legitimacy was not well-established to the same degree as their military might. The formation of different alliances, for instance, between the Mevlevis and the Germiyans, was not necessarily premised upon military prowess or brute force but required a good deal of cooperation of the religious orders. Therefore, the Germiyans needed the approval of a social formation as strong as the Mevlevis in order to secure their cultural legitimacy. However, beside learned hypotheses, there is, in fact, much to be done to understand the formation of these alliances. Even if we take for granted that forming patronage networks was necessary for state building, it is not clear how specific alliances were formed, why the Germiyan dynasty sought to form an alliance with the Mevlevis, and what were the economic, political, and cultural reasons behind these networks? To give a more concrete example, we can turn to the tensions between various religious orders.

In the post-Seljuk era, the fact that there was military and political competition among the principalities is well-established by scholars. While the realm of intense competition is usually reserved to the principalities, different religious orders which also inhabited Anatolia are often seen as the carriers of benevolence, social cohesion, and more importantly, Islamization and Turkification process. However, this competition among these religious orders was no less intense. In this respect, it is also highly probable that there were tensions between the Mevlevi order and Ahi Evren, who was the pîr of many craftsmen. Even though some scholars situate these tensions within a religious and political context, there is hardly any work on the political economy of these divides. The fact that both Mevlevis and Ahi Evren were trying to appeal to the same pool of craftsmen and merchants seems to indicate that there was more to their rivalry than religious-philosophical disagreements. Any possible alliance between the Germiyans, and one of these orders or movements should therefore take into account the larger context of economic relations. More often than not formation of alliances comprised a much larger network of power relations and economic interests than a search for cultural legitimacy would suggest.

The establishment of dervish lodges, as I have argued, was such a means to form an extended network of interests. The construction of other public buildings also functioned in the same way by strengthening the state, controlling the economy, promoting the trade, and even settling the nomadic population. These buildings include imarets (soup kitchens, or more extensive complexes that included other buildings along with the soup kitchen), hamams (public baths), and caravanserais. During the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, when the struggle for supremacy in Anatolia was still inconclusive, the history of the construction of such buildings is also a testimony to the constantly changing power configurations. The construction of the complexes of Yakub II, the last sovereign of the Germiyan dynasty provides an example. The imaret seems to represent the last attempt by the Germiyan dynasty to strengthen their hold on their territories. Yakub II’s reign, which lasted from 1387 to 1429, went through periods of vassalage, autonomy, resistance, independence, and finally submission to the Ottoman power. When, in or around 1381 Süleyman Şah marries his daughter, Devlet Hatun, to the Ottoman şehzâde, Sultan Bayezid, son of Murad I, as was commonly done to form further dynastic

25 Mikail Bayram, Ahi Evren Ve Ahi Teşkilatının Kuruluşu (Konya1991). pp. 89-90
26 Vryonis, "The Economic and Social Worlds of Anatolia in the Writings of the Mawlawi Dervish Eflaki."
alliances, between the principalities, this was more a matter of accepting Ottoman suzerainty than of forming an alliance between two equal powers. The fact that Süleyman Şah gave a considerable part of his land, including Kütahya, to the Ottomans as dowry (and also seems to have retired to one of the nearby towns), and that Bayezid was appointed governor of Kütahya along with a retinue, looks more like a case of incorporation or co-optation - if not outright invasion. Furthermore, the building of an endowment complex by Timurtaş Paşa, the military commander whom Bayezid appoints to Kütahya upon his accession to the throne, can also be seen as another step toward consolidating Ottoman control of the region. Nevertheless, it is important to note that most of our information comes from Ottoman-centered accounts rather than from a variety of sources. This idea that this was a process of annexation should therefore be accepted with some reservations, or at least should be seen in the context of shifting alliances and unstable power relations. It was in this context of instability that Yakub II increasingly sought to reassert his autonomy - first, following the death of Murad I, but more importantly after Bayezid’s defeat by Timur in 1402. In later Ottoman histories, the Germiyans are described as the villains who identified Bayezid for Timur, and hence were responsible for his imprisonment. The ensuing interregnum also seems to be a period during which Yakub II constantly shifted alliances between rival contenders to the Ottoman throne. In the end, he sided, first with Mehmed Çelebi, and finally, with Murad II, to whom he is said to have bequeathed his principality in 1429.

The endowment deed and subsequent references in Ottoman land registers to the imaret of Yakub II, are also important for a couple of reasons. First, the fact that the Germiyan dynasty established a soup-kitchen along with other public buildings, in or around 1411, right after the end of the Ottoman interregnum is significant; it represents another attempt to assert their patronage. Second, the endowment deed shows the extent of their revenues, the size of some of their properties, and some of the notable changes in the status of these properties that took place during the first fifty years of the fifteenth century. Third, the deed is important for its cultural significance; unlike most of the endowment deeds that were written in Arabic during that time, it was written in contemporary Turkish. The early history of the imaret can therefore be read as a ground upon which the power struggles and claims of sovereignty left their marks.

The imarets in the Ottoman Empire have received systematic scholarly attention only during the last five years. Before then, they were treated as parts of larger public buildings and were studied mostly from an architectural perspective with little or no reference to their political, economic, social, and cultural context. There are almost no comparative studies or monographs on the changing nature of these institutions over time, on the ways in which the imaret changed over time, let alone any account of their legacy in the post-Ottoman world. As Nina Ergin,

27 There is a very strong tendency in Turkish Ottoman historiography to portray this entire period in terms of Ottoman efforts to establish a Turkish unity, or in terms of other principalities’ “adhering” to this policy led by the Ottomans. In this sense, the Germiyans finally arrive at, and “enter into” this unity when Yakub II bequeaths his principality to Murad II in 1429. Another – and more recent – tendency in Ottoman historiography is to emphasize the “practicality,” “tolerance,” or “pragmatism” of Ottoman policy. It has been argued that this so-called practicality was the major factor that made the Ottoman suzerainty more acceptable to the principalities that they ruled over. See for instance, Feridun Emecen, İlk Osmanlılar Ve Batı Anadolu Beylikler Dünyası (İstanbul Kitapevi 2001). Hasan Basri Karadeniz, Osmanlılar Ve Beylikler Arasında Anadolu'da Meşruyet Mücadelesi (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yaynevi, 2008). For a more specific defense of the pragmatism argument, see Gabor Agoston, "A Flexible Empire: Authority and Its Limits on the Ottoman Frontiers," International Journal of Turkish Studies 9, no. 1-2 (2003).
Most of the imarets seem to have been built between 1400 and 1700, and though they were still being built in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, either the pace slowed or the content and form of the state’s charitable works by the state started to take on a different dimension after the seventeenth century. Early in the fourteenth century, the Ottomans had already started to build or endow imarets in the Bithynian region, either as single buildings or as parts of larger public complexes, including mosques or dervish lodges. As H. Lowry points out it is significant that “the oldest document to have survived from the early Ottoman era is the 1324 Mekece vakfiyesi (endowment deed), wherein the newly enthroned Ottoman ruler Orhan Gazi established a hanegâh (dervish lodge) for the purpose of feeding and housing travelers.”

Initially, the imarets were part of the “multi-purpose structures – convents (zaviye) would distribute food and mosques would include residential space for dervishes.” Later on, the imarets would be built solely for the purposes of preparing and distributing food; the first example is the imaret in Orhan Gazi’s mosque complex in Bursa, which was built in 1339. For the next hundred years, the nascent Ottoman polity continued to endow various buildings and imarets, and as Singer notes, by the mid-sixteenth century, there were no fewer than eighty imarets in the Ottoman lands—not counting many more that were still under construction at that time. As social welfare institutions, the imarets played an immensely important in most of the major towns, but especially in the major cities. Istanbul had at least thirty imarets, Bursa twenty-one, and Edirne eleven. Iznik, Amasya, Diyarbakır, and Manisa each had more than three imarets (even though it is hard to tell whether they were all fully functional throughout the centuries). It would seem, then, that the imaret of Yakub II was an important institution. There is some debate on how best to define the buildings usually referred to as “Yakub Çelebi medresesi or imaretı”

28 Nina Ergin, Christoph Neumann, and Amy Singer, eds., Imarets in the Ottoman Empire, Feeding People, Feeding Power (Istanbul: Eren,2007). See the introduction, p.14. Even though the imarets were recognized as important institutions, and although there was some scholarly research on the imarets, this research was either limited in scope or confined to the paradigms of a single discipline, mostly architecture. Amy Singer is one of the first scholars to study systematically various aspects of the history of the imarets; see Amy Singer, Constructing Ottoman Beneficence (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002). Amy Singer, "Evliya Çelebi on Imarets," in Mamluks and Ottomans: Studies in Honor of Michael Winter, ed. Ami Ayalon and David Wassertein (London: Routledge/Taylor and Francis, 2006); Amy Singer, "Mapping Imarets," in Imarets in the Ottoman Empire, Feeding People, Feeding Power ed. Nina Ergin, Christoph Neumann, and Amy Singer (Istanbul: Eren, 2007); Amy Singer, Charity in Islamic Societies (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). For an introduction to previous and current scholarship see. Probably because so little research has been done on imarets, there is still some reluctance on the part of the historians to treat the imarets as a topic in its own right. It is usually discussed as a part of the larger public complex; see, for instance, the references in Kate Fleet, ed. The Cambridge History of Turkey, Byzantium to Turkey 1071-1453, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2009).

29 Heath Lowry, "Random Musings on the Origins of Ottoman Charity: From Mekece to Bursa, Iznik and Beyond," in Imarets in the Ottoman Empire, Feeding People, Feeding Power ed. Nina Ergin, Christoph Neumann, and Amy Singer (Istanbul: Eren, 2007). p.69, see also the list of the early imarets.


31 Singer, Constructing Ottoman Beneficence. p.152-153
but leaving the architectural debates aside and taking the deed of trust and the functionality of the building into consideration, it is most likely that it was built as an imaret, and even though recent scholarship does not refer to the imaret of Yakub Çelebi explicitly, this was also probably one of the earliest examples of complex of public buildings.32

FROM GERMIYAN TO OTTOMAN RULE

The Germiyan family, perhaps even before the Ottomans, had started to lay the foundations of a more institutionalized state structure,33 and as soon as central and western Anatolia started to achieve relative stability and peace after the interregnum, Yakub II took the steps necessary to retain his own network, albeit under Ottoman suzerainty. The Germiys and the Ottomans were drawing on a similar pool of political, cultural, and architectural traditions. In fact, the architectural origins of the imaret of Yakub II, and the debate on whether the building can be defined as an imaret only or as part of a complex, can be situated in the context of these traditions. As Ergin, Neumann, and Singer observe, “the origins of Ottoman imaret buildings lie not in a building devoted to the specific purpose of food preparation and distribution, but in a different type of architecture: the kitchens of Seljuk caravanserais. As places of hospitality for travelers, caravanserais provided not only stables and fodder for animals, but also kitchens where food was prepared for guests and distributed to them free of charge for the first three days of their stay. The Ottomans continued many Seljuk traditions, including the tradition of hospitality extended to travelers.” Furthermore, Kütahya, as well as Eskişehir and Afyon were placed on the important north-south route, and the construction of an imaret was vital to provide in order to provide logistical support to traders and pilgrims or military expeditions. As for the east-west route, Ankara was the only relay station in central Anatolia before Sivas. The fact that central Anatolia had relatively few imarets made Kütahya and Afyon even more important centers for trade, settlement, and logistical stations for military campaigns.35

As Singer points out, “hundreds of sufi residences, variously called zaviye, ribâ or kâhâgâh were [also] scattered across pre-Ottoman Anatolia, the early Ottoman Balkans, and throughout the Muslim world, another type of institution that included kitchen. The kitchens cooked food for the dervishes and also fed travelers, needy people, and those who came to pray at the tombs of the shayks or participated in sufi rituals. Some also functioned as residences for poor or elderly people, with an endowment to hire a cook and a doctor when needed.” The feeding of the poor or providing food to the populace in general, was a central creed of the Mevlevî and the Bektaşi orders - so much so that “food imagery and metaphor were ubiquitous

32 See the relevant entries in Uzunçarşılı, Bizans Ve Selçukiyerle Germiyan Ve Osman Oğulları Zamanında Kütahya Şehri. who identifies it as a medrese, pp.79-75, Altun, "Kütahya’nın Türk Devri Mimarisi, "Bir Deneme"." pp.288-304 is one of the first scholars to argue systematically from an architectural history that this is building is essentially an imaret, and that a complex of other buildings was later on formed around it, pp. 288-304; and Uysal, Germiyanoğlu Beyliğinin Mimari Eserleri. who also argues that it is definitely an imaret, p.300
33 Whether this process is best seen as Islamization, Turkification, or Ottomanization, or whether it should be defined in political and sociological terms is an important question, one that calls for further research. The classical viewpoint is best expressed in Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorlukunda Bir İskan Ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Vakıflar Ve Temlikler: 1. İstila Devirlerinin Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri Ve Zaviyeler," Vakıflar Dergisi 2(1942).
34 Ergin, Neumann, and Singer, "Introduction."p.25
35 See the maps in Singer, "Mapping Imarets."
36 Singer, Constructing Ottoman Beneficence. p.151
in the texts of Mevlânâ Celâleddin Rumî, where a tension between eating and fasting kept food a prominent concern among his followers.”

The Germiyans’ connection to the Mevlevi tarikat, their geopolitical location, and their Seljuk vassalage, make it highly likely that the imaret of Yakub II can be seen as an attempt to preserve, and even to strengthen previous political, economic, and cultural ties.

The general economic, social, and cultural characteristics of the period may allow us to situate a specific imaret in its proper context, and hence to make sense of the political motives of its endowers. However, what is important is to understand the precise political intentions of the Germiyan dynasty. Yakub II might well have wanted to consolidate his rule in his territories in the post-1402 political context, but did he intend to assert his sovereignty as before, as a contender for subjugating other principalities to his rule? Or did he simply want to guarantee the continuity of his – now rather less ambitious – dynasty while at the same time accepting Ottoman suzerainty? In other words, was a rivalry for all or nothing? Or was it possible to scale down one’s ambitions and keep a rather low profile, without necessarily running the risk of losing it all? In the context of the early-modern world, the former route was much more traveled than the latter; dynasties did disappear, but not necessarily without trying different survival strategies. The question, then, is How was this possible? To answer this question, it is important to bear in mind that the imarets were first and foremost vakf (pious endowment) institutions. They benefited from vakf revenues, and thus formed part of a larger political, social, legal, and institutional structure.

To establish a vakf was an act of piety and charity as well as a legal act whereby a person made part of his or her property unalienable, and endowed its revenues for a specific purpose to benefit designated persons, or public services. However, this rather formal definition does not do justice to the many functions of this institution, or to the management strategies employed by subsequent generations of vakf claimants and users. Almost every landscape in the Ottoman Empire, urban or rural, agricultural or commercial, or public or private, was crisscrossed by the economic, legal, and social practices related to the vakf.

There were many motives for establishing a vakf. According to Singer, these motives included “urban and rural development; imperial legitimation; the desire for personal prominence; avoiding restrictions on the division of inheritance; the protection of wealth from imperial confiscation; the promotion of community or sectarian interests; and the preservation of social hierarchies and cultural norms.” Vakfs were also instrumental crucial in consolidating political power in frontier regions and at a time and place when the Muslims were hardly the overwhelming majority. As Singer points out, “the imaret intruded and merged with the organization of property, patronage, and power at the local level. Because it was a waqf, dependent for its income on endowed properties, the imaret also altered economic relationships. The ties of large waqfs to the countryside through their landownership were not superficial; they refashioned the identities of villagers both proximate and remote, aligning them with the purpose of waqf through their regular payments in kind or cash, as well as the supply of other goods for

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37 Ibid.
38 The literature on the vakfs is extensive, which attests to the multifaceted character of this institution, see for instance, multi-authored and rather lengthy article, in Encyclopedia of Islam, 2ed.
39 Singer, Charity in Islamic Societies p.104
purchase … [They were] wholly embedded in the political, social, economic, and cultural fabric in which they existed."

Ömer Lütfi Barkan, one of the pioneer historians of the early Republican period, was among the first to draw attention to the social and economic powers of the vakfs and the extent to which they were instrumental for the consolidation of the Ottoman state. A close look at the vakfs of Murad II, Mehmed II, and Bayezid II in Istanbul, Edirne and Ergene shows the extent to which those vakfs had control over a variety of resources and could alter the economic, political, social, and cultural landscape of the regions in which they were established. According to the land and tax registers dating from 1530 to 1540 in the province of Anatolia, 17 percent of the annual revenue went to the vakfs. This 80 million akçe funded 45 imarets, 342 mosques, 110 medreses, 642 dervish lodges, and some 75 caravanserais including the salaries of thousands of people who worked in or for these various institutions. More importantly, in the Hüdavendigar province (comprising the previous capital and the commercially crucial city Bursa), there were 1,966 villages, of which 477 belonged to the vakfs. In the Kütahya region there were 1,071 villages listed in the registers, and of these 166 belonged to the vakfs. The vakfs in Istanbul and Edirne were especially enormous in terms of their scope and resources. Compared to such imperial vakf institutions, the imaret of Yakub II looks pretty insignificant, but an imaret complex such the one established by Mehmed II represents perhaps the most developed form of the institution in all its aspects. What is significant, then, about this comparison is not so much the discrepancy of scope as the similarity of function between the two kinds of vakf.

Our information about the imaret of Yakub II, its foundation, its purposes, and its revenue comes principally from two sources. The first is the deed of trust, in which the founder states the terms and conditions of his endowment. In most cases, this was the legal act whereby the founder established his or her endowment and had it registered in court. The written deed of trust for the imaret of Yakub II has been lost, but a copy exists in a court register. Yakub II.

Our other source on the imaret of Yakub II is the land register from the sixteenth century. A juxtaposed reading of the inscription with the land register tells more about the scope of the

40 Singer, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence*. p.164
41 See especially, Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Şehirlerin Teşekkül Ve İnkişafı Tarihi Bakımından Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İmâret Sitelerinin Kuruluş Ve İşleyiş Tarzına Aİt Araştırmalar," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 23, no. 1-2 (1963); Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Fatih Camii Ve İmâreti Tesislerinin 1489-1490 Yıllarına Ait Muhasebe Bilançoları," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 23, no. 1-2 (1963). Influenced by the Annales School, Barkan’s works are still very important in many respects. His empirical studies and his analytical approach to social and economic history are still relevant if one wishes to understand the foundations of the Ottoman Empire, or engage in comparative research. However, it is also important to note his state-centrism. Barkan is very much a product of his time. He privileges the state in order to show that the Ottoman polity was almost unique and therefore could not be grasped in universalist terms. His bias underlies his approach to the role of the imarets, and his interpretation of their function almost in terms of the modern social welfare state. For a critique of his approach, see Halil Berktay, "The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography," in *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, ed. Halil Berktay and Suraiya Faroqhi (London: Frank Caas, 1992). See especially the section; “The State as God in Turkish Nationalist Historiography”, pp: 149-156
42 Barkan, "Şehirlerin Teşekkül Ve İnkişafı Tarihi Bakımından Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İmâret Sitelerinin Kuruluş Ve İşleyiş Tarzına Aİt Araştırmalar." p.242
43 Moreover, Yakub II had another copy of this deed of trust inscribed on a big block of stone in 1414. Uzunçarşılı published the deed in his book, Uzunçarşılı, *Bizans Ve Selçukiylerle Germiyan Ve Osman Oğulları Zamanında Kütahya Şehri*. p. 79-81, Mustafa Çetin Varlık found a copy of the deed in Afyon court registers, and published it along with the inscription, Varlık, *Germiyan-Oğulları Tarihi* (1300-1429). p. 147-149, see also Ara Altun, p.295-297
properties and about the various ways in which they were used. In the deed of trust, it says that the imaret was founded in 1411-12, and but that it had to close down five months later, when the Karamanlis invaded the Germiyan lands. It remained closed for two and a half years, and reopened only after Mehmed Çelebi returned to Anatolia in order to consolidate his power as the legitimate Ottoman sultan. We can infer from the deed of trust that the suzerainty over the Germiyan lands now belonged to the Ottomans. Even though Yakub II states that he inherited some of his lands and property from his grandfather or his father’s relatives (including Simav and some villages and agricultural lands in Sanduklu); and that he bought many others (including Aslanapa and Ilıcasu) it is stated explicitly and with reference to most of these properties that it is Mehmed Çelebi (or Hüdavendigâr, as he is referred to in the inscription) who either gave the title of ownership to Yakub II or gave his approval for turning these properties into an endowment. The deed, then, appoints the managers and states the proposed functions of the imaret. It appears that like many other imarets, or multifunctional endowments, this imaret was intended to function in a variety of ways; these including providing food and health care for travelers, and funeral services for the travelers, if they happened to die there.

The significance of the land register of the sixteenth century is that it lists the properties and revenues of the imaret that are included in the deed of trust of 1414, but it also gives information on properties and revenues that were added to the endowment later. During the reigns of Bayezid I, Mehmed I and Murad II, property transactions were continuous between the Ottomans and the Germiyans. These property transactions ranged from the purchase of land to gift giving in the form of dowry, or as an act of recognition of dynastic claims. I have already pointed out that as part of the marriage dowry of Devlet Hatun, Süleyman Şah had given lands to the Ottomans. It is interesting to note in the land register that some of these lands returned to the Germiyans and became part of the endowment. For instance, on at least three different occasions, the revenues that were designated as has\(^4\) either of the sultan (even though they amounted to no more than 2,000 akçe), or of Timurtaş Paşa, the governor of the province, were returned to Yakub II as part of the endowment. In other cases, different lands or revenues, such as hamams or değirmens (mills) are bought by Yakub II and then, endowed. It is not certain that the register lists all the endowed revenues, but the revenues that it does list total approximately 55,000 akçe. This was a considerable amount; it equaled the annual salary of a high-ranking military officer in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

In a context where the Ottomans were reasserting and consolidating their power—and this time more firmly than before, after overcoming a period of turmoil—it is possible that Yakub II, having himself gone through this period of quickly shifting alliances and uncertainty, might have thought that his chances for coming out on top were rather slim. Already related to the Ottomans by marriage, and having established themselves in the region, the Germiyans would have been wiser to give up their claims of suzerainty over their rivals and opt for a less ambitious strategy in order to survive. By establishing the imaret, Yakub II was able to regain

\(^4\) The land register lists some of the lands as has, which means that they belonged to the princes, or the sultans, or were given as revenue to the governors of the provinces. The revenues of different sources considered as fiefs were more or less standardized by the sixteenth century, and were categorized as follows: timar revenues were less than 20,000 akçe, zemmet revenues were between 20,000 and 100,000 akçe, and has revenues were more than 100,000 akçe per year. These revenues were derived from a number of different sources, so what is listed in the evkâf register as has does not necessarily mean the whole source of revenue, but some of the sources that made up a has.
some of the lands that had been lost to the Ottomans, protect part of those same lands from confiscation, and guarantee that the patronage ties he thereby established would last, and with them the name of his dynasty. As the deed of trust makes clear, the endowment did not directly benefit his family, nor did it enable him to devise a strategy of inheritance in order to circumvent the stipulations of the Islamic law. The endowment, then, can hardly be seen as part of a strategy of property devolution, but it can be argued that it was part of a plan designated to consolidate the Germiyans’ power.

What made Kütahya one of the prime examples of a frontier town was that Seljuks, Ilkhans, and the Byzantine Empire all had left their marks on it and that the Germiyans were the heirs of these traditions, institutions, and practices. This helped them to devise strategies of survival in a context of political and military instability. But the region around Kütahya also provided them with economic opportunities that likewise enabled them to survive. There are almost no reliable data on the economic history of the twelfth to fifteenth centuries. Nevertheless, it is possible to make at least some inferences based on the travelers’ accounts, the deeds of trust, later registers that refer back to the fourteenth century, and the scant archival data on trade in European archives. From taxing foreign trade to plundering urban as well as rural areas, and trading slaves, there was an array of sources that new principalities could use in order to accumulate wealth. Just how feasible and sustainable they were was another question—and this was the real problem. It was this specific context of conquest and fragmentation that made possible all these different ways to get rich quickly. With the foundation and subsequent institutionalization of the Ottoman state, this context would change radically, and the political economy of fragmentation would give place to another political economy, one in which the internal order of the economy itself would be as important as the prosperity born of conquest. Nevertheless, it also seems that the most of the Anatolian peninsula, at the time of the principalities, was already relatively prosperous in spite of fragmentation, and that it already possessed a network of economic and social institutions. This is, at least, the impression we get from Ibn Battuta when he says, “This country called Bilad al-Rum [Anatolia] is one of the finest regions in the world, in it God has brought together the good things dispersed through other lands. Its inhabitants are the comeliest of men in form, the cleanest in dress, the most delicious in food, and the kindliest of God’s creatures.” As for more specific references to the Kütahya region, two of Ibn Battuta’s observations are important – those on the ahi organizations, and those on the textile production of the region.

When Ibn Battuta was in Denizli, a town just southwest of Kütahya, he described it as one of the most prosperous towns he had visited so far in Anatolia, with “seven mosques for the observance of Friday prayers, and with splendid gardens, perennial streams, and gushing springs.” And even though they might have been vassals of the Germiyan dynasty, he also

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portrayed the İnançoğlu, who ruled over Denizli as a minor principality in the first half of the fourteenth century, as independent rulers. What impressed Ibn Battuta most, however, in Denizli was the generosity of the ahi organizations (and their enthusiasm with which they competed to host him). Ibn Battuta lodged with, had contact with, or noted on at least in twenty-five other occasions the existence of these organizations in and around Anatolia. I have already pointed out that the network of ahi organizations played an important role not only in developing the urban centers, but also in connecting those centers to the countryside. I have also noted that the Germiyans dynasty must have gained control of Denizli right after Ibn Battuta left the region. So it is plausible to suppose that these organizations were among the economic and political resources that the Germiyan could use or mobilize. However, it is not entirely clear to what the extent these organizations were the institutional precursors of the guild institutions, which became the cornerstones of the Ottoman economy. There are no extant archival sources that might provide a reliable link between the ahi organizations and the artisans, especially for the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. It seems probable that the ahi organizations included the artisans, and that some of the organizational features and principles of these associations were transferred to the guild organizations, but despite the impression we get from Ibn Battuta, his brief accounts should be taken with a grain of salt, and the existence of the ahi organizations not be linked directly with the guilds.

Ibn Battuta is more explicit about the production of textiles. After praising the city for its beauty, he goes on to say that “its bazaars are very fine, and in them are manufactured cotton fabrics edged with gold embroidery, unequalled in their kind, and long-lived on account of the excellence of their cotton and the strength of their spun thread. These fabrics are known from the name of the city. Most of the artisans there are Greek women, for in it there are many Greeks who are subject to the Muslims and who pay dues to the sultan, including jizya, and other taxes.” Unfortunately, he provides no information on the dimensions of this textile production: how it was organized, where and by whom it was marketed, whether it was intended only for local or regional consumption, or whether it was sold overseas? Suraiya Faroqhi gives some clues concerning textile production two hundred years later, suggesting that “the Orthodox women who embroidered liturgical fabrics also worked for entrepreneurs, some of whom

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48 Battuta, Travels of Ibn Battuta A.D 1325-1354; Translated with Revisions and Notes from the Arabic Text Edited by C.Defremery and B.R.Sanguinetti, by H.A.R Gibb. p.426
50 As Suraiya Faroqhi notes, Ibn Battuta did not speak Turkish, and there is no way to “guarantee that he did not overlook or misunderstand some of the phenomena that he saw, especially forms of organization he had not known in his native Morocco.” Furthermore, even though “in all likelihood the rank and file of these urban brotherhoods were craftsmen, Ibn was more interested in princes and men of religion than people of relatively low status.” Suraiya Farkghi, Artisans of Empire Crafts and Craftsperson under the Ottomans (London New York: I.B Tauris, 2009). p.28. See also Gabriel Baer, “Ottoman Guilds: A Reassessment,” in Türkiye’nin Sosyal Ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071-1920), Birinci Uluslararası Türkiye’nin Sosyal Ve Ekonomik Tarihi Kongresi Tebliğleri, ed. Halil İnalcık, et al. (Ankara: Meteksan, 1980). Ozer Ergene, "Osmanlı Şehrinde Esnaf Örgütlerinin Fizik Yapıya Etkileri," in Türkiye’nin Sosyal Ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071-1920), Birinci Uluslararası Türkiye’nin Sosyal Ve Ekonomik Tarihi Kongresi Tebliğleri, ed. Halil İnalcık, et al. (Ankara: Meteksan, 1980).
51 Battuta, Travels of Ibn Battuta A.D 1325-1354; Translated with Revisions and Notes from the Arabic Text Edited by C.Defremery and B.R.Sanguinetti, by H.A.R Gibb. p.425
probably were female as well.”\(^{52}\) It is therefore plausible to argue that textile production was intended for more than just local, or even regional, use, but that textile workers were not members of the guilds. That the Germiyans, early in their rule, used the cizye to fund their institutions indicates that they had already established institutionalized forms of surplus extraction and revenue collection, which constituted gave them a reason, or even encourage, the production of textiles.

The political context in Anatolia was unstable for over a century, but this did not bring trade relations between the eastern and western Mediterranean to a halt. Venetian and Genoese merchants continued to dominate the trade, and the sea routes in the Mediterranean. When, in the first decades of the fourteenth century, Ibn Battuta took a ship from the coast of Palestine to the southern shores of Anatolia, it was not surprising that this was a Genoese vessel.\(^{53}\) Anatolia, an agriculturally rich region provided Europe with a wide array of produce, including cotton, rice, and fruit. But grain, the agricultural product that was essential to early-modern societies, was the main commodity for export. As Kate Fleet notes, “grain was vital for the Latin trading colonies in the eastern Mediterranean and even on occasion for the mother cities of Genoa and Venice. The importance of this commodity is highlighted by Marcha di Marco Battagli da Rimini who in his chronicle of the years 1212-1354 regarded it as a cause of the western crusade against Aydin in 1334. The beyliks of Menteşe and Aydin were active in trading grain with the European merchants … the Ottomans traded it from the early days of their state’s existence, and the Venetians were buying grain from Orhan in 1333. The Ottomans also sold to the Genoese.”\(^{54}\) It is likely, then, that grain was the major agricultural commodity in central Anatolia but the records do not say that grain was produced in high quantities by the Germiyans or in the Kütahya region specifically, nor do they mention the quality of the grain produced in that area.\(^{55}\) Mineral resources, such as iron and copper, were also among the commodities of trade, but during the period of the principalities the most important resource for this region was alum.

During the Middle Ages and for good part of the early-modern period, alum was so essential to the production of textiles that “without alum, the textile industry would stop spinning.”\(^{56}\) In almost every part of the Europe where textiles were produced, from the Netherlands and England to the Italian city-states, alum was extensively used to fix dyes. Even though there were alum mines in Europe, it was of low quality, and the production was far from meeting the demands of the textile industry. The exploitation of, and the trade in alum was therefore a lucrative business, especially if it was discovered in large quantities and controlled through monopolies. The merchants sought sources of alum throughout most of the eastern Mediterranean, but the most productive mines with the better quality alum were in Anatolia. The Phokaea mines, on the Aegean coast, were the most profitable, since its location greatly reduced the cost of transportation; but there were also alum mines around Kütahya - more precisely in Gediz which became a major center for the exploitation and exportation of alum. There were

\(^{52}\) Faroqhi, Artisans of Empire Crafts and Craftpeople under the Ottomans. p.41
\(^{53}\) Battuta, Travels of Ibn Battuta A.D 1325-1354; Translated with Revisions and Notes from the Arabic Text Edited by C.Defremery and B.R.Sanguinetti, by H.A.R Gibb. p. 415
\(^{54}\) Fleet, “The Turkish Economy 1300 - 1453.” p.240
\(^{55}\) Kate Fleet, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State, the Merchants of Genoa and Turkey, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). pp: 80-94
\(^{56}\) For a detailed account of the alum production and trade in early-modern Europe, see: Jean Delumeau, L'alun De Rome Xve-Xixe Siecle (Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1962). p. 13
mines were around Bursa and Gallipoli as well. The available estimates of production from the first half of the fourteenth century indicate that the Kütahya-Gediz mines were producing as much as the Phokaea mines.\textsuperscript{57} Alum production, trade, and tax-farming privileges were almost entirely in Genoese hands, and most of the influential members of the Genoese merchant community were deeply involved in the alum trade from at least 1395 to 1455.\textsuperscript{58} However, Genoese monopoly did not necessarily mean that there was no competition; at least two companies competed for the alum trade, which seems to have led to a decrease in prices. The beginning of the fifteenth century was characterized by a certain specialization between the companies that exploited the mines and those involved with the trade, each of which created an extensive network of commercial ties, including the financiers and the middlemen. Unfortunately, we have no information on how alum was mined, how many workers were needed, who they were, or what their working conditions were like.\textsuperscript{59} And even though we have some data on the alum trade for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we have no comparative or precise data either on how much alum was exploited, or on how it was transported and shipped from the Kütahya region, and who exactly the middlemen were. What is certain is that the Genoese managed to control the alum trade. At the end of the fourteenth century, Genoese Giovanni Demorede appears to have had the monopoly over the alum production.\textsuperscript{60} In or around 1449, Francesco Draperio, another Genoese merchant (who was also a diplomat, a politician, and occasionally a captain), also gained the upper hand in the competition, formed a company, and had quasi monopoly over the alum trade.\textsuperscript{61} He was also involved in the Byzantine–Ottoman rivalry, and sided with the Ottomans (which earned him the title of “traitor of Constantinople” after the fall of Constantinople). Alum production, especially in Phokaea, appears to have increased during this period, with prices remaining stable at a profitable level. However, even though Draperio continued his monopoly after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, this state of affairs did not last long, and Anatolian alum gradually disappeared from the European market after 1458.

It is not exactly clear why this happened. It was probably due to a combination of political and economic factors, as well a decline in the production of alum. It seems plausible to assume that the Ottomans imposed a monopoly on alum, or that their constant advance toward Europe disrupted economic and commercial relations between the Italian city-states and the Byzantine Empire, or the principalities in Anatolia. It has indeed been suggested that when Ottomans started to exert control over the Germiyan principality and western Anatolia in the late fourteenth century, this “annexation” increased prices and had a disruptive effect on trade in general.\textsuperscript{62} The Genoese and the Venetians complained that under the rule of Murad II, the alum

\textsuperscript{57} For the figures see, ibid. p.16, see also Fleet, \textit{European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State, the Merchants of Genoa and Turkey}. p.86
\textsuperscript{58} One of the first studies on this subject is, Marie-Louise Heers, "Les Genois Et Le Commerce De L'alun a La Fin Du Moyen Age," \textit{Revue d'Histoire Économique et Sociale} 32, no. 1 (1954). For the list of the individuals, p. 33
\textsuperscript{59} The same is true for the history of alum in Europe, Delumeau’s study is a rich source of data on production, trade, and the transportation of alum, but it contains few detailed descriptions of workers and working conditions. Delumeau, \textit{L'alun De Rome Xve-Xixe Siecle}. see. pp. 59-82
\textsuperscript{60} Halil İnalcık, \textit{Türkiye Tekstil Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar} (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008). p.129
\textsuperscript{61} Heers, "Les Genois Et Le Commerce De L'alun a La Fin Du Moyen Age," pp.37-43
\textsuperscript{62} Fleet, \textit{European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State, the Merchants of Genoa and Turkey}. For an account of these views (of Elizabeth Zachariadou and Michel Balard) see, pp.92-92
trade was becoming more difficult. However, trade relations and tax-farming practices do not seem to have come to a complete halt. As Fleet notes, “the Ottomans pursued a more hard-edged trade policy than that of the weaker beyliks, using their increasing political strength as a base from which to exercise greater economic dominance. Ottoman rulers were prepared to use Genoese, thus benefitting from a guaranteed income without much effort. The Ottomans, as well as exerting control, were also prepared to give concessions in order to foster trade.”\(^{63}\) The fall of Constantinople must have put a further strain to trade, but this does not seem to have changed commercial relations drastically either, since the Venetians were able to obtain the tax-farming privileges of the Phokaea mines as late as 1461. Nevertheless, by 1461 the alum production in general was already too insufficient to meet the European demand, or even to replace a substantial part of the alum stock. Faroqhi argues that “this result was brought about by two major factors working in the same direction. The Ottoman conquest of Istanbul and of the alum mines in western Asia Minor disrupted the Genoese import of this vital mineral. This happened even though export was never prohibited by the Ottoman authorities, as was the case with many foodstuffs and raw materials considered strategic, such as grain, leather, cotton, or copper.”\(^{64}\) It also appears that the alum mines continued to be granted as tax-farms. İnalçık points out that in a tax-farm (mukataa) register from 1547, the tax-farmers of the Gediz mines were the Venetians for 1.320.000 akçe. The register also indicates that the tax-farm was for a period of three years and the production was around 75 tons.\(^{65}\) Considering the fact that at around the same time the revenue of the governor of the province of Anatolia was 1.000.000, this was a considerable sum. More importantly, the fact that the tax-farmers were the Venetians also shows that there was no significant local competition from the region for the tax-farming privileges. It could also be argued that textile and leather production in the region was not important enough to require the consumption of alum locally.

Another turning in the history of alum production, and hence in trade relations between the Genoese, the Venetians and the Ottomans was the discovery of alum mines in Tolfa, near Rome, not long after a crisis in production arose the second of half the fifteenth century. The discovery of these mines was such great news for Europe, and especially the Papacy, that it would more than compensate for the decline of the alum trade in the eastern Mediterranean.\(^{66}\) From the sixteenth century to the second half of the eighteenth century, the Tolfa mines would be a strategic tool for the Papacy as it sought to impose monopoly over alum production and trade. Even though this attempt was never fully successful, the production of the Tolfa mines constituted the largest share of the market. As for Asia Minor - especially the alum mines in Gediz - the sixteenth-century tax-registers indicate that production was not significant, and the overall revenues from alum production were falling drastically. There are no specific figures on alum production in Gediz alone, but total production, with the other mines from Gümülcine (Komotini), Greece, seems to have been around 400 tons a year, which is rather modest compared to the 1,830 tons produced by the Tolfa mines during that same period.\(^{67}\) During times of economic fluctuation, there appears to have been contraband alum trade from the Anatolian

\(^{63}\) Ibid.94  
\(^{64}\) Suraiya Faroqhi, "Alum Production and Alum Trade in the Ottoman Empire (About 1560 - 1830)," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 71(1979). p.153  
\(^{65}\) İnalcık, *Türkiye Tekstil Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar*. p.130  
\(^{66}\) The discovery of the mines created such enthusiasm that it was seen as finally providing the Papacy enough resources to finance yet another Crusade, Delumeau, *L'alun De Rome Xve-Xixe Siecle*.p.21  
\(^{67}\) Faroqhi, "Alum Production and Alum Trade in the Ottoman Empire (About 1560 - 1830)." p.164
mines to Europe, but only in negligible quantities. On the other hand, “smuggling [within the Ottoman Empire], at least in the second half of the 18th century was so common that it can almost be considered as part of the system”, - another fact that makes it impossible to establish reliable figures on the production and the trade.

However, as Faroqhi suggests “the wider relevance of alum production and the alum trade does not lie in the topic as taken in isolation, but it is due to the fact that this branch of production can be used as a guide to the more basic sectors of textile and leather. These in turn should be studied because they form a large part of pre-industrial production outside of agriculture, and also because weaving and leathermaking allow us to approach the difficult topic of urban-rural relations.” The alum mines can also be situated within the changing financial and fiscal policies of the Ottoman polity, because they were given as appanages to the princesses, and as such, were essential to the tax-farming policies. More precisely for the alum mines, the tax-farming privileges of the Gediz mines were given to Şah Sultan, daughter of Mustafa III, at the end of the eighteenth century, for period of at least thirty years. The significant point here is the extent to which political and economic privileges were interrelated. Tax-farming came with certain regulations that gave the tax-farmers quasi (sometimes complete) monopoly over the production and marketing of a given commodity. For instance, the tax-farming privileges of the Gediz alum mines meant that important textile centers such as Ankara and Kayseri had to buy their alum exclusively from the Gediz mines.

However, this apparent prosperity did not guarantee the Germiyans military and political supremacy. Even at the height of their power, they were not strong enough to resist the pressure from two different fronts, and they were perhaps too landlocked in between the Ottomans and the Karamans. These two strong principalities were major obstacles to their expansion either toward the northwest or toward the southeast. Most historians hold that the Germiyan principality ended in 1381, when Süleyman Şah, seeking an alliance with the Ottomans against her southern rival Karamans, married her daughter to Bayezid I, the son of Murad I, and most of the lands of the Germiyan principality, including the capital, Kütahya, came under Ottoman control. However, even though the Ottoman historians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries give long accounts of the marriage, it is hard to establish with certainty that the lands were given to Murad I, or for that matter, to Bayezid, as part of the dowry or as the wedding present. Colin Imber, for one, argues that “in fact, the Germiyanid marriage and the annexation of Hamid probably followed a military campaign. A chronology of 1439-40 tells us that in 1375-76 ‘The Germiyanid and Tatar armies were routed, and Kütahya, some of the fortresses and the land of Hamid were conquered.’” Furthermore, and more importantly, as Elizabeth Zachariadou notes most of the later Ottoman historians writing on the marriage remain silent “upon the most important aspect of this marriage: that the region of Kütahya, where important mines of alum were found, was offered in dowry to the Ottomans, who could thus control the alum trade.” One thing is certain: that having control of the Germiyan lands (as well as Hamid, farther to the south) made the Ottomans

68 Delumeau, L’alun De Rome Xve-Xixe Siecle.p.51
69 Faroqhi, “Alum Production and Alum Trade in the Ottoman Empire (About 1560 - 1830).” See, esp. pp: 165-167
70 Ibid. p.171
71 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650, the Structure of Power (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). p.11
72 Zachariadou, "From Avlona to Antalya: Reviewing the Ottoman Military Operations of the 1380s." p.230
feel secure in their westward expansion and also gave them access to a very important trade route that connected Bursa to southern Anatolia, to the Mediterranean, and to the Black Sea.
CHAPTER 3
A NEW POLITY: KÜTAHYA FROM THE FIFTEENTH TO THE LATE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

CONSOLIDATION OF OTTOMAN POWER

When, a century after Ibn Battuta, another voyager passed through the same part of Anatolia, the environment in which he found himself had changed to a considerable extent—especially insofar as the administrative structure was concerned. As an envoy (or a spy) of the Duke of Burgundy, Bertrandon de la Broquiere traveled to the Holy Land, and to Constantinople, between 1432 and 1433, and he wrote an account of this voyage, which may provide an interesting comparative perspective to that of Ibn Battuta. The differences between their accounts can be attributed to the fact that de la Broquiere was an outsider, while Ibn Battuta felt much more at home in most of the lands he traveled; but they were both keen observers and avid writers. Nevertheless, if one of de la Broquiere’s missions was to gather information to prepare for another crusade by the Duke of Burgundy, it is natural that he should have paid particular attention to the military, political and administrative aspects of the lands he was traveling in. Like Ibn Battuta, de la Broquiere begun his journey in Anatolia from the south, but his trajectory, cutting across the Anatolian peninsula from the south to the northwest to Constantinople, passes through Konya and Kütahya to reach Bursa. Along the way, de la Broquiere hints at the existence of thieves and bandits but he does not describe an intense competition among the more or less equal principalities. Especially after he leaves Konya and the land of the Karamans behind, the impression we get from de la Broquiere’s account is that the Ottoman suzerainty was firmly established in the lands from Konya to Bursa. Furthermore, even though he depicts the Karamans and the Ottomans as competing for supremacy, once he enters Kütahya, he does not so much as mention the existence of a powerful local prince or notable. The name Germiyan does not appear in his records; not even with reference to the past. The transition from Germiyan rule to the Ottoman rule seems already to have taken place.

In de la Broquiere’s account, the consolidation of the Ottoman power is unmistakable: “Kütahya is a nice city, without walls of any kind, but there is fine large castle. It is really three fortresses one above the other, going up the mountain. It is well protected with double walls. The eldest son of the Grand Turk was there. I saw his people coming out to meet a woman who was coming from Mecca with the same caravan I had been with. She was the wife of a lord called Camussat [Hamza] Pasha, who is the most powerful governor of the Grand Turk, and who played a role in bringing him to power.”¹ Another interesting point about de la Broquiere’s account is the terminology he uses to define the political landscape. Compared to Ibn Battuta, who mentions principalities, religious orders, and specific institutions, de la Broquiere differentiates much more markedly between the political and the ethnic spheres in what was by then a more centralized geographical area. First, he says that once he leaves Syria, he enters the

land of the Turcomans (which he also refers to as Armenia). Later on he introduces another distinction between the Turcomans and the Turks. He does not define this distinction clearly, but some of his descriptions make clear he is using the term Turcoman to refer mostly to the nomadic groups, and the term Turk to refer to the settled principalities with some form of legal and administrative structure. After noting the ethnic, religious, and linguistic composition of south and central Anatolia (an area populated by Arabs, Turks, Turcomans, Greeks, and Armenians) de la Broquiere also very clearly delineates political boundaries that separate the Ottomans, which he calls the Grand Turk, from their immediate neighbors, the Karamans. He describes the area between the Mediterranean coast and Kütahya as the land of the Turcomans, (although it is also inhabited by Armenians and Greeks), and he says that the Karaman principality is the main political authority in and around the Konya region. Kütahya seems to be the demarcation line where the sovereignty of the Ottomans starts. “The countryside [after Konya] is rather heavily populated, mostly by Turcomans, for it is a land of swamps and grass. I crossed a small stream which is the dividing line between the lands of Karman [Karaman] and Murad Bey, whom we call the Grand Turk.” It is also significant that after he crosses from Konya to Kütahya, any specific reference to the Turcomans disappears from his narrative, and once he reaches Bursa, Turkmenia (referring to the southern Turkey) becomes Turkey. “The city of Bursa is a very fine commercial center, the best city belonging to the Grand Turk. It is a very large city, situated at the foot of a high mountain called Olympia, to the south … the Lords of Turkey are buried there.” Nevertheless, de la Broquiere’s insightful observations describe the process of a new power configuration, rather than an established fact. What they tell us is that the political map of central and northwestern Anatolia was more centralized and unified than it had been a century ago.

In this context, even though we should take with a grain of salt de la Broquiere’s claim that the eldest son of the Grand Turk was in Kütahya, there were good reasons for Murad II to keep an important part of the ruling strata in or around Kütahya, for the consolidation of the Ottoman central authority in Anatolia would not take place for at least another hundred years. It

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2 Broquiere, The Voyage D’outremer by Bertrandon De La Broquiére. Translated, Edited, and Annotated with an Introduction and Maps by Galen R. Kline. “When I left Syria, I entered the land of Turkmenia, which we call Armenia, whose capital is a great city they call Entequeye, and which we call Antioch”, p.51
3 For a detailed account of this differentiation in de la Broquiere and other historians and travelers, see Reha Bilge, 1514 Yavuz Selim Ve Şah İsmail Türkler, Türkmenler Ve Farslar (Istanbul: Giza Yayıncılık, 2010).
4 For instance, while he was on his way to Adana, de la Broquiere mentions that “the land between the sea and the mountain is very nice. It is inhabited only by those tribes of Turcomans who are beautiful people and who always live in the open. They carry their houses with them. The houses are round like tents and are covered with felt. There are many people, but frugal. They are all archers and have a leader whom they obey, for they are not always in the same place. When they are in the territory of the Sultan, they obey him, and the same for other lords.” Broquiere, The Voyage D’outremer by Bertrandon De La Broquiére. Translated, Edited, and Annotated with an Introduction and Maps by Galen R. Kline. p.56-57
5 Ibid. p.77
6 Ibid. p.83
7 There are not many explicit references to Murad II’s sons, or his eldest son being a governor in Kütahya in 1432-33. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, with reference to de la Broquiere, mentions that şehzade (prince) Alâeddin was in Kütahya in 1432. However, rather confusingly he also refers to Ahmed as being the governor. The eldest son of Murad II, born in 1420, was Ahmed whereas Alâeddin who was born 1430 could not have been a governor. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, "Kütahya’nın Tarihi," in Kütahya - Atatürk'ün Doğumunun 100. Yılına Armağan (İstanbul: 1981). p.44 For a comprehensive list of the Ottoman dynasty, and the princely governorates, see also A. D. Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956).
could even be argued that it was only after the control and pacification of eastern Anatolia that the Ottoman central authority could finally establish a more or less stable administrative and political system in the peninsula, and that the uncertainty of Ottoman rule in the eastern provinces in the fifteenth century necessitated the presence of top level administrators in the regions like Kütahya.

Another major difference between the accounts of Ibn Battuta and de la Broquiere has to do with the administrative structure of the Ottoman realm. Whereas Ibn Battuta observes that the Ottoman ruler, Orhan, was personally involved in the administration of the affairs of his realm, de la Broquiere’s account is one in which the authority of administration is delegated to subordinates by the Grand Turk. As Colin Imber points out, “it was probably during the first years of Bayezid’s reign [1389-1402] that the first two administrative provinces of the Ottoman Empire came into being. To the west of the Dardanelles lay Rumelia (Rumeli), comprising all the lands conquered in Europe. To the east lay Anatolia (Anadolu) comprising all the conquests in Asia Minor. With the eastward expansion of Bayezid’s realms in the 1390s, a third province – the province of Rum – came into existence, with Amasya as its chief town.”

Early administrative partitioning of the lands was arguably a significant factor in the recovery of Ottoman power after the defeat against Timur in Ankara in 1402, and during the decade of interregnum. When de la Broquiere was in Anatolia, and especially in Kütahya, right after the Germiyan principality was incorporated into the Ottoman state, he must have witnessed the first steps of the gradual takeover of the Germiyan principality by the Ottomans. The delegation of authority is evidence of the establishment of a new power configuration, but it was still too early for a new political-legal system of land distribution and revenue allocation to emerge. The major turning point for the establishment of an imperial administrative structure was the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. After the conquest, the Ottomans can be said to have entered a new phase of imperial state formation. From their claims to a universal empire to the formulation of a much better defined administrative hierarchy and the promulgation of new laws, everything signals the emergence of a centralized political authority, and a more ambitious political project. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the Karaman dynasty would be conquered only in 1468. As for the expansion of Ottoman political authority to eastern Anatolia, it would take even longer.

The Battle of Çaldıran in 1514 was the turning point for the fate of eastern Anatolia. It was a decisive victory for the Ottomans, not only over the Safavids, their main rivals to the east, but also over the other Turkish and Kurdish principalities, as well as the nomadic elements that posed a constant challenge to the centralizing aspirations of the emerging Ottoman state. The rivalry between the Ottomans and the Safavids, and the tensions between the central authority and the nomadic tribes, would continue for another fifty years, until the conquest of Van in 1548 finally firmly established the central Ottoman authority in the east. At the same time, the internal dynamics of the succession from the rule of Bayezid II to Selim I, and the consequences of the victory in eastern Anatolia meant more than the continuation of a pattern of imperial

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9 For a detailed account of the importance of the Battle of Çaldıran see Bilge, *1514 Yavuz Selim Ve Şah İsmail Türkler, Türkmenler Ve Farslar*. See also Leslie Peirce, *Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). pp. 251-276
expansion. True, the emerging Ottoman power aspired to further conquests. But the transition from Bayezid II’s reign to that of Selim I was also a struggle for hegemony within the state itself—a struggle between the forces of centralization and the periphery represented by the frontier warlords—especially in Rumelia.\footnote{For a fresh account of the succession process and the internal dynamics of the regime, see Hakkı Erdem Çıpa, "The Centrality of the Periphery, the Rise to Power of Selim I 1487-1512" (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertatation, Harvard, 2007).} In the late fifteenth century, there were only four provinces in the administrative structure of the Ottoman state. By 1609, there were thirty-two. But this consolidation was achieved only after the dust settled following a long period of strife in eastern Anatolia, and internal struggle in the formation of a centralized state.\footnote{Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650, the Structure of Power. p.179 The increase in the number of the administrative units was the result of territorial expansion as much as the increasing complexity of the imperial system.}

**FORMATION OF THE EARLY-MODERN OTTOMAN STATE**

After the military conquest, and the pacification of the forces of opposition, the process of integration was by no means one-dimensional. Historians of the early-modern period argue that the establishment of the Ottoman regime was not about a central government imposing its own control over the conquered lands unilaterally. But rather it was a process of negotiation, and of reconfiguration of the power relations that took place over many years. The incorporation of particular regions into the imperial regime took place in various ways, and existing local power relations determined to a great extent the outcome of the reconfiguration. For Aintab and the surrounding regions, military conquest was the first step, as Leslie Peirce points out:

> In 1540, Aintab, like Erzurum, was undergoing the second phase of incorporation into the Ottoman Empire, a broad shift in rhetoric and practice that we might term an imperializing phase in the domains conquered a generation earlier by Selim I. New cadastral surveys and new provincial law books of the years around 1540 dropped references to the laws of former rulers and spoke instead of Ottoman law and Ottoman administrative control. The transition was over. To local populations, incorporation into the domains ruled over by the Ottoman dynasty – that is, integration into its military, fiscal, and legal systems – was a trade-off. It meant both constraint and protection, both loss of autonomy and gains from the prosperity generated by the “pax Ottomanica.” This was a time of conflict and resistance as well as opportunity and jockeying for a share of the benefits.\footnote{Peirce, Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab. p. 277}

There are major differences between the incorporation of Kütahya and that of Aintab into Ottoman imperial rule. The time span over which incorporation took place, the ethnic and social composition of the region, its location within the network of trade and military routes, and economic and political claims over the realm by different dynasties, and groups—all these differed substantially in the two regions. Nevertheless, the gist of the foregoing explanation holds true for Kütahya as well.

Taking cadastral surveys was the first step in the process of imperialization of the conquered lands. These surveys were essential to establish administrative control and to
redistribute wealth, but Peirce argues that they were important for reasons that went beyond the mere gathering of data. She emphasizes the centrality of the act of writing and documentation in the data-gathering process. In this respect, “inscription was an act of possession … [and even though] inscription archived, and thus immobilized, the subject population [by tying them to their land through a variety of sanctions], it was not only the practical utility of registering resources that, from the government’s point of view, drove the survey process. ‘Inscribing’ a province was a symbolic act that was a necessary corollary of conquest, a ritual that was essential to the assertion of sovereign authority.”15 Surveys and registration, therefore, symbolically represented the absent sultan and his authority. What is more, the cadastral surveys also recorded the particular aspects of each province. Every cadastral survey, even though it imposed some sort of uniformity in terms classifying and registering the local population and its resources, also formed the legal basis for a wide array of past and present privileges. Inscription and recording was an act of sovereignty, but at same time it represented a contract between the central authorities and a variety of agents, by reaffirming the economic, political, social, and cultural hierarchy of the society.

This emphasis on the act of writing, inscribing, and recording also highlights the importance of the kadı courts—first “as a prism for observing macro historical processes, mainly the process of imperialization,” and second, as “a social arena where a wide range of actors interact.”16 The court’s role as the nexus between the sovereign and his subjects shows the extent to which local and imperial concerns, social and moral values, economic and administrative practices were intertwined, and the extent to which the administration of justice was a dynamic process. In this respect, Peirce’s emphasis on the sociolegal dimension of the imperialization process enables her to write a historical narrative that combines micro- and macrohistory.17 The court records provide the ground upon which specific case studies, with their focus on the concrete details of everyday life, can be situated within a broader historical context. This allows the historian to develop a holistic approach by constantly moving between the details of everyday life and that broader context. As Iris Agmon points out in her review of Peirce’s study, “the success of microanalyses depends to a large extent on the insights they provide about the micro and the macro historical domains as a whole. The reduced scale of the analytical unit is, therefore, not necessarily an end in itself. Rather it constitutes a means to the goal of writing ordinary people into the grand historical narratives in order to change these narratives.”18 This holistic approach19 serves to turn our attention to the agency of a variety of social actors who might otherwise go unnoticed. These include the peasantry, urban poor, women, and ethnic or religious minorities. In recent years, the court records have been the major resources that social historians have used to find and give these forgotten groups a voice.

This approach is particularly suitable for provincial studies because it enables scholars to redefine the relationship between the center and the provinces. Most of Peirce’s predecessors, in their pioneering studies of the provinces, had already used both micro- and macrohistory to

14 Ibid. esp. p. 279-285
15 Ibid. p.280
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 I am more inclined to call it approach rather than methodology as the latter denotes a more systematic and rigourous in terms of studying social change.
highlight the agency of the peripheral actors. What makes Peirce’s study more relevant as a framework of interpretation for this chapter is that while most of the provincial studies are about the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and mostly about the Balkan and Arab lands, Peirce concentrates on the sixteenth century and on Anatolia. While the former studies redefine the dynamics of the transformation in terms of decentralization, incorporation into the world economy, or the rise of the local notables, Peirce’s focuses on the process of imperialism of a provincial town, the dynamics of centralization, and the consolidation of a new political regime. However, despite its masterful contextualization of multifaceted power relations and the process of negotiation in the consolidation of an imperial polity, Peirce’s study does not provide a comparative perspective for analyzing social and political change in early-modern polities. Nor does it provide a theoretical framework of state formation, or of social and economic change for the early-modern era. Even though this may well be a conscious choice—and even an implicit critique of the grand comparative theories or historical narratives—the holistic approach to the consolidation process can be improved by situting the dynamics of the sixteenth century within a broader comparative framework.

More precisely, Peirce’s emphasis on the juridical dimension of the imperialization process in the sixteenth century can be developed within a more comparative framework of socioeconomic change in the early-modern era, and within a political-economy perspective that can explain such phenomena as state formation, capital accumulation, population change, and production patterns in agrarian societies. In this sense, a microhistory of a region provides a preliminary ground upon which broader changes across different agrarian societies and periods can evaluated. As Huri İslamoğlu argues in her study of agrarian relations and economic

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21 It is important to note that there is also considerable literature on different provinces for the 15th and 16th centuries. It could even be argued that there is “provincial studies” subfield in Ottoman history, especially in Turkey. However, most of the studies in this subfield, even though rich in terms of archival research are descriptive, and state-centric. For a bibliographical study, see Adnan Gürbüz, *Xv-Xvi. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Sancak Çalışmalari Değerlendirme Ve Bibliyografi Bir Demene* (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2001).

development in the sixteenth century, it is necessary to differentiate between the administrative and juridical functions of the state in order to properly define the political dimension of the socioeconomic constitution of Ottoman society, and to engage in a more explicitly comparative historical discussion. The purpose of this chapter is not to focus on socioeconomic change in the sixteenth century, nor is it to propose an in-depth interpretation of theories of social change in the early-modern era. However, it is important to single out the major issues at stake in order to provide a theoretical framework for the formation of Ottoman polity in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

It is also important to keep in mind that a more explicitly political economy perspective provides a critical reading of the Eurocentric accounts of modernity whose historical narrative usually portrays non-Western societies as stagnant, unless they are transformed by exogenous factors. Even alternative accounts, which are critical of the stagnation thesis, emphasize the uniqueness of the historical trajectory of Western societies, and highlight divergences rather than similarities between the East and the West. Generally couched in the language of free-market and free-trade economy, these latter interpretations turn the specific historical dimensions of the European experience into a norm. Once this is done, any deviation from the so-called norm is explained by either social or political forces that inhibit the development of that norm (such as a despotic rule, or Asiatic mode of production); or by a series of absences (such as the absence of autonomous guilds, cities, private property, or the rule of law in general). It is therefore important to broaden the theoretical perspective of socioeconomic change in order to critically evaluate these assumptions from a comparative perspective. One of the ways to do so is to establish comparable categories, such as surplus extraction, taxation, capital accumulation, commercialization of agriculture, or state formation. More concretely, this approach requires distinguishing—for analytical purposes—between the expropriation of surplus and the juridical dimensions of a polity. While the courts, as Peirce shows, were essential for the legitimacy of the political system, the expropriation of surplus was no less essential in order to ensure the distribution of wealth, and the regulation of political and economic activity. Therefore, only by paying equal attention to the distributive and juridical dimensions of the polity can we understand the historical trajectory of the Ottoman Empire. This understanding requires in turn a better articulated conceptualization of the state, state power, and more importantly the dynamics that distinguish the political realm from the economic, social, and juridical realms.

Seen from this perspective, the Anatolian peninsula, the Balkans, and later on, the Arab lands of the empire constituted an arena for intense political and commercial competition, and underwent historical processes similar to those in other societies and polities in sixteenth century Eurasia. These processes included population growth, commercial expansion, and increasing

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*Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1994).

23 İslamoğlu-İnan, "Introduction: Oriental Despotism in World System Perspective.", also İslamoğlu-İnan and Keyder, "Agenda for Ottoman History."

demand from urban centers. However, the outcomes of similar historical processes differed from part of Eurasia to another. As İslamoğlu argues, “population growth and commercial expansion in the sixteenth century … in Anatolia did not have the outcomes—i.e., fragmentation and expropriation of peasant holdings, formation of large commercial estates, increased social differentiation in the countryside—predicted in economic models of development. This is because the institutional context of existing relations of surplus appropriation, of property and of exchange imposed certain limits to such development.”

The state’s ability to regulate and administer different claims to surplus revenue was a major factor in shaping the social and political constitution of Ottoman society. However, notwithstanding the concentration of enormous power in state institutions, it is inaccurate to define the state as an independent factor for social change. It is more important to identify different claims to revenue or privilege, to examine how different social groups gained or lost power in relation to regional as well as global changes, and to see how their interactions with state institutions redefined new power relations. The important point here is that existing power relations were also subject to constant change. Just as Ottoman polity in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did not embody the power relations of a stagnant agrarian society, so it would undergo considerable transformation to resist or adapt to its immediate environment from the seventeenth century onward.

This interaction between different groups and the state in defining power relations was evident in the sixteenth century. It manifested itself mainly through a hierarchy of privileges, in the form either of the right to collect taxes or of the right to be exempt from taxation. The central authority, the old dynasties of the pre-Ottoman period, the religious institutions, as well as the custodians of the dervish lodges competed with each other to gain access to surplus agricultural production. This access was, arguably, the most important source of their power. The central authority sought to increase its share of the surplus by appropriating as much as it could revenues from the lands that belonged to the old dynasties by converting them to timars— that is, by allocating the revenues accruing from a given piece of land to these groups in return for military service in times of war. The relative strength of the local dynasties determined the extent to which this policy was successful. This appropriation process was not simply a matter of military conquest—one in which the Ottoman state annexed and had exclusive property rights over the land. Conquest gave legitimacy to the Ottoman state to become one of the claimants— generally the most powerful one—over revenues. There existed a range of property categories. These included political, military, economic, and even cultural and religious claims over revenues, and the balance of power between the central authority and other claimants in given region manifested itself in specific legal categories. For instance, in “the former domains of Turco-Mongol dynasties, the malikâne-divânî system of surplus extraction prevailed. Under this system, ownership rights (rakaba) to the land rested with pre-Ottoman ruling groups designated

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25 İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century. p.xiii
26 “The instrumentality of state’s regulatory practice should not suggest that rules or institutions are simply tools in the hands of politically dominant groups, to realize their particularistic interests. On the one hand, rules define the institutional boundaries of the different types of economic activity, of the relations or surplus extraction, or property and distribution relations. On the other, rules and the institutions they define, are subject to constant negotiations and represent negotiated settlements that are made and remade with changes in the power relations among different groups.” Ibid. p.3
27 İslamoğlu-İnan, "State and Peasants in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of Peasant Economy in North-Central Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century." p.108
as *malikâne* holders; revenues from the land were divided between the legal owners—who held the land as their freehold property (*mülk*) or as *vakıf* (pious endowment)—and state appointees or *divânî* holders who were entitled to revenues as part of their *timar*. However, the *malikâne-divânî* system reflected only the balance of power as it stood at end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century. Throughout the sixteenth century there was a gradual increase in the portion of the revenues controlled by the state, and other claimants were either replaced by administrative officials or incorporated into the administrative core as state officials.

If the *malikâne-divânî* reflected a compromise between the old dynasties and the Ottoman state, the institution of *vakf*, reflected a similar balance between religious institutions and the central state. But *vakf* was not necessarily exclusive to the religious institutions or the custodians of the lodges, as I have pointed out. Old dynasties could also turn some of their freehold properties into family *vakfs*. The importance of *vakf* lies in the fact that a property and the revenues accruing from that property was assigned as *vakf*, the state was unable to claim all or part of the revenues. This protective measure against state interference benefitted the religious establishment more than the old dynasties. İslamoğlu suggest two main reasons for this and argues that the state was in fact seeking to co-opt the religious establishment against the local elite. Compared to the revenues of the old dynasties, which were already partially fragmented at the time of conversion to *vakf*, the revenues of the religious *vakfs* had remained largely intact. Thus religious institutions were able to retain or accumulate more wealth. Second, and more importantly,

The central state in the sixteenth century was allotting a significant part of revenues that directly accrued to it, to mosque-medrese complexes. It can thus be surmised that the central state sought the alliance of local ulema who as teachers, judges, reciters of sermons at mosques controlled the ideological-juridical structures. These structures had formed the basis for legitimacy of the power of local Turkish dynasties. As such, alliance with the ulema was a means of co-opting that legitimacy and therefore further undermining the domination of local dynasties. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that the central state appointed the kadıs in this area from the ranks of the local ulema, who then would be in a position of implementing the juridical precepts that constituted the basis for legitimacy of state power. This, in turn, could explain the prominence of ulema as claimants to surpluses in the sixteenth century.

Besides the use of force, military conquest, and geographical expansion, these specific socioeconomic policies, and concomitant legal categories were the major mechanisms used by state institutions to gain access to revenues. In short, conquest and the appropriation of revenues was a long process of creating a new hegemony in the post-Mongol period over a territory that

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28 Ibid. p.107
29 Ibid. p.109
30 Following Cihan Tuğal, a reworked Gramscian definition would be as follows; “hegemony is (1) the organization of consent for domination and inequality (2) through a specific articulation of everyday life, space, and the economy with certain patterns of authority (3) under a certain leadership, (4) which forges unity out of disparity. Hegemony is not the same as Weberian legitimacy or popularity in the political science sense: it is active support for a system of rule that actually changes people’s lives … So hegemony involves taking part in changing one’s life: it is partial power over oneself.” Cihan Tuğal, *Passive Revolution Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). p. 24 Admittedly, this definition is more in tune with the dynamics of the modern
stretched from the Balkans and Crimea to Egypt and Iraq, and this process involved a complex set of policies from keeping the cadastral surveys to re-organizing the urban setting.\footnote{31}

It is within this theoretical framework that we must situate the differences that existed among the regions. Indeed, one of the defining features of the early-modern polities is the particularistic character of the various political, economic, legal, and cultural realms as compared to the homogeneity that is a feature of modern capitalist market relations and of nation-states.\footnote{32} That is to say, the distributive logic of the political system was geared to accommodate the particular demands of specific groups, and different power relations in different regions. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, law codes were the manifestation of this political logic. But, scholars are still far from understanding the transition of provincial administration in Anatolia from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, especially as concerns the transition from the Seljuk and post-Mongol period to Ottoman rule.\footnote{33} As Oktay Özel points out in a recent study on the transformation of provincial administration, it is significant that “the Seljukid connection is particularly weak”, and most of the studies dealing with the formation of the Ottoman provincial administration “are descriptive in nature and reiterate a common pattern detailing the course of events leading towards the Ottoman takeover of the area concerned, generally followed by the outline of the development of Ottoman administrative system as portrayed in the extant tahrir registers.”\footnote{34} Even though scholars have studied certain characteristics and the patterns of the formation of the Ottoman provincial administration—such as the establishment of administrative units and the fiscal policies of the central authority—there has been no conceptual and contextual comparison between different regions.\footnote{35} Furthermore, most of the pioneering studies that have combined descriptive and conceptual analysis concentrate on the province of Rum—that is, central and northern Anatolia. In so doing, they have emphasized particular aspects of the political, economic, and administrative transformation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The most important of these have been the continuing influence of the previous administrative categories (Byzantine, Seljuk, or Ilkhan) in the formation of the Ottoman provincial system, and the incorporation of the local notables through, a variety of legal measures and economic policies, into the central Ottoman administration. Therefore, the following remarks on the provincial administration in Kütahya in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries must necessarily be tentative, and must raise more questions than can be answered here.

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34 Ibid. pp.53-54

35 See for instance the bibliographical study of Gürbüz, \textit{Xv-Xvi. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Sancak Çalışmaları Değerlendirme Ve Bibliografik Bir Demene}.\end{flushright}
KÜTAHYA AND THE EARLY-MODERN OTTOMAN STATE

The balance of power, especially in and around the Bithynia region, was constituted more directly than it was in northern and eastern Anatolia, where the former Turco-Mongol and Kurdish principalities were strongly entrenched. In the Bithynia region, and more specifically in Kütahya, the state’s access to the agricultural surplus was more firmly established, and the central authority did not have to compete with the local elite to the same degree as it did in central and eastern Anatolia. The constant ebb and flow between the Byzantine and Seljuk forces must have made very difficult, if not impossible, the maintenance of an existing land tenure system or the establishment of a new one. Furthermore, the status of uc was the defining feature of the Bithynian region for the Seljuks, and hence must have given the military leaders appointed to this region more administrative and political autonomy. The important question here is what kind of landholding system and administrative practices prevailed, especially compared to the province of Rum, where the malikâne-divânî system had become a distinguishing feature of the Ottoman administration.

The Germiyans, who ruled around Kütahya after 1300, seem to have followed in the footsteps of the Seljuk institutions as they took the first steps toward state building. But in the absence of administrative or legal documents pertaining to Germiyan rule, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the Ottoman imperialization process incorporated certain legal categories established by the Germiyans, or the extent to which the Germiyans themselves had adopted legal categories established by the previous administration. 36 Osman Turan argues, with specific reference to the Germiyans, that “in the [frontier] principalities, in accordance with the old Turkish traditions of nomadic feudalism, sovereignty was divided among the members of the royal family,” 37 but he does say how this tradition was practiced in, or to what extent it influenced the administrative structure of, the Germiyan principality. Mustafa Çetin Varlık is more explicit about the continuity between the Germiyans and the Seljuk state, and argues that “Germiyan landholding system and administration are a continuation of the Seljuk institution.” 38 According to Varlık, Germiyan policies mirrored those of the Seljuk state, from the construction of the medreses to the Germiyan’s taxation policy (the Germiyans, as I pointed out above, funded some of their institutions, including the Vâcidiye Medrese, with taxes (cizye) levied upon non-Muslims.) Despite their plausibility, Varlık’s arguments only draw attention to the fact that there were continuities in administrative practices between the Seljuks and the Germiyans. But they do not explain why, then, the malikâne-divânî system was not as widespread in the Kütahya region as it was in the province of Rum.

36 For the autonomy of the frontier regions within the Seljuk and the Ilkhanid period, see Osman Turan, Osman Turan, "Anatolia in the Period of the Seljuks and the Beyliks," in The Cambridge History of Islam Volume 1 the Central Islamic Lands, ed. P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). Turan argues that “[the frontier principalities,] which were modelled on the institutions of the Seljuk state and the tradition of the nomadic Turks generally recognized the sovereignty of the Seljuk sultans, and their emirs received from them such emblems of power as a robe of honour, a standard, a diploma and the title of ghazi. But in reality they were independent.” p.252
37 Ibid.
With the weakening of Seljuk power, the general trend in most of Anatolia was toward further control of state lands (or more appropriately, of the revenues accruing from those lands) by the powerful military rank holders. Throughout the thirteenth century, the Seljuk state granted the right to collect revenues to the emirs appointed to specific regions. This process, whereby the state gradually transferred to the emirs its rights on the land, paved the way for the emergence of a local landholding class; and the origins of the malikâne-divânî system seem to lie in the dissolution of the Seljuk state. As Özel argues, “it would not be wrong to think, therefore, that this ‘privatisation’ which was followed by what might be called, vakıfisation was largely accomplished by the time of the Ottoman takeover.” However, it is also true that no historian has provided a satisfactory account of the origins of the malikâne-divânî system. Since Ömer Lütfi Barkan first drew attention to the characteristics of this system in 1939, most subsequent studies have concentrated on the imperialization process, rather than explaining the emergence and the persistence of this system. Thus Barkan’s reflections remain essential to our understanding of landholding patterns and provincial administration.

Barkan starts by pointing out the differences between the freehold property rights granted by the sultan after the establishment of Ottoman authority, and the property rights of the malikâne holders before the Ottoman conquest. According to Barkan, in the malikâne case, it is the rakaba (legal right of ownership to the land) that is specifically recognized by the state, whereas other revenues accruing from the land are appropriated by the state. In other words, “while the land is recognized as the property of the malikâne owner, those who rent the land to the peasant are not the owners but the sipahis as the representatives of the state.” As for the grant of freehold property rights by the sultan, the rakaba may or may not stay with the state, but the revenues accruing from a property are granted to different groups for different purposes, mostly to the sipahis in return for military service. The legal dimensions of the timar and malikâne systems, and the question as to which one is more in line with the Islamic law of property, must be clearly understood in order to understand the development of Islamic jurisprudence in the Ottoman Empire, the creation of an imperial ideology, and a new political hegemony. However, for Barkan (at least, insofar as he explicitly discusses the topic) the most important question was why the malikâne-divânî system was found mostly in the province of

41 For the definitions of these terms I rely on the glossary provided by Huri İslamoğlu in her, İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century.
43 Ibid. pp. 152-154
44 Barkan’s state-centric approach is unmistakable. His idealized state is one that is highly centralized, and in control of the most aspects of the society. He therefore tends to see almost every form of individual property rights as a danger that could be usurped against the established order of the state, and the well-being of the society. I am not discussing here such details, for an extensive critique of Barkan, Halil Berktay’s works are indispensable. See for instance, Berktay, "The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography."); Halil Berktay, "Iktisat Tarihi: Osmanlı Devletinin Yükselişine Kadar Türklerin İktisadî Ve Toplumsal Tarihi," in Türkiye Tarihi, ed. Sina Akşin (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989).
The crucial point here is the competition between the Ottoman central authority and the previous landholders for the appropriation of certain rights to the exclusion of others. What matters in this respect is the extent to which the central authority was able to impose its rules and regulations on, and was able to interject itself into the already existing social, political, and economic relations. Therefore Barkan places his emphasis on the political-historical dimension of power relations that is crystalized at the juridical level, rather than on the history of Islamic jurisprudence per se.46

One of the sociohistorical hypotheses that Barkan discusses with regard to the emergence of the malikâne system is that of Ottoman bureaucrat and intellectual Mustafa Âli. Mustafa Âli suggests that these malikâne rights were first distributed and recognized by the sultan Mehmed Çelebi (1413-1421) to reward the local notables who supported him during the period of interregnum after the defeat of Bayezid I (1389-1402) against Timur. This explanation, insofar as it emphasizes the struggle among the principalities throughout the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, also implies that those principalities which sought to recover their lands, and which made further attempts to expand at the expense of the Ottomans, were suppressed and punished once the interregnum was over and the Ottoman dynasty was able to reestablish its authority. This hypothesis would make sense in the case of the Germiyans for a couple of reasons. First, the Germiyans had been one of the Ottomans’ main adversaries since 1300. Second, the Ottomans also saw the Germiyans as the culprits who identified Bayezid after his defeat by Timur, and which led to his imprisonment. Finally, after the defeat of Ankara, the Germiyans made one last attempt to recover their lands and establish their suzerainty in Bithynia. So the Ottomans had reason enough to want to punish—even erase—the Germiyan dynasty, because they controlled the strategic zone that bordered the land of the Karamans, their main rival in fifteenth century Anatolia. However, Barkan is highly suspicious of Mustafa Âli’s suggestion. Barkan starts with the observation that the first Ottoman sultans did not radically alter the landholding patterns of the lands they conquered, and argues that Mustafa Âli’s suggestion attributes too much power to Çelebi Mehmed.47 Furthermore, the fact that the malikâne system was mostly—but not exclusively—confined to the province of Rum requires a better explanation than Mustafa Âli provides when he argues that the system was established to reward the local principalities for their support during the period of interregnum. Barkan’s contends, first, that the malikâne system must have been established prior to the fifteenth century, before the Ottoman suzerainty; and second, that the persistence of the malikâne holders indicates a form of resistance on the part of the principalities, and an act of recognition of the landholders’ rights (however circumscribed these rights were) on the part of the sultan.

Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr, like Barkan, points out that the malikâne-divânî system was prevalent mostly in the provinces and the regions of Karaman, Rum, Kayseri, Kastamonu, Ankara, Diyarbakir, and Malatya. Specific references to this legal category, whereby agricultural production was appropriated both by the local elite and by the state, are almost nonexistent in the

45 Barkan, "Malikâne-Divânî Sistemi." p.162. However, Barkan’s observations on the malikâne system can also be read in his other articles compiled in the volume. It must also be mentioned that even though the legal aspect of the system is no less important than the socio-economic dimension, however, in the following I will be focusing mainly on the socio-economic context.
46 Ibid. p.182
47 Ibid. p.164
region of Trabzon and the province of Hüdavendigâr—that is, in northern Anatolia and the Bithynia region respectively. Beldiceanu-Steinherr provides evidence that malikâne-divânî was not a new legal category established by the Ottomans, but rather that it predated them, and argues that the Seljuks must have set an important legal and administrative precedent in the lands they firmly controlled. She attributes the absence of references to malikâne-divânî in the Trabzon region to the fact that this area was under Byzantine control until it was conquered by Mehmed II in 1461.\(^48\) She does not offer a similar explanation for the absence of references to malikâne-divânî in the Bithynia region, but she mentions that the only reference to malikâne-divânî was in the land registers of Seferihisar, which was under the direct control of the Seljuk state. For the rest of region; including Kütahya, it could be surmised that the characteristics of the frontier region left their mark on the establishment of a new administrative system. However, this explanation, although it is historically sound and highly plausible, does not explain why the malikâne system was not as widespread in this region as it was in the province of Rum. It cannot be because in the province of Rum the malikâne holders were the military leaders who were granted lands by the Seljuks and the Ilkhan overlords, and that in time they were able to establish their property rights more firmly than the military leaders in other regions. For the same can be said of the Germiyans, and it could even be argued that like the Karamans, the Germiyans were the one of the first, and most powerful dynasties to secure their property rights at the expense of the weakening Seljuk state.

