We live in a monumental era for the advancement of democracy. Invented so long ago in ancient Greece, democracy has spread around the globe for the first time ever during the past three decades. In all regions of the globe, democracy has emerged as the political system most preferred by the mass citizenry (Gallup-International 2005). Even economically poor and culturally traditional societies, once viewed as inhospitable to democratic development, now demand that free elections and other democratic institutions supplant undemocratic or personal forms of rule (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005). Growing demands from ordinary citizens along with increased pressures and inducements from international communities have made democratization a global phenomenon (Carothers 1999).

This phenomenon has given scholars and policymakers new insights into what constitutes a functional democracy. A political system can become institutionally democratic with the installation of competitive elections and multiple political parties. These institutions alone, however, do not make a fully functioning democratic political system. As Rose and his associates (1998, 8) aptly point out, these institutions constitute nothing more than “the hardware” of representative democracy. To operate the institutional hardware, a democratic political system requires the “software” that is congruent with the various hardware components (Almond and Verba 1963; Eckstein 1966). Both the scholarly community and policy circles widely recognize that what ordinary citizens think about democracy and its institutions is a key component of such software. Many experts, therefore, regard the mass citizenry’s unconditional embrace of democracy as “the only game in town” as the hallmark of democratic consolidation (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Diamond 1999; Linz 1990; Rose 2001).

This paper seeks to unravel the perspectives of ordinary citizens as they experience the introduction of democracy to their daily lives. How do these citizens take part in the process of transforming authoritarian rule into democracy? Does their active participation in this process contribute to the survival and growth of their new democratic regime? How broadly and deeply do they support democracy as both a political ideal and a reality? How does their level of support or demand for democracy compare with the level its institutions supply? Empirically, this paper addresses these and related questions with accumulations of factual and public opinion data. Key sources are Freedom House and four regional barometer projects monitoring democratization in Africa, East Asia, Latin America, and New Europe. Our analysis highlights regional differences in institutional and cultural dynamics by comparing citizens’ reactions to democratic change across these regions.

First this paper explicates the notion of democratization and clarifies a number of key conceptual issues. Next it examines the evolution of the current wave of global democratization, which Huntington (1991) popularized as the third wave. Thirdly, it examines how citizen involvement in democratic regime change has affected the survival and growth of new democracies. Next comes the large part of the paper, which compares, inter-regionally, the
breadth, strength, depth of popular commitment to democracy by considering both pro-
democratic and antiauthoritarian orientations among mass citizenries. Finally, the paper
compares the levels of popular demands for and institutional supplies of democracy, and
explores the problems of and prospects for the democratic consolidation of countries currently in
transition.

The Notion of Democratization

What constitutes democratization? In general, it refers to the movement to democracy The
existing literature on third-wave democracies generally agrees that democratization is a highly
complex transformation involving a political system and its citizens.(Boix and Stokes 2003;
Bunce 2000, 2003; Doorenspleet 2000; Geddes 1999; Karl 2005; McFaul 2002; Rose and Shin
2001; Shin 1994). Specifically, it refers to the process of transforming an authoritarian political
system into a democratic system in which people influence government and government
responds positively to their demands. The phenomenon, therefore, has multiple dimensions as
democracy competes with its alternatives. The process of democratization has many stages with
several analytically distinct steps that are empirically overlapping. The process also has multi-
directions because one step of democratic development does not necessarily lead to a particular
higher stage.

In the logic of causal sequence, the stages of democratization may run from the decay and
disintegration of an old authoritarian regime and the emergence of a new democratic system,
through the consolidation of that democratic regime, to its maturity (Dahl 1971; Shin 1994). In
reality, however, the process of democratization has often failed to advance sequentially from the
first to the last stage. As Puddington and Piano (2005) and Marshall and Gurr (2005) have
documented, some new democracies disappear soon after they emerge, while others erode as
much as they consolidate. As a result, many new democracies remain less than fully democratic
even decades after the establishment of democratic institutions. For this reason, they are
variously described as electoral, incomplete, illiberal, broken-back, or delegative democracies or
the mixed or hybrid regimes of competitive authoritarianism, fleckless pluralism, or dominant
power politics (Carothers 2002; Diamond 1999, 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; O’Donnell 1994;
Rose and Shin 2001; Zakaria 2003).

The same literature views democratization as a multi-faceted phenomenon. Institutionally,
it involves a transition from authoritarian rule to a political system that allows ordinary citizens
to participate on a regular basis and compete in the election of political leaders. Substantively, it
involves a process in which electoral and other institutions consolidate and become increasingly
responsive to the preferences of the citizenry. Culturally, it is a process in which ordinary
citizens dissociate themselves from the values and practices of authoritarian politics and embrace
democracy as “the only game in town.” As Dahl (2000), Karl (2000), and Linz and Stepan (1996)
note, the process of democratizing a political system involves much more than the installation of
representative institutions and promulgation of a democratic constitution.

