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Critics have again and again exposed the inadequacies of the modernization model, even for an understanding of the West. It still stands, however—a deserted mansion, its paint peeling, its windows broken, its chimneys falling down, its sills rotting; a house fit only for spectral habitation but also occupied, from time to time, by squatters, transients, and fugitives.

—Christopher Lasch

The edifice Lasch describes is an intriguing one. In the 1950s and early 1960s, modernization theory dominated American scholarship on the problem of international social change. Over the next decade, however, the modernization model was largely discredited, rejected, and abandoned.

Today, when a historian stops by to survey the wreckage, questions come to mind. Why did modernization theory emerge in the United States in the years following the Second World War? How did it function in the Cold War context of the 1950s and 1960s? If the rotting “mansion” is still standing, what has enabled it to weather wholesale assault by a range of well-armed critics? Finally, and fundamentally, where might the historian turn for interpretive and methodological guidance in dealing with these complex issues?

Because the problem of modernization theory raises profound questions about the connection between ideas and their effects, between social science, culture, and institutions, it provides an excellent opportunity to explore the possibility of writing a history inspired by the work of Michel Foucault. Although his reception by historians has been “troubled and contentious,” Foucault suggests interesting means for understanding the way systems of structured knowledge
produce powerful results. Much of his work focuses on the links between the creation of knowledge and the exercise of a power that constructs, defines, and alters its objects. Foucault therefore raises issues that bear directly on the history of a social theory and its institutional practices. Through an application of some of Foucault’s key concepts, it becomes clear that they can indeed prove valuable in understanding the development and application of a specific theoretical model. At the same time, however, appropriating Foucault for a historical study also reveals a number of problems. If Foucault’s thought helps us understand why the “mansion” has endured, it gives us few clues about how to study the causes of its construction or the individuals that lived within it. For this part of the survey, the tools Foucault provides are somewhat less useful.

To be sure, the haunted house that Lasch describes was once an imposing, even majestic dwelling. Producing a massive literature stretching across the fields of economics, political science, and sociology, modernization theorists raised a structure that strongly influenced the practice of American social science. From their nation’s position of post-war affluence, thinkers like Walt W. Rostow, Karl Deutsch, Daniel Lerner, and Talcott Parsons argued that “traditional” societies became “modern” through a process of rapid economic growth integrated with sweeping social and political changes. As Rostow explained, capital formation moved a society away from a state of “pre-Newtonian science” and “fatalism” towards new, rational production functions in industry and agriculture. Often resulting from contact with the West, these changes produced growth in compound investment, stimulated the expansion of the leading sectors in a national economy, and contributed to the formation of an entrepreneurial class, developments Rostow characterized as a “takeoff” in a country’s “drive toward maturity.” In tandem with this economic shift, the physical environment came to be seen as a natural resource, birth rates declined, social status became grounded in personal achievement, and more stable, democratic political institutions fell “naturally” into place.

By the early 1960s, studies of the modernization process came to dominate scholarship on the problem of international “development.” Early analyses had focused on the problem of how the gross national product of poorer nations might be increased, but a broad range of scholars working at a range of institutions soon proposed a more ambitious undertaking. Using a set of interlocking socioeconomic and political indices, they advocated a more holistic perspective, called for a comparative evaluation of the differences between “traditional” and “modern” societies, and turned their attention to defining the requirements for movement from one condition to another. In this emerging synthesis, “modernization” involved a series of closely related changes in economic organiza-
tion, political structures, and value systems. As C. E. Black explained it, “modernization” was the “process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect unprecedented increase in man’s knowledge, permitting control over his environment.” The research problem at hand, it seemed, was nothing less than the creation of a set of universal, empirical benchmarks to categorize the overall process of global transformation.

As Lasch has illustrated, however, the stronghold of modernization theory soon became a ruin occupied by only marginal members of academic society. Less than a decade after its striking initial formulations, it came under heavy fire from scholars pointing out its fallacies. One group attacked the idea of an identifiable, sharp break between “tradition” and “modernity” by noting that older types of social organization were not always swept away by the modernization process. “New forms,” a critic argued, “may only increase the range of alternatives. Both magic and medicine can exist side by side, used alternatively by the same people.” Others challenged the idea of an integrated process of change. Case studies demonstrated that social structures often remained unaffected by changes of national government and that rather than stable democracies, increases in political participation often produced volatile situations that could lead to autocratic military regimes, oligarchies, frequent coups, ethnic conflict, and civil war. When the Vietnam War brought a renewed focus to the problem of imperialism, critics questioned the idea that movement through the “transitional stages” could be accelerated by contact with Western economic institutions and culture. Rejecting the ethnocentric assumption that those living in “traditional” societies could only imitate and not create, many argued that far from producing a beneficial “demonstration effect,” colonialism typically left a legacy of destruction and violence.