However, it is also possible—indeed, it is more likely—that the existence of the malikâne-divânî system in the province of Rum leads historians to draw too strong a dichotomy between the province of Rum and other provinces where the timar system was prevalent.\(^49\) It is therefore important to contextualize the characteristics of each landholding pattern, and to qualify the differences among them. Barkan calls for two important qualifications. First, the malikâne was not exclusive to the province of Rum; it was only most prevalent in that region. There is evidence that malikâne shares existed in other regions too, but they had less of an economic, political, and military impact than they had in the province of Rum. Second, Barkan and other scholars, such as İslamoğlu and Steinherr, argue that the central authority always appropriated the lands directly wherever and whenever it could. So whether there were previously established rights on the lands conquered by the Ottomans, and where these rights originated—whether from

\(^48\) Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Fiscalité Et Formes De Possession De La Terre Arable Dans L’Anatolie Préottomane," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 19, no. 3 (1976), p.243

\(^49\) If a more historiographical note is permitted, it must be pointed out Barkan’s emphasis on the malikâne system needs to be revisited. First, Barkan’s own notes and remarks on the subject shows the extent to which he has his own doubts on the importance of this particular land holding system. He not only raises doubt as to his own overall interpretations, but also his notes show much empirical evidence is needed in order to support some of his assumptions. The credit must be given, in this respect, to the editor of Barkan’s collected articles for having kept Barkan’s notes as an integral part of the book. They provide a unique perspective into the works of one of the most important Turkish historians of the early republican era. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Barkan’s emphasis on the malikâne system seems to reflect his contemporary engagement with the attempts of land reform in the late 1930s. It could then be argued that his preoccupation with the historical development of the land holding pattern in the Ottoman Empire was an attempt to situate and to legitimize land reform in modern republican Turkey. His constant remarks on the centrality of a state-controlled economy for the well-being of society, on the uniqueness of the Ottoman state-society relations (as different from the Western feudalism), on the dangers of a landed aristocracy for degenerating the uniqueness of the Ottoman system, all seem to bear the ideological baggage of his time. In this sense, it is not surprising that he might have given too much emphasis on the malikâne system because the owners of the malikâne, in one form or another, posed a challenge to the primacy of the state.
the Byzantine Empire, or the Seljuk state—mattered less than the balance of power that prevailed in a region. Moreover, even after the rights of the previous owners were recognized, the previous owners’ shares gradually dwindled, while the state took every opportunity to appropriate more. The fact that the Ottomans used military conquest, peaceful diplomacy and marriage ties to expand their control of the Germiyan principality indicates that compared to the expansion of Ottoman control in the province of Rum and Karaman, the process of imperialization was more direct. From a legal perspective, it could be argued that the bestowal of many parts of the Germiyan principality as dowry upon the Ottomans—more specifically upon Bayezid I at the end of the fourteenth century—entailed a transfer of full property rights. In this sense, the Ottomans—having inherited these rights—had no legal or political reason to recognize the rights of any previous. In the seventeenth century, competition for these revenues would play a major role in the increasingly competitive interstate struggle for military dominance in Eurasia. In the context of military competition (as I pointed out above), most states would seek to eliminate the claim of anyone other than the state authority to revenues.

Scholars working on the establishment of the Ottoman provincial administration often turn to provincial law codes (kanunnâmes) and land registers (tahrir) in order to analyze the continuity of the previous legal categories and/or the privileges and rights of the local landholders under Ottoman rule. The provincial law code of Kütahya, dated 1528, does not mention any specific rules pertaining to the revenue rights of the previous rulers. However, even though the provincial law codes were sometimes written as an introduction to the land registers, and although they were meant to serve as a guide for the tax collectors, they do not necessarily summarize all of the information contained in the registers. It is not surprising, therefore, to find no specific reference to the Germiyan, or for that matter to malikâne revenue claims. If the provincial law codes are an expression of the gradual Ottomanization of the conquered lands, and an affirmation of a new sovereign entity in these lands, the specific rules and regulations stipulated in the register with regard to revenue extraction are the end result of a process of negotiation. Therefore, the provincial law codes and the land register, taken together, express a new configuration of power relations.

50 For Barkan’s remarks on Trabzon where the Ottomans did not have to recognize any of the rights of the previous landowners, see, Barkan, “Malikâne-Divânî Sistemi.” p.168
51 For this point on the see again, ibid. pp. 151-155
52 See Ömer Lütfi Barkan, 15. Ve 16. yüzyıllarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Zirai Ekonomisinin Hukuki Ve Mali Esasları / Kanunlar (Istanbul: Buhaneeddin Matbaası, 1943). pp. 23-28. The provincial land code of Kütahya is also part of the land register of the province of Anatolia for 1530, however, there are not significant differences between the provincial land code published by Barkan and the land code published in 438 Numaralı Muhasebe-I Vilayet-I Anadolu Defteri (937/1530), (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1993). Compare the land code of Kütahya with other examples provided by Barkan in his study of the malikâne system, Barkan, “Malikâne-Divânî Sistemi.”
53 Huri İslamoğlu argues that “essential for the interpretation of the data contained in the fiscal surveys are the kanunnâmes … Sometimes prefixed to the surveys, these regulations were set down for the guidance of officials in charge of their preparation. Such kanunnâmes listed rules and rates of taxation as valid in a particular area, thus accounting for specific conditions prevailing in each region … where more than one version of a given kanunnâmee survive, it is sometimes possible to trace the process of assimilation or Ottomanization.” İslamoğlu-Inan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century. p.24 However, İslamoğlu also recognizes that the information contained in the surveys can more revealing for understanding the changes and continuities in the landholding patterns than the kanunnâmes, private conversation with Huricihan İslamoğlu, (5.1.2011)
If we compare the Ottoman central administration’s share of the revenues accruing from the province of Rum and of Anatolia, we find that that by the middle of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman central administration was able to control most of the revenues from both provinces. While the vakfs, and the malikâne owners controlled about 20 percent of the revenues in the province of Rum, they controlled only slightly less (17 percent) in the province of Anatolia. In this respect, the existence of the malikâne system made very little difference in terms of actual revenue collection. But this holds true only at the provincial level. A closer look at Kütahya reveals that the percentage controlled by the state was much higher at the subprovincial level. While the total revenue of the sancak (sancak) of Kütahya was 4,589,175 akçe, almost 4,400,000 (96 percent) of this formed part of the revenues of the sultan, or was assigned to the governor and distributed as timar and zeamet. The difference at the subprovincial level with respect to the malikâne shares can be explained by some of the factors mentioned above. These factors include the balance of power between the central authority and the local dynasty, the transfer of lands as part of the marriage dowry in the fourteenth century, and the Ottomans’ reprisal against the Germiyans for their siding with Timur in 1402. However, even the shares of the vakfs are minimal, which requires further explanation. As I noted earlier, turning a property into a vakf was one of the major ways to escape state control, eliminate the fragmentation of property under the Islamic inheritance laws, and so guarantee permanent revenue. Many households with property, especially big notable families, resorted to this solution after the establishment of the Ottoman central authority. However, as Varlik points out, another explanation is that the exemptions from taxation, or from fiscal and military obligation granted by the Seljuk states or the Germiyan principality continued into the Ottoman era. Hence the state officials did not include these exemptions as part of the vakf or emlâk when they calculated the revenues. It is also possible that some of the properties granted by the Germiyans were transformed into timar, and were therefore included in the revenues coming from the timars, rather than from the vakfs or emlâks. This latter strategy is important in that it shows both the continuity and the incorporation of previous property patterns into the Ottoman administration. By recognizing the previous owners’ right to certain revenues, the Ottomans kept intact social and economic relations on the land. At the same time, by turning some of the revenue rights into timar, the central authority interpolated itself into the social and economic relations between the landowners or more precisely, the revenue owners and the peasantry. Furthermore, under strict Islamic jurisprudence, freehold property usually meant exclusive property rights (in terms of inheritance, and being exempt from military or fiscal obligations in return for the right to collect

54 For the province of Rum total revenue at the beginning of the sixteenth century was around 21 million akçe while the revenues belonging to vakfs and malikâne owners was roughly 4,300,000 akçe. See, Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Kuruluş Devrinin Toprak Meseleleri ", p.286
55 Barkan uses the same land register 438 Numaralı Muhasebe-I Vilayet-I Anadolu Defteri (937/1530), for 1530 pp.1-7. However in his article the register is classified as no.881 (no date is given), this was the old number given to the register in the central Ottoman archives before a reclassification took place. According to this register, total revenue is around 79 million akçe, while the revenues belonging to the vakfs and emlak is 13,500,000 akçe, Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Kuruluş Devrinin Toprak Meseleleri ", p. 290.
58 I thank Prof. İslamoğlu for pointing out this alternative. See also Varlık, "Germiyanoğlu Beyliği." p.157
revenue accruing from the land). By comparison, the state could more easily reclaim the property held as timar.

Nevertheless, with respect to the establishment of the Ottoman administrative system, there are two major difficulties for historians. The first is to make accurate comparisons among different regions and different administrative units on the basis on concrete evidence. The second is to describe administrative-institutional change as a procedure that changes over time, rather than giving snapshots of specific moments. The major works on the Ottoman administrative system, such as Ayn-i Ali’s *Kavanîn Âl-i Osman* (1609), the treaty of Sofyalı Ali Çavuş (1653), and Hezarfen Hüseyin’s *Telhîsü'l-Beyân Fî kavanîn-i Âl-i Osman* (1670), all date from the seventeenth century. These works give only an overall picture of administrative-institutional change. Furthermore, as most contemporary scholars working with and on these works point out, they contain major lacunae and repetitions. This makes the use of their works—at least insofar as they pertain to regional and local history—very redundant. According to Ayn-i Ali, at the beginning of the seventeenth century the total revenue of the province of Anatolia was 37,310,730 akçe, a sum that was distributed to 7,311 military titleholders (as 6,136 timars and 195 zeamets). Together with the sancak of Hüdavendigar, Kütahya had the highest number of timars and zeamets; there were 32 zeamets and 1,005 timars in Hüdavendigar, and 29 zeamets and 975 timars in Kütahya. Ayn-i Ali also puts the number of soldiers that the timar and zeamets holders had to recruit at 17,000. Most of the authors repeat these numbers throughout the seventeenth century. The only minor difference in these numbers is found in the treaty of Sofyalı Ali Çavuş where the number of the military grants has risen to 8,619 and the number of the soldiers to 25,000. However, when we turn to Hezarfen’s work, which was written twenty years later, we see that Hezarfen uses Ayn-i Ali’s numbers for the province of Anatolia. Apart from such inconsistencies, even if we accept Ayn-i Ali’s numbers as more or less reflecting the actual distribution of military grants, it is important to know how big the zeamets and the timars were (since the revenues accruing from a timar could vary from 2,000 to 20,000 akçes, and those accruing from a zeamet from 20,000 to 100,000 akçes). It is also important to know to whom and by whom the revenues in question were distributed, whether there was a significant change in the distribution pattern, and to what extent the grants remained within a family (usually being transferred from father to son). It is also important to remember that a timar could be granted to more than one person, and the revenues could be used as conjointly.

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62 Not every single timar was granted by the sultan, or the central authority in Istanbul. The provincial governor could grant smaller timars without the approval of the central authority. For instance, in the province of Anatolia, the governors could grant timars whose revenue was up to 5,000 akçe without the approval of the state. For the grants with higher revenues, the governor could propose the grant but the grant holder had to get the approval of the central authority. Even though one major purpose of the timar system was to prevent the rise of a local aristocracy by constantly making these grants subject to the control and approval of the state, the fact the governors had the discretion to distribute grants is important in order to study the formation of different clientage ties. Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Timar," in *İslâm Ansiklopdisi* (İstanbul: Mili Eğitim Basımevi, 1974). p.315
63 Barkan’s article on timar is still important in order to get good overall information on the timar system. Barkan also uses Ayn-i Ali, and Hezarfen, and complements their data with his own research, ibid. Also published in Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi - Toplu Eserler I* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980). Metin Kunt’s work on the development of the Ottoman administrative system from the sixteenth to the second half of the seventeenth
Barkan states that in the province of Anatolia, from the end of the fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth century, there was a steady increase in the number of grants, and in the number of soldiers that the grantholders had to recruit. The number of the grantholders increased from 7,603 (103 zeamets and 7,500 timars) to 7,936 (338 zeamets and 7,636 timars). The significance of this increase can be debated, but Barkan relates it to two factors. First, this was a period of constant expansion for the Ottoman Empire; hence there was also a steady increase in the revenues that had to be distributed in order to raise a bigger army. Second, the population increase of the empire as a whole increased throughout the sixteenth century. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the province of Anatolia was second only to Rumelia as the region where the zeamets and timars were most widely distributed. But there is another factor to consider here. If the extent of the timar system indicates how much control the central authority exerted over lands and revenues, this control was not permanent. The central authority, for one reason or another, could recognize the rights of the previous revenue owners, but the state’s the main purpose of in doing so was to gain access to, increase its share of, and establish itself as the most legitimate dispenser of these revenues; and to prevent any other body from doing. In short, retaining control was even more important to central authority than the one-time grant of certain revenues. It could even be argued that the permanent control of the revenues is what differentiated the sovereignty of the central authority from other claimants. In this sense, it is interesting to note the high number of mensûh (abolished) zeamets and timars in the Anatolian provinces in general, and in Kütahya in particular. Ayn-i Ali notes in his lists that in Anatolia there were 574 abolished zeamets and 564 timars at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Of these zeamets and timars, 78 and 87 respectively were in Kütahya. It could then be hypothesized that the state was able to exert a good deal of control over these revenues in Kütahya. Furthermore, the high number of zeamets also shows that the central authority could impose its will on the claimants to higher revenues. Nevertheless, since Ayn-i Ali does not say whose grants were abolished and why, it is difficult to explain these numbers within a more nuanced historical context. Taking for granted that Ayn-i Ali’s figures reflect more or less accurately the situation at the beginning of the sixteenth century, were these grants abolished in response to the Çelâlî uprisings that ravaged Anatolia at the end of the sixteenth century? Was the abolition of the grants intended to punish the ineffectiveness of the military class in putting down the uprisings? Or did the uprisings reduce the production to such an extent that existing timar holders could no longer collect enough revenues to meet their military responsibilities—obliging the central authority to restructure revenue collection, either by assigning the right to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of Sancaks</th>
<th>Zeamet</th>
<th>Timar</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>24</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>8,360</td>
<td>9,274</td>
<td>33,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anatolia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>7,116</td>
<td>7,311</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaman</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rum (Sivas)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>3,021</td>
<td>3,130</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>5,159</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>7,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Barkan, "Timar," s. 290

Kavânîn-I Âl-I Osman Der Hülâsa-I Mezâmin-I Deftıer-I Divân, Ayn-i Ali.
collect revenue in a different way, or by granting these revenues to new officials? Or was the abolition of the grants related to a longer-term change, such as a change in the composition of the army? Ayn-i Ali’s remarks on the transformation of the müsellem (provincial landed cavalrymen) and yaya (literally, foot soldiers of the provincial army) may provide some clues in this respect, because he notes that the revenues of these forces were either abolished or “tied to timars.”

The müsellem and yaya forces were basically peasant soldiers. With their origins going back to the fourteenth century, they represent yet another dimension of the continuity between the post-Mongol context and the rise of the Ottoman polity in Anatolia. There were müsellem and yaya forces in both Rumelia and Anatolia, but they were especially concentrated in the Bithynia region, around Eskişehir and Kütahya. They worked on their lands and were exempt from certain taxes in return for serving in war as auxiliary forces. Their exact function changed over time, and they finally lost their importance even as auxiliary forces with the rise of the gunpowder empires. In addition to serving in the army, the müsellems were used for other purposes. For instance, in an order sent to Kütahya in 1574, the müsellems of the district were ordered to go Istanbul to work on the reparation of Saint Sophia, with enough provisions to last for at least six months. The müsellems were used for a variety of purposes. The disintegration of the müsellems was due to the way the central authority appropriated more and more of the revenues by making new efforts at centralization. Most of their tax exemptions were abolished or their revenues were turned into timar. As for the yaya, they were turned into simple peasants. Even though it is generally accepted that the müsellems were abolished in the seventeenth century, there had clearly been previous attempts to abolish both the müsellems and yaya at the end of the sixteenth century. Already in 1582, an imperial order (hattı hümayûn) stated unequivocally that the müsellems and yaya organizations in Bolu, Kastomonu, Ankara, Kangûr, Menteşe, and Kütahya were abolished, and the müsellems and yaya forces were registered as peasants (bundan akdem piyade ve müsellem tayifesı ref’ olunub giru raiyyet kayıd olunmak ferman-i şerîfim olmağın). Probably to prevent any resistance, the revenues of the leaders (beğ) of these müsellems were augmented for 30,000 akçe, and they were incorporated into the military class in the imperial council (her birinin tasarruflarında olan ziametleri üzerine otuz bin terakki ile dergâh-ı muallâ müteferrikaları zümresine ilhâk). Ayn-i Ali’s remarks on the transformation of the müsellems and yaya revenues into timars could therefore be seen in the context of both longer- and shorter-term changes. While the increased use of gunpowder, and of more effective military technology, rendered these previous auxiliary groups obsolete, the uprisings at the turn of the sixteenth century must have made it much more difficult for them to live as peasants, and to compete with newly emerging...
mercenary forces. Nevertheless, it appears that despite the ravaging effects of the Celâlî rebellion, the state was able to retain its control over at least some of the revenues assigned to the müsellem and yaya.

For most scholars, this distributive pattern also represents the core of the Ottoman classical administrative system, in which most of the lands were controlled by the state, and the revenues derived from the lands were distributed in return for military service. However, to make an absolute category out of the timar system, and to measure the strength of the state and the Ottoman classical system according to this yardstick may not be the most productive way to make comparisons among different regions, and to explain socioeconomic change. For it seems that the sixteenth century does not necessarily represent the classical form of the timar system, and that it cannot easily be confined to a core territory. Furthermore, even the most radical reforms to appropriate the revenues of the vakıfs and to abolish the privileges of their previous owners met with resistance, and fell short of their intended consequences. One of the most notorious of these attempts came after the conquest of Istanbul. Mehmed II’s effort to centralize and appropriate freehold properties and the vakıfs is usually interpreted as a radical land reform. However, most of the properties confiscated by Mehmed II were later restored to their original owners by his son Bayezid II, and the whole policy of appropriation seems to have failed. Therefore the registers from the first decades of the sixteenth century do reflect the transformations brought about by Mehmed II. Nevertheless, even though, as Oktay Özel argues, Mehmed II’s policies were neither a land reform (they were mostly about the revenues, not the land per se) nor radical, the reform attempt plays an important role in the interpretations of past and contemporary historians when they explain the successes and failures of the Ottoman administration.

Indeed, to equate the prevalence and strength of the timar system with that of the absolute authority and strength of the state was a central tenet of the decline literature, according to which once the central authority lost control of revenue distribution in return for military service, alternative and centrifugal centers of power in the provinces threw the empire into a process of decentralization–resulting in the breakup of the empire. In this context, Metin Kunt’s analysis of the transformation of the provincial administrative system is relevant, insofar as the prevalence of timar and the decline of the timar system in Anatolia are concerned.

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70 It seems that there was a steady decline in the revenues of the müsellem organization in Anatolia even before the Celâlî uprisings at the end of the sixteenth century. While the total revenue of all the müsellem organization in Anatolia was 234,000 akçe in 1521, it dropped to 206,000 in 1527. In 1609, it was down to 50,200 akçe. See, Doğru, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Yaya-Müsellem-Taycı Teşkilatı (Xv. Ve Xvi. Yüzyılda Sultanönü Sancağı)*. p.115
71 For instance, İnalık argues that “the typical Ottoman province was one where the timar system was in force.” Halil İnalık, “Timar,” in *Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition* (Leiden: Brill, 2000). p.502 There were important exceptions too. In Egypt, Baghdad, Yemen, Habesh, Basra, Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis, the timar system was not used.
72 İnalık argues that it was fully developed already in the fifteenth century. Ibid. For the origins and the development of the timar see also, Nicoara Beldiceanu, *Le Timar Dans L'etat Ottoman (Debut Xive - Debut Xvie Siecle)* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1980). who also argues that timar was developed before the sixteenth century.
Kunt observes that there was a remarkable transformation in the pattern of distribution of the office of district (sancakbeyi) and provincial governorships (beylerbeyi) from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century. There was an increase in the appointment of provincial governors trained in the capital, and a decrease in the appointment of the governors trained in the provinces. Prior to the seventeenth century, officials trained in the provinces and who held district governorships were appointed to different provincial governorships. But by the second half of the seventeenth century, 61 percent of the provincial governors came directly from the center. Furthermore, the new appointment system placed more emphasis on the importance of the households of the provincial governors, and less emphasis on the military responsibilities of the district governors. Kunt explains this phenomenon by situating it within the general economic and political context of the seventeenth century. The intensifying military competition, especially on the western front with the Habsburgs; the ensuing stalemate; the effects of the population growth and inflation of the sixteenth century; and the Celâlî uprisings, taken together, enormously increased the financial burden of the state. The most pressing need was to find cash to finance military expeditions and ever-growing central army, which made the provincial cavalry and the timar holders more and more obsolete. As Kunt puts it, “what was needed, then, from around 1550 to 1650, was massive operation of transfer of revenues tied up in the dirlik system to a tax-farming of revenue collection. This shift away from assigning revenues in return for services and toward an arrangement which yielded cash to the central treasury was gradual, for it meant nothing less than a total revision of the classic Ottoman system of organizing revenue collection in conjunction with provincial administration and military service.” These transformations in the administrative structure reflected the institutional responses of the state to the socioeconomic challenges of the seventeenth century, and the fact that provincial governors became more important with the weakening of the timar system did not necessarily mean the weakening of the central authority. It is more important to focus on the social, political, and economic consequences of this transformation than to see it in terms of the decline of the classical order.

The new arrangement in the seventeenth century, involving the increasing power of central government officials in the provinces and greater cash resources at the disposal of the central government, aimed at a greater degree of centralization. However, the new beylerbeyi, supreme in their provinces, did sometimes challenge authority. Even more important, the beylerbeyi came to depend increasingly on the cooperation of local—unofficial—elites, either as agents (mütesellim) or as aides in revenue collection, thereby contributing to the rise of a powerful group of provincial notables (âyân) in the eighteenth century.

74 “It is striking,” says Kunt, “that around 1570 85.7 percent of all new beylerbeyi are from among the sancakbeyi: with very few exceptions it seems to have been the rule in that period for officers to serve first in provincial administration before being considered worthy of promotion to the beylerbeyi rank … this requirement, which incidentally points out the importance and prestige the sancakbeyi enjoyed in the mid-sixteenth century, was relaxed by the 1580s … [this] trend continued … to the 1630s: the share of the sancakbeyi plummeted to 26.9 percent while that of the central administration personnel climbed to 61.5 percent.” Metin Kunt, The Sultan’s Servants, the Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). p.66
75 Ibid. p.80
76 Ibid. p. 98-99
THE CAPITAL OF THE PROVINCE OF ANATOLIA

Before turning to the dynamics of the eighteenth century and the extent to which administrative transformation led to the rise of the provincial notables, it is in order to point out another lacuna in our understanding of the social and economic history of the provinces. Almost without exception, every single work on Kütahya mentions the fact that it became the capital of the province of Anatolia in 1451, and argues that this shows the importance of the city. However, there is almost nothing to substantiate the argument that there is a correlation between the administrative designation of Kütahya as the capital of the province of Anatolia and the geostrategic, social, economic, or urban characteristics of the city. Was Kütahya chosen as the capital because it was strategically important in terms of controlling the whole province? Was it because Kütahya and the surrounding areas produced more wealth than other cities or regions? Were there any particular groups that the central authority wanted to incorporate into its broader administrative system by making the city an administrative nexus for the region? The answer to these questions is, more often than not, no. At best, the topic calls for further research. Historians have made literally no attempt to relate the administrative history of the region to social and economic change in Kütahya from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries.

Kütahya was not only the capital of the province of Anatolia but also one of the major centers where the Ottoman princes were sent as administrators in the sixteenth century. The practice of sending princes as governors to specific cities was an important aspect of dynastic rule, and of the institutional apparatus of the Ottoman state, especially in the sixteenth century. The princes became experienced in administrative matters and proved themselves able as governors—at least, this was the ideal behind the practice. However, this ideal was seldom realized. The provinces were not necessarily a testing ground for the princes’ administrative abilities, for the practice did not form part of a truly meritocratic system. Rather, it was a practice of political formation that provided legitimacy for future rulers. Rhoads Murphey also points out that “the key unit of analysis in the sixteenth-century context is the princely household, whose formation often commenced decades before the prince’s accession to power. Vying interests within the family were matched by vying backers and factions drawn from society at large, most particularly from the regions where the princes held their princely governorates during their minorities.”77 In fact, the provinces became the seat of intense political competition. In this context, as a “prince district” (sehzâde sancağı), Kütahya, along with other important centers, such as Manisa, Amasya, and Trabzon, became one of the cities where a prince competing for the throne might form his own retinue. Already in 1389, the geostrategic importance of Kütahya as the seat of the Germiyan dynasty seems to have played a role in the succession struggle. Murphey argues that upon the death of Murad I in 1389, Bayezid’s accession to the throne was to a great extent related to his marriage to Germiyan princess Devlet Shah in 1381. The fact that he was preferred—over his brother Yakub, who was in the western front,—by the court advisers and military leaders reflected also preference of consolidating Ottoman power in Anatolia over an expansionist policy at the western front.78

78 Ibid. p. 108
The struggle for the throne was particularly severe in 1512 and 1566, to decide who was to succeed Bayezid II and Kanuni Süleyman, respectively. In the case of Bayezid II, not only did his sons partition most of the Anatolian districts, but their sons of age were given the governorships of the nearby districts. There was thus a wide network of patronage ties that were competing with each other. As Kunt says, “it was plain to see that when the sultan died, the resulting struggle would eclipse any that had gone before. Distance of a prince from the capital at the death of a sultan could be a decisive factor: he who reached the capital first had an enormous advantage in gaining the allegiance of the father’s household and government.”

As it turned out, Selim I, who was not the closest to Istanbul (his seat was in Trabzon) dethroned his father and became the next ruler. What is important here is not so much the political history of succession as the social and economic impact of the formation of the princes’ retinues for provincial history. Here again, Kunt’s analyses provide important insights.

Although Kütahya was the provincial capital, it was Manisa, in western Anatolia, that was the privileged seat of the princes who ascended to the throne in the second half of the sixteenth century–Murad III in 1574, and Mehmed III in 1595. Kunt goes so far as to argue that there almost emerged a “Prince of Manisa, so to speak, an Ottoman Prince of Wales.” Even though he is quick to point out that circumstances rather than long-term trends dictated this outcome, and that this privileged provincial governorship in the succession procedure was never formalized, it is an important point to keep in mind when evaluating Kütahya’s so-called importance and its place in the administrative structure. The only prince to succeed his father whose seat was in Kütahya was Selim II in 1566. Even though in his case the succession was a foregone conclusion by 1566, because he was the only surviving son of the sultan, the years preceding to his governorship in Kütahya had seen one of the most intense struggles for succession—later on, Selim II’s son and grandson would have to eliminate all the potential challenges coming from their brothers too. Before Selim II took the governorship of Kütahya, he had to face his brother in Konya in 1559, and defeat him. Only after this defeat could he move to Kütahya, and become the legitimate successor to Kanuni Süleyman.

What is important for us is the political economy of succession, because the succession gives us an opportunity to witness the extent to which dynastic struggle could upset existing political and economic privileges. Even though a new ruler could not simply dismiss the established rules and regulations, and even though, in this sense, “the law [of the realm] was [by the mid-sixteenth century] truly above the legislator,” there was nevertheless a good deal of anxiety among the upper echelons of the ruling elite, since the new ruler could replace the

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80 Ibid. p.221
81 Once again, Murphey, referring to the struggle between Bayezid and Selim, takes a step further and argues that “of all the succession struggles experienced during the entire 600-year history of the dynasty, the bitterest broke out before the death of the incumbent on the throne rather than being precipitated by it.” Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty, Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800*, p. 110
82 The Imperial Orders published by Ahmet Refik after Bayezid’s escape to Iran are particularly important to understand the political dynamics of this period, Ahmet Refik, "Konya Muharebesinden Sonra Şehzade Sultan Bayezid'ın Iran'a Fırrarı (Divan-ı Hümayunun Gayr-i Matbû' Vesaikine Nazaran) " *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası* 6 (Büşinci sene), no. 36 (1331/1916).
83 Kunt, "Sultan, Dynasty and State in the Ottoman Empire: Political Institutions in the Sixteenth Century." p.222
existing cadres with his own retinue. As Kunt argues, a complete restructuring of the dynastic household was not in the Ottoman tradition, since most of the imperial household retained their positions. However, by the time of Selim II, things had changed to some extent. Until then, the size of a provincial prince’s retinue was rather modest—around five hundred to six hundred retainers—and therefore did not really threaten the ranks of the existing imperial household, since these retainers could be assimilated into the polity. But Selim’s household had grown much bigger, and “at Selim’s accession, Süleyman’s palace people and officials around the realm were worried that the plum posts would go to advisors, officials and troops who came from the prince’s seat at Kütahya.” So the problem was not only the legitimacy of the succession, but the distribution of the political, military, and economic resources. Significant, in this respect, is an edict issued to the kadi of Kütahya in 1559, after the defeat of Bayezid (whose governorship seat was Kütahya until 1558, when he was removed to Amasya by his father.) Kanunî ordered the immediate confiscation of the properties belonging to Bayezid and promised rewards to those who would cooperate to track Bayezid down. With these confiscations and rewards, Kanunî probably hoped to secure the political allegiance of Selim’s followers and redistribute the economic resources accordingly. Once Kanunî made sure that Bayezid would not pose an immediate danger to the throne with a large retinue, he eased the confiscations of Bayezid’s belongings and revenues, and even issued a pardon for some of his followers. The new configuration of power relations—Bayezid out of the picture, Selim in Kütahya, and Kanunî as the supreme authority in control of the situation in Istanbul—created in fact a court in waiting in Kütahya.

But even after Selim succeeded his father in 1566, the tension between the royal and princely households did not appease, and almost led to a civil war because Selim II also promised to reward his followers in Kütahya. It is significant in this respect that “some revenue-grant holders recognized their peasants among Selim’s troops and claimed re’aya dues from them.” After Selim’s accession to throne, there was a significant increase in the number of salaried state officials. Murphey shows that “the figures for the 12-month period ending on 10 March 1567, six months after Selim’s accession, reflect a one-year gain of 4,956 men (an increase of 12.5 per cent), and a one-year increase in annual expenditure for salaries of 38,705,812 akçe (an increase of 40.8 per cent).” All of the 4,956 followed Selim as his retainers when he arrived to Istanbul. Unfortunately, we don’t know much about the details of Selim II’s retinue, who the main figures were, what their background was, where they were

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84 Murphey argues that “each reign marked not just a new beginning but, in many senses, a recreation of the institution of the sultanate and, more widely, even of the state itself, from the ground up.” Murphey, Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty, Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800. p. 99
85 Kunt, “Sultan, Dynasty and State in the Ottoman Empire: Political Institutions in the Sixteenth Century.” p.225
86 Refik, “Konya Muharebesinden Sonra Şehzade Sultan Bayezid'in İran'a Firari (Divan-ı Hümayunun Gayr-ı Matbû' Vesaikine Nazaran)”. p. 709, 714
87 See for instance the edict sent to the kadıs of Kütahya, Karahisar-ı Sahib and Şeyhlü, ibid. p. 715
88 Murphey, Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty, Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800. 115
90 Murphey, Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty, Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800. p. 124
Located in Kütahya, and more importantly, how they were integrated into the social and economic life of the city. But it is highly unlikely that such a large retinue would be completely detached from the fabric of the society in Kütahya.

Kunt is more interested in the process of succession, and the impact of the princely household formation had on the central authority. But given the importance of the revenues allocated to the princes and the high-ranking governors, their discretion in spending and allocating these revenues to establish their own patronage networks, and the predominance of regional trade, it can be imagined that the impact of a specific princely household on the economy of a province was also extremely important. To give an idea of the financial scope of a household at the end of the sixteenth century: Murad III’s retinue in 1574 consisted of 1,800 men. Mehmed III’s retinue in 1583 was “between 1,500 and 2,000 in all with the standard contingents of cavalrymen, troops (sekbân), runners (peyk), left-handed guards (solak), and horse-grooms, many from the imperial palace but also some from grandee households. The prince’s revenue grant …” was 3,200,000 silver akches, an amount greater than revenues allocated to vezirs. While the official rank of the prince was sancakbeyi, district governor, one of the several hundred in the realm, his revenues were commensurate with his status as royal prince. The practice of sending the princes to Anatolian provinces came to an end with Mehmed III. From then on, the palace became the privileged seat of succession struggles, and even though the Ottoman dynasty reigned supreme, a new configuration of power relations determined the political structure of the Ottoman realm from the seventeenth century onward—a new political formation in which new actors and groups came more and more to replace the sultan and his immediate entourage.

Most studies on the socioeconomic history of the provinces concentrate on the peripheral provinces, and the works on the province of Anatolia are exclusively descriptive in character. This leaves major lacunae in our understanding of socioeconomic change in places like Kütahya. The scholarship tends to oscillate between a state-centric perspective, which privileges the central authority as the main agent of historical change (Kütahya becomes important for no other reason than that it was made the capital of the heartlands of the empire), and a perspective that emphasizes the agency of the social groups and actors in the periphery in order to counter the excesses of the statist point of view. Moreover, long term structural changes, such changes in the relations of production, landholding patterns, population change, and trade relations, get more attention in socioeconomic histories of the provinces than do specific historical conjunctures, and these histories relegate contingent factors to the background. However, the impact on the provinces of the administrative structure and of the formation of the princely households is well worth studying in detail, because the relationship between the policies of the central authority and those of the local power holders was more complex than can be explained by a dichotomy based on the center and the periphery. Not only were the enormous revenues in the possession of the princes the basis of household formation in the provinces, but the allocation of revenues to household members could extend the reach of a network of patronage ties, because the revenue holders could form new alliances at the local level. As Kunt explains, “some of them

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91 In English, a household would usually consist of both men and women, where a retinue might be just men. This is important to note that household and retinue are used interchangeably in this context. I thank Irene Elmer for pointing out this subtle but important difference.

92 Kunt, "A Prince Goes Forth (Perchance to Return)." p.64
increasingly built up their operations to bid for larger sources, sometimes in partnership with merchants. This development, mixing essential military duties with fiscal enterprise … made it possible to keep regular per diem low. By this method, the household could be expanded at no extra cost.”

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

If the details of household formation and its impact at the local socioeconomic level are hard to come by, the same holds true for the specifics of the population change. However, in this case, general patterns of change can be identified, at least for the sixteenth century, because Ottoman demographic studies developed to a great extent as a byproduct of the works on local-history, and they focused mostly on the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These studies have provided historians with enough material to work on demographic change. Most of these historians agree that the population of the empire increased considerably throughout the sixteenth century. Barkan, who was the first historian to concentrate on demographic history, states that the Ottoman population in general, and the urban population in particular, grew continuously. This observation holds true for the district of Kütahya overall. According to Varlık’s calculations, the population of the district was 215,410 in 1520. It was 276,053 in 1534 and 356,971 in 1571, for an increase of over 75 percent throughout the century. This is consistent with a general pattern of population increase in the Ottoman Empire. Table 1 gives Barkan’s and Varlık’s estimates of population change in some of the major provinces throughout the sixteenth century.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1521</th>
<th>1520-1530</th>
<th>1570-1580</th>
<th>% increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kütahya (district)</td>
<td>215,410</td>
<td>276,053</td>
<td>356,971</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anatolia</td>
<td>474,447</td>
<td>672,512</td>
<td></td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaman</td>
<td>146,644</td>
<td>268,028</td>
<td></td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rum-i Kadım (Amasya, Tokat, Canik …)</td>
<td>106,186</td>
<td>189,643</td>
<td></td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rum-i Hadis (Trabzon, Kemah, Malatya)</td>
<td>75,976</td>
<td>117,263</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Population Change in some of the major provinces throughout the sixteenth century

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93 Kunt, “Sultan, Dynasty and State in the Ottoman Empire: Political Institutions in the Sixteenth Century.” p.229
97 I am using Barkan’s and Varlık’s estimates. It is important to note that my purpose in providing these data is to give only a sense of the populations change and a comparative perspective. There are considerable difficulties in calculating the population change, and most of the data should be taken with a grain of salt. Delving into the specific problems of demographic history, and especially into the specific problems of the use of the land registers could be a long research project in its own right. Barkan, "Research on the Ottoman Fiscal Surveys." p.169, Varlık, "16. Yüzyılda Kütahya Sancağında Yerleşme Ve Vergi Nüfusu."
With some exceptions, such as Aleppo and Damascus, the population of the major towns and cities also seems to have increased by 80 to 90 percent. In the city of Kutahya itself, the population increase was 70 percent. Table 2 gives estimates of the population change in some of the major towns in Anatolia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City or town</th>
<th>1520</th>
<th>1530-1535</th>
<th>1570-1580</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kutahya</td>
<td>5,438</td>
<td>4,972</td>
<td>7,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lâzikiyye (Denizli)</td>
<td>3,500 – 4,800</td>
<td>3,600 – 6,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>34,930</td>
<td>70,686</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>14,872</td>
<td>29,007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>6,127</td>
<td>15,356</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manisa</td>
<td>6,496</td>
<td>8,245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaman</td>
<td>2,079 – 2,426 [1523]</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,144 – 7,168 [1585]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amasya</td>
<td>5,970 – 6,965 [1523]</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,978 – 11,641 [1585]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,644 – 1,918 [1585]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Population change in some of the major towns throughout the sixteenth century

However, despite the availability of demographic data, and despite the fact that demographic studies based on the land registers (tapu tahrir) became a field in their own right, there are significant disagreements among scholars concerning the details. The major problem posed by demographic studies is the difficulty of relating population growth to other social developments, such as the Celâlî uprisings at the end of the sixteenth century, or to changing production patterns in agrarian economies. The question is how to interpret correctly the impact of the population growth. Was it important enough to cause a population pressure, which in turn led to a significant decrease in population in the seventeenth century? This would be in accord with Malthusian, or Neo-Malthusian theories. To what extent was the population growth the cause of the great Celâlî uprisings at the end of the sixteenth century—uprisings that emptied the countryside, and led to a drastic decrease in agricultural production?


For studies that try to relate demographic patterns to social history, an important factor in determining whether population growth might have led to social unrest is the increase in the population of landless peasants, especially in number of mücerred (landless unmarried men). This increase indicated either that there was less land available for cultivation, or that young men could not marry easily because the economy was in the midst of a depression (a point first emphasized by M. A. Cook). Both landlessness and the postponement of marriage created a pool of young men looking for ways to make a living other than working on their lands. Migration to relatively wealthy urban centers, vagabondage, joining the unruly groups of brigands in the countryside, entering a religious school (medrese), or joining the household of a provincial governor as an irregular soldier were the available options. Whichever the option, the mücerreds took, it created a good deal of anxiety for the ruling cadres, because it meant the loss of taxable population, social unrest, the need to reorganize the army, and the rise of centrifugal forces. I will have more to say about the social, economic, and political consequences of this specific demographic change, but to suggest how serious the problems was, in northwestern Anatolia, “the combined proportion of unmarried and landless men among the total adult male population at the turn of the last quarter of the sixteenth century was around 80 percent in Canik region and around 76 percent in Amasya.” Even though the short life span and the high proportion of young people in premodern societies can explain the high percentage of the mücerreds to some extent, these figures still indicate “a serious imbalance between the population and the economy.” Similar studies on the demographics of the sixteenth century also show that there was an increase in the number of the mücerreds in most parts of Anatolia and Rumelia. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that in the field of demographic history there are still major gaps in our knowledge that prevent us from making generalizations concerning the territories of the empire. Not only are there not enough empirical data, but there are also significant regional differences. For instance, Leila Erder and Suraiya Faroqhi have shown that even with the decrease in population in the seventeenth century, it is possible to observe an increase in the mücerred population in some parts of Anatolia—a finding that does not support Cook’s argument. They argue that the increasing number of mücerreds despite a

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100 Cook argued that “one would expect the scarcity of resources in a society to have some effect on the age at which a man might be in a position to marry. How far this is so depends of course on the society in question. It is plausible enough that such an effect should have existed in sixteenth-century Anatolia, where marriage was subject to the payment of a bride price. A rise in population pressure might thus be expected to generate a rise in the population of adult males unmarried … the surveys certainly indicate a dramatic increase in this proportion, with levels as low as 3 percent at the beginning of the period and as high as 48 percent at the end.” M. A. Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia 1450-1600, London Oriental Series (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). p.26 However, let us note that Cook is also careful to qualify his statement, and proposes it as a hypothesis.

101 Özel, "Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The "Demographic Crisis" Reconsidered." p.187

102 Ibid.

103 See for instance, İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century. However, Özel criticizes İslamoğlu for misinterpreting the category of mücerred and caba, and therefore making factual mistakes, Özel, "Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The "Demographic Crisis" Reconsidered." p. 186

104 In their article published in 1979 that tried to provide an overall interpretive framework for the population change in the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Leila Erder and Suraiya Faroqhi pointed out the limitations of the resources, and the difficulties to come up with satisfactory generalizations based on convincing evidence. Leila Erder and Suraiya Faroqhi, "Population Rise and Fall in Anatolia 1560-1620," Middle Eastern Studies 15, no. 3 (1979). For their reference to Cook, p. 336. Özel makes similar points after twenty-five years, Özel,
population decrease is attributable to the pull factor. The urban centers in certain parts of Anatolia drew mücerreds from other parts of Anatolia, leading to an increase in the urban centers. They also suggest that the officials may have changed some of the criteria for registering the mücerreds either by lowering the age of males qualifying as mücerreds or by registering as mücerreds other groups who might have previously been exempt from taxation. These observations and suggestions indicate the extent to which local factors play a role in determining the specific characteristics of a region within a general pattern of population change.

For instance, a rather different pattern emerges in the sancak of Kütahya. In the case of Denizli, which was part of the sancak of Kütahya, there was “an extraordinary increase (159.59%) in the number of households holding the minimum amount of land (bennak, or less than a farmstead), while the proportion of those holding a full farmstead decreased significantly … Interestingly, this was accompanied by a drastic fall in the number of unmarried adult men (75.77%). In this case, it seems that the observed population growth followed a different path.”

At the same time there was a significant decrease in the full and half farmsteads (tam çift and nim çift)–51 percent and 30 percent respectively—which shows that the lands cultivated under these categories were getting smaller and smaller. This was a situation that the central authority wanted to avoid, because more often than not the dividing up of the cultivated lands meant less production, less taxation, and consequently the dispersal of the peasantry—a serious threat to the tax base of the state as well as a threat to the legitimacy of the state as the protector of the peasants. Following this logic, Turan Gökçe’s interpretation of the change in the landholding pattern and the tax base is that even though the state could not prevent the dividing up of the farmsteads, it attempted to register as many taxpayers as possible under different categories.

As far as the mücerreds are concerned, a similar pattern can be detected in the sancak of Kütahya. Table 3 shows the number households and mücerreds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1520</th>
<th>1534</th>
<th>1571</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Households</td>
<td>41,638</td>
<td>40,559</td>
<td>71,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mücerred</td>
<td>7,237</td>
<td>11,393</td>
<td>1,441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: The number of households and mücerreds in the sancak of Kütahya throughout the sixteenth century

In the case of the Kütahya district, the decrease in the number of mücerreds was even more pronounced. However, Varlık, who compiled the numbers does not explain why there was such a drastic decrease. The fact that this decrease accompanied a significant increase in population goes against the major assumptions in the field. For this reason, we need to look into it further. For the moment, we can only put forward certain working hypotheses. First, the proximity of the Kütahya district to major cities such as Bursa and Istanbul might have worked as a pull factor by

"Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The "Demographic Crisis" Reconsidered."

105 Özel, "Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The "Demographic Crisis" Reconsidered." p.187 Özel makes this remark with reference to Gökçe, Xvi Ve Xvii. Yüzyıllarda Lâzikyye (Denizli) Kazâsi. p.343

106 Gökçe, Xvi Ve Xvii. Yüzyıllarda Lâzikyye (Denizli) Kazâsi. p.343

offering the mücerreds better opportunities to earn a living. Second, as Gökçe suggests, the category of mücerred might have been changed to include a significant number of these men in other categories of taxpayers.

As for the consequences of the population increase in the sixteenth century, new demographic research shows that there was a population decrease beginning in the latter part of the sixteenth and reaching its low point in the 1640s. However, while there is a general notwithstanding a consensus on the decline, there is disagreement as to the gravity of the decline—that is, as to whether it could be interpreted as a catastrophe. A well-articulated and comparative discussion of this subject comprises two important scholarly debates. The first debate is about the effects of population pressure on premodern societies in general. This debate revolves around the characteristics of the peasant economy, and the extent to which a premodern peasant economy could find ways to increase production to feed an increasing population without falling into a subsistence crisis. The stagnant character of the peasant economies and their technological threshold make them susceptible to subsistence crises in the face of population increase. The second debate is the general crisis of the seventeenth-century in Eurasian polities in particular. This debate takes on a more comparative perspective. It asks whether it is possible to talk about a crisis that goes beyond population pressure and subsistence crisis. And it asks to what degree the general crisis was a widespread phenomenon that included most societies in Eurasia. Scholars started discussing the general crisis of the seventeenth century fifty years ago, and they still believe that it is plausible to talk about a widespread social, political, and demographic crisis for the seventeenth century, but they also point out that this crisis needs to be much more carefully defined. As far as historical demography is concerned, Anne E.C McCants argues that despite a population decrease and to some extent a subsistence crisis in the seventeenth century, it is no less crucial to explain the responses to these phenomena than it is to make generalizations about the crisis of the seventeenth century itself. In this respect, recent research shows that the response to these phenomena varied by region to a greater extent than was previously thought. At the same time, it appears that marriage behavior, which displayed a similar pattern across Europe, did not change significantly in response to the crisis. This factor differentiated Europe from other premodern societies. How, then, asks McCants, is it

109 Özel, "Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The "Demographic Crisis" Reconsidered."
110 There is a substantial literature on these two topics which will take us far beyond the topic at hand, that is, to make some general remarks on the demography of the district of Kütahya. Özel gives a concise overview of both debates with specific references to how they were interpreted in Ottoman history, ibid.. A more indepth discussion of Malthusian, and neo-Malthusian theories of population growth, the nature of the premodern peasant economies is in, İsmailoğlu İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century. Maria Todorova situates the debates on population fall into the context of the seventeenth century crisis, Maria N. Todorova, "Was There a Demographic Crisis in the Ottoman Empire in the Seventeenth Century?," Études Balkaniques, no. 2 (1988). For a recent reevaluation of the seventeenth century crisis, Anne E.C. McCants, "Historical Demography and the Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," Journal of Interdisciplinary History XL, no. 2 (2009). Theodore K. Rabb, "Introduction: The Persistence of Crisis," Journal of Interdisciplinary History XL, no. 2 (2009); Jan De Vries, "The Economic Crisis of the Seventeenth Century after Fifty Years," Journal of Interdisciplinary History XL, no. 2 (2009).
possible to talk about a demographic crisis, if one of the indicators of change remains more or less constant?  

For the historians of the Ottoman Empire, there is the added dimension of another set of debates. These debates focus on the reliability of a new set of primary sources used for demographic studies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Major land and fiscal surveys, which are the primary sources used for demographic studies of the sixteenth century, do not exist for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The demographic historians therefore need to find alternative sources, and the new tax registers (the registers of avârız and cizye) that replaced the old land surveys pose even more serious problems of interpretation than the old surveys. As far as demographic studies are concerned, the major problem is that it is very difficult to infer the general population of a given locality on the basis of a single tax unit (hâne, or more precisely avârızhâne). The multiplier three or five is generally used in the case of a tax unit in the old land registers, because every tax unit referred to a real household, which is believed to have been composed of a family of three to five. However, it is not clear how many real households an avârızhâne refers to. The best strategy so far has been to follow the number of avârızhâne assigned to a region over a period of time, without making any guesses as to the population of the region. It is true that this approach takes for granted that the tax unit remained constant throughout the period under scrutiny, and it makes observations on population growth on the basis of change in the number of the tax units. Furthermore, as Faroqhi says, “in the eighteenth century so many taxes came to be collected by lifetime tax farmers that counts of the taxable population became irrelevant.” Whatever the assumptions and the shortcomings of these registers may be, Özel argues that “the few studies undertaken on these sources in comparison with the tahrir registers of the late sixteenth century point out to a radical decrease of around 80 percent in the recorded tax-paying population of the north-central Anatolian district of Amasya, Canik, and Bozok in the first half of the seventeenth century, with a corresponding figure of around 70 percent in the district of Tokat. [Furthermore] in the case of Amasya, 30–40 percent of the villages that existed in the 1570s appear by the 1640s to have been abandoned or ruined. A

111 McCants, "Historical Demography and the Crisis of the Seventeenth Century."
112 Faroqhi, "Rural Life." p. 376 Historians have of course been drawing attention to the new tax registers for some time, however, the first detailed study on these registers is very recent. For the major problems pertaining to the use of these registers and an attempt to use them for social and demographic history, Süleyman Demirci, The Functioning of Ottoman Avârız Taxation: An Aspect of the Relationship between Centre and Periphery a Case Study of the Province of Karaman 1621 - 1700 (Istanbul The ISIS Press, 2009). For another attempt to use both land register of the sixteenth century with the avârız registers of the seventeenth century in a comparative maner for demographic change in Syria, Malissa Taylor, "Some Figures for the Urban and Rural Populations of Damascus Province in the Late Seventeenth Century," Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies 35(2010). Taylor argues that despite its limitations, avârız registers when carefully used, could give valuable information on demographic change, landholding patterns, and agricultural production.
113 Demirci provides a working definition for avârızhâne, “the term avârızhâne denotes an administratively-defined ‘tax-household’ or ‘tax house unit’. In the fifteenth and early sixteenth century one avârızhâne comprised of just one gerçekhâne (real household) or nefer (individual) but by the seventeenth century the system had changed to one of larger groupings, with one avârızhâne comprising several gerçekhânes or nefers. Avârız was levied only every 4-5 years in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries … and annually in the seventeenth century. The number of gerçekhânes in an avârızhâne unit varied over time and place, according to government need, to administrative practice, and to the estimated financial circumstances of the tax-payers in a given area.” Demirci, The Functioning of Ottoman Avârız Taxation: An Aspect of the Relationship between Centre and Periphery a Case Study of the Province of Karaman 1621 - 1700. p.44
114 Faroqhi, "Rural Life." p.376
similar pattern, though less dramatic, is observable in the neighboring districts of Canik, Bozok, and Tokat.” However, the research on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is very recent, the scope of this research is still very limited, and the limitations of the sources on demography are significant. There is therefore good reason to be skeptical about such a significant population decrease throughout the empire. More importantly, it is not clear whether this decrease was the cause or the consequence of a subsistence crisis, if there was one.116

This, then, is the general context of the debates on the population decrease in the seventeenth century. If we turn to the district of Kütahya, we can only make educated guesses about this decrease on the basis of scant hints about demography, since no demographic studies for the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries have been undertaken. One possible clue to examine population change is to look at the change in the number of mezraas (uninhabited or abandoned arable lands or villages), and at how widespread they were in a given region.117 In 1984, Margaret Venzke looked at the change in these lands and argued that in the face of population pressure, one possible way to prevent a subsistence crisis and to augment agricultural production was to revive the mezzraas. In Syria, Venzke observed a significant increase in the number of mezzraas that revived for use in cereal production, and interpreted this “as the decisive factor in staving off a real food crisis.”118 In a sense, these lands were auxiliary sources that were closely linked to the villages and urban centers, and were reopened, as it were, in case of food shortage. Venzke also notes that in the district of Aleppo, the mezzraas had outnumbered the settled villages, and therefore there was already a pool of lands that could be used to grow food. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan also draws attention to the use of the mezzraas to settle the nomadic population, to increase the number of people working on the land, and consequently to raise more taxes throughout the sixteenth century in northern and central Anatolia. She also argues that the mezzraas could thus be turned into villages by settling a population on them permanently, which would in turn increase food production and slow down, if not totally prevent, the fragmentation of arable lands.119 As for the province of Anatolia in the first half of the sixteenth century, the number of mezzraas was relatively low compared to the number of villages.120 Table 4 shows the distribution of the villages and mezzraas in Kütahya.

115 Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The "Demographic Crisis" Reconsidered.” p. 190
116 Already in 1988 Maria Todorova argued that it was highly dubious to suggest that there was a drastic population fall, let alone a crisis, Todorova, “Was There a Demographic Crisis in the Ottoman Empire in the Seventeenth Century?” Recently, Mehmet Öz argued that even though it is plausible to talk about significant population fall, “there is a need for more research to examine the reliability of these data on the one hand, and study the changes in settlement patterns and population after 1650 on the other.” Mehmet Öz, "Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok," Archivum Ottomanicum 22(2004). p.169-170
119 İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century. pp.146-148. For a summary of her arguments in this regard, İslamoğlu-İnan, "State and Peasants in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of Peasant Economy in North-Central Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century." pp. 114-116
120 438 Numaralı Muhasebe-I Vilayet-I Anadolu Defteri (937/1530). Varlık, "16. Yüzyılda Kütahya Sancağında Yerleşme Ve Vergi Nüfusu." Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Kuruş Devrinin Toprak Meseleri ", p.290 For İslamoğlu-İnan’s research area, north-central Anatolia, the ratio of the villages to the mezraas was 491to 119. However there is a good deal of uncertainty on the transformation of the mezraas into the villages, and whether or
Villages & Mezraas in the sancak and the district of Kütahya in 1534

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Anatolia (Province)</th>
<th>Kütahya (sancak)</th>
<th>Kütahya (district)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1534</td>
<td>12,527</td>
<td>1071</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.197</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures suggest that there was less land to be revived in the district of Kütahya in case of population pressure and food shortage. There are no reliable demographic data for the sancak of Kütahya for the end of the sixteenth or for most of the seventeenth century, but İnalcık argues that starting with the end of the sixteenth century, there was a tremendous increase in mezraas in Anatolia, resulting in a great diminution of agricultural land and grain production. This contradicts Venzke’s findings with respect to Syria.

In the absence of secondary sources that investigate and compare many factors that vary over time and place, these observations about Kütahya can be only starting points for further research. As far as administrative organization, demography, and landholding patterns are concerned, there are simply too many variables that must be accounted for, and even a seemingly minor point of inquiry could well turn into a full-length dissertation project. In the case of the mezraas, for instance, registering the ratio of the mezraas to villages, or providing a snapshot of their numbers at a given point in time, would not give an accurate picture of social change. Not only is it necessary to record the change over time, but it is also crucial to follow the transformation of one category into another. In this sense, the transformation of the mezraas into settled villages, and the total number of villages that remain intact throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are just as important as the ration of villages to mezraas. The lack of hard data and comparative evidence force the historian to recognize that sometimes one’s research findings resemble a patchwork rather than a fully integrated representation of social change. One of the ways to overcome these shortcomings is to diversify one’s sources, and to use other types of evidence to fill in the gaps in one’s knowledge. This is evident when one turns to the study of the Celâlâ uprisings.

THE CELÂLİ UPRISINGS

From the 1590s to the 1620s is one, most of the empire, but more specifically the Anatolian peninsula, was affected by the Celâlâ uprisings. Groups of brigands, usually led by disenchanted military officers roamed the countryside, pillaged the villages, laid siege to the towns, and rebelled against the central authority. As is the case with all large-scale social movements, a variety of causes led to the emergence of the Celâlâs. Apart from the population not the relatively low number of transformation (15 in total) is enough evidence for İslamoğlu to make the claim that mezraas played as an important role as in Syria for sedentarization process, in increasing food production and staving off subsistence crisis. İslamoğlu-Inan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century. p.50 Turan Gökçe’s research on Lâzıkyye (Denizli) also shows that the number of the mezraas were not very high, and they had even dropped to some extent throughout the sixteenth century (however, the administrative restructuring plays a more important role by taking one of the sub-districts out of Denizli’s administrative terrain than other social and economic factors). Gökçe, Xvi Ve XVii. Yüzyıllarda Lâzıkyye (Denizli) Kazâşı. pp.166-168

112 İnalcık, "Mezra'a."
increase, the protracted wars at the Habsburg and Safavi fronts, the spread of firearms, the rise to prominence of the provincial governors and the formation of households, inflation, and the heavy taxation of the peasantry all contributed to the uprisings. While it is difficult to determine their net effect on the decrease in population, the most important consequence of the uprisings was their effect on the countryside. The Celâlî bands either pillaged the farmlands, or tried to raise their own taxes on the peasantry, and this pressure, coupled with the general economic downturn, forced the peasantry to leave their villages and flee their lands. Furthermore, their recruitment into the households as irregular troops, or directly into the army, created a new career path for the dislocated and impoverished peasantry, and made it even more difficult for them to return to peasant life. It is at this juncture that a whole array of documents, but especially the mühimme registers (orders sent from the central authority to the provincial districts); provide historians with some of the details that are missing from the tax registers and fiscal surveys. Because they represented the perspective of the state, they register the anxiety of the central authority in the face of the disorder, and its attempt to legitimize itself as the protector of the reaya. They are replete with responses to the complaints of the villagers, and town dwellers about the devastating effects of the uprisings, and they frequently refer to the dispersal and oppression of the peasantry by the rebels, the emptying of villages, famine, and falling revenues.

The critical turning point for the uprisings occurred after the Battle of Mezö-keresztes (Eğri) in 1596. In the aftermath of the war, the grand vizier dismissed the revenue grants of the timar holders who either had altogether been absent or had fled during the war. It is suggested that the military men whose revenues were dismissed and confiscated became the leaders of the uprisings. Mustafa Akdağ suggests that most of the dismissed timar holders had been granted substantial revenues and had been avoiding military service for some time. We may speculate that with these wealthy timar holders might already have established themselves in their districts, and that any interference with their income would put not only their livelihood but also the livelihood of others at stake. There was, in short, a wide network of interests that may have formed the background of the uprisings. Furthermore, as we have seen, the formation of households at the provincial level throughout the sixteenth century had prepared the way for mobilizing young men, and had provided them with firearms. It is understandable, then, that the Anatolian peninsula, where the timar system was more thoroughly established, was also the hotbed of the uprisings, and that Kütahya, like most of the other major towns suffered heavily during the Celâlî rebellion.

What is commonly referred to as the Celâlî uprisings was not one single uprising, comprising well-defined groups and following a clear-cut chronological order. The uprisings went through phases, and those who were labeled rebels at one point were later coopted by the

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123 Christoph Neumann, "Political and Diplomatic Developments," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey, the Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). p.45

state and fought against other rebel groups. The complicated history of the uprisings does not concern us here, but its effects on the region do. The Celâlî uprisings were the culmination of a long social transformation, and similar disturbances had taken place since the middle of the sixteenth century. Akdağ mentions, for instance, important suhte movements around Kütahya in the period 1572-1575. These religious students proliferated in consequence of the increase in population and the scarcity of land. Following a career path in the medreses (religious schools), they greatly increased the number of graduates from these schools. Some suhtes unable to pursue their career path, and others, aware that their future looked bleak, formed groups of anywhere from fifteen or twenty to five hundred suhtes and began to pillage the countryside or levy their own “taxes.” The formation of rival groups brought with it intense competition, amounting in some cases, to a small-scale civil war. Akdağ states that regions both west and south of Kütahya witnessed these turf wars. Mühimme registers indicate that up to eight hundred suhtes might participate in these wars, but Akdağ believes that this figure could well be even higher. In one instance in 1572, at least a hundred suhtes from Germiyan fought with another group of three hundred suhtes from the Karasi, and their war caused a good deal of destruction in and around the region. Before 1572, there are already records of incidents that took place in the area between Kütahya and Antalya. Similar competition between groups of students led to pillaging of the countryside, kidnapping, and rape. The important point that Akdağ mentions is the existence of a rather well-developed textile sector and a widespread network of soup kitchens, which could provide the religious schools with financial assistance. Not only were these soup kitchens and religious schools indicators of wealth, but they provided the institutional background that attracted the students in the first place. Nevertheless, the student groups never formed a truly threatening unified front against the state. The central authority’s attitude toward them was at best ambiguous. As Barkey points out, “state officials felt forced to take new action only when suhtes moved closer to Istanbul, when Bursa, Balıkesir, in fact all of western Anatolia seemed terrorized by the threat of suhtes and Afyonkarahisar became the feared center of students. The suhte problem became acute when the military’s attention was diverted to the war with Iran in 1581-1582. At this time, new edicts, pardons, and solutions of various kinds were promulgated.” Barkey argues that the state perceived the suhtes as part of the general provincial malaise—a part that was easy to defeat militarily if need be. The attitude of the central authority changed when the suhtes became part of a broader uprising, sometimes in alliance with the Celâlî forces, sometimes in open rivalry with them. In this respect, the fact that the suhtes would sometimes ally themselves with the local people and serve as a deterring force against the Celâlîs explains the ambiguity of the state’s attitude toward them.

Apart from the movements of the suhtes, the gravest incident seems to have been the siege of Kütahya in 1602 by the forces of Deli Hasan. The years from 1600 to 1603 also seem to represent a turning point in the composition of the forces that made up the uprisings, in the intensity of the uprisings, and in the tactics used by their leadership. One of the leaders of the

125 For Karen Barkey, this process of cooptation and negotiation was a very important part of the state centralization process in the seventeenth century. Rather than a decline or a weakness, cooptation was a response to the social, economic and military change of the seventeenth century. Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats : The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).
126 Akdağ, Türk Halkının Dirlik Ve Düzenlik Kavgası. p.194-195
127 Ibid. pp.199-207
128 Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats : The Ottoman Route to State Centralization. p.162
129 Akdağ, Türk Halkının Dirlik Ve Düzenlik Kavgası. p.406-412
Celâlî forces at the end of the sixteenth century was Karayazıcı Abdülhalim. A musketeer who had been promoted to the rank of bölük-başı (company leader), Karayazıcı gathered around him a large retinue and pillaged the countryside in northern and central Anatolia. Up to now, the, the effects of the rebellions were felt mainly in the countryside, and bigger towns and cities were relatively safe. After the central authority attempted to coopt Karayazıcı into the Ottoman administrative system by assigning him a post, he was finally killed by a military force dispatched to suppress the rebellions. According to Akdağ, after Karayazıcı’s death, his brother Deli Hasan stepped up for the leadership, and the rebellion intensified—this time including the siege and pillaging of the major cities. In 1601 the forces of Deli Hasan moved west, pillaging first Çorum and Tokat, and extorting 80,000 gold guruş from Ankara for not pillaging that city. In response, the state dispatched Hafiz Ahmed Paşa to suppress Deli Hasan’s forces, but Hafiz Ahmed Paşa took refuge in the Kütahya castle. Apparently the rebel forces then laid siege to Kütahya, but had to withdraw due to bad weather. The fact that Kütahya had a castle probably saved the city from destruction, and it is clear from the orders sent from the central authority that the upkeep of the castle was of the utmost importance. After the siege of Kütahya, Deli Hasan and some of his forces were given military positions, and a deal was struck between the state and Deli Hasan. Kütahya was thus saved from another major attack, but other rebel leaders, such as Tavil Mehmet and Karakaş Ahmet, continued to roam the countryside and plunder the cities. In the summer of 1603, Tavil Mehmet laid another siege to Kütahya, and threatening to burn the neighborhoods around the castle unless he was given 60,000 gold guruş and horses. The state struck another deal by giving Tavil Mehmet the governorship of Şehrizul, and once again Kütahya was saved.

The cooptation of Deli Hasan opened another phase in the Celâlî uprisings. The attacks of different Celâlî groups intensified, especially from 1603 to 1606, sparing only well-fortified towns and cities. The result is often described as the “Great Flight” (Büyük Kaçgun), the peasantry leaving their villages for the security of the walled towns or the mountains. As Akdağ points out, it is difficult to document the scale of destruction in the countryside and the cities, but there is no doubt that the villages in the countryside were deserted, and that agricultural production fell considerably. Furthermore, the districts of Saruhan and Ankara, west and east of Kütahya, remained the stronghold of the rebel forces for another decade. Even though Kütahya seems to have escaped the destruction that Ankara suffered, complaints of oppression by and the unruly actions of the bandits (eğkiya) frequently appear in the mühimme registers. Süleyman Polat, in a study on the orders concerning Kütahya and its environs in the mühimme registers, found out that out of 179 orders sent to Kütahya throughout the seventeenth century,

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130 For a concise political history of Karayazıcı and his brother Deli Hasan, Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020 / 1591-1611. pp. 24-46
131 It is not clear how long the siege lasted. Even though it is known that the Hafiz Ahmed Paşa preferred to stay within the castle, how much of it was due to an actual siege is unclear. Griswold says with reference to Naima that the siege lasted a couple months, ibid. p.42, whereas Uzunçarşıhi notes with reference to Katip Çelebi that it lasted three days, İslami Hakki Uzunçarşıhi, Bizans Ve Selçukilerle Germiyen Ve Osmanlı Ogullari Zamaninda Kütahya Şehri (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1932). p.151
132 Akdağ, Türk Halkının Dirlik Ve Düzenlik Kavgasi. p.415-416
133 For a general description of the “Great Flight,” ibid.pp.455-503
nearly half were about various forms of rebellion, bandits, and the Celâlîs; more precisely, 72 orders were about the bandits and the Celâlîs.\footnote{Polat’s study covers 37 mühimme registers, and transcribes all of the orders sent to Kütahya. It is an attempt to classify, and analyze the contents of the mühimme register for a specific region, but the study does not provide an overall historical context, nor does it refer to specific debates about the period, or the mühimme registers. It should also be noted that the classification of the orders (as rebels, the corruption of the state official, or military/army etc) is not based on any clearly articulated criteria. In this sense, it is not exactly clear what differentiates the Celâlîs from sporadic banditry, brigandage from unruly behaviour of a group of religious students. These distinctions are very hard to established. It is therefore important to take the classification with a grain of salt. Süleyman Polat, “17. Yüzyılda Mühimme Defterlerine Göre Kütahya” (Unpublished M.A Thesis, Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 2005). For the mühimme registers, I will use Polat’s study, and the references will be first to individual the register, then, the order number in the register, and then the page number in Polat’s study. Hence MD (mühimme defteri) 75, hk (hüküm, order) 4, ibid. p. 55. MD 75, hk 57, ibid. p. 57 For the differentiation between those who were from the region (yerlüden olmak) and Celâlî, MD 77, hk 381, ibid. p.59 MD 78, hk 2043, ibid. p.65 Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020 / 1591-1611. p.42}

The orders from the first decade of the seventeenth century clearly show the central authority’s preoccupation with the Celâlîs. The century opens with Hafız Paşâ being dispatched to suppress the rebellion. The order of dispatch, issued in 1602, and recorded in the mühimme register, is short and does not reveal much about the dimensions of the rebellions,\footnote{MD 78, hk 2043, ibid. p.65} but it becomes apparent that the Kütahya castle retains a crucial role as a stronghold against the Celâlîs. Even though there are no references to Deli Hasan’s siege of the castle, or to the fact that Hafiz Ahmed Paşa had to take refuge in it, another order, issued in 1602, states that because some of the military personnel employed for the protection of the castle have joined the rebel groups, it is of the utmost importance not to let any suspicious personnel into the castle.\footnote{For the mühimme registers, I will use Polat’s study, and the references will be first to individual the register, then, the order number in the register, and then the page number in Polat’s study. Hence MD (mühimme defteri) 75, hk (hüküm, order) 4, ibid. p. 55. MD 75, hk 57, ibid. p. 57} One of the important aspects of the Celâlî uprisings is the fluidity of the boundaries between a legal military position and that of a Celâlî, or rebel and bandit. It seems that at least in some cases, the central authority tried to differentiate between the local groups which might have revolted—for various reasons—and those who were described as outsiders and Celâlîs.\footnote{For the differentiation between those who were from the region (yerlüden olmak) and Celâlî, MD 77, hk 381, ibid. p.59} This differentiation would be an important factor in deciding whether to issue pardon for those who had joined the rebels out of fear but were not proven to have acted against the establishment.\footnote{MD 78, hk 2043, ibid. p.65} Even though cooptation and pardon was a major state policy, and can even be seen as contributing to the transformation of the state structure in response to certain problems in the seventeenth century, central authority needed a legitimate ground to take this specific decision. To pardon the peasantry who might have joined the Celâlîs or provided them with logistic support was probably easier than pardoning the Celâlîs who had previously been members of the military. This was because some of the Celâlîs were offered higher positions, but also because the damage inflicted on the revenue holders who had remained loyal to the central authority was substantial enough for them to insist on punishing, rather than rewarding, the rebels. As William Griswold points out the central authority had a hard time controlling the Anatolian sipahis whose revenues had been hit hard by the Celâlî rebellions. Pardons and cooptation policies "brought sharp protests from among various Anatolian landholding cavalrmen who were temporarily stationed at the capital. These askerî possessed lands which were being laid waste and whose way of life was being torn apart by the government’s weakness toward the Celâlîs. Thus did the elements for violent military revolt merge in January 1603."\footnote{Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020 / 1591-1611. p.42} Even though the government was able to quell
the revolt, the pressure on the central authority to change its policies continued. It was in this context of mounting pressure from the Celâlâis on one side and the Anatolian sipahis on the other that the central authority had to act. Deli Hasan, who had just laid siege to Kütahya, was given the provincial governorship of Bosnia, while some of the sipahi forces in the capital were killed to prevent further turmoil, after which “more than 4,000 angry sipahi cavalymen fled to Anatolia, many to join the very Celâlâ rebels they had sacrificed so much to eliminate.”

This does not mean, of course, that the government was simply condoning the Celâlâ uprising, as the appointment of Hafiz Ahmed Paşa demonstrates. However, the policy of suppression intensified only gradually. It is not difficult in this context to see why there was resentment on the part of the Anatolian sipahis. In an order dated 1610, it is stated that Bâli Çavuş and Yusuf Çavuş were identified as bandits (eskiyadan olub), and that they, together with thirty of their followers, raided the lands of Hasan, a zeamet holder. The bandits not only damaged crops worth of 20,000 akçe, but also seized crops worth of 30,000 akçe. Furthermore, the bandits also stole two horses, and the sword of Hasan’s subaşı along with other valuables. The fact that the bandits were identified as çavuş (sergeant) shows that they came from the disenfranchised military cadres. It is highly possible that they were not from among the cavalymen, but that they had been recruited as part of the irregular forces, moved up in the ranks, and later joined the rebel forces. The damage inflicted on the zeamet holder is also considerable. The loss of 50,000 akçe, horses, sword, and other valuables would have been enough to destroy the livelihood of a middle-rank military officer, and render him incapable of earning a living. Add to this loss the fact that the ongoing wars compelled the officer to remain the military duty; this, together with inflation, bandits roaming the countryside, and the flight of the peasantry from their lands, must have meant a total catastrophe for the zeamet holder.

There was even more reason for the provincial cavalymen to pursue their case against the bandits and the rebels, because by the end of 1609, the most organized Celâlâ groups and their chiefs had been eliminated. The grand vizier Kuyucu Murad Paşa had carried out a careful

\[140\] Ibid. p.44

\[141\] MD 79, hk 132, Polat, "17. Yüzyılda Mühimme Defterlerine Göre Kütahya". p.67. The transcription of the order is not entirely clear, it is highly possible that there are some mistakes in the transcription. However since by the time of the writing I did not access to the original, I used it with caution and by leaving out the sections which seemed dubious to me. For instance the position of the subaşı is not entirely clear. If the reference is to the subaşı of the zemet-holder, then probably the zeamet-holder is from a high military position (perhaps the son of Vezir Hızır Paşa) because the subaşıs in the provinces exercised more power than their counterparts in the cities. As J.H Kramers argues “they had their own fief and they exercised police control over the other sipahis and the inhabitants of the district under their charge. Amnistratively, they were under the authority of an alay-bey, who again, was subject to the sandjak bey. These subaşıs had many privileges, which varied according to the different provinces; they had the right to a certain amount of the impost and the fines extorted from the people.” J.H. Kramers and [C.E. Bosworth], "Subaşı," in Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: Brill, 2000). The following is the transcription of the first part of the order: "Anatolı Beğlerbeyisine ve Kütahiyeye ve Kebsud Kâdhılarna hüküm ki; düstür-i mükerrem, müşir-i müfahham nizamü’l-âlem Vezir Hızır Paşa edâma’llâhü te’âlâ iclâlehûya tarafından şöyle arz olundu ki Bâli Çavuş ve Yusuf Çavuş ve Hüseyin nâm kimesne eşkiyâdan olub müzarûn-ileyhallar mahallerin kazdurub merakleri üzerine müşarurün-ileyîyeh tarafindan müzevêver mektub yollayub Dergâh-ı Mu’allam müteferrikalarından olub müşararûn-ileyîyin oğlu olan Hasan zide medûhûnun ze’amet-i mahsûlûnden yirmi bin açaîîldadan ziyâde mahsûlûn ik’ârî bozub gâret idüb ve ademlerinden seferîn timarına ulûfeleleri yûgîken tuan Hatt-ı Hümayûnûla mukarrir kılmûnûs iken otuz neferden ziyade eşkiyà cem’ idüb varbud otuz bin açaîîld mahsûlûn kâzb idüb ve subaşı Mustafa’nın iki at ve iki kurnûzû ferâce ve kemer-rahî ve kılıç ve ba’zî esbâbını yağma idüb ziyade fesâd eyledikleri i’lâm olmağın mezbûrleri ele getirmegen emir idüb buyurдум ki.”
policy of first attracting the major chiefs to his side and then eliminating them one by one. After Kalenderoğlu, another major Celâlî leader, was defeated, there were only two important Celâlî leaders who could pose a direct threat in Anatolia. One was Yusuf Paşa, who was stationed in Aydın with a retinue of 3,000 to 4,000 men, and the other was Muslu Çavuş who had been the governor of İçel. Both were executed after being lured within the reach of the central authority, with the promise of high military rank for the upcoming Persian campaign. Griswold argues that “after 1610 an uncharacteristic calm came to Anatolia. For a decade no large-scale rebellion broke out. The executions of [the major Celâlî leaders] plus the strengthening of loyal military forces, helped to cool the ambitions of the minor Celâlîs who yet remained. Most importantly, timar-holders remained for a time on their lands rather than on the frontiers of the Empire, and protected their interests by acting against local brigands.” It is true that there are no specific references to the Celâlîs in the orders sent to Kütahya after the 1620s, but the repercussions of the uprisings continued at many different levels. For instance, the blurring of lines between the reaya and the askerî class, which some Ottoman historians, bureaucrats, and intellectuals had been complaining about so vehemently for some time, became the principal concern in the seventeenth century. A similar blurring of the lines complicated the distinction between the Celâlîs as more or less organized brigand groups, and the local bandits, who staged sporadic raids. The term eşkiya was usually applied to both, and references to bandits pillaging homes, killing cavalrymen, and seizing their valuables continue throughout the seventeenth century. For instance, in two cases in 1636, the bandits were identified either as military men—more specifically sipahis—or as the household servants of a sergeant, and were accused of being the accomplices of other bandits. In both cases, it is difficult to tell whether these men had actually been Celâlî bandits or whether they were identified as bandits simply because they had committed illegal actions. However, it is reasonable to assume that splinter groups would continue to exit long after the suppression of the main uprisings.

If it is not totally clear to what extent Celâlî splinter groups continued well into the 1630s, it is clear that calm was not easily restored between 1609 and 1620. While some minor Celâlî leaders who were caught and imprisoned in the castle of Kütahya were executed in 1609 and 1610, others continued to pillage the villages around Simav, taking more than 40,000 akçe. What is interesting in this case is that there seems to have been a battle between the suhtes and the Celâlîs, and as a result some suhtes were killed. It may be surmised that the tension between the suhtes and the Celâlîs intensified in or around 1609 and became a turf war. The central authority, after eliminating the major threats from the rebel forces, took on the suhtes. In 1610, an order was sent to the governor of Kütahya warning him not to allow the students in the Kula, Saruhan, and Menteşe regions to gather together. The order explicitly stated that—other than Istanbul, Edirne, and Bursa (bilâd-ı selâse)—the suhtes were forbidden to “walk around in groups” (cema’ât ile gezmeyeler). It appears that the student groups posed an immediate threat to Kütahya, as they were mostly concentrated further west, and as their numbers decreased

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143 Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020 / 1591-1611. p.208
144 MD 78, hk 232, Polat, "17. Yüzyılda Mühimme Deferlerine Göre Kütahya". p.60
145 MD 78, hk 957, ibid. p.62
146 MD 78, hk 2182, ibid. p.66, see also, MD 79, hk 576, ibid. p.70. Barkey also notes that “in 1613 an order was issued banning the students’ distinctive dress everywhere outside Istanbul, Edirne, and Bursa,” Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats : The Ottoman Route to State Centralization. p.163
substantially after 1610. However, another order, issued in 1617, refers to the tension between the people of Simav and the suhtes, and directs the deputy (kaim-makam) of the governor of Kütahya to relocate the suhtes to the lodge of Germiyanoğlu in the city. This order seems to be consistent with the state’s policy of accommodation and cooptation, because it states that the students had asked for pardon, and that they were to be accepted and tolerated so long as they minded their own business.\textsuperscript{147}

Insofar as the mühimme registers are concerned, a clearly discernible state policy after 1615 was not only to restore order but to refrain from alienating the local people. One of the characteristics of the Celâlî uprisings, which historians very often point out, is the fact that some of the state officials were no less oppressive than the Celâlî leaders and that they too were responsible for the deteriorating social and economic conditions in the countryside. Either collaborating with, or under the pretext of pursuing the unruly groups, they exerted much pressure on the peasantry, collected so-called emergency taxes, and punished local communities for failing to cooperate with them.\textsuperscript{148} There are many directives in the orders sent to the Kütahya district that explicitly warn the state officials not to go on “patrol” in the countryside (“devre çıkmak”). Even when they are ordered to carry out investigations, the officials are reminded of the promulgation that patrolling in the countryside is forbidden. In most cases, this policy was a response to the demands, or more precisely to the complaints and threats, of the local people. For instance, in 1617, an order sent to the judge and to the mütesellim (the deputy of the provincial governor) of Kütahya, states that the people of Kütahya, along with some of the dignitaries of the city, have made it clear that they will leave their city en masse (celây-ı vatan), if the officer appointed to investigate and suppress the suhte bandits is allowed to go on patrol. They further indicate that the current mütesellim is doing a good job of maintaining order, and is not acting unjustly.\textsuperscript{149} The fact that similar orders prohibiting state officials from going on patrol were still being issued in 1637 shows the extent to which the central authority was still mindful of the delicate balance in the countryside.\textsuperscript{150} The orders from 1610 to roughly 1640 indicate that the central authority was trying to entice the peasantry to return to their villages, and was trying to avoid putting further pressure on those who had somehow managed to stay on their lands.\textsuperscript{151}

Like most of the other documents, the mühimme registers usually reflect the perspective of the state. Even though it is safe to assume that some of the orders were written in response to demands, or complaints, from the region, it is not always easy to determine the background of the specific demands, or to what extent the orders sent were executed. Moreover, notwithstanding frequent references to the peasant flight, and the emptying of the countryside, we have no hard data on demographic change in the individual villages, or even in the major towns; nor can we determine to what extent the peasant flight might have changed the

\textsuperscript{147} MD 82, hk 350, Polat, "17. Yüzyılda Mühimme Defterlerine Göre Kütahya". p.83
\textsuperscript{148} For some of the examples preceding the Celâlî uprisings, Akdağ, Türk Halkının Dirlik Ve Düzenlik Kavgası. pp.225-252
\textsuperscript{149} MD 82, hk 216, Polat, "17. Yüzyılda Mühimme Defterlerine Göre Kütahya". p.79
\textsuperscript{150} MD 87, hk 143, ibid. p.100
\textsuperscript{151} For an example from 1628-1629 that once again forbids the practice of patrol, and that clarifies the taxes that the officials could legally ask, MD 84, hk 49. Another order from 1630 that refers to the oppression of the previous mütesellim as a cause of the peasant flight, and urges the officials to entice the peasantry to return to their villages, HD 85, hk 590. For two more orders, again from 1630, that order the current mütesellim of Kütahya to prevent the mütesellim of Afyon from going on patrol, MD 85, hk 591 and hk 594. Ibid. p. 85, 92 and 93 respectively.
socioeconomic balance of power. We do not know whether demographic change benefited the relatively well-off peasantry or the notables by allowing them to appropriate the lands of the small peasantry. In spite of the physical damage to the towns, Griswold also suggests that the conditions favoring commercial traffic improved. Griswold states that “urban activities revived, caravans received protection, and trade among the interior cities began to assume a more normal routine.”