Democratization is a multi-level phenomenon; on one level, the transformation must take
place in individual citizens, and on another level, it must take place in the political regime that
rules them. At the regime level, democratization refers to the extent to which authoritarian
structures and procedures transform into democratic ones, and in the process, become responsive
and accountable to the preferences of the mass citizenry (Dahl 1971; UNDP 2005). At the
citizenry level, the extent to which average citizens detach themselves from the virtues of
authoritarianism and become convinced of democracy’s superiority constitutes democratic change.

Finally, we shall view democratization as a dynamic process of ongoing interactions between individual citizens and institutions of their democratic regime. Congruence theory suggests that the more the current institutional supply of democracy exceeds what citizens demand, the less likely democracy is to expand. Conversely, the more cultural demand for democracy exceeds what institutions supply, the more likely is democracy to advance. When the institutional supply meets cultural demand, further democratization is unlikely (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2003; Rose and Shin 2001).

**Institutional Democratization**

Scholars dubbed the surge in democracy that occurred over the last three decades of the twentieth century the “third wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991; Diamond 2003). Powerful forces of the democracy movement spread from one region to another like a rushing wave. It emerged in Southern Europe and has spread, in sequence, to other regions around the globe (O’Loughlin et al. 1998).

**Diffusion**

In the mid-1970s, the third-wave of democratization first broke out in Portugal and Spain, where right-wing dictatorships had held power for decades; the democratic transition came to Greece in 1974. From 1979 to 1985, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay successively underwent the democratic transition from military rule. In Chile, the democratic transition proceeded more slowly and emerged in 1989 after years of peaceful civic resistance movements against authoritarian rule. In June 2000, Vincente Fox’s presidential victory in Mexico, the most populous Spanish speaking country in the world, marked the end of seven decades of single-party rule and a new era of democracy in the region (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005).

In the mid-1980s when most military dictatorships in Latin America were overthrown, the third-wave of democratization reached the shores of East Asia (Croissant 2004). It first toppled the civilian dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in February 1986; massive “people’s power” movements forced him to flee to Hawaii. Nearly three decades of military rule ended and in December 1987 the direct popular election of a president fully restored civilian rule in South Korea. In the same year, after nearly four decades of one-party dictatorship, Taiwan began to gradually democratize. It lifted martial law and established institutional democracy by holding its first direct presidential election in 1996. In 1990, Mongolia, one of the poorest and remotest countries in the world, abandoned its sixty-year-old communist one-party system and held competitive multi-party elections to choose a president. And in 1992, Thailand reemerged as a democracy when it rid itself of military rule. During this time, three very poor countries in Asia—Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan—became democracies.

By the end of the 1980s, the electoral and other democratic institutions were operative in all or much of three regions of the world—Southern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. The other three regions of Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East still remained resistant to the winds of democratization. In Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the end of one-party communist dictatorships and the rapid transitions to democratic rule based on competitive multi-party systems followed. In less than a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, competitive and
free elections took place to install democratic political systems in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created 15 states in the Baltic region and Central Asia. Seven of them emerged as democracies (Goehring and Schnetzer 2005; McFaul 2005; Rose et al. 1998).

In the early 1990s when the long history of communist dictatorships was ending in Eastern Europe, the third wave of democratization began to roll in Africa, a vast region where only three countries were known as democratic states. In February 1990, the apartheid regime of South Africa released Nelson Mandela from prison and launched the slow process of ending racial oligarchy in response to years of economic sanctions from the democratic world. The March 1991 election in Benin marked the first example of peaceful transition of power in mainland Africa. In 1994, South Africa adopted one of the most democratic constitutions in the world and held competitive elections to create the most vigorous democracy in the region. In ensuing years, other countries allowed opposition forces to organize and compete in the electoral process under intense pressures from international aid agencies. By the standards of Western democracies, electoral competitions in many countries were highly limited. Nonetheless, by 2001, 14 countries had met the minimum conditions of democracy (Bratton et al. 2005, 17; Marshall and Gurr 2005, 42).

By the end of the last millennium, the Middle East was the only region hardly touched by the global wave of democratization. After the collapse of consociational democracy in Lebanon in 1975, Israel remained the sole democracy in the region. Although contested legislative elections were occasionally held in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Morocco in the past decade, the head of the government in these and other Middle Eastern countries remained unelected until early this year. In January 9, 2005, Mahmoud Abbas was elected as the president of the Palestinian Authority, having defeated five other candidates. Two months later, millions of Lebanese people took to the streets to protest against Syria’s military presence in their country in what became known as “the Cedar Revolution.” Their protests drove the occupying Syrian troops out of Lebanon and disbanded the pro-Syrian government. In September 2005, a multi-candidate presidential election was held in Egypt for the first time in the country’s history. These developments indicate that even the Middle East, the region known as the last bastion of autocratic rule, is not impervious to democracy’s third wave (Economist 2005).

Breadth and Depth

In policy circles democracy is too often equated with the holding of free and competitive multiparty elections (Carothers 2002). The electoral conception of democracy, however, does not provide a full account of the process that transforms age-old authoritarian institutions into democratically functioning ones. This conception provides only a minimalist account because it deals merely with the process of elections and overlooks additional important institutions of democracy. It is formalistic or superficial because it fails to consider how democratically or undemocratically these institutions actually perform. It also provides a static account of institutional democratization because it ignores interactions between various democratic institutions between each round of elections.