Finally, systematic challenges emerged from both the Left and the Right. Drawing on a Marxist analysis of the development process, thinkers like André Gunder Frank attacked assumptions of universal, linear progress to argue that the pasts of today’s developed countries did not resemble the “presents” of so-called undeveloped nations like those in Latin America. Distinguishing between “undeveloped” and “underdeveloped,” these dependency theorists noted that economic relations between industrial metropoles and Southern Hemisphere satellites kept the latter locked in subservience to an exploitative, capitalist global economy. From the opposite side of the spectrum, thinkers like Peter Bauer mounted a “counter-revolution” in development theory by challenging evidence of a widening per capita income gap between poor and rich nations and insisting that foreign aid hindered local entrepreneurial incentive. Bauer also argued that if former British colonies like the United States, Canada,
and New Zealand could achieve unprecedented affluence, then theories blaming “Third World” poverty on the legacy of colonialism were not only wrong, but were also rooted in irresponsibility and resentment. For conservatives, policies based on modernization only led to financial transfers and centralized planning that hindered the functioning of an efficient free market which was the real engine for development. By 1978, the cumulative damage inflicted on the theory of modernization was so great that the editors of Comparative Studies in Society and History described its weaknesses as “blindingly apparent.”

But even this prolonged onslaught did not completely sweep away the central assumptions reflected in the modernization model. The concepts of “tradition” and “modernity” still fill frameworks of historical analysis and social scientists remain preoccupied with questions of how broad, economic-based theories can be related to the transformations of social systems and political forms. Even the dependency, world systems, and free-market analyses that did the most damage to the modernization model have remained deeply concerned with the problem of “development” and the forces that seem to have historically obstructed or promoted it. Although the prolonged critical attack has damaged its exterior, the solid walls of the old mansion are still intact.

Foucault’s concept of “archaeological” inquiry provides one means of explaining the surprising durability of the modernization model in the face of a determined intellectual opposition. Where older histories of science had catalogued “the progress of discovery” and the obstacles overcome on the way to intellectual achievement, Foucault proposed to dig deeper into the past and centered his analysis at “a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse.” As he put it in The Order of Things, he intended his work “to be read as an open site,” as a study of knowledge revealing the widely shared yet unacknowledged rules that social scientists follow to “define the objects proper to their own study; to form their concepts, to build their theories.” Referring to these sets of unconscious yet essential discursive rules as the “epistemes” that make particular types of knowledge possible, Foucault went on to write a history in which separate periods are marked not by specific political or social events, but by rare and fundamental changes or “ruptures” in the means humans employ to interpret their world. Like the separate layers of artifacts uncovered through a painstaking excavation, Foucault’s “epistemes” seem to mark lengthy historical epochs in which common intellectual standards and practices become evident, but most individuals and contextual occurrences remain invisible.

Because the base of modernization theory is so firmly set in the philosophical foundations of the Enlightenment, Foucault’s “archaeological” method provides an understanding of why its central assumptions continue to endure. Ac-
cording to Foucault, the eighteenth century turned away from descriptive representation toward an increasing concern with the underlying “order of things,” resulting in a different and still continuing system of abstractions in the human sciences, a “modernity that we have not yet left behind.”

When considered in Foucault’s terms, as part of a common discursive “episteme” governed by the same set of rules, modernization appears less as a particular theory that suddenly appeared in the decades following World War II, and more as the continuation of a long-standing, unbroken discursive pattern of social analysis based on the concept of progress.

As one historian has pointed out, “modernization theorists usually denied any connections with earlier philosophies of history.” Instead, they presented their work as “modern and scientific, implicitly exemplifying the best of the modernization process.”