Before trade and the regional markets in particular could fully recover, not only did the peasantry have to return to the land, but agricultural production had to pick up and market relations had to resume. Perhaps one indication that the state was actively involved in reviving the economy was the fact that it was providing the regional markets with fresh money and new currency. An order dated 1643 states that due to the scarcity of the new currency (cedid akçeye müzayaka olduğundan), 500 new akçe was sent to Kütahya from Istanbul. One purpose in sending the new currency was to collect from the market the other old currencies, and to replace them with the new one. As Şevket Pamuk points out, the period from 1586 to 1690 was one of “exceptional instability for the akçe.” The combined effect of internal factors and external factors led to severe fluctuations in the currency, and counterfeiting was one of the major consequences. In order to control these fluctuations and to prevent counterfeiting, the state sought to set new standards for the akçe, and a series of corrections (tashih-i sikke) were implemented in the first half of the seventeenth century. The order sent to Kütahya was issued after the last tashih was carried out in 1640.

Only after the 1650s, do the problems prevalent at the turn of the century give place to new ones. Whether this can be taken as a return to normalcy—if the term normalcy makes sense at all for a historian—is hard to tell but, the mühimme registers allow us to observe the emergence of a new set of concerns on the part of the central authority. It is true that banditry remained a problem as late as 1690. It appears to have been more sporadic, but it still manifested in the region comprising Kütahya, Hûdavendigar, Aydın, and Saruhan. But (as we have seen) the registers are not necessarily the most reliable source on social unrest. For instance, they do not reveal much about a major uprising that occurred in 1657—an uprising that involved many provincial governors, including Can Mirza Paşa, the governor of the province of Anatolia, and thousands of provincial cavalrymen. In that year, in one of the major aftershocks of the Celâlî rebellions, Abaza Hasan Paşa, the governor of Aleppo, rebelled along with Can Mirza Paşa, in an apparent attempt to topple the grand vizier, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa. During this uprising, almost three hundred of his mercenaries of Can Mirza Paşa were killed in Kütahya by the local people, who sided with Konakçı Ali Paşa, who had been appointed governor of the region. Even though Can Mirza Paşa defeated the military forces sent against him and tried to lay siege to the city in revenge for the killing of his forces, he failed in his attempt. However, we know very little about the clashes that led to the defeat of Can Mirza’s forces, and the reference to the people of

152 Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020 / 1591-1611, p.212
153 MD 89, hk 75, Polat, “17. Yüzyılda Mühimme Deftlerlerine Göre Kütahya”, p.104
154 Şevket Pamuk, “Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-191,” in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300 - 1914, ed. Halil Inalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). p.962
155 For two different orders from 1688 and 1690, MD 98, hk 47 and MD 102, hk32, Polat, “17. Yüzyılda Mühimme Deftlerlerine Göre Kütahya”, p. 152, 159 respectively. The tone of the order from 1690 is more pressing and serious; it covers a much wider area comprising much of the central and western Anatolia, and assigns a new provincial governor to take care of the situation.
156 However, it must also be noted that there is a ten year gap in the mühimme registers; the register number 95 covers the years 1665, and the register number 96 covers the years 1678-1679.
Kütahya is rather vague. It is not clear whether the attack on the mercenaries of Can Mirza Paşa was carried out by the military forces assigned to Kütahya for that purpose, with the participation of some groups from Kütahya, or whether this was a clash between the household forces of the old and new provincial governors. But the balance of power between the rebel and the government forces remained in flux for over a year, the rebel forces sometimes threatening to attack the outskirts of Kütahya, only to be pushed back again. In the fall of 1658, clashes took place near Kütahya for two months; the government forces gradually pushed back the rebels; and finally Abaza Hasan Paşa retreated to southeastern Anatolia to set up his winter quarters. Once again, there is little in the primary and secondary sources that enable us to assess the effect of these developments on the social and economic history of the region. We do not know what effect these clashes had on the city of Kütahya, or on the surrounding countryside, nor do we know which groups supported the rebel and which groups supported the government forces.

Of course, complaints about the corruption of, or the injustices and the oppression perpetrated by, the state officials almost always find their place in the registers for all periods. In this regard, a significant change in the lexicon of the registers is the emergence of the word mütegallibe. This term, which will be very frequently used in the eighteenth century, means literally a usurer, an oppressor, but in the legal and political vocabulary of the eighteenth century, it usually refers to the local notables who assert their powers at the expense of the state. The first reference to mütegallibe in the registers occurs in 1665 in relation to certain military officers who levied money under pretext of providing the provincial governor with the basic provisions (mirîlîva zahire bahası). However, the references are few, and the only other reference, which occurs at the end of the century, is about a false accusation, where the warden of the Kütahya castle is ordered to free the falsely accused men.

**NOMADIC GROUPS**

The most obvious problem for the central authority after the second half of the seventeenth century was posed by the nomadic and seminomadic groups. As the high number of the cemaats in the land registers of the sixteenth century attests, the nomadic tribes came to

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157 Uzunçarşılı, Bizans Ve Selçukluların Geriye Girişi Ve Osmanlı Öğulları Zamanında Kütahya Şehri, pp. 151-152

158 For a brief political history of the rebellion, Caroline Finkel, *Osman’s Dream, the Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923* (New York: Basic Books, 2005). pp. 257-262

159 For 1657-1658: MD 92, hk 295; for 1665: MD 95, hk 394, hk 473, hk 532; for 1678-1679: MD 96, hk 377

160 MD 95, hk 151, Polat, "17. Yüzyılda Mühimme Defterlerine Göre Kütahya". p.120

161 MD 111, hk 1316, ibid. p.185


163 A cemaat in the registers usually refers to a tribal unit, but it is important to mention that the limitations of the sources pose significant problems in determining the basic characteristics of the tribes such as their composition, their numbers, and their demographic change over time. The land registers upon which statistical evidence is built was primarily about taxation purposes, covered the settled population, and therefore categories that were devised for
the Kütahya region starting with the first waves of migration into Anatolia and they had been a crucial part of the society and of the economy ever since. It is estimated that by around 1520, 27 percent of the population of Anatolia was nomadic or seminomadic. The concentration of nomads was particularly dense along the old Byzantine border, and according to another estimate two-thirds of the nomadic population was concentrated in western and southern Anatolia. The terms konar-göçer or Yörük were applied to those nomadic tribes who had moved to central and western Anatolia and the Balkans. Even though they did not completely cease to be nomadic, some of these groups had also started to work on the land. What differentiated them as an administrative category was the fact that they moved between winter and summer pastures. The land register for the province of Anatolia shows that some of the nomadic groups around the Kütahya region were known as Hâssa Yörüks. As İlhan Şahin notes,

these people who lived mostly in the environments of Selendi and Taşabad were undoubtedly known under this name because they were the subjects financially attached directly to the governor. The name given to them suggests that they probably had close political and economic ties with the center of the province during the period marked by the dominance of the Germiyan principality. Among the other major groups was the Bozguş group, which consisted of forty-two communities (cemaats), the Kılcan group, which again consisted of forty-two communities, and Akkeçili group, which consisted of forty communities.  

Feridun Emecen argues that the even distribution of the communities (each about forty) around the center of the Germiyan/Kütahya region suggests that the central authority was involved in this settlement pattern.  

There were many other groups who populated both the center of the region and the plains of Uşak, Aydın, and Lazkıyye/Denizli. Bursa Yörüks whose pastures were further to the north also lived as far south as the Şeyhli district in Kütahya, and other groups used Afyon in the south as summer pasture. 

Even though they were much more difficult to tax and govern than the settled peasantry, the nomads were nevertheless part of the administrative system. They were organized into large and small units; ulus and il were confederations comprising smaller units such as boy, cemaat and kabile. Each unit was governed by a representative chosen from among the notable families, and these representatives were then approved by the state. Ulus were governed by voyvodas, and cemaats by kethüdas, for example. In some cases, a unit could even be categorized as a district, in which case the state would appoint a kadı to adjudicate internal matters and act as an

detailed analysis were more pertinent for them. For the details of the administrative categories pertaining to the nomads, İlhan Şahin, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Konar-Göçer Aşiretlerin Hukuki Nizamları," in Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler, Nomads in the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul: Eren, 2006). İlhan Şahin, "Xvi. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Anadolu'yu Göçebe İktidarında Kethüdalık Ve Boybeyilik Müessesesi," in Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler, Nomads in the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul: Eren, 2006).

Şahin, "The Oghuz Turks of Anatolia." p.94-95


166 For a concise information on most of the communities and the regions they lived in western Anatolia, see ibid. For general information on Anatolia, Yusuf Halaçoğlu, "Osmanlı Dönemide Türkiye'nin Nüfus Yapısı Ve Aşiretler," in Anadolu'uda Ve Rumeli'de Yörükler Ve Türkmenler Sempozyumu Bildirileri, ed. Tufan Gündüz (Tarsus: Yörtürk Vakfi Yayınları, 2000).
intermediary between the tribes and the state. Kasaba notes that “as a further indication of the government’s willingness to accommodate these communities, the kadıs accompanied the tribes through their seasonal cycles of migration.” The economic and social integration of the nomads into the settled peasant economy was probably even more important than their administrative integration. Not only did the nomads provide labor force in the labor-scarce environment of western Anatolia, but as camel drivers, they also served as necessary intermediaries for the merchants between local markets. Finally, “a large number of the sheep without whose meat, milk and wool Ottoman society could not have survived were also bred by nomads; exchanges with settled villagers might take place at local fairs.” Therefore to portray the nomadic groups as living a self-sustaining life without contributing much to the economy, or as unruly groups defying state control, is not necessarily accurate. At best, it represents a highly circumscribed picture as that picture that is accurate only within a specific historical context.

Throughout the sixteenth century, the state made periodic attempts to settle the nomadic population; and even without forced attempts, it seems that part of the nomadic population had begun to settle or had become seminomadic. However, following the population increase and the Celâlî uprisings at the end of the sixteenth century, there was a new wave of tribal migrations to western Anatolia from the east. The orders that reflect the state’s preoccupation with the nomadic tribes become much more frequent after the 1670s. One of the first references to the unruly actions of the nomadic tribes (in this case, described as konar-göçer taifesi who had pillaged of a house, and killed someone) occurs in 1678 in an order sent to the kadıs and mütesellims of Kütahya, Isparta, and Konya. After that year, the frequency of similar orders increased significantly, and references to the names of the tribes, their whereabouts, and their actions became more detailed. In most cases, the immediate context is either the destruction of the fields in or around the villages by the nomadic groups, or their pillaging the countryside and disrupting the trade routes. Probably in response to these developments, a major forced settlement policy was initiated after 1690.

The mühime registers show a steady wave of migration coming from the east. An order sent to most of the state officials in Kütahya in 1688 states that the Turcoman tribes that are pillaging villages, disrupting trade routes, and killing people must be punished. However, the order also makes clear that it is forbidden to oppress innocent members of the tribes under the pretext of punishing the guilty. Compared to this very specific and rather lenient order, the following orders suggest a much more comprehensive policy. Three consecutive orders issued in 1690 and 1691 are addressed not only to the state officials and the kadi, but also to the kethüdas and the voyvodas. The orders cover a large area to the west of Kütahya, include a detailed list of the cemaats, and specify where and how they should be settled. It is also possible to discern a gradual radicalization of the settlement policy—even though we do not know if the orders were written in exactly the order in which they were recorded. The first order, written to the officials of Sivas and Kütahya, states—without specifying which groups they are—that large groups of

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167 Kasaba, A Moveable Empire, Ottomans Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees. p.24. For a detailed description of the administrative role of the voyvodas and the kethüdas, see Şahin, "XVI. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Anadolu Göçebelerinde Kethüdalik Ve Boybeylik Müessesesi."
168 Faroqhi, "Rural Life." p.379
169 MD 96, hk 645, Polat, "17. Yüzyılda Mühimme Deferlerine Göre Kütahya". p.140
170 MD 98, hk 146, ibid. p.154
Turcoman communities have left their lands upon the incitement of the bandits and moved westward. The order does not specify what specific crimes the bandits have committed but mentions in general terms the destruction, disruption, and oppression caused by their presence. The provincial governor is ordered to imprison the unruly individuals, and to return the cemaats to their lands.\footnote{MD 102, hk 344, ibid. p.160} However, as Cengiz Orhonlu points out, the wave of migration was too big and too intense to be dealt with only through the local officials, and the voyvodas and the kethüdas of the tribes. The central authority therefore appointed the provincial governor of Anatolia, Genç Mehmet, to oversee the settlement process.\footnote{For the background and the detailed list of the names of the tribes as well as their places of settlement see Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretleri İskân Teşebbüsü (1691-1696). Esp. pp. 68-74} The next two orders specify exactly where the listed communities should be settled. It appears from the list that the city of Kütahya was not overrun with migrants, nor was the district chosen as one of the dense settlement areas. One exception was the settlement of the Danişmendlı tribes from the Bozulus confederation (ulus, or il). Many of the Danişmendlı cemaats were ordered settled mostly to the south of the Kütahya district, to Homa-Geyikler region.\footnote{The list is pretty comprehensive with the names of the cemaats, and their kethüdas. It also includes the locations, and some information on the settlement process. MD 102, hk 429, Polat, "17. yüzyılda Mühimme Defterlerine Göre Kütahya", p.162 Other copies of the same order were sent to the kadıs in the region, see for instance, Refik, Anadolu’da Türk Aşiretleri (966-1200). pp. 103-106 For the Bozulus Turcomans who were mostly concentrated in southern and southeastern Anatolia, see Tufan Gündüz, Anadolu’da Türkmen Aşiretleri, Bozulus Türkmenleri 1540-1640 (Ankara: Bilge Yayınları, 1997). For the Danişmendlı tribes, p. 65-66 \footnote{“Anadolu beylerbeğisine ve Kütahya kadi’sına hüküm ki; Kadimü’l-ezmandan bu âne gelince Türkman taifesini Kütahya sancağına dahil olmayub ahar yerde kışlayu gelmişler iken haliyâ liva-i mubûrda gelib müslümanların ve reaya ve berâyânın tarla ve ekinlerini çiğnedilüb zulüm taaddi üzredir deyü reaya tarafından tazzallum olunmağın mezburlar kadımden kışlayu geldikleri ba'bında ferman-i açıman sadir olmasın buyurdum ki vusul buldukda goriesin fîlvači taife mez'bûrda kadımden liva-i mez'bûrda kışlayu gelmiş değilers ise men ü re’ idib kadîm-i kışlayugeldikleri yerde kışlatduruq reaya ve berayahya zulüm ve teaddi idirmiyesin, memnu’ olmeyanlar yazub arz eyleyesin – fi 10 1 1022”, Refik, Anadolu’da Türk Aşiretleri (966-1200). p.67} But in general the settlement areas lay west and north of the Kütahya district, and the problem is once more to explain satisfactorily why the district of Kütahya was not chosen as one of the settlement areas.

Even though the region comprising Lazkıyye/Denizli and Uşak in the south and Güre and Kula in the west of Kütahya was a region dense with nomadic population, the area immediately surrounding the center of the district seems was not as populated with the nomads. An order sent in 1613-1614 to the provincial governor and to the kadı of Kütahya clearly states that the Turcoman tribes have never used the Kütahya district as winter pastures, and that the tribes that are currently in the region must be relocated to their old pastures.\footnote{We have no way of knowing whether this order was based upon misinformation, or whether it was issued to justify not allowing specific groups into the region at the request of others who were already there. In short, the order may well be an ideological construction, but unless there is historical evidence to support this assumption, we can view the order as a corrective to assertions that are based mostly on the land registers. The fact that the same directions were renewed in another order issued almost a century later, in 1740-1741, makes it likely that the center of the district, at least, was not densely populated with nomads. In this case, the order was sent in response to a petition submitted by the judge adjutants of Kütahya, Simav, Gedûs, and Sandıklı in response to complaints by the local population that the nomadic groups were damaging their fields. Similar complaints were very frequent after the second half of the seventeenth century, but references to}
historical precedents—that is, as to whether a region had been used by the nomadic groups in the past are not that frequent.\textsuperscript{175}

Most historians suggest that the settlement policies were intended to contain the influx of nomadic groups by redirecting them to depopulated areas, and to revive the use of the lands for agriculture. According to this perspective, we may surmise that after the population increase of the sixteenth century and the Celâlâli uprisings in the first half the seventeenth century, the district of Kütahya was not as depopulated as some other districts in Anatolia, and that agricultural production had not fallen too drastically. However, it is worth repeating that this is a state-centric perspective in that it privileges the governing capabilities of the central authority. The state, in this framework of explanation, becomes an almost totally autonomous center of decision making, which settles the nomads to those areas that are not densely populated—it acts upon the input coming from the provinces, and which settles nomadic population with a clear rationale calculating the land-labor ratio. But the land-labor ratio provides only a partial rationale for the settlement policies. Even though the sources do not always reflect the local population’s resistance to the settlement policies—or for that matter, regional pull factors that might have made settlement more acceptable—it is important to remember that resistance to settlement policies came not only from the nomadic tribes but also from the settled communities. We cannot take at face value the assumption that the revival of the deserted lands was intended primarily to settle the nomads. In most cases, the settled communities’ main complaint was that the tribes’ animals were damaging their fields. What is more, the settlement was not unilaterally imposed on the tribes. If it is too optimistic, or even naïve, to argue that the details of the settlement, from the choice of location to the type of agricultural goods that the tribes were supposed to produce, was the end result of a process of negotiation, it is nevertheless true that the legitimacy and viability of the policy depended upon the tribes’ and the state’s mutual recognition of each other’s claims. Not only were the representatives of the tribes officially recognized, but the tribes’ exemption from certain taxes was duly recorded, to guarantee that the settlement process was protected against arbitrary rule. Nonetheless, the settlement process was never immediate, and the first years especially were subject to many complaints, relocations, and changes. In the case of the Danişmendlü tribes, some of the communities, in a petition they sent to Istanbul, made it clear that they wanted to settle in the deserted and empty regions in the Kütahya district. The petition also shows that these areas lay in the west and south of the Kütahya district, in the region comprising Honaz, Homa, Güre, and Kula.\textsuperscript{176} But although the petition can be taken as evidence of voluntary settlement, and therefore as an indication that less trouble could be expected if the state did as the tribes asked, within a couple of years other petitions were sent to the imperial council complaining about the disorder caused by the settlement process.\textsuperscript{177} The

\textsuperscript{175} "Anadolu valisi vezir Veli Paşa’ya ve Kütahya ve … kadılarına hüküm ki; Kütahya kazasında ve kürbüb civarında yürük ve Türkman taifesinin ve aşayı ve kabail ricalinin kadımden mahsus yaylakları olmayub ve eyalet-i Anadolu’da birkaç seneden beri yüzver-ı izam bulunmadığından cevanib-i erbaada olan yürük ve Türkman taifesini kadim-i yaylaklarını terk ederek ve Kütahya ve Karahisar-i Sahip ve Sultanönü sancaklarına varup fukara-i raiyetini mahsulat ve mezruatların bilkülliye itlâf ve koyun ve keçi ve çift öküzlerini dahi gasb ü intihab idüb … zikrolunan yürük ve Türkmen tavaifi ve sayir aşayı ve kabail ricali kadımden beru olmahallerde yaylaya gelmiş değiller ise minbaad o caniblerde yaylatmayub men ü def" eyleyesin kadımden yaylaya gelişmişler ise dahi zarar kadim olmaz … ", ibid. p.204-206

\textsuperscript{176} Tufan Gündüz, Xvii. Ve Xviii. Yüzyıllarda Danişmendli Türkmenleri (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005). p.133

\textsuperscript{177} MD 106, hk 1304, Polat, "17. Yüzyılda Mühimme Deftelerine Göre Kütahya". p.177 However, it should be noted that in this case the complaint was against the Turcoman tribes without specifying the names of the
settlement process created tension not only between the settled communities and the nomads, but apparently also within the nomadic communities themselves. Other orders from the 1690s indicate that either members of the tribes or the kethüdas were petitioning the central authority to intervene against the unruly actions of others within their own tribes.\(^\text{178}\)

It seems that it was the process of settling the Danişmendlü tribes coming from the Raqqa region that caused the central authority most concern. Already in 1690, the governors of Raqqa, Sivas, and Kütahya were ordered to oversee the migration and settlement of these tribes. The first orders, issued in the early 1690s and sent to Sivas and Kütahya, also show to some extent the east-west trajectory of the migration wave, and it appears that the settlement region comprised Denizli, Aydın, and Bâlkesir—a settlement region that almost overlapped with the southern and western frontiers of the province of Anatolia at the time.\(^\text{179}\) A decade later, around 1700-1701, the settlement was still under way. Another set of orders—issued partly in response to petitions submitted by the nomad communities—indicate that the distance between the settlement region and major urban centers, as well as natural disasters, were also partly what made the settlement a long process.\(^\text{180}\) The next major change in the settlement policy occurred in 1712-1713, and was about the tribes further in the south, in the Karaman and Teke regions.\(^\text{181}\)

It appears, in this case, that the central authority ordered the deportation of a group of nomadic tribes to the island of Cyprus, and that the deportation was only partially successful. Some of the tribes escaped deportation, got back to Anatolia, and continued to roam the countryside. Even though the provincial governor of Anatolia was ordered to investigate and control the situation, the district of Kütahya seems to have been little threatened by the renegade nomads.

\(^{178}\) For two of such petitions pertaining to the Bozulus tribe, MD 104, hk 212 and hk, 642, ibid. p. 169 and 172 respectively.

\(^{179}\) For these orders, Refik, Anadolu'da Türk Aşiretleri (966-1200). pp. 100-102, and 103-106


\(^{181}\) “Anadolu beylerбегîsi Şehsüvar oğlu Mehmed Paşa’ya hmuş ki; Bir kaç seneden berû İc il ve Alaiyye ve Teke semtlerinde ve havâllarinde biölüb ibâda isali hareket üzere olan yûrûkta hayîylesinden Şamlu ve Kara Hacîlu ve Eski Yûrûk ve Kise oğlu ve Şeyhli ve Senevlü ve Batrah ve Çiblakî ve Kedikî ve Toslâlu ve Cîrîd ve Şâfi Iara cemaatleri yerlerinde ve yurldarında kendü hallerinde durmayubah bahar eyâyaminda sa’bûl mürûr cibali şahîkaya çikub bahar mevsûmî geçîdiği gibi dağlardan salîfîzzikir İc il ve Alaiyye ve Teke sancaklarına ve havâllarine ceste ceste дажûlb … elihi ayallerîylerle Kibîrs ceziresine naklî iskan olunmalari babinda bûnîyuzyîrimdîrt senesinde hatt-i hümâyunu celâlemakrunum mucibince … Antalya iskelesinden süvar olub giderler iden anlar dahi mübaşîrлерini ve sefine reislerini katl ve Alaiyye ve İc il semtlerine firar idûb ve bazalari dahi cezireye vusullerinden sonra haber virîdîsî üzre ol vakite Kibîrs’dan mütesellim Abî’nin habasetinden naﬁ ruhsat vireslice cezire mezburden çikub hâlî ekseri Kacar Halîl nam şaţînîn yaninda tecemnu’ and eyaye sitada Aydîn ve Saruhan ve Menteşe ve Kütahya sancaklarında kışlayub …” ibid. pp.148-149. The other orders following this one, pp. 151-154
The settlement process was not simply a case of turning the nomads into peasants. Another strategy was to relocate some of the tribes to different regions to serve as mountain guards. The security of the trade and military routes had always been of first importance to the state. The trade was not only a source of income but maintaining the security of the trade and military routes was at the same time a matter of preserving the legitimacy of the state as the protector the people. Therefore, with the deteriorating situation in the countryside, it was all the more pressing to secure and revive the major trade routes. It was already an established practice to assign some peasant communities as guardians of strategic mountain passes (derbend) in return for exemption from certain taxes. By enlisting nomads into the derbend system, “it was hoped that improving the conditions of roads, bridges, and commercial and lodging establishments along the main routes of the empire would reopen the networks of internal trade and relink them with their European and Asian counterparts in a steadier and more regular manner. It was also expected that by obtaining land and joining the network of guards and sentries, some of the itinerant groups would acquire a stake in the social order they were expected to defend and protect.” However, although this strategy succeeded to some extent, it also led to conflicts, not only in Anatolia but in the Balkans as well, between the newly assigned groups and the old guards, who feared the loss of their fiscal privileges. The fact that unruly groups could now be enlisted also excited the suspicion and resistance of the settled communities who lived near or used the passes. The effort to restructure the derbend system focused especially on southeastern Anatolia, and “hundreds of nomadic tribes from different parts of Anatolia were settled as derbends between Aleppo and Damascus in the 1690s.” In the district of Kütahya, the initial settlement and the reorganization of the derbend system did not cause much of a problem. Some nomads from a couple of different tribes were assigned to two different passages in the south, in the region of Karahisar-ı Sahip, but the area around city of Kütahya was not assigned to the nomads. It can be argued that the existence of an important and well-protected castle in the city of Kütahya was enough to provide security for much of the region. The fact that the governor of the province or his representatives resided in the city made it absolutely necessary that the city and its immediate environment be well guarded. Another reason for not assigning nomads as derbendci in Kütahya may well be the fact that the city was a post station on an ancillary route in the general network of menzils (post stations). This system, which overlapped more or less with the main trade and military routes, was developed in the sixteenth century and divided Anatolia (and Rumelia) into three major routes. The right course

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182 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Derbend Teşkilatı (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1967).
183 Kasaba, A Moveable Empire, Ottomans Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees. p.71
185 Kasaba, A Moveable Empire, Ottomans Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees. p.72
186 Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Derbend Teşkilatı. p. 98 Orhonlu notes that 23 men from the Kara-koyunlu cemaat and 7 men from the Karıkcılu tribes were assigned to the derbend of Döşeme. Another group was assigned to protect the bridge in Karahisar-ı Sahib.
(sağ kol), connected Bursa to Eskişehir and then continued via Bolvadin and Akşehir to Konya. Kütahya, in this system, remained slightly off the main routes, and was on an ancillary route which connected central Anatolia to Simav, and then to Manisa and İzmir. The close connection between the menzils and the derbends in terms of maintenance, repair, and protection might have diverted the central authority’s attention from Kütahya, at least during the initial phase of the settlement process. This does not mean that the derbend system in and around Kütahya was not important; it was. It played a central role in a network that connected Simav, Gediz, and Uşak, to İzmir in the west, and Antalya in the south. However, the need to revive the economy, settle the people, and protect trade must have led the central authority to give priority to the reorganization of the most important existing routes, and these routes overlapped to a great extent with the main menzil routes.

If there is any indication that things were back to normal after almost a century of turmoil, it would be in the way the central authority tried to raise an army for a new expedition at the western front, and in how it regulated the grain production and supply. It appears that wheat and barley production in the district was channeled to Istanbul, and more specifically to the imarets of Sultan Selim and Sultan Ahmed. It is, of course, extremely hard to tell how much of the grain production was consumed locally, but the orders prohibit the distribution of wheat and barley for other purposes than supplying Istanbul. The privilege of transporting the grain was also given to specific individuals—in some cases to the flour makers of the imarets. But what stands out most throughout the 1690s is the government’s constant effort to levy military personnel. After the second failed siege of Vienna in 1683, the other defeats that followed, and especially the death of the Grand Vizier Fazıl Mustafa Paşa, there had ensued a period of uncertainty about what military strategy to follow at the western front. Orders were sent to most of the districts in western and central Anatolia directing state officials to levy new troops and send them to Edirne. As for the Kütahya district, the levy orders included Şehylü, Uşak, Selendi, Kula, and Temürcü, and stated that the troops must be enlisted as cebecis. Another order sent to Bursa, Kütahya, and Karahisar-ı Sahib in 1695 made it clear that troops who were enlisted as cebecis had to be reorganized, and that measures must be taken against those who tried to avoid their duties.

Putting down the Celâlî uprisings and dealing with the aftershocks, settling the nomadic population, regulating the currency and grain production, the levying new military forces—all this did not necessarily mean that thing were back to the normal. The configuration of power relations changed substantially throughout the seventeenth century in response to both internal and external developments. With respect to the settlement policies, the military stalemate at the beginning and the defeats toward the end of the seventeenth century forced the Ottoman central authority to control the nomadic elements more effectively than before. In the context of intense military competition, the search for new financial resources to fund increasingly more expensive armies made internal borrowing and controlling new trade routes all the more crucial. As Kasaba puts it, “the Ottoman Empire responded to the new world of expanding trade networks and

system, and a useful map of the major post-stations, Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Osmanlılarda Ulaşım Ve Haberleşme (Menziller) (Ankara: PTT Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002).

Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Derbend Teşkilatı, pp. 38-41

MD 96, hk 713 and hk 909, Polat, "17. Yüzyilda Mühimme Defterlerine Göre Kütahya", pp. 143 and 149 respectively.

MD 103, hk 534,617, 618, 623, ibid. pp. 165-167, MD 104, hk 618, s.170-171

MD 108, hk 105, ibid. p.179
territorial states by initiating measures aimed at improving its security. These measures can be interpreted as the first steps toward creating a functionally differentiated state structure that continually sought to improve its capacity to rule over an unruly society that was highly mobile. The fixing of the borders, as Linda Darling calls it, also necessitated the regularization of extraordinary taxes, and a concomitant reorganization of the financial structure through an extension of the tax-farming system. Accordingly, the period roughly from 1550 to 1700 saw the consolidation of a more bureaucratic power configuration. In this new configuration, the figure of the sultan and the role of the dynasty receded further into the background, even though the rule of the sultan had never gone unchallenged, and his role in the political constitution of the polity remained central. What determined the role of the sultan in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was the overlap among the dynasty, household politics, and the polity at large. The patrimonial nature of political relations made the distribution of economic and political privileges by the imperial household essential to the legitimacy and to the proper functioning of the society. According to Baki Tezcan, a fundamental transformation occurred after 1580—one that could be called a transformation from patrimonial politics to a limited government. Tezcan argues that this transformation was so important that the period from 1580 to 1826 deserves to be called the Second Empire. In this configuration, the hierarchy of patrimonial relations was replaced with a more diffuse and horizontal structure, which allowed new social and political actors to emerge. Furthermore, “while land had not lost its importance overnight, the gradual development of a market society shifted the primary focus of political power toward the control of monetary resources through a network of patron-client relationships in a weblike structure that did not have a single center.”

But how this transformation was experienced changed from region to region, and depended on the socioeconomic structure of each region. If we go by what Evliyâ Çelebi says towards the end of the seventeenth century, this transformation is hard to capture in the provinces—especially in and around Kütahya. Compared to Ibn Battuta’s and Bertrandon de la Broquiere’s accounts written in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Evliyâ Çelebi’s account of western Anatolia at the end of the seventeenth century, portrays a rather seamless polity that was not radically transforming.

192 Kasaba, A Moveable Empire, Ottomans Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees. p.52
THE EMERGENCE OF AN EMPIRE

Figure 1 Major Towns and Cities

- Istanbul, the Ottoman capital
- Major regional centres (Cairo, Aleppo)
- Minor regional centres, main ports
- Other towns
Figure 2 Anatolian Towns

Figure 3 Major Derbend Stations
Figure 4 Major Relay-Stations (Menzil)
Figure 5 Baghdad Expedition (Murad IV) Major Relay-Stations
Figure 6 Historic Kütahya and major neighborhoods
Figure 7 The Sancak of Kütahya
When Evliyâ Çelebi set out on road for pilgrimage in the spring of 1671, instead of taking the direct route from Istanbul to Mecca and Medina, he made a detour and traveled in western Anatolia—a part of the peninsula that he had somehow neglected before. In what proved to be his last travel, his first important stop after Bursa was Kütahya—his family’s hometown. But the fact that Kütahya was his family’s hometown does not seem to have given Evliyâ Çelebi’s observations and narrative a particular depth or twist. Once in Kütahya, he sure does mention that his ancestors were from that city and that they were the benefactors of some buildings. In his capacity as the mütevelli (supervisor) of the mosque of his forefather Kara Mustafa Beğ, he even oversees the repair of the mosque. His uncle, says Evliyâ Çelebi, lived in the family house, and “everyone buried in the cemetery in front of our door is a kinsman or retainer of ours.” But Kütahya is not the only place where he has familial ties. Further to the west, Demirci is another ancestral seat for Evliyâ Çelebi. It was conquered by Demircioğlu Kara Mustafa Beğ, brother of Kara Mustafa Beğ with first wave of Turkic conquest of western Anatolia. Hence, Evliyâ Çelebi claims that his ancestry in the region goes six generation back. But despite invoking his familial ties to the region, he does not show any particular attachment to Kütahya or Demirci. We can therefore only speculate on the reasons why he took a western Anatolian detour on his way to pilgrimage, and whether or not his visit to Kütahya meant anything more than another stop in his journey. Considering his age, and his wish to go on pilgrimage, he might have thought that this was his last chance to see his family’s hometown, and that looking after and making necessary repairs to the buildings founded by his ancestors for charitable purposes was a pious act. But all this may well be yet another reason to satisfy his traveller’s appetite on his way to Mecca and Medina.

After following the route of the major relay-posts from Üsküdar to İznik, Evliyâ Çelebi descended from Bursa to Kütahya, cutting through Bithynia but following what may be called an auxiliary route. Major military and pilgrimages routes also crossed Bithynia but after Bursa they passed through Söğüt and Eskişehir, and were then connected further south to Bolvadin to reach

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2 On his way to Kütahya, he spends 20,000 akçe to repair the mosque of forefather Ya’kub Ece Beg in İznik. He says that he is the mütevelli of the mosque of his forebear Kara Mustafa Bey in Kütahya, and makes the necessary repairs of the mosque. Çelebi Evliyâ, *Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 306, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Pertev Paşa 462, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Hacı Beşir Ağa 452 Numaralı Yazmaların Mukayeseli Transkripsiyonu, ed. Seyit Ali Kahraman, Yücel Dağlı, and Robert Dankoff, vol. 9 (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Yayınları, 2005). For İznik p. 8, for Kara Mustafa Bey camii, p. 15


4 Evliyâ Çelebi begins his narrative of his pilgrimage journey with a clear note of longing for travelling and mentioning specifically how bored he was after six months of residence in Istanbul. Evliyâ, *Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 306, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Pertev Paşa 462, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Hacı Beşir Ağa 452 Numaralı Yazmaların Mukayeseli Transkripsiyonu. p.6
Finally Konya, which was the major destination point of south-central Anatolia. Compared to the observations of Ibn Batuta and de la Broquiere, Evliyâ Çelebi’s descriptions of the province of Anatolia and of the sancak of Kütahya depict, understandably, a much more unified realm. Almost two and a half centuries after de la Broquiere’s travels, Evliyâ Çelebi, an Ottoman observer par excellence, offers a picture of a seamless polity. It is true that even before he reaches Bursa, he starts talking about the bandits, and says that in Bithynia, the valleys cut through by the small rivers were also home for the outlaws and a trap for the merchants. Despite his little anecdote of narrowly escaping the bandits at one of the mountain passages, these remarks do not amount to a description of political and social disorder. The legitimacy of the Ottoman regime is well intact, and the existence of the bandits that roam the countryside is almost taken for granted. Evliyâ Çelebi does not only travel a geographical landscape that is well-connected and relatively well-protected, but also a historical one. His descriptions are not only about the urban landscape and administrative structure. They are not confined to social, economic, and cultural characteristics of the places he visited. He also writes about the historical memory of the lands he traveled. In his account of western Anatolia, for instance, references to the Germiyan lands start as he approaches Kütahya from northwest. Approximately ten hours ride to Kütahya, Tavşanlı, a small town with six neighborhoods, sets the limits of the historic Germiyan territory. As Evliyâ Çelebi enters Germiyan territory, he also recounts that the area was first conquered by the Germiyan in 1381, and later was given as part of the dowry to Bayezid I. His remark that Tavşanlı was given as part of the hass-ı hümâyûn (the domain of the sultan) also indicates the appropriation process and the ownership status of this realm. As he travels through the land of Germiyan, Evliyâ Çelebi juxtaposes topography with history, and his account reveals the extent to which Ottoman central authority established itself on the former Germiyan lands. He dates back the conquest of Kütahya from the Byzantine Empire, more specifically from the Greek infidels (Rum keferesi destinden) to 1315, but his account of the Ottoman annexation of the Germiyan territory is rather vague as he mentions that Osmançek (referring to the eponymous founder of the empire?) conquered Anatolia later on and therefore became the ruler of Kütahya too.

Evliyâ Çelebi’s first remarks on Kütahya are about the administrative structure of the province. His remarks portray a polity that is perfectly controlled by the central authority and distributed efficiently in return for mainly military service. Even though, compared to the number of the timar holders provided by Ayn-i Ali in 1609 (7311), and by Sofyalı Ali Çavuş in 1653 (8619), Evliyâ Çelebi’s estimate of timar holders shows a significant decrease in timars (4589), his overall picture depicts nevertheless a strong central control over the region in which most of the revenues of the towns and the villages are assigned to various officials. Furthermore, he also points out that as many as three hundred villages belong directly to the sultan (as hass-ı

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5 There is a growing literature on Evliyâ Çelebi. I relied mostly on Dankoff, An Ottoman Mentality the World of Evliya Çelebi.
6 Of course, what ten hours ride means is highly ambiguous. Evliyâ Çelebi was not travelling alone. He had a small retinue with him, which must have impacted their pace. Furthermore, there is not any clear reference to the condition of the roads, nor to how to the pace he was riding. For brief reflections on Evliyâ Çelebi’s trajectory in western Anatolia, and horse riding practices, see Caroline Finkel, "Evliyâ Çelebi’nin Toynak İzinde: Yazından Yola, Parşömenden PATIKaya," in Çağının Siradışı Yazarı Evliyâ Çelebi, ed. Nuran Tezcan (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2009).
hümâyûn), and some are distributed as grants. Evliyâ Çelebi also mentions that some of the grantholders, especially, those belonging to yaya and müsellem organizations, hold their revenues with a great deal of autonomy. Their right to those revenues resembles, in fact, to exclusive private property rights (makṭû‘u’l-kalem ve mefrûzü’l-kadem). However, considering the fact that yaya and müsellem troops were no longer efficiently used by the army and that most of them were dissolved by the second of the seventeenth century, his emphasis on the importance of the yaya and müsellem organizations and on their control over the revenues assigned to them by the central authority casts some doubt on his account. Nevertheless, his overall account that portrays Kütahya as a sancak controlled by the central authority does not contradict the data derived from the archival material. Moreover, his notes on the urban landscape are among the most important sources for Kütahya in the seventeenth century—just as they are for many other urban centers.

Evliyâ notes, first of all, the centrality of the Kütahya castle—perhaps not so much for its role in the economic and social life on the city, but for its strategic predominance overlooking the city. Even though he does not say whether or not it played a significant role in protecting the residents during the Celâlî rebellions at the beginning of the seventeenth century, he nevertheless, mentions that one of the purposes to expand the walls of the castle was to secure an important water source in the case of a siege of the city. However, aside from this strategic role, Evliyâ notes that inside the castle is relatively empty—except a neighborhood of seventy houses that is adjacent to the outer walls of the castle. Evliyâ counts 34 neighborhoods for Kütahya—a number that is in line with the archival sources from different periods. Evliyâ also adds that there were three Armenian and three Greek neighborhoods. As for the other important minority groups, the Jews, Evliyâ’s account is an example of an imaginative explanation. It is a weird thing, says Evliyâ, the Jews come and engage in trade, but cannot dwell in Kütahya because when they try to do so, they die! Whether Kütahya was deadly or not for the Jews is left to our imagination. However, the beginning of the sixteenth century there were Jews living in Kütahya. Their number was small, and diminished even more until they left the city in the second half of

8 Ibid. Halîl İnalcık translates the term as “completely and absolutely free as crossed out from the state tax registers and freed from the interference of the state agents … [İnalcık further notes that] the phrase mefrûzu’l-kalem ve maktu’al-kadem in Ottoman temlîk grants, pious foundations and mukata’a diplomas was originally borrowed from the earlier Arabo-Persian bureaucratic terminology … the formulary was added most of the time with the explanatory phrase of serbestiyyet üzere or ber vech-i serbestiyyet, emphasizing the autonomous character of the land bestowed vis-à-vis the governors and local state agents.” Halîl İnalcık, "Autonomous Enclaves in Islamic States: Temlîks, Soyurghals, Yurduluk-Ocaklik, Mâlikâne-Mukâta’as and Awqaf," in History and Historiography in Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East, Essays in Honor of John E. Woods, ed. Judith Pfeiffer et al. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006). p.112-113


10 “Kâdim-i eyyâmından berü Yahûd tâfesî yokdur. Ticaret edüp giderler, tavattun entseler öülürler, acep hikmettir.” Ibid.
the sixteenth century. Land registers show that in 1520 there were 15 Jewish households. The number of the households dropped to 12 in 1534 and to 6 in 1571. \(^{11}\) It is therefore true that the Jews for one reason or another tried to settle in Kütahya, but chose to move somewhere else—most notably to Manisa. Feridun Emecen shows that in the sixteenth century, Manisa, after Bursa, was the second city with the largest Jewish community in western Anatolia. In 1531, there were 88 Jewish households, and 33 unmarried Jews in Manisa, and their numbers increased throughout the sixteenth century. \(^{12}\) Emecen explains the Jewish migration to western Anatolia with the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492. Even though there is no specific information on the exact numbers of the Jews, who came to the Ottoman Empire, and to western Anatolia, whether they came in big or small groups, or on the routes they followed, the sixteenth century is a turning point for the Jewish migration to Ottoman lands. As for the question why they concentrated in Bursa and Manisa, Emecen argues that Bursa was an obvious choice because as the former capital of the empire, it was a big city and trading center with investment opportunities. However, the choice of Manisa requires more explanation. Manisa was not a known trading center, nor had its location, at least in the sixteenth century, a strategic importance. Emecen’s explanation is primarily a political one. He contends that Manisa, as a price district (şehzâde sancağı) was a political center, and that the Jews might have been part of the household of the princes who were sent to Manisa. Emecen’s explanation therefore implies that Manisa was more important in terms of its patronage ties to the crown than Kütahya. Even though the latter was the administrative capital of the province of Anatolia, Manisa seems to have provided more lucrative business opportunities with the crown. \(^{13}\) Emecen’s argument is line with Kunt’s emphasis on Manisa’s importance in the politics of succession. However, it must be noted that in the absence of evidence based on archival documents, the emphasis on the political importance of Manisa as a pull factor for the Jews remains a sound hypothesis.

Along with his demographic remarks, Evliyâ’s account of the urban topography of Kütahya gives the impression of a relatively big and well-off town—but one which still carried the signs of the economic downturn of its recent past. In Evliyâ’s account there are around 7,000 houses in 34 neighborhoods. Even though the number of the neighborhoods is plausible, 7,000 houses at the end of the seventeenth century is a highly inflated figure. It is not clear what Evliya Çelebi means by a house, but it is reasonable to think that he means a household by that term. If that is the case, we can compare his estimates with the information gathered from the land registers. According to the land registers at the end of the sixteenth century, the number of households was around 1,500. After all the population decrease in the seventeenth century, it would be an extraordinary development to expect such an increase in the number of the households. Nevertheless, his observations are still valuable. For instance, he especially notes that the roofs of the houses were covered with earth rather than tile. But he also observes that seventy-seven new mansions, all with tiled-roofs were built, whereas “before there was not even a single house with tiled-roof.” \(^{14}\) The existence of the tiled-roofs is an important indication of the general level of prosperity and also of the existence of an artisanal group. There is unfortunately

\(^{11}\) Feridun Emecen, *Unutulmuş Bir Cemaat Manisa Yahudileri* (Istanbul: Eren Yayncılık, 1997). p.29

\(^{12}\) Ibid. pp. 32-34

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

no detailed information on the guilds and the artisanal groups in Kütahya for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is therefore difficult to substantiate Evliyâ Çelebi’s impressions with archival sources. But it is possible to argue that his observations can be taken as an indicator that the general level of prosperity, which had dropped after the devastating impact of the Celâlî rebellions in Anatolia, was showing signs of improvement—at least for the grandees. Not only the construction activity per se, but also the use tiles to cover the roof show that there was enough capital to build new mansions, incentive to spend for the construction of new mansions, and a group of artisans to produce to meet the demand. Evliyâ Çelebi does not mention where the tiles were manufactured, but given the priority of local and to some extent regional trade over longer distance trade, it is highly likely that the tiles were locally produced. The only other major production center, İznik (in the north, not too far from Kütahya) specialized mostly on luxury items, and was declining in the second half of the seventeenth century.

When he talks about the palaces, or mansions, he specifically point out four of them: Ali Paşa palace, Osman Paşa palace, İftedlioğlu and Saçlızâde palaces. Ali Paşa palace dates from the Germiyân era, and seems to be the biggest among them. With its towers, baths, gardens and 360 rooms, Ali Paşa palace has also a huge courtyard, which Evliyâ likens to palace in Aleppo. The importance of the palace is also evident in that it has forty personnel who are zemmet and timar holders, and who have considerable social prestige in the town. Sadly, its roofs are covered with lime rather than roof-tiles! Evliyâ does not give as much detail about the other palaces as he does for Ali Paşa palace, other than he stayed in Osman Paşa palace for ten days. What differentiates these buildings, other than their size, is that they have roof-tiles.

In order to qualify further Evliyâ Çelebi’s remarks, it is also necessary to differentiate the roof-tile makers (kiremitçi), and the other tile makers that Kütahya is known for, especially the pottery (and faience)-makers (çinici). There is evidence that despite the impact of the Celâlî rebellions, the pottery-makers were well and alive, and were commissioned for major works in 1630s. The Çinili complex in Istanbul, Üsküdar was completed in 1640. It was built under the patronage Kösem Sultan, and as Tülay Artan points out it “became famous for its good-quality Kütahya tiles, usually mistaken for İznik manufactures.” Almost a century later, in 1718-19, Kütahya potteries would be commissioned for another important building—for the Cathedral of St James in Jerusalem. As for specific references to the tile-makers (both roof-tile makers and the pottery-makers), Evliyâ Çelebi mentions the importance of pottery-making in Kütahya only in passing. Though he notes the distinctiveness of the cups and plates made in Kütahya, he also mentions that İznik potteries are also very famous. Faroqhi argues that “perhaps this scant regard was due to the fact that Evliya, with his courtly background, held Chinese porcelain in much higher esteem than local faiences. Likewise he devoted only a brief remark to the potteries of İznik. Admittedly by the time of Evliya’s visit in the early 1670s, the days in which faience

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16 Ibid. p. 469
manufacture had flourished in this town had long since receded into the past.\textsuperscript{18} Evliyâ Çelebi mentions the tile-makers’ guild in his famous description of the guilds procession in Istanbul, but his account—other than a colorful explanation on why they are also called “eyvâncı”—does permit us to make any connections between the guilds in Istanbul and in Kütahya, or to say anything substantial about their historical development and socioeconomic condition in the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{19} The heyday of pottery and faience manufacture—both artistically and in terms of production—was the thirteenth century, and Konya was the principal center of production. Scholars such as Oktay Aslanapa and Şerare Yetkin argue that the pottery and faience making reached its artistic peak and technical proficiency during the reign of the Seljuks of Anatolia.\textsuperscript{20} The decline of the Seljuk state, Mongol suzerainty, and the period of the principalities was a period of stagnation—even though pottery and faience continued to be used as part of the decorative arts in the buildings of that period. After the ascendancy of the Ottoman state, Iznik became the major center of production until the first half of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{21} It seems that pottery and faience continued to be manufactured in Kütahya from throughout the same period, but the Kütahya-ware was not as well-renowned as the İznik-ware. Faroqhi argues that the production in İznik was geared toward a luxury market whereas Kütahya production was cheaper and geared toward more modest consumers. But exactly because it was less subject to the fluctuations of luxury markets, the producers in Kütahya had more flexibility in finding alternative markets and adjusting their output. They therefore lasted longer.\textsuperscript{22} Heath Lowry too argues that “in the eyes of the Ottoman rulers [İznik’s] ceramicists were perceived as bound to work exclusively on the commissions supplied them by the Palace. Repeatedly, the Sultans complained about delays in receiving orders they had placed, and on more than one occasion, stated that while their building projects were being delayed due to late receipt of their orders, they had learned that contrary to the established order İznik tiles were being sold on the open market.”\textsuperscript{23} While, as producers to the palace, İznik manufacturers might have also enjoyed

\textsuperscript{18} Suraiya Faroqhi, \textit{Artisans of Empire Crafts and Craftpeople under the Ottomans} (London New York: I.B Tauris, 2009). p.100

\textsuperscript{19} Apparently, eyvân is with reference to their exclamation upon seeing their carefully ordered potteries fall for one reason or another. “Bu çinicilere eyvâncı dimeden garaz oldur kim şöhret içün cümle çini kâse ve kuze ve zî


\textsuperscript{21} Tülay Arta'n argues that “in the winter months of 1613 and 1614 the sultan had renovated the Edirne Palace for the use of his hunting parties, and also constructed a pleasure pavillion (Kasr-i Ahmed / Kasr-i Hümâyûn) in the Topkapı Sarayı. Designed by his chief architect, Sedefkâr Mehmed Ağa, this pavillion displays the last fine examples of İznik tile-work.” Arta'n, "Arts and Architecture." p. 454

\textsuperscript{22} Faroqhi, \textit{Artisans of Empire Crafts and Craftpeople under the Ottomans}. p.101

\textsuperscript{23} Heath W. Lowry, "Ottoman İznik (Nicaea): Through the Eyes of Travelers and as Recorded in Administrative Documents, 1331-1923." in \textit{Defterology Revisited, Studies on 15th and 16th Century Ottoman Society} (İstanbul: The ISIS Press, 2008). p.129
exemption from taxation, and prospered more easily than their Kütahya counterparts, it is also true having been dependent on a single market, they were more susceptible to the fluctuations in demand. But the resilience of Kütahya-ware was not only related to their flexibility; the decline of the faience manufacture in İznik came to a complete halt at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Rıfat Çini, in an unreferenced passage, suggests that İznik’s decline was attributable to an earthquake at the beginning of the eighteenth century. However, even though the 1719 earthquake, which devastated Istanbul, might also have affected İznik, there is no clear historical evidence to that effect. Moreover, Kütahya was not immune to the devastating effects of earthquakes. There is no record of a major earthquake in Kütahya before 1700, but historical record shows that it was badly affected in 1717 by an earthquake in Denizli. Lowry suggests that an epidemic due to city’s contaminated ground water might explain the decrease in the population, and “the fact that the operations of the town’s community of ceramicists had perhaps moved their kilns to mountain villages south of the town … far away from the swampy malaria infested shores Lake Ascanius and the polluted water supply upon which İznik depended.”

Despite the central authority’s, or more precisely the grand vizier Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Paşa’s attempts to revive the production in 1718-1719, İznik declined as the main center of pottery and faience making, Kütahya became the only center of production. And the faience and pottery manufacture experienced a revival in the first half of the eighteenth century. The production was not only for local consumption—they were taken as far as Hungary and sold there. Furthermore, as far as eating and drinking habits and consumption patterns are concerned, there was also a change at the beginning of the eighteenth century, which might have provided Kütahya cup makers with a wider market. Coffee came to the Ottoman Empire in mid-sixteenth century, and was consumed in most places in Anatolia by the end of the century. Coffee cups became household items even for the poor throughout the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century, “ordinary coffee drinkers used pottery cups, mostly from the town Kütahya … [while]

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24 Çini, *Ateşin Yarattığı Sanat Kütahya Çiniciliği*, p. 23
25 But there have been fourteen earthquakes of various magnitude, the most important of which was the Gediz earthquake in March, 1970. This activity shows that Kütahya is located on an earthquake zone. "Kütahya," in *Yurt Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Anadolu Yayınırlık, 1982-1983).
27 Lowry, "Ottoman İznik (Nicaea): Through the Eyes of Travelers and as Recorded in Administrative Documents, 1331-1923." p. 150
28 Ibid. p. 141
29 In an order sent to the the governor of İznik, Nevşehirli Damad Ibrahim Paşa, after noting that the pottery shops stopped the manufacture of new potteries, asks the governor of İznik for a list of the shops that had been working previously. The order also mentions that an inspector from the imperial palace architects was sent to investigate the situation and revive the manufacture. For transcription of the document (which does not cite the archival reference), see Çini, *Ateşin Yarattığı Sanat Kütahya Çiniciliği*, p.158
wealthier individuals generally had a cup of Chinese porcelain.”30 The import of the Chinese porcelain as luxury items was one of the reasons of the decline of İznik pottery manufacture—they could not compete with the quality and the prices of the Chinese porcelain. Alongside the coffee and tea cups, bottles, bowls, plates, dishes, and a variety of containers manufactured for local consumptions, the Kütahya-ware was sold in other regions, and the tiles were commissioned for the renovation of old and the construction of the new buildings too.31 Despite scattered evidence that pottery and faience-making was important for Kütahya, what is essentially missing in this picture is an institutional perspective—that is, whether or not the pottery-makers were organized as a guild, and if they were organized as a guild, the extent to which the guild organization exerted an influence on the production patterns. Faroqhi mentions that “we do not know for sure whether potter of İznik ever formed a guild. According to an official Istanbul price register from 1599-1600, the makers/sellers of such goods did possess a guild organization, complete with a kethüda (headman of a guild) who fix a price for rarer varieties. However, it remains unknown whether this guild was based at the production site or in the capital itself.”32 Perhaps the single most important document about the guild of the pottery and faience makers in Kütahya dates from 1766, at the onset of another period of economic downturn—a period which I will discuss later on.

Evliyâ Çelebi’s description of Kütahya at the end of the seventeenth century also gives the impression of a town where local and regional trade was well and alive. He notes, for instance, the existence of a central market street (sûk-i sultâni) lined with 860 shops. Furthermore, Kütahya has two stone-built covered markets. Evliyâ especially praises the shoemakers market, which he thinks is the best decorated of all the markets. Evliyâ Çelebi does not say much about the physical condition of the markets was in, nor does he mention anything specific about the state of the commerce. But, with his inclination to note architectural features of the buildings (whether they were in good condition or in ruins), it is reasonable to think that local (and probably regional) commerce had picked up in Kütahya at the end of the seventeenth century. His remarks on the hâns (caravanserais) further strengthen this view. If the shops and covered markets are an indication of a lively local commercial life, hâns indicate in turn the extent to which a specific town was connected to major trade routes. Evliyâ Çelebi mentions the existence of seventeen hâns in Kütahya. There is no doubt these were in different sizes, and probably most of them were modest and pretty small. However, Evliyâ notes the size of Kapan hân, which was built in at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and likens to it a castle. Merchants mostly lodged in this hân, which had two hundred rooms.33 To make better sense of these observations, Evliyâ Çelebi’s remarks need to be put in comparative context.

31 Yeni Valide Camii in Üsküdar (1708), Kütahya Balıklı Tekkesi (1750), Konya Nakiboğlu Camii (1763), Konya Çelik Paşa Camii (1763), Beylerbeği Camii (1778) is a partial list of these buildings. Arh, "Osmanlı Döneminde Kütahya Çiniliği." p.31; see also, Şerare Yetkin, "Kütahya Dişindaki Kütahya Çinileri ile Süsü Eserler," in *Kütahya Atatürk'ün Doğumunun 100. Yılına Armağan* (Istanbul: 1981).
32 Faroqhi, *Artisans of Empire Crafts and Craftpeople under the Ottomans*. p. 100
33 “Ve cümle onyedi hânları vardır. Her biri kal’a-misal hanlardır. Cümleden Kapan Hân demir kapulu kal’a misalıdır … cemi’i müsafirinve müşavirin bunda arâmvâ istîrâhat edib ederler. Bu hânın câmbi’i erba’asında fevkânî ve tahtânî ikî yuz oca’ki bir hân-i azidir.” Evliyâ, Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi, Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 306, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Pertev Paşa 462, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Hacı Beşir Ağa 452 Numaralı Yzmalarının Mukayeseli Transkripsiyonu. p.17 Evliyâ Çelebi lists the following hâns; Çâşnigirbasi, Bolvadinli,
Faroqhi, in her study of the Anatolian towns from 1520 to 1650, classifies the Anatolian towns into three major categories according to the tax paying population. In the first category are the towns with more than three thousand taxpayers (with 10,000 inhabitants or more). In the category, which formed the bulk of the towns in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were those towns with 1,500 to 2,999 taxpayers (hence, roughly with 5,000 to 9,000 inhabitants). The third category includes the smallest towns with 400 to 999 taxpayers (Faroqhi also includes a category IIa, with 1,000 to 1,499 taxpayers). With these categories in mind, Faroqhi mentions that “all cities with more than ten thousand inhabitants were large cities, and …categories II and IIa corresponded to a medium level. But a stricter standard of evaluation is equally possible, and in that case all Anatolian cities except for Bursa might well be considered of middling size.”

However, using a less strict classification, Kütahya is falls into the second category, and only Bursa, Ankara, Konya fall into the first in western and central Anatolia. I will follow this classification to evaluate Evliya Çelebi’s remarks. Faroqhi points out that in order to assess the importance of the commercial building for the socioeconomic life of the towns, the existence of the covered markets (bedestan) are most significant. All the cities from the first category had covered markets—in some cases, more than one. As for the category II, sixteen out of nineteen, possessed covered markets, and “more than one bedestan appears to have existed in Kütahya and Larente.” If we take into consideration western Anatolia only, then Kütahya remains the only middle-sized town with more than one bedestan.

As for the hans, as Faroqhi says, “broadly speaking, the number of hans in a given city should indicate its commercial importance. In the major trading centers, such as Istanbul, Bursa, or even Ankara, [the hans] were grouped closely together and formed a business center in immediate proximity to the covered market. Toward the end of the sixteenth century, a city like Ankara might possess about fifteen hans, where merchants not only marketed their wares, but also organized caravan connections with central and western Anatolia, as well as with Istanbul.” That Istanbul and Bursa had many hans is understandable; they were the major trading centers of the empire. Ankara was important for central Anatolia. It was a trading center, especially for mohair and linen. Tire, in western Anatolia, was another major center with a number of hans. In Tire’s case, the hans seem to have served mainly for the trade of foodstuff and cotton. Even though it is rather scant, the historical record shows that at the end of the seventeenth century, the merchants played a crucial role in channeling cotton production in western Anatolia to Tire; “fabrics woven at Denizli, Buldan or Manisa were transported to Tire for dyeing.”

Faroqhi also mentions that Afyon, (Karahisar-ı Sahip, Tokat, and Beypazarı had more than five hans. They were all major trading centers for interregional trade, and Tokat was a major stop in the caravan route that connected Istanbul and Bursa to the markets in Iran. Compared to these cities, Evliyâ Çelebi’s observation on the existence of seventeen hans in Kütahya—if it is true—is quite significant. Evliyâ does not say anything in particular about the details of the commercial activity—about the kind of goods that were produced or traded, about

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Bostan Efendi, Osman Paşa, Rüstem Paşa, Serdar hâni and Acem hâni. These are, in Evliyâ’s account, the hans that were in good condition, and well-maintained (“bunlar cümle ma’mûr hânlardır”.)


36 Ibid. p. 29

the interregional or long-distance trade, or about the guilds, but the Kapan hân, which was probably named after the public scales that were used for bulk items, was probably primarily used for trading the woolen fabrics, and rugs—another hân called the Kapan Hani, in Kayseri, also had scales for publicly weighting the cotton. There is unfortunately no way of comparing the relative importance of regional versus interregional or long-distance trade, but with a sizeable nomadic population in and around the sancak of Kütahya, it is likely that woolen fabrics and rugs would be the major items for trade. We do not possess either any significant data on the activities of the merchants, but it is also reasonable to assume that the merchants were crucial to link different trading network to one and another. The differences between the manufacture, use and the trade of the cotton and woolen fabrics—the political economy of cotton and woolen—explain to some extent the reason why we have less information on the woolen industry and trade.

The manufacture of woolen fabrics and cloth was not as extensive as cotton weaving. Cotton textile was used for a wide variety of purposes, from the manufacture of garments of different qualities to supplying the Janissaries with cloth and the Arsenal with sailcloth, and the central authority tried to regulate the production of cotton and the supply of the cotton textile as much as it could—including prohibiting the export. As Faroqhi argues, “even more important than the manufacture of cotton garments was the production of sailcloth for the Arsenal. In fact, it was the need of the fleet for sails, aside from the demand of the army for tents, which accounted for the constantly repeated prohibition on the export of cotton and cotton thread.” With a large market, and the state as one of the main consumers, cotton textile manufacture was widespread but it was western Anatolia that produced much of the raw cotton—especially the region that comprised Aydin and Saruhan. Hence, the central authority’s attempts to regulate the supply of cotton for the weavers concentrated on this region. The orders sent to the state officials, and the kadis provide therefore an important source of information, and explain why there is more data on the cotton than woolen manufacture. However, despite the prohibition on the export of cotton, it appears that it was not strictly enforced. In the seventeenth century, foreign traders, particularly Venetian, French, and English, were implicated in the cotton trade, and there is a good deal of additional information coming from the foreign archives as well as the Ottoman archives that shows the central authority’s attitude toward foreign merchants and the cotton trade. There is a good deal to be said about the English and French trade in the Levant, and the extent to which the changing dynamics of the trade relations have an impact on the availability of the primary sources we can rely on to write the history of different trade goods. Leaving aside the English and French competition for the capitulations in the Ottoman Empire, the shifting of the major trade routes, the gradual withdrawal of the English from the Ottoman market throughout the eighteenth century, and the French takeover of the Ottoman markets, suffice it, here, to point out the increasing trade volume, and the place of cotton in it.

38 Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650.* p. 135 Faroqhi gives another example from Adana, where there was a hân for weighing the cotton (kapan-ı koton), and where another was used to weighing in the soap. Ibid. p.30
39 Ibid. p. 127
40 Faroqhi says that “a collection of rescripts dealing with the affairs of Venetian merchants in Ottoman Empire refers to the fact that, during the first quarter of the seventeenth century, traders from [Izmir] had repeatedly been granted permission to export cotton and cotton thread, while certian French and English merchants benefited from the same privilege.” Ibid. p. 136
traders gradually withdrew from the Levant because Levant silk had been replaced by that of Bengali and Chinese, the French were able to maintain, and then increase their trade volume with the Levant. The diversification of their trade spectrum played an important role in this. As Edhem Eldem shows, “the French, although they were also able to maintain and increase their import trade by developing their purchases of other products: wool, mohair, camel hair, beeswax, hides and, most of all cotton. It was for this last product that the most formidable growth was registered throughout the century, from a value of a mere 1.5 million livres at the beginning of the century to almost 13 million at the end.”

Furthermore, two more important factors need to be pointed out in accounting for the predominance of the cotton trade over the woolens. The first is the expanding market for cotton textiles in France. Marseilles in the eighteenth century became the major port in France for the import of the cotton from the Levant—there was a more than twenty-fold increase throughout the eighteenth century. The second was the geography. If Marseilles was the main port of import for the cotton in western Mediterranean, Izmir and Selonica became the major ports of exports in Aegean. The rise of Izmir and Salonica as major ports concentrated the trading activities in these regions. Izmir, with 70 per cent of the export of raw cotton, had a major impact on the socioeconomic dynamics of in western Anatolia. Commercialization of agriculture followed the increasing volume of the cotton trade, and as Eldem points out, the local notables of the region “played a crucial, if ambiguous, role, in this trade, acting variously as middlemen, power brokers, suppliers, protectors or abusers.”

Kütahya, falling outside the cotton producing areas of western Anatolia, remained a bystander of these transformations, and became even more isolated in terms of the incorporation in global trade networks. I will return to the impact of these changes when I discuss in more detail the second half of the eighteenth century, and the history of the local notables in Kütahya.

In comparison, manufacture and the trade of the woolen fabrics seem to have been much more limited, and the scarcity of the primary sources, which refer to woolen manufacture, further prevents us from making generalized remarks. Nevertheless, western Anatolia, with its nomadic population, was an important region for woolens too. Faroqhi argues that wool was woven as rugs and carpets, and that the Venetian traders bought them—a trade relation that was referred to in a mühimme document. Kütahya seems to have been an important center of production. This insight is “also borne out by another rescript which informs us that an employee of the central administration, sent to collect taxes in the area of Kütahya, invested part of his money in a load of rugs, which he stored in local covered market for safekeeping.”

Other than the carpets and rugs, rough fabrics (sacks, or tents) made of hemp or goat hair, were also produced. Even though there is no reference to Kütahya as a trading center for rough fabrics, there is evidence, especially for the second part of the eighteenth century that, with a new period of intense military struggle, there was increasing pressure from the state for Kütahya to supply the army with sacks and tents. But this may not mean that Kütahya was somehow a specialized center for the manufacture of such rough fabrics—sackcloth manufacture was widespread in Anatolia—but that the manufacture and the trade of rough fabrics might well have been another occupation in

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42 Ibid. p.315 Whereas the value of sheep-wool and camel-hair trade increased from around 1 million livres to around 3.5 million, p. 334
43 Ibid. p. 316
44 Ibid. p. 317
45 Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650.* p. 138
Kütahya. As far as carpets and rugs are concerned, there are more references to Uşak and Kula as more important centers of carpet manufacture than Kütahya. Evliyâ Çelebi, who visited these towns after Kütahya, describes in some detail the carpet making sector in these towns.46

I have already pointed out the importance of alum for cleansing and preparing the cloths in process of dyeing, and that Gediz, in the sancak of Kütahya, was one of the major mines that exported alum to Europe until the second half of the fifteenth century. I have also indicated that starting with the second half of the fifteenth century, and especially after the discovery of the alum mines around Rome, the Gediz mines started to decline. We can argue that if Kütahya had a textile manufacture industry to talk about, we could expect from Evliyâ Çelebi to mention the importance of the Gediz mines but he only makes a brief reference to it stating that as a part of the imperial domain it was given as tax-farm, and that it provided the alum for the whole Anatolian peninsula.47 Even though Evliyâ Çelebi’s remarks give the impression that the mine was active and running, in the absence of specific references to the management of the Gediz mine, it is difficult to support or substantiate his observations. As Faroqhi argues there was a long-term crisis, which began at the end of the sixteenth century, and which adversely affected the extraction and the marketing of the mineral; “in later periods, more specifically in the eighteenth century, the [tax] farmers of alum mines experienced persistent difficulties in marketing the mineral they extracted. Thus it is tempting to assume that the downturn began during the critical period of 1584-90, and that a slump in textile or leather production was the real reason why the farmers of the alum mines could no longer make ends meet.”48 If Faroqhi’s suggestions are reasonable, we may as well speculate that almost a century later, when Evliyâ Çelebi was in Kütahya, textile and leather production had not picked up to a considerable extent—despite the fact that his other remarks can make us think otherwise for the general level of prosperity.

As far as the alum production is concerned, and as far as its production is taken as an indicator for the production volumes of other manufacture sectors it is used, the scarcity of documents makes generalizations difficult. But even though mining was closely controlled and regulated by the state,49 it seems that the state did not very actively intervene in order to increase or regulate the production—at least, at the end of the seventeenth century. The first laws that specifically regulate the production of alum in Gediz go back to the time of Bayezid II—to 1488—and show to what extent the central authority was trying to keep the alum market restricted to certain regions. The alum mines of Gediz had been given to tax-farmers for three years—a practice which lasted probably until the end of the seventeenth-century—but a kadi and a supervisor were appointed to oversee the production and the areas in which it could be marketed. It is stated very clearly in the law code that the alum of Karahisar must not be alum in

48 Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650. p. 146
49 “Much more than any other sector” says, Faroqhi, ibid. p. 187
the regions where the alum of Gediz is to be used, and that an investigation of the production and the marketing has to be carried out every three months. Later in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, references to specific regulations are much sparser. Faroqhi mentions one case, which is also closely indicative for the leather production at the end of the sixteenth century. She shows that in 1579, the tanners from Burdur complained to the central administration that alum tax farmers were selling the alum to a higher price than it was fixed by the kâdî, and that the tax farmers were forcing the tanners to buy in higher quantities. The monopoly of the tax farmers of the alum mines over a region is, without a doubt, one of the principal reasons for such abuses, but it is also possible that the decline alum production and in demand of the leather manufacturers for alum might have led the tax farmers to take advantage of their monopoly. Scarcity of the primary sources fails us here too, but the relationship among alum production, tanners, and the shoemakers (haffâf, or kavvâf) is also intriguing.

Even though, he does not give any further details, according to Evliyâ Çelebi, the shoemakers’ market was the best ornamented and built of all the markets in Kütahya. Whether Evliyâ Çelebi’s observation tells something about the prosperity of the shoemakers can only be speculated upon. But Faroqhi draws attention to the fact that the tanners—who with whom the shoemakers were closely connected—formed one of the strongest guild organizations in the Ottoman Empire. The connection between different tanner guilds was such that the masters of the guilds “were appointed in the presence of a representative sent out by the şeyh of the dervish convent of Ahi Evren in Kırşehir.” Ahi Evren (or Evran) was likely the pîr (the spiritual leader of a dervish lodge) of many guild organizations already by the middle of the thirteenth century, and the şeyhs of the Ahi Evren lodge in Kırşehir, who succeeded Ahi Evren, continued to have influence on some of these artisanal organizations. However, the earlier connection between the tanners’ guild and the şeyhs of Ahi Evren was rather loose and symbolic, and the centralization of the tanners’ guild was a probably a phenomenon of the late seventeenth century. Faroqhi suggests that the state might have played an important in strengthening the hand of the şeyhs of Ahi Evren in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as a strategy against the increasingly powerful local notables and provincial administrators. With the scarcity of the sources, it is impossible to determine whether or not the centralization of the tanners’ guild might have played a role in protecting the shoemakers against the difficulties of social and economic

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51 Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650. p. 160
53 Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650. p. 156
54 It is important to note here, once again, that the question is to understand the socioeconomic context in which the ahi organizations grew and transformed. In order to explain the emergence of Ahi Evren and his successors as the leaders of the guild organizations, especially the tanners’ guilds, it is more appropriate to provide a historical and sociological context, rather than discovering the ethnic origins of the ahi organizations, or proving the Turkishness of the ahis. Such analyses are still missing in the literature on the connection between the guilds and the ahis. For a critical account of the historiography on the ahi organization, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Türkiye’de Ahilik Araştırmalarına Eleştirel Bir Bakış,” in I. Uluslararası Ahilik Kültürü Sempozyumu Bildirileri (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1996).
change, but the existence of Ahi neighborhoods—including an Ahi Evren neighborhood—in Kütahya also attests to a connection between the city and the Ahi Evren lodge. However, it is not clear to what extent specific guilds organizations or artisan groups were located in these neighborhoods, and to what extent they defined themselves as part of a broader ahi organization. As for the connection between alum production and the tanners, it is known that alum was also used by the tanners to prepare different types of leathers, and that hides were sometimes treated with alum. 55 Already in the law code of the Gediz mine, issued in 1488, it was explicitly stated that the alum of the Gediz mine was to be used and sold exclusively by the tax-farmers, their agents, and the shoemakers of the tax farmers. 56 The monopoly of the tax farmers over alum production and trade in western and central Anatolia was not always beneficial for the tanners. Just like the textile manufacturers, when the mineral was scarce, they too were forced to buy at fixed prices, and had to pay more than they would if they were permitted to find alternative markets. Unfortunately it is not possible to trace the historical trajectory of the relations between the tax farmers of the Gediz alum mines, the tanners and the shoemakers of Kütahya. Evliyâ Çelebi remarks and the scattered information coming from the archives permit us to point out the connections that need to be kept in mind and investigated further.

Apart from the connections among different guilds and tax farmers, another important aspect of the socioeconomic life of the towns was the connection between the pious foundations and the shops in the market places and hâns. I have already pointed out the importance of pious foundations as nexus of patronage ties, and to what extent they could be effective for political purposes. They also played a crucial role in the development of urban centers for which the construction of commercial buildings was a decisive step. The Ottoman central authority (like the other early modern states) did not intervene directly in order to initiate or carry out the projects of urban development. The construction of commercial buildings (covered markets, or hâns), which were usually attached to and benefitted from the pious foundations were founded either by state officials (of various standing, but more often than not by high ranking officials such as provincial administrators), or the local notables. In the case of Kütahya, Evliyâ Çelebi does not offer an inventory of the commercial buildings and their benefactors, but mentions that the big covered market was founded by one of the viziers of Mehmed II, Gedik Ahmet Paşa, 57 who funded other major constructions in Anatolia, such as the mosque complex in Afyon. 58 Gedik Ahmet Paşa was one of the major statesmen who helped consolidate the power of the Ottoman central authority in Anatolia in the fifteenth century, 59 but his role (along with other high ranking officials) went beyond military prowess and administrative centralization as he was the founder of pious foundations and mosques which were instrumental in the development of urban centers. The Ottoman central administration’s construction activity through the provincial

55 Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650. p. 159-160
56 The law code stipulates that “âmillerden ve âmil adamlarından ve âmillerin kâvvaslarından her kimin elinde mezbûr âmiller tahvillerinden satmak için Gedüz şabı bulunursa, cemî’isin zabet edüb bir emin ve mahfûz yerde emanet koyub mühürleyesiz.” Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri Ve Hukuki Tahlilleri, Ii. Bayezid Devri. Gediz Şaphânesi Yasaknamesi, pp. 252-253
57 Evliyâ, Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi, Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 306, Süleymaniye Küütûphanesi Perteş Paşa 462, Süleymaniye Küütûphanesi Hacî Beşir Ağa 452 Numaralı Yazmalarının Mukayeseli Transkripsiyonu, p. 17
58 Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650. p. 42
administrators had begun earlier than the time of Mehmed II. Timurtaş Paşa, who was appointed to Kütahya in 1389 by Bayezid I, and his son Umur Bey were the principal benefactors in the region—including other towns and cities than Kütahya. Timurtaş Paşa’s pious foundation in Kütahya included 121 shops along with an imaret and medrese complex. However, the construction of the commercial buildings was not restricted to the foundations of the provincial administrator. Individual shops were also part of smaller pious foundations. These “isolated vakıf shops”, as Faroqhi classifies them, outside the major complexes amounted to forty-two percent of the vakıf shops in Kütahya (153 out of 363 vakıf shops). But a good deal of coexistence was also possible as some of the smaller shops were located inside the larger commercial buildings.

Shops, markets, and hans connected to the pious foundations were centers for commercial activity. But at the same time, they were the channels through which wealth was transferred. If the construction activity is crucial for understanding the patterns of development of urban centers, the identity of the benefactors, the history of the construction activity (when it first started and ended, whether it continued throughout the centuries with a discernable pattern), and the characteristics of the transfer of wealth (whether the pious foundation were instrumental in transferring wealth from the provinces to the capital, whether they were primarily instrumental in keeping it within a region) are also of substantial significance in determining the socioeconomic transformation of a locality. One important remark in this respect is that the construction activity of the large commercial complexes in the provinces took place, to a great extent, before the sixteenth century. Individual, or “isolated vakıf shops” continued to be funded in the later centuries but as far as the hans, and the markets are concerned, the institutional foundations of the commercial activity was laid down to a great extent in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. Kütahya was not an exception to this rule. No major covered market or hân was constructed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Even though, from an architectural perspective, it does not appear to fit in the characteristics of a covered market, the big bedesten belonged to the pious foundation of Gedik Ahmet Paşa (late fifteenth century). The other bedesten, commonly referred to as Küçük Bedesten appears to be built during the time of Timurtaş Paşa, and can be dated to the beginning of the fifteenth century, to 1402. As for the Kapan Han, an epigraph, which Evliyâ Çelebi refers to, is dated to 1502, to the governorship of Karagöz Ahmet Paşa.

Even though this is yet another point of speculation, Faroqhi suggests that the centralization of power more and more in Istanbul, and priority given to the construction of the capital might have diverted available resources from the provinces to Istanbul, while at the same time, the same centralization process, by concentrating political and economic stakes in Istanbul might have prevented provincial governors from investing in the provinces. It is also important to note that the pious foundations did not necessarily and exclusively rely on the income

60 Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650. p. 40
61 For Timurtaş Paşa complex and other construction during the brief Ottoman suzerainty over the Germiyans before 1402, see Uysal, Germiyanoğulları Beyliği'nin Mimari Eserleri. pp. 58-83
62 Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650. p. 304-305
63 Ibid. p. 46
64 For an evaluation of these buildings primarily from an architectural point of view, Ara Altun, "Kütahya'nın Türk Devri Mimarisı, "Bir Deneme"," in Kütahya - Atatürk'ün Doğumunun 100. Yılına Armağan (Istanbul: 1981). Esp. pp. 390-400
generated from the rents of the shops, some were closely connected to the countryside. The revenues generated in the countryside were used for the upkeep of the pious foundations, and to keep them afloat. Hence, they also functioned as part of “tax-gathering mechanism, which resulted in constant transfer from the village to the city.”65 The transfer of wealth from rural to urban centers may well be another reason why there was less and less construction activity of commercial buildings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because, once disrupted by the population decline and the disruptive effects of the Celâlî rebellions, economic decline of the countryside might have deprived potential benefactors from funding new pious foundations, and the administrators of the older pious foundations from the necessary income for the upkeep of the buildings.

