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Publication Date
2018

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
Jakarta’s Kampungs: Their History and Contested Future

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
in Geography

by

Dian Tri Irawaty

2018
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Jakarta’s Kampungs: Their History and Contested Future

by

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Master of Arts in Geography
University of California, Los Angeles, 2018
Professor Helga M. Leitner, Chair

This thesis aims to locate the kampung (urban village) within the broader mobilization of ‘slums’ as urban blight in Global South cities. Slums have been widely known as settlements with poor living conditions: comprising a lack of basic services, such as water, sanitation, drainage, waste collection, street lighting, and paved footpaths; as well as a lack of community space, schools, and clinics within easy reach. However, in Indonesian cities including Jakarta, the label of ‘the slum’ has been attached to the unique space of the ‘kampung’, which are densely populated areas of poor and working-class communities in the center and peripheries of the city. For decades, the kampung has been understood in a derogative way. Beginning in the Dutch era, kampungs have been identified as disorganized and relatively problematic space: a nest of disease, filth, and crime. The contested understanding of the kampung continued but the similar and misguided label of ‘the slum’ was added. I argue that the double stigma has strengthened the aspiration to “fix” the kampung through city beautification projects, that leads to massive forced evictions. These projects have reduced the
number of kampungs and displaced hundreds of thousands of residents in the city – threatening the
notion of the kampung as distinct settlement form and space of life in Indonesian cities.
The thesis of Dian Tri Irawaty is approved.

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2018
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to Juan, who inspired me to write and express my positionality on this thesis. Thanks to Helga and Eric, who have support, coach and made me a more thoughtful scholar.

Thanks to Sam, Emma, Dimitar, Fernanda, KT, and Dita for support and care.

Thanks to JRMK, The Urban Poor Consortium, and Rujak Center for Urban Studies, without whom this thesis would not have been possible.

Funding for this research was provided by Center for South East Asian Studies and UCLA Graduate Division.
CHAPTER 1. Introduction

In 2016, Jakarta Legal Aid recorded 193 cases of forced evictions affecting 5,726 families and 5,379 business units (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Jakarta, 2016). The preceding report from 2015 had recorded 8,145 Jakarta households evicted for a variety of reasons, but mainly due to the enforcement of the public order clause/ordinance and the river “normalization” program (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Jakarta, 2015). This trend of forced evictions is a continuation of an approach to kampungs that has been taking place in Jakarta since the late 1950s and throughout the 2000s. During those periods, developments in Jakarta, including forced evictions have affected the densely populated areas of poor and working-class communities in the center and peripheries of the city, generally referred to as kampungs, and their hundreds of thousands of inhabitants (Jellinek, 2011; Kusno, 2013; Silver, 2007).

In this thesis, first, I will interrogate the evolution of the notion of kampungs and its relationship with slums. I will examine how the terms kampung and slum are positioned in public discourse and planning policies. Second, I will investigate the drivers of forced eviction and its implications for the future of kampungs, including the resistance of kampung residents.

Forced evictions target kampungs labeled as “illegal” settlements and located in undesignated dwelling areas such as in green space, next to railways, riverbanks, highway underpasses, and next to high voltage power lines. Referring to de Soto, Tunas and Peresthu (2010) argue that there are two indicators to define the legality of kampungs. First, kampungs should be acknowledged as part of the formal urban territory; meaning that kampungs should be in a legal urban territory or a designated dwelling area. Second, kampungs should possess land tenure; means through which kampung residents can hold a property and/or land title. However, the issue of land titles is considered quite problematic by many urban scholars examining the problem of land registration in
Indonesia, who see it as contributing to people’s vulnerability to eviction. Principally, under the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) of 1960, all lands must be registered to the National Land Agency (BPN). However, in practice, most Jakarta’s land remains unregistered under the National Land Agency, and some of those lands are registered at the local district administrative level, known as kelurahan. Until 1976, only 5% of the land in Indonesia was included in the national land registry. In urban areas, including Jakarta, less than one-third of the land was registered. Commonly, the land that is registered at the kelurahan will have land claims that are secured by tax letters or other documents issued by the kelurahan offices including the land’s sales receipt (witnessed by the kelurahan officials). Despite the official registration by the kelurahan, from the point of the Basic Agrarian Law, these various unregistered land rights are considered as illegitimate, which leads to its susceptibility to any contest in the future (Kusno, 2013, Leaf, 1994). Some of the large-scale evictions in Jakarta were enabled by collusion among politician, developers, and financial institutions which succeed in taking advantage of the uncertainty on land registration. These actors managed to circumvent the law and transfer lands, mostly located in strategic areas, into the hands of private corporations (Simone, 2014). One prominent case was the Portanigra Company, which had a land dispute over 44 hectares with the resident of Meruya, West Jakarta. The company purchased the land in the 1970s and claimed the land in 2007 when it was already settled by hundreds of households who also claimed to have legal paper over the disputed land. The company won the dispute in the supreme court (Arditya, 2012). A more recent case was a land dispute between the residents in Buaran, Klender, East Jakarta with the Graha Cipta Kharisma company, where the company, again, won the dispute. After the dispute, the prominent developer Agung Podomoro Land acquired the Graha Cipta Kharisma company’s share, planning to develop this recently purchased property with apartment blocks - six middle-class apartment towers and several shop houses (Tetiro, 2014). The 2015 forced eviction in Bukit Duri, South Jakarta, provides another
example of land registration problems in Jakarta. The twelve evictees who filed for a class action over the eviction, provided evidence of land ownership ranging from land certificates to letters of land appointments, purchase agreements, building-use permits, and ownership statement. These are evidence of land ownership that is registered at the kelurahan, making it vulnerable to being accepted as evidence of ownership (Koesoemawiria, 2017).

The pressure on kampungs to be evicted or transformed into other functions (apartment and superblocks) coincides with the mobilization of a modernization discourse in Jakarta. Modernization as a narrative of progress has “forced” Jakarta to emulate cities such as Singapore and cities in Europe and the US to craft Jakarta’s future as a global city. Consequently, Jakarta has been developed into fragmented urban space including the growth zones, new towns, superblocks, and traditional spaces of kampungs (Kusno, 2015). The fragmentation of urban space has been aggravated by the increasing dominance of large property developers and planners. These two groups see central city kampungs as attractive sites for modernizing the city, and as profitable sites for investment. At the same time, there has also been an increasing demand from the emerging middle classes, aspiring for modern living in condos, consuming in shopping malls, working in office towers, and more generally desiring a clean and beautiful environment. Together these forces have increased the pressure for the redevelopment of city center kampungs, leading to the displacement of many kampungs residents (Leitner and Sheppard, 2017). The accelerating disappearance of kampungs from Central Jakarta, therefore is considered as threatening the conception of kampungs as distinct settlement form and space of life in Indonesian cities.

The content of the thesis will be organized into five chapters. In this chapter, I provide background for the research, including my own positionality as researcher. I discuss the three main aspects of the thesis: (1) examining how slums as a concept and discourse began to be paired with kampungs; (2) the discourses on slum interventions, mostly in the Global South cities, promoted by
the World Bank and UN Habitat through City Without Slums project. And (3): the resistance toward forced evictions where grassroots organizations collaborate with other stakeholders in proposing alternatives to forced evictions. Chapter 2 discusses kampungs under the colonial rule. This period defined kampungs as distinctive category of settlement, and at the same time labeled them as a form of anti-modernity. Kampungs were labeled as a space of filth, full of diseases and lacking an aesthetic value. This label further influenced the way the kampung was perceived by the government and the public. Chapter 3 discusses the gradual disappearance of kampungs from mainstream planning discourses and housing policies, indicative of the gradual erosion of the perception of kampungs as a distinct settlement form and space of life in Jakarta. I discuss the development period in Jakarta which marked the beginning of the use of slum as a terminology to describe kampungs. From the 1960s-1990s Jakarta’s government aimed to modernize its city to affirm its status as the capital city of Indonesia. This was the period when kampungs became associated with slums and in need of improvement. Jakarta’s government then pioneered an in-situ upgrading approach through Kampung Improvement Program (KIP). Chapter 4 discusses forced evictions as the primary approach to the elimination of ‘illegal kampungs’ under Jakarta’s three political regimes, Governor of Sutiyoso, Fauzi Bowo, and Jokowi-Ahok. In this chapter, I examine each of the regimes and its handling of forced evictions including justifications, mechanisms, and compensation. Chapter 5 discuss the ongoing resistance towards forced evictions by civil society, through the actions of two prominent NGOs, that have worked with and on behalf of Jakarta’s urban poor: The Urban Poor Consortium and Ciliwung Merdeka. I will also examine forms of resistance implemented by the urban poor who work with these NGOs to fight the forced evictions.

The thesis is a product of six months of fieldwork during 2016 and 2017, including fifteen interviews, one focus group, participatory observation and document analysis. I interviewed government officials, expert on housing and land, activist, and historian. Jakarta’s spatial planning,
policy documents (law on housing, law on public order, etc.), and the report of Kampung Improvement Program were among the analyzed documents. It is important to acknowledge that my approach to this research has been shaped by my past involvement with a pro-poor urban advocacy organization for more than ten years. Throughout my involvement, I learned about kampungs as a distinctive settlement in Jakarta. Through my engagement, observation, and discussion with kampung residents, I came to perceive kampungs as an organic environment, which developed through its inhabitants' intense interactions and activities. It is a space where social norms restrict, yet sometimes liberate, and where houses are incrementally expanded following the needs and anticipatory action of its inhabitants. Borrowing Simone’s term (2010), I argue that the kampung is a space of anticipation, where residents try to stay one step ahead of the game to survive and thrive. The fluidity of kampungs, where physical, social and economic spaces are intertwined, provides opportunities for residents to operate even as they are continually uncertain about the outcomes produced by their action.

The distinctness of kampungs has never been fully understood, however, by planners and the city government, which through their policies have reduced the diversity, dynamic, and resourceful nature of kampung to a singular conception of a pathological slum in need of clearance. Instead of acknowledging kampungs as a way of life, the city government has preferred forced evictions as a method of clearance, forcing qualifying kampung residents to relocate to social housing (rusunawa). Yet, the majority of kampung residents refuse to relocate to rusunawa due to the distance (rusunawa is located up to 15 km away) with relative expensive rents that contrast to their unstable income. Rusunawa also do not provide for, or allow, any space for home businesses, worsening their precarious livelihoods.

The government’s perspective and policies have become a driving force for kampung residents to organize in defense of kampungs. Through mass demonstration, legal battles in court,
proposing alternative designs, and engaging in electoral politics, grassroots organizations have been fighting forcefully against forced evictions for decades. Fighting alongside these organizations has prompted me to question the position of kampungs in Jakarta’s urban planning and policies, and the reasons used by the city government to justify the forced evictions. The following chapters represent my answers to these questions. These answers also prompt more questions for me, which I will seek to address through my doctoral research.

1.1 Kampung and slum

There is no single, but rather a variety of different definitions of and meanings for a kampung. This reflects debates about the significance of kampungs in Jakarta. From the contemporary perspective of urban planning, a kampung is a slum. It is the urban version of a rural village (or desa), typically made up of a dense cluster of single (or sometimes two) story residential structures packed together in a contiguous area, interlaced by an unplanned network of footpaths, lacking sanitary infrastructure, and whose inhabitants live precariously (Silver, 2007; Jellinek 1991). The leading architect on the Kampung Improvement Program, Darundono, identifies kampungs as unplanned settlements where most of the infrastructure and houses were built independently by the residents – also known as an informal settlement. These settlements were in many parts of Jakarta: at city center, next to the business center, or located along the river banks, railway, and swamp. Darundono further argues the lack of infrastructure including the utility and sanitation facilities have led some to identify kampungs as slums (Darundono, 2011). Regarding its nature, Kampungs embody the idea of self-help housing in Indonesia. Kampungs, as a self-initiated urban settlement, are characterized by informality, irregularity, and their flexibility and resilience (Tunas and Peresthu, 2010)
With regards to its role, kampungs are considered as a substantial space for the everyday life. First, Kampungs have been considered as a buffer zone, a space that mediates the transition from rural to urban life. In an interview with JJ Rizal, a historian, he claimed kampungs as space where people could be exposed to and practice on the idea of democracy. He further quotes a statement made by the Governor Sadikin: “kampung is the space where people can learn to be a Jakartan, to be an Indonesian” (interview-1). Second, Leitner and Sheppard (2017) emphasized the significance of kampungs as spaces that mediate practices of commoning, which exceed the capitalist social relations. They further emphasize that kampungs provide livelihood support to kampung residents through its local social support system, including arisan (non-bank savings group), food sharing, or simply togetherness. However, referring to Simone (2014), Leitner and Sheppard (2017) also emphasize that kampungs are not only built from harmony since resident’s practices in kampungs also influenced by self-interest, and power hierarchies.

Not limited to the cultural and social functions, the kampung is a substantial node in the urban economy. Considering the housing backlog as an enduring problem in Indonesian cities, kampungs, described as a vernacular settlement with mixed functions: working and dwelling, make substantial contribution in accommodating the urban poor. As they were absorbed through the intensification of development, kampungs continued to attract people as they were places of affordable residence and advantageous location (Santoso, 2006; Tunas and Peresthu, 2010). Moreover, Kusno (2015) emphasized kampungs as a space that provides economic networks used by the urban poor to survive in the city, yet at the same time also shape the city. A book published by the Graduate School of Planning, the University of Tarumanagara in 2015 compiled researches on kampung transformation in Jakarta. Many of the case studies examine the connections between kampungs and informal economic activities. One of the case studies, Jembatan Lima (West Jakarta),

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1 Interview was conducted in Depok, August 1st, 2016
discusses a kampung which has many home industry-sweat shops. These home industries have been shaping the city through the economic networks established by the home industries in the kampung to other part of the city. The home industries in kampungs are not only creating the employment but creating an opportunity for other economic activities supporting the home industries, such as transportation, food business, logistic, etc.

Regardless of their significance, Colombijn (2015) emphasizes that the government still sees kampungs as un-organized and relatively problematic spaces, following the colonial government’s perception of kampungs as the antithesis to modernity. This understanding drives an ambition to fix them to improve the livelihood of the kampung residents. But for residents, the surroundings are far from chaotic, as they negotiate the many opportunities coexisting with the multitude of apparent problems.

Kampungs and the surrounding city used to have a symbiotic relationship, growing together physically and economically. This relationship blossomed in the mid-1960s during the Jakarta city center's construction boom, when kampungs provided cheap labor, services, and goods for the city’s construction. This symbiotic relationship began to be eroded in the late 1970s and beginning of 1980s when the rapid modernization of city began to undermine kampungs. By the 1980s, the existence of kampung was threatened when urban planners began to see kampungs both as anomalies and slums and therefore yearn to rehouse kampung’s residents in social housing. This approach replaced decades of practice of an in-situ upgrading approach through the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP). This program, began under Governor Ali Sadikin in 1969, was funded and championed by the World Bank (Jellinek, 1991). Since the 1980s, resettlement to social housing (Rusunawa) has been promoted by the local and national government as the preferred solution to improve housing conditions for the urban poor. Rusunawa also institutionalized as the contemporary approach to prevent new enclaves of slums (The Law on Social housings (Rusunawa)
The use of slums as terminology to describe kampungs has been reinforced by major policy initiatives of supranational organizations, such as the “City Without Slums” initiative by the Cities Alliance in 1999 under the leadership of the World Bank and the UN-Habitat. These initiatives were enshrined in the Millennium Development Goals. In the text of City Without Slums, kampungs were likened to Favelas, Bidonvilles, and Tugurios, which shared the same miserable living condition; such as lack of basic services - water, sanitation, drainage, waste collection, street lighting, paved footpaths; and lack of community space, schools and clinics in easy reach (Gilbert, 2007; Weinstein 2015).