With Foucault as a guide, however, the strong parallels between modernization theory and some of the most famous historical models of the Enlightenment and the nineteenth century become clear. Adam Smith’s explanation in The Wealth of Nations of how it came to be that the English laborer was better off than the African king, as well as his belief that the division of labor might produce a similar advance for poorer regions and peoples, addresses the same issues treated by modernization theorists nearly two centuries later. Condorcet’s arguments in favor of Western tutelage for tribes requiring only enlightened assistance to become civilized also resonate with the hopes of twentieth-century modernizers to demonstrate “rational” values and “modern” social and political forms to populations emerging from older, superstitious and even “fatalistic” worldviews. Auguste Comte’s “historical method” of comparing sequential, developing conditions of humanity, Ferdinand Tonnies’s treatment of the transition from a “gemeinschaft” of close, communal relationships to the “gesellschaft” of atomized society, and Max Weber’s attempt to explain the rise of uniquely Western “rational conduct” in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism also reflect integrated models of social growth strikingly similar to those of the modernization cohort.

An “archaeological” study, therefore, reveals that modernization theory, its eighteenth and nineteenth-century predecessors, and even its later intellectual challengers all share a set of common assumptions about the nature of social change. Modernization theorists, along with their intellectual ancestors and later detractors, all worked within a common, unbroken discursive “episteme.” Although they arrived at different conclusions, they asked a similar set of questions about the passage from “tradition” to “modernity,” attempted to correlate theories of sweeping economic change with the transformation of social and political systems, and shared a common concern with the process of “develop-
ment.” Encouraging us to read intellectual history in this long view, Foucault helps us understand just why it is that, although its surface has taken a beating, the deeply-set foundations of the old building remain strong and secure.

The institutional approach Foucault uses in his later works also provides the historian with valuable insights by demonstrating the way a common system of knowledge functions in diverse, practical settings. In *Discipline and Punish*, for example, Foucault identifies the modern discourse of corrective reform and traces its operation from the prison through the diverse realms of criminology, psychiatry, education, and medicine.14 Running through distinct institutional sites, the social scientific language of reform was used to identify the deficiencies of individuals, categorize their failings, and authorize specific practices to discipline and correct them.

Conducting an inquiry along these lines, one finds the tenets of modernization theory embedded in practices and institutions ranging from U.S. foreign aid programs to the Peace Corps and even to the counterinsurgency efforts of the Vietnam War. Like the reformers Foucault describes, American modernizers also participated in the elaboration of a complex, “scientific” discipline which claimed to facilitate the unfolding of a progressive, “natural” process. Making use of their academic positions and government connections, American social scientists advocated policies to rectify the deficiencies they perceived and validated political strategies that produced powerful and far-ranging effects. Peace Corps “community action” programs sought to mobilize “passive” rural populations, established grassroots political organizations, and held popular village and town elections in the hope of transforming “traditional” societies and paving the way for “democratic development.” Programs like the Alliance for Progress, the Latin American aid initiative of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, brought foreign leaders and educators to the United States not only to teach them specific technical skills, but also with the expectation that they would take “modern,” rational, capitalist values home with them to replace those of their “feudal” or subsistence cultures. In the early 1960s, American counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam, based on “strategic hamlets,” were meant to do more than separate the rural farmers from the Viet Cong guerrillas. They were also intended to engineer a new, nationalistic loyalty on the part of an “apathetic” peasantry toward the South Vietnamese state. In each case, one finds the ideas of modernization and the attempt to accelerate that supposedly natural, universal process running through an institution charged with providing Western values as well as capital, correction as well as assistance.15

Although Foucault’s ideas open up these interesting avenues for research, an attempt to apply his insights also leaves some of our initial questions without
entirely satisfying answers. In particular, both Foucault’s “archaeology” and his concern with institutional practice give us little guidance in dealing with issues of cause and motivation. Even if one does acknowledge the discursive similarity found between modernization theory and its Enlightenment predecessors, how does one account for the reemergence or recycling of the modernization model in the late 1950s and early 1960s? Why did modernization theory become such a popular intellectual framework at that time? What did theorists believe they could achieve by articulating it? Why did a collection of social scientific ideas seem so appealing within specific cultural and historical conditions?