The sociopolitical profile of the benefactors is also important. One of the indicators of the extent to which the old dynasties, or influential families, who had established themselves in their regions before the Ottoman expansion, could maintain their economic wealth and political influence is the pious foundations they established and continued to administer. It is plausible to argue that the overall importance of the pious foundations established by the old dynasties in the economic structure of their regions give us a clue about their perseverance to remain powerful after the Ottoman conquest. In this regard, it is possible to read Evliyâ Çelebi through the silences in his account. For instance, even though he is clearly aware of the historical importance of Germiyans in Kütahya, the Germiyans do not appear as benefactors of large pious foundations – in fact, at least insofar as Evliyâ Çelebi’s account is concerned, the Germiyan dynasty seems to have vanished from the political, economic, and the cultural scene of Kütahya. It is true that Evliyâ Çelebi refers to medreses, baths, and mosques established by the Germiyans, but it is not clear from these references whether or not the Germiyan family still exerted an influence in Kütahya, and survived as one of the local notables of the sancak. This may be due to the fact that to Evliyâ Çelebi, the evkâf founded by the Germiyans were not extensive or big enough to effect in any major way the socioeconomic life of the city. It is plausible to think that the evkâf of Germiyanoğlu might have also fallen in disarray, and that they were improvised, if not totally dysfunctional. However, scattered historical evidence shows that the evkâf of Germiyanoğlu Ya’kub Bey was not in disarray either. In an order issued in 1579, and sent to the kadıs of Kütahya and Gedüs, it was stated that the administrator of the evkâf (mütevelli), Nasuh, wrote a petition, complaining that the clerk (kâtîp) and the collector of the revenues of the evkâf (câbî) prevented him from inspecting the accounts of the evkâf. The order states that the administrator should have access to the accounts and any abuse pertaining to the income of the evkâf should be barred.66 Another order issued in 1721 also indicates that there was a conflict between the administrator of the evkâf of Germiyanoğlu and the collector of the ağnam taxes. The order states that first, the registers of the vakfs belonging to the Haremenyn-i Şerifeyn, for which the taxes were collected should be consulted, and that any unlawful intervention of the collector outside his area of jurisdiction is to be prohibited.67 Despite the fact that the pious foundations established by the Germiyans continued to function, they do not seem to have had a significant role in the overall economic structure of the region—for instance, in terms of transfer of wealth

65 Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650*. p. 45
66 Mim Kemal Öke, Sezgin Demircioğlu, and Süleyman Bilgin, eds., *Tarihin Tanıklığında Evliya Çelebi’nin Kütahyası (Belgeler)* (İstanbul: İrfan Yayınları, 2006). p. 116-117
67 Ibid. p. 80-81
from the rural to the urban areas, or in terms of generating business in Kütahya. One of the reasons for the relatively unimportant role of the Germiyan vakfs may be related to the fact that their ascendancy, and their accumulation of capital, which then be used to found vakfs, were cut short during in a period of instability. Their location at a frontier zone between the Byzantine and the Seljuk states was constant challenge to establish stable mechanism of production, and taxation. Later on, when the Byzantine and Seljuk states were no more, the competition among the many principalities that occupied the frontier zone also prevented them from accumulating wealth.

In Kütahya, it was not the Germiyans, as the pre-Ottoman dynasty ruling over the region that possessed the largest share of the revenues generated by the vakf shops. In that respect, the vakf of the imaret of Timurtash Paşa, with a share of the 33 percent of the vakf shops,\(^{68}\) was the most important institution in the economic life of Kütahya. The fact that it was the pious foundation that was established by an Ottoman governor, which had the predominant role in the economic life of the city shows to what extent the consolidation of the Ottoman central authority in Kütahya was able to push aside the old power holders. To give another comparative example in this respect, the evkâf of the Ramazanoğulları in Adana, established in 1513-1514, possessed 79 percent of shops. In a similar way to the Ottomans—in fact, in a similar way to most of the principalities of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries—Ramazanoğulları, established a mosque and a medrese, while his son, who became the governor of the region, expanded the complex with further constructions. Perhaps, rather untypically, all the hâns of Adana, belonged to the evkâf of Ramazanoğulları.\(^{69}\)

Hâns, covered market, and evkâf shops played a crucial role in the economic development of a town, but periodic fairs and village markets were also important. In one of the earliest studies carried out on the village markets in west and central Anatolia, Faroqhi argues that the place of a town in the administrative hierarchy of the central administration was also related to the place of village markets in the hierarchy of commercial centers.\(^{70}\) Just like the commercial activities that were generated by the local fairs and villages markets could sustain and support the administrative functions of a town, the administrative importance of a town could be an incentive to develop local markets either by local landowners or by the central authority. Village markets could function as alternative commercial nexuses in regional and interregional trade for the peasantry and large landowners to market their cash crops. In this sense, it is reasonable to think that the central authority would promote these markets for the purposes of taxation. However, despite the obvious importance of these commercial nexuses, research on the dynamics of the village markets is still inadequate and faces many limitations. Documentation, especially for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is scarce. The existing documents (here, the land registers and provincial law codes of the sixteenth century are still the most informative sources) do not always permit to come up with an overall picture over time, and with a general interpretive framework. For instance, as far as the stipulations regulating the taxation of the regional markets (bacı bazar) are concerned, the provincial law code of Kütahya

\(^{68}\) Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650*. p. 308

\(^{69}\) Ibid. p. 29-30

does not even mention anything specific.\textsuperscript{71} Even though the village markets were also contact zones between the settled communities and the nomads—another crucial nexus for the explaining the socioeconomic, political, and even cultural dynamics of a region,—unfortunately there is more documentation on the conflict between the nomads and the settled communities than there is on their cooperation and commercial activity. Evliyâ Çelebi is silent on this relationship too. He praises the quality of the food and the fruits, and mentions that the prices were pretty low for most of the essential food items.\textsuperscript{72} He also travels in the countryside, and visits most of the important towns around Kütahya, but he is conspicuously silent about the nomads. Whether Evliyâ Çelebi’s silence on the nomads stems from his elitism that tends to perceive the urban areas as civilized and hence much more worth recounting than the “empty” countryside is moot point for the readers of Evliyâ Çelebi’s travel notes\textsuperscript{73} but whatever the reasons for his silences might be, historical evidence that can be gathered from the archives is also rather sparse.

Faroqhi’s work on the sixteenth century village markets reveals that even though there was an increase in the number of the periodic village markets established in the sancak of Kütahya, the number of these periodic markets was relatively small. Faroqhi says that “even in the latest series [the land registers] compiled about 1570-1571, there were no more than eleven village markets in the entire sancak. No intermediate marketing centers have been found and markets on summer pasture and in other temporary settlements were apparently scarcely if even recorded.”\textsuperscript{74} Table 1 shows the periodic village markets established throughout the sixteenth century in western and central Anatolia.\textsuperscript{75}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sancak</th>
<th>Bayezid II</th>
<th>Kanuni</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kütahya</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1570-1571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydın</td>
<td>19 (1478-81)</td>
<td>42 (1528-29)</td>
<td>48 (1575-76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menteşe</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37 (1562-63)</td>
<td>44 (1583)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karahisar-ı Sahib</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 (1572-73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamid</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22 (1522-1523)</td>
<td>23 (mid-16 century)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İçel</td>
<td>13 (Selim II)</td>
<td>32 (1551)</td>
<td>43 (1584)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Periodic village markets established throughout the sixteenth century in western and central Anatolia

The increase of the number of the village markets in the sixteenth century and yet their relatively small number in the sancak of Kütahya also calls for an explanation. The scarcity of resources

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid. p. 39
\textsuperscript{72} “ve mekûlât ve meşrûbâtı gayet ucuzdur, hatta bir vukiyye hâs ve beyaz ekmek bir kuş gözü akçeye ve bir vukiyye koyun eti iki akçeye ve sığır eti bir akçeye amma çiğer üç akçeyedir” Evliyâ, Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahât Nâmesi, Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 306, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Pertev Paşa 462, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Haci Beşir Ağa 452 Numaralı Yazmalarının Mukayeseli Transkripsiyonu. p. 17
\textsuperscript{73} Compare, for instance, Dankoff, who thinks that Evliyâ’s elitism is apparent and explains his silence on the countryside and Caroline Finkel, who thinks there is valuable information in Evliyâ Çelebi on rural conditions in the seventeenth century. Dankoff, An Ottoman Mentality the World of Evliya Çelebi. Esp pp. 50-70, and Finkel, “Evliyâ Çelebi’nin Toynak İzinde: Yazından Yola, Parşömenden Patikaya.” p. 160
\textsuperscript{74} Faroqhi, "Sixteenth-Century Periodic Markets in Various Anatolian Sancaks: İçel, Hamid, Karahisar-ı Sahib, Kütahya, Aydın, Menteşe." p. 60. In an unreferenced entry in Yurt Ansiklopedisi, it is mentioned that the number of the markets was given as following: 5 (1481-1512), 12 (1520-1566), 14 (1570-1571) "Kütahya."
\textsuperscript{75} The table is from Faroqhi, "Sixteenth-Century Periodic Markets in Various Anatolian Sancaks: İçel, Hamid, Karahisar-ı Sahib, Kütahya, Aydın, Menteşe."
and their content make substantial generalizations very difficult. The population increase throughout the sixteenth century seems to be one of the major reasons why there was an increase in the number of the periodic markets. However, even though it is reasonable to argue that an increase in the volume of agricultural production, the commercialization of agriculture, and the expansion of the interregional trade might have led to this increase, there is no concrete evidence in this regard. As for the small number of village markets in the sancak of Kütahya, Faroqi mentions that “a monopolization of commercial opportunities on the part of the central place [Kütahya?]” was probably a less important factor than in Karahisar-ı Sahip but does not explain fully this comparison by explaining in detail what she means by commercial opportunities, and what the parameters of comparison are. A tentative explanation is the large scale of the sancak, and the existence of other important towns, such as Denizli, where commercial activity was also remarkably high.

Evliyâ Çelebi’s preference of urban centers over the countryside as places worth recounting may be a point of contention, but that he did not shy away from using pejorative remarks on number ethnic groups, including the Anatolian Turks, is less disputable. When talking about the attributes of the people living in Kütahya, Evliyâ has a many good things to say about their attitudes and appearances but his overall remark reveals to some extent his cultural elitism. He says of Kütahya that “to be sure, this is Anatolia and Turkish country, nevertheless, it has very many religious scholars and educated people and poets.” As Dankoff points out, “the phrases ettrak-ı bi-idrak” (mindless Turks) and ettrak-ı na-pak (impure Turks) occur infrequently in the Seyahâtname. But opprobrious rhyming epithets are quite common: Kazak-ı ‘ak (cussed Cossaks), Rus-ı menhûs (inauspicious Ukranians), … Macar-ı füccar (fornicating Hungarians), Alaman-ı bi-eman (faithless Germans), ‘Urban-ı ‘uryan (naked Arabs), ‘Urban-ı bi-edyan (irreligious Arabs).” Whether these epithets were literary devices or not, Evliyâ’s silence on the nomadic population in the sancak of Kütahya is particularly puzzling because not only because these epithets usually referred to nomadic population, but nomadic or semi-nomadic population continued to live in the sancak of Kütahya, and the central government tried to control and tax them efficiently throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In a report prepared after the second half of the nineteenth century, it is stated that from 1757 to 1864, the taxes accruing from some of the nomads that lived in the region were used for Mecca and Medina. The report specifically refers to ten nomadic groups, known as Haremeyn Aşireti (with reference to the Holy Cities). It is clear from the report that successive attempts were made to settle them. The report also states that the manufacture of carpet and rugs they were known for almost completely stopped, and that their livelihood depended now mostly on small scale farming and raising animals. It is also important to note that similar to the other references to Kütahya, only two of the ten of the nomad groups are located within the immediate vicinity of Kütahya. Others were scattered to the greater region comprising Eskişehir, Bozöyük, Aydın, and Balıkesir.

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76 Ibid. p. 60
78 Dankoff, An Ottoman Mentality the World of Evliya Çelebi.
Evliyâ Çelebi’s account of Kütahya is the most important source for an overall assessment of the town in the second half of the century. However, despite his observations and colorful descriptions of the town, Evliyâ Çelebi’s account is not enough to for an overall evaluation of the socioeconomic change of the town and the sancak of Kütahya throughout the seventeenth century. Notwithstanding their value, his accounts can be taken only as groundwork for further research. But then, the scarcity and the changing nature of the state documents do not really permit us to substantiate his observations or fully correct where he might have gone wrong. In short, we are bound with tentative interpretations rather than with conclusive arguments.

More than thirty years ago, Faroqhi, in one of the first comparative studies on the development of the Anatolian cities and towns, and the development of urban network, noted that “governmental functions were not enough to make a great city.” She gives specifically Amasya and Manisa, as examples of the towns with princely courts, and argues that despite the fact that members of the imperial family and many high administrative officials resided in these towns, and that both towns were endowed with pious foundations, they never were among the most populous or more commercially active towns in Anatolia. The same can be said of Kütahya with even more conviction. Kütahya’s administrative role as the capital of the Anatolian province did not make it a center of migration, nor did it turn it into a commercial hub. In this respect, Kütahya was never really on a par with Bursa or even Ankara. The presence of the high ranking administrative officials endowed the city with pious foundations, and religious institutions. But even this specific development is confined to the first centuries of the consolidation of the Ottoman power. In this respect, even the presence of a good many religious establishments did not significantly alter the urban development. For instance, Faroqhi notes that Amasya, with twenty-one medreses, was a major learning center. Only Bursa and Konya had more medreses, but the high number of medreses alone, was not enough to turn Amasya into a major populous city. Evliyâ Çelebi counts seven medreses in Kütahya, and notes, as I pointed out above, that in contradistinction to the region being an area with high nomadic population, Kütahya was a learning center too. But then again, most of these institutions were built in the first centuries of the Ottoman rule, and this does not seem to have affected the city in a major way, especially as far as the socioeconomic transformation of the town in the seventeenth, and eighteenth century is concerned.

For a significant urban development, other factors were also necessary. Faroqhi especially notes proximity to the trade routes, commercialization, the degree to which the town...
could be protected from sieges—either its geographical location, or by fortification. But the most important factor was the urban center’s relation to its hinterland and the agricultural productivity of this hinterland. Given the primacy of local and regional trade for most of the towns in the early modern era, it was the hinterland that provided the city with the most crucial agricultural produce, affected the volume of trade, and even sustained the viability of the artisanal sector as well as the pious foundations. It seems that the overall impact of the connection between the towns and the hinterland was more important than the administrative function—and hence the central authority’s control—of the towns.  

In the absence of the documents such as the land registers and the court records, it is very difficult to reconstruct an overall picture of this specific relationship between Kütahya and its hinterland. That the population increase of the sixteenth century also had an impact on Kütahya is beyond dispute but the after effects of the Celâlî rebellions and the population decrease throughout the seventeenth century are still not well known. Evliyâ Çelebi acknowledges the devastating effects of the rebellions on the city, and argues that had it not been for the Celâlîs (especially Karayazıcı and Sa’îd Arab), it would have been a more developed and better built town. But as far as the agricultural productivity is concerned, we need to rely on indirect and in some cases highly limited information coming from the central authority.

One source of information that can help us to figure out, at least tentatively, the level of agricultural production comes from the extraordinary taxes levied by the state in times of war or when large numbers of troops were deployed to repress the rebellions. Some of these extraordinary taxes (tekâlif-i örfiyye), which later became regular taxes, were levied mostly on barley and flour. It is not clear what kind of criteria the central authority used in order to assess the amount of the extraordinary taxes to be levied for each district and how it was distributed among the tax-paying units calculated as hâne, but the productivity of the lands must have been of the foremost importance because as Linda Darling shows the revenue assessment methods in the seventeenth century were based on the previous assessments; land registers or fiscal surveys of the sixteenth century. Under the timar system, the productivity of soil was already the

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82 Faroqhi, in another article written in 1990, says that in 1980, she “was more than ready to assume that the geographical distribution of markets reflected mainly the central administration’s success in penetrating the countryside, today the operation of factors not directly connected with government business seems to carry more weight. Exchanges between peasants and nomads, the needs of travellers in district centers located on a major route, in certain areas the cultivation of local specialty crops or the presence of rural crafts all contributed toward the development of ‘markets-in-administrative-centers’ into small towns.” Suraiya Faroqhi, "Towns, Agriculture and the State in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Anatolia," *journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 33, no. 2 (1990): p. 147

83 Using the land registers and court records together is particularly fruitful, see Amy Singer, "Tapu Tahrir Defterleri and Kadi Sicilleri: A Happy Marriage of Sources," *Tarîh Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1 (1990).


85 It was, of course, mostly barley and wheat but it was the responsibility of the taxpayers to mill the wheat. Lütfi Gücer, *Xvi-Xvii. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi Ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler* (İstanbul: Sermet Matbaası, 1964). Especially, pp. 67-92

primary concern in assessing the value of the agricultural lands.\(^{87}\) A çiftlik, in the timar system, was the basic land unit ranging from sixty to one-hundred-and-fifty dönüm\(\text{\textsubscript{s}}\) (a dönüm is roughly 1,000 sq. m) according to its productivity, and these figures on the productivity of the çiftlik\(\text{s}\) were also often stated in the provincial law codes.\(^{88}\) It is, therefore, possible to have an idea on the productivity of the lands of specific provinces by comparing these figures. The following is a comparative table based on the figures determined in different law codes.\(^{89}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sancak</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Mediocre</th>
<th>Unproductive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kütahya</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80-90</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hüdavendigâr</td>
<td>70-80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>130-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydın</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>130-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaman</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80-90</td>
<td>100-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbekir</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silistre</td>
<td>70-80</td>
<td>100-120</td>
<td>130-140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Productivity of lands in different provinces according to law codes

What we can conclude from this comparative table is of course highly limited. The table does not give the area of the sancaks, nor does it provide any information on the ratio of productive lands to the mediocre or unproductive lands in a given province. All we can say therefore is that in the sancak of Kütahya, sixty dönüm\(\text{\textsubscript{s}}\) could be enough for a good level of productivity, and that the region could be seen as one of the productive regions in Anatolia. As far as the cereal production (barley and wheat) of the lands is concerned, a further step can be taken, and the percentage of the revenues accruing from cereal production can be assessed within the overall revenue of a given sancak and districts. Lütfi Güçer’s study on the extraordinary taxes levied from the cereal production also includes data on the total revenue of the different sancaks and districts in the sixteenth century, and the percentage of the revenue coming from wheat and barley production in the total revenue.\(^{90}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sancak</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total revenue in akçe</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Barley</th>
<th>Total Value and Percentage in overall revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kütahya</td>
<td>Kütahya</td>
<td>1564-1565</td>
<td>149,520</td>
<td>6,818 / 10</td>
<td>68,180</td>
<td>26,240 (94,420) / 63,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saruhan</td>
<td>Menemen</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>724,883</td>
<td>10,290</td>
<td>246,960</td>
<td>378,938 (378,938)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{87}\) There were other factors in revenue assessment of a given province but here we are mostly concerned with the productivity of soil. For a concise information on revenue assessment based especially on land registers see, ibid. pp. 29-35


\(^{89}\) Güçer, Xvi-Xvii. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu\(\text{\textsubscript{n}}\)da Hububat Meselesi Ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler, p.46

\(^{90}\) Ibid. pp. 62-63
Once again, the limitations of this comparative table are obvious. The dates of the documents from which the data was compiled vary from region to region. The districts for which the data was compiled also vary in terms of their size and location, and there is no detailed data on the lands that could be cultivated within a given region. Furthermore, it is not exactly clear to what extent a middle size urban center such as Kütahya can be compared to Menemen, which is a relatively small provincial town—hence, the huge disparity in cereal production. Also important to note is the fact that the weights were not standardized until the late nineteenth century and local variety could result in significant differences in comparative analysis. Finally, even the value of kile changed from region to region—hence, in this case, the huge disparity between the values of wheat and barley for Kütahya and Tire. All of these factors make rigorous comparative analysis very difficult. Notwithstanding these limitations, it is nevertheless important to have an estimate understanding of the cereal production in different location in Anatolia. In the case of the sancak of Kütahya, for instance, a more detailed breakdown on the cereal production is available—again from the data compiled by Güçer.91

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total revenue in akçe</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Barley</th>
<th>Total Value and Percentage in overall revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kütahya</td>
<td>1564-1565</td>
<td>149,520</td>
<td>6,818 / 10</td>
<td>68,180</td>
<td>5,248 / 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

91 Ibid.
Table 4.4: Cereal production in the sancak of Kütahya (1564-1565)

It appears from the above table that compared to the districts of Konya, Teke, and Saruhan, the sancak of Kütahya, was not a major producer of cereal—perhaps except Eğrigöz and Gedüs. Even though it is well known that the main grain source for Istanbul was not Anatolia, but the European coasts of the Black Sea and Egypt, the cereal production was nevertheless very important in the overall economy of the sancak; it made up almost eighty percent of the total revenue. This was especially important when the central authority levied extraordinary taxes. The following is the table of the nüzzül taxes levied in 1590 from different sancaks in Anatolia.92

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sancak</th>
<th>Avarızhâne</th>
<th>Flour / Kile</th>
<th>Barley / Kile</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kütahya</td>
<td>19.558</td>
<td>3.259,5</td>
<td>9.978,5</td>
<td>13.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saruhan</td>
<td>3.261</td>
<td>543.5</td>
<td>1.632,5</td>
<td>2.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karahisar-ı Sahip</td>
<td>4.116</td>
<td>2.102,5</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2.802,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastamonu</td>
<td>8.004</td>
<td>1.334</td>
<td>4.002</td>
<td>5.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolu</td>
<td>10.500</td>
<td>1.751</td>
<td>5.253</td>
<td>7.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangiri</td>
<td>6.274</td>
<td>1.041,5</td>
<td>3.140,5</td>
<td>4.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultanönü</td>
<td>1.301</td>
<td>216,5</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>867,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hüdavendigâr</td>
<td>7.158</td>
<td>1.193</td>
<td>5.379</td>
<td>6.572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karesi</td>
<td>4.285</td>
<td>714,5</td>
<td>2.143,5</td>
<td>2.858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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92 Compiled from ibid. p. 146-163.
Table 4.5: *Nüüzül* taxes levied in 1590 from different sancaks in Anatolia

As with the other data compilations, it is important start by pointing out the limitations of the table. Apart from the difficulties in determining the fluctuations in measurement of the weights, comparing the areas of cultivated lands, the fertility of soil, and a whole range of exemptions depending on a variety of factors, the most important variable here is to determine the size of the main tax-unit; avârızhâne. I have already pointed out that historians who work on Ottoman demographic history are extremely cautious when it comes to the use of avârızhâne as unit of analysis because in most cases it is not clear to how many real tax payers units, or more precisely, tax paying household units, an avârızhâne refers to. It is possible that an avârızhâne in Kütahya, as the basic tax unit, could be composed of ten real households, whereas in Saruhan it could refer to fifteen. Unless it is explicitly referred to in the tax collection orders sent to the provinces how many real household units make up an avârızhâne, it is highly speculative even to come up with an educated guess.\(^93\) The following is the detailed breakdown of avâriz households (hâne) and avarızhâne taxes for the sancak of Kütahya.\(^94\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sancak</th>
<th>Avarızhâne</th>
<th>Flour / Kile</th>
<th>Barley / Kile</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kütahya</td>
<td>4.442</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>2.196</td>
<td>2.961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geyikler</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gököyük</td>
<td>1.008</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kire</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dağardı</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>41,5</td>
<td>124,5</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eşme</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayı</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavşanlı</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şeyhlu</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>417,5</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çarşanba</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bozguş</td>
<td>5.165</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>1.082</td>
<td>1.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eğrigöz</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>101,5</td>
<td>306,5</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kula</td>
<td>1.455</td>
<td>242,5</td>
<td>727,5</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simav</td>
<td>1.100</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selindi</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homa</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banaz</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>45,5</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>181,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honaz</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazkiyye</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>461,5</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emlak</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^93\) Specifically for the distribution of extraordinary taxes among tax payers, ibid. p. 70-71
\(^94\) Ibid. pp. 147-148, for a much more comprehensive discussion, see Süleyman Demirci, *The Functioning of Ottoman Avârız Taxation: An Aspect of the Relationship between Centre and Periphery a Case Study of the Province of Karaman 1621 - 1700* (Istanbul The ISIS Press, 2009).

131
Table 4.6: *Avâriz* household and *avârızhâne* taxes in the sixteenth century for the sancak of Kütahya

As critical levies of provisions for the army, the nüzül taxes were regularized throughout the seventeenth century, and more importantly, it became a cash tax rather than a levy in kind for barley and flour. Nevertheless, depending on the needs of the army, at times nüzül continued to be levied in kind.\(^95\) The following table shows the distribution of the nüzül for some of the Anatolian towns in 1637, during the military campaign against Iran.\(^96\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Avarızhâne</th>
<th>Flour</th>
<th>Barley</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kütahya</td>
<td>5,534</td>
<td>1,591,25</td>
<td>6,321</td>
<td>7,912,25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saruhan</td>
<td>4,138</td>
<td>2,160,25</td>
<td>7,826,5</td>
<td>9,986,75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>731,5</td>
<td>2,915,25</td>
<td>3,646,75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karahisar-ı Sahip</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>409,75</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>2,049,75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastamonu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamideli</td>
<td>1,750,5</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>3,165,5</td>
<td>4,026,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangiri</td>
<td>708,5</td>
<td>337,25</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>1,684,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultanönü</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>274,5</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>1,372,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hüdavendigâr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karesi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>531,25</td>
<td>529,75</td>
<td>1,589,25</td>
<td>2,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleppo</td>
<td>795,25</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>2,183,25</td>
<td>2,888,25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7: The distribution of the nüzül for some of the Anatolian towns in 1637, during the military campaign against Iran

Nüzül were among the levies that represent the central authority’s need for more and immediate cash after the sixteenth century. A whole range of developments from the transformation of the military technology that rendered the tımar system more and more ineffective, the increasing number of the people salaried by the state,\(^97\) the need of the provincial governors to have an ever

\(^{95}\) As Darling defines them, “avarız (levies), avarız-ı divaniyye (state levies), and tekalif-ı örfiyye (civil ve customary dues) were blanket terms for a large number of dues in cash, king, or services. Some of these were extraordinary revenues or levies of supplies assessed, usually for military purposes, by order of the sultan in times of need. Others were routine levies for the maintenance of institutions such as guarding mountain passes or maintaining bridges, roads, and waterworks. The term “avarız”, which often refers to an assessment in cash (also called avarız akçesi), can be used as a general term for all these levies.” Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560 - 1660*. p. 87

\(^{96}\) Compiled from Güçer, *Xvi-Xvii. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Hububat Meselesi Ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler*. pp. 164-185

\(^{97}\) Linda Darling notes that “even during the sixteenth century the number of people salaried by the state grew from 41,000 to 91,000, and during the seventeenth century it increased again; in 1630 military wages formed 77 per cent of the Ottoman budget, and in 1670 62,5 per cent.” Linda Darling, ”Public Finances: The Role of the Ottoman
expanding household and retinues, and even the particular characteristics of the Ottoman financial state system that led to cyclical crisis, such as the sıvış year crises that Halil Sahillioğlu drew attention to, the need for cash became paramount. Extraordinary taxes were levied before, but insofar as the regularization of these levies are concerned, the war with the Habsburgs seems to have been the turning point and by 1620-21, they had become regular taxes, with the concomitant development of the bureaucratic structure in the state to assign, control, and collect them. Furthermore, as Darling points out, “the traditional Ottoman revenue system drew mainly on agriculture, urban revenues representing only a small part of the total, but the avarız, paid by all, tapped the new commercial prosperity resulting from sixteenth-century urbanization.” The extent of urbanization and the capital accumulation that occurred in the sixteenth century may be debatable, but the regularization of the extraordinary taxes was a means to expand the tax basis of the state in order to supply the state with increasing need of cash. Avarız taxes, along with cizye (poll-taxes paid by the non-Muslims), and the tax-farming (first through iltizam, then through malikâne, and finally through the esham) of a number of revenues was part of the changing financial system of the empire, and further monetization of the economy. Relative weight of these new taxes within the transforming state finance also changed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Darling points out that avârız taxes came to represent the government’s largest revenue source in the seventeenth century, and that the avârız akçesi (the avârız taxes that were levied in cash), which were around 60-80 akçe in the sixteenth century became fixed to 300-400 akçe in the seventeenth century, and the avârız surveys, which were based on previous land register, comprised not only more and more people but also became empire-wide after 1640. However, at around the turn of the century, especially after the second siege of Vienna, which ended with failure in 1687, the central authority put further emphasis on the regularization and the collection of the cizye revenues. The revenues from cizye quadrupled. This was yet another important transformation in the financial policies of the empire because, as Darling argues, the new financial policies also determined who would be singled out as the main resources of taxation policies; “cizye came to comprise over 40 per cent of the Ottoman budget in the first half of the eighteenth century. Meanwhile, avarız totals decreased, and avarız dropped around 10 per cent of the budget. [This means that] unless the amount of avarız concealed in the category of farmed revenues increased proportionately, in these years a greater portion of the financial burden of empire was transferred to a shrinking non-Muslim population.” Along with the changes of the financial policies on cizye and avârız, the changes brought about in tax-farming policies were, perhaps, the most momentous for their in the transforming the social and economic configuration of the power relations. The implementation and the consequences of the life-time tax-farming policies (malikâne), which started in 1695, have been interpreted, almost anonymously by scholars of the Ottoman Empire, as one of the key developments that explains

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100 Ibid. p. 90
101 Darling, “Public Finances: The Role of the Ottoman Centre.” p. 119 For the avârız rates, see also Demirci, The Functioning of Ottoman Avârız Taxation: An Aspect of the Relationship between Centre and Periphery a Case Study of the Province of Karaman 1621 - 1700.
102 Darling, “Public Finances: The Role of the Ottoman Centre.” p. 125
the dynamics of change for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; especially for the role they played in the rise of the local notables, and hence reconfiguring the relationship of the central authority with the provinces. Coupled with the changes in international trade and the way the Ottoman Empire connected and responded to these, “this time period saw deep structural changes whereby social actors of different origins, locations, and interests connected through political and economic networks of association, and explored the means by which they could become empowered vis-à-vis the state, perceiving alternatives not fully within imperial vision.” This would be a world that Evliyâ Çelebi would have recounted probably differently.

Among the notable silences in Evliyâ’s account of Kütahya are the local notables. Even though, as I have pointed out above, his account makes clear that Kütahya is the land of the Germiyans, there is no trace of the dynasty in 1671–other than its name. But it is clear from the historical records from the later periods that the Germiyans were well and alive–not only through the pious foundations that they had established in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but as a local dynasty–and they would take their place in the historical records of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as one of the rising local notables. Nevertheless, for all the puzzling silences that permeate his narrative, Evliyâ Çelebi remains as a crucial landmark that helps us reconstruct a larger historical framework. So far the emphasis of this reconstruction has been to turn back to previous centuries, and compare Evliyâ’s account with the available data on the sixteenth and seventeenth century–with an occasional look to the end of the seventeenth century. We can, now, move forward into the eighteenth century.

CHAPTER 5
KÜTAHYA (1700-1760)

NOTES ON THE PRIMARY SOURCES

In this chapter, I feel it is appropriate to begin with a few remarks on the nature of the primary sources. Although this will entail a digression from the structure of the historical and historiographical narrative adopted so far, I believe these remarks are too important to be confined to the footnotes. I have two reasons for thinking so. The first is that, starting in the eighteenth century, the archival material becomes more abundant and more diverse for the historians of the Ottoman Empire. The second is that the increasing bureaucratization of the central authority, together with new administrative and fiscal practices, meant that more—and more different kinds of—records were kept.104

Obviously, change in the eighteenth century did not take place uniformly. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the central authority tried to reassert its authority more forcefully in certain regions than in others. The regional difference in the implementation of the new measures, coupled with the existence of richer primary sources in some regions, sometimes amplifies the disparities between regions at the expense of the similarities. While the pace of historical change may seem to have accelerated in some places, other places may seem to have remained stagnant backwaters. For instance, Karl Barbir’s work on Damascus105 and Dina Rizk Khoury’s work on Mosul106 show the extent to which the administrative and fiscal measures adopted during this period promoted the Ottomanization of the provincial elites rather than the decentralization of the empire. She argues that the central authority’s tax-farming policies and the recruitment of mercenaries by the local notables were the two major means through which Ottomanization took place. As for Damascus, the reorganization of the pilgrimage routes, and the military duties of the governors in Damascus, especially after 1699, added a further dimension to the socioeconomic history of the region. Hence available resources show that these two provincial societies undergoing a rapid transformation compared to the inland regions of Anatolia. A similar disparity between the inland and the coastal regions is also more and more pronounced in the nineteenth century, when trade between the West and the Ottoman Empire increased, and trade relations took on a new dimension. In this new context, while change accelerated in some of the coastal regions, it stagnated in the inland regions (including older centers such as Damascus). As a result, historians understandably have turned their attention to the coastal trade centers rather than to the inland regions, for which primary sources (both Western and Ottoman) are hard to come by.

104 However, as far as the availability, diversity and the systematic categorization of the primary sources are concerned, it is the nineteenth century that proved to be the real turning point. In that sense, even though the primary sources for the eighteenth century are richer than the previous centuries, the record keeping practices have more affinities with the seventeenth century than the nineteenth.
106 Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire Mosul 1540 - 1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Most of these observations hold true for Kütahya. On the one hand, even though it had been the administrative capital of the Anatolian province since the fifteenth century, Kütahya cannot be viewed in the context of increasing trade relations between the West and the Ottoman Empire; nor were the radically new measures, which reasserted the power of the central authority, forcefully implemented in Kütahya. On the other hand, it is true that Kütahya fares much better than Eskişehir (Sultanönü), for which there is a real dearth of primary sources—at least until the late nineteenth century. Primary sources for eighteenth-century Kütahya are limited to the Ottoman archives, and are too sparse, especially for the first half of the century, to permit a cumulative or serial analysis. Only after the 1830s does it become possible for historians to work with the data in the administrative yearbooks (salname) and censuses, which give much more extensive information about the administrative, economic, and demographic aspects of the various districts. Another very important source for socioeconomic history, namely, the survey registers of real estate, land, animals, and income (temettuat defterleri) became institutionalized only after the 1840s. The income registers in particular point to a significant change in administrative structure, in that they record income much more meticulously, and on the basis of a new approach to property relations. These income registers, which replace the land registers (tapu tahrir defterleri) of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, represent a new power configuration—one that turns the individual (head of the household, to be more exact), his income, and his property into statistical data that the modern state can use to increase productivity of the land, and hence the taxation of income. While the historians working on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rely on the scarce data to identify even general demographic and economic trends, there are 17,540 income registers for 543 districts in Anatolia and the Balkans for the historians of the nineteenth century. Not only are more data available, but there is also a more refined theoretical framework of interpretation for the available data. A significant development in this respect is the increasing number of dissertations that use the yearbooks and income registers. Even though almost all of them transcribe these sources rather than interpreting them, these dissertations nevertheless make the archival materials available to other researchers and the public in general.

An even more notable development has been the use of the court records, which today forms a subfield of research within the field of Islamic history in general, and Ottoman-Middle

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108 The literature on the “temettuat registers” is getting bigger and more sophisticated. For an introduction, Hayashi Kayoko and Mahir Aydn, eds., *The Ottoman State and Societies in Change a Study of the Nineteenth Century Temettuat Registers*, Islamic Area Studies (London New York Bahrain: Kegan Paul, 2004).
110 Kayoko and Aydn, eds., *The Ottoman State and Societies in Change a Study of the Nineteenth Century Temettuat Registers*. p. 6
111 The examples are too many to be cited here, even if we narrow down to Kütahya in particular. Some of these dissertations (most of which M.A theses) can be found, an downloaded from the webpage of yok.gov.tr Especially the income registers are too many and detailed to be comprehensively studied, or transcribed by a few researchers. For a specific study on the yearbooks, Nilüfer Bakan, "Salnamelere Göre Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Kütahya Sancağı'nın Sosyo-Ekonomik Profili" (Eskişehir Osmangazi, 2007).
Eastern history in particular. The development of Islamic legal theory and practice, the role of the court in conflict resolution, the role of the kadı, the relationship between Islamic jurisprudence and the laws and regulations promulgated by the state, and women’s and the non-Muslims’ use of the Islamic courts—all these have been studied with a renewed rigor over the past twenty years.\textsuperscript{112} More important for the purposes of this study has been the use of the court records in writing about social and economic history. Scholars have turned to the court records in particular to write this history from below. Arguably the major shortcoming of the Ottoman archives is that most of the sources emanate from the state, and hence have a state-centric bias. Moreover, the Ottoman archives provide a perspective from above, and are hardly useful to reconstruct the everyday life of the common people. Despite their shortcomings,\textsuperscript{113} the court records provide historians with a new perspective to counter this state-centric bias and perspective from above. The court records have therefore been instrumental in putting the provinces, and the everyday life of the common people, back on the historians’ agenda.\textsuperscript{114} The last two decades have witnessed a remarkable increase in scholarly works that make use of the court records to research a variety of topics over many different time periods. The fact that we have court records for most of the countries that were part of the Ottoman Empire has also helped scholars to focus on different regions while deriving their data from a similar archival source. The local differences between regions are expressed through the medium of the court records, which give a procedural and textual uniformity to local diversity. In this chapter and the chapter that follows, I will make extensive use of the court records of Kütahya, to provide a more comprehensive and sometimes comparative picture of socioeconomic change in the eighteenth century.

While scholars have turned to the court records for the purpose of writing social and economic history, a parallel development, at least for the Ottoman archives in Turkey, has been the classification and centralization of the court records. Previously located in the libraries of specific towns or cities, these records were all collected in the National Library in Ankara in the nineties, and were recently relocated to the Prime Ministry Archives. During the past four years, the reclassification of the court has been under way.\textsuperscript{115} It is not clear how the court records will eventually be classified in the Prime Ministry Archives as the court records are currently not available to the scholars. This relocation and reclassification has made it difficult to cite

\textsuperscript{112} For a recent compilation of a variety of articles, especially on the role of the kadıs and their judgments, and an overview of the recent developments in the study of the courts, Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters, and David S. Powers, eds., \textit{Dispensing Justice in Islam, Qadis and Their Judgments} (Leiden Boston: Brill,2006).

\textsuperscript{113} As stated, there is a remarkable literature on various aspects of the court records. Critical perspectives that draw attention to the shortcomings of the court records are part of this literature. For an example of a more critical approach on and a reevaluation of the usefulness of the court records, Dror Zeevi, "The Use of Ottoman Shari'a Court Records as a Source for Middle Eastern Social Histor: A Reappraisal," \textit{Islamic Law and Society} 5, no. 1 (1998).

\textsuperscript{114} Ronald Jennings was one of the first historians to draw attention to the possibilities offered by the court records, Ronald Jennings, "Kadı, Court and Legal Practice in the 17th Century," \textit{Studia Islamica} 48(1978). Ronald Jennings, "Limitations of the Judicial Powers of the Kadi in the 17th Century Ottoman Kayseri," \textit{Studia Islamica} 50(1979). For a more comprehensive and theoretical discussion that put the court records on the historians’ agenda, see Beshara Doumani, "Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine: Writing Palestinians into History," \textit{Journal of Palestine Studies} 21, no. 2 (1992).

\textsuperscript{115} For an overview of the primary sources see, Suraiya Faroqui, \textit{Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For the court records, pp. 55-57. However Faroqui notes that the records are in the National Library. For a general catalogue of the court records in Turkey, Ahmet Akgündüz, \textit{Şer'iyye Sicilleri, Mahiyeti, Toplu Kataloğu Ve Seçme Eserler Hükümler}, 2 vols. (Istanbul1988).
references properly. When the present research was conducted, Kütahya court records were in the National Library and could be accessed only through the microfilms. There was no uniform reference for citation, and every scholar had to develop his or her own reference system. Furthermore (as far as one judge from the microfilms), there were serious mistakes, inconsistencies, lacunae, and duplications overlaps in the numbering of the pages and of individual records in a given volume. The page numbers and the numbers of the individual records look as if they had been casually written either on the court record itself or on the microfilm. In the following discussion, I will refer to the individual volumes and the individual records without citing a page reference. Hence KCR1/5 refers to Kütahya Court Records, volume 1, record number 5.

One (rather limited) way to overcome the problem of cross-checking the references is to use the court records that have been transcribed. The court records are among the favorite archival sources that are routinely transcribed, especially by graduate students working on their MA theses. Some of the Kütahya court records are also available to scholars in transcribed form. Even though there is no established and uniform method of transcription, these transcribed records are nevertheless much easier to access, read, and search. For instance, the first volume of the Kütahya court records, which is around 193 pages, and which contains more than nine hundred records, is divided into three parts, and each part is transcribed individually. Two of these transcriptions are available online. In the following discussion, I will use the transcribed records whenever possible, and will follow the reference system used in these records. For example, the reference K2/62/327 refers to the first volume of the Kütahya court records, part 2, page 62 of the court record (according to the transcription), record number 327. These references do not always match the microfilm copies, but even though this may create an inconsistency in references, it is easier for other researchers to cross-check the individual records. Apart from the problems posed by the inconsistency and uniformity of the citation system, and by the reference system in the transcribed sources, there is also the problem of “reading” the primary sources. It is undeniable that transcribed archival material is enormously helpful to scholars who must collect large amounts of data on various aspects of socioeconomic change over a long period of time. It is much faster to skim thorough the transcripts than to plow through the primary sources to relevant information. However, it is not wise to take the transcribed records at face value. There are often serious mistakes in the readings of the proper names, and in specific references to state policies. There are even mistakes that give a totally different meaning to the whole text.

Ekrem Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iiyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği" (M.A, Dumlupınar, 2006). (Henceforth as K2/page number/record number) And Leyla Sarraçevi, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iiyye Sicili (3. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği" (M.A, Dumlupınar, 2007). Are available online and can be downloaded from yok.gov.tr The first part transcribed by Serpil Dağlı is listed on the yok.gov.tr but is currently not permitted for downloading.

It must be admitted that the script of the Kütahya court records, in most cases, is not an easy one. Even though there are different scribes with different handwritings, the reading of the individual records, with the added difficulty to read them from the microfilm, or their photocopies, is a challenging task. In this sense, mistakes are understandable, but not always justified. One important example is about an entry in KCR-1 (K2/102/510) that contains information about the lifetime tax farming (malikâne)–one of the earliest examples of the implementation of a crucial fiscal policy that had a significant impact on Ottoman polity. Not only are there serious problems in reading the formulaic presentation of the lifetime tax farming as a new policy, but also one of the first tax farmers is identified as Turdanoğlu, whereas the correct reading should be Torunoğlu, who was one of the local notables in the Kütahya region. The name Torunoğlu, later in the eighteenth century, would appear in other documents as a rebel. If the readings are taken for granted, this and similar examples can therefore pose a problem in the construction of the
Hence, even when I used the transcribed material, I had to go back to the primary source when I felt the need to double-check the transcription.

THE KÜTAHYA COURT RECORDS

Kütahya is not one of those towns for which many court records are extant. Unfortunately, there is no "happy marriage" of the land registers and the court records for the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that would allow us to juxtapose the bird’s eye view of the land registers with the more grounded information in the court records. For the whole eighteenth century, there are only five volumes of court records for Kütahya, and there are significant gaps between those volumes. The first volume covers the four years from 1698 to 1702. The second volume starts with the year 1757 and covers three years. The third volume covers the years 1764 to 1767, while the fourth volume begins only a decade later in 1778 and ends in 1780. The last volume for the eighteenth century covers the years 1784 to 1786. The sixth extant court record for Kütahya dates back only to the beginning of the nineteenth century; it covers the years 1802 and 1803. These significant gaps between the volumes make it difficult to reconstruct socioeconomic change on the basis of solid historical evidence. This is especially true for the first of the half of the eighteenth century, because the consensus in Ottoman historiography is that the period from 1700 to the 1760s was one of economic recovery, and administrative restructuring. It is impossible to make use of the court records to assess the changes that took place during this crucial period.

Dror Zeevi argues that “historical research based on the sijill [court records] can be divided into three basic categories or techniques, according to the methodology used: quantitative history, narrative history, and microhistory. Each of these methodologies requires a different strategy for reading, collecting and sifting information from the court records … Almost all studies based on court records make use of at least one of these modes of history writing. Most of them employ two, and some employ all three to make the reconstruction of the past as full and detailed as possible.” Different types of sales, especially sales of houses and lands, registrations of marriage and dowries, divorce settlements, and probate inventories are all amenable to quantifiable analysis. A careful comparative or statistical analysis can reveal much about the socioeconomic changes that took place within a region or a town; about the socioeconomic and political power of different social groups; about the consumption patterns; and about the economic, social, legal, and cultural aspects of gender relations. If the historian is lucky enough to find a series of documents related to one another, the court registers usually provide a better foundation, and richer details than other types of primary sources; and the historian can use these to narrate the transformation of a whole range of topics—from the history of a social class (such as local notables or religious leaders), to the history of an institution (such as the guilds). And when complemented with other documents, such as imperial edicts, registers of regulations (ahkâm defterleri), or even better, with private family papers, the court records historical context, and can sometimes lead to serious misinterpretations, and gaps in our knowledge. For the formulaic presentation of the lifetime tax farms, compare for instance, K2/102/510, with similar lifetime tax farming documents in Erol Özvar, Osmani Maliyesinde Malikane Uygulaması (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2003).

119 Zeevi, "The Use of Ottoman Shari'a Court Records as a Source for Middle Eastern Social Histor: A Reappraisal." pp. 38-39
allow historians to write quite comprehensive social and economic histories. The court records have also been used—together with a whole range of other documents pertinent to various social, political, legal, and cultural issues—to construct microhistories. In the writing of microhistory, it is the uniformity of the legal language used in court records (despite the variety of topics covered) that can shed light on a specific case, precisely because the historian is able to identify the record “that is not a ‘run-of-the-mill’ type of record.” That which stands out as interesting or as peculiar can sometimes shed light on the foundational assumptions and dynamics of a polity. And even seemingly ordinary cases, once situated in their socioeconomic and legal context, can reveal more than an isolated individual incident at the court.

Of course, each of these approaches has its shortcomings, and most historians working with the court records are acutely aware of them. The shortcomings that cast the greatest doubt on the uses of the court records are the limited extent to which they can be used as samples for statistical purposes, the formulaic nature of the legal texts, and the difficulty of situating the cases in their extralegal context and of tracing the consequences of the cases brought to the court. In short, the critics argue that the court records are merely a “façade,” and that “we know almost nothing about the courtroom strategies that lie” beyond that façade. This, the critics argue, is an insurmountable obstacle to take the data in the court records at face value. Who goes to the court, for what purpose, and with what final outcome is in most cases the historian’s guess. Zeevi goes so far as to argue that because we cannot satisfactorily answer most of the questions pertinent to the representative nature of the records, “the kinds of graphs and tables demonstrating social stratification, for example, so popular in quantitative research, might … be skewed to such an extent that they only represent the sample itself.” He also argues that the legal conventions used in the formulation of the cases create such dense layers of embedded meanings that they “obfuscate in a myriad ways the ‘reality’ of the case as it unfolds.” All these arguments are well taken, and are shared by most historians. However, there are other conventions shared by historians that make an interpretation more or less acceptable. Even on a more theoretical level, antifoundational claims about the impossibility of recovering the reality that lies behind the legal texts do not necessarily assume that the main referent of the texts is themselves. Apart from examining the literary conventions employed in specific documents, and the meanings embedded in court practices as an institution, it is always possible to support the information contained in the court records with information found in other types of documents, which employ different literary conventions. Moreover, reconstructing the past with as comprehensively as possible, and without confining oneself only to textual evidence, means situating the texts and the practices of the court in a broader political, social, and economic context.

120 Ibid. p.48
121 A very good example of this is Leslie Peirce, Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
122 These examples are for too many to cite here. However, in most studies of the court records, it is almost a standard approach to point out these shortcomings.
123 Zeevi, "The Use of Ottoman Shari’a Court Records as a Source for Middle Eastern Social Histor: A Reappraisal."
p. 43
124 Ibid. p. 40
125 Ibid. p. 52
Bearing in mind all these limitations concerning the use of the court records, I will use the Kütahya court records selectively. I do not intend to conduct a statistical analysis of the types of litigation, the social status of the witnesses, or the consumption patterns of the residents on the basis of the probate inventories. That is not the purpose of this study, and the gaps in the Kütahya court records are so significant that any statistical analysis must necessarily be incomplete. Furthermore, there are almost no secondary sources, no monographs on Kütahya for the eighteenth century that could be used to situate the information contained in the records in a broader socioeconomic context, or to fill in the gaps in the series. Therefore, although I will use the court records for quantitative and narrative purposes, I will do so only to provide a richer context for the socioeconomic changes that took place in the eighteenth century. In short, I will barely scratch the surface of the information the court records contain. I nevertheless hope that they will take us to the streets of Kütahya, as it were, and will broaden a perspective that would otherwise be narrowly confined to the documents emanating only from the central authority.

KÜTAHYA SEEN THROUGH THE COURT RECORDS

THE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE FORTRESS

I have already discussed the problems posed by the study of demographic history, especially for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and have noted the limited use of the avârız registers that replaced the land registers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Another way to make an educated guess on population change is to look for an increase or decrease in the number of neighborhoods that appear in the court records. To be sure, this approach is even more problematic than using the avârız registers, because in most cases the neighborhoods are mentioned only to locate a given case in its proper legal context. And if orders concerning the levy of avârız taxes are not recorded in a court register, then only the neighborhoods that play a role in a legal case are mentioned, leaving the other neighborhoods unrecorded. Nevertheless, it appears that throughout the eighteenth century, the court records show no significant change in the numbers of neighborhoods. Evliyâ Celebî had counted thirty-four of them in 1671, and there were still thirty-four, maybe thirty-five, neighborhoods in the Kütahya court register thirty years later. Even though no tax levy listing all the neighborhoods was appears in the Kütahya court register volume 1, all or most of the neighborhoods seem to be mentioned in different cases. We can therefore assume that there was no significant increase in population. But the number of the neighborhoods is also important for another reason as well. The neighborhood was the basic administrative, legal, economic, and social unit in urban settings. Furthermore, a city is never a neutral terrain; “cities and their parts exemplify, embody, and express power relations to be sure,

but at same time they enforce, perpetuate, and engender relations of power.”

It is therefore imperative to say more about the neighborhoods.

This is not the place to discuss the architectural history of Kütahya. However, reading the court records with an eye to the physical characteristics of a city can provide valuable insights into its social and economic history. Arguably the most remarkable characteristic of the neighborhoods that emerges from the records is that Muslim and non-Muslims often lived side by side. Reading Evliyâ Çelebi, one gets the impression that even though there were non-Muslims in Kütahya, non-Muslim neighborhoods were separated from Muslim neighborhoods. And this impression lends support to one of the assumptions about the “the Islamic city”—at least, insofar as it has been defined and discussed in the architectural and socioeconomic history of Islam. It is therefore in order to look at some of these assumptions briefly, in order to situate the data gathered from the court records of Kütahya within a broader context.

In architectural history, the notion of the Islamic city has been highly contentious ever since the early seventies. The notion as it was developed throughout the first part of the twentieth century was based on certain characteristics of the city in question. Amira K. Bennison summarizes these characteristics as follows: “According to the Orientalist canon laid down by the Marçais brothers and von Grunenbaum, the distinguishing characteristics of such cities were: a centrally located great mosque; a spatial market hierarchy in which the most prestigious trades were located closest to the mosque; public baths; a governorial complex; inward-looking residential quarters; and a wall system. A discursive relationship was established between Islam and such urban characteristics as narrow streets, blind alleys, courtyard houses and a relative lack of open public spaces. The apparent absence of urban corporations of a medieval European type, and thus city’s subjugation to despotic political powers, was similarly attributed to the pernicious effects of Islam.”

Most of these assumptions were later criticized by such historians as Albert Hourani, Janet Abu-Lughod, and Andre Raymond. The common points of the criticisms were that the notion of the Islamic city was based on very limited observations and case studies; that this notion became popular as matter of faith rather than critical inquiry—that is, it was widely accepted because different scholars cited each other uncritically; and that it was built on

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128 There are more studies on Arab cities such as Aleppo, Cairo, Damascus that combine architectural and socioeconomic than there are on Anatolian cities. One notable exception to that rule is Suraiya Faroqhi, Men of Modest Substance, House Owners and House Property in Seventeenth-Century Ankara and Kayseri (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Mustafa Çetin Varlık used other archival documents, especially the data of the land registers, to evaluate Evliyâ Çelebi’s account of Kütahya. However, his reading is confined to correcting some of the mistakes Evliyâ Çelebi makes when he tries identify some of the mosques. Mustafa Çetin Varlık, “Evliya Çelebi’ye Göre Kütahya Ve Bu Bilgilerin Arşiv Belgeleri Ile Karşılaştırılması,” Marmara Üniversitesi Türklik Araştırmaları Dergisi 4(1988).


an ahistorical comparison between the West and Islam. Furthermore, the “Islamic city,” its chaotic plan, with its absence of large public spaces, of autonomous administration and guilds, was defined more by what it lacked than its existing features. This notion turned the city into a highly idealized ahistorical prototype, ignoring in its regional diversity and socioeconomic variety.

However, even the critics of the ideal “Islamic city” have continued to single out the features that differentiated cities in Islamic societies from those in other societies. For instance, Janet Abu-Lughod argues that “the three Islamic elements that set in motion the processes that give rise to Islamic cities were: a distinction between the members of the Umma and outsiders, which led to juridical and spatial distinction by neighborhoods; the segregation of the sexes which gave rise to a particular solution to the question of spatial organization; and a legal system which, rather than imposing general regulations over land uses of various types in various places, left to the litigation of neighbors the detailed adjudication of mutual rights over space and use. These three factors were Islamic, per se.” For Abu-Lughod, they were not, however, the determining factors that shaped the Islamic city. The three factors that Abu-Lughod lists provided a legal and social vocabulary that enabled the authorities and the citizens to negotiate their claims, solve their conflicts, and give meaning to socioeconomic change. In this sense, Islam was not an imposing and unchanging structure; it was the medium through which everyday life in the cities—with all its diversity and constant restructuring—was experienced. Andre Raymond, another critic of the notion of the Islamic city, also argues that religious segregation of the neighborhoods was one of the major characteristics of urban experience in Islamic—and more particularly in Arab—societies. He says that ‘if the ethnic minorities were unequally grouped together according to the extent of their 'differences' (the Turks and the Kurds had a stronger tendency to stay together than the non-native Arabs), the religious communities (the people of the Book, or dhimmis) were usually subject to fairly strict segregation.” According to these scholars, the neighborhoods were segregated on the basis of religious affiliation for many reasons. These reasons ranged from certain premises of the Islamic legal canon to the authorities’ tendency to let ethnic and religious communities govern themselves.

In the light of these assumptions, it is difficult to see Kütahya as a prototypical Islamic city—at least insofar as the social fabric of the neighborhoods is concerned—because there is a good deal evidence for mixed neighborhoods. To be sure, the neighborhood in the eighteenth century was still the basic administrative, legal, economic, and social unit, but especially insofar as the segregation of the neighborhoods is concerned, the picture we get from the court records calls into question the prevalent assumptions. The court records—the orders concerning the levy of a variety of taxes and other types of legal disputes—do not directly refer to the mixed nature of the neighborhoods; but it is possible to infer from the sale of houses, or from disputes concerning taxation the existence of mixed neighborhoods. In most cases, when there was a sale or a donation (hibe) of a house, or a plot of land in a neighborhood, the court records carefully specify the boundaries. The houses and roads—either private or public—surrounding the house that is subject to sale or donation are recorded with specific reference to their owners,

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133 Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic City - Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance." p. 172
134 Raymond, "Islamic City, Arab City: Orientalist Myths and Recent Views." p. 14
135 For the use of the house sales in court records, see also, Faroqhi, Men of Modest Substance, House Owners and House Property in Seventeenth-Century Ankara and Kayseri. For the neighborhoods, see esp. pp. 13-15
which gives some idea of the ethnic and religious composition of a given neighborhood. Although the names of the neighborhoods, such as Çerçi Müslüman, and Çerçi Kefere, strengthen the impression that religious groups lived in their own neighborhoods, it seems that these two neighborhoods were in fact mixed. In a record that registers the donation of a house in Çerçi Müslüman in 1702, for instance, it is clear not only that the donation was made by non-Muslims (Greeks), but also that the house donated was located between a Muslim and a non-Muslim residence. Furthermore, the witnesses of the registration were both Muslims and non-Muslims. Another case in the same neighborhood concerns a legal settlement on an inheritance. This record too makes it clear not only that non-Muslims were living in the neighborhood, but also that Muslims could act as their legal agents before the court. Çerçi Müslüman was not the only mixed neighborhood in Kütahya, similar evidence—mostly the sale of houses—suggests that the Ahi Erbasan, Bölücek, Şehreküstü, and Lala Hüseyin Paşa neighborhoods were also mixed.

Although the mixed neighborhoods are evidence of religious coexistence, it is difficult to infer from this evidence the extent to which interreligious relations were peaceful and harmonious on a broader social, economic, and political level. And it is even more difficult to determine how these relations changed from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. For instance, it may be an oversimplification to think heavy taxation will necessarily lead to social and religious tensions; sometimes, on the contrary, heavy taxation may encourage residents to accept the religious diversity of a given neighborhood—only if to alleviate the tax burden. When the eighteenth century saw an increase in the levy of lump sum taxes from a given neighborhood or community, it became more important to share the tax burden. This was probably why the people of the Lala Hüseyin Paşa neighborhood (sigâr ve kibâr bâ cem’ihim) sued the people of the Çerçi Kefere neighborhood in 1701, arguing that some of the non-Muslims who appeared to be registered to Çerçi Kefere were in fact part of their own community. They defended their case by arguing that the said non-Muslims had previously been registered in the taxbooks as belonging to Lala Hüseyin Paşa, and that their fathers and grandfathers had paid taxes as members of that community. The case was settled in their favor after the tax-registers were consulted, and after the said non-Muslims confirmed that their families had always paid taxes as residents of Lala Hüseyin Paşa.

Evidence on mixed neighborhoods is not restricted to the registration of sale or taxation disputes. In a case concerning assault and battery, two non-Muslim brothers, residents Lala Hüseyin Paşa, sued Mehmed from the El-Hac Ahmed neighborhood, arguing that Mehmed and a friend of his (refïki) entered their house late at night and assaulted them. Mehmed was brought to the court by an appointee of the deputy governor of Kütahya, and confessed to having consumed alcohol on the night of the assault.

Legal disputes provide a little more information on the background of the assault, nor anything specific on the aftermath of their court appearance other than both sides had to take oaths, and that Mehmed’s father Osman Dede would act as his guarantor (kefil).

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136 Güngör, “1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği”. (K2/85/441)
137 Ibid. (K2/70/362)
138 Ibid. For Ahi Erbasan (K2/70/365), for Bölücek (K2/76/398 and especially 399, see also K2/78/408), for Şehreküstü (K2/83/429), for the registration of a donation among non-Muslims (KCR-1/38), for Lala Hüseyin, (K2/75/389, 391), (K2/84/433)
139 Ibid. (K2/64/340)
140 Ibid. (K2/87/448) The limits of the court records are apparent in this type of cases; there is no information on the background of the assault, nor anything specific on the aftermath of their court appearance other than both sides had to take oaths, and that Mehmed’s father Osman Dede would act as his guarantor (kefil).
social relations between different religious groups than does the registration of sales and donations. But this information exits only as snapshots or fragments. Nowhere in the records do we find stories that are so connected as to form a coherent historical narrative.

Another snapshot that we can get from the court records is that of the fortress. Nikita Elisséeff argues, with reference to such cities as Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs, that “the main function of the citadel is to be the ruler’s residence; all the administrative buildings are grouped around it; there is an arsenal, a mosque and a bath, as well as a small market place. Occasionally, as in Aleppo, a maydan [public square] is laid out for cavalry exercises … The citadel is a city in itself.” However, this specific function that centralizes the administrative and military powers of the rulers within the citadel holds true only for the Middle Ages; in early-modern period when political power became more diffuse or more bureaucratic, citadels seem to have lost their administrative centrality in the cities. The Kütahya fortress appears never to have been a city in itself, never to have been the main base of the provincial administrators, who resided in Kütahya. Kütahya’s administrative role as the capital of the Anatolian province did not make the fortress the administrative center of the city. The citadel may have protected the city from the complete destruction brought about elsewhere by the Celâlî uprisings, but this did not necessarily mean that the citadel would take on a central role after the uprisings were over. And, when large retinues—composed mainly of irregular troops—became increasingly important for provincial administrators to protect themselves and to carry out their administrative and military duties, the fortress must have declined further in importance, both because these retinues were becoming too large for small fortresses and because, being irregulars, they were harder to control than regular troops.

I have already pointed out that in Evliyâ Çelebi’s narrative, the importance of the Kütahya fortress was mainly a strategic one—its position overlooking the city made it essential for the protection of the city. Evliyâ states that there was only a very small neighborhood, consisting of eight houses, within the fortress. In what he calls the inner walls of the fortress (iç kal’a), there were no major buildings. Its strategic location, and the relatively empty zone within the inner walls, served a defensive function. The other main function of the fortress was to protect a water source that had been secured by the construction of new fortifications. The only remark that Evliyâ makes about the socioeconomic role of the fortress sounds more like fiction than an actual observation. Evliyâ says that the residents of the fortress had the exclusive right to buy sheep’s liver from the butchers, and that there was significant animosity between the residents of the town and those of the fortress over this right. Be that as it may, Evliyâ’s account must be taken with a grain of salt because the Kütahya fortress served a more administrative function in the city than Evliyâ would have us believe.

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One of the functions of the fortress was to imprison convicts, and it would continue to serve that function throughout the eighteenth century. One of the first records in the Kütahya court register volume 1 lists the names of the nineteen individuals imprisoned in the fortress in 1698.\textsuperscript{143} Other records also show that the prisoners were not all the residents of Kütahya. Since Kütahya was the administrative capital of the Anatolian province, the prison was also used to incarcerate people from other parts of the province, and even from other parts of neighboring provinces. For instance, when the collector of the extraordinary taxes for the province of Karaman failed to deliver the taxes he collected in 1698 (a sum amounting to 32,000 guruş), an order was issued to arrest him and imprison him in the Kütahya fortress. Similar orders would continue to be issued for high-profile officials throughout the century, and those who were convicted and caught would be imprisoned in the Kütahya fortress. However, even though incarceration was one of the main functions of the fortress, it is difficult to determine exactly what role the fortress played in the penal system. That is, it is difficult to know to what extent Kütahya’s position as the capital of the province of Anatolia also meant that the fortress functioned as some sort of high-security prison for politically influential people or for the more dangerous convicts in the empire. One thing is certain, however: Kütahya would later—especially in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries—become one of the main places where people would be “exiled” (nefy). Whether this could be seen as a continuation of Kütahya’s place in the penal system (albeit in a different form) is hard to tell because the period from the 1760s to the 1830s was highly unstable. During this period, the central authority constantly tried to reassert its power vis-à-vis the local notables by eliminating them. It is possible that Kütahya became a place where the central authority was confident of maintaining control, and that it sent convicts or political suspects to Kütahya because there was little chance that they could form alliances there with the local notables against the state.

The governors of Anatolia, and other state officials appointed to the province or to Kütahya, did not reside in the fortress. Numerous orders at the turn of the eighteenth century show that when a new governor was appointed, mansions (konaks) were to be prepared as his residence, and other logistical provisions (such as food) were to be made ready for the governor’s retinue. In the appointment order of Abdi Paşa to the governorship of Anatolia in 1700, it is stated that mansions had to be prepared before the governor took office.\textsuperscript{144} The locations of these residences are not specified; and apparently the preparations had not been completed, nor had Abdi Paşa arrived in Kütahya, a year later, because a similar order was issued in 1701.\textsuperscript{145} By the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, it was an established practice for the appointed governors to appoint a deputy in their turn, and to govern in absentia. (In the court registers, it is not uncommon to find both orders registered one after the other, the appointment of the deputy governor following the appointment of the governor.) However, during times of serious political upheaval, of political and administrative centralization, or of economic restructuring, the central authority controlled the governors more closely, and forced them to govern at their seats. For instance, when the governor of Baghdad, Mustafa Paşa, was appointed to the province of Kütahya in 1702, the order of appointment made clear that he was going to come with his retinue not only to provide security against the bandits in the province, but also to oversee the provinces of Sivas and Karaman, whose governors were sent to the

\textsuperscript{143} (KCR-1/3)
\textsuperscript{144} Saravci, “1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (3. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği”. (K3/89/734)
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid. (K3/101/798)
In this last appointment, the residences of the governor and his retinue are not mentioned, but it is reasonable to assume that they were not in the fortress, because the court records almost always mention the fortress with regard to other military or administrative matters.

Various orders sent to Kütahya indicate that there were 119 guardsmen in the fortress at the turn of the eighteenth century. However, these military men were not local fortress guardsmen in the strict sense of the word. They were part of a special Janissary company consisting of cavalrmen. This company was first formed during the reign of Murad I (1362-89) at the suggestion of Kara Timurtaş Paşa, and consisted of two companies, called Sipah and Silahdar. Later on, probably in the fifteenth century, four more companies (Uluşeciyian-ı yemin, Uluşeciyian-ı yesar, Gurabâ-ı yemin and Guraba-ı yesar) were formed, bringing the total number of companies to six. After the formation of these companies, they were referred to collectively as the Sixth Company (altîbölük halkı). Even though the members of the Sixth Company were cavalrmen like the timar holders (timarlı sipahi), they were different from the timar-holding cavalrmen in that they were part of the sultan’s retinue, like the Janissaries. As such, the members of the Sixth Company were supposed to reside in the capital; but as their numbers increased (to around twenty thousand at the end of the sixteenth century), and for logistical reasons (such as finding appropriate grazing land to feed their horses), they started to move out of Istanbul and to settle in the surrounding regions, especially in Bursa, Edirne, and Kütahya.

The orders show that only nineteen of the guardsmen were assigned to permanent service in the fortress. The rest were to be summoned during military expeditions. However, summoning different military units in an effective manner was a constant challenge for the state at the end of the seventeenth century. Although it was a treaty of defeat for the Ottomans, the Treaty of Karlowitz, signed in 1699, gave the state a respite to reorganize the military, to reform the provincial administration, and to put new fiscal measures into effect. As part of the military reorganization, a series of orders was sent to the guardsmen in Kütahya directing them to put their companies in order. The state, in fact, had long recognized that like other timar-holding cavalrmen, and the Janissary regiments, some of the guardsmen who belonged to the Sixth Company were only nominally soldiers, and that it was practically impossible to summon all of them during wartime. Instead of engaging in an endless and inconclusive struggle to summon every soldier for every expedition, the central authority resorted to levying a replacement tax (bedel) for those who would not or could not go on military expeditions. An order from 1698 confirms that there were 119 guardsmen in the fortress, and only 100 of them were required to participate in war efforts. The same order also states that the replacement tax for those who

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146 Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/86/442), (K2/86/444)
147 Ibid. (K2/104/513B), see also (K2/109/546)
149 Uzu'nçarlı notes that at the end of the seventeenth century, they could be found in other regions far from the capital, as far as Bosnia, Salonica, Adana or Sivas. Ibid. p. 156
150 Perhaps a better translation would be “wartime payment in lieu of military service” but I chose replacement-tax, which is a more practical translation.
could not be mobilized was 30 guruş, but that due to the poverty of the guardsmen, it was reduced by half, to 15 guruş.¹⁵¹

THE MILITARY CLASS

Modern scholars (following Ottoman scholars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) usually argue that one of the principal reasons for the decline of the military institutions established in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was that while the military class was getting more and more involved in other activities, such as commerce, many members of the nonmilitary class were infiltrating the ranks of the military. While different elements of the military class, such as the cavalrymen of the Sixth Company stationed in Kütahya were becoming localized, the so-called outsiders (ecnebi) from the nonmilitary class were mobilized as irregular troops and recruited as the retinue of governors and their deputies. In this respect, the replacement tax can be seen an indicating that the state now de facto recognized the localization of the Sixth-Company soldiers by treating them as taxing subjects (the military class was exempt from paying taxes). The state used the income accruing from the replacement tax to finance more irregular troops, and to finance other expenses as well. For instance, in 1698, all of the revenue accruing from the replacement tax in Kütahya was allocated to Selim Giray Khan of Crimea,¹⁵² who had fought alongside the Ottoman forces on the western front, and was staying in an estate near Silivri,—to cover part of the expense of resuming his khanate. He did so a couple of years later, in 1702.

The efforts of the central authority were particularly intense at the height of the war on the western front. In 1698, a series of orders was sent to Kütahya in what may be one of the last attempts to reorganize the units belonging to the Sixth Company. Although reorganization attempts and the replacement tax would seem to be mutually contradictory, they reflect different sides of the same socioeconomic transformation and the change in the military organization that accompanied it. One main purpose of the orders was to prevent the recruitment or infiltration of the irregular soldiers into the Sixth Company.¹⁵³ It appears that the central authority was dealing with the consequences of its previous policy of recruiting irregular troops for its war efforts. The order sent to İbşir Hasan Paşa specifically stated that the irregular troops that had previously been dismantled (because they had become too unruly) were allowed once again into the military as part of governor’s retinue—on the condition that they be strictly controlled and not mix with other military units, such those belonging the Sixth Company. Furthermore, similar orders demanded urgent mobilization of the members of the Sixth Company for the western front and ordered the provisioning of horses for them.¹⁵⁴ These orders were sent to summon more troops for the western front immediately before the state signed the Treaty of Karlowitz. Four years later, there was another attempt to reform and reorganize different military units. Probably as part of this attempt, a new commander of the Janissaries (yeniçeri serdarı), and a senior officer who was in charge of the members of the Sixth Company (kethüdayeri) were appointed to the Kütahya fortress in 1702.¹⁵⁵ In 1698, the senior officer of the Sixth Company was ordered to

¹⁵¹ Güngör, "I Numaralı Kütahya Şer'îyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/109/546)
¹⁵² Ibid. (K2/113/565)
¹⁵³ Ibid. (K2/102/508), (K2/106/525)
¹⁵⁴ Ibid. (K2/105/522), (K2/105/524), (K2/106/526), (K2/106/527), (K2/108/536)
¹⁵⁵ Ibid. (K2/98/497), (K2/98/498)
keep an eye on the irregular troops that had tried to levy unlawful taxes on the peasantry under the pretext that they were from the Sixth Company (levendât taifesi sipahi namıyla). A year later, the central authority was still trying to control the irregular troops. Another series of orders sent to the governor of Anatolia, Ömer Paşa; to other state officials; to their appointees; and to the local leaders made it clear that the recruitment of irregular troops into the army had created a good deal of confusion in the ranks of the Janissaries. The gist of the orders was that as long as these troops were recruited as members of a governor’s retinue, they were recognized by the state. However, when they roamed the countryside and claimed military status for themselves, they were seen as posing a threat to the order of the polity. In any case, the state appears to have had significant difficulty in mobilizing the cavalry and the Janissaries not only for the war efforts at the western front but also to suppress the uprisings and the banditry in the east, especially in Baghdad.

It is hard to tell to what extent this difficulty in mobilizing the troops is directly attributable to the localization of the Janissaries in Kütahya. Nevertheless, it is clear that the timars that they held gave the members of the Sixth Company a vested interest in the economic life of the city and the surrounding areas. The litigations concerning members of the Sixth Company cover a range of issues—from other officials' unlawful appropriation of timar revenues to peasants’ complaints that the timar holders were trying to extract more taxes than were their due. It is difficult to analyze in detail the vested economic interests of the military class in Kütahya as a whole. That is, it is difficult—specifically for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—to determine what percentage of agricultural land was controlled by the members of the military class, and to what extent they were involved in commerce. Evidence for the localization process is therefore fragmentary, but it suggests that, apart from holding timars and collecting taxes, some members of the military were rich enough to buy property—especially houses—in the city, and to be involved in small-scale commercial activities. These members of the military class were, more often than not, relatively high-ranking officials—or at least, men who could use their political and administrative roles to enrich themselves. For instance, Kürd Mahmud Bölükbaşı was the steward of the deputy governor of the governor of Anatolia, Mustafa Paşa. Two relatively detailed records concerning the settlement of his divorce case in 1701, and another record concerning the sale of a house in 1702, show that Kürd Mahmud had bought property both in the city, and in the surrounding region. The house he sold in the neighborhood of Servi was worth 240 guruş. He also owned a farmhouse and farmlands in the district of Güreği. As far as we can tell from the sources, it is hard to see Kürd Mahmud as one of the local magnates, but he probably used his administrative role as the steward of the deputy governor to acquire his property, and that property was sufficient to give him a vested interest in the socioeconomic and administrative structure of the region.

156 Ibid. (K2/100/502)
158 Ibid. (K3/88/727-728)
159 Ibid. (K3/113/845-846)
160 Kürd Mahmud’s divorce cases give a more detailed account of some of the property he owned, and the amount of dowry for divorce (mahr-i müeccel) he had to pay (40.000 akçe, that is, around 360 guruş). See Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/66/350, K2/67/354). For the sale of house, see (K2/66/351). For his administrative role, and the revenues accruing from his administrative position (K2/86/447). For a litigation concerning theft of his property, see (K2/66/349)
THE PERSISTENCE OF THE OLD ORDER

There is also ample evidence (in the court registers and in other archival sources) to show that the guardsmen of the fortress tried to hold on to the revenues accruing from their timars and zeamets. Although the prevalent assumption (both among contemporary Ottoman observers of Ottoman polity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and among modern scholars) is that the timar system was almost totally obsolete by the eighteenth century, timar and zeamet holders still held adamantly to their rights. In most of the litigations concerning timar and zeamet, the plaintiffs frequently cited the old registers and the old law codes of their provinces to vindicate their claims. For instance, the court registers show that when there was a complaint about illegal interference in the administration of a timar or zeamet, these registers and law codes were used in the adjudication process. In most cases, the litigations were settled with reference to both detailed and summary land registers compiled in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The fact that these registers were used shows that even though the timar system had lost its efficacy in mobilizing the troops, it had not been entirely replaced by a new system. Not only was it still legitimate and effective as an administrative and legal system, but it appears that the records were preserved intact and were frequently used by the state bureaucracy.

Although the central authority initiated new fiscal and administrative policies, such as the malikâne system, at the end of the seventeenth century, the court registers show that there was a mixed pattern of landholding and tax collection at the beginning of the eighteenth century—a pattern that would continue throughout the eighteenth, and the first decades of the nineteenth, centuries. During this period, not only was the timar system evoked retrospectively with reference to the old privileges and rights, but also new timars and zeamets were granted by the central authority. There are many examples of such grants for the sancak of Kütahya. In particular, the central authority used those timars which had fallen into disuse or which had remained vacant (mahlul timar) by granting them again to other military personnel. When there was a request for a grant from a senior military official, the central authority first checked the records to see whether the timar in question had fallen into disuse or remained vacant. If the records showed that it had not been effectively administered or that it had remained vacant, a grant was issued for the new timar holder. In some cases, the timar in question had remained vacant for twenty years. Failure to participate in a recent military expedition was also grounds for dismissing a timar holder and granting the timar in question to somebody else. Many timars in the districts of Altuntaş, Aslanapa, Sazanos and Gökağaç were withdrawn and reissued because the timar holder failed to present himself for the Baghdad expedition to suppress the

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161 I point out only a few cases concerning the timars in the Kütahya court register (no.1) because my purpose here is not to analyze every single dispute but show that timar was still an important source of income and social and military status for the timar holders. (KCR-1/33), (KCR-1/50),

162 See for instance, Saraveci, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (3. Bölüm) Transkripsyönu Ve Kritiği". (K3/124/897) For a case concerning the rights of three timar holders holding their timars in partnership in the district of Sazanos (K2/92/468)

163 See for instance, ibid. (K3/95/762) and (K3/98/778). Both timars were granted in 1701—the former was in the village of Virancık and the latter in the village of Aslan—and their revenues were around 3.000 akçe. Kütahya is by no means unique for the granting of timars at the turn of the eighteenth century. For similar examples concerning the sancak of Sultanönü, for instance, see Ali Emiri (II. Mustafa, 404), (II. Mustafa, 1023), (II. Mustafa, 1024), (II. Mustafa, 1813). (II. Mustafa, 9712). For Bözyüük, Ali Emiri (II. Mustafa, 9541, 9542, 9543)

164 This was the case for a timar in the district of Altuntaş, Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsyönu Ve Kritiği". (K2/73/653)
uprising that took place on the eastern front in the 1690s. This withdrawing and reissuing of timars may be related to the state’s attempts to reorganize the military after the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz. But sometimes the grants were issued systematically. A register of timar and zeamet grants shows that at least 250 timars and zeamets were granted from 1699 to 1730 in the sancak of Kütahya. Most of the grants were in the form of timars and were worth around 3,000 akçe (25 gurüş). However, zeamets as high as 76,800 akçe (640 gurüş) were also granted. The total value of the grants was nearly 1.67 million akçe (around 14,000 gurüş).

While disputes concerning the reallocation of timars were decided by the central authority, in certain cases the settlement of disputes concerning the administration of the timars took place in the local court. For instance, in a case concerning the administration of a timar in the district of Sazanos, the claimant, Mehmed Bey from the district of Gedüş, argued that he had requested the usufruct rights of a farmstead that had belonged to Sefer but that remained vacant. The farmstead was transferred to Mehmed Bey with the approval of the deputy judge (naib). Then Mehmed Bey transferred (temessük virdim) the farmstead to Hasan Ağa, who returned it to Mehmed Bey. Mehmed Bey then transferred the farmstead to Ahmed Beşe, who did not farm the land either and returned it once more to Mehmed Bey. When Mehmed Ağa decided to make use of the land himself (ziraat etmek) Hasan Ağa claimed that he had the usufruct rights (tasarruf eden) of the farmstead. When Hasan Ağa was able to present the title deed (temessük) and a rescript (emr-i ali) to prove his case, it was decided that Mehmed Bey did not have any usufruct rights over the land and he was barred from making further claims. While it is difficult to say exactly how widespread such cases were, this case nevertheless shows that the timar system, in all its legal, economic, and social aspects, was alive in Kütahya at the turn of the century.

The revenue accruing from the reallocated timars was usually around 3,000 to 4,000 akçe (25 to 30 gurüş), which was not a considerable revenue. It is therefore plausible to suppose that the impact of these timars on the overall economy of the sancak was not considerable either—especially if the total number of reallocated timars was relatively low. But the reallocations were not limited to small timars. Zeamets were also granted to higher military officials or to members of their entourage. A list of the dating to 1689 that records the names and affiliations of the zeamet holders for all the districts of Kütahya, and seven other districts in western Anatolia, shows that these zeamets were granted mostly to people who were affiliated with high-ranking military officials or bureaucrats. In some cases, the zeamet holders were the sons of these officials and bureaucrats and were residents of other cities, mostly of Istanbul. Of the forty-four zeamets on the list, four were from Kütahya. The total value of these four zeamets was around

166 See MAD 38. The register contains information on the following districts: Eğrigöz, Uşak, Şeyhlü, Homa-Geyikler, Kula, Altuntaş, Tavşanlı, Güre-Selendi, and Simav. It is difficult to tell whether this register was comprehensive one for the whole sancak of Kütahya, or whether it is part of other registers. There is no detailed information on why, and by whom it was carried out. Furthermore, the summary of the register in the Prime Ministry Archives indicates that it covers the years 1694-1700. Since there is no information other than the dates recorded in the register (which covers the years 1699-1730) it is not clear why the summary of the register refers to the years 1694-1700.
167 Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/83/431)
168 MAD 18500
40,000 akçe (340 guruş). The holders of these four zeamets were all the sons of high-ranking officials, and even though the list does not say where they lived—except for one zeamet holder, who resides in Uşak—it appears that none of them were residents of Kütahya. In 1698, a zeamet in the district of Tavşanlı, in the village of Çukur, which was worth 80,000 akçe (around 670 guruş) was granted to İbrahim, who had been serving in the military for more than forty years. Smaller zeamets (ranging from 80 to 400 guruş) were also granted in the district of Altuntaş.