The mobilization of the word slum has the side effect that contradicts its intentions. Research has recalled large-scale evictions projects in many cities in India, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. For these evictions, the slogan of “Cities without Slums” is partly to be blamed. The wording of slums promoted the equation of the physical problems of poor quality housing with the characteristic of its inhabitants. Slums have been affiliated with spreading of diseases and pockets of criminal activities. This stereotyping tends to be appropriated by the government to justify their slums clearance program. Despite the gap between the interpretation of the debate on slums and the eviction in the ground, both Gilbert (2007) and Huchzermeyer (2011) believe these development agencies genuinely attempt to overcome the problems of housing and deteriorating living conditions in the poor neighborhood. UN-Habitat in The Challenge of Slums (2003) explicitly championed the participatory slum upgrading as best practices and at the same time endorse it as the best approach in slum eradication. However, the UN Habitat’s strategy through statement as such, “Slum free cities by 2020” was merely perceived as an operational target and not as a long-term vision by city leaders. The City Without Slums initiative become the paradox in urban policy due to its simultaneous drive to achieve two contradictory goals; to achieve global urban competitiveness and stay committed to
improving the lives of slums dwellers (Gilbert, 2007; Huchzermeyer, 2011; Weinstein, 2015).

While the deployment of slums as discourses at the global level was initiated by two prominent international agencies (UN-Habitat and the World Bank), the mobilization of the slums as discourses at the urban level is implemented through nuisance talk. Nuisance talk, loaded with prejudice and stigma about the slums, represents them in a derogatory way as characterized by filth, dirt, malicious and environmentally destructive. This is how the anxieties toward the presence of slum have been translated into a larger politics of urban abjection, a symbolic division between oneself and the other. In Delhi, nuisance talk has been a key principle in the mobilization of discourses of slums from everyday conversation to gain legitimacy in popular representation. The nuisance talk throughout the initiative of environmental improvement in a “Clean and Green Delhi” program has collected a larger coalition and consolidated a sense of collective understanding of who and what belongs in the city (Ghertner, 2012).

1.2 Globalization and intervention in slums

Slums have been playing a role as a place where the urban poor, who have been incorporated into the informal economy, reside. The rapid growth of megacities has produced an unequal urban geography in which the urban poor are excluded from access to housing, services, and infrastructure. Essentially, slums have become a direct result of land mismanagement and of a city’s failure to address the basic housing needs of the poor. In this paradox, slums have become the “answer” for housing crisis produced by the globalization in many megacities (Boonyabancha, 2009; Gillespie, 2016; Shatkin, 2004). The perceptive to see slum as a strategic site in the ongoing global urban land grabbing is originated from the transformative effect of globalization and neo-liberalization on slums. Though it is easy to argue the impact of globalization on the increase of new geographies, including slums, the ambiguity of the relationship between globally driven liberalization and locally
based informality still exists. Therefore, the relationship between globalization and slum is highly debated. Hence, aside from its role, slums are also a place that received a daily mounting pressure of slum clearance. The pressure comes from the slums’ worth of $2 billion as depicted by Dharavi, a prominent slum in Mumbai. Due to its worth, financial powers - supported by the state, push for forcible slums clearance. These practices, where land is acquired at no cost, has created a capital accumulation over the slums (Harvey, 2012).

Nonetheless, the opportunity to transform these urban spaces into a capitalist property development entail encounters due to its characteristic of slums which usually lays outside capitalist land market (Leitner and Sheppard, 2017). One of the strategies to overcome the delicacy of slums’ position outside the capital land market is through the slums redevelopment projects. To support this strategy, neo-liberalization plays a significant role in transforming the main principle in the urban governance system in megacities through a replacement of technically oriented “managerialism” into market economy-oriented “entrepreneurialism”, to be able to compete with other urban centers on the global stage (Sheppard, 2014; V. Dupont and D.Vaquier, n.d.).

In slum redevelopment projects, state intervention in slums is shifted from a welfare approach to neoliberal resettlement practices, which is driven by new land market and lucrative redevelopment opportunities. Slum redevelopment policy involves market mechanisms and the public-private partnership between various actors: state bureaucracies, developers, NGOs, community groups, and financiers. It offers cost-free formalized resettlement to eligible evictees. It has not only increased the role of the private sector in low-income housing construction, but also expanded the available space for market-rate redevelopment. Through a cross-subsidy model, developers would receive Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) throughout the city, including new mega-projects, as an exchange for providing compensation housing units to slum dwellers (Doshi, 2013).
Slum redevelopment policy comes into the discourses after decades of debate on the best approach towards slums. The dominant approach in the 1950s and 1960s to informal settlements was the demolition and replacement of public housing, led by the state as part of the desire to overcome the perceived disorder of informal settlements. Slum redevelopment projects were seeded in the 1960s and 1970s when John Turner and other academics bombarded strong critics toward the public housing and called for a transformation to greater autonomy in the production of housing. Turner proposed users as the principal actors in housing provision (Abbott, 2002; Mukhija, 2001). The World Bank responded to the call and pressure, mostly from developing countries, with emphasis on the radical shift away from the public housing into the self-help in two forms: sites and services, and in-situ slum upgrading. For the upgrading, there were two fundamentally different types of intervention: the first, an externally designed comprehensive upgrading; and second, a support based intervention. The first is an intervention aimed to transform an illegal and substandard settlement to fulfill the required standard through a capital-intensive intervention, usually driven by external agencies or the government. The Comprehensive Slum Improvement Program in Madras, India, initiated in 1977 by the World Bank and the George Settlement in Lusaka, Zambia are the best examples of the externally designed comprehensive upgrading. The second, the support based intervention, is divided into two different approaches: government-initiated support-based interventions and NGO-initiated support-based interventions. The former could be explained through the million houses program in Sri Lanka, and the latter is best explained through the Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi, Pakistan (Abbott, 2002).

In Jakarta, the approach to slums became a champion through Kampung Improvement Program in the 1960s to 1990s. The program, which was supported by the World Bank, has improved more than 10,000 hectares of kampungs and improve the lives of more than three million kampung residents. However, the program ended in the 1999 and since 2000, the City without
Slums initiative, also sponsored by the World Bank and UN-Habitat Indonesia, has been implemented through several different programs, the latest being Kota Tanpa Kumuh (City Without Slums). These programs have been enforced into kampungs which are perceived as a site of precarious living. Thus, the implementation of City Without Slums programs has been only understood by the government as an operational target to “clear” the slums which manifested in forced evictions of kampungs and displaced hundreds of thousands of residents.

1.3 Slums and resistance: collective action and claiming the right to the city

Accumulation by dispossession in cities through slum redevelopment projects is not free from resistance from slums dwellers. From silent encroachment to collective action, the urban poor has shown its political act to intervene. This is quite contrary to the label of the slums dwellers as passive victims of dispossession (Gillespie, 2016). The collective action on claiming the right to the city has appeared in different form and approaches. In Bangkok, Thailand, through the Ban Mankong Program, the organized community collaborates with the NGO (Asian Coalition for Housing Rights), and the government body (CODI - The Community Organizations Development Institute in Thailand) in 512 upgrading initiatives involving 1,010 communities during 2003 and 2008 (Boonyabancha, 2009). In Mumbai, India, the organized community (Mahila Milan and Slum Dweller International) works with the NGO (SPARC - Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centers) and a private developer in the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS) (Doshi, 2013). In Surabaya, Indonesia, an organized community (Paguyuban Warga Strenkali Surabaya-PWSS) in riverbank managed to resist eviction and proposed a slum upgrading concept. Their resistance was granted with the by-law permitting the settlement to co-exist with the river (Taylor, 2015). The slums upgrading approach addressed above is fallen to the second type of slum upgrading: the support-based intervention. Despite the acclaim for promoting civic engagement and proposing an
alternative solution on housing issues, these approaches also received criticism. One of the criticism is for lacking the common unitary methodology since it is mainly built on an empirical framework and therefore the success is viewed subjectively and makes it difficult to be universally applied (Abbott, 2002). The other criticism is to fall under the neoliberal ethos of government where these NGOs and community organizations play a significant role either replacing or in collaboration with the government. This scheme suits the process of individualization in which the subject is constructed to be a responsible and self-reliant member of a self-governing community (Ismail, 2006; Doshi, 2013). Despite the criticisms above, I argue that the proposed solution from civil society is a breakthrough effort to fill the void of the lack of a suitable approach to dealing with slums.
CHAPTER 2. Jakarta’s Kampungs under Colonial Rule: the kampung as antithesis of modernity

This chapter focuses on addressing how the kampung was defined and understood under the colonial regime. A robust group of researchers has researched kampungs in the colonial era, including Jellinek (1991), Silver (2008), Blackburn (2011), Colombijn (2013), Kooy and Bakker (2014), and Roosmalen (2014). I will draw on their accounts here. I began the discussion by addressing how the colonial rule perceived kampungs through the lens of modernity. Kampungs were understood as embodying the criteria that contrary to the idea of modernity, which introduced through the implementation of modern town planning and water infrastructure; unplanned, unhygienic and dangerous. In realizing the concept of modernity, the Colonial rule intervened kampungs through the Kampung Improvement Program, aimed to improve the physical quality of kampung and “civilized” its inhabitants.

2.1 Kampungs as spaces of everyday urban informality

Under Colonial rule, kampungs were portrayed by scholars as settlements that were spread all over the city. Blackburn (2011) described kampungs as dwellings which are mostly made from wood, with roofs made from bamboo leaves, surrounded by a full yard where poultry were kept, and vegetables were grown. Colombijn (2011) portrayed kampungs as neighborhood built (self-built) without an overall plan for streets and building plots, which either evolved in the urban center as squatters’ settlements or a rural village that was absorbed into the broadening city.

Kampungs were mostly located in North Jakarta, which was denser, prone to fire and flood, and yet neglected by the Colonial government. Only a few public restrooms were available, drainage and waste collection system were lacking, and people had to buy drinking water from vendors. During the depression period in the 1930s, many villagers migrated to Jakarta seeking unskilled work. These
laborers lived collectively in a communal lodging house or Pondok; non-permanent dwellings, a relatively large building, and divided into few units. It was a common house with ground floor shared by individuals and families living in different rooms, shared veranda for cooking, and a collective restroom shared by 10-30 households. Pondok usually was occupied by people who have ties based on the common village of origin. From this aspect, the communal lodging functioned as a temporary net for the newcomers to survive before manage to settle independently (Colombijn, 2013; Blackburn, 2011).

Based on ethnographic research in Kampung Kebun Kacang, Jellinek (1991) illustrated the way groups of migrant established kampungs in Jakarta. She categorizes two different groups which occupied land in Central Jakarta since the early of 1900s. First, were those who had already previously settled in Jakarta and considered themselves as the native Jakartans (known as Betawi). They usually have legal title to the land they occupy and have built a substantial house, of woven bamboo walls and coconut palm roofs. They were known as the richest in the kampung, owning quite large plots of land surrounded by vegetable gardens, fruit gardens, and fish ponds. Second, were squatters coming from neighboring areas, including Bogor and Tangerang. Many of them were landless peasants occupying unused land. The Municipal government allowed these groups to cultivate the land but not to settle and build a house. These squatters, who paid taxes for the right to cultivate, slowly encroached the land, and illegally built a substantial house. These residents would dismantle their place when the area was patrolled by the Dutch officials and rebuilt it soon afterward. Through their persistence, they eventually settled in the area. Shortly, more people, relatives or friends invited to help with agricultural work, joined the existing families. Inter-marriage among families and friends accelerated the growth of settlers. The first families who had claimed the land were considered as a patron or landlord by the others. The newcomers usually are the breadwinners who leave their family back in the village and live together, with the patron, in a
Pondok. The number of Pondoks in Kampung Kebun Kacang varied from five to nine, each housing two to fifteen people. Other than working in agriculture, many of these residents tried to earn extra income by renting out small units to accommodate newcomers migrating to Jakarta in response to the allure of Batavia, with its European and Chinese population growth and offices and infrastructure facilities. Immigrants then filled the demand in laboring and service jobs (Jellinek, 1991, Silver, 2008).

Kampung residents perceived kampungs as a habitual, multi-functional living space: as their home, as a place to pursue income generating activities, and as a space to develop close-knit social networks. Kampung residents shared common facilities, including water and established collaborative services like sewing/tailoring or tofu production in the backyard. The support system also created where people could rely on neighbors during times of crisis. Kampung alleyways were where activities of every person living in the kampung were pursued, became a playground, a commercial site and a social corridor. Yet, despite the lack of any structured settlement plan, as in modern town planning, kampung residents find it easy to navigate the kampungs (Blackburn, 2011; Colombijn, 2013).

2.2 Colonial attitudes toward Kampungs and the Question of Modernity

Contrary to the way of residents perceived their kampungs, the European colonial administrators regarded kampungs as “indigenous neighborhoods,” contrasting them with Jakarta’s European streets and Chinese quarters. Kampung residents tended to be distinguished based on race and ethnicity instead of class. According to Silver (2008), the stratification was a product of the European-style city planning within Batavia, which should be understood within the broader context of racial separation and stratification imposed by the Dutch colonial administration. Kooy and Bakker (2014) reiterate Silver’s argument, stressing race-based stratification, rather than social class,
in the provision of water. Adopting the framework of post-colonial governmentally, they argue that the water provision in the colonial period enabled new categorizations and divisions into three population categories: European, mixed races, and native, which shaped the organization of urban water supply in Jakarta until today. Moreover, Roosmalen (2014) emphasizes that the ethnic-based stratification in Netherland Indies society was portrayed in the layout and design of residential areas.

Although there was no rigid segregation between Europeans, foreign oriental (Chinese, Arabs, and Indian), and indigenous Indonesians, these different ethnic groups lived in separate areas, except for indigenous workers in the domestic sector, who mostly lived in European or foreign Orientals’ homes. The European district was primarily located in better neighborhoods, at high elevations filled with spacious houses. The indigenous and other Asians lived on small plots of lands with small houses, narrow streets, and little public space. However, the geographical distribution was not entirely exclusive. Due to financial means, Roosmalen argues that it was possible for affluent Chinese, Indo-European, and indigenous people to live in European quarters. Equally, deprived Europeans and Indo-Europeans also lived in non-European areas. The residential pattern with a mixture of ethnicity and class, according to Colombijn (2013), was more accurate and leads us to think of the kampung as a lower-class neighborhood compares to an indigenous one. Furthermore, Colombijn argues that social class, and not ethnicity, was the determinant factor in people’s choice to reside in a European suburb or an indigenous kampung. Income was the primary consideration by which the poor indigenous, foreign oriental and Eurasian populations lived together and portrayed as multi-ethnic lower-class neighborhoods in the 1920s.

The colonial regime, which mostly focused on the physical aspect and disregards the social fabrics of the kampung, perceived kampungs as disordered and highly problematic. From this perspective, the disorder of kampungs represented the opposite of modernity, posing a challenge for the Colonial regime’s aspiration to become a modern administration with a rational town planning.
Further, kampungs, as inaccessible sites and unhygienic environments, were considered a breeding zone for epidemic diseases and criminal behavior. The colonial administration saw epidemics of plague and cholera as a direct result of enormously unhygienic conditions in the kampungs (Versnel and Colombijn, 2014; Colombijn, 2013; Roosmalen, 2014).