To overcome these limitations of the formal and minimalist conceptions of electoral democracy, scholars have proposed a number of alternative conceptions, using terms such as complete democracy, liberal democracy, and full democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997;
Schedler and Sarsfield 2004). All such alternative notions extend beyond the elements of electoral democracy to matters of accountability, constitutionalism, pluralism, and the separation of powers. Electoral democracy advances to liberal democracy when the law constrains political authority while protecting individual citizens so that they can exercise political rights and civil liberties (Diamond 1999; O’Donnell 2004; Zakaria 2003). Incomplete democracy becomes complete when the institutions of elections, accountability, civil society, and the rule of law all have a firm hold (Linz and Stepan 1996; Rose and Shin 2001).

Freedom House annually monitors the electoral and liberal domains of institutional democratization. In 2004, Freedom House (2006) rated 122 of 192 independent countries (64%) as electoral democracies because their last major national elections met the international standard for being free, fair, competitive, regular, and open to all segments of the mass citizenry regardless of their cultural, ethnic, and socio-economic backgrounds. However, not all these electoral democracies are liberal countries (free countries) because some have elected leaders with serious problems regarding the rule of law, corruption, and human rights. Out of the 122 electoral democracies, 89 (73%) are rated as free, liberal democracies and 33 (27%) as partly free, illiberal democracies.2 Note that liberal democracies outnumber illiberal democracies by nearly 3 to 1. Nonetheless, liberal democracies govern fewer than half (46%) the population of independent states in today’s world after more than three decades of rapid democratization.

According to the data compiled by Freedom House in 2005, 23 of 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa meet the minimum criteria of democracy and 11 of these 20 countries meet the definition of liberal democracy. Of 39 countries in East Asia and the Pacific, 7 are electoral democracies and 16 are liberal democracies. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 4 of 27 countries are electoral democracies and 13 are liberal democracies. In Western and Central Europe, 24 of 25 countries are liberal democracies; the only country rated as an electoral democracy is Turkey. In America and the Caribbean, 9 of 35 countries are electoral democracies and 24 are liberal democracies. Of 18 countries in North Africa and the Middle East, only one country—Israel—is a liberal democracy.

To characterize democratization in regional terms, Western and Central Europe ranks first with 100 percent of countries earning a rating of at least an electoral democracy, followed by America and the Caribbean (94%), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (63%), East Asia and the Pacific (59%), sub-Saharan Africa (48%), and North Africa and the Middle East (6%). In achieving liberal democracies, Western and Central Europe ranks, once again, first with 96 percent and America and the Caribbean is a distant second with 69 percent. Eastern Europe and Central Asia with 48 percent and East Asia with 41 percent rank, respectively, third and fourth, followed by sub-Saharan Africa (23%) and the Middle East and North Africa (6%).

Trends

Democracy even in its minimal, electoral form was highly unpopular among world governments when the third wave of democratization began three decades ago. A count by Freedom House (2005) revealed only 41 democracies among 150 independent states in 1974. Democracies, heavily concentrated in the regions of Western Europe and North America, accounted for 27 percent of the states. In 2004, 122 of 192 independent countries (64%) were democracies.

Notably, the percentage of democratic states more than doubled from 27 to 62 percent during the three decades of the third wave. Most advances in democratization came during the first two decades (1974-1994) when the percentage of democratic states rose sharply from 27 to
64 percent. During the last ten years, the percentage changed only slightly from 60 to 64 percent. During the same period, however, the percentage of liberal democratic states has risen modestly from 39 to 46 percent. These findings suggest that the first two decades of the third wave were, by and large, the period of electoral democratization, and the last decade was a period of advancement to liberal democratization.

A recent analysis of the Polity IV data by Marshall and Gurr (2005, 16) confirms Freedom House’s finding that democracy has expanded more in a single generation than it had since its invention in Greece more than two and a half millenniums ago (see also UNDP 2002). Unlike the data compiled by Freedom House, the Polity data deal with the extent of both democracy and autocracy in the governance of independent states. According to that analysis, a dramatic global shift from autocratic regimes to democracy began by the late 1980s and continued through the 1990s. By 1977, there were 35 democracies, 16 mixed regimes, and 89 autocracies. In early 2005, there were 88 democracies, 44 mixed regimes, and only 29 autocracies. Over the last two and a half decades, the number of democracies has more than doubled while autocracies have dwindled to one-third their number. Evidently, we live in the historically unprecedented period of global shifts toward democracy.

**Ordinary Citizens as Democratizers**

Transitions from authoritarian rule have not always brought about democracies. According to the Polity IV Data, as many as 21 countries experienced re-authorization between 1997-2003. Why have some transitions from autocratic rule reverted back to non-democracies while others remain democracies? Why have some new democracies turned into liberal democracies while others have not? Has the participation of the mass citizenry in the democratization process shaped the dynamics and trajectories of the process? Previously, answers to these questions have been hard to find because although there is a large body of the empirical literature examining the role of civil society in democratic transitions (Alagappa 2004; Fukuyama 2003; Newton 2001; Norris 2002), very little of this literature has examined the role civil society plays in advancing electoral or formal democracies into liberal democracies (Bermeo 2003; Collier 1999). A recent study by Freedom House (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005) represents the first systematic research endeavor linking the success or failure of liberal democratization to non-violent civic activism.