Another reason for continuing to regulate the timars and zeamets by reallocating the vacant ones or those whose holders did not fulfill their military obligations was that doing so enabled the central authority was able to maintain its hold on these lands and revenues.

Another practice which shows that the central maintained its hold on the revenues was the granting of some revenues as arpalık. Arpalık denotes a living, a source of revenue usually granted to retired ulema dignitaries by the state. We do not have a comprehensive list of the sources of revenue granted as arpalık in the sancak of Kütahya, but it appears that the state was using Kütahya quite frequently for this purpose—and not just for grants to ulema dignitaries. The state granted certain villages in the district of Gedüs as arpalık to Şahbaz Giray Sultan from the khanate of Crimea, in 1698. An order sent to the judges in Kütahya indicates that once granted, these lands should be considered as the freehold property of the arpalık holders, and that other state officials must not interfere with the collection of the taxes imposed upon these lands.

**TAX FARMING AND THE MANY CLAIMS ON THE REVENUES**

We see a similar mixed pattern for the collection of taxes through the tax-farming system. In the last chapter, I discussed the extent to which recent scholarship has interpreted the implementation of the malikâne system as a turning point in the transformation of Ottoman polity in the eighteenth century. Briefly put, scholars have seen this new fiscal policy, initiated in 1695, as promoting the rise of the local notables and the reconfiguration of power relations between the center and the periphery. This interpretive framework has influenced scholars in rethinking the dynamics of the eighteenth century—especially in dispelling the view that the rise of the local notables was detrimental to Ottoman polity—but much work remains to be done if we are to understand the dynamics of the malikâne system. Scholars may theorize about the overall impact of the malikâne system on Ottoman polity, but we lack empirical data for comparative analysis. We have data on the revenues collected by the state through the sale of the malikânes; on the extent to which these revenues contributed to the state budget; on the legal and fiscal transformation of the system throughout the eighteenth century; and even on the identities of the malikâne holders. But we still do not know much about the effect that the sale of the malikânes in different regions had on transforming relations of productions or on the socioeconomic relations in general. To assume that this effect was the same throughout the empire is to ignore the differences in power relations from one region to the next. For instance,
one most of the most widely accepted assumptions about the malikâne system is that it had a trickle-down effect. That is to say, the malikâne holders, most of whom were high military officials and bureaucrats located in the capital, appointed deputies from among the local notables to collect the taxes from the malikânes. This intermediary role in turn empowered the local notables both financially and politically. However, the assumption that this trickle-down effect worked in the same way in every single context where the malikâne system was implemented is an assumption too general to support rigorous historical analysis. In this respect too, regional variety and the configuration of power relations call for reevaluation.

If we take a closer look at tax collection through the malikâne system in the sancak of Kütahya, we find that the implementation of this system did not always dramatically transform the configuration of power relations—at least initially. To be more specific, six malikânes were sold for the sancak of Kütahya during the first three years after the malikâne system was implemented. The registers do not always record the malikâne holders’ place of residence, but it appears that at least one of them was from Kütahya, and two of them resided in Istanbul. The total value of the down payments for the six malikânes was 1,582 guruş. However, the yearly payments differed. The highest yearly payment was 840 guruş for a malikâne that was sold in Gedüs, while the lowest yearly payment was 190 guruş for a malikâne that was sold in Gönen. These sales are noteworthy for two reasons. The first is that relatively fewer malikânes were sold in Kütahya than in the other regions where the system was implemented, and the total revenue accruing from the down payments was also less. The second is that only in one case do we have evidence that the malikâne was held by a local notable. Three of the malikâne holders were members of the military class and three were members of the nonmilitary class—a fact that does not tell us much in and of itself. Furthermore, we have no detailed information on whether Istanbul-based high military officials delegated the collection of the revenues of their malikâne to local notables. However, it is possible to follow in the court records the subsequent transfer of at least one of the malikânes to a new holder. Mirzâde Ahmet from Kütahya was the first malikâne holder of the revenues accruing from the market dues (bac-ı bazar) of the districts of Tavşanlı and Geyikli, for a down payment of 150 gurus, and a yearly payment of 45,000 akçe (375 guruş). Court records show that upon his death, the malikâne first went to auction, and Torunoğlu Mehmed paid 200 guruş to hold the malikâne. The Torunoğulları family, especially Torunoğlu Mustafa and his sons, would reappear in the court registers and other documents in the district of Eskişehir toward the end of the century. By that time, they had come to be seen as bandits and rebels. It appears that they had gathered a force of four to five hundred men, and could hide in the valleys of the Sakarya river. The central authority started to send orders to Kütahya to the provincial governors in the late 1770s. The orders recorded in the court registers as well as other documents show that in 1792, the central authority was still trying to catch and imprison the Torunoğulları. It is reasonable to think that malikâne played an important role in

173 For a detailed analysis of the sale of the malikânes from 1695 to 1698, see Özvar, Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Uygulaması. The date is taken from pp.
174 As it was the case with the sale of the malikânes, after the death of a malikâne-holder, the priority was given to sons and the relatives of the malikâne-holder. And this is what happened with Mirzâde’s malikâne. His son, first proposed to pay five hundred guruş, but then declined, upon which the malikâne went to Torunoğlu Mehmed. For the details of the sale, see Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/102/510), see also Sarracli, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (3. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K3/76/664), and (K3/81/691)
175 (KCR-5/118), Cevdet Maliye 3788, Cevdet Zaptiye 3788
the rise of Torunoğulları throughout the eighteenth century. The fact that Torunoğlu Mehmed was able to buy a malikâne shows that he had enough capital to invest for such an enterprise. The Torunoğlu family must also have used their investment to enrich themselves further by creating a patronage network. The fact that the central authority referred to them as bandits and rebels should be not taken at face value—even though it may not have been totally false. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the central authority was already trying very hard to control and eliminate the local notables, and it may well be that because the Torunoğulları were one of the less powerful families, their power over the region comprising Eskişehir and Kütahya was coming more and more to be seen as illegitimate and illegal.

Other than the Torunoğulları family, there is no evidence that the local notables of Kütahya and the surrounding regions invested in the malikânes during the first three years after the system was implemented. However, other sources of revenue (mukataa) continued to be sold as malikânes. One of the biggest of these revenue sources was the replacement tax for military service. The revenues accruing from this tax for the Anatolian province, Silivri, and Üsküdar were sold for a down payment of 1,450 guruş to Mustafa, who was a scribe in one of the finance departments that oversaw the collection of revenues not assigned to the military personnel (mevkufat halifeliği) in Istanbul. He held the malikâne in partnership with one of his relatives, and the yearly payment amounted to 1,800 guruş, which was a considerable sum. However, it is not clear how much of this revenue came directly from Kütahya, because the source of revenue that was sold as malikâne comprised more than one region.

The records also show that part of a given revenue source, such as the replacement tax, could also be sold as iltizam. Part of the revenues for the sancaks of Kütahya, Karahisar-ı Sahip, and Sultanönü were sold in this way. The initial down payment to hold the iltizam for the replacement tax for these sancaks was 600 guruş, and the iltizam changed hands every year—at least, from 1699 to 1702. By selling part of the revenues as malikâne and part of them as iltizam, the central authority was trying to maximize the short-term income. The practice of frequently changing the iltizam holders must have been instituted for the same reason. However, even though the records do not always say so explicitly, it seems that the farming out of these revenues as iltizam did not have the desired effect, and the iltizam holders continued to have difficulty collecting taxes. Increasing the revenues of the state, especially to finance wars, would be a constant problem throughout the eighteenth century, and the central authority relentlessly sought to make ends meet. In one of these attempts, the state decided to transfer part of the revenues accruing from all the down payments for malikâne. In 1741, it was suggested (probably by the finance department) that for every 1,000 guruş levied as down payments for the malikânes, 150 guruş should be levied as a replacement tax. The record of this suggestion also states that there were 8,681 malikâne holders for the entire empire, and that their combined down

176 Saravci, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iiye Sicili (3. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K3/74/1699)
177 It is difficult to define mukataa precisely. The concept represented different sources of revenue. Sometimes it was used with reference to single source of revenue accruing from different regions, sometimes it was used with reference to a group of revenue sources. For a concise discussion, Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Mukataa Kavramı," in Osmanli Maliyesi, Kurumlar Ve Bütçeler I, ed. Mehmet Genç and Erol Özvar (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006).
179 Cevdet Maliye 5001
payments totaled nearly 6.5 million guruş. The number of malikâne holders and the total value of the down payments for the province of Anatolia are not calculated separately and we do not have totals for all the sancaks, but 4.5 million of the total revenue came from the down payments for the provinces of Anatolia, Damascus, Aleppo, Baghdad, Diyarbekir, and Mosul.

The central authority interfered in the administration of the malikâne from time to time—even though they were tax farms held for a lifetime and held as freehold property—in order to guarantee that they were governed effectively. In 1740, a group of malikânes in the province of Anatolia were abolished, and the revenue derived from them was assigned to bigger revenue sources. The finance department argued either that these malikânes were too small to bring in a significant yearly payment, or that their yearly payments were not being paid. In some cases, the malikânes were not properly governed, and their owners were not well known. Among the eight malikânes that the finance department advised be abolished and assigned to other sources of revenue, the only significant one that was in the sancak of Kütahya was the tax on coffee (tahmis-i kahve), which brought in a yearly revenue of 7,921 guruş.\textsuperscript{180}

The taxes that various nomadic (or seminomadic) groups paid were also sold as malikâne. The revenues accruing from the Akkeçili nomads were sold in 1702 for a down payment of 300 guruş, and a yearly payment of 500 guruş.\textsuperscript{181} Depending on the size of these groups, the revenues accruing from them could be substantial, and could be a lucrative investment if administered successfully. For instance, the yearly payment for the Karalu, Sermayelü, and Karamanlu tribes that belonged the Danişmendli Turcomans was 8,500 guruş in 1722—a tax farm that was held jointly by two military officers. As the nomadic groups spread out to different administrative units, the records concerning nomadic groups were also sent to more than one administrative unit, and when the tax farmers of this revenue complained to the imperial council that other state officials were interfering in their tax farm, the order of the central authority to stop the illegal interference of state officials was sent not only to the officials (including the judge) in Kütahya but also to the officials in Aydın.\textsuperscript{182} When the same malikâne holders complained in 1746 that a group of bandits were looting the aforementioned tribes and making the collection of taxes impossible, an order was sent to the governors of Kütahya and Aydın, to the voyvoda\textsuperscript{183} of Denizli, and to the leaders of the tribes to catch the bandits and imprison them, and an inspector was also appointed to the case.\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{180} Cevdet Maliye 6018
\textsuperscript{181} Saravci, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iiyye Sicili (3. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K3/122/885) However, it also appears that the same source of revenue was granted to the governors of Anatolia. Two other orders recorded in the court register number one indicate that the revenues of the Akkeçili nomads were granted to Mustafa Paşa in 1699, and to Abdi Paşa in 1701—with a detailed account of the revenues during their tenure. One possible explanation is that these revenues were sold as malikâne a year later. (K3/126/903 and 904)
\textsuperscript{182} A.E (III. Ahmed), 13714. For this record see Mim Kemal Öke, Sezgin Demircioğlu, and Süleyman Bilgin, eds., 

\textit{Tarihin Tanıklığında Evliya Çelebi'nin Kütaçyası (Belgeler)} (İstanbul: İrfan Yayınları,2006). p. 158
\textsuperscript{183} The term voyvoda was used for the governors of Moldovia and Wallachia. However, “its more generalized application was for a class of officials who performed a variety of administrative functions including tax collection on lands belonging to certain specific categories, in particular gross lands, and for certain kinds of tax-farm revenues attached to large gross holdings such those assigned to provincial governors or to the sultans’ mothers.” Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire. Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century (Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1994). p. 255
\textsuperscript{184} Cevdet Zaptiyye 1516
The sale of the malikânes further complicated the problems related to the multiplicity of rights over different types of revenue. Not only was there growing confusion as to who should collect the revenues of the specific malikânes, but there was also confusion as to which revenue was part of which malikâne. For instance, in 1725 the collection of the sheep tax (adet-i ağnam) from the districts of Şeyhlu and Gediz formed part of a case concerning the collection of various taxes from these districts. The petitioners (whose names are not mentioned the document) argued that even though the sheep tax in these districts was assigned to the vakf of Sultan Murad, they were the malikâne holders in these districts. The tax collectors of the vakf were supposed to collect the sheep tax but not the other revenues. However, argued the petitioners, the tax collectors of the vakf were trying to collect more than they were entitled to.\(^{185}\) This and similar cases also seem to have encouraged the peasantry to avoid paying part of the tax that they owed. In most cases, and probably also due to the legal confusion, the peasants and the nomadic groups argued that they were to pay their taxes to an authority other than the malikâne holder. In 1740, the malikâne holders of the revenues accruing from the Bozdoğanlu and Germiyanlu nomads wrote a petition to the central authority complaining that even though they held the malikâne rights in return for a yearly payment of 933 guruş for the Bozdoğanlu nomads and 122 guruş for the Germiyanlu nomads, these groups had refused to pay their taxes for the last two years, arguing that they were supposed to pay their taxes to another tax collector.\(^{186}\)

Özer Ergenç gives similar examples of the multiplicity of claims engendered by the new forms of tax collection for other districts and sancaks in Anatolia. He argues that the provincial administration of the lands where the timar system was prevalent—as opposed to the lands that were administrated based on the collection of a yearly tax—was hindered by the expansion of the tax-farming practices.\(^{187}\) While it could be argued that Ergenç’s overall interpretation is a reiteration of the decline argument, it remains true that new fiscal and administrative practices created a good deal of confusion in the collection of revenues, especially in the short run. Whether these new practices were also detrimental to the state treasury and to small producers in the long run is likewise debatable. For instance, Ergenç notes that the practice of allocating revenues as arpalık to nonmilitary state officials increased throughout the eighteenth century, and in fact made it difficult for the state to collect taxes in an efficient manner. This in turn led to the imposition of the new taxes that oppressed the small producers. A comprehensive study is needed that compares the practice of arpalık—and other new tax collection practices—in the various provinces; and that shows how widespread each practice was and what percentage of the total revenue was given out as arpalık—hence depriving the state of taxes. As for the sancak of Kütahya, more and more revenues would be allocated as arpalık throughout the eighteenth century, but the practice of farming out revenues as iltizam, especially by zeamet holders and vakfs, seems still have been in use at the beginning of the century. And it also seems that the iltizam revenues were higher than both arpalık and the malikânes revenues.

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185 Ali Emiri 3675. Unfortunately, it is not possible to follow in this specific document the outcome of the case.
186 Cevdet Maliye 5122. The peasantry also complained from the oppression of the malikâne holders who tried to the levy more taxes than the peasantry could pay for. In such case in 1702 (which apparently ended with peaceful settlement) the peasants from Eskişehir complained from their landlords. When they petitioned Istanbul, they were asked to settle their case at the local court. Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/95/486)
To give a few examples, a zeamet that was held as freehold property (ber vech-i serbest) in the district of Virancık (and in others) was given as iltizam to Yakub Ağa for the amount of 2,250 guruş in 1699. This is a considerable sum, given that iltizams—in most cases, as in this specific case—were given only for a year, and must be renewed after that. This sum is also considerable when compared to the amounts paid for malikânes. Although it is not entirely accurate to compare the lump sum amounts paid for iltizams and malikânes, because a malikâne was held for a lifetime and annual rent had to be paid during this time, and because the malikâne system was implemented partly to remedy the shortcomings of the short-term iltizams, the amount paid Yakub Ağa is still significant. It meant that Yakub Ağa had to collect more than 2,250 guruş a year in order to turn his iltizam into a profitable investment. It is difficult to trace the administration of a given zeamet year by year over a long period of time, but the records in this case show that Yakub Ağa’s iltizam was renewed four years in a row, and he continued to pay the same amount at least until 1702. In other cases, evidence found in the court registers is more fragmentary, but records show that zeamets from the districts of Virancık and Altuntaş were also farmed out by high-ranking military officers. The zeamet of Virancık was farmed out to Abidin Ağa in 1701 for 2,000 guruş. The record that registers the farming out of the zeamet in Altuntaş does not state the amount, but it is reasonable to suppose that since a zeamet belonged to a high-ranking officer, the iltizam holder must have paid the same amount.

But of course, this was not always the case; and iltizams frequently changed hands. This was, in fact, one of the practices that the central authority sought to prevent by implementing the malikâne system, because the central authority saw that the iltizam holders were trying to realizing short-term gains by levying as much as tax as they could from the peasants rather than trying to improve the productivity of their lands. For instance, the revenues of the villages that were part of the vakf of Eyüb Sultan changed hands every year from 1698 to 1702. Even though the amount paid—53,000 akçe (440 guruş)—remained the same, the iltizam holders were different, and finally in 1702, rather than giving these revenues to iltizam, the vakf appointed a trustee (vekil). The iltizam practice of the vakf of Elvan Beğزادye Sinan Bey was a little more complicated. In this case, even though the revenues of the villages that belonged to the vakf were given as iltizam every year to someone different, the iltizam holder was always a warden of the palace (bostancı). It also appears that when there was a higher bid, the iltizam could be revoked and given to someone else—as happened when the vakf revoked the iltizam of Yusuf Ağa, who had paid 390 guruş in 1698, and gave it to Hasan Ağa, who paid 400 guruş for the same year. The iltizam would change hands—for the same amount, 400 guruş—each year for next three years, but Hasan Ağa (assuming that this was the same Hasan Ağa) would hold it again in 1702. We do not know whether these iltizam holders were from Kütahya, but in the

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188 Saravci, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (3. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K3/83/700)
189 Ibid. (K3/90/737), (K3/121/883)
190 Ibid. (K3/99/784)
191 Ibid. (K3/84/704)
192 For 1698, Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/103/511), for 1699, 1701, and 1702 Saravci, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (3. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K3/65/618), (K3/83/701), (K3/111/838)
194 Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/107/530)
case of the vakf of Elvan Beğzâde Sinan Bey, their titles suggest that they resided in Istanbul. If so, they may have appointed a local agent to collect the revenues in their stead. But given the proximity of Kütahya to Istanbul, it is also possible that they collected the revenues themselves.

Internal customs duties were another important source of malikâne, as we see from the administration of the internal customs for the tobacco trade. Tobacco is one of the agricultural products that showed a phenomenal growth in both production and trade throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the Ottoman Empire. It is probable that after Anatolia—more specifically Milas, in western Anatolia—was one of the first places where tobacco was produced for commercial purposes. Introduced to Anatolia at the end of the sixteenth century, tobacco production expanded very rapidly. Fehmi Yılmaz estimates that by the end of the seventeenth century, tobacco was produced in at least 180 districts (that is to say, in 20 percent of all districts) of the Ottoman Empire. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the number of districts where tobacco was produced had reached 400 (38 percent of all districts), and the number of peasants who produced tobacco had increased from 50 thousand to 150 thousand. Tobacco trade—both within the empire, and with Europe—also increased following the increase in production.

With this phenomenal development, the administration of tobacco production and trade became one of the priorities of the central authority. The production, and especially the consumption, of tobacco was strictly controlled and sometimes banned during the period 1609–49. Although the production and consumption of tobacco was initially banned, the taxation of the tobacco became part of the miri system, and it remained part of the miri system until 1688. This meant that the tax on tobacco was levied by the timar holders and the tax collector of the vakfs of lands where tobacco was produced. After 1688, the central authority imposed a direct tax on tobacco production and trade to channel the revenues to the coffers of the state. However, the new direct tax, called the nisf (half), was too high for the producers. Instead of tapping a new source of revenue, the nisf tax exacerbated the smuggling of tobacco, and had a negative impact on production. In 1696, the state started to levy a tobacco tax on the basis of dönüm. Yılmaz argues that the specific goal was to tax internal trade as much as production. What motivated this attempt to closely control tobacco production and trade was the financial problems created by the long wars at the western front at the end of seventeenth century. In order to increase its revenues, the state had either to resort to internal borrowing or to expand its tax base. The creation of internal customs to regulate and tax tobacco and the sale of these sources of revenue as malikâne must be viewed within this financial context. The sale of internal customs duties on tobacco as malikâne continued until 1759. After that, the state stepped in once more, abolished the malikânes, and resorted to the collection of internal customs duties through centrally appointed officials (as part of the emanet system). In 1775, the emanet system was replaced with the esham system.

It is therefore not surprising to find that there are at least a dozen records concerning the regulation of tobacco production and trade in Kütahya court register volume 1. It appears from

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195 For comprehensive history of tobacco production, trade, and taxation see Fehmi Yılmaz, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Tütün: Sosyal, Siyasî Ve Ekonomik Tahlili (1600-1883)" (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Marmara, 2005). p. 250
196 For the taxation of tobacco see ibid. pp. 238-250
these records that even though Kütahya was not a major center for tobacco production, it played a crucial role in the regulation of the tobacco trade and the administration of internal customs in western Anatolia. There is no detailed information on the level of production, on the amount of tobacco under cultivation, or on how many households farmed tobacco in the Kütahya sancak, but tobacco was cultivated in at least thirty-five districts in 1699. This number of districts may sound high, but it is probable that most of the production in these districts was small scale, and that it was intended for local (or best, for regional) consumption. Furthermore, the records indicate that the tobacco produced in Kütahya was of medium or low quality. The quality of tobacco was better further to the west—Milas tobacco was described as being of superior quality. And farmers had to pay 2.5 guruş for a dönüm of land when they cultivated tobacco. But the central authority seems to have been more intent on taxing trade than on taxing cultivation. The taxes were levied on internal customs according to the quality of the tobacco: 60 akçe on a vukiyye (a unit of weight roughly equivalent to 1.28 kg) of superior quality; 40 akçe on a vukiyye of medium quality; and 20 akçe on a vukiyye of the lowest quality. More importantly, orders sent to Kütahya show that the smuggling of Milas tobacco was a major concern for the central authority. The internal customs were intended to control this smuggling. But the role of the internal customs was also to regulate the production and sale of tobacco within a region. Orders also show that tobacco traders were not allowed to bring tobacco into the market and sell it freely, or even with local traders and shopkeepers as intermediaries. The traders were obliged to register the tobacco, which was then collected by the customs duty officers. In this way, internal customs were designed to centralize the trade before the tobacco was distributed.

Until 1702, the internal customs duties were collected by different officers appointed by the central authority under the emanet system. However, it appears that the officers did not always collect the taxes themselves. In 1699, Hasan Ağa, who was the collector of internal customs duties at the time, appointed Mustafa Ağa, a resident of Kütahya, to collect the taxes for the Kütahya customs. This transfer of power resembled the appointment of local agents to collect the taxes for the malikâne owners who resided in Istanbul in that it empowered the local agents; and the confusion created by the constant transfer of power sometimes led to complaints on the part of the traders. Their usual complaint was that everytime a new tax collector was appointed, they were forced to pay taxes again even if they had already paid them to the previous tax collector.

In 1702, the collection of customs duties on tobacco for a region comprising Kütahya, Karahisar-i Sahib, Sultanönü, and Hamideli was sold as malikâne for a down payment of 905
The malikâne holder, Ahmet Ağa, was a Janissary sergeant in the imperial council—another relatively high military officer residing in the capital. The record does not specifically mention Kütahya, because although customs duties on tobacco were considered to be as a single source of revenue, the central authority had decided to sell them in bundles. We have little information concerning production and volume of trade in the malikâne held by Ahmet Ağa. But the administration of this malikâne follows familiar pattern. Ahmet Ağa appointed Sefer Ağa, the sergeant of the sipahis, who resided in Kütahya, to collect the taxes.

This type of evidence shows how specific fiscal policies created new administrative, financial, and political networks between the capital and the provinces. However, we do not have enough of this evidence to show the extent to which these policies affected the overall economy of the sancak of Kütahya. Nor do we have enough evidence to show the extent to which these policies transformed power relations between the center and the sancak of Kütahya in general or the power relations between the malikâne holders and the peasantry in particular.

The trickle-down effect of the malikâne system probably did not greatly alter existing power relations. As Faroqhi argues, “provincial dignitaries became rich because they were able to integrate themselves into the tax-collecting mechanism rather than, as has sometimes happened in other societies, by investing in tax-farms because they were seeking a secure haven for money previously earned in trade. However it seems that in the countryside surrounding certain commercially and industrially productive cities such administrative and political activity was by no means the only way of making profit.” Faroqhi has Bursa, specifically, in mind when she talks about the effects of tax-farming in commercially and industrially active cities and their surroundings. Her argument holds even truer for commercially and industrially less productive cities, such as Kütahya and its surroundings. In order to understand whether deep structural transformations took place, it is important to know whether the creation of new financial and political networks included the local merchants, landowners, malikâne holders, and âyâns. The question boils down to whether well-to-do subjects sought to transform their economic power into political power in order to enrich themselves further by buying malikânes, or by forming monetary (or other) connections with malikâne owners. The malikâne system may well have provided investment opportunities for the military and bureaucratic class residing in the capital, and for some of the provincial dignitaries, but this is only part of the story when it comes to the economic and political transformation of the eighteenth century. For the beginning of the eighteenth century, we have only meager evidence to suggest that the malikâne system had a deep impact on the socioeconomic relations of the Kütahya sancak. To quote Faroqhi once more, “perhaps we have focused too much on Istanbul, and that has made us oblivious of the very real diversity of the Ottoman world.” We must turn to the traders and the credit relations in order to get a glimpse of that diversity.

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206 Ibid. (K3/116/863)
209 Faroqhi, "Indebtedness in the Bursa Area 1730-1740." p.212
CREDIT RELATIONS

The probate inventory (tereke) of Mehmed b. Mehmed from the Meydan neighborhood in Kütahya shows that he was involved in the tobacco trade. When he died, Mehmed’s main assets were a house worth 78 guruş, some animals, and the tobacco he had in his possession.\(^{210}\) He had bought two different types of tobacco, one from İnegöl, worth 59 guruş, and one from Milas, worth 65 guruş. His total assets amounted to 235 guruş. This was a very modest sum for a merchant. Even though the items listed in probate inventories should be viewed with great deal of caution, because they did not always reflect the real fortune of the deceased, it is clear that Mehmed was a small merchant. The fortunes of some of the merchants from bigger cities, such as Bursa, were worth 20,000 guruş (and sometimes much more). Compared to theirs, Mehmed’s venture was very limited.\(^{211}\) The inventory does not tell us where he intended to sell the tobacco, but the fact that he bought it from other regions suggest that the tobacco cultivated in the districts of Kütahya either was not cultivated for commercial purposes and was restricted to household consumption or was not of good quality. It is therefore likely that Mehmed had bought better-quality tobacco in order to sell it in the city of Kütahya. Another significant aspect of the probate inventory was that Mehmed’s debts were greater than his assets. His biggest debt was around 198 guruş, and he also owed 17.5 guruş to the administrator of a vakf (which was probably a cash vakf). This evidence attests to the existence of credit relations, but it is hard to know how widespread these relations were in Kütahya at the beginning of the eighteenth century, because there are only a handful of inventories—our main source of information on the credit relations—in court register volume 1. However, a number of studies have shown that different forms of credit relations involving both private individuals and vakfs were an important part of commerce and agriculture at the end of the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth century.\(^{212}\)

In one of the earlier studies carried out on the credit relations, Ronald Jennings studied 1,400 entries from principally the court records of Kütahya but also the court records of Karaman, Amasya, and Trabzon for the period between 1600 and 1625. He argued for the following points: “1. The use of credit was widespread among all elements of the urban and rural society. 2. The supply of capital available for credit was fairly abundant and hence not the monopoly of any small clique of big money lenders. 3. Loans and credit were very much the domain of the Muslim Turkish inhabitants of Kayseri, not the preserve of local Greek and Armenian Christians. 4. Interest was regularly charged on credit, in accordance with the sharia and kanun, with the consent and approval of the kadi’s court, the ulema, and the sultan. 5. A ‘commercial’ or ‘mercantile’ mentality and profit motive permeated all the elements of Kayseri society, not just the people of the bazaars but the rural agas, the Ottoman military class, and the

\(^{210}\) (KCR-1/55). The house was registered worth 13480 akçe, and the record also indicates that one (esedi) guruş was worth 160 akçe, hence 116 guruş. It must be mentioned that whenever it is not specified, I calculated one guruş as worth 120 akçe.

\(^{211}\) For detailed analysis of a merchant from Bursa and his commercial venture, Faroqhi, "Indebtedness in the Bursa Area 1730-1740."

\(^{212}\) In addition to Faroqhi’s article, ibid. see also Murat Çızkakça, A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnership: The Islamic World and Europe with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archive (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996). Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
ulema as well.”

There are obviously important limitations to the use of court records in drawing these conclusions; from the formulaic nature of the records that make it difficult to trace the credit relations over a long period of time to the specific historical context (the Celâlî rebellions) and the geopolitical location of Kayseri (even though a trading and manufacturing center, it was not involved in long-distance trade). More importantly, Jennings also says that “creditors and debtors were usually not identified by mahalle [neighborhood] or village nor by social or economic class. Consequently it has been possible to investigate such important questions as rural-urban flow or credit or intra-city capital flow from one quarter to another; quantitative conclusions concerning social and economic classes also have proved impossible.” Finally, only a part of the credit relations were recorded. According to Jennings estimation, the total number of the credit relations was at least four times higher than the recorded cases. Despite these shortcomings, Jennings findings are important because they provide a context for comparison.

The debtors usually owed small debts. These debts were often around 2 to 4 guruş; small amounts that would not put the debtors would not be in trouble to pay them back. Moreover, “97% of all debts registered in the sicils were recorded as the responsibility of single individual debtors and only 3% represented debts mutually the responsibility of two or more debtors.” As for the identity of the creditors, there was no evidence for a small group of individuals who dominated the credit relations. For instance, there was no one who appeared frequently in the court registers for the period between 1600 and 1625. Even though there were rich men such as the merchants, the military officers, and the wardens of the non-Muslim community, none of them stood out principally as money-lenders. Jennings findings also call into question the assumption that non-Muslims were very influential in credit relations. However, contrary to this assumption, “82% of credit set out in Kayseri and the other Anatolian cities was given by Muslims and only 18% by Rum and Armenians. 68% of outstanding credit was between Muslims only, versus only 15% between zimmis. 18% of all credit involved both Muslims and zimmis, but Muslims extended credit to zimmis four times as often as zimmis extended credit to them.” However, these figures do not suggest that Muslims constrained or tried to exclude the non-Muslims from credit relations. The non-Muslims’ involvement in credit relations was proportionate to their numbers, and there was interdependence rather than mutually exclusive competition for lending and borrowing money.

What is noteworthy in Jennings’ findings is that even though the credit relations were widespread, these did not include major money lenders or credit institutions (more on such institutions as the cash vakfs later). This was an important feature of the credit relations compared to Egypt and Syria of earlier periods, and also compared to such as cities as Cairo, Aleppo, or Damascus, where credit relations were more institutionalized. Jennings does not offer a comprehensive explanation as to why Kayseri in particular and the Anatolian cities in general were different from the Arab lands in this respect. However, he argues that his findings point to a

214 Ibid. p. 172
215 Ibid. p. 174
216 Ibid. p. 176 This aspect of the credit relations was in sharp contrast with Cairo.
217 Ibid. p. 182
more balanced and healthy economic structure. Not only did the absence of big money lenders prevent the economic prosperity in Kütahya, and the availability of credit was also a "boon rather than a burden. With loans so frequent, and so readily available, the economy of Anatolia, or perhaps even the Ottoman Empire, may have been more dynamic and vigorous at [beginning of the seventeenth century] than is usually assumed."

In the light of Jennings findings, Mehmet’s credits relations represent similar characteristics. As a small merchant, he had borrowed 273, 32, 28, 17 guruş from four different people, and 17.5 guruş from a vakf. Moreover, as Faroqhi points out for Bursa “credit transactions, involving both private borrowers/lenders and pious foundations, were widespread in late seventeenth-century and presumably in the early eighteenth-century, and merchants were … more prone to be heavily indebted.” However, Faroqhi differs from Jennings in that she emphasizes the scarcity of capital in her analysis of credit relations. Small amounts of credit transactions, and the absence of the big money lenders does not so much represent a balanced and healthy socioeconomic structure than the scarcity of capital.

Scholars have suggested a variety of explanations to explain why capital was always scarce in the Ottoman Empire. They attribute it to the economic effects of bad harvests; to the lack of silver bullion; to the systematic monetary crises; to the state’s overwhelming control of over the economy; or to unequal exchange relations with Europe. Some explanations focus on long-term structural factors, such as the low productivity of a peasant economy. Other explanations focus on specific short-term factors that aggravated the shortage of money, such as the impact of the extraordinary taxes levied to finance wars. This is not to say that there was no accumulation of capital at all. Members of the ruling elite, some merchants, and some vakfs as institutions were able to amass fortunes, and to make investments. Generally speaking, however, money was too scarce for even better-off peasants or artisans to make investments that might change the relations of production. There is no fundamental disagreement about the shortage of money or about the relative scarcity of capital, but many issues have not been fully explored. There is little agreement as to the causes of the scarcity. And there are few studies that focus on the socioeconomic conditions of specific regions, or that offer a comparative perspective on the scarcity. I will have more to say on credit relations and the scarcity of capital when I discuss the latter part of the eighteenth century. Suffice it here to note that scarcity of capital would be a major defining feature of the socioeconomic conditions that prevailed in the sancak of Kütahya throughout the eighteenth century. Let us, for now, take another example to illustrate credit relations at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

The highest amount of debt recorded in court register volume 1 is around 600 guruş. These data come from a peaceful settlement case between the heirs of Abdülkerim b. Abdülbasir, resident of İstanbul, and Ahmed Bey b. Mehmed Paşa, from the neighborhood of Bolad Bey in Kütahya. The heirs of Abdülkerim argued, through their legal representative, that Ahmed Bey

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218 Ibid. p. 213
219 Faroqhi, "Indebtedness in the Bursa Area 1730-1740."
221 Güngör, "I Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/67/352)
had borrowed 618 guruş from Abdülkerim before the latter died. It appears from Ahmed Bey’s response that his debt was not in cash but was in fact for the 300 vukiyye (around 380 kg) of coffee his steward had bought from Abdülkerim Bey. Ahmed Bey also argued that his steward had bought (or was duped into buying) the coffee for a much higher price than the current market value—an argument that seems to have gone unnoticed at the end. Furthermore, his steward carried a blank authorization already signed by Ahmed Bey (“kendüde memhr beyazım olmağla”), and agreed to the deal. At the end of the deal, Ahmed Bey received a bill (temessük) that acknowledged his debt for 618 guruş, 200 guruş of which he immediately paid (150 guruş in cash and 50 in kind). He proposed to pay balance in kind with coffee, but in the end, he paid it in kind with silver horse trappings, clothing, a pistol, a dagger, and two horses. The heirs of Abdülkerim acknowledged receipt of these goods and gave their consent to the settlement. Ahmed Bey’s lineage and title suggest that he was a member of the bureaucratic class (his father was probably from the military class); and that he was involved in coffee trade. It is not clear whether he intended to sell the coffee only in Kütahya, or in other areas as well. Six hundred and eighteen guruş was not a huge sum, but considering that this was a single item, it is likely that his commercial venture was bigger than this case would suggest. Furthermore, the fact that he had a steward and could send him to the capital as his representative suggests that he already had well-established connections, and that business partners (real or potential) trusted him. But when we look at the credit relations, and capital accumulation, the picture is more ambiguous. On the one hand, the goods with which Ahmed Bey paid his debt show that he was able to purchase things that only well-off residents could afford. On the other hand, it appears that he was short of cash. The settlement case does not say anything about Ahmed Bey’s business relations in Kütahya and in Istanbul, but it is reasonable to think that the relative proximity of Kütahya to Istanbul, and perhaps more importantly Ahmed Bey’s social standing as the member of the bureaucratic class made easier for him to establish credit relations with the merchants of Istanbul.

It also appears that high-ranking military officers and bureaucrats, such as the governors of Anatolia, also found it easier to borrow money from Istanbul-based financiers than from local moneylenders when they had to cover part of their expenses. For instance, three closely related records from 1699 show that the governor of the province of Anatolia, Mehmed Paşa, had borrowed 1,652 guruş from Arslan, a Jewish resident of Istanbul. Arslan asked repeatedly to be repaid, but Mehmed Paşa continued to refuse whereupon Arslan wrote a petition to the imperial council. The first two records inform the judge of Kütahya about the issue, and order him to hear the case and make sure that justice is done. The last record is from Arslan, who appointed Abdullah Ağa as his representative to collect the money. Although we cannot tell from the records whether Mehmed Paşa had ever borrowed money from the local notables or moneylenders, it would not have been if he had first turned to Istanbul, first, because the capital was the finance center of the empire; and second, because the social, political, and financial networks among the high-ranking office-holders and private moneylenders were much better established in Istanbul. These networks not only allowed those who were seeking loans to connect with the lenders, but also allowed the lenders to assess their risks, and use their political relations to recover their loans if need be—as Arslan’s complaints demonstrate. But we may add to these factors the fact that the provinces were short of cash. That is to say, even though credit relations were also established and widespread in the provinces, private individuals and vakfs that lent money were not rich enough to meet demands for big loans, nor did they have the extra-economic relations to assess the risks and recover their loans.
Another way to look at credit relations and evaluate whether there was a shortage of cash at the local level is to look at the cash vakfs. A cash vakf was a trust fund established with money rather than real estate—a difference that has led to a good deal of controversy among Islamic legal scholars. This controversy has centered around two main points. The first is whether movable property (that is to say, the capital that was donated to found the vakf) could be treated as immovable property. The second is whether the capital of the endowment could be considered as credit given to the borrowers. This would mean that the return was interest, which Islamic law forbade. Scholars such as Jon Mandaville and Murat Çizakça have studied various aspects of the cash vakfs. While Mandaville has concentrated on the legal dimensions as to whether cash vakfs were permissible under Islamic law, Çizakça has studied the extent to which they were important in Islamic commercial practices and banking. As Mandaville puts it, “the acceptance of the cash waqf meant the opening of a legally sanctioned and governmentally controlled money market for the small lender and buyer.” Mandaville shows that this practice was already well established in the sixteenth century, partly as a response to the economic turbulence of the period, and that legal controversy concerning the cash vakfs was highly politicized. Çizakça has also demonstrated that court registers can be used—especially if they are available in series—to study the duration of the cash vakfs over long periods of time, and to learn whether they were instrumental in the accumulation of capital. The relevant question here is “In what way did cash waqfs contribute to the process of capital accumulation? This question has to be approached from two perspectives... from the point of view of savers as well as of funds. More specifically, did the savers pool their resources to form joint cash waqfs, or did they add their capital to already existing ones? Did the users of capital have access to several cash waqfs so as to enlarge the available pool of capital at their disposal?”

Çizakça’s long term study focuses only on the cash vakfs, and he had access to a continuous series of court registers and cash vakf censuses spanning almost three hundred years. Drawing upon these resources, Çizakça was able to identify more than seven hundred vakfs for the period 1555–1823. By comparison, the relative scarcity of court registers for Kütahya (only five for the whole eighteenth century with a fifty-year gap between the first and second register) constitutes the main obstacle to a rigorous interpretation of the data on the cash vakfs of Kütahya. There is nothing resembling a cash vakf census for Kütahya; the only more or less specific record in court register volume 1 is not a typical entry. It does not include information on such matters as the original capital of the vakf, later additions to that capital in the form of donations by individuals or other vakfs, the balance of the new capital, and the list of the borrowers. Rather it simply records of the renunciation (kasr-ı yed) of the administration of a cash vakf in 1702. The record concerns Mehmed b. Osman Çelebi, who was one of the soldiers stationed in the Kütahya fortress, and who wished to renounce his duties as the administrator of the cash vakf established in the fortress with an initial capital of 38,200 akçe

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223 Murat Çizakça, “Cash Waqfs of Bursa, 1555-1823,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 38, no. 3 (1995); Çizakça, A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnership: The Islamic World and Europe with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archive.
224 Mandaville, “Usurious Piety: The Cash Vaqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire.” p. 290
226 For the information contained in a typical cash vakf and its management, ibid. p. 323-325
227 Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/72/373)
(320 guruş). The previous administrator of the vakf was Mehmed’s father, died during a military campaign, upon which the administration was given to Mehmed. Mehmed’s reason for renouncing his position was that the vakf had a negative balance, and he was unable to collect the money from the borrowers. Compared to some of the Bursa cash vakfis, which might have a capital of 3,000 guruş, this was a modest capital but not an unusually small one. Mehmed’s complaint about the negative balance was not unusual, either. Çizakça has shown that only 20 percent of the cash vakfis were able to survive for more than two centuries. The rest disappeared after some time. Probably the only noteworthy aspect of the cash vakf of the fortress is that it was established and run by members of the military class. Unfortunately, we have no information on the specific purpose of this vakf, or on the borrowers. One of the most important functions of the cash vakfis was to give credit—usually in small amounts—to the residents of a neighborhood when they were short of cash to pay taxes. But since the members of the military class did not pay most of the taxes, it is reasonable to think that this vakf must have served a different purpose—providing food to the guardians of the fortress, perhaps, improving their accommodations. However, if the residents of Kütahya were among the borrowers, it is also possible that a cash vakf founded and administered by the members of the military class was a medium through which the soldiers stationed in Kütahya established financial and social ties with the local population and so became localized.

There were two ways for a cash vakf to survive for a long period of time. One way, obviously, was for the returns from the borrowers to exceed the expenses of the vakf. The other way was for other vakfis or individuals to contribute additional capital to the cash vakf. Çizakça argues that the enhancement of capital was crucial for the survival of a vakf. This helps us to understand how new financial, social, and political networks were established at the local level. The contributions not only enhanced the survival of the vakf as a social and economic institution but also; they could be seen as strategies to create new nexuses of socioeconomic relations. Çizakça states that 9 percent of the inhabitants of Bursa used the cash vakfis to borrow money. Most of the borrowers were small-scale consumers, and the amounts borrowed were not high—an average of 53 guruş in 1749. More importantly, “there seems to have existed a secondary capital market in the Ottoman economy. This … is suggested by the observation that market interest rates prevailing among the sarraf [moneylenders] in Istanbul as well as in Ankara were significantly higher than the Bursa interest rates.” As I have shown above, the moneylenders in Istanbul could provide higher sums to the high-ranking members of the military and the bureaucracy, as well as to merchants and tax-farmers. The existence of two different interest rates also led to the transfer of capital from the provinces to the capital because it was economically profitable to borrow from provincial cash vakfis and lend the same amount to the moneylenders in Istanbul. As the century progressed, there emerged an almost distinct group of professionals who administered cash vakfis (sometimes as many as eight vakfis at the same time), and transferred their funds to the moneylenders in Istanbul. I will return to the question of whether there was a similar pattern for the Kütahya cash vakfis in the next chapter, when I talk

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228 Çizakça, “Cash Waqfs of Bursa, 1555-1823.” p. 325
229 Ibid. p. 335 This average would increase 43 per cent in forty-six years and reach 76 guruş. I will turn to this point when I discuss the cash vakfis again at the end of the eighteenth century.
230 Ibid. p. 331
231 Ibid. p. 351
about the socioeconomic transformation at the end of the eighteenth century. But first, let us turn briefly to other indicators of wealth—probate inventories and divorce cases.

I have pointed out that probate inventories can be used in the study of many fields—from socioeconomic history to cultural history, from the study of consumption patterns to gender studies. I have also explained that my purpose in this study is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of all the probate inventories, but to use them selectively to emphasize certain aspects of socioeconomic life. In any case, there are surprisingly few probate inventories in Kütahya court register volume 1—only seven. The average value of the assets in these probate inventories is 268 guruş. Six of these inventories (one of which belonged to the tobacco merchant, Mehmed) belonged to people of rather modest social standing and wealth. Only in one case, did the total value of the assets exceed 800 guruş. Although his title and his family name show that Emirzâde Ahmed Ağa from the neighborhood of Saray came from an affluent family, his probate inventory does not tell much about his particular investments. He did lend some money (around 50 guruş) to a few people, but it is hard to tell from his credit relations whether he was a local moneylender, as most of his assets consisted of the items he owned.

As for the divorce cases, they too can be read with an eye to gathering information on the wealth and monetary relations in a given region. In this respect, even though it does not tell us much about the dynamics of capital accumulation, the dowry (mihr) paid by the husband to the wife nevertheless provides a window into the couple’s wealth. There were essentially two kinds of the dowry: in advance (mihr-i muaccele), paid upon marriage, and deferred (mihr-i müeccele), paid in the case of divorce or the death of the husband. The deferred dowry could sometimes be paid in kind to guarantee a peaceful settlement in the case of divorce, especially when the divorce was requested by the wife (muhala’a). Of the two divorce cases with the highest deferred dowry that are recorded in the Kütahya court register, one was requested by the wife, and the other by the husband. In the case of the muhala’a, the deferred dowry was 330 guruş—a significantly high amount for Kütahya. To conclude the divorce, and in lieu of the deferred dowry, the husband agreed to give the wife a shoemaker’s shop (pabuççu dükkanı) in the main covered thoroughfare (suk-ı arasta). In the second case, the dowry amounted to one thousand silver coins, for which the husband agreed to pay it in kind with items including garments and a pair of gold earrings. Scholars working on the court registers point out that the wealthiest and the poorest members of the community seldom appear in the courts. But even taking into account the limitations on the evidence drawn from the court registers, we can assume that these two cases represent two well-to-do, but not very wealthy, couples. Like the other examples cited above, the divorce cases also suggest that compared to such cities such as Istanbul or Bursa, Kütahya was rather short of cash.

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232 (KCR-1/5, 12, 24, 43, 55, 64, 68)
233 (KCR-1/43) The reason for giving his loans as an approximate value is because his inventory is particularly badly written and hard to read (both because of the handwriting of the script and due to the photocopying process.)
234 Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/62/330)
235 Ibid. (K2/76/398)
When Seyyid (a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad or a presumed descendant) Mehmed Emin Efendi b. Şerif Ahmet Efendi b. Abdullah Efendi from the Balıklı neighborhood died away from home in Antalya in 1750, his probate inventory indicated that his wealth amounted to around 29,000 guruş. After his debts (amounting to 8,711 guruş) and the expenses for his burial were deducted, the inheritance to be divided among his wife, daughter, and brother came to 17,847 guruş. Although Seyyid Emin Efendi’s wealth was not on a par with that of the famous local notables of the eighteenth-century Anatolia, this was nevertheless a considerable sum. His house in the Balıklı neighborhood was worth 1,500 guruş. This was more than most houses were worth not only in his neighborhood but in Kütahya in general, where an average house cost between 200 and 400 guruş. His personal possessions—garments and household items—were few and mostly old (köhne) and used (müsta’mel); and with his cash amounted to 1,664 guruş. The probate inventory does not specifically state what Seyyid Emin Efendi’s profession was, nor does it indicate whether he was engaged in any specific trade. But it is clear that he owned no fewer than seven shops (dükkan) in the different souks of the city. These were probably small shops because their value varied from 200 to 400 guruş—the total value of the seven shops was 1,500 guruş—while a water mill he owned was worth 750 guruş. The more interesting aspect of Seyyid Emin Efendi’s inventory is that most of his assets were in the form of debts owed him. He had loaned a total of 19,229 guruş to many different people—the inventory gives only the sum without the details (bâ-temessük zimem-i müteferrika). Seyyid Emin Efendi’s inventory also shows that he owed money to a total of nine people, including his daughter (130 guruş), and his wife (400 guruş). Even though the other creditors are listed by their names, the specific amount of these debts is not given.

Another significant aspect of Seyyid Emin Efendi’s inventory is that it includes his will. In addition to the money he leaves for the pilgrimage expenses of a pious believer (salih ve mütedeyyin bir kimesne irsal oluna), he leaves around 1,300 guruş to be divided among eleven people. Emin Efendi also declares in his will that he donates the revenues of two of his shops as vakfs. The first vakf endows the construction and upkeep of sidewalks (kaldırım ferş olub ta’mir icin dellalbaşı icaresinde olan dükkanı vakf idüb). The second vakf endows the recitation of different prayers, and the feeding of the poor. He ends his will by reminding his “dearest” that this world is transitory, and that should they succumb to the temptation of keeping material wealth for themselves and fail to fulfill the terms of his will, they will never be forgiven.

Based on the available data from Kütahya court register volume one, Seyyid Emin Efendi’s probate inventory shows that he was one of the wealthiest residents of the city. His loans also reflect a significant change in the credit relations of the period. It is true that there are very few cases concerning credit relations in court register volume one, so we have only limited data to support this conclusion. Nevertheless, most creditors at the beginning of the century didn’t loan out as much money as Emin Efendi—and we will see that his was by no means an isolated case.

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1 D. BŞM.MHF. 12594
That the characteristics of Seyyid Emin Efendi’s wealth (relatively few garments and household items, very few “new” items in his inventory, and the small amount of cash compared to the money he had loaned) and his credit relations (the size of those debts relative to his assets and the variety of people he had loaned money to) were not atypical is apparent when we compare his inventory to other inventories in the court registers for the second part of the eighteenth century. However, given the major gaps between the court records, and other primary sources for the first part of the eighteenth century, the challenge is to determine how he may have accumulated his wealth. The second volume of the Kütahya court registers starts only in 1759—with a fifty-seven-year gap after the first volume. This is particularly disturbing because, as I pointed out above, not only are the court registers our main source for the writing of socioeconomic history, but also there is a growing consensus among scholars that the first part of the eighteenth century was a period of economic recovery, administrative restructuring, and political transformation. It is therefore essential to understand whether this assumption held true for Kütahya, and whether we can view the wealth of a man like Seyyid Emin Efendi in this context. Furthermore, after the wars with Iran ended in 1746, there ensued a period of peace, which must have helped to stabilize the economic recovery. This period of recovery lasted until 1768, when the wars with Russia led to another period of financial crisis, this time much more destructive and costly for the empire—and for the sancak of Kütahya. Faroqhi sees the period from 1770 to 1839 as one of deep crisis (and new beginnings for the Tanzimat reforms of the nineteenth century.) She remarks that “some branches of the Ottoman economy, such as the various textile industries, enjoyed a strong upturn in their fortunes from the beginning of the eighteenth century … This meant that the depression was all the more dramatic when it arrived. To aggravate matters, a lengthy period of peace was followed in 1768 by a new war against Russia.”

Yavuz Cezar argues that the financial problems of the eighteenth century had started in the second part of the seventeenth century, and that it was the chronic nature of these financial problems that led to the military crisis, rather than vice versa. The economic recovery of the first part of the eighteenth century was therefore bound to be only temporary as long as the state tried to keep the financial structure of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries intact. The central treasury (Hazine-i Amire) was relatively small, given the size of the empire and the total amount of revenue. The fiscal revenues were shared among the central treasury, the timar holders, the sultan’s private treasury (İç Hazine), the peripheral provinces, and the vakfs, and increasing the revenue of the central treasury—basically to finance the war efforts—meant decreasing the revenues of the other recipients. But as Cezar argues, “the conditions of the eighteenth century [principally intense military competition in Europe and Asia] brought about this result without any governmental intervention … The eighteenth century was [in this respect] the age of struggle

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among these sectors to maintain their share in the total fiscal revenue.”5 Given this financial structure, the chronic deficit of the central treasury was the main financial problem. One of the ways the state sought to solve this problem was by implementing the malikâne system. Cezar also points out that the implementation was gradual, and that it did not necessarily entail dismantling the old means of revenue collection. The malikâne system solved the deficit problem in the short term. In the longer term, however, its efficacy diminished, and even though significant adjustments were made to the system (such as implementing the eshâm), it became necessary to abolish it in the nineteenth century. I have already discussed the extent to which the malikâne led to the emergence of the local notables. Here it is important to emphasize another aspect of the fiscal crisis in the eighteenth century—that is, the further monetization of revenue collection, and of the economy in general.

Changes in military technology and competition in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries required the central authority to recruit soldiers and pay them in cash, as I have explained; and this, together with its further integration into international trade, accelerated the monetization of the Ottoman economy. Furthermore, starting in the seventeenth century, timars, zeamets, and hasss were transformed into revenue sources that were given out as iltizams and malikânês. However, as Cezar argues, this did not eliminate the timar system. “The government was still willing for the local governors (eyalet ve sancak mutasarrıfları) to fulfill their traditional obligations. But, as their revenues became insufficient, it became extremely difficult for them to do so.”6 The solution was to allow the provincial governors to raise new and irregular taxes (tekalif-ı sâkka) to finance their expenditures. These taxes became regular starting in the 1730s (in the form of imdad-ı seferiyye and imdad-ı hazariyye). Initially, these taxes were not always levied in cash, but as the eighteenth century progressed, they were levied in cash more and more often. On top of these taxes, the central authority added a tax on provincial expenses (eyalet masrafı) which increased the burden on the taxpaying subjects even more. As Gilles Veinstein points out, this was at the same time a transition from fixed-shared tax, which represented the fiscal system of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, to apportioned tax. In this new fiscal system, “the state did not lay down the rate requested from each hâne but the global product which might change every year. The total amount was then apportioned out from top to bottom, successively at the level of the eyalet, the sancak, the kaza or nahiye, the city and the quarter to the community, the village or the mezra and finally the respective shares were portioned out between the households of the basic unit.”7 Scholars such as Veinstein and Cezar also point out that negotiation played an important part in deciding the amount of the total tax to be levied at different levels and on how to apportion it within each level; and the process of negotiation further strengthened the political role of the local notables as representatives of their communities. Cezar argues that “the practice called the ‘vilayet masrafi’ required the participation of the provincial population in the local expenses. So, these payments were more of a kind of ‘participational contribution’ rather than a kind of tax. This participation took place by means of a ‘tevzi defteri’. The local kâdi had the main job in the preparation of these records. The local population and especially the notables would also intervene and help in these

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5 Cezar, “From Financial Crisis to the Structural Change: The Case of the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century.” p. 51
6 Ibid. p. 52
preparations. Tevzi defteri was in fact a book of records that showed the portioning of the expenditures among the tax payers. As a principle, everybody had to know his share before the revenues were collected."

Although it is not clear how the representatives of the communities were chosen, or how the practice of apportioning worked, the new fiscal system had two important consequences, one political and the other economic. At the political level, while Cezar argues that the practice of participational contribution was a step toward democratization, and toward the establishment of a civil regime in local administration, Veinstein claims that that new fiscal practices resulted in “an unprecedented reinforcing of community ties.” Communal ties—at different administrative levels, and within religious communities—had always been important; but the new fiscal practices gave these ties a new political dimension by making them part of an emerging fiscal and legal system. At the economic level, the impact of the new fiscal system was the further monetization of the economy. Cezar is very explicit regarding this aspect of the new system. Even though both the timar system and the new fiscal practices allowed the provincial governor to collect new taxes, “the new practice had one distinguishing feature, when compared with the older in-kind tax obligations in the provinces: it was collected in cash.”

CREDIT RELATIONS

With these general characteristics of the second half of the eighteenth century in mind, let us turn to an evaluation of credit relations during this period. More court registers are available for this period, and this gives us a different picture of credit relations than we derive from our limited sources for the first half of the century. While some aspects of credit relations resemble Jennings’ findings for the seventeenth century, there are also significant differences. Credit

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9 This is, in fact, part of a more important debate about the origins, administration, and the development of the millet system. In this respect, “the millet, not only as a religious and judiciary entity, but as a self-rules unit, was able to emerge in the Ottoman Empire only after the appearance of the objective conditions for such an emergence. And these conditions were fully established only in the eighteenth century with the generalisation of [the apportioning system].” Veinstein, "İnalcık's Views on the Ottoman Eighteenth Century and the Fiscal Problem." p. 10
10 Cezar, "Comments on the Financial History of the Ottoman Provinces in the 18th Century: A Macro Analysis." p. 90
11 The following remarks are not based on a comprehensive analysis of all the probate inventories but the sampling is large enough to represent most of the probate inventories (especially those with higher amounts and with extensive credit relations) in nine court registers for a seventy-year period between 1758 and 1828. KCR-2 (1758-1762), KCR-3 (1763-1768), KCR-4 (1778-1780), KCR-5 (1784-1786), K-6 (1802-1803), K-8 (1810-1811), K-11 (1819-1820), K-13 (1824-1825), K-15 (1828). The volumes 2 to 5 are not transcribed, and I used the microfilms copies for these volumes. I used the transcribed copies for the rest. Ö. Kürşad Karacağil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği" (Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 2002). Özbur Kutluğ Bozkurt, "Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicilleri 8 Numaralı Defterinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi" (Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 2006). Rabia Canpolat (Dağ), "11 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (1819-1820m / 1234-1236)" (Fırat Üniversitesi, 2003). Hüseyin Erol, "13 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili Transkribe Ve Değerlendirilmesi" (Yüksek Lisans, Kırıkkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1997). Mustafa Yavuz, "Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicilleri 15 Numaralı Defterinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi" (Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 2009). The total number of the inventories is 357 in these registers. Total number of probate inventories included in this sampling is 127. The break down of the sampling is as follows: KCR-2 (78/29), KCR-3 (36/24), KCR-4 (76/15), KCR-5 (49/11), K-6 (26/10), K-8 (6/5), K-11 (59/26), K-15 (27/7)
relations were still widespread in the second half of the eighteenth century but given the limited data we have for the first half of the century, it can even be argued that they were more widespread than they were the first part of seventeenth-century Kayseri and the first part of eighteenth-century Kütahya. It can also be argued that even though in most cases the amounts loaned were small, they were sometimes significantly higher than Jennings findings would suggest, and there were also a few very rich men, who seem to have been moneylenders.

People from all walks of life were involved in credit relations. Loans and debts were recorded in an inventory with assets of 11,343 guruş as well as in another inventory with assets of only 299 guruş. For instance, in 1760 Mehmed Ağa’s assets from were 11,343 guruş, and of this amount 7,068 guruş is recorded as debt owed to him by different people (there is no list of the debtors; the record simply states the total amount). Mehmed Ağa was the steward (kethüda) of a certain Abdullah, who, it is safe to assume, was also a wealthy person. Mehmet Ağa also had 977 guruş cash when he died. While Mehmed Ağa may have amassed a small fortune for himself as a steward, Ali (b. Abdullah) was a former slave. But he too, with his much more modest wealth, which amounted to 299 guruş, had given to ten different people loans worth a total of 95 guruş. But Ali’s case is not unusual—except for the fact that he was a former slave—because inventories show that people with relatively modest wealth loaned money to many other people, and a good deal of their assets were in the form of these. In these cases, the amount they loaned was usually around 2 to 5 guruş. The inventory of Seyyid Mustafa Halil from the Balıklı neighborhood shows that with assets worth 816 guruş, he had loaned small amounts to thirty-five people. Given that his house was worth 150 guruş, and that (probably as a merchant) he had bought alaca (mixed fabric of wool and silk) from Antalya worth 170 guruş, most of his assets consisted of his loans. Süleyman b. Said from the Çukur neighborhood was a tailor. In his inventory, there was bogasi (coarse cotton cloth used mainly for lining) from Denizli, alaca from Damascus, and lining from Gedüıs among other household items, and his share of a house was worth 170 guruş. With his assets amounting to 1,446 guruş, he was a relatively well-to-do tailor. But he had only 11 guruş of cash, because no fewer than fifty people owed him various debts—mostly small amounts between 3 to 5 guruş. In Süleyman b. Said’s case, it is reasonable to assume that these debts were probably related to his profession rather than to moneylending cash per se. But he also owed 789 guruş to his brother, which suggests that credit relations could expand by taking different forms: while his debtors may have been his customers, he apparently borrowed money from his brother. At the end, with only 11 guruş of cash and relatively few personal items, it would be up to his brother to collect the debts owed to Süleyman b. Said.

Between 1758 and 1788, credit relations generally revolved around small amounts that rarely exceeded 100 guruş. For this period, the list with the highest number of debtors belonged to an outsider. Two consecutive records both dated 1765 show that the creditor was Komi v. Markos, a non-Muslim from Iran, who resided in the district of Virancık. The first record concerns the district governor’s attempt to register and appropriate Komi’s assets for the public

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12 KCR-2/7 (page 7) but the record is not numbered.
13 KCR-2/108
14 KCR-2/19
15 KCR-2/249
16 KCR-2/3, KCR-2/8, KCR-2/23, KCR-2/28, KCR-2/96. The highest amount in these inventories was 110 guruş in KCR-2/3, next highest amount was 55 guruş in KCR-2/8.
17 KCR-3/236 and 237
treasury (beytü'l-mal). His heirs argued that Komi had written a testament in his will leaving his inheritance to them. They were able to prove their claim, and they won the case. The second record is a list of Komi’s debtors. This list contains two hundred names, and most of the loans were for 5 to 6 guruş—the highest amount was 40 guruş. In two other lists from the same year, at least one hundred people—forty and sixty respectively—were recorded as debtors. In each case, the assets of the deceased were around 2,000 guruş, and the lists of the debtors show that the loans ranged from 3 to 40 guruş. There are many such for the rest of the eighteenth, and the beginning of the nineteenth century. In an inventory dated 1820, the list of the debtors included 130 people. Karaşehrilizâde Seyyid Ali Ağa b. Ahmed was from the neighborhood of Lala Hüseyin Paşa, and had left to his heirs, 4,233 guruş. He was probably a small merchant or a grocer. He owned a shop where cups were manufactured (desti bardak kârhanesi) worth 400 guruş along with substantial amounts of rice, soap, and sugar. The list of his debtors shows that most of the loans ranged from 3 to 10 guruş, and a few ranged from 30 to 40 guruş.

But there were also remarkable exceptions. In 1726, Seyyid el-Hac Süleyman from the Lala Hüseyin Paşa neighborhood, had left 7,769.5 guruş to his heirs. Among his main assets were his house (400 guruş), a shop (100 guruş), and a water mill (100 guruş). Aside from his personal belongings, such as clothing, and household items, he did not own many things, and most of what he did own were old or used. But Seyyid el-Hac Süleyman’s credits amounted to 7,000 guruş—with a list of twenty-five debtors. As Jennings argues it is very difficult to reconstruct the credit flow between the countryside and urban centers, or between social classes. However, Seyyid el-Hac Süleyman’s inventory shows that the people he loaned money to were either well-established families—as the suffix zâde in their names suggest—or people who had gone to hajj—as the prefix el-Hac suggests. It is hard to say for certain but it appears that credit was often given to people of similar social and economic standing. This does not mean, of course, that credit relations were somehow exclusive; to the contrary, it was essential—especially for moneylenders—to expand their credit relations in order to make more money and—sometimes for political purposes—to create patronage ties. However, it is also true that the informal connections within the same social and economic class must have made it easier to find credit, and that the credit relations were, in turn, a means of strengthening these informal connections. Informal connections were also probably an important factor in assessing the risks of moneylending; Seyyid el-Hac Süleyman’s credit relations show that he had lent an average of 300 guruş to each creditor. But Seyyid el-Hac Süleyman is not the only example of a creditor who loaned higher amounts. With 4,698 guruş left to his heir, İbrahim Ağa b. Halil from the

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18 KCR-3/239 and 243
19 (Dağ), "11 Numaralı Kütahya Şeri'iyeye Sicili (1819-1820m / 1234-1236)". K11/215
20 KCR-2/157
21 Şeyh Abdulkadir Efendi who died in the neighborhood of Börekçiler was probably from the village of Zığıre since his inventory shows that he owned a good amount of wheat and barley as well as many animals. The list of his debtors indicates that he loaned money to twenty-seven people however since the list does not state where these debtors were from, it is difficult to investigate the flow of credit relations from urban to rural areas. KCR-2/8
22 It could also be argued that risk assessment does not need to involve higher amounts necessarily. Two inventories that belonged to two retainers of the steward of the governor of the province of Anatolia show that with they also had loaned money to other people in governors’ retinue. Their assets were very modest—55 and 61 guruş—and yet they had loaned money. They were not from Kütahya (one was from Istanbul, and the other from Nevşehir), it therefore makes sense that as outsiders to Kütahya, they would restrict their credit relations with their immediate social circle. KCR-2/152, KCR-2/153
Şehreküstü neighborhood, had loaned money to at least twenty people. The list of his debtors shows that the amounts were fairly high—there are loans for 294, 225, 395, 360, and 500 guruş. Given that his own house was worth 600 guruş, his credit relations were as vital to his wealth as his real estate—if not more so.

Credit relations that included higher amounts—around 400 guruş—would become more frequent towards the end of the century. For instance, when, in 1788, the inventory of El-Hac Ali b. Hasan from the Balıklı neighborhood was recorded, the list of his debtors included twenty-three people, most of whom owed him small amounts—around 10 guruş; but there were those who owed 404, 366, and 113 guruş as well. The total of these debts amounted to 1,642 guruş, while his entire assets amounted to 2,796 guruş. This type of credit relations—involving higher amounts—was, in fact, typical for the period between 1802 and 1828. Of the forty-eight inventories that I examined for credit relations, fifteen inventories included a list of the debtors. Of these fifteen inventories, twelve included at least one credit relation that was higher than 300 guruş. Although debts were often much higher than they were for the earlier period, there were exceptions to this rule. One such exception is the inventory of Ibrahim b. Halil from the Börekçiler neighborhood, and even in this case, the debts owed him were comparatively high. Ibrahim b. Halil’s assets amounted to 2,468 guruş, and his loans constituted most of his amount. His inventory included a list of thirty-one debtors, and the loans ranged from 2 to 240 guruş.

To give two examples, from the period 1802-28, let us turn first to the inventory of Semercizade el-Hac Ali Ağâ b. Mehmet. El-Hac Ali Ağâ from the Bolad Bey neighborhood, who died in 1802, was probably a merchant, and he probably came from a family of pack-saddle makers (hence Semercizade). He was quite wealthy with an inheritance that amounted to 12,306 guruş—one of the highest amounts in the inventories that cover the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. His inventory is not very detailed in terms of personal or household items—other than the typical pillows, rugs, and quilts, his inventory records fabric from Antakya, and one silver watch. His house was worth 1,000 guruş, and he also owned a shop (400 guruş). His credits constituted the rest of his assets. Not only had he put up 810 guruş as the capital for a joint venture (mal-ı mudaraba), but he had also loaned money to surrounding districts and regions, such as Eskişehir, and these loans ranged from 250 to 400 guruş. As the data concerning his credit relations are limited to names, and sometimes to places, we cannot say what these credit relations entailed, but we can assume that these were business relations rather than informal and short-term loans—the type of loans that Jennings describes for early seventeenth-century Kayseri. The second example concerns the Tarakçızade family. Süleyman Tarakçızade

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23 KCR-2/252
24 KCR-5/299
25 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". K6/50, 95, 135, 144, 153, 173, Bozkurt, "Kütahya Şer'iye Sicilleri 8 Numaralı Defterinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi". K8/11, (Dağ), "11 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (1819-1820m / 1234-1236)". K11/40-(103 and 206 are two different records but they are the probate inventories of the members, the two daughters of Tarakçızade, therefore I counted this case as one), 120, 161, 125, Yavuz, "Kütahya Şer'iye Sicilleri 15 Numaralı Defterinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi". K15/7-11-44
26 Except Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". K6/173, (Dağ), "11 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (1819-1820m / 1234-1236)". K11/161 and 215
27 K11/161
28 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". K6/153
lost his daughters, Fatma and Havva, in 1828. Two different inventories were recorded—one for each daughter. It appears that the Tarakçızâde family, from the Lala Hüseyin Paşa neighborhood, was one of the wealthiest families in Kütahya in the 1820s, because the total worth of the two inventories was around 21,000 guruş—Fatma’s assets being worth 10,714 guruş, and Havva’s assets being worth 11,514 guruş. The list of the shops they owned is impressive: a coffeehouse (1,200 guruş); a helva (a kind of sweet) shop (1,000 guruş); a barber shop (400 guruş); and a shop where woodwork, mats, and saddles were sold (‘oturakçı dükkanı’ worth 1,500 guruş); a packsaddle shop (500 guruş); and a grocery (2,000). Fatma’s house was worth 2,200 guruş, and Havva’s house was worth 2,000 guruş. Both women owned a good many household items. Their clothes were many, too, and some of them were new. Furthermore, they owned gold and diamond jewelry—a privilege of the well-to-do. As for credit relations, only in Havva’s inventory was there a short list of debtors; the list consisted of five people but the total amount of the debt was 4,000 guruş. The average debt was therefore 800 guruş—a sum that only a very few people could have borrowed.

Whether moneylending was a lucrative means of making money is an important question. It appears that that those with the highest assets in Kütahya in the 1760s were not moneylenders. The probate inventory of Seyyid El-Hac Osman Ağa b. Davud Ağa from the neighborhood of Bolad Bey, shows that his assets were worth 12,509 guruş. As the voyvoda (local officer, tax-collector) of Uşak, Osman Ağa seems to have profited from his official position to enrich himself. He owned two orchards in two different locations in Kütahya (worth 410 and 600 guruş respectively). It also seems that he also had a small farm, which included a water mill. In the district of Aslanapa, he had another mill, which was worth 1,000 guruş, and his house alone was worth 2,500 guruş. This very expensive house also had an orchard. Osman Ağa’s other assets included wheat and barley stored in storehouses (anbar). Besides these main assets, Osman Ağa owned many clothes and household items, but most of these items were either old or used, and apparently he did not possess anything that was bought from other regions of the empire or from overseas—items that one would expect to see in such inventories, even if not in great numbers. The second-highest amount in the probate inventories belonged to El-Hac Salih Mehmed Ağa b. El-Hac Ali Ağa from the district of Virancık. Salih Mehmed Ağa was one of the local notables in his village of Hacı Kebir—as his title and the title of his father indicate. He also has the title hazinedar (treasurer); however, it is not clear what his official function was.

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29 K11/103 and 206 for Fatma and Havva respectively.
30 KCR-2/228
31 Voyvoda carried out a variety of duties, tax-collection was one of them. Huri İslamoğlu describes the duties of a voyvoda as follows; its more generalized application was for a class of officials who performed a variety of administrative functions including tax collection on lands belonging to certain specific categories, in particular hass lands, and for certain kinds of tax-farm revenues (mukataat mali) attached to large hass holdings such as those assigned to provincial governors (beylerbeyi voyvodas) or to the sultans’ mothers (valide sultan voyvodas). The closet English equivalent for the official charged with the performance of the kinds of duties assigned to voyvodas is steward.”Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century (Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1994). p. 255
32 It is very difficult to prove this suggestion with extensive data, and there are exceptions. For instance, the inventory of another voyvoda, Mustafa Ağa, shows that he had loaned money to different people. However, compared to Osman Ağa, he was not a wealthy voyvoda—with an asset that amounted to 1,958 guruş. 400 guruş of this asset was recorded as debt. KCR-3 (page 77, no record number)
33 KCR-2/158
Salih Mehmed Ağa’s wealth amounted to 8,650 guruş. Most of his possessions were in the countryside surrounding his village. Among the items listed in his inventories were many rugs and carpets (kilim, seccade) from the surrounding districts, such as Uşak, Simav and Kula. In addition to a good number of animals, he had in storehouses close to 3,000 kile (75,000 kg) of wheat and barley, which was worth 1,200 guruş. As for his real-estate, Salih Mehmed Ağa had a house (500 guruş), a farm, a water-mill (500 guruş), and a tobacco shop (268 guruş). Only very limited credit relations are listed in his inventory. One debtor owed him 290 guruş; all the rest of his loans were for small amounts. It appears that compared to Osman Ağa, the voyvoda of Uşak, Salih Mehmed Ağa made his small fortune through farming and maybe to some extent through trading in rugs and carpets. While his house was in the neighborhood of Hacı İbrahim, there is nothing to suggest that he had established credit connections with Kütahya, or with other districts for that matter.

The third-highest amount in the probate inventories for the period 1758-62 belonged to Seyyid el-Hac Mehmed Ağa b. Davud Ağa from the Meydan neighborhood. El-Hac Mehmed Ağa was the chief financial officer in the city (deftedar). His inventory shows that most of his assets came from his real-estate. His house was worth 1,900 guruş. He also owned a shop (800 guruş), a water mill, and some orchards (each of which was worth around 350 guruş). Given that his total assets were 6,663 guruş, almost two-thirds of this wealth came from his real-estate, but his inventory does not record any significant credit relations.

Another way to understand whether there were moneylenders is to look at the number and size of collective debts. One noticeable difference between the first and second half of the eighteenth century is that collective debts appear more frequently after the 1780s. The lack of court registers for the first half of the eighteenth century makes it difficult to draw rigorous comparisons but that no collective debts are recorded in the inventories prior to 1780. Şişman Kara Hacı Mehmed b. Receb Bey’s inventories from 1786 show that he was a wealthy man who owned shares in a shop and a good many clothes and household items, as well as animals. Two different inventories were recorded, because there was a disagreement among the heirs, and it turned out that many of his assets had not been recorded in the first inventory, whereupon a new inventory was prepared. His assets in these two inventories totaled around 14,000 guruş—the highest amount recorded for the 1758-88 period. At least one hundred people were recorded as debtors, and they owed Hacı Mehmed a total of about 3,500 guruş. The debtors included a village that owed Hacı Mehmed 424 guruş. The inventory of Germiyanzâde el-Hac Ali Ağa b. El-Hac Yusuf, dated 1802, likewise shows that the residents of Şuhud owed him 1,110 guruş. As the rulers of Kütahya dating back to pre-Ottoman rule, and as one of most important families of notables during the eighteenth century, the Germiyanzâdes deserve a closer and a more comprehensive look, and I will have more to say about them later. Suffice it to say here that Ali Ağa’s inventory was around 40,000 guruş—the second-highest amount in all the probate inventories for the period 1699-1828—and that his family’s total fortune was probably much

34 Kile as a unit of weight for the grain, varied from place to place, and the inventory does not indicate what of kile was used in calculating the grains. But we may assume that it was the kile of Istanbul, which was around 25 kg. For the kile used in Bursa and the surrounding regions in the second half of the eighteenth century, see Mustafa Öztürk, "Bursa'da Hububat Fiyatları (1775 - 1840)," Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi 7(1992).
35 KCR-2/246
36 KCR-5/135-136
37 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/50)
more than that. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the credit relation between the residents of Şuhud and the Germiyans was probably also a political and social relation. Another significant example of credit relations between private persons and collectivities comes from an inventory dated 1819. At that time, Ali Yüzbaşızâde el-Hac Hüseyin Ağa was one of the wealthiest residents of Kütahya, with an inventory that exceeded 25,000 guruş. We do not know whether he was a merchant but his inventory shows that he owned many rugs and carpets made in Kula and Uşak as well as barley and wheat stored in a mansion. He had many household items; his kitchen utensils alone numbered more than two hundred and they were worth 1,000 guruş. More importantly, the residents of different villages in the district of Kütahya owned him 3,925 guruş. But Hüseyin Ağa also was indebted to other people. He owed 6,400 guruş to seven creditors, most of whom seem to have been affluent people in Kütahya—they could loan more than 1,000 guruş and in one instance 2,500 guruş.

Credit relations between private persons and collectivities were not unusual, and as Faroqhi shows there were even more extensive credit relations, especially around commercially and industrially productive cities such as Bursa. Faroqhi suggests that such relations were among “nonpolitical” means of making fortune in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Compared to the credit relations that she describes in and around Bursa in early part of the eighteenth century, credit relations in Kütahya in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were limited with respect both to the geographical area they comprised and to the amount of capital in circulation. According to Faroqhi, people who had access to malikâne, or to the political circles in and around Istanbul, found moneylending in the vicinity of their cities or towns a profitable to enrich themselves. Faroqhi does not explain why the villages as collectivities started borrowing money, or how that specific credit relation was formed. However, she points out that the debt of these collectivities “were carried over beyond the deaths of individual debtors and creditors. This de facto setup made the village in question into something like a corporation, for every established peasant was responsible for a share in the debts owed, the son taking over his father’s obligations, just as he inherited the farm.” Another factor that led private individuals to extend their credit relations to the villages had to do with the new taxes levied throughout the eighteenth century. As Cezar and Gilles Veinstein point out, with the monetization of the economy caused by the cash requirements of the state, and by the communalization of the payment requirements, the need to find cash from private individuals must have increased significantly for villages and neighborhoods. This in turn must have given the wealthy an incentive to increase their fortunes through moneylending.

As for Kütahya, not only did the tax requirements of the state increase throughout the eighteenth century, but provisioning the army—especially throughout 1810s—became another burden for the people of the region because they were asked to provide the army with animals, food, and other necessities such as tents and sackcloth. On top of all these, there were also the

38 (Dağ), "11 Numaralı Kütahya Şeri'iyye Sicili (1819-1820m / 1234-1236)". (K11/120-121)
39 Suraïya Faroqi, "Indebtedness in the Bursa Area 1730-1740," in **Societes Rural Ottomanes**, ed. Mohammad Afifi, et al. (Cairo: Institut français d'archeologies orientale, 2005). p. 205 Faroqhi gives the credit relations of Mustafa Çelebi el-Hac Abdürrahman as an example. Mustafa Çelebi was a manufacturer but seems to have been more interested in moneylending as a means to enrich himself than his trade. 416 individuals owed him money—a total of 16,526.5 guruş. Given that his assets were around 21,000 guruş, his credits made up most of his estate. Seven villages and one neighborhood also owed him money.
40 Ibid. p. 209
centralization efforts of the central authority. The expenses for the upkeep of the relay stations
and the repair of the palace of the governor increased the heavy financial burden that the people
had to endure. To draw a comprehensive picture of the taxation and how it changed throughout
the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth century is very difficult due to the
complexity of the taxation practices. And the sometimes opaque language of the records
pertinent to tax levy does not help the historian to disentangle and then summarily organize a
myriad of taxes either. The following data are therefore intended to give only an idea about the
taxes levied for the period between 1760s and 1820.