The discussion of kampung as an antithesis of modernity begins with the introduction of modern town planning and the Batavia’s urban water infrastructure. Town planning in the Netherlands Indies was a demonstration of modernization and, one of the primary agents of the modernization of Indonesia in the early of the twentieth century. The introduction of modern town planning was instigated by the epidemics of plague and cholera, which involved the medical experts who have called the attention to the connection between the outbreaks, public health, and housing conditions. The well-known figures on the subject was a pharmacist H.F. Tillema and the physician W.T. De Vogel. Tillema established the connection between construction, town planning, and public health. He generated ideas on the modern city by arguing that the housing construction should emphasize a modern architecture. He then accentuated the opposite of the European city: disorder, dirty and impoverished spaces, and an indigenous and traditionally built quarter which inhabited by ignorant people who care less about the hygienic aspect of their environment. Soon after, the Town Planning Commission was established with two objectives: to make an inventory of fundamental elements of urban development; and to formulate town planning regulation. In regards to the modernization of the city, the Town Planning Commission proclaimed that town planning was beyond the re-organization of the city. It was related to an aesthetic ideal where beauty is equal to order. Town planners, as agents of modernization, get to define what modern was and they located the kampung as an antithesis of modernization: unplanned, disorderly, unhygienic and dangerous. Kampungs were perceived as a contrary to modern town planning where a city was ordered, harmonious and a delightful space to our sight (Jellinek, 1991; Roosmalen, 2014).
In urban water infrastructure, Kooy and Bakker (2014) argue there was no direct link made between the health and the consumption of the standardized quality of clean water before the 19th century. Concerns about health-focused more generally on the urban environment. It changed by the mid-1800s, as colonial administrators started to see the connection between urban health and water supply, motivating government intervention towards the supply of hygienic water. The more advanced technical and scientific knowledge about the relationship between water and health brought legitimization of colonial authority over the indigenous population. The contrasting use of clean water by European residents versus contaminated water sources by indigenous residents has demonstrated the rationality of colonialism. The consumption of untreated surface water by the kampung residents, for drinking, washing, and bathing, reinforced the superiority and advanced knowledge of the modern European population over the kampung residents. This division of urban space and community based on the “level of modernity” was incorporated into the water supply infrastructure, which was mostly constructed within the emerging European settlements.

Throughout the first decade of 20th century, the European advanced its water supply infrastructure from non-pipe provision to private household connection.

2.3 The Colonial Kampung Improvement Program

Jakarta’s growth brought suburbs like Menteng closer to “overcrowded and unsanitary” kampungs. This raised concern that kampungs might affect the well-being of European quarters, and therefore instigated growing fears among the European elite about the threat of disease generated from kampungs. In responding to such concern, the colonial government was driven to appropriate kampungs through the Kampung Improvement Program. It was considered as both a necessity and a public interest. Thus, the Kampung Improvement Program was a top-down policy (Jellinek, 1991; Tunas, 2010; Colombijn, 2013; Versnel and Colombijn, 2014; Roosmalen, 2014).
The colonial administration’s initiative to “fix” kampungs was also part of the Dutch Ethical Policy aimed at addressing the welfare of kampung inhabitants. From the perspective of the colonial administration, kampungs represented chaos, decay, and dirt, which were believed as the outcome of their autonomy. The Regeringsreglement of 1854 had guaranteed Indonesian villages (kampungs) their autonomous administration. Later, the 1903 Decentralization Act protected the administrative autonomy, and officially separated European and non-European population in the colony. It made the native officials as the person in charge of the kampung affairs (Silver, 2008; Roosmalen, 2014). Enactment of the Municipal Ordinance in 1906 strengthened this autonomy whereby regulating indigenous lands to fell under the jurisdiction of indigenous authority (the autonomous Desa), also called inlandsche gemeentes.

When municipalities began to question living conditions in kampungs, they saw two issues: first, how to improve the physical aspect of kampungs and second, how to abolish kampungs autonomy and locate them under the colonial government’s control. The abolition of kampung autonomy was considered a necessary condition to overcome their chaotic appearance and perceived unhygienic conditions. However, abolishing kampung’s autonomy was not simply a judicial issue, but also a financial one. D. Tollenaar, the then-Government Commissioner for Centralization, argued an enormous amount of money would be needed for the city administrator to take over kampung administration, to finance the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, water supply, and street lighting in kampungs within city boundaries.

The abolition of kampungs autonomy was finalized through a revision of 1903 Decentralization Act in 1918. The revision amended the Act to locate kampungs under the authority of the municipality. In 1927, after advocacy by nationalists at the City Council during the First Native Housing Congress in 1925, the Colonial Government increased the budget allocated for kampung improvement. In 1928, it made an ambitious plan to conduct the improvement program
throughout Java, channeled through the public health budget. Unlike the much later Kampung Improvement Program (in the 1960s), kampung residents could not participate in the planning process, which was entirely designed and directed by municipal officials. The design for the improved kampungs was prepared by the city’s planning department and executed by the public works. It was not completed entirely, due to the great depression in the 1930s and the crisis in the colonial economy due to falling of sugar prices, which made the funds allocated for kampung improvement were less than 2% of the required budget. Nevertheless, the program was formalized with a bylaw in 1934.

Two prominent figures led the implementation of Kampung Improvement Program; Ruckert, a European bureaucrat, and Hoesni Thamrin, an Indonesian elected politician, who both were part of the Volksraad (democratic representation in the parliament) on the same period. From their perspective, each fought for the realization of the Kampung Improvement Program. Ruckert, influenced by Tillema and Thomas Karsten on the idea of town planning, emphasized the danger to inhabitants outside the kampungs of epidemics including the plague and cholera. For that reason, he proposed the program to be funded by the central government. Despite his advocacy, the final budget provided for kampung improvement only for the costs for construction and not maintenance. Hoesni Thamrin represented and voiced the interests of kampungs and indigenous residents. One of his significant contribution on the Kampung Improvement Program was his strong advocacy on the preservation of the kampungs’ character. Thamrin gave an example related to road construction. If the program planned to replace an existing road, it should not be built in the style of Hausman in Paris (Silver, 2008; Blackburn, 2011; Versnel and Colombijn, 2014; Kooy and Bakker, 2014).

Within a very short period of its implementation, and despite its good intention to improve the living condition in Kampung, the program received criticism, mostly related to its impact. One
criticism regarded its implementation of strict building regulations. When building’s regulations were strictly enforced, many kampung houses were declared unfit and had to be demolished. This reduced the number of existing kampung dwellings, forcing the homeless to move in with their relatives or families, eventually resulting in overcrowding in kampungs that were not part of the program. The other criticism addressed the externality of the program, which solely focused on neighborhood improvement such as upgrading streets, public facilities, and sewerage. These physical improvements, including the provision of water supply service, led to the increased land values, and rents. These forced the poorer families in affected kampungs to move to the city’s outskirts or to other kampungs, again triggering more overcrowded dwellings (Blackburn, 2011; Colombijn, 2013; Kooy and Bakker, 2014). The improved kampungs were soon settled by a new administrative middle class of salaried Indonesians and Eurasians. Blackburn (2011) offers additional criticisms, related to the execution of the program. By mainly improving the roads, footpaths and sewage system in the kampung, the Kampung Improvement Program was criticized as a program dominated by European interests and benefitting mainly Europeans. As an illustration, Batavia established The Local Water Supply Enterprise of Batavia in 1918, which extended piped water to certain kampungs during the program. However, it is confirmed in 1929 that the European quarter received four times the water supply available to kampung residents (Silver, 2008; Blackburn, 2011).

**Conclusion**

Kampung residents perceived kampungs as a habitual, multi-functional living space, and easy to navigate, despite the lack of any structured settlement plan. As a contrary, the colonial regime, which mostly focused on the physical aspect and disregards the social fabrics of the kampung, perceived kampungs as disordered and highly problematic. From this perspective, the disorder of kampungs represented the opposite of modernity, posing a challenge for the Colonial regime’s aspiration to
become a modern administration with a rational town planning.

The mobilization of the perception towards kampung as the antithesis of a modern city begins with the introduction of modern town planning and the Batavia’s urban water infrastructure. With this perception, the only approach toward kampungs was through a Kampung Improvement Program. With the program, the Colonial administrator, which aimed to bring the enlightenment to the kampung’s life, introducing the modern environment and therefore ‘fix’ the behavior of kampung inhabitants. While the program was not implemented as planned due to the economic crisis, it created the foundation for how kampungs have continued to be perceived thereafter; an unplanned, disorderly, unhygienic and dangerous space. As the following chapter discusses, the perception of kampungs as an antithesis of modernity persisted during the period of Jakarta’s massive development. This became the primary influence shaping policy choices with respect to the kampung as a space that needs to be “fixed” to achieve the modern version of Jakarta.
CHAPTER 3. Kampungs as Slums? The Meaning of Kampung in contemporary housing and planning policy

For decades, the kampung has been understood in a derogative way by the city government. Beginning in the Dutch era, kampungs were identified as a disorganized and relatively problematic space. Kampungs are spaces organized by ethnic groups who live in enclaves outside the city center, having once been considered as harmful to the well-being of Dutch society. As discussed in Chapter 2, kampungs were considered as the antithesis of modernity by the Colonial administration. This perspective persists in the Indonesian government and among its bureaucrats, who see the kampung as a space that is equivalent to a slum. Therefore, when the government envisioned the nationalist project, the approach was to “drag” people out of Kampung, according to JJ Rizal, a historian from University of Indonesia (Interview 2). He elaborates that the other approach is to ignore kampungs and exclude them from the urban landscape. In this view, kampungs are only significant once the government is in need of strategic, inner-city land. In this chapter, I demonstrate how approaches towards kampungs by the government, under the regimes of Presidents Soekarno and Suharto, led to gradual disappearance of kampungs from mainstream discourses in planning policies, thereby losing their entitlement to be perceived as a distinct settlement form and livelihood space in Jakarta.

3.1 Jakarta’s Kampungs and the State: Interactions with Kampungs through the Slums Alleviation Program

Soekarno, a civil engineer by training, envisioned Jakarta as becoming one of the world’s great cities. The extensive redevelopment made by Jakarta’s government during 1957-1966 was a realization of Soekarno’s vision to transform Jakarta into a symbol of a unified and independent Indonesia.

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2 Interview was conducted in Depok, August 1st, 2016
Recognizing the slow progress of urban development in the 1950s, Soekarno decided to increase the power of its Mayors by making them into Governors. By a Presidential Decree in 1959, Jakarta was elevated to the status of a province. In 1961, Soekarno issued another decree that provided Jakarta with more autonomy. This decree made the Governor directly responsible to the President, releasing him from the authority of the municipal council. Under this new governance, Jakarta experienced a massive eviction of kampungs during the preparation for the Asian Games 1962. Between 1960-1962, 47,000 people were evicted to make way for the Asian Games complex. Under Soekarno, the first Spatial Plan (1960 Master Plan) also was drafted. The 1960 plan guided a restructuration of Jakarta through a combination of the redevelopment of old buildings, streets and sanitation improvement, and new market areas. Soekarno envisioned a modern city, welcoming the ideas of slums being cleaned and resettling people into social housing (rusunawa). For him, rusunawa realized a modern lifestyle, as was being implemented in major cities including Singapore. The earlier plans also advocated for a slums clearance in the dense neighborhood and market areas encroaching into the neighborhood located in the former European quarter. Though the 1960 Spatial Plan was never realized due to the political atmosphere, it addressed a policy and an allocated budget to “clean the slums”, a threat to the existence of kampung. These visions were not realized, which benefited the urban poor who avoided displacement under Soekarno’s administration (Jellinek, 1991; Silver, 2008; Blackburn, 2011).

3.2 Approaching Slums through Kampung Improvement Program (KIP)

Appointed by Soekarno as Governor of Jakarta in 1966, Sadikin had housing backlog and increasing immigration as his primary challenge. In the 1960s, kampungs dominated the landscape of Jakarta, which sized 7.200 Ha out of 12.000 Ha or 60% of Jakarta’s area. The dominance of kampungs was
contributed by the urbanization which was not only driven by the economic reason but also for safety reason. During the 1950s, the urbanization was intensified due to the uprising in some areas in Indonesia including in West Java and Central Java which lead to the increasing of the population of Jakarta up to 250% (Darundono, 2011). Seeking to limit the increasing inflow of migrants, Governor Sadikin restricted the main occupations where most migrants found employment; becak driving and the petty trading. The aim of his policy was not only to force the migrants back to their village, but also to spread the news to other villagers and hopefully discouraging further migration.

In regards to Soekarno’s envision of a modern Jakarta, Governor Ali Sadikin proposed a different approach to dealing with slums. The pressures to develop Jakarta had intensified, but Sadikin refused to evict the slums kampung and relocate the kampung residents into social housing (rusunawa). Governor Sadikin did not consider this a strategic solution for Jakarta’s urban poor. At first, assisted by the World Bank, Sadikin built houses in the outskirts of Jakarta. However, not only was far from the city center, but it was also unaffordable for so many urban poor (Blackburn, 2011).

Silver (2008) categorizes kampung in the 1950s into three types: first, the inner-city kampung, residential areas with the highest density; second, the peripheral kampung, those that retained rural characteristics, but were increasingly encroached upon by an expansion of the urbanized area; and third, the woodland kampung, those which would not be swallowed into the urban fabric before the massive suburbanization that took place in the 1970s and 1980s. The inner city kampungs were the ones paid most attention by Sadikin. Eventually, Sadikin chose a Kampung Improvement Program to improve kampung’s conditions, yet with a different objective than as the Colonial government did. In the colonial era, the objective of the Kampung Improvement Program was to protect nearby European quarter from the spread of diseases from kampungs. Under Sadikin, kampungs were facilitating millions of new rural migrants with minimum infrastructure investment, causing kampungs to be lacking in basic services and therefore remain as places with a significant public
health problem. The 1969 assessment of Jakarta’s kampung generated the following information: out of 500 kampungs, 68% of kampung’s houses had no private toilet; 80% were without electricity; 90% were without piped water; and only 24% of buildings in kampungs had solid walls, floors, and roofs. Sadikin saw kampungs as part of the urban fabric. He further argued that kampung residents played a significant role as workers needed for the city’s development. Thus, their quality of life needed to be improved. However, while kampungs were considered essential to community life for Jakarta’s residents, they were also a deterrent to Jakarta’s transformation into a modern, international city, a goal shared by Sadikin and President Soekarno, and later with President Suharto, whom Sadikin worked for 12 years. Therefore, the Kampung Improvement Program was considered by Sadikin as a solution both to improve the poor physical condition of kampungs and eventually the quality of life of kampung residents.

In 1969, kampung’s improvement became part of six vital projects in Jakarta. The program was designed to upgrade kampung’s housing, improving poor and high-density kampungs by providing basic infrastructure and facilities. The Kampung Improvement Program became part of a comprehensive housing and neighborhood improvement program during the first two decades of Suharto’s New Order regime. Later, Kampung Improvement Program was followed by a more ambitious urban revitalization project beginning in 1980s which ironically led to the eviction of many kampungs which had initially been rescued by Sadikin through Kampung Improvement Program (Silver, 2008; Darundono, 2011).