The problems of applying Foucault’s methods to these questions become especially clear when considering the reasons behind the articulation and application of particular discourses. Foucault does propose a “historical ontology of ourselves,” a project that might allow us to investigate the human sciences to ask why we are “constituted as subjects of our own knowledge.” At times, he takes very promising steps toward this goal. In his History of Sexuality, for example, Foucault describes the way in which the bourgeoisie employed the discourse of sexuality in order to affirm and defend their own values in opposition to the “dangerous” or “unhealthy” practices of the proletariat. At other points, however, Foucault’s account seems to avoid treating the reasons behind that type of discursive production and analysis. Although demonstrating the effects discourses can produce on the objects of investigation and discipline, Foucault’s approach does not delve into the motivations for applying knowledge in specific historical moments. A materialist analysis, for example, might contextualize the relevant circumstances of labor needs and class conflict within an industrial capitalist system to explain their importance in motivating the creation of a discourse on sex. Foucault touches on the problem of causality only by citing a vague, Nietzschean “will to knowledge.” Instead of identifying the interests and motivations behind the creation and application of systems of knowledge, Foucault only refers to the shadowy “spirals of power and pleasure” that, since the late eighteenth century, have come from exercising and evading “a power that questions, monitors, watches, spies, searches out.” For the historian attempting to provide what John Toews has called the “explanation of why certain meanings arise, persist, and collapse at particular times in specific socio-cultural situations,” this treatment of causality provides precious little to hold on to.

As recycling of older ideas, the foundations of modernization theory are hardly new. With modernization, however, American social scientists and political analysts articulated an intellectual framework many of them believed would help clarify and serve America’s national interests amid the challenges of the Cold War. Telling that story, moreover, demands an attention to the type of causal
As they gazed out at an increasingly postcolonial world, American social scientists took comfort in their own nation's postwar power, but remained concerned with the future of the "developing" societies of the world. Although the U.S. had emerged from World War II in a position of unprecedented geopolitical strength, the breakup of Western empires and the formation of "new states" presented a series of challenges. Over the next few decades, no less than twenty-three nations gained official independence from imperial control. As these combined with the older countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia to call for international assistance in meeting their economic and social needs, the Cold War took an important turn. Competing with the Marxist ideologies of "development" presented by the Soviet Union and later the Peoples Republic of China, the United States gave global poverty and low living standards a new level of attention. For many American social scientists, evaluating the overall process of "Third World" change and finding ways to channel it became issues of heightened strategic importance and intense scholarly inquiry. To defend against revolution and Marxist-inspired "wars of national liberation," many theorists and policymakers argued that the U.S. would have to develop and present an ideology of its own. Modernization, it seemed, might help defeat the Communist threat that Rostow himself perceived as a "disease of the transitional process."

Linking institutions and functions, attitudes and motivations, American social scientists attempted to provide a framework for stimulating the "progress" of "developing" countries by identifying a series of historical "stages" that their own society had passed through on the way to the apex of modernity. Defining the transitional path as essentially liberal, capitalist, and democratic, modernization theorists effectively legitimated their own nation's institutions and held them out as a model essential for others to emulate. As thinkers like Seymour Martin Lipset put it, new nations could learn a great deal if they sought to acquire the same "key values" of equality and achievement that "stem from our revolutionary origins." As the "first major colony successfully to revolt against colonial rule," the U.S. had also gone through the process of breaking with "the traditional sources of legitimacy" and exemplified the value of distinguishing between "the source of sovereignty and the agents of authority" through the formation of a democratic polity. The transformations were not easy ones, but, as Lipset optimistically concluded, "the entire Western world has been moving in the American direction . . . and . . . America, which was democratic and equalitarian before industrialization, has merely led the way in these patterns."

As modernization theorists put it, the world of "developing" nations could find a blueprint for genuine progress in the forms of economic and political
organization that had allowed the U.S. to succeed. Less fortunate societies might have a harder time of it, but if they put the framework for a national state in place, built infrastructure, increased agricultural productivity, established banks and investment institutions, and protected the democratic process and the functioning of the market, they too might experience the rapid “take-off” that would carry them through the historic watershed of self-sustaining economic growth. As sociologist Daniel Lerner argued in his work on the Middle East, “the model evolved in the West is an historical fact . . . the secular process of social change, which brought modernization to the Western world, has more than antiquarian relevance to today’s problems of the Middle East transition. Indeed, the lesson is that Middle Eastern modernizers will do well to study the historical sequence of Western growth.”