Even though the avârız and nüzül taxes remained constant for the district of Kütahya,
other taxes varied. From 1760s to the 1820s, the avârız and nüzül taxes were around 7,000 and
8,000 guruş.41 Other taxes, such as the hazariyye taxes, fluctuated largely in the response to the
circumstances. For instance, in 1763, the first installment of the hazariyye tax, which was
collected in two installments, was 6,889 guruş. It was increased to 8,252 guruş a year later.42
Twenty-two years later, while the second installment of the hazariyye was 19,577 guruş, it was
down to 16,322 in 178643 (the wars with Russia and Austria played the major role in this
significant increase). Right about the same time, the expenses for the governor’s residence
amounted to 29,000 guruş—these expenses were also collected from the people of the district of
Kütahya.44 As we will see, even more would be asked from the people when the palace was
repaired and new additions were constructed. Apart from avârız, nüzül and the hazariyye, the
records of the provincial expenses also give an idea about the tax burden in the eighteenth
century. In 1802 and 1803, the tax on the provincial expenses was around 100,000 guruş,45 and
in 1810, it increased to 125,000 guruş.46 In 1824, the provincial expenses increased another 20
percent, and amounted to 153,000 guruş.47 But this was not all. During the war with Russia in
1810, the central authority frequently demanded provisions for the army. More precisely, 600
camels were requested from all district of Kütahya (the language was rather threatening to warn
those who would not obey the orders)48 but when the officials in charge of collecting the camels
realized that it would not be possible for the people of the district to provide 600 camels, it was
decided to change the levy in kind to cash. For each camel that the people were supposed to
provide, they were asked to pay 150 guruş, putting the tax burden to 90,000 for the whole
district—Kütahya the city’s share was 59 camels and 8,850 guruş.49 Similar orders were
frequently sent for sheep50 and mules.51 In each case, the sub districts were apportioned, and
frequently the levies in kind were levied in cash—increasing the monetary burden for the tax
payers. Recruiting soldiers and then levying cash taxes instead was another way for the central

1802/1803: (Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". K6/62),
1824/1825: (Erol, "13 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkribe Ve Değerlendirmesi". K13/59)
42 (KCR3/29 and 125 respectively)
43 (KCR5/66 and 91 respectively)
44 (KCR5/82)
45 More specifically, it was 101,309 guruş in 1802 and 101,331 a year later, Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye
Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/36 and 78 respectively)
46 Bozkurt, "Kütahya Şer'iye Sicilleri 8 Numaralı Defterinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi". (K8/64)
47 Erol, "13 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkribe Ve Değerlendirmesi". (K13/70)
48 Bozkurt, "Kütahya Şer'iye Sicilleri 8 Numaralı Defterinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi". (K8/6, 7, 8)
49 Ibid. (K8/9, 10)
50 Ibid. (K8/28, 29, 30)
51 Ibid. (K8/51)
authority to finance wars. For instance, in 1824, 500 soldiers were requested from the district of Kütahya. Or the tax payers were supposed pay 45 guruş as the monthly salary for each soldier, which put the tax burden to a significant 135,000 guruş for the district (to give a specific example, Kütahya’s share was 50 soldiers, or in other words a monthly tax of 2,250 guruş and 13,500 guruş in six months). It is quite clear that the increasing tax burden and especially the monetization of the taxes that were previously (or were supposed to be) levied in kind, also increased the demand for cash from all sectors of society. This was an incentive for those with ready cash to make profit by lending money.

One final aspect of credit relations is the role of the non-Muslims in moneylending. Confirming Jennings’s findings, it can be stated that the non-Muslims were no more heavily involved in credit relations than the Muslims, and they seem to have been much less active as moneylenders. In the twelve inventories recorded for non-Muslims, only one appears to have been more extensively involved in credit relations than his Muslim contemporaries. Furthermore, there is no record in the court registers after 1802 of non-Muslims lending money; during the period 1802-28 all of the local big moneylenders who registered their estates were Muslims. There is in fact only one example of a probate inventory that belonged to a wealthy non-Muslim. Santos v. Santos had assets amounting to 4,975 guruş, and of this amount 4,161 guruş consisted of loans made to forty people. It appears that Santos was a merchant; among his assets were fabrics from Iran, and Salonika, as well as clothes. He may be an example of the artisan turned moneylender that Faroqhi mentions in the case of Mustafa Çelebi, but of course, Santos’s credit relations were much more modest.

When big loans made by non-Muslims are involved, we must turn our attention to the sarraf of Istanbul. Cezar argues that the state considered moneylenders to be artisans with their own guild; “according to a document dated 1714 the number of the sarrafs registered in the guild’s records was 40, and besides these, the artisans called gümüşçü were also registered; the total number was 50. In another document dated 1761 the total number of sarraf and gümüşçü of Istanbul is seen as 137 (only 72 of them were sarrafs). The same document also shows that all of them are zimmi . This category of sarrafs dealt mainly with the exchange of real coins and had close relations with the imperial mint.” Cezar’s main point is that in the absence of a central bank, the sarrafs benefitted enormously from the malikâne system as the principal moneylenders to those who sought to buy lifetime tax-farms. The period between 1750 and 1850 was the golden age for these big moneylenders. To give an idea of the extent of their credit relations and the amount of credit involved, Cezar gives an example from a probate inventory. The debts of 435 people were registered for the years 1814-33. The total debt was more than 22,000,000 guruş and forty-five debtors owed to the sarraf more than 100,000 guruş each. To be sure, such high amounts involved high-ranking state officials, and were mostly confined to close circles centered in Istanbul. It appears that when they needed higher amounts of credit, the affluent people turned

52 Erol, "13 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili Transkribe Ve Değerlendirmesi". (K13/39 and 72)
53 (KCR-2/15, 20, 31), (KCR-3 (page 77, no number), 236, 237, 272), (KCR-4/23, 54, 69), (KCR-5/131, 286), (K6/111)
54 (KCR-5/286)
56 Ibid. p. 70
to the sarrafs in Istanbul. According to an order dated 1765 and sent to the governor of Anatolia and to the judge in Kütahya, a certain Hacı Ali had borrowed 4,900 guruş from the non-Muslim sarraf, Kevork a couple of years back, and was reluctant to repay him. The order stated that it was imperative for Hacı Ali to repay his debt back, and that if he failed to do so, he would face imprisonment.57 Another entry from 1765 also attests to the existence of credit relations between the sarrafs and the affluent residents of Kütahya. The entry does not give much detail about the identity of the sarraf—the term suggests that he was probably from Istanbul—but he had loaned close to 6,000 guruş to one of the residents of Kütahya in 1763.58 His complaint was similar to one made by Kevork. The debtors, apparently relying on some people (bazı kişilere istinaden) to protect them, had not repaid their debt, whereupon which the sarraf sent a petition to the imperial council. As in Kevork’s case, the central authority ordered the judge and the provincial governor to make sure that the debt was paid back.

All this evidence shows that the amount of credit relations that was circulating during the period 1802-28 had increased significantly compared to the period 1758-1802. This in turn suggests that there was more cash in the economy, and that it was more readily available to borrowers. But for a more comprehensive account of the period between 1758 and 1828, we must also examine other aspects of the socioeconomic transformation.

WEALTH AND CONSUMPTION

Another significant difference between the two periods is the huge disparity in wealth recorded in the inventories. A comparison of the ten inventories with the highest amounts for the periods 1758-1802 and 1802-28 shows that the total amount recorded in the latter period was four times higher than the total amount recorded in former period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1758 – 1788</th>
<th>1802 – 1828</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14,000 (KCR-5/135-136) 1786</td>
<td>57,412 (K-15/7) 1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,509 (KCR-2/228) 1762</td>
<td>40,623 (K-6/50) 1802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,507 (KCR-2/ page 7) 1760</td>
<td>24,945 (K-11/120) 1819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,808 (KCR-4/20 – 45) 1782</td>
<td>23,644 (K-11/204) 1820</td>
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<tr>
<td>7,769 (KCR-2/157) 1762</td>
<td>21,000 (K-11/103 – 206) 1820</td>
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<tr>
<td>6,756 (KCR-2/158) 1762</td>
<td>14,713 (K-6/144) 1801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,115 (KCR-2/246) 1762</td>
<td>12,497 (K-8/73) 1810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,592 (KCR-5/267) 1787</td>
<td>12,306 (K-6/153) 1802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,975 (KCR-5/286) 1787</td>
<td>9,773 (K-15/11) 1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,698 (KCR-2/252) 1763</td>
<td>9,429 (K-15/39) 1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>80,729</strong></td>
<td><strong>337,412</strong></td>
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Table 6.1: Comparison of the ten inventories with the highest amounts for the periods 1758-1802 and 1802-28 in Kütahya

57 (KCR-3/100)
58 (KCR-3/272) I was unable to read the name but the suffix zâde suggests he was from one of the well-established and affluent families in Kütahya.
Like the increase in credit relations, the fourfold increase in wealth recorded in the court registers also shows that there was more money in the economy. However, it would be a mistake to take the data in these registers at face value as an indicator of increasing wealth and of the monetization of economy. This approach has serious limitations. First of all, probate inventories were not intended to be registers of economic data. The data in these inventories were registered for legal, and not for statistical purposes. Furthermore, the registration of the inventories was a choice, and not a legal obligation. Not only do we rarely know why certain inventories were registered, but we do not know how many probate inventories were left unregistered. Scholars argue that the poorest and the richest members of society used the court less frequently than what we may consider the middle class (although this term does not describe the group in question quite accurately). Secondly, economic indicators, such as the inventories, must be situated in their social, political and legal context. The increase in wealth in the registered inventories may well have been recorded in response to political developments, rather than for the sake of recording individual wealth. As I noted above, during the period between 1780 and 1830, wars with Russia put a heavy strain on the state’s finances, and the state sought to levy more taxes in cash in order to finance its army. To reduce its deficit, the state tapped into private wealth and resorted to confiscations more frequently during this period than it had done in the past. This may help to explain why more and more inventories with higher amounts were registered, as the wealthier members of society sought to secure the transfer of wealth from the increasing pressure of the state. Finally, it must be kept in mind that the inventories recorded for the period 1802-28 do not necessarily reflect the economic context of this period, because the probate inventory records the end result of a process accumulation. Even though the total amount recorded in the inventories of this period far surpasses that for the previous period, this does not mean that this period was economically more prosperous than the previous one. On the contrary, it is likely that the owners of these inventories had accumulated their wealth during the period 1758-88, or even earlier. Bearing all this in mind, let us turn briefly to another aspect of socioeconomic change: consumption.

Scholars have long recognized the connections between the increase in wealth, the monetization of the economy, industrialization, the emergence of the market economy and consumption. Seen from this perspective, the increase in consumption and the diversification of the items consumed were responses to changing socioeconomic conditions in general but to changing patterns of production in particular. This perspective does not attribute much autonomy to the consumers, nor does it view the consumers as the initiators of socioeconomic transformations. Seen from this perspective, which prioritized the production over consumption, the recent emphasis on consumption rather than production in the economic development of the West has been nothing short of revolutionary. However, the emphasis on consumption has been a relatively new development—Jan de Vries’ works since the early 1990s, but especially the publication of The Industrious Revolution in 2000 have been pioneering in this respect—and there is still much ground to cover in the study of consumption patterns both in the West and in the rest of world. De Vries does not propose to replace the production-oriented narrative of industrialization and the rise of the modern market economy with a narrative that is centered on consumption. But his approach seeks to question most of the major assumptions of the older,

production-oriented narrative including the periodization of the industrialization of the West; the organization and the autonomy of the household; and the role of the consumer as an active rather than a passive participant in the process of modernization. On a theoretical level, he seeks “to add to the macrohistorical processes of modern economic growth and state formation that dominate most theorizing about long-term structural change a third, anterior process: the structure and behavior of the household.” More importantly for our purposes, his historical claim is that “north-western Europe and British North America experienced an ‘industrious revolution’ during a long eighteenth century, roughly 1650-1850, in which a growing number of households acted to reallocate their productive resources (which are chiefly the time of their members) in ways that increased both the supply of market-oriented, money-earning activities and the demand for goods offered in the marketplace. Increased production specialization in the household gives access to augmented consumption choices in the marketplace.”

Ottoman historians have also been quick to turn their attention to the study of consumption. But this attention has generally taken the form of suggestions rather than book-length analyses. Moreover consumption studies have been confined to the older perspective, and de Vries’s challenge has not yet been taken up seriously. For this reason, a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical underpinnings and implications of the role of consumption in the socioeconomic transformation that took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries cannot be attempted here. I will confine my remarks to some basic observations on consumption in Kütahya in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; and I will use James Grehan’s study on Damascus for comparative purposes. This is one of the few book-length studies on consumption in the eighteenth century that try to come to grips with the new approaches to consumption.

Grehan’s conclusion for Damascus is that “nearly everywhere one looks, an overwhelming continuity reigned: in dietary regime, sartorial tastes and fashions, infrastructure, and architectural design and interior decoration, all of which would have been fully recognizable to the parents and grandparents [of the eighteenth century Damascenes]. The world of physical things and mental expectations was quite stable—not rigid and inflexible, as it might first seem, but very loyal to old habits and preferences. For this reason, the eighteenth century can more accurately be characterized as a time of consolidation, not innovation.” For Grehan, the most important changes had occurred earlier with the introduction of coffee and tobacco to Ottoman market in the sixteenth century. After the initial reaction to these new goods subsided, they began to be consumed more and more widely—not only in the coffeehouses but in homes too. There is no doubt that the growing popularity of coffee and tobacco led to new developments in consumer culture (from the spread of the coffeehouses to the production and consumption of such items such as cups and small coffee grinders with which to enjoy these good). What is debatable is whether the introduction of coffee and tobacco had an impact sufficient to transform consumer culture, and whether Ottoman subjects reallocated their productive resources

60 Vries, The Industrious Revolution, Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy, 1650 to the Present. p. 9
61 Ibid. p. 10 Emphasis original.
64 Ibid. p. 223
accordingly, much in the manner that de Vries describes for northwestern Europe. In short, whether the Ottoman Empire experienced trends similar to the ‘industrious revolution.’ Grehan casts serious doubts on the likelihood of a similar phenomenon in Damascus, and argues that “perhaps the greatest imprint that Ottoman rule left on consumer culture was not so much an increase in the range of available goods as in aggregate levels of demand—integration of the markets and stability … The biggest beneficiaries of this were the member of the urban elite.”

The characteristics of consumer culture in Kütahya confirm most of Grehan’s findings.

As most of my findings on Kütahya come from the probate inventories, they are confined to the period 1758–1828, and for this reason, it is difficult to determine to what extent “the world of physical things and mental expectations was stable.” But it is true that coffee and tobacco were consumed more and more widely throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and aggregate levels of demand seems to have risen too, especially for the urban elite. As for the effect of Ottoman rule on consumer culture in Kütahya, it possible to argue that the integration of markets and the resulting stability of the economic and political context increased the range of available goods as much as they increased demand. But a look at the range of different items found in the inventories shows that most of the household items and garments were produced and consumed at the regional level throughout the period between 1758 and 1828. There were other items bought from other parts of the empire, but it is hard to argue that the range of items found in the inventories was impressive—especially given that the eighteenth century was a period of further integration into the world markets. It appears that the only noticeable exception to an otherwise regional trade was the alaca that came from Aleppo and Damascus. Alaca was one of the items most frequently listed in the inventories during the period 1758-1828, and alaca was found in both modest and wealthy households. Other fabrics listed in the inventories came from the regions surrounding Kütahya, such as Bilecik, Bursa, Afyon (Karahisar-ı Sahip), and Manisa. As for small rugs and carpets, they came almost exclusively from Uşak, Simav and Denizli. When fabrics from such cities as Salonika appeared in the inventories, the inventory belonged to a merchant rather than to a household. Even though they may have been used in the local manufacture of clothing, it is probable that these fabrics were bought to be sold to other regions rather than locally. It also appears that there was no noticeable change in the consumption of such relatively cheap fabrics as alaca between the periods 1758-88 and 1802-28. Table 2 shows some of the most frequently recorded items that were manufactured outside Kütahya, and the entries in which they were recorded for these two periods.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>1758 – 1788</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alaca (Damascus)</td>
<td>Alaca (Damascus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(KCR-2/222-249-X)</td>
<td>(K-6/131-143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(KCR-4/23-113)</td>
<td>(K-11/148-214)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(KCR-5/291-299)</td>
<td>(K-15/11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alaca (Aleppo)</td>
<td>Alaca (Aleppo)</td>
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<td>(KCR-5/300)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Alaca (Afyon)</td>
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<td>(KCR-2/19)</td>
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<td>Alaca (Manisa)</td>
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<td>(K-11/148-204)</td>
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</tbody>
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65 Ibid. p. 228
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillow (Bilecik)</td>
<td>KCR-2/96-97-228</td>
<td>Pillow (Bilecik)</td>
<td>K-11/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KCR-4/20</td>
<td></td>
<td>K-15/39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KCR-5/5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillow (Bursa)</td>
<td>KCR-4/23</td>
<td>Pillow (Bursa)</td>
<td>K-6/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogasi (Denizli)</td>
<td>KCR-2/249</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugs (Uşak-Simav-Kula)</td>
<td>KCR-2/158</td>
<td>Rugs and table cover</td>
<td>K-6/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KCR-5/39</td>
<td>(Uşak)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillow (Bursa)</td>
<td>KCR-4/23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabric (Salonika)</td>
<td>KCR-5/286</td>
<td>Quilt (Tokat)</td>
<td>K-6/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Towels (Antakya)</td>
<td>K-15/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saddlebags (Maraş)</td>
<td>K-15/7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: Most frequently recorded items that were manufactured outside Kütahya for the period 1758 - 1828

As for the two major consumption goods—coffee and tobacco—they were very popular with a wide range of consumers. Both wealthy and middle-class people enjoyed them. For instance, a coffee grinder can be found in an inventory that amounted to 557 guruş and in an inventory that amounted to 40,000 guruş. Nevertheless, coffee grinders are rarely found in inventories of less than 100 guruş. However, it is hard to determine whether coffee became more popular throughout the eighteenth century and in the early part of the nineteenth century than it was in the seventeenth and early part of the eighteenth centuries. The consumption of coffee grinders or pots for brewing coffee does not seem to have increased significantly. But this does not mean that the consumption of coffee did not increase because it is possible that more coffeehouses were opened during this period, and more coffee was consumed in the coffeehouses—two subjects about which we have no data.

Table 3 shows the number of inventories in which items related to the consumption of coffee were recorded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1758 – 1788</th>
<th>1802 - 1828</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(KCR-4/2-54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(KCR-5/135-136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pots for brewing coffee (ibrik)</td>
<td>(KCR-2/222-249-252)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3: The number of inventories in which items related to the consumption of coffee were recorded for the period 1758 - 1828

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66 KCR-2/222
67 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şerif'ye Sircili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/50)
68 In two inventories, coffeehouses are recorded (K11/103, and K15/39), but this data is too limited to use it in any meaningful way.
Despite the impression of continuity that we get from the inventories, the acceptance of coffee as a major consumption good had come a long way since the central authority resisted its introduction in the sixteenth century, and banned it entirely in the seventeenth century. The state was attentive to consumers’ and traders’ complaints about the quality of coffee. In an order sent to Kütahya in 1765, it was stated that some traders mixed coffee from Yemen with European coffee (frenk kahvesi) and that unmixed coffee was becoming less and less available in the markets. The officials and traders were warned not to mix coffee, but to sell only genuine Yemenite coffee. In a series of orders issued in the same year, it was also stated that the rice, soap, and coffee that came by way Egypt had to be sold in the shops that were located next to Timurtaş Paşa mosque, and that only Muslim traders could sell these goods. Non-Muslim traders who had shops in this market had to be relocated somewhere else. We can only speculate whether the relocation of non-Muslim traders, and the affirmation of the monopoly of Muslim traders on coffee, rice, and soap was the result of competition over a lucrative business; but it is clear that coffee was available in the markets as a basic consumption good.

Except for evidence on the monopoly and organization of shops that sold tobacco, much the same can be said of the tobacco trade. I have already discussed the importance of tobacco cultivation and production for the Ottoman Empire in general and for western Anatolia in particular. There was no significant tobacco production in the sancak of Kütahya, but it benefitted from the tobacco trade nevertheless, because Kütahya played a role in the regulation of the tobacco trade through the collection of internal customs dues. There were also tobacco shops in Kütahya, and the inventories suggest that it was consumed in households. How widely it was consumed is difficult to tell because the existence of tobacco in an inventory does not necessarily indicate that the tobacco was consumed. In some cases, it is possible to determine from the inventory that the person in question was a trader, but the inventories do not always provide clues about the profession of the deceased. Moreover, only rarely do the inventories record items that are used to consume tobacco such as tobacco pipes. So in most cases it is impossible to draw a clear line between consumption and trade. Nevertheless, tobacco is frequently found in the inventories throughout the second half of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth century; and there is no noticeable change in the patterns of consumption between the periods 1758-88 and 1802-28. Table 4 shows the instances when tobacco was recorded in the inventories for these two periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1758 – 1788</th>
<th>1802 - 1828</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(KCR-2/158 – tobacco shop)</td>
<td>(K6/50 – ashtray? “duhan tablası”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(KCR-3/259 – tobacco shop)</td>
<td>(K6/131 – tobacco pipe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(KCR-4/2 – tobacco in his possession)</td>
<td>(K6/144 – tobacco in his possession)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(KCR-4/20 – tobacco trader)</td>
<td>(K11/40 – tobacco trader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(KCR-5/5 – tobacco trader, tobacco in his possession)</td>
<td>(K15/32 – tobacco trader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(KCR-5/252 – tobacco trader, tobacco in his possession)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.4: Instances when tobacco was recorded in the inventories for the period 1758 - 1828

The apparent continuity throughout the 1758–1828 does not mean that there were no changes at all. The range of items and goods that were consumed probably increased during this period. But it was a slow and uneven change. New items appeared—as could be expected—in the inventories of the wealthiest members of society. For instance, such items as binoculars manufactured in England, Venetian fabrics, tableware manufactured in Germany, and snuffboxes were found exclusively in the inventories of the Germiyans—the most important notable family of Kütahya. In the inventories of other wealthy families, there were fabrics from Tabriz, and Baghdad, cups manufactured in Austria and Belgium, and pistols manufactured in England, but in most cases, there were only a few of these items, and it is highly probable that similar items in comparable numbers could have been found in earlier periods—perhaps even more in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Watches, which historians take as evidence of new notions of time—crucial to the reallocation of productive resources, as de Vries argues—made their appearance in the inventories during this period. However, as Grehan remarks in his discussion of Damascus, “urban culture showed no interest in more precise methods of timekeeping, and produced little rhetoric that might betray an obsession with greater diligence, punctuality, and self-discipline. One index for this new sensibility was ownership of personal watches, which, in Damascus, was restricted mainly to affluent townspeople, who kept them for ornamental uses.” The distribution of watches in the inventories for the period 1758–1828 shows a similar pattern for Kütahya. There were more watches in the inventories recorded after 1802, and in most cases, they were recorded in the inventories of affluent people, such as local notables, or the scribes of the finance department. The inventories in which watches were recorded rarely amounted to less than 1,500 gurüş. Table 5 shows the distribution of watches in the Kütahya probate inventories throughout the period 1758–1828.

71 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/50)
72 Ibid. (K6/153)
73 (Dağ), "11 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (1819-1820m / 1234-1236)". (K11/103)
74 Ibid. (K11/40)
75 (Dağ), "11 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (1819-1820m / 1234-1236)". (K11/120)
76 “Timepieces of all kinds, mentioned in less than 10 percent of English probate inventories around 1675, were recorded in over a third of all inventories by the 1720s, and by no less than 38 percent of pauper inventories in 1770-1812. By the 1780s, 70 percent of the inventories of Parisian servants mention watches, as do 32 percent of those for wage earners.” Vries, The Industrious Revolution, Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy, 1650 to the Present. p. 3
77 Grehan, Everyday Life and Consumer Culture in 18th-Century Damascus. p. 225
78 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/50)
79 (Dağ), "11 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (1819-1820m / 1234-1236)". (K11/204)
80 Only in one case did the inventory amount to 190 gurüş. But this only after debts and other funeral expenses were substracted from the total amount the assets, which was 5,171 gurüş. Non-Muslim, Agop v. Artin was indebted to many people, and debts were 4,981 gurüş, and no doubt appropriately his nickname was “hayta” (carefree, happy-go-lucky)
In short, then, except in the case of coffee and tobacco, consumer culture in eighteenth and early nineteenth century Kütahya seems to have remained to a great extent regional. As Grehan suggests with reference to Damascus, “it seems improbable that coffee or any other tandem of commodities could launch a dramatic cultural transformation.” Another way to examine this continuity over the eighteenth century is to look briefly at the production of consumption goods. That is to say, in the case of Kütahya, to turn to what Kütahya is famous for even today—the production of pottery and faience.

### THE MISSING CUP MAKERS

I have already noted that after the demise of İznik, Kütahya was the most important center of pottery and faience making at the beginning of the eighteenth century. But Kütahya’s importance in this respect is rather assumed than proven on the basis solid evidence. Just how big a center it was, what kind of pottery was produced, for whom, in what quantities, and by how many workers are questions that we cannot answer directly. The evidence that comes from the court volume 1 is also indirect with regard to these essential questions. The two legal cases that concern the pottery and faience makers are inheritance litigations that provide only indirect evidence. However, two other cases provide direct information on the cup makers’ guild.

The first two cases—the inheritance litigations—show that there were cup makers’ shops (çinici ve fincancı kârhânesi) in the neighborhood of Lala, and that they were owned by Armenians. In both cases, the plaintiffs argued that they had been stripped of their inheritance rights, which included their shares in cup makers’ shops. Apparently, the shops were rather small. There is no specific information about the shops, but in one case, the total value of the inheritance was less than 150 guruş, which is a modest amount. In the other case, which was a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1758 – 1788</th>
<th>1802 – 1858</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KCR-5/5 (old, used watch) – 252 – 291 (a couple)</td>
<td>K-6/50 (silver watch) – 153 (silver watch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K-8/11 (French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K-11/138 (English) – 204 – 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K-15/7 – 11 (Persian watch) – 41 (silver watch)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5: The distribution of watches in the Kütahya probate inventories for the period 1758–1828

84 Ibid. (K2/91/467), (K2/74/386)
85 The plaintiff, Vartan, claimed that his deceased wife had owned half of a pottery making shop in the neighborhood of Lala. Before she passed away, Vartan claimed, she donated her share to him. However, the daughters of Vartan’s wife (this was her second marriage) claimed in their turn that they were the rightful inheritors of their mother’s share. It turns out that they were able to present a legal title deed to prove their case, and Vartan is prohibited to make further claims. During the litigation, it also becomes apparent that the value of Vartan’s wife possessions were seventy-three guruş—which may well have included other items than her share of the shop. Hence
peaceful settlement case between a brother and sister over their inheritance from their father, the
plaintiff, Mekrem, agreed to a peaceful settlement with her brother in return for five thousand
cups (fincan) and 15 guruş in cash. What is of interest here is the number of cups that are
subject to the settlement agreement. Considering the fact that Mekrem and her brother had one
more sister and three more brothers (as well as their mother), it is reasonable to suppose that the
shop may have produced more than five thousand cups. We have no way of knowing whether the
other heirs also had a share in kind (that is to say, in cups or other pottery) along with the cash,
but it is plausible to think that the first brother took over the shop, and gave a share of the cups
produced to Mekrem. We do not know where these cups were sold, but if a relatively small shop
produced thousands of cups, the extent of trade may have gone beyond the province of Anatolia.

The other two cases provide direct information on the cup makers’ guild (fincancı
taifesi). The first record concerns litigation among the members of this guild. Four members
of the guild were accused by the other members of abusing their responsibility for buying and
transporting the paint used to decorate the cups. They were also accused of hiding part of the
paint and keeping it for themselves. The plaintiffs argued that in the past they had bought the
paint from Karahisar-ı Sahip, and that buying the paint had been the responsibility of a warden
(boya ağası). They also stated that half of the expenses to buy and transport the paint had been
paid in cash and half in kind. This arrangement seems to have worked just fine until the prices
went up, upon which they agreed to send the four members of the guild to buy the paint. They
accused these four members of hiding part of the paint and reserving a bigger share of it for
themselves. In their response, the defendants argued that they had not hidden any part of the
paint, and that the paint had been distributed fairly to all the members by the warden. They
admitted that they had received an extra share, but they stated that the warden had given it to
them as a reward. The case ends with a note of warning (tenbih) that the paint should be
distributed fairly.

It appears that at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the cup makers’ guild did not
have a head warden (kethüda or şeyh), who acted as the arbiter for cases concerning disputes
among the members. Another important aspect of this case is that two of the defendants were
Muslims. This is important because it is often assumed (by professional and amateur scholars
alike) that pottery and faience making was almost exclusively in the hands of the Armenians.
While it appears to be true that most of the masters and apprentices were Armenians, Muslims
were also among the guild members.

The second case concerning the cup makers not only affirms this latter point, but also
provides further information on the guild. The record is actually about registering the debts
incurred during a business partnership between an Armenian (Zedebali v. Hacı Bali) from the
neighborhood of Şehreküstü and a Muslim (Halil Çelebi) from the neighborhood of el-Hac
İbrahim. In this case, the court acts as a notary to record the details of the business and the

the value of the shop appears to be less than one hundred and fifty guruş—at least, as far as we can tell from the
evidence presented during the case. (K2/68/355)
86 Mekrem argued in court that she initially left her share to her brother. She brough the case to the court when her
brother refused to give her share back. (K2/75/389)
87 The document only talks about “boya”, that is to say paint without specifying what kind of paint it was. I therefore
assume that it was a kind of ink to decorate the cups. (K2/91/467)
agreement reached between the partners to dissolve their business. The partnership had been created with Halil Çelebi contributing 284 guruş and Zedebali contributing 50 guruş as the initial capital. They also borrowed (istidâne) 270 guruş from others. They were able to pay back 100 guruş of their debt, but after some time their business started to go bad, and they decided to dissolve it. Zedebali deposes to the court that he agrees to take upon himself the debts incurred by the business and also to buy out Halil Çelebi—probably to continue the business alone. What is interesting for our purposes is that among the assets of the business was a cup maker’s shop (mal-ı şirketten olan fincan cvârhanesi) producing water cups (mâyi fincanı). The record also shows that there were three more partners holding shares in the shop: Mustafa Beşe, Elâgöz, and Mardyos. Zedebali bought their shares for 12, 7, and 2 guruş respectively. Furthermore, the record specifies that the four thousand cups were sent to Istanbul, and that price of forty cups was 1 guruş. It also turns out that two of the moneylenders were from Istanbul—a Muslim, who had lent 100 guruş, and a Jew, who had lent 30 guruş.

What can be gathered from this information is that this partnership was the nexus of a network of economic and social relations. It appears that investing in cup making was seen as lucrative, not only by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, but also by people of different social and economic classes. Like Zedebali, Elâgöz and Mardyos were non-Muslims, and they were probably Greek. Abraham, the moneylender from Istanbul, was a Jew. Moreover, the Muslim partners were of different social statuses. While the title “Beşe” is commonly used for low-ranking military men, “Çelebi” is used for men of letters or for the learned members of religious institutions. It is also reasonable to assume that with shares ranging in value from 2 to almost 300 guruş, the business brought together people of different economic means. We have no way of knowing whether Istanbul was the final destination of the cups produced in Kütahya—it is possible that Istanbul merchants were buying Kütahya ware to sell it to other parts of the empire, or even overseas—but it is clear that the cups were sold beyond the regional market. The record says nothing about the masters and apprentices either, but it seems that at least the rules of investment, and maybe even the rules for opening a shop, were flexible enough to allow a variety of people to become involved. (These rules would become more and more restrictive as the eighteenth century progressed.) But despite the variety of the people involved in the business, the sums invested were rather modest compared to the sums invested, say, by of the merchants of Bursa.

We have little direct information on workplaces and working conditions for the guilds prior to the nineteenth century; indirect information suggest that production was confined to small shops. When three Armenian sisters from the neighborhood of Lala sold their shares devolving from their inheritance rights in 1702, the record of the sale shows that these shares included a house with upper and lower floors (fevkanî ve tahtanî mülk menzil), a courtyard (havlu), and a well (bî’r-i mâ), as well as a pottery shop (çinic cvârhanesi). Each share was sold for 20 guruş. The record does not indicate whether there were other shares, but considering the size of families in the eighteenth century and among non-Muslims, it is highly unlikely that there were more than seven or eight shares. It is therefore reasonable to assume that this was not a big house, or a big shop. Furthermore, the deed of sale describes the shop as located on an upper floor (fevkanî), which probably means that it was confined to a small room, and that production was also small scale.

88 Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/84/433)
Even though the production of pottery and faience seems to have provided an opportunity for enrichment, it is difficult to argue that the business was thriving at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The gap between the first and second volumes of the Kütahya court records makes it hard to know what happened to the cup makers during the period 1702–58. This is particularly unfortunate because knowing what happened to the cup makers during a period of economic recovery could have thrown light on other aspects of socioeconomic development and on the true nature of the economic recovery. Tuncer Baykara’s research on the provincial administration shows that many artisans were active in Kütahya throughout the century.\(^89\) Records of appointments, or of the approval of appointment of heads or head wardens of artisanal groups show that the mid-eighteenth century there were a great many of these groups. Among them were groups of porters, butchers, barbers, blacksmiths, tanners, tinsmiths, bakers, sword-makers, goldsmiths and jewelers, herb and spice sellers, makers of aba (rough woolen cloth), furriers, and tailors. Head wardens were not appointed for each of these groups separately. For instance, blacksmiths, tanners, and tinsmiths seem to have been considered one group, with a single head warden (called ahı-baba in this specific case). Arasta (the covered thoroughfare lined with shops) and ehl-i sanayii (manufacturers\(^90\)) also had a separate şeyh and ahı-baba respectively. There is no specific reference to the cup-makers in these records. However, different records from 1762 show that cup-makers had a şeyh too. A certain Ali seems to have been their şeyh. He wrote a petition to the authorities in the capital saying that he had lost his certificate (berat) issued by the imperial council and asking to renew it. An order was issued stating that his first berat had indeed been issued in 1760, and that Ali should continue to hold his position as the şeyh of the cup makers in Kütahya.\(^91\) We know that Ali kept his position at least until 1766, because his name appears as the current şeyh of the cup-makers in two rare documents signed by the masters and apprentices of the cup-makers’ guild (the same documents show that the previous şeyh was Hasan Efendi).\(^92\)

These two documents date from 1765 and 1766 respectively, and are frequently cited in the books on modern Kütahya ware manufacture.\(^93\) They concern contractual agreements between the masters (üstüst), the journeymen (kalfa), the master-journeymen (halife), and the apprentices (şakird). The first agreement is between the master-journeymen and the masters. As is usual in such contractual agreements, the document states number of cups a master-journeymen was allowed to produce in a day, and how much he was to be paid. This particular agreement states that the master-journeymen are to produce no more than one hundred cups for a daily wage of 60 akçe.\(^94\) As is also usual in the agreements that regulate the working conditions of the guilds, the agreement states that the master-journeymen are not allowed to produce the

\(^89\) Tuncer Baykara, *Osmanlı Taşra Teşkilatında XVııı. Yüzyılda Görev Ve Görevliler (Anadolu)* (Ankara: Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü, 1990). Baykara gives a long list of appointments for the eighteenth century, but the list—more precisely, the records he used—is not in chronological order, but covers different years between 1720s and 1810s.

\(^90\) The term manufacturer is too broad and vague but it is not clear from the term ehl-i sanayii which specific artisans are included under the ehl-i sanayii.

\(^91\) Cevdet İktisat - 852

\(^92\) At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the şeyh of the cup-makers was el-Hac Abdurrahman. He held this position in 1901 after the current şeyh transferred his position to him (kasr-ı yed). When el-Hac Abdurrahman died, his son petitioned the central authority to hold the same position. Cevdet Belediye 1559

\(^93\) See for instance, Rıfat Çini, *Ateşin Yarattığı Sanat Kütahya Çiniciliği* (İstanbul: Celsus Yayıncılık, 2002).

\(^94\) KCR-3/229
cups in their homes, and that the masters should not use the potter’s wheel to produce cups (çarha girip işlemeyeler). While this agreement seems to have been registered at the court, the second agreement was recorded in the court register in the presence of the provincial governor, Ali Paşa. This second agreement is more comprehensive than the first one. Even though the opening lines state that it constitutes an agreement between the journeymen and the masters, the clauses of the agreement also include the apprentices, and give more information about the guild. The agreement states that over time the internal organization of the guild has deteriorated and that the masters are no longer making a profit.  

To adjust production to the current requirements, production and daily wages are determined as follows. Journeymen are to produce one hundred cups a day for 40 akçe; apprentices are to produce one hundred cups a day for 24 akçe, and 250 cups a day for 60 akçe. Master-journeymen may produce up to ninety cups a day for 90 akçe. Even more importantly, the agreement states that there are twenty-four shops (kârhane) that produce cups, and that the number of these shops is restricted to twenty-four. If anyone violated the rules of the agreement, the punishment was penal servitude on the galleys (kürek, – oar). The parties to these agreements were all Armenians, but the witnesses to the registration were all Muslims. Among the witnesses in the first agreement were the current şeyh, Ali Efendi; the previous şeyh, Hasan Efendi; the ahi-baba, Ahmet Efendi; the tobacco merchant İbrahim Efendi; and a few other members of the learned class.  

Scholars argue that the second part of the eighteenth century was especially a trying time for most of the guilds. Even though domestic trade still outweighed foreign trade—even though the guilds were not totally decimated by foreign trade, and especially by finished goods manufactured gradually industrializing West—it became harder for the guilds to compete with foreign-manufactures goods. The constant wars with Russia took a heavy toll on the guilds’ production too. Monetization of the economy, and rising shop rents also worsened their financial situation by promoting inflation. The guilds responded by developing their own protective measures—both against internal competition (among the members) and against other guilds. As Engin Deniz Akarlı argues, gedik was one such protective measure, especially for the guilds in Istanbul in the period between 1750 and 1840. As he explains, “initially, the explicit meaning of gedik or ‘slot’ in Ottoman legal documents was an artisan or trader’s tools and equipment. This basic legal meaning remained carefully preserved in legal documents even when gedik ownership acquired new implications. At a time of slow technological change, when the same means of labour passed from a generation of master artisans to the next, linking the tools of trade to seniority and tenure would make sense. However, gedik also signified a specific ‘slot’ in the marketplace in a tangible sense.” The rights and obligations pertinent to gedik had been recognized for at least two centuries but the specific legal developments concerning the
definition of a gedik took place in the period 1750–1850. These developments and especially the “ownership requirements [for obtaining a gedik] … not only enabled an experienced artisan to become his own boss as a fully-fledged master, but it also provided him with a slot among a group of fellow masters and thereby with a work place at a specific location in the marketplace.” Not only did gedik become not only a legal concept to defend the (more and more exclusive) rights of the guilds and their members, but it was used as security for establishing credit. In a rapidly monetizing economy, and under inflationary pressure, it became ever more important for an artisan to establish credit if he wanted to buy raw materials and to work with the merchants.

There is no specific reference to gedik in the Kütahya court records, and as Akarlı shows the development of gedik as legal concept was a gradual process, even in Istanbul. The contractual agreements of 1765 and 1766 do not seem to have been responses to the socioeconomic transformation as was the development of gedi; but the restriction on the number shops that could produce cups must have played an important role in the preservation of the rights and obligations of the members of the cup makers’ guild. Since we have no data from previous periods with which to compare the data from 1765, it is difficult to know whether these two contractual agreements were specific responses to market conditions. They may well have been two regular agreements among the guild members—the reference to the passage of time and to the need to adjust to the requirements of the current situation may well be a formulaic expression common to such agreements. Newer market opportunities and the fear of losing the market share may well have engendered similar responses—to increase profit or to restrict competition. Evidence other than court records is fragmentary, but it suggests that Kütahya ware, and especially cups, was sold not only regionally but also to other parts of the empire and even across the Black Sea to Crimea and then to Russia.

When documentary evidence concerning the production and trade of Kütahya ware is scarce, historians can turn to historical archaeology. Marcus Milwright’s research on Syria shows that there were already references to Chinese porcelain and pottery in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and that coffee cups were the most common items of pottery to be found in the inventories. As for the trade of pottery from Kütahya, it seems to have been most intense during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: “Kütahya wares are the most common imports in the archaeological record. While published catalogues of Kütahya ware show that these workshops produced a wide range of vessel types, the excavated finds in Bilad-al Sham are largely restricted to small cups, probably designed for the consumption of coffee. Assemblages from rural sites in Greece, Cyprus and Anatolia also indicate that the most widely distributed products from Kütahya were their coffee cups.” It also appears that pottery, and especially cups, were sold across a wider area than in previous centuries. While sale of pottery had previously been concentrated in port cities and towns, by the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the sale had extended inland. But Kütahya ware was exported to more places than

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100 Ibid. p. 176
101 Marcus Milwright notes that “the term [historical archaeology] can be taken simply to refer to the archaeology of historical periods (i.e. of those societies that produced written records) where a conscious effort is made to integrate the evidence from textual sources with the artefacts and other data recovered from excavations and surveys.” Marcus Milwright, "Imported Pottery in Ottoman Bilad Al-Sham," Turcica 40(2008). See also Veronique François, "Jarres, Terrailles, Faïences Et Porcelaines Europeennes Dans L'empire Ottoman (Xviiie-Xixe Siecles)," Turcica 40(2008).
102 Milwright, "Imported Pottery in Ottoman Bilad Al-Sham." p. 128
Syria, Greece, and Anatolia. A study on the Black Sea trade written by French consular Charles Peyssonel’s in 1762 provides evidence that different types of Kütahya ware were sold all around the shores of the Black Sea and in Crimea—along with rugs and carpets from Uşak and Kula. Even though merchants earned a 100 percent profit when it was sold in Crimea, Peyssonel also mentions that the volume of the trade was not significant. Due to the fragility of pottery and other faïences, exportation was very risky, and therefore the merchants invested only small amounts of capital.

A major factor in the wide distribution of Kütahya ware in general, and of the coffee cups in particular was that they were not manufactured for the luxury market but for more modest consumers. However, the cup makers were also attentive to the demands of consumers; archaeological evidence suggests that they were quick to imitate the motifs found on more popular—and more expensive—cups manufactured in Europe. Compared to İznik ware, which was highly esteemed by the elite, Kütahya ware was inexpensive and of relatively low quality; and this had given the Kütahya manufacturers more flexibility to adapt to the fluctuations of the market—as well as the opportunity to reach more costumers—in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They seem to have maintained the same policy throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. But what worked under conditions of relatively restricted market competition no longer worked when competition from Europe and China intensified. As Grehan notes, “like the coffee itself, the service conformed to its own scale of taste and prestige. The most admired cups were of ‘Chinese’ porcelain, imported from East Asia via the Red Sea, whereas others were European imitations. Cheaper and less esteemed was the output of Kütahya that by the eighteenth century had become the center of production tiles and ceramics. As regional elites turned increasingly to imported wares (especially from Europe), the quality of [Kütahya] manufactures steadily declined. As confirmation of this trend, affluent households in Damascus largely shunned the Kütahya wares, together with any copies that local artisans may have produced.” Veronique Francois’s work on the European export to the Ottoman Empire shows that the volume of pottery and faïence trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was higher than scholars had at first believed. More importantly, not only luxury items but also more modest and less expensive pottery items were sold in the Ottoman Empire.

Kütahya cup-makers probably prospered modestly in the first half of the eighteenth century. But even though they survived the troubled times between 1770 and the early nineteenth century, cup making was not a lucrative business. Milwright’s comments on pottery trade in Syria apply to the Kütahya cup makers as well. “Imported pottery is of limited economic significance when seen in the larger context of the balance of trade between Europe and the Middle East in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What makes it worthy of attention, however, is the social visibility of glazed ceramics; these affordable objects were bought and used by a wide spectrum of socio-economic groups in both urban and rural contexts. Not only did glazed pottery perform practical functions, it was also conspicuously displayed

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103 M. de (Charles) Peyssonel, *Traité Sur Le Commerce De La Mer Noire* (Paris1787). The work was published in 1787, but it was finished around 1762 with the consular reports that Peyssonel had written between 1750 and 1762. Peyssonel notes that he wrote his work as he had composed it during that period. p. 109-110
104 Ibid. p. 67
105 Milwright, "Imported Pottery in Ottoman Bilad Al-Sham." p. 128
107 François, "Jarres, Terrailles, Faïences Et Porcelaines Europeennes Dans L'empire Ottoman (Xviiie-Xix Siecles)."
within domestic settings.” In fact, we need not look far to understand that business was not thriving for the cup makers. The probate inventories of Kütahya show that in only very few cases were coffee cups listed among the household items. Coffee cups were almost totally absent in the inventories of ordinary residents, and the more affluent members of the society seem to have opted for cups imported from abroad—more precisely from Austria and Belgium. In some cases, when the cups were recorded in the inventories, it was clear that they formed part of the assets of a merchant or a cup maker. For instance, in Karabet veled-i Abram’s inventory there were more than 10,000 cups worth a total of 120 guruş, as well as hundreds of plates and bowls. His other assets show that he was also a merchant of fabrics. In short, widespread use of coffee or tobacco did not change significantly older forms of consumption, and even though cup makers found were not totally wiped out under deteriorating socioeconomic conditions after the 1760s, they were not the among the winners, either.

POLITICAL PRIVILEGE AND WEALTH

In a hierarchically organized society where inequality was the norm, privilege of all kinds played an important role in accumulating wealth—especially if there were no fundamental transformations in the socioeconomic structure and the political constitution of the society. Grehan argues that “in the hands of the Ottoman class, state privileges could serve essentially consumerist ends. As townspeople understood, such privileges also offered valuable insurance against economic instability and predatory speculation … If trade and production bowed to weighty military and political interests, at least in large Ottoman towns, patterns of consumption were no more immune to the very same pressures. … To understand the flow of goods—particularly of the most select goods—one must first trace out all the different forms of political leverage that were available to households.” To give a few specific examples from 1762, the most luxurious clothing items, such as fur kaftans, turbans, and kavuks, appear only in the inventories of high-ranking state officials and of those who were the upper echelons of their retinue. For instance, the governor of Anatolia, Ali Paşa, had ordered fur from Sivas that was worth 524 guruş—a sum that would pay for a house in Kütahya. When he died in Kütahya the same year, his assets amounted to only 4,825 guruş. This was a modest amount for a provincial governor but it probably did not represent all of his wealth. It is possible that only his possessions in Kütahya were recorded in the inventory. Be that as it may, Ali Paşa’s inventory easily made the top ten for the period 1758–1788, and it included many luxury items—especially clothing—very rarely seen in the inventories of the residents of Kütahya. Not only did the politically privileged luxury items on an individual basis, but their other expenses, such as the upkeep of their residences, contributed to an ever-widening circle of consumption. For instance, when one of Ali Paşa’s aides spent 1,775 guruş for the upkeep of his mansion, the job must have

108 Milwright, "Imported Pottery in Ottoman Bilad Al-Sham." p. 143
109 (KCR-2/28, 46), Karacagil, "6 Numarali Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/111)
110 (Dağ), "11 Numarali Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (1819-1820m / 1234-1236)". (K11/40), Yavuz, "Kütahya Şer'iye Sicilleri 15 Numarali Deferinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi". (K15/7)
111 Karacagil, "6 Numarali Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/111)
112 Grehan, Everyday Life and Consumer Culture in 18th-Century Damascus. p. 230-231
113 (KCR-2/38-39)
114 (KCR-2/48)
115 I did not include his inventory in the list above because he was not from Kütahya.
involved a good many artisans and a wide range of items. Of course, most of expenses were paid by the subject population.

The disparity between the privileged and the subject population had always been great, and it seems to have become greater throughout the eighteenth century. As Hülya Canbakal points out with reference to seventeenth-century ‘Ayntab, “the estates of the wealthiest 10 percent of the deceased were on average a hundred times the value of the poorest (2,875:20 guruş).” The disparity of wealth in Kütahya was even more blatant. The estates of the wealthiest 10 percent were four hundred times the value of the poorest in 1760 (12,509:31 guruş), and five-hundred times the values to the poorest in 1820 (57,412:114 guruş). However, it is important to keep in mind that the probate inventories may not be an accurate indicator of wealth. As I have already pointed out the wealthiest and the poorest tended not to register their wealth. As Canbakal admits the disparity of wealth was probably much greater than the inventories would suggest, and “the financial strength of the military became even more conspicuous as one moved higher up in the scale of wealth”. As far as Kütahya is concerned, we could add the members of the bureaucracy to the members of the military.

With an inventory amounting to 24,945 guruş, Ali Yüzbaşı el-Hac Hüseyin Ağa was one of the wealthiest members of Kütahya for the period 1758–1828—the third wealthiest, if we judge by the inventories. He was appointed as the captain of the Sixth Company in 1802. The scarcity of court registers for the period between 1802 and 1828 makes it difficult to trace him as he accumulated wealth and power. But his military status made him one of the prominent figures in the city and he started to act as a witness in legal matters concerning other prominent figures and notables. His inventory shows that apart from a house in Kütahya, many household items, and a brace of pistols made in England, his main assets were located in rural areas. He had a large amount of wheat and barley in possession, as well as rugs and carpets from Kula and Uşak. He was also deeply involved in credit relations; he gave credit to ten different villages, and he owed 6,400 guruş to other creditors. The court records do not give any detailed information about the villages he established credit relations with, nor do they say where he may have bought land or other estates. Such information comes years later, in 1845, with the temettuat registers. The temettuat registers of Gönen show that the Yüzbaşıoğlu family was well established in Kütahya and in the surrounding districts. The registers do not permit us to reconstruct the genealogy of the Yüzbaşıoğlu family with certainty, but we know that el-Hac Hüseyin Ağa had at least four sons, and five grandsons. Their combined annual income was around 8,000 guruş—the highest amount in the neighborhood of Meydan. They owned a lot of lands in different districts of Kütahya, and also many orchards in Kütahya. The registers show that the profession

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116 (KCR-2/37)
118 (KCR-2/228 and 27 respectively)
119 Yavuz, "Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicilleri 15 Numaralı Defererin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi". (K15/7 and 7 respectively) I have always used the value of the inventory after the expenses were calculated.
121 Karacaogil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/54)
122 Ibid. (K6/151)
123 For his debts, (Dağ), "11 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (1819-1820m / 1234-1236)". (K11/121)
124 ML. VRD. TMT 8767
of one of the family members as gardener (bağçevan), and of another one as farmer (ziraatçı). In short, it seems that el-Hac Hüseyin Ağa had used his military status to enrich himself, and that he became localized by investing in land. While el-Hac Hüseyin Ağa was a member of the military, another wealthy resident of Kütahya, el-Hac Osman Ağa, was a member of the bureaucracy—of the finance department (defter kethüdası) to be more precise. With assets amounting to 23,644 gurüş, he was almost as wealthy as Hüseyin Ağa. It is impossible to trace el-Hac Osman’s family in the temettuat registers, but his inventory shows that he owned a farmstead in one of the districts of Kütahya. And of course along with the farmstead, he owned many animals—three hundred sheep and goats worth 3,500 gurüş—and a good deal of wheat and barley stored in storehouses. His inventory also included such rare items as mirrors, works of calligraphy, and a watch.

The wealthiest members of society belonged to the ruling class but they were not necessarily from the military or bureaucratic strata. They also included members of the religious institutions. Mufti Muhîyî Abdurrahman Efendi b. Feyzullah was one of these. His inventories compiled on two separate occasions (because many of his assets were not registered in the first inventory) show that his wealth amounted to 8,808 gurûş—the fourth highest for the period 1758–1788. Aside from his real estates (a house, a water mill, and a few shops), he also owned many household items, including such luxury items as expensive rugs and furs. But more importantly, Muhîyî Abdurrahman Efendi owned an Arab woman slave (worth 450 gurûş), and around 250 books (worth 2413 gurûş). Owning a slave was not very unusual in Kütahya but neither was it common, and it indicated of higher social status. Books were probably even rarer than slaves as they appear almost exclusively in the inventories of higher-ranking members of the learned class. As a rule, books were not very expensive (although they were more expensive than most of the household items, such as kitchen utensils); they were usually valued at between 2 and 10 gurûş. As such, they were sometimes part of modest inventories, but despite their relative low price, books represented cultural privilege and power.

The inventory with the highest assets belonged to a mufti. When Ruşenzâde es-Seyyid Ömer b. Ruşen died in 1828, he left behind an inheritance worth 57,000 gurûş (more than 71,000 gurûş before the expenses and his debts were deducted). A court record entry from 1803 shows that Ruşenzâde Seyyid Ömer Efendi was appointed as the administrator to the vakfs endowed by eş-şeyh el-Hac Ömer Efendi b. Mustafa. Ömer Efendi was a resident of Kütahya (in the Meydan neighborhood) and also a mufti—teaching in the medrese of Ali Paşa. It appears that Ömer Efendi was already a mufti when he was appointed as an administrator because

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125 (Dağ), "11 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'îyye Sicili (1819-1820m / 1234-1236)". (K11/204)
126 (KCR-4/20)
127 (KCR-1/23), Güngör, "1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'îyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği". (K2/65/344-345, 71/367, 370, 72/372)
128 (KCR-2/222), (KCR-5/291), (Dağ), "11 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'îyye Sicili (1819-1820m / 1234-1236)". (K1/94), (K11/150), (K11/214)
129 For instance, Ahmed Necip Efendi’s inventory was no more than 560 gurûş. Among his modest possession were forty books, each of which was around one or two gurûş. (KCR-2/222)
130 Yavuz, "Kütahya Şer'îye Sicilleri 15 Numaralı Defterinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi". (K15/7)
131 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'îye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/183)
another entry from 1803 indicates that his position as a mufti was renewed.\textsuperscript{132} Hence, Rusenizade’s appointment to the vakf of another mufti and the fact that he was a resident of Kütahya must have strengthened his privileged social standing within the community. The witnesses to the registration of the appointment were also of high social standing. Among the witnesses were Germiyanizade Mehmed Ağa b. El-Hac Ali Ağa, who was arguably the most important notable of the period; and the head-scribe of the court, Muhýi Tevfik Efendi, who was from one of the important families in Kütahya, a member of the learned class, and a professor (müderris) in the medrese of Timurtas Paşa. Ten years later, in 1810, Rusenizade Ömer Efendi would himself appear as a witness, this time with the title of professor only, without any reference to his being the mufti of Kütahya.\textsuperscript{133} But in the same year, after the departure of Feyzullah Efendi, he was appointed as the representative (kaim-makam) of nakibü’l-eşraf (chief of the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) for Kütahya, Bozöyük and İnönü, and was in charge of supervising those who claimed to be a seyyid.\textsuperscript{134} In 1823, Ömer Efendi was appointed as the mufti of Kütahya once again to replace another family member, Rusenizade es-Seyyid Abdurrahman Efendi—apparently due to misconduct in office of the latter.\textsuperscript{135}

It is reasonable to think that the Rusenizades’ monopoly on the office of mufti enabled them to accumulate a good deal of wealth. Even if their immediate goal was not to enrich themselves, their social standing as the privileged members of society provided them with enough opportunity to become wealthy and to hold on to that wealth. There is no record for Rusenizade es-seyyid Abdurrahman Efendi, but the inventory of Ömer Efendi is indicative of the wealth he accumulated. His house, which was worth 4,000 guruş was one of the most expensive in Kütahya, and probably looked more like a mansion than an ordinary house. Five shops he owned in different places were also worth around 4,000 guruş for all five. Ömer Efendi also owned at least two female slaves, one of whom was black. It can be surmised that the other female slave was either very young or a Caucasian with remarkable physical characteristics or both, because she was worth 1,750 guruş. This was a very high amount; as a rule of thumb, slaves, unless they were very young and physically very healthy and beautiful, were usually worth the price of an ordinary house\textsuperscript{136}—around 500 guruş in the case of Kütahya, maybe even less. Caucasian slaves were also more expensive than black slaves. Ömer Efendi’s other personal and household items were also impressive. He possessed a good deal of clothing including furs, along with some jewelry. He was a resident of Kütahya, but he seems to have had a taste for luxury items rather than cheap items manufactured locally because even his coffee cups were from Belgium. Even more remarkable were Ömer Efendi’s credit relations. His list of nearly 130 debtors is the most extensive recorded in the Kütahya court registers and suggests that he was a

\textsuperscript{132} However, the record only mentions Ömer Efendi without any reference to the family Rusenizade. I therefore assume that this Ömer Efendi was the same as Rusenizade Seyyid Ömer Efendi. Ibid. (K6/165) Another entry from 1823 confirms that Rusenizade was a mufti, Erol, “13 Numaralı Kütahya Şeriyye Sicili Transkribe Ve Değerlendirmesi”. (K13/20)

\textsuperscript{133} Bozkurt, “Kütahya Şeriyye Sicilleri 8 Numaralı Defterinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi”. (K8/59)

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid. (K8/68) There is no specific reference to the office of nakibü’l-eşraf in this entry but it is clear that the office of kaim-makam was for the nakibü’l-eşraf.

\textsuperscript{135} Erol, “13 Numaralı Kütahya Şeriyye Sicili Transkribe Ve Değerlendirmesi”. (K13/20) The entry says “su-i hal,” which is not exactly misconduct in office but I rendered the translation as misconduct of office because misconduct is too ambiguous.

moneylender as well as the mufti of Kütahya, and a medrese professor. There is, unfortunately, no detailed information on how much interest he charged, how he extended his credit relations, or how he collected his debts, but the list of debtors shows that people from all walks of life borrowed money from Ömer Efendi in amounts ranging from 9 guruş to nearly 9,000 guruş. A certain Mesut Hasan Efendi borrowed 8,992 guruş, and the record lists at least five others who borrowed more than 1,000 guruş each. Ömer Efendi’s own debts amounted to 12,000 guruş.

Ruşenzâdes seem to have retained their wealth (or at least part of it) and privileged social standing well into the first half of the nineteenth century. Ruşenzâde Abdurrahman Efendi, who was dismissed in 1823, was reappointed as the mufti of Kütahya in 1841. Ruşenzâdes continued to hold on to another important office, that of the representative of nakibül’l-şerâf, for the same period. An entry from the Kütahya court registers shows that another family member, es-Seyyid Mehmed Ruşen Efendi, was dismissed from his position as the representative of nakibül’l-şerâf—again due to misconduct—and was banished (nefû u ıclâ) to Gelibolu for a year. I have not specifically traced what happened to Mehmed Ruşen Efendi, but the temettuat registers of 1845 show that Mehmed Ruşen Efendi’s son Ahmed Sadık resided in the Cedid neighborhood and that he was the wealthiest member of the neighborhood with a total of yearly income of 5,486.5 guruş. Among his properties were nineteen shops, which brought in a total of 1,275 guruş annually as rent. Ahmed Sadık also owned orchards and pieces of land around the city and in some of the districts. The record also shows him registered as ashab-ı ulufe—that is to say, he was receiving salary from the state (ashab-ı ulufe) was subject to special taxation (virgü-yi mahsusadan).

Ruşenzâdes were among the wealthiest residents of Kütahya for the period 1758 – 1828 but the path they followed to accumulate wealth and attain power was not atypical. The claim to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad played a significant role in this path. Canbakal has drawn attention to the process of “seyyidization” in her study of ‘Ayntab in the seventeenth century. She points out that scholars have studied the increase in the claims of being a seyyid for the Arab lands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and have shown that in a city such as Damascus, for example, the number of sădât doubled during the first half of the eighteenth century. She shows that similar developments took place in Anatolia and Eastern Balkans starting even earlier. According to Canbakal, claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad was one of the ways to gain political privilege in the second part of the seventeenth century—along with receiving revenue grants and joining military corps. Privilege in turn meant exemption from taxation, access to different revenue sources, and participation in a network of power relations. It is not surprising then, that more and more people began claiming to be seyyid. For instance, in the case of ‘Ayntab, there are no sădât listed in the land register of 1542; be the end of the seventeenth century, the sădât made up 11 percent of population. So many people claimed to be sădât, in fact, that the claim elicited criticism both from the state and from society a whole. In 1659 two surveys were conducted to investigate the false claims and to identify the

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137 Serkan Karaca, "Kütahya Şer'iye Sicilleri 22 Numarali Defterinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi" (Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 2007). (K22/25)
138 Ibid. (K22/67)
139 TMT 8751
140 Canbakal, Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town, ‘Ayntab in the 17th Century. p. 77
141 Ibid. p. 80
true descendants of the Prophet Muhammad in certain provinces. Other surveys were conducted by the state throughout the seventeenth century but the number of sadāt continued to increase. According to the list compiled by Canbakal using these registers, Kütahya does not appear to have been one of the towns with a high number of claimants (Canbakal included in her list those districts with more than one hundred claimants, and Kütahya is not in the list). The central authority—that is to say, the office of nakibü’l-eşraf—ceased conducting the surveys in the eighteenth century but it seems that the number of the sadāt continued to increase in Kütahya throughout the eighteenth century.

As for Kütahya, while only ten sadāt were recorded in the land register of 1534, there were frequent references to the sadāt in the court records for the period between 1758 and 1828. Of course, it may be misleading to conclude that the number of the sadāt increased significantly in Kütahya solely on the basis of these frequent references. It is probable that the sadāt, due to their higher social status, were more visible in the court records—whether as litigants or as witnesses. However, there is another way to support the claim that being a seyyid (true or false) became more important throughout the eighteenth century, and that is to look at the relationship between the social, political, and economic privilege status that came with the title of seyyid, and wealth. This relationship is more easily identifiable in the court records. As Canbakal observes with reference to ‘Aynab, “seyyidization was the channel of [upward economic] mobility preferred and controlled by the local elite, particularly as it crystallized in the eighteenth century.” In Kütahya too, sadāt were among the most affluent members of society throughout the eighteenth century. For the period 1758–1828, the total assets of the sadāt amounted to 104,098 gurūs, or 25 percent of the combined total assets of the top twenty estates (418,141 gurūs). Their shares of the wealth (according to the wealth recorded in the inventories) increased from 25 percent (19,476 out of 80,729) for the period 1758-1788 to 30 percent (84,622 out of 337,412) for the period 1802–28. This data does not include the inventory of Şerife Aişe, whose registered assets were more than 12,000 gurūs in 1810—one of the highest amounts for both periods. Şerife Aişe was the daughter of es-Seyyid Ubeydullah Efendi, and if we relate her wealth to a seyyid family, the place occupied by the sadāt in the higher tiers of wealth is even more apparent. Not only do the inventories show the assets of the sadāt, but they also show that the sadāt were part of a widespread network of credit relations. The amounts involved in these credit relations were sometimes significantly higher than average. For instance,
Germiyanzâde el-Hac Ali Ağa b. el-Hac Yusuf Ağa’s debts, which were around 5,000 guruş (almost one-tenth of his assets) were borrowed from two sâdât, who lent him (3,995 and 1,001 guruş respectively). With close to 15,000 in his estate, Seyyid el-Hac Ali Ağa b. Seyyid el-Hac Ahmed Ağa was also one of the wealthiest of Kütahya in the end of the eighteenth century. His credit relations show that—like many other members of his society—he too lent and borrowed money. Among the fifty people registered in his list of debtors, there were eleven sâdât and their debts ranged from such small amounts as little as 5 guruş to as much as 1,000 guruş. Ruşenzâde es-seyyid Ömer Efendi’s extensive credit list shows that among the 130 debtors, there were 23 sâdât, and that some of them borrowed remarkably high amounts (for instance, three sâdât borrowed 2,800, 1,200, and 1,225 guruş respectively and three others borrowed more than 500 guruş each). Other entries demonstrate that these high credit relations were not necessarily limited to the wealthiest or the most prominent people. With assets of around 3,200 guruş in 1802, Karakullukçu İbrahim b. Abdî was a well-to-do resident of Kütahya, but nothing in his inventory indicates that he was one of the notables, or the wealthiest member of his society. Nevertheless, almost half of his assets—1,500 guruş—was registered as credit that he gave to Seyyid Mahmud. Likewise, when El-Hac Hasan Ağa from the Ahı Erbasan neighborhood died, his probate inventory, dated 1828 showed, that he had left close to 10,000 guruş to his family, 4,963 of which was registered as credit to seyyid Ateş Ağa. Beside the high amount of credit involved, these two examples also indicate that the creditors trusted the sâdât enough to risk half of their assets. Respectability, trustworthiness, and accountability were crucial factors in calculating the risks of extending a credit—especially, in cases such as these.

A closer look at other factors such as the distribution of administrative duties also reveals the extent to which the sâdât were involved in power relations at every level. From the governor and the deputy governor of the province of Anatolia to the senior officer of the Sixth Company, and the senior officer of the Kütahya fortress, a whole of range of administrative positions were occupied by those who held the title seyyid. Furthermore, the sâdât appear very frequently among the witnesses in cases concerning the vakfs (especially the vakfs of the prominent figures), administrative regulations, and taxation. Scholars of Islamic law and Ottoman history have examined the importance role played by witnesses for the legal process, and have pointed out that even though more research is needed, being a witness seems to have indicated a position of some distinction in society.

149 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/50)
150 Ibid. (K6/144)
151 Yavuz, "Kütahya Şer'iye Sicilleri 15 Numaralı Defterinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi". (K15/7)
152 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/135)
153 Yavuz, "Kütahya Şer'iye Sicilleri 15 Numaralı Defterinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi". (K15/11)
154 (KCR3/103, 107)
155 (KCR3/158, 165, 216, 266)
156 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/53)
157 See for instance, (KCR/258, 283), (KCR/5, 133), ibid. (K6/110, 157)
158 (KCR-3/205), (KCR-5/205, 235), Erol, "13 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'îyye Sicili Transkribe Ve Değerlendirmesi". (K-13/10, 38)
159 For an overview of the literature on the witnesses, see Canbakal, Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town, 'Aytab in the 17th Century, Chapter 4, and Boğaç Ergene, Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the Ottoman Empire: Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu (1652-1744) (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2003).
The prominence of the sâdât in Kütahya in the eighteenth century is in some ways similar to their prominence in other areas, and these similarities indicate that to study the sâdât in Kütahya we must situate them within a larger historical context. While privilege was intrinsic to the political, social, economic and legal constitution of early-modern societies, and it was the norm for those seeking upward social mobility to acquire privilege, we must take specific historical conjunctures into account in order to explain the increase in the number of the sâdât. When wars increased the pressure on the state to tax the population more heavily, and the cash requirements of the state (and hence of taxpaying population) further monetized the economy, only those with privilege could avoid the taxes, and could find credit if need be. To some extent, then, the increase in claims to being a seyyid throughout the eighteenth century was a response to these specific circumstances. Furthermore, Canbakal suggests that these claims took place within a more specific political and cultural context. “It is important,” she writes, “to note with regard to the sâdât in particular that there was probably a connection between their political and demographic ascendance in the provinces on the one hand and the promotion of the cult of the Prophet in the capital and the simultaneous liberalization of the state’s surveillance politics over the sâdât on the other, which paralleled the consolidation of center-periphery relations in other ways.”

160 In the sociopolitical context of the late eighteenth century, claims to sâdâthip seem to have taken precedence even over the political claims of the old dynasties. It is significant in this respect to see even the members of the Germiyans claiming sâdâthip. The Germiyans survived many centuries of Ottoman rule, and the central authority always acknowledged their political, economic, and social privileges with reference to their dynastic past. Keeping a low profile as local notables seems to have enabled the members of the Germiyans to survive and to maintain their local prominence. Until the late eighteenth century, the members of the Germiyan family were referred to variously as “prominent members of their regions” (vücuh-ı belde), as “old dynasts of Kütahya” (hanedân-ı kadîm), 161 or simply as local notables (âyân) and “âgas” by the central authority. Until the late eighteenth century, the title seyyid had never been used with reference to any member of the Germiyan family, but after the second half of the eighteenth century, documents started referring to Germiyanzâde Hacı Mustafa Ağa, who died in or around 1801, 162 and his son Mehmet, with that title. Whether Hacı Mustafa Ağa and Mehmet had made a seyyidship claim as part of a conscious strategy to gain further political and economic prominence in their region—and more importantly, in the eyes of the central authority—is difficult to determine with certainty. In order to make better sense of such claims, it is necessary to situate the Germiyans within the socioeconomic context of the late eighteenth century in general, and within the context of the politics of the notables in particular.

POLITICS OF THE NOTABLES: THE EXAMPLE OF THE GERMIYANZÂDES

In the first two chapters, I discussed the role of the Germiyan principality in the sociopolitical history of Kütahya in pre-Ottoman times. The dearth of primary sources makes it nearly impossible to reconstruct the history the Germiyan dynasty from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century, nor is it my purpose to do so here; but it is appropriate to turn briefly to the Germiyans to wrap up my discussion of Kütahya in the closing years of the eighteenth century. To do so will

160 Canbakal, Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town, ‘Ayntab in the 17th Century. p. 89
161 (KCR-4/200), HAT 31145
162 Cevdet Maliye, 2244
allow us to evaluate my previous general historiographical remarks on the rise of the local notables in a more concrete context.

Recent works on the emergence of the local notables have included a number of specific case studies, and these have provided new empirical data. Although this increase in empirical data has not yet produced a consensus on the different classifications of the local notables, it allows historians to work within a better grounded comparative framework (for the general historical context of the eighteenth century that gave rise to the local notables, and the recent approaches to their rise in Ottoman historiography, see the appendix). Quataert suggests that the local notables can be classified in three distinct groups, each representing a different sociopolitical context. In the first group, there are those notables who started out as officials who were appointed by the central authority. As they gradually became localized, they used their privileges to retain their power and rose to local prominence. The historical context for this group of notables is that of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries because the number of centrally appointed officials decreased significantly after the late seventeenth century. The second group of notables existed only in the Arab provinces. They were the descendants of the slave soldiers, the Mamluks of the medieval period. They rose to prominence gradually after the seventeenth century. The third group were the families whose roots go back to pre-Ottoman times. They were either members of the local elites or the rulers of their regions like the Germiyans. Quataert suggests that “historians likely have underestimated the retention of local political power by such pre-Ottoman elite groups, and more of these families played an important role in the Ottoman period than has been credited. In another pattern, existing elite groups who originally were stripped of power gradually re-acquired political control and recognition by the state.” Not only were the Germiyans among the local rulers who retained their power—albeit in a much-diminished form—but they were also among the less visible notables in the eighteenth century. Studying these less visible provincial elite rather than the powerful magnates can give us a better historical perspective on the reasons why despite the emergence of the local notables in the eighteenth century (see the appendix), the central authority was able to reassert its power so effectively in the nineteenth century.

164 Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922. p. 47
165 Ibid.
The history of the Germiyanzâdes in the late eighteenth century resembles the history of many other local notables. They seem to have used the opportunities provided by the administrative practices of the eighteenth century to turn their economic and social prominence into political power. They used the wealth they had accumulated to extend and retain their patronage ties, and credit relations were one of the major means of doing so. Continuous wars after the second half of the eighteenth century, especially the Ottoman-Russian War of 1787-92, and the state’s need to finance these wars, to levy troops, to provide the army with logistics, and to feed the capital constituted the major windows of opportunity for the Germiyanzâdes to use their local power. But the state’s needs also showed the limits of the Germiyanzâdes’ power and prepared the ground for the central authority to reassert its own power. The Germiyanzâdes, like other notables, were not without rivals in their region. They competed with other minor notables, and this competition too, contributed to their downfall.

But in some respects, the Germiyanzâdes were different from other notables, and even the similarities must to be qualified. The Germiyanzâdes did not really emerge, like most of the notables around them. It would be more correct to say that they re-emerged. Their roots, unlike those of the Karaosmanzâdes of western Anatolia, the Çapanoğlu of central Anatolia, or the Caniklizâdes of northeastern Anatolia, went back to pre-Ottoman rule. While these notables rose to power very rapidly, and quickly accumulated significant wealth and power, and even gathered enough strength to mount an open challenge to the central authority, the Germiyanzâdes re-emerged slowly and disappeared slowly. They never accumulated as much wealth as these major notables, nor was their fall as drastic. The credit relations they formed were not even on a par with those of some of the smaller notables from the Bursa region, who had accumulated their wealth through agriculture and trade, and who used credit relations to make even more money. It is now a well-established fact that acquiring the malikânės of their regions was one of the major ways through which the local notables rose to power. It seems that the Germiyanzâdes never succeeded in acquiring these revenue sources in their regions, which significantly limited their political power. Furthermore, because there was significant competition both within their own region, and from the major notables who surrounded them, the Germiyanzâdes were never able to extend their power geographically, either. While some of these major notables—the Karaosmanzâdes for instance—used their wealth to fund new vakfs, to invest in the infrastructure of their regions, the Germiyanzâdes never enriched themselves sufficiently to have an impact on the socioeconomic context of their regions.

Administrative practices in the sancak of Kütahya—as in many other sancaks of Anatolia—changed over the course of the eighteenth century. However—as in many other sancaks—it was not a substantial change, in that different revenues continued to be granted to the provincial governors and the kadıs of Kütahya as arpalık. What differed from previous practices was that arpalık actually represented the absentee rulers and kadıs. Arpalık holders, whether they were provincial governors or kadıs, frequently appointed their own deputies, who were in fact subcontractors—mütesellims for the provincial governors, and naibs for the kadıs. It was this practice of subcontracting that provided a window of opportunity for the local notables to acquire state offices, integrate themselves into the state hierarchy, and claim political power.

167 Yücel Özkaya, 18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Toplumu (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2010). p. 190
İnalcık sees the practice of arpalık as arguably the most important factor that contributed to the rise of the notables; “governors and beys either chose to appoint or were forced to select their deputies from among the local ayan. These ayan-mütesellims gradually became more powerful than the sancakbeysis themselves. While the former often changed, the latter remained in place strengthening their positions by such means as obtaining as tax farms the state mukataa (lease) revenues of sancaks.” One of the main reasons for subcontracting, especially for provincial governors, was that they were constantly short of revenue. Even though arpalık was just one of the sources of revenue for provincial governors—their income included the revenues accruing from a myriad of sources that belonged to the state treasury (beytü'l-mal), such as the estates of those who died without heirs—they were obliged to spend more than they took in, and they opted to subcontract their revenues usually for short periods of time. As Canbakal states, “inevitably, the governor’s domain turned into a resource pool that circulated (and circulated fast) between numerous claimants through subcontracts.” It was the office of the mütesellim that would constantly change hands between the Germiyanzâdes, Abbas Ağa and his family, and the Nasuhzâdes in Kütahya at the end of the eighteenth century.

But at the end of the seventeenth century—more precisely in the court records of 1699—Germiyanzâde Mehmed Ağa did not hold any office. As one of the witnesses to a case concerning the vakf of Yıldırım Bayezid, Mehmed Ağa was referred by his family name alone. When he was summoned to the presence of the provincial governor, he was referred to simply as a resident of Kütahya (Kütahya sakinlerinden). But when, later on, he was summoned to Istanbul, his prominence was more clearly acknowledged (kdvetü'l-emasil ve'l-akran). It appears that he was not summoned to the presence of the governor, and later to the capital, in order to grant him an official title. Mehmed Ağa, held as iltizam the zeamet of a certain Mustafa (who was probably a high-ranking military officer residing in Istanbul) for 6,600 guruş, but he failed to pay part of his dues to Mustafa. Even though he was ordered to pay his dues on two separate occasions, Mehmed Ağa ignored these orders upon which he was summoned to the capital.

The more than fifty years’ gap between the first two court registers makes it impossible to follow what happened to the Germiyanzâde family during the crucial period between 1700 and 1760. As far as we can tell from the primary sources of the period 1760–1830, the Germiyanzâdes did not hold any other significant iltizams, nor could they invest in lucrative malikânes in their regions. Some important revenue sources, such as the revenues of the alum mines of Gedüs, were in the hands of the princesses. Şah Sultan, the daughter of Mustafa III held this malikâne at least until 1796, and she seems to have administered it through her agents rather than subcontracting it to the Germiyanzâdes, or to the other notables. The Germiyanzâdes’

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169 “Kütahya’da vâki’ olan beytü’l-mal Anadolu valilerinin irâd-ı muayyesinden olmağa …” (KCR-2/164)
170 Canbakal, Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town, ‘Ayntab in the 17th Century. p. 52
171 Güngör, “1 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili (2. Bölüm) Transkripsiyonu Ve Kritiği”. (K2/82/424)
172 Ibid. (K2/113/570)
173 For a document from 1775 Cevdet Adliye 6127 The document is about Kasapoğlu whose banditry around Gedüs made the administration of the mines very difficult. See also, Suraiya Faroqhi, “Alum Production and Alum Trade in the Ottoman Empire (About 1560 - 1830),” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 71(1979). p. 156 - 157
inability to acquire malikânes put them in a different league from the other local notables, especially the more powerful ones such as the Karaosmanzâdes, the Caniklizâdes, and the Çapanoğlus with other smaller and less powerful âyâns. Rather, they were on a par with the smaller and less powerful âyâns.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the first prominent member of the Germiyanzâdes was Hacı Yusuf Ağa. Throughout the 1760s and 1770s, Hacı Yusuf Ağa appears in the court records as one of the local notables of Kütahya. He was among the witnesses to what may be considered high-profile vakf cases as well as to cases concerning the administrative matters. An important development that took place in the eighteenth century was that the state started keeping the registers of expenditure and allocation (tevzi defterleri). From the general expenditures at the provincial level to the more specific expenditures to repair the menzils at the local level, these registers were crucial in calculating the burden of taxation and in allocating taxes at the local level. While the exact nature of the procedure of the allocation of the taxes is not entirely clear, it is highly likely that it involved a good deal of bargaining between the central authority and the leaders of the local communities. Thus it was a matter of political power to be one of those with whom the central authority bargained, and to whom the final order was addressed.

The first few years of the 1780s were a turning point of sorts for Germiyanzâde el-Hac Yusuf Ağa and his family. Not only did he continue to hold a prominent place in Kütahya, but he was appointed a mütesellim in 1781. He and his son İbrahim also became witnesses in high-profile legal cases in the 1780s. But Germiyanzâde Yusuf Ağa was also subject to investigation for his role as the trustee of the vakf of Germiyanzâde Yakub Çelebi. According to the petition of the administrator of the vakf of Mecca and Medina, the scribe of the vakf, el-Hac Mehmed Emin b. Mehmed Yusuf Ağa argued that Yusuf Ağa was mismanaging the funds of the vakf, and was preventing him and others from keeping an accurate record of expenditures and income. The surplus that accrued from the Yakub Çelebi vakf did not belong to the trustee (who was supposed to be from the Germiyanzâde family) but belonged to the vakfs of Mecca and Medina (vakf-ı mezbûr fazlasi evlâd-ı mütevelliye meşrûta olmayub). By keeping false records of the vakf accounts, Yusuf Ağa was channeling part of the revenues to himself. The plaintiff argued that Yusuf Ağa should be dismissed and a representative of the vakf of the Mecca and Medina (kaim-makam) should be appointed by the central authority. The petition urged the central authority to conduct a reassessment of all the accounts of the Germiyanzâde Yakub Çelebi vakf. Furthermore, Yusuf Ağa was described as a usurper (mütegallibe), and the petition also demanded that he be prevented from oppressing the vakf employees.

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174 Even though there are significant differences in terms of their origins, and family history, the Germiyanzâdes in the eighteenth century is more comparable to the Battalzâde of Ayntab. And even the Battalzâdes were able to hold some malikânes, Çınar, “18. Yüzyılda Ayıntab’da Bir Yerel Güçün Yükselesi Ve Düşüşü: Battalzâdelere.”

175 (KCR-3/22, (the entry that follows the entry number 113 is not numbered) , 155, (the entry that follows the entry number 165 is not numbered) , 205, 258, 283). However, vakf cases and administrative matters do not constitute an exclusive category for the Germiyanzâdes to appear as witnesses. In other litigations concerning inheritance (KCR-3/278), rape (KCR-2/1), or reparation for physical damage (KCR-3/257), el-Hac Yusuf Ağa also appeared as a witness.