Five kampungs were chosen as a pilot projects: Kampung Kemayoran Kecil (Kemayoran, Central Jakarta), Kampung Rawa Badak I (Koja, North Jakarta), Kampung Krendeng I (Tambora, Central Jakarta), Kampung Menteng Wadas (Setiabudi, South Jakarta), and Kampung Kayumanis (Matraman, East Jakarta). The focus of the pilot project was to build infrastructure and public facilities, including streets, pathways, bridges, drainage systems, water and sanitation facilities, health
facilities (clinics) and schools. The pilot project was initiated by a grassroots initiative three years prior when people collected money and tried to improve the kampung’s conditions independently. The government saw it as a good initiative and decided to do the pilot project. It was successfully implemented and received attention from the national government.

Considering the pilot projects a success, Jakarta’s government aimed to increase the extent of improved kampungs through a governmental loan from the World Bank. The World Bank conducted a quick assessment in 1972, and judged this as the best approach to the slums. In 1973, the World Bank chose Jakarta as the first country that accepted a loan for the informal settlements’ improvement (Urban Projects I, II, III and IV). The World Bank aimed to help the Indonesian government to formulate its urban development program and its overall urban policies. Their immediate goal was to support the implementation of government policy to provide housing and basic infrastructure in Indonesian cities.

The project was launched in 1973, named the Muhammad Husni Thamrin project, after a Betawi councilor who had fought for the interest of kampung residents in the 1920s and 1930s. The total funds loaned by the World Bank for the urban development project amounted to US$438.3 million in 1993 dollars. The loan covered a period from June 1970 to February 1988. The KIP component of the Urban I-IV Projects was the housing and environmental improvement for low-income urban households in Indonesia (Darundono, 2011, Wallsten, 1995).

According to Werlin (1999), a former World Bank Urban Project officer, the World Bank’s slum upgrading approach was influenced by the writing of John F.C Turner, especially his 1972 book *Freedom to Build*, which promoted “development from below”. Based on his observations in Peru, Turner argued that the solution for slums is not to evict their residents but to improve the environment. Turner argued that the slums residents would be able to maintain the built
infrastructure and, after the upgrading, they would gradually improve their homes and living conditions, especially when it also involved security of tenure and access to credit.

### 3.3 Implementation of Kampung Improvement Program (KIP)

During the pilot project, the kampung improvement was implemented by a different government agency led by the head of district (Camat) as the project officer. Division of work through different agencies caused an incoherent project. Under the Mohammad Husni Thamrin’s project, the World Bank required the Jakarta’s government to establish an integrated body to coordinate the project. Later, the Jakarta’s government, by the Governor’s decree in 1973, established the *Badan Pelaksana Pembangunan Proyek* (BAPPEM) MHT, an integrated body specifically in charge of the project’s implementation. Members of the integrated body came from different government agencies who worked full time on the project. As an example, a staff from a sanitary agency oversaw waste management and the provision of sanitary infrastructure; or a staff from public works oversaw the footpath construction in kampungs.

The project had three stages. First, the selection of kampungs, which came from kampungs residents’ proposals. All proposals were screened by the Steering Committee, consisting of Mayors, related agencies and the project officer, chaired by the Vice Governor. Discussed at the meeting were: the kampung’s information: the age of kampung, land tenure, density, and any issues with flooding, water provision, sanitation or health issues that became the main considerations for kampung selection. The meeting produced a list of kampungs selected for the program, which was formalized through a gubernatorial decree. Second, there was a field assessment and detailed survey to collect kampungs’ information and to assess the project’s requirements in each kampung. The assessment was realized into a mapping plan with a 1:1000 scale (kampung scale). Third, there was a planning meeting, where participants included the BAPPEM MHT, government agencies, the
Mayor, the head of district and sub-district, and the head of kampungs discussed the planning map. The planning meeting was also functioned as a public hearing to discuss the planning details with kampungs residents.

The collaboration with the World Bank was not only financial. During the program, the World Bank actively guided Jakarta’s government, including on the selection of kampung. According to the World Bank Evaluation Report (1995), the selected kampungs had more comprehensive criteria including residential densities, the age of kampung, proximity to existing infrastructure, and residents’ participation. Throughout the Kampung Improvement Program, the government tried it best to avoid the housing demolition, although in some cases, such as when part of a house blocked a necessary pathway, households were moved and compensated (Wallsten, 1995, Darundono, 2011).

From 1969-1982, the project successfully improved 537 kampungs within 10.953 Hectares and involved 3.8 million kampungs residents. The program upgraded or built roads and footpaths, improving drainage and water supply, and sanitation and solid waste disposal. This was done with a very small budget, 15-20% of the city budget to improve kampungs providing housing for 60% of city population. It cost only about US$ 118 per capita in 1993 dollars. The Kampung Improvement Program was considered as a success, receiving an Aga Khan award, and was replicated in Surabaya in 1976. The program lasted within fifteen years where on the last five years, the program introduced a TRIBINA approach, meaning that other than only focus to the physical development, the program also aimed to improve the social services (health, education, and recreation) and economic capacity of kampung residents (job training, technical assistance and credit for micro enterprises) (Silver, 2008; Darundono, 2011, Blackburn, 2011).

3.4 Evaluating the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP)

In 1995, the World Bank published a KIP evaluation report (Wallsten, 1993). The report highlighted
the main impact of the program, concluding that it improved life of kampung residents through improved footpaths, lighting, education, health facilities, living space and housing density reduction. Kampung residents’ access to clean and safe water, private toilets and septic tanks, was also improved. The report emphasized that two-third of the respondents in the project areas associated the improvements in their kampung to the KIP, and claimed that the overall environmental condition in their neighborhood was far better after the KIP. However, other respondents also expressed their dissatisfaction about garbage collection (the frequency and quality).

In her book on Kampung Kebun Kacang in Central Jakarta, Jellinek (1991) highlights major shortcomings of the program which she thought failed to improve the tiny and packed houses and provide them with better amenities. Jellinek criticized the program for concentrating too much on the upgrading of footpaths and drains which eventually were laid in a much richer neighborhood. Werlin (1999) also criticized the KIP regarding poor maintenance of the communal toilets and washing blocks, which became inefficient facilities. Winayanti (2004) criticized the KIP for failing to address land tenure issues, and therefore not generating any form of tax revenue that the city government could use to finance the program. Winayanti further notes Jakarta’s local government has been inconsistent, as settlements that had undergone the KIP were later demolished to accommodate new commercial and business facilities. Blackburn (2011) added a very critical point, which addressing subsequent approaches to slums in Jakarta, arguing that the program neglected the illegal kampung on railways and canals. For these settlements, the only approach was displacement, and no solution offered to the poorest population.

3.5 From Kampung Improvement to Urban Renewal

As has been elaborated on by Werlin (1999), who believed Kampung Improvement Program was a better approach towards slums kampung, President Suharto declared the National Kampung
Improvement Program in the 1990s, which involved 15 million kampung residents throughout Indonesia. However, the bureaucracy failed to understand the dynamics of the kampung, and therefore, the people participation in the program was also distorted. In 1993, the integrated body (BAPPEM MHT) aimed specifically to implement the project was dismissed. The Housing Agency later was given the authority to enforce the program, which failed to ensure the integration approach throughout the program. The housing agency slowly shifted the execution of the program towards a technocratic approach and no longer implemented the community-based development. The housing agency also questioned the TRIBINA approach, a mixture of physical, social and economic improvement. Darundono (2011) argued that this was the phase when the affordable housing policy changed to the development of the social housing (rusunawa). The housing agency believed that the urban renewal, by evicting kampung and build a walk up flat, was a better approach to overcoming the slums issues. In 1999, the Mohammad Husni Tamhrin program (KIP) was officially ended. This led to a more ambitious urban revitalization project that started in the late 1980s and finally the demolition of many kampungs which had initially been reserved by the Governor Sadikin. In 2000, the KIP was transformed into a community empowerment program on the sub-district level (PPMK), where each Kelurahan was granted IDR 2 billion. The program no longer emphasized on the kampung level. The PPMK was continued to be accompanied by the development of social housing (rusunawa) across the city and the peripheral one (Silver, 2008; Darundono, 2011).

Various policies and strategies have been developed by the government to address housing problems in Indonesia by applying both the welfare and market approaches and by offering the poor alternatives to a formal housing such as slum upgrading programs, including KIP. The approach to kampungs began shifting when the government decided to embrace different strategies, other than KIP, to meet the increasing demands of affordable housing. From the mid-1970s onward, both central and local governments begin to approach the housing issue by developing public housing
and urban renewal projects. Social housings were provided under redevelopment or urban renewal programs by the central and local government (Winayanti, 2004).

In 1974, the Indonesian government established three key institution to address the housing backlog: The National Housing Authority, which has the authorization to formulate the national housing policy; National Corporation for the Development of Housing (PERUMNAS), which is responsible to provide low cost housing in Indonesian cities; and the State Saving Banks (BTN) which provided the mortgage (Rukmana, 2018). Through PERUMNAS, private developers built houses on land acquired by the government. During the 1980s and 1990s, the urban development strategy shifted its focus to new private housing. In Jakarta, housing provision program was implemented on the periphery and was mainly reserved for the civil servants. Some units were offered to lower income households, but there was not a good response, since they were located very far from employment opportunities. Later, the Jakarta’s government and PERUMNAS begin to explore other alternative locations in the city center. In 1981, PERUMNAS planned to construct a social housing consisting of 960 units in Tanah Abang, Jakarta. Directed by the Public Works Department, the social housings aimed to house residents of Kampung Kebun Kacang. Since Kampung Kebun Kacang had not benefited from the KIP, due to its density and difficulties to upgrade without destroying the main part of houses, the construction of social housings was justified by the Public Works to improve the unhealthy and a fire-prone slum. The government was confident that the program could improve kampung residents’ standard of living.

Jellinek (1991) argues the main reason for the selection of Kampung Kebun Kacang as the pilot project for Rusunawa was its location in the city center; near Jalan Thamrin, embassies and the Hotel Indonesia, the prime site of modernization projects in Jakarta. It became an eyesore for the government and city planners, who believed that slums should not occupy the central city. Through this pilot project, the government wanted to demonstrate that Jakarta was on the same path as Hong
Kong and Singapore. Jellinek criticized it as a double standard approach. Previously ignored by the
government, planners began to see Kampung Kebun Kacang as a prime location that needed to be
“capitalized” by the government soon after an increasing demand for land, particularly on the city
center. In August 1981, the Ministry of Public Works, Directorate General of Housing, the Mayor’s
Office of Central Jakarta and other related agencies invited kampung dwellers to inform them about
the urban renewal program. Each displaced household would be granted a unit of 18 or 36 m2 on
the ground or first floor, in four story apartment buildings. Each unit would be equipped with piped
water, gas, electricity and sewerage installation. Soon after the meeting ended, the kampung
residents panicked, realizing that the program was equivalent to demolition. Jellinek argues the
residents did not have a major housing problem. Most were the owners who had been incrementally
improving their houses. Renters had paid a constant rate for the past 25 years, only 5% of their
monthly income.

Overall, kampung residents had major concerns regarding the urban renewal program. First,
the rental system cast additional financial burden to each household. In the new rusunawa all renters
would be forced to have fixed monthly expenses, quite incompatible to their insecure jobs and
insufficient income. Second, residents were concerned about the flat design and regulations
governing use, which limited the operation of informal economic activities from their homes. For
those who depended on the informal sectors as their main source of income, the social housing
design and arrangement would disrupt their already precarious life. Over three-quarters of the
kampung residents, worried about their inability to pay in the future, and refused to move to the
flats. The remaining 25% accepted sites and serviced housing on the city’s peripheries, and the rest
rehoused themselves. Residents decided to express their concerns and fought the development
project for over a year. With the national government pressure, Kampung Kebun Kacang eventually
was made ready for flat construction in March 1982 after residents dismantled their building days
before. Jellinek further explained that 160 families who accepted the flats had to wait for two and a half years, instead of the six-month waiting period promised by the government.

Throughout those two and half years, they were rehoused by PERUMNAS nearby, in a temporary barrack-like accommodation where they had to endure conditions that were much worse than their previous kampung; more congested, unhygienic, and uncomfortable. When the flats were completed, they were advertised for commercial consumers even before the kampungs residents acquired their allocated units. The units were sold between IDR 13 million to IDR 16 million, exceeding the kampung residents’ expectations. The kampung residents were finally received their flats unit in April 1984. Though much relieved to leave the temporary barracks they were alarmed and horrified with the building, which had cracks and unanticipated costs including charges for electricity, gas, and water connection. The residents were also forced to pay some additional certificate cost to the head of sub-district (Lurah). Those who could not adapt to the additional financial burdens eventually left the flats.

For the next ten years, 1985 to 1995, the city built another 7,163-social housing units (rusunawa), ranging in size from 18 to 54 m². The accelerated pace of low-income housing construction began after 1995, with approximately 1,200 units added to the housing stock that year. These projects were built in parts of Jakarta in Jati Bunder, Karet Tengsin, Bendungan Hilir, and Tebet. During 1995 and 2000, Jakarta set a target to build 15,750 new low-cost apartments. But after the 1997 economic crisis, the nation’s fiscal crisis shut down the government’s housing construction program which was only able to add about 5,200 new units to response to the housing backlog (Silver, 2008). The Kebun Kacang case and the following built social housing set the basis for the future approach to slum issues in Jakarta. Instead of in-situ upgrading as exemplified by the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP), the national government mobilized the concept of social housings (rusunawa) as the only solution to urban slums (Kementerian PU Direktorat Jendral Cipta
Karya, 2012).

3.6 Kampung and slums in Spatial Planning and Government Policies

The exclusion of kampungs from the urban landscape was not only caused by designating them as slums, but also by the stratification of kampungs based on their location; Kampungs that do not conform with the zoning regulation: along riverbanks, railways, or waste disposal sites, are categorized as illegal. The exclusion of those kampungs labeled as illegal was strengthened through a map of slum areas (Peta Tematik Daerah Kumuh) issued by the Jakarta Statistics Bureau in 1997. The map documents the locations of major slum areas in Jakarta but fails to identify many that were mainly located along riverbanks, railways, or waste disposal sites (squatters’ settlement).

The government justified their disinclination to document these squatter’s settlements for three reasons: First, the settlements may not have the administrative status of Rukun Tetangga (RT or neighborhood association)\(^3\), questioning their political legitimacy in the eyes of the government. The implementation of the ‘closed city’ policy in Jakarta by Governor Sadikin in the 1960s, which scrutinized incoming migrants, led to administrative consequences of denying RT status to newly formed settlements that did not conform with zoning regulations. Second, these settlements are considered illegal due to the land status or zoning. In this case, even kampungs with RT status could be assumed to be illegal because they occupy state land that is required for public use, or land that is

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\(^3\) One of attempts to regulate kampungs, under the Colonial rule was done through the application of administrative governance in kampung by the Japanese. The Rukun Tetangga (RT) is an organizing scheme first introduced under the Japanese rule. The RT was functioned to distribute government information and as a monitoring scheme over the population (Blackburn, 2011). This system was replicated by the Mayor of Sudiro in 1957 when he launched a massive campaign to organize the kampung’s residents into Rukun Tetangga (RT) and Rukun Kampung, which is equal to Rukun Warga (RW) today. The head of Rukun Kampung was elected locally and expected to help the government in organizing the manpower especially for local projects like road construction (Silver, 2008; Blackburn, 2011). The notion of kampung and Rukun Kampung still exist in policy documents until the issuance of Law no 5/1979 on Village Government, which overlaid kampung with kelurahan. Thus, the state treats the kampung as an entirely separate entity and never suggested either Rukun Kampung nor Rukun Warga as part of any level of government representative (Sullivan, 1992). The advisor of the Public Work Minister argues that it may be the critical moment in which kampung was superimposed with governance system (urban village/kelurahan).
zoned for functions other than residential. Third, it was assumed that these settlements will eventually be demolished. By not being indicated on the map, or listed as an administrative unit, a kampung was ignored in the planning process and became ineligible for any government infrastructure program. The most common action of the local government towards squatter settlements is forced eviction (Winayanti, 2004). The separation of kampung (legal and illegal) strengthens Blackburn’s criticisms of the KIP’s neglect towards illegal kampung, which has persisted to this day.