To determine the importance of citizens’ involvement in democratic reform, this Freedom House study analyzed the political dynamics of 67 countries that had undergone transitions from authoritarian rule over the last three decades. Specifically, it analyzed the relationships between the mode of civic involvement in democratic regime change and the post-transition state of freedom, that is, the degrees of political rights and civil liberties citizens of these transition countries were experiencing in 2005, many years after the democratic transition.

The analysis reveals that transitions from authoritarian rule do not always lead to greater freedom. Of the 67 countries categorized, 52 percent are now Free, while 34 percent are Partly Free and 14 percent are Not Free. In 91 percent of the countries that become Free, their transitions were driven by civic forces alone or in combination with power holders. The corresponding figures for the groups of Partly Free and Not Free countries are, respectively, 60 percent and 44 percent. While 64 percent of transitions driven by civic forces become Free, only 14 percent of transitions driven solely by ruling elites become Free. The incidence of becoming Free post-transition is five times higher for the former than the latter.
To examine the impact of civic activism on liberal democratization, we reanalyzed the same data compiled by the Freedom House staff. Among the 50 countries whose transitions were driven by nonviolent civic forces, 64 percent have turned into liberal democracies and 18 percent into non-democracies. Among the 14 countries where ruling elites drove the transition from authoritarian rule, only 14 percent have become liberal democracies and 50 percent have returned to non-democracies. When the transitions were driven by strong civic coalitions, not just civic coalitions, 75 percent of them became liberal democracies and only 6 percent emerged as non-democracies. When the transitions to democracy were made without the active and peaceful involvement of civic coalitions, 59 percent of them turned into non-democracies and 18 percent into liberal democracies (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1 The Distribution of Regimes by Levels of Civic Activism**

Source: Karatnycky, Adrian and Peter Ackerman (2005)

To put it differently, the likelihood that a transition from authoritarian rule would lead to liberal democracy was over four times higher for transitions supported by strong and non-violent civic coalitions than for those unsupported by any civic organizations at all. Conversely, the incidence of change to non-democracy is nearly ten times higher for the latter than the former. These findings suggest that the success or failure of liberal democratization depends largely on the role the mass citizenry plays during the transition. The more vigorous, cohesive, and peaceful
civil society is, the likelier the progress toward full democracy; the less vigorous and cohesive and more violent civil society is, the more common is the reversal to non-democratic rule.

**Cultural Democratization**

Clearly, in the current wave of global democratization, civil society does sustain change toward full democracy. Active and cohesive civil society forces do successfully transform authoritarian regimes into electoral democracies and electoral democracies into liberal democracies. Absent these forces, many democratizing countries remain mixed regimes or revert back to non-democratic rule. An important question, then, is, why do some of these countries fail to develop a civil society that advances democratization on a continuing basis? In the literature on third-wave democracies, the answer consistently lies in the country’s political culture (Bernhard 1993; Fukuyama 2001; Putnam 1993; Tarrow 1998).

**Support for Democracy**

Political culture refers to a variety of political attitudes, beliefs, and values, such as efficacy, tolerance, and trust. These attitudes, beliefs and values all affect citizen conceptions of and involvement in civic life as well as political life. Yet, one is clearly more fundamental than the rest: the attitude that democracy is more preferable than any of its alternatives (Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996; Rose et al. 1998).

There are several specific reasons why democratization can advance when ordinary citizens embrace democracy as “the only game in town.” Democracy, unlike other forms of government, is government by *demos* (the people) and thus cannot be foisted upon an unwilling people for any extended period of time. As government by the people, democracy depends principally on their support for its survival and effective performance (Mishler and Rose 1999). Only those committed to democracy as the best form of government are likely to reject anti-democratic movements to overthrow the new democratic regime, especially during a serious crisis (Dalton 2004; Inglehart 1990, 1997). Moreover, when citizens confer legitimacy on a newly installed democratic regime, it can govern make decisions and commit resources without resort to coercion. Therefore, there is a growing consensus in the literature on third-wave democracies that democratization is incomplete until an overwhelming majority of the mass citizenry offers unqualified and unconditional support for democracy (Fukuyama 1995; Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996).

**Conceptualization.** What constitutes support for democracy? In the literature on democratic political culture there is a general agreement that popular support for democracy especially in new democracies is a highly complex and dynamic phenomenon with multiple dimensions and layers (Dalton 2004; Klingemann 1999; Shin 1999). Democratic support is a multi-layered or multi-level phenomenon because citizens simultaneously comprehend democracy both an ideal political system and as a political system-in-practice. It is a multi-dimensional phenomenon because it involves the acceptance of democratic decision-making as well as the rejection of democracy’s alternatives.

To ordinary citizens who lived most of their lives under authoritarian rule, democracy at one level represents the political ideals or values to which they aspire. At another level, democracy refers to a political regime-in-practice and the actual workings of its institutions, which govern their daily lives (Dahl 1971; Mueller 1999; Rose et al. 1999). Popular support for
democracy, therefore, needs to be differentiated into two broad categories: normative and practical. The normative or idealist level is concerned with democracy-in-principle as an abstract ideal. The practical or realist level is concerned with the various aspects of democracy-in-practice, including regime structure, political institutions, and political processes.