In addition to writing accounts that resonated with official attempts to define a liberal, capitalist path toward progress, a number of modernization theorists actively sought to place their talents at the service of the state. As Rostow later recalled, “the Korean War convinced some of us that the struggle to deter and contain the thrust for expanded communist power would be long and that new concepts would be required to underpin U.S. foreign policy in the generation ahead.” The social scientists working at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies, a research unit that received support from the Central Intelligence Agency, provide an excellent example of a group working to serve that purpose. Walt Rostow and M.I.T. colleague Max Millikan argued that through modernization the U.S. could “promote the evolution of a world in which threats to our security and, more broadly, to our way of life are less likely to arise.” Explaining that the “bulk of the world’s population has been politically inert,” the two theorists argued that the U.S. could “steer the world’s newly aroused human energies in constructive rather than destructive directions.” By providing investment capital through a long-term fund of ten to twelve billion dollars, assisting with the formation of integrated national development plans, and gearing aid to the “stage of development” of each recipient nation, they argued that the U.S. could accelerate the passage of transitional societies toward modern forms and fulfill what they defined as America’s “mission to see the principles of national independence and liberty extended on the world scene.”

Convinced that promoting modernization would help speed developing nations through the dangerous transition in which poverty and instability made them vulnerable to insurgency and Marxist ideology, several members of M.I.T.’s group also took government positions. Rostow served in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations as a White House national security advisor and as
chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council. Millikan worked as an advisor to the Agency for International Development (AID) and served on the Kennedy Administration’s task force on foreign economic policy. M.I.T. political scientist Lucian Pye worked as an advisor to AID and the State Department, and economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan served on a panel of experts reviewing Latin American development plans.27

These contextual factors are integral parts of a historical narrative that helps us understand why modernization theory emerged when it did and how it functioned. They are also difficult to explain employing only Foucault’s methods. An archaeology of the discourse of modernization may allow us to link it with its intellectual, Enlightenment predecessors, but that approach does not help us understand why many American social scientists and policymakers found an integrated model of social change so useful and important in the late 1950s and early 1960s. If modernization theory exists only as part of an unbroken, largely static epistemic block, it cannot “emerge” in the context of Cold War concerns. Foucault’s interest in institutions certainly invites a promising look at the different settings in which discourse operates. A larger sense of motivation and its context, however, is necessary if we are to appreciate the significance actors gave to the knowledge they created or the reasons they applied it as they did.

Foucault certainly raises interesting questions for the historian. His concern with the structures and rules of discourse, his analysis of the way ideas can function across different institutional settings, and his suggested study of how formal systems of knowledge allow us to define ourselves all open up broad avenues for research. Indeed, the greatest advantage that Foucault provides may be found in the way that his ideas allow us to see patterns and ask questions that we might not consider otherwise. As a source for methodological guidance, however, Foucault’s work seems less useful for historians concerned with exploring the reasons actors may have produced the type of knowledge they did. In contemplating the now largely deserted and decaying mansion, I expect that I will complement some of Foucault’s valuable insights with somewhat unFoucauldian methods. Appropriating his concerns and combining them with a causal and contextual emphasis will give me a better understanding of what lay at the building’s foundations, why its ruins still stand, and what went on within its walls. Following nearly three decades of criticism of the modernization model, my goal is largely one of reconstruction: not to make the old building fit for future habitation, but to provide an understanding of just why it was that so many once found it such an appealing place to live.

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Notes
8. See, for example, sociologist Jeffrey Alexander’s recent call for a “neo-modern” theory that will “incorporate some broad sense of the universal and shared elements of development into a critical, undogmatic and reflective theory of social change” in “Modern, Anti, Post and Neo: How Social Theories Have Tried to Understand the ‘New Our Time,’” *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 23 (1994): 167.

10. Ibid., xxiv.


12. Speaking at a Georgetown University conference on Middle Eastern studies, Rostow himself urged that Smith’s work be “read afresh” and described The Wealth of Nations as “a relevant handbook for a developing nation.” Department of State Bulletin 48 (1963): 827.


18. Ibid., 45.


20. Within five years of the war’s conclusion, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel had all gained independence. Following the Geneva Accords of 1954, Cambodia, Laos, and a divided Vietnam came into legal existence. Within a few more years, Malaya, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt also gained official freedom from imperial control and Ghana, Togoland, the Cameroons, and Guinea soon followed.

21. See, for example, the argument Rostow made as Chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council. Rostow, View From the Seventh Floor (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 85.


27. For a collaborative work by these individuals and their colleagues, see Max F. Millikan and Donald L.M. Blackmer, eds., *The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Foreign Policy*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1961).