During Governor Fauzi Bowo’s regime (2007-2012), the KIP was reenacted under the name Muhammad Husni Thamrin (MHT) Plus. But it only improved legal slums Rukun Warga (RW), and neglected those located in illegal areas. The identification of RW instead of kampung raised question on how and when the term of kampung begins to switch. However, during an interview, an advisor for the Ministry of Public Works claimed that there has been no such a shift or transformation of kampung into slums. The advisor argues that the kampung is no longer a distinct settlement form in Jakarta:

“We do not address nor identify kampung in our Law on Housing in both No 4/1992 and No 1/2011. We only have the definition of perumahan (housing) and permukiman (settlement). People no longer refer to kampung as their residence. They refer to Kelurahan, RW (Rukun Warga) and RT (Rukun Tetangga)” (Interview 3)\(^5\)

One of Jakarta’s Deputy Governors further argues:

“Within the urban administration, a kampung is no longer a term. Normatively there is no kampung in the city. It is still existing in the village. But in the city, there is only an urban village (kelurahan). Well, kampung that exists in the city is kampung in the naming context, including Kampung Melayu, Kampung Bali, Kampung Ambon. Not in the administrative context.” (Interview 4)\(^6\)

\(^5\) Interview was conducted in Jakarta, August 23\(^{rd}\), 2016

\(^6\) Interview was conducted in Jakarta, August 4\(^{th}\), 2016
According to the Law on Housing no 4/1992, *perumahan* (housing) is defined as a group of houses that function as a residential district equipped with infrastructure and facilities. *Permukiman* (settlement) is a functioning urban and rural residential area that support livelihoods. The updated Law on Housing, no 1/2011, contains an additional characteristic to define *Perumahan* and *Kawasan Permukiman*, which by law is a unified system consisting of management, housing provision, maintenance and repair, prevention and quality improvement for slums, land supply, financing and financing system, and community role.

Whereas the kampung is not addressed in these laws, slums are addressed and defined in both. In Law on Housing no 4/1992, local governments may assign residential neighborhoods as slum settlements and therefore unfit for habitation. In Law on Housing, no 1/2011, slum housing (*perumahan kumuh*) is defined as “housing that has decreased the quality of function as a dwelling place”. Slum settlements (*permukiman kumuh*) are “unfit settlements due to building irregularity, high building density, and quality of buildings and facilities that do not meet the requirements”.

The only planning policy addressing kampungs is Jakarta’s Detailed Spatial Planning, no 1/2014. In article 1, a kampung housing zone is defined as “a group of houses designated by the government as a conserved area that is part of the city and inhabited by a specific culture, within a series of low level building (three story buildings)”. This arrangement seems to acknowledge kampungs, yet it also limits the understanding of kampung to a distinct form of settlement and space of life in Indonesian cities. In the Detailed Spatial Plan, a kampung is defined as a conserved (heritage) area, which will lead to a limitation of use and function of space in kampung, as a residential, social and economic space.

In 2014, the Ministry of Public Works-Directorate of Settlement’s Development published
The Slums Identification Guideline (2014), listing six criteria to identify a slum: condition of residential buildings; condition of neighborhood accessibility; condition of neighborhood drainage system; condition of water provision services; condition of waste water management; and condition of waste management. On the condition of residential buildings, there are three indicators in the quick count identification of slum areas: the regularity, density and form of residential buildings. For neighborhood accessibility, there are two such indicators: the coverage of road network services, and the quality of the road network. On the condition of drainage, there is only one indicator: inundation. For water provision services, there are two indicators: the quality of the drinking water source, and the adequacy of the drinking water service. With respect to wastewater management, conditions depend on the sanitation infrastructure. And lastly, on the waste management, the sole indicator is neighborhood waste management.

These indicators are important to understand the logic of slum alleviation approach and to predict the future of kampung. As an example, on the criteria of the condition of residential buildings, one of the indicators is the following: “building irregularity seen from the orientation, size, and shape, for example, If the building orientation is different between one with another; not facing the road, not facing the river”. These criteria applied an approach echoing that the Colonial rule in understanding kampungs as the opposite of modernity. The criteria applied have perpetuated preceptions of kampungs as an unplanned space, in need of being fixed.

**Conclusion**

This chapter discusses how the kampung, slowly disappeared from mainstream discourses in planning policies, under the regime of President Soekarno and Suharto. Began with the President Sukarno’s ambition to craft Jakarta into a modern representation of Indonesia, the then Governor,
Ali Sadikin, was “forced” to resolve the deterioration of kampungs while facilitating incoming migrants along the boom and bust of city’s development. The categorization of kampungs, during the Colonial era, as the representation of anti-modernity for its irregularity and its “chaotic” form persist through post-independence. Thus, label as slum was maintained to be attached to kampungs. Counting the kampungs as part of the urban fabric, Sadikin considers the significant of kampung residents as the body needed for the city’s development. Insisted on approaching kampungs with a different strategy, Sadikin reinstates the Kampung Improvement Program which once was implemented under the Colonial rule, by thoroughly involving the kampung residents. The World Bank supported the program in the latter stage and by the end of the program, more than 10,000 hectares of kampungs and the lives of more than three (3) million kampungs residents were improved. The program ended in the 1990s along the transformation into a technocratic approach, and no longer implemented the community-based development.

Under the Housing Agency, the kampung upgrading was transformed into the urban renewal, by evicting kampung and build a social housing. The Kebun Kacang case and the following built social housing set the basis for the future approach to slum issues in Jakarta. Instead of in-situ upgrading as exemplified by the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP), the national government mobilized the concept of social housings (rusunawa), accompanied with eviction, as the only solution to urban slums.
CHAPTER 4. Jakarta’s Political Regimes, “Illegal Kampungs” and Evictions

Kampungs in Jakarta have experienced four distinct periods of transformation. The first period was in the early 1900s, when many kampungs were cleared to create space for urban development, including Menteng district in Central Jakarta and the Chinese quarter in North Jakarta. The second period of transformation took place after independence, when kampungs experienced an increase in size and density to accommodate mass migration from rural areas. The third period was after the 1960s, when kampungs experienced a massive physical improvement under the Kampung Improvement Program. Silver (2008) notes a fourth period which he describes as a period, during the 1980s to 2000, when kampung displacement accelerated due to large and aggressive private redevelopment projects. I extend Silver’s time frame to argue that kampungs are still experiencing a huge transformation after 2000, including evictions under three different gubernatorial regimes.

In this chapter, I discuss the approaches to evictions under the following three governorships: Sutiyoso (1997-2007), Fauzi Bowo (2007-2012), and Jokowi-Ahok (2012-2017). For the last, I emphasize the partnership between Jokowi and Ahok, since Jokowi was only in power for two years before being elected as the President of Indonesia in 2014. The regime selection is based on the critical moment in Jakarta in the Post-Soeharto era in which a transformation of Jakarta happened, with the spatial change and decentralization with implications to the urban and regional development (Bunnel, 2011). In each regime, I will examine the ongoing evictions focusing on the following three aspects: the process of evictions; the justification of the evictions; and the compensation provided for the evictees.

4.1 The Sutiyoso regime

During 2001-2007, under Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso, many kampung were forcibly and violently destroyed with little or no warning, dialogue or negotiation with the kampung dwellers. During those
years, almost two hundred thousand people lost their homes with little notice, due process or compensation (Human Right Watch Report, 2006; Jellinek, 2011). After the 1997 Asian economic crisis, Sutiyoso was left to govern Jakarta with little direction from the national government. Sutiyoso was obsessed with his vision to transform Jakarta into Asia’s “New York City”, and embarked on Jakarta’s beautification project. As remnants of the previous regime, Sutiyoso inherited an approach of urban governance associated with Suharto’s New Order. Enclosing the public space was among his policies, aiming to ban the vendors, homeless, the unemployed and political activists from transforming the public space into a political stage. He devoted much energy to demolish kampung, banning rick-shaws, restricting motor-bike taxis (ojek), catching vendors, street musicians, beggars, scavengers and sex workers.

With the extensive evictions, Sutiyoso was known as “the King of Evictions” (Silver, 2007, Kusno, 2004). COHRE (2006), who had compiled eviction records from various organizations (National Commission on Human Rights, Jakarta Legal Aid and the Urban Poor Consortium) recorded that between 2003-2004, 60,526 families; and from January to September 2006, 1,180 families were evicted. The evictions were organized by the local government and were enforced by public order officials with the support of the military. Jakarta’s Public Order Office is made up of three local government security forces under the authority of the governor and mayors: Satuan Polisi Ketentraman Dan Ketertiban (TRAMTIB - Police Unit for Peace and Order), Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja (SATPOL PP - Municipal Police Unit), and Lindungan Masyarakat (LINMAS - Community Protectors). A report from the Human Right Watch (2006) stated that these three local government security forces were established in 1990. These forces are separate from the police and are empowered to enforce administrative regulations concerning public order and security. Some of their main task is to collect local taxes, and enforce local public order ordinances, yet their overall mandate is not particularly well defined. With the involvement of the security forces, violence
happened during the forced evictions, when evictees were beaten and mistreated by these security forces (Sheppard, 2006).

Under Sutiyoso, the eviction often involved gangs of private individuals to assist in the demolition. In 2002, the Urban Poor Consortium, an NGO coalition working defending the right of the urban poor, won a class action suit, which ordered Sutiyoso to halt the evictions. UPC and its members were marching and demanding Sutiyoso to follow the court order. During the march, they were assaulted in front of the National Human Right Commission’s office by some 200 members of the Betawi Brotherhood Forum (FBR). The attack was brutal: men, women and children were badly beaten, including Wardah Hafidz, the coordinator of UPC, who had a machete held to her throat (Eldrige, 2005, Wilson, 2015). The Betawi Brotherhood Forum (FBR), a new ethnic *preman* organization, was established in 2001. The FBR was led by a religious scholar with long-standing links to elements of the former New Order regime, and Sutiyoso (Wilson, 2010). FBR claimed to be established to help the Betawis (native Jakartans) youth to find employment. Most of the members are blue-collar workers: motorcycle Taxi (ojek) drivers and the unemployed (Eldrige, 2011).

Regarding Governor Sutiyoso ties to the FBR, he denies giving any money to FBR members, though the Governor had attended an FBR gathering at which the founder of the organization, Fadloli el-Muhiir, supported Sutiyoso’s re-election as governor in 2002. Nonetheless, the FBR representatives stressed that they are not linked to government officials (Sheppard, 2006). In his book, Wilson (2015) explained that the attack of FBR on UPC was widely regarded as a proof that the FBR was on the government’s payroll. He further argues that Sutiyoso likely helped embolden the attack, albeit indirectly (Wilson, 2015).

The evictions mostly took place on state-owned, privately-owned land or land with disputable ownership. Sutiyoso’s administration predominantly justified evictions on the grounds of:
illegality; (ii) disruption of public order; and (iii) evictions due to a public interest-development project. **First**, with “illegality,” it was frequently argued that the settlements are “illegal”, understood as failing to comply to the building codes, were built without permits, or exist in unregulated or unplanned settlements (Human Right Watch, 2006). Blackburn (2011), Silver (2007), and Leitner & Sheppard (2017) underline this “illegal” term as paradoxical, given the frequent insecurity of land tenure in Jakarta, particularly on the legal regime for administering land. Leaf (1993), Kusno (2013) and Winayanti (2004), highlight the legal dualism of land in Jakarta, where in the 1990s, 60% of its land remained unregistered under the BPN (National Land Agency). However, Kampung residents may have quasi-legal titles such as *hak girik* and *hak garapan*, which are acknowledged by the BPN, but does not confer rightful ownership of the property (Winayanti, 2004, Tunas and Peresthu, 2010). The lack of secure tenure makes the urban poor vulnerable to evictions since Kampungs are indisputably illegal. Most of the kampungs where the poorest of the urban poor settle are located on abandoned land (*tanah terlantar*). It is referred as “unused” land, located under bridges, along riverbanks and the railway. During the economic crisis in 1998, the government allowed the poor and homeless to occupy *tanah terlantar* as a solution to the housing shortage (Kusno, 2013; Irawaty, 2012). However, since then, the government refers the people who settle in *tanah terlantar* as squatters, assigning these locations a negative connotation. Once identified as squatters, the residents may be forcefully evicted, without compensation nor resettlement (Winayanti, 2004).

**Second**, on the disruptions of public order, eviction practices in Jakarta is fallen under the ground of securing the “public order” by implementing the Jakarta Bylaw no 11/1988. The Jakarta Public Order bylaw 11/1988 defines settlements along the river banks, beneath the bridges and railway tracks as illegal for human settlement. The bylaw has been criticized as specifically targeting the urban poor and street vendors. **Third**, evictions are justified on the ground of “public-interest development projects”, such as big infrastructure projects. There were two big projects under the
Sutiyoso’s regime. One was a double track railway program and the other was the East Canal Flood, a program to divert floods from rivers around Jakarta and channeled it into the sea. The first flood canal was the West Flood Canal designed by Hendrik van Breen in 1918 (Sheppard, 2006).

4.2 The Fauzo Bowo regime

Following Sutiyoso, the Fauzi Bowo regime implemented a similar forced evictions approach to dealing with the informal settlements. However, in contrast to Sutiyoso, Fauzi Bowo’s regime justified his policy on evictions based on the “Clean and Green” Jakarta campaign. During his regime, the Law on Spatial Plan No 26/2007 was issued which mandated each city to acquire 30% of green space. Due to the ongoing decreasing green space, the Jakarta government expressed its ambitious plan to increase the green space from 9% to 13.9%, moving towards the Spatial Plan target of 30% of green space by 2030. The goal of creating more green space in the city, which, however, mostly for the middle class, necessitates the eviction of the urban poor. To achieve the target of 13.9% green space, the city government made plans to evict over 15,000 squatters around different public spaces including near railway tracks and riverbanks. There were two massive evictions; Kolong Tol in 2007 and Taman BMW in 2008, which affected more than six thousand families (Kusno, 2011; Irawaty, 2012; Rukmana, 2015). To execute the eviction, the Fauzi Bowo government, similarly to the Sutiyoso regime, invoked Jakarta’s Bylaw on Public Order No 8/2007 (an update from previous No 11/1988), which prohibits settlement along riverbanks, parks, and green space, under flyover and bridges, to justify evictions of people settling in these areas. The bylaw was updated based on the need to regulate issues that have not been regulated on the previous one (Bylaw No 11/1988), yet it still maintaining the access restriction for the urban poor including to ban settlements in the above-mentioned locations.

The evictees received compensation in two forms depending on their residency status. First,
for non-Jakarta’s citizen, they received US$50-100 /household. Second, those who were Jakarta citizen were relocated to Rusunawas (housing project) in the outskirt of the city. For example, the evictions of Kolong Tol in 2007 has forced the evictee to relocate to a rusunawa in Marunda, 15 km away (Irawaty, 2012).