At the first level support for democracy refers largely to a psychologically loose attachment citizens have to the positive symbols of democracy. Democratic support at the second level refers to favorable evaluations of the structure and behavior of the existing regime (Easton 1965). As empirical research has recently revealed, there is a significant gulf between these two levels of democratic support (Klingemann 1999; Mishler and Rose 2001; Norris 1999). To offer a comprehensive and balanced account of democratic support, therefore, we must consider both levels of support, normative and practical.

Moreover, democratic support especially among citizens of new democracies involves more than favorable orientations to democratic ideals and practices. Citizens with little experience and limited sophistication about democratic politics may be uncertain whether democracy or dictatorship offers satisfying solutions to the many problems facing their societies. Under such uncertainty, citizens who are democratic novices often embrace both democratic and authoritarian political propensities concurrently (Lagos 1997, 2001; Rose and Mishler 1994; Shin 1999). Consequently, the acceptance of democracy does not necessarily cause rejection of authoritarianism or vice versa.

Measurement. For two decades, many scholars and research institutes conducted public opinion surveys in democratizing countries. Gallup-International Voice of the People Project, the Pew Global Attitudes Project, UNDP program on Democracy and Citizenship, the World Values Survey, and many other national and international surveys monitored and sought to unravel the dynamics of citizen reactions to democratic change. They have compared the patterns and sources of those reactions cross-nationally, cross-regionally, and even globally (Camp 2001; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Gibson 1996; Gibson and Gouws 2005; McDonough et al. 1998; Reisinger et al. 1994).

Among the most systematic endeavors to unravel the dynamics of mass reactions to democratic change are four regional democracy barometers: the New Europe Barometer, the Latinobarometer, the Afrobarometer, and the East Asia Barometer. These barometer surveys ask a variety of structured and unstructured questions to ascertain—directly and indirectly—how the citizens of democratizing countries conceive, perceive, and evaluate democracy as a political system. We selected a subset of items from their latest surveys, described below, to compare the levels and patterns of citizen support for democracy across Africa, East Asia, Europe, and Latin America.

Normative Support: Democracy as an Ideal Political System

Numerous survey-based studies document that democracy as an ideal political system has achieved overwhelming mass approval throughout the world and become “virtually the only political model with global appeal” (Inglehart 2003, 52). In the last two waves of the World Values Surveys, for example, “a clear majority of the population in virtually every society endorses a democratic political system” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 264). Even in the Islamic Middle East, Confucian East Asia, and the former Soviet Union, large majorities are favorably oriented to democracy-in-principle (Dalton and Ong 2006; Gibson et al. 1992; Park and Shin 2005; Pew Research Center 2003; Tessler 2002). According to the 2005 Voice of the People
surveys conducted in 65 countries by Gallup-International (2005) between May and July 2005, “8 out of 10 global citizens believe that in spite of its limitations, democracy is the best form of government, almost 10 percent more than in 2004.” Undoubtedly, the ideals of democracy attract an ever-increasing number of ordinary citizens.

Yet knowing ordinary citizens view democracy-in-principle favorably does not tell us just how democratic they would like their own political system to be. To address this never previously studied question, the East Asia and New European Barometers asked respondents to express their desire on a 10-point scale for which 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. Scores of 6 and above on this scale indicate general support for democracy as a normative phenomenon, and scores of 9 and 10 indicate full support for it. On this scale, the 5 East Asian and the 13 New European countries average, respectively, 8.3 and 8.0, the scores that indicate that although the citizens generally support democracy, they do not want to live in a complete or nearly complete democracy.

For each of the East Asian and New European countries, Table 1 reports percentages expressing general and full support for democracy as an ideal political system. In all East Asian and New European countries, majorities up to 97 percent do generally support democracy as an ideal system. Full supporters, however, constitute majorities in 3 of 5 East Asian countries and 6 of 13 New European countries. Only in one country in each region—Thailand in East Asia and Hungary in Europe—did more than two-thirds of the population fully support democracy-in-principle. In most countries in both regions, large majorities have yet to become fully attached to democracy even as a normative phenomenon. As Inglehart (2003, 52) points out, many citizens seem only to give “lip service to democracy.”

**Practical Support: Democracy as a Political System-in-Practice**

To what extent do the mass publics in new democracies endorse democracy as the best form of government in their country? To date, numerous public opinion surveys have attempted to measure public support for democracy-in-practice by tapping either citizen satisfaction with the performance of the existing regime or the perceptions of its relative preferability to undemocratic alternatives. Because this satisfaction approach is based on the dubious assumption that all citizens recognize the current regime as a democracy, it does not necessarily tap support for democracy-in-practice (Mishler and Rose 2001, 306; see Cnache et al. 2001). The professed preferences for democracy over its alternatives are generally considered a more valid measure of practical democratic support. Using this to measure the legitimacy of democracy, the levels of empirical democratic support in consolidated democracies like Spain and other Western European countries varied between 70 and 92 percent in the late 1990s and the early 2000s (Diamond 2001; Torcal 2002).