176 (KCR-4/page 3, the entry is not numbered , 27, 32, 190, 192, 194)

177 (KCR-4/94, 184 – 185)
There is no doubt that the vakf of Yakub Çelebi played the biggest role in the survival of the Germiyanzâde family for centuries. To write a socioeconomic history that revolved around this institution from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century would be a fascinating project in its own right. Such a history would shed light on a variety of topics such as the politics of devolution of the trusteeship within the Germiyanzâde family; the strategies of management of the vakf through hard times; and the role played by the vakf institutions in the relation between the center and the provinces. The lack of primary sources for the crucial period between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries makes such an undertaking impossible, but it is reasonable to think that even if it did not enrich the Germiyanzâdes, the vakf of Yakub Çelebi did supply them with much needed cash for centuries, and that it was the nexus of their social and political network. We can only wonder whether there were similar accusations of embezzlement of vakf funds in earlier; but it is also reasonable to think that Yusuf Ağa was emboldened to claim more than his due by the conditions of the late eighteenth century that gave more autonomy to the local notables, and that he did so to strengthen his economic power. And as it turned out his assessment of the situation was not inaccurate because not only do the accusations seem to have gone unnoticed, but Yusuf Ağa was appointed mütesellim of Kütahya in 1781. It is interesting that in his appointment certificate (berât) el-Hac Yusuf was referred to as descending from the “old dynasty of Kütahya” (hanedân-ı kadîm).

While it can be argued that the central authority’s acknowledgement of the dynastic claims of the Germiyanzâdes was only a matter of formulaic expression appropriate for the appointment certificate, it is at the same time interesting to see how quickly a usurper, a simple resident, could become the old dynast. No matter how weak the Germiyanzâdes may have been vis-à-vis the Ottoman central authority, there is no doubt that the knowledge of their local dynastic claims was preserved intact by that same authority. Even though dynastic claims were part of the transformation of the eighteenth century, and even though the central authority allowed such claims to legitimize the rule of the new local notables retrospectively, this was not an “invented tradition” in the case of the Germiyanzâdes, brought up to the surface at the end of the eighteenth century. The Germiyanzâdes made sure that they were visible to the sultan even when they did not hold any office. For instance, a list of items sent from Kütahya to Ahmet III when he acceded to the throne in 1718 shows that the Germiyanzâdes sent some gifts; they were listed as the only local notables of Kütahya and were referred to as dynasts on this occasion too.

During the period between 1781 and about 1820, the Germiyanzâdes—again much like other local notables—tried to gain a monopoly on the office of deputy governor. By 1788, El-Hac Yusuf Ağa’s son Ali Ağa had become the mütesellim of Kütahya. But this was not an uninterrupted succession; the administrative cadres changed frequently during this period and the Germiyanzâdes were not without competitors. The orders sent to the mütesellim of Kütahya between 1783 and 1786 were addressed to Abbas Ağa, who had been the mütesellim of Kütahya as early as 1765. In another document, dated 1775 and addressed to the governor of

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178 (KCR-4/199 – 200)
179 Cevdet Dadaş and Atilla Batur, Osmanlı Arşivi Belgelerinde Kütahya I, vol. 1 (Kütahya: Kütahya Belediyesi, Kütahya Kültür ve Tarihini Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 1999). See Müteferrik, (File no. 21)
180 Cevdet Dahiliye 7340
181 Cevdet Zaptiye 3519, Cevdet Maliye 27165, Anadolu Ahkam (85/484)
182 Cevdet Zaptiye 2477
the province, Abdi Paşa and to the kadi of Kütahya, Abbas Ağa was described as the previous mütesellim and was accused of unlawfully killing—probably while he was the mütesellim—Emir Hacı Mustafa under the pretext that he was a rebel mercenary, and of appropriating his property worth more than 15,000 guruş. Abdi Paşa and other high-ranking officials in Kütahya were ordered first to look into the matter carefully and to establish with certainty the truth of the charges. It is further stated in the order that Abbas Ağa would be pardoned for his misdemeanor on the condition that he return whatever he had unlawfully appropriated. What saved Abdi Ağa was probably the wartime conditions that obliged the state to depend on the help of the provincial governors and their deputies. Hard pressed to levy taxes, gather troops, and provision them with arms, food, and materiel, the state could not afford to eliminate a crucial intermediary. Furthermore, relations of patronage at every level played an important role in the preservation of the financial and political networks.

In the case of Abbas Ağa, his relations with Abdi Paşa, the governor of the province of Anatolia, were probably decisive because it was during Abdi Paşa’s tenure in Kütahya that Abbas Ağa was appointed mütesellim once more; and after the death of Abdi Paşa, he was involved in the confiscation of Abdi Paşa’s estate. Abbas Ağa seems to have been Abdi Paşa’s favorite deputy during his tenures as the governor of the province of Anatolia (Abdi Paşa held this office at least twice). When he was appointed to the governorship once again in 1781, Germiyanzâde Yusuf Ağa was the mütesellim and he was ordered to repair the governor’s mansion before Abdi Paşa arrived in Kütahya. But thereafter Abbas Ağa held the office. It should be noted that during his tenure, Abdi Paşa, perhaps more than other governors who either held the governorship in absentia or were in Kütahya only for a short time, invested in Kütahya and bought property. This economic investment must have played a role in strengthening the patronage ties between Abdi Paşa and Abbas Ağa. A good deal of information about Abdi Paşa’s investments and relations in Kütahya comes from the various reports that were written during the confiscation of his property. Confiscation of the property of high-ranking officials—especially of the property of provincial governors by the state—was not an unusual practice, but swift orders of confiscation and thorough investigation of every single detail pertinent to the wealth of a high-ranking official became more common after the second part of the eighteenth century. Obviously, confiscation was a way to acquire quick cash during a period of financial crisis. But more importantly, it was also a mean of preventing the accumulation of wealth by the family of the deceased and their entourage, and thus a means of controlling the rise of centrifugal political formations.

The confiscation of Abdi Paşa’s wealth was very carefully carried out. But after the initial investigations were completed and his inventory was prepared, the authorities in the capital, and probably the sultan himself, were not satisfied with the result. In an order addressed

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183 Cevdet Dahiliye 9995
184 (KCR-4/203)
185 Hatt-ı Hümayun 6471, 9453, 9724, 9752, 10114, 11233, 11519, 11555, 16102, 11625, 11609, 56436, Cevdet Maliye 4964, 23728
to the interim governor, it was stated that the official in charge of preparing the inventory was corrupt, and that he had hidden a good deal of property that belonged to the paşa, including two valuable rings (one set with diamonds, and one set with rubies). Furthermore, it was stated that Abbas Ağa was involved in this corruption. The order clearly stated that if another official carrying an imperial rescript had not been sent, none of this corruption would have been discovered. While the orders sent from Istanbul to Kütahya do not give exact dates, Abbas Ağa was dismissed during the period following Abdi Paşa’s death on the grounds that he was creating factionalism among the residents of Kütahya. But it also appears that Abbas Ağa was cooperating with the central authority by giving them insider information on Abdi Paşa wealth. In any case, only part of Abbas Ağa’s wealth was invested in Kütahya.

Most of his confiscated property was used for the army—half of it went to the finance the crew of the imperial fleet, and half went to buy arms for the arsenal. In the meanwhile, Abdi Paşa’s valuable personal belongings, such as jewelry and clothing were sent to the sultan and to his harem, and at least half of the jewelry was kept for the royal family. However, Abdi Paşa’s heirs petitioned the central authority to be given at least a modest part of his wealth. In response to this request, part of Abdi Paşa’s property in Kütahya was sold and 1,500 güruş was granted to one of his heirs, Şerife Emine. After Abdi Paşa’s valuables were sent separately to Istanbul, and the property that was found on his farms, such as the animals, was recorded, the officials suggested that his farms could be left (probably temporarily) to the management of Abdi Paşa’s steward. Abdi Paşa’s farms were in three different villages in the district of Etraşçhehir, and a quick glance at the inventory of the property found only in his residence reveals how great was the divide between a high-ranking official and the local notables of Kütahya. The inventory does not give the values in gürüş; it gives only the number of each item, but Abdi Paşa had in cash at least ten thousand different gold coins. Moreover, the number of his kitchen items alone—523—easily makes Abdi Paşa, among the wealthiest residents of Kütahya. The value of the property found in his residence and in his farms, excluding some items such as clothing, was finally calculated as 95,582 gürüş.

When Abdi Paşa died in or around 1788, the new governor, Hacı Abdullah Paşa, appointed Germiyanzâde Yusuf Ağa’s son, Ali Ağa, as mütesellim, but Ali Ağa’s tenure proved to be a short one, and also showed the limits of the Germiyanzâdes’ powers during wartime. Right after he was appointed mütesellim, Ali Ağa was asked to participate in the military expedition against the voyvoda of Wallachia, and was given 17,525 gürüş for his expenses. However, Ali Ağa deserted the expedition without returning the money. When the official in charge of collecting the 17,525 güruş from Ali Ağa by confiscating some of his property, Ali

87 Hatt-ı Hümayun 9453
88 Hatt-ı Hümayun 9752
89 Hatt-ı Hümayun 11233 The information was on Abdi Paşa’s steward of his harem. Abbas Ağa informed the authorities in Istanbul that if anyone knows whether anything was hidden from the inspectors, that would be Abdi Paşa’s steward.
90 Hatt-ı Hümayun 11555
91 Hatt-ı Hümayun 11519, 11609
92 Hatt-ı Hümayun 11555
93 Hatt-ı Hümayun 11609
94 Hatt-ı Hümayun 11625
95 Cevdet Maliye 23728
Ağa was nowhere to be found, and his property had already been appropriated by member of his family. The order was to confiscate his property and to execute him for his betrayal. It appears that when Germiyanzâde Ali Ağa disappeared from the scene, Abbas Ağa was once more appointed the mütesellim of Kütahya, and the Germiyanzâdes were sent to Wallachia, but this time under the supervision of an official specifically in charge of taking them to the front. Abbas Ağa remained in office for only a short time, and Germiyanzâde Süleyman Ağa was appointed mütesellim in 1791. In a letter signed by the prominent residents of Kütahya and addressed to the sultan, Süleyman Ağa (together with his family) was acknowledged as having been the old dynast and the mütesellim of Kütahya (on different occasions) for the last thirty years. It also appears from the letter that a certain Hacı Molla, was the mütesellim right before Süleyman Ağa, which means that Abbas Ağa’s tenure was really short. However, the office of mütesellim changed hands so frequently that it is almost impossible to reconstruct the correct chronological order. For instance, in a report sent to the sultan (more correctly the imperial council) in 1791, it was stated that the people of Kütahya were complaining about their current mütesellim Mehmed Ağa and were asking to have Abbas Ağa appointed mütesellim again. The same report also shows the extent to which the war strained the financial and military capacity of the Ottoman state because the main consideration in the appointment of Abbas Ağa was the fact that he had borrowed 40,000 guruş from the yamaks in Hotin when he was serving there as the collector of nüzül taxes, and that he had used the money to pay the soldiers. The report suggested that if Abbas Ağa was appointed the mütesellim of Kütahya, he would have to use the funds of the province of Anatolia to pay back his debts. However, under the dire financial circumstances, it was difficult to transfer funds, and Abbas Ağa’s appointment could make things even more complicated for the central authority. We don’t know what the imperial council’s final decision was but Abbas Ağa left the scene for good in 1792. He was executed, and as in the case of other high-ranking officials, his property was subject to confiscation, down to the last animal he owned. Even his retinue’s property, mostly the horses they owned, was confiscated by the state. Furthermore, the state officials also tried to collect the debts owed to Abbas Ağa. The report on the collections of these debts does not say exactly how much he was owed, but a thorough investigation of the temessûks was ordered in order to find out as much as possible. If the debtors died without paying their debts, the orders specified that their property was to be confiscated for the state.

During the period between 1790 and 1810, there was an intricate balance of power in and around Kütahya between the central authority and the local notables on the one hand, and among the local notables on the other. The central authority was trying to control the rise of the local notables by either co-opting them with appointments, or confiscating their property whenever it could. Minor local notables around Kütahya, such as Hacı Himmetoğlu of Bilecik, Tiryakioğlu

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196 Hatt-ı Hümayun 55212
197 Hatt-ı Hümayun 55988
198 Hatt-ı Hümayun 56065
199 Hatt-ı Hümayun 1973
200 (Is this apprentice? It is not clearly explained what the term refers to. This could be related to the apprentices working in the guilds?)
201 Cevdet Maliye 3418, 2034, Cevdet Adliye 3637
202 Cevdet Maliye 18095
203 Cevdet Maliye 6941
204 Cevdet Maliye 4371
Ömer of Eskişehir,\textsuperscript{205} or Çiracıoğlu Mustafa, the voevoda of Mihaliç,\textsuperscript{206} had developed similar relations with the central authority and had had part of their wealth confiscated in the early 1790s. In most cases, after the fall of a local notable, there ensued a period of negotiation. First, the state went ahead with the confiscation very rapidly, sending orders and officials to the region. However, in most cases part of the wealth of the local notables was returned to the family members. The central authority took a step back, probably so as not to completely alienate a powerful local notables. For instance, the relationship of Tiryakioğlu Ömer, the local notable of Eskişehir, with the central authority during the 1780s and 1790s is almost exactly the same as the central authority’s relationship with the Germiyanzâdes (except, of course, that they were not a long-established dynastic family). He was given 17,525 guruş to raise troops for the war efforts at the Balkan front in the late 1790s, and he too deserted without paying the money back. It is likely that he was executed even before the official in charge of collecting the 17,525 guruş went to Eskişehir, and when his property was confiscated, his wife petitioned the central authority to be allowed to keep part of his wealth. We do not know what the outcome was, but the report on the procedure of confiscation indicates that Tiryakioğlu’s whole wealth amounted to the half of the 17,525 guruş he owed the state. However, this intricate balance of power was not confined to the late eighteenth century—at least for the province of Anatolia or for sancak of Kütahya. Other minor local notables (who were also called bandits according to the circumstances) had their property confiscated in similar fashion before the 1780s, and if the balance of power permitted, without any negotiations between the state and the family.

This is what happened to Sepetoğlu Osman, who was variously referred to as the local notable (or a rebel) of Gönen, Manyas, and Kütahya during the period between 1765 and 1779.\textsuperscript{207} Sepetoğlu Osman’s inventories show that like other notables, he held short-term tax farms (iltizam) in the district of Gönen, and was deserter from the war (asakîr-i vafire ile olan muharebe esnasında firari).\textsuperscript{208} He invested in the countryside, and owned a few farms that produced mainly wheat and barley. He was also raising animals and had around three hundred camels. His personal items included nine slaves (four white and two black female slaves, and two black and one white male slave).\textsuperscript{209} Unlike some other notables, he does not seem to have been involved in extensive credit relations—but he owed 500 guruş to Abbas Ağa. At the end, when the officials in charge of preparing his inventories and confiscating his wealth finished their job, they sent around 70,000 guruş to Istanbul. Half of this sum came from Sepetoğlu Osman’s personal items, and the other half from the sale of his real property, his animals, and his stored wheat and barley.\textsuperscript{210}

Another notable whom the state tried to eliminate was Himmetoğlu Ahmet of Bilecik. In 1776, an order was sent from the imperial council to the mütesellim of Kütahya asking him to arrest Himmetoğlu and to bring him before the provincial council. Himmetoğlu was described both as a local notable and as a usurper, who had killed the nakibü’l-eşraf ten years ago, raided

\textsuperscript{205} Cevdet Maliye 5052  
\textsuperscript{206} Cevdet Maliye 2051, 26880  
\textsuperscript{207} BŞM. MHF (Başmuhasebe Muhallefat) 12701, 12856, Cevdet Zaptiye 2477, Cevdet Maliye 6910, 7359, Cevdet Adliye 3650  
\textsuperscript{208} BŞM. MHF 12701  
\textsuperscript{209} Different inventories were prepared, for his tax-farms and real estates, Cevdet Zaptiye 2477 and BŞM. MHF 12856, and for the slaves BŞM. MHF 12701  
\textsuperscript{210} Cevdet Maliye 7359
his house, stolen his money, and taken the book in which his debts were recorded (probably in order to appropriate these debts). Since then he had been a rebel and had been hiding in the region between Bursa and Kütahya. However, he too either was pardoned or reinstated himself as a notable in the 1780s. When another report, written in 1786, mentioned Himmetoğlu as the local notable of Bilecik, it was in relation to his illegal intervention in one of the tax-farms in his region. Finally, in 1789, the central authority resolved to kill him and his men and did so; the severed heads of some of his men were sent to the capital. In 1791, Abbas Ağası, in what appears to be one of his last duties, was involved the preparation of Himmetoğlu’s inventory and the confiscation of his property. The interesting—but by no means unusual—aspect of Himmetoğlu’s wealth was that his credit relations were very extensive and amounted to 131,803 gurüş. All of this credit was given to different villages in and around Bilecik. The challenging task was to collect the money that he was owed. This was an amount that the central authority desperately needed, but to collect all of it at once was obviously impossible, and the villagers who were indebted petitioned the state to forgive almost a quarter of the debts—31,803 gurüş, to be exact. In the end, 50,000 gurüş was collected and sent to the capital, 70,000 gurüş was to be collected in two installments, and only 11,803 gurüş was forgiven by the state. The state followed the payment process closely. A year later, another order was sent to the governor of Anatolia and the kadi of Bilecik informing them that the villagers still owed 31,500 gurüş, but that they were able to pay only 20,000 gurüş upon which a moneylender from Istanbul promised to pay the rest (probably charging the villagers a good deal of interest in the long term). However, the moneylender changed his mind, and villagers were once again obliged to pay the remaining 11,500 gurüş. The order stated that this sum had to be collected as promptly as possible—albeit in five installments if need be. After his wealth was confiscated, the hunt for Himmetoğlu’s men went on for another ten years, and the severed heads of his followers continued to be sent to Istanbul until 1805.

This was Abbas Ağası’s last tenure of office. In response to the report on the collection of Himmetoğlu’s wealth, it was written (presumably by the sultan, Selim III, himself) that Abbas Ağası was oppressing the people and that he should be executed. But when he was summoned to the capital, he tried to entice the people to write a petition on his behalf (asking that he remain a mütesellim). Furthermore, disregarding the warnings of the new mütesellim, he tried to raise 12,500 gurüş under the pretext that this sum represented new taxes, and he imprisoned Himmetoğlu’s closest associates in order to extract more money from them.

When the opportunity presented itself, the Germiyanzâdes asserted their power. In a report written to the imperial council by the provincial governor el-Hac Ali Paşa in 1793, Germiyanzâde el-Hac Ali Ağası, Mustafa Ağası and their steward Hacı Mehmed were accused of

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211 Cevdet Adliye 1523
212 (KCR-5/128)
213 Hatt-ı Hümayun 9209
214 Cevdet Maliye 11880
215 But of course, not without other alternatives of collecting the debts and payment, compare Cevdet Maliye 11880 with Hatt-ı Hümayun 10292
216 Cevdet Maliye 4371
217 Hatt-ı Hümayun 14802
218 For the dismissal of Abbas Ağası and the appointment of İsmail Ağası, Hatt-ı Hümayun 9705
219 Hatt-ı Hümayun 9836, see also 9752
illegally appropriating the real estate of Ömer Paşa whose wealth was supposed to be confiscated by the state.²²⁰ But these accusations did not prevent a new governor, Abdullah Paşa, from appointing Germiyanzâde el-Hac Ali Ağa mütesellim once again a year later, in 1794.²²¹ The central authority expected a mütesellim like Haci Ali Ağa not only to collect taxes, raise troops, provide logistical support for the army, and suppress rebellious and unruly elements, but also sometimes to step in to finance the construction or repair important religious buildings. Such spending was part of the political negotiation between the state and the notables in the provinces. For instance, in 1795, it was reported (probably by the trustees of the vakf) to the imperial council that the mosque of Yıldırım Bayezid was in such bad shape that it was about to collapse. After an investigation, the estimated cost of repair was calculated to be 9,805. The imperial council stated in response to the report that since the vakf did not have the funds to do the necessary repairs, Haci Ali Ağa, who had the means, could undertake them, which of course entitled him to another term in the office.²²² A year later Hacı Ali Ağa and some of his associates (rüfeka) were exiled.²²³ Hacı Ali Ağa would become a mütesellim in 1802 for one last time, but this very brief final tenure would end with his execution.

With regard to the politics of the notables, there were two significant challenges to the Germiyanzâdes at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. One was the state’s centralization efforts in and around Kütahya, and the other was competition from another family of notables, the Nasuhzâdes. The centralization efforts—among other things—meant that the central authority had to become more visible and make the administrative institutions more efficient. The construction and the repair of the administrative palace (Kütahya sarayı, or hükümet konağı as it was also called) after it burned down occupied a central place in these efforts. Already in 1787, the cost of repairing the old the palace and of the constructing new buildings was estimated to be around 113,031 guruş. This was a major undertaking, especially during a period of financial crisis. The money was to be collected from different parts of Anatolia. Of the 113,031 guruş, 21,090 guruş was to be collected from the districts of the sancak of Kütahya, 18,989 guruş from the sancak of Hüdavendigâr, and 72,992 guruş from the other sancaks of Anatolia.²²⁵ However, the state was aware that it would not be easy to raise such an amount. Three years later, another report sent to the imperial council stated that distributing the cost of repairing and constructing the palace to different sancaks was likely to create more problems for the central authority, and that the collecting such expenses from the people and that it was not in fact in accordance with past practices. The suggestion was to assign the collection of the necessary funds to a powerful local notable, such as the Karaosmanzâdes of western Anatolia. The imperial council did not follow this suggestion, but the prediction about the difficulty of the collecting this amount came true. After eight years, in 1795, the people of Ankara were petitioning the capital to be forgiven their share (6,666 guruş), on the ground that the obligation to pay other extraordinary taxes, and the fact they had just suffered a famine, had left them without the means to pay.²²⁶ In 1795, after further studies, the amount to be collected from the sancaks was brought down to 79,088 guruş,²²⁶ but this was still a lot of money—both

²²⁰ Ömer Paşa’s wife had petitioned the governor to complain from their illegal appropriation, Cevdet Maliye 21900
²²¹ Cevdet Dahiliye 9899
²²² Cevdet Evkaf 2380
²²³ Cevdet Dahiliye 487
²²⁴ Cevdet Dahiliye 8875
²²⁵ Cevdet Dahiliye 8074
²²⁶ This is in response to the petition, Cevdet Dahiliye 8074

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for the state to collect and for the people to pay. Perhaps it was in the face of such difficulties that the treasurer (emin) of the Kütahya palace chose to quit his position and escape in 1796.\textsuperscript{227}

Despite these difficulties, at least part of the construction was finished in 1796. Other reports and orders from 1796 show that after the funds were collected, and the initial construction was finished, there was enough money left over to complete construction and furnish the palace properly, and even to construct new buildings and expand the main palace. Another report suggested that more construction was needed outside the main building, and estimated its cost at around 55,000 guruş.\textsuperscript{228} Two other reports followed this one. The first report, which was actually the second registration (defter-ı sanî) of the new costs, estimated that another 22,419 guruş would be necessary to add more rooms to the main palace.\textsuperscript{229} Yet a second report added another 5,300 guruş for the repairs to the palace and for the purchase of rugs and carpets.\textsuperscript{230}

The reports specify in detail the materials to be used, and the dimensions of the new buildings. The information in these reports suggests that the palace was meant to house a great many people. Different officials had their own quarters, there was a separate quarter for guests, and there was space that could be used to store, or even to locate cannons (it is not clear from the descriptions that this was an arsenal). The building that was described in these reports as the palace of the governors came to be called government house (hükümet konağı) in later documents. This was more than a simple change in the administrative jargon. It is likely that the state wanted to use the period of relative peace between 1793 and 1797 to reassert itself in the region—and this time not only through the intermediation of provincial governors and local notables, but also in a more bureaucratically institutionalized fashion. Even though the transition to a more centralized and bureaucratic state would not take place in earnest for another forty years, the construction of the government house was a step in that direction. The state was becoming not only more visible, but also more efficient in terms of controlling and governing the region.

But controlling and governing the region was apparently beyond the powers of the Germiyanzâdes and during this period there arose another challenge to their authority, this time from the Nasuhzâdes, the local notables of Emed.\textsuperscript{231} In the 1780s, the Nasuhzâdes resided in the district of Gedüs near Kütahya. In an order to the mütesellim and to the kadi of Kütahya, written in 1782, Nasuhoğlu Ali is described as a derebey (literally, lord of the valley, but a term that is usually used to describe rebellious and unruly local potentates). As was usual in such cases, Nasuhoğlu Ali and his men are accused of stealing and looting property and killing people in an area that included Eğrigöz and Uşak. The petition in response to which an order was issued from the imperial council stated that Nasuhoğlu Ali and his men had stolen the property of the people in Gedüs as well as wheat and barley crops worth 50,000 guruş. The order explicitly refers to the Nasuhzâdes’ attempt to assert themselves as the âyân (âyânlik ve voyvodalık vâ’iyesi) of the

\textsuperscript{227} Cevdet Dahiliye 9335  
\textsuperscript{228} Cevdet Dahiliye 8891  
\textsuperscript{229} Cevdet Dahiliye 8357  
\textsuperscript{230} Cevdet Dahiliye 2515  
\textsuperscript{231} They were also known as the local notables of Uşak, Özkaya, \textit{Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Ayanlık}. p. 138, 167
region, and demands that the mütesellim take them to court (to face the plaintiffs).\textsuperscript{232} Nothing much seems to have come out of these complaints and orders. Nasuhoğlu Ali was not punished, but when he died in 1795, the state ordered the confiscation of this property. In any case, the initial inventory compiled by the officer in charge of the confiscation shows that he had accumulated a good deal of wealth in Emed and the surrounding areas. He owned a khan (worth 1,000 guruş, which indicates that it was a small khan), and a house in a vineyard in Emed. There was a separate house for his wives, and a mill in another village. There was nothing particularly interesting in the household items—rugs, carpets, pillows, some furs clothing. But he owned many animals—apart from oxen, and horses, he had four hundred sheep and two hundred goats. He also had a good deal of wheat and barley stored in many storehouses in different villages.\textsuperscript{233} This inventory indicates that Nahuhoğlu Ali’s wealth came from the rural areas. The inventory does not reveal any credit relations with the villagers. His relations to the major urban areas such as Kütahya, Bursa, or Istanbul were probably limited to selling wheat and barley, maybe some sheep and goats.

However, the central authority was highly suspicious of the accuracy of the initial inventory, and ordered another investigation in 1796.\textsuperscript{234} According to the initial inventory Nasuhoğlu’s wealth amounted to 23,498 guruş—15,971 guruş from his estates, animals, household items, and so forth, and 7,527 guruş from his stores of grain. But Nasuhoğlus sphere of influence extended beyond Emed to other districts, such as Simav, Gedüs, and Dağardı. But what prompted the new investigation was not only the usual suspicion that like many of the local notables, he and his family might have been hiding other property in those districts. A petition from Nasuhoğlu’s heirs was presented along with the initial inventory requesting the state to leave their father’s wealth to them. Nasuhoğlu had a large family, including seventeen children, who pleaded that without their father’s wealth they would become poor. The second investigation was therefore ordered in order to find out to what extent their claims were true. In the end, it turned out that there was not much hidden property and only an additional 2,500 guruş was added to the initial inventory. But this was not lump sum payment; the agreement reached between the state and the Nasuhzâdes was that only 10,000 guruş was to be paid in advance, and the remaining 20,000 guruş was to be paid in installments within a year. What may seem at first to have been an advantageous agreement for the state was by no means detrimental to the economic and political influence of the Nasuhzâdes because Nasu Ağa (one of the sons of Nasuhzâde Ali) was the mütesellim of Kütahya in 1797. He was ordered to move against the rebels of the Uşak region, Acemoğlu Ahmed, Teslimoğlu Ömer, and their men (who were the Nasuhzâdes’ longtime rivals)—a mission that required nothing less than using a field cannon.\textsuperscript{235} Although they paid the state more than the actual value of the inventory, buying out their father’s wealth enables the Nasuhzâdes to keep a whole network of economic, social, and political relations together. In other words, it enabled them to retain their bid for political power.

\textsuperscript{232} Anadolu Ahkam 85 / 188
\textsuperscript{233} Cevdet Adliye 3660, see also Cevdet Maliye 1198
\textsuperscript{234} Cevdet Maliye 2271
\textsuperscript{235} Cevdet Zaptiye 3094
Nasuh Ağa’s tenure did not last long; a year later there was a new mütesellim. And yet the ascendancy of the Nasuhzâdes put them in competition with the Germiyanzâdes—a competition that sometimes entailed cooperation. When the wealth of Ali Paşa, one of the previous governors of Anatolia, was confiscated, two farmsteads that he owned in Kütahya were put up for sale. The yearly income of two the farms was estimated at around 7,500 gurüş, and the asking price was 30,000 gurüş for both. However, when after ten days, no one offered to pay was able to offer that price, the Germiyanzâdes and the Nasuhzâdes offered to buy the farms jointly.\textsuperscript{236} Unfortunately, we do not know what they did with this joint enterprise, or whether it was the only partnership between these two families; but the office of mütesellim kept changing hands between them. In 1799, the governor of the province of Anatolia, Ebubekir Paşa, appointed Nasuh Ağa (or Bey, as the letter of appointment called him) mütesellim once more,\textsuperscript{237} and as soon as he took office, petitions complaining of his unruly and oppressive practices began arriving at the capital. The residents of Kebsud in particular complained that his retinue was composed of no fewer than thirty bandits, and while Nasuh Ağa was forcing them to pay more taxes than they owed, his men were stealing their animals and other property.\textsuperscript{238} But the capital ignored their complaints, and Nasuh Ağa retained his position. In another order sent to Nasuh Ağa in his capacity as mütesellim, we also learn that the Germiyanzâdes were involved in credits relations with the moneylenders of Istanbul. The order was written in response to a petition by the voyvoda of Galata, el-Hac Mehmed Ağa, who claimed that he had lent 35,000 gurüş to Germiyanzâde el-Hac Ali Ağa in 1786. When he asked Ali Ağa to pay back the debt, Ali Ağa kept finding excuses and postponing payment.\textsuperscript{239} Nasuh Ağa was ordered either to collect the money from Ali Ağa, or if Ali Ağa refused to pay, to send him to the capital.

We don’t know whether Ali Ağa paid his debt back or whether he was sent to the capital, but the Germiyanzâdes were active in the capital for purposes other than borrowing money. A short and a rather opaque order of the imperial council addressed to the kadi of Sinop and to one of the high-ranking officials of the imperial council (which also sent the order) states that Germiyanzâde Mehmet, along with the senior officer of the fortress and another person, was in Istanbul trying to defame (tehevvi̇f) some people in Kütahya.\textsuperscript{240} It is not clear from the content of the order who these people were, or what exactly Germiyanzâde Mehmed was saying and to whom but it is clear that his lobbying efforts did not achieve the desired result. He was seen as causing disorder and as posing a threat to the stability of the city, and was ordered exiled to the city of Sinop. The order does not state for how long or under what conditions he was exiled, but it is not unreasonable to think that he was lobbying to be appointed mütesellim. In any case, the office of mütesellim kept changing hands between the Germiyanzâdes and the Nasuhzâdes—and it was also granted to many other people. In 1802, with the governorship of Seyyid Mustafa Paşa who held the province of Anatolia as arpalık, Germiyanzâde el-Hac Ali held the office again. The order of appointment stated that Nasuh Ağa was dismissed because he did not get along well with the central authority and the residents of Kütahya (adem-i imtizac).\textsuperscript{241}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[236] Cevdet Maliye 13741
\item[237] Cevdet Dahiliye 37
\item[238] Cevdet Dahiliye 5160
\item[239] Cevdet Adliye 2407
\item[240] Cevdet Zaptiye 586
\item[241] Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'îye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/6)
\end{footnotes}
But of course, losing an office did not mean that the Nasuhzâdes’ influence faded in the region—more radical developments were needed for that. We know from the inventory of Nasuh Ali Ağa that he was operating mainly in the countryside as a local notable. It is reasonable to assume that his children and grandchildren built their own wealth and power on this foundation, and that they too were active mostly in the countryside. But even though Nasuh Ali Ağa was not heavily involved in moneylending his family members probably used their accumulated wealth to lend money. In 1815, the residents of the district of Tavşanlı sent a petition to the central authority complaining of the oppression of Nasuhoğlu Hacı İbrahim. For the last ten years, Hacı İbrahim had been charging an exorbitant interest on loans and many of them were heavily indebted to him. The central authority responded by informing the governor of the province of Anatolia and the deputy kadi of Eğrigöz that the interest rate was limited to 10 percent. If Hacı İbrahim was collecting an interest more of than 10 percent, the order was to return the difference to the debtors. Once again, we don’t know whether the rule was implemented, or whether Hacı İbrahim simply disregarded the order, but the state was determined to curb the influence of Nasuhzâdes.

Nasuh Ağa’s bid for power continued for another sixteen years after Germiyanzâde Hacı Ali Ağa became the mütesellim in 1802, but he was executed in 1818. Nasuh probably understood clearly that the end was imminent, and pleaded vehemently to be pardoned arguing that not only was he an obedient servant of the sultan, but the people of Gedüs had expressed their wish to see him as their mütesellim. Nasuh Ağa also stated how much he contributed to the war efforts, and listed in detail the money and other supplies he provided to the governor of Anatolia. But all this pleading was not enough to save him. The officer in charge of executing Nasuh Ağa, and the two Tatars who brought his severed head to the governor of Anatolia were given different gifts with a total value of 2,500 guruş. More importantly, many members of Nasuh Ağa’s family fled the region to avoid the same fate. At least three of his brothers, two of his nieces, and some of his retinue ran away and their wealth was confiscated with Nasuh Ağa’s wealth. A summary account of the confiscation shows how influential and wealthy an extended family such the Nasuhzâdes could be. The summary does not give the details of each inventory, but the total value of the inventories of the eight members was 187,949 guruş.

Even before Nasuh Ağa was executed, his immediate family (three wives and their children) were already relocated and under close scrutiny by the central authority—the officers in charge of guarding them were the ones who were ordered to capture Nasuh Ağa and send him to the capital. After Nasuh Ağa was executed and the family’s wealth was confiscated, there seems to have been another period of negotiation between the state and the Nasuhzâde family. There is no direct evidence of negotiations taking place, but the central authority certainly changed its mind about confiscating family’s whole wealth. Five different entries in the court register dated 1819 show that some of the family members were given their confiscated property back. Each order states that the property was confiscated as part of the confiscation process that

242 Cevdet Adliye 1814
243 Cevdet Adliye 2169
244 Hatt-ı Hümayun 47913 C1
245 Cevdet Zaptiye 3524
246 Cevdet Maliye 6519
247 Hatt-ı Hümayun 47913 C and D2
pertained to Nasuh Ağa’s wealth. Of the 187,949 guruş, 101,340 guruş was returned to the Nasuhzâdes in the end. However, this time, the Nasuhzâdes were not able to regain their power. Although they retained much of their wealth, the state’s centralization efforts took on a different dimension after the 1830s, and the Nasuhzâdes could hardly claim political privilege on the ground that they were local notables.

The Nasuhzâdes were gradually eliminated as contenders for political power, but this did not mean a free ride for the Germiyanzâdes. Their fate was no different from that of the Nasuhzâdes. Even though, Germiyanzâde el-Hac Ali’s position as the mütesellim of Kütahya was approved by the incoming governor, Seyyid Ömer Paşa, again in 1802, but he did not hold that position long. El-Hac Ali was dismissed, and executed soon after the approval. But shortly before he was appointed mütesellim, there was another loss in the Germiyanzâde family. Germiyanzâde Hacı Mustafa died in 1801, and the state immediately proceeded to confiscate his property. Hacı Mustafa was not executed but Zağnos Paşazâde Ahmed, an officer of the imperial council was appointed to prepare the inventory and confiscate his wealth. A detailed inventory and a series reports on the confiscation process were quickly prepared and submitted to the imperial council. The total value of Hacı Mustafa’s inventory amounted to 63,342 guruş—a considerable sum for Kütahya. But upon closer inspection, it became apparent that Hacı Mustafa owed at least 42,000 guruş to different people. After his father, Hacı Memiş Ağa, died, Hacı Mustafa, as the eldest son, had appropriated his sisters’ shares, which amounted to 12,000 guruş; and his other debts totaled 30,000 guruş. After these debts and the expenses (for the burial and the confiscation procedure) were deducted, Hacı Mustafa’s wealth was reduced down to 19,145 guruş—a modest amount for a member of a local notable family. Then the negotiations began. The report stated that Hacı Mustafa’s heirs were already impoverished due to bad harvests and locusts, and the confiscation of 19,145 guruş would impoverish them even more and would not benefit the state. The suggestion was for the Germiyanzâdes to buy out their father’s inheritance, paying 10,000 guruş in the first year in two installments, and the balance gradually over time. Hacı Mustafa’s inventory contains many different household items and clothing, as well as some jewelry, showing that he was a wealthy man who indulged but by no means a man who indulged in luxury items. His only involvement with the guilds and the manufacturing sector was a small pottery shop (worth 350 guruş). Most of the rest of his property was in the countryside. He owned three farms (worth 7,500 guruş together) in different villages, and many animals. He was also involved in credit relations. Fourteen villages owned him close to 15,000 guruş, and he had also money made loans various individuals.

After confiscating the wealth of Germiyanzâde Hacı Mustafa, there was no doubt that the state would also confiscate Germiyanzâde el-Hac Ali’s wealth. Like the other local notables whom the state eliminated, he too was accused of oppressing the people. When the governor Ömer Paşa executed el-Hac Ali, he stated in his report that el-Hac Ali had appropriated more than 33,000 guruş out of the taxes he was supposed to collect for provincial expenses. According

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248 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/16)
249 Ibid. (K6/31)
250 Ibid. (K6/34, 50), Hattı Hümayun 4214, Cevdet Adliye 510
251 Cevdet Maliye 2244
252 Cevdet Maliye 15635
253 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/34)
to the report, this placed such a heavy burden that on the people that they were impoverished and started leaving their homes. However, it is important to note that accusations of this kind, and references to the plight of the people, are so common in these reports that it is impossible to know what was really meant by people leaving their homes (terk-i evtân ve ekseri perâkende ve perişan olub). El-Hac Ali was also described as becoming too independent (ta’yyün ve teferrüd eden). His punishment was therefore to serve as a warning to other notables with similar ambitions, and his severed head was to be sent to the capital.254

Two different records on el-Hac Ali’s inventory show that his wealth amounted to 50,000 guruş, and after the expenses and his debts were deducted the amount that the state could confiscate was around 40,000 guruş. The amounts are approximate because the report and the inventory prepared by the officer in charge of the confiscation and sent to the capital put el-Hac Ali’s total wealth at 49,621 guruş,255 while the inventory recorded in the court register put it at 53,156 guruş.256 A closer look at el-Hac Ali’s inventory shows that except as concerns his credit relations, it was similar to that of Hacı Mustafa. The household and clothing items were many but there is also evidence to suggest that el-Hac Ali was spending his money for luxury items. He owned a pair of binoculars made in England, a watch, and some jewelry; but most of the household and clothing items were manufactured regionally—especially in Uşak. Interestingly enough, El-Hac Ali did not invest in the manufacturing sector. He did not own any shops, nor did he hold any shares in a joint venture. Most of his wealth was in the countryside; it consisted of grain stored in storehouses, animals, and mills. El-Hac was also involved in credit relations, but these were not extensive and did not constitute an important part of his wealth. He had only a couple of debtors, and the highest amount owed him was the 1,100 guruş that he had lent to the residents of Şuhud. As for his own debts, they totaled around 9,500 guruş—his highest debt being 3,995 guruş. So despite the tone of the orders and the reports, Germiyanzâde el-Hac Ali did not wield enough economic power to pose a great threat to the state. It was not as if he had extensive economic patronage ties, and was accumulating sufficient wealth to act autonomously or independently as the reports claimed. In the end, and perhaps surprisingly, his heirs were allowed to buy out el-Hac Ali’s inheritance for a modest 7,500 guruş.257

The state was not acting purely out of mercy. If it gave a break to el-Hac Ali’s heirs, this was probably because the Germiyanzâdes were still deemed useful for a variety of purposes. Controlling, and if need be, eliminating, other relatively small local notables, such as Kumarcı Abdullah, was one of these purposes. So, two years later, in 1804, we see Mehmed Germiyanzâde (probably the son of el-Hac Ali258) as the mütesellim of Kütahya trying to control the growing influence of the Kumarcı family of Eskişehir.259 These attempts were unsuccessful, and Kumarcı Abdullah continued to exert control in and around the Eskişehir region for at least another fifteen years. In 1813, the state was still asking the mütesellims of Kütahya whether they

254 Hatt-ı Hümayun 4214, ibid. (K6/31)
255 Cevdet Maliye 22279
256 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/50)
257 Cevdet Maliye 22279. On top of the reports of the confiscation, the summary decision of the central authority reads: (verese-yi merkumenin paye-yi merhamet oldukları zahir olmağla 7,500 bedel verilmek üzere muhallefat-ı merkumenin verese-yi mütevaffaya terki)
258 Karacagil, "6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği". (K6/151), Bozkurt, "Kütahya Şer'iye Sicilleri 8 Numaralı Defterinin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi". (K8/42)
259 Cevdet Dahiliye 2847
would be able to control Kumacı Abdullah on their own. Under the highly unstable conditions that were prevalent at the time, it is not surprising that Mehmed’s tenure did not last long. And yet, in 1809, another Germiyanzâde, Süleyman Ağâ was appointed to the same office, which he retained throughout the first half of 1810. In the July of 1810 he was dismissed, but he was reappointed a year later, in 1811. During 1810 and 1811, the state relied on both Germiyanzâde Mehmed and Süleyman to raise troops from Kütahya. In what appears to be one of the last major orders to the Germiyanzâdes in their capacity as mütesellims and local notables, they were ordered to find and equip three hundred cavalrymen and one thousand infantrymen. But from that point on, references to the Germiyanzâdes as the mütesellims of Kütahya, or as powerful local notables vying for political dominance are almost completely absent—at least in the court records. As late as the 1820s, to be sure, Mehmed Ağâ was still acknowledged as the descendant of an old dynasty (vücûh-ı hanedan), and the Germiyanzâdes’ presence as legal witnesses for the registration of the distribution of the provincial expenses in the court records attests to their political importance, but the Germiyanzâdes never again regained the power that they had exercised during the period 1780–1810. They survived the turbulent years at the end of the eighteenth century, and the state’s centralization efforts at the beginning of the nineteenth century—just as they had survived under the hegemony of an emerging Ottoman state in the fifteenth century—but when they appeared in the court registers (which happened less and less frequent) after the 1820s, they appeared in their capacity as residents of Kütahya.

Given the limits of their powers and the centralization efforts of the state, it is not surprising that the Germiyanzâdes along with the other minor local notables gradually lost their importance by the 1820s. It would be interesting to explore the dynamics of their survival and their newly formed relations with the central authority during the Tanzimat period and into the Republican era. But however interesting and important these dynamics may be, they are beyond the scope of this research. It is therefore in order to conclude with a few brief remarks on the centralization efforts of the state prior to the 1830s.

I have already pointed out that in repairing and expanding the governor’s palace, the central authority was taking a significant step to reassert its hold over the region towards the end of the eighteenth century. I have also emphasized how crucial it was for the state to finance its wars against Russia, Austria, and France during the period 1760–1820. Provisioning the army with everything from wheat to cannons was as important as meeting the cash requirements of the state. In that respect too, the state relied heavily on the provinces and on the intermediation of the local notables. What the state asked from the local notables, under what conditions, and in return for what kind of concessions, tells much about the balance of power between the two, and

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260 Cevdet Adliye 165, 2891, Cevdet Zaptiye 945, Cevdet Maliye 4286, 5603, Hatt-ı Hümayun 52778
261 Cevdet Dahiliye 2370,
262 Bozkurt, “Kütahya Şer'iye Sicilleri 8 Numaralı Defererin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi”. (K8/5, 14, 15, 18, 19)
263 Ibid. (K8/63)
264 Hatt-ı Hümayun 30996, 31145
265 Bozkurt, "Kütahya Şer'iyê Sicilleri 8 Numaralı Deffererin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi". (K8/42)
266 Erol, "13 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicili Transkribe Ve Değerlendirilmesi". (K13/3)
267 Ibid. (K13/70, 109)
268 Yavuz, "Kütahya Şer'iyye Sicilleri 15 Numaralı Defererin Transkripsiyonu Ve Değerlendirilmesi". (K15/7, 16)
about the extent to which, the state could rely on its centrally appointed officials to tap the logistical, human, and agricultural resources. A series of entries from court register volume 8 that cover the years 1802 and 1803 are revealing in this respect—they refer to the military supplies and munitions stored in the Kütahya fortress. The fortress was not the seat of the governor, nor was it the administrative center of the city or the region, but it was used as a prison and as an arsenal. The entries show not only that there were a good many munitions in the fortress under the control of the fortress commander, but that these munitions were used to subdue local notables whom the state deemed rebellious. Even though the state needed the Germiyanzâdes and the Nasuhzâdes to act as intermediary to subdue other notables such as Kumarcî Abdullah, the careful registration of the munitions before and after these intermediaries were permitted to use them shows not only that the representatives of the central authority strictly controlled the munitions, but also that they exerted control over the local notables. Another aspect of the control that the central authority exerted over the region was that the local notables never succeeded in achieving an office higher than that of mütesellim. A crucial step for the big provincial magnates of the Balkans and Anatolia, such as Mehmet Ali Paşa, Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa, Tepedeni Ali Paşa, or the Karaosmanzâdes, was to hold the officer of provincial governor. They were the real contenders and partners (both at the same time) of the central authority. These magnates started out as local notables, held lifetime taxes, and acted as mütesellim, but in the end they were able to hold the highest administrative position, and hence become a crucial part of the state authority. Compared to them the Germiyanzâdes and the Nasuhzâdes, even though they were recognized as mütesellims and hence as part of the state bureaucracy, remained only intermediary figures. It is highly dubious whether we can say that they were part of the elite; it is much more certain that we can say that they were claim for the magnates. The attitude of the central authority toward both the magnates and other less powerful notables is shown in the way they were perceived by the bureaucracy and the advisors of the sultan. In 1808, when the sultan signed the Deed of Alliance (Sened-i İttifak) with these magnates, other less powerful notables were eliminated, and their properties were confiscated. If the Deed of Alliance was a contract that recognized the local magnates in their capacity as the de facto rulers of their regions, as partners in a new configuration of power relations, the confiscations demonstrated that the local notables did not represent a united front, and that the less powerful ones would be the first victims of the new balance of power.

The responses of the local notables to the centralization reforms also varied. The reform movements had begun in the 1790s, and the two major pillars of the reforms were the creation of a new army and direct control of taxation through a centralized administrative structure. Even though the local notables of Kütahya were important intermediaries, who raised troops, levied taxes, and provisioned the army with wheat, barley or camels throughout the war years, it was clear that the reforms threatened their regional autonomy. However, not all the local notables or the big magnates were against these reforms. For instance, the Karaosmanzâdes of western

269 Karacagil, “6 Numaralı Kütahya Şer'iye Sicili Transkripsiyonu Ve Edisyon Kritiği”. There are at least a dozen of entries that give a good idea about the function of the fortress (K6/38 - 50)
271 See for instance the report of the imperial council advising Sultan Mahmud II in 1809 that he should borrow money from these magnates. The report states clearly that they should be treated differently than the other notables. Ibid.
Anatolia supported these reforms and were instrumental in the creation of the new army by recruiting peasants from their region. But as could be expected, there was also a very important opposition block. This block was formed by some of the notables, by part of the religious establishment and more importantly by the Janissaries, whom the state intended to replace with the new army. Under the conditions of financial crisis and continuing wars, the reform movement developed slowly, and the politics of the opposing block made it even slower. In the years between 1806 and 1809, the lines were drawn more clearly as the capital experienced coups and upheavals for and against the reforms. After Selim III was dethroned, and replaced by the favorite of the reactionary block, Mustafa IV, a group of magnates under the leadership of Alemdar Mustafa Paşa tried to salvage the reforms. Mustafa IV’s reign lasted barely a year, and Mahmud II took the throne. The Deed of Agreement was negotiated with and signed under Mahmud II. However, the terms of the agreement were never met because another major Janissary revolt put an end to the influence of Alemdar Paşa—and to his life. Mahmud II came to throne under these conditions, which threatened the state’s new administrative centralization efforts. However, Mahmud II continued the reform efforts and in what many scholars consider to be the decisive step of the reforms, the Janissaries were eliminated in 1826.

More research is needed to understand the dynamics of resistance and alliance in the provinces for and against the reform movements. We don’t know much about the politics of the minor notables, such as the Germiyanzâdes, towards the reform movements. Nor do we know much about the reactions of the military officers and the different military groups in the provinces. Not only had the Janissaries become localized and integrated into the provincial society, but they had long-established organic ties with such groups as the Bektaşi orders. As a matter of fact, they had become so localized in the provinces, and were so intertwined with the different segments of society that they exerted their political leverage to represent the popular will against the despotism of the new sultans (Selim III and Mahmud II). However, most of our information on the Janissaries and their alliances with different groups comes from studies on the politics of the Janissaries in the capital. There are few reliable studies on the affiliation of the Janissaries with different social groups in the provinces, or on the extent to which such affiliations provoked popular resistance against the reforms at the end of the eighteenth century, and especially in response to the elimination of the Janissaries are. Bearing all this mind, if we turn to Kütahya specifically, there seems to have been no resistance in Kütahya because Kütahya was the first places where the new military order was established. As Aksan points out, “the first provincial regiment was established in Edirne by order from Istanbul on 4 August 1826. It was based on the Istanbul model. Recruiting was to be local; officers sent from Istanbul would command. Plans were made for five regiments (of 1.527 men) in the Balkans: two in Edirne, and one each in Silistre, Vidin, and Salonika. Another five were to be established in Anatolia: Erzurum, Çankırı, Bolu, Kütahya and İzmir. The colonel of the provincial regiments was under the command of the military offices in Istanbul, but also obligated to the governor in matters of local policy.” This is only indirect evidence, but it is reasonable to think that it would be

272 For two recent studies of this crucial period, Ali Yaycıoğlu, ”The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)” (Harvard University, 2008). Especially, Aysel Yıldız, ”Vaka-Yı Selimiyye or the Selimiyye Incident, a Study of the May 1807 Rebellion” (Sabancı University, 2008). See also Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008).

highly risky for the central authority to recruit new soldiers from a place where there was strong popular resistance to the military reforms.

One final remark about the control of the central authority over the region pertains to the role of Kütahya as a place of exile. A register of imprisonments in the fortresses (kalebend defteri), which also included the records of exiles for the period 1826-33, contained 1,350 records of those who were exiled to different parts of the empire. Kütahya received seventy-four deportees—more than any other city except Bozcaada and Bursa (which received eighty-two ad seventy-six respectively). Exile as a form of punishment did not necessarily mean being sent to a desolate place, nor was it meant to last too long (More than 70 percent of exiles lasted no more than a year, and 33,5% percent less than six months). Nevertheless, the fact that most places of exile were in central and western Anatolia and close to the capital meant that these were locations where the state felt sure that it had control over the social and political environment the deportee ended up in. Kütahya must have been seen as a safe environment—at least for the state.

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274 Sibel Kavaklı, "929/a Numaralı Nefy Defterinin (1826/1833) Transkripsiyon Ve Değerlendirmesi" (Gaziosmanpaşa, 2005). p. 618
275 Ibid.
CONCLUSION

Both empirically and theoretically the eighteenth century continues to pose a major problem for scholars of the Ottoman Empire. As Jane Hathaway puts it, “the eighteenth century, in the Ottoman Empire as elsewhere in the Mediterranean world, is frequently characterized in terms of what went before and what came after. For much of the twentieth century, the two dominant views of the Ottoman eighteenth century were as the culmination of the Ottoman version of the ancien régime, on the one hand, and as the prelude to modernization-cum-Westernization, on the other.” Much of this understanding has been changing in the last decade, and the lump-sum characterization of the eighteenth century as the “era of the âyâns” has given place to a more refined and complex picture (as the contributions to The Cambridge History of Turkey demonstrate).

Historians are now reevaluating this complex process of transformation—one that took place between roughly the end of the seventeenth century (say, from a fiscalist perspective, from 1695) to roughly the end of the 1820s (say, from a political perspective, to the abolition of the Janissaries in 1826). This reevaluation does not pertain only to the rise of the local notables or to trade relations; but it extends to every major aspect of Ottoman polity. Scholars of the Ottoman Empire have started to focus on the transformation of the public sphere, consumption patterns, and the material culture in general—as well as on such abstract issues as the changing attitudes toward death, and concomitantly changing perceptions of the self. The expanding array of research makes it all the more difficult to devise a master narrative that addresses the totality of social, political, economic, and cultural change. New studies reconfigure the field but not necessarily with an alternative grand narrative, or systematic analyses. As Meltem Toksöz and Biray Kolluoğlu observe, “contemporary research is dispersed,” and “[it] is being carried out not around a common perspective, but rather around a shared set of concerns.” In this context of new interpretations, frequent references to the eighteenth century as one of transformation simply state the obvious: Polities change in response to a variety of internal and external factors.

But there are nevertheless points of agreement among different perspectives in this new historiographical field. The first concerns the economic recovery that took place during the first half of the eighteenth century, and the subsequent financial and military crisis—a deeper and

277 Suraiya N. Faroqhi, ed. The Cambridge History of Turkey, the Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2009).
more overwhelming crisis than that of the seventeenth century. The 1760s and 1770s, and especially the Ottoman-Russian Wars, which ended with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, are most often seen as the turning point—not only as the beginning of the economic downturn, but also in terms of population movements, and political upheavals. Trade relations between the Ottoman Empire and the West changed significantly during the course of the eighteenth century, but none of these changes can be attributed to a clear pattern of Western domination. In short, throughout the eighteenth century “Western trade had matured enough in its format, if not in its impact, to prefigure the turn it would take in the following century. All it would take, then, is the final comeback of an industrialized power, Britain, whose massive irruption on the Ottoman market would soon be followed by others.”

Even though the globalization of commercial relations marginalized the role of the Ottoman Empire in international trade, this did not amount to an absolute decline in the trade relations, or in economic growth. This period also marks the beginning of a much more pronounced regional differentiation—during which the Balkans and Egypt moved further away from the center in search of autonomy, and eventually, in the first half of the nineteenth century, achieved independence. New global commercial networks had a negative impact on some of the older trade centers and new nexuses emerged. However, while the new trade relations created larger and more complicated monetary networks, it is likely that the impact of these networks remained largely regional. As a matter of fact, the complex history of the port cities, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, shows the extent to which these cities can be seen as autonomous spaces where specific social and economic networks developed, and as even political alternatives to the nation-states of the twentieth century.

Another point which the new perspectives all agree on is that there were significant changes in the administrative and legal structure of the central authority, and that these changes resulted in significant movement toward a more representative decision-making process. The major actors that emerged from these changes were the local notables, whose rise does not indicate a radical political and economic breakdown, but rather a serious reconfiguration of power relations. But the question here is still how and why the central authority was able to reassert and maintain its power in the nineteenth century, and retain an alliance with some of the notables. Dina Rizk-Khoury suggests that “part of the answer may be found in the changing relations between the centre and local elites not necessarily at the pinnacle of the provincial hierarchy of political power … Drawn from diverse social backgrounds, these elites constituted the backbone of Ottoman hegemony in provincial setting.” She argues that studying less visible provincial elites rather than magnates can provide us with a better historical perspective on the background of the centralization policies implemented after the 1830s. In this respect, for the period between roughly 1760 and 1830, these minor notables represent a new research agenda—an agenda to which I hope to contribute with the present research.

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Like the other scholars of his generation, Cem Emrence pleads for a more realistic and more diverse account of the changes that took place in the eighteenth century, but he favors a more systematic approach. Emrence proposes a model based on three regional trajectories that existed in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century: coastal, interior, and frontier. “In a nutshell,” Emrence argues, “Ottoman trajectories were shaped by the discourse of modernity and the strength of market relations on the coast, by the bureaucracy and the notion of an Islamic state in the interior, and by religious networks and the politics of mobilization on the frontier. In terms of the Asian provinces, the coastal framework was represented by the port cities and commercial hinterlands of western Anatolia, Lebanon, and the eastern Mediterranean littoral. The interior path concerned the inland experience of central Anatolia, Syria, and Palestine. The frontier incorporated the borderland regions of Eastern Anatolia, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula.”

What distinguished the trajectory of the inland regions was that the impact of the global markets was relatively weak, and that there was no direct foreign intervention. In the absence of these two factors, “Ottoman imperial modernization initiated two-long term trends in the interior: state-led transformation and consensual rule, which extended Ottoman authority inland while confirming the privileged status of urban intermediaries.” The consensual rule, in this context, was the merging of the Muslim notables into a single bloc at the expense of the non-Muslims, and their support for the centralization efforts of the state. In return, they were awarded important offices. Office holding within the imperial bureaucracy was the major venue for Muslim notables to consolidate their political, economic, and cultural power. The economic power of the Muslim notables was based mostly on agricultural goods, primarily on cereals and livestock. A variety of factors, from the expansion of the cities to rising agricultural prices and improved transportation, allowed the Muslim notables who controlled grain trade to consolidate their position in their respective regions even more decisively. Despite the increasing pressure from the global markets, domestic manufacturers of inland “operated on a low-cost basis, benefitted from an intimate knowledge of customers tastes, and targeted the lower end of the market. Textile merchants [for instance,) used extensive chains of subcontracting, fragmented the production process, and benefitted from unorganized labor.”

Regional textile centers also emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, and were connected to the port-cities. In this socioeconomic context, and in the long term, the major political and social conflict took place among the different factions of the elite, to determine which of them should rule. Alliances, negotiation, political struggle, and sometimes overt social violence determined the political constitution of these regions in the early twentieth century.

Emrence argues that “the interior path was the symbolic expression of expanding imperial authority during the nineteenth century. The key was the institutionalization of the public sphere around the state by integrating economic, political, and moral orders into the imperial framework … the Ottomans replicated this model by bringing Anatolia, Syria, and (to a lesser extent) Palestine, into their bureaucratic orbit.” Promising as it is, this tripartite comparative model needs to be developed further, for two reasons. First, the emphasis on the

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284 Cem Emrence, "Imperial Paths, Big Comparisons: The Late Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Global History* 3(2008). p. 299
285 Ibid. p. 302
286 Ibid. p. 303
287 Ibid. p. 309
288 However, it should be noted that by the time I finished my research, I was unable to rconsult Emrence’s book-length study published in 2012.
nineteenth century places the historical trajectory at the end of a very long process, and to some extent takes for granted the very power relations that it seeks to explain. An accurate model of the historical trajectory of state-led transformation and consensual rule must address the historical context of power relations and their specific transformation prior to the nineteenth century—rather than taking nineteenth century power relations as the starting point. Second, the model for the interior path draws mostly on evidence from the Arab lands (and more specifically from Syria). The treatment of Anatolia, by comparison, is based on relatively weak empirical evidence. The relative scarcity of empirical evidence on Anatolia also makes it difficult to answer a whole range of questions, the most important of which pertain to the connections among the three regions and their respective historical trajectories. With regard to eighteenth century Anatolia, for instance, were there no connections between the coastal and inland areas? If not, how do we explain the relative isolation of each region and trajectory at a time when global and national markets were unifying the geopolitical, economic, and social realms more decisively than ever before—a question that the histories focusing on the coastal regions also need to explore more thoroughly? More specifically, when it comes to the Ottoman state’s centralization efforts throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and to the way in which these centralization efforts determined the political constitution of early twentieth-century Turkey, is there a difference between the fate of the Karaosmanoğlus (who could be seen as the ideal typical notables of the coastal regions) and the Germiyanzâdes (the ideal typical notables of the inland)? Finally, even though Emrence points out the importance of the institutionalization of a new administrative structure, the transformation of the legal realm seems to be of secondary importance to his model; whereas one of the most promising models to explain the transformations that took place in the nineteenth century focuses on legal theory and practice as the basis of the reconfiguration of relations of power. Moreover, it was an overarching legal framework that connected the seemingly different historical trajectories during Ottoman rule. The particularistic nature of law was not necessarily subordinate to different historical trajectories; it was a characteristic of the power relations that defined the early-modern Ottoman polity. In this sense, the Ottoman polity was comparable to other early-modern polities, and the transformation of the legal realm in the nineteenth was comparable to the transformation of the legal realm in other modern polities.

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of an approach that seeks to delineate the historical trajectories of different regions, the emphasis on regional diversity is an important one, which the present research seeks to contribute to. But instead of constructing a model, or subscribing to a well-defined theoretical model, the goal of this research is to prepare the groundwork for assessing the soundness of more comprehensive investigations of historical sociology. As such, it also seeks to examine a series of assumptions about the transformation of Ottoman polity, and to give a more grounded interpretation of the change that it took place in the eighteenth century. These assumptions include (but are not limited to) the following. First, attributing the importance of Kütahya in Ottoman polity to its being the administrative center of the province of Anatolia. Second, assuming the centrality of the role of tax-farming in the ascendance of the local notables and the emergence of a “homegrown modernity.” Third, assuming that the incorporation of

Ottoman economy into the global markets in the eighteenth century had largely negative effects on the Ottoman economy overall. Fourth and finally, assuming that the financial crisis of the late eighteenth century and the monetization of economy are closely related, and that the financial crisis did not change significantly the relationship between political privilege and wealth.

An assessment of these assumptions with regard to Kütaşya and its surrounding region shows the difficulty of neatly categorizing the major parameters of the socioeconomic transformation of the Ottoman polity in the early-modern period. Kütaşya, except in the period between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the socioeconomic characteristics of a frontier region determined the configuration of power relations, was almost always eclipsed by the more important regional centers. As the capital of the Germiyan principality, Kütaşya had enjoyed all the conditions necessary for a small principality to attain statehood. The frontier region had the military, bureaucratic, and intellectual human resources that carried with them the imperial legacy of the Seljuk state and the Byzantine Empire. The constant ebb and flow of the competing Byzantine and Seljuk states in the region had left behind not only an experienced bureaucratic legacy but also a group of warriors who could be used for further expansion. Artisans who also came to the frontier formed the backbone of the economic infrastructure, while their alliance with various religious groups provided stability for the social fabric of a principality. The Germiyans used all of these factors to establish themselves in the region. But Kütaşya was not exactly rich in natural resources—it was just at the frontier of the more fortunate Bithynia. Expansion was imperative, not only to control other competing principalities, but also to reach more fertile lands. However, the Germiyans were caught between two of the strongest contenders for supremacy in Anatolia, the Ottomans and the Karamans. The Mongol invasion of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries restructured the balance of power among the principalities, and was a huge blow to Ottoman suzerainty over the other principalities, but the Germiyans eventually succumbed to Ottoman rule.

Within the Ottoman Empire, Kütaşya not only was firmly controlled by the central authority but also was subordinate to such regional centers as Bursa, Manisa, Ankara, and Izmir—to say nothing of Istanbul. The firm control exercised by the Ottomans can be attributed related to a couple of factors. The region was incorporated into the Ottoman state in the early stages of the Ottoman expansion, and after the conquest of Constantinople, the full-fledged imperial structure was institutionalized in the regions first incorporated into the state. Once the Ottomans incorporated the Germiyan principality, the similarities between the institutional infrastructure established under Germiyan rule and that of the Ottomans (especially with respect to landholding and taxation) enabled the Ottomans to take over this small polity without much trouble. The timar system was institutionalized without much resistance. The Germiyan dynasty was not wiped out, but it made no political and economic claims in the region. Rather than challenging the Ottoman central authority directly over regional revenues, the Germiyans established a vakf. This helped them to survive for centuries under Ottoman rule.

Kütaşya was made the capital of the province of Anatolia in the middle of the fifteenth century, and throughout the sixteenth century, it also served as a training center for the princes to gain experience before they succeeded to the throne. But despite the fact that the princes had a large retinue stationed in and around the city, this rather short period during which Kütaşya was a princely district does not seem have left an impact on the city or the region. However,
Kütahya’s proximity to Istanbul enabled the central authority to exert control over the region and the city. The state could collect taxes relatively effectively and extract other resources to provision the capital and the military during the times of emergency—as it often was the case the end of the eighteenth century. While Istanbul benefitted from this proximity, Kütahya did not benefit as much because when the Celâlî rebels at the end of the sixteenth, and İbrahim Paşa of Egypt in the nineteenth century, very nearly captured Kütahya, and Istanbul did not (more precisely, could not) act immediately and effectively to defend the region. The only way in which Kütahya’s proximity to the capital seems to have helped the residents of the city was the availability of high credit in the hands of the non-Muslim moneylenders residing in Istanbul. However, evidence shows that the credit relations formed between the capital and Kütahya was not important. Kütahya did not benefit from a geostrategic position as major gateway to Istanbul or as a nexus of commercial routes either because it was located on an auxiliary route with regard to military expeditions and commercial networks. It was only the coming of the railways in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that truly connected Kütahya to a larger regional network and a national market.\(^{290}\)

In many respects, Kütahya was a typical middle-sized Anatolian town, and it underwent much the same developments that historians have observed for other Anatolian towns. Institutional stability of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries allowed rural and artisanal production to increase. Population also increased. Although western Anatolia had been heavily populated with nomadic groups, and their relation with the urban population and the peasants had been tense, the central authority was not under much pressure to subdue these nomadic groups in the sixteenth century. In any case, the nomadic groups did not migrate into the immediate vicinity of Kütahya. As is true of many other Anatolian towns, it was the Celâlî rebellions of late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries that seem to have had the greatest impact on Kütahya and the immediate vicinity. Kütahya the city escaped destruction thanks to its fortress, and also probably thanks to the negotiations between the central authority and the rebel forces. But the countryside must have been badly affected, and production must have fallen in the seventeenth century even after the rebellions subsided. Population also seems to have stagnated or decreased in the seventeenth century—and was slow to pick up in the eighteenth century. Evliyâ Çelebi, who visited the city in 1671, describes it as a quiet town but one that still bore the scars of the Celâlî rebellion. However, the social composition and political constitution of Kütahya were not fundamentally transformed by the crisis of the seventeenth century—to use a more comparative term. The central authority retained its hold over the revenues. There were no political contenders, and no resistance from different social and religious groups.

The economy of the sancak of Kütahya was regional to a great extent and remained so well into the early nineteenth century (and probably well into the Republican period). Production in the countryside was largely limited to the production of wheat and barley. The region did not have the olive trees of the Mediterranean coast, nor was it conducive to the production of cotton—two extremely valuable assets for commerce throughout the early-modern period and the nineteenth century. Nor was the region lucky enough—like Ankara—to specialize in the production of a specific commodity, such as mohair. Even the now-famous Kütahya-ware was produced for middle- and lower-class consumers, and was therefore of low-quality. Production

for the luxury market was Iznik’s specialty. After the seventeenth century, when Iznik disappeared as a production center, Kütahya retained its position but it never really experienced a boom in production—even at the regional level.

The eighteenth century did not bring major transformations either. The scarcity of court registers makes it nearly impossible to assess an important assumption about the first half of the eighteenth century—namely, that it was a period of economic recovery. Even if there was economic recovery in the first half of the eighteenth century, it must have remained largely regional. With the possible exception of the production of Kütahya-ware, there was no noticeable change in the manufacturing sector. Evidence from other parts of the empire—especially from Syria—suggests that with the increasing consumption of coffee, the demand for coffee cups also increased. As coffee consumption spread to the masses, the demand for lower-quality and cheaper coffee cups must have benefitted the cup makers of Kütahya. But Kütahya did not become part of the global trade network. For instance, when the capitulations allowed the French merchants especially a freer hand in trade and especially inland, where they had had limited access before the 1740s, Kütahya does not appear on their list of trade relations. While the French were quick to capitalize on the mohair trade in Ankara, and while they developed a network of trade and credit relations in Izmir and its hinterland, there is no evidence that this network included Kütahya, or any of its produce.

In assessing the socioeconomic development of the sancak of Kütahya, it is also imperative to look at credit relations and the monetization of the economy. The availability of relatively more primary sources allows us to study credit relations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries over two distinct periods: 1758-1788 and 1802-1828. Cash was scarce in Kütahya for most of the eighteenth century. Credit relations were widespread, but the amounts in circulation were small. In this respect too, the economic recovery does not seem to have injected cash into the economy. Compared to some of the surrounding regions, such as western and northern Anatolia, evidence based on the probate inventories shows that wealth accumulated in the Kütahya region was rather modest. Even the probate inventory with the highest value was not a par with the wealth of a big merchant from the Bursa region, or with the wealth of the local notables of western and northern Anatolia. The major difference between the two periods is that in the second period there was more cash in the economy and more wealth was accumulated by the wealthiest members of society. But the accumulation of wealth was not a general phenomenon; the disparity in wealth between the richest and the poorest sectors of society increased throughout the eighteenth century. The increasing accumulation of wealth on the part of the richest sector can hardly be related to changing patterns of production or to the rise of a new middle class. It is more appropriate to see it as a by-product of the monetization of the economy, which was itself closely related to the cash requirements of the state to finance the wars at the end of the eighteenth century. More importantly, privilege—political, economic, and cultural—played an essential role in the accumulation of wealth.

The local notables of Kütahya and the surrounding region were also among the less visible and less powerful, compared to the major local notables of other regions. They neither accumulated enough wealth to have an impact on the economy of their regions, nor rose to the top of the administrative hierarchy. Furthermore, tax farming does not seem to have altered socioeconomic relations in any significant way—especially when it was first implemented.
Significant revenues of the region continued to be granted as arpalık to high-ranking military officials or members of religious institutions. And the tax farms that brought higher revenues were controlled by the elite in Istanbul, who seldom seem to have relied on the local notables as intermediaries. True enough, the notables of Kütahya, like other notables, were appointed as mütesellim by the usually absentee provincial governors, but this was an administrative position and a political appointment rather than an economic investment in the malikânes on the part of the local notables. So one of most discussed consequences of the malikâne system—that it might become a venue for the local notables to invest their economic wealth and their military might to acquire an administrative position, and hence to have a say in politics—did not materialize in the case of Kütahya. There is also almost no evidence that the malikâne system, and the new taxes introduced in the eighteenth century that required the participation of the community, promoted the emergence of a civil society, or led to “homegrown modernity”. It is true, as Canbakal observes with reference to ‘Ayntab, that “the lack or scarcity of local sources, particularly biographical dictionaries and chronicles, has largely limited historians’ access to local voices in Anatolian cities. By contrast, the availability of, and over-reliance on, such sources for Arab cities has had an opposite consequence … Consequently, Anatolian cities continue to appear devoid of ‘civic pride, autonomy and collective identity’.”291 However, even if sources, such as biographies and dictionaries were available, much would still need to be done in order to make generalizations on the transformation of the political order in the eighteenth century.

The overall picture that emerges from an in-depth investigation of these assumptions is at times an ambiguous one, but as Eldem argues, a more realistic picture of the transformation of the eighteenth century—especially if it seeks to address different assumptions without subscribing to a particular theory of change—is likely to lead to such a result.292 However, this does not mean that this more realistic (and rather ambiguous) picture is inconsistent with a theoretical perspective. On the contrary, this investigation constitutes the groundwork for what Charles Tilly calls big structures, large processes, and huge comparisons.293 The transition to capitalism, the emergence of the nation-states, the creation of a market economy, revolutions, and the dynamics of social and economic upheavals are all examples of the big structures and large processes that concern historical sociology in particular. Even though the underlying metanarratives of these processes have long been criticized, they remain crucial to a better understanding of the present. New works of historical sociology continue to study the large processes and investigate such issues as the undevelopment of capitalism, and the role of the elite struggle in the formation of the modern states—albeit from a more interdisciplinary and critical perspective.294 Ottoman historiography was receptive to the critique of the metanarrative of the

292 Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade."
old concerns of historical sociology, but it has not yet tackled in any meaningful way the concerns of the new studies. Ottoman historiography has also been open to comparative perspectives, and has added a comparative dimension to its agenda with fair success, but comparison has been largely confined to the rise and fall of the empires. If, however, we are to reconsider the eighteenth century as a period of transformation, we need to diversify the field of comparison and rethink the dynamics of the transition to modernity.

The major problem today is therefore how to refine the interpretation of the eighteenth century. To argue that the economic, political, and cultural developments of the Ottoman Empire were on a par with those of Western Europe is untenable. On the other hand, to insist on a Eurocentric historical trajectory with industrialization and parliamentary democracy as the major end results of a long process, is to fall into an unproductive dichotomy of either–or. That is to say, there is a sharp and clearly defined historical trajectory that leads to modernity with all its concomitant institutions and practices, and another diverging path that inhibits this specific outcome. In each case, the main fallacy is one of teleology, which puts the emphasis on the existence or the absence of specific institutions, or historical patterns—all of which are measured according to the norms of the West. A more promising route is to take a comparative approach, and to assess more closely the transformation of power relations. The transformation of power relations can disclose both similarities and differences in an interconnected historical context. This research hopes to provide an empirical ground for reconsidering these issues.

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APPENDIX
TWO MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE LONG EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY – NOTABLES AND TRADE

ON THE LOCAL NOTABLES

Even though the emphasis on the process of decentralization and the rise of the local notables can be dated to the beginning of the twentieth century, the real focus and a theoretically articulated explanation of the importance of the rise of the local notables in the eighteenth century started after the Second World War. As far as the Arab lands are concerned, Albert Hourani’s ‘politics of the notables’ established a long-lasting framework of analysis. In his analysis, Hourani argued that the Arab elite, consisting of urban elite, merchants, ulema or the tribal leaders, acted as intermediaries between the center and their provinces. In their capacity as intermediaries, they retained an autonomy vis-à-vis the central authority but they were also instrumental in creating a political culture of negotiation that kept the empire intact for centuries. Hourani might have intended to portray the intermediary role of the âyâns as a part of a complex set of relationships that shaped the Middle Eastern political structure throughout the Ottoman rule, but one of the consequences of his framework of analysis (within the context of post-colonial era, and rising Arab nationalism of the 1960s and 70s) has been to generate “a localist-Arabist version of Ottoman provincial history, written from a local perspective, that is, based on local, non-Ottoman sources. Many of these are totally or partially decontextualized, that is they ignore, or merely pay lip service to, the Ottoman context of their subject matter.” The scholarly works that bring forth the politics of the notables may not be uniform in terms of their approach but insofar as they focus on the chronicles of the period, and on the local elite, these studies emphasize the political history at the expense of social and cultural history—hence, fall to a great extent into the category of history from above. As for the Balkans, and the Eastern Europe, a somehow different approach that mixed Marxism and nationalism was at play. In this perspective, economic history and class struggle played a more prominent role than the political history of the chronicles. Compared to the provincial studies in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the Arab provinces and the Balkans for the later periods, the history the Anatolian provinces in the eighteenth century remains understudied. Hathaway relates the paucity of the monographs dealing with the eighteenth-century provincial history to “the state-centered historiographical tradition dominant in modern republican Turkey.” Within this framework, the decentralization process, and the decline of the central Ottoman institutions, is usually interpreted as the decline of the land tenure system of the sixteenth century, and the ascendancy of the local notables seen as a negative development for the welfare of the Ottoman society because more often than not, the local notables were seen as the usurpers of a declining political system. If the political history of the provinces in the eighteenth century tended to reflect the concerns of the political regimes in the twentieth century (post-colonial nationalism, Marxism, emancipation, modernization from above), another tendency—this time a more economic

3 Hathaway, "Rewriting Eighteenth Century Ottoman History." p. 35
4 Ibid.
perspective—focused on the incorporation into the capitalist world economy. In this case, the provincial studies concentrated more on the ports cities, or coastal areas where the interaction with the foreign merchants was likely to change the social and economic structure. However, the studies based on the political culture preceded the studies based on the political economy approach, and “as a consequence, the two realms of inquiry—provincial political culture and provincial political economy—remained oddly separate until the very end of the twentieth century.”

One of the ways to refine our understanding of the eighteenth century is therefore to work more on the dynamics of the relationship between the center and the provinces. For instance, despite the emphasis put on the capital, the connection between the center and the provinces is still somehow weak. Most of the time, the connection between the two is either presumed, or constructed unilaterally as the center exerting power on the provinces. Of course, the policy decisions of the center—especially financial policies—exerted a major influence on the provinces, but the connection between the specific groups and how they interacted is still not well known. Major turning points for the center, the Edirne incident of 1703, Patrona Halil rebellion in Istanbul in 1730, and even the abolition of the Janissary corps in 1826 need to be studied with a much better contextualization that includes the interaction of the center and the provinces. Istanbul as the dominant center of political, economic, and cultural power in the empire emerges so large that even when other cities, such as Edirne, Bursa, Damascus, Aleppo, or Cairo come into the picture, they do so, almost always with reference to Istanbul. Hence, the politics of the imperial capital become the determining factor in order to assess the overall framework of transformation in the eighteenth century. There is no reason to deny the overwhelming importance of the capital, but the perspective of the historian depends to a great extent on where he decides to place himself to interpret the change. In this sense, a perspective from the provinces may well prove to be quite different in terms of the magnitude and the scale of the transformation.

Perhaps as a response to the overwhelming importance of the capital, the Balkan and Arab historiography sought to reverse this trend by putting much emphasis on the autonomy of the provinces, and constructed a nationalist narrative. To counterbalance the polarity of the narratives of the periphery (mostly represented by the Balkan and Arab provinces) and of the center (mostly represented by the capital, but also to some extent by the Anatolian provinces, perhaps to the exclusion of the Kurdish areas), a more integrative narrative has been proposed in the last decades. For instance, Toledano, has argued that what has been interpreted as decentralization and decline, should be seen as an intertwined process whereby Ottoman and local elites came to form a new and a more integrated strata. To begin with, the Ottoman ruling elite was not a military cast whose institutional boundaries were rigidly defined; rather, the ‘military-administrative’ elite was “loosely integrated, [and a] diversified group,” who sometimes went through a process of localization. The rise of the grandee household in the seventeenth century accelerated this process. The recruitment of the local peasantry, and other non-military subjects into the households of the provincial governors, and the tendency to appoint less and less officers from the centers to the provinces paved the way for the Ottoman officers to become localized and have a stake in the areas they were serving. The process of

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5 Ibid. p. 33
localization continued throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, accompanied by “a parallel process of Ottomanization, [that is to say] the gradual political, economic, social, and cultural integration of provincial notable families into the Ottoman elite.” 7 The decline or the dismemberment of this structure came only late in the nineteenth century when the resources were directed towards Europe with rampant imperialism, and when the local elites started to opt for nationalism rather than maintaining their allegiance with the Ottoman central authority.