The government’s endeavor to obtain green space by evicting residents in informal settlements was challenged by NGOs who suggested it was not only the poor who are encroaching on the green space. According to a report from Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), the encroachment of green zones by the urban poor only amounts to 218.2 ha, compared to the 1,960-ha occupied by malls, apartments, luxury housing, golf courses and gas stations. Moreover, once space is reclaimed through evictions, it is taken over by ‘private’ properties that can be turned into public-oriented private spaces such as super- blocks, instead of green space. One of the examples was the eviction of ceramics vendors in Rawasari (Central Jakarta) in 2008 using green space justification only to be replaced by an apartment complex, which ironically named as Green Pramuka, managed by one of the big developer named Agung Podomoro Land (Kusno, 2011; Bantuan Hukum, 2017).

4.3 The Jokowi-Ahok regime

Under the third regime, Jokowi and Ahok, a transformation was taken place in Jakarta in the way the government dealt with informal settlements. During Jokowi’s leadership, his approach toward ‘illegal’ kampung settlement and the urban poor changed. Known for his “participatory approach” when governing Solo, Jokowi applied the similar approach with the urban poor in Jakarta. Promoting Kampung Deret (kampung upgrading) as the solution to poor living conditions, Jokowi won the heart of the urban poor. Kampung Deret Program aimed to improve the quality of housing in kampungs, which has main requirements: legality of the land tenure. To be eligible for the program, kampung residents were required to provide evidence of formal or semi-formal land tenure. With the
program, the Jakarta’s government promised to give land title for those who have occupied the similar parcel of land for the past 20 years. Kampung Deret was built in few areas in Jakarta. Kampung Deret in Petogogan, South Jakarta; Pekojan, Central Jakarta, and Cipinang Besar Selatan, East Jakarta are among the best practices of this program. Kampung Deret was inspired by the Kampung Improvement Program under Governor Ali Sadikin; one of the World Bank best practices in the 1970s. Within Kampung Deret, the families were assisted with aid/funding of around 4,750 USD per household to renovate their houses. Thus, in contrast to the previous regime’s handling of evictions, Jokowi’s Kampung Deret focuses on the neighborhood and housing physical improvement, yet it paid less attention to the social and economic aspects (Lamidi & Hendra, 2015, Rukmana, 2018).

Although Jokowi’s Kampung Deret program allowed them to stay put and thus facilitated a preservation of kampung life, evictions were also taking place under his term. It was in 2013, soon after Jakarta was flooded for almost a week that Jokowi informed the approximately 6,000 households along the Pluit reservoir in Muara Baru, North Jakarta that they were to be relocated due to reservoir’s preservation program which aimed to protect against floods. Jokowi ordered a “normalization” of the reservoir, and planned to relocate its inhabitants who have been living in 19,8 out of 65 ha of the reservoir’s total size to the social housing (Rusunawa) in several sites around Jakarta: Muara Baru, Marunda, and Angke (North Jakarta), Pulogebang (East Jakarta) and Cengkareng (West Jakarta). Within this program, no extra compensation was provided for the displaced/resettled. However, in contrast to his predecessor, Jokowi enacted a dialogue where the urban poor could express their ideas and propose alternatives (Savirani and Saidi, 2017). Through this dialogue, the urban poor managed to convince Jokowi to resettle a significant proportion of them nearby, in a Rusunawa within one mile from their previous place. Nevertheless, since Jokowi was elected as the President of Indonesia in 2014, Ahok, the then vice governor, took over the governorship. Under Ahok, the approach toward the urban poor and informal settlements was
drastically changed. Eviction and relocation to a Rusunawa was Ahok’s offer. The kampung residents along the Pluit reservoir were forced to relocate to Rusunawa Muara Baru. During the relocation (2014-2015), the residents who owned houses were given keys for their rusunawa unit. Despite Ahok claimed that none of the evictee received compensation, nevertheless, it was executed differently on the ground. The contractor, who was appointed to relocate the residents, paid the residents certain amount of money to ensure the site will be cleaned as scheduled. For the residents, the amount of compensation depends on their leverage and bargaining position. Those who can show access and link to the existing Community Based Organizations (JRMK) and NGO (UPC) had more leverage to get higher compensation.

The legacy program of Jokowi with Kampung Deret was halted under Ahok’s regime since it was not supported by the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK). The audit report depicted that many houses built through the Kampung Deret program stood on state land, on water catchment areas and even public roads, which was against the law and thus it could not be funded by the government resources. After BPK’s audit report, Ahok’s administration handed over the Kampung Deret program to private entities under corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs (Jakarta Post, 2015). The other contributing factors was the poor administration by the National Land Agency (BPN) on providing legal tenure to residents. The Jakarta’s government was only able to give the legal title for households involved in the first few cases of Kampung Deret Program, yet it was not continued due to a complicated process of land titling (Rukmana, 2018).

Similarly, with Sutiyoso, Ahok involved the military and the police. In 2015, Ahok issued the Governor Decree No 138/2015 which assigned local resources to the Army and the Police force, for their assistance in the evictions. The use of excessive force was strongly criticized by the Jakarta Legal Aid within their consecutive reports on evictions in Jakarta (LBH Jakarta, 2016).
Throughout his leadership, Ahok has presided over one of the most aggressive campaigns of evictions and forced displacements in the history of Jakarta, competing with Sutiyoso, who was known for his brutal evictions (Wilson, 2016). The controversy emerged along with the way Ahok narrated the poor and how he attracted support from the middle classes for the evictions. The aspiration of the middle class for an orderly city; free from dreadful traffic congestion and flooding, yet minus self-sacrifices required to achieve that aspiration, situate the urban poor as the convenient scapegoat. Wilson (2017) suggests that Ahok’s firm stance regarding the eviction of the informal settlements was a calculated move to gain the support of his middle-class constituents. Not only did he dismiss solutions proposed by the urban poor, but he also presented the urban poor as the cause of floods in Jakarta, a problem that needed to be solved during his term (Leitner, Colven, and Sheppard, 2017). During his leadership, there were several massive evictions accompanied by controversy, including the evictions in Kampung Pulo, Bukit Duri, Kalijodo, Luar Batang and Kampung Aquarium (Leitner, Colven, and Sheppard, 2017; Tilley, Elias and Rethel, 2017).

In terms of justification of 113 eviction in 2015, LBH Jakarta reported the top fifth justification of evictions: the enforcement of Public Order bylaw no 8/2007 (43 evictions), followed by 37 evictions aimed at the river “normalization”; 13 evictions for road construction, either toll roads, inspection roads, or highways; 10 evictions aimed at the construction of reservoirs; and 4 evictions aimed to build city parks. In the following year in 2016, out of 193 cases of forced eviction, 142 were due to the enforcement of Public Order’s bylaw no 8/2007, and the others are for the Jakarta’s government main projects: river “normalization” (40), other projects (20), city park (3), and road widening (2) (LBH Jakarta, 2015; LBH Jakarta, 2016). Under Ahok’s regime, there are two main legal instruments enforced to support the eviction: The Public Order Bylaw No 8/2007 and the Perpu No 51/1961 on the Prohibition of Unauthorized Use of Land Without Authorization. Kampung’s residents who have quasi-legal title such as girik and garapan, are usually the target of...
However, though implementing a similar approach by using the military and police, Sutiyoso and Ahok received very different levels of support from the population. Compared to Sutiyoso, Ahok successfully propagated the “clean government program”. Ahok was portrayed as a ‘saint’ who only works in the interest of Jakarta’s residents, including the poor. He also maintained a clean government and discharged many bureaucrats who were considered as corrupt. During his leadership, many of Jakarta’s Government high officials were arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). With his leadership style, confrontational and fierce approach, Ahok stands out from previous governors, gaining support for combating such despised aspects of contemporary Indonesian politics as corruption, lack of transparency, and inefficiency (Hatherell&Welsh, 2017).

4.4 Evictions and Nuisance Talk

The section above has elaborated how eviction have been executed in different regimes. However, the government’s ambition to transform Jakarta into a world class city is not the sole reason. This section will discuss the built narrative of “necessary eviction” through the lens of nuisance talk. Ghertner (2012) has shown that nuisance talk is mobilized to justify slum evictions in Indian cities. Nuisance talk is depicting slums as a nuisance - an illegal environment that is filthy, dirty, malicious and environmentally destructive. This image is associated with the slum dweller, or as Ghertner (2012, p. 8) puts: “It attributes the aesthetic annoyances and daily hassles of urban life to a particular “outside” subject—the slum dweller, the migrant, the street vendor.” In Delhi, nuisance talk as a narrative has been built and reproduced by the middle-class. For more than a decade, more than a million residents of informal (slum) settlements have been evicted, predominantly through the political and legal action of associations of private property owners named Residents Welfare
Associations (RWA). RWA won the High Court decision issued in 2006 on their public interest litigation (PIL). The slums emerge in the petition as an illegal environment along its nuisance that considered harm to property-owning residents of the city. For RWA, the aesthetic impropriety of the poor was considered as the source of the urban decay.

Since the early 2000s, the courts have begun to accept the argument proposed by the RWA on the “nuisance of slums” as a legitimate ground for slums demolition. Based on the court ruling, Ravi Das Camps, the biggest slums in Delhi was demolished (Ghertner, 2012). The phenomenon of a court ruling on evictions is addressed by Bhan (2009) as representing a new shift in eviction practices in Delhi. According to his record on the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court of India from 1985 to 2006, the evictions in Delhi happened as a result of a judicial ruling and not ordered by the city government. The role of media in mainstreaming and reinforcing the nuisance talk into public understanding, as far as the court decision, should not be undermined. The middle class’s perception on slums was enhanced by media coverage of violent crime and dangerous slums, which portray an increasingly violent city, demand a securitization, despite a decline of a crime rate over the past decade (Bhan, 2009; Ghertner, 2012).

Nuisance talk cannot be separated from the emerging of the middle class in many Asian mega cities. One of the striking features of urban developments in Global South cities, including São Paulo, Jakarta, Manila, Karachi, and Mexico City is the increasing number of urban residents who have joined the middle class. In recent years, the Indonesian middle class has grown rapidly and the national economy is expected to benefit from their increased consumption (Ansori, 2009; Simone and Fauzan, 2013). The rising middle class plays a significant role in mobilizing the nuisance talk, which is popularly perceived as an initiative of environmental improvement.

Negative sentiments about evictions, blaming the poor who live in riverbanks have been
spreading on social media in response to the forced evictions of riverbank dwellers in Jakarta. The 'normalization' of rivers in Jakarta was not the only ongoing process. Likewise, it is the 'normalization' of public opinion, viewing violent evictions of poor people as a normal phenomenon. A discussion among activists and scholars in Tarumanagara University (reported by the Jakarta Post) on this recent phenomenon has revealed a shifting perception of the middle class in Jakarta on forced evictions. Many of the middle class supported the city administration's current eviction policy and argued the city would benefit from the decreased flooding (Budiari, 2015).

The support of the middle class for government programs that evict the urban poor along with getting rid of ‘illegal’ kampungs, is not a recent phenomenon. Along with the growth of the middle class, the protection of the urban environment, realized as the greening of the city, was intensified in response to demands from the middle class with their interest in gaining access to public parks as they experience it in Singapore. When Jokowi-Ahok realized that by transforming kampungs into parks - including the Kampung Tebu (Waduk Pluit), Kampung Kali Jodo, etc, - the middle class supported the policy even further. Kusno (2011) argues that the increased involvement of the middle class in formulating the narrative of green city, supported by private developers, was intensified in the early 2000s when middle class residents ‘returned to the city’ and thus were supportive of increased amenities. This demands of the middle class were embraced by the Fauzi Bowo’s regime to support its ambition to turn Jakarta into a “world-class sustainable city.”

The “normalization” of Ciliwung River and Pluit reservoir in Jakarta, resonates with the “Clean and Green Delhi” program, which portrayed the pressure of the middle class for a “slum-free city” as a significant aspect of becoming the world-class city. However, we can still assess the difference of eviction practices in Delhi and Jakarta regarding the main narratives and powerful actors. In Delhi, as Bhan (2009) and Ghetner (2012) already addressed, the evictions are driven by the nuisance talk mobilized by the middle class. The court also plays a significant role in facilitating
evictions and at the same time strengthening the nuisance talk.

In Jakarta, though the middle class engages in nuisance talk, according to media representations, the nuisance talk is still driven by the local government. Discourses equating ‘illegal’ kampungs with slums are still actively narrated by the local government in prominent mass media, either printed or online, and are reflected in opinions of local government officials. For example, a high-profile government official would argue the following on the slums:

“Regarding slums, you can see how people live there. Do you think it is normal? There is so much incest taken place. Slums contain so many social problems.” (Government-Interview 4)

Evictions, driven by global city aspirations, involve displacement and a form of commodification and enclosure of existing informal settlements (Doshi, 2013; Gillespie, 2015). Informal settlements are not new to Jakarta, and neither are evictions. However, the post-millennial evictions are different from the past, not just in degree, but also in process. I argue that current eviction practices are not just characterized by an increased frequency and intensification of evictions, but portray the participation of the middle class in accepting and strengthening the narrative constructed by the state. The use of altered definitions of “public interest,” the ongoing narrative of slums versus the modern city, and the lack of empathy towards the urban poor within the media and the public, has been “successfully” built the narrative of “necessary eviction” for the sake of modern Jakarta.

**Conclusion**

As has been discussed above, there are similarities in eviction practices across these three regimes. All three administrations have similar reasons for eviction: illegality (illegal settlement), disruption of

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7 The interview was conducted in Jakarta, August 4th, 2016
public order (Bylaw no 11/1988), and public interest. A justification for eviction based on public interest are usually linked to development projects including flood canal and river “normalization.” The evictions in all three regimes were carried out with government forces; the public order officers, the police, and the military. The involvement has produced violence towards the evictee. The violence added trauma to kampungs residents. Evicted and lost most of their possession, the evictee also suffered from injuries. To justify the chosen policy and gain support from the public, especially the middle class, the eviction in these three regimes was supported by a continuous built narrative of the urban poor and kampung as the urban blight.

Regarding differences, each regime mobilized different arguments to justify evictions. Sutiyoso and Ahok’s administration mobilized public interest project in supporting eviction, arguing that public interest supposed to supersede the urban poor’s interest. Fauzi Bowo, on the other hand, mobilized a different argument. He argued to realize Jakarta into a world-class city, Fauzi Bowo mobilized a “clean and green” campaign. Evicting urban poor who live in green areas (on the riverbank, next to the railway) was considered necessary to increase green space in Jakarta. The use of force in evictions has differed in these three regimes. Known for his ties to some gangs of private individuals, Sutiyoso deployed Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR) to “help” the public order officer in evictions. In contrast, Ahok chose the “formal” one by allocating local resources to the police and the military in exchange for the police and military’s support in evictions.

Aside from gaining “support” from gangs, police and the military, these three regimes have been gaining support from the middle class. Interestingly, among these regimes, the support from the middle class has been strengthened and gain its peak during Ahok’s regime. The support mostly circulated through social media such as facebook and twitter where the middle class was expressing their full support to Ahok’s policy on eviction. As recent eviction in Bukit Duri, the middle class came to believe that eviction was a necessary action to manage the flood problem. In regards to the
eviction approaches, most of the approach implemented by these regimes is an authoritarian one, except during Jokowi’s regime when Jokowi shifted it into a participatory approach, including the “celebration” of kampung life. The participatory approach implemented by Jokowi with the Kampung Deret Program sent a signal of hope for kampung’s resident. The Kampung Deret Program was a resurrection of the popular program back in the 1970s, Kampung Improvement Program. However, it did not run for a longer time due to disputed land status issue. Lastly, the difference among there regimes relates to the compensation to the evictee. Sutiyoso and Ahok’s administration provides no compensation to the evictee, while Fauzi Bowo provides compensation only to the urban poor who have a residential permit (Jakarta ID card).