To measure support for democracy-in-practice, all four regional barometers asked: “With which of the following statements do you agree most? (1) Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government. (2) Under certain situations, a dictatorship is preferable. (3) For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic government or non-democratic government.” The respondents who rate democracy as always preferable to its undemocratic alternatives are deemed to endorse its legitimacy as democracy-in-practice (Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996).
Table 1. Orientations toward Democracy and its Alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>95(31)</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>94(58)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>89(54)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>88(35)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>97(82)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mean)</td>
<td>93(52)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>83(45)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>86(40)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>93(67)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>82(44)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>87(52)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>86(56)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>79(41)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>87(56)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>73(47)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>90(63)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>86(54)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusia</td>
<td>84(42)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>56(31)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mean)</td>
<td>82(49)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>cong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>cong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Africa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>posi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>cong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mean)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>cong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>cong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>cong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>cong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>cong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>cong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mean)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>negi.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: figures in parentheses are percentages of full supporters for democracy.
Keys: Auth. Dem. Sup.; authentic democratic support
Dem. Exp.; democratic experience
cong.; congruence
negi.; negative incongruence
posi.; positive incongruence

Sources: The Afrobarometer II; the East Asia Barometer I; the Latinobarometer 2004; the New Europe Barometer VII.

Table 1 shows that majorities or near majorities of the adult population in all 16 African countries embrace democracy as always preferable to its alternatives in their country. The table also shows similar levels of democratic support in 4 of 5 East Asian countries (80%), 9 of 13 New European countries (69%), and 10 of 18 Latin American countries (56%). In terms of regional mean ratings, Africa registers the highest level of support with 63 percent. This region is followed by East Asia (59%), Latin America (53%), and New Europe (51%). In terms of how widely the extent to which citizens support democracy varies within each region, Africa and Latin America score, respectively, the lowest (32% points) and highest (43% points) degrees of variation. With the highest percentage of empirical democratic supporters and the least uneven distribution of these supporters within the region, Africa stands out from the rest of the
democratizing world. Even in Africa, however, only 6 countries reached the two-third level, which Diamond (1999, 179) characterizes as “a minimum threshold of mass support for democracy in a consolidated regime.”

**Authentic Support:** Committed Democrats

Citizens of new democracies had life experience with undemocratic rule prior to democratic regime change. Doubtless many of them remain attached to the age-old authoritarian mindset. In view of the importance of early life socialization (Mishler and Rose 2002), the professed preferences for democracy among these citizens cannot be equated with unconditional or unwavering support for it (Dalton 1994; Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992; Hahn 1991; Inglehart 1997; Mishler and Rose 2001). To measure such authentic support, we take into account both pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian orientations, as done in previous research (Bratton et al. 2005; Diamond 2001; Lagos 2001; Shin and Wells 2005).

Table 1 reports percentages of respondents who reject the various forms of authoritarian rule including military rule, strongman rule, and one-party dictatorship. Opponents of authoritarian rule constitute substantial majorities of the citizenry in Africa (63%) and New Europe (60%) and a bare majority in East Asia (52%). In Latin America, they constitute a small minority of less than one-quarter (23%). Evidently, more citizens of Africa and New Europe oppose a reversal to authoritarian rule than citizens in East Asia and Latin America.

For each region, we now compare the distribution of democratic supporters and authoritarian opponents and ascertain its particular pathway to cultural democratization among the mass citizenry. In African countries as a whole, democratic supporters and authoritarian opponents are equally numerous (63% versus 63%). In East Asia, democratic supporters outnumber authoritarian opponents by 7 percentage points (59% versus 52%). In Latin America, the former outnumber the latter by a larger margin of 30 percentage points (53% versus 23%). In New Europe, by striking contrast, the latter outnumber the former by 9 percentage points (60% versus 51%).

These contrasting patterns of attitudinal distribution suggest three distinct pathways to cultural democratization: (1) embracing democracy and rejecting authoritarian rule simultaneously; (2) embracing democracy before rejecting authoritarianism and (3) rejecting authoritarianism before embracing democracy. Apparently, Africa falls into the first pattern of simultaneous democratization, East Asia and Latin America fall into the second pattern of embracing democracy first, and New Europe fits the third pattern of first rejecting authoritarianism.

To distinguish authentic support for democracy from other types of regime support, we now consider both practical support for democracy and opposition to authoritarian rule. We consider support for democracy authentic when ordinary citizens show they view democracy as the only political game by endorsing it always and rejecting its undemocratic alternatives fully (Bratton et al. 2005, 91; Shin and Wells 2005, 99). We can differentiate this type of democratic support from non-authentic or proto-type, democratic regime support that is mixed with authoritarian orientations.

Considering all the countries in each region together reveals no region has yet reached the 50-percent level of authentic support. Yet, mean levels of authentic support vary considerably; 14 percent in Latin America, 35 percent in East Asia, 38 percent in New Europe, and 44 percent in Africa. In no country in Latin America and East Asia does half the population or more respond
as authentic democrats who are likely to support greater democracy. In Africa and New Europe, on the other hand, there are 3 countries that have already reached this level of authentic support for democracy.