Different aspects of this intertwined process of localization and Ottomanization have been emphasized by different scholars. While Karl Barbir focused specifically on the localization process of the Ottoman ruling class in Damascus from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth century, 8 Dina Rizk Khoury showed the extent to which the local notables were appropriating the local offices, and also emulating the material culture of the center in their own regions. Rarer are those approaches that try combine provincial dynamics with the political, institutional and legal changes that occurred in the center. More recently, as Ali Yaycıoğlu has shown in his comprehensive analysis of the period, this was at the same time a substantial institutional transformation whereby there was the political power of the central authority was disseminated “from to provinces, from imperial agents to provincial actors, [and] from the state to communities”—a process which finally redefined the basic tenets of the Ottoman polity, in 1808 with the Deed of Agreement. He argues that “as a result of the institutional transformation, the Ottoman Empire allowed the broader participation of the provincial actors in governance and politics at the provincial level, and gradually on the imperial scale. In fact, the Deed of Agreement (Sened-i ittifak), which was signed in that fall of 1808, between one of the factions of the central state and some regional power-magnates, signifies a movement in which the provincial elite participated in the political process on the imperial scene through a process of deliberation, collective responsibility and decision-making.” 9 Therefore, what has been for a long time defined as a process of decentralization, laid, in fact, the foundations of a new constitution, which grew out of the dynamics peculiar to the Ottoman society but was, at the same time, a response to the developments of an interconnected historical context of intense inter-state rivalry. Yaycıoğlu analyzes the process of institutional transformation at three fundamental levels: localization of the administrative system, privatization of the fiscal structure, and the communalization of the political representation. I have already pointed out the dynamics of the localization process with reference to Kunt’s works, and Toledano’s article. Yaycıoğlu also suggests that the marginalization of the governors appointed to the provinces from the center, turned them into nominal authorities, while local actors, primarily acting as deputy-governors (mütesellim) came to be vested with more and more administrative powers, which they used as political bargaining chips. Privatization was a similar process, which arose out of the fiscal necessities of the central authority, and also led to the strengthening of the administrative and fiscal autonomy of the local notables—a process, which I will discuss in more detail shortly. As for the communalization of the political power, Yaycıoğlu also suggests that throughout the eighteenth century, “while the status of ayan was transformed from a natural category to an

7 Ibid. p.155  
9 Ali Yaycıoğlu, "The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)" (Harvard University, 2008). p.5
acquired category, it was to be acquired not through appointment from top to bottom, but through the nomination of the community, from bottom to top.” Especially after the second half of the eighteenth century, the process of collective participation in the process of representation changed the “rules of governance”, and helped the communities “to develop a collective political awareness about their right as a source of authority.” This was a gradual and uneven process. That is, the institutionalization of the rules of governance came as a response to the changing circumstances, and depended on the configuration of the power relations in different regions. Yaycıoğlu (in line the arguments that localization and Ottomanization process was an intertwined process) also shows that what he calls the communalization of the political power was not unilateral process, but was the outcome of a process of negotiation and to some extent the unintended consequence of the fiscal demands of the central authority. This latter point, the transformation of the fiscal structure, as other scholars such as Ariel Salzmann and Yavuz Cezar have pointed out before for the malikâne and tevziat regulations respectively, was perhaps the most fundamental changes that allowed the consolidation of power of the local notables. They also argued that this consolidation of power had what may be termed a trickling down effect and included larger segments of the population into the decision making process as to how the tax burden should be distributed. Yaycıoğlu’s contribution is to show in detail the process whereby the financial change led to the rise of the local notables as public office holders. As he puts it,

the ayan, as the overseer of the district community, was more than just a tax-collector or an individual who carried out the business of the state and the orders of the higher authorities. He was also responsible not only for matters of state in the district but also for overseeing the public good, prosperity and security of the community. The documents … point to two sets of responsibilities, which were often juxtaposed: the important matters of the state (umur-i mühimme) and matters of the district community (umur-i vilayet or mesalih-i ibad, umur-i fukara ve re'aya). The ayan was expected to oversee both of these obligations, matters of the state as well as of the community. This gave the ayan a “public” character.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the “system seems to have developed organically”, that is, the process of turning the local notables from a natural into a formal offices was not initiated with the direct control of the central authority. The procedural details of the election of the local

10 Ibid. p.9 For a general account of this process, see Chapter Three. pp. 121-188
11 Ibid.
13 Let us also note the Yaycıoğlu makes between ayanhood and aynanship; “because the Ottomans used the term "ayan” for both community leaders in collectively and at the same time for a singular individual who acquired this status as an office, this double meaning of the term have confused several observers and historians. Therefore here I suggest the term “ayanhood” for the natural leadership and “ayanship” for the office of overseers, and I propose to understand this transformation from collective community leadership to public office-holding.” Yaycıoğlu, "The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)". p.124
14 Ibid. p. 133
notables are not clear either; there is not much data—if any—on who were allowed to participate in the election process, who were nominated under what conditions, how the election was carried out, and finally sanctioned. Only after 1765 did the central authority start to take steps in order to regulate certain aspects of the elections of the local notables. These regulatory interventions continued for the rest of the century, and intensified especially throughout the period of the wars with Russia (1768-1774, an interbellum period between 1774-1786, and 1786-1792). The wars with Russia also marked the end of a period of relative economic and financial improvement, and put further strain to the state’s financial resources. This strain further increased the state’s reliance on the âyâns in order mobilize human resources and finance the extraordinary expenditures. Concomitantly, Virginia Aksan argues that “the 1760 – 1830 period saw significant upheaval not just in the Ottoman military order but also in its political order, especially with the rise of provincial challengers to Ottoman hegemony, precisely in those areas in the Danubian theatre where warfare had been sustained and proved so costly.”\(^{15}\) But even though the Danubian theatre was the frontline for the war, it was not the only context where the local notables proved to be indispensable for the war effort, in Anatolia too, big local magnates, such as the Karaosmanoğlu in western Anatolia, or Caniklioğulları in northern Anatolia played major roles after 1768—and later on a target in the reform and centralization movements.\(^{16}\)

All of these processes were, of course, part of a complex transformation, and took different forms and followed different dynamics in different regions as a response to local social, economic, and political factors. However, as “in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, while in every corner of the Ottoman Empire there was a new typology of regional leadership, the Ottoman provincial world transformed into a polyarchic system, where the empire gradually shared its sovereignty with these regional power-holders in the provinces.”\(^{17}\) The second half of the eighteenth was therefore a period of political reconfiguration. I will return to the dynamics of the period between 1760 and 1820. Let us note, in passing here, that while Aksan seems to undermine the legal (read constitutional) implications of the social, economic, political, and military transformations of the period, Yaycıoğlu demonstrates quite convincingly that these changes were in fact constitutional—both literally and figuratively. Aksan argues that in the compared to the Ottoman empire (and Russia), the creation of modern armies in the West was “a constitutional rather than a cultural issue”\(^{18}\) and shows the extent to which the increasing emphasis on the Muslim faith, and the duty to fight the infidel (Moskof, in this case) in the state rhetoric was part of the war mobilization efforts—a point that Yaycıoğlu does not emphasis in his account of the political transformation of the polity. According to Aksan, the emphasis on the “Muslimness” was a way to reassert the control of the state in the provinces, especially in those regions with a Muslim majority, such as Anatolia. Especially after the 1790s, the state started to recruit more actively from the Anatolian provinces, in this sense too, “the significance of recruiting from the Anatolian countryside] lies not so much in performance as in composition—most … were Anatolian peasants, largely of Turkic stock, and Muslim. Secondly, the mobilization of the countryside represented Selim III’s attempt at establishing a relationship—a


\(^{16}\) Ibid. p. 183-193

\(^{17}\) Yaycıoğlu, “The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)”. p. 10

\(^{18}\) Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700-1870 an Empire Besieged*. p. 181

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slim coalition at best—between Istanbul and the countryside, in opposition to the entrenched Janissary force in Istanbul." With her emphasis on the rhetoric of “Muslimness”, and the changing recruitment patterns, Aksan also argues that the need to reform the army led the central authority to seek new alliances with provincial governors, which was the real context of the rise of the âyâns, and their empowerment.

While Aksan highlights the implications of the short term context for the rise of âyâns, and the ethnic and religious aspects of the transformations in the second of the half of the eighteenth century, Yaycıoğlu stresses the longer term changes in the administrative structure, economic and financial policies, and their implications for the creation of a new constitution for the Ottoman polity. It is important, in this respect, to point out that for both authors, one of the consequences of this significant period of change was the mechanisms through which the central authority was able to assert its hegemony after the second half of the nineteenth century. On this point, Yaycıoğlu pays attention to the minute administrative process through the state tried to assert its legitimacy not through the direct control of the process of election and provincial politics, but as “ultimate arbiter, if necessary.” Various edicts promulgated after the 1760s bear witness to the state’s regulatory role rather than top down imposition of its rules. As for Aksan, she seems to think that after the turn of the nineteenth century—especially with Mahmud II’s reign—the Ottomans opted for “an exclusive, absolutist model.” Even though the differences between the authors cannot be reduced to mere disagreements about the details on the writing of the eighteenth century, they do not need to be seen a contradictory either, and can be used as complimentary explanations for a more comprehensive account of the eighteenth century. While these new integrative approaches successfully criticize a variety of long held assumptions about decentralization, decline, the rise of the âyâns, and the absolutist nature of the Ottoman state and propose another narrative for the long eighteenth century of the Ottoman empire, Karen Barkey tries to situate the eighteenth century and the same administrative, fiscal, and military transformations into a longer term with reference to the longevity of the Ottoman polity, and to explain them with reference to what may be termed the historical sociology of institutional flexibility.

Even though a comparative approach (of the Ottoman Empire with the Habsburg, Russian, Roman and Byzantines empires) is an essential component of Barkey’s analysis of the longevity of the Ottoman Empire, we can leave aside her references to other polities and focus more on her account of the transformations of the eighteenth century. For Barkey too, the eighteenth century represents a period of profound transformation. However, as far as the “organizational modus vivendi” of the earlier centuries is concerned, she also sees significant

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19 Ibid. p. 197
20 Aksan states that “responding to his opponents to his military reforms in Istanbul, Selim III had to acquire provincial allies: hence, he unintentionally recast centre-periphery politics to suit his vision of reform [even though the emergence of great rural households was not new, 1760 – 1830 has been dubbed as “the age of the ayans”] … the argument here is that they emerged precisely because of the military needs of the empire for defence as well as reform.” Ibid. p. 214
21 Yaycıoğlu, "The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)". p. 151
22 Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700-1870 an Empire Besieged. p. 223
continuities. According to Barkey’s “structural institutionalist network approach,” the Ottoman polity was able to connect not only a wide variety of socioeconomic structures, but also to respond to the changing internal and external conditions with a flexible institution structure. At the start, the brokerage abilities of the early Ottoman rulers had enabled them to exploit the material and human resources of a frontier region, which was extremely fluid in terms of cultural identities and political alliances. Once the frontier Ottoman principality acquired the political, economic, and military power to form a state, this brokerage was transformed into an institutional feature of the new state, which Barkey characterizes as a hub-and-spoke structure. The “pragmatic flexibility” of the early Ottoman polity, which was the built-in feature of the evolution of the institutions of the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, enabled the central authority to successfully negotiate political, economic, and cultural claims coming from the peripheral actors, and construct a legitimate hierarchical order. In this respect, the “brokerage was key to the establishment of the incipient state, whereas its development into an empire was constructed as a hub-and-spoke structure, maintaining vertical integration and horizontal segmentation at the same time.” Like the other scholars who point out the intermediary role of the local notables, Barkey also emphasizes the extent to which intermediary actors were essential in keeping the imperial structure together. What has been perceived as decentralization, decline, or the rise of the local notables was therefore very much in line with the organizational logic of the empire that had been unfolding since its inception.

However, Barkey does not only situate the eighteenth century in an institutional-structural continuum, but also points out those developments that prepared the end of the empire, and laid the foundations of a new political structure. The empowerment of new political actors was one of the developments that took place in this period of transition. Three significant events, 1703 Edirne Incident, 1730 Patrons Rebellions (and the end of the Tulip Period), and the signing of the Deed of Agreement in 1808, changed the political landscape and “the result was a forceful broadening of the base of political power in the empire, in which each event appealed to and called for broader political participation. Such a process definitely marked the reorganization that ratcheted up the stakes in politics, spread to the provinces, ignited rebellions, and transformed the nature of factions and alliances in faraway regions of the empire.” This broadening base of the political empowerment and participation also allowed the new actors, and the alliances that they would form, to generate their own responses, which Barkey defines as alternative protomodernities, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this newly emerging context, rather than representing the decline of the empire, most of the notables who would sign the Deed of Agreement in 1808, were in fact flexible and pragmatic enough the side with the central authority in order to maintain the empire—albeit under a new configuration of power relations. Most of the notables supported the policies of reformist rulers such Selim III (1789-

23 Barkey argues that “the organizational modus vivendi that had been accomplished [in the earlier periods] operated in the eighteenth century to produce alternative forms of organization and adaptation.” Barkey, Empire of Difference the Ottomans in Comparative Perspective. p. 194
25 For references to the theoretical background of this analysis from the perspective of historical sociology, see especially, Barkey, Empire of Difference the Ottomans in Comparative Perspective. pp. 70-72
26 Ibid. p. 193
27 “The historical unfolding of an organizational logic” is Barkey’s own words, ibid. p. 194
28 Ibid. p. 200
1807) and Mahmud II (1808-1839) because retaining the imperial structure intact was more advantageous for them to accumulate more wealth, political control and social status.29

The empowerment of the local notables was not an isolated phenomenon, and the proper historical context within it can best be explained is not confined to the Ottoman Empire. It took place within and as response to the military competition in the Eurasian zone, and the dynamics of changing global trade relations. Had the political empowerment of the local notables remained confined to their provinces, they might have still exerted influence on the state but it is highly unlikely that the state would have signed an agreement recognizing them as legitimate political actors. In other words, local notables would have remained peripheral if they had not been able to connect to each other, and to the dynamics of a larger context. Barkey argues that commercialization and tax farming were the two macrohistorical developments that increased the horizontal connections among the local notables as well as their vertical connection to the state. Halil İnalcık,30 Mehmet Genç,31 and Ariel Salzmann32 were the first to draw attention to the new economic, social, and political consequences of the tax farming (malikâne) system. I have already pointed out that the Ottoman state, from early on, subcontracted the rights to collect taxes in return for advance annual payment. However, in most cases such subcontracting was limited to certain revenue generating sources, such as the mines, and was not widespread. Later on, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, tax-farming coexisted with the timar system. As a fiscal policy, which most of the early modern states resorted to, it was used to subcontract those resources that the state could not administer efficiently and to generate cash income in times of financial strain. For the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, tax farming (iltizam) was usually limited to three years, and the state controlled various aspects of the revenue collection. With the constant wars at the end of the seventeenth century, the increasing military spending, an expanding bureaucracy, the state needed constant cash flow to its treasury. Broadening the tax base, eliminating the tax exemption of the privileged classes, and direct taxation would be much more beneficial for to fill the coffers of the state, however the Ottoman state, just like most of the early modern polities, did have the administrative, and bureaucratic structure to implement direct taxation easily. Furthermore, due a variety of other factors, from the particularistic character of laws to the difficulties to monitor the collection of taxes, the state relied more and more on the local notables to collect taxes. The promulgation of a new fiscal policy in 1695 grew out of these concerns and limitations.

Once again the immediate reason was to generate new cash income for the treasury, and at the same time to address some of the problems related to the economic inefficiency of the tax farms and the oppression of the tax payers by mültezims, (tax-farmers, holders of an iltizam) who

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29 The Deed of Agreement benefited both the state and the ayans. “For the state then, the Sened-i İttifak may not have been a complete political victory, but certainly it was a political act of consolidation. For the ayan, the Sened-i İttifak also was not a political victory, but an event that demonstrated their potential relational power. The peripheral elites had come to the center, empowered by horizontal ties, but saw their interest anew in bolstering central power over which they now had much sway.”Ibid. p. 224
30 Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," Archivum Ottomanicum 6(1980).
31 Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi," in Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet Ve Ekonomi (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2000).
32 Salzmann, "An Ancien Regime Revisited: Privatization and Political Economy in the 18th Century Ottoman Empire."
instead of trying to invest in their tax farming units to increase the production and the revenue, sought to extract as much as tax they can from the tax payers during limited time they held the tax farm. What was so different about the tax farming system that was put into effect in 1695 was that the duration and the extent of the rights of the tax farmers. Malikâne as was now sold to the highest bidder for life-time, and the tax farmers enjoyed much greater freedom in the management of their resources. In this way, the state hoped that to increase the short term cash income for the treasury, and to implicate the tax farmer more firmly in their tax farms and therefore boost the production and the conservation the revenue sources. Since the tax farmers could now hold their tax farm for a life-time, it was expected that they would be more involved in increasing their revenues. Once the tax farmer died, the revenue unit was supposed to revert to the state, but it was promulgated that the inheritors of a tax farmer would be in advantageous position if they wanted to retain the tax farm, and would be preferred in the sale of tax farm. In short, the tax farmer could hold the malikâne as a private property. Indeed, as many scholars who studied the malikâne system, this was a process of privatization of the revenue sources. However, the malikâne had far greater ramifications than providing cash income for the state, and the privatization of the revenue sources.

For instance, Barkey argues that tax farming helped to create the competitive market conditions in the Ottoman Empire more than the trade relations with the West. In a polity where the state ownership of the land was the predominant form of ownership, “not only did this new process allow for the privatization of land and enterprises and made enterprises alienable, but it also initiated a process of appointment that relied on the market. That is, by allowing for the highest bidder, it brought about market competition and facilitated market relations … That is, in this odd way, market relations evolved from tax farming rather than from commercialization.” The important point here is that the sale of the tax farms was not confined to the bidders and the eventual malikâne-holders only. There was a trickling down effect in the sale and the management of the tax farms. To begin with, the number of the malikânâes that were put to auction was kept rather limited, and was confined to those revenues sources mostly in the eastern provinces. The sale was a mechanism for the state to entice the wealth of the private individuals and to put their wealth into circulation through fiscal procedures and market relations. Empirical studies show that in the first years of the sale, wealthy military personnel as well as administrative cadres and the ulema constituted the majority of the tax farmers. The state was able to attract the private wealth accumulated in hands of the military-administrative cadres. Perhaps more important than the number of the malikânâes held by the military-administrative cadres was that their down payment constituted 71 per cent of the cash income that the state was able to collect. This in turn shows that they were able to buy the most expensive tax farms.

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33 The imperial edict, which promulgated the malikâne regulation was first Mehmet Genç, and since then other scholars also published it. For this specific edict as well as other promulgations, and reports on the malikânâes, especially in the first years of its application, see Erol Özvar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Uygulaması* (Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2003). pp. 171-180

34 Barkey, *Empire of Difference the Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*. p.233

35 Özvar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Uygulaması*. As Özvar points out, it is not easy to draw a clear line between the military class and the civilians. And furthermore, there are cases in which the social status of the malikâne-holder was not mentioned. But despite these reservations, there emerges a clear trend, which shows that the majority of malikâne-holders were from military-administrative cadres.
Another crucial aspect of the tax farms was that an ever growing circle of moneylenders, intermediary people, partnerships and subcontractors came to be implicated in the sale and the administration of the malikânes. In fact, according to Salzmann and Barkey, the growing number of the people associated with the tax farms was the most important consequence of this fiscal policy. The elites of the military-administrative class were the first and the most dominant group to acquire a variety of tax farms. They must have seen the tax farms as a good economic and political investment opportunity to either strengthen their status within the established order, or in some cases as an opportunity to advance within the ruling cadres. The fact that the bidders for a tax farm often borrowed money from the moneylenders shows that the competition was also intense. In this way, the moneylenders came to be implicated in a cash nexus centered in the capital. More importantly, non-Muslim moneylenders—Jews, Armenians, Greeks—were also drawn into the circle. Furthermore, these malikâne-holders who often resided in Istanbul, left the administrative matters to the local notables, and subcontracted their tax farms. The practice of subcontracting the tax farms strengthened further the political and economic power of the local notables. Local notables became part of the network not only through the subcontracting process, but also by buying their own tax farms. In most cases, they could not compete with the elites of the capital for expensive tax farms but could buy less important ones in their regions. For most of the eighteenth century, the income accruing from the malikânes steadily increased. While the economic and the political network formed around the tax farms expanded, the central elite retained their predominance in the shares of the malikânes. By mid-century, the investments calculated on the basis of down payments and directly related to the malikâne reached 4.3 million kurus (while it was around 550,000 kurus at the beginning of the century.) The number of the malikâne-holders (individually or in partnership) increased from 771 in 1768 to 963 in 1789, and their share in malikânes rose from 65 per cent to nearly 87 per cent. In 1787, the income from the down payments had reached 13.6 million. Also emphasizing the continuities and the transformations that marked the eighteenth century, Salzmann points out that the cash nexus radiating from Istanbul laid the foundation of a new political organization. In her words,

The devolution, transfer, and partnership of shareholders of tax farms … premodern "privatization" did not necessarily contribute to economic and political disaffection with the state. Instead, it fostered a distinct form of sociopolitical integration: vertically, the ricâl-t devlet, the Ottoman aristocracy of service and courtiers cultivated extensive networks across the empire in order to manage their assets; and horizontally, as [the local notables] (esrâf ve ayân) invested in smaller scale tax-farming as a means for creating spheres of influence within the city and the countryside. Not "indirect rule" or the solvent of an imperial structure, tax farming should be considered state formation by other means.

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36 It is important to note that that was general trend. Not only there were fluctuations in the total income accruing from the malikânes, but also the average yearly income that went to the state treasury changed. For instance, in 1695, that is in the first year of the malikâne sales, the income was around 20 million akçes, and even though this figure reached 126 million in 1703, the average yearly income had dropped to 14,600,000 akçes. Ahmet Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1985). p. 132
37 If we accept that 1 kurus was 120 akçe.
39 Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi." p. 282
40 Salzmann, Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State. p. 10-11
Another crucial dimension of this spreading cash nexus was the contractual relationship that it engendered. This new relationship was not only confined to the fiscal obligations of the tax farmers toward the state, or the subcontractors to their lessor. When a tax farmer residing in Istanbul subcontracted the management of his tax farm to a local notable, the relationship engendered more than notable’s collecting the revenues and sending them to the capital. This was at same time a new form political contract because it implied administrative and managerial powers for both parties. Malikâne represented both private interests of the tax farmers and the public authority of the state because along with the guarantee to hold a tax farming unit for life in return for a down payment and yearly rents, the tax farmers also enjoyed extensive fiscal administrative powers within his tax farm. As Yaycıoğlu argues, “by giving these privileges, the state expected the *malikane-holder* to protect the tax payers, to invest in the unit and not to over exploit the tax base. In other words, he was expected to connect his private interest to the public interest of the community in his unit. In other words, the state turned to deepening the "privatization" of authority in order to be able to … protect its tax base, thereby maintaining law and order in a more efficient way.”

The only realm which the tax farmers could exercise any authority upon was the judiciary, which would be at the center of political and legal tensions of the nineteenth century, and the centralization movements that would accelerate after 1830s. In other words, while the fiscal privileges of the tax farmers were the ground upon which local notables could build their political claims—a century long process, which culminated in the Deed of Agreement,—“fiscal patronage anticipated formal bureaucratization of the state”. These two tendencies—the political and fiscal empowerment of the local notables and the bureaucratization of the state—were two different aspects of the same process, and determined to a great extent the transformation of the Ottoman polity in the eighteenth century. The central authority was able to respond to the fiscal and administrative requirements of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries by transforming and enlarging the political realm of decision-making and participation, and thus retaining its legitimacy, “yet, the unintended by-product of such an extension of distributive was that it allowed provincials to develop their own new world.”

Even though scholars do not interpret the dynamics of the eighteenth century as one of decline, there was an undeniable tension between the empowerment of the local notables and the centralization and bureaucratization of attempts of the central authority. Both the benefits and disadvantages of the malikâne system were discussed right from the beginning, and the system was not without its critiques. The benefits of the tax farming were obvious; it provided the state with the immediate cash requirements, it enabled the state to tap into the private wealth, and the contractual nature of the tax farming was an important step towards standardizing the taxation. For most early modern states, standardization of taxation was at least as important, if not more, as the necessity to increase their cash income because this was crucial step in order to do away with a variety of privileges (exemption from taxation was a privilege, and a marker of social and political status), to broaden the basis of the taxable population, to increase the efficiency of tax collection, and to expand direct taxation—all of which help states to consolidate their centralized bureaucratic power. With a limited (but steadily growing) administrative and bureaucratic structure, the central authority could not easily expand the direct taxation policies, but had to rely on intermediaries. In that sense, the Ottoman state’s policies were commensurable with other early modern states. The fact that there was a great deal of interest in buying tax farms, the income from the sales of tax farms increased

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41 Yaycıoğlu, "The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)". p. 75
42 Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State*. p. 119
43 Barkey, *Empire of Difference the Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*. p. 236
continuously throughout the eighteenth century, and that the system lasted (with some substantial changes after 1770s) for more than century also attests to its success. However, it was not without its shortcomings, and paradoxes. As far its economic efficiency is concerned, it was a method of risk aversion since the down payment and the yearly income was guaranteed for the state. And yet, for exactly the same reason if a given tax farms started to bring more revenue than initially agreed upon by the contract, the state could not benefit from the higher revenues, which accumulated in the hands of private tax farmers. Moreover, it was important to make sure that the tax farms were not accumulated in the hands of a few individuals. Despite the initial interest in the system, it was abolished in 1715, only to be reinstated a few years later with some modifications—policy decisions that probably reflect the ambiguity of the practice, and the unease of the central authority with the shortcomings of the system.

The tension-ridden—even paradoxical—nature of the system did not escape the contemporaries. On the one hand, for those who were favor of the practice, malikâne was way to rectify the shortcoming of the previous short-term iltizam system, and a productive way to balance the state budget. On the other, the practice was, in a sense, legitimizing the intermediary position of the tax farmers, and cutting the state from its tax base, both politically and economically. It was politically detrimental to state’s interests because the tax farmers were given administrative and executive power within their tax farms, with minimal state intervention. For the critics, the private interests of the tax farmers could cost the state dearly because unlike the previous tımar holders, they were guaranteed to hold their revenue sources and would not be willing to participate in war efforts like in return for the revenues that were granted to them. It was economically detrimental too because it “prevented the central authority from renewing its assessment of the tax base on a regular basis.”

This tension remained as long as the tax farming was practiced. As Salzmann succinctly summarizes,

Such agreements were not merely economic transactions. Although privileges and immunities were not rights in the classical sense, they were from ephemeral. In the Ottoman case, tax farming implicitly or explicitly entailed a redefinition of obligations and privilege, hence of political status. On a more abstract plane, long-standing privileges, like property, established new boundaries between state and society. Cumulatively, revenue contracting and venal offices often constituted veritable forms of governance. Moreover, these privileges or contractual relations established a baseline from which subjects might make new demands of central authority or, alternately, erect barriers against the further state encroachment on local authority.

The political empowerment of the local notables, and the concomitant financial base created what Salzmann calls “government in the vernacular.” That is to say, novel local forms of governance. Both Yaycıoğlu and Barkey agree that the—mostly unintended—consequence of the state policies led to the development of powerful local agencies, whose functions went beyond their being an intermediary between the local population and the central authority. Hourani’s emphasis on the politics of the notables as the intermediaries and on the relationship between the capital and the provinces as complementary rather than absolutist—even though insightful—pertains only to a stage in the development of local governance. The transfer of administrative, executive, and even judicial

44 Yaycıoğlu, "The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)", p. 73 For a discussion of the different perspectives of the contemporary Ottoman officials, and intellectuals on the tax farming, see esp. pp. 99-109
45 Salzmann, Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State. p.21
46 Ibid. Chapter 3, pp. 122-175
powers from the center to the provinces signify the transition from imperial to the government in the vernacular. Obviously, this was not an abrupt, and a wholesale transfer of power. It was gradual, and piecemeal, “like a dialect that consists of an imperial syntax and a local vocabulary, vernacular government entailed a gradual transformation of the character and content of rule that differed depending on which branches of … administration were affected.”  Meeker gives a more analytical twist to Salzmann’s rather figurative description, and calls the same process “regional governance regimes”. Regional governance regimes consisted of “networks of large patriarchal families who established themselves around one or two leaders; developed their resources and influence through multiple state and nonstate activities and positions; extended their networks to incorporate clients; whether lesser notables or peasants; and both in their local rule and in their understanding of their legitimacy mimicked the ruling household of the sultan.”

The success of these regimes varied depending on a variety of factors; from their connection to the local and international trade routes to the military capabilities of the local notables and their relations with the central authority. The limited scope of these regime—compared to the Ottoman Empire, or a modern nation-state—determined both their success and failures vis-à-vis the centralization policies of the central authority especially after 1830s. They were able to create new patronage ties, exert a good deal of influence on the fabric of society with their investments, and emerge as a political and social alternative to the imperial modes of governance, but because the scope of the natural and human resources they could rely on was limited, they could not resist the last centralization efforts of the Ottoman state. Furthermore, local notables, even though some of the acted in unison in the signing of the Deed of Agreement, did not represent a homogenous social class with clear cut economic and political interests.

The competition among them was also another factor that acted against the consolidation of their power beyond the nineteenth century. However, the fact that some of these local notable families survived even after the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, and under the new and even more centralized regimes of the nation-states attests to their resilience and the socioeconomic and political power that they had accumulated throughout the centuries, but especially in the eighteenth century.
An even bolder claim about the local notables is that “even if the long run they were not successful, the notables represented an alternative form of modernity in the empire.”\(^{51}\) According to Barkey, changing notions of property was at the core of these alternative forms of modernity because a push towards a modern notion of exclusive private property gave the local notables further incentives to invest in their tax farms, and provided them with the material conditions to challenge the central authority. While for the central authority tax farm was a part of fiscal policy for cash income, risk aversion, a form of internal borrowing, and long-term care of taxable resources, for the notables it meant planning and investment, which led to “a well-developed sense of property.”\(^{52}\) Therefore during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the struggle was about the reformulating the legal contours of private property. Barkey argues that because tax farming was a prelude to the modern notions of private property, the local notables could be seen as the first entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the patronage networks they established in their regions—in a similar fashion, and emulating the central authority—necessitated novel forms of governance. The local notables, especially those who were connected to the new trade routes, with their knowledge about the local conditions, and their function as the nexus of the flow of information, invested in improving the infrastructure, in transforming the production patterns, and also in strengthening the connection to the lucrative markets. Therefore the role they played in transforming the social fabric of their regions was as important as, if not more, than the central authority—a process, which Barkey calls “homegrown modernity.”\(^{53}\)

In a similar vein, Salzmann talks about a potential “federalist alternative,”\(^{54}\) which developed throughout the eighteenth century but reforms of the Tanzimat period (1839-76) were able to suppress and replace it with a more top down centralized state structure. The groundwork of this alternative form of government was laid in the eighteenth century, and took its most concrete form in the signing of the Deed of Agreement (which Salzmann translates as Charter of Federation) because “the agreement between subject and sovereign reflected a sense of partnership. In exchange for mutual defense, past privileges were elevated to permanent rights.”\(^{55}\) The Deed of Agreement represented therefore a workable compromise between the state and the governments in the vernacular (or different regional governance regimes, in Barkey’s terminology.) Whether the central authority ever intended to take the Deed of Agreement and a federalist alternative seriously or saw the Agreement merely as short-term compromise until it gathered enough military and administrative strength to launch another wave of centralization by eliminating the provincial regimes is a moot point. It seems that from Salzmann’s perspective the loss of Greece, Algeria and Egypt and other local uprisings in the first decades of the eighteenth century reinvigorated the conviction that the federalist alternative was not a viable route to take in order to defend the empire against the military assaults of the Western powers and Russia, and to modernize the economy in order to compete with the rapidly industrializing countries. But as Yaycıoğlu suggests, despite the fact that the provincial challenge was to a great extent curbed with the implementation of a reformist agenda, to connect the social, economic, political, and legal dynamics that led to the Deeds of Agreement in 1808 with the formation of the nation-states after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, provides a more

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51 Barkey, *Empire of Difference the Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*. p.257
52 Ibid. p.259
53 Ibid. p. 260
54 Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State*. pp. 187-199
55 Ibid. p. 187
comprehensive account of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and the Middle East, as well as a more in-depth understanding of the democratic experiences of these regions.\(^{56}\)

**ON TRADE**

If the discussions revolving around the rise of the local notables and on how to best interpret the process of decentralization constitute a major field of inquiry to explain the internal dynamics the eighteenth century Ottoman history, the very nature and consequences of the trade relations with the West constitute the external dynamics. Obviously, to draw a clear line between internal and external dynamics is nearly impossible, and scholars of the eighteenth century Ottoman history have noted the extent to which the trade relations with the West enabled some of the local notables to become political alternatives to the Ottoman state. Nevertheless, insofar as the emphasis of the scholars is on the political, administrative, and institutional change, the narrative is an internal one, and the trade relations figure only as secondary in their explanatory framework. Furthermore, as I have pointed out above with reference to Hathaway, there was a disjuncture between the studies on the political culture of the provinces and on the political economy of the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist world economy at least until late the 80s. However, despite the substantial shift of emphasis from the internal factors to the external ones, that is to say, to trade relations, this did not change the basic tenets of a narrative of inescapable decline. While the decentralization process went through different phases, from the rise of local notables in the eighteenth century to the separatist-nationalist movement in the nineteenth, the trade relations were also one of gradual incorporation, and hence, colonization of the Ottoman economy. According to this latter, externalist perspective, the unequal trade relations were based on the export of the raw material from the Ottoman Empire, and import of finished manufactured goods from the West; a process, which not only led to a constant capital flow from the Ottoman Empire to the West, but also totally inhibited any industrial development in the empire. This pattern of unequal trade relations, or dependency started already in the seventeenth century, accelerated throughout the eighteenth, and led to the full incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy as an exporter of raw material.

A set of consequences follow from this overarching schema. First of all, the explanatory framework relies on the primacy of the economic and commercial relations, relegating the extra-economic factors to the background. This assumption also locates the modern economic development, but especially the industrialization process of the West in the seventeenth century, and takes for granted that the trade relations between the Ottoman Empire with the West in the eighteenth century represent the encounter of two different worlds—an industrialized, or industrializing West, and a pre-industrial, pre-modern Ottoman Empire. Hence, the assumption is that these two entities are politically, economically, and culturally incommensurable. Secondly, the incorporation process occurred mainly through the trade relations. Rather the internal dynamics of the mode of production, and the relations of production in the empire, the consequent underdevelopment (or the late development) of the Ottoman economy (or the economies of the nation-states that succeeded the empire) has more to do with the nature of the commercial relations, which caused the flow of capital and the raw materials from the empire to the West. The impact of this general pattern was nevertheless uneven depending on the

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\(^{56}\) Yaycıoğlu, "The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)". pp. 13-14
landholding patterns in different parts of the empire. The incorporation process benefited mostly the local notables who had been consolidating their hold in their provinces, and organizing the agricultural production in order to meet the demand of the West for raw material. Therefore, and thirdly, the debates on the existence and the extent of the large estates (çiftliks) farmed to meet the demands of an expanding capitalist world market have been, since the 80s, the intersection of the political culture and political economy. The divergent trajectories of the studies on the local notables, and the trade patterns with the West converged on the topic of the intermediary role of the notables in integrating the Ottoman economy into the capitalist world economy. The newly acquired administrative roles of the local notables helped them to access to the markets, and have a legitimate and secure position as their commercial transactions. They used a variety of strategies from outright oppression to money lending in order to coerce the peasantry to produce for the world market. They used their administrative roles as tax farmers and sought to increase their legal rights at the expense of the small producers—a development, which the central authority had tried to prevent since the very foundation of the empire. Elena Frangakis-Syrett summarizes the consequences of this development which spiraled into the vicious circle of underdevelopment of the manufacture.

The capital accumulated from trade by these administrators-cum-çiftlik owners was invested diversely: some of it was used to purchase more land, greater tax farming rights, or state offices; a portion was committed to further trading or money-lending activities; a part was spent on luxuries; and the rest was hoarded. However, there was no investment in manufactures, at least not on any considerable scale, because political instability, social unrest, economic uncertainty, and—particularly in the closing decades of the eighteenth century—the impoverishment of the masses limited the internal market for manufactured goods. Furthermore, the lack of fixed capital, which was always exceeded by circulating capital, may well have hindered existing manufactures.

Therefore, while the integration patterns into the world market provided a stimulus for economic change, this did not alter the pre-capitalist relations of production, but empowered the provincial notables politically, and hence led to further weakening of the central authority. Especially, the local notables of the Balkans used their economic and political power to initiate and lead nationalist movements. Their rise in the eighteenth century might have culminated in a new constitutionalist agreement, but once their integration into the world economy empowered them even more, nationalist aspirations brought about the end of the constitutionalist (or federalist) compromise. The clash of the centralization efforts and the nationalist movements under the leadership of the local notables led to the break-up of the Empire in the nineteenth century, starting with the Balkans. Another corollary of this schema is the intermediary role of the non-Muslims. Apart from the local notables, non-Muslim Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, especially the merchants and bankers (a group which can be seen as the nascent bourgeoisie of the empire) benefitted from the trade relations with the West. Their intermediary position, as different from the administration position of the local notables, was also guaranteed through legal regulations, most concretely, with the new capitulary agreements after the second half of the eighteenth century.

57 Other than individuals works, see the essays in Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak, eds., *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991).
century. Their economic ascendancy in turn fueled and aggravated religious tensions, and politicized ethnic and religious identities throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Both the theoretical assumptions and the empirical evidences that go into the making of this general framework of interpretation of the dynamics of the trade relations between the Ottoman Empire and the West have been criticized. To start with, it has been pointed out that this framework of analysis is rather deterministic in that it does not take into consideration the agency of the Ottoman state, or that of the local actors. That is to say, according to this analysis, the Ottoman central authority, or the local actors act to a great extent in response to the demands of the West. The dynamics are determined by the level of economic development and the political relations that define the center and radiates from there to its peripheral areas. Therefore, despite the fact that it was supposed to be a critique of the modernization theories, which define the Ottoman economy as basically stagnant unless it is stimulated by external forces, the incorporation process also replicates similar Eurocentric assumptions about the development patterns of the West and the rest of the world. Furthermore, this interpretation posits an uninterrupted and a linear process that starts early in the seventeenth century, and reaches its mature form of domination in the nineteenth century. As Eldem points out in a recent reevaluation of the trade relations in general and the capitulations in particular, “it is rather striking that most scenarios concerning the evolution of Western trading activities in the eastern Mediterranean basin tend to reinforce the often-criticised vision of decline applied to the Ottoman Empire as a whole and more particularly, to its military and diplomatic performance against the growing power of Western nations.”

Recent studies suggest a couple of major reevaluations. First, the seventeenth and even the eighteenth century are too early to argue for the existence of a clear pattern of unequal trade relations. The threshold of a more or less clear pattern whereby the Ottoman Empire becomes mainly an exporter of raw material and importer of finished manufactured goods is pushed further to the second half of the eighteenth century, and the economic dominance and the control of fiscal administration of the Ottoman polity by the West occur only at the end of the nineteenth century. Second, and more importantly, the establishment of the dominance of the Western economic interests in the Ottoman Empire, cannot be explained solely through economic factors and as the end result of trade relations. The exclusive emphasis on the trade relations as if these constituted a completely separate realm of interaction, stems also from the Eurocentric models of development and the dominance of a language of liberal economy in historical thinking. Eldem, on the contrary, constantly makes the point that extra-economic factors were inseparable from what is perceived as the commercial realm. When the Western traders complained from the insecurity of the trade routes, the demands (gifts, or bribes in most cases) of the middle-men or the officials they had to deal with, or the inconsistencies and the unpredictability of the legal framework within which they had to operate, they were to a great extent trying to cut the middle men, and have direct access to the resources. However, local merchants and other intermediaries were much more competent about the local market conditions, and they seemed to have persevered in retaining this strategic position. For most of the eighteenth century, therefore, the Western traders could only use limited port cities, and had very limited access to the hinterland of their trading posts. In this sense, the interaction in the eighteenth century was not only about

59 Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade." p. 283
of buying and selling commercial items, but it was a struggle about the “taming” of the local conditions, and making the market much more predictable for Western interests.60

Third, it is also worth noting that the discrepancy, or the incompatibility of the resources that the historians rely on to reconstruct the trade relations in the eighteenth century, has an effect on the way they portray the dynamics of supremacy of the West. As Eldem puts it, “while European sources – especially for the eighteenth century – will enable researchers to draw continuous statistical tables of the major elements of trade and complement this information with a parallel flow of observations, comments and projections derived from reports and correspondence, Ottoman sources will require them to deal with a patchwork of imperial edicts, selected entries from court records, occasional surveys of customs activity and notes and memoranda addressed to and by the representatives of foreign powers in the Ottoman lands.”61 The discrepancy is not only between the Western and Ottoman sources, but even for the Western resources, the archival evidence for the eighteenth century is incomparably richer compared to the previous centuries. What is happening is a newly emerging perception in the West on the primacy of the economic activities, the role of the state in promoting commercial activity and national wealth, the role of the statistical precision in controlling one’s environment, and even one’s destiny—in a sense, it is the taming of the chance before the taming of the unreliable Ottoman economic and political landscape. In the new era, different state offices and the trading companies generated their own statistical data, and it is the wealth rather than the dearth of information, which created the discrepancies, and which forces today the historians to weigh the pros and cons of each source in order to come up with reasonable estimates—as the discrepancies of the data compiled by the “Bureau de la balance du commerce” (annual reports of the consul in Smyrna to the Minister of Marine) and “Chambre du commerce” (the statistical data compiled by the Chamber of Commerce) in eighteenth century France demonstrate.62 In comparison, Ottoman economic policy (or mentality) is usually seen as anti-mercantilist and still rooted in the pre-statistical era. Scholars usually accept Mehmet Genç’s tripartite description for the Ottoman economic mentality before the nineteenth century. Genç argues that the three defining features of the Ottoman economic system were provisionism, fiscalism, and traditionalism.63 The system was geared toward securing the flow of necessary commodities for the consumers, especially in the capital and in other strategically important cities, and run by a fiscal attitude that typically gave the priority to the needs of the central treasury. According to Eldem, it was this “Ottoman economic policy that essentially non- or anti-mercantilist [that] was the Achilles’ heel of the empire in its confrontation with the West”.64 The trade relations in the eighteenth century between the Ottoman Empire and the West were not necessarily a confrontation between two

60 As Eldem puts, “at any rate, without ceasing completely, the complaints of European merchants started to fade away rather visibly in the eighteenth century … for those nations who were able – and willing – to maintain their presence well into the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire would prove to be a much safer and more reliable environment. In fact, much more than an increase in the volume of trade, the most important change that the eighteenth century brought to the Levant trade was a gradual ‘taming’ of a half-hostile and hardly controllable world into a collaborative and eventually dominated one.” Ibid. p. 311
61 Ibid. p. 287-288
63 Genç, “Osmanlı İktisadi Dünya Görüşünün İlkeleri.”
64 Eldem, “Capitulations and Western Trade.” p. 307
essentially different historical trajectories, nor was there a clear pattern at least, in the eighteenth century, that could predetermine the domination of one over the other. The concomitant perceptions of the two economic systems at their different level of development and configuration reflected the two sides of the same reality—the dynamics of Levant trade. The discrepancy of the archival materials between the West and the Ottomans, and the more aggressive (if we are allowed to use a military term) economic policy of the Western trading nations reinforces the impression that the Ottoman polity (and non-Western contexts in general) was economically stagnant, and passive. The Achilles’ heel that Eldem refers to was therefore, especially for the Ottoman side, the unintended consequence of this relationship. While the mercantilist policies of the West continuously sought to change the balance of trade relations as matter of principle to their favor, and hence prepared the groundwork for the further incompatibility between the two economic systems after the industrialization process accelerated in the nineteenth century, the Ottomans followed a policy that allowed a growing disparity to turn into a relation of dominance.

However, as to the economic realities of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century, it is important to put into its proper context the consequences of visibility. That is to say, while international trade might have become more visible, its impact differed depending on the context. It is worth noting first that “even if one has to allow for the existence of a different and somewhat less clear perception of this trade from an Ottoman perspective, the dispersion and marginality of local sources on the subject clearly convey the message that what to European cabinets and trading companies was a major issue took, at the Ottoman level, the proportions of a rather small fish in a considerably larger pond.” Furthermore, the organization of the trade in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, had institutionalized the social, economic, and legal dimensions of the domestic trade along with the long-distance trade. This means that there was a group of merchants whose interests lied in protecting the domestic trade. Barkey’s remarks in this respect are important; “whereas the [merchants engaged in long-distance trade] developed a freer, looser relationship to the state and prospered through its commercial ties acumen and network ties, the other group advanced through the regulation of its trade by the state, which made this trade both more controlled and more protected.” The provisionist policies that privileged the consumers of the capital and other major centers, also helped the creation of networking ties. One of the ways in which the local notables acquired their economic and political power, was through controlling the provisioning networks. This intermediary role in the domestic trade network allowed them to control administrative position too because the central authority exerted a good deal influence—both as the main consumer and the regulator—in the organization of the internal dynamics, and the economic and administrative duties of the local agents were often interconnected. It is therefore important not to think of the merchants in the empire as one, more or less homogeneous group, with well-defined interests.

The resistance of the local artisans, and small producers was strengthened thanks to the existing networks of domestic trade. So behind and apart from the perceptions, the intrusion of

65 As Donald Quataert points out, “throughout the 1700-1922 period, international trade was more visible but less important than domestic trade.” Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922, New Approaches to European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). p. 126
66 Eldem, “Capitulations and Western Trade.” p. 288
67 Barkey, Empire of Difference the Ottomans in Comparative Perspective. p. 237
the Western trade and its impact on the overall Ottoman economic structure was not important enough to ring the alarm bells in real terms either—at least in the eighteenth century. It is estimated that in the seventeenth century (despite the lack of reliable sources for both sides) the Western trade was not more than 10 percent in the total volume of the commercial activity in the Ottoman Empire.\footnote{Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade." p. 305} Taking into the consideration the fact that the domestic trade and production as well as regional trade were increasing in the Ottoman Empire for the first part of the eighteenth century, a significant reversal of this percentage is highly unlikely. Donald Quataert suggests that domestic trade was did not far exceed the international trade for the only for the first half of the eighteenth century, but it was true, in terms of volume and value for the entire period between 1700 and 1922.\footnote{Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922. p. 126} Even though, the scarcity of statistical data still poses a significant problem for the historians to confidently support general observations, available data from the major trading centers such as Istanbul, Edirne, Salonica, Damascus, or Aleppo point, all point out to the importance of the domestic trade.\footnote{Faroqhi also points out that mos of the Anatolian towns recovered economically in the first half of the eighteenth century. Faroqhi sees the mid-century, the period between 1750-1760, when the trend of recovery and domestic trade expansion start to slow down. Then, in 1770 a new period of crisis ensues until 1840. Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan, Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire. pp. 225-246} Compared to these centers, the commercial activities of many of the smaller cities and towns remain understudied—in most of the cases without any substantial archival material to lay out even the contours of the trade. Furthermore, not only was there an economic recovery after the troubles of the seventeenth century, and an expanding domestic trade, but even the balance of trade with Europe was favorable for the Ottomans. Even though, the latter claim needs to be substantiated with more empirical evidence, it is important to enough to challenge the argument that the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire—and all its concomitant socio-economic transformation—that resulted in the colonization and the underdevelopment of the Ottoman polity started early in the seventeenth century with the trade relations and gradually led up to the economic and political dominance of the West in the late nineteenth century. As Eldem notes in his essay, the important task is to develop a more realistic account of the eighteenth century.\footnote{"The aim is not to negate the existence of a gradual pattern of domination inherent to the widening and development of Western trade in the eastern Mediterranean, but rather to this process into a wider, and possibly more realistic, perspective that would allow for a combination of several factors in explaining its complexity." Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade." p. 285} This account needs to balance the narrative of economic determinism with a political, and the legal perspective, to come to grips with the limitations of the both sides of the reality (that is, Ottoman and Western sources), and to avoid projecting the economic and political patterns of the late nineteenth century back into the early eighteenth.

It is true that the role of the international trade became more important than the previous centuries in terms of its impact in the Ottoman Empire. As Quataert argues “global market forces may have affected the eighteenth century Ottoman economy more powerfully than state policies.”\footnote{Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922. p. 42} The proper historical context to evaluate the eighteenth century is therefore broader than the trade relations of the Levant. The decline of the importance of the silk route, the rise of the maritime empires, the marginalization of the Levant trade within the global market relations, military and political struggles within Europe, and in their overseas colonies, all contributed to
the emergence of a new configuration of the global commercial relations. The changing dimensions of the trade relations of the Ottoman Empire should be assessed in relative terms too; “whereas international commerce globally grew sixty-four times during the nineteenth century, it increased a comparatively meager ten- to sixteen-fold in the Ottoman Empire … the Ottoman economy was not shrinking—to the contrary – but it was declining in relative significance.” To give another example, the trade with the East, especially with India, was no less important—at least in terms of value and volume of trade—than the trade with the West. It is estimated that in 1785, the total annual imports from India to Istanbul amounted to approximately ten million tournois. This was, as Daniel Panzac argues, was a huge sum compared to the imports from Europe to Istanbul, which was around eleven to twelve millions (five to six millions of which was with France). Moreover, even if only the maritime trade is roughly calculated, “the total value of the transactions between the Ottoman Empire and Europe at the end of the century was estimated to be 110-120 million livres tournois; exchanges between various Ottoman provinces using the maritime route in the Mediterranean, but also in the Black Sea and the Red Sea, had an estimated value of about 180-200 million livres tournois, close to double the international maritime trade.” In this sense, it may as well be true that the scholars may be overestimating the role of the Ottoman central authority in the economic realm as the predominant factor that affected the economy. Neither the tripartite economic system (based on provisionism, fiscalism, and traditionalism) nor the anti-mercantilist economic mentality might have been a true Achilles’ heels. As the resilience of the local producers, the continuing importance of the Muslim merchants in domestic trade well into the nineteenth century in the domestic trade, some of the responses of the state institutions such as the tax farming policies in the eighteenth and further legal developments that regulated property relations in the nineteenth century demonstrate, the Ottomans were not completely out of touch with the realities of a new era, and their responses were similar to the responses of their Western counterparts—of course, within the given circumstances and the context of the existing power relations.

It is true that an array of other developments, from the gradual takeover of the maritime transportation by the non-Muslims and the Western traders in the Levant maritime trade, to the increasing use of foreign currency in the Ottoman lands and the use of bills of exchange were related to the very dynamics of the commercial relations, and allowed the Western nations to control a larger portion of the Ottoman economy. The capitulations of 1740 with France also

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73 Ibid. p. 126
75 Ibid. p. 202
76 Eldem notes at the end of his essay that the marginalization of the Levant trade, and the Ottoman Empire within an expanding network of international trade may well be the real cause of the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist world system, which implies that this factor might have been more important than the anti-mercantilist policies. Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade." p. 325
proved to be a turning point for some of the non-Muslims merchants to participate much more actively in the commercial relations, and use their intermediary role in order to acquire legal and political privileges. But even though at first glance, the capitulations seem to be of strictly commercial nature, the context within which they were signed, their implementation and consequences were much more comprehensive. Eldem, for instance, draws attention to the fact that insofar as the commercial clauses were concerned there was not anything substantially new in the 1740 capitulations. However, the novelty—a very significant one—was that what had been granted for centuries unilaterally by the Ottoman sultans now took place in a much more formal context, and was transformed into the obligation rather than a grant. New regulations brought about a more precise legal framework that restricted the realm of autonomy for the local agents. Furthermore and more importantly, the implementation of the capitulations created a political and legal context that inhibited the transformation of the resistance of the local merchants into a political force. The capitulations that granted lower custom duties and other legal privileges to the French merchants helped them to overcome the intermediary role of the local agents, and create more extensive commercial and credit networks. From being confined to the coastal areas, they were more and more able to extend their influence in the hinterlands. All these developments in turn led to the “exclusion of potential economic forces—a nascent bourgeoisie—from the mechanisms of power and decision-making controlled by the ruling class. The development of the status of berâtlı merchants during the [eighteenth] century is one of the clearest illustrations of this alienation.” Berâtlı merchants were the non-Muslim merchants of the Ottoman Empire who had acquired a certificate (berât) that granted them the same privileges and rights of the western merchants under the capitulary system; lower custom duties, the right to solve their legal disputes outside the Ottoman juridical system. These stipulations created a significant demand from the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, and the number of the berâtlı merchants seems to have steadily increased. Of course, the new capitulary regime was a means for the western merchants to incorporate local non-Muslim agents into their economic and political network, which also created resentment among the Muslim subjects in general and the merchants in particular, and politicized ethnic tensions.

79 The aim of these remarks is not a comprehensive discussion of the capitulations. Suffice it to point out here that especially after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the capitulations were seen as one of the major reasons for the decline of the Ottoman Empire. This perspective is still well alive today in Ottoman historiography. It may therefore be argued that from early on the consequences of the capitulations were perceived in its totality as a legal, and political issue as much as an economic one. It is closely related to an understanding of the sovereignty of the Ottoman state—and later on the Turkish Republic—within their territories. For one of the earlier works on the capitulations, Mahmoud Essad, Du Regime Des Capitulations Ottomanes (Stamboul1928). See also Ali İhsan Bağış, Osmanlı Ticaretinde Gayri Müslümler (1750-1839) (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1983). For a more in-depth study, which focuses on the legal dimensions of the capitulations, Maurits H. Van Den Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System, Qadıs, Consuls and Berâtlıs in the 18th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2005). In his brief introductory survey, Boogert also shows the extent to which the first European studies on the capitulations focused mostly on the legal theory and practice and the international context.
80 Eldem, “Capitulations and Western Trade.” p. 320-321
81 Eldem, French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century. p.289
82 A cautionary remark is in order. An essential component of the discussions about the capitulations in Ottoman historiography, especially in its Turkish variants, is the role of the non-Muslims. It is usually assumed that capitulations benefited the non-Muslim subjects as a whole at the expense of the Muslims. This perspective is all the more important insofar as it is also one of the factors that explain the causes of ethnic and religious violence at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. It is particularly central to the debates on the Armenian genocide. Even if it is true that non-Muslim merchants benefited from the capitulations, most of the Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire were peasants, and they were not immediately or directly affected by the
However, a new study by Maurits Van Den Boogert suggests that some of the generalizations about the impact of the capitulations need to be reconsidered. Two specific assumptions are in need of correction. First is the assumption that capitulations almost totally exempted western merchants and the berâtlıs from the Ottoman legal realm and gave significant economic and political autonomy. Related to this argument is that the capitulations were a means to imperialist abuse, and the berâtlı merchants acted as collaborators (or were the precursors of comprador bourgeoisie). The second assumption is that there was a boom in the number of the berâtlı merchants. However, these assumptions were not closely scrutinized. To begin with the latter assumption, even though it is true that the demand for the berâts increased, actual number of the berâts given by the ambassadors (the granting of a berât was the prerogative of the ambassadors) was not very high, maybe more significantly, nor there seems to have been a substantial change after 1740 in the average number of the berâts.83

Taken into the consideration the fact that a berât exempted not only the person who held it, but the household of the titular, the extent of the privileges that came with a berât was more widespread. However, Boogert concludes that, “even if every berât exempted ten adult men … from paying taxes, the total at the end of the eighteenth century came to about 2,500 for the entire Eastern Mediterranean. The protection system was thus a much less widespread phenomenon than has been generally assumed.”84 Another pattern that emerges about the extent of the protection network of the berâts, is that Istanbul was the most important center. At the beginning of the eighteenth century Izmir was a close second one, but later Istanbul far surpassed Izmir. Even though the locations of the issuance of the berâts do not say much about the trade networks established by the berât holders, the centrality of Istanbul stands also as a corrective to the assumption that the network of the berâtlıs was much more extensive than before. The relatively low number of the berâts issued in Izmir can also be taken (with caution) as evidence that the demand for berâts from the hinterland of Izmir was not too high either.

Finally, the assumption that the capitulations totally exempted the foreign merchants, and the berâtlıs from Ottoman law, and created an exclusive legal realm that expanded at the expense of the Ottoman sovereignty seems to be overstated. A closer look at the legal texts and practices reveal that there were important overlaps and in many cases negotiation and peaceful settlement (between the Ottoman subjects and the foreign merchants) was a preferred method for solving a wide range of problems from debt to theft. Different perceptions seem to play a role in the assumption that capitulations were a form of extraterritoriality, and they carved out a exclusive legal realm within the Ottoman laws and regulations. While western sources discuss in detail specific problem pertaining to litigations, and give a detailed account of the specific complaints of the merchants, the Ottoman sources are confined to much briefer decrees issued by the central economic and political changes until the second half of the nineteenth century. For a critique of this perspective, see Stephan H. Astourian, "The Silence of the Land: Agrarian Relations, Ethnicity and Power," in A Question of Genocide, Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman M. Naimark (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

83 Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System, Qadıs, Consuls and Berâtlıs in the 18th Century. p.88
As Boogert explains, there are significant limitations to this statistical table; the berâtlıs of the other nations, especially the Russians, are missing from this account. Furthermore, the registrations that Boogert used do not have a comprehensive list of the berâts, and most of the time, they include only the renewals. Nevertheless, it seems that the registrations are comprehensive enough to discern a pattern.

84 Ibid. p. 91-92
authority. The detailed complaints give the impression that the foreign merchants were trying to press their claims of exemptions from Ottoman law, and were relying on specific stipulations of the capitulations. Boogert argues that “the capitulations formed a framework of privileges that was not designed to offer solutions for every imaginable problem the foreigners might be confronting with. General rules had to be applied to specific situations, a process that required discussion and negotiation between the Ottoman authorities and the Western representatives.” Rather than being fully exempted or in conflict in case of dispute, foreign merchants (and the capitulary system) were part of the Ottoman legal structure—albeit a transforming one.

As for the larger historical context of the 1740 capitulations, Robert Olson argues that they should be situated in a context that takes into account not only the Ottoman Empire relations with the West, but also the military developments in the eastern front. In that regard, even though the apparent reason was for the 1740 capitulations was the Ottoman’s gratitude for France’s role in the signing of the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, with which the Ottomans regained Belgrade lost in 1718 to the Austrians, Ottoman wars with Nadir Shah in Iran throughout the 1730s that determined the Ottomans’ policy towards France. Moreover, Russia was a threat both for the Ottoman Empire, and for France, and “an alliance, collusion or even cooperation between Iran and Russia, or even an Iranian victory in Iraq, would have seriously weakened the Ottoman Empire during the period 1730-46. Perhaps the European powers as well as the Porte recognized this. The Ottoman-French Treaty of 1740 was signed in such a context.” The formalization of the capitulatory regime with 1740 treaty can, in this sense, be attributed to the transformation of the military alliances and the diplomatic relations towards the second half of the eighteenth century.

A series of military and political struggles, beginning the Wars with Russia at end of the eighteenth century, and continuing with Muhammad Ali Pasha’s growing power in Egypt and the Greek Wars of Independence in the first decades of the nineteenth century significantly weakened the financial structure of the empire, and also opened up the maritime routes to foreign control including the Black Sea, which was almost exclusively controlled by the Muslims previously. Hence, the importance of the extra-economic factors in assessing the economic performance of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, it is not too implausible to argue that at the beginning of the eighteenth century, most of the European economies, probably with the exception of England and the Dutch Republic, were not even too different from the Ottoman Empire. Early modern polities were all trying to solve similar problems from raising more taxes to find secure ways to borrow money internally. As commercial networks were expanding, so were the credit mechanisms. However, most of the governments faced the challenge of repaying their debts, and control the interest rates low (England’s success was to the creation of the Bank of England, keeping the interest rates low and turning money lending to the state into an secure investment). France of the early eighteenth century, for instance, was still a predominantly

85 Ibid. p. 303
87 Ibid. p.79
88 More specifically on the role of the bills of exchange, see Eldem, French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century. For a comprehensive account of the wars of the eighteenth century, Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700-1870 an Empire Besieged.
agricultural economy with a low level of productivity, in which small peasantry rather than large-scale commercial estate was the norm. The fiscal structure was also highly controlled by the central authority. Internal borrowing and the growing debts posed serious problems for the French state. In this respect, the debasement of the currency was also a similar monetary policy that both France and the Ottoman Empire resorted to in order to meet their debts. Furthermore, even though Marseilles became an important trading center and manufacture, French economy was by no means industrialized. It is true that mercantilist policies were implemented, and overseas expansion represented the influence of the merchant capital, but nevertheless the influence of the commercial sector was highly precarious, and the financial crises of the eighteenth century (probably more than the rise of the bourgeoisie) prepared the conditions that led to the French Revolution. Therefore, while the mercantilist mentality (and all the other developments that ushered France into the statistical era) was to a great extent incommensurable with the Ottoman economic mentality, the economic structure in general can be said to have had comparable features.  

FRANCE, IZMIR AND THE HINTERLAND (WESTERN AND CENTRAL ANATOLIA)

The impact of the French trade was very important for the commercial relations of western and central Anatolia—the essential regional zone that included Kütahya—through the “échelle” of Izmir. It may therefore be helpful to look briefly at the French trade in the Levant, and especially in Izmir. After the prominence of Venice in the Levant trade in the seventeenth declined, the market was to a great extent shared between the English and the Dutch traders. However, after the turn of the eighteenth century, “the oligarchic structure of community of powerful Marseilles merchants, under the aegis of the chamber of commerce of the city, came into being setting up rules and regulations of a systematic exploitation of the trade channels to the Levant.” Supported with the mercantilist policies and with the help of a more aggressive and expansionist international policy under Louis XIV, the French traders (more precisely the merchants of Marseilles) recovered their market share and dominated the trade especially after 1740s.


91 Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade." p. 300
The expansion of the international trade, the changing international maritime routes, and diversification of the trade ventures more and more marginalized the Mediterranean and Ottoman trade within the global trade network. These factors diverted the British involvement in the Mediterranean, and allowed the French traders to assert their commercial interests more easily in the Levant. The French trade also responded to the dynamics of the expanding international trade network, and especially their involvement in the Caribbeans changed the overall dynamics of the trade relations, but the Levant retained its importance even in a much more diverse and globalized network. While the total value of the Marseilles trade was around 78 million livres (tournois) at the end of the seventeenth century, 30 million (38.5 percent) of this was with the Levant. At the end of the eighteenth century, the total volume had more than tripled to reach 250 million. The Levant trade also doubled to reach 64 million, and made up 25 percent of the Marseilles trade.92

Izmir, which had become an important port city already at the end of the seventeenth century, was the most important trading port for French commercial interests. According to Goffman, the reorganization of the global commercial networks, and the marginalization of the Levant trade within the new commercial network helped Izmir to become a major port city. The decline of the other major commercial centers, such Aleppo, Bursa, which were connected to the spice routes, increased the search for an alternative.93 Geo-political characteristics of Izmir turned a small town into a major center. Its natural harbor and the relative security of the area were important factors for the merchants to redirect their attention on Izmir.94 Goffman also argues that “the lack of manifest and prominent lore also was a determinant. Other than as a supplier for Istanbul the Ottomans simply had no clear vision of western Anatolia’s historical mission and consequently took no initiative to steer it along a particular course.”95 In short, as an alternative to the declining old commercial cities, and relatively free from the state intervention, Izmir was a free trade zone in the first decades of the seventeenth century. 1620s and 1630s transformed the city. The Dutch, French, English, Venetian merchants met with their Ottoman Muslim and non-Muslim counterpart, and looked for new grounds to extend their commercial networks. As Frangakis points out, Izmir offered “access to Ottoman markets for European and colonial goods at a larger scale and at more comprehensive prices than its rivals. Acquiring a hinterland that covered large parts of Anatolia and stretched as far as the Persian market are important factors that enabled Izmir to [become the predominant port-city in the empire.]”96

The trade with the port of Izmir increased significantly in the first decades of the eighteenth century. Already in 1727, the reports estimated that the French “had the throat of the Dutch trade”.97 Especially after 1750s, Izmir trade was unrivaled; not only in terms of volume of

92 Ibid. p. 328
95 Goffman, "Izmir: From Village to Colonial Port City.” p. 89
96 For a recent historiographical essay on Izmir in the long eighteenth century (1700-1820), Frangakis-Syrett, "The Ottoman Economy and Izmir in Perspective.” p. 206-207
97 Paris, Histoire Du Commerce De Marseille, De 1660 a 1789. Le Levant. p. 446
trade, the percentage of the exports and imports compared to the other port cities, but also in terms of the presence of the French traders, consular and officials. In short “la nation française” was more numerous than it was in other port cities, and also more numerous than other “nations” in Izmir. Even though the trade volume between France and Izmir increased throughout the century, taken year by year, there were important fluctuations too. Especially the first half of the century was a period during which both the Ottoman Empire and France were engaged in war that affected the trade volume. While the Ottomans were fighting both on the Western and Eastern fronts, France was busy with the Spanish War of Succession (1701-1714) and the Austrian War of Succession (1740-1748). However, during this period, the declining importance of Izmir (which had fallen to the fourth place among other Levant port cities) is more connected to the increasing trade volume with the Syrian and Greek port cities, and the multiplication of consulates in the Greek peninsula. Another important factor in the fluctuations was plague. Both Izmir and Marseilles were struck by plague epidemics multiple times especially in the first half of the eighteen century. The plague did not only disrupt the commercial activities in and around the port city. Once a major nexus was struck along the caravan route that transported export items to Izmir, the whole activity was affected. As Frangakis points out, “since the area around Persia was an almost constant source of the plague, the Persian silk trade, which relied on the long caravan route through the area, was often disrupted; and during local epidemics, the trade in cotton, wool, and other goods from Smyrna’s hinterland, which used the short caravan route, was also halted.” After 1730, “French traders were disseminated throughout the empire. While this had previously been because of disorganization and instability, by the eighteenth century this dispersal allowed the development of a rather efficient trading network monitored by Marseilles, sometimes via Istanbul … smaller centres were always connected to major échelles – Aleppo, Cairo, Izmir, Salonika – whose much more balanced trade gave them greater power and autonomy. Izmir, already one of the major emporia of the Levant trade in the preceding century, had become the wealthiest échelle of all, draining products from its rich hinterland and beyond, and serving as a centre of redistribution of French commodities throughout Anatolia.” Late 1740s were the real turning point for the Izmir trade—the capitulations strengthened the French predominance in Izmir. The total value of trade between Izmir and France was close to nine million tournois in 1748. It was doubled in 1766, and was around twenty-two million in 1788. A comparative look at the export figures from Izmir to the major European trading centers (French, British and Dutch) between 1775 and 1820 also clearly illustrates the French predominance until the Revolution. After a steep decline during the Revolutionary period, the trade would pick up, but never to recover completely because the nineteenth century would witness the British takeover of the markets—during which the structure of the trade relations would also change.

98 While the Dutch had eighteen to twenty personnel, Genoese had two at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The French presence was around 150 personnel at the beginning of the century, and had reached 300 to 400 in 1763. Ibid. p. 444
99 Frangakis-Syrett, The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820). p. 130
100 Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade." p. 313
102 Frangakis-Syrett, The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820). p. 265
103 The percentages do not add up to 100 percent, I have excluded the export figures to Livorno, Genoa, and Messina. Ibid. p. 274-275
After 1740, the French expansion into the hinterland of Izmir, and further into the Anatolian peninsula was an important prospect for the traders. These areas were not totally unknown territory to the French because already in the seventeenth century, the French traders were involved in the mohair yarn trade, and had established formal ties with the traders in and around Ankara. But their attempt to establish a consulate in Ankara at the beginning of the eighteenth century failed because of the resistance of the Armenian traders, who controlled the long-distance trade over the land, and especially from Iran.104 The caravan trade was also controlled by the Muslims, and being confined to a relatively restricted area around Izmir, the French could not make use of the full potential of the Izmir as a nexus of distribution. Their expansion was not fast and comprehensive but nevertheless significant enough that in 1754 they were able to overcome the resistance of the Armenian traders.

Exports from Izmir increased significantly, but the port city was also crucial to sell the French goods. For the period from 1749 to 1789 (for which there is reliable data), “annual average of 30 per cent of all French imports entered through Izmir.”105 Istanbul, the most dominant consumer center of the empire came close second. However, their role in the distribution patterns of the French goods was different. While Istanbul consumed most of the European products (essentially cloth, sugar and coffee) inside the city itself, only a small portion of the imports were consumed in Izmir, and the majority of the products were distributed to different areas of the empire.106 Hence, the strategic location of Izmir that gave the French traders more access into the hinterland and sometimes the flexibility to diversify the trade items.

As far as the trade items are concerned, another clearly documented trend in the eighteenth century Levant trade is the decline of the silk trade and the spectacular rise of the cotton. The distribution of the major export items from the Ottoman Empire to Europe throughout the century clearly demonstrates this changing pattern.107

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1700-1702</th>
<th>1750-1754</th>
<th>1786-1789</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silk</td>
<td>2,416,000</td>
<td>2,095,000</td>
<td>1,638,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton wool</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>3,760,000</td>
<td>9,853,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton thread</td>
<td>1,303,000</td>
<td>1,924,000</td>
<td>2,939,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep’s wool</td>
<td>737,000</td>
<td>911,000</td>
<td>2,257,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camel-hair</td>
<td>173,000</td>
<td>879,000</td>
<td>1,021,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohair</td>
<td>639,000</td>
<td>1,835,000</td>
<td>1,437,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides</td>
<td>537,000</td>
<td>318,000</td>
<td>966,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyestuff</td>
<td>208,000</td>
<td>746,000</td>
<td>1,919,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olive oil</td>
<td>743,000</td>
<td>1,451,000</td>
<td>3,261,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beeswax</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>387,000</td>
<td>753,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat and Barley</td>
<td>725,000</td>
<td>3,489,000</td>
<td>409,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile products</td>
<td>385,000</td>
<td>1,715,000</td>
<td>2,529,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,628,900</td>
<td>2,289,000</td>
<td>3,042,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

104 Paris, Histoire Du Commerce De Marseille, De 1660 a 1789, Le Levant, p. 442
106 Ibid. p. 121, Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade," p. 313 The most comprehensive account of the French trade to Istanbul is Eldem, French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century.
107 Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade," p. 333
Izmir was not a silk producing center. The most important center for the silk trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was Aleppo. Recognizing the city’s increasing importance for the caravan routes that brought in the species, but also the Iranian silk, the Venetians moved their consul to Aleppo in 1548, and the English Levant Company followed suit right after—making Aleppo their headquarters until 1825. In the fifteenth century, Aleppo was already the preferred market of the Armenian merchants, who to a great extent controlled by the silk trade, but with the increasing demand for silk from the northwestern Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth century proved to be a major change.\(^{108}\) Even though Venice and France were among the major importers of silk, by the second half of the seventeenth century, they disappeared from the Levant market. Despite major fluctuating in the first half of the seventeenth century, the English traders persevered and became the masters of the silk trade. The English silk trade by the end of 1660s was around 400 tons—a volume that would not be repeated until the nineteenth century.\(^{109}\) As for Izmir, most of the silk that was exported was brought to the port from Persia and Bursa. Different caravan routes converged, and supplied the city with different silk of different qualities. With the development of Izmir as a trade center in the seventeenth century, especially the Dutch and the British traders saw Izmir as an alternative to Aleppo, Alexandria, and Istanbul, helping the port city to develop even more, and creating demand for redirecting silk toward Izmir.\(^{110}\) The demand and the supply for the silk continued to increase and reached its peak in 1716 amounting to fifty-four per cent of the total export for that year.\(^{111}\) However, 1720s, there was a sharp decline in the Levant silk trade. The Ottoman wars with Nadir Shah, the insecurity of the caravan routes were the major factors for the decline of silk supply via the Persian route. It seems that around 1750s, the silk supply to Izmir was mostly from the Bursa region. Another reason for the decline in silk trade—especially insofar as the British trade is concerned—was the emergence of alternative silk markets. Chinese and Indian silk markets became lucrative alternatives for the British traders. The Levant silk could hardly compete with the cheaper prices of the Indian and Chinese markets, and their market share continued to decrease until the end of eighteenth century. In western Anatolia, there were small production centers, such as Manisa, Chios, and Smyrna, which continued their productions but their production was mostly geared to the internal market.\(^{112}\)

The decline of silk was compensated with the rise of the cotton trade. The French responded to the decline of the silk trade by diversifying their trade items and volume. The purchase of sheep’s wool, camel hair, mohair, and olive oil increased, but the essential boom was in cotton. Total export value of cotton increased almost tenfold in a century, from 1.5 million livres at the beginning of the eighteenth century to 13 million at the end.\(^{113}\) Frangakis argues

| Total       | 9,970,000 | 21,800,000 | 33,025,000 |

\(^{108}\) There are numerous studies on Aleppo. For a concise account of the development of the city with specific reference to commercial networks, Bruce Masters, "Aleppo: The Ottoman Empire's Caravan City," in *The Ottoman City between East and West, Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

\(^{109}\) Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade." p. 299

\(^{110}\) Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550-1650*. For the silk trade, the consolidation of the port city as a major trading center, and the role of the Dutch and British traders, esp. pp. 50-77 see also Goffman, "Izmir: From Village to Colonial Port City."

\(^{111}\) Frangakis-Syrett, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820).* p. 225

\(^{112}\) Ibid. p. 230

\(^{113}\) Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade." p. 315

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that “the predominance of cotton among the exports of Izmir coincides almost to the year with
the predominance of Izmir as the biggest exporting port of the Empire.”\textsuperscript{114} The export volume of
cotton, which was 7,319 bales (a bale was around 300 lbs) in 1750, tripled in three decades to
reach its peak with 26,402 bales in 1788. Not only was there a significant increase but also
cotton made up 72 per cent of the total exports in 1788. From 1780s to 1820s, the trade tripled
once more to 70,000 bales.\textsuperscript{115} The predominance of cotton dropped after 1820s (largely due to
the fact that the French and the English turned to the American cotton market) but from roughly
1750 to 1820s its crucial role in the economy of the region can be established unmistakably.

One major characteristic of the cotton trade compared to the other major other trade items
such as silk, mohair, or wool was that it was produced in the hinterland of Izmir. In an area
comprising the plains of Gediz, Akhisar, Bergama, Kasaba, and Manisa, as well as the valleys of
Menderes rivers, cotton was produced, and was considered to be of higher quality than the cotton
of Adana or Syria. It is plausible therefore to expect the cotton trade to have a more profound
effect on the socioeconomic structure of the region for the period between 1750 and 1820. This
is in fact a paradigmatic case for testing a set of assumptions about the commercialization of
agricultural products, the incorporation into the world economy as peripheral (or semi-
peripheral) economy, the transformation of the landholding patterns, and the rise of the local
notables. The increasing demand from the French textile markets increased the production and
the sale of the raw cotton (compared to cotton thread). This was an important sign of a more
evident unequal exchange pattern. Nevertheless, it did not yet eradicate the local industry, and
internal market still created enough demand for a variety of industries to survive. The French
traders also expanded their credit network, and used bills of exchange in order to tap available
raw cotton in the region. However, even in this case, it seems that they were reluctant to fully
integrate their local intermediaries and non-Muslim merchants into their trading networks—at
least, until 1815.\textsuperscript{116} But two important local notable families emerged in this specific context in
western Anatolia; the Karaosmanoğlu and the Araboğlu. While they were large-scale
landowners, and used a variety of strategies (from indebting the peasants to coerce them
explicitly) in order to raise the price of cotton, and reshape the production patterns, this did not
amount to a re-feudalization process in the region, and redefined the relations of production.
Especially Karaosmanoğlu accumulated significant wealth, sustained extensive credit
networks both with the internal and international market, and established patronage networks in
the area, they seem to have relied on their administrative functions as tax-farmers more than their
investments as private entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{117} Even though they continued as a wealthy family into the
Republican era, the fact that they were relatively easily subdued by the centralization policies of

\textsuperscript{114} Frangakis’ book on Izmir provides a comprehensive account of the trade in the eighteenth century, including the
cotton trade. For a more concise article on cotton, see her Elena Frangakis-Syrett, “The Trade of Cotton and Cloth in
İzmir: From the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century to the Early Nineteenth Century,” in Landholding and
Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East, ed. Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (New York: State University of
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. p. 98
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid. p. 99
\textsuperscript{117} Karaosmanoğlu’s history is one of the best documented among the local notables, thanks to Yuzo Nagata’s
works. Yuzo Nagata, "Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Hüseyin Ağa'ya Ait Bir Tereke Defteri," in IX. Türk Tarih Kongresi
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988); Yuzo Nagata, Tarihte Ayânlar Karaosmanoğlu Üzerine Bir İnceleme
the nineteenth century also demonstrates that their economic power remained rather limited, and did not translate into political power.  

Another characteristic of the trade relations between Western Europe in general, France in particular, and the Izmir region (including the hinterland) is the degree to which credit networks and monetary policies were intertwined. Apart from its geo-strategic location as free-trade zone, as supplier of export items and a center of distribution of the Western products, Frangakis especially draws attention to the impact of the monetary policies of both the Western nations, and the Ottoman central authority had on the socioeconomic conditions of the region. What made economic growth possible throughout the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth century was also a complex set relations between the discount mechanisms that the Western merchants used to sell their products, the effects of the debasement of the Ottoman currency, and the extent of the credit relations in the region. There was a constant need overcome monetary shortage to sustain growth and commercial relations. As Frangakis’ studies show, “in the late 1780s transfers of money to Izmir, representing a large part of the total trading activity of the port and answering a strong need for coinage in the Ottoman economy, attained their highest levels. By then, Izmir had become the port of entry par excellence for specie in the empire, while speculating in monetary operations seems to have overtaken commodity trading amongst French merchants.”

This point is important for a couple of reasons. First, in an economic context where monetary speculation was as important as the demand for raw material, the incorporation into the capitalist world economy, might not necessarily result in the transformation of the relations of production for those economies providing the raw material. Besides a whole host of other reasons (such as the state intervention, the persistence of the small peasantry in landholding, and the resistance of the local industries), the movement of the funds, and international flows of bullion may also engender other forms of capital accumulation than simply the emergence of large-scale commercial agriculture. Secondly, and on a related note, the same set of monetary relations also implies that the positive trade balance of the Ottoman Empire may not necessarily reflect the true nature of the flow of capital. For instance, while the trade figures may register a deficit for France, and positive trade balance for the Ottoman Empire, the impact of the monetary speculation and bills of exchange (even though it is hard to quantify it) may reveal a more complex reality.

Finally, and probably more importantly for our purpose, it is important to realize that the commercial growth of Izmir and its hinterland does not follow a uniform pattern of expansion. That is to say, the growth of the economy, commercialization of agriculture, the expansion of the credit networks do not radiate from a center (Izmir) to other regions (to Kütahya for instance) in growing circles. In the absence of a developed national capital market in the early modern era, regional economies created their own spheres of influence sometimes (more often than not?) to the detriment of other regions. In this respect, Izmir’s relatively developed (and developing) money market and credit network both with the merchants of the Ottoman Empire and the western merchants, might have tapped capital from

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118 For a concise discussion of the findings of the earlier studies on the subject, Gilles Veinstein, "On the Çiflik Debate," in Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East, ed. Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991). Both Frangakis and Eldem are in agreement on this point.

119 Frangakis-Syrett, "The Ottoman Economy and Izmir in Perspective." p. 34, see esp. Frangakis-Syrett, "The Balance of Trade and the Balance of Payments between Izmir and Marseilles, 1700-1789."

120 Frangakis-Syrett, "The Ottoman Economy and Izmir in Perspective." p. 35
other regions, and contributed to the monetary shortage inhibiting investment opportunities and economic growth.