The last paragraph addressed the middle class’s significance in constructing the narrative of kampung and urban poor as urban blight, who therefore should be evicted to prioritize the public interest. Learned from Delhi’s experience, middle class, and nuisance talk become a significant driver of evictions. Though the Court currently play more active in deciding eviction in Delhi, the Jakarta’s case is slightly different where the eviction is still initiated and adjudicated by the government, mobilized by the media and supported by the middle class. Nevertheless, such transformation of eviction was never and will ever be free from contestations from the urban poor.
Chapter 5: The Right to Stay Put: The Resistance of the Urban Poor

In this chapter, I examine the role of civil society/grassroots organizations in resisting evictions through promoting and enacting alternative discourses and actions, using two grassroots NGOs as case studies: The Urban Poor Consortium and Ciliwung Merdeka.

Civil society is increasingly acknowledged as being essential for the success of people centered the development. Indeed, the role of civil society has been widely adopted in the discourse of international development agencies, but with various meanings. Civil society can be understood as “Associations for common purposes or action, outside the direct control of the state. It includes not just formal organizations, such as NGOs, political parties, and trade unions, but a whole range of more informal networks and groups, including community-based organizations, whether formally constituted or not” (Devas, 2004: 26). Within this frame, grassroots organizations are regarded as a remedy for promoting people-centered, pro-poor development. This acknowledgment began in the 1970s when development professionals started to recognize the contribution of NGOs particularly their ability to work directly with the poor and with grassroots organizations. The 1980s and 1990s were characterized by a reduction in the role of the state in every area, particularly on the provision of basic right: provision of housing, education, and health services. Neoliberal globalization envisioned reduced state power, opening domestic markets to the free movement of commodities, capital, and patents. This ideology required the private sector to take over state functions wherever possible, moving from a state allocation system to one based on markets. Urban-development experts believed that NGOs could assist residents in squatter settlements through community organizations and mobilization (Mitlin, 2001; Habib, 2009; Sheppard, 2015).

As in other megacities in the global south, the evictions from informal settlements in Jakarta have been hardly executed without any contestation from the urban poor (Doshi, 2013; Gillespie,
Various contestations advocate by the urban poor have been supported by NGOs, experts, and community activist. Not all these contestations have produced positive results for the urban poor residing in these settlements. However, these practices have been inspiring and are markers of progress of civil society in fighting eviction.

In Indonesia, including Jakarta, various social movements and NGOs have flourished in the post-Suharto era. Eldridge (1989, 1990) has classified NGOs in Indonesia into three types based on their different ways of cooperating with the government. The first features close and amicable cooperation with the government. These NGOs usually limited their work to being intermediaries in support of government’s development projects. The second type engages in limited cooperation with the government. These NGOs focuses on structural analysis and raising consciousness of citizens’ rights. The third focuses on community mobilization, and has minimal contact with state institutions. This type includes smaller NGOs advocating legal rights of the poor, as well as mobilizing resources during forced evictions and exploitation by city authorities (Winayanti, 2004). In Jakarta, there are few robust names, including the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) and Ciliwung Merdeka. Both NGOs have been working with the community organization for the past two decades, taking rights based approach and falling in between the second and the third type of NGOs as addressed by Eldridge. In this section, I will discuss the spectrum of their activities on promoting a pro-poor urban policy; (i) mass demonstration (ii) litigation (iii) alternative design and (iv) political contract.

5.1 Structure of the NGOS

The Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) was established during the Indonesian economic crisis in 1997 that lead to the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime. A group of NGOs and activists came together to establish a new organization working for the empowerment of the urban poor in Jakarta. UPC
received attention from national media when they started the advocacy to defend the informal sector workers such as pedicab driver, street vendors and street musicians against Sutiyoso’s eviction (Eldridge, 2005). UPC envisions a city for all, in which the poor could live a dignified life and uphold their basic rights, including rights to determine their own and their community’s future. The mission of UPC is grassroots empowerment through advocacy, organizing, and networking. Advocacy is aimed at influencing and changing public policies that are detrimental to the practical and strategic interests of the urban poor (Irawaty, 2010). For over two decades, UPC has brought poor communities, advocates, and architects to work together (Simone, 2010). In 2010, the community based organization named Jaringan Rakyat Miskin Kota (JRMK) - which is part of UPC - was established. It is consisted of organized kampungs spread in North, West and East Jakarta which, as UPC, aimed to fight for the right to the city of the urban poor. In North Jakarta, kampungs organized by UPC are in different districts, including Kamal Muara, Muara Baru-Penjaringan, Pluit, Warakas, Ancol, Pademangan, Tanjung Priok, and Kalibaru (Simone, 2010).

When it was first established, UPC envisioned that it would be funded by its members’ donation. Along the way, UPC received financial support from multiple funding agencies such as MISEREOR, Hivos, Development and Peace-Caritas Canada, etc. In 2009, UPC transformed its funding system when they chose to stop receiving funding from these funding agencies. Instead, UPC choose to drastically cut the number of its staff, and focusing on organizing and acting as a support system for the community-based organization (JRMK). UPC then relies mostly on

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8 MISEREOR is a Catholic organization based in Aachen, Germany that works with its partner organizations in Africa, Latin America and Asian countries to fight against poverty.

9 Hivos is a Dutch organization for development. Hivos provides financial support to organizations in Latin America, Africa and Asia, it provides advocacy and its supports the sharing of knowledge in the field of social change, rural innovations and digital activism.

10 Development and Peace-Caritas Canada is a Catholic organization member organization in Canada of Caritas Internationalis, a Confederation of 162 Catholic relief, development and social service organizations working on behalf of the poor and oppressed in 198 countries and territories. It is one of the largest NGO networks in the world.
volunteers, and inhabits a common space with other NGOs. The advocacy and research task is being pursued in collaboration with other NGOs and institutions including Rujak Center for Urban Studies, Jakarta Legal Aid, Lab Tanya, Architectes Sans Frontières" Indonesia (ASF-ID), etc. UPC supports the JRMK to advocate for the government’s fund for the poor or to rely on the membership support to finance programs in Kampungs. Thus, this transformation influenced UPC’s activities. Organizing and advocacy are currently fully relying on the community support. This puts more pressure on the community organizers in kampung. UPC is known for big advocacy target, such as changing a policy or proposing a new policy, which also required big funding support. According to a UPC organizer, UPC should “lower” their advocacy target.

“In the past, UPC used to has big targets for advocacy, which sometimes sacrificed the organizing process on the grassroots level. Nowadays, we have nothing to lose. We used to have big policy targets. To raise our advocacy issue, mass demonstration, participated by thousands of kampung’s people, was required. Today, our interest is to have a strong cadre in kampung.” (UPC’s community organizer- Interview 5)11

The second NGO highlighted in this chapter is Ciliwung Merdeka, an NGO in Bukit Duri. Since the beginning of year 2000, a few activists lead by Sandyawan Sumardi (former Jesuit), organized kampungs residents in Ciliwung Merdeka. Sandyawan Sumardi decided to stay and live in the Bukit Duri community on the banks of the Ciliwung River. Together with residents, Ciliwung Merdeka set up a common place called “Sanggar Ciliwung” in RT 06/RW 012, Bukit Duri, South Jakarta. Sanggar Ciliwung functioned as a meeting place and center for Ciliwung Merdeka’s program including education and theatrical program, which mostly participated by the children and youth. Ciliwung Merdeka works with residents in RW 12 in Kampung Bukit Duri, Tebet, South Jakarta and residents across the river in RW 03, Kampung Pulo, Jatinegara District, East Jakarta. The organization’s objective is to enable community members to struggle against the harmful effects of

11 Interview was conducted in Jakarta, July 30th, 2017
social- economic/political, and legal inequalities such as marginalization, inaccessibility, and poverty. To achieve these objectives, Ciliwung Merdeka works to increase the capacity and capability among kampungs residents, to enhance critical awareness and solidarity, and to cope with flood disasters, the threat of forced eviction and stigmatization. Ciliwung Merdeka’s method of organizing is through cultural and educational programs which address environmental issues, health, economy, spatial planning, art and culture (Sumardi 2013; Pandawangi, 2015).

5.2 Resistance and Organizing Strategies

On advocacy, UPC aims to open a political space for the urban poor to be able to influence the government’s decision making. UPC used a broad range of advocacy tools, ranging from mass demonstrations to closed-room meetings with government officials. UPC’s strong emphasis on advocacy, combined with the decision to take the high-profile road, meant that UPC was constantly ‘on stage,’ voicing its demands and entering high stakes negotiations. However, according to Kusno (2004), the mood of post-1998 Jakarta is completely different, for the Jakarta’s inhabitants seem to have found their critical voice. They were become more skeptical and critical on urban projects. The ‘passive’ resistance toward the city’s programs of national development, were replaced by explicit protests, rallies and strikes in the early of the year of 2000. During this moment, UPC advocated a platform for the urban poor to voicing their demand for a pro poor urban policy. The community organizing was the backbone of this objective. Critical discussion was initiated through saving group as organizing platform. UPC emphasize more on women empowerment given the context of patriarchal society which was uphold during Suharto’s regime. In terms of cultural, UPC also advocate the “people’s culture” by encouraging the kampung residents to present themselves, based on their culture, to challenge the formal culture of politician and bureaucrats. As an example, they wore sandal and casual daily outfit when they met with the governor or parliament member. At the
same time, it also aimed to build the confidence of the kampung residents to fight the stigma as a backward society member, and therefore lacking the contemporary knowledge on city.

Differing from UPC, Ciliwung Merdeka express their voices through art performance. Since their main organizing platform is through art, collaborating with Ciliwung Merdeka and several artists, the youth who are organized within the Sanggar Ciliwung performed in many cultural events in Jakarta. One of their solid performance was the Ciliwung Larung, a musical theater, performed in Taman Ismail Marzuki art center in 2011. In this performance, the youth from Kampung Pulo and Bukit Duri performed a musical theater based on their daily experience dealing with flood and forced evictions (Ciliwung Merdeka, 2011).

5.3 Resistance through litigation

In terms of litigation, Ciliwung Merdeka supports community members filing lawsuits against Jakarta’s government concerning their forced eviction in Bukit Duri. On January 2017, the panel of judges at the Jakarta State Administrative Court (PTUN) has granted the lawsuit filed by Bukit Duri residents against an eviction notice issued by Tebet district, declaring that the eviction violated the law (Jakarta Post, 2017). The panel of judges had ordered the Jakarta administration to revoke the eviction notice for against the law. The legal suit won by the urban poor, yet, it was completely overlooked by the local government who continue the eviction on July 2017, evicted over 331 families (Jakarta Post, 2017). Nonetheless, by the end of October 2017, the Central Jakarta District Court’s granted the lawsuit filed by Bukit Duri residents in South Jakarta regarding the forced eviction conducted by the administration in 2016. With the court ruling, the administration is obliged to pay each of the 93 plaintiff residents Rp 200 million (US$14,740) (Jakarta Post, 2017).
The court ruling is reminiscent of a similar litigation approach applied by UPC in 2002. UPC won a class action that ordered Sutiyoso to halt the eviction. The lawsuit was filed against the Government of Jakarta and the Railway Company in responding to the eviction of Kampung Karang Anyar in Central Jakarta in 2001. The government evicted 300 households who lived on the land owned by the Railway Company. In 2002, the court issued a verdict in favor to the residents of Karang Anyar, Central Jakarta. In the litigation process, UPC collaborated with Jakarta Legal Aid on training the residents to represent themselves at the court (Hukumonline, 2002).

In terms of challenging the law on eviction, both NGOs, supported by the Jakarta Legal Aid have challenged the Bylaw on Public Order and Law no 51/1960 to no avail. On September 2016, LBH Jakarta along with evictees from Papanggo (North Jakarta) and Duri Kepa (West Jakarta) and supported by several NGOs including UPC and Ciliwung Merdeka filed a judicial review to the Constitutional Court to challenging the 1960 eviction law (Perpu no 51/1960 on the Prohibition of Unauthorized Use of Land), asking the court to amend a law issued in 1960 that is frequently used to facilitate evictions. According to LBH Jakarta lawyer, Aldo Felix, the article on the law is unfair for residents since it obliged the residents, as the evictee provide evidence of their ownership. In contradictory, before evicted the kampungs based on claim that its government land, the Jakarta administration was not required to proof ownership of land.

Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court rejected the petition because the city administration's action was based on the article 33 of the Constitution that mandates the nation’s land, natural resources, and water are controlled by the state and should be utilized for the interest of the public welfare. However, the court argues that the plaintiff failed to show the contradiction of the 1945 Constitution's article with the Law no 51/1960 since in this case, the local government repossessed land occupied by people who do not possess the rightful ownership. Nonetheless, Jakarta Legal Aid convince that the people have the rightful ownership since the law was formulated in 1960 where
people could occupy land freely (Jakarta Post, 2017).

5.4 Resistance through Alternative Design

UPC proposed an alternative design to the government’s Rusunawa replacement housing for evictees. During the eviction of the informal settlement under the North Jakarta toll road in 2007, UPC works with a team of urban planners and architects to propose a housing concept at ten locations under elevated toll roads in Jakarta. Proposing a concept of “a city for all,” UCP demanded government acknowledgment for the rights of the urban poor to live under flyovers. This initiative to win recognition through the existing settlement could create a greater sense of belonging. The residents would subsequently maintain the cleanliness and the aesthetics of their neighborhoods. The proposed design was rejected, and the eviction took place in the following months affecting the life of more than 10,000 families (Kusno, 2011, Irawaty, 2012).

In 2013, as a response to Governor Jokowi’s policy on forced relocation, JRMK, the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), Rujak Center for Urban Studies (RCUS), Jogia Community Architect (ARKOM Jogja), and Architecture Department from University of Indonesia worked with Kebun Tebu residents to draft two alternative concepts: a favored resettlement. Kampung Kebun Tebu, the affected kampung in the Pluit reservoir, is one among many informal settlements centered in Muara Baru, North Jakarta. Silently encroached in 1960s by laborers who worked in Sunda Kelapa harbor, Kebun Tebu soon became one of the main destinations for Bugis and Makassar seafarers originated from Sulawesi. The kampung residents were divided at least into two large groups: first, the residents who ask for compensation, mostly those who owned buildings/houses and have been renting it out. Second, those who want to be involved in the kampung upgrading (favored settlements). 1,200 households participated the kampung upgrading design planning.

From February to April 2013, the residents met with the Governor and proposed the
kampung upgrading concept. In the meeting, the residents proposed the on-site kampung upgrading in Muara Baru area. Based on the previous participatory research by JRMK and UPC in 2008 on the social and economic profile of the Kebun Tebu inhabitants, it was identified that most residents work within 1-2 km distance from their kampung. Relocation to Marunda Rusunawa (15 km away) would affect their daily work, especially their informal economy activities. Muara Baru has become one of the economic regions in North Jakarta. Fish auction-market, warehouses, and factories are among the economic centers that have been supporting the life of Muara Baru residents, including Kebun Tebu. Moreover, the residents argued for the social network that has been crafted for more than 30 years in the kampung. The residents succeed in convincing the Governor Jokowi and he asked the residents to propose with NGOs an alternative design for a Rusunawa located within 1 km from the location of their informal settlement.