While large majorities of four-fifths of East Asian and New Europeans are favorably attached to democracy as an ideal political system, small minorities of less than two-fifths are fully committed to it as a political enterprise. These findings confirm earlier research: popular support for democracy in third-wave democracies is broad in scope but shallow in depth (Bratton 2002; Gibson 1996; Shin and Wells 2005). They also accord with Inglehart’s (2003, 51) claim that “overt lip service to democracy is almost universal today.”

**Citizen Demand versus Institutional Supply**

An incomplete democracy will likely become complete only if people demand that their political leaders supply the essentials of democracy (Rose et al. 1998, 200). Accordingly, democratic progress in all four regions requires significant increases in the current levels of authentic support for democratic rule. Without increasing support or demand, these countries are likely to remain incomplete democracies (Rose and Shin 2001; see also Mattes and Bratton 2003; Rose et al. 2004).

The movement toward more or less democracy, however, does not depend on the level of democratic demand from the citizenry alone; it also depends on the relationship between citizen demand and institutional supply. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 187), “shifts toward more or less democracy follow the logic of reducing the incongruence between citizen demand and institutional supply of democracy.” The more citizen demand for democracy outstrips what institutions supply, the more likely are political systems to move toward more democracy. When citizens demand less democracy than institutions supply, political systems are likely to stagnate or move toward less democracy. When popular demand exceeds institutional supply, positive incongruence occurs for further democratic development. When the latter exceeds the former, negative incongruence occurs for democratic decay.

**Citizen Demand**

During the current wave of democratization, we found in all four regions that many citizens do not view democracy as the best political system for their country. Even among those who prefer it to its alternatives, a minority embraces democracy unconditionally, while a majority is only committed to it “superficially” or “expeditiously.” Between these two types of authentic and non-authentic supporters, we assume that it is the former who are leaders in cultural democratization. It is also reasonable to assume that leaders, not laggards, demand more democracy to complete the process of democratization. Authentic mass support for democracy takes expression as cultural or popular demand for democracy (Mattes and Bratton 2003).

**Institutional Supply**

People demand more democracy when what their institutions supply falls short of meeting their desires. It is likely that the experienced level of democracy, not the actual level of democracy, shapes popular demand for greater democracy. To measure the experience level of democracy supplied by institutions, we chose a pair of questions from regional barometers. The East Asia
and New Europe Barometers asked respondents to place their current political system on a scale for which 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. Scores of 8 and higher on this scale are considered indicative of experiencing an adequate level of democracy.

All 5 East Asian countries received ratings above the scale’s midpoint of 5.5 and are rated as democracies. In New Europe, only 6 of 13 countries are rated as democracies. In 2 of 5 East Asian countries, majorities of the citizenry rate the current level of institutional supply as adequate. On the other hand, in none of the 13 countries in New Europe does a majority judge the current system in an equally positive light. Obviously, Europeans perceive less democratic progress than East Asians do. Despite this difference, however, there is a general agreement that their political systems are far less than complete democracies.

In Africa and Latin America, citizens rated their new political systems with one of four verbal categories: (1) full democracy; (2) a democracy with minor problems; (3) a democracy with major problems; and (4) not a democracy. Responses in the first two categories indicate an adequate supply of democracy (Mattes and Bratton 2003). In as many as half the African countries, majorities rate their democracy as either a full democracy or a democracy only with minor problems. In striking contrast, the majority in no Latin American country rated its democracy as either a full democracy or a democracy with minor problems. In the eyes of citizens, more democratic advances appear to have been achieved in Africa than in Latin America.

When all the countries in each region are considered together, Africa is the only region in which a majority (52%) reports experiencing an adequate level of democracy. It is followed by East Asia (44%), Latin America (25%), and New Europe (18%). Why do Africans and East Asians rate their democracies much more positively than their peers in Latin America and New Europe? Do they do so because they are not capable enough to distinguish incomplete democratization from complete democratization? To explore these questions, Figure 2 compares across the regions the percentages reporting the experience of complete or full democracy. As expected, those who mistake the existing limited democratic rule for a full democracy and prematurely recognize the completion of democratization in their country are from three to over five times more numerous in Africa and East Asia than in Latin America and New Europe. Evidently, Africans and East Asians are far less cognitively sophisticated in knowledge about democratic politics than their peers in Latin America and New Europe.7

We next compare the levels of citizen demand and institutional supply of democracy across regions to determine whether democratic supply and demand are congruent or incongruent. To measure the extent of congruence in cultural and institutional democratization, we calculate a percentage differential index (PDI) by subtracting the percentage experiencing democracy adequately—democratic supply—from that of those who are unconditionally committed to democratic rule—democratic demand. Scores of this PDI can range from -100 to +100. Negative scores indicate the incidence of negative incongruence in which democracy is perceived as oversupplied (overdemocratization). Positive scores indicate the incidence of positive incongruence in which democracy is perceived as undersupplied (underdemocratization). Because PDI scores of plus or minus 5 points indicate little gap between supply and demand, we interpret these as evidence of congruence rather than incongruence in the levels of institutional and cultural democratization.