The proposed design was argued as being a more accommodative to the urban poor’s way of life. Flexibility is one of the main principles to be channeled into the design of multi-story flats. The design also facilitated the resident’s aspiration including ramps (connector) between building, flexible designs and economic space for each unit, and a communal space on each floor. Regarding ownership, the residents aspired settlement with collective ownership title, which will be acquired through long-term payments (20-25 years), and organized through saving groups. The Pluit Design was accepted by the Governor Jokowi. However, it was later rejected in meetings with the Jakarta Housing Agency. Arguing that it was not feasible, the housing agency claimed they did not have time to realize such design. Later, the governor no longer made himself accessible, and rusunawa were finally built in Muara Baru following the government’s design, which is not accommodative to the urban poor’s way of life. They were built by two big developers under the mechanism of “transferable development rights” (TDR) in return for acquiring development right in a contested mega project: Jakarta Island’s Reclamation.
One of the success stories of an alternative design proposal is Kampung Tongkol in North Jakarta, which has been covered by many medias and visited by different institutions either from local, national or abroad for its best practices story. Organized by Gugun Muhammad, a resident of this kampung and is also staff at UPC, kampung Tongkol’s residents transform their dwelling. Three kampungs (Tongkol, Lodan, and Krapu) formed an organization (Anak Kali Ciliwung Community) as a response to an eviction threat for the construction of a road in 2015. The government’s plan is to “clean” fifteen meters from the riverbank and evict all houses in between. The organized residents argued, using the existing law in 1992 which allow five meters’ distance from houses to riverbank. They cleaned the river, beautify the area with plants, and recycling their waste and managed to reduce their waste up to 80%. These initiatives got support from various organization and academics who then helped the community to redesign their kampung. To this present, the Kampung Tongkol has not received any follow up on eviction threat (Jakarta Post, 2017).

In Bukit Duri and Kampung Pulo, Ciliwung Merdeka and community members presented the Kampung Susun (multi-story village) vision as an alternative on-site resettlement proposal to the Governor Ahok. The workshop to discuss Kampung Susun was participated not only by community members but also scholars (an architect sociologist, lawyer), an initiative such as PETA Jakarta12, students, and volunteers. The design was preceded by participatory mapping of urban floods. The participatory community mapping of flood-prone areas functioned as a tool to bring people together, as well as to collectively discuss an alternative design for replacement (Sumardi 2013; Padawangi et al, 2016). The agreed design of Kampung Susun included the following: flat ownership with long-term payment, full participation of community member, and the flexibility of

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12 PetaJakarta.org/banjir is an open source, community-led platform to collect and disseminate information about flooding and critical water infrastructure in Jakarta (https://petajakarta.org/banjir/en/index.html). It offers solutions that enable its users to share real-time information about floods with social media.
space including to navigate the existing flood. Kampung Susun is designed with column in the ground floor. The column will facilitate the flow of water during the flood. These plans were proposed to two governors; Jokowi and Ahok. The design was introduced to public during the gubernatorial campaign in which Jokowi and Ahok used the design to campaign a pro poor policy. Once Jokowi and Ahok were elected, the Kampung Susun proposal that was initially supported, culminated in a disagreement on the participatory method that finally ended with evictions of Kampung Bukit Duri’s residents. Once Ahok becomes the Governor to substitute Jokowi, another follow up meeting on Kampung Susun was held. During the meeting, Ciliwung Merdeka required the process to build Kampung Susun to be fully participated by the community member. However, the Governor Ahok declined such request insisting that the local government’s agencies should execute the entire process (construction of Kampung Susun).

5.5. Resistance through Political Contract

Lastly, through its nationwide network, UPC escalated their approach by engaging in political platform through political contract during mayoral or governor elections in different Indonesian cities, such as Jakarta, Surabaya, and Makassar. In 2012, UPC and JRMK proposed a political contract with Jokowi during his campaign. The articles of the agreement addressed that the elected Governor, Jokowi, will involve the urban poor in the spatial plan formulation; the legalization of “illegal” kampungs and the protection of the informal sectors including the street vendors, and becak (traditional three-wheel mode of transportation). It was apparent as failed agreement since the urban poor was evicted during Jokowi and Ahok’s leadership. Discarded without the option other than to negotiate, the urban poor signed up another political contract with the current elected Governor, Anies Baswedan.
Interviewed in their community center (Interview-6), members of JRMK claimed that it was a conscious and well-informed decision. Eni Rochayati, the coordinator of JRMK, argues that it was a necessary approach to fight for the right of the urban poor. “We have to convince the government that we can do good things to our kampungs. Like we did in Kampung Tongkol”, Eni said. Amini, the committee member of JRMK, added that the government had not considered Kampungs as part of the city. “That’s what we have been trying to convince them of. We are here, and you should acknowledge us”. Reminded by a lesson learned from the previous political contract with Jokowi, JRMK and UPC tried a new strategy by designing the political contract as a legally binding force agreement. 26 kampungs, three streets vendor’s location and one pedicab (becak) organization are the subjects of the agreement. Each of the head of kampung, street vendor and becak representative signed the agreement along with the Governor Baswedan and his Vice Governor, Sandiaga Uno. Gugun explained that the agreement would focus on five points: 1) Spatial transformation for Kampung, 2) Legalization of kampung, 3) Affordable housing program for the urban poor, 4) Business licensing for the street vendors, and 5) Profession transformation for becak drivers.

Apart from these five points, the current political contract also was drafted with a wide and strong support from various groups/organization and scholars. All actors are participated and assisted the formulation of the agreement, interpreting the agreement’s content into the realistic government program and to communicate the agreement to the greater public. The target of UPC and JRMK with the contract politic is to ensure that the content of agreement is regulated on the Five Years Plan and Budget Plan (RPJMD/RAPBD) of Jakarta’s government. Currently, the Community Action Plan (CAP) proposed by UPC and its allies succeeded to be integrated into the

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13 Interview was conducted in Jakarta at August 10th, 2017

14 The head of the kampung is an informal leader that was elected by the organized kampung residents. It is different with RT (formally elected leader) as has been explained in the footnote earlier.
current city budget and was officially launched at January 14\textsuperscript{th}, 2018. There are sixteen kampungs involve in the Kampung Upgrading Program for the next three years, including Kampung Tongkol, Kampung Aquarium, Muara Baru and Bukit Duri. Within the Kampung Improvement Program, becak will be allowed to operate again in these Kampungs as a mode of transportation.

On May 21st, 2018, the Governor Baswedan issued a Governor Decree no 878/2018 on the Task Force on the Kampung and Community Planning Program. The decree assigned task forces within Jakarta’s administration in supporting the Kampung and Community Planning Program. The decree also listed twenty-one kampungs which are involved in the program. The task force established by current Governor did not follow the strategy applied by the governor Sadikin under Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) in the 1960s. During KIP, the governor created an integrated body (BAPEPAM MHT) which oversaw the program’s implementation. By having an integrated body, the kampung upgrading program which involving different department will be implemented in a more integrated approach. With Anies’ task force, the Kampung and Community Planning will likely face problems in coordination among the department, including on the department's priority and budget allocation.

5.6 Assessing Resistance

In theorizing the community organizing and everyday politic, Oldfield and Stokke (2007) argue that community-based activism which is embedded in the local politics are more complicated than a simple dualism between engagement and opposition. They further argue that both strategies, either to engage or to oppose have consequences. While political engagement leads to access to material resources for community development, it potentially undermines the legitimacy of the movement as the representative of the struggling people. Conversely, opposition in the form of demonstration or
community mobilization may empower the movement in criticizing the state, though may also leads to be labelled as disruptive to state power.

Researching the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign in South Africa, Oldfield and Stokke argue that the organizations in the campaign performed different and wide range of strategies, such as doing legal battles, engage with state officials and institutions, while at the same time opposing through mass mobilization and protest actions. The engagement with state officials and institution did not automatically put the civic leaders to become dependent on the relationship and deter the leaders in resisting evictions. Similar to the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, UPC and Ciliwung Merdeka undertake a wide range of resistance and organizing strategies from legal battle, proposing alternative design, and lastly, engage in electoral politics through a political contract at the governor's election in return for resources to upgrade the kampung. Resisting eviction with a “right based approach", UPC and Ciliwung Merdeka have been transforming for the last fifteen years, moving beyond merely mass demonstration. They have initiated a collaboration with a very diverse set of actors, proposing alternative to mainstream approach to urban informality in Jakarta.

In her paper about the role of NGOs in the slums redevelopment policy in Mumbai, Doshi (2013) argues that residents engaging with the government in a slum redevelopment project is equal to engaging in a neoliberal partnership with NGOs, the state, and developers. She underlines the role of the SPARC (the Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres) Alliance in facilitating the Slums Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS) in Mumbai, India. The SPARC Alliance was appointed and contracted as the primary NGO to implement a World Bank funded project: a community-based resettlement program for more than 20,000 families affected by the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP). Doshi argues that the Alliance has facilitated a neoliberal development policy, enabling the freeing of land for accumulation by promising the evictee improved living condition through resettlement (Doshi, 2013). Reflecting on Doshi’s argument on SPARC Alliance, I would
argue that UPC and JRMK’s current collaborative program with the government (Kampung Upgrading Program), cannot be considered a neoliberal partnership among NGOs, states, slum residents, and developers. UPC and JRMK, according to its organizer, Gugun Muhammad, will not change their nature of being a critical group. The current partnership with the government under the Kampung Upgrading Program will not situate UPC and JRMK as being dependence to the government. Gugun further argues that they will not hesitate to return to the street and organize a protest action if the current government violates their commitment as laid down in the political contract (personal conversation).

Miraftab (2009) uses the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign as an example to discuss the insurgent concept in grassroots action. Borrowing a term coined by Holston (2008) on insurgent citizenship, Miraftab argues that the two types of actions of grassroots within the campaign could be categorized as an invented and invited spaces of citizenship. Invited space is defined as a grassroots collective action that is legitimized by donors and the government. Invented space, on the other hand, are collective actions by the urban poor that challenge the status quo. The latter means that the urban poor work by themselves and not “dictated” by the agenda coming from their alliance. However, I argue that JRMK as a grassroots organization, works fluidly across both spaces. Kusno (2011) argues that the green space discourse, though shaped by the city government and middle-class aspirations, has been providing a new space of the resistance of the urban poor, who work with activist and expert. By proposing alternative design over the Rusunawa, JRMK and the urban poor in Bukit Duri, who collaborate with UPC and Ciliwung Merdeka, have been appropriating and employing the language of “the green” to justify their stance. When the urban poor greening their homes and their community, these efforts have been seen successful in changing the image of “slums” to be able to halt the evictions as in the case of Kampung Tongkol.

UPC’s approach to advocacy by promoting mass demonstration and currently the political
contract, has invented, literally, another space for the urban poor fighting for the right to the city.
Since 2007, UPC decided to implement different strategies on its advocacy to convince the
government on alternatives to the evictions. Assisted by the Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), an organization from the United States, UPC decided to
engage in an electoral politics; the Jakarta Governor election. The idea was to organize votes and
exchange the ballots for a particular candidate for the implementation of urban pro-poor policies
once they are elected. It remains to be seen whether the promise by Governor Baswedan as a
candidate will be realized.
CHAPTER 6. Conclusion

The broader mobilization of ‘slums’ as urban blight, also in cities across the Global South, has threatened the notion of the kampung (urban village) as a distinct settlement form and space of life in Indonesian cities. Kampungs are an organic environment, developed through their inhabitants’ intense interactions and activities. Thus, kampungs became a space of anticipation, where residents survive and thrive through the fluidity of kampung space, which provides opportunities for residents to operate.

In parallel, slums are widely known as settlements with poor living conditions: comprising a lack of basic services, such as water, sanitation, drainage, waste collection, street lighting, and paved footpaths; as well as a lack of community space, schools, and clinics within easy reach. However, in Jakarta and other Indonesian cities, the label of ‘slum’ increasingly has been attached to the kampung.

Beginning in the Dutch era, kampungs became a distinctive category of a settlement, labeled at the same time as a sign of anti-modernity. The Colonial regime represented kampungs as a space of filth, full of diseases and lacking an aesthetic value. This representation of kampungs as the antithesis of a modern city began with the introduction of modern town planning and Batavia’s urban water infrastructure. In turn, it fostered a perceived need to improve kampungs through a colonial Kampung Improvement Program. While the program was not implemented as planned, it perpetuated derogatory perceptions of kampungs, as an unplanned, disorderly, unhygienic and dangerous space.

This contested understanding of the kampung continued after independence, but with the addition of the similar and misguided label of the ‘slum’. Shortly after independence, Jakarta “forced” itself to emulate cities such as Singapore and cities in Europe and the United States aspiring to a future as a global city. From the 1960s-1990s, Jakarta’s government aimed to
modernize its city to affirm its status as the capital city of Indonesia. This pressure underwrote the forced evictions and transformation of Jakarta’s kampungs, replacing them with office towers, apartments and superblocks, and coinciding with the mobilization of a modernization discourse in Jakarta. Modernization became the primary narrative and driver for the fragmentation of Jakarta into modern spaces, including growth zones, new towns, superblocks, and traditional spaces of the kampung. During these decades, the kampung was represented by elites in a derogatory way; as slums in need of improvement.

Considering the significance of kampung as the source for workers needed for many significant scale construction projects, however, Jakarta’s government pioneered an in-situ upgrading approach through a second Kampung Improvement Program. Between 1969 and 1982, more than 10,000 hectares of kampungs and the lives of more than 3 million kampungs residents were improved. After its end in 1999, the program was transformed into a more technocratic approach that no longer implemented a community-based development approach.

The increasing dominance of large property developers and planners has worsened the fragmentation of urban space, with kampungs in central cities mainly seen as attractive and profitable sites for investment by planners and large property developers. Concurrently, the emerging middle classes have created new demands and aspirations for a modern urban lifestyle: living in condos, consuming in shopping malls, and more generally yearning a clean and beautiful environment. In combination, the aspiration of the middle class and the aggressive moves of developers have increased pressure to redevelop city center kampungs, leading to the displacement of many kampung residents.

From 1997 to 2017, under Jakarta’s three political regimes of Governors Sutiyoso, Fauzi Bowo, and Jokowi-Ahok, Jakarta has witnessed the demolition of “illegal kampungs.” All three administrations offered similar reasons for eviction: illegality (illegal settlement), disruption of public
order (Bylaw no 11/1988), and public interest. A justification for eviction based on public interest usually also was linked to other development projects, including flood canal and river “normalization.” In all three regimes, evictions were carried out violently by public order officers, the police, and the military. To justify the chosen policy and gain support from the public, especially the middle class, evictions were accompanied by a continuously built narrative of the urban poor and kampungs as aspects of urban blight. Most of these evictions were carried out in an authoritarian way, except under Jokowi, who made space for a participatory approach, including the “celebration” of kampung life with the Kampung Deret Program.

Forced evictions were never, and never will be free, from contestations from the urban poor in alliance particularly with two prominent NGOs that have worked with and on behalf of Jakarta’s urban poor. For the last fifteen years, resisting evictions through a “rights based protest approach", UPC and Ciliwung Merdeka have been moving beyond merely mass demonstrations to proposing alternatives to mainstream approaches to urban informality in Jakarta. Both the Urban Poor Consortium and Ciliwung Merdeka have been pursuing a wide range of resistance tactics and organizing strategies, from legal battles, to proposing alternative neighborhood and building designs, to engaging in electoral politics through a political contract with the governor. Borrowing a term introduced by Simone (2015), I would argue that these grassroots initiatives have shown great endurance. This essential driving force is exemplified by a continuous and ongoing fight by the urban poor, the persistence to work on and propose solutions, the strength to overcome the frustration of false promises by the government, and the belief that good things will come in the end.
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