The last column of Table 1 shows 9 of 16 countries in Africa in negative incongruence, 4 countries in positive incongruence, and 3 countries in congruence. In East Asia, 4 of 5 countries are in negative congruence while 1 country is in positive incongruence. In Latin America, 11 of
18 countries are in negative congruence and 7 countries in congruence. In New Europe, 12 of 13 countries are in positive incongruence and only 1 country, Russia, is in negative incongruence. Negative congruence prevails in three of the four regions—Africa, East Asia, and Latin America while positive congruence prevails in only one region, post-Communist Europe.

**Figure 2 Regional Differences in Experiencing Complete or Full Democracy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: see Table 1.

According to the congruence theory of democratization, new democracies in Africa, East Asia, and Latin America confront the problem of low popular demand for democracy as their demos perceive institutions as supplying an adequate level of democracy. Countries in New Europe, on the other hand, tend to face the problem of low institutional supply as their demos perceive institutions as failing to supply an adequate level of democracy. Between these two problems of democratization, the one featuring a lack of popular demand for more democracy poses a greater obstacle to successful democratization because this problem likely will stall the process prematurely and discourage elites from supplying any more necessary reform. To prevent a premature end to democratization or escape from “a low-level equilibrium trap,” citizens of new democracies have to do more than embrace “democracy as the only game in town.” They have to be sophisticated in knowledge about the limited nature of the current democratic regime.
Summary and Conclusions

The current, third-wave of democratization began in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s. This paper has sought to provide a comprehensive and balanced account of this wave by examining perspectives from the mass citizenries about its institutional and cultural dynamics and their congruence. We found considerable global progress during the three decades expanding the family of democratic countries and broadening popular affect for the ideals of democracy. However, the new democracies have achieved relatively little progress in dissociating the mass citizenry from the age-old habits of authoritarianism. In most of these countries today, only small minorities are unconditionally committed to democratic politics. Even these committed democrats are not always cognitively capable of distinguishing limited democratic rule from complete or full democracy. As a result, many new democracies are trapped in a low-level congruence or negative incongruence between citizen demand and institutional supply of democracy.

To escape from this trap, third-wave democracies need an increasing number of authentic democrats who not only embrace democracy but also reject its alternatives. To advance toward full democracy, moreover, they need to multiply the number of authentic democrats who are cognitively sophisticated about the practices of democratic politics (Dahl 1992; Shin et al. 2005). Without substantially increasing the existing level of democratic citizenship among the mass citizenry, these nascent democracies are likely to persist as incomplete or broken-back democracies. In this regard, we should note that the embrace of democracy as “the only game in town” is a first step, not a last step, toward the democratization of mass citizenries.
Endnotes

“The author wishes to thank Michael Bratton of the Afrobarometer, Yun-han Chu of the East Asia Barometer, Marta Lagos of the Latinobarometer, and Richard Rose of the New Europe Barometer for collecting and sharing the public opinion data reported in this paper. He also wishes to thank Wonbin Cho and Neil Munro for analyzing the data, and Byong-Kuen Jhee, Ibrahim Ozdamar, Rollin Tusalem, and Jason Wells for research assistance. He gratefully acknowledges thoughtful comments and suggestions from Michael Bratton, Russell Dalton, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, and Jack Van Der Slik.

1. The existing literature is not in agreement over the inception of the third-wave democratization. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 177) and Marshall and Gurr (2005, 16), a global shift from autocratic regimes to democracy began in the late 1980s, not in the mid-1970s.

2. Freedom House annually rates every country on a 7-point scale that measures the extent to which the mass citizenry is guaranteed political rights and civil liberties. The mean score of 2.5 or lower on the 7-point scale is considered indicative of being advanced to liberal democracy.

3. These countries are: Armenia, Belarus, Dominican Republic, Fuji, Gambia, Ghana, Hati, Honduras, Lesotho, Malawi, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, and Zambia.

4. For comprehensive reviews of these surveys, see Norris (2004); Heath, Fisher, and Smith (2005).

5. Critical reviewers of the overt and other approaches to the measurement of democratic support can be found in Inglehart (2003), Mishler and Rose (2001), and Schedler and Sarsfield (2004).

6. The second round of the Afrobarometer surveys was conducted in 16 countries between May 2002 and November 2003. The first wave of the East Asia Barometer surveys was conducted in 5 countries from May 2001 through December 2002. The 2004 annual Latinobarometer surveys were conducted in 18 countries between May and June of the year. The seventh New Europe Barometer surveys were conducted in 13 countries from October 2004 to February 2005. Further information about these surveys is available from their websites: www.afrobarometer.org, www.eastasiabarometer.org, www.latinobarometro.org, and www.cspp.strath.ac.uk. It should be noted that the 15 countries in Afrobarometer Round 2 do not represent sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Nor does the 5 East Asian countries reported in this study represent East Asia as a whole.

7. The Latinobarometer asked a pair of questions about military rule and strongman rule to tap antiauthoritarianism.

8. The African and Asian country samples are not representative of their respective continents as a whole. For this reason, our cross-continental comparisons may not be highly accurate.